Royal Song of Saraha: Study in the History of Buddhist Thought

Saraha, arrowsmith , songster, and sage

THE ROYAL SONG OF SARAHA A Study in the History of Buddhist Thought TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED BY

HERBERT V. GUENTHER

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SHAMBALA Berkeley and London

SHAMBALA PUBLICATIONS, INC. 1409 Fifth Street Berkeley, California 94710 and Barn Cottage, Stert Devizes, Wiltshire

Distributed in the Commonwealth and Europe by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. London and Henley-on-Thames First paperback edition 1973

Copyright © 1968 by the University of Washington Press Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress 68-8512 ISBN 0-87773-042-3

Preface

The richness of Eastern thought and its influence in moulding the life of the peoples in the Far East are still relatively little known and appreciated. The vast field of Tibetan thought and civilization is virtually unexplored. Too often, also, thought and action have been presented as unrelated to each other. The theme of this study of Saraha is the interrelation between thought and action. It is not exhaustive, rather exploratory, and attempts to show the significance of Saraha's work for the development ofTibetan Buddhist thought and ways oflife in the manner in which it was understood by the Tibetans themselves, as illustrated by the two commentaries translated here, one by the Nepalese scholar, sKye-med bdechen (eleventh century), and the other by the famous bKa'brgyud-pa Lama Karma Phrin-las-pa (fifteenth century). In this respect, it is hoped, this study will destroy the longcherished myth that the Tibetans merely translated mechanically from Indian sources and thus were little more than the custodians of works unfortunately lost in India. There is nothing to support this myth and it is about time to realize that Indian Buddhist thought acted merely as a powerful stimulus to an otherwise profound indigenous thinking which could absorb and remodel new ideas. v

In searching for expressions suitable for conveying the meaning of the many technical terms, I have tried to remain as close as possible to the associations these terms evoke in spoken Tibetan and to the ideas they convey to the Tibetan listener. It should be constantly borne in mind that in the field of philosophical thinking the Tibetans made use of symbolic etymologies distinct from the linguistic ones. In attempting to convey what the Tibetans understood and what they lived by, it is best to follow their example. Therefore, the translation offered here is not a "crib" which, pretending to deal with ideas, actually confuses irrelevant linguistic etymologies with significant philosophical statements. Eastern philosophical texts, which in most cases are also psychologically informative, must be dealt with from the viewpoint of philosophy and psychology, not from that of exercises in grammar and syntax. No one can know better than I do that such a task is beset with difficulties, so much more so because philosophy is not something reducible to one or another" ism," but a perpetual questioning. I am not thinking of this translation as a substitute for the original, because a translation worth the name is more a commentary on the original than a cheap substitute for it. Therefore, my aim has qeen not to give a complete and unchallengeable answer to any problem that arises in the texts, which would be impossible, but to give pointers in what I believe to be the right direction and to arouse interest, curiosity, and the desire to explore further. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness and gratitude to Mr. K. Angrup, Lecturer at Panjab University, Chandighar, India, who assisted me in procuring the rare blockprint of Karma Phrin-las-pa's commentary on Saraha's Dohiis and in having it copied; to Geshe Nagwang Nima (dge-bshes Ngag-dbang Nyi-ma), formerly of Drepung monastery, Vl

Tibet, and Research Fellow at the Sanskrit University in Varanasi, India, now at Kern Institute in Leiden, Holland; to Naynang Rinpoche (Gnas-nang dpa' -bo rin-po-che) of Darjeeling, India; and to the Incarnate Lama TarthangTulku (Dar-thang sprul-sku) at the Sanskrit University in Varanasi, for their untiring help in deciphering the often illegible blockprint and making the necessary corrections in the copied text. All of them were always ready to discuss and elucidate difficult passages. My thanks are also due to Professors L. Miller, T. Y. Henderson, and R. W. Krutzen of the University of Saskatchewan, who read part of the typescript and made valuable suggestions concerning the rendering of philosophical terms. To G.J. Yorke, I owe much for style and presentation. I am especially grateful to the University of Saskatchewan for making available a substantial fmancial contribution for the publication of this book. My wife has given unstinted help in proofreading and indexing; and even more in the patience and understanding she has shown when all my spare time was devoted to the writing of this book. H. V. G.

PREFACE

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Contents

PART I: TRADITION AND PHILOSOPHY

The Tradition about Saraha and His Works 3 The Teaching of the Dohas 21 Existence versus Essence 42 PART II: THE ROYAL SONG OF SARAHA

The Song on Human Action-the Treasure ·of Dohiis 63 PART III: COMMENT ARIES

Commentaries by sKye-med bde-chen and Karma Phrin:..las-pa 75 Selected Bibliography Index

209

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PART I

TRADITION AND PHILOSOPHY

The Tradition about Saraha and His Works

"King Dohas" is the name given by tradition to one of three works composed in a number of melodious verse forms, summarized under the term "Doha." The particular composition bearing the name "King Do has" is said to have been sung to a certain king on a certain occasion by its author Saraha, the "Great Brahmin" as he is usually referred to in Tibetan texts. As in almost all cases in the history of Indian thought practically nothing is known about him and yet, to judge by the many quotations from his compositions, his importance for the mystic philosophers ofTibet and for some in India cannot be overestimated, even if he is not counted as one of the spiritual teachers in succession. This latter circumstance may be the reason that his name is hardly ever mentioned in works dealing with Indian thought. The few indigenous "biographies" differ about his birthplace and the name of the ruler at that time, but are· unanimous in their assertion that a decisive turn in his life occurred through a woman. By far the most interesting account ofhis life is given by Karma Phrin-las-pa, who writes: 1 1 Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-hii skor gsum-gyi {i-kii sems-kyi rnam-thar ston-pa'i me-long (hereafter cited as Do-hii skor-gsum ... ), fol. za.

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Although many different opinions prevail concerning his time Rang-byung rdo-rje's [A.D. 1284-1 339] statement that he was born three hundred and thirty-six years after the demise of the Buddha is most plausible. The Great Brahmin Saraha was the youngest offive sons born to the Brahmin sPangs-pa phun-sum-tshogs and his wife, the Brahmini sPangs-ma phun-sum-tshogs, in the South, in India, in the country of Be-ta [Vidarbha]. The five brothers were well versed in many subjects, but excelled in the knowledge of the Vedas. Therefore King Mahapila was pleased to honor them as worthy persons. At this time Hayagriva2 had assumed the form of the Bodhisattva Sukhanatha in order to provide spiritual tr:lining for those capable of becoming instantly enlightened. Thinking that the Great Brahmin might accomplish his purpose he appeared in the guise of four Brahmin girls and one female arrowsmith, all of them beings of the spiritual world (mkha'-'gro-ma). Four· of them took up their place in a park, while one remained behind in a market place. When the five brothers came to the park the four Brahmin girls approached them and asked them where they had come from, where they were going, and what they were doing. Being answered that they had not come from any particular place, were not going anywhere and also were not doing anything special, the girls inquired about their caste. The brothers declared themselves to be Brahmins and recited the four Vedas on the spot. Four of them asked the girls whether they would like to have them as their consorts and when the girls had consented theywentaway together. The youngest brother thought of becoming a monk and asked the king for permission. Having obtained it he entered the order under Mahayana Srikirti, a disciple ofBuddha's son Rahulabhadra. Through intense studies he became a noted scholar in countless subjects. Not only did he become famous as the Brahmin Rahula, 2 Hayagriva {rTa-mgrin) is one of the protecting deities (choi-skyong) ofTibet. For a description see Alice Getty, The Gods tifNorthern Buddhism (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1962), pp. 162 ff., and Pl. xliv, fig. c.; Antoinette K. Gordon, The Iconography of Tibetan Lamaism (rev. ed.; Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1960), p. go and plates; Raghu Vira an.d Lokesh Chandra, A New Tibetan-Mongol Pantheon (Vol. XXI in the Sata-pi!aka Series oflndo-Asian ,Literatures; New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1961), Part I, Pl. 64; Part II, Pis. 137-41; Part VIII, Pl. 55·

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he also became the spiritual master of the teacher Nagarjuna and other illustrious persons. . Once when this Brahmin Rahula was roaming in his district and had come to a garden, the four Brahmin girls approached him with cups ofbeer and begged him to drink them. Although he protested he succumbed to their entreaties and drank the four cups of beer in large gulps. He had four particularly pleasant sensations3 and, as had been prophesied about him, he met the Bodhisattva Sukhanatha face to face. Blessed by him he was exhorted: "In this city there lives a mysterious arrowsmith woman who is making a four-piece .arrow. Go to her and many beings will profit by it." With these words the vision disappeared. Through the sustaining power of this vision the mystic awareness of the coemergence of both transcendence and immanence was born in him. Thinking that he would have to act after this instantaneous realization of spiritual freedom, he went to the big market place and thete he saw a young woman cutting an arrow-shaft, looking neither to the right nor to the left, wholly concentrated on making an a,rrow. Coming closer he saw her carefully straightening a reed with three joints, cutting it both at the bottom and at the top, inserting a pointed arrowhead where she had cut the bottom into four sections and tying it with a tendon, putting four feathers where she had split the top into two pieces and then, closing one eye and opening the other, assuming the posture of aiming at a target. When he asked her whether she was a professional arrowsmith she said: "My dear young man, the Buddha's meaning can be known through symbols and actions, not through words and books." Then and there the spiritual significance of what she was doing dawned upon him. The reed is the symbol for the uncreated; the three joints, that of the necessity to realize the three existential norms ;4 the straightening of the shaft, that ofstraightening the path ofspiritual growth; 3 This is an allusion to the four kinds of delight sensed during the process of spiritual development and integration. See Herbert V. Guenther, The Life and Teaching of Niiropa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 78, note 2. 4 They are those of noetic (chos-sku, dharmakiiya), communicative (longs-spyod rdzogs-pa'i sku, sambhogakiiya), and authentic being (sprulpa'i sku, nirmiipakiiya). The Tibetan term sku always implies the dynamic character of being and existing; the static aspect of~' body" is termed Ius.

THE TRADITION ABOUT SARAHA AND HIS WORKS

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cutting the shaft at the bottom, that of the necessity to uproot Sal!lsara, and at the top, that of eradicating the belief in a self or an essence; the splitting of the bottom into four sections, that of "memory," "nonmemory," "unorigination," and "transcendence" ;5 inserting the arrowhead, that of the necessity to use one's intelligence; tying it with a tendon, that ofbeing fixed by the seal of unity; splitting the upper end into two, that ofaction and intelligence; inserting four feathers, that oflooking, attending to the seen, ·acting on the basis of what has been seen and attended to, and their combination of fruition; opening one eye and closing the other, that of shutting the eye of discursiveness and opening that of the a priori awareness; the posture of aiming at a target, that of the necessity to shoot the arrow of nonduality into the heart of the belief in duality. Because of this understanding his name was to become" Saraha" (he who has shot the arrow). In India, sara means "arrow" and ha(n) "to have shot," and so he became known as "He who has shot the arrow" (mda'-bsnun) because he had sent the arrow of nonduality into the heart of duality [which is the belief in subject and object as ultimate entities]. Then he said: "You are not an ordinary arrowsmith woman; you are a teacher ofsymbols."6 He lived with her and engaged in yogic activities. "Till yesterday I was not a real Brahmin, from today I am "7-with these and similar words he departed with her .to the cremation grounds. When on the occasion of some people celebrating a Tantric feast he sang some songs and when, singing many songs, he feasted in company with the arrowsmith woman in the cremation grounds, 5 These are the key·terms used in the elucidation of the progressive deepening of mystic insight and the felt knowledge of existence. As symbol terms they must not be confused with the connotations these words have in ordinary language. 6 There is here a word-play between mda'-mkhan-ma (female arrowsmith) and brda-mkhan-ma (a woman well versed in symbols), the pronunciation of the two words being the same. 7 The same words are quoted in dPa-bb gtsug-lag, mKhas-pa'i dga'ston, ed. by Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1959), Part II, pp. 349 ff. In the account of Saraha's life in this work these words were spoken after his vision and before his meeting with the arrowsmith woman.

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a great number of people who had gathered to watch in faith, gained an understanding of the meaning of reality by merely hearing the word "Reality" and went into ecstasy.s At this time, many dirty-minded Indians vilified and slandered him: "The Brahmin Rahula does not perform the time-honored rites and has given up celibacy. He indulges in shameful practices with a low-caste woman and runs around like a dog in all directions." When the king heard these slanders he issued orders to his subjects headed by Saraha's four Brahmin brothers that they should try to persuade the Great Brahmin to give up his scandalous behavior and by acting decently to help the people in the realm. It was then that on behalf of the people he sang the one hundred and sixty verses [constituting the" People Dohas "],thereby setting them on the right path. When the king's queens entreated him in like manner he sang the eighty verses [forming the "Queen Do has"], making them understand the meaning of Reality. Finally, the king himself came to beg the Great Brahmin to revert to his earlier behavior, and it was for the sake of the king that Saraha sang the forty verses [known as the "King Dohas"]. As Saraha led the king and his entourage on the path of Reality the country·ofBe-ta [Vidarbha] became empty instantly [that is, the inhabitants lost interest in the common preoccupations in life]. There is little historical value in this delightful biographical sketch with its poking fun at the puritanical tenor of Indian society. The reference to King Mahapala is worthless for at least two reasons. One is that other texts give the king' s name as Ratnapala or Candanapala, 9 and since these names are as common in the Indian setting as are Jones and Smith in English it is very unlikely that any one of them was a member of the Pala dynasty, which ruled for about three centuries (from the ninth to the eleventh) in the eastern part of India. The other reason is that "king" is an administrative title whose use is not restricted to persons who have become so Literally, "attained the faculty of walking in the sky." M. Shahidullah, Les Chants Mystiques de Kii~;~ha et de Saraha (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1928), p. 31. 8

9

THE TRADITION ABOUT SARAHA AND HIS WORKS

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famous in one way or another that they have gone down in history. This Mahapala may well have been a city magistrate, and it can be noted in passing that there is also no unanimity concerning the city where Saraha was born. 10 It has been argued that the language in which Saraha expressed his ideas is a late Apabhrarpsa form pointing to Bengal, and that for this reason he must belong to a late period of Buddhist thought. This argument from language might have carried. conviction ifSaraha had not been quoted by Naropa [A.D. IOI6-IIoo], and hence must have been an authority before Naropa's time. Moreover, it remains a strange fact, reflecting rather unfavorably on the scholarliness of those who have dealt with the "People Dohas," that none of them noted that the Tibetan translation, apart from being larger than the alleged original, does not tally with the Apabhrarpsa version. 11 The latter studiously avoids all the 10 According to the source used by M. Shahidullah, ibid., Saraha was born at Roli in Rajfii in the Eastern part of India. But according to Padma dkar-po, Phyag-rgya chen-po'i man-ngag-gi bshad-sbyar rgyal-ba'i gan-mdzod (hereafter cited as Phyag-chen gan-mdzod . .. ), fol. 9b, he was born in Varanasi (Benares). Padma dkar-po lets him be a direct disciple of Buddha's son Rahula and claims that he was born only thirty years after the Buddha's death, and that his early name was Rahulabhadra according to the custom of the disciple taking part of the teacher's name in forming his own name. Padma dkar-po then attempts to explain away the period between Saraha's and Nagarjuna's birth. The assumption that Mahapala is a misspelling for Mahipala, the name of the ninth king of the dynasty (circa A.D. 978-1030), also does not help because the popular memory has attached itself to this ruler more than to any other so that he is more like a peg on which to hang any tradition about important persons. 11 A translation, not always correct, of the "People Dohas" in French has been given by M. Shahidullah, Les Chants Mystiques de KatJha et de Saraha, and one in English by D. L. Snellgrove, "Saraha's Treasury of Songs," pp. 224-39 in E. Conze (ed.), Buddhist Texts through the Ages (Oxford: Cassirer, 1954). The English translation closely follows the French one but omits all verses not found in Apabhramsa and destroys the logical-context by removing two verses {16 and 17 in Shahidullah's

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technical terms characteristic ofSaraha's line of thought. For instance, the Apabhramsa version reads:1 2 It arises as a thing and into no thing fades, Having no essence when will it arise again? Without end or beginning, that which links both is not found. Stay! The gracious master speaks. Look and listen, touch and eat, Smell and wander, sit and stand, Pass your time in easy talk, Let mind go, move not from singleness. The Tibetan "translation" has If that born as a [thing or] substance becomes quiet like the sky What then is there to be born when that substance has been destroyed? That which from the beginning has no origination Is now understood when taught by the gracious Guru. If to see, hear, touch, and remember, To eat, drink, wander, go, and stand, Empty talk and answers are but mind, Then from the One one never moves. Karma Phrin-las-pa who, of course, bases his explanations on the Tibetan translation, comments on these lines as follows: 13 If whatever has come as substance and quality, such as color-form, has subsided in the realm of spontaneity,14like clouds disappearing version) from where they belong and placing them outside the body of the text. 12 Verses 56 and 57 in M. Shahidullah's edition. 13 Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-ha skor-gsum . .. , fol. 35ab. 14 The literal translation of the Tibetan term lhan-cig skyes-pa (Sanskrit sahaja) would be "coemergence," and as such it iS explained by Padma dkar-po, Phyag-chen gan-mdzod . .. , fols. 29a ff. Essentially it refers to the spontaneity and totality of the experience in which the opposites such as transcendence and immanence, subject and object, the THE TRADITION ABOUT SARAHA AND HIS WORKS

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in the sky, what kind of belief in subject and object [as ultimates] can arise when the idea of substance which is the content of a mind believing in determinables, has been abolished? The objects of the six senses [then] partake of the nature of unorigination. When does [the feeling of] unoriginatedness in which the idea of substance has been abolished, arise? As long as one has not appreciated that that which has been without origination from the very beginning has been so before, it is understood the moment it is taught by the Guru, and this understanding is but incidental. Therefore it has to be safeguarded as the foundation of the path of spiritual development. Then, when through an absorption in which everything is experienced as being of an apparitional nature, a yogi who understands the meaning of being knows as mind whatever he may see with his eyes, hear with his ears, feel with his body, think in his mind, whatever also he may eat and smell, whatever he may do in the way of walking, going, standing, and giving appropriate answers to the chatter in everyday life, and then by being aware that all ideas due to the six senses are transformations of the sole reality, Mind, he does not lose a state of composure. On the other hand, gNyis-med Avadhiitipa, whose work is available only in its Tibetan translation but who as an Indian dealt with the Indian version, has also commented on a text from which the present Tibetan translation has been made and which cannot be identified with the available Apabhraq1sa version.15 He says: noumenal and the phenomenal indivisibly blend. The translation of this term by" I' !nne" (M. Shahidullah) and" the Innate" (D. L. Snellgrove) is wrong. 1 5 Do-ha mdzod-kyi snying-po-don-gyi glu'i 'grel-pa (Dohiiko~a-hrdaya­ artha-giti-tikii) ; Derge ed.: rgyud-' grel, Vol. zhi, fols. 82b ff.; Peking ed.: rgyud-' grel, Vol. rtsi, fols. 97a ff.; (hereafter cited as Do-hii mdzodkyi snying-po .. .). If the author's name, gNyis-med Avadhiitipa, is a

contraction of gN yis-med rdo-rje and A vadhiitipa, which according to Sog-po Khal-kha chos-rje Ngag-dbang dpal-ldan, Grub-mtha' chen-mo'i mchan-'grel dka'-gnad mdud-grol blo-gsal gees-nor zhes-bya-ba-las dngossmra-ba'i skabs, fol. 2a, were other names of Maitripa, then the work

represents the famous" Commentary by Maitripa." IO

The existentiality of Mind is comparable with the sky while "memory," an outcome of mind, is like mist and passes away; hence, "If that born as a [thing or] substance has become quiet like the sky." The origination of things [substances] is not something that happens apart from mind; it comes out of" memory" and [this in turn] out of"nonmemory." But what is there to arise in what is beyond these two? Hence, "what then is there to be born when that substance has been destroyed?" If anything originates from that which has had no origin from its very beginning, even a sky-flower can be said to come into existence. In this way everything that appears is known [to be like] a sky-flower. Why? Because the sky gradually takes shape and appears as a variety of things. Therefore appearance is like a sky-flower. Inasmuch as mind as such can be compared with the sky and "memory," which is the outcome of mind, with a sky-flower, neither hope nor fear should prevail in a meditation moving in the realm of" memory." Therefore that which is not vitiated by "memory" and "nonmemory" [is spoken of as] "That which from the beginning has no origination." When appearance is pointed out by the symbols of body, speech, and mind, and nothingness by [those ofnonmemory and] unorigination, [the concluding wor~s apply]: "Is now understood when taught by the gracious Guru." As to the value of the felt knowledge of reality, when there is no longer any deliberation about anything, color-form, sound, flavor, fragrance, and touch are referred to by the symbol-term "memory," and hence [Saraha begins] "If to see, hear, touch, and remember." The pure and impure, going and coming are referred to by the symbol-term [" nonmemory "], [and the verse continues] "to eat, drink, wander, go, and stand." Question and answer is referred to by the symbol-term [" unorigination "], hence "Empty talk and answers are but mind." And since the actuality of mind does not part from its "transcendence" [Saraha concludes] "Then from the One one never moves."

Even if we were to accept the thesis that the Tibetan commentators read into the text what is not, or is supposed to have been, the original meaning, the fact remains that this "reading something into something" relates to words that are found in the Tibetan translation and that also must have been THE TRADITION ABOUT SARAHA AND HIS WORKS

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in the version from which the Tibetan translation was made, although they are not in the available ApabhraJ!lS'a text. It is from the outset rather unlikely that the Tibetan translators failed to understand this particular text while in all their other translations they thoroughly understood the Indian versions. Since, moreover, the Tibetan version contains more verses than the Apabhrarp.sa text and since also the grouping of the individual lines into a coherent verse differs from the available text,· there is no other alternative but to consider the Apabhramsa text as a "bowdlerized" and fragmentary version of an earlier work that unfortunately has been lost. We are thus left with the tradition that Saraha was the teacher ofNagarjuna, whom he met when he was already an old man. Unfortunately the time ofNagarjuna is unknown, too. The hypothesis that he lived in the second century A.D. is highly plausible, but no exact proof can be adduced. Nagarjuna certainly is one of the greatest mystic philosophers; so is Saraha, and for this reason a pupil-teacher relationship may well have existed. The attempt, however, to duplicate Nagarjuna, claiming the one to be a philosopher and the other a Tantric, is not worth a moment's consideration as it merely reflects· ignorance about the relationship between theory (philosophy) and practice (Tantra) and prejudges both. Although the historicity of Saraha cannot be doubted, the elusiveness of the man is matched by that of his teaching. This is not so much because what he has to say is so abstruse as to be incomprehensible; rather it is the internal structure of his teaching that has baffled those who have referred to him. This is partly because the song form in which Saraha's thought is expressed renders the whole representation into little fragmentary pictures which seem to stand independent! y by themselves. The progression of thought goes from image to image, from emotion to emotion, and therefore seems to lack the logical clarity of a didactic treatise. The failure to 12

detect a progression of thought is certainly because most philosophers have lost all vital contact with poetic modes of expression and instead substitute, ifever they aspire to poetry, an intellectual activity that consists of giving reflective thought a metrical form. Ifit is already difficult to detect a systematic progression of thought in one work, how much more difficult it is to relate three different works to one single strand of thought! Traditionally, the work of Saraha is mentioned by the name The Three Cycles of Do has (do-ha skor gsum) consisting of what is otherwise known as "King Dohas," "Queen Dohas," and "People Dohas," each of them dealing with a specific existential problem. It seems that this particular triple division has sometimes been doubted as having been the intention of Saraha. Karma Phrin-las-pa 16 states that some people were of opinion that The Three Cycles of Dohas were indeed sung by Saraha, but were not divided into larger and smaller poems as they all were merely expressive of his mystic experience. At a later time they were written down by Saraha's disciple Nagarjuna and for the sake of instruction discussed in the form of three treatises varying in size. Others, however, claimed that Nagarjuna cannot be held to have arranged the songs into treatises; they were put so by Saraha for the benefit ofMaitripa, Saraha having realized spiritual freedom when the songs were recited to him as an instructive injunction.

Karma Phrin-las-pa rejects these views in favor of the tradition by Rang-byung rdo-rje for whom The Three Cycles of Dohiis were the authentic works of Saraha. When reading the kind of texts which are likely to contain quotations from Saraha, what strikes us immediately is the fact that almost all quotations are taken from his so-called "People Dohas." 17 This also seems to have been noted by the Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-hii skor-gsum . .. , fol. 3b. An exception is kLong-chen rab-'byams-pa, Chos-dbyings rin-poche'i mdzod-kyi 'grel-pa lung-gi gter-mdzod (hereafter cited as Chos16 17

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Tibetans, who then by way of"higher" criticism proceeded to claim that the " Queen Do has" and "King Dohas" were not the works of Saraha. Karma Phrin-las-pa rejects this claim, and his objection against the arbitrariness of any "higher criticism" is well taken. 18 He calls its followers "ignoble persons" who declare that19 both the "King Dohas" and "Queen Do has" are not genuine works by Saraha and that the term" Three Cycles ofDohas" does not mean three different works. Rather, "Three Cycles ofDohas" means the cycle ofinitiation as the prerequisite for spiritual maturation, the cycle of explanation of the basic work, and the cycle of guidance in making a living experience of that which has been explained and taught. The first cycle is the initiation into the spiritual meaning of Vajravarahi or the initiation by the four symbol-terms20 used in the Dohiis. The second is the explanation of the "People Dohas" in connection with Maitripa's commentary on it, and the third is the guidance by means of the four symbolterms used in the Dohiis or the instruction by means of pebbles. Since this is the meaning of" Three Cycles ofDohas" the two other works ["King Do has" and "Queen Do has"] are a forgery. In order to substantiate this criticism the same people state that the index to the bsTan-'gyur by Bu-ston [A.D. 1219-1364] only lists the "People Dohas"; that there is no Indian commentary on the other two works; and that Ras-chung-pa [A.D. 1083-II61] saw only the "People Dohas" in India where he had gone because gLing-ras-pa [A.D. II28-88], an expert in mysticism, had written a commentary on the "People Dohas" but not on the other two "Dohas," but on his return to Tibet found three works with Bal-po A-su. For this dbyings rin-po-che'i mdzod . ..), fol. 54b, where the first line of stanza 8 of the" King Dohas" is quoted. Stanza 17 is quoted in full by Thub-bstan 'bar-ba in his Nges-don phyag-rgya-chen-po'i sgom-rim gsal-bar byed-pa'i legs-bshad zla-ba'i 'od-zer, fol. 5ab. 18 On the unsound methods of "higher criticism" in general, see Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), pp. 265 ff. 19 Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-ha skor-gsum .. ., fol. 3b ff. 2° That is, "memory," "nonmemory," "unorigination," and "transcendence."

reason the two works may well have been composed by Lama Bal-po himself. This is all subversive talk and reflects on the ignorance [of those who hold such views] because though the verses do not occur in gLing's commentary, they can be seen in other works after the main body of the text. Moreover, in the index to the bsTan-' gyur many works have not been listed; if this is to mean that they have not been written and that in the absence· of an Indian commentary works are not genuine, the number ofspurious works would increase greatly. Therefore, the works are oflndian origin; and since such wise persons as Rang-byung rdo-rje and others have written commentaries on them on the basis of other commentaries being existent, taking these works as genuine, and written by former scholars such as Par-phu-ba and Tsang nag-po, and since also many later scholars like Mati paQ.-chen [circa A.D. 1334] and Yidbzang rtse-pa continued writing commentaries on them, they must be considered as genuine. The tradition of the Dohiis in Tibet goes back to Mar-pa [A.D. 1012-97], who had studied them in India under Maitripa

and who transmitted his knowledge to his favorite disciple Mi-la ras-pa [A.D. 1040-II23]. It seems, however, that he merely referred to them rather than giving a detailed explanation. Karma Phrin-las-pa says in this connection that "from among the four special and famous disciples of Maitripa, Lord Mar-pa studied the subject matter of the Dohiis well, and after having experienced for himself what the teaching was about, he handed it down to Mi-la ras-pa and others, but he did not translate or teach the subject matter of the three works.'' 21 AtiSa [A.D. 982-1054], too, had studied the Dohiis and was about to teach them when he was requested by 'Brom-ston not to do so because he was of opinion that the Tibetans might take them too literally and that as a consequence their morals might suffer. Although Maitripa's commentary was translated into Tibetan, the Dohiis were not 21

Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-ha skor-gsum ... , fol. 7a.

THE TRADITION ABOUT SARAHA AND HIS WORKS

15

specifically taught. Similarly the Zhi-byed system, 2 2 which goes back to Pha dam-pa Sangs-rgyas and which accepts the Dohiis, was more concerned with the realization of what the Dohiis taught than with teaching and promulgating them. The actual continuity of the teaching of their subject mai:ter derives from the Indian Vajrapal).i, who was the teacher of several Tibetans. Karma Phrin-las-pa informs us :23 Atisa had studied under Maitripa and when he arrived in mNga'ris he began teaching the Dohiis. When he gave a literal interpretation of statements such as "What is the use of sacrificial lamps and cakes?" he was asked not to continue with the teaching as it was feared that the morals of the Tibetans, slight as they were, might suffer. Although AtiSa was not happy about it, he is reported to have henceforward desisted from mentioning the Dohiis. He and Ba-ri lotsava translated Maitripa's commentary, but its contents were not taught. The followers of the Zhi-byed system, which derives from Pha dam-pa Sangs-rgyas, emphasized the inner experience of what the Dohiis suggested rather than the dissemination of the teaching itself, although they wrote notes on the translation of the "People Dohas" by rMa chos-'bar. The actual transmission of this teaching, the essence of Buddhism, is due to the Indian VajrapaQi.

The exploits ofVajrapaq.i are merely hinted at by Karma Phrin-las-pa, and a more detailed and intelligible account is found in 'Gos lotsava's sDeb-ther sngon-po. 24 Without the latter's version much of what Karma Phrin-las-pa writes remains unintelligible. · 22 A short account of this system, which aims at the total annihilation of suffering, is given in Thu'u-kvan bLo-bzang cho-kyi nyi-ma dpal bzang-po, Grub-mtha' thams-cad-kyi khungs dang 'dod-tshul ston-pa legs-

bshad shel-gyi me-long, Part V. 23 Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-hii skor-gsum. . . . See also George N. Roerich, The Blue Annals (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1949, 1953), II, 843 ff. 24 George N. Roerich, ibid., p. 858.

16

Vajrapal]i's influence centered on three persons who were to acquire great fame and contributed much to the development of Buddhist thought in Tibet. They were the Nepalese A-su (commonly known as Lama Bal-po), Ras-chung-pa, and mNga'-ris-pa, through whom the continuation of the teaching as well as the practice of realization was established. Karma Phrin-las-pa again informs us :2 5 The tradition which originated with Bal-po A-su became known as the Bal method about the Dohiis; the one which derived from Ras-chung-pa, who had studied the subject under Ti-phu-ba, was known as the Ras-chung method; and the one which spread through Gru-shul-ba, who had studied under mNga'-ris-pa, became known as the Par method because it was Par-phu-ba [a direct disciple of Gru-shul-ba] who had arranged the Three Cycles of Dohiis into treatises including the manuals about them. In course of the development of these three methods it happened that mNga'ris-pa and Ras-chung-pa also studied under LamaBal-po. Although in this way the two traditions [ofmNga'-ris-pa and Ras-chung-pa] go back to Bal-po who had studied under Vajrapal}i, the methods of teaching seem to have had individual traits, although both accepted the interpretation by Bal-po. For this reason our own tradition came to be known as consisting of three methods. My teacher, 'Khrul-zhig chen-po, explained solely the Par method and followed the text as embodied in the commentary written by the latter.

mNga'-ris-pa, whose full name was mNga'-ris Jo-stan Chos-kyi tshul-khrims-mNga'-ris after the name of his birth-place; Jo-bo stan-gcig-pa in recognition of the quality ofhis studies; and Chos-kyi tshul-khrims, his monastic name -had studied in India but, as advised by Vajrapal]i, went for further studies to Lama Bal-po. At ftrst he was aware of a difference between Vajrapal)i's and Bal-po A-su's teaching, but searching deeper he found that neither differed essentially, and so he accepted Bal-po A-su' s interpretation. Reading 25

Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-hii skor-gsum ... , fols. 7b ff.

THE TRADITION ABOUT SARAHA AND HIS WORKS 17

between the lines this means that Bal-po, a native Nepalese of, probably, Tibetan stock had interpreted the teaching of Vajrapat].i in the light of his Tibetan background, for every translation is an interpretation and no interpretation occurs in a vacuum. mNga'-ris-pa saw the difference but proceeded to reconcile it by the assumption that both the Indian and the Tibetan scholars dealt with Buddhism as their common ground and ultimate aim (nges-don), and he accepted the Nepalese-Tibetan way as more suited to his Tibetan character.26 The fact that mNga'-ris-pa noted the difference between the Indian and Nepalese-Tibetan conceptions cannot and must not be underestimated. It certainly destroys the long-cherished myth that the Tibetans translated mechanically from Indian texts, assuming ideas and concepts conveyed by the words in use to be separately movable and examinable counters (which is the fervent belief of modern dictionarytranslators). They were well aware of the fact that concepts are functionings of words which interlock with the functioning of other terms in a specific realm of discourse and, although" one word may have two or more functions, one of its functions cannot change places with another. " 27 mNga'-ris-pa's direct disciple was Gru-shul-ba, about whom little is known. His disciple was Par-phu-ba, who was born in g Yor-po and belonged to the ancient family ofrNga. His proper name was bLo-gros seng-ge, but he became known as Par-phu-ba because he had founded a monastery at ParIbid., fol. Sa. Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, r960), p. 32. It seems that many of the pseudoscholarly translations of Buddhist philosophical texts, by linguists who deliberately close their eyes to the fact that an etymological dissection of an isolated word is not a meaningful proposition, mask an attempt to bring into ridicule and contempt civilizations different from our own, because their so-called "objective" approach is but a euphemism for their self-centered feeling of superiority. 26

27

18

phu. Under Bu lotsava he had studied logic and epistemology and then met Phag-mo gru-pa ('Gro-mgon Phag-mo gru-pa rDo-rje rgyal-po, A.D. I I ro-70), who was a follower of one of the idealistic-mentalis* schools ofBuddhisni (sems-tsam). It was this idealistic-mentalistic interpretation which was . accepted by Par-phu-ba in his writings about the Dohiis. As Karma Phrin-las-pa's teacher also taught the Par method, idealistic-mentalistic trends are easily detected. Here again it must be noted that the Tibetans developed this line of thinking in their own way, and several distinct variations from the Indian prototype can be observed. Par-phu-ba became a disciple ofGru-shul-ba, who introduced him to the teaching of mysticism. A number of commentaries and explanatory works on the Dohiis testify to his interest in these works. From Par-phu-ba the tradition of the Dohiis continued through his direct disciple dGyer-sgom of sNye-phu shugsgseb, a monastery dGyer-sgom had founded and where he stayed for twenty-six years. His disciple was Sangs-rgyas dbon, alias Rin-chen snying-po, who acted as abbot for many years. He was succeeded by his disciple Brag-'bur-ba, the latter by Ri-la gzhon-rin, better known as Shugs-gseb ri-rab because he acted as abbot of Shugs-gseb monastery. Afterwards the tradition passed through Bla-ma dKon-mchog rdo-rje, Chos-sgo-ba dPal shes-rab, rDza-khol-ba Jo-stan, Bla-ma sMon-lam-pa, sTag-lung Chos-rje Ngag-gi dbangpo, rJe Sha-ra rab-'byams-pa bSod-nams seng-ge, and 'Khrul-zhig Sangs-rgyas bsam-grub, who was Karma Phrinlas-pa's teacher.2s Although Karma Phrin-las-pa follows the tradition ofhis teacher Sangs-rgyas bsam-grub, he also incorporated the teaching of Chos-grags rgya-mtsho (A.D. 1454-1505), who was the seventh Karma-pa hierarch and who followed the 28

Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-hii skor-gsum ... , fols. Sa 1f.

THE TRADITION ABOUT SARAHA AND HIS WORKS

19

Kar method which began with Ras-chung-pa and continued through Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa, 'Gro-mgon Ras-chen (the First Karma-pa hierarch), and his successors.2 9 Since Karma Phrin-las-pa expresses his indebtedness to the seventh Karmapa, whose instruction he says he frequently obtained, the commentary on the "King Dohas" translated in the following section of this book belongs to the second half of the fifteenth century. From Karma Phrin-las-pa's works it also becomes evident that Bal-po Asu and sK ye-med bde-chen are one and the same person. In two places Karma Phrin-las-pa refers to the "previous commentary" and there he quotes the exact words of sK ye-med bde-chen whose commentary has been translated here, as well. 30 29 Ibid. Another tradition als derived from Ras-chung-pa. It was developed by rGyal-ba Lo (A.D. II87-1250), Sum-pa, and, in particular, gLing-ras-pa (born A.D. I 128). In this tradition special attention was given to the "People Dohas." 3 0 See below, the commentaries on stanzas 1 and 29.

20

The Teaching of the Dohas

Every teaching aims, with more or less success, at fitting a person to develop his potentialities and to become a valuable member of the society in which he lives. The latter itselfhas organized its existence, its activities, and its mental conceptions and procedures on the basis of a certain value system which consequently determines how man sees what he does see of the world and in the world. However, within each concrete society, man's mind in becoming attuned to that society's cultural tradition is increasingly narrowed down from an almost unlimited potentiality to a very limited and definite actuality. Nevertheless, beyond this narrow mentality there always remain the wider possibilities of actualization that either have been discarded or which the individual is made to abandon. Whereas the majority of the members of any society remain within the limited confines of their traditional culture and, like the respectable Philistines, also resent being stirred out of their stagnation and self-deception, there are some who, dissatisfied with the growing staleness of the prevailing way oflife, look at reality through a different value system. They naturally tend to select other attributes and aspects of the seen and experienced and for this reason are 2!

seldom much appreciated, although they alone are capable of pointing to and enacting new ways oflife and often have done so. If they have been persons of genius they have introduced new concepts and beliefs (ethical, religious, scientific) which have won wide acceptance. Saraha's appearance on the scene well illustrates this point. There are, of course, various value systems by which an individual and even a society may order its life. One such system, aiming at the development of man rather 'than at controlling nature, has given Buddhism its specific humanistic character. Technically it is )mown as "Buddha-intentionality" (sangs-rgyas-kyi dgongs-pa). Here, "intentionality" (dgongs-pa) is to be understood as the evaluative cognition of the factual realm as well as the organization of the vision of reality; "Buddha" (sangs-rgyas) is used in the purely philosophical sense of" felt knowledge" in which a subject as such and not as this or that specific (empirical) subject knows itself as subject in its act of being aware. It does not refer to the person known by the title" Buddha." A term coming closest to what is understood by "Buddha" in Tibetan would be "Buddhahood." It points to the fact that what is designated by it is beyond any empirical subject and does not necessarily imply some ontological subjectivism. "Buddha-intentionality" is an e~stential category, not a set of properties and traits. Since we cannot live well without a decisive insight into the order of the world in which we happen to live, awareness also of our own role in establishing this order, and a clear distinction between a person who possesses this cognitive power and those who live in an impersonal routine fashion', Buddhahood is appropriately called "the procedure [path] by which we see what is not [otherwise] seen."l 1 sGam-po-pa, Collected Works, Vol. Ja, fol. sa. In Vol. Tha, fols. rSb ff., he enlarges on the meaning of"intentionality" in the following manner: "The turning of the process of logical constructions into the

22

The whole aim of teaching in Buddhism as a practical discipline rather than an intellectual pastime is to bring about a change in outlook and to introduce a person to certain experiences which, though not very frequent in a high degree of inten~ity, have occurred in a high degree among a few men at all times and places. They are introduced to a certain objective aspect of reality that is not revealed to ordinary persons in their everyday experiences and is difficult to state clearly in ordinary language. The point to note is that the decisive factor in teaching is to bring about certain experiences that are felt to be valuable in their own right rather than to discuss the contents in propositions and to assign them a purely speculative value. This purpose of the teaching is clearly brought out by Karma Phrin-las-pa's Guru, who states :2 When the Dohas are taught, a threefold procedure is employed: objectively with reference to the outer world .by similes, subjeca priori awareness is like a forest fire; predication becoming freein itself is like the melting ofice on a lake; the indivisibility of appearance and nothingness is like meeting a former acquaintance; the intensity of the a priori awareness is like the sun; and the presence of meditative concentration is like having arrived at the island of gold and jewels." The term "a priori" as used by me here and in the body of the text differs from the Kantian use as it does not refer to judgments but to that event which is prior to juqgments. Padma dkar-po in his sNying-po-don-gyi man-ngag sems-kyi me-long, fol. 7a, explains "Buddha" (sangs-rgyas) as follows: "Since everything belonging to error ('khrul-pa) has passed away, there is the state of something having gone (sangs); since everything observable is known in aesthetic immediacy, there is the state of a broadened horizon (rgyas)." Similarly kLong-chen rab-'byams-pa in his bLa-ma yang-tig I 4, fol. 30a, interprets this a priori awareness of Buddhahood as that from which all impurity has gone forever (dri-ma ye sangs) and in which all positive qualities have expanded (yon,tan ye-nas rgyas-pa). It is important to note that 'khrul-pa (Sanskrit bhriinti) "error" does not imply culpability. It refers to the straying away from the immediacy of a peak experience into the shallowness of "judged" experiences. 2 Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-hii skor-gsum ... , fols. roa ff. THE TEACHING OF THE DOHAS

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tively by experiencing for himself what it is about, and mystically by the symbol-language of the :Oakas. 3 The first makes use of the thirty-five similes such as the sky and a jewel, the second outlines the division into insight, contemplation, action, and goal-realization, and the third resorts to the terms " memory," "nonmemory," "unorigination," and "transcendence." And this is very appropriate. Although reference is made to the thirty-five similes in the "People Dohas," 4 it applies to the twenty-three in the" King Dohas" as well. It is easy to see that this triple division refers to what we would call the pictorial, emotional, and cognitive meanings, all of which are present in poetry or a song which rna y be said to bring into the open all that we then discuss and deal with in everyday language. Hence poetry never takes language as a raw material ready to hand; rather it is poetry which first makes language possible. Here poetry is seen as having a dynamic continuity with all the other activities in life, and the words it creates and uses have the power to suggest the other activities and to produce an accompaniment of images, feelings, and dispositions. The poem (or song) then is the realization in its medium oflilnguage (or music) of a content that expressively portrays a subject matter well beyond visual (and auditory) data as" fixed" images. The words which, on the part of the poet, express what is of deepest concern for him, and which also may serve as a reminder .of the experience, equally become the point of departure into fancy and 3 I retain the ordinary word "simile" in order to avoid the possibility of confusing "analogy," which in Buddhist philosophy means only resemblance or basis of comparison, with an argument from analogy, which because of its inherent fallacy of imperfect analogy is always invalid as a deductive argument. For an explanation of:J;:>akas see note 9 on p. 79· 4 Their list is given in gNyis-med Avadhiitipa's Do-hii mdzod-kyi snying-po ... , (Derge ed.), fol. 69a.

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reflection on the part of the audience. Through the words the poet speaks his audience may pass through that particular experience, or a similar one, which prompted the poet to formulate it in that particular imagery. 5 Although a poet, like any other artist, expresses the nature of human feeling, his ·expression is not symptomatic of a private sensation of pain or joy as is claimed by modern positivists who fail to distinguish between expression and description. Rather the poet's expression is the formulation ofhis knowledge of sensuous, mental, and emotional life, and it is this knowledge that he presents for our contemplation. This at once determines the direction ofour thought: the outward image becomes the symbol for an inward process, not its explanation. Viewed outwardly, the image exists in its own right and in its presentational immediacy as an indissoluble expressive formula, not as an extension oflogical discourse or the conclusion in a syllogism. The image is received and felt, but it is not used for arriving at postulationally prescribed beliefs about things in nature or about man himself. The image in its immediacy is a moment of original vision full of suggestions rather than comprehension. From this it follows that the use of emotionally moving imagery as embodied in the various similes employed in the teaching of the Dohiis has nothing to do with what is known as an argument by analogy. The imagery taken in its own right gives us a sense of the inexhaustible depth of our own being; it does not explain by being conceived as a symbol for something otherwise inexpressible. It invites us to explore the depth. Thereby a s Seealso R. G. Collingwood, The Principles ofArt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 267: "Thus, when one person expounds his thought in words to another, what he is direcdy and immediately doing is to express to his hearer the peculiar emotion with which he thinks it, and persuades him to think out this emotion for himself, that is, to rediscover for himself a thought which, when he has discovered it, he recognizes as the thought whose peculiar emotional tone the speaker has expressed." THE TEACHING OF THE DOHAS

25

transition from sensuous concretizations to an inner feeling of spirituality is effected. The spiritual is discovered as a "path" stretched out before our eyes to a distant goal and yet grounded in ourselves; it is not a spurious addition. But even here, the words used to describe the inner processes rna y mislead us into concretizing the momentary events of experience into permanent externalized facts and into believing that they have a fictitious duplicate beyond themselves. These duplicates, however, do not necessarily refer to an external world as distinct from the mental one; the latter is as much an abstraction as is the material or physical. Perhaps, since abstraction may be understood in the sense of an intellectually abstracted essence out of reals existing apart from it, which is not meant by it, it is better to say a logical construction. In order to break the tendency ofh ypostatizing a fiction into an actuality and of constructing barren systems of thought (realist, idealist, positivist, and so on), another kind of "language" has to be used, which makes it clear that its "words" do not stand for "things" and cannot really mean "things" as such, because this "language" is no longer the common one of everyday life. Nor is this new language a kind of" meta-language" whose creation is the desperate and self-defeating attempt to improve on language by using each symbol in a single invariable sense and defining it with precision. After all, a person has to be told what these symbols mean before he can use them, and this would imply the creation of a "meta-meta-language" ad infinitum. The "language of the I)akas" is both expressive and meaningful in the sense that it expresses a feeling or an emotion and that it refers beyond that emotion to the thought whoseemotionalchargeitis. These !)aka-terms," memory," "nonmemory," and the rest, are correct enough symbols of the experience of him who has had it and used the terms, and of him who is introduced to the experience and would under-

26

stand the terms well enough as symbols for the peculiar experience that brought forth the peculiar verbal response. Instead of abstracting the meaning away from reality and then projecting it on an alleged independently objective world to which it does not belong, the "])aka language" helps to develop the personality as a dynamic self-creation that cannot be fathomed by the mechanical thought-patterns of a philosophical atomism. Awareness seems to be basic to man, and mind as we know it is largely characterized by what we may call" referential" cognition. 6 In the most common form of a perceptual situation it is sensuous, intuitive, has an objective constituent of a characteristic kind and an epistemological object. By" objective constituent" we understand something that displays certain qualities that we believe to be a part of a larger whole of a certain characteristic kind, as, for instance, a physical object. By "epistemological object" we understand whatever may be expressed by a substantive-word in a phrase describing the situation, as, for instance, in the sentence " I see a conchshell," where "conch-shell" would be the epistemological object and the whitish oblong patch the objective constituent. The situation is furthermore called "sensuous" because sensation plays a part in perceptual situations which it does not play in others such as those caused by thought. Lastly, it is said to be "intuitive" in contradistinction to though t-situations, which are largely "discursive." We may sum up by saying that a situation as described above is" objective" and "referential." As referential it involves nonreferential situations which have an objective constituent but no external reference. The latter, as we have seen, is the conviction we have about the particular objective constituent as pointing beyond the situation and what is contained and sensuously 6 The analysis follows C. D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), pp. 141 ff.

THE TEACHING OF THE DOHAS

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manifested in it. An objective nonreferential situation can be illustrated by the mere awareness of an image or a mere sensation. Lastly there are nonobjective nonreferential situations. These would be the mental event itself. However, it would be wrong to label the latter as "purely subjective" because here subject and object, self and other, imperceptibly fuse; and it is equally wrong to identify it with a" universal spirit," which is merely a reintroduction ofsubjectivity and self-aggrandizement. Possibly the best way to speak of the mental event is to call it a "presential awareness," out of which by creative imagination (sgom) we may build a world of aesthetic appreciation (which may lend itself to fulfilling man's metaphysical need), and by acting out of this awareness (spyod-pa) may order a world of values. Or, by losing the presential awareness, we may glide off into a world oflifeless things for observation (rather than insight and appreciation), where values become ephemeral fictions. 7 The mind as a potential for this or that kind of perception is a presupposition in which mental and material things, subjects and objects become determinables rather than being defmite realizations of this or that kind of subject and object. The presential awareness is not so much the awareness of man's possibilities as it is the possibilities themselves as a functional unit pervading and sustaining all human traits, values, and experiences. The transition from the closed world of ordinary thought and action with their frustrating limits to the open dimension of potentiality and unlimited possibilities is made through disciplined contemplation and insight, which reinforce each other and culminate in an indissoluble unity. In the course of the practical instruction, the various perceptual situations are analyzed in view of a presuppositionless cognition (stong-pa) 7 That this particular cognitive event is the starting point for all interpretations in philosophical discourses is discussed by Karma Phrinlas-pa, Do-hii skor-gsum ... , fol. 45b.

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and a feeling of intense bliss (bde-ba), both ofwhich equate with each other. Karma Phrin-las-pa discusses this specific technique from three angles :B (1) An objective nonreferential situation (dmigs-med), (2) an objective referential situation (dmigs-can), and (3) a nonobjective nonreferential event (chos-nyid-kyi ngang). 1. The first is indicated by the verse: "When I no longer thought of bliss and mystery as separate / Meditation and no meditating became for me the same." Discussing this problem objectively the following is implied. There is bliss because there is no longer the frustratingly painful str$ ofdiscursive reasoning, and we speak of the mystery ofBeing because it is so difficult to understand. When the notions had been discarded that bliss and mystery ofBeing can be held apart or added up because the very meaning ofnothingness (stong-pa-nyid) or unity (zung-du 'jug-pa) is indivisibility, then meditation and nonmeditation were left to themselves in their indivisibility within the spontaneity ofbliss and nothingness unsullied by ideas of substance and quality. [And therefore Saraha could say]; "I have seen the meaning ofexistence'' [when meditation and not meditating became for · me the same]. In this connection Par-phu-ba says: "When through the understanding of what spontaneity of bliss and mystery of Being mean, discursive reasoning, productive of the separate entities of the world, is given up, and discursiveness itself becomes the selfeffulgent, irradiative, and illuminating light ('od-gsa~, then meditation and nonmeditation, good and evil become indivisible, and so do discursiveness and nondiscursiveness in this inner light." However, it is necessary to consider whether his statement represents the intention of the verse or not. From the viewpoint of subjective experience the verse may be interpreted as follows: "The presential feeling ofgreat bliss [which] in itself[is] the mystery of Being implies that the effort involved in fmding the diverse and separate means of understanding it has been completely abandoned. In this state of genuineness, by understanding meditation and nonmeditation as indivisible I have seen existence." Here, gLing-ras-pa says: "When the objective 8

Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-ha skor-gsum .. ., fols. 43b ff. THE TEACHING OF THE DOHAS

29

reference, that is, the four or six focal points of experience9 as the foundation of the felt knowledge of existence as the unity of bliss and mystery of Being, together with their ramifications, has been completely given up [it is possible to say]: I have seen reality, the indivisibility of meditation and nonmeditation, the genuine nature from which I have never been separate." Although such an interpretation seems possible, I am afraid that gLing was taken in by the next verse [in Saraha's song]. In a mystic sense the verse means that through the significant communication 10 [consisting in the use of the term] "memory," the pleasurable feeling accompanying the involvement in the objects of sensuous experience is eradicated; by that of "nonmemory" the craving for nothingness [deemed to be] the mystery of Being is dismissed; by that of "unorigination" we no longer believe in the unity of the two aspects [ofbliss and mystery ofBeing as a concrete entity]; and by that of "transcendence" all [ideas] about substance and quality are finally abolished so that by feeling translated into the sphere of self-effulgent irradiative light where no fictions enter [Saraha can say] : " I have seen the real [the purest particular of the moment] as indivisible into meditation and nonmeditation." 2. The objective referential situation is expressed in the verse Others think about the epistemic referent; by remembering that there is no duplicate Apart from what is known, the logical fictions of discursive thought by themselvest 1 come to an end. 9 The four focal points of experience are "located" in the forehead, the throat, the heart, and the navel; when six are counted the same arrangement is preserved with one added in the crown of the head and the sex region, respectively. On the meaning of" focal point of experience" see Guenther, The Life and Teaching of Niiropa, p. 164. 10 man-ngag, upadefa. According to Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-hii skorgsum .. ., fol. sSb: "man-ngag means to point out an important topic in a few words, or to elucidate the meaning of existence by having singled out the means of its understanding." 11 rnam-rtog, vikalpa. On the precise meaning of this term see Hemanta Kumar Ganguli, Philosophy of Logical Construction (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1963), pp. 58 ff.

30

This means that certain people who emphasize the objective reference in the perceptual situation fix their mind on it and think of existence by means of the epistemic referent in the perceptual situation. It is by fixing mind on the psychic event itself (which is the particular determined by the point instant) that logical constructions come to an end by themselves. The literal interpretation is as follows: "Others," that is, people who are not yogis but realist scholars, think about the problem of existence by means of the epistemic referent in the perceptual situation; yogis or idealists (and mystics) look at and think about the psychic event which is the owner of the objective perceptual situation; thereby the logical construct of an epistemic referent on the one hand and of a subjective owner of the perceptual situation on the other comes to an end by itself. ' Speaking in a general way, those who believe that there is something left after it has been shown that what is stated to be a certain object is not bodily a constituent of the situation (bden-med), think in a similar way [as discussed before]; it is by thinking that subject and object form an indivisible psychic event that the fiction expressing itself in the belief that subject and object are independently separate entities comes to an end by itself. In the sense of mystic experience, the above proposition implies the following : While [some] imagine as bliss-nothingness the spontaneous feeling of bliss which as the real value differs from what is revealed by the epistemic referent in the situation, [technically known as] "the messenger's path," it is by thinking of this very bliss-nothingness that all logical constructions submerge in what is the mere particular point-instant (chos-nyid) 12 and come to an end by themselves. 12 In Tibetan the particle nyid points to the particular of the moment. chos-nyid, which appears as the translation of Sanskrit dharmatii does not mean "the essence or nature of things" but "the real thing at hand." When the real thing becomes an object of discourse it is referred to by the word chos-can (which corresponds to Sanskrit dharmin). This shows that the Tibetans, in translating from Sanskrit, interpreted the texts .irt the light of their phenomenalistic thinking, which sees the absolute in the phenomenal, not beyond it. The particular of the moment is the total event, not an abstraction from it which then is contrasted with the universal. A lucid distinction between chos-nyid and chos-can is found in kLong-chen rab-'byams-pa's bLa-ma yang-tig I 4, fol. 30a.

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In the fmal analysis the statement means: [Some] think about Nirvai.J.a as different from what is manifested by Sarpsara (the epistemic referent of the situation); it is by thinking ofSarpsara and Nirvai.J.a as each being identical in the immediate psychic event that the logical constructions [of Sarpsara and Nirvai.J.a] are resolved in noetic Being (chos-sku) as such and that expectations and fears [which accompany all fictions] come to an end by themselves. These are the possible interpretations of (Saraha's verse). In some translations we read:" By keeping in mind that there is no duplicate entity external to knowledge, nonunderstanding comes to an end by itsel£" In this version, nonunderstanding has been explained as synonymous with logical construction. J. The nonobjective nonreferential situation is indicated by the verse: When mind becomes the target of the mind, discursiveness And (its cause) no longer stir so that (the mind) stays stable; As salt dissolves in water Mind submerges in itself. This statement may be explained with reference to the ground and starting point [of all spiritual development] as follows: When, by the ever-active mind, mind as possibility (kun-gzht) 13 is made the object of inspection, there is no epistemic referent since neither subject nor object can be the referent. The question then arises, how does this come about? The logical constructions of the ordinary thought processes and what leads to them, by which is meant the mental activity (yid) which makes mind turn to an object 13 Sanskrit iilaya. This is usually translated by "store-house," and since it is said to contain or "store" the experientially initiated potentialities of experience (bag-chags, viisana), the notion of it being a permanent substratum has been created. The dGe-lugs-pa understand by it an "indeterminate cognition" (see Tsong-kha-pa, Collected Works, XVIII 3, fol. 7b); the bKa'-brgyud-pas a pervasive potentiality; and the rNying-ma-pas distinguish between the kun-gzhi (iilaya) as the ground exhausting itself in being the ground and not being behind or over the rest of reality, and the kun-gzhi rnam-shes (iilaya-vijiiiina) which is the first step in the direction of conceptualization and logical construction. See Herbert V. Guenther,Indian Buddhist Thought in Tibetan Perspective: Infinite Transcendence versus Finiteness (History of Religions, Vol. III, No. r), pp. 88 ff.

32

[which it assumes to be external to itself] and which consists in the process of subject and object creation, do not .stir and [mind] remains stable in the in~tantaneous particular event. This stability is illustrated by tqe simile of salt dissolving in water and yielding a wiiform flavor. Interpreted with reference to the path of spiritual deveiopment it relates to · I. The basic insight. When mind becomes its own target it passes beyond what can be said to the referent and the referring agent: because it is not seen when introspected, no qualities are revealed when thought about, and no extra-logical reality is found when investigated. When in this way the process of logical construction with its defining activity and the habit-forzriing activity has become stabilized in the self-luminous psychic event which is nothing in and beyond itself, there being no stirring [of these forces], according to the simile of salt dissolving in water, mmd projecting its referent, comparable with salt, is dissolved in the mind being itselfas such comparable with water, and becomes nonobjective and nonreferential. 2. The development of the basic insight. Even when mind about which no predications are possible is psychologically objectified by a mind moving in the duality of a meditating agent and an object to be meditated upon, [it remains a nonobjective nonreferential event] as it does not contain any referent. By practicing a meditation which is not vitiated by [the postulates of] something to be meditated upon and [someone who] meditates, because motility14 becoming a set of logical constructions and mind appropriating [them] do not move but stay firm, the mind that is engaged in [this kind of] meditation submerges in its very being, the point-instant, without losing the flavor of what appears like meditation, like salt dissolving in water. . 3. The behavior [in view ofinsight and its cultivation]. There is no epistemic referent when the self-effulgent irradiative mind becomes psychologically objectified by mind engaged in what is positive, after a distinction between negative and positive conduct has been made. It is then, out of a situation in which the logical fictions of something to be accepted and something to be rejected 14 rlung, vayu. On motility as the cradle of mind as we understand it, see Guenther, The Life and Teaching of Naropa, pp. 165 ff.

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as well as the impulse to an outward show [of ethical behavior] do not move and stay firm in the self-same cognitive event of the moment, that there is spontaneous ethical behavior without any concretization of what ought to be done and of someone who should do so. Thereby mind as the creator of good and evil and of acceptance and rejection as two distinct abstractions submerges in the nothingness [of its] being [and remains what it really is], in the same way as salt dissolves in water. 4· The goal [which is the unity of insight, the cultivation of insight, and the action born from it]. There is no epistemic referent when noetic Being, or the a priori awareness which is mind endowed with the double purity, 15 is psychologically objectified by the mind desirous ofattaining Buddhahood. As a result, the fictions consisting in the belief in a goal [attained] as well as the impulse which is the desire to attain the goal do not stir and stay firm in the act of nonmentation, devoid of expectations and fears. In the same way as salt dissolves in water, mind [ordinarily] torn between hopes and fears submerges in itself and becomes what it really is, noetic Being, whereby the three existential norms are realized in a manner of nonrealization. 5· The use of the symbol language. When mind as the projecting and apprehending agent becomes psychologically objectified by the mind which is involved in its apprehendable projects as external objects, and when the projecting mind and the project are claimed to be separate entities, the mental basis is made clear by the significant communication of "memory." When the projecting and apprehending mind is then imagined as ultimate awareness and luminosity, after the naive belief in an external reality has been abolished, it is through the significant communication of "nonmemory" that this very mind is known as nothingness and as having no essence, similar to dreams and apparitions. The words "and [its cause]" are connecting the preceding statement with the following one. When this self-sensible and self-luminous cognition, in which neither the construct of a subject nor that of an object obtains after the refutation of the coarse subjectivism [of the previous phase], is unshakabl y held to be the ultimate reality [imp! ying a subtle form of subjective idealism], through "unorigination" this awareness as awareness as such is set free in an [indivisible unit 15

See note 49 on p. 139.

34

of cognition] by being determined as truly unoriginated. As a warning against becoming fettered by the experience of staticness in clinging to this felt unit of cognition, by "transcendence" the radiance and nothingness, devoid of the operations of the intellect, are indicated as Mahamudra. When by these four expressive symbols an ultimate understanding has come about, the simile applies as follows: In the same way as salt dissolves in water, the self-luminous irradiative light becomes the path of seeing when mind concerned with the fictions of :i subject and an object and other constructs [built on these fictions} submerges in the pure particular of the moment.

This analysis of perceptual situations, which is the main concern of the practical teaching, clearly shows that the only reality is the instantaneous particular which is of a cognitive nature and out of which the notion of" a mind'' as a stream of evanescent events can be constructed. Therefore, as a rule, the texts distinguish between "mind" (sems) as a successive series of specially interconnected total events and these events themselves (sems-nyid), which are cognitive because to cognize is characteristic of rninds.16 But insofar as such a series is already a configured constituent of a logical construction, it 16 This distinction is most clearly elaborated by the rNying-ma-pas. For them, sems corresponds to what we usually understand by the word "mind." kLong-chen rab-'byams-pa defines it in his Chos-dbyings rinpo-che'i mdzod . .. , fol. 48a, as "the awareness which clings to objects," and in fol. 132b says, "mind-is so called because it is concerned with objects." As the totality of cognitive being sems-nyid has an existential significance and rna y be viewed from various angles. Ibid., fol. 30a: " In so far as it is nothing as such, sems-nyid is noetic being (chos-sku), in so far as it is illuminingness it is communicative being (longs-spyod rdzogs-pa'i sku), and in so far as it becomes a presencia! value it is authentic being (sprul-pa'i sku). Although it is spoken of by such designations it is not found as a substance that can be apprehended. This existential category of intentionality is immanently present without change or variation throughout time. Since it pervades the whole of Sa111sara and NirViii]a in the manner of being its very reality, it has been said that all sentient beings are permeated by the potentiality ofBuddhahood."

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is not the real; but as the logical it can be communicated in intelligible language. The real itself is beyond logic and language. Consequently it is unjustified to speak of either idealism or realism iri.this ~onnection, since both are nothing more than a set of propositions. The analysis proceeds from realism to idealism (both subjective and objective) and beyond but does not set up a new metaphysics, at least not in the traditional essentialist way. Much confusion has been created by linguist translators who singularly failed to note the specific uses of technical terms in such different disciplines as Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta, and under the influence of the latter confused the Buddhist "particular of the point-instant" with the permanent, absolute "universal" of the Advaita-Vedantins. In Buddhism the particular (chos-nyid, dharmata) has no duplicate over and above itself, that is, the particular event on the one hand and "the nature of the event" on the other. If a particular event has a "nature" it is a logical fiction or a construct and accordingly is termed a postulate (chos-can, dharmin) .17 While linguists have been guilty of an unabashed obscurantism whenever they tried to deal with philosophical problems, in the field of philosophical thought a similar confusion has prevailed, especially in the realm of epistemology, when it was claimed that there is an (unknown and forever unknowable) object in itself over and above the objectcontent of knowledge, and a perennial universal consciousness behind the subject-factor of the total cognitive event. Here again the teaching of the Dohiis attempts to break the inveterate tendency of externalizing thought into things and to bring about that spontaneity that is considered the ultimate goal. In realizing the particularity of the instantaneous event Buddhahood is" placed in your hand." The analysis which 17

See note

12,

above in this chap.

Karma Phrin-las-pa offers again starts from a description of a perceptual (cognitive) situation and is based on the consideration that an object of knowledge must be a content ofknowl_; edge and that every content of knowledge is a content in knowledge and not outside it and therefore can never be known. The simile used in the teaching is that of a dreamexperience in which no external reality is found and which clearly is an instant of the externalization of thought. Saraha had said: 1 B The mind that falls asleep and dreams ofhaving met a dancing Girl not known before does not rest on a concrete. Do not see this mind as different from its manifest Content. Buddhahood is then placed in your very hand. And Karma Phrin-las-pa explains: 1 9 When someone dreams that he has met a woman, a dancing girl, sleeps with her and that a child is born, the dreaming mind starts 18 This verse is another instance where the Tibetan translation and arrangement of the verse lines differ completely from the Apabhra~p.sa text. While the French translation of some of the lines is correct, the English version of the ApabhraiJlsa text is certainly wrong. 19 Do-ha skor-gsum .. . , fol. 46b. gNyis-med Avadhiitipa, Do-hii mdzod-kyi snying-po . .. , fols. 96b ff., comments on this verse as follows: "That of which it has never been possible to say that it exists or does not exist transcends the range of conceptualizing mind. It is bliss supreme which as the ground [of all that is] is capable of captivating the mind, thoughts, ideas, perceptions, and ' memory' of all yogis. Since this is taught by a competent Guru [Saraha says]: 'Having met a dancing girl not known before. 'When someone then sleeps with this charming girl [whom he has not known before and who has not existed as either this or that] it so happens that, since mind having no foundation or root in anything rests on what cannot offer a foundation and is like a bird in the sky not falling on the earth below, the yogis do not trust 'memory' which is a surface phenomenon. [Hence Saraha continues] : 'The sleeping mind rests on what has no basis' [or,' the mind of him who sleeps']. Even so, it is not apart from the variety [of the phenomenal]. When one wakes up from a dream in which one has enjoyed the pleasure of having cohabited with a charming dancing girl, there is nothing besides onesel£

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from the experientially initiated potentialities of experience without there being any real dancing girl, and since this [dream] woman is the formulated content of the experience, potentialities of mind do not view this [content] as different from the potentiality itself. According to this simile, when you travel the paths and scale the spiritual levels in a state of composure which is like falling asleep, when you have met the a priori awareness which intuitively comprehends the nature of existence, [this a priori awareness being comparable with] a dancing girl not met before, this understanding and comprehending mind proceeds from the dynamics of interdependent and correlated function patterns, there being no understanding subject as such and no object as such to be understood, and travels the paths and scales the spiritual levels. As this understanding is the very form of the a priori awareness of mind itself, do not view it as different from itself. By relating the simile and the actuality in the above manner, Buddhahood is placed in your hand. Speaking in terms of the inner experience : "not before" is said because the nature of existence has not been understood before; (this understanding] is encountered in the particular of the point instant, the dancing girl adorned in the unreality of the phenomenal world. In this encounter or understanding, appearance and nothingness are known to have the same flavor, and mind coming to rest in a manner of submerging in the particular of the point instant has nothing in it of a thing-in-itself (chos-nyid) and of its replica (choscan); it has passed beyond substance and quality. "Starting from [this point instant]" means that it stays without moving from the evidence ofbeing, and since this understanding of the evidence of being is to see the very form of the a priori awareness of mind itself, do not see a difference between mind and evidence of being. Since by this experience brought to life within 'yourself, enlightenment as a unitary experience in which evidence of being and a priori awareness are no longer two (independent] factors comes about, the goal has been placed in your hand. Since in the same way nothing else is found but mind as such, being 'nonmemory' [Saraha declares] : 'Do not see this mind as different from its manifest content.'When it is thus felt and known, one has not moved from the existential norms [of noetic, communicative, and authentic being] as they are the immanently present Buddhahood. [Therefore Saraha concludes]: 'Buddhahood is then placed in your very hand.'"

In terms of the symbol language: When the dancing girl, that is, nothingness which previously had never been an object before the mind, has been met because through the significant communication of "memory" the logical constructions of a subject and an object have been uprooted, through that of "nonmemory" all judgments concerning subject and object are transferred into nonmentation [which is] like falling asleep. Through understanding appearance and mind as having the same value and flavor in their having no origin as such, by "unorigination" mind which appears in the form of an objective situation and of its owner, although these two have no basis in themselves, can be known as mere appearance due to conditions like water and waves. Therefore, since by "transcendence" the [utter] ineffability is asserted, the conceptualizations of an objective situation and its owner and of the apprehendable project and the apprehending agent become clarified. Then when the whole of the phenomenal world has become free in [the point-instant of] a self-cognitive [event], do not see a difference between [the content] and this event because there does not appear so much as an atom of difference from the formulated self-cognitive event. [The latter part of this sentence] is an injunction. When in such a way a vivid experience has been effected, Buddhahood is placed in your hand. In one way or another the various analyses of perceptual cognitive situations emphasize the "unity" of the experience. It is singularly important to note that this unity does not mean a feeling of oneness with some· reality or other. The unity refers to the particular of the moment, the t:ognitive event itself, and not to its interpretation. Unity is not union, 20 but another term for "interdependence" and "nothingness." That is to say, while in ordinary perception the knowing subject and the known object seem to stand in an asymmetrical relation in which something depends on something which is itself independent, in the unity of the cognitive event this split between subject and object, which actually '

Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-ha skor-gsum ... , fol. 17b: "Unity means nonduality, not union of two entities." 2o

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belongs to an interpretation, is resolved in the mutual dependence of subject and object, which are seen to be on a par, and which for reasons of their mutual dependence are nothing as such (or ontologically nonexistent). In resolving the tension between subject and object the conflicting feelings accompanying the subject-object tension are also resolved, as is indicated by the title of the aim of the teaching, the "realization of bliss-nothingness," where nothingness relates to the nonobjective nonreferential event and bliss to its feeling tone of pure intensity, and not to that of the instable differentiations associated with the epistemic referents. This "nothingness/' however, is not a new "independent" category on which subject and object and the various feelings depend. If it were so it would plainly contradict the axiom of interdependence and, as Karma Phrin-las-pa points out, become another kind ofbondage. In order to exclude this po~sibility the symbol term "transcendence" is applied, which is synonymous with "ineffability," by which "something" is not posited which is " other than" the point-instant of the momentary event.21 Another point to note is that no event can outlive itself and become a subsistent fact. If it did so it would contradict the axiom of momentariness. An event can only be described as a point-instant of energy in the sense that the event is itself energy22 and not a substance having the specific quality "its energy," and as serving as an occasion for later events in a 21 This distinguishes Buddhism from Advaita Vedanta, where "ineffability" (anirvacaniya) means something beyond existence and nonexistence. See Hemanta Kumar Ganguli, Philosophy ofLogical Construction (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1963), pp. 62 ff. 22 So Karma Phrin-las-pa, Do-ha skor-gsum .. ., fol. 4sb: "The particular of the moment (chos-nyid), or the ultimately real and true (dondam-pa'i bden-pa),. is the single point-instant (de-kho-na-nyid gdg-pu) devoid of all judgments. The actuality (gdangs) of this point-instant, or its ceaseless creativity (rtsal), is the origin of all things."

40

recurrent pattern. To interpret an event in this way is already a judgment involving conceptualization and the very pointinstant of the event is lost in a logical construction. Both the unity of the cognitive event and its momentariness directly entail the Buddhist doctrine of instantaneous enlightenment, ~hich figures pre-eminently in Zen and which is frequently alluded to in Tibetan texts: "In one moment variety unfolds, f In one moment Buddhahood is complete." 23 The analysis of cognitive situations which occupies the central position in the teaching enables us to train ourselves not to think of an "I" distinct from a "that" but as interdependent and, consequently, as never having come into an existence of its own. Thereby we can rid ourselves of the tendency to conceptualize, which is the cause of bondage. Thus the teaching serves to make us free, free from what the Buddhist text~ call intellectual fog. It must not be supposed that this gradual freeing leaves us with nothing. This negative aspect is countered by the positive presupposition of momentariness implying that we are free, free to remain free or to renounce freedom. Here we encounter the idea of freedom as self-determination or spontaneity. 2 4 23 I mention only kLong-chen rab-'byams-pa, bLa-ma yang-tig I I, fol. 99b. 24 Valuable contributions to this conception of complete freedom in Indian and Buddhist thought are found in Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963). Still, the problem needs special investigation.

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Existence Versus Essence

One ofthe basic assumptions ofEastern thought, to which the Tibetan interpretation ofTantric Buddhism is no exception, is the perfectibility of man. This idea places no ceiling on man's capacities, and therefore does not stop short with the mere control of the passions by the intellect. 1 It frankly recognizes that there are other values, not only besides, but even beyond the intellect's postulates of good and evil, and thatin the hierarchy of values beauty, happiness, and freedom are the only worthwhile ways of being. Not only is freedom as such not subject to limitations whether of common customs or traditional morality, but it is also at the opposite end oflibertinism, with which the negators of freedom unfortu1 Failure to recognize the presuppositions of Eastern thought is responsible for the unwarranted statements that have been made and continue to be made about the nature ofTantrism.With few exceptions these categorical misrepresentations derive from the naive assumption that Eastern cultures are either underdeveloped or degenerate Western ways of thinking. Those who hold these beliefs usually denounce as unintelligibility and obscurantism what actually is their own lack of understanding. A challenge to these antiquated views (which still seem to die hard) is Agehananda Bharati, The Tantric Tradition (London: Rider and Company, 1965).

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nately confuse freedom, and which is total bondage to the passions, the intellect not controlling but justifying them. Freedom as such logically entails beauty and happiness, for ugliness is a negation of freedom inasmuch as subjectivism has reasserted itself with its restricting postulations and judgments which aim at beautification rather than at the aesthetic appreciation of beauty. Similarly the shrinking offreedom is frustration that may assume many forms: discontent, unhappiness, pain, suffering. Where freedom is considered to be the highest value the idea of a determinate structure or essence is excluded, and man's existence, his peculiar mode of being which is always active and at every moment involves an awareness of being, is emphasized. Human existence, which must be of primary concern for human beings, can never be properly conceived as being enclosed within itself; it is not something that man has or possesses. It is what he is. It certainly is not found in any kind of absorption in an absolute (which would be tantamount to a total loss ofhuman existence), nor is it some part of a stream of evolution proceeding toward cosmic goals. Existence has no parts, and yet it is always a being-to-another. Such a relation, which can only be made clear by hyphenated phrasing and not by the atomistic thought patterns of traditional logic, is not to be thought of as an inert rod lying between two already existent terms. As Dharmakirti pointed out long ago, such a relation is a self-contradiction. 2 If the two terms that are to be related are self-established reals they have no need of accepting a bond of dependence; and if it is claimed that the relation establishes the terms it is itself a preestablished term. There is still another difficulty: an intrinsic independence must be granted exactly when the terms are held in mutual' dependence. Real existence is not made up of 2

Sambandha-parik$a V

s.

EXISTENCE VERSUS ESSENCE

43

discrete units juxtaposed together, but of vectors each of which exists by virtue of the other. This vectorial character of Being is the key to an understanding of what is meant by the existential norms with which Saraha is concerned and which rna y be logically isolated but which are really integrated together in a unity. This, according to Karma Phrin-las-pa, is the meaning ofSaraha's words in his "Queen Dohas": Nondual and devoid of affirmation and negation it is [noetic] being; It is the very fact ofbeing and [its] bliss, significant communication; Though appearing to all beings according to their interests The indivisible awareness embraces all and everything. Karma Phrin-las-pa comments on this verse as follows :3 Noetic being (chos-kyi-sku) is a priori awareness, the aesthetic perception of everything perceptible, nondual and devoid of the extremes of eternalism and nihilism which are the formulated fictions of affirmation postulating existence and of negation postulating nonexistence. The truth of the stopping of frustration, which has become revealed in its entirety because the evidence of being (dbyings) pure as such is devoid of the incidental impurity that has to be removed, is the very fact ofbeing (ngo-bo-nyid-kyi sku). [Its] bliss endowed with double purity4 and not afflicted by the frustration of discursive thought is blissful being (bde-ba chen-po'i sku). Perfect communication [and communion] in governing the whole of the Mahayana way oflife, in company with the Bodhisattvas on earth through discussion, te