Russian Governance in the Twenty-First Century: Geo-Strategy, Geopolitics and New Governance (Cass Contemporary Security Studies Series)

This is an excellent book…. It is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand how Moscow sees its interests as w...

Author: Irina Isakova

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This is an excellent book…. It is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand how Moscow sees its interests as well as how it goes about achieving them. Mark N.Katz, George Mason University, USA A brilliant discussion of the domestic and foreign sources of Russia’s return to the world as a major partner of the Western world in coping with the post-September 11 security environment. Must reading for anyone who seeks to understand how and why President Putin and his government act the way they do both at home and abroad. Paul A.Goble (US), EuroCollege of the University of Tartu, Estonia

RUSSIAN GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY This book analyses the cardinal changes that have recently occurred in the Russian state, its principles of governance and its foreign-policy orientation. It reviews the recent changes in Russian approaches to geo-strategy and the geopolitical development patterns that influenced the transformation of Russian military strategic thinking and foreign policy in the beginning of the twenty-first century. It draws attention to defence and security policies prior to and after 11 September 2001 and the evolution of civil-military relations in Russia. The book demonstrates how the scale of political, social-economic, territorial-administrative and military reforms clearly transformed the country in a systemic manner, which is unequalled since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result the book helps us to understand the roots and reasons for Russia’s decision to increase its engagement with the West after 11 September 2001, as well as the pitfalls of such ‘geostrategic shifts’, the success of which should not be taken for granted. Dr Irina Isakova (PhD, ISKRAN, Russian Academy of Sciences) is an0 Associate Fellow at RUSI and Specialist Adviser on Russia and the FSU to the House of Commons Defence Committee. Previously she was Research Fellow at King’s College London; Research Associate at the IISS, London; Head of Section at the Institute of the USA and Canada Studies, Moscow, and served as a foreign policy expert at the Foreign Affairs Committee, RF Federation Council. She was a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institute (Washington, DC).

CASS CONTEMPORARY SECURITY STUDIES SERIES MILITARY STABILITY IN EUROPE The CFE treaty Jane M.O.Sharp MACMILLAN, KHRUSHCHEV AND THE BERLIN CRISIS, 1958–1960 Kathleen Newman US NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY 1989–97 Tess Oxenstierna NATO’S SECRET ARMY Operation Gladio and terrorism in Western Europe Daniel Ganser THE US, NATO AND MILITARY BURDEN-SHARING Stephen Cimbala and Peter Forster RUSSIAN GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Geo-strategy, geopolitics and governance Irina Isakova

RUSSIAN GOVERNANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Geo-strategy, geopolitics and governance

Irina Isakova

FRANK CASS LONDON • NEW YORK

First published 2005 by Frank Cass, an imprint of Taylor & Francis 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Frank Cass 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2005 Irina Isakova All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Isakova, Irina Viktorovna. Russian Governance in the twenty-first century: Geo-strategy, geopolitics and governance Irina Isakova.—1st ed. p. cm. Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada. Includes bibliographical references. 1. Geopolitics. 2. Geopolitics—Russia (Federation) 3. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations. 4. Russia (Federation)— Politics and government—1991– I. Title: Russian Governance in the 21stcentury. II. Title. JC319.I8 2005 327.47–dc22 ISBN 0-203-49925-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-60825-9 (OEB Format) ISBN 0-714-65529-5 (Print Edition)

To my parents, with love and gratitude for their support and tremendous encouragement

CONTENTS

Glossary

x

Introduction

1

PART I Geopolitics, geo-strategy and foreign policy 1 Geo-strategy and Russia’s vision of the new world order

10

2 Practical politics and international relations

23

3 Strategic partnerships in brief

69

4 Testing geopolitical convictions

95

PART II Domestic reforms 5 The strategy of reforms

114

6 The litmus test: civil-military relations

159

7 Military reform and Russia’s future defence

195

PART III Present and future integration channels 8 New security systems and Russia’s long-term engagement strategy

233

Conclusion: net results—systemic changes

256

Appendix Notes Bibliography Index

261 264 302 304

GLOSSARY ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CBMs confidence building measures C&C command and control CFE conventional forces in Europe CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CJTF combined joint task forces CNADs Conference of National Armaments Directors EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development FAPSI Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information FBTS Federal Border Troop Service FD federal district FIS Foreign Intelligence Service FSB Federal Security Service FSU former Soviet Union Goscomstat State Committee on Statistics Gosplan State Planning Committee IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IPE international political economy krai province MD military district MES Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence MIC military industrial complex MJTF multinational joint task force MoD Ministry of Defence MoI Ministry of the Interior MOTF multinational operational task force NIS new independent states NPA NATO Parliamentary Assembly NSP Nuclear Safety Programme oblast region okrug district OSC Operational-Strategic Command OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe OTCS Collective Security Treaty Organisation OTF operational task forces

PE presidential envoy PM prime minister PSI Proliferation Security Initiative RF Russian Federation

Introduction

1

INTRODUCTION Why should anybody read about Russia now? After years of being treated as a ‘chronically ill’ society, Russia, suddenly for many, has been once again transformed into a major partner of the developed world in dealing with new security challenges. At the break of the twenty-first century Russia became a vital member of the international community in addressing threats of global terrorism as well as in proving itself to be an important and secure source of energy and other natural resources for the world markets. Once again, though with certain caution, the country was treated as a land of golden opportunities for international business. This transformation was especially striking since only several years prior to that the country was labelled as marginal in international affairs, despite more than a decade of fascination with Russia’s revolutionary transformation during perestroika years and the first Yeltsin presidency.1 The economic crisis of 1998 produced massive scepticism about Russian economic reforms. Developments in relations between the federal centre and regions did not inspire much optimism either and stimulated numerous speculations about options and probabilities of the disintegration of Russia under pressure from regional separatist movements and the economic interests of oligarchs. In the late 1990s assessments of Russia’s future were exceptionally dim. Some Western scholars suggested that Russia ‘would be considered as a “pariah state” if it had not been for its nuclear weapons’.2 Its identity created certain discomfort in dealings with the state on the international arena. For instance, one could read that ‘Russia is neither European nor Asian, but Eurasian, a world geographically, historically and culturally separate’.3 In 2000 and 2001, however, the changes of the governing elite in Russia and the terrorist attack of 11 September in the US once again put that country firmly in the middle of everything that was happening in the world. At the same time, the events of 9/11 and the global anti-terrorist campaign that followed revived interest in enhancing regional studies that became essential for effective and successful counter-terrorist operations. In 2002 Audrey Kurth Cronin recognised this trend and wrote in respect to the US security concerns that to succeed over time in this campaign, the United States must institute a revolution in diplomatic affairs, including increased foreign assistance to politically volatile areas like Central Asia, better long-term co-ordination of intelligence with allies, more co-operation in international criminal law enforcement, better public diplomacy, improved language capabilities, better education in regional studies and active long-term coalition-building.4 Current security and the political situation emphasised the importance of effective preventive diplomacy and sustainable long-term partnerships, which could be achieved

Russian governance in the twenty-first century

2

with growing universal understanding of regional context. This approach is certainly applicable to Russia, as its Eurasian identity—especially its geographical position, philosophical roots, cultural diversity and diplomatic history—became more than just useful, but rather strategically and operationally essential for its allies in the global war against international terrorism. Europe’s interest in Russia was also confirmed during this period, although it had a different dimension than that of America. As it was wisely noted by two distinguished American and Russian political scientists, European concern over Russia’s fate was based largely on ‘geo-strategic pragmatism, since they [Russia and Europe] share the continent. In blunt terms, Russia is an inescapable presence on Europe’s security horizon. Of particular concern are the new security threats’,5 that are understood in a wider context. Russia’s increasingly active eastern policy added interest to the country in Asia as well. Both above-mentioned factors—Russia’s ‘sudden’ revival as an important political and economic player and the 9/11 aftermath considerations—stimulated my desire to explore and reveal the undercurrents of Russia’s developments. In other words, the events in the international arena and the results of the first term of Putin’s presidency provided an opportunity to assess the results of the transformation of Russian society. As so many times in history, once again it became essential to show where Russia was coming from and where it was going. Points of concern Among many questions of concern about Russia two issues proved to be of most importance for the West. They are the need to confirm the irreversibility of Russian reforms and Russia’s decision on participation in the anti-terrorist coalition as a longterm strategy. After all, Russia’s co-operation with the West after 9/11 was not unanimously supported inside the country. The controversial reality was recognised by Russian scholar Nadia Alexandrova Arbatova who revealed the difficulties of acceptance by the Russian public and political elite of ‘the emerging model of selective cooperation’.6 Deputy Head of the State Duma III Defence Committee Alexei Arbatov voiced a note of caution, pointing out that President Putin has probably gone as far as he can in co-operating with the West, and much further than could be expected, judging by his previous middleof-the-road policies based on bureaucratic consensus. The majority of Russian public opinion, parliament, mass media and military bureaucracy does not support his line on the anti-terrorist campaign, although there is little opposition to Putin—due to the general curtailment of any political opposition to the president after the most recent presidential election in mid-2000.7 In contrast to some Russian experts, who expressed doubts about the importance and long-term feasibility of the Russian-US-Western co-operation in the global anti-terrorist campaign, Strobe Talbott demonstrated strong belief that major shifts in geopolitical assessments had occurred in Russia since 9/11. In his book The Russian Hand,8 presented as a diary of the 1990s and covering the period of the Clinton Administration and

Introduction

3

primarily Yeltsin’s presidency, Strobe Talbott, as a prominent American specialist on Russian affairs and practitioner, touches the essential issues that are determining the core of the Russian-US-Western rapprochement after 9/11: Whatever Americans had to fear from bin Laden’s version of jihad, it wasn’t the breakup of their country. Russians, by contrast, knew that if bin Laden had his way, the entire North Caucasus-Chechnya and surrounding republics along with other Islamic areas in the near abroad, would be part of a new caliphate. That was the geopolitical essence of September 11 for many Russians.9 Policies: inside and outside In Russia’s case it becomes vital to understand the essence of the reforms, to spot the main trends that define functional specifics of Russian society, especially having in mind a growing demand in adapting Russian society to the requirements of globalisation and economic world governance.10 This book is about both Russia’s foreign policy and domestic reforms. The importance of the interaction of domestic factors and international politics is a well-recognised factor. In recent years several publications were setting a conceptual framework in this field.11 The book Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (1996) is one of them. It produced an example of a synthesised approach to the analysis of both domestic conditions, internal factors in Russian foreign policy, foreign policy thinking and making, public politics and accountability for the decisions in the international arena and the role of the military in foreign policy.12 A group of prominent British experts on Russia demonstrated the interactions of influence of a variety of factors on foreign policy, such as assumptions and decision-making, the role of public perceptions and the use of external environment on the trends in domestic developments. No less important was an institutional analysis of the decision-making. The above-mentioned work sets a pattern in analysis that the author of this book intends to follow. Revealing the traditions and cultural heritage could also be considered essential for understanding the long-term trends and goals in Russia’s foreign policy.13 This book attempts to demonstrate the principles, methods and procedures in contemporary Russia’s governance. In other words, this analysis looks at the internal factors that explain the mechanics of the decision-making process and maps the intentions that allow an understanding of the present and future patterns of Russia’s development. It is a state-centric realistic multidimensional analysis of the major trends in the country’s development. Mapping the context The first part of this book, ‘Geopolitics, Geo-strategy and Foreign Policy’, is dedicated to Russia’s foreign policy. The first chapters of the book intentionally concentrate on assessments of the basic visionary approaches that shaped the country’s foreign policy.


4

Though some of the initial pages cover history and the evolution of philosophical concepts well known to the readers, such as Eurasianism and Westernism, the presence of this information in the manuscript was considered essential. The reason for this was a necessity into establishing a proper link between traditional and new interpretation of the main geopolitical concepts that became popular and, once again, decisively important in formulating the present geostrategic tasks for Russia. This retrospective analysis was used in order to give a clearer explanation of the current practical foreign and defence policy choices, the emerging ‘strategic partnerships’ and evolving attitudes towards international institutions. This approach was considered most appropriate for putting the reasoning within historical, philosophical and practical geo-strategic contexts. Several chapters are devoted to analysis of practical policy issues that could be considered vital and central in Russia’s foreign policy. Those issues are the following: relations with main security institutions and selected countries, regional policies in Europe and the Asian Pacific, and Russia’s vision of its role in the global anti-terrorist campaign and the forms of its participation in it. For instance, the impact of global terrorism influenced official Moscow in its new approach to the NATO enlargement. President Putin announced that ‘if NATO takes a different shade and is becoming a political organisation…we would reconsider our position with regard to such expansion, if we are to feel involved in such process’.14 This statement led some scholars to an assumption of Russia’s re-emerging interest in processing its own application for the membership in the organisation.15 However, it was not the case. First of all, this proposal was put forward initially by prominent Russian political scientist Andrei Kortunov and Michael Bezrukov in the early 1990s. Second, the emphasis of this proposal was not on the membership as such, but on the necessity of fundamental institutional transformation for NATO as part of the adjustment processes to the post-Cold War order. As a result of this proposal any suggestions of the engagement in the decision-making process were not seen as an erosion of unity of the Alliance or its principles. Understanding the roots of the position also clarifies the Russian statements and decisions that followed. The assessments of the EU-Russia relations vary dramatically from the assumption that the aggravation of tensions in NATO-Russia relations could automatically become ‘the single most likely cause of a wholesale deterioration of Russian-European relations’16 to the belief that increasing disagreements between NATO-Russia and among the NATO member states on ESDP could provide conditions for the establishment of actual security ties within the EU-Russia framework.17 For instance, Anatol Lieven predicted: If there is ever a really serious split between the United States and the majority of the Europeans—for example, over a war with Iraq—then Russia will inevitably side with the EU, and not with the United States. In this event, a Russian-EU security partnership, excluding the United States, might begin to develop. However, it would take a really colossal upset in US-European relations to happen.18 The reasons why both statements could be considered equally correct as well as misleading are addressed in the sections dedicated to the EU-Russian and NATO-Russian

Introduction

5

relations (pp. 55–76 and 28–55, respectively). The dynamic of Russia’s foreign policy could not be understood in full without at least brief coverage of the country’s politics within the institutional networks (international, subregional and regional). As identified by Mark Webber, specialist on Russia from Birmingham University, the multilateral institutions provided ‘both an anchor and a compass for Russia in Europe’.19 However, similar assessments could be made concerning Russia’s use and participation in other institutional networks outside Europe. Though the results of the exhaustive research project on sub-regional cooperation of the East-West Institute, New York, critically assessed the effectiveness of the sub-regional alliances, institutions and groupings,20 it is still essential to look once again at the Russian arguments and views on these developments. By doing so we are helping ourselves to understand the limits and potential of Russia’s interests in institutional participation, the importance of selective strategic partnerships and bilateral relations and the overlapping significance of some security and economic arrangements in the areas considered vital for Russia’s national interests. In recent years it has become common to assess the external and domestic policies through the priority of foreign policy relations, thus justifying any internal reforms through the necessity of continuing a steady course in the international arena. According to one such assessment President Putin has made it clear that he will ‘adopt a “liberal” foreign policy that realigns Russia with the West to promote Russia’s long-term strategic interests. In order to buttress this transformation in foreign affairs Putin will continue to promote a more authoritarian domestic policy’.21 Some scholars stress the inconsistencies in the policy approaches chosen by the Russian government. For instance, one of the scholars pointed out that Vladimir Putin has not created solid political foundation for his foreign policy course. Moreover, he has launched most of the [present] trends himself, having emerged with strategy guided by three incompatible goals: a ‘strong state’ based on ‘controlled democracy’; liberal economic reform and good relations with the US. The restoration of ‘vertical power’ (the Soviet like federal control by means of controlled democracy, political squeeze on any opposition) for the sake of economic reforms is not viable strategy in Russia.22 Bobo Lo, a political commentator and Russian specialist, former Australian diplomat who served for many years in Moscow, pointed out that ‘the genesis of Putin’s foreign policy lies in the duality of his inheritance,23 and that ‘the nexus between economic capability and strategic ends has influenced Putin’s thinking since even before his accession’.24 In this book, analysis of Putin’s Russia is presented together with historic data that identify the roots, trends and innovations in foreign and domestic policies. It became natural to compare the approaches and solu-tions proposed by the present presidential administration and government to the ones that had been on the agenda during Yeltsin’s presidency and in the previous Soviet times. In the last ten years many fascinating historical books and memoirs have been published that look at the perestroika years and beyond in order to assess the transformations of the Soviet and Russian societies.


6

Stephen White suggested that contemporary Russia seemed ‘more likely to emphasise the Soviet and pre-Revolutionary tradition of executive authority than the western tradition of limited and accountable government based on the consent of the mass electorate’.25 On the other hand, Graeme Herd, a specialist on regional and security politics in Russia, analysing the state of governance in Russia during ‘the Soviet-era unitary state and the anarchy of decentralisation that characterised the Yeltsin years’, drew a very important conclusion. He pointed out that the real strength of Putin’s Russia was in ‘his synthesis of the approaches, political culture and apparatus of the two preceding political systems’.26 A list of policy goal priorities, declared by the Russian government throughout 2000 and 2003, did not come as a surprise to most ‘Russian’ specialists. Two of the most distinguished and engaged commentators on Russian politics, Michael McFaul27 and Richard Sakwa,28 were pointing out a step-by-step construction of the so-called ‘managed democracy’ during the years of perestroika and revolutionary transformation under President Yeltsin. This tendency, in their view, was only reinforced after 2000. Both scholars provided a highly sophisticated, balanced and informative analysis of the emerging Russian vision of democracy and the institutional system, leaving the issues of the nature of democracy beyond the analysis. In the present work, however, it is essential to show how the country has been transformed, or is being transformed, in terms of its ability to be governed. One has to keep in mind that the multinational and diversified society experienced almost two dozen years of constant changes and revolutionary and evolutionary adjustments. For this specific purpose the assessments of political and administrative reforms are seen as absolutely vital in understanding what exactly Russia can deliver (in terms of both domestic reforms and foreign policy initiatives) and how it could be delivered. As a result, the second part of the book, ‘Domestic Reforms’ is dedicated to the analysis of structural elements of the state’s governance: political, administrative and military-security reforms. The historical and cultural characteristics of societies in transition, comparative analysis of the centre-regional relations29 and the evolution of the federation-confederation politics in the multinational states were especially important for this research.30 However, the most effective methodological tool in dealing with the research was the IPE approach. The security issues (‘soft’ and ‘hard’) are presented in parallel with the establishment of new territorial divisions in Russia. In this respect it is important to define the meaning of security and the vital link with regionalism. In terms of the relationship between security issues and subregionalism, it is striking that security itself is no longer defined simply in terms of military threats from neighbouring states. At least one key feature of the new subregionalism appears to be the attempt to come to terms with a whole new range of transnational concerns, such as transnational organised crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and the ever-increasing flows of illegal migration. Each of these represents a new kind of challenge to the authority of state governments and to stability in the territories over which they rule.31 An analysis of this security dimension is especially important for readers interested in statehood theories, investment policies and international relations. Looking at the newly established macro-regions (federal districts) as an extension of potential implementation of the analytical concepts of ‘regional security complexes’ and ‘regional orders’, it is encouraging to view new Russian developments as a part of the international security

Introduction

7

system.32 Though the concepts outlined are traditionally used in defining the subregional co-operation of independent states facing similar types of security threats and pushed to a certain level of co-operation. Expanding the use of this terminology to the Russian regions, parts and subjects of the sovereign state has some relative logic. On the one hand, it allows us to view the creation of a security system within the ‘macro-regions’ as a part of the larger geographical, geopolitical and economic context. On the other hand, it gives an opportunity to assess the potential security arrangements—not only as an integral part of Russia’s defence and security system but also as an active sub-system of global security arrangements. Part II, then, addresses the issues of the management of contemporary Russia. The testing of the established norms of any democratic society, as well as the efficiency of governance, can be seen in the analysis of contemporary interpretations of civil-military relations and implementations of the procedures and norms allowing civil control over the military and security services. The first two parts of the book look at the history of reforms and the current state of Russia’s foreign and domestic policies, describe the results of the reforms and explain the contemporary decisions. The third part, ‘Present and Future Integration Channels’, addresses the issues related to Russia’s future. Chapter 8 covers Russia’s vision of future economic and security arrangements, which will define Russia’s role in the international arena and provide conditions for the completion of the domestic internal reforms. The concluding sections of Chapter 8 provide a step-by-step analysis of the building blocks in the future international architecture. I hope readers will find this book interesting and useful.

Part I GEOPOLITICS, GEOSTRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

1 GEO-STRATEGY AND RUSSIA’S VISION OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER What is ‘new’ in geopolitics and why? A Russian geopolitical school of thought has emerged much later than similar theories in the West. However, the first recorded geopolitical statements can be traced back to 1510. It was the time when, according to church manuscripts, Filofei, a monk from the SpasoElizarova monastery in Pskov, formulated the concept: ‘Moscow is the third Rome’. This phrase turned to be the fundamental principle of Russian geopolitics. Since then missionary and global vision became recognisable features of Russian geopolitics.1 The geopolitical positioning of any state has been defined by Russian scholars not as some once permanently given state of historic development but as a process where the factors of geography (place) and timing matter in changing that environment and reality of geopolitics.2 In order to understand the specifics of the geopolitical position of any country, however, one has to follow the historic patterns of development of that country. Russia’s geopolitical position has not been given to it on a silver platter; Russia had to fight for it. Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, during the time of the formation of Russia as a state, it spent 160 years fighting the external threat. From the Kulikov battle until the end of the First World War Russia was at war for almost 334 years.3 During this period Russia’s territory was increased by 400 times. Russian scholars proclaimed Ivan the Terrible as the first practitioner of geopolitics. During his reign the key geopolitical priorities for Russia were formulated. First, the importance of accession of the neighbouring unstable (in geopolitical terms) areas of the former enemies (like Kazan, Astrakhan or Siberia) was stressed. Second, it was recognised that access to the oceans was vital for the state’s development. These assumptions led to the Livonian wars for the Baltic Sea and increasing activity of the country in the northern part of the White Sea. Both priorities were named as strategic goals of the nation. The most interesting combination appeared in the support of the synergy between the Russian Orthodoxy and autocracy in the framework of the people’s monarchy. Russian geopolitics as an area of study went through two main phases in its development. The first phase dates back to the end of the nineteenth century. The second is connected with the developments in the last century. The most prominent intellectuals of that time, like S.Soloviev, B. Kluchevskiy, A.P.Shapov, B.N.Checherin and I.L.Solonevich, contributed to the development of these theories. Russian geopolitics was not just about the state and its external environment and missions, it also touched upon the issues of what was the most appropriate type of government for the country and relationships between the authority and the people: those who govern and those who were

Geo-strategy and Russia's vision of the new world order

11

governed. The founding fathers of Russian geopolitics pointed out that there were certain characteristics in Russia’s geography and life styles, such as large vast national territory, under-populated areas, non-diversification of labour activities and permanent threat of invasion, that determined the existence and preservation of powerful central authorities. Analysing the climate and its influence on the labour patterns, and indirectly on the national character of the local population, S.Soloviev pointed to a link between natural life-climate changes and the types of activity and forms of social organisation that the local population was choosing. In his writings he gave an explanation as to why central Russia’s territories, and Moscow in particular, were to become the natural centre for the state’s unification. According to Soloviev, severe climate hardened national character and tested determination to succeed. These conditions predetermined certain types of socialpolitical organisation which developed with strong authoritative tendencies. I.L.Solonevich focused his attention on the comparative analysis of geography, climate and levels of individual freedoms in Russia and in the USA, writing: The American liberties, as well as American wealth are determined by American geography. Our freedom and our wealth are determined by Russian geography. Thus, we’ll never have the same freedoms as the British and Americans have, because their security is guaranteed by the seas and oceans, but ours could only be guaranteed by military conscription.4 Further development of geopolitics as a theory and policy occurred within the Eurasian school of thought. In the twentieth century, popular philologist and historian Count N.S.Trubetskoy (1890–1938), professor of geography and geo-politician P.N.Savitskyi (1895–1968) and historian G.V.Vernadskiy (1877–1973) were among many prominent representatives of this philosophical school. N.S.Trubetskoy explained the net meaning of the concept: National base of the state, that was previously called the Russian Empire and presently is named the Soviet Union, could only be a composition of all nationalities, multinational identities with special brand of nationalism. We call these peoples the Eurasians, its territory is named Eurasia, its nationalism is called Eurasian.5 P.N.Savitskyi believed that Russia was a separate civilisation, where the geopolitical and social-cultural ‘mainland’ represented its basic features. He argued that Russia had more potential to be called the mainland than China due to its geopolitical position, where Western Europe was only the western ‘border’ of Eurasia and Russia was located in the middle of this new continent. Savitskyi believed that Eurasia had not only a synergy overlap with different civilisations, as the Western European and Asian, but was also considered to be a core of the Old World. It had its own specific characteristics, civilisation patterns, morale, assessment logic and cultural background. He strongly believed that Russia was an essential link between continental states and regions such as Europe, Asia, Iran, Iraq, Indo-China, China and Japan. In his view, without it the Continent would lose its sense of identity, and linkages, connections and states would find themselves fragmented. Thus, according to Savitskyi, the natural and cultural-


12

geographic characteristics create two main principles of the Russian statehood. They were, in his view, the imperial character of foreign policy and the sense of great power (velikoderzhavnost) statehood. Historically the formation of the Russian territory was done by accession of the neighbouring states and the geopolitically unstable areas. Instead of waging permanent wars with the neighbouring countries over the territories, Russia was incorporating the contested regions into the Russian Empire. Russian geopolitics was an ideology rather than a mechanism of policy implementation.6 Russian geopolitics was always part of the conservative political trend and mentality. One of the distinctive examples of this conservative geopolitical behaviour was the Russian policy in Europe that preserved the status quo of the regime after the establishing of the Sacred Union in 1815. Russia took over a mission to suppress any democratic regimes in Europe, turning herself into a police force to that effect. The policy of Nicholas I was a sort of culmination of this policy, when the Russian army was sent to suppress the Hungarian revolt against the Habsburgs and in support of the dynasty. Though Pan-Slavic ideas also carried geopolitical orientations they were not always conservative. For instance, the famous poet F.Tutchev urged the Russian tsar to use the revolutionary situation in Europe and the dissatisfaction of the European nations with the Austrian Empire in order to reintegrate all Slavic territories under the Russian rule. Instead, Nicholas I chose to support the Habsburgs. However, Pan-Slavic ideas were based on geo-strategic theories put forward by N.Danilevskiy who was lobbying for the establishing of the All-Slavic federation, with its capital in Constantinople. This federation was to unite the following Slavic lands: two Orthodox states (the Russian Empire and the kingdom of Bulgaria), one Slavic-Catholic state (the Czecho-MoravoSlovak kingdom), the Yugoslav state of the Serbian-Croatian-Slavic kingdom (with a population of both Orthodox and Catholic faiths); the Orthodox, but not Slavic, kingdom of Romania, the Hellenic kingdom, as well as the Hungarian kingdom. This concept proposed by Danilevskiyi synchronised the PanSlavic ideas and orthodox unanimity. It fully incorporated Russia’s geopolitical intentions in the south-western and western directions. As a matter of fact it was so in tune with Russia’s geopolitical self-projection that it was finally realised in the political-military and economic alliances after the Second World War in the Council of Economic Assistance (1949) and the Warsaw Pact Treaty (1955). Thus, the second phase of the development of this political thought in Russia can be dated back to the beginning of the twentieth century. In Russian terminology it received the name of ‘socialist continentalism’.7 Though denying any geopolitical connotation, this theory was strictly speaking purely anti-transatlantic, based on the assumption of the need to oppose the leading nations of the transatlantic community. The idea initially was to establish socialism in one country and then, with expanding influence, to other regions to create a vast socialist community. This system was functioning within the territorial limits of the Heartland theory. In the 1980s, for the first time in the history of Russia, the transatlantic vision prevailed and dominated in the political thinking as well as in the theoretical justifications of the policy decisions. As a result of the decisions taken during this period the state found itself in a vulnerable geo-strategic position. It was pushed further inside the continent, losing access to the open seas, accepting buffer zones between Western Europe and Russia that


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were made of the states which intended to distance themselves from Russia. Current debates on geopolitics as the result of the above dilemma are concentrated around three trends: transatlantic, isolation from the Western civilised world and choosing the Eastern diversity and appeal; or the balanced pragmatic approach to the Western and Eastern neighbours with sustainable Russian cultural exclusiveness. In comparison with the Western traditions Russia’s geopolitical culture was always advertising a polycentric world order. Eurasia has never been portrayed as a static heartland, as in the works of Mackinder. Eurasia was always seen as one among many centres of power such as Europe, China or India. Multipolar diversity became the main methodological principle of Russia’s geopolitical theory and practice. For this purpose it is important to describe the main geopolitical trends that are currently popular. The following concept signifies a transition to a new qualitative level. On the basis of the ethno-genesis theory, L.N. Gumilev managed to combine the features of development of natural and political systems. He proved that passive stimuli (micromutation that pro-duces passive signs in the populace and brings to life new ethnic systems in the regions affected by it) determined the rhythms of Eurasia and its internal structure. Eurasia is not some mythical centre dominating in the world, as Mackinder believed, but one of the centres—as are Europe, China and India. Polycentrism is the most important common methodological principle of ‘Eurasianess’ in contrast to many European concepts. Another promising Russian geopolitical concept is the theory of ‘Great Limitrof’ by S.Khatuntsev and V.Tzimbursky. On the basis of the six main types of civilisation of S.Huntington, which determine the present geopolitical picture of the world, the authors introduce a thesis about a great number of inter-civilised zones where numerous conflicts are of a pseudo-civilised, not civilised, nature. In these zones there are some states which do not belong completely to any civilisation. They constitute the area of ‘Great Living Limit’. It covers Eastern Europe, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The authors maintain that ‘Great Limitrof’ is a phenomenon exclusively of the new times and is a remaining vestige of ancient Eurasia which clearly outlined the contour of Russia. In contrast to the ‘Eurasians’, S.Khatuntsev and V.Tzimbursky affirm that Russia is the destroyer of Eurasia, and ‘Great Limitrof’ is all that is left from it. A conclusion is made from this premise that as far as the limitrof states are concerned Russia should conduct a policy based on the ‘pragmatism of gains’ and not on the ‘internationalism of unselfishness’. That is why the authors state that ‘Great Limitrof’ is in the sphere of Russia’s vital interests—of geopolitical interest rather than an internal political one. Reflecting on the peculiarities of Russia’s destiny they come to a conclusion that its civilisation is not numerous, though having vast territories. That is why in order to survive it removed the question of preserving its own niche by sublimating it in expansion on ‘Great Limitrof’. It subdued great masses of people, and by interfering in the life of other civilisations, especially those of the Euro-Atlantic, it finally turned into the second world power. When national interests are discussed, the discussion in fact is about national state interests. As a rule they are divided into permanent, fundamental, and transient, intermediate interests.


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The first mentioned is concerned above all with the defence of the territory, population and state institutions from external danger. H.Morgenthau, a classic of American tradition, included the following as paramount in the structure of the term ‘national power’: geographic situation, natural resources, military potential, number of people, national character, morale of the people and efficiency of diplomacy. In the 1990s attention to the problem of the national interest of Russia considerably increased. The national interest includes a system of relations, which combine the necessities of functioning and developing a nation-people as a single body. Its basis is composed of the needs of a society necessary for its developing and functioning, defence of people against threats from other states, and natural-climatic factors, as well as the preservation of social peace and order inside the country. Basic national interests include the questions of territorial integrity and cultural identity, security of a nation-people, as well as control of, and the possibility of using, important natural resources. The most important systemic factor of national interest is the preservation of culture and system of education, science and their bearers, as well as the territory where they live. The natural borders of national interest are represented by the scantiness of the resources base and the national interests of other countries. The international law and international organisations are the major consequence of the mutual limitation. The geo-strategic situation of a state is usually characterised by the following parameters: • location in the world (geographic co-ordinates) and ties to the theatres of military operations; • distance from important regions and international communications (nets of trade and economic ties, industrial regions, transportation lines, energy and raw material resources, etc.); • its own territorial size, keeping in mind the needs of organising defence and conducting military operations; • combination of natural and artificial means of using the geopolitical space for the needs of military construction and conducting a war; • closeness to potential and real hotbeds of war and military conflicts.8

Russian foreign policy theories: in search of ‘adequate geo-strategy’ Contemporary Russian geo-strategy differs from that of the Western, as pointed out in the Introduction where the definitions of Russia’s vision of the concept were discussed. Although contemporary, Russian geo-strategy is based on many traditions formed both in the period prior to 1917 and during the Soviet times. There are several schools of thought that are important to have in mind in assessing the influence of geopolitics on current foreign policy decision-making. They are the so-called westernism, eurasianism, neoeurasianist model, and the so-called pragmatic geopolitical model. Westernism was initially developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The postulates of this philosophical approach became dominant among Russian intelligentsia. They were also popular in the society of the 1980s and early 1990s. During this period the approach was dominant in the country’s foreign policy thinking.


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Gorbachev’s doctrine of ‘new political thinking’ and the so-called ‘Kozyrev doctrine’, named after the then minister of foreign affairs of Russia, are typical examples of this approach. The basic principles of this mindset were the following. The concessions to the West were in exchange for supposed tolerance and assistance, corresponding to the mutual interests of both Russia and the West. Deep idealisation of the Western model of liberal democracy and market economy, seen as a panacea for Russia, would guarantee Russia’s economic revival and attract an inflow of foreign investments if adopted rapidly and decisively. Disintegration of the socialist community and the USSR, political concessions, the economic and financial collapse of 1998 in Russia, all strongly undermined support for this geopolitical and development model in Russia. Eurasianism again became popular during the period of Russian society’s painful transformation and search for its own identity. During the early 1990s after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, geopolitics in Russia was almost monopolised by the left wing, patriotic authors and politicians. The search for a new proper geopolitical paradigm of Russia’s foreign policy became an essential element of most policy publications during this period. Numerous geopolitical books, manifestos and pamphlets were to justify the policy visions of political leaders on Russia’s future.9 In the contemporary Eurasian vision traditional interpretations of theoretical German and Anglo-Saxon geopolitics are accompanied by the overestimation of Eurasia as a potential dominant and essential player in world politics. These perceptions are based only on the facts of the geographical position (geographical determination) and political-economic mission10 of Russia to keep the balance between the West and the East.11 The neo-Eurasianist model combines ideas developed by Russian classical geopolitical authors with elements of traditional Western geopolitics and the works of contemporary West European right-wingers. It emerged among the Russian emigrants in the 1920s and 1930s. Contemporary neo-Eurasianists have significantly modified the doctrine of the first half of the twentieth century, artificially reducing the world political process to a clash between adherents of ‘atlantism’ and ‘continentalism’. This model carries strong anti-American perceptions. However, within this approach a strategic compromise with Europe and other non-Slavic states, conditional on those states taking an anti-American position, is perceived as a possibility. The logic is based on the importance of physical space, natural resources, military power and direct control over territory. According to this view, it is still possible to defend your national interests by building military and political blocs. As the result, the trans-Eurasian geopolitical system is recommended to be shaped in the following way: as a quadrangle, taking in the Berlin-Moscow-TokyoTehran axis (A.Dugin’s version), or as the Berlin-Moscow-Beijing-Tehran-Delhi axis (L.Ivashov’s version). However, it seems that the Pragmatic geopolitical model (also called a ‘creative adjustment’12) became the most popular in the late 1990s and the first years of the twenty-first century. If during Yeltsin’s presidency it was common wisdom to note that Russia was experiencing the shrinking of its geo-strategic space, Putin’s presidency was labelled with the revision of the ‘Eurasianist’ spirit and policy. The Putin doctrine and active foreign policy approach13 were marked by Western scholars as a revision of the traditional ‘Eurasianism’ that symbolised the state’s efforts to expand its influence to the East and to the West, boosting its influence in the neo-imperial fashion. The traditional


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interpretation of ‘Eurasianism’ sees Russia as the ‘ultimate World-Island state’, apart from and hostile to the maritime and commercial Euro-Atlantic world. Contrary to this, the current vision of the Putin administration of the twenty-first-century mission for Russia is based on the assumption that the unique geo-strategic place of the state provides conditions for its economic revival, opportunities for engaging in the regional institutions and security arrangements and eventually for the increase of the geoeconomic influence of the state as a world player. Russia’s unique geopolitical position links it with most of the important regions of the eastern hemisphere, including Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, the oilrich Middle East, resources-rich Central Asia and the vast Asia-Pacific markets. Such a position enables Russia to focus its foreign and trade policies on the ways that increase its prestige and power. Russia sees itself as a ‘bridge state’ between the emerging markets, providing its own territory for the ‘continental shortcuts’ from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, from Northern Europe to the Middle East and the Mediterranean (through the north-south routes and river waterways to the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea). Thus, in the twenty-first century more than ever before, ‘Eurasianism’ became a version of the engagement strategy for Russia. Despite the fact that it has many characteristics similar to neo-Eurasianism, this geo-strategic model has one significant difference: the supporters of this approach have no political preferences towards potential allies; everything is determined by specific conditions and circumstances. The essential elements of this model are:14 • economic efficiency; • more efficient use of the geopolitical resources inherited by Russia from the Soviet Union; • nuclear weapons as an important element of containment; • status, role and right of vote in the UN Security Council; • pragmatism (for instance, re-establishing relations with former allies and friends— India, Cuba, the Arab states, Vietnam, Serbia, Armenia); • extended geopolitics (forward presence, Russian military bases abroad); • maximum use of geoeconomic privileges. The most concentrated assessment of the current Russia’s understanding of ‘adequate geopolitics’ probably could be seen in the early writings of Dmitrii Rogozin, ex-chairman of the State Duma III Committee of Foreign Relations: The national, not left or right political ideas, will unite the nation, will revive its confidence, will re-establish the new Russian state as a world power. The formula of revival’ is in the Russian character that is capable of overcoming turbulence and standing up to its natural pride. It is high time to understand that Russia does not have friends; there are only interests. It is high time to understand that there is no place in politics for naive emotions. Our own people should be loved, and the same right should be given to our neighbours. But it is not permissible to love your neighbours’ cat more than your own child. We live in a tough world and in tough surroundings. All our actions should be determined by the policy of rational national egoism.15


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What does it mean in practice? It seems Russia has to balance its policy in three main directions at least: the EU, China and the US. The European orientation still remains the key strategy in the Russian foreign policy, based on centuries of historical traditions and relations and corresponding to important components of the state’s national identity. The European dimension in Russia’s foreign policy has become more important since the replacement of Kozyrev by Primakov as the minister of foreign affairs in January 1996. Relations with the European states were mostly focused on the Russia-Germany-France axis. The privileged relations with Germany and France were seen as a way of integrating into the EU and eventually creating a new balance of power. Tactically, Russia first selected an important country in the region (Germany) with which it tried to develop privileged relations. Following this stage it looked for another state (France) in order to form a stable and non-antagonistic triangle. Germany was and is Russia’s main creditor and foreign trade partner. Since the 1970s Germany has been Russia’s strategic partner as energy consumer (‘gaz za truby’— gas for tubes deal). Presently Russia supplies up to 30 per cent of the gas requirements of the German market (agreement with Rurgaz on gas supplies until 2030). In addition Germany is the most active nation among the West European states in the CIS and Eurasia as a whole. Only when President Putin came to power was Britain added to Russia’s privileged partners. The important element of the strategic partnership with the UK is based on the joint ventures in the energy sector and the UK investments, as well as on political importance. The political elite, including those who are oriented to the West, are not prepared to accept the formation of a mono-polar world with American dominance or, for that matter, the dominance of any other single country. Consequently, the specific pro-European Westernism has emerged in Russia’.16 The popularity of this new vision is very high in Russia. In 2003 sociological surveys registered 60 per cent support for this foreign policy option. The necessity to concentrate on the ‘European’ integration patterns was almost unanimous. Russian scholars examined the evolution of priorities of geographical regions in Russia’s foreign policy through comparative analysis of the hierarchy and geographical distribution of diplomatic and other missions abroad from 1991 to 2000. According to the data provided, Western Europe has become the main direction for Russia’s foreign policy activity in the ‘far abroad’ category, accounting approximately for more than about 40 per cent of foreign visits. During détente this figure increased to 22–23 per cent, dropped to 13 per cent in 1980, and jumped to 34–36 per cent in 1989– 91, which were the most dramatic years of transition when, as a result of the disintegration of the socialist community and of the USSR itself, foreign policy was almost entirely determined by the relations with Western European countries and the US.17 As it was noted during the time of Y.Primakov (as minister of foreign affairs and PM), Russian foreign policy demonstrated the ‘geopolitical’ approach by promotion of regional


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systems of power balances. Russia was building a coherent Asian policy similar to its European focus. At the same time President Putin (following the tradition of Prime Minister Primakov’s policy) is actively developing relations with Asian states (to play an ‘Asian card’) in order not only to avoid a pro-Western bias but in order to strengthen Russia’s position in its relations with the West. The policy towards Asian states is by no mean a substitute or just an addition to the European one, it is an integral part of the state’s foreign policy paradigm, based on the synergy and complementary approach. It should be remembered that ‘due to historical reasons and to its geopolitical location, Russia developed the most intimate contacts with the Asian world among all Europeans’.18 Tactically, Russia’s recent policy has similar characteristics to the European one. In the 1990s Russia selected China in Asia as the main state for its privileged relations and re-established a new relationship with India, creating a stable geostrategic triangle. This priority list, where ‘China is first, India is to follow’, could be seen as an important difference between the Russian and Soviet foreign policy agenda in Asia. One has to remember that India was the most important Soviet partner in Asia. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Primakov proposed the strategic geopolitical triangular partnership as a counterbalance to the US dominance on his visit to India in 1998. Russia assumed more active involvement in the integration process that is under way in the AsiaPacific region (participation in the ASEAN and APEC forums, increased number of visits to the countries in the region). In accordance with ‘The Concept of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy’ (signed by President Putin in July 2000), ‘Russia will achieve the formation of a multi-polar system of international relations, reflecting the real diversity of the contemporary world… A special feature of Russian foreign policy is its balanced character. It is determined by the geopolitical situation of Russia as the largest Eurasian country, requiring an optimal combination of efforts in all directions’.19 This requires the adoption of strategy balancing among the major global powers such as the US, EU and China, ‘which all in return should allow Russia to become actively involved in the process shaping the new world geopolitical order’.20 One of the best Russian defence specialists, Dmitrii Trenin, pointed out: ‘Fitting Russia into both Europe and Asia is a Hercules [sic] task, but the one that cannot be avoided if the goal is Europe’s security and Asia’s stability.’21 The ambitious foreign policy is based on the need to use the state’s geopolitical potential and its natural resources. Those who believe that the Russian foreign policy is absolutely unrealistic (lack of financial and economic resources) and is designed only for domestic consumption are very wrong. Equally wrong is the assumption that Russia is only marking its presence in the key geopolitical areas, and formulating its position on the most important international issues just for the sake of laying the foundation for the future position of a global power. Presently, any of the foreign policy decisions (right or wrong) are taken on the basis of their pragmatic usefulness in the process of the restoration of Russia’s economic, political and military status. This strategy suggests several aspects, such as maximising Russia’s influence in world politics; preventing the strengthening of separate geopolitical centres; exploiting the ‘windows of opportunities’ in existing political and economic differences within and between leading world powers and coalitions in order to stress the importance and usefulness of Russia’s potentials. It


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also involves using ‘package deals’ in the foreign policy issues (introduction of the socalled traditional linkage principle for getting additional concessions) and receiving the maximum economic efficiency. Geo-strategy in military assessments The revival of geo-strategy in the Russian public military writings is a sign of the times as well. One could mention the works of several authors22 whose writing is essential in examining the typology based on the clarification of roots/sources and the main directions of the threat factors to the national security of Russia proceeding from geopolitical considerations. In all current official documents the priority attention is given to the necessity to deal with domestic sources of conflict and internal instability factors, focusing on the anti-terrorist and policing (anti-drug, anti-money laundering criminal resources, illegal migration and arms smuggling) operations as the key element of potential co-operation with the international community. However, military specialists were considering the worst-case scenarios as well, where the Russian armed forces had to be engaged in a conflict with an external enemy. Among many probable and lessprobable scenarios the following worst-case hypothetical scenarios might be of interest, due to the fact that they reveal the geopolitical calculations of such threat-assessment exercises: • Mid-term future. Spreading terrorist activity that might require expanding international co-operation, including the areas traditionally viewed as the ‘security belt’ of Russia. Increased tensions were predicted in the South, South-East and Far East by 2005–10.23 • After the period 2007–10 a confrontation with the US is listed as a possibility. When the US is fully ready for the six-generation warfare, confrontation with Russia, India and China is among the speculative options. The attack against Russia’s interests is considered as a possibility (especially as part of the ‘sea-shore’ operation). A research unit, Navy Branch, Academy of Military Sciences, has made this estimation. • In 2010–15 period Russia might find itself in a possible conflict with China. A potential war over the resources and the territory of northern Asia or Central Asia was named as a possibility that could emerge from a series of conflicts. • Around 2015–25 main conflicts are seen as part of the North-South confrontation. The main threat factors in the cyclic crisis will endanger or interrupt the imports of natural resources and increase cheap labour flow to Europe, when Russia might be drawn into participation as part of the industrial world. The main areas of potential conflict are to affect South Europe/or the EU and Mediterranean region. • Around 2025. Russian military specialists predict a war in the Asia-Pacific region between the US-led coalition and China, with neutral Russia or without Russia’s direct participation. Some Russian analysts picture a combat situation along the line that covers Alaska-Japan-South Korea-Taiwan-Philippines-Singapore, and foresee the Chinese victory in this conflict.24 In the assessment of a potential world war and Russia’s role in it, one can say that there is a certain level of consensus among the experts presently that Russia does not have (in the


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short-or in the mid-term) the resources to wage a war on several fronts simultaneously. In a long-term perspective the specialists differ in their views on possible, or most effective geopolitical, political-military alliances that Russia will have to be part of in order to exclude the possibility of fighting the conflict on its own. Some of the potential alliances listed are worth looking at. For instance, some Russian military strategists are dreaming about the restoration of the bipolarity, where Russia is one of the central players in the new global rapprochement among the Russian and German-led expanded EU-India-Japan. Such a new alliance was hoped to be a serious containment challenge to the US military superiority and to potential expansionist China in the Asia-Pacific, Far East and Central Asia.25 Interestingly enough, the same analysts were also stressing the possibility of such an alliance being effective not only in the AsiaPacific region but also rather useful in the Western strategic direction. The possibility of Russia’s support for the EU continental powers (German-French alliance) against the USBritish maritime coalition was mentioned within this school of thought. It was suggested that Russia’s strategic potential, and its navy and air force in a possible conflict, as well as its strategic energy resources, could effectively supplement the German-French axis of the EU military force.26 The Chinese threat also reveals other opportunities for Russia’s options for necessary coalitions. It was believed that if the Russian-Chinese war broke out, Russia might lead a coalition that would include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and possibly Uzbekistan. (Sceptics were considering the more probable neutral position of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Mongolia.) Hope was expressed by some experts that in this type of conflict Russia would receive support from Japan, South Korea, the United States and/or the EU.27 Some experts believed that Pakistan might join China. On the other hand, the closing of Russia’s radar installations in Cuba and naval base in Cam Rahn Bay,28 supposedly aimed at saving the finances needed for the military reform, including the social aspect of it, had a geopolitical argument too. The funds needed for upgrading the facilities could be rechannelled into the space-based communication satellites, more essential for the Russian Federation (RF) armed forces, rather than into the outdated radar station. Russia’s relations with the US and the need for co-operation in the political-military sphere make the RF presence in Cuba expensive, inefficient and awkward in the present situation. The increasing co-operation with China (arms deals and energy complex, etc.) and potential tensions between the US and China are just two of the arguments that could have influenced the RF position while considering the withdrawal from the Cam Rahn Bay base, previously occupied by the 7th US Fleet. On the other hand, by stepping out from these bases and ‘allowing’ China possibly to substitute itself in Lurdes base in Cuba, and the US to settle in Cam Rahn Bay, Russia was entering a very sophisticated power game by trying to place the potential adversaries one against another, avoiding direct confrontation with one on the side of another and retaining potentially ‘allied/neutral’ policies with both.29 On the other hand, the emphasis exclusively on the geopolitical considerations might have negative consequences for economic and trade relations. The above-mentioned withdrawal from bases in Cam Rahn Bay (Vietnam) and Lurdes (Cuba) affected the prospects and the future of joint projects between Russian and local business companies. Russian military presence in Asia-Pacific and Cuba was linked to trade and economic deals in those regions so closely that when the military component


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was withdrawn the economic incentives were not compatible enough in comparison to other offers. The military base Cam Rahn Bay cost Russian taxpayers around $30 m per year. The pay for the rent of the base could be covered by the payments of the Vietnamese debt to Russia, which was about $1.5 bn. Six months after the base was closed the Vietnamese withdrew from the energy deal (joint oil development) with Russia and pulled out from a joint company, ‘Vietnamsovpetro’, which was annually extracting up to 12 million tons of oil and bringing in about $250 m in revenues. It was believed that the Russian decision of leaving Cuba and closing the monitoring radar station in Lurdes also influenced the prospects of Russian business to be in the frontline runners in the tender for the reopening of the nickel complex in Las Cariocas in Cuba. In 1991 Russia withdrew its support from this enterprise due to economic shortages and political miscalculations. In 2003 the Cuban government decided to reopen the complex, but did not demonstrate any loyalties to the former partners, especially after its diminishing military and economic presence in Cuba. Special attention should be paid to the role of the Mediterranean region as an ‘initiator of the conflict-spills effects’, especially for Europe and Russia. The importance of the Mediterranean region for European security in the mid-term and long-term future lies in three main areas: • elimination of the possibilities of a spillover effect from regional conflicts; • prevention of the disruption of energy supplies and their transportation to the European market; • neutralisation of the side effects of the uneven North-South economic development and rising demography issues (that led to increasing migration flows to Western Europe). According to the Russian strategic analysis the conflicts that may affect European security may take place around 2015–25. The following data provided by Professor Anatoli Utkin is important in clarifying Russian assessments of the future conflicts and their origin. According to these statistics Western civilisation is losing its position of domination in the twenty-first century. Western civilisation (Western Europe, North America, New Zealand and Australia) had 11 per cent of the world population in 2000, and will have only 10 per cent in 2025. The industrial development ratings were the highest in 1928 (84.2 per cent of the world’s industrial output). Industrial output was 64.4 per cent in 1950, but only 48.8 per cent in 2000. In 2015 it is expected to be just 30 per cent of world industrial production. In 1900 the Western armies had 44 per cent of all servicemen in the world at their disposal. At the end of the twentieth century only 21 per cent of all servicemen are serving in Western armies.30 As a result, the mid-term and long-term policy could be oriented towards sustainable and protected communication and supply routes, and controlled migration policy. It seems that the EU policy towards the Mediterranean region will be linked with the role and influence of the ethnic lobbies in the domestic politics of the European states. The importance of the Mediterranean region raises a question about the urgency of improving relationships between Turkey and Greece, restoring relations with Libya and clarifying the forms of its deterrence and, as the result, an increased role for Malta as a potential channel of Libya’s integration into the Western (European and US) markets and as a kind of defence barrier/deterrence. The latter raises the issue of forms and ways of economic


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and military presence and assistance to Malta, which is seemingly becoming a central element of the Western (US) policy towards restoration of the balanced relations with Libya. Russia’s presence in both states was considered to be a useful factor. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the increased role of the Mediterranean in policy planning for other regions, such as the Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia. The developments in even one of the four Mediterranean subregions could have significant effects on the developments in the CIS/NIS and influence relations with Russia. For instance, in the Balkans the decision on the reconstruction of the waterways, blocked during the NATO air campaign, is sending strong signals to the Eurasian states (including Russia) regarding the main investments in the infrastructure and Western trade priorities. These decisions show whether the main investment channels and potential trade flows are going to be realised along the TRANCECA and INOGATE (EU project), or along the traditional routes that go through Russia as well. In this respect the restoration of certain waterways in the Balkans is becoming an important link to the prospects of increasing trade for Russia. The increased interest in indirect policy measures on the part of Russia should be expected. The special concern of Russian foreign and military experts is shared over the developments around the Caspian-Central Asian energy projects,31 the spread of terrorist actions in the region, and in the containing of instability factors. It is more so after the events of 11 September 2001. The competition/co-operation in the energy sphere is seen as a potential motivation for continuous geopolitical and geoeconomic disputes or an effective basis for joint international security system. The security concerns shifted from the global to the regional level. Russia is experiencing security concerns in the western, southern and eastern directions. The Russian policy altogether changed to a more active participation in the regional international arrangements, economy and security. Geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations are a vehicle and constraint for the foreign activity of Russia and the definition of its role in the New World order.

2 PRACTICAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Western and Russian scholars registered the revival of Eurasianism in late 1990s, when world politics was once again ‘perceived through the prism of Eurasianism and traditional geopolitics’.1 Boris Rumer, associate at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University, USA, noticed that Eurasianism became a ‘fashionable topic of discussion among Russian philosophers, historians and political scientists’, which is ‘of considerable contemporary significance’.2 He pointed out that Putin’s accession to power gave this re-emergent Eurasianism a boost. There are indications that the Kremlin is sympathetic towards the Eurasian movement… The current ideologists of Eurasianism are adapting it to fit in with the new president’s statist views, quoting his remark that ‘Russia always felt itself a Eurasian country’.3 The Centre of Strategic Projects, which was responsible for the formulation of the comprehensive programme for strategic development for the Presidential elections of 2000, then circulated a draft document ‘Manifesto’, in which the authors describe Russian foreign policy as being influenced by Russia’s ‘new place’ in the world. The touchstone of this programme is that ‘foreign policy must be determined by national, mainly economic, interests’.4 The same message was pronounced by President Vladimir Putin three years later during his address to the Federal Assembly on 16 May 2003. The main goals of Russian foreign policy were and are re-establishing Russian economic potential and preventing disintegration of the state, and as a result promoting the re-emerging of the state’s international status. In other words, ‘a healthy and strong economy and with defensive military muscles’. These tasks could not be achieved in isolation from the world markets or institutions. They could be implemented through active policy and intensive diplomacy, which are characterised by: • pragmatism; • economic determinism in the foreign policy objectives; • firm links between geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations and military capabilities; • broad international engagement. Pragmatism in Russian policies means, first of all, recognition of the fact that the present Russia depends on investments and economic aid from the international institutions and Western nations. Thus, by putting a limit on Russia’s ambitions and easing access of foreign capital and investments to the internal Russian market, introducing changes to tax laws, promising to curb corruption and establishing rule of law, a new team hopes to create conditions for attracting investors to the Russian market.5 It is believed that a return of the Russian capital back to Russia will promote activity of foreign investors as


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well. Pragmatism means that by avoiding challenges linked to the past bipolar world, Russia should address only the challenges that are to threaten its economic security and prevent disintegration, or provoke disengagement from international community or international networks. All this defines especially sensitive zones for Russian security. Geographically it is first of all the territory of Russia itself and the CIS. The decision of Russia’s likely participation in other regions, even in the Balkans, was based on a combination of security and economic considerations. In sum, Russian international behaviour is not to be determined by the past Soviet ideological pattern of reaction to international crises. Pragmatism during Putin’s time has meant setting achievable goals. The Russian government proved to be very pragmatic in achieving its goals and was using both Russia’s weaknesses and strengths. This approach was skilfully introduced during the negotiations with the London Club on the rescheduling of the debts in 1999/2000. The new government reduced the time spent between the diplomatic-political rhetoric statements and practical actions. Most important was the recognition of the priority of economic considerations in defining the foreign policy goals and need of a broad international engagement. According to the strategic analyses that are currently popular in Russia, the twenty-first century will be the century of global economy, which brings about the geo-economic interdependence of the states and create interstate, continental and transcontinental markets. In the near future Russia perceives itself as being potentially excluded from these markets, with little prospect for full-fledged membership in the European Union (EU), Central European Free Trade Area or the economic structures of the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, Russia sees its possible role in the world economy as a bridge state between those economic markets. Therefore for Russia to become part of the trans-Eurasian ‘bridge of stability’, that would anchor the state to Europe and to the Asia-Pacific region, is considered to be one of the most vital conditions for economic prosperity and for the survival of Russia in the twenty-first century. From this logic, and without discussing other factors and reasons, four main regions of targeted Russian foreign policy are envisaged. They are the US, Europe, the Asia-Pacific region and the CIS. However, one should not underestimate Russia’s long-term goals to become in 10–15 years an active player in all major economic and security global and regional institutions. A new approach to the international institutions was demonstrated by adjusting former Russian prime minister Yevgenii Primakov’s course towards the European security institutions, putting less emphasis on OSCE, but focusing more on relations with NATO and the EC. Economic determinism in Russia’s foreign policy If one had to choose the leitmotif that describes the current state of the foreign policy orientations of Russia, the following citation from one of the documents of the RF Security Council (May 2002) would be the most appropriate. It clearly characterises the core of Russia’s present policies: ‘Russia has to avoid being cornered by ideological notions of division between friends and foes. Economic benefits for Russia should become the main factor and criteria for its foreign policy orientations’.6 The main goal of

Practical politics and international relations

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the present Russian government and president is to use all the opportunities available to prepare the state for potential security challenges, create conditions for the country’s sustainable development and ensure its engagement in the world economic and security systems. In order to achieve the goals Russia demonstrates equal activity in its rapprochement with the West, East and South. Several topics are becoming essential for defining the main targets of its foreign policy. Among them are the following: RussiaNATO and Russia-EU relations, and Russia’s approach to the anti-terrorist campaign. The changes in the Russian foreign and defence policies were dramatic. But the most outstanding adjustments were made in relations with the Western security institutions. NATO-Russia relations: from foes to…very good partners In 1990 a totally new geopolitical situation appeared in Europe. This involved the withdrawal of Russian forces from Eastern European countries, German unification, Warsaw Pact disbanding and the USSR’s initial disintegration. This was essentially a difficult and very dangerous international crisis, the consequences of which no one dared to predict at that time. Its peaceful regulation was based on agreement between the world’s major political players to create a common European space. That space would include the former USSR with Asian NIS in the new European Security System. The historic treaty was confirmed by a charter, which was adopted at the OSCE Paris Summit in November 1990. Russia gradually expanded its relations with NATO, starting from December 1991 when Russia joined the newly created North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), along with other former Central and Eastern European communist countries. This was the first formal NATO body bringing NATO member countries and non-NATO countries together, after the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe. In 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) replaced NACC. Between 1990 and 1994 Russian politicians believed that the end of the Cold War meant that all European countries had decided to create a common security space, in which the division between the West and the East would no longer exist. Those perceptions were strengthened by the evidence of an intensive process of transformation of NATO itself. It concerned the Alliance’s military doctrine and the changes that were introduced to its operational planning and nuclear policies, especially on limitations to geographical areas of probable use of nuclear weapons. In this context the NATO enlargement was not seen by the Russian leaders as threatening their security or limiting Russia’s participation in the European affairs. The statement of President Yeltsin regarding NATO as a new institution of collective security for Europe (December 1991) and his acceptance of the Polish decision to integrate into the West European security structures (August 1993) were partly a reflection of such perceptions. The Partnership for Peace Programme (January 1994) was considered by the Russians as a substitute for a formalised enlargement process. The Programme itself, despite its intense military and technical-military components, was accepted as part of the process of exchange of information between NATO and non-NATO states, including Russia. However, the negotiations on the Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) suffered its first stalemate when the date for the first enlargement was incorporated in the


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documents and individual programme that were submitted for signature to Russia and NATO. Nevertheless, by signing the invitation and framework agreements Russia indirectly agreed to the evolutionary enlargement process. At the same time it was conditioned by the transformation of NATO and promises of its further politicisation as well as by the creation of the European Security System. Russia went on to join the Alliance’s PfP programme in June 1994 and agreed to pursue a broad and enhanced dialogue with NATO beyond PfP. Some Russians criticised the PfP arrangements and complained that Russia had lost the opportunity to shape the programme and to demonstrate from the very beginning its special status. It was believed that the postponement and indecisiveness in signing the agreement within the PfP stimulated the West to intensify the discussions on NATO enlargement. Russia lost its initiative in establishing relations with the Alliance, concentrating its major diplomatic efforts on the support of the idea of the OSCE transformation and establishing special status for Russia within NATO.7 After a six-month interval in the negotiations Russia returned to the discussion of the individual PfP programme. This decision was strictly political and was influenced by the US-Russia Summit (30 May 1995). In order to persuade Moscow to return to negotiations on the NATO-Russia agreement the Alliance had to make more concessions to Russia than originally intended. Initially the support from Russian military experts for agreements with NATO was based on the assumption that normalisation of the relationship with NATO indirectly contributed to reducing the level of tensions along all Russian frontiers.8 In the 1990s Russia was experiencing the shrinking of its geo-strategic space. The pressures, according to the Russian military, were coming from the West and the South-west (due to NATO enlargement), from the South (because of the direct and potential threats of separatism, spillover effects of local conflicts, drug trafficking and proliferation of weapons), as well as from the Far East (due to the increased role of China). Agreements with NATO provided Russia with the opportunity to concentrate its forces on the most vital and vulnerable frontiers/strategic directions (strategicheskie napravleniaya). However, this perception was holding ground only insofar as Russia believed that its concerns were being taken into account in the cases of future enlargements. The hope of Russian diplomacy was to persuade the West to reconsider the decision on the ‘open door’ to NATO enlargement, or to stretch that principle so that it will be applicable to Russia as well. The enlargement of the first group of states kept intact the ‘buffer zone’ between the regularly stationed forces of Russia and NATO. But in the case of the Baltic states, membership of NATO for the first time in the history of the Alliance, the NATO forces would be stationed on the frontiers of mainland Russia. The time for a missile attack from the Baltic states on Moscow will therefore shorten to 3–4 minutes, putting the Russian forces on a special alert cycle. The situation on the south flank was even more complicated. It was believed at that time that potential membership in the Alliance of Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria could damage Russia’s plans of using alternative communication routes through those countries, bypassing Ukraine, increasing its presence in the region and earning hard currency from energy exports and arms sales. It was also considered important that the nominees to NATO membership on the southern flank would territorially connect the


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areas of NATO responsibility with the CIS states, which were actively involved in the PfP. Ukraine, an important element of the Russian West-East and North-South policy, in this case would territorially become a ‘bridge state’ between GUAM states9 and Uzbekistan, and NATO. Thus in the Russian view it would increase the potential level of Western involvement in the areas if crises occurred. The NATO policy of applying Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the defence of the territories and troops of the member-states causes special concern in the areas of potential ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes. The CIS regions are considered by Russia to be areas of vital national interests and security concerns, especially in the period of economic transition.10 The logic of this position is based on the following perceptions. First, according to the analysis of the Russian Security Council, Russia’s dependence on the CIS natural reserves (especially in oil, gas and ferrous and non-ferrous metals) will increase in the period 2002–5.11 Accessibility to the CIS natural reserves and markets is perceived as a vital national security issue and an important area of private interests of Russian corporations. Second, control of transcontinental transportation networks is considered one of the most vital conditions for Russia’s economic prosperity in the twenty-first century and one of the main reasons for integration with the countries that ‘host’ those networks (especially railways). According to the currently popular strategic security concepts, Russia sees the twenty-first century as the century of global economy, the geoeconomic inter-dependence of states, and of interstate, continental and cross-continental markets. Russia identified its chances to play a role in the world economy with its position as a ‘bridge state’ between the economic markets of the West and East. It could be explained by the fear of potential exclusion from the world markets and its poor prospects to become a full-fledged member of the European Union or economic structures of the Asia-Pacific region. This reasoning has been a powerful motivation for the Russian interest in the CIS communication networks. According to the Russian national security concept (1995), the priorities of national concerns were focused on preserving the territorial integrity of the state, access to communication networks (in accordance with international law), and sustainability of market reforms. The same elite groups that were supportive of the deal with NATO have vast economic interests in the CIS space. Thus, Russian-Western, especially Russian-US, policy controversy on the one hand, and the vital need for Russia to co-operate with the West on the other, are most distinctly demonstrated in that region. As for Russia, important reasons for co-operation are drug trafficking, separatist movements, crime prevention and traditional military-technical co-operation. Russian military experts consider the country to be self-sufficient. However, according to their assessment, the strategic geopolitical interests of Russia go beyond its borders and are directly or indirectly connected with historic, ethnic and military strategic territories. In this sense Russian geopolitical interests are stretched towards the CIS states, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Black Sea and Asia-Pacific regions.12 Thus, the enlargement possibilities on the NATO northern and southern flanks are equally sensitive for Russia (but for different reasons). However, the main Russian concern was the ‘enhanced Partnership for Peace’ for the CIS states. Not being able to confront the PfP, Moscow’s criticism was mainly concentrated on the NATO enlargement to the areas


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either adjacent to the Russian frontiers (the Baltic) or adjacent to the vital CIS states (such as Ukraine). In parallel, and as early as 1995, Moscow officially began probing whether Russia could participate in making political decisions in NATO, along the lines of the French model. The assumption was that a mechanism for Russia’s participation in making political decisions within NATO could be developed rather quickly. It was believed by many, sharing support for co-operation with the Alliance, that even in the case of new members joining in Russia would already be sitting at the table making political decisions. In this way it would even have a chance for blocking military decisions that could be considered as interfering with Russian national interests. However, it is exactly this type of ‘interference’ that NATO states were trying to avoid. The second round of internal Russian debates on the possible interest of the Russian Federation to be integrated into the NATO structures along the French model, or other special arrangements, can be dated to the 1996–7 period, when ideas and plans for CJTF as an operational tactical element of the new European and Eurasian security system were starting to look a realistic possibility.13 However, it was believed that Moscow understood that the Alliance was not interested in having Russia as a long-term potential partner. In particular one could register opposition to NATO policies because it was believed that the Alliance would never let Russia join it, but only use its application as an excuse for letting all of Russia’s neighbours join the Alliance. The Russians were hoping to see NATO being transformed from an institution of collective defence to a collective security institution, where the role of Russia would be secured. Another main issue of disagreement during the first stage of negotiations was about decision-making and clarification of the authority that enabled the activation of NATO forces for ‘out of area operations’. One of the natural tasks of Russian diplomacy was to use the benefits of the dual-track approach in NATO strategy for minimising the effects of the NATO enlargement, primarily through participation in the NATO institutions and structures. To a great extent the changes of attitudes were influenced by two major factors. First, was the increasing role of the CJTF in the military planning of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, especially in ‘out of area’ missions. Second, it concerned the NATO decision to provide regular appointments in its military manning tables to non-NATO officers at the strategic HQ in Mons (Belgium) and Norfolk (US), as well as in a large regional HQ. These developments became especially important in the latest period of developing relationships between the Alliance and Russia, starting from 2001. The basis for co-operation was established in the NATORussia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The Permanent Joint Council (PJC), created under the Founding Act, developed into an effective forum for consultation and co-operation in many fields of common interest. Regular meetings of this body quickly led to a new pattern of dialogue and to an unprecedented level of contacts at many different levels. The PJC met for the first time on 18 July 1997. Within weeks of the signing of the Founding Act it became the principal forum for exchanging views and developing security co-operation on the basis of mutual interest, normally meeting on a monthly basis. Apart from the situation in the Balkans and peacekeeping issues, discussions covered non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms


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control, defence conversion, air traffic safety, terrorism and nuclear weapons. Joint activities were also conducted on defence-related scientific co-operation. The Founding Act, 1997, was a painful compromise that has not changed Russia’s negative views of the NATO enlargement plans or NATO itself. Russia regarded as its main task the implementation of those provisions of the Russia-NATO Founding Act that would guarantee the non-advancement of NATO forces into the territory of non-member states. Russian tactics tended to focus increasingly on criticism of specific integration efforts by the established NATO states, newcomers and prospective members, particularly with regard to the extension of military multinational groups and joint command centres to the Central European states and the Baltic region. For instance, Russia critically opposed the set up of the North-east corps in early 1998. The majority of the Russian proposals submitted for discussion in the military working group under the PJC were concerned, directly or indirectly, with the implementation and deployment possibilities for the CJTF. Moscow believed that the Alliance should assume additional commitments on the non-deployment of major military contingents outside of NATO’s region. One of the Russian proposals in the late 1990s was to sign a CBM agreement on the exchange of information on CJTF temporary deployments that exceed the territorial limits set by the CFE Treaty. That proposal was seen as the first step in creating the CBM regime on the CJTF. It seems the proposal on establishing the AllEuropean Code on Peacekeeping, introduced to the OSCE, should be also considered as part of the Russian overall policy towards multinational forces and their use in the European theatre.14 More than a year’s work of the Russia-NATO PJC demonstrated the following results. First of all, it showed different interpretations of the PJC role and that its activities were deadlocked because of the disputes over procedures and agenda items. Second, Russia did not receive a right of veto over NATO actions, but got more than simply a voice within the PJC. In order to avoid antagonising Russia, the agenda of the Council was partially modified, extending to the issues that were not put forward within the original framework of the document, discussion of which the NATO states opposed. The NATO countries found it difficult to segregate discussions of the military policy of the Alliance and the implementation of military components of the SFOR (stabilisation force) mission in Bosnia during the PJC meetings on Bosnia. For example, the issue of the absence of proper information from the Russian command about some measures of a military nature by the NATO-led SFOR was drawn to the attention of the defence ministers meeting under the PJC. Third, a multi-channel approach to the NATO policies on enlargement and separation of the related topics in order to avoid linkages and concessions proved to be more successful for the Russian side than for the Alliance. In 1996/7 the position of the Alliance was to separate CFE negotiations, talks on infrastructure and issues discussed within the PJC framework, and to address them within different institutional frameworks (NATO, OSCE, etc.). That approach was hard to implement, as the extended agenda of the PJC showed. On the other hand, the multi-channel approach proved to be successful in bringing different Russian force ministries under the PfP co-operation programme and stimulating the interest of the MoD towards active participation within the programme.


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The assessments of the Ministry of Defence of Russia of its participation in the PfP in 1998 were marked as 85 per cent successful. The financial restrictions were named as the main problems that were limiting more active participation of the Russian MoD in the programme. The changes occurred with regard to the education of the Russian officers in the NATO military colleges. To a great extent the change of attitude was influenced by two major factors. First, it was the increasing role of the CJTF in the military planning of the peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, especially in ‘out of area’ missions. Second, it concerned the NATO decision to provide regular appointments in its military manning tables to non-NATO officers at strategic HQ in Mons (Belgium) and Norfolk (US). The perceived benefits of co-operation with NATO modified Russian attitudes. The Russian side might be more interested in time to become a more regular participant in the PfP Plus. In some cases the Alliance was too slow to react to and on Russian proposals for cooperation, even when they were suggested along the lines of the Founding Act. The difficulties usually concerned the proposals that went beyond traditionally offered and discussed packages of measures within the PfP. For instance, in 1996/7 the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations complained about the absence of interest of the NATO states to discuss the issues of joint humanitarian aid deliveries for Bosnia, where Russia and NATO could split the costs and divide the functions. Another example is NATO’s slow consideration of a Russian suggestion to set up a joint structure to engage in collecting intelligence data on terrorism. Nevertheless, basic elements of the institutional network were put in place within the first year and a half of the signing of the Founding Act. The creation of additional networks between NATO and Russian institutions (joint NPA-Russian Parliamentary group to monitor the work of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), NATO and Russian regional authorities, the establishment of joint early warning systems, etc.) gave some hope and optimism for the long-term future of NATO-Russian relations. In January 1998 a permanent Russian mission was opened in NATO, and a military team, headed by General Zavarzin, was introduced as part of the Russian delegation.15 Almost simultaneously the NATO information centre started its work in Moscow, though not without certain difficulties. During the first couple of years the NATO mission was represented by only one liaison officer stationed on rotation basis at one of the NATO states’ embassies in Moscow. Other practical aspects of the relationship included the opening of the NATO Documentation Centre in Moscow, in February 1998, and an Information Centre in the Russian capital. Both centres were to help retired military personnel to find new jobs in civilian life, drawing on know-how and assistance from the NATO countries. The co-operation between Russia and NATO under the Permanent Joint Council was considered successful by both sides involved. A new multidimensional programme of cooperation was introduced in 1998. It included co-operation in military, technicalmilitary, ecological, scientfic and humanitarian spheres. The Russian Individual Programme in the Partnership for Peace was put forward for revision too. Since 1995 Russia has conducted joint emergency relief exercises within the PfP. It had an extensive exchange programme between Russian and US/European border guards services, had installed elements of early warning systems as part of an agreement signed


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between NATO and the ministries of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence, and had expressed interest in co-operation between the Ministry of the Interior and NATO. In practice, while formally rejecting participation in the CJTF exercises, Russia conducted exercises among different services and force ministries that are considered in fact to be integral parts of the operational joint task forces (JTF) and multinational operational forces (MOS-Russian abbreviation for the CJTF concept). The rejection was on the grounds that Russia was interested in planning CJTF missions as well as participating in them. A need for a definition of the joint or unified doctrine for peace-keeping, and possibly for combat performance at later stages of co-operation, was seen as a precondition for establishing any CJTF. However, 1998 also demonstrated the fragility of this beneficial co-operation. Russia twice threatened to reconsider the agreements with NATO: in January, in connection with the signing of the Baltic Charter between the Baltic states and the US; and in February, in an attempt to prevent the bombing of Iraq. These half-bluffs and half-threats prove that the NATO-Russian relationship is not just about the Russian European policy. The security concerns in such areas as the Baltic and the South/Middle East are interconnected in Russian mentality and strategic thinking. Additional uneasiness was added by the continued negotiations between NATO and membership seekers. The formal decision to establish the recruitment procedures of new members through military co-operation was feared to create more permanent stalemate in the relations between Russia and the Alliance. The ‘Madrid Plus package’, proposed by US Secretary of State M.Allbright at the NAC Session in December 1998 and adopted at the 1999 Washington Summit, set a pattern for the swift integration of potential new members into the Alliance’s military procedures. The pre-admission-decision package for future members included drawing up plans to make the new members’ forces interpretable with NATO, retraining officers, and ensuring the democratic accountability of the military and adapting military doctrines. In other words, the ‘Madrid Plus package’ was PfP Plus policy accompanied with the promise of swift entry at a later date. To some extent it prepared the ground for the decisions of the Prague Summit, 2002. However, if in 2002 the solutions proposed for the NATO-membership-seeking countries were less painful due to the changes in the international environment, the so-called MAC NATO plan (1999) was definitely not welcomed by Moscow. The situation was aggravated even further during the expanding Kosovo crisis because of sharp differences over how to handle the Kosovo situation and Russia’s opposition to the air campaign undertaken by NATO. With the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) over the Kosovo crisis, starting from March 1999, Moscow put on hold many of the positive developments in the relations between Russia and the Alliance. Regular ministerial meetings of the PJC were interrupted. The ‘positive element’ in this situation was that Russia had only suspended relations, but had not terminated its military co-operation with NATO. Military co-operation has nevertheless continued without interruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the NATO-led, UN-mandated stabilisation force (SFOR) was working towards the establishment of a lasting basis for peace and stability. Russia formally contributed about 1,200 troops to SFOR’s total complement of 20,000. When the air campaign ended, Russia agreed to contribute significant forces to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), set up under United Nations


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auspices to prevent a resumption of the conflict and to create the conditions for peace. Russian peacekeepers provided 3,250 troops to the 42,500-strong KFOR force. Despite the obstacles that Kosovo presented, the process of resolving the problems provided certain opportunities for testing and improving the NATO-Russia crisis management mechanism. In the end, unexpectedly, the strengthening of Russia-NATO and Russia-US relations occurred as the result of joint deployment in Kosovo under the UN mandate and the introduction of a new mechanism (of consultations rather than of information sharing) in the Russia-NATO PJC. That type of compromise (solution) meant that Russia could rate the results as positive for its own political/diplomatic and strategic goals. NATO and Russia formally resumed relations in May 2000 at the meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in Florence, after a break of more than a year, and agreed to work on a programme of joint activities.16 The Florence meeting followed a visit by Lord Robertson to Moscow in February 2000 during which it was agreed that NATO and Russia would work to intensify their dialogue in the PJC and would seek to improve co-operation on a broad range of issues. Nevertheless, Russia could never publicly accept the NATO enlargement. Traditionally its public opinion was almost equally divided over the issue. However, the combination of prolonged debates on this issue, Western policy in Iraq and the FRY, as well as a worsening economic crisis and the spread of dissatisfaction in Russia, could be named as factors that intensified the anti-NATO attitudes. Opinion polls demonstrated the following division in public attitudes in July 1996, with 25 per cent backing tough measures against NATO expansion, 25 per cent seeing no threat in NATO enlargement, and almost 50 per cent indifferent to security developments in Europe.17 In January 1997 a poll showed the same balance between pro-Western and anti-Western attitudes. However, a level of awareness in the population of the debates on European security increased (41 per cent, 41 per cent and 8 per cent respectively).18 In 1999 the polls demonstrated a significant polarisation of public opinion in Russia over the issue. The poll conducted by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion (2–3 April 1999) found that 63 per cent of the Russians interviewed believed that NATO could be a threat, and that Russia had reasons to fear a NATO attack. Other polls showed the same tendency; however, they also demonstrated the reluctance of the general public to be actively involved in the Balkan crisis. For instance, 93 per cent opposed NATO actions against Yugoslavia. Fifty-seven per cent of those surveyed said that Russia should use diplomacy to stop the fighting, while only 2.8 per cent to 10 per cent supported military assistance to Serbia,19 or direct Russian involvement in the fighting.20 The NATO enlargement of the first wave was perceived as dangerous from political and strategic considerations. It was viewed as an opening of a Pandora’s box of the unstoppable and uncontrolled enlargement process. Nevertheless, Russia could not allow itself to worsen the relationship with Eastern Europe due to geoeconomic considerations. There is also a whole range of short-and long-term goals that Russia is pursuing in cooperation with NATO. This extensive list of interests determined Russia to act ‘politically correctly’ during the first wave of enlargement.21 Russian interest in co-operation with NATO was and is based on economic, political and military considerations. One could mention such important areas as practical


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assistance in the implementation of the arms control agreements (START II, Chemical Weapons Convention); prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical) and their delivery means; enhanced regional air traffic safety and increased air traffic capacity issues. There is also an intensification of the exchanges of information and consultations on strategy, defence policy, military doctrines, budgets and infrastructure development programmes, and co-operation in the field of emergency relief operations, in procurement and arms development, in maintaining joint production and development service lines; co-operation in planning and participating in peacekeeping operations outside the area of responsibility of NATO. The last two issues mentioned need to be addressed here in some detail. The preservation of the basis of the military-industrial complex is considered as one of the main national security concerns for Russia. It is because the military-industrial complex is considered the only hope for Russia to retain its status as an industrial power. It is also essential for the procurement policies and preservation of any defensive capabilities by the armed forces. And whole regions of the country, over 70 factory-towns (including closed administrative areas), fully depend on the defence industry. The main resources for the restructuring of the military industrial complex are supposed to be obtained through military-technical co-operation with Western enterprises or through the sharing of profit from arms sales. The Southeast Asian financial crisis affected the ‘arms sales industry’. Hard currency earnings fell from $2.1 bn (1996) to $1.6 bn (1997). It seems Russia has lost its contracts in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and the United Arab Emirates. Thus, co-operation with Western companies is becoming the main channel for the military industry’s restructuring. Co-operation with Western firms in the production of air defence equipment and a tactical anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence system is essential to Russia.22 Major financial industrial groups such as MAPO (producers of MiG fighters), Sukhoi and Granit stated their long-term interests in co-operation with the NATO states in R&D, production and procurement. Two citations highlight this trend of thought. In 1997 Alexander Shokhin, First Vice-Speaker of the Russian State Duma, mentioned in his interview to newspaper Rabochaya Tribuna: It’s an open secret that NATO is a military-political bloc. For its part, Russia could benefit by becoming its raw-materials appendage, provided that it would supply the alliance’s members with all sorts of weapons. Among other things, Russia’s Sukhoi Su-35 multi-purpose warplane could be used to develop the EU-2000 (Eurofighter-2000) aircraft. Such an approach would completely meet the military and financial interests of all user countries.23 An even more daring statement came from Alexander Ageev, Department of Marketing and Strategic Planning for the Moscow Aviation Production Organisation (MAPO): Russia can enjoy some of the profits of NATO expansion… Operation of the MiG-29, alongside US-made F-16s and F-18s, in the German Air Force (which acquired 24 MiG-29s from East Germany) and in Malaysia proves that the dual solution is positive and effective. Integration of Russian-built and Europeanmade aircraft and control systems has also been tested in Greece and South


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Africa. These are the precedents for proposed collaboration among the Russian, American and West European aviation industries in the NATO expansion process. We can go forward to the East European market together, and MiG can lower the bill which the NATO and US taxpayers would have to pay for integration.24 As an example of possible co-operation a new modification of MiG-29 was shown in 1998 at one aviation fair in Europe. This aircraft was made according to NATO standards and produced by MAPO MiG and Daimler-Benz Aerospace (Germany) under the sponsorship of Rosvooruzheniye, a Russian arms exporting firm.25 Thus, having membership and not observer status in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNADs) is becoming increasingly vital for Russia. At the same time, the Russians believed that the probability of their membership status in CNAD would increase with the necessity of the NATO states to deal with rearmament costs for new members. Another area of Russia’s increased interest for co-operation with NATO was peacekeeping and emergency relief operations. On the one hand, Russia was afraid to lose control of the deployment of NATO forces (peacekeeping or emergency relief units) in the CIS states without its consent. In the period 1996–8 Russian special concern was over Ukraine and Uzbekistan, who have been part of the ‘extended PfP programme’. In the Russian view they have been trained to ‘host’ NATO troops in case of emergencies. Additionally, increasing threats to Russia’s national security also demanded co-operation with the West in that field. Some public statements of the defence and foreign policy analysts went as far as the recognition of the possibility of joint actions by the Russian Federation and NATO Combined Joint Task Forces in possible conflict areas in the postSoviet region, especially on the southern periphery of the CIS borders. These missions were portrayed as defending European security in the distant belt. For example, Colonel Igor Kopylov of the General Staff Military Academy stated: ‘It is most important for the NATO states to start planning measures to prepare themselves to help defend the territory of Russia in case of aggression from the South… It would be most advisable to clarify in advance the NATO groups of forces that should be deployed in a certain time-frame in the operational areas and be ready to fight together with the Russian forces at the distant to NATO borders’.26 Nevertheless, Russian mainstream defence analysts still support the idea of the usefulness of the joint Russia-NATO CJTF only ‘in between’ the so-called areas of responsibilities of NATO and Russia. But even mentioning the existence of these debates in Russia in the late 1990s is important. This type of discussion is essential, especially when it is considered that at that time Russia’s participation in any arrangement was still supposedly doubtful. They demonstrate to some extent that evolution in the NATO-Russia relations was unavoidable. The change of leadership in Russia and the emergence of Vladimir Putin as President Yeltsin’s successor brought some clarification in the new Russia’s policy towards NATO and European Security institutions. The official attitudes towards NATO (of the presidential team) are in line with Putin’s policy of seeking to integrate Russia with the West. At the same time as trying to achieve the goal of integrating into the world economic security system Russia sees the goal of integrating into the security structure as


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equally natural. On 3 October 2001 at the NATO HQ, President Putin said that Russia would no longer oppose NATO enlargement if the alliance could prove that it was becoming more a political and less a military organisation. It is strongly believed by Russian political analysts that during his visit to Moscow, in late November 2001, NATO secretary-general George Robertson informed the Russian government that the enlargement would definitely proceed by one pattern or another. The determination of the NATO member states to continue with the unlimited NATO enlargement reflected the state of mind both in Washington and in European capitals. In parallel British prime minister Tony Blair (16 November 2001) called for the formation of a Russian/North Atlantic Council (R-NAC) which would have a mandate to discuss terrorism and certain ‘soft security’ areas such as weapons non-proliferation and peacekeeping. The Council was to substitute the 1997 PJC accord. Blair expected that his initiative would be approved at the NATO Summit in November 2002, where the new member states were to join the Alliance. NATO plus Russia (19+1) was to be transformed into ‘20’, where Russia would have an equal part in decision-making on specific issues of mutual concern. Defence issues involving only the NATO members would remain the sole prerogative of the ‘allies-only’ 19 members NAC. It was initially believed that such countries as the US (Prime Minister Blair’s proposal was backed by the US), Germany, Canada and Italy supported the UK proposal. France had some reservations. However, on 6–7 December 2001, at the Brussels meeting of NATO ministers of foreign affairs and the NATO-Russia PJC, the reservations to British proposals were voiced. Concern was expressed by the US (primarily the military), Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Statements of reservation also came from Bonn. Decisions expected on the establishment of the new council were postponed. Instead the decision was taken to establish an expert group to prepare by February 2002 the recommendations on details of a new arrangement and ways to include the Russians in decision-making while retaining NATO’s ability to act on its own. On 7 December 2001 Moscow agreed to work towards a new decision-making council, which would eventually replace the 1997 Permanent Joint Council. Among many burning issues, NATO has to decide whether the peacekeeping missions and peace support operations will be part of the agenda for the new Russia-North Atlantic Council. Initially, the proposed idea to include peacekeeping and peace support operations in the new Council’s agenda were downplayed and, it seems, excluded for the time being from the joint agenda. However, US secretary of state Powell, during his visit to Central Asia and Russia in December 2001, pointed out that the agenda was still being discussed and that peacekeeping could easily be put on the priority list. It was important to see whether the need for a new mechanism for joint operations between NATO and Russia would be addressed within this new framework. For the Russians the ability to discuss, jointly, future out-of area operations prior to formal NATO decision is an essential element of the ‘new pattern’ of the relationship with the Alliance. On 7 December 2001 Russian defence minister Sergei Ivanov stressed on his arrival to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, that Russia was not seeking close military ties with NATO but expected to discuss the full spectrum of security issues, such as questions of opposing the new threats from terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, various conflicts and ways of solving them.27 It seems this specific topic might become the main


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disagreement point for plans to set up the effective Council. First of all, there are operational issues. Russian military and political experts strongly believe that they need to be involved in every stage of the peace support operations if they were to take part in it. The involvement includes the stage of the decision-making as well. Second, though Russia increased co-operation with the Western states in the antiterrorist campaign and support of the Western (US, French, Italian and possible UK) deployments in Central Asia, Russia is against NATO membership of the post-Soviet states, especially the CIS states, in the Alliance without its active participation in the same institutions at the level of decision making. On numerous occasions Russian officials stressed that the US/Western forces were not going to stay long in Central Asia. Despite the repeated statements, Russia was taking steps in securing its status within the CIS arrangements and legal terms for its bases in the Central Asian states—for instance, sorting the legal issues regarding a Russian military base near Tajik town Kudzhant.28 Thus, the joint decision-making on future peacekeeping in the out-of-area operations was considered to be an essential element of policy restricting the CIS states to slide to formal NATO membership and leaving Russia outside the security arrangement. As the result of difficult negotiations, the Rome Declaration ‘NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality’ was signed on 28 May 2002. It formally established the NATO-Russia Council, replacing the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council established by the NATORussia Founding Act in 1997. The new forum is designed to provide ‘a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the EuroAtlantic region’. The security issues of common interest that have been defined are the struggle against terrorism; crisis management; non-proliferation; arms control and confidence-building measures; theatre missile defence; search and rescue at sea; militaryto-military co-operation and defence reform; civil emergencies; new threats and challenges. The new NATO-Russia Council established a pattern of decision-making by consensus where the position of the NATO allies is not pre-coordinated before meetings of the Council. The NATO-Russia Council will take decisions by consensus, with all parties working ‘as equal partners’ and meeting on a regular basis to raise levels of understanding and trust. As explained in the Rome Declaration, the NATO-Russia Council ‘will work on the basis of continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determination of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions, as appropriate’.29 Thus, it is mapping out the possibilities for expanding the joint security agenda. The events of 11 September 2001 became a turning point for the relationship between the Alliance and Russia, which has reached a qualitatively new level. Russian analysts are already saying that new strategic co-operation between the West and Russia will turn out to be of greater importance in the current war against terrorism than relations with NATO.30 However, NATO-Russia relations provide an essential ground for a long-term stability framework. A new unified approach to NATO-Russia relations was demonstrated more vividly in the statements of the then secretary of the Security Council V.Rushailo, deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council Oleg Chernov and minister of foreign affairs Igor Ivanov, as well as those by other officials. They showed a co-


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ordinated approach in their assessments of the current Russia’s attitudes towards the Alliance. It was stressed that the mechanical enlargement of NATO as a military alliance had never been supported by Russia since the Warsaw Pact Treaty, or so-called Soviet military threat, was no more, and that Russia represented no threat to anyone in NATO or in Europe as a whole. More than that the Russian military component of defence was minimised in the Western direction. It becomes more difficult to justify military policy by pointing out Russia’s threat. In October 2002 secretary-general of NATO, Lord Robertson, said that once upon a time, most people in the West looked at Russia as part of the problem. No more. Today, Russia is very much part of the solution. We still have differences. And there may be some security challenges that could be resolved without Russia. But there are many more security challenges that can be resolved with her: terrorism, proliferation, ballistic missiles, crisis management, to name just the most obvious.31 On 3 October 2002 at the same high-level conference in Brussels on NATO’s future, secretary-general Robertson named NATO the ‘ark of security’ capable of responding to ‘a guaranteed supply chain of instability’. Debating the future shape and role of the Alliance, the secretary-general predicted more instability, more spillovers, more terrorism and more failed states as part of the environment, in which the ability of NATO to act as an ‘ark of security’ will be tested. The five ‘planks’ that the ‘ark of security’ rested upon, he said, were military capabilities, consultation among the Allies, co-operation with nonNATO countries, interaction with other international organisations and NATO-Russia cooperation. Six months before that speech during the presidential campaign, when trying to get the support of the Russian politicians and public for the necessity of closer relations between former adversaries, President Putin characterised the ‘NATO-Russia council of 20’ as ‘the arch of stability’ and a promising base for a new security system (19 April 2002). One can assume that the echo of the assessments was not coincidental, since NATORussia relations have come a long way during the 53 years of the Alliance’s existence. The NATO-Russia relations provide an essential ground for a long-term stability framework. The ‘Cold War basis’ has disappeared and to construct new division lines in Europe is becoming counterproductive, due to the fact that Russia is one of the main energy suppliers to Europe. The opening of the US market to Russian energy resources as part of the trend of diversification of the energy supply system after 9/11 also created additional incentives for looking differently at the foundation of NATO-Russia relations. Opening a new phase of relations with NATO, Russian officials still publicly point to the importance of other international security forums such as the UN, OSCE, EU, etc. But this should not create a problem between Russia and the Alliance, as the representatives of the NATO states themselves stress the need of the institutional interface as a blueprint for long-term security and sustainable development in the Euro-Atlantic region and world-wide. The debates on the best role and functions of those institutions in crisis management are not a problem of the past, but it could not be seen as a major division line within an ‘alliance with the Alliance’.


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However, at the moment it is most important that there are no disagreements between NATO and Russia regarding external threats assessments, the nature or character of the threats or their implications to international security. On 6 June 2002 the first meeting of the new NATO-Russia Council agreed to start practical work in the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At a press conference at the Brussels HQ (7 June 2002) the minister of defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Ivanov, confirmed that Russia was ready to carry out its responsibility in fighting against terrorism even outside its geographical zone. According to the Russian minister of defence, the events of 11 September made many people think about new mutual threats and new responses to them. These threats are outside the geographical area of responsibility of NATO or Russia; they are all in the ‘arch of instability’.32 This approach coincided with NATO interests to look at threats functionally, not geographically. In May 2002 the RF Security Council adopted Russia’s conceptual approach to the anti-terrorist campaign, summed up as: • Joint actions (including preventive measures) against terrorists should be sanctioned by the UN Security Council. • Readiness to share the burden of combating international terrorism without geographical limitations. • Concentration of international co-ordination on joint actions in combating military terrorist formations and channels of financial support for the terrorist activities. • Importance of multilevel and overlapping anti-terrorist networks. Russia does not reject the right of nations to defend themselves by preventive strikes against terrorists, but stresses the necessity of such actions being sanctioned by the UN. The importance of flexible coalitions in peacekeeping and peace enforcement or other operations is becoming obvious. Despite extending the areas of co-operation between NATO and Russia, it was stated that the new relationship and new arrangements do not intend to consider the unification or establishment of a joint military doctrine for Russia and NATO. However, the necessity of a joint educational curriculum for military establishments, as well as unification of the military doctrine for anti-terrorist cooperation, was acknowledged by both sides. NATO and Russia can intensify work on a common intelligence assessment of terrorist threats, and develop programmes that enable NATO and Russian military forces to operate together in counter-terrorist operations in the future. In developing a programme for the military role in combating terrorism, focusing on the possibility of concrete co-operation and joint actions could become an important element of future integration in the military sphere. The member states of ‘Forum 20’ also agreed to consult each other on theatre missile defence, to share experience in defence reform, to co-operate closely in logistics, training and exercises, and to look for novel solutions to common problems, including some of NATO’s biggest, such as military capability, lack of air transport and air-to-air refuelling. As secretary-general Robertson pointed out, Russia could play a part in NATO’s new drive to spend more and spend more wisely on defence to ensure that NATO could respond to new threats wherever and whenever they emerge: ‘Some of the capability gaps that the NATO countries have are capability gaps that might be filled by Russia or that


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Russia itself experiences as well’.33 As an example of opening opportunities a small-scale project is already being discussed. European Aeronautic Defence and Space Co (EADS), producer of the Airbus planes, is considering using Russian design and manufacturing for some components of the planned A400M military transport plane. EADS is already co-operating with the MiG aviation plant in upgrading the MiG-29 fighter jet. In 2002 the US ambassador to Moscow, Alexander Vershbow, mentioned that possible areas of the NATO-Russia co-operation could include ‘joint early warning, joint exercises, and even joint industrial development of missile defence systems’.34 As Russia moves closer to the Alliance, some of its defence industries could become integrated with those of Europe and America.35 Indeed, NATO membership of the Central and Eastern Europe and Baltic states increases the necessity for a single armaments market. It might make it easier for the NATO forces to use common equipment and thus work together more effectively. NATO and Russia are already working on a range of initiatives in the area of counterterrorism, including regular exchange of information and indepth consultations on issues related to terrorist threats and civil-emergency planning. One of the latest success stories was the first-ever NATO and Russia joint crisis-response exercise in Noginsk, 70 km outside Moscow, held from 25–27 September 2002. The exercise simulated an international response to a terrorist attack on a chemical plant. Crisis-response exercises are part of NATO’s cooperation programme with partner countries and are organised within the Partnership for Peace work programme under the umbrella of the EuroAtlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre. The programme covers both consultation and practical co-operation, such as military exercises and civil emergency operations. The main goal of the present Russian government is to use every opportunity available to prepare the state for potential security challenges, to create conditions for the country’s sustainable development and to ensure its engagement in the world economic and security systems. Russia-NATO relations and Russia’s approach to the anti-terrorist campaign are becoming essential for defining the main targets of its foreign policy. Russia publicly voices its understanding that NATO needs it as much and even more than Russia needs NATO in the present state of international relations and the fight against terrorism. However, it is a difficult terrain. The public opinion polls, taken on 24–26 May 2002, just before the last historic meeting between NATO and Russia, demonstrated the existence of contradictory tendencies in the public mood in Russia. On the one hand, the survey results confirmed support of the majority for the latest foreign policy agreements between Russia and the US, EU and NATO. On the other hand, the Russian population tends to judge the present outcome of the agreements as a sign of weakness and of Russia’s inability to pursue a different type of policy than the one it had been carrying out. Thus, the following results are very important to understand the political and socialpolitical atmosphere in Russia. A clear majority of 64 per cent (against –20 per cent) of the respondents considered the signing of the new Russia-NATO agreement as an important political landmark. However, only 35 per cent of the respondents support Russia’s membership in NATO, in comparison to 47 per cent who are strongly opposed to it. The practical results of foreign policy decisions such as Russia’s acceptance of the


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fact that the East European and Baltic states are becoming NATO members, the US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the presence of the US forces in Central Asia and the Caucasus are considered to be a demonstration of Russia’s weakness and unnecessarily following in the shadow of the US policies. Only 25 per cent of the polled managed to see a sign of political realism and state wisdom in the above-mentioned decisions; 31 per cent had no opinion. At the same time, the majority believes that President Putin’s deals of cooperation are the results of mutual compromise with the US and the West. More than that: 12 per cent strongly believe that Putin urges the Western partners to make significant concessions for the promises of Russian co-operation. This assessment of the effectiveness of presidential policies is quite different from similar assessments of the former USSR and Russia’s leaders. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate the limits and obstacles with which the supporters of the improving NATO-Russia relations have to deal after the Prague Summit of November 2002. Membership in the Alliance was offered to seven states, and attention was drawn to Central Asia and the Caucasus as potential areas of future instabilities and to the intensification of ‘partnership’ programmes with the states actively engaged in supporting joint antiterrorist actions. Additional Russian concerns were expressed regarding the remaining NIS-CIS partners’ intentions to apply formally for NATO membership or to adopt the NATO Membership Action Plan, as well as with the changes in the NATO command and control structures as a reflection of the USA’s UCP changes. It shows that not all aspects of the relations within the ‘alliance in the Alliance’ are completely settled and that the relationship will experience ups and downs in the future. However, one should not forget that the changes both in NATO-Russia relations and in NATO itself were prompted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States and the ensuing need for greater cooperation in dealing with challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The new stage of relationship with NATO and the synchronisation of mutual goals (first of all in combating terrorism) put forward the need for the RF government to consider changes in the official documents related to national defence and security. The changes in the political environment dictated the necessity of adjustments in the National Security Concept and all other fundamental concepts and documents defining RF defence and security challenges, strategy and operational requirements for the military and paramilitary. The required changes in the National Security Concept had to reflect first of all a new stage of relationship between NATO and Russia, as well as the consequences of consensus on joint anti-terrorist actions. Though NATO is named as such only twice in the National Security Concept, the anti-NATO sentiments coloured the document from top to bottom. For instance, in the section on ‘Threats to the national security of the RF’, of the eight threats mentioned36 only three actually became or are becoming a reality: for instance, NATO expansion to the East, the deployments of foreign troops and bases in the proximity of the Russian borders, and the weakening of the integration tendencies within the CIS. Despite these developments becoming a reality, and their supposedly negative effects on the Russian security situation, Russia’s international position and stance have improved since 2000. However, the military assessments of Russia’s security were much


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more sceptical and worrying. On 21–22 November 2002 at the NATO Prague Summit the members adopted a package of measures that were to strengthen NATO preparedness and its ability to take on the full spectrum of security challenges, including terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Thus the ‘Forum 20’ (or 27 after the enlargement of Prague 2002) will be more important than was initially considered possible. The Forum is not a back door for Russia to gain membership status, but NATO-Russia co-operation can become one of the central elements of a new global security system. The Prague Summit did not bring any surprises in NATO-Russia relations. Even prior to the Prague Summit the Russian official position has become clear in respect of the post-enlargement process and the NATO-Russian relations. President Putin expressed his belief that NATO enlargement as a whole will not undermine the system of military security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and will not undermine Russian interests: ‘I have mentioned to the secretary-general that we treasure our cooperation and political declarations on these matters, but most certainly the military institutions of Russia will be first of all assessing the military potentials that will be added with the incorporation of new member states. We are hoping that mutual military containment and a respect for each other’s interests will be the basis of the relationship between Russia and NATO’.37 The priority issues for NATO-Russia co-operation were confirmed as being in the field of anti-terrorist activity, missile defence, rescue at sea, mine clearing and humanitarian operations. An essential statement was made by President Putin at the press conference in Brussels after a meeting with the secretary-general of NATO, George Robertson, in November 2002. Though denying that the Russian government had previously addressed the issue of full-fledged membership in NATO or was checking the present possibilities, President Putin did not rule out such a possibility in the future. He said: However, if our relationship with NATO is going to develop in the same positive way as it does at this moment, if NATO is to be transforming and reforming itself internally, if our co-operation is continuing to be beneficial to the national interests of the Russian Federation, if it is to be the instrument allowing us to achieve our national interests, then our co-operation with NATO is going to expand, transform and become more comprehensive and full.38 Nevertheless, several issues were to test the newly established pattern of the RussiaNATO relationship. Among those issues were the new sets of adjustments in Russia’s Baltic relationship. As senator Victor Ozerov, the chair of the Committee on Defence and Security of the Federation Council, Russian Parliament, pointed out in 2002: ‘NATO is still remaining a military-political, and not just political alliance’, but in respect of the Baltic states’ membership ‘the significant turn in Russia’s relations with these states is not expected’.39 Even so, it does not mean that there are no sensitive issues left between Russia and the Baltic countries after the summit in Prague. On the contrary, there are several problems that need to be dealt with in relation to the states’ membership in NATO. What were the problems? The following are examples:


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• The future of the CFE arms control agreement in the Baltic region and CBMs on the CJTFs; • The expanding agenda for the ‘Forum 20’: will the Baltic dimension be considered as part of the ‘new security challenges’? • Non-interference access to the Kaliningrad operational strategic group. As one influential Russian website publication Strana.Ru indicated: ‘the NATO summit in Prague did not eliminate the existing disagreements on the conventional weapons reductions in Europe’.40 On 11 November 2002, at the meeting with NATO secretary-general Lord Robertson in Brussels, President Putin mentioned that the main concern over the issue of the Baltic states entering NATO was that none of those states had signed the CFE treaty. The president expressed hope that the membership of the three Baltic states in the Alliance would not ‘undermine the existing system of military security and stability in the EuroAtlantic region and would not downgrade the Russian national interests’.41 On 22 November 2002 a similar statement was made by Russian minister of defence Sergei Ivanov, who expressed his concern about the non-signature status of the three Baltic newcomers and stressed that in the future they would have to comply with the Treaty in one way or another. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (or CFE Treaty) was initially signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 by NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries and established parity in major conventional forces/armaments between the East and the West from the Atlantic to the Urals. Following the demise of the Warsaw Pact, collapse of the USSR and enlargement of NATO, the then 30 states/parties to the CFE Treaty signed the Adaptation Agreement at the Istanbul OSCE Summit on 19 November 1999. The original CFE Treaty established an East-West Group structure for limiting the NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional armaments/equipment (including main battle tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, artillery pieces, as well as combat aircraft—except for naval ones—and attack helicopters). The Adapted CFE Treaty provided a system of national and territorial ceilings that limit the amount of equipment present on each state’s border. According to the IISS publication The Military Balance’s 2002/3 data, the military potential of the Baltic states could hardly pose any direct threat to the RF defence or security.42 So why is there such a fuss? Article 15 of the Prague Summit Communiqué 127 (2002) specifically addresses the issue. It officially links early entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, which provided a fundamental contribution to the changed environment in Europe, to the accession to the Treaty of new NATO members and compliance of the RF on the flank level reductions: We remain committed to the CFE Treaty and reaffirm our attachment to the early entry into force of the Adapted Treaty. The CFE regime provides a fundamental contribution to a more secure and integrated Europe. We welcome the approach of those non-CFE countries, which have stated their intention to request accession to the Adapted CFE Treaty upon its entry into force. Their accession would provide an important additional contribution to European stability and security. We welcome the significant results of Russia’s efforts to reduce forces in the Treaty’s Article V area to agreed levels. We urge swift


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fulfilment of the outstanding Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova, which will create the conditions for the Allies and other States Parties to move forward on ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.43 Russian analysts specifically outline the terminology used in Article 15, when the support was expressed for the non-CFE countries that ‘stated their intention to request accession to the Adapted CFE Treaty’. The semantics of this Article suggest to Russian analysts that the NATO states expressed undoubted interest in prolonging this process. Military specialists in Russia presuppose that this position might be motivated by several facts. First of all the benefits of the ‘grey area’ have not been calculated fully by Western military experts. With NATO membership the territory of the Baltic states could become the ‘grey zone area’, allowing them to deploy an unlimited amount of weaponry and equipment.44 Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov (ret.), vice-president of the Academy of Geopolitical Studies and former head of the Main Directorate for International cooperation of the RF Ministry of Defence, in an exclusive interview given to the website publication Strana.Ru, pointed out: The Alliance is not an enemy to us. But we have to clearly understand what type of military potential is around us and what potential might be there in the future’.45 Second, in parallel to the commencement of the accession negotiations to NATO between the Alliance and the Baltic states, all the parties involved, the three Baltic states and NATO, confirmed their commitment to the Membership Action Plan (MAP). This is supposed to enhance the Baltic’s contribution to the Alliance’s capabilities. In other words, the number of forces and equipment (both of local and foreign origin) to be deployed on the territories of the Baltic states might increase as a result of the continuance implementation of the MAP even before the official entry of these states to the Alliance. Special concern was expressed by those in Moscow who were worried about the possibilities of the redeployment of nuclear weapons to the Baltic states after their accession. According to the Russian daily Izvestia, over two hundred aviation bombs and tactical nuclear weapons are deployed in seven European states. In the absence of any agreement between NATO and Russia on tactical nuclear weapons, their location and redeployment could become a major concern if moved closer to the Russian borders. The views of the RF General Staff are even more radical. It supports not just the accession of new NATO member states to the Adapted CFE Treaty but full negotiations on the Treaty provisions. The then first deputy head of the General Staff and now head, Y.Baluevski, pointed out that the Russian military ‘have no confidence that after the accession of the Baltic states in NATO, military bases will not be established on their territories, or armoured combat vehicles and aviation of the NATO states will not be redeployed’.46 No less of a problem in this respect is the NATO intention to initiate a new missile defence feasibility study to examine options for protecting the Alliance’s territory, forces and population centres against a full range of missile threats. An assumption shared by some Russian specialists is that some elements of supporting infrastructure of a missile defence system might be considered for future deployment in the Baltic region and might automatically require an increase in the Alliance capabilities aimed at defending it. Thus,


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prolonging the time of the accession to the CFE by non-CFE states is useful until all of the elements of the NATO missile defence architecture are considered to be in place. Besides, one should not underestimate the importance of the on-site inspections (as part of the CFE verification procedures) that Russian officials are keen to preserve. It is especially vital bearing in mind that NATO forces would be stationed on the frontiers of mainland Russia. ‘Russia could hardly be indifferent to the potential of the NATO military forces being deployed only a few dozens kilometres from St Petersburg.’47 Though threat of missile attack on Russia from the NATO states is not envisioned as a possible reality in the present geopolitical environment, nevertheless technologywise military assessments have to take into consideration that the time of a missile attack from the Baltic states on Moscow will shorten to 3–4 minutes. Russia’s approach of special sensitivity towards deployment (even friendly) near its borders is traditional in NATORussia relations; one need only recollect how Russia critically opposed the set up of the North-East corps in early 1998. The majority of the Russian proposals submitted for discussion in the military working group under the old PJC directly or indirectly were concerned with the implementation and deployment possibilities for the CJTF.48 Moscow believed then, and still does, that the Alliance should assume additional commitments on the non-deployment of major military contingents outside of the NATO region or on the RF borders. One of the Russian proposals in the late 1990s was to sign a CBM agreement on the exchange of information on CJTF temporary deployments that exceed the territorial limits set by the CFE Treaty. That proposal was seen as the first step in creating the CBM regime on the CJTF. The proposal on establishing the All European Code on Peacekeeping, introduced at the OSCE, was also part of the Russian overall policy towards multinational forces and their use in the European theatre. In other words, concerns about the CFE extension and the preservation of its principles were and are a cornerstone of Russia’s defence policies. Thus, Moscow’s concern over the accession of new countries, especially the Baltic states, to the Adapted Treaty is likely to increase with time rather than diminish. According to the Adapted CFE Treaty (1999), in comparison with the original document of the 1990s it is open for third parties to join in. However, any follow-up negotiations on the accession of new member states could begin only 40 days after the Adapted CFE Treaty’s ratification by all member states. The difficulty with the Adapted CFE Treaty is that it was not fully put into practice; it was ratified only by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It has not been ratified by the European states because of the conditions imposed by the Europeans on the ratification. These are linked with the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova and the closure of the Russian military bases there. The US continuously insists on the reduction of RF forces in Chechnya and RF compliance with the flank-zone limitations provided by the Istanbul decisions. The Russians are deeply dissatisfied with this approach, considering it a double standard. First of all, though Russia is reducing its military potential and presence in the aforementioned regions, it does not support the linkage between the flank reductions in the Baltic and Moldova/Chechnya. Second, the Russians reject the notion that there are any violations in the flank ceiling in Chechnya. In a response to the US claims, General Mahmud Gareev (ret.), president of the Academy of Military Sciences, formally first


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deputy of the chief of the General Staff of the RF armed forces, rejected the US statements and backed his position by presenting official statistics. In accordance with official data (as of 1 July 2002) there were 1,204 battle tanks in Chechnya (96 tanks less than allowed by the CFE limitations), 2,010 armoured fighting vehicles (130 less than allowed) and 1,495 artillery pieces (185 less than allowed). Moscow’s position is aimed at concentrating the efforts of both the NATO states and Russia on making a joint appeal to new NATO members to comply with the Adopted CFE Treaty and to show restraint in deploying their own troops and hosting foreign ones on their territories. Russian military specialists were specifically insisting on reaching the appropriate agreement among the interested parties before or at the Prague Summit. On 3 December 2002 the heads of the General Staffs of the armed forces of the state members of ‘Forum 20’ had their first meeting in Brussels since the Prague Summit. Though the technical issues of timing and procedures for the accession to the CFE Treaty were not on its official agenda, they are going to be raised again within this framework in the future. In any case, for many defence analysts in Moscow and St Petersburg addressing the issues of Russia’s security concern at the ‘Forum 20’ is an essential mission of the newly established framework. Although the CFE commitments are the primary area of concern, other issues remain to be resolved: 1 Composition of the deployment forces in the areas of joint responsibility. A major issue for the future is the potential composition of the CJTF (with Baltic participation) to be deployed in the sensitive areas of joint responsibility, for instance (and especially) in Eurasia. One of the latest examples that could be mentioned in this respect is the initiative to deploy a Baltic contingent consisting of the Baltic and Danish units in Kyrgyzstan as an extended supporting element within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as part of the antiterrorist campaign. The Russian objections to this deployment, and increased pressures (in spring 2002) on Kyrgyzstan officials, influenced the decision of Bishkek to withdraw, for the time being, its invitation to host this international deployment. 2 Non-interrupted military transit between the Russian mainland and Kaliningrad. After Lithuanian accession to full NATO membership, this issue is tremendously sensitive, especially for bilateral Russian-Lithuanian relations, and has thus far been handled remarkably well by all interested parties, including Russia, Lithuania and NATO. 3 Non-restricted access of Russian military vessels to the ports in the Kaliningrad region. 4 Regional air defence. How will Lithuania co-exist with the regional air defence system of Russia and Belarus after it becomes part of the NATO air and missile defence posture? The decision of the RF and Belarus presidents on the joint air defence system was taken in April 2000. Though the joint patrolling of the air space has been in practice since 1996, the documents for the agreement on the establishing of a regional unified air defence system were ready for signature at the end of 2002.49 In any case, the Kaliningrad region and operational strategic group of forces are an integral element of the regional air defence and missile defence system. 5 New strategic stability agreement with the US/NATO. According to Russian experts the US is considering building early warning radars not only in such states as Norway,


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Great Britain and Greenland but also in Latvia as well as in part of the NMD system. The effective area of these radars covers the flight tracks of Russian strategic missiles from the Plesetsk proving ground near Arkhangelsk (Russia’s European North).50 The importance of the security of a space launching site like Plesetsk should not be underestimated, especially considering the increasing role of space geo-strategy for the future warfare and unique characteristics of the Plesetsk space launching site.51 It is becoming increasingly important to the Russians not only to be persistent in stressing the need of the Baltic states to comply with the CFE Adaptation Treaty but also in drafting a new strategic stability agreement with the US, and maybe with NATO, that would cover the issues of co-operation in NMD and the security of space infrastructure. These, and most probably many other concerns, have still to be addressed over the next two years. It is important that nothing is overlooked that will, to any extent, determine the relationship between Russia and its Baltic neighbours. The NATO Summit Communiqué (2002) clarified the schedule of accession for new member states, with the accession talks starting immediately after the Prague Summit. The signing of accession protocols, and the ratification process, was planned to take place before the NATO Summit in 2004. The Baltic states’ membership in NATO raises a number of problems because Russia has to address various issues related to defence and security, such as border control and customs policies, etc. In view of their accession to NATO in 2004, Russia is taking steps not only in establishing better dialogue with the Baltic countries but also in creating adequate mechanisms and infrastructures that would correlate to the developments in the region. According to Russian military and security experts, military science goes through revolutionary transformations twice in a century. In the last century historic transformations took place in the 1920s and 1930s and were linked to the completion of the Industrial Revolution, and in the 1950s when nuclear weapons globalised conflict. The war against terror made it clear that we have entered into a new revolution of warfare, and it is not just linked with new technologies (new process of decision-making) but rather with the changing character of conflict. In April 2003 the parliamentary committees of NATO and State Duma met in St Petersburg to assess developments in bilateral NATO-Russia relations since the Joint Rome Declaration (2002). Lubov Slizka, vice-chairperson of the State Duma and head of the Russian delegation openly voiced concern about the non-effectiveness of NATORussia cooperation, precisely in the area of crisis management. The consultation’s mechanism on crisis management was named as a priority number one in a list of topics in the Rome Declaration that was signed on 26 May 2002. However, this specific mechanism was not activated or used for any consultations during the Iraq crisis of 2003. The Russian delegation was pointing out the necessity to start thinking about the establishment of a mechanism of operational contacts within the co-operation framework of NATO-Russia.52 Great hopes were placed on the work of a new institution, which was established within the format of ‘Forum 20’ as a follow-up of the Rome and Moscow NATO-Russia Summits. The goals of this institution are to deal with the strategic assessments of the potential challenges and threats and to provide possible solutions, and also to consider options for long-term policy planning and confidence-building measures.


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But NATO-Russia co-operation can become one of the central pillars of the global security system of the twenty-first century. Acting as a global alliance and carrying out the ‘post-Cold War’ and post-9/11 missions, with the support of the UN, NATO would be enhanced by the multiple international security networks. Opening a new phase of relations with NATO, Russian officials were still publicly stressing the importance of other international security forums such as the UN, OSCE, EU, etc. But this should not create a problem between Russia and the Alliance, as representatives of the NATO states themselves stress the need of an institutional interface as a blueprint for long-term security and sustainable development in the Euro-Atlantic region and world-wide. The debates on the best role and functions of those institutions in crisis management are not a problem of the past, but it could not be seen as a major division line within the ‘alliance with the Alliance’, as the relationship between NATO and Russia was labelled. Contacts with the EU were developing in parallel to other achievements of Russian diplomacy in Brussels. EU: the first port of call? Relations with the EU for the Soviet Union and then Russia were primarily based on the importance of economic relations between the state and the European Union. As part of the innovations of foreign and domestic policy, the first and the last president of the USSR, Gorbachev, introduced the policy of a dual-track approach towards the West.53 On the one hand, this strategy envisaged a continuing dialogue with Washington on strategic international political and military issues; on the other, economic rapprochement with Western Europe and, if possible, with Japan for the sake of the accelerated development of the Soviet economy. Robert Miller, a well-known Russian specialist, stressed that the first track was necessary for progress on the second. However, the main thrust of Soviet economic policy was concentrated on Western Europe and then the EEC, where the potentials for binding economic linkages and eventual political leverage were expected to flow; thus this track was considered much more advantageous for long-term Soviet interests. He stressed that this was the strategic rationale behind Gorbachev’s favourite slogan of a ‘common European home’.54 Intensive rapprochement with Western Europe began to take shape in 1987 and gathered pace in 1988, when largescale disarmament programmes and an alteration of Moscow’s role in central-eastern and south-eastern Europe were introduced.55 As Robert Miller pointed out, Western Europe clearly remained the primary focus of Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign policy and the most consistent target of his famous ‘initiatives’.56 Some Western specialists picked up the sense of Gorbachev’s new policies that were put forward in his speech at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in July 1989. Though in some respects the speech definitely outdated itself, the symbolism of it as a call for overcoming the divisions of Europe by a new détente process is still an essential one.57 The speech put great emphasis on the importance of the economic, political and cultural identity of the ‘common European home’. It was as if Russia wanted to guarantee its place within the intensified process of the European integration in the early 1990s. Robert Miller also believed that Russia was ‘seeking to get some kind of tenancy agreement with the “common European home”


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before the door was locked and all dealings with it had to be conducted en bloc, through a supranational EC bureaucracy’.58 Almost two decades after its initiation, Russia’s policy towards the European institutions was confirmed during President Putin’s state visit to the United Kingdom in June 2003. On two, among many, occasions relations with the EU were properly assessed as being of high priority for Russia: European identity is, first and foremost, culture, and Russia without a shadow of a doubt belongs to this part of European culture and is an active participant… Of course, we will always support not only the integration of Russia into the European economy, but will also support any positive processes in regard to strengthening Europe in the world.59 The country has chosen the European vector for its development and sees in the European vector of development one of the most important paths of mutual relations on the international arena: one of its fundamental priorities. The strengthening of partner relations with the countries of the European Union is of great importance for us.60 Within less than two decades the importance of the EU in Russian foreign policy shifted from the purely economic sphere to a wider comprehensive agenda. This historic intervention into the evolution of Russian thinking on appropriate forms of its relationship with Europe is essential for understanding the basic dilemmas and present potentials of the EU-Russia dialogue. The landmarks of EU-Russia relations almost coincide with important events in the NATO-Russia relations, and to some extent are influenced by their developments. However, undoubtedly there is an internal logic in Russia’s approach to the European Union. One could name three stages in the history of EU-Russia relations. They are: • 1994–9: start of formal contacts; • 1999–2001: transformation of the EU, emergence of the ESDP, expanding agenda and changing nature of the bilateral relationship; • 2001-current: step-by-step institutionalising of EU-Russia ties. In 1994 the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (the PCA) was signed and entered into force on 1 December 1997. EU-Russia relations within the PCA format were mostly concentrated around economic and political issues, including issues related to the promotion of democracy, rule of law, media pluralism and human rights’ observance. Initially, relations with Russia, other than practical issues covered by the PCA, were not a major factor in EU foreign policy. However, in the ‘Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia’, initiated under the German EU presidency in 1999, a move was made to discuss policy on stability and security and integrating Russia into a common European economic and social space.61 The adopted document represented a joint policy for the member states and the Union towards Russia. The main points of the long-term strategy included such tasks as consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions in Russia, its integration into a common European economic and social space, cooperation in


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strengthening stability and security in Europe, and in addressing common challenges in Europe. The EU Cologne Summit set parameters of the relationship for the last decade of the twentieth century and beyond. Since then the mutual goals have been presented as evolutionary tasks. They could be characterised in the following ways: • from economic transparency to common economic space; • extending beyond economic co-operation to justice, home affairs and internal security and to sharing experience in governance and restoration of traditional common cultural and educational space; • evolving political dialogue and security/defence dynamic. The European Voice of 30 April 2003 stated that ‘a blueprint for radically changing the ways the EU handles relations with Russia has been developed by the European Commission’.62 It seems several factors became influential and provoked changes within EU-Russia relations. For Russia the enlargement of the EU meant the incorporation of its traditional trading partners and stimulated, in addition to its internal reforms, the necessity of swift WTO membership. For the EU it meant the incorporation of new members that had both historically intense economic and political ties with Russia and anxieties regarding that country. But on the basis of their ‘know how’ they were naturally assuming a major role in the redefined EU policies towards Russia. Enlargement turned the issue of Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave within the boundaries of the EU, and free access of the Russians to this Russian region, into an important security challenge for both parties involved—Russia and the EU. Russia’s role in the EU energy supply system was expected to increase as the result of the enlargement process. However, its importance grew even more substantially due to the 9/11 terrorist attack, when the diversification of energy resources became an essential element of the EU security requirements. Russia’s oil supplies were offering alternative sources to the volatile Middle East. Internal developments in the EU itself, with establishment of the ESDP and plans to adopt the EU Constitution, brought an understanding to the EU and Russian political elite of the necessity to work intensively on upgrading EU-Russian relations. In the late 1990s and early 2000s an understanding of the urgency and proper timing for Russia’s actions and policy initiatives towards the EU was based on proper assessments of the international situation and world trends. Economic necessity Some 57 per cent of Russia’s external trade is conducted with continental Europe. In comparison, trade with the US covers only 6 per cent, and with Japan is slightly over 1.6 per cent.63 Russia has the world’s largest gas reserves and already supplies 25 per cent of Europe’s gas. It is planned that gas production and its export will increase very substantially, up to 50 per cent by 2020. It is the second biggest exporter of oil in the world and supplies 15 per cent of Europe’s oil.64 The House of Lords (the British Parliament) Report noted that the EU/Russia Energy


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Dialogue was chosen to play an essential role in creating energy security for the EU in future years. Though there is nothing new in this statement, it was significant for a number of reasons. Sub-Committee C (the EU-Common Foreign and Security Policy Committee of the House of Lords) confirmed that Russia was and will be in the future a dominant energy supplier to the EU, this being accompanied by a strong statement that Russia was not exploiting the overlap of geopolitical and economic interests, but rather putting its foreign policy on a solid economic base.65 One of the main priorities for Russia was its consistent integration in the European and global economy. For Russia, establishing a common European economic space had become the number one priority in its relations with the EU since the years of perestroika, but it was only in the early 2000s that the signs that this goal could actually be achieved in the not-so-distant future appeared. A concept of common economic space in Europe was formally presented at the EU-Russia Summit in November 2003 in Rome. Russian accession to the WTO has crucial significance for EU-Russian relations. Russian membership in the WTO was expected to greatly facilitate the development of EU/Russia trade. Regulatory convergence was essential for progress towards creating a genuinely free trade area, as was envisaged in the proposal for a common European economic space (CEES). The High Level Group, which was tasked with elaborating the concept of a common European economic space, was to report to the autumn 2003 EU/Russia Summit. The Working Group for Russia’s accession to the WTO, made up of representatives from 65 countries, debated three drafts of the final report in April and November 2002 and July 2003. In accordance with the procedure the draft is to be discussed at the WTO ministerial conference, after the Working Group endorses it and talks are completed with all the countries. Russia and the European Union were seeking to work out a common approach on the conditions for Russian accession to the World Trade Organisation by the end of 2003, according to the then economic development and trade deputy minister, Maxim Medvedkov, Russia’s chief negotiator on the WTO accession. Negotiations on Russian accession to the WTO touched on an extensive list of items. Energy dialogue is only one among many, including special consultations on the trans-shipment of gas and oil, which is related to price formation. The talks covered traditional issues of market access, including issues of regulation of trade in selected goods, such as alcohol, precious metals and stones, pharmaceuticals and cars.66 The EU programme of assistance specifically targeted helping Russia to meet the obligations of the WTO membership. The RF government was planning to wrap up the negotiations on co-ordination of the WTO accession by the end of 2004. According to German Gref, the economic development and trade minister, this key objective became the prime goal of the Russian government for 2003–4.67 Meanwhile, the EU was already providing Russia with favourable terms of access to its exports to the Union markets. The EU enlargement was to bring the EU share of Russian imports to more than 50 per cent. President Vladimir Putin confirmed at a press conference of 4 July 2003 that the trade between the European Union and Russia would grow by more than 50 per cent after the EU enlargement.68 The growth that enlargement generates in new member states is expected to strengthen, on the one hand, the EURussia economic relationship still further, and on the other to regenerate Russia’s interest in its traditional markets in central-eastern and southern Europe and the Baltic states.


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Among the requirements for speeding up the process was liberalisation of the Russian domestic market. On 22 June 2003 Viktor Khristenko, then the Russian vice-premier, pointed out that experts’ studies conducted in a majority of sectors of the economy unambiguously indicated that the encouragement of integration and the creation of liberalised regimes in economic relations ‘have got to be of tangible benefits to both Russia and the EU’. Economic liberalisation was based on the realisations of the principles of ‘four freedoms’, such as trans-border movement of commodities, services, capital, and labour force. The concept would reflect the stages, forms and time-frame for the implementation of individual elements in each of the categories of the ‘four freedoms’. Thus, the freedom of the movement of labour force would envision not only streamlining of visa formalities but also the creation of the most favourable possibilities for every citizen to perform his/her labour and carry out his/her business both in the EU and Russia.69 The proposal on free-visa travel was seen as an integral part of the further development of the concept of common economic space in Europe. It was understood that, on the one hand, the criteria and terms for switching to visa-free travel needed to be defined and set up. On the other hand, the regulations introduced were not to undermine the existing increase in people-to-people contacts and be in compliance with Russian legislation and the Shengen Treaty laws.70 One of the results of the EU-Russia Summit, held in St Petersburg, was a promise to consider the possibility of a non-visa regime between Russia and the EU, though it was unanimously agreed that it was a long-term policy plan. However, even putting this issue on the long-term agenda of the future Russia-EU negotiations was considered to be a success for the Russian delegation.71 Civil servants and parliamentarians alike voiced support for the liberalisation of the visa regime. The problem was portrayed as more of an operational character than of the substantial differences that Russia and the EU have to solve before adopting the proposal of the free-visa arrangement. For instance, during his official visit to the Netherlands (July 2003) Russian State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov lobbied for the same cause and pointed out that it was necessary to ease the transit of Russian citizens to Europe and Europeans’ travel to Russia. It was believed that part of the existing problems could be automatically solved during Russia’s upcoming accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).72 The Russians were actively using international interest groups to keep this proposal on the EU agenda. The Liberal, Democratic and Reformers’ Group in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe supported the idea to annul the visa regime between Russia and the EU member countries. The Group made a statement on 23 June 2003 urging the European Commission, Russia and heads of state and parliaments of the EU member countries to hold intensive consultations on the subject in order to define joint measures. This statement was made on the initiative from Yabloko faction member and Group vice-president Alexander Shishlov, as the Yabloko faction press service reported.73 In the late 1990s and early 2000s Russia’s strategic and pragmatic approaches to developments in the EU area were in dynamic contradiction. Certain inconsistencies in Russia’s tactical and strategic priorities in dealing with the EU in the economic sphere were clearly defined by President Vladimir Putin during his state visit to the UK in June 2003. Russia was not very interested in the strengthening of the Euro, or in the current


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integration processes, because it was selling its export goods for dollars. Also, it was paying for the goods of mass demand, which constitute the bulk of most of the country’s imports, in Euros. Therefore, it was better for Russia if the Euro remained low and the dollar higher and stronger. However, addressing strategic assessments of the future shape of European politics, President Putin confirmed Russia’s support for the European unification process as it overlapped with Russia’s own strategic interests. He clarified that unification of Europe should be the strategic goal ‘if Europe wants to play a serious and noticeable role in the world in the future, if it doesn’t want to just live out its life, but win in the increasing dramatic competitive struggle against global economy’.74 The creation of a common economic, political and secure European space was and is in the country’s strategic interests, insofar as Russia both geographically and mentally considers itself to be a part of Greater Europe. Kaliningrad In April 2003 the EU-Russian Co-operation Council was reported to have agreed a gradual transition to visa-free public travel, so that the Russians could travel freely to and within the European Union by 2007. This long-term task was confirmed at the EU-Russia Summit in June 2003 in St Petersburg. The EU was not ready yet to give the Russians visa-free access to the EU. However, the arrangements for Kaliningrad were to ensure that the Russians could move with minimum hindrance and cost between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia without disrupting the Shengen accord. It is the responsibility of each Shengen member state to have the mechanisms in place to police their external borders satisfactorily. This applies equally to Lithuania. However, none of the accession states will be full Shengen members until the evaluation process is complete in 2006. Lithuania and other new members will therefore still have internal border controls with the rest of the EU until that time, completely independently of Lithuania’s border arrangements with Kaliningrad. This type of arrangement provides flexibility and the time that was essentially needed to defuse tensions. In 2003 Russia was campaigning heavily for a special regime and for visa-free travelling between Russia and the EU. Great hopes were put on the Italian presidency in promoting debates on prospects for visa-free travelling arrangements. Russian policy experts saw in the programme presented by Italy for the period of its presidency in the EU a clear goal for bringing EU-Russia relations to a strategic partnership level. Environment Among the essential elements of international co-operation between the EU states and Russia was an extensive programme in the environmental field. The Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was considered very important and would allow the Treaty to enter into force. The main point in the Protocol is the quantitative obligations of developed countries and countries with transitional economies in the field of limitation and reduction of releasing toxic gases in the atmosphere. By the beginning of 2003 the Kyoto Protocol was ratified by 102 countries, in particular by all countries of the EU, Japan, Canada, China and Brazil. Among the countries refusing to ratify was the United States.


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In 2003 Russia was only preparing grounds for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in the State Duma. Viktor Khristenko, the then vice-prime minister of the Russian Federation, believed that the Kyoto Protocol was pushing Russia to a quality economic growth. Commenting on the opinion that Russia should not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, he pointed out that ‘the whole problem was how fast and at what quality level Russia’s economy will develop’.75 By looking at good and bad scenarios for Russian development he made the following assessment: We double our GDP by 2010. In this case according to Russia’s energy strategy, the power-consuming of GDP will be two times reduced. In this case should we be afraid of the Kyoto Protocol? No. Russia easily fulfils its requirements and it additionally has a so-called reserve of strength. In the worst scenario from the point of view of the Kyoto Protocol: we double our GDP but do not save energy. Shall we face sanctions? Possibly. However, we shall never double GDP if we do not save. So, it means that the Kyoto Protocol is pushing us to a quality growth.76 Important as it was, this policy decision was not considered in isolation from other important issues. The whole process of ratification was linked to such policy priorities, as Russia’s accession to the WTO and successful implementation of the Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme for Russia (MNEPR) agreement. It was understandable that the EU was putting its weight and efforts into ensuring that progress is made in the Russian position. Romano Prodi expressed his hope that Russia would ratify the Kyoto Protocol by September 2003 so that Europe could work together in the interests of future generations. He also mentioned Europe’s co-operation with Russia on nuclear safety. Europe will help Russia to solve the problem of spent nuclear fuel in the north-west.77 The MNEPR agreement in particular was planning to set the framework for the release of over £100 m of Western donor money over the next ten years to assist in environmental clean up and nuclear safety work in north-west Russia. Russia saw the MNEPR agreement as part of the co-ordinated international programme to help address the disarmament and environmental programmes by providing the RF government with funds and oversight monitoring of the programmes’ implementation. This goal was seen as an essential complementary programme to Russia’s domestic efforts as long as these plans were under domestic operational control. Educational programmes The EU states and the Commission increased educational exchange programmes. The EU assistance programme in Russia supported this through the Tempus programme, which worked with Russian educational institutions to improve their facilities and curricula and to ensure that these adjustments better reflected the needs of a modern European society. Tempus also provided individual mobility grants (with allocations up to €10 m per year) for Russian students to study in the EU and vice versa. Some €30 m have been allocated to programmes in Russia from 2004 to 2006.78 The EU resource centre in Moscow acted as a clearing house for all EU documents and provides important educational support with its own team of researchers. The provision of technical assistance to the government


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through the TACIS programme also exposes Russian officials, government employees, parliamentarians and experts on how the EU and its member states operate in key policy areas. Internal security The EU is also co-operating with Russia on internal security issues. As part of addressing the EU priority task in combating illegal immigration, including people trafficking, the community is co-operating with Russian partners in improving border security and assisting law enforcement agencies in tackling such crimes. The EU/Russia readmission agreement was negotiated in 2003. The EU/Russia Action Plan on Combating Organised Crime provides a useful framework for inter-agency co-operation. In 2003 Russian officials put forward new initiatives. The Secretary of the RF Security Council proposed to use Russian strategic lift for the EU Rapid Reaction forces, to intensify co-operation in the liquidation of the consequences of catastrophes and terrorist acts, and joint emergency planning.79 Russia expressed its interest in co-operation with the European Union in creating a joint/unified European law enforcement space (edinnoye pravoohranitelnoye prostranstvo). It meant first of all co-operation in the fight against drug trafficking, as well as support for the creation within the EU-Russia framework of an internal EURussian Security Council. The last mentioned proposal meant the establishment of something similar to the co-ordinating mechanism that was initially established between NATO and Russia in the late 1990s. A French proposal (of 2001, put forward 18 months before at the French-Russian Strategic Summit) about the creation of a European Security Union (on an EU-Russia basis) to deal with terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal immigrants and criminal activities could be seen as a prototype of the envisioned mechanism. Security dimension Serious calculations of better forms of co-operation with the EU security institutions became part of Russian diplomatic policy considerations, mainly as a result of developments related to the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Though efforts at generating European security autonomy can be traced back to the 1950s, during the Cold War such efforts had little success as the US engagement in NATO guaranteed the collective defence of Europe. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union, US threats to withdraw from Europe were becoming more credible. The pressures on the European states to come up with their own solution for sharing the defence burden increased. It led to the Franco-German initiative to develop a European pillar within NATO as a response to these challenges. The first step in this direction was the introduction of the concept of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in the framework of the Treaty on the European Union, which came into effect on 1 November 1993. In the early and mid-1990s a credible European contribution outside NATO was seen as unrealistic since the countries were cutting their defence expenditures. And even the WEU capability to deal with missions, which excluded territorial defence, remained limited and undeveloped. Moreover, two main initiatives that were to enhance the ability of the WEU to wage operations and strengthen the


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organisation, such as the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept80 and European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI),81 reaffirmed its operational and organisational connection to NATO. In these circumstances Russia’s choice to focus primarily on NATO in reaching new agreements in the security field was understandable and unavoidable. In fact, as long as NATO has priority in decision-making about command and control, as well as planning on the ‘out of area operation’, Russia’s interest towards establishing priority relationship with NATO as the main security and defence institution will be unchanged. But it does not mean that the emerging defence and security structures in the EU have been unnoticed or ignored by Russian officials or policy and military experts. There is a widespread misperception that in Russian policy-making the military elite has considered the EU/WEU potential as a counterweight to that of NATO. Despite the rhetoric regarding such an assumption, Russian assessments on the proper role and effectiveness of the EU security arrangements were very realistic. Even after the decision was made on the NATO-EU synergy in the security field, the WEU/EU arrangement in this area was considered to be some sort of ‘paper tiger’ by Russian military planners. However, the group of political scientists and military experts devoted to the promotion of the importance of the ESDI and Russia’s interest in the EU arrangements has been retained. These scien-tists and military experts stressed the importance for Russia to strengthen its bilateral and multilateral relations with European states, the aim being to create a European core within NATO. They were hoping that Moscow’s European partners could be relied on in cases essential to the security and defence of Russia. However, doubts regarding the ability of the EU to produce adequate Common European Security and Defence policy caused uncertainty about the effectiveness of EU– Russia ties in the defence and security field as well. Sergei Karaganov, of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policies, voiced this viewpoint extremely clearly: [The Europeans] were telling us for many years that they have a ESDP and invited us to co-operate. We said fine, let us be friendly and use these channels. But it became obvious that to be friends along these channels is very difficult, because there is nothing there and if there is, this is a policy of the lowest-class general rating. It seems [that] all [the] more or less sensible initiatives and strong political actions are put down there, and we are receiving something… that could be compared only to cold custard… It is a European problem, but it is our problem as well, because we would like to work with Europe, to be part of the common European economic and political space, so [a] strong Europe is important to us. This is not against America, but it is beneficial for us to have virtually a neighbour, strong and friendly.82 If the Cologne European Council in June 1999 established the institutional structures for the ESDP, in December 1999 the Helsinki Council provided details for the institutional mechanism, as well as setting out the so-called headline ‘goal’ of desired force levels for the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). By that time Javier Solana, the former NATO secretary-general, had been appointed as the first high representative for the CFSP, as well as secretary-general of the Council of the European Union and WEU


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secretary-general. The institutional framework was emerging rapidly. After the European Council meetings, held in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 and in Nice the following December, the ESDP was provided with operational capabilities. The Nice Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy of 4 December 2000 released details on the operational structures of the ESDP. The positions were incorporated into the text of the Treaty of Nice. For the first time, Article 25 of the Treaty of Nice admitted institutionalising the EU defence and security policy. It also introduced the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as the EU pivotal security and defence organ, exercising political control and strategic direction of the EU response in crises. The PSC also represented the initial point of contact for the non-EU member states in EU-led crisis relief or humanitarian operation. Though Russia was named among the important non-EU partners (together with Ukraine and Canada), neither the Treaty of Nice nor the documents that accompanied the summit put the Russian Federation in the category of preferential allies. Between the Feira and Nice meetings considerable progress was made in the operational institutionalisation of the relationship between the EU new security structures and NATO. An Interim Security Agreement was concluded between Javier Solana, the high representative of the CFSP, and George Robertson, the secretary-general of NATO. A series of meetings between the Interim EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) in September and November 2000 were followed by the establishment of new and permanent NATO-EU consultation arrangements that started functioning shortly after the Nice Council. By the EU Council’s decision, January 2001, two new institutions—the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS)—were formally established and strengthened in delivering military advice and early warning assessments to the PSC.83 Both institutions became permanent in mid-2001. In addition, in 2001 the Capabilities Improvement Conference of the EU Ministers of Defence agreed to the European Capabilities Action Plan. It was proposed as a combined measure of improvement of the effectiveness and efflciency of European defence efforts, using existing or envisioned co-operation between countries or group of countries; closing a capabilities gap and creating additional capabilities on a national and voluntary basis; and for co-ordination between the EU states as well as for EU-NATO harmonisation.84 According to Sir Rupert Smith, there was ‘about a 60 per cent commonality between the EU capability gap and the DCI (NATO) requirements’.85 The introduced changes were strengthening the arguments of those in Russia who were stressing the importance of parallel intense negotiations with the Europeans on the terms of Russian participation in the emerging ESDP. At the same time the developments were feeding the arguments of those who had been very sceptical towards the ESDP from the start. This group of political scientists and politicians was promoting bilateral strategic partnerships and co-operation with regional and subregional groupings if they had the potential to play more or less independently on the regional-local level. The second option also deserves detailed clarification. However, first let us look closely at the supporters of further engagement. Looking back at the evolution of Moscow’s approaches to the ESDP one could easily see a pattern as well. In Cologne, 1999, a co-operation framework for work with Russia was set up. The EU Council defined the agenda, mechanism and priorities of the relations, and put forward the concept of co-operation in the defence and security sphere.


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Even then, Russia—though with certain reservations based on the assessments of current effectiveness of the new mechanism—demonstrated a keen inter-est in establishing a formal relationship with the new EU institutions. Soon after the June 1999 EU Cologne Summit, Moscow adopted a mid-term strategy on relations with the EU: ‘Strategy for the development of relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union in the medium term (2000–10)’,86 which was deliberately made very public. This document was in line with Russia’s traditional support of security and defence architecture in Europe that would provide an overlapping co-operation among the subregional groupings, institutions and organisations under the co-ordinating role of the OSCE or/and UN. This Russian vision of its role in the security arrangement in Europe was confirmed by its endorsement of the ‘Charter for European Security’, adopted at the Istanbul OSCE Summit of November 1999. By that time Russia had already demonstrated that its negative reaction towards NATO enlargement and military-political countermeasures did not automatically create a similar reaction towards EU enlargement or towards its European military component in this case. In the Joint EU-Russia Statement (29 May 2000) President Putin expressed positive reaction towards establishing a joint security and defence posture of the EU and noted the possibilities for co-operation. Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, former head of the Department of International Co-operation, RF MoD, addressing the French Institute of International Affairs at the beginning of 2003, explicitly stated that Russia did not consider the EU anti-crisis defence and security mechanism a potential threat to its national interests. The increased emphasis on bilateral relations should not be viewed by the European players as an attempt to split the EU alliance, but rather as an additional component of Russia’s integration efforts to become an active member of the European community. Russian specialists supporting Russia-EU co-operation stress the possibility of joint interests in at least four areas: • in defining the conceptual framework of the ESDI and joint defence and security capability; • in analysing the potentials for joint projects and co-operation in military-technical and military-economic areas; • in planning future joint European operations under the St Petersburg tasks; if Russian participation is envisioned in them, the state should be included in planning the operations; • in increasing co-operation in non-military, preventive areas of crisis management, as in cases of emergency planning and activities. The EU-Russia Summit, held in Paris in October 2000, offered Russia a promise of opening consultations on defence and security matters between the parties. The Joint Declaration, ‘On Strengthening Dialogue and Co-operation on Political and Security Matters in Europe’, defined a framework of bilateral cooperation in crisis management.87 The interest in co-operation in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation was revealed. Russia expressed its willingness to participate in the EU-led crisis-management operations, if certain conditions were satisfied. Russia requested the authorisation of any EU operation by the international community, which meant that the missions were to be


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based on a mandate from the United Nations or OSCE. It also requested in advance agreement on the terms of Russia’s engagement, especially on the EU consent to involve the RF at the starting planning point of any EU-led operation. The stipulation raised sensitive issues in bilateral relations and questioned the essence of the ESDP. This approach was similar to the one adopted by Russian officials in the discussions with NATO on joint peacekeeping operations. Russia made it clear that it would like to see the opening of regular meetings between the PSC and the ambassador attached to the Russian Permanent Mission to the EU in Brussels. This request was not about ‘keeping the appearance’ of a great power, ‘status’ or a ‘representation mission’. Russian experts recognised in time the nascent mechanism and political and security arrangements being established in Europe, and Russia therefore intensified attempts to get itself on board the new European arrangement before its completion. By midsummer 2001 both the EUMC and EUMS became permanent military organs within the EU. Russia signalled its interest in moving from dialogue to co-operation in joint threat assessments, contingency planning, common positions, and joint actions and decisions, including joint operations/missions in the conflict areas. However, it asked for the clarification of a geographical area, where the EU would prefer to play a leading role and where it would be more acceptable for the EU to co-work with the third party, allowing it to lead the operation. This point is very important in understanding the limits of Moscow’s acceptance of the EU-Russia missions. In October 2001, as a response to the growing necessity of co-operation in the counterterrorist campaign, the above-mentioned request—for regular consultations at the PSC— was granted. The framework and procedures were established for monthly consultations with the EU Political and Security Committee at the ambassadorial level. The EU high representative and the Russian minister of foreign affairs hold regular consultations on international developments and crisis management issues. The decision coincided with the adoption of the joint ‘Resolution on the Fight against Terrorism’ (October 2001). In accordance with this declaration the following measures were advised: consultations on the unification of the legal base of co-operation, co-operation against money laundering and the accumulation of criminal funds, information-sharing about terrorist organisations and their activity. This was seen as an important addition to co-operation in the St Petersburg tasks, considered an important item in the EU-Russia agenda. In May 2002 agreement was reached at the EU-Russia Summit in Moscow concerning Russian representation at the EUMS. It was decided that a Russian officer would be appointed as liaison to the EUMS to lay grounds for military-to-military co-operation in crisis management. According to the EU guidelines for the EU-led operations, as a contributor to a EU-led operation Russia would be entitled to appoint a liaison officer to the planning staff and could participate in the operational control of the joint operation, as could any other member of the joint force. But the strategic planning of the ESDP mission was only within the EU member states’ competence. However, Russia would have preferred to have certain rules in place for a joint operation under the EU command, which at that point did not exist. Thus, the May 2002 Moscow Summit formally opened the military-to-military contacts between the EU and Russia and set an agenda for the co-operation programme in crisis


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management. To some extent this approach was part of the early EU decision to identify the format of the participation of non-member states in EU missions and exercises. The starting point, in Russian opinion, was to reach an understanding on basic principles regarding conflict prevention and crisis management in order to prepare both parties for possible EU-Russia joint operations. However, even at the present state of affairs Russia can become an operative partner of the EU in the sphere of security, considering that Europe is developing its own defence model. EU-Russia relations in the security sphere go beyond political dialogue. Russia has expressed its interest in participating in the ESDP operations in the Balkans and pledged to send five police officers to the EU’s first ESDP operation, the EU police mission to Bosnia. The minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov, promised Russian participation in the mission in his interview on 11 July 2003.88 The EU has agreed to invite Russia as an observer to its first crisis management exercises. It was especially important, bearing in mind further developments like the June 2002 decision of the Council of Europe to adopt a plan for defending the external borders of the EU member states. The first testing of a multinational joint border patrol, a sort of prototype of the joint EU border police, took place in Germany from 4–13 December 2002. Germany, Poland, Italy, the UK and Greece took part in this experiment.89 It was believed that due to the rather indifferent attitude of the Russian public and political elite to the EU, their reaction to the deployment of the EU-led international contingents in the FSU, instead of the Russian forces or peacekeeping units, if not supportive would definitely not be antagonistic. It seems that this assumption was a little bit too optimistic. The EU proposals concerning Transdniestria and Abkhazia were not received with overwhelming support in Moscow. On the other hand, the Russian proposal to consider a joint operation or mission with EU units’ participation under Russian command did not generate exceptional enthusiasm in the EU member states either. Nevertheless, it seems important to reveal some details of a possible mission in the postSoviet space in detail. A multinational peacekeeping contingent under the aegis of the UN can be brought to Moldova by the end of 2004, according to William Hill, the OSCE representative and head of the OSCE mission in Moldova. The EU did not send a request on participation in Moldavian peacekeeping. However, at present the co-operation of the OSCE and EU on this issue is under discussion. Objectively the European Union is interested in the joint multinational mission. As Romania, a neighbour of Moldova, is preparing to join the EU in 2007, the European community would like to have a stable and predictable situation on its new borders. On the initiative of Holland, the chair of the OSCE, the EU has already considered the possibility of using its peacekeeping forces in Moldova.90 There was an understanding in the EU that the capability’s shortcomings demand cooperation with those non-EU states which could provide assistance. For instance, the press secretary of the commissioner on foreign affairs of the EU said to Swiss newspaper Tagblatt that the EU military capabilities were quite limited. He pointed out that therefore both Ukraine, neighbouring Moldova, and Russia, which still has a military base in Transdniestria, could include their troops in the international peacekeeping contingent. Experts believe that the genuine reason for these conceived changes were linked to the fact that by the end of 2003 Moscow pledged to withdraw its weapons and military


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contingent from Transdniestria. By this time a new joint constitution of Moldova and Transdniestria was scheduled to have been worked out. A political declaration by both countries and a document on the mechanism of guarantees (including military) for the next stage of the settlement’s implementation were expected to be signed as well. There was no unanimity among Russian experts on the assessment of the EU plans. There were some Russian analysts who graded the proposal with a certain level of suspicion as a possible intention to use this new situation for pushing Russia out from the region. In accordance with this logic, Russia was bound to lose its commanding role in the region. However, some view the proposal as direct EU support of the Russian proposal on security guarantees (including military) for the Moldova-Transdniestria settlement. This idea was promoted by the head of the RF president’s administration Alexander Voloshin during his 2003 visit to Moldova and Transdniestria. Tiraspol supported these Moscow’s plans, while Chisinau did not even comment on the situation. It is likely that it was not by chance that soon after Alexander Voloshin’s visit the head of the OSCE mission made the above-mentioned statements, which were meant to exert influence on Chisinau to respond to the new security guarantees approach.91 Developments in the ESDP provided Russia with opportunities to explore other options in co-operation with the EU. The US defence budget for 2003 is about $390 bn; the joint defence budget spending of the 15 EU states is about $160 bn. In 2002 the US spent over $100 bn on mili-tary R&D in comparison to the $40 bn spent by the European states on new weapons programmes. The creation of the interstate agency dealing with armaments and strategic R&D was considered as an attempt to create an alternative to the American Center for R&D of new weapons systems. The increasing loss of traditional markets by European weapons producers stimulated support for the initially French idea to establish exclusively European arms producers.92 Russia’s long-term plans for establishing military-to-military and political-military relations with the EU included its interest in joint R&D and joint servicing and production plans. On the one hand, the time is perfect for long-term planning and for exploring interest in joint ventures in the military-technological field. On the other hand, the time is not so favourable because by establishing a joint European defence and security policy the European states would have to go through a period of elimination of the duplicating facilities, installations, infrastructure, etc. Thus, to find a proper longlasting partner in these circumstances is quite a challenging task. In this respect Russia’s proposal on the joint European Missile Defence should not be seen as just a tactical measure aimed to influence its negotiations with the US on the BMD and ABM Treaty. The proposal was aimed at exploiting the technological capabilities of potential parties involved in establishing long-term co-operation in the military and dual-purpose R&D field. As recognition of this long-term strategy, one should mention the bilateral agreement signed by France and Russia during their summit in February 2003. Russian president Vladimir Putin said that Russia did not intend to help or hinder the processes taking place at the moment in European defence policy: We are interested in what is happening in Europe in this field. Everything taking place in a united Europe is being done to maintain world stability. This approach suits us fine. The only thing is that all actions should be clear and


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transparent. These processes are taking place in Europe regardless of whether Russia wants it or not. We do not intend to hinder or help them. We are ready to work together, particularly in the field of information.93 Interest was expressed in co-operation at all levels, including every institutional level. Alexander Alexeyev, ambassador-at-large in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, pointed out in March 2003 that ‘the Russian Federation is willing to participate in the ESDP as a partner, providing that necessary mechanism and rules could be worked out’.94 The call for establishing a formal institutional relationship between the Russian Federation and the EU was put forward in recent times by Russia soon after the Paris Summit in October 2000 and is still on the agenda. Russia’s officials considering the EU CFSP manifestations were pushing for the adoption of a new institutional mechanism that would give the state some kind of association with the structures being set up under the ESDP. Though lobbying for such arrangements Russian diplomats and military personnel were keen to reassure that there is no intention of undermining the existing Russian link to NATO by 2003. However, it seems that in order to find a proper type of association with ESDP arrangements, both Russia and the EU will have to test themselves. On the one hand, one should examine Russia’s willingness to put its weight and capabilities on the ground in ‘out of area missions’, like Afghanistan, where the interaction and coherence between alliances like NATO and the EU, international organisations, NGOs and individual member states’ contributions are being blended. On the other hand, it will become important to demonstrate the EU readiness to accommodate its and Russia’s interests in the creation of stable regional security arrangements. It is especially important in view of the pattern used in Afghanistan by establishing a network of regional provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) under the mandate of the United Nations. For the time being the EU has resisted signing a legally binding agreement setting up institutional arrangements in the defence and security sphere before the ESDP would fully reveal itself, especially in relations with NATO. The dialogue between the European Union and Russia on the European Security and Defence Policy, although at an early stage, was developing well. With growing co-ordination between NATO and the EU, the military-to-military co-operation of both organisations with Russia is expected to become even easier and complementary. However, in actual fact the mechanism is already being put in place. The creation of the common economic space, with increasing interdependency in the energy fields, evolving joint security and defence arrangements, is only a matter of time. The establishing of separate security and defence arrangements outside the framework of the ESDP for a group of European states, and Russia’s support of these intentions, only provides evidence for these developments. Russia and two-layer core of the ESDP In October 1997 during the Council of Europe Summit in Strasbourg, the German, French and Russian presidents announced their intention of establishing the trilateral consultation mechanism. This particular development has been seen as an essential goal for Russian diplomacy. Unfortunately, Western scholars tend to see and judge this line of Russian


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reasoning and activity primarily as an institutional ‘zero sum game’ that Russia was playing between NATO and the WEU/EU.95 Though this type of reasoning has its own logic, it would be too simplistic to limit Russian intentions and policy assessments only to support for the institutional competition and exclusive interest in the diminishing US influence in Europe. Russia’s policy in Europe was always multi-channelled and multidimensional, based on traditional geopolitical, geoeconomic and geo-strategic considerations. In this respect the 1997 announcement was a very significant Russian achievement that revealed the intense diplomatic and business activity of the last 10–12 years. It anticipated to some extent the trilateral meetings of 2003, which defined the position of these states on Iraq and their role in the UN Security Council on this issue. Despite the overall agreement among the EU member states on their joint and unified approach in the security and defence sphere with Russia, there are some essential differences in the individual states’ policies in this vitally important area. The states involved in the so-called mini-summit that took place in Brussels in April 2003 first of all see additional opportunities in their relations with Russia in upgrading the ESDP capabilities. Some EU member states point out the necessity of being certain that the relationship with Russia would not undermine their ties with other partners, especially in security and defence. For instance, the UK’s main security dialogue with Russia is through NATO. Moscow-based newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta cited Gerhard Schroder, who commented on the mini-summit of the four in Brussels: ‘The summit took place in an environment of a Europe in need of a new policy… The issue is not that there is too much of the United States in NATO, but rather that there is too little of Europe there’.96 The newspaper then drew the conclusion that ‘[t]hese were the reasons that required the changes in European policy’.97 According to Russian mass media, officials in Moscow not only applauded the decision to create the EU defence headquarters and set up the nucleus of the EU Rapid Reaction force that was made as the result of the meeting of Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg in Brussels on 29 April 2003, but formally endorsed the idea. RF foreign minister Igor Ivanov said that ‘the meeting marks the start of a process at the heart of the European Union’ and that Russia would follow ‘closely how it develops’.98 In that respect J.Solana’s visit to Moscow in spring 2003 had a special meaning for Russia-EU relations. The negotiations that took place between J.Solana and his Russian counterparts—at that time Igor Ivanov, the minister of foreign affairs, and Vladimir Rushailo, the secretary of the Security Council—confirmed the intentions of both sides, Russia and the EU, to strengthen EU-Russia relations in defence and security fields. Most importantly, both sides expressed their support for promoting bilateral programmes, taking into account the decisions of the April 2003 mini-summit of four states in Brussels. Relations with the EU are strategic for Russia. Russia is interested in a common safe Europe without division lines. It is necessary to broaden economic, defence and security co-operation. That was the target of the resolutions of the Russia-ZEU Summit held in St Petersburg in May 2003.99 The analysis of the dynamics of EU-Russia and NATO-Russia relations allows making certain observations. Russian defence and security policy focus will be placed on relations with NATO as long as this institution is going to be in charge of taking any


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decisions in the defence and security network NATO-EU/ESDP. However, the role of the Europeanbased arrangements (including those based on the decision of the April 2003 mini-summit in Brussels) is going to be treated with increasing seriousness and sensitivity as an important element of Russian European defence policy. Additional factors might speed up these developments. On the one hand, is the acceptance by the EU ESDP of Russia’s Eurasian interests; on the other, it is the inability of NATO to activate the early warning and crisis prevention consultations in the ‘20’ format in time, as it failed to do during the Iraq crisis in 2003. For the first time in history Russia and the EU have so much in common that it allows them to preserve friendship and not to be involved in conflicts. EU high representative for common foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, believed that a very important market exists in Russia that may be used by EU states to expand contacts, particularly in the economic sphere. He noted that the EU understood that Russia had friendly partners not only in the West but also in the East.100 Institutional changes: looking beyond 2004 By mid-2002 it became clear that there was an increasing need to adopt a long-term strategy for EU-Russia relations. The EU/Russia relationship outgrew the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) to some extent. Though there was no specific position adopted by the EU Council it was assumed that, due to important changes that occurred in both the EU itself and in bilateral EU-Russia relations, the basic terms of relations with Russia have to be reviewed. Considering the existing time-frame of the EU enlargement process and the conclusion of negotiations on the future EU constitution in 2004 at the Intergovernmental Conference, the same year is to become the target for setting new guidelines and parameters for expanding relations between Russia and the EU. After all, the effectiveness of EU external actions in the context of the Convention on the Future of Europe (EU constitution) was to depend to a large extent on a clear and fully defined relationship with its main trade and political partners, including Russia. Though the EU Common Strategy on Russia was scheduled to be reviewed in 2004, the EU Council was examining the options of making the Common Strategy more operational and concise as early as the spring of 2003. Moscow, as well, was pressing for a more formally institutionalised relationship. The obstacles in day-to-day work related to the inefficiency of the insti-tutional system were recognised by both the Russians and Europeans alike. Presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky pointed out the difficult decision-making process and the need to address the problem of bureaucracy in the European Union.101 The EU was still seen by its Russian counterparts as terribly inefficient, while too many agreements reached at the EU-Russia Summits were implemented very slowly.102 Some British and international experts at the House of Lords inquiry in 2002, and during parliamentary debates, expressed similar dissatisfaction. Proposals were put forward with the aim to increase the efficiency of the EU institutions dealing with Russia and to stimulate better co-ordination among the member states and the EU institutions. For instance, the British House of Lords committee advised on the creation of the ‘Russian Office’ in the EU that would act as a co-ordinator and raise the profile of EU-Russia dialogue.


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Despite criticism of the EU institutions, both sides confirmed their interest in preserving the existing structures that were effective within the framework set by the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), including the Co-operation Council, and the Co-operation Committee and its sub-committees. The aforementioned committees were instrumental in improving co-operation in several areas, for example in customs and border control. The PCA remained an important and useful channel for dealing with trade and economic issues. The introduction of the new PCA trade dispute settlement mechanism, though still to be fully tested, was seen as an element of improvement in the resolution of technical trade issues and in freeing up the agendas of the Co-operation Council and the Co-operation Committee for discussion of wider EU-Russia issues. The important arrangement for Russian citizens’ transit across the enlarged EU to access the Russian Baltic Sea region of Kaliningrad was agreed within the structures of the PCA as well. In 2002/3 the co-ordinating role in the EU was played by an office in the Commission headed by the external relations commissioner Christopher Patten. The office, for instance, performed a co-ordinating role on the EU side in preparing for the EU-Russia meetings. The Council (and its Secretariat) shares responsibility for policy towards Russia with the Commission and has sole authority in certain areas of the EU/Russia relations. There are different levels of contacts between the EU and Russia, including summits, meetings of heads of the Commission and members of the RF government, as well as recently added monthly briefs on such issues as policy, security and defence between the Russian ambassador to the EU and chairman of the EU. The EU, represented by its high representative for common foreign and security policy (HR-CFSP) Javier Solana, developed and deepened the relationship through a series of summit meetings, which still continue. However, the possibility of improving EU coherence could eventually be achieved by bringing bilateral relations in line with the framework’s guidelines. In some respects the unofficial summit in St Petersburg could be called ‘a dress rehearsal’ for the Rome EU-Russia Summit (4–5 November 2003). The St Petersburg Summit adopted resolutions on the development of Russia-EU relations, and the launch of a new co-operation mechanism: the Russia-EU Permanent Partnership Council. These decisions were discussed at the November 2003 EU-Russia Summit. Though the increased and broadened co-operation between Russia and the EU is highly desirable for both sides, both parties immediately defused the talks that followed the proposal by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi that Russia and Israel should be allowed in. He made it just before assuming the rotating EU presidency on 1 July 2003. Igor Ivanov, the then RF minister of foreign affairs, dismissed the suggestion as groundless and premature. The European Union officials made it clear that the EU was not about to shift policy to allow Russia to apply for membership. EU external relations commissioner Christopher Patten and enlargement commissioner Guenter Verheugen said that the EU policy towards Russia did not involve proposals to invite it to join while closer trade and political co-ordination, and ‘a new neighbourhood policy’, were planned with Russia. As part of this framework regular political dialogue and preferential trade deals would be offered. Easy access to West European energy and transportation markets, and help to combat corruption, drugs trafficking, illegal immigration and law


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enforcement are in the framework as well. As part of the work to get these ties closer, the Commission said it would set up a task force, headed by Patten and Verheugen. Meanwhile a creation of a task group ‘3 plus l’ (France, Germany, Britain and Russia) in March 2004 could be considered a very important addition to bilateral ties and Russia-EU contacts, as well as a highly promising development for the future European security landscape as a whole. The initiative proposed by France received support among the other participants. The first session of this integration task group took place in mid-April 2004. Establishing new forms of co-operation with international organisations, Russian foreign policy gurus were not forgetting their traditional interest and support for the allembracing organisation in Europe, the OSCE. OSCE: still important The history of relations with the OSCE was quite dramatic as well. The Helsinki Act became a symbol of détente between the West and the East after the Cold War. This historic document was seen as a channel for establishing co-operative relations and a sphere of the most severe ideo-logical confrontations, especially on the humanitarian issues within the framework of the OSCE third basket. In the late 1990s, with the transformation of Eastern Europe and changes in the New Independent States, the former republics of the Soviet Union after the USSR disintegration, the OSCE was considered by the Russian authorities as the main institutional umbrella in the security field for European and Eurasian states. Russian policy in Europe proceeds from an assumption that the OSCE is a proper functioning regional organisation based on the UN principles and the Paris Charter (1990). The approval of the Charter at the OSCE Summit in November 1999 became very important for the Russian political elite. The RF believed that the organisation had possibilities to become the institution mainly responsible for practical peacekeeping and early warning monitoring, as well as for post-crisis reconstruction. Russia was hoping that some of the NATO functions would be shifted to the OSCE. A lot of attention was given to CBM for Central and Eastern Europe and CBM concerning the CJTFs deployment in the region, as well as CBM for the sea activities. The adoption of the Vienna agreement and CFE Treaty, practical implementation of the Open Ski Treaty, are considered important for promoting stability in Europe. At the beginning of this century, as a result of all the changes and challenges of the last decades, the OSCE was also going through a period of transformation and rebalancing the three dimensions of its work (political-military, economic and environmental and human). The reform of the OSCE was not intended to change the political nature of the organisation but rather was aimed at improving the political and administrative management of the OSCE, transparency, efficiency and coherence. Russia supported a New Security Charter of the OSCE for the twenty-first century that was signed in Istanbul in November 1999. However, Moscow objected to the changing of the principal arrangement in the OSCE from consensus to majority voting. The latter was perceived as a condition for creating a legitimate base for the coalitions of the willing (CJTF). This


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tendency was seen as a legitimisation of new procedures for decisions on the use of force outside the UN Security Council framework by using simplified procedures within the OSCE. The OSCE played an important role in promoting democratic values throughout the OSCE area and bringing the organisation closer to citizens, establishing the universally acceptable procedures and principles of democratic elections. As part of its expanding agenda, the OSCE was looking at the new challenges to its member states—for instance, the sustainable use and protection of natural resources, including quality of water. This work was being done as part of the policy assessments of the conditions required for sustainable developments in the OSCE regions. Throughout its history the OSCE has demonstrated an understanding of the need to balance the decisiveness of measures against terrorism and the need to preserve democratic institutions and human rights. It joined the efforts of the UN, NATO, European Union, Council of Europe and other international organisations in coordinating the fight against terrorism. The OSCE Code of Conduct defines the principles regarding the use of armed forces and at present is a key instrument in the organisation’s anti-terrorism efforts. Democratic control over military and security forces is a key issue for the OSCE. The organisation sponsored and initiated roundtables and training sessions on the role of armed, paramilitary and police forces and intelligence services in democratic societies. The fight against terrorism became a priority objective for the OSCE after 9/11. The OSCE ‘Charter on the Prevention and Combat of Terrorism’, proposed at the OSCE Ministerial Troika meeting on 12 June 2002, was adopted at the following Ministerial OSCE meeting in December 2002. The long-term strategy in preventing and combating terrorism required a comprehensive programme based on the promotion and consolidation of the rule of law, democratisation, respect of human rights, tolerance, and religious and political freedom. It was vital that the fight against terrorism should not just be military, but should also include diplomatic initiatives, economic assistance and political efforts, and, when possible, was seen to be dealing with the root causes. The role of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly was unquestionably high in this respect. The Final Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted at the 11 Annual Session (‘Confronting Terrorism: A Global Challenge in the Twenty-first Century’) addressed the political, economic and human rights aspects of the international fight against terrorism. The goal of the OSCE was to provide security and preserve human rights. The OSCE became an important element in the justification of the Russian internal domestic reforms, legitimisation of the election process, a learning exercise in democracy process, and in addressing the cross-European-Eurasian challenges. It was important for Russian practical policies in linking the work done under the CIS framework with activities of the OSCE under a wider security and development umbrella. Nevertheless, for Russia it was more important to stress the unique characteristics of the OSCE as a unifying European security institution that was set up with the goal to address the challenges that were dividing European states. In view of the OSCE transformation President Putin once again used the opportunity to put across the Russian vision of the tasks and main goals of the organisation in his interview of 4 September 2003. Addressing the foreign policy issues in the wake of the Moscow Russian-Bulgarian


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Summit, he stressed the importance of the OSCE in dealing with such main security challenges as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The hope was expressed that the OSCE would not be fragmented in addressing only regional and subregional issues with the relevant groupings, but that it would act in unifying way in Europe and Eurasia—especially during the coming Bulgarian presidency in 2004. Regional and subregional institutions As part of establishing and preserving the continuity of the institutional security web in Europe a set of overlapping comforting measures was implemented in the region. They could be characterised as blurring the division lines that might be imposed with NATO and the EU expansion. Among such measures, for example, were P4P security-political consultations; co-operation within regional and subregional groupings, intensified reliance on existing new arms control agreements and regimes. In the 1990s Russia assessed this policy as an extension of the so-called ‘buffer policies’. The Russian approaches were concentrated on promotion of the equal security guaranties for every state in the region, disregarding whether a country was a part of the military alliance or not. Russia was against formal subordination of the regional institutions and the creation of an hierarchy of international organisations. Of most interest to the state were the initiatives that carried a combination of economic and military elements in the co-operation programmes. One of the aims and tasks of these programmes was to engage the Russian regions, for instance the North-west FD. The Northern European Initiative (NEI) was officially launched in September 1997 in Bergen, Norway. The NEI encompasses the old Hanseatic League, including Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the Baltic nations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as Poland, northern Germany and Russia’s north-western regions. The Russian regions that are involved in the plan are Kaliningrad (Russian enclave—disputed territory), Karelia, St Petersburg, Novgorod, the port of Murmansk, and the mining outpost of Nikel. The focus of the project is interregional and cross-regional economic co-operation and joint ecological campaigns. For example, the local budget of Nikel mainly depends on foreign investments. International ecological assistance to the denuclearisation of the Russian navy in Murmansk was another important element of the NEI. The programme, though a joint venture of the US and European states, is very much an American initiative. It is in line with US official policy aimed at promoting the process of regionalisation in Russia. With Finland’s presidency of the European Union, the role of the European participants was intensified. However, there was more to NEI than economy and ecology. The NEI was also used as an additional channel for the integration of the Baltic nations into Western organisations. The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Barents Council were oriented at the promotion of economic co-operation and trade. All these programmes were and are viewed by the Russian side as an opportunity to attract investment in the regions through region-to-region co-operative efforts, as well as a positive example of regional co-operation in the OSCE area. These types of relations between the Russian regions and the regions of the EU member states, or EU associated


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partner states, were seen by the RF as a chance to keep the door to the EU and NATO open. The Northern Dimension, the EU programme, is aimed at encouraging co-operation in areas such as energy and the environment in the northeastern European region, including the Russian regions. Moscow understands the multilevel Western-US policy towards the Baltic area. It believes that the way military co-operation is dealt with in the region in practice means pushing the RF out from co-operation in the military sphere in the region. To counter this tendency Russia introduced the idea of overlapping security guarantees from Russia and NATO, as well as the CBM regime for sea activity in the Baltic area. Both initiatives were rejected by the Baltic states. It seems that for the time being the options left for the RF are: • co-operation between the regions; • lobbying for the CBM on the CJTF; • stalling as long as possible the ratification of the border agreements between Russia and two Baltic states; • playing on the different interests of the Nordic states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) and supporting the special Russian-German relationship. In the 1990s Moscow was sending a message that the admission of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the NATO ranks would constitute a clear act of hostility against Russia, and that this would further complicate ties between Russia and the West at the start of the twenty-first century. Russian foreign policy experts were referring to the study on NATO enlargement in order to back their arguments for the non-readiness of the Baltic states for NATO membership. After 2000 Moscow’s approach was concentrated on intense economic co-operation, especially in the energy and communication fields. Russia was re-establishing itself economically and politically in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. The RF position towards the regional/subregional institutions was in constant adjustment, along with the changing foreign policy priorities. Initially, official Russia demonstrated interest in any substitute for the formal NATO membership of the bordering countries. Its policies at that time were led by the objection to create effectively functioning closed regional and sub-regional caucuses within the wider security institutional networks. Russian interest in the CIS states increased after 2000, as the following chapters will show.

3 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS IN BRIEF Russia’s attitudes and policy priorities towards the Western partners were always played hand in hand with carefully accompanied bilateral relations. Sometimes those partnerships were dictated by a traditional set of economic considerations and the necessity to balance the powerful players. Sometimes the choices were dictated by the best possible options for the coalitions within the international institutions and organisations. In other words, Russian policies in the last decade of the twentieth century, and at the beginning of the twenty-first, were defined on the basis of historical traditions and concrete practical realities. Though there are many works published about the priorities of Russian foreign policy choices, one among those many deserves special attention. Robert H.Donaldson and Joseph L.Nogee provided a very realistic assessment of Russia’s priority list of bilateral relations in Europe. In their book, The Foreign Policy of Russia. Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, they point out that throughout the 1990s the primary advocate in regional forums on behalf of Soviet and then of Russian integration into Europe had been Helmut Kohl’s Germany. They cited a phrase used by Germany’s ambassador to Russia, who named Bonn’s role as ‘somewhat like that of defense lawyer for Russia in the construction of the new Europe’.1 They also stressed that in Russian priorities in Europe second only to Germany was France. Although French economic aid to Russia did not approach the level of German assistance, in 1992 France did grant economic credits, announced during Yeltsin’s February visit to Paris. In 1994, the two countries signed agreements on military co-operation, including projects for joint development and production of weaponry, which were integrated in part to allow the countries to compete more effectively with the United States in the arms export market. It was Moscow’s first military-technical co-operation agreement with the European state.2 In the first pages of this chapter the dynamics of the essential relations in Europe will be briefly touched upon. However, the assessments of the RF policies would be incomplete without some additional details that reveal Russian foreign policy logic. Unfortunately it is impossible to analyse all the elements of Russian foreign policy. Thus, the selection of bilateral relationships here in some respects reflects the recognition of the priority states’ list by the majority of Russian experts. The specific focus on selected bilateral relationships was aimed to reveal, on the one hand, the most important elements of Russian foreign policy logic, and, on the other hand, to show the new dynamics in Russian policy patterns, especially in its actions towards international institutions, regimes and new initiatives.


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The German factor In the 1990s one could see Russian-German rapprochement. The new policy immediately received an ideological label and was described by one of the centrist popular newspapers in Russia as the last chance of national survival. Russian daily Nezavisimaya gazeta wrote in 1999: The revision of imperial Russian policy was becoming an essential condition for the national revival of the Russian states. The modification of policy has nothing to do with Kremlin ambitions; expansion of Russian influence was becoming not a luxury but a matter of national survival. The monolithic and monocentric pattern of security arrangements in Europe and in the world, imposed by the US and its allies, was giving Russia the status of a marginal player only, on the periphery of Europe and to be exploited. However, one needs to fight for more just and respectful attitudes and status, and in parallel try to deal with internal problems.3 Starting from the late 1990s, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the priority of Russian-German ties was extended to a Russian-German-French relationship. The interest of Russia in special contacts with the Southern European states (Italy, Spain, etc.) was transferred to its interest in Southern Europe as a whole, embracing the countries seeking membership in NATO and the EU. Additionally, with Putin’s new team in Moscow there also emerged a strategic partnership between Russia and the UK. In the report Geopolitical Changes in Europe, Policies of the West and Alternatives for Russia (1996), published by the Institute of Europe, Moscow, the reorientation towards strategic partnership with Germany was stated as a prime goal of RF foreign policy. Several statements followed the publication from the Security Council staff that adhered to the same logic. Russian interests in the priority of Russian-German ties were connected with Russia’s current economic policy and economic interests. Russian economic interests in that relationship could be seen in re-establishing financial industrial groups (FIG) within the CIS with the participation of foreign capital, preferably German; in following up economic integration within the CIS with parallel integration with European institutions through Germany; in strengthening Russian industry through re-establishing former COCOM ties—with German participation, shares, investment and the country’s engagement in the privatisation process. The German interest in the production development cycles was considered more suitable for the needs of the RF and Eurasian states than the US attitude in participating primarily in oil/gas energy deals. Even the pattern of management and social economic integration proposed by the Germans firms were considered more suitable for the Russian tradition than the one working under American patterns. All the projects involving the restoration of the transportation networks from Europe through Eurasia to the Asia-Pacific region were considered on the basis of a significant German participation. Germany’s priority interests in the markets of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia

Strategic partnerships in brief

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supported the Russian assumption of the importance of the Russian market to Germany, especially taking into consideration the level of energy and raw material dependency of the state on the Russian and NIS markets. The Russians relied on the assumption that as a result Germany would be most interested in the necessity to preserve the status quo in the CIS and support the Russian role in the CIS alliance as a stability guarantor. The first ‘gas for pipes’ deal of the 1970s signed between Western Germany and Russia set a firm basis for future EU-Russia energy dialogue. By special relationship with Germany, Russia was willing to neutralise a possible drive of the Eurasian states towards closer ties with Western security institutions. The NATO expansion was also seen from Moscow as an extension of the zone of conflict management and control area over the zone of economic activity and influence of Germany in Central and Eastern Europe. Membership of the Baltic states in the northwest and Ukraine in the south-east, in addition to the ‘Vyshegrad states’, was seen as part of the creation of a buffer zone between Germany and Russia. This buffer was supposed not only to limit German geopolitical and economic manoeuvring in Central and Eastern Europe but also to neutralise all potential attempts for ‘strategic appeasement’ between Germany and Russia in Europe.4 In the early and mid-1990s the establishment of Belarus-Russian confederate state was seen as an addition to economic benefits and a legal precondition for the redeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the republic as a countermeasure to the NATO enlargement. In the late 1990s the situation changed. Since then the support for the confederation/union was based on other geopolitical and economic considerations. This Russia-Belarus unification was also seen as a means for the creation of a base for strategic partnership between Russia and Germany, as well as a disruption of the plans for the creation of the Baltic-Black Sea alliance (or Riga-Vilnius-Minsk-Kiev axis). In the prospect of the NATO enlargement the Russian vision of a specific Russian-German relationship was understood as a way of putting an umbrella over the ‘grey area states’ and creating a framework for the NIS being included in the Russian sphere of influence and European security architecture. In the late 1990s Russia turned its attention to Central and Eastern Europe, its priority focus being political rather than economic. The Russian government and private companies expressed their interest in the opportunities of the Central and Eastern Europe market, that allowed Russian capital and firms to become integrated into the EU economy through a merger with the companies of the first runners-up for new EU membership. Russian influence in middle Europe increased dramatically by the beginning of the twenty-first century. The policies towards Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe were to a large extent seen as part of the major Russian-German rapprochement. The crisis over Iraq (2003) only stressed the closeness of the positions of the two countries and their mutual interest in developing preferential ties. After a bilateral summit, held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in October 2003, the Russian mass media called the state of bilateral relations ‘close to perfect’.5


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The USA: a love-hate strategic partnership In the 1991–3 period the image of the US in Moscow was of a financial-economic donor, a philosophical and cultural mentor and friendly partner. From the mid-1990s these illusions disappeared even in the friendly pro-Western mass media. In 1994 the assessment of the potential for Russia-US relations experienced substantial transformation. To some extent these changes were linked to a more defined US policy towards Russia and a more clarified US role in world politics. The last election campaign in the US crystallised these differences. The following years only increased the intolerance gap towards the US in the public perception. The year 1994 could be called one of a crisis of trust and confidence in the US. In 1995/6 it seems that Russia reassessed its role and its expectations of this most important relationship with the US, and the results only confirmed the lost illusions. The Report of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997, stated: If the strategic goals of the USA were summed up it would become obvious that in every year after the end of the ‘cold war’ Washington continued to use a policy of ‘dual containment’ of post-Soviet Russia in the political and economic spheres. In politics it meant the NATO expansion eastwards towards Russian frontiers and containment of the integration tendencies within the CIS; in the economic sphere it meant limitation of access of Russian products (especially with competitive high-tech products) to the world markets and deterring our industrial potential by refocusing our attention to the oil-energy and raw materials sector of the economy.6 Since 1994 the public opinion polls demonstrated the rise of anti-American sentiments. According to official statistics, the rise in anti-American sentiment was from 2 per cent in 1991 to 22 per cent in 1999. However, it seems that the statistics might be reflecting a dissatisfaction with the elite in the US and a lowering of expectations, rather than the spread of public sentiments. From the reaction to the Kosovo crisis, 1999, the overall mood of the public has changed drastically against the Americans. Changes in mood, from overwhelming admiration of all things American to a severely critical approach, have also been traced in the generation groups: from people in their teens and early twenties, early thirties and older. The attitude of Russian citizens towards the United States has considerably worsened. At the end of December 1998, 67 per cent of Russian citizens sympathised with America, but by the end of March, when the United States and NATO launched air strikes against Yugoslavia, this number dropped to 38 per cent, and by the middle of April it was down to 33 per cent. These figures were obtained by the All-Russia Centre for Studying Public Opinion (VTSIOM) from three polls, each one involving 1,600 respondents. Statistical error did not exceed 4 per cent. The percentage of respondents whose attitude towards the United States was negative increased from 23 per cent in December to 49 per cent in March, and then to 53 per cent in April. Anti-American feelings mostly affected military circles (especially at the level of major-colonel). The Russian military assumes that all the recent examples of the US


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unilateral or multinational actions are aimed at creating a precedent to establish legality for the new principles of humanitarian intervention in the name of securing human rights around the world, and to test a new generation of the weapons, including the highprecision weapons systems. Nationalistic parties and the Communist Party put the blame for the deterioration of the economic situation in Russia on liberal reformers who are being viewed as agents of the US policy in Russia. The US steadily features among three main trading partners of Russia and is a major source of investment, advanced technologies, know-how and managerial experience for the country. The volume of annual trade increased up to $9 billion dollars. And there was $5 bn of US investments in Russia at the end of the twentieth century. The major investment projects were not affected by the economicfinancial crises of August 1998 or the Kosovo crisis. According to the American Chamber of Commerce, in 1999 there were 403 US companies working in Russia. As the American Chamber of Commerce and European Business Club survey showed at that time, no major company had pulled out of the Russian market and many corporations were investing. Danone, Coca-Cola, Mars, McDonald’s, Philip Morris, Nestlé, BMW and others were maintaining or expanding investments. The activity was picking up in the strategic investment funds as well. Boeing’s Sea Launch venture ($500 m), that institutionalised co-operation between Russian, Ukrainian and Norwegian firms, completed its first commercial launch of a satellite from a floating ocean platform days after NATO started bombing the FRY. The understanding of the interdependency of the global economy and the importance for Russia to keep economic and trade relations with its main partners, including the US, put some limits on the ability of Moscow to play with countermeasures and rely on antiWestern sentiments. In the middle of the Kosovo crisis and emotional reactions to the US-UK bombing of Iraq, that took place from December 1998 to February 1999, sets of important bilateral agreements between Russia and the US were signed. For instance, agreement was reached on a food assistance package, worth $1 bn, and a $2 bn contract for assistance in reviving the food industry in Russia. Both sides also signed a $12 bn agreement between the MinAtom (Ministry of the Atomic Energy) and the US Energy Department on the decommissioning of 1,000 Russian nuclear warheads.7 Negotiations with the IMF on a new tranche of financial assistance to Russia continued during this critical time. The signing ceremony of another major contract between Lukoil, Russia’s largest oil producer, and US and Norwegian corporations (Texaco Inc., Exxon Corp., Conoco Inc. and Norsk Hydro ASA) to develop Siberian oil fields was not cancelled, though it was rescheduled from March to April 1999 in a changed location (from Washington, DC to Moscow). Finally, on 31 March 1999 agreement was reached on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty; this would not have been possible without a compromise being reached between Russia and the US. Opposing the US-Western involvement in the post-Soviet space, Russia could offer limited response to the active PfP policy in the CIS space. Thus the debates were shifted to the discussions of a level of acceptable disagreement with the West and an acceptable form of co-operation between Russian and the Western states in regions, levels and forms of the US/Western involvement in the CIS areas. The following citation represents a very typical assessment of Russian adjustments to the changing realities that should be taken into consideration:


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Basically, what is particularly dangerous is not the fact of the US expansion itself, but that it is taking place in the politically most explosive regions. So the consequences of this strategy could be very tragic. This US policy could contribute in no small way to a possible exacerbation of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Karabakh conflicts. Future siting of a US military contingent on the eastern and western shores of the Caspian Sea and in its immediate environs is certainly part of Washington’s long-term plans to establish itself in the oil-and gas-rich region and secure complete control of the extraction and transportation of the oil and gas.8 Dissatisfaction with the pace and results of the reforms in the RF and NIS affected public attitudes towards the concept of development and transition advocated by the World Bank and IMF. The concept of the middle class as the backbone of civic society was put under question. Russian society, in its dissatisfaction with the results of economic transformation, turned its criticism against the ‘consumption societies of Anglo-American civilisation’. The revised philosophy of transformation for the NIS pointed to deterrence in consumption, national patriotism and traditional values. The new philosophy was labelled ‘democratic patriotism’. The linkage between military, economic, social and philosophic explanation of the need for a change of strategic partnership became evident in mid-1995. By the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996 changes in the personnel in major institutions dealing with policy-making occurred. The ‘Westernised’ pro-American politicians within the RF presidential administration and key institutions were discharged or lost their influence. The new group that came to power in Moscow, ‘gosudarstvenniks’ have close ties with the military industrial complex (MIC) and security services. The industrial lobby backed up the projectionist policies with orientation towards the CIS markets and such traditional foreign markets as Germany, Iran, China, Central Europe and Latin American countries. Despite the preferences, none of the politicians could disregard the importance for Russia of maintaining channels of communication with the US. Strategic and global issues were still being discussed at the bilateral level. At the same time it was a widespread feeling that there was mutual need for USRussian co-operation at the strategic level of arms control agreements, crisis management measures and in the development of economic projects. Despite growing dissatisfaction with US-Russia ties there was a strong belief in Moscow that the creation of ESDI would require the US to give more consideration to Russia and its interests. The 9/11 events also opened an additional arena for co-operation and competition between the states, as the following chapters will show. Besides security, military and political factors that influence Russian policies towards the US, there is the very important aspect of the ‘dollar’ economy trade that affects Russian short-term policy.9 There is almost no regional or global policy issue that Russia could presently decide without taking into consideration the ‘American factor’. This is double edged. Russia feels that the Iraq crisis of 2003 demonstrated that this understanding of a strategic partnership modifies US policies towards the RF as well. Despite growing differences over their stance on Iraq, the United States tried to limit its criticism of Russia’s foreign policy approach. There were several reasons for this


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stand: economic, political-military and geoeconomic. In 2002/3 Russia provided just 0.2 per cent of the US oil imports (in comparison to Saudi Arabia’s and Venezuela’s 20 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively).10 Despite this fact the Russians strongly believe that the US still sees Russia’s vast oil supply as an essential means of weaning itself off its dependence on Middle East oil. As part of its diversification policy the US market started to open for the Russian oil supplies. In November 2003 five Russian major oil companies signed an initial deal to build an Arctic export terminal to boost shipments to the United States. Yukos Oil Company estimated that Russia could provide the United States with 15 per cent of its oil supply.11 Mr Khodorkovskiy (Yukos) became one of the few proactive US supporters as a result of the opening opportunities. However, dissatisfaction over the Russian policy was made public on a couple of occasions. The US ambassador to Moscow, Alexander Vershbow, warned Russia that it could suffer serious economic consequences if it followed up on threats to veto a UN resolution authorising war on Iraq. In the interview with Izvestia (published on 11 March 2003), Vershbow warned that a Russian veto could put the planned US-Russian energy co-operation at risk, including massive US investments to Russia’s vast oil industry. But this position was softened in an interview with daily newspaper Gazeta (14 March 2003), where the ambassador confirmed that the United States was interested in dramatically increasing the amount of Russian oil it imports every year, as well as US investment in Russia’s oil industry. During a visit to Moscow in the first quarter of March 2003, US energy secretary Spencer Abraham glossed over warnings by US diplomats that Russia’s fierce opposition to US war plans in Iraq could disrupt economic partnership between the two countries. He pointed out to US interests in stimulating co-operation between the US and Russian companies in the energy market. Analysts in Moscow agreed that Washington recognised Russia’s potential to help the United States to lessen its dependence on oil in the unstable Middle East. The Russian position in respect to the Iraq crisis was not seen as destabilising for the long-term strategic US-Russia partnership, especially in the energy sphere. According to Pavel Kushnir, an analyst with the Troika Dialog investment bank, ‘the United States wants to diversify its oil providers and Russia can become a very important supplier. But for now the access to the US markets is limited by a lack of terminals’.12 In May 2002 presidents Vladimir Putin and George W.Bush launched a programme to boost oil co-operation between the states. In summer 2002 Russia’s second largest company, Yukos, started sending tankers to the United States. However, Russian shipments to the US remain small. The main obstacle is the transportation capacity of the Russian pipeline system. Russian oil majors have been lobbying the government for permission to build their own pipelines. All pipelines are currently run by the statecontrolled Transneft and work at near full capacity. The main energy market for Russian energy supplies is Western and Eastern Europe. According to Pavel Kushnir, nearly 99 per cent of Russian oil exports are still destined for Western and Eastern Europe.13 While the United States remains the top foreign direct investor in Russia, European companies are more embedded in Russia’s oil sector. As a result, the Russian government is not very active in helping the US-Russia energy co-operation project. ‘We strongly support the development of greater capacity to export oil in Russia. More pipelines will be a good


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thing for Russia and will allow more exports’, US energy secretary Abraham said. The secretary’s statements were echoed by a senior US diplomat who said, on condition of anonymity, that ‘there won’t be a strategic course change’ in US policy towards Russia even if Moscow vetoed the UN resolution on Iraq. After 9/11 the priority list of issues for US-Russia co-operation was changing. The US was interested primarily in anti-terrorist threat assessments and counter-terrorist activities, and in promotion of the procedures, regime and regulations in international cooperation in intelligence sharing and early warning systems. The Russians, though keen on co-operation in the same field, were continuing to express their concern over issues dealing with strategic stability. The understanding of the unavoidable link with the US did not, however, downplay the rather cynical interpretations and assessments of American hostile intentions towards regional potential threats, even if they were addressing the policy issues that Russia in principle supported as well. For instance, one could give the example of actions in support for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 2002/3 tensions in relations between the US and North Korea were explained in a rather traditional way: Possibly, the answer is in the statements of some American experts, who think that the inclusion of North Korea in the so-called ‘axis of evil’, along with Iran and Iraq, was aimed at avoiding the impression that the US was hostile to Islam. It is because of this reason that it will be probably politically unacceptable for the administration of George Bush after Iraq and Afghanistan to begin the third war again against an Islamic country. That is why it is quite possible that the third country can be the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.14 The policy over North Korea was not the only point of disagreement; there were plenty of others: the US policies in the post-Soviet states and Afghanistan, the approach to Iran, and the Middle East process as a whole, etc.15 If one wanted to make the transatlantic and European elements in Russian foreign policy compatible, the relationship with an inter mediate state was very useful. UK-Russia ties In the late 1990s special relations between Russia and Britain were initiated by the UK and were established due to the persistent policy of the PM’s office to work directly with the new team in Moscow (then prime minister Vladimir Putin and secretary of the Security Council Sergei Ivanov) and with Russian oligarchs in the UK integrated into the London ‘City’ economy. In Russia, the UK was chosen among other Western states as a strategic partner during the term of President Putin for several reasons. First of all the decision was based on the assumption of a stable team in power in London that was bound to survive the 2001 elections and that was known for its good connections in Europe and globally. In comparison the relationship with France at that particular time was much more difficult on a political level due to that country’s approach to Russian policy in Chechnya and some other factors. In 2001 the extremely close, and in the longrun strategically vital, relations with Germany were overshadowed by difficult


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negotiations on the rescheduling of the $58bn owed to the Paris Club, where Germany is a main holder of Russian debts. The 2001 elections in Italy and a new team coming to power also created a time-gap between the ‘properly structured and functional bilateral relations’ and a period of transition. Thus, among the European G-7 states the UK was seen as an important partner for a stable and continuous drive towards integration with European institutions. At the same time strengthening relations with European countries and the EU, contrary to many published statements, was not meant to be a counterbalancing policy to US-Russia relations. Leaning towards the European states and the EU, the main task of Putin’s administration was not to spoil relations with the US while improving them with Europe. The main goal was rather to stimulate their modification for better pragmatic ones and to increase the US-Russian co-operation in several vital areas, including co-operation in regional matters—for instance, in a Nagorny Karabach settlement, Afghanistan and in the AsiaPacific region. Here again traditionally special relations between the UK and US were seen as the most useful to the Russian policy-makers. In practical terms, however, UK-Russian relations have a great potential, but several obstacles have had to be overcome in order to make the strategic partnership truly a longterm policy. The positions of the UK rep-resentatives in the international organisations where Russia was hoping to have access to decision-making, or potentially a membership (NATO, EU, EBRD), played an important part in Russia’s assessment of the importance of preferential bilateral relations. The special emphasis on the anti-terrorist campaign as a new approach towards international security challenges became an important element of Russian-British special relationship. The co-operation in anti-terrorist activities, initiated in 1999 in the middle of the Kosovo campaign, received a new impulse after the UK adopted (February 2001) the anti-terrorist legislation that forbade financial and economic support of the institutions linked with terrorist organisations. The anti-terrorist campaign and co-operation against crime and corruption could be considered an important element of international co-operation with Russia. Joint activities were bound to increase in these fields. From the second half of 2001 the Russian government has intro duced the state policy of building a system of public security, when the fight against crime was named as a prime task. Since then close relationship and co-ordination among the special services grew closer, as was confirmed during the state visit of President Putin to the UK in June 2003. Since the year 2000 the situation has been changing for the better. Good relations in the political sphere were complemented by expanding economic, financial and investment opportunities, as well as in an increase of co-operation in the military sphere. The turning point for the relations came after the 2000 presidential elections in Russia. The main EU-Russia joint projects that were essential for the economic development of Russia, and vital for providing a basis for solid long-term relations within the EU framework, were usually run by consortiums of non-British companies.16 These were the reasons of Russia’s encouragement of British business especially to take a more active part in long-term investment projects. British participation in joint ventures in the energy field was most essential for Russia. The preferential bilateral relations were proving to be most helpful in the economic sphere, such as co-operation in the diamonds trade and market sharing agreement


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(agreements of 2000/1, and an especially made deal on UK firm operations in Yakutia, Republic of Saha),17 and in the transformation and restructuring of the railway system. Russian officials spoke in favour of upgrading economic co-operation between Russia and Great Britain. On 21 November 2000 President Vladimir Putin said at a press conference after the end of his talks with Prime Minister Tony Blair that economic cooperation between Great Britain and Russia was developing in two directions. ‘One of these directions of interaction is Russia’s co-operation with the European community, and Britain is the most important component part of united Europe. Great Britain is playing an important role, and its position is important to us.’ The Russian president continued: ‘Bilateral co-operation is no less important in the economic sphere. We know that some British companies are major investors in a number of projects valued at hundreds of millions of dollars. Our task with the Prime Minister is to create a favourable atmosphere for the development of businesses.’18 There have been positive developments in economic and investment co-operation, and growth in the volume of trade between Russia and Great Britain. In 2002, the volume of reciprocal trade increased by almost 15 per cent and exceeded $5 bn. The growth rates of trade operations registered a 50 per cent increase in January–February 2003 in comparison with the previous year. The number of trade operations over the first five months of 2003 has doubled. The plans of large energy companies in Great Britain with regard to their investing in Russia make a good basis for increasing economic engagement between the two states. In the list of leading European countries investing in Russia, in April 2003 the United Kingdom was registered at the third place, behind only Germany and Cyprus; as for the investments from Cyprus they were and are the de facto repatriation of Russian capital.19 The level of British investments in Russia in 2003, in comparison with one year prior to that, grew 1.5 times.20 However, after the decision of British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell to invest a total of $17 bn in the Russian energy sector, Great Britain took a leading place in the volume of investments in Russia’s economy. A document was signed between BP and the Russian group TNK, which laid the foundation for realising these agreements. BP put £4.28 bn into partnership with Tyumen Oil.21 British Petroleum planned creating an oil company ‘TNK-BP’ in view of the long-term strategic partnership. Royal Dutch Shell is actively co-operating with Russian businessmen in a wide range of projects in the area of exploration and extraction of oil and natural gas. Britain, especially, was considered to be an interesting and potential consumer market for Russian energy companies, such as Gazprom. This company is the major provider of the EU. In less than ten years the UK is going to turn from a gas exporter into a gas importer. These assessments were made by the British prime minister at the conference on ‘Russia-UK Energy: Long Term Partners’, held in London during the Russian-British Summit, 2003. Extended plans for joint projects in the pipeline infrastructure were considered and are at the first stages of their implementation. New possibilities for the interaction of Russian and British exporters on the markets of the third countries were opened up with the signing of the agreement between Vneshekonombank and Great Britain’s Credit Exports Guarantee Department. Important agreements on credit have also been reached with Russia’s Vneshtorgbank.22 Russian businessmen were counting that conditions of the British Export Credits Guarantee


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Department would be no worse than the conditions that were offered by insurance agencies in other European countries. Russian companies used a perspective form of attracting capital by placing corporate stocks and bonds at the London Stock Exchange. For example, in January and February 2003 stocks at the electronic trade market reached around £6 bn sterling.23 Mutual interest was expressed in involving other fields into this co-operation, in particular in high technology areas. The important aspects of interaction are high technology in energy, energy conservation and using non-traditional types of energy, including within the framework of the Work Group for Energy and on the level of the bilateral Intergovernmental Committee on Trade and Investments. There is a whole range of highly promising projects in the hi-tech sphere, including aerospace design work. In the latest contacts between Rosaviakosmos and British firms potentials were explored, first of all, in the sphere of future space exploration. ‘The Days of Russian High Technologies’, which were successfully held in London in 2003, demonstrated the latest designs of Russian scientific research institutes and confirmed the interest of more than 300 British firms in their R&D innovations. The development of direct contacts between the business communities of both countries was seen as a priority, in particular between the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Confederation of British Industry. Russia is one of the beneficiaries of the Nuclear Safety Programme (NSP), funded by the UK Department of Trade and Industry. The NSP has been running successfully for several years. The overall aims of the programme are supporting civil nuclear safety projects in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It focuses on projects that could improve the safety of older Soviet-designed reactors (RBMK and VVERs), strengthen nuclear regulatory authorities, encourage safe decommissioning of nuclear power plants and encourage the development of Westernstyle safety culture at nuclear power plants. With the increased annual budget for 2003/4 up to £5m, more focused programmes were planned to be available to the beneficiary organisations.24 Great significance is given to advanced interregional contacts—for example, between the Central, North-west, and Ural Federal Districts of Russia and London region. Intense business projects were accompanied by the assistance programmes, tailored to specific regional needs. In April 2003 a new bilateral programme between the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, called the Closed Nuclear City Partnership, began its operations.25 The programme aims to assist commercialisation in the closed cities by creating sustainable businesses. The signing of the protocol opens the way, and the programme is now looking forward to fruitful partnerships between commercial companies and formally closed nuclear cities in the RF, like Seversk, Tomsk, Obninsk, Katerinburg, and others. The programme was to be developed using the results of the previous US and EC TACIS programmes and was to incorporate the lessons learnt from them. The main activities will be the grant funding of projects that take research towards commercial exploitation, supported with training in business and management skills. The cities themselves presented a comprehensive selection of their technical and business capabilities. They also identified where there were gaps (e.g. lack of production facilities,


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trained business managers, knowledge of intellectual property law and capital investment). The secretary of state for trade and industry, Patricia Hewitt, characterised co-operation in this field as very important for security and business purposes: Dismantling nuclear submarines and making safe spent nuclear fuel are among Russia’s highest priorities in dealing with the legacy of the Cold War. This is difficult, complicated work in which the UK can offer real experience and assistance. Not only does this project offer proliferation and environmental benefits, it also presents future business opportunities for the UK companies with nuclear clean-up expertise.26 Russia’s entrance into the World Trade Organisation was always considered of principal importance. The Russian government was grateful to its British counterpart for actively encouraging British businessmen to help Russia integrate into the global economic system and support its aspiration to join the WTO. It was also noted that the issue of the European Union recognising Russia’s market economy status was settled on the initiative of Great Britain. As it was openly acknowledged during President Putin’s speech in the City, Russia was hoping for UK support to conclude the bilateral talks with the European Commission successfully in 2003.27 Russia has just been accepted as a full member in the Financial Action Task Force, an organisation that is fighting money laundering. The level of corporate management was growing—as was the number of Russian companies getting registrations at the London Stock Exchange. One of the main priorities for Russia was its consistent integration in the European and global economy. In this goal the United Kingdom was and is viewed as Russia’s most important partner.28 At the concluding press conference of the state visit to the UK, President Vladimir Putin emphasised the importance of the ‘strategic character of our partnership’ and noted ‘the growing dynamics of political dialog, a dialog which gives a tonality to the entire complex of the Russian-British interaction’.29 In the foreign policy arena both countries, Russia and the UK, have overlapping interests in the Middle East, especially concerning the practical realisation of the provisions stipulated in the ‘Road Map’, as well as the establishment of an appropriate mechanism to monitor the situation; in Southern Asia and on the Korean Peninsula; and in the interrelations of Russia with the European Union and NATO. Both states expressed unanimous opinion on the need to further encourage Teheran’s co-operation with the IAEA and on the necessity to work with Iran by engaging the state in different types of relationships and exchange programmes.30 Joint collaborative work in/on Afghanistan could be considered as a very promising example of joint efforts in regional crisis management. The mechanism of decision-making acceptable for this particular country and the organisation and legitimisation of power in Afghanistan could be taken as the foundation for joint work in the conflict areas. It is no less important to solve the problems of the country’s economic renewal. However, the British role in transferring the transatlantic message to Russia as an invitation to the joint peacekeeping, peace-enforcement operation and sharing the crisis management burden as a precondition of the acceptance to the league of the powerful world players was received with a certain level of scepticism and high agitation in


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Moscow. Russian politicians and experts in Moscow interpreted the British message, delivered during the prime minister’s visit to Moscow on 29 April 2003, in the following way: In brief, influential British circles tell Moscow that if it wants to regain an active role in world politics it must become another world policeman. When suggesting to Russia that it should join the British-American alliance and master the role of a junior world policeman, the allies refer to the Iraqi situation… Moscow is advised in future situations to join the efforts of the allies right from the start and follow the Anglo-American lead… So, the Russian political elite will now have to work on trying to prove its loyalty to the West and its predictability, while the West will have to take into account Russian interests.31 Russia unavoidably shared special interest and appreciation towards the UK initiative to consider Russia’s role in the new security arrangements, especially in establishing a ‘G8+’ security arrangement. During his June 2003 state visit to the UK, the importance of bilateral relations was stressed once again by President Putin, as he admitted that both countries had periods of partnership and co-operation, as well as, unfortunately, episodes of distrust and ideological rivalry. But bilateral relations between Russia and the United Kingdom were constantly key priorities for both states. Today, they are by right becoming the most important foundation of European, and without exaggeration, global politics.32 Central and Eastern Europe and the grey area zone It seems that at the beginning of the post-Soviet period Moscow had no coherent foreign policy that actually dealt with the area as a whole. Previously there were three not exactly connected vectors: the Baltic states, Western CIS states (with the diversification of Ukraine and/or Belarus changing priority and Moldova), the Central/Eastern European states. In 1996 it looked like the reorganisation of foreign policy priorities had occurred, and Russian policy for the region has shown signs of unification. At that time Prime Minister Primakov’s doctrine influenced the changes. Russia could never publicly accept the NATO enlargement. The enlargement of the first wave was perceived as dangerous from political and strategic considerations. It was viewed as an opening of a Pandora’s box of the unstoppable and uncontrolled enlargement process. Nevertheless, Russia could not allow itself to worsen the relationship with Eastern Europe due to geoeconomic considerations. The European Union is the main trading partner for Russia.33 Major oil and gas pipelines, delivering over 50 per cent of Russian oil and 90 per cent of Russian gas to Europe, go via the East European countries. The Central and Eastern European countries are viewed by the Russians as a very valuable export market. After several years of declining trade with the Central and Eastern European states, Russia finally managed to reverse the negative trend in 1995.34 Another important factor is a heavy dependence of the Kaliningrad enclave on trade and investment from the European states.


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The major investors are Poland, and Germany, with a one-third share of the trade with the region belonging to Poland.35 In 2003, in a special interview to Russian weekly Kommersant-Daily, Igor Ivanov, minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, described the 1990s as a ‘lost decade’ for bilateral relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.36 Relations with the Central and East European countries were becoming increasingly important as part of Russia’s policy towards and with the EU and NATO. After the 2000 presidential elections in Russia the economic interests of the state and private companies in the Central and Eastern Europe markets increased substantially. Over the last several years tangible positive shifts have occurred in Russian relations with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe without exception. The atmosphere of Russian-Polish relations has greatly changed for the better, thanks to close contacts at the highest level. More specifically, this found confirmation in the course of the meeting on 28 June 2002 between presidents Vladimir Putin and Alexander Kwasniewski in Kaliningrad. Dynamically, on a stable pragmatic basis, Russia’s political dialogue and co-operation were developing with Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. President Putin’s state visit in March 2003 opened a new chapter in relations with Bulgaria. The signing of the Russian-Romanian treaty on friendly relations and cooperation wrapped up the series of steps taken for the qualitative renewal of the treaty foundation of Russian relations with all Central and Eastern European countries. It was of fundamental importance that over the recent period a host of channels for cooperation between the countries—in addition to governmental or parliamentary ones— have begun working more energetically, including at the civil society level. Regions were communicating more closely, youth and student exchanges were being intensified. A growing interest was observed for the resumption of cultural ties with Russia, and for the Russian language. There was an upsurge of tourism—despite the introduction of a visa regime on the Central and Eastern Europe countries’ initiative. There is a new fashion of an expanding presence of Russian business and capital, and their participation in privatisation, which ensured a solid investment inflow, the renewal of productive assets, and the appearance of new jobs. At the May 2003 economic forum in St Petersburg Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov stressed that the membership of Eastern and Central European countries in the European Union would enhance Russia-EU relations.37 The overall theme was prevention of the deterioration of economic ties during the transition period. However, it was rightly assumed that by officially joining the EU in May 2004 the Central and Eastern European states will have a major say and influence in addressing the issues especially related to Russia. The Asian dimension: in pursuit of its own identity In the 1990s Europe and Asia started talking intensively to each other. The Europe-Asian dialogue became an important element of interdependent world economy and politics. Russia, though seeing itself as a natural bridge between the two continents and civilisations, to its greatest surprise found itself in the institutional black hole, as the country was not invited to the forums between Europe and Asia at all. The reasons were


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very simple. Russia was not a member of the EU and therefore didn’t qualify as a European country; nor was it a member of any organisation in the Asia-Pacific region so could not attend the meetings as an Asian state. The irony of this situation helped to shape Russian policy in the East, and specifically in the Asia-Pacific region. It intensified Russian attempts to integrate into regional economic, political and security systems. Russia followed the same multi-channelled approach as in Europe by parallel rebuilding of bilateral relations and getting firm positions in regional institutional networks. Naturally, the question is to be asked as to how Russia’s European policy is linked with Russia’s strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region, which is the other important pillar of the RF multilateral and multilevel foreign policy approach. A highranking Russian diplomat stationed in Geneva at a public meeting in London in June 2002 interpreted President Putin’s definition of the ‘arch of stability’ as one of special relations among the Russia-EU-US-China axis existing under the guidance of the UN and international law. For Russia the policy in Asia and the Asia-Pacific region is important in at least three aspects. Russian activity in the region is carried out as a countermeasure to the policies of its potential marginalisation in Europe and European affairs, and as a counterbalance to US global influence. The relationship between Russia and China is presented as part of the ‘global neighbourhood’, definitely not as an alliance. It is a strategic partnership not directed against any third party, but one that allows correlating efforts in the international arena and an organising of mutual support for international regulations. Moscow recognises the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region for international trade and economic relations. Finally, Asian security is no less important to Russia’s own security. The visits in July 2000 of President Putin to North Korea and China before the G-8 meeting in Okinawa symbolised a new publicly visible Russian policy in the region. The first-ever official visit of the Russian president to North Korea and the summit in China was a useful background for President Putin’s arrival at the Okinawa G-8 meeting. The support of the Chinese government on the anti-ABM stand and the consent of North Korea to suspend its missile programme if other nations supplied it with rockets to launch satellites for space exploration, were used by the Russian side to build up opposition against the US policy on missile defence (MD) deployment. This multi-channelled proactive approach gave Russia an opportunity to re-engage itself politically in the region.38 Putin’s visit to North Korea days before Russia was included into the regional ASEAN forum could be seen as a diplomatic presentation of that state to the international community. Despite the statement of North Korea ruler Kim Jong II on the misunderstanding that occurred during the visit of the Russian president about North Korean intentions to stop its missile programme, the importance of that visit for the Russian policies in the Asia-Pacific region should not be underestimated. On 5 August 2000 President Putin signed the law ‘On the Ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourship and Co-operation with the Korean People’s Democratic Republic’. In comparison with the Treaty of 1961 the new document did not have provisions that would force Russia to intervene automatically in a military conflict in order to defend North Korea.39 The integration policies in north-east Asia were in full swing, and Russia was interested in its participation in the process. This meant a more pragmatic approach to


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bilateral commitments. Mikhail Titarenko, director of the Institute of the Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, pointed out that Russia put some efforts into strengthening its relations with the Asia-Pacific region in 2002 by using the achievements of the previous years and trying to capitalise on them.40 Prior to 2003 there were no economic incentives which could stimulate foreign investments in Russia, especially in the eastern regions of the country. Trade with Asian countries accounted for less than 15 per cent of the overall Russian trade turnover. In the Asia-Pacific, Russia could only be accounted for 1 per cent of the trade turnover. Strategic partnership with China received strong economic backup only in 2002/3. The trade turnover between Russia and China had a 40 per cent increase in 2003 and was about $12 bn, but with the so-called ‘grey area’ trade it reached a level far beyond $20 bn. The most important achievement of 2002/3 was that Russian business turned its interests towards markets and frontiers in the East.41 The limitations and barriers existing for Russian business in the West pushed it to consider other market options in the East. One of the major oil companies, Yukos, followed the appeal of the Russian government to participate in building a pipeline to China and investing in the eastern pipeline networks. Russian companies participated in the construction of the atomic energy reactor at Tin’van near Shanghai. There are plans to build a connection that would link the South Korean railway with the Russian TransSiberian rail. The key elements of Russian policies in the Asia-Pacific region were based on attempts primarily to intensify relations with China, Japan and South Korea. One of the Russian proposals was to establish a multi-factor support system for regional security arrangements, especially in the field of energy supplies for north-east Asia. The idea about establishing a regional forum on energy security as a base for such a system was proposed by the then head of the RF Security Council Sergei Ivanov in April 2000.42 This proposal was based on recognition of the fact that the integration of the regional energy market was already underway. Russia’s energy strategy (2000–20) has a regional dimension. The energy complex of the Far Eastern region was considered as a perfect testing case and a basic locomotive in stimulating co-operation between Russia and countries of the Asia-Pacific region in the energy field. The negotiations were underway to establish a five-year plan on joint exploration with China of the vast region from Eastern Siberia in Russia to the Chinese provinces (western, central and north-eastern). In these negotiations Russia’s position was backed by the unified approach to the negotiations with China by the CIS states. Since 1999 the policy of a unified approach in the energy field was exercised within the group of four CIS states, such as Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The ‘Sakhalin-2’ project was resumed as well. It was announced that an international consortium, created by Russian, American and Japanese companies for the development of oil and gas fields, was planning to resume exploratory drilling on Sakhalin Island.43 Through investment projects and joint ventures the Russian state institutions were increasingly trying to secure a role for Russia as an intermediate broker in difficult bilateral disputes. Through investment projects between Russia-Japan-North Korea or Russia-China-Vietnam, Moscow was trying to resolve regional hostile situations. Such an approach also provided possibilities to address state interests with the help of national private companies. It was giving a political chance to gain a role in the peace process on


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the Korean Peninsula as well. This intention is in the interests of Japan, too, which shared a desire to see the four-party process there (North and South Korea, US, China) develop into a six-party gathering with itself included. The intensification of bilateral relations in the region has a powerful domestic dimension. Russia was keen in developing its Northern and Arctic territories that provide 70 per cent of the profit to its budget. Limited human resources and communication networks, and the need for financial and technological assistance shape the relations on the regional level. This political agenda, as well as the economic overlapping interests of Russia and Japan, intensified bilateral contacts (2000–2). It seems that Moscow accepted the position of Japan, which believed that while solving acute problems with Russia it was better to move from the general to the specific. It means moving from the discussion of how Russian-Japanese relations in the twenty-first century could develop in general to the discussion of the Peace Treaty. It also means putting aside the issue of the Northern Territories. Even if the Treaty of Friendship were not signed, the integration of RussiaJapan interests in economic fields, especially energy and technology, could be helpful to Russia in attracting Japanese assistance and investments, receiving access to technology, as well as opening the Japanese markets. In an interview to the Japanese newspaper Nipon Kadzai simbun (1 September 2000) President Putin mentioned that it would be impossible to attract the needed $150–200 bn investment in Russia until 2010 without Japanese funds and interests in joint strategic projects. In 2000/1 Japan was in 13th place on the list of states investing in Russia. In 1999 Japan invested only $3,157 bn in the Russian economy. Russia constitutes only 0.58 per cent of the Japanese trade turnover. An increase in investments could be expected only after modification of the Russian domestic legislative norms and an easing of the investment climate, resolving some of the vital problems with joint ventures, especially in the Far Eastern region. The second visit of President Putin to Japan in 2002 was aimed to symbolise the strategic importance of Japanese-Russian relations in the short and long-term perspectives. It was meant to mark a new Russian approach in bilateral relations with Japan: from declarations of intent to sign a peace treaty to a policy of concrete actions with fixed stages of implementation. Eight interstate and intergovernmental agreements were signed between Russia and Japan as a result of the Russian president’s visit to Tokyo (3–5 September 2000). One of the vital agreements is a ‘Programme of Deepening Co-operation in the Trade-Economic Sphere’. In accordance with the agreement Japan will be assisting Russia (technologically and intellectually) in its industrial policy, in budgetary funding, and in small and medium business enterprises. In 2000 the Russian government adopted a decree on establishing Japanese centres for assistance to Russian reforms. The centres were created as non-profit organisations subordinated to the Japanese embassy and general consulates in Russia, but not integrated in their structures.44 The bilateral Intergovernmental Memorandum of 30 June 2003 confirmed the status and responsibilities of the Japanese centres on technical assistance to Russian reforms, which were by that time already successfully training civil management personnel. By 2003 more than twenty thousand businesspersons received training in the centres; about 11.5 per cent of these had internship programmes with firms in Japan. The development of small and medium business was considered essential in the


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promotion of the sustainable and economically independent Russian Far Eastern region. The main areas of co-operation are in the fields of energy, ecology, science and technology, space and transportation. Several other important documents were signed: a memorandum on co-operation in crime prevention and one on mutual actions in transborder co-operation (between the Federal Border Service, RF and the Department of Security on the Sea, Japan), an international agreement on scientific-technical cooperation, mutual exploration of space, and several agreements on regional co-operation and on military and technical co-operation.45 The Joint Japanese-Russian statement on co-operation in international affairs was signed as well. Both states agreed on mutual assistance in conflict prevention and peaceful settlements of disputes, shared their stance towards regional conflicts (Afghanistan and the Balkans) and attitudes to the preservation of the international arms control agreements as START-2 and the anti-ballistic missile treaty, and expressed mutual interest in START-3. Among the projects proposed by the Russian side to the Japanese business community were the construction of a railway tunnel under the Tatarskiy and Laperusa channels, and a proposal to Japan to consider the partial financing of the ‘Blue Stream’ project (energy transportation project for Eurasia). RAU ES (a Russian electric company) proposed to build an energy bridge between Russia and Japan. The ambitious project presupposes a construction of two new electric power stations (6 million kilovolts), a cascade of hydroelectric power stations on the rivers Uchur and Timpton in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). Electricity was planned to be delivered to the islands of Honshu and Hokkaido under the sea (1,400km). This project was intended to stimulate Japanese investments to Russia and create a new job market. For Japan it meant receiving cheap energy supplies. A trilateral agreement was signed between the Japanese corporation Marubeni, RAU ES and the authorities of the Sakhalin region. The ‘energy bridge’ was planned to start functioning in 2012. However, in 2003 the construction of the ‘energy bridge’ that would link Sakhalin and Japan was still under consideration. The agreement on joint economic development of the Southern Kuril Islands has some interesting angles. First, several specific issues have to be resolved before the agreement is fully implemented. Russia was prepared to introduce a new set of laws on productionsharing agreements, which could provide ‘comfortable conditions’ for foreign and Russian investments. The current level of about $5 bn annually is absolutely insufficient for accomplishing the tasks facing the country. Second, there were some security issues to be addressed. For instance, the Shikotan Island had a military garrison that was relocated in the years 1999– 2000. However, stocks of weapons (mainly from the Second World War) pose a problem for the implementation of joint economic development of the island. In 1999 50 three-ton containers were delivered from the island to the Khabarovskiyi region for deactivation. By the end of 2000 the second tranche of the weapons were supposed to be transferred to the Continent.46 The radio station ‘Echo Moskvy’ conducted an opinion poll analysing public attitudes towards the transfer of the South Kuril Islands to Japan. The results were very close: 1,064 respondents supported the transfer of the islands to Japan in order to speed up the signing of the bilateral friendship agreement; 905 of those polled were against such a


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measure.47 This poll symbolised a certain turn in Russian policies towards economic security priorities. The North and Arctic regions in Russia give over 70 per cent of the budget revenues, and only about nine million people are living in that area. The risk of losing the Far East to economically expanding and overpopulated China dictates the necessity to reconsider the strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region and to look for a balanced policy. All Russian high-profile visits to the Asia-Pacific countries included the president’s trips to the proper Russian regions. The introduction of regional co-operation in the international arena became an important element in the Russian policy of international economic integration and domestic economic revival. In July 2000, before the visits to North Korea and China, President Putin visited Blagoveshensk (20 July 2000). The issues of the transportation development and economic revival of the regions were discussed at the meetings with local heads of administrations on migration. The issues of migration regulation are becoming essential, together with finding the economic, technological and financial assistance to address the problem of industrial and economic communication development in the regions. Prior to the 2000 summit in Tokyo, the ninth regional meeting of the local authorities, business and political communities of the Far Eastern region, Siberia and Hokkaido, took place in Sakhalin. Three hundred representatives of the business and political communities from Hokkaido, Sakhalin, Irkutsk, Chita, Kamchatsk oblast (region) and Primorsk krai (province), Khabarovsk, the Republic of Sakha and Buriatia, the Jewish autonomous republic, participated in the meeting. The joint communiqué addressing economic development, ecology, taxes and customs was signed between the regional authorities, providing a framework for bilateral contacts until 2002.48 The regional authorities of Hokkaido and Sakhalin have signed several agreements on joint activity in preserving the ecology, on joint actions in emergency situations, creating a joint system of emergency warning. The most recent agreement signed was the trilateral agreement between Sakhalin, Hokkaido Island and the US state of Alaska. ‘In our assessment, Russian-Japanese relations are at their highest level of development since the end of World War Two’, President Putin told reporters after his arrival at Tokyo airport in 2000.49 At the session of the Russian-Japanese intergovernmental commission on trade and economic issues that took place in Vladivostok, Russia, on 29–30 June 2003, the results of the bilateral relations were put under scrutiny. The bilateral trade turnover demonstrated a 30 per cent increase in export and import operations in 2003 in comparison with 2002. The Japanese participants rated extremely high bilateral cooperation in several fields.50 One might say that the intensified contacts were linked to the fact that in 2003 Japan departed from its policy of preconditions for investments. Previously any offers and promises of financial commercial involvement in Russia’s regional economy were linked with the signing of the main peace treaty between the two states. At the same time the signing of the treaty, according to the Japanese position, depended on the completed and closed settlement of the so-called Northern territories. In 2003 the official Japanese position slightly changed, though the rhetoric about the necessity to solve the territorial dispute did not disappear from the official Japanese addresses to the Russian government. Despite the linkage and appeal for the resolution of the dispute over the Northern


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territories, new agreements were signed and negotiated on the major investment projects in Russia. The majority of the investments were oriented towards the energy sphere. The international energy development projects ‘Sakhalin-1’ and ‘Sakhalin-2’ were named by the Japanese government as the joint ventures that were to receive a Japanese contribution of up to $8 bn. The Japanese partners were prepared to cover almost onethird of the $22 bn overall investment costs of the projects. Such a high level of investment was linked to the decision of leading Japanese energy companies to sign up for a 20-year deal with Russia in securing their gas imports. The region was expected to produce about 410,000 barrels of oil daily and more than 15 ton of gas annually as the result of the implementation of both projects. The involvement in the energy sector in the Far East was not limited to the development of the Sakhalin deposits. Japan is also involved in lobbying efforts to influence the pattern of future pipeline networks in the AsiaPacific region. The Russian Far East has a tremendous wealth of natural resources, and there are technology and financial resources in Japan. Japan’s and the Russian Far East’s economies were good in complementing each other, and there is a huge potential for development. The military-military co-operation proved to be tremendously successful as well. Nuclear disarmament issues were included in the joint Japanese-Russian action plan signed by the two heads of state. The denuclearisation programme was considered an important contribution to the ecological security of the Sea of Japan. Russia was and is interested in active participation in regional forums and in joint international peacekeeping and peace-enforcing activities as part of the regional setting. Russia conditions its participation in the CJTF by receiving the UN mandate for a mission and by stressing selective approaches to its national interests in the Far Eastern and Zabaikalskiyi regions. The issues of special concern for the regions, such as migration, are the focus of attention—especially the problems linked with Chinese and Korean migration to the aforementioned regions. Russian participation in internationally supported campaigns—for instance, peacekeeping and peacemaking activities on international request was to be used as proof of Russia’s international engagement and co-operative intentions, as well as securing Russian participation in the reconstruction activities in the affected regions. It was publicly acknowledged that the security concerns shifted from the global to the regional level. While the Asia-Pacific region security situation differed from that of other regions it required Russia’s attention and collective international engagement. The policy based on balancing Japan-China in the Russian foreign policy approaches, that was so typical in ex-PM Primakov’s period, changed to a more active participation in regional international arrangements, economy and security, though not without the reference to traditional policy tools when required to serve national interests. One of the potential reasons of concern for Russia was and is that China is an ‘expanding partner’. The Chinese population will constitute the second largest national Diaspora in Russia in the twenty-first century. By official statistics there are about 2.5 million Chinese residing within the Russian borders. However, in reality the number is even higher because of illegal settlers. China is ‘quietly expanding’ into Russia because of the absence of a well-thought-out Russian immigration policy. The bilateral


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agreements on the use of the labour force of the 1990s also intensified the process. It is believed that in the next 10–15 years the Chinese labour force will constitute up to 30 per cent of the labour markets of the Far East and Siberia. According to the scholars attending a roundtable on migration in Vladivostok (28 June 1999), the Chinese tend also to settle in Russia through naturalisation and marriage.51 The debates on migration in the Far Eastern region demonstrate the increase in Chinese population—up to dozens of thousands monthly. Other statistics are even more interesting. The State Duma Committee on the Federation and regional policy appealed to the government to take into consideration the ‘hidden Chinese expansion’, especially in the Amur region. Their appeal was based on the migration statistics of the Amur region. The local population of one million people was increased by 238,000 in 1999. Local officials produced the alarming statistic that an increase of 10,000 Chinese emigrants daily occurred in 2000.52 In January-February 2003 the governors of the Far East region put forward before the relevant committees in the Federal Assembly the request to reassess migration and labour policy in the Far East, stressing the urgency of dealing with both the illegal and increasing legal migration flows from China. In parallel it was noted that Russia was registering increasing shortages in the labour force, especially in less-populated areas such as the Far East and Siberia. The energy companies, mainly those responsible for gas and oil production, were becoming strong and devoted supporters for the introduction of proper regulations in respect of the use of foreign labour. There was increasing support for co-operation within the framework of bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries, especially China, in order to provide the companies in the aforementioned regions with the requested labour force. Some representatives of Russian energy companies, like Yukos, for instance, openly lobbied for closer economic relations with China and for liberalisation in the rules and procedures for the foreign labour force in Russia. China is marked as a ‘strategic’ and main economic partner of Russia in the foreseeable future. On 16 July 2001 Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chinese president Jiang Zemin signed the ‘Good Neighbourly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’, replacing the outdated 1950 version that expired in 1980. The Treaty established a framework for bilateral relationship for a period of 20 years and marked the areas of potential co-operation that both sides would like to explore. The Treaty contains a procedure of almost automatic prolongation on a five-year basis, unless one side expresses an interest in the termination of the Treaty one year in advance (Article 25). Relations in the security sphere are to continue through many channels: the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), for example, and bilateral high-profile visits. For instance, on 27 July 2001 the meeting between the heads of border guard services within the framework of the SCO intended to discuss issues of transborder co-operation in dealing with drug and arms trafficking, illegal migration and other types of security threats. According to the APN news and information agency, the then Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, proposed to subsidise the repayment of the Russian loans to the international institutions and G-7. The proposed annual credits, worth $3–5 bn, were to cover Russia’s foreign debts repayments. In 2003, a critical year for Russia, China was ready to provide the RF with $10 bn, according to APN. In return, Russia would be obliged to cover the


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credits by supplying military equipment and technology, as well as transferring its military ‘know-how’, to the Chinese Military Industrial Complex; it would also be required to provide services to the MIC by Russian specialists. The Chinese proposals were introduced as a secret attachment to the Treaty. The secret draft was presented to President Putin by President Jiang himself.53 Speculations like these were made at the proper time (before the G-8 meeting in Genoa) and could be considered helpful to the Russian delegation in its negotiations on the loan repayments. Even discussions along these lines could be seen as an additional option for Russia to deal with its debts. On the other hand, China made itself visible in the G-8 agenda once again, as it did when the Russia-Chinese connection surfaced before the previous meeting. It was most essential for the Europeans and the US to understand whether the military alliance was formed or envisioned on the basis of the mutual opposition of Russia and China to the US plans to abandon the 1972 ABM treaty and proceed with the development of national missile defence (NMD). The NMD plans were considered by both states as undermining international stability and, in the long run, the deterrent capabilities of both nations—first of all China. Information on the consultations regarding co-ordinated responses to the US unilateral abandonment of the ABM treaty had been appearing since 2000. Despite the significant programme of countermeasures voiced by Russia as a response to the US unilateral actions, Moscow was making a point that the first stages of the NMD deployment would not harm Russia’s deterrent potential and would leave strong leverage for a ‘counter-strike against the potential aggressor’. These arguments led to the logic that Russia was in a sense only helping China in its struggle against the US NMD plans that would totally undermine China’s nuclear capability. As was mentioned by one of political analysts, Sergei Markov, director of the Institute of Political Studies (Moscow), ‘China should be grateful to Russia for this assistance. And Russia should take advantage of this situation and demand from China…the type of economic-trade opportunities for Russian business that Russia is most interested in. To be more specific China should import from Russia the high-tech, especially non-military high-tech products, build power stations, pipeline systems and educate its students in Russia by investing real money in the educational system of Russia’.54 The feeling that it was primarily China’s battle against the NMD plans was strengthened after President Jiang Zemin’s fivecountry tour (Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Malta). It was mainly concentrated on economic co-operation, and on trade and support for its anti-NMD position and stand regarding Taiwan. Russian and Chinese specialists in US affairs stressed that the Treaty of Friendship between Russia and China symbolised the increasing importance of the arms sales markets in international relations.55 Nevertheless, the Treaty itself does not have specific articles that address the issue, with the exception of Articles 7 and 16, where military co-operation was mentioned as not being aimed at third parties. The military-technical co-operation was referred to as only one among many of the potential fields of co-operation. There were no specific details on technical-military co-operation in the Treaty itself. However, traditionally China has been the largest arms export market for Russia. Special attention was and is given to aviation. The Military News Agency (Moscow) announced that China confirmed its interests in purchasing additional


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‘Sukhoi’ (SU) aircraft. The sales of SUs are the most profitable item in the Russian arms sales register. The co-operation in military radio electronics is a stable area of joint interests as well. The corporation Fazatron-NIIR received a request for the supply of radar ‘Zhuk-M’ for Chinese fighters J-8IIM.56 Russia expressed special interest in providing package deals to China, especially in ABM defence equipment. Western specialists register the increasing dependence of the Chinese defence complex on the Russian military procurement programmes and arms sales. Strengthening non-military economic links was seen as one of the priorities of the Russian policies in signing the bilateral treaty. The overall trade turnover between Russia and China was about $8 bn in 2000, and in 2001 it was expected to be about $10 bn. In comparison with the US-Chinese annual trade volume of $120 bn, Russian-Chinese trade activity looks less impressive. However, the statistics do not reflect the real cross-border ‘grey economic activities’ in the neighbouring regions. They also do not yet accommodate the data that the trans-continental transfer of goods and services will bring to the states’ economies after opening up the Eurasian transport corridors. On the other hand, the 2000 annual US-Russian trade amounted to only $10 bn as well. The statistics only demonstrate the non-exploited potential of trade and investment opportunities of the Russian markets. The two heads of state of Russia and China agreed that the implementation of the agreements in economy and trade, science and technology, and other fields, would steadily strengthen the material basis of China-Russia strategic co-operation. Russian experts pointed out the necessity to transfer emphasis from increasing arms export to increased co-operation in the non-military sphere. Russia was interested in China as a customer of Russian high-tech products, especially of non-military use. It is co-operation in machinery, civil aviation projects, nuclear energy, building atomic power stations, oilgas pipeline systems, energy reproduction facilities, the chemical industry, telecommunications, information, aerospace and environment, as well as expanding the number of educational exchanges and increasing the number of Chinese students to receive higher education in Russia. The expressed interest in reproducing a core of potential specialists with knowledge of the Russian language, not only English, was also seen as a strategic long-term goal for Russian policy-makers. The focus was made not only on the increased capacities of the arms sales market and new non-military exports potential, but also on joint ventures, joint exploration and development projects. Energy pipelines and transport corridors were only one of the aspects of the expanding field of bilateral co-operation. Russian and Chinese leaders expressed the wish to make joint efforts to create favourable conditions for economic and trade co-operation, to improve the banking system for the mutual settlement of accounts, and the financial service and efficiency of Chinese-Russian business arbitration systems. Both states were promoting the policy of non-alignment, supported by a strong consultation mechanism in security issues. The Treaty stated that the friendly ties between the two states should be built on the basis of non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of any third country. The Treaty confirmed the agreements on CBMs along the borders and the continuance of negotiations on solving the remaining issues of border disputes. The so-called security articles constitute the bulk of the Treaty (Articles 2–9). The support of the territorial integrity of both nations, and specifically Russia’s public support of China’s position on


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Taiwan, should be considered as exceptionally important (Articles 4–7). Article 8 of the Treaty specifically says that both states should not take part in alliances against one another or allow their territories to be used by third parties for actions harmful to the state sovereignty, security or territorial integrity of the other state. Article 9 specifies the framework of the consultation mechanism for the states in case one of them fears that the aggravation of the international situation might threaten its security and peaceful existence. The sides reserved the channels for immediate bilateral consultations in order to diminish the threat. The strategic partnership, though not an alliance, allowed a free hand in foreign policy. The Treaty provided both states with additional flexibility in their foreign and security policies. Russia received visible options for dealing with the G-7 on economic issues. China demonstrated that it was not isolated in the international arena in its position towards Taiwan. Both nations got their own points in their political debate with the US on NMD. The unified position (rejecting the arms race in space) was especially important for Russia before it agreed to link consultations on the AMB adjustments to the negotiations on a direct link between offensive and defensive systems. For China the unified position was essential in its preparations to deal with a potential crisis in the Taiwan Straits. However, the agreement allowed flexibility in the states’ policies, and that is important. Good Russian-Chinese relations were considered as a precondition for the implementation of the transcontinental transport corridors. Russia’s development plans were tied up to the full use of its unique geopolitical position, that links it with most of the important regions of the eastern hemisphere, including Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, the oil-rich Middle East and allows its resources to reach Central Asia and the vast Asia-Pacific markets. Such a position enables Russia to focus its foreign and trade policies by providing its own territory for the ‘continental shortcuts’ from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, from Northern Europe to the Middle East and Mediterranean (through the north-south routes and river waterways to the Black and Caspian Seas). Russia’s estimated profit from transit operations from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region and back to Europe, is expected to bring $3–10 bn annually to the state budget. This could only be implemented if the transcontinental passages run from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific coast. This implies one essential condition: that there are stable and predictable relations between Russia and China. The Moscow Treaty was aimed to send the international community a message of the feasibility of long-term investments in the Eurasian communication network. In other words, the signing of this agreement could only be considered as a positive measure for the EU supporters of the ‘transcontinental shortcuts’. The Treaty marked the ‘strategic partnership’ of states that both face increasing separatist and terrorist activity. Both states have distinguished themselves by opposing the principle of ‘limited territorial sovereignty’ and the so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’ (Articles 11 and 13). The strategic partnership of these two nations could be and probably should be seen as part of the potential geo-strategic and geoeconomic triangle that might influence the balance of power and change the trends in the international legitimisation of humanitarian interference in the states’ affairs by the international community. Both states, together with India, could reverse recent


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developments in international law on ‘humanitarian interventions’. In reality, all three nations face similar threats: they are all locked together in their plans of national economic development brought by expanding opportunities that are linked to transcontinental communication transport corridors and shared energy markets. India’s major investment projects abroad include Russia’s Sakhalin-1 development pro gramme. All three states are considering the possibilities to be included in the international infrastructure that would monitor the distribution of energy resources throughout northeastern and Southeast Asia. All of them are either de jure or de facto nuclear states. This strategic triangle is experiencing internal competition and threat factors. Nevertheless, the potential for unified actions in the international institutions based on the abovementioned mutual rejection of ‘humanitarian interventions’, and on economic interests, could be one of the most serious mid-term results of the bilateral treaty signed in Moscow. This by itself might have the most long-lasting effect on the international security system. Nevertheless the ‘practical policy towards the Asia-Pacific region’ means that Russia is continuing its policy of intensive relations with both North and South Korea and with Japan to balance the Chinese influence and potential. After 11 September 2001, and increasing international co-operation against the terrorist threat and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Asia-Pacific region became an essentially important area of international actions against potential threats. In the statement adopted on 2 June 2003 the world community leaders (G-8) intend to use military inspections, export control and, if necessary, other measures in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This statement was primarily aimed at the Asia-Pacific and Mediterranean regions. Russia became very active in the ASEAN regional forum on security. In the joint communiqué between Russia and China a special article was included that supported and encouraged Russia’s integration into the security institutions in Eastern Asia and membership in the ASEAN. In reality it meant confirmation of Chinese support for Russian engagement in the process of the institutionalisation of the new grouping in the Asia-Pacific region, which received the name of ‘ASEAN plus three’. These three countries were China, Japan and South Korea. The article in the joint Russian-Chinese communiqué (of 2000) supported expanding membership of this emerging security group. The years 2002 and 2003 saw the addition of the economic base needed for political and security integration within the region.57 It is important to stress the main features of the present Russian policy in the Asia-Pacific region. They could be characterised as actions focused on active participation in the regional and sub-regional alliances and engagement in joint initiatives on international combined joint task forces. They are the promotion of priority economic ties and arrangements, and the ability to use them as locomotives for the settlement of regional issues and the activation of several areas of co-operation at state-to-state, regional and local levels, plus the introduction of multi-layer approaches to regional revival. Summing up In a brief review of Russian foreign policy trends it is important to indicate the following points. Multilateralism and regionalisation became the over-lapping principles of security


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arrangements for Russia in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Properly combined they enlarged the ‘shadow’ of Russian presence in the regions, at the same time giving the RF additional guaranties of assistance in case of major violence breaking out in the sensitive tiers. These principles provided a solid base for the proclaimed policy of the so-called economic determinism. Foreign policy under President Putin was the very successful and pragmatic realisation of long-lasting traditions and mapped a pattern for a long-term future.

4 TESTING GEOPOLITICAL CONVICTIONS Russia has fully engaged itself in the international struggle against terrorism. The campaign against terror has two angles—domestic and international. On 20 January 2004 in his interview with RIA-Novosti the then Russian deputy foreign minister A.Safonov said that for Russia ‘counteracting international terrorism remained among the priority tasks of foreign policy’. According to A.Safonov it was ‘closely linked with the efforts to build a new effective international security system and to provide internal security of the country’.1 In this chapter the focus will be exclusively on the international dimension in anti-terrorist cooperation. Since 1999 NATO has been considering refocusing the Alliance to combat anti-terrorist activities. In parallel, in 1999 the second Chechen campaign in Russia was officially labelled as the ‘anti-terrorist campaign’. The hostage crisis in Moscow (23–26 October 2002) once again proved that the combat theatre for the anti-terrorist campaign was not just in Chechnya but that it had spread all over Russia. The terrorist threat became a dominant feature of internal and international politics in the US as well. To some extent the international campaign against terrorist threat assisted the international community to overcome the dilemma that was formulated during the early 1990s and still existed at the beginning of this century, though in less sharp forms. This search was around proper definition of the relationship with Russia: Yet if the term ‘partnership’ is misleading because it suggests a much more harmonious relationship than in fact exists, it would be equally mistaken to view Russia as an ‘adversary’ or ‘enemy’ in the way that the Soviet Union surely was during the Cold War. Today, Russia is not quite a partner, nor it is an adversary, and we need to find the proper terminology for conceptualising this new relationship.2 Russia actively participated in the work of all international institutions that were addressing the threat of terrorism and focusing on the reorientation of their activities in this rather new field. The RF lobbied for the formulation of a global strategy of counteracting new threats and challenges. The UN was considered to be an essential institution in the international anti-terrorist network. In fact, on Russia’s suggestion the 58 session of the UN General Assembly adopted a new resolution specifying further steps towards forming a global strategy for the anti-terrorist campaign. Another Russian initiative received practical support after the decision by the Convention on International Terrorism of the UN General Assembly was made to establish a ‘Group of wise men’ that was to prepare recommendations for collective counteractions against global challenges and threats. Former prime minister Primakov was expected to represent Russia there. Quite understandably Russia is in favour of more active work from the UN SC Counterterrorism Committee. In particular, Moscow welcomed the results of the October 2003


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meeting of the Committee with regional organisations aimed at co-ordinating and synchronising anti-terrorist strategy. The Russian Federation is a member of 11 out of 12 international conventions against terrorism, including the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and the International Convention Against Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, etc. In early 2004 Russia’s adherence to the 12th convention, a Montreal convention of 1991 regarding the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of their detection, was at the preparatory stage of its ratification. The RF was also among the initiators and supporters of the elaboration of a code of human rights protection against terrorism under the UN aegis. The 58 session of the UN General Assembly had adopted the resolution ‘Human rights and terrorism’, which included all elements of such a code—in particular, provisions on the right of each human being for protection against terrorism irrespective of nationality, race, sex and religion, as well as on barring asylum to persons guilty of committing terrorist acts. Russia is active in joint anti-terrorist initiatives in the G-8, EU, NATO and OSCE frameworks. In June 2003, during a G-8 summit, the participants adopted a ‘plan of actions on strengthening political will and potential for the fight against terrorism’, putting the fight against terrorism high on their agenda. At a time when the EU and NATO are being enlarged to establish an effective structure of European security, as well as adapting European institutions to the task of combating anti-terrorist actions, the fight against terrorism remains an important part of Russia’s foreign policy. The Russia-NATO Council, established in May 2002, provided an effective framework for practical co-operation in the field of counter-terrorism. Its Working Group on Terrorism is a good format for information exchange on terrorists’ activity and for methods of prevention of terrorist acts, evaluation of terrorist threats to armed forces, civil aviation, vital objects in Euro-Atlantic regions, and threats of terrorists using nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Russia also supports the expanding of the OSCE anti-terrorist activity. For example, Moscow welcomed the adoption by the foreign ministers of the OSCE countries on 12 December 2003 of the OSCE ‘Strategy on Counteraction to Threats to Security and Stability of the 21st Century’. In the Council of Europe, Russia participated in preparing a protocol amending the 1977 European convention on stopping terrorism. For the first time in the practice of international law the protocol provides for establishing a mechanism of checking how the CE member countries carry out their Convention obligations, including the extradition of terrorists. Russia supports the preparation of a comprehensive European convention on fighting terrorism, which would include a definition of terrorism agreed upon within the regions. In this regard Moscow highly values the results of the Rome Russia-EU Summit (November 2003), which made a substantial contribution to strengthening its strategic partnership with the EU. The signing of an agreement on cooperation with Interpol was, in particular, regarded as an important achievement. The US-international allied campaign against terrorism started with the operation against Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. During the period of debates over the phases of the anti-terrorist campaign, Russian perceptions on the nature of the campaign, the role of the US involvement and the limits of Russian-Western co-operation became clearer. One

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of the first lessons of the joint international anti-terrorist campaign was an understanding of the newly born dilemma between traditional geopolitics and international antiterrorism.3

Anti-terrorist activity It is most useful to demonstrate the divisions in the political and military elite on geopolitics adequate for Russia by looking at the reaction of Russian foreign and defence experts to the idea of joint coalition against terrorism. The assessment of the anti-terrorist campaign in Russian military-political literature starts with the debate not about the causes but rather about the consequences of the actions undertaken by the security services, primarily Western security services, for they themselves have used representatives of the most extreme forms of Islam for their political aims. The interstate wars are publicly pronounced as events of the past. The coalition building exclusively in the military sphere is considered to be less important than co-operation between security institutions. These public statements, though reflections of certain current policy priorities, nevertheless should be considered only as one element of long-term Russian policy orientations in the Western direction. In any case, a starting point for theoretical assessments of the new world geopolitics has become the understanding that as a result of globalisation ‘new geography was developing, the wholeness that is described not by the continuance of the physical territories, but by the ability of synchronised monitoring of the events and actions in different parts of the world in real time’.4 On the theoretical level there is an understanding of the necessity to look at the possibilities of the rethinking and re-evaluation of attitudes towards Central Asia as the heartland of the Eurasian continent, of the perception of the epicentre of the ‘Rimland’ and its geopolitical code. Tracking the attitudes on these two issues in Russia might help in an understanding as to what extent the notion of a new world order, based on the need for international cooperation in counter-terrorist activity, has impressed itself on Russian political culture. In practical politics it means, first of all, defining attitudes—for instance, to the presence of the Western forces in Central Asia and in the post-Soviet space in general. Russia refuses to agree to the long-term presence of the US and allied military personnel in Tajikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. However, the allied forces have secured deployment rights in Uzbekistan (Khanabad US airbase), in the Kashkadarinskaya region, and in Kyrgyzstan (Manas airport, Bishkek)—the fastest-growing American military station in Central Asia.5 Tajikistan is providing two airports in Kuliab and Aini. There are two bases available for the members of the anti-terrorist coalition. There is one Russian base and the other will host joint French, US, UK and German units. In addition, the US, France and Japan made commitments to provide ‘aid packages and investments’ as a trade-offs for the stationing rights in the republic. In parallel, negotiations were underway for establishing the NATO states’ presence in the Caucasus. For instance, Turkey was negotiating with Azerbaijan on turning Azeri military airports (in Baku, and near Kurdamir in central Azerbaijan) into Turkish military bases. The opening of the Turkish military base would be within the framework of the bilateral Turkish-Azeri military accord.6 As a balance, Azerbaijan agreed to let the RF


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use the radar facilities at Gabalinskaya for ten years (for $7 m annual rent). The agreement was signed in Moscow on 25 January 2002. As a result, Russia secured the ability to monitor air space and air traffic in the Caucasus and Central Asia.7 The Western/US deployments in Central Asia were seen by the Russians as the land bridges and air corridors between Afghanistan and other parts of Eurasia, as well as potential transit routes from Europe to the Far East and from the mineral-rich Caspian basin to the open seas in the South. While admitting the importance of the presence of the Western allied forces for future development in Eurasia, there are distinct opposing views on the long-term influence of such deployments on Russian national security. A distinction between two main groups of views—neo-Eurasianism and that concerning Chinese and Islamic threat factors—can be made. Neo-Eurasianism The deployments are seen as a land base for the military/political and sustainable economic expansion of the US/NATO force projection capabilities in energy-rich Eurasia. There is still a sense of treating Central Asia as ‘Russia’s soft underbelly’, thus expressing unease about the growing Western presence in the region. The following citation is typical in this respect: ‘Besides placing under their control the oil and gas resources in the region and the routes of their transportation, Washington has another mission in mind, that is establishing geopolitical situation conditions in Central Asia favourable for the United States’.8 Within this group fear is expressed that the US and allied military deployments are already opening the way for aid and then investments in the region that could hurt Russian economic and security interests. The developments in the Central Asian region are assessed as being part of the wider geopolitical situation. Russian reaction and policy decisions taken after 11 September are considered as a Russian retreat from the geostrategic achievements of the last two years. From late 1999 Russia’s foreign policy team demonstrated strong capabilities in upgrading Russia’s influence on the continental theatres and expanding the state’s geo-strategic space. The supporters of this view point to new forward looking agreements with China, India, Japan, increased co-operation with the CIS, Iran and the Middle East, intensified contacts with the two Koreas, Vietnam, Cuba, etc., and special achievements in relations with the European states. They believe that after 11 September, Russia, by choosing sides, has lost some of its achievements and traded them for a closer alliance with the West. Russia’s support of the US actions in Afghanistan was done without any long-term assessments of US/Western deployment in the region. By its actions Russia stimulated the devaluation of the international legal system and supported the unpopular world system. This viewpoint was most clearly presented by Leonid G.Ivashov, vice-president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences. Within this opinion group another argument is quite popular that the Afghanistan operation was used by the US military industrial complex for testing new military technology. As proof, the supporters of this view point out that around eighty highprecision missiles were tested in Afghanistan.9 The campaign against Iraq (2003) only strengthened the conviction of this group that only limited and selective co-operation with the West over terrorist threat is possible.


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Western-oriented realists expressing concern regarding Chinese and Islamic threat factors US deployments in Central Asia were said to be essential in preventing the spread of the Islamic threat to the region and in providing conditions for the modernisation of the airfields and transportation system infrastructure, which are considered in the long run to be exceptionally important for the national security of Russia.10 This co-operation was characterised as vital, not only in dealing with immediate military insurgencies from the South but also as a preparation for US/Western assistance in case of Chinese aggressive intentions towards Central Asia, the Caspian region, or the Far East. Alexander Sharbin, the director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, pointed out the necessity to be ready for wars of the third type. He warned about the illegal migration of the Chinese from overpopulated China to the rich areas of Siberia. This type of migration might stimulate conflict. According to this logic the Western presence or potential ability of rapid deployment in the region is considered essential for the Russian-Western coalition against illegal Chinese expansion in the energy-rich areas of the Caspian basin, the Russian Far East and Siberia. It is interesting that while supporters of this view consider it to be possible to limit or avert the US presence in the region, Chinese expansion without the balancing potential of the US is seen as almost unstoppable. Security analyst Vladimir Levin stated: Washington understands that Central Asia and the Caucasus are a zone of vital interests of the RF. There is no escape from this fact. In case of necessity Moscow might neutralise all US efforts by local supporters and friends, behind the scene intrigues, by destabilising activity and as the last resort by covert actions.11 However, even within this group there is a distinct understanding that rapprochement with the West will not build a stable international security system. The Western orientation is considered as a transatlantic model, and thus is not confrontational and not sufficient for Russia as a Eurasian state. A stable security system for Russia could be considered only as a multi-vector security arrangement that would incorporate long-term relationships with the West, and with main Eastern partners such as India and China. In reality President Putin’s consent to the US/Western presence in Central Asia was given for a limited time (throughout the duration of the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan).12 The initial US-Uzbek agreement was for one year, with a possible extension. However, the agreement could be renegotiated to allow for a long-term US presence in Uzbekistan. The initial agreement with Kyrgyzstan for US deployment was also for one year and was renegotiated in autumn 2002. On 17 January 2002 director of the Federal Border Guard Service Konstantin Totsky, in his interview to Russian journalists, announced that Moscow was ready to tolerate the American presence in Central Asia, especially on Tajikistan soil, while the anti-terrorist campaign continued in neighbouring Afghanistan. However, he stated that ‘if this was for long, we would not be friends’.13 It would be useful to demonstrate the balance of both assessments of US policies by


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providing the public opinion survey data done in 2001 by the independent firm ROMIR. These polls are also important due to the fact that they reveal the basic attitudes towards the US in Russian society. Most hostile were the eldest (60 years and over) and the youngest (18–29 years) generation groups of those being polled. Although the first category attitudes are quite predictable, the attitudes among the young people, who are eligible for mobilisation in the next 30 years, should be very worrying to the policymakers. People with higher education also expressed higher levels of concern over the US actions and intentions than others polled, and were more cautious about the level and type of co-operation with the US. Thus, generally, 51.3 per cent of all those polled opposed the decision to provide air corridors to the US for redeployment in Afghanistan. However, in the above-mentioned groups 61.4 per cent were against providing air corridors to the US for anti-terrorist operations. Overall only 38 per cent supported Russian co-operation with the US in providing the latter with air corridors. The majority of people polled were against giving the US permission to deploy its forces in bases on the territory of the CIS states: 63.5 per cent opposed this idea, with only 26.7 per cent supporting it. Primarily the support was limited to such area of cooperation as an exchange of intelligence information with the US (51.1 per cent supported). The main area of objection was sending Russian troops to Afghanistan for support of the anti-terrorist coalition (88.8 per cent were against military deployment of Russian troops). A survey conducted in Moscow on 8 October 2001 among 5,000 recipients demonstrated a high level of concern over the US operation in Afghanistan, 60.1 per cent believing that the action could threaten the national security of Russia; 36.3 per cent took the opposite view and supported the US operation. Special concern was voiced by Russian experts on the post-military phase of the antiterrorist operation. According to Russian analysis, drug production and the redistribution rings have not been touched at all in Afghanistan. It was believed that the US is not interested in dealing with this problem directly, but would prefer to delegate the right to deal with this problem to the states which were affected by the distribution of heroin. (The EU, Russia and Central Asia became the main and only markets for Afghani heroin dealers.)14 The soft security issues were considered mostly to be in the area of responsibility of joint actions of European and neighbouring states, including Russia. In any case, the Russian reaction was very typical in understanding the basic principles of the ‘pragmatic geopolitical approach’. Adopting a new agenda for the Russian military and security services, focused on antiterrorist activity, meant the implementation of complex synchronised measures aimed at changes to the international practices of cooperation, new operational requirements, etc. In May 2002 the RF Security Council adopted decisions on the RF approach and role in the international struggle against terrorism. Russia’s conceptual approach to the antiterrorist campaign can be summed up as: • Joint actions (including preventive measures) against terrorists should be sanctioned by the UN Security Council. • Readiness to share the burden of combating international terrorism without geographical limitations. • Concentration of international co-ordination on joint actions in combating military terrorist formations and channels of financial support for the terrorist activities.


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• Importance of multilevel and overlapping anti-terrorist networks. As was stressed by the deputy secretary of the RF Security Council, Oleg D.Chernov: it is essential that the fight against terrorism would not be used for selfish political reasons and geo-strategic purposes. In this struggle there should not be leaders and followers. The main institution co-ordinating and waging this fight should be the United Nations. It is essential that the UN should monitor the expanding of the struggle against terrorism to some other countries in order not to create more problems and threats for mankind.15 Russia does not reject the right of nations to defend themselves by preventive strikes against terrorists, but stresses the necessity of such actions being sanctioned by the UN Security Council. At the press conference in the Brussels HQ, after the first meeting of the NATO-Russian 20 Forum (7 June 2002), the minister of defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Ivanov, confirmed that Russia was ready to carry out its responsibility in fighting against terrorism—even outside its geographical zone. According to the Russian minister of defence, the events of 11 September made many people think about new mutual threats and new responses to them. These threats are outside the geographical area of responsibility of both NATO and Russia; they are all in the ‘arch of instability’.16 Russian officials marked joint actions as essential for international co-ordination in combating the terrorists’ military formations and channels of financial support. The introduction of a new federal system of financial control, with the expanding functions and powers of the Federal Audit Chamber, was considered as part of the Russian efforts to reinforce its ability internally and externally to fight against the financial roots of terrorism. In January 2003 a very important step was made. It was the introduction of changes into the Russian federal law ‘On prevention of legalisation (laundering) of incomes received by criminal means and financing terrorism’. Those changes were necessary for implementation of the ‘eight special recommendations’ on fighting the financing of terrorism by the group on working out financial measures to fight money laundering (FATF). In June 2003 Russia was accepted as a permanent member state of the group. Achievements in stopping terrorist money laundering and creating appropriate national mechanisms and procedures allow Russia to assume more active positions within the framework of international co-operation. The reaction of the Russian president to the 11 September 2001 terrorist acts against the US has redefined Russia’s strategic orientation towards co-operation with Western states, as well as its special attention to the Caucasian and Central Asian strategic directions, as the first priority area that national security institutions should be dealing with. President Putin has confirmed more than once that the fight against international terrorism in the Asian region must continue. Co-operation with the international and CIS community was and is a necessity. The state has had to consider the necessity of concentrating a great number of resources in the territories bordering Afghanistan in order to defend Russia’s southern borders. Starting from the first days of the second Chechen campaign Russian officials were trying to make a point of the strong link between Chechen fighters and the international terrorist network. Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Lieutenant-General Sergei N.Lebedev, went on record as saying that


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the Foreign Intelligence Service was stepping up the activities in the struggle against international terrorism. You are right that there is a direct link between Afghanistan and events in the North Caucasus. We have come up against international terrorism. The brigades, detachments or gangs of fighters now operating in the North Caucasus and partially in Central Asia essentially move about from one conflict region to another. The fighters now operating in the North Caucasus emerge in Afghanistan shortly afterwards and surface in the ranks of the Palestinians thereafter. We know of such facts. That is why there is a great deal of complicated work here. The task of gathering information there is a complex one. Nonetheless, we are actively monitoring the events taking place not only in Afghanistan, but also in all regions where there are conflicts. We are trying to get information to help us fight international terrorism and to settle conflict situations in various regions.17 The Russians were increasingly voicing criticism regarding limited co-operation among international partners in the information-sharing area. For instance, the Russian side complained that while the Russian intelligence sources provided intelligence assessments with analytical analysis of the intentions of potential terrorists, the CIA reports were providing their Russian counterparts with only bare statistics and accountability of facts. According to deputy director of the FSB (Federal Security Service of Russia), Viktor Komogorov, the Russian sources sent over 100 reports (analytical) to the CIA, receiving in return only 50 data reports, where the analysis was completely absent.18 However, the areas of co-operation, besides early warning and intelligence information sharing, were stretching to joint training of the emergency services and co-ordination among the special services.19 Russia was implementing a dual approach to the engagement strategy with the antiterrorist coalition. On the one hand, the RF was keen to introduce the regional transformed alliances of the CIS states as part of the wider international anti-terrorist network. On the other hand, it was essential for the state to engage NATO in anti-terrorist activity within the Forum-20 framework. For instance, when Russia was asked whether it intended to be supportive of the international coalition in Afghanistan, and was planning to send its troops as part of the national contingent to the coalition forces or as part of the regional CIS peacekeeping formation, the answer that was given was very characteristic. The Russian minister of defence, Sergei Ivanov, dismissed the possibility of co-operation in the anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan within the CIS-NATO framework, noting that the sphere ‘was not part of the CIS format’. The Russian minister of defence stressed that even theoretically Russia did not consider the question of sending its servicemen to Afghanistan. But Russia intends to co-operate in the anti-terrorist campaign with NATO in the format of Council Russia-NATO, especially having in mind that from autumn 2003 the command of the anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan was transferred to NATO.20 Nevertheless, Russia was intent on putting its weight into setting the international antiterrorist network in post-Soviet space, that it could easily become an essential player. The international centre for co-ordination of the anti-terrorist campaign in Kuliab, Tajikistan,


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was to function as a regional cell for the co-ordination of the coalition partners. This initiative was discussed initially at the US-Russia Summit, November 2001. In the future this centre is to be transformed into the international HQ of the anti-terrorist campaign and accompanied by the establishment of a military base with substantial military infrastructure. Presently, a Russian aviation brigade is located near the Kuliab airport and acts as a security guarantor to the centre. This decision has supporters as well as opponents in the RF Ministry of Defence. The latter express concern over the risk of losing Tajikistan, an important strategic location in the CA region, to the increasing Western/NATO presence there.21 In 2002 there were 1,000 US soldiers in Uzbekistan and a 3,000-strong international force in Kyrgyzstan. They were deployed in Central Asia as part of the anti-terrorist campaign. The aforementioned concerns received the unusual support in spring-summer 2003, when the last stage of negotiations on the legitimisation of the Russian base in Tajikistan ran into difficulties and was substantially delayed. The situation became public in connection with the transformation of the 201 Mechanised Rifle Division into the fourth base of the Ministry of Defence of Russia. According to some mass media publications, the deadlock was due to the lobbying and abstraction policies of the US administration that was attempting to block the long-term Russian lease and base deployment.22 On 5 June 2002, in his interview to the Chinese newspaper Renmin Ribao, Russian president Vladimir Putin said that Russia was ‘not particularly allergic’ to the temporary presence of US troops in the Central Asian region. ‘By lending its support to the world community and its effort to eliminate a hotbed of terrorism on the territory of Afghanistan, Russia meant to protect its own security interests, as well as the interests of its partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States, with whom it had consulted beforehand’, stressed Putin.23 However, it was mentioned that ‘Russia was fully aware that it was still a long way to go until Central Asia achieved peace and tranquillity, and [that] no one could relieve’ Russia and other members of the Collective Security Treaty and Shanghai Co-operation Organisation of ‘their responsibility for security in [a] region as important’ as Central Asia. According to Putin, ‘stability in Central Asia still depends directly on the situation in Afghanistan’.24 With the beginning of the joint international campaign in Afghanistan, and deployment of the international coalition forces, the Russian MoD reduced its expenditure by cutting the level of its presence in Tajikistan. It was assumed that during the limited time of friendly deployments by other countries in the region the burden of dealing with potential risk factors to regional stability would be shared as well. As a result of the cuts the personnel of the division, stationed in Tajikistan, suffered a reduction from 8,000 to 5,500 men. In the framework of the anti-terrorist situation in Afghanistan it is allowed to use national airspace and Russian airfields. However, Russian military and policy experts assumed that there was never any agreement on deployment of the NATO military contingent. There was a shared belief that there was only agreement on the presence of a small group of experts from the states of the anti-terrorist coalition. With the official transfer of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan under NATO subordination in summer 2003, the Russian Ministry of Defence came to the conclusion that the reduction of the Russian presence was too severe and that some redeployment was unavoidable. According to deputy commander of the division, Rubcov, ‘it was being planned to re-


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establish a separate anti-aircraft/rocket unit’ and continue the support of the remaining contingents in Tajikistan. By summer 2003 Russian units remained in Dushanbe, KurganTube and Kuliab. Seven tactical groups of the division continued to be deployed at the stations of the so-called ‘Moscow’ and ‘Piandge’ border guard units in the most dangerous directions on the Tajik-Afghani border.25 The bridge-head of Central Asia and South Caucasus included in the sphere of military interests of several blocs—NATO, the European Union and the Organisation of the Treaty on Collective Security of the CIS states (ODKB)—is divided according to the principle ‘common enemy—different strategic interests’. According to the permanent representative of Russia in NATO, General Konstantin Totsky, international terrorism represents a common enemy of the aforementioned organisations. As for the interests, they are contraindicated to geopolitical aspirations in the regions of the US and NATO, on the one hand, and the ODKB on the other. Without harming those aspirations it is possible to search for Bin Laden jointly.26 The second and following phases in the fight against terrorism involved difficult decisions for the anti-terrorist coalition, such as the decision whether to support a campaign against Iraq or other nations that were hosting terrorist networks. The sensitivity of such decisions was increasing, particularly in view of the international deployments in Russia’s backyard. According to the Russian newspaper Izvestia’s military sources, among the states that could be asked to consider hosting the US (or other) forces for such an operation are the countries of the second tier—Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The military campaign against Iraq, and increased US rhetoric against Syria and Iran, intensified the concerns of Russian defence experts about the intentions and plans of the US administration in the region adjacent to Iraq, explicitly regarding possible new targets like Syria and Iran for the USled coalition. These apprehensions of Russian defence and security specialists about the possibility of US military actions against Syria were publicly voiced at the end of April and beginning of May 2003.27 There was a growing concern among the Russian military about possible use by the US of its South Caucasus (especially Azeri and Georgian) and Central Asian (Uzbek in particular) bases in the military campaigns against Iran and Syria. The sensitivity over US deployment has increased in view of the ratification by the Georgian parliament of the bilateral agreement with the US ‘on technical-military cooperation’28 and information of the deployment of 1,500 servicemen in Azerbaijan. As in every international incident or crisis in recent history Russia demonstrated extreme flexibility in defining its attitude to these potential developments. It is possible to point out to at least two trends in this respect. One trend, because of the hostage crisis in Moscow in October 2002, stressed a forceful support of the anti-terrorist coalition and increased the level of understanding between the Putin-Bush administrations. The other trend was demonstrated in the intensified efforts of official Moscow to establish regional units, organisations and institutions that could address the terrorist challenges without the participation or assistance of the US. The hostage crisis in Moscow (23–26 October 2002) once again linked, according to Russian officials, the state’s national security with the need for international co-operation in the field of the anti-terrorist campaign. More than 700 people were taken hostage in a theatre by the Chechen terrorist group headed by Movsar Barayev. The incident led to the deaths of over one hundred and twenty hostages. The events influenced the changes in


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the Russian approaches to the whole spectrum of issues dealing with anti-terrorist policies. The extraordinary events in Moscow have influenced the Russian position towards support of more profound ‘preventive actions’ against terrorists, their home bases, and the sources of financial support and networks. The official launch of the ‘Putin Doctrine’ presupposes that the preventive strikes not only against the terrorists themselves but also against those who support them, either financially or ideologically,29 automatically extend the geography in using force against the terrorists, including beyond the national borders of Russia. Tracked telephone conversations of the hostage-takers’ leader in Moscow, M. Barayev, were considered by the Russian Security Service as reliable proof that former leaders of Chechnya stationed abroad, and elected Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, were involved in the hostage-taking raid in Moscow. These assessments became essential in Russian arguments to follow the American method in dealing with terrorist threats in a ‘preventive manner’. Ex-Prime Minister Stepashin stated: ‘[The h]ostages rescue operation in Moscow has no analogy. A psychological and military point is evident today, which is necessary for dealing with terrorists both in the mountainous parts of Chechnya and the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia’.30 Those foreign connections were used for stepping up pressure to strap A. Maskhadov of legitimacy, for neutralising financial and organisational support from abroad to Chechen separatists, and for increasing pressure on foreign governments to close Chechen-linked centres and extradite the Chechens to Russia. On 31 October 2001 presidential aide, Sergei Yastrmbzhenskyi, declared that Russia was preparing warrants for an international search and detention of the Chechen leaders suspected of ties with terrorist organisations.31 On 1 November 2002, in a separate motion, Mikhail Margelov, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, sent a formal request to the US State Department (addressed to Secretary of State C.Powell) to consider putting in the Department’s list of terrorist organisations the name of terrorist battalion ‘Riydus-Salihin’ headed by Shamil Basaev, who is believed to have masterminded the attack on the Moscow theatre. Russia was using all possible channels to put the names of known groups of Chechen warlords on the US State Department’s ‘black list’ of terrorist organisations. The Russians were requesting that Chechen information offices and centres abroad be closed. They praised Azerbaijan and Turkey for doing so. Moscow also insisted on the transfer of the EU-Russia Summit (2002) from Copenhagen—where the World Chechen Congress was assembled—to Brussels. At the same time, starting from 24 October 2002 onwards, the Kremlin sent messages to the international community that its bilateral relations from now on would depend mainly on other states’ willingness to respond to Moscow requests to stop support of the individuals and organisations linked to the terrorist activities.32 The horrific events of the theatre seizure, and such a massive hostage-taking experience, provided Moscow with substantial arguments for choosing to back up the US approach of retaliation and preventive strikes against potential terrorist threats. This new attitude could be seen during the discussions on Iraq in the UN Security Council. On 25 October 2002 the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov, and US secretary of state, Colin Powell, agreed not to press for the vote on the draft resolution on Iraq but rather to work more closely on a mutually acceptable text of the resolution. The minister


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of foreign affairs stated that Russia and the US had agreed not to speed up the voting on the draft but to continue seeking to bring their positions closer. On 8 November 2002 the UNSC Resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously. At the time of the hostage crisis in Moscow Russian delegations at different international forums were stressing the need for joint international actions against terrorism and the creation of an international anti-terrorist security network. Despite the inability of Vladimir Putin to be present at the summit in Mexico (October 2002), a highlevel Russian delegation, headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov, was able to stress the need for a joint international cooperation against the terrorist threat. The same message was delivered at the meeting of the Business Advisory Council of the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation Organisation (APEC) in Los Cabos by then Russian prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov. The Russian prime minister stressed the need to act jointly and strengthen regional co-operation in identifying and locating potential terrorists, the sources of their support and organisational networks. At the time of the hostage crisis in Moscow high-level political debates within the framework of a ‘civil debates’ (Moscow-based NGO) forum were staged. Though the initial topic of the October session was planned to be different, the assessment of the outcome and reasons for the hostage crisis became the core of the discussion. One of the leading politicians and analysts, Vecheslav Nikonov, the president of the Politica Foundation, predicted that the situation would automatically bring Russia closer to the US rather than to the European states. It was due to a similarity of the approaches between the US and Russia, and their mutual understanding of the scope of the international terrorist threat and the forms needed for strategic containment of the threat and ways of dealing with it.33 The European approach is different. Russian political and military experts understand this. Though some of them hope to avoid departure or distancing from the Europeans over this issue, they nevertheless overwhelmingly stress the need for united actions—primarily with those who accept the logic of forceful means against terrorism. An even more definite acceptance of new alliances against terrorism was confirmed in the statement of Sergei Karaganov, the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policies, made to the popular web-site publication strana.ru: The deepest problem is in the inability of the Europeans to get involved in the struggle against terrorism. They do not have either the will or the militarypolitical abilities for this. And as a result the burden for the anti-terrorist campaign is put on the US, Russia and the UK, but continental Europe wants to sit this round through. This is a huge cultural problem, because Europe, in its present state with its principles of political correctness, is denying the use of force… The difference in these attitudes exists between the US and Europe, and between Europe and Russia, at different levels. We exist in different dimensions. We are the state that is fighting for its national borders. We are the state that is on the borderline between the poor and the wealthy, between the world of failing Islam and rising Western civilisations, to which, by the way, not only Christianity belongs but Buddhism as well. But Europe is trying drastically to escape from these issues and likes to criticise us.34


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President Putin’s consistency and determination of rhetoric reflected President Bush’s political debates almost word for word. It was supposed to remind the Americans of the similarity of political wills and tasks in the US and Russia in their mutual struggle against international terrorism.35 The essential element of current Russian rhetoric was based on the logic that an ally in the struggle against terrorism could be any state, including a totalitarian one, if it had committed itself to the joint anti-terrorist campaign. Irina Khakamada, Russian MP, pointed out shortly after the crisis: ‘Today Russia’s ally could be any political regime (even totalitarian), if its goal is to liquidate terrorism.’36 On the other hand, analysts drew attention to the fact that Russia could be the best choice as an ally for the US as well, keeping in mind the ‘ability of Russian leaders to act in secrecy, to sacrifice the lives of the country’s own citizens, but preserve the power. This is making Russia unique and exceptional in its own way, that could be compared only with Pakistan.’37 As one of Russia’s leading journalists, Yurii Alekseev stated that the story of contemporary terrorism demonstrates that to ‘defend and attack jointly could be easier’.38 On 10 January 2003 Russia was acknowledged as a signatory of the International Convention on Prevention of Terrorism (1977) by the UK government. In accordance with this document any person trialed for extradition on charges of terrorism cannot plead political reasons in order to gain asylum.39 Russia continued this trend by introducing its own black anti-terrorist list. In February 2003 the Supreme Court of the RF complied with a request by general prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov to have 15 radical Islamic organisations acknowledged as terrorist and to ban their activities in Russia. Among those mentioned on the list were the international radical Islamic groups such as Hizb attahrir and Al-Qaeda, as well as the Chechen-based Supreme Military Madjlisul-shoura of United Forces of Modjaheds in the Caucasus and the Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Daghestan, established by Chechen field commanders Basayev and Udougov.40 Anti-terrorist containment network From 2002 Russia’s diplomatic activity was concentrated on establishing, or formally institutionalising, regional and subregional international networks for co-ordination in anti-terrorist activity. In 2003 and the beginning of 2004, bilateral Russian-American, Russian-Chinese, Russian-British and Russian-Indian groups held their regular meetings. A high-level Russian-German working group on security questions has been established, and its responsibilities include anti-terrorism. Russia attached great importance to increasing constructive work within the mechanism of anti-terrorist consultations established with Canada, Italy, Poland, Japan, France and the CIS countries. In 2003, a Russian-Pakistani working group on fighting terrorism and other challenges to security started its work. Moscow continues to expand the geography of its advanced bilateral anti-terrorist contacts. In 2003 anti-terrorist consultations with some Balkan countries and states of North Africa (Algeria, Morocco) were held. In December 2003 bilateral antiterrorist consultations, the first in the history of Russian-Indonesian relations, also took place. Russia was active in anti-terrorist co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2003 substantial preparatory work was done for the adoption of a declaration on fighting


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terrorism between Russia and ASEAN. Russia and the Philippines, as co-chairmen of the mechanism of the intercession meetings on counteracting terrorism of the ASEAN regional forum (APF), were responsible for addressing issues related to fighting terrorism on all types of transportation. Russia is actively interacting with anti-terrorist structures in all regions of the world. In Latin America Russian delegations participate as observers in sessions of the InterAmerican committee on fighting terrorism (CICTE). During the UN general assembly sessions anti-terrorist questions occupy a key place in the agenda of meetings between the Russian foreign minister and the expanded ‘troika’ of the Rio Group. As a result of one such meeting (September 2002) a decision was taken to establish a mechanism of permanent co-operation in the fight against terrorism between Russia and the Rio Group. Agreement was reached on more active bilateral co-operation with Latin American countries, including Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Equador. Russia has been very active in establishing regional and subregional forums on antiterrorist co-operation and co-ordination. The following subregional groupings should be taken into account, the so-called ‘groups of four’: Slavic group (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland), Caucasian group (Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), on the Middle East (the UN, EU, US and Russia), the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, etc. Russia gives special attention to international co-operation in field of the anti-terrorist activities with the neighbouring states. Here are only few examples of the RF actions. On 4 June 2002 the Alma-Ata Summit on Co-operation and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia resulted in the signing of the Alma-Ata Act on regional security. These decisions were followed by the formal institutionalisation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation during its summit in St Petersburg, Russia, on 5 June 2002. The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), which includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, was founded in 1996 with the relatively modest aim of resolving border disputes. The group has evolved into a platform for voicing opposition to the unilateral policies of the United States, criticising its superpower status and urging the establishment of a ‘multipolar’ post-Cold War world. In 2001 it started to transform itself into a regional anti-terrorist network as well. The agreement on the regional anti-terrorist alliance, SCO’s Charter and the Joint Declaration of the member states, were approved in St Petersburg. The decisions demonstrated not only consensus on the goal, functions and priorities of this organisation, but the readiness to turn it into a properly functioning regional international institution, registered by the UN, with an established mechanism of decision-making and policy implementation.41 The Charter of the alliance had to be ratified by at least four member states to become effective. In accordance with the Charter, a permanently functioning international anti-terrorist HQ in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) was proposed to be established. The goal of the proposal was to share information/intelligence and co-ordinate the activity of major enforcement services of the member states. Among the tasks of major priority the co-ordination of the SCO members’ foreign policy positions and activities was named.42 On 10 January 2003 President Putin signed the federal law ‘On Ratification of the Shanghai Convention on Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism’. On 29 May 2003 the summit of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation took place in Moscow, during which documents


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were signed that formally established the statute of the main governing bodies of the organisation, including such as summits of heads of states, governments and ministers of foreign affairs.43 SCO officially received a military and security component to deal with the terrorist threat and other soft security challenges. In August 2003, in Kazakhstan, the anti-terrorist exercises ‘Interaction 2003’ of the Shanghai Organisation member states took place. On 14 December 2003 the Russian president sent the State Duma a set of documents necessary for the ratification of the Agreement among the Shanghai Organisation member states on regional anti-terrorist structure designed to promote coordination and the interaction of appropriate institutions in fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism. This regional structure already has its own budget; its components are being established, and its council has held its first meeting. The SCO’s own regional agenda was to be a prime player in a wide arc of Eurasian territory, even as the US troops remain in Central Asia. India officially expressed interest in joining the organisation. The Russian newspaper Izvestia confirmed that it would be admitted after its formal application, as the decision in support of its membership had already been reached among the existing six members of the SCO.44 With the threats coming from Afghanistan, Russia was using various channels, above all working within the framework of the Shanghai Organisation of Co-operation, at the bilateral level with Tajikistan, and within the framework of the Organisation of the Treaty on Collective Security. The existing terrorist threat was used for stimulating security integration in the CIS space. On 31 October 2002 the RF Security Council session was totally devoted to the analysis of relations with the CIS states and the need to adjust policies to the realities of new security challenges. Addressing the Council, President Putin stressed the need for joint collective measures against terrorism, and the need to modernise and unite the intelligence data on terrorist activities within the CIS.45 It was expected that the need for a better mechanism for discussions and joint policymaking procedures would be voiced within the CIS. The deputy secretary of the RF Security Council, Oleg Chernov, presented a list of suggestions that Russia was ready to propose to the CIS states in the anti-terrorist field. First, the RF suggested that the structures and staff membership of the Anti-terrorist Centre (CIS) should be radically changed. Initially Uzbekistan, Georgia and Turkmenistan did not have their representatives in the HQ, which limited the Anti-terrorist Centre’s potential and its ability to be an effective anti-terrorist institution. This proposal was linked to the recommendation to change the financial arrangements of the HQ and increase its budget. The creation of the joint intelligence-sharing database for the CIS region was initiated, as well as the proposal to intensify the training and joint exercises of special forces units and establishing the regional Anti-terrorist HQ in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan). The most interesting proposal of the RF Security Council was to appoint Russian specialists from all security and military networks (Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, Ministry of Interior, MoD) as liaison officers responsible for co-ordinating the anti-terrorist activities to similar institutions in the CIS states.46 According to the minister of foreign affairs, Igor Ivanov, promoting military and technical-military co-operation becomes the first priority task for the CIS member states. Russia has been working intensely on this since President Putin took office in 2000. The


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agreement on the legal status of the Organisation of the Treaty on Collective Security was signed in Kishineu on 7 October 2002. According to the agreements and the Charter, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, as the Treaty on Collective Security (1992) signatories, became fulltime members of the new institution.47 On 29 April 2003 at the CIS Summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, the Treaty of Collective Security was finally formally transformed into a regional political security institution the Organisation of the Treaty on Collective Security (OTCS). The newly established organisation has a defined structure of six committees and a Secretariat (headed by Nikolay Borduzha, then the director of the Russian border guards), joint HQ and rapid reaction forces (each country pledged to assign a battalion), and a confirmed budget. E.Rakhmonov, the leader of Tajikistan, was appointed chairman of the Organisation. Kant airbase in Kyrgyzia was chosen to become the main base. As negotiations on the terms of the base in Tajikistan revealed, the new organisation would not only deal with military threats but also with the issues of political instability and provide support for the OCST leaders on their request. The main goals of the new organisation are the counter/anti-terrorist campaign and anti-drug campaign.48 The Russian minister of defence expressed hope that the states would use the opportunities and time to negotiate the conditions needed for refocusing the military-technical co-operation agreements by paying special attention to technical support for anti-terrorist activity. The hope was that new adjustments to the military-technical co-operation programme could be adopted at the CIS Summit in St Petersburg in May 2003, and they were. In late spring 2003 the government of Russia approved and presented them to the president for introduction for ratification to the State Duma, which they passed in July 2003. Thus, a new defensivesecurity alliance was formed. As the CIS was restructuring its defence-security mechanism questions regarding practical relationships with Western partners on the soft security issues and new challenges were being transformed from theoretical discussions into operational practice. One should remember that by 2002/3 there were signs of a realisation of the provisions on joint actions against terrorism with NATO and the EU. Both the Joint US-Russia Declaration (Moscow, May 2002) and the NATO-Russia Rome Declaration (May 2002) have provisions on the creation of an international anti-terrorist containment network. International incidents, as well as the decisions at the EU and NATO November 2002 and 2003 Summits, transferred the possibility of such a network into a structure that was gradually being built. Russian reaction was mixed and very practical. On 21 November 2002 Valerii Nikolaenko, the general secretary of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, stated at a press conference after the meeting of the CIS Council of Defence Ministers that he did not exclude co-operation between the CIS members of the Collective Security Treaty and NATO, especially in the anti-terrorist area: ‘We are prepared for co-operation with NATO in the anti-terrorist field, but only after this direction is clarified. Presently NATO does not have collective rapid deployment forces, without which it would be impossible to have effective anti-terrorist operations’.49 On the other hand, at the meeting of the ministers of defence of the CIS Collective Security Treaty it was stressed that the main emphasis of the Organisation would be put on military co-operation, especially in the field of counter-terrorist co-operation. Presently the signatories of the CIS Collective Security Treaty are: Russia, Armenia,


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Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The CIS rapid deployment force of 2,000 men, with its HQ in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, is ready for action in the Central Asian (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) direction.50 In the future there will be a full-scale group of forces based in this direction, as well as in the East European (RussiaBelarus) and Caucasian (Russia-Armenia) directions, where a joint group of forces is combined from divisions. As a result of these plans, ‘The Perspective Plan for Development of the Rapid Deployment Forces until 2005’ was adopted at the Moscow CIS defence ministers’ meeting on 21 November 2002. However, the Charter of a new organisation, OTCS, that has been established as a successor to the CIS Collective Security Treaty, has limitations in the area of military-technical co-operation between individual member states and third parties. Nevertheless, as was promised, in the future the CIS Collective Security Treaty, or its successor OTCS, would be open for cooperation with international organisations, including NATO. The terrorist threats represented global challenges to the state authorities world-wide and provided Russia with the opportunity to use these channels of integration. The roles of the UN and UNSC as a mandatory institution for sanctioning any joint international anti-terrorist actions were seen almost as an obligatory blessing for any Russian/OTCS participation in any future anti-terrorist campaign. Accepting the need to find the most appropriate ways of modernising the United Nations, Russia defined the parameters of adjustments so they should not diminish the UN’s role and its work. During his state visit to the UK in 2003 the Russian president expressed satisfaction that responsibility for resolving the crisis in Iraq had been returned to the UN, and that other serious regional problems, particularly regulation in the Middle East, were again being dealt with through political means: In the fight against terrorism we should not lose everything that mankind has accumulated in the millennia of its history. I mean, first of all, international law and also the whole international system and the central role of the UN. This system has served us well over the last decades. Civilisation has nothing to replace it with. And now, when the ideological schism in the world has been overcome, its potential could be used to the full.51 The important element in Russia’s quest for a new international security system was the support of the role of the UN in the international crisis management and peace-building institutional hierarchy. The anti-terrorist policy being pursued by the Russian government was accompanied by substantial internal reform and adjustment of the internal security system and government (federal, regional and local) to face the new challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century world.

Part II DOMESTIC REFORMS

5 THE STRATEGY OF REFORMS Systemic changes and their implications Specialists are divided in their opinion on President Putin’s intentions concerning reforming the system of governance in Russia and his ability to deliver the outlined and promised plans. Critics often stress the slow pace and inconsistencies in reform implementation.1 The opposite view is shared by an extensive group of prominent scholars who consider the pro grammes of development proposed by the executive institutions to be no less than revolutionary.2 This logic was strengthened by the description of the scope and level of changes that Putin’s administration was bringing into political and administrative systems and due to radical solutions introduced on the economic front. With the new administration coming to power in the Kremlin a wide range of reforms was started. They were the introduction of institutional changes in such fields as economic relations, financing and investments; reforms of social security and pension systems, of labour market legislation and natural monopolies, housing and budget reforms. The changes in the economic sphere were accompanied and preceded by reforms of federal centre-regional-local relations, the judicial system, the military and security sectors and party reforms, to name just a few. This book rather supports the arguments of those who see the strategic long-term consequences of the economic and political reforms of Putin’s government and their long-term influence on all spheres of life in Russia. However, the reforms are seen as being part of the concluding phase of revealed tendencies that initially appeared during the perestroika years, and even before that time. The reforms are also seen as a certain phase in Russia’s search for the most effective form of governance, that could both incorporate national traditions and be adjustable to the requirements and challenges of the new century.3 There is an extended list of innovations that have been introduced in Russia. However, for the purpose of supporting the argument of radical and evolutionary, rather than predictable, changes in the Russian system of governance this book concentrates on a few specially selected topics. It seems most appropriate to demonstrate the analysis of changes in the political and administrative systems, to show the mechanics of new management through a detailed demonstration of changes in the civil-military control regime in Russia, and to reveal the main tendencies in the military reform. Though the choice of topics might seem selected at random, this is definitely not the case. The areas defined allow a demonstration of the links between the national cultural environment, traditions and influence of external factors, and the contemporary and long-term challenges that the state and those who govern it must take into account in building a stable system of governance. The issues of financial and economic reforms are at the core of the transformation of

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Russian society, but it is no less important to understand how and if at all the promised changes can be implemented. The issues of governance that allow the changes to be introduced, prepare the public for acceptance of the reforms and secure the implementation by dealing with internal and external risks and instabilities, are becoming the prime task for a systemic approach to reforms. Though not touching on economic issues to any great extent, in practice this book addresses the issues that secure economic marketing development in Russia. Under President Putin, as suggested by Vadim Volkov, the Russian leadership had taken a widely supported call for a strong state, reflecting the president’s own conviction that ‘an ineffectual state is the main cause of the lengthy and profound economic crisis’.4 Patterns of the new governance in Russia that will determine the state’s internal and external policies for years to come are discussed in this chapter. Reform of the administrative system: new governance Building the twenty-first century territorial-administrative system After winning the 2000 elections President Vladimir Putin started his term in office by signing a large number of decrees that were aimed at restructuring the federation. This process was accompanied by a wide range of administrative reform that affected federal, regional and local levels of governance, the civil service and even the so-called ‘knowhow’ of the country’s management system. One of the traditionally shared myths about Russian history and development plans is their unpredictability and the spontaneous character of developments. The dilemmas of Russia’s choices and pattern of development have long become a legend. The turmoil of the last decade was seen as a proof of these tendencies. There is but another story of the Russian way of adapting to changes. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the country was facing an intensified process of integration, a process which had been carefully thought of in advance during the perestroika years. The implementation, however, has taken long and controversial forms. The foundation of the present territorial-administrative divisions in Russia was established by Catherine the Great, who by the end of the eighteenth century completed the transfer of large territorial units—established by Peter the Great—to relatively compact territorial units (gubernyi). The main requirements for such units were the existence of town/city centres and the availability of 300,000 men for recruitment into military service.5 Many territorial administrative regions still function within their 200year-old boundaries; it is especially typical in Central Russia. According to one of the prominent specialists on regional politics in Russia, Nikolay Petrov, this territorial division, with the exception of some insignificant changes during the period of Emperor Paul’s reign, was preserved until 1917.6 Several innovations were then implemented during the Soviet period. They included the introduction of new regional divisions in Central Asia and a regrouping of the regions when the new administrative territorial mapping of the country was initiated to create better conditions for the implementation of the state’s socio-economic development programmes. For instance, during the industrialisation years (1930s) the focus was on the creation of the ‘macro-regions’


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around industrial centres; from the late 1950s into the 1960s, when development of modern agriculture was named as a priority of the state’s economic programmes, the regrouping of the regions took place around functioning state-owned agricultural enterprises. Otherwise the structural composition was left more or less untouched. The main innovations of the Soviet period were linked to strengthening the ethnic-territorial units and establishing a strict hierarchy of the regions in accordance with the constitution of 1936. However, the main principle of the territorial administrative division introduced in the late eighteenth century, the formation of a region around the main city/town centre, was preserved as the core of the systemic state construction. The developing conditions of the Industrial Revolution and the main directions taken by economic reforms in the state inspired the changes taking place. In the mid-1980s the Soviet Union came close to restructuring the territorial administrative divisions of the state. The necessity for reform was based, on the one hand, on the need to modernise the domestic economy in correlation with the international tendencies of globalisation and accepting Western theories dealing with centre-regional power politics which to some extent were popular in the 1950s and the 1960s. Special focus was placed on providing technological solutions for problems,7 when stable, diverse, and multiple communication channels and opportunities were seen as a way of preventing a split and preserving the state’s integrity. On the other hand, Aleksei Salmin, for example, argued that ‘different statuses for the component parts of the state should be developed to succeed the now archaic division into republics, autonomous regions and autonomous areas’.8 The debates on the necessity of a new territorial administrative system—one that would allow the state to address the main economic and security challenges and be more integrated into the international system openly began during the perestroika years. The Russian Federation, as an integral part of the USSR, was preparing to face the new technological challenges posed by information societies, and the increasing pressures on its security coming from the multipolar world such as multidimensional threats to the nation-state. Three major changes in the territorial administrative system had been planned to be introduced in the RF and in the USSR: • enlargement of the territorial units in the RF; • elimination of the non-equal division between ethnic territories and federal territories (in Russia); • making newly established ‘macro territories’ economically self-sufficient, and securitywise functioning reliably as sub-elements of regional security complexes and regional orders.9 The disintegration of the Soviet Union overshadowed these plans and created conditions for postponing these developments. Relations between the centre and regions experienced a period of turmoil, and concessions from the centre to the regions—and developments in the regions themselves—were influenced mostly by political considerations, personal power-policy struggles and economic restraints. However, the main goal implementing territorial administrative reform of the state, allowing it to function successfully in the twenty-first century, was not forgotten. The main tendency, such as the merger of the


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regions and creation of economically sustainable areas capable of dealing with all types of threats, was developing, although there were some setbacks. Pendulum of transition The decentralisation and integration tendencies were winning in turns during the 1990s. The chronology of the variables of centre-regional relations provided by the scholars specialising on the issues, varies. All scholars underlined that the decentralisation and centralisation process was developing in parallel. However, if the 1990–6 period could be marked as one during which the democratisation and introduction of elements of the free market economy stimulated primarily the devolution of authority from the centre to periphery,10 then 1997–9 could be characterised by an increased number of systematic attempts to introduce solutions to strengthen the role of the federal centre (during the PM term of Sergei Kirienko, and especially that of Yevgenii Primakov).11 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss clearly identified the main challenges faced by the state, including fiscal policy, the need to establish a balance between the ethnic and non-ethnic regions of Russia, and the related issues of national integration.12 Economic and financial relationships between the centre and regions were widely examined by academic scholars. The so called fiscal appeasement was shown as a winning strategy of the federal centre and as temporary accommodation policy in dealing with the regional problems.13 Daniel S.Treisman, explaining the so-called ‘selective fiscal appeasement’, pointed out that by extracting and redistributing fiscal resources from docile rebellious regions, the centre managed to demobilise bandwagons of local protest and preserve its political control. Though costly in terms of social equity and economic efficiency, this pattern of politicized redistribution helps to explain why Russia in the early 1990s survived the serious threats to its integrity.14 Economic analysis helps us to understand the transitional stages for the new administrative system as well as the prominence of new economic patterns in relations between the centre and macro-regions. However, as Stefanie Harter and Gerald Easter, for example, noted, ‘post-communist Russia is not only experiencing the challenges associated with having a transitional economy, but also undergoing changes related to a transitional federation’.15 ‘Asymmetrical federation’ was only a transitional solution of the RF state authorities in dealing with separatism. The scholars dealing with constitutional debates on the division of powers and responsibilities between regional and central governments were focusing on analysis of the proposed versions of the reform that was gradually phasing out and replacing ethnic territorial formations with territorial units with equal rights and status, similar to Germany’s Länder (zemli, lands).16 The difficulties and obstacles of this process, as well as the clear opposition to these fundamental changes, have been fully documented.17 The most interesting debate, however, was not about the efficiency of the federation as such for a multinational state like Russia, but rather the design and effectiveness of federations as a form of statehood and state system. Those researchers who managed to trace the step-by-step attempts of the federal centre to part from the federation as a type of systemic state order were closer


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than others to the realities and perspectives of Russia’s development. Since the early 1990s, a debate was taking place on the necessary and unavoidable adjustment of the constitution to the new territorial administrative structure of the state. Scholars and policy-makers were divided on whether it was possible to introduce such significant changes to the principle of statehood on the basis of amendments to the existing constitution only, or as a part of the reconciliation policy agreement between main regional and political players, or by the adoption of a new constitution in post-Yeltsin Russia. As Vladimyr Klimanov stressed, the proposed solutions could be divided into three main groups. First, reorganising the administrative territorial division based on reestablished gubernyi (territorial units) as a basic building block of a new territorial administrative system. The second option was meant to establish an intermediate level of authority in the form of interregional economic associations formed with the assistance and co-operation of the executive powers in the regions. The third type of proposals established new subjects of the federation on the basis of an evolutionary merger of some neighbouring regions. New subjects of the federation should be the upgraded regional units.18 The last option suggested the merger of the St Petersburg and Leningrad oblast (region), the Kamchtka and Koriakskii autonomous okrug (district), the Khabarovsk krai (province) and Jewish autonomous oblast, as well as the Krasnoyarsk krai and Republic of Khakassiya.19 One of the striking features of Russia’s territorial composition throughout the last decade of the twentieth century was the incomplete nature of any of these three patterns. Elements of each pattern were apparent and visible in some areas of the country. This incompleteness blurred the main tendency in the emerging state order; that is, the establishment of the new administrative-territorial units/federal districts. The proposals on the enlargement of the territorial units were already highlighted in the early 1990s; they were seen as a vital counterbalance to regional and ethnic separatism. The initial election platform of President Yeltsin (1990) also included a programme of the enlarged 8–10 regions instead of the more than eighty subjects of the RF. Later these plans were dropped because of their unpopularity. However, the idea of enlarged and merged regions, with unification in statute between the ethnic territories and federal territories as a basis for the new administrative-territorial reform, found its place in the first drafts of the new Russian constitution. As a transitional step towards the enlargement of the regional territorial units, interregional economic associations were used. Between September 1990 and early 1991, seven interregional associations were established. The eighth Chernozemie was established in 1992.20 The associations were formed within the boundaries of the Gosplan (State Planning Committee) divisions of the economic regions. The plans for joint regional programmes of social and economic development for the economic associations’ members were among the proclaimed goals. The interregional programmes addressed the issues of transportation, as well as agrarian and energy programmes. During the 1990s, the economic and financial con-straints minimised the effect of the associations’ influence over the economy, making them rather an informal consultative club for interactions between the governors and the federal authorities. Many scholars noticed the difference between proclaimed goals and real influence of the regional


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associations. According to Steven Solnick, if some regions are able to form coalitions for bargaining with the centre, they may be able to exact concessions from federal authorities. At the same time, unaligned regions may seek to strengthen the federal centre as a safeguard against domination by emerging blocs. This scenario could lead to a federal bargain incorporating a strong centre and/or asymmetrical treatment of regional groups. If, however, regional coalitions become stronger and more comprehensive, the role for the centre may diminish. With little bargaining leverage left to federal authorities, this scenario could lead either to a peripheralized federal state or to a confederation.21 Nevertheless, the regional economic associations were recognised as important elements of the future state management system. Since 1997 heads of the interregional economic associations were representing governors in the round table debates with the president in the Kremlin. In 1997, during PM Primakov’s government, they were admitted as members to a special presidium in order to intensify co-ordination between the regions and the federal centre. The main distinguishing element of this book is that it sees the developments within the regional economic associations as an element of the introduction of a new territorial administrative reform rather than as a demonstration of regional separatist tendencies or integration on the exclusively local and regional level. These issues are addressed in detail in Chapter 5. The need for a greater role for the regions was recognised in changes to the institutional responsibilities of the RF state system. For example, the Security Council of the RF was granted (1997) the responsibility to monitor regional policies as one of the prime areas of concern. The debate on the need for constitutional changes intensified.22 The existence of the Duma, lower chamber of the parliament (it represents the views of the political parties) was questioned. The need to strengthen the upper chamber—the Federation Council (it represents the views of the regional elite)—was constantly voiced. This tendency intensified after the financial collapse of 1998. During and after the economic and financial crisis of 1998, different programmes for the country’s survival were proposed to the then prime minister Y.Primakov. The mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov, suggested one of the options; it was based on dividing the country into a more compact confederation based on the 10–12 existing regional economic associations. Meeting on 16 September 1998 with Prime Minister Primakov, Luzhkov advocated the reduction of the number of the federation subjects from the present 89 to 10–12. Mayor Luzhkov’s proposal for changing the existing structure of the RF was aimed at granting governmental status to the leaders of the interregional associations: Eduard Rossel (Ural Region), Anatoly Guzhvin (Greater Volga), Anatoly Lisitsyn (Central Russia), Viktor Ishayev (Far East and Transbaykal), Vladimir Yakovlev (North-west), and several other governors. This approach entailed the automatic rise of regional leaders to national politics and was based on the previous decisions of the Soviet (November 1991) and Russian (September 1993) governments.23 However, the option was rejected for a number of reasons. On the one hand, some of the regional structures were heavily penetrated by criminal elements; they therefore had


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no international legitimacy in the eyes of international monetary institutions. The criminalisation of the local communities became a severe obstacle to receiving short- and long-term investments, both from national and foreign business communities and international financial circles. The formation of regional power groupings gathered pace during the late 1990s. Some of them are well known as full-blown territorial criminal communities such as in Primorye, Sverdlovsk oblast, St Petersburg, Bashkortostan and Dagestan. In addition, Luzhkov’s proposed structure was to be built on the legitimisation of an asymmetrical federation: the state would be composed of regions, territories, as well as ethnic republics, and areas where the ethnic Russian population (82 per cent of the nation) found itself isolated from the management of regional affairs on the basis of ethnic criteria. On the other hand, the governors who enjoyed a good reputation with foreign investors were feared in Moscow as potential supporters of separatist tendencies. As was stated by some Russian political scientists and specialists in demographic issues during the mid-1990s, the [p]resent economic and political life of Russia, and accordingly the economic policy of the federal administration, are more and more determined by a conflict of interests of two types of regions: those which widely participate in international economic affairs and have substantial foreign currency reserves and those regions (‘introverts’), the economy of which is mainly oriented to the domestic market.24 Another source of concern was the functioning of the international network of overlapping regional institutions, including the Russian subregions within the aforementioned borders, which could create a power vacuum in the centre and thus tear the country apart. The debated, proposed, and partially implemented institutional organisation of the Russian regions in the economic associations overlapping the borders of the economic development zones, outlined by Gosplan during Soviet times, did not provide a straightforward solution of the disintegration problems. The economic associations or macro-regions do not automatically strengthen the integration tendencies. In some cases the integration process at the regional level intensifies separatist tendencies if the territory of so-called association overlaps with territory historically affected by similar patterns of cultural, religions and economic separatism. Dr Nikolay Petrov and Dr Andrei Treivish stressed that there are three types of threat factors to national integrity and territorial sovereignty of the state: If taking a combination of all factors of prime risk (geopolitical, ethnodemographic and economic), we have three major areas of separatism with ethnic and geopolitical reasons dominating in the Caucasus and Siberia, while economic reasons dominate in Volga-Ural area. The latter, because of their volume and consequences, generally represent a much more serious threat… Russia will suffer the greatest damage in the case of the separation of capital, and important industrial and resources-producing regions, the majority of which are not interested in disintegration.25 Dr Aleksei M.Salmin clearly identified the inappropriate approach of focusing on the


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regional economic associations as a basis for the reintegration of Russia under the conditions of the weak federal authorities. He pointed to the main knots of regional instability and the level of their danger to the integrity of the Russian state. The dynamics of regional relations (taking into account the complexity of economic, political and international factors) shows that there are four main zones or belts of instability: NorthCaucasian, Volga, Siberian-Baikal and Northern.26 Separatism in the North-Caucasus has been considered as potentially the most serious and long-lasting factor, which could negatively influence Russia’s international image. However, due to the absence of serious integrating tendencies in the region itself and historically isolated forms of the separatists’ movements, the instability in that particular region was not seen as threatening the existence of the Russian state and its federal structures. The second belt of instability—the Volga region (despite its presently acceptable civilised form of separatism)—was historically viewed as the main source of instability, not only at the regional level but in the whole Russian federation. The combination of all these factors, such as the existence of a non-Russian ethnic majority of the population, rich natural resources, the relatively modern industrial basis, and the history of political, cultural and religious separatism, makes this area potentially the most dangerous for the overall stability of the state. The third instability belt, in the Siberian-Baikal region, was regarded as the one with a distant possibility to stimulate regional separatism (primarily in the Tuva region), though only in combination with other destabilising factors such as the degradation of Russia’s relations with China or disintegrating processes in that country. The Northern instability belt was linked to separatism based primarily on economic considerations. The separatist input of these Northern territories was characterised by Dr Salmin as a potential to destabilise the financial system of the state and intensify the separatist tendencies of Far Eastern or Siberian export-oriented regions and territories.27 In practice, the first examples of administrative-territorial division reform were seen in Moscow and Yekaterinburg in 1991 and 1996. The Yekaterinburg administrative reform is especially important for the present research, as it resembles the most recent developments in the FDs. In 1996, seven administrative districts were established in the Yekaterinburg oblast. The innovation was supposed to increase co-operation among the towns and districts (raions) in the Yekaterinburg oblast. The heads of these districts were nominated by the governor, chosen from the local and municipal officials, and were introduced as members to the oblast regional government. The increasing pressures on the federal government, and the rising economic problems, intensified the debate on the necessity to implement administrative-territorial reform in the country. However, at the beginning of 1999 at the All-Russian meeting on federative relations the then PM Yevgenii Primakov insisted on postponing any debate on administrative-territorial reform. The conditions for the reform appeared to be ready in 2000 with the new Russian president. Prospects for the territorial-administrative reform then entered a new stage. The presidential decree No. 849 ‘On the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Federal Districts (FDs)’, 13 May 2000, established seven FDs. Their borders coincided almost exactly with those of the military districts; the decree also created the institution of plenipotentiary representatives of the Russian Federation in the FDs. This decision heralded the beginning of the process of re-


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establishing vertical subordination in the state management of the Federation. The country itself was divided into seven FDs, which incorporated the existing subjects of the Federation. The following FDs were established: the North-western, Central, Southern, Volga, Urals, Siberian and Far Eastern districts.28 Thus, the transformation of the Federation was launched without prior introduction of any changes in the 1993 constitution of the RF. This decision was aimed to address the following tasks: • to unify the system of state jurisdiction on the federal and local level; • to prepare the regions for sustainable development on the basis of maximum selfsufficiency, and to initiate and monitor economic development plans for the shortterm, mid-term and long-term future; • to secure and implement strict vertical subordination of the military and security services to the president, neutralise any possible influences the local elite might exert on the power structures and support the implementation of the military reform; • to prepare the districts/territories to withstand any military intervention and repel any challenges to its internal security from within. Presidential envoys The presidential envoys were appointed by the decrees (Nos. 890–6) on 18 May 2000. Five out of the seven nominees had a publicly recorded history of service, either in the military or security services, and agencies Lieutenant-General Victor Cherkesov (head of the Federal Security Service—FSB department for the St Petersburg and Leningrad Region and first deputy director of the FSB) for the North-western Region;29 Georgy Poltavchenko (FSB and tax police background) for the Central FD; General Victor Kazantsev (former commander of the joint group of federal forces in the North Caucasian FD) for the Southern FD;30 Sergei Kiriyenko (former prime minister of the RF) for the Volga FD; Colonel-General Pyotr Latyshev (former first deputy interior minister of Russia) for the Urals FD; Leonid Drachevsky (former deputy foreign minister of the RF) for the Siberian FD; and Lieutenant-General (Ret.) Konstantin Pulikovsky for the Far Eastern FD.31 According to public information, the nominees were personally known to the Head of State and were introduced to the regional authorities by President Putin himself. In a private interview, for instance, Sergei Kiriyenko noted that the president had made the nominations himself. The presidential envoys who had served together with Vladimir Putin in the services were known to have the closest relationship with the president: generals Victor Cherkesov (North-western FD) and Georgy Poltavchenko (Central FD). The presidential envoys held strong positions since they were regarded as de facto leaders charged with the right to represent a joint stance to the public and state structures. According to some experts, Poltavchenko acted as an informal political and corporate leader of the PEs since he was widely regarded as being responsible for the formulation of their common positions on issues. To gain more power, the PEs lobbied heavily for an expansion of their status and functions. To be effective and be able to manage the newly created system of governance, it was necessary to strengthen the powers and responsibilities of the PEs. According to


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Dmitriy Kozak, the deputy head of the presidential administration, the expansion of their functions was initially planned in the course of future reforms; and, as this book demonstrates, they were. However, in the opinion of the head of the foundation Politika, Vicheslav Nikonov, the PEs will fail, despite their strong lobbying potential, to institutionalise their positions through the provisions of the new amended constitution. In other words, the PEs are components of the presidential executive system in Russia and their functions are limited by the presidential powers. Initially, the PEs were responsible for the following: • re-establishing federal-regional relationships and organising further co-operation between the federal bodies of executive power and the organs of state power in the regions of the RF; • developing and implementing programmes for the socio-economic development of the regions; • monitoring the power structures within the respective districts. Their functions extended to monitoring all regional force structures (MoD, MoI, MoE, fire-fighters, tax police, border guards, security services), controlling the financial channels and resources from the centre to the regions, especially the financing of the power bloc ministries, and making recommendations to the president on personnel issues and assignments to military posts. The president has a right to assign high military ranks (Article 111.6 of the Regulations of the Plenipotentiary Representatives of the Russian Federation President in the FDs32). PEs were to monitor civil-military relations in the FDs. During a transitional period the subordination of the commanders of the military districts (strategic directions), districts of the interior forces, regional branches of the border guards, MoE, etc., to the PEs was envisioned. Thus, in addition to apparent political problems, Russia is also solving problems related to a lack of military coordination.33 As the administrative reform continued and new tasks were taken on board, the functions and the list of responsibilities of the PEs were also expanding. Stages of the reform: from harmonisation of laws to co-ordination of economic programmes The administrative reform is to be carried out in several stages. For the moment, it is possible to name four stages: 1 May-December 2000: during the first stage, the goal was to achieve harmonisation of the federal and regional legislation with priority of the federal laws over local ones, and establishing the institutional structures and network for the PE activity in the respective territories (staff issues). 2 December 2000-mid-2001: monitoring financial flows, trade and regional development programmes with the parallel implementation of the military reform. 3 Mid 2001–2: promoting the engagement strategy with the international community. At this stage of the reform the focus was on introduction of the district’s plans of sustainable development and linking them with the development plans of a wider international community. As the result of 9/11 the PEs were given co-ordinating


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counter-terrorism functions. 4 2002–6: in view of the increasing threats of international terrorism the PEs were given additional and specific functions to co-ordinate anti-terrorist monitoring and counterterrorist actions within the federal districts. In addition the PEs were given responsibilities of looking after and supporting the reform of municipal and local authorities. During this period the administrative reform was implemented in parallel to the realisation of final pre-election stages of the political system reform. The PEs were to co-ordinate the functions of the federal executive institutions in their districts. The co-ordination was to affect only certain aspects of the activity of the federal institutions. During the first stage of the federal reform, the PEs’ monitoring activity was designed to harmonise local and regional laws with federal legislation. The implementation of this task required the establishment of an alternative expertise procedure for the local laws and legislation. The PEs designed a new procedure by applying alternative scientific and educational expertise to the existing local laws. Laws that were inconsistent with the constitution and federal legislation were brought to the attention of the governors. If faced with resistance from the local authorities, the PEs were instructed to contact the local offices of the prosecution with their problems. In turn, they prepared cases for the courts if disagreement on legal regulations persisted between the regional authority and the PE. The PEs and federal authorities had to ensure that the prosecution offices in the local communities would support the constitution of the RF and follow its pro visions. After a decision was reached in the court, irregularities in the law had to be changed within a set time-frame. The PE was also in a position to recommend that the federal authority take into account useful experiences provided by the local authorities and to advise the federal government on adopting useful regional practices.34 One-third of the legal acts, which were considered inconsistent with the federal laws and procedures, went to the courts since the cases were not solved on a voluntary basis by the local authorities. For example, in the Urals FD 320 provisions of the regional charter and acts of local legislation were found to be inconsistent with federal laws; 297 were brought in line with the federal legislation by May 2001.35 It is believed that up to 80–90 per cent of inconsistency cases in local-regional legislation were solved by December 2000.36 To implement the decisions of the courts it was necessary to design a system which was subordinate to the federal authority and could execute the legal procedures in favour of the federal centre and the president. In practice the new system started functioning by the end of 2000. During the first stage of the reform the PEs had to create a system of presidential control in their respective districts. This meant establishing a network of general inspectors for the districts and inspectors for the regions. The PEs became responsible for the appointment of inspectors to their staff and were also free (initially) to select members of their own staff. However, after six months of reform personnel policy in the PE offices has changed. The FSB submitted a report to the president on activities in the districts. The report clearly demonstrated that among the PE personnel there were a number of people who either had a criminal record or were directly connected with local structures, whose influence it was necessary to limit or eliminate in order to foster reforms. Consequently, some changes were introduced. The PEs lost their right to appoint personnel to any


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position without approval of the candidates by the MoI and FSB, where the personnel records of the nominees were examined. From December 2000 presidential approval for any appointment to the PE offices in the districts also became necessary. The departments responsible for regional policies in the Presidential Administration were transformed. Some of their personnel were sent to the regional offices of the PEs to strengthen presidential influence in the districts. On 26 January 2001 President Putin signed the decree on the restructuring of the Main Territorial Directorate, Presidential Administration. Andrei Popov, then head of the Internal Policy Department, was appointed as new head of the Directorate.37 He was under the direct control of Alexander Abramov, then deputy head of Presidential Administration. Control of the Internal Policy Department was handed to Alexander Kosopkin, who at that time was formerly responsible for relations with the State Duma. The Main Territorial Directorate staff was believed to have been cut by 40 per cent. One internal sub-division (12 persons strong) replaced seven units of this Directorate dealing with the administrative regions, which was responsible for working with the PEs and their staff. Twenty-eight people were transferred directly to the staffs of the PEs. Some of the redundant personnel were offered jobs in the Legal Directorate, where the creation of a special sub-department on regional legislation was considered. Presidential decree No. 97 (30 January 2001), ‘On Additions to the Statute of the Envoy of the RF President in the FD, Introduced by the Presidential Decree of 13 May 2000’, stressed the importance of the liaison functions of the head of Presidential Administration between PEs and their staff and other departments in the administration. The Decree strongly emphasised the subordination of PE activity to the president and head of Presidential Administration.38 At a regular monthly meeting of the Presidential Administration with representatives of the Ministry of Justice, Prosecution Office and PE staff (27 December 2000), the results of the pending reform were discussed. It was agreed that the goals of the first stage of the reform had been achieved. The second stage of the reform was expected to address the economic development programmes for the regions. During this stage, the functions of the PEs were expanded. They also included an important economic dimension, which focused, for example, on monitoring financial flows in the districts, development of core industries, and other areas of economic activity in the territories. The government considered all these as strategic measures since they formed an important part of the development plans in each FD. The implementation of the regional socio-economic programmes also presupposes the ability of the PEs to deal with crisis management in the region. Within this stage, the PEs also had to co-ordinate the monitoring of financial policy and to implement an audit of the federal funds transferred to the regions. These were regarded as high-priority tasks in the list of the PEs’ responsibilities, which also entailed a revision and audit of the regions’ financial state and examination of all spent funds— proper or improper. The PEs also analysed the possibilities for further reprivatisation procedures and assumed responsibility for specially targeted federal programmes for the regions. Consequently, the PEs were becoming heavily involved with regional development issues. For instance, Konstantin Pulikovsky noted that the president would possibly transfer the right to manage the state-owned stock shares of the shareholding


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corporations in the regions to the PEs. In turn, he expected the PEs to take charge of the regions’ strategic national resources and monitor trade operations with precious metals, timber, oil and energy. PE Sergei Kirienko introduced the idea of bankruptcy procedure for a whole region in case of the deterioration of the regional financial, economic situation and inability of regional authority to secure energy, food or medical supplies for the population in the respective region.39 Among the criteria that allowed the federal authorities to introduce new external management was the inability of a region to repay 30 per cent of its debts to the central authorities. The external management meant the transfer of responsibility of the region to the PE authority and the appointment of a new team of executives from the federal civil service pool.40 The assessment of the effectiveness of regional authority was judged by the ability of the regions within the FDs to function and produce results within the socio-economic development programmes, especially tailored for each FD. There were different types of responsibilities carried out by the presidential envoys at the federal district level. Two such were the strategic management and crisis management functions, the latter concerned primarily with the operational management of the districts. Since mid-2001 the presidential envoys received a new function. President Putin asked the PEs to co-ordinate the complex security measures in light of the possibility of terrorist attacks. The PEs were to co-ordinate interagency activity in the anti-terrorist sphere in the FDs.41 The last stage of the reform was to address the inconsistencies in the state’s local and municipal government structures, administrative divisions and patterns of financing and taxing the population and private business. Regional development and global economy An intensive programme for regional development is planned for the period 2001–15.42 Addressing a plenary session of the State Duma (6 October 2000), Alexander Kudrin, then vice-prime minister, noted that the government highlighted five target areas to receive priority federal funding. The programmes for regional development were at the top of the list. However, it was stressed that the programme had to be transregional in nature, crossing the divisional lines between the regions and districts. The government selected transportation and communication projects as areas meriting a high federal priority. Indeed, the main task for the PE in the Siberian FD will be to build communication transport corridors. Leonid Drachevsky argued that building rail and highways was to be a prime focus in his region of responsibility.43 For the Far Eastern FD, a transport corridor between the East and West is to be constructed. It is intended to link the cargo transportation corridors between Siberia and the Urals through the Russian ports (Primorsk and Khabarovsk) to China and the US.44 Another important transport corridor to be built in the Far Eastern FD is a rail link between the Trans-Siberian and TransKorean railway systems.45 The Volga FD, according to PE Kirienko, will concentrate on building and maintaining the ‘North-South’ transportation corridor, using traditional economic and trade links, especially with Iran. The Southern FD is also an important part of the Russian ‘North-South’ engagement strategy.


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In the years 2000–2 the international project ‘Regionalisation of Russian Federation and Security Policy: Interaction between Regional Process and the Interest of the Central State’, funded by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, produced over 20 reports demonstrating the importance of international links in the development of Russian regions. The main bulk of the reports was dedicated to the analysis of the Russian northwest and relations with the neighbouring countries, and subregional and regional economic and security institutions. The overall assumptions of the authors of these extensive studies were exceptionally important as they registered not only the internal dynamics of regional development and the role of the external players in that process but also demonstrated the variety of options that the process of regionalisation provided for Russia’s foreign and security policies.46 The North-western FD was to focus its efforts on the regional complex development programme within the framework of the ‘Concept of Transborder Co-operation of the RF’, a blueprint adopted by the government and approved by the Security Council. The programme started in 2001. The North-western region of Russia has a lot to offer to its neighbours. There are 40 per cent of the world’s non-tropical forests, 40 per cent of its natural gas, 13 per cent of its oil, and great quantities of nickel and other minerals. The mutual co-operation of the regions can become a prototype for that same initiative of an all-European economic space, which in particular was mentioned by Vladimir Putin and Romano Prodi as a long-term aim of development of Russia’s co-operation with Europe and the EU:47 Together with North Europeans we can take such big projects as the Shtokmanov gas deposit or Timano-Pechora oil deposit. The negotiations on laying a gas pipeline on the bottom of the Baltic Sea were entering a concrete stage. With the appearance of new ports and the expansion of old ones the Baltic pipeline system is gradually improving. In the future it can relieve the port of St Petersburg, which has reached its maximum annual capacity of 30 m tons of load, and now presents an important ecological problem for the northern capital.48 The North-western FD is becoming an essential element of Russia’s European policy and is an important participant in the long-term economic development of the country as a whole. The north-west to Baltic oil-pipe system is a transport corridor that unites Russia’s regions and the North European markets. It is also a new channel for exporting Russian oil from the Timano-Pechora oil-producing province which has the potential to link the North-western area with Western Siberia, the Urals and Volga regions. This additional pipeline infrastructure should increase Russia’s political weight and influence in the Baltic region and the countries of Northern Europe. According to official estimates of the Russian government, 20 years of use of the pipeline are expected to generate $106 m for the federal budget and about $300 m for the local budgets of the territories used for the pipeline. The Baltic pipeline system (BPS) is designed to encourage foreign investments in the energy complex, thereby stimulating further production and use of energy resources. There are also good port facilities in the area. In 1999, for example, the seaport of St


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Petersburg had a twofold increase in the volume of its cargo operations. Kaliningrad and Baltiysk are the warm water ports (in the USSR, Kaliningrad occupied third place in cargo operations after Leningrad and Vladivostok). In April 2000, the building of new oil refinery transport facilities was also started in Primorsk. The first sea terminals of BPS in Primorsk started functioning in December 2001. The oil company Surgutneftgaz is building new terminal facilities in the ‘Batareinaya buhta’ in the Gulf of Finland. The terminals for the oil refinery in Kirishi were opened in 2003. Financing the BPS is essential and has strategic consequences for the energy and transport security of the country.49 Otherwise, Russia will be barred from independent access to the international markets in the West. It is therefore extremely important to develop the economy of the North-western region, to create additional jobs, and to support national entrepreneurs and exporters. The sea terminal (for exporting coal) in Ust’-Lug was completed, and another terminal specialising in the export of minerals is also planned for construction in Ust’Lug.50 The North-west is the only Russian region that borders with the EU. It provides a window and a starting point for Russian access to the Trans-European transportation/communication networks. Of the nine Trans-European corridors that were chosen at the second European Conference on Transportation (Crete, 1994), three pass through the Russian territory. The gateway for all three is in the North-west region: • Helsinki-Tallinn-Riga-Kaunas-Warsaw, with extensions/linkages to Riga-KaliningradGdansk; • Berlin-Warsaw-Minsk-Moscow; • Helsinki-St Petersburg-Moscow. The Pan-European transportation system is to be completed by 2010. It is expected that the Eurasian transit will add an additional $3 bn to $10 bn annually to the Russian budget. The North-west is also extremely important for import-export operations. At present, around 35 per cent of the imports and 25 per cent of the exports of the RF pass through the region. According to experts’ estimates, the volume of cargo operations in the Baltic will be between 1.5–3 billion tons annually. There is a clear necessity for building a powerful transport/technological complex in the Gulf of Finland. In general, the Northwestern region enjoys good rail and road connections with the rest of Russia. The economic development plans for the North-western FD are closely linked with the structures and institutional arrangements providing security for the region. First, the FD has to confront ‘soft security issues’ such as drug trafficking which has become a source of great concern for Russia and Europe. Approximately 12 per cent of all drug traffic passes through Russia (other channels are the Middle East and the countries of Southern Europe, with the main source being Afghanistan which has an annual drug production worth $40–45 m).51 The Volga and Urals FDs are also seen as vital elements of Russia’s North-South strategy. The merger of the Urals and Volga military districts was implemented in accordance with the presidential decree of 2001.52 According to a local publication, Business Urals, the merger was expected to eliminate one of the most severe obstacles facing the economic revival of these vast territories. The existing boundary between the


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FDs essentially cut in half the total economic space and operational capabilities of the association of the economic co-ordination of the regions (oblasts) and republics of the Urals region: ‘Bolshoi Ural’ (est. 1991). The governor of Sverdlovsk, Eduard Rossel, headed the organisation for a very long time. He was considered to be one of the most powerful governors who rejected the establishment of administrative regions within the presidential reform programme. In response, the PE in the Urals FD, Latyshev, took decisive measures to curb the resistance of the governor to the new changes. Consequently, Rossel and his political lobby suffered a serious political setback.53 The discussions on the creation of the Ural Republic, as well as the importance of the Tyumen region, undoubtedly affected any decision on the survival of this economic association. Ultimately, another economic association, named ‘Bolshaya Volga’, could expand its functions to the Urals FD as well. The programme of social-economic development for the Southern FD (2001–5) was prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and co-ordinated by German Gref and Victor Kazantsev, PE to the Southern FD until March 2004. A special meeting on the details of this programme was held in Mineralnye Vody on 16 February 2001.54 During his visit to the Southern FD in November 2000, the prospects for the social-economic development of the district were outlined by the president himself. The Southern FD would be capable of starting a complex development programme only after 2003 according to the then PE Victor Kazantsev. The programme for the Southern FD was only one of the targeted economic development programmes for the regions that have been considered by the Russian government. The strategic tasks for regional development were put forward by President Putin in November 2000. They included the expansion of transportation networks and corridors, development of the infrastructure for the production of oil and gas, and use of facilities for tourism and medical rehabilitation purposes. One of many international channels of this ‘North-South’ transport corridorfrom India to Northern Europe via Iran (rail and Enzelia port) and Russia (Olia, Astrakhan region, the Caspian Sea and rail)—was already proving to be exceptionally profitable.55 The federal budget subsidies were supporting the regional development programme, with a special focus on foreign and local private investments in the district. According to Victor Kazantsev, to be fully implemented the programme requires around 150 bn roubles; only 10 per cent of the funds will be provided from the federal budget. However, if plans are implemented an additional one million jobs are foreseen, and the unemployment rate in the region will fall from 14 to 7 per cent.56 The importance of a proper migration policy was stressed, as well as its intimate link to any future employment policy. The economic development plans are co-ordinated with the economic association The Northern Caucasus’ (13 territories). There is a plan to develop the local economy by using strategic enterprises, with a special focus on the Rostov-onDon and Volgograd regions as potential donors for the whole district. Co-ordination in the district and with neighbouring regions is considered an essential element of this strategy. Historically, regional economic associations represented the only organisations which provided a certain level of economic co-ordination for regional and local authorities. According to Volgograd governor Nikolai Maksuta, the newly established chain of subordination and co-ordination—region-district (PE)-federal centre—proved to


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be even more effective after June 2000. In the Southern FD some efforts were made to include state-employed managers in the staff of enterprises with state capital. This proposal was mostly oriented towards the energy sector enterprises, which are considered to be a principal problem yet a potential reserve for promoting regional development in the district. Special attention was also paid to the port facilities and infrastructure. Under PE Victor Kazantsev, a special working group was established. The first meeting of the heads of ports of the Black, Azov and Caspian seas took place on 14 November 2000. This group was increasingly focusing its attention on the work and effectiveness of the ports’ infrastructure in the district. The ports in southern Russia comprise roughly 70 per cent of the maritime cargo operations in the country. The PE’s goal is to control the shareholding of the port facilities and establish a state service of sea pilots (not yet privatised). This would allow them to perform their duties in time of conflict as well. There is also a fiveyear plan (2001–5) to assist the Novorosiysk authorities in the reconstruction of the port and its infrastructure as a future HQ of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In the Central FD, the economic programme for district development is presented as a joint effort on the part of several NGOs and councils established under PE Poltavchenko. One of the structures tasked to create a comprehensive development concept is the Economic Council, consisting of vice-governors responsible for the economy in their respective regions. The Council of Mayors of the regional centres undertakes similar work as well.57 The federal government and security council were formulating a socioeconomic development programme for the Siberian FD. Its guidelines were ready by the end of 2001. The Siberian FD became a focus for the economic strategic development of the Russian state and its role in Russia’s foreign policy interests. The majority of the regions and territories of the district became border regions after the break up of the Soviet Union. Problems in this FD could be solved in co-operation with Asian states, as President Putin pointed out during his visit to the Siberian city of Novosibirsk in November 2000. The Siberian FD plays an essential role in the newly established ‘EuroAsian Economic Community’.58 The Siberian FD is rich in natural resources such as ferrous and non-ferrous metals and water energy. The profit extracted from exporting these resources could be used to fund the increased production of oil (30–40 million tons) and gas (45–50 million tons annually), and the development of the energy (oil and gas) complex of Siberia. The following areas were highlighted as strategic imperatives for the socioeconomic development of the district: • transport infrastructure (integration with the communication networks of Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, South and North Korea); • unification of the energy system of Siberia with the joint energy system of the RF, and to export electric energy to Europe and Asia; • economic cooperation with foreign states, the increase of export-import operations, and encouragement of investments.59 The PE in the Siberian FD, Leonid Drachevsky, maintained that his attention would be focused on the oil and energy sector, since the latter required over $15 bn for the Baikal energy project, and on implementing a detailed and controlled migration policy for the


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region. However, the state of development of the Siberian FD and the absence of communication links between the towns, cities, and settlements necessitates urgent action before a complex development programme can be implemented.60 Socio-economic programmes for the development of the FDs were directly linked with Russia’s ‘policy of engagement’ with the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. All five- to ten-year programmes of the districts’ development were fully incorporated into Russia’s comprehensive economic and political strategy (2001–10). One of President Putin’s suggestions was to appoint members of the cabinet to be responsible for the targeted economic development programme for specific regions. For instance, the then minister of finance and vice-prime minister, A.Kudrin, was put in charge of the Siberian FD. The then vice-prime minister V. Khristenko took control of the development programme for the Far Eastern FD, since his role as Russian co-chairman in the Russian-Japanese interstate economic trade commission proved beneficial for his new responsibilities. The importance of the linkage between regional development plans and targeted foreign investments becomes obvious once the balance between capital flight, the investment climate and the needs of funds for the state’s economic recovery is understood. The annual illegal flight of capital from Russia was $25–30 bn.61 According to Russian sources, there was a 30 per cent increase in the illegal export of capital in the year 2000, thus bringing it to the highest level of illegal transfers since 1998. At the same time, the RF Finance Ministry estimated that Russia must invest $10–15 bn a year to keep its economy growing—and a significant portion of that sum must come from foreign investors.62 In 2000, investments increased by 17 per cent, half of which went to the energy complex.63 The trend continued through the period 2001–3. However, it was also important to pay attention to some additional information, which clarifies Russia’s policy objectives. Its estimated profit from transit operations in the ‘Europe-Asia-Pacific region’ was expected to add $3–10 bn annually to the state budget. This data suggested that three policy priorities were essential to Russia’s reform efforts. First, the state’s foreign policy needed to do everything possible to assist domestic economic programmes and projects. Second, the aforementioned information highlights the importance of domestic economic policies, especially the stimulation of Russian business activities. Third, trans-continental transportation and communication projects were essential for the implementation of economic and military reforms in Russia. Each of these tasks was an invaluable component of the regional development programmes, a core aspect of which was the construction and preservation of the transportation/communication corridors which were to link Russia with the world markets, especially with the Asia-Pacific region and Europe.64 The North-west, Volga, Urals, Southern Siberian and Far Eastern FDs play an important role in Russia’s vision of its engagement with the world. A Draft of the Concept of Transborder Co-operation for the RF covers the potential benefits, as well as the forms, of co-operation among the bordering regions of Russia and adjacent states. Fifty-one per cent of the subjects of the RF are border regions; 24 territories became border regions only after the break up of the USSR. Thus, the influence of the border and neighbouring states on the economy, and on the political and social life of Russia, should not be underestimated. A vital aspect of this policy is economic benefits. Exceptionally important for the understanding of regional developments is the


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mechanism of implementation of decisions and programmes. There are certain similarities in the newly established procedures and structures in the FDs. The PEs consult with those regional economic associations, which are not viewed as an alternative to the districts’ development. For instance, Kazantsev discussed the plans for the districts’ development with members of the interregional association ‘North-Caucasus’. The ‘Bolshaya Volga’ (Big Volga) association is to expand and cover the whole Volga FD. The association ‘Bolshoy Ural’ will probably disappear. (Head of the association, Governor Rossel, strongly opposes PE General Latyshev.) ‘The Siberian Accord’ has established good working relations with PE Leonid Drachevsky, and their joint work will undoubtedly continue. Integration within the districts is considered to be a regional responsibility, but the federal government and ministries were assisting the PEs in their task of reshaping the political and economic map of the country and focusing on the districts’ system of planning. The centralisation of resources on a regional level affected all elements of financial and economic activity. The conditions for the second stage of the administrative reform were prepared, along with the implementation of the initial first phase. The following are just a few important examples. Goscomstat (the State Committee on Statistics) started to formulate macroeconomic indicators and devise a socio-economic development programme based on the country’s division into seven FDs.65 The Ministry of Finance and Federal Registry adjusted their planning process to the seven districts’ requirements; branches of the Federal Registry are being opened in the 89 subjects of the RF. The labour unions and the Ministry of Transportation also embraced the planning system based on seven administrative FDs.66 The transfer of operations of the Central Bank’s branches from the regional to interregional level was discussed by the government in September 2000.67 Finally, in October 2000 the then prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, signed the governmental decree ‘On Organising Co-ordination Between Federal Institutions of the Executive Branch and the Presidential Representatives’.68 Since that time the districts have become focused regional settings. From January 2001, federal institutions and structures in the districts were financed only from the federal budget. The financing covered social security payments as well and minimised the influence of regional authorities over federal employees and servicemen. PE Latyshev, for example, urged the deputies of the State Duma to divide the responsibilities between local and federal authorities to avoid unnecessary tensions.69 At the same time the newly introduced tax system was channelling the financial resources to either federal or local levels (cities or city councils), practically eliminating the influence of the regions on national politics. As a part of this reform, the regional budgets lost up to 30 per cent of their revenues. In 2000, the figure amounted to over 4.2 billion roubles. The boundaries of the regions were effectively blurred within the districts. The rise of cities and local councils was becoming evident, though the reform of the municipal administrative system was still to come. These measures were undertaken within a strict central regime of financial transfers in Russia. The functions and division of responsibilities among the federal, regional and local authorities were undertaken through different channels and on three principal levels: the state council, presidential administration and the government. The regulation of the relationship between the federal centre and the subjects of the


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federation was considered an important element of federation reform. The appropriate provisions of this regulation were contained in the federal law ‘On General Principles of Relationship Between the Legislative and Executive Regional Authorities and the Federal Centre’. This law emphasised two important aspects. First, it was impossible to transfer the functions that were supposed to be within the federal jurisdiction to the subjects of the federation; second, subjects of the federation were not allowed to act on matters that were under joint federal-regional jurisdiction. The legislatures of the federation subjects were given three years (until 2003) to change these unacceptable practices. However, in practice this became possible only after a ‘reconciliation’ between the PEs and governors was achieved (on terms set by the PEs). On 1 February 2001, new laws under which governors could be relieved of their duties came into force. According to these laws, the president has the right to fire governors who are under criminal investigation or violate the federal law. A test case for the application of the new legislation was the sacking of the Far Eastern governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko. All this demonstrates that changes in the state management system are taking place in Russia. The branch principle was being replaced by the territorial principle of management of the country and regions. Disproportion between the regions and cities within one district, as well as among the districts, created the need for a new strategy on how the FDs could maintain a self-sustaining economy and at the same time an appropriate military capability (under strict federal control). In sum, one can refer to the comments made by PE Kazantsev about the results of the first six months of existence of the FDs: these measures helped the consolidation of Russia. It is because there appeared an opportunity to have a closer look at each region with its peculiarities, potential, its own ways in economy, traditions and customs… Having determined the things inside, one can establish close interregional ties with neighbours, present your own proposals and consider the co-operation projects of others. The plenipotentiary representatives do not substitute local leaders, but with them together and within their own framework of functions work for the implementation.70 The PEs carry out the presidential policy only in their respective districts/regions. In principle the institution of the PEs could, however, be temporary. Ultimately, the future of their status and position will depend on their achievements and effectiveness. In 2002 a new stage of the reform was started in Russia. The commission on the division of powers between federal and other authorities, led by Dmitriy Kozak, deputy head of the Presidential Administration, was made responsible for the conceptual development and practical implementation of the administrative reform, which is introducing changes to: • the judicial system; • the legislative level: political structures of the party system, election laws and structures of the legislative power at every level; • the executive level, in changing the structure and type of management at all levels of governance, and presenting new rules in the civil service and restructuring the


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government as a whole. Though the goal of the administrative reform was to strengthen the vertical power and the role of the central authorities, it was noted that ‘there is no goal to rebuild a Soviet-type country’, and that ‘super-centralisation is not effective and will not work’.71 The harmonisation of laws at federal, regional and municipal level was seen as an important goal of the whole administrative reform. The federal laws were to take into account regional specifics, and regional laws were not to be in contradiction to the RF constitution. Introduction of changes to the local level: municipal reform The principle of territorial management of local government was mentioned in the draft of the law addressing local reform. Since the initiators of the reform believed that the current divisions of local (village-like) communities were still effective, there were no changes envisioned at the local level in the way the communities were directed by the local government. The main changes were introduced in the regulations of the financial flows in the country and in determining the financial base of regional and local government, their functions and obligations to their residents. At this stage of the reform local budgets were to be put under the scrutiny of the kaznacheiskiy (financial) register, which became the spine for all financial operations in Russia. The transfers to and from the budgets of the local (municipal) offices were planned to go through the federal kaznacheiskiy register. All future transactions among state authorities (federal, regional and local) were to be done through the kaznacheiskiy register as well. Besides the aforementioned innovations, the municipal reform in the financial sphere meant the following: introduction to the local budgets of the principle of public transparency, and elimination of conditions when the local authority could monopolise the mass media (any local government was legally allowed to establish and finance only one mass media source—TV, radio or newspaper). De-monopolisation of mass media was seen as a precondition for rising public awareness and for the stimulation of economic activities in the regions. Formally the government introduced a new procedure for the bankrupt regions, already tested in some cases in 2001/2. This procedure meant the introduction of a temporary financial administration into the regions seeking emergency federal assistance. The temporary financial administration could be established in the region/municipal authority in deprived regions/towns, when the local budgets were bankrupt, and 30 per cent of the federal debts were not paid back, thus resulting in deep socioeconomic crises in the areas. The external governance could be introduced to assist the local community in dealing with a debt problem, specifically in restructuring the debt obligations and introducing monitoring procedures over the financial flows. The main purpose of the reform was to divide and separate all financial responsibilities and clarify the sources of income for all levels of the authorities. Financial benefits were planned to be redistributed and transferred at the local level. (For instance, state subsidies for children and other social benefits.) The new system’s goal was to structure the financial relationship in such a way that it would create conditions for future equal


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development of all Russian regions. The reform was aimed at the construction of the properly functioning inter-budgetary relationship in the federation in compliance with the RF constitution, with established principles of relationships between centre-regions and self-governance.72 The new financial and administrative system of self-governance was aimed at neutralising existing disparities in the regions, and stimulating development in economically depressed regions which previously relied solely on state subsidies. It was believed that all the regional and municipal authorities should be given stable sources of funding. The distribution of resources from the regional to the municipal, and from the federal to regional budgets was supported by relevant legally binding documents. In accordance with presidential reform, the taxes were to be allocated on a permanent basis to different levels of budget (federal, regional, and municipal), thus creating legally regulated financial support for different levels of governance. These developments were accompanied by the decision to decentralise the distribution of social support and social benefits and to transfer the implementation for delivering social support benefits to regional and local governments. On 21 February 2003 the first draft of laws on the separation of powers between levels of the government and on the reform of the municipal system was introduced in the State Duma.73 At that time there were around two hundred legal acts and regulations singled out as needed to be compliant or abandoned until 2005. During the third stage of the administrative reform radical changes in structure, functions and methods of governing local communities were planned to be introduced. The plans were proposed by the same presidential commission on the division of powers between federal and other authorities, headed by Dmitriy Kozak, deputy head of the Presidential Administration. On 16 October 2002 the State Council (Gossovet) under President Putin’s chairmanship adopted a concept of the reform of the municipal system of Russia. In accordance with this document, Russian officials confirmed their intent to proceed with the last stage of restructuring the administrative system. The concept was adopted by the general meeting of the Gossovet, representing all governors, heads of administrations and heads of the RF republics. The municipal reform addressed the most difficult yet basic principles of the state’s governance system. It was aimed at finalising the redistribution of functions and responsibilities between the federal, regional and local authorities. The municipal reform itself was planned to be implemented in several stages. At the initial stage the adoption of the federal law on municipal legislation and the redrafting of the geographical boundaries of local communities were envisioned. By January 2004, in accordance with the plans 28,000 municipal districts and villages were to be re-established. Each of the municipal divisions has to have no less than 1,000 inhabitants. After municipal demarcating is complete, adjustments to the tax and budget codes are going to be introduced. As a result each municipal council will have legitimate authority and the financial capacity to govern properly within its territory, in accordance with the principle of municipal selfgovernance reflected in Article 132 of Russia’s constitution.74 The federal budget’s funds for local government are to be transferred directly to the local authorities. Local spending plans are to be financed by local taxes. Introduction of a new financing mechanism for the local authorities also presupposes staging local elections and having a right for local


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referendums and meetings. President Putin confirmed the parameters of the administrative reform as a whole in his annual address to the Federal Assembly in May 2003. The details and regulations were covered in the presidential decree ‘On Measures on Implementation of the Administrative Reform in 2003–7’ that was issued on 23 July 2003.75 The principal approach at this stage of the reform was to minimise the presence of the state’s funds at local municipal budgets level. The government was trying to privatise social and other services by cutting the state’s functions in public services and social security at the local level to the minimum. The decree also authorised the creation of a governmental commission on administrative reform with duties to oversee and monitor the realisation of the programme. The then prime minister, Kasyanov, was put in charge of the commission and was to report back to President Putin on the results of its work on a monthly basis. The operational preparations were completed by the beginning of August 2003. On 5 August 2003 the prime minister appointed Boris Aleshin, then vicepremier, as a responsible party within the government to monitor the developments in this field.76 On 16 September 2003 the State Duma adopted the third and final reading of the law ‘On Principles of Municipal Self-management in the Russian Federation’. On 24 September 2003 the legislation was approved by the upper chamber of the parliament. On 6 October 2003 the president signed the document. In accordance with this new legislation municipal executive institutions were divided into two levels: small villages and town settlements belonged to the first group; cities and large towns constituted the second group. The introduced gradation was accompanied by strictly and clearly defined functions, areas of responsibilities of municipal authorities, and sources of their revenues. The law will be in force after 1 January 2006. The date was chosen because the planned redrawing and re-mapping of the boundaries of municipal territories were also scheduled to be implemented in 2006.77 The reform was aimed at establishing proper regulatory functions to monitor interbudgetary relations between different levels of executive powers in Russia. It was aimed to reassess and redistribute functions and responsibilities between the centre and regions. As a result of its implementation centralisation of power will be concentrated in certain areas and decentralisation of responsibilities planned for other areas. For instance, the social security net, the social benefits system, and health- and education-related issues were transferred so as to be under the jurisdiction of regional authorities, giving them the right of legislative initiative and responsibilities in the above-mentioned spheres. A possible merger of the subjects of the RF raised many anxieties. Officially Moscow rejected the notion that the merger of the existing territorial or regional units was envisioned as unavoidable and an obligatory part of the large-scale administrative reform. However, the possibility of such a merger as an option for better or alternative regional development proposed and supported by the majority of the local population of the specific regions or local communities was not denied. In order to deal with any requested demand occurring, the procedures for such initiated from the bottom mergers were thought out and adopted in advance. In other words, the government, though understanding the necessity of the streamlining of some of the regional territorial inconsistencies, decided to resolve them by exclusively using the ‘bottom-up approach’.


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The adopted procedures included the expressed interest of the local population, consent of regional/local authorities, a regionally staged referendum and the adoption of a federal law on the introduction of changes to the territorial-administrative system of the state on the basis of appeal by regional/local authorities to the federal centre. Procedurewise such requests were to come from regional or other authorities (subjects) of the Russian Federation. In practice it means that those authorities interested in the merger have to follow certain steps. First, request letters from the legislative bodies (regional or municipal parliaments) of the subjects in question should be sent to the Russian president, asking for support for the merger and the creation of a new subject of the RF. The executive authorities are to sign two documents: an agreement entitled ‘On Joint Co-ordinated Actions’ and the ‘Memorandum on a Merger’. The first document is to co-ordinate activities of the authorities in the process and map the plans for the future development of the region as a whole. The second document, the Memorandum, is to clarify the role and involvement of the federal authorities in the merger process. It was assessed that the legal process could take up to one year. According to Natalia Melikova, a journalist from the popular daily Nezavisimaya gazeta, the Kremlin plans that national units should be reduced to simple cultural autonomies. In order to solve this problem Moscow used a two-channelled approach. On the one hand, it initiated referendums for the unification in the regions themselves and, on the other, it introduced changes to legislation, which created an economic basis for enlargement of the territories.78 The first examples of the merger of the subjects of the Russian Federation have already demonstrated the most likely pattern in which this process could take place. The first subjects of the RF to merge into a new oblast were the Perm oblast and the KomiPermiatskiy okrug. The merger was initiated in February 2003. Initially the executive authorities planned to prepare all necessary documents for the merger by 1 July 2003, thus combining the elections to the RF State Duma (chamber of the parliament) and a referendum on the merger in both subjects of the federation. The results of the referendum gave the so-called ‘green light’ for unification. In March 2004 the decision was ratified by the State Duma and sent for approval to the upper chamber of parliament. The next in line to join the process were Irkutskaya oblast and Ust’-Ordynskiy Buriatskiy okrug.79 The ethnic units—Ust’-Ordynskiy Buriatskiy okrug and Komi-Permiatskiy okrug—were both negotiating for the right to function as special administrative-territorial sub-units within the newly established subjects. The requests were supported by all sides involved in the merger process because the arrangement allowed the continuation of a special support programme for the former ethnic territorial units until 2015. The initiatives were supported in Moscow as timely and useful in eliminating the ethnic territorial units and establishing a unified pattern of administrative-territorial units within the state. According to Dmitriy Kozak, then the deputy head of the Presidential Administration and the man behind the reform implementation, one-third of the total goals set out in the administrative reform were achieved by mid 2003.80 Any present and future agreements between the regions and the federal centre were to be signed in accordance with one unified pattern and regulated by identical procedures with strictly defined sources of financing a regional budget. In his interview Dmitriy Kozak pointed out that the state had


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to assess its functions realistically and voluntarily abandon several of them.81 The issue of the merger of regions and their possible enlargement is very sensitive in Russia since it is linked with the debates on a possible complete restructuring of the administrative-territorial structure of the state and establishing the confederation on the basis of the existing seven FDs. It was reported that this option allegedly had been discussed at the meeting with Prime Minister Blair in Moscow in October 2002 and with the German chancellor Schroder in Oslo in November 2002. However, Moscow was denying the intention of such radical changes to be introduced at the current stage of reforms. Changing the management system In his 2001 annual address to the Federal Assembly (3 April 2001) President Putin stressed the importance of the administrative reform in sustaining the stability and security of the state. The annual addresses to the Russian parliament that followed confirmed the position and tasks set in the 2001 appeal: Even a year ago it became obvious that establishing proper relations between federal and regional authorities is becoming a necessary condition for the strategic transformation of the state. The absence of distinctly divided functions between regional and federal levels of power, as well as the absence of an effective mechanism of co-ordination between the levels of authorities, is leading to substantial economic and social losses. The first task is to determine concrete and distinctive areas of joint responsibilities of the federal centre and subjects of the Federation. The federal legislation…specifically and above all… should determine the distinction of these functions and responsibilities of the federal and regional levels of administration… The second task is to re-establish order within territorial branches of the federal institutions of the executive power. Presently they are financially and organisationally weak, copy activities of regional authorities and are incapable of carrying out even monitoring functions… The government should define a newly established order in the system of territorial branches of the federal ministries and institutions. And finally the third task, which is also political in nature, is to establish an order in intra-budgetary matters. A clear distribution of the resources and tax revenues is an issue of mutual respons-ibility and effective implementation of mutual obligations by various levels of authorities… We have to start preparing for the administrative reform: in the first place of the government, ministries, administrations and their territorial branches. The need is not only to reassess their structures and staff requirements, but mainly the functions of the institutions of power.82 The presidential address officially created a framework for the administrative reform in Russia, which, however, was already under way in practice. This systemic approach to regional security in 2001 meant, first of all, establishing a network of institutions that would allow and assist the PEs in their districts to unify the regions and territories within their respective FDs. At the same time, it was necessary to implement several measures


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that would limit the influence of the authorities (at the governor or republican level) on the power bloc ministries, judicial system or any branches of the federal institutions in the regions. This excluded and decreased the influence of local structures on security and defence issues and established strict subordination of vertical authority in these matters. These measures were also perceived as a drive towards optimisation and efficiency, leading to a decision to cut all overlapping expenditures. In practice all this led to the adoption of the following: • enlargement of regional structures of the power bloc ministries and force structures; • elimination of the conditions allowing regional authorities to influence personnel policy in the power ministries or influence those views and positions of local branches of the power ministries that could benefit the local elite. This, in turn, created a need to change the distribution of the budgetary support system, and laws and regulations in personnel appointment policies in the federal institutions. In 2000/1 the federal institutions opened their district branches in all seven FDs. The regional and territorial branches were subordinated to the newly established district affiliates. In some cases the merger of regional offices within the districts and the creation of joint ones at district level were perceived as part of the military and administrative reform. They were seen as harmonisation measures that permitted a cut in expenditure and an overlapping in regional budgets, especially in military and security matters. In parallel the laws were adopted to limit the role of regional authorities on financial or personnel policies of the federal institutions. In November 2000, the constitutional court adopted two decisions that directly limited the responsibilities and opportunities of regional authorities to influence personnel policy in the federal institutions, power ministries, or other services within their territories. The interpretation of the laws ‘On Federal Institutions of the Tax Police’ and ‘On General Principles of the State of Affairs in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Federal Institutions in the Subjects of the Russian Federation’ proved that the federal authorities enjoyed priority rights. In both cases, the constitutional court confirmed that the federal centre had the right and priority to appoint any candidate for a position in the institutions of federalregional dual use without any obligatory consent or confirmation by local/regional authority. These decisions were coherent with other policy decisions or suggestions on personnel appointments to the federal institutions in the regions and territories. The following decisions are essential for understanding the substantial changes that occurred in relations between the regional and federal authorities. First of all, the government introduced a principle of horizontal transfers and exchanges for personnel in the federal institutions. The civil servants could work in the federal institutions of certain regions only for a limited number of years. They were under the obligation to be transferred to other regions by the end of a specific term. Therefore, the moral obligations, financial status and promotion possibilities for employees depended on their professional loyalty to the federal institutions. For example, in 2000 only half of the former presidential representatives in all Russia’s regions received an invitation to join the staff of the PEs as chief general inspectors or federal inspectors. For the first time since the break up of the USSR, a rotation principle was used in the employment of federal civil servants. The majority of staff members of the previous presidential


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representatives were asked to take a job in a different region. From January 2001 the principle of payments to the federal employees changed as well. It was forbidden to receive a salary from the local regional budget. Even social security net benefits to the personnel in the civil service were to be paid only from the federal centralised fund. The adoption of new procedures of appointing federal civil servants to the economically bankrupt regions (in place of elected governors) for the period of achieving each region’s ‘economic recovery’ would also strengthen the role and influence of the federal centre. According to the APN agency, at present plans are being debated in the government on the most effective ways to achieve regional economic recovery. For instance, any region that is financed by more than 75 per cent from the federal centre would face the possibility of being named an economic disaster zone and require immediate assistance from federal institutions. As a result of their performance the appointed civil servants who succeed in rebuilding regional economy were to receive a chance of joining an elite group of federal civil service executives with promising careers in government structures.83 In August 2001 President Putin confirmed his support for the reform of the civil service and approved the overall concept of such reform. Within that framework a number of new federal laws and regulations were to be adopted, including ‘On the System of Civil Service in the RF’, ‘On the State of the Civilian Civil Service’, ‘On the Basics of the Municipal Service in the RF’, ‘On the Pensions for Citizens-Civil Servants and Members of their Families’. Several presidential decrees provided guidelines for the civil service reform. Among many new documents were decrees ‘On the Programme of Reform of the Civil Service in the RF’, as well as amended editions of already existing regulations, such as decrees ‘On the Financing Regulations of Civil Servants, on Regulations for Providing Information on their Earnings, Property and Abiding Limitations, Imposed by the Civil Service’, ‘On Qualification Requirements for Federal Civil Servants’, ‘On Competition for the Employment Opportunities in the Civil Service and its Procedures’, ‘On Personnel Reserves for the Civil Service’, ‘On the Assessment of the Professional Performance of Civil Servants’, etc. On 21 February 2003 the presidential plan for reforming the state civil service (‘On the System of the Civil Service in the Russian Federation’) was finally introduced in the State Duma. The draft law ‘On the System of the Civil Service in the Russian Federation’ was just one of a series of documents in a new legislation package that was prepared by the president’s team regarding the introduction of a new system, classification and incentives for the civil service in Russia. In accordance with this draft law the civil service in the RF is defined as a service in four areas: for the state federal government, military and law enforcing services, and civil service for the subjects of the Russian Federation. For the first time new terminology was included in the legally binding documents, defining the ‘the status of the civilian civil service’, ‘civil service in military’ and ‘in law enforcement’, as well as the introduction of a ‘service contract’ that anyone applying for the civil service should sign. The adoption of this basic document was supposed to open up almost immediate opportunities for making the civil service more effective, accountable and transparent, and to provide conditions of easier implementation of anti-corruption measures within all levels of the government. According to the Ministry of Finance, additional resources were not required for the


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implementation of the reform at the federal and regional levels; however, resources were needed for the introduction of administrative reform at the municipal level.84 The introduced changes were to establish a new class of executives (new nomenclatura), loyal to the Putin government. System of monitoring The State Accounts Committee became one of the central elements of a new presidential monitoring system. The new trend was to use the committee as a de facto alternative monitoring service of the president (outside of the government) to monitor events in the economy. This was a new development in comparison with the Yeltsin era when the audit system was seen as independent from government. Currently, the president enjoys the right to investigate companies and various incidents; he gives orders to the government and services to react. In an interview with Rossiyskaya gazeta, the chairman of the State Accounts Committee stated: The former president’s attitude to the Chamber was as to the institution in opposition. President Putin’s attitudes are completely different. I am reporting to the President at least once a month… By the way, the President many times put resolutions and notes on the reports submitted to him, advising the Prime Minister, a minister or the Secretary of the Security Council to react to the information received through the audit and investigation procedures. Thus, the effectiveness of our reports is completely different; it increased 100 per cent.85 According to the constitution (1993), the State Accounts Committee is formed by the parliament. The law regulates that the Committee’s investigations emanate from a request by the parliament (a decision taken by the Federation Council, State Duma, or a request supported by one-fifth of the MPs). The presidential inquiries are considered by the collegium, which decides whether the Committee should react on them. However, the amendments, introduced in 2001/2, changed the regulations and provided additional powers to the presidential administration. Changes were also occurring in the staff appointments to the State Accounts Committee. The audit personnel operate under a sixyear term with the Committee. In February 2001, Mr Boldyrev, the head audit officer, was relieved of his duties by a decision of the Federation Council. Six other audit officers’ contracts ran out in April 2001. It was not surprising that the contracts of the personnel linked with Yeltsin’s ‘liberal’ team were not renewed. Alexander N.Semikolennich, who previously worked in the presidential audit office (kontrolnoie upravlenie) together with President Putin, was appointed by the Federal Assembly to the post of deputy head of the State Accounts Committee, taking Boldyrev’s place. Every oblast and town had its own control-audit institutions subordinated to local authorities. In December 2000, the State Accounts Committee initiated an all-Russian conference of all heads of the audit-controlling institutions of the country. In accordance with the conference’s decision, the Association of the Audit-monitoring Institutions of Russia was formed. The chairman of the State Accounts Committee heads the Association. At the moment it is chaired by former prime minister Sergey Stepashin. This Association became a base for the creation of regional and local offices of the Committee


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in all subjects of the Federation. The amendments to the law on the State Accounts Committee that had been introduced by President Putin were designed to establish a procedure for creating regional structures of the State Accounts Committee.86 Other amendments proposed by the president gave the Committee the legal responsibility to prosecute the violators through the courts. The amendments strengthened the functions and weight of the State Accounts Committee. Joint operational groups (State Accounts Committee, General Prosecution Office, other services) were initially formed when specific criminal cases were complicated in nature. For example, the monitoring of arrangements of food supplies to the military by local and regional communities in Chechnya during Yeltsin’s presidency. The Committee checked the food supplies case. On the basis of the State Accounts Committee’s report a decision on the food supply system for the armed forces and power ministries was taken by the president on a recommendation by the Security Council.87 The importance of the State Accounts Committee in investment operations in the regions as a part of administrative reform was once again demonstrated by its chairman, Sergey Stepashin, at the Interfax conference on investment in Russia, which took place in London on 26 April 2001. The new role of the Committee as a monitoring institution of foreign investment projects in the regions was defined. The foreign investors’ informal supporting club was to be established under the umbrella of the State Accounts Committee. The interested partners could receive professional assessments of the efficiency of a regional project and optimal investing strategy. The State Accounts Committee proposed to act as a monitoring institution for the investment projects that were to be implemented fully or partially with federal resources, or under guaranties of the Russian government, or financed from the sources of international financial institutions. Such investment projects were eligible to receive the Committee’s audit and could use its monitoring system at their service. The proposed approach was of vital importance for understanding the new realities in Russia’s regional-federal relations and possibilities for foreign investors in the regions.88 Financial control The accounts of all power ministries and services were transferred to the federal treasury by the end of 2000.89 On 14 April 2000, Kasianov, the then acting first deputy prime minister, introduced a new regulation according to which all funding for MoD activity had to be transferred to the federal treasury. Thus, a four-year dispute over the proper authority for monitoring defence and security spending was over. Political control over the financial flows for the power ministries was established through the channels of the Ministry of Finance. Simultaneously the reform affected the regional structures of the power bloc ministries and services.90 On 24 May 2000, by an order of General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation Vladimir Ustinov, federal prosecution offices were created in the seven FDs. This act was the first step in establishing a new unified vertical line of authority subordination in the country and as a move in the direction of regional mergers and the creation of larger subjects of the federation without changes in the constitution. This measure could also lead to the assumption that it was a step in the direction of a future unified state (instead


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of the federation). According to this presidential decree, similar regional offices were to be opened by the federal treasury, tax service, customs and MoI. Fundamental changes occurred in the structure of the MoI. It bears the prime responsibility for crime prevention and maintaining peace and order in the country. Due to the arrangements of the 1990s, the MoI branches and offices were put under the jurisdiction of the local authority. It was among the first to face the changes. The plans to reorganise the structure of the MoI were reported as early as May 2000.91 The steps that were already taken include the creation of the Federal Criminal Militia (police) by decree of Mikhail Kasyanov, the then prime minister, at the end of 2000. The criminal police (Ugrozisk), directorates on economic crime, drugs, organised crime, criminal activity in the high technology sphere, security, special forces and SOBR, as well as the Russian branch of Interpol, were transferred to the Federal Criminal Militia. The Committee of the Federal Criminal Militia within the MoI was running the new institutional structure. Its head operated under a deputy minister of the interior. The Committee was put in charge of the regional committees in seven FDs. The changes entailed a strict vertical subordination of the district offices to the central HQ in Moscow. It is widely believed that the influence in this field of regional and local factors in the subjects of the Federation was eliminated or at least seriously undermined. The main purpose of the changes was to take away criminal investigation procedures from local and regional authorities. However, the proposed solution did not prevent the attempts of local authorities to lobby for their own candidates for the regional committees, as was pointed out by the then deputy minister of interior Vladimir Kozlov.92 In October-November 2000, the FSB was also establishing its district branches with the prime task of monitoring counter-intelligence operations and strengthening state security. According to Russian press sources, the main purpose of the meetings of General Nikolai Patrushev, director of the FSB, with his colleagues in Novosibirsk (Siberian FD) and Yekaterinburg (Ural FD) was to refocus the work of newly established district branches of the FSB on preventing economic crimes, supporting counter-terrorist operations and monitoring personnel policy in the districts.93 The FSB offices dealing with corruption and economic crimes in the Siberian and Far Eastern FDs were amongst the most active ones in 2000. In the customs service the reform was started on 6 July 2000. It was characterised by the establishment of centralised procedures and unification of the customs service in the FDs.94 This was done in accordance with the presidential decree on PEs. In July 2000 the reform of the customs service in FDs was announced.95 In the Central FD, the Central Customs Office will be organised as a result of the merger of the Western and Moscow offices. This Central Customs Office monitors the following regional customs areas: Belgorod, Briansk, Vladimir, Voronezh, Western operational, Ivanovo, Kaluga, Kostroma, Kursk, Lipetsk, Orel, Prioksk Tula, Riazan, Smolensk, Tambov, Tver and Yaroslavl customs. In the Siberian FD, the Siberian Customs Office was formed on the basis of the Western Siberian Office. The main departments within the federal customs service were made responsible for personnel policy, specialities of the services in the regions. The independence of judicial institutions is an essential element of any properly functioning legal system. The changes touched the basics of Russia’s judicial system.


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According to new procedures of relations between the federal government and governors, only the federal authorities appoint the judges. The ways of securing formal approval of judges’ appointments by local parliaments or local state councils were also changed. The most memorable example was a decision by the RF Supreme Court on the right of federal judges to perform their duties in the subjects of the Federation without the interference of local authorities (case of the Republic of Udmurtia, 2000). The need to re-establish the rule of unbiased legal authorities in the regions of Russia, in conjunction with the difficulties experienced by the PEs in reintroducing federal judicial norms in regional legislation, motivated the work in the regions of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Property Relations and the State Accounts Committee. The Ministry of Justice already started the verification process of federal, republican and regional legislation in 1995. Between 1995 and 2001 from 25 to 50 per cent of cases in local legislation, which was inconsistent with federal laws, were registered. The regions violated over fifty signed agreements between Moscow and the republics/territories of the RF. However, only after the introduction of the FD administrative structure was the Ministry able to intervene directly in the process of adjusting local legislation at the point of its initial approval through the monitoring procedures at the district level. This job was performed by its territorial branches, which were created in 2001. The Ministry of Justice in Moscow was responsible for appointing their heads. It is important to stress that the unification of the logistic system, and operational control of the military and other power bloc ministries, was accompanied by a wide systemic change in the overall management of the whole country. As this chapter demonstrates, the systemic changes touched all spheres of life in Russia. As part of the wider administrative reform the presidential team was considering the introduction of new structures, functions and missions of governmental departments in order to intensify the effectiveness of their performance and bring them into line with the new principle of governance (from branch-focused management to institutional and territorial, aimed at assisting the institutions to implement state policies). Originally the intention was voiced in the federal government programme in July 2001: ‘the reforming of the system of government service will be done in relation with principles of the optimisation of state structures, institutions and their staff requirements’.96 On 17 February 2003 the government of Russia presented a draft of its mid-term programme (till 2005) with distinct guide outlines for its own reform. Though being more detailed than the 2001 edition, it nevertheless demonstrated strong resistance within the government to put itself up for scrutiny by the audit office and parliament as part of the implementation procedures. Then vice-premier Boris Aleshin, head of the commission on administrative reform, confirmed the plans for the major restructuring of the government in 2004.97 These plans were initiated in March 2004, when the Presidential Administration started the restructuring of the executive branch of the government prior, not after, the presidential elections scheduled for 14 March 2004. The shake up of the government started with PM Mikhail Kasyanov, who was relieved of his duties; Mikhail Fradkov was appointed to this post on 5 March 2004. A few days later, on 9 March 2004, the new structure of the government and new appointments within the executive branch were authorised by the presidential decree ‘On System and Structure of the Federal Executive


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Institutions’. The main goal of such ‘preventive measures’ was to signal that changes within the executive branch were unavoidable and reflected the necessity to adjust the state’s management and policy-making mechanism to current requirements. The reform was in the planning for two years by a team in the Presidential Administration under the supervision of Dmitriy Kozak and Boris Aleshin. According to the plans, supported by President Putin and PM Fradkov, all federal executive bodies were divided in their subordination either to the president (bloc of power ministries, responsible for defence and national security)98 or to the prime minister (bloc of the ministries covering social and economic areas). In order to achieve maximum efficiency and to simplify the process of co-ordination in decision-making the number of ministries was cut from 30 to 13. All executive institutions and departments were divided into three categories with clearly defined functions, areas of responsibilities and competence: federal ministries, federal services and federal agencies. A federal ministry is to formulate policy and adopt legislative acts, but as an institution it is forbidden to issue licences, take concrete decisions concerning individual organisations or persons, or to control federal property. A federal ministry is to carry political responsibility for the develop-ments within its area of responsibilities. A federal service is given monitoring functions over institutions and individuals in overseeing their activity in accordance with regulations and laws. Nobody is allowed to interfere with the legislation process. A federal agency has the prime function of managing authority and is not allowed to interfere in the functions of policy-making or monitoring audit that are required by the two above-mentioned federal institutions. The reform of the executive branch of the government is to stimulate better and more effective completion of the administrative reform without reducing efficiency in management. The reasons for merging ministries and the introduction of such a rigid structure lie in a desire to avoid duplication and the overlapping of the ministerial functions, and to increase their effectiveness. The new ministries should become more dynamic and independent. The government was given 2–3 months to adjust to the new system and management principles. After the March 2004 presidential elections the transformation of the Presidential Administration was initiated as part of the administrative reform in order to synchronise and adjust all elements of the management system. The step-by-step changes that were introduced transformed the state administrative system. New appointments to the government made by the president formally changed not only the personnel policy but also started a major transformation of the government, its ministerial structures, as well as of its territorial branches.99 The Yeltsin era is going to be totally over with the completion of the administrative reform: new relationships between the federal centre and the regions, new management and accounting system for the state, and a new territorial-administrative system. The scale of the planned changes is clearly transforming the country. Those changes are equal only to those which had occurred in the 1990s, and were connected with the collapse of the Soviet Union.


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Evolution of the political system Arguments for reform From the beginning of the twenty-first century Russia’s official circles systemically attempted to introduce reforms and impose changes on the institutional system of Russia that would allow the continuity of the reformation process of society. Starting from the very first months of his first term in the office, President Putin was determined to reconstruct the ‘vertical principle of subordination and hierarchy’ in legislative and executive institutions. The introduction of the administrative reform and the formation of the federal districts were just two examples of Putin’s approach. Still, in 2003, despite the dramatic changes within the administrative system, the majority of leaders at the regional and local levels primarily belonged to the nomenclature (nomenklatura) appointees that had come to power during Yeltsin’s era. The statistics of 2003 demonstrate an interesting reality: 52 per cent of the governors were elected before President Putin acquired the ability to influence the results of the nomination of candidates for election process; 27 per cent of those who were elected after President Putin had taken the office received public support for the second time. In 2003 40 per cent of all serving governors were elected for the second term, but 20 per cent of them were initially appointed by President Yeltsin and did not go through the election process at all. Starting from 2000, during President Putin’s first term of office, only 21 per cent of the functioning governors were elected for the first time.100 Thus, still in 2003 the regional ruling elite in practice represented those appointed during the Yeltsin period or elected on the basis of federal administrative relations, the nature of which the current federal centre was trying to change. The Report Risks and Threats for Russia in 2003, prepared by the NGO National Strategy Council, was made public in March 2003. It made predictions about intensified political struggles on the eve of the elections: In the absence of a new ‘Putin era’ convention, ‘conclusive monopolization’ will lead to oligarchic power-struggles intensifying drastically at all levels in 2003: in the economy, in state administration, in law, in politics. The Duma elections will be the culmination of that battle; it will peak in the pre-election period (autumn 2003), and it could lead to the ruling elite in its present form falling apart.101 This author’s political prediction echoes statements made by Western scholars, who expressed concern about the stability of the reform process. For instance, in his recent book Russia: A State of Uncertainty Neil Robinson argued that the roots of the difficulties were in the weakness of an ‘inherently unstable’ constitutional-patrimonial state, which had been developed under the tutelage of Boris Yeltsin, hijacked by elements of the old nomenklatura and oligarchs, and which lacked the resources and flexibility of actions to make political and economic reforms. Robinson saw the consequences of such a situation in a ‘deformed democracy’, a ‘hybrid economy’ and a diminishing role in the


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international arena. As net result, Robinson argues that ‘continuity in Russian political and economic life…[as] helped produce deformations in the Russian political and economic system that require state action and reform to amend them’.102 In order to make the changes irreversible a reform of the overall political system was required. There was either a growing need to amend the country’s constitution or to introduce sets of regulations and proce-dures that would take into account the situation on the ground—the optimisation of the authority of the state. The changes in the legislation were advertised, as they had to reflect the realities of practical policies. The legislation was to be influenced by the evolution of an understanding of state interests. The State Duma Council and PE in the State Duma, Kotenkov, agreed with the assumption that the time had come to change the constitution.103Ex-PM Primakov, on behalf of the State Duma, appealed to President Putin to establish a joint committee, responsible for preparatory work on amending the RF constitution. The proposals for new regulations, functions and procedures for a new system of state institutions are considered in the Commission of the Federation Council on the methodology of the implementation of constitutional powers, the RF parliament (Komissiya SF po metodologii realizatsii constitutionnyh polnomochii). Since January 2002 the Commission was headed by Eduard Burbulis, the state secretary in the Yeltsin administration, at the same time a very close associate of the former PE to the North-western FD, Cherkesov, who is considered to be one of the closest members of the presidential circle. E.Burbulis was elected to the Federation Council as a representative of the administration of the Novgorod region in November 2001. The reform of the system, initiated by President Vladimir Putin, intends to make it [openly] ‘transparent’ and adaptable to Kremlin initiatives. It meant the liquidation of the very basis of the previous political system of multilevel ‘checks and balances’, that functioned during President Yeltsin[’s term of office]. As a result the ‘multi-centric’ political system was substituted by the ‘monocentric’ one, when the majority of political institutes and players lost the status of independent centres of power and influence. The new system was intended to be strictly subordinated to the Kremlin and synergetic.104 The formation of a ‘monocentric system of power’ was seen as the major result of Putin’s administration. This was the term used by a group of political scientists for describing the logic in changes introduced by the government.105 To some extent this term precisely captures the essence of the reforms; that is, the abolition of the non-manageable chaotic system of management and multiple subordination so characteristic of the 1990s. This terminology also captures the importance of the hierarchy in power politics that increased in Russia in the early years of the twenty-first century. Though the terminology misses the multi-channelled overlapping arrangements within the described system of governance, it seems most appropriate to be used as this terminology describes the main tendency in Russia’s development. That is a reconstruction of the management rules for the strong internal governance that provides conditions for flexibility of its external actions.


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The political system: new arrangements In the period 1999–2003 internal political developments, the introduction of administrative reform and Moscow’s support of the international anti-terrorist campaign stimulated changes in the configuration of the political system in Russia. Starting from March 2000, new appointments of military and security personnel to high-ranking civil service positions were aimed at assisting the new presidential team to change the structure and basis of the Yeltsintype political system. It also focused on liquidating the so-called ‘multicentric’ and introducing the ‘monocentric’ political system, where, according to Russian political scientist and politician Mark Urnov, military and security personnel were to represent the first core-line of the presidential system.106 The first testing ground for the institutional changes were introduced in the State Duma III. State Duma: from ‘supportive’ to ‘constitutional’ majority Inherited from the Yeltsin administration was a traditional conflict of interests between the executive and legislative branches of power. One of the bitter periods in the relations between the Russian parliament and the Presidential Administration resulted in the dire crisis of 1993 that led to violence and the use of force against the RF parliament. However, even after these events the relationship between the government and two chambers of the parliament were complicated and difficult. The situation changed with President Putin taking office in 2000. After the last parliamentary elections the pro-presidential forces in the State Duma III formed the so-called ‘new supportive majority’ coalition which allowed the Presidential Administration to control the voting procedures on the legislation issues in the lower chamber. In 2001/2 the balance of power between the opposition and pro-Kremlin forces in the State Duma III changed. Previously the State Duma CPRF faction had 205–210 members. In 2001/2 the State Duma CPRF faction had only 130–140 members. The progovernmental bloc consisted of 270 MPs. The centrist factions of the Duma III comprised the majority. Several factions and parliamentary groupings belonged to this pro-Kremlin entity. They were party factions ‘Unity’ and the OVR (the left-wing opposition and Father-land-All Russia Party) and MP groups ‘People’s Deputy’ and ‘Regions of Russia’. However, this coalition was not homogeneous. The party faction OVR and parliamentary grouping ‘Regions of Russia’ demonstrated more flexibility in their political judgement and were constantly involved in political trade with the Kremlin over their support for the policies proposed by the government and the president. But the ‘new supportive majority’ coalition was manageable. The decisions in the State Duma’s council were usually taken the following way: progovernmental votes by ‘the union of four’ together with the LDPR (Zhirinovsky party) and five of the so-called opposition votes, who were represented by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), agrarians, the ‘Union of Rightist Forces’, the ‘Yabloko’ party, and the chairman. The ‘new supportive majority’ could deliver solely on its own the results needed to the Kremlin on almost any legislation, with the exception of votes concerning the federal laws where absolute majority was required. All this


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presupposed the need for further coalition building in support of the notion within the chamber. This situation significantly influenced the disposition of forces in the State Duma, as parties of neither left nor right orientations could disrupt the process of passing the programmes and laws prepared by the executive branch. As a result, the parties and groupings of the left political orientation were gradually leaning towards support of the ‘new majority’ coalition. The same situation, however, aggravated criticism of the government by the right forces in the State Duma III, primarily within the CPRF. It also provoked the crisis between the faction and the Kremlin in March 2001, when the government initiated the process of a reconsideration of the ‘package deal’ that would reflect the position of majority and minority factions in the lower chamber. The conflict was regarding the proposal to take the post of chairman from Gennadii Seleznev, as a member of the opposition party, and redistribute the posts of heads of the committees in order to reflect the role of the opposition adequately to its representative status within the chamber. The struggle to dismiss Seleznev from his post reflected the interest of the centrist MPs to create a favourable balance of votes in the chamber. The Speaker had to choose between support of party politics and resignation from his post or support of the ‘new majority’ decision, which meant keeping the position of Speaker of the House but having to leave the party. When the Communist Party faction rebelled in the State Duma in an attempt to strengthen its position in the parliament, the reaction of the executive branch was rather severe. The struggle over the redistribution of the posts of heads of the committees in the State Duma III resulted in the CPRF losing control over eight main committees.107 The reappointment of five MPs to their previous posts (as a trade-off for their expulsion from the Communist Party or as part of their compromise with the ‘new majority’) was made only in relation to the committees dealing with social issues and the social security agenda. The CPRF MPs were actually forced to take them back at the expense of those committees being terminated in principle, which the party faction (or MPs) could not publicly allow itself to be associated with. As a result of the long campaign the balance of forces in the State Duma council shifted in favour of the Kremlin, due to the fact that Seleznev kept his position as the Speaker of the State Duma III, but decided to leave the Communist Party of Russia. Another important tendency in the lower chamber was connected with the establishment of numerous political and issue-focused, cross-faction parliamentary groupings in the State Duma. This tendency in the State Duma became a typical feature of the State Duma III. Two-thirds of all members of the State Duma was taking part in the 38 cross-faction parliamentary groupings. The most numerous were such cross-border parliamentary groupings that were formed on the basis of primarily economic interests, such as ‘Energy of Russia’ (122 deputies), ‘Producers of Russia’ (107 deputies), ‘Zubr’ (142 deputies strong with a focus on environmental issues). The new balance of forces and new adopted ‘package deal’ for forming the committees confirmed the following tendency. The State Duma became an institution for mainly processing the legislature prepared and submitted by the executive power. Members of the parliament have the right to initiate the introduction of a discussion of the drafts of legislature. However, presently statistics demonstrate that initial introduction of the laws from the MPs dropped significantly in this State Duma.


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As the result of the stand-off in the Duma, the Kremlin confirmed that the lower chamber could be considered as reliable and non-confrontational. The compromise achieved after the crisis with the CPRF allowed the Kremlin to step up the reform of the legislative branch by radically changing the character of the upper chamber. The proposed changes secured the compliance not only of the State Duma and the Federation Council but of the whole parliament, making the legislative branch of the government transparent and more supportive of the policy adopted in and by the Kremlin. The parliamentary elections of 2003 changed the balance of forces even further in favour of the government in the State Duma IV. The pro-Kremlin party, ‘United Russia’, received over 37 per cent support in the election, the Communist Party and LDPR (Zhirinovskiy party) received, respectively, 12.7 per cent and 11.6 per cent, with the ‘Motherland’ Party (Dmitriy Rogozin-Sergei Glaziev bloc) getting just 9 per cent of public support. Pro-Kremlin United Russia took control of all Duma committees, publicly assuming responsibility for the work of the chamber and paving the way for full support of whatever socio-economic programme the Kremlin pursues after the presidential election. The Presidential Administration aimed to transform the United Russia Party into the main source of legislative initiatives and stable supporter of the second stage of its reform programme. At the first working session of the 450-seat State Duma IV on 16 January 2004 the majority party (it has more than 300 deputies), set out new ground rules for the lower house of parliament. The number of deputies who may form a parliamentary floor group was raised from 35 to 55, reflecting the changing nature of political associations and their diminishing importance in the chamber. The ‘vertical principle’ has been transferred to parliament as well, with control centralised within United Russia. The session confirmed en bloc, with 343 votes in favour, the appointment of United Russia members to chair all 29 Duma committees. The Defence Committee is chaired by General Viktor Zavarzin, who led the dash to seize Pristina airfield in June 1999; the Committee for the CIS and Russians Abroad is headed by Andrei Kokoshin, a former Security Council secretary; and the Economic Policy Committee chairman is former customs chief Valery Draganov. Opposition parties had hoped to head some committees, under the formerly observed ‘quota’ principle of awarding appointments between parliamentary floor groups according to the number of seats held. Motherland offered ten candidates for committee chairs, but all were rejected. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) nominated no candidates. The Communists (CPRF) boycotted the issue on the grounds that it had already been settled in the Presidential Administration. Committee first deputy chairs (newly introduced) and deputy chairs were voted at the plenary session on 23 January 2004 when the quota principle was applied. However, United Russia bears full responsibility for legislation for the next four years. Federation Council: new institution The changes were introduced to the composition and representation of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, in accordance with the federal law ‘On Regulation of the Formation of the Federation Council’. They made the Federation Council a different institution in comparison with what it was in 1993 when its functions


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were defined by the constitution (1993). In July 2000 President Putin won parliamentary approval to remove the regional leaders from the Federation Council and replace them with appointed legislators by early 2002. This decision could be considered a landmark in the transformation of the character of the Russian parliamentary system. In parallel the State Council (Gossovet), under the chairmanship of the president, was established in accordance with the presidential decree ‘On the State Council of the Russian Federation’ of 1 September 2000. For operational purposes the Council’s presidium was formed. The president himself nominated members to the presidium, who were to be rotated every six months. The Council’s sessions were promised to be held when needed, but no less than once a month, but by the decision of the president. The Council initially was to discuss the budget and governmental relations with potential expanded agenda. The Council played an important role during the transitional period to the new composition of the parliament’s upper chamber. As of January 2002 the new Federation Council experienced significant transformations. In accordance with the new regulations all regional leaders (heads of regional administrations and presidents of the republics, as well as speakers of regional parliaments) lost their representative seats on the Federation Council. Their places were taken by MPs nominated to serve on a permanent basis during the term of the parliament by the regional legislative and executive branches (one candidate from each of the branches). According to Oleg Savchenko, the governor of the Belgorod region, regional authorities were encouraged independently to nominate only one out of two MPs representing their region.108 In practice, representatives of powerful lobby groups and those supported by the Presidential Administration were nominated to the Federation Council. The upper chamber of 2002/3 had representatives of the following lobby groups: oil/gas industries, energy sector, metallurgy, machinery complex, chemical-forestry complex, financial and insurance sector, aviation companies, and agrarian and food processing sectors. Information has been recorded that PEs in their FDs were also involved in the promotion of their candidates to the Federation Council. By 5 December 2001 only 15 out of 112 newly appointed senators worked in the previous Federation Council during the term of 1996–2001. The Federation Council of 2002/3 was not functioning as a corporate entity. Assessing the political potential of the Federation Council, Alexei Makarkin, head of the Analytical Department at the Centre of Political Technologies, made a very significant observation. He pointed out that since the main function of the upper chamber had become a representative institution for the regional/business elite in lobbying their primarily economic interests, the options for independent political actions among MPs became very limited by their role of professional lobbyists.109 As the result of the changes the political influence of regional executive and legislative representatives significantly diminished in contrast to the strengthened position of the Kremlin in the upper chamber. The new Speaker of the Upper House was appointed. Sergei Mironov, from St Petersburg, is a close friend of President Vladimir Putin. He was chairman of the St Petersburg City Council, and holds the post of secretary of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly (St Petersburg). Sergei Mironov was known for his public testing of controversial political initiatives. For instance, he initiated a public debate on the possibility of extending terms for the RF presidency, the transfer of the Russian capital


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from Moscow to St Petersburg, changing the principle of representation at the Federation Council from election of the officials to the nomination of senators by the president himself. All deputy speakers were appointed by the personal decision of the Speaker; some of the candidates had been known to him from the beginning of his career. Two of the newly appointed deputy speakers of the upper chamber—Mr Goregliad and Mr Torshin—had long and very close relations with Putin’s Presidential Administration. Another deputy speaker, Nikolaev, was believed to have received his post as a compromise with the Kremlin because of his stance in the regional elections, where according to the Russian press he assisted a Kremlin protégé to win the election. In the first three months of 2002 changes were introduced to personnel policies, appointments of deputy speakers and heads of the committees, establishment of new committees and the re-composition of existing ones, and to the overall procedures and regulations of the Federation Council. Since January 2002 the new regulation procedures for the Federation Council were adopted and new heads of the committees in the upper chamber were nominated. Only as the result of reshuffles in 2002 were an additional 11 committees and commissions established, bringing their total number in the Federation Council up to 23. Among members of the Federation Council 70 were professional MPs, and among them 20 had experience in working in the federal legislative bodies; 9 were former heads of regions and republics. The new Federation Council abandoned the policy of support for the creation of internal caucuses. According to the official regulations and policy statement of the Federation Council there is a strict restriction in establishing any political factions or political groupings among the members of the Federation Council. While in the previous councils this restriction was not fully observed, the new Federation Council was determined to comply with the officially stated regulations and keep the Federation Council MPs away from the temptations of being politicised by lobbying activities that were mushrooming in the lower chamber. At the same time a parallel process was developing in an increasing number of links between economic lobbies in both houses of parliament. Political and financial commentators were registering the intensified activities of MPs linked with influential groups and economic lobbies that had been successful in seeing that their representatives were nominated from the regions to the Federation Council. In 2002 the cross-faction parliamentary groupings that were functioning across the State Duma and the Federation Council were becoming increasingly more visible in parliamentary politics. In accordance with the RF constitution, the official procedure on debates over new legislature presupposes that during the first stages of discussions of draft laws in the State Duma, the senators-members of the Federation Council are not involved in the debates. The Federation Council has the right either to adopt or reject the legislation already approved and adopted by the State Duma. It has been the long-term intention of members of the Federation Council to be part of the initial debates on any new legislation in order to have an opportunity to influence the debates at the very beginning. The crossfaction parliamentary groupings spread across not only the State Duma but the Federation Council as well could provide an arena for such informal discussions without the need of introducing changes in the constitution. These debates


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were not considered as a breach of regulations, due to the fact that any solutions reached at the cross-faction parliamentary groupings could only be considered as recommendations for the formal committees to act upon. However, such informal procedures were seen as useful in speeding up the process of adoption of legislation and increasing the effectiveness of the Russian parliament as a whole. Additional forms of co-ordination between the State Duma and Federation Council were established. One such channel of formalised communication was already introduced in June 2001, when a representative of the State Duma was appointed to the Federation Council with liaison functions. The appointee, Petr S.Volostrigov, was to co-ordinate an understanding of approaches between the chambers. In January 2002 a similar position with the liaison mission in mind was established in the Federation Council, within the framework of the above-mentioned commission on the methodology of implementation of the constitutional powers. It was the same commission that was formed as a compromise between the Presidential Administration and parliament in order to analyse the possibilities of non-conflict transformation of the state’s institutions within the institutional and administrative reform in Russia. The commission was to consider the proposals for new regulations, functions and procedures for the new Federation Council in the new system of state institutions. By becoming more tolerant to the interests and needs of the federal executive branch the Federation Council was opening opportunities for expanding the list of functions that it was initially assigned to deal with.110 The tendency only increased after the parliamentary elections of 2003. Party system The administrative reform also touched the basics of the political party system in Russia, restructuring and re-mapping it. The first major decision in reshaping Russia’s multiparty system was taken in 2000/1, when sets of new regulations dealing with the political party process were put forward. Two main legislative acts set a framework for the reform of the party system in Russia. They are the law ‘On Political Parties’ and the federal law ‘On General Principles of Organisation of Legislative and Executive Institutions of State Authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation’. The federal Law ‘On Political Parties’ was adopted in July 2001. It became operational in July 2003. Many restrictions were introduced to party restructuring; new incentives were added too. Responsibility for monitoring party activity and enforcing restrictions belongs to the Ministry of Justice, whose representatives are entitled to attend all party meetings. New adjustments were imposing conditions that were making it more difficult to register and sustain the existence of small local parties. Previously the minimum party membership was 5,000. Under the new legislation a party was to have a minimum of 10,000 members. In order to prevent any party from representing regional interests, the quotas were introduced for regional representation. All parties have to have members in all 89 subjects of the Federation, with a membership of at least a 100 in each of the 45 administrative-territorial units, and of at least 50 in each of the remaining 44 regions. No collective membership was allowed, and members of any party could not belong to one single profession. All parties have to meet minimum requirements in order to participate in elections


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(presidential, parliamentary, gubernatorial, regional and municipal). For example, it is obligatory to nominate candidates at municipal elections in at least half of the subjects of the Federation. Failure to meet such a norm over a period of five years constitutes grounds for the suspension of a party’s registration. It is only parties that have the right to put up candidates for the elections. The NGOs and civic associations, which previously were given the right to name candidates, were not permitted to do so under the new regulations. They were to participate in the elections only indirectly by joining electoral blocs with existing political parties. Especially interesting were regulations on the framework of funding norms and procedures for party funding. Parties were not allowed to accept donations from the following categories of potential donors: anonymous donors; foreign states, organisations and citizens; or Russian companies with a foreign capital stake of over 30 per cent; stateless persons; international organisations or international social movements; government bodies at any level; organisations, 30 per cent or more of whose property is owned by the government; charities; religious associations and organisations that have not been registered for at least one year. Ceilings were set on the size of donations that any party can accept in any one year. For instance, an individual donor could give up to 1 m roubles and an organisation up to 10 m roubles. Up to a further 1 m could be taken in cash collections. Total donations to a party could not exceed 1 bn roubles, and to any regional party organisation must not be more than 20 m roubles. Parties that pass certain thresholds of electoral performance could receive small amounts of state funding, $1 m a year is to be assigned for this purpose from 2004 on. Though the parties are allowed to raise funds from joining fees and membership dues, and from business operations, the area of business is restricted to only three areas: media and publishing, real estate, and the production and sale of party souvenirs. Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of the Presidential Administration, according to a February 2002 article in Nezavisimaya gazeta, rejected the idea that parties could receive funding for certain promises to industrialists and investors. He stressed that it was essential to continue dialogue with investors and convince them not to fund certain specific programmes; rather, they should provide financial support for the overall concept that a party promises to achieve. In other words, the government put forward requirements that automatically stimulated restructuring the existing parties, or at least their regrouping. Just before this new federal law ‘On Political Parties’ was to become operational two reports were published, both in March 2003, that to some extent set parameters for party building and certain criteria for public expectation of the country’s new party system. The public opinion ROMIR Monitoring and the Regional Political Studies Agency conducted a survey on the existing party system in Russia. The survey of 1,600 people in 28 constituent members of the Federation was completed in March 2003. The results demonstrated that over 40 per cent of the respondents believe that they need new parties, while 53 per cent were against it and around 6 per cent were undecided. Scientists explain this as the disappointment of socially active people in the current political players. The poll revealed that in order to be successful new parties should focus on the three predominant public preferences: democracy, socialism, as well as patriotism and great spirit.111


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The report Risks and Threats for Russia in 2003, produced by the National Strategy Council, a newly established NGO, Moscow, in March 2003, stated that the main political parties, like the Unified Russia Party, the People’s Party of Russia, and the Yabloko Party were under the direct control of the ruling elite. The Communist Party was said to be partially controlled as well. The Western analysts tend to regard the neo-liberal Union of Rightist Forces and the social democratic Yabloko Party as loyal opposition, as both of the parties adopted a pragmatic approach in their support or rejection of governmental initiatives. Dr Bobo Lo believed that both parties were ‘to struggle to reach the 5 per cent threshold required for any party block representation in the new Duma’, and were ‘likely to do so only if they cut deals with the Kremlin’.112 However, the report Risks and Threats for Russia in 2003 went further, speculating about the possibilities of governmental reshuffles. It stated that in the period between and after the elections of 2003/4 in order to stabilise its achievements in creating a controlled but representative political environment the Presidential Administration might be tempted to use the abovementioned parties as the basis for forming a new political party-based government.113 The popular daily Nezavisimaya gazeta (Moscow) published a report on the lecture on party politics delivered by Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of the Presidential Administration, who was responsible for overseeing party developments within the Administration.114 The lecture was prepared for the training sessions in political activities that were tailored especially for regional delegates of the pro-governmental Unified Russia Party. The lecture that was delivered in February 2002, two years prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections, clarified the long-term strategy of President Putin’s government and its vision of the party system to be eventually constructed in Russia. According to Surkov’s presentation the party’s goal was to prevent local and regional interests receiving priority over federal and national interests and considerations. Only the parties were supposed to be responsible for forming the government, as well as nominating and appointing the president. Then, in 2002, the government promised to adopt amendments that would allow high-ranking civil servants (group A) to participate in party politics. The idea was to allow an additional influential group of the constituency to be active in the 2003 parliamentary election and the 2004 presidential election. Stimulating party activity the Administration was providing assessment of the state of politicisation of Russian society in 2002. The verdict was rather sobering as overall the officials registered general political tiredness of the Yeltsin era rather than political stability of the society. Such critical assessment determined the focus on information managers capable of winning the next elections and on ‘circumstantial alliances’. As Vladislav Surkov pointed out, ‘If I put some money in power, I want to receive even more power’.115 By introducing strict rules of registration and limiting the quotas for small parties, the conditions were created for eliminating small parties from parliamentary representation. The procedures and regulations were supposed eventually to stimulate the establishment of a two/or ‘a few’ party system at the federal level. The implementation gradually meant a new disposition of balance in the State Duma. The Putin government started to introduce new regulations, step by step, in order to reform the party system. The second major step in that direction was the federal law ‘On General Principles of Organisation of Legislative and Executive Institutions of State


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Authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation’. The law instituted a different system for electing representatives to regional legislative bodies. Initially the combined electoral system—party lists and single mandate districts—was introduced as obligatory for the election to regional legislative bodies in the election law ‘On Basic Guaranties of the Citizens’ Election Rights’ (June 2002). In accordance with the new legislation, 50 per cent of the members of a regional legislature were to be elected on the basis of party lists, the other 50 per cent on singular mandate principles. The first requirement stimulated the formation of regional branches of political parties and was seen as an opportunity for rebuilding the federal and regional party systems on a firm representative basis. The guidelines also undermined the practice of regional governors to have exclusively pocket regional legislatures116 and provided conditions for the division of legislative and executive branches of government on the regional level. The new system was activated in each region/subject of the Federation, gradually providing time for parties to establish themselves properly at the regional level if they did not achieve that beforehand. It was recommended, when adopted, to wait until at least three regional branches of the federal parties could open their offices in the selected region before implementing a proportional principle for local and regional elections. This approach gave a new spin to the democratisation process. The party building process during the Putin presidency received the label of ‘managed pluralism’.117 The appearance of the factions of the all-Russian parties in the regional and local parliaments creates a basis for the unified political party system in Russia. There was no vacuum in the party building process. In the period 2001–3 new parties were formed that covered all spectra of political activity, left, right and centre, declaring themselves to be pro-presidential. In December 2001 the centrist parties Unity, Otechestvo and All Russia merged together to form a ‘new party of power’. In parallel with concentrated activity in the political centre, according to the CMI.RU, the Presidential Administration supported separate initiatives to establish two more political parties. The parliamentary group ‘People’s Deputy’ was transformed into the People’s Party, with a left-centre orientation. The Democratic Party of Russia was revived as a right-centre political party. Governor Michael Prusak, known for his close relations with the Presidential Administration, became its new leader. The identification of the political orientation of these new parties is less important than their publicly proclaimed official support of executive power. In autumn 2003 the combinations of leading in public support parties and blocs changed, but the principle of main competition in all political spectra for the votes remained the same. The main competing parties were the pro-Kremlin Unity and Peoples’ Party, Rossia (newly established in 2003, with MP Sergei Glaziev as its leader) and the CPRF. Each of the above-mentioned contenders was receiving flexible ratings of support (between 26–29 per cent and 8–10 per cent) and was constantly changing places in the popularity race.118 Other possible favourites could also be found among the newly formed parties, such as the Motherland-National Patriotic Union (with Dmitriy Rogozin, MP and chairman of the State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee) or the Party of Life (with Sergei Mironov, speaker of the Federation Council). According to Dr Bobo Lo from RIIA, London: There is purpose to this charade… The larger impact is twofold: personalities, not parties, will continue to dominate political life; and serious alternatives


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to the regime will not emerge any time soon’.119 From 14 July 2003 the proportional system of representation for the regional legislatures became obligatory in all of Russia’s regions. From July 2003 the federal law ‘On Political Parties’ became operational as well. Russia was getting ready to collect the results of the political party reform in the parliamentary (2003) and presidential (2004) elections. Having in mind the adoption of new regulation on the party registration that would take effect prior to the next election, the new arrangement further strengthened the Kremlin’s position in the Duma. On 18 February 2003, when addressing the parliament, President Putin expressed support for the fact that the factions of the all-Russian federal parties had been established in regional parliaments in all subjects of the RF. In this fact he saw evidence of the creation of a ‘solid base for the new united political party system for the whole country’. He welcomed these developments as important elements of the democratisation of the country, providing stability and predictability to the country’s political system.120 Interest groups in civic society During his first presidential term Vladimir Putin confirmed the support of new allies. The potential allies were incorporated into the system of consultations, which took conflicting issues out of the public domain into the sphere of internal, behind-the-scenes discussions, consultations and co-operation. By the end of 2001 the formation of corporate organisations of the business community, such as RSPP, Delovaya Rossia, OPORA, keen to co-operate with the president was completed. In November 2001 the Civic Forum, a popular umbrella organisation, declared its intention to co-ordinate civic activities and work with local initiatives. The Civic Forum was supposed to institutionalise the relationship between the federal centre and regional, local communities, to combine together the ‘bottomup’ and ‘bottom-down’ approaches in public political debates and provide opportunities to use the best ideas and individuals in practical politics. It is also important to mention that in 2001 the adopted labour code provided solid grounds for non-confrontational institutionalised relations between the united labour movement, FNPR (Independent Trade Unions of Russia) and the Presidential Administration. On 23 December 2003 Putin presented principles for co-operation with the business community at a meeting of the board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. The key theme of the new approach was the notion of shared responsibility of government and business for the well-being of the nation. The president proclaimed support for business, but opposed tax avoidance, and confirmed the government’s intention to expropriate excess profits and encourage economic development. The Kremlin confirmed its intention to proceed with a policy of encouraging business (primarily the highly profitable energy sector) to invest in manufacturing and programmes of industrial restructuring and the social sphere, forming the beginning of a new stage of reform in the country.


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First term results The task of ‘reconstruction of the vertical line of subordination and the sense of order’ soon produced side effects of transformations, such as building the ‘monocentric system of power’. The mentioned changes in the institutional system were essential in preserving stabilisation after President Putin’s elections. But the centralisation of power under federal authorities cut short the autonomy of many institutions and undermined the sensitive mechanism of checks and balances built by President Yeltsin. Some scholars interpreted the changes not only as attempts at streamlining subordination and the introduction of simplified rules of governance but as a potential way for the restoration of an autocratic regime. However, the assessments are most relevant to the reality if taken in all their complexities, and the reforms should be judged as only systemic. That is why the introduction of the municipal reform and reform of the judicial system were seen as essential elements of the wide-ranging reforms programme, as well as an alternative balance to the centre-driven tendencies so popular in the country. This period has received the name of ‘managed democracy’.121 Professor Stephen White touched on a very important factor in the assessments of the sustainability of the democratic reforms and democratic tradition in Russia. He named it the so-called ‘cultural limits of transition’, suggesting that each state has to find its pace and way to a democratic society. He wrote: Russia was a European power, and a Christian one, but demo cracy had been a product of the West, not of the Eurasian landman… None of this meant that post communist Russia had to be authoritarian… Russians, it had been suggested at the outset of perestroika, would need some time to ‘learn democracy’.122

6 THE LITMUS TEST Civil-military relations The first test for any society in transformation is the state of its civil-military relations.1 There are two groups of questions to be addressed in this respect: is there an institutional mechanism in place that facilitates a meaningful and effective control of civil-military relations, and does the military constituency have the ability to adapt to the changing political and economic environment? The attitudes of the military constituency in Russia towards new presidential policies are becoming increasingly important for a couple of reasons. First, the military and security services’ support is essential for the consistency of policy implementation. Second, they represent the main constituency that gave support to Vladimir Putin during the 2000 presidential elections. It is also the group whose support was important for the presidential team in the 2004 elections. In this respect the analysis of the state of civilmilitary relations is important in tracing long-term trends in foreign and domestic policies, as well as allowing an understanding of the outcome of the 2003 (parliamentary) and 2004 (presidential) elections in Russia. The logic of reforms in the civil-military sphere, as well as the potential results of the political events mentioned, can be best demonstrated by records of the historic transformation of civil-military relations during the 1990s.2 Stages of evolution The introduction of civilian and political control over the military and security services was considered an essential element for the democratisation of Russian society after 1991. Russian scholars make a clear distinction between ‘political’, ‘civilian’ and ‘parliamentary’ control over the military. It is strongly believed that not every country could be ready and prepared to exercise a similar level of control over the military, and that the state of affairs in specific states and societies should be correlated to the respective mechanisms of control. Vladislav Cheban, former military strategist, then special aide to the chairman of the Defence Committee of the State Duma, made a very interesting clarification of the Russian official understanding of civil-military relations. General Cheban (ret.) pointed out that civil control means not civilian (non-military) as such but the state’s control over the military and security services, when the military or personnel from other services are monitoring the activities of the MoD and other services as citizens with a special professional knowledge and understanding of the sensitive


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nature of information and respect for secrecy.3 This interpretation of a‘proper pattern’ for civil-military relations came about as a result of the events Russia has experienced since 1991. One can even mark the stages of civil-military relations, when priority was given to different branches of state power in the field of controlling the military and security services. The period 1991–3 was characterised by the dominance of parliament in civil control over the military. Since 1993 the upper hand has been given to the executive branch. The strengthening of presidential political control was achieved in two phases. Civil control over the military (1991–3): stage I-parliamentary control The first set of laws on civil control over the military was introduced through the RF parliament and was aimed at establishing a balance between the legislative and executive powers in dealing with military-civil issues. On the one hand, the new approach was copying the American experience, on the other, it was demonstrating an attempt to break away from the former traditions of the USSR. In the USSR military-and security-related decisions were taken exclusively by the political bureau of the Communist Party, or personally by the general secretary. The ministries of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as the security services, were practically relieved of any accountability to the government, which was engaged mainly in economic policy implementation. In accordance with the constitution and laws (1991–3) regulating political control over the military and security services in Russia, those functions were divided between the president and the Supreme Soviet (as a legislative body). The law ‘On Security’ (adopted in March 1992) gave considerable priority to the Russian parliament in comparison with other branches of power, especially in defining ‘vitally important objects of security’ and exercising control over personnel and recruitment policy in all institutions responsible for state security and defence. Civil-military relations (1993–9): stage II-political control Developments in Russian domestic politics influenced the evolution of approaches to civil-military relations. The events of 1992–3, such as the crisis of power and direct confrontation between the legislative and executive institutions that led to violence in summer-autumn 1993, drastically changed the situation. Under the new constitution (adopted after the elections of 1993) the priorities shifted to presidential control over the military as an option for avoiding politicising the military and security forces. During this period there were up to twenty laws regulating the relations between the federal authorities and Ministry of Defence, as well as approximately the same amount of regulations covering the monitoring procedures between civil authorities and ‘power’ ministries and services. The most significant ones are the constitution (1993) and the law ‘On Defence’ (1996).4 Vicheslav Nikonov, the head of Foundation ‘Politica’, believed that under the existing conditions ‘in full accordance with the constitution the system of power in Russia is fully subordinated to the president’.5 According to the Russian constitution, the president of the Russian Federation is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (Article 87). All other military and paramilitary

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forces are also under his direct control. Since 1993 this presidential authority has been put within the constitutional framework (Chapter 4, Articles 83, 87, 88). Appointments of highranking officers are within the responsibility of the president alone (Article 83 of the RF constitution, 1993). The president is also responsible for appointments to the Security Council, the status of which is to be determined by federal law, and to the Presidential Administration. The president approves the main defence and security bills, including military doctrine. The state of marshal law and emergency rule could be introduced in the country, as well as in selected regions, by presidential decree. But the regime of marshal law or state of emergency must be approved by the upper house of the parliament (Articles 87 and 88 of the RF constitution, 1993). The list of functions and rights of the president in respect of defence policy and the armed forces was specified in the provisions of the Law ‘On Defence’ (1996). The constitution of 1993 defines the responsibility of the government on defence issues rather vaguely. Article 114 says that the ‘government shall exercise measures aimed at providing the defence of the country, state security, and implementation of foreign policy of the Russian Federation’; neither clarification of the nature of the measures nor their legal standing was given. In the 1990s the government was practically cut off from any dealings with defence issues (with the exemption of technical budgetary ones). However, during the period 1993–9 the focus of activity in civil-military relations was shifting within the executive branch. The state of health of President Yeltsin, as well as a competition of various groupings of oligarchs and power circles in the executive branch regarding military issues, drew the government’s attention to military matters from mid1995. The establishment of the post of a chief military adviser to the head of the government symbolised a shift of practical responsibilities to the government. This shift was within the framework of the constitution (1993). In accordance with Article 91, in case of the inability of the president to perform his duties, the responsibility goes to the head of the government. The Law ‘On Defence’ (1996) specified the goals and functions of the government in this area. They are: the responsibility for the state and maintenance of the armed forces of Russia; preparation and submission to the State Duma of proposals on defence expenditure in the federal budget; and organisation of the procurement of weapons for the armed forces. The government was also responsible for new technology, material and energy resources; organisation and control over practically all kinds of military industry, and preparation of the economy for activity under conditions of war etc.; and control over the export of arms and military technology, strategic materials, technologies and dualpurpose products. The system of executive power bodies in Russia (1995–9) designed to monitor the military and security structure can be characterised by political flexibility and is subject to frequent changes. Since the government functions have been expanded in controlling the military and security services, several competing structures were established within the government and in the Presidential Administration. It was done in accordance with the president’s decision dealing with military and security issues. The idea was to avoid a concentration of influence on the military in the hands of the head of the government. The constitution (1993) and the Law ‘On Defence’ limited the powers of parliament in


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military affairs. Nevertheless, the Russian parliament (both houses—State Duma and Federation Council) was to play a significant role in adopting decisions on the military budget and its key components; on laws concerning issues relating to war and peace, and on legislation on military and armed forces-related problems. The relationship between the legislative and executive branches on the issues related to war and peace was based on the principle of mutual support and acceptance. For instance, in accordance with the constitution, the laws adopted by the State Duma are subject (Article 106) to mandatory consideration in the Federation Council. However, they come into force only after approval by the president. The Federation Council (under Article 102 of the RF constitution, 1993) has to approve presidential decrees on the introduction of a state of war or state of emergency. Presidential decrees on the use of the armed forces of Russia beyond its state borders should receive consent from the Federation Council. According to the Law ‘On Defence’ (Article 18) the Russian parliament is to declare war by the federal law in the event of aggression against the state or CIS countries, and in the event of fulfilling international treaties of the Russian Federation. In other words, the president is to issue an order to the armed forces to conduct a military action if Russia is attacked or if there is a need to fulfil the country’s international obligations under allied treaties. But a state of war, with all its consequences, could be declared only as a federal law, adopted by the State Duma and approved by the Federal Council. Optimisation of the authority of the state: stage III—current state of affairs Changes of the state political leadership in 1999/2000, the military and anti-terrorist campaign in Chechnya, increased possibilities for Russia being engaged in a regional conflict in the CIS (especially in Central Asia due to the invasion of Islamic forces from Afghanistan), as well as the rise in the number of terrorist incidents all around the country, were the background for the events that led to the evolution of political control over the military in Russia. Current developments are characterised by further consolidation of presidential control over the power ministries and all spheres of life dealing with military developments. In reality there were two hierarchies for the management and subordination of the military construction and armed forces—presidential and governmental. They were dealing with three major sets of issues in the field: • command of the armed forces and power ministries; • management of military enterprises; • co-ordination of military-technical co-operation. All these aspects of defence policy are being placed under the supervision of President Putin. According to strategy planners and MoD experts, the unification of command during the period of military transformation was considered an essential precondition of successful military reform policy. The strengthening of presidential authority over the power bloc ministries is achieved through the introduction of changes into the structures of the state and the political system in Russia. The changes affect the expanding powers of the president on the issues that were under

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the jurisdiction of parliament or elected local officials during the last four years of President Yeltsin’s rule. These innovations were aimed at preventing decentralisation of the state and decentralisation of political control over the defence and security sector. On 1 September 2000 the then Minister of Defence Marshal Igor Sergeyev, addressing the military academy of the General Staff, said that ‘structural changes in the political system had become a necessity’.6 In the period 1999–2002 further changes occurred in the configuration of the parliamentary system in the Russian Federation. In the first three months of 2002 there were appointments of deputy speakers and heads of the committees, the establishment of new committees and re-composition of existing committees, plus changes to the overall procedures and regulations of the Federation Council. According to American scholar Stephen Blank, during the time of transition the number of MPs with a professional background in military and security areas increased by 30 per cent in the upper chamber.7 Another important element of the new presidential policies that influenced the system of civil-military relations in the country was the introduction within the executive power of the institution of presidential representatives (envoys) in the territorial-administrative units, in the FDs, established in May 2000. Their monitoring functions and responsibilities in civil-military relations in their federal districts have already been described in detail (see pp. 145–159). The presidential representatives received membership in the Security Council and in a group under Victor Khristenko, the then vice-premier, created for the clarification of ideology, strategy and tactics for the seven presidential envoys in the regions. Their functions include the monitoring of all regional force structures (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Emergency Situations, fire-fighters, tax police, border guards, security services), controlling the financial channels and resources from the centre to the regions—especially financing from the power bloc ministries and providing recommendations to the president on personnel issues and assignments to military posts. The president has an exclusive right to award high military ranks (Article 111.6 of the Regulations of the Plenipotentiary Representatives of the Russian Federation President in the Federal Districts8). The Security Council and General Staff s plan presupposes that during a special period the commanders of the military districts (strategic directions), districts of the interior forces, regional branches of border guards and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, etc. should be subordinated to the presidential plenipotentiaries. Some other presidential decrees made provisions for concentrating the functions of civil and military leadership in the same hands. Thus, in addition to political problems, Russia was also to solve the problems of military disconnection’.9 In 2002, as a result of the increasing wave of terrorist threats, the PEs were given additional responsibility and functions to monitor counter-terrorist operations within their respective districts. However, it would be incorrect not to touch on a very important aspect of the PEs, activities in the sphere of civil-military relations: their ability to influence the decisions related to the sphere of questions discussed in the Russian parliament. Though there are no regulations that allow or prohibit PEs, actually take an active part in the elections of the representatives from the areas of the FD to the RF parliament, in reality such a practice exists. Some PEs have a constant working contact with MPs and are known for engaging them in consultations on a regular basis. For instance, former PE in the North-


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west FD, Cherkesov, had a group gathering of loyal MPs in the Federation Council. Some PEs are engaged in the process of discussions over the nomination of candidates for a position in the upper chamber of the parliament, like PE of the Volga FD Sergei Kirienko. Reintroduction of civil control over the military The changes introduced or planned within the presidential strategy to strengthen his authority over civil-military relations were treated by President Putin and his supporters as a reaction to a major systemic geopolitical challenge and threat to national state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The establishment of strict presidential political control over the military and security establishment is considered to be one of the essential elements of the national response policy. Political impact: why the military constituency matters Any judgement of the role of the military and security services in Russian domestic policy can be made on the analysis of the following three factors: • participation of representatives of the military and security services in parliamentary and governmental structures; • their influence on public opinion and in shaping public views on defence and security issues; • their role in decision-making and possibilities of the use of force in domestic politics. The first element of the policy will be discussed further in the chapter. It presents a complex policy of penetration into the institutions by the military and security services, as well as a demonstration of the basis of support for the elected civil authorities. It also reveals the channels of control over the military and services introduced by the elected democratic authority. Thus, this element of policy does require analysis at length. Involvement of the military and security services in politics Legally keeping the army away from political in-fighting, the legislators left quite a few loopholes in the law, which offers many possibilities for manipulation of the military. But, since there was no unity in the army, different parties and movements were trying to use it their way, and to influence military voters and the outcome of the elections. The flexibility of this legislation, and chaotic developments in the sphere in 1999 and 2000, was replaced by a new system which incorporated servicemen into the state-controlled political system. This tendency has been further strengthened from 2001–3.

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Reliable constituency The military electorate constitutes 5.5 to 18 million votes in Russia. Different figures presented during the parliamentary (1999) and presidential (2000) elections were based on assumptions of what categories of eligible voters could be considered as supportive of the military or affected by the military mentality and have a former or present association with the Ministry of Defence, other power ministries or related institutions. According to the Russian MoD, 5.5 million voters represent the military.10 The number almost doubles if family members are counted. Colonel-General Vasily Volkov, a member of the Central Election Commission in 1999, believes that the figure was 10 million. According to the weekly Independent Military Review (Moscow), the military electorate—voters with a military frame of mind—could number as many as 15 to 25 million. These voters include retired military personnel, police and intelligence service officers and defence industry employees. Considering the fact that there are 60 million eligible voters in the country, the military and security service community could make up to 40 per cent of the entire voting population.11 ‘People linked to the Armed Forces are the driving force in the campaign’, said Colonel Nikolai Shulgin of the Defence Ministry press service. They are the most organised part of the electorate, they actively participate in elections. Whoever wins them over could quite likely win the elections as well’.12 Accordingly, politicians are attracted to the military electorate above all because soldiers and security personnel, and their dependants, represent a considerable portion of the general electorate. They are reliable in turning up at the ballot stations and in most cases are predictably conservative, with deeply shared ‘patriotic’ and nationalistic values. They are also a prime target for political campaigning because members of the armed forces tend to live compactly in military towns, making campaigning cheap and effective. Thus, including servicemen in the party lists has been quite a useful election tactic and policy. In the 1993 elections the Ministry of Defence, having the right to nominate candidates for parliament and other legislative institutions, did not execute its right at all. In 1995 the position changed drastically. The Ministry nominated 123 candidates from its ranks, including 23 generals, to take part in the majority voting system districts. Only two from this nominated list won seats in the State Duma. In the 1996 parliamentary elections 20 military representatives won seats in the State Duma; eight of them were not supported by the Ministry and ran in the parliamentary elections within the party lists system. Thus, the first organised attempt to create a ‘strong military-democratic caucus’ in parliament failed. In the 1999 parliamentary elections the MoD promoted candidates who constituted only 4–5 per cent to 15 per cent of candidates running for parliament nation-wide. Military candidates mostly represented military educational institutions, military mobilisation centres and enterprises of the Defence Industrial Complex, rather than combat units. Candidates on the MoD list were four times less numerous than in the 1995 elections. However, the number of representatives of other power structures increased, including the Ministry of Interior, Federal Security Service, State Customs Committee, Federal Tax Police Service, Ministry of Emergency Situations, etc. Candidates were not


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compromised by any scandals and won the elections quietly, without any undesirable publicity. On the whole, 80 servicemen took part in the 1999 parliamentary elections, and nearly all of them were generals. The Spiritual Heritage, a patriotic political organisation, recruited 40 generals and 2,000 officers in reserve and retired, who acted on behalf of this public organisation. Twenty-two generals and high-ranking officers were in the central committee of the institution. Ten members of law enforcement structures were in the election party lists. The Movement in Support of the Army, the bloc ‘Communists and Working People of Russia for the Soviet Union’ and the Party of Peace and Unity had six such candidates each. There were five candidates in the uniforms of the OVR (PrimakovLuzhkov alliance), the Conservative Party, and other election blocs and parties. The aforementioned figures relate only to active generals, officers and army personnel.13 Candidates linked to the armed forces and security services made some party lists more appealing to the voters. One needs only to look at Yabloko’s No. 2, General Sergei Stepashin—or Unity (Yedinstvo’s) leader Sergei Shoigu, who holds the rank of ColonelGeneral. Boris Gromov, commander of the 40th Army (which fought in Afghanistan), adorned the slate of the Fatherland-All Russia bloc, and former Defence Minister Igor Rodionov decorated the list of the Communist Party. Several senior officers, including Colonel-General Vorobyev and retired Colonel Yushenkov, joined the ranks of the liberals. The military bloc deputies (on active duty and retired) won 36 seats and constitute 8 per cent of the MPs in the State Duma III. This tendency continued during the party registration process in the wake of the parliamentary elections of 2003. The main party blocs and newly established ones were putting the names of well-known military and security personalities on the ballot lists. For instance, the new pro-Kremlin People’s Party included on its list the name of Colonel-General Troshev, known for his participation in the Chechen campaign.14 When patriotic feelings are on the rise the names of military and security representatives become essential commodities for parties in the election race. An interesting phenomenon has been detected in the election preferences of the servicemen. In the 1990s military and security personnel increasingly voted for candidates from the forces and services. During a ten-year period support for civilians dropped by 67 per cent.15 Throughout the 1990s the percentage of military votes for ‘military candidates’ promoted by the MoD increased, with a reduction of support for other parties and alternatives to the MoD military movements. The Movement in Support of the Army, created by the late General Rokhlin and known for its opposition to the MoD, experienced an exceptional setback, receiving less than 1 per cent of the vote during the 1999 elections. The support for the right Yabloko Party has fallen by 80–84 per cent within the military since 1995. The Communist Party lost 2–4 per cent of the military vote in comparison with the 1995 elections. The Liberal Democratic Party (led by Zhirinovsky) also experienced significant reductions in support. The Kremlin party Unity, on the other hand, received majority support among the military. Nation-wide it received twice as many military voters than civilians.16 This tendency continued during the parliamentary election campaign of 2003, when military voters demonstrated support for the party that was representing the government and patriotically oriented forces. As in previous elections, over 50 per cent of the military votes were given to the United Russia Party, with an equal number of supporters (12 and

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11 per cent respectively) registering for the Motherland and LDPR (Zhirinovsky). The liberal-oriented parties Yabloko and the Union of the Right Forces received less than 1 per cent each.17 The same tendency was even more obvious in the presidential campaigns. During the first presidential election campaign (1991) two-thirds of the military gave their support to Boris Yeltsin, some military divisions voting with a 90 per cent majority for the candidate. Dissatisfaction with the official policy and developments in the areas of military reform split the military constituency. During the 1996 presidential elections President Yeltsin received only 25 per cent of the votes.18 In the first round of the elections 58 per cent of the servicemen gave their votes to General Alexander Lebed’. In the second round, when President Yeltsin included General Lebed’ in his team in order to absorb the military votes received by the general in the previous round, the military and the servicemen gave 50 per cent of their vote to Genadii Zuganov, the candidate of the Communist Party. The military were very active during the 2000 presidential elections. According to official data over 97 per cent of Russia’s 1.2 million troops went to the ballot boxes. In Chechnya the ballot boxes were brought to them. The following examples show the percentages of servicemen voting: • 83 per cent in Kamchatka; • 78 per cent in Sakhalin; • 84 per cent in the Kuriles; • 91 per cent of the Pacific Fleet; • 98 per cent in Chechnya.19 According to Major-General Nikolai Burbuga, director of the Ministry of Defence’s education department, the majority of the military personnel participating in the elections overwhelmingly voted for Vladimir Putin.20 In the so-called closed ballot boxes in the military and navy installations over 80 per cent of servicemen supported Putin. This is 30–50 per cent higher than the support for Putin, on average, in the country as a whole. Even simple arithmetic showed that the military votes had secured Putin’s victory in 2000. Since President Putin took office the activity of former military and security personnel has been higher than during the final years of the Soviet Union. Former military people occupied 11 per cent of all new leading posts in the regional authorities. Nevertheless, it is important to see the results in proportion to representation in other categories. The professional background of the new generation of regional leaders is as follows: 60 per cent of the regional leaders of 2002/3 served in previous posts within the former Communist Party and Komsomol (Young Communist League), or were civil servants, and 12 per cent came to politics from industry.21 A comparison of all categories of highflyers in the regional legislative and executive bodies shows that the participation of former servicemen or others could not and should not be seen as alarming. Nevertheless, the results demonstrated a major increase in the political activity of the military-security community. These results demonstrated the effect of the aggressive election operation, which saw the country’s armed forces and other security services actively courted during the


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campaign period. The election results proved that the military still see themselves as a closed organisation with a corporate system of relations and interests. Potentially the armed forces can become both a relatively independent object of political struggle and its subject. However, new procedures for the nomination of candidates for the role of regional representatives in the reformed Federation Council in 2002/3 demonstrated a new tendency when former military and security officers were supported by the non-military constituency, more precisely by powerful economic groups and companies as well as directly by the Presidential Administration. Elections laws and the military The existing electoral regulations provide wide opportunities to influence the military electorate within its professional environment more than any other body of voters. On the one hand, the Russian constitution states that every citizen has the right to stand for election. On the other hand, the law on the armed forces states that active military personnel may participate only in non-political associations and organisations. There are no regulations forbidding or restricting active military personnel to stand for election. All attempts to introduce amendments to the constitution to ban military personnel on active duty from standing in elections failed, according to LieutenantColonel Alexander Stukalov, a spokesman for the main military prosecutor’s office. On the contrary, the recent tendency has been to stimulate active military personnel to try to enrol them into politics without formally breaking ties with the ‘professional club’. The Presidential Decree No. 535 (of 30 May 1997) ‘On Securing the Election Rights of the Servicemen Belonging to the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Federal Tax Police Service and General Prosecution Office of the Russian Federation’ established a legal framework for a ‘professional’ lobby in the legislative institutions. This decree allowed: • servicemen applying for the election to be considered on leave from the service from the day of official registration of their candidacy for the elections; • servicemen elected to be considered temporally out of the service for the period of their work in the legislative institutions. Their personal files were to be kept at the personnel/recruitment offices of the respective ministries. Elected servicemen could also resign in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Law. Such an approach unavoidably stimulated the MPs with a military or relevant background to be sensitive to the interests of their ministries during their term in the legislative office. Each of them had the right of returning to their former place of work after the end of the elected term. It is obvious under such a set up that their ‘return’ would very much depend on their record as a deputy. The elected military are still kept in reserve; they are not asked to retire from the service, only receiving the status of being on leave. Thus, all this was creating even more direct linkage to the official military structures. Public admission of the linkage was made after the 1999 parliamentary election. The Ministry of Defence officially announced that the members of parliament who were officers in the reserve were to be given a higher rank. Thus, in April 2000 about one-third of the MPs were

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promoted: 153 deputies of the State Duma received new higher ranks.22 This tendency contradicts Western traditions of the military in politics. At the same time, military personnel in Russia are less susceptible to standard election propaganda than other voters, because by law political campaigning on the territory of military bases and garrisons among soldiers and officers on active duty is forbidden. Thus, they are more influenced by their commanders. The armed forces’ candidates also include commanding officers and members of the military faculty—people with the most scope for influencing their troops. The election laws do not ban these candidates from speaking before their troops and colleagues. The problem was acknowledged by both military authorities and the Defence and Military Prosecutor’s Office officials. On 20 November 1999 both parties met with Central Elections Commission (CEC) representatives to examine abuses and breaches of the law ‘On Political Campaigning and the Armed Forces’. First Deputy Defence Minister Nikolai Mikhailov cited several examples of what he called ‘minor violations’— cases when commanding officers allowed campaigning to go on among their troops. But the Ministry of Defence itself came under fire from the media after distributing campaign material to commanding officers in support of the Unity bloc—considered to represent the Kremlin and government interests in the forthcoming elections. Thus, opportunities to influence the military constituency are opening up, with the military candidates themselves waging campaigns among their colleagues. It is not difficult to imagine that those in active service have to have the support of their senior officers. ‘This contradiction in the law brings no good’, said admiral in reserve Valery Aleksin. ‘I think it’s time to amend the constitution to ban military personnel in active service from standing in elections’, said Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Stukalov, a spokesman for the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office. He continued: ‘But unfortunately, this is unlikely in the near future; the public is not yet fully aware of the inherent dangers of politicians playing with the army and other security forces’.23 The Russian Independent Research Centre ROMIR held an opinion poll on public attitudes regarding the security provided by the authorities. Only 5.6 per cent of the participants were absolutely confident that the police and security bodies would defend them and their interests. Of those polled, 14.9 per cent were sure that they would not be defended in time by the police authorities; 13.1 per cent were undecided. With regard to the police, 31.2 per cent were not sure about their effectiveness, while 31.4 per cent were absolutely unsure about it.24 Thus, from a number of polls, it becomes clear that the public is not sure about the authorities’ power to provide security. On the other hand, as an institution the military managed to preserve public respect. The 1999 and 2000 public opinion surveys demonstrated a significant increase in the respect and trust of the population towards the army and security services. According to a poll by ROMIR, 52 per cent of respondents said that they trust the military and FSB, with a further 20 per cent saying that they ‘totally trust’ them. In comparison the level of trust of other institutions was much lower. For instance, the public expressed less trust in executive power (30 per cent trust level and 4 per cent total trust), legislative power (17 per cent trusted the State Duma and 20 per cent the Federation Council), the Church (8 per cent expressed trust and 19 per cent total trust),


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police (24 per cent trusted and 4 per cent expressed total trust).25 Even if one could question the results of the polling, the very fact of its publication should be considered exceptionally symptomatic and important. It shows the main tendencies in public developments in the country. In 2002 the Russian public, while rating the services on the basis of their effectiveness in dealing with criminal and illegal activity, demonstrated the same tendency. The most trust was expressed in the FSB (40 per cent), followed by the MoI (24 per cent), the border troops service (23 per cent) and the tax police (22 per cent).26 Other channels were also used by the ‘power/force structures’ in order to increase their influence in society. The introduction of former military to the executive and legislative positions, as well as to high posts in business and media, became more frequent. In 1992/3 officers of the Military Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence Service, as well as the Federal Security Service, were officially assigned to high positions in the government and in commercial structures. This drive resulted in the fact that major contenders for the governmental posts in 1999/2000 were members of the security community. In early 2000 military officers from other power structures were also appointed to high-ranking posts. Some have received important promotions. Chief of the General Staff, army general Anatoliy Kvashnin, was appointed to the Security Council by presidential decree. Thus two representatives of the armed forces (Minister of Defence and Chief of General Staff) were members of the Security Council.27 This is evidence of the preservation of the former Soviet practices of sending the military to civil political ministries and departments, including the Presidential Administration and Security Council. The personnel reshuffles in the power ministries helped to stabilise the position of the Putin administration and to neutralise the influence of the ex-president’s ‘family circle’, as well as creating the necessary conditions to reopen opportunities for the military reform. The personnel changes introduced in the ‘power bloc’ ministries had a profound political and structural effect on the overall strategy of reforms. By shifting personnel policy and appointing new people to key positions in the security and defence institutions President Putin broke the influence of previous professional or so-called ‘family’ clans. The opposition to the mil-itary and security sector reform within the ministries was diminished. In a sense, according to the study done by a very influential group of scholars, the Russian president achieved the same effect in defence and security reform as he had achieved a year prior to that in transforming the territorial-administrative system of the state and in the relations between the federal centre and the regions. Similar to the actions in the administrative reform, the autonomous centres of influence were liquidated and the whole system was transformed in accordance with the principle of ‘political monocentrism’. The executive power became more politically homogeneous and more ‘transparent’ for the Kremlin initiatives. Inside the ‘monocentric political system’ a new internal core appeared; the new centre of gravity was within the strategically important ‘power bloc’ and was subordinated to the president. Thus, the growing influence of the military on the decision-making process in the sphere of security and defence was becoming unavoidable. News agency RIA-Novosti reported the results of the all-Russian opinion poll that was held in 40 regions of the Russian Federation in May 2000. The Russians were asked for their opinion concerning the appearance of a great number of military officers and

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representatives of the Federal Security Service in the power structures. According to the poll, 38 per cent of respondents think that the new situation will lead to the reestablishment of order without diminishing democracy, while 23 per cent think that it will lead to the militarisation of power in the society, and, as a result, the cutting down of democratic norms; 23 per cent of respondents think that the appearance of the military in power structures will not change anything; 16 per cent of citizens found it difficult to answer this question.28 Public opinion polls in 2002 confirmed the tendency of the increasing influence of security services and the military on policy decisions during Putin’s presidency. This position was supported by 38 per cent of those polled, 10 per cent disagreed, and 49 per cent believed that it stayed the same. The majority believes that such tendency has some good and some bad elements (49 per cent), 24 per cent strongly support these developments, and 12 per cent express concern.29 Social security and economic factors Despite the evidence of the increasing role of the military in Russia, economic data proves that servicemen were less secure and paid less than, let’s say, qualified workers. The existing problems—for example, lack of housing, accumulated financial insecurity, an inability to adjust to civilian life—are creating conditions for special concern for the state regarding the military during the period of social transformation in Russia and the implementation of military reform. The results of the poll on the self-security assessment of the military, conducted by the Russian Ministry of Defence in 2000, demonstrated that the majority of servicemen felt an absolute lack of social security.30 The newspaper Trud published a survey demonstrating this fact by the difference in salary scales and relations to the minimum wage level. In a decade the economic security of a family of servicemen (consisting of four peopie) had dropped by 30–70 per cent from the minimal cost of living (prozitochnyi minimum). For comparison, the minimal monthly cost of living in Russia was 2,274 roubles (as of August 2000), while the standard monthly wage of a lieutenant was 1,354 roubles and that of a commander of battalion (in the rank of colonel) 2,135 roubles. The monthly wage of a qualified worker in Moscow (as of August 2000) was 4,000 roubles.31 More than 50 per cent of junior officers were so lowly paid that they could not afford to be married.32 According to the opinion survey of the moral and psychological state of the servicemen published by the weekly Independent Military Review (Moscow), more than 77 per cent expressed dissatisfaction over such issues as salaries, social benefits, housing and the absence of trade union support for the rank and file.33 About 80 per cent of the money transferred to military accounts in 2000 was spent on social needs. Almost one-third of this sum was spent on the troops in the North Caucasus. Nevertheless the funds transferred were not enough to pay the previous year’s debt to the military, or pay regular salaries. For instance, the Baltic Fleet had not been paid for three months prior to the tragedy with the submarine Kursk. However, some other factors, besides those mentioned above, influenced the financial condition of the servicemen and their morale. First of all, one should mention the changes introduced in the payments for the group of federal forces in the North Caucasus. Their


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financial subsidies were substantially reduced from 31 May 2000, when a new accounting system for salaries was introduced. The servicemen were to receive the socalled ‘war money’ only for actual participation in anti-terrorist operations (meaning combat deployment). The rest are to receive the so-called ‘field money’—only twice as much as their regular pay. The economic situation of the military personnel was aggravated with the adoption of a new tax system. On 7 June 2000 the State Duma supported the governmental proposal regarding implementation of the flat tax rate of 13 per cent on incomes of all private citizens, including servicemen. In accordance with the new tax system the military are to pay income tax from now on. As a result, the budget will be boosted by up to 4 billion roubles. The introduction of new amendments to the ‘Law on the Status of Military Personnel’, when the linkage between military salary and minimal wages was taken out, has also saved the state 26 billion roubles on the military.34 New governmental initiatives regarding the military, such as the cancellation of benefits in payments for public transportation, for public utilities (including housing) and so on, are still in the pipeline. The monetary compensations were promised by Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin because of the introduction of new taxation and the abolishment of benefits.35 The government made appropriate economic and financial estimations. The governmental decree (No. 524) established new servicemen’s payments, regulation procedures for payments to family members of those taken hostage, detained during combat, or missing in action.36 As a reaction to the Kursk tragedy President Putin promised to increase salaries of military personnel by 20 per cent. However, the increase would only balance out the reductions introduced by the new accounting system and the abolition of the previously used benefits programme for the servicemen (Articles 1.3 and 12 of the decree). In accordance with the government’s proposal, military service was considered to be a type of civil service; so personnel serving by contract in the military and security services were qualified as civil servants and shared the same social benefits. In 2002 these developments were included in the law ‘On Status of and Guaranties as State Civil Service Employees of the Federal Institutions and Ministries’.37 However, as it was stated at that time by Major-General Vladimir Potapov, deputy secretary of the Security Council, in reality the benefits of these changes would be realised no sooner than 1 January 2003. The new civil service law of 2003 confirmed the position described above, as the military received the same status as civil servants. The Presidential Administration and Security Council closely monitored the issues related to the social security of servicemen. In May 2001 the RF Security Council took a lead in addressing the problem and coordinated a meeting ‘On the State of Affairs and Perspectives in Addressing Social Security Problems of Servicemen and Persons of Adequate Status, Citizens who retired from the Military Service and Members of their Families’. As the result of the initiated discussions two decrees and a set of other documents expressing the options on solving the debated issues were presented to the president and the government. Consequently the salary rates for military personnel and persons of similar status were increased by up to double from 1 July 2002.38 At a reception for graduates of higher military academies, President Vladimir Putin confirmed that he was personally supervising the reform of Russia’s military and that he was committed to turning the Russian armed forces into a professional force by 2010.39

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In this connection, sorting out the socio-economic issues is becoming the first priority goal for the successful implementation of all plans for military reform. In one of his interviews the secretary of the RF Security Council pointed out that the Presidential Administration was monitoring the developments in 2000/1 very closely. During that time there were four special sessions of the Security Council under President Putin’s chairmanship and one meeting of the members of the Security Council, where the issues concerning the armed forces and other services, as well as their social security, were discussed and decisions taken.40 The pay of military personnel has increased by about 50 per cent since July 2002 and pensions by 80–90 per cent since the beginning of 2002, although some of this increase has been eaten up by inflation.41 Housing problems of servicemen represent another factor of concern. The housing shortage will not be overcome before the period 2012–15.42 According to the statistics presented in the federal programme ‘State Housing Certificate’, 210,000 families of servicemen and retired officers need housing, and two-thirds of them are in the armed forces. In order to solve the problem, each year 42,000 families of officers on duty and retired should receive housing. However, the government has failed to meet this requirement. In 1998 more than 26,000 officers and non-commissioned officers expressed their interest in buying flats using state housing certificates. The Ministry of Finance issued the necessary documents for 10,200 servicemen. However, only 4,800 of them actually received flats. In 1999 18,400 state housing certificates were issued. In 2000 the federal government planned to issue around 25,000 certificates for retired officers of all force structures, such as the MoD, Ministry of Interior, the security services and Ministry of Justice. Nevertheless, this is less than a half of the certificates needed annually. The certificates do not automatically provide officers with 100 per cent opportunity of buying housing. A certificate covers only up to 20–40 per cent of the housing costs, depending on the regional market price for real estate. The officers usually have difficulties in covering the difference, taking into account their low salaries and unpaid wages. Despite the fact that these problems are still very acute, some issues have been sorted out. For instance, in 1998/9 housing certificates were not covered by real financial support from the state. The construction companies were not accepting them as payment because the terms and conditions for repayment from the government were not legally specified and were not secure. In 2002, according to former commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Popov, the situation changed completely. The construction firms gladly accepted the certificates because the housing bonds were guaranteed by the state and had real money behind them, ready to be collected by the firms.43 According to the plans of the Ministry of Defence housing programme, 23,000 servicemen were given accommodation; 9,000 of these had retired. In 2004 an additional 30,000 are to leave the service; they too are promised to be provided with accommodation options in due course. The Ministry of Defence of the RF finally took a decision to establish a formal housing pool for the military and to introduce a special system of payments to an individual housing account for each serviceman from the first day of his/her service. The funds are to finance private housing accommodation of the personnel. In 2000 the Ministry of Labour and Social Development made an analysis of the employment possibilities for retired military personnel. The survey was conducted among


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928 officers in reserve, living in the following regions: Voronezh, Kursk, Moscow, Rostov, Samara and Tumen’ oblast. The polling showed that poor starting potential and non-competitiveness on the labour market of retired officers led to their diminishing social status and a reduction of economic well-being. This affected self-esteem and influenced the rise of critical attitudes among retired personnel and their families. A special state of despair was spread among the personnel from the former military installation sites, which after their closure as part of the reductions in the military were not put under local, municipal or regional governance. As a result of such negligence the supporting infrastructure (water, electricity and gas supplies) of such sites deteriorated. Trade, educational and medical facilities were closing down as well. According to the data of the Ministry of Labour and Social Development these events affected up to 35,000 families44 in 1,200 ghost towns.45 According to the Institute of Employment of the Russian Academy of Sciences, over 70 per cent of retired officers have a problem in finding a civilian job after leaving the forces. Twenty-six per cent of the polled respondents admitted that they received employment from representatives of criminal structures.46 The internationally funded resettlement programmes help to fill the gap and do the job that the MoD had been previously reluctant to do. Until 2000 there had been no coordinated and synchronised policy for dealing with retraining issues. The military social councils functioned at the federal and local level. Different retraining programmes received support and were monitored through either the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Labour. However, until recently there had been no unified federal programme on retraining. The only body of co-ordination was the Co-ordinating Council on Servicemen established under the RF government. The new tendency is to place all existing retraining programmes within one framework. On 9 May 2000 the Minister of Defence signed a document authorising the structure set out by the Co-ordinating Council. This scheme presupposes the establishment of the All-Russian Centre of social adaptation for servicemen. This structure is planned to be linked with similar affiliates in all services, military district HQs, installation sites, army and garrison HQs, and at the consulting centres in the units.47 The structure is to monitor all existing programmes and to function on non-budgetary funds from the targeted federal, regional and international projects.48 Overall mood in the forces and among the retired officers was very low: 71 per cent of those polled critically assessed the developments of the previous decade, 39 per cent were experiencing anger and stress, and 22 per cent were ready to participate in an action of protest.49 In order to deal with this state of morale in the military, the main directorate of education and training (vospitatelnoy raboty) of the Ministry of Defence implemented a series of measures aimed at boosting morale and psychological atmosphere and strengthening discipline in the armed forces. A complex federal programme designed to intensify education and training and to raise the social status of servicemen by enhancing the prestige of the military service and developing military culture (2002–5), was worked out by 1 May 2001. The federal executive institutions were ordered to build a system of operational information for the military at the places of permanent deployment of troops and at the places of their combat performances. This system, based on modern

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informational technologies with the use of federal executive institution resources, was to be operational by 2003. In 2005 a unified system of education and training, and social and informational support for the armed forces and other power branches, should be completed. It is planned to be formed under the co-ordination of the Ministry of Defence. The only foreseeable obstacle in the way of implementation of the programme could be the issue of adequate financing.50 Meanwhile, on 20 May 2000 the MoD press service was transferred under the subordination of the head of the main directorate of education and training. Besides the above-mentioned medium-term goals, this decision was aimed to create a positive public image of the armed forces.51 Recent developments in the social sphere of the military could be characterised by the government’s attempts to introduce unified systems of monitoring the socially oriented programmes, and educational and PR campaigns. On the other hand, abolishing the system of benefits and bringing the military within the category of federal civil employees demonstrates the interest of the authorities in bringing the military and security services within the state civilian social programmes, thus eroding the ‘exclusiveness of the military club’. As former commander of the Northern Fleet Admiral Popov stated, ‘one of the important elements of the introduction of proper civil-military relations is the restoration of servicemen’s trust in the state’.52 Public influence Public opinion in Russia is generally influenced by the military mentality. It is especially evident in the changes of attitudes towards the increasing support of military spending, or the use of force and preventive diplomacy measures. According to some polls, up to 90 per cent of Russian citizens do not consider themselves safe. Less than one-third (steadily produced results in the period 1997–9) believe that the army is incapable of securing their interests or defending them. An increasing number of Russians tend to support the notion that military might is an essential element of any major power. In November 1998 this opinion was shared by 76 per cent of those polled, and in May 1999 by 86 per cent.53 The available Russian statistics show steady public support for the increase in military spending: up to 55 per cent in July 1999.54 Another poll showed public attitudes on the issues of use of force and other force methods in politics. Forty-three per cent of the respondents approved preventive strikes against the Chechen bases on the Afghan territory (as they were named in the poll), with only 37 per cent being disapproving of such actions. A proposal to bomb a foreign territory was mainly supported by the male population; disapproval was mostly expressed by people with higher education, Muscovites and those living in St Petersburg.55 Ultimate cause: the use of force The first set of rules addressing the relationship between military and civil institutions in post-Soviet Russia were adopted in 1991/2. They were the laws ‘On Security’ (5 May 1992) and ‘On the State of Emergency’ (17 May 1991). Both were crucial in establishing


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a mechanism for monitoring the use of force by the military. Both laws became obsolete after the adoption of the new constitution (1993). The military was reluctant to give consent for the use of the armed forces in domestic political events. A proposal to extend the functions of the military to policing was widely rejected within the military community. However, some developments in the country, such as the rise of terrorist activity and separatist tendencies along the border periphery, as well as the evolution of military strategy, incorporation of the CJTF units as elements of operational and strategic planning, led even traditionalists within the armed forces towards accepting new military roles. The National Security Concept (2000) and Military Doctrine (2000) expanded the use of force domestically by the military and security services, and included the task of using force against terrorist and separatist actions as an obligation in defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Detailed justification for the use of force internally is given in the Military Doctrine (Chapter I, Articles 6 and 10; Chapter II, Articles 17 and 18). Complete legitimisation of the use of force within the country requires, however, clarification of the relationship between military and civil authorities in a place of conflict, the use of mass media and the rights of citizens and servicemen. Until the end of 2002 the applied legislation on emergency rule dated back to the RSFSR of the USSR (N01253–1 of 17 May 1991). According to that document, local or regional emergency ruling could be adopted by an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation with the consent of the presidium of the Russian Federation, or vice versa by the presidium of the RF but by consent of a local republic. In line with the present constitution, the president can declare a state of emergency by decree—stating the timeframe, place and reasons. He must then inform the parliament and confirm the decree by a simple majority in the Federation Council, the upper chamber, which is comprised of regional leaders. The upper chamber approves the emergency rule with measures ranging from simply tightening security in trouble spots to such actions as censorship, curfews and summary arrests and evacuations. The existing legislation creates loopholes that allow using the armed forces without proper approval procedures. Several problems emerge here. One of the important issues concerns the initial use of force. This situation leads to numerous problems, including leaving the armed forces without proper legal back-up. This in turn means that the military or other services acting out of the legal framework have to face the consequences. Doubts about their mission and functions have led to the absence of legal and formal justification for the servicemen to receive the status of veterans, which is connected with benefits in the medical treatment of the wounded, pension benefits for the servicemen and financial support for family members in case of death in conflict. Thus, the servicemen are becoming legally abused because of a political decision to bypass the proper legal channels. This practice also creates possibilities to put the blame for the use of force on the military and treat it as a breach of the constitution in accordance with the RF criminal law. For instance, General Anatoly Kulikov, formerly the commander of the joint group of forces in Chechnya (1994–6) and former head of the Ministry of Interior, assessing the situation, mentioned that the military were acting without legal back-up and could be prosecuted under Russian criminal law as violators of the state constitution.56 As a result

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the military were urging the parliamentarians and political authorities to overcome such double standards by adopting legislation that would remove this legal vacuum. Special requests were for a bill ‘On the Status of Servicemen’ to cover their status in hot spots and combat situations, and one ‘On Military Rule’, as well as amendments to the federal law ‘On Emergency Rule’. For instance, with the expanding campaign in Chechnya in 1999 the military urged the deputies to address the military package as soon as possible.57 The heavily debated ‘grey areas’ in the drafts of the above-mentioned laws were concerned with issues in the border conflict areas, the role of local civil authorities and the technicalities of their co-ordination with the military in the regions under the emergency rule. The debates demonstrated the interests and intention of both parties (authorities and the military) to define properly the regional and local state of emergency, thus leaving some space for the civilian institutions. The analysis of events during the period 1991–2000 shows that the use of force in domestic situations was and could be in the future initiated by political democratically elected authorities. However, sometimes the decisions were made outside proper legal procedures in the absence of harmonised legislation. Thus preservation of the procedures in the decision-making process, with the adoption of complex legislation and systematic feed-back information on the effectiveness of political and civil control, became essential during a new stage of implementation of civil control over the military and security services. Playing a role in defence policy The role of the military lobby in parliament was demonstrated in the debates over amendments and amplifications to the law ‘On Military Obligation and Military Service’, adopted in 1993 and amended in July 1995 with the full requirements of the Ministry of Defence. For instance, mandatory basic military training was introduced in secondary educational institutions and most deferments from conscription were cancelled. It was allowed to draft students, as soldiers and sergeants, from universities having military departments. Previously they had a right to graduate without interruption and be drafted only as junior officers. Another example is the law ‘On Military Service’, that increased the term of military service from a year and a half to two years. The military lobby heavily influenced parliamentary decisions on military operations in Chechnya, the Russian position regarding Kosovo, the military presence in the CIS, and in arms control debates. The military are using their influence quite successfully in order to modify the views of the deputies. Boris Pastukhov, chairman of the committee on the CIS and relations with the compatriots, appealed to the government and parliament to reconsider the decisions of the Istanbul OSCE Summit on the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transdniestria after having meetings with the officers in the limited group of forces there. The military personnel reviled the plan and insisted that due to technical limitations the withdrawal of Russian troops and redeployment of equipment would not be possible by the year 2003, which was the deadline set in accordance with the decision of the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul.58 It sees that assessments produced by military and security experts were realistic, as the logic of their arguments was


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understood at the highest levels in the Kremlin. In October 2003 there was a leak to the media about the position taken by the Presidential Administration on the issue. That led to an official letter sent by Vladimir Putin to his counterpart in Moldova.59 Military experts successfully introduced into political thinking firm links between geopolitical and geoeconomic considerations and military capabilities. Thus, Russia officially entered into the period of a policy of direct overlap between economic and military interests. There is a distinct correlation between economic power and flexibility in the world markets and military capabilities to defend those interests. At the same time economic and geoeconomic considerations are increasingly used in estimation plans for military restructuring and modernisation, as well as in the matters of determining the structures of military forces and priority planning among the services. For instance, expectations of the economic profitability and political importance of the pipeline project ‘Blue Stream’ to Turkey was one of the main driving forces for the increased focus on the modernisation of the navy in the military construction plans. This tendency was revealed during a November 1999 meeting of the Russian Security Council, where a decision on new missions of the navy was formulated.60 Another area of traditionally strong military and security services presence lies in determining the priorities of the military-technical policies and arms sales. A military state order and the restructuring of the MIC, as well as planning foreign arms sales, were linked in a comprehensive programme of short-term and long-term development of arms and ammunition for the period 2001–10, and within the concept of the development of arms until 2015.61 Despite the fact that there are several laws already functioning monitoring defence issues (like the laws ‘On Defence’, ‘On Military Duties and Military Service’, ‘On the Status of Servicemen’, ‘On Military Technical Co-operation of the Russian Federation with Foreign States’), there is no unified and harmonised system of legislative support of military reform. This is still to be established. In order to do so several bills and new amendments to the existing laws should be approved, introducing changes not only to the defence legislation but also to other bills and laws covering funding issues, taxation, and administrative criminal procedures that indirectly influence the state of defence.62 The Committee on Defence, State Duma, was most interested in adopting bills on marshal law, emergency rule and alternative military service. Terrorist attacks in Southern Russia, and especially the events in Moscow in October 2002, intensified the need for preparing laws that regulate the activity of the military and security services and give ultimate power to the President in using the forces in counterterrorist operations. After the events of 2002 the executive branch intensified its radical reform of the security, law enforcement and counter-terrorist organisations and continued the construction of the new security and counter-terrorist institution solely responsible for monitoring internal security within the state. Visibility in foreign policy Traditionally the military in Russia were not directly involved in the policy-making decisions concerning international relations. During Soviet times the opinion of the

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military in that area was usually presented to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, mainly through Ministry of Foreign Affairs channels. In cases when institutional differences between the approaches of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were great, both could submit their proposals separately to the highest state authority—the Politburo and its departments that were dealing with foreign relations and defence issues. In modern Russia (1991–2002) the role of the military in foreign policy decision-making definitely increased. It could be easily demonstrated in the events dealing with Kosovo, in the changes of attitudes towards redefinition of the arms control agreements and assessment of the overall approach towards foreign policy. Foreign and defence policies were increasingly influenced by the estimations provided by military analysts and defence considerations. This tendency could be seen: • in the formulation of the main areas of potential activity for Russia in the mid-term future on the basis of an analysis of potential threats (such as border conflicts, disputed territories) and opportunities (arms sales markets);63 • in conceptual approaches to nuclear policy and the adoption of the extended nuclear deterrence; • in preparing a policy basis for Russian participation in the anti-ballistic missile modernisation and redefinition of the arms control regimes. According to the strategic analyses that are currently popular in Russia, as described in the first chapter of this book, the twenty-first century is seen as the century of global economy, which will bring about the geoeconomic interdependence of states and create interstate, continental and transcontinental markets. Therefore for Russia to become part of the Trans-Eurasian ‘bridge of stability’, that would anchor the state to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, is considered to be one of the most vital conditions for economic prosperity and for the survival of Russia in the twenty-first century. Seeing Russia’s role as a bridge-state between the world’s economic markets set the vision of military planners as to the future defence and security posture required for the state. The CIS states have always been considered to be a sensitive area for Russian security. In the years 1999 and 2000 the intensified activity of Russia in the CIS region (bilateral agreements on the air defence system, military technical agreements, etc.) was registered. At the same time it might appear that a partial withdrawal of RF forces from the Eurasian region, as was announced regarding the 201 Division stationed in Tajikistan, could be viewed as the signal of a limited Russian presence. This would be wrong. Partial withdrawal was based on the assumption that it could limit Russian expenses with regard to supporting the forces stationed abroad. But signed agreements on the basing rights legalised the Russian military presence (forward deployment type). This approach actually increased the flexibility of Russian responses in the region. The events of summer 1999 and 2001, and the increased Islamic influence in the region, proved to Russia that the states of the region would need outside assistance (and not necessarily exclusively Russian). So, in fact, the policies in the CIS are characterised by their greater flexibility rather than weakness. After forces of the international coalition were deployed in Central Asia as part of the joint campaign against terrorism in support of the deployment in Afghanistan, Russian military and security personnel intensified the


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campaign against the possibility of similar unlimited deployment of international nonRussian forces/anti-terrorist units. in the Southern Caucasus. The representatives of the RF MoD and Security Council were trying to increase the number of servicemen in the Russian contingent deployed in Tajikistan to the previous level. On 9 October 2003 at the informal meeting of the NATO ministers of defence, Colorado Springs, USA, Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov, who was invited for several sessions, clarified once again the Russian position on the ‘foreign deployment’ in Central Russia and Russia’s presence there. He repeated that Russia agreed to the deployment, not on indefinite terms but as part of the duration of the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan. The minister said that Russian forces had left their bases in Cuba and Vietnam, but were not leaving the CIS space, and that Russia would act in its national interests up to the point of using preventive strikes, even within the CIS space.64 The message is supposed to be very clear. It determines the necessity to clarify the common approach to terrorist threat assessments. Another example of the increased role of the military and the military industrial lobby on foreign policy objectives can be demonstrated by the definition of priorities in the military-technical co-operation field. For instance, the concept for military-technical cooperation with foreign states (2000–10)65 was prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; that is, Russian diplomats prepared the selling of the conceptual package. However, the main work was done by the specialists in the marketing of military equipment within the government and related departments of the Ministry of Defence and Security Council. Thus, the marketing was made primarily within the military oriented community. The main focus will be on the states that deliver payments. Linkages between arms sales, military-technical co-operation and hopes to influence policy decisions of the states that purchase Russian equipment are not emphasised publicly anymore. However, a decision of the German Ministry of Defence to purchase the Russian-Ukrainian-German transport plane AN-70 for its air force, as well as the possibility of the same type of sales to other NATO states, was definitely considered to be a victory for Russian foreign and defence pol-icies. For some time 50 per cent of arms sales have been going to India, China, Libya, Iran and Iraq (before the events of 2003). Russia’s need for hard currency will continue to stimulate efforts to sell military equipment and some dual-purpose technologies in spite of Western objections. One example was the sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. Another is the sale of advanced conventional air and naval systems to China. It seems that Russia would like to address its interests preferably in co-operation with the West, but if necessary this will be done on a competitive basis. Among examples of the influence of the military on foreign policy the Kosovo operation could be considered especially important. The debates on the proper settlement of the Kosovo crisis (in mid-1999) demonstrated the growing and significant gap in communication, as well as a substantial difference in opinions on the Russian role in the Balkans, between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. As a result of the public controversy the functions between the ministries were divided. From 4 June until 14 June 1999 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was made responsible for the political settlement in Kosovo and for the overall political principles of the Russian participation in the KFOR (the Kosovo force) mission. During the same period the Ministry of

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Defence was given responsibility for operational planning of the Russian participation in the KFOR mission. According to a MoD official, all recommendations prepared by the General Staff on the RF participation in KFOR were set aside by S. Chernomyrdin, the then head of the Russian negotiation team with the FRY, in the final stages of reaching agreement on the crisis settlement (on 3 June 1999). 66 The required calculations on the number of troops, equipment and logistic issues were addressed in the assumption that the KFOR mission was going to be implemented under the UN auspices. The operational planning was done in accordance with the political guidelines given by President Yeltsin to the Russian delegation and ministries involved in the negotiation process. To some extent the Pristina operation could be seen as an open clarification of the abovementioned differences. It also raised many questions about a proper chain of command, about the role of the military as an independent political player and about the practical implementation of the mission. After the publicly stated disagreement between the MoD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the terms of KFOR settlement, the military received the approval of the Russian president to deal with the military and military-technical issues of deployment of the Russian unit in Kosovo. During a private meeting between President Yeltsin, Minister of Defence I.Sergeyev and Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov on 4 June 1999, 67 the MOD was made responsible for the military and military-technical implementation of the Russian participation in KFOR. It was publicly stated both by Foreign Minster I. Ivanov and S.Chernomyrdin on several occasions. Thus, officially the operational planning for RF participation in the KFOR mission was transferred fully to the MoD. The practicalities were planned by the then First Department of Operational Planning (Colonel-General Balyevsky) of the General Staff, RF Armed Forces, with the full participation of the head of the General Staff General Kvashnin. Minister of Defence I.Sergeyev and Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov were fully informed about the operational planning of the mission. The timing of the mission was chosen by General Kvashnin. The decision was made primarily on the basis of military-strategic considerations. The RF General Staff received information that the US and UK contingents were preparing for deployment prior to political agreement on the political settlement that was supposed to be reached within the framework of US and Russian negotiations. Formally the implementation of the Pristina operation was motivated by the following considerations. For public consumption the main reasons were political and economic, such as the need to secure Russian presence in the post-conflict restoration of Kosovo, its participation in the South European Stability Pact and to secure the rights of ethnic Serbs in the province. However, it seems that the main motivations for the ‘blitz operation’ to Pristina have been truly military and military-strategic—such as the need to prevent the NATO states from getting uncontrolled and exclusive access to the airport. The importance of this factor can be explained by the following considerations. The Bosnia example demonstrated that controlling the airport had a strategic significance for the whole peacekeeping mission. According to the Russian press, the Russians were interested in preventing the use of the secret airport near Slatina. According to military intelligence sources, Yugoslav officials informed the Russians about the existence of the second secret underground airport (similar to one in Bihach). They also shared their intelligence data on potential use by the North Atlantic Alliance of this base in future


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‘humanitarian out-of-area operations’.68 The division of responsibilities between the MoD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided Russia with a certain level of flexibility at the initial stage of various negotiations and full-time confusion at the stage of policy implementations. Formally, the co-ordination between the ministries and the priority role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in defining the final security/ peace-keeping/foreign policy for the Balkans were re-established at the special session of the RF Security Council (14 June 1999). As was stated in the press briefing paper: At the meeting the attention of all heads of ministries was focused on the necessity to keep a constant and clear line of co-ordination between themselves and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in respect to their activities in the implementation of the crisis settlement agreements in the Balkans.69 But for the first time the MoD as an institution was openly involved in the public foreign policy debate. Though during President Putin’s term public statements from the military on defence and foreign policy issues were not encouraged, the role of this group in the decision-making process has undoubtedly increased. Russian scholars pointed out that during 2001 and 2002 the defence and security establishment urged the government to take decisions on a reduction of the Russian presence in the Balkans—for instance, on the basis of political-military considerations prepared by the services. Military experts were among those who supported a limited and conditional US presence in Central Asia as part of co-operation efforts in the anti-terrorist campaign. The challenges that the civil and political leadership was faced with, due to the increasing activity of the military due to its own decisions, led to the introduction of an additional mechanism of control over the armed forces and services. A close analysis of the mechanism (1993–2003) reveals the evolution of political and civilian control over the military and security services in Russia. Mechanism of implementation of political and civilian control over the military and services Political control over the armed forces means their loyalty to the existing regime, subordination to the state and political leadership, and refusal to play an independent social and political role. This approach presupposes primarily a strict subordination of the military to the political leadership of the country, which means the establishment of a controlling mechanism that influences personnel recruitment policy, and determines the guidelines for strategy reviews and military construction plans. Civilian control over the armed forces includes political control as an inherent element; but it is not limited to it. It was pointed out that several provisions were seen as essential for the introduction of civilian control over the ‘power structures’. They are: • subordination to the democratically elected power and non-engagement in independent political activity, plus prohibition of such activity in military structures and institutions;

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• legislative and legal procedures as a basis for relationship between political authority and the military; • adoption by civilian institutions (legislative and executive powers) of decisions regarding strategic doctrinal developments and military construction, budgetary and personnel (high-ranking appointments) issues, and the ability to monitor the implementation of decisions; • civilian arbitration for the military in all types of conflicts with the exemption of those of a professional and military operational nature; • human rights and democratic norms should be applicable to the armed forces as well. The civilian control could be exercised both through parliamentary control and through non-parliamentary forms and methods. Parliamentary control At present in Russia the powers of the parliament in the military sphere are rather limited in comparison with the powers of the president. However, there are three main areas where the role of the parliament is still significant in the introduction and implementation of political and civil control over the power institutions. The parliament is playing an important role in adopting decisions on the military budget and its key components. In accordance with procedure the government develops a draft of the budget allocations for defence on the basis of the budget requests of the Minister of Defence. The years 1997 and 1998 were critical for the ability of the legislative branch to execute democratic control over the military budget and state military order. In 1997 the military budget was the clearest for parliament to oversee. About 200 articles were submitted for consideration. In 1998 only the articles of the military budget dealing with state procurement order were granted confidential status. In 1999, for the first time since the post-Soviet period, the whole military budget was considered confidential. The limits of the parliamentary overseeing of military spending are most evident in the estimation of costs for the current campaign in the Caucasus. The absence of the financial record of military allocations also complicated the task of parliament for monitoring defence spending. During the years 1993–2000 a draft of the military budget was considered by two committees of the State Duma III—the Committee on Defence and the Budget Committee. On the basis of the recommendations given by the committees, the State Duma adopted the law on the federal budget, which was then approved by the Federation Council, the upper chamber, and finally by the president. With the new Presidential Administration and an increasing tightening of security requirements, the State Duma III adopted a new regulation procedure for defence budget consideration. The State Duma established the Joint Committee on federal budget spending for defence, security and law enforcement activity in July 2000. The Committee was created to ‘secure confidentiality and personal responsibility for state secrecy during consideration of the annual national budget’. Co-chairmen of the Committee were Alexander Zhukov (Committee on Budget and Taxes), Andrei Nikolaev (Committee on Defence), Alexander Gurov (Committee on Security). The Committee was composed of three working groups (18 members each),


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which deal with matters of defence (looking into funding under the ‘national defence’ article), security (articles of law enforcement activity and national security), as well as on the co-ordination of the funding of these two articles in the national annual budget. The term of the Committee will be prolonged annually, and it will function until the end of the term of the State Duma III. The Committee is formed on the basis of equal representation, with three deputies from each coalition of deputies (ob’edinenie), as well as 27 deputies from each grouping of deputies represented in the committees on budget and taxes, defence and national security.70 The representatives of the Presidential Administration, the Security Council of the RF, government and Accounting Office are included on the Committee. This committee is a prototype of a new approach to the parliamentary control of military spending.71 However, the parliamentary control over budget matters has limitations. Its weakness lies in the absence of a mechanism to monitor or receive independent information on key parameters of the military construction, such as manpower and structure. For instance, while adopting the military budget the State Duma has to establish the figure for the manpower of the armed forces. However, the Ministry of Defence has successfully ignored the respective provisions of the laws on the federal budget. The Committee of Multiparty Groups was also established in the State Duma to monitor the implementation of international agreements, such as START-2, START-3, ABM, CTBT. The Committee submitted to the State Duma a full report by 30 September 2001.72 The committees are the major players in preparing grounds for the ratification of the new arms control agreements signed between Russia and the US in Moscow in 2002 and the international agreements of 2002. Another important area of parliamentary work with the military and security forces was a campaign on the institutionalisation of the alternative service in Russia. It was seen as an exceptionally important element of both the modernisation of the military and of the existence of civil-military control in society. The initial draft of the law on alternative military service was modified so much under the influence of the military lobby that it lost its appeal and sense, as the military were deciding when and how the alternative service has to take place. The draft came back to the State Duma, and on 9 October 2003 amendments to the law ‘On Alternative Services’ were adopted in the first reading. The amendments were introducing the regulations in the process and reintroducing the importance of the alternative service near the original locations of those asked to contribute to the service.73 The fact that this document was put forward for consideration again in spite of the vast military lobby proves the importance of the parliamentary mechanism in civil-military relations. Parliamentary control expands to the adoption of the legislation that reflects the changes in political necessities and respect for the rights of servicemen. On monitoring capabilities Monitoring the military reform has some loopholes. For instance, in accordance with official records the army HQs were disbanded and the personnel excluded from the payroll in accordance with the military reform and personal redundancies. However, the structures were in reality preserved and were to function de facto outside the formal MoD

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structures. This policy of unofficially preserving the ‘army HQ’ helped the military to reinstitutionalise them during the second Chechnya war (1999–2000). These and other examples of inefficient civilian control stimulated the introduction of additional elements of civil and political control over the military. Non-parliamentary channels of control: institutional network In the years 1992–9 there were several institutional structures established for political monitoring of the military and security services. They were used as channels for the presidential monitoring of the services as well as being a testing ground for debates on the implementation of military reform and changes in military construction. In addition to procedural monitoring functions, these institutions were to play another important role in internal domestic politics. Appointments of selected individuals to important positions in those institutions were used by the Presidential Administration for ‘neutralising’ popular politicians, who were considered as potential challengers to President Yeltsin, or for taming the opposition by setting them off against each other. To some extent the second function became more important than the first one. With this approach it became obvious that with the institutional system of monitoring the effectiveness of civil-military relations was, on the one hand, tremendously flexible and influenced by political turmoil. On the other hand, instead of becoming a stabilising element in the system of civil control over the military the institutional network became a field for competition between the different ‘monitoring institutions’ for influence in the armed forces. The principle of responsibility to the state has been substituted by the principle of responsibility to the president. The institutional network is exceptionally complicated. The majority of the monitoring institutions were established by presidential decision. Their lifetime was determined by the political considerations of the president. The changes were influenced by an attempt to find the most appropriate structures and optimal solutions for civil-military interactions, as well by an intention to use them in the internal struggle of different political groups for influence over the military. The only institution that had any reference in the constitution was the Security Council. However, its functions were determined by a federal law on the Security Council (Article 83, 1993 constitution), though this has not been adopted yet. Presently the Security Council is functioning on the basis of the presidential decrees. Thus, the sets of priorities for the Council’s activity are influenced by short-term considerations. This ambiguity provided the president and executive branch with flexibility with regard to establishing different institutions to monitor the civil-military relations and to grant them functions and diversify the level of responsibilities on the basis of political considerations only. Since 1992 a set of competing institutions dealing with the military reform, defence and security issues was established. Under the umbrella of the Presidential Administration there were several structures functioning and claiming responsibility for political control over the armed forces. They included the Office of the President’s Assistant on issues of national security (1993–8), the Commission on Top Military Positions, High Ranking Military and Special Ranks (until March 1997); a section on military reform and social security within the Chief Inspection Department, later it was transformed into the Department on Military-Industrial Complex and the Social Security


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of Military Servicemen; the Department of Personnel Policy (established in March 1997); the State Military Inspection (1996–8), and the Defence Council (1996–8). In 1997 several commissions were established under government auspices dealing with military issues. All those bodies were headed by prominent and competing members of the Council of Ministers. Two commissions on military reform and military construction were functioning simultaneously under Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and influential member of the government Anatoliy Chubais. The evolution of these institutions and the dynamics of their influence and failures say a lot about the sustainability of the system of political control over the military and services in Russia in the period 1993–9. The Office of the President’s Assistant on the issues of national security and the Commission on Top Military Positions, High Ranking Military and Special Ranks, both headed by Yuri Baturin, had a important role in the supervising of the power ministries until March 1997. To some extent the influence was gained due to two factors. It was believed, on the one hand, that in the early days of his appointment (December 1993) Yuri Baturin had direct access to President Yeltsin. On the other hand, until the termination of the Commission and the transfer of its functions to the Department of Personnel Policy, the president’s adviser on issues of national security could influence the personnel policy (leading to appointments and discharge) in the military and security services. The culmination of Baturin’s influence was in the second half of 1996 and early 1997, when he became Secretary of the Security Council and then Secretary of the Defence Council. After that the secretary’s position in the Security Council was offered to General Lebed as a compensation for his decision to join Yeltsin’s ranks in the second round of the presidential elections of 1996. That move by the general secured President Yeltsin’s victory. During the above-mentioned time the roles of the institutions monitored by him were clearly important with regard to civil-military relations. The Defence Council (1997), established by presidential decree, was formally created to provide implementation of the presidential decisions in the sphere of military construction, decisions of the Security Council on strategic issues of defence industry, strategic development of the armed forces and the adoption of proposals on military doctrine. In reality the Defence Council was to duplicate the functions and tasks set before the Security Council in order to limit the ambitions of General Alexander Lebed to have unchallenged control over the military. In fact it resulted in the situation when all military issues were withdrawn from the Security Council and transferred to the new agency. However, the Defence Council did not succeed in producing its own concept of military reform (in accordance with the presidential instructions of 22 May 1997). The concept was produced by the General Staff and approved by the Commission on Military Reform and Military Construction under the Council of Ministers. The main task of the Defence Council as a counterbalance to the Security Council became irrelevant after General Lebed was dismissed from his post of secretary of the Security Council. At the same time parallel structures that were created to monitor selected areas of military construction, such as the State Military Inspection (SMI), were gaining more political weight. The SMI, established by presidential decree as an independent subdivision of the Administration in November 1996, was a product of the attempts of Anatoliy Chubais to outplay his competitors in relations with the military. It was headed

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by Andrei Kokoshin, former first deputy minister of defence. The main purpose of SMI was to exercise control over the implementation of the military reform, rather than general political control over the power ministries. The policy on the defence complex and social security of the military was the responsibility of the section of the Chief Inspection Department in the Presidential Administration, later reorganised into the Department on Military-Industrial Complex and the Social Security of Servicemen. The personnel policy was the responsibility of the Department of Personnel Policy. This was the time of the maximum influence of the Chubais group. The unification of monitoring structures occurred with the abolition, by presidential decree, of the Defence Council and the State Military Inspection in early 1998. Their staff merged with the Security Council. As a result of the merger a new structural unit was formed within the administration of the president. Initially the Security Council was created in summer 1992 in accordance with provisions of the law ‘On Security’ (March 1992) as ‘a constitutional body exercising the preparation of decisions of the president of the Russian Federation in security related matters’. The decisions of the Security Council, taken by simple majority (from the total number of votes), were to enter into force only after approval by the chairman of the Security Council (that is, the president of the RF). The advisory decisions of the Security Council could be formalised only by decrees of the president of the Russian Federation. The provisions for this institution (its main task, goals and functions) were modified. The changes in the institutional status of the Security Council and range of issues covered were introduced with appointments of new secretaries of the Security Council. The changes usually reflected the political weight of a statesman and his personal views on the tasks and aims of the Security Council and his ambitions. For example, after Alexander Lebed’s appointment to the Security Council the provisions for this institution were reviewed. It received additional responsibilities: the right to propose to the president to bring to account any top official in the field of defence and security, gather and submit to the president ‘information’ on candidates recommended for appointment to top state positions, independently hold ‘work meetings’ between the sessions of the Council, introduce potential members for the Security Council, submit drafts of presidential decrees for consideration. If all these had been implemented, the Council could have become an institution capable of exercising political control over the military and security services. With the appointment of Ivan Rybkin, and the approval of the National Security Concept (1997), the functions of this institution were curtailed; but the scope of issues under the Council was expanded. In accordance with a presidential decree (1997), the Security Council received additional areas of responsibility. It had the right to prepare reports for the president with analysis of international, defence and political developments; to issue in the name of the president directives aimed at the implementation of the national security concept, mandatory for execution by officials; and to exercise control over the execution of its instructions and orders. This undoubtedly increased the influence of the institution on the process of taking strategic decisions in the field of defence and security; however, it did not give visible possibilities to exercise control over the military and the security services. During Yeltsin’s presidency the institutional network for monitoring the armed forces


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and security services was based on the principle of counterbalancing and was part of the internal political struggle for the status quo. In 1999 and 2000 a new approach to the institutions monitoring defence and security services was introduced. The main principle applied was the elimination of duplication in the network, unified distribution of functions and strict subordination under presidential control. Changes were introduced to the Presidential Administration and to the Security Council status, etc. In accordance with the newly defined priorities of the state building, a new department was established in the Administration— the territorial department, the main functions of which are to reform the territorial-administrative set-up in the country. This department, together with the political department and department of internal policies, will probably carry the main burden of political control over military and security issues.74 The Security Council, under the presidential chairmanship, is becoming the main centre of strategic planning and formulation of the strategy for the defence and security sector, as well as being responsible for the introduction of the implementation mechanism for political and civil control over the military. The national security concept, new military doctrine, new foreign policy concept, and the information security concept were prepared by the Security Council. The Security Council is becoming responsible for strategy formulation, addressing all aspects of security (military, economic and informational). It is planned to be taken out of the Presidential Administration and to be established as a more independent institution, though it will still be chaired by the president. However, the personality of the secretary of the Security Council still impacts on the influence of the institution and its role in the system of security and defence bodies. During the time of Sergei Ivanov (presently minister of defence) as secretary of the Security Council, the Council was seen as the main co-ordination centre and think-tank on military reform. Since the transfer of Sergei Ivanov to the Ministry of Defence and the appointment of General V.Rushailo (formerly minister of the interior and a close ally of Yeltsin’s family) as his successor, the role of the Security Council has diminished. From the political think-tank on military reform it was converted to a co-ordinating institution mostly on specific law-enforcement issues, as was demonstrated at the Security Council meeting on the ‘Basic State Policies on Military Construction Until the Period of 2010’ that took place on 30 May 2002. After a governmental reshuffle in March 2004 and the appointment of Igor Ivanov, former minister of foreign affairs, to the Security Council, the SC was once again changed to become the major think-tank on foreign policy and strategic assessments. Nevertheless, the previous institutional duplication stimulated a growing division within the military and security services that was revealed in public statements, demonstrating competing ideas within the military on military reform, construction, procurement policy and strategy. These institutional overlaps, duplications and the limits of parliamentary control over the armed forces, produced certain difficulties for the implementation of civilian control. These issues were addressed during administrative reform (2002/4).

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Civilians in defence Non-parliamentary forms of civilian control imply first of all that the minister of defence is a civilian person who reports back to the head of state, government or parliament, as well as in some cases to the political party which won the election. Appointing a civilian to head the Ministry of Defence has always been considered a formal evidence of civil control over the military. If judged by formal features, a civilian minister has been in charge of the Russian Ministry of Defence at least three times since 1992. The first civilian minister of defence of Russia was the then president, Yeltsin. On 16 March 1992 he signed a decree establishing the Ministry of Defence of Russia and appointed himself as minister of defence. Two months later, on 18 May 1992 he appointed General Pavel Grachev, who resigned after his competitor General Lebed was made head of the Security Council, as a result of political compromise in the presidential campaign of 1996. In July 1996 head of the General Staff Academy General Rodionov became his successor and was appointed minister of defence. He was dismissed in 1997.75 General Rodionov, and later Marshal Sergeyev, received the post after mandatory retirement from the armed forces (60 years of age is the maximum age for active military service). The professional service, however, could be prolonged by a special decision of the president. The decision is usually taken individually on an annual basis. For instance, Yeltsin asked Rodionov to stay on as the defence minister after Rodionov’s mandatory retirement from the military. Sergeyev also became a civilian minister after formally retiring from the military. This tendency to appoint retired (or in reserve) servicemen to the post could continue in Russia due to the cultural specifics of the military community and a strong belief that only by belonging to ‘the club’ could a minister truly represent the interests of the profession. Competition in influence between Chief of General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin (until his dismissal on 19 July 2004) and the minister of defence (initially Marshal Igor Sergeyev (ret.) and then Sergei Ivanov, appointed in 2001) was inherited by Putin’s administration from the time of President Yeltsin. On several occasions it has been revealed that the Presidential Administration and President Putin favour the division of functions and responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and General Staff. It was planned initially that the Ministry of Defence should be headed by a civilian and deal with logistics matters as a result of the reform of the military institution. At the same time the role of the General Staff as an operational planning institution for all power ministries was defined by the new military doctrine (February 2000). In 2001 the appointments of Sergei Ivanov to the post of minister of defence and his former deputies (in the Security Council) to ministerial posts in other ministries created the necessary preconditions to implement the reform of the ‘power bloc’ in a synchronised manner.76 These issues were addressed by presidential decree (No. 1058 of 10 September 2003). The Ministry of Defence was given political responsibility in the hierarchy of institutions during peacetime and the authority to co-ordinate other services through the work of the General Staff. The General Staff was to assume full operational responsibility over the military organisation in the period of war. However, the decree gave room for flexible interpretation of the subordination principles in the military organisation. It was allowing


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the Chief of General Staff not only to co-ordinate the ‘power bloc’ ministries and services (presently there are about eleven) but also to be engaged in planning and monitoring their activities, as well as in redistributing the financial and material resources. The annual conference of the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) held in Moscow in late January 2004 addressed the issue of the most effective forms of military management and command and control (C&C) arrangements for the Russian armed forces. The government confirmed its intention to reintroduce the principle of one-man management and strict unification of C&C over the military and security services. The establishment of a highly centralised C&C system within the services and other power ministries was authorised by President Putin in his decisions (14–22 July 2004). The speech of the minister of defence at the AMS conference in January 2004 repeated the main points of the ministerial report ‘On Current Tasks of Development of the RF Armed Forces’ that had been publicly announced last autumn (October 2003). The minister once again pointed to a streamlining of the subordination structure and the necessity for a clear definition of the responsibilities and redistribution of functions between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. The General Staff should rely on the solidity of the principle of one-man management, unity of military control, the violation of which ‘engenders machinations and irresponsibility for the entrusted job’. Mahmud Gareev, president of the Academy of Military Sciences, went even further and publicly recommended the consideration of an adjustment to the law ‘On Defence’ at the 2004 spring session of State Duma IV. The suggested amendment eliminated the possibility of direct access of the chief of the General Staff to the commander-in-chief, subordinating the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence. Andrei Kokoshin, member of State Duma IV and former first deputy minister of defence, the first civilian appointed to such a post in the 1990s, addressed the relations between the MoD and General Staff in his book Strategic Governance: Theory, Historical Records, Comparative Analysis, Tasks for Russia (2003).77 Andrei Kokoshin, with the support of former Chief of General Staff Marshal Kulikov, argued for unified command in the armed forces under a civil minister of defence, strengthening the role of the MoD and operational capabilities of the General Staff, releasing the latter from overwhelming administrative burdens but not from all regulating functions, as the General Staff s ability for regulations was part of the Russian military tradition. The streamlining of command presupposes a clear division of functions between the two institutions and their changing roles in peace and wartime circumstances. The consolidation of the political influence of the president over the ‘power bloc’ strengthened the president’s position in his dialogue with the country’s elite, especially with regional and economic elite circles. The direct subordination to the presidential control of civil-military relations should also be considered an important element in the establishing of a ‘monocentric political system’, with the new strategically essential political nucleus within the power bloc strictly subordinated to the president. Under President Putin the role of the civil authorities was growing in the militarytechnical sphere. During his first term the issues of the military R&D, as well as arms sales, were implemented under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology. After the major governmental reshuffle in March 2004 all ‘power bloc’ ministries and services were directly subordinated to the president. Military R&D and the

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military industrial complex were transferred to the Ministry of Industry and Energy. Financial transparency The accounts of all power ministers, including the MoD, Customs and other services, were transferred to the Federal Treasury by the end of 2000, according to the presidential message on budgetary issues to the Federation Council.78 By this action the president was trying to liquidate commercial banks from servicing the power ministries. This measure was also aimed at clarifying the spending and transfers of the non-budgetary funds of the power bloc ministries for the executive branch. The Ministry of Finance was determined to introduce a special Treasury register (kaznacheiskii) for monitoring military spending. This monitoring procedure was tested in two military districts. However, this policy faced resistance from the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry is interested in establishing a special branch within the Ministry of Finance that would be directly connected with both governmental institutions, increasing in this way, according to the Ministry of Defence, the co-ordination of policy implementation and resisting strict subordination to the Ministry of Finance. The appointment of the civilian deputy minister of defence (L. Kudilina) to monitor the financial situation within the MoD was to signal the determination of the present administration to introduce strong and clear presidential control over defence financial flows. In 1998 a new post was established in the Ministry of Defence at the level of defence minister’s assistant (civilian) for the co-ordination of all financial and economic activities within the armed forces, overall monitoring of the main department of military budgeting and financing, the department of military-economic analysis and expertise and MoD financial inspection.79 It is also important to note the increased role of the regions in providing assistance and logistic support for the force structures existing on their territories. The regions were to provide logistic support for the deployed military and all necessary resources as barter between the regions and the federal government to cover their tax debts to the federal institutions. The governmental decree No. 1082 (28 August 1997) on the new mechanism of financing the military through territorial branches of the Federal Treasury was introduced nationally on 1 July 1998. The experimental try-out that was done in the Kaliningrad area and former Volga region demonstrated the increase of a time gap between money transfers from federal to local offices of the Treasury.80 On 14 April 2000 Acting First Deputy Prime-Minister M.Kasyanov introduced a new regulation according to which all funding for Ministry of Defence activity was to be transferred to the Federal Treasury. Thus, a four-year old dispute over the proper authority for monitoring defence and security spending was over. Political control over financial flows for the power ministries was established through the channels of the Ministry of Finance. In 2001/2 the Federal Audit Committee also received additional duties to monitor the appropriation and spending within the ‘power bloc’ ministries and defence enterprises. For instance, in January 2004, as an example of financial scrutiny, the Federal Audit Committee announced a joint investigation by the Federal Audit Committee and Military Prosecution Office of a multi-million dollars misuse of funds in


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the MoD and General Staff budget. The joint team was to re-examine the circumstances of financial violations and produce recommendations for the government.81 Increased role of the security services At the core of this phenomenon lie objective and subjective reasons. On the one hand, the fall in popularity of President Yeltsin in the armed forces (to 2–4 per cent) during his second term influenced him to turn to security bodies and the promotion of many of their officers to top state posts. On the other hand, the limitation of the monitoring institutions and the absence of an effective mechanism for the verification of applied control of the armed forces stimulated the executive branch to strengthen the role of security bodies, military counter-intelligence and the Federal Security Service (FSB). One of the first comments President Putin made after being made acting president at the end of 1999 was to praise the security services. State information agency TASS said that he had delivered a jocular report to the meeting saying: ‘A group of FSB officers sent to work under cover in the government has successfully coped with its first tasks’. It is believed that he said in a more serious tone that ‘the organs of state security have always guarded Russia’s national interests, they should not be separated from the state and turned into a monster’. The influential Russian philosophical and political journal Vek published an article stating the reasons for such developments. In order to understand the basic changes that were occurring in Russian society in the first year of the twenty-first century it was important to take into account the introduced logic. According to Vek, the increased role of the security services in Russia’s politics was an inevitable result and consequence of Yeltsin’s presidency and criminalisation of Russian society during the last decade of the twentieth century. The criminalisation of society touched different aspects of life. It means not only rackets and assassinations, performed by organised crime, but the existence of a ruling class with a criminal mentality that established itself by criminal means, as well as a balance between a normal and black economy and level of criminal freedom in society. It makes sense to believe that the transitional period of the authoritarian regime is needed due to the fact that criminal society does not transform itself voluntarily to democracy… If the president intends to build a democratic society he will inevitably have to go through a period of authoritarianism. Besides, he has all opportunities for that. In Russia there has always been the priority of authority over financial wealth; the latter in Russia was always controlled by those in power.82 A 1995 law gave the security services the right to monitor all sorts of correspondence, from postal deliveries to cell phone conversations, providing they first obtained a warrant. The changes were introduced into the legislation in the atmosphere of increased violence in society, with terrorist acts and conflicts in the northern Caucasus paving the way for relieving the security services, especially the FSB, from parliamentary control and confirming their direct subordination to the president. On 24 September 1999 the Duma unanimously voted to pass the law ‘On Additions

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and Amendments to Articles 13 and 15 of the Federal Law “On Institutions of the Federal Security Service” ’, granting further powers to the security service (FSB).83 This extended the jurisdiction of the FSB. It can restrict citizens’ freedom of movement if necessary and enforce house arrest. With the growth of the Internet, the FSB and State Communications Committee have issued new regulations—based on their interpretation of the 1995 law. They stated that the Internet service providers were to link their computers to those at the FSB headquarters. The FSB SORM project—the acronym stands for System for OperationalInvestigative Activities—already functions as well. In August 2000 all types of communication under the Ministry of Communication became available for similar cooperation with the security services. Greater rights and functions were also given to tax police: the right to monitoring mail, e-mail, telephones and any type of private and business communications, together with the FSB, Ministry of Interior and other services.84 In accordance with presidential decree, the Federal Security Service could not be monitored by the parliament any more. It became the main security agency that has rights and functions of control over other power bodies, including the Ministry of Defence, and in some cases even requires other bodies’ subordination. This was done in accordance with the new Security Concept (2000), where terrorism and crime are viewed as a political alliance and are identified as a prime threat to the national interests. Thus, any additional rights and expansion in FSB functions could be introduced not on the basis of amendments to the federal law by the parliament but on the basis of presidential decrees. On the other hand, an attempt has failed to introduce the law on security services for the consideration of the State Duma. Thus the increased role of the security services in Russian society became an element of presidential policy to intensify political control over the military and other services. The security services were used as an important channel for the verification and monitoring of the implementation of presidential, governmental and parliamentary decisions regarding the military.85 The need for the monitoring was clearly expressed by a group of Russian political scientists and policy consultants. They wrote that modernisation of foreign policy started to create dissatisfaction within the ranks of military high brass and politicians supportive of a strong state (gosudarstvenniki). The first sign of indignation was a negative reaction towards the decision to close the military bases in Camhran and Lurdes. Russia’s cooperation with the anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan was seen by the military as a materialising of the long-shared threat of growing US influence in the area of the traditional military-political interests of Russia. Besides, the allied relations with the US made the American military presence in Central Asia (Uzbekistan) possible and created potential conditions for the re-orientation of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to special relations with the US. This was becoming another source of irritation for the Russian military elite. However, the main concerns for generals were the prospects of Russia’s consent to the deployment of the American National Missile Defence. However, Putin managed to avoid direct confrontation with the military on this most sensitive issue. According to Mark Urnov, if the modernisation of foreign policy puts the Kremlin in confrontation with the military elite, the modernisation in domestic policies also creates contradictions with the army as the major ‘social corporation’:


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The military elite can and is appealing not only to the patriotic sentiments of the statehood oriented politicians, but to the corpor-ate interests within the army itself. Shortages in the financing (during the transitional period) created the conditions for establishing individual commercial interests within the so-called ‘main social corporation’ (such as army, police and judicial system) and ‘nontransparent links’ with the market system as well as establishing the closed network of ‘cliques’. These developments weaken the discipline and control abilities of the federal centre.86 External assessments American scholar Dr Brian D.Taylor analysed the patterns of civil-military relations in the Russian army from 1689 until 2000. In the conclusion to his book Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689–2000 he wrote: Most of the deficiencies in Russian civil-military relations and military organizational culture are deeply rooted and will not be changed quickly. Fortunately, there are also highly positive aspects of Russian civil-military relations and military organizational culture that are also very entrenched, in particular a norm of civilian supremacy in sovereign power issues. It is worth remembering that establishing more democratic civil-military relations is always a protracted process, with both setbacks and advances. Given the political and economic collapse that accompanied the end of Communist rule in Russia, along with the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself, the rapid creation of well institutionalized democratic civil-military relations could hardly be expected. But with the fundamental basis of an apolitical military organizational culture in place, the potential for progress and democratic changes in Russian military affairs remain very much alive.87 Establishing civil control over the military has never been easy in Russia.88 The analysis demonstrated the difficulties of this process, setbacks and achievements. As a result of the last 13 years the political presidential control over the military has been established. The institutional network aimed at monitoring the process is still in the period of transformation. However, it is becoming obvious that current changes in the mechanism and institutional approaches will shape civil-military relations for a decade. The situation in civil-military relations also proved the necessity for the government to pay more attention to the military reform in Russia.

7 MILITARY REFORM AND RUSSIA’S FUTURE DEFENCE The military reform in the RF was a long-expected necessity. It was needed to deal with the internal requirements of military organisations, to address them in response to the internal strategic transformations of society and its administrative/management system, as well as a reaction to current challenges, linked first of all with the spread of international terrorist threats. The task is huge by itself, especially for a country which has experienced the turmoil of changes for almost two dozen years. However, by the end of 2003 the Russian military seems to have come out of this ‘crisis of survival’ and was entering a stage of systemic development. Adjusting to domestic developments A prototype of the current federal administrative districts was created in 1998. The first steps in reforming the administrative system were made within the military reform framework. In accordance with presidential decree No. 900, ‘On the Militaryadministrative Division of the Russian Federation’, signed by President Yeltsin on 27 July 1998,1 the military districts were transformed and received the status of strategic operational directions.2 This transformation was to be completed by 1 January 2000. After the signing of the ‘Basics of the State Military Build-up Policy Until 2005’ in the summer of 1998 and The Military Doctrine of the RF’ in April 2000, the role of a coordinating body of the country’s defence capability was given to the General Staff and territorial operational-strategic commands (military districts).3 The MoD was to coordinate defence-related relations between federal and regional authorities.4 In the new power structure, the problems of federal-regional, civil-military relationships will supposedly be solved through the Security Council, its branches in the FDs, and by the leaders of the FDs. The General Staff and operational-strategic commands will carry out the planning and organisational functions within the scope of their competence, as outlined by the 1993 constitution and the law ‘On Defence’ (1996). As columnist Alexander Golts pointed out, in preparing a decree on the FDs the Security Council officials insisted that they did not want to reinvent the wheel. According to the Security Council, it was the military that were the first to apply a more rational method of dividing the country.5 This experience formed the basis for the overall reform of the country’s administrative and political system. The military and security services began to ‘modernise’ the system in conformity with their own needs and attempted to prevent the spread of separatism and any military actions against the state. In one of his early articles, the former head of the General Staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin, made the following


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point: One of the vital elements of the military reform is making a transfer to the territorial principle of C&C over the military and other services of the Russian Federation… The system of a military-administrative territorial division in Russia is based on a territorial principle of subordination, command and control. The realisation of this principle in full should help to unite all elements of operational control of the ‘power ministries’ under one executive official, who as a result should carry personal responsibility for defence and security of the state within the defined territorial boundaries… Today’s victory on the ground is not to be achieved without gaining superiority in the air, space and without active information superiority… The principal character of future wars will be determined by the use of high precision weapons, intelligence-information systems and by the means of radio-electronic warfare. The increasing possibility to incorporate all these components in one joint combat system will be able to radically change any future military activity… The forming of this system began in the Russian armed forces in the mid-80s. Presently it is at the stage when such a system received realistic features and could be established on the existing material basis… Establishing a unified system of technical assistance and logistics for the armed forces and all other forces and military formations and institutions of the Russian Federation that are responsible for the state’s military security is becoming one of the main priority tasks of military construction.6 If the previous citation outlined the strategic trends in RF military restructuring, the future developments of the armed forces were partly clarified by the MP Andrei Kokoshin, former deputy minister of defence. The following quote is essential in understanding the level of threats that the RF is facing in the mid- and long-term perspective and the directions the military reform will take in case of increasing threats to RF territorial integrity. Andrei Kokoshin, in particular, stated: It is very important for Russia today to assess the external threats correctly. You have to understand, when it comes down to real military planning, we cannot be strong everywhere… As early as the end of this decade, China, for example, will have five to seven times more nuclear devices on strategic platforms; it is intensely building up its intercontinental weapons delivery systems as well. By all appearances, India is following the same path: it will have developed intercontinental systems by the decade’s end. Pakistan evidently is not going to sit idle and Iran and few others are also coming on. So we will have a totally different strategic landscape. I would distinguish two basic problems for Russia in the military field. First of all, there is a changing nuclear balance in the world. We cannot maintain the former number of nuclear weapons—by 2007 the number of warheads on strategic platforms, and indeed on operationaltactical platforms, will drop sharply. Secondly, the role of China is growing fast. The nuclear equation will be different—much more complex and less pleasant for us. A large-scale war does not threaten us now, of course, but our headache

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will be much stronger… Local wars in the South, considering the presence of the Islamic factor in Russia itself, pose a direct threat to Russia. We cannot rule out that this factor will also be used to create tension inside the country. Right now there are no direct threats to us, but in ten years Chechnya or Central Asia might seem a mild unpleasantness to us. Almost certainly we will have to again increase the numerical strength of the armed forces by 2010.7 The present transitional phase of the Russian economy and society dictates the necessity to approach the reform of the military by creating the proper conditions for future structural reforms and concentrating on the ‘preconditions for a swift process of reform that could be completed in 57 years, building on the basis of achieved results and selected reforms’. For the purpose of this study it is becoming increasingly important to look at the FDs and military reform in Russia as complementary elements of the long-term policy development. The federal programme ‘On Operational Readiness of the Territory of the Russian Federation for the Purposes of Defence until 2025’, prepared by the General Staff, received support in the Ministry of Finance, the Main State Legal Department of the Presidential Administration, and by all subjects of the Russian Federation. The RF Ministry of Justice also certified it and it was submitted to the government for approval.8 This document brought together military planning within the FDs and programmes of socio-economic developments in the regions. The new administrative structure of the state is directly linked with the future of the military reform, which is to be implemented on the basis of the universally integrated ‘effectiveness-cost-feasibility’ model. It is also linked to the reform of the established strategic commands, operational task forces (OTF), and joint logistics, which are considered essential elements of new cost-effective approaches to defence and security. The following formations will be used in two types of conflicts: • local/regional/global conflicts with regular armies (international interstate conflicts); • local/regional conflicts with irregular military formations (intrastate conflicts) with separatist movements, and against criminal groups and bandit formations. These types of conflicts could be purely internal and focused on anti-crime, anti-terrorist activities, and actions to reestablish constitutional order. They could also occur outside the borders of the state (on the territory of the CIS) or be classified as cross-border conflicts. Depending on the type and nature of the conflict, the objectives that are placed before the OTFs are different. The OTFs’ goals and mission determine the structure of the unit and the functions that the unit should perform. The OTF concept was legitimised in the federal law ‘On Defence’ (1996), where it was stressed that joint efforts and co-ordination among different force structures such as the MoD, MoI, MES (Ministry of Emergency Situations), FBTS, FAPSI, and the FSB would be essential in fighting against enemy Special Operation Forces, airborne troops and criminal formations, and in the guarding and defence of communications, military installations, and vital economic and state facilities. The OTF was confirmed in the RF ‘Military Doctrine’ (2000) as a basic organisational and combat formation to be used in


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an internal conflict (Articles 5, 6) and for national defence against external threats (Article 13). The functioning of the OTFs depends on the harmonisation of the demarcation zones between the military and other force structures. Before the ‘Concept of State Policy on the Military Development of Russia until the Year 2005’ was approved in early August 1998, there were different types of overlapping demarcation zones for the MoD and other force structures. All together there were eight military districts and four fleets, seven districts of the MoI, six FBTS districts and nine regional centres of the MES. The ‘Concept of Military Reform’ established a single system of military-administrative division of Russian territory into strategic directions.9 They are the North-western— within the boundaries of Leningrad Military District; Western—within the boundaries of Moscow Military District; South-western—within the boundaries of North Caucasian Military District; Central Asian—within the boundaries of the Volga and Urals Military Districts; Siberian—within the boundaries of Siberian and Trans-Baikal Military District (the decision for their unification was taken on 1 August 1998; the latter was integrated into the Siberian Military District) and Far Eastern—within the boundaries of Far East Military District.10 Kaliningrad Special Area (raion) in the administrative borders of the Kaliningrad region (oblast) is an independent military-administrative unit that is not a part of the RF armed forces military districts. The boundaries of the strategic directions and seven federal districts established in May 2000 overlap, with only a few temporary exceptions. The Central Asian strategic direction with the merged Urals and Volga military districts, now called the Volga-Urals military district,11 stretches over two FDs—the Volga and Urals. Kaliningrad is incorporated into the North-western FD. According to Sergei Ivanov, the then secretary of the Security Council and currently Russian minister of defence, the ‘Kaliningrad region should belong to the North-western FD and there is no reason or necessity to establish a separate eighth FD on its territory’.12 However, there is a possibility that the merger of military districts and establishment of strategic directions will stimulate the merger of FDs as well. This might become necessary if the functioning of the districts and strategic directions can only be settled within an established model. However, if the principle of joint logistics permits certain technological variations, the diversification between the boundaries of the FDs and strategic directions would be politically advisable. The non-identical relationship between the FDs and strategic directions represent a positive public relations campaign for the government, especially if one has in mind the international trade relations of the Volga FD, first of all with Iran. This harmonisation of the demarcation of security space was designed to cut short the disunity of the power structures. In a situation of grave financial shortages, it was also designed to unify the mobilisation reserves, technical support, procurement policies and logistics, and co-ordinate command and control functions within the aforementioned strategic directions. Abandoning the duplicating functions of services and infrastructures was considered to be a prime task of the reform. As was said by President Putin at the Security Council meeting (November 2000), ‘keeping duplicating military structures does not help the country’s defence and damages the armed forces’.13 However, in each of the strategic directions a co-ordinating HQ for the MoD services


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and other force structures was set up. The choice of the main co-ordinating HQ depends usually on the following questions and perceptions: what service/or force structure would be the main and adequate force to repel the main sources of threat to stability within a military-administrative unit? Which of the force ministries and services would carry the main burden in preventing the escalation of a conflict? The choice is made on the basis of traditions in strategic and opera-tional planning and political considerations. It is also made on a case-by-case basis. The RF Military Doctrine (Article 22) defines the functions of the Operational Strategic Commands in the following way: The C&C of the MDs (OSC) provides command for the inter-service groups of forces of general purposes, as well as planning and organising joint activities with other military units, formations and institutions responsible for military security within the boundaries of their responsibilities and a unified system of military-administrative demarcation of the territory of the RF.14 In 1997 an integrated group of forces was established in the Kaliningrad region. It included the troops of the 11th Army, the air force and air defence units and the Baltic fleet (North-western strategic direction). At the operational level, the forces were subordinated to the Baltic fleet command for the sole reason that the fleet incorporates strategic nuclear forces. The main task of the integrated group of forces was to ensure the combat stability of group of naval strategic nuclear forces. Naval Spetsnaz (special task groups modelled after the US SEALS and the Israeli 13th naval flotilla) is usually directly subordinated to the fleet commander. In March 1998, the coastguard troops of the Baltic fleet and the troops of the 11th Army were integrated in accordance with the plans of unification and optimisation of force structures only up to one-third of the initially planned level.15 The same principle was about to be applied in the joint north-eastern command (Far Eastern strategic direction). An integrated group of forces was to be subordinated to the Pacific fleet command (main deployment areas Kamchatka and Primorie).16 The then secretary of the Russian Security Council and new Russian defence minister, Sergei Ivanov17 stated the following in November 2000: ‘Separation of administrative and operational functions is not envisaged in the military districts’.18 The interministerial working group under the RF Security Council was to provide clarification on the restructuring of the command and control structures of the RF armed forces, and whether Russia is changing to some form of the so-called ‘Anglo-Saxon model’.19 However, the obvious change to be seen is the growing role of the operational-strategic HQ in a FD.20 The functions of the presidential envoys (PEs), who stand at the head of the federal district, are limited by their engagement in co-ordination activity without any intrusion into the operational work of the ministries of Defence, Interior and the security services, etc. In accordance with military assessments of the military reform, the MoD acknowledges the possibility of a short-term subordination of the military, paramilitary, and security structures to a civilian presidential representative. The set-up represents a civil-military authority in the FDs. There is a noticeable unification of procedures and


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approaches to security and defence issues in all FDs. However, certain variations, depending on regional requirements and the personnel preferences of the PEs, are still allowed. The effectiveness and usefulness of any initiative are assessed in Moscow and could be adopted as a prototype for new forms of civil-military relations for the rest of the country. The local structures under the authority of the PE in the North-western FD could become a model for at least two districts. The PE initiated the creation of the following institutions, thereby handing direct supervision over the power bloc to himself. He formed a co-ordination council of military command, which deals with defence and security issues in the region. The council members are commander of Leningrad Military District, Colonel-General Valentin Bobrishev; head of the regional office, Civil Defence and Emergency Situations, Alexander Efimov; commander-in-chief of the Northern fleet, Admiral Viacheslav Popov; head of the Baltic fleet (prior to his election as a governor it was Admiral Vladimir Egorov), and the heads of regional directorates of the FBTS. This structure is designed to assess combat readiness of the regional group of forces; to provide military-political and socio-economic analysis of regional developments; and monitor the appointments to local branches of the power ministries. The decisions taken by the council are not obligatory and often provide policy recommendations. It is obvious that decisions reached by the council will directly affect the lives of everybody in the district. The PEs also established a council of security and crime prevention agencies. The network, which appeared in the North-western FD, was aimed at limiting the influence of the local regional elite on the military, militia, and other law enforcement and security agencies.21 It also guarantees that in peacetime the main monitoring functions for security in the district will be provided by the security services under direct supervision of the PE through some form of the FD’s own ‘security council’. The Far Eastern FD is passing through a period of transformation too. The economic and political system in the district will reflect the changes in elite and power structures in Primorye. At the moment, it is possible to assume that the structures and institutions, as well as the relationship between local governors, military authorities and the PE, will be similar to the ones proposed and implemented in the North-western FD. The orientation of both regions towards cross-border co-operation, energy and transportation projects as major sources of revenue, and as channels of integration with the international community, is also very similar, but with regional specific characteristics. It would be understandable if the institutional networks of civil-military relations were similar as well. The Southern FD is an exception, as it became the testing ground for new types of formations, communication networks and command control structures. According to a pro-governmental information network (www.strana.ru), the Southern FD is an example of the type of civil-military relations that should exist in a FD during periods of conflict and states of emergency.22 Some elements of the new model of civil-military relations for the FDs were tested even before the anti-terrorist campaign of 1999. The decision on C3I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) in the south-western strategic direction was made on the basis of the division of functions between the force ministries (in accordance


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with internal law and legal decrees and on the basis of political considerations). The coordination of the power ministers (especially the MoD and FBTS) in the North Caucasus was given to the Minister of the Interior (MoD and FBTS).23 The Operational Command was established in Stavropol for co-ordination of all activities between the MoD, MoI and FBTS in the North Caucasus. The Operational HQ in Stavropol became responsible for co-ordinating all security forces, and especially the local branches of the Ministry of Interior in the autonomous republics of the North Caucasus. Colonel-General Leontii Shvetsov, the then deputy minister of the inter-ior, signed the Protocol on co-ordination activities with the head of Operational Command in Stavropol and the heads of the local security and MoI branches of Dagestan, KabardinoBalkaria, North Ossetia, Chechnya and Stavropol Territory.24 Local security and MoI forces were becoming primarily responsible for maintaining peace and stability and the preservation of the status quo in their own regions. For instance, the situation in Dagestan was to be dealt with by the local Dagestanian militia. Several new appointments were made to the local MoI branch in order to strengthen the communication links between the Operational Command in Stavropol and local authorities.25 The Ministry of the Interior increased financing to the Dagestan local branch by allowing the local authorities to employ an additional 1,000 persons in OMON units (special-purpose detachments of militia). The local authority had taken the decision to establish local self-defence units of citizens in the communities neighbouring Chechnya and to legalise military formations of ethnic (non-Chechen) groups in Dagestan.26 The only federal troops left on the territory of Dagestan belonged to the FBTS. The FBTS formation consisted of seven units (7,000 servicemen, 50 per cent of whom were conscripts, 89 per cent contract servicemen; 30–35 per cent of the officers were locals).27 Russia’s federal troops avoided the situations of direct involvement in the escalation of tensions in the regions thereby keeping open the opportunities to monitor the crises and intervene when they were ready themselves. The shift in burden sharing between the local and federal authorities was motivated by the desire of Moscow to be drawn into the next round of the Russian-Chechnya-North Caucasus conflict settlement (by military means) as the last resort only. At the same time this arrangement gave more flexibility and space for the local leaders to exercise influence on Moscow’s behaviour without carrying the unpopular label of being too pro-Russian. During the second Chechnya conflict Russian forces were testing the principle of coordination and upgrading its troops, formerly introduced in the concept of the (Multinational) Operational Task Forces (within the framework of the military reform). This included the transfer of subordination from the MoI to the MoD as part of the standard upgrading procedure in case of an escalating conflict. The Operational HQ for combating anti-terrorist activity in Dagestan was established. Viktor Kazantsev, then commander of the North Caucasus military district, was put in charge. Colonel-General Boris Maksin, head of the General Staff of the Interior Troops, MoI, received the post of the first deputy commander at the HQ.28 It is also important to remember the participation of the reserves as a crucial part of the civil defence component in the territorial defence plans. The volunteers used in Dagestan were from the reserves and were experienced in operating in local conflicts or


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peacekeeping missions in the CIS. The legal foundation underlying the arming of irregular formations (formerly illegal) was made on the basis that the volunteers who had joined were called upon from the reserves. There were 2,000–5,000 armed volunteers defending the Republic of Dagestan in 1999.29 Another 25,000 signed up for so-called ‘self-defence units’, that were established in accordance with the decision of the Dagestan State Council (21 August 1999). Their functions included patrolling and securing enterprises, electric power plants and communication networks. The ‘selfdefence units’ in combat on the border with Chechnya were to be co-ordinated by military registration and enlistment offices (voenkomaty); in other areas this task would be performed by militia.30 The local government assumed overall co-ordination and control of the ‘self-defence units’. Another important element of this territorial model was the establishment of ethnic units as part of regional civil defence. On 18 August 1999, at the request of the Security Council of Dagestan and a decision of the Muslim religious authority,31 the then minister of defence, Marshal Sergeev, made a decision to establish ethnic Dagestani formations within permanent deployment units in the Republic. For this reason, residents of Dagestan serving in the RF armed forces were to be transferred to the Republic. More than 300 volunteers and conscripts from St Petersburg military district had already arrived in Dagestan. Some military experts considered that decision controversial and shortsighted. It was believed that a precedent could be set for establishing ethnic regional armies that at some point might become uncontrollable by the federal authorities and General Staff. They pointed out, for instance, that the militarisation of Chechnya started with a similar pattern.32 In reality there was an immediate contradiction in understanding by the highest authorities of the degree of subordination of those ‘self-defence units’. According to the Dagestan State Council, it was the Council that had to perform the overall co-ordination over the units. At the same time the RF MoD believed that the units should be placed under the Operational Command HQ in Dagestan. Similar requests came from the Chechen communities in Dagestan and other North Caucasian republics.33 However, the request was difficult to implement, bearing in mind that in recent years the Chechen minority had increased its presence in all republics through ‘passport exchange procedures’. Therefore the military could not allow the creation of armed local Chechen ethnic formations. As a result, the issue of establishing ethnic formations within the Russian armed forces will remain one of political problems. It should be noted, however, that a similar principle of ethnic formations was already in practice within the MoI in Dagestan since 1998. Consequently, all military and paramilitary formations in the Republic were to be organised on the basis of ethnicity and local residency. Possible patterns of crisis escalation had been publicly reviewed since the very beginning of the conflict. It was necessary to localise the conflict, stage attacks on separatist bases in Dagestan, wage extensive anti-terrorist operations in the Republic (MoI, special operation units, FSB, etc.), and confront possible separatist counter-terrorist activities in other regions whilst at the same time waging attacks on separatist bases on the Chechnya territory.34 Leaving aside the issues of changing responsibilities of the ministries for carrying out the anti-terrorist campaign, it is more challenging to analyse the state of relations between


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civil and military authorities after the operation was transferred from the MoD to other ministries and services for co-ordination. One of the essential characteristics of the OTFs (as well as CJTFs) is the ability for upgrading the forces in response to a strategic or operational necessity. No matter what type of forces/services are chosen to host the operational commands within the strategic directions, the options for upgrading include assigning additional units and formations to the existing HQ or Operational Command, including the main MoD forces within a respective military-administrative unit; or receiving assistance from the neighbouring strategic directions.35 Developments in the Southern district outlined the necessity to focus on interoperability at least in C2I (Command, Control and Intelligence), logistics and air support operations. Maximising efficiency The infrastructure of the armed forces’ Logistic Support Service is being optimised in accord with the country’s economic capabilities.36 According to Lieutenant-General Bulgakov, one of the ways of optimising it is to abandon the narrow departmental approach toward development of military infrastructure as a whole and logistic support in particular. This is due to the fact that operational defence organisation of the country’s territory is currently not under the jurisdiction of any state agency. A national territorial defence programme was pending. Its implementation will help to end duplication in the logistic activity of different ministries and departments in various parts of the country. Subsequently, it is planned to ensure their development on an integrated basis with the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces playing a coordinating role.37 Soon after been appointed, Sergei Ivanov, the minister of defence, wrote in the MoD newspaper Krasnaya zvezda that there would be a ‘rationalisation of logistics’ as a part of the military reform.38 Services such as warehousing, transport and healthcare for both the army and the paramilitary forces answerable to the Ministry of the Interior would be integrated under a single command in each military district.39 As was stated in the Military Doctrine, presented to the public in October 2003, among the goals and tasks of the military reform was the necessity to speed up the unification of logistic support and technical assistance of the military and other services.40 The unified logistics meant the establishment of a unified logistic system for the military and other services within the seven military-administrative districts. The system was an essential and basic element of the optimisation of the armed forces. It became a principal direction in the reforming of the military system. The unified logistics presupposed certain changes in the military system. First, it assumed optimisation of the command and control system and elimination of duplication of command structures in the regions. Second, it meant unification of procurement orders for the military and other forces. Third, it meant the merger of medical and infrastructure support systems and of


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transportation systems that would lead to significant reductions in personnel. Finally, it presupposed an introduction of a territorial system of induction within the boundaries of the administrative districts. Among the goals and tasks of the military reform for 2003 was the necessity to speed up the unification of the logistics support and technical assistance of the military and other services. Learning from experience: co-ordinating effect At the heart of Russia’s military reform efforts was the idea to introduce a joint and combined doctrine for territorial defence. The essential element of the military reform was to prepare for local conflict.41 From 1997 Russian military planners moved away from focusing exclusively on the mobile forces as a key major structural block for the newly reformed Russian military forces. Instead, they concentrated their efforts on a combination of mobile and multifunctional units. There is a certain terminology, such as ‘harmonisation’, ‘optimisation’ and ‘standardisation’,42 which accompanies any clarifications of the OTFs. Besides adjustment of the military to the revolution in military technology and military affairs, the OTF has to confront the task of preserving its combat capabilities in a climate of financial shortages and limited resources for R&D. Establishing working relationship amongst power structures in the FDs, the PEs and their staff had to learn from experience and by intervening at the stages when co-ordination between the services and power structures was deemed essential. Deputy head of the Committee on Defence and Security of the RF Federation Council, Vladimir Kulakov, in his interview to Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, stated: I believe there is a need to adopt a law on military forces of the RF Ministry of Defence, on its command and control structures. Different ministries and federal agencies are providing the forces for the RF armed forces. It is necessary to define by separate regulations the rules of engagement and co-ordinating procedures for joint actions in the unified formations in cases like Chechnya or in case of external aggression, or in order to implement other assignments.43 According to a pro-government information network (www.strana.ru), the new statute of the Military Districts (MDs) will clarify the functions and roles of the command and control structures in the newly defined MD-FD. Special attention is given to clarification of the relationship between the role and functions of the MoD HQ and subordination to it of all HQs of other force structures within a FD in case of declared state of emergency. The state of emergency in the region, territory or FD could be declared by presidential decree.44 Public debates on the implementation of military reform in Russia, widely presented in the military and policy journals and newspapers such as Military Thought, Krasnaya zvezda, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, etc., during the 1990s, allow the conclusions that follow to be drawn and indicate the areas where co-ordination among the services, ministries, civil and military authority will be essential.


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MoD multi-services compatibility problems In the last few years Russian defence and security specialists were accumulating and assessing the results of the practical experiences the forces had been put through. It is important to demonstrate what type of problems the military and security forces had to deal with prior to the decisions on better co-ordination and the merger of the security institutions. There were no unified communication systems amongst the formations of the RF MoD forces. The absence of proper communication and nonexistent reserves formed the impetus behind the restructuring of the air force and changes in its structure at the local level. For instance, the absence of communication between the aviation units belonging to different services was named as one of the obstacles hindering a co-ordinated and effective air-strike campaign in Chechnya. According to Sergei Ivanov, RF minister of defence, the Russian armed forces have, for example, 26 different types of anti-aircraft weapon and 20 types of communication control system—thus making the need for what he called a single technological policy for weaponry almost essential.45 MoD and FBTS In accordance with the experts’ analysis, in case of escalation of a crisis the FBTS was supposed to be transferred to the command of the regional HQ of the MoD group of forces. There is only a limited number of documents that define the procedures of transfers of the FBTS units. This ambiguity resulted in some confusion about the decisions regarding proper timing and conditions for the use of the FBTS. Prior to the resignation of the head of the FBTS, General A.Nikolaev was directly subordinated to the Russian president, which resulted in confusion about the dual chain of command structure. In case of a crisis, although the units were to be transferred to be under the operational control of the MoD HQ, they were still subordinate to the FBTS. In accordance with a new decision on the reorganisation of the FBTS, the operational control of the service came under FSB control. As a result, it was hoped that the intelligence/counter-intelligence potential of the FBTS would increase. This measure was aimed at restructuring the MoD command and control structures, clarifying the timing, forms and procedures underlying the structural changes, as well as outlining their priority functions within the OTFs. However, the complexities of the dual chain of command were not challenged. The issue of the engagement of officers and staff of the regional HQ into operational planning processes at the MoD regional HQ at the first stages of a conflict was also to be addressed. It has become essential to divide the functions and responsibilities between the MoD and FBTS units after a potential attack on Russia’s territory and the retreat of its forces from the border. It was widely regarded as a mistake to make the FBTS units responsible for operational tactical tasks since their number was limited and their training insufficient. The FBTS main functions within the OTFs would include:46 • guarding control posts and infiltration networking (100–120 km from the front line);


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• guarding military and industrial installations; • conducting and co-ordinating intelligence gathering; • conducting terrorist acts and raids on the territories occupied by the enemy; • disrupting communication lines and facilities of enemy forces in the areas of their former responsibilities; and • combating criminal formations and enemy airborne troop units (such a decision was to be taken by the OTF officer in command). In that case, the unit’s responsibility was to monitor the situation on the territories where there were no regular troop deployments. The FBTS units could be made responsible for blockades of enemy formations in specially marked directions. The definition of priority tasks for the FBTS within the joint task force concept demonstrates the logic underlying the recent decisions taken about the future role of the FBTS. MoD and MoI Since 1994, significant changes have been made to the structure and equipment of the MoI units. For example, combat divisions with full fighting capabilities were formed. However, the need for co-ordination in regulating relations between the MoD and the MoI forces required attention, such as determining which units and divisions would be allocated to the joint regional command in case of an escalating crisis; the nature of command at the joint HQ, and appropriate levels of combat readiness. These requirements stimulated the decisions in the security sector reform that were taken by the president and government in March 2003. The March 2003 reforms were designed to resolve a number of problems relating to the absence of co-ordination and compatibility of forces within the MoD, between the MoD and MoI, and between the federal border guards and other paramilitary within the Russian armed forces. Also to be resolved were the non-compatibility of concepts and different definitions of the rules of engagement, terminology and education. The curriculum of major military and interior forces colleges did not cover the structure and tasks of other force ministries. However, since 1996, the General Staff Academy included in its curriculum basic information on the MoI’s structure, functions, its operational plans and the means at its disposal. This information was considered essential for Joint Command operational planning. The MoI’s functions within the OTFs were as follows: guarding the facilities, railways, communication centres, major bridges and links, dams and atomic power stations, and combating criminal and enemy airborne forces within the range of the facilities under its responsibility. The decisions on the number of the MoI forces assigned to the OTF units should be coordinated with the MES. The functions to be addressed by both ministries could entail the following scenarios: massive evacuation of the population, evacuation of vital economic enterprises, and the policing and introduction of marshal law activities. The distribution of functions between the respective ministries was assigned to the OTF officer in command and fully depends on the local situation. It was deemed possible that the compatibility of forces could be achieved through the


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obligatory presence of observers/liaison officers of the ministries at military exercises. The MoD liaison officers from their respective military districts should be present at all training exercises of the MoI units. The MoI liaison operational group is assigned to the regional HQ of the MoD (Joint Command). Training exercises and experiences in the period 1997–2001 demonstrated the need to change the status of the MoI liaison operational groups assigned to the MoD (Joint) HQ and upgrade their level of representation. A liaison officer should have the responsibility to activate the forces of the respective ministry so that the operational planning for joint missions could be undertaken from the regional Joint Command HQ.47 In reality, the most probable scenarios to test the OTF concept would arise when dealing with social arrests and the complex emergency situation inside Russia and the CIS states, as well as dealing with local border conflicts. The type of crisis or emergency (social conflict, natural or technological disaster, tensions on the borders, etc.) would determine at least two factors guiding the first stage of the forces’ engagement in a potential conflict: (1) the forces and services that would be asked/ordered to act in crisis and conflict prevention, and (2) the initial chain of command and control (or the ministry/HQ) responsible for the operation. According to policy assessments, in a situation of emergency the key role was to be given to the MoI units. If the nature of the emergency escalates and assistance is required by the MoI troops, plans were prepared for the MoD to join the operation. For these purposes, a legal and technical base and operational planning structures are ready for the MoD units. The political and economic crisis in Russia (August-September 1998) was an example of an occasion where joint planning between the ministries became evident. MoD and MES The OTFs (MoD and MES) were considered vital not only for combat situations but also in cases of united efforts in tackling the prevention and elimination of the consequences of natural calamities and technological disasters. The limited resources of the MES and the limited specialised and rescue training of the MoD units determined their cooperation in such fields as evacuation planning (co-ordination of activities involving military transportation plans and population evacuation); equipping the points of transportation and re-grouping of forces; fire-fighting exercises and reconstruction of military facilities; and joint efforts in providing medical assistance. It is also considered vital to have open lines of communication on upgrading security alerts about the sources of a threat, information about nuclear explosion monitoring, and the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction. Special training and equipment/weapons should be provided to the MES units and be assigned potentially to the OTFs. These MES units are responsible for guarding communication facilities and lines of communication; guarding transport corridors and communication networks; reconstructing the communication networks; and assisting in the reconstruction of the defence infrastructure.48 An ecological or technological catastrophe in a military-administrative unit would first of all activate the local branch of the MES. Ultimately, the MES HQ will be responsible


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for the co-ordination of activities among other ministries, which would be assigned to assist the MES in dealing with an emergency situation. In case of a deteriorating ecological disaster, rising social unrest, or increased criminal activities the roles of other force structures might increase. This would necessitate a shift in the responsibility of dealing with the situation in Operational Command, with the key role played by the MoI (inter-ministerial upgrading). In order to implement this the ability of the militaryadministrative units to deal independently and self-sufficiently with small-scale emergencies and conflicts is bound to increase. If a situation continues to deteriorate (i.e. it spills over to other military-administrative regions or there is a possibility of external involvement in the conflict), political and military authorities could receive the necessary assistance either from the neighbouring FD or directly from the federal authorities. Capabilities and reserves In accordance with military guidelines in the RF there should be a minimum of ten (a potentially increasing number) fully equipped infantry divisions in a high state of combat readiness at any time. They will be ‘professionally trained to fulfil any tasks of ensuring the defence and security of the country and its allies, and to effectively repel a threat to national interests’.49 These infantry divisions are supposed to be an integral part of the OTFs.50 The number of divisions for the OTFs may increase if certain conditions are met—for example, better financing and regular supply of equipment and systematic training. According to military analysts there was a need to increase twofold the supply of weapons and equipment to the force structures by 2001 and threefold by 2005. The plans include the unification and standardisation of the equipment for all services and force structures.51 (These calculations were made in advance of the economic crisis, which enveloped Russia in August and September 1998.) As of June 1998, the following number of OTF formations were fully equipped, manned and 100 per cent financed for training: three divisions, four brigades and 21 regiments.52 With the re-establishing of the Ground Forces Main Directorate, which started functioning from 1 December 2001, it was confirmed that several fully equipped infantry groupings would be ready to carry out any tasks during peacetime. Appointed head of the Ground Forces Main Directorate, Colonel-General Nikolai Kormiltsev said: ‘We are not planning to wage war with the rest of the world, but these infantry forces are needed to be able to implement the tasks in 2–3 main strategic directions’. He also stated that the Russian government considered as the most serious and threatening the situation in the Central Asian and south-western strategic directions.53 The need for such reorganisation was proved in the following months with the increase of danger from the Taliban in Afghanistan. An economic assessment of the required financial support for the armed forces demonstrated that Russia could not afford to have more than 800,000 servicemen. According to the Security Council data (2001), there were around 2.5 million servicemen in all power structures. The proposals to cut other services were only partly satisfactory


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since they were deemed as measures which would undermine the effectiveness of the services and general security of the nation. According to military experts, cuts in personnel should affect not only the military (up to 365,000), but civilians as well. A reduction of 120,000 civilian service personnel was planned.54 At the Munich conference (2000) the then secretary of the Security Council, Sergei Ivanov, later appointed minister of defence, noted that the reductions were planned to affect up to 568,000 military personnel in all power ministries, of which 440,000 were servicemen.55 On the other hand, analysis of the minimum requirements for the force structure of the RF needed to be calculated against several factors, one of which was the potential increase of threats to Russia’s security in the mid-term future and the likelihood that the Russian military would have to participate in 2–2.5 local conflicts, one of which could escalate to becoming a major regional conflict.56 These calculations were used in addressing the reduction of personnel in the armed forces, rescheduling allocated funds, and increased emphasis on the territorial command and control principle in the reform of the military. In October 2003 it was confirmed that no more redundancies of military personnel were planned. The principle of combined recruitment (people under conscription and contracted personnel) was mentioned in the text of the doctrine of the modernisation of the RF armed forces, this being made public. The target was to increase the number of those serving under contract by up to 70 per cent by 2005.57 The country was expecting to face the so-called ‘demographic black hole’ from 2005 until 2010, when the draft reserve will be reduced by 40–50 per cent.58 By that time the military and state authorities should have introduced the changes that will meet the demands of national security (both in personnel policies and technological support). The introduction of the OTF is partly an element of the response policies of the military to personnel shortages, financial restrictions and new challenges in operational planning. The task was the introduction of the combined principle for the induction to military and security services—contract and conscription for 2004–10, with the goal of transformation to a fully professional military service by 2010. In late 2001 President Putin confirmed the decision once made by President Yeltsin. However, the dates for the transition to the professional armed forces that had been voiced were different: from 2003 (suggested by the Union of Right Forces), to 2004 (by Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov) and to 2010 (by former Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin). Rapid transition to a professional army was impossible, due to the fact that it was too expensive. MajorGeneral Valeriy Astanin, the then chief of the Main Organisation and Mobilisation Directorate, expressed his attitude to making the RF armed forces professional by pointing out that ‘rapid abolition of the conscription would cost hundreds of billions of roubles, which neither the nation nor its armed forces could afford; therefore the transition to a professional army could take a long time’.59 Joint efforts Marshal I.Sergeev, former minister of defence, always supported and lobbied for a national and unified joint state military structure. Until 2000 military formations were scattered amongst 10–12 different ministries, ranging from the MES to the MoI.


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However, in his time President Yeltsin did not support Marshal I.Sergeev’s ideas, relying on the system of ‘checks and balances’ policies he had devised. The unification of the military state structure was perceived as threatening due to the concentration of power in the ‘power ministries’. When the second Chechen campaign began, Marshal I.Sergeev was hoping to achieve his goal since his plans had received a boost from Acting President Putin (1999). The entourage around Putin strongly supported a merger of the power institutions, especially those dealing with security (Foreign Intelligence Service, FAPSI, FBTS and FSB).60 Increasing threats of the criminalisation of the society and domestic and international terrorism motivated the above support. There was another reason for support of the unified joint military organisation and structure. The purpose of these fundamental changes was to preserve the most capable personnel and the most effective, stable, and strategic military units. The selection principle is to be based on the moral-psychological factor. Using this criterion, the following units could be selected: the majority of the paratrooper forces, army special forces, special forces in the MoI (Vitiazi, Sobry, etc.), marines, military intelligence, motor rifle brigades, and regiments which had experience of combat action. Special attention was also placed on police operations and crime prevention, and antiterrorist activity (the so-called soft security issues), according to policies outlined by the FSB and FBTS. This approach was connected with the ‘specialities’ of the regions as well. For instance, the North-western and Far Eastern FDs are to concentrate their efforts on addressing soft security issues. This requires that the services instructed to deal with potential threats and security risks are to be co-ordinated within a security and defence bloc in the respective districts. The orientation of the North-western FD towards geoeconomic co-operation with neighbouring states, as well as its co-ordination of efforts on the soft security agenda with the regional and subregional alliances in the Baltic area and Northern Europe, shifted the focus to the Central FD for addressing hard defence issues. A regional group of forces was promised to be established by the Russian and Belorussian armed forces in case of a threat to the western frontier of the RF. On 12 April 2000, Colonel-General Igor Puzanov, the ex-commander of Moscow military district and appointed chief of the ground forces,61 stated that the decision to create a regional group of forces had been already signed and had entered the stage of practical implementation The numerical strength and nature of the structure was already determined. The topic of this joint Belarus-Russian military grouping was discussed by presidents Lukashenko and Putin during the latter’s visit to Minsk in April 2000. The grouping is supposed to contain 300,000 personnel, the core of which will be the Belarus army. The Russian forces will come from Moscow Military District and the Central FD. The Belarus-Russian joint military doctrine is developing in line with the process of designing the basic documents for the union of the two states. Difficulties still remain, one of many being the merger of tax and customs laws between the two states. Being part of the CIS security treaty, the RF forces were included in the plans of the coalition building in the CIS and preparations for preventive measures against any outside aggression or escalating internal crisis where and when the CIS joint actions would be required. Thus the RF forces in the Southern FD, together with the Armenian armed forces, constitute a coalition group of forces, or multinational OTFs in the


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Caucasian theatre of military operations within the CIS treaty on collective security. The RF OTFs of the merging Volga-Urals MDs, together with the new Operational-Strategic HQ 201 Motorised Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan, and the military formations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, form the Central Asian MOTFs (theatre of military operations). The aforementioned plans were part of the main activities for forming the system of collective security within the treaty of CIS collective security for 2001–5.62 Supporting elements During the period of mass reductions, the main directorate of education and training (vospitatelnoy raboty) of the MoD implemented a series of measures aimed at boosting morale, psychological atmosphere and strengthening discipline in the armed forces. A complex federal programme on the intensification of educational training and raising the social status of servicemen, uplifting the prestige of the military services, and developing military culture (2002–5) was submitted in May 2001. Federal executive institutions are instructed to construct a system of operational information for the military at the places of permanent deployment of troops and places where combat actions are going on. This system, based on modern informational technologies with the use of federal executive institution resources, was to be operational by 2003.63 In 2005, a unified system of education and training, moral-psychological, social and informational support for the armed forces and other power forces, should be completed. The only foreseeable obstacle towards implementing these measures is the issue of proper financing.64 The main work was to be done under the guidance of the districts’ press centres with the help of civil institutions. They were assisting to disseminate information about the armed forces, to educate the military and public, to create an environment of understanding of the needs and responsibilities of both in addressing issues related to the military service.65 At the district level, the first testing was initiated in September 2001 in the Ural FD. One of the reasons for such a choice was the planned reduction of military personnel in the Ural FD. Besides achieving these medium-term goals, the reforms were aimed at generating a positive public image of the armed forces. Modernisation of the transport infrastructure and telecommunications is becoming essential for the economic development of districts, regional and cross-regional cooperation, and the adequate preparation of conditions for ‘hosting’ international humanitarian aid and, potentially, for CJTFs. Despite the fact that the OTFs have to rely fully on their own resources in communication systems, the role of civil telecommunications becomes more important when local government and nongovernmental organisations are added to the more traditional military chain of command and have to communicate.66 Establishing effective communication networks within the FDs is becoming crucial for economic and military purposes. Construction of a fibreoptic communication line and the introduction of direct digital communication systems should be considered as essential.67 Whilst renovation of the aviation infrastructure is also important for deployment purposes, the modernisation and construction of transportation networks is considered


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vital for regional coalition building and promoting mobile efficiency of the local armed forces. The integration of the transportation system has great economic, political and military implications for the entire Eurasian region. Responding to terrorist threat The military reform means the introduction of ‘changes not only in the armed forces but to all elements of the military organisation of the state that should be capable in effectively providing self-defence in any developing circumstances of the international situation’.68 The anti-terrorist campaign in Russia started long before 11 September 2001. Violent actions in the North Caucasus and Moscow (1999 and October 2002), as well as in other locations throughout the country, motivated the Russian government to face the necessity to address the issue of terrorism by adopting appropriate legislation, governing procedures and reforming the security services. The changes were to limit and prevent terrorism and provide the Russian state with a basis for international co-operation in the anti-terrorist field, as well as legal, economic and political mechanisms for dealing with these issues domestically. The October 2002 events in Moscow, when more than 700 hostages were taken by the Chechen separatists with a demand for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, influenced the speed and forceful manner of political decisions taken by Moscow in the field of anti-terrorist measures. The following types of decisions were introduced: new anti-terrorist legislation, including a new law ‘On extremism’, amendments to the laws dealing with defence and security, and plans to restructure the Russian military and security services in order to adapt them to the needs of the antiterrorist campaign. As a result of the events the decisions were taken to increase the security of vital economic and political infrastructures and to carry out joint exercises by the Ministry of Emergency Situations with other services, including medical and police ones. New contingency plans were worked out for regional authorities in order to prepare them to respond to terrorist acts. Though all measures introduced were thought of and debated in advance, the October 2002 events in Moscow, as well as the November 2002 decisions of NATO and the EU to reorient their focus on anti-terrorist activities, stimulated the RF government to introduce new systemic reforms of the security and law enforcement agencies. Specific emphasis was made on the prevention, pre-emption and elimination of the anti-terrorist threat. Despite the high number of casualties the authorities took responsibility for the outcome of the operation in Moscow. That was quite a substantive change in behaviour of the political leadership in Moscow regarding difficult decisions of using force in situations with potentially high casualties of civilian lives. This was appreciated by the military and services involved. On 28 October 2002 President Putin had a meeting in the Kremlin with servicemen from the units of the Special Forces that took part in the rescue operation in the theatre complex in Melnikova Street in Moscow. A firm stance on the presidential responsibility for the operation’s outcome was essential in the circumstances of changes that were to be introduced in the Russian legislation related to national


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defence and security, making the anti-terrorist functions a high priority for all services. It was necessary politically if the military were to acquire new priority functions and the responsibility of using force and threat of force for internal purposes. Special services from 30 states sent their representatives to assist Russia in that crisis.69 Formal consultations started on 25 October 2002, when consultants were incorporated into the joint operational centre. Thus, by accepting the presence and consultations of anti-terrorist specialists from foreign services the Russian government shared collective responsibility with those involved for the results of the rescue operation itself. This approach of ‘shared collective responsibility’ for the outcome of the antiterrorist operations most probably would become one of the main characteristics of the Russian vision of a joint anti-terrorist campaign. Changes in legislation After the hostage events it was necessary for the Russian government to introduce major changes to the National Security Concept and other main documents that defined the defence and foreign policy of the state. Besides amendments to the National Security Concept, the law ‘On Defence’ and other official documents dealing with defence and security issues became urgent. The legal basis was to be adjusted to the changing environment, that would allow the use of force for operations inside the country itself as well as beyond its borders. Before October 2002 the intent to use force domestically was only theoretically mentioned in the Russian Military Doctrine and Concept of National Security. In the National Security Concept (2000) the use of force internally was allowed in strict accordance with the constitution and federal laws in cases of threat to the lives of citizens, territorial integrity and forceful changes to the RF constitutional basis. As was explained by a legal expert from the General Staff of the Russian armed forces, amendments regarding new approaches to using military force were possible precisely for parts of the National Security Concept.70 As a result the changes were introduced into the laws ‘On Defence’, ‘On the Status of Servicemen’ and some other legal documents. The RF government requested the parliament to adopt new legislation in order to provide the services with a proper legal framework in their war against terrorism. According to special PE to the State Duma Alesander Kotenkov, the proposed new draft of the law ‘On Combating Terrorism’ supported extending the rights and functions of the power ministries, state institutions and military personnel in the course of counter-terrorist operations. The presidential proposals suggested adjustments in the series of laws related to defence and security issues. Among the so-called preventive measures, judging by the statements of Pavel Burdukov, the deputy chairman of the State Duma III Security Committee, were amendments to the law ‘On Combating Terrorism’ and ‘On Burying and the Funeral Service’. The amendments, in particular, deprived relatives of detained persons charged with terrorism to have the right to receive their bodies after their death or know the place of their burial.71 Moscow’s operation, which was admittedly formed and carried out under the urgent threat of mass casualties, raised several important questions. They concerned the changes to the rules for the military, making the saving of civilian lives a high-priority task; the


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inter-agency co-ordination of military operations; and the consequences of using chemical/or other similar components in counter-terrorist operations as a justified aspect of projected military actions. President Putin addressed the issues of the reform of power bloc ministries in accordance with the need to adjust to the requirements and challenges of the war against terror at the session of the Security Council, RF on 31 October 2002. Under presidential orders the General Staff of the Russian armed forces was to make recommendations for a new draft of the National Security Concept that would accommodate the requirements of extending functions, tasks and missions of the military in anti-terrorist operations. The chief of the General Staff was to provide proposals for changes in the procedures and use of military formations in counter-terrorist activities. The General Staff was to assume greater responsibility and authority over all military and paramilitary formations. First, tighter co-operation was required between the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of Interior (MoI). To some extent, the presidential proposal was only expanding the potential of the plans formulated within the guidelines of the RF MoD and other services reforms. However, the changes were potentially to radicalise the concept of using military force internally. As part of the new approach the changes introduced modified the whole system of combat and special training, and stressed the necessity to create special army/military units with specific anti-terrorist functions, the basic core of which could be special purpose units of the FSB, MoI, GRU (military intelligence) and VDV (airborne troops). In order to complete this task, using the experience of foreign special services would be required. The pledge for the joint anti-terrorist campaign made at the Rome RussiaNATO Summit (2002) did not exclude, but presupposed, such a joint approach. The armed forces do not have special units trained for counter-terrorist missions and bearing consideration for saving the lives of hostages. The units assigned to such a job would have to be trained for such operations and would be required to strike with surgical precision. To some extent new missions require the adoption of a new military psychology, and the use of new combat techniques and methods—not just for conventional combat but specifically for anti-terrorist operations. Practical steps The Moscow events of 23–26 October 2002 also demonstrated the need for an efficiently functioning linked security services network.72 Special attention was given to the reforms in the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and to interior troops, increasing funding for all the services involved in the anti-terrorist operations. Directions for the reforms of the security and law enforcement sector were formulated in the Security Council documents adopted on 9 November 2000 and 31 May 2002, as well as in the ‘Fundamentals of the State Policies of the Russian Federation on Military Construction until 2010’, approved by presidential decree on 17 August 2002. In October 2002 the then minister of the interior, Boris Gryzlov, introduced a draft of the federal law ‘On Securing Civil Order’ for consideration by the RF government and State Duma III. The document proposed the reform of the Ministry of Interior and of interior troops. The idea of a division of functions among federal police, municipal militia and the National


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Guard was introduced, together with increased co-ordinating functions for the Ministry of the Interior.73 The municipal police were planned to be exclusively local and work only within their own territory. It was suggested that the federal police be established on the basis of the criminal militia service. The National Guard was to be formed primarily from the interior forces of the Ministry of the Interior, with functions to neutralise criminal formations and civil riots.74 The reforms were to be implemented in two phases. The first phase was expected to bring results until 2005; the second phase of the reform was planned to take place from 2006–10. The plans for the reform of the MoI interior troops were formulated in greater detail in the ‘Plan of Construction of the Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the RF for 2001–5’. During the first phase, priority in the reform was given to the optimisation of the structures and reductions in the numerical strength of the troops. By the end of 2005 about 30,000 servicemen are planned to be made redundant. The prime financing went to technical and procurement support, with special emphasis on automation.75 New units are to be formed in the regions with difficult social-political environments and high crime rates. The formations and units are to be transformed into brigades and battalions, thus reducing the surplus elements of command and control, logistics and services. The plans included the introduction of changes in functions and missions of the interior troops. Such functions as street patrolling in local communities, security servicing of essential federal infrastructures and enterprises, transit and communications are to be minimised. The process of establishing special purpose units as independent formations of the interior troops is to be completed by 2004. During the second phase (2006–10) the transformation of the organisational structures of the interior troops is to be completed. The interior troops’ formations and units will be the main forces that are going to be responsible for domestic security. By 2006 the interior troops in the seven federal districts are to be subordinated to five regional commands and two regional HQs. The formation of operational strategic commands in accordance with the Russian Military Doctrine automatically brings adjustments in the command and control (C&C) structures of the MoI and interior troops. The introduction of new technologies in the C&C structures demands the necessity to have special information-telecommunication units in the chain of command as well. On 1 November 2002 the State Duma adopted a draft of the law ‘On Technical Support of the Ministry Interior Troops’ at the first reading. Its focus was on operationalterritorial formations as characteristic of the organisational forms of the interior troops. New options were introduced in servicing the Ministry of the Interior equipment. New regulations opened the opportunities for servicing special purpose, combat and aviation equipment, not only at the MoD facilities but at any local maintenance facilities on a competitive basis.76 Additionally, the 2002 events demonstrated the need for new procurement policies, and the introduction and use of secret and specialised means that could allow immediate neutralisation of criminals and terrorists before they were able to detonate explosives. The use of armed forces and a wider spectrum of weapons, plus nonlethal means and new types of explosives was considered. As the events in Moscow demonstrated, a new type of equipment and special kit for anti-terrorist operations were needed, including sets of depressants and antidotes, and special medicine. It was stressed


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that medical units of the MoD had to be trained for counter-terrorist operations. Special training for military and Ministry of Emergencies and Civil Defence units against radioactive, chemical and bacteriological attacks should be provided. In accordance with its new expanding functions the General Staff of the Russian armed forces was to coordinate the efforts of its medical service, its radioactive, chemical and bacteriological units and the services of the Ministry of Emergencies and Civil Defence. Changes were introduced to the military and to special forces’ procedures in hostagerelated situations, to the structures and tasks of the armed forces, and to procurement policies that would allow the military and law enforcement services to deal adequately with the new security challenges. Though some of the measures were long promised, the October events intensified the necessity to address them urgently. Among them was the decision of the Russian government to allocate additional resources for the anti-terrorist activity. Parliament was requested by the government to consider a transfer of additional resources to the budget articles dealing with defence and security. The ‘preventive package’ was planned to increase the counter-terrorist budget expenditure by an additional 157 million roubles in 2003.77 According to Colonel Mikhail Grishanov, the deputy chairman of the Committee on Security of the State Duma III, special attention was given to financing intelligence and preventive information gathering, technical assistance to the law enforcement agencies and the training of special forces units (Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, etc.).78 Financial assistance was confirmed for new construction on the southern borders of the RF. According to Major-General Mikhail Fedorov, the then deputy head of the Logistics Department of the Federal Border Guard Service, up to 2 billion roubles were to be spent on building more than eighty border control check points and infrastructures in military settlements along the southern borders in 2003. Despite an increase in spending in the fight against terrorist activities, it was obvious that it would hardly cover all the needs and requirements. Emphasis on increased coordination among the services was considered an essential reserve. The turn of the General Staff and Russian armed forces in general to the issues of anti-terrorism became a new systemic task, not only for the military but for society as a whole.79 Centralised response: the Federal Anti-terrorist Commission On 15 December 2002 it was announced that the Russian prime minister approved appointments to the Federal Anti-terrorist Commission and signed the order on the status of the Commission. The nominations confirmed the establishment of the permanent institutional body that was to act as a centre for the co-ordination of security, border guard services and militia (police) on a regular basis and in case of emergencies. This decision started a process of establishing a new coordination system for anti-terrorist security. That governmental decision also clarified the subordination of special antiterrorist forces (MoI) and interior troops for operations other than war in the internal (anti-terrorist) use of force in Russia. The governmental decision No. 880 ‘On the Statute of the Federal Anti-terrorist Commission’ was adopted on 10 December 2002. It clarified the Commission’s missions and tasks, naming it as the co-ordinating body for the anti-terrorist activities of the


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federal executive institutions, executive branches of the subjects of the Russian Federation, regional and local governments and all organisations concerned. The Commission was named responsible for formulating the RF anti-terrorist strategy and tactics, and for co-ordinating the actions of the ministries, services and executive authorities of any level aimed at neutralisation and prevention of terrorists attacks, as well as at addressing the conditions that promote them. It was made responsible for initiating and introducing the anti-terrorist legislation. The decisions taken by the Commission are obligatory to all federal executive institutions, executive authorities of all subjects of the Russian Federation, regional anti-terrorist commissions and all organisations of the RF. The Federal Security Service (FSB) provides operational management and logistic support. The information support and policy assessments are provided by all federal ministries, agencies and services represented in the Commission and the authorities involved in any potential terrorist incident on a case by case basis. As General Kulikov, former minister of the interior, pointed out, the difference of the 2002 arrangement for the security counter-intelligence operations was in procedures and clear division of functions. It was made clear that both the prime minister and president approved the suggested overall plan of an operation that left the operational implementation to specific services.80 The leading roles of the FSB and Ministry of Interior as main players in the Commission were confirmed by the then prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s decision (No. 2149). The PM nominated himself as the chairman and appointed director of the Federal Security Services Nikolay Patrushev and the then minister of the interior Boris Gryzlov as deputy chairmen of the Commission. The other 22 members of the Commission were not specified. Their anonymity was intentional for security reasons. Though the Commission is governmental, the role of the president is defined as the ultimate authority, especially in the use of force and/or in the introduction of a state of emergency in specific regions or territories. The governmental reshuffle (March 2004) did not change the status or subordination of the Commission. The first Interagency Commission on Terrorism was established in January 1997.81 It functioned within the Directorate for Combating Organised Crime in the Ministry of the Interior. The Commission included representatives of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Foreign Intelligence Service, Ministry of the Interior (MoI), the Federal Government Communication and Information Agency, the Federal Border Guard Service and Ministry of Defence. The roots of the present Federal Anti-terrorist Commission date back to the governmental decision made on 6 November 1998. The Federal Anti-terrorist Commission (1998) was established at the time when President Putin was head of the FSB and was responsible for the operational guidance of the Commission.82 Throughout the period 1998–2000 changes were introduced to the legislation defining the statute and procedures of the Commission. The events of 9/11 2001 and increased terrorist activities in Russia, including the events in Moscow, the Far East and Siberia in 2002,83 demonstrated the need for a more effective institutional structure with better-defined areas of responsibilities and simplified procedures. The Security Council of the RF could not take the responsibility for co-ordinating the anti-terrorist activity, due to its constitutional constraints. The decisions taken by the SC, as well as its recommendations, have to be approved and supported by the president. The SC decisions are not obligatory to any institutions, executive or legislative powers, or local community. Despite the


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attempts of some policy-makers and former servicemen to suggest the RF Security Council as a proper authority for co-ordination of anti-terrorist activity in the country, the government and President Putin supported the idea of establishing a new Federal Antiterrorist Commission that would allow by its statute, networks and subordinated affiliations in the federal districts immediate response to terrorist threats and be able to deal with them authoritatively, having at its disposal financial means, security and other services’ capabilities.84 It was soon understood that in the anti-terrorist campaign there was an essential need for an institution that could co-ordinate activity and have the legally binding authority to require the implementation of its decisions. Security services merger The FSB played a leading role in each commission. The idea of a permanently functioning and effective centre for the co-ordination of security and border guard services and militia (police) has been already voiced for some time. In 2001 President Putin’s chief of staff Aleksander Voloshin,85 Centre for Strategic Studies’ director German Gref and Federal Security Service chief Nikolai Patrushev produced a report on strategic development trends in Russia. Along with other plans it outlined ‘the strategic necessity to integrate the FSB and other special services’.86 In December 2002 director of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev pointed out that presently the highest priority of the FSB was to combat terrorism.87 The FSB Anti-terrorist Centre is the main operational HQ in dealing with events like the October 2002 hostage crisis in Moscow.88 The Internal Security Directorate of the FSB, responsible for safeguarding the facilities of the Russian security structures, promotes a more active role for the internal security structures in the regions and their co-ordination in light of ‘threats, assessed by the FSB, as coming from the external sources including foreign intelligence agencies and international terrorist organisations’.89 Many former security servicemen were publicly discussing the need for co-ordination of the security services in Russia. The need, in the opinion of many, was dictated by the current level of crime, terrorist threats and the disorganised and uncoordinated activities of various security services (state and private) that were established during the 1990s in Russia. It was believed that such a disintegrated and overlapping system was a very ineffective way to secure Russia’s society, especially after 11 September. Professor Anatolii Sudoplatov, acting member of the Academy of Security, Defence and Law Order, wrote in December 2002: It is necessary to think once again about the co-ordination among various and numerous security services and law enforcement services in Russia… We cannot tolerate any longer the [ease with which] our borders [are breached] in light of creeping crime and the overwhelming flow of illegal immigration. The reality urges us to substitute the ineffective system of numerous security services and law enforcement agencies[, each duplicating the work of the other,] with a revived unified centre for operational daily supervision of the security, border control and law enforcement agencies, that would function under strict parliamentary control and be empowered with full responsibility for its


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decisions. It’s high time to stop frightening people with the idea of the revived NKVD-KGB. It’s quite typical that the ‘democratic US society’, when it understood the threat posed to its basic principles of existence, decided to limit some of its traditional liberties and rights and to establish the federal ministry of internal security (as indeed recently happened when establishing the US Department of Homeland Security).90 In 1996 Lieutenant-General Sergei Bogdanov, former analyst of the General Staff of the RF armed forces and chief of the Centre for Operational-Border Studies, Moscow, described the relationship between the FSB and MoD forces in counterintelligence/border control operations. He pointed out that the proposed military countermeasures along the border include strengthening border troops; beefing up armed forces along the western border; and closer co-ordination between the FBS border districts and Ministry of Defence military districts, with the FBS gaining operational control over MoD forces and assets, such as army and tactical aviation and motor rifle units.91 It seems that the same principle used in the subordination to the FSB at the operational level has been adopted towards the services and military units assigned to perform in counterterrorist operations. Besides traditional police functions, the Ministry of the Interior, together with the FSB, was to provide force power for anti-terrorist operations. The special purpose forces of the FSB, plus the special purpose forces and interior troops of the Ministry of the Interior, constitute the core of paramilitary strength available to act against terrorist attacks in the first instance. Special attention is given to the availability of the interior troops of the MoI to perform the anti-terrorist tasks. According to the then commander-in-chief of the interior troops, deputy minister of the Interior Colonel-General Viacheslav Tikhomirov, the appropriate presidential directive clarified the development plans for the interior troops for 2005–10 and emphasised the subordination of the interior troops to the MoI.92 The principle of subordination was confirmed in the framework of major governmental restructuring in March 2004. In the future, as part of the military and security sector reform, the name of the interior troops will be changed to ‘National Guard’ (or ‘Federal Guard’). The National Guard is charged with the protection of social and constitutional order within the federal districts. The new name more appropriately characterises their tasks as force capability units of the Ministry of the Interior without changing their subordination. At the same time it was considered important to drop the term ‘troops’ in order to avoid confusion with the Ministry of Defence military units. The future plans of the reform also presuppose the establishment of special purpose units. Those units are to become a separate structure, in future acting as part of the rapid reaction forces of the Ministry of the Interior. Those plans were confirmed at the MoI Military Council on 28 November 2002. One should not confuse the developments regarding the interior troops with the plans of the Russian Ministry of Defence to revive traditions of the National Guard of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries as part of the military reform and optimisation of military forces. The then minister of the interior, Boris Gryzlov, pointed out that in the near future interior troops will have to respond accordingly to the ‘internal threats to the national security of Russia’. This task motivated the need for their intense reform.


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MoI special forces units are to constitute the core of the rapid reaction forces, their main purpose being anti-terrorist activities. Together with the special purpose forces of other services they are to be re-formed into the National Guard, under the direct supervision and control of the president, and could be activated by presidential order and easily redeployed throughout the country without conventional forces in Europe (CFE) limitations being applicable to deployment.93 New special forces formations were ready for operational training from 1 November 2002. By mid-2003 there were six special purpose units, and by the end of 2003 ten new special purpose units were planned to be ready for active duty. Special purpose units are to be formed on a contract basis. Their deployment is to be regionally based. At least four out of the ten units were planned to be deployed in Chechnya as part of the stabilisation force. A merged pool of special purpose forces is to be combined from the special forces units previously functioning under MoD and MoI subordination or as part of the interior troops contingents. They are to become the core of the mobile detachments of the permanent readiness forces and part of the rapid reaction units of the Ministry of the Interior, mainly responsible for domestic security and crime prevention. In a sense the concept of the National Guard, a type of rapid reaction corps under strict and exclusive presidential control, initially appeared in 1991 and was proposed by the head of the presidential security service, General A.Korzhakov.94 Among the objections of the General Staff against the transfer of the interior troops under MoD supervision was the recognised need to respect CFE requirements. According to the Adapted CFE Treaty (1999) only armed forces equipment was accountable under the provision of the Treaty’s system of national and territorial ceilings that limits the total amount of equipment present on each state’s border. In the case of the transferred subordination of the interior troops to the Ministry of Defence the flexibility of movements and regrouping of forces would be lost. In addition, new units were planned to be used for internal purposes (antiterrorist), while the armed forces are traditionally used for national defence from external threats. The need for co-ordinated actions between the MoD and MoI was implemented through many different channels, including the appointment of army officers with practical military experience in local conflicts to the highest commanding positions in the MoI interior troops. For instance, after the 1994–6 disasters in miscommunications between the MoD and Ministry of the Interior units in Chechnya, the RF government has taken the decision to appoint a military officer to the position of commanding officer of the interior troops. The knowledge and experience of international CJTFs was brought to the MoI after the appointment of General Shevtsov, former representative of the RF MoD to NATO, as deputy minister of the interior. The RF president made the PEs responsible for the co-ordination of anti-terrorist activities at the interagency level in the federal districts. As a result the PEs were made responsible for the actions of the counter-terrorist services in their respective FDs. Several reasons were put forward for such steps. The decision allowed Russia to keep its lead in the ability to perform ‘grey area’ tasks in operations other than war (OOTW). The existence of strong paramilitary (‘militarised’) forces, such as the interior troops and special units of the Ministry of the Interior, was considered an important structural advantage. It gave an opportunity to carry out ‘grey zone’ security tasks that required the use of substantial military force without bringing in regular or special units of the armed


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forces. In accordance with the Russian federal law ‘On Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior’, the interior troops units are responsible for blocking the regions of imposed emergency rule, neutralising local conflicts, keeping apart the conflicting sides, liquidating illegal military formations, as well as keeping order in the areas neighbouring the places of conflict and putting down social unrest. This approach permitted increased militarised presence in case of need in any region without violating the CFE Treaty limitations on the presence of forces in the territories covered by the Treaty, such as the north, west and south-west of Russia and the North Caucasus. The Ministry of Defence adaptation to the new security missions combating the terrorist threat is still in process.95 However, some results in institutional adaptations had been achieved by March–April 2003. However, certain functions such as protection of the military infrastructure and counter-intelligence tasks, etc., that are related to the responsibility of the department of military counter-intelligence within the FSB, or internal security units re-established within the MoD in 2000,96 put the MoD under the direct supervision of the new Federal Anti-terrorist Commission. All units of the armed forces and special military counter-intelligence branch in the FSB were ordered to prepare assessments of potential terrorist threats to military installations, the infrastructure, etc. and to provide recommendations for liquidating conditions enabling terrorist activities by 15 December 2002. This was an official starting working date for the new Federal Anti-terrorist Commission. The results were reported to the MoD and the Federal Anti-terrorist Commission in March 2003. In reality inspections of the military districts and armed forces have already begun, as well as of all services within each federal district’s framework, and of the ability of each to withstand terrorist threats and incidents. The command and control structures of the Far Eastern military district were among the first that were inspected in December 2002. The results of the inspection demonstrated shortfalls in the co-ordination of military units and other services of the military district in providing effective territorial defence, early warning and information dissemination, as well as air-space support in time of war. The weaknesses in defence were eradicated by 1 March 2003. It should be noted that in addition to the counter-intelligence and safeguarding functions within the MoD the military add the expertise and capabilities of units from the department on chemical, bacteriological and nuclear defence to the anti-terrorist measures. The upgrading of territorial defence in case of a threat of massive terror presupposes the increased role of the Ministry of Defence and General Staff of the armed forces. Under present decisions the MoD and General Staff are ordered to step up co-ordination between the armed forces and security services. A new mechanism of co-ordination was to be defined by spring 2003. The Federal Anti-terrorist Commission united representatives of other executive departments and agencies which have the responsibility for the security of infrastructure or services within their own areas and to deal with terrorist attacks. In mid-December 2002 the Russian parliament adopted the federal law with a funding of 500 million roubles for the anti-terrorist campaign, including funding for the special forces of the FSB. The money was allocated for the purchase of specialised equipment for the FSB and


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active participants in the anti-terrorist campaign. The Anti-terrorist Centre is an essential part of the Federal Anti-terrorist Commission and is responsible, among other tasks, for procurement decisions for anti-terrorist operations. In previous years the director of the Centre was also one of the deputy chairmen of the Commission. Anti-terrorist security system The governmental status of the Commission and its ability to engage additional resources and players at any federal, regional and local level for the task of dealing with economic, social and political conditions that could prevent and eliminate the spread of terrorist activity make it an essential element in the anti-terrorist security structure in present-day Russia. The governmental status of the Committee simplified the process of securing funds and co-ordination efforts in dealing with preventive measures in the country’s infrastructure. The Federal Anti-terrorist Commission also co-ordinates the performances of the regional anti-terrorist commissions in Russia. The anti-terrorist commissions were established at federal district level and in all Russian regions. The regional anti-terrorist commissions were headed by the governors or heads of the regional FSB branches. The experience of the Southern FD demonstrated that the most effective were commissions headed by the representatives of regional executive authorities—governors, for instance, who had financial and administrative powers at their disposal to implement immediately counter-terrorist or protective measures on the advice of the security services.97 The Commission, through its Anti-terrorist Centre, is connected with anti-terrorist networks in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (Anti-terrorist Centre in Bishkek). It acts as an interagency and crossterritorial institution that unites the efforts of multiple players in the fight against international ter-rorism. Thus, it takes a lead in stimulating and co-ordinating international engagement and co-operation in the anti-terrorist sphere. The potential of the Commission is tremendous. The governmental decision to establish the Anti-terrorist Commission revealed elements of the new architecture of the anti-terrorist security system in Russia and the role of its main players. The second phase of the institutional restructuring of the new anti-terrorist architecture will be in place with the adjustments for new missions within the Ministry of Defence. In some sense this Commission is similar to the US Homeland Security Department. It will be used as the core point for international anti-terrorist cooperation. According to the Russian media the RF government and parliament transferred substantial financial resources for the merger of military, law and security structures with a view to intensifying the anti-terrorist campaign. The total transferred is difficult to determine, varying from 3–23 billion roubles in 2003, depending on the source being consulted.98 This money was to finance the new interagency co-ordination centre for antiterrorist activities; that is, the Federal Anti-terrorist Commission and seven anti-terrorist commissions in all seven federal districts.


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Finding a role—international aspect It was also pointed out that Russia needed to develop its own specialisation in the antiterrorist campaign formed as part of the global US-led coalition.99 However, as stressed by Russian military analysts on many occasions, any joint international anti-terrorist or special forces operation presupposed the correlation of doctrines, allowing the maximisation of the effectiveness of joint actions. LieutenantGeneral Anatoliy Klimenko (Ret.), former director of the centre of military-strategic research of the General Staff, RF Armed Forces, stressed in particular that the ‘coordination of military doctrines is a necessity as a codification of the efforts of the international community in its struggle against terrorism, and that it requires to be dealt with on the international level’.100 Clarification of the terminology of what could be considered an act of terrorism became essential as well. In Russia terrorism was traditionally defined as an act of war, as one of the means to achieve political goals by extreme, nationalistic and other organisations, which put terrorism on the same level as such an activity as war.101 Such a definition required an adequate practical response from the state. Thus, the means employed and the level of force in response should be equal to that in a combat situation. The events of October 2002, at least in the formal political context, required President Putin to address the issues of adequate use of force, and the need for different operational procedures and procurement policies. As Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Klimenko pointed out, it became important to focus attention not on the potential suspects as such, and potential violators of international regimes, but rather on the methods and targets of potential terrorist attacks.102 On 18 January 2003, at the annual meeting of the Military Academy of the General Staff, the need was stressed to address the issues of a new contemporary use of ground forces, including use in anti-terrorist operations. It was pointed out that it was imperative to clarify the terminology of international terrorism, its definition, elements and characteristics, and to define internationally basic principles of action against terrorism and establish a model of international law on fighting it. Special significance was attached to the monitoring of financial activities that might provide the sources of support for terrorism—for instance, to monitor drugs trafficking. Sergei Ivanov, Russian minister of defence, once again stated at the informal meeting of the NATO ministers of defence in Colorado Springs, 9 October 2003, that there was an urgent necessity to work out joint approaches to the process and methods of fighting against the terrorist threat. At the same time he confirmed Russia’s right to use preventive strikes, in case of potential threat, against any target at any location.103 Pacing reforms The public documents (1999–2001) which clarify the current defence and security postures of the state cover the tasks for the transitional period, a period characterised by the synergy of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic deterrents, and their means and capabilities.


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The assessment of four military campaigns (the Gulf War, and those in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq), and Russia’s own campaign in Chechnya, led to important readjustments in military planning and theory. In 2000 and 2001 some conceptual decisions (with presidential approval) were taken, they determined advances in the following spheres: nuclear deterrence, naval strategy and forces development, space and aviation, air-space defence, the defence industry, and the creation of command control systems of forces at tactical level. In 2002 and 2003 decisions were taken on priority directions and spheres for R&D in military science and technology. Assessments of priority areas in science developments, technology and techniques until 2030, and a concept of scientific-technological security in Russia, were submitted for presidential approval during 2002. In 2002 a document ‘On Basic Principles for the Long-term Military-Technical Policy of Russia’ was adopted. The main goal of military reform is to create modern, compact and mobile armed forces with reasonable deterrent potential. In 2001 Russia started to implement the second phase of military reform. The programme initially adopted by President Yeltsin (1997)104 had to be modified and adjusted to economic requirements and necessities to guarantee a balanced development of the state military system. In the course of the implementation of the first stage (1997 to January 2001) it became obvious that even the concept of the military reform itself required basic changes. Several decisions were adopted as a result of discussions in the Security Council, recommendations of a commission of experts on military reform under the auspices of the Security Council, and also parliamentary hearings on defence issues which were held in the RF MoD. The goals of the programme (2001–15) were to transform the post-Soviet military into a modern type of military system. For the first time since the break up of the Soviet Union the plans for military reform were based on the parameters (short and mid-term) for economic development provided by the government and incorporated in them. The implementation of the programme was planned in three stages, each based on a five-year plan of economic development. The Centre of military-strategic analysis under the General Staff introduced threat assessments as the reform parameters. According to their assessments the Russian armed forces must be ready to perform combat tasks in local wars and armed conflicts and be in a state of mobilisation readiness for a large-scale regional war. These considerations led to the decisions on strategic missile forces and conventional forces. The focus was to be made on rebuilding conventional capabilities and re-establishing the ground forces as a separate force structure. The re-establishment of the space forces, where strategic missile forces will be an integral part, was also one of the tasks. Carrying out reductions, abandoning duplication in missions and functions of services and supporting overlapping logistics were aimed at creating a financial and technological pool, allowing the preservation and restructuring of a reasonable deterrent potential (1,500 warheads on strategic missiles until 2010). It was considered essential for the preservation of the status quo and reducing the chances of nuclear escalation. The reforms are planned to be carried out by a maximum concentration and accountability of financial, technical and intellectual resources that are to be channelled to the main areas of R&D. This is a policy of ‘targeted programme planning in military construction’. The introduction of the mechanism of ‘targeted planning’ is expected to


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optimise the resources and to construct a modern balanced military system. The main tasks of military restructuring were to improve the functioning basis of the defence-industrial complex, to introduce and develop the legal and jurisdictional basis for defence and security activity, to improve the state’s system of command and control of the military and security, to improve the socio-economic conditions of the service and retirement package for servicemen and civil personnel in 12 military and security related ministries and agencies. The essence of the military reform is to change everything in the Russian armed forces—from the principles of socio-economic support of the military personnel to the development base of the defence-industrial complex.105 In 2003 the third round of reshuffles in the power bloc bodies marked the next round of military and security reforms. In March 2003 a certain cycle in the military and security reform was completed with the third wave of reshuffles in the power structures and reunification of the power institutions and network. At the same time steps were taken to integrate the security structures in order to increase their efficiency to deal with new security challenges. On 11 March 2003, by a series of decrees, President Putin reorganised the state’s security system. The decisions were taken on integrating the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) and the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS) into the Federal Security Service (FSB). The integration measures were supposed to lead to substantial savings.106 Presumably the argument was that the merger could help those institutions to become more efficient. As was demonstrated in practice, both services could only benefit from the joint work, since the FSB and border troops were especially uncoordinated in Chechnya. The Federal Tax Police Service was abolished and its functions transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. The State Committee on Drug Trafficking was created. Sergei Stepashin, who heads the Audit Committee, said on 16 March 2003 that President Vladimir Putin’s reorganisation of the country’s security institutions was ‘a necessary measure’ for Russian security. Stepashin went even further, stating that the dismantling of the KGB in 1991 was a purely political decision and that after 9/11 it became necessary to consolidate all security functions into a single centre.107 The changes have to be viewed as part of Putin’s long-term strategy for government administrative reform.108 By the end of 2003 the RF Minister of Defence clarified the current four groups of tasks put forward before the military. First, priority was given to the deterrence of military and political-military threats to RF security. It meant securing strategic stability and providing stable defence for the country. Second, the safeguarding of economic and political interests of the state were named essential even if this required the threat or use of force as the last resort. Third, the ability to perform in peace-enforcement missions under the UN or the CIS mandates was named essential as the country’s compliance with its international commitments. Finally, the Russian military were urged to use force to neutralise military threats and/or prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In 2003 high military officials reported that the period of crisis develop-ment of the


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Russian armed forces was over. It was believed that the Russian armed forces had managed to skip the period when the issue of the plain survivability of the RF military was at stake. From 2003 the military reform was concentrated on the systemic sustainable development of the military organisation within a set of parameters. Russian officials publicly confirmed that as of 2003 Russia was concentrating on the widescale systemic development of its armed forces. The main goals, as defined by the political-military authority, were the following. First, the RF armed forces were to achieve an increase in the number of units of permanent readiness. Second, Russia was to preserve the capability potential for strategic deterrence and should be able to respond to two military conflicts of any type or nature and simultaneously participate in a peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operation on its own or as part of a multinational contingent. This position was confirmed at the annual conference of the Academy of Military Sciences in January 2004. In his speech the minister of defence repeated the main points of the ministerial report ‘On Current Tasks of the Development of the RF Armed Forces’ that had been publicly announced in October 2003. It was pointed out that the main purpose of the General Staff should be situation assessments and development of the operational use of the armed forces. Special focus was put on the necessity to go beyond tactical military planning (stimulated by experience in counter-terrorist operations) to the operational and strategic level of assessments and planning. The importance of nuclear deterrence and strategic capabilities (with a predominance of air/space and navy operations, rapid deployment and intelligence support) was confirmed. The task of staffs and commanders is to prepare for operations on a completely different scale, including air, space, naval and ground elements, where the control system requires an incomparably more serious approach. According to Andrei Kokoshin, Russian MP and ex-deputy minister of defence, Russia is in the process of forming a completely different military triad: strategic forces (with traditional elements of strategic missile forces, a strategic navy and strategic aviation); conventional forces (consisting of ground forces, a non-strategic navy and air components) and special anti-terrorist forces. Still deterrence: difficult issues One of the influential newspapers, Vremya Novostei (Moscow), stated: ‘The joint battle against terrorism does not exclude the bitter struggle for energy transit routes and economic influence in the space which both Russia and the US regard vital for their interests’.109 The situation is getting increasingly complicated due to the fact that both US/NATO and Russia view the same areas of ‘middle Europe’,110 Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia as areas of applied ‘intensive’ geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. Justifying their policies Russia and the US are appealing to the modified deterrence concept and are stating their right to preserve the possibilities for ‘forward presence’ in the Eurasian region. ‘Regional deterrence’ (US) suggests that the United States adopts a national military strategy based on the ability to deny the opponent’s political/military objective, either by basing US forces within the region in times of crisis or by convincing the


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adversary that they can be forward deployed rapidly if the need arises.111 Since the counter-terrorist campaign started in Afghanistan, US/foreign deployment on the territory of a state in Central Asia has changed from being a possibility to one of practical reality. In the 1990s Russia introduced the strategy of ‘realistic deterrence’. The concept, on the one hand, signalled the acceptance by Russia of its limited financial resources and force capabilities that prevented its continued and permanent military presence in the CIS. On the other hand, this concept introduced a new type of Russian presence in the region (through operational commands and established liaison missions in the ministries of defence of the former Soviet Republics). The concept officially proclaimed the lowering of the threshold for using nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.112 The current version of Russian Military Doctrine (the one in operation until 2005) stated that ‘Russia would consider as direct military threat any deployment of foreign troops on the territories of the adjacent states as well as concentration of forces near its borders’.113 This is the only statement that directly addresses the future deployment of CJTFs in Eurasia. Otherwise there are no public international agreements among the CIS states (with the exemption of the Russia-Belarus agreements) that address the issues of direct deployment of Western military forces on the territories of the CIS countries. This position is very much linked with the following systemic elements of Russia’s foreign and defence policies; that is, the evolution of approaches to deterrence and to the policy of ‘preventive strikes’, and the Operational Task Forces (OTFs). Conceptually, the OTFs are linked to the principles of ‘realistic deterrence’ in military policy and the philosophy of ‘extensive geopolitics’. The philosophy of ‘extensive geopolitics’ is based on a new understanding of how the state should maintain its influence in vital areas by changing its form of presence in the regions: from physical deployment to monitoring a security space through C3I networks; by keeping open the options for upgrading its military presence in ‘zones of influence’; adopting a new policy of relations with local communities. The OTFs represent an attempt by defence and security forces structurally to address the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century with adequate means and at the same time optimise the costs of national security and defence postures. It is apparent that the multinational OTF (Russian version of the CJTFs) represents the ‘power projection’ capabilities of the RF forces in the CIS where national or local forces/units are added to the Russian OTFs in accordance with bilateral and multilateral agreements. OTFs were the proper solution that came in time for the security and defence system of the state to respond to the challenges of terrorist threats. ‘Realistic deterrence’ implies that the state should abandon its orientation towards the preservation of military balance through quantitative parity in weapons and reserves and the right to respond to any aggressive acts by all possible means. According to Russia’s National Security Concept (2000), the country is giving priority to diplomatic, political, economic and non-military and non-force methods in crisis and conflict prevention operations. However, the state reserves the right to use military force unilaterally if the combination of non-military threats to national security are considered unacceptably dangerous.114 In other words, the principle of ‘real deterrence’ means that the state accepts the possibility of becoming engaged in a conflict both via an escalating pattern and through an inadequate or asymmetrical response (for instance, declaration of


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a unilateral strike as a means of response to a non-nuclear threat in case of threat to the existence of the nation).115 It is believed that strategic deterrence will still remain a basis of the nuclear and general-purpose forces. This will affect the structure of the armed forces and military art.116 New elements in military art will be strategic non-nuclear deterrence on the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD), on the basis of high-precision weapons technology. The targets will be essential objects of the economic system of an enemy state. This concept of strategic non-nuclear deterrence will require establishing a completely new intelligence-offensive system that would include intelligence capabilities of a strategic early warning of attack; readiness to deliver an offensive, or to intervene within a certain time-frame (day, hour, minutes) with certain types of weapons and forces; the required number of high-precision weapons with different basing possibilities; an automatic C&C system that could cover all forces and means of strategic non-nuclear deterrence. In the period of transition from strategic nuclear deterrence to strategic non-nuclear deterrence it is expected that both types of deterrence will coincide and overlap. It is believed that nuclear weapons will exist for another 20–40 years as a means of deterrence.117 By acquiring the necessary high-precision weapons the nuclear component of strategic deterrence will become out of date. Information warfare and technological necessity intensify the priority for integrated systems allowing a large-scale use of defensive and offensive weapons, intelligenceinformation systems and systems of radio-electronic warfare. Information support, the need for global as well as regional air-space information space (fields), guidance systems for cruise missiles, and the ability to receive information within a real-life time-frame are becoming essential for the wars of the sixth generation. However, the importance of fourth generation nuclear weapons, the prime characteristics of which are their high precision with minimum negative ecological aftermath effects (such as deep-targeted bombs, that are creating deep underground nuclear explosions while targeting the objects on the surface, and the use of high precision nuclear missiles),118 should not be underestimated. The work on these new nuclear weapon systems is done in Russia, the USA and UK, France and China. Russian scientists are believed to be ahead in the research by at least a decade, according to Victor N.Mikhailov, director of the Institute of Strategic Stability and former minister of atomic energy. According to the Institute’s assessments the technology and means of production are expected to be ready for use within 10–20 years.119 Russia confirmed the continuing interest in preserving nuclear deterrence. At the same time Moscow introduced changes in the criteria of assessments of its sufficiency. According to Yuri Baluevsky, then first deputy chief and now chief of the General Staff, all the measures introduced with the missile defence (2009–15), and possibly even until 2020, ‘do not threaten the national security of Russia’. Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov made a similar assessment on 14 September 2003. Parity of nuclear weapons has become an insufficient criterion for the strategic nuclear components. The new criterion for sufficiency now relies on the assessment of the capability of nuclear forces to penetrate national missile defences. In other words, the concept of development of nuclear forces is in transition and provides flexibility. It puts the decisions on the future structure of


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Russia’s strategic potential on hold for ten years, after which the relationship between Russia and the West should either develop into something different like, let us say, between the UK and France, or will require the need to reassess Russia’s nuclear triad structure. The seriousness of the situation was outlined once again during the annual meeting of President Putin with the MoD on 2 October 2003. At that meeting Yuri Baluevsky, then first deputy head and now head of the General Staff, pointed out that ‘unless the anti-Russian nature of the military planning in NATO is modified and lowers the ceiling of the possible use of nuclear weapons, Russia will have to respond by adjusting its nuclear posture’. Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov stressed that Russia was monitoring the trends aimed at reconsideration of the role of nuclear weapons beyond deterrent functions and stretching their functions with the help of new technological achievements that could make their use possible in the battlefield theatre. Russia was consistent in its promotion of minimum deterrence. So, at the beginning of the twentyfirst century Russia’s minister of defence confirmed that a level of adequate sufficiency in strategic nuclear defence had been obtained. The changes of nuclear posture and criteria for adequate defence changed Russia’s attitudes towards missile defence. President Putin expressed the RF decision to work with every nation on the NMD, especially on theatre missile defence. Official confirmation was made that Russia was cooperating on a bilateral basis with the US and NATO on theatre missile defence.120 On 16 September 2003 the State Duma voted to abolish Article 26 of the federal law ‘On Co-operation in Space’, that obliged the government to ratify any agreement in the RF parliament if it covered the issues related to space cooperation. The State Duma abolished the Article by the vote 275–93. The decision opened possibilities for joint work within the framework of the NMD and in parallel with the variety of Russia’s partners—like Europe, the US or China. Stating the goal A year prior to the above-mentioned event at another conference, dedicated to the bicentenary of the Russian Ministry of Defence, General Kvashnin, the then chief of the General Staff, characterised the main new features of the Russian army for the new century. He said: ‘In the twenty-first century the RF armed forces should not only defend the state’s sovereignty but create conditions for its democratic development and implement international obligations of the RF in peacekeeping and in combating terrorism.’121 This statement was echoed by Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov, who addressing military brass at the MoD pointed out that the ‘character of contemporary threats demands Russia’s armed forces to address a variety of issues in different parts of the world. We cannot rule out the preventive use of force if this is required by the national interests of Russia or by its obligations to allies.’122 The optimistic tone did not discourage those who expressed doubts about long-term prospects of co-operation, both among the military and civilian experts. Assessing the developments of the first years of the twenty-first century, well-known defence expert Dmitrii Trenin warned that the fight against terrorism ‘forms a too narrow basis for security integration’.123

Part III PRESENT AND FUTURE INTEGRATION CHANNELS

8 NEW SECURITY SYSTEMS AND RUSSIA’S LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY The days of hostile blocs and alliances are over. Today we need wider forms of co-operation that reach beyond the confines of militarypolitical groupings. It is my absolute conviction that this is the road of the future.1

The previous chapters have discussed new and sustainable trends in Russian politics that have determined the state’s policy, behaviour and reaction patterns at least for the first half of this century, and will continue to do so. Russia is focusing on the multi-channelled and regionalised approach in foreign and domestic policies. This policy is to some extent a continuance of the traditional approach to sustainable development and international engagement through membership in international organisations, the policy that the country pursued all through the last century. However, the assessment of Russia’s vision of its role in the world order in the twenty-first century would be incomplete without at least a brief look at some new patterns of cooperation and engagement that became available to Russia as the result of new security challenges and the international response to the events of 9/11. This new pattern goes far beyond international co-operation in the fight against terrorism—the co-operation that opened new forms and methods of joint actions, but which were activated mostly within the existing institutional arrangements. The developments of recent years demonstrate that the country is keen to put its foreign policy and security on a solid base, with the economic interdependence of the main world players on Russia’s vast natural resources and with Russia continuing existing patterns of relations with its partners. Pipeline politics (or joint electricity systems) became more than just a competition over the markets and a stable source of economic profit. The so-called pipeline/network infrastructure that was being put in place set a pattern of obligatory interdependence on Russia’s international relations and limited its foreign policy options.2 The second and by no means least important new development was the creation of swiftly formed alliances, based on the principle of functioning networks. It was definitely a try-out response, mostly of developed nations to the terrorists’ challenge. The new-type coalitions are being established on the basis of network-like arrangements.3


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The 11 September impact on the oil and gas industry4 It is very difficult and sometimes impossible to describe the current state of relationships among nations (bilateral or internal dynamic within international institutions) without referring to energy supply issues. In the first chapter the energy issues were addressed as just one of the many essential factors defining the foreign policy objectives and policies of Russia in different regions. This chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis of the energy networks—the so-called pipeline politics that are becoming an essential element of the new world order. This chapter means to show the wider picture of global politics in order to demonstrate the difficulties and sophistication of Russia’s multi-channelled foreign and pipeline policy. The events of 11 September 2001, the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan and the military campaign in Iraq that followed raised several questions for the producers and consumers of energy world-wide, starting from the acceptable level of prices on fossil fuels to the issues of possible avoidance of interruptions of oil and gas supplies to the energy markets. The main issues were linked to the mid-term and long-term effects of these developments. More precisely the politicians and economists were equally concerned how the current events could affect the future investment plans in the industry’s infrastructure. There are four strategic challenges to be addressed in this respect: the security of energy resources, investment in energy resources, threats to the environment or damage by energy use, and uneven access of the world’s population to modern energy sources. It is projected that the global energy demand will increase by 50 per cent between now and 2020. Primarily the international community will still depend on gas and oil. According to the World Energy Outlook, 2002, world energy use will continue to increase steadily at 1.7 per cent per year through 2030. Fossil fuels will remain the primary sources of energy and will meet more than 90 per cent of the increased demand to 2030. Among fossil fuels, natural gas will grow faster, but oil will remain the most important energy source. The renewable energies (like wind and solar power) are expected to grow in importance, while the nuclear energy supply might experience a drop in production. In the 2000–30 period 62 per cent of the increase in the world’s energy demand will be from developing countries. Almost all the increase in energy production will be in non-OECD countries. Most of the demand in oil and gas is expected to be covered by the increased production of oil and gas from the Middle East and the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). However, by 2030 the portion of the OPEC supply is also projected to increase by up to 40–60 per cent.5 The 2001 International Energy Agency report6 demonstrated that there were adequate fossil fuel reserves to meet the world’s growing demands, but only with huge sustained investments in the development of these resources. The global reliable energy supply system for the twenty-first century will require significant investments. The implementation of the projects usually takes five to ten years, but the created infrastructure will be the subject of policy decisions for decades. The need for the revaluation of the energy policy, driven by the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and

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following terrorist attacks world-wide, was recognised even prior to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Producers and consumers alike shared this need. For example, the EU Commission Green Paper on security of supply, Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply (November 2000) relaunched the reassessment of energy security and EU energy policy. The energy strategy of the Bush administration and the Russian energy security concept (2000) also address the issues of energy security and reassessment of the investment priorities in the industry. The APEC Energy Security Initiative (2000) covers measures of response to temporary disruptions and the long-term challenges facing the region energy supply. The results of the anti-terrorist operations, level of hostility in the Middle East and anti-Western sentiments were bound to influence the long-term investment priority trends in the oil and gas industry. It is useful to remember that the beginning of this century was the time for a decision on strategic investments for 2005–10. After 9/11 the existing trends in the development of the industry were clarified and drew attention to the necessity of changes and adjustments to market conditions and political realities. The recognition of the pivotal role of the Middle East in oil supply was confirmed. The Persian Gulf was expected to remain the key marginal supplier of oil to the world market, with Saudi Arabia in the lead, unless Iraq is able to activate its resources fully and compete to be the leading producing nation by 2010. In order to meet the increasing world demands in energy consumption (until 2020) the Middle East must increase its oil production capacity from around 39 million barrels a day to more than 70 million barrels by 2020, or from 43 per cent to 51 per cent of world capacity, according to the assessments of the US Department of Energy report (2001). Oil is expected to rise from 35 per cent to 45 per cent of world exports. However, internal security problems, economic and demographic problems, regional instability factors linked to threats of an expansion of Bin Laden’s networks and the second Intifada could prevent the Middle Eastern states fulfilling the goals without an extensive aid package or a DFID-like approach assisting regional development. This approach might be costly financially and not easy to implement in case of rising anti-US and anti-Western sentiments in the region. On the other hand, the anti-terrorist campaigns provided an opportunity to re-open the markets of such suppliers as Iran and Libya. Their participation (even limited) in the international anti-terrorist campaign against the Bin Laden networks, and compliance with the non-proliferation treaty regime in the case of Iran, would allow an unfreezing of economic relations with them. It is not difficult to see that the policies towards these countries are changing. Iran, Iraq and Libya are important global suppliers of energy. Together these countries possess 23 per cent of the world’s proven reserves of oil and 19 per cent of the world’s proven reserve of gas. The post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, after the military campaign of 2003, was to concentrate on rebuilding the energy industry and to provide conditions for major supplies of Iraqi oil to reach the world’s markets. The situation with Libya also changed after the state took responsibility for the 1988 bombing of a Pan American airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, that cost 270 lives. However, presently the US energy policy towards Iran still functions within the guidelines of the possibility of this state being included in multinational energy deals and is linked with the demands to Iran to comply with the NPT. The European states proved to be more


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responsive to the adjustment to changes in international realities; in addition their policy of ‘constructive engagement’ with Iran allowed them to be so. The dramatic events of the anti-terrorist campaign also confirmed the interest and intention to diversify energy supplies geographically by increasing the role of the nonOPEC suppliers in the future. The interest in diversification of the energy suppliers and increasing reliance on the non-OPEC states was voiced prior to the 11 September 2001 events. One could mention the initiative, launched by Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch prime minister, who acknowledged the need for international co-operation in the energy field to deal initially with East European energy inefficiency in March 1990. The European Community, during the Dutch presidency in the second half of 1991, played a leading part in organising negotiations for the European Energy Charter. All the countries of Europe, the European Community, and nine of the fifteen former Soviet states (the remaining six subsequently also signed), together with the US, Japan, Canada and Australia signed the European Energy Charter in The Hague on 17 December 1991. It represented a political commitment to establish greater co-operation in the energy field. Its ultimate goal was a single integrated energy market in Europe. However, the initial aim was more modest: to improve the ‘security of energy supply and [to maximise] the efficiency of production, conversion, transport, distribution and use of energy, to enhance safety and to minimise environmental problems, on an acceptable economic basis’.7 The Charter acknowledged that ‘account must be taken of the problems of reconstruction and restructuring in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in the USSR’. It also called the signatories ‘to participate in joint efforts aimed at facilitating and promoting market-oriented reforms and modernisation of the energy sectors in these countries’.8 The benefits of this arrangement were also, it declares, likely to accrue to the West Europeans, through an increase and diversification of supplies, particularly desirable in view of their current dependence on the Middle East. This statement is just as valid a decade later. The diversification in energy supplies after 2001 was to ensure that the supplies remain resilient to geopolitical disruptions. However, the increasing anti-American tensions in the Gulf area and the expanding conflict speeded up the trend forcing the Western states to put their money into projects in the non-OPEC countries. The Caspian basin and Russia, as well as Latin America and Africa, are becoming the prime areas for diversified resources. The share of world oil production from Eurasia is to increase from 9 to 12 per cent, and the Caspian oil contribution will play an important though not pivotal role in world supply. European imports of gas will be covered primarily by Russia and Algeria, which will account for up to 70 per cent of energy exports. The increasing energy dependency of Europe on external supplies stimulated a debate on the ways of avoiding risks to the European energy supplies. The building of new gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea and the southern Mediterranean was seen as a commercially feasible option. Other markets besides those of Western Europe and the US will also be driven to different energy suppliers than OPEC. The OPEC suppliers might lose up to 30–50 per cent of the market in the Asia-Pacific region from 2004–10. The southern Caspian pipeline, mostly lobbied by American companies, is also planning to transport the Caspian resources to neighbouring Pakistan and India. In other words, the Persian Gulf states might lose some of their customers due to potential instability.


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The 9/11 events and those following did not change the energy industry, but they definitely intensified the need to adjust the market to new realities. Russia’s strategy As described by influential Russian political scientist Vladimir Baranovsky, ‘Russia was both psychologically and politically ready to join the club of the international elite. Its hope, however, did not last long. Instead, with the end of the bipolar division of Europe, Russia unexpectedly found itself pushed to the periphery’.9 The policy of energy diversification provided a chance for Russia to escape from the negative results of its diminished political status in the world arena after the end of the Cold War. It also provided the opportunity for a more balanced and sober multi-dimensional foreign policy. It gave the country the ability to avoid, despite its weakness, a strictly transatlantic orientation, as was suggested by many: Operating within the Euro-Atlantic area is more important than playing at other tables. Russia’s global role depends on its ability to develop co-operative interactions with other powerful and globally involved international actors, and most of them are Euro-Atlantic countries. It is true that these theses are not unanimously accepted in Russia… Most important, Russia lacks the resources to be a challenger; for this reason, co-operative globally oriented interactions with those who have resources are essential.10 Since the beginning of the twenty-first century the policy of the Russian government and private sector became the overall expansion of export capabilities in every possible direction: in Europe, the US, Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Over the last 20 years the four main consumers in the Asia-Pacific region were China, India, Japan and Korea, accounting for over 70 per cent of total oil demand. India and China, the most highly populated countries in the world, presently account for about 30 per cent of the region’s total oil demand, and this share will increase to about 40 per cent by the end of the next decade. Russian and Central Asian energy resources transported to China and other AsiaPacific countries will cover up to 30–50 per cent of energy demands in the region. For instance, the agreement between Moscow and Beijing ‘On Basic Principles of Development of Technical-economic Grounds for the Construction of the Oil Pipeline Russia-China’ (17 July 2001, Moscow) marked a new stage in the practical implementation of plans to establish multifunctional pipeline-transport-communication networks in the Asia-Pacific region, where both Russia and China will play dominant roles. The agreement signed in Moscow is only one among many that shows the interests of Russian companies (backed by government political support) in exploring the possibilities to reorient its energy exports to the new emerging markets. Another no less important agreement under discussion is on co-operation in the gas industry. The Chinese agreed to let the Russian natural gas monopoly Gazprom bid on the $6 bn pipeline project ‘West-East’ (4,000km long, export volume 20 billion cubic metres annually), which is intended to connect Shanghai with the undeveloped region of western China. However, the plans of Gazprom are much wider. The company is planning to build a unified network of the Asian pipeline system, which would link


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pipelines from Tomsk oblast to the Northern provinces of China from Yakutia to Shanghai, from Sakhalin island (‘Sakhalin-2’). This is in addition to a project on joint exploration of the Kovyktinskiy deposit (Irkuts region, Eastern Siberia, RF) and building a new pipeline to China. This energy net, according to the Russian plans, was to unite the production and distribution of oil-gas-electric-nuclear energy resources in the Asia-Pacific region. The plans include the establishment of an international infrastructure that would monitor the distribution of energy resources throughout North-eastern and South-east Asia. The pipeline net constructions are connected with the plans to build or renovate transport corridors that would link Europe with South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. These expanding plans could be seen as a major Russian contribution to the ASEAN Regional Forum, particularly to the ‘Hanoi action plan’ (especially in such areas as transportation, energy, oil production).11 It is not only the resources themselves but also negotiations on the optimal route for the pipeline networks that became a useful commodity for the Russian government and corporations. For instance, Japan expressed its interest in the oil pipeline route that could connect a development site near Angarsk, Siberia, with port facilities in Nahodka, Primorie, on the Pacific Ocean coast. Tokyo was hoping to influence the decision on the mapping of the pipeline. This option allowed the pipeline route to avoid a third country’s territory, in this particular case China. On 30 June 2003, at a press conference in Vladivostok, the press-secretary of the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, pointed out that though it was exclusively a Russian decision to choose a proper and best pipeline route across Russian territory, in the opinion of Japanese experts the use of port facilities in Primorie was seen as the most beneficial for the regional developments of Eastern Siberia and the Far East. An appeal from the Japanese side for the options on the route to be reconsidered provoked a statement from Victor Khristenko, the then Russian vicepremier, who announced in late June 2003 that the final decision had not been taken and that experts’ technical assessments were still under consideration and being evaluated by the RF government. One might suggest that the decision to reassess priorities was motivated by the debated options of the future route of the main pipeline network from Russian energy deposits to the Asia-Pacific markets.12 It has to be admitted that the absence of a final decision on the route provided the Russian government with certain flexibility and additional options for discussions on related or much wider issues in Russian-Japanese and Russian-Chinese relations.13 The idea of a Russia-EU joint energy policy initiative has been under consideration since the EU-Russia Summit in Paris in 2000 when President Putin and Mr Prodi addressed the possibility of a joint response to the oil crisis. The oil and gas potential of Russia, especially from the deposits in the Russian north-west and the Caspian basin, was meant to be used in case of any potential disruption of OPEC energy supplies. Russia was ready for the external capital investments into its oil/gas sector. The joint decision of the EU and Russia on a major diversification and expansion of non-OPEC oil suppliers was supposed to send a signal to the OPEC states. Thus, President Putin’s suggestion (made during his visit to Germany at the end of September 2001) to escalate Russian oil exports to Europe if the Middle East supplies were cut off by political or military actions was a carefully thought-out strategy. At the moment of Putin’s announcement the pipelines


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were being used at full capacity, but three new pipelines are planned to go into operation in the 2003–4 period. On 15 October 2001 the Caspian pipeline (Chevron Texaco, BP), which stretches for about 1,000 miles from western Kazakhstan across southern Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorosiisk, became operational. The new Baltic pipeline system became operational in 2002, stretching from Russia’s Tyuinan Pechora region to Primorsk on the Baltic Sea. It is believed that until 2004 Russia will enjoy an acceptable level of prices on oil and energy exports. During this time-frame the policy stimulating external investments is to be implemented. The years 2000–4 were to be used for infrastructure development. Russia’s policy was focused on attracting foreign, especially European, investments into the energy industry (in joint infrastructure development and production, on negotiating long-term agreements on energy supplies to Europe, and establishing business relations with future potential competitors of gas supplies in the European markets (Norway, the UK and North African corporations and governments). Serious attention was and is given to the development of the energy infrastructure and the design of new routes for transporting energy resources. Special importance was attached to creating a North European natural gas pipeline along the Baltic Sea bed, as well as through the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, leading to the shores of Great Britain. On 26 June 2003 the Memorandum on Cooperation in the Project of Constructing the North European Natural Gas Pipeline was signed between the UK and Russia. The completion of this project will increase the stability and reliability of sending Russian natural gas to Great Britain, as well as onto the markets of continental Europe. This contract will allow a long-term basis to be formed for stable deliveries of Russian natural gas to Western Europe, including Great Britain. British and Russian energy companies are working together on the Russian market, as well as engaging in joint ventures in the markets of other countries. The joint projects are discussed not only for Europe but also for that most dynamic and promising region the Asia-Pacific which experiences a shortage of diverse energy resources.14 It was pointed out at the Russia-UK Energy Conference, held in London in June 2003, that energy deals have a tremendous impact on business philosophy, the economy and international politics, thus cooperation in the field of energy resources could be seen as a tangible step towards Russia’s integration into the global economic system. Viktor Vekselberg, chairman of the TNK management, said that TNK-BP joint projects open new horizons for co-operation, not only limited to the oil sector. Energy cooperation serves as the basis for strengthening political co-operation with the UK, US and OECD consumer nations, further strengthening the link with the industrial world. It facilitates Russia’s transformation from a regional exporter to a global energy supplier.15 These plans and intentions were confirmed at the Russia-EU Energy Summit that took place in London in March 2004. Pipeline data The construction of the pipelines can only become feasible if and when the demand for


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oil is sufficiently assured from the client states. Several major pipelines that are to become operational during this decade are going to determine the long-term foreign and economic policy options of the RF. Brief details on these major pipeline deals are essential in order to demonstrate the diversity of challenges for Russia in this area. This short exercise is also quite vital in showing Russia’s potential reactions to the present and future challenges in a world where policy and military actions are going to be defined by the availability of resources and access to them. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is considered essential in promoting the flow of Caspian energy resources along the East-West corridor. The pipeline will ensure that a large portion of Caspian oil flows through non-OPEC countries, but not Russia and Iran, the latter being the subject of a conditional objection from the US administration. Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, the United States and later Kazakhstan agreed on building the pipeline, which is due for completion in 2005. The BTC consortium currently comprises BP, which is also the operator, the Azeri state oil company SOCAR, ExxonMobil, Statoil, ENI Agip, Unocal, Delta Hess, Devon, TPAO and Itochu. Russia’s corporate involvement in the BTC might increase the interest of Russian companies in the project. Indications were that the route might not produce enough oil by 2004. The newly merged (October 2001) US oil company ChevronTexaco announced its intent to join the $2.9 bn project BTC in December 2001. Its participation was essential to secure the economic viability of the project. The pipeline is to be operational by early 2005. The proposed exploration project for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline demonstrated that it was economically profitable—24.5 per cent, which could be considered quite an attractive option for private investments. Presently the Russian government has not changed its opposition to the participation of the Russian energy companies in this project. The transportation monopoly company Transneft is especially against it. However, the Russian companies Lukoil, Yukos and TNK have expressed an interest in taking part in the project. Their arguments were based on several assumptions. First, the new project was becoming economically profitable and viable. Second, the northern route of the Caspian oil transportation through Russian territory was not enough. The capacity of the pipeline was to limit the transportation capability in the future. Third, participation in the project could be helpful in influencing the flow of Caspian oil in the markets. The aforementioned companies were mostly afraid of the construction of the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk pipeline, which would bring Caspian energy resources to the markets in Eastern, Central and Western Europe occupied by the same Russian companies, thus creating severe competition. At the same time the Russian government was extremely interested in keeping this supply channelled under Russian close control. Since August 2003 negotiations have intensified between Ukraine and Russia on gas transit to European markets via Odessa-Brody.16 The Ukrainian government demonstrated competing interests in relation to the exploitation of this pipeline. It is not difficult to assume that any decision within the Ukrainian government is going to be linked with the wider issues of power succession in Ukraine and the results of the Ukrainian political reform and presidential elections (2004). Participating in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was supposedly to provide the opportunity for Lukoil, Yukos and TNK to influence the oil flows and more effectively readdress the competition from the markets they already occupy. The final decision on


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joining the project had to receive the consent of the Russian government, according to the president of the Lukoil Oil Company Vagit Alekperov. On 23 November 2001 the State Company of Azerbaijan presented the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project at the Russian Ministry of Energy. Representatives of BP, the project’s largest investor, Russian oil companies and the Transneft company were present.17 Russian deputy foreign minister Victor Kalyuzhnyy clarified Russia’s stance on the issue. He said that the government backed the State Duma initiative to forbid Russian oil companies from participating in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project.18 It seems that the reassessment of the Russian companies’ participation will be made no sooner than a settlement of the Caspian basin among the littoral states will be achieved. However, 2001 bilateral agreements between Russia-Kazakhstan, Russia-Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan and the restarting of negotiations between TurkmenistanAzerbaijan, as well as intensified negotiations between Russia and Iran,19 demonstrated increased pressure on the littoral states to make multilateral arrangements regarding the Caspian Sea reserves. It seems the Caspian dilemma has three important angles to consider in relation to the Southern Caucasus: the feasibility of the pipeline projects, a legal regime for the Caspian Sea, and the role of the campaign against Iraq in US approaches to regional energy resources. It could only become economically sufficient if Kazakhstan commits 20 million tons of oil. Indications are that it is not quite sure that it could produce enough oil by 2004. The negotiations with Astana on these issues during the first months of 2003, as well as Russia’s reaction to the negotiations, demonstrated the importance of Kazakhstan for the economic efficiency of the whole project. In 2003 certain progress was made in respect of the acceptable legal regime of the Caspian Sea. Though these developments were directly affecting only Russia and one of the South Caucasian states (Azerbaijan), they influenced an overall state of relations in the region and were considered important for the assessment of one of the essential elements of Russian-Iranian relations. However, the most important effect these developments had was on the long-term energy/pipeline politics in the South Caucasian region. From 1991 five littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan) could not agree on a legal regime for the Caspian Sea. That has created uncertainty about the ownership of many Caspian offshore oilfields and prevented their development, at the same time creating a situation ripe for tension and hostility among the littoral states. The importance of these negotiations is becoming obvious as the plans for the realisation of the new pipeline projects in the area are reaching the final stages of assessment and the ready-to-implement phase. Construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline has already begun.20 Special attention was given to the politics involving the right of states to lay underwater pipelines. The draft convention contained another sensitive issue as it provided for the littoral countries’ right to lay underwater pipelines—though only with the approval of the countries through which a pipeline was to pass. Beside legitimate environmental concerns, Russia and Iran were both trying to block any such projects. Both states oppose underwater pipelines across the Caspian Sea, these being meant to bypass them and provide an alternative export route connecting Kazakhstan and


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Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, which is linked by pipeline to the Georgian Black Sea coast and, in the future, to the Turkish Mediterranean coast. Both Russia and Iran could offer oil and gas export routes via their territories to the other three land-locked Caspian states and were interested in promoting these options. Having agreed to the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan oil pipeline (BTC) in principle, Russia concentrated its efforts on blocking the Kazakh initiative regarding the underwater pipeline. Judging by the available public and official statements, such a position was backed by the energy lobby. The demilitarisation of the Caspian Sea is very much connected to Russia’s political logic with the pipeline debate. In 2002/3 Russia demonstrated its interest in discouraging Kazakhstan to build its Caspian flotilla.21 The RF opposed the Kazakh plans to establish its own navy in the Caspian,22 and especially to use US and UK assistance for building the naval force and training personnel for flotilla services in the Caspian Sea. Thus, the argument in the energy/pipeline debate for the Caspian and the Caucasus turned from being purely economic to being military-political as well. Recently this factor became important in Russia’s assessments of its attitudes to the US/Western presence in post-Soviet space, especially in relations to the Caucasus. In this respect special attention should be given to Moscow’s attempts to upgrade its forces in the Caspian Sea area. In the 2000–2 period Russia increased its military presence in the Caspian Sea. In 2002 the Russian Caspian flotilla received a new patrolship, Tatarstan. In February 2003 it was declared that another patrol-ship, Dagestan, was expected to be added to the naval forces. The Russian naval forces in the Caspian Sea consist of various types of ships and a brigade of marines. According to Yurii Startsev, commander-in-chief of the Caspian flotilla, the naval forces in the Caspian are expecting to receive new types of ships specially designed for the Caspian Sea basin. The new acquisitions are planned for 2005–10.23 These developments are important to bear in mind, especially in view of the plans to construct other pipelines in the region. An underwater pipeline from Aktau to Baku is being considered for construction at the request of the Kazakh government, and is to be carried out by Mobil, Chevron and Agip. This project is a commercially attractive oil pipeline (there were some failures in other oil development projects around the Caspian Sea, and the companies were concentrating their resources on the feasible one). For its part, the US supports the BTC pipeline and opposes the Iranian route for strategic reasons. Another essential pipeline deal is the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project. It will secure deliveries of Turkmen gas24 (Shakh Deniz field), with US support along the BakuTbilisi-Erzurum (Eastern Turkey) pipeline. It is planned to be operational by 2004–5. The construction of the $2 bn, 1,630-kilometre Trans-Caspian gas pipeline is primarily supported by Royal Dutch/Shell and will run from Turkmenistan under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, through Georgia, and terminate in Turkey.25 This project is competitive to the Russian-backed Blue Stream project that was built and ran into difficulties due to the limits of the consumer market. However, as part of the successful diplomatic negotiations and legal political battle that ended on 30 July 2003, Russian interests were secured when Turkey agreed to resume gas imports as part of the Blue Stream project starting from 1 August 2003.26 The competition over the Caspian resources will undoubtedly continue. Washington


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and Moscow still promote two different pipeline routes from the offshore oilfields of Azerbaijan. The difference of approaches remains regarding the transportation of Turkmen gas to Turkey. The implementation of the competing energy projects will place a special focus on the competition in and for Kazakhstan. Its resources are becoming pivotal for the implementation of any commercially viable energy project in Central Asia. The Kazakh deposits are also essential for the transitional phase of the Russian pipeline projects in the period of construction and in the need to honour expanding contracts. It seems that the previous geopolitically motivated projects could be implemented, but the real interest is going to be shifted to the economic efficiency of the pipeline routes. Several factors can serve as a testing ground for the level of co-operation in energy fields, including long-term contracts on supplies and US participation in Asia-Pacific regional infrastructure constructions.27 The increasing importance of the Caspian region raises the question of the potential for both cooperation and confrontation between Russia and the US. In October 2003 the Guardian (UK) cited its correspondent’s new book The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (2003): In May 2001 the US Vice-President Dick Cheney recommended in the national energy policy report that ‘the president makes energy security a priority of our [US] trade and foreign policy, signing out the Caspian basin as a ‘rapidly growing new area of supply’. With a potential oil production of up to 6 m barrels per day by 2015, the Caspian region becomes crucial to the US policy of ‘diversifying energy supply’. It is designed to wean the US off its dependence on the Arab-dominated OPEC cartel, which is using its near-monopoly position as pawn and leverage against industrialised countries.28 In the mid term and long term this area will become the region of US-Russia-China geopolitical competition. The land-based presence of US troops in Central Asia increases US influence over Caspian resources. However, it might not necessarily be confrontational with Russia if the interests and sensitivities of Moscow in the region are taken into consideration. The energy deals, in combination with other overlapping interests, create a potential for Russian-Chinese co-operation to withstand the US pressures in the region. On the other hand, alliance with the US is important for Russia in facing the non-violent Chinese expansion in the region. Another impact of the recent anti-terrorist operation is that a pipeline project through Afghanistan29 might be on the agenda again after the completion of the anti-terrorist operation there. On the one hand, there is Moscow’s priority interest to stimulate the construction of the North-South energy corridor through Afghanistan. It was reported that Russian interests in the Restoration programme in post-Taliban Afghanistan were stretching to rebuilding the transportation networks and connections, and the gas pipeline (the first priority for the Uzbek government as well30) and energy facilities.31 According to political scientist Joseph Diskin, one of the most significant results of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan would be the creation of a stable energy corridor North-South through the appeased Afghanistan. This corridor will carry oil and gas supplies from the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the Indian Ocean.


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The main loser in the pipeline politics in this respect would be Georgia.32 This means that this deal is most satisfying to the RF, since it leaves Georgia within a primarily RF energy supply system and creates additional access to RF firms in the Asian markets. However, it seems that the official blessing of Moscow could only follow some kind of a formal deal on the international consortium for this project through Afghanistan. If implemented, it will provide access to the vastly developing market of the main energy consumers of this century. On the other hand, there were plans for a Trans-Afghany gas pipeline, 1,270 kilometres long, that would go across Afghanistan to carry natural gas from eastern Turkmenistan, which has 700 billion cubic metres of proven reserves, to Pakistan and beyond. Unocal (Union Oil Company of California) and Bridas Petroleum (Argentina) were looking at options for the $1.9 bn project in the 1990s. In 1997 Unocal formed a consortium to build a pipeline. Bridas sued Unocal for stealing the idea but lost. From 1997–8 Unocal had its HQ in Tashkent. The bombing of the US embassies in Africa in 1998 were linked to Osama bin Laden in order to spoil the growing contacts between the Taliban and the US,33 according to William O.Beeman, specialist on Central Asia and a professor at Brown University. With the collapse of the Taliban the idea of the project was revived once again. Unocal has studied the history and traditions of actions towards the industrial infrastructures. The conclusion of the study was that, with the exception of Columbia, rebels in war-torn countries do not destroy key elements of the economic infrastructure. That is true even in Afghanistan, where a series of dams and hydroelectric plants built in the 1950s and 1960s have survived constant fighting for almost two decades. ‘It is absolutely essential that the US make the pipeline the centerpiece of rebuilding Afghanistan’, says S.Rob Sobhani, professor of foreign relations at Georgetown University and the head of Caspian Energy Consulting. The State Department thinks it’s a great idea, too. Routing the gas through Iran would be avoided, and the Central Asian republics wouldn’t have to ship through Russian pipelines.34 The Unocal corporation virtually has a contract to supply Uzbek gas to Pakistan through Afghanistan. However, in 2001 Russia signed an agreement with Uzbekistan on the export-import of Uzbek gas and the reselling of rights to third countries. But its implementation depends heavily on the stability of the region. During the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan Uzbekistan held views similar to the US position on the division of that country and the creation of an autonomous territory con-trolled by the Northern Alliance within Afghanistan. This would mean that the pipeline could be made secure with the help of friendly Uzbeks and Tajiks and a zone of safety would be created for the Central Asian states, especially Tashkent.35 Thus, pipeline politics is becoming a centre of debate on the post-Taliban nation building. The Bonn decisions (2002), especially the assistance programme for the transitional government, helped the Karzai government to receive legitimatisation as the future government of Afghanistan at the Loya Jirga in June 2002.36 The post-June support for the newly established authorities would include pipeline politics as part of the delivery package to supportive warlords and Kabul authorities. It appears that in


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November–December 2002, under the auspices of the US State Department, agreement between the Karzai government (Afghanistan), Turkmenistan and Pakistan on the pipeline project (through Kandahar) was reached.37 According to Sergei Ivanov, Russian minister of defence, ‘the Russian government has not yet officially specified its strategic interests in Afghanistan. However, if the issue is about Afghanistan being partitioned between the members of the anti-terrorist coalition then Russia is not planning to stand aside’.38 He also stated that the issues of deployment of Russian peacekeepers were not being discussed with the US, though it was pointed out that these issues could be discussed with the newly appointed transitional government of Afghanistan. The potential conflict of interests (geo-strategic and geoeconomic) was revealed even more distinctly at the informal meeting of the ministers of defence of NATO states at Colorado Springs, US, in October 2003, to which the Russian minister of defence, Sergei Ivanov, was invited. He confirmed the existence of Russia’s economic and security interests in Afghanistan.39 The debates about the possibilities of joint actions in post-conflict Iraq were also very much linked to co-operation in the energy sector and respect for the deals set before the fall of the Saddam regime. Currently Russian experts are questioning the limits of cooperation. Issues were raised about the extent of co-operation in counter-terrorist operations and whether it could lead to cooperation in the energy field between the US and Russia—especially in such regions as the Caucasus and Central Asia—or whether the situation around Iraq would intensify tough competition between the states in the energy field. There are at least three types of assessment of the influence of the US military campaign against Iraq on the world energy markets—US energy policy priorities and the so-called ‘energy dialogue’ between Russia and the US. One of them directly reflects Russia’s views on the energy and security policies for the South Caucasus. According to this view the results of the Iraqi campaign will directly influence the interests and intentions of US companies and the government, as well as their support for the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC). It is believed in Russia that if the US establishes effective control over the oilfields of Iraq, their interests will be switched to Iraqi reserves at the expense of abandoning the pipeline, a controversial and geopolitically sensitive project. Assessment of the existing financial capabilities will also require such a shift in order to promote better-concentrated efforts in the modernisation and revival of the Iraqi oil infrastructure. On the other hand, it was pointed out that in case of failed attempts to control the Iraqi oil reserves safely or the Iraqi forces’ ability to destroy the oil infrastructure in the course of the military campaign, the US and some Western firms will be forced to look for alternative sources of energy supplies. According to this logic, interest in the implementation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline will undoubtedly increase. On the other hand, Konstantin Zatulin, director of the Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States Studies, expressed the widespread worries of policy-makers and specialists in energy and security matters. He stated that the US firms’ domination in the energy market after establishing control over Iraq could hurt Russia’s and Azerbaijan’s interests through low prices.40 In the aftermath of the Iraq campaign Russia’s energy policy options were becoming


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much clearer. For the first time the independent oil pro ducers, such as Mexico, Norway and Russia, were invited to join the OPEC Summit on 11 June 2003.41 Among the independent producers only Russia could effectively influence changes in oil prices and either help or spoil the price game introduced by the OPEC states on energy supplies. An invitation was issued to Russia to join OPEC as a member state and change its status from observer to full member. The Russian position is dual. Tactically the goals of Russia and OPEC coincide in the short term, as both were eager to keep the price of oil at around $20–25 per barrel. This is Russia’s preferential price corridor. For Saudi Arabia the preferential price for a barrel is no less than $25, as anything under this has financial implications. Tactically, therefore, it is in the interests of both to co-operate closely in the future. Deputy Minister of Energy Yusufov confirmed that this was an issue to be negotiated. However, the strategic intentions of both states in the energy sector are quite different. Russia is interested in the free-hand approach and the ability to decide on its separate individual policy in oil/gas production. As a state that is interested in increasing production and foreign investment in the energy sector, it has no interest in becoming a member of any organisation or institution that might limit its flexibility in the market. These plans contradict the long-term interest of Saudi Arabia to control and limit the production of energy resources. In addition, the majority of Russian experts also foresee growing competition in the energy field, revealed by the increasing US presence (including military) along potential routes of pipeline/s, especially in the Southern Caucasus and Kazakhstan. One of the influential newspapers Vremya Novostei (Moscow) stated: The joint battle against terrorism does not exclude the bitter struggle for energy transit routes and economic influence in the space which both Russia and the US regard as vital for their interests’.42 That is why pipeline politics should not be regarded as just an economic, geoeconomic and geopolitical issue. Since 9/11, and especially in view of the Iraqi and post-Iraqi antiterrorist campaigns, pipeline politics were softly transferred into the economic-politicalmilitary sphere. Involving others: in need of co-operation Russian oil and gas producers are ready to supply much larger volumes to the world markets.43 However, in order to do so the Russian oil and gas complex needs, first of all, investments at a rate of $15–17 bn a year.44 Such investments are needed to develop new and promising deposits and to build additional infrastructure capacities for the increased demands in energy exports. In 2003 Russia’s official representatives stepped up the lobbying to create an Investment Guarantee Fund that would support investments in Russia’s energy sector.45 The idea was to exploit the possibility of investments in the energy sector and to give the Russian authorities the opportunity to merge foreign and domestic investments in the sector and redistribute the funds among the essential projects that could generate further growth, investment and swift profit. At the same time any merger of companies and take-overs are under close governmental scrutiny.46 Preparing for the next Russia-EU Summit, Moscow proposed to consider the possibility of discussing the synchronisation of EU and Russian energy policies, as both have longterm policy programmes: Russia to be a state-exporter until 2020 and the EU to be an


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importer until 2030.47 Second, the energy complex has to find a solution for shortages in the labour resources. It is not surprising that the energy lobby became very active in supporting new legislation and rules that were allowing an increase in foreign labour and the migrant workforce in the country. On 8 April 2002 M.Kasyanov, the Russian prime minister, confirmed the governmental decision to close for public scrutiny any information on the national oil reserves and balances of energy resources. Any data on these issues were made confidential and taken from the public domain.48 One should remember that in the 2002 financial year (FY) the hydrocarbon industry accounted for 15 per cent of GDP, 55 per cent of Russia’s exports and nearly half of state revenues.49 Everything related to strategic planning and assessment in this area became an issue of strategic significance. Presently there are two main trends in the world’s energy sector, policy-wise. First, there is a tendency to create new energy consortiums, both at the global and regional levels. For instance, there are intense attempts at the global level to establish a gas producers’ consortium (Russia, Algeria, etc., possibly on the basis of a Gas Exporting Countries Forum, initiated in 1998). There are plans for special regional arrangements between Russia and the Central Asian states, or in the Asia-Pacific region at the regional level. The idea to establish a regional alliance of gas producers between Russia and the states of Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) was to exploit the links between energy and security in the region. According to the Russian proposals, a regional alliance of gas producers could unite not only the countries that are extracting gas for export, but also those whose territories are used by export pipelines. The alliance or consortium was not only to help in the development of a joint policy on the extraction, exporting and transporting of gas, but to have mutually beneficial projects for regional developments. The same approach was proposed for the Caucasus. In 2003 different energy projects were suggested to overlap the distribution channels in order to minimise the financial costs and maximise the results in achieving a sustainable regional supply system. The second major policy development is an effective lobbying for and against adopting regulations limiting a certain percentage of supplies from any individual country—energy imports to regional markets, for instance. In the EU a limit of 30 per cent from any one source is recommended to be put into force by 2004. Thus, delays in the opening of a competitive market for gas supply in the EU were and will be an essential element of the EU-Russian relations.50 By increasing the exporting potential of energy resources from any region, the state consumers have to address the problem of creating a regionally sustainable energy supply system that would be used as a basic resource for regional development. For instance, the Southern Caucasus Stability Pact is under discussion. The APEC Energy Security Initiative is functioning. Probably the same could be suggested with regard to the Caspian region for energy security arrangements. For security reasons limitations on the export of resources from a single supplier (within an individual state of economic regional organisations) might be more widely introduced. Increased overlap and co-ordination between governments and the private sector in securing the energy infrastructure against sabotage and/or terrorist attack,51 including cyberterrorism, are also envisioned.


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Co-operation is possible and desirable in this very competitive field, as it became the strategic commodity and basis of Russia’s foreign policy decisions. The issue of the security of the energy supplies has become an increasingly important question. The statement of Mikhail Fradkov, Russia’s prime minister, appointed in March 2004, stressed the importance for the country to abandon Russia’s concentration exclusively on energy resources as the main channel of its integration with the world. This statement did not undermine the importance of the ‘energy security’ angle in Russia’s foreign policy. Rather, it revealed that while still essential it is going to be complemented by other no less important channels of international integration in the future—for instance, cooperation in space exploration and the use of space technologies for commercial and defence purposes.52 Building the future: keeping the old and opening new forms of security cooperation The traditional approach to security challenges is now inadequate. Though part of several arms control and monitoring regimes, Russia was experiencing the need for a new combined approach towards disarmament issues that could be introduced as a joint G-8 initiative. Presently there are several initiatives that have been taken on board by the international community (though primarily by the G-8 countries) and expanded so that other states can participate by blurring the divisions between the different limitations that were made by international organisations and institutions. G-8 approaches to WMD and non-proliferation Russia signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on Chemical Disarmament to destroy all chemical weapons by 2007. However, faced with shortages in funding it was engaged in negotiations to either move the deadline or receive international assistance in order to fund the programme. Even with financial backup from the EU, US, Germany and the UK Russia expressed doubts that it could fulfil its obligations without additional substantial assistance to its programme. By the time of the review conference only 200 out of 40,000 tons of Russian chemical weapon stocks have been eliminated, according to the report of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute.53 The EU gave Russia €11 m from 1997–9 under the TACIS programme, and has its own programme on non-proliferation and disarmament. The EU non-proliferation and disarmament projects include support to build a chemical weapons destruction facility at Gornyy in Russia. The US gave $900 m for the destruction of chemical weapons. The UK and Germany have provided considerable sums in the past. In 1999 the main monitoring body was established in Russia—the Russian Munitions Agency. The new agency was lobbying for a unified financial and technical assistance pool that would optimise the planned disarmament. In June 2002 the G-8 states agreed to assist Russian chemical weapons destruction. Under this initiative the US pledged $10 bn to the cause, and all other countries pledged $10 bn over a ten-year period. In 2003 the UK offered another £12 m for the


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implementation of the projects. Currently about $3 bn is devoted to chemical weapons destruction annually, almost half financed by Russia and the other half by international partners. In December 2002 the Gornyy facilities became operational after Germany adopted a leading role in assisting in the construction of the processing plant. It has thus far eliminated 200 tons of blister agents. According to Russia’s plans another facility, the Shchuch’ye site, will be operational in 2005. In addition to European funding the Russian Ministry of Finance released the funds for the facility at the Kambarke site in Central Russia in autumn 2003. This reprocessing facility is to become operational by 2007.54 The establishing of international pools for addressing a specific identified threat became a sign of the times in the Russian approach to international technical and financial assistance in the defence and security sectors. The US programmes, under the auspices of the US Department of Defense and Department of Energy, tailored to assist Russia in monitoring the radioactive fissile material are well known. The RussianAmerican Nuclear Security Council regularly reports on accomplishments in the Threat Reduction and Non-proliferation Programs in Russia.55 To some extent the programme set a pattern for approaches to international assistance in this field. ‘The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction’ was launched at the G-8 Summit in Kanananaskis in 2002. The Global Partnership programme focused on the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and weapons delivery systems. Since its launch the programme has been expanded by including the non-G-8 countries which have taken the decision to join the Global Partnership. These are such states as Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden. The goal was to obtain $20 bn for the projects, which were focused on nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety in the former Soviet states. The driving force behind the agreement was the US. And it was planning to contribute as much as it could to this programme during its G-8 presidency. The initiative was built on more than a decade of co-operation between the US and the former Soviet states. From the 1992 FY through 2003 FY, the US allocated over $8 bn for non-proliferation purposes. President Bush requested another $1 bn for FY 2004, and had pledged a total of $10bn over the ten-year period through to 2013.56 An international project in Shchuchy’e, Russia, is one example of the multinational efforts to destroy nerve-agent-filled weapons. In March 2003 the United States began construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuchy’e. The UK began to construct a transformer station for the Shchuchy’e facility in 2003. France was planning to begin three projects to deal with nuclear fuel and solid waste from dismantled nuclear submarines during the same year. International co-operation in this field also concentrated on the continuing project on nuclear disarmament issues. The British government has provided £70 m over ten years under a programme to dispose of 34 million tons of surplus Russian weapons-grade plutonium. In June 2003 Germany started projects aimed to increase the physical protection of 17 sites storing fissile material. In addition, Russia signed an agreement with Japan on a project to dismantle general-purpose nuclear submarines in the Far East. Executive agreement on demolition of Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines


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was signed between Japan and Russia during the visit of Mrs Yoriko Kawaguti, minister of foreign affairs of Japan to the Russian Far Eastern region Primorie in late June 2003. The agreement to decommission 41 nuclear subs (‘Victor-III’ by NATO classification) is to be implemented within ten years. In July 2003 the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia signed the first contract with the government of Norway on dismantling and utilising two Russian atomic submarines of ‘Tshuka’ (Pike) class (NATO classification: ‘Victor-III’) of the Northern fleet. Sergey Antipov, the Russian deputy minister of atomic energy, reported that a contract was prepared in the framework of cooperation of the two countries in the area of providing radiation security according to the proposal of Norway from the beginning of 2003. It was noted in the Ministry of Atomic Energy that the government of Norway allocated €10 m for utilising two Russian atomic submarines. All this money will be sent to the accounts of two Russian ship-repairing enterprises in Murmansk and Severodvinsk. From the Norwegian side the contract was signed by Kim Traawik, deputy minister of foreign affairs of Norway. According to the instructions of the Russian government the Ministry of Atomic Energy acts as a state customer from the Russian side. Tony Blair, British prime minister, announced that the UK would commit up to $750 m over ten years to the Global Partnership. In June 2003, during the London UK-Russian Summit, several agreements were signed as part of this extensive programme. For example, on 26 June 2003 a benchmark agreement was signed between the UK and Russia that enabled the UK to start spending £30 m on nuclear clean-up projects. This is a key component of the UK’s wider counter-proliferation strategy. The UK took a decision to join the Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation (AMEC) programme, which includes practical work on dismantling submarines. Initially it was a trilateral project involving Russia, the US and Norway to make safer the Russian system for the storage of nuclear waste and the transfer of nuclear waste and nuclear fuel from submarines to railcars in Murmansk. The UK projects were concentrated on dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines and safely storing tons of spent nuclear fuel, making a total commitment of up to £20 m. This important bilateral programme is co-ordinated by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Foreign Office. It is integrated with other EU initiatives. Russian officials claim that the overall cost of the whole programme to scrap the submarines that need to be decommissioned could be around £2.5 bn.57 The UK is also committing £10m to the Northern Dimension Environmental Programme. Managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, this programme will include several major projects to deal with spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste, all of which will complement the UK’s bilateral activities. The UK Ministry of Defence joined AMEC and was planning to work more closely with Norway, Russia and the United States on nuclear clean-up projects. This complements the work the UK has been doing in helping Russia to destroy its stock of chemical weapons. The UK has committed up to $100m to it over the period of the Global Partnership. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said: Tackling WMD proliferation is one of this government’s highest priorities. Our co-operation with Russia in dealing with its nuclear legacy is a crucial part of this—and I’m delighted that during this state visit we have been able to sign an agreement that enables many new UK projects to begin.58


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On her part, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Patricia Hewitt stated: Dismantling nuclear submarines and making safe spent nuclear fuel are among Russia’s highest priorities in dealing with the legacy of the Cold War. This is difficult, complicated work in which the UK can offer real experience and assistance. Not only does this project offer proliferation and environmental benefits, it also presents future business opportunities for the UK companies with nuclear clean-up expertise.59 Funding for this important work comes from the UK’s commitment to the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The announced nuclear projects form a substantial part of this pledge. The Proliferation Security Initiative Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represents one of the biggest risks to global security. Whether the weapons are obtained by rogue states or, even worse, a terrorist organisation, there is no doubt that WMD pose a very real and very serious threat. The inability of the international community to prevent proliferation at the state level, despite the existence of treaties and co-operation agreements, means that a more practical and direct strategy of intervention is called for. The PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) was born primarily out of the international community’s inability to prevent states from obtaining the means to create or use weapons of mass destruction. The initiative was first discussed at the international forum of 12 countries (the US, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Canada) in June 2003 on the margins of the G-8 Madrid meeting. The ‘Madrid Initiative’ confirmed agreement to change international law that would enable ships and aircraft suspected of involvement in illegal activities to be stopped and searched on the high seas.60 On 26 June 2003 Condoleezza Rice, assistant to the US president, mentioned at her press conference at the IISS, London, that the US was in the middle of introducing a major change in the international legal approach based on the new US interdiction policy. On 11 July 2003 a two-day conference in Brisbane, Australia, resulted in the adoption of a decision to start negotiations on the Proliferation Security Initiative. Eleven countries (the US, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain) agreed to increase their level of co-operation through intelligencesharing and, eventually, joint direct action to intercept shipments of weapons that violate international treaties.61 The PSI interdiction strategy is primarily intended to halt the proliferation of WMD, but will also strive to stem the flow of other illegal arms shipments, or consignments that would pose a threat to the international community. The concerted effort by these countries represents the first such step since the formal establishment of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, and is a move towards direct intervention to prevent states from possessing or further developing suspected nuclear weapons capabilities. However, it is also a result of the growing threat posed by international terrorist groups, and their efforts to obtain and use WMD.62 The US-led PSI did not even pretend to


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involve any official international intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the IAEA or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It is a network-type response to the potential threat of WMD proliferation by rogue states or terrorist organisations. It is introduced to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world. There are international treaties in existence aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms trading. However, this new initiative marks for the first time a group of nations that have agreed to specifically enforce the provisions of those treaties, effectively increasing pressure on the states that are actively seeking such weapons to negotiate a settlement with the international community. The Proliferation Security Initiative could eventually lead to a joint direct action against suspected shipments of illegal weapons or materials to/from rogue states, putting greater pressure on those states to move more rapidly towards a negotiated settlement. Although the official plans of the PSI did not specifically name either North Korea or Iran as targets of potential interdictions by the coalition, recent events clearly point to the actions and admissions of the two countries as driving the need for more direct action by the international community.63 It is meant to disrupt terrorist efforts to obtain such weapons. An example of the targeted interdiction method that has already been employed is the interception by the US and Spanish forces of a ship carrying Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen in December 2002. The type of action being proposed under the PSI is not necessarily allowed under international law. Even when it isn’t crystal clear that an international treaty has been violated, direct action could still be taken under the PSI. The law concerning the proposed actions that are possible under the PSI is unclear, but the group of 11-member countries is hoping that their number will grow, along with the legitimacy of their actions. The initiative is capitalising on the network type of arrangement that uses decentralisation and the ability to operate in a number of geographic locations, regardless of national borders. The immediate stimulus for the PSI may be state-level proliferation, but the long-term need is fuelled by the presence of enemies that cannot be seen or sanctioned. The PSI is an example of establishing systemic networks in dealing with weapons of mass destruction, providing a mechanism and the procedures and means for preventing their proliferation, as well as joint efforts in eliminating their stockpiles or R&D facilities. It is the setting up of new coalitions that were ignoring the institutional principle. This approach combined the need for joint capabilities to deal with imminent threats (technological and financial as well as personnel resources) with the need to respond to the challenge put to the countries’ stability by extremist terrorist networks. The Americans introduced this idea to the Russians as early as January 2002. According to existing public records the initiative was not automatically brushed off. With expressed overall interest in the proposal and the promise to study it, the Russian representatives requested certain clarifications. Among many concerns, the Russians pointed to the need to clarify and name the authority which would be taking decisions on the activating of the mechanisms of monitoring, detention and prosecution on a case-bycase basis. The legitimacy of the initiative (in accordance with the norms of international law) was also questioned. It seems that the questions posed by the Russian


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representatives at the early discussions about this initiative are still to be answered, but it seems that the door for RF participation is open. The 29 April 2003 meeting in Moscow between President Putin and Prime Minister Blair was primarily focused on issues related to Iraq and the Middle Eastern process. However, one of the essential elements of the meeting was a debate about the structure of the new world order. The British approach was complementary to that of the US, and was based on the assumption that the international community could effectively face new security challenges and create a safer environment for international development and investments in the monocentric world based on the unification of interests of the US and Europe, extended to include Russia’s presence. However, the British role in transferring the transatlantic message to Russia as an invitation to the joint peacekeeping, peaceenforcement operation, and sharing the crisis management burden as a precondition of the acceptance to the league of the powerful world players, was received with a certain level of scepticism and high agitation in Moscow. Russian politicians and experts interpreted the British message in the following way: In brief, influential British circles tell Moscow that if it wants to regain an active role in world politics it must become another world policeman. When suggesting to Russia that it should join the British-American alliance and master the role of a junior world policeman, the allies refer to the Iraqi situation… Moscow is advised in future situations to join the efforts of the allies right from the start and follow the Anglo-American lead. So, the Russian political elite will now have to work on trying to prove its loyalty to the West and its predictability, while the West will have to take into account Russian interests.64 The Russian position towards Iraq during 2003, especially during the restoration period, can be considered as very pragmatic. During the summer visit to Italy in 2003, at the press conference before departure to Moscow, President Putin opened the possibility of the Russian military contingent’s presence under the US command as part of the UN efforts to restore post-conflict Iraq. Russia was prepared to share the burden of the restoration process in a situation when and if the mission received the UN mandate. Though the situation was very specific, individual Russian experts looked at this as a tryout option for possible similar exercises of joint policing efforts in the future. Nevertheless, the proposal has the potential to be successful. It is coherent with the Russian development pattern (military reform and sustainable development within the federal districts; emphasis on overlapping regional security complexes). It is supported and lobbied for by the US in its drive to tackle the terrorist threat to the American mainland and national assets abroad. Finally, it expresses the interest of regional players in sustaining regional security complexes. However, the issues of legality of actions stress the importance of a radical reform of the United Nations or the de facto creation of a functioning (in parallel to the UN regime) new pattern of security arrangement. The building blocks of the operational capability of such an arrangement could be the CJTFs, units representing different services and various civil-military institutional engagements. The dangers of the parallel functioning security arrangements were defined by Kofi Annan, secretary-general of the United Nations, in


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his speech to the UN General Assembly (September 2003). He pointed out that the right to act unilaterally or in ad hoc coalitions…represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last 58 years. My concern is that if it were to be adopted, it would set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force with or without justifications.65 Regional and global engagement strategy The PSI is to function on the basis of the existence of a leading regional player that could be delegated the responsibility to implement policies agreed in advance in ad hoc situations. The PSI, one could say, is based on the so-called ‘regional engagement’ concept, which was pronounced by the Bush administration. In respect to Russia, it was tailored so that both nations would be able to address new challenges together. This approach, generally, is related to those areas in which Russia has political and economic influence. Those are the areas in which, the Americans believe, Russia could tackle problems better than the Americans themselves—though still under US guidance. In the view of Russian experts, they might agree to the international co-ordination of efforts in cases related primarily to security in Eurasia in general, to the Caucasus, Central Asia, and to some general aspects of relations with China, as well as to a joint effort in response to the problems of security and economic stability in the Caspian region. However, Russia believes that any mission should be given proper authority by an international institution or that it should be mandated on the basis of an internationally recognised and legal decision. Just to follow the footsteps of the US meant increasing the price for co-operation. In any case, support for new initiatives based on network-centric principles meant the need for Russia to readjust. Russia was hoping to be the leading and principal partner, the driving force, with the US acting as a junior partner in some circumstances. While Russia is a junior partner to the US on the world scene today (and President Putin has admitted that), in some regional circumstances Russia is quite likely to act as the principal partner and the United States as a junior one.66 A group of American scholars of Russian origin put forward a wishful-thinking list, hoping to see in the future a transformed relationship within the developed world: From the point of view of the economy, the US and Europe are two economic giants. Europe, the sooner it starts talking a single language the better, and as a result, instead of the G-7 summit there will be the G-8 or essentially a G-2 summit, meaning the United States and Europe will be solving economic problems. And it would not be bad if someone at that summit represented Eurasia. I think that the desire for this will appear in many countries so that the summit be held within the G-3 framework Europe, Eurasia and the United States. In this case Russia has a good chance to try it. Although China and other countries may attempt to fill that position. That is why here we again have a clean slate. In general, Russia, I believe, has a very good basis for presenting


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itself as a reliable, serious, predictable partner in that region with all the ties that have to be created, as the Americans believe, in Europe. And if Russia does this, the Americans will probably use Russia with pleasure as an ally vis-à-vis the problems that arise in that region.67 This statement should not be automatically disregarded. On its part Russia was putting forward for consideration another option of the new world order dealing with the twentyfirst century security challenges—as ‘G-S+’, meaning the expanding co-operation between recognised G-8 countries and China, and possibly India. As was noted, ‘the nature of the Western stake in the international order has also been transformed in the wake of the end of the cold war’.68 At the same time it is difficult not to agree with experts like Allen C.Lynch who was pointing out that the scope of Russian influence was much greater than one wished to deduce from a simple projection of the existing presence of Russia’s power.69 A few years back the prototype of the cooperation similar to the PSI was already considered as a possibility for the new world order by Professor Victor Kremenuyk: The US-Russian partnership may become one of the major cornerstones of the global security structure in the twenty-first-century. This structure could be something genuinely global, with space-based monitoring, transitional information systems and databases, with highly sophisticated weaponry and qualified personnel. The structure would be based on principles of universal security in the spirit of the UN Charter. In part, that system may be controlled by the Western alliances and US-led groups in the Pacific and Western hemisphere. However, partnership with Russia may well be one of the primary means to extend this global security system to encompass the vast Eurasian ‘heartland’ that has played such a visible role in human history.70 Exclusive reliance on military force, or threat of military force, will not be sufficient for managing the security environment of the twenty-first century. While situations will continue to emerge that may ultimately necessitate a military response, the limits of the application of military force as a means of achieving ends in a world community should be taken into consideration.71

CONCLUSION Net results—systemic changes The main objectives of the present Russian government are to integrate the country into the international security system and provide the state’s firm engagement with the industrialised international community. It is to create the conditions and infrastructure for a sustainable development of the whole territory of the state, using the resources of its regional geography, economy and politics, and to further engage Russia with the world economy by relying on a regional/district method of governance and authority. At the same time, the government is preparing the country to deal with risks and threat factors in the next 5–20 years. This can only be accomplished by changing its management principles and by increasing the emphasis on territorial command and control planning, with strong monitoring and control features built into these processes. There are two methods to be used to achieve such aims: a consensus model, which emphasises constant dialogue with the regions, and a command model, in which changes are imposed from above. This book suggests that Russia merged the two models into one when its federal government decreed reforms from above; however, much of its implementation is still subject to negotiations from below. Russia’s administrative and military reforms are being planned and carried out simultaneously. The stages of the administrative reform were conceived to eliminate inconsistencies in federal and regional legislation, establish conditions for economic revival and to create a new security system with strong information support, as well as introduce the reform of the municipal and local governments. During the first stages of the federal reform the PEs’ monitoring activity was designed to harmonise local and regional laws with federal legislation. The implementation of this task required the establishment of alternative expertise procedures for local laws and legislation, and resubordination of the security, police and legislative authorities to meet the requirements of the federal centre. The implemented changes paralleled the developments in Russian military reform. One of the vital elements of the military reform is the transfer to the principle of C&C for the military and other services of the Russian Federation. Incorporating this principle into one joint combat system will radically change any future military activity. Establishing a unified system of technical assistance and logistics for the armed forces, and for all other forces and military formations and institutions of the Russian Federation which are responsible for the state’s military security, is rapidly becoming one of the main tasks of the reform. A new administrative structure for the state is directly linked with the future of the military reform, which is to be implemented on the basis of the universally integrated ‘effectiveness-cost-feasibility’ model. It is also tied in with the reform of the established strategic commands, operational task forces and joint logistics, which are considered to

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be essential elements of a new cost-effective approach to defence and security. A move towards territorial management of the country became evident, when structural changes in the federal economic and security institutions became evident. The systemic approach to regional security at the beginning of the twenty-first century meant, first of all, establishing a network of institutions that would allow and assist the PEs in the districts to unify the regions and territories within their respective FDs. At the same time, it was necessary to implement a number of measures that would limit the influence of the authorities (at the governor or republic level) on the power ministries and judicial system in the regions. On the one hand, it was excluding or decreasing the influence of local structures on security and defence issues and establishing strict subordination of vertical authority in these matters. On the other hand, it was perceived as a drive towards optimisation and increased efficiency, leading to the cutting of all overlapping expenditures and the defining of sources of funding and social responsibilities at all levels of the authority in the country. Russia is reshaping its political and economic map and focusing on the district’s system of planning. Since 2001, the financial and economic statistics and all economic plans are to be prepared at the district level. The regional plans for territorial development are becoming the highest priority of federal-district-regional-local economic and political relations. The programmes are linked to the idea of creating conditions for sustainable development in the regions and attracting foreign and domestic investors. The programmes for regional development are prepared by the PEs at the district level and approved by the federal government. However, the programmes have to be transregional in nature, crossing the divisional lines among the regions and districts. The government has also selected transportation and communication projects for those areas meriting a high federal priority. The transcontinental transportation and communication projects are essential for the implementation of economic and military reforms in Russia. Each is an invaluable component of regional development programmes. Their core aspect is the construction and preservation of transportation/communication corridors which will link Russia with the world markets, especially with Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Socio-economic programmes for the development of the FD are directly linked with Russia’s policy of engagement with the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. All five- to tenyear programmes of the district’s development are fully incorporated into Russia’s comprehensive economic and political strategy (2001–10). The North-western, Volga-Urals, Southern, Siberian and Far Eastern FDs play an important role in Russia’s vision of its engagement with the world. ‘The Concept of the Transborder Co-operation for the RF’ covers the potential benefits, as well as forms of co-operation, among the bordering regions of Russia and adjacent states. Fifty-one per cent of the subjects of the RF became border regions only after the break up of the USSR. Thus the influence of the border and neighbouring states on the economic, political and social life of Russia should not be underestimated. A vital aspect of this policy is economic benefits. The reforms of the 2000–3 period have created conditions for the reopening of foreign engagement in the regions, as well as the implementation of new stages of the military reform. In 2002 the RF submitted for the United Nations’ consideration Russia’s ‘Concept of the State’s Sustainable Development’ as a follow-up to the commitment given by Russia in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and there was no surprise

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that the RF programme was based on the plans for the FD’s sustainable development. The institutional network of regional and subregional organisations is a cornerstone of the security architecture of modern Europe. The multilevel security arrangements in the Baltic area and in South-eastern Europe served as a locomotive for regional development, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. The North-western region of the RF proved to be very effective in the Baltic co-operative ventures. The establishment of coordinated policies amongst themselves was aimed at providing better opportunities for integrating with their European counterparts. The Southern regions of Russia, selectively active in cross regional co-operation efforts, were tied up in the conflicts in the Caucasus. For the first time in recent history the Far Eastern and Siberian regions were given the opportunity to implement one of the essential elements of the country’s motto of being a Eurasian state. The increased co-operation with the neighbouring regions and countries in Asia finally gave economic substance to the political statement of Russia’s equal interests in both Europe and Asia. Besides, the existing patterns of international co-operation stimulated integration efforts in the Russian Federation. To some extent, the establishment of the FDs in the RF could be viewed as a local adaptation of regional communities to one of the major security trends—the integration of international efforts on the ‘soft’ security issues and confidence building measures (CBMs) at the local and regional level. The administrative reform was linked to the introduction of new principles of transparency and accountability in governance, reforms in the civil service and changes in the political parties’ systems that were supposed to reflect the changing realities in Russia. The systemic changes touched all spheres of life in Russia. If they are fully implemented, the scale of planned changes will clearly transform the country in a systemic matter, which will be unequalled since the collapse of communism. Recognition of these trends is essential, especially between the parliament (2003) and presidential (2004) elections in Russia. The developments not only demonstrate the realities of the achievements of President Putin but also map future patterns for the country’s development. The domestic reforms were accompanied by dramatic changes in Russia’s foreign policy, strongly labelled as the ‘diplomatic revolution’ by some Western scholars. Russia’s new foreign policy course became even more evident after the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Agreeing in principle with those who recognise Russia’s strategic decision at the beginning of the twenty-first century towards integration and co-operation with the international community, the chapters of this book, hopefully, demonstrate that this strategic decision was based on the gradual realisation by the Russian leaders of the importance and unavoidability of the chosen way. The realisation of the necessity to establish institutional relationships with the main security and economic institutions around the world, and the use of traditional alliances and bilateral relations in the promotion of special arrangements for the state were always among the goals of the RF political elite. But it takes two to tango. The changed realities of international relations, new security threats and the opening of economic investment opportunities in the formerly closed vast regions of the Russian Federation, and the increasingly recognised

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importance of Russian energy and other natural resources for the world’s diversified supply system, provided good backup for a new realistic approach in dealing with Russian policy assessments. The globalisation process and the emergence of new risks, coupled with the intensification of the old ones, produced fundamental changes in the concept of security. The fight against international terrorism, crime, drug trafficking and the protection of the global environment, prevention of forced international migration as a consequence of conflict or economic degradation in the ‘home’ regions are the new areas of security concern.1 Continued good relations at the head of state/governmental level do not downplay the importance to modern societies in a medium- and long-term future of stability and the viability of the state’s structures and authorities at the domestic level— because the stability of a regime and the ability of its authorities to rule have a significant impact on international (regional and interregional) governance. The stability in Russia is becoming even more essential as a country/supplier of energy resources to the EU after the signing of the co-operation programme within the Euro-Russian Energy Dialog and to the US as a transit country between the EU and ASEAN. The EU-ASEAN dialogue is vitally important for the economic development of Europe.2 With the evolution of EURussian relations, and expanding energy co-operation, the issue of the non-interrupted supplies of energy resources from Russia to Europe is becoming an issue of security rather than of just economic concern. Thus, the internal stability in Russia and a controlled economic-social situation have become matters of concern for Russian customers. The RF is becoming an important partner in the global war against terrorism. Russia is actively engaged in the anti-terrorist campaign and was among those states that initiated and supported the establishment of the anti-terrorist containment networks. It backed up the creation of the overlapping security networks under the auspices of the UN, and gave special priority to the institutions in neighbouring states and in the post-Soviet space, where Russia could monitor the developments in the grouping and organisations. The ability to defend oneself with preventive strikes against terrorist threats was widely supported, though such actions had to be sanctioned by the UN SC. The anti-terrorist policy being pursued by the Russian government was accompanied by substantial internal reform and the adjustment of the internal security system and government (federal, regional, local) to face the new challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century world. The established FDs’ structure does not directly affect the existing arms control agreements. However, the patterns of civil-military relations in the FDs and introduction of the multinational OTF as an option of the Russian CJTFs are vitally important to understand Russia’s future behaviour patterns and roles in international peacekeeping, conflict prevention actions and in the anti-terrorist campaign. The purpose of this book has been to reveal that revolutionary changes in Russian foreign and domestic policies are based on long-standing traditions and on searches for the optimum realisation of Russia’s geo-strategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic potentials. The business of statecraft in the twenty-first century will demand greater sophistication, insight and skill in negotiation and diplomacy, derived from a deep understanding of history, culture, society and interests—perhaps even of the

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psychological profiles of individual leaders of other nations and of nations as a whole. The influence of Russia will be critical for shaping the standards of conduct for global politics into the twenty-first century. The realities of the twenty-first century suggest the necessity for concerned multilateral action among nations to hold the preservation of global security as a priority. These realities will shape relations with Russia and set rules of expectation for the state’s internal and external policy.

APPENDIX I Federal districts: information data In order to provide comprehensive characteristics of these FDs it is useful to compare their configurations with the boundaries of the economic areas that were used in the USSR Gosplan’s (State Planning Committee) statistical and economic development programmes—as well as with the composition of the military districts of the Russian Federation.1 The following FDs were established.2 The North-western FD The Republic of Karelia, the Republic of Komi, Arkhangelsk Region, Vologda Region, Kaliningrad Region, Leningrad Region, Murmansk Region, Novgorod Region, Pskov Region, the city of St Petersburg and the Nenets Autonomous Area, with the city of St Petersburg as the district centre. The North-western FD fully incorporated two economic development areas: North and North-west. It is established on the basis of the Leningrad military district and the Kaliningrad operational strategic group of forces. The Central FD Belgorod Region, Bryansk Region, Vladimir Region, Voronezh Region, Ivanovo Region, Kaluga Region, Kostroma Region, Kursk Region, Lipetsk Region, Moscow Region, Orel Region, Ryazan Region, Smolensk Region, Tambov Region, Tver Region, Tula Region, Yaroslav Region and the city of Moscow, with Moscow as the district centre. The district fully incorporated two economic areas: the Central and the Central Chernozem (black earth). It is established within the boundaries of the Moscow military district, with the exception being the Niznii Novgorod Region which is not included (it became the seat of the HQ of the Volga FD). The North Caucasian, renamed as the Southern FD (23 June 2000) The Republic of Adegeya (Adygeya), the Republic of Dagestan, the Republic of Ingushetia, the Republic of Kabardin-Balkaria, the Republic of Kalmykiya, the Republic of Karachai-Cherkessia, the Republic of North Osetia-Alaniya, the Chechen Republic, Krasnodar Territory, Stavropol Territory, Astrakhan Region, Volgograd Region, and Rostov Region. Initially, the city of Rostov-on-Don was named as the district centre. However, on the insistence and recommendation of the PE to the region, General Victor

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Kazantsev, the North Caucasian FD was renamed as the Southern FD and its centre was transferred to the city of Stavropol in accordance with the presidential decree.3 The impetus behind this move was that these changes would stretch the FD over the territories of Astrakhan and Volgograd regions and Kalmykiya (autonomous republic) in addition to the regions and territories of the Northern Caucasus. The transfer of the district centre was important so that the PE HQ could be closer to the conflict area. This FD was created on the foundation of regions in the North Caucasus economic area, which are traditionally united in combination with three economic areas of the Volga economic region, such as the Astrakhan and Volgograd regions, as well as the Republic of Kalmykiya. The North Caucasus military district (MD), with its HQ in Rostov-on-Don, fully overlaps with this FD. The Volga FD The Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Marii El, the Republic of Mordova, the Republic of Tatarstan (Tatarstan), the Republic of Udmurtia, the Republic of Chuvashia, Kirov Region, Nizhni Novgorod Region, Orenburg Region, Penza Region, Perm Region, Samara Region, Saratov Region, Ulyanovsk Region and Komi-Permyak Autonomous Area, with the city of Niznii Novgorod as the district centre. Economically, this district comprises several regions that traditionally belonged to three economic areas: Volga-Vyatka, the Volga area (except the Astrakhan and Volgograd regions, as well as the Republic of Kalmykiya) and the Urals. The majority of the regions that constituted the Urals economic area, such as the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Udmurtia, Orenburg and Perm Regions, and the KomiPermyak Autonomous Area, belonged to this federal administrative unit. In military terms, the forces subordinated to the PE were a part of the Volga military district (with the exemption of the Niznii Novgorod region). The HQ of the military district is located in the city of Samara. The Urals FD Kurgan Region, Sverdlovsk Region, Tyumen Region, Chelyabinsk Region, the KhantyMansi Autonomous Area, the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area, with the city of Yekaterinburg as the district centre. Economically, the district encapsulates several regions belonging to the two main development areas, such as the Urals (e.g., Kurgan, Sverdlovsk and Chelybinsk regions) and Western Siberia (Tyumen, with autonomous areas). In military terms, the district is established on the basis of the Ural military district with its HQ in Yekaterinburg.

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The Siberian FD The Republic of Altai, the Republic of Buriatia, the Republic of Tuva, the Republic of Khakassia, Altai Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Irkutsk Region, Kemerovo Region, Novosibirsk Region, Omsk Region, Tomsk Region, Chita Region, the Aga Buryat Autonomous Area, the Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets) Autonomous Area, the Ust-Urda Buryat Autonomous Area and the Evenk Autonomous Area. Novosibirsk is the district centre. In economic terms, the district incorporates regions with considerable economic potential: Eastern Siberia and Western Siberia (with the exception of Tyumen region). The FD fully corresponds to the Siberian MD with its HQ in Novosibirsk. The Far Eastern FD The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Maritime Territory (Primorie), Khabarovsk Territory, Amur Region, Kamchatka Region, Sakhalin Region, the Jewish Autonomous Region, the Koryak Autonomous Area, and the Chukchi Autonomous Area, with the city of Khabarovsk as the district centre. The geographic boundaries of this district fully correspond to the Far Eastern economic area (which also existed in the days of the USSR Gosplan’s statistical and economic development programmes) and to the Far Eastern military district with its HQ in Vladivostok.

NOTES INTRODUCTION 1 Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the Sixteenth Century to the Present (London: Pimlico, 2003); Robert Service, A History of Modern Russia from Nicholas II to Putin (London and New York: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 529–547. 2 Yves Boyer, ‘Les Russes’, in Yves Boyer and Isabelle Facon (eds), La Politique de Securite de la Russie: entre continuite et rupture (Paris: Ellipses Edition Marketing, 2000), pp. 7–8. 3 Anne de Tinguy, ‘La Russie peut-elle avoir une Ambition Asiatique?’, in Yves Boyer and Isabelle Facon (eds), La Politique de Securite de la Russie, p. 191. 4 Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism’, The IISS Quarterly Survival, 44, 2(2002), p. 133. 5 Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtsova, ‘America, Russia and Europe: a Realignment?’, The IISS Quarterly Survival, 44, 4(2002–3), p. 127. 6 Nadia Alexandrova Arbatova, ‘Russian-Western Relations after 11 September: Selective Cooperation versus Partnership (a Russian view), in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Superterrorism: Policy Responses (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), p. 168. 7 The Day After: An Assessment. An American/European/Russian Colloquium with David Gompert, Francois Heisbourg and Alexei G.Arbatov’, The IISS Quarterly Survival, 43, 4(2001), p. 151. 8 Strobe Talbott, The Russian Hand: a Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002). 9 Strobe Talbott, The Russian Hand, p. 412. 10 Andrew Fenton Cooper, John English and Ramesh Thakur, Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2002). 11 William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993–2000 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003). 12 Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996). 13 As was demonstrated in Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Holy Revolution, Communism and After (London and New York: Routledge, 2000) p. xiv, written by

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prominent political scientist and historian Peter J.S.Duncan. 14 ‘Putin Eases Stance on NATO Enlargement’, Washington Post, 4 October 2001. 15 Stuart Croft, ‘Guaranteeing Europe’s Security? Enlarging NATO Again’, International Affairs, RIIA, 78, 1 (2002), p. 111. 16 Mark Webber (ed.), Russia and Europe: Conflict or Cooperation? (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 222. 17 Anatol Lieven, The Secret Policemen’s Ball: the United States, Russia and the International Order after 11 September’, International Affairs, RIIA, 78, 2 (2002), pp. 245–260. 18 Anatol Lieven, The Secret Policemen’s Ball: the United States, Russia and the International Order after 11 September’, International Affairs, RIIA, 78, 2 (2002), p. 257. 19 See Mark Webber (ed.), Russia and Europe, p. 17. 20 Andrew Cottey (ed.), Subregional Cooperation in the New Europe (London: Macmillan, 1999); Renata Dwan (ed.), Building Security in Europe’s New Borderlands (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe, 1999); Renata Dwan and Oleksandr Pavliuk (eds), Building Security in the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe, 2000). 21 Graeme P.Herd and Anne Aldis (eds), Russia’s Regions and Regionalism: Strength Through Weakness (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 276. 22 Nadia Alexandrova Arbatova, ‘Russian-Western Relations after 11 September: Selective Cooperation versus Partnership (a Russian view)’, in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), Superterrorism, p. 169. 23 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, p. 29. 24 Ibid., p. 65. 25 Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds), Russia after Communism (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 49. 26 See Graeme P.Herd and Anne Aldis (eds), Russia’s Regions and Regionalism, p. 277. 27 Michael McFaul, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell University Press, 2001). 28 Richard Sakwa, Politics in Russia (London: Routledge, 2002). 29 Michail Alexseev, Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia: Federation Imperilled (New York, 1999); Irina Busygina-Thraenert, ‘Russia: Difficulties in Establishing a Federation’, Aussenpolitik, 3, 6 (1995); Martin Nicholson, Towards a Russia of the Regions, Adelphi Paper No. 330 (London: IISS, 1999); Neil Melvin, Regional Foreign Policies in the Russian Federation (London: RIIA, 1995); N.Petrov and A.Treivish, ‘Regionalnyi Separatism i Desintegratsia Rossii: Opyt Izmereniya Razlichnykh Kategorii Riska’ (Regional Separatism and Disintegration of Russia), in Grigorii Kostinskii (ed.), Rossiya i SNG: Dezintegratsionnye i Integratsionnye Protsessy (Moscow: Institute of Geography, RAS, 1995), pp. 25– 38; Richard Sakwa, ‘Russian Regionalism, Policy-Making and State Development’, in Stefanie Harter and Gerald Easter (eds), Shaping the Economic Space in Russia: Decision Making Processes, Institutions and Adjustment to Change in the El’tsin Era (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 11–34.

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30 Graham Smith (ed.), Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge (London and New York, 1995); Gail W.Lapidus and Edward W.Walker, ‘Nationalism, Regionalism and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia’, in Gail W.Lapidus (ed.), The New Russia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 79– 114; V.V.Ivanov, Rossiysky Federalism i Vnutrygosudarstvennaya Dogovornaya Politika (Russian Federalism and Internal State Treaty Policy) (Krasnoyarsk: Krasnoyarsk State University, 1997); Ruslan Khasbulatov, The Struggle for Russia. Power and Change in the Democratic Revolution (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); R.Abdulatipov, V.Zorin, V. Michailov and E.Pain (eds), Natsionalnaya Politika Rossii: Istoriya i Sovremennost (National Policy of Russia: History and the Present) (Moscow, 1997). 31 Glenn Hook and Ian Kearns, ‘Conclusion’, in Glenn Hook and Ian Kearns (eds), Subregionalism and World Order (Sheffield: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999), p. 249. 32 David A.Lake and Patrick M.Morgan (eds), Regional Order: Building Security in a New World (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

1 GEO-STRATEGY AND RUSSIA’S VISION OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER 1 See Peter J.S.Duncan, Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After (London: Routledge, 2000). 2 N.Diakova and M.Chepelkin, Istoriya Rossii (History of Russia) (Moskva: Izdatelstvo ‘Shik’ dlia Centra voenno-strategicheskikh I voenno-technologicheskih issledovanii/Institut SShA I Kanady RAN, 1995), p. 5. 3 V.Cheban, Geopoliticheskoye Polozhenie i Voennaya Politika Rossii. Razmyshleniya Publitcista o Nastoyshei i Budushei Voennoyi Politike Rossii (Geopolitical Situation and Military Policy of Russia. A Publicist’s Thoughts on Present and Future Military Policy of Russia) (Moskva: Gralia, 2001), p. 9. 4 V.V.Karpov, Geopolitika. Kurs Lektcii (Geopolitics. Course of Lectures) (St Petersburg: Izdatelstvo Mihailova V.A, 2000), p. 35. 5 Hrestomatiya po russkoy voennoy istorii (Essay collection on Russian military history) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1947), p. 638. 6 See N.Diakova and M.Chepelkin, Istoriya Rossii, p. 27. 7 Ibid., p. 37. 8 See V.Cheban, Geopoliticheskoye Polozhenie i Voennaya Politika Rossii, p.17. 9 Genadii Zuganov, Za Gorizontom (Over the Horizon) (Moscow, 1995); G. Zuganov, Kontceptsia Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti RF in 1996–2000 (The Concept of National Security of the RF in 1996–2000) (Moscow, 1995); Genadii Zuganov, Geografia Pobedy: Osnovy Rossiiskoi Geopolitiki (The Geography of Victory: Basis of Russian Geopolitics) (Moscow, 1997); Genadii Zuganov, Rossia i Sovremennyi Mir (Russia and the Contemporary World) (Moscow, 1995); Sergei Baburin, Rossiyskii Put’: Stanovlenie Rossisskoi Geopolitiki Nakanune XXI Veka (The Russian Way: the

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Establishment of Russian Geopolitics on the Brink of the Twenty-first Century) (Moscow: Moscow University Press, 1995); Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, The Last Rush to the South (Moscow, 1997); A.Mitrofanov, Shagi Novoi Geopolitiki (Steps of New Geopolitics) (Moscow: Russkii vestnik, 1997); Geopoliticheskoe Polozhenie Rossii: Predstavleniya i Realnost’ (Geopolitical Situation of Russia: Assessments and Reality) (Moscow: Art-Courier, 2000). 10 Especially having in mind the potentials of the emerging markets. 11 Peter J.S.Duncan, ‘Westernism, Eurasianism and Pragmatism: Foreign Policies of the Post-Soviet States, 1991–2001’, Working paper prepared for the conference ‘Ten Years since the Soviet Union’, SSEES, University College London, 9–10 November 2001. 12 Dmitrii Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalisation (Moscow: Carnegie Center Moscow, 2001), p. 32. 13 President Putin made public appearances at the G-8 Summit in Okinawa and at the Millennium Summit in New York in 2000, bilateral summits with the EU in Paris, Stockholm and Moscow in 2000/1, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum in Brunei in November 2000, and at numerous CIS Summits in Moscow, Yalta. In 2002 Russia-US, Russia-NATO and Russia-EU Summits took place in addition to increased high-level bilateral contacts with the UK, US, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Mongolia, North and South Korea, China, India, Iran, Iraq, Greece, Turkey, Libya, Malta, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, etc. 14 K.E.Sorokin, ‘Geopolitika Sovremennosti I Geostrategia Rossii’ (Contemporary Geopolitics and Geostrategy of Russia), in Rossiiskaia Politicheskaya Encyklopedia (Russian Political Encyclopaedia) (Moscow: Rossien, 1996), pp. 56–57. 15 Emphasis added. Dmitrii Rogozin, Formula Raspada (The Formula of Disintegration) (Moscow: Biblioteka Kongressa Russkih Obschin, 1998), pp. 63–64. 16 Andrew H.Dawson and Rick Fawn (eds), The Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe (London and Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 150. 17 Ibid., p. l54. 18 See M.Hauner, What is Asia to US? (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 19 ‘Kontcepzia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 July 2000, p. 6. 20 Sergei Rogov, ‘Kontury Novoi Rossisskoi Geopolitiki’ (Outlines of New Russia’s Geopolitics), Nezavisimaya gazeta-Scenarii, No. 3,1998, p. 5. 21 Dmitrii Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalisation (Moscow: Carnegie Center Moscow, 2001), p. 28. 22 For example, General (Ret.) Valerii Manilov, Bezopasnost’ v Epokhu Partnerstva (Security in the Epoch of Partnership) (Moscow: Terra, 1999); Major-General V.I.Slipchenko (Ret.), Voina Budushego (War of the Future) (Moscow: Moscow Public Science Foundation, 1999); M.Gareev, Yesli Zavtra Voyna: Chto Izmenitsia v Kharaktere Vooruzhennoy Borby Blizhayshiye 20–25 Let (If War is Tomorrow: What will be Changed in the Nature of Armed Fighting in the Nearest 20–25 years) (Moscow: Vladar, 1995); Academic Rear-Admiral V.S.Pirunov, Geopolitica i Bezopasnost (Geopolitics and Security) (Moscow: ‘ARBIZO’, 1993);

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V.V.Zhirinovskiy, Ocherki po Geopolitike (Essays on Geopolitics) (Moscow 1997); Colonel V.Cheban, Geopoliticheskoye Polozhenie i Voennaya Bezopasnost’ Rossii (Geopolitical Situation and Military Security of Russia) (Moscow: Voin, 1997), and ‘Rossia v Sisteme Sovremennych Voeynno-Politicheskih Sviazei’ (Russia in the System of Modern Military-Political Ties) (Voennaya mysl, No. 3, 1993, pp. 3–9); Admiral Ivan M.Kapitanets, Voina na More (War at Sea) (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001). 23 S.Harlamov, ‘Geostrategitcheskiye Ugrozy’ (Geostrategic Threats), in Armeiskyi sbornik, 10 (1997), p. 15. 24 Yevgenii Morozov, ‘Bol’shoi Evraziiskyi Proekt’ (Big Eurasian Project), Armeiskyi sbornik, 2 (1995), pp. 14–26. 25 Alesander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopolitika Budushchee Rossii. Myslit Prostranstvom (The Basics of Geopolitics: Geopolitics Sees the Future of Russia in Terms of Space) (Moscow: Arktogeya-tsentr, 1999), pp. 265–269. 26 Yevgenii Morozov, ‘Rossiisko-Germanskiye Otnosheniya: Geostrategicheskiyi Aspect’ (Russian-German Relations: Geostrategic Aspect), Elementy, 5 (1994), pp. 26–30; O. Tunander, P.Baev and V.Einagel (eds), Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1997); Vladimir Kolossov and Rostislav Turovsky, ‘Russian Geopolitics at the Fin-deSiecle’, in Andrew H.Dawson and Rick Fawn (eds), The Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe (London and Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 141–164. 27 Dmitrii Trenin, ‘Kak Prikryt’ Vostochnyi Geostrategicheskiyi Fasad Rossii’ (How to Secure the Eastern Geo-strategic Front of Russia), Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 7(1997), pp. 1,4. 28 Russian officials announced the possibility of withdrawal of the RF Navy from the base after the end of the leasing period in 2004 (annual rent is 300 million US dollars). 29 Michael Leontiev, ‘News in brief’, National Electronic Library, 2 February 2002. 30 Segodnya, 2 September 2000. 31 Harir Dekmejian and Hovann Simonian, The Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region (London: I.B.Tauris, 2001), p. 271.

2 PRACTICAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1 Yuri Fedorov, ‘Kriticheskii vyzov dlia Rossii’ (Critical Challenge for Russia), Pro Contra, 4,4 (1999), p. 22. 2 Boris Rumer, ‘The Powers in Central Asia’, The IISS Quarterly Survival, 44, 3 (2002), p. 59. 3 Ibid. 4 Interfax, 1 March 2000. 5 Proposals for the oil industry, prepared by McKinsey Global Institute in coauthorship with Harvard and the University of Massachusetts, include suggestions to

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remove limitations on export, to liberalise the domestic market and expand the law on production sharing—Obtshaya Gazeta, 23 December 1999. 6 Section Documents, the RF Security Council—available www.scrf.ru 7 Sergei Karaganov (ed.), Geopolitical Changes in Europe, Policies of the West and Alternatives for Russia, Report of the Institute of Europe, RAS, Moscow, 19 (1995), pp. 38–40. 8 V.Tstigitchko and R.Huber, ‘Strategic Stability: Two Approaches to its Assessments’, Voennaya Mysl’, 1 (1998), pp. 20–27. 9 The GUAM group consists of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. 10 D.Gornostayev, ‘Russian Foreign Minister Formulates Russia’s New Strategic Objectives in International Arena’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 March 1998. 11 Russia’s mineral and raw material wealth has been its main source of current revenue. The crude oil and raw minerals base accounts for 60–65 per cent of the financial resources earned annually from exports, and approximately 43 per cent of these resources consist of energy exports. The sustainability of Russian economic development depends on maintaining resources production volumes. Russia has 13 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, 35 per cent of its gas reserves, 12 per cent of coal, 15 per cent of non-ore minerals, and 13 per cent of metals. However, due to the cost of developing deposits in difficult-to-access areas such as the North and Siberia, and lack of funds, most of new deposits are not ready for development. The lack of financial, technical and human resources has determined a policy focused primarily on the reutilisation of energy resources and has eliminated the possibility of preparing for potential utilisation of the country’s vast mineral and raw material reserves. At the same time Russia has always depended for raw materials on the CIS: more than one-third of its needs in ferrous and non-ferrous metals was once satisfied by the former Soviet republics. Shortages in these resources will be more evident when the industrial production starts rising in Russia. 12 S.Harlamov, ‘Geopolititcheskaya Ekspansia’ (Geopolitical Intervention), in Armeiskyi sbornik, 11 (1997), p. 28. 13 Segodnya, 2 January 1997. 14 TV Inform MIA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefings, Russia, 10 December 1998. 15 Since 2001 the Russian military mission to NATO has been headed by Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov, career military diplomat. 16 ‘Statement of NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting at Ministerial Level, held in Florence on 24 May 2000’, Press release, 24 May 2000. 17 ROA NATIONAL, ‘Security report’, The Officer, 10 (1995), p. 35. 18 International Herald Tribune, 1 January 1997. 19 Celeste A.Wallander, ‘Russia, Kosovo and Security Cooperation’, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS), Memo No. 58 (Johnson’s List 3224, No. 7, 2003). 20 Kommersant Daily, 31 March 1999. 21 For a detailed list of Russian interests in NATO-Russia co-operation, see Irina Isakova, ‘Russia and NATO: Is There a Basis for a Stable Relationship?’, CDS Bulletin of Arms Control, 28,12 (1997), pp. 6–10. 22 A.Piontkovsky and V.Tsygichko, ‘Russia and NATO after Paris and Madrid’,

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Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 27 November 1997. 23 V.Treskov, ‘Russia Has Every Right to Protect its Interests in Europe’, Rabochaya Tribuna, 19 February 1997—www.russia.net/ria/dr/drl9022.htm 24 John Helmer, ‘Micoyan MiG to Sweeten NATO Deal’, Moscow Tribune, 28 February 1997. 25 ‘MiG-29 Maintenance and Support Joint Venture’, Military Technology, MILTECH, Marketing Report, May 1998. 26 I.Kopylov, ‘Strategicheskoye Predpolie NATO’ (Strategic Anteroom of NATO), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 April 1997. 27 ‘Russia Ready to Talk Security with NATO-Defence Minister Ivanov’, Reuters, 1 December 2001. 28 National Electronic Library, 1 December 2001. 29 www.byegn.gov.tr 30 Alexander Golts, ‘New Alliance Proposal Poses Challenge’, The Russia Journal, 23–29 November 2001. 31 NATO secretary-general Lord Robertson, ‘Prague 2002: Challenge and Change for NATO’, Speech at the ‘NATO: A Vision for 2012’ conference organised by NATO and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels, 3 October 2002. 32 RIA-Novosti, 7 June 2002. 33 www.strana.ru 34 Alexander Vershbow, ‘Transforming NATO-Russia Relations’, in electronic journal U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, 27 March 2002—available usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/ijpe0302.htm 35 Charles Grant, ‘NATO’s New Role’, Financial Times, 1 August 2002. 36 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 5 November 2002. 37 RIA-Novosti, 11 November 2002. 38 Ibid. 39 ‘Head of the Committee of the Federation Council: NATO Enlargement is a Mistake’, RIA-Novosti, 21 November 2002. 40 www.strana.ru (22 November 2002). 41 Vladimir Myhin, ‘Naskolko Ugrozhaet Rossii Rasshirenie NATO?’ (To What Extent Does NATO Enlargement Threaten Russia?), www.strana.ru (22 November 2002). 42 The Military Balance 2002–2003, IISS (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 71–72, 74–75. 43 ‘Communiqué 127 (2002): Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Prague NATO Summit, 21 November 2002’, Washington File, 22 November 2002— available usinfo.state.gov 44 Alexander Yakovenko, ‘Russia is Not Trying to Enter NATO, Neither from the Main Nor the Back Door’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 November 2002. 45 Vladimir Myhin, ‘Naskolko Ugrozhaet Rossii Rasshirenie NATO?’ (To What Extent Does NATO Enlargement Threaten Russia?), www.strana.ru (22 November 2002). 46 Dmitrii Litovkin and Andrei Zaitsev, ‘Genshtab Vidit Vse Naskvoz’ (General Staff

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Sees Through Everything), Izvestia, 4 November 2002. 47 Alexander Yakovenko, ‘Russia is Not Trying to Enter NATO, Neither from the Main Nor the Back Door’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 November 2002. 48 TV Inform MIA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefings, Russia, 10 December 1998. 49 Unfortunately there was no confirmation on the signing of the agreement or information available in the public sources confirming the absence of such agreement. 50 Victor Litovkin, ‘Russia-US Co-operation Budding’, RIA-Novosti News Bulletin, 9 January 2002. 51 Everett C. Dolman, ‘Geo-strategy in the Space Age: An Astropolitical Analysis’, in Colin S.Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (eds), Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy (London and Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), pp. 83–106. 52 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 April 2003. 53 A radical new foreign policy doctrine was formally presented by Gorbachev at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986. 54 Evraziiskoye obozrenie, 3, 6–7 (2001). 55 Neil Malcolm, ‘Introduction: Russia and Europe’, in Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, for RIIA, 1994), p. 16. 56 Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, for RIIA, 1994), p. 72. 57 Robbin F.Laird, The Soviets, Germany, and the New Europe (Boulder and San Francisco, Calif. and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p. 8. 58 Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe, p. 72. 59 President Vladimir Putin, ‘Statement and Answers to the Questions at the Press Conference at the Conclusion of the Talks with Prime Minister of Great Britain Tony Blair’, London, 26 June 2003—available [email protected] 60 Vladimir Putin, ‘Speech at the Official Dinner on Behalf of the Lord Mayor of London City’, London, 26 June 2003—available [email protected] 61 ‘Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 June 1999, L157/1–9. 62 The European Voice, 30 April 2003. 63 House of Lords Report, HL Deb 16 May 2003 c441. 64 House of Lords Report, HL Deb 16 May 2003 c459. 65 Ibid., paragraphs 25–31. 66 ‘Russia, EU Might Find Common Approach on WTO Accession by End of 2003’, Interfax Weekly Business Report, 24 June 2003. 67 ‘Russia About to Wrap up Co-ordination of WTO Accession’, Interfax Daily Business Report, 18 June 2003. 68 ITAR-TASS, 4 July 2003. 69 Alexander Kondrashov, ‘Russia-EU Common Economic Space Concept to be Tabled in November’, ITAR-TASS World Service, 23 June 2003. 70 ‘Russian Foreign Minister Critical Debate on possible EU entry’, Interfax, 11 July 2003. 71 RIA-Novosti, 30 June 2003.

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72 ‘Seleznyov Calls for Easing Transit of Russian Citizens to Europe’, ITAR-TASS World Service, 10 July 2003. 73 ‘PACE Group Approves Idea to Annul Russia-EU Visa Formalities’, Interfax News Service, 23 June 2003. 74 President Vladimir Putin, ‘Statement and Answers to the Questions at the Press Conference at the Conclusion of the Talks with Prime Minister of Great Britain Tony Blair’, London, 26 June 2003—available [email protected] 75 ‘Viktor Khristenko: Kiotsky Protokol Podtalkivaet Rossiu k Ekonomicheskomu Rostu’ (Victor Khristenko: Kyoto Protocol Pushes Russia to Economic Growth), RIA-Novosti, 16 July 2003. 76 Ibid. 77 RosBalt, 31 May 2003. 78 House of Lords Report, HL Deb 16 May 2003 c476. 79 ITAR-TASS, 30 April 2003. 80 CJTF concept was launched in 1994. It permitted the WEU to draw on NATO assets, thus effectively subordinating the WEU to the Alliance. 81 Paragraph 5 of the Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Berlin, June 1996) defined the goals of the ESDI as the ability ‘to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance’ and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership—see NATO Review, 44,4 (1996), pp. 30–35. 82 Sergei Karaganov, ‘I am not sure we need Zakaev, but we had to request his extradition’, 15 November 2002. 83 The EUMC is the highest military body in the EU. It is composed of the 15 chiefs of defence. However, normally participants are at the level of their military representatives, and meetings at the level of the chiefs of defence are envisioned when required. It provides military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC. The EUMS performs early warning functions, and provides situation assessments and strategic planning, including identification of European national and multinational forces. 84 RUSI Journal, February 2002, pp. 17–20. 85 RUSI Journal, February 2002, p. 17. 86 ‘Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union in the Medium Term (2000–10)’, Diplomatichesky Vestnik, November 1999, pp. 20–28. 87 Joint Declaration, Paris, 30 October 1999. 88 ‘Relations with EU are Strategic for Russia—Ivanov’, ITAR-TASS World Service, 11 July 2003. 89 RIA-Novosti, 4 December 2003. 90 Natalia Prikhodko, ‘Rossiiskaia Voennaia Baza v Pridnestrovie-Eto Oshibka ili Spekuliatzia. OBSE Pretenduet na Mirotvorchestvo v Moldavii’ (Russian Military Base in Transdniestria—is it a Mistake or Speculation. OSCE Claims Peacekeeping Role in Moldova), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 July 2003. 91 Ibid. 92 ‘In War as in War. European Arms Producers Appeal to the EU States to Start an

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Arms Race’, Izvestia, 29 April 2003—available www.izvestia.ru/politic/article33294 93 ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, 21 November 2000. 94 Presentation at the Wilton Park Conference in London, 11 March 2003; cited with permission from the presenter. 95 Cletia Rrontoyanni, ‘So Far, so Good? Russia and the ESDP’, International Affairs, 78, 4 (2002); Jeffrey Surovell, ‘Western Europe and the Western Alliance: Soviet and Post-Soviet Perspectives’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, II, 2 (1995), pp. 155–197. 96 Ksenia Fokina, ‘Europe is Getting Ready for Defence’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 May 2003. 97 ITAR-TASS, 1 May 2003. 98 Ibid. 99 News, 11 July 2003—available global.factiva.com/en/eSrch/ss_hl.asp 100 Kseniya Kaminskaya and Alexander Kondrashov, ‘Russia-EU Political Dialogue is Developing Dynamically—Solana’, ITAR-TASS World Service, 9 July 2003. 101 Taisia Nikitenko and Oleg Osipov, ‘EU Bureaucracy Hampers Deeper Relations with Russia’, ITAR-TASS World Service, 8 July 2003. 102 ‘Putin Says Russia-EU Trade to Go up by 50 per cent After Enlargement’, ITARTASS, 4 July 2003.

3 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS IN BRIEF 1 Robert H.Donaldson and Joseph L.Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia. Changing Systems, Enduring Interests (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 227. 2 Ibid., p. 229. 3 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 March 1999. 4 Vasilii Krivokhizha, Rosiia v novom mire: vremia reshenii (Russia in the World: Time for Decisions) (Moscow: RISI, 1997), p. 193. 5 Yevgenii Evdokimov, ‘Politicheskie otnosheniya Rossii I Germanii blizki k sovershenstvu’ (Russian-German political relations are close to being perfect), www.strana.ru (9 October 2003). 6 Vasilii Krivokhizha, Rosiia v novom mire, p. 289. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., p. 49. 9 President Vladimir Putin, ‘Statement and Answers to the Questions at the Press Conference at the Conclusion of the Talks with Prime Minister of Great Britain Tony Blair’, London, 26 June 2003—available [email protected] 10 ‘US Seeks Russian Oil Despite Widening Rift over Iraq’, 16 March 2003, AFP. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

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13 Ibid. 14 Alexander Zhebin, ‘Sledushaia—Severnaia Korea? Tretia Posle Iraka i Afganistana Voina v Islamskoi Strane Neudobna Washingtonu’ (Next is North Korea? Third War in Islamic Country is not Advantageous to Washington), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 April 2003. 15 See Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 April 2003. 16 Here are only a few examples. The construction of a new pipeline via Poland and Slovakia, bypassing Ukraine, was supposed to provide Russia with a reliable infrastructure to supply the European states with gas until 2020. The construction is to be implemented by the international consortium (Russian ‘Gazprom’, German companies ‘Ruhrgas’ and ‘Wintershall’, French firm ‘Gas De France’ and Italian ‘Snam’). They are planning to take part in the reconstruction and renovation of the Russian railway system as a part of the Eurasian transport corridor. 17 President Putin’s press conference on the results of the CIS Security Treaty Summit, 25 May 2001. 18 ITAR-TASS, 21 November 2003. 19 President Vladimir Putin, Speech at the Conference on ‘Russia-UK Energy: Long Term Partners’, DTI-BP-Shell-RIIA, London, 26 June 2003—available [email protected] 20 Ibid. 21 Marshall Goldman, ‘Russia will pay twice for the fortunes of its oligarchs’, Financial Times, 26–27 July 2003. 22 President Vladimir Putin, Statement and Answers to the Questions at the Press Conference at the Conclusion of the Talks with Prime Minister of Great Britain Tony Blair. 23 President Vladimir Putin, Speech at the Conference on ‘Russia-UK Energy: Long Term Partners’. 24 www.dti.gov.uk 25 www.dti.gov.uk/energy/nuclear/fsu/news/cncp_2–4april03.shtml 26 www.dti.gov.uk 27 Vladimir Putin, Speech at the Official Dinner on Behalf of the Lord Mayor of London City, London, 26 June 2003—available [email protected] 28 President Vladimir Putin, Speech at the Conference on ‘Russia-UK Energy: Long Term Partners’. 29 President Vladimir Putin, Statement and Answers to the Questions at the Press Conference at the Conclusion of the Talks with Prime Minister of Great Britain Tony Blair. 30 President Vladimir Putin, Statement and Answers to the Questions at the Press Conference at the Conclusion of the Talks with Prime Minister of Great Britain Tony Blair. 31 Yevgeniy Verlin, ‘Putin is not yet One among Equals. London Offers Russia More than Just the Role of an Assistant in Oil Supplies’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 July 2003. 32 Vladimir Putin, Speech at the Official Dinner on Behalf of the Lord Mayor of London City.

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33 Over 40 per cent of trade is done with the EU states. 34 E.Murtazayev, ‘Russia Alarmed by Potential East European Integration’, Segodniya, 11 October 1996. 35 Keith Craine and Mathew J.Sagers, ‘The Revolution in Trade between Central and Eastern Europe and Russia’, Occasional Paper, The Atlantic Council of the United States, November 1995; A.Kokoshin. ‘The New Russia: the Heritage and Perspectives’, PRIF Papers, No. 49, August 1996. 36 Igor Ivanov, ‘Russia and the Central and Eastern Europe countries—A New Stage of Relations’, Kommersant-Daily, 2 July 2003, p. 10. 37 ‘Russia About to Wrap Up Co-ordination of WTO Accession’, Interfax: Daily Business Report, 18 June 2003. 38 The Independent, 15 August 2000. 39 National Electronic Library, 5 August 2000. 40 Yurii Alekseev, ‘Michail Titarenko: The Russian Oligarchs Turned to the East this Year’, www.strana.ru (26 December 2003). 41 Ibid. 42 ITAR-TASS, 20 April 2000. 43 RIA-Novosti, 13 April 2000. 44 National Electronic Library, 6 September 2000. 45 Interfax, 8 September 2000. 46 NEGA Information Agency, 13 June 2000. 47 Echo Moskvy, 1 September 2000. 48 Finmarket Information Agency, 30 August 2000. 49 Reuters, 3 September 2000. 50 ITAR-TASS, 30 June 2003. 51 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 127, part 1, 30 June 1999. 52 APN, 5 July 2000. 53 ‘Kitai Pokupaet Rossiskyiu Federatciu. V Genuiy na Sammit Priedet Drugoi Putin’, APN, News Briefs, 20 June 2001—available www.apn.ru/lenta 54 ‘Rossiya Vystupaet Pomoshnikom Kitaiya v Voprosah NPRO’ (Russia Acts as Assistant of China in Questions of NMD), APN, News Briefs, 17 July 2001. 55 Washington Post, 16 July 2001. 56 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 20 July 2001. 57 A historical overview of Russian policy in Asia during the last decades can be found in Gennady Chufrin (ed.), Russia and Asia. The Emerging Security Agenda (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 534.

4 TESTING GEOPOLITICAL CONVICTIONS 1 RIA-Novosti, 20 January 2004.

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2 Paul J.Marantz. ‘Neither Adversaries nor Partners: Russia and the West Search for a New Relationship’, in Roger E.Kanet and Alexander V.Kozhemakin (eds), The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (London: Macmillan Press Ltd and New York: St Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997), p. 97. 3 See F.Tolipov, Terrorism, Fight with Terrorism and the World Order (Lessons from Afghanistan)’, in Response to Terrorism and Insurgency Movements in Central Asia (Moscow, 2002), pp. 142–161. 4 www.strana.ru (1 July 2002). 5 Foreign deployment—American and French. By February 2002 the planned number is a 3,000 to 4,000-strong contingent. After modernisation the airport will host up to 40 F-15 and six French ‘Mirage’ aircraft with an equal number of refuelling planes. The aircraft could reach the western provinces of China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the main Kazakh cities, as well as the areas around the India-Pakistan border. 6 ANS, Azerbaijan TV station, 9 January 2002. 7 National Electronic Library, 25 January 2002. 8 Dmitrii Nikolaev, ‘America Here to Stay…’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 January 2002. 9 Izvestia, 18 January 2002. 10 www.presscenter.ru 11 Ibid. 12 Telephone conversation between US president Bush and Uzbek president Karimov, UK-Uzbek consultations in London, 19 September 2001; 20 September—agreement reached on the deployment and use of the airbase in Khanabad for the US humanitarian missions in Afghanistan; 20–21 September 2001—the first planes arrived in Uzbekistan; 23 September 2001—the Russian president had a meeting with force ministers on the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia; 24 September 2001—President Putin in his public statement in Germany approved and welcomed the Central Asian states’ support for the US-led anti-terrorist coalition. The Central Asian states followed. 13 www.strana.ru (17 January 2002). 14 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 26 January 2002. 15 www.strana.ru (31 October 2002). 16 Ria-Novosti, ‘Russia is Prepared to Share Responsibility of Others’, 7 June 2002. 17 Russian TV News, 31 October 2002. 18 www.smi.ru (20 April 2002). 19 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 18 January 2003. 20 Sergei Ivanov, ‘Drugs from Afghanistan are a Global Threat and to Europe Before All’, RIA-Novosti, 10 June 2003. 21 www.grani.ru (27 November 2001). 22 See Igor Plugatarev, ‘Moskvu Vikidyvaut iz Tajikistana za Milliard Dollarov’ (Moscow is Thrown out of Tajikistan for One Billion Dollars), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 July 2003. According to information learnt by the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta from the border guard service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, Tajikistan was demanding from Russia to fully take upon itself the financing of the border group guarding the TajikAfghani border. The Tajiks intended to abandon the arrangement when the group

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was financed on the basis of 50/50 contributions from each side. This proposal was tabled in connection with a draft of prolongation of a new agreement on deployment of the Russian border guards in Tajikistan, which was discussed during the springsummer of 2003. The terms of the old agreement expired, and a new agreement was being prepared for signing by the heads of the two states. However, Dushanbe was allegedly involved in an active discussion about the conditions of $1 bn credit. It was believed that the sum of a long-term credit allegedly offered to the president of Tajikistan, Imamali Rakhmonov, by the United States depended on Dushanbe not signing the agreement with Moscow on real estate and movable property, organisational and personnel structure. The agreement in question was to cover the terms of transferring forces of the 201 Motorised Rifle Division to the forces of the Russian fourth military base, stationed on the territory of Tajikistan. These developments in Tajikistan were accompanied by further delays in negotiations on the final resolution of the problems preventing the Russian military base to start functioning normally. The agreement on the base was signed in 1999, and it should have entered into force in the year after its signing. It was even ratified by the parliaments of both countries, but there was no exchange of the instruments of ratification until summer 2003. 23 ITAR-TASS, 5 June 2002. 24 Ibid. 25 Igor Plugatarev, ‘Moskvu Vikidyvaut iz Tajikistana za Milliard Dollarov’ (Moscow is Thrown Out of Tajikistan for One Billion Dollars), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 July 2003. 26 Arif Useinov, ‘Baku Provodit Politiku Tikhogo Vnedrenia v NATO. Geopoliticheskie Interesi Aliansa Diktuut Emu Individualnuu Programmu Sotrudnichestva s Azerbidlanom’ (Baku Carries Out Policy of Quiet Advancing into NATO. Geopolitical Interests of the Alliance Induce it to Adopt an Individual Programme of Co-operation with Azerbaijan), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 July 2003. 27 Izvestia, 11 April 2003; www.strana.ru (11 April 2003). 28 www.utro.ru (10 April 2003). 29 Y.Yevdokimov, ‘One Could Rely on Totalitarian Regimes as Well in the War against Terror’, www.strana.ru (29 October 2002). 30 Interfax, 26 October 2002. 31 www.strana.ru (31 October 2002). 32 ‘Moskva Perehodit v Nastuplenie’ (Moscow Goes on the Offensive), Vremia novostei, 1 November 2002. 33 www.strana.ru (29 October 2002). 34 Sergei Karaganov, ‘I Am not Sure we need Zakaev, but we had to Request his Extradition’, www.strana.ru (15 November 2002). 35 www.strana.ru (30 October 2002). 36 www.strana.ru (29 October 2002). 37 www.strana.ru (31 October 2002). 38 Yurii Alekseev, ‘Words of Support are Not Yet Followed by Deeds’ (Slova Podderzhki Delami Poka ne Podkrepliautsya), www.strana.ru (1 November 2002). 39 ‘Russia Priznana Uchastnitsei Konventsii o Bor’be s Terrorismom’ (Russia is

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Accepted as Participant of a Convention on the Fight against Terrorism), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 31 January 2003. 40 ITAR-TASS, ‘Party of Islamic Liberation Tried to Extend its Influence to Russia’, 9 June 2003. 41 National Electronic Library, 1 June 2002. 42 Igor Ivanov, ‘SCO can and will Play a Stabilising Role in the Asia-Pacific Region and in the World’, www.strana.ru(8 June 2002). 43 ITAR-TASS, ‘News bulletin’, 25–29 April 2003. 44 Izvestia, 6 June 2002. 45 ITAR-TASS, 31 October 2002. 46 www.strana.ru (31 October 2002). 47 RIA-Novosti, 16 July 2003. 48 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 April 2003. 49 RIA-Novosti, 21 November 2002. 50 RIA-Novosti, ‘General Secretary of the CIS CST Does not Exclude Co-operation with NATO, Especially in Anti-Terrorist Activities’, 21 November 2002. 51 Vladimir Putin, Speech at the official dinner on behalf of the Lord Mayor of London City, London, 26 June 2003—available [email protected]

5 THE STRATEGY OF REFORMS 1 Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 2 Alexei G.Arbatov, Karl Kaiser and Robert Legvold (eds), Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E.Sharpe, 1998); Geoffrey Alan Hosking, Jonathan Aves and Peter J. Duncan, The Road to PostCommunism: Independent Political Movements in the FSU (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992). 3 For background historical reading see Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians (London: Penguin Press, 2001); Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia (London: Penguin Press, 2003); Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals from the 16th Century to Present (London: Pimlico, 2002). 4 Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 182. 5 G.O’Donnel, ‘Delegativnaya democratia’, Predely Vlasti (Limits of Power), 2–3 (1994), pp. 52–69. 6 Nikolay Petrov, ‘Otnoshenye “Tsenter-Regiony” i perspectivy territorialnogosudarstvennogo pereustroistva strany’ (Relations ‘Centre-Regions’ and Prospects of Territorial-State Reconstruction of the Country), in Regiony Rossii Ezhegodnoye Prilozhenie k Politicheskii Almanah Rossii (Moscow: Moscow

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Carnegie Center, 1998), p. 64. 7 Daniel S.Treisman, After the Deluge. Regional Crisis and Political Consolidation in Russia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 5. 8 Aleksei M.Salmin, ‘Russia’s Emerging Statehood in the National Security Context’, in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and Europe. The Emerging Security Agenda (SIPRI: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 128. 9 Vladimir Klimanov, ‘Mezhregionalnoye Sotrudnichestvo’ (Interregional Cooperation), in Regiony Rossii. Ezhegodnoye Prilozhenie k Politicheskii Almanah Rossii (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1998), pp. 87–93. 10 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, ‘Federalism and Regionalism’, in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds), Developments in Russian Politics (Houndmills, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), pp. 229–250. 11 See Nikolay Petrov, ‘Otnoshenia “Tsentr-Regiony” i Perspectivy TerritorialnoGosudarstvennogo Pereustroystva Strany’ (Relations ‘Centre-Regions’ and Prospects of Territorial-State Reconstruction of the Country), pp. 61–62. 12 See Stoner-Weiss, ‘Federalism and Regionalism’, p. 229. 13 Ibid., pp. 229–250; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, ‘Central Weakness and Provincial Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 15, 1 (1999), pp. 87–106; Richard Sakwa, ‘Russian Regionalism, Policy-Making and State Development’, in Stefanie Harter and Gerald Easter (eds), Shaping the Economic Space in Russia: Decision Making Processes, Institutions and Adjustment to Change in the El’tsin Era (Ashgate, 2000), pp. 11–34. 14 See Daniel S.Treisman, After the Deluge, p. 27. 15 Stefanie Harter and Gerald Easter (eds), ‘Introduction’, in Shaping the Economic Space in Russia, p. 8. 16 Elisabeth Teague, ‘Center-Periphery Relations in the Russian Federation’, in Roman Szporluk (ed.), National Identity and Ethnicity in the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe, 1994), pp. 30–31, 43; Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 199. 17 Mikhail A.Alekseev (ed.), Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia: A Federation Imperilled (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999); V.Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame (London: Sage with IPRE, Oslo, and UN RISD, 1997). 18 Vladimyr Klimanov, ‘Interregional Cooperation’, in Regiony Rossii. Ezhegodnoye Prilozhenie k Politicheskii Almanah Rossii (Moscow, Moscow Carnegie Center, 1998), pp. 87–93. 19 K.P.Belorusetz, ‘Vneshneeconomicheskaya deyatelnost’ regionov Rossii’ (Foreign Economic Activity of Regions of Russia), in RISS. Informatsionnoanaliticheskiyi bulleten. Strategitcheskiye problemy economicheskoi reformy v Rossii (Moskva, No. 9, 1999), pp. 69–132; Graeme Herd, Russia in Crisis: The Disintegration of the Federation?, London Defence Studies Papers, Centre of Defence Studies (London University Press, 1997); V.V.Ivanov, Rossiysky Federalism i Vnutrygosudarstvennaya Dogovornaya Politika (Russian Federalism and Domestic State Contractual Policy) (Krasnoyarsk: Krasnoyarsk State University, 1997); Ruslan Khasbulatov, The Struggle for Russia. Power and Change in the Democratic

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Revolution (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); B.S. Krylov, I.P.Iliinsky, N.A.Mikhaleva, Problemy Suvereniteta v Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Problems of Sovereignty in the Russian Federation) (Moscow, 1994); see Nikolay Petrov, ‘Otnoshenia “Tsentr-Regiony” i Perspectivy Territorialno-Gosudarstvennogo Pereustroystva Strany’ (Relations ‘Centre-Region’ and Prospects of Territorial-State Reconstruction of the Country), pp. 57–69; Barnett R.Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds), Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); G.D.Kostinsky (ed.), Rossia i SNG: Dezintegratsionnye i Integratsionnye Protsessy (Russia and CIS: Disintegration and Integration Processes) (Moscow, 1995); see Stefanie Harter and Gerald Easter (eds), Shaping the Economic Space in Russia; Lilia Shevtsova, ‘Russia: Logic of Political Changes’, in Lilia Shevtsova (ed.), Rossiya Politicheskay (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1998). 20 V.V.Ivanov, Rossiysky Federalism i Vnutrygosudarstvennaya Dogovornaya Politika, pp. 92–101. 21 Steven Solnick, ‘Will Russia Survive? Centre and Periphery in the Russian Federation’, in Barnet R.Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds), Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 62, 67. 22 See Nikolai Petrov, ‘Otnosheniye “Tsenter-Regiony” i perspectivy territorialnogosudarstvennogo pereustroistva strany’, pp. 87–93. 23 Decree of the President of the RSFSR, ‘Ob obespechenii uslovii po povysheniu roli I vzaimodeistviya respublik v sostave RSFSR, avtonomnych obrazovanii, kraev I oblastei v osuchestvlenii radical’noi economicheskoi reformy’, 14 November 1991; Government Decree, ‘O poriadke formirovanie, registratcii I deyatelnosti dobrovol’nyh ob’edinennii (associatciy) economicheskogo vzaimodeistviya sub’ektov Federatcii I organov mestnogo samoupravleniya’, 6 September 1993, in V.V.Ivanov, Rossiysky Federalism I Vnutrygosudarstvennaya Dogovornaya Politika, pp. 92–94. 24 Grigorii Kostinsky (ed.), Rossia i SNG: dezintegratsionnye i integratsionnye protsessy (Moscow, 1995), p. 51. 25 N.Petrov and A.Treivish, ‘Regionalnyi Separatism I Desintegratsia Rossii: opyt izmereniya razlichnych kategorii riska’, in Grigorii Kostinsky (ed.), Rossia i SNG: dezintegratsionnye i integratsionnye protsessy, p. 38. 26 This report was delivered by Dr Salmin in his address at the Council of Foreign and Defence Policy meeting on the ‘Disintegration of Russia?’ in Moscow (17 November 1992)—Alexander Salmin, ‘Dezintegratsiya Rossii? Tezisy doclada. Sovet po vneshnei I oboronnoi politike’ Programme ‘Strategiya dlya Rossii’, November 1992—available www/svop.ru:8005/doklad05.htm 27 Ibid. 28 See Appendix I in this volume: Federal Districts (information data). Also see Appendix II: the map of the FDs, in Military News Bulletin, 6, 6(2000), p. 10. 29 In March 2003, as part of the major executive reshuffle, Lieutenant-General Victor Cherkesov, PE for the North-west FD, was transferred to Moscow and appointed head of a new security department—the State Committee for the Control of Narcotics. Valentina Matvienko, ex-deputy prime minister, was appointed

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presidential plenipotentiary envoy of the North-west Federal District. In September 2003 she was elected as new governor of St Petersburg. Ilya Klebanov was appointed to the post of PE in December 2003. 30 In March 2004 Lieutenant-General Victor Kazantsev was relieved from his duties by presidential decree. V.Yakovlev, former governor of the Leningrad region, was appointed to the post. 31 ‘Biographies of the Plenipotentiary Representatives of the President’, Military News Bulletin, 6, 6 (2000), pp. 11–14. 32 Presidential Decree No. 849, ‘On the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in Federal Districts’, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 16 May 2000. 33 ‘Russia Turns to Military-Administrative Principles of State Structure’, Defence and Security Weekly, No. 57, 19 May 2000. 34 See www.government.ru/government/officials/Kozak.html (30 December 2000). 35 Victor Belimov, ‘Petr Latyshev: Za God My Izmenili Psyhologiu Vlasti’ (Petr Latyshev: In a Year we Changed the Psychology of Power), www.strana.ru (11 May 2001). 36 Izvestia, 27 June 2001; Vremia novostei, 27 June 2001. 37 The president sacked Sergei Samoilov as head of the Main Territorial Directorate. 38 Presidential Decree No. 97 (30 January 2001), ‘O Vnesenii Dopolneniya i Izmeneniya v Polozhenie o Polnomochnom Predstavitele Presidenta Rossiskoy Federatcii v Federal’nom Okruge, Utverzhdennom Ukazom Presidenta Rossiskoy Federatcii ot 13 maya 2000 No. 849’, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 31 January 2001. 39 News Bulletin, Military News Agency, 14 November 3000. 40 Larisa Uho, ‘Kazhdomy Krizisu-Svoi Menedger’ (Its Own Manager to Each Crisis), Vek, 15 December 2000—Interview with Petr Tchedrovitskiyi, head of the Centre for Strategic Analysis of the Volga FD. 41 Maxim Glikin, ‘“Polpredov Uvolniat’ ne Budut”. Plany Sergeia Kiriyenko Raschoditsia s Predlozheniaymi Gruppy Dmitriya Kozaka’ (‘PEs will not be Fired’. Sergei Kiriyenko’s Plans Contradict the Proposals of Dmitriy Kozak’s Group), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 December 2002. 42 Regional plans for territorial development are prepared by the PEs, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (German Gref) and approved at the federal government level. 43 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 1 October 2000. 44 This project requires substantial investments in the rail system of the region. See ‘News Briefs’, Information Agency Russian Regions, 6 October 2000-available www.regions.ru/news/news.html 45 This project was introduced by President Putin at the Russian-South Korean Summit in Seoul in February 2001. The voyage from North Korea to Europe by sea is about 24–25 days. The opening of the route through the continent via North Korea is to reduce the time of the trip to 12 days. In the last several years Russia has invested around $1 bn into the reconstruction of the Trans-Siberian railway system and is prepared to invest a few million dollars into the modernisation of the North Korean part of the Trans-Korean railway system. See Interfax News Bulletin, 27

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February 2001. This project was partly implemented in 2003, when South Korea and North Korea agreed to link their railways and have a subsequent outlet to the TransSiberian railway. On 14 June 2003 the railways were linked, connecting eastern and western parts of the demilitarised zone. Thus, the long-standing project was completed, and the transportation net of the Republic of Korea got an exit to the Trans-Siberian main line and Europe through the territory of North Korea. See ‘South Korea and KPDR will Link their Railways with Outlet to Transsib’, Interfax, 9 June 2003. The Trans-Siberian railway was revitalised as well by 2003. With a number of problems being successfully solved, South Korea and China, and in the future possibly Japan as well, will be connected through the territory of Russia directly with central and northern parts of Europe. It is supposed that by 2005 the transit of cargo and passengers through Russian territory will give the country about $15 bn per year. See Alexander Kuranov, ‘Igor Yurgens: Baltic is not a “Barricade” for us but a “Bridge” to Europe. Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians Gradually Get Rid of Russo-Phobia’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 June 2003. 46 All of the studies in this series are available in full-text at www.fsk.ethz.ch 47 Alexander Kuranov, ‘Igor Yurgens: Baltic is not a “Barricade” for us but a “Bridge” to Europe’. 48 Ibid. 49 Aleksei Miller, general director of the BPS, was appointed as head of Gazprom, succeeding Rem Viacherev: www.oreanda.ru (31 May 2001). 50 ‘V.Kurdukov: Porty na Baltike Nachnut Deistvovat’ v Dekabre’ (Ports in the Baltic will Start Operations in December), Interfax, 29 May 2001. 51 RIA-Novosti, 1 November 2002. 52 Presidential Decree, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 24 August 2000. 53 ‘News Bulletin’, National Electronic Library, 26 February 2001—available www.nns.ru/chronicle/index.html 54 See www.strana.ru/army/2001/02/14/982158415.html 55 The transport corridor reduces the timing for transporting cargo from India to Europe from 50–60 days to 16–20 days and cuts the prices by $600 per container: see ‘Regiony Rossii: Korotko’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 November 2000—available ng.ru/economics/2000–11–14/4_korotko.html 56 ‘Polpred Prezidenta v UFO Nameren Borotsia s Hischeniyami’ (Presidential Envoy in Southern FD Intends to Fight Theft), Interfax, 22 May 2001—available www.interfax.ru/kavkaz_body.htm 57 Izvestia, 5 December 2000. 58 The Treaty on establishing the ‘Euro-Asian Economic Community’ was signed in Astana (Kazakhstan) on 10 October 2000. Both houses of the RF parliament adopted the Treaty, and the RF president signed the RF law ‘On the Ratification of the Treaty Documents’—Interfax, 3 May 2001. 59 ‘News Briefs’, Information Agency Russian Regions, 20 November 2000 available www.regions.ru/news/news.html 60 Ibid., p. 93. 61 Trud, 24 November 2000. 62 Deputy Finance Minister Andrei Petrov made the statement on 24 January 2001.

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See RFE/RL Newsline, 25 January 2001. 63 This data was made public by Vice-Prime Minister Aleksei Kudrin. See InterfaxAFI, 9 February 2001. 64 Irina Isakova, The CIS and Europe: Evolving Security Relationships (London: Brassey’s for CDS, 1997). 65 Interfax, 9 June 2000. 66 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 November 2000. 67 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 September 2000. 68 ITAR-TASS, 4 August 2000. 69 ‘News Briefs’, Information Agency Russian Regions, 4 November 2000—available www.regions.ru/news/news.html 70 ‘Obzor osnovnyh sobytii v rossiiskih regionah’, Rossiiskiyi regional’nyi bulleten BZI (Russian Regional Bulletin, EWI), 21,2 (27 November 2000). 71 ‘News-wire’, ITAR-TASS, 18 February 2003. 72 First attempts to introduce new responsibilities and functions at the municipal level were registered during 1996–7. Anatolii Chubais, then being a head of the Presidential Administration and vice-prime minister, proposed them as a measure to balance the growing influence of the regional elite and governors. The measures were introduced sporadically and ad hoc, their application was stopped completely after the departure of Anatolii Chubais from the government. 73 Natalia Melnikova, ‘Dmitrii Kozak. Segodnia Vakuma Vlasti Net’ (Today There is No Vacuum of Power), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 February 2003. 74 Yvgenii Yevdokimov, ‘Reform of the Self-Governance Will Begin a Year Prior Schedule’—available www.strana.ru (22 October 2002). 75 RIA-Novosti, 23 July 2003—available www.ria-novosti.ru 76 ‘Administrative Reform’, www.strana.ru (23 August 2003). 77 www.strana.ru (16 September 2003). 78 Natalia Melikova, ‘Map of the Motherland Will be Remade: There Will be Only 40 Regions. That Promises a Fierce Struggle of the Subjects of the Federation for their Survival’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 June 2003. 79 Svetlana Ofitova. ‘Ukrupnenie Nachali s Okruga Kirienko’ (The Merger Began from Kirienko’s District), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 February 2003. 80 Yevgenii Evdokimov, ‘Kreml’ ne Sobiraetsia Ukrepliat’ Regiony’ (The Kremlin is not Planning to Enlarge the Regions), www.strana.ru (8 July 2003). 81 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 February 2002. 82 Ezhegodnoye Poslanie Prezidenta Rossisskoi Federatsii Federal’nomu Sobraniu Rossisskoi Federatcii (Annual Statement by the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation), Official Site of the President of the Russian Federation: Addresses and Statements, 3 April 2001—available www.president.kremlin.ru/events/191.html 83 ‘V Kremle Obsuzhdaetsia Plan’ (A Plan is being Discussed in the Kremlin), APN Agency, 27 April 2001—available www.apn.ru 84 www.strana.ru (24 January 2003). 85 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4 April 2000. 86 Press conference of Sergei Vadimovich Stepashin, chairman of the State Accounts

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Committee, Interfax, 6 February 2001—available www.interfax.ru/free_group.html 87 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 31 January 2001. 88 ‘Investitsii v Rossiu: Vzgliad Schetnoi Palaty Rossisskoi Federatcii. Tezisy Vystupleniya S.V.Stepashina v Londone, 26 aprel’ 2001’ (Investments in Russia: Views of the Accounts Committee of the Russian Federation. Main points of S.V.Stepashina’s Speech in London, 26 April 2001), Interfax Invest in agrocomplex in Russia, Conference in London, 23–26 April 2001. 89 ‘News in brief’, The National Electronic Library, 31 May 2000, available www.nns.ru 90 For details see section on military reform. 91 ‘News in Brief’, The National Electronic Library, 31 May 2000—available www.nns.ru 92 Vedomosti, 12 March 2001; Military News Agency, 12 March 2001—available www.militarynews.ru 93 www/cry.ru/news/2000/10/16 94 Comments from the mass media, National Electronic Library, 23 June 2000— available www.nns.ru 95 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4 July 2000. 96 www.strana.ru (18 February 2003). 97 www.strana.ru (16 October 2003). 98 The following institutions are subordinated directly to the president. They are five federal ministries (the MoI, Ministry of Emergencies, MoD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice), five federal services (State Courier Service RF, Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal Security Service (FSB), Federal Service of Drugs Control and Federal Service of Bodyguards RF), and two federal agencies (Main Department of Specialised Programmes RF and Presidential Department of Management). 99 ‘The Russian Government is Preparing Proposals on the New Structure of the Cabinet’, Interfax, 31 March 2001-available www.interfax.ru 100 Sergei Miheev, ‘Russian Governors: Putin’s Reserve’, Monitor, 31 January 2001available www.politcom.ru 101 National Strategy Council Report, ‘Risks and threats for Russia in 2003: The Pax Americana, the Russian Ruling Elite, and the Kasianov Government’, 2002available www.wps.ru/e_index.html 102 Neil Robinson, Russia: A State of Uncertainty (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 159. 103 National Electronic Library, 8 June 2000. 104 Igor Bunin, Aleksei Zudin, Boris Makarenko, Aleksei Makarkin and Mark Urnov, The Beginning of the ‘Third Wave’. Analysis and Assessments of the Political Situation, Report, January 2002—available www.politcom.ru/p_pr.php 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 The leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Gennadii Zyuganov, said in separate interviews with ORT on 7 April 2001 and the daily, Nezavisimaya gazeta, on 8 April 2001 that his party was withdrawing from the responsibility of governing the country: ‘As the Government and Duma turned into

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a bulwark of criminal bourgeoisie plundering the country, the Duma is being transformed into a crew obedient to the commands of [chief of the presidential administration Aleksandr] Voloshin, [his deputy Vladislav] Surkov, and [leader of the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS) Anatolii] Chubais.’ See RFE/Liberty, 9 April 2001. 108 Sergei Micheev, ‘Sov’et Federatsii—Regiony Otstupaut’ (Council of the Federation—the Regions Retreat), Monitor, 2 February 2002—available www.polit.ru 109 Alexei Makarkin, ‘Sovet Federatsiy: Novyi Sostav i Perspektivy Deiatelnosti’, (Federation Council: New Composition and Prospects of Activity), Monitor, 23 January 2002-available www.polit.ru 110 Sergei Micheev, ‘Sov’et Federatsii—Regiony Otstupaut’ (Council of the Federation—the Regions Retreat), Monitor, 3 February 2002—available www.polit.ru 111 Georgy Ilyichev, ‘Russia Still Searching for the National Idea’, Izvestia, No. 40, March 2003—www.izvestia.ru 112 Bobo Lo, ‘Uncivil State’, The World Today, November 2003, p. 23. 113 National Strategy Council Report, ‘Risks and Threats for Russia in 2003’. 114 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 February 2002. 115 Ibid. 116 The authors of the draft of this federal law pointed out that prior to the adoption of this legal act the overwhelming practice in the regions was to receive final consent from the local ruling governor for the names of deputies elected to the regional parliaments. See www.strana.ru (9 April 2002). 117 Jeff Gleisner, ‘The Funding of Political Parties in Russia (1998–2001)’—available RAS No. 16 item 1,2002. 118 Public opinion polls conducted by Obtshee mnenie on 4–5 October 2003 and ROMIR on 30 September 2003. See: ‘Elections’, available www.strana.ru 119 Bobo Lo, ‘Uncivil State’, p. 23. 120 Prime Times, 18 February 2003. 121 Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, p. 215. 122 Stephen White, Russia’s New Politics. The Management of a Postcommunist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 291–292.

6 THE LITMUS TEST: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 1 In recent years a few books were published that debated progress in civil-military relations in Russia. Some registered difficulties in establishing meaningful civilmilitary procedures. See Brian D.Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: CivilMilitary relations, 1689–2000 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

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2 The conceptual approach to the analysis of civil-military relations was tremendously useful in putting the ‘Russian case’ into its proper framework and perspective. However, it would not be complete without the analysis of institutional specifications and cultural differences that accompany the Russian experience of transforming civil-military relations. Detailed and comparative analysis of civilmilitary relations in post-communist societies is given in the following publications: A.Belkin and J.H.Brusstar, A Military in Charge of Itself: Civilian Control is a Russian Myth, National Defense University Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 50, 10(1995)—available www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum50.html; S.Blank, The Great Exception: Russian Civil-Military Relations’, in Graeme Herd (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Post Cold War Europe (London: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2001), pp. 67–85; B.Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); D.R.Hespering and I.Volgyes (eds), CivilMilitary Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1978); Graeme Herd (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Post Cold War Europe (London: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2001); T.J.Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1979); Ch. Dandeker, ‘On the Need to be Different: Military Uniqueness and Civil-Military Relations in Modern Society’, The RUSI Journal, June 2001; Andrew Cottey, Tim Edmunds and Anthony Foster (eds), Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards (London and New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd, 2002); Andrew Cottey, Tim Edmunds and Anthony Foster (eds), Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: A Framework for Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist Europe, Working Paper 1/99, ESRC ‘One Europe or Several?’ Programme (Sussex: Sussex European Institute, 1999); M.Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); S.E.Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962); S.P.Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); Yuri Ivanov, ‘Legal, Political and Budgetary Aspects of Civilian Control of the Military in Russia’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 17, 1 (2001–3); E.T.Luttwak, ‘From Vietnam to Desert Fox: Civil-Military Relations in Modern Democracies’, Survival, 41, 1 (Spring 1999); W. Parkhomenko, ‘The State of Russia’s Armed Forces and Military Reform’, Parameters, 29, 4 (Winter 1999–2000), pp. 104–106; B.Taylor, ‘The Duma and Military Reform’, Programme on New Approaches to Russian Security (Washington, D.C.: SCIS, 154 (December 2000). 3 V.V.Cheban, Geopoliticheskoye polozhenie I voennaya politika Rossii (The Geopolitical Situation and Military Policy of Russia) (Moscow: Graliya, 2001), pp. 363–371. 4 The law ‘On Defence’ was adopted by the State Duma in April 1996 and approved by the Federation Council in mid-May 1996, receiving final approval by the president of Russia on 31 May 1996.

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5 Echo Moskvy, 1 January 2000. 6 Mayak, 1 September 2000. 7 Stephen J.Blank, Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy (Carliste, Pa.: USAWC, 1995), p. 49. 8 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 16 May 2000. 9 Defence and Security Weekly, No. 57, 19 May 2000. 10 ITAR-TASS, 20 November 1999. 11 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 11 August 2000, p. 8. 12 Ibid. 13 Alexander Golts, ‘Army Poised to Strike in Russia’s Elections’, The Russia Journal, 15–21 November 1999. 14 www.strana.ru (10 October 2003). 15 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 11 August 2000. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid., 19 December 2003. 18 Ibid., 23 April 2000. 19 In Chechnya, polling stations and mobile ballot boxes were established at the sites of deployed combat units. According to the armed forces representative LieutenantGeneral Vladimir Kozhemyakin, an aggressive programme aimed at getting military votes was carried out in compliance with voting laws and regulations and no violations were registered. See ITAR-TASS, 24 March 2000. 20 Eighty-one per cent of servicemen deployed in Chechnya voted for Vladimir Putin. Other data provided by the Department, demonstrated the following support for Putin: 80 per cent of the servicemen deployed outside of Russia; 87.3 per cent of peacekeepers assigned to Bosnia and Herzegovina; 86 per cent of sailors assigned to the Black Sea Fleet in Sebastopol. See Interfax, 26 and 27 March 2000; ITAR-TASS, 26 March 2000. 21 Sergei Miheev, ‘Russian Governors: Putin’s Reserves’, Monitor, 31 January 2002available www.polit.ru 22 Rossiyskaya gazeta, 18 April 2000. 23 The Russia Journal, 29 November-5 December 1999. 24 Infoart.ru, 6 June 2000. 25 ITAR-TASS, 18 March 2000. 26 VCIOM, public opinion survey conducted by the firm from 24–27 May 2002, with 1,600 respondents in 33 regions of Russia. See www.grani.ru (5 June 2002). 27 APN, 10 June 2000. 28 www.oreanda.ru (9 June 2000). 29 VCIOM, public opinion survey conducted by the firm from 24–27 May 2002. 30 Weekly Reports, ‘Armed Forces and Interior Forces’, Interfax-Military News Agency, 17–24 June 2000. 31 Trud, 11 August 2000. 32 Parlamentskaya gazeta, 5 May 2002. 33 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 19 December 2003. 34 Izvestia, 11 July 2000; Military News Agency, 11 July 2000. 35 Krasnaya zvezda, 1 June 2000.

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36 www.oreanda.ru (18 July 2000). 37 Military News Agency, 4 July 2000. 38 E-net conference with the secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation V.B.Rushailo, 31 May 2002—available www.sc.ru 39 ‘Putin Pledges to Build Better Military’, Interfax-Military News Agency report, 26 June 2002. 40 ‘E-net conference with the secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation V.B.Rushailo’, RF Security Council website, 31 May 2002-available www.sc.ru 41 Richard F.Staar, ‘Russia’s New Military Program’, Insight, 4, 1 available http://www.psan.org/ 42 Ibid. 43 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 5 June 2002. 44 Military News Agency, 6 July 2000. 45 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 June 2000. 46 Ibid. 47 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 2 June 2000. 48 Ibid. 49 Military News Agency, 6 July 2000. 50 Military News Agency, 3 July 2000. 51 Military News Agency, 20 May 2000. 52 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 5 July 2002. 53 rbn.newstv.ru/isapi/broker.dll?n-r…ght-news=975976846F! C729DC32567C6002D34BB 54 Interfax, 14 July 1999-available www.interfax.ru 55 APN, 11 June 2000. 56 Segodnya, 24 January 2000. 57 Informatcionnoye Agentstvo ‘FINMARKET’, 18 August 1999—available www.infoart.ru/misc/news/99/08/18_026.htm 58 RIA-Novosti, 28 April 2000. 59 www.strana.ru (10 October 2003). 60 Infoart, 22 January 2000—www.infoart.ru/misc/news/00/01/22–003.htm 61 Profil, 13 March 2000. 62 Military News Agency, 3 July 2000. 63 V.A.Rodin and V.P.Gridnev, ‘Koalitsionnaya Sostavliaushaya Voennick Doctrin Gosudarstv’ (Coalition Element of Military Doctrines of States), Voennnaya Mysl, August 1999, p. 5. 64 Interfax, 10 October 2003; RIA-Novosti, 10 October 2003. 65 Segodnya, 2 February 2000; Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 31 January 2000. The Commission on Military-technical Co-operation with Foreign States analysed the potential perspective plans of arms and military technology sales for 2000. The planned increase in arms sales export for 2000 is around $4–4.3 bn (special firms and nine enterprises are allowed to address the foreign market directly). State support for arms sales is becoming a number one priority for the Foreign Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service.

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66 Obtchaya Gazeta, 10 June 1999. 67 ORT TV, 4 June 1999; Kommersant-Daily, 5 June 1999; Segodnya, 5 June 1999. 68 Ekspert, 21 June 1999. In addition: according to the FRY sources, the underground part of the airport that was designed to withstand direct hits, including nuclear ones, was planned to be used as a substitute for the NATO base in Aviano, Italy; see also Kommersant-Daily, 3 July 1999. 69 Ibid. 70 Military News Agency, 18 July 2000. 71 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 July 2000. 72 RIA-Novosti, 8 July 2000. 73 ‘News Information Bulletin’, available www.strana.ru (9 October 2003). 74 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 June 2000. 75 Kommersant Daily, 4 February 2000. 76 Ibid. Former deputy secretaries of the Security Council, S.Frandkov and V. Vasiliev, were appointed to head, respectively, the tax police and Ministry of Interior. 77 Andrei Kokoshin, Strategic Governance: Theory, Historical Records, Comparative Analysis, Tasks for Russia (Moscow: Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 2003). 78 The National Electronic Library, 31 May 2000. 79 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 3–9 July 1998, p. 1. 80 Ibid., 3–9 April 1998, p. 3. 81 ITAR-TASS, 11 and 14 January 2004. 82 Vek, 11 August 2000—available www.nns.ru/chronicle/center/ 83 www.smi.ru.news/?date=0’id=947 84 Interfax, 14 January 2000. Federal law ‘On Introduction of Changes into the Federal Law on Operational-Investigative Activities’—available lenta.ru/rssia/2000/01/11/control/ 85 Akm News, 11 January 2000—available www.akm.ru/rio/news/htm 86 See Igor Bunin, Aleksei Zudin, Boris Makarenko, Aleksei Makarkin and Mark Urnov, The Beginning of the ‘Third Wave’. Analysis and Assessments of the Political Situation, Report, January 2002, p. 5—available www.politcom.ru/p_pr.php 87 See Brian D.Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army, p. 340. 88 Dale R.Herpering, ‘The Search for Stability in the Russian Army’, in Constantine P.Danopoulos and Daniel Zirken (eds), The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 77–94.

7 MILITARY REFORM AND RUSSIA’S FUTURE DEFENCE 1‘Voenno-Federalnyi Okrug’ (Military Federal District), Vremya Novostei, 15 May

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2000—available www.polit.ru:8085/gazety.htmlorwww.polit.ru:8085/index.html 2 The term ‘strategic direction’ is used in the following context. It is a subsystem of the national defence posture with similar geopolitical and military threats, common economic interests and geographical proximity. Each of the sub-systems, being part of the comprehensive defence and security arrangement, has relative self-sufficiency in economic, political and military matters, with strong vertical and horizontal links. With the increasing number of threats and risk factors that might challenge the state’s security and sovereignty simultaneously, the leadership can only deal with a limited number of challenges in parallel emergency mode, the state’s vast territories and limited communications dictating the need to change to a different mode of dealing with security challenges. 3 ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, Article 22, Presidential Decree No. 706, 21 April 2000—available scrf.gov.ru 4 Ibid. 5 Alexander Golts, ‘Russia’s Militaristic Vertical Line’, The Russia Journal, 29 May– 4 June 2000—available www.cdi.org/russia/104.html##6 6 Anatoly Kvashnin, ‘Perestroika in Accordance with Suvorov’s Principles’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 17 July 1998. 7 Ekspert (Moscow), 20 November 2000—available newsmoisnfo.ru/news/eksp/demo/demo.html 8 Information Agency ‘Finmarket’ and Military News Agency, 13 June 2000— available www.finmarket.ru/z/nvs/snews.asp and at www.militarynews.ru/emain/asp 9 ‘Sobranie Zakonodatelstva Rossisskoi Federatsii’ (Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation), 1998, No. 31, Article 3839; RF Military Doctrine (Moscow, 2000), Article 19. 10 Daily Review, 10 August 1998; Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 5–18 December 1997, p. 1. 11 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossisskoi Federatcii, ‘Ob Obespechenii Stroitelstva i Razvitiya Vooruzennyh Sil Rossisskoi Federatcii, Sovershenstvovanii ih Structury’ (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On Providing the Building and Developing of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Improving their Structure’), 24 March 2001—available www.wsf.org 12 ‘Kaliningrad’, Interfax Severo-Zapad, 25 March 2001. 13 Security Council of the Russian Federation, 9 November 2000—available scrf.gov.ru 14 Ibid. 15 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 March 1998. 16 ‘The Russian Navy Already has Ships Designed for the Twenty-first Century’, Argumenty i Fakty, No. 18 (May 1998), and Daily Review, 14 May 1998. 17 Sergei Ivanov was appointed to the post of minister of defence of the Russian Federation by presidential decree, 28 March 2001—See ‘News Bulleti’, ITAR-TASS, 28 March 2001. 18 Kommersant-Vlast, 15 August 2000. 19 Sergei Pechurov, ‘General Staff or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Within the Reform of the RF Armed Forces the Choice to be Made on their Command and Control

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Model’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 8 June 2001—available nvo.ng.ru/forces/2001–06–08/l_staff.html 20 Interview with Colonel-General Valerii Manilov, first deputy head of the General Staff—See Ivan Egorov, ‘Systema Stanet Lutche, Estli Ubrat iz Nee Neskolko Nenuzhnyh Zveniev’ (The System Will be Better if Several Unnecessary Links are Taken Away), 6 December 2000—available strana.ru/state/army/2000/12/06/976117420.html 21 Profil Magazine, No. 41, 30 October 2000. 22 Alexandr Orlov, ‘Voennaya Reforma ne Stala Itogom 2000 Goda’ (Military Reform was Not the Result of 2000), 20 December 2000—available www.strana.ru 23 RF TV News programmes (18.00), Vesti, 26 May 1998. 24 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 July 1998, p. 5. 25 Vesti, RF TV News programmes (18.00), 26 May 1998. 26 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 20–26 February 1998, p. 2. 27 Ibid., 8–14 May, 1998, p. 2. 28 RIA-Novosti, 18 August 1999. According to other sources (Interfax Vremiya, 20 August 1999), General Ovchinnikov was monitoring the activities of the Ministry of the Interior troops in the joint task force. 29 RIA-Novosti, 19 August 1999. 30 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 March 1999. 31 Expert, 16 August 1999. 32 Agentstvo voenniych novosteyi, 18 August 1999—available www.infoart.ru/misc/news/99/08/199_160.hlm 33 RIA-Novosti, 19 August 1999. 34 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 August 1999. 35 RF Military Doctrine (2000), Chapter II: Military-Strategic Basics, Article 7: ‘Local war might be waged by the group of forces (units), deployed in the region of conflict, with the possibility of being upgraded by transfer forces and capabilities from other directions or by the introduction of a partial strategic mobilisation of forces’. 36 The infrastructure of the RF armed forces, Logistic Support Service is an aggregate of bases, depots, enterprises and other facilities and installations designed to ensure logistic support for combat operations and to conduct daily routine activities—See Lieutenant-General D.V.Bulgakov, ‘Reforming the Logistic Support System’, Military Thought, 1 January 2000, p. 68—available news.moisinfo.ru/news/2000/MTH/07/data/004mth67.htm 37 Ibid. 38 Krasnaya zvezda, 26 April 2001. 39 Robert Cottrel, ‘Russia to Restructure Army’, the Financial Times (UK), 26 April 2001. 40 Interfax, 11 October 2002. 41 Krasnaya zvezda, 19 December 2000. 42 ‘Standardisation’—means the unification of a number of types and categories of weapons and military technology that will be used by the RF military and other forces and paramilitary formations in Russia.

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43 Sergei Sergeev, ‘Zakonodatelnyi Karkas dlia Oborony’ (Legislative Framework for Defence), Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 27 April 2001—available nvo.ng.ru/forces/2001–04–27/l_kulakov.html 44 Alexandr Orlov, ‘Voennaya Reforma ne Stala Itogom 2000 Goda’ (Military Reform was Not the Result of 2000), 20 December 2000—available www.strana.ru 45 Robert Cottrel, ‘Russia to Restructure Army’, the Financial Times (UK), 26 April 2001. 46 www.fsb.gov.ru; www.fsb.ru 47 V.Kolibaba, ‘Problemy Vzaimodeistviya VS RF i Souznyh Gosudarstv’ (Problems of Interaction of the RF AF and Allied States), Military Thought, 1997, p. 27. 48 See Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters website—available www.mchs.gov.ru 49 Military Reform Entered Practical Stage, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 July 1998. 50 Ekaterina Stepanova, Voenno-grazhdanskiye otnosheniya v operatciach nevoennogo tipa (Civil-Military Relations in Operations Other Than War) (Moscow: Prava Cheloveka, 2001), pp. 204–210. 51 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 19–25 September, 1997, p. 3. 52 Ibid., 8–14 May 1998, p. 3. 53 ‘V Sukhoputnyh Voiskah Otmeniat Poniatie Mira’ (Notion of Peace will be Abandoned in the Ground Forces), News Bulletin National Electronic Library, 20 April 2001. 54 Prime-Time, 2 February 2001. 55 Rossiyskay gazeta, 3 February 2001. 56 V.V.Cheban, Geopoliticheskoye Polozhenie i Voennaya Bezopasnost’ Rossii (Geopolitical Situation and the Military Security of Russia) (Moscow: Foundation Voin and Independent Military Research Centre ‘Otetrchestvo i Voin’, 1997), p. 184. 57 www.mod.ru 58 Graeme P.Herd, Foreign and Security Policy Implications of Russia’s Demographic Crisis, Working Paper No. 20, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, March 2002, pp. 11–54. 59 Oleg Odnokopenko, ‘Ckol’ko stoit proffessional?’ (What is the Price for a Professional?), Itogi, No. 3, January 2002, pp. 18–20. 60 Interfax, 2 February 2001; ‘Verim: siuda vernetsia mir’ (We Believe: The Peace Will Return Here), Krasnaya zvezda, 28 February 2001. 61 In accordance with the presidential decree of 28 March 2001. 62 Alexandr Orlov, ‘Voennaya Reforma ne Stala Itogom 2000 Goda’ (Military Reform was Not the Result of 2000), 20 December 2000—available www.strana.ru 63 A.A.Ivanov, ‘Armed Forces Information: Problems and Solutions’, MilitaryThought, 3 January 2000—available news.mosinfo.ru/news/2000/MTH/03/data/002mth06.htm 64 ‘News in Brief’, Military News Agency, 3 July 2000. 65 Ibid., 20 May 2000. 66 Ragnar Dag Wik, A CJTF HQ Communications Infrastructure Based on COTS Equipment, Working Paper, 1997.

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67 Delovaya Nedelya (Almaty, in Russian), 6 September 1996, p. 12; N.A. Fakhrutdinova, ‘The Legal Base of Information Security in Uzbekistan’, Paper presented at the International Conference ‘Information Technologies, Security and Conflict Resolution’, Moscow, 28–30 April 1998. 68 This definition of military reform was given by Sergei Ivanov, RF minister of defence, at the meeting in the State Duma that was organised in celebration of the National Day of the Defender on 18 February 2003—Sergei Ivanov noted the role of the State Duma in the defence and security of the country: RIA-Novosti, 18 February 2003. 69 According to the Russian press among over 120 hostages who died in the hostagerelated crisis were nine foreign nationals (from Austria, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Ukraine, the USA). 70 Press Bulletin, Press Office, Presidential Administration, 28 October 2002. 71 RIA-Novosti, 1 November 2002; also see www.strana.ru, www.lenta.ru, www.vesti.ru 72 Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolay Rogozhkin, the head of General Staff, Interior Troops, Ministry of the Interior—See Badim Udmantsev, ‘My Gotovim Universalnyh Soldat’ (We Prepare Multifunctional Soldiers), Neza-visimaya gazeta, 11 November 2002. 73 www.strana.ru (26 September 2002). 74 ‘Gryzlov Divides the Militia in Three Parts: Militia, Police and the Guards’, 26 September 2002—available www.gazeta.ru 75 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 November 2002. 76 RIA-Novosti, 1 November 2002. 77 Vremia Novostei, 30 October 2002; see also RIA-Novosti, 1 November 2002. 78 Ibid. 79 www.strana.ru (12 November 2002). 80 www.vesti.ru, www.lenta.ru, www.strana.ru 81 The Commission met for the first time on 6 May 1997. The first meeting was attended by the then prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. FSB director Nikolai Kovalev chaired the Commission, his deputy Viktor Zorin was the director of the FSB Anti-terrorist Centre—See Interfax (6 May 1997), Monitor, 3, 91 (8 May 1997). 82 During the two years of its existence the Russian Federal Anti-terrorist Commission concentrated on several threat-assessments and methods of prevention, such as cyber-terrorism (i.e. the use of computers for terrorist purposes), or stealing explosive agents and materials during their production and turnover cycles. In 2002 it had plans to focus on preventing biological and chemical terrorism, terrorist acts on traffic lines and ensuring the safety of Russian citizens and representatives abroad—available www.russian-centre-mumbai.org 83 ‘Interview with President Putin’, 19 December 2002—available www.strana.ru 84 ‘Interview with Colonel-General (Ret.) V.Manilov MP’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 27 December 2002. 85 He was dismissed in November 2003. 86 Richard F.Staar, ‘Toward a Police State?’, Perspective, XI, 3 (January-February,

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2001). 87 Glava FSB Rossii: ‘Bor’ba s Terrorismom Yavliatsia Prioritetnoi Zadachei Specsluzhb (Head of the FSB: the Priority Task for the Services is to Combat Terrorism’), 15 December 2002—available www.strana.ru 88 Alexander Golubev, ‘Interview with Major-General Sergei Shishin, the New Head of the Internal Security Directorate of the FSB’, Gazeta, 17 December 2002— available WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html 89 Ibid. 90 Anatolii Sudoplatov, ‘Voina Tol’ko Nachinaetcia’ (The War is Only Starting), Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 1 November 2002. 91 Lieutenant-General Sergei Bogdanov, ‘Problemy, Kotorye Nado Reshat’ Uzhe Seichas’ (Problems which it is Necessary to Solve Now), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 May 1996, p. 2—Cited in Dmitri V.Trenin, ‘The Changing Geopolitical Realities in Europe’, in Alexei G.Arbatov, Karl Kaiser and Robert Legvold (eds), Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E.Sharpe, 1999), pp. 171–172. 92 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 1 November 2002. 93 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 December 2002. 94 RIA-Novosti, 23 November 2002. 95 ‘Genshtab Napisal Novye Pravila Voiny Dlia Rossiyskoi Armii’ (The General Staff Wrote New Rules of Waging War for the Russian Army), Izvestia, 13 December 2002. 96 The internal security service was established as part of the military units and organisations of Russian armed forces in December 2000. The internal security service in the MoD comprises paramilitary security sub-units to be used to guard exceptionally important and special facilities. The internal security service is to protect those facilities against illegal actions, to ensure compliance with access and entry and internal regulations and procedures, and to avert and put a halt to criminals and to administrative violations. The list of facilities coming under the remit of the internal security service are defined and endorsed by the Ministry of Defence. The financial, material and technical provisions for the internal security service come from the federal budget allocations set aside for the Ministry of Defence. The internal security service is comprised of civilian personnel of the Russian armed forces, as established by the RF government, through voluntary employment of male RF citizens in reserve and female citizens (age 18 and over), who have undergone the necessary professional and physical training. The statute for the new service was endorsed by the RF government—See ‘Russian Defence Ministry Setting up Internal Security Services’, RIA News Agency, 19 December 2000. Since 2001 the internal security service MoD has had to concentrate on anti-terrorist activities. The MoD units of the internal security service are part of the system monitored by the Internal Security Directorate FSB. The Internal Security Directorate FSB protects buildings and constructions, and communications of the Russian security structures and facilities from technological or physical penetration and from acts of sabotage. Alexander Golubev, ‘Interview with Major-General Sergei Shishin, the new head of the Internal Security Directorate of the FSB’.

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97 RIA-Novosti, 8 December 2002. 98 ‘Vokrug Ob’edinennniya Silovikov’ (About Unification of Men of Power), www.smi.ru (29 November 2002). 99 Vadim Soloviev, ‘Krutoi Povorot v Voennom Reformirovanii. NATO Proshlo Poloviny Etogo Puti. Rossiya Tol’ko v Nachal’noi Tochke’ (Abrupt Turn in Military Reformation. NATO has Travelled Along Half of this Road. Russia is Only at the Beginning), Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 5 November 2002. 100 A.F.Klimenko, ‘Voennye doktriny kak mehanizm koordinatcii usiliy mezhdunarodnogo soobschestva po bor’be s terrorizmom: neobhodimost’ soglasovaniya I utochneniya na mezhdunarodnom urovne’ (Military Doctrines as a Mechanism of the Co-ordination of Efforts of the International Community in Combating Terrorism: A Necessity of Co-ordination and Clarification), in Otvet Terrorizmu I povstancheskim dvizheniyam v Centrl’noy Azii (Response to Terrorism and Partisan Movements in Central Asia) (Moscow, 2002), pp. 29–37. 101 Igor Ivanov, ‘Concept of Peace in the XXI Century. Presentation at the 54 Session GA UN, New York, NY 21 September 1999’, Mehzdunarodnaya zhizn’, 10 (1999), pp. 2–7. 102 See A.F.Klimenko, ‘Voennye doktriny’, pp. 29–37. 103 Interfax, 9 October 2003. 104 The guidelines of the reform were contained in the presidential decree, ‘On Initial Measures of Reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Improving their Structure’ (9 June 1997) and in the presidential decree (31 July 1997) that approved the detailed concept of military reconstruction until 2005. 105 ‘Voenkom Moskvy Mikhail Sorokin: My Mozhem Prosto Poteriat’ Armiyu’ (Military Commissar of Moscow Michael Sorokin: We Can Simply Lose the Army), 9 November 2000—available http://www.mil.ru/duty/index.htm 106 According to Sergei Stepashin, the head of the Federal Audit Committee, the previous budget of the FPS was twice as large as that of the FSB and it had three times as many employees and ten times as many generals. 107 RTR, 16 March 2003. 108 Nikolai Petrov, ‘Putin Reform: Round 3’, Moscow Times, 13 March, 2003. 109 www.eurasianet.org (4 December, 2001). 110 The term ‘middle zone between Russia and NATO’ was recently introduced in addressing three states of the former Soviet Republics—Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. See Sherman W.Garnett and Rachel Lebenson, The Middle Zone and PostEnlargement Europe’, in Stephen J.Blank, NATO After Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces (CSIS & US Army War College, September 1998), pp. 73–94. 111 K.Watman, D.Wilkening, J.Arquilla and B.Nichiporuk, US Regional Deterrence Strategies (Washington, D.C.: Rand, 1995). This report assesses the requirements of deterrence strategy for application to potential regional adversaries. The US military problem of regional deterrence in this instance focuses on two factors: how the United States can make its deterrent threats highly credible, and what military capabilities are required for credible denial and punishment threats. 112 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, No. 7 (1998), p. 5.

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113 Makhmut Gareev, ‘Military Doctrine of Russia’, Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 9–15 August 1997, p. 4. 114 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, No. 7 (1998), p. 5. 115 ‘The RF is reserving the right to use nuclear weapons as a reciprocal measure if nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction are used against it or its allies, as well as against those who use large-scale aggression with non-nuclear means in critical situations when the national existence of the RF is threatened’ (Article 8, RF Military Doctrine, Moscow, 2000). 116 Ibid.; also see I.M.Kapitanets, Voina na More (War at Sea) (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), p. 58. 117 See I.M.Kapitanets, Voina na More (War at Sea), p. 137. 118 Alexander Hohlov, ‘Esli Chechentsy Zaimutsia Yadernym Shantazhom, Chechni na Zemle ne Ostanetsia’ (If the Chechens Engage in Nuclear Blackmail, Chechnya will Disappear from the Earth), Izvestia, 4 December 2002. 119 Ibid. 120 Interfax, 2 October 2003. 121 ‘Anatolii Kvashnin: Nuclear Forces of the RF will be Minimal but Sufficient’, RIA-Novosti, 27 September 2002. 122 RIA-Novosti, 2 October 2003. 123 Anatole Lieven and Dmitrii Trenin (eds), Ambivalent Neighbours: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 8.

8 NEW SECURITY SYSTEMS AND RUSSIA’S LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 1 ‘President Vladimir Putin’s address at the session of the Council for Co-operation’, Moscow, 23 June 2003—available [email protected] 2 David Buchan, ‘The Threat Within: Deregulation and Energy Security’, The IISS Quarterly Survival, 44, 3 (2002), pp. 105–116. 3 See: RAND website—www.rand.org 4 The main arguments of this chapter were presented at the RUSI/Guardian Conference on the New World Order, 30 October 2001. However, the detailed information on Russian pipeline politics and assessment of the situation around Afghanistan was done exclusively for this specific chapter. 5 See ‘The Changing Oil Equation’, in Strategic Survey 2002/3: An Evaluation and Forecast of World Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press for IISS, 2003), pp. 41– 48. 6 Autonomous energy institution (Paris) of 26 member states, linked to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 7 Perdita Fraser, ‘Russia, the CIS and the European Community: Building

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Relationship’, in Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation? (London and New York: Pinter Publishers for RIIA, 1994), p. 217. 8 Ibid. 9 Vladimir G.Baranovsky and Alexei G.Arbatov, ‘The Changing Security Perspective in Europe’, in Alexei G.Arbatov, Karl Kaiser and Robert Legvold (eds), Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E.Sharpe, 1999), p. 47. 10 Ibid., p. 56. 11 www.in.mid.ru/website/brp…/ 12 Igor Verba, ‘Dalnevostochnay zvezda nadezhdy’ (Far Eastern Star of Hope), www.strana.ru (30 June 2003). 13 ‘Giants of the East vie for Russia’s Oil’, the Sunday Times, 14 March 2004. 14 Vsevolod Vosledov, ‘Neftegazovyi Visit’ (Oil and Gas Visit), Smi.Ru, 27 June 2003—available www.smi.ru 15 Viktor Vekselberg, ‘TNK-BP: Importance and Significance’, Presentation at the DTI/RIIA ‘Russia-UK Energy Conference’, London, 26 June 2003. 16 RIA-Novosti, 1 July 2003. 17 Ibid., 23 November 2001. 18 Zerkalo (Baku), 23 November 2001. 19 On 14 November 2001 Russia and Iran called the presidents of the five literal Caspian Sea states to hold a summit to resolve the dispute over the region’s oil reserves. On 14 November 2001 agreement was reached between Victor Kolouzhny, special Russian envoy for the Caspian Sea, and Mehdi Safari, special envoy for the Caspian Sea, to speed up the dialogue. See Tehran AFT, BBC Monitoring Service, 21 November 2001. 20 Lutz Kleveman, ‘The “War on Terror” is Being Used as an Excuse to Further the US Energy Interests in the Caspian’, the Guardian, 20 October 2003. 21 In previous multilateral and bilateral agreements Russia took an obligation to promote military-political and military-technical contacts on a beneficial basis between Russia and Kazakhstan. For instance, these obligations were stated in ‘The Treaty of Common Security’ (1992) and in Article 11 of ‘The Treaty on Military Co-operation between Russia and Kazakhstan’ (1998). The latter specifically confirmed the right of the Republic of Kazakhstan to have its own naval forces and mapped the framework for bilateral co-operation in the naval sphere between the two states. Since 1992 Kazakh military personnel have been trained at the RF naval colleges and military academies. 22 The intention to build the Kazakh navy was officially voiced by Muchtar Altunbaev, Kazakh minister of defence, on 17 February 2002. 23 ‘The Caspian Sea is Worth Fighting a War for’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 March 2003. 24 Russia has failed to secure stable gas deliveries from Turkmenistan since 1995, with prices being the main point of disagreement. However, Gazprom is in discussions to ink a long-term agreement under which this gas monopoly will buy 2 bn cubic metres in 2003 and then boost purchases to 20 bn cubic metres a year for the next ten years. Itera will buy 10 bn cubic metres of Turkmen gas in 2002 at $40

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per 1,000 cubic metres, while Iran is expected to import 8 bn cubic metres at $40 per 1,000 per cubic metres. History shows that Gazprom denied Turkmenistan access to the pipeline over payments disputes. Gazprom still holds a virtual monopoly over Turkmenistan’s export routes, at least until the implementation of the construction of the pipeline. 25 HABARLAR-L Digest, 25 March 2002. 26 ITAR-TASS, 31July 2003. 27 The confirmed interest of the international consortium in the commercial implementation of the Sakhalin-1 project was announced on 29 October 2001. A US company (ExxonMobile), Japanese, Indian and two Russian companies are involved in ‘Sakhalin-1’. The oil is to be supplied to the Russian Far Eastern market and also produced for deliveries to Japan and China markets (starting oil deliveries in 2005). The cost of the project is considered to be about $12 bn. ExxonMobile is engaged in the Sakhalin-1 and 3 projects. The ExxonMobile officials announced that they would proceed with long-stalled plans to develop the oilfields near Sakhalin Island off Russia’s eastern coast, declaring themselves finally satisfied, not only with regulatory and tax reforms but also with the improved spirit between Washington and Moscow. Exxon-Mobile intends to spend $4 bn over five years, the largest single investment in Russia’s history. 28 Lutz Kleveman, ‘The “War on Terror” is Being Used as an Excuse to Further the US Energy Interests in the Caspian’. 29 Could it be as part of the International Fund for Afghanistan, administered by the UN. Reconstructing Afghanistan might take from 5–10 years—‘Order out of Chaos: The Future of Afghanistan’, Speech by foreign secretary to IISS, 22 October 2001. 30 Russia and Uzbekistan had already signed the agreement on joint exploration of the Uzbek gas resources and Russia’s right to resell the resources to a third party. Among the Russian companies involved is Lukoil. 31 BBC, 27/11/01. This information was sited by the NEL 27.11.01. 32 ‘Gosudarstva SNG toriat sebe velikiy neftianoy put’ (CIS States Build a Great Oil Way for Themselves), Agency of Political News, 24 September 2001. 33 Unocal sponsored a visit of Taliban officials to its HQ in Houston, Texas, in 1997. See also, Daniel Fisher, ‘Kabuled Together Oil Companies Have Dreamed of a Trans-Afghan Pipeline. Are They Crazy Enough to Pull it off Now?’, Forbes Global, 4 February 2002. 34 Ibid. 35 Uzbekistan also sees an opportunity to destroy or to weaken the main adversary of the present Uzbek authorities—namely, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan led by Juma Namangoniy, who by unconfirmed sources was killed during the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan. 36 According to Lutz Kleveman, Karzai was representing the interests of the American corporations (Unocal) at the negotiations with the Afghani government during the 1990s. See Lutz Kleveman, ‘The “War on Terror” is Being Used as an Excuse to Further the US Energy Interests in the Caspian’, the Guardian, 20 October 2003. 37 www.lenta.ru 38 www.times.ru (7 December 2001).

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39 www.strana.ru (12 October 2003). 40 ‘In Case of Victorious US Military Campaign in Iraq the Building of the Pipeline will be Postponed’, News in Humanitarian Technologies, 20 March 2003. 41 Sergei Pletnev, ‘Irak Tolkaet OPEK v Ob’iatia Rossii’ (Iraq Pushes OPEC into Russia’s Arms), ITAR-TASS, 14 May 2003. 42 www.eurasianet.org(4 December 2001). 43 Russia’s main producers in the oil sector are Lukoil, Yukos, Surgutneftegaz, Tyumen Oil Company and Tatneft; in the gas industry it is Gazprom (producing 97.89 per cent of the 2000 level). See Interfax, 25 January 2002. 44 According to Togul Bagirov, executive vice-president of the Moscow International Oil Club. 45 ‘European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Considers Investing into the Russian Energy Sector’, Press Release issued by RAO UES on 3 April 2003. 46 There was an intense debate in the Russian press about possible intentions of major oil companies to sell their assets to foreign investors. Allegations were made about such companies as Yukos and Sibneft, especially before the confirmation of the companies’ merger. It was speculated that there was a swap deal under way around the BP-TNK joint project, introducing the American company instead of Russian counterparts. These allegations slowed down the decision on the merger deal between Yukos and Sibneft that was an integral part of the international BP-TNK joint project. Despite the criminal investigations against Yukos that were launched in July 2003, Russia’s anti-monopoly ministry confirmed its support of the merger of the Yukos oil group with Sibneft on 12 August 2003. See Andrew Jack, ‘GoAhead for Merger with Sibneft’, Financial Times, 13 August 2003. The media speculations about the purchasing of the shares of Russian companies by the American firms continued throughout autumn 2003. 47 www.strana.ru (13 October 2003). 48 RIA-Novosti, 8 April 2002. 49 Financial Times, 18 August 2003. 50 See David Buchan, ‘The Threat Within’, pp. 107–110. 51 According to the National Electronic Library information bulletin of 27 November 2001, the FBI was informing the oil and gas companies that Bin Laden supporters were preparing incidents and/or terrorist attacks on the energy pipeline system and facilities. 52 Russia is planning to cover up to 40 per cent of the international commercial space launches in the next decade. The bilateral and multilateral agreements signed in 2003 and 2004 demonstrated this intention and Russia’s capability to offer these services to the international community. 53 Michael Moodie and Isabelle Williams, The CWC Review Conference, Special Report No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2003), p. 28. 54 www.gov.ru 55 Jon B.Wolfsthal and Tom Z.Collina, ‘Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia’, The IISS Quarterly Survival, 44, 2 (2002), pp. 71–84. 56 ‘Broadening the Partnership to Stop the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction’,

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Fact Sheet, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Evian, France, 2 June 2003—available www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/21153.htm. 57 ‘Russia Vows to Raise Nuclear Sub After Nine Die in Sinking’, the Sunday Times, 31 August 2003. 58 ITAR-TASS, 26 June 2003. 59 www.dti.gov.uk 60 www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/06/12/1055220706427.html 61 David Rice, ‘Global—International Coalition Establishes “Proliferation Security Initiative” to Disrupt Illegal Arms Trade’, WMRC Daily Analysis, 11 July 2003. 62 www.cfr.org/background/wmd_interdict.php 63 Concern over North Korean efforts to obtain nuclear weapons turned into an international priority when in November 2002 officials of its government admitted having nuclear weapons. It was intensified by their subsequent withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003 (see ‘North Korea: Pyongyang Withdraws from Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty’, ITAR-TASS, 10 January 2003). On 9 July 2003 South Korean intelligence officials reported that they had detected roughly seventy high-explosive detonations, a possible indication that the country was developing the means to use small nuclear weapons. Iran provoked international criticism when the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report in early June 2003 expressing ‘concern’ over some of Iran’s ‘undeclared nuclear activities’. Those concerns became more serious when, in the same week that the IAEA produced evidence that Iran had created elements for a nuclear weapon, such as uranium metal and a heavy-water research reactor, Iran admitted testing its 1,300-km range Shahab3 missile. 64 Yevgeniy Verlin, ‘Putin is not yet One Among Equals. London Offers Russia more than just the Role of an Assistant in Oil Supplies’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 July 2003. 65 Glen Kessler, ‘A Vague Pitch Leaves Mostly Puzzlement’, 24 September 2003— available http://story.news.yahoo.com 66 ‘Press Conference with Nikolai Zlobin and Ivan Safranchuk, Center for Defense Information: Officials on USA-RF Summit’, Press Development Institute, 22 May 2002—available www.cdi.org 67 Ibid. 68 Allen C.Lynch, ‘The Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy in 1990’, in Richard Fawn and Stephen White (eds), Russia after Communism (London and Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 179. 69 Ibid. 70 Victor A.Kremenyuk, The United States and Russia’, in Sharyl Cross, Igor A. Zevelev, Victor A.Kremenuyk and Vagan M.Gevorgian (eds), Global Security Beyond the Millennium. American and Russian Perspective (London: Macmillan Press Ltd and New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 18. 71 Sharyl Cross, ‘United States-Russian Security Relations’, in Sharyl Cross, Igor A.Zevelev, Victor A.Kremenuyk and Vagan M.Gevorgian (eds), Global Security Beyond the Millennium. American and Russian Perspective (London: Macmillan Press Ltd and New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 43.

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CONCLUSION: NET RESULTS—SYSTEMIC CHANGES 1 Georgij Alafuzoff, ‘Russian Military Policy Seen from a Nordic-Baltic Perspective’, in Mika Kerttuner (ed.), Security in the North. Change and Continuity, Series 2, Research Report No. 9 (Helsinki: National Defence College, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, 2000), pp. 21–30. 2 Roberto Menotti, Ferrucio Pastore and Manuel Rosini, ‘The New Security Agenda’, in Strengthening International Order. The Role of Asia-Europe Co-operation. ACAEC Task Force Report (Ditchley Park, 2000), pp. 158–173.

APPENDIX 1 Comparative data is taken from the following resources: Military News Bulletin, No. 6 (June 2000), pp. 6–11; The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (London: IISS, 2001); Europa Publications, The Territories of the Russian Federation. An Extensive Reference Survey of the 89 Constituent Units of the Russian Federation (1st edn) (London: Europa Publications, 1999), p. 286. 2 Military News Bulletin, No. 6 (June 2000), p. 10. 3 General Kazantsev announced this change during his meeting in Essentukhi with a representative of the local office of the executive power. The reason for the transfer was described as a military necessity for the authority to be closer to the conflictprone regions, the military command, and the troublesome North Caucasian Republics. See http//www.polit.ru (18 June 2000); http//www.cdi.org/russia/104.html##6

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Publishing/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003). Malcolm, N., Pravda, A., Allison, R. and Light, M., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996). The Military Balance 2002-2003, IISS (London: Oxford University Press, 2002). Response to Terrorism and Insurgency Movements in Central Asia. Presentations at the international seminar held jointly by the Center for Strategic and Political Studies (Russia) and the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Britain) in Moscow on 24-25 November 2001 (Moscow: Asti-Izdat, 2002), p. 163. Robinson, N., Russia: A State of Uncertainty (London: Routledge, 2002). Ruble, B., Koen, J. and Popson, N. (eds), Fragmented Space in the Russian Federation (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). Sakwa, R., Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1993 and 2003). Shevtsova, L., Putin’s Russia (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). Talbot, S., The Russian Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 2002). Trenin, D., The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalisation (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 2001). White, S., Pravda, A. and Gitelman, Z. (eds), Developments in Russian Politics (Houndsmill, Basingstoke (Hampshire) and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997). White, S., Russia’s New Politics. The Management of a Postcommunist Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Zimmerman, W., The Russian People and Foreign Policy: Russian Elite and Mass Perspectives, 1993-2000 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).

INDEX ABM 32, 37, 59, 82, 89, 90, 177 Abraham, Spencer 74 administrative: reform 113–7,120, 132, 136, 143, 152; stages of reform 122; system 113, 131, 194 Afghanistan 60, 73–5,79, 85, 95–8,100–1,108, 127, 178, 192, 243 Alexandrova Arbatova, Nadia 1 anti-terrorist xiii, 18, 37, 65, 74, 76, 100, 106, 107, 110, 211,214; activity 96, 101, 209; campaign xiii, 3, 24, 35, 57, 110; containment network 37, 104, 106; joint coalition xiii, 95, 101; strategy 216; tactics 216 APEC 17; Energy Security Initiative 246 Arbatov, Alexei 1 ‘arch of instability’ 36, 100 ‘ark of security’ 36; ‘of stability’ 36, 82 Armenia 15, 109 arms control 28, 32, 85, 182 ASEAN 17, 107; plus three 92; Regional Forum 82, 92, 237 Asia xiii, 82; dimension 81; policy 16 Asian Pacific region 3, 14, 18–9,22, 26, 69, 81–2,85, 92, 129 association: ‘Bolshoy Ural’ 127, 131; ‘Bolshaya Volga’ 127, 130; economic 117–9,127, 130; inter-regional 117; ‘North Caucasus’ 128, 130; ‘Siberian Accord’ 131 ‘Atlantism’ 141 Azerbaijan 96, 103, 104, 239–40

Index

305

Balkans 21, 23, 286, 85 Baltic: Charter 30; region 26, 43; state 25, 37, 40, 42–3,49, 67, 69 Baluevsky, Yuri 180, 227 Belarus: joint military doctrine 209; military grouping 209; Russia 44, 69, 82, 109 Bin Laden 2, 103, 149–50,242 Blair, Tony 34, 137, 249 Blank, Stephen 162 BMD 59 see also missile defence ‘bridge state’ 26 Britain see United Kingdom Bulgaria 25, 81 Bush, George W. 74 Cam Rahn Bay 19 Canada 34, 52, 55 Caspian Sea 14, 235, 240, 246 Caucasus 12, 21, 39, 96, 101, 119, 253 CBM 28, 41, 43, 64, 67 Central Asia xiii, 12, 14, 19, 21, 34, 38,100, 102, 236, 253 Central Europe 14, 23, 26, 27, 70, 72, 80; Free Trade Area 23 Central FD 78, 120, 128, 209 centre-regional: relations 4, 115–43 CFE Treaty 41,41,; Adapted 27–8,41, 43, 45, 72, 219 Chechnya 2, 43, 75, 94, 100, 104,106, 176, 200–1,204, 211, 219 Cherkesov, Victor 121, 146 Chernov, Oleg D. 36, 100, 108 China 10–2, 16–8, 25, 52, 73, 82,87–90,92, 98, 120, 125, 129, 236, 237, 253 Chubais, Anatoliy 185 CIS 16, 23, 26, 34, 39, 67, 69, 72, 100, 176, 177; Antiterrorist Center 26, 108 CIS Treaty on Collective Security 109, 209 civil-military control 5, 158, 162, 183; parliamentary 158, 182; presidential 161, 186 civil-military relations 113, 158,169, 182, 192 civil service 133, 138–9; reform 138 CJTF 27,29, 33, 41, 43, 44, 54, 64, 87, 92

Index

306

‘Cold war’ 24, 94; post-Cold war order 3, 36, 106 Commission: on the administrative reform 134, 143; on the division of power between federal and other authorities 132, 134; on implementation of constitutional power 146, 152 communication: transport corridors 125, 129 Communist Party RF (CPRF) 147–9 confederation 118, 137 Constitution RF 116, 121, 122, 145, 149, 160 ‘constitutional majority’ 146 containment 15, 105; dual 71 continentalism 141 counter-terrorist see anti-terrorist crime 5; criminalization 118; organised 5, 53; prevention 26, 209 crisis management 57 Cronin, Audrey Kurth xiii Cuba 15, 19 Czech Republic 34, 81 Davis Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard, USA 22 decentralisation 5, 116, 135 decision-making 2, 54 defence 6, 27; budget 59; Council 184; also see Russia’s defence democracy 4, 191; ‘controlled’ 4; ‘deformed’ 145; ‘democratic patriotism’ 73; democratisation 116; ‘managed’ 5, 155 deterrence 20, 224; ‘realistic’ 226; ‘regional’ 225; ‘strategic non-nuclear’ 226 devolution 116 domestic 17, 20; factors 1; policies 5; reforms 113–92 Drachevsky, Leonid 125, 131

Index drug trafficking 25, 127 Easter, Gerald 116 Eastern Europe 12, 18, 26, 38, 80 East-West Institute, New York 4 economic and financial reform 14, 113, 130 economic crisis (1998) xiii, 71, 117 economic determination 22, 92 election: laws for the military 167; parliamentary 136, 145, 163–4; presidential 1, 22, 163 elite: regional 145, 189; ruling 145 emergency relief operation 32 energy xiii, 19, 74, 83–4,86, 127; consortium 33, 83, 86, 91, 246 North-South corridor 242; sector 129, 150; strategy (2000–20) 83 engagement 22–3,25, 49; ‘policy’ 129; regional concept 252; strategy 15, 101, 126, 232, 253 ESDI 54, 73 ethno-demographic 119; -genesis theory 11 EU 3, 4, 15, 17, 22, 38, 46, 48, 50, 51, 78; Constitution 62; Council 61; enlargement 48, 49; ERRF 52, 55, 61; ESDP 53–5,57–61; Political and Security Committee (PSC) 54; Russia 3, 23, 48, 57, 61,76; summits 48–9,51, 56–7,63, 245; trilateral consultation mechanism 60 Eurasia xiii, 12, 15, 69, 225, 253; Eurasianism 3, 13–4, 22, 97; identity xiii; neo-eurasianist model 13–4 Euro-Asian Economic Community 129 Euro-Atlantic 12, 14; Disaster Response Co-ordination Center 37 Europe 10–1, 20, 23; integration patterns 16; unification 51

307

Index

308

European Energy Charter 234 Far East 83, 85–7,130 Far-Eastern district 120, 125, 129, 142, 198, 209 ‘Fatherland’ 165 federal: budget 128; centre xiii, 116, 123, 132; centre-regional-local relations 113, 122; Treasury 141 Federal Assembly 22, 136 Federal District 117, 120, 122, 130–1,150, 162, 219 federal laws 149; ‘On Combating Terrorism’; ‘On Defence’ 159–60,194; ‘On Political Parties’ 151–3 federation 5, 116, 118; asymmetrical 118; Council 146, 149–50; transitional 116 financial: control 131, 141; Industrial Groups (FIG) 69 fiscal appeasement 116 force: use 174, 212 foreign policy 2, 4, 10, 14, 16–7,22–3,79; military in 2, 177 ‘Forum 20’ 37, 40,44 France 34, 68 FRY 30–1 G-2 253 G-3 framework (Europe, Eurasia and the United States) 253 G-7 88–91,253 G-8 82, 89, 92, 247,253; ‘+ 1’ 253 Gareev, Mahmud 44, 189 geoeconomics 14, 20, 22, 73, 91, 243; consideration 21–2,61, 80, 177 geopolitics 2, 9–11, 141–14, 16, 22,23, 26, 68, 119; ‘adequate’ 15; ‘pragmatic geopolitical approach’ 99; trans-Eurasian geopolitical system 141 Georgia 42. 108 geo-strategy xiii, 2, 10–1, 17, 25, 61, 91, 97, 243; ‘adequate’ 13–5

Index German: factor 68; French alliance 19; Russia relations 96 Germany 19, 33, 68, 73, 80, 237 global: economy 22, 125; globalisation 2, 115, 258; partnership 248–9; security 5, 249 Gorbachev, Mikhail 46; doctrine 14 ‘gosudarstvenniks’ 73, 192 governance 2, 113, 143,146; self xiii, 51; system 113, 121; world 2 governors 39, 155 Great Britain see United Kingdom Harter, Stefanie 116 Heartland theory 11 Hewitt, Patricia 249 hostage crisis (Moscow, 2002) 94, 103, 104, 211 House of Lords inquiry (2002) 62 humanitarian intervention 71, 91 Hungary 34, 81 Huntington, S. 12 India 12, 15, 17, 18, 91, 108, 235 INOGATE (EU project) 20 instability: belt 120; factors 18; regional 119–20 institutional 60; changes 113; system 5, 156 institution 23; international 2, 23; networks 4, 137 intelligence 29, 52; assessments 36, 101 internal: factors see domestic; reforms see domestic international: co-operation 18;

309

Index

310

engagement 22; politics 2; security system 5, 110 International Energy Agency report 233 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 44 investment: foreign 77, 82, 245; pre-investment conditions 86; project 83, 86 92, 141; strategy 141 Iran 10, 75, 79, 103 Iraq 10, 30, 31, 70, 97, 103 Islam 2, 98; radical organisations 106 Italy 34 Ivanov, Igor 36, 58, 80, 104, 108, 179 Ivanov, Sergei 34, 36, 75, 83, 100, 101, 179–87,198, 202, 204, 208, 227, 243 Ivashov, Leonid 56, 97, 180 Japan 10, 18, 52, 83–4,92, 130, 235–7 JTF 29, 141 judicial system 113, 132, 143 jurisdiction: federal-regional 131 Kaliningrad 41, 44, 48, 51, 63, 66, 80, 127, 190 Karaganov, Sergei 54 Kasyanov, Mikhail 81, 104, 141, 142, 190, 215, 246 Kazakhstan 19, 83, 103, 109, 129, 239–41 Kazantsev, Victor 128,131, 201 kaznacheiskiy (financial) register 133, 189 KFOR 31, 179 Khristenko, Victor 50, 52, 129, 162, 237 Kirienko, Sergei 116, 125 Kokoshin, Andrei 185, 189, 194 Kortunov, Andrei 3 Kosopkin, Alexander 124 Kosovo 30, 71, 76, 176, 178, 179 Kozak, Dmitriy 122, 132, 134, 136 Kozyrev, A. 16; doctrine 14 Kremenuyk, Victor 254 Kudrin, Alexander 125, 130 Kvashnin, Anatoly 169, 180, 188, 194, 208, 228 Kyoto Protocol 51 Kyrgyzstan 19, 44, 96, 98, 102,109 Latin America 72, 235

Index

311

Latvia 45 Latyshev, Pyotr 128 LDPR (Zhirinovskiy party) 147–9,165 Lebedev, Sergei 100 legislation 136, 143, 211 legislative: act 151, level 132 Lieven, Anatol 3 Lithuania 44, 51 Lo, Bobo 4, 153, 155 Lynch, Allen C. 253 Mackinder, Halford John 12 macro-regions see Federal Districts ‘Madrid plus package’ 30 management 113, 124–5,132, 137, 146 Margelov, Mikhail 104 Markov, Sergei 89 McFaul, Michael 5 Mediterranean 18, 20,92, 235 Middle East 14, 30, 48, 75, 78, 232–3 migration 5, 20, 87 military 5, 10, 141, 22, 32, 57, 59–60,87, 164, 113, 122, 158, 162, 167, 176–7,196, 222–3; reforms 4, 113, 122, 130, 194, 196; security service in 5, 162, 167 Military Balance, IISS 41 Military Doctrine 174, 194, 212 Miller, Robert 46 missile defence (NMD) 37, 42, 44–5,59, 89–90,225 Moldova 42, 43, 58, 80, 176 Mongolia 19, 129 monocentric political system 146, 169 Morgenthau, H. 13 ‘Motherland’ 155, 165 Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme for Russia (MNEPR) 51 municipal 125, 134–5 national 15, 113; identity 16; integrity 119; interests 4, 12, 87; Security Concept 39, 174, 211–2 NATO 36, 37, 40, 55, 250; anti-terrorist activity 37, 96; co-operation 37; enlargement 3, 24, 40, 80; Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 24; Membership Action Plan (MAP) 41;

Index

312

North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) 23 NATO-Russia 3, 23, 35–6,83, 101; co-operation 37, 39–40,45; Founding Act 27–8; PJC 27–30,34, 35–6; summits 30, 38–9,41; Rome Declaration 45 ‘new neighbourhood policy’ 63 new world order 20, 96, 232 Nikonov, Vecheslav 105, 122, 159 Nogee, Joseph L. 68 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 250 North Caucasus 2, 191, 199 Northern Dimension 67, 120, 249 Northern Europe 14, 126, 209 Northern European Initiative (NEI) 66 North Korea 75, 82, 85, 129, 251 North-western FD 78, 120, 126–7,130, 146, 198 Norway 45, 248 NPA-Russian Parliamentary group 28 NSP 78 nuclear weapons xiii, 15, 24, 28; tactical 42 oil 73, 126–7,150, 232, 242 OPEC 235,237, 244 Operational Task Forces (OTF) 196, 200–1,204–8,209, 225 Organisation of the Treaty on Collective Security (OTCS) 108 OSCE 23, 28, 36, 43, 64,17; Code of Conduct 43, 65; New Security Charter 64 ‘Otechestvo’ (OVR) 147, 155, 165 ‘out of area’: missions 27, 29, 60; operations 35, 54 parliament 148, 150, 182 Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) 47, 62 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 24, 28, 38, 72; enhanced 26; ‘extended’ 33; ‘plus’ 9, 29 Party of Peace 164 peacekeeping 27,32, 34, 37, 43, 57–8, 64, 87 perestroika xiii, 4, 49, 113, 114–5 Pipeline 74, 232, 237–46; Baltic (BPS) 126, 237; Baku-Tbilisi-Cheyhan 239,244;

Index

313

Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum 241; Caspian 237; Odessa-Brody-Gdansk 239; Trans-Afghan Gas 242; Trans-Caspian 241 Plenipotentiary Representative see Presidential Envoy (PE) Poland 34, 80 political: military alliance 18–9; opposition 1; reforms 4, 113; system 113,144–5,146 political party 113, 146, 151–5,164–5 Poltavchenko, Georgy 121, 129 Powell, Colin 34, 104 power 146, 157; block 122, 137, 141, 142, 146, 156, 198 pragmatism 12, 15, 22 Presidential Administration 4, 123–4 Presidential Envoy (PE) 120, 122–5,130, 131, 150, 162, 198, 219 preventive strike 99, 174 Primakov, Y. 16, 23, 87, 116, 118; doctrine 80, 120, 146 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 250 proliferation 25; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 37, 39, 92, 250 public opinion 1; polls 31, 71, 98, 153, 170, 172 Pulikovsky, Konstantin 125 Putin, Vladimir 1, 141–16, 22–,33–40,47, 49–51, 66–74, 75–6,79–80,82, 84, 86, 163, 98, 102, 107, 113–,121, 124, 128, 134, 137, 140, 144–6,154, 155, 161, 171, 173, 192, 209, 213, 228, 251; doctrine 14, 104 rapprochement 2, 19, 46, 70, 98 reforms 1, 4, 113 regional xiii, 20, 82; alliance of gas producers 246; development programmes 125, 130; institutions 15, 66, 119, 126; legislative 154–5; ‘order’ 115; power groupings 119; ‘security complex’ 115; studies xiii regionalism 5, 125 regions 115; bordering 130; macro 119;

Index

314

merged 117, 136; in Russia 146 resettlement programmes 173 Rice, Condoleezza 250 Robertson, George 31, 34, 36, 37, 41, 55 Romania 25, 81 Rome Declaration 35, 45, 109 Rossel, Eduard 118, 128, 131 Rumer, Boris 22 Russian government 39, 51 Russia’s defence 5, 61; army 11, 18, 223 see also military Russia’s foreign policy 2, 4, 10, 17, 46, 81 Russia’s National Security concept (2000) 26, 192, 226 Russia’s Security Council 25, 117, 129, 171, 185, 207, 223 Russia’s strategic partnership 4, 15, 51, 90–1,100; British 68, 76, 77; French 68; Germany 68, 70, 75; German-French 68; US 70–4 Sakwa, Richard 5 Schroder, Gerhard 61 security xiii, 4–5, 15, 18, 20, 23, 24, 26, 33, 53,80, 82, 92, 98, 115, 121, 127, 211, 213, 232 security: sector 113, 213; service reforms 162, 190, 216 Separatism 26, 119–20 Sergeyev, Igor 162, 180, 187, 200, 209 SFOR 27–30 Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) 85, 102, 107; Charter 107 Siberian FD 120,125, 129–30,141 Slovakia 81 Slovenia 25 Sobhani, S.Rob 243 socialist: community 141; continentalism 11 Solana, Javier 55,61–2 Southern Europe 14, 22, 49 Southern FD 120, 125, 127–8,198 South Korea 18, 82, 92, 129 Soviet Union (USSR) 10, 144–14, 233 state order 116–7,136 State Account Committee 139–41

Index

315

State Council (Gossovet) 134, 149 State Duma 117, 125, 133, 136, 146,182 State Military Inspection 185 Stepashin, Sergei 104, 141,165 Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 111 ‘strategic partnership’ see Russia’s strategic partnership strategy 4, 59, 194; direction 25, 127, 197; economic and political (2001–10) 129; stability 75 sustainable development 24, 120 systemic 113–4,137 Talbot, Strobe 1 Tajikistan 34, 96, 98, 102,109 Tax 22, 134,137, 142 Taylor, Brian D. 193 territorial-administrative 114–7,119–20,135–6 terrorism xiii, 28, 36, 91, 102, 141, 211, 212; international xiii, 65, 105; 9/11 xiii–1, 20, 35–6,39, 46–8,65, 73, 74, 97, 100, 122, 216, 232–3; threat 74, 211 Totsky, Konstantin 98, 103 Traawik, Kim 249 trade 86; Russia’s external 48, 82 TRANCECA 21 Trans-Atlantic community 11 transcontinental corridors 91; transportation 26, 46 Transdniestria 58 transport 69, 127,129 Treisman, Daniel 116 Turkey 20, 96, 104 Turkmenistan 19, 103, 108, 240 Ukraine 12, 25–6,59, 83 Union of Rightist Forces 147 United Nations Organisation (UN) 36, 60, 110; Charter 251; Security Council 15, 64, 104, 250 United Russia party 153, 165 United States of America (USA) xiii, 14, 16, 22, 37, 44, 72, 96, 102, 125 ‘Unity’ 147, 155, 164–5 Ural FD 77, 120, 125–7,130, 141 Uzbekistan 19, 26, 96, 98, 102, 108, 152 velikoderzhavnost 11

Index

316

Vershbow, Alexander 38, 74 Volga FD 120, 125–7,130 Warsaw Pact Treaty 11, 36, 41 Westernism 3, 16, 16, 114 Western oriented realists 98 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 47, 49–50, 78 Yabloko 147, 153, 165 Yakovlev, Vladimir 118 Yastrzhembsky, Sergei 62, 104 Yeltsin, Boris xiii, 4, 141, 24, 68, 117, 140, 145, 162, 165, 184, 186, 191, 194 Yugoslavia 31 Yukos 74, 83, 88, 239 Zavarzin, Viktor 29, 149 Zhirinovskiy, V.V. see LDPR

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