Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey

Russia and Islam A Historical Survey

Galina M. Yemelianova

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Studies in Russian and East European History and Society Series Standing Order ISBN 0±333±71239±0 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Russia and Islam

A Historical Survey Galina M. Yemelianova

Q Galina M. Yemelianova 2002 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin's Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0±333±68354±4 hardcover This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Yemelianova, Galina M., 1960Russia and Islam: a historical survey / Galina M. Yemelianova p. cm.Ð(Studies in Russian and East European history and society) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0±333±68354±4 1. MuslimsÐRussiaÐHistory. 2. MuslimsÐSoviet UnionÐHistory. I. Series. DK34.M8 Y46 2002 9470 .0080 2971Ðdc21 10

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Witshire

To My Parents

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Contents List of Maps

ix

List of Illustrations

x

Preface

xi

Technical Note

xiv

Acknowledgements

xv

Glossary

xvi

Maps

xxi

1 Russia's Encounter with Islam (622±1480)

1

Russia before Rus

1

Kievan Rus

4

The Mongol Period

16

2 Russia and its Muslim Neighbours: 1480±1881

28

The Russian Conquest of Genghizid Khanates

28

The Russian State's Assault on Islam

36

The Reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great

41

The Conquest of the Caucasus

45

The Conquest of Kazakhstan and Central Asia

55

3 Russia's Umma and Modernization at the Turn of

the Nineteenth Century

69

The Great Reforms

69

Al-Usul al-Jadid

74

The Constitutional Period

87

The Impact of the First World War

92

vii

viii Contents

4

5

6

Muslims under Soviet Rule: 1917±91

99

Muslims and the Russian Revolution Stalinism and Islam Muslims in the Great Patriotic War Muslims in Late Soviet Society

99

112

120

130

Russia's Muslims after the Collapse of Communism

137

The Islamic Renaissance The Western North Caucasus Dagestan Muslims of the Volga-Urals Region `A Muftii Boom'

137

139

144

153

157

Chechnya and Political Islam

166

All-Russian Islamic Political Parties and Movements Regional Islamic Political Parties and Movements The Russian±Chechen Conflict

Wahhabism

The Rise of Islamophobia

166

173

177 185 191

Conclusion

194

Notes

203

Bibliography

224

Index

233

List of Maps

1 The Middle and Lower Volga 2 The Caucasus 3 Central Asia 4 The Soviet Union

xxi

xxii

xxiii

xxiv

Source: Y. Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union: from World War II to Perestroika (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), pp. xxiv±xxvii

ix

List of Illustrations

2.1 Interior Decoration of a House in the village of

Kubachi in Dagestan (photo by Guzel Sabirova, 14 August 1998)

2.2 Imam Shamyl ± source: M. Chichagova,

Shamyl na Kavkaze i v Rossii (St Petersburg, 1889), p. 6

4.1 Medresse Mir-i-Arab in Bukhara, from a calendar of 1901 5.1 Sabantuy Festival in Naberezhnie Chelny, Tatarstan (photo by Guzel Sabirova, 25 August 1998) 5.2 New Mosque in Otradnoe in Moscow (author's photo, 29 September 1999) 6.1 Students of the Medresse Yunis in Makhachkala, Dagestan (author's photo, 30 June 1997)

x

46

51

115

155 160 177

Preface

The relationship between Russia and Islam is a fascinating issue which however has not yet received adequate academic attention.1 One of the reasons for this is its theoretical controversy and political sensitivity.2 This book takes the risk of elaborating on this complicated phenomenon and trying to fill a considerable gap in both Russian and Islamic studies. It presents the cumulative results of my academic experience in and of Russia, the Islamic world and the West.3 Its contention is that historically Russia developed special relations with the world of Islam which differ significantly from the relations between the West and Islam.4 These special relations were shaped by Russia's intermediate geographical location between Europe and subsequently Islamicized Asia, as well as its predominantly flat landscape, lacking natural borders and abundant with long and mighty rivers. From early times, Russian historians have pointed out their country's geographical openness to the Islamic East, the resemblance of its plains to `Asian spaces', its natural links with the `Great Steppe' and the spontaneous and intensive interaction of proto-Russians with other inhabitants of the vast Eurasian plains and steppes, especially with Turkic nomads, many of whom subsequently converted to Islam.5 Representatives of the neo-Eurasian movement believe that the Turkic, or `Turanian' factor had a formative influence on the evolution of the Russian state and predetermined its civilizational divergence from the West.6 By comparison, some Western researchers explain the pivotal sociocultural difference of Russia from the rest of Europe by its non-involvement in the Latino-Germanic civilizational synthesis of the fourth to the sixth centuries A D which was responsible for the genesis of Western feudalism and the subsequent economic and political make-up of the West. Since then, they argue, the development of individual Western states has been characterized by gradualism and progressive dynamism which has been absent in Russian history.7 Nevertheless, most Russian and Western historians agree that the historical evolution of Russia has been spasmodic and dependent on the fragile balance between sedentary, transhumant, or nomadic factors, as well as powerful external influences. Some compare it to a pendulum, the extreme swings of which were always followed by lengthy periods of regression and stagnation. Others describe it as `a peripheral civilization' which lacks a xi

xii Preface

genuine civilizational backbone and therefore combines mutually conflicting cultural vectors. The latter, arguably, are responsible for the fact that by the beginning of the twenty-first century the Russian state and society paradoxically incorporate patriarchal, agrarian, industrial and post-industrial features.8 The academic and political debate about Russia's socio-cultural identity and its position in relation to the West and East has acquired a new momentum as a result of the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War. Some practitioners and theorists of international politics in the West have celebrated the final resolution of world history on Western terms.9 Others have claimed that the previous system of global ideological conflict has been transformed into a new conflict system, based on the cultural and religious differences between civilizations.10 According to such thinking, post-Communist Russia, which is home for over 14 million Muslims, could not avoid an internal civilizational split. The protracted Russian±Chechen conflict, the beginning of which coincided with the demise of the Soviet Union, has thus been viewed as the first manifestation of a religion-based conflict. Both theories may be seen by their critics as merely representing the other side of the Western Eurocentric approach which denies the possibility of other than Western forms of viable political and social organization. Thus, the lengthy period of Rus's existence within the Genghizid Islamicized empire had a profound impact on its subsequent socio-economic, political and cultural evolution. In Russia itself the post-Soviet cataclysm has revived the `eternal' Russkii Vopros (`The Russian Question') about her socio-cultural essence and place in the world. Some authors, who represent a new generation of Westernizers, have regarded Western influence as crucial in Russian history. Their opponents, the neo-Slavophiles, have emphasized the eastern Slavic dimension of Russia's identity. Yet others, the neo-Eurasianists, advocated the Euro-Asian nature of Russia. The `Russian Question' has transcended the academic debate and become a factor in post-Soviet state and nation-building. The policy of the early Yeltsin government (1990±93) was dominated by a neo-Westernized approach which had disastrous consequences for the Russian state and society in general and Russian±Islamic relations in particular. Since the mid-1990s Russian politics have been defined by neo-Slavophiles and neo-Eurasianists. The former have perceived Russia's future as a unitary and authoritarian state of Russians, while the latter have advocated Russia's gradual transformation into a democratic federation, or even a confederation which would reflect its ethnic and cultural pluralism. The advent of Vladimir

Preface xiii

Putin as Russia's new President in 2000 reflected the neo-Slavophile shift, which might well have an unfavourable impact on relations between Russia and Islam. This book is focused on Islamic Russia, that is the Islamic regions of Eurasia which in various historical periods were under Russian suzerainty. It is divided into six chapters each corresponding to a distinctive historical phase in these relations which included both public and private spheres. The book is particularly concerned with non-official Russian±Muslim interactions which have been neglected by scholars who have tended to view them through the prism of official Russian policy towards Islam and Muslims. I have deliberately not employed a particular philosophical, ideological or theoretical approach, seeking rather to provide a culturally and politically `disengaged' analysis. Nevertheless, this study has drawn intensively on eurasianist theory and the concept of orientalism, theories of national and ethnic identity as well as those exploring the relationship between modernization and national identity formation.11

Technical Note

For the sake of convenience I have used place names that were in vogue in the period under discussion. Where there has been a change, which has sometimes occurred more than once, I have also provided in parentheses present-day names. Most personal and geographical names have been transliterated from Cyrillic, with the exception of those that have a generally accepted English spelling. Thus, Amu Darya, rather than Amu Daria and Khwarasm, rather than Khorezm. For Arabic names and terms I have used a simplified transliteration, dispensing with diacritical and vowel-length marks. For words of Arabic origin in the languages of Russia's various Muslim peoples I have maintained a unified spelling system which represents a spelling and pronunciation compromise between those languages and Arabic. I have rendered plural forms of foreign words by adding an `s', instead of the form used in the language of origin. Thus, raions instead of raioni. The exception to this is words appearing very frequently, like ulema instead of alims or Polovtsy instead of Polovets. I have given all dates before February 1918 according to the Julian calendar, which was 12 days behind the Gregorian calendar in the nineteenth century and 13 days in the twentieth. The dates after February 1918 have been rendered in accordance with the Gregorian calendar.

xiv

Acknowledgements

I am thankful to the British Academy, the Economic and Social Research Council and the Leverhulme Trust for the financial support which has been vital for my research. I would also like to thank the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, the University of Birmingham, for providing me with excellent research facilities, ample source material and a congenial atmosphere which has greatly facilitated my work on this book. I owe a special debt of gratitude to its librarian, Nigel Hardware, for his assistance in dealing with the book's bibliography. I also wish to thank Marea Arries for her help in producing the typescript. I am thankful to Julian Cooper, the Director of the Centre, and my colleagues Maureen Perrie, Hilary Pilkington and Jorgen Nielsen for their help and encouragement. I am particularly indebted to Jeremy Smith for his time in reading my manuscript and for his invaluable suggestions, comments and criticisms. My special gratitude goes to Robert Landa, Irina Smilianskaia, Dmitrii Makarov and Svetlana Akkieva, as well as other Russian colleagues and friends, who have given me much-needed moral support, as well as professional advice. Above all, I want to thank my husband for his courage and patience in dealing with me and my book and for his enormous editorial assistance. G.Y. Birmingham

xv

Glossary

abystay ± lit. `older sister'; used for female religious figure or mullah's wife, who would give religious instructions to girls abyz ± lit. `elder'; religious and administrative leader of a Tatar village community adat ± customary law ahl-ul-kitab ± lit. `people of the scrip', followers of the world's three main religions akhund ± leading religious figure of the Shiite mosque; leading Imam among the Tatars aksakal ± lit. `white beard'; elder Alash Orda ± lit. the Horde of Alash named after Alash, the mystical ancestor of the Kazakhs al-usul al-jadid ± lit. `new method'; the new phonetic method of teaching Arabic in Russia's Muslim schools which was first introduced by Ismail Gasprinskii in 1884 al-usul al-qadim ± lit. `old method'; the old syllabic method of teaching Arabic, opposite to al-usul al-jadid 'alim (pl. 'ulema, or ulemo) ± a scholar of Shari'a law amanat ± a non-Russian privileged hostage in medieval Russia amir ± lit. `leader' amliak ± a category of state-owned land in Bukhara ataman ± Cossack chieftain aul ± a kinship and territorial formation among various nomadic peoples avlod ± an ethno-religious community among the Tajiks ayat ± a verse of the Koran baskak ± collector of yasak under Mongol rule basmach (pl. basmachi) ± participant of the liberation movement in early twentieth-century Central Asia batyr ± chieftain among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes bek, bey, biy ± aristocratic rank among Turkic nomads, head of clan bessermen ± an official in the Mongol empire bibiotun ± female religious figure bichura ± the house-spirit among the Volga Bulgars bid'a ± sinful innovation in Islam boevik ± fighter boiarin (pl. boiare) ± a representative of the Rus trade nobility bulgari ± a distinctive Bulgar technology of fur and leather processing caravansarai ± trade-stations in Central Asia CARC ± abbreviation for the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults chaikhane ± Central Asian tea-house da'awa ± summon to Islam danishmend ± a member of the Islamic elite in the Khanate of Kazan Dar-ul-Harb ± lit. `the world of war' Dar-ul-Islam ± lit. `the world of Islam' dehqan (pl. dehqane) ± peasant in traditionally sedentary parts of Central Asia xvi

Glossary xvii dervish ± member of a Muslim order who takes upon himself vows of poverty and austerity desiatina ± 2.7 acres desiatnik ± a commander of ten warriors in the Mongol empire dhikr ± lit. remembrance; remembrance of glorification of Allah with certain fixed phrases, integral part of ritual of all Sufi or dervish orders dirham ± a silver coin which was the main currency of the Arab Caliphate djien ± a popular festival among the Volga Bulgars domovoi ± the house-spirit among Eastern Slavic tribes druzhina ± a kniaz's guard in Kievan Rus dua' bi-tavassul ± help esers ± abbreviation for members of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party faqir (pl. fuqaro) ± a representative of the lower class in the Khanate of Bukhara fiqh ± a branch of traditional Muslim scholarship on jurisprudence gayur ± infidel gazawat ± an Islamic holy war, identical to jihad gazi ± fighter of the gazawat gubernia ± province in the Russian empire hadith ± tradition, the account of what the Prophet said or did hafiz ± a member of the Islamic elite under the Genghizids hajj ± annual pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, one of the five pillars of Islam hajji ± a member of the Islamic elite in the Golden Horde; a pilgrim to Mecca and Medina hijab ± full veil ibadat ± homage to Allah `Id al-Adha ± Islamic festival of Immolation, blood sacrifice ijaza ± licence granted by a shaykh to his khalifa to spread the tariqa and to initiate his own murids ijma' ± a consensus of Muslim experts in legal matters ijtihad ± independent judgement in a legal or theological question based on interpretation of the Koran and hadith igrishe ± a popular festival among Eastern Slavic tribes imam ± prayer-leader among Sunni Muslims imamate ± theocratic state in the North Caucasus governed by the shariat imam-khatib ± imam who also fulfils the role of khatib iman ± Islamic faith inorodets (pl. inorodtsy) ± in Russian historiography, non-Russian subjects of the Tsar ishan ± a Sufi teacher or leader jadid or jadidist ± lit. `new' representative of Islamic modernism jamaat ± rural commune in Dagestan jihad ± an Islamic holy war juz ± Kazakh term for horde kadets ± abbreviation for members of Russia's party of constitutional democrats kafir ± non-believer in Islam karachi ± a Genghizid dignitary kazi-kolon ± the supreme Islamic authority among Tajiks khalifa ± deputy, caliph. In Sufism, a deputy of a Sufi shaykh khatib ± person who delivers the Friday sermon (khutba)

xviii Glossary khutba ± Friday sermon by the khatib kishlak ± rural settlement in Central Asia kniaz ± supreme chieftain, or ruler in Kievan Rus kniazhestvo ± kniaz's domain kolkhoz ± collective farm krai ± a province within the Soviet administrative system kufr ± apostasy kulak ± a well-off peasant Kurban-Bayram ± Islamic festival of blood sacrifice. Identical to 'Id al-Adha kurbashi ± Central Asia, a chieftain leshii ± the wood-goblin among Eastern Slavic tribes madhhab ± a juridical school within Sunni Islam mahalla ± traditional urban settlement in Central Asia mahdi ± God's messenger maslenitsa ± a celebration of the arrival of spring among Eastern Slavic tribes Mawlid ± celebration of the Prophet's or saint's birthday, usually accompanied by prayer and chanting of hymns in honour of the celebrated person mazar ± holy shrine or tomb medresse ± a secondary Islamic school mekteb ± a primary Islamic school mihrab ± a niche in the mosque's wall directed towards Mecca millet ± lit. `nation', the ethno-cultural community of Russia's Muslim Turks muamalat ± social practice muallim (pl. muallimin) ± lit . `teacher' in a mekteb muderris (pl. muderrisin) ± lit. `teacher' in a medresse muhajir (pl. mahajirin) ± those companions of the Prophet who emigrated with him from Mecca to Medina. In the North Caucasus, those who emigrated from the Russian-controlled territories to the Islamic mainland. muhtasib ± regional representative of spiritual board muhtasibat ± office of muhtasib mujahed (pl. mujahedin) ± Islamic warrior/s muftii ± head of Muslim spiritual directorate in Russia and the USSR mul'k ± private land in the Islamic East mullah ± Muslim religious functionary; often senior clergyman in a mosque mullah-zade ± a representative of the Islamic elite in the Khanate of Kazan munafiq (pl. munafiqin) ± hypocrite murid ± Sufi novice or adept muridism ± in Russian historiography, the equivalent of the Sufi movement in the North Caucasus murshid ± Sufi spiritual guide qualified to direct the murid murza ± a dignitary among the Volga Bulgars and in the Mongol empire mutashaykh ± lit. `spurious shaykh'. In Dagestan this term is applied by the officially recognized Sufi shaykhs to their opponents. naib ± lit. `deputy'. A governor of a province in Shamyl's imamate in the North Caucasus. namaz (salat) ± the basic Islamic prayer, recited five times daily niqab ± face veil oblast' (pl. oblasti) ± administrative region within Russia and the USSR oglan ± a free warrior in the Mongol empire

Glossary xix okhranka ± secret police in Tsarist Russia okrug ± military territorial unit otpadenie ± falling away from Christianity by forcibly converted Muslims otynchi ± female religious figure who gives religious instructions to girls pir ± old person or elder (Persian); in Sufism, the murshid or mentor pools ± single currency in the Golden Horde, introduced by Uzbek-khan pop ± Russian Orthodox priest posadnik ± a kniaz's personal representative in provinces of Kievan Rus qadi ± a shariat judge qadim, qadimist ± lit. `old' ± related to proponents of Islamic traditionalism and scholasticism; opposite to jadid qibla ± orientation towards Mecca rais ± a chieftain in medieval Dagestan RCP(b) ± Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks), name of Soviet ruling party 1918±36 RSDRP ± abbreviation for Russia's Socialist Democratic Party sabantuy ± Festival of the Plough among the Volga Bulgars and Tatars sadaqa ± voluntary alms safi ± lit. `pure' salafi (pl. salafiyin) ± proponent of the pure Islam of ancestors saum ± Islamic fasting; one of the pillars of Islam seyid ± descendant of Muhammad shahada ± testimony or profession of faith; one of the five pillars of Islam shakird ± a medresse student in the Volga-Urals shaman ± a pagan priest, witchdoctor shamkhal ± the ruler of Tarku, one of the main Dagestani principalities shari'a, or shariat ± Muslim code of law shaykh ± lit. old man; a. religious figure serving at place of pilgrimage; b. Sufi, head of order shaykh-ul-Islam ± the leading authority in Islamic doctrine shaykh-zade ± a member of the Islamic elite in the Khanate of Kazan shirk ± heresy shurale ± the wood-goblin among the Volga Bulgars silsila ± chain of transmission of a particular Sufi tradition sipokh ± military nobility in the Khanate of Bukhara sotnik ± a commander of a hundred warriors under the Mongol system stanitsa ± a Cossack settlement sufi ± Muslim mystic sufism or tasawwuf ± Islamic mysticism sunnet ± lit. custom; circumcision tajdid ± renovation of Islamic creed taqlid ± lit. tradition ± Islamic traditionalism, opposite to tajdid taraqqi ± lit. progress tariqa (pl. turuq) ± lit. way or path; mystical method, hence Sufi order tariqatism ± Sufi Islam in the North Caucasus tarkhan ± a Genghizid dignitary tawhid ± monotheism taip ± a tribe among the Vaynakh (Chechens and Ingushes) temnik ± a commander of ten thousand warriors under the Mongol system

xx Glossary tiubeteika ± the skullcap of Russia's male Muslims treba ± main sacrifice ritual among eastern Slavic tribes tugra ± a special heraldic sign of the Islamicized court tukhum ± a rural commune among some peoples in the North Caucasus tysiachnik ± a commander of a thousand warriors under the Mongol system ulan ± a member of the military elite in medieval Russia ulus ± a province of the Mongol empire umma ± universal community of Islam, embracing all believers `umra ± small hajj Uraz-Bayram ± `Id al-fitr; or Little Festival, celebrating end of 30-day fast of Ramadan ustadh ± Sufi mentor (equivalent of murshid) uyezd ± an administrative unit within Russia (abolished 1929) uzden' ± a free man of common origin veche ± city assembly in Kievan Rus vezir ± chancellor in the Golden Horde vladyka ± regional Christian Orthodox authority voievoda ± military governor in medieval Russia volost (pl. volosti) ± an administrative unit within the Russian empire waqf ± religious endowment wird ± lit. the special litany given the adept by his ustadh; a subdivision of the tariqa yarlyk ± a khan's permission or decree in the Mongol empire yarmarka ± the annual trade market among Eastern European tribes yasa ± the Genghizid codex of laws yasak ± the annual tribute which was paid by provincial vassals to the Mongol khan yasakchi ± a collector of the yasak yuvari ± a member of the military aristocracy in the Mongol empire zakat ± obligatory alms among Muslims zemstvo ± municipal government in the Russian empire ziyarat ± lit. visitation; hence, Muslim holy shrine (N. Caucasus)

The Middle and Lower Volga

Perm9 Moscow

Izhevsk 1 Yoshkar-Ola 5 Cheboksary 2 4

Gor9kii Arzamas

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R Orenburg

KAZAKHSTAN

Key: 1. MARI ASSR 2. CHUVASH ASSR 3. MORDVINIAN ASSR 4. TATAR ASSR 5. UDMURT ASSR 6. BASHKIR ASSR

Astrakhan9 0

100

200

Km

Map 1

300

The Caucasus Krasnodar EI A S S R ADYG

Maikop

Stavropol9

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Cherkessk KARACHAICHERKESS AO KH AZ

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NA KH IC HE VA N

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Azer

IRAN

Baku

Central Asia RSFSR

Novosibirsk Omsk

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AZ E

N ME

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N Charjou

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Map 3

Naryn

Tashke

Fergana Valley

Jizak Samarkand Karshi

CHINA

Tokmak

K I R GI Z I A

Bukhara

Ashkhabad

100 200 300

Alma-Ata Frunze Talas

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TAJIKISTAN Tyube

AFGHANISTAN

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Leninabad UP Tyube

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The Soviet Union IA LITHU A N

Vilnius

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Map 4

0

300 Km

600

1

Russia's Encounter with Islam (622±1480)

Russia before Rus By the time Islam emerged in Arabia as a new powerful religion in the seventh century A D , the ancestors of modern Russians, or proto-Russians, were still pagans who venerated natural forces. Their pagan pantheon included Perun, the god of thunder and lightning; Svaroga, the god of the sky; Stribog, the god of the wind, and the god of the sun known under the names of Dajbog, Khors and Veles. The pagan customs which were centred on a sacrifice ritual, or a treba, constituted an integral part of their existence. Proto-Russians belonged to the eastern Slavic tribes of Poliane, Severiane, Viatichi, Radimichi, Dragovichi, Il'men and Krivichi. They populated the river banks of the Dniepr, Pripyat', Bug and Volkhov of presentday western Russia and Ukraine. They were largely sedentary people and made their living by gathering, fishing, hunting, trade and agriculture based on the slash-and-burn technique. The prominent Russian historian V. Kluchevskii, among others, believed that the formation of Russian ethnicity and later of the Russian nation occurred under the influence of four major natural factors ± les (the forest), step' (the steppe), reka (the river) and zima (the winter). Kluchevskii also argued that the enormity and boundlessness of the habitat and the short agricultural cycle due to the long and severe winter enhanced such Russian national characteristics as an expansive attitude to environment and short bursts of productivity, followed by longer periods of apathy and idleness.1 The flat landscape, lacking major water and mountain barriers, facilitated a spontaneous and gradual expansion of proto-Russians eastwards and southwards. By the eighth century A D they had settled in the river basins of the Oka, Volga (Idil') and Kama (Chulman). In the next century they occupied most of the eastern European plains and became one of the 1

2 Russia and Islam

largest ethnic groups in Eurasia. Their immediate neighbours were various nomadic and sedentary peoples of Turkic, Altaic, Finno-Ugric, Mongol, Iranian and Caucasian origins.2 The relations between protoRussians and their neighbours presented a combination of conflict and co-operation. Conflicts arose because of the claims over fertile agricultural lands and pastures, natural resources, and lucrative transcontinental trade routes. The major regional opponents of the proto-Russians were the Turkic nomads. Their raids on the Russian settlements and merchant missions seriously hindered the economic advance and political consolidation of the early Russians. On the other hand, the common natural conditions and external threats facilitated close interaction between proto-Russians, Turks and various other Eurasian peoples, which accounted for the development of similar survival and production skills, customary norms and beliefs and essential elements of social organization.3 The economy and polity of the proto-Russians developed under the impact of their more culturally and economically advanced neighbours, represented by the Turkic Khaganat, Biarmia and the Khazar Khaganat and to a lesser extent Khwarasm, Soghdiana, Sassanid Iran, Byzantium and the Arab Caliphate. The major agents of the external formative influence were proto-Russian merchants who participated in the lucrative trans-Eurasian north±south trade, known as `the Greek route' which connected Eastern Europe and Scandinavia with Constantinople and the Middle East by the Black and Mediterranean seas. According to Arab and Persian chronicles, the proto-Russians, who were called the Kuiabah, Arthaniyah, or Sakaliba, conducted regular trade trips to Baghdad and Constantinople, as well as to Derbend and Semender on the Caspian sea. They were selling slaves, wheat, honey, wax, furs, timber, lead, arrows, swords, armour, black sable and beaver-skins. Alongside `the Greek route', proto-Russians were also involved in the trade by the terrestrial `salt route' that was parallel to `the Greek route' and `the Zalozhnii route' which linked Eurasia to the Caucasus and the Middle East. The participation in the trans-Eurasian trade triggered urban development among proto-Russians who built their first towns along the trade routes. Among them were Kiev, Chernigov, Pereslavl', Polotsk, Rostov, Liubech, Novgorod and Izborsk.4 The archeological and historical sources indicate that the initial political and social organization of proto-Russians was particularly influenced by the Khazars and the Biars (Bulgars). In the mid-seventh century A D the Khazars broke away from the Turkic Khaganat (552±745) and formed their own state in the steppes between the rivers Volga and Don and the

Russia's Encounter with Islam 3

Azov sea. Its capital was the town of Itil' in the Lower Volga. By the mideighth century it had turned into a powerful military empire which occupied most of Eurasia and challenged the Byzantine and Arab Caliphate for regional supremacy. The Khazar ruling military class consisted of Turkic nomads who imposed their suzerainty and tribute on numerous sedentary peoples who were engaged in what was for the time advanced agriculture and trade. The sources reveal that the Khazars had a sophisticated fiscal and tax system. Although the Khazar rulers were largely pagan they allowed Christianity and Islam within the borders of the Khaganat. Islam arrived in the Khazar Khaganat during the Arab±Khazar wars of 708±37. By the end of the eighth century the Khazar capital, Itil', and other Khazar towns had mosques.Various medieval travelogues pointed out their religious tolerance which presented a sharp contrast to the amosphere of religious intolerance in contemporary Christian Western Europe. In many Khazar towns mosques were situated in close proximity to Christian churches and pagan shrines. The military guard of the Khagan were predominantly Muslims.5 From the seventh century, the Khazars sought domination over various proto-Russian tribes. Arab sources inform us that some protoRussian tribes, known as Kasogi, allied with the Khazars against the Arab advance in the Caucasus. Following defeat by the Arabs in 737 A D , the Khazar rulers forced some Kasogi to move to the North Caucasus in order to strengthen the Khazar defence there. In 740 A D the Khazar Khagan introduced Judaism as the official religion of the empire. This decision in favour of Judaism was to a large extent determined by the contemporary geopolitics since it provided the Khagan with the ideological counterweight in his relations with Christian Byzantium and the Islamic Arab Caliphate. There is no evidence that the confessional pluralism of the Khazar empire was seriously affected as a result of the official Judaization of the elite. The devastating defeats of the Arabs at Talas in 751 A D and Poitiers in 753 A D facilitated the Khazar expansion to the west. By the mid-eighth century, the Khazars established their rule over the southern part of the North Caucasus. However, their further expansion westwards was stopped by the Biars who controlled the Eurasian part of `the Greek trade route'. As a result, many proto-Russian tribes were drawn into a century-long conflict between the Khazar Khaganat and Biarmia.6 It is likely that Biarmia was named after its main ethnic group ± the Biars (a Turkic nomadic people) who inhabited the valley of the rivers Volga and Kama. Since the sixth century they had abandoned a nomadic way of life in favour of settlement. Like the Khazars, the Biars were

4 Russia and Islam

originally under the political control of the Turkic Khaganat. At the end of the seventh century they broke away from it and established their own state. The economic and political strength of Biarmia was largely dependent on their control over the north±south trade. The Turkic elite was pagan, although the population of Biarmia was multi-ethnic and poly-confessional. Alongside the Biars it included other Turkic peoples, such as the Bulgars, the Essengels, the Suvars, the Bersuls, the Burtas and the Barandzhers, as well as Finno-Ugric peoples, represented by the Maris, the Mordvas, the Udmurts and the Komis. Biarmia had a relatively developed urban culture. In its towns there were designated districts for foreign traders. For example, the chronicles referred to the proto-Russian trade settlements in the towns of Bulgar and Oshel on the Volga; the towns of Suvar on the river Utka and Kashen on the Kama. In the ninth century the south-western province of Biarmia, known as Volga Bulgaria, evolved into a separate state. From the twelfth century Biarmia was not mentioned any more in the chronicles.7 In the early ninth century, the Khazars overpowered the Biars and forced them into submission. The Biars lost to the Khazars their control over a substantial part of the north±south trade and began to pay tribute to the Khagan. Having subjugated Biarmia the Khazars advanced further into the Eastern European plains, largely inhabited by proto-Russian tribes. In 859, they took Kiev, one of the largest trade centres, which was traditionally dominated by the Eastern Slavic tribe of Poliane. Afterwards, the Khazars imposed their domination over Severiane, Radimichi and Viatichi. The chieftains of these tribes agreed to pay regular tribute of ermine, swords and sable skins to the Khagan and to send members of their families as hostages to the Khagan court. The merchants from these tribes were subjected to a tax of one-tenth of the value of the goods in favour of the Khagan. In return the Khazars guaranteed them military protection against plunder by nomads. As a result of the Khazar subjugation of most of the proto-Russian tribes, the borders of the Khazar Khaganat stretched from Kiev in the west to Khwarasm in the east and from Biarmia in the north to the Bosphorus in the south.8

Kievan Rus The imposition of Khazar tutelage enhanced ethnic conciousness among proto-Russians who began to seek political consolidation against external domination.9 At the end of the ninth century, this process acquired a new momentum as a result of the Varangian (Viking) invasion from the north.

Russia's Encounter with Islam 5

The advance of the Varangians from Scandinavia into the Eurasian plains was driven by the ambitions of their chieftains (kniazes) to gain control over the lucrative north±south trade. The realization of this plan clashed, however, with the interests of the Khazars and their vassals ± the protoRussians and the Biars. In 882 the Varangians under the command of Kniaz Oleg defeated the Poliane and took Kiev which they turned into the Varangian political centre and their major trade emporium in Eurasia. After this Varangian and foreign chronicles referred to Kiev as the capital of the new political formation ± Kievan Rus.10 It is believed that the founding fathers of Rus were the chieftains Sineus, Trevor, Askold and Rurik. The latter became the founder of the first political dynasty in Rus ± the Ruriks (859±1598). By the end of the ninth century, the Varangians had imposed their control on the Drevliane, Severiane, Radimichi and some other eastern Slavic tribes. Thus, the borders of Kievan Rus stretched from Lake Ladoga in the north to the Dniepr in the south, and from the Upper Western Bug in the west to the river Kliazma in the east.

The Varangian invasion remains a problematic issue in Russian history. Many Western and some Russian historians regard it as the real beginning of Russian history while others tend to view it as an important but not a pivotal event. They base their argument on the comparative analysis of the pre-Varangian and post-Varangian periods in Russian history, on the one hand, and the comparison of post-Varangian (Norman) development in Russia and in Northern Europe, on the other. This analysis reveals the continuity, although with significant modifications, of the basic socio-economic, political and cultural patterns in Russian historical evolution before and after the Varangians. It also shows more commonalities between Kievan Rus and the Khazar Khaganat, Biarmia, Volga Bulgaria, or even the Arab Caliphate, than between Kievan Rus and post-Varangian (Norman) Western Europe. Thus, the Norman invasion of England at approximately the same period caused the fusion of the Norman and Anglo-Saxon economic and political systems which resulted in centralized English feudalism.11 In the case of Russia, however, the Varangian invasion did not bring such structural changes and was suppressed by the existing social, economic and ethno-cultural system, although it created the nucleus of the elite represented by the Rurik kniazes, the court (kniazhie liudi), the guards (druzhina) and the trade nobility (boiare).12

6 Russia and Islam

The Varangian advance into the Eastern European plains, which were part of the Khazar domain, precipitated a number of wars between the Kievans and the Khazars. Relatively soon the Khazars managed to reverse the situation and to restore their supremacy over Kiev and most of Eurasia. The Kievan Kniaz and other Rurik kniazes were brought into submission to the Khagan and were forced to pay him tribute. The Ruriks were formally incorporated within the Khazar imperial hierarchy and were given the titles of Smaller Khagans compared to the Greater Khazar Khagan, based in Itil'. The establishment of the Khazar tutelage over the Varangians furthered their `Khazarization' and `nativization'. They were involved in an intensive ethno-cultural amalgamation with the local dignitaries. As before the Varangian invasion, the political power in Kievan Rus was rather a function of commercial and military success, than of land-ownership, as was the case in contemporary Western Europe. The Kievan ruling class, although of Varangian ethnic origins, absorbed the basic indigenous economic, socio-cultural and political traditions and behavioural norms, as well as rituals and court etiquette. The social hierarchy of the Kievans was vertical and characterized by rigidity. At its top was a supreme ruler, the Kievan kniaz, who had absolute sacral and secular authority. Local kniazes and other dignitaries were subordinated directly to him. They, in turn, had unlimited authority over the peasants, craftsmen and merchants who lived within their domain. Kniazes put a great value on ceremony and symbolism to underline their positions. The Kievans preserved, albeit with some modifications, the centralized tributary system which was at the core of the economic system of the Khazar empire. The local eastern Slavs paid tribute in the form of furs and money, mainly in silver dirhams which was the currency of the Arab Caliphate. The tribute was either to be brought to Kiev, or to be collected by the posadniks, the kniaz's personal representatives in particular regions. After the tribute was paid, the Kievans, like the Khazars, did not interfere in the internal life of local communities. At the centre of the ownership relations of Kievan Rus remained slaves (kholops, naimits) who cultivated the land. The development of towns continued to be determined by the north±south trade. Compared to contemporary towns in Western Europe the early towns of Kievan Rus lacked the high urban culture and traditions of urban autonomy. This, as well as the tributary-redistributary system blocked the development of economic and political autonomy in the regions of Kievan Rus. Furthermore, the prevalence of politics over economics and the submergence of the state by the autocratic ruler jeopardized the subsequent parcellization of the sovereignty and

Russia's Encounter with Islam 7

constrained the emergence of unconditional private property, as in Western Europe.13 The preservation of Khazar tutelage facilitated the ethnic and cultural pluralism of early Kievan Rus. Eastern Slavs and other peoples of Kievan Rus maintained their primary engagement with their eastern neighbours, many of whom were Muslims. Among them were the Volga Bulgars, Bukharians and other Central Asians who acquainted protoRussians and other eastern Slavs with Islam. Islam gained a foothold in Bukhara, Khwarasm and Samarkand as a result of the Arab conquest in the mid-seventh century. Most Central Asians belonged to the Hanafi madhhab (a juridical school within Sunni Islam) of Sunni Islam. From the end of the eighth century the political and social evolution of the proto-Russians was particularly influenced by the Volga Bulgars (protoBulgars), who split from Biarmia and formed a separate state ± Volga Bulgaria in Lower and Middle Volga, which still remained politically dependent on the Khazar Khaganat. Volga Bulgars were Turkic people ethnically and culturally close to the Khazars. Like its predecessor Khazaria, Volga Bulgaria presented a multi-ethnic and poly-confessional state formation. The largest ethnic groups were of Turkic and FinnoUgric origins. Relations between Kievan Rus and Volga Bulgaria were shaped by their common opposition to Khazar supremacy, on the one hand, and their increasing competition for economic and political domination in western Eurasia, especially the north±south trade, on the other. Henceforce, the Bulgar and, subsequently, Tatar factors were central to the development of proto-Russia. In 922 A D , the Bulgar ruler Almas Shilki proclaimed Sunni Islam of the Hanafi madhhab as the official religion of Volga Bulgaria. The formal conversion to Islam occurred during the legendary visit of Ibn Fadlan, the ambassador of the Abbasid Caliph Muqtadir (908±32) to Volga Bulgaria. It sought to cement the alliance between the Volga Bulgars and the Abbasids which substantially strengthened the positions of the Bulgars against the Judaistic Khazars and pagan Kievans. On the other hand, the choice in favour of the Hanafi madhhab was made under the strong influence of existing commercial and diplomatic links between the Volga Bulgars and predominantly Hanafi Muslim Central Asia. It is significant that the Bulgar elite refused to follow the Abbasid version of Islamic public rites and insisted on sticking to more familiar Islamic practices which resembled those in Central Asia. Some researchers interpret this fact as a sign of political wisdom and substantial ideological independence of the rulers of Volga Bulgaria. The official Islamicization of Volga Bulgaria occurred against the background of the

8 Russia and Islam

earlier spontaneous proliferation of Islam in the region. By the end of the tenth century, Volga Bulgaria and its capital Biliar, in particular, had become one of the renowned centres of Islamic learning and scholarship. It had a wide Islamic educational network represented by mektebs and medresses (the Islamic primary and secondary schools). Its ulema (Islamic scholars) were in the vanguard of Islamic creative thinking, promoting a tajdid (renovation of the Islamic creed) and ijtihad (critical theological judgement).14 The Islamicization of Volga Bulgaria had important political and cultural implications for Kievan Rus, and subsequently for Russia. The rivalry between the originally pagan Kievan rulers and their Islamicized Bulgar and Judaist Khazar conterparts influenced Kiev's decision in favour of official conversion to Greek Orthodoxy. According to chronicles, the Kievan elite had a lengthy period of hesitation over the choice of future religion for their subjects. They invited to Kiev Orthodox, Islamic and Judaist clerics who explained the basics of their religions. Interestingly, in 986 Volga Bulgar delegates to Kiev merely succeeded in turning Kievan Kniaz Vladimir towards Islam. The distinguished Russian scholar V. Bartol'd argued that Kievan Rus very nearly became an Islamic country and avoided it only by pure accident.15 In 988 Kievan Kniaz Vladimir proclaimed Orthodox Christianity as the state religion of Kievan Rus. Nevertheless, right up to the present day Russian historians and philosophers have questioned the correctness of the Christian Orthodox option for Russia and have expounded on the allegedly lost benefits had Russia been Islamicized.16 It is worth noting that other peoples of Eurasia showed similar hesitation between Orthodox Christianity and Islam. For example, the Pechenegs and Karluks chose Islam, while Alans and Polovtsy (Kipchaks) preferred Orthodoxy. Kniaz Vladimir believed that the introduction of Orthodox Christianity would secure Byzantine support for Kievan Rus against its powerful regional rivals ± the Islamicized Volga Bulgaria and Judaistic Khazar Khaganat. In 907 Kiev and Constantinople signed a treaty on mutual military assistance in the case of their involvement in a war with a third party. The treaty strengthened the regional status of Kievan Rus. In 965 the Kievans, who were supported by Byzantium, defeated the Khazars and destroyed their capital, Itil'. Kiev's victory triggered the disintegration and eventual collapse of the Khazar Empire. Some members of the Khazar elite pledged their allegiance to the Kievan Kniaz and were accepted into the Kievan court. Special Khazar military units were formed within the Kievan troops, lasting until the twelfth century. Those Khazar dignitaries and military who refused to submit to Kievan

Russia's Encounter with Islam 9

rule fled either to present-day Hungary, or to the Caucasus and Crimea, where they were subjected to assimilation and Islamicization. The largest Khazar enclave remained in the city of Derbend in the North Caucasus. For two centuries after the Kievan victory, Khazar quarters continued to exist in Kiev and some other towns of Kievan Rus.17 The demise of the Khazar Khaganat marked the beginning of the independent political existence of Kievan Rus. Nevertheless, in the following two centuries, its development was largely determined by the Khazar legacy. Thus, the Rus kniazes continued to hold parallel titles of khagans, or white khagans. Their military organization followed the Khazar patterns and the tributary system remained the economic basis of Kievan Rus. In spite of official Christianization the Rus kniazes for quite a long period afterwards continued to appeal simultaneously to Jesus Christ and to Perun and other pagan gods in their political and social practices. At the same time the institutionalization of Orthodox Christianity introduced a new Byzantine dimension into the development of Rus and strengthened its distinctiveness from the Khazar and Bulgar patterns, on the one hand, and from Western Europe, on the other. Orthodox Christianity enabled the Rus kniazes to present themselves as perpetuators of the Byzantine imperial and spiritual traditions which sacralized the secular authority and sanctioned its supremacy over the law. This resulted in the merger between the Christian Orthodox Church and secular authority whereas in Western Europe the Church competed with it.18 Subsequently, the religious and cultural difference between Russia and Western Europe, which since the eleventh century developed predominantly within the Catholic context, was codified through the adoption of different alphabets (Cyrillic and Latin respectively), written languages and literary norms. Significantly, this divergence of political patterns and high cultures of Rus and Western Europe occurred against the background of the continuity of the grassroots eastern social and cultural traditions of Rus. It could be argued therefore that the Varangian invasion, in spite of its undoubted significance, did not interfere with the existing Eurasian dimension of the political and cultural evolution of proto-Russians who together with other sedentary and nomadic peoples of Eurasia constituted an integral part of its ecological and social system. Within this system Rus's contacts with its Eurasian neighbours, many of whom were Islamicized, and Byzantium had priority over its relations with Western Europe. The Western direction of the Rus was mainly confined to their involvement in the north±south trade and the sporadic political contacts of the kniazes of Novgorod and Pskov with their Scandinavian and Western European counterparts.19 Since initially Christianization in

10 Russia and Islam

Kievan Rus was predominantly an elitist phenomenon, it coexisted with the continuing paganism, or the religious syncretism of ordinary people. The ordinary Rus therefore did not share the Crusade mentality against Muslims, which was characteristic of the contemporary Western European public. Also, compared to Byzantium the Christian Orthodox religiosity among ordinary Rus did not acquire a dogmatic form and absorbed various pre-Christian beliefs. As a result, there emerged a popular Orthodox Christianity which had some common features with popular beliefs of other peoples of Eurasia, including Muslims. On the whole, the adoption of Orthodox Christianity symbolized the divergence of political traditions of Rus and its Islamic neighbours, Volga Bulgaria, in particular, while it did not significantly change the existing patterns of relations between ordinary peoples. The main reason for this was the considerable autonomy of the local societies from their respective states embodied in their autocratic rulers, the persistence of common pagan and customary practices and the flexibility and tolerance of the Hanafi madhhab of the Volga Bulgars. On a popular level Rus and Volga Bulgars shared similar beliefs in the woodgoblin (shurale / leshii), the house-spirit (bichura / domovoi) and the spirit of a dead relative which, allegedly, returned on a particular day after the death.20 The Rus and Bulgar folk festivals also had a lot in common because they originated from common pagan practices based on the agricultural cycle. Among such similar festivals was, for example, a celebration of the arrival of spring which was known as the maslenitsa among the Rus, and sabantuy among the Bulgars (later Tatars). The other Rus popular festival, the igrishe, was very similar to the Bulgar festival, the djien. Both were accompanied by an international trade fair (a yarmarka), games and various other entertainments which were part of ancient traditions of annual trade and cultural gatherings of various peoples of Eurasia and the Islamic East. Among them were people of Slavic, Turkic and Finno-Ugric origins who professed paganism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and other religious beliefs. The impact of these traditional gatherings can still be traced in some similarities of dress design, cuisine, games and entertainment of different peoples of Eurasia.21 On the official level, Kievan Rus's liberation from the Khazar suzerainty and its Christianization introduced significant changes into the policies and attitudes of Rus rulers towards Volga Bulgaria and various Turkic nomadic peoples, primarily the Pechenegs and Polovtsy. The liquidation of the common Khazar threat strengthened the rivalry between Kievans and Volga Bulgars over economic and political domination in western

Russia's Encounter with Islam 11

Eurasia and over the lucrative north±south trade, in particular. Like Kievan Rus, Volga Bulgaria broke away from Khazar dependency in 969. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Volga Bulgars had considerable economic and cultural superiority over the Kievans. Their economy was based on transcontinental trade, agriculture, cattle breeding, hunting, fishing and various crafts. In the tenth century, that is, much earlier than the Rus, the Bulgars acquired their own metal currency ± silver dirhams which were modelled on Arab dirhams. The dirhams were used parallel with squirrel, marten and fox fur which were the main money equivalent among the Rus. Bulgar potters, blacksmiths, coppersmiths, carpenters, stonemasons, jewellers and builders were highly valued in Kievan Rus, the Caucasus and Central Asia. A distinctive Bulgar technology of fur and leather processing, known as bulgari, was recognized internationally. In the period between the tenth and thirteenth centuries the activity of Bulgar merchants transcended Eurasia: they supplied Western Europe with silver, cast-iron, various metals and mammoth bone.22 The economic development of the Rus was less impressive. Its ruling class was dominated by military chieftains who regarded a military campaign against the neighbouring states as a major source of enrichment and were less keen on various forms of productive economic activity. The Rus trade nobility (boiare) were inert and idle. The slaves remained at the centre of economic relations in Kievan Rus while the bulk of ordinary Rus were involved in hunting, fishing, gathering and primitive agriculture. From the end of the tenth century, Rus and Volga Bulgaria were engaged in a sequence of wars which were often initiated by the more militarily accomplished Rus rulers. This sequence was briefly interrupted in 984 when Kievan and Bulgar rulers signed a peace treaty, which did not in fact last very long. Yet another attempt to establish peaceful relations between the two states was made in 1006. Then both sides agreed to refrain from aggression against each other and to develop trade relations on the basis of mutual trade privileges. That treaty ensured relative peace between Rus and Volga Bulgaria during the eleventh century. This lengthy peaceful period enhanced the political and economic development of both states. However, in the twelfth century, warfare resumed. The Rus troops raided the territory of Volga Bulgaria in 1120, 1160, 1164, 1172, 1183, 1186 and 1220 while the Bulgars attacked the Rus in 1209 and 1219.23 According to various historical sources, the wars between Volga Bulgaria and Rus did not take the form of religious or ethnic conflicts but were defined by purely economic and political goals. Moreover, the armies on both sides often included the representatives of opposing

12 Russia and Islam

adverse ethnic or religious groups. Thus, there were cases when the Rus allied with some of the Turkic nomads, such as the Kipchaks (Polovtsy) against the Turks of Volga Bulgaria. It is also significant that the endless wars and different official religions did not prevent frequent intermarriage between representatives of the Rus and Bulgar elites. For example, the second wife of Kniaz Andrei Bogolubskii (d. 1174) came from Volga Bulgaria. Various Rus dignitaries from the cities of Vladimir and Suzdal regularly invited Bulgar stonemasons and carpenters to build public and private buildings there. Buildings constructed in the Bulgar white stone, with Bulgar arabesques and embossed pictures, were particularly valued by the Rus nobility. At the grassroots level, relations between the Rus and Bulgars were free of enmity or religious hatred and were shaped by common natural problems. There were numerous cases of Rus±Bulgar mutual assistance. For example, the chronicles refer to Bulgar assistance to the Rus during the severe famine of 1228±29, when the Volga Bulgars shipped large quatities of cereals to the starving Rus of Novgorod and Belozersk.24 Another important factor of early Rus was its interaction with various Turkic nomadic peoples who after the demise of the Khazar Khaganat intensified their raids into western Eurasia. At that time, peoples perceived plundering raids against their neigbours as the main source of their existence. The nomads were not unified and often changed their alliances against, or in favour of, Rus. There were periods when some of them supported Kievan and other Rus kniazes against their Turkic adversaries. From the tenth century various Rus principalities suffered particularly badly from the raids of Pechenegs who seized the southern provinces of the Khazar Khaganat. The Kievans and the Pechenegs disputed control over the steppes south of the present-day Ukrainian city of Khar'kov and the middle and lower reaches of the commercial artery of the Dniepr. The devastating nomadic raids hindered the economic advance of Rus and aggravated its stagnation. On the other hand, relations between individual Rus principalities and particular Turkic nomads were ambivalent and subject to the power balance in the region. Thus, in 915 a large group of Pechenegs made peace with the Rus and were granted permission to serve in the Rus guard and to settle within the domain of Kniaz Galitskii. A century later, a few more Pecheneg tribes appealed for Rus suzerainty. The kniazes of Kiev, Chernigov and Riazan agreed to create cultural-territorial autonomies for Pechenegs within their domain. Some other nomads abandoned their raiding practices because of the switch from nomadism to a settled way of life; some of them accepted the tutelage of various Rus kniazes.25

Russia's Encounter with Islam 13

In 1036, the Kievan kniaz inflicted a devastating defeat on the Pechenegs from which they never recovered. Those who survived fled to Byzantium and what is now known as Moldova, their present-day descendants there being known as the Gagauz. Having crushed the Pechenegs, the Rus were faced with a new threat from some other Turkic nomads ± the Polovtsy. Most of the eleventh century was dominated by wars between the Rus and the Polovtsy. However, like the Pechenegs, the Polovtsy lacked political unity and were prepared to change their alliances in pursuit of material and political gain. Thus, at the beginning of the twelfth century some Polovtsy tribes accepted Rus tutelage and allied with Rus kniazes against their own kin. They made up the core of the nomadic confederation of Black Klobuk which aligned itself with Rus. The Rus chronicles referred to them as Berendeis. In spite of conflict, the Rus and various nomadic Turks treated each other as members of the same geographical and cultural entity. They shared similar customs, ethics, behavioural norms and attitudes. Intermarriage was relatively common among both the elites and ordinary people. Significantly, different religious persuasions did not seem to be an obstacle to their relations. Quite a few Polovtsian dignitaries, who were Muslim, married into the Rus Orthodox elite. For example, Kniaz Mstislav Udaloi of Galitsia was married to the daughter of the Polovtsian khan Kotian.26 By the mid-eleventh century, the Rus rulers gained the upper hand in their confrontation with the nomads. They asserted their domination over most Pechenegs, Polovtsy and other nomadic peoples of western Eurasia. As a result, the borders of Kievan Rus shifted significantly eastwards and southwards. The territorial expansion of Rus had several major implications. It strengthened the Eurasian dimension of the Rus polity and society. An integral part of this process was further `nativization' of the Rus elite. The Kniaz's court and druzhina, which originally consisted largely of Varangians, also included Slavs, as well as Khazars, Polovtsy, Jews and other indigenous peoples. In dynastic terms Kievan Kniaz Yaroslav (1019±54) was the last pure Varangian.27 After him, Kievan and other Rus kniazes represented wealthy local merchant families. The cultural assimilation of the Varangians by the indigenous Slav, Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples could be traced, for example, in the weaker linguistic impact of the Varangians on the Russian language compared to the influence of various Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples. The eastward shift of the Rus' borders also weakened the central role of Kiev, which was located on the western frontiers of Rus, in favour of the more eastern Rus principalities. Kiev's authority became increasingly challenged by the cities of Vladimir, Suzdal', and later Rostov, Murom, Riazan' and Moscow.28

14 Russia and Islam

The eastern expansion of the Rus principalities allowed the Rus to remain economically and politically engaged with the North Caucasus and other former provinces of the Khazar Khaganat. Historically, due to their geopolitical position between Asia and Europe, the North Caucasus experienced political and cultural influences from foreign powers. Its territory was contested by the Iranians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Goths, the Arabs, the Mongols, the Jews and the Ottomans. In the sixth century A D the western part of the region was under Byzantine rule; between the seventh and tenth centuries the North Caucasus was incorporated into the Khazar Khaganat. The region was also subjected to intensive trade colonization by Venice and Genoa which founded there the trading colonies of Matrega, Kopa, Mapa and Anapa. In the later period, it was invaded by the Mongols and incorporated within the Golden Horde. At the end of the fourteenth century, the North Caucasus was conquered by Timur (Tamerlane, 1370±1405), who included it within his vast Central Asian empire.29 The mountainous landscape of the region determined the lifestyle, economic activity and beliefs of the local population. The scarcity of arable land accounted for its extreme value and for numerous conflicts and disputes between various tribes and clans for control over it. Various landless mountain peoples regularly raided the more prosperous lowlanders, although mutual raids between the highlanders were also quite common. The raiders plundered their neighbours and took hostages whom they subsequently returned for ransom. The Caucasians were natural warriors and horsemen and spent a substantial part of their time in fighting. Their life was regulated by the institution of vendetta, the code of Caucasian honour and the adat (customary norms). In ethnic terms, the North Caucasians belonged to Iranian, Caucasian and Turkic ethno-linguistic groups. The most numerous peoples of Iranian origin were the Ossetians, or the Alans, who had the most ancient statehood tradition and claimed their direct descent from the great Scythian and Sarmatian Hordes. Among other indigenous peoples of Iranian origin were the Tats, the Talishes and the Kurds. The peoples of Caucasian ethnic origin belonged to two distinct groups: the western Caucasians, or Abkhaz-Adyghs, and the eastern Caucasians, or Nakh-Dagestanis. The first group comprised various Abkhaz and Adygh peoples, including the Adyghs, or the Circassians, the Kabardins, the Cherkess, the Abazins, the Abadzekhs, the Ubukhs, the Bzhadugs, the Nabukhays and the Shapsugs. The second group was represented by the Chechens, the Ingushes, the Avars, the Andis, the Tsez, the Lezgins, the Dargins and the Batsbiis. The Turkic peoples of the region were the Karachays, the Balkars, the

Russia's Encounter with Islam 15

Nogays and the Kumyks. Despite their extraordinary ethnic diversity all Caucasians belonged to a distinct Caucasian culture which was a synthesis of indigenous and external cultural influences.30 The peoples of the region were characterized by different levels of political development. Some of them, like the Ossetians, the Kabardins, the Avars, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Tabasarans and the Nogays had an ancient statehood tradition and formed various principalities under feudal rulers ± khans, beks, and so on ± while the Chechens, the Ingushes, the Balkars, the Karachays and the Kumyks did not have such traditions. In religious terms the region was also extremely diverse. Christianity reached the pagan North Caucasus in the fourth century A D , followed by Judaism and Islam. Islam began to spread in southern Dagestan among the Lezgins in the late seventh century A D . By the mid-eighth century the bulk of Laks were converted to Islam by the Arab invaders. By the fifteenth±sixteenth centuries most Dagestanis professed Shafii madhhab of Sunni Islam. The proliferation of Islam in Dagestan was accompanied by its merger with pre-Islamic pagan traditions and adat norms. The commercial and political links between various Rus and Caucasian principalities, were enhanced by the existence of Rus trade settlements in the Caucasus. The Rus elite hoped to use these settlements as a springboard for further Rus expansion in the region. In the tenth and eleventh centuries Rus kniazes made several attempts to create their strongholds in the eastern Caucasus by supporting one or other of the conflicting sides in local feuds. They were especially interested in the establishment of Rus control over Derbend, Shirvan and Ardabil which were the major regional political and Islamic centres. In 987 the Rus responded to the call from emir Maimun of Derbend for assistance against his local rivals (the raises) and dispatched 18 ships to the Caspian sea which assisted the emir's storming of Derbend from the sea. On several other occasions, Rus rulers supported the Muslims of southern Dagestan, the Alans and Lezgins, in particular, against the Deylemite expansion in the southern Caspian.31 In general, the policy of the Rus kniazes in the Caucasus lacked consistency and was strongly dependent on the position of Byzantium, which until 1453 remained the spiritual patron of Kievan Rus. Its influence accounted, for example, for the Kievans' alliance with the Christian Armenians who were allies of Byzantium against the Muslim Azeris.32 Alongside the Caucasus, the Rus maintained their trade connections with Central Asia, and in particular with Khwarasm, which had established commercial links with Volga Bulgaria. Khwarasm was a powerful citystate, which had existed since the seventh century B C in the Lower Amu

16 Russia and Islam

Darya. It was a centre of sophisticated irrigated agriculture, trade and handicrafts. In 712 A D Khwarasm was conquered by the Arabs and Islamicized. Khwarasmian merchants brought to the Rus principalities silk, pearls, gold, silver, pepper, musk, glass, china and jewellery. In the opposite direction went flax, honey, fish, leather, wood and swords.33

The Mongol period In the 1230s, the independent development of Rus which had lasted for two centuries was again interrupted as a result of the Mongol invasion from the east. By that time, the Mongol troops under the command of Genghiz-khan (1206±27) had already conquered Korea, China, Central Asia, Iran, the western Caspian, eastern Caucasus and southern Volga. In 1223, the Volga Bulgars repulsed Mongol aggression and maintained their independence until 1237 when they were finally defeated by the Mongol Khan Batu (1236±55), the grandson of Genghiz-khan. Following this defeat, Volga Bulgaria disintegrated into a number of quasi-state formations such as Bulgar, Zhukotin, Shongut and Narovchatsk which were headed by various members of the former ruling dynasty. Many members of the Bulgar ruling class joined the Genghizid court which already included Khwarasmian, Iranian, Uyghur and Chinese dignitaries. However, another faction of the Bulgar elite migrated to the area between the rivers Volga and Viatka where they formed a new state formation which became the nucleus of the future Kazan Khanate.34 In 1237±38, the troops of the Mongol Khan Batu invaded Riazan', Vladimir, Suzdal' and Moscow. In 1240, the Genghizids took Kiev and came to the borders of modern Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria. Only Novgorod, Pskov and the adjacent territories of northern Eurasia escaped the Mongol conquest. By the mid-thirteenth century the Genghizid empire embraced almost all Eurasia and turned into one of the largest state formations of the Middle Ages. Its political centre was in Karakoram. Rus, Volga Bulgaria and some other state formations of western Eurasia were included in the Juchi province (the Ulus Juchi) of the empire. It consisted of three main regions: the Kok Urda (the Blue Horde) consisted of the territories of present-day Kazakhstan and southern Siberia, the Nogay Horde comprised the North Caucasus and the White, or the Altyn Urda (the Golden Horde) which included various Rus principalities, Volga Bulgaria and some other western provinces. Interestingly, the Genghizids themselves applied to the Rus the term Tatar which seems to be a generic Mongol name for various western Eurasian peoples. Like the rest of the Genghizid empire, the Golden Horde was a

Russia's Encounter with Islam 17

nomadic state formation which was held together by the Mongol military hierarchy headed by the Khan, surrounded by the Mongol oglans (the free warriors). The Khan was supreme owner of the land and the commanderin-chief. The middle level of the imperial hierarchy was made up of culturally more sophisticated indigenous elites represented by sultans, emirs, beks, murzas and yuvaris (members of the military aristocracy). The majority of them were local Islamic dignitaries who were incorporated within the Genghizid ruling class. Of particular influence were the Bulgars, Khwarasmians, Iranians and other Islamicized peoples of Turkic and Iranian origins. As a result of the extensive territorial expansion and the massive co-option of the local elites into the ruling class, the Mongol nomads soon turned into a privileged minority.35 The Genghizids introduced different forms of administration in various parts of their vast Eurasian empire. Some were subjected to direct Genghizid rule which implied the stationing of Genghizid garrisons there. As for the Rus, they were ruled indirectly, on the basis of the annual yasak (tribute). The tribute relations between the Mongol Khan and a particular Rus kniaz were confirmed by the yarlyk (the Khan's permission). The yarlyk enabled a kniaz to rule in his traditional domain on behalf of the Khan in exchange for the fixed yasak. The first Rus kniaz who in 1243 received the Mongol yarlyk and undertook to pay yasak to the Khan was the Kniaz of Yaroslavl'. Originally the yasak comprised one-tenth of the crops; the duties for the use of the public meadows, main roads, river-crossings; the trade taxes; subsistence for the yasak collectors and the dispatch of recruits for the Genghizid army in case of war. Yasak was collected by special officials ± yasakchis, baskaks, or bessermens who were accompanied by the military ± desiatniks (commanders of ten men), sotniks (commanders of a hundred), tysiachniks (commanders of a thousand) and temniks (commanders of ten thousand). If a kniaz disobeyed, or was not accurate with yasak payments, he was subject to punishment and his domain was raided by the Genghizids. Then the cities and towns were destroyed, and hundreds of peoples were taken prisoner and turned into slaves.36 The Mongols did not occupy the Rus land and did not interfere in local administrative, economic and religious practices. They recognized the exclusive rights of the Varangian dynasty of Rurik to govern Rus. The north±south trade, which was crucial to the economy of various Rus principalities, persisted under the Mongol rule. Furthermore, the incorporation of almost all Eurasia within the Genghizid empire and the consequent relative political stability within its borders, as well as the greater security on the roads, stimulated commercial activity

18 Russia and Islam

all over the continent. As a result, the east±west trade along the traditional Great Silk Road received a new impetus. The Genghizids entrusted control over the borders of the subjugated Rus principalities to the Cossacks, who presented a distictinctive ethno-cultural group of professional warriors.37 Since the eleventh century the Cossacks had inhabited the Great Steppe and the border areas of Rus. They lived in rural militarized communities ± the stanitsas ± headed by chieftains ± the atamans ± (literally, fathers of thousands), who were elected by the Assembly. Life in the stanitsas was regulated by the norms of military democracy and customary law. The Genghizids exempted the Cossacks from the yasak in recognition of their service as border guards of the empire. Moreover, the Cossacks were entitled to a fixed share of the yasak paid by Rus kniazes to the Khan.38 The Golden Horde, like its predecessor the Khazar Khaganat, was a poly-ethnic and multicultural empire with a single codex of laws (yasa) for every resident and a sophisticated administrative, fiscal and mail system. Although Genghiz-khan and his immediate successor were pagan, the yasa of Genghiz-khan guaranteed equal status to all religions and beliefs and exempted all clergy from taxation. The successive Genghizid khans differed in their religious preferences. Some of them favoured Islam, while others preferred various forms of Eastern Christianity. For example, during the rule of Khan Guyuk (1246±49) the majority of the Genghizid administration were Christian Orthodox and Nestorian believers. The fourth khan of the Golden Horde, Khan Berke (1257±66) converted to Islam and recognized the spiritual supremacy of the Baghdad Caliph. An important role in Khan Berke's conversion belonged to the Sufi shaykh Sayf ad-Din Bakharzi from the tariqa (Sufi order) of Kubrawiyya in Bukhara. However, the successors of Berke-khan returned to paganism. Only under the rule of the powerful Khan Uzbek (1312±42) did the Sunni Islam of Hanafi madhhab become the official religion of the empire. Official Islamicization of the Golden Horde enhanced the formation of an Islamic stratum represented by seyids, shaykhs, imams, mullahs, hafizes, hajjis and dervishes. It was accompanied by differential treatment between Muslims and non-Muslims of the empire. As a result, the Muslims of the Volga-Urals, Caucasus and Central Asia acquired advantageous positions in the political and administrative spheres.39 The reign of Uzbek-khan was the heyday of the Golden Horde. Uzbekkhan strengthened central power and standardized the administrative and economic structures within the empire. He created an effective central apparatus which consisted of a chancellor (vezir) and four emirs representing the major Mongol tribes ± Qiyat, Manghyt, Sicivut and

Russia's Encounter with Islam 19

Qongrat. A vezir had the power to resolve issues without consulting the emirs and he often managed the state in the absence of the Khan, who spent most of his time roaming the steppes of the north Caucasus and between the Caspian and Azov seas. Uzbek-khan unified the monetary and weight systems and withdrew the right of some of his vassals to mint their distinctive coins. He introduced a single currency called pools, the minting of which occurred in Bolgar, Mukha and some other cities of the Golden Horde. These reforms boosted the trade activity all over the empire, especially in its Muslim provinces, and facilitated the development of the urban culture there. Uzbek-khan was also concerned with developing contacts with the outside world. He sent diplomatic missions to many neighbouring countries and promoted dynastic intermarriage. It is significant that the Islamic religion of the Genghizids was not regarded as an obstacle to their marriages with the Christian Orthodox. Thus, one of Uzbek-khan's sons was married to a daughter of the Byzantine Emperor Andronik Paleologus, whereas his sister became a wife of the great kniaz of Moscow.40 The institutionalization of Islam as the state religion of the Golden Horde completed the cultural and spiritual yielding of the Mongol elite to their Islamicized sedentary Turkic subjects, primarily the Volga Bulgars. From the mid-fourteenth century until the demise of the Golden Horde in 1437 the Volga Bulgar elite dominated the cultural and Islamic discourse of the empire. Its cultural centre shifted from the Middle to the Lower Volga. There the city of Bolgar emerged as the new centre of the Bulgar principality and of Islamic learning and scholarship. The prosperity of Bolgar was facilitated by its advantageous location near the influx of the Kama into the Volga where a big trade fair, the Aga-Bazaar, took place. Bolgar Muslim scholars (ulema) were influenced by the ideas of such great medieval Islamic thinkers as al-Ghazzali (eleventh century), al-Maarri (eleventh century), Omar an-Nasafi (twelfth century), Ibn Taimiia (fourteenth century) and Saad ad-Din atTahtazani (fourteenth century) and were noted for their creative and critical thinking. Adherence to the tajdid (renovation) tradition enabled the Kazan ulema to play down dogmatic differences and to emphasize the moral and social values of religion. It is indicative that the official canonization of the rulings of the main schools of Islamic law (Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki and Hanbali), which by the eleventh century was accomplished in the rest of the Islamic world, did not take place in the Golden Horde. There the major political and religious task was not so much to affirm the true faith, but to achieve the peace, order and economic prosperity of the empire.41

20 Russia and Islam

One of the most important consequences of the tajdid approach and the politicization of Islam in the Golden Horde was the Genghizid state policy of religious tolerance, which contrasted with prevailing policies in contemporary Western Europe. In the Golden Horde different viewpoints were allowed provided that they were not imposed upon people and that any conflicts over them did not lead to social disintegration. This was manifested in Islam's attitude both to other religions and to differences within Islam. The Genghizids did not regard those differences as a real threat to their hegemony or to social order. In the capital of the Golden Horde there were ulema and followers of the Shafii and Maliki madhhabs and various Sufi communities. Turkic cultural influence and the adoption of Islam did not threaten the nomadic lifestyle which formed the basis of the Golden Horde's military capability. As a result, religion did not become a dividing factor in the Genghizid empire, which as a consequence was practically spared religious wars.42 The official status of the Islamic religion in the Golden Horde did not undermine the positions of other religions and beliefs ± Christian Orthodoxy, Buddhism, Shamanism, Tengrianism and paganism. Regardless of their personal likes and dislikes, the Khans of the Golden Horde kept the representatives of various religions and beliefs at an equal distance from themselves. There were no official restrictions on proselytizing non-Islamic religions, although this did not prevent occasional conflicts between representatives of different religious creeds. The Genghizids did not penalize those dignitaries who refused to convert to Islam and preferred to move to the courts of its non-Muslim vassals. From the second half of the fourteenth century a considerable number of the Mongol nobles converted to Christian Orthodoxy and joined the Rus elite. In 1267 Khan Mengu-Timur exempted priests, monks and laymen associated with the Church from taxation and military conscription. The Russian Orthodox Church was given a preferential legal status. In 1313 Khan Uzbek issued the yarlyk which prohibited any anti-Orthodox propaganda and activities and envisaged capital punishment for anyone, Muslim and pagan alike, insulting the Orthodox Church and its affairs. This allowed the Church to strengthen its economic and political positions in Rus. Under Genghizid rule the Orthodox monasteries turned into Rus's biggest landowners. The most powerful among them was Troitskii monastery, which was founded in 1339 in Radonezh, not far from Moscow. State protection enhanced the promotion of the Christian Orthodox religion and culture, represented by ancient icons, books, manuscripts and precious church utensils.43

Russia's Encounter with Islam 21

Relations between the Mongol khans and the Rus kniazes were ambivalent and featured wars, conflicts, distrust and betrayal, as well as partnership, mutual assistance and intermarriage. The Genghizid and Rus elites borrowed from each other's economic, administrative and military practices, as well as from court etiquette, dress and cuisine. During the period between 1228 and 1462 the Rus were involved in more than ninety internecine conflicts as well as over one hundred and sixty conflicts with the Genghizids.44 The Genghizids' punitive raids devastated many Rus towns and cities and hindered the development of handicraft production. Many Rus craftsmen and artisans were either killed or deported to the Genghizid capital Saray-Batu, and later to Saray-Berke. On the other hand, the rivalry and enmity between various Rus kniazes often outweighed their common opposition to Mongol rule. In the early Genghizid period some Rus kniazes regularly sought the Khan's assistance against their Rus opponents, or sided with one Genghizid faction against another during Genghizid fratricidal conflicts. In 1299 Kniaz Andrei, the son of the renowned Rus Kniaz Alexander Nevskii, allied with Khan Toktamysh against Khan Nogay. In 1382 the Kniaz of Tver', who had had a lengthy feud with the Kniaz of Moscow, backed Khan Toktamysh's attack on Moscow. Furthermore, there were cases when some Rus kniazes who escaped Mongol tutelage sought rapprochement with the Genghizids against Western European invaders into Rus lands. Thus, Kniaz Alexander Nevskii of Novgorod (1220±63) forged an alliance with the Genghizids against the Swedish and German invaders from the west. Subsequently, he was canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church. Similarly, in 1274 the Kniaz of Smolensk appealed to the Khan for assistance against the Lithuanians.45 The Genghizids, in accordance with their divide and rule approach, exploited the rivalries between regional Rus rulers. They divided the Rus lands into four large principalities ± kniazhestvos ± with their centres in Moscow, Nizhnii Novgorod, Tver and Riazan'. The kniazes of these four principalities were recognized as great (velikii) kniazes compared to the rest, who had inferior status and were regarded as provincial (udel'nii) kniazes. Great kniazes were entrusted with the collection of yasak on behalf of the khan. Genghizid administrative policies promoted some Rus regional rulers and curtailed the power of others. Thus, Uzbek-khan favoured Kniaz Ivan Kalita of Moscow (d. 1340) over the rest of the Rus kniazes and contributed to his fast elevation and eventual victory over his powerful rival ± the Kniaz of Suzdal'. In 1328 the Genghizids made Ivan Kalita the Great Kniaz of the whole of Rus and put him in charge of the collection of yasak from all Rus principalities. From that time, chronicles

22 Russia and Islam

referred to Moscow as the capital of Rus. In 1326, in order to strengthen the ideological power of Moscow, Ivan Kalita transferred the residence of the Metropolitan of Rus from the city of Vladimir to Moscow.46 After the rule of Uzbek-khan and his two successors, Dzanu-bek and Berdi-bek, the Golden Horde entered a period of gradual decline which occurred as a result both of the bubonic plague which swept across the region in waves from 1346 until 1396, and the power struggle within the ruling elite. The Black Death caused large-scale depopulation, massive migrations, cultural and technological regression and political instability. The decline of the Golden Horde made it more vulnerable to external threats and enhanced ethno-regional separatism within the empire. In 1354, the Ottoman Turks established their control over the Dardanelles and severed the links between the Golden Horde and the Islamic mainland. However, the Genghizid dignitaries remained aloof from these regional changes and were more concerned with internal jockeying for the Khan's position. Between 1360 and 1380 the Golden Horde was ruled by 14 successive khans. The eastern Genghizids began to challenge the supremacy of the khans of the Golden Horde over Rus, Volga Bulgaria and other provinces of western Eurasia. In the 1390s Khan Timur (Tamerlane) of Samarkand in Central Asia conducted a number of devastating raids in the lands of the Golden Horde. By the 1370s almost all the western part of the Genghizid empire was engaged in mutual warfare.The inability of the Mongol khans to safeguard their Slavic and Turkic vassals from external invasions encouraged the proindependence drive of the latter. By the 1420s the Golden Horde had split into the Great Horde, situated upon the ruins of Saray, the eastern part, comprising the Nogay Horde and Siberian khanate, and the western part consisting of the Astrakhan, Crimean and Kazan khanates and various Rus principalities.47 The Kazan princedom emerged in 1402 as a result of the mass migration of Volga Bulgars to the north beyond the Kama and Viatka rivers and towards the lower reaches of the rivers Sviaga, Miesha and Kazanka. Its first ruler was Alibek, the son of the last Volga Bulgar Khan. Nominally, he recognized the supremacy of the Golden Horde and was obliged to pay a yasak. However, in reality, the Kazan princedom enjoyed considerable independence from Saray. By the 1430s the Kazan khanate had turned into a powerful state comprising half the territory of former Bulgaria. Its khans stopped paying a yasak and introduced their own money. In 1445 Saray attempted to return Kazan province to its control. It succeeded in placing the representative of the Genghizid dynasty on the Kazan throne and declared the Kazan Khanate (1445±1552) the

Russia's Encounter with Islam 23

successor to the Golden Horde. The political and economic organization of the Khanate of Kazan was modelled on that of the Golden Horde while in cultural and ethnic terms the Khanate of Kazan strongly resembled Volga Bulgaria.48 The Kazan khanate, like Volga Bulgaria, was the Islamic centre of Eurasia. The Islamic faith and its practices were formalized and codified. The Khanafi madhhab of Sunni Islam formed the basis of the legal system of the khanate. An intricate network of Muslim clergy was established. It comprised seyids, shaykhs, mullahs, imams, dervishes, hajjis, hafizes, danishmends, shaykh-zades and mullah-zades. They enjoyed high social status and authority. Their head was elected from the seyids and was regarded as the second most important figure in the Hanate. He usually headed the provisional government during interregnums.49 The Kazan clerics geared the system of religious law of the Hanafi madhhab to the local conditions, determined by the geographical alienation of Kazan from the Islamic heartland, and the specific requirements of the state. The Kazan clergy tended to rely on the principle of an ijma' (the agreed opinion of legal experts) as a valid basis of fiqh (an Islamic law) and emphasized the regional specifics of Islam in the Volga region. Muslim clerics enjoyed an honoured place in the khanate. Kazan±Rus relations also developed along the same lines as those between various Rus principalities and Volga Bulgaria. They consisted of wars, alliances, collaboration and conspiracies. As in the past the religious factor was not essential and quite often the Kazan khans allied with the Rus Orthodox kniazes against the co-religious Turkic khanates. From the 1450s Rus±Kazan relations were increasingly influenced by a new regional player ± the Kasimov khanate on the Oka river. Its first khan was Kasim ben Ulug Muhammad, a rebellious son of the khan of the Golden Horde, who in 1446 joined the Moscow Kniaz Vasilii II (1425±62) against his father. Vasilii II rewarded him with land and the town of Gorodets-Mesherskii on the Oka river. The town was renamed Kasimov and became the capital of the Kasimov khanate which was the first Islamic enclave within the Rus Orthodox mainland. In 1467 the first mosque was built in Kasimov. The khans of Kasimov were the first Muslim vassals of Moscow kniazes and often played the role of fifth column among the Genghizids. The crumbling of the Golden Horde forced some other Genghizid dignitaries to seek the protection of the rising Moscow principality. Many of them pledged loyalty to Moscow and were accepted into the Rus aristocracy. Some married into the Rus nobility and considerably increased the portion of Turkic blood in the veins of the Russian aristocracy. Among their famous descendants

24 Russia and Islam

were Russian Tsar Boris Godunov (1598±1605), as well as such renowned Russian families as Aksakov, Apraksin, Akhmatov, Berdiayev, Bulgakov, Bunin, Gogol, Godunov, Karamazov, Rakhmaninov, Saltykov, Turgenev, Yusupov and many others.50 The first serious attempt to cast off Genghizid tutelage was made by the Great Kniaz Dmitrii (Donskoi) of Moscow in 1380. He defeated the Genghizids under the leadership of khan Mamai on the river Don and denounced the Genghizid suzerainty. In 1382 Khan Toktamysh managed for a short period to bring the Moscow principality back under Genghizid rule, but the days of the supremacy of the Golden Horde were numbered. From the late fourteenth century the Golden Horde de facto ceased to exist and turned into a conglomerate of autonomous principalities and khanates. The most powerful was the Moscow principality while among the prominent khanates were those of Kazan, Nogay, Astrakhan and Crimea. The Nogay khanate was founded by Wakkas, a grandson of khan Edigey in the 1390s, between the rivers Volga and Irtysh. It was a typical Turkic nomadic state formation modelled on the Golden Horde. Its political centre was the town of Saraychik situated in the delta of the Ural river. The Nogay khanate extended its political influence from the northern parts of the Kipchak steppe to Siberia and the Bashkir lands. Another emerging regional power was the Astrakhan khanate under Timur-Kutlug, the son of Urus Muhammad. It broke away from the Golden Horde in 1459. Earlier, in 1428, the ruler of Tumen' denounced the Genghizid suzerainty. He was followed in 1443 by the Crimean Khan Khaji-Girey who founded a new Crimean dynasty of Girey (1443±1792). The new regional leaders clashed over the right of succession to the Golden Horde and forged changing alliances against the crumbling centre and each other. From the very beginning, there was a rapprochement between Moscow and Crimea against both the Golden Horde and the Kazan khanate, as the religious factor was subordinated to political and pragmatic considerations.51 In 1480, Moscow Kniaz Ivan III (1462±1505) put a final end to the Genghizid domination over Rus. He succeeded in uniting most of Rus under his rule by subjugating his long-time rivals ± the Kniazes of Yaroslavl' in 1463, Novgorod in 1478 and Tver' in 1485. Ivan III became the first ruler of the independent and unified Rus state which subsequently became known as `Russia'.52 The political make-up of the Russian state was based on the indigenous, eastern Slavic, Islamo-Genghizid and Byzantine traditions. The latter were of particular importance since the rulers of independent Russia appealed to them in order to emphasize their separation from the Genghizid political context. Ivan III adopted

Russia's Encounter with Islam 25

the Byzantine title of the Tsar of Russia, alongside the traditional title of `Great Kniaz of all Russia'. In accordance with Byzantine political culture the authority of the Tsar was declared divine and sacralized by the Orthodox Church. The resulting indivisibility of state and church in Russia emphasized her political and cultural divergence from Western Europe, where the secular authority of a king was contested by the religious authority of the Catholic Church. Ivan III's second marriage to the Byzantine princess Sophia Paleologue strengthened his claims to the Byzantine legacy. He adopted Byzantine court and diplomatic protocol and the Byzantine symbol of two eagles as Russia's insignia. From then on, eastern Greek themes became increasingly incorporated within Russian national mythology, whereas the relevant Western mythologies were dominated by the Latin-Germanic heritage.53 In spite of the substantial Byzantinization of the new Russian state it maintained its strong Islamo-Asian component. It was present in the economic and military organization of the Russian state, its political and social hierarchy, its ethnic composition, its court ceremonial, costumes, architecture, arts and design. The Genghizid influence remained particularly strong during the first two centuries of Russia's independent existence and continued to shape its state, society and material and spiritual culture.54 Russia inherited from the Genghizid period such vital features as the extreme concentration of power at the centre and the vertical tribute-redistributary economic relations between the autocratic centre and the periphery. The Genghizid legacy was present in the development of the Russian autocracy based on the supremacy of personal relations between a ruler and a subject over any other relations which were dependent on social or genealogical status. The policy of the Russian state towards its subjects also had a strong Genghizid element and was characterized by such features as cruelty, ruthlessness, lawlessness, arbitrariness, flogging, torture and capital punishment. This promoted negative attitudes among ordinary Russians towards the state authorities, which were often perceived as a symbol of legalized plunder and banditry.55 The Genghizid rule prevented the development of the cantonal system and predetermined the failure of local democratic governments represented by veche (city councils) and their subjugation by the central authorities. The only exceptions were the northern Russian cities of Novgorod, Pskov and Viatka which until the late fifteenth century enjoyed limited autonomy from the centre. The consequent economic and political weakness of cities and towns defined the evolution of ownership rights in Russia. The Genghizid nomadic practice of individual

26 Russia and Islam

ownership of livestock with collective appropriation of the land strengthened the supreme state power, based on supreme state landownerhip. This was decisive in the perpetuation of the `Asiatic principle' that hereafter led to the imposition of serfdom in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In other words, Genghzid tutelage maximized the vertical relationship and blocked the development of horizontal links and social solidarity. As a result, in Russia the state principle irreversibly overcame the social principle and the public sphere eclipsed the private.56 These economic and political characteristics of the new Russian state distanced it from contemporary Western Europe. In the West, the cities and towns were incomparably stronger than in Russia. Western towns presented self-governing communities which since Roman times had preserved their corporate economic, political and military autonomy from the central ruler and the Church. As a result, the towns restricted the arbitrariness of the monarchs and gentry and forced them to reckon with representative bodies of various estates that limited their absolute power but, simultaneously, also supported and financed them. The existence of strong towns rendered a flight from serfdom and promoted the eventual emancipation of the serfs, which occurred during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Also, the towns provided nuclei for national markets and nation-states.57 The Russian juridical, military, and taxation systems also continued to resemble their Genghizid analogues. Thus, Russian rulers continued to adhere to the Genghizid succession tradition which prioritized the right to succession of the son over other male relatives of the ruler. The official list of the Russian nobility ± a `Velvet book' which was compiled by Sophia Paleologue ± claimed that out of a total of 930 Russian noble families, 158 were of Turkic Islamic origins. Until the late seventeenth century, Russian official documents and correspondence contained a tugra ± a special heraldic sign of the Islamicized court. In particular, a tugra was used by the Genghizid and Ottoman rulers. The first Russian criminal code was modelled on that of the Genghizids. Its core was the death penalty and physical punishment. The Russian troops were formed according to the Genghizid principles. The Russian military elite ± ulans (from the respective Genghizid title `oglans') consisted of commanders of ten men (desiatniki), commanders of a hundred (sotniki), commanders of a thousand (tysiachniki) and commanders of ten thousand (temniki).58 The Russian rulers preserved and `improved on' the extensive bureaucratic and surveillance apparatus which they inherited from the Genghizids. They took over the Genghizid practice of taking a regular general

Russia's Encounter with Islam 27

census for tax and police purposes and controlling the population through passports. The Russian authorities preserved and further advanced the postal service which was also introduced by the Genghizids.59 The inauguration ceremony of the first Russian monarchs very much resembled the similar procedure at the Genghizid court. It is significant that Russian tsars were crowned for the throne with the Genghizid furand-gold hat (`shapka Monamakha'). Russian court etiquette included such Genghizid elements as bowing to the feet of a monarch (`bit' chelom'), strewing the new monarch with coins and so on. The Genghizids had also a visible impact on Russian architecture, design, costumes, popular epics, music and the Russian language. From those times the Russian vocabulary absorbed many Turkic words relating to military activity, trade, travel, cuisine, cattle-breeding and entertainment.60

2

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours: 1480±1881

The Russian conquest of Genghizid Khanates Russia's emancipation from Genghizid tutelage enabled her to diversify her relations with the outside world, including her western neighbours ± the Poles, Lithuanians, Germans and Swedes. Russia still maintained her primary engagement with her eastern and southern neighbours all of whom shared a common Genghizid past. Among them were the Great Horde which represented the remnants of the Golden Horde, the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimea, Siberia and Nogay. Compared to the Russian Orthodox tsars the rulers of the Great Horde and the khanates appealed to their Turkic and Islamic links with their former Genghizid suzerain. All of them claimed their rights to the Golden Horde's succession although the real pretenders were sedentary Russia and the Kazan khanate. The rulers of the latter were convinced of their exclusive rights to succeed the Golden Horde and even attempted to force a yasak on Moscow and other former Genghizid provinces. However, the great power ambitions of the Kazan elite were not matched by the khanate's economic and military capability. In these terms the young and expansive Russian state had considerable advantages over the declining Kazan khanate, the rulers of which were steeped in corruption and internecine strife, effectively losing interest in state matters.1 From the 1450s Moscow's rulers closely followed the internal scuffling in Kazan and sought to gain the sympathy of some disenchanted Kazan dignitaries. Eventually they succeeded in the formation of a pro-Moscow faction at the Kazan court. It opposed the pro-Nogay grouping which was oriented towards Central Asia and the pro-Crimean faction, supported by Ottoman Turkey. For two decades Moscow was confined to the policy of indirect political pressure on Kazan. But in 1471, Moscow finally 28

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 29

subjugated Novgorod, which was its century-long rival for supremacy over Rus, and started to exercise a more assertive policy towards Kazan. In 1487, Moscow Kniaz Ivan III undertook a successful military campaign against the Kazan khanate and established a Russian protectorate over it (1487±1506). This victory was symbolic for the Rus because it marked the reversal of the three centuries-long relations of domination and subjugation between the Genghizids and the Rus in favour of the latter. Ivan III adopted the parallel title of the `Kniaz of the Bulgars' and in the official correspondence began to call the Kazan khan `brother', stressing their adherence to the same political culture. On the other hand, the Kazan khans and other former Genghizid Turkic rulers regarded the Russian tsars as members of the Genghizid hierarchy. Various sources revealed that they addressed Russian tsars as the `white tsars', recognizing their relation to the `white khans', that is, the khans of the Golden Horde. However, even until the seventeenth century the Russian rulers suffered from something of an inferiority complex towards the Turkic descendants of the Genghizids.2 Moscow's annexation of the Kazan khanate spread havoc among other descendants of the Golden Horde. The Girey khans of the Crimean khanate, which from 1477 was a protectorate of the powerful Ottoman empire, were particularly concerned about the growing expansion of Moscow although they hoped that Ottoman backing would safeguard them from the fate of Kazan. Relations between Moscow and Bakhchesaray, the capital of the Crimean khanate, had a complicated history. Until 1480 the Rus and Crimean rulers were often allies against the Great Horde, which was backed by Catholic Poland-Lithuania. However, following the collapse of the Great Horde their alliance was replaced by mounting rivalry over their spheres of influence in the former Golden Horde. Between 1507 and 1554 the Crimean rulers conducted over forty incursions into Russian lands and intensified their political and military co-operation with the Kazanians against the Russian domination.3 In 1506, in the context of Moscow's protracted conflict with Lithuania and Smolensk, the Gireys provided the crucial military assistance to the Kazanians which enabled the latter to regain their independence from Moscow. This secured the Crimeans a special role in Kazan affairs while the Russian involvement was reduced to the politics of clandestine intrigues at the Kazan court. In 1519, Moscow succeeded in placing on the Kazan throne its proteÂge Shah Ali from the Kasimov dynasty, who managed to maintain his position only until 1521 when he was replaced by a succession of anti-Moscow Khans backed by the Crimeans, Poles and Lithuanians. In the 1530s Moscow, having consolidated its power over the last

30 Russia and Islam

of its rival Rus principalities ± Smolensk and Riazan' ± resumed its active policy in relation to the Kazan Khanate. The Russian Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible, 1533±84) placed the military suppression of the Kazan khanate at the top of the Russian political agenda. In 1545 and 1547 Moscow undertook two unsuccessful military expeditions against Kazan. Its failure forced the Russian military to change tactics in favour of a lengthy siege of Kazan. For this purpose the Russians founded the town of Sviyazhesk which oversaw the external links of Kazan. On 12 February 1550 the Russian troops began the siege of Kazan by blocking its vital supply routes via the Volga, Kama and Viatka rivers. In August 1551, the Kazanians submitted to the Russian pressure and accepted defeat. In accordance with Moscow's demand, Kazan was divided into two parts. The upper town was turned into a Russian protectorate under the rule of Moscow's proteÂge Khan Shakh Ali, while the lower town under the rule of Khan Kaman maintained its independence.4 In March 1552 the Russians experienced another setback in their relations with the Kazanians. Anti-Russian factions gained control over both parts of Kazan by staging an anti-Moscow coup d'eÂtat in the upper town which overthrew the marionette government of Shakh Ali. Ivan the Terrible's response was a declaration of war on Kazan. In August 1552, Russian troops launched an offensive against Kazan which sealed its fate. Among the factors which facilitated the Russian victory were the numerical and technical superiority of the Russian army of 150 000 over Kazan's 30 000 troops, the disarray within the Kazan ruling class, and the lack of substantial external support. During the Russian offensive a number of high-ranking members of the Kazan elite, such as murza Kamay Huseinov, defected to the Russian camp and provided the Russians with important intelligence information. The Russians also managed to win the support, or sympathy, of some non-Kazan ethnic communities which were unhappy with the ruling regime. The Russian authorities promised to grant some of them ownership and tax privileges in return for their cooperation. As a result, many ordinary Bashkirs, Chuvashes and Maris took the Russian side during the Russian±Kazan war.5 As in the past, the religious factor played a secondary role in the conflict between Christian Orthodox Russia and the Muslim Turkic Kazan khanate. The conflict did not acquire a religious dimension and did not evoke significant religious or ethnic solidarity on either side. Moreover, the Turkic Muslim rulers of the Kasimov khanate actively supported the Russian offensive against the co-religious and co-ethnic Kazanians. Similarly, some Nogay murzas sided with Ivan the Terrible, while the khan of Astrakhan maintained neutrality. Even Kazan's traditional ally, the

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 31

Crimean khan, chose rather to plunder Moscow, which was left defenceless as a result of the Russian±Kazan conflict, than to assist the Kazanian resistance. On the other hand, the common political anti-Russian interests accounted for close co-operation between Muslim Kazanians and Catholic Poles and Lithuanians.6 The conquest of Kazan had an important impact on the development of the Russian state and society. It signified Moscow's deviation from the steppe politics which had previously defined its relations with the other Eurasian players and its opting for the annexation of their territories. It also radically changed the ethnic and confessional make-up of Russia which before 1552 was largely an ethnic state of Russians with only a few non-Russian enclaves, represented by the Muslim Kasimov khanate on the Oka and a number of Finno-Ugric and Turkic communities in the north and the Volga-Urals, most of which were pagan. After 1552, Russia became a multi-ethnic and poly-confessional state and the Russian rulers were faced with the difficult task of redefining its state and national policy. Russia's new state identity was reflected in the new official title of Russia's ruler as the `Tsar of Russia and Kazan'. The Kazan crown was incorporated within the state symbol of Russia. The Kazanians, having lost their statehood, were overnight reduced to the status of Tatar subjects of the Russian Tsar.7 The Russian annexation of Kazan shifted the balance of power in Eurasia in favour of Russia, which acquired supremacy over its Genghizid neighbours ± the khanates of Crimea, Astrakhan, Nogay and Siberia. Nevertheless, these neighbours, especially the Crimean Gireys, continued to threaten the eastern and southern borders of Russia. Initially the Russian tsars pursued their traditional policy of `divide et impera' towards these khanates. They played some factions within the Genghizid elite against others. However, Moscow's strategic aim was the military and political subjugation of the khanates. After Kazan, Ivan IV chose the Astrakhan khanate as his next expansionist target. Astrakhan had an important strategic and commercial location in the centre of the Volga delta commanding the east±west trade routes. In spite of its economic wealth it was a relatively weak state which was subject to external influences and enfeebled by frequent nomadic raids. In 1556, Ivan the Terrible used the appeal of the Astrakhan dignitary, Emir Ismail, for Russian assistance in his domestic struggle for power as a formal pretext for the invasion of the khanate. Astrakhan fell under the Russian military assault without serious resistance. Like the Kazan khanate it was incorporated within the Russian state and the Russian tsar added to his title the `Astrakhan Tsar'.8

32 Russia and Islam

The subjugation of Kazan and Astrakhan boosted Ivan the Terrible's confidence in the military superiority of the Russians over the Genghizids and facilitated Moscow's advance on its most serious adversary ± the Crimean khanate. However, in 1559 the Russian troops were defeated by the Gireys's army, which was assisted by the Ottoman Turks. The Russians were forced to retreat and postponed their expansionist plans towards Bakhchesaray. Following their victory over the Russians the Crimeans resumed their devastating raids on the Russian lands. In 1571 troops under the command of Khan Dewlet-Girey (1551±77) invaded Russia and plundered 36 towns killing and taking prisoner thousands of their inhabitants. During one such raid a considerable part of Moscow was burnt down. In order to protect the Russian lands from incursions by the Crimeans and various southern nomadic peoples, the Russian rulers began to build a southern defence barrier. By 1684 it consisted of four fortification lines stretching from the present-day town of Belgorod to the town of Samara.9 The Crimean disaster did not hamper Moscow's drive for the incorporation of the Golden Horde's lands. From the 1580s it focused on the Siberian Khanate, the Genghizid khans of which traditionally raided the eastern territories of Russia. During the rule of Khan Kuchum (1568±98), these raids acquired a regular character. In the 1580s, the joint forces of the Tsarist troops and the Cossacks under the command of the ataman Yermak, funded by the wealthy merchant and entrepreneurial family of Stroganoff, crossed the Urals and began its advance into Siberia, which was populated by various Turkic, Ugric and northern peoples. The former were represented by Siberian Tatars, Teleyutys, Shortsys and Yakuts. The local Ugric peoples consisted of Khantys and Mansys. The northern ethnic groups included Tungus, Yuakagirs, Nentsys, Evenkys, Chukchys, Kamchadalys and Butyatys. The main occupations of the bulk of the population of the Siberian Khanate were hunting, fishing and nomadic cattle breeding. In religious terms most of them were pagans, mainly shamans, while the ruling Genghizhid elite and Siberian Tatars professed Islam.10 The Russian military advance in Siberia was accompanied by its economic reclamation. The key role in this process belonged to the Stroganoff family who specialized in salt production and the fur trade. The Stroganoffs created in Siberia a sort of free economic zone which facilitated the subsequent political and military Russian expansion in the region even though the Cossack and Russian troops faced fierce resistance from the Genghizids of the Western Siberian khanate and some northern peoples. In 1582, the Cossacks occupied the capital of the khanate in the

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 33

lower flow of the Irtysh river and established their authority there and in the adjacent areas. In 1598 the last bastions of the Siberian khanate's resistance fell under pressure from the Cossack and the Russian troops. The territory of the khanate was incorporated within the Russian state and the khanate's crown was integrated within the Russian state symbol. In order to secure Russian control over Siberia the Russian authorities founded a number of Russian towns there; among them were Tumen' (1586), Tobol'sk (1587) and Tomsk (1604).11 Russian±Nogay relations had a special character. From the early fifteenth century the Nogay murzas had been the allies of various Rus kniazes against other Genghizids. The Nogays were the main suppliers of horses, sheepskin coats and ammunition for the Russian troops. Many Nogay dignitaries, murzas and biys, joined the Russian service. In return, they were given generous annual subsistence by the Tsar and were allowed to keep their Nogay titles which were supplemented by relevant Russian titles. As was mentioned earlier, the Nogay murza Ismail welcomed the Russian conquest of Kazan, and later Astrakhan. Ivan the Terrible rewarded his loyalty by granting him the ownership of the town of Romanov on the Volga. Officially Romanov was under the jurisdiction of the Russian Posol'skii Prikaz (the Foreign Office), although de facto it had administrative and financial autonomy from Moscow. In 1561 the Nogay murza Tohtar Kutimov, together with his brothers and 70 other Nogay dignitaries pledged their allegiance to the Moscow court and were admitted into the Russian nobility's hierarchy. In 1564, three sons of Nogay biy Yusuf and several grandsons of biy Urus accepted Russian suzerainty and became the founders of the infamous noble Russian dynasties of Yusupov and Urusov. Among other noble Russian families of Nogay ethnic origins were the Baiterekovs, the Kanbarovs, the Kutumovs, the Tinbaievs, the Tinmametovs, the Urmametovs and Sheidiakovs.12 By the end of the sixteenth century the Nogay Horde, which presented a tribal alliance consisting of various clans, each controlling its own territories between the Volga and the Kama and along the Yayik river, split along clan lines into three autonomous state formations. The largest one, known as the `Great Nogay Horde', corresponded to the central part of the old Nogay Horde with its centre in Saraichik. Its elite maintained the traditional pro-Moscow orientation. In 1630, the Great Horde was defeated by the Kalmyks. The bulk of its members moved to the right bank of the Volga and were incorporated into the Russian state. The second Nogay formation, or the `Lesser Nogay Horde', was situated in the Kuban region. Its rulers allied with the Crimean khans against Russia

34 Russia and Islam

and were eventually subjugated by Bakhchesaray. The third Nogay formation, or the `Altyul Horde' united those Nogays who moved to the Kazakh steppe and succumbed to Uzbek political and cultural influence. In 1630, the Great Nogay Horde disintegrated as a result of the invasions of the Mongol tribes of Kalmyks from Central Asia. The bulk of its members moved to the right bank of the Volga and were relatively peacefully incorporated within the Russian state.13 Russia's annexation of the former Genghizid territories occurred in accordance with Genghizid political and military logic and practices. As a result, the early Russian state maintained many features of its former suzerain. The Russian rulers continued the Genghizid pattern of having a junior co-ruler, or co-rulers, who were often the representatives of the Genghizid nobility. The junior co-ruler of Vasilii III (1505±33), the Great Kniaz of Moscow, was the Genghizid prince Khudaikul. The Genghizid nobles Simeon and Mikhail Kaibulovich were junior co-rulers of the Tsar Ivan the Terrible. The Genghizid noble Boris Godunov was the junior co-ruler of the Tsar Fedor (1584±98). Boris Godunov even succeeded Tsar Fedor and became the Russian Tsar in 1598±1605 and his court included a large number of Genghizid dignitaries.14 For almost two centuries, the Kasimov Khanate remained a source of persistent Genghizid and Islamic influence on the Russian state and society. The Kasimov elite played an important role in early Russian politics. The Kasimov khans and other nobles were accepted into the Russian state hierarchy. They were granted equal status with the Russian noble family of Glinskii, who were close relatives of the tsar, which allowed them to intermarry with the Russian nobility. For instance, Peter the Great's aunt Yevdokia Naryshkina was a granddaughter of the Kasimov Khan, Alp Arslan. Some of the Kasimov dignitaries were entrusted with the handling of the most mobile and effective cavalry units within the tsar's army. The Kasimov Tatars made up the core of the Russian army which was involved in the conquest of the Genghizid Khanates of Astrakhan, Nogay and Siberia.15 The incorporation of Genghizid dignitaries within the Russian aristocracy contributed a trans-ethnic character to the authority of the early Russian rulers. Like their Khazar and Genghizid predecessors, they assumed authority over their subjects irrespective of the ethnic and religious affiliation of the latter. This ethno-religious inclusiveness of the Russian ruling class contributed to its cultural syncretism and enhanced the primary role of collective factors over ethnic or religious solidarity within the Russian state. Alongside the Genghizid traditions, the early Russian rulers were also responsive to other cultural influences coming

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 35

from the Islamic east and south. Some historians trace an Ottoman and Cherkess influence in Ivan the Terrible's decision to divide the Russian polity into two parts ± the zemshchina which represented the traditional Russian nobility, the boiare, with their symbolic parliament, the Boiar Duma, and the oprichnina, which was ruled directly by the Tsar. The oprichnina embraced all levels of administration and repressed every conceivable form of decentralization and initiative from below. It blocked the evolution of the Boiar Duma into a genuine Parliament, as happened in various states of contemporary Western Europe.16 Overall, the Genghizid and Islamicized eastern influences remained a powerful factor in the Russian state and society until the westernizing reforms of Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century. The Genghizid statehood tradition had a strong impact on the formation of the Russian state. In particular, it contributed to its exaggerated autocracy, rigidity and militarization, on the one hand, and to the weakness of its economic and legal systems and to its social restrictiveness, on the other. This resulted in the intrinsic underdevelopment of any status autonomy among almost all social groups ± peasants, urban dwellers and even aristocracy ± and enhanced their dependency on the Tsar's will and choice. The supreme and detached status of the Tsar encouraged the predominantly collective loyalty of the peoples ± loyalty, especially to a particular regional, ethnic, or religious community. This process contrasted with contemporary Western social evolution, which was defined by the growing supremacy of the individual who was viewed as the unit of social contract.17 From the sixteenth century, the grassroots Genghizid trend in Russia's historical development was intertwined with the official Byzantization of the Russian state. The interplay of these two cultural influences contributed to the sacerdotal make-up of the Tsar's authority and the fusion between the secular and religious domains. As a result, in Russia the Orthodox Church was increasingly subordinated to the authority of the Tsar while in the West the Catholic Church challenged the authority of the sovereign. The Church sacralized Russia's political centralization which occurred on the basis of the personal loyalty of landowners to the Tsar. Its motto was `he who owns land ought to serve the Tsar'. The Tsar had supreme jurisdiction over all peoples living within the borders of the Russian state while the political power and the ownership rights of provincial and local elites were consistently restricted. By comparison, in the West conditional landownership (the fief ) gradually evolved into unconditional private property, followed by parcellization of sovereignty.18

36 Russia and Islam

The Russian State's assault on Islam Moscow's initial policy towards its new Muslim subjects was volatile and combined elements of the eastern Slavic, Great Steppe, Rurik and Byzantine political traditions. In order to elevate themselves over their Genghizid counterparts, the Russian rulers emphasized their adherence to the Byzantine political culture. This accounted for the increasing Byzantine trend in Russia's historical development. The official Byzantinization of the Russian state enabled its rulers to overcome their political and psychological dependence on the Genghizids and to legitimize their claims to Russia's imperial mission as the gatherer of the former Golden Horde's territories and the civilizer of its population. Byzantine Orthodox Christianity was supposed to enhance the divine and sacral authority of the Russian tsar over his multi-ethnic and polyconfessional subjects. Therefore, the enforced comprehensive Christianization of Russia's population was regarded as a vital condition for the stability of the state.19 The Orthodox Christianity legitimized Moscow's ruthless policy towards its former Genghizid suzerains. Russian Orthodox rulers sought the complete destruction of the Genghizid ruling elite, represented by karachis, beks, murzas, oglans and tarkhans; the confiscation of their most fertile land, and its redistribution among the Russian nobility and the Orthodox monasteries, the coercive Christianization of Muslim populations and the deportation of those who refused to convert. The majority of the Genghizid elite were destroyed during a series of anti-Russian revolts in the 1550s and 60s. According to some sources, 1560 Kazan murzas and beks lost their lives during the uprising of 1553±57 alone. Some of those nobles who survived, converted to Orthodoxy and therefore saved their status and property. They were admitted to the Russian state service and became agents of Moscow's influence in the Islamic countries. They worked as the tsar's advisors, ambassadors and interpreters. Yet some rejected the conversion under any circumstances. They were stripped of their nobility and ownership and were forced into the commercial domain. As for the ordinary Muslims who refused baptism, they were expelled from the cities into rural areas.20 The main ideologists of the coercive Christianization of non-Russian subjects were the Orthodox metropolitan Makarii and the priest Silvester, who had a strong personal influence over Tsar Ivan the Terrible. They called for the crusade against `godless' Kazanians and other Muslims. Makarii promoted the concept of `Moscow as the third Rome' and the Russian tsar as its divine guardian. The official chronicles portrayed

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 37

Moscow as the centre of the Christian world, unstained by links with Catholicism. They began to refer to Orthodoxy as synonymous with Russianness and enlightenment, and to Islam as synonymous with Tatar darkness and wickedness. Makarii and Silvester masterminded a campaign of coercive Christianization and religious cleansing against Muslims. The same policy was also applied to various Finno-Ugric peoples who were predominantly pagan. This aggressive policy persisted until 1555 when it was replaced by a more moderate approach associated with the Kazan archbishops Gurii (1555±63) and German (1564±65), who advocated voluntary conversion. However, Tsar Fedor (1584±98) returned to the policy of the enforced baptism of Muslims and the destruction of mosques, medresses and mektebs, the confiscation of the waqf (religious endowment) property and the persecution of Muslim clerics. Surviving representatives of the Islamic elite fled to Central Asia, Afghanistan and Hejaz.21 The suppression of Islam was one of the major elements of Moscow's policy of integrating non-Russian territories within the centralized Russian state. Its other components were the incorporation of these territories within the Russian administrative system, militarization and economic colonization. The Russian authorities created a system of military fortresses on the territory of the former Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, the other Genghizid formations, as well as constructing fortified bulwarks along Russia's borders with the steppe. The fortresses were designed to prevent any anti-Russian revolts in the annexed territories, like the uprisings of 1570±72 and 1581±84 in which the Kazanians and Maris participated. The non-Russians were also not allowed to keep weaponry. The fortification lines were to secure the southern borders of the Russian state from invasions and raids by Crimeans, Nogays and Steppe nomads. In the 1560s, the first fortification line ± zasechnaia cherta ± was built along the Volga. In the 1580s, it was strengthened by three Russian strongpoints in the Lower Volga which safeguarded the trade route to Astrakhan. In the early seventeenth century the Russians built yet another fortification line along the left bank of the Volga.22 Former khanates were transformed into Russian provinces, uyezds, ruled by Russian military governors, voievodas. The latter introduced the practice of enforced settlement of some members of the local elites (amanats) in the Russian administrative centres. They served as hostages in case of anti-Moscow rebellions in their homeland. The governing body of the former Kazan khanate was the Tsar's department of the Kazan palace. The Russian authorities carried out the policy of Russification of Kazan and other Genghizid cities. Their indigenous Muslim populations were

38 Russia and Islam

pushed out into the rural areas while the representatives of the Russian middle nobility, the Orthodox Church clergy and merchants took their place. The city mosques were destroyed and replaced by Orthodox cathedrals. As a result of this policy, the cities turned into Russian Orthodox enclaves within non-Russian Muslim territories. The tsars distributed the former khan's and Genghizid elite's lands among the Russian nobility, Russian peasant settlers and Orthodox monasteries, which were the major beneficiaries of Russia's territorial expansion into Muslim-populated territories. This explains the anti-Islamic sentiments of the contemporary Russian chronicles, most of which were written by Orthodox monks and clerics. Interestingly, in spite of Moscow's suppression of the former Genghizids the relationship between Moscow and the Kasimov khanate did not undergo serious change and retained its special character. Up until the middle of the seventeenth century, the Russian tsars continued to recognize the semi-independent status of the Khanate and allowed its khans to profess Islam freely and to preserve its distinctive statehood symbols.23 By the mid-seventeenth century, Moscow secured its military and political domination over the former Genghizid khanates and turned from suppression of the subjugated elite towards collaboration with their surviving representatives. Russian tsars confirmed their ownership rights on land, apiaries and beaver hunting forests. Members of the Muslim landed aristocracy were co-opted within the Russian hereditary nobility and were recognized as social equals to their Russian counterparts. It is significant that non-Muslim, pagan elites were not allowed into the Russian nobility although they were recognized as members of the service class (sluzhilie liudi) who had social and economic advantages over the bulk of the ordinary people. Kazan, Astrakhan and other Genghizid units of military horsemen were transferred to Moscow's command.24 Since the Orthodox Church was the main guardian and promoter of the state religious and national policies, it watched with suspicion the moderation of official policies towards Muslims and other non-Russian subjects. It unleashed a new wave of coercive Christianization which was orchestrated by the patriarch Nikon (1652±81). The Russian Orthodox clergy viewed Islam, which was better suited to the everyday life of ordinary people than hierarchical and pompous Orthodoxy, as a real threat to their economic prosperity and spiritual domination. Their ambition was the complete eradication of Islam in Russia. The Orthodox missionaries tried to implant into the mass consciousness the idea of the allegedly moral superiority of Orthodox Russians over other inhabitants of the Russian state.25

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 39

Those Kazanians and other Muslims who were coerced into Orthodox Christianity during this period and earlier became known as starokreshennie (old converts). Still, in spite of political pressure and ideological brainwashing, the bulk of Russia's Muslims preserved their faith. A century later their religious resilience triggered off yet another anti-Islamic campaign which was masterminded by the Archbishop of Kazan, Luka Kanashevich. He believed that the most effective method of fighting Islam was the complete liquidation of mosques. In 1740, a special Department of Conversion was formed within the Russian Government. Its officials were in charge of the demolition of mosques. During that campaign in the former Kazan khanate alone, 418 out of a total of 536 mosques were destroyed and several hundred Muslims were converted to Christianity. These new converts made up a group of novokreshennie (new converts). Still, in spite of the persistent attempts by the Russian government and the Orthodox Church to create an Orthodox Russian state many old and new converts retained their parallel secret allegiance to Islam and returned to it several decades later under the religious liberalization of Catherine the Great (1762±96). The process of otpadenie (falling back to Islam) was a permanent feature of the originally Muslim communities under Russian rule.26 The regular otpadenie of former Muslims from Christianity signified the failure of Moscow's official religious policy towards its non-Russian Orthodox subjects. This failure reflected the alienation of the state from society which was a characteristic feature of Russia from the early period. Because of this alienation the official policies, in spite of their considerable impact on Russian society, did not undermine its traditional mechanisms of economic and power relations and social cohesion. Since within the traditional system of values and social regulation a religion did not have a divisive function, the official anti-Islamic policy failed to mobilize an adequate popular response. This phenomenon has been overlooked by academics who have tended to judge Russian±Muslim relations within the Russian and later Soviet empire on the basis of Russian state policies and the writings of Russian historians.27 Moscow's authority did not go beyond the top and sometimes middle levels of provincial administration, while the life of the local community remained more or less immune to it. Thus, in spite of the imposition of serfdom on the bulk of the Russian peasantry the vast majority of Tatar, as well as various Finno-Ugric, villagers retained personal freedom. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, most Tatar peasants were registered as `state peasants'. The Russian tax system and the level of taxation also resembled the Genghizid times. If in the past the Tatar peasants paid an

40 Russia and Islam

annual tribute (a yasak) to the khan, under the Russian regime they were obliged to pay relatively similar tribute either to the Moscow central treasury or to their landowner. At the grassroots level, therefore, relations between Russians and Tatars were not seriously affected by the official political and propaganda assault on Islam. In fact, the bulk of ordinary Muslims regarded the establishment of Russian domination over them as a routine transfer of formal suzerainty to a more powerful Eurasian political formation. As for the majority of Russian peasants, they also barely gained from the Russian territorial expansion into the adjacent Islamic territories. Their living standards were pretty much the same. Furthermore, the Russian peasants were similarly subjected to the coercive and arbitrary policies of the Russian state.28 Nevertheless, almost two centuries of ruthless state suppression dealt a severe blow to Russia's Islam and Islamic elite, in particular. It led to their dramatic quantitative and qualitative reduction and the break-up of the traditions of high intellectual Islam. Islam survived predominantly in its unsophisticated popular form. Having been evicted from Kazan and other former major Genghizid cities, Islam moved to the villages, which became the main repositories of Tatar national and religious distinctiveness crystallized in Islam. For centuries these villages maintained their integrity by living according to Islamic tradition, Shariat and adat. In order to safeguard themselves from assimilation by the dominant Russian Orthodox culture these villages reinforced the patriarchal clan-based relationship which formed the ancient clan communities. Under Russian rule, they transformed themselves into Tatar village communes with a fairly precise structure. They were ruled by a council of elders which took decisions binding on all members of the commune. The key agents of the perpetuation of Tatar national life were local aksakals and abyzes (elders), who constituted the core of the village councils and informally held supreme authority and combined religious, educational, juridical and social functions within the village. Often they were Sufi ishans (teachers). They were the guardians of the past and present and the upholders of the tradition, the unofficial local policy-makers and the true conductors of peoples' minds and social attitudes. The abyzes ensured the liaison between the specific local community and the Russian authorities. They were people noted for their personal qualities and achievements and in the absence of the professional Islamic clergy also played the role of clerics and Russian±Tatar interpreters.29 The Russian conquest of the last Genghizid stronghold ± the Crimean Khanate ± was the most difficult and protracted affair. It occurred two centuries later and was determined by Russia's European politics which

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 41

necessitated her access to the Black Sea and the Crimean peninsula, in particular. Meanwhile Crimea remained under the Ottoman protectorate. From the middle of the sixteenth century, Russia had been involved in numerous wars with the Ottoman empire over southern Eurasia and the Black Sea. Control over the Crimean peninsula therefore acquired a particular importance for both sides. During the Russian±Turkish war in 1676±81, the Crimean khans fought against the Russians on the Ottoman side. By the Bakhchesaray Treaty, which was signed in the aftermath of this war, southern Ukraine was included in the Crimean khanate. In 1687 and 1689 Moscow tried to establish its dominance over Crimea but failed. The special relations between Bakhchesaray and Istanbul were reconfirmed by the Russian±Ottoman Treaties of 1713, 1720 and 1724. Only 15 years later, during the Russian±Ottoman war of 1735±39 Russian troops managed to occupy Bakhchesaray and to destroy the Khan's Palace. However, in 1769, the Ottomans and Crimeans reversed the situation in their favour once again. The Crimean Khan Kyrym-Girey raided central Ukraine, which in 1654 had signed a treaty of union with Russia, and southern Russia. According to some sources during that raid over ten thousand Russians were killed and many thousands were taken prisoner. The Russians retaliated in 1771 when troops under the command of Prince Dolgorukii defeated the Crimean Khan Sahib-Girey II and occupied the Crimean peninsula. Under the treaty of Kuchuk-Kaynardji of 1774, which terminated the Russian±Ottoman war of 1768±74, the Ottoman empire gave up its claims on Crimea and accepted Russia's special interests there. Russian troops were deployed in the Crimean fortresses of Kinburn, Kerch and Enikale on the Black Sea. In 1783, Catherine the Great annexed the Crimean peninsula under the pretext of the Ottomans' violation of the 1774 Treaty. By the Treaty of Jassy of 1792 the Ottoman empire recognized Russia's suzerainty over Crimea, Kuban and the territories between the rivers Bug and Dniester, including the fortress of Khadzhibey (since 1795, Odessa).30

The reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great Compared to Kazan, Astrakhan and other Genghizid territories, the Russian annexation of the Crimea occurred in different historical and geopolitical circumstances which affected the nature and forms of its colonization. By that time Russia had overcome the `Time of Troubles', the period of anarchy which followed the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584, and acquired the new ruling dynasty of Romanov (1613±1917), which represented the indigenous Russian ruling class. Under the rule

42 Russia and Islam

of Tsar Peter the Great (1682±1725) Russia underwent radical reforms which were designed to break her Asiatic stagnation and divert her along a more dynamic Western path. Peter sought to transform Russia into a `patrimonial' state where the whole country was viewed as an appendage of the monarch. In 1721 he became Emperor of the Russian empire with its capital in St Petersburg, which became Russia's window onto Western Europe. In 1721 he institutionalized the Russian Orthodox Church as a symbol of Russian statehood by the creation of the Holy Synod, the supreme state department in charge of the Orthodox Church, headed by the chief prosecutor appointed directly by the Tsar. Petrine westernization `from above', in spite of its incontestable benefits for the Russian state, had a rather ambiguous effect on Russian society. It aggravated the existing alienation between the state, the ruling elite and some urban strata, on the one hand, and the narod (the ordinary people), Russians and non-Russians, on the other. While the former embraced the values and lifestyle of the West, the latter continued to adhere to traditional Eurasian norms and patterns. As a result of Petrine reforms, Russia acquired essential industries, a modern fleet and weaponry. She became a modern military power which began to claim a full role in European matters in accordance with the logic of realpolitik. As a genuine Westernizer, Peter the Great believed in the incontestable superiority of Western Europe over Russia and therefore perceived Russian traditional institutions and customs as barbaric and Asian. He literally pushed Russian society into Western cultural and social patterns. Russians were ordered to copy Western behavioural norms, to look, speak and think in the Western way. They were to wear Western costumes, cook Western meals and drink coffee. Men were also prohibited from growing beards.31 This societal split was accompanied by the strengthening of the autocratic and coercive functions of the state and the curtailing of any form of local autonomy and individual freedom. The divergence of the Russian state and elite from the Russian people accounted for numerous paradoxes in the subsequent historical development of Russia. Thus, by 1800 post-Petrine Russian industry produced more cast-iron than any other European country and was also amongst the first in the production of metal, armaments and military technology. But the nature of the Russian industrial boom was quite different from industrial development in Western Europe and was associated with the further intensification of serfdom. Also, Tsar Peter's attempt to foster in Russia Western patterns of trade ± such as trade companies made up by the joint capital of individual merchants ± led to the emergence of `trade houses' which

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 43

were formed along the old clan and family lines. As a result, the Russian bourgeoisie was underdeveloped and dreamt rather of becoming nobles and acquiring serfs than involvement in modern production and financial activities. Thus, in terms of civic development, Petrine reforms widened the gap between Russia and contemporary Western Europe where the absolute monarchies were increasingly opposed by parliaments, independent judges, urban and provincial councils and the various factions of the bourgeoisie and even nobility.32 In the second part of the eighteenth century, during the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia made another major step towards superficial Westernization. Catherine's policy of `enlightened despotism' introduced Western institutions into the Russian political system, while leaving intact the traditional economic and social mechanisms of Russian society. She issued the Law of Noble Liberty (1762) and the Charter of Nobility (1785) which granted the formal independence of the Russian nobility from the monarch. Catherine was well acquainted with the ideas of the European Enlightenment and publicized her friendship with its great representative, Voltaire (1694±1754). She initiated a new liberal dimension of Russian religious and national policies. On the other hand, Catherine kept intact the anachronistic system of serfdom. She blocked the development of the judiciary's autonomy. Compared to Western Europe, where it was represented by judges, investigators and prosecutors who challenged each other and enjoyed significant independence from the monarch, in Russia the judiciary remained indivisible and totally dependent on the monarch. Catherine brutally suppressed any manifestations of class, national, or religious opposition and discontent, and continued expansionist wars to the south and east of the Russian empire.33 In spite of the ambiguities of Catherine's rule, it had an invigorating impact on Russia's umma (Islamic community). Catherine believed that productive collaboration with her Muslim subjects rather than their suppression would ensure their loyalty to St Petersburg. The new religious policy was launched in the aftermath of the Pugachev popular revolt (1773±75) which almost brought an end to Catherine's rule. Active participants in the revolt included Muslim Tatars and Bashkirs from the Urals. Catherine provided favourable conditions for the economic and cultural development of the Volga Tatars, whom she regarded as potential promoters of Russia's interests and as the civilizing force among the culturally less developed Islamic regions within and outside the borders of the Russian empire. In 1763, Tatar merchants were granted permission to trade all over the Russian empire. The first Tatar chamber of trade was opened in Kazan. Between 1750 and 1800, Tatar entrepreneurs built a

44 Russia and Islam

number of textile and leather factories, as well as soap-boiling workshops in and near Kazan. By 1814, Tatars owned 148 various companies in the Volga-Urals region. By the decrees of 1763 and 1776, Tatar merchants acquired the right to found their settlements in the Kazakh Steppe. Tatars made up the bulk of the staff of the first Russian±Tatar joint shareholding society which was founded in Orenburg. The society opened its branches in the main trading cities of Central Asia. Tatar financiers created the first Islamic credit system. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Tatar trade and financial community in Orenburg comprised about eighteen thousand people. Tatar merchants became the main agents in the trade between Russia and its Muslim neighbours ± Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and western China.34 In 1773, Catherine adopted the Law on Religious Tolerance which banned the Russian Orthodox Church's interference in the life of other confessions. The law enabled the local authorities to take decisions regarding mosques, medresses, caravansarais (trade stations), waqfs and other Islamic institutions. The Government returned some of the previously confiscated waqf property to the local Islamic communities and permitted the building of a new mosque in any area populated by three hundred or more Muslim men. After two centuries of the Volga Tatars' isolation from the centres of Islamic learning they were given access to higher Islamic education in the medresses of Bukhara and Samarkand. From the late 1790s, Tatar medresses began to open in the cities of Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, Astrakhan and Tobol'sk and in the Tatar villages of Kashgar, Satysh, Menger, Saba, Tunter, Kursa and Izhbodia, among others.35 By the decree of 1786, Catherine the Great authorized the creation in the Bashkir and Kazakh Steppes of a large network of mosques, medresses and caravansarais staffed by Volga Tatars who were instructed to educate various Turkic nomads and to ensure their loyalty to the Russian crown. Catherine's religious liberalization also caused an Islamic publishing boom among Tatars and other Muslim peoples of the Russian empire. In 1800, the first Muslim publishing house was opened in Kazan, which published 14,300 books of an Islamic nature during its first three years alone. The process of Islam's institutionalization culminated in 1788 when Catherine invented the Muftiyat as a medium of state control of her Muslim subjects. The first Russian Muftiyat ± the Islamic Spiritual Board ± was formed in the Urals, in Ufa. Between 1796 and 1802, it was based in Orenburg and was subsequently referred to as the Orenburg Islamic Board.36 Catherine the Great's liberal approach towards trade and the cultural development of Russia's Muslims was accompanied by her ruthless

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 45

military suppression of Islamic political movements and the violation of the economic rights of Muslims in the Crimea, the North Caucasus and other Muslim-populated regions. Thus, following the Russian annexation of the Crimea, she distributed its most fertile lands among her favourites and other members of the Russian ruling class in violation of the declared rights of former Muslim owners to retain their land. The Crimea was subjected to intensive agrarian colonization by Russian peasants. As a result of these policies over 300 000 Crimeans fled to Turkey. Catherine initiated a century-long annexationist war by Russia against the North Caucasus, which from the mid-sixteenth century had been disputed between Iran and the Ottoman empire.37

The conquest of the Caucasus The Russian military advance in the Caucasus followed two centuries of Russian political and economic penetration of the region. In 1557, Tsar Ivan the Terrible forged an alliance with the rulers of Kabarda in the western part of the North Caucasus. In 1561, this alliance was cemented by the marriage of Ivan the Terrible to Maria Temrukovna, the daughter of a Kabardinian chieftain called Temruk. In 1594, a Russian regiment under the command of Khvorostin made its way to Dagestan and founded a Russian fortress on the river Sulak. Some feudal rulers of Dagestan, such as the shamkhals (the rulers) of Tarku, the Avar nutsals (the aristocracy) and the princes of southern Dagestan also favoured the growing Russian presence in the Caucasus. They regarded Moscow as a viable counterbalance to the Ottoman and Persian presence in the region. However, the bulk of the ordinary Caucasians, especially highlanders, were suspicious of the Russians and resisted fiercely their military advance. In 1605, the Russian troops were surrounded and exterminated by Dagestani highlanders.38 From the seventeenth century the Cossacks, who were zealous Christian Orthodox believers, were increasingly involved in the Russian penetration of the region. After the disintegration of the Golden Horde many of them returned to an independent existence within the self-ruled stanitsas. Gradually, they consolidated in central Russia along the rivers Don, Volga and Dnieper. In the late sixteenth century, they colonized the present-day Stavropol' region of southern Russia, becoming known as the Terskie Cossacks (Terek Cossacks). During the seventeenth century, another large group of Cossacks settled in the fertile plains along the Kuban river. They constituted the Kubanskie (Kuban Cossacks). The Terskie and Kubanskie Cossacks began to conduct regular

46 Russia and Islam

Figure 2.1 Interior Decoration of a House in Kubachi, Dagestan

incursions into the northern plains of the north Caucasus. As a result, a substantial part of the local population was pushed into the mountains. The first Cossack stanitsas in the region emerged along the river Terek. In 1654, most Cossacks with the exception of those living in the Dnieper area agreed to serve the Russian Tsar as border guards in southern Russia. Moscow recognized their semi-autonomous status and exempted them from serfdom, although each male was obliged to serve 25 years in the army.39 The Russian authorities skilfully played upon the Cossacks' Orthodox religiosity in order to enhance their loyalty to the Russian crown. They carried out their raids into the Muslim regions under the banner of Orthodox Christianity. However, in everyday life, they closely interacted with Caucasian Muslims. Intermarriage was quite common. There were also numerous similarities in their dashing clothes, weaponry, cuisine, reverence for horsemanship and raiding tactics. The Terskie Cossacks were very much influenced by their Chechen neighbours. They had similar social norms, code of honour, customs, dances, interior decoration, cuisine and costumes, such as the burka (woollen cloak), the beshmet (a loose shirt) and the cherkeska (military caftan). Interestingly, the many Cossacks had close relations with the Ottoman Turks in spite of the overt Russian±Ottoman animosity.40

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 47

In 1722, Tsar Peter the Great made the first serious attempt to get hold of the Caucasus by organizing the Persian campaign. The campaign sought to consolidate the Russian positions in the Caucasus as a potential springboard for a future advance towards the Indian Ocean. The Russian military fleet captured the cities of Derbend, in southern Dagestan and Baku in Azerbaijan. In 1732±35, the Russians left Derbend under pressure from Iran, Russia's potential ally against the Ottomans. By the Giandzi agreement of 1735 Russia was forced to recognize Iranian domination in the Caspian Sea, including the Derbend region. However, in the same period the Russians managed to strengthen their positions in northern Dagestan by founding the Russian town of Kyzliar. In the 1760s, they built a chain of fortresses in the plains of the north Caucasus. Most present-day cities and towns originate from those fortresses. In accordance with the Kuchuk-Kaynardji Treaty of 1774, Russia established her protectorate over Kabarda. In the 1780s, a number of Russian cities and settlements were created on the territory of Ingushetia and Chechnya.41 It is worth mentioning that by the end of the eighteenth century the vast majority of the population of the North Caucasus were Muslims. Most Dagestanis, Chechens and Ingushes adhered to the Shafii madhhab, while the rest belonged to the Hanafi madhhab of Sunni Islam. The most `serious' Muslims were Avars and Dargins and, partially, Kumyks. They produced the largest number of Islamic scholars (ulema) who were recognized in the Islamic world. Avars dominated the Islamic elite in the region. The least Islamicized Muslims in the region were various Adygh peoples of the western part of the North Caucasus. They were converted to Islam by the Ottoman Turks, or the Crimeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Their Islamicization was more superficial than their eastern neighbours. Compared to the Adyghs, the Karachays and Balkars were more deeply Islamicized, although they adopted Islam practically at the same period as the Adyghs. The `youngest' Muslims of the region were the Chechens and Ingushes. Their Islamicization began only in the eighteenth century. In the twelfth century the bulk of Ossetians, or Alans (an Iranian people), of the western part of the North Caucasus adopted Orthodox Christianity. Since then, they have remained a single Orthodox indigenous people in the largely Muslim region. However, in the seventeenth century a small group of Ossetians, known as the Digors, converted to Islam.42 The specific geographical, cultural and political conditions of the North Caucasus predetermined the proliferation of mystical Islam, or Sufism there. Sufism, which presented a rural and tribal alternative to the legalistic Islam of the cities, fitted well into the local tribal and clan social

48 Russia and Islam

structures. The first Sufis turned up in the region in the twelfth century. They were followers of the Kadiri tariqa. In the fifteenth century the Naqshbandi tariqa reached the North Caucasus from the Black Sea region of eastern Anatolia and later on from Central Asia. The Naqshbandiyya put down particularly deep roots among the Avars, Dargins and Kumyks. Subsequently, most Dagestani Naqshbandis belonged to the Mujaddidi branch of the tariqa.43 The tariqa of Yasawiyya had strong positions among the Nogays of northern Dagestan. By the seventeenth century a substantial part of the Muslims of the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan and Chechnya, were Sufis. Sufism became deeply integrated into the system of traditional community, providing its spiritual substance. As a result, there emerged a specific regional form of Sufism, known as tariqatism.44 In the 1780s, Catherine the Great launched a full-scale military campaign aimed at the annexation of the North Caucasus. The Russian authorities regarded its conquest as an essential condition for safeguarding the Russian southern territories from the persistent devastating raids by various peoples of the region. It was also believed that it would provide a strong leverage in Russia's relations with its powerful southern Muslim neighbours, Ottoman Turkey and Iran, since it would allegedly secure the irreversibility of Russian domination in the Caucasus. And finally St Petersburg hoped that Russian control over the North Caucasus would provide it with a trump card in the political and military duel with Great Britain, which was Russia's main European rival in the East. Compared to Kabarda and northern Dagestan, where the Russian presence met relatively passive resistance, in Chechnya and the mountainous areas of the North Caucasus the Russians faced the ferocious resistance of the local Muslim population. The majority of Chechens, Avars, Adyghs, Abazins, Abadzekhs, Ubukhs, Bzhadugs, Nabukhays and Shapsugs began a full-scale guerrilla war against the numerically and technically superior Russian troops. In 1785, a Chechen holy man called Mansur Ushurma headed the anti-Russian campaign. Mansur Ushurma used the existing Sufi network for popular mobilization against the Russian Orthodox invaders. During that war Islam, particularly the Sufi Islam of Naqshbandi tariqa, provided the ideological framework for the first political unification of the region. In 1791, Shaykh Mansur was defeated and imprisoned by the Russians and died in the Shlissel'burg fortress.45 Because of the selfless resistance of the Chechens, the Cherkess and other indigenous peoples and the mountainous landscape of the region, which was almost impassable for outsiders, the conquest of the North

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 49

Caucasus became an extremely difficult and costly affair in terms of human lives and economic resources. Having met severe resistance, St Petersburg turned from individual military campaigns to continuous warfare. On their conquered territories the Russians built their fortresses. In 1790 they founded the fortress of Vladikavkaz in Ossetia and in 1806 the Ossetian rulers recognized Russian suzerainty. In the same year they annexed Kabarda and Derbend, which was made the centre of Derbend province of the Russian empire, ruled by the Russian military administration. In 1813 Russian suzerainty over Derbend was confirmed by the Gulistan Treaty which was signed between Russia and Iran. An important role in the Russian advance in the North Caucasus was played by the Russian general A.P. Yermolov (1816±27) who combined the expansionist war with the building of fortification lines, roads and supply bases which were vital for waging a protracted war. In 1818 the Russians built the fortress of Groznii in Chechnya and of Nal'chik in Kabarda, as well as a line of smaller forts along the rivers Terek, Chegem, Beksan and Melka. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Russian control was established in the Balkar-populated mountainous regions of the eastern part of the North Caucasus. In 1844 the Russians founded the fortress of Petrovsk (present-day Makhachkala) in Dagestan. Alongside the North Caucasus the Russians strengthened their grip over the Transcaucasus, which was the object of Ottoman and Iranian territorial and political claims. In political terms the Transcaucasus presented a conglomerate of various state formations corresponding to present-day Armenia and Georgia, which were both Christian, and Azerbaijan, which officially belonged to Shia Islam as a result of Iranian cultural influence. By the Georgian Treaty of 1783, Russia asserted its influence over Georgia. By the Treaty of Jassy of 1792 the Ottoman empire recognized Russian domination in Georgia albeit maintaining its control over the territories between Anapa and Batumi. During 1801±13 several Transcaucasian rulers accepted Russian suzerainty. In 1812, by the Gulistan Treaty between Russia and Iran, a Russian protectorate was established over most of present-day Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia represented by Megrelia, Imeretia, Guria, Abkhazia and the Khanates of Baku, Yerevan, Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Giandzi, Shirvan, Shekin, Kubin and Talish. The town of Anapa was transformed into a Russian military fort. The Treaty of Turkmanchay of 1828 confirmed Russia's annexation of northern Azerbaijan and eastern Armenia and defined the border between Russia and Iran along the Araks river. By 1839, the Russian authorities had built 17 forts along the Black Sea coastline. In 1847 the northern part of Azerbaijan was transformed

50 Russia and Islam

into the Kaspiiskaia oblast' (region) of the Russian empire. Regular troops and Cossack regiments were stationed there. Russia's relations with its Transcaucasian vassals highlighted the religious aspect of Russian policy in the Caucasus. Representatives of the Armenian and Georgian nobility received preferential treatment while their Azeri counterparts were less fortunate. Many representatives of the Armenian and Georgian nobility were relatively easily integrated within the Russian state hierarchy and promoted to the higher civil and military ranks. They constituted the core of the Russian imperial administration in the Caucasus. For example, the Georgian kniazes Bagration, Tsitsianov and Orbeliani became generals of the Russian army and commanded Russian troops during the Caucasian wars. In 1812, General Bagration led the Russian army in the war with the Napoleonic invaders. On the whole, Armenia and Georgia soon became bastions of the Russian influence in the Caucasus while Azerbaijan for quite a long time was regarded in St Petersburg as a problematic region. There were hardly any members of the Caucasian Muslim nobility among the Russian imperial elite. Until 1887 Caucasian Muslims were exempt from regular military service in the Russian army.46 In the 1830s St Petersburg intensified its military operations in the North Caucasus, which was triggered by the growing resistance of the local Muslim fighters who began a gazawat (an Islamic holy war) against the Russian Orthodox invasion. It is believed that the ideologist of the gazawat was the Dagestani Islamic scholar Imam Muhammad Yaragskii (d. 1839). He gave a radical interpretation of tariqatism which also included the struggle for the spiritual and political independence of North Caucasian Muslims. Imam Yaragskii was also a zealous opponent of pre-Islamic adat norms and traditions and a promoter of the shariat. He advocated the formation of an Islamic state ± an Imamat, based on the shariat as a viable political framework for the armed gazawat against the Russian gayurs (infidels). In 1825, the congress of the ulema in the village of Yarag in southern Dagestan proclaimed the gazawat against the Russian invaders. The first leader of the gazawat was Imam GaziMuhammad (d. 1832), a close associate and a follower of Imam Yaragskii. The gazawat began in southern Dagestan, but by the end of the 1830s it already embraced most of Dagestan and Chechnya. After Imam Gazi-Muhammad's death, the gazawat was headed by Imam Gamzat-bek (d. 1834). From 1834 till 1859 its legendary leader was ImamShamyl (d. 1871), who unified Chechnya and northern Dagestan within a single Islamic state ± an Imamat ± which for more than a quarter of a century successfully withstood the Russian military advance.47

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 51

Figure 2.2 Imam Shamyl Source: M. Chichagova, Shamyl na Kavkaze i v Rossii (St Petersburg, 1889), p. 6

Subsequently, Imam Shamyl became a symbol of courageous and stoical anti-Russian resistance, although in real life he was a rather controversial figure. Like Muhammad Yaragskii, he combined the features of a political and a religious leader. He was a murid (a disciple) of a distinguished Dagestani Muslim scholar and Naqshbandi shaykh Jamaluddin from Kazi Kumukh. The Sufi affiliation enabled Shamyl to mobilize the Sufi network for the anti-Russian resistance. He also established close political and military co-operation with Russia's main rival in the south ± the Ottoman empire. During the Crimean war (1853±56), Imam Shamyl

52 Russia and Islam

and his troops supported the Ottoman invasion of Georgia. The Ottomans rewarded him with the title of General of the Ottoman army. Various sources also reveal that Imam Shamyl was notoriously ruthless and cruel towards his rivals, enemies and simply those who were disobedient. He used mass executions and pogroms as an `effective' method in dealing with any form of dissent and disagreement. In the Imamat he prohibited dancing and smoking and introduced capital punishment for deception, theft, drunkenness, any violation of five-times daily prayers and non-payment of sadaqa (Islamic alms).48 By the end of the 1850s Tsarist troops finally gained the upper hand in the warfare against Imam Shamyl's warriors, who in 1859, near the village of Gunib, were encircled and crushed. Shamyl himself was taken prisoner, although later he was set free under the condition that he would never return to the North Caucasus. He settled in the town of Kaluga in central Russia. In 1871 he died during the hajj to Mecca and was buried in Medina. The Russians dealt mercilessly with the remnants of Shamyl's troops. Hundreds were killed while many thousands fled to the Ottoman empire. The Imamate of Shamyl was disbanded and its territory was divided into nine military okrugs (districts). The new administrative bodies were headed by representatives of the tsarist military elite, many of whom were of Armenian and Georgian origin. In 1878 Imam Muhammad Sogratlinskii (1859±77) made the last attempt to revive the gazawat against the Russian occupation and to restore the Imamate, but was defeated by the Russian army. After this defeat, thousands of Abkhazes, Adyghs, Avars, Chechens, Cherkess and other irreconcilable mountain peoples fled the North Caucasus and settled in Anatolia and other provinces of the Ottoman empire. They made up large immigrant communities in what are now Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. By the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878, Ottoman Turkey recognized the Russian annexation of the eastern Caucasus. The Ottoman empire gave up its claims on the cities of Batum, Kars, Ardagan and Baiazet of the eastern Caucasus which were transferred to Russian suzerainty. Having defeated the gazawat, the Russian authorities moved towards economic and political colonization of the region. They began the construction of the railway network in order to connect the region to central Russia. In 1875±77, a railway was built between Rostov and Vladikavkaz; and in 1889 between Novorossiisk and Tikhoretskaia and between Beslan and Petrovsk. The integration of the North Caucasus within the imperial Russian transport system facilitated economic and trade activity in the region. Also, the Russian military presence, in spite of the obvious drawbacks of the military

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 53

occupation, put an end to the devastating raids of various local peoples against each other and provided a higher level of regional security. It introduced the locals to new agrarian technology, as well as to some elements of modern administration and the legal system.49 An important factor in the Russian victory over Imam Shamyl was the rivalry and disarray within his gazis (fighters of the gazawat), which weakened their resistance to the Russians. There were cases when some close associates of Imam Shamyl and other leaders of the gazawat joined the Russians and provided them with valuable intelligence information. Among such defectors were Shamyl's naibs (local governors) Eski Bata, Idil Khodzhiev and Muhammad Emin. It is also known that during the very peak of the gazawat in 1837 Imam Shamyl himself was ready to negotiate with Tsar Nicholas I (1825±55) a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Members of Shamyl's family also displayed a variety of attitudes towards St Petersburg's regional policy and towards the Russians generally. Thus, after the Russian victory in 1859 two of Imam Shamyl's sons, KaziMuhammad and Muhammad Kamil, emigrated to Turkey, while two other sons, Muhammad Shafi and Jamaluddin, became officers in the Russian army. On the other hand, there were also cases where some Russian officers and soldiers, as well as Cossacks, for personal or political reasons, joined the anti-Russian front. Such cases were most common among Terskie Cossacks who often changed sides and aligned themselves with Chechens fighting the Tsarist troops. It is significant that the different religious beliefs of Cossacks and Chechens did not present an obstacle to their military alliances. In order to prevent such alliances, the Tsarist Government transferred some of the Chechen lands to the Cossacks. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877±78, a considerable number of North Caucasians fought on the Russian side. Among them were the Tersko-Gorskii (Terek and Highlands) regiment and the Ingush division. Also, there is abundant evidence that the leaders of the gazawat and ordinary gazis distinguished between the brutal colonial policies of St Petersburg and ordinary Russians and Cossacks with whom they had much in common.50 The Russian victory in the Caucasus war was to a large extent a Pyrrhic one. During it, 24 147 Russian soldiers were killed, over 65 000 were wounded and over 6000 were taken prisoner. After the war, the Russian presence in the region cost St Petersburg almost a quarter of the annual imperial budget. The major expenses were related to the maintenance of the Russian military administration and the occupation army of 300 000 soldiers. Due to the specific conditions of the North Caucasus and the lengthy and bloody history of its annexation, the Russian military

54 Russia and Islam

administration there did not interfere in the existing economic, social and legal system. In Dagestan they did not pursue a policy of massive agrarian colonization. St Petersburg combined the military occupation of the region with the policy of cooptation of the local political and religious leaders and support of some of them against their rivals. This policy tended to favour the members of the Kabardinian and Ossetian nobility who converted to Orthodoxy. The latter were granted Russian imperial noble status, while the other ethnic elites were treated as socially and culturally inferior.51 The Caucasian war, which acquired a religious dimension, inflicted severe damage on Russian±Muslim relations in the region and within the Russian empire as a whole. In the North Caucasus the Naqshbandi tariqa, which played a crucial role in the anti-Russian resistance, suffered particularly badly in its aftermath. Many Naqshbandiis emigrated to Turkey, while those who stayed were weakened by the witch-hunt which was unleashed against them by the Tsarist okhranka (secret police). Many Naqshbandi shaykhs and ustadhes (teachers) and their murids were physically eliminated. The survivors were forced either to move to other tariqas which were not associated with the recent gazawat, or to hide in the mountains. In Chechnya, many former Naqshbandiis joined the Kadiri wird (a branch of the tariqa) of Kunta-Haji (d. 1867), which became the largest wird.52 By the late 1860s there were over 6000 followers of Kunta-Haji in Chechnya. Compared to the Naqshbandiis, who conducted a quiet dhikr (rhythmical repetition of the name of Allah), the Kadiriis were characterized by a loud and ecstatic dhikr which subsequently became a symbol of the resilience of the Caucasians to Russian rule. Kadiriis, or dhikrists, believed that through their expressive dhikr they physically cleansed themselves from their unclean social environment. Apart from the wird of Kunta-Haji, some Chechen and Ingush Kadiriis also followed the wirds of Batal-Haji, Bammat Girey-Haji and Chimmirza.53 After the Caucasian wars the Kadiriis prevailed in the plains, while the Naqshbandiis maintained their secretive dominance in the mountains. It is not clear if any Naqshbandi shaykhs survived in spite of the severe Tsarist persecutions and managed to leave their successors. The descendants of Dagestani and Chechen Naqshbandiis who fled the North Caucasus in the 1870s believe that after the Caucasian wars no Naqshbandi shaykhs were left in the region and the Naqshbandi silsila (Sufi transmission chain) there was interrupted. This point of view is opposed by the living Dagestani Naqshbandi shaykhs who insist that some Naqshbandi shaykhs survived in spite of the Russian and later Soviet

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 55

persecutions and continued the Naqshbandi silsila. Compared to the Naqshbandiis, who refused to submit to Russian rule, the Kadiriis were prepared to formally accept it in spite of their internal opposition to it. This enabled them to work as qadis (Muslim judges), mullahs and other Muslim clerics under the Tsarist administration.54 The annexation of the Caucasus created, after the Volga-Urals, the second largest Islamic enclave in Russia. The substantial increase in Russia's Islamic population required from St Petersburg an appropriate religious and national policy. Compared to its policy in the Volga-Urals, St Petersburg refrained from insisting on the total Christianization of the Islamic Caucasus and Crimea. In order to monitor the life of the local Muslim population there, it created two other Muftiyats in addition to the existing Muftiyat in Orenburg. In 1831, the Muftiyat of Crimea was formed in Bakhchesaray and in 1872 the Muftiyat of the Transcaucasus was created in Baku. The Muftiis were on the payroll of the Ministry of the Interior and the most co-operative of them received imperial decorations. The Muftiis reported directly to the Interior Minister who sanctioned their appointments and major initiatives. Still, the Muftiyats had a limited autonomy, based on its waqf property in the form of plots of land, hospitals, shelters and canteens. Until 1874, the Muftiyats were also in charge of mektebs and medresses which provided a comprehensive Islamic education for the bulk of the Muslim population. This accounted for the considerable spiritual authority of the Muftiis among ordinary Muslims. Some of them came from distinguished Islamic families who maintained their high spiritual status in spite of their formal compliance with Russian official policies.

The conquest of Kazakhstan and Central Asia The final stage of the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus was intertwined with the Russian eastward expansion towards Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Western Kazakhstan, which bordered the Russian empire, was populated mainly by Kazakhs, while eastern Kazakhstan, especially the regions adjacent to China and the Kokand Khanate, was dominated by Kyrgyzes, Turkmens and some other Turkic nomads. The nomadic way of life shaped the social organization, system of values and culture of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes. They bred sheep, goats, and camels and were involved in trade. Nomads regarded peasants and craftsmen as socially inferior peoples. Their major social unit was the aul, a kinship formation which comprised 10±15 related families. An aul was headed by an aksakal elected by the council of the heads of families. Several auls formed a clan

56 Russia and Islam

which presented a bigger kinship-territorial group headed by a biy. Clans in their turn made up the hordes, juzes which were military and political formations. At the head of the hordes were khans. From the end of the sixteenth century, Kazakhstan was dominated by the Kichi Juz (Small Horde), the Orta Juz (Middle Horde) and the Ulu Juz (Greater Horde). The Small Horde occupied the western part of Kazakhstan on the border with Russia. The territory of the Middle Horde roughly corresponded to central Kazakhstan while that of the Greater Horde lay to the south-west of Kazakhstan. In the thirteenth century, the Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes, like the Russians and other inhabitants of Eurasia, were incorporated into the Golden Horde. They were officially Islamicized during the rule of the Khan Uzbek (1313±42) although de facto many of them continued to adhere to shamanism, animism and tengrianism.55 The late nineteenth-century Russian advance towards Kazakhstan and Central Asia followed a lengthy period of Russian diplomatic and economic activity in western Siberia. In the early eighteenth century, Peter the Great began the construction of military fortification lines with fortresses along the Russian±Kazakh border. By 1752 the Irtyshskaia liniia (the Irtysh line) linked three Russian military strongholds ± Omsk (founded in 1717), Semipalatinsk (founded 1718) and Ust'-Kamenogorsk (founded 1720). In 1742, the Orenburgskaia liniia (the Orenburg line), which connected Orenburg (founded 1734) and Troisk (founded 1583), was built and in the 1750s the Yaitskaia liniia (the Yaitsk line) was constructed. In 1811 the Iletskaia liniia (the Iletsk line) was built between the rivers Ilek and Ural. Overall, by the beginning of the nineteenth century there were already 46 Russian fortresses within the fortification lines in western Siberia which served as actual borders between Russia and Kazakhstan and safeguarded Russian territory from raids by nomads. The fortification towns also acted as centres of trade and diplomatic contacts between Russia, the Kazakh Hordes and various state formations of Central Asia.56 From the seventeenth century the Russian rulers sought to influence the politics of the region through their meddling in the conflict between Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes on the one side, and the Kalmyks of the Jungar Khanate (1635±1758) and Chi'ing China (1644±1911), on the other. In this period, the Jungar Khanate, which embraced the vast territory from the river Don in the west to the river Yenisey in the east, was a powerful Eurasian state formation. In the late seventeenth century, the Jungars subjugated most of the Kazakh clans and established their control over the Kazakh Steppes. However, since the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Jungars were overpowered by the Chinese who finally

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 57

defeated them in 1758. Faced with Chinese expansionism some Kazakh and Kyrgyz khans and chieftains turned to St Petersburg for protection. In 1718, diplomatic relations were established between Russia and the Small Horde under the rule of Khan Abul Khayr (d. 1748). In 1731 St Petersburg granted Russian protection to the Small Horde and in 1732 to the Middle Horde under Khan Semeke (d. 1738), and guaranteed their security from plundering raids by the Jungars and Bashkirs. The Khans of the Small and Middle Hordes were to pay an annual tribute ( yasak) of fur skins to St Petersburg. They were also obliged to guard the eastern borders of the Russian empire and to enhance Russian military, political and economic interests on the territory of both Hordes. However, the Russian protectorate lasted only during the lifetime of the khans who agreed to it. Their successors changed their allegiance from Russia to Jungaria and subsequently to China. As for the Greater Horde, the bulk of its clans accepted Chinese suzerainty after the Jungar defeat in 1758.57 The early relations between Russia and various Central Asian states had a similar volatile dynamic. Between 1700 and 1714, diplomatic contacts were established between Russia and the Khanate of Khiva, which could have been a prologue for closer economic and political interaction. However, the treacherous assassination in 1717 of the Russian ambassador to Khiva Alexandr Bekovich-Cherkassky (converted Kabardian Kniaz Devlet-Kyzden-Murza) interrupted further development of Russian±Khivan relations. The situation was aggravated as a result of the conquest of Khiva by Iran in 1740. In spite of these setbacks Russia maintained its economic engagement in Central Asia. In 1738, St Petersburg gave official permission to Russian merchants to export gold and silver coins, iron and grain to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The Russian towns of Semipalatinsk, Orenburg and Tobol'sk became the major Russian centres of the trans-Asian caravan trade. From Orenburg Russian caravans headed to the seasonal markets of western Kazakhstan; from Semipalatinsk to the markets of central Kazakhstan, Kokand, Kulja and Kashgaria; and from Tobol'sk to Bukhara. There was also a caravan connection between Astrakhan on the Caspian sea and Tashkent. By the end of the eighteenth century, the main Russian merchant companies controlled two-thirds of the Russian trade with Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The further development of this trade was blocked by hard climatic conditions, nomadic plunder and the inadequacy of the transport system.58 Catherine the Great strengthened the Russian engagement in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. This was triggered by the mass participation of the Kazakhs of the Small and Middle Hordes in the anti-Government revolt under the leadership of Yemelian Pugachev (1773±75). Having suppressed

58 Russia and Islam

the rebels, Catherine pursued a policy of intensive economic and cultural colonization of the Kazakh Steppes. She adopted measures which enhanced the migration of Russian peasants to Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the sedentarization of the indigenous nomadic population. As was mentioned earlier, Catherine the Great facilitated the proliferation of Islam among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes and encouraged the Volga Tatars to act as the agents of Islamization there. Tatar merchants established their trade centre near Orenburg, in Kagralinsk, which oversaw Russia's trade with Kazakhstan and Central Asia. In 1784, Catherine decreed the building in the Kazakh Steppe of mosques, medresses and caravansarais and their staffing with Volga Tatars. Also, the Orenburg Muftiyat was entrusted with a proselytizing mission among Kazakh and Kyrgyz nomads. This mission was relatively successful and by the beginning of the nineteenth century Islam turned into the dominant religion among the Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes.59 During the nineteenth century, the Russian advance towards Kazakhstan and Central Asia acquired new momentum as a result of the growing political and economic activity of Great Britain in the region, which St Petersburg considered as its sphere of influence. During that period the Russians secured their dominance over the Kazakhs of the Small and Middle Hordes. The khans' authority became nominal. In 1818, the title of khan was abolished in the Middle Horde, and in the Small Horde in 1824. The territory of the Middle Horde was incorporated into the Western Siberia province of the Russian empire under the name of the `Kyrgyz steppe'. In 1844, the Kazakhs of the former Small Horde were transferred to dual administration by the Asian Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Orenburg town mayor. In 1818, Khan Suyuk of the Greater Horde recognized Russian tutelage and by the mid-nineteenth century most of the population of the former Greater Horde accepted Russian suzerainty. In 1854, the territory of the former Greater Horde was transformed into the Semipalatinskaia gubernia (province) of the Russian empire. Compared to the Muslim population of the North Caucasus, the Kazakhs and other Turkic nomads of the Kazakh Steppe reacted rather passively to Russian expansion on their lands. Furthermore, some Kazakhs regarded Russian supremacy as a lesser evil than the rule of their powerful neighbours in the east ± the Buddhist Jungars and Chinese. In the case of the Turkmen tribes of Abdaly, Chaudori and Indiri, they preferred Russian protection to the expansionist policies of Iran and the Khanate of Khiva. The Russian political and military presence in the Kazakh Steppe enhanced regional stability and put an end to the devastating mutual raids among the nomads.60

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During the initial period after the establishment of its domination in the Kazakh steppe, St Petersburg did not interfere in the administrative, legal and economic practices of the local population. However, in the late 1820s, it turned towards a comprehensive integration of Kazakhs, Kyrgyzes and indigenous peoples within the Russian economic, administrative and political system. The symbol of the new approach were the reforms by M. Speransky, the General-Governor of Western Siberia. Those reforms, which were implemented between 1820 and the 1840s, sought to uproot the clan-based social organization and nomadic way of life of the local population. Every Kazakh man was given the right to receive free a 15-desiatin (40-acre) plot in private ownership as well as free seed and implements with which to farm. The `Kyrghyz steppe' was divided into seven large okrugs which were administered by the council, headed by a sultan and two Russian and two Kazakh representatives. Each okrug was assigned defined borders that could not be crossed by the Kazakh nomads without the permission of the local authorities. Russian merchants were given the right to duty-free trade in Kazakhstan and Kazakh traders to duty-free trade in the rest of the Russian empire. The juridical part of the reforms sought the codification of the adat, known as the Code of Laws for the Steppe, and its adjustment to the Russian imperial juridical system. Alongside the economic and political reforms, the Russian authorities continued building the new border fortification lines and fortresses. In 1824, the fortresses of Karkagalinsk and Kokchetav were built; in 1827, Akmolinsk; in 1831, Sergiopol' (Ayaguz); and in 1834, Kokpeshty and Urdojar. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian fortifications went all the way along the borders of the Southern Steppes, the river SyrDarya and Semirechie. In 1867, Kazakhstan was integrated within the newly established Turkestan Governorship-General.61 Russian conquest had ambiguous consequences for the nomadic population of the region. It undermined the traditional nomadic way of life. The institution of Khan rule ceased to exist and the position of the clan aristocracy was irreversibly weakened. Kazakhs, Kyrgyzes and other nomads did not receive the status of subjects of the Russian empire and remained inorodtsy who were exempted from military service. Among the implications of the coercive settlement were total pauperization, mass hunger, cattle-plague and other ecological disasters. Between 1780 and 1850 there were a number of anti-Russian rebellions among the Kazakhs of the Small and Middle Hordes. The largest were the uprising of the Kazakhs of the Small Horde under the leadership of batyr (chieftain) Srym Datov in 1783±97 and of the Middle Horde under the leadership of Khan Kenesary in the 1840s. On the other hand, local peoples were

60 Russia and Islam

allowed to preserve some degree of self-government, represented by the Councils of Elders, which operated on the basis of the customary law. They benefited from the relative political security, better transport system, basic medical care and some education for a privileged minority which came about with Russian rule.62 The subjugation of Kazakhstan facilitated the Russian advance into Central Asia which, as noted earlier, was not entirely a terra incognita for the Russians. Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, both Russians and Central Asians were under the Genghizid rule. They developed trade links and were acquainted with each other's culture and customs. Russian merchants participated in the trans-Asian trade which was largely controlled by merchant companies from Bukhara and Samarkand. The main destinations of this trade were markets in the Far and Middle East and Eurasia. From Central Asia came diverse fabrics, dyestuffs, medicinal herbs, leather and rugs. Apart from that, there was an established caravan trade between Bukhara and the Siberian town of Tobol'sk (1587) which was regulated by Tatar and Russian merchants. Political contacts between the Russian and Central Asian rulers were sporadic and volatile and strongly influenced by other regional powers, in particular, Safavid Iran. The disintegration of the Safavid empire in 1736 prompted the emergence of three centres of power ± the Emirate of Bukhara, the Khanate of Khiva and the Khanate of Kokand ± which clashed over regional superiority.63 The Bukhara Emirate occupied the fertile valley of Zaravshan between the two mighty rivers of Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Its two largest cities ± Bukhara and Samarkand ± were the ancient regional trade and cultural centres. Bukhara was the capital of the Emirate, while Samarkand used to be the capital of the powerful Timurid empire. The Emirate was populated predominantly by Uzbeks (a Turkic people), Tajiks (an Iranian people), Turkmen, Farsi-speaking Jews and some other smaller ethnic groups. Its economy was based on irrigated agriculture, sophisticated craft industry and trans-Asian trade. From the mid-eighteenth century, the Bukhara Emirate was ruled by the Islamic Uzbek dynasty of Mangyt (1753±1920). It was a medieval state formation which was characterized by economic stagnation and political decentralization. The Emir's power was undermined by the rebellions of the Kitay-Kipchaks, the merchants and craftsmen of Samarkand, as well as by nomadic raids and the wars with Kokand and Khiva.64 Islam, which was brought to Bukhara by the Arabs in the seventh century, penetrated the economic, political and legal system of the Emirate. The Emir issued laws and decrees on the basis of the shariat. The

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principal interpreters of the shariat were the shaykh-ul-Islam and the kazikolon. The upper class consisted of the military nobility ± the sipokh ± and the Islamic elite ± the ulemo. The lower class, or the fuqaro, included the dehqane (the peasants), craftsmen, merchants and cattle-breeders. At the very bottom of the social pyramid were slaves who played a significant economic role. The primary social unit of Bukharan society was the local commune, which was called a kishlak in the rural areas, and a mahalla in the cities. The Emirate's land was divided into three main categories ± state (amliak) which predominated, private (mul'k) and Islamic (waqf). It was most often cultivated by impoverished tenants who were allowed to retain only a small fraction of the crop. The spiritual and social centres of a commune were a mosque headed by a mullah, the most learned and respected person in the community, and a mazar, the burial place of the local Islamic saint. Mazars were guarded by Sufi shaykhs, or pirs, who were regarded as having supernatural and mystical abilities.65 The bulk of the Emirate's population professed the Hanafi madhhab of Sunni Islam. Compared to Kazakhs, Kyrgyzes and other nomads of the region, the Bukharans were deeply religious people. The remoteness of Bukhara, as well as of other Central Asian cities, from the Islamic heartland in the Middle East, and its encirclement by Russian and Chinese `infidels' defined the specific characteristics of regional Islam which incorporated various local pre-Islamic beliefs and adat norms. Iranian religious influence accounted for the elements of Shiism in the Turkmens' Islamic beliefs and practices. There was even a saying `when the Turkmen prays, the Uzbek spits', meaning that Sunni Uzbeks did not accept the Shiite aspects of Turkmen Sunnism. Also there was a substantial Shia community of Ithna-Asharites, or Twelvers. Local Shiites maintained links with their spiritual centres in Meshhed, Qum, Al-Najaf and Kerbela. From the fifteenth century a Shia community of Ismailis existed in the Pamir mountains.66 A considerable number of Bukharans were Sufis. From the tenth century Bukhara was a recognized regional centre of Islamic learning and mysticism. The Sufi authorities ± shaykhs, pirs and ishans ± enjoyed enormous spiritual and political influence which was comparable to that of emirs, khans and sultans. Compared to Iran, Bukhara's Sufism developed within orthodox Islam. From the twelfth century, the Kubrawiyya and Yasawiyya were the most influential tariqas. In the fourteenth century, the Naqshbandiyya acquired domination. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Naqshbandiyya headed resistance to the Buddhist Oirot and Kalmyk invaders.67 The Kokand Khanate was situated in the Ferghana valley and Tashkent oasis. It was ruled by the Khans of the Uzbek dynasty of Ming (1710±1876)

62 Russia and Islam

and populated by Uzbeks, Kyrgyzes, Kipchaks and other Turkic nomads. The political and economic system of the Khanate was similar to that of the Bukhara Emirate. However, compared to the Emirate, the Khanate had a much larger and less Islamicized nomadic population which continued to live according to the adat norms. Moreover, the leaders of the Kyrgyz and Kipchak aristocracy constantly challenged Uzbek central authority. Yet another distinctive characteristic of the Kokand Khanate derived from its close proximity with China, which was simultaneously a permanent military threat and a source of strong cultural influence. Until 1814, the Kokand Khanate was de facto a protectorate of China.68 The Islamic Khanate of Khiva embraced the lands of the lower Amu Darya and the southern shore of the Aral sea, including the oasis of Khiva. Its economic, social and legal systems resembled those of Bukhara and Kokand. Its population consisted of Uzbeks, Kara-Kalpaks, Turkmens, Kazakhs and some other Turkic peoples. The political and social dynamic was determined by the unstable balance between the nomadic and settled peoples of the Khanate. The central authority in the Khanate was contested by the Uzbek, Turkmen and Kara-Kalpak elites. By the nineteenth century, the Uzbek dynasty of Kungrat had gained political dominance.69 In the 1860s, St Petersburg opted for a military campaign to achieve the annexation of Central Asia. It was driven by the logic of the `Great Game' between Tsarist Russia and Great Britain and economic changes within Russia, generated by the bourgeois reforms of Alexander II (1855±81).70 The Game acquired a new turn after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War and British activities in Afghanistan, which was adjacent to Central Asia. Russia was forced to withdraw from active politics in the Middle East and the Balkans and to focus on Central Asia. Following its Western European counterparts, Russian policy-makers preceded the military campaign in Central Asia with intensive ideological propaganda presenting its actions as a civilizing mission. Among the economic reasons for Russian expansionism in Central Asia were the interests of Russian manufacturers and merchants, who sought direct access to the markets of Central Asia, as well as Iran, Afghanistan, India and China. They were interested in the export to Central Asia of grain, sugar, tobacco, cloth and various metal items, and in the import of cattle, leather, wool, rugs and spices. Another important economic incentive was to do with irregularities in the supply of cotton from America, which between 1861 and 1865 was engulfed in civil war. Russian manufacturers and commercial circles viewed Central Asia as a potential producer of cotton and as a wide market for their production, which did not compete very successfully with relevant Western goods. The existing caravan trade routes had ceased to satisfy growing

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needs due to a high level of insecurity, expense and the length of time it took.71 It is worth mentioning that long before the beginning of the military campaign St Petersburg took some measures aimed at facilitating Russian trade in the region. For this purpose, in 1819 a special Asian Committee, under the joint supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of War, was formed. In the 1820s, Russian±Central Asian trade acquired an impetus as a result of the Russian Government's switch from a policy of free trade towards a policy of protectionism. St Petersburg managed to gain considerable privileges for Russian merchants in the Bukhara Emirate. Thus, for some time, Russia achieved a rapprochement with Bukhara on an anti-Khiva and anti-Kokand basis. Russia and Bukhara exchanged diplomatic missions, although the Bukhara Emir refused to have a permanent Russian representative in Bukhara.72 In 1864, the Russian army under the command of General Cherniaev crossed the borders of Kokand Khanate, which was regarded as an easier target than the other two Central Asian states because of the regular Chinese invasions and the exhausting wars with Bukhara. In 1842, the Bukharans established their control over the major cities of the Khanate, Tashkent and Khodjent. The Kokand elite was fragmented and demoralized: some of its factions began to seek external alliances against the other. In these circumstances, the Russian emissaries struck a deal with representatives of the Kokand elite who favoured the Russian invasion as a counterbalance against imminent Chinese and Bukharan expansionism. In spite of the complacent attitude of some of the ruling class, the ordinary population, especially the Kyrgyz and Turkmen tribes, met the Russian advance with fierce resistance. However, the overwhelming Russian numbers and technical superiority sealed the fate of the Khanate. By the beginning of 1865, the Russians had taken the towns of Turkestan, Chimkent and Aulie Ata and established their control over most of Kokand Khanate. As a result of this operation, the Russian Siberian and Syr Daryanian fortification lines were joined together. In May 1865, the Russian army occupied Tashkent and a year later Khodjent. In 1867, the bulk of the territory of the Kokand Khanate was included within the Turkestan Governorship-General of the Russian empire. The first Governor-General of Turkestan was Gen. K.P. Kaufman, followed by Gen. M.D. Skobelev.73 In 1868, Khan Khudoyar of Kokand officially recognized Russian suzerainty. In 1876, the Khanate of Kokand was abolished and most of its territory was included within Ferghana oblast' of the Turkestan

64 Russia and Islam

Governorship-General, which was subordinate to Russia's Ministry of War. The Russian state assumed the ownership of the Khanate's land, which was then divided into several administrative-territorial units ± the uyezds and volosti, the borders of which cut across the traditional clan and tribal lines. Turkestan Governor-Generals were furnished with almost unlimited powers. Only at the local level did the Russian authorities allow for some autonomy embodied by the shariat courts in the villages and the biy's courts among the nomads. A sequence of Russian land codes, adopted in 1867, 1873, 1886 and 1891, eroded the economic base of the indigenous clan and Islamic elite and undermined the nomadic way of life. Under the new legislature, the size of the nomads' pasturelands was considerably reduced and many of them were isolated from the traditional grazing land and water resources.74 On the whole, the nature and methods of the initial Tsarist policy in the former Kokand Khanate, and Turkestan in general, differed significantly from those in other non-Russian parts of the empire. Although the local population was subject to Russian civil and military law, the institution of the municipal government (zemstvo) was not introduced there with the exception of Tashkent. St Petersburg did not create a Muftiyat and the local Islamic clergy were subordinated to the Russian Governor-Generals. Over 60 per cent of the annual regional budget was designated for the military, police and administrative needs of the region. The Turkestan government was largely represented by the Russian military, who were assisted by collaborators from the local elite. The Russian authorities fostered the rapid expansion of cotton production which destroyed the traditional crops and predetermined Turkestan's future dependence on grain imports from central Russia.75 Discriminatory land legislature, the policy of coercive settlement and the intensive agrarian colonization by Cossack, Russian and Ukrainian peasants inflicted terrible damage on the way of life and wellbeing of the nomads. Many thousands of nomads and their cattle died of hunger. The local population responded to Russian rule by a series of revolts, some of which acquired an Islamic form. Its leaders were often Sufi shaykhs, or ishans of the Naqshbandi tariqa. For example, the anti-Russian uprising in the Chirchik valley was headed by Khoja-ishan of Kulkari. Kurban Murat, a Naqshbandii, was the leader of the Turkmen rebellion near Geok-Tepe. Ishan Muhammad Ali headed the massive anti-Russian uprising in the Ferghana valley. The rebels besieged Andijan and Osh and attempted to storm Tashkent and Samarkand. It is significant that during the RussoTurkish war of 1877±78, the local Naqshbandi leaders undertook an abortive attempt to co-ordinate their actions with the North Caucasian

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 65

Sufis.76 Still, as in the case of Kazakhstan, the Russian conquest of Kokand Khanate also brought about some positive changes.77 In 1866, St Petersburg presented the Bukhara Emir Muzzaffer (1860± 85) with an ultimatum which demanded immediate capitulation and acceptance of the Russian protectorate over Bukhara. The Emir's rejection of the ultimatum provoked a Russian military advance against Bukhara. In May 1868, the 3500-men Russian army under the command of General Kaufman, the Governor-General of Turkestan, took Samarkand and, following the course of the Zaravshan river, reached KattaKurgan. In May 1868, General Kaufman defeated the Emir's troops. In June, Emir Muzzaffer was forced to agree to the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Bukhara Emirate. According to the `Treaty of Friendship' between St Petersburg and Bukhara, the latter agreed to pay Russia a contribution of 500 000 roubles and accepted the privileged status of Russian merchants on the territory of the Emirate. A substantial part of the Emirate's territory, including the towns of Khodjent, UraTube, Djizak and Katta-Kurgan, was transformed into Zaravshan okrug of the Turkestan Governorship-General. In 1873, St Petersburg forced yet another humiliating treaty on the Bukhara Emir. According to this treaty, the Emir was obliged to accept the interference of St Petersburg in the succession matters of the Emirate; submit to the introduction of a diplomatic representative as the main intermediary between Bukhara and the Turkestan Governorship-General; and yield to the stationing of a several thousand-strong Russian military contingent on the territory of the Emirate. In 1885, the functions of the diplomatic representative were transferred to `the Russian political agent', who was based in New Bukhara (Kagan). The Russian political agency oversaw Russian commercial interests, agrarian immigration and cotton production in the territory of the Emirate.78 Nevertheless, the introduction of the Russian protectorate did not seriously affect the internal organization of the Emirate. Bukharan society maintained its closed medieval character. In spite of the partial introduction of cotton agriculture, craft production maintained its leading position in the Emirate's economy. The Bukharan leather-makers, rugweavers and golden cloth-workers continued to dominate local and regional markets. The Emir, who proclaimed himself the Caliph of Central Asia, remained Bukhara's supreme religious and secular leader. Bukhara maintained its high status as the regional centre of Islamic learning. The medresses of Bukhara attracted thousands of students from various Muslim enclaves of the Russian empire. Islamic education was based on qadimist (lit. `old') traditions which emphasized conservatism and

66 Russia and Islam

scholasticism. By contrast with the Volga-Urals and the North Caucasus, the local Sufis remained politically inert. Moreover, they merged with the ruling class, submissive to conquering rulers.79 The conquest of Khiva, protected by arid deserts, turned out to be particularly difficult for St Petersburg's strategists. In 1840, V.V. Perovskii, the Governor-General of Orenburg, undertook the first, unsuccessful attempt to subjugate Khiva. Over twenty years later General Kaufman put forward a more sophisticated campaign plan against Khiva. It included the simultaneous advance towards Khiva of the 13 000-strong Russian armies from the Caucasus, Orenburg and Turkestan and the gradual encirclement of Khiva. The campaign began in early 1869 and lasted four years, until 1873. In May 1873, General Kaufman entered Khiva. In August, the Khivan Khan Sayid Muhammad Rakhim Bakhadur was forced to accept the Russian peace conditions. The western part of the Khanate's territory was annexed by Russia, while its eastern part was placed under the Russian protectorate. Apart from this, the Khan was required to pay a substantial contribution to St Petersburg.80 The Turkmen tribes of the oasis of Akhel-Tekke, which was under the control of the Khiva Khan, refused to submit to Russian rule. In 1879, the Teke Turkmen tribes defeated the Russian troops at the fort of GeokTepe. As in the North Caucasus, the Sufi tariqas played a vital role in inspiring, organizing and leading the fight. In January 1881, 11 000 Russian troops under Gen. M.D. Skobelev took Geok-Tepe after a fierce battle, slaughtering hundreds of its defendants. In February 1884, the Russian army occupied the last stronghold of Turkmen resistance, the towns of Merv and Tedjen. The oasis of Akhel-Tekke was transformed into the Caspian oblast' of the Russian empire. The subjugation of the Turkmen brought the number of Russia's Muslims to almost 35 million. China and Iran recognized the new eastern borders of the Russian empire in the Sino-Russian treaty of 1860 and the Russian± Iranian treaty of 1887, respectively. In 1887 the border between Russian Central Asia and British-dominated Afghanistan was determined. In 1895, the Russian empire and Great Britain finally drew a demarcation line between their spheres of interest in Asia. This marked the end of `the Great Game' and Russia's eastward expansion.81 The conditions of the Russian protectorate over Khiva were tougher than in the case of Bukhara.82 The right bank of the Amu-Darya was annexed by Russia and transformed into Amu Darya oblast' of the Russian empire. Unlike the Emir of Bukhara, who had the right of direct communication with the Russian monarch, the Khan of Khiva enjoyed no such right. Instead he had to act through an intermediary, the

Russia and its Muslim Neighbours 67

Russian administration of Amu Darya oblast', based in Novo-Aleksandrovsk. Control over the Khanate's foreign relations was transferred to St Petersburg. In 1894, the Tsarist Government included Khiva, alongside Bukhara, within the all-Russian customs zone. Still, as in Bukhara, the everyday life of the Khiva Khanate did not undergo radical change as a result of the establishment of Russian control. This accounts for the relatively weak anti-tsarist movement there. During the 1870s±90s, popular protest was more defined by the reaction against the arbitrariness and abuse of power by the tax collectors and other officials than by opposition to Russian rule.83 Compared to the Volga-Urals and the Crimea, in Central Asia the process of social and economic intermingling between the Russians and the locals was limited to large cities where the Russians were mainly the military, officials and merchants. Russian and Cossack agrarian settlements remained enclaves within the indigenous rural population. The Russian authorities did not attempt a coercive conversion of the local population as they did in their relations with the Muslims of the VolgaUrals. The non-interference of the Russian authorities in the internal organization of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva perpetuated the archaic and backward characteristics of these traditional societies. Members of the Bukharan and Khivan bureaucracy who did not receive a regular salary from St Petersburg made their living out of extortion, arbitrary taxation and corruption. As a result, the local population was subjected to over fifty different taxes in favour of the ruling class. In fact, the taxation burden there was much heavier than in Turkestan.84

So, the process of incorporation of various Islamic peoples into Russia, which took almost four centuries, had a formative impact on the political, social and cultural evolution of both the Russians and the various Muslim peoples involved. Until the ascent of the Romanov dynasty in the early seventeenth century, Russian political and economic practices, diplomatic and court ceremonies and customs were strongly influenced by the Islamicized Genghizid legacy. Russia's technological and cultural modernization, which was initiated by Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century and continued by Catherine the Great and Alexander II, had an enclave, elitist and symbolic character, and did not penetrate the fabric of Russian society, which continued to evolve along traditional lines. While eighteenth-century Western Europe experienced an industrial revolution, which led to the breakthrough into a modern civil society

68 Russia and Islam

characterized by the priority of the producer and the supremacy of individual rights, contemporary Russia continued to adhere to a non-productive, redistributary economy and to pre-modern social institutions. The political outcome was the Russian state's non-involvement in the revolutionary turmoil in Europe following the French Revolution of 1789. During the nineteenth century, the Russian autocracy demonstrated its rigidity in resisting any structural change and confirmed its total control over Russian society. The Russian political system had the appearance of a formally representative system, while real power remained with the Tsar and repressive state bodies, which were accountable to no-one. The discrepancy between state and society affected Russia's official domestic and external policies. From the eighteenth century, Russia's interaction with Asia, including its Islamic part, became dependent on her relations with Europe, especially Great Britain, France, AustriaHungary and the German states. In this context, the incorporation of the Islamic North Caucasus and Central Asia into the Russian empire in the nineteenth century was conducted in accordance with the logic of realpolitik which shaped the relationship between the world's major colonial powers. The dualism of the Russian state and society accounted for the differences between its form of colonialism and that of Western Europe. While the former was largely defined by military and political considerations, the latter was the product of advancing capitalism. Russian expansion within the Islamic south and east, therefore, added a stagnating impulse to its economic and political development. Its corollary was the further strengthening of the Russian autocracy and the Russian Orthodox Church as its constituent parts. This led to deterioration in Russian±Islamic relations at the level of policy, although it did not seriously affect them at the grassroots level.85

3

Russia's Umma and Modernization at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century

The great reforms Russia's defeat in the Crimean war demonstrated its economic and military backwardness and revealed the acute necessity for its technological modernization and political liberalization. On 19 February 1861 Tsar Alexander II issued the Statute on the Abolition of Serfdom in the Russian Empire which marked the beginning of `the Great Reforms' of Russia's economic, political, military, legal and educational systems. Like previous modernizations by Peter the Great and Catherine the Great those reforms were initiated from above and therefore bore a limited and superficial character. Nevertheless, they provided an impetus to the capitalist development of Russia, an important part of which was the awakening of the national consciousness of Russians and non-Russian peoples of the empire. Russia's Muslim peoples reacted differently to the reforms. The Tatar and to some extent the Azeri elite met them with enthusiasm, while the Muslims of the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia remained practically aloof from them. Among the Tatars, and to a lesser extent among the Bashkirs and Azeris, the reforms triggered the process of formation of the first entrepreneurs. In the towns of the Volga-Urals and Siberia, Tatar businessmen began to organize the first capitalist factories which employed primarily Tatar or other Muslim workers. These factories specialized in stearin, leather, flex, weaving and soap production. In the southern Urals Tatar and Bashkir entrepreneurs became involved in goldmining and timber production. Tatar entrepreneurs, alongside Russian, Armenian, Jewish as well as English and French businessmen, took part in the development of oil production and in oil-related industries in 69

70 Russia and Islam

Azerbaijan. As a result of Tatar involvement in capitalist development they soon became the most urbanized Muslim people of Russia. By 1913 there were 388 industrial plants in the Tatar-populated regions. This rapid economic advance allowed Tatars to strengthen their dominance in other Islamic parts of Russia.1 Similarly, Tatars, Bashkirs and Azeris were the main beneficiaries from the political and cultural aspects of the modernization process. From 1864 they had their representatives in zemstvos and other elected bodies. By the end of the nineteenth century, for example, Tatars made up about a quarter of Deputies of the Kazan Duma (municipality). The political activity of various Muslim elites gained new momentum in 1886 when St Petersburg granted Russia's Muslims equal political rights with its other subjects.2 Among the consequences of the military reform was a substantial enlargement of the Muslim faction within the Russian imperial military hierarchy and the promotion of representatives of the military Muslim elite to the top ranks. For example, Muhammad-Shapi, one of the sons of Nakhichevan Khan Gusein, was elevated to the rank of Russian General. He served in the Caucasian squadron of the Tsar's personal convoy and was rewarded with a number of high imperial decorations. During the Russo-Turkish war in 1877±78 this squadron, as well as other Muslim units of the Russian army, fought bravely on the Russian side. Still, the military reform did not affect the Muslims of Central Asia who remained exempted from military service, although some members of the Central Asian elite were accepted into the Russian political and military establishment and regularly received Russian state decorations. For instance, Bukhara Emir Seyid Alim Khan had the rank of General of the Russian imperial army.3 Of special significance was religious reform, which created better conditions for the fulfilment of the religious needs of Russia's Muslims. It simplified the hajj to Mecca and Medina. As a result, the annual number of Russia's hajjis rose to almost ten thousand. Together with the liberalization of emigration rules the religious reform enabled many thousands of Muslims to leave the country for good. In the year 1899 alone 120 000 Kuban Muslims fled Russia. The 1887 decree of the Russian State Council permitted a Muslim community of 300, or more, to have its separate mosque. It also introduced some restrictions on interference by the Orthodox Church into the life of the Islamic umma. Russia's Muslims were granted an official right to profess their religion and to conduct Islamic practices, although under the condition that the latter did not infringe upon the rights of the neighbouring Christian Orthodox communities. This implied that in mixed Orthodox±Muslim

Russia's Umma and Modernization 71

areas the Muslims needed the permission of the Orthodox Church to proceed with the construction of a new mosque, or with other Islamicrelated activities. Nevertheless, these measures boosted the morale of Russia's Muslims.4 In 1872, in Baku, the Russian authorities established the Muftiyat of the Transcaucasus in addition to the two other Muftiyats in Orenburg and Bakhchesaray. All three Muftiyats were headed by Muftiis who were appointed and funded by the Ministry of the Interior. It is worth mentioning that in spite of the Muftiyats' administrative and financial dependency on the Russian authorities they maintained some autonomy and enjoyed considerable respect among ordinary Muslims. Their substantial economic resources derived from waqf property, which included land and various charities ± hospitals, shelters for old people, widows and orphans. The Muftiyats oversaw the educational, legal and ritual affairs of the Muslim population. In 1886 the Tsarist Government recognized the legitimacy of the shariat courts, although the official policy on this issue had substantial regional variations. In Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the Russian authorities promoted the existing shariat courts while in the North Caucasus, where the shariat was associated with the recent gazawat, they opted for the institutionalization of the adat courts. In 1868 St Petersburg codified the adat norms and adapted them to the Russian legislature. Adat courts were then permitted to deal with major civic and criminal cases.5 In 1865, St Petersburg introduced a relatively liberal publishing law which included the withdrawal of a wide range of books and other publications from the preliminary censorship. This created a powerful impetus for literary activity among Muslims, especially Tatars. A number of Islamic publishing houses emerged. By the end of the nineteenth century, Islamic publishing houses existed in Kazan, Temir-Khan Shura (Buynaks, Dagestan), Port-Petrovsk (Makhachkala, Dagestan), Bakhchesaray, Simferopol' and St Petersburg. The Kazan University Publishing House was the undisputed leader among them. It published books in Tatar, Arabic, Persian, Turkish and some other local Muslim languages. The bulk of the published literature bore an Islamic character, with the Koran having the largest edition. Various Islamic publishers also produced popular literature which included healing recipes, Islamic poetry and literary imitations of famous medieval Arab, Persian and Ottoman authors. Given the relatively high level of literacy among Russia's Muslims, the development of the Islamic publishing business contributed to their growing national and religious self-awareness.6 However, it was the reform of the educational system which was particularly important for the national development of Russia's Muslims.

72 Russia and Islam

The aim of this reform was to create a nationwide, unified and standardized educational system which would be adequate to the needs of the capitalist development. It sought, therefore, to integrate Russia's Muslims into the socio-economic and political fabric of the empire. In particular, the Russian state needed more modern-educated Muslims who could fill the middle and lower levels of imperial administration in Muslim-populated regions of the empire. The reform's contents, forms and intensity differed significantly from one region to another. In the Caucasus, priority was given to Russian-based schooling, similar to that in Central Russia. In the Volga-Urals, Crimea and Central Asia, the Russian authorities preferred a mixed Russian±native type of school system and allowed a non-Russian language of instruction. The first Russian school in the Caucasus was opened in 1862 by Great Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich. In the Kazakh Steppe a network of similar schools emerged. They were modelled on the first local `Asiatic schools' in Omsk (1786), Khanskaiia Stavka (1841) and Orenburg (1850).7 As in the past, the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church played an important part in the educational reform among the Muslims. They regarded Islam, which regulated the everyday life of Muslims and did not require a large clergy apparatus, as a serious threat to its spiritual monopoly in Russia. The Orthodox Church sought to safeguard its position as the state religion and therefore advocated state interference in Islamic confessional education and the formation of special antiIslamic faculties at Russian Universities; and official support for the missionary activities of Orthodox clerics which were aimed at the ethnic and religious assimilation of inorodtsy. Thus, according to one of the documents of the Russian Ministry of Education dated 2 February 1870, the final goal of the education of inorodtsy was their complete cultural and religious Russification. In 1874, the Government transferred Islamic confessional education in the Volga-Urals from the supervision of the Orenburg Muftiyat to the Russian Ministry of Education, which imposed obligatory Russian classes in Islamic schools.8 The Orthodox Church instigated missionary activities, which were most prevalent in the Volga-Urals. From 1860 to the 1880s, the main agencies of the Orthodox mission were the Orthodox Church Brotherhood of Saint Gurii of Kazan Cathedral Church, founded in 1867, and the Kazan Ecclesiastical Academy which had a specialist anti-Islamic faculty. Their ambition was the eradication of Islam in Russia. They promoted the idea that Russia's prosperity and development were functions of the complete Christianization of her population which allegedly could be achieved only by imposing on inorodtsy a conviction

Russia's Umma and Modernization 73

of the moral superiority of Russian ethnicity and Russian culture. The Orthodox clerics bitterly criticized any Government liberal initiatives in relation to Islam and Muslims and pressed for the escalation of the official policy of coercive conversion of Muslims and their deportation to central Russia. Thus, in 1866 the Kazan' vladyka Antonii (the regional Orthodox authority) proposed to the Synod `a programme of suppression of Islamism' which included the mass deportation of Tatars to ethnically Russian regions of the empire. The most influential methodologists of the Orthodox mission to Russia's Muslims were M.A. Miropiev, N.I. Baratynskii, P.D. Shestakov, M.A. Mashanov and N.I. Il'minskii, who in spite of their ideological rejection of Islam had a profound understanding of it. Some of them had powerful connections, or even official posts within the Russian Government, which enabled them to influence decision-making concerning Russia's Muslims and the educational reform among them, in particular. Professor Mashanov and clergyman Bagin, for example, were among the official advisors of the `Special Committee in charge of fighting Islam' within the Ministry of the Interior. Interestingly, they recommended to the government the promotion of Islamic studies in Russia in order to know and understand the weakness of Islam and thus be able to fight it more effectively. Although Russian clerical intellectuals shared the same goal, their tactics were quite different. Thus, N.I. Baratynskii and his followers advocated straightforward Russification and a ban on non-Russian languages and on other than the study of Orthodox Christianity in the school curriculum. Compared to them, P.D. Shestakov and N.I. Il'minskii suggested a more subtle form of Russification through Christian Orthodox education. They believed that Orthodox Christianity was the essence of Russianness and should therefore form the basis of the school curriculum, while the medium of instruction was less important and could be the language of a particular non-Russian community.9 The Russian clerical intellectuals differed considerably on the methods and pace of Russification of the inorodtsy. N.I. Baratynskii and his followers advocated a straightforward Russification and a ban on non-Russian languages and on other than Orthodox Christianity religions in the school curriculum. Compared to them, P.D. Shestakov and N.I. Il'minskii suggested a more subtle way of Russification through Christian Orthodox education. They believed that Orthodox Christianity was the essence of Russianness and therefore should form the basis of the school curriculum, while the medium of instruction was less important and could be a language of a particular non-Russian community. Their educational

74 Russia and Islam

programme included three types of schools: Russian-Tatar schools (Russko-Tatarskie Shkoli); the Central School for Baptized Tatars (Tsentral'naia Kresheno-Tatarskaia Shkola); and the Kazan Teachers Seminary for non-Russians (Kazanskaia Inorodcheskaia Uchitel'skaia Seminaria).10 In 1870, this approach was favoured by the Russian authorities, which sanctioned its practical implementation in the Russian-native schools of central Russia. In 1870, the first Russko-Tatarskaia Shkola was founded in Kazan, and in 1871 a similar school was opened in Simferopol'. In the Kazan school the language of instruction was Tatar, while in Simferopol' it was Russian, although the Tatar language, as well as Islam and Islamicrelated disciplines, were included in the curriculum. In 1876 the Kazanskaia Inorodcheskaia Uchitel'skaia Seminaria was opened in Kazan, the first higher school for members of the Tatar elite. The graduates of this seminary formed the core of the Tatar national intelligentsia who became teachers in secondary schools and medresses and the activists of the Tatar national movement. In 1884, the first Russian-native schools were formed in Kazakhstan and Turkestan. An important role in their creation was played by the Kazakh and Turkestani intellectuals Ibray Altynsarin, Choqan Valikhanov, Abay Kunanbay, Sayid Aziz Khodj, Sayid Karim-bay, Haji Muin, Ashur Ali Zahiri and Sayid Rasul Rasuli. In spite of the elitist character of these schools, they provided limited access for Russia's Muslims into the Russian higher education system, represented by gymnasiums, cadet schools and universities.11

Al-usul al-jadid The reform of Islamic education, which embraced the bulk of the Muslim population, had a profound impact on Russia's umma as a whole. The centres of confessional education were mektebs (primary Islamic schools), attached to a local mosque, and medresses (secondary Islamic schools). The education in mektebs lasted a year, or two, and was limited to teaching literacy skills and the basics of Islam and shariat, while a small number of medresses provided a more extensive Islamic education which required many years of study. The teaching in mektebs and medresses was based on Bukharan scholastic textbooks written in Arabic, Persian and Chagatay. The medium of instruction was Arabic, as well as one of the Turkic languages ± Tatar, Uzbek, Kazakh, or Turkish.12 During the centuries of Russian political and cultural domination, mektebs and medresses were the main reservoirs and transmitters of the national cultural distinctiveness of various Muslim peoples and perpetuated their social and cultural segregation within Russia. For decades the

Russia's Umma and Modernization 75

linguistic and curriculum insularity of mektebs and medresses caused concern to the Russian authorities and particularly the Synod, which regarded them as potential centres of subversion. In 1870, therefore, Government attempted to change the situation by the imposition of obligatory Russian in the curriculum of newly opened mektebs and medresses. Four years later the Government took the next step by withdrawing mektebs and medresses from the authority of Muftiyats and placing them under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. It also demanded from mullahs, akhunds and other Muslim clerics an obligatory knowledge of the Russian language.13 Because Russian educational policy in the Islamic regions was determined primarily by pragmatic and security factors, it did not seek the comprehensive reform of confessional education. The latter was initiated within Russia's umma itself. From the 1860s, a number of Tatar intellectuals raised the issue of the modernization of confessional education without its Russification. They regarded the existing system, which was based on rote memorizing of Islamic texts in Arabic without understanding the meaning, as rigid, scholastic and distant from the needs of modern life. In 1861±62, a distinguished Tatar thinker Huseyn Faizkhanov (d. 1866) developed a detailed project for educational reform which was aimed at the creation of a network of secondary schools for Tatars and other Muslims which would combine the standards of Russian gymnasium education with the teaching of Tatar national history and language. It is significant that Faizkhanov believed in the vital necessity for Tatars to learn Russian, which he viewed as a medium of technological and cultural progress as well as a lingua franca. However, the educational reform suggested by Faizkhanov and other Muslim intellectuals did not get beyond paper.14 The actual modernization of Islamic confessional education was pioneered by Ismail Gasprinskii (d. 1914), a well-educated and Europeanminded Crimean Tatar. In 1884, he introduced a new method (al-usul al-jadid, in Arabic) of teaching in the Tatar mekteb in his home village in the Crimea. Subsequently, the proponents of this method were called jadidists, while the advocates of the preservation of the old syllabic method of teaching (al-usul al-qadim, in Arabic) were called qadimists. The al-usul al-jadid involved the phonetization of reading instead of memorization from Arabic, the translation of the Koran into the Tatar language and the introduction of secular subjects like arithmetic, geography, history and the Russian language into the school curriculum. The application of the al-usul al-jadid was accompanied by the switch from Bukharan textbooks written mainly in Arabic, Persian, or Chagatay to

76 Russia and Islam

Turkish textbooks or new Tatar textbooks in Arabic, or slightly modified Ottoman Turkish. On the whole, the new education was designed to meet the interests of the growing Tatar business class which sought wider opportunities and markets in the Muslim-populated regions of Russia and beyond the Russian borders.15 The new method was welcomed by the Muslim-educated minority, most of whom were graduates of the Kazanskaia Inorodcheskaia Uchitel'skaia Seminaria and who had worked as teachers of Russian in various medresses. In the late 1880s, due to their enthusiasm, the Husainov medresse in Orenburg, the Bubi medresse in Sarapul, the Galeev medresses in Kazan and Ufa and the medresse in Sterlimakskii uyezd, as well as some other medresses in the Volga-Urals, switched to the al-usul al-jadid. In the 1890s, reform-minded Tatar clerics opened a few jadid schools in Andijan, Samarkand, Tokmak, Tashkent and Bukhara. Later on, a number of Central Asian intellectuals founded jadid mektebs and medresses. Among the first such schools were the one in Tashkent, which was opened in 1901, and another in Samarkand, opened in 1903.16 However, proliferation of the new method was slow because of the strong opposition of qadimists, on the one hand, and the Russian authorities and the Orthodox Church, on the other. The al-usul al-qadim preserved its quantitative superiority over the al-usul al-jadid until the early twentieth century. The qadimists feared to lose in competition with their reformist rivals who provided better education and practical training more suited to modern conditions. The Tsarist Government regarded the jadid medresses as bulwarks of future dissent and of nationalist and Islamic extremism. The Russian Orthodox Church viewed them as a dangerous antidote to the total Christianization of Russia's Muslims.17 The al-usul al-jadid, originally associated with philological-lexicographic reform, soon turned into a wider socio-political and cultural phenomenon, jadidism. The latter was organically linked to a wider Islamic reformist movement represented by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935). Jadids claimed their allegiance to the Bulgar-era traditions of Islamic creative thinking ± the ijtihad ± and drew on the ideas of the renowned Muslim enlighteners Abu Nasr al-Qursawi (d. 1812), Abdul Qayum an-Nasiri (d. 1902), Shihabuddin Marjani (d.1889) and the earlier mentioned Huseyn Faizkhanov (d.1866). Significantly, all of them included the historical interaction with Russians as a defining component of Tatar national identity, alongside Islam and the Tatar language. They derived the importance of the Russian factor from the fact that the Tatars and the Russians had a common homeland and knowledge of each other's interests, habits,

Russia's Umma and Modernization 77

customs and beliefs. They traced mutual cultural influences in such areas as architecture, costume, traditional medicine, fairytales and superstitions. At the same time, they made a clear distinction between the antiIslamic Russification policies of the Russian state, which they categorically rejected, and the objective benefits for Russia's Muslims of a strong Russian state under an enlightened Tsar who would treat all his subjects equally, irrespective of their religious and ethnic origins. An-Nasiri, Marjani, Faizkhanov and other proto-jadids recognized the importance of Russian as the lingua franca of a poly-ethnic and multicultural state. In modern terms they were the proponents of the principles of multi-culturalism and the civic nation.18 Among noted Tatar jadids were the Islamic reformers Musa Bigi, Ziauddin Kamali, Ubaydulla Bubi, Jarullah Bigi, Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Galimjan Galeev and Zaki Kadiri. Tatar Islamic reformers rejected Islamic scholasticism and the dogmatic and factional differences between Sunni and Shia Islams and within Sunni and Shia Islams, in particular. Instead they emphasized the cultural and ethical sides of the Islamic faith, viewing it first and foremost as the source of moral judgement and self-control for the individual Muslim. They suggested a modified interpretation of iman (faith), namaz (prayer) zakat (alms) and other basics of Islam, which reflected Russian geographic and cultural realities.19 In political terms jadids sought to revive the dynamic nature of the Islamic community and to secure its socio-economic success in the Russian, Eurocentric, capitalist cultural environment. Alongside its religious essence jadidism had an important national dimension and provided an ideological framework for the process of national consolidation of Tatars, as well as some other Muslim peoples of the Russian empire. In the late nineteenth century, the Tatars of the Volga-Urals, Siberia and Astrakhan were consolidating into a single Tatar nation. This process received new momentum as a result of Alexander III's policy aimed at forging a Russian nation on the basis of Russian ethnicity, the Romanov dynasty and the empire.20 Jadidism, then reflected the specific conditions of Russia's Muslims. In this sense, it was a peculiarly Russian Islamic phenomenon. Some noted jadids, such as Ismail Gasprinskii, Yusuf Akchura, Sayid Alkin, Burgan Sharaf, Hadi and Sadri Maksudi and Jemal Validi were either directly involved in the Russian nationwide intellectual and political debate on the future reform of the Russian state and society, or were strongly influenced by it. Marjani and Qayum an-Nasiri were members of the Society of Archaeology, History and Ethnography of Kazan University. Also, some jadids, or proto-jadids had close personal connections with democratically

78 Russia and Islam

minded Russian academics and writers. For instance, Faizkhanov and Marjani were on friendly terms with the distinguished Russian scholars V. Veliaminov-Zernov and V. Stasov. Ismail Gasprinskii in his youth worked in Paris as a Secretary for the famous Russian writer Ivan Turgenev. Jadids were bilingual and were well acquainted with the Russian press and literature. They were thoroughly informed about modern national theories which dominated Russian and European academic and political discourse. Some jadids also knew European languages, which enabled them to place the jadid movement within a European perspective.21 Conversely, some well-known Russian academics closely followed the jadid movement and the situation within Russia's umma. Among them were, for example: I.N. Berezin, I.E. Bertel's, A. Dmitriev, N.A. Firsov, K.D. Fren, K.F. Fuchs, V.A. Gordlevskii, A. K. Kazem-Bek, J.D. Koblov, I.lu. Krachkovskii, A.E. Krymskii, N.Iu. Marr, S.F. Ol'denburg, P.S. Pallas, N. Pashino, W. Radlov, G.S. Sablukov, F.I. Sherbatskoi, S.M. Shpilevskii, N.A. Smirnov, V.V. Vel'aminov-Zernov, and N.I. Veselovskii. However, a special place belonged to the academician V.V. Bartol'd (d. 1930). Apart from numerous scholarly works on various Islamic peoples, which became classics of Islamic studies, Bartol'd promoted a true picture of Muslims and Islamic culture through his contributions to specialized Oriental societies and periodical journals. He was the editor-in-chief of the academic journal Mir Islama (The World of Islam), published in St Petersburg from 1912. It contained comprehensive information about Muslims in Russia and elsewhere; science, literature and arts; religion and clergy; customs and traditions; the feminist issue; and economics and social activity.22 Bartol'd, as well as other Russian scholars of Islam, did much to promote and diversify Islamic and Asian studies in Russia. The leadership of Russian Islamic studies belonged to the Oriental faculty of Kazan University, which was founded in 1804. It taught Eastern and Oriental languages, history and culture. The University became the first Asian publishing house which used Arabic script. Islam, Asian languages and history were also taught at the Oriental faculty of St Petersburg University, the Lazarevskii Institute of Oriental Languages in Moscow and in some gymnasiums, schools and special courses. Many of the lecturers were of Asian origin. Some of them were muderrises (teachers at the medresse), or learned mullahs who combined teaching at medresses with secular higher schools. For instance, an-Nasiri was a teacher of the Tatar language in the Ecclesiastical Academy and in the Russian-Tatar school in Kazan. All these institutions constituted a solid basis for thorough education and training in the history, culture and languages of the Muslim and other non-Russian

Russia's Umma and Modernization 79

peoples of Russia. Alongside academics and teachers, they produced a large number of highly professional government servants who dealt with Islamic matters. On the whole, the number of Russian officials, who knew the languages and cultures of Russia's inorodtsy was relatively high compared, for example, to the number of the British or French government officials in charge of colonial matters.23 Scholarly links between Russia's Russians and various Muslim peoples were accompanied by their interaction in literary, music and artistic spheres. The Islamic theme was present in the works of many famous Russian writers, poets, philosophers, artists and musicians.24 Works by prominent Muslim poets and philosophers were widely known in Russian cultural circles. Among them were those by such prominent Muslim poets and philosophers, as Jalaluddin Rumi, M. Saadi, Abdurahman Jami and Farid Attar, which were translated into Russian by M. Mikhailov, the Russian poet, playwright and anthropologist.25 In 1883, Ismail Gasprinskii founded a newspaper, Terjuman-Perevodchik (Interpreter), which became a powerful medium for the dissemination of jadidist ideas. For almost forty years Terjuman (1883±1918) was the most influential and popular Muslim periodical, and it helped shape the national political debate, as well as the literacy norms of Russia's Muslim educated class. Terjuman promoted the idea of a strong, modern and nationally pluralistic Russian state, on the one hand, and Turkic unification within Russia on the basis of `common language, action, and thought' (dilde, iste, fikirde birlik), on the other. For this reason, Gasprinskii opposed the ethnonyms Tatar, Bashkir and so on and suggested replacing them with `Turk', common to all Turkic peoples in Russia and abroad. According to Gasprinskii, the priority in national identification was language. He therefore advocated the development of a common Turkic language Turki, which technically represented a simplified and standardized version of the Ottoman Turkish language. Significantly, Gasprinskii's Turki was favoured by such prominent religious and literary-political figures as Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Abdurashid Ibrahim, Fatih Kerimi, Fatih Amirhan, Yusuf Akchura, Ahmed Agaev and Huseyn-zade Ali. Some Turkic novelists also adopted Turki. Among them were Musa Akagat-zade, Fatih Halidi and Muhammad Zahir Bigiev. Later, in the aftermath of the 1905 revolution Turki was the main language of Crimean, Caucasian and Central Asian periodicals. However, it failed to become the language of the Volga Tatars. The bulk of the Volga Tatar periodicals kept their allegiance to the Kazan vernacular ± testimony to the stronger regional and cultural self-awareness of the Volga Tatars compared to the rest of Russia's Muslims.26

80 Russia and Islam

Gasprinskii viewed Turki as the foundation of millet. Although millet is often translated as nation, Gasprinskii interpreted it largely in the ethnocultural context. Islam was viewed as an essential component of that millet. Gasprinskii's political aspirations differed substantially from those of the Turkists of the Ottoman empire and resembled the views of an-Nasiri, Marjani and Faizkhanov. Thus, compared to the Ottoman Turkists, Gasprinskii never envisaged the political self-determination of Russia's Turks and always viewed their future within the Russian state. He argued that for Russia's Muslims Russian cultural influence was more important than the influence of Ottoman Turks, Iranians, or other powerful Islamic neighbours. He advocated the cultural and psychological affinities of Russia's Tatars and Russians and viewed Russian cultural influence as a positive factor in the Tatars' historical development. Furthermore, he believed that the key to the economic and social success of Russia's Muslims was in their full-fledged engagement in nationwide Russian modernization, and he therefore welcomed their intellectual Russification.27 Other distinguished Tatar jadids, such as Fatih Kerimi, Jemal Validi, Ahmed Hadi and Sadri Maksudi (all Volga Tatars) shared Gasprinskii's belief in the political integrity of the Russian state as the precondition for the national prosperity of Russia's Muslims. They regarded knowledge of the Russian language as the necessary condition of Muslims' successful economic development. They emphasized the difference between Russia's Turkic peoples and the Turks of the Ottoman empire. In cultural terms many of them considered the Volga Tatars superior to the Ottoman Turks and viewed the Volga-Urals as the cultural centre of the Turkic world. In Istanbul maktublari (`Istanbul Letters') Kerimi criticized the Ottoman Turks for their social and cultural apathy, their lack of patriotic feeling and the degrading treatment of their women. He suggested that Ottoman Turks should learn from Tatars. Jemal Validi argued in favour of Russian political suzerainty over the Tatars and pointed out the impracticability of the idea of a territorial nation, given their dispersal all over Russia. Interestingly, Hadi Maksudi considered the development of ethnic and religious nationalism in the conditions of poly-ethnic Russia as destructive for the state as a whole, as well as for the various ethnic groups. He viewed the politicization of jadidism in the context of growing ethnic Russian (Russkii) nationalism. In his publications he advocated the formation of the modern Russian (Rossiiskii) civic nation which would embrace citizens of various ethnic origins and faiths.28 There was also a relatively small number of jadids who viewed the national and cultural development of Russia's Muslims in political terms

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and advocated their territorial self-determination. Among them were Gayaz Iskhaki, Yusuf Akchura, Mehmet Akif (Ersoy), Ahmed Aga oglu (Agaev), Galimjan Idrisi and Abdul Majid Gaffurov. Thus, Gayaz Iskhaki, a Volga Tatar historian, argued in favour of Tatars' political independence from Russia, stressing the ancient tradition of statehood of the Volga-Urals Tatars and their alleged political and cultural superiority over the other inhabitants of Eurasia, including the Russians. They advocated political unification of Russia's Muslims on a pan-Islamic, or pan-Turkic, basis. They opted for political radicalism and the secession of various Muslim peoples from Russia, and the `restoration' of historical union primarily with the Ottoman Turks. The political views of Yusuf Akchura, a Siberian Tatar, developed under strong external influences, especially the doctrine of Turkism of the Ottoman Turk Ziia Gokalp (d. 1924). Like Gokalp, Akchura advocated Islamic Turkism and viewed Islam as a function of Turkic nationalism. He believed that Islam needed modification so that it could facilitate the formation of the Turkic nation. So, compared to Gasprinskii, who identified Tatars in religiousethnic terms, Akchura gave priority to Turkic ethnic identification. He also did not consider the Tatars' existence within the Russian state as a fait accompli and considered the possibility of their eventual secession from Russia. Mehmet Akif and a small number of his followers represented the radical wing of Russia's Muslim politics. They called for an immediate secession of Muslim-populated regions from the Russian empire and the `restoration' of historical union with the Ottoman Turks. 29 The main limitation of jadidism was its tataro-centrism which alienated non-Tatar Muslim intellectuals from it. As a result the number of jadids in other Islamic parts of the Russian empire was relatively small. Among the propagators of jadidism in Kazakhstan and Central Asia were Ibray Altynsarin, Abay Kunanbayev, Alikhan Bokeykhan-uli, Ahmet Baytursyn-uli and Mir Jaqyb Duwlat-uli, Ismail Abidi, Mahmud Khoja ibn Behbud Khoja (Behbudi), Sadriddin Aini, Sattar Khan Abdulgaffar ogli, Usman Khoja-ogli, Ahmadjan Mahdum, Mirza Abdul Wahid Munzim, Muhiddin Khoja, Abdulqadir Shakuri, Fazliddin Mazum, Ishaq Khan, Sayid Ahmad Sidiqqi, Munawwar Qari Abdurrashid Khan ogli, Mirza Muhitdin Mansur-ogli, Murad Khoja Zade Ayni, Hajee Rafik, Abdalrauf Fitrat, Muhammad Sharif Sufizade and Awlani; and in Azerbaijan, Mehmet Resul-zade and Mirza Fatali Akhundov. Although all of them experienced the powerful influence of Gasprinskii's ideas, they were more conservative in their interpretation of progress (taraqqi) and sympathized primarily with the Islamists rather than with the Turkists

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of the Ottoman empire. Compared to the Jadids of Central Russia, most of them had a purely Islamic education and were less acquainted with Russian progressive thinking. Their major sources of references were works by Islamic reformers from India, Iran, Turkey and Egypt which were written in Arabic, Farsi, Ottoman Turkish and Tatar. In fact, the Tatar publications of Russian and European works provided Central Asia's only window on Europe.30 As for the educated elite of the North Caucasus, they were largely unaffected by jadidism and remained within the positions of traditionalism, or qadimism. The only exception, perhaps, was Ali Kayaev, a Lak alim from Dagestan. He studied in Al-Azhar in Egypt and travelled extensively in the Middle East. He was strongly influenced by the ideas of Rashid Rida, the Egyptian Islamic reformer. From 1911 until 1918 Ali Kayaev was editor-in-chief of the newspaper Al-Jarida al-Dagestaniyya (Dagestani Newspaper) which propagated jadidist ideas.31 Overall, outside the Volga-Urals, Crimea and Azerbaijan, the religious and moral monopoly of qadimists remained practically intact, which accounts for their intellectual and social passivity. However, in Tatar-populated regions, where qadimists were under immediate threat from the proliferation of jadidism, they were prompted to action. There the jadid±qadimist debate went far beyond a dogmatic framework and acquired strong social and political overtones. Qadimists opposed the social and political modernization of the Russian Islamic community because they feared that it would lead to the destruction of the traditional Islamic way of life and, subsequently, to the cultural and ethnic Russification of Russia's Muslims. Therefore, qadimists advocated the preservation of the existing political and social system and were fervent supporters of the Russian monarchy. Significantly, like most jadids, Tatar qadimists appreciated the historical interaction between Russians and Tatars and regarded it as an essential factor in the historical evolution of the latter. For example, in works by Nurgali Khasanov (Bughali) and Husameddin ben Sherefeddin Bulgari, most of which were written in Arabic, the particular characteristics of the Volga Tatars were linked to their Eurasian location, their Bulgarian statehood and their lengthy engagement with Russians and other neighbouring ethnic and religious groups. Murat Ramzia in his book Talfik-ul-akhbar va Talkih-ul-asar fi Vakangi Kazan va Bulgar va Muluki Tatar (Anthology of News and Publication of the Manuscripts related to Kazan, Bulgar and Tatar Rulers) pointed to the positive mutual cultural influence between Russians and Tatars and their mutual tolerance. Without questioning Russian political suzerainty over various Muslim peoples Ramzia bitterly criticized Russian official policies towards Muslims.32

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In the Caucasus, Crimea and Central Asia, which were more exposed to Turkish influence, a substantial number of qadimists had strong proOttoman sympathies. The latter were particularly strong among the members of Kadiri tariqa in the North Caucasus and the Islamic elite of Kokand Khanate. There was also a small number of qadimists who advocated the ethnic and religious isolationism of Russia's Muslims and their political disengagement from the Russian state. Their noted ideologist was Bakha ad-Din (d. 1893), a Naqshbandi Tatar, who proclaimed himself the spiritual leader of the anarchist Tatar-Islamic sect, Vaisov Bozhii Polk (`The Godly Regiment of Vaisov'). Baha ad-Din called for Tatar national revival and the restoration of the Bulgar state through the Tatars' purification from the `filthy' ethnic and cultural accumulations of the postBulgar period. The strategy of the Vaisites was civic disobedience to the authorities, including the Islamic authorities. They rejected civil registration, refused to pay taxes, perform military service or attend mosques where prayers were led by mullahs who had passed the Russian language test. It is worth mentioning that in spite of the Vaisites' denunciation of the Russian state they did not object to non-political contacts with particular Russian individuals. It was known that Baha ad-Din regularly exchanged letters with the famous Russian writer and humanist Leo Tolstoi.33 Still, the Vaisites' lack of an attractive positive programme and their reliance on a peculiar propagandist rhetoric undermined their political credibility. They failed to acquire mass support. There was no clear-cut correlation between the jadidist or qadimist orientation of the representatives of Russia's Muslim elite and their attitude to the Russian state, culture and people. Although the majority of jadids and qadimists perceived the future of Russia's Muslims within the Russian political context, they differed considerably about the level and intensity of their engagement with the Russian state and society. As noted earlier, the jadids welcomed the deeper intellectual, economic and political integration of Russia's Muslims within the nationwide process of modernization. Compared to them, the qadimists were largely in favour of perpetuation of the `semi-detached' existence of various Muslim communities within Russia. They were suspicious of any reformation of the Russian state and society and opposed Muslim involvement in it. The bastions of qadimism were Muftiyats, which tended towards an alliance with conservative forces in Russian politics. Muftiis, who were among Russia's largest landowners, were devoted monarchists. As a result, they often found themselves in paradoxical alliances with the `Black Hundred of Archangel Michael' and other right-wing organizations of a chauvinist nature.34

84 Russia and Islam

Still, it is important to bear in mind that until the late 1880s the jadid± qadimist debate was limited to the educated Islamic minority represented by clerics, intellectuals and businessmen. The vast majority of ordinary Muslims remained within the positions of traditional popular Islam. Their perceptions of themselves and the outside world were largely defined by their local mullahs, Imams, shaykhs and pirs. The social and spiritual status of these representatives of popular Islam was higher than that of Russian priests and derived from their role as perpetuators and safeguards of national identity based on Islam. In the Volga-Urals, on the interpersonal level, the attitudes of ordinary Muslims towards mullahs, Imams and so on were warmer and more emotional compared with the attitudes of Russian peasants to the Orthodox pop (priest). In the Russian case, priest±parishioner relations were formal and had a rather occasional character. In the case of Muslims those relations arguably involved a greater degree of commitment which was durable and unchanging. Even in quantitative terms their positions were very different. For example, in 1870, there was one mullah for every hundred Tatars: on average there was one Orthodox priest per thousand people.35 The major instrument of the mullah's influence was taqlid (tradition), which appealed to the subconsciousness of the main social groups. This accounted for the stronger manipulative power of the mullahs compared to that of the Russian priests. The Sufi affiliation of many of them further promoted their religious charisma and influence in Tatar communities. The distinctive place of a mullah or an Imam in a rural Muslim community contributed to the self-sufficiency of these communities and the tolerant indifference of its members to the outside world. If there was no direct threat to the traditional Islamic way of life, local mullahs and Imams displayed political apathy and formal loyalty to the Russian monarch, and conveyed this message to the villagers. They served effectively as mediators between the Russian authorities and local Islamic communities and channelled mass discontent into legal forms of complaint and appeal to the Tsar or Tsarina. They were the main organizers of the collective petitions to the provincial centres, or directly to St Petersburg, by means of which local Muslims complained about the misconduct and fiscal arbitrariness of the Tsarist local administration.36 However, in periods of regression by the Tsarist government into antiIslamic Russification policies, mullahs reversed their traditional passivity with their calls for mass resistance. Analysis of the nineteenthcentury archive documents related to anti-government activities in the Volga-Urals suggests that there was a constant correlation between the

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intensification of Russification campaigns, accompanied by official conversion to Orthodoxy, and mass disturbances among the Tatars under the Islamic banner. During such periods Tatar mullahs, usually in disregard of the frequently pro-government position of the Muftii, mobilized the community and conducted the process of otpadenie. For example, in the 1860s±70s there were massive returns to Islam which were provoked by the missionary assault by the Christian Orthodox Brotherhood of Saint Gurii, founded in 1867, Il'minskii's educational programme of 1870, and the introduction of obligatory Russian classes in newly built mektebs and medresses according to the government edicts of 26 March 1870.Whole villages of starokreshennie and novokreshennie (`old' and `new' converts) returned to Islam. The first step of otpadenie was group abandonment of wearing the belt which was an obligatory item for a Russian Orthodox peasant. The second step was the shaving of the head and the wearing of the tiubeteika (a skullcap) instead of cutting the hair according to the Russian tradition. After that, the village usually began to keep Fridays as a holiday instead of Sundays, and the invitation to, or election of, someone from among themselves as the mullah and the opening of a mosque.37 The behaviour of the village mullahs was not, however, always adequate to the situation. This was due to the low level of their general education and their poor knowledge of the Russian language. Sometimes, misinterpretations by them of actions or statements by the Russian authorities resulted in the instigation of mass disturbances. Also, the political agitation of the Tatar mullahs was not determined by an exclusively anti-Russification agenda. There were occasions when Tatar mullahs initiated joint action by Tatar and Russian peasants against the political and fiscal excesses of the Centre. For example, such a common protest movement developed during the severe hunger of 1877±78. This demonstrates that Tatar mullahs, as well as ordinary Tatar peasants, did not necessarily associate the Russian Orthodox establishment with ordinary Russians, with whom they often shared similar economic and social hardships. In any case, the moderate national and religious policy of the Centre in the last decade of the nineteenth century ensured the relative tranquillity of the Tatar villages and the absence of large-scale popular unrest.38 As shown earlier, Tatar village mullahs reacted negatively to the alusul al-jadid which began to penetrate rural communities in the late 1880s. Apart from their selfish fear of losing their unlimited control over the hearts and minds of their parishioners, they were also worried that the jadids' strong secular emphasis and preference for the Turkic

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rather than Islamic components of national consciousness might irreversibly damage Tatar national identity, which they had safeguarded in spite of centuries of severe repression by the Russian state. Qadimists accused their jadid colleagues of such `sinful' innovations as bringing school desks and benches into the mekteb and the installation of blackboards ± which they compared to Christian icons! They also vigorously resisted any changes in the mekteb curriculum. They especially protested against the introduction of history, geography and the Russian and Kazan Tatar languages. The study of both languages was considered as apostate deviation from the sacredness of Arabic. The term jadid was applied to everything unknown, even if it had nothing to do with jadidism. It was used, for example, to refer to compliance with the requirements of the state census, to wearing European clothes, and to cutting the hair rather than shaving.39 The common anti-jadid stance accounted for the tactical rapprochement, in spite of their formal religious antagonism, between some qadimist mullahs, who treated the promoters of al-usul al-jadid as an even bigger evil than the Russian Orthodox religious state, and the Russian authorities. Archives of the Russian Ministry of the Interior contain numerous reports by Ishmuhammed Dinmuhammedov (Ishmi), Ilajeddin Muhutdinov, Khadjelatlashe, Ahmed Dukanchi and some notorious qadimists on their jadid counterparts. In order to ensure the prompt action of the authorities against reformers, qadimist mullahs did not hesitate to describe their opponents, however absurdly, as revolutionaries, `Red', pan-Turkists, pan-Islamists, singers of the Marseillaise and advocates of translating the Koran into the Kazan Tatar language! As a result, jadids often looked more like left-wing extremists than Islamic reformers. Another ploy used by the traditionalists against innovators of all kinds, and especially to persuade the Russian authorities of the danger represented by the jadids, was to claim that they planned to proclaim an independent Muslim republic, with the material support of England and Turkey. However, for internal consumption within the villages, qadimist mullahs cultivated a negative image of reformers less as political subversives than as moral threats ± as `drunkards, immoral bastards, burglars, kafirs (apostates) and promoters of bid'a (sinful novelty). For example, in the anti-jadid lampoon Isharat al-marat ila mafi ikamata-l-Borhan by qadimist mullah Ishmuhammed Dimuhammedov jadids were presented as `immoral monsters, who betrayed the Islamic religion and turned into semi-Christian morons'. Jadidism was compared to Russian Orthodoxy, which was presented as the `worst form of moral degradation and paganism' and its followers were excluded from Ahl-ul-kitab (People of the

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Script) and were put in the same category as fire-worshippers and carrioneaters. Mullah Ilajeddin Muhutdinov in his pamphlets called for the physical elimination of the jadids while Ahmed Dukanchi and Rashidqadi particularly targeted the positive attitude of jadids towards female education. They argued that higher education for a woman was the `worst form of moral decay and human indecency'.40 In the appeal by twelve Kazan qadimist mullahs to the Minister of the Interior, Stolypin, in July 1908 they pleaded to be protected from `filthy' revolutionary jadid muallims (teachers of mektebs), and to strengthen the administrative functions of the Muftiyat against any unauthorized activities within the Islamic umma. Among the alleged centres of jadidist activity the medresses of Ij-Bobi in Sarapul, the medresse of Shamsutdinov in the village of Tunteri, the medresses of Muhammadiyya and Galeev in Kazan and Ufa, the medresse of Hussainov in Orenburg and the medresse in the village of Sterlibash were particularly mentioned. However, most village mullahs preferred to maintain their traditional non-engagement in politics and treated the activities of the informers with disapproval and contempt. As far as the relatively small proportion of pro-jadid mullahs were concerned, they were eloquent in expressing their disgust at Dinmuhammedov and his like. Nevertheless, reformist mullahs were quite capable of fighting their opponents with their own weapons, sending counter-reports to the Russian authorities on Dinmuhammedov and others in which they were described as unbalanced and paranoid figures, who had lost touch with the community and become public disgraces.41

The constitutional period The bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905±07 created more favourable conditions for the socio-political and intellectual activity of Muslims in Russia. While the rural Muslim majority remained outside the revolution, the Muslim elite defined their position towards it. It was largely congruent to that of the Russian liberal opposition, represented by the Kadet Party (Constitutional-Democratic Party, 1905±17), which opposed violence and favoured a peaceful liberalization and democratization of the Russian state under a constitutional monarchy. In August 1905 Tatar and Azeri intellectuals and businessmen organized the First All-Russian Muslim Congress. Due to official refusal to allow the Congress, it was held on the steamboat `Gustav Struve'. Its resolutions, which were written by Musa Bigi, a Volga Tatar, included the demand for the establishment of constitutional monarchy, based on proportional representation of nationalities; the freedom of the press, assembly

88 Russia and Islam

and religion; legal, political and social equality for Russia's Muslims; organization of local Muslim Assemblies (mahalli mejlis) and Muslim congresses; and reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis and religious tolerance of each other.42 The October Manifesto of 1905 changed favourably the political climate in Russia. As a result, Russia's Muslims could carry on their activities openly and on a legal basis. In January 1906 the Second All-Russian Muslim Congress took place in St Petersburg. It formed the first Islamic political party Ittifaq-i-Muslimin (`Union of Muslims', 1906±17) and decided to co-operate with the Russian Kadets in the election of the first Russian Parliament, the Duma. The Third All-Russian Muslim Congress, which was held in August 1906 in Nizhnii Novgorod, witnessed the emergence of other Islamic organizations, such as the Islamic Popular Party, the Azeri National Party Musawat (`Equality') and the Kazakh National Party Alash. The Congress focused on constitutional changes in Russia, wider cultural autonomy for Muslim peoples and educational reform. In particular, it pressed for the incorporation of Islamic confessional schools based on the al-usul al-jadid within the all-Russian educational system. This implied inclusion of these schools, which were traditionally financed from private sources, into the State budget. At the same time, the Congress emphasized the preservation of the national character of these schools and the necessary participation of Muslims in their management. Thus, it called for the transfer of supervision of Tatar schools from the Ministry of Education to the local Muslim administration and the abolition of the obligatory knowledge of Russian for Tatar mullahs.43 In the first Duma (April±July 1906), Muslims gained 25 seats; in the second Duma (February±June 1907), 35 seats; in the third Duma (1907±8), ten seats; and the fourth Duma (November 1912±February 1917), seven seats. Most of the Muslim Deputies were Tatar, Azeri and Dagestani members of the Ittifaq. Their most brilliant spokesman was Sadri Maksudi (d. 1957), who took the floor in the second and third Dumas more than a hundred times. Among other eloquent Muslim politicians were Yusuf Akchura, Hadi Maksudi, S. Alkin, F. Tukhtarov, Sh. Muhammediarov, Abdurreshid Mehdi, Shahaidar Sirtlanov, I. Akhtiamov, A. Topchibashev, K. Khasanov and the Dagestanis Magomed Dalgat (T.M. Khalikov), Zubair Temirkhanov and M. Mavraev. In the Duma they focused on issues of democratization and the specific problems of Russia's Muslims. Their motto was `National self-realization and prosperity of various Muslim peoples of Russia through comprehensive democratization and modernization.' They advocated the parliamentary transformation of despotic

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Russia into a democratic, multi-ethnic, modern nation where Muslims could enjoy equal political and legal rights. Among specific concerns raised by Muslim Duma Deputies were the wider participation of Muslims in central and local government; their greater autonomy in religious, educational and cultural matters; the lifting of the ban on Turkestani Muslims to be elected to the Duma; the right of Russia's Muslims to elect their Muftii themselves instead of him being appointed by the Minister of the Interior; the legitimization of the imams' authority in dealing with property issues according to the shariat; the reinstitution of waqf property; the right of shakirds (students of medresses) to defer their military service until after their graduation; the exemption of mullahs from military service and taxes and their promotion to nobility after 20 years of service; and the recognition of Friday as the official weekly holiday for Muslim civil servants, traders, workers and others. Tatar Deputies sought state guarantees and financial support for educational reform, based on al-usul al-jadid and the Tatar literary and standardized language, which would ensure equal starting opportunities for Tatar children. They also advocated the transfer of supervision of the Tatar schools from the Ministry of Education to the local Muslim administration and the abolition of obligatory knowledge of Russian for Tatar mullahs.44 The October Manifesto triggered a publishing boom among Russia's Muslims, and Tatars in particular. As a result, by 1907 the number of Islamic periodicals published in Russia reached 52. In addition to the existing Terjuman, Tatar socio-political and historical-cultural periodicals, which adhered to jadidist principles, included Yulduz (`Star'); Vatan Hadimi (`Servant of the Motherland'), Idil' (`Volga'); Iktisad (`Economist'); Kazan Mukhbire (`Kazan Messenger'); Shuro (`Council'); Vakt (`Times'); Yalt-Yurt (`Lightning'); Chukuch (`Hammer') and Magarif (`Knowledge'). There also emerged some specifically Islamic periodicals of both qadimist and jadidist orientation. Among them were, for example, Din va Adab (`Religion and Ethics'); the Bayan-ul-Khaqq (`Exposition of Truth'), the Din va Maghishat (`Religion and Life') and the al-Jarida al-Dagestaniyya (`Dagestani Newspaper') edited by Ali Kayaev. The major reformist periodicals in Kazakhstan were the papers Kazakhstan, Ishim Dalasi, Ay Qap and Kazakh. In Turkestan, jadidist periodicals were represented by the journal al-Islah (`Reform') and the newspaper Tudjor (`Dawn'); and in Bukhara by the newspaper Bukhara-yi Sharif (`Bukhara the Noble'). The Muslim periodicals discussed issues similar to the agenda of the Duma Muslim faction. For example, the motto of Vatan Hadimi was `Love of Motherland is Part of Faith'. The Tashkentbased newspaper Tudjor wrote in one of its issues: `Russia's prestige was

90 Russia and Islam

our prestige and we were proud that during various social upheavals we remained quiet and loyal to the authorities.' Most of those periodicals contained extensive factual and analytical material on the history, ethnic origins, popular holidays and festivals of various Muslim peoples of Russia, and opposed the politicization of Islam. In particular, they denounced the damaging effect on Russian±Muslim relations of the reckless use by some Russian officials of such propagandistic clicheÂs as `pan-Turkism' and `pan-Islamism.' Yulduz, for example, viewed `panIslamism' as merely a cant-term of the tsarist Okhranka (secret police). The suggestion was that it was borrowed from the lexicon of the intelligence services of the Western imperialist states, England above all, and was irrelevant to Russia.45 The Muslim periodicals were published in Arabic script and were in Tatar, Ottoman Turkish, Uzbek, or Arabic languages. Significantly, most Tatar periodicals used the Kazan vernacular, though Gasprinskii's Terjuman was in modernized Ottoman Turkish. Alongside periodicals which had a relatively small readership, Russia's Muslim publishers began to produce an Islamic popular literature which had a wider circulation and greater social impact. The popular literature was represented by collections of essays, folk stories, novellas, moral and cautionary tales and some drama. Although this literature mainly discussed moral issues and the conflict between jadidist and qadimist values, it touched indirectly upon problems of nationhood and relations with Russia. For example, Tatar popular literature reflected common Tatar public attitudes towards `the fair and just Tsar' surrounded by crooked and dishonest officials, as well as towards the good nature of ordinary Russians in contrast to the monstrous and treacherous Russian Orthodox Church.46 On the whole, the 1905 bourgeois-democratic revolution strengthened the positions of the Islamic reformers and expanded the geographical boundaries of the jadidist movement. The Tsarist Manifesto of 17 April 1905, which put an end to the interference of the Orthodox Church in decision-making related to Muslims, facilitated the proliferation of the alusul al-jadid in mektebs and medresses and pushed it beyond the VolgaUrals. A network of jadid schools was created in Kazakhstan and Central Asia although the scale of jadidist education was incomparably smaller than in the Volga-Urals. Of particular significance was the creation in 1908 of a jadid medresse in Bukhara which had for centuries remained the bastion of qadimism. The jadidist ideas began to penetrate the Islamic elite who in general remained traditionalist. It is significant that in 1907 qadi Khadji Mir Ibragim of Ashkhabad issued a fetwa which abolished the dogmatic differences between the Sunnis and Shiites. The fetwa divided

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many local communities and caused open clashes between its supporters and opponents. Nevertheless, the socio-political impact of the Central Asian and Kazakhstani jadids was marginal and they were outplayed by Russian-educated secular intellectuals under the leadership of Choqan Valikhanov, Mustafa Chokay, Ubaydullah Khojaev and Abdurahman Fahredi.47 However, in conditions of increasing politicization caused by the protracted war, the main conflicts within Russian society occurred along socio-political rather than national and religious lines. Thus, in 1916 a group of left-wing Muslim Deputies quitted the Muslim faction in the Duma and joined the left faction of the trudoviki (labourers). Compared to the kadets, who proposed the introduction of long-term land tenure for peasants, the trudoviki demanded the free distribution of land. They also called for the abolition of all forms of discrimination on national and confessional grounds, especially in relation to the Muslims of Turkestan. As far as the Muslim dissenting minority was concerned, many of its representatives were in sympathy with the socialist-revolutionaries, socialist-democrats and anarchists of the Russian radical tradition. The views of Russia's Muslim radicals presented a remarkable synthesis of socialist-democratic and Islamic ideas. For example, the left-wing members of Ittifaq, Abdurashid Ibragim and Emin Resul-zade advocated the socialist transformation of Russia, which they perceived as the realization of Islamic principles. The Tatar radical Islamist Hanafi Muzaffar gave a socialist interpretation to pan-Islamism (Islamiyyat) as a form of internationalism. A similar approach was further developed by Sultan Galiev who after the 1917 October Revolution became the leading ideologue of Muslim Communism.48 At the beginning of the twentieth century left-wing jadids formed a number of Islamic organizations which advocated strikes, mass demonstrations, individual terrorism and other revolutionary methods of struggle against the Tsarist regime. In 1903, Abbas and Mirza Shirinskii, Mustafa Kurty, Menseit Jemil and some other Crimean Tatar radicals joined the all-Russian social-revolutionary (the Esers) and social-democratic (the RSDRP) parties. In 1905 they took an active part in a series of anti-government demonstrations in Feodosia. In 1906, a group of radical Crimean jadids under the leadership of Abdurreshid Mehdi, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Vatan Hadimi (`Servant of the Motherland', 1906±08), formed the Party of Young Tatars. The Party's programme included abolition of the monarchy, equal distribution of land among peasants, equal political and social rights for Russia's Muslims, the wider involvement of Muslims in local administration; better access for

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Muslims to Russian gymnasiums and universities, and the comprehensive introduction of the al-usul al-jadid method in Muslim confessional schools. Abdurreshid Mehdi also organized the Jemiet-i Khairie (Charity Society), in the Crimean town of Karasubazar, which was concerned with the promotion of al-usul al-jadid education. In 1906, Abdurreshid Mehdi was elected to the municipality of Karasubazar, in which the Young Tatars had over half of the seats.49 In 1904, S. Muhammediarov and A. Davletshin, the leaders of shakirds of the medresse of Muhammadiyya in Kazan founded the Al-Islah (Reform) Party. During the Revolution of 1905±07 the Islahists stood alongside students of Kazan University on the revolutionary barricades against the Tsarist regime. In 1906, the Islahists G. Iskhaki, F. Tuktarov, S. Muhammediarov and A. Davletshin quit the party and formed two separate parties, Brek (Union) and Tangchi (Dawn), both of which were politically close to the Socialist Revolutionary Party (the SR). Yet another former Islahist, Husein Yamashev, completely accepted the political programme of the RSDRP and joined the Bolsheviks.50 Similarly, in 1905, Azeri radicals created the Popular Islamic Party Gummet (Energy, 1905±12) in Baku, which was politically close to the RSDRP. Interestingly, the party leadership included both Muslims and Christians. Among Gummet's Muslim leaders were Nariman Narimanov, Emin Resul-zade, Meshadi Azizbekov and Medjid Efendiev, while its Christian activists were represented by Stepan Shaumian (an Armenian) and Alesha Djaparidze (a Georgian). In Dagestan, Makhach Dahadaev and Djelalutdin Kormasov created a proBolshevik group, while Ahmet-bey Tsalikov, Gaidar Bammatov and Ibrahim-Bek Gaidarov formed a separate Menshevik organization.51

The impact of the First World War As was already mentioned, the pro-Russian political orientation of the Muslim liberal majority survived the test of the First World War, in which Russia confronted Muslim Turkey. Although there were attempts by extremist nationalist and Islamist circles to instigate mass disturbances among the Islamic population of the Russian empire in support of their Turkish co-religionists, the vast majority of ordinary Muslims in general remained passive. From the first days of the war, the Muslim elite unambiguously allied itself with the Russian government. The extraordinary Muslim congress in St Petersburg expressed loyalty to the Russian state on behalf of Russia's Muslims. In August 1914, the Muslim Duma Deputies G. Enikeev, B. Akhtiamov and M. Djafarov published a declaration of loyalty in the Millet (`Nation'), the newspaper of the Muslim Duma faction.

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Gasprinskii's Terjuman described the position of the Muslim Duma faction as a `friendly opposition' which did not question Muslim loyalty to the Tsar and Russia. Similarly, most of Russia's Muslim soldiers, mainly Tatars and Bashkirs, as well as some Caucasians, fought courageously against their co-religious adversaries. The Russian army also included a semi-autonomous cavalry division, known as the Dikaya (Wild) division, which consisted of six ethnic regiments representing Dagestanis, Kabarda, Chechens, Ingushes, Cherkess and Tatars. The commanderin-chief of the division was Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, the Tsar's brother. Although the members of the Wild Division were on state salaries, they were allowed to keep their own disciplinary norms and a distinctive Caucasian uniform.52 However, the Tsar's decree of 25 June 1916 introduced considerable tension into Russian±Muslim relations. Under this decree, 250 000 Muslim men from Turkestan and 230 000 from Stepnoi krai (Steppe region) were assigned to various military auxiliary works.53 The decree divided local Muslim society. Some representatives of the landed, religious, intellectual and commercial elite expressed their support for it and offered their assistance in its implementation. Among the supporters of the Russian policy were, for example, the big landowner Abdurahman Djevanchi, the Sufi authority Nazir Khodja, wealthy local merchants Arif Khodja, Kurbanbaev, Mavlanbaev, Isamuhamedov, locally educated intellectuals and jadids Awlani, Munawwar Qari, Rasul, Nizamutdin and Ubayullah Kodjev and Khodjamiyar. They created special committees in charge of recruitment and organized a propaganda campaign for the support of official Russian policies. Thus, the local newspaper al-Islah wrote in September 1916 that `fighting for the dear Motherland was an obligatory duty of Russia's Christian Orthodox and Muslim population'. However, the larger part of the local elite rejected the Tsarist decree as an excessive interference in the life of local communities and instigated the basmach revolt under the Islamic banner.54 It began in July 1916 in Khodjent. By November 1916 over 50 000 basmachi took part in the uprising which embraced a large territory from the river Amu Darya to the Urals. Significantly, among the basmachi there were those who opposed Russian mobilization policy, as well as those who had risen against the excesses of the feudal landowners, the usurers, or the Russian kulak (well-off farmer) settlers. In January 1917 the revolt was suppressed by Russian troops.55 This revolt acquired a distinct anti-colonial character. It reflected the long suppressed resentment of local nomads and sedentary peoples against the agrarian colonization of the most fertile land by Russian

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and other Slavic settlers, as well as against the advancing destruction of the traditional way of life as a result of the Russian economic and military penetration. During the revolt the basmachis attacked the Russian towns, garrisons and railway stations. The northern and eastern parts of Semirechie, which were particularly subjected to colonization by the immigrant settlers, witnessed fierce clashes between the Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes, on the one hand, and the Russian settlers, and representatives of the Tsarist administration and police, on the other. As a result, over 3000 Russians and many more local people were killed. In some areas of the Kazakh steppe almost all immigrant settlements were destroyed. The consequences of this abortive resistance were devastating for its participants, especially the nomads. Over 100 000 Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes died and over 200 000 fled to eastern Turkestan under Chinese suzerainty.56 The bourgeois-democratic revolution of February 1917, which put an end to the monarchy, caused different reactions within Russia's Muslim elite. Its traditionalist representatives, especially among the Tatars and Bashkirs, feared that the abolition of the monarchy and its replacement by the republic would have a destabilizing impact on the multi-ethnic and poly-confessional empire. The qadimist feudal elites of Bukhara and Kokand were shocked by the demise of the authority of the White Tsar, who fitted their perceptions of effective government. They were therefore suspicious of the new republican regime, which they associated with anarchy and disorder. By contrast, the majority of reform-minded Muslim liberals and radicals welcomed the establishment of the Provisional Government, which proclaimed equal political status for all citizens of Russia irrespective of their ethnic and religious origins.57 From the first days of the revolution they launched into action and formed the Provisional Central Bureau of Muslims of Russia in Moscow and the Islamic Committee in Kazan. The aim of both bodies was to secure and promote the political and economic interests of Muslims in republican Russia. In May 1917, they organized the First All-Russia Muslim Congress in Moscow. It gathered over 800 delegates from Central Russia, the Volga-Urals, the Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The major issue of debate at the Congress was the political and administrative organization of the Russian state, which divided the delegates into federalist unitarist camps. Rasul-Zade, Zaki Validi Togan, Hadi Maksudi, Fatih Kerimi, Ali Merdan Topchubashi and other federalists argued for the transformation of Russia into a democratic federation of national republics. Their opponents, led by the Ossetian delegate A.Tsalikov, favoured the preservation of the unitary Russian state and national-cultural

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autonomy for Russia's Muslims in it. They reckoned that Russia's federalization would be fatal for the integrity of Russia's umma. Nevertheless, the federalists prevailed and the Congress adopted a resolution in favour of the formation of the autonomous republics of Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Turkestan and Kazakhstan within the federal Russian state. The Congress created the Milli Shuro (the Central Muslim Council) as the presiding body over the practicalities of federalization.58 The activity of the Milli Shuro was hampered as a result of the growing unitarist opposition, led by Sadri Maksudi. At the Second all-Russia Muslim Congress, which took place in July 1917 in Kazan, the Tatar and Azeri unitarists gained a majority. The delegates from the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, who were predominantly federalists, rejected the Tatar±Azeri domination and boycotted the Congress. This enabled the unitarists to promote the resolutions which overrode the decisions of the First Congress in favour of a unitary Russian state and national-cultural autonomy for the Turko-Tatars of the Volga-Urals and Siberia. The Congress elected the legislative body ± the Milli Mejlis (the National Council) and its executive body ± the Milli Idare (the National Administration). The Islamic Military Congress, which took place at the same time, formed the Harbi Shuro (the Islamic Military Council) chaired by the noted Tatar politician Ilyas Alkin. The Harbi Shuro was supported by the Provisional Government which allowed it to organize special Islamic armed forces.59 However, a number of Muslim radicals regarded the 1917 February Revolution as an opportunity to restore the political independence of some Muslim peoples of Russia. In April 1917, Kazakh activists convened their first congress in Orenburg which demanded administrative autonomy for the Kazakhs and the introduction of a ban on new Russian agrarian settlements in the Kazakh steppe. In the summer of the same year they formed their political party, the Alash Orda, to represent and articulate their interests in Petrograd.60 In Central Asia jadids formed the political parties of Young Bukharans and Young Khivans.61 In May 1917, Imam Uzun Haji, who received substantial assistance from Turkey, proclaimed an Emirate of the North Caucasus. He declared a jihad against `everybody who wrote from left to right'. In August 1917 another North Caucasian leader, Imam Najmuddin Gotsinskii attempted to re-create Shamyl's Imamat on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan. He was backed by members of the Bamat Girey-Haji wird of the Kadiri tariqa under the leadership of shaykh Ali Mitaev and Said-bey, a grandson of Imam Shamyl, who was based in Turkey. In the same period a Chechen warlord, Ahmetkhan Mutushev, mobilized members of the

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Kunta-Haji wird of the Kadiri tariqa and began a struggle for the independence of Chechnya, forming a Government ± the Mejlis. The Crimean Tatar radical nationalists responded to the February revolution with the movement `Crimea for Crimeans'. Its vanguard was the Milli Firka (the National Party) under the leadership of Chelebidjan Chelebeev;62 in Azerbaijan, the Azeri nationalists from the Musawat Party (`Equality', 1912±20).63 In Central Asia, the Russian revolution of 1917 boosted the hopes of the traditional elite of regaining independence from Russia. This accounted for a new upsurge of the basmachi movement. The left-wing Muslim radical minority was particularly enthusiastic about the February Revolution. Like their Russian colleagues, they regarded it as the prologue to the fundamental social and political transformation of Russia. The Bolsheviks moved onto the offensive and soon turned into the major political force challenging the authority of the Provisional Government. In this situation, many Muslim radicals either joined the Bolsheviks, or introduced elements of Marxism into their political programmes. Thus, in April 1917, Tatar Marxists under the leadership of Mulannur Vahitov formed the Muslim Socialist Committee, which became the Muslim centre of Bolshevism in the VolgaUrals. On the whole, however, the national aspirations of the majority of Russia's Muslim political, economic and intellectual elite, which was dominated by Tatars, did not transcend the Russian political context. They saw their national and cultural self-realization in the context of allRussian democratic reforms. In this respect their political agenda differed considerably from the national aspirations of other non-Russian peoples of the Russian empire, the Poles and Finns, in particular, who sought political and territorial independence from Russia.64 Unlike the elite the overwhelming majority of Muslims of the Russian empire remained indifferent to the revolutionary events of February 1917. They were mainly peasants who maintained a traditional lifestyle and, like their Russian counterparts, were not interested in politics and continued to perceive themselves, Russians and other outsiders in local and communal terms. At the grassroots level, the relationship between Russian and Muslim peasants were defined by pragmatism and common sense. They were based on the lengthy history of their cohabitation and mutual cultural influence, similar economic and social conditions, common problems and deprivations resulting from the arbitrariness of the central and local authorities, and similar beliefs in a just and wise tsar who was surrounded by corrupt and greedy officials. This was particularly true of the Russians and Tatars who had been historically closely engaged

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with each other. Russian and Tatar villagers had a detailed knowledge of each other's everyday routines. Although Russian and Tatar peasants lived separately in their own villages they closely interacted in various spheres and knew each other's traditions and customs. They borrowed substantially from each other in the areas of technical, agricultural and building skills, cuisine, folklore and language. Often there was a mutually beneficial exchange of labour and services between neighbouring Russian and Tatar peasants. They also assisted each other in natural calamities and during periods of extreme economic hardship. On the interpersonal level their relations were characterized by a substantial degree of mutual tolerance and respect for each other's culture, traditions and different religions. It is significant that the latter did not become a major dividing factor in their relations and did not aggravate antagonism between them in periods of crisis, in spite of centuries of official Russification and the intensive missionary activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Islam was not a taboo for ordinary Russians. Some Russian peasants voluntarily converted to Islam, which they found in some respects a more attractive and down-to-earth religion than Orthodoxy. There were also numerous cases of Russian women adopting Islam in order to marry Tatar men. The efforts of local Orthodox priests to return such ex-Christians to the fold usually failed. The greater attractiveness of Islam for the peasantry was recognized even by some Orthodox scholars who pointed out such practical advantages as the generally higher level of mutual assistance, close relations between villagers and the local religious authority, the mullah, and ± importantly ± the simplicity and lower cost of ritual proceedings.65 As for Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the interaction between the indigenous Muslim population and the Russian settlers was minimal and both sides largely maintained parallel economic and cultural existences. Nevertheless, local sedentary people experienced some positive changes as a result of the Russian conquest which to some extent counterbalanced its negative consequences. Thus, Russian rule put an end to devastating internal conflicts and secured the population from external invasions. It brought about abolition of the slavery system. Tashkent and other large cities were integrated within the all-Russian transport and post network which ended the centuries-long isolated existence of local rural communities. The local population benefited considerably from acquiring access to such vital goods as sugar, tea, rubber shoes, glass and kerosene, which were inaccessible before. The Russians introduced modern methods of land cultivation and new marketable agriculture. The promotion of cotton growing was accompanied by the emergence of the first cottonrelated industries. By the end of the nineteenth century, 208 out of a total

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of 220 Russian cotton mills were located there. The manufactured cotton goods were designated for the markets of central Russia, Iran, Afghanistan and other countries of the Middle East and Eastern Asia. Also, the first mining industries were established. The Russian authorities built the first hospitals and veterinary stations and introduced vaccinations, which radically reduced the death rate among the people and the cattle caused by various infectious diseases. The creation in the 1880s of the network of Russko-Tuzemnie (Russiannative) schools had major cultural implications. Although the actual goal of those schools was to prepare an indigenous cadre for local Russian administration, they became the first factories of the national intelligentsia. The first local periodicals also emerged at that time. A number of distinguished Central Asian intellectuals, such as Abay Kunanbayev, Ibray Altynsarin and Chokan Valikhanov acknowledged the modernization factor of the Russian conquest for the peoples of Central Asia. Chokan Valikhanov wrote: `We will perish without Russia, without Russians we are only Asia, and can not be anything else without her.'66 It is significant that Russian rule in Central Asia was characterized by a low racist profile in comparison to the contemporary Western racist dichotomy between white master and black or yellow native. According to various documentary and memoir sources, Russian officials treated more or less equally badly the ordinary ethnic Russians and Central Asians, although the wages of Russian civil and military servants allowed for their higher living standards compared to those of local peasants and Russian settlers. It is a well-known fact that General Skobelev, an aggressive and ruthless commander, publicly punished the Cossacks and Russian military for mistreating the locals. He was therefore highly respected by ordinary people who called him Ak Pasha (White General) because of his white uniform and white horse.67

4

Muslims under Soviet Rule: 1917±91

Muslims and the Russian Revolution Unlike the February bourgeois-democratic revolution, the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 shattered the foundations of Russia's state and society. The Bolsheviks' promise of land, peace and social justice appealed to the bulk of Russia's poor and desperate peoples, including its eighteen million Muslims. At the same time, Muslims were frightened by the Bolsheviks' atheism, as well as their rejection of private property and their social and gender egalitarianism. Because the reaction of the Muslim public at large was determined by the position of its leaders, the Bolsheviks needed the support, or at least the neutrality of the latter. This was not an easy task since the majority of the Muslim educated class viewed the revolution with suspicion, or even overt hostility. Thus, most Islamic traditionalists, or qadimists, refused to recognize the legitimacy of Bolshevik power and turned to open or secret opposition to it. They advocated the restoration of the monarchy which they regarded as the only viable guarantor of stability and inter-ethnic and interconfessional peace in Russia. It is worth mentioning that within this generally anti-Bolshevik conservative camp there was a small group of ultra-traditionalists, like the Vaisites in the Volga-Urals, who paradoxically welcomed the October revolution. They preferred the Bolsheviks' atheism to `the corrupted Islam of the majority of the Islamic population'. In March 1918 the Vaisites forged a tactical alliance with the Bolsheviks against the Islamo-nationalist separatist movement.1 The Muslim reformists, or jadids, were divided in their attitudes towards the Bolsheviks. The moderate liberals who defined pre-revolutionary Islamic political and cultural discourse opposed the Bolsheviks. Their representatives, who before the revolution expressed their preference for 99

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a unitary Russia and national-cultural autonomy for its Muslim population, rejected the Bolshevik programme of political self-determination for Russia's non-Russians. Some of them joined the White movement, which united various counter-revolutionary forces; others emigrated from Russia; and yet some others withdrew from politics and confined themselves to professional life under the new regime. Thus, Muftii Galimzian Barudi organized the opposition Islamic regiments which allied with the White resistance. Similarly, Zaki Validi headed the opposition Bashkir nationalist movement `Bashkiria for Bashkirs!' In June 1918, Validi formed the Bashkir bourgeois nationalist government on the territory of Ufimskaia gubernia ( Ufa province) which was temporarily occupied by the White Czechs. However, the alliance between Zaki Validi and the Whites was short-lived due to the Great-Russian chauvinism of the latter. Bashkir nationalist government was overthrown first through the efforts of the White General, Blukher, and later by the White admiral, Kolchak.2 Muslim liberal reformers who fled Bolshevik Russia began to fight the Communist regime from abroad. For instance, the noted Tatar jadids Iskhaki and Almasov became activists of the emigrant Tatar-Bashkir Committee of Idel-Ural, which launched a propaganda war against the Bolsheviks. Both joined the international anti-Soviet Turkic League, Prometey, which was based in Warsaw. Prometey's members also included Resul-zade, Seydamet, Mustafa Chokay and some other Muslim intellectuals. Subsequently, Gayaz Iskhaki established the emigrant journal Milli Yul (the National Path, 1928±35) which dealt with the political, cultural and religious life of Muslims of the former Russian empire. The Muslim emigration included some former social-democrats who rejected the `class extremism' of the Bolsheviks and their insensitivity towards the national and religious feelings of Muslims. Among them was, for example, Ahmet-bey Tsalikov, one of the key figures of the socialistdemocratic movement in the North Caucasus. Immediately after the revolution he took part in the organization in Baku of the Committee of Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus for the liberation of the Caucasus from Bolshevism. The establishment of Bolshevik rule in the Transcaucasus in 1921 put an end to the activity of the Committee and forced Tsalikov's emigration.3 A few representatives of the Muslim liberal intelligentsia attempted to collaborate with the Bolshevik regime. Thus, Sadri Maksudi on behalf of the Milli Mejlis ( the National Council), which was created in July 1917 at the Second All-Russia Muslim Congress, negotiated with the Bolsheviks a form of national-cultural autonomy for the Turko-Tatar Muslims of the Volga-Urals. In November 1917 in Ufa, he formed the autonomous

Muslims under Soviet Rule 101

Government which two months later was disbanded by the Bolsheviks under the pretext of fighting bourgeois nationalism. In early 1919 the Bolsheviks took advantage of Zaki Validi's falling out with the Whites and drew him into an alliance against the forces of Admiral Kolchak. In February 1919 the Bolsheviks announced an amnesty for those Bashkir and Tatar nationalists who initially sided with Admiral Kolchak and promised to ensure `Bashkir national freedom' in return for a common front against Kolchak. As a result of the amnesty over two thousand Muslim officers and soldiers moved into the Bolshevik camp. Zaki Validi was allowed to form the Bashkir Military Revolutionary Committee, the Bashrevkom, on the territory of the former Ufimskaia gubernia. The Bashrevkom established itself as a viable government with departments (Commissariats) for war, economy, land, labour, finance, education, justice, interior and nationalities, health, information and food. On 23 March 1919 this government proclaimed the Bashkir Autonomous Republic. However, its activity was soon paralyzed due to the intrigues and machinations by local Russian and Tatar Communists who pressed either for a unitarist Russia, or a wider regional formation in the form of the Tatar-Bashkir republic, dominated by the Tatars. This resulted in the collapse of the Bashrevkom and its replacement by the Moscow-driven administration. Subsequently, Zaki Validi was accused of bourgeois nationalism and was forced to emigrate to Turkey. A similar fate was shared by some other nationalist leaders from the Young Bukharans and Young Khivans, the Azeri Musawat Party, the Kazakh Party of Alash Orda and the Crimean Tatar Party of Milli Firka.4 While the majority of the old Islamo-nationalist elite rejected the revolution, the Bolsheviks promoted new revolutionary Muslim leaders who were entrusted with the difficult mission of securing the support of the Muslim population for the new regime. This was particularly important against the background of international hostility, Western military intervention and White resistance inside the country. Lenin, Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders regarded Russia's Muslims as potential allies of the revolution, which claimed to defend the interests of all economically dispossessed and socially deprived peoples. The main political trump cards of the Bolsheviks regarding Muslims were their decrees about Russia's withdrawal from the devastating First World War, the fair redistribution of land and wealth and the recognition of the national equality of all peoples of Russia and their right to self-determination. The Bolsheviks portrayed the Russian empire as `a prison of peoples' and skilfully exploited the great Russian chauvinistic policies of the previous regime and of the leaders of the counter-revolutionary White movement who

102 Russia and Islam

preached Russian national exclusiveness, Orthodoxy and monarchism. They emphasized the supra-national, internationalist nature of Communist ideology, which was reflected in their multi-ethnic make-up. Thus, the top Bolshevik leadership included ± apart from Russians ± Jews, Ukrainians, Georgians, Poles, Latvians, Armenians, Moldovans, Hungarians, Czechs, Serbs, Croatians, Germans, as well as Tatars and Azeris. Tatar revolutionaries made up the core of the Muslim Communists who became agents of Bolshevik influence in the Muslim regions of the former Russian empire.5 The first Muslim Communists were Mulannur Vahitov and Mir Sultan-Galiev of the Kazan-based Muslim Socialist Committee. Both sincerely believed that Bolshevism was the only solution to the dire socio-economic and national problems of Russia. On the other hand, they recognized the vital necessity to adjust the Bolshevik programme to the specific needs of Russia's Muslims. They concluded that Russia's Muslims should have a separate Islamic Communist Party and special Muslim units within the Russian army, as well as their representatives in the local administration. M. Vahitov and M. Sultan-Galiev were directly involved in the creation of the Communist Party's first documents on national and Islamic questions ± the Declaration of Rights of Peoples of Russia of 2 (15) November 1917 and the Address to All Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East of 20 November (3 December) 1917. These documents proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of all peoples of Russia, irrespective of their ethnic and religious origins; the right of Russia's peoples to free self-determination up to and including secession and the formation of independent states; the abolition of all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions; and the free development of the national minorities inhabiting the territory of Russia.6 In December 1917 the Bolsheviks formed the Commissariat (Ministry) of Nationalities ± the Narkomats, which was headed by Joseph Stalin. One of its principal departments was the Muskom (the Muslim Committee) under M. Vahitov and M. Sultan-Galiev. Among other influential Muslim Bolsheviks were F. Khodjaev, A. Kamaletdinov, I. Kuleev, S. Akhmadiev, V. Ibragimov, T. Ryskulov, Safarov, Narimanov and Hanafi Muzzafar. After the death of M.Vahitov in August 1918 M. Sultan-Galiev became the indisputable leader of the Muslim Communists. In November 1918 he initiated the creation of the Central Bureau of Muslim Communists, which was a specifically Muslim unit within the Russian Communist Party (the RCP(b)) and of the Union of Young Muslim Socialists. The first action of the Muslim Bureau was the organization of the First All-Russian Congress of Muslim Communists which debated the issues of the separate Muslim

Muslims under Soviet Rule 103

Communist Party of Russia and the promotion of communism among Muslims abroad. An indication of the importance of the Congress for the Bolshevik leadership was Stalin's participation in its work.7 Under the guidance of M. Vahitov and M. Sultan-Galiev, the initial Bolshevik policy towards Islam and Muslims was characterized by considerable flexibility, tolerance and tactfulness. In fact, the atheistic Bolshevik campaign, which was triggered by the Government Decree of 1918 on the Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church, targeted primarily the Russian Orthodox Church as the symbol of the Russian monarchy. As for Islam and Muslims, the Party leaders and functionaries tended to refrain from statements and comments of an offensive nature. On many public occasions, Stalin, Kirov and other top Bolshevik politicians spoke favourably about Islam and Shariat. In particular, they stressed that there was no conflict between the Soviet system and Islam and promised the preservation of the Shariat courts in the Islamic regions of Russia. Vahitov and Sultan-Galiev also masterminded a number of important propagandistic actions of the Soviet Government, aimed at improving its image in the Muslim-populated regions of Russia. Among these were the return to the Islamic community of the legendary Koran of Osman, which was previously confiscated by the Tsarist Government and displayed at the museum of St Petersburg; of the mosque of Caravansarai in Orenburg; of the Suumbike Tower in Kazan; and of some historical mosques in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Bolsheviks also organized special propagandist trains which travelled all over the country and distributed free brochures, booklets and posters that in a simple and comprehensive form explained the alleged advantages of Bolshevik rule. Among the major achievements of Bolshevik propaganda was its winning of the support of some Muslim clerics who became known as Red Shariatists. Among them were, for example, Mullah Babakhan in Turkestan, Mullah Rasulov in Tatarstan, Mullah Takko-Kahadji in Dagestan, Mullah Katkhanov in Kabarda and Mullahs Ali Mitaev and Sugaip in Chechnya. The Red Shariatists organized a movement under the slogan `For Soviet Power ± for Shariat'.8 Sultan-Galiev was the main theoretician of Muslim Communism which presented a fusion of Bolshevism and left-wing jadidism. SultanGaliev fully subscribed to the socio-economic platform of the Bolsheviks, although he maintained allegiance to the jadidist programme on national, religious and cultural issues. In particular, Sultan-Galiev opposed the atheism of the Bolsheviks and believed in the productive compatibility of Islam and socialism on the basis of such allegedly common characteristics as social justice, communalism, the priority of

104 Russia and Islam

the group over individual interests, concern for the poor and denunciation of slavery and usury, which was compared to capitalist profit. Like jadids, Muslim Communists argued in favour of special Muslim local administrations, courts and schools based on the al-usul al-jadid and subordinate to the Mahkama-al-Islamiyya ( the Islamic Court). On the whole, Muslim Communism provided a viable framework for a productive relationship between the Russian centre and the Muslim periphery, although it suffered from Tatar-centricity. Like most jadids, Muslim Communists perceived the Tatars as the natural leaders of the various Muslim peoples of Russia and beyond its borders, and regarded Kazan as the Islamic capital of Russia and the centre for the export of communism into the Islamic East. The pro-Tatar drive of Sultan-Galiev alienated many non-Tatar Muslim reformers from him. Significantly, the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, which took place in Baku in September 1920, denounced the pro-Tatar drive of Muslim Communists.9 In spite of its limitations Muslim Communism had a profound impact on the Islamic radical movement in Russia and abroad. Of particular importance was the Muslim Communists' thesis about the strategic alliance between Bolshevik Russia and oppressed Muslims of Western colonies. A similar view was shared by Leon Trotskii, proponent of the theory of permanent revolution, and some of the Party's experts on the East, such as V. Gurko-Kriajin and K. Troianovskii. However, Lenin, Stalin and the majority of the Bolshevik establishment opposed this view and regarded the working class of the West as the main strategic partner of Communist Russia. The ideas of Sultan-Galiev and other Muslim Communists were met with enthusiasm by some left-wing Muslims abroad. Among these, for example, were Mobend Nat Roy, Sultan-Zade and Tan Malaka. They joined the Eastern Bureau of the Communist International (the Comintern), the international Communist agency, established by the Bolsheviks in 1919 for the worldwide promotion of Communism. Foreign Muslim revolutionaries viewed Russia's Muslims as in the vanguard of the coming pan-Islamic revolution against Western colonialism. They regarded Moscow as a new revolutionary Mecca which would facilitate the liberation of the Darul-Islam (the world of Islam) from the Western Dar-ul-Harb (the world of war). They welcomed the modifications to the international Communist slogans which were introduced by the First Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku. In particular, the Congress replaced the traditional slogan `Proletariat of all Countries Unite!' with its new version `Proletariat of all Countries and Oppressed Peoples of the World, Unite!'10

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Muslim Communists played an essential role in the prevention of a nationwide, popular anti-Bolshevik Islamic revolt and its merger with the White movement. The vast majority of Russia's Muslims remained neutral during the critical period of the Russian civil war and foreign intervention in Russia in 1918±21. This was an important factor in the survival of the Bolshevik regime. Nevertheless, for almost a decade after the revolution, the Bolsheviks were faced with sporadic and enclave resistance in Muslim-populated regions of Russia. In the Volga-Urals the Bolsheviks relatively quickly managed to establish their rule in Kazan, while Ufa for almost two years remained under the control of Tatar and Bashkir nationalists. The Bolsheviks' success in Kazan could be explained by their considerable political influence which remained from the February Revolution. By the late summer of 1917 the local Bolsheviks, headed by M. Vahitov, N. Ershov, K. Grasis, K. Yakubov, V. Tikhomirnov, G. Olkenitskii and Y. Sheynkman had gained a majority on the Kazan city council and on a number of local Soviets. On 25 October 1917 the Kazan Bolsheviks, simultaneously with their Petrograd counterparts, began an uprising against the Provisional Government. On 26 October the Bolsheviks took over the major administrative, military and information structures of the city and established the Bolshevik administration ± the Provisional revolutionary committee ± consisting of 20 people. In November 1917 the Kazan Bolsheviks formed the Soviet Council which was headed by Y. Sheynkman. By March 1918 the Bolsheviks controlled most of the Kazan gubernia.11 In Ufa, by contrast, the Bolsheviks met strong opposition from the Tatar and Bashkir nationalists who agitated for wider regional autonomy in the form of Idel-Ural Shtati (the State of Idel-Ural), in accordance with the Bolshevik slogan about the right to national self-determination. It was anticipated that the Idel-Ural Shtati would cover the territory of modern-day Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, much of Orenburg oblast' and the territories extending south to the Caspian sea, with a total population of 7 million. In November 1917 in Ufa, the Tatar and Bashkir nationalists convened the Milli Mejlis which assumed the functions of the provisional government of the Idel-Ural Shtati. Sadri Maksudi became its first chairman. In January 1918 the Milli Mejlis adopted the constitution of Idel-Ural Shtati, written by the distinguished Tatar intellectuals Galimzian Sharaf, Ilias and Jangir Alkin, O. Tokumbetov and Y. Muzaffarov. The Milli Mejlis scheduled the official declaration of the IdelUral Shtati for 1 March 1918. However, the Bolsheviks foiled this plan by arresting the leaders of the Milli Mejlis and proclaiming a Tatar-Bashkir Soviet republic within approximately the same borders as the Idel-Ural.12

106 Russia and Islam

However, in August 1918 the Bolsheviks suffered a serious setback in the Volga-Urals as a result of the counter-offensive by the joint forces of the White Czechs and Samara-based Komuch (the Committee of the Constituent Assembly of Russia) under the command of V. Kappel.13 The counter-revolutionary coup d'eÂtat was followed by ruthless persecution of the Bolsheviks. Among its victims was M.Vahitov. In September 1918 the Bolsheviks temporarily recovered their control over Kazan by playing on the internal squabbling within the Komuch. The Bolsheviks demolished the Komuch's headquarters in Samara and forced its leaders to flee to Ufa. There they proclaimed the Directoria, the anti-Bolshevik Government of Russia, which established an alliance with the Bashkir nationalists under the leadership of Zaki Validi and the Kazakh nationalists from the Alash Orda. In November, the Bolsheviks were once again expelled from Kazan by Admiral Kolchak.14 As was mentioned earlier, the conflict between Kolchak and Zaki Validi contributed to the rapprochement between the Bashkir nationalists and the Bolsheviks. Their temporary alliance enabled the Bolsheviks to change the regional balance of power in their favour. By the end of 1920, the Bolsheviks had created the administrative structures of two separate Tatar and Bashkir republics which encroached upon the Idel-Ural project. The republics' borders were drawn across homogeneous ethnic communities leaving outside the republics a considerable number of ethnic Tatars and Bashkirs. Thus, the Tatar republic included only 1 459 600 out of a total of 4 200 000 Tatars living in Soviet Russia. In the Bashkir republic the ethnic Bashkirs were a minority in comparison to the Tatar and Russian population of the republic.15 The process of sovietization of the Volga-Urals was interlinked with the Bolshevik advance in Kazakhstan. The Bolsheviks' major opponent there was the Kazakh nationalist movement, led by the party of Alash Orda. In December 1917, the Kazakh nationalists formed the autonomous government of Alash Orda in Orenburg under the leadership of Ahmed Baytursun. The leaders of Alash Orda established links with other anti-Bolshevik forces, such as the Bashkir nationalists under the leadership of Zaki Validi, the Cossacks under the command of General Dutov, the White army of Admiral Kolchak and the Kokand separatists. However, the rapprochement between Zaki Validi and the Bolsheviks in February 1919 affected the policy of the Alash-Orda. In June 1919, Ahmed Baytursun followed the example of Zaki Validi and met Lenin. They agreed to form a coalition government between the Bolsheviks and the members of the Alash Orda. As for the irreconcilable members of the Alash Orda, they quit Ahmed Baytursun and continued their

Muslims under Soviet Rule 107

anti-Soviet activities. In March 1920, they were finally beaten by the Bolsheviks.16 In Azerbaijan, the Bolshevik advance was hampered by the Azeri nationalists from the Musawat party who refused to co-operate with the Bolsheviks and formed in Baku the separatist government which received the backing of Britain, Germany and Turkey. This large-scale international engagement reflected the region's particular geopolitical and economic significance, its vast oil resources in particular. This also explains the personal involvement of leading Bolshevik figures, such as S. Kirov, A. Mikoyan and G. Ordjonikidze in the sovietization of Azerbaijan. In September 1918, the Musawatists welcomed the Turkish and German military intervention in Azerbaijan. From November 1918 until August 1919, they relied on British military and economic assistance, in return for which they agreed to British interference in Azerbaijan's internal and foreign policies, including the unification of the foreign policies of Azerbaijan and Iran. The Musawatists' strong dependence on external forces, their limited social base and their conflict with other anti-Soviet regional players, such as the dashnaks (Armenian nationalists) of Nakhichevan and Nagornii Karabakh, the Georgian mensheviks and the Whites under General Denikin, weakened their resistance to the Bolsheviks. After the British withdrawal from the Caucasus in August 1920, the days of the Musawatist government were numbered and at the end of 1920, it fell under the advance of the Red army which occupied most of Azerbaijan.17 In the Crimea, the anti-Bolshevik camp included the Crimean nationalists of the Milli Firka, the Kadets, Socialist Revolutionaries ( SRs), Mensheviks and foreign interventionists. The Party of Milli Firka united educated and politically active representatives of the Crimean Tatars who made up just a quarter of the total population of the Crimea. In December 1917, the members of the Milli Firka and their allies formed a coalition government, the Council of Peoples' Representatives, which had its own armed forces under the command of General Makukhin. In spring 1918, Chelebeev and other leaders of the Milli Firka established close links with the commanders of the German interventionist forces in the Crimea. They appealed to the German Kaiser Wilhelm to provide a security umbrella for the `neutral' Crimean Khanate. With German backing they formed the Kuraltay, the Crimean Parliament. After the withdrawal of German troops from the Crimea in November 1918, the Milli Firka turned for protection to the British and French interventionist armies. The Milli Firka's attempt to collaborate with the White Generals Denikin and Wrangel failed due to the incompatibility of their

108 Russia and Islam

national ideologies. However, the contacts between the Crimean nationalists and the White Russian Generals had a damaging impact on the credentials of the Milli Firka among ordinary Crimean Tatars. As a result of the growing internal squabbling the Milli Firka split into a number of rival factions. Its radical members accepted the Bolshevik political platform and organized a Red-Green Muslim Bureau of the Bolshevik Party of the Crimea, headed by Veli Ibragimov (Ibragim), which de facto replaced the Kuraltay. Following the withdrawal of foreign troops in November 1920, the Red Army, headed by M. Frunze, occupied the Crimea. The establishment of Bolshevik rule was accompanied by Red terror, organized by Bela Kun, the former leader of Soviet Hungary and R. Zemliachka. According to some sources, during the Red terror campaign, which went on for almost three years, the Bolsheviks shot about 150 000 people and burnt dozens of villages. In October 1923, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the Crimea the Crimean Soviet Autonomous Republic. Veli Ibragim became the first chairman of the Crimean Committee of the Communist Party.18 In the Muslim North Caucasus, the Bolsheviks faced ferocious opposition which comprised various national separatists, Islamic fighters (the gazis), Terek and Kuban Cossacks, Whites linked to General Denikin and foreign interventionist forces. In November 1917, Turkish troops invaded Derbend and the adjacent areas of southern Dagestan. In May 1918, in the eastern part of the North Caucasus, the separatists proclaimed an independent North Caucasian Republic, the idea of which was born at the Third North Caucasian Congress in September 1917. The republic was short-lived and fell under the advance of the combined forces of General Denikin and the Cossacks. However, as in Russia's other Muslim regions, the chauvinistic policies of the White generals prevented an alliance between the Whites and the Islamo-national opposition. Furthermore, some Islamic leaders began to consider the Bolsheviks, who promised national and cultural self-determination, a lesser evil than the Whites who advocated the restoration of unitarist and Orthodox Russia. In late 1918, Bolshevik troops, with the assistance of local Islamic collaborators, advanced deep into the region. They positioned their garrisons in the most important mountain fortresses of Gunib, Gimri and Vedeno. Having established solid control over the eastern part of the North Caucasus, the Bolsheviks allowed for the formation of the Gorskaia (Mountain) Autonomous Republic on the territory of modern-day Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Kabarda, Balkaria, Karachay and parts of the Krasnodarskii and Stavropol'skii krais. But the republic was a stillborn creation and by May 1919 it had practically

Muslims under Soviet Rule 109

ceased to function because of the irreconcilable national agendas of its leaders. In November 1919, the Bolsheviks and their local allies proclaimed the Dagestan Autonomous Republic.19 That same year, Islamic radicals under the leadership of Uzun Haji of Salty, a 90-year-old Naqshbandi Chechen shaykh, attempted to recover the initiative by proclaiming an independent North Caucasian Emirate in the eastern part of the North Caucasus. Uzun Haji never accepted Russian domination and spent 15 years before the revolution in a labour camp in Siberia. The Emirate was an Islamic state modelled on the Imamate of Imam Shamyl. It was under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan Caliph. Like the Gorskaia republic, it did not last very long and after the death of Uzun Haji in March 1920 it fell under the advance of the combined forces of the Reds and their local allies. However, Uzun Haji's death sparked off an Islamic popular revolt against Red Russian rule which evoked memories of the nineteenth-century gazawat. The nominal leader of the revolt was Said Bek, grandson of Imam Shamyl, who came from Turkey, while its actual political leader was an Avar, shaykh Najmuddin of Gotso (Gotsinskii) who had been elected imam of Dagestan and Chechnya in August 1917. The bulk of the gazis were uzdens (free clansmen) tied by religious and kinship loyalty. They were well organized and had the advantage over the Reds of operating in a familiar high mountain terrain. In spite of the heavy numerical and technical superiority of the Red Army over the gazis it took it more than a year to break their resistance although the sporadic outbreaks of the rebellion persisted until 1925.20 The Bolsheviks' advance in Muslim Central Asia was inconsistent and determined by the political, ethnic and ideological circumstances at a particular locality in a particular moment of time.21 The main strategists of the Sovietization of Central Asia were the prominent Bolshevik leaders V. Kuibyshev and M. Frunze. An important component of their approach was the recognition of the local specifics related to Islam and regional ethno-cultural customary norms. They emphasized the Bolsheviks' positive attitude to shariat courts, mosques and Muslim clerics. The egalitarian Bolshevik socio-economic programme and their Islamfriendly propaganda won a considerable number of supporters among local radicals. In November 1917 in Tashkent, the pro-Bolshevik forces created the Soviet Government, the Sovnarkom (the Council of Peoples' Commissars) of Turkestan. In January 1920, it adopted a decree about the priority of shariat and adat over Soviet civic legal norms. However, outside Soviet Turkestan, the Bolsheviks were faced with ferocious resistance from the basmachis, the Cossacks of ataman A.

110 Russia and Islam

Dutov and various White formations. The basmachi chieftains, like the gazis of the North Caucasus, fought an Islamic war and appealed to panIslamic solidarity against the atheistic Bolshevik regime. As a result, the basmachi movement turned into a popular national liberation movement which presented one of the most serious internal military challenges to the Bolshevik leadership. In December 1917 in Kokand, the basmachis under the command of the kurbashi (chieftain) Irgash proclaimed `Kokand autonomy' as a first step towards the restoration of the Kokand Khanate as the future centre of the Islamic Caliphate of Central Asia. The first Kokand government, which consisted of members of the Kokand feudal and Islamic elite, was headed by Mustafa Chokaev who established close links with the Emir of Bukhara, the Khan of Khiva, the Bashkir and Kazakh nationalists, the Cossacks and various factions of the White movement. Thus, Seyid Alim-Khan, the Bukharan ruler, provided the Kokand separatists with an army of 95 000 soldiers trained by White Russian and British instructors, based in Meshhed. Nevertheless, in February 1918, the Red Army defeated the Kokand separatists and established Soviet rule in Kokand. However, until the end of 1921, the Bolshevik positions there remained fragile and were constantly threatened by basmachis.22 In Khiva, the Bolsheviks' major adversaries were Turkmen tribes under the leadership of Dzhunaid-Khan and the Cossack formations under the command of Colonel Zaytsev. They de facto became the real masters of the Khanate, while the role of Khan Isfendiyar became nominal. It took the Bolsheviks more than two years to impose Soviet rule there. In February 1920, the Bolsheviks finally liquidated the Khanate of Khiva and on its territory proclaimed the People's Soviet Republic of Khwarazm, which existed until 1924. Its legislative and legal systems included shariat and adat norms. In 1927, Djunaid-Khan made an attempt to restore the Khanate, but failed and was forced to flee to Iran. In early 1918 in Bukhara, Emir Seyid Alim-Khan, the basmachis and the young Bukharans united in the `Turkestan Military Organization' which for more than two years successfully withstood the attacks of the Red Army. In September 1920, the Bolsheviks finally broke the Bukharan resistance and forced Emir Seyid Alim-Khan to flee to Eastern Bukhara. The Emirate was transformed into the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara, which like the Khwarasm Republic, functioned till 1924. In spring 1921, Seyid Alim-Khan with a 15 000-strong basmachi formation tried to recapture Bukhara, but he was crushed by the Reds. After this defeat he and over 200 000 of his supporters emigrated to Afghanistan. From there they provided substantial material and military assistance to the remainder of the basmachi formations in Central Asia.23

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In November 1921, the basmachi movement acquired new momentum under the leadership of Enver Pasha, the former War Minister of Ottoman Turkey, who had strong connections with Muhammad Nadir-Khan, the Minister for War of Afghanistan. Enver-Pasha managed to restore discipline and raise morale in the basmachi camp. He proclaimed himself commander-in-chief of the Islamic army which began a jihad for the liberation of Central Asia from Bolshevism and the creation of an Islamic state there. Under Enver-Pasha's leadership, the basmachis managed to recapture a vast area including the towns of Dushanbe, Karshi and Shakhrisyabz in modern Tajikistan. The Bolsheviks reacted to the basmachis' advance by sending two divisions and three brigades of special forces. S. Kamenev, the supreme commander of the Red Army, as well as G. Ordjonikidze and Y. Peters, both high-ranking Bolsheviks, personally supervised the military situation in the region. In June 1922, the Reds began a counter-attack against the basmachis, who were driven out of Dushanbe and adjacent Tajik-populated areas. The death of Enver Pasha on 4 August 1922, which dealt a devastating blow to the basmachi movement, helped the Bolshevik advance. By the end of the year they controlled most of Central Asia, although local basmachi revolts took place until 1926. The 1925 Soviet `land and water' reform, which substantially improved the economic conditions of local dehqane, undermined the social base of the basmachi resistance. The last significant outbreak of the basmachi movement occurred in 1929 during the Bolsheviks' forced collectivization of the dehqane. However, it lacked a unified leadership and was relatively easily suppressed by the Soviets. Nevertheless, sporadic occurrences of basmachi protest continued up until 1941.24 Overall, it took the Bolsheviks almost two decades to reassert the Centre's control over the Muslim-populated parts of the former Russian empire. Alongside the internal Islamic challenges, the early Bolshevik leadership also became involved with foreign Muslims. This involvement reflected the internationalist dimension of Soviet foreign policy, which was aimed at winning the sympathy of Muslims of the Western colonies. On 20 December 1917, the Bolshevik Government issued an appeal `To All the Working Muslims of Russia and the East,' which stated that the Arabs and other Muslims had the right to be masters of their countries and to decide their own destinies as they wished.25 The Bolshevik politicians caused embarrassment to their Western European counterparts by their public denunciation of the West's underhand diplomacy related to the countries of the Islamic East. In particular, Lenin's Government published secret agreements between the governments of Tsarist Russia and major European states, including the Sykes±Picot Agreement of 1916

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on the colonial partition of the Middle East. In 1920, the Soviet Government condemned the establishment of British mandate rule over Iraq, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and French mandate rule over Syria and Lebanon. In 1921, the Soviets challenged the Western mandate system with a number of equal `Treaties of Friendship and Brotherhood' which they signed with the governments of Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran. Soviet Russia was the first European state to establish diplomatic relations with Hejaz (since 1932 ± Saudi Arabia) and Yemen and to offer them economic assistance. Bolshevik Russia turned into the revolutionary training centre for radicals from abroad. Representatives of the national-liberation movements in Islamic colonies were invited to Moscow-sponsored international gatherings, such as the four congresses of the Comintern in 1919±22 and the Congress of the Peoples of the East in 1920. Foreign Muslim left-wing activists were granted access to free higher Marxist education in Russia's international institutes, such as the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (the KUTV), the Institute of Red Professorship (the IKP), the Moscow Agrarian Institute (the MAI), the Moscow and Petrograd Oriental Institutes and some other politicized institutions. From the mid±1920s, they included the Communist Party Higher schools attached to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties in the Muslim-populated republics of the Soviet Union, which was created in 1922. On the whole, the anti-Western and anticolonial initiatives of the early Soviet Government, as well as their egalitarian internal policies, enhanced its favourable image in Muslim colonies and semi-colonies. This was an important factor in the internal and international survival of Soviet Russia in the first years after the Bolshevik revolution.26

Stalinism and Islam From the mid-1920s, the Bolshevik leadership, having consolidated its rule, began to change its domestic national and religious policies. This change was triggered by the death of Lenin and the ascendance of Stalin as Soviet dictator. Stalin adopted a policy of rigid centralization and unification of the Soviet state and society which implied the suppression of any form of political or intellectual dissent. The Stalin leadership began to stigmatize anybody who disagreed with their vision of socialist state- and nation-building and interpretation of internationalism as left or right political extremists, petit-bourgeois nationalists, religious obscurantists and so on. The latter were subjected to

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persecution, including physical elimination. In the atmosphere of growing ideological intolerance the Muslim Communists were doomed. The first open conflict between Stalin and Sultan-Galiev took place at the 12th Communist Party Congress in April 1923. Sultan-Galiev challenged Stalin's unitarist programme for the future organization of the USSR by proposing a federal structure as the only viable form of political organization of a multi-ethnic Soviet state. Furthermore, Sultan-Galiev accused Stalin of great-state chauvinism, thus sealing his fate. In May 1923, Sultan-Galiev was charged with petit bourgeois nationalism and expelled from his Party and Government posts. In June 1923, at a special meeting of the Party Central Committee, the views of SultanGaliev and his followers were condemned as nationalist deviations from the Party's line and labelled as the Sultan-Galievshchina. During the1920s and '30s Sultan-Galiev was repeatedly accused of various anti-Party activities, including alleged secret links with Bashkir and Crimean nationalists. In 1939, a Stalinist court charged Sultan-Galiev with treason against the Soviet state and sentenced him to death, executing him in 1940.27 The Crimean Tatar leaders Veli Ibragim, Deren-Ayerli and Umerov were the other high-profile victims of Stalin's dictatorship. They were charged with trying to achieve the nationalist plan of `Crimea for the Crimean Tatars', and with connections with Sultan-Galiev, Zaki Validi, Trotsky and other politically unreliable figures, as well as with maintaining a secret allegiance to Islam. Between 1922 and 1927, the campaign against the Crimean Party leaders, which was later termed the Veli-Ibragimovshchina, transcended the Party context and evolved into wider anti-Islamic purges. It was aimed against the shariat courts, medresses, mosques and Muslim clerics. In 1928, Veli Ibragim was executed. Stalinist campaigns against all forms of alleged bourgeois nationalism destroyed the most intelligent and talented representatives of the Muslim Communist elite. Among them were, for example, the founder of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Akmal Ikramov, the chairman of the Soviet Government of Turkestan, Turar Ryskulov, and the former leader of the Young Bukharans Fayzullah Khojaev. But their Islamic background was not the main reason for Stalin's animosity towards them. In fact, they constituted only a small fraction of the ten million or more victims of the purges against intellectually and politically independent representatives of Soviet society, irrespective of their various ethnic and religious origins.28 Under the Stalinist leadership, the previous relatively liberal approach towards Islam and Muslims was replaced with an aggressive policy of suppression of any manifestation of religious or national identity. The

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practitioners of this new approach were largely professionally incompetent, albeit obedient Party functionaries who were selected by Stalin on the grounds of their personal loyalty to him. Their notorious leader was E.Yaroslavskii (Miney Gubel'man). In 1925, Stalin appointed him as chairman of The Union of Militant Fighters against God, the motto of which was `A war against religion is a war for socialism.' The Union recruited a large number of poorly educated, unemployed young people who were attracted by its militant slogans and guaranteed subsistence. As a result, by 1927 in Tatarstan, alone, there were 2141 members of Yaroslavskii's guard. By 1931, their number had risen to 16 872. In 1928, the Union opened its first branch in Uzbekistan, although it took almost a decade to establish itself in Tajikistan. The publishing house Atheist was founded under the auspices of the Union, specializing in anti-religious publications. It also produced antireligious periodicals, such as the newspaper Bezbozhnik (`Godless') and the journal Antireligioznik (`Anti-religionist').29 In the late 1920s, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government issued a number of directives which formed an ideological framework for anti-religious practices. Among them were, for example, the Communist Party Central Committee's directive `On the intensification of measures in the war against religion' and the Government's decree `On religious associations'. The persecution of Islam and Muslims continued through the 1930s. During it, about thirty thousand Muslim clerics perished; almost all mosques, medresses, mektebs and other Islam-related institutions were either destroyed, closed, or converted into various mundane premises, such as secular schools, publishing houses, social clubs, kindergartens, factories, storage places, or even wine-refinery and drying-out clinics. The last two cases were especially insulting to Muslim religious feelings. Thousands of mullahs and other Muslim clerics fled to Afghanistan and Iran. The destruction of the mosques was particularly severe in the Caucasus, which remained the most troublesome zone for the Bolsheviks. Thus, only 980 mosques remained in Tatarstan in 1930, compared to the 2223 mosques which had been there in 1917. In KabardinoBalkaria and Adyghea not a single mosque was left. Waqf property was sequestered, shariat courts were closed, the network of religious schools, both traditional and jadidist, practically ceased to exist. At the behest of official Islam only two out of thousands of medresses remained open. They were the medresse of Mir-i-Arab in Bukhara and the medresse of Imam Ismail al-Bukhari in Tashkent. The publication of most Islamic literature and periodicals was stopped. In 1928 the official journals Islam and Diyanat (`Religion') of the Central Spiritual Board in Ufa were banned. The banning of Islamic books was accompanied by highly publicized burnings.30

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Figure 4.1 Medresse Mir-i-Arab in Bukhara

As a result of the anti-Islamic campaign, `high', intellectual Islam, which developed from the late eighteenth century and persisted until 1917, was virtually destroyed while the religious life of ordinary Muslims was channelled within parallel Islam, dominated by traditionalism and Sufism. Many distinguished Islamic thinkers were arbitrarily charged either with anti-Soviet activity; or espionage in favour of the West, especially, England; or having a pro-Trotsky orientation; or being guilty of the Veli-Ibragimovshchina, or some other form of bourgeois nationalism. Many of them were executed, while the rest were sent to the Gulag. Among the victims of Stalinist terror were Muftii Rizaeddin Fahreddinov, who was highly respected among Muslims of the USSR and abroad, and the majority of mullahs, shaykhs, ishans, elders and other Muslim authorities. In 1937, the Bolsheviks eradicated the so-called Chechen-Ingush nationalist centre and executed its actual and alleged leaders. In the Volga-Urals and Central Asia the anti-religious purges irreversibly disrupted the Sufi network which had survived under the Tsarist regime. However, in the mountainous North Caucasus, Sufism, although seriously undermined, maintained its secret existence.

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The destruction of mosques, medresses and mektebs ruined the system of Islamic confessional education which, especially in the case of Tatars and Bashkirs, ensured the transfer of the Islamic way of life through the generations in spite of the Orthodoxy-dominated environment. The replacement of the Arabic alphabet first with the Latin (Yanalif) in 1929±31 and subsequently Cyrillic in 1939 dealt yet another severe blow to Islamic scholarship in the USSR. This double change cut Soviet Muslims off both from their religious and cultural heritage, and from their co-religionists outside the USSR. Muslim children, like all Soviet children, were taught within the compulsory unified Soviet educational system, a central element of which was atheistic Communist indoctrination. They were taught a new Soviet version of their history defined by class struggle. National and religious identities were depicted as insignificant and rudimentary. Those national historic figures who did not fit the class criteria were erased from the school curriculum and textbooks. The names of many pre-revolutionary Muslim intellectuals, who rejected the Bolshevik revolution, were not mentioned. On the other hand, those who agreed to co-operate with the Bolshevik regime, were glorified and turned into great national heroes. Their names were given to streets, kolkhozes and factories. Numerous films, plays and books were dedicated to them. Higher education and academic studies were similarly radically modified in accordance with Stalin's demands. In order to promote a unified and Russified version of the history of non-Slavic peoples of the USSR, Moscow created a network of Research Institutes of History, Languages and Literature in every ethnic union and autonomous republic. These Institutes were to propagate the civilizational and liberational role of the `Great Russian people' towards their non-Russian younger brothers; to foster national cultures which were `national in form and socialist in content' and to forge a new supra-national entity ± the Sovetskii Narod (the Soviet People). According to Stalin's plan, the implementation of which began in 1922±24, some ethnic groups, or nationalities, were classified as `firstclass nationalities,' others as `second-class' or even `third-class nationalities', while yet other ethnic groups were not recognized at all and were incorporated within larger ethnic communities. Only fifteen out of more than a hundred nationalities acquired the `first class status' and were entitled to form their own union republics. The others were assigned either to an autonomous republic, an autonomous province (krai), an autonomous region (oblast') within a union republic, or completely denied any form of autonomy. Under the new national-administrative hierarchy the Tatars and Bashkirs, who were among the largest and most

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politically and culturally advanced Muslim communities of the USSR, were assigned to `second-class nationality', while nomadic Turkmen, Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes were promoted to `first-class nationalities'. Following the ethno-territorial delimitation of Muslim-populated regions of the USSR, which was finalized in 1936, Central Asia was divided into five union republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Azeris were rated as `a first-class nationality' and were allowed to form a union republic, while Muslims of the North Caucasus were assigned to a lower status and were granted various forms of autonomy within the Russian Federation. As a result, there emerged the autonomous republics of Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, ChechenoIngushetia and Northern Ossetia. The Crimea was transformed into the Crimean autonomous republic.31 The political and administrative delimitation of the Muslim-populated areas was designed to prevent an ethno-territorial consolidation of nonRussians, including Muslims. The borders between the new administrative units were therefore drawn across traditional regional, ethno-religious and clan ties. The new delimitation created numerous potential ethnoterritorial time-bombs. This was particularly the case in the extremely multi-ethnic and poly-confessional Caucasus. Within the union republic of Christian Georgia were formed the Muslim autonomous republics of Ajaria and Abkhazia. Within the Russian Federation were created the autonomous republics of Checheno-Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan. Muslims of Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Adyghea were entitled only to the status of an autonomous oblast' within the Stavropol'skii and Krasnodarskii krais of the Russian Federation, respectively. The administrative borders between those republics divided some homogeneous ethnic communities, on the one hand, and artificially unified ethnically and linguistically distinct ethnic groups, on the other. Thus, the mountainous people of Kabarda, who were Circassians, were united with the Balkars, a Turkic people, within the one republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. Similarly, the Turkic people of Karachay, who were linguistically and culturally close to the Balkars, were united with the mountainous Cherkess, who were Circassians. In spite of the consolidation of Soviet power in the North Caucasus, the region, especially Chechnya, remained troubled for the Soviets throughout the 1930s. The last outbreak of the Caucasian war occurred in 1940.32 A central element of Stalinist social engineering was the creation of a loyal new national elite. In the late 1930s, Moscow replaced most regional Party and Government leaders who belonged to the revolutionary generation with representatives of the first Soviet native cadre. They

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were generally poorly educated, ideologically brainwashed and therefore more disciplined and obedient. This cadre shake-up occurred within the framework of the Communist Party's policy of korenizatsia (nativization). The Tatars, who historically dominated the intellectual and political elite of Russia's Muslims, suffered particularly badly from this policy. Their best representatives were destroyed during the campaigns against Sultan-Galievshchina and Veli-Ibragimovshchina. Stalin's particular distrust of Tatars and Bashkirs accounted for the higher proportion of Russians in the top Party and government positions in the Tatar and Bashkir autonomous republics compared to other Muslim republics of the USSR. Until the mid-1950s, the korenizatsia there did not transcend the second and third levels of the government.33 In Central Asia and the North Caucasus, where clan and ethno-religious loyalties remained prevalent, Moscow's policy of korenizatsia was selective and aimed at those clans or ethnic groups which were politically and economically disadvantaged before the October Revolution. The Stalinist leadership believed that in return for political and security backing from the Centre, they would ensure the loyalty of their republics to Moscow. Hence, in Kazakhstan the Soviet central leadership promoted representatives of the Greater Horde; in Uzbekistan, members of the Ferghana, Samarkand, Bukhara and Tashkent clans; in Turkmenistan, the representatives of the Charjou tribes; in Tajikistan, representatives of Khodjent and Kulyab regions; and in Kyrgyzstan, members of the northern tribal groups of Osh. In Dagestan, the Centre favoured the Avars, in Kabardino-Balkaria, the Kabardinians and in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, the Cherkess. On the whole, Moscow's reliance on the traditional social network in the North Caucasus and Central Asia enhanced the clan solidarity there and exacerbated the existing social and economic discrepancies between the central and regional governments. The Communist Party and Soviet system camouflaged the continuing primordial social structures there. As a result, the regional leadership, though it formally complied with the Centre's political and ideological requirements, treated the Centre as an alien entity which could be abused in the interests of the local community.34 The impact of the Stalinist social and economic policies for the bulk of the Muslim population was ambivalent. Like the rest of the Soviet population, they suffered from the kollektivizatsia and the enemy-seeking hysteria of the political climate, but they also benefited from technological modernization and modern free education and health care. The correlation between gains and losses of Sovietization for various Muslim communities varied a great deal. The nomadic Kazakhs, Kyrgyzes and Turkmen who were chiefly engaged in cattle-breeding suffered most as a

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result of the coercive sedentarization and collectivization which destroyed their traditional way of life. Traditional tribal and clan relationships were undermined by the administrative delimitation which either divided members of the same tribe, or allocated representatives of different tribes to one administrative unit. The nomads en masse opposed the Centre's policies by either slaughtering their herds, or migrating to Afghanistan, Iran, Mongolia or China. According to some sources, the population of Kazakhs and Kyrgyzes was reduced almost by half as a result of their migration into neighbouring countries, the coercive collectivization of 1929±32 and the ensuing famine in the mid-1930s. Nomadic resistance to the atheistic Centre's brutal destruction of the traditional economic and social patterns acquired an Islamicized form. It furthered their secret Islamicization.35 Compared to the nomads, the settled rural Muslims in Central Asia gained considerably from the Soviet reforms. Following the `land and water' reform, which was implemented in the 1920s, vast areas of land which belonged to a few feudal landowners were redistributed among the poor dehqane. The Soviet authorities created a network of various cooperatives which assisted the dehqane to sell their products and to purchase tools and other essentials of agriculture. The collectivization, however, was devastating for those dehqane who were put into the category of kulaks (well-off peasants). They were deprived of their cattle and deported, while their land was distributed either among their impoverished neighbours, or agrarian immigrants from central Russia. The local kulaks resisted by attempting to revive the Basmachi movement, though this was short-lived. However, for the poor majority, the kolkhoz system provided considerable economic and social advantages. Significantly, compared to central Russia, where kolkhozes were completely new formations, in Central Asia, as well as in the North Caucasus, they were often created along existing clan, tribe and neighbourhood lines. In Tajikistan, for example, the borders of kolkhozes corresponded to those of avlods (traditional ethno-religious communities). The head of a kolkhoz was usually the leader of an avlod. An individual allotment of a kolkhoznik (a member of a kolkhoz) disguised a traditional mul'k (piece of private land). Moreover, a substantial part of a kolkhoz's income was diverted towards the traditional needs of the local community such as conducting Islamic rituals and festivals and the maintenance of Islamic shrines.36 Centralized material and technical assistance accelerated the modernization of crop-growing and cattle-breeding among rural Muslims. The kolkhoz system had an important social dimension because kolkhozes also ran schools, clubs, libraries, cinemas and agro-based industries. The

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integration of Central Asia, as well as the North Caucasus, into the nationwide energy and electricity supply systems radically improved the living standards of ordinary Muslims and opened them to many aspects of modern life. The introduction of compulsory free education and modern health care in largely illiterate and disease-stricken rural Muslim provinces was among the indisputable achievements of Sovietization. For instance, in 1926, only 5 per cent of the population of Central Asia could read and write but forty years later everyone was literate and almost half of the adult population had secondary or higher education. Mass vaccination eradicated many infectious diseases which used to be fatal, and this contributed to the rapid growth of the population.37 The Stalinization of Soviet society had important international implications. In the late 1920s, the Soviet leadership modified its interpretation of internationalism by reducing the latter to proletarian solidarity. As a result, the Comintern dropped its strategy of the united anti-imperialist front which was adopted by its Second and Fourth Congresses. This implied a strategic alliance between communist and non-proletarian democratic forces in Asia and Africa, including the Islamic East. Instead, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, which took place in 1928, replaced it with a policy of confrontation between communists and non-communist democratic forces. This had a devastating effect on local communists who were isolated from national-liberation movements. Those leaders of the Comintern and local communists who disagreed with this approach and regarded it as destructive and politically damaging, were eliminated by the Stalinist leadership. They were charged with espionage in favour of the imperialist West, Britain, in particular, and links with the Zionists, the Troskyists. Many of them were executed, while others were sent to the Gulag.38

Muslims in the Great Patriotic War The Second World War (1939±45), which turned into the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against German aggression (1941±45), presented a serious challenge to Russian±Muslim relations within the USSR. Hitler regarded Soviet Muslims as a potential fifth column within Soviet society. The Germans therefore organized a massive propaganda campaign in order to stir the national and religious feelings of Muslims and to draw them into collaboration on an anti-Soviet basis. From the first days of the war German commandos infiltrated the Muslim-populated regions of the Soviet Union. The Germans' trump card, as far as propaganda was concerned, was the promise of political independence to various Muslim

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peoples of the USSR if they collaborated with the invaders. Stalin responded to the German propaganda by a promotion of the supra-national Soviet patriotism and an appeal to the religious feelings of the polyconfessional population of the USSR. This was accompanied by a relaxation in the Government's national and religious policies. Islamic clerics, as well as leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, were co-opted into the Soviet establishment in order to arouse the patriotic feelings of believers. In 1942, various nomadic Muslim peoples were allowed to return to their traditional life-style, albeit under the auspices of the kolkhoz system. The infamous Union of Atheists was dissolved. The purges against the Muslim intelligentsia were slowed down. The Soviet authorities lifted the ban on some religious activities and practices. In May 1942, Moscow permitted Muslim leaders to hold in Ufa an Islamic conference which urged Soviet Muslims to support the Soviet Government in its war against Nazi Germany. In 1943, Gabdrahman Rasulev, the Muftii of Ufa, reached an accord with Stalin about the institutionalization of Islam in the Soviet Union. It was followed by the formation of three more Muftiyats in addition to the one in Ufa which administered the Sunni Muslims of the European part of the USSR. Among the new Muftiyats was the Muftiyat of the North Caucasus, based in the city of Buynaks in Dagestan, which was in charge of the Sunni Muslims of the Caucasus. The other new Muftiyat was based in Baku and oversaw the Shia Muslims of the Caucasus. The third and most influential new Muftiyat (the SADUM) was in Tashkent. It administered the Sunni Muslim population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The famous medresse of Mir-i-Arab was reopened in Bukhara. In May 1944, Stalin formed a special department within the Soviet Government, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC), with the task of liaising between the Soviet State and the Muslim community. In 1945, the Government provided wider financial independence to various Muslim organizations.39 The patriotic propaganda and pro-Islamic practical measures of Stalin's Government strengthened the loyalty of the bulk of the Soviet Muslims and prevented their rapprochement with the Germans. The Muftiyats played an important propagandist role and called for a Muslim jihad against the German invaders. They also organized the collection of money and aid for the Red Army which enabled the formation of an entire tank column. During the war many thousands of ordinary Muslims fought side by side with their non-Muslim compatriots. In spite of a history of difficult relations between Russia and the North Caucasus, the latter produced the largest number of heroes of the USSR per capita of the population. Over 19 000 soldiers from Turkmenistan, the total population

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of which was just over a million, received Soviet military honours. The corresponding figure was 20 000 for Azerbaijan and 50 000 for Tajikistan. The famous Tatar poet Musa Jalil became a symbol of Soviet Muslim patriotism. He was a soldier of the Red Army and fought selflessly against the Germans. When he was taken prisoner, he preferred death to collaboration with the Germans.40 Nevertheless, German propaganda gained limited success among some Muslim nationalists in the North Caucasus and Crimea. In early 1942, Mayrbek Sheripov and Hasan Israpilov, in anticipation of the German invasion, organized an anti-Soviet revolt in Checheno-Ingushetia. In the Crimea, Djafer Seydamet and Jemal Abduraimov, the former activists of the Milli Firka, established an anti-Soviet Central Muslim Committee which unleashed pro-German propaganda. It also formed eight battalions of Crimean Tatars who volunteered to fight on the German side. These separate cases of political disloyalty provoked the disproportionately severe reaction of Stalin's Government. In 1944, all ethnic Chechens, Ingushes, Balkars, Karachays, Khamshils, Kurds, Meskhetian Turks, Greeks, Bulgarians, Germans and Crimean Tatars were arbitrarily accused of collaboration with the Germans and overnight deported to Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The total number of deportees was about 700 000 people, the majority of whom were Chechens and Ingushes. Many of the deportees did not survive the journey, or died of hunger and disease after they arrived. As a result, the Chechen population alone was reduced by almost a third. The forceful resettlement of whole ethnic groups was accompanied by the redrawing of administrative borders, which further aggravated the problematic relations between neighbouring peoples, especially in the North Caucasus. In March 1944, the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated and its territory was allocated to the adjacent autonomies and regions of the Russian Federation.41 In June 1945, the Crimean Tatar Autonomous Republic was transformed into the Crimean oblast' of the Russian Federation. Subsequently, in 1954, Khrushchev transferred the Crimea to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The mass deportations and administrative changes aggravated the relationship between Stalin's regime and particular Muslim peoples although they did not seriously affect the grassroots relations between Muslims and other peoples of the Soviet Union. In fact, Islam was not the major reason for the Stalinist repression. The deportees also included non-Muslim peoples, such as, for example, the Volga Germans. Moreover, the deportations did not evoke strong feelings of Islamic solidarity in the Islamic umma of the USSR compared with the solidarity

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between peoples of various ethnic and religious backgrounds who were unfairly persecuted by the regime. There were also numerous cases of personal involvement by representatives of some Muslim ethnic groups in instigating the deportation of rival Muslim ethnic groups. Thus, according to reliable sources, some Kabarda Party and Government functionaries contributed to the deportation of Balkars, and some Dagestani apparatchiks to the deportation of Akkin Chechens from the Aukhovskii raion of Dagestan.42 Some Muslim ethnic groups benefited from the deportations of their Muslim neighbours. Thus, in the aftermath of the deportation of Chechens and Ingushes, six raions of Checheno-Ingushetia were transferred to Dagestan. In Dagestan the land and property of the Akkin Chechens from the Aukhovskii raion were distributed among Laks and Avars. Aukhovskii raion was renamed Novolakskii raion. In the 1950s, most of the deported Muslims were rehabilitated. The autonomous republic of Checheno-Ingushetia was restored although some of its territory remained within the borders of the neighbouring autonomies of Northern Ossetia and Dagestan. The deportation of some Islamic peoples of the USSR, since they were conducted without the knowledge of the Muslim public, did not seriously aggravate relations between the Soviet state and its Muslim subjects. On the whole, the hardships of the war and the countrywide conscription helped to erode the existing division between the largely Russian European part of the USSR and its Islamic periphery. The war accelerated interaction between Muslims and Russians, as well as other peoples of the country. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet Muslims fought side by side with Russians, Ukrainians and other non-Muslims of the USSR. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan received over a million evacuees from the European part of the Soviet Union. The transfer of hundreds of factories from the frontline zone to the Muslim periphery boosted the industrial development of the latter. As a result, Kazakhstan gained 140 industrial enterprises, Uzbekistan about 100 and Kyrgyzstan over thirty. The republics of Central Asia also obtained hydro-electric plants and dozens of military and civilian educational and scientific institutes and hospitals. The emergency industrialization of Central Asia also opened up unprecedented employment opportunities for women, thus furthering women's emancipation.43 The Soviet victory over Nazi Germany was a powerful unifying factor which reinforced the socio-political and ideological unity of various peoples of the USSR. It could be argued that after the Second World War the Soviet identity of various Muslim peoples of the USSR had precedence over their religious and national solidarity with their brethren abroad. The

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new socio-political realities were reflected in the new version of Soviet history, and the history of Russian±Muslim relations in particular, which was supposed to strengthen the `eternal friendship' between Russians and Muslims of the USSR. Immediately after the October revolution, Bolshevik theoreticians portrayed the Russian empire as `a prison of peoples' and the revolution as a means of national liberation from this `prison'. In the 1930s, Party historians modified their approach towards the Russian conquest of various Muslim peoples of the USSR. They began to describe it as `a lesser evil' which safeguarded Muslims from either medieval stagnation and anarchy, or conquest by more powerful Asian, or European states, such as Iran, Turkey, China and Britain. In the late 1940s, the concept of `a lesser evil' was replaced by the concept of `the voluntary transition of various Muslim peoples of Eurasia to Russian rule'. The very word `conquest' was banned from the historiographic lexicon relating to the Muslim regions of the USSR. The Russian period in the history of various Muslim peoples was presented as the beginning of their civilized and enlightened existence. Those historic and literary writings which did not conform to the official interpretation were declared `anti-popular and anti-socialist' and banned. Among the repressed works of literature were, for example, the Azeri epic Dede Korkut, the Uzbek epic Alpamysh, the Kazakh epics Er Sain, Shora Batyr, Koblandi Batyr, and the Kyrgyz epic Manas.44 The USSR's crucial role in the defeat of Nazi Germany boosted its international image, especially among the peoples of the Third World. This, as well as the beginnings of the Cold War determined the new emphasis on proselytizing on behalf of Soviet Communism in the Western colonies and semi-colonies of Asia and Africa. The Soviet leaders began to perceive the national liberation of various Asian and African peoples as the first phase of socialist revolution there. Leading Soviet social scientists generated the concept of the non-capitalist path for the developing countries of Asia and Africa, representing a modernized version of the National Communism of the 1920s. According to this concept the `anti-imperialist forces' in Asia and Africa were declared major international allies of the Soviet Communist Party. (The Comintern's strategy of exclusive reliance on Communists in Asia and Africa had proved ineffective and in May 1943 the Comintern was dissolved). The importance of the Islamic factor in the national-liberation movement in the East forced Soviet leaders to moderate their official position on Islam. As a result, the Soviet leadership managed to gain a strategic rapprochement with some radical Islamic forces in the Middle East. The leaders of the national-liberation movements, on their part, believed that the USSR could provide a viable social alternative to their

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otherwise neo-colonialist future. From the end of the 1940s, the USSR supported demands for the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, the struggle for independence in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, and the granting of independence to Lebanon, Syria, and later to Libya. In 1955, the USSR and Egypt under President Nasser signed an arms deal which established the Soviet military presence in the Middle East. In the 1960s pro-Soviet regimes were established in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Libya and South Yemen. The USSR's credentials among foreign Muslims were enhanced as a result of its unambiguous and resolute siding with the Arabs (including a nuclear ultimatum to the West in the Suez crisis), during their confrontation with Israel and the West in the years between 1956 and 1982, as well as its active solidarity with the Palestinians' struggle for an independent state. The relations between the USSR and radical Arab regimes took on political, military, economic and cultural dimensions. For instance, thousands of Soviet civil and military specialists, Russians and non-Russians, went to Egypt and other Arab countries in order to assist them in building the economic foundation to underpin their political independence. The Soviet Government provided free scholarships to students from various Muslim countries. Many Muslim graduates of Soviet universities became enthusiastic proponents of the socialist mode of life in their countries and supporters of the USSR in the international arena. In the mid-1950s, the period of relative religious freedom came to an end. The logic of a still Stalinist regime ± even though Stalin himself had died on 5 March 1953 ± required regular cleansing from the alleged internal and external enemies of the Soviet people. Soviet society was once again engulfed in the enemy-seeking hysteria which targeted freethinking Jews, other non-Russians and `wrong Russians,' and religious people, including Muslims. The Soviet leadership feared that a religious revival among the Soviet people, such as had occurred during the war, might get out of control and subsequently challenge the official Communist ideology. On 7 June 1954, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party adopted a resolution `On the major mistakes in scientific and atheist propaganda and the measures to correct them'. The resolution stated that `the ultimate goal of the Government was complete eradication of religiosity among the Soviet people and emancipation of various national cultures from religion'. It introduced tough restrictions on the social, educational and cultural activities of religious institutions and societies. Thus, Muslims were prohibited from opening new mosques, medresses and mektebs. Moreover, the Soviet authorities, like their Tsarist predecessors, encouraged the incorporation of pre-Islamic

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customs into `socialist national cultures' and their cleansing from the Islamic components.45 Parallel to the propaganda assault on popular Islam, the Soviet authorities continued to foster the official Soviet Islam controlled by Muftiis. Muftii Gabdrahman Rasulev of Central Russia and Siberia (the DUMES), made a significant contribution to the shaping of the optimal relationship between the Soviet state and its Islamic umma. He propagated the political and ideological benefits for the Soviet state of having a contented and economically prosperous Muslim community under its jurisdiction. Among the achievements of Rasulev's enthusiastic campaigning was the decision by the Soviet Government to allow a hajj of Soviet Muslims to Mecca and Medina. An important consideration behind this decision was the Soviet leadership's hope that Soviet hajjis would demonstrate to foreign Muslims the advantages of the Communist system. In December 1945, 17 Soviet Muslims conducted a hajj. The restructuring of the relationship between Moscow and the Islamic officialdom fuelled the competition between the four Muftiyats for supremacy and the right to represent Soviet Muslims abroad. In spite of the personal popularity of Muftii Rasulev, the authority of the DUMES was challenged by the Muftiyat of Central Asia (the SADUM), which represented the largest and most homogeneous Muslim community of the USSR.46 In 1948, the Soviet Government recognized the leading role of the SADUM in the Soviet umma. The other three Muftiyats in Ufa, Baku and Buynaksk became subordinated to it and it was given the exclusive right to grant permission for the opening of new mosques. The SADUM administered higher Islamic education, which was provided by the qadimist medresse of Mir-i-Arab in Bukhara and the medresse of Imam Ismail alBukhari in Tashkent. All four Muftiyats controlled officially registered mullahs and Imams. By the mid-1950s there were about 400 registered mosques in the country. The Muftiyats were infiltrated by KGB agents and were controlled by the Government Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. Many representatives of Islamic officialdom regarded their religious career as a means of acquiring the material and social benefits of the Soviet system. They complied with the Government's demand to enhance Soviet patriotism among Muslims of the USSR and to promote a positive image of the Soviet Union in the Islamic world. The Muftiis and other representatives of official Islam obediently orchestrated the popular support of Soviet Muslims for the Government's policies involving Muslims abroad. This related, for example, to official Soviet criticism of the Chinese Government's discrimination against China's Kazakh and Uyghur

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Muslim minorities; the Iranian Shah's suppression of the democratic Azeri movement in 1947; and the discrimination by Afghanistan's Pushtun-dominated monarchic regime of its Uzbek and Tajik population. Soviet Islamic officials also praised Moscow's backing of revolutionary Arab regimes against the West. The Muftiyats' functionaries were included in official Soviet delegations to Islamic countries, presenting a `live' image of the prosperous life of Muslims under the Soviets.47 The post-war shift of the centre of Soviet Islamic officialdom from Ufa to Tashkent and its further institutionalization widened the gap between official Islam and its unofficial, popular counterpart. While the former was integrated within the Soviet political establishment, the latter turned into the dominant form of Islam, and continued to be an important regulator of the everyday life of Muslim communities, especially in rural areas. Still, it is worth mentioning that on the informal level the links between the official and unofficial never ceased. The specific features of Islam, such as its ability to function without a religious infrastructure and clerics, secured its survival, in its popular form, in contrast to Orthodox Christianity. The Bolsheviks' destruction of mosques and the Muslim clergy did not therefore undermine the Islamic faith and way of life among Muslims of the USSR, particularly in the rural parts of Central Asia and the North Caucasus. However, the official suppression, as well as the lengthy isolation of Soviet Muslims from their co-religionists abroad, exaggerated the specific characteristics of Soviet Islam, which was overloaded with pre-Islamic and adat beliefs and norms. This related to the prominence in some Muslim-populated regions of the USSR of the pantheon of spirits, sprites, goblins, animals, heroes, princes and princesses as well as old `sages' and poet-lyrical singers. Their tombs were places of great veneration and miracles, destinations for pilgrimage and seasonal reunions.48 The religious practice of adepts of various forms of Soviet popular Islam differed a lot from the basic requirements of Islam. Due to official restrictions, the bulk of Soviet Muslims could not observe all five pillars of Islam ± shahada (the affirmation of faith); salat (the five daily prayers); hajj (the religious pilgrimage), zakat (almsgiving) and saum (fasting). Only the shahada was universally followed. About 30 per cent of Soviet Muslims conducted daily prayers and fasted during the month of ramadan. The majority of Soviet Muslims continued to observe sunnet (circumcision) and to follow Islamic norms for weddings, divorces and funerals. During the fasting period and other Islamic festivals, many Soviet Muslims, especially in rural parts of Central Asia, tended to avoid public places and comply with Muslim dietary norms. Regular prayers were

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observed by a relatively small number of believers, mainly elderly people in the rural areas. They prayed either at home, or in disguised local mosques. As for the hajj, it was practically impossible for the vast majority of Soviet Muslims.49 The centres of popular Islam were Sufi shrines and underground mosques which were disguised as clubs, chaikhanas (tea-rooms), bakeries or some other non-religious public places. However, inside they had a disguised qibla (the orientation towards Mecca) and a mihrab (a niche in the wall directed towards Mecca). In the eastern part of the North Caucasus and the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia, practically every village had at least one unofficial mosque. On the whole, the number of unofficial mosques much exceeded the registered ones. For example, in the 1970s in Checheno-Ingushetia, alongside five official mosques, there functioned 292 unofficial ones. In Central Asia, 230 registered mosques coexisted with at least 1800 unofficial mosques. Unofficial mosques, as well as Sufi Islamic shrines, were guarded by mullahs, pirs, shaykhs, ishans and khodjas who conducted the major Islamic family rituals, such as marriages, divorces, name-givings to the newly born, circumcisions, funerals and so on. A special position among rural Muslim women belonged to highly respected older women ± abystays, bibiotuns, or otynchis. In the rural areas of the Volga-Urals there were also itinerant mullahs who were not attached to a particular mosque, but were venerated for their allegedly virtuous life and the ability to conduct essential Islamic rituals and to solve disputes. Some of them were Sufis. Most of these unofficial Islamic authorities were self-educated and often knew only the basics of Islam. Nevertheless, they frequently commanded higher moral authority than the various representatives of official Islam.50 Overall, after the Second World War, Sufism in the USSR lost its dynamism and vitality. The Stalinist leaders were particularly intolerant to it because they regarded it as intrinsically anti-Communist. Many Sufi shaykhs, pirs, ishans, ustadhes and their murids had been repressed and perished in the 1930s. Sufi mazars, which represented the graveyards of local shaykhs and other `holy places' were `secularized' and transformed into cultural centres, museums, libraries, dining halls and residential homes for the elderly. In order to discredit itinerant Sufis, Soviet officials vilified them as opportunistic seekers of riches who used religion to accumulate wealth. Still, a few mazars survived and remained the centres of secret Sufi activities. One of them for example, was in the village of Atabay in southern Kyrgyzstan. It was the secret centre of the Yasawiyya tariqa which united several dozens of Sufis who were known for their anti-Soviet orientation. The extremist branch of the

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Yasawiyya was represented by the wird of Hairy Ishans headed by ishan Satybaldyev. Similarly, in Samarkand the tomb of Qusam ben Abbas continued to be a place of secret Sufi pilgrimage. In Turkmenistan, where tribal and clan connections remained strong, the so-called holy tribes derived their holiness from the cult of ancestors.51 Among the official Islamic clerics there were a few surviving representatives of the traditional Islamic learned elite which before the Bolshevik revolution generated the intellectual, or `high' Islam. In spite of decades of purges, which destroyed the bulk of the Islamic intellectual elite, in the mountains of the North Caucasus and in the Ferghana Valley there remained underground centres of the `high' Islam. Also, the Institutes of Philosophy, History, Literature and Oriental Studies, as well as departments of the Academies and Universities in the Soviet Muslim republics, acted as repositories of the Islamic heritage and secured transmission of the Islamic intellectual tradition. The specialists who worked there collected and analyzed medieval Islamic texts and produced scholarly works on Islamic history and philosophy. The obligatory atheistic formulae of those works did not affect their scholarly significance. Some academics in these institutions came from respected ulema dynasties and outshone registered and unofficial mullahs, shaykhs and ishans in their knowledge of Arabic, medieval sources, and the classical Islamic sciences. Furthermore, they continued to secretly fulfil many functions of the ulema. Later on, they also studied the works of contemporary Islamic thinkers and closely followed the Islamic revival in the Middle East, which began in the 1970s. It is significant that some of them became `spin-doctors' of the Islamic opposition movement which emerged in the late 1980s in various Muslim regions of the USSR.52 In contrast with the Volga-Urals and Central Asia, in the mountains of the North Caucasus the Sufi network survived even though it was badly damaged by the Stalinist persecutions. During the first two decades after the revolution, the majority of local Naqshbandiis remained hostile to the Bolshevik regime, although a small group of Naqshbandiis known as the Red shaykhs supported it. As a result, the latter survived the purges of the 1930s, which were devastating for those Sufi shaykhs and murids who refused to collaborate with the Bolsheviks. In the late 1930s, following the lead of the Red shaykhs most wirds of the Naqshbandiyya tariqa accepted Soviet rule. The Naqshbandiis began to return to public life although in a disguised, non-religious form. Some undercover Naqshbandiis even managed to infiltrate the Communist and Soviet administration of Dagestan and Checheno-Ingushetia. For example, Bagautdin Arsanov, a Chechen and a son of the Naqshbandi ustadh, reached the position of colonel of

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the NKVD (later KGB). In this capacity he saved a large number of Naqshbandiis from persecution by the Soviet authorities. Yet another undercover Naqsbandii, Muslim Gerbekov, in the late 1950s became primeminister of Checheno-Ingushetia. In Soviet Dagestan, the level of the Naqshbandiis' secret political engagement was even higher, since they had their people in all major political and power structures. It is significant that Sufis had their representatives even in the official Islamic administration ± the Muftiyat ± which was allegedly fully integrated within the Soviet system.53 The majority of Kadiriis from the first days of the October revolution expressed their loyalty to the Bolsheviks. In return, they were allowed to keep their clerical positions. During the anti-religious campaign of the late 1920s, Islamic clerics, many of whom belonged to the Kadiri tariqa, were persecuted and sent into exile. Most Kadiri books were destroyed and Kadiri teaching was subjected to various distortions and accretions from myths and fantasies. Among them were, for example, the myth about the future arrival of a mahdi, personified by Kunta-Haji, and the myth about the salvation mission of the British. As a result, Kadiri Sufism was reduced to an Islamic ritual and an ethno-cultural tradition which lacked a vital spiritual component. The deportations of Chechens in 1944 dealt another severe blow to the Kadiriyya. Its organizational and spiritual network was irreversibly ruptured, fragmented and marginalized. In the 1950s, there emerged among the Chechens a new wird of Vis-Haji, some of whom deviated from the main Kadiri principle of non-involvement in politics.54

Muslims in late Soviet society In the early 1960s, Islam acquired a new momentum in the conditions of general political liberalization under Khrushchev. The Soviet leadership considerably relaxed its grip on religious activities, although antireligious inertia persisted in the form of regular Party and Government resolutions. The change in religious policy derived from the Communist Party's assessment of Soviet reality as `mature socialism'. According to the concept of `mature socialism', Soviet socialist society had developed immunity from any anti-Communist ideologies of a religious or nationalist nature. It was assumed that Islam and its clerics were fully integrated within the Soviet system and had therefore ceased to be a danger to the Communist regime. The Soviet mass media was instructed to portray Islamic festivals and other Islam-related rituals as a national form of Soviet culture which was `socialist in content'. The SADUM

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and other Muftiyats were allowed more freedom in educational and publishing matters. In 1968, the SADUM began producing a journal, Muslims of the Soviet East, in Tashkent which was designed to laud the accomplishments of Soviet Muslims. It was issued in Uzbek (in Arabic script), Persian, Arabic, English and French.55 However, collaboration between the Soviet regime and the Islamic establishment concealed its continuing internal tensions derived from an irreconcilable conflict between atheism and Islam. In spite of public loyalty and conformity, the official Islamic clerics kept their primary allegiance to Islam. Significantly, they had never been accused of shirk (heresy), kufr (non-belief), or even bid'a (innovation) by Muslim spiritual authorities abroad. The registered Islamic clerics maintained their relatively high position in the unofficial traditional hierarchy which either had precedence over, or coincided, with the official Party and Soviet hierarchy. Thus, in Ferghana Valley and in many parts of the North Caucasus, the Soviet and Communist Party structures converged with the traditional social networks and hierarchies and produced a specific Sovietized version of Islamic traditionalism. The Communist and Soviet camouflage disguised the traditional mechanism for the distribution of power which was based on an unwritten contract between the traditional leaders. Despite the officially proclaimed triumph of atheism, Islam and adat remained essential regulators of social and family life in rural Muslim communities and partially among urban Muslims.56 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989, following the Marxist coup of 1978, strained the formal harmony in relations between the Soviet regime and the Islamic periphery of the USSR. Thousands of Soviet soldiers of Islamic background were sent to Afghanistan to fight local Muslims for the sake of abstract political gains of the USSR in its confrontation with the West. Compared to the Great Patriotic War, when most Islamic authorities supported the Soviet authorities and called upon believers to fight against the German invasion of the Motherland, their reaction towards the USSR's involvement in the Afghan war was subdued. In spite of the Muftiyats' official support of Soviet policies in Afghanistan, in private the majority of Muslim clerics disapproved of it. The war had a catalytic effect on the Soviet umma, which became more politically engaged. Its generally negative response towards the Soviet invasion accounted for the passivity and inefficiency in combat of a substantial number of Soviet Muslim soldiers involved in Afghanistan. Furthermore, there were even cases when Soviet Muslims, especially those from Central Asia, changed sides and joined the mujahedin (Islamic warriors) from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Sudan and other Islamic

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countries who fought against the Soviet troops. Internationally, the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan damaged the relatively high political and moral standing of the USSR in the Islamic East. The International Islamic Conference, which was organized by the Uzbek Government in Tashkent in 1980, was boycotted by the majority of Islamic countries. As a result of this war, Afghanistan was turned into an international training camp for Islamic radicals some of whom ten years later re-emerged in various Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Government responded to the rise in the religious and political activity of Soviet Muslims by tightening its control over them. In 1981 and 1983 the Communist Party's Central Committee passed resolutions on `Measures to counteract attempts by the adversary to use the ``Islamic factor'' for ends hostile to the Soviet Union' and `Measures for the ideological isolation of the reactionary sector of the Muslim clergy'. Both encouraged the country's leading organs to reinforce atheistic propaganda vis-aÁ-vis the Islamic community and to buttress efforts against violation of the legislation on religion by either government officials or clerics. The ascendance in 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev as the new reform-minded leader of the USSR did not change the tough official stance on Islam. Moreover, Gorbachev's preoccupation with the West was accompanied by declining political and cultural engagement with the Islamic East. The liberalization of Soviet society under Gorbachevian perestroika occurred alongside the escalation of the anti-Islamic campaign, which was aimed primarily against secret parallel Islam. A number of Communist Party and Komsomol members were accused of secret Islamic religiosity and prosecuted. The authorities took measures towards further Russification of the administration and education cadres in the Muslim regions of the USSR. In 1986 the Communist Party's Central Committee adopted yet another resolution `On strengthening measures to fight Islamic influences' which targeted Islamic radicalism in Central Asia.57 The USSR's military disaster, followed by the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan in 1989, revealed the weaknesses of the Soviet army and state and triggered the snowballing disintegration processes. In the conditions of spontaneous democratization there emerged the so-called young Imams, graduates of Central Asian medresses, who opposed the old Imams, whom they criticized for passivity, theological ambivalence, low moral standards and conformity with the Soviet establishment. They began a campaign for the restoration of the Islamic infrastructure on the pre-revolutionary scale, and for the wider involvement of Soviet Muslims in social and political life. Among the leaders of the young Imams were

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Muftiis Talgat Tadjuddinov and Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf. Talgat Tadzhuddin became the head of the DUMES in Ufa in 1980, while Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf headed the SADUM in Tashkent in 1989. The ailing Soviet authorities were forced to give in to the pressure from the young Imams. In particular, in 1989 they allowed the formation of several dozen new mosques in various Muslim regions of the USSR; the reprinting of the Russian translation of the Koran of 1963; the return to the SADUM of an invaluable original copy of the Koran which was confiscated by Tsarist troops during the conquest of Central Asia in the nineteenth century; and an agreement to distribute 1.5 million copies of the Koran, freely supplied by the Saudi government among Soviet Muslims.58 In September 1990, the USSR's Supreme Soviet (the Parliament) adopted a new liberal law on religion which guaranteed freedom of conscience and allowed various forms of religious activities. In particular, it prohibited persecution on religious grounds. As a result, the number of people who admitted their Islamic faith rose overnight from 10 to 12 per cent to over 50 per cent. A third of those who identified themselves as Muslims were young people. The law stimulated an Islamic revival which acquired various forms. Soviet Muslims began to enjoy the legal right to observe Islamic devotions, including hajj, to openly celebrate Islamic holidays and to conduct Islamic ceremonies for marriage and death, as well as those marking the ritual of sunnet, the celebration of KurbanBayram ( the feast of sacrifice), the fasting during the month of Ramadan and the feast following it. Islamic regions of the USSR witnessed an Islamic building boom. New mosques, medresses, Islamic colleges, universities and academies were constructed and a network of Arabic courses opened. By 1990 there were already 1330 registered mosques in the USSR and 94 mosques in Russia. The number of medresse students rose to several hundreds. In 1990, an Islamic University was opened in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. It was headed by qazikolon Akbar Kahharov. Islamic programmes were allowed on the TV and radio. In the summer of 1991, Kazakh and Kyrgyz young Imams split from the Uzbek-dominated SADUM and established separate Kazakh and Kyrgyz Muftiyats.59 An important feature of the Islamic revival was the emergence of Islamic political organizations and parties. The most influential among them was the Islamic Renaissance Party (the IRP), which was formed in June 1990 in Astrakhan. In August 1990, a branch of the IRP was established in Tajikistan. The Party emphasized its peaceful character and advocated the gradual re-Islamicization of historically Muslim regions of the USSR, the promotion of Islamic family ethics and the protection of the environment. In political terms, then the IRP was loyal to the

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existing Soviet regime and did not seek the establishment of an Islamic state. By contrast, the Islamic Democratic Party of Turkestan ( the IDPT), which was formed in August 1990 in Uzbekistan, adhered to political radicalism. It overtly challenged the existing Communist regime and sought the secession of a unified Islamic state of Central Asia from the USSR. The IDPT 's leader was Dadakhan Hassanov, an Uzbek musician. Among other Islamic radicals were Islamic fundamentalists, called salafiyin (proponents of the pure Islam of the ancestors) and Wahhabis, who had strong external connections with co-religionists in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other neighbouring Islamic countries.60 They advocated a full-fledged Islamicization of Central Asian society and the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate there. The Wahhabis challenged the teachings of local ulema and insisted on independent judgement in matters of religion. They called for a `purification' of Islam from degrading accretions and a return to the true Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and the righteous Caliphs.61

Overall, seventy years of Soviet rule had a major impact on the various Muslim peoples of the USSR. They were subjected to the Sovietized form of economic modernization and societal transformation. As a result, the Islamic regions of the USSR acquired modern industries and agricultural production, and the Islamic regions of the Volga-Urals turned into one of the main industrial centres of the USSR. The North Caucasus acquired advanced military, oil and electronic industries. Azerbaijan became a major oil-related industrial zone. Central Asia, which before the revolution was the least developed agrarian and cattle-breeding periphery of the Russian empire, became an industrial and agro-industrial region, although it maintained its cotton specialization. This economic advance, as well as comprehensive free secondary education and the accessibility of free higher education, transformed the social face of the Muslim regions of the USSR. Among its manifestations was the emancipation of Muslim women, who acquired economic and social equality with men. The standardized Soviet education system eradicated the widespread illiteracy among Muslims of the former Russian empire. For example, in 1926 only about 5 per cent of the population in Central Asia could read and write, while in the 1970s everybody was literate and almost half of the adult population had secondary or higher education.62 So, in terms of education and professional qualifications, Soviet Muslims greatly excelled their co-religionists abroad. They also had the advantages of free modern

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healthcare which contributed to the elimination of numerous deadly diseases. As a result, the Muslim population of the USSR increased substantially. Thus, during the period between 1940 and 1960, the population of Central Asia increased from 22.5 million, which constituted 10.7 per cent of the total population of the USSR, to 42 million, or 16 per cent of the total population. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Ferghana Valley experienced yet another demographic boom.63 The Soviet practice of regularly transporting large groups of people all over the country within a particular economic or military project, enhanced closer interaction between Muslims and other inhabitants of the vast Soviet empire. The massive influx of Russian and other Slavic workers, who made up the core of the industrial working force in Muslim regions of the USSR, turned the major Muslim cities into cosmopolitan areas. For example, by 1939, Russians and other Slavs constituted half of the population of Tashkent. By 1959, the Russians and other Slavs made up about 65 per cent of the population in Kazakhstan and 50 per cent in Tatarstan.64 In the early 1960s, northern Kazakhstan had a massive influx of Russians and other Slavs under Khrushchev's `Virgin Lands Scheme'. The total number of immigrants amounted to one and a half million. Because the new wave immigrants settled on no-man's-land, their arrival was not accompanied by the usual territorial conflict. On the whole, intensive Russian immigration did not lead to ethno-religious tension between newcomers and the indigenous Muslim population. In fact, there was a specific division of labour functions between locals and immigrants. They were involved in parallel modes of production, virtually without overlap. As a result, the relations between Muslims and Russian immigrants were free from ethnic managerial discrimination and economic rivalry which were characteristic of the relations between European managers and Muslim workers of the European colonies in the Islamic East.65 On the other hand, Soviet Muslims, like the whole multi-ethnic population of the USSR, suffered from the excesses of the Soviet regime. Among them were drastic ecological problems, caused by extreme exploitation of land, heavy use of agro-chemicals and nuclear testing. Soviet Muslims were subjected to regular cadre purges, deportations and other manifestations of Soviet totalitarianism. They lost a substantial part of their literary heritage as a result of the dual alphabet change, first from Arabic to Latin, then from Latin to Cyrillic, which was carried out by the Soviet Government in the 1920s and 30s. The alphabet reform widened the cultural and information gulf between Soviet Muslims and their brethren abroad. Muslims of the USSR, like other Soviet people, were subjected to

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intensive ideological brainwashing. The Institutes of History, Language and Literature, which were created in the Soviet Muslim republics in the 1930s, promoted a Russified and class-defined version of the history of various Muslim peoples of the USSR. They glorified `the civilizational and liberational role of the great Russian people' towards non-Russian peoples and promoted the formation of a new supra-national Soviet identity ± the Sovetskii narod (Soviet people). It is, perhaps, ironic that this Soviet identity still prevails among various peoples of the former USSR despite the new political conditions.66

5

Russia's Muslims after the Collapse of Communism

The Islamic Renaissance Despite the predictions of some Western experts, Islam and nationalism were not among the major factors behind the collapse of Communism and the break-up of the USSR.1 So, when in December 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the bulk of Soviet Muslims, with the exception of a small faction among the Chechens, Tatars, Uzbeks and Kazakhs, were bewildered and frustrated by the new political realities. As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet state, over seventy million Muslims, constituting about a quarter of the total population of the USSR, found themselves in different political entities represented by newly independent states of Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as other former Soviet republics which had Muslim minorities. Russia's Muslims, who made up between twelve and twenty million, were overnight cut off from their more numerous coreligionists in Central Asia and Transcaucasus and transformed into Russia's religious minority. Since this book focuses on the Muslims of Russia, analysis of the situation in the former Soviet Muslim republics which acquired political independence from Moscow is left aside. During the first years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency, the Muslim-populated regions of the Volga-Urals, the North Caucasus and Central Russia continued to experience an Islamic renaissance which was triggerred by the Gorbachevian perestroika. Its most noticeable indicators were the emergence of new mosques and medresses, the increase in the number of hajjis to Mecca and Medina and the Islamic publishing boom. In the 1980s there were only 179 functioning mosques, affiliated to the Spiritual Board of Muslims of European Russia and Siberia (the DUMES), based in Ufa, and the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the North Caucasus (the DUMSK) in 137

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Makhachkala (since 1974). In 1998 there were already over 5500 registered mosques in Russia. About 2000 of them were in Chechnya; 1670 in Dagestan; around 1000 in Tatarstan; and 400 in Ingushetia. The large increase in the number of mosques was accompanied by a similar rise in the number of Islamic clergy. Thus, in Tatarstan, where there were only thirty Muslim religious figures in the late 1980s, a decade later there were about 5000 Muslim clerics of various ranks. Similarly, in the 1980s in Russia, there was only one medresse at the level of secondary Islamic education in Ufa and no higher Islamic schools at all. Russia's Muslim clerics received higher religious education in the medresses of Bukhara and Tashkent. In 1998, there were 106 religious schools and 51 registered religious centres and societies which provided basic Islamic education. In Dagestan alone nine Islamic institutes, including three Islamic universities, 25 medresses, 670 mektebs and 11 Islamic cultural and charity centres were opened. Over 200 000 Dagestanis, or almost every fifth Dagestani was involved in some form of Islamic education. There were about 1500 Dagestanis studying in various Islamic institutes and universities of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. Apart from special Islamic schools, the study of Islam and shariat has been increasingly introduced into the curriculum of comprehensive schools in densely Muslim-populated regions of Russia. Also, the hajj, which used to be a luxury restricted to just a handful of carefully screened individuals, became accessible for ordinary Muslims. Each year about 20 000 Russian Muslims conduct a hajj. Over half of Russia's pilgrims are from Dagestan. The hajj has enhanced the contacts between Russia's Muslims and their foreign co-religionists. Among the controversial consequences of the rise in the number of hajjis has been their acqaintance with other interpretations of Islam, including salafi Islam, which are different from the various versions of Russian Islam.2 Russia witnessed the mushrooming of Islamic publications and periodicals, as well as the proliferation of Islamic literature and audio and video materials produced in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Great Britain and other foreign countries. The Santlada Publishers in Moscow and the Iman Publishers in Kazan became Russia's leading specialized Islamic publishing houses. Also, various semi-official publishing houses became engaged in the production of Islamic literature. Among them were, for example, the Tonar Publishers in Moscow; the Kamaz Kitap Nashriyati (the Kamaz's Publishing House) in Naberezhnie Chelny in Tatarstan; the Kitap Publishers in Ufa; and the Foliant Publishers in Cherkessk in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. It is worth noting that publishers of many Islamic publications, especially of a salafi nature, maintain their anonymity.3 The large increase in Islamic construction, publications media and video materials has

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produced some qualitative changes in Russia's umma, accompanied by steady growth in mosque attendance, observance of fasting and other pillars of Islam, and the rise of interest in Islamic education among Muslim youth. For example, in the mid-1990s, daily attendance at the newly opened mosque in Nal'chik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, varied between eight and ten elderly people. In 2000 it rose to over fifty people, most of whom were young.4 On the other hand, the Gorbachevian political liberalization, including the relaxation of immigration rules, opened Russia's Muslim regions to foreign Islamic activities. A number of foreign Islamic funds and organizations opened their offices in Russia. The main official provider of such assistance, which came under the banner of da'awa (`summon to Islam'), was King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who regularly subsidized an annual hajj of Russia's Muslims. He also sponsored dozens of scholarships to those who wanted to study in Islamic universities and colleges in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, the UAE, and Malaysia, and subsidized the free distribution of Korans and other Islamic literature in various Islamic communities of Russia. Among other official benefactors were the University of Imam Muhammad ben Saud; the Islamic Development Bank; the Organization of Islamic Conference; the Islamic Fund for Cooperation; the World Islamic League, the World Association of Islamic Youth and the World Centre of Islamic Sciences of Iran. Non-official Islamic assistance was even more impressive. It was conducted by the Committee of Muslims of Asia in Kuwait; the Iranian World Organization Madaris; the Islamic Charities of Al-Waqf-al-Islamii, Taiba and Ibrahim alIbrahim of Saudi Arabia; the International Islamic Charities of Ibrahim Hayri, Igatha, Zamzam and the UAE Islamic Charity Organization AlKhairiyya. Alongside the construction and staffing of mosques, medresses, Islamic universities and other Islam-related institutions, these funds were heavily invested in the proselytizing conducted by Islamic missionaries and the organization of various Islamic training camps and courses.5

The western North Caucasus The scope and specific forms of the Islamic revival differed considerably in various Islamic regions of Russia. It was most intensive in the North Caucasus, which was a relatively small region with a total population of 5.7 million ± less than 4 per cent of the total population of the Russian Federation. In administrative terms it is divided between Russia's Muslim autonomies of Adyghea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya. The vast majority of the region's

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population are Muslims. In Chechnya and Dagestan, Muslims make up over 90 per cent of the population. Despite the partial industrialization of the North Caucasus during the Soviet period, it remained the least economically and socially developed enclave, albeit it had a few high-tech military plants which employed predominantly Russians and other immigrants from central Russia. The region was heavily dependent on subsidies from the centre. Therefore, the breakdown of the vertical centre±periphery relationship and especially the disintegration of the Soviet-era military-industrial complex and the drastic reduction in vital supplies and investments has been devastating for it. It brought about an overnight impoverishment, marginalization and displacement of large groups of people. Among the drastic consequences of the rapid decline in living standards have been the predominance of the black market economy, the proliferation of arms and drugs trafficking and other illegal activities, and the rise of crime, terrorism and various forms of extremism. In the early stages, the Islamic revival occurred outside the control of the local authorities, most of whom with the exception of the Chechen and Ingush leaders, treated it with suspicion. They were typical Party and Soviet apparatchiks who were brought up and made their careers under an atheistic regime and had very little true interest or expertise in Islam. During the `parade of sovereignties,' triggered by Yeltsin's appeal to Russia's regions `to take as much sovereignty as they could grasp', most North Caucasian leaders pledged their loyalty to Moscow, which they regarded as the major guarantor of their secure rule. However, the Kremlin's increasing indifference to the region, as well as to Russia's periphery in general, forced local leaders to seek other means and alliances in order to safeguard their jobs. The collapse of the Communist Party hierarchy and ideology, as well as the Soviet institutions of socialization, pushed the traditional social networks, and customary and religious norms to the forefront of local societies. Clan and ethnic ties gained precedence over more modern forms of social organization which were associated with the failed Soviet system. In these circumstances the Soviet-era ethnocratic nomenklatura was challenged by rising new ethnic elites who claimed their fair share of power within existing administrative boundaries, or pressed for the redrawing of the borders in the interests of ethnic communities they claimed to represent. As a result, a carefully engineered ethnopolitical balance of power was upset and the region was engulfed by rising ethnic nationalisms. Situations of conflict characterized the relations between Ingushes and Ossetians on the border between the two autonomies; between Adygh and Turkic peoples within the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and

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Karachaevo-Cherkessia; between Chechens and Dagestanis in western Dagestan and in the border area between the two republics; between Adygheans (an Adygh people) and Russians in the republic of Adyghea, and between Cossacks and their Muslim neighbours in northern Dagestan, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Adyghea. The catalyst of the Ingush± Ossetian conflict was President Yeltsin's Law on Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples, which was adopted in 1991. The law ensured the rights of various repressed peoples to reclaim their land, but did not provide a coherent mechanism to settle the inevitable territorial and property problems between them and the present inhabitants of the land. Ingush nationalists began a campaign for the restoration of Ingush control over the Prigorodnii raion of North Ossetia, which before the deportation of Ingushes in 1944 was part of the autonomous republic of ChechenoIngushetia. The conflict, which in 1992 escalated into military clashes, inflicted large human and material losses. Even according to the Russian official statistics, which are usually substantially understated, during the Ingush±Ossetian conflict 419 Ingushes, 171 Ossetians and 60 others were killed; over 65 000 refugees fled from North Ossetia to Ingushetia; and over 3000 houses were burned.6 In the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia politically and economically disadvantaged Balkars and Karachays (both Turkic peoples) have risen against Adygh (Kabardinian and Cherkess) domination and begun a campaign for the restoration of their political and territorial rights. Their aims have been to reunite Karachays and Balkars within one autonomous unit, or to form separate autonomous republics based on pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic principles. In 1991, Kabardino-Balkaria was on the brink of separation when Balkars, led by the Balkar nationalist movement Tere (Balkar Forum), which was formed in 1989, demanded the `return of the Balkar ancestral lands which were mainly inhabited by Balkars before the deportations but now mixed, and the formation of a sovereign Balkar republic within the Russian Federation'.7 In November 1996, the Balkar nationalists under the leadership of the former Russian commander of the Transcaucasus military district, Sufian Beppaev, and the leader of the Balkar nationalist movement Tere, B. Etezov, proclaimed the autonomous republic of Balkaria; but it is not recognized by the official republican authorities. In Karachaevo-Cherkessia the Karachay nationalists have been even more assertive than their Balkar brethren. In 1988, they formed the national movement Jamagat (Union) and began lobbying to raise the administrative status of Karachaevo-Cherkessia, on the one hand, and to form a separate Karachay autonomy, which existed from 1926 to 1943, on the

142 Russia and Islam

other. In 1991, the Yeltsin government responded to their demands and upgraded the status of Karachaevo-Cherkessia from an autonomous oblast' of Stavropol'skii krai to an autonomous republic. However, the Karachay nationalists continued to press for separate autonomy. In 1991, the extraordinary Congress of the Karachay people adopted a declaration of Karachay state sovereignty. During the first `democratic' presidential elections in April±May 1999, the Karachay nationalists succeeded in bringing their candidate, the former commander-in-chief of the Russian ground forces Vladimir Semenov (ethnically half-Karachay, halfRussian) to office. The Cherkess community, led by Semenov's rival in the presidential race, Cherkessk mayor Stanislav Derev (a Cherkess) refused to recognize Semenov's legitimacy as the new president. So far, the Karachay nationalists have received mainly moral support from the Balkars of Kabardino-Balkaria. However, if a change of leadership were to ensue in Kabardino-Balkaria, it seems likely that the Balkar nationalists would take advantage of the situation to intensify their separatist activity.8 Karachay-Balkar nationalism has enhanced Adygh solidarity and their rapprochement with Russians and Cossacks. Following the defeat in the 1999 Presidential elections, Cherkessk Mayor Derev called upon the Cherkess, Abazin and Russian population of the republic `to split from the Karachays and to return to their native Stavropol'skii krai. This call has received a positive response from the Cherkess nationalist organizations Adyge Khase under the leadership of Khetazhukov and the International Cherkess Association under Susnaliev, as well as from significant parts of the Russian and particularly Cossack populations of Karachaevo-Cherkessia. In September 1999, the Congress of the Kabardinian people of Kabardino-Balkaria linked the Kabardin nationalist agenda to the outcome of the Cherkess struggle for secession. So far, the Kabardin elite, headed by President Valery Kokov, has managed, by means of negotiation and suppression, to secure relative inter-ethnic and inter-confessional peace and to neutralize the forces of ethnic and religious radicalism. At the same time, President Kokov has demonstrated his willingness to play the nationalist card in his bargaining with the federal centre. For example, in July 1997, he masterminded Adygh unity in the form of the Inter-Parliamentary Council of Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Adyghea. In May 1995, he signed a Treaty on special relations between Kabardino-Balkaria and Abkhazia in spite of Moscow's objection to it.9 The ethno-political situation in Adyghea has differed considerably from that in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. In 1991, Adyghea, like Karachaevo-Cherkessia, was upgraded from an oblast'

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within Krasnodarskii krai to an autonomous republic. The post-Soviet dynamic of Adyghea has been determined by the presence of a Russian majority and the almost complete absence of a Turkic population, comparable to the Balkars and Karachays in the other two republics of the eastern North Caucasus. Russians, alongside Ukrainians and Armenians, constitute almost 80 per cent of the total population of the republic, while the Adygheis make up the other 20 per cent. Such overwhelming Russian numerical superiority has determined their political and cultural domination in the republic and prevented large-scale ethnic conflict. Still, considerable tension has emerged as a result of the policy by President Djarimov (an ethnic Adyghei) of building an ethnic Adygh state in a republic where the Adygheis constitute an ethnic minority. The official policy of Adygheization has been opposed by the leading opposition group, `The Union of Slavs of Adyghea'. The latter has been campaigning for a referendum in areas with a high concentration of ethnic Russians about returning the territories to Krasnodar's jurisdiction. Such claims have been supported by the Cossack leadership, which has been pushing for direct rule of the Cossack enclaves (stanitsy) by the Russian authorities in Krasnodar. The dire economic conditions, the ideological vacuum and spontaneous re-traditionalization of local societies, on the one hand, and the widespread corruption and growing insecurity of the population as a result of the rise of crime and terrorism, on the other, have facilitated the merger of ethnic nationalisms with religion. Thus, the Karachay-Balkar nationalist agenda in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia has been increasingly Islamicized. The weakness of Sufism among its Muslim population has accounted for the predominantly fundamentalist, or Wahhabi, form of Islam there.10 Similarly, in Adyghea the major conflict has developed along ethno-religious lines: the Orthodox Russian and Cossack majority against the Muslim Adygheis. In spite of the historically low level of Islamicization of the Adygheis, they tend to perceive in Islam a vital component of their national identity. However, in the case of the Kabardinians and Cherkess, who have been mainly preoccupied with the preservation of their domination in their respective republics, political considerations have outplayed Islamic solidarity. Thus, in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, there has been a rapprochement between the Muslim Cherkess and the Christian Orthodox Russians and Cossacks against resurgent Islamicized Karachay nationalism. Still, one should not exaggerate the scope of Islamicized nationalisms in the republics of the western North Caucasus, where it has so far been confined to a relatively small group of people. Among its devotees have been

144 Russia and Islam

representatives of the nationalistically minded intelligentsia, as well as the socially deprived people on the margins of society. The bulk of the population has remained aloof from the appeals of the nationalist opposition leaders and supported the national and religious policies of the current governments.11 The official Islamic clerics in all three republics have also shared the authorities' tough approach to Islamic fundamentalism, or Wahhabism, which has proliferated in the conditions of the Chechen war. It is worth mentioning that the local Muftiyats, which emerged in the period between 1989 and 1992, have been consistently loyal to the political authorities. In fact, their appearance was a part of the republics' sovereignization rather than the result of a premeditated and organized opposition to Muftii Gekkiev of the DUMSK, which fell apart in 1989. In terms of ethnic background they represent the largest Muslim ethnic community of each republic. Thus, the Muftii of Kabardino-Balkaria is Shafig Pshikhachev who is Kabardinian; the Muftii of Karachaevo-Cherkessia is Ismail Berdiyev, a Karachay; and the Muftii of Adyghea is Askarbii Khachemizov, an Adyghean of Adyghea. The agenda of the Muftiyats in each of the three republics has been dominated by specific socio-economic, ethnic and regional problems linked to the Chechen war and the spread of Wahhabism.

Dagestan In Dagestan, and the eastern North Caucasus as a whole, the impact of Islam on the policy-making process has been more prominent than in the autonomies of the western North Caucasus. The major reason has been the substantially higher level of religiosity of the population, as well as spontaneous popular Islamic activities within Dagestan and its uneasy relationship with its neighbour, the rapidly Islamicized Chechnya. In Dagestan, the Avar-dominated leadership was particularly upset by the break-up of the USSR and subsequent de-Sovietization of the country which they perceived as the worst nightmare in Dagestani history.12 The Dagestani leaders worried that any changes of existing political and economic structures would inevitably violate the carefully constructed ethno-political status quo. It is, perhaps, indicative that the Soviet political system persisted in Dagestan until 1995, which was much longer than elsewhere in Russia, while the Communists remained the most popular party there until the late 1990s. Like other North Caucasian autonomies, Dagestan has experienced the negative consequences of the controversial Law on Repressed Peoples, which has

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aggravated relations between Akkin Chechens, Laks and Avars in Novolakskii (former Aukhovskii) and Khasavyurtovskii raions. The previous Avar monopoly, which for decades had been safeguarded by Moscow, was opposed by other large ethnic groups, especially the Dargins, who had increased their influence during perestroika. The Dargin political offensive was accompanied by the rising activity of the Kumyks, Nogays, Lezgins and Laks, who had also felt disadvantaged during the Tsarist and Soviet periods. Thus, in northern Dagestan the Nogay (a Turkic people) nationalists formed the Nogay society Birlik (Unity) which asserted the rights to the Nogay historical motherland ± the Nogay steppe ± and began a campaign for political and administrative reunion into one autonomous unit of the Nogay people who since 1957 have been split between Dagestan, Chechnya and Stavropolskii krai. In the south, the Lezgin nationalists formed the popular Lezgin movement of Sadval (Unity), which claimed to represent 250 000 Dagestani Lezgins who belong to the Ibero-Caucasian ethno-linguistic family. It called for unification of Dagestan's Lezgins with 175 000 Lezgins in Azerbaijan and the creation of sovereign Lezgistan. Sadval's leaders argued that Azerbaijan's Lezgins, as a Sunni minority, were under threat of religious and national assimilation by Turkic Azeris who have traditionally been Shiites.13 Within Dagestan itself, some ethnic leaders advocated an autonomization option. For instance, in 1989, the Kumyk nationalists formed the Popular Movement Tenglik which sought wider administrative autonomy for Kumyks, a Turkic people, and the restoration of their rights on the plains of the Caspian valley which since the 1920s and 30s have been largely populated by mountain peoples ± Avars and Dargins ± who were of Ibero-Caucasian ethno-linguistic origins. In November 1990, the Kumyk nationalist leadership declared the republic of `Kumykistan' which they viewed as the nucleus of a larger politico-territorial formation linking the Turkic communities of the North Caucasus.14 Kumyk territorial ambitions were opposed by Avars, Dargins and Laks (also an IberoCaucasian people). In 1992, Avar nationalists formed the Shamyl Popular Front in order to safeguard the pro-Avar status quo. The Dargin national leaders organized the movement Zadesh (Unity), although this was a stillborn creation. However, the Lak national movement Kazi-Kumukh under the leadership of Magomed Khachilaev turned into a significant factor and shaped Dagestani politics until 1998. In 1992, the territorial dispute between Kumyks and Laks led to a violent confrontation. On the other hand, the ethnic resurgence of the Laks collided with the interests of Akkin Chechens in Novolakskii raion of Dagestan, since the Laks insisted on

146 Russia and Islam

their right to the land which belonged to Chechens before the onset of their deportation in 1944.15 The relations of these national movements and organizations with Islam have been purely instrumental. The majority of their leaders and members have an atheistic Soviet background and no real interest in Islam. However all of them have exploited Islamic rhetoric and symbols in their programmes and propaganda. This has been particularly characteristic of the Lak national movement due to its leader's relations with the Union of Russia's Muslims (the URM). The peak of nationalist activity occurred in the period between 1991 and 1993, that is when various nationalist movements and organizations played a vital role in the postSoviet process of redistributing power and in the formation of new political regimes. They secured powerful informal political, economic and military backing for their respective ethnic elites. This period was particularly fraught with violence, mass disturbances, and the onset of contract killing and hostage-taking. The situation was further aggravated by destabilizing impulses from the neighbouring break-away Chechnya. In 1994, the power struggle was more or less over. The new constitution of Dagestan, also adopted in 1994, formalized the new political realities. It established the main collective executive body ± the State Council ± which represented 14 titular ethnic groups and asserted the principle of ethnic proportionality at all levels of the political system. The new constitution reflected the new balance of power, that is, the leading positions of Dargin and Avar ethnic elites, followed by Kumyks and Lezgins. The elections in 1997, 1998 and 1999 legitimized the new ethnocratic regime.16 In social terms, the new regime represented an alliance between the old, atheistic Soviet/Party apparatchiks, who preserved their jobs ± although under new `democratic' labels ± and the nouveaux riches who made their fortunes through various semi-criminal and criminal businesses. The Dagestani Muftiyat ± the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan (the DUMD) ± was co-opted into the ruling regime. The first leadership of the newly established Dagestani Muftiyat was contested by young Imams from the largest ethnic groups, that is the Avars, Dargins, Kumyks and Laks. Between 1989 and 1992, the central strife occurred between Avars, who dominated Islamic officialdom in the Soviet period, and the rest. This major split was further exacerbated by internal conflicts. Initially, representatives of non-Avar ethnic groups took the lead in the race for the Muftiyat. In early 1989, the Kumyks promoted their candidate shaykh Muhammad Mukhtar Babatov to the post of Dagestani Muftii. Several months later Babatov was replaced by Abdulla

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Aligadjiev, a proteÂge of the Dargin ulema. In January 1990, the Kumyks fought back: Bagauddin Isayev, a Kumyk, became the next Muftii of Dagestan. The religious supremacy of Kumyks and Dargins was short-lived. From late 1990, the Avar young Imams intensified their campaign for the restoration of Avar domination in Dagestani Islamic officialdom. In February 1992, the Avar Muslim clerics succeeded in organizing the `election' of Sayid Ahmed Darbishgadjiyev, an Avar, as new Muftii of Dagestan. However, the Avar profile of the Muftiyat alienated many non-Avar Dagestanis from it. Kumyks, Dargins and Laks refused to recognize the legitimacy of the DUMD and formed their ethnic Muftiyats. The Nogays also undertook an unsuccessful attempt to create their own Islamic Board in Tereklimekteb. In order to strengthen their claims to religious supremacy Avar tariqatists began to promote the Naqshbandi shaykh Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii, an Avar, to the rank of `the supreme Shaykh of Dagestan'. The authority of the next Dagestani Muftii, Magomed Darbishev, also an Avar, was already based on Shaykh Sayid-efendi's blessing. Darbishev's successors, Seyid Muhammad Abubakarov (an Avar, 1996±98) and Ahmad-Haji Abdulaev (an Avar, 1998± ) were also proteÂgeÂs of Sayidefendi. During the period of their administration Sayid-efendi's murids, especially from Gumbetovskii raion, the homeland of Sayid-efendi, were appointed to the top posts within the DUMD. In unofficial circles the Muftiyat became referred to as `the Muftiyat of Gumbet'. Among Sayidefendi's other high profile murids was, for example, KhasmuhammadHaji, the head of the Council of the Dagestani Imams.17 In 1994, Avar tariqatists finally realized their ambition: the Dagestani government recognized the DUMD as the only legitimate supreme Islamic authority in Dagestan. The rival Kumyk, Dargin and Lak Muftiyats were pronounced illegitimate and self-proclaimed. Shaykh Sayid-efendi's wird of the Naqshbandiyya became the embodiment of mainstream traditional Islam in Dagestan. Under instruction from Sayid-efendi the Muftiyat has granted official status to four other living Sufi shaykhs who demonstrated their loyalty to him. They are Muhammad Mukhtar Kakhulayskii, Magomed Amin Gadjiev, Tadjuddin Khasavyurtovskii and Muhammad-Haji Khadjiev. The de facto institutionalization of shaykh Sayid-efendi as the official shaykh of Dagestan has been accompanied by his increasing influence in other spheres of public life. His followers, or sympathizers have strengthened their presence in the political and economic structures of the republic. Sayid-efendi's approval has become crucial for many Dagestani politicians and businessmen.18 Among high-ranking supporters of the DUMD have been Mukhu Aliev,

148 Russia and Islam

the chairman of the Peoples' Assembly, Gadji Makhachev, the leader of the Avar national movement and Surokat Asiyatilov, a parliament deputy and the leader of the Islamic Party of Dagestan (the IPD). On the other hand, official backing has allowed the Muftiyat and Sayidefendi's close associates, in particular, to employ the state infrastructure, including the official mass media and the militia and intelligence services, to secure its domination.19 The merger of the old nomenklatura, mafia and Islamic establishment occurred along ethnic lines producing a specific Dagestani phenomenon ± ethnic parties.20 The Dargin and Avar ethnic parties occupied the top positions, while the Kumyk and Lezgin parties dominated the second most important positions. The Dargins secured their political supremacy by placing their representative, Magomedali Magomedov, to the post of chairman of the Dagestani State Council. Under his leadership, the State Council de facto turned into the main executive organ of the republic, while the power of the Peoples' Assembly (Parliament) under Mukhu Aliev, who was an Avar, became nominal. The Kumyks acquired strong positions in Government structures via their representative, prime-minister Hizri Shikhsaidov. Until 1998 the Lak ethnic party, headed by the Khachilaev clan, was expanding its sphere of control. However, the participation of its leaders, the Khachilaev brothers, in the abortive attempt to seize the Parliament building in Makhachkala in May 1998, put an end to the Laks' advance. In terms of corruption and incompetence, the Dagestani regime followed the general post-Soviet pattern. It failed to curb an increase in crime or to safeguard the population from the economic and social hardships of the transitional period. Like Chechnya, Dagestan has been overwhelmed by a wave of terrorism, including political assassinations and kidnappings in return for ransoms. Among its victims were the Finance Minister, G. Gamidov; the leader of the Kumyk national council, B. Aljanbekov; the former Trade Minister B. Khajiev, the Peoples' Assembly Deputy M. Sulaymanov and the Dagestan Muftii A. Abubakarov. The Mayor of Makhachkala, S. Amirov, has survived over ten assassination attempts.21 The consolidation of the new regime was accompanied by the decline of nationalist and religious organizations and movements. As a result, the nationalist leaders either rose to institutional positions, or descended into criminality, or were radicalized. Some nationalist movements splintered, while others ceased to exist. For example, the Avar popular movement split into the Front of Shamyl, headed by Gadji Makhachev, and the Union of Avar Jamaat. The Kumyk national

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movement was divided into the Tenglik, infiltrated by the FSB (Federal Security Service, the former KGB) agents, the Vatan (Motherland), and the Kumyk National Council. Birlik disappeared altogether. Only the Lezgin Sadval has remained loyal to the idea of federalization, but its influence has seriously diminished. In 1996±97, there were attempts to revive, or to re-create nationalist movements that would campaign for the genuinely national interests of various ethnic groups, especially those which remained or became disadvantaged during the post-Soviet redistribution of power. A Co-ordination Council of Popular Movements was formed in January 1996 for this purpose, but it lasted only one month. In December of that year an Organizing Committee of the Assembly of the People's Movements and Political Parties of Dagestan was created. In March 1997, it convened a Conference of the Assembly, but since then it has not shown any signs of life. The official authorities have not concealed their irritation with any unsanctioned nationalist and Islamic activities. The major concern of members of the new regime was the preservation of the newly constructed ethno-political status quo. However, for 70 per cent of Dagestanis it has meant deepening poverty, unemployment, socal marginalization, moral degradation and the rise of crime. In this situation the social protest against the continuing deterioration in living conditions, economic hardships and social and personal insecurity has been largely chanelled into the grassroots Islamic movements, represented by unofficial tariqatism and Islamic fundamentalism, or Wahhabism.22 According to some experts over 60 per cent of the Muslim population in post-Soviet Dagestan are Sufis belonging to the Naqshbandi, Kadiri and Shadhali tariqas. In spite of decades of Soviet atheism, the local Sufis have clandestinely preserved their network and hierarchical structures. In ethnic terms, the majority of Dagestani Sufis are Avars, who are considered the most religious ethnic group. There are also many Sufis among Dargins and Kumyks, who have the reputation of being moderately religious peoples. In terms of organization, Dagestani Sufis are affiliated to between 40 and 50 wirds. The biggest are the Naqshbandi and Shadhali wirds. However, the Akkin Chechens, who live in Dagestan's Khasavyurtovskii raion, mainly belong to the Kadiri tariqa. The wirds are headed by shaykhs, some of whom simultaneously control wirds from different tariqas. The most common practice is when the same Sufi shaykh heads a Naqshbandi and a Shadhali wird. The most influential living shaykh, as has already been indicated, is Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii who teaches according to Naqshbandi and Shadhali wirds. Among other noted living Dagestani shaykhs are Badrudin Botlikhskii, Magomed Amin

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Gadjiev, Mukhadjir Dogrelinskii, Arslanali Gamzatov (Paraulskii), Ramazan Gimrinskii, Idris-Haji Israpilov, Abdulwahid Kakamakhinskii, Muhammad Mukhtar Kakhulayskii, Tadjuddin Khasavyurtovskii, Sirajuddin Khurikskii and Abdulgani Zakatal'skii. On the whole, there are 23 living shaykhs in Dagestan, the majority of whom are Avars. Some Dagestani Sufis follow the path of the dead shaykhs Ali-Haji Akushinskii, Amay, Gasan Kakhibskii, Kunta-Haji and Vis-Haji.23 Under perestroika, the Sufis emerged from underground and championed grassroots Islamic activities. A characteristic symbol of the Sufi dimension of the latter was the restoration of the traditions of ziyarat to over 1000 mazars. They strengthened their influence on decision-making at a local level through the promotion of their representatives in village administrations. This enabled the renewal of public Islamic festivals, as well as the reintroduction of some elements of Islamic food norms and dress codes which existed in pre-Soviet times. However, the most significant was the Sufis' return to the political scene. Tariqatists, other representatives of Islamic traditionalism, as well as Islamists, who were largely associated with pure, salafi Islam,24 and members of the dissident democratic intelligentsia made up the core of the Islamic-democratic movement which opposed the existing Party-Soviet system, and the collaborationist DUMSK in particular. The ultimate goal of the opposition was economic and political liberalization and the creation of an Islamic state in Dagestan and in the North Caucasus in general. Their immediate demands were the resignation of the old leadership of the DUMSK under Muftii M. Gekkiev who was regarded as the major obstacle to genuine religious reform in the region, and its replacement by a younger generation of Islamic clerics, the young Imams ± including both Sufis and Islamists ± who claimed to have had no involvement with the Soviet state and the KGB. In 1989 Muftii Gekkiev was charged with corruption, collaboration with the KGB and moral laxity, and was forced to resign. Having achieved legal status, the tariqatists broke their alliance with the Islamists and claimed their monopoly over the Islamic umma. In order to strengthen their religious and political positions tariqatist activists joined their respective ethnic parties. Thus, the Muftii and most of the DUMD's staff belong to the Avar ethnic party. The tariqatist Muftiyat played an essential role in the formation of the Government's confrontational approach towards Wahhabism which began to spread in Dagestan in the late 1980s.25 However, the Muftiyat has failed to represent ethnically and religiously pluralistic Dagestan society. Thus, a large number of Muslims of Kumyk, Lak, Dargin and Lezgin ethnic origins have refused to recognize the

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legitimacy of the DUMD. Moreover, far from all Dagestani tariqatists have been loyal to the official shaykh Sayid-efendi. The DUMD has punished such rebels by pronouncing them mutashaykhs (spurious shaykhs). Among the main opponents of Shaykh Sayid-efendi have been the Kumyk shaykhs Muhammad Mukhtar Kakhulaiskii and Ilyas-Haji; the Avar shaykhs Tadjuddin Khasavyurtovskii and Idris-Haji Israpilov; and the Dargin traditionalists Muhammad Amin, Magomed-Haji and Abdulla-Haji Aligadjhiev. In contrast with the representatives of official Sufism, who shaped their political agenda according to the Government's demands, their unofficial opponents have maintained considerable autonomy from the political and Islamic establishment. In the conditions of ineffectiveness or impotence of government bodies they have often assumed the role of intermediaries in resolving inter-clan and inter-ethnic disputes, and have even occasionally defended the interests of Muslims against the central authorities. For instance, during the 1990s, non-establishment Sufis played a major role in resolving conflicts between Avars and Akkin Chechens in Kazbekovskii raion, between Dargins and Kumyks in Khasavyurtovskii raion, between Laks and Chechens in Novolakskii raion and between Kumyks and Avars in Karabudakhkentskii raion.26 It is also significant that some tariqatist and traditionalist opponents of Sayid-efendi have not shared the DUMD's hostility towards Wahhabism. For example, shaykh Muhammad Mukhtar disagrees with the DUMD's portrayal of Wahhabis as kafirs on the basis that they accused other Muslims of kufr. Shaykh Mukhtar, as well as shaykh Abdulla Aligadjiev and a number of Dargin ulema and Imams, repeatedly expressed their willingness to hold a dialogue with the Wahhabis.27 Another manifestation of the possibility of ideological reconciliation between tariqatists and Wahhabis was their participation in the Congress of Muslims of Dagestan, held on the initiative of the pro-Salafi organization of Al-Islamiyya in Kudali in September 1998. There were 585 delegates to this Congress, representing Dagestani Wahhabis, tariqatists and other Islamic traditionalists. The Congress adopted a resolution in favour of ending the conflict between the different trends in Islam and strengthening the religious and legal base of the Islamic movement by creating a Council of Ulema to promote re-Islamization of Dagestani society. Yet another example of a Wahhabi±tariqatist `joint venture' was the Islamic Shura (Council) of Dagestan which was formed in spring 1998, which consisted of 40 representatives of Wahhabis and traditionalists from Akhvakhskii, Botlikhskii, Tsumadinskii, Buynakskii, Untsukul'skii, Novolakskii, Karabudakhkentskii and Khunzakhskii raions of Dagestan.28

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In spite of the dissident minority, Sufi discourse has been defined by the Sufi majority under the leadership of Shaykh Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii. The role of unofficial, persecuted Islam was transferred to Wahhabism. The first Wahhabis turned up in Dagestan in the mid-1980s. From the very beginning there were two distinct trends in Dagestani Wahhabism: one intellectual and the other popular. Intellectual Wahhabism was represented by a moderate majority. The first noted Dagestani intellectual Wahhabi was Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev. While intellectual Wahhabism was centred primarily in Makhachkala, popular Wahhabism spread predominantly in the rural areas inhabited by Avars, Dargins and Lezgins. In July 1998, three villages in Buynakskii raion (Karamakhi, Chaban-Makhi and Kadar) proclaimed themselves an Islamic territory, based on the shariat. Apart from Buynakskii raion, Wahhabism also rapidly proliferated in Kizilyurtovskii, Khasavyurtovskii, Karabudakhkenskii and Tsumadinskii raions. By the end of 1990 Wahhabis already made up between 7 and 9 per cent of Dagestani Muslims.29 In December 1997, under pressure from the Muftiyat, the Dagestani Parliament issued a ban on the activities of the Wahhabis, who were defined as religious extremists. This signalled the beginning of the war against the Wahhabis. Many of them were arrested, their offices were demolished and their periodicals banned. The official campaign against Wahhabism had a strong political underpinning. In particular, it reflected the regime's need for the phantom of internal and external enemies in order to justify its indispensability and to have an effective lever in its relations with Moscow, given the latter's allergy towards Islamic extremism. The crackdown on Wahhabism had a radicalizing impact on its devotees and pushed them into alliance with Chechen radical nationalists. At the beginning of 1998, the leaders of Wahhabi Jamaat announced the start of a jihad against the Dagestani regime. In August and September 1999, they participated in the abortive Chechen military invasion of western Dagestan commanded by the Chechen field commanders Shamyl Basayev and Jordanian-born Abdurahman Khattab ibn Ul. The Dagestani authorities' reaction to the invasion was further suppression of Wahhabism and the adoption of a new and tougher law aimed at the complete eradication of Wahhabism in Dagestan. The participation of radical Wahhabis in the Chechen incursion has shifted Dagestani public opinion decisively in favour of tariqatism. However, the prolongation of the current economic and societal crisis, aggravated by bleak prospects for any democratic removal of the current corrupt regime, could increase the attractiveness of an Islamic solution in Dagestan. Still, it is most unlikely that in the perceivable future the Islamic

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solution will be associated with Wahhabism, discredited as it now is by its Chechen and foreign connections. On the whole, the Islamic revival in the North Caucasus has maintained its enclave character and has not had a direct impact on the Islamic dynamic in the Volga-Urals and other Islamic regions of Russia. It is significant that even the Chechen war has not evoked practical Islamic solidarity on both official and non-official levels. Thus, there has been hardly any collaboration between Muftiyats of the North Caucasus, on the one hand, and the Muftiyats of the Volga-Urals and Central Russia, on the other. Still, during the first half of the 1990s the North Caucasian Muftiis participated in the newly established all-Russian Islamic organizations, such as the Higher Co-ordinating Centre of Spiritual Boards of Muslims of Russia (the VKK) and the Council of Muftiis of Russia (the SMR). Subsequently, this participation has been purely symbolic. In August 1998, all the North Caucasian Muftiis withdrew their membership from the VKK and formed a separate Co-ordinating Centre of Muslims of the North Caucasus, headed by Muftii Albogachiev of Ingushetia.30 Also an important distinctive feature of Islamic officialdom in the eastern North Caucasus has been its Sufi face. The local Muftiis therefore have denounced Islamic fundamentalism, or Wahhabism. It is significant that in the early stages of the Russian±Chechen conflict, the Chechen young Imams under the leadership of the first Chechen Muftii, Muhammad Bashir, a representative of Sufi Islam of the Naqshbandi tariqa, refused to support General Dudayev and advocated a political settlement of the Chechen±Russian conflict. Similarly, Muftii Bashir's successors, Ahmed Kadyrov and Ahmed Shamayev, distanced themselves from Shamyl Basayev, Salman Raduev, Khunkar-pasha Israpilov, Movladi Udugov, Bagauddin Kebedov, Khattab and other Chechen irredentists. The political engagement of the Chechen Muftii reached its peak in May 2000 when President Putin appointed Muftii Kadyrov as the head of the Chechen administration within the Russian Federation.31

Muslims of the Volga-Urals region Compared to the North Caucasus, in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and other Muslim regions of the Volga-Urals, the Islamic revival has been less obvious. It has occurred within the context of the national revival of Tatars, Bashkirs and some other Muslim peoples. As in the past, the Tatars have been at the forefront of this process. In 1988, Tatar nationalists from the Tatar Public Centre (the TOTS) launched a campaign to upgrade the political status of Tatarstan within the USSR as a first stage towards the

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restoration of Tatar statehood. The TOTS's leading ideologists, R. Khakimov and D. Iskhakov, viewed Islam as an organic component of Tatar ethno-cultural identity.32 Therefore they advocated the transfer of the DUMES from Ufa to Kazan. They considered such a transfer a first, ideological step towards the sovereignization of Tatarstan. A similar view was shared by the leaders of other Tatar nationalist and Islamo-nationalist organizations and societies, such as the Cultural Society of S. Marjani (1988), the Youth Cultural Centre `Iman' (1990) and the Islamic Democratic Party (1991).33 In 1992, the Tatarstan leadership under President Shaimiev forged an alliance with the Tatar nationalists and refused to sign the Federal Treaty with Moscow. Having failed to secure the collaboration of Muftii Talgat Tadjuddinov of the DUMES, the Tatarstan leaders opted for a laissez faire approach towards the separatist activities of the local young Imams who challenged Muftii Tadjuddinov's supremacy.34 In August 1992, the Congress of Imams of Tatarstan elected 38-year-old Imam Gabdulla Galliulla as Muftii of a Kazan-based DUMRT, independent from Ufa.35 In order to justify this secession, Muftii Galiulla and his clerical and nationalist supporters unleashed a propaganda assault against Muftii Tadjuddinov. The latter was accused of a pro-Moscow position, anti-Islamic ecumenism and schizophrenia. Muftii Tadjuddinov, on the other hand, did not recognize the `self-proclaimed' Muftii of Tatarstan and continued to consider the Tatarstan Muslim community as his spiritual domain, and to nominate his muhtasibs (regional representatives) there. He also supported the formation of the alternative Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan (the DUMT) in Zelenodol'sk, first headed by Gabdulhamit Zinatulla and later by Farid Salman, who was based in Kazan. As a result, two Muftiyats emerged in Tatarstan, each claiming its legitimacy. In February 1994, Tatarstan President Shaimiev signed a power-sharing treaty with President Yeltsin. The Treaty secured for the Tatarstan leadership considerable independence from Moscow and enabled the Tatarstan leadership to proceed with nation-building based on the Tatar national heritage. Important elements of this process were the Tatarization (that is, promotion of ethnic Tatars) of the political, economic and cultural spheres, and the formation of alternative autonomous political structures. This led to a persistent indirect role for Islam in Tatar politics since Islam was regarded as a characteristic of Tatarness. Moreover, some of the Tatar official ideologists, such as R. Khakimov, the former nationalist leader who was subsequently co-opted into the ruling elite, viewed Islam as the central element of Tatar national ideology. He was the author of the concept of EuroIslam which was described as a post-modern

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version of jadidism. Khakimov and his likes viewed EuroIslam as a viable way of resolving the apparently inevitable tension between formally Muslim Tatarstan and allegedly Islamophobic Europe.36 Alongside the official pro-jadid approach to Islam there have been a few advocates of neo-qadimism. The latter have called for the restoration of the Islamic way of life among the Tatar population. The leading campaigner for the thorough re-Islamicization of Tatars has been the parliamentary deputy F. Shaymardanov. He has initiated parliamentary discussion of such issues as the creation of Islamic schools, hospitals, maternity wards, food stores and cafeÂs, as well as special places for prayer in various places of work and recreation; the formation of Muslim units in the Russian army; the introduction of a ban on alcohol sales during Islamic holidays, and a ban on the use of Islamic symbols in the labelling of alcohol and travel tickets, and so on. However, these initiatives have had only a marginal effect on government policies.37 In February 1998 the Shaimiev administration organized a unifying Islamic Congress in Kazan which legitimized the break with Ufa and elected Gusman-hazret as the Muftii of the DUMRT . Significantly, Gusman Ishakov's promotion was to a considerable extent due to the spiritual influence of his mother Rashida Abystay over Sakine Shaimieva, the wife of President Shaimiev.38 With the backing of President Shaimiev, Muftii Iskhakov introduced new registration rules for Islamic communities on

Figure 5.1 Sabantuy Festival in Naberezhnie Chelny in Tatarstan

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the territory of Tatarstan, which allowed him to impose his jurisdiction over the formerly Ufa-related muhtasibats and Islamic communities. He also attempted to position his nominees in various regions of the Volga-Urals, that is, within the borders of the mythological Idel±Ural. The decree `On freedom of conscience and on religious formations', which was adopted by the State Council (the Parliament of Tatarstan) in July 1999, recognized the DUMRT under Muftii Iskhakov as the only legitimate Muslim administration of Tatarstan. As a result, the positions of the Ufa-oriented DUMT under the leadership of Muftii Farid Salman were further undermined. However, it is not impossible that the situation might change again in favour of the pro-Ufa Muftiyat after the election in May 2000 of a new Russian President, Vladimir Putin who has begun to dismantle the `asymmetrical' relations between Moscow and Kazan.39 The Islamic dynamic in neighbouring Bashkortostan has resembled the situation in Tatarstan, although it has had some specific features which reflected local historical and ethno-political conditions. Among them is weaker Islamicization of Bashkirs, which was linked to their nomadic past and their minority position (Bashkirs make up only about 20 per cent of the total population of Bashkortostan, while Russians constitute 40 per cent and Tatars over 30 per cent). Given the history of political and religious domination of Tatars over Bashkirs, the post-Soviet Bashkortostan leadership under President Murtaza Rakhimov has watched closely the Islamic factor, especially its links with the Tatar national resurgence. It is worth mentioning that among the features of spiritual renaissance among the Bashkir population, there has been a revival of paganism. Compared to the Tatarstan leadership, the official Ufa has been less keen on the Islamicization of the Bashkir national idea. It has chosen to keep an equal distance from the Ufa-based TSDUMR under Muftii Tadjuddinov and the Bashkortostan Muftiyat, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Bashkortostan (the DUMB), which emerged in 1992 under the leadership of Muftii Nurmuhamet Nigmatullin.40 Compared to the North Caucasus, the grassroots Islamic revival in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan has been marginal. The vast majority of the population there has remained within the secular domain. The Sufi factor has been absent. There has been no evidence of viable Islamic opposition, although a number of small and purely religious Islamic groups were formed. Among them has been, for example, a group of safi (pure) Islam, which later transformed into the group led by the former Tatar Imam Faiz Rahman Sattarov who bears the title of amir (Islamic leader).41 Faiz Rahman Sattarov advocates life on the basis of the Koran only and criticizes Islamic officialdom for the distortion of Prophet

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Muhammad's teaching by indulging the weaknesses of ordinary people. On the outskirts of Kazan he created an Islamic commune of a small number of `chosen people' and appointed his representatives ± the rais ± to neighbouring Udmurtia, Marii-El and Permskaia oblast'. The members of the commune divide their time equally between Islamic studies, prayers and communal work. All textbooks are written by Faiz Rahman himself. The commune is economically self-sufficient and its budget is drawn out of compulsory zakat which amounts to two-thirds of the members' income. In terms of Islamic doctrine the teaching of Faiz Rahman is eclectic and paradoxically combines elements of taqlid, tajdid and Sufism. Compared to radical Islamists in the North Caucasus, who attach a military dimension to the concept of jihad, Faiz Rahman defies any form of coercion and regards jihad as a spiritual process. Therefore, he stresses his loyalty to the secular regime of President Shaimiev, while opposing Muftii Iskhakov and other representatives of Islamic officialdom.42 As for the other Muslim-populated areas in the Volga-Urals, Siberia and Central Russia, the Islamic revival has been purely symbolic and there have been no significant grassroots Islamic activities. The revival has been entirely dominated by young Imams, many of whom had little to do with the umma and viewed Islam as an opportunity to make an easy and fast career. In this respect they differed substantially from their counterparts in the North Caucasus and to a lesser extent from the Muftiis of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. At the same time, they have shared some common features. Thus, like all the young Imams, they turned up in the conditions of perestroika which allowed them to challenge the Soviet-era Islamic establishment in Ufa and Makhachkala. They rose against the authority of Muftii Tadjuddinov of Ufa and Muftii Gekkiev in Makhachkala whom they accused of anti-democratism, corruption and collaboration with the Communist Party and the KGB. The young Imams championed a campaign for the devolution of the rigid federal Islamic administrative system and its rejuvenation. They succeeded in destroying the DUMSK and degrading the status of the DUMES by the formation of alternative Islamic administrations.

`A Muftii boom' Compared to the republics of the North Caucasus and Tatarstan and Baskortostan, where the secessionist movement of young Imams had an important sovereignization dimension, in other regions it was defined primarily by the material interests and personal ambitions of a group of Kazan and Siberian Tatars. The latter were driven by the desire to gain

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access to the lavish foreign Islamic assistance which between 1988 and 1990 poured into the Ufa Muftiyat. At that time Muftii Talgat Tadjuddinov of the DUMES was the main recipient and subsequent distributor of the flow of dollars and other material assistance from abroad. The corruption which already existed in the Islamic administration intensified in the climate of late- and post-Soviet economic disorder, and there was widespread fraud and mismanagement of foreign Islamic aid. According to some sources, during that period the Muftiis, especially Talgat Tadjuddinov and his close associates, had appropriated up to a quarter of the total assistance. Their rapid and easy enrichment created a strong incentive for the young Tatar Imams to follow suit and to proclaim themselves Muftiis. As a result, between 1989 and 1992, Russia experienced a `Muftii boom' which brought the number of Islamic administrations to over forty.43 In terms of status and geography the new Muftiis could be grouped into three distinctive categories. One includes the Muftiis of the autonomies of the Volga-Urals and Siberia, represented by the Muftiis of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Buriatia, Chuvashia, Kalmykia, Khakassia, Komi, Mordovia, Sakha (Yakutia) and Udmurtia. Another group is made up of the Muftiis of Russia's regions (oblast' and krai) of Altay, Astrakhan, Cheliabinsk, Chita, Kamchatka, Kemerovo, Kurgan, Nizhnii Novgorod, Omsk, Orenburg, Penza, Perm, Primorsk, Rostov, Samara, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Tumen, Ul'ianovsk, Vladivostok and Volgograd. The third group is composed of the Muftiis of the all-Russian and supra-regional level, like the Muftii of All-Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS), the Muftii of European Russia, the Muftii of Asian Russia, the Muftii of the Volga region, the Muftii of Siberia and the Far East and the Muftii of St Petersburg and the north-western part of Russia. In fact, these first two groups of Muftiyats represent the upgraded former provincial structures of the DUMES, Ufa. As for the Muftiyats of the third group, these are a new invention with the exception of the Soviet-era DUMES, which in 1994 was renamed the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and the CIS (the TSDUMR). The TSDUMR under the leadership of Talgat Tadjuddinov has maintained its special status. In spite of the emergence of many new Muftiyats, claiming their share of power, Muftii Tadjuddinov has insisted on his monopoly right to administer the Muslims of Central Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to the TSDUMR, in 1999 25 smaller Islamic Spiritual Boards and 2061 (out of a total of 5786) of Russia's Islamic communities were under its jurisdiction.44 However, the monopoly of Talgat Tadjuddinov has been crumbling under an intensive

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attack from the new Tatar Muftiis, most notable among whom have been Muftii Ravil Gaynutdinov of European Russia,45 Nafigulla Ashirov of Asian Russia (until February 1999 Muftii of Siberia and the Far East),46 and Mukaddas Bibasov of the Volga region.47 In the past all of them belonged to the inner circle of the Ufa Muftii and they have used their intimate knowledge of Talgat's financial improprieties, especially related to foreign Islamic assistance, and of his illnesses, to undermine his centralized power and to promote their own ambitions. This anti-Ufa campaign has been joined by two insiders and Muftii Tadjuddinov's relatives ± Tatarstan Muftiis Gabdulla Galiullin (until February 1998) and Gusman Iskhakov.48 They have both accused Muftii Tadjuddinov of corruption, of extreme ecumenism, of an antidemocratic style of work and of schizophrenia. The ambitions of the Tatarstan Muftiis who have sought control over all the Tatar Muslims of Russia have transcended republican borders. They have aspired to transfer the all-Russian Islamic administration from Ufa to Kazan. In 1992 in Moscow, the young Tatar Imams formed a Higher Co-ordinating Centre of Spiritual Boards of Muslims of Russia (the VKK) as an alternative to the DUMES. It was first headed by Gabdualla Galiullin and later by Mukaddas Bibarsov and Nafigulla Ashirov. However, the activity of the VKK was soon paralyzed by harsh internal rivalry between its creators. This resulted in the emergence in 1996, also in Moscow, of another Islamic supra-structure ± the Council of Muftiis of Russia (the SMR). The SMR has been permanently chaired by its principal organizer, Moscow Muftii Ravil Gaynutdinov. Although the SMR claims to be an all-Russian Islamic forum it represents de facto the interests of the narrow Moscow-based Tatar Islamic elite under the leadership of Muftii Gaynutdinov. Since the mid-1990s, Russia's Tatar Islamic establishment has been influenced by a new actor ± the wealthy Tatar entrepreneur, Rashid Bayazitov.49 He has generously sponsored the Islamic renaissance in Siberia and Central Russia; in particular, he has invested in the construction of mosques and medresses in Siberia. In 1994, he fully financed the construction in the Moscow district of Otradnoe of an impressive Islamic Centre of Tatar Cultural Heritage ± Hilal. Formally, Bayazitov holds the post of Chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Siberia and the Far East, based in Omsk and affiliated to the TSDUMR. The spiritual leaders of this Muftiyat are the Shakirdzyanov brothers. One is the actual Muftii and the other is the Imam of Novosibirsk. The Muftiyat of Bayazitov and Shakirdzianov claims its jurisdiction over the Muslims of the Novosibirsk, Omsk, Krasnoiarsk, Tumen and Orenburg oblasti of Russian Siberia.50

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Figure 5.2 New Mosque in Otradnoe in Moscow

Although Bayazitov is a thoroughly secular person, he has gathered around himself an impressive group of highly educated Islamic clergy and specialists in Islamic and Arabic studies. He adheres to the principles of state and religious unitarism and has defied the secessionism of the young Imams, campaigning for the restoration of the Soviet-era Government Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults, or the formation of some other similar institution which would be the central co-ordinating and monitoring body of the religious situation in Russia. On a number of occasions,

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the representatives of the Hilal have called for reconciliation between Ufa and Moscow and the administrative unification of Russia's Muslims. Bayazitov has been involved in politics. He advocates exclusive reliance on Russian material and spiritual sources and claims to have had no involvement with foreign Islamic funds. He opposes the activity of foreign Islamic missionaries in Russia and their local associates. Bayazitov stresses his neutrality and distances himself from the former Soviet and newly emergent Islamic establishment. However, in practice, he has been close to Talgat Tadjuddinov and aggressively intolerant of his opponents, particularly Ravil Gaynutdinov, Nafigulla Ashirov and Abdel-Wahid Niyazov,51 the leader of the Islamic Cultural Centre (the ICC) and later of the Party of Refah (Prosperity). They have been consistenly attacked for alleged sleaze, corruption and criminal connections.52 On the whole, by the mid-1990s, there were three major Islamic administrations which claimed to represent the Muslims of Eurasian Russia. One, represented by TSDUMR, has remained in Ufa. Since 1980, it has been headed by Muftii Talgat Tadjuddinov who combines the titles of Shaykh-ul-Islam and Supreme Muftii and Chairman of the TSDUMR. He perceives all Russia's other Muftiis as illegitimate and continues to nominate his representatives to the Muslim autonomies and Russia's regions as well as to Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Recently there has been a growing rapprochement between Muftii Tadjuddinov and Rashid Bayazitov in spite of the latter's criticism of Tadjuddinov's lack of dynamism, poor administration and corruption. The alliance between them could create a viable counterbalance to their main opponent ± Moscow Muftii Ravil Gaynutdinov. Muftii Gaynutdinov of European Russia represents the second and most dynamic of Russia's Islamic centres of power. It benefits from its location in Moscow which enables its easier access to the Russian political and financial establishment. Muftii Gaynutdinov has worked closely with Nafigulla Ashirov and the earlier mentioned Abdel-Wahid Niyazov. In spite of the alliance between Gaynutdinov, Ashirov and Niyazov, strengthened by their common opposition to Ufa, their relations have not been free from internal rivalries. All three have sought religious domination ensuring monopoly access to domestic and foreign financial resources. By the beginning of 1999, Gaynutdinov and Ashirov outplayed Niyazov by `dividing' Muslim Russia between themselves into its European and Asian halves. While Ravil Gaynutdinov assumed the title of the Muftii of European Russia, Nafigulla Ashirov became the Muftii of Asian Russia with formal headquarters in Siberia, in Tobol'sk. In October 1999, Niyazov, who has undoubted political shrewdness, organized the Party of

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Refah and made his debut in Russian politics. Like other post-Soviet political parties, the Refah represents and promotes the interests of its organizers. It unambiguously supports President Putin's policies, including that on Chechnya. The third Islamic centre of power is in Kazan. It is headed by Tatarstan Muftii Gusman Iskhakov whose long-term aspiration is to make Kazan the Islamic capital of Russia. The parallel existence of various Islamic administrations has contributed to confusion and double-registration at the level of local Islamic communities. As a result, in some places several parallel Spiritual Boards and muhtasibats have emerged. Thus, in Tatarstan there are de facto two Islamic Spiritual Boards in operation at the moment. One Spiritual Board is under Muftii Gusman Iskhakov; the other, headed by Farid Salman, is affiliated to Ufa. There is a similar situation in Bashkortostan where the TSDUMR under Muftii Talgat Tadjuddinov coexists with the Muftiyat of Bashkortostan under the leadership of Muftii Nurmuhammed Nigmatullin. In Asian Russia, some Spiritual Boards are affiliated to the Muftiyat under Muftii Ashirov, others to the Muftiyat of Siberia and the Far East under Muftii Shakirzianov and yet others to the TSDUMR under Muftii Tadjuddinov. Some of these local Islamic Spiritual Boards are registered with all three Muftiyats while others, like the Islamic Spiritual Board under Bikmullin in Tumen, remain independent. In the Urals, in Orenburgskaia oblast', there are two parallel Islamic Spiritual Boards: one in the city of Orenburg and the other in the small town of Buguruslan. The Orenburg Spiritual Board, which is headed by Khayrullin, is under the TSDUMR's jurisdiction, while the Buguruslan Spiritual Board under the leadership of Shangareev is affiliated to the SMR under Muftii Gaynutdinov.53 Furthermore, various Muftiyats provide conflicting information on the number of Islamic communities which they administer. For example, Muftii Tadjuddinov claims control over 470 Islamic communities in Tatarstan, while Tatarstan Muftii Iskhakov insists that all 1200 Islamic communities of Tatarstan are registered with his Muftiyat. The situation is further complicated as a result of the introduction by different Muftiyats of various Islamic calendars, which has even created confusion among ordinary Muslims about the dates of major Islamic events.54 Russia's Tatar Muftiis vary considerably in their political orientation and the degree of their political engagement. During Yeltsin's Presidency (1991±99) the Ufa Muftii Tadjuddinov maintained his institutionalized status as the `court' Muftii. Alongside the Moscow Orthodox Patriarch Alexii II, Muftii Tadjuddinov was integrated within the Yeltsin political establishment. Similarly, a special relationship has been forged between Muftii Tadjuddinov and the politically influential businessman

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Boris Berezovskii.55 In terms of political orientation, Tadjuddinov is a gosudarstvennik (in favour of the strong and indivisible Russian state). Given Tadjuddinov's political aspirations and his allegedly close links with the KGB in the past, it is likely that he will strengthen his claims to supremacy under President Putin who favours a strong and unitary Russian state and is favourably disposed to those with KGB pasts. Tadjuddinov's ally, Rashid Bayazitov, has demonstrated consistent sympathy towards the Russian military and patriotic forces. Thus, in 1994, he formed the patriotic political party za Derzhavu (for the Great State) and established relations with General Lebed and Sergei Baburin. It is perhaps significant that the executive director of the Hilal fund Rifat Osmanov is a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Military Interpreters, an officer of the Russian Army with extensive war experience in the Middle East.56 The Moscow Muftii, Gaynutdinov, has established his own special relationship with the powerful Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov. Luzhkov's political and financial assistance has enhanced Gaynutdinov's ambition to turn Moscow into the Islamic capital of Russia. Muftii Gaynutdinov further strengthened his position in Russian Islamic and non-Islamic politics as a result of the parliamentary elections in December 1999 which brought Abdel-Wahid Niyazov and some of Gaynutdinov's other associates into the Russian Duma. The election of Vladimir Putin as the Russian President in March 2000 has intensified the struggle between Talgat Tadjuddinov and Ravil Gaynutdinov for the role of `court' Muftii of Russia. Thus, the party of Muftii Tadjuddinov has contributed to the removal from office of Andrei Loginov, who was the head of the Department of Internal Politics of the Presidential Administration and the powerful patron of Muftii Gaynutdinov. However, the latter has gained as a result of the promotion of Farid Mukhametshin, a supporter of Gaynutdinov, to the post of Head of the Department of Social and Religious Formations of the Russian Government. In March 2000, Muftii Gaynutdinov scored a significant victory over Muftii Tadjuddinov. He established his control over the second largest mosque in Moscow ± the Historical Mosque ± which used to be under the jurisdiction of the TSDUMR. As for Muftii Ashirov of Asian Russia and Abdel-Wahid Niyazov, the leader of the Party of Refah, they have been notoriously unscrupulous in their political engagements which have been directly related to anticipated financial gains. For example, for some time they were collaborating with the leader of the Union of Muslims of Russia (the UMR), Nadirshakh Khachilaev. Ashirov and Niyazov supported Khachilaev's

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efforts to organize an Islamic political party, Jamaat, which would seek Dagestan's secession from Russia. Their collaboration ended in May 1998 as a result of Nadirshakh Khachilaev's participation in the storming of the Dagestani Parliament under the banner of Islam. According to some informants, both Ashirov and Niyazov have been involved with the Tumen and Uralmash criminal groupings. They have also been known for their links with foreign Islamists from the Refah Party of Turkey, the Islamic movement in Yemen, the Islamic Renaissance Party and Hamas in Algeria and the Jamaat Polami Party in Pakistan. They have been widely accused of the unauthorized use of the names of some highranking Russian and foreign politicians for their own purposes.57 So, most new Muftiis have been corrupt and theologically incompetent figures who were dependent on local semi-criminal structures, and on material and doctrinal `assistance' from foreign Islamic institutions. Their policies and behaviour have often been motivated by internal rivalry, personal ambitions and greed. They have been based in cities and have shown little genuine interest in the life of the grassroots Islamic village communities. Like their Soviet predecessors, the new Muftiis have asserted their doctrinal monopoly and described their religious opponents in terms of bid'a or even apostasy. Village Imams, who constitute about 90 per cent of the Muslim clergy in Russia, have deplored the inadequate attention and practical assistance, as well as the absence of spiritual leadership, from the Muftiyats. Muftiis have often been viewed from below as self-obsessed, over-materialistic, corrupt and theologically incompetent.58 It is also significant that the bulk of the population of various Islamic regions of Russia have not regarded `career Imams' and Islamic politicians as genuine agents of the Islamic revival and have preferred Sufis, elders and other unofficial Islamic authorities to them.

On the whole, the Islamic revival has been welcomed by Russia's Muslims irrespective of their level of religiosity. The majority have perceived Islam as a viable moral and spiritual foundation in the post-Soviet crisis of values. However, the national/ethnic origins of Russia's Muslims, as well as their historical and religious backgrounds, have affected their views on the optimal degree of `Islamization' of the society and its specific forms. Thus, Tatars, Bashkirs and Adygheans have stressed the importance of Islam in their national self-identification given their exposure to massive Russian cultural influence. They have therefore been in favour of the

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gradual strengthening of Islamic ethics and morality in family life and the incorporation of Islamic norms in public life (related to intergender and intergenerational relations, communalism, charity for the poor and care for the disadvantaged, dress code, attitudes to alcohol, drugs, theft and so on). In the North Caucasus, especially in the east, the Islam-related expectations of the public have been even greater. There, Islam has often been regarded as a crucial factor in the moral salvation of local societies that have been socially degraded and criminalized. Many have admitted that they would have welcomed the parallel development of an Islamic educational system and the introduction of elements of the shariat into public life as a potentially effective deterrent to the proliferation of a culture of violence, crime and lawlessness. At the same time the majority of Russia's Muslims, with the exception of some Chechens, have opposed the idea of an Islamic state and their subsequent secession from Russia and expressed their loyalty to the Russian secular state. Interestingly, the prevailing view has been that the revival of Islam, alongside the revival of Orthodoxy and other traditional religions and faiths of various peoples of Russia, will have an invigorating effect on Russian civilization.59

6

Chechnya and Political Islam

The Chechen war has fuelled an academic and political debate about Russia's cultural essence and its relations with Islam. In particular, it has highlighted the issue of political Islam and Islamic extremism and its relationship with the Christianity-based system of liberal democratic values.

All-Russian Islamic political parties and movements In terms of its impact, the effect of perestroika on Russia's umma could be compared to the political liberalization at the beginning of the twentieth century. Both gave a revitalizing impetus to Russia's umma and stimulated the political activity of its members. Gorbachevian Russia witnessed the emergence of a number of political parties and organizations which placed Islam at the centre of their identity. Some of those organizations claimed to represent Muslims from all over Russia, others confined their activities to a particular region, an autonomous republic, or even a city, a town or a village. Those with nationwide status were, for example, the Islamskaia Partia Vozrozhdenia (the Islamic Renaissance Party, the IRP), the Islamic public movement Nur (Light), the Soyuz Musul'man Rossii (the Union of Muslims of Russia, the UMR), the Islamskii Kul'turnii Tsentr (the Islamic Cultural Centre, the ICC) and the movement Refah (Prosperity). Among more or less noted regional Islamic organizations were: the Islamic public movement Musul'mane Rossii (Muslims of Russia) which had some following in the Middle Volga, primarily in the Saratov and Penza regions; the party of Ittifaq (Union) and the movement Musul'mane Tatarstana (Muslims of Tatarstan), both in Tatarstan; the Islamic organization of Islamiyya and the Islamic Democratic Party (the IDP); the Islamic Party of Dagestan (the IPD), all based in Makhachkala and the Chechen 166

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parties of Islamskaia Natsia (Islamic Nation) and Islamskii Put' (Islamic Path). Despite the claims of their leaders to represent Russia's entire umma, most of these parities and movements were de facto relatively closed associations of intellectuals, or political adventurers. So far, none of them has managed to attract a wider Islamic public and approximate the rating of the Ittifaq Party at the beginning of the century. Their activity has often coincided with the all-Russian, or regional elections. Their political programmes have lacked clarity and tended towards abstract theoretization, utopian aspirations and doctrinal confusion. Most of them have subscribed to the idea of an Islamic state in Russia, where Muslims constitute a minority. Also, having declared their allegiance to Islamic unity within Russia, they have in fact promoted the administrative and doctrinal fragmentation of Russia's umma. Among the first Islamic parties was the Islamic Renaissance Party (the IRP), which was created under the Soviet regime in 1990 in Astrakhan.1 The founding fathers of the IRP were Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev, Geydar Jemal2 and Veli Ahmed Sadur.3 The activists of the IRP were mainly Tatars, Bashkirs, Caucasians and Tajiks. The doctrinal foundation of the party was Salafi Islam and its declared goal was the re-Islamicization of society and polity in Muslim-populated regions of the USSR. The major targets of the IRP's criticism were the official Islamic clerics who were regarded as munafiqin (hypocrites).4 Nevertheless, the leaders of the IRP stressed their adherence to peaceful constitutional politics and pledged their loyalty to the Kremlin. They regarded education and propaganda as their main mediums of influence. Following the disintegration of the IRP in 1992, its Moscow- and Makhachkala-based branches turned into independent parties, although nominally autonomous. IRPs also existed in Chechnya and the Middle Volga (Nizhnii Novgorod, Saratov), Tatarstan (Kazan) and Tumen. The leaders of the Dagestani IRP in Makhachkala were Ahmedqadi Ahtaev and brothers Bagauddin and Ilyas Kebedov. The Central Russian group, based in Moscow, was headed by Geydar Jemal. In terms of political influence the Dagestani IRP was more prominent than the Moscow party, which united just a few conflicting intellectuals. Ahmedqadi Ahtaev, who bore the title of amir, was a noted Dagestani intellectual, theologian and doctor. He was convinced that Russia's Muslims needed an effective Islamic political party which would promote their specific interests on various political and administrative levels. Ahtaev and his followers believed in the moral and spiritual superiority of Islam and advocated the gradual transformation of Dagestan into a modern Islamic state. Like other proponents of Salafi Islam, Ahtaev regarded Sufism as a later distortion and deviation from original pure

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Islam. In traditional Islamic circles, dominated by tariqatists, Ahmedqadi Ahtaev was regarded as an ideologist of moderate Wahhabism. In contrast with the Dagestani radical Salafis, who were led by Bagauddin Kebedov, Ahtaev argued that Dagestan, due to its specific history, simultaneously belonged to the Islamic and Russian Orthodox civilizations. He therefore opposed applying the concept of takfir and jihad in relation to Russia. Nevertheless, he was in favour of closer ties between Dagestan and Chechnya and supported in principle the idea of the unification of the Caucasus on an Islamic basis. It is worth mentioning that the leaders of break-away Chechnya highly respected Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev and on several occasions offered him important posts in the Chechen government.5 Ahmed-qadi believed that a united Islamic North Caucasus would force Moscow to treat it with more respect and consideration and to grant it wider political and economic autonomy. He also supported the idea of devolution of the de facto Russian unitarist state into a democratic confederation. In some respects, Ahtaev's political aspirations were attuned to the programme of the infamous Middle Eastern fundamentalist Islamic organization, the Muslim Brotherhood.6 Under his leadership the IRP gained popularity among some young educated Avars in Makhachkala and in Gunibskii raion, where Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev's native village of Kudali was situated. Between 1989 and 1991, Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev and his followers took part in the Islamo-democratic opposition movement which also included representatives of traditional and tariqatist Islam, the young Imams and members of the dissident democratic intelligentsia. The Islamo-democrats denounced the existing Party-Soviet system and one of its constituent parts, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the North Caucasus (the DUMSK) under Muftii Gekkiev. After the resignation of Gekkiev in 1989, and the subsequent fragmentation of the DUMSK along ethnic lines and the formation of the autonomous Dagestani Muftiyat, the DUMD, which was dominated by tariqatists, the Islamodemocratic movement went into decline. It tried unsuccessfully to regain its momentum in the aftermath of the Russian Parliament's liberal bill on `freedom of religious persuasions,' which was adopted in October 1990. In July 1991, the representatives of the Islamo-democratic opposition organized a demonstration for the freedom of hajj which ended in violent clashes with the Dagestani militia.7 However, following the institutionalization of tariqatism as the official strand of Islam in 1992, the Islamo-democratic opposition fell apart. The IRP came under growing political and propaganda pressure and was forced to curtail its public activities.

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Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev and his supporters became increasingly alienated and isolated. The DUMD's officials ignored his appeal to work together for the benefit of the Islamic revival in Dagestan and regarded him as a dangerous religious and political opponent. Ahmed-qadi and his followers were subjected to a smear campaign in which they were accused of intimidation of various representatives of tariqatist, or other forms of traditional Islam, of having links with foreign Islamists and of being `Wahhabis in disguise.' His supporters in Kudali were also charged with defiling local Sufi tombstones.8 Still, until his death in March 1998 Ahmed-qadi remained involved in Dagestani politics.9 From 1989 until 1993 he was a member of the Parliament. In 1992 he was elected as a Deputy to the Dagestani Supreme Soviet. In 1993, he founded an educational Islamic organization, Al-Islamiyya, which gave an educational and cultural dimension to the IRP until it ceased to exist in 1994. In 1998, Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev planned to stand for the post of head of Gunib raion administration. His sudden death dealt a fatal blow to the representatives of intellectual Salafism. The new leader of the Al-Islamiyya was Sirajuddin Ramazanov, Ahmed-qadi's relative and the former chief of a transport fleet. Unlike his predecessor, Ramazanov soon succumbed to radicalism and allied himself with Bagauddin Kebedov. During the Chechen±Wahhabi incursion into Dagestan in 1999 he joined the invaders, who appointed him prime minister of the government of the future Islamic state of Dagestan. In 1995 two all-Russian Islamic organizations emerged ± `The AllRussian Islamic Popular Movement Nur' and `The Union of Muslims of Russia' (the UMR). Both were formed in Moscow on the eve of the Russian Parliamentary elections of 1995. The Nur was registered in January and the UMR in May 1995. The initiative to create these organizations belonged to Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party (the LDP), who hoped to attract Muslim voters. The first leaders of the Nur and the UMR were Khalit Yahin and Ahmed Khalitov. Khalit Yahin combined the leadership of the Nur with his other job as an aid to Alexei Mitrofanov, the MP from the LDP, while Ahmed Khalitov also worked as editor-in-chief of the newspapers Pravda Zhirinovskogo (`Truth of Zhirinovskii') and Sokol Zhirinovskogo (`Falcon of Zhirinovskii'). By December 1995, the Nur had created branches in 47 regions of Russia and the UMR in 50. In order to raise the political profile of these organizations their leaders tried, although without success, to attract into its membership some prominent personalities of Islamic background, such as President Aushev of Ingushetia, Ramazan Abdulatipov, then the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Federation (the upper chamber of the Russian

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Parliament), and Mahmud Esambayev, the internationally famous dancer. From the first days of its existence the UMR liaised with the Islamic Cultural Centre (the ICC) headed by Abdel-Wahid Niyazov. Both the Nur and the UMR appealed to the new Muftiis and other young Imams to back them. Muftii Gaynutdinov of Central Russia and some other Tatar young Imams supported them, while Ufa Muftii Tadjuddinov and the Muftiis of the North Caucasian autonomies refused to deal with them. Both organizations presented themselves as successors of the Duma Muslim faction which existed in pre-Revolutionary Russia. Both had vague political programmes which claimed to support the interests of Russian Muslims at all levels; to seek a political solution of the Chechen crisis; to promote Islamic norms and traditions in private life, especially Islamic family values and a sober lifestyle; to restore the institution of waqf; to form Muslim TV and radio channels and to form special Islamic units within the Russian Army.10 In spite of the active election campaign, the UMR's leadership failed to comply with the requirements of the Central Election Committee and was eliminated from the election race. The Nur, which was registered in 72 regions of Russia, was therefore the only Muslim party which took part in the Parliamentary elections in December 1995. It managed to get only 0.58 per cent of votes which was far below the 5 per cent level necessary for the formation of a faction in the Duma. However, in Russia's Muslim regions its results were better. Thus, in Chechnya and Ingushetia it received the support of 23 per cent of the voters, in Tatarstan of 5 per cent and in Bashkortostan of 1.25 per cent. After the elections the Nur, having fulfilled its main purpose, disintegrated even though some of its regional branches continued to survive. Among such survivors was, for example, the Dagestani branch of the Nur which in 1998 was renamed the Partia Rossiiskikh Musul'man (the Party of Russia's Muslims).11 By contrast, the activity of the UMR, which from 1996 was headed by Nadirshakh Khachilaev, was on the rise.12 The UMR acquired an impetus from Nadirshakh's election as a Dagestani Deputy to the Russian Duma, where he replaced the earlier assassinated Dagestani Deputy, Gamid Gamidov. Under Khachilaev's leadership the UMR, which was previously dominated by Tatars, strengthened its Caucasian profile. Branches were formed in the Muslim autonomies of the North Caucasus. It was particularly active in Dagestan where it allied with the Lak ethnic party under the leadership of Mogomed Khachilaev, Nadirshakh's brother. Like most new Russian Muslim leaders Nadirshakh did not know Arabic and had only a very approximate idea of the essence of Islam and the Koran. His position on the role of Islam in Russia was

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strongly dependent on his particular emotional state, his audience and political considerations. Still, he seemed to prefer Salafi Islam to Sufism and was sympathetic to the goals of the Chechen Islamists.13 In Moscow Nadirshakh Khachilaev developed close links with the infamous political and religious adventurist Abdel-Wahid Niyazov, who acquainted him with Moscow's beau monde and foreign Islamic circles. In spite of educational and theological gaps, Nadirshakh proved to be a skilful and fast-learning politician, who managed to turn the URM into a viable factor in Russian Islamic politics. He became recognized as the leader of Russian Muslims in various Islamic and non-Islamic countries. In the Duma, Nadirshakh Khachilaev was an enthusiastic proponent of the wider involvement of Muslims in Russian politics and pressed for the formation of an effective Muslim faction in the Russian Duma. There he regularly criticized Moscow's handling of the Chechen crisis. In 1996±97, he was actively involved in Russian±Chechen negotiations and contributed to the exchange of war prisoners between Moscow and Groznii. In Russian political circles, Khachilaev acquired a reputation as the most radical Muslim Duma Deputy. During the Presidential elections in 1996, Nadirshakh allied with Muftii Gaynutdinov and Abdel-Wahid Niyazov in support of Boris Yeltsin against Gennadii Zuganov, the Communists' candidate. According to some sources, AbdelWahid Niyazov and his allies demanded the sum of $2.3 m from Yeltsin's election office as their reward for securing the support of the Muslim voters.14 The fact that the majority of Russia's Muslims voted in favour of Zuganov revealed the degree of detachment of these `Muslim leaders' from their flock. Nadirshakh's growing all-Russian political profile had important implications for Dagestani politics. It fuelled the ambitions of the Khachilaev clan which claimed the greater share of power in the Dargin- and Avardominated Dagestani political establishment. Among the Khachilaevs' political gains was the appointment of Magomed Khachilaev to the lucrative post of chairman of the Parliamentary Committee. Nadirshakh himself seriously considered the possibility of standing for the top political job in the forthcoming elections. In late 1997, he intensified his propaganda assault on the Dagestani regime and on several occasions sided with the Chechen leaders. He even attempted to organize in Dagestan an Islamic political party of Jamaat (Community), which would seek Dagestan's secession from Russia. In May 1998, his political ascendance came to a sudden halt as a result of his participation together with Magomed Khachilaev, Gadji Makhachev, the leader of the Avar popular movement, and Mahmud Gadjiev, the chairman of Makhachkala city council, in the

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abortive attempt to storm the Parliament building in Makhachkala when the rebels installed the green banner of Islam over the Dagestani Parliament. The Khachilaev brothers were arrested and charged with political extremism. In 2000, Magomed Khachilaev was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. As for Nadirshakh Khachilaev, he was politically marginalized. After Nadirshakh's arrest his party, the URM, disintegrated and de facto ceased to exist. At the beginning of 1999, Anvar Kadiev, the leader of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Dagestan, attempted to create a viable replacement to the URM in the form of an `All-Russian Islamic Congress' with a network of regional branches. However, the organization was stillborn. Khachilaev's removal from politics strengthened the position of his Moscow-based Tatar `ally-rivals.' Among the main beneficiaries of Khachilaev's decline was Abdel-Wahid Niyazov, who lacked any professional or religious education and presented the most explicit case of `career Muslims' who emerged on the wave of the Islamic revival. In 1991 he had founded the Islamic Cultural Centre (the ICC), which had an impressive programme promoting Islamic spiritual and cultural values. However, in reality the ICC served the personal ambitions of its young, dynamic and morally flexible leader, who had no genuine interest in Islam, but was determined to get a seat in the Russian Duma. Niyazov has been notoriously unscrupulous in his political and financial connections, which have included members of the Russian criminal underworld. He also courted representatives of rich Arab countries who provided him with substantial financial support. Niyazov competed with Ravil Gaynutdinov and Nafugulla Ashirov to establish a special relationship with Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov. At the beginning of 1999, Niyazov found himself outside the Islamic domain following the `division' of Russia's umma into its European part under the leadership of Muftii Gaynutdinov and the Asian part under Muftii Ashirov. However, he managed to turn his subsequent demotion into a triumph. In 1999 he abandoned his ICC and launched a new political movement Refah, which claimed to represent Muslims and other non-Russian minorities of Russia.15 In order to gain the Kremlin's support, Niyazov's Refah adjusted its political programme to Moscow's official position on Islam, including Chechnya, and focused on the cultural, educational and humanitarian problems of Russia's Muslims and other non-Russians. During the Russian Presidential election campaign of 1999±2000, Refah joined the pro-Putin regional block Edinstvo (`Unity') which was heading for victory. This alliance paid dividends and Niyazov got himself finally elected into the Duma. With four other Refah candidates he makes up the core of the Duma Muslim faction consisting of

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twelve members. Duma status enabled Niyazov to expand the Refah's activity in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tumen, Saratov, Orenburg, KhantyMansi and Yamalo-Nenetsk.

Regional Islamic political parties and movements In April 1996, there emerged in Saratov the organization Musul'mane Rossii (Muslims of Russia) which was designed as a regional counterbalance to the Moscow-based UMR and the ICC. Among its founders were Imam Mukaddas Bibarsov, Veli Ahmed Sadur and Talib Saigbaev, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Islam Minbire of the Moscow Muftiyat who claimed to represent Muslims of the Middle Volga. However, the organization failed to outplay its Moscow rivals and was forced to confine its activity to Saratov and Penza regions. Tatar nationalists under the leadership of Fauzia Bayramova also made an attempt to form a viable regional Islamic organization. In 1989, they formed in Kazan a Tatar nationalist party of Ittifaq, which has been increasingly gravitating towards Islam. In 1996, Ittifaq's leaders adopted the Tatar Kanuni (the Tatar Code) which placed Islam in the centre of its activity. Significantly, Bayramova denounced the traditions of Tatar Islamic modernism ± jadidism ± as destructive of the fabric of Tatar nationhood, and called for the revival of fundamentalist Islam in the Tatar umma.16 In June 1996, Muftii Gabdulla Galliullin of Tatarstan headed the Islamic popular movement Musul'mane Tatarstana (The Muslims of Tatarstan) which also subscribed to the Tatar Kanuni. The new movement sought to create an Islamic faction in the Parliament of Tatarstan. However, the activity of this movement was soon reduced to lobbying on behalf of the interests of its leader and his entourage. In November 1998, Galiulla Galiullin, who in February of the same year lost the job of Muftii of Tatarstan to Gusman Iskhakov, turned to opposition to the Shaimiev regime and formed a political movement Omet (Hope). Galiullin transcended the Islamic context and invited various opposition forces, including the Communists, Ittifaq members and the Islamists to join in. As was earlier noted, Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev tried to stop the demise of the IRP in Dagestan in 1993 by reforming it into the new regional political party Al-Islamiyya. The party found a limited response among young Avars who had recently moved from the mountains to the plains. Its activities were restricted by the authorities, which viewed it as a hotbed of Wahhabism. Since Ahtaev's death in 1998, the party has been in crisis. In 1990 in Makhachkala, Muslim democrats under the leadership of Abdurashid Saidov, who was a professional doctor of Avar origins, formed

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the Islamic Democratic Party of Dagestan (the IDP). Its original programme presented a paradoxical combination of Islamic and democratic ideals. It declared its opposition to the corrupt and ineffective ruling regime and called for its replacement by an Islamic-democratic government. Its political demands were consonant with those of the IRP. However, compared to the IRP, which adhered to Salafi Islam, the IDP stressed its allegiance to tariqatist Islam, although it expressed tolerance towards Salafis. In 1994, the IDP split between those who stuck to the original goals of the party and those who agreed to co-operate with the authorities. The former, headed by Abdurashid Saidov, were alienated and forced out of Dagestani politics. Abdurashid Saidov himself emigrated to Moscow. The collaborationist faction of the IDP was headed by Surokat Asiyatilov, a lecturer of Avar origins at Dagestan University. With official backing Asiyatilov was `elected' as the new leader of the party, which changed its name to the Islamic Party of Dagestan (the IPD). It soon evolved into a tame pro-government party. Since Surokat Asiyatilov's election to the Popular Assembly in 1995, the IPD has turned into a political mouthpiece of the DUMD. It has begun to promote tariqatist Islam of the Naqshbandi wird of Shaykh Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii as the genuine Dagestani Islam, and pressured the authorities to ban any other forms of Islam in Dagestan. Its parliamentary demands have also included the removal from the Constitution of Dagestan of its clauses on the separation of church and state and of schools from the church, and the official recognition of Islam as the `religion of the democratic majority'. On behalf of the DUMD the IPD has been lobbying for a new freedom of conscience bill which would endorse the DUMD's control over clerical appointments, vesting it with powers to confirm the elections of Imams at all levels and to monitor the registration of all religious organizations.17 Interestingly, the IPD regarded Turkish Islam ± which is close to the traditions of Naqshbandiyya Sufism ± as a possible model for the role of Islam in Dagestan.18 It is also worth mentioning a radical Islamic group Jamaat-ul-Muslimi (Islamic community) which was formed in 1989 by a group of Islamists, mainly from the Dargin village of Gubden in Dagestan. Between 1989 and 1991, the members of the Jamaat-ul-Muslimi participated in the Islamodemocratic movement. In June 1990, K. Khasbulatov, the leader of the party, was among the instigators of attacks on Government buildings in Makhachkala. In doctrinal terms Khasbulatov and his followers were Salafis. They advocated the radical reform of Dagestani society on the basis of the shariat and the subsequent transformation of Dagestan into

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an Islamic state. In Gubden, the Jamaat's activists opened a number of Salafi mosques and introduced separate education for boys and girls. In 1996, under growing official pressure, the activity of the Jamaat-ul-Muslimi was practically suspended. In 1997, Chechen Islamists under the leadership of Movladi Udugov created the Islamskaia Natsia (Islamic Nation) party which claimed to represent over thirty Muslim organizations of the North Caucasus. The aim of this party was the political independence of the North Caucasus and its unification on the basis of Islam. In April 1998, in Groznii, the leaders of the Islamskaia Natsia organized a Congress of peoples of Ichkeria (Chechnya) and Dagestan. On its agenda were the practicalities of the Islamic unification of Chechnya and Dagestan under Chechen leadership. However, the authorities and the major Dagestani nationalist and religious leaders boycotted the Congress, which they regarded as a threat to the sovereignty of Dagestan. In August±September 1999, the leaders of the Islamskaia Natsia tried to bring about the unification project by masterminding the Chechen invasion of Dagestan. Yet another Chechen Islamic party, Islamskii Put' (Islamic Path), was founded by the mayor of Groznii, Bislan Gantemirov. It advocated the comprehensive Islamicization of Chechnya as a first step towards Islamicization of the entire region. Significantly, both of these parties adhered to Salafi Islam and opposed the Chechen Islamic establishment represented by tariqatists. Alongside these `all-Russian', or `regional' Islamic parties and organizations which have been around for relatively lengthy periods of time there have been plenty of other short-lived local Islamic organizations. Among them, was, for example, the Dagestani Civic Union, Jamaat va-l-Khuriyya (`The Community and Freedom'); the popular Islamic movement, Muhtasibat of Imam Gazi Muhammad; the `Union of Islamic Youth'; the `Supreme Religious Council of the Peoples of the Caucasus'; and the Association of Muslim women, Maslima. In Kazan in May 1991, there was formed the Islamic Democratic Party (the IDP) under the leadership of Imam Fanil Ahmadiev of the Aktubinsk mosque. Tatarstan and some other parts of the Volga-Urals have witnessed the activities of international Islamic organizations such as the Pakistan-based Jamaat-atTabligh; the Behaiyya and the Ahmadiyya. They have lacked formal organizational structures and managed to recruit just a small number of followers, mainly among the cultural intelligentsia.19 An interesting new phenomenon in the political life of Russia's Muslims has been the emergence of organizations and societies of newly converted Muslims. Most of these new converts are Russians or

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other Slavs with Christian Orthodox cultural backgrounds. The first wave of conversion to Islam occurred in the context of the Russian military involvement in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. During that period, a considerable number of Russian soldiers, who were taken prisoner by mujahedin, converted to Islam. Having been released from captivity, many of them chose to remain so. During the 1990s, the number of new Russian Muslims grew steadily, although not to a significant degree. In 1997, a spiritual and educational organization Soyuz Novoobrashchennikh Musul'man (The Union of Newly Converted Muslims), was formed in Makhachkala. It unites over 200 new converts of mainly Russian ethnic and cultural origins. Its chairman is Muhammad-Ali (formerly Dmitrii) Tveritinov. Surprisingly, among the new converts are former Christian Orthodox priests. Among them is Ali (formerly Viacheslav) Polosin, the editor-in-chief of the Musul'manskaia Gazeta (the `Muslim Newspaper'), founded in 1999. Before his conversion in 1999, Polosin was well known as an Orthodox priest of democratic orientation. Polosin believes that the key to the future spiritual and political revival of Russia is in its Islamicization.20 In spite of its seeming absurdity, the idea of Russia's conversion to Islam has been discussed in Russian literature and periodicals. In 2000, a Russian bestseller was Yurii Nikitin's Yarost' (`Rage'), which elaborated on the Islamic option for Russia as a potent response towards NATO expansion eastwards.21 On the whole, the existing Islamic parties and movements have not yet become genuine political organizations. They have remained aloof from the needs of ordinary Muslims. Its leaders, with the exception, perhaps, of the founders of the Islamskaia Natsia and the IRP, have appealed to Islam primarily in order to satisfy their personal political ambitions and financial interests. Their chances of gaining popular support and respect have been jeopardized by such evident defects as their low educational level, ignorance of Islamic doctrine and Arabic, their high levels of corruption and involvement in shady and semi-criminal business activities. With a few exceptions, the leaders of these parties have refused to collaborate with Muftiis and other Islamic clerics, whom they regarded more as rivals than potential allies. They have also met competition from some influential Russian politicians and Duma Deputies of Islamic background who have had increasing appeal to Russia's Muslims. Among the latter have been Ramazan Abdulatipov, a former Russian deputy prime-minister and the chairman of the Assembly of Peoples of Russia in charge of national policy; Aman Tuleev, the Governor of Kemerovo oblast', and Danya Karimova.

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Figure 6.1 Students of the Medresse Yunis in Makhachkala, Dagestan

The Russian±Chechen conflict In contrast with the rest of the Muslim regions of Russia, Islamic principles have actually been translated into political and military actions in postSoviet Chechnya. Three major factors determined a greater role for Islam in Chechen politics. One was the incompetence and incoherence of the early Yeltsin government, which disregarded the national aspirations of the Chechens, who had suffered particularly badly during the Tsarist and Soviet periods. Another factor was the particular national resilience of the Chechen people, who rejected the psychology of submission.22 The third was linked to the intertwining of the Chechens' struggle for freedom with their Islamicization. Thus, when in 1989 the Chechen nationalists under the leadership of Major-Gen. Dzhokhar Dudayev, the former commander of the Soviet air-force base in Tartu, began the movement for the sovereignty of Chechnya, they did not seek secession from Russia. Their main demand was to upgrade the administrative status of Chechnya from autonomous to federal republic. Moscow's lack of response to Dudayev's demands had a radicalizing impact on the Chechen nationalist agenda. In October 1991, the All-National Congress of the Chechen People, which emerged as a viable alternative to the dysfunctional Supreme Soviet (the Parliament) of Checheno-Ingushetia, proclaimed Gen. Dudayev President of Independent Chechnya. In 1992, Dudayev, along with Tatarstan

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President Mintimir Shaimiev, refused to sign the Federal Treaty, which formed the framework for the post-Soviet administrative restructuring of the Russian Federation. In August 1994, Yeltsin's government declared war on break-away Chechnya.23 The war inflicted colossal human and material losses. In May 1996, it was suspended as a result of the Khasavyurt agreements which were brokered by Gen. Lebed in his brief capacity as the Russian Security Council Secretary. In May 1997, President Yeltsin and Chechen President Maskhadov signed a cease-fire agreement which left the political status of Chechnya indefinite. In August 1999, the agreement was violated and the war was resumed. In spite of the nominal termination of the conflict in 2000, it continues to claim numerous victims on both sides. Overall, during the Russian±Chechen conflict about 40 000 civilians have died, and 90 000 altogether have perished. The Russian military lost over 7000 of its soldiers, while the number of the Chechen boeviks (fighters) has been reduced by more than a half. The war destroyed Chechnya's oil-based economy, its transport and public infrastructure and created hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people. The conflict has aggravated the already existing culture of violence and lawlessness which fuelled crime, terrorism and various forms of extremism. In the conditions of war, many Chechen taips transformed themselves into criminal gangs, profiting from drugs and arms trafficking, the slave trade, kidnapping and hostage-taking. The war has had a spill-over effect on Chechnya's neighbours, causing a lengthy economic blockade and a massive influx of refugees.24 Specialists have tended to link the particular ethno-cultural resilience of the Chechens to their social organization, centred on taips which represent self-governing kinship formations. It is worth mentioning that the taip structure had a formative impact on the political organization of the Chechens. Thus, the Ossetians, the Kabardins, the Avars, the Lezgins, the Laks, the Tabasarans and the Nogays had an ancient statehood tradition and formed various principalities under feudal rulers, khans, beks, and so on. They looked down upon those who did not have such a tradition ± the Chechens, the Ingushes, the Balkars, the Karachays and the Kumyks ± as inferior and primitive. In the fifteenth century, the Chechens and Ingushes got rid of their aristocracy. Their societies were egalitarian, unstratified and classless and were regulated by the norms of clan democracy. They presented a conglomerate of various clans, or taips. Their clans differed in size but not in prestige. Each clan was headed by a respected elder and had its particular ethics

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and code of honour. Clans and villages were autonomous. Only in response to extreme external threats did they temporarily unite for military purposes. Social stability was determined by a fragile balance of power between numerous clans.25 Traditionally, mountain taips were the most zealous fighters against any form of foreign domination. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Chechens, alongside the Adyghs and the Avars, made up the core of the resistance to the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus. Later on, in spite of the establishment of Russian rule in the region, a large number of Chechens, especially highlanders, were not able to become reconciled to this. It is significant that following the Russian annexation of Chechnya in the late nineteenth century the Russian, and subsequently Soviet, authorities preferred to deal predominantly with Chechens from the plains. Thus, Doku Zavgaev, the last First Secretary of the Communist Party of Checheno-Ingushetia, belonged to the plains taip. However, Gen. Dudayev and his close associates were from mountain taips. In presentday Chechnya there are about 170 taips. More than half of them are made up of mountain people, while the rest unite the plains dwellers.26 As discussed earlier, the Chechens, as well as Ingushes, adopted Islam in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that is to say, much later than their neighbours.27 In fact their Islamicization, which is not yet over, was a by-product of their fighting against the Russian Orthodox invasion. The Chechens preferred Sufi Islam which incorporated their pre-Islamic beliefs and adat norms. The Naqshbandiyya and Kadiriyya were the largest tariqas. In the aftermath of the nineteenth-century Caucasian war, the Kadiriis prevailed in the plains regions, while the Naqshbandiis, who were the driving force of the anti-Russian resistance, maintained their dominance in the mountains. After the revolution, the Naqshbandiis acquired substantial political and quantitative superiority over the Kadiriis, who suffered bigger losses during the Soviet period. Nevertheless, the Kadiri wird of Shaykh Kunta-Haji, which was formed in 1950 amongst the Chechen deportees in Kazakhstan, is often regarded as the embodiment of Chechen Sufism. This is largely due to its members' loud dhikr (chanting of the name of Allah) accompanied by their rhythmical body movements and running in circles, as opposed to less obvious, quiet Naqshbandi practices.28 The Chechens, especially urban dwellers and representatives of the diaspora, did not avoid the secularizing effects of Soviet industrialization, unified atheistic education and inter-ethnic social mingling. In their case, the importance of the taip and Islamic affiliation was challenged by modern kinds of social relationship based on economic and political interests.29

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The recent Russian±Chechen war has evoked primordial forms of solidarity among Chechens. As in the past, the war has become a powerful unification factor and encouraged Chechen Islamicization. However, the role of Islam during the war has been ambiguous. Some Chechen leaders, such as Movladi Udugov, Zalimkhan Yandarbiev and Bislan Gantamirov, as well as some of the Chechen mass media, described the conflict from its first days in terms of a jihad by Chechen Muslims against the Russian kafirs. On the other hand, Gen. Dudayev and his close associates who were not religious, even atheist themselves, stressed the national character of the Chechen movement for independence.30 At the same time, Dudayev viewed the Muftiyat's approval of his policy as an important legitimizing act. Therefore, he attempted to forge a close relationship with the Chechen Muftii Muhammad Bashir, a Naqshbandii. However, the latter refused to co-operate and accused Dudayev of violation of basic Islamic norms. During the presidential elections in 1991, the Chechen Muftiyat distanced itself from Dudayev. In the same year, there emerged another Islamic structure ± the Mehk-Khel (Council of Elders) ± the leaders of which claimed their equal non-engagement with Dudayev's Government or the Muftiyat. They advocated the greater role of tariqatist Islam in Chechen society as a viable medium to overcome acute intertaip and inter-communal problems. In 1992, in order to weaken the Muftiyat's authority, Dudayev instigated its division into two bodies ± the Muftiyat itself and the Islamic Centre of the Chechen Republic (the ICCR). The ICCR was headed by Muhammad Huseyn Alsabekov, President Dudayev's advisor on religious matters. In 1993, the Dudayev leadership backed the election of Mammud Garkaev as the new Muftii of Chechnya. In 1994, Muftii Garkaev was replaced by Muftii Muhammad Huseyn Alsabekov who was loyal to President Dudayev. The Russian military invasion of Chechnya, which began in December 1994, enhanced the Islamic dimension of the Chechen nationalist agenda. Gen. Dudayev turned to Islam, which he proclaimed an ideology of national consolidation of Chechens and declared a new gazawat against the Russian invasion. However, some members of the Muftiyat, especially the Naqshbandiis, remained critical of Dudayev's instrumental use of Islam. Overall, the failure of Dudayev's leadership to mobilize the Naqshbandiis for the anti-Russian resistance predetermined their rapprochement with the Kadiriis, who were much more disadvantaged than the Naqshbandiis during the Soviet period. Bek-murza, the older brother of Dzhokhar Dudayev, played an important role in the formation of this alliance.31

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During the war of 1994±96, Dudayev increasingly incorporated Islam into his political vocabulary and official ceremonies. Thus, he introduced the practice of swearing on the Koran; and Chechen fighters put on headbands with imprinted ayats (verses from the Koran). Dudayev's appeal to Islam had an important propaganda function: it sought to attract international Islamic support for the Chechen cause. At the same time, however, internally the Chechen leaders continued to give preference to taip, and the ethnic affiliations of Chechens, over their common Islamic background. Thus, Gen. Dudayev used to refer to the `ethnic impurity' of his political rivals in order to discredit them. For example, he accused Avturkhanov of having Kabardinian blood in his veins; Ruslan Khasbulatov of being a disguised Cherkess, and Slambek Khadjiev a secret Avar. Dudayev's appeal to Islam had a strong psychological impact on the Chechens. It revived memories of the Chechen Shaykh Mansur who waged a gazawat against the Russian invaders in the eighteenth century. As a result, Dudayev succeeded, although for a relatively short period of time, in uniting the majority of Chechens irrespective of their taip or regional affiliation into a popular anti-Russian front.32 After Dudayev's death in 1996, the Islamicization of Chechnya acquired a new momentum. Zalimkhan Yandarbiev, in his capacity as the acting president of Chechnya, abolished the secular courts of justice and created the Supreme Shariat Court with its regional branches. During 1996±97, shariat norms were introduced in the Chechen legislature. The new Constitution of Chechnya proclaimed Islam as the state religion and the legal basis for the Chechen legislature, incompatible with the Russian legal system. After Aslan Maskhadov's election as the new Chechen president in 1997, Movladi Udugov, the founder of the Islamskaia Natsia, gained the post of first deputy prime-minister. The promotion of Udugov, who deviated towards Salafi, Wahhabi Islam, split the Chechen leadership along doctrinal lines. Udugov considered Sudan and Afghanistan under the Taliban as the models for the Chechen Islamic state. He criticized the Chechen tariqatists for their deviation from true Islam and their collaboration with the Tsarist Russian and Soviet authorities. Under Udugov's guidance the Chechen Criminal Code of the shariat courts was copied from the Shariat Criminal Code of Sudan. Udugov and his high-ranking associates supported the creation of Wahhabi military formations which did not recognize the authority of President Maskhadov and the Chechen Islamic establishment under the Muftii Ahmed Kadyrov, a Kadirii, who was elected in 1996.The doctrinal shift of Movladi Udugov, Zalimkhan Yandarbiev, Shamyl Basayev, Salman Raduyev, Abdul-Malik Madjidov, Khunkar-pasha Israpilov, and some other leading Chechen politicians

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and field commanders in favour of Salafi Islam reflected their growing financial and ideological dependence on foreign Islamic radicals and Islamic funding bodies. The pro-Wahhabi Chechen leaders turned to opposition to President Maskhadov, who maintained allegiance to the local Sufi Islam. In August 1997, President Maskhadov's position was further undermined as a result of his attempt to ban Wahhabism on the territory of Chechnya. The period between 1996 and 1999 witnessed the growing grassroots Wahhabization of the Chechen resistance. The advance of Salafism shifted the balance of power from President Maskhadov to a dozen illegal armed formations under the command of Chechen warlords. Given the total devastation of state and societal structures, the unprecedented corruption and the rise of crime and banditry, they became the real masters of Chechnya while the authority of President Maskhadov barely went beyond the Chechen capital Groznii. Among the effects of the proliferation of Wahhabism in Chechnya was the strengthening of relations between the tariqatists, both Naqshbandiis and Kadiriis, and Maskhadov's leadership. The Chechen Muftii Ahmed Kadyrov acquired considerable political weight and began to influence President Maskhadov's position in favour of political resolution of the Russian±Chechen conflict. As a result, Maskhadov significantly moderated his policy towards Moscow and, in contrast with Shamyl Basayev and other Chechen warlords, was prepared to negotiate the status of Chechnya with it. The anti-Maskhadov forces acquired dominance even in some government structures, such as the shariat guard, the shariat courts and the shariat intelligence, as well as in the Chechen mass media. Some Wahhabi military units were integrated within the armed forces of Chechnya. Shamyl Basayev established his control over the Supreme Shariat Court, which was turned into the parallel supreme legislative body. In February 1998, Maskhadov attempted to restore his control over the legislature power by dissolving the Parliament and creating the Shura (Council), which functioned on the basis of shariat. However, the radical opposition refused to recognize the new legislative organ and proclaimed an alternative Shura. In July 1998, in Gudermes, a bloody conflict erupted between the tariqatist forces loyal to Maskhadov and Salafis. The tariqatists were defeated and the authority of President Maskhadov became more symbolic. The Russian invasion of Chechnya in August 1999 put an end to the collaboration between President Maskhadov and the tariqatist establishment. Maskhadov joined the pro-Wahhabi radicals, while Muftii Kadyrov agreed to have talks with the Russian authorities about the future of Chechnya.33

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The proliferation of Wahhabism in Chechnya began in 1995±96, which is much later than in Dagestan. Its main agents were foreign Islamists who fought on the Chechen side during the war. An important factor was the substantial financial, material and military assistance provided by foreign Islamic fundamentalist organizations. The first amir of the Wahhabi jamaat in Chechnya was the Saudi-born Abdurahman. Subsequently, the role of leader of the Chechen Wahhabis and the agent of international Islamic assistance was transferred to Jordanian-born Abdurahman Khattab.34 Compared to Dagestan, where it had both intellectual and popular dimensions, in war-torn Chechnya Wahhabism was present mainly in its popular form. For ordinary Chechen fighters Wahhabism meant the military jihad against the Russian army, the rule of the shariat, the introduction of a specific Wahhabi dress code and hair style and the rejection of Sufi practices. In 1995, the Wahhabis attempted to destroy the main Kadiri ziyarat of Khadi, the grave of the mother of Kunta-Haji. This led to bloody clashes between the Wahhabis and the tariqatists. At the beginning of 1998, Chechnya received a massive influx of Dagestani Wahhabis led by Bagautddin Kebedov, who were fleeing the official persecutions in neighbouring Dagestan.35 The Chechen warlords saw in Wahhabism primarily an ideology for the trans-taip unification of Chechnya and its territorial expansion. They began to claim the role of saviours of their Muslim neighbours from the rule of the Russian kafirs. Neighbouring Dagestan was chosen as the first candidate for the Chechen `salvation' mission. The Chechen radicals called for the restoration of the nineteenth-century Imamate of Imam Shamyl, which had united Chechens and various peoples of Dagestan. The more mundane reason for the Chechen expansion eastwards was their need for an exit to the Caspian sea to ensure their direct links with the outside world. In December 1997, Chechen Islamists under the command of Khattab invaded the city of Buynaksk in Dagestan. In April 1998 in Groznii, maverick field commander Shamyl Basayev organized a Congress of Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan. The Congress was supposed to proclaim the political unification of Chechnya and Dagestan as a first step towards pan-Islamic regional integration. However, the Dagestani authorities boycotted the Congress and its decisions remained on paper.36 In August 1999, the Chechen radicals of the Islamic Liberation Forces, led by Shamyl Basayev and Abdurahman Khattab37 unleashed a military campaign for the Islamic unification of Chechnya and Dagestan and invaded Botlikhskii, Tsumadinskii, Novolakskii and Buynakskii raions of western Dagestan. In Botlikhskii raion they proclaimed an Islamic Republic of Dagestan. Among its leaders were Sirajuddin Ramazanov, the leader

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of the Dagestani organization Al-Islamiyya, Adallo Aliev, the editor-inchief of the newspaper Islamskii Put' and Magomed Tagaev. However, the invasion ended in failure due to the strong resistance of Dagestanis, the majority of whom perceived the `Chechen Islamic liberation mission' as an external aggression and responded to it by organizing a mass liberation movement. The defeat of the Chechen plan for Islamic integration revealed the actual weakness of pan-Islamic solidarity among Russia's Muslims. Moreover, the Dagestanis, who considered themselves `better Muslims' than the Chechens, rejected the Chechen religious leadership. The Dagestanis also refused to recognize the claims of Shamyl Basayev, the Chechen warlord, to be leading a jihad since the traditional leaders of a jihad were Avar Imams. The Chechens' appeal to Islamic solidarity against the Russian kafirs met a rather subdued response even among the Cherkess, Adyghs and Abkhazes who in the past were sympathetic to the Chechen cause. The number of Caucasian volunteers in Chechnya was much lower than the number of Muslims from various distant regions of Russia and from abroad. In interviews, representatives of various Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus expressed their doubts about the alleged advantages of the future Islamic state under Chechen auspices. In particular they often pointed to such `problematic' qualities of their Chechen neighbours as their social rigidity, inability to compromise and their militancy towards what they perceived as the other. They were therefore concerned about the prospect of an independent Chechnya and pressurized Moscow to restore Russian control over it. On the other hand, the Chechen struggle for independence received symbolic support from some Muslim nationalists outside the North Caucasus. For instance, Tatar nationalists from the Ittifaq Party demonstrated their solidarity with Chechnya. Thus, the Kashapov brothers (ethnic Tatars), who had made a fortune out of the alcohol business in Naberezhnie Chelny, Tatarstan, sent several lorries with humanitarian aid to Chechnya. A group of Tatar shakirds (Muslim students) from the medresse Yulduz in Naberezhnie Chelny fought in Chechnya. Similarly, among Muslims abroad, the Chechen boeviks were widely regarded as mujahedin.38 As for the official authorities of Russia's Muslim autonomies, most of them, with the exception of Ingushetia, supported the Kremlin's policy on Chechnya. The governments of foreign Muslim countries, except perhaps the leaders of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, also reacted cautiously to Chechen irredentism and did not rush to offer diplomatic recognition of the Chechen Republic. As for the lavish foreign Islamic assistance to break-away Chechnya, it was administered by nonGovernment Islamic organizations and funds of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,

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Qatar, Jordan and some other Islamic countries. Since 1995, the Chechen conflict has been increasingly internationalized as a result of a consistent influx of foreign mujahedin with extensive war experience in Afghanistan and some other hotbeds of Islamic militancy. According to some sources, several hundred `Afghanis' from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, who fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s, took part in the Chechen invasion of Dagestan in 1999. A substantial number of the foreigners were ethnic Chechens, Cherkess and Adyghes from the diasporas in Jordan and Turkey. It should also be added that a number of non-Muslim mercenaries of Ukrainian, Baltic, or Russian ethnic origins participated on the Chechen side in the war. The response of the new Russian leader Vladimir Putin to the Chechen incursion into Dagestan in August±September 1999 was a renewal of the war of annihilation against the Chechen separatists, who were termed `international terrorists'. The Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov denounced Moscow's actions as a violation of the Khasavuyrt agreements and joined the pro-Wahhabi camp in the war against Russia. Meanwhile, the Chechen Muftii Kadyrov, who regarded Wahhabism as a worse evil than Moscow, distanced himself from Maskhadov.39 The declared goal of the Putin Government is the full-fledged reintegration of Chechnya within the Russian Federation and the restoration of Russian constitutional order there. The realization of this goal implies the complete eradication of the Chechen boeviks, the destruction of their bases, training camps, communication and supply systems and a formation of the pro-Moscow Chechen administration. The second Chechen war was Vladimir Putin's election trump card. It was accompanied by an intensive propaganda campaign which secured considerable popular support for Putin's tough line on Chechnya. This was quite different from the first Russian±Chechen war of 1994±96 which was unpopular in Russia. In May 2000, President Putin appointed Muftii Ahmed Kadyrov as head of the temporary administration of Chechnya. However, the war is far from over and continues to claim lives on both sides. Given the history of Russian±Chechen relations it is unlikely to have any positive outcome in the foreseeable future.

Wahhabism Strictly speaking, the use of the term Wahhabism in relation to Islamic fundamentalist movements in Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union is incorrect because Wahhabism is a religious and political movement reflecting the specific conditions of eighteenth-century Arabian society.

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It was named after its leader Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab. Wahhabism is one of the forms of Islamic fundamentalism which defined the desire to return to the pure, unadulterated Islam of the period of Prophet Muhammad and the four righteous caliphs. It was based on the most strict and rigid Hanbali madhhab of Sunni Islam. In political terms Wahhabism was an ideology of the supra-tribal political unification of Arabia. The postSoviet version of Wahhabism is a new and multi-faceted phenomenon which emerged in the context of the reintegration of the post-Soviet umma into the Muslim world. It advocated a return to true Islam which had been badly distorted as a result of the lengthy isolation of ex-Soviet Muslims from the Islamic heartland. It was based on a wider doctrinal foundation than the teaching of Abd al-Wahhab, including works by A. Maududi, S. Kutb, K. at-Turabi and some other contemporary ideologists of Islamic fundamentalism. It is believed that the term was introduced, wrongly, by the KGB and the mass media in the late 1980s to describe Islamic fundamentalist activities in the Ferghana valley. Subsequently, in post-Soviet Russia and in the former Soviet Muslim republics, it came to be applied to any Islamic teachings and practices, including those of Shia Islam, which collided with local Islamic traditions. It is significant that socalled Wahhabis reject this term and prefer to call themselves Salafis, or simply Muslims.40 By the late 1990s, the term acquired a derogatory and negative meaning and became synonymous with international Islamic extremism, which presented a major threat to the integrity and national security of Russia and other former Soviet Muslim republics. Despite these inadequacies in the use of the term Wahhabism, I have kept it as the description of the local form of Islamic fundamentalist movements because of its wide acceptance by politicians, journalists and the general public.41 There have been several mechanisms by which Wahhabism has proliferated in Muslim regions of Russia. One of them has been the annual participation of thousands of Russia's Muslims in the hajj and `umra (the small hajj). This has allowed Russia's Muslims to become acquainted with different interpretations of Islam and its rituals. Many hajjis on their return home began to question the validity of their Islamic customs. Also, Wahhabism has penetrated via educational channels. A growing number of Muslim students from Russia went to study in foreign Islamic Universities and colleges where they were taught different forms of Islam. In Russia itself numerous medresses and Islamic colleges were opened which were staffed with foreign Islamic teachers who often taught the nontraditional madhhab of Sunni Islam. Wahhabism was promoted by foreign Islamic missionaries who in the early 1990s came in large numbers to

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Muslim-populated regions of Russia. The foreign Muslim funds, many of which opened their offices in Russia, distributed free of charge Korans and a variety of Islamic literature and videos which propagated Salafi Islam. And finally war-torn Chechnya was infiltrated by foreign radical Salafis.42 The popular appeal and political influence of Wahhabism has differed considerably in various Islamic enclaves of Russia. It has been greater in the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan and Chechnya. In Dagestan Wahhabism from the very beginning had two distinct forms: one intellectual and the other popular. In political terms, intellectual Wahhabism was dominated by moderates, popular Wahhabism by radicals. The leader of intellectual Wahhabism was the already mentioned Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev, the leader of the Dagestani branch of the IRP. Like other Wahhabi ideologists Ahmed-qadi nevertheless opposed the explicit association with Wahhabism and described himself as an Islamic modernist or reformer.43 Intellectual Wahhabism was centred in Makhachkala. Its proponents advocated a gradual re-Islamicization of Dagestani society as the precondition for the subsequent re-Islamicization of the state. Ahtaev and his followers emphasized their adherence to peaceful means of Islamic proselytism. They also stressed their tolerance of representatives of other forms of Islam and of non-Muslims, although they bitterly criticized their opponents, especially Sufis, for their alleged deviation from the tawhid (strict monotheism). They did not consider themselves to be bound by the Shafii madhhab which has been traditionally dominant in Dagestan, or by any other madhhab; they only concurred with those regulations of the four madhhabs that could be tested by reference to the Koran and the Sunna. Wahhabis believe that on questions of ibadat (homage to Allah) only what was prescribed in the Koran and the Sunna is permissible; everything else was a deviation from Islam. In muamalat (social practice), everything is permitted unless it is specifically forbidden by the Koran and the Sunna.44 Wahhabi intellectuals counted as many as 100 bid'a in Sufi doctrine and practice.45 They were particularly critical of the Sufi veneration of saints and shaykhs as intercessors between believers and Allah. They regard excessive worship and glorification of Islamic saints (even of the Prophet Muhammad) as a deviation from monotheism, which proscribes the worship of anyone other than Allah. Apart from clear, conceivable knowledge embodied in the shariat, Wahhabis rule out the existence in Islam of another hidden, mystic knowledge which was supposedly accessible only to saints and Sufi shaykhs. They did not recognize the mystical ability of the saints and of the Prophet himself to intercede before Allah on behalf of Muslims, and challenged the legitimacy of praying to the saints for dua'

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bi-tavassul (help). Neither did Wahhabis accept that baraka (divine grace) could be passed down through saints, shaykhs and artefacts related to them (such as shrines). Wahhabis thus reject such Sufi practices traditional to Dagestani society as ziyarat, reading the Koran at cemeteries, mawlids (chanting praise to saints or shaykhs) and using amulets and talismen. While condemning innovations, at the same time Wahhabis advocate the strict observance of all provisions of the Koran and Sunna concerning ritual and ceremony and the behaviour and appearance of Muslims, even if these provisions were unfamiliar to most Dagestanis. In particular, they insisted on unshaven beards and shortened trousers for men and hijab (the full veil) or even niqab (the face veil) for women. The Wahhabis also attacked the tariqatists for their ideological and political corruption and for their support of the present government. They accused the official shaykh Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii and his entourage of legalizing usury, which was forbidden by the shariat law, by allowing money to be invested in state and commercial banks.46 Until mid-1997 the positions of representatives of intellectual and moderate Wahhabism were comparable to those of radicals. However, the official crackdown on Wahhabism as a whole which began in December 1997, as well as Ahtaev's death in 1998 strengthened the radical dimension of Dagestani Wahhabism. Ahtaev's relative and successor Sirajuddin Ramazanov, also from Kudali, who had lived in Kaspiisk and worked as the boss of a fleet of vehicles, lacked Ahtaev's charisma, knowledge and political skills. Eventually, he rejected Ahtaev's moderate approach and joined the radicals. So, since 1997 the Wahhabi discourse in Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus has been shaped by its radical popular form. The spiritual and political leader of radical Wahhabis has been Bagauddin Kebedov. The radicals called themselves the Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan (the IJD). Unlike the moderates they refused to co-operate with the Dagestani government, which they described as kafir, and focused their activity on building their organization, religious propaganda and introducing the shariat law at a local level. They aspired to create an Islamic state in Dagestan with subsequent political unification of the Caucasus as a single Islamic entity. They also categorically refused to have any dialogue with tariqatists whom they accused of shirk (heresy), incompatible with Islam.47 The radicals emphasized the special role of jihad, which they regarded as the core of Islam without which it was like a `lifeless corpse.' Unlike the tariqatists, who interpreted jihad predominantly in terms of the spiritual self-perfection of a Muslim, Wahhabis believed that the jihad also implied a campaign to spread Islam all over the world. They accused the Sufis of

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distorting Islamic teaching on the jihad and of effectively consigning the jihad to oblivion. The radicals viewed the jihad as a preventive armed advance in order to overcome those obstacles which the enemies of Islam placed in the path of its peaceful proliferation. This approach opened up the possibility of declaring a jihad against the present regime which allegedly resisted the effective ad-da'wa al-Islamiyya (re-Islamicization) of Dagestan.48 Alongside the radicals there was a small group of ultra-radicals, the followers of amir Ayub, the leader of the jamaat, who was based in Astrakhan and had a substantial following among the Dagestani diaspora there. The Dagestani ultra-radicals formed their commune in the village of Belidji in southern Dagestan. Interestingly, its members included a few Russian converts. The followers of Ayub viewed tariqatists and other representatives of Dagestani traditional Islam as kafirs. They also called for the introduction of a strict Islamic dress code. In particular, they insisted on the obligatory niqab for Muslim women.49 Popular Wahhabism has appealed to those who were disillusioned with the ruling regime and collaborationist Muftiyat, which had failed to protect them from drastic impoverishment, moral degradation and the rise of crime. The impoverished and marginalized youth have been attracted by Wahhabism's rationalism, accessibility and ability to overcome the elitist and closed nature of Sufism. They were attracted by the Wahhabis' call for social equality and justice, by their actual egalitarianism, as well as by their practical social and material support. Particularly appealing was the Wahhabis' condemnation of the `non-Islamic' custom, which was firmly rooted in Dagestan, of spending huge amounts of money on weddings, funerals and other family events, the costs of which in such a poverty-stricken society became ruinous for the bulk of the population. Wahhabi jamaats which advocated strict spiritual allegiance to Allah alone offer converts a new form of social solidarity. It allows the detachment of the individual from the system of tukhum, or in case of Chechnya, taip ties which still cemented Dagestani, as well as Chechen societies and which were intrinsically interwoven with Sufism. The yearning for individual independence and self-determination has been especially strong among the young, who were particularly badly affected by the rapid property-based stratification of society over recent years, the loss of moral points of reference and the interruption of the socialization process. Also, social welfare provided by the Wahhabi jamaats to its members and direct financial assistance to individuals in need were additional incentives to join the movement. On several occasions during the 1990s, Wahhabi leaders demonstrated their ability to mobilize their followers for the struggle against injustice and lawlessness

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created both by corrupt officials and by various criminal ethno-political groupings associated with them. No less important is the fact that Wahhabi jamaats represented a highly organized formation, capable not just of offering their members a sense of social protection, but also actual, if need be, armed protection against the criminal free-for-all and the arbitrariness of the police.50 Wahhabism spread predominantly in the rural areas inhabited by Avars, Dargins and Lezgins. It rapidly proliferated in Buynakskii, Kizilyurtovskii, Khasavyurtovskii, Karabudakhkenskii and Tsumadinskii raions. In August 1998, the four villages of Karamakhi, Chaban-Makhi, Durangi and Kadar of Buynakskii raion, in which the Wahhabis had gained domination, were proclaimed an Islamic territory, based on the shariat. The spiritual and military leader of these villages was Djarulla Radjbaddinov, who was a close associate of Khattab. The villages were well armed and even had antiaircraft guns. The centres of Wahhabism in Kizilyurtovskii raion were the villages of Zubat-Miatli, Miatli, Kirovaul, Komsomolskoye, Chontaul, Sultan-Yangiyurt; in Buynakskii raion, the above-mentioned villages, as well as those of Verkhnee Kazanische and Nizhnii Djangutay and the Lezgin town of Belidji. By the end of the 1990s, Wahhabis already made up between 7 and 9 per cent of Dagestani Muslims. The symbols of Wahhabi affiliation were obligatory square beards and ankle-length trousers for men and the veil or scarf for women. Still, there are some objective limitations to the further proliferation of Wahhabism in Dagestan. Among them are its intolerance of Dagestani national cultural and religious traditions; its strong anti-Russian position; its financial, political and ideological dependence on external forces; and the alliance of Wahhabi radicals with Chechen separatists.51 Despite the official antagonism towards Wahhabism, non-official relations between Wahhabis and tariqatists have been more complicated. Some villages were divided into Wahhabi and tariqatist parts, each having their separate mosque, as well as Imam, or amir. There have also been cases of armed conflict between the proponents of Wahhabism and tariqatism. Both sides were belligerent in these conflicts, although the actions of tariqatists were often the more aggressive.52 But there have also been cases of grassroots collaboration between the two sides. For example, in May 1998, tariqatists and Wahhabis of the village of Kirovaul of Kizilyurtovskii raion formed a joint vigilante brigade and a shariat commission to deal with drug addiction, alcoholism, theft and prostitution. When these shariat structures began to work, the incidence of livestock and property theft decreased dramatically, and the moral atmosphere in the village improved. The case of Kirovaul, in spite of its localized character, showed

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that if there were no interference from outside, the doctrinal differences between Wahhabis and tariqatists did not necessarily present an obstacle to their constructive co-operation in solving social problems. The case of the Islamic zone in Buynakskii raion provided yet further evidence of the possibility of a constructive dialogue with the Wahhabis. On 20 August 1998, Sergei Stepashin, the then Minister of the Interior of Russia, and the leaders of the Wahhabi villages reached an agreement according to which the Wahhabis recognized Russia's suzerainty. In return the Russian authorities promised not to interfere in the internal life of the Islamic zone.53 However, the escalation of the official witch-hunt against real and imagined Wahhabis forced Dagestani radicals either to emigrate, or to go deep underground. In January 1998, Bagauddin Kebedov and a large group of his followers moved from Dagestan into Urus-Martan in Chechnya. There they were welcomed by the Chechen Islamists and warlords, such as Udugov, Khattab, Basayev and Israpilov. In late August 1999, the Russian Federal and Dagestani authorities opted in favour of military elimination of the Islamic zone in Buynakskii raion in violation of the agreement of 20 August 1998. In response, the Chechnya-based Wahhabis issued a declaration of jihad against the Government of Dagestan. As a result of the participation of Dagestani Wahhabis in September 1999 in the Chechen invasion of western Dagestan public opinion in Dagestan shifted decisively against them.

The rise of Islamophobia The Chechen war became a symbol of the political incompetence of the post-Communist Russian government which lacked sound national and religious policies. Yeltsin's call to the regional leaders `to grab as much sovereignty as they could swallow' on the one hand, and Moscow's initial indifference to the needs of its Islamic periphery, on the other, fuelled regional and national particularism. The local ethnic elites exploited Moscow's political and economic withdrawal to build ethnocratic regimes based on traditional primordial social networks. This has resulted in a considerable re-traditionalization of the social and economic structures of many of Russia's Islamic enclaves. An important feature of that process has been the rise of ethnic nationalism which has threatened the existing ethno-political balance of power. Among its manifestations has been the new type of korenizatsia policy, which was promoted by titular ethnic elites against representatives of other ethnic groups. When the titular ethnic elites and their opponents had differing

192 Russia and Islam

religious backgrounds, this policy has often acquired a distinctive religious overtone. As a result of such policies, ethnic Russians and other Slavs, who constituted a minority in most of Russia's Islamic regions, have been discriminated against, although discreetly, in employment, housing and education. As a result, the Russians have been persistently pushed out of the local power structures and key economic, administrative and teaching positions. Subsequently, many of them were forced to emigrate to the Russian heartland. This has had drastic economic and political consequences given the key role of Russians in the economic and cultural spheres and their traditional role as non-indigenous brokers in multi-ethnic societies.54 The Chechen conflict, apart from its enormous human and material cost, has had a spill-over effect on the adjacent regions of Stavropol'skii and Krasnodarskii krais, in particular, and on Moscow itself. It has contributed to the rise in crime, the illegal trafficking of arms and drugs and the proliferation of terrorism all over Russia. Also, Russian±Muslim relations have suffered from Moscow's encouragement of the growing assertiveness of 600 000 Kuban and Terek Cossacks who sought to restore their traditional role as the Russian Orthodox bulwark against the Islamic periphery. In 1992, President Yeltsin signed a decree about full rehabilitation of the Cossacks. In 1997, the Russian Duma adopted a law which recognized the Cossacks as `a community of people with their particular traditions, areas of residence, culture, economic system and a special attitude towards army service and their relationship with the state'.55 With Moscow's backing the Cossacks began a campaign for administrative delimitation in favour of the Russian mainland. Thus, they demanded the return of Shelkovsky and Naursky raions from Chechnya to Stavropol'skii krai. Similarly, the Cossacks from Karachay-Cherkessia sought direct rule from Stavropol' and Terek Cossacks advocated the creation of their separate republic in Dagestan with the centre in Kyzliar.56 The Chechen drama, the rise of ethno-religious nationalism in Russia's Islamic enclaves and the failures of Moscow's regional policies have aggravated Russian±Muslim relations. Furthermore, during the Chechen conflict, Russian politicians and the official mass media portrayed the Chechen fighters as bandits, international terrorists and Islamic extremists. The corollary of such an approach has been Islam's increasing association with political extremism, military aggression, terrorism, savage public executions and intolerance towards the other. The FSB (former KGB) and the Russian mass media have coined numerous politically and scientifically incorrect clicheÂs of an anti-Islamic and anti-Caucasian nature, such as, for example, Litsa Kavkazskoi Natsional'nosti (people of

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Caucasian nationality) and Musul'manskaia mafia (Muslim mafia). The Russian interior and police forces have begun to treat all Muslims, particularly Caucasians, with suspicion and to subject them to humiliating routine identity checks. The religious feelings of Russia's Muslims were offended by President Yeltsin's de facto promotion of Orthodoxy as the state religion and one of the pillars of the new Russian idea. Particularly damaging was the introduction by the early Yeltsin government of Western legalistic norms based on the supremacy of the territorial principle over ethno-cultural factors and individual rights over the collective rights of a particular ethnic group, a kin or any other primordial community. It was indicative of the official indifference to the situation in Russia's umma that until the late 1990s the Russian Government, the Presidential apparatus and the State Duma hardly had any structures which could deal with ethno-religious problems. On the other hand, the dissolution of the Government Religious Committee, which monitored religious activities in the Soviet period, as well as the liberalization of immigration policy, allowed the uncontrolled access of foreign Muslim missionaries to various Muslim enclaves of the Russian Federation. The latter promoted different versions of Islam, including those which advocated the inevitable secession of Russia's Muslim territories from Russia. On the whole, the continuing Russian±Chechen conflict and the rise of political Islam have aggravated inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relations in Russia and raised the issue of the compatibility of Russia's future democratic development and the preservation of its ethnic and cultural pluralism. Some Russian politicians and journalists have begun to analyze the Chechen conflict in terms of the civilizational conflict between, historically, largely Orthodox Russia and its Islamic periphery. Their views have been received with sympathy by some factions of the Russian public.57 The rise of Islamophobia has caused frustration and desolation among Russia's Muslims and fuelled Islamic radicalism. It has been damaging for the centuries-long traditions of mutual grassroots tolerance and respect for the productive coexistence of Russians and Muslims on the Eurasian expanses called Russia.

Conclusion

Islam has played an important, albeit indirect, role in Russian history and has arguably accounted for some common fundamental characteristics between contemporary Russian society and those in the Islamic East. Among them are a tendency towards political despotism and a deficit of established and democratic procedures in the acquisition, appliance and transfer of power; undeveloped civic solidarity; the prevalence of collective over individual values; extensive predatory patterns of behaviour; incomplete secularization of individual and public consciousness; and the strength of emotional, mystical and contemplative attitudes to life.1 The proto-Russians' interaction with Muslims and Islamic culture was one of the central factors in the formation of Russian ethnicity, which occurred between the eighth and tenth centuries.2 The main agents of Islamic influence were various Muslim peoples of the Khazar Khaganat and subsequently Volga Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent Khwarasm, Soghdiana, Bukhara, Samarkand, Sassanid Iran and the Arab Caliphate. Their impact was crucial in the initial formation of the political and legal norms and economic practices of the then pagan proto-Russians. In contrast to the countries of Western Europe, which experienced the Norman invasion, the Varangian invasion of the proto-Russians' habitat in the late ninth century, and the subsequent formation of the centralized state of Kievan Rus and the nucleus of its elite, embodied in the Varangian dynasty of Rurik, did not bring radical structural changes and was accommodated by the indigenous socio-cultural system. By the twelfth century, the process of ethnic and cultural `nativization' of the Kievan ruling class was practically over and the latter had largely absorbed the existing preVarangian economic, political and cultural traditions and behavioural norms, as well as rituals and court etiquette. Moreover, as a result of active intermarriages between the Kievans and the indigenous elites, the ethnic 194

Conclusion 195

composition of the ruling class of early Russia became overwhelmingly indigenous. On the other hand, the Varangian invasion marked the beginning of the steady divergence between the Russian polity, represented by its military and trade elite, and the vast majority of its inhabitants who made up the proto-Russian society. While the evolution of the former was, at least formally, subjected to a variety of external influences, including European influence, the development of the latter persisted according to its intrinsic indigenous logic. It maintained its autonomy from the state and remained aloof and indifferent to its major political and religious initiatives. At the core of state±society relations was, de facto, the Khazar tribute system which secured the state's non-interference in the internal life of local communities provided the latter paid the required tribute to it. This relationship was further developed and diversified in the period between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries when Rus was under Genghizid suzerainty. At the end of that period, Russia turned into a centralized and militarized state, which, however, continued to function on a tributary-redistributary basis. The corollary of this system was the submergence of the society by the state, the weakness of the legal system, the prevalence of politics over economics, and the subsequent underdevelopment of urban autonomy and unconditional private property. Among the social implications of this system was the underdevelopment of any status autonomy among almost all social groups ± peasants, urban dwellers and even the aristocracy ± and the great dependency of the latter on the will and choice of the supreme ruler. Given this dualism of the state and society, the official adoption of Greek Christianity by the Kievan rulers in the tenth century did not have a profound impact on the bulk of Rus's population and did not significantly affect the nature and scope of their multifaceted contacts with their Eurasian neighbours, including Muslims. In fact, until the fifteenth century or even later, the majority of Russians, as well as many of their Muslim neighbours, gave priority to their pagan beliefs over formal Christianity, or Islam. Meanwhile, the proselytizing activity of the Russian Orthodox Church gained momentum when Rus was under the rule of the Islamic Genghizids. The final choice of Orthodox Christianity by the Kievan rulers, who also seriously considered the Islamic option for Rus, was determined by political reasons. The Kievans believed that Orthodox Christianity would enable them to break from their political, cultural and psychological dependence on their Genghizid suzerains, on the one hand, and to legitimize their claims to Russia's imperial mission as the religious successor to the Byzantine empire, on the other. The Rus Tsars Ivan III and Ivan IV played a crucial role in the realization of this ambition.

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They introduced a Byzantine element into Russian politics and court etiquette and enhanced the fusion between the state and the church. The institutionalization of Christian Orthodoxy was accompanied by official anti-Islamic politics. Ever since, the church has been subordinated to the authority of the state, embodied in the autocratic ruler. The church sacralized Russia's political centralization, which occurred on the basis of the personal loyalty of landowners to the tsar and under the banner of Orthodox Christianity. This relationship presented a contrast to the state and church dichotomy which was characteristic of contemporary Western Europe. On the other hand, it strongly resembled the situation which prevailed in the Islamic world at that time where there was no clear division between the secular and spiritual authorities. Until the end of the seventeenth century, Moscow's domestic and external politics were primarily determined by the balance of power in Eurasia and the East in general, although in the post-Genghizid period the Russian state had increased its political and military involvement with northern and western Europe. Despite Rus's official Christianization and selective Byzantinization, the political, economic and behavioural patterns of its ruling class for many centuries afterwards were shaped by the Islamicized Genghizid legacy. The Russian ruling class co-opted a large number of the representatives of the Genghizid nobility. The rulers of Russia, which was the largest and militarily the strongest offspring of the Golden Horde, claimed their rights as the `gatherers' of the Eurasian territories of the Genghizid empire. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Russian state incorporated most of the former Golden Horde, with the exception of the Crimea. As a result, Russia turned into a polyconfessional country with large Muslim-populated enclaves in the VolgaUrals and Siberia. Significantly, Moscow's official policies of suppression of Islam and coercive Christianization of Russia's new Muslim subjects did not seriously interfere with the traditional grassroots interaction between ordinary Russians and Muslims. In fact, it enhanced the cross-ethnic and cross-religious coherence of Russian society in its relation to the alien and coercive state. It was not surprising, therefore, that on many occasions, such as, for example, the Pugachev revolt, Russian and Muslim peasants banded together against the equally oppressive centre. The advent of Tsar Peter the Great in the late seventeenth century marked a new era in Russia's political and economic development and its relations with the outside world. He forced Russia into its first modernization phase in order to break her allegedly `Asian' backwardness and to bring her into the club of major European powers. A central element of Peter's reform was social and cultural Westernization associated with Christian-

Conclusion 197

ity. At this time, the Russian Orthodox Church acquired its supreme political organ, the Synod, which became the major guardian and promoter of the state's religious and national policies and was the key orchestrator of regular nationwide anti-Islamic campaigns. The aggregate result of Peter's reforms was Russia's enormous technological and military acceleration and further alienation between the state, the ruling elite and some urban strata, on the one hand, and the people (narod), Russians and non-Russians, on the other. While the former embraced Western values and lifestyle, the latter continued to adhere to traditional Genghizid norms and patterns. This societal split was accompanied by the strengthening of the autocratic and coercive functions of the state and the curtailing of any form of local autonomy and individual freedom. Thus, in terms of civic development, Peter's reforms actually widened the gap between Russia and contemporary Western Europe, where the absolute monarchies were increasingly opposed by parliaments, independent judges, urban and provincial councils and various factions of the bourgeoisie and even nobility.3 At the same time the aims, and economic and social implications, of Peter's reforms had much in common with the modernization project of Muhammad Ali in Egypt in the early nineteenth century and the tanzimat reforms in Ottoman Turkey in the 1830s and 1870s. Catherine the Great made yet another major step towards Russia's superficial modernization and Europeanization. Her policy of `enlightened despotism' introduced Western institutions into the Russian political system, though it did not affect the traditional economic and social mechanisms of Russian society. She also left intact the anachronistic serfdom system which formed the economic basis of the Russian state. Of special importance was Catherine's religious liberalism, which marked a shift in the official Russian stance on Islam from a policy aimed at its eradication to one of its management. She legalized Islam and limited the interference of the Russian Orthodox church into the life of the umma. In order to control Islam she invented the institution of the Muftiyat and permitted the existence of mosques and Islamic schools. Catherine's policy had an invigorating impact on Russia's Muslims: it triggered an Islamic renaissance and encouraged the economic and cultural activity of Muslim Tatars and Bashkirs. On the other hand, Catherine presided over the continuous territorial expansion of the Russian state towards the Muslim-populated Crimea and the North Caucasus. The Russian conquest of the latter went on for almost a century and was formally accomplished in the 1870s when the Russian state acquired, together with the Volga-Urals, yet another large Islamic enclave. In the North Caucasus the resistance to the Russian invasion took the form of a gazawat under

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the leadership of Sufi shaykhs. Still, in spite of the undoubtedly religious colouring of the Caucasian war, the character and goals of the latter transcended the framework of a jihad. For example, the leaders of the gazawat also fought against the adat norms, which secured the power of local feudal rulers, and its substitution by the shariat. Apart from that, the actual relations between the Russians and Caucasians during that war were more complicated than is often acknowledged. Thus, alongside the obvious animosity between Russian soldiers and Cossacks, on the one hand, and the gazis, on the other, there were also cases of their collaboration, changing sides and mutual assistance. Similar ambiguity characterized the relations between Russians and Cossacks and the Muslims of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, which presented the last and largest Islamic acquisition of the Russian tsars. Alexander II's `Great Reforms' in the 1860s presented the next phase of Russia's modernization `from above.' It stimulated Russia's belated capitalist development and stirred the national and religious consciousness of her multi-ethnic subjects. In order to contain such non-Russian nationalisms the Tsarist authorities and Tsar Alexander III, in particular, decided to mould a Russian nation, the key characteristics of which were Russianness, Orthodox Christianity and the monarchy. Official Russification paradoxically enhanced the national development of various nonRussian peoples of the Russian empire. The 1905 bourgeois-democratic revolution provided another catalyst to national and religious revival among Russia's Muslims. In particular, it brought about the Islamic publishing boom and boosted the political and cultural activity of the educated Muslim minority. The latter generated ideas of jadidism as a viable form of accommodating Islamic values with the technological challenges of modernity. Significantly until the beginning of the twentieth century, most representatives of Russia's Muslim elite did not raise the issue of the political independence of their people from Russia and favoured the effective cultural, linguistic and religious self-realization of various Muslim peoples within the poly-ethnic and multi-cultural democratic Russian state. Until the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the process of national awakening in Russia was partial and confined to the elite, while the vast majority of the population, both Russians and nonRussians, remained indifferent to it. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917, despite being the antithesis of the previous political and societal norms, presented yet another step towards Russia's modernization `from above'. Compared to previous modernizations, it had a more profound impact on Russia's society. It could be argued that the Bolsheviks' lasting success in Russia, compared to contemporary

Conclusion 199

Hungary and Germany, for example, was determined by their ability to mobilize the support of grassroots society, which had hitherto been disengaged from the state and its rulers. The Bolsheviks' appeal to Russia's poor and disadvantaged majority, irrespective of their ethnic and religious affiliation, found a positive response among the bulk of the population and secured the survival of the regime in conditions of international intervention and subsequent isolation. The Bolshevik theory of Muslim Communism, which emphasized the affinity between the umma and Communism in some of their fundamental principles related to social justice, communalism, the priority of the group over individual interests, concern for the poor and the denunciation of slavery, played an important role in the advance of Bolshevism in the Muslim regions of the former Russian empire. This could explain, for example, why the kolkhoz system fitted well into the traditional social networks of rural Muslim communities and why the Muslim regions hung onto the Soviet and Communist party structures longer than other parts of the former USSR. After the collapse of Communism and the break-up of the USSR, the exCommunist Russian leaders made yet another attempt to reinforce Russia's European identity. In the early 1990s, the Yeltsin government declared Russia a bourgeois democracy and subscribed to the politics and values of the West. The corollary of such an approach was Moscow's indifference towards its Muslim periphery and the decline in Russia's engagement with foreign Islamic countries. The Islamic North Caucasus was regarded as an embarrassing cultural atavism and an unacceptable economic burden for the market-oriented Russian economy. The Yeltsin leadership encouraged the sovereignization of its Muslim subjects and did not mind their increasing involvement with foreign Islamic powers. Nevertheless, most leaders of Russia's Muslim autonomies, with the exception of those of Chechnya and Tatarstan, were frustrated by the Centre's withdrawal, which caused a massive reduction in investments and resources. For the bulk of the population Moscow's position meant overnight impoverishment, social displacement and the rise of crime and general insecurity. In these circumstances, the local elites, whose authority had previously been secured by Moscow, turned to nationalism, or Islamo-nationalism, in order to legitimize their claims to power. As a result, there emerged ethnocratic regimes which comprised former Soviet apparatchiks and a semi-class of nouveaux riches, both masquerading under a democratic camouflage. Cohesion was secured by primordial social networks which replaced Party-based subordination. A characteristic feature of the nation-building process in Russia's Muslim autonomies was the emergence of a distinct national ideology,

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which in one way or the other appealed to Islam. In Dagestan, Islam became an important factor of internal politics, while in Tatarstan and some other Muslim autonomies it played a predominantly symbolic function as an intrinsic attribute of national identity and culture. In Chechnya and Ingushetia, Islamic norms were introduced into political and public life. The combination of Moscow's political failure and the evolution of Chechen nationalism generated Russian±Chechen conflict, which resulted in Chechnya's secession from Russia and the politicization of Islam in Chechnya and the North Caucasus in general. The Russian±Chechen war which began in 1994 in order to restore Moscow's effective control over Chechnya has inflicted terrible damage to Russian federalism and Russian±Muslim relations. In particular, it has undermined the historically favourable basis for the viable and productive coexistence of Russians and Muslims within Russia. Another consequence of Moscow's political and economic withdrawal from its Muslim periphery was the increasing influence there of neighbouring Islamic countries, Turkey and Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The leaders and unofficial representatives of these countries conducted their contacts with Russia's Muslims under the banner of religious or ethnic solidarity with them. Foreign, especially Turkish, businesses were established in most of Russia's Muslim autonomies. Goods from various Muslim countries dominated the local markets. A network of Turkish colleges was created all over Muslim Russia. The language of instruction, the teachers and the curriculum of these colleges were Turkish. The Muslim republics were also subjected to the activities of foreign missionaries and representatives of numerous Islamic institutions. These financed and took charge of Islamic education in the new Islamic colleges and universities, supplying Islamic literature published in their own countries. Moreover, the Chechen war attracted hundreds of foreign mujahedin. From the mid-1990s, the euphoria about Russia's possible and quick transformation into a Westernized, and prosperous democracy began to fade. Liberal economic and political reforms stalled. Instead, Russia witnessed the emergence of a form of nomenklatura capitalism of a non-productive, comprador character. The new Russian political establishment comprised ex-Party and Soviet nomenklatura who merged with the nouveau riche of dubious social and economic background. Real democracy was suspended. Political pluralism became a charade. Democratic elections turned into a political farce with the ruling elite securing its position through Soviet-era methods. Freedom of the press, which was regarded as one of the greatest achievements of perestroika, was curtailed.

Conclusion 201

For the bulk of the Russian population `bourgeois reforms' brought about drastic falls in living standards, moral frustration and cultural and intellectual degradation. The continuing Chechen crisis has become a permanent feature of post-Soviet Russia. Also, Russia's Muslims, like the bulk of Russia's population, suffered badly from the sovereignization of their republican elites. In addition to the all-Russian economic and social crisis, they were faced with specific ethno-territorial problems, the upsurge of ethnic nationalism and the proliferation of non-traditional, fundamentalist forms of Islam. The local elites, who have been preoccupied with their own political and economic interests, failed to improve the material and social situation in the republics and to safeguard its population from growing pauperization, the rise of crime and political and religious extremism. The `nationalization', albeit indirect, of the Muslim republics has affected their Russian and other non-Muslim populations who have been pushed out of the top jobs in the economic, political and cultural spheres. This has had negative consequences for the economic, social and interethnic stability of the republics, given the central role of Russians and other non-Muslims in the industrial, educational and cultural spheres. It is worth noting that a decade of post-Communist experience for Russia's Muslims has revealed the illusory hopes of pan-Islamic or panTurkic solidarity and the prevalence of common Soviet identity over it. Though there were high expectations, the level of foreign Muslim investment in the economies of Russia's Muslim autonomies has been minimal. Furthermore, the realization of the economic, social and educational programmes offered as aid by Turkey and other Muslim states has been hampered by their incompatibility with the local infrastructure, ethics, language and cultural specifics. Education, provided by Turkish and other foreign Muslim colleges and institutes, did not correspond to the requirements of the local societies. The promotion of foreign Islams, represented by Wahhabism, Salafiyya, Ahmadiyya, Tablighiyya and Behaiyya, as well as by Islams of non-traditional madhhabs and Sufi tariqas, aggravated the situation within local Muslim communities, splitting them along doctrinal lines. In Dagestan and Chechnya, the conflict between Islamic traditionalists and Wahhabis escalated into military confrontation. The alliance between Chechen radical nationalists and Wahhabis, who were involved in the invasion of Dagestan in 1999, the kidnapping, hostagetaking and terrorist activities, turned Muslim public opinion in Russia against Wahhabism and other foreign forms of Islam. So far, the lengthy traditions of productive co-habitation between Russians and Muslims have largely withstood the challenges of post-Soviet

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disorder and external influences. Once again, the attempt by the Russian establishment to undermine Islam as a part of its modernization drive, has been offset by the inertia of grassroots society which treats Islam as its integral component. It seems that in spite of the gloomy predictions, post-Communist Russia has not become an arena for the clash of Christian and Islamic civilizations. To the contrary, the ten dramatic years of Russia's transition and the Chechen war, in particular, have shown that the violation of the historical coexistence of Russians and Muslims is damaging for both sides. However, the favourable historical and cultural conditions for the formation of new and civilized relations between Russians and Muslims have been fast disappearing as a result of Moscow's official policies. The Russian leadership has yet to generate a coherent national and religious policy, which could provide a framework for the democratic and stable development of Russia as a multi-ethnic and polyconfessional state. Such a policy has to serve the long-term objective of Russia's gradual transformation into a modern civic nation; but, at the same time, it has to deal with the existing ethno-political and confessional realities.

Notes

Preface 1 Here, I use the terms `Russia' and `Islam' in their wider meanings as signifiers of distinctive ecological and socio-cultural systems. 2 Among works which deal with some aspects of Russian±Islamic relations are: S. Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union (London: Kegan Paul, 1983); A. Bennigsen, Muslims of the Soviet Empire: a Guide (London: Hurst, 1986); A. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998); Y. Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union. From World War II to Perestroika (London: Hurst & Company, 2000); S. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); B.S. Erasov, Rossiiskaia Imperia, Pravoslavie i Islam: Urovni i Uslovia Vzaimodeistvia (Moscow: Nauka, 1992); R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1995); A.V. Malashenko, Musul'manskii Mir SNG (Moscow, 1996); A.V. Malashenko, Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie v Sovremennoi Rossii (Moscow: Carnegie Centre, 1998); K. Sahni, Crucifying the Orient: Russian Orientalism and the Colonization of Caucasus and Central Asia (Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1997); R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia: the Four Seasons (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000). 3 Here and afterwards the term `the West' refers to the countries of Western Europe and North America, the societies of which function on the principles of bourgeois liberal democracy and the market economy, historically generated in Europe. Therefore, it does not include Japan and newly industrialized states of South-Eastern Asia which, although they share with Western Europe and North America similarly high technological and living standards, arguably belong to different political and cultural traditions. 4 The literature on the relationship between Islam and the West is too extensive to list fully here. Here are some of the more fundamental and important books on the subject: P.K. Hitti, Islam and the West: a Historical Cultural Survey (London: Van Nostrand, 1962); N. Daniel, The Arabs and Medieval Europe (London: Longman, 1975); E.W. Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); A. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights (London: Westview Press, 1991); A. Hourani, Islam in European Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); B. Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford: OUP, 1993); F. Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996); G.M. Munoz (ed.), Islam, Modernism and the West: Cultural and Political Relations at the End of the Millennium (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999). 5 Here the term `proto-Russians' is applied to various Eastern Slavic tribes which in the eleventh±thirteenth centuries made up the core of the Russian ethnicity, which subsequently evolved into the Russian nation. V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 1 (Moscow: GIPA, 1956), p. 143. 6 The Eurasian movement was formed at the beginning of the twentieth century. Among its noted representatives were Alexeev, Berdyaev, Fedotov, Florovskii, 203

204 Notes

7 8 9 10 11

Il'in, Karsavin, Lossky, Savitskii, Shakhmatov, Trubetskoi, Vernadskii and Zenkovskii. See more: N. Trubetskoi, K Probleme Russkogo Samosoznania (Berlin, 1927), p. 47; N.S. Trubetskoi, `Obshcheevraziiskii Natsionalism', Evraziiskaia Khronika, no. IX (Paris, 1927); L.N. Gumilev, Drevniaia Rus i Velikaia Step (Moscow, 1989), pp. 11±25; Puti Evrazii. Russkaia Intelligentsia i Sud'bi Rossii (Moscow, 1992); Rossia i Vostok: Problemi Vzaimodeistvia (Moscow: IBRAN, 1993); G. Vernadskii, Russkaia Istoria (Moscow, 1997), pp. 22, 87; R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 16. P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: New Left Review Editions, 1974), p. 213. Y. Kabishanov, Afrika. Kul'turnoe Nasledie i Sovremennost' (Moscow, 1985); I. Yakovenko, `Tsivilizatsia i Varvarstvo v Istorii Rossii', Obshchestvennie Nauki i Sovremennost', no. 4 (Moscow, 1995), 67±77. F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992). S.P. Huntington, `The Clash of Civilisation?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (1993), 22±50 and no. 4 (1993), 2±25. G. Vernadskii, Russkaia Istoria (Moscow, 1997); R. Urkhanova, `Evraziitsi i Vostok: Pragmatika Lubvi?', Acta Eurasica, no. 1 (Moscow, 1995), 12±31. E.W. Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); J. Fishman, `Social Theory and Ethnography: Language, Ethnicity in Eastern Europe', F. Sugar (ed.), Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe (Santa-Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1980); C. Geertz, `The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1973); M. Nash, The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983); E. Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992).

1 Russia's Encounter with Islam (622±1480) 1 V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 1 (Moscow: GIPA, 1956), pp. 65, 119, 143. 2 The Russian Eurasianists N. Trubetskoi and N. Berdyaev identified various eastern neighbours of proto-Russians as Turans and divided them into five groups: Finno-Ugric people (Ests, Karels, Finns, Lopars, Mordva, Cheremis, Permian Finns, Ugors, Meria, Muroma and Meshera); Samoeds; Turkic people composed of Turks, Tatars, Mesheriaks, Teptiars, Balkars, Kumyks, Bashkirs, Kyrgyz-Kaisaks, Kara-Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Sarts, Uzbeks, Altays, Yakuts, Chuvash, Khazars, Bulgars, Kipchaks, Uyghurs; Mongols and Manjurs. N. Trubetskoi, `O Turanskom Elemente v Russkoi Kulture', Panorama-Forum, no. 1 (Kazan, 1997), 9, 25. 3 N. Trubetskoi, K Probleme Russkogo Samosoznania (Berlin, 1927), p. 47; G. Vernadskii, Russkaia Istoria (Moscow, 1997), pp. 22, 87; R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 16. 4 Drevnerusskoe Gosudarstvo i ego Mezhdunarodnoe Znachenie (Moscow, 1965), pp. 384±5; Puteshestvie Ibn Fadlana na Volgu (Moscow, 1939), pp. 78±84.

5 B. Peter, Golden Khazar Studies (Budapest, 1980), pp. 62±4.

Notes 205 6 M.I. Artamonov, Istoria Khazar (Leningrad, 1962), p. 174; D.M. Dunlop, History of the Jewish Khazars (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), pp. 46, 241; R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 31; Istoria Dagestana, vol. 1 (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), p. 173; V.F. Minorskii, Istoria Shirvana i Derbenda (Moscow, 1963), pp. 27±41. 7 V.V. Trepalov, `Vostochnie elementi Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennosti', Rossia i Vostok. Problemi Vzaimodeistvia, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1993), p. 42; M.Z. Zakiev, Tatari. Problemi Istorii i Yazika (Kazan: ANRT, 1995), pp. 33, 58±67; Istoria Tatarskoi ASSR (Kazan: Tatknigizdat, 1973), p. 19; A. Rorlich, The Volga Tatars (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 4, 10, 33, 100; A.A. Rorlich, `Islam under Communist Rule: Volga±Ural Muslims', Central Asian Survey, vol. 1, no. 1 (July 1982), 6. 8 M.Z. Zakiev, Tatari. Problemi Istorii i Yazika . . . , p. 101; D.M. Dunlop, History of the Jewish Khazars . . . , pp. 198, 232. 9 A.P. Novosel'tsev, `Kievskaia Rus i Strani Vostoka', Voprosi Istorii, no. 5 (Moscow, 1983), 18. 10 The etymology of the name `Rus' is still not entirely clear. Some scholars consider that `Rus' was the original name of one of the Eastern Slavic tribes who lived along the banks of the river `Rus' in the vicinity of Kiev long before the arrival of the Varangians. Some other researchers argue that `Rus' was a self-name of the Varangian military and civil aristocracy. See more: V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 1 . . . , pp. 143, 152; M.N. Tikhomirov, `Proiskhozhdenie Nazvania ``Rus'' i ``Russkaia Zemlia'' ', Sovetskaia Ethnographia, vols. 6±7 (Moscow, 1947), p. 62. 11 Yanus Foote, Russian and Soviet Empire (England, 1972), pp. 1±5; P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: New Left Review Editions, 1974), p. 158; V.O. Kluchevskii, O Russkoi Istorii (Moscow, 1993), p. 80. 12 V.V. Trepalov, `Vostochnie Elementi' . . . , p. 43; M.I. Artamonov, Istoria Khazar (Leningrad, 1962), p. 365; N.S. Trubetskoi, `O Turanskom Elemente v Russkoi Kul'ture', Rossia mezhdu Evropoi i Aziei: Evraziiskii Soblazn (Moscow, 1993), p. 59. 13 V.V. Trepalov, `Vostochnie Elementi' . . . , p. 43; M.I. Artamonov, Istoria Khazar . . . , p. 365; N.S. Trubetskoi, `O Turanskom Elemente v Russkoi Kul'ture' . . . , p. 59; P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity . . . , p. 150. 14 M. Zakiev, Tatari. Problemi Istorii i Yazika . . . , p. 101; Istoria Tatarskoi ASSR . . . , p. 19; Tatari Srednego Povolzhia i Priuralia (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), pp. 327, 373; R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , pp. 26±34, 40; R. Mukhametshin, The Islamic Factor in Russian Society and Culture, an unpublished manuscript. 15 V.V. Bartol'd, Sochinenia, vol. 2, part 1 (Moscow: IVL, 1963), pp. 811, 852.

16 Y. Nikitin, Yarost' (Moscow: TsentrPoligraph, 2000).

17 D.M. Dunlop, History of the Jewish Khazars . . . , pp. 250±7.

18 V.O. Kluchevskii, O Russkoi Istorii . . . , pp. 56±7; Yunus Foote, Russian and Soviet

Imperialism . . . , p. 5; P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism . . . , p. 236; K. Gadzhiev, `Razmyshlenia o Politicheskom Kharaktere Sovremennoi Rossii', MEiMO, no. 2 (Moscow, 1996), 27. 19 A.M. Sakharov, Obrazovanie i Razvitie Rossiiskogo Gosudarstva v 14±17 vv. (Moscow: Visshaia Shkola, 1968), p. 26.

206 Notes 20 Kazanskaia Istoria (Moscow±Leningrad, 1954), pp. 89, 91; Tatari Srednego Povolzhia . . . , pp. 58, 336±69; N. Trubetskoi, `O Turanskom Elemente v Russkoi Kul'ture', Panorama-Forum, no. 1 (Kazan, 1997), 22. 21 Tatari Srednego Povolzhia i Priuralia (Moscow: Nauka), pp. 217±18; Kazanskaia Istoria . . . , pp. 89, 91. 22 V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 1 (Moscow: GIPA, 1956), p. 136; R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 86. 23 R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 90. 24 I.B. Muslimov (ed.), Na Styke Kontinentov i Tsivilizatsii (Moscow: Insan, 1996), p. 708; A. Rorlich, The Volga Tatars . . . , pp. 12±14; Istoria Tatarskoi ASSR . . . , p. 19; R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 111. 25 Povesti Vremennikh Let (Arzamas, 1993), pp. 119±20; R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 90. 26 P.P. Tolochko, Drevnia Rus (Kiev, 1987), pp. 164±5. 27 V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 1 . . . , p. 9. 28 P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism . . . , p. 231; V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 1 . . . , pp. 166±8, 217. 29 S. Smith, Allah's Mountains. Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), pp. 32±6. 30 M. Abdushelishvili, Narodi Kavkaza (Moscow: RAN, 1994), p. 97. 31 A.R. Shikhsaidov, T.M. Aitberov and G.M. Orazaev, Dagestanskie Istoricheskie Sochinenia (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), p. 42. 32 Istoria Dagestana . . . , p. 174; D.M. Dunlop, History of the Jewish Khazars . . . , p. 238; A.P. Novoseltsev, `Kievskaia Rus . . .', p. 24. 33 V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 1 (Moscow: GIPA, 1956), p. 136. 34 Tatari Srednego Povolzhia i Priuralia . . . , p. 180, 374; Istoria Tatarskoi ASSR . . . , p. 27. 35 R. Fahretdin, Khani Zolotoi Ordi (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1996), p. 68; A.K. Khalikov, Mongoli, Tatari, Zolotaia Orda i Bolgaria (Kazan: FEN, 1994), pp. 8±15. 36 R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii. . . . , p. 50; L.N. Gumiliev, Ot Rusi k Rossii. . . . , pp. 131±2. 37 Specialists differ on the issue of the ethnic origins of the Cossacks. Some stress their Slavic roots, some their Turkic, or even Scythian, Sarmatian or Khazar roots. 38 S. Smith, Allah's Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), p. 37. 39 Puteshestvie v Vostochnie Strani Plano Karpini Rubruka (Moscow, 1957), pp. 79±80; M.D. Poluboiarinova, Russkie Liudi v Zolotoi Orde (Moscow, 1978), pp. 28±34. 40 R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , pp. 148±54. 41 R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 142; G.M. Yemelianova, `The National Identity of the Volga Tatars at the Turn of the 19th Century: Tatarism, Turkism and Islam', Central Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 4 (December, 1997), 554. 42 C.D. Galperin, `Rus v Sostave Mongol'skoi Imperii', Tatarstan, vol. 7/8 (Kazan, 1995), 113. 43 R. Fahretdin, Khani Zolotoi Ordi . . . , pp. 74, 94; M.A. Usmanov, `Etapy Islamizatsii Dzhuchieva Ulusa i Musul'manskoe Dukhovenstvo v Tatarskikh Khanstvakh XIII±XVI vekov', Dukhovenstvo i Politicheskaya Zhizn' na Blizhnem

Notes 207

44 45 46 47 48

49 50

51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58

i Srednem Vostoke v Period Feodalizma (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 1985), p. 177; Istoria Dagestana . . . , p. 197; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii. . . . , pp. 52±3; S.M. Soloviev, Sochinenia, Kniga 2 (Moscow: Mysl, 1988), p. 145; R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 153. V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 2 . . . , p. 47; L.N. Gumiliev, Ot Rusi k Rossii. Ocherki Etnicheskoi Istorii (Moscow, 1992), pp. 137±8. V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 2 . . . , p. 47; L.N. Gumiliev, Ot Rusi k Rossii. Ocherki Etnicheskoi Istorii (Moscow, 1992), pp. 131±2; 137±8; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii. . . . , p. 50; R. Fahretdin, Khani Zolotoi Ordi . . . , pp. 91±2, 115±18. V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 2 . . . , pp. 54, 115; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 60. R. Fahretdin, Khani Zolotoi Ordi . . . , p. 100; R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , pp. 159±60, 170, 177. S.K. Alishev, Kazan i Moskva: Mezhgosudarstvennie Otnoshenia v XV±XVIvv. (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1995), pp. 17, 23; V. Bazhanov, Kazanskaia Istoria (Kazan, 1847), pp. 27±8; V.V. Veliaminov-Zernov, Issledovania o Kasimovskkh Tatariakh i Tsarevichakh (S.-Petersburg, 1863), p. 27. M. Khudiakov, Ocherki po Istorii Kazanskogo Khanstva (Kazan, 1990), pp. 195±6. M.N. Tikhomirov, Rossia v 17 Stoletii (Moscow, 1962), pp. 42±6; V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 2 . . . , p. 47; L.N. Gumiliev, Ot Rusi k Rossii. Ocherki Etnicheskoi Istorii (Moscow, 1992), pp. 137±8; R. Fahretdin, Khani Zolotoi Ordi . . . , pp. 91±2, 115±18. R. Khakim, `Rossia i Tatarstan' . . . , p. 41; R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 205. R. Khakim, `Rossia i Tatarstan' . . . , p. 41; S.M. Soloviev, Sochinenia, vol. 3 (Moscow: Mysl', 1989), p. 460; N.M. Karamzin, Istoria Gosudarstva Rossiiskogo, vols. 5±8 (Kaluga, 1993), p. 488. V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 2 . . . , p. 122; Yanus Foote, Russian and Soviet Imperialism . . . , p. 20; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 66. On the role of the Genghizid factor in Russian history, see: S.M. Soloviev, Istoria Rossii s Drevneishikh Vremen, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1960), pp. 284±8; M.N. Tikhomirov, Drevnia Rus (Moscow, 1975), p. 383; P. P. Tolochko, Drevnia Rus (Kiev, 1987); V.V. Kargalov, Mongolo-Tatarskoe Nashestvie na Rus (Moscow, 1966); A.M. Sakharov, Obrazovanie i Razvitie Rossiiskogo Gosudarstva v 14 ±17 vv. (Moscow: Vys'shaia Shkola, 1968); L.N. Gumilev, Ot Rusi k Rossii . . . , pp. 134±5; V.V. Bartol'd, Islam i Kul'tura Musul'manstva (Moscow, 1992), pp. 92±3; R. Khakim, `Rossia i Tatarstan: `U Istoricheskogo Perekrestka', PanoramaForum, no. 1 (Kazan, 1997), 34±63. I.B. Muslimov, Na Styke Kontinentov i Tsivilizatsiy . . . , p. 709. N. Eidelman, `Revolution from above', Political History of Russia, vol. 15, no. 1 (NOVA Science Publishers, 1995), p. 20; V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 2 . . . , pp. 54, 115; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 60. P. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism . . . , p. 206; Trian Stoianovich, `The Segmentary State and La Grande Nation', Geographic Perspectives in History (Blackwell, 1989), p. 280. V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 2 . . . , pp. 204±5; R. Fahretdin, Khani Zolotoi Ordi . . . , p. 126; I.B. Muslimov, Na Styke Kontinentov i Tsivilizatsii . . . , p. 712;

208 Notes Yanus Foote, Russian and Soviet Imperialism . . . , p. 9; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 47, 58, 61. 59 G. Vernadsky, `Chto Dali Rossii Mongoli?', Rodina, no. 3±4 (Moscow, 1997), 98; I. Konovalova, `Stepnoi Biznes', Rodina, nos 3±4 (Moscow, 1997), 36±7. 60 Here are just some of such words: ataman (chief ), cossack, bogatyr (a great man), esaul (an officer) kabala (enslavement), kandaly (leg chains) kinzhal (dagger), kobura (holster), nagaika (whip); altyn (golden coin), ambar (barn), arshin (a measuring stick), bazar (market), bakaleia (groceries), balagan (booth), barysh (profit), denga (money), karavan (caravan), maidan (place); arkan (lasso), bulanii (Isabel, dun), otara (flock); tamga (stamp), kazna (treasury), tamozhniya (customs), karaul (guard), yarlyk (label), yamshchik (coachman); kalancha (tower) and kabak (pub). See, I.B. Muslimov, Na Styke Kontinentov i Tsivilizatsii . . . , pp. 712±13.

2 Russia and its Muslim Neighbours: 1480±1881 1 S.K. Alishev, Kazan i Moskva: Mezhgosudarstvennie Otnoshenia v XV±XVI vv. (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1995), pp. 33±5. 2 V.V. Trepalov, `Status ``Belovogo Tsaria'' . . .', pp. 306±8; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 65. 3 V.O. Kluchevskii, Sochinenia, vol. 2 . . . , p. 209; S.K. Alishev, Kazan i Moskva: Mezhgosudarstvennie Otnoshenia v XV±XVIvv. (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1995), p. 8. 4 V.V. Kargalov, Na Stepnoi Granitse (Moscow, 1974), p. 149; Kazanskaia Istoria . . . , pp. 95±8. 5 The Russian State Archive of State Acts (RGADA), fund 127, inv. 3, fol. 137; N. M. Karamzin, Istoria Gosudarstva Rossiiskogo . . . , p. 288; S.Kh. Alishev, Kazan i Moskva: Mezhgosudarstvennie Otnoshenia v XV±XVIvv. (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1995), pp. 33±5; 118; 127. 6 The Russian State Archive of State Acts (RGADA), fund 127, inv. 3, fol. 137; N. M. Karamzin, Istoria Gosudarstva Rossiiskogo . . . , p. 288; S.Kh. Alishev, Kazan i Moskva . . . , pp. 33±5; 118; 127. 7 A. Kappeler, Rossia±Mnogonatsional'naia Imperia: Vozniknovenie, Istoria, Raspad (Moscow: Progress, 1997), p. 26. 8 S.Kh. Alishev, Kazan i Moskva . . . , pp. 155±6; R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 206. 9 R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 18. 10 A. Kappeler, Rossia±Mnogonatsional'naia Imperia . . . , p. 32. 11 Ibid., pp. 32±3. 12 A. Kh. Khalikov, 500 Russkikh Familii Bulgaro-Tatarskogo Proiskhozhdenia (Kazan: Izdatel'stvo `Kazan', 1992), pp. 172, 187. 13 R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , p. 206. 14 D. Lieven, Russia's Rulers under the Old Regime (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 8±9. 15 R. Bukharaev, Islam in Russia . . . , pp. 218±19. 16 S.M. Soloviev, Istoria Rossii s Drevneishikh Vremen, book 3 (Moscow, 1960), p. 605.

Notes 209 17 A.J. Motyl, Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities (New York: CUP, 1992), p. 12. 18 Ibid., pp. 208±9. 19 A. Kappeler, Rossia±Mnogonatsional'naia Imperia . . . , p. 26. 20 G. Gubaidullin, Tarikhi Sahifalar Achylganda (Kazan, 1989), pp. 199±200; A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), p. 6. 21 A. Kappeler, Rossia±Mnogonatsional'naia Imperia . . . , p. 26. S.A. Dudoignon, `Djadidism, Mirasism, Islamism', Cahiers du Monde Russe, XXXVII, 1±2 (1996) 17; Tatari Srednego Povolzhia . . . , p. 17. 22 A. Kappeler, Rossia±Mnogonatsional'naia Imperia . . . , p. 27. 23 Ibid., p. 28. 24 Ibid., p. 28. 25 G. Yemelianova, `Volga Tatars, Russians and the Russian State at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century: Relationships and Perceptions', SEER, vol. 77, no. 3 (London, 1999), 474. 26 A. Kefeli-Clay, `L'Islam populaire chez les Tatars ChreÂtiens Orthodoxes au XIX sieÁcle', Cahiers du Monde Russe, XXXVII (4) octobre±deÂcembre (Paris, 1996), 410. 27 See, for example, M. Rywkin (ed.), Moscow's Muslim Challenge (London: Sharpe, 1990); M. Batunsky, `Russian Missionary Literature on Islam', Zeitschrift fuÈr Religions ± und Geistesgeschichte, 39, Cologne, 3, 1987. 28 I. Kuzeev, Narodi Srednego Povolzhia . . . , pp. 319±20; Ismail-bey Gasprinskii, Russkoe Musul'manstvo (Oxford, 1985), p. 31. 29 Istoria Tatarii v Materialakh i Dokumentakh (Moscow, 1937), p. 342; G. Yemelianova, `The Volga Tatars. . . .', 555. 30 R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 88. 31 R. Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 394. 32 N. Eidelman, ` ``Revolution from above'' in Russia', Political History of Russia, vol. 5, no. 1 (NOVA Science Publishers, 1995), p. 25. 33 R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 113; N. Eidelman, ` ``Revolution from above'' . . .', p. 26. 34 G. Burbiel, The Tatars and the Tatar ASSR, Handbook of the Major Soviet Nationalities (London: The Free Press, 1975), p. 391; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 125. 35 M.B. Olcott, The Kazakhs (Hoover Institution, 1987), p. 47. 36 N. Ashmarin, Ocherki Literaturnoi Deyatel'nosti Tatar-Muhammedan za 1880±95 (Moscow: Lazarevskii Institut Vostochnikh Yazykov, 1901), pp. 55±8. 37 R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 100±1. 38 Dagestan v Izvestiakh Russkikh i Zapadno-Evropeiskikh Avtorov XIII±XVIII vv. (Makhachkala, 1992), pp. 64±6, 69±74, 79±85; S. Smith, Allah's Mountains . . . , p. 39. 39 S. Dontsov, `Kazachestvo ± God 1997-i', Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 19 March 1997 (Moscow), 5 40 R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 78±9. 41 A. Bennigsen and M. Broxup, The Islamic Threat . . . , p. 134. 42 A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire . . . , p. 159. 43 The Mujaddidi branch of the Naqshbandiyya derives from Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi al-Mujaddid (died in 1624).

210 Notes 44 V.G. Sadur, Musul'mane v SSSR. Istoria i Sovremennost'. Na Puti k Svobode Sovesti (Moscow, 1983), pp. 420±45; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 115, 118. 45 A. Zelkina, In Quest of God and Freedom (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), p. 66. 46 R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 109. 47 A.G. Agaev, Magomed Yaragskii (Makhachkala: DGU, 1996), p. 99; A. Zelkina, In Quest of God . . . , pp. 160±203. 48 R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 99, 112, 116. 49 Istoria Dagestana (Moscow, 1967), pp. 344, 355; Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 18 November (Moscow, 1995), 5. 50 M.N. Chichagova, Shamyl na Kavkaze i v Rossii (St Petersburg: Muller & Bogel'man, 1889), pp. 202±5. 51 G.A. Daniialov, Imam Shamyl, vol. 3 (Makhachkala: Yupiter, 1996), p. 67. 52 See more on Kunta-Haji ± V. Akaev, Shaykh Kunta-Haji: Zhizn i Uchenie (Grozny, 1994). 53 Interview with Shamyl Beno, a Naqshbandii, a Moscow representative of the Government of Chechnya, 24 April (Moscow, 2000). 54 Interview with Shamyl Beno, 24 April 2000, Moscow; Interview with Naqshbandi Shaykh Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii; interview with Naqshbandi Shaykh Tadjuddin Ramazanov, interview with Naqshbandi Shaykh Siradjuddin Tabasaranskii, Dagestan, August, 2000. 55 M.B. Olcott, The Kazakhs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), p. 13. 56 E. Allworth, Central Asia, 130 Years of Russian Dominance . . . , p. 10. 57 R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 112, 119. 58 M.B. Olcott, The Kazakhs . . . , p. 40. 59 M.B. Olcott, The Kazakhs . . . , pp. 101±4. 60 E. Allworth, Central Asia, 130 Years of Russian Dominance . . . , p. 50. 61 M.B. Olcott, The Kazakhs . . . , p. 59. 62 A. Bennigsen and Ch.L. Quelquejai, Islam in the Soviet Union . . . , p. 7. 63 M. Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , p. 11. 64 A. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 19±44. 65 M. Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , p. 10. 66 A. Bennigsen, Ch.L. Quelquejai, Islam in the Soviet Union . . . , pp. 4±5; A. Bennigsen and M. Broxup, The Islamic Threat . . . , p. 134. 67 A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars . . . , p. 14. 68 V. Plosskikh, Istoria Kyrgyzskoi SSR, vol. 1 (Frunze: Kyrgyzstan, 1984), pp. 526±54. 69 E. Allworth, `Encounter', E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia . . . , p. 16. 70 See more on the `Great reforms' by Alexander II, Ch. 3. 71 R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 21. 72 E. Krivets, Islam v Tsentral'noi Azii (Moscow: Lenom, 1999), pp. 80±1. 73 E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia . . . , pp. 143±6. 74 S. Poliakov, Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 139. M. Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , p. 12. 75 H.C. d'Encausse, `Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories', E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia.130 Years. . . . , pp. 151±60.

Notes 211 76 S. Polyakov, Everyday Islam . . . , p. 139; R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 125; R. Lewis (ed.), Geographic Perspectives on Central Asia (Routledge, 1982), p. 27. 77 See more on the consequences of the Russian domination in Central Asia, Ch. 3. 78 Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , p. 12. 79 A. Bennigsen and S.E. Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars . . . , pp. 2±3. 80 Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , p. 13. 81 N. Khalfin, Politika Rossii v Srednei Azii (1857±1968) (Moscow: Nauka, 1969); G. Hidoyatov, Iz Istorii Anglo-Russkikh Otnoshenii v Srednei Azii ( Tashkent, 1969); Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , p. 14; A. Bennigsen and S.E. Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars . . . , p. 3. 82 On the wider implications of the Russian conquest of Khiva see Ch. 3. 83 H.C. d'Encausse, `Organizing and Colonizing the Conquered Territories', E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia. 130 Years. . . . , pp. 163±7. 84 S. Polyakov, Everyday Islam . . . , p. 138. 85 P. Anderson, Passages . . . , pp. 26, 28.

3 Russia's Umma and Modernization at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century 1 M. Nechkina (ed.), Istoria SSSR, vol. 2 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literaturi, 1949), p. 729; G.Burbiel, The Tatars and the Tatar ASSR, Handbook of the Major Soviet Nationalities (London: The Free Press, 1975), p. 391. 2 R. Salikhov, `Predstavitel'stvo Tatar-Musul'man v Vybornikh Organakh Mestnogo Samoupravlenia v Kazani na Rubezhe 19±20-kh Vekov', Islam v Tatarskom Mire: Istoria i Sovremennost (Kazan, 1997), p. 119. 3 A. Ramazanov, Semia Imama Shamilia (Makhachkala: Daguchpedgiz, 1996), p. 20. 4 R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 134. 5 F. Leontovich, Adati Kavkazskikh Gortsev, no 1 (Odessa, 1882). 6 V. Smirnov, `Musul'manskie Pechatnie Izdania v Rossii', Zapiski Vostochnogo Otdelenia Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva, vol. 3 (St Petersburg, 1888), p. 103. 7 T. Tajibaev, Prosveshchenie i Shkoly vo Vtoroi Polovine XIX Veka (Alma-Ata, 1962), p. 17. 8 G. Yemelianova, `Volga Tatars . . .', p. 476. 9 Tatarskaia Prosvetitel'skaia Mysl' . . . , p. 230; Agrarnii Vopros i Krestianskoe Dvizhenie v Tatarii XIX veka (Moscow, 1936), p. 451. 10 S. Rakhimov, `Sotsial'no-Pravovoi Status Tatarskikh Uchebnikh Zavedenii Poslednei Chetverti XVIII±XX vv.', R. Kahkimov (ed.), Islam v Tatarskom Mire: Istoria i Sovremennost (Kazan, 1997), pp. 78±9. 11 A. Rorlich, The Volga Tatars: a Profile in National Resilience (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 45; E. Bacon, Central Asia under Russian Rule . . . , p. 101; Agrarnii Vopros i Krestianskoe Dvizhenie v Tatarii XIX Veka (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1936), p. 462; T. Tajibaev, Prosveshchenie i Shkoly Kazakhstana vo Vtoroi Polovine XIX veka (Alma-Ata, 1962), pp. 22±4. 12 On Islamic education in Central Asia see A. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 20±34.

212 Notes 13 V. Gorokhov, Reaktsionnaia Shkol'naia Politika Tsarizma v Otnoshenii Tatar Povolzhia (Kazan: Tatgosizdat, 1941), pp. 221, 228; S. Bobrovnikoff, `Moslems in Russia', Moslem World, vol. 1 (1911), p. 18. 14 S. Mikhailova, Formirovanie i Razvitie Prosvetitel'stva sredi Tatar Povolzhia (Kazan: Kazan University, 1972), pp. 159±9. 15 Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, Russkoe Musul'manstvo (Oxford: Society for Central Asian Studies, 1985), p. 11. 16 H.C. d'Encausse, `The Stirring of National Feeling', E. Allworth, (ed.), Central Asia . . . , p. 177; A. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform . . . , pp. 157, 165. 17 G. Yemelianova, `Volga Tatars: Relationships and Perceptions . . .', pp. 457±8. 18 G. Yemelianova, `The National Identity of the Volga Tatars . . .', p. 544. 19 T.R. Kamalov, `Zia Kamali o Vere i Provovernosti v Islame', Islamo-Khristianskie Pogranichi'e. Itogi i Perspektivy Izuchenia (Kazan: IYALI, 1994), pp. 46±9. 20 Th. Zarcone, `Philosophie et theÂologie chez les djadids: la question du raisonnement indeÂpendent (ijtihad)', Cahiers du Monde Russe, XXXVII, 1±2, (Paris, 1996), 55±8; Tatari i Tatarstan (Kazan, 1993), p. 15. 21 S. Mikhailova, Formirovanie i Razvitie . . . , p. 31

22 G. Yemelianova, `Volga Tatars: Relationships and Perceptions . . .', pp. 481±2.

23 Musul'manskii Mir, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1917), p. 63.

24 Among them were K. Bal'mont, V. Benediktov, V. Briusov, I. Bunin, P. Chaa dayev, G. Derzhavin, G. Fedotov, A. Fet, S. Glinka, A. Griboyedov, V. Zhukovskii, I. Kozlov, M. Kuz'min, M. Lokhvitskaia, A. Maikov, N. Nekrasov, A. Polezhaev, Y. Polonskii, A. Pushkin, A. Shishkov, V. Soloviev, L. Tolstoi, V. Tumanskii, F. Tiutchev, A. Vel'man and P. Viazemskii. See R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 135±7. 25 R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 135±7. 26 D. Iskhakov, Problemy Stanovlenia i Transformatsii Tatarskoi Natsii (Kazan: Master Line, 1997), pp. 72±4; G. Yemelianova, `The National Identity of the Volga Tatars . . .', p. 550. 27 Ismail Bey Gasprinskii, Russkoe Musul'manstvo . . . , p. 59; Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Bolgar ve Kazan Terekler (Kazan, 1893), pp. 50±1. 28 G. Yemelianova, `The National Identity of the Volga Tatars . . .', pp. 550±1. 29 Ayaz Iskhaki, Idel'-Ural (London: Society for Central Asian Studies, 1988), p. 6; F. Georgeon, `Aux origines du nationalisme turc. Yusuf Akchura (1871± 1935)', SyntheÁse, no. 2 (Paris, 1970), pp. 18, 64±5; Politicheskaia Zhizn Russkikh Musul'man do Fevral'skoi Revolutsii (Oxford: The Society for Central Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 5±8. 30 A. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 104, 110, 117; H.C. d'Encausse, `The Stirring of National Feeling', E. Allworth, (ed.), Central Asia . . . , pp. 175, 196, 202. 31 Interview with Ilyas Kayaev, a grandson of Ali Kayaev, 25 September (Makhachkala, 1999). 32 G. Yemelianova, `The National Identity of the Volga Tatars . . .', p. 546. 33 P. Birukov, `Tolstoi i Vostok', Novyi Vostok, no. 6 (Moscow, 1925), pp. 399±400. 34 G. Yemelianova, `Volga Tatars . . .', pp. 466±7. 35 Agrarnii vopros . . . , p. 193. 36 G. Yemelianova, `The National Identity of the Volga Tatars . . .', p. 556.

Notes 213 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

61

S. Bobrovnikoff, `Muslims in Russia' . . . , p. 13. G. Yemelianova, `The National Identity of the Volga Tatars . . .', p. 557. G. Yemelianova, `The National Identity of the Volga Tatars . . .', p. 558. G. Yemelianova, `Volga Tatars . . .', pp. 460±1. Ibid. M. Bigi, Islahat Esaslari (Petrograd, 1917), p. 177. N. Devlet, Rusya Turklerinin Milli Musadele Tarihi (1905±1917), (Ankara, 1985), pp. 101, 106±8. Gosudarstvennaia Duma, Stenograficheskie Otcheti, 3 sozyv, vol. 1 (St Petersburg, 1910), pp. 1992±3. Musul'manskaia Pechat' v Rossii v 1910 godu (Oxford: Society for Central Asian Studies, 1987); Inorodcheskoe Obozrenie, Prilozhenie k Zhurnalu `Pravoslavnii Sobesednik', no. 12 (Kazan, 1915), pp. 996±1006; R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 146. Inorodcheskoe Obozrenie . . . , no. 2 (Kazan, 1915), p. 71. A. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform . . . , pp. 82±113; E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia . . . , pp. 175, 196, 202; R. Nafigov, Formirovanie i Razvitie Peredovoi Tatarskoi Obshchestvenno-Politicheskoi Mysli (Kazan, 1964), pp. 50±3. R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 206. H. Kirimli, National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars, 1905±1916 (Istanbul, 1996), p. 35. K. Khasanov, Revolutsia 1905±1907 v Tatarii (Moscow, 1965), pp. 313±19; Politicheskaia Zhizn' Russkikh Musul'man do Fevral'skoi Revolutsii (Oxford, 1987), p. 6. R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 168.

G. Yemelianova, `Volga Tatars . . .', p. 472; R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . ,

p. 172. On the revolt in 1916, see Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane. Sbornik Dokumentov (Moscow, 1960); E.D. Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore, 1954). The word basmach derives from the Turkish word basmak which means `to attack'. Originally, it was applied to the Muslim raiders of the Russian positions in Central Asia. E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia . . . , p. 208; R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 178. A. Kappeler, Rossia±Mnogonatsonal'naia Imperia . . . , p. 260. On the reaction of the Central Asian jadids on the February revolution of 1917, see A. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform . . . , pp. 269±80. A. Kappeler, Rossia±Mnogonatsional'naia Imperia . . . , 266. Shafigula Daulet, `The First All-Muslim Congress of Russia', Central Asian Survey, vol. 8, no. 1 (London, 1989), 27±9. See more on the Alash Orda ± M. Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs. . . . , p. 129; G. Kendirbaeva, `The Early Twentieth-century Kazakh Intelligentsia: in Search of National Identity', T. Atabaki and J. O'Kane (eds), Post-Soviet Central Asia (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998), pp. 248±66; R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 179. See more on the Young Bukharans and Young Khivans. S. Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865±1924 (Cambridge, 1968), chs 14±17.

214 Notes 62 See more on the Milli Firka ± A.W. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978). 63 See more on the Musawat Party ± C. Mutafian, Karabakh in the Twentieth Century, L. Chorbajian, P. Donabedian and C. Mutafian (eds), The Caucasian Knot. The History and Geo-Politics of Nagorno-Karabakh (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 113±14. 64 A. Aida, Sadri Maksudi Arsal (Moscow, 1996), p. 91.

65 G. Yemelianova, `Volga Tatars . . .', p. 453.

66 Quoted in R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 126, 128.

67 A. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform . . . , p. 73; Inorodcheskoe

Obozrenie, vol. 11 (Kazan, 1915), p. 746.

4 Muslims under Soviet Rule: 1917±91 1 A. Alishev, Rasskazi po Istorii Tatarstana (Kazan: Magarif, 1994), p. 201; A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union (London, 1967), p. 3. 2 M. Sultan-Galiev, Tatari i Oktiabrskaia Revolutsia (Oxford: Society for Central Asian Studies, 1984), p. 31; F.G. Nurutdinov, Rodinovedenie (Kazan, 1995), p. 157. 3 R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 198. 4 A. Aida, Sadri Maksudi Arsal (Moscow, 1996), p. 110; D. Shneider, `Agrarnie Preobrazovania i Sotsialisticheskoe Zemleustroistvo v Bashkirii (1919±1929)', Iz Istorii Sovetskoi Bashkirii (Ufa, 1969), p. 33; J. Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917±23 (London, 1989), pp. 88±90; M. Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , p. 23; R. Landa, `Ahmet-Zaki Validov (Zaki Validi Togan) kak Vostokoved i Obshchestvennii Deiatel', Vostok, no. 1 (Moscow, 2000), 122±35. 5 A. Bennigsen and S.E. Wimbush, National Communism in the Soviet Union: a Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World (Chicago, 1979), p. 87. 6 A. Vasiliev, Russian Policy in the Middle East. From Messianism to Pragmatism (Ithaca Press, 1993), pp. 1±2. 7 M.S. Sultan-Galiev, Stati'i (Oxford Central Asian Survey, 1994), pp. 28±9. 8 S.M. Kirov, Izbrannie Stat'i i Rechi (1912±34) (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957), p. 128. 9 R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 226. 10 A. Bennigsen and C. Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union . . . , p. x; Novyi Vostok, no. 19 (Moscow, 1927), iv±v. 11 Istoria Tatarskoi ASSR (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1960), pp. 50±6. 12 S. Blank, `The Struggle for Soviet Bashkiriia 1917±1923', Nationalities Papers, vol. XI, no. 1 (1983), 16±17. 13 The Committee of the Constituent Assembly of Russia consisted predominantly of Mensheviks. It claimed to represent Russia's democratic parliament. In January 1918, the Komuch was disbanded by the Bolsheviks. However, its leaders I. Alkin, G. Teregulov, F. Tuktarov and some others refused to comply with the Bolshevik dictate and moved to Samara. There they joined in the anti-Bolshevik opposition movement. On the whole, the Komuch was an elitist formation which lacked a wide social base.

Notes 215 14 B. Sultanbekov, L. Kharisova and A. Galyamova, Istoria Tatarstana. XX.vek. 1917±95, part IV (Kazan: Kheter, 1998), p. 58. 15 I. Uyazbek, `The Political Status of the Tatar Autonomous Republic', Studies on the Soviet Union, vol. 1, no. 1 (1961), 12. 16 M. Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs . . . , pp. 137±51. 17 C. Mutafian, `Karabakh in the Twentieth Century', L. Chorbajian, The Caucasian Knot . . . , pp. 116±18; D. Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994), pp. 38±41. 18 Voprosi Istorii, no. 10 (Moscow, 1994), pp. 101, 120; R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 222. 19 S. Smith, Allah's Mountains . . . , p. 56. 20 M. Bennigsen Broxup (ed.), The North Caucasian Barrier . . . , pp. 114±16. 21 See more H.C. d'Encausse, `Civil War and New Governments', E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia . . . , pp. 224±53. 22 R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 201±5. 23 Y. Polyakov and A. Chugunov, Konets Basmachestva (Moscow, 1976), pp. 60±1. 24 M. Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , pp. 39, 43. 25 A. Vasiliev, Russian Policy in the Middle East . . . , pp. 1±2. 26 G. Yemelianova, `Alexandr Moiseevich Shami (1893±1938)', Neizvestnie Stranitsi Otechestvennogo Vostokovedenia (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 1997), pp. 45±50. 27 R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 223. 28 N. Vert, Istoria Sovetskogo Gosudarstva (Moscow, 1992), p. 223. 29 A. Malashenko, Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie . . . , p. 53. 30 D. Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad . . . , p. 29. 31 H. Krag and L.F. Hansen, Severnii Kavkaz: Narodi na Pereputie (St Petersburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 1996), p. 25. 32 Istoria Dagestana, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1968), pp. 106, 135. 33 D. Martin, `An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923±1938', Unpublished PhD. Dissertation (Chicago, 1996), pp. 63±150. 34 Y. Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union. From World War II to Perestroika (London: Hurst & Company, 2000), pp. 550±606. 35 D. Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad . . . , p. 28. 36 S.P. Polyakov, Everyday Islam . . . , p. 140. 37 E. Allworth, `The New Central Asians', E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia . . . , pp. 547±5. 38 G. Yemelianova, `A.M. Shami . . .', p. 77. 39 See more on the CARC ± Y. Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union . . . , pp. 11±55. 40 D. Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad . . . , p. 33. 41 W. Flemming, `The Deportation of the Chechen and Ingush People: a Critical Examination', B. Fowkes, (ed.), Russia and Chechnya: the Permanent Crisis (Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), pp. 65±82; A. Avtorkhanov, `The Chechens and Ingush during the Soviet Period and its Antecedents', M. Bennigsen Broxup (ed.), The North Caucasian Barrier . . . , pp. 184±92. 42 Interviews with representatives of the intelligentsia of deported ethnic groups who asked to remain anonymous. 1997±2001, Makhachkala, Nal'chik, Ufa, Moscow. 43 D. Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad . . . , pp. 33±4.

216 Notes 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66

R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 238.

Y. Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union . . . , pp. 203±5.

A. Malashenko, Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie . . . , p. 62.

Y. Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union . . . , pp. 60±1; R. Landa, Isam v Istorii Rossii . . . ,

p. 239. V.F. Piacentini, `Islam: Iranian and Saudi Arabian Religious and Geopolitical Competition in Central Asia', From the Gulf to Central Asia (University of Exeter Press, 1994), pp. 27±31. Sociological survey of various Islamic regions of the former USSR, conducted within the ESRC-funded project on `Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism in the post-Soviet Russian Federation', Birmingham, UK, 1997-99. A. Rorlich, `Islam and Atheism: Dynamic Tension in Soviet Central Asia', W. Fierman (ed.), Soviet Central Asia. The Failed Transformation (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p. 188. A.-A. Rorlich, `Islam and Atheism: Dynamic Tension in Soviet Central Asia', W. Fierman (ed.), Soviet Central Asia. The Failed Transformation (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p. 203. A. Niyazi, `Islam and Tajikistan's Human and Ecological Crisis', M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel C. Waugh (eds), Civil Society in Central Asia (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1999), p. 185. Interview with Shamyl Beno, a Naqshbandii, a Moscow representative of the Government of Chechnya, 24 April (Moscow, 2000). A. Bennigsen and S.E. Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars. Sufism in the Soviet Union (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1985), pp. 70±3. Y. Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union . . . , pp. 551±2. M. Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , p. 89. Y. Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union . . . , pp. 155±83. M. Atkin, `Islamic Assertiveness and the Waning of the Old Soviet Order', Nationalities Papers, vol. XX, no. 1, 1992, 59; M. Alimov and A. Mursaliev, `Mi ± Partia Allakha', Komsomolets Tadjikistana, 14 December 1990. G. Utorbaev, `Podgotovka Musul'manskikh Bogosluzhitelei', Komsomolets Uzbekistana, 12 October 1990; A.-A. Rorlich, Islam and Atheism . . . , p. 190; Pravda, 9 October 1990. The application of term `Wahhabis' to various Islamists in the former USSR is theoretically incorrect since Wahhabism was a historical phenomenon of mid-eighteenth century Arabia. It represented a political and religious movement within the Hanbali madhhab of Sunni Islam which was founded by Muhammad ben Abd al-Wahhab. The latter advocated strict monotheism (tawhid) and renounced the worshipping of saints and sacred places and called for purging Islam of its later accretions. Wahhabism is the state ideology of Saudi Arabia. See more on Wahhabism, Ch. 6. F. Rahman, Islam (New York: Anchor Books, 1968), p. 243. R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , p. 240. N. Lubin, `Uzbekistan: the Challenges Ahead', Middle Eastern Journal, vol. 43, no. 4 (1989), 622. Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie. Narodnoe Khozaistvo SSSR za 70 Let (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1987), pp. 64, 214, 414. M. Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge . . . , p. 61. N. Lubin, `Uzbekistan . . .', 629±32.

Notes 217

5 Russia's Muslims after the Collapse of Communism 1 M. Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1982), p. vii; A. Bennigsen, S.E. Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1985), p. 39; A. Tabyshalieva, Otrazhenie vo Vremeni (Bishkek: Soros-Kyrghyzstan, 1998), p. 88. 2 R. Mukhametshin, Islam v Obshchestvenno-Politicheskoi Zhizni Tatarstana v kontse XX Veka (Kazan: Iman, 2000), p. 96; D. Makarov, Ofitsial'nii i Neofitsial'nii Islam v Dagestane (Moscow, 2000), p. 5; Argumenti i Fakti, Dagestan, no. 24, Makhachkala, 1998. 3 In the late 1990s, the lengthy list of Islamic periodicals contained, for example, the newspapers Tawhid (`The Unity'), As-Salam (`The Peace'), Nurul-Islam (`The Light of Islam'), Islamskii Vestnik (`The Islamic News'), Islamiskie Novosti (`The Islamic News'), Islam Minbire (`The Tribune of Islam'), Musul'manskaia Gazeta (`The Muslim Newspaper'), Persona (`Personality'), Mezhdunarodnaia Musulmanskaia Gazeta (`The International Islamic Newspaper'), Altyn Urda (`The Golden Horde'), Islam Nuri (`The Light of Islam'), Iman (`The Faith'), Gratis, Tugran-Yak, As-Salam (`The Peace'), Islamskii Poriadok (`The Islamic Order'), Put' Islama (`The Path of Islam'), Znamia Islama (`The Banner of Islam'), Zov Predkov (`The Call of Ancestors') and Khalif. Islamic journals included the Musul'mane (the `Muslims', Moscow), the Iman Nuri (the `Light of Faith', Kazan) and Islamskii Mir (the `Islamic World', Kazan). 4 Z. Mal'bakhova, `Novie Musul'mane', Gazeta Yuga, 13 April (Nal'chik, 2000). 5 Interview R. Osmanov of Hilal, 23 April (Moscow, 1999). 6 S. Smith, Allah's Mountains . . . , p. 109. 7 Balkar National Newspaper `Tere', no. 2(5) (Nal'chik, 1998); A. Yaz'kova, Politiko-Etnicheskoe Protivostoianie v Kabardino-Balkarii i Problemi Stabil'nosti v Zapadnikh Regionakh Severnogo Kavkaza (Moscow, 1999), p. 52. 8 Russian Regional Report, vol. 5, no. 1, 12 January (2000), 15. 9 A. Yaz'kova, Politiko-Etnicheskoe Protivostoianie . . . , pp. 54±5. 10 Here, the terms Islamic Fundamentalism and Wahhabism define the desire to return to pure, unadulterated Islam of the period of Prophet Muhammad and the four righteous caliphs. See more on Wahhabism, Ch. 6 11 Findings of the author's research within the Leverhulme-funded project on `Ethnic Politics and Islam in the Western North Caucasus', Birmingham, 2000±03. 12 The authors's interviews with various representatives of ethnic elites and ordinary people in Dagestan in 1977±99 within the ESRC-funded project on `Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism in the post-Soviet Russian Federation', Birmingham. 13 N. Gasanov, Mezhnatsional'noe Soglasie . . . , p. 52; Respublika Dagestan: Sovremennie Problemi Natsional'nikh Otnoshenii (Makhachkala, 1922), pp. 102, 197, 211±13. 14 Deklaratsia o Samoopredelenii Kumykskogo Naroda Tuzniu Tangi (Makhachkala, 1990), pp. 11±13; Dagestan: Kumykskii etnos (Moscow: Institut GumanitarnoPoliticheskikh Issledovanii, 1993), p. 51. 15 Dagestan: Kumykskii etnos . . . , p. 39

218 Notes 16 R.B. Ware and E. Kisriev, `Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan: a Consociational Approach', Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53, no. 1 (Glasgow, 2000), 125. 17 The author's findings within the ESRC-funded research project on `Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism in the post-Soviet Russian Federation', Birmingham, 1997±99. 18 Interview with M. Kurbanov, 17 July (Makhachkala, 1997). 19 In spite of close collaboration between the DUMD and the Dagestani authorities, relations between them have not been trouble-free. For example, in 1997±98, the DUMD bitterly criticized the Government for slowing down the Islamicization project, promoted by the DUMD, and for `insufficient' hostility towards Wahhabis. As-Salam, no. 23, December (Makhachkala, 1997). 20 The term `ethnic party' was introduced by the Dagestani sociologist Enver Kisriev to describe quasi-party political organizations based on ethnic and clan solidarity. See E. Kisriev, `Dagestan', Mezh'etnicheskie Otnosheniia i Konflikti v post-Sovetskikh Gosudarstvakh, Ezhegodnii Doklad (Moscow, 1998), p. 39. 21 G. Yemelianova, `Islam and Nation Building in Tatarstan and Dagestan of the Russian Federation', Nationalities Papers, vol. 27, no. 4 (Abingdon, 1999) 611±12. 22 G. Yemelianova, `Islam and Nation Building . . .', 616; R.B. Ware and E. Kisriev, `Ethnic Parity' . . . , p. 126. 23 The author's findings within the ESRC-funded research project on `Ethnicity, Politics and Transnational Islam: a Study of an International Sufi Order', Birmingham, 1998±2001. 24 In the Islamic regions of the former USSR the term traditional Islam is applied to all forms and branches of regional Islam, an integral part of which are local pre-Islamic traditions and adat norms. Traditional Islam is widely regarded as the antithesis of foreign Islam, which is associated with Salafism, or Wahhabism. Here, the term Islamism is applied to the political activity of the proponents of Salafism, Wahhabism and other forms of Islamic fundamentalism. 25 Interview with Magomed Kurbanov, the Deputy Minister of Nationalities of Dagestan, 30 June (Makhachkala, 1998); Nur-ul-Islam, no. 3, March (Makhachkala, 1997); Islamskii Vestnik, no. 22 (Makhachkala, 1999). 26 M.R. Kurbanov, G. M. Kurbanov, Religia v Kul'ture Narodov Dagestana (Makhachkala, 1996), pp. 70±6. 27 E. Kisriev, `Dvizhenie Wahhabitov v Dagestane'. Mezh'etnicheskie Otnosheniia i Konflikti v post-Sovetskikh Gosudarstvakh. Ezhegodnii Doklad, 1998 (Moscow, 1999), p. 43. 28 Molodezh Dagestana, no. 36, 11 September (Makhachkala, 1998); Moskovskie Novosti, no. 31 (999), 17±23 August (Moscow, 1999). 29 Interview with Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev, 19 July (Makhachkala, 1997). 30 Informatsionnii Bulleten Koordinatsionnogo Tsentra Musul'man Severnogo Kavkaza, September±November (Moscow, 1998). 31 Put Islama, no. 8±9, July (Makhachkala, 1997); Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 17 July (Moscow, 1998). 32 See, for example, R. Khakim, Sumerki Imperii. K Voprosu o Natsii i Gosudarstve (Kazan: Tatarskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1993: D. Iskhakov, Problemy Stanovlenia i Transformatsii Tatarskoi Natsii . . .'.

Notes 219 33 R. Mukhamentshin, Islam v Obshchestvenno-Politicheskoi Zhizni Tatarstana v Kontse XX veka (Kazan: Iman, 2000), pp. 55±6. 34 Muftii Talgat Tadjuddin was born in 1948 in Kazan. He is a Kazan Tatar. He received his Islamic education in the medresse Mir-i-Arab in Bukhara, and the prestigious Islamic University Al-Azhar in Cairo. He has a high level of Islamic knowledge and religious culture and enjoys considerable popular respect in the Islamic communities of Russia. 35 In 1994 the DUMES in Ufa was renamed as the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and the CIS (the TSDUMR). 36 G. Yemelianova, `Shaimiev's ``Khanate'' on the Volga and its Russian Subjects', Asian Ethnicity, 1:1 (2000), p. 46. 37 G. Yemelianova, `Islam and Nation-Building . . . ,' p. 612. 38 Muftii Gusman Iskhakov was born in 1958. He is a Kazan Tatar. He studied in the medresse of Mir-i-Arab in Bukhara and at the Islamic Institute in Libya. From 1992 to 1998 he was deputy to the Tatarstan Muftii Gabdulla Galiulla. 39 G. Yemelianova, `Shaimiev's Khanate . . .', pp. 48±9. 40 A. Yunusova, `Islam mezhdu Volgoi i Uralom', Rossia i Musul'manskii Mir, no. 12 (Moscow, 1999), pp. 57±68; I. Gabrafikov, `Tatarstan-Bashkiria: Slozhnosti vo Vzaimootnosheniakh', Rossia i Musul'manskii Mir, no. 7 (Moscow, 1999), p. 23. 41 Faiz Rahman Sattarov is a Kazan Tatar in his seventies. In 1964, he graduated from the Bukhara medresse Mir-i-Arab where he studied for almost ten years. He worked as the Imam-khatib in Leningrad (now St Petersburg), Rostov, Oktiabr'sk and some other Russian cities. In 1972±76 he was a qadi (an Islamic judge) at the DUMES in Ufa. Afterwards he turned to opposition to the Soviet-era Islamic establishment and declared himself the amir (the leader) of Muslims. 42 Interview with Faiz Rahman, 17 July (Kazan, 1999). 43 According to the Islamic Fund Hilal (Moscow), in 1999 in Russia, there were 1151 registered Islamic Institutions at the level of Islamic Spiritual Board. Interview with R. Osmanov, the executive director of the Fund, 23 April (Moscow, 1999). 44 Interview with Rustam Valeev, the Moscow representative of the TSDUMR, 22 April (Moscow, 1999). 45 Muftii Ravil Gaynutdinov, a Kazan Tatar, was born in 1959 in Kazan. He studied at the Theatrical Institute and is often referred to as an `artist' (actor) by other members of Russian Islamic officialdom. In the 1980s he studied at medresse Mir-i-Arab in Bukhara. From 1985 to 1987 he was the personal secretary of Muftii Tadjuddinov. 46 Muftii Nafigulla Ashirov, a Siberian Tatar, was born in 1954 in Tobol'sk. In the 1970s he spent five years in prison, charged with burglary and hooliganism, a fact which has led to his nickname of `bandit'. In the 1980s he reformed and studied at Mir-i-Arab medresse in Bukhara and in the Islamic Insitute in Algeria. Since then he has established links with Algerian Islamists. There he married his second wife who is Algerian. In 1991±92, he was a deputy of Muftii Talgat Tadjuddinov. 47 Muftii Mukaddas Bibarsov, a Siberian Tatar, was born in 1960 in Penza region. In 1985, he graduated from the medresse in Ufa. He was taught by Muftii

220 Notes

48

49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

59

Tadjuddinov. Since 1987 he has been Imam-khatib of Saratov mosque and from 1994 Muftii of the Volga region. Talgat Tadjuddinov, Gabdulla Galiullin and Gusman Iskhakov are relatives. They are all related to Rashida Abystay, the influential spiritual teacher and representative of one of the most respected Tatar Islamic dynasties, which originated in 1886 in the village of Starii Kyrlay of Arskii raion of Tatarstan. The present Muftii Gusman Iskhakov of Tatarstan is her son and Talgat Tadjuddinov and Gabdulla Galiullin are married to her daughters. Rashid Bayazitov was born in Nizhnii Novgorod to a poor family of nine children. He has a PhD in economics and the honorary title of Academician of a number of Academies, including the International Slavic Academy of Sciences and New York Academy. He has made a fortune as a result of a successful construction business. Interview with R. Osmanov of Hilal, 23 April (Moscow, 1999). Abdel-Wahid Niyazav (formerly Vadim Medvedev), a half-Tatar, was born in 1970 in Omsk. He does not have religious, or any other higher education. In the late 1980s, he converted to Islam and adopted an Islamic name. Tugran Yak, 2 April, 9 April (Nizhnii Novgorod, 1999). Vestnik Evrazii, no. 2(9) (Moscow, 2000), 59±85. Interview with Muftii Tadjuddinov, 12 March (London, 1999); interview with Muftii Iskhakov, 16 April (Kazan, 1999). Interview with R. Valeev, 21 January (Moscow, 1999). In comparison to the ecumenism of Talgat Tadjuddinov, the political views of Bayazitov and his supporters are characterized by overt anti-Semitism. Interview with R. Osmanov of Hilal, 12 April (Moscow, 2000). Interviews with representatives of the Islamic establishment who asked to remain anonymous (Moscow, Kazan, 1997±99). Interview with Imam Ayrat, muhtasib of Laishevskii raion of Tatarstan, 22 April (Kazan, 1999); interview with Imam Nakip of the village of Burnak in the Baltasinskii raion of Tatarstan, 15 July (Burnak, 1998); interview with Imam Seyid Khashem, 30 August (Derbend, 1998); interview with Imam Abukkerim, 25 August (Buynaks, 1998). The author's findings within the ESRC-funded project on `Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism . . .'.

6 Chechnya and Political Islam 1 In Central Asia the IRPs were registered in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan, the IRP gained considerable political influence and public support. Its members made up the core of the anti-government opposition forces during the civil war in 1992±93. 2 Geydar Jemal, an Azeri, was born in 1947. In the 1970s he joined the dissident movement. He was member of the Russian Nationalist-Patriotic Front Pamyat ' (Memory). In the IRP, he was regarded as the leader of its radical wing. 3 Veli Ahmed Sadur, a Tatar, was born in 1956. He was the leader of the IRP's moderates. 4 Abu Kasym, `Islamic Fundamentalism', Al-Wahdat, 9 January (1991).

Notes 221 5 Interview with Ilyas Kayaev, 12 August 2000, Makhachkala; M. Kurbanov and G. Kurbanov, Islamskii Faktor: Realnost i Domisly. Narody Dagestana. Etnos i Politika, no. 3 (Makhachkala, 1994), 11; Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 5 March (Moscow, 1998). 6 Islamskie Novosti, no. 2, 20 February (Makhachkala, 1992). 7 A. Malashenko, Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie . . . , p. 106; D. Makarov, `Radikal'nii Islamism na Severnom Kavkaze: Dagestan i Chechnya', Conflict-DialogueCooperation, Bulletin, no. 2, (Moscow, 1999), 44. 8 As-Salam, no. 16, August (Makhachkala,1997). 9 It is widely believed in Dagestani dissident circles that Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev was poisoned. 10 The Elections Manifesto of the Islamic Popular Movement Nur (Moscow, 1996). 11 Novoe Delo, no. 22, 29 May (Makhachkala, 1998). 12 Nadirshah Khachilaev, a Lak, was born in 1959. He graduated from the Literary Institute and was known for his achievements in martial arts and karate. He does not have any religious education. Nadirshah's brother, Magomed Khachilaev (d. 2000) was the leader of the Lak national movement Kazi Kumukh. See more on national movements, Ch. 5. 13 Interview with Nadirshakh Khachilaev, 29 July 1997, Makhachkala. 14 Moskovskii Komsomolets, 8 April (Moscow, 1996). 15 Interestingly, the Refah Party in Turkey is based on the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism. 16 F. Bayramova, `Nation, Religion and Power', Madani Dzhomga, 3 April (Kazan, 1998). 17 Dagestanskaia Pravda, 29 May (Makhachkala, 1996); As-Salam, no. 23(63), December (Makhachkala, 1997); As-Salam, no. 24 (64), December (Makhachkala, 1997); Nur-ul-Islam, no. 12, July (Makhachkala, 1998); Islamskii Vestnik, no. 24, 27 July±2 August 1998 (Makhachkala, 1998). 18 The new Central Mosque in Makhachkala, opened in 1996, was built with Turkish aid, and until 1998 a representative of Turkey was the Imam of the mosque. 19 The author's findings with the ESRC-funded project on `Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism . . .'. 20 Interview with Ali Polosin, 15 April (Moscow, 2000). 21 Y. Nikitin, Yarost' (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000). 22 A. Solzhenitsin, Archipelago Gulag (Moscow, 1994), p. 98. 23 See more on the Russian±Chechen conflict: P. Siren, `The Battle for Grozny: the Russian Invasion of Chechnya, December 1994±December 1996', B. Fowkes (ed.), Russia and Chechnya: the Permanent Crisis . . .; E.W. Walker, No Peace, No War in the Caucasus: Secessionist Conflicts in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Harvard University, 1998), pp. 1±11; S. Smith, Allah's Mountains . . .; F. Hill, `Russia's Tinderbox.' Conflict in the North Caucasus and its Implications for the Future of the Russian Federation (Harvard University, 1995). 24 S. Smith, Allah's Mountains . . . , pp. 260±1.

25 M. Gammer, The Russian Conquest of the North Caucasus (London, 1999).

26 A. Zelkina, In Quest of God and Freedom . . . , p. 16.

27 See Ch. 2.

28 A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars . . . , pp. 121±2.

222 Notes 29 Interview with Shamyl Beno, the Foreign Minister of the Dudayev Government, 24 April (Moscow, 1999). 30 A. Malashenko, Islamskoe vozrozhdenie . . . , p. 182. 31 Interview with Shamyl Beno, the Foreign Minister of the Dudayev Government, 24 April (Moscow, 1999). 32 A. Malashenko, Islamskoe vozrozhdenie . . . , p. 182; R. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii . . . , pp. 276±7. 33 D. Makarov, Radikal'nii Islamism na Severnom Kavkaze: Dagestan i Chechnya, Bulletin of Conflict±Dialogue±Co-operation, no. 1 (Moscow: 1999), 54. 34 Abdurahman Khattab ibn Ul is an ethnic Cherkess, born in 1963 in Jordan. In 1979, he fought against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Later he graduated from the Military Academy in Amman and served in the Cherkess Guard of King Hussein. He took part in the war in Bosnia where he was in charge of a military training camp for local Muslims. Since December 1994, he has been fighting against the Russians in Chechnya. One of the three wives of Khattab is from Karamakhi village of Buynakskii raion. 35 V. Akaev, `Religiozno-Politicheskii Conflikt v Chechne', Tsentral'naia Azia i Kavkaz, no. 4(5), (1999), 103. 36 Novoe Delo, no. 20, 15 May (Makhachkala, 1998), 4; Molodezh Dagestana, no. 21, 29 May (Makhachkala, 1998), 3. 37 See n. 34. 38 Interviews with representatives of the intelligentsia of Dagestan, KabardinoBalkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Adyghea, Tatarstan, Jordan, Turkey and Egypt. 1997±2000. 39 Argumenty i Fakty, February, no. 6 (Moscow, 2000) 40 The author's interviews with Salafis, conducted in 1997±99 within the ESRCfunded project `Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism . . .'. 41 See more on discussion of the term `Wahhabism'; A. Malashenko, Islamskie Orientiry Severnogo Kavkaza (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), pp. 137±64. 42 From the Gulf to Central Asia (Exeter Press, 1994), p. 226.

43 M. Kurbanov and G. Kurbanov. Islamskii Faktor: Realnost' i Domisly. Narody

Dagestana. Etnos i Politika, no. 3 (Makhachkala, 1994), p. 11. 44 D. Makarov, Ofitsial'nii i Neofitsial'nii Islam . . . , p. 25. 45 Video recording of a mosque address, 5 January (Kizilyurt, 1996). 46 D. Makarov, Ofitsial'nii i Neofitsial'nii Islam . . . , p. 26; interview with Muhammad-Shafi, Makhachkala, 21 July 1997. 47 `Taliban: Chto Skryvaetsia pod Flerom Taini?', Khalif, no. 2, August (1997). 48 Novoe Delo, no. 38, 18 September (Makhachkala, 1998). 49 Compared to the ultra-radicals, the followers of Bagauddin allow for a choice between a niqab and a hijab (face veil). As for the followers of Ahtayev, they oppose any veil for women in Dagestan. They argue that there, contrary to its purpose, the veil will attract universal attention to women. 50 D. Makarov, Ofitsial'nii i Neofitsial'nii Islam . . . , pp. 27±8. 51 Interview with Ahmed-qadi Ahtaev, 19 July (Makhachkala, 1997). 52 Interviews with a number of local administration representatives in 1997±98. 53 D. Makarov, Ofitsial'nii i Neofitsial'nii Islam . . . , p. 37. 54 Central Asian Brief, vol. 11, no. 3, March (1995); Dagestanskaia Pravda, 24 July (Makhachkala, 1992).

Notes 223 55 OMRI, Daily Digest, 5 March (1997). 56 V. Shorokhov, `Chechenskoe Protivodeistvie', Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 20 January (Moscow, 1995); Segodnia, 14 June (1995), 2. 57 A. Malashenko, Islamskoe vozrozhdenie . . . , p. 184.

Conclusion 1 A. Hourani, Islam in European Thought (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), p. 100. 2 See more on the theory of ethnicity: A. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwells, 1986); J. Rex, `Ethnic Identity and the Nation-State: the Political Sociology of Multi-Cultural Society', Social Identities, vol. 1, no. 1 (London, 1995), 21±34. 3 N. Eidelman, `Revolution from above' in Russia, Political History of Russia, vol. 5, no. 1 (NOVA Science Publishers, 1995), p. 25.

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Articles and chapters in books (in Russian) Akaev, V. `Religiozno-Politicheskii Conflict v Chechne', Tsentral'naia Azia i Kavkaz, 4:5 (1999), 98±110. Birukov, P. `Tolstoi i Vostok', Novii Vostok, no. 6 (Moscow: L'Association Russe pour les Etudes Orientales, 1925), 44±58. Gabdrafikov, I. `Tatarstan-Bashkiria: Slozhnosti vo Vzaimootnosheniakh', in A. Bel'skii (ed.). Rossia I Musul'manskii Mir, no. 7 (Moscow: INION, 1999), pp. 27±34. Gadjiev, K. `Razmyshlenia o Politicheskom Kharaktere Sovremennoi Rossii', MeiMO, no. 2 (Moscow, 1996), 26±39. Galperin, C.D. `Rus v Sostave Mongol'skoi Imperii', Tatarstan, 2/8 (Kazan, 1995), 110±36. Gasanov, N. `Mezhnatsional'noe Soglasie v Dagestane', Polis, no. 3 (1993), 32±54. Gismatullin. `Polozhenie Musul'manskikh Mektebov i Medrese', Inorodcheskoe Obozrenie, no. 15 (Kazan, 1915), 898±902. Kamalov, T.R. `Zia Kamali o Vere i Provovernosti v Islame', Islamo-Khristianskoe Pogranich'e, pp. 40±9. Khakim, R. `Rossia i Tatarstan: ``U Istoricheskogo Perekrestka'' ', Panorama-Forum, no. 1 (Kazan, 1997), 34±63. Khudiakov, M.G. `Ocherki po Istorii Kazanskogo Khanstva', in I.B. Muslimov, Na Styke Kontinentov i Tsivilizatsii . . ., pp. 622±758. Kisriev, E. `Dagestan', Mezhetnicheskie Otnoshenia i Konflikty v post-Sovetskikh Gosudarstvakh, Ezhegodnii Doklad, 1997 (Moscow: IEA RAN, 1998), 27±45. ÐÐ , `Dvizhenie Wahhabitov v Dagestane', Mezhetnicheskie Otnoshenia i Konflikty v post-Sovetskikh Gosudarstvakh, Ezhegodnii Doklad, 1998 (Moscow: IEA RAN, 1999), 23±47. Klimovich, L.I. `Bor'ba Ortodoksov i Modernistov v Islame', Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma, 2 (1966), 65±88. Konovalova, I. `Stepnoi Biznes', Rodina, nos 3±4 (Moscow, 1997), 36±7. Kul'chik, D. and K. Djabrailov `Kumykskii Etnos: Poisk Sobstvennogo Mesta v Mnogonatsional'noi Respublike', in D. Kul'chik, (ed.), Dagestan, pp. 5±58. Kurbanov, M.R. and G.M. Kurbanov. `Islamskii Faktor: Real'nosti i Domysly', Narody Dagestana. Etnos i Politika, no. 3 (Makhachkala, 1994), 9±27. Makarov, D.V. `Radikal'nii Islamism na Severnom Kavkaze: Dagestan i Chechnya', in V.V. Naumkin, and I.D. Zviagel'skaia (eds), Conflict-Dialogue-Co-operation, Bulletin no. 1 (Moscow, 1999), pp. 42±58. Novosel'tsev, A.P. `Kievskaia Rus i Strany Vostoka', Voprosy Istorii, no. 5 (Moscow, 1983), 17±31. Salikhov, R. `Predstavitel'stvo Tatar-Musul'man v Vibornykh Organakh Mestnogo Samoupravlenia v Kazani na Rubezhe 19±20kh Vekov', Islam v Tatarskom Mire: Istoria i Sovremennost, pp. 102±17.

232 Bibliography Shneider, D. `Agrarnie Preobrazovania i Sotsialisticheskoe Zemleustroistvo v Bashkirii (1919±1929)', Iz Istorii Sovietskoi Bashkirii (Ufa, 1969), pp. 48±74. Smirnov, V. `Musul'manskie Pechatnye Izdania v Rossii', Zapiski Vostochnogo Otdelenia Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Obshchestva, vol. 3 (St Petersburg, 1888) pp. 88±124. Tikhomirov, M.N. `Proiskhozhdenie Nazvania ``Rus'' i ``Russkaia Zemlia'' ', Sovetskaia Etnografia, vol. 6±7 (Moscow, 1947), 41±72. Trepavlov, V.V. `Status ``Belogo Tsaria'': Moskva i Tatarskie Khanstva v XV±XVI Vekakh', Rossia i Vostok: Problemy Vzaimodeistvia, vol. 2 (Moscow: IVRAN, 1993), 302±11. ÐÐ . `Vostochnie Elementy Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennosti', Rossia i Vostok. Problemy Vzaimodeistvia, vol. 1 (Moscow: IVRAN, 1993). Trubetskoi, N.S. `O Turanskom Elemente v Russkoi Kul'ture', Panorama-Forum, no. 1 (Kazan, 1997), 9±25. Trubetskoi, N.S. `Obshcheevraziiskii Natsionalizm', Evraziiskaia Khronika, no. IX (Paris, 1927). Vernadskii, G. `Chto Dali Rossii Mongoly', Rodina, nos 3±4 (Moscow, 1997), 96±8. Urkhanova, R. `Evraziittsy i Vostok: Pragmatika Lubvi?', Acta Eurasica, no. 1 (Moscow, 1995), 12±31. Usmanov, M.A. `Etapy Islamizatsii Djuchieva Ulusa i Musul'manskoe Dukhovenstvo v Tatarskikh Khanstvakh XIII-XVI vekov', Dukhovenstvo i Politicheskaia Zhizn, pp. 152±84. Yakovenko, I. `Tsivilizatsia i Varvarstvo v Istorii Rossii', Obshchestvennie Nauki i Sovremennost, no. 4 (Moscow: 1995), 67±77. Yemelianova, G. `Alexandr Moiseevich Shami (1893±1938)', in V.V. Naumkin (ed.), Neizvestnie Stranitsy Otechestvennogo Vostokovedenia (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 1997), pp. 39±81. Yunusova, A. `Islam mezhdu Volgoi i Uralom', Rossia i Musul'manskii Mir, no. 12 (Moscow: INION, 1999), pp. 57±65.

Books and Articles in Other Languages Bigi, M. Islahat Esaslari (Petrograd, 1917), in Tatar. Devlet, N. Rusya Turklerinin Milli Musadele Tarihi (1905±1917) (Ankara, 1985), in Turkish. Dudoignon, S.A. `Djadidisme, Mirasisme, Islamisme', Cahiers du Monde Russe, XXXVII, 1±2 (1996), 13±40, in French. Fahreddin, Rizaeddin, Bolgar ve Kazan Terekler (Kazan, 1893), in Tatar. Georgeon, F. `Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc. Yusuf Akchura (1871±1935)', SyntheÁse, 2 (Paris, 1970), 7±34, in French. Gokalp, Z. Turklesmek, Islamlasmak, Muasirlasmak (Istanbul, 1918), in Turkish. Gubaydullin, G. Tarikhi Sahifarlar Achylganda (Kazan, 1989), in Tatar. Kefeli-Clay, A. `L'Islam Populaire chez les Tatars ChreÂtiens Orthodoxes aux XIX SieÁcle', Cahiers du Monde Russe, XXXVII (4) (1996), 409±28, in French. Zarcone, T. `Philosophie et TheÂologie chez les Djadids: la Question du Raisonnement IndeÂpeÂndent (Igtihad)', Cahiers du Monde Russe, XXXVII, 1±2 (Paris, 1996), 53±64, in French.

Index

Abadzekhs, 14, 48

see also Circassians

Abazins, 14, 48, 142

see also Circassians

Abduh, Muhammad, 76

Abdulaev, Ahmad-Haji, 147

see also DUMD Abkhazes, 117, 142

Abubakarov, Seyid Muhammad, 147±8

see also DUMD; Muftiyat

Abul Khayr, Kazakh Khan, 57

Abyzes, 40

adat, 14, 59, 61, 71, 109, 127, 131

Adyge Khase, Cherkess organization,

142

see also Cherkess;

Karachaevo-Cherkessia

Adyghea, 114, 117, 141±3

see also Adyghs and Circassians

Adyghs, 14, 47±8

Al-Afghani, Jamal ad-Din, 76

Afghanistan, 37, 44, 131±2, 185

Ahmadiyya, 175, 201

Ahtaev, Ahmed-qadi, 152, 167±9,

187±8 see also Islamic Renaissance Party

Ajaria, 117

Akchura, Yusuf, 79, 81

Akkin Chechens, 123, 145, 149, 151

Alans, 8, 14, 47

see also Ossetians

Alash Orda, 88, 95, 101, 106

see also Kazakhs

Albogachiev, Magomed, 153

Alexander II, 62, 67, 69

Alexander III, 77

Aliev, Mukhu, 147±8

see also Dagestan

Andis, 14

Arab Caliphate, 2, 7

Armenians, 49±59

Arthaniyah, tribe, 2

Ashirov, Nafigulla, 159, 161±4

see also Muftiyat

Asiyatilov, Surokat, 148, 174

see also Islamic Party of Dagestan

Astrakhan Khanate, 22, 24, 28, 30±1,

33

see also Genghizids

Avars, 14±15, 47±8, 145±8, 190

avlod, 119

see also Tajiks

Azerbaijan, 47, 49±59, 70, 81, 96, 107,

137, 145

see also Azeris

Azeris, 67, 117

Bakha ad-Din, 83

see also Vaisov Bozhii Polk

Bakhchesaray, 29, 41

see also Crimean Khanate

Bakhchesaray Treaty, 41

Baku, city and region, 71, 107

Balkars, 15, 47, 117, 141±2

see also Kabardino-Balkaria; deportations

Bammat Girey-Haji, wird, 95

Barandzhers, 4

Baratynskii, N.I., 73

Bartol'd, V.V., 78

Basayev, Shamyl, 152, 182±3

see also Russo-Chechen conflict

Bashkirs, 30, 43±4, 57, 69±70, 116

see also Bashkortostan

Bashkortostan, 118, 156±7

Bashrevkom, 101

see also Validi, Zaki

basmachi movement, 93±4, 96, 110±11,

119

Batal-Haji, wird, 54

see also Chechens; Kadiriyya

Batsbiis, 14

Batu Khan, 16

see also Genghizid empire

Bayazitov, Rashid, 159±61, 163

see also Muftiyat; Hilal

233

234 Index Bayramova, Fauzia, 173

see also Ittifaq Party

Baytursun, Ahmed, 106

see also Alash Orda

Beppaev, Sufian, 141

see also Tere; Kabardino-Balkaria

Berdiyev, Ismail, 144

see also Muftiyat;

Karachaevo-Cherkessia

Berke Khan, 18

see also Genghizid empire

Bersuls, 4

Biarmia, 3±4

Biars, 3±5

Bibarsov, Mukaddas, 159, 173

see also Muftiyats

bid'a (innovation), 131

Bigi, Musa, 87

Birlik, Nogay national society, 145, 149

see also Nogays

Black Klobuk confederation, 13

Blue Horde (Kok Urda), 16

see also Genghizid empire

Bogolubskii, Andrei, 12

Boiar Duma, 35

boiare, 5, 11

Bulgars, 10±12, 23, 82

see also Volga Bulgaria; Tatars; Baha

ad-Din

Bukhara, 44, 57, 60, 65±6;

Emirate, 60±1; social organization

of, 65;

Islam in, 60, 65; under Russian

protectorate, 65, 67

al-Bukhari, Ismail, medresse

(Tashkent), 114, 126

Bulgars, 4, 7±11, 16, 19

see also Volga Bulgaria; Baha

ad-Din

Burtas, 4

Byzantine empire, 8±9, 15, 19;

influence on Rus, 24±5, 195±6

Bzhadugs, 14, 48

see also Circassians

CARC, see under Council for the Affairs

of Religious Cults

Catherine the Great, internal politics,

43, 57±8, 197

Policy on Islam, 43±5, 197; conquest of Crimea, 40±1; conquest of the North Caucasus, 45±8; policy towards Kazakhstan and Central Asia, 57±8 see also Muftiyat; North Caucasus; Crimea

Catholic Church, 35

Caucasian war, 48, 50±2, 54, 117

see also gazawat;

Central Asia, 44

relations with Russia, 55, 57, 60±7;

Jadid movement in, 81 under

Soviet rule, 109±10, 128

see also under individual countries Checheno-Ingushetia, 117, 123, 179

Chechens, 14±15, 46±8, 50, 53;

deportation of, 122; Islamicization

of, 179±85

see also taip; Kadiriyya; Kunta-Haji;

Wahhabism

Chelebeev, Chelebidjan, 96, 107

see also Crimea; Milli Firka

Cheremis, 204

Cherkess, 14, 48, 141±2

see also Circassians Chimmirza, wird, 54 see also Chechens; Kadiriyya

Chuvashes, 30

Circassians, 14, 117

see also under individual names

CMR, see under Council of Muftiis of

Russia

Comintern, see under Communist

International

Communist International

(Comintern), 104, 112, 120, 124

Constitutional-Democratic Party of

Russia

see under Kadet Party

Cossacks, 18, 32±3, 45±6, 53, 106, 108,

110, 142±3, 192

Council for the Affairs of Religious

Cults (CARC), 121, 126, 160

Council of Muftiis of Russia, 159

see also Muftiyat, Gaynutdinov

Crimea, 22, 24, 28±9;

relations with Moscow, 29, 32;

relations with the Ottoman

Index 235 empire, 29, 32; relations with

Kazan, 30±1; Russian conquest

of, 40±1, 45; under Soviet rule,

107±8, 117, 122; under the

German occupation, 122

see also Crimean Khanate; Tatars; Catherine the Great; Milli Firka Crimean Khanate, 22±9, 33, 40±1 da'awa (summon to Islam), 139

Dagestan, 48, 50, 54, 71;

under Soviet rule, 108±9, 117±18,

123, 144±5, 168; in post-Soviet

period, 145±53, 169±70, 173±7,

184

see also North Caucasus; Caucasian war; gazawat; Sufism; Wahhabism Dargins, 14, 47±8, 145±8

see also Dagestan

Datov, Srym, 59

see also Small Horde; Kazakhs

deportations, 122±3

see also Balkars; Chechens; Crimean Tatars; Volga Germans; Ingushes; Karachays; Meskhetian Turks Derbend, city and region, 15, 47, 49

see also Dagestan

Derev, S., 142

see also Cherkess; Karachaevo-

Cherkessia

Dewlet-Girey, 32

see also Crimean Khanate

dhirk, 52, 54, 179

see also Sufism

Digors, 47

see also Ossetians

Dinmuhammedov, Ishmuhammed,

86±7

see also Tatars; qadimism

Djarimov, A., 143

see also Adyghea

Donskoi, Dmitrii, 24

see also Moscow kniazhestvo

Dragovichi, 1

Dudayev, Dzhokhar, 177, 179±81

see also Chechens

Duma Muslim faction, 88±9, 91±2,

172±3

DUMB, 156

see also Muftiyat; Bashkortostan;

Nigmatullin, Nurmuhammed

DUMCR (Chechnya), 180,

see also Chechens; Muftiyat

DUMD, 146±8, 150±1, 174

see also Dagestan; Muftiyat; Abubakarov, Seyid Muhammad; Abdulaev, Ahmad-Haji DUMES, 126, 137, 154, 157±8, 161

see also TSDUMR; Rasulev,

Gabdrahman; Tadjuddinov,

Talgat

DUMRT, 154±6

see also Tatarstan; Muftiyat

DUMSK, 137, 144, 150, 157, 168

see also Muftiyat; Gekkiev, Mahmud;

North Caucasus

DUMZ, in Baku, 71, 121

see also Muftiyat; Transcaucasus

Enver-pasha, 111

see also basmachi movement

Ests, 204

Etezov, B., 141

see also Balkars; Kabardino-Balkaria Eurasianists, xi, 203±4 EuroIslam, 154±5 see also Khakimov, R.S. Fahreddinov, Rizaeddin, 115

see also Muftiyat

Faizkhanov, Huseyn, 75

Fedor, Russian Tsar, 34, 37

Finno-Ugric people

see under Cheremis; Ests; Finns; Karels; Komis; Lopars; Maris; Meshers; Mordva; Muroma; Udmurts; Ugors Finns, 204

Gagauz, 13

Galiev, Mir-Sultan, 91, 102±4, 113±14

see also Muslim Communism;

Sultan-Galievshchina

Galiullin, Gabdulla, 154, 159

see also Muftiyat; Tatarstan; Omet

236 Index Gamzat-bek, 50

see also Caucasian war; gazawat;

Naqshbandiyya

Gasprinskii, Ismail, 75, 79±80 see also jadidism; Terjuman Gaynutdinov, Ravil, 159, 161±3

see also Muftiyat; SMR

gazawat, 50±3, 109, 180±1, 198

see also jihad; North Caucasus;

basmachi movement

Gazi-Muhammad, 50

see also gazawat Gekkiev, Mahmud, 144, 150, 168

see also DUMSK Genghiz-khan, 16, 18, 22

see also Genghizid empire

Genghizid empire, 16±17, 18±28

see also Genghiz-khan; Golden

Horde

Geok-Tepe, Russian conquest of, 64, 66

see also Central Asia

Georgia, 49±50, 52, 117

German, Kazan archbishop, 37

see also Russian Orthodox Church

Al-Ghazzali, 19

Gianzi, agreement, 47

see also Russo-Iranian wars

Gireys, Crimean dynasty of, 24, 29

see also Crimean Khanate

Godunov, Boris, Russian tsar, 24, 34

Gokalp, Ziia, 81

Golden Horde, 16, 18±19, 22, 29, 36

Christianity in, 20

see also Genghizid empire

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 132, 139

see also perestroika

Gorskaia (Mountain) Autonomous

Republic, 108±9

see also North Caucasus

Gotsinskii, Najmuddin, 95, 109

see also North Caucasus

Great Britain, 62, 66, 112

see also Great Game

Great Game, between Russia and

Britain, 62, 66

Great Reforms, 69±71, 198

see also Alexander II

Greater Horde (Ulu Juz), 56, 58

see also Kazakhstan

Greek trade route, 2±3

Groznii, city and region, 49

see also Russo-Chechen conflict

Gulag, 115, 120

Gulistan treaty, 49

see also Russo-Iranian wars

Gummet party, 92

see also Azeris

Gurii, Kazan archbishop, 37

see also Russian Orthodox Church

Guyuk Khan, 18

see also Genghizid empire

Hairy Ishans, wird, 129

see also Yasawiyya

hajj, 70, 127, 133, 137±9, 186

see also pillars of Islam

Harbi Shuro, 95

Hilal, Islamic centre of, 159

see also Bayazitov, Rashid Ibn Taimiia, 14

Idel-Ural, 100, 105±6

Il'men, tribe, 1

Il'minskii, N.I., 73, 85

Imamate, 50, 52, 95, 109, 183

see also Dagestan; Chechnya

Ingush±Ossetian conflict, 140±1

Ingushes, 14±15, 47, 122±3, 141

see also deportations; Ingush±

Ossetian conflict

Ingushetia, 141

see also Ingush±Ossetian conflict

inorodtsy, 59, 72±4, 79

Iran, 44±5, 47±8, 60, 66, 127, 139

see also Russo-Iranian wars

ishan, 40, 64, 115

see also shaykh; pir

Iskhaki, Gayaz, 81, 92

Iskhakov, Gusman, 155±6, 159, 162

see also Tatarstan; Muftiyat

al-Islah (Reform), party, 92

Islam, pillars of, 127

politicization of, 20; suppression of,

36±41; under Catherine the

Great, 43±5; under the Soviet

regime, 116

see also Islamic education; Islamic renaissance

Index 237 Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC), 161,

170, 172

see also Niyazov, Abdel-Wahid

Islamic Democratic Party of Dagestan

(IPD), 173±4

see also Saidov, Abdurashid;

Dagestan

Islamic Democratic Party of Turkestan,

134

see also Uzbekistan

Islamic education, 74±7, 116

see also al-usul al-jadid; al-usul

al-qadim

Islamic fundamentalism, 149, 153,

189±91

see also salafism; Wahhabism Islamic Nation, party, 175, 181

see also Udugov, Movladi;

Chechnya

Islamic Party of Dagestan, 148

see also Dagestan

Islamic Path party, 175

see also Chechens Islamic renaissance, 137±9 Islamic Renaissance Party, 133, 167±8, 184

see also Ahtaev, Ahmed-qadi; Sadur

Ahmed; Gemal, Geydar

Islamiyya, organization, 169, 173

see also Ahtaev, Ahmed-qadi;

Dagestan

Ismailis, 61

see also Shiites

Ithna-Asharites (Twelvers), 61

see also Shiites

Ittifaq Party, 173, 184

see also Bayramova, Fauzia;

Tatarstan

Ittifaq-i-Muslimin Party, 88, 91

Ivan III, Moscow kniaz, 24, 29

Ivan IV, Russian tsar, conquest of

Kazan Khanate, 29±31 conquest of Astrakhan Khanate,

31±2; domestic politics, 35;

foreign policy, 45

jadidism, 74±7, 79, 81, 83, 85±6, 90,

104, 198

see also al-usul al-jadid

Jassy treaty, 41

see also Russo-Turkish wars

Jemal, Geydar, 167

see also Islamic Renaissance Party

jihad, 111, 121, 152, 157, 180, 183±4,

188±9, 191, 198

see also gazawat Jungars, 56±8 see also Kalmyks Kabardino-Balkaria, 114, 117±18,

139±40, 143

see also Balkars; Kabardins

Kabardins, 14±15, 45, 47, 49, 54, 123

see also Circassians;

Kabardino±Balkaria

Kadet Party, 87±8, 91

Kadiriyya, tariqa, 48, 54, 83, 130, 149,

179±80, 182

see also Sufism; tariqatism; Kunta-Haji; Batal-Haji; Bammat Girey-Haji; Chimmirza; Dagestan; Chechnya Kadyrov, Ahmed, 153, 182±3, 185

see also Muftiyat; Chechnya

Kalita, Ivan, Moscow kniaz, 21±2

Kalmyks, 33±4, 61

see also Jungars

Kanashevich, Luka (Kazan

archbishop), 39

Karachaevo-Cherkessia, 117±18,

141±4

see also Cherkess; Karachays

Karachays, 14±15, 47, 117, 122, 141±2

see also Karachaevo-Cherkessia;

deportations

Kara-Kalpaks, 62

Karels, 204

Karluks, 8

Kasim Khan, 23

see also Kasimov Khanate, 23, 29±31, 34, 38

Kasogi, tribe, 3

Kaufman, K.P. (Russian General), 63,

65±6

see also Central Asia, Russian

conquest of

Kayaev, Ali, 82, 89

see also Dagestan

238 Index Kazakhs, 55±9, 61±2, 97

see also Small Horde; Middle Horde;

Greater Horde; Kazakhstan;

jadidism Kazakhstan, 56±7, 59, 106, 117±19,

123, 137

Kazan, city and region, 16, 71, 74, 78,

92, 94, 105, 154, 156, 162

Kazan Khanate, relations with

Moscow, 23, 29, 30

Islam in, 23; relations with Crimea,

29; relations with Lithuania, 31

see also Genghizid empire

Kazi-Kumukh (Lak national

movement), 145,

see also Laks; Khachilaev, M.

Kebedov, Bagauddin, 167±8, 183, 188,

191

see also Dagestan; Wahhabism

Kenesary Khan, 59

see also Middle Horde; Kazakhs

Khachemizov, Askarbii, 144

see also Muftiyat; Adyghea

Khachilaev, Magomed, 145

see also Kazi-Kumukh; Laks

Khachilaev, Nadirshakh, 163±4, 170±2

see also Union of Russia's Muslims

Khakimov, R.S., 154±5

see also EuroIslam; Tatarstan

Khasavyurt agreements, 178, 185

see also Russo-Chechen conflict

Khattab, Abdurahman, 152, 183

see also Russo-Chechen conflict;

Wahhabism

Khazar Khaganat, 2±9, 14

Judaism in, 3, 7

see also Khazars

Khazars, 2±9, 13

see also Khazar Khaganat

Khiva Khanate, 57±8, 62, 66±7, 110

see also Central Asia

Khudoyar Khan, 63

see also Kokand Khanate

Khwarasm, 7, 15±16, 110

Kievan Rus, 5±6, 12±13, 205

Christianization of, 8±11

Kipchaks, 8, 12, 62

see under polovtsy

`Kokand autonomy', 110

see also Central Asia

Kokand Khanate, 55, 61±4, 83, 110

see also Central Asia

Kokov, Valery, 142

see also Kabardino-Balkaria

kollektivizatsia (collectivization),

116±18

Komis, 4

korenizatsia (nativization), 118, 191

Krivichi, tribe, 1

Kubrawiyya (tariqa), 61

Kuchuk-Kaynardji, treaty of, 41, 47

see also Russo-Turkish wars

Kuchum Khan, 32

see also Siberian Khanate; Genghizid

empire

kufr (non-belief), 131, 188

Kuiabah, tribe, 2

Kumyks, 15, 47±8, 145±51

see also Dagestan

Kunta-Haji, wird, 54, 96, 130

see also Kadiriyya; Vis-Haji, wird

Kurban-Bayram, 133

Kurds, 14

Kyrgyzes, 55, 58±9, 61±3, 94, 117±19,

123, 133, 137

see also Kyrgyzstan; Central Asia

Kyrgyzstan, 117, 137

see also Kyrgyzes

Kyzliar, city, 47

see also Dagestan

Laks, 15, 145±6, 150

see also Dagestan; Kazi-Kumukh Law

on Rehabilitation of Repressed

People, 141, 144

see also deportations

Lazarevskii Institute of Oriental

Languages, 78

see also Russian orientalists

Lezgins, 14±15, 145±8, 190

see also Sadval, movement; Dagestan

Lithuania, 28±9

Lopars, 204

Luzhkov, Yurii, Moscow Mayor, 163

Al-Maarri, 19

Magomedov, Magomedali, 148

see also Dagestan

Index 239 Makarii, Orthodox metropolitan, 36

see also Russian Orthodox Church

Makhachev, Gadji, 148, 171

see also Imam Shamyl Popular Front;

Avars; Dagestan

Makhachkala (Petrovsk), 49, 52, 71,

148, 152, 157, 166±8, 171, 173, 178

see also Dagestan

Maksudi, Hadi, 80, 94

see also Tatars

Maksudi, Sadri, 88, 95, 100, 105

see also Ittifaq-i-Muslimin Party;

Tatars

Mansur Ushurma, shaykh, 48

see also Caucasian war;

Naqshbandiyya

Maris, 4, 30

Marjani, Shihabuddin, 76, 78

see also Tatars

Maskhadov, Aslan, 178, 181±2, 185

see also Russo-Chechen conflict

mazar, 61, 128

see also Sufism

Mehdi, Abddurreshid, 91±2

see also Young Tatars Party; Crimea

Meshera, 204

Meskhetian Turks, 122

Middle Horde (Orta Juz), 56±9

see also Kazakhstan

Milli Firka Party, 96, 101, 107±8

see also Chelebeev Chelebidjan;

Crimea

Milli Mejlis, the National Council, 95,

100, 105

Milli Shuro, the Central Muslim

Council, 95

Mir-i-Arab medresse (Bukhara), 114,

121, 126

Mordva, 4

Moscow kniazhestvo, 21, 23±5, 28

Moscow, city and region, 13, 21,

28±33, 36±9, 159±63, 167, 171±2,

185, 192, 196, 199±200

see also Moscow kniazhestvo

mujahedin, 131, 184±5, 200

see also Russo-Chechen conflict

Muftiyat, of Central Russia, 44, 58, 71,

83, 121, 126±7, 131, 137, 146,

158±65

of Transcaucasus, 55, 71, 131; of

Central Asia, 121, 126±7, 131; of

North Caucasus, 121, 131, 137,

144, 157; of Crimea, 71, 131; of

Kazakhstan, 133; of Kyrgyzstan,

133; of Uzbekistan, 133

see also under individual names Muroma, 204

Musawat, party, 88, 96, 101, 107

see also Azerbaijan

Muslim Communism, 91, 102±5, 113,

199

see also Galiev, Mir-Sultan; Vahitov,

Mulannur

Muslims of Russia, movement, 173

Muslims of Tatarstan, organization,

173

see also Galiullin, Gabdulla

Muzzaffer, Emir, 65

see also Bukhara Emirate

Nabukhays, 14

see also Circassians

Nal'chik, city,

see also Kabardino-Balkaria

Naqshbandiyya, tariqa, 48, 54, 61, 64,

129±30, 147, 149±50, 179±80, 182

see also Caucasian war; Sufism;

tariqatism; Dagestan; Chechens

An-Nasafi, Omar, 19

An-Nasiri, Abdul-Qayum, 76±7, 80

see also Tatats

Nevskii, Alexander, Novgorod kniaz, 21

Nicholas I, Russian tsar, 53

Nigmatullin, Nurmuhamet, 156, 162

see also Bashkortostan; DUMB;

Muftiyat

Nikon, Russian patriarch, 38

see also Russian Orthodox Church

Niyazov, Abdel-Wahid, 161, 163±4,

171±3

see also Islamic Cultural Centre;

Refah party

Nogay Khanate (Horde), 16, 22, 24, 28,

33±4

see also Genghizid empire

Nogays, 15, 145, 147, 149

see also Birlik, society; Dagestan;

Nogay Khanate

240 Index North Caucasus, geography and peoples of, 14, 45±8; Islam in, 47±8, 129; Russian conquest of, 49±54; under Soviet rule, 128; after Communism, 137±53, 177±93 see also Sufism; tariqatism, Caucasian

war

North Ossetia, 117, 123

see also Ossetians

novokreshennie (new converts), 39, 85

see also Russian Orthodox Church

Nur, Islamic movement, 169±70

Omet party, 173

see also Galiullin, Gabdulla;

Tatarstan

Omsk, city and region, 56, 72

Orenburg, city and region, 44, 56±7

Ossetians, 14±15, 49, 54, 141

see also Alans; North Ossetia; Ingush-

Ossetian conflict

otpadenie (falling back to Islam), 39,

85

see also Russian Orthodox Church

Ottoman empire, relations with

Crimea, 32

relations with Russia, 40±1, 45, 51±2

see also Ottoman Turks; Russo-

Turkish wars

Ottoman Turks, 22, 29, 32, 80

see also Ottoman empire;

Russo-Turkish wars

paganism, 1, 9, 32

Pechenegs, 8, 10, 12±13

perestroika, 132, 137, 157, 200

see also Gorbachev, Mikhail

Peter the Great, 42±3, 47, 56

pir, 61, 128

see also shaykh; ishan; Sufism

Poliane, tribe, 4

Polosin, A.V., 176

Polovtsy, 8, 10, 12±13

see also Kipchaks Pshikhachev, Shafig, 144

see also Muftiyat; Kabardino-Balkaria

Pugachev, Yemelian, revolt of, 43,

57±8

Putin, V.V., Russian President, 156, 185

Qadimism, 65, 75, 82±4, 89±90, 155

see also al-usul al-qadim

Al-Qursawi, 76

see also Tatars

Radimichi, tribe, 1, 4

Rakhimov, Murtaza, Bashkortostan

President, 156

see also Bashkortostan

ramadan, 127, 131, 133

Rasulev, Gabdrahman, 121, 126

see also DUMES, Muftiyat

Red Shariatists, movement of, 103, 129

Refah party, 162±3, 166, 172

see also Niyazov Abdel-Wahid

Rida, Rashid, 76

Romanovs, the Russian ruling dynasty

of, 41

Ruriks, the Varangian dynasty of, 5, 17

Russia, emergence of, 24

Byzantine influence on, 24±5, 35±6;

Genghizid influence on, 25±7,

34±5; foreign relations of, 29,

31, 40±1, 45, 47, 49, 111±12, 125;

during Soviet period, 99±137;

after Communism, 144±96

Russian orientalists, 78±9

Russian Orthodox Church, foundation

of, 8

under Genghizid rule, 20; and the

Russian state, 35±8; Holy Synod,

43, 75; policy on Islam, 72±4,

84±5; after Communism, 193,

195±7

Russian Social-Democratic Party (RSDRP), 91±2

Russo-Chechen conflict, 177±85

Russo-Iranian wars, 47, 49

Russo-Turkish wars, 41, 51, 53, 70,

92±3 Sadiq, Muhammad Yusuf, 133

see also SADUM; Muftiyat

SADUM, 121, 126, 130±1, 133

see also Muftiyat; Central Asia

Sadur, Ahmed, 167, 173

see also Islamic Renaissance Party

Sadval, movement, 145

see also Lezgins; Dagestan

Index 241 Saidov, Abdurashid, 173±4

see also Islamic Democratic Party of

Dagestan

Saint Gurii Brotherhood, 72, 85

see also Russian Orthodox Church

Saint Petersburg, city and region, 42,

52, 63, 71, 78, 88

Sakaliba, tribe, 2

Salafiyya, 134, 138, 167±8, 181±2

see also Islamic fundamentalism; Wahhabism Salman, Farid, 154, 156, 162

see also Muftiyat; Tatarstan

Samarkand, city and region, 44, 60

see also Bukhara Emirate; Central Asia

San Stefano Treaty, 52

see also Russo-Turkish wars

Saray, city, 22

see also Golden Horde; Genghizid

empire

Sattarov, Faiz Rahman, 156±7

see also Tatarstan

Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii, 147±9, 188

see also Naqshbandiyya; Dagestan

Semeke, Kazakh Khan, 57

see also Middle Horde; Kazakhs

Semenov, V., 142

see also Karachays; Karachaevo-

Cherkessia

Semipalatinsk, city and region, 56±7

Severianie, tribe, 1, 4

Seyid Alim Khan, 70, 110

see also Bukhara Emirate

Shadhaliyya, tariqa, 149

see also Sayid-efendi Chirkeevskii;

Sufism; Dagestan

Shaimiev, Mintimir, Tatarstan

President, 155±6

see also Tatarstan

Shakh Ali, Kazan Khan, 29±30

see also Kazan Khanate

Shamyl, Imam, 50±3, 109

see also Caucasian war;

Naqshbandiyya Shamyl Popular Front, 145

see also Makhachev, Gadji; Avars;

Dagestan

Shapsugs, 14, 48

see also Circassians

shariat, court, 71, 103, 109, 181±3, 190

shaykh, 18, 61, 149±50, 187±8

see also pir; ishan; Sufism

Shiites, 61, 77

see also Ismailis; Ithna-Asharites

shirk (heresy), 131, 188

Siberia, 56, 58±9, 157, 159

see also Siberian Khanate

Siberian Khanate, 22, 28, 32±3

silsila, 54±5

see also Sufism

Skobelev, M.D., 43, 63, 66, 98

see also Central Asia

Slavophiles, xii

Small Horde (Kichi Juz), 56±9

see also Kazakhs; Kazakhstan

SMR, 159, 162

see also Gaynutdinov, Ravil

Sogratlinskii, Muhammad, 52

see also Caucasian war;

Naqshbandiyya

Sovetskii narod (Soviet people), concept

of, 116, 136

Speranskii, M., reforms of, 59

see also Siberia

starokreshennie (old converts), 39, 85

see also Russian Orthodox Church

Stroganoffs, Russian merchant family,

32

see also Siberia

Sufism, 47±8, 61, 66, 115, 128, 149±50

see also tariqatism

Sultan-Galievshchina, 118

see also Galiev, Mir-Sultan

Suvars, 4

Tabasarans, 15

Tablighiyya, 175, 201

Tadjuddinov, Talgat, 133, 154, 158±63

see also DUMES; TSDUMR; At-

Tahtazani, Saad ad-Din

taip (clan), 178±9, 181, 189

see also Chechens

Tajikistan, 111, 117±19, 133, 137

see also Tajiks

Tajiks, 60, 111

see also Tajikistan

Taliban, movement, 181

see also Afghanistan

242 Index Talishes, 14

Tamerlane, see under Timur Khan

taqlid, 84

tariqatism, 48, 50, 149±52, 168, 182,

187±8, 190

see also Sufism; North Caucasus

Tashkent, city and region, 57, 64, 97,

109 Tatar Public Centre (TOTS), 153±4

see also Tatarstan

Tatars, 16, 31, 39±40, 43±4, 69±70, 74±8,

80, 106, 116, 118, 128, 153±7

see also Tatarstan

Tatarstan, 138, 153±6

see also Tatars

Tats, 14

tawhid (strict monotheism), 187

Tenglik, Kumyk national movement,

145, 149

see also Kumyks; Dagestan

Tere, Balkar organization, 141

see also Kabardino-Balkaria; Balkars

Terjuman-Perevodchik, newspaper, 79,

90

see also Gasprinskii, Ismail; jadidism

Timur Khan, 14, 22

see also Genghizid empire

Tobol'sk, city and region, 33, 57, 60

see also Siberia

Tsalikov, Ahmet-bey, 92, 94, 100

see also Dagestan

TSDUMR, 158±9, 161±2

see also DUMES; Tadjuddinov, Talgat;

Muftiyat

Tsez, 14

tukhum (clan), 189

see also Dagestan

Turkestan, 59, 63±5, 93, 109, 137

Turkic Khaganat, 2

Turkmanchay Treaty, 49

see also Russo-Iranian wars

Turkmenistan, 117, 121

Turkmens, 55, 58, 60±2, 66

Ubukhs, 14

see also Circassians

Udmurts, 4

Udugov, Movladi, 175, 180±1

see also Islamic Nation; Chechnya

Ufa, city and region, 105±6, 156

see also DUMES; TSDUMR;

Bashkortostan

Ugors, 204

Ukraine, 41

umra (small hajj), 186

Union of Militant Fighters against

God, 114, 121

see also Yaroslavskii, E.

Union of Newly Converted Muslims,

146

see also Dagestan

Union of Russia's Muslims (URM), 146,

169±72

see also Khachilaev, Nadirshakh

al-usul al-jadid, 74±9, 81, 83, 85, 87±8,

92

see also jadidism

al-usul al-qadim, 75±6, 82±3, 85±6, 99

see also qadimism

Uzbek Khan, 18±20, 56

see also Genghizids

Uzbekistan, 117±18, 123, 137

see also Uzbeks

Uzbeks, 60±2, 133

Uzdens, 109

see also Caucasian war

Uzun Haji, Imam, 95, 109

see also North Caucasus

Vahitov, Mulannur, 96, 102±4

see also Muslim Communism

Vaisov Bozhii Polk, 83, 99

see also Bakha ad-Din

Validi, Zaki, 100±1, 106

see also Bashrevkom Valikhanov, Chokan, 98

see also Kazakhs

Varangians (Vikings), 4±10, 13

Vasilii II, Moscow kniaz, 23

Vasilii III, Moscow kniaz, 34

Veli Ibragim, 108, 113

Veli-Ibragimovshchina, 113, 115, 118

Viatichi, 1, 4

Vikings, see Varangians

Vis-Haji, wird, 130, 179

see also Kunta-Haji, wird

Vladikavkaz, city and region, 52

see also North Ossetia

Index 243 Vladimir, Kievan kniaz, 8

see also Kievan Rus

Volga Bulgaria, Islamicization of, 7±8,

16

under Genghizid rule, 16, 19

see also Bulgars

Volga Germans, 122

Wahhabism, 134, 144, 149, 151±2,

181±3, 185±91

see also salafiyya; Islamic

fundamentalism

waqf, 44, 55, 61, 71, 170

Westernizers, xii, 42

Yandarbiev, Zalimkhan, 181

see also Russo-Chechen conflict

Yaragskii, Muhammad, 50

see also Naqshbandiyya; Caucasian

war

yarlyk, 17, 20

Yaroslav, Kievan kniaz, 13

see also Kievan Rus

Yaroslavskii, E., 114

see also Union of Militant Fighters

against God

yasak, 17, 21±2, 40

see also Genghizids

Yasawiyya, tariqa, 48, 61, 128

see also Sufism

Yeltsin, B.N., Russian President, xii,

140±1, 162, 171, 177±8, 191±3, 199

Yermak, 32

see also Siberia

Yermolov, A.P., 49

see also Caucasian war

Young Bukharan Party, 95, 101

Young Khivans Party, 95, 101

Young Tatars Party, 91±2

see also Mehdi, Abdurreshid zakat, 127

zemshchina, 35

see also Ivan IV

Zhirinovskii, V.V., 169

ziyarat, 188

see also tariqatism Zuganov, G.A., 171