Roma Rights: Race, Justice and Strategies for Equality (Sourcebook on Contemporary Controversies Series)

Sourcebook on Contemporary Controversies

ROMA RIGHTS: Race, Justice, and Strategies for Equality

Claude Cahn, editor I NTERNATIONAL D EBATE E DUCATION A SSOCIATION

Roma Rights: Race, Justice, and Strategies for Equality

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Roma Rights: Race, Justice, and Strategies for Equality Edited by Claude Cahn

International Debate Education Association NEW YORK ✶ AMSTERDAM ✶ BRUSSELS

Published in 2002 by The International Debate Education Association 400 West 59th Street New York, NY 10019 © Copyright 2002 by International Debate Education Association All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, without permission of the publisher. ISBN 0-9702130-6-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Roma rights : race, justice, and strategies for equality / edited by Claude Cahn. p. cm. -- (IDEA sourcebooks in contemporary controversies) ISBN 0-9702130-6-9 (trade pbk.) 1. Romanies--Civil rights--Europe. 2. Europe--Ethnic relations. I. Cahn, Claude. II. Series DX145.R659 2002 305.891’497--dc21 2002017183 Printed in the United States of America

IDEA Sourcebooks in Contemporary Controversies The International Debate Education Association (IDEA) has dedicated itself to building open and democratic societies through teaching students how to debate. The IDEA Sourcebooks on Contemporary Controversies series is a natural outgrowth of that mission. By providing students with books that show opposing sides of hot button issues of the day as well as detailed background and source materials, the IDEA Sourcebooks on Contemporary Controversies give students the opportunity to research issues that concern our society and encourage them to debate these issues with others. IDEA is an independent membership organization of national debate programs and associations and other organizations and individuals that support debate. IDEA provides assistance to national debate associations and organizes an annual international summer camp.

The editor is grateful to the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), for materials and texts appearing in this book. ERRC interns Tara Bedard and Morag Goodwin and consultant Dragan Risti? contributed significantly during the preparation of the manuscript.

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Table of Contents ❖ Part 1: Introduction Human Rights and Roma: What's the Connection? by Claude Cahn The Present and Future of the Gypsy Past by Sir Angus Fraser Life in My Hometown: Romani Poverty in Craiova, Romania by Valeriu Nicolae

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❖ Section 2: Strategies and Approaches 55 1. Approaches to the Problem of Hate Speech Hate Speech: New European Perspectives by Helen Darbishire 57 Freedom of Expression: A European View by Roger Errera 62 2. Education for a Multi-Cultural Society Roma in the Educational Systems of Central and Eastern Europe 71 by Claude Cahn, David Chirico, Christina McDonald, Viktória Mohácsi, Tatjana Peri? and Ágnes Székely Inclusive School – Myth or Reality? by Laura Laubeová 86 Beyond Segregation or Integration: A Case Study from Effective Native American Education by Linda Pertusati 97 3. The Role of the Media When the Media Make a Difference: Comparing Two European Race Crimes by Beata Klimkiewicz 116 Active Journalism: Dangers and Difficulties by David Altheer 127 4. Access to Justice Romani Men in Black Suits: Racism in the Criminal Justice System in the Czech Republic by Barbora Bukovská 138 Abuse of Discretion in Criminal Justice Systems: A Police Officer’s Perspective on Systematic Change by Burton J. Brown 149 5. Political Participation Romani Political Participation and Racism: Reflections on Recent Developments in Hungary and Slovakia by Peter Vermeersch 161 The Democratic Responsibility: Rights and Freedoms as Tools 176 by Bill Hangley Jr.

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❖ Section 3: Afterword The Denial of Racism by Dimitrina Petrova

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❖ Appendix: Human Rights Standards 227 1. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 228 2. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 237 3. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 253 4. Glossary 271

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Section 1 INTRODUCTION

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Human Rights and Roma: What's the Connection? by Claude Cahn*

A

t the giddy heights of revolution, on August 26, 1789, the National Assembly of France approved the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. This manifesto famously begins: “The representatives of the French people, organized as a National Assembly, believing that the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments, have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being constantly before all the members of the Social body, shall remind them continually of their rights and duties; in order that the acts of the legislative power, as well as those of the executive power, may be compared at any moment with the objects and purposes of all political institutions and may thus be more respected, and, lastly, in order that the grievances of the citizens, based hereafter upon simple and incontestable principles, shall tend to the maintenance of the constitution and redound to the happiness of all.”

And so the people took control of their destiny, wrested the reins of power from abusive rulers — “tyrants” in the parlance of the day — placed government at their service, and the human rights movement was born. Although for the time being confined to France, the delegates assembled in the National Assembly that day in 1789 were certain that they were speaking for humanity, setting down the con-

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stituent language of “the people”. The delegates were sure that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was the founding document in a new arrangement of power, in which not an arbitrary ruler, but rather the will of the people, would govern. Moreover, the delegates did not feel that they were merely “seizing power” from an abusive king, but rather that they were arriving for the first time in history at a fundament — that they had broken through a history of the lies used to support abusive power, and arrived at basic truth: that the people have a right to govern themselves. And in so doing they felt they were liberating humanity from servitude. Were the delegates right? Was their act original and groundbreaking? Was 1789 really the first act of the people rejecting abusive rule and delivering power into the hands of it subjects? Or does the honor of defining the sovereign will of the people over the brute force of oppression (sometimes masked, sometimes difficult to see through a veil of benign subjugation) not in fact belong to the American people? In 1776, after all, while asserting independence from Great Britain, the U.S. Congress adopted a declaration including the words: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Surely here begins the revolt of the people against tyranny. But wait, recent scholarship on medieval Germany finds us on similar grounds. See, for example, what the historian Peter Blickle has written on peasant revolts in Germany in the period 1300-1550: In many of the South German lordships, peasant revolts were settled by means of a negotiated treaty, the character and contents of which prompt us to regard it as an agrarian fundamental law (Agrarverfassungsvertrag). By means of such laws, the subject collectively gained recognition as a legal person...1

A peasant revolt: rebellion by farmers, risking death by hideous means, in the interest of defining the boundaries of their power, rights and liberties for future generations — again our theme is in view. And not only peasants defined rights: In 1215, King John of England was

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forced by an assortment of barons and clergy2 to sign a document committing himself to the following proposition: “We have granted ... and given to all the freemen of our realm, for us and our Heirs for ever, these liberties underwritten...” A nascent human rights idea? The Magna Carta, from which the quote is taken, continues to be seen as a defining moment in the history of rights. In fact, human history is filled with people taking charge of their own destiny — individuals or groups revolting against states of degradation, against oppression by arbitrary powers — and asserting popular control over decision-making, setting the limits of their own autonomy. The fragments above are merely a few of the exuberant records left behind by groups of individuals during the heady moment of freedom and power — when the principles of justice for the people and the primacy of individual dignity are set down. But something fundamental does divide the French and American pronouncements from their medieval predecessors. Medieval peasants and lords operated within a medium of power relations which, although changeable in detail, were ultimately determined by a fixed chain of command. God sat at the top of this rigid hierarchy, his or her temporal mediators (kings, popes, priests) below, thereunder subjects, and finally persons unfortunate enough to be so far removed from the exercise of power that the lacked all control over their own governance — people completely devoid of autonomy. The peasants of Germany and lords of Britain aimed at securing greater rights — at rolling back the front of expanding powers of those above them. The peasants rebelling in Germany could hope to establish themselves as real players within that order, but they could not hope — and would not have dared to dream — that they would alter their position within it fundamentally, or indeed, transform hierarchy itself. By contrast, the delegates gathered at the revolutionary National Assembly were breaking out of the hierarchical system in which power proceeds down a long ladder with God at the top and mortals arranged in various positions along the lower rungs: they were working at setting human beings at the center of all conceptions of power. From then on, rule proceeded from the will of the people and only with its consent (if they left unexplored the difference between “the people”

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and “the person”, two hundred years of negotiation have not fully resolved it). It is at this juncture that “rights” — the things, acts and powers to which I (as a peasant, lord, king or other status) am legally entitled — become “human rights” — the things, acts and powers to which we are all entitled inalienably as human beings. If all of this seems abstract, its implications have been concrete and huge. The idea of human rights as a force has reshaped the world. Across the 19th century, struggles between the old order and human rights idea were met and won by the human rights side: The EuroAtlantic slave trade was abolished and then slavery itself — prevalent in Romania, the United States and elsewhere in the Americas — outlawed; the right to education was made universal; serfdom was abolished and serfs set free; Jews were relieved of the separate legal order relegating them to pariah status in Europe; across the 19th century, ever more persons acquired the right to vote until, in the late 19th and early-mid 20th century, suffrage became universal — every adult became entitled to vote. Meanwhile, privileges acquired by birth have been abolished and replaced by systems in which individuals advance — in principle at least — by individual merit or by democratic election. Across the 19th century too, concepts within the human rights scheme developed. In the United States, for example, the highest value of “liberty” — for which Americans had gone to war with Britain in 1776 — soon came to vie with another principle “equality” — over which Americans fought each other in a bloody civil war 1860-1865. Equality won, and the principle of “equal protection of the laws” was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution in 1868 as part of the 14th Amendment. But human rights soon suffered serious setbacks. The 19th century was also a time of dramatic abuse by Europeans of Africans and others considered inferior in the various frantic efforts to conquer the globe. In 1895, in the course of attempting to suppress insurrections in Cuba, Spanish authorities deployed for the first time a new instrument of degradation and cruelty — the “concentration camp”.3 Shortly thereafter, Britain too used the concentration camp in the course of a brutal war against settlers of Dutch origin (“Boers”) in South Africa.

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Initially fought in the colonies, war and violence rebounded into Europe in 1914 and from then until 1945, mass killing was visited on young men in the trenches of France, various groups in the Soviet Union, and Jews, Roma, homosexuals, the mentally and physically handicapped and others throughout Europe. The revelation of — indeed the photographs of — huge piles of dead bodies in, and emaciated survivors of, death camps such as Treblinka, Belzec and Maidanek — revealed the nightmarish inverse of the French revolutionary ideal. Although “the individual” and “the people” now stood at the center of human conceptions of dignity and rule, an ugly twin — “the mass” — had come with it. Mass societies had arisen, and with them, the ability to inflict mass suffering and mass death. The ideal of individual autonomy and rule by the people appeared to have been dramatically reduced, through the instruments of war and totalitarianism. In its place had come states in which people could be “atomized” — effortlessly severed from their surroundings and their belonging on arbitrary criteria (often with the assistance of pseudo-scientific doctrines such as racism) and, in this naked state of vulnerability, subjected to cruelty without limit. In 1945, a world exhausted by war and recently exposed to the fact of genocide in Europe — as well as newly cognizant of a very real ideological divide between the Soviet Union and its affiliate Communist states and those states rapidly becoming a bulwark of opposition to Communism — agreed to the United Nations, a system of international government which would ideally prevent events such as World War II from recurring. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was passed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, by forty-eight votes to nothing, with eight abstentions. The UDHR is included in this collection on page 222. The appearance of the UDHR in 1945 was arguably revolutionary, in that it introduced the individual into international law — previously only a domain of states. The UDHR established human rights as universal, and set them in opposition to the sovereignty — the privilege of rule — of states. This move transformed the international system which, since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, had emphasized among other things the right of non-interference in domestic affairs of

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the sovereign state. Before the UDHR, states were effectively free to do whatever they chose within the boundaries of their own territory. Foreign policy and domestic rule were strictly divided. Inserting the rights of individuals into the international system had the potential to reshape all of international law, and the full implications of this move are probably not yet fully expressed or even properly understood. For example, it was only as recently as 1999 that the international community approved for the first time military action on international human rights grounds — the reported ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo by Yugoslav forces. Whether the UN-sanctioned NATO action was a precedent for further military actions on behalf of oppressed groups or individuals suffering human rights abuse, or if it was rather an experiment never to be repeated, remains to be seen.4 It is possible also, however, to regard the UDHR as an appropriate response to the recognition of new conditions: the world is now a mass, its inhabitants easily exposed to abuse. The UDHR sets out the conditions for basic dignity in the new international system, in which no corner of the world is unknown, no person truly out of the reach of state power — powers fundamentally unstable and ripe for abuse. The UDHR begins from the premise of recognizing the new conditions in the world — those revealed by the events of the first half of the 20th century — and attempts again to imagine their inverse — a world (“international”, “global”) system, but one in which the sanctity of the individual and her dignity prevails. However, the UDHR is not law, in that states are not bound by its provisions in the same way they are bound by treaties. In light of a perceived need for international laws which would legally bind states to human rights commitments, subsequent documents have followed. In international law terms, the two of primary significance are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)5 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).6 Together with the UDHR, the two Covenants form the International Bill of Rights. Although neither the ICCPR or the ICESCR are included in this collection, you can view them on: www.unhchr.ch.

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For the purposes of this collection, we have chosen to include the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), due to its direct relevance in Europe, and especially because a court — the European Court of Human Rights — exists to enforce its provisions. The ECHR was concluded in 1950 and came into force in 1953. It is law in the member states of the Council of Europe. The Convention is primarily concerned with civil and political rights.7 The ECHR system allows for individual complainants to take cases against governments, now the backbone of the system, as well as for inter-state complaints. The provisions of the Convention, in theory, override domestic legislation and practices. Like all of the major human rights treaties, the ECHR recognises no distinction between citizens and non-citizens, where securing fundamental rights and freedoms are at issue.8 Because it is a document concerned primarily with civil and political rights, states are under obligation to ensure that all of the rights of the ECHR are secured to all individuals on their territory from the moment the ECHR enters into effect in a given state.9 It is not enough merely for a state to take steps towards the realization of the rights in the ECHR. The issue of race, racism and racial discrimination remained of particular salience in the post-war period. In the first place, the everincreasing strength of the individual as the primary legal unit appeared to be having little impact on differences between groups: quite the contrary, discrepancies between, for example, wealth in the first world and wealth in the third world, only seemed to be growing. Similarly, blacks in the U.S. continued to labor under the racist regime of “separate but equal”, enforced by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896, in effect until it was struck down in 1954. Secondly, racism enjoyed a boom in the post-war: anti-Semitism actually increased in Germany and elsewhere in the years following World War II, and in South Africa, the system of laws enshrining white minority rule over the black majority, known broadly as apartheid, was codified, especially following the victory of the Herenigde Nasionale Party in the 1948 elections. In light of these distressing facts, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) was

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opened for signature in 1965. The language of the ICERD’s provisions is uncompromising: state parties are committed to eradicating racial discrimination by whatever means necessary, and without delay.10 The treaty is also important in that it provides a comprehensive definition of racial discrimination, in Article 1, which has come to be accepted as definitive.11 The ICERD is included in this collection on page 231. In recent years, the values affirmed in the documents cited above have been dramatically reaffirmed — first in the events of 1989, which shattered totalitarian rule in Central and Eastern Europe, and then in the course of the 1990s, as the racist apartheid regime of South Africa — the legally enforced rule of whites over blacks — was systematically dismantled after nearly half a century of organized opposition, both in South Africa and internationally. But as the events in South Africa have dramatically shown, it makes little sense to speak of human rights purely — or even primarily — in terms of rights set down in international treaties. Human rights have always been an issue of human actors. At some points and places in history, these actors have been intellectuals — brave individuals speaking out for human rights against the mass. Think, for example, of Emile Zola’s famous public “J’Accuse” letter, in the midst of the so-called “Dreyfus Affair” in France; Alfred Dreyfus was a Jewish officer wrongly convicted of treason in an atmosphere of pervasive anti-Semitism. After the real culprit was discovered and exonerated, Zola published his famous letter on January 13, 1898, condemning French anti-Semitism and triggering a chain of events which eventually saw Dreyfus’s conviction overturned and the government of the time toppled. More often, human rights actors have been social movements, such as the nonviolent resistance movement (“Satyagraha”) inspired by Mahatma Ghandi in South Africa and India, the U.S. civil rights movement, and the international movement against apartheid in South Africa. Since the 1970s, the human rights movement has become increasingly institutionalized, among other things through the formation of networks of non-governmental organizations. Although these have played a role in international human rights since the birth of the International Red Cross in the mid-19th cen-

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tury, the human rights movement was changed dramatically by the growth of, especially, the international non-governmental organization Amnesty International, from the 1970s onwards. Amnesty has millions of members worldwide, a fact which makes it able to lay claim to having a real international constituency, and therefore a high degree of legitimacy in its human rights campaigns. Today, human rights activists and organizations resort to a range of tactics in order to press human rights claims, including petitioning international bodies, lobbying governments, bringing law suits, working with members of the press, organizing public events such as demonstrations or concerts, enlisting prominent public figures such as famous writers, prominent politicians or popular cultural icons such as musicians or actors, as well as mobilizing the people whom it is ultimately about: individuals. What is the relevance of all this for Roma in Europe? After all, the human rights idea is not about certain groups — it is about the treatment of individuals. It is increasingly recognized that Roma are among the primary human rights issues in Europe because although human rights are universal, human rights abuses frequently fall disproportionately against certain groups. In Europe, the exposure to human rights abuse to which Roma are subjected is jarring. Roma in Central and Eastern Europe have, throughout the 1990s been subjected to a wave of violence by ideological racists, by their neighbors and by the very police officers assigned to shield individuals from violent abuse. In some countries — Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia — violence has risen to the scale of pogrom. More than one police killing of Roma has taken in France, a country which lays claim, as we have seen above, to being the birthplace and cradle of human rights.12 In addition, Roma suffer discrimination in nearly all spheres of life: education, housing, employment, access to health care and social services. Around Europe, from Spain to Italy to Greece and in nearly all of the countries of the former Communist Block, Roma live and are schooled segregated from non-Roma. In many areas, denial of basic human rights is so extreme that it is visible to the naked eye: all over Europe, paved roads end at the entrance to the Romani community and basic sanitation services and waste removal

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are lacking. Meanwhile, anti-Romani racism has near full respectability in many countries and many politicians have built successful careers by appealing to, encouraging and inflaming anti-Romani sentiment among the wider population. As a result of an increased awareness that the situation of Roma is basically unacceptable, states and non-governmental organizations have, throughout the 1990s, devoted ever-increasing energies to resolving the fact of a group of people disproportionately excluded from the societies in which they live and subjected to a broad range of discriminatory burdens. Some of these efforts have paid off. However, to date actions undertaken have been too weak and too few to make significant inroads, due to the massive problem of contemporary antiRomani racism in Europe, as well as because of the legacies of generations of discrimination and racism against Roma. The next essays in this collection provide, first, a brief overview of some issues of debate in Romani history and, next, a Romani author’s description of extreme poverty among Roma in his hometown. In Part 2 of this collection, you will find five issues central to debate among activists and policy-makers. They are: ❖ The problem of hate speech: whether or not to punish violent, hateful, racist speech as a criminal act; Helen Darbishire argues that speech is closely linked to thought and must therefore be immune from criminal punishment if our societies are to remain free to debate issues of common concern. Roger Errera counters that in the interest of basic civility, we need laws banning hate speech to protect individuals as well as society as a whole from aggression.

❖ The issue of education for a multicultural society: is segregation the problem? How to ensure dignity, inclusion and equal education to the children of groups burdened by racism? How to fight racism in the school system? Segregation is unequivocally banned under Article 3 of the ICERD and is viewed as particularly anathema in light of apartheid. Non-

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❖ The role of the media: do journalists have an obligation to fight racism — to be “activists”? Or does this corrupt their role as “objective” reporters? Beata Klimkiewicz describes two hate crimes — one in Poland, one in Great Britain — and notes the dramatically different effects of media action on society in each country. David Altheer counters that while activist journalism is praiseworthy, there are a number of serious limitations of the possibility of effective activist journalism.

❖ The problem of racism in the criminal justice system: how can we address problems of race in an institution that strenuously resists acknowledging the possibility of its own corruption by race factors? Barbora Bukovská notes that the discretion members of the criminal justice system enjoy — correctly enjoy — often leads to serious patterns of disparate impact on certain groups, often minority groups facing racism in the wider society. She presents a range of measures governments and other authorities can undertake to counteract these effects. Burton J. Brown argues that accountability to the public is crucial to ensuring that officers refrain from abuse, and ensure human rights protection for all, and he presents a comprehensive vision for ensuring police accountability.

❖ Political participation: how to balance democracy with the necessity to compensate for the weakness of some groups?

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Peter Vermeersch describes the role of anti-Romani racism on political systems in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and calls on politicians to seek greater inclusion of Roma in the political process. Bill Hangley Jr. counters that empowerment is first and foremost an issue of the mobilization of the group concerned. Rumyan Russinov offers, from his own experience, a portrait of Roma rights action in one country and the obstacles such action encountered. Nicolae Gheorghe, Advisor on Roma and Sinti issues at the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, offers his vision of the future of the Romani movement.

Finally, as an afterword, an essay by Dimitrina Petrova on what is possibly the toughest nut to crack in the field: the problem of the denial of racism and the possibilities (and limits of those possibilities) for acknowledgment of racism as a vehicle for overcoming racism. These are exciting times in Roma rights. Not only are generations of Roma and non-Roma becoming increasingly aware of the need to secure equal rights for Roma in Europe, but also anti-discrimination law in Europe is in a period of dramatic expansion. The European Union Race Equality Directive (Directive 2000/43/EC, “implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin”), adopted in 2000, has greatly expanded the definition of what is to be regarded as discrimination in Europe, by including “indirect discrimination” within its ambit.13 In addition, Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights, providing a comprehensive ban on discrimination in the enjoyment of any right set forth by law, was signed by 25 states when first opened for signature in late 2000, indicating a broad consensus in Europe that discrimination on any grounds is anathema. The next years will be crucial in determining how the human rights paradigm will have an impact on the real situation of Roma in Europe. This collection is intended as an introduction to the facts of Roma rights now, as well as to the discourses and dilemmas around which change will likely occur. It is also an invitation to get more involved. Ultimately, all change begins at the level of consciousness. You may be an actor in the human rights movement of and for Roma — the Roma

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rights movement. In weighing the facts, turning the questions and arguing out the debates, you are taking part in social change in Europe.

NOTES Claude Cahn is Research and Publications Director of the European Roma Rights Center, as well as editor of the quarterly journal Roma Rights. Morag Goodwin generously assisted with research for this article and offered comments on draft versions. Peter Vermeersch also kindly offered comment. 1 Blickle, Peter, Obedient Germans? A Rebuttal: A New View of German History, Charlottesville: University of Virginia, p.67. 2 Exactly: “all Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, Priors, Earls, Barons, and to all freemen of this our realm”. 3 Kotek, Joël and Pierre Rigoulet, Le Siècle des camps, Paris: J.C. Lattès, 2001. 4 Exactly how complicated this issue is is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the European Court of Human Rights has just declared admissible — i.e., legitimate and therefore that they will rule on the case in the next year or two — a complaint against NATO for bombing Yugoslavia. For more information on the issue, see: news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1607000/1607392.stm 5 As its title suggests, the ICCPR is concerned with civil and political rights, including the right to life, to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. The language of the ICCPR is strong, in line with the binding nature of its provisions, and it commits state parties “to respect and ensure” the rights enshrined in the Covenant from the moment of ratification, and not merely take steps towards their realization. Rights in the ICCPR are divided between “derogable” and “non-derogable”; “derogable” rights are rights — such as the right to marry or the right to participate in free election — which states may, during times of emergency — such as war — suspend for periods of time. “Nonderogable” rights are those which a state must secure all the time — such as the right to life or the right to freedom from torture. 6 The ICESCR states, at Article 2: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” The guiding principle of the ICESCR is that, while it may not be possible for states to guarantee to all individuals all of the rights included in the ICESCR at the moment at which the Covenant enters into legal force in a given state (think, for example, of an impoverished state such as Bangladesh and its ability to *

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provide, for example, “an adequate standard of living” as required by the Covenant), states must be working to implement the Covenant — and show real improvement — over time. The importance of economic and social rights are currently being reaffirmed in many quarters (perhaps because in many places they are so threatened): The World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993, adopted the following declaration: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Further, two major international human rights organizations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have both recently affirmed their commitments to fighting for social and economic rights; for Amnesty this was a major shift from their historic preoccupation primarily with torture and prisoners of conscience (persons jailed because of their political, religious or other beliefs). 7 The primary European document addressing social and economic rights is the European Social Charter, in effect from 1961. The Revised Social Charter was adopted in 1996 and has been in effect since July 1, 1999. Information about the European Social Charter is available on: www.humanrights.coe.int/cseweb/GB/ 8 The European Convention on Human Rights states, at Article 1: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” 9 The term “secured” has been interpreted by the Court to entail both negative and positive obligations for state parties. Thus, for example, the obligation to respect the right to life: a negative commitment requires that state agents themselves do not arbitrarily deprive individuals of their lives, but the positive duty to secure life obligates states to protect the lives of those on its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. This positive duty requires of a state in connection with the right to life that there are, for example, laws in place making the taking of life illegal, an effective police force and legal system to enforce the law, so that any killing is thoroughly investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice. Moreover, it is recognized that the values at the core of the Convention are changing, and thus the Court has been keen to stress the Convention as a living instrument, one which is constantly evolving to take into account developments. More information, and access to case-law, is available from the Council of Europe web-site at: www.echr.coe.int/ 10 As a treaty, ICERD provisions are legally binding and enforced through its monitoring body, the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which periodically reviews the compliance of signatory states. The reports submitted by states, the dialogue between the Committee and state

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representatives, as well as the Committee’s concluding observations about the state of compliance are available on the treaty body web site at www.unhchr.org. The ICERD also provides for individual complaints through an additional optional declaration, and a list of those states which have accepted the competence of the Committee to hear individual complaints, and the limited case-law in this area, are also available on-line at the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 11 Article 1 of the ICERD states: “… the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights an fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.” 12 France additionally deprives significant numbers of Roma the right to vote

by imposing a minimum local residence requirement for voter registration. Itinerant Roma — a significant group in France — frequently do not meet this and are thereby deprived access to the basic medium for participation in a democratic society. According to the Race Equality Directive, “indirect discrimination” occurs “where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.”

13

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❖

The present and future of the Gypsy past 1

by Sir Angus Fraser

The article outlines different points of view concerning the origins and migrations of Roma -- "Gypsies". It examines assumptions implicit in appellations given to Roma when they arrived in Western Europe, and then considers theories of origin proposed over the next three centuries. New lines of investigation were stimulated once the Indic nature of the Romani language had been identified in the late 18th century, but the attitudes underlying the conclusions that were subsequently drawn have come under increasingly critical scrutiny. Debate continues as to how far Romani's evolution indicates the history of the speakers of the language. Among those who accept the link with India, recent analyses of the pre-European Romani past have led to divergent conclusions, while the determination of Romani scholars to regain some control over their history will intensify pressures for reassessment.

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M

odern stereotypes still characterise Roma/Gypsies as a wandering people, even though settled Roma/Gypsies are in the majority. None the less, since World War II, international Gypsy2 migrations have involved greater numbers than ever before. Initially this was because of the reversal of war-time displacements, and transfers of both people and territory between countries. Then, in the 1960s, relaxation of frontier regulations stimulated movement from a variety of Yugoslav Gypsy groups into Italy, Austria, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Once communism collapsed in eastern Europe, more Roma sought to migrate, particularly from Romania, in an attempt to escape from the resurgence of racially motivated attacks. That led to repatriations from Germany – which had been the prime destination for many – and pressure for tightening of asylum laws. More recently, conflicts in the Czech Republic and the Balkans have produced much-publicised arrivals in England and other countries. Westward migrations have been a recurrent feature of Romani history in Europe. The first came in the late Middle Ages. Western European communities at that time were familiar with itinerants of many different types, but when confronted in the early 15th century by a widely attested influx of dark-skinned migrants from the east, they devised for the newcomers a variety of designations that were for the most part based on supposed geographical provenance or on religious status – “Tartar” in northern Germany and Scandinavia, “heathen” in German- and Dutch-speaking lands, “Saracen” and later “Bohemian” in France. More widespread were references to Egypt or Little Egypt as the place of origin; the latter was apparently picked up from Gypsies themselves, but remains obscure. The geographical uncertainty was conspicuous in records with descriptions like “Tartars from Egypt”, a “Count of Little Egypt in Bohemia”, and “Bohemians of Little Egypt”. Gradually the names used by outsiders became more standardised. In some countries the assumed association with Egypt was the decisive factor, producing the range represented by Egyptians

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(eventually curtailed to “Gypsies”), Egipcani, Egyptenaars, Gitanos, Pharaones. A number of other countries adopted derivatives of a Byzantine term, Athínganoi, which gave rise to French Tsiganes, German Zigeuner, Italian Zingari, Hungarian Cigányok, Turkish çingene, and similar forms elsewhere. The origin of Athínganoi is not entirely clear; a widely accepted view is that it was a corrupt form of the Byzantine name for a heretical sect, applied to Roma because they shared a similar reputation for heathenish practices. There is no evidence that these migrants had a single collective name for themselves. “Roma” as a self-designation became prevalent mainly among those in eastern Europe. Those who moved on westwards would use Romani terms like “Calé” (blacks), “Manush” (man) and “Romanichal” (Gypsy man), confining the word “Rom” to the sense of “husband”. The earliest published appearance of the group appellation “Sinti” did not occur until 1793.3 In German-speaking lands, old-established Gypsies have for some time insisted on their separate identity as “Sinti”, and even today, when there is considerable impetus towards standardising on “Roma” as a collective ethnonym, a major association in Germany feels it necessary to retain both “Sinti” and “Roma” in its name (Zentralrat deutscher Sinti und Roma). When scholars began to address questions of origin in more considered fashion, they floundered just as much as minor local officials had done.4 From about the middle of the 15th century, we find serious authors advancing explanations that range bewilderingly around much of the eastern and southern periphery of the known world. Theories were often based on nothing more substantial than a perceived similarity with the name or the way of life of some known people of antiquity. In 1597 a Dutchman, Vulcanius, identified Lesser Egypt with Nubia, and Romani with Nubian or Coptic. Interestingly, he drew a distinction between Gypsies, with their own language, and Errones, used in the modern sense of “Travellers”, who were said to be of local origin and to speak an artificial jargon. A hundred years later a German, J.C. Wagenseil, argued that Gypsies were German Jews who had hidden away in secluded places around 1350 so as to escape persecution, and then re-emerged after 50 years of hiding. One schol-

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ar settled for the shores of the Black Sea, another for Cilicia in Anatolia, another for an ancient Persian tribe. Most regions and peoples of south-eastern Europe were drawn in as candidates, including the Thracian tribe known to the Romans as Getae, already appropriated as ancestors by early Gothic historians. Gypsies were descendants of Noah’s accursed son Ham, declared some; they derived from ancient priests and priestesses of Isis and the Syrian goddess, claimed Voltaire. So the speculation continued, over three centuries and more. In so far as Gypsies themselves offered some explanation, it was in the early years after their arrival in the West, when they were content to foster a story of being penitents undertaking a pilgrimage to expiate a period of apostasy, and thus perhaps obtain sporadic assistance from pious burghers to supplement whatever they earned in exchange for goods or services. Pretended pilgrims, like the coquillards of France, were no novelty in the Middle Ages, but they did not usually travel in family groups under leaders with impressive titles, as these new arrivals did. Their version of events was supported by safe-conducts obtained from people in high positions; some of these may have been procured in the flourishing market for false documents, but clearly some were not. It was indeed recognised by not a few potentates that administration of justice among them was largely an internal matter - a feature that placed them in a most unusual position among the itinerant classes of the time. The Quaker John Hoyland, an early writer on Gypsies, was full of admiration for the “discernment and discrimination” of those who devised such stratagems and their “consummate artifice of plan, and not a little adroitness and dexterity in the execution”.5 In practice the stimulus for the migration is likely to have been the Ottoman advance through the Balkans and the disruption and danger that went with the ebb and flow of warfare. In the 16th century a number of commentators began to react sharply against the idea that the people known as Gypsies were anything more than a disparate rabble, gathered together for nefarious purposes. Such views conveniently served to blur any distinction between them and the general population of vagrants and “dangerous classes”, and lent support to the mania for anti-Gypsy legislation that was sweeping through Christendom, where footloose and masterless

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men of any description, whether or not classified as Gypsies, seemed a blatant negation of the dominant scheme of values and a threat to the security of the state. The German chroniclers Albert Krantz and Johann Thurmaier (Aventinus) were among the first to adopt this stance. Aventinus declared that the Zigeni who arrived in Bavaria in 1439 were made up of “the dregs and bilge-water of various peoples who live on the borders of the Turkish empire and of Hungary.” Like Krantz, he dismissed the story of a pilgrimage as a fabrication. In his eyes, these were traitors and spies.6 At the time he was writing, about 1522, the Holy Roman Empire had for more than two decades been applying penal sanctions against Gypsies on those same grounds. In the 1530s two Swiss chroniclers, Brennwald and his son-in-law Stumpf, suggested that the original Gypsies had gone back after seven years and, in the words of Stumpf, “the useless tribe of scoundrels which wanders around in our times has sprung up since then”;7 while Sebastian Münster, a German geographer and astronomer, claimed they were “a people of Germany, collected however from various lazy folk, [...] for they incorporate many foreigners, mostly Gauls, but some from other realms who are permitted to enter their company.”8 Similar accusations of criminal association, coupled with denial of any distinctive identity, were expressed by a wide range of subsequent writers. Jurists and judges, priests and theologians, chroniclers and academics, politicians and statesmen, in Switzerland, Germany, Italy, France, Spain and England, all joined in; but they were largely repetitive, parroting not just the ideas but often the very words of their predecessors. Many of them were men of standing and influence, and their writings were heeded.9 Legislators showed related concerns in seeking to expel or extirpate Gypsies who failed to abide by the norms of settled society. Particularly in countries where the description “Egyptian” or an equivalent was in use, measures to eliminate them soon ran into difficulties over how to classify and deal with native-born Gypsies, as well as nonGypsies who had chosen to join Gypsy companies. From 1524 decrees issued in the Netherlands, then under Spanish control, made a point of categorising Egiptenaers as “diverse people, men and women of all nations, under colour and cover of being Egyptians.” A concept of

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“counterfeit Egyptians” was introduced into English law in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, in an Act of 1562 which was designed to catch people following a Gypsy way of life, regardless of whether they had been born in England or Wales and therefore might argue that they were not “Egyptians”. Spain had similar preoccupations with its Gitanos, a name still carrying implications of foreignness, and showed a particular concern to stop others from adopting their language, dress and lifestyle. In 1619 the theologian Sancho de Moncada asserted: “those who prowl about Spain are not Gitanos, but swarms of spongers and atheistical wretches, without any kind of law or religion, Spaniards who have introduced this life or sect of Gypsyism, and who admit into it every day all the idle and irreclaimable people of Spain.”10 In the same year a decree of Philip III, ordering all Gypsies to leave the kingdom or to abandon their present way of life, specifically stated that they were not Gitanos “by nation”. In 1633 a pragmatic sanction of Philip IV, setting the course in the direction of forced assimilation for the next century and a half, sought to suppress the very name of Gitano and roundly stated that ‘those who call themselves Gitanos are not so by origin or by nature but have adopted this form of life for such deleterious purposes as are now experienced’. In the following century Empress Maria Theresa of Austria also tried to abolish the name of Gypsy when she introduced a series of decrees aimed at sedentarisation. In this, her political stimulus was the utilitarian consideration that Hungary, ravaged by the conflicts between Habsburg and Turk, was severely underpopulated. All over Europe, repressive measures meant that even Gypsies who remained nomadic in pursuit of a livelihood were tending to restrict the range of travel and to acquire national characteristics under the social influences of the country in which their main field of activity lay. Questions of origin were, then, not simply matters of academic interest. They held major implications for the way Gypsy populations were regarded and treated by the authorities. Stripping them of any separate identity was part of the process of social regulation and assimilation. However, in the latter part of the 18th century developments in linguistics made it necessary to reappraise all that had been said before about the Gypsies’ past and provenance. As so often happens

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with new ideas, several people may be credited with some share in the forging of a link between Romani and the Indo-Aryan languages of India - notably István Váli, a Hungarian pastor; two Englishmen, Jacob Bryant and William Marsden; and two Germans, Johann Rüdiger and Heinrich Grellmann. In the present context only the Germans call for more extensive consideration.11 Rüdiger’s findings were published in 1782, in an essay which set out the claims of Gypsy history and language to be proper subjects for scholarly study, and indeed of Gypsies themselves to something better than treatment ‘which our enlightened century should be ashamed to tolerate further’.12 His work was based on original empirical research and constituted the first serious attempt at a comparative investigation of the language.13 It was, however, his contemporary, Grellmann, who captured the attention. Grellmann’s book was published the following year.14 It drew widely on previous writers and treated the borrowed material as applicable to all Gypsies. The earlier, ethnographic chapters relied heavily on a series of over forty anonymous articles that appeared in 1775-6 in the Wiener Anzeigen, a German-language Hungarian journal. For linguistic matters the source was mainly one Christian Büttner, who, as Grellmann pointed out in his preface, had drawn Romani vocabulary from precursors ranging from Vulcanius to Rüdiger. The imperfections in Grellmann’s analysis did not prevent him from becoming the vehicle for winning acceptance of the Indian link. Had he never existed, however, the study of Romani and the inferences drawn from it would no doubt have followed much the same line of development, for recognition that it was related to Indic languages was emerging in a variety of quarters. In matters aside from language, on the other hand, Grellmann remained pivotal for many years to come, through his portrayal of Gypsies as untrustworthy, primitive, childish and sorely in need of firm guidance and control, of the type introduced by Maria Theresa and her son. A study by Wim Willems and Leo Lucassen of the genealogy of ideas on Gypsies as set out in Dutch encyclopaedias shows, for example, that well into the 20th century Grellmann’s work was a major factor in preserving stereotypes in a kind of publication that carried special authority in the eyes of the public.15

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Grellmann was quickly overtaken in the linguistic field, once Sir William Jones established the place of Sanskrit in the Indo-European family. Comparative philology began to make gigantic strides and the study of Romani was swept along at a fast pace. Particularly important in shedding some light on Gypsy origins and migrations were the efforts made towards identifying Romani’s closest relatives among the modern Indic tongues, and in assessing the time of its separation from them and tracing the routes it followed subsequently - all this on the assumption that whatever was established for the language would also hold good of its speakers. The new study attracted some major scholars, notably August Friedrich Pott at Halle and Franz Miklosich in Vienna. Pott, founder of Romani philology, concluded that the dialects of Romani formed a linguistic unity, while Miklosich, some thirty years later, reasoned that the ancestors of Europe’s Gypsies left India around the 10th century. On the basis of lexical borrowings, he mapped out likely migration routes.16 From 1875 a Dutch Orientalist, Michiel de Goeje, drawing on both linguistic and historical material, argued that Gypsies could be identified as descendants of the Jats of India. Meanwhile researchers in a few countries were beginning to comb their national and local archives for references to Gypsies. Such records generally represented a qualitative advance on the repetitive chronicles, for it was there, in the raw, often before external influences had decisively warped attitudes, that primary evidence might be found. These scholars, though they read each other’s publications, were not pursuing their activities within any collective framework. In 1888, however, a society was formed in England, under the title of the Gypsy Lore Society, to facilitate joint pursuit of the shared interest, principally by means of a journal. Charles Godfrey Leland, an American who had settled in England and had two Gypsy books to his credit, became the Society’s first president. By the end of 1888 there were sixty-nine members, twelve of them institutional. The individual membership was predominantly British, but fourteen had joined from Continental Europe, particularly Austria-Hungary, and seven from the United States. There were no manifestos: the aim was to gather in information, with no preordained programme or methodology. The

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editors’ preface to the first issue of the Journal did, however, set as a major target the solution of the conundrum of Gypsy origins. The society lasted only until 1892, but was revived in 1907, surviving with a few intermissions up to present times. From a modern perspective, it has to be said that certain features in the attitudes of some pioneers of the society (if not too often in their Journal, certainly in their letters and books) are likely to set teeth on edge today. Despite all the evidence to the contrary that must have stared them in the face, they tended to favour a rudimentary genetic determinism in deciding who was to enjoy their benevolent attention. Rather naively, they took blood-descent to be an adequate explanation for differences in human behaviour and assumed that, for example, the better the Romani spoken, the more pure-blooded was the Gypsy speaker likely to be (and vice versa). Such attitudes among the early members (often encouraged by their Gypsy informants to think along these lines) would set the tone for Gypsy studies in Britain for some time to come, until in the end the whole concept of pure-bloodedness rebounded on the Travellers generally.17 None the less, the membership included gifted scholars, and one finds work of lasting importance among the material published in the Journal in those early series (1888-92, 1907-16): historical surveys, Romani dialect studies, analyses of old vocabularies, physical and cultural anthropology, folk-tales, songs and music, and much else. What was absent for most of the time was comment on current political and social issues affecting Gypsies. There was also a perceptible delay in seizing upon the significance of the renewal of migrations in the latter part of the 19th century among Vlach (Wallachian) Rom who became an enduring new stratum of Gypsy population in many European countries and an even more important constituent in the Americas. One of the society’s leading lights was John Sampson, whose year of no return was 1894, when he encountered Edward Wood, a Gypsy harpist and fiddler from whom he first heard a richly inflected Romani dialect that had been preserved in Wales. Sampson, librarian of Liverpool University, devoted the better part of his life to further study of Romani and its speakers. His massive The Dialect of the Gypsies of Wales was the fruit of thirty years’ labour, supported by a band of

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helpers, and remains the finest study of a single Romani dialect yet produced.18 It also incorporated an extensive historical analysis of the development of Romani from Sanskrit. Sampson argued that the Gypsies’ ancestors left India as a single people speaking a single language which originated in the north-west provinces, the departure from there occurring at least as early as the end of the 9th century AD. On the basis of a comparison with data relating to Romani in Armenia and the Near East, he suggested that on Persian territory there was a parting of the ways which gave rise to two branches, one travelling north by way of Armenia and becoming the ancestors of Armenian and European Gypsies, and the other journeying southwards into Syria. An erudite tussle ensued in the pages of the Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society between Sampson and Sir Ralph Turner of the London School of Oriental and African Studies.19 Turner sought to show that Romani belonged originally to the central group typified by Hindi, and explained the language’s north-western features as later accretions, the result of a migration, probably before 250 BC, out of the central area into the north-west. As regards the time of departure from India, there was no major difference with Sampson, and Turner believed it to have taken place sometime before the 9th century AD. Turner’s position tended to be the one adopted, explicitly or implicitly, in subsequent works. By the time of the Sampson/Turner exchanges there was also a fair measure of consensus that one should look for the Gypsies’ Indian forebears among a low-caste group of commercial nomads known as Doms, Dom being an early Indic form of the word Rom. Turner did argue, however, that the morphological, lexical and phonological differences between the branches of Romani in Europe, Armenia and the Near East might be better explained if there had been more than one exodus from India or if there was already some differentiation within the language at the time of the exodus. Again his standpoint appeared the more persuasive. Less arcane was a widespread debate on the benefits of eugenics that was flourishing in the 1920s among those who advocated improving the quality of the human race by genetic means. The eugenicist assumptions of the day were taken over in the Nazi ideology of “racial hygiene”, dressed up as the scientific basis for eliminating those

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deemed to be of inferior stock. In the present context the subject of Nazi atrocities against Gypsies can be given no more than a brief reference. Two aspects of the ideological background should, however, be noted here in relation to theories concerning Gypsy origins and migrations. Robert Ritter, head of the Research Centre for Racial Hygiene and Population Biology in Berlin, was convinced that a Gypsy propensity for nomadism was genetically transmitted and therefore among the many undesirable characteristics that would contaminate the German populace if intermarriage took place.20 This belief underpinned the genealogical and other researches leading to his centre’s tally of those in the Reich who carried Gypsy blood; Ritter concluded that more than 90% of German Gypsies were themselves of mixed blood and that their further breeding had to be stopped once and for all. Secondly, if Höss, the commandant at Auschwitz, is to be believed, the Reichsführer-SS harboured a notion of preserving some Gypsies out of two groups not given to mixed marriages: In his view they were the direct descendants of the original IndoGermanic race, and had preserved their ways and customs more or less pure and intact. He now wished to have them all collected together for research purposes. They were to be precisely registered and preserved as an historic monument.21

Himmler’s naive idea was vetoed by the Führer, and there was no Gypsy reservation. Postwar, it was only a matter of time before Gypsies themselves would set out to have more say in the presentation of their history, once some of them began, from the 1950s, to form themselves into political associations and pressure groups, locally, regionally, nationally, and then internationally. When they did so, they showed little disposition to jettison the basic findings of their gajé (non-Gypsy) precursors in regard to Indian roots and migration paths. Indian scholars, for their part, warmed to the task of identifying racial and cultural affinities preserved in the folk-ways and speech patterns of forgotten children of India. Politically, the Indian connection and its ethnic implications helped in making the case for ethnic minority status, a

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matter of practical importance both in the communist countries and in the rest of Europe. In the former particularly, where the bulk of Europe’s Gypsy population lived, recognition as a national minority could win certain linguistic and cultural rights, although in practice most of the communist regimes at some stage demanded Gypsies’ integration. From the late 1960s, as international forums gradually took an interest in the status of Gypsies, the activists became increasingly skilled in pursuing political goals by direct lobbying and shaping the resolutions and documents of bodies like the Council of Europe, the European Union, the United Nations and the CSCE (later OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). More and more they moved towards a pan-European perspective on Gypsy history and destiny, despite some ideological reservations on the part of the Zentralrat deutscher Sinti und Roma. Some of the Gypsy spokesmen were in no doubt that they were going through a process of “ethnogenesis”.22 Out of that background emerged several reassessments of what might have happened in India. Vanya de Gila Kochanowski, a Latvian Gypsy, produced a number of exuberant hypotheses.23 He identified the Gypsies’ Indian forebears with successive migrations of kshatriyas, the warriors who formed the second rank among the four castes of Hindu society. Later he argued for brahmins as well. More recently, Ian Hancock, an eminent member of the International Romani Union, has amplified this approach. First, using traditional linguistic techniques, he tackled the evolution of Romani in Persia and the pattern of Gypsy migrations there, and moved that debate well beyond the state it had reached as a result of the scholarly exchanges of the 1920s.24 Then he expanded the scope of his survey to produce a monograph on The Indian Origin and Westward Migration of the Romani People. This time he was concerned not only with linguistic evidence, but also with Indian, Persian and Arab history and possible Gypsy cultural retentions from India. His central conclusion on origin opened rather tentatively: We are now more inclined to believe that while the ancestors of

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the Roma probably did include those referred to as Doms, they were only one constituent of the overall exodus - camp-followers who went along to take care of the needs of a military force which was put together to resist the spread of Islam into India in the 11th Century.25

The Muslim assailants were the Ghaznavids, first in a series of Turko-Afghan Muslims to invade northern India. On the Indian side it was the Rajputs (literally “king’s sons”) who waged the staunchest resistance. Where and how the Rajputs originated remains in some doubt, but they kept the Turko-Afghans busy for years. Hancock argued that once the Ghaznavids were gaining the upper hand, some Rajputs fled to the north and took with them a diversity of followers from the lowest caste and the untouchables. Later, crossing mountain passes in the Hindu Kush, they moved westwards into Persia. These future Gypsies were therefore of very mixed ethnic and social composition, but [a]s the Roma became more and more remote from their homeland, moving along the eastern periphery of the Islamic expansion, we may assume that the awareness of their shared origin in India overcame whatever newly acquired jâti or caste distinctions had divided them socially; and in time, the population became one, losing its mixed, occupational identity to acquire its emerging ethnic one.

These are big assumptions, not least the supposition that the Ghazni-Rajput conflicts can transfer some of their undoubted historical authenticity on to a postulated diaspora of proto-Gypsies. Apparent difficulties also arise from the compressed chronology inherent in the hypothesis. Although it concedes that the migration must have preceded the second battle of Tarâîn, where the Rajputs suffered a major defeat in 1192 and which might therefore have seemed a plausible cause of northwards dispersal, it still leaves relatively little time for the language of the migrants to acquire north-western or Dardic features, followed by a stock of word borrowings that indicate a somewhat prolonged stay in territories where Iranian languages were spoken, before Romani came under Greek influence in Byzantium.26

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Moreover, Rajputs are known for intense pride in their ancestry and personal honour and for fondness for marriages where the bride marries into a social group higher than her own. If these characteristics were already marked in the 11th or 12th century, they would have set constraints on the supposed drift into peripatetic homogeneity with a motley population of camp-followers. Hancock completed his analysis by drawing cultural parallels between Gypsies and India. In his earlier survey of Romani linguistics, he had pointed out that “Indian scholarship in this connection is an intriguing combination of subjectiveness and careful documentation,” and quoted the following claim as an example of the former: “The very fact that Roma love buffaloes for their milk proves their origin in the Panjab, where till today, every Panjabi would forgo anything else, but not buffalo’s milk.”27 He avoided that kind of excess in indicating possible Indian retentions in Gypsies’ music, system of justice, religion, funeral customs, pollution code, eating habits, and beliefs on spiritual and physical well-being. However, on such matters, more than one interpretation is often possible and it may not be difficult to point to European analogues. Leonardo Piasere, an Italian social anthropologist, has recently declared that, outside the linguistic domain, the results of such comparisons with India have always been paltry.28 On the other hand, an Indian paradigm might well account for the widespread existence of the pollution beliefs and purity code which reinforce the ethnic boundary between Gypsy and gajo. Hancock also mentions briefly the evidence of blood groups, which do tend to confirm - in a way that linguistics cannot - an Indian connection between language and original speaker. Understandably, however, Gypsies may be wary of investigations of blood groups and other genetic markers, given the use they were put to in the Third Reich. The Interface series of specialist studies on Gypsies, supported by the European Commission, led to the appearance in 1993 of a differently focused search for historical pointers. Donald Kenrick’s Gypsies: From India to the Mediterranean surveyed traces of immigration from India in Middle Eastern literature, and then homed in on those referring to the Zott, a name given to Indians by the Arabs when they invaded India after conquering Persia. More than a century earlier,

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Michiel de Goeje had combed through such early mentions of Zott and published them.29 If one were to accept all these as references to Gypsies, a historical picture of Gypsy migration would soon build up. The trouble is that there are too many of them, and at times the selection of candidates almost borders on the arbitrary. Both Kenrick and de Goeje highlighted one in particular among the Indian groups brought by force to the Middle East. This was a contingent settled by the Arabs on the banks of the Tigris, who became so numerous and powerful that the Arab ruler in Baghdad had to subjugate them by force of arms. In 834 they were resettled partly in Khânaqîn to the north-east of Baghdad and partly on the northern frontier of Syria. Kenrick suggested that the Khânaqîn Zott “probably formed the main bulk of the unskilled Romanies who moved north into Armenia and then into Europe, ending up working in the fields in the Balkans and elsewhere. The same route would have been taken by other Indians moving on from Persia, nomadic entertainers and craftworkers whose passage was not noted.” In the book’s concluding section the hypothesis was reiterated as: The social group which constituted the bulk of the Romany immigrants into Europe was probably the several thousand Zott who were resettled in Khaneikin. This mixture of landworkers, soldiers and their families were accompanied along the route by smaller numbers of other persons of Indian origin with specialist skills, especially nomadic craftworkers and entertainers.30

De Goeje had argued that the Zotts on the Syrian frontier constituted the first band of Gypsies brought into the Greek empire, after being captured by the Byzantines; Kenrick was certain that, if that were so, they did not survive intact as one of the Gypsy groups in Europe. Arab historians were silent on the Khânaqîn contingent favoured by Kenrick. Not all those engaged in Gypsy studies share this interest in prehistory, and from the 1970s some have played down any connection between Gypsy language and origin. Judith Okely, while accepting the existence of a distinct Gypsy ethnicity, began to express reservations about the concept of Indian provenance in 1979, if not before.31 In

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1983 she suggested that “[p]erhaps many forms of Romanes might be classified as creole or pidgins which developed between merchants and other travelling groups along the trade routes” and that “[i]t may be the case that groups of people brought or appropriated some linguistic forms, creole or pidgin related to some earlier Sanskrit in the movements along the trade routes between East and West, but it does not follow that all ‘real’ Gypsies or Travellers are the genealogical descendants of specific groups of persons allegedly in India nearly a thousand years ago.” She also pointed out that in England it is “impossible to identify ‘Romanies’ by their physical or ‘racial’ features. The physiognomy of the majority of Gypsies is very much like that of the average English Gorgio.”32 That kind of observation does not necessarily hold good in some other countries, but certainly it cannot be said that there is any distinctive Gypsy phenotype. Even if one does accept the Indian link, this need come as no surprise, in view of the time-spans involved. During the period when Gypsies have been present in Europe, it would have required no more than a few marriages in every hundred to be with non-Gypsies to give rise to a preponderance of European ancestry. A fortiori, a very small average percentage of unions with non-Gypsies since the exodus from India would have produced a preponderance of non-Indian ancestors.33 One can but speculate about the extent to which exogamy actually existed, but genealogical investigations have generally shown that, within the past century at least, it was significant. It is reasonable to assume that the genetic inheritance among Gypsies became increasingly diffuse with the passage of time, just as it has among other peoples in the continuing process of human hybridisation. Moreover, in being uprooted from India and maintaining a mobile existence, the ethnicity of the early migrants would be fashioned and remoulded by a multitude of influences and assimilate innumerable elements that had nothing to do with India. This tradition of change and adaptability has far from run its course. The most insistent attack on perceived exoticism has come from the Netherlands, notably from Wim Willems.34 In his doctoral dissertation of 1995, after referring to linguistic and archaeological studies of Indo-European languages, he continued:

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archaeologists today exercise considerable restraint when it comes to reconstructing the migration routes which Indo-Europeans might have followed on their way from the East to the West. It is also possible, to their way of thinking, that linguistic influence made itself felt through trading outposts or cultural transmission and that thus the speakers of an Indo-European language in Europe did not migrate in the remote past from Central Asia but perhaps made the language of others their own. Research into these matters has still not generated conclusive answers, which prompts the question whether in the case of so many diverse Gypsy groups a similar process may not have taken place, i.e. that certain groups between the eighth and eighteenth centuries came, as a kind of group ritual, to adopt a dialect of the Indian Romani.35

This line of thought was presumably influenced by acquaintance with works like the archaeologist Colin Renfrew’s Archaeology and Language,36 which outlines a theory that the spread of Indo-European languages across Europe was linked with the gradual diffusion of farming and the growth and contact of populations, and occurred over several millennia. Comparison with a model of pastoral and agricultural gradualism in the bronze age, coupled with a concept of linguistic group ritual, seems to many an unsatisfying combination for accounting for Romani’s dissemination as a coherent linguistic entity. Yaron Matras commented pointedly, in his recent article on Rüdiger: “Both Willems and Okely owe us an explanation as to how and why a fullyfledged language with grammatical inflections will have been transmitted from Asia to Europe and expanded there to become the everyday language of millions, without the physical migration of a population of speakers at an early stage.”37 Willems also argued for a radically more restrictive approach to Gypsy studies - one that would bypass questions of origin altogether. He listed uncertainties in the Gypsies’ prehistory in India - cause of the exodus, their socio-economic status, their cultural background and, in the original Dutch version of his dissertation, went on to say that on all such questions linguistics still owed the answers. In the English version, this became: ‘Linguistics will never be able to give conclusive answers to all such questions concerning the reconstruc-

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tion of the Gypsies’ history’.38 He therefore proposed confining the focus of attention to European migrants in general. As set out in the subsequent collaborative work, Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups, the aim should be to concentrate on two alternative approaches. One is the “stigmatisation perspective”, and involves looking at the position of itinerants “in the light of the way they have been treated by the dominant groups in society, especially (judicial) authorities, and the sometimes indirect negative effects of their wandering lifestyle.” The other is to consider the socio-economic functioning of travelling groups generally, and “look upon them as individuals and families who - like other people - try to make a living and much more often than is commonly assumed succeed in reaching a modest state of welfare and sometimes are even outright successful.”39 That is a very bare summary but is perhaps enough to justify a few comments. The suggested agenda is worth tackling, though tailored to the writers’ special interests and antipathies and not entirely novel. From the 1980s several collections of ethnographic material have appeared on a range of peripatetic communities (including Gypsies) who, in various parts of the world, adopt commercial nomadism as a strategy for selling goods and services.40 The proposal by Willems and colleagues would build on the historical dimension and contextualise it, at least in regard to travelling groups in Europe from the Middle Ages onwards, by examining wider issues concerning migrant or vagrant populations as a whole and the official apparatus set up to deal with them.41 Apparently the history of the many settled Gypsies would be beyond their purview, a matter of no little significance in the case of a country like Spain, where sedentarisation was largely accomplished as early as the 18th century. The ‘stigmatisation perspective’ would be no more than half-sighted if it did not stimulate or accommodate the kind of research which, within the last twenty-five years, brought to light a carefully orchestrated round-up of all Gypsies in Spain, men, women and children, on a single night at the end of July 1749, to be set to forced labour as captives in places of the government’s choosing, all their possessions being sold.42 This rested, not on considerations related to itinerancy, but on the assumption that the entire Gypsy population was incorrigible.

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It is difficult to see reasons for anathematising endeavours conducted outside the restricted socio-historical field that is proposed, other than the underlying premise that Gypsy ethnic identity is a construction on the part of misguided ethnologists and folklorists. It still seems likely that, in the future, Gypsy intellectuals and the linguists, sociologists, ethnographers, anthropologists, ethnomusicologists, folklorists and others now engaged in what is loosely labelled ‘Gypsy studies’ will for the most part continue to entertain the idea that, somewhere within the diverse range of populations sharing an itinerant lifestyle (past or present), there is a group, known variously as Gypsies, Roma, etc, with an identity and culture meriting consideration in their own right, however awkward to define they may be.43

NOTES A version of this article first appeared in the journal Cambridge Review for International Affairs. ∑ Sir Angus Fraser is, inter alia, the author of the book The Gypsies. 2 Editor’s note: The author’s frequent use of “Gypsy” — a pejorative term to many Roma — has been left intact to reflect the author’s contention that it is only recently that there is a “considerable impetus towards standardising on ‘Roma’ as a collective ethnonym.” 3 Biester, J.E., “Über die Zigeuner; besonders im Königreich Preussen”, Berlinische Monatsschrift, vol. 21, 1793, pp. 108-165. On the origin of “Sinti”, see Matras, Yaron, “Johann Rüdiger and the Study of Romani in 18th-century Germany”, Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society, series 5, vol. 9, no. 2, 1999, pp. 89116, esp. pp. 108-12. 4 For an extensive analysis of theories of Gypsy origins in the period 14611841, see Piasere, Leonardo, “De origine Cinganorum”, Études et documents balkaniques et méditerranéens, no. 14, 1989, pp. 105-126. 5 Hoyland, John, A Historical Survey of [...] the Gypsies, York, the Author, 1816, pp. 222-223. 6 Thurmaier, Johann, Annalium Boiorum libri septem, Ingolstadt, 1554, pp. 509 and 663. 7 Stumpf, Johann, Schweytzer Chronik, Zürich, 1606, fol. 731. 8 Münster, Sebastian, Cosmographiae universalis lib vi, Basel, H. Petri, 1550, pp. 267-268. 9 Cf. Fraser, A.M., “Counterfeit Egyptians”, Tsiganologische Studien, no. 2, 1990, pp. 43-69. 10 de Moncada, Sancho, “Espulsion de los Gitanos”, Restauracion politica de 1

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España, Madrid, Luis Sanchez, 1619, p. 130. 11 For a detailed linguistic survey, see Hancock, Ian, “The Development of Romani linguistics”, in Jazayery, M.A. et al., eds., Languages and Cultures: Studies in Honor of Edgar C. Polomé, Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 1988, pp. 183223. More compressed is Bakker, Peter and Yaron Matras, “Romani Linguistics: A Very Brief History”, in Matras, Yaron et al., eds., The Typology and Dialectology of Romani, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamin, 1997, pp. viix. 12 Rüdiger, Johann C.C., Von der Sprache und Herkunft der Zigeuner aus Indien, (Part 1 of his Neuster Zuwachs der teutschen, fremden und allgemeinen Sprachkunde), Leipzig and Halle, 1782, p. 49. Reptd., with introduction by H. Haarmann, Hamburg, Buske, 1990. 13 Rüdiger’s originality is discussed in depth in Matras, “Johann Rüdiger”, pp. 89-116. 14 Grellmann, Heinrich Moritz Gottlieb, Die Zigeuner. Ein historischer Versuch über die Lebensart und Verfassung, Sitten und Schicksale dieses Volks in Europa, Dessau and Leipzig, 1783. 15 Willems, Wim and Leo Lucassen, ‘The church of knowledge: representation of Gypsies in encyclopaedias’, in Leo Lucassen et al., Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups: a Socio-Historical Approach, London, Macmillan, 1998, pp. 35-52. 16 Pott, A.F., Die Zigeuner in Europa und Asien, Halle, Heynemann, 1844-5; F.X. Miklosich, Über die Mundarten und die Wanderungen der Zigeuner Europas, Vienna, Gerold, 1872-81. 17 The pioneering book on this last point is: Acton, Thomas, Gypsy Politics and Social Change, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. A brief account of the early history of the Gypsy Lore Society is: Angus Fraser, ‘A rum lot’, in Matt T. Salo, ed., 100 Years of Gypsy Studies, Cheverly MD, Gypsy Lore Society, 1990, pp. 1-14. 18 Sampson, John, The Dialect of the Gypsies of Wales, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926. 19 Turner, R.L., “The Position of Romani in Indo-Aryan”, JGLS, 3rd ser., vol. 5, 1926, pp. 145-189; J. Sampson, “Notes on Professor R.L. Turner’s ‘The position of Romani in Indo-Aryan’”, JGLS, 3rd ser., vol. 6, 1927, pp. 57-68; R.L. Turner, “‘The position of Romani in Indo-Aryan’: A Reply to Dr J. Sampson”, JGLS, 3rd ser., vol. 6, 1927, pp. 129-138. 20 Willems, Wim, “Ethnicity as a Death-Trap”, in Lucassen et al., Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups, p. 26. 21 Hoess, Rudolf, Commandant of Auschwitz, London, Pan Books, 1961, p. 138. 22 Cf. Gheorghe, Nicolae, “The Social Construction of Romani Identity”, in Acton, Thomas ed., Gypsy Politics and Traveller Identity, Hatfield, University of Hertfordshire Press, 1997, pp. 153-171. 23 E.g. “Black Gypsies, white Gypsies”, Diogenes, Vol. 63, 1968, pp. 27-47; “Roma - History of their Indian Origin”, Roma, vol. 4, no. 4, 1979, pp. 16-32; Parlons Tsigane, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1994, pp. 1-61. 24 Hancock, Ian, “On the Migration and Affiliation of the Dômba: Iranian

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words in Rom, Lom and Dom Gypsy”, in Matras, Yaron ed., Romani in Contact, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, John Benjamin, 1995, pp. 25-51. 25 Hancock, Ian, The Indian Origin and Westward Migration of the Romani People, Manchaca TX, IRU, 1998, p. 13. This was an expanded version of a chapter in Ian Hancock, A Handbook of Vlach Romani, Columbus OH, Slavica Publishers, 1995, pp. 17-28. 26 119 European Romani forms which may have Iranian etymons are listed in Hancock, “On the Migration and Affiliation”, Op. cit., pp. 34-39. 27 Hancock, “Development of Romani Linguistics”, Op. cit., pp. 204 and 217. 28 Piasere, Leonardo, Un mondo di mondi: antropologia delle culture rom, Naples, L’Ancora, 1999, pp. 29-30. 29 de Goeje, M.J., Mémoire sur les migrations des Tsiganes à travers l’Asie, Leiden, Brill, 1903. A translation of an 1876 version of de Goeje’s essay was incorporated in D. MacRitchie, Accounts of the Gypsies of India, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, 1886, pp. 1-59. 30 Kenrick, Donald, Gypsies: From India to the Mediterranean, Toulouse, CRDP, 1993, pp. 33 and 53. 31 Okely, Judith, “An Anthropological Contribution to the History and Archaeology of an Ethnic Group”, in B. Burnham et al., eds., Space, Hierarchy and Society, Oxford, BAR International Series, 1979. 32 Okely, Judith, The Traveller-Gypsies, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 9, 12 and 17-18. Editor’s note: Gorgio is another English spelling of gajo. 33 The precise figures would depend on the assumptions made about the chronology and the average number of years in a generation. 34 Willems, Wim, Op zoek naar de ware zigeuner, Utrecht, van Arkel, 1995 (English version: In Search of the True Gypsy, London, Frank Cass, 1997). Lucassen et al., Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups. 35 Willems, In Search, p. 83. 36 Renfrew, Colin, Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins, London, Jonathan Cape, 1987. 37 Matras, “Johann Rüdiger”, Op. cit., p. 113. On the basic unity of Romani, see Bakker and Matras, “Romani Linguistics”, Op. cit., pp. xv-xvi. 38 Willems, Op zoek, p. 302; In Search, p. 308. 39 Lucassen et al., Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups, pp. 8-10. 40 E.g. Berland, J.C. and M.T. Salo, eds., Peripatetic Peoples, special issue of Nomadic Peoples, nos. 21/22, Dec. 1986; Aparna Rao, ed., The Other Nomads: Peripatetic minorities in cross-cultural perspective, Cologne/Vienna, Böhlau, 1987. 41 Leo Lucassen has undoubtedly contributed to the body of knowledge in this area, e.g. in his En men noemde hen zigeuners. De geschiedenis van Kalderasch, Ursari, Lowara en Sinti in Nederland: 1750-1944, Amsterdam/The Hague, Beheer IISG/SDU, 1990; and Zigeuner. Die Geschichte eines polizeilichen Ordnungsbegriff in Deutschland, 1700-1945, Cologne/Weimar, Böhlau, 1996. 42 Cf. Alfaro, Antonio Gómez, The Great Gypsy Round-up, Madrid, Presencia Gitana, 1993.

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As it happens, the law in England and Wales, somewhat confusingly, engages with both rival methods of classification to meet different situations. A generalised categorisation (“gipsies” are “persons of nomadic habit of life, whatever their race or origin”) was formerly related to provision of camping sites for Gypsies and still has limited residual uses. However, for the purposes of the Act which gives protection against discrimination on grounds of colour, race, nationality, or ethnic or national origins, the Court of Appeal concluded in 1988 that Gypsies (considered not to be synonymous with ‘Travellers’) were a ‘racial’ group, as decided by ethnic rather than biological or racial criteria.

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❖

Life in My Hometown: Romani Poverty in Craiova, Romania by Valeriu Nicolae1

The author, a Romani man from Romania, describes extreme poverty among Roma in his hometown of Craiova. The article completes a cycle of three introductory pieces by providing a Romani voice on the situation of Roma in Europe today.

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W

herever I go, people ask me where I am from. The answer is always complicated because I have to explain that although I am from Romania, I am a Gypsy. In Europe, when I give this answer, people look at me like I am crazy. Gypsies are the people no one wants around: the thieves and the beggars who cheat everybody and live rich and carefree lives. But I was the manager of a respectable company with partners all over the European continent. I did not prominently display big gold rings or chains; in fact, I seemed to be absolutely normal. In North America, the reaction when I say I am a Gypsy is usually “cool!” People think I must be a free spirit with some mystical ability to read their future in their palms, even though I work as a computer programmer. None of them know or want to know that life for the majority of Roma in Romania is a daily struggle for survival and nothing else. Summer days are dry and dusty in the southern Romanian city of Craiova. The stench is terrible as I approach the garbage dump in Mofleni, five kilometres away from Craiova: This is the place were sanity stops. Between the heaps of garbage, I see several dead animals; I can recognise the remains of a cow and a horse. Around them are live crows and pigs, scavenging for food. Not far away are about twenty children, all of them Romani, looking for scraps of any kind: food, metal, paper and wood in the field. They survive by the only means they can — by collecting and selling metal and paper scraps, and by stealing. Most of them are barefoot and wearing only shorts. They are extremely dirty as they have no running water in their homes… and the places they call home are just shelters built of dirt and straw, often shared with chickens, dogs and cats. In the winter, they keep the animals inside to keep their homes warmer. When I visited the garbage dump in summer 2001, Ionu?, a ten-year-old boy, told me that the garbage dump was a good place during the winter because they often found food which was still good because it had frozen, and wood to

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burn for heat. Since I came to Canada in 2000, I have visited Romania several times and each time I came to see the Roma with whom I have worked on various educational projects since 1992. Even in the garbage dump, the kids play games. When the trucks come to dump garbage from the city, they wait and try to catch the rats which fall out of the trucks with the garbage. Then they kill them. This is a dangerous game: Quite a few of the children have been bitten. In May 2001, two Romani children died, one of tetanus and the other of septicaemia. At around 12:30 everyone suddenly starts running towards an approaching car from the Daewoo factory in Craiova. The South Koreans are known for throwing away the best stuff: The food is usually still good and sometimes even still sealed in its package. Some entire families live nearby and spend their time at the garbage dump. Most of the adults collect paper and metal scraps to sell. Copper gets the best price. Between 1995 and 2001, the Romanian press reported at least five deaths of Roma by electric shock as they tried to steal copper cables. Flori?a and his two daughters wander around the field looking for scraps of metal, paper and food. He makes the equivalent of about 25 euros per month selling metal and paper scraps. He told me that he had decided to steal a chicken in order to get thrown in jail for two years. Then his daughters would be put in an orphanage and would finally have enough to eat. I heard later, at the end of 2001, that he had succeeded: He was in prison and his children were in the orphanage. Another brother and sister have been put in the orphanage because their father is in prison for stealing a coffin to bury their mother. The village priest refused to provide a funeral for the woman unless they had a coffin, although he knew they couldn’t afford one. Orphanages: Picture an average-sized house. As many as 90 kids are crowded into this space. The bathrooms have just four toilets, two for boys and two for girls, and they are always filthy. The food looks and tastes worse than anything you have ever seen. At night you are afraid to switch on the light because you don’t want to see the cockroaches scatter. Everything has a musty smell and the walls are always wet.

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Nothing in the place is new. All of the pots and dishes are at least six years old, most of them are rusted and all of them chipped. The children get a shower once a week on Fridays, and this the only time they have hot water. For most of them this is luxury: when they come to the orphanages at eight years old or more, many of the children don’t even know how to use a water faucet or shower, or how to flush a toilet. In winter, the temperature inside is just above eight degrees most of the time, and the water is so cold that many of them will avoid washing their hands. The biggest event is when some sweets, close to their expiry date, are sent by a company eager to get rid of them so they can write them off in their taxes. This is the heaven into which many Romani parents try to get their children. Another of Craiova’s Romani neighbourhoods is close to the “Fabrica de confectii” (clothing factory). Outside the factory canteen you can always find Romani kids waiting for the garbage. The cook told me she doesn’t dare throw away anything which could make somebody sick: “I couldn’t live with myself if any of those kids got sick and died.” This is an unusual attitude. Most Romanians think that “a good Gypsy is a dead Gypsy.” One of the stores I managed in Craiova is close to Valea Luncii, an area with a large Romani majority. I found out that Romani children rummaged through the garbage bins behind the stores looking for discarded salami, meat and dairy products. At first I thought they fed the scraps to their dogs or cats. Then I saw a six-year-old child eating one of the old salamis. The salami was almost green. I tried to find a way to provide some food for the children but I had to give up — there were too many of them. One time a 12-year-old Romani child managed to hide overnight in one of the grocery stores I managed. There was the Romanian lei equivalent of more than 1000 US dollars in the store. He spent the night eating as much as he could. When the security guard caught him trying to leave the store with the first customers the next morning he had only four pieces of sausage and one salami on him. Criminality does run high in Romani families. Sometimes children are sent by their parents to steal as a way to avoid prosecution, as children under 14 can’t be prosecuted. However, most of the children caught stealing

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in Craiova are caught stealing food. You can also see Roma at Craiova’s market at the end of the day, filling their sacks with half-rotten oranges, apples and other discarded produce. Any of these can feed a child or even a family, or produce alcohol as a last resort to deal with a hopeless life. Children growing up with alcoholic parents and family violence as well as extreme poverty have almost no chance to develop normally. Many of them end up addicted to alcohol, aurolac (a paint thinner) or perlandez (a glue) – the last two extremely toxic substances which seriously damage the brain. In 1999, Craiova’s emergency room registered 22 cases of Romani kids with severe caustic soda intoxication (resulting in permanent oesophagus and stomach burns). They had found almost empty juice or alcohol bottles in garbage bins and had drunk the remaining liquid, which turned out to be caustic soda used to clean the bottles. Even after these incidents there are no educational programs aimed at keeping Romani kids safe. About half of Craiova’s Romani population live close to the open sewer canal (Craiovi?a Veche). In the summer a fetid stench rises from the canal, advertising the danger. But the children are unaware and play around the canal wearing next to nothing. Some of them have open ulcers. Dr. Anghelescu, a pediatrician, told me that in Craiova more than seven out of ten cases of serious infections are among Romani children. In winter the situation is desperate, and it is normal to see children inside garbage bins looking for anything to burn or to wear. On the coldest days, it is typical to see in the emergency room of Craiova’s hospital, groups of Romani children and adults with frostbite. Another normal sight in the winter is Roma carrying sacks of wood. You can see them around deserted buildings removing pieces of the wooden floors with their hands. Dragos Popescu’s wife died when a deserted house collapsed on her as she was trying to get pieces of wood for heating their home. Dragos was left with four children to look after. He makes a living filling gas lighters, making the equivalent of about 30 euros per month. In order to survive he was forced to give up three of his four children to the orphanage: He alternates which child he keeps at home in order to give each of them some attention.

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Cuvantul Liberta?i, a Craiova newspaper, printed an article describing how Gypsies destroy apartment buildings by lighting fires in their own flats using the wood from the floor. In fact, this happened only two times. The article did not mention that both families could not afford the Romanian lei equivalent of close to 20 euros per month to pay for heating. Craiova has several main intersections. At any of them you will find Romani kids waiting to wash or scrape the frost off your windows for anything you may want to give them, even a piece of gum or a sandwich. You may say that you can find people washing windows at intersections in most cities. The difference is that these kids are mostly between four and nine years old. Sometimes they have to work in pairs to reach the car window, a smaller child sitting on the shoulders of a larger child. And you will find them at work in all weather conditions, from minus 20 to plus 40 degrees Celsius. They live on what they earn at the intersections, and if they don’t make anything they will not eat that day. One Romani woman sells air fresheners at the intersections. In the winter of 2001 she always had a young child her arms. Cuvantul Liberta?i accused her of cruelty, saying that the Roma didn’t care about anything except making money, even if it meant keeping a young child outside in minus 20 degree weather. I talked to her the day after the article was printed. She told me that she had no one to leave her child with. Her three other children were in school during the day, and the temperature in her home was just above freezing. The only way to keep the child alive was to keep it close to her body. And the only way for the mother to survive was to sell those air fresheners. I didn’t see anyone playing music or dancing close to the garbage dump or the canteen garbage bins. There were no tarot card readers or beautiful dramatic girls after the market closed. In the orphanages, I found no free and open fields or passionate lifestyles. But there are Gypsies: There are thousands of them just trying to find a way to survive through the day. Some of the kids have enormous, dramatic brown eyes but it is just despair or fever flickering in those eyes.

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FURTHER INFORMATION: Even in countries where Roma live in large numbers, information about the human rights situation of Roma is frequently unavailable. In some countries, there is widespread misinformation about the situation of Roma. A brief overview of some human rights issues, by country and theme, follows: Roma in the Wars of Yugoslav Succession Roma suffered wholesale ethnic cleansing at the hands of Kosovo Albanians, following the cessation of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in June 1999. Information on Roma in Kosovo is available at: errc.org/publications/indices/kosovo.shtml. For information on the situation of Roma in other successor states of the former Yugoslavia, as well as issues related to Roma in the genocidal wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s, see: For Bosnia and Herzegovina: errc.org/publications/indices/bosnia. shtml For Croatia: errc.org/publications/indices/croatia.shtml For Macedonia: errc.org/publications/indices/macedonia.shtml For Serbia and Montenegro: errc.org/publications/indices/ yugoslavia.shtml For Slovenia: errc.org/publications/indices/slovenia.shtml For links to documentation, images and descriptions of the persecution of Roma during World War II, see: www.geocities.com/Paris/5121/holcaust.htm Violence against Roma in Post-1989 Europe Roma have suffered disproportionately from violence in post-1989 Europe, including most notably pogroms in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia and Ukraine; attacks by racist skinheads in the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany Hungary, Poland and Slovakia; and police violence in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. Information on violence against Roma is available: By country: errc.org/publications/indices/cindex.shtml

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By theme: errc.org/publications/indices/tindex.shtml Social and Economic Rights Roma all over Europe suffer serious threats to the exercise of social and economic rights, including but not limited to the right to an adequate standard of living, education, adequate housing, health care, employment, access to social services and access to public accommodation. Links including information pertaining to these themes follow: Social and Economic Rights: errc.org/publications/indices/soc_n_eco. shtml Education: errc.org/publications/indices/education.shtml Housing: errc.org/rr_nr2_2000/index.shtml Public Services: www.soros.org/romaandpublicservices.html Racial Discrimination Linking many of the above themes is the problem of racial discrimination against Roma. Since racial discrimination is frequently misunderstood, you may be interested in doing some brief research on the theme: What is racial discrimination?: errc.org/publications/indices/discrimination.shtml Current trends in anti-discrimination law in Europe: errc.org/rr_nr1_2001/advo2.shtml

NOTES Valeriu Nicolae is a computer programmer from Craiova Romania, presently living in Canada. Hannah Slavik provided editorial assistance during the preparation of this article.

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Section 2 Strategies and Approaches In this section, you will find five debates on issues central to Roma rights: ❖ The problem of hate speech: whether or not to punish violent, hateful, racist speech as a criminal act; ❖ Education for a multicultural society: Is segregation the problem? How to ensure dignity, inclusion and equal education to the children of groups burdened by racism? How to fight racism in the school system? ❖ The role of the media: do journalists have an obligation to fight racism – to be "activists"? Or does this corrupt their role as "objective" reporters? ❖ The problem of racism in the criminal justice system: How can we address problems of race in an institution that strenuously resists acknowledging the possibility of its own corruption by race factors? ❖ Political participation: how to balance democracy with the necessity to compensate for the weakness of some groups?

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1. Approaches to the Problem of Hate Speech

Hate speech is among the most exposed areas of racist action and discriminatory treatment. Words -- in speech and in print -- have the power to scar, frighten and humiliate, as well as the ability to inspire more racism and further acts of violence. Hate speech is also much easier to prove than more subtle forms of racist action: Hate speech is blatant and in the open. It may come as some surprise, then, that the problem of what to do about hate speech is among the most embattled and divisive discussions among rights activists. At its core, the discussion centres on whether hate speech should be regarded as a criminal act (like other forms of violence) and therefore punishable under criminal law (for example by jail sentence), or whether protections on freedom of expression -- viewed by many as crucial to democratic debate as well as to thought itself -- should make speech off limits to such serious forms of punishment. Below, Helen Darbishire and Roger Errera present two sides to the debate

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HATE SPEECH: NEW EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES by Helen Darbishire*

F

or many members of minority groups, the problem of hateful or inciteful speech in the media is a sensitive question. It is also a very difficult issue for those who want to promote the right to media freedom and at the same time protect members of minority groups from incitement to hatred. The classic definition of “hate speech” is expression which incites hatred, particularly racial, national, or religious hatred. It must be recognised that some speech which is undoubtedly offensive, does not constitute hate speech, even though it may contribute to a climate of prejudice and discrimination against minorities. Such speech would include the tendency by media to report the bad news about minorities when it affects the majority population, for example noting when the perpetrator of a crime is the member of a minority. There is of course the reality that bad news makes the best headlines, although often the mainstream media overlook the bad news when it affects the minority population. One example of this is the low level of reporting on attacks on Roma in Slovakia. Equally, depicting members of minorities through clichéd and stereotyped images might be offensive but is not generally regarded as hate speech. Biased or poor journalism should be addressed through, for example, training programmes to promote greater professionalism in reporting.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS International law encourages states to introduce legislation which penalises incitement to hatred. There are two main instruments that require this of states: the International Covenant on Civil and

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Political Rights (ICCPR) at Article 20 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: 1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

ICERD at Article 4(a) requires that States “shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin…” Legislators introducing these provisions into domestic law and judges hearing prosecutions for speech crimes need of course to balance the need to curb incitement to violence with the fundamental importance of the right to freedom of expression, as set forth in Article 19 of the ICCPR or Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights has often stated that when evaluating restrictions on freedom of expression, and media freedom in particular, it is faced “not with a choice between two conflicting principles but with a principle of freedom of expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted.”1 Furthermore, it should be stressed that the provisions of international law, although reflected in the penal codes of many European states, are not without controversy. The “Anglo-Saxon” model promoted in particular in the United States and the United Kingdom and advocated by many freedom of expression organisations, is that only the narrowest restrictions which are absolutely necessary should be imposed. Restrictions should only be imposed when there is a clear danger of imminent violence arising from the speech and there is no other reasonable means of preventing that violence. Otherwise, it is strongly argued that the best antidote to speech is more speech; intolerant speech can be countered, ridiculed and shunned by tolerant

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speech. Since it is improbable that expression in the media, particularly the print media, could directly incite violence, such expression should be excluded from hate speech laws. In continental Europe, however, the legacy of the Second World War is still strong and European legislation and practice are directed to penalising speech which it is feared might promote hatred. The historical roots of such restrictions perhaps explain why in countries such as France or Germany, much attention is given to the speech of extreme right-wing leaders such as Jean Marie Le Pen, although it might seem that the problems of day-to-day racism against minority communities would merit more attention. Concern is also increasingly expressed that by forcing extremists to moderate their speech (Le Pen has recently been prosecuted for saying that the Holocaust was merely a “detail of history”), one makes their messages more palatable to the electorate. With far-right political parties recently showing a high level of popularity in elections in Austria and Switzerland, such concerns are ever more pressing.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA When considering the role of the media in promoting or combating the spread of hatred, a distinction should be made between state-funded and private media. State-funded media have a particular obligation under international law to non-discrimination, which must include ensuring that there is no discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, and religion in their coverage. For private media, this is a professional ethical consideration, although in many countries the private media are also bound by national legislation prohibiting hate-speech. One of the biggest problems encountered in Europe in this decade has been incitement to hatred and war in government-controlled media. This was in particular the case prior to and at the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.2 Such incitement is clearly a violation of international treaties which those governments are obliged to uphold. At the same time, if anti-democratic governments themselves engage in hate speech, there is very little likelihood that there will be prosecutions of the media. Anti-hate speech laws therefore

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simply don’t work where they are most needed. This is once again an argument for engaging at the earliest possible juncture in alternative strategies to root out and combat hatred and discrimination. If the media is to address issues of hatred within its society, it must be free to report on the problem, perhaps interviewing and quoting those who are expressing hatred. This was the case when a Danish television programme broadcast the words of members of the Greenjackets, an extreme racist youth group. Those who were interviewed in the programme were prosecuted for their speech, but so was the journalist, Jens Olaf Jersild. Jersild took his case through the Danish domestic procedures to the European Court of Human Rights which ruled, in the case of Jersild v Denmark3 that the media should be free to report on hate speech and should not be prosecuted for transmitting expression, even if that expression is unlawful in the country concerned. This is particularly so when, as in this Danish case, the programme was made in the public interest to expose a problem. The European Court of Human Rights found that Jersild’s right to freedom of expression and information as protected in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) had been violated. This is a very important ruling for all media professionals in Europe as it offers a significant measure of protection when reporting on debates on issues of racism, xenophobia and religious intolerance, as well as other matters of public interest.

CONCLUSION There is a widespread recognition that prohibition of speech does not solve the underlying problems which lead to intolerance and discrimination. There are many actions which a state can take to protect individuals and groups from incitement to hatred, discrimination and violence, without ever having to address the vexed question of what is punishable speech. Such initiatives include education on tolerance; measures to eliminate discrimination in education, employment, and housing; particular measures to ensure no discrimination in government bodies or agents, such as the police, or in the judiciary; ombudspersons empowered to receive and act on any complaints; and

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rigorous investigation and punishment of all crimes motivated by racial, religious and national hatred. If all these measures have been thoroughly tried, and if a problem still exists, then restrictions on the right to freedom of expression become more tolerable. However, it should be noted that even in the established democracies of western Europe, the full application of all alternative measures cannot be said to have taken place. There exists therefore much room for action without infringing on media freedom, and without preventing the media from carrying out their role in ensuring that there is public debate on the problem of discrimination and racial violence in society.

NOTES Helen Darbishire is Media Law Programme Manager for the Open Society Institute in Budapest 1 Sunday Times v UK A 30 (1979). 2 See Thompson, Mark, Forging War, London: Article 19, 2nd edition, 1999. 3 Jersild v Denmark A 298 (1994). *

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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A EUROPEAN VIEW by Roger Errera*

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reedom of expression is an essential constitutional right in our societies. It is guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Nowhere, however, is it an absolute right, as is shown by the present state of international law, for example by Article 10(2) of the Convention, which states: The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

As is clear, from the texts of Article 10(2) of the ECHR and Article 4(a) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), among the necessary limitations on the right to freedom of expression are, in Europe and elsewhere (for example, Canada), group libel and hate speech laws. The classic limitations on freedom of expression are related to ensuring the rights of the individual (for example, protection from libel or insuring the right to privacy), defending public morality (through obscenity or pornography laws), securing public order and the vital interests of the State (for example, by prohibiting incitement to serious crimes and the disclosure of defence secrets). In the 20th century, new political and social factors have reinvigorated concerns

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pertaining to the reasonable limitation of the right to freedom of expression. These factors include the rise of political anti-Semitism and the expression of opinions and attitudes directed against specific groups and minorities. The contents of such political discourse are clear: to denigrate certain groups and individuals belonging to them; and to make such persons or groups responsible for all kinds of political and social evils and dangers — insecurity, unemployment, corruption, decline, danger to national identity, etc. Remedies suggested flow easily from the hateful accusation: according to those propagating hateful ideologies, members of minority groups should be denied basic rights, should be excluded from society, and should be subjected to discrimination in such areas, for example, as housing, education, social services, employment. We need group libel and hate speech laws not only — and not even primarily — to protect and defend certain groups as persons, although this is an important and legitimate concern. Rather, we need such laws for the well-being of society as a whole. This is a political issue, in the highest sense of the word. The ultimate meaning of such laws is that the maintenance of a minimum of civility in public is a societal good. Civility includes the ban on attacks on an individual or a group of persons on the grounds of what they are (or are not) — on grounds of their identity. Permitting vilification harms society as a whole. We live in a century and in societies in which the use of legal instruments against what is — and is intended to be — aggression, is fully legitimate. It is sometimes argued that such laws may pose a danger to freedom of expression, and have a “chilling effect”. That is, they may impose a form of indirect censorship. Persons who argue as such hold that the best way to fight hate speech and group libel is public and open discussion in what is strangely called the “marketplace of ideas”. Such an absolutist view of freedom of expression is alien to the European tradition, to the present state of the law in most, if not all European countries, and to the philosophy of Article 10 of the ECHR. The necessary group libel and hate speech statutes must be carefully worded, in order to withstand constitutional challenge or litigation before the European Court of Human Rights. And they must be enforced. Both Article 10(2) of the ECHR and Article 4(a) of the

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ICERD provide such laws a firm ground in international human rights law.

FURTHER INFORMATION: For more information on freedom of speech issues, see: www.derechos.net/links/issues/speech.html European Court of Human Rights’ case-law is available on-line at: www.echr.coe.int/; searches can be country-specific or relate to a specific Article, such as Article 10. Further information on the David Irving libel trial, the surrounding controversy, and the full judgement, are available at: www.guardian.co.uk/irving/

NOTES Roger Errera is a member of the Council of State of France and a professor of law at the Central European University in Budapest 1 Commonly attributed to Voltaire, but likely composed by S.G. Tallentyre. *

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STICKS, STONES AND NAMES There is a saying in English that “sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me.” Human rights traditions and the legal instruments in which human rights values have been enshrined have largely tended to follow this logic – that violence is among the greatest evils but that speech is not violence, or if it is, it is a lesser evil. Violence shocks us in a way that speech, even hate speech, does not. The right to hold and freely express views is established as fundamental under international law and in many domestic legal systems. Nevertheless, events of the last decade may cause us to question the cost of our belief in the intrinsic value of near unlimited freedom of speech. What light does the knowledge that a state-controlled radio station played a pivotal role in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 shed on the debate? How far should one link the statements of a politician like Corneliu Vadim Tudor in Romania, who is reported as stating on August 16, 1998, that his programme for running the country would involve “isolating the Roma criminals into special colonies” in order to “stop the transformation of Romania into a Gypsy camp”1, to on-going violence and discrimination against Roma in that country? How likely are such widely shared racist opinions to provoke mass violence against Roma in Europe? And yet, while Senator Tudor’s views are unacceptable in today’s Europe, should he, or anyone expressing similar opinions, face criminal sanction for publicly stating them? Two recent cases, one in an English court, and the other before the European Court of Human Rights, highlight the problems of the debate and the differing approaches of legal systems to hate speech, the so-called dichotomy between the “Anglo-Saxon model” and the continental European tradition. Both concern differing views of history. The case before

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an English court concerned a historian of the Third Reich and a libel suit brought in the High Court in London, the other a criminal prosecution for an advertisement in a French newspaper. The English case involved a libel writ issued by David Irving against allegations by the U.S. academic Deborah Lipstadt and her publishers, Penguin Books, that Irving had denied that the Holocaust of the Jews during World War II had taken place. The trial lasted for several months in the spring of 2000 and resulted in a verdict against Irving, with the judge, Justice Gray, condemning Irving as “an active Holocaust denier” and “a pro-Nazi polemicist”. Justice Gray, also, however, noted that, “as a military historian, Irving has much to commend him ... it is plain ... that his knowledge of World War II is unparalleled.” The controversy generated by Lipstadt’s allegations had led Irving’s publisher to cancel the forthcoming publication of his latest book on the Third Reich; the result of the trial and the subsequent public outcry against Irving forced the University of Oxford Union Debating Society to withdraw an invitation to face a rigorous examination of his views behind the closed doors of the Union. Irving faced no criminal sanctions, but his reputation as a serious historian was severely, arguably fatally, damaged by Lipstadt’s damning comments. The libel trial provided Irving with the opportunity to defend his reputation; it was the judgement of the Court that his version of history was indefensible. The French case relates to an advertisement taken out in the Le Monde newspaper on July 13, 1984, in which the Association for the Defence of the Memory of Marshall Pétain attempted to persuade French society of the merits of the former Head of State of the Vichy regime, and of the injustice of his conviction in 1945 for treason. Marshall Pétain headed the Vichy regime during World War II, a regime which collaborated with the Nazis, and it was for his

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colloboration with an occupying force that he was convicted for treason. The case before the European Court of Human Rights, Lehideux and Isorni v. France, concerned the criminal prosecution and conviction of the author of the piece, Mr Jacques Isorni, and the President of the Association for the Defence of the Memory of Marshall Pétain, Mr MarieFrançois Lehideux, on the charges of aiding and abetting a public defence of the crimes of collaboration with the enemy. The two men alleged a violation under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression. The Court took the opportunity to reiterate its previously stated opinion that ideas that are deemed offensive, or which shock and disturb are as equally protected under Article 10 as those which are favourably received by society, as such is the hallmark of a broadminded and tolerant society. It was perhaps with this in mind that the majority of the Court found against the French government and in favour of freedom of speech. It is, however, worth noting that the Court also stated that their finding in this case was ruled by the fact that the majority did not find anything in the Le Monde advertisement which could be seen as undermining the underlying values of the Convention, as protected by Article 17 of the Convention, and that where, for example, a pro-Nazi policy was promoted, it would not be granted the protection of Article 10. ❖ For additional information on the genocide in Rwanda, including the role played by the media in inciting genocide, see excerpt's from Philip Gourevitch's book, "We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda", available on-line at www.historyplace.com/pointsofview/rwanda.htm; also, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/ and www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/235.htm. A

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helpful background to the genocide is available from the BBC news web site, at: news.bbc.co.uk, under "country profile". ❖ A vast amount of material on the Holocaust is available on-line. A basic Holocaust site, designed for students, is available at: www.holocausthistory.net/ ❖ An interesting site examining Holocaust denial, with a number of articles examining the work of David Irving, is that of the Holocaust History Project, at www.holocaust-history.org ❖ An informative site on the nature of French collaboration with Nazi Germany and Marshall Pétain's role in the collaboration is available from the University of Sunderland web site, at: www.sunderland.ac.uk/~os0tmc/occupied/collab.htm

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DEBATE POINTS:

?

Is there a different between hateful speech and other violent acts? In what way are these different? Do you believe that hateful speech can lead to hateful acts, or is there no causal connection between the two?

Does the debate surrounding the dangers of hate speech versus the dangers of limiting the right to freedom of expression depend upon the individual country? What factors might be relevant? Does the Internet introduce new factors to the hate speech debate? How?

What are the dangers of allowing restrictions on freedom of expression in relation to academic investigation?

If you believe controls on hate speech should be in place, should these be different depending on whether the individual at issue is a journalist, politician academic, non-specialist or other? Or should there be one standard for everyone? If you believe that people should not be punished for acts of hate speech, what other methods do you believe should be used to discourage this anathema phenomenon?

Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “The answer to hate speech is not to ban it, but more free speech; bad (and hateful) ideas should be discussed (and ridiculed) in public.” Can you think of examples in which that approach may not work? Voltaire famously (and somewhat melodramatically) is purported to have stated, “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”1 Is this statement noble in sentiment, or was Voltaire misguided?

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2. Education for a Multi-Cultural Society The ban on racial segregation under international law is unequivocal. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Article 3, stipulates, “States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction.” Romani children in Europe frequently suffer the grave harm of segregation in school. This problem notwithstanding, discussions on Romani children and education are by no means as simple and clearcut as one might imagine. Below are materials related to that discussion, including: ❖ An article on issues surrounding Romani education in Central and Eastern Europe ❖ Statistics on the racial segregation of Romani children in the school system of one Czech city ❖ A response by Czech educator Laura Laubeová arguing that segregation is only one component of a wider problem of "tracking" or "streaming" in Central and Eastern European schools ❖ Details of recent desegregation action by nongovernmental organisations in Bulgaria ❖ An article reflecting on the relevance of the segregation/desegregation debate for the education of Native American children in New York State, USA.

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ROMA IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE by Claude Cahn, David Chirico, Christina McDonald, Viktória Mohácsi, Tatjana Peri? and Ágnes Székely

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he relation between Roma and the non-Romani educational systems of central and eastern Europe has historically been troubled. In the view of many Roma, school is traditionally the place where Romani children, stolen by the state, are “turned into gadje (non-Roma).” Early modern policies, such as those of the modernising Habsburg rulers Maria Theresa and Joseph II in the eighteenth century, attempted to change Roma into “Christians”, “new citizens” and “new farmers” by removing them from Romani families, placing them with non-Romani ones, and sending them to schools to have their difference educated out of them. These strategies were echoed in the countries of central and eastern Europe after World War II as governments used schools to enforce policies of assimilation — Roma were forcibly settled, expected to conform closely to rigid standards of sameness, and display a demonstrative loyalty to the ethnic majority. Romani children were to learn such norms by having their Romaniness removed in school, and their culture itself was viewed as a package made up of social disadvantage and deviance which a tide of systematic schooling would cleanse. Following the collapse of communism, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been characterised by both economic crisis and a dramatic rise in overt racism. The impact of both has important implications for the human rights situation of Roma in schools. First of all, Roma suffer abuse in the normal school system: teachers physically, verbally or emotionally harm Roma. Other pupils, or their parents,

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also abuse Roma and school authorities such as teachers or school directors fail to act appropriately to curb, prevent and punish such behaviour. Secondly, most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe feature school systems which are segregated; Roma are educated in different classes or different schools. This arrangement bears no relation to the minority education called for by some Romani activists. Existing separate classes and schools are invariably worse in quality than classes where the student body is predominantly nonRomani. This effective segregation is more-or-less codified in some countries in the institution of so-called “special schools”. Special schools are schools for the mentally disabled. Roma are so fabulously over-represented in such schools that many suspect that, as before in the history of Roma, Romani ethnicity is viewed by schooling authorities as synonymous with social and educational disability. Finally, in many countries Roma simply do not attend school at all or, if once enrolled, are forced back out of the schooling system.

ABUSE IN SCHOOLS Many Roma suffer abuse in schools including physical abuse by teachers. An ERRC interview with a ten-year-old Romani girl from the village of Bontida, near Cluj-Napoca in Romania, in March 1998 revealed that her schoolmaster had pulled her ear so hard that it had bled and medical assistance was required. Ms Annamarie Kovács, a primary school student from the Hungarian town of Dömsöd, approximately fifty kilometres south of Budapest, related similar problems to the ERRC when interviewed in November 1997: One day we laughed at the maths teacher in class. The maths teacher told Ms Ciboja, our form-teacher, about it. Ms Ciboja came to punish us for laughing at the maths teacher. She told us, ‘You stinking little Gypsy whores!’ Everyone heard it — she said it in front of our whole class. Ms Ciboja said all sorts of other bad things about us and she slapped Anita, the other Romani girl in our class, on the face. Then she told us to go home. I didn’t go to school for about a month after that — why should I? I won’t go someplace where they humiliate me like that. The headteacher didn’t know

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about the incident though, and the school wanted us to pay a fine because I didn’t go. So my mother went to school and explained why I hadn’t gone. Still, nothing happened to that teacher. She wasn’t reprimanded and she never apologised. I started to go to school again, but I didn’t go to Ms Ciboja’s classes and they failed me because of absences.

One Romani boy who had been enrolled in both German and Macedonian schools told the ERRC in an interview conducted in August 1997 that he preferred German schools because, “in Macedonian schools, teachers hit me.” Three former teachers interviewed by the ERRC in the Czech Republic recalled meeting with extensive and explicit racism from other teachers in the staffroom. Abuse in schools comes not only from teachers. Non-Romani children also laugh at and humiliate Romani children in school and teachers do not intervene effectively. Education for tolerance is close to nonexistent in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, a thirteen-yearold Romani girl from Alexandria, Romania, told the ERRC in a 2000 interview that, “[My schoolmates] said that I was Gypsy and that I was not supposed to be there.” In another case reported to the ERRC in a school in northern Czech Republic in 1997, the parents of nonRomani children requested that their children not be seated next to the only Rom in the class. The teacher complied with the request and seated the Romani boy by himself. It was only when his mother, a social worker, went to the school and suggested that the teacher should not support racism in this way, that her son was returned to his seat. Abuse in the normal school system leads to segregation. This process has been documented as far back as 1926, with the opening of the first of two “Gypsy schools” in the then-Czechoslovakia, the U?horod schools No. 13 and No. 14 in the Transcarpathian region of what is present day Ukraine. The 1938 doctoral thesis of Marie Nováková on these schools tells of one of the reasons for their establishment: “…the families of the other children protested that ‘they didn’t want their children to sit on the same bench as dirty and flearidden Gypsies’.”

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SEGREGATING ROMA: SPECIAL SCHOOLS The educational systems of Central and Eastern Europe are demanding and continue, with a few notable exceptions, to place an emphasis on the memorisation of large quantities of facts provided by the teacher, a figure who is often authoritarian. At the core of schooling philosophy in the region is streaming: rather than aim at the best education for all, schools aim quickly to differentiate between weaker students and would-be achievers. A small number are prepared for university education, and by the time children reach the end of the eighth class, most of them have their future clearly delineated. Romani children — for reasons ranging from early-age language differences to the cultural specificity of both curricula and pedagogical methods and the abuses described above — do not as a rule perform well early on in their schooling lives. They are, in the overwhelming majority of cases, streamed into classes offering substandard education. At worst, and in countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, commonly, Romani children are transferred early in their educational lives to so-called “special schools”: schools for the mentally handicapped. ERRC research in the Czech Republic in 1999 revealed that Romani children were twenty-seven times more likely to be found in schools for the mentally disabled than non-Roma. Pedagogues interviewed by the ERRC in the Czech Republic and Hungary agree that in most cases, placement of Romani children is made not on the basis of real mental disability, but rather because of racial discrimination. One special schoolteacher in the Czech Republic told the ERRC: “I have five or six Roma in my class. At least three or four could perfectly well be in elementary school.” In Hungary there are financial incentives for parents with children in special schools. In the current economic climate in Hungary, in which 60-80% of Roma are unemployed and are living in dire poverty, additional payments for children in special schooling are a mechanism for the perpetuation of separate, substandard schooling for Roma. ERRC research in the eastern Hungarian towns of Hajdúhadház in the year 2000 revealed that 90% of the special school

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population in the town were Romani. Once in such schools, children are rarely transferred back. In the Czech Republic there exists a mechanism called “the diagnostic stay”, through which children are sent from normal schools to special schools for periods of up to six months to determine whether they have learning disabilities or not. In reality, children are rarely, if ever, transferred back to normal schools following the completion of the “diagnostic stay”. The diagnostic stay is particularly insidious in that it is designed for so-called “borderline cases”, children whom educational psychologists — the persons charged with recommending children for special schools — are unsure about. In practice, all Romani children are deemed borderline, since psychologically perfectly normal Romani students are frequently seen as candidates for failure in the Czech educational system. The situation is similar in Hungary, where educational experts have noted that Roma are simply much more likely to be recommended by teachers for evaluation by psychologists, than non-Roma. According to an educational psychologist at a special school in the city of Novi Sad in northern Yugoslavia, Roma are over-represented among students considered to be mildly mentally handicapped at the school at which he worked, but not among those students considered severely mentally handicapped because, “If both parents have not completed primary school or have been to special school themselves, are unemployed or do not speak Serbian properly, differences will appear when such children come to school.” Such children were, according to this educational psychologist, “pseudo-retarded”: although not developmentally handicapped, the educational system regarded them as such. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, children who finish primary school in special schools are in practice frequently blocked from continuing their education in anything other than remedial technical schools offering vocational training for future low skilled labour: the so-called “schools for mops and brooms”. In Hungary, legislation stopping children who had graduated from special schools from continuing in anything other than a parallel system of substandard secondary schools was changed in 1992. In practice, however, children graduating from special schools in Hungary still do not cross the line from spe-

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cial primary education into normal secondary education. Thus, in effect, those who attended such schools are condemned to a lifetime of unemployment or, where available, poorly paid unskilled labour. Even where segregation does not involve the labeling of the greater part of the ethnic group as “mentally disabled”, Roma are often relegated to separate, substandard schooling. For example, authorities in several towns in southern Poland took advantage of the existence of a private schooling project aimed at reducing illiteracy among Roma and transferred all local Romani children into the separate classes, literate or not. De facto segregation has existed in Hungary since the 1960s. From 1962, so-called “c-classes” were established for “socially deprived” children, with the “c” meaning lowest level on a scale of ac. In 1971, sociologists István Kemény and Gábor Havas reported that these classes were predominantly Romani. According to a report by sociologist Péter Radó, in 1997 there were separate classes made up predominantly of Roma in 132 of 840 normal schools surveyed. An interview with an English-language teacher in the Hungarian town of Kecskemét suggests that the ideology underpinning separate classes is that of racial inferiority; Ms. J.H. told the ERRC in May 2001 that, “I have no Roma in my class. I think the reason is that I teach only the best children, only the cleverest children, so I don’t have to teach the Romani children. The Roma always receive the lowest grades ... To tell you the truth I don’t really like them. We have a lot of problems; they are very very different.”

ONE STEP BEYOND: ROMA OUT OF SCHOOL While the issue of racial segregation in schools in the region is of major concern, the fact remains that many Romani children never have the opportunity to attend even sub-standard schooling. A combination of bureaucratic obstacles and poverty work effectively to exclude many Romani children from the schooling system entirely. A lack of identity documents, has been used by school authorities in Romania, for example, as a pretext for denying Romani children access to schools; it has been estimated by one NGO operating extensively in the field that 1200-6000 Roma in Romania may be stateless,

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a situation which the authorities have been slow in tackling. Statelessness is a serious problem for Roma throughout the region, adversely affecting those without papers in many areas of life, education being just one. There is also often pressure on Romani children, those who have successfully negotiated the hurdles of registering, to leave school. Hungary features an arrangement, for example, whereby children may become “private students” and thereby be exempt from the “normal” school programme if, in the wording of the 1993 Hungarian Education Act, “it is justified by the student’s abilities, disabilities or his or her special situation.” This programme is, more often than not, used by teachers simply to remove Romani students from their classrooms. A headmistress of a school in Kecskemét explained to the ERRC in May 2001 that private students, “learn at home, and then every half a year [they] have to come into school and take an exam. The students who learn in this way ... are not successful. It is almost impossible to learn individually.” ERRC research in the eastern Hungarian village of Berettyóújfalu in March 2000 discovered that all nine private students at the Toldi Miklós school were Romani, the majority of whom were repeatedly failing exams. There were no other private students at any of the other five schools in Berettyóújfalu at that time. Moreover, although education until the mid-teenage years is compulsory in nearly all of the education systems of Central and Eastern Europe, school abandonment is alarmingly high among Romani children in comparison with their non-Romani peers. According to a Romanian government-sponsored study in 1998, approximately 40% of Romani children under the age of eight did not receive any education at all, and an expert in Romani education working at the Romanian Ministry of Education, Professor Gheorghe Sarau, told the ERRC that about 65% of Romani children had abandoned school by the 3rd and 4th grades of primary school. The reasons for the failure to attend school once the difficulties in registering have been overcome are several, ranging from a failure to deal with language difficulties in the early years of schooling to poverty. In much of the region, grinding poverty disproportionately affects Roma. The inability of Romani parents to afford to buy the necessary clothes, such as gym

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shoes, textbooks or notebooks and pens for their children directly affects their children’s success and attendance at school. In Macedonia, for example, where unemployment was recently registered at over 45%, nearly all Roma with whom the ERRC met were unemployed and many were living solely on social welfare payments of 4,100 denars (approximately 140 German marks) per month for a family of four, paid irregularly. Schoolbooks cost from 1,619 denars (approximately 55 German marks) for pupils in the first class, to 3,600 denars (approximately 120 German marks) for pupils in the eighth class. A family of four living on social welfare payments in Macedonia would therefore have to pay one month’s salary a year simply for textand notebooks for their children. Poverty affects other aspects of the education of Romani children as well. For example, in the Romani Veliki Rit settlement in Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, the majority of houses in the settlement lack electricity and thus the children encounter significant difficulties in doing their homework in the evening. Such difficulties cause the children to fall behind their non-Romani peers, leading to the failing of exams and a general disinterest in school. The neglect of Romani history and culture in curricula is also a factor in a Romani child’s continued attendance, as is the abuse they are likely to receive in the classroom.

MINORITY RIGHTS: MINORITY SCHOOLING FOR ROMA The rights of minorities in the states of Europe have become an issue of great concern in the years following the end of communism, especially in the light of the war in the former Yugoslavia and tensions emerging between minority groups and so-called nation-states in the wake of 1989. The issue of minority education resides at the centre of this debate. International concern over violence between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in the region of Transylvania in Romania in 1990 spurred political demands that the Hungarian university in the city of Cluj be reopened. Concerns over the situation of ethnic Greeks in southern Albania has similarly played out in the provision of arrangements for minority schooling at the level of secondary

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schools for Greeks in Albania. The legal basis for such arrangements was codified at European level when the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities entered into effect on February 1, 1998. Minority schooling, especially at the level of primary and secondary education, is commonly of two kinds. In its minimal form, language and culture classes are provided so that members of the minority in question may learn their native language, history and customs. In its maximal form, members of the minority are taught “international” subjects such as maths and biology in the native language. Some states have undertaken minimal programmes in the Romani language. Since 1991, Hungarian universities have offered credit courses in Romani. Four primary schools in Skopje, Macedonia offer Romani language lessons to students. Such programmes need to be well funded and spread beyond the urban centres in which they are presently located. In Romania, much work is being done to create Romani-Romanian dictionaries and picture books to assist Romani children in becoming bilingual, a Romani language curriculum has been created for schools and a faculty exists at the University of Bucharest for the study of the Romani language and literature, in which Romani-language teachers are also being trained. Roma-specific schooling programmes at present sometimes involve provision of Romani teaching assistants in the classroom. Such programmes exist, at present, in Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. They are often run and/or sponsored by non-governmental organisations, and systemisation of successful projects in this field is often called for by Romani activists and is currently taking place in Romania. There are also a number of private initiatives or non-governmental schools for Roma, such as the Ghandi School in Pécs, Hungary. The Ghandi School is a boarding school for high-achieving Romani secondary school pupils; the school has a distinctive philosophy involving the removal of the children from their homes and their training for Romani leadership. Yet, even in a seemingly maximal minority school, teaching is primarily in Hungarian. Minority schooling models developed elsewhere, such as bilingual schools educating tolerance for both

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members of the minority and of the majority are rarely discussed and seem not to be part of the current mainstream discourse on Romani education in central and eastern Europe. Non-Roma with whom the ERRC has spoken see the idea of schools where Romani culture and language would receive equal weight as the national culture as anathema, and do not want to consider sending their children to such — at present, purely hypothetical — schools.

ALIENATION AND EFFECTIVE CHANGE Centuries of discrimination have alienated Roma from the present educational systems in the region in ways similar to their alienation from other areas of society. Discrimination in education reproduces the effects of discrimination across generations. Governments and authorities have not shown a willingness to act firmly to punish abuse in school or to desegregate schools. Most countries of the region remain without effective anti-discrimination legislation, or the will to tackle pervasive discriminatory practices. An end to or at least amelioration of the effects of the streaming system is similarly not envisioned anywhere. Thus, for the time being, the majority of Romani children within the education systems of central and eastern Europe are still at ground zero in the struggle to achieve equal access to quality education.

FURTHER INFORMATION: More information on Roma and education at the European Roma Rights Center web site: errc.org/publications/indices/education.shtml A general background to the importance of education for all is provided for by a UNICEF report, “No Excuses”, available at: www.unicef.org/pubsgen/noexcuse/noexcuse.pdf For more details concerning the education of Roma in the Slovak Republic, see: Eva Sobotka, “1+1 = 3: Roma in the Slovak educational system”, Central European Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, 15 January 2001, available on-line at: www.ce-review.org/01/2/sobotka2.htm

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DEBATE POINTS:

?

What is “segregation”? Can you give some examples?

Can you imagine segregation arising even without the active ill will of the segregators? Can you give some examples?

How intense do you believe objections would be to mixed Romani/non-Romani classes and schools in your country? Would your parents object to mixed classes? What about your teachers? What other issues do the authors raise concerning Roma in education? What, do you believe, can be done to overcome problems described in the article?

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THE DESEGREGATION OF “ROMANI SCHOOLS”: A CONDITION FOR AN EQUAL START FOR ROMA On September 15, 2000, approximately 300 Romani children from the Romani neighborhood of Vidin, Bulgaria, started the school year by being bussed to one of the six mixed regular schools in the town. The program for equal access of Romani children to education, initiated by the Vidin based non-governmental organization DROM and supported by the Open Society Institute, was a major challenge to the pattern of continued educational segregation of Romani children in Bulgaria. The successful implementation of the Vidin program, which today includes some 600 Romani children, has prompted a debate about using it as a model throughout Bulgaria. According to the 1992 census, the general educational level of Roma in Bulgaria was much lower than that of the majority population. Roma with high school diplomas constituted 4.9 percent of the Roma population older than 6 years and those with university diplomas constituted only 0.1 percent of the same population. The respective shares for Bulgarians were 36.5 and 8.9 percent. These low educational levels are the result of several decades of denial of equal educational opportunities to Roma. In 1998, 70 Romani organizations proposed the Framework Program for Equal Integration of Roma in Bulgarian Society, which included school desegregation plans. A year later, the government formally adopted this comprehensive policy plan, but authorities have to date failed to take action to end school segregation. About 70 percent of school age Romani children in Bulgaria attend all-Romani schools located in segregated Romani neighborhoods throughout the country. These

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schools were established in Romani neighborhoods from the 1950s to the 1970s and were labeled by the authorities at the time as “schools for children with inferior lifestyle and culture.” In the 1970s and 1980s the policy of the educational authorities was to channel all Romani children to these schools. Starting in 1966, the Ministry of Education established primary schools with special curricula for intensified manual skills training in Romani neighborhoods. The special curriculum for these schools was not abolished until 1992. The schools in Romani neighborhoods were initially seen as a positive development since they contributed to the inclusion of Roma in the educational system. Gradually, however, the quality of education declined because of the continual neglect of the educational needs of Romani children, a policy of tracking unqualified teaching staff to these schools, and failure to restore the standard educational process. Despite their formal status as regular schools since 1992, all-Romani schools in fact remain “special schools” which offer low quality education and put the overwhelming number of Roma in a disadvantaged position compared to their peers at mixed schools. The all-Romani schools today are usually overcrowded and lack basic facilities; classes are not held regularly; some Romani students who graduate from these schools can hardly read or write; and in many cases teachers do not have the qualifications required by law. Underlying negative prejudices towards Roma held by nonRomani teaching staff often result in degrading treatment of Romani schoolchildren. Educational experts and Romani leaders have expressed concern about all-Romani schools for years, yet the state has failed to address the problem of educational segregation. Moreover, Bulgarian authorities have not interfered effectively in the numerous cases in which Romani children have been denied access to mixed regular schools and were

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tracked instead to the over-crowded “Roma schools”. A recent conference in Sofia, co-organized by the Open Society Institute’s Roma Participation Program, the European Roma Rights Center, the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, and the Human Rights Project and attended by governmental and non-governmental actors involved in efforts to desegregate the Bulgarian school system, shed light on the following points: Discriminatory school segregation of Roma puts them in a disadvantaged position compared with other children and raises barriers between the Romani community and the rest of society. The effects of segregated schooling have an impact on all of Bulgarian society, particularly its economic development and its chances for smooth accession to the European Union. Efforts to reform all-Romani schools have failed and many of the problems stem from indirect forms of discrimination such as chronic under-funding of Romani schools and unqualified teachers. The Bulgarian government could be vulnerable to legal action based on international and European anti-discrimination instruments and should commit all available resources to eliminating educational segregation. The public candor about discrimination and educational segregation by elected public officials such as Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov is a very positive development and an opportunity for Romani advocacy organizations to increase cooperation with the government. Integration policies must consider the interests and concerns that government officials, teachers, parents, and children have about desegregation. The success of desegregation efforts in Vidin indicates that the integration of Romani children in mainstream schools can be achieved and that the Romani community wants to

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integrate. High levels of transparency and participation by all interested parties were key to Vidin’s success. Cooperation among international agencies and donors, the national govern-ment, local officials, NGOs, and parents and teachers is also critical. The government should be the primary actor in implementing the school desegregation process nationwide. Government and media outlets should become more active in raising awareness about discrimination and make it clear to the public that desegregation benefits all of Bulgarian society and is not a privilege bestowed upon a selected group. Obstacles to further desegregation efforts will range from Constitutional challenges, to entrenched public prejudice to teachers and parents who may feel threatened by change, to lack of co-operation among government officials, NGOs, and local communities.

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Inclusive School – Myth or Reality? by Dr Laura Laubeová*

M

any non-governmental organisations, independent researchers as well as teachers have made highly-publicised arguments about the segregation of Roma in the Czech school system, and specifically into so-called “special schools” — schools for the mentally handicapped. While these arguments have shed important light on aspects of problems in Czech schooling — and these problems are at present numerous — arguments focusing exclusively on the problem of racial segregation in Czech schools are flawed in their basic assessment of the problem, because they do not take a holistic approach to school reform. In point of fact, Czech schooling is detrimental to a majority of the children who pass through it, not only Romani children. Education is highlighted as a priority in the programme of every political party in the Czech Republic, appropriately recognised as a precious capital with the potential for increasing society’s wealth. Protection of minorities and respect for human rights belong to basic principles of all democracies. However, in the field of education, human rights and minority rights have been constantly neglected, not only in the Czech Republic. After several years of public debate, the Czech Ministry of Education released a White Book on Education in 2001. The document, officially titled “The National Programme of Development of Education in the Czech Republic”1 focuses on the following aims: 1. Implementation of a system of lifelong learning for all; 2. Adaptation of educational and study programmes to meet the everyday needs of society; 3. Monitoring and assessment of the quality and effectiveness of education;

ROMANI CHILDREN IN REMEDIAL SPECIAL SCHOOLS IN OSTRAVA, CZECH REPUBLIC, SPRING 1999 School

Romani pupils

%

193 166 191 190 156 159 136 169 1360

31 27 49 110 121 135 128 161 762

16.06% 16.26% 25.65% 57.89% 77.56% 84.9% 94.11% 95.26% 56.03%

ROMANI CHILDREN IN NORMAL PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN OSTRAVA, SPRING 1999

The ERRC gathered statistics on the number of Romani and non-Romani pupils in 69 of the seventy normal primary schools in Ostrava in Spring 1999. In addition to the schools listed below, the ERRC visited a further 32 normal primary schools in Ostrava not attended by a single Romani pupil. In total, in Spring 1999, at least 16,722 Czech children in Ostrava attended school every day without a single Romani classmate. Address

Total Romani

TOTAL:

33,372

65 303 430 208 548 639 560 335 585 315 437 625 767 ROMA:

Address F. Formana 45 G. Klimenta 493 Gajdošova 9 Porubská 831 Volgogradská 6 Zelená 42 A. Kucˇery 20 Deˇtská 915 Kounicova 2 Mjr. Nováka 34 Nádrazˇní 117 Ukrˇízˇe 28 Bohumínská 72

1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 753

Total Romani 581 367 292 631 720 623 746 723 415 520 642 530 343

7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12

Address Matrosovova 14 Antošovicka 55 Vrchlického 5 Chrjukinova 12 Rostislavova Gen. Janka 1208 Trnkovecká 55 L’ Štúra 1085 Škrobalkova 51 Gebauerova 8 Nám. J. z Podeˇbrad

Total Romani 264 172 370 706 334 711 249 516 214 331 333

19 24 26 29 29 31 44 56 69 97 172

❖ 87

Bartovická 59 Bílovecká Bulharská 1532 Maticˇní 18 Mitušova 16 I. Sekaniny 1804 Komenského 668 L. Podesˇteˇ 1875 Porubská 832 Peˇˇsí 1 Ukrajinská 1533 Kosmonautu° 13 Maticˇní 5

SECTION 2. STRATEGIES AND APPROCHES

Total student body

Kapitana Vajdy U Haldy ˇ kvalovova C Na Vizineˇ Karasova Teˇˇsinská Ibsenova Halasova Total

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❖ ROMA RIGHTS 4. Support for thorough-going change and openness of educational institutions; 5. Changes in the role and professional prospects of pedagogical and academic workers; 6. Transition from centralised management to shared accountability decision-making.

Among many positive aspects, the White Book suggests to implement these aims through the following measures: ❖ Compensating the health and socio-cultural disadvantage of some pupils through targeted support for developmental programmes for such pupils at all levels of schools, by means of the introduction of preparatory classes, inclusion of special schools in the system of standard schools, and optimum integration among other pupils of those who have special needs; ❖ Improving the conditions for the education of national and ethnical minorities and foreigners; ❖ By means of legislative measures, gradually integrating the first years of multi-year academic secondary school (gymnazium2) with the second phase of the basic school, simultaneous with the implementation of differentiated and individualised teaching of heterogeneous groups of pupils and the development of care for talented and gifted children at schools and in extra-curricular activities. Shortly after its release, the White Book was rejected by the Czech parliament. As a reaction to justified criticism, the efforts of government officials were sincere but not well managed. Although there was a public debate under the name “Challenge for 10 Million” (the population of the Czech Republic), this debate was limited to the Internet and did not reach the majority of teachers or parents. The government also underestimated the necessity to communicate with media and opinion-makers over the issue, a fact which resulted in the absence of strong arguments to provide explanation and support for, and ensure the future implementation of the new educational policies. The reasons for the rejection of the programme by parliament were mainly

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related to cost — parliamentarians deemed 6% of GDP too much to spend on education, and took a dim view of teacher salaries targeted at 130% of the average salaries in the Czech Republic. Another objection to the government’s White Book, raised by non-governmental organisations and human rights activists, was that although the programme presupposed “the inclusion of special schools in the system of standard schools, and optimum integration of those who have special needs among other pupils,” it did not provide concrete practical mechanisms how to implement these. Finally, the issue became a bone of pre-election contention. Thus the government’s plans remained utopian. The Czech educational system acutely needs to be reformed. In the heady period after 1989, we believed that the long-awaited changes would occur quickly and spontaneously. However, it now appears that education is one of the most conservative areas in Czech society. The present educational system was designed almost 230 years ago according to a military model requiring obedience from soldiers as well as of the population in general. I have elsewhere described the dilemma facing teachers in the present system in the following terms: “A traditional school still represents an environment where natural and effective learning can happen only very little. Therefore an arsenal of coercive tools is needed. These are… mainly the system of marking. Those teachers who started with so-called verbal assessment, soon find out that if they want to assess differently they have to teach differently.”3 Frontal teaching and teacher-centred education, verbal memorising, and a focus on reproducing information are the main features of Czech schooling. Such a system cannot correspond to the needs of a democratic society in which participation, responsibility and the initiative of citizens are as vital as obedience had been for a society based on serfdom. Further, the predominant objective of education in the Czech Republic is not to develop children’s potential and abilities, but rather to prepare them for entrance examinations to gymnazium and university. Such an ethos penetrates all educational processes and is shared in teachers´ and parents´ attitudes toward schooling. For example, even in the civic education curriculum, students are expected to command an extensive amount of information within the basics of social sciences, rather then acquire practical skills and an active approach that would

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help to prepare them as citizens for life in a democratic society. A research study conducted in 1996-97 on the “Typology of Czech Families” revealed immense inequalities in Czech families mainly in terms of cultural capital (the educational background of parents, social status, value placed on education, etc.) and showed that schools further reproduce instead of redressing these inequalities. Comparative international surveys in Mathematics and Sciences have repeatedly shown that although Czech children score highly in primary schools (at the ages of 9 and 14), they score much worse in secondary school (at age 18). The results of students from non-academic secondary schools (at age 18) are actually poorer than results of pupils from primary schools (at age 14)! In short, the apprentice training centres not only do not stimulate students, but rather actually inhibit their educational potential. Although there are only small differences between students at the primary school level, these are caused mainly by family background. Czech schools do not compensate for inequalities but rather increase differences between families.4 Czech pupils repeatedly score well in international surveys in subjects such as mathematics and hard sciences. Detailed analysis of international survey results reveal that Czech pupils perform well on such tests mainly because their performance is based on reproducing knowledge gained by memorisation. Also, as opposed to less successful students from other countries, Czech children show very negative attitudes towards the subjects in which they score highly, as well as toward school as a whole. This should alarm Czech educators and policy makers. Instead, the Czech educational system has since been praised for international success and any criticism and suggestions for changes rejected.5 Education in the Czech Republic is thus, at present, not inclusive; this lack of inclusivity here means that schools are able to meet needs and provide opportunity for the potential development of only a small number of children. Schools are tailored for average or typical pupils — even though such children rarely exist in reality — and exclude most children who are “different” not only in terms of abilities, but also with regards to cultural and social background. In other words, Schools tend to increase social inequalities through favouring children from families with cultural capital who are more able to reproduce academic infor-

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mation than children from less favourable family backgrounds. Czech schools do this at the price of equality. Any pupil who is more able or less able or just different does not fit into the scheme and is viewed as a problem. This factor as well as an often decreasing quality of school ethos, has in recent years resulted in a strange phenomenon: more than one third of pupils around the age of 10-11 — or rather their parents — prefer streaming, i.e. going to a more elite school setting. These aspire to enrol in the eight year academic gymnazium. These schools can accept, according to official regulation, only up to 10% of children in a given year. This means that a large number of “average” (in terms of ability) children want to leave the mainstream primary school, either for gymnazium or for a private school, leaving behind those pupils whose parents do not ambitiously seek other schools. The “quality” of mainstream schooling is therefore decreasing, which causes further pressure on parents. As a reaction to this situation and in accordance with the aims of the White Book, the Minister of Education has recently called for the abolition of this kind of gymnazium. This would be, however, an unacceptable limitation of democratic freedoms. Experts warn that early age streaming is detrimental to society as whole, but individual parents want the best for their children and they cannot find it in any typical Czech school. Apart from parents’ efforts to improve education of their children through “voluntary” streaming, there is a much more dangerous trend in the Czech Republic — that of forced streaming at a very early age. One method is pre-school “maturity” psychological testing (or such testing early in the school career), which disadvantages mainly children from less supportive cultural environments and often results in placing these children in the special schools for the mentally handicapped. Another streaming practice is streaming within the same class, used as a generally very “effective” and easy method of teaching. Streaming in this sense means that children are grouped according to abilities and taught separately, which in itself does not necessarily be a problem — if short term and if groups are flexible enough. However, early in-class streaming often means that teachers do not aim to develop the potential of the less able, or “different” as they focus on those “better off”. This means that the groups became fixed, and a pupil has

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little chance of moving up, if placed in a weaker class. There is also a tendency that if a pupil is weak in one subject, than he or he comes to be regarded as weak in all subjects. And the Pygmalion effect6 brings bitter results when streaming into groups is a fixed process. However, practice as well as research has shown that co-operative teaching (i.e., teaching using less authoritarian models than those presently deployed) and positive use of differences, instead of grouping children according to their abilities is, in the long term, more effective for both the intellectual and the social development of all children. Cooperative teaching is able to bring children of lower ability up to standard, and also dramatically reduces pressure on children in general (presently intense in the Czech Republic). It can also remedy individual cases of isolation or extreme introversion, as well as diminishing the number of children condemned early as “failures”. Children from backgrounds of ethnic or linguistic minorities, who bring further differences to schools, often serve as an indicator of whether a school is good or bad. The argument goes that a good school is good for all pupils regardless of their differences. Experts throughout the world have not been able sufficiently to reconcile arguments for and against separate vs. mainstream schooling. It seems that under certain conditions each can have their pros and cons. According to some experts, including many Roma, separate schooling on secondary level, if well funded and with high quality standards, may compensate for past discrimination and moreover provide special knowledge to Romani students that would help them in the process of enhancing the whole Romani community. A very good example of this kind of school is the Romani secondary school in Kolin. Another example might be girls schools for Muslims in the UK. The danger is, however, that if these schools do not accept also majority students, certain side effects may appear that may aggravate hostility and tension towards others (social cohesion). Such schools, in my view, should be conceived only as a temporary measure, similarly as positive action policies. Unfortunately, the Czech Republic is notorious for a special kind of separate Romani schooling at primary level, that is, enrolment of Romani children in special schools for mentally handicapped children (Zvlá?tní ?koly). These may at the first sight look like a very good

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solution: less children in the classroom, classmates from the same ethnic and cultural background, no open racism, better qualified teachers and access to qualified specialists, availability of Romani personnel (such as Romani assistants), allocation of more funds per capita, etc. Experience however shows that this kind of school is not effective despite the sincere efforts of many educators and specialists, as it does not correspond to the needs of children themselves nor to the needs of society. These schools have very low expectations and they generally inhibit academic development and the potential of their pupils. They are primarily structured as an institution that should keep mentally handicapped children quiet and not aim to develop their personality. Indeed, paternalism and institutional racism can be more detrimental than open racism, as the damage caused cannot be identified and redressed quickly and easily and require substantial systemic changes in the minds of people. Hopefully, the policy makers as well as ordinary people will soon rethink their views due to a “new wind” that is coming from EU. The European Union has provided a definition of indirect discrimination as apparently neutral measures, criteria and practice.7 This represents a very useful tool for acknowledging, identifying and redressing discrimination and institutional racism. In the above paragraphs I indicated several problems hindering education in the Czech Republic. In the coming years, educational policies should focus on several basic principles: Mainstream (inclusive) schooling for all children; In exceptional cases, part-time separate schooling as a temporary measure; Respecting, valuing and positively using difference in the classroom; High quality for all; Curriculum, including the hidden curriculum,8 should include multicultural and anti-discrimination aspects; Education should be a priority in every society.

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CONCLUSION Broader social structures have immense impact on education, the most important asset in any society. Racial animus presents one of the most detrimental dangers for our globalised society. Acknowledging, identifying and redressing racism in all its forms is a basic prerequisite of any society´s peaceful present and future. One of the major problems Romani (but not only) children face in the Czech Republic is the whole culture of education and teaching. Policies should aim at a systemic change and overcoming of the conservative approach of the past two centuries.

DEBATE POINTS:

?

What does the author mean by “streaming”? Does your school system “stream”? How? Do you think all school systems stream? What harms can arise from streaming, or from excessive streaming? How does the author’s approach to school reform differ from those who state that the problem of schooling in Europe is segregation, and who call for desegregation of schools? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches?

The author notes that the Czech school system produces some of the highest scoring pupils in international competitions on mathematics and hard sciences and yet she still appears critical of the present state of Czech schooling. Why? What is “cultural capital”? Can you think of examples? Does the state have an obligation compensate for unequal distribution of “cultural capital”? Why or why not? What is “paternalism”?

What do you think of the author’s proposals at the end of the piece for basic principles for school reform? Can they be realized? Should they be realized? If you believe they should, what practical measures can you envision to implement them?

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NOTES Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University Prague More information in English can be found at: www.msmt.cz/cp1250/web/12/WhiteBook.doc 2 “Gymnazium” corresponds to grammar school in the United Kingdom and in the classic model provides four year long “secondary” academic education for students aged 14 – 18. Other types of secondary education in the Czech Republic are: secondary professional schools (st?ední odborné ?koly) and secondary vocational schools or apprentice training centers (st?ední odborná u?ili?t?)). After 1989, new types of gymnasium were introduced: the six-year gymnazium (ages 12-18) and eight-year gymnazium (ages 10 – 18). 3 See Laura Laubeová, Laura,: The Role of Education in Preventing Ethnic Conflicts. Case of Roma in the Czech Republic (2000), Cambridge: University of Cambridge, GSFI, Occasional Paper No 15, p.25. 4 The information from the above paragraph is derived from a course on educational policy at Faculty of Social Sciences in Prague, delivered by authors of the government White Book, Ing. Jan Koucky and Jan Kovarovic, in 2000/2001 academic year. 5 See Laubeová, Op. cit., p.25. 6 The “Pygmalion effect” is a powerful factor influencing pupils´ academic success and was repeatedly proved through experiments. The “Pygmalion effect” is as follows: If a teacher is told that a certainsome concrete childrenpupil (randomly selected) isare very bright and talented, the teacher then is very likely to have higher expectations of theseis pupil, and wills and pays more attention to thehim or her. Thiswhich has the the effect that they areof making the given pupil more likely to be academically successful than the control groupother pupils. The teacher thus, through his or her attitudes, expectations, and belief in theto potential of a pupil, can enhances pupils academic attainment and success (or vice versa). The Pygmalion effect is sonamed after in a similar way as Ovidius’s Pygmalion, who inspired a life into a sculpture of a girl. (the story also inspired G.B Shaw´s comedy Pygmalionyou may know, or your parents, a famous musical My Fair Lady about a poor girl Lisa Doolittle that managed to learn, as a result of efforts of a professor of phonetics, a high standard English so that nobody would recognise her background..… 7 See Directive No 2000/43/EC, “implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin” (the “Race Equality Directive”), available on the Internet at: europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/lif/dat/2000/en_300L0043.html. 8 By “hidden curriculum, I mean all factors that influence learning, including the unintentional and unconscious ones, be it attitudes or prejudices of teachers, nonverbal communication, remarks by a teacher at break times, seemingly non-related content of other subjects, learning acquired from other * 1

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resources than just “official” ones , generally everything that may influence the final result of learning. If teachers are aware of the hidden aspects of curriculum, they may use them either in a synergic way (in positive cases) or teach pupils how to cope with controversial issues and minimise impact of negative factors in a given society, school, class.

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Beyond Segregation or Integration: A Case Study from Effective Native American Education by Linda Pertusati*

S

chool desegregation has been a major issue in the United States since the 1954 Brown versus Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, decision which found that “separate but equal is inherently unequal.” Segregated education has two basic forms: “defacto” and “dejure.” Dejure means by legal code, while defacto means existing in actual fact. Defacto segregated education, though illegal, does exist. Policy makers emphasizing civil rights have struggled to create desegregated education. Educators concerned with educational effectiveness have re-considered the desirability of the desegregated education. That debate has primarily focused on the black, urban community and has been predicated on dichotomous characterizations of segregated vs. desegregated schools. This paper analyzes rural schools with Native American students. Theoretical considerations of segregated and desegregated education We will review five theories which consider the effectiveness of segregated education. Bouma (1968) argues that in segregated schools, students do not receive socialization needed to participate in the dominant society. While Bouma argues an assimilationist1 education as a source of accommodation to dominant society, Weinberg (1968) emphasizes the opportunities for cultural relativism and personality development in the desegregated setting. After reviewing studies from different cities and age groups, he concludes that in segregated schools black academic achievement lagged, while in racially balanced settings measured achievement levels rose. St. John (1975) argues that segregated schools symbolized black

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powerlessness and limited opportunities. She claims that: desegregated education has not rapidly closed the black-white gap in academic achievement . . . [and questioning the belief] that desegregation alone . . . will raise the educational achievement of black children. (p. 119)

She calls for a reconsideration of desegregated schools, contending that: the proper comparison (for evaluating effectiveness) is not between black and whites, but within each racial group between the segregated and desegregated schools. (ibid, pp. 119, 120)

Hawley (1981) contends that desegregated schools are: most likely to improve race relations and to enhance achievement, increase self-esteem, and improve the life chances of students. (p. 298)

He argues that segregated education is ineffective and impairs social mobility because the discrimination of the larger society is reflected within the institutional setting. Desegregated education structurally prevents more overt forms of discrimination, and thereby assures the necessary fiscal resources needed for effective education. However, truly equal educational opportunities would require substantial changes in the structure of schools. Hare and Levine (1984) challenge the assumption that desegregation would automatically improve the quality of education for minorities. They argue: that effective education and desegregation are not synonymous and can not be expected to deliver each other. . . . [Further, if we assume] that majority youngsters can be effectively taught in a segregated setting, we should assume that minority youngsters are capable of the same thing. (pp. 6, 12, 18)

Emphasis should be on creating effective education; if a segregated

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school also values the minority culture, then it may create a more positive learning environment. Cultural assimilation should not be the price of academic effectiveness. Thus, we have (respectively) presented the behavioral, humanist, symbolic interactionist, structuralist, and cultural advocacy positions on desegregated education. These studies have been drawn largely from the Black experience. There has been a similar debate among Native American educators. Theoretical considerations of current Native American education Native Americans have been educated in mission and private schools, federal schools, and public schools. Fischbacher (1967) reviewed the historical context of Native American education. While noting that the form and structure has changed over time, he contends that the goal of such education has been to encourage cultural assimilation of Native American children into the dominant society. While analysts of Black education frame their discussion in terms of segregation-desegregation, those analyzing Native American education have emphasized cultural assimilation vs. cultural preservation. In each case, community control, curriculum content, minority student identity, and the role of the minority culture within the educational process are the central focus of concern. Croft (1977) surveyed recent literature on Indian educational performance and noted several conditions impeding effective education. These included unequal access to resources, teacher insensitivity, and lack of relevance in the curriculum. Buckanaga (1975) notes that due to geographic and political separation of reservations, many communities have segregated schools. This segregation could facilitate local control and culturally-attuned schools. Instead, schools have been one of the chief instruments of domination over Native Americans. Zintz (1978), Heath (1972), Deloria (1978), and Davis & Pyatskowit (1976) argue that education attempts to assimilate Native American children into the dominant culture. Since most teachers are not versed in the values and practices of the Native American culture, they are unaware of the discontinuity between values embedded in

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their curriculum and those of the native culture. This condition denegrates the students’ identity. While implicit value biases contribute to an elitist curriculum, contradictions and tribal history further alienate the student from the learning experience. Heath notes the discontinuity between pluralist rhetoric and the curriculum’s intolerance of minority cultural values. Deloria contends that the contradictions between legal practices and justice, and between equal opportunity and the practices of racial discrimination delegitimates the content and process of formal education. Building on this notion Zintz, and Davis and Pyatskowit assert that in order to improve Native American students’ performance there is a need to integrate a students’ cultural heritage and values into the curriculum. Community control is essential to that process whether resulting in an integrated curriculum (Hayes and Ames, 1976) or as a basis of a distinct Native American system of education (Cooper and Gregory, 1976). Despite the distinct contexts, the basic concerns of the segregation-desegregation debate are ingrained in the Native American battle for an effective educational curriculum. Studies of Indian schools verify that in segregated settings the white educational curriculum becomes a source of cultural denigration and overt racism, and denies resources needed for creating equal opportunity. Thus, while desegregated schools may not be the answer, neither are white-dominated segregated schools. Given the acknowledged shortcomings of each approach (Cultural Isolation vs. Assimilation, Desegregation vs. Segregation), we need to wed concerns for cultural identity and cultural pluralism. What seems to be needed is a “third way” to educate students.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY Methods In-depth interviews were conducted with administrators and faculty members of the St. Regis Mohawk (a de facto segregated school on the reservation) and the Salmon River Central school (a desegregated

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school which is in nearby Ft. Covington, N.Y.).2 The respondents were asked a common series of questions regarding their school, curriculum, community, and problems of bicultural education. The interviews were augmented with statistical data provided by school documents and public reports. Demographics The Akwasasne (Mohawk) reservation lies in rural northern New York and is divided by the international border.3 The traditional seasonal pattern of males leaving home for extended periods and returning is maintained. Many men work high steel and live (temporarily) in nearby cities (Boston, Buffalo, Syracuse) and come home in winter. Due to these steel jobs and some skilled work in nearby aluminum plants, some reservation families have high incomes. An important attribute of this community is that they have a treaty with both the federal and state government (the Jay treaty of 1786) and are recognized as a nation which is not under the administration of the Bureau Of Indian Affairs. Thus, although education is state and federally-funded, it is state administered.4 The Akwasasne community is a highly politicized, well organized community, and relatively well known as the location of the publication, “Akwasasne Notes.” As Pyke, White, and Heerman (1975) noted, there was a contest over curriculum and community input in the two schools from 1968-70.5 The results of this will be discussed later in this paper. The Program This case study attempts to determine: (1) if a minority-controlled educational institution can be academically effective, and (2) if a bicultural academic program can be effective within a desegregated school environment? Most of the Native American students attend the segregated Mohawk school through grade three. There they receive traditional academics as well as special courses in Mohawk language, history, and culture. There are also special after-school programs that offer academic help. The Mohawk school program, directed by a Native

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American administrator and with strong community input, includes two years of pre-school. By comparison, students at the Salmon River grade school begin at the kindergarten level and receive minimal instruction in Indian culture and history. In addition to providing strong academic skills, this culturally-grounded program develops a sense of history and collective identity among the students. The transition to the desegregated public school is eased by programs to integrate and familiarize the Native American students with their future classmates and school. They visit the school to which they will transfer, learn the layout of the buildings and classrooms, and meet their future teachers and classmates. Reciprocal visits to the Mohawk school also occur. This is an attempt to allay fears of transferal which might even be more pronounced due to the change from majority to minority status; moving beyond the familiarity and shared cultural understandings of the reservation community. Due to class composition of advanced classes in Mohawk language which occur in the 7th and 8th grades, cohort groups among Native Americans are informally maintained. Additional cohesion arises from cultural practices outside the school setting which are sanctioned and tacitly supported by the school. School officials recognize Native American holidays, elections, and ceremonies, and encourage students to leave school to attend these events. One interviewee noted that students are given rides by faculty on their way to ceremonies. Each school formally recognizes a Native American holiday — May 11 — which is incorporated into its school calendar. Thus, in-group cohesion and identity are maintained by student practices and supported by school policy. Respondent consensus broke down over the issue of Native American culture receiving sufficient prominence in the public school curriculum. Some respondents felt that Native American issues were restricted to specialized curriculum. This posed a special problem due to federal cuts in Title IV funding. Local funds have been allocated to cover these specialized faculty lines, but one line dedicated to Mohawk culture had been terminated. Respondents seemingly recognized the resulting void, and several argued the need to reestablish that line.

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Human Inputs Affecting The Program The Salmon River high school employs three Native American teachers in a staff of 40, two of whom are Title IV teachers. About 35% of the student population is Native American. Additionally, three of the nine school board members are Native American. In the Mohawk school there are five Native American teachers (of 24), a Native American principal, and a student population composed almost exclusively of Native Americans. In 1968, Native American students boycotted the Salmon River Central School claiming that their needs and interests were not being considered. This confrontation created several forms of community input which continue today. In addition to representation on the district Board, an organized community advisory committee meets with the central school district officers and principals. They offer proposals and keep school officials attuned to the conditions, needs, and expectations of the Indian community. This dialogue has sensitized the committee and Native American community to the limitations on discretionary decision-making at the district level, and has encouraged political lobbying and advocacy at the state government level. In response to community pressure, Mohawk language which used to be taught every other day in 7th and 8th grade, has been expanded to a full class period every day in 8th grade. An anticipated new hiring should provide for daily instruction in the 7th grade as well. Despite this, one interviewee asserted that community involvement was still insufficient. Native Americans have a “separate program,” Title IV6 which provides for Mohawk culture and language instruction, and for an outreach worker who provides home-school coordination. That person is a paid professional who represents the school in the community, and who is a community advocate within the school system. Community members talk with the outreach worker who both explains policy decisions, and attempts to mediate disagreements between individuals (students or parents) and school officials. The Mohawk school reflects the atmosphere of the community and frequently hosts community festivals and meetings. The advisory committee and community members visit the school frequently, reflecting

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a sense of identity with the institution. Community influence and input in the education process of the Mohawk school is relatively unimpeded. The Mohawk school, being community identified, does reflect community issues. However, due to the age of the students and an emphasis on educational quality and effectiveness, community issues do not give rise to classroom disputes nor overtly impact the learning process. Community conflicts have occasionally affected the school culture and educational process in the Salmon River School. A number of years ago conflicts on the reservation (between traditional and elective factions) carried over into the school context. This included fights among Native American students reflecting their parent’s positions. As a result of factional disputes and debate over the role and content of formal education, an alternative school—Akwasasne Freedom School—was created. With the withdrawal of these students, community conflicts receded within the school setting. Half of those interviewed stated that community conflicts and debates in either village do not effect educational policy. Five to 10 years ago there was racial conflict in the Salmon River School, but none of our respondents noted recent problems between the two cultures. Community composition and inter-personal familiarity contribute to the feeling of comfort within both school environments. For the children of the area — both Native and non-Native — going to school together is perceived as a “natural” thing. Occasional adolescent conflicts have been labeled as racial by outsiders, where in fact the only racism is that imposed (and therein is reflected) by the outsider. Because of the “defacto segregation”, it was not surprising to find that there were no cited examples of racial conflict existing between students at the Mohawk School. Racial conflict between teachers and students also seemed non-existent. Educational Quality and Academic Effectiveness In the Salmon River School (like other schools), teacher commitment varies, but most faculty are perceived as being committed to providing students with academic assistance. Teacher sensitivity to Native American history, culture, and issues has increased since the boycott

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and the inception of Title IV. Several teachers in the history, art, music and even physical education departments have attempted to integrate segments on Native American history and culture into their curriculums. Strong faculty commitment was found at the Mohawk School. Special after-school programs offering academic assistance have been instituted. Teacher sensitivity to the needs of Native students has been ensured by faculty familiarity with community residents. The education process at both schools is effective in terms of institutional criteria. Salmon River has a strong math and science program, due in part to federally funded supplies and equipment for advanced studies. These funds are granted due to Native American student attendance, as noted by one of my respondents. Scores on SAT tests and State Regents Exams are above average, and a higher percentage of students receive Regents (State-wide) Scholarships than in adjacent school districts. Salmon River has various educational tracks, and those students not prepared for post-secondary education learn vocational skills through the vocational-technical curriculum. It was reported by one of the respondents that the Mohawk school is exceptional due to its federal resources, low faculty-student ratio, and curriculum. Students leaving the school are often one or two grade levels above the norm in reading skills. Due to student confidentiality, specific data on this was not available. The universality of this consensus is itself highly indicative. Educational achievement is often measured in terms of post-secondary attendance. Our data (Table 1) indicates a marked change between pre- and post-boycott (1968) rates of post-secondary attendance by Native Americans, both relative to their classmates, and to the pre-boycott trends of Native American students. At first glance, there is a marked increase of Indians going to college, especially relative to their white classmates. Yet Native American drop-out rates are also higher, especially at the beginning of the period. Initially, these rates seemingly pose a problem and indicate a failure of the system. Yet the discerning eye examining holding power7 can note two trends. First, the percentage of students of both racial

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groups completing high school increased markedly. Second, the holding power (student retention) of Native American students grew more rapidly and, while still lagging, has moved toward parity with their classmates. This indicates general success in that greater numbers of Native American students are completing high school, and greater numbers are entering post-secondary education relative to the preboycott era and to their classmates. The percentage of Native American students who graduate and attend college is higher than whites, although this success is partially due to the continued but narrowing disparity between the holding power of the various graduating classes by race. Despite a lack of empirical data on the initial advantages of segregated education, that program combined with the Title IV programs in the desegregated setting contributed to the above noted positive outcomes. There was an increased percentage of students graduating and choosing post-secondary training. Benefits to top students are also indicated. Native American students win Regents Scholarships proportionate to their percentage of the school population. Last, the levels of Native American holding power and post-secondary attendance vary, but seem to do so specific to class cohort. This would indicate that factors influencing educational success (teachers, national educational program cuts, new jobs in the adjacent factories) effect both groups. Thus, opportunity and environment seems to effect students equally regardless of race. This supports the contention that group cohesion is not in-group specific; an inference one might draw if the opportunities of Native and Non-Native Americans were radically different or non-covariant.

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TABLE 1 GRADUATE STATISTICS: SALMON RIVER SCHOOL SYSTEM Category

Year 65-6 Total enrollment 474 # Indian Drop Outs 15 # White DropOuts 17

Holding Power 66 % Indian* 61% %White 73%

66-7

67-8

68-9

69-0

70-1

71-2

72-3

73-4

494

505

522

468

513

580

606

631

10

11

17

13

16

23

14

5

9

12

21

22

15

9

14

12

67 48% 75%

68 68% 70%

69 71% 81%

70 84% 90%

71 83% 80%

72 65% 78%

73 68% 82%

74 76% 87%

69 115

70 111

71 104

72 107

73 114

74 155

77

76

65

67

78

111

38

35

39

40

36

44

78

72

66

69

55

73

48

49

39

38

34

41

30

23

27

31

21

32

77%

66%

69%

77%

58%

72%

62%

64%

60%

57%

43%

34%

56%

55%

57%

50%

40%

55%

51%

58%

48%

44%

36%

32%

Graduates 66 67 68 # Graduate 103 97 109 # White Graduate 76 72 76 # Indian Graduate 27 25 33 # Further Ed. 44 41 53 # White Fur. Ed. 35 31 40 # Indian Fur. Ed. 9 10 13 % Indian Grad to Further Ed. 33% 40% 39% % White Grad to Further Ed. 45% 41% 52% Indian Fur. Ed. from 9th grade 21% 19% 27% % White Fur., Ed. from 9th grade 30% 32% 37% Category Year 74-5 Total enrollment 595

7S-6

76-7

77-8

78-9

79-0

80-1

81-2

567

562

515

506

517

485

443

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# Indian Drop Outs 12 7 # White Drop Outs 15 11

10

13

13

14

12

9

9

22

14

14

9

8

Holding Power 75 % Indians 77% % White 92%

77 76% 91%

78 91% 90%

79 80% 89%

80 73% 83%

81 82% 87%

92 71% 84%

76 71% 85%

Graduates 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 92 # Graduate 148 126 129 109 124 127 101 111 # White Graduate 101 96 87 77 64 93 72 86 # Indian Graduate 47 30 42 32 40 34 29 25 # Further Ed. 49 51 -52 74 42 66 60 55 #White Fur. Ed. 25 30 31 58 31 50 49 32 # Indian Fur. Ed. 24 21 21 16 11 16 21 13 % Indian Grad to Further Fd. 51% 70% 50% 50% 28% 47% 72% 52% % White Grad to Further Ed. 33% 31% 37% 75% 37% 53% 54% 48% % Indian Fur. Ed. from 9th grade 40% 50% 38% 46% 22% 34% 60% 37% %White Fur. Ed. from 9th grade 23% 27% 32% 67% 43% 45% 59% 31% All percentages rounded. Source - Salmon River Central School Guidance Department Report.

cum. Ave.

60% 48%

The Salmon River School is educationally effective on non-institutional grounds. Adjacent schools have less than 1% minority population, so this is the only school providing an inter-racial, cultural relativist experience. That exposure and experience, and the resulting tolerance and mutual respect, prepares students for the conditions of the society-at-large.

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SUCCESS AND CONSTRAINT. WHY DOES THE SYSTEM WORK SO WELL? Three basic factors are essential to making this system work effectively: (1) parent and community participation, (2) planned transition, (3) teachers. The bicultural emphasis of the Mohawk School encourages parent and community involvement in shaping curriculum and student participation. Student participation in the bicultural educational programs establishes a strong skills foundation and a basis for academic success. Teacher commitment, as exemplified by after-school programs, also contributes to this success. In addition to the familiarization program noted earlier, the transition from the Mohawk to Salmon River School is eased by on-going teacher conferences in which the skills and needs of individual students are discussed. When the transition occurred in the 6th grade and there was no transition program, problems were more common. Early transition, occurring before prejudices, stereotypes, and cohort bonding become entrenched, seemingly eases the transition process. Salmon River’s success results from its accommodation of Native American students with a program tailored to their experience. Specialized courses, while overtly providing for a continuation of ethno-cultural studies, simultaneously encourage and nurture Native American identity. Further, incorporating input from a community committee and Native American board members has ensured effective input into the school curriculum. One difference between the two schools should be noted. Due to government resources, the faculty-student ratio in the Mohawk is smaller (19:1 versus 25:1 at Salmon); they have gym classes daily and more art instruction than in the Salmon grade school. The Mohawk School also has specialized math and reading teachers to augment the classroom teachers. These resources encourage both faculty-student familiarity and more personalized student development. Impediments were noted by respondent’s difficulties in the Salmon River School. They are of three types: (1) cultural, (2) community context, (3) policy and curriculum.

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The rural context creates a certain cultural and social naivete among all students. The size of the school district and home-school distances discourage student participation in extra-curricular activities. Additionally, it was felt that top students were not strongly challenged because class size did not justify separate classes for advanced students.

CONCLUSION We will now consider the questions posed earlier: (1) Can a minority educational institution (operated by and for Native Americans) be academically effective? (2) Can a bicultural program be effective within a segregated school environment? Most of the theoretical arguments over segregation and desegregation, and cultural integration and cultural isolation are considered as dichotomous absolutes—juxtaposed ideal types. In these analyses segregated education is conceptualized (1) on white standards and ideology, and (2) on political relations of power. Thus, concerns about politics and culture override considerations of educational effectiveness and ignore attributes of the minority culture. A similar critique of dualistic constructs should be leveled in the cultural isolation-cultural assimilation debate. Such dualistic constructs are also burdened by a value contra-position and concerns with power. In these debates each side has its own definition of effective education. The assimilationist-integrationists contend that the dominant academic curriculum is desirable, while the cultural isolationist-segregationists contend that a culturally-specific program is preferable. Yet, these positions are as absolutized as the dichotomous theories from which they emerge. We can delineate a concept of effective education which does not include these seemingly mutually-exclusive components. An effective education is one which teaches skills, logic, self-identity, and interaction skills. If these are criteria of effective education, then by definition the ability of education to achieve such goals in the culturally pluralistic world may require both segregation and integra-

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tion; isolation and assimilation. The recognition of diversity and the cherishing of uniqueness are essential to effective education. The values of each need to be reinforced and encouraged, since each devoid of the other is less effective than the combined approach. This study has found that both schools are unique and educationally effective for Native American and Non Native-American students. This demonstrates that positive cultural and academic outcomes of segregated education can be achieved. The students use the academic skills and cultural identity received from their education at the Mohawk School and continue to grow academically and socially. From this study, it can be deduced that to be educationally segregated for a while, and then integrated, can be positive. The St. Regis Mohawk and Salmon River Central cases could serve as role models for other educational institutions. It seems the students get the best of both educational environments.

REFERENCES Bouma, D. and Hoffman, J. (1968). The dynamics of school integration. Grand Rapids, MI.: Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing. Buchanaga, J. (1975). Inter-racial politics: The pressure to integrate an experimental school. In T. Thompson, (Ed.) Schooling of Native America. Washington, D.C.: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. Cooper, R. and J. Gregory (1976). Can community control of Indian education work? The Journal of American Indian Education, 15 (3). Croft, C. (1977). The first American: Last in education. The Journal of American Indian Education, 16(2). Davis, T., and Pyatskowit, A. (1976). Bicognitive education: A new future for Indian children? Journal of American Indian Education, 15 (3). Deloria, V. (1978). The Indian student amid American Inconsistencies. In T. Thompson, (Ed.) The Schooling of Native America. Washington, D.C.: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education. Fischbacher, T (1967). A study of the role of the federal government in the

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education of the American Indian. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. Reprinted 1974, San Francisco, CA.: R and E Research Associates. Hare, B., and Levine, D. (1984). Toward effective desegregated education, draft copy, prepared for United States Department of Education, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Education. Hawley, W. (1981). Equity and quality in education: Characteristics of effective desegregated schools. In W. Hawley, (Ed.) Effective School Desegregation. Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage Publications. Hayes, S., and Ames, K. (1976). A program for teachers of native American youth. Journal of American Indian Education, 15 (2). Heath, G. L. (1972). Red, brown, and black demands for better education. New York, NY: Westminster Press. Pyke, B., White, B., and Heerman, C. (1975). Mohawk nation and education. Journal of American Indian Education, 14 (3). St. John, N. (1975). School desegregation; Outcomes for children. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. United States Department of Commerce (1974). Federal and state Indian reservations and Indian trust areas. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Weinberg, M. (1968). Integrated education. Beverly Hills, CA.: Glencoe Press. Zintz, M. (1978). What classroom teachers should know about bilingual education. In Bilingual Education for American Indians. New York, N.Y.: Arno Press.

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DEBATE POINTS:

?

From your experience, how would you say schooling provisions for the Native American children, as described, differ from schooling provisions for Roma in your country? Can you imagine a comparison between Romani schooling and Native American schooling, or are the situations of the two groups, in your opinion, too different to sustain comparison? Support your views with evidence. The article seems possibly to challenge the argument that desegregation, unsupported by other programs, is the one true path to education reform where minorities such as Roma are concerned. What arguments does the author make about the schools presented in the article? What does she suggest is shown about education strategies, where minorities are concerned, from her research in these schools?

If you are persuaded that the arguments put forward about Native American schools apply for Roma in Europe, what further government (or non-governmental) programs, if any, would be necessary to bring about conditions in which schools of this sort could flourish in Europe? If you agree that the comparison between schooling for Roma and schooling for Native Americans is valid, do you think the arguments raised in this article apply also where Romani children are segregated in schools for the mentally handicapped? Or is the argument purely about separate vs. integrated schooling for minorities?

NOTES

* Linda Pertusati is Associate Professor in the Ethnic Studies Faculty at Bowling Green State University. The author would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance in the research and writing of this paper: Patrick McGuire, Bruce Hare, Anthony Mixon, C.J. and Phyl McGuire, and my various interviewees. This article originally appeared in the Journal of

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American Indian Education. 1 Editor’s note: In Europe, the term “assimilation” is at the center of a debate over the relative merits of “integration” versus “assimilation”, where the latter is a negatively loaded term implying measures aiming at the forcible eradication of a minority culture. In the United States, this debate is little known and not a major component of discussions about minority education. The author’s use of “assimilation” reflects common usage of the term in the United States: as a relatively neutral descriptive for the gradual acceptance of and adaptation to mainstream cultural norms (i.e., without the sense of coercive state policies as causal). 2 We were not allowed to interview students at either school for reasons of student confidentiality. 3 For a full discussion of the demographics of this reservation, consult U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, 1974; 414-415. 4 Since there are no local tax payers on the reservation, there are no local revenues paid to the public school system. All funding for Indian students is directly allocated by the New York State government. 5 Students can attend the Mohawk School for grades pre-kindergarten through 3. Almost all of these students then transfer to the Salmon River School, which includes grades kindergarten through 12. It is one of two American public school systems which the Mohawk Indian students can attend and is the one which the vast majority (about 85-90%) chose to attend. 6 Title IV is a program which specifically earmarked money for Native American Education. For a full description, See “The Indian Education Act of 1972; Title IV of Public Law 92-318, Educational Amendments of 1972,” in Journal of Indian Education, May, 1975, pp. 5-10. 7 “Holding power” is students completing high school as a percentage of the total cohort which entered 9th grade.

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3. The Role of the Media

Media – newspapers, television and, ever more frequently, new technologies such as those provided by the Internet – both reflect our societies and are presumed to have a powerful role in shaping public opinion: The media tell us the stories and provide us with the images through which we understand the world around us. The two writers below both encourage the development of activist journalists working for justice. They come to quite different conclusions, however, over what impact journalists can have, and what, precisely, they should do

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WHEN THE MEDIA MAKE A DIFFERENCE: COMPARING TWO EUROPEAN RACE CRIMES by Beata Klimkiewicz*

O

ur sense of who we are, how we are perceived by ourselves and by others, and how we perceive others in relation to ourselves, within the framework of the public sphere in general, stems at least in part from meaning provided by the media. The media can, over time, bring about changes in public consciousness, especially in sensitive areas such as the role of race and ethnicity in society. Below, I compare the case of Stephen Lawrence and its representation by the British media, with the case of the pogrom against the Romani community in M?awa, Poland and the portrayal of that violent event by the Polish media. Both events achieved a high level of visibility in the media and consequently engaged large audiences. But only one of them brought about a change in policy.

THE KILLING OF STEPHEN LAWRENCE: THE MEDIA IN THE ROLE OF THE JURY On April 22, 1993, a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, was stabbed to death at a bus stop in Etham, southeast London, by a gang of white youths. In June 1993, two men appeared in court charged with Stephen’s murder, but a month later, in July, the Crown Prosecution Service dropped the charges against them, stating that there was “insufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of a conviction”. New evidence, uncovered by Stephen Lawrence’s family, was ruled by the Crown Prosecution Service as “insufficient to support murder charges” in April 1994, and in April 1995, Stephen’s parents launched

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a private prosecution against four young men: David Norris, Jamie Acourt, Neil Acourt and Luke Knight. During committal proceedings in September 1995, charges against two of the men, David Norris and Jamie Acourt, were dropped, but the remaining two men were committed for trial and charges were brought against a fifth man, Gary Dobson. However, the case against Neil Acourt, Luke Knight and Gary Dobson collapsed in April 1996 following the judge’s ruling that vital eyewitness evidence was inadmissible. The three men were formally acquitted of the murder of Stephen Lawrence. In February 1997, the inquest into Stephen’s death reopened at Southwark Coroner’s Court and the jury returned a verdict of unlawful killing, concluding on February 13 that Stephen had died “in a completely unprovoked racist attack by five white youths.” The determination of Stephen’s parents to gain justice for their son, as reported by the press, inspired mass public interest in the twists and turns of the on-going saga. On the day after the verdict, on its front page, The Daily Mail newspaper ran the headline “Murderers”, and the names and photographs of five men, David Norris, Jamie Acourt, Neil Acourt, Luke Knight and Gary Dobson, claiming that they had killed Stephen Lawrence, and challenging them to sue for libel if the allegation was false. It is highly unusual in reporting to accuse a person of charges of which a court has acquitted them, not least because it constitutes contempt of court, as well as violating journalistic ethics. Many newspapers criticised The Mail on various grounds: The Observer noted the paper’s well-known strong right-wing bias and it’s “previous traditional distaste for Black causes.”1 The Times noted that the “low-risk strategy” in The Mail’s campaign, commenting that the likelihood of the accused men having the funds to be able to mount a libel action was remote and reminding readers that the burden of proof is, in any case, lower in civil cases than in a criminal trial.2 The Independent commented dryly that The Mail, a paper not known for it’s multi-cultural or liberal outlook, was “metamorphosing — abracadabra”.3 Nevertheless, notwithstanding The Daily Mail’s late conversion to anti-racism campaigning, their decision to up-the-ante in publishing the names and photos those suspected of Stephen’s murder intensi-

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fied the media’s — and thus the general public’s — interest in the Stephen Lawrence case. The ensuing campaign for justice touched the highest political offices: then-Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw, promised publicly that he would consider whether to back an inquiry into the case if the Labour Party was to win the general election in that year. Later, as Home Secretary, Straw met the parents of Stephen Lawrence, something which his Conservative predecessor had refused to do, and ultimately announced a full and independent judicial inquiry into the handling by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service of the investigation into Stephen’s murder. The results of the inquiry, the so-called Macpherson Report, were published in February 1999 and its findings have left a deep and indelible mark on British society. The report concluded that the investigation into Stephen’s murder had been fundamentally flawed by a combination of professional incompetence and a failure of leadership by senior officers. More importantly, the report accused the Metropolitan Police of “pernicious and institutionalised racism” – a conclusion so revolutionary, that the term “institutional racism” has since entered into common parlance in the race relations debate in Britain today. Macpherson’s team defined institutional racism as: “The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.” This definition touched on a crucial point: while the inquiry did not find that any individual officer had acted with racial animus in carrying out their duties, it found that racist attitudes are so deeply embedded within the collective that the police had, in effect, treated Stephen Lawrence’s death, and his parents’ campaign for justice, differently because of their ethnic origin. Following the publication of the report, the Home Secretary made a widely publicised speech to Parliament, in which he stated, “The very process of the inquiry has opened all our eyes to what it is like to be Black or Asian in Britain today. And the inquiry process has

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revealed some fundamental truths about the nature of our society. Some truths are uncomfortable. But we have to confront them.” He stated that the government accepted the definition of institutional racism set out in the Macpherson Report, and promised to reform every public institution, since he acknowledged the existence of such racism not only within the police force, but throughout the institutions of British public life. The government has also taken action to implement a number of the report’s recommendations, potentially the most far-reaching of which is the extension of the Race Relations Act (1976) to the police force and other public services, including the civil service and the National Health Service.4 The practical implications of the amendment will allow the Commission for Racial Equality to begin its own inquiries into deaths in custody, the discriminatory use of “stop and search” by the police, and of forces suspected of harbouring racist officers.5 The Home Secretary also set higher national targets for the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority officers for all police services. The report’s proposal that the Court of Appeal should be given the power to permit prosecution after acquittal where fresh and viable evidence is presented, to effectively do away with the established principle of double jeopardy, was referred to the Law Commission for comments. The government’s reaction to the Macpherson report was accompanied by an almost unprecedented amount of column space dedicated to the findings. The Guardian published a special edition, with an additional thirteen page supplement to the normal paper, quoting from and analysing the Macpherson Report. Peter Preston, the editorin-chief of the Guardian Group newspapers led the public debate which followed the report, in an co-authored article entitled “In our own backyard”: “Time to be brutally honest. Whenever charges of institutional racism start flying around, editors of national newspapers tend to study their boots or glance over their shoulders.”6 Gary Younge, the piece’s co-author, wrote of the need to provide opportunities to more ethnic minority journalists in the national media and he presented figures detailing the under-representation of ethnic minority journalists in the London-based national papers.7 Media organisations ultimately noted that media policy, not only the images

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they offer, may be as important as government policies in challenging racial prejudice and negative stereotypes. The struggle of Stephen’s parents for justice has become a turning point in the relationship between the majority society, the white lowermiddle-class England which The Daily Mail represents, and Britain’s ethnic minority communities. It became, and remains, a symbolic struggle of Afro-Caribbean and other ethnic minorities to set an identity politics agenda in Britain. As such, it also marks a defining moment in the on-going movement to transform race relations in Britain.

THE POGROM IN M?AWA, POLAND: NO MEDIA INFLUENCE ON JUSTICE On June 23, 1991, in the Polish town of M?awa a teenage Romani youth named Roman Packowski ran over two young pedestrians in his car. Mr Jaros?aw Pinczewski, one of the victims, died two weeks after the accident, and Ms Katarzyna Zakrzewska suffered permanent physical incapacitation as a result. The local radio station reported the incident almost immediately, claiming that the driver had fled the scene of the accident. Two days later, a group of approximately sixty youths gathered and set about attacking M?awa’s Romani inhabitants. The retributive attacks began with the destruction of the house of the local Romani leader, Mr Wojciech Packowski. The mob quickly grew to one hundred. Even though many Romani families succeeded in escaping and sought protection at the local police station, a number of Roma were seriously injured in the ensuing violence, and a number of Romani houses were set alight. Thousands of inhabitants of M?awa watched the attacks without intervening and the pogrom, which started on July 26, 1991, lasted five days, despite police reinforcements from other towns. The local press reported that the reason for the pogrom was the fact that the driver had fled the scene and was still at large thanks to bribes paid by his parents to the police and public prosecutor. In fact, it later came to light that Roman Packowski’s father had taken him to the police, that nobody had bribed the prosecutor, and that the young man had fled the scene of the accident only after those who witnessed

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the accident indicated that they wanted to “administer justice” there and then. Thus, the local media not only rationalised the racist attack by M?awa locals on innocent neighbours by using false or incomplete information, but they also contributed in raising the intensity of the conflict itself. The national media dedicated attention to the case, but only one national daily — Gazeta Wyborcza — devoted space comparable to the British media’s coverage of the Stephen Lawrence Case. Gazeta Wyborcza described the event as a “Pogrom on Gypsies in M?awa”8 and instead of denying the attack was racially-motivated, attempted to explain the racism of the local community. The paper noted a local envy based on the wealth of the M?awa Romani community. The tragic accident caused by a young Rom, in the eyes of the Gazeta Wyborcza, had been seen by the poorer inhabitants of the town as an ideal moment for “revenge”. The journalists of Gazeta Wyborcza noted that the non-Romani inhabitants of M?awa came with their families to gape at the actions of the mob and informed its readers that the police had failed to provide adequate protection to the M?awa Roma. Gazeta Wyborcza was the only paper to advocate official action against ethnic hatred, following the events, and was also the only paper that dared openly to criticise the police. In an editorial of July 1, 1991,9 Adam Michnik, a famous Polish dissident, human rights activist and the editor-in-chief of the paper, wrote that he considered that everybody who ignored the fact of pogrom — everyone who was silent — shared the shame of it. He also apologised to the Polish Romani community in the name of all Poles and he appealed to the churches, the government and the president to follow his condemnation. As a result, a number of political parties and academic institutions also condemned the pogrom in M?awa, but no concrete action was taken by the government, such as a tightening of legislation to fight racism in the wake of the attack. The lack of political action was reflected by the lack of justice for the victims of the attack: only four people were detained by the police on the first day of the pogrom, and a further fourteen were taken into custody four days later when the assault finally abated. All of those arrested were accused not of a racially-motivated attack on the M?awa Romani community, but of

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disturbing public order. A year later, a number of those involved were convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment. The Polish media did not attempt to place the pogrom within the wider context of ethnic relations in Poland, in contrast to the British press, which elevated the murder of Stephen Lawrence to the very symbol of race relations in Britain. The Polish press, where it dealt with the attack in M?awa to any great degree, merely condemned the event rather than attempting to analyse what it said about Polish society, or advocating a change in the law or in policy which could have protected the M?awa Roma or brought justice to the victims. Only Gazeta Wyborcza criticised the police for acting too late and deploying too few officers to protect effectively the M?awa Romani community.10 A number of other national newspapers and television stations did attempt to situate the pogrom within a framework of intolerance in general, though. In the weekly papers, Polityka11 and Wprost, expert sociologists were used to explain to the readers the richness and value of Romani culture. The daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita published the results of an opinion poll showing that the Roma are the most hated ethnic group in Poland.12 Sadly, media coverage of the pogrom in M?awa did not result in a fundamental re-evaluation of race relations, nor result in a change in legislation, as it did in Britain. Media coverage and the surrounding public discussion did not end in the reform of public institutions or of government practice, nor did the government feel compelled to propose such changes in Poland. The only positive result of the M?awa pogrom was a heightened self-awareness within the Polish Romani community and the establishment of several nongovernmental organisations for the advancement of Roma rights. The Association of Roma People in Poland was founded in 1992 by Dr Andrzej Mirga and Roman Kwiatkowski in O?wi?cim. Later the same year, the Romani community of Kielce founded the Association of Roma National Minority, ‘Solidarno??’. Both organisations emerged as a result of a fear of racist attacks and the recognition that the community must fight together for justice. Six years after the M?awa pogrom, Wprost13 published the results of a survey comparing attitudes of the Poles towards the Polish Romani community then, to those of six years earlier. The survey showed that little had changed since the vio-

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lent events of 1991 - Roma still headed the list of those most disliked by Poles.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MINORITY-AWARE MEDIA Why were the effects of the two cases on the public, the media and government so different? Why did the Stephen Lawrence case bring about a range of reforms as well as mass public introspection in the United Kingdom, while the pogrom against the Roma of M?awa failed to have a similar effect in Poland? The media were certainly not the only factor in the differing outcomes. Firstly, the ground in Britain had been prepared over a longer period of time, some forty years: a plethora of anti-racism organisations have been at work longer and public debate on the role of race has been encouraged, not stifled as it was in Poland under communism. The British Black community has achieved a considerable degree of participation in British society, and also a certain level of political participation: for example, there are a number of Black MPs in the British Parliament, while there are no Roma in the Polish Parliament. Also, the pogrom in M?awa took place shortly after the upheaval of 1989, and the media and people of Poland were preoccupied by the large number of political reforms ahead. Thus, for a number of reasons, the problem of racism did not receive the same attention in the public sphere as it did in Britain. In both cases, however, the role of media activity — or the lack thereof — was significant. Firstly, the British media made an effort to address the existence of discrimination in public institutions such as the police, the judicial system, etc. Journalists and editors took up the crusade not just against the acts of racist murderers, but against the institutional racism which then deprived the victims of these acts of justice. The Polish media failed to raise the wider aspects of the M?awa case, focusing instead on the acts of young hooligans, rather than on the role of the police and justice system in combating such crimes. If the pogrom was seen in the context of Polish society, it was treated as an unidentifiable and anonymous group of people. Secondly, the British media recognised that the issues involved went to the core

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of modern British society and demanded that the government and those public institutions with which institutional racism resided took urgent action to tackle the problem. Journalists and editors urged authorities to search for practical solutions: establishing a commission examining racist behaviour inside public institutions, condemning racist statements by the government and political parties, calling on politicians to meet with victims. In Poland, editors only appealed to politicians and leaders to publicly condemn the pogrom. Thirdly, media coverage of the murder of Stephen Lawrence became a longlasting media event, one that functioned as a form of social pedagogy. Once engaged in administering justice, the media also introduced new codes for the discussion of race relations: public institutions may be condemned and accused of racism just as individuals can. But while in Britain the media was preoccupied with the Stephen Lawrence case with varying intensity for six years until change of the race relations policy was proposed by the government, in Poland the M?awa pogrom captured the attention of the media only two or three months. In light of the analysis above, a number of general suggestions can be made. First of all, the media should see itself as crucial in shaping race relations within society and become fully involved: not simply condemning racist acts, but in demanding full prosecution of those who commit racist crimes, as well as prompting an examination of the racism at the core of society. It should examine practical solutions and not be shy in demanding action of politicians to tackle the problem. Internally, there should be a concerted effort to increase minority participation in the media at all levels — including ownership of media organisations and the employment of minority journalists. The quality of media coverage of race and ethnic relations, and the representation of minorities in the public sphere, is significantly influenced by the participation of members of minority groups in important creative and decision-making capacities. The misrepresentation of Roma, as well as their virtual absence from the media of Eastern and Central Europe, has undoubtedly contributed to their exclusion from larger society, and has sharply defined how Roma perceive themselves and how others perceive Roma. To end with Oscar Gandy’s observation: a communicator is more likely to be able to faithfully reproduce or rep-

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resent experiences and perspectives with which she has had direct and substantial experience.14

FURTHER INFORMATION: For further information on the situation of race relations in the United Kingdom, see the Commission for Racial Equality’s web site, at www.cre.gov.uk Additional information on the situation of Roma in Poland is available at the European Roma Rights Center web site: errc.org/publications/indices/poland.shtml For more details on the Stephen Lawrence affair and the impact on British society, see The Guardian archive: www.guardian.co.uk/lawrence/ On issues related to journalistic ethics, see: www.poynter.org/dj/Projects/newmedethics/me_insert1.htm www.publicintegrity.org/ethics.html spi.org/ethics/code.htm aish.com/Israel/articles/7_principles_of_media_objectivity.asp www.activedayton.com/partners/ddn/nie/journalism/principles1.html

NOTES Beata Klimkiewicz teaches at the International School of Journalism at the University of Jagiellonian, Krakow, and co-operates with the Polish National Television. In 1999, she was an international policy fellow at the Open Society Institute, Budapest. 1 Durham, Michael, “Hostile Mail Changed Tack on Lawrence Justice Campaign”, The Observer, February 16, 1997, p 1. 2 Gibb, Frances, “Daily Mail Murder Challenge is Low-Risk Strategy”, The Times, February 15, 1997, p.5. 3 Popham, Peter: “Murdered Because He Was Black”, The Independent, February 15, 1997, p.20. 4 The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. 5 The Commission for Racial Equality was set up by the 1976 Race Relations *

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Act. It receives a grant from the Home Office, but is independent of government. 6 Preston, Peter and Gary Younge, “In Our Own Backyard”, The Guardian, March 1, 1999. 7 Ibid. 8 “Pogrom Cyganów w M?awie”, Gazeta Wyborcza, June 28, 1991. 9 Michnik, Adam, “Ha?ba pogromu”, Gazeta Wyborcza, July 1st, 1991. 10 “Troszeczk? za pó?no”, Gazeta Wyborcza, July 8, 1991. 11 The articles appeared in the following issues: Polityka, June 26-27, 1991; Polityka, July 6, 1991; Polityka, August 3, 1991. 12 The research was conducted by DEMOSKOP for Rzeczpospolita, July 13-14, 1991. 13 The survey was conducted in October 1997 by CBOS. 14 Gandy, Oscar, Communication and Race: A Structural Perspective, London: Arnold, 1998, p 97.

DEBATE QUESTIONS:

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Does the media really have an impact on society? Can the media have an impact on society? Or do people use the media simply to receive information and support views that they already hold? Does “objectivity in the media” exist?

Were the “unethical” actions of the Daily Mail Newspaper justified by their outcomes?

Should journalists be activists for social change, or does the adoption of a cause threaten a journalist’s “objectivity”? Do those who work in the media have a responsibility to attempt to reform the ills of society, such as racism? Do you accept the author’s argument that the difference between the impact of the Stephen Lawrence case in Britain and M?awa pogrom was primarily a result of the different responses to those events by media? Or do you think there were other factors at play?

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Active Journalism: Dangers and Difficulties by David Altheer*

T

he discussion of the Daily Mail’s role in the Stephen Lawrence case is an accurate summary of how journalists took an active role in a series of events that led to a change in attitudes to race in the United Kingdom. Yet there are some aspects that Beata Klimkiewicz has overlooked or misunderstood. She writes that “how we perceive others in relation to ourselves, within the framework of the public sphere... stems... in part from meaning provided by the media.” The problem is that the public sphere in which she sets her narrative does not exist in the United Kingdom. What is the “public sphere”? It is a term propagated by Jürgen Habermas, a German social theorist, to mean forums for the involvement, by unmediated discussion, of the public in the decisions and actions of society. He caught the imagination of mass-communication and media scholars around the world when he published in 1962 a history of the bourgeois public sphere in the 18th century and contended it had since been lost. Many mass-communication researchers since have eagerly sought manifestation of this sphere in contemporary society, but they search in vain, although there have been some false sightings.1 Habermas may still be dreaming of a social arena permitting free discussion, but a dream is what it remains. This is not merely to quibble with a tangential aspect of what Klimkiewicz has written, but to delve into an aspect that is fundamental to Klimkiewicz’s argument. The Daily Mail was not operating in a public sphere. Like all media outlets, including those of the ground-breaking public-service broadcaster, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), it delivers news to citizens within the constraints of business imperatives — to sell newspapers or to win listeners and

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viewers — and only after it has been mediated by journalists operating in a company/office culture. In the case of the Mail, that culture is proudly right-wing conservative; in the case of the BBC it may be left of that, but in most cases, the British media derive from white, middle-class culture. And in the United Kingdom, most major newspapers openly represent certain groups, usually in the political sense, as with The Mirror supporting the Labour Party (and present government) and the Telegraph daily and Sunday newspapers supporting the Conservative Party. So the Mail’s “active journalism”2, as one might call it, in “Lawrence”, though it raised a cheer from many in the media, was an exception in a highly mediated sphere that proves the rule: such campaigns by the media are rare. Why, then, did the newspaper wield the gavel of justice for a black family when the courts had apparently failed to do so? The reason for the paper’s interest is instructive. The victim’s father, Neville Lawrence, had been working as a decorator at the home of the Mail’s editor, Paul Dacre, who had been struck by the injustice of what the tradesman told him. Were it not for the chance encounter between a highly paid journalist and a man working just above the lowest economic level in society, the Mail may never have embarked on the campaign. (A reader of this chapter might ask why a newspaper envied by other newspaper editors for its reporting skills had not previously examined in detail the black British experience.) The newspaper acted bravely in front-paging its accusation that the five men were guilty of Stephen Lawrence’s murder. But contrary to what Klimkiewicz says, contempt of court was not a factor: no proceedings were under way against the men. How brave, then, was the newspaper in risking libel suits from one or all of the men? Not particularly. In Britain, no legal aid is provided to help people to sue for defamation. The newspaper’s bravery came from daring to campaign on an issue that would not normally interest its readers. It gambled — correctly, we now know — that it could appeal to the sense of justice of its insular constituency, often described as “Middle England”, and win publicity for its stand. In the event, the Mail’s stand won publicity in rival newspapers and around the world and, though the men are still at lib-

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erty, the face of race relations was changed forever in Britain. This was indeed bravery, but it is not an example of idealised Habermasian practice. In her conclusion, Klimkiewicz insists that the media should see themselves as crucial in shaping race relations, demanding “full prosecution” of those who commit racist crimes. The Mail did not do that; the men had been freed by the court and the chance to demand prosecution had passed. The paper decided that was wrong and that it was therefore willing to risk private legal retribution. Nevertheless, Klimkiewicz ‘s idea of active journalism is attractive, particularly to newcomers to the profession: we all want to change the world, to make a difference. But for the media — the so-called “fourth estate” — to “demand... prosecution” is possibly to override the rules of that other estate, the law. That estate provides safeguards for the citizen and, of course, it is the press’s duty to investigate when those safeguards have failed, as the Mail believed they had.

DANGERS, LEGAL RIGHTS AND PRACTICALITIES What happens when the press gets it wrong? In 2000, the News of the World (NoW), a mass-circulation Sunday tabloid newspaper, started to “name and shame” convicted paedophiles, publishing details of where they lived and photographs of the accused people. At the time, concern about paedophiliac crime had reached a peak in Britain and the NoW was accused of mounting its project purely to win readers and become a story in itself. It certainly succeeded in becoming the story. To police chagrin, paedophiles around Britain, obliged by law to let the authorities know of their whereabouts, were fleeing their homes to avoid howling mobs, mostly female, which had appeared shouting outside their doors. Once the paedophiles left their known addresses, the police argued, the offenders could no longer be kept under any kind of surveillance. The police were also worried about the possibility of vigilante action and it was not long before some nonpaedophiles found their names and photograph appearing in the paper. At the Paulsgrove housing estate in Portsmouth, Hampshire, five families wrongly identified as harbouring sex offenders were

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forced to flee their homes after violent protests at their front doors. Another victim of the newspaper-inspired vigilantes was Yvette Cloete, a consultant doctor specialising in treating children’s diseases. One summer morning, she awoke to find that her home in a quiet South Wales village had been daubed with graffiti. Scrawled in white paint over her windows was the word “Paedo”. The vigilantes had mistaken her occupation, paediatrician, for paedophile. Such are the dangers of trying to inflame tabloid newspaper readers, who are often not well-educated. Others in society disliked the breach of the principle in British law that once someone convicted of a crime had completed their punishment — imprisonment, in the case of the paedophiles — they were to be considered rehabilitated: they had “done the time to wipe the crime”. The News of the World had carried out highly active journalism, but it had over-ridden the legal protections of citizens. Active journalism thus potentially harms the liberty and rights of citizens. It is not always practical, either: few journalists have the power to change company culture to persuade their employer to take such an active role. The culture may be such that news executives will ignore news or features tips because they consider the particular subject to be of little interest to the people they think are their readers/listeners/viewers.3 Or the journalists and executives may fear that the potential news story or feature will require a stance to be taken that conflicts with the political views of their employer. Even public-service broadcasters are sometimes wary of offending the government of the day because they depend in some way on it for their funding. Newspapers find themselves under such commercial pressure — partly because of the proliferation of television, radio, video and other rival media — that they consider investigative campaigns economically risky, quite apart from the danger of being sued for libel. Newspapers — and, for that matter, other news organisations, such as television news-suppliers — have to think carefully before assigning a reporter or a team of them to investigate or campaign on a matter in depth. It could take weeks or even months, weeks when those reporters will not be available for his or her daily duties. At the end of the investigation, the story produced may be insufficiently interest-

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ing or inconclusive and not worthy of publication. On the other hand, if the newspaper hesitates, the campaign may be taken up by a rival news organisation. News can be regarded as a commodity that has to be bought, i.e., paid for, so a news organisation has to weigh carefully the pros and cons of embarking on a campaign. Another consideration is that the campaign may not succeed in its objective, but instead end in embarrassing failure, on which rivals may mockingly comment. The Times pushed in its weekly technology supplement for several months for cheaper Internet access in Britain — but eventually the campaign was quietly dropped and telephone fees for Internet usage are still high. In this case, rivals did not comment, but, soon after, the supplement itself ceased, because advertising support had declined fast because dot.com companies were in fact failing. The section’s executives were left wondering whether a better product, with perhaps better campaigns or even no campaigns, may have appealed more to the dwindling number of advertisers. Other British national newspapers have continued to produce weekly technology supplements. They have eschewed active journalism.

LONE WOLVES How is it, then, that some reporters do succeed in active journalism? By themselves, is the partial answer (which in itself demonstrates the veracity of the preceding section). A prime example of what could be called a lone wolf is John Pilger, the British freelance journalist who campaigns in newspaper and magazine articles and books and documentary films against government malpractice and for human rights. Such is his success that he has become a major irritant to governments and the military around the world and is almost certainly the subject of large files in intelligence agencies such as MI6, Mossad and the CIA. The word “freelance” is important. Pilger usually has no regular direct employer, so he can be hired for individual projects because his work is not intimately associated with one particular media outlet. This has not always been so for Pilger, but he appears happiest when offering his campaigning projects to media organisations, rather than

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working full-time for them. He has nevertheless had to endure the opprobrium of politicians and business people discomfited by his campaigns. Influential journalists, particularly those on the Right, frequently disparage his work as being politically motivated, but it is possible that they are envious of his determination to tell stories that others do not wish to. He has withstood intense criticism because he has achieved respect from the public for a portfolio of work of a quality equalled by few other journalists. Young journalists may aim to emulate this, but it requires great resilience and in a world in which media organisations struggle in an intensely competitive market, there appears to be room for only a few such operators. Talent and tenacity has more than a little to do with the success of lone wolves.

THE ETHICAL ASPECT: REALITY AND UNWRITTEN RULES Does active journalism violate ethical codes? I have examined journalistic codes in many countries and have found nothing to suggest specifically that over-involvement in a story in the ways discussed here is unethical, although the code of Britain’s National Union of Journalists says: “...avoid the expression of comment and conjecture as established fact and falsification by distortion, selection or misrepresentation”. On the other hand, I have found nothing that specifically advocates active journalism. Active journalism does, however, violate an unwritten rule: that reporters should try to apply the idea of objective truth, although most are sufficiently well educated and well enough able to intellectualise to realise that such an idea is little more than that: an ideal they should aim to respect. Campaigning journalists such as the late James Cameron, who achieved acclaim as a foreign specialist for The Guardian in the 1970s, and, John Pilger, mentioned above, would denounce this aim, contending that the journalist’s job is to be committed, to take sides. Most journalists of my acquaintance — and I am old enough to have many friends throughout Fleet Street, as the British national press is generically known —are wary of this approach. How, they say, does one decide which is the right side? In

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the case of the Middle East, for example, does one side with the Israelis or the Palestinians? In the case of the Vietnam war, many western journalists decided that America’s war and the way in which it prosecuted it was wrong, but, according to their custom and practice, the reporters respected the objective-truth ideal. Thirty years on, antiAmericanism in this case may seem justified. But some journalists also had doubts during the conflict about the morality of the Vietnamese side, with its authoritarian communist affiliations and its aid from China and the Soviet Union. Who would argue, in this post-communist era with the new knowledge of the horrors unleashed in the name of Marxism, many of them in Southeast Asia, that journalists should have taken sides? Yet how can news media be taken seriously by their public if they never practised active journalism? The Sunday Times, a large-sale British weekly newspaper, is still famous for a campaign run in the 1970s by its editor, Harold Evans, to expose the dangers of a drug called Thalidomide that was being administered to women but was suspected of damaging foetuses. Thanks to Evans’s refusal to capitulate to threatening letters from high-priced lawyers acting for the manufacturer of the drug, the sedative was withdrawn.

THE POLISH ROMANI INCIDENT: WOULD THE PRESS REACT DIFFERENTLY IN BRITAIN? Klimkiewicz’s other case study — the Romani manslaughterer in Poland and the subsequent anti-Romani pogrom — includes an assertion that the British press would have reacted differently. That is true, as it has been for several decades. If a minority is involved in a news event with potentially great significance, the media will investigate, analyse and agonise. When Afro-Caribbean youths went on the rampage in London and other English cities in the 1980s, the media, once the riots had been calmed by the police, gave much space to the grievances of the rioters, or at least, to what the mostly white journalists thought had been contributing factors to the disturbances. (The policies of then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were considered a leading culprit.) The media do that almost as a matter of routine, so

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one could see their behaviour in Britain as being better than their counterparts in the Polish case. When Romani asylum-seekers arrived in unexpected numbers at the Channel port of Dover in the late1990s, the British press did investigate the Gypsies’ conditions in Romania, the Czech Republic and the other countries of origin and occasionally expressed some sympathy — although not for long. Both British cases are examples of the media being not active, merely reactive. Why wait for rioting in the streets before trying to understand black grievances? If Roma were being persecuted in Central and Eastern Europe, why wait for the news to reach Britain with the refugees? The gap of understanding between white and black people in Britain is being narrowed, thanks to the occasional riot and the McPherson inquiry into the Lawrence murder. However, despite London-based newspaper, television and radio news outlets occasionally giving Roma a chance to express their grievances, the comprehension gap between Gypsies and non-Gypsies in Britain is widening. Throughout the world, Roma face open prejudice, despite the legal prohibition in Britain and some other countries of the practice or expression of racial discrimination. The prejudice is based on a nonunderstanding that the media have made little effort to overcome. The BBC’s Director-General, Greg Dyke, has described his vast newsgathering and entertainment organisation as “institutionally racist” and some leading newspapers and journals have the same problem, which in Britain, at least, makes the lack of explanation of Romani culture predictable. Why, then, are media in Britain not doing more to understand other ethnic groups? It could be that the media and society are relishing the chance to be rude about one last group, the Roma. One cause of the prejudice is that few people in Britain know who the Gypsies are: they tend to think “gypsyism” is a lifestyle. Ignorance is one of the first obstacles to racial tolerance and one of the first a journalist must overcome. Scapegoating, bedevilled as it is by ignorance and misunderstanding, presents an ideal opportunity for a young person brave enough to attempt a bit of active journalism.

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SUMMARY Without a true public sphere, active journalism is a difficult course for anyone starting in the profession. Company/office culture can be a formidable obstacle. Commercial realities make it likely that the practitioner will have to lead a lone-wolf existence. The legal rights of the targets of such journalistic campaigns should be considered. Ethics: you’re on your own. Should the journalist exploit the gap in journalistic codes of conduct or should he or she follow the unwritten rule of “objectivity”. And which side is the right side to back? Scapegoating: expose it. Racism: the need to explain before an unpleasant manifestation occurs.

CONCLUSION Despite all of the preceding, do not be discouraged from showing courage. This essay is not designed to eliminate active journalism, merely to point out the difficulties of practising it. Once you are aware of those pitfalls, you can arm yourself to deal with them. Discuss with fellow students what difficulties might arise in your country and how you would overcome them. The world needs you. As the British press magnate, Lord Beaverbrook is reported to have said, “News is something that that someone somewhere wants someone somewhere not to know.”

FURTHER INFORMATION: * The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas, reprinted by MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991 * Journalism codes: www.uta.fi/ethicnet * John Pilger: pilger.carlton.com Pilger’s books include Heroes,

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Vintage, London, 2001, Hidden Agendas, Vintage, 1998; Distant Voices, Vintage, 1994; A Secret Country, Vintage, 1992; Under Siege: Racism and Violence in Britain Today, Vintage, 1988. Pilger’s recent television documentaries: The New Rulers of the World, 2001; Paying The Price: Killing The Children Of Iraq. * The Guardian: www.guardian.co.uk * Welsh Gypsies, Eldorai Jarman, University of Wales Press, 1998 * Between Past and Future: The Roma of Central and Eastern Europe, Will Guy (editor), University of Hertfordshire Press, 2001

NOTES David Altheer is a journalist at The Times, and the Father of the National Union of Journalists chapel (leader of the union branch). He recently completed a postgraduate project for the Centre for Mass Communication Research (CMCR) at the University of Leicester, England, on the British press and Gypsies. This article is Copyright 2001 David Altheer. The author can be contact at: [email protected]. *

I have in my CMCR research argued that the Internet was becoming a public sphere, but the high cost of entry — a start-up PC is expensive and even an Internet café charges a few dollars an hour in most parts of the world — makes this claim open to challenge. In any case, the near unavailability of telephone lines in poor parts of the world denies the possibility of Internet access to millions of people.

1

2

“Active journalism” is preferable to a cliché such as “pro-active journalism”.

A side-effect of the increased rivalry among news outlets has been what critics call “dumbing-down”: an emphasis on light news about celebrities that is easily obtained from the public-relations/promotions industry. It is cheaper and easier to collude with, say, Madonna’s manager, in photographing and writing at length about a Parisian shopping excursion by the singer than in tackling something that someone wants to keep secret. The more that the public buy publications featuring such “stories”, the more editors believe that they are the way to increase circulation and, with it, appeal to advertisers.

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4. Access to Justice

Statistical data repeatedly shows that minority groups such as Roma are often treated unfairly by the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, criminal justice officials – police officers, investigators, prosecutors, judges and others – must be allowed sufficient powers and discretion to administer justice effectively. The two authors below present divergent views of how to reconcile the problem of racism with the necessity to provide justice and law enforcement officials with the scope to act.

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ROMANI MEN IN BLACK SUITS: RACISM IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC by Barbora Bukovská (Kvo?eková)*

“Question: What do you call a Romani man in a black suit and white shirt? Answer: Defendant, please rise!“ Judge of the Prague District Court No. 7 ❖ In April 1999, D.B., a male Romani teenager, was walking near a construction site in Ostrava, eastern Czech Republic. The construction site was not guarded and not fenced off, and according to witnesses a number of other people were at the same place at the same time as D.B. However, D.B. was approached by an off-duty police officer who drew his gun and pointed it at him, and then threw him to the ground, screaming at him. D.B. was eventually handcuffed and arrested for attempting to steal metal tins from the construction site. Although there was no proof whatsoever that D.B. attempted even to enter the construction site and there was no damage caused, the District Court sentenced him by a penal order to imprisonment of 13 months.1

❖ During the same month, in the centre of Prague, Mr P.H., a Romani man in his forties, was attacked by a group of skinheads in front of a cafe. He was injured and in self-defence stabbed one of the attackers. After a police patrol arrived at the scene of the crime, they immediately arrested Mr P.H. and charged him with injury to health.2 The attack on Mr P.H. was never investigated, despite a number of criminal complaints on behalf of the victim.

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❖ In June 2000, the Czech government issued a decree of forced administration on one of the main banks in the Czech Republic. Among the reasons that led to the resolution was that the bank almost closed due to the wrongful administration of loans to and investments in enterprises in which board members and various other people including governmental officials had a stake. The bank had provided loans to two main political parties (the Civil Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party) which, in contrast with other credit recipients, were not required to guarantee loans by real estate or any other collateral. State action to cover bank debts and prevent massive losses to individual savings cost more than 40 billion Czech crowns (approximately 1.15 billion euros) which will have to be reimbursed from the state budget. This means that every single taxpayer will contribute to the rescue action a sum of approximately 20,000 Czech crowns (approximately 580 euros). So far, there has not been any serious criminal investigation into the actions of perpetrators and no one has been arrested or indicted.

Each incident described above, in its own way, is an example of the misuse of discretion in the criminal justice system. Few would doubt that the Romani origin of the teenager at the construction site played a significant role in the police officer’s decision to stop and question him. The second example involved an actual crime, but the police officers exercised their discretion not to arrest the white perpetrators. The third example shows that so-called “white collar” crimes rarely result in arrest, although the damage caused and the danger to society is disproportionately higher compared to petty crimes, which are often investigated without hesitation. The changes in political climate and possibilities for development of a free market in the Czech Republic after the fall of communism were accompanied by a rise in crime. From 1989 to 1990, crime in the Czech Republic rose 52 percent. In Prague, the crime rate rose 181 percent. The increase has continued. From 1977 to 1997, criminal activity increased four times. The number of prosecuted offenders grew 62% during this same period. Television and newspaper reports attributed this crime wave to Roma. Indeed, especially in the context of discussions about the division of Czechoslovakia on January 1,

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1993, during which fears were expressed that Roma from Slovakia might move to the Czech Republic in large numbers, the popular assertion was that most crime in the Czech Republic is committed by the Roma. Then-MP Miroslav Sladek stated in the course of parliamentary debate that Roma were “criminals who are getting rich through thievery and prostitution.” In the Czech Republic, Roma enter the criminal justice system in a disproportionate number to their percentage in the general population.3 Several explanations have been offered for such disparities. The first is the racist claim that Roma and similarly situated minorities are more likely to commit crimes.4 Another explanation is that they are victims of economic discrimination that may result in a higher rate of so-called “crimes of survival”, for example petty theft. This explanation additionally focused on the observation that defendants from minority groups, who are often poor, frequently do not hire a private attorney or cannot afford to pay bail in order to be released prior to trial. The third explanation is that minorities are victims of racism and discrimination and that there is prejudice against them at various stages of the criminal justice process.5 This article supplies a brief sketch of the problem and explores its legal context, based on the author’s experience as a practising attorney in the Czech Republic.

IDENTIFICATION AND PROOF OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION When discussing racial discrimination and criminal justice, one is confronted with the problem of identification of discrimination, because the very nature of criminal law enforcement involves differentiating fundamentally. Due to differences in the characteristics of criminal acts and criminal offenders, differential treatment appears to be an inevitable aspect of a criminal justice system. Criminal law enforcement authorities are endowed with the discretion to consider all relevant circumstances of individual criminal behaviour, and to shape their decisions to fit individuals and their crimes. Thus, many differences between individual occurrences of one type of decision (for example to detain or to impose a certain sentence), can be explained

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by legitimate factors — such as the type and seriousness of crime, its danger to society, the offender’s age, motivation, prior criminal record and other factors. This discretion is checked, however, by numerous constitutional protections which afford criminal defendants the right to a fair trial and equal protection of the laws. The authorities must take only relevant considerations into account and their acts must not be based on any prejudice or bias. The key is to determine whether criminal justice authorities exercise their discretion in a race-neutral manner. The problem of demonstrating racial discrimination in the criminal justice system is a great challenge for researchers and human rights activists as with some notable exceptions, most racist behaviour today is not openly expressed. If criminal law officials always expressed their racist views as openly as in the following case, it would be easy to identify and label the invidious nature of their actions: “…The rehabilitation [of the defendant] is problematic because of his identification with the value system of the criminal Romani subculture and because he does not have even basic working habits. In the light of these circumstances, I impose a sentence on the defendant in the upper level of possible sentences, an unsuspended imprisonment of fourteen years… “6

More significantly, some racist acts are committed unconsciously or are otherwise not overt. However, unconscious and other forms of hidden racism, although arguably less offensive than purposeful discrimination, are no less harmful. They are, in fact, in many ways more pernicious because they are often unrecognisable to the victim as well as to the perpetrator. Nevertheless, unconscious bias can lead to a state in which seemingly neutral practices have a disparate impact on minority groups. For example, one on-going study in the Czech Republic, the “Roma Rights: The First Step” Project, has shown that the majority of Romani defendants were informed at the time of their first interrogation that they would be given an opportunity to study their files at a certain time after arrest,7 at 9:00 AM, in the secretariat on the third floor of the Investigator’s Office for Praha 1, Bartolom?jská street no. 7.” This practice should be considered a vio-

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lation of the presumption of innocence, since according to paragraph 166 of the Czech Criminal Procedure Code8 the act of “studying the file” refers to the opportunity afforded to the accused and his attorney to view the contents of the file after the investigation has been completed. This means that investigators were confident only hours into the investigation that a solid case against the defendant would eventually be assembled — and that they assumed this before hearing any of the witnesses, before collecting material evidence, before receiving expert opinions, etc. At the same time, investigators or prosecutors very often make reference to the personality of a defendant that could identify him as Romani, for example by noting that he finished a remedial special school for the mentally handicapped and/or lives in a “socially disadvantaged community”. They generally do not make such references in cases pertaining to non-Roma.9 Proof of systemic discrimination can be obtained by collecting data and subjecting it to appropriate statistical analysis. Racial impact studies are necessary in order to reveal illegitimate differential treatment based on racism or ethnic bias, either conscious or unconscious. Examples include surveys in the USA on the imposition of the death penalty. Although studies have found that African Americans were more likely to receive the death penalty, the best of such research has not simply concluded that, for example, “The population of this state is 12% black, 50% of death penalties are against blacks, therefore there is a racial bias in death sentencing.” Rather, recognising the validity of discretion in the criminal justice system, such studies have been more nuanced. A study conducted in the state of Georgia in 1970s by law professors David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth of the University of Iowa10 examined over 2000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia from 1973 through 1979. The Georgia Department of Pardons and Paroles and other state agencies provided Baldus and his colleagues with police reports, parole board records, prison files and other items that shed light on the process by which state authorities handled murder cases. Professor Baldus and his colleagues subjected these data to extensive analysis, considering 230 variables that could have explained the imposition of the death penalty including age, level of education, criminal record, military record,

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method of killing, motive for killing, relationship of defendant to victim, strength of evidence, and so forth. Among them, the race of the victim emerged as the most consistent and powerful factor in the decision to impose the death penalty. They discovered that there was a high correlation between the race of the victim and both prosecutors’ decisions to seek the death penalty and decisions by juries to impose it. Defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times more likely to be sentenced to death than defendants charged with killing black victims. Black defendants were 1.1 times more likely to receive the death penalty than white defendants. The study concluded that there existed “the likelihood of substantial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty depending on the victim’s race, and smaller disparities associated with the defendant’s race.”11 The “First Step Project” in the Czech Republic — a similar study — uses pair-sample methodology in cases concerning Roma and nonRoma.12 The preliminary results of the project show that, for example, male Romani defendants in identical positions to non-Romani defendants (meaning defendants of similar age, similar background, alleged to have committed similar crimes, etc.) receive disproportionately longer sentences than their non-Romani counterparts. For example, for the crime of attacking a public official (Article 155, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code, further only “CC”), male Romani defendants receive on average 8.2 months longer imprisonment than non-Romani defendants; for drug trafficking (Article 187, paragraph 1 of the CC) the disparity is 6.5 months; for murder (Article 219, paragraph 1 of the CC) 12.9 months; and for robbery (Article 234, paragraph 1 of the CC) 17.1 months. Also, female Romani defendants were identified as receiving on average 13.1 months longer imprisonment sentences for theft (Article 247 of the CC) than non-Romani women. Even if racial impact studies reveal illegitimate differential treatment based on racial bias — conscious or unconscious — the problem remains how to respond to the situation. For several reasons, racial inequality in the criminal justice system cannot be eradicated easily. First of all, as already mentioned, very rarely is there overt racial discrimination in criminal law practice. More commonly, a whole com-

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plex of laws, policies, priorities and practices interact to produce racially influenced outcomes. The second problem is that efforts to reform criminal justice policies are politically unpopular — no politician wants to be labelled “soft on crime” — and measures to make crime policy more rational and equitable are uniquely susceptible to demagogy. A comprehensive programme of action will be needed to combat discrimination in the criminal justice system. As racial disparity begins with discretionary decisions by criminal law authorities, remedies should begin there. If it is proven that the exercise of this discretion has a disproportionate impact on Roma, it should be subjected to public scrutiny and change needs to be sought. Moreover, it is a serious problem that although Roma are often over-represented among those dealt with by the criminal justice process, they are dramatically underrepresented among the staff of most criminal justice agencies and much hostility can be traced to this fact. Criminal law agencies are often seen as a force against rather than a service to the community, and the veritable absence of Roma among the ranks of law enforcement officials increases the distrust of Roma towards the system as a whole. If people believe that justice and fair treatment are not “on offer” for them, this may influence their attitudes and approach to the institutions of justice. They may also expect to encounter ignorance about their own cultures and backgrounds or stereotypical assumptions. Serious attention should therefore also be paid to efforts to recruit and retain Romani staff in criminal law enforcement authorities. Diversity will most certainly require some sort of affirmative action. The government should include minority recruitment and hiring practices in its crime prevention policy and provide adequate funding for such programs.

CONCLUSION The system by which violators of the law are apprehended and punished is one of the pillars of any democracy. But for that system to remain consistent with constitutional guarantees of equal treatment under the law, the public must be confident that at every stage of the

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process — from the initial investigation of a crime to the prosecution and punishment of that crime by prosecutors and judges — individuals in like circumstances are treated alike. Racial disparities affect both innocent and guilty minority citizens. There is obvious reason to be outraged by the fact that innocent Roma are detained by the police far more than non-Roma. But there must also be outrage about the disparate treatment of Roma who have violated the law. A defendant is entitled to many civil rights upon conviction and equal protection of the laws is one of them. Thus, there should be similar outrage and it is an affront to society as a whole when a minority defendant, even a guilty one, is treated unfairly by the police, or by prosecutors, or at sentencing, because of his race or ethnicity. Too often the public has been content to believe that bias and prejudice towards Roma does not exist in the sacred sphere of court rooms. Criticism directed towards actors within the system is often refused as an attack on the independence of the judiciary. I believe that most police officers, prosecutors or judges would vehemently deny that they have ever discriminated against minority defendants or that they take Romani ethnicity into account in any way in the exercise of their duties. They would most likely state that they reach their decisions utilising facts, evidence and highly constrained legal criteria. Ignoring injustice will not make it go away. All of us — judges, prosecutors, lawyers, representatives of non-governmental organisations and the public at large — have an enormous stake in the proper functioning of the justice system. If the problem is that some of the decisions in criminal justice are products of bias against certain groups within the population, we should fight it. If such decisions are prejudice-free, we should monitor official behaviour to ensure that it stays that way. The Czech government is presently making serious and concerted efforts to reduce crime. It is important to recognise that one explanation for the presence of so many defendants from one group of the general population prosecuted and in prisons is that the criminal justice system’s attempt to cope with the dramatic increase in crime has itself driven them there. Crime prevention programs should include recognising injustice, racial bias and prejudice and bias in the system and should initiate corrective measures to fight crime and dis-

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crimination simultaneously. Efforts to reduce crime in ways that ignore the problem of racial discrimination cannot be effective.

FURTHER INFORMATION: For further information concerning access to justice for Roma throughout Central and Eastern Europe, see European Roma Rights Center, “Access to Justice”, Roma Rights, 1/2001, on-line at errc.org/rr_nr1_2001.shtml Further information about human rights violations of Roma in the Czech Republic is available on-line at errc.org/publications/indices/czech.shmtl

DEBATE QUESTIONS:

?

Is it possible to discriminate against a person, without realising one is doing so?

What might the long-term consequences of systemic discrimination against a particular group be on the place of that group in society? Consider the principle that “justice must not merely be done, but be seen to be done.” What might the effect be of a shared understanding in a given community that the justice system will not deliver justice to them because of who they are?

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NOTES Barbora Bukovská (Kvo?eková) is a staff attorney at the Prague-based human rights organisation Counselling Centre for Citizenship, Civil and Human Rights 1 Documentation on the case is available from the non-governmental organisation Counselling Centre for Citizenship, Civil and Human Rights, Prague. E-mail: [email protected]. Internet: www.poradna-prava.cz. This article does not address the complex issues surrounding Roma and statistics, such as whether the state should gather race-based statistics and, if so, who should be considered Romani. 2 Ibid. 3The Council on Nationalities of the Czech Government 1997 “Report on the Situation of the Romany Community in the Czech Republic and Government Measures Assisting its Integration into Society,” which later became known as the “Bratinka Report”, stated that this disparity is partly due to the discrimination Roma face: “[one a]rea in which the relations between the Romany minority and the majority deteriorate is people’s behaviour in daily life, based on generalised prejudices, more or less covert expressions of discrimination, also from companies and institutions...” (“Report on the Situation of the Romany Community in the Czech Republic and Government Measures Assisting its Integration in Society”, Special Part, 1997). In the view of the authors of the Bratinka Report: “[The] seriousness of the problems connected with the Romani community comes primarily from the fact that a significant portion of the Romani minority in the Czech Republic belongs to the lowest social level, with high unemployment, a low level of education, and, compared to the total population, a disproportionately high crime rate” (Ibid). The Council also found that the Roma believe that “they do indeed receive disadvantageous treatment at the hands of the state authorities which indirectly strengthens the Roma’s mistrust of the majority population and its institutions, and further contributes to the tension between the Czech Republic’s two population groups” (Ibid.). 4See, for example, Piatt, Bill, Only English?: Law and Language Policy in the United States 1979-1993, 1999, p.159. Piatt reinforces a racist stereotype commonly applied to immigrants and other marginalised groups: because ethnic and linguistic minorities are more likely to commit crimes and/or otherwise disrupt society, they should be feared by the dominant-language speakers and suppressed within the dominant culture. According to Piatt, people, particularly children who are denied the right to view the world through their language and culture, are made to feel inferior, and they react negatively “by engaging in criminal, anti-social, or self-destructive conduct.” 5On racial prejudice and discrimination in the U.S. context, see especially Walker, Samuel, The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity and Crime in America , 2d ed. 2000, p.154). 6Decision No. 7 To 35/97 of the Upper Court in Prague (Vrchní soud v Praze) from November 19, 1997, p.29. *

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“Roma Rights: the First Step” Project of Tolerance and Civil Society, a nongovernmental organisation based in Prague. The project, supported by the Open Society Fund Prague, aimed to gather preliminary data on disparate treatment of Romani defendants in the criminal justice system in the Czech Republic. The project was launched in December 1999 and has since been merged with the NGO Counselling Centre for Citizenship, Civil and Human Rights. The report on the Project results, When Justice Becomes Injustice, is forthcoming and is available from [email protected]. 8Article 166 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law No. 141/1961 of the Collection of Laws as amended, reads as follows: Terminating Investigation 1) If the investigator believes that the investigation is over and its results are sufficient for lodging indictment, he shall make it possible for the accused person and his lawyer to study the files for a reasonable time and to make proposals for additional investigation. The investigator shall inform the accused person and his lawyer at least three days in advance. This time period can be shortened upon the consent of the accused person and his lawyer. If the investigator does not believe that the proposed additional investigation is necessary, he shall refuse it. The investigator shall record these operations in the file and he shall inform the accused person and his lawyer on additional investigation refusal. 2) If the accused person or his lawyer do not take advantage of studying the files although they were duly instructed about this possibility, the investigator shall record this in the file and he shall continue as if this operation was performed. 3) After terminating investigation the investigator shall present to the state’s attorney the file together with the indictment proposal, the list of proposed evidence and the reasoning of why he did not agree with presenting additional evidence or he shall make a decision pursuant to Article 171 through 173. (Translation by the author) 9Unpublished report of the Tolerance Foundation’s “Fair Trial Project”, 1998. 10 Baldus, David, Charles Pulaski and George Woodworth, Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 1991. 11 Ibid. 12 Pair-sample methodology utilizes a small sample base, and aims to scrutinize factually similar cases involving one member of a subject group and one member of a control group. 7

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Abuse of Discretion in Criminal Justice Systems: A Police Officer’s Perspective on Systemic Change by Burton J. Brown*

M

y own introduction to police abuse of discretion was rather dramatic. More than 25 years ago, as a rookie deputy sheriff, I observed an incident that would impact the rest of my career. Late on a midnight shift I had arrested a man on an outstanding warrant. The arrest I had made was a misdemeanor of little consequence. As I finished “booking” my prisoner I heard a loud disturbance near the back entry way to the county jail. As I was on my way out I saw a very large deputy from another district literally carrying a young man like a suitcase. The noise I had heard was the cries of pain of the young man being carried. The deputy had “hogtied” the young man behind his back with bailing wire. Handcuffs were not used. With the young man’s wrists and ankles “wired” behind his back the deputy had picked him up, thrown him in a patrol car, and transported him some 40 miles to the county jail. With every move the wire cut more deeply into the young man’ s wrists. As I left the county jail the corrections officers were cutting the wire off. The deputy was never charged, although the young man filed a lawsuit and was later awarded damages for his injuries. This incident left an indelible image on my mind that I have never forgotten. The abuse in this case was severe and dramatic. It’s hard to imagine what someone would have to do to deserve that kind of treatment. Both the deputy and the young man were white and I have always wondered what would have occurred if the young man had been black.1 Abuse of discretion by police officers and other criminal justice

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officials is a tragic and potentially deadly socio-legal plague. The problem is not limited to despotic regimes nor is it conveniently tucked away in the hidden recesses of the third world. A cursory review of news reports from around the world reveals that abuse of discretion is systemic in many parts of the world. The Kurd minority in Iraq and Turkey, the Romani minority in Europe, the Palestinians in Israel, and African Americans in the United States have all been victims of the abuse of discretion by police and other institutions of government. As a retired law enforcement officer I was in a position to see such abuses and to work to avoid them. The United States is clearly not immune to systemic abuses. A current problem in the U.S. is race-based profiling. The term DWB has come to be used by African Americans to describe being stopped by the police for no other reason than having the wrong skin color. DWB means “Driving While Black” and is a word play off of the term DWI or “Driving While Intoxicated”. Racial profiling is a process whereby police officers evaluate “suspect” persons by looking at their skin color, their clothing, their car, their location, and their mannerisms.2 A key danger in racial profiling is that the decision to stop someone may be based upon an apparently valid reason, even though racial profiling was the actual basis for the stop. Simply stated, racial profiling is a race-based police process where persons who may not be committing any crimes are selected for a traffic stop and subsequent search. However, police abuse of discretion can be much more severe. In the United States two recent incidents serve as high profile reminders of how abuse of discretion may lead to injury or death. In New York City in 1997 Haitian immigrant Abner Louima was arrested outside a nightclub. He was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. Louima was later beaten and tortured by police officers. Louima’s torture included being sodomized with a broken broom handle. Louima was hospitalized and underwent surgery several times to repair his physical injuries. Louima filed a lawsuit and was successful in securing financial compensation for his horrific injuries. However, even very considerable financial compensation will not be able to undue what happened to him.3 In 1999 an unarmed Ghanaian immigrant, Amadou Diallo, was

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shot and killed by police officers while he was standing in his doorway. The officers fired a total of 41 shots at an unarmed man. Ultimately, no criminal charges were filed against the officers. Other legal actions remain pending.4 New York City is certainly not to be singled out for cases of suspected abuse of discretion by the police. Recently in Gainesville, Florida, a police officer shot and killed a 29-year-old man for allegedly driving toward him with an automobile during a traffic stop. The incident was recorded on the officers own patrol video equipment. In this case, both the officer and victim were white but the videotape was sufficient for the grand jury to return a sealed indictment against the officer for manslaughter. This case is still pending and final judgment must be reserved to the courts. However, a young man is dead and the distinct possibility remains that a police officer abused his discretion.5 We must keep clear in our minds that we are walking a delicate line when making accusations of police abuse. The same officers that we accuse today may have done many positive acts in the past and may do many more in the future. Like it or not, we all count on the police to provide certain services and to protect our societies from the types of harm that would certainly befall them in their absence. This does not mean that we should fail to hold the police to the appropriate levels of accountability and to see it that those levels are met. However, we must be careful not to see every encounter between an officer and minority citizen as an actual or inchoate case of abuse of discretion. Ms Bukovska recounts a Czech case involving a Romani teenager who was walking near an unfenced construction site when he was approached by an off duty police officer. The officer drew his firearm and pointed it at the teenage boy then threw him to the ground while screaming at him. The teen was eventually handcuffed and arrested for attempted theft. According to this account there were other, presumably non-Romani, persons at the construction site at the same time that were not arrested.6 Accepted as fact, this incident appears to be a clear case of police abuse of discretion. But before anyone makes such an accusation they need to be very clear of the facts in the given case. What is not known about a case can be of as much importance as what is known. I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the

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facts in this case and what follows is illustrative of alternate possibilities that could serve to mitigate the police officers degree of responsibility. In this example, the site is described as being unguarded and yet there is an off-duty police officer present. Was this officer acting as the security guard in an off duty capacity? If he was, we have reduced the seeming capriciousness of the contact by at least a degree. Did the officer identify himself before pulling his firearm? Did the teenager engage in any act or movement that seemed potentially criminal other than walk by? Did the teenager resist the officer in anyway including minor verbal resistance? If the answer to any of these questions is yes, then we may have possibly reduced further the level of the officer’s culpability. It is imperative that the facts be discerned as accurately as possible in order to properly evaluate abuse cases and recommend them for further action. I write this understanding how difficult this task can be. But the difficulty does not absolve us of our duty to inquire as thoroughly as possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The reader must keep in mind that officers assigned to districts comprised of primarily minority populations are by their very presence going to have a very high percentage of contacts with minority persons. Officers making traffic stops in these areas will be stopping a disproportionately high number of minority drivers. As citizens and advocates we must give our police officers room to do their jobs. As advocates we should know the demographics of the areas in which we work. If we know that a given area is both a minority district and a district with high levels of reported crime, then we must understand that a high rate of minority arrests may result. In cases such as these, we do a disservice to the police and to the law abiding minority population if our advocacy efforts lead to reduced police presence and activity. What we do need to do is to watch how the arrests are affected and how searches and seizures are conducted. As advocates, we need to know the prevailing laws and constitutional requirements of the jurisdictions under consideration. When disproportionate physi-

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cal force is used, we must be ready to step forward and attempt to hold the police accountable. If illegal searches and seizures are upheld by local courts we must stand ready to take the case to the highest level. As is evident, this is can be a very fine line to walk, but that fine line represents the challenge before us. As advocates and citizens we must take the challenges as they are presented and work to effectuate appropriate change. Why does abuse of discretion exist? Is it the bigotry and prejudices of individual officers or is it the deep cultural biases of the dominant ethnic majorities? I would argue that both exist to the extent that such attitudes come from aspects of cultural behavior. Cultural behavior is by its very nature is self-replicating and widely spread throughout entire cultural systems. However, such behavior can be unlearned over time. How do we affect the unlearning process? I believe that the answer lies in a three-tiered process comprised of effective advocacy, the establishment of new recruiting and training policies for police, and establishing more effective police accountability. These three functions, although important alone, operate best in concert together.

ADVOCACY All officers are not abusive, unfortunately many are. These officers and their abuses should be the first focus of advocacy efforts. Incidents of abuse should be identified, investigated, and prosecuted. It is easier to remove a single bad police officer then to change an entire system. Change will be achieved in small steps. I realize fully that stonewalling by police agencies and public prosecutors remains an enormous problem throughout much of the world. However, we should not underestimate the long-term effects of persistent efforts. In “Romani Men in Black Suits: Racism in the Criminal Justice System in the Czech Republic”, Barbora Bukovska provides insight into the abuse of discretion in the criminal justice system of the Czech Republic. Ms Bukovska has focused her observations and investigations on specific incidents of discretionary abuse and brought them to the attention of a wider audience. Her examples, accepted as fact, are

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clear cases of systemic abuse of discretion and demand correction. Human Rights organizations such as the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) provide the type of multi-layered advocacy that I believe will be most effective in addressing both discrimination and abuses of discretion in criminal justice systems. The ERRC continually identifies and investigates incidents of abuse throughout Europe. The ERRC takes testimony, publishes accounts and provides legal assistance to the victims and to local lawyers involved in the defense of abused persons. Further, the ERRC provides assistance to those bringing cases before the European Court of Human Rights, by supporting the victim’s lawyers and presenting legal briefs as amicus curiae.7 Although the ERRC deals only with cases involving Europe’s Romani Ethnic community, the approach of the organization is thorough and effective. As advocates, we place legal and social pressure upon those that systemically violate the rights and freedoms of others. Much of the pressure comes from exposure. Corrupt systems do not like to be exposed. Exposure is embarrassment and embarrassment is potentially damaging. However, when we force an exposed element to take even a small action to rectify a wrong we have forced that element into an implicit admission of wrong. Without the watchdogs, very few agencies or criminal justice systems would exhibit even the slightest interest in self-policing.

NEW RECRUITING AND TRAINING POLICIES FOR POLICE Recruiting of police officers of high moral fiber should be a high priority. After all, once recruited, we give police officers a considerable amount of authority to effect our every day lives. Many agencies in the United States have adopted rather lengthy and sophisticated recruitment processes. These processes involve extensive background investigations, polygraph (“lie-detector”) examinations, drug screening, psychological screening, and entrance examinations. These processes come only after an applicant has met the agencies’ minimum standards. Today minimum standards may require two or four years of

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college as well as an arrest-free past history and a number of written recommendations from people close to the applicant over an extended number of years. Still, unsuitable applicants make it through the procedure. Even sophisticated processes are not infallible, but they are an important first step. I strongly recommend such recruitment processes where they do not exist and strongly recommend improvements where improvement is needed. After screening, the next phase in the applicant process is basic training. It is here that accountability should be first taught and stressed. When I attended police basic training over 25 years ago, we were required to take a course in constitutional law. I agree that this is an essential topic of training but what has stuck in my memory is how it was taught. We learned virtually nothing about a suspect’s rights per se, but we were taught a great deal about how to stay on the legal side of those rights. In other words, we were taught how far we could go not how and why those rights existed in the first place. During my career the term human rights never used. The term of choice was always civil rights. I learned the difference between civil and human rights many years later on my own. These shortfalls still exist in the police-training arena and need to be addressed and rectified. My own police experience took place in the United States and the abuses of law enforcement training voiced above I observed first hand. But problems exist also outside the United States, in other parts of the world. I have had considerable contact with officers from other countries who have echoed my observations. Officers from Canada, South Africa, and Europe have indicated similar problems in teaching officers the subtleties of their own “rights” systems. It is not enough for police officers to have only a broad general understanding of the constitutional system from which they must work. They must be taught and then held accountable for the knowledge. Many European countries have constitutional provisions incorporating the fundamental rights and freedoms of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) into their basic law. This does not guarantee that all police officers have sufficient knowledge of the important subtleties of the systems that they will be working in. This is precisely the

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kind of training shortfall to which I am referring. Human rights advocates and law enforcement training personnel must evaluate their own police training curriculums and decide to what degree these ideas are being taught (or ignored) and seek to make necessary recommendations and corrections. As to the training of police officers I have a number of specific recommendations: The specific rights available within the specific legal system must be taught and applicants need to be tested to assure a sufficient level of understanding. Officers must be taught that these protections belong to the individual and not to the state. In Europe, most countries have adopted the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms during the process of admission to the Council of Europe. Where certain countries provide greater or additional rights and freedoms these must also be taught. In any case, training should reflect the real and aspirational aspects of the given system.

Officers must be taught that individual rights and freedoms exist concurrently with the state’s duty not to infringe upon them. They must further be taught that the state — and its representatives — has a positive obligation to secure rights. Finally, officers must learn that there are consequences for violating these rights such as loss of employment or even criminal charges. In many systems, such consequences are generally lacking, especially in cases involving minority victims. This is where long term, persistent, and highly motivated advocacy will help. Remember, change comes in small steps. Officers must receive substantive instruction in human diversity. This training must be newly conceived to represent the reality of human differences and not the overused clichés that tend to prevail in such training situations as they presently exist. My very considerable experience with police officers and training has taught me that officers will respond to interesting and engaging material that may provide them with some potentially valuable information. I have developed and taught such a program and it has been very well received.

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Police officers must be taught that they are the first line of defense in the struggle to maintain rights and freedoms for all persons under their charge. The police are there to protect these rights and not to be the entity primarily responsible for violating them. Police officers must be trained to control their prejudiced tendencies. Everyone has these tendencies including police officers but the mark of a true professional is their ability to operate coolly and evenly in spite of them. They must also be made aware of the legal obligation to do so and the legal repercussions for failure to do so.

ACCOUNTABILITY In order to affect long term and meaningful change in a criminal justice system, there must be accountability. This will be the most difficult to put into effect and will likely receive the greatest degree of resistance. Creating it where it does not exist will require the most patience and the most persistent work from all of us advocating systemic change in criminal justice processes. The formation of citizen review committees could provide one possible level of accountability, as could the presence of an active press. The development or improvement of internal review procedures within police agencies would provide an additional level of accountability, as would active investigations by state prosecutorial agencies. Procedures must be created to emphasize and enforce the legal obligations placed upon officers of the system. That is, police officers must understand that they are obligated to investigate all reports of criminal activity even against them selves. The same strictures would apply to the prosecutorial agencies involved. They must understand their legal obligation to not only investigate but to prosecute crimes even against the police. Finally, the termination of officers found guilty of serious abuses of discretion and their prosecution when those abuses rise to the level of crimes will provide the most effective defense against abuse of discretion. This is both a deterrent and the best method of reinforcing the legal accountability and obligation involved. There are numerous possible approaches to the accountability issue but none of them will ever exist without vigorous advo-

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cacy by compassionate and interested people. Without this most essential element there will be no change. We must not fail in this essential duty. Official misconduct and abuse of discretion should always be identified and rectified to the fullest extent possible, within the social context and legal system in which it is found.

ASSEMBLING THE PARTS Advocacy is the engine driving change. In order to begin addressing change in police training policy there must be some form of inside or outside pressure to drive the process. Advocacy can be a very valuable part of that pressure. Once training changes have begun, accountability becomes the means of enforcing the legal obligations attached to the changes. Providing police officers with a sufficiently detailed human rights curriculum is necessary because it provides the base line of training for which officers can be held accountable. Advocacy must inform policy change and this can then fuel accountability. Such a system can work, and it can be tailored to the reality of the situation in which it is needed.

NOTES Burton J. Brown is a retired Deputy Sheriff from Florida and a lawyer. He is currently completing his Ph.D. in cultural anthropology at the University of Florida. 1 A few years later the deputy in this case was arrested for unrelated criminal charges and served prison time. 2 In a recent statement submitted to the World Conference Against Racism, Xenophobia, Racial Discrimination and Related Intolerance the Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights explained that “Police practices are often driven by biased assumptions. Race and ethnicity are used wrongly as a proxy for well founded individualized suspicion of wrong doing.” August 2001. 3 David M. Herszenhorn, “Family Describes a Readily Friendly Man,” New York Times: August 13, 1997 4 Michael Cooper, “Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, And an Unarmed Man is Killed,” New York Times: February 5, 1999. 5 Cindy Swirko, “GPD Officer Kills Driver During Stop,” Gainesville Sun: January 31, 2001. Lise Fisher & A. P. Thompson, “Indictment Sealed in Student Shooting,” Gainesville Sun: June 19, 2001. *

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Barbora Bukovska, “Romani Men in Black Suits: Racism in the Criminal Justice System in the Czech Republic”, Roma Rights 1/2001, on the Internet at: errc.org/rr_nr1_2001/noteb4.shtml. 7 Amicus curiae means “friend of the court”. 6

DEBATE QUESTIONS:

?

What does the author mean when he uses the term “advocacy” and “advocate”?

Do you agree that the problems the author describes can be resolved by “exposure”? Why or why not? If not, what other forms of pressure can be brought on authorities to end problems such as torture in custody? Can the goal of eradicating torture be realized? Or will police always abuse their powers?

A prominent U.S. lawyer has recently urged that torture be permitted by police as long as it is ordered by a judge, and is used only when there is a “ticking bomb”, i.e., when torture can be used to force a suspected terrorist to reveal the location of a bomb that will imminently explode. Do you agree that in such circumstances, torture is permissible? Do you think that there are other circumstances in which torture is permissible?

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5. Political Participation

Throughout its history, theorists writing on democracy have warned of the danger of "the tyranny of the majority" -- the threat that weak groups may be dominated or oppressed by the will of the majority. Such warnings seem particularly apt where Roma are concerned: Roma are dramatically underrepresented in the organs of decision-making and administration in Europe and play little role in shaping the policies that effect their lives. The two authors below present sharply divergent views on what should be done to overcome this problem.

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ROMANI POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND RACISM: REFLECTIONS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA by Peter Vermeersch*

T

he eradication of anti-Romani racism continues to be one of the most important political challenges in contemporary Central Europe. International and domestic human rights organisations have repeatedly pointed out the responsibilities of the state authority in this process. Politicians in power can develop policy initiatives to improve legal safeguards and to tackle discrimination. Domestic Romani associations have frequently attempted to push their governments towards more determinant action in this field. However, to date the real impact of Romani interests on government decisions continues to be limited. There are a number of reasons for this. In the first place, politicians in Central Europe are in general not prepared to attach crucial importance to policies dealing with antiRomani racism. Moreover, mainstream political parties have been reluctant to allocate favourable positions to Romani activists on their party lists and thus have excluded Romani interests from mainstream politics. In some cases, leading politicians have even capitalised on popular anti-Romani sentiment. The underrepresentation of Roma in politics has incited Romani interest organisations and Romani political parties to seek special channels to influence policy making. This article seeks to compare two countries that have responded differently to the Roma’s political demands: Hungary and Slovakia. Already in the first half of the 1990s, Hungary granted its Roma minority cultural autonomy and introduced

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a system of elected “minority self-governments”, including “Gypsy self-governments”. In Slovakia, a non-elected advisory body for Romani affairs was only initiated after the 1998 elections. Although these approaches are motivated by a very different stance towards collective minority rights, they commonly aim at addressing the Roma’s systemic disadvantage in politics by designing group-specific institutions. Both countries have elicited positive reactions from the European Union for this aspect of their “Roma policies”. One wonders, however, how these developments are to be evaluated from the perspective of the Roma. The crucial question is whether and to what extent the designed strategies for Roma political participation will realistically lead to a more firm policy against anti-Romani behavior.

THE UNDER-REPRESENTATION OF ROMA Between 1990-1994 the Hungarian National Assembly contained three Romani Members of Parliament (“MPs”). Two Romani candidates (Ms Antónia Hága and Mr Aladár Horváth) had been elected from the list of the liberal party Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) and one Romani MP (Mr Tamás Péli) had been a candidate of the Socialist Party (MSzP). Of these three, only Hága was able to keep a seat until 1998. There are no Romani MPs in the current National Assembly, despite the constitutional right of every minority to have ensured political representation (Article 69, paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary).1 Separate Romani parties stood candidates in the elections of 1990, 1994 and 1998, but they failed to attract enough votes to gain representation. In 1998, the most successful candidate nominated by a Romani party (Democratic Party of the Hungarian Gypsies, MCDP) polled only 1.4 percent of the vote in his individual constituency. Ms Antónia Hága and Ms Ágnes Daróczi appeared on the national list of the SzDSz in 1998, but did not obtain any mandates. More or less the same development is observable in Slovakia. In the first elections to the various parliaments in Czechoslovakia in 1990, Slovak Roma ran for office in coalition with the leading anti-communist movement organisation Public Against Violence (VPN). Certain Romani candidates were elected to

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the Federal Assembly (Mr Gejza Adam) and into the Slovak National Council (Ms Anna Koptová). The Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) also included Roma on its list and this brought Mr Karol Zeman and Mr Vincent Danihel into the Federal Assembly in the 1990 election. After 1992, Romani representation in the Slovak National Council disappeared completely.2 The Romani parties Roma Civic Initiative (ROI) and the Party for Labor and Security (SPI) stood separately in the 1992 elections, but reached no more than 0.6 and 0.97 per cent of the vote – far below the five per cent threshold. In the 1994 elections, the ROI enjoyed support from the nationalist-oriented Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) of former premier Vladimír Me?iar, but did again not manage to attract enough votes (0.67 per cent). No separate Romani parties took part in the 1998 elections. Romani candidates Jan Kompu? and József Ravasz ran on the HZDS list. However, weeks before the election Mr Kompu? died and was not replaced by another Romani candidate. Mr Ravasz, who appeared at number 88 on the HZDS list, failed to win a seat. In Slovakia, Roma constitute approximately eight per cent of the population, in Hungary approximately five; but in parliament they are absent.3 Why have Roma systematically been under-represented? Weak minority representation in democratic polities may be caused by a range of organisational factors, such as the limited size of the minority constituency or the fact that the minority population is distributed across various electoral districts. In the case of the Roma, there is clearly also a more fundamental factor at play. Although there are no legal restrictions on the political rights of the Roma, the dominant political climate produces a barrier inhibiting them from participating in political life. In both Hungary and Slovakia, Roma are usually portrayed as a social problem and a threat to political stability; they are not seen as serious contributors to the political debate. In their struggle for votes, mainstream political parties have cultivated this image. In the beginning of the 1990s, there were still certain parties that attempted to win the “Romani vote” and to this purpose put Romani candidates on their lists. But this proved not as easy as expected. Romani candidates were relatively unknown to Romani voters who themselves were difficult to mobilise as a result of their long-standing

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social exclusion from society. Realising the potential size of the Romani electorate, mainstream parties have sometimes developed new political strategies.4 But in general these parties became increasingly reluctant to support Romani claims openly and they distanced themselves from Romani politicians. The idea gained ground that Romani politics are being “by nature” quarrelsome and maladjusted. Strikingly, the absence of Romani representatives in the national legislative bodies in both Slovakia and Hungary contrasts sharply with the number of Roma involved in minority organisations and local politics. In 1999, the Slovak Ministry of the Interior reported that there were 59 Romani associations and 14 Roma political parties officially registered. It also reported that following the 1998 local elections, six mayors and 86 council members have been elected from Romani political parties.5 A recent report of the Hungarian government states that in Hungary almost 250 Romani organisations have registered.6 Moreover, since 1993, Hungary has entitled its minorities to form local and national “self-governments” – elected advisory bodies that have a limited say in matters of culture and education. Since the last minority elections in 1998 there are 753 local “Gypsy minority selfgovernments”, which means that at present approximately 3000 Roma have a certain role in public affairs at the local level. There are also 53 Roma active in the national “Gypsy self-government”. Hungary has currently also one Romani mayor and 177 local council members who identify themselves as Roma. One can conclude that despite the fact that Roma are increasingly organised in independent associations and in local ethnically-based political parties, the gap between them and mainstream parties is widening. What matters is not that the Romani population of a country should exclusively be represented by Romani politicians, but that the absence of Romani politicians in the central arenas of politics reflects a growing negative stereotypical thinking about Romani politicians – a negative view which mainstream parties do not seek to challenge in fear of losing votes. In these circumstances, it becomes increasingly difficult for Romani politicians to defend their interests on the national level. Likewise, it becomes increasingly unlikely that non-Romani politicians will stand up to represent Romani interests effectively.

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RACISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE “ROMA PROBLEM” The growing gap between Romani and non-Romani politicians is related to the widespread influence of racism on popular thinking and public behaviour. By racism I mean a way of thinking which involves the categorisation of a group of people as naturally inferior on the basis of stereotypical understandings of perceived social and cultural differences.7 In this form, racism is generally an incoherent assembly of ideas and stereotypical images which underlies certain behaviour, institutional practice and everyday conversation. That Roma have been subject to negative categorisation in Central Europe is clearly illustrated in the way in which the problems they are facing have been explained in public, by politicians and even in some official reports. In public opinion it has been frequently asserted that the cause of the problems facing the Roma lies in “Romani culture” itself, understood as a static phenomenon incompatible with “European” culture. Consider, for example, this quote from a recent letter to the Central Europe Review: I do not think that the Romanies will be ever capable of integrating themselves into European society. A specialist in the cultures of India has written in one book that the Romanies simply have different customs, a different culture, a different morality, and so they are encountering problems.8

The negative view of Roma which emerges from this quote does not at all match the complex reality of diverse forms of Romani culture. However, it is considered to be true by many people because it offers the illusion that the social position of the Roma and the general breakdown of inter-communal relations between Roma and nonRoma is not an issue for which society at large bears any responsibility. Their argument is that Roma have origins outside Europe and are therefore “natural troublemakers”. This is what can be called the construction of the “Roma problem”. Public opinion makers and press have played a key role in the reproduction of this argument, for example by assuming a natural connection between Roma and crime.9

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The idea of the “Roma problem” has crucial consequences when it spills over into politics. Based on the assumption that Roma are not full-fledged members of the European cultural community, politicians can easily argue that issues relating to the situation of the Roma should never be given priority. It is this type of reasoning which farright parties have systematically used as a basis for their political mobilisation. Parties like the Slovak National Party (SNS) in Slovakia or the Hungarian Party of Justice and Life (MIÉP) in Hungary have stressed the “ethnic” unity and purity of the people they seek to represent. They perceive any efforts to counter racism as unjustified ways of favouring a problematic “foreign” culture within the “own” nation. Consider, for example, the following statement by MIÉP chairman István Csurka quoted in Magyar Hírlap on November 3, 1993: The Gypsies can now charge policemen even for the slightest use of force. We must not have privileged groups in this country.10

The idea of the Roma as a naturally inferior category of people has underpinned such shocking proposals as the one recently made by Slovak MP Vít’azoslav Moric (SNS) that Roma are “idiots” and that a humane way of dealing with them is to put them in reservations.11 The extreme right attracts a considerable number of voters in both Slovakia and Hungary, but is currently also a rather isolated fraction in parliament.12 The danger, however, lies not exclusively with the extreme right, but also with seemingly objective statements about Roma by more accepted parties that are also informed by the idea of the “Roma problem”. For example, Mr Géza Jeszenszky, a founding member of the rightist-centrist party Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1990-1994) and current Ambassador to the United States of America stated recently: Hungary has a large Gypsy minority with serious social problems deriving mostly from poverty, poor education and, in many cases, an inherited lifestyle that lacks any incentives to break out and do better.13

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Refering to “inherited lifestyle” as a cause of “social problems” is an indirect way of asserting that Romani culture itself has produced a situation of disadvantage. Many voters are readily prepared to accept these and other culture-based arguments from mainstream parties as they have become accustomed to the idea that Romani identity is essentially nothing more than a biological inclination towards antisocial behaviour. Arguing that there is a “Roma problem” which is indissolubly connected to a reified and negatively-loaded notion of Romani culture is a simplistic way of avoiding the difficult process of probing the variety of political and social conditions of present problems. Racist ways of explaining social problematics are easy to sell and therefore useful in a struggle for votes. It is no doubt a positive development that anti-Romani statements by SNS-representatives are increasingly condemned by politicians in government. Consider in this respect the Slovak Parliament’s response to Moric’s racist statements by deciding to strip him of the immunity from prosecution he normally enjoys as an MP. This move demonstrates that politicians in Slovakia are increasingly aware of the damage anti-Romani statements have on the country’s reputation. It is also a positive development that Romani associations have become articulate in attacking views comparable to those of Moric. Nevertheless, racism continues to be a basis for politicians of more generally accepted parties and even politicians in government. In Slovakia, this phenomenon is illustrated by the way authorities have “explained” the migration of Roma to European Union countries. They refused to perceive the phenomenon as related to the failure of policies related to Roma and the resulting distrust between Roma and the ethnic majorities. Instead, leading politicians have referred to “Roma mentality”. For example, in July 1999 Minister for Human and Minority Rights and Regional Development Pál Csáky appealed to the media to stop using the word “exodus” – as the refugee wave had been labelled in the press to date – on the grounds that this implied a violent act of forced eviction. Instead, Csáky described the phenomenon as “ethno-business”.14 In this way, migration was portrayed as the logical continuation of what is now popularly regarded as “typical” Romani behaviour – abuse of state welfare resources.

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Tellingly, in January 2000, Slovak MP Róbert Fico – formerly the representative of the Slovak Republic at the European Commission for Human Rights and now one of the country’s most trusted politicians – tried to find popular support for his newly established political party Smer (Direction), by proposing to stop paying social benefits to returned asylum seekers for a period of twelve months.15 In June 2000, he advocated the reduction of family allowance for large families, a measure which in his view would help solve the “Roma problem”.16 Migration and abuse of welfare systems are far from the only forms of problematic behaviour which are attributed to the typical “nature” of the Roma as an inferior category. Other crucial areas are housing, education and employment. Also statements about Roma “lifestyle” made by national leading politicians in Hungary have sometimes implicitly reflected such categorising views. Consider, for example, Hungary’s former Prime Minister Gyula Horn quoted in the Hungarian daily Népszabadság of November 28, 1997, as stating: While the country is doing very much to benefit its minorities, one must take the interests of the majority society into consideration as well. (...) it can no longer go on that people establish themselves in a lifestyle without labour earnings.17

In response to accusations from the European Union about insufficient protection of Roma, Hungarian Foreign Minister János Martonyi asserted in 1999 that the main problem facing the Roma is not that they are victims of ethnic hatred but that they are poorly educated and cannot compete for jobs.18 By separating the Roma’s lack of education and jobs from the prejudice they face when seeking them, Martonyi implicitly stressed the Roma’s own responsibility for their situation.

STATE RESPONSES TO ROMANI UNDERREPRESENTATION: “ETHNIC” POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS The under-representation of the Roma in politics constitutes a problem of democracy and damages the international reputation of

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Hungary and Slovakia. Sensitive to these matters, both countries have taken a number of measures to remedy the insufficient participation of Roma in decision-making procedures. The strategies they have applied depart from a different view on minority rights. The most radical strategy has been developed by Hungary. Already in 1993, the Hungarian parliament adopted legislation which acknowledged the principle of non-territorial cultural autonomy for minorities.19 The minority legislation (Act LXXVII of 1993) resulted in the establishment of a system of elected minority self-governments for the 13 officially recognised minorities – including Roma. Hungary has presented this approach as crucial for Roma.20 Specifically it has been seen as a way to remedy the structural political weakness of Roma and ensure Romani influence on Roma-related policies. Since the first minority elections (1994), this system has elicited mainly positive reactions from international institutions. In July 1997, the European Commission mentioned Hungary’s minority legislation in its Agenda 2000 and the European Parliament subsequently commended Hungary on its “exemplary minorities policy”.21 However, both academics and Romani activists have been very critical, suggesting that this system unnecessarily reduces Romani politics to the participation of the Roma in one group-specific domain of political life.22 Roma are granted a certain place in the decision-making process, but this place is inherently a marginal one. Besides having only limited competencies as de facto advisory bodies, the self-governments actually polarise the political landscape. The additional measures which the Hungarian government has taken from 1995 onwards – for example, the so-called “medium-term package” of measures for the improvement of the living conditions of the Roma (Government Decisions 1093/1997 and 1047/1999) and the creation of an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Roma Affairs (1999) – are no doubt important initiatives, but they do not even attempt to change the growing gap between mainstream politics and Romani politics. Romani participation is simply considered an accomplished fact. Tellingly, Romani political participation as an area in need of improvement was not mentioned by any Hungarian party in their latest policy programs.23 Slovakia’s attempt to introduce institutional channels for Romani

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political participation is largely a post-1998 phenomenon. The last Me?iar government (1994-1998) only managed to deliver a number of unimplemented measures aimed at “assisting” the Roma in becoming “integrated”. In a 1996 government resolution the Roma were considered to be no more than “citizens in need of special care”, or in other words, a problematic category of people who do not conform to the “Slovak” way of life and are therefore socially inferior. After the 1998 parliamentary elections, when former opposition parties established a new government – a coalition dominated by the newly created Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) of Prime Minister Mikulá? Dzurinda and which also included the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) – a new approach towards designing Roma-related policy was explored. Of crucial importance here again was the criticism of non-governmental organisations and of the European Union. Slovakia had been excluded from the first group of candidate countries to begin detailed EU accession negotiations in 1998. However, with governments in the West openly supportive of the new government, Slovakia has aspired to quickly catch up with the other candidates. The Dzurinda government has attempted to ensure Romani influence in the decision-making process through the appointment of a Government Commissioner for the Solution of the Problems of the Roma Minority. This institution, filled by the former MP Vincent Danihel – himself a Rom, as the government vigorously emphasises – has been given the task to elaborate government strategies and is, to a large extent, responsible for the distribution of available funds.24 Government Commissioner Danihel is, however, not an elected representative and has been criticised by Romani associations for his uncritical acceptance of governmental views on Romani migration. This has given rise to a great deal of distrust, with many Roma believing that both Danihel’s position and the whole strategy in which he is involved is merely declaratory – aimed at enhancing Slovakia’s standing in the international community instead of empowering the Romani minority with a substantive voice in policy making. A fundamental criticism of both the Slovak and the Hungarian styles of addressing Roma is that specific “ethnic” institutions may empower the Roma with a limited degree of influence, but do not at

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all foster, and possibly even hinder, Romani participation in the central areas of policy making. Implementing group-specific measures in itself does not reduce the barrier between Romani and non-Romani politicians; it may actually institutionalise this barrier instead. Under the current circumstances, the existing distrust between Romani and non-Romani politicians is not likely to disappear because Roma widely suspect that government initiatives have been induced by considerations other than a specific concern for enhancing the situation of the Roma.

FIGHTING RACISM Although a different approach to minority rights underlies the Slovak and Hungarian ways of facilitating Romani political participation, one can observe certain similar trends in the two countries. Both approaches have commonly organised a form of guaranteed group representation through administrative political institutions. There are certainly positive points to be made about this. For example, Gypsy local self-governments in Hungary can in theory serve as a source of civic education for many Roma who would not have the possibility to achieve this in other public bodies. Likewise, the Slovak Government Commissioner will in theory draw the attention of appropriate ministries on issues important to Romani communities. While these measures are perhaps commendable from these latter points of view, they do not actually guarantee that Romani interests will effectively be protected. Moreover, these forms of special representation become problematic when they are seen as the only measures suited to overcome under-representation. As an exploration of the political discourse on the “Roma problem” shows, under-representation is clearly linked to a generally dominant negatively-loaded image of Roma and the Romani politician. Therefore it is crucial to oppose unequivocally the dominant stereotypical understanding of Romani identity, because it is this prejudice that prevents Roma from gaining broader political support. Special representation without at the same time correcting popular stereotypes may be counterproductive. It can simply be invoked by mainstream political parties as a reason for not

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taking the Romani perspective into account. It can also serve as an excuse for not including Roma in mainstream political parties. It is therefore likely that Romani activists will only be able to influence policy when problems of prejudice and racism are more successfully addressed by the state and when different mainstream political parties will be more inclusive towards Romani politicians and more sensitive to the Romani perspective.

DEBATE QUESTIONS:

?

Does the fact that minority groups such as Roma are underrepresented matter? Why? Should all minority groups enjoy guaranteed representation? Or do Roma have a special claim on guaranteed representation in a given country’s political system? Are the examples cited of anti-Romani speech by politicians a problem? Why or why not? Is there a tension between the obligation of a politician not to make such statements and the desire of the same politician to win votes?

What do you think of the recent trend of creating ethnicityspecific political institutions? Are these a good way of increasing the role of weak minorities in democratic decision-making? Or do they marginalize the minority they are designed to assist?

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NOTES Peter Vermeersch is research assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research Flanders at the University of Leuven, Department of Political Science. 1 The Hungarian parliament has to date not been able to agree on a procedure to ensure seats for minorities, despite a 1992 judgement of the Hungarian Constitutional Court that this legislative failure has produced an unconstitutional situation. 2 The Federal Assembly ceased to exist following the split of the state. 3 The seats of the 150-member Slovak National Council are distributed according to an electoral system based on proportional representation. There is a 5 percent parliamentary threshold for individual parties and a 7 to 10 percent threshold for electoral coalitions. Hungary has a mixed electoral system of proportional and majoritorian representation to fill the 386 seats in the Hungarian National Assembly. There is a 5 percent threshold to enter parliament through regional party lists on the principle of proportional representation. 4 For example, in the run-up to the 1994 parliamentary elections in Slovakia, Me?iar publicly stated that financial loans would be made available to Romani politicians on the condition that they would form a united party. These propositions aroused mixed reactions since Me?iar had made statements before which were evidently anti-Romani. Apparently his Roma-friendly discourse was driven not by a concern for the minority itself but primarily by his desire to prevent other parties from attracting Romani voters. More than once Me?iar referred to the Roma for his own political purposes. For example, on July 12, 1994, Me?iar said in an interview with the Austrian daily Die Presse that his party opposed a recently adopted law allowing the use of bilingual road signs because “it is concerned about the welfare of ethnic minorities.” According to Me?iar, the law was restrictive because it did not pay attention to the language of the Roma (reported by RFE/RL, July 13, 1994). This seemingly pro-Romani statement was at the same time also a clear anti-Hungarian one, and even an anti-minority statement. It used the case of the Roma to block pro-minority legislation of which many Roma, mainly those who are Hungarian-speaking, were supportive. The Hungarians are the largest and also the most politically organised minority group in Slovakia, constituting around 11 per cent of the Slovak population. 5 “Report submitted by the Slovak Republic pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, Bratislava, May 1999. The report makes no mention of the annulment of the election of Romani mayor Marián Bill? (ROI) in the north-eastern town of Petrová. Immediately after Mr Bill? took office the local council in Petrová gave him a vote of non-confidence on the basis of a very questionable door-todoor petition. Re-election in September 1999 returned a non-Romani man as mayor (see Roma Rights, No. 1, 2000; Michal Va?e?ka, “The Roma”, in: Grigorij *

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Mese?nikov et al., Slovakia 1998-1999. A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 1999, p. 404). 6 “Report of the Republic of Hungary. Implementation of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities”, Budapest, January 1999. 7 For a further discussion of current concepts of “racism” in this direction, see Solomos, John and Les Back, Racism and Society, London: Macmillan, 1996, p. 25-29. 8 “We Are Not Racists, But We Do Not Like the Gypsies”, Central Europe Review, Vol. 2, No. 5, February 7, 2000. 9 This is well illustrated by Gábor Bernáth and Vera Messing in their cogent analysis of the influence of mainstream media on the image of the Roma in Hungary, “Seen from Afar: Roma in the Hungarian Media”, in ERRC, Focus: Roma in Hungary. Published Materials 1996-1999, pp. 75-82 and on the Internet at: errc.org/publications/indices/hungary.shtml. 10 Quoted in Nozskai, Gábor, “Cigányok és pártok 1994”, Amaro Drom, No. 6, 1994. Csurka’s remark sounds especially cynical when considered against the background of results from a study of police attitudes in Hungary carried out by György Csepeli, Antal Örkeny and Mária Székelyi. The study found that Hungarian police officers widely believe that there is an explicit connection between crime and ethnicity. Fifty-four percent of the officers questioned reportedly stated that they believe a criminal way of life is a key element of Roma identity. See Csepeli, György, “Claimed Consensus as a Means of Justification of Hostile Stereotypes Against the Roma Minority among Hungarian Policemen”, Intermarium, Vol. 2, No. 3. 11 See ?ediv?, Vladimír, “Moricove rezervácie”, Pravda, August 5, 2000. 12 The SNS hold 9.3 per cent of seats in the Slovak parliament, the MIÉP holds currently 3.1 per cent of seats in the Hungarian National Assembly. 13 Jeszensky, Géza, “Story on Hungary’s Gypsies ‘Ill-informed, Malicious’”, The Washington Times, December 7, 1999. 14 Reported by SITA on July 8, 1999. 15 Nicholsonová, Lucia, “MP Suggests Roma ‘Solution’”, Slovak Spectator, January 24-30, 2000. 16 Borszék, Peter, “Súvislosti etnickej ?asovanej bomby”, Práca, 16 June 2000. 17 The Prime Minister’s speech at a miners’ congress in Balatonfüred, reported in Népszabadság, November 28, 1997. See also RFE/RL Newsline, November 26, 1997. 18 “Can Hungary Hug its Gypsies?”, The Economist , March 20, 1999, p. 57. 19 This initiative was not exclusively a matter of internal politics. The then incumbent government of premier Jószef Antall made the concern for Hungary’s co-ethnics in the neighbouring countries a crucial theme of its foreign policy strategy. Ostensibly, the domestic approach towards minorities served as a moral justification for Budapest’s critical stance towards Bratislava and Bucharest. Moreover, adoption of this legislation was unmistakably promoted by Hungary’s aspiration to join the European integration process. In

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1993 the European Union had stated in its criteria for EU accession – the socalled Copenhagen criteria – that minority protection would serve as an EU entry requirement. Official documents concerning EU enlargement can be found on europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index.htm 20 For example, in the 1997 “Report No. J/3670 of the Government of the Republic of Hungary to the National Assembly on the situation of the national and ethnic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary” it is stated that the “Act on minorities (Act LXXVII of 1993) is of crucial importance in assisting the integration of the Gypsy minority into society.” It is also stated in this report that “With the exception of the Gypsies, the integration of the minorities into the social and economic life of the country is a completed process.” 21 European Parliament, “Resolution on the Communication from the Commission ‘Agenda 2000 – for a stronger and wider Union’” (COM(97)2000 - C4-0371/97) 22 For a critical analysis of the minority self-government system see Kovats, Martin, “Minority Rights and Roma politics in Hungary’, in Cordell, Karl, (ed.) Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 145-156. 23 Only the liberal party SzDSz – one of the two governing parties in the 19941998 government – has stated in its 1997 Congress Decisions that “the future of the Gypsies is the responsibility of Gypsies as well: any governmental policy can only succeed if it builds on the will, opinion and communal participation of the Gypsies”. SzDSz hereby emphasises the responsibility of the Roma, but fails to offer any plan on how to make Roma participation structurally possible. 24 This article first appeared in December 2000. Mr Danihel has since been replaced by Ms Klara Orgovanová, a Romani woman who was previously director of the Slovak office of the Open Society Insitute.

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The Democratic Responsibility: Rights and Freedoms as Tools by Bill Hangley, Jr.*

I

t’s a classic chicken-and-egg debate: which came first, the racism against Roma or their lack of political representation? And which needs to be solved first to solve the other? This is the problem with which Peter Vermeersch tangles. In his essay, “Romani Political Participation and Racism,” he asks whether current strategies to increase Roma political participation are working, and looks at two examples, Hungary and Slovakia. Both have created new government institutions, ostensibly designed to better represent Roma. These institutions are crippled by their limited power and credibility, and are no match for the power of majority interests. Neither has significantly increased Romani access to the material wealth and legal protections of the countries in which they live, or stemmed the tide of racist rhetoric that justifies existing inequities. In other words, they are not working, and Vermeersch properly asks, why? He concludes that mainstream politicians still don’t take Roma seriously, dismissing their poverty and lack of representation as products of Romani culture. Roma are still considered outsiders, culturally incapable of full participation in civic life, Vermeersch reports. The new “Roma advisory boards” or “Gypsy self-governments,” seem little more than token gestures, better suited to ingratiating these emerging democracies with their powerful European neighbors than to improving the lives of Romani citizens. So if racism undercuts attempts to gain representation, does racism have to end for representation to begin? Vermeersch suggests that it does. “Romani activists will only be able to influence policy when problems of prejudice and racism are more successfully addressed by the state,” he concludes.

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This sounds reasonable enough on the face of it, but really brings us right back to where we started: the state is not doing enough. Racism allows it to ignore prejudicial policy. So which comes first, the chicken or the egg? Must the state attack racism to end prejudicial policies, or must it attack prejudicial policies in order to end racism? This essay will suggest not only that the latter is the answer, but also that Romani citizens themselves bear the primary responsibility for making that happen. The emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe must be forced to address the material inequities that affect Roma, and Romani citizens must use the existing freedoms built into their systems to advocate for this change. In so doing, they can both access their fair share of their nation’s wealth and deflate the racist argument that they are incapable of civic participation. Success depends on two things: first of all, the states involved must be forced to act like democracies. And second of all, the Roma concerned must act like democratic citizens. Roma must continue to strengthen their position as a minority interest group if they are to successfully pressure their states to change. This may sound a bit presumptuous. An observer like myself has no authority to tell anyone what they “must” or “must not” do. My understanding of the specific problems faced by Roma is limited to what saw, heard, and read while living for many years in Central Europe. I am an American with a biased belief that my own system can work if properly used. I’m not an expert in minority activism or the techniques needed to wrest power from entrenched interests. But I think that most people will agree that no expert testimony is needed to prove that no one gives power away, and power is what Roma need. My first reaction to the advisory boards and quasi-governments that Vermeersch describes was, “If these things were worth anything, would the Slovaks or Hungarians give them away?” I don’t think so. They seem more like sops designed to defuse Romani activism than real solutions. But they, like any political position, can be infused with power, if Roma figure out how to empower them. The bad news is that such empowerment is difficult to bring about. But the good news is that representative democracies are built facilitate that empowerment. They assume that every society contains

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minority groups whose interests could be trampled upon by the majority, and they grant every citizen the right to speak, travel, associate, vote, and enjoy the full protection of the law in part so that these groups can organize and advocate on their own behalf.

THE PROBLEM: UNEQUAL ACCESS A great deal has been written about the “Roma problem” and its causes. Hard and anecdotal data alike show that Roma do not enjoy full access to public resources like health care, education, housing and so on, and that they do not consistently enjoy equal treatment in the eyes of the law. That an imbalance exists is undeniable. “Racism” is often given as the ultimate cause of this imbalance, but as a tactical matter, “racism” is extremely hard to attack. What is it? Where is it? Whose is it? This is an overarching problem that defies solutions. But it is worth considering the possibility that even if no racism were present, Roma would still suffer. Why? Because they are a minority interest: numerically small, politically isolated, underrepresented and generally disempowered. This would translate into unequal access to the wealth of the state even if racism were not a factor. As it stands, while some citizens are out-and-out “racists”, a far larger number will tolerate any policy that translates into more resources and better treatment for their own interest group or community. The state only has so much wealth to spread around, and everyone is trying to get as much of it as possible, putting small groups of any kind at a disadvantage. Racism exacerbates this disadvantage, and the struggle for equal access to education, legal protection, and public resources would certainly be easier for any minority if no racists existed. But suppose for a moment that ending racism is impossible. The next-best scenario is if minorities enjoy the full benefits of citizenship despite the presence of racists and racism. This is what a representative democracy allows for. Representative democracy is not nearly as utopian as Communism or fascism; it does not try to create a world in which everyone agrees. Instead, it is more pragmatic, and tries to accommodate a world in which everyone com-

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petes. Representative democracy assumes that minorities (and by this I mean not just different ethnic groups, but any numerically small group) start at a disadvantage in the competition for full access to material resources, and it assumes that they will need to fight constantly for their interests. In theory at least, democracy provides the tools with which minorities can wage that fight. Unequal access to material wealth, legal protection, and the policy-making process may not be the only problem Roma face, but it is the problem that the system of representative democracy was designed to address.

COMPETITION: THE CORE OF THE SYSTEM It is critical at this juncture to understand that what Roma need to do in this case is not all that different from what everyone in a democracy needs to do: compete for attention and resources. The democratic system assumes that society is made up of interest groups, not a monolithic block of citizens. These interest groups may be based on ethnicity, business interests, geographic location, age, ideological bent, or anything else, but they all have their own agendae. It is assumed that they compete at all times, and that their alliances and tactics will shift as the situation warrants. It is also assumed that any one that got the upper hand could potentially abuse it, given the fact that each interest group’s mission is to win the greatest possible advantage for itself. Only by keeping the competition in constant motion does democracy keep the “tyranny of the majority” or the domination of a single interest group at bay. So the fight for shares of the state’s wealth is ongoing. Minorities may operate from a disadvantage, but the question they face is the same as that faced by everyone: how do we effectively join the fray? The answer is simple: organize. Minority interest groups that seek to influence their governments must overcome their numerical and financial disadvantage through focused and effective organization. This organization is absolutely necessary because the system does not generally provide guaranteed representation or guaranteed consideration of particular interests. The system provides only the tools

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with which to compete for such representation. So what are these tools? At the risk of sounding too naively American, these tools are rights and freedoms: free speech, freedom of movement and association, freedom of the press, and the right to vote. What these freedoms translate into is the freedom to organize and build a power base. Free speech offers the ability to speak about and define problems in the public sphere. The free press offers the ability to publicize those problems in a broader format. The freedom to move and associate essentially guarantees the right to form alliances with anyone, anywhere, who might support a given group’s agenda, and the freedom to vote makes every individual a viable source of power, worth courting and representing. What they offer, in other words, is the opportunity to build power from the bottom up, because it is assumed that power will not be distributed from the top down. Consider Vermeersch’s skepticism concerning with the top-down initiatives supposedly designed to help Roma, like “self-governments” and advisory boards. He suggests that they are effectively powerless because their primary function in many cases is not to help Roma, but to ease a given country’s entry into the EU, thereby providing a better life for the majority, not necessarily the minority. Romani representatives might mean more business with Europe and more money in the majority’s pockets, so they are supported. But because true Roma power might threaten that majority’s control on resources, however minutely, a relatively powerless Roma representative is ideal, and Vermeersch is right to be skeptical. But at the same time, this shouldn’t lead Vermeersch or anyone else to be cynical. The majority in this case is doing exactly what the system assumes it will do: constructing the best deal on its own behalf. The majority, given the chance, will devise a minority policy that best serves the majority. The representatives Vermeersch discusses are not worthless. But they will likely prove ineffective unless Roma empower them, because no one else will do it. The rights and freedoms discussed above are the primary tools in their arsenal.

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THE GOALS OF ENGAGEMENT Thus, the key question for any minority interest, ethnic or otherwise, is, how do we organize ourselves? Obviously, there are material problems here that must be acknowledged up front. Poverty, illiteracy, and other practical barriers challenge anyone organizing among a disenfranchised minority. Corruption in existing political systems is a major barrier. Central and Eastern European countries have only a few of the extra-governmental civic institutions that play such a critical role in mature democracies. Roma suffer from racism, but like many of their fellow citizens they also suffer from the fact that their “new democracies” retain significant portions of an autocratic system that defies change and tenaciously defends its privileges. But minority groups have successfully overcome these problems before. They are profound but not insurmountable. But I will propose this: no group can overcome them without a strong consensus that the fight is worth fighting. Thus the key question for the minority interest is not, “what don’t we have,” but, “what do we want?” This is the core of the interest group: a shared agenda. Without that, you don’t have an interest group, even among those racially or geographically united. All people of the same color or the same district are not necessarily an interest group. Only if they all want the same thing do they become a power base. So what do Hungarian or Slovak or Czech Roma want? Better schools? Better housing? Better roads? Better access to jobs? An end to police brutality? Their own language on street signs? What do Roma want from their countries? This is the question for Roma to address, not me. But notice that these are all concrete problems that can be organized around, and such problems represent opportunities, politically. A problem suggests a goal, and it is impossible to organize politically without goals. A group with a goal is a potential power. A group without a goal is not. Successful organizing relies on a great deal of technique and political acumen, different in every situation, and as

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noted above, organizers must confront a number of oppositional forces that can be daunting, to say the least. But the shared goal is the launching point of the entire process. Without it, nothing works. An interest group that doesn’t identify what it wants doesn’t stand a chance of getting it.

THE RACISM PROBLEM This brings us back to the basic problem of racism. Obviously, racist attitudes do a lot of damage to minorities like Roma. But among their most pernicious effects is to discourage that minority’s will to participate in the system at all. It serves the majority well to badger potential competitors for state resources into dropping out of the game. Racist beliefs allow the majority to justify these exclusionary practices, and to deny responsibility for their results. Racism is literally a tool in the fight for material wealth and privilege; racists have wielded it well enough over generations to have effectively turned Roma into something less than full citizens. But anyone can be a citizen in a democracy, and resident minorities of new democracies now face a choice: do we want to be a part of the state at all? If the answer is no, then the group should prepare for more troubles. Any group that does not engage with the system can never make it work for them. But if the answer is yes, and the minority wants something from the state, is willing to organize and engage with the state, and will accept the need to be accountable and responsible to the state, then the groundwork for an internally generated and supported movement for political rights has been laid. This is the foundation of change. Look around the world, at the history of minority movements for equal rights, and every success starts with a grass-roots component, an organized movement by the minority itself that demands representation and a full share of the nation’s wealth. These kinds of movements don’t succeed on their own. They need allies in high places - in the executive branch, the legislature, the courts - to put pressure on the mid-level government functionaries who set policy and control the

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distribution of wealth, resources, and legal protections. In the end, absent a major revolution, it’s probably impossible for grassroots movements to effect this pressure on their own; bureaucrats tend to respond only when pressure is applied from both below and above. But the movement comes first. The minority must agitate on its own behalf. This is not just the political reality; it is the citizen’s responsibility. What makes a representative democracy work is that people agitate for what they want. They must keep the competition going, or face domination. The state has a responsibility to ensure that the freedoms needed to organize are present and enforced, but it does not really have an obligation to organize on anyone’s behalf. That responsibility belongs to the interest groups themselves.

ACCEPT AND REJECT This means that Roma must accept and reject racism. They must accept that the system is unjust and that it will not quickly change itself. At the same time, they must reject the proposition that the status quo simply continue unchallenged. The system of representative democracy is designed to adjust the state’s behavior in the face of inequity, and this capacity must be understood and embraced. It has been said many times that the “Roma problem” is a major test of Europe’s emerging democracies. If they work as they should, they must respond to pressure to change. The democratic state is not a monolithic or unchanging entity. It should be a flexible, fluid creature, changing its face and priorities in response to the changing faces and priorities that make up its overall body politic. This is a relatively new concept of the state, historically speaking, and Europe (and the world) is full of countries with far older autocratic traditions than democratic. But any minority seeking equal treatment faces the challenge of overcoming any autocratic tendencies and forcing the state to behave democratically. The “Roma problem” is a test for new states and Roma alike. On the face of it, this seems an impossible challenge for Roma. Anti-Romani sentiment is widespread, and citizens throughout Central and Eastern Europe — Roma and their neighbors alike —

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have grown used to a segregated society. Racism is deeply rooted and openly supported in some communities, and many non-Roma simply reject the notion that Roma are anything but second- or third-class citizens. But at the same time, encouraging signs are present. Vermeersch notes an increasing number of local Romani politicians, and these will likely prove the ultimate source of any significant push for equal rights; certainly they are the seeds of wider Romani participation. The European Union offers Roma a powerful potential ally, as states seeking EU acceptance now have a clear incentive to shed their racist policies and practices. Non-governmental civic institutions are emerging as important sources of information, advocacy, and legal protection. As societies diversify, other “have nots” emerge as possible allies. Democracy’s cornerstone freedoms — free speech, a free press, freedom to travel and vote — are routinely exercised. European societies may face enormous problems of corruption, bureaucratic inertia, and downright nasty politics, but the conditions for minority organizers could be far worse. But nothing will happen until Roma can answer this question: what do we want from the state? Once a critical mass of people come up with a viable answer to that question, Roma can organize around specific goals, form a power base, and force the system to adjust as a democracy should. They will need allies, to be sure. They will need people at the highest levels of government to respond to their emerging power, embrace their cause, and ally with them to force a change in behavior by the mid-level bureaucrats and public officials whose local decisions most directly affect Roma. But history shows that this pressure will not start from above. It must start from below. And in that sense, the challenge facing Roma activists is not just to get the state to act more like a democracy, but to get their own people to act like citizens of a democracy. Interest groups must take responsibility for organizing and agitating on their own behalf. If Roma do not effectively engage with and pressure the government, then the government will probably continue to ignore and abuse them.

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DEBATE QUESTIONS:

?

What does the author mean by “unequal access”?

Do you agree with the author’s description of society as fundamentally about a competition for attention and resources? Why or why not? Why would one aim at a society in which such competition were the highest good? Do you think your society should be the kind of society in which such competition is the highest good? Why or why not? What are the alternatives, if there are any? The author asks “What do Roma want?” Do you believe it is possible for any group to attain the degree of consensus and agreement this question implies? Think about your own society – Do all members agree on basic aims? If not, how can we make sense of what the author says is necessary – basic agreement. Can you imagine ways in which Roma can – democratically – arrive at agreement on demands? The author’s view of fundamental rights and freedoms is somewhat different from the basic rights described elsewhere in this book. Can you describe the difference between various views of fundamental rights and freedoms used in various places in this book?

NOTES

The author is a policy analyst for Public/Private Ventures, a Philadelphiabased research group that studies the effectiveness of American social programs. *

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The Bulgarian Framework Programme for Equal Integration of Roma: participation in the policy-making process by Rumyan Russinov*

O

n April 7, 1999, representatives of the Romani community signed an agreement with the Bulgarian government over the Framework Programme for Equal Integration of Roma in Bulgarian Society. The agreement was endorsed by more than 70 Romani organisations throughout the country and by the then-Chair of the governmental National Council for the Ethnic and Demographic Issues and the Vice Prime Minister of Bulgaria. Several weeks after this agreement, on April 22, the Bulgarian Council of Ministers adopted the Framework Programme by resolution. Anyone asking Romani activists in Bulgaria to name the most significant accomplishment of Roma in public life is likely to receive a single answer: The Framework Programme. Public officials will probably respond similarly. The adoption of the Framework Programme by the Bulgarian government was also welcomed by international and European institutions.1 What were the events leading to the adoption of the Framework Programme and what lessons can be drawn from the experience? I was closely involved in advocacy work leading to the adoption of the Programme, and I describe these efforts briefly below. The answers to these questions are, I believe, still relevant to the political reality in Bulgaria, and may be of use to Roma rights advocates around Europe.

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CAMPAIGNING The idea of a comprehensive policy document for Roma appeared in an environment of inadequate state policies with regard to Roma and a lack of political will to solve Romani problems. All Bulgarian governments after 1989 failed to undertake meaningful actions to address the problems that Roma face in Bulgaria. While some measures have been taken over the years, government programmes that existed before and after the fall of the totalitarian state were doomed to be ineffective for two reasons. First of all, underpinning these programmes was the fundamentally flawed conception that Roma problems are social problems and not issues of ethnicity and discrimination.2 Secondly, authorities have generally ignored Roma as participants in the process of formulating these programmes, and the policies were never communicated properly to the Romani community. The Framework Programme, and the campaign for its adoption, broke this pattern. For the first time, Roma themselves initiated and actively took part in designing a policy that affects their lives. The Framework Programme was initiated by a campaign called “For the Equal Participation of Roma in the Public Life of Bulgaria”, launched in January 1998 by the Sofia-based Roma rights advocacy organisation, the Human Rights Project. The goal of the campaign was the formulation of a comprehensive policy document addressing issues pertaining to Roma in Bulgaria. After preliminary consultations with Romani activists and experts working on Romani issues, the Human Rights Project developed a plan that included the following stages:

1. Preparation of a draft Programme; 2. Submitting the draft to discussion with Romani organisations throughout the country; 3. Negotiating with government officials for the adoption of the document. The drafting of the Framework Programme was carried out by a team including the leaders of two national Romani organisations and experts on human rights and Romani history and culture. This co-

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operation between professionals with a command of theory and people with practical experience yielded high quality results. At the core of the draft Programme formulated by the Romani activists was equal treatment and equal opportunities for Roma. Unequal treatment of Roma in society was defined by the Framework Programme as the fundamental problem facing Roma in Bulgaria. Central to the goals of the Framework Programme, therefore, was combating racial discrimination. Toward this end, the draft Programme envisaged the establishment of a specialised government body with powers to investigate complaints of discriminatory treatment and to impose sanctions on juridical and private persons for discriminating on an ethnic basis. Along with the establishment of a specialised body, the draft Programme also stipulated enactment of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law and amendments to existing legislation to strengthen legal provisions combating racially motivated violence and discrimination. The draft Programme also recommended the introduction of stricter sentences for racially motivated crimes. The goal of combating discrimination was additionally reflected in specific proposals in each section of the document: employment, social support, education and the media. In the field of education, for example, the document emphasised that the desegregation of the segregated ghetto schools in Romani neighbourhoods is a precondition for equal educational opportunities for Roma. Further, positive action by the state in higher education was proposed as a means to remedy the effects of past discrimination of Roma in education. By May 1998, the skeleton of the future Framework Programme had been created. In the following months, the document was circulated among Romani organisations throughout the country and was widely discussed, both by activists and ordinary people, formally and informally. This stage of our work had a crucial impact on the outcome of the campaign for the adoption of the Programme by the Bulgarian government. In the course of our meetings with Roma from around the country, we gained confidence that the concepts for the development of the Romani community as formulated in the Framework Programme were relevant, given the perceptions and the expectations of ordinary Roma with whom we spoke. Ultimately, over 70 Romani

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organisations made written declarations of support for the Framework Programme. At this point the Framework Programme was no longer a document produced by experts — it became the Roma Programme. For me this was the most rewarding part of the campaign. However, the most difficult work lay ahead of us. We still had to negotiate with the government the adoption of the Framework Programme as the basic document defining policy towards Roma.

THE FIGHT BEGINS A team of Romani activists presented the text of the Framework Programme, as produced by the experts and approved by the Romani community, to the government in August 1998. We received no direct response from the government concerning the draft Programme. However, the government soon revealed that it was going to follow its own agenda. Several weeks after the submission of the Roma-supported Programme, the governmental National Council for Ethnic and Demographic Issues (NCEDI)3 announced its own Programme for Roma. In the draft Programme offered by the government, rhetoric substituted for concrete commitments and mere description of the problems prevailed over analysis of underlying causes. Lacking an explicit commitment to concrete actions, the document was a declaration rather than a plan of action. Moreover, the document failed to incorporate any of the proposals made in the Roma-supported Programme. It made no mention of discrimination against Roma, nor did it propose any mechanisms to combat it. With this act, the government demonstrably rejected the idea that Roma might be participants in the policy-making process. After such a discouraging start, the coalition of Romani organisations that had initiated the Framework Programme began mobilising support at the domestic and international level. We held consultations with leaders of Romani organisations in the country, discussed the Programme with non-governmental Bulgarian organisations, contacted international non-governmental organisations, including Romani organisations, and appealed for support to intergovernmental institutions.

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On October 3, 1998, the Romani coalition organised a national roundtable in Sofia and invited representatives of all major Romani organisations in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian government and the Council of Europe. The goal of the roundtable was to communicate to the government the will of the Romani community to participate in the policy-making process and to reach an agreement regarding the proposals of the Romani organisations. As the accomplishment of these goals depended on the government, we needed participation at the conference by senior officials — officials able to make commitments on part of the government. For a long time before the conference, our attempts to contact officials from the government remained futile. Our letters and requests for meetings were simply ignored. At this point, pressure through the media as well as intervention by international organisations — in particular the Council of Europe — crucially determined the outcome of our efforts to involve the government. The conference was attended by the Deputy Prime Minister of Bulgaria and Chair of the NCEDI, Mr Vesselin Metodiev, who on behalf of the government committed to engaging in dialogue with representatives of the Roma in order to finalise the Framework Programme and to propose it for adoption to the Bulgarian Council of Ministers. This commitment was made explicit in an agreement, which was signed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Romani representatives and obligated the NCEDI to carry out negotiations with Romani representatives and within three months to produce a final version of the Framework Programme based on both the Roma-supported document and government proposals. Some representatives of the Romani coalition resented the fact that the agreement with the government envisaged incorporation of the Programme proposed by the government in the final version of the policy document and feared that the government’s vision for the development of Roma might eventually prevail. However, at this early stage, when even communication with the government was problematic, this agreement was a necessary compromise that made possible the start of the dialogue with the government. Until that moment, the government had acted as if the Roma-supported document did not exist; after the roundtable, the Romani activists’ version was acknowledged as one of the docu-

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ments to be considered in the drafting of the future official Framework Programme for the Roma. The agreement reached at the roundtable on October 3, 1998, was possible due to the unanimous endorsement of the Framework Programme by Romani organisations and the support from the international community. Intergovernmental organisations, such as the Council of Europe, and leading European non-governmental organisations, such as the European Roma Rights Center, maintained that anti-discrimination had to be central in policies addressing Romani issues. Emphasis by these organisations on the international obligations of the Bulgarian state to address this problem gave much-needed support to the Roma document in the future negotiations with the government, during which recognition of discrimination provoked the most ardent debates.

SETBACKS The months following the roundtable marked the first real participation of Roma in policy-making. Although without formal status, a group of Roma representing Romani organisations was constituted as a partner of the government in the formulation of the future policy document. This group had to defend the concepts and the proposals of the Roma-supported Framework Programme and to ensure that they came to be embodied in the final version of the policy document to be adopted by the government. Experience of attempting to work with government officials on Romani issues in the years after 1989 made many of the obstacles that we encountered in the process of the negotiations predictable: resistance on the part of the authorities to recognising discrimination as underscoring the Romani experience in Bulgaria, reluctance by officials to commit to concrete actions and deliberate provocation of disagreement between Romani representatives. These aproaches have characterised the government’s attitude to the Romani leadership throughout the post-1989 period, and they emerged again in the course of discussions between activists and the government. The issue of recognising discrimination provoked the most endur-

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ing confrontation between the government and the Romani representatives. Public officials continued to make statements denying the existence of discrimination against Roma. Other officials denied that Bulgaria is a multi-ethnic state. This position was reiterated in the official comments on the Framework Programme provided by the Council on Legislation of the Ministry of Justice. The Council asserted that the establishment of a specialised body for combating discrimination would be unconstitutional since “the principle upon which the existence of such organs is based implies that the Bulgarian nation is a mixture of different ethnic groups.” The Council concluded that “[t]his idea is contrary to the idea of the unity of Bulgaria which is proclaimed by the Constitution.”4 Conceptual clashes in the course of the negotiations were accompanied by unconcealed attempts on the part of the government to restrict the influence of the Romani organisations in the process of formulating the policy paper, and to substitute their proposals for less concrete and less radical ones. The government’s actions in the course of the negotiations with the Roma revealed a deep unwillingness to make concessions to the Romani side. One of the main challenges for the Romani advocates appeared when the government decided to invite carefully selected foreign experts in the drafting of the governmental policy for the Roma. The involvement of these experts could have been beneficial for the drafting process, if it had not merely been an attempt by the government to isolate Roma from the process. The joint document produced by the government and the experts was rumoured to set down policies aimed at the integration of Roma based on those reportedly existing in Spain. Reports spread about a “Spanish model” of integration of Roma. The document was never publicised, nor were the results of government meetings with the experts discussed with the Romani community. A few people read the policy paper in Spanish, the language in which it was written. For others, a few excerpts were translated into Bulgarian and made available. The fact that Roma were alienated from work on the document was itself a precondition for its ineffectiveness. In essence, however, the “Spanish model” contained serious deficiencies that made it unacceptable for the Roma: it did not

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address the fundamental question of how to fight and remedy discrimination against Roma in Bulgaria. But then, the lack of concrete commitments to fighting discrimination against Roma was precisely what made the “Spanish model” appealing to the government. In January 1999, the government manoeuvred to find new “partners” for dialogue — ones who would presumably endorse the “Spanish model”. The NCEDI convened a meeting, to which it invited several Romani organisations but excluded the Human Rights Project, the organisation which had initiated the drafting process and had, up until that date, taken the lead in negotiations with the government. The meeting, which was intended to introduce the “Spanish model” to the Romani organisations, turned out to be a move for revision of the agreements between the government and the Roma reached after October 3, 1998. Vehement opposition by some participants at the meeting, however, made it impossible for the government to pretend that an agreement had been reached with Roma over the “Spanish model”. Nevertheless, after the meeting, despite the fact that most of the Roma in Bulgaria were not familiar with the ideas for the improvement of their condition set forward in the new policy paper, in public, government officials celebrated the “Spanish model” of integrating Roma, and said it would be implemented in Bulgaria too. This appeared to be a restoration of the old practice of imposing policies on Roma.

WINNING THE FIGHT FOR THE FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME At this point, the process of the drafting of the Framework Programme seemed to have been kidnapped, and the results achieved to that moment destroyed. The Romani organisations were back in the initial position they had been in when they had first asserted their right to be partners in the development of the policy paper. This setback was overcome, however, due to the consolidation of the efforts of the Romani organisations. A new meeting of all seventy of the Romani organisations which had initially supported the policy document was held in early March 1999. At this meeting, they denounced the

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attempts by the government to adopt decisions ignoring the will of the Roma, and they reiterated their support for the Romani document proposed during the round table of October 3, 1998. A number of Romani organisations sent letters to the NCEDI insisting that it should renew the negotiations with the Romani representatives over the Framework Programme. It is important to note that transparency and the media were crucial. Most of the disagreements between our side and the government were publicised in the national press and the electronic media. We had the opportunity to argue with the government over the proposals in the Framework Programme on the National Radio and in the press. Publicity of disagreements between the Roma and the government during the negotiations rendered it impossible for the government to pretend that agreement with the Roma had been reached before it actually had. This ultimately set the government under serious pressure. By the end of March 1999, the government representatives had accepted all of the proposals in the Roma-supported document, and we were notified that the Council of Ministers would adopt the Framework Programme as an official document defining its policy towards Roma. On April 7, on the eve of the International Roma Day, we convened a national roundtable at which the Romani organisations and the government signed a second agreement — this time an agreement over the final policy document called Framework Programme for Equal Integration of Roma in Bulgarian Society.

TWO YEARS ON The process of winning adoption of the Framework Programme demonstrated that Romani organisations had outgrown the weaknesses which had previously impeded efforts to become equal partners in the political dialogue. The campaign for the Framework Programme proved that Romani organisations can define an agenda and pursue clear goals, and that they can build a common strategy and consolidate their efforts to accomplish it. Thus the Romani movement in Bulgaria reached a new phase — it is no longer as susceptible to patro-

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nising policies on part of the state as it had been previously. The successful outcome of the campaign gave an impulse to new initiatives of Romani organisations to advocate Roma rights and to seek a dialogue with the authorities. Unfortunately, the good will of the government in seeking solutions to problems pertaining to Roma involving Roma themselves was apparently exhausted in the period following the adoption of the Framework Programme. At the time of writing in late Spring 2001, two years have passed without any observable progress in the implementation of the Programme. Over this period, in our contacts with government offices, we have become aware that many officials are not even familiar with the Framework Programme. The government has thus far failed to develop a detailed plan of activities, to allocate resources, or to appoint officials in charge of implementing of the Framework Programme. It is worth noting that many of the tasks envisaged by the Framework Programme do not require substantial funding and depend entirely on the political will of the authorities. For example, amendments to the Penal Code introducing enhanced sentences for racially motivated crime, envisioned under the Framework Programme, have not yet been made. The adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination law and the setting up of a specialised body for combatting discrimination remain similarly unrealised to date. In response to criticism by Romani organisations regarding the postponement of the implementation of the Framework Programme, government officials often refer to the several appointments of Roma to the central government and its regional subdivisions. Apart from the fact that the appointment of Roma to the government administration is not a formulated task in the Framework Programme, the appointments themselves have had an ambiguous effect on the implementation of the Programme. First of all, with one exception,5 the Romani appointees hold low positions and do not have decision-making powers. Secondly, many of the appointed Roma, especially those in the regional government administrations, do not have clear functions, and some of them do not even have a job description. The inactivity of the government after the adoption of the

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Framework Programme has prompted sceptics to conclude that the Programme is just a good document, doomed never to be transformed into action. I am more optimistic, aware as I am that a number of Romani organisations continue to exert pressure on the government. Despite their frustrations with the failure of the government to live up to its promises, Romani activists have not given up pursuing government accountability. The existence of an official document formulating concrete tasks provides a solid basis for the public to judge the government’s performance on Romani issues. I also believe that the wide support for the Programme from international institutions will ultimately guarantee that it will not remain solely on paper. I look forward to the long-term commitment of the international community in monitoring Bulgarian authorities’ compliance with the Framework Programme in Bulgaria.

NOTES * Rummyan Russinov is Director of the Roma Participation Programme of the Open Society Institute. He was previously director of the Monitoring and Advocacy Programme of the Sofia-based Human Rights Project. In this capacity he led the group of Romani organisations which negotiated the adoption of the Framework Program with the Bulgarian government in 1998-1999. 1 In his speech before the Bulgarian Parliament in January 2000 the Chair of the European Commission, Mr Romano Prodi, noted that, along with the abolition of the death penalty, the adoption of the Framework Programme was one of the most important human rights developments in Bulgaria of the last two years. With regard to the Romani campaign for the adoption of the Framework Programme, a recent report of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe stated that “the roundtable process produced a model of effective Roma participation in the development of national Roma policy” (see Report on the Situation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE Area, High Commissioner for National Minorities, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, March 10, 2000, p.146). In his welcome address to the national round table on October 3, 1998, Mr John Murray, Coordinator of Activities on Roma/Gypsies at the Directorate of Social Affairs of the Council of Europe, said that “the overall approach [of the Framework Programme] and the specific measures proposed are very much in line with Council of Europe principles and recommendations.” He also expressed satisfaction with “the emphasis on equality and participation.” See Roma Rights in Focus, Newsletter of the Human Rights Project, No 10, special

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edition, pp.15-16. 2 For example, Programme for the Solution of the Roma Problems in the Republic of Bulgaria, adopted by the government of the Socialist Party with decision 163 of January 30, 1997, stated that: “The existing social problems and lack of integration of the Roma ethnic group in the years of transition to a market society are related overwhelmingly to the economic situation in the country. [T]he main goal of the Programme is to achieve stable socio-economic development of Roma.” The fact that Bulgarian authorities classified the Romani issue as a social one was also evident in the titles and mandates of the institutions which dealt with Romani issues. For example, the National Council for Social and Demographic Issues, established in June 1995, was set up to deal with ethnic communities, including Roma, women’s organisations, disabled and pensioners. This body was replaced by the National Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues (NCEDI), established in December 1997. The link between ethnic and demographic issues in the title of this institution, apart from its racist implications, is also indicative of the ideology which interprets minority issues through the paradigm of social issues. 3 The NCEDI is the only governmental structure in Bulgaria which addresses minority issues, including Romani issues. According to its goals, stated in Article 1 of its Rules and Regulations, it has to “facilitate consultation, cooperation and coordination between government bodies and nongovernmental organizations with the aim to develop and implement a national policy with regard to ethnic and demographic issues and migration.” According to Article 2(2) the National Council is empowered to “coordinate with the state bodies and with the non-governmental organizations concrete measures in execution of accepted international obligations from the Republic of Bulgaria in the sphere of the rights of Bulgarian citizens belonging to minority groups and their integration in society.” See Official Gazette No. 118 of 10 December 1997. 4 See Opinion of the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice on the Framework Programme from 19 January 1999, available in the Human Rights Project archive. 5 In March 2001 the government appointed Ms Svetlana Vassileva, a Romani woman, to the position of Secretary of the National Council for Ethnic and Demographic Issues. She is the first Romani person to be appointed to this body, four years after it had been established, and the first Romani person to hold a senior government position since 1989.

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In search of a new deal for Roma ERRC interview with Nicolae Gheorghe

In September 2001, the editor of Roma Rights spoke with Mr Nicolae Gheorghe — founder of the Bucharest-based non-governmental organisation Romani CRISS and currently Advisor on Roma and Sinti issues at the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, based in Warsaw — about political participation, Romani politics and civil rights work in Europe.

ROMA RIGHTS: Mr Gheorghe, you’ve been working for over ten years on Roma Rights. We want to talk with you about “political participation”. What has changed since the beginning of the 1990s? Where are we now? Where do you see progress? Where do you see things that need to be worked on? Where should we go from here? Nicolae Gheorghe: Well, I think it started with chaos and we are starting to identify now some lines along which we can create order. The chaos at the beginning of the 1990s was productive — it was like a big bang: There was heat, light, energy — for good and bad — and a lot of us drew a lot of creative activist strength from the years immediately after 1989. There was an emergence — an enthusiasm, a flowering — in which Roma went forth into public life, to be acknowledged and to affirm themselves. It was refreshing. It was a time when a lot of people started to work for organisations and parties. Activity took different clear forms in different countries, depending on the political climate. Take Czechoslovakia for instance: ROI — the Romani Civic Initiative —

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came as a sort of junior partner to the dissident group Charter 77, which took power. They were on a progressive track; President Havel shook Emil ??uka’s hand in Bratislava and the ROI came in with something like 11 Members of Parliament in the three parliaments — the Czechoslovak Federal Parliament and the Czech and Slovak lower houses. Today, there is no more ROI in the Czech and Slovak parliamentary houses, and between the two countries, there is only Monika Horáková. She is on the list of the Freedom Union party and has no links to that earlier generation of Romani politicians; she came like a meteor into Romani politics. So if we are talking about Czechoslovakia and post-Czechoslovakia, we see a situation in which now there is a greatly diminished presence of Roma in parliament. The Romani party is almost defunct, there is a growing rejection of Roma in the wider society — as shown by the 1993 citizenship law and the flight of many Roma from the country, so there is a sense of a loss over ten years in Romani politics. International Romani Union President Emil ??uka has said repeatedly that the causes of this loss are first of all the break-up of Czechoslovakia. He says that the number of Roma in the Czech Republic is now too low for Roma to compete as Roma in the political system. All in all, Romani party politics in the Czech Republic are dead. Emil ??uka has also said that one of the reasons for this is the flourishing of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This is the other development throughout the region: the dramatic growth of Romani non-governmental organisations. There are hundreds of NGOs throughout the region — in Bulgaria, in Romania, in Slovakia. This hasn’t killed off the political parties, but we can see that, over ten years, Roma explored a variety of forms of political expression and political participation: through non-governmental and traditional political forms. This is the achievement: I think we have a plurality of channels through which to express ourselves and to try to channel the mobilisation in political life. And now, after ten years, I think we need to start to assess and try to strategise a little about which way to go. Some people in political parties look critically at the role of NGOs. They say, “look, our young and talented and educated people are going into work in NGOs — doing basically civil society work — humani-

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tarian, civil rights, etc. They are no longer interested in Romani politics. Who remains in the political parties? The old ones: the traditional ones, the self-appointed presidents and ‘vajdas’ [editor’s note: a “vajda” is a local community leader].” In many ways, they are people who have not succeeded in other areas, and in many ways they are doing rather badly in political life — at least, the political parties are doing rather badly. So there is a crisis now in Romani politics: The bright ones are drawn into work in NGOs; they are better paid, they are self-appointed, they are less accountable to the people — they are less democratic. And this would be my criticism of the Open Society Institute, of the Council of Europe, of the PHARE programme of the European Union — those considered, through their funding preferences, to be responsible for this proliferation of NGOs. It may also be a symptom of a generation gap, but it is something I am concerned about: How can we re-launch Romani politics? One way that is encouraging to me is via Romani electoral politics, where Roma have started to play a role in individual countries. I am encouraged by the growth of individual Roma participating in mainstream politics. This is the case of Monika Horáková in the Czech Republic and this is the case of Normunds Rudevi?s in Latvia. Now there are two Roma in the Bulgarian parliament from various parties, in Romania there is one Romani representative of the mainstream Social Democratic party, and we still have the reserved seat — the one seat in the Romanian parliament reserved for a Romani representative. In Romania, the Romani Party (Partida Rromilor), which has existed for ten years, decided before the last election that they would not try to get elected on the strength of the Romani constituency alone, and they made an alliance with the Social Democrats two years ago, when they were in opposition. On a local level, this strategy lost to some extent, but on a national level, this strategy paid off: There is now a second Romani MP. He is the head of the Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights, Minority Rights and Churches. They have an advisor to the president, they have a state secretary in the Ministry of Public Information, and they have about 40 people in local government. So actually they made a pretty good political deal.

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We will see if this deal will pay off. In any case it is certainly better than before. In Bulgaria, the four or five Romani parties that competed in the election lost, while those Roma who stood on individual party tickets are now in parliament. I think, we are moving now into a kind of maturation among Romani politicians. For example, Macedonia: In Macedonia, there has always been one strong Romani constituency because of the huge number of Roma in the ?uto Orizari municipality in Skopje. The MP from the district is Romani. The local council and the mayor are Romani. Competition is now between three Romani parties, plus the mainstream parties have Roma on the ground competing. This reflects the development of pragmatic political thinking. There is an electoral success of Roma — still very limited, but success nonetheless. There is even a new growth of succesful Romani politicians in Western Europe. For example, there is a new Romani representative — Mr Rudolf Sarközi — on a Vienna district council. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia will all have elections next year, so it will be interesting to watch what happens further. If we think about how political ideologies are starting to be articulated in the Romani world, most of them are dominated by ethnic thinking: “We are Roma, we are an ethnic Romani party, we need to go forward as Roma.” There is not that much debate among us about political ideologies: Who is a social democrat, who is liberal, who is a Christian democrat, etc. This is a mistake, in my opinion: Roma are pushed all the time onto an ethnic ticket, rather than into a wider debate about political philosophies and where we stand. We are still at the beginning of fleshing out our ideologies. Roma Rights: Can we go back to the recent Bulgarian result? I found it rather depressing; I mean, activists painstakingly put together a Romani coalition of a number of Romani parties, and it won only 0.6 percent of the vote. Is there a way to imagine a Romani platform that is not purely ethno-nationalistic? Are there issues specific to Roma that would stand distinct from mainstream politics, address Romani concerns, attract Romani voters, and yet not be simply the lowest common denominator of ethnicity?

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Nicolae Gheorghe: The loss in Bulgaria, I think, has a lot more to do with the fabulous success of Tsar Simeon, and the way in which he captivated Romani and non-Romani Bulgarians, and much less to do with anything particular about Romani politics. Roma are part of Bulgarian society. There is a high level of integration in Bulgarian society. For example, social democracy has rather deep roots in Bulgarian society. If you look closely at what goes on on the ground in Bulgaria, you can see that Romani voters in Bulgaria have tended to behave rather coherently as a Romani segment of Bulgarian proletarian voters, rather than endorse ethnic parties that would pull them out of their local context and push them toward ethnic-specific politics. I see more productive and useful work toward mainstreaming Roma in the political system — I would rather see Romani social democrats, Romani liberals, etc. Another interesting recent development in Bulgaria is the fact that some of the new Romani political formations are much closer to the “tribes”; there is, for example, a party of Kalderash Roma. These people are reacting not only to their marginalisation in society, but also to their marginalisation in Romani parties. What we at the Contact Point have tried to do is to network commonalities and foster coalition between Romani parties, as well as to try to get smaller Romani parties allied — and with good positions — on the lists of the mainstream parties. But again, I am still hoping that young Roma will come from the NGOs and re-enter mainstream politics — and we have seen this in Bulgaria during the 2000 elections with the training programme by the Open Society Institute and some of the follow-up activities of that group. I was heartened to see a team of around ten young people whose clear aim is to be politicians — not NGO activists, but mainstream politicians, doing basic parliamentary and governmental politics. Roma Rights: More donor money has gone toward NGOs in recent years than towards other areas of Romani life. Some have said that this money may have been detrimental to the growth of Romani grassroots politics. Is that true? Or is there a better way of using these funds to focus Romani power?

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Nicolae Gheorghe: Well, as I said, I speak from the far side of a generation gap. My generation of Romani activists grew up in trade unions, in the Communist parties, and young people probably needed to break that model and get some distance from it. But we are now in a new phase. Governments are adopting policy documents on Roma. We are moving into a period when those policies will have to be implemented. This means the focus is moving much more to a local level and to specialised areas of expertise. We now need Romani officers and experts to fill the ministries and governmental offices — professional Romani administrators. Roma who have been working in NGOs are in a good position to fill these positions. Funding might now focus on encouraging these people to go into public administration. Of course, these people may have to accept lower pay. But it may now be important to break the cycle of “monitoring” and “community work” and send people into government. We need Romani experts — I am one. My NGO training was crucial for my preparation for my job as an international officer in the OSCE. Of course, NGOs continue to have a key role. They are more policy-oriented now. They will be important for developing new ideas and new areas. Also, it is of course crucial that NGOs monitor the performance of Roma in the administration. Some of us now are in those jobs — not enough, there should be more — but NGOs must monitor Roma and non-Roma in power. We are, if you accept my metaphor from earlier, post-big-bang. Roma Rights: You travel a lot and meet with Romani activists in many countries. Do you see clearly emerging issues — specific cross-border issues — around which Roma can mobilise? Are there common issues around the region? Or is the Romani issue still about separate states, separate conditions, separate realities, and in need of redress at a local or national level?

Nicolae Gheorghe: Most Roma are entrenched locally — local groups, local issues. From time-to-time in the course of the 1990s, we have found ways to

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mobilise nationally. For example, in Romania during the serious mob violence episodes in the early 1990s, we managed to build national Romani unity. In spite of initial resistance by Roma to recognise that what goes on in the next village matters, Roma acted in solidarity with those Roma who were attacked around the country. We also managed to react as a cohesive group when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Romania tried to impose the name “?igan” on Roma in the mid-1990s. We reacted with a common voice and made it clearly known that the ministry had no right to name us. That was the last time I think. There have been some street demonstrations since then, but I think they have been mainly shows, and not really organised around issues. In the late 1990s of course, Roma have organised in pressing through policy programmes. I am thinking mainly of Romania and Bulgaria. Romani activists in those countries shaped a platform and worked to get support from Roma around the country to endorse a Romani platform. The only truly transnational issue thus far among us has been the refugee question — whether or not to show real solidarity with Roma who have fled their home countries. I am not sure there is genuine widespread solidarity with Romani refugees, but at meetings, you will generally hear statements of sympathy, and it is a basic fact that no Romani leader today can be without a position on refugees and causes of flight. And of course in some countries, the refugee issue has caused deep disagreement among Romani leaders as to what kind of politics to pursue. Of course one issue that could unite us is Kosovo and the situation of Roma in the former Yugoslavia. I confess I was surprised by the low level of solidarity among Roma with the Roma from Kosovo. Early on there was a lot of emotion; we gathered some money among ourselves for the victims. But two years after the ethnic cleansing, there has been no major Romani-led action. I don’t see mass action built around the Kosovo crisis. We are still concerned mainly about unemployment in our own countries, whether EU money is being properly spent, etc. I really was amazed; maybe I am wrong, but I have noticed that it is actually difficult to focus people’s attention on the crisis of Roma in

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the countries of the former Yugoslavia. So I think we are still very concerned with our own families, our own groups, our own localities, our own countries. Roma Rights: You are now Advisor on Roma and Sinti Issues at the Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. What will your office do over the next few years to increase Romani power?

Nicolae Gheorghe: We have spent money and energy on organising a series of roundtable events aimed at bringing together the major competing international Romani organisations and trying to assist them in reaching a coherent programme to present to their partners at an international level. We have had some success, but it is generally fleeting — sometimes up, sometimes down. It is still basically a zero-sum game between the major Romani organisations. One side wins everything or loses everything. I will continue to work in this area both out of inertia, and also because I think it is important. In the coming years, I also intend to devote more time to fostering Romani electoral politics with the goal of increasing the number of elected Roma in the OSCE region countries. I would like to see more Roma with knowledge of how the game of politics is played. Elected Roma can have real legitimacy. I would like to devote energy to getting us out of the self-appointed leadership model. I dream of transnational Romani elections — to implement mechanisms to elect our leadership democratically, to foster accountability and legitimacy. Today we choose undemocratically among the selfappointed. I want to see a more democratic Romani movement. One small step toward this end is happening presently: We have been holding meetings on the initiative of President Tarja Halonen of Finland to create a constituent assembly of Roma at a pan-European level. This body would have links to the Council of Europe and aim to influence decisions taken on Roma at the European level. I will also continue the work of the OSCE, begun in the early

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1990s, to find mechanisms for the international recognition of Roma as a people in diaspora. The issue of Roma is discussed often in the OSCE and is an OSCE priority. We may now begin to think about a Roma peace conference — to make peace between Roma and the wider societies, to make a political deal between Roma and others — a peace conference to settle the issue of Roma in the Balkans and to establish Roma as a legitimate and constituent member of the Balkan peoples. A deal about what? Possibly about the European Roma Rights Charter proposed now for several years by Rudko Kawczynski. Perhaps about the “Roma nation” idea promoted by Emil ??uka. About how to implement human rights principles in reality and how the work of anti-discrimination activists can find its place in the machinery. There are a number of perspectives that can be harmonised, but I would like to sit down at one table with all of the players — governmental and non-governmental — and hash it out. We need to work out a draft of our deal — of our peace treaty. Roma Rights: Thank you very much.

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Section 3 Afterword

If you have made it this far, it has probably already occurred to you that one issue at the core of the dilemmas described here – racism – remains obscure. What are we talking about when we talk about “racism”? How does the problem of racism extend to those people who do not think of themselves as active “racists”? Is fighting racism like dueling one’s own shadow? Where is the line between mistrust of the unfamiliar and “racism”? The following essay is provided here for those who would like to go deeper into contemporary approaches to racism

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The Denial of Racism by Dimitrina Petrova*

Hate speech is among the most exposed areas of racist action and discriminatory treatment. Words -- in speech and in print -- have the power to scar, frighten and humiliate, as well as the ability to inspire more racism and further acts of violence. Hate speech is also much easier to prove than more subtle forms of racist action: Hate speech is blatant and in the open. It may come as some surprise, then, that the problem of what to do about hate speech is among the most embattled and divisive discussions among rights activists. At its core, the discussion centres on whether hate speech should be regarded as a criminal act (like other forms of violence) and therefore punishable under criminal law (for example by jail sentence), or whether protections on freedom of expression -- viewed by many as crucial to democratic debate as well as to thought itself -- should make speech off limits to such serious forms of punishment. Below, Helen Darbishire and Roger Errera present two sides to the debate

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1. DENIAL: THE NEW RACISM For the purposes of this paper, I assume that (1) all societies are racist to some degree; (2) racism is ubiquitous at least at the level of attitudes and its presence is not necessarily visible at the level of social behaviour; (3) the existence of racism is widely denied across cultures, with varying degrees of disguise; (4) acknowledgement of racism is a prerequisite (but not at all a guarantee, or a bridge) to overcoming it. The concept of racism is used broadly here. “Racist” can be a description of attitudes (mental states of individuals or groups), ideologies (sets of socially constructed and politically functional ideas of whole societies, classes, cultures, etc.), social practices, institutions, etc. Of these, human rights advocates and international organisations have addressed issues of racism mostly in respect to social practices. This is understandable. While racist beliefs and attitudes can be present in a person’s mind with varying degrees of conviction, awareness, scope and intensity, we can define more concretely, and prohibit by law, racist acts. Critical race theory, a recent legal philosophy, understands racism broadly. “Racism is viewed not only as a matter of individual prejudice and everyday practice, but as a phenomenon that is deeply embedded in language and perception. Racism is a ubiquitous and inescapable feature of modern society, and despite official rhetoric to the contrary, race is always present even in the most neutral and innocent terms. Concepts such as ‘justice’, ‘truth’, and ‘reason’ are open to questions that reveal their complicity with power. This extraordinary pervasiveness of unconscious racism is often ignored by the legal system.”1 Can we talk of racism in a historic sense; was there “racism” in slave owning, or in feudal societies? Or is racism a phenomenon of modern history which emerged with the rapid expansion of biological, evolutionary, and genetic descriptions of life? Without going into this debate, I will limit my observations to one point: having accepted a very broad definition of racism, and fully aware of the risks of anachronism, we might benefit today from understanding racist attitudes as present throughout history. In ancient Greece and Rome, we may then say, racism was typical of the treatment of slaves and metekoi

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(foreigners residing in the city), and reached extreme forms of expression in such places as the Greek ergasterion — that special prison, in which slaves — as a rule ethnically different from the locals — were engaged in the hardest labour. In the orthodoxy of Stalinist Marxist textbooks, “race” was regarded as a biological concept, while discrimination on racial grounds was denounced. Racial discrimination and racism were applicable, from the point of view of communist ideology, to cases such as the treatment of blacks in the USA, apartheid in South Africa, and similar “black and white” issues, but neither racism, nor racial discrimination were acknowledged as a possibility in the context of a “socialist society”. Thus, the societies of post-communist (post-1989) Central and Eastern Europe were unprepared to accept the more general definition of racial discrimination as found in international law, especially in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In the first half of the 1990s, the governments and the political classes of the region were — and in many places still remain — outraged by the very suggestion that one can speak of anti-Romani racism in Eastern Europe. Courts, too, have failed to apply the concepts of “race” and “racial discrimination” in the broader sense in which they are construed in the UN (ICERD) framework. On October 30, 1995, non-Romani persons on a train in the Czech Republic threatened to beat up and throw from the train four Romani passengers. Perpetrators were subsequently prosecuted and charged with, inter alia, racially motivated violence. On November 20, 1996, the District Court in Hradec Králové acquitted the defendants stating that the Romani victims were not a distinct racial group and “belong(ed) to the same race” as the defendants (ethnic Czechs). In so holding the Court relied on a narrow biologically-rooted definition of race according to which Roma, like Czechs, are members of the same “Indo-European race”. The Court declined to impose punishment on either defendant.2 There can be different levels of awareness of racism: from totally explicit awareness to hidden assumptions and habit. For instance, people may be unable to formulate general racist principles as such, but they know that they disapprove of immigration, or preferential job

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allocation to minorities. Levels of awareness of racist attitudes can also be dependent on whether such attitudes form part of a dominant ideology. As Teun A. van Dijk notes, Whereas oppositional ideologies by definition will tend to be more explicit and conscious among group members, dominant ideologies will precisely tend to be implicit and denied, or felt to be ‘natural’ by their members. Such group members may indeed be unaware of their ideologies (typically so of male chauvinism, racism, etc.) until they are challenged by members of the other group.3

Much of Stanley Cohen’s discussion of denial of human rights violations in his 1995 book Denial and Acknowledgement is highly relevant to the case of denial of racism. Cohen analysed denial in the sense of “how people react to the suffering of others.”4 But what he says about the ways in which people react to information about suffering caused by human rights violations, applies to the experience of racism and its deeds. “Denial of racism” is meant below in the sense that (a) the suffering of victims of racism, (b) the existence of attitudes in oneself or society which makes this suffering possible, and/or (c) the existence of practices and institutions of racism, are denied. The denial of racism is a reaction to the post-World War II sanction of racism as a socially unacceptable opinion. In my view, racism’s presence is denied more vehemently in those cultures which, following World War II, have done more to limit racism and related intolerance. Denial is a manifestation of a certain level of accomplishment in implementing a human rights and anti-racism agenda in a society. The more progress a society has made in denouncing racism as a social and political evil, the more vehemently its continued existence is denied. Ironically, the denial of racism is a product of the progress of the struggle against it. In Western democratic societies, for example, most people who share racist opinions and act accordingly, would deny that they are racist — because racism is officially and culturally condemned, while tolerance, racial equality and human rights are dominant ideological values. Thus, at present racism is rarely admitted; increasingly, and under the influence of Western democracies and the international anti-racism movement, it is becoming mostly a label

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applied to groups or individuals by others. Although explicitly racist groups and parties exist, the larger part of today’s “racists”, who hold people of certain ethnic background in contempt or hostility, at the same time oppose being described as “racists”. Austria’s Freedom Party experienced a dramatic rise in popularity following a change of leadership in the mid-1980s, which brought the demagogic, charismatic Jörg Haider to its head and with him a newly invigorated populistic, anti-foreigner language, together with renewed belittling of Austria’s complicity in the racist crimes of the Third Reich. Nevertheless, most of the party members and supporters deny its racist character. After and as a direct result of World War II, at least in Western cultures, racist prejudice has sunk deeper into the layers of the pre-predicative judgement and has metamorphosed into a set of more subtle assumptions. Most forms of contemporary racism are no longer biologically based, but take the form of “cultural racism”, though the latter label is, of course, also denied by its proponents. “Cultural racism” is a form of denial, insofar as its proponents are trying to avoid the stigma of being called “racists”, while at the same time holding views that perpetuate or worsen racial and ethnic inequality. An illustration of the way in which racism manifests itself in seemingly race-neutral policies is the justification by the European Union and other Western countries of immigration restrictions. The Western political class has been pushing market values, and with it the free movement of capital and goods. But it has balked at the idea of a free movement of labour and has increasingly been trying to restrict the movement of people across borders. At face value, the current policy of increased obstacles to immigration created by the EU is race neutral, and its justification may sound legitimate from the point of view of protecting domestic labour, national security, national culture, etc. However, this policy operates on the foundation of deeper lying and unchallenged racist presumptions, and is applied in a racist way.5 The latter becomes evident in the case of seekers of political asylum who come from countries with civil and political unrest, in which whole ethnic groups are denied their basic rights. These people, even though they may also be simultaneously victims of institutionalised extreme poverty, are often genuine victims of persecution in the sense

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of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which contains, at Article 1(A)(2), a definition of “refugee”. But if their numbers are perceived as significant by Western authorities, they are rejected, either by being categorised as just “economic migrants”, or on other grounds. I am asking: What is wrong with the prospect of persecuted ethnic groups from outside Europe (and by the same token, Roma from Eastern Europe who seek asylum in Western countries) being allowed to remain in the calm and clean cities of the West? At first glance, the claim that they would undermine social welfare systems by offering cheap labour may seem convincing to those who are unwilling or unable to think beyond the trivialities of a populist agenda. The further claim that such ethnic immigrant groups would dilute the national culture of the host country, insofar as they would not be able/willing to integrate (read: “assimilate”), meets with the immediate sympathy of large sections of Western society. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that it were true that an influx of immigrants would really threaten some aspects of material life in the affluent host country, or dilute its national culture. There remains a small but disturbing question: Why is a citizen of Western Europe more anxious about her compatriots’ welfare and cultural identity, than about the threats to life and physical safety of foreign nationals? The very frame of reference of our responsibility (the community, the nation) that shapes our opinions is fraught with assumptions of racist superiority. Most of us take for granted that we should contribute chiefly to our own community (city, clan, nation, etc.) even though we would admit that “outsiders” have suffered more severe violations of human rights than members of our own community. The priority list of the Western majority’s concerns is thus not the same as the priority list that would have been respected, if the sole basis of judgement was humanitarian and related to the seriousness of human rights violations. There is hardly an escape from the conclusion that the discrepancy of the two priority lists, the realpolitik one concerned with domestic prosperity, and the one that Western publics ought to have developed if human rights and humanitarian concerns mattered more, is possible exactly because racism interferes with judgement.6

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2. FORMS OF DENIAL OF RACISM Many of the types of denial identified by Stanley Cohen in his 1995 Denial and Acknowledgement are highly relevant to the case of denial of racism. Following Cohen’s distinctions, we can differentiate between different forms of denial: 1. Denial in good faith, when the subject honestly thinks s/he is telling the truth; 2. Denial as outright lying, when the truth about racist abuse is clearly known but denied, as in deliberate deception at the individual level and disinformation, manipulation, or cover-up at the political level; 3. All other cases of “partly” knowing, when the denying subject is in neither of the above mental states.

The most challenging case, both in theory and in practice, is the third case: several philosophical and social science schools of thought have addressed the experience of “knowing without knowing that you know.”7 Cohen’s distinction between literal, interpretative and implicatory denial of human rights violations is also highly relevant to the denial of racism. Literal racist denial is widespread as a governmental reaction to human rights reports, and is expressed in such statements as: “Your reports are exaggerated; your position is alarmist, sensationalist, harmful; we work on issues constructively while your way of exposing things is destructive, etc.” Interpretative denial is at work when the facts are not disputed, but their interpretation disguises their racist aspect. Example: “This police action was not a punitive expedition as human rights advocates called it; it was a legitimate arrest of suspects in the Romani neighbourhood; it is true that force was used, but police acted in self-defence, etc.” I would highlight implicatory denial as the toughest challenge in dealing with racist denial. In this case, the subject — individual or collective — inserts a shield of rationalisations between the facts and the moral responsibility they suggest. Acknowledging the facts of

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racist abuse, e.g. the beating of Romani street children by police in Bucharest or Sofia, the witness can say, “This is racist and outrageous, but it has nothing to do with me, especially since I am in a hurry to catch a plane. I can’t correct all the world’s evils. I have a right to do other important things. Actually, I am too busy doing other important things, important to the community and not egoistically to myself. Even if I would stop and intervene here, what can one ordinary person like me do? Finally, there must be people, and I am sure there are people somewhere, whose job it is to handle this problem of the street children and brutality against them. Oh yes, I know that organisation working on the issue. So let me hurry to the airport.” Implicatory denial — since both the facts and their interpretation as racist abuse are acknowledged, and only the implications are denied — is the daily reality of many of us. As Cohen himself notes, “the problem is not to explain how people ‘deny’ — but how anyone ever pays any attention.”8 A further useful set of distinctions in Cohen is that of individual denial, official denial (sponsored by the state) and cultural denial. The latter is again the most serious challenge in addressing the issue of racist denial: members of society, without being told what to think, share a consensus about what can be publicly acknowledged. For example, there is a broad consensus in EU countries that tightening of immigration controls is good and therefore cannot be described as racist. Further, “the mass media coverage of wars, atrocities and human rights stories is the most important arena to observe the mutual dependency between official and cultural denial.”9 I saw this interdependency in the case of the anti-Serb bias of the mainstream Western media in the Kosovo war of 1999 (“Another busy night for our pilots over Yugoslavia”, CNN, US broadcast news, heard one morning in late April 1999). Similarly, in the aftermath of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the way in which the destruction of the Kosovo Roma was presented in the mainstream media was a case of wholesale cultural denial. Rather than presenting the process as ethnic cleansing, the media stressed the “understandable” aspect of revenge due to Roma alleged complicity with “the Serbs”. In conclusion, I will briefly list several rhetorical forms of racist

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denial, in no particular order, taking the example of the Roma in Europe, who are perhaps the most disadvantaged people in Europe on account of their race/ethnicity. Presenting race/ethnicity problems as only a social and economic problem: Governmental officials from Eastern Europe have been saying: “We are not racist, and do not discriminate. We have no problem with the race or ethnicity of the Roma, but this group is economically and socially weak. The fact that its members are of the same, namely Romani ethnicity, is unimportant (irrelevant, accidental, etc.).” In this case, the government has an excuse for not dealing with race discrimination as an urgent issue. The government’s obligation is reduced to slowly improving the material conditions, educational status, etc., depending on the availability of resources. That the ethnic group is also socially disadvantaged, marginalised, or excluded, is true, but this partial truth is used to deny the racist side of reality. The “equality before the law” argument: Somewhat opposite to denial by presenting race problems as solely socio-economic problems, this one lays a stress on the existing allegedly equal protection by the law. The claim is: “Racial minority members are equal before the law, or are entitled to equal protection by the law, and therefore do not suffer discrimination in my country; anything that would favour them over others is unfair.” As has been noted, sometimes there is a conflict between legal equality and social justice with respect to ethnic minorities, which might require a special program for a particular group to compensate the disadvantage (“affirmative action” in the USA, “positive action” in Europe). The stress on legal equality as sufficient to guarantee race equality can be, in certain contexts, a highly disguised and seemingly legitimate form of denial. The “equal opportunity” (meritocratic) argument: This denial is similar to the “legal equality” argument, but in this case the claim goes like this: “The members of the Romani ethnic group enjoy equal opportunities with everyone else in our society. How they use these opportunities is up to them. The fact that they do not make good use

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of their opportunities is not our fault. People ultimately get what they deserve.” This form of denial sometimes verges on blaming the victims: “The Roma must have done something wrong, if not the current generation then previous ones; otherwise they would not have ended up in such misery/in prison/on the street, etc.” Reduction of the struggle against racism to prohibition and penalisation: Many people think that they have essentially challenged racism in society by outlawing (the most egregious forms of) racial discrimination and providing access to justice and adequate legal remedy to victims of discrimination. Such is also in essence the anti-racism strategy of the United Nations to date, according to its major conventions and projects. While this strategy of making race discrimination illegal and bringing lawsuits in cases of abuse is indispensable, it can’t alone eradicate, or even substantially reduce racist practices (let alone attitudes) in society. As the removal or reduction of crime cannot be accomplished purely via the criminal justice system, no matter how well developed it is, so the removal or reduction of racism is impossible if strategies to combat racism are limited to making its manifestations illegal. Litigation is not the universal and sufficient answer to racism. A society based on the rule of law may well be one of racist complacency. This is especially true in societies where litigation tends to be too expensive and beyond the reach of most victims.10 Recasting race difference as mental disability: An illustration of this form might be the denial by the Czech majority of the de facto racial segregation of Roma children in the schooling system in the Czech Republic, by sending them to so-called “special schools” for the mentally handicapped. The policy is built on the underlying stereotype that Roma are inferior, and that “Romani children are not ready for normal school.” The result has been a denial of equal educational opportunity for most Romani children.11 Many Czech politicians and educationalists deny vehemently that sending Roma to special schools is a racist policy. However, race-neutral factors (such as language skills or poverty) fail to explain the gross racial overrepresentation. (See the article on Czech schools on page XXX).

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Recasting race difference as behavioural disorder: According to the “private student” arrangement in Hungary, pupils can be removed from school if their behaviour disrupts their own and other student’s work, and transferred to a private study scheme, which does not involve school attendance. This seemingly race-neutral regulation has in effect excluded a number of Romani pupils from regular school, expecting students instead to take final exams, but eventually causing them to drop out of school entirely. A similar form of recasting has been reported in the case of Black Caribbean boys in the UK, who have been removed from school due to bad behaviour: “Black Caribbean boys are around six times more likely to be permanently excluded from UK schools than white boys, according to Department for Education and Employment Statistics. While there has been a lot of media interest in soaring school exclusion rates in England and Wales, the statistic no longer appears to shock. Yet for Black Caribbean families it amounts to a crisis in the education of their children. With an estimated 10,000 — 14,000 permanent exclusions during 1995-6, schools are dumping the population of a small town each year. This suggests bad practice and possible unlawful discrimination in managing behaviour in schools. Exclusion from school often means the denial of the child’s right to education; once excluded a pupil has only a 15% chance of returning to mainstream schooling.”12 Emphasis on duties as pre-condition for the enjoyment of rights: The logic in this case is, “If Roma do not fulfil their duty X, they cannot claim their right Y.” Such was also the communist approach to rights: rights were seen as conditioned on the fulfilment of corresponding duties. The respective chapters in the communist constitutions were usefully titled “Rights and Duties of the Citizen”. One often hears that the high drop out rate of Roma from primary school is due to the fact that Romani parents do not fulfil their parental duties. Hence, the over-representation of Romani children institutionalised without parental consent: a phenomenon which reflects the societal racist perception of Roma as incompetent parents. What is lacking is the ability and/or willingness to understand rights as innate, not dependent on past, present or future behaviour of the subject. This

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lack of a human rights perspective is felt in the overwhelmingly paternalistic, social care approaches to Roma issues, in which Roma are seen as passive recipients of help, rather than subjects of rights. In Italy, for example, there exist numerous charities that are spending public funds to provide social work services to Roma in the insane world of the “nomadic camps”. Denial by “the positive example” argument: “Look at those minority members who made it to the top of society, the company, etc.” Accordingly, in social practice, a policy of tokenism is often used to fight back allegations of racism and discrimination. Denial by disclaimer: “Some of my best friends are Roma/blacks/Jews”; and also, “Of course there are exceptions, but most X are Y.” Individualisation and self-exclusion from the mainstream: “I love my black neighbour and her friendship is more dear to me than that of others; and such personal links are more important than race relations in the larger society.” Similarly, “I can’t be racist, because in my building there lived a Romani family, and I had a very good relationship with them.” (The latter statement was made in October 2000 by a then-chair of a parliamentary commission on human rights, in one Eastern European country, in response to accusations of racism; this is a public official who has displayed in his policy a variety of markedly racist attitudes.) The romanticising stereotype: A romantic stereotype almost surely will be found to accompany the negative one for many ethnic groups, e.g. Roma, blacks and native Americans in the US, the Australian indigenous people, etc. The romantic stereotype of Roma includes such elements as musical and dancing talent, capability of passionate love and other strong emotions, spontaneity, free and spiritual character, magical relatedness to nature, ability to enjoy themselves, etc. The overstatement of historic optimism, the reference to historical

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progress in race relations: “Compare and consider how much has changed in the last 20 years; see how much the situation of minority X has improved.” The normalisation shrug: On visiting a Romani ghetto, somewhere in Europe, “That’s just what it is like in places like that.” Interpretative denial by downplaying of injury: “No serious damage has taken place; Roma were indeed treated not very gently by the police, but they don’t feel abused or humiliated, because they are used to violence; they understand only the language of coercion.” Condemning the condemners: We have heard from Central European politicians presently in office: “The Western governments are condemning us only because they want to put pressure on us. They are not really concerned with ethnic equality and their criticism is a geopolitical game.” Almost none of the above rhetorical forms of racist denial, taken in isolation, would be sufficient to describe a racist attitude. Racist statements are contextual. We can describe an attitude as racist only if we can identify a set of opinions, a more or less clear bias or stereotype. Otherwise, we would have difficulty in differentiating racism from innocent, morally neutral remarks, such as “The Spanish are bad drivers.” Most forms of denial are characterised by a deceptively easy availability, when needed as comments on the causes of racially based disadvantage, which, at the level of non-reflective everyday discourse, are never in short supply. For example, “Roma drop out of school because they are poor.” Yet, the person making this statement will say a minute later, “They are poor because they don’t study well.” Being “logical” is not among the qualities of “ideological” thoughts. Only upon reflection, it is revealed that racist rationalisations are not quite rational and often rotate in a vicious circle.

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3. AFTER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The discussion of denial of racism should be accompanied by a discussion of acknowledgement. To become aware of existing denial and to acknowledge the presence of racism may become the beginning of a transformation, at a personal as well as political and cultural level. Acknowledgement may lead to reduction of racist attitudes and to anti-racist action. Unlike racism as such, racial discrimination is understood in human rights law as a violation of human rights; the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity is characterised by the universality and the democratic nature of fundamental rights. By concluding the treaty on eliminating racial discrimination (ICERD), the states signatories have in effect made it possible for practical accomplishments in reducing racism to overtake public opinion if the latter is moving at lower speeds. The concept of racial discrimination takes the issue of racism beyond its dependence on acknowledgement. It turns out that societies as well as individuals will not learn to be mentally free from racist bias, before having made practical steps to eliminate racial discrimination.

FURTHER INFORMATION: European Roma Rights Center, Racism: Denial and Acknowledgement, Roma Rights, 4/2000, on the internet at: errc.org/rr_nr4_2000/index.shtml Yvonne Delk, “Building a strategy to dismantle racism”, Sojourners, March-April 1998; available on-line at www.sojourners.com/soj9803/980314.html A good internet portal to further information on anti-racist organisations and articles is: www.icare.to/ See also the search engine at: www.globaldiversitysearch.net For the latest action by the international community in combating racism, visit the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ website on the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, at www.unhchr.ch/html/racism/racism.htm

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DISCUSSION POINTS:

?

How does racism manifest itself?

What is the difference between racism and racial discrimination? Was there racism in pre-modern times?

Should an ordinary person care about the effects of racism on himor herself or on his or her society? Why? Is acknowledging racism important? Why should individuals confess the effects of racism on themselves and society? What are the benefits, if any, to such acknowledgement? What are the disadvantages of denial? Are Eastern European and other post-Communist countries or Western European countries more racist? Are poverty and racism related? How?

What is worse: an avowed racist skinhead, or a person acting out racial prejudice but ignorant of or in denial about the racist content of his or her actions?

NOTES

Dimitrina Petrova is Executive Director of the European Roma Rights Center. A version of this paper was prepared for the International Council of Human Rights Policy in December 1999. The text reproduced here has been slightly abridged. A full version of this article appears on the Internet at: errc.org/rr_nr4_2000/noteb2.shtml. 1 Vago, Steven, Law and Society, Sixth edition, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 2000, p.68. 2 On August 8, 1997, acting under an extraordinary procedure for review of unlawful court rulings, the Czech Ministry of Justice filed a motion in the case asking the Czech Supreme Court to declare that the District Court’s rationale for acquitting the two defendants was in breach of Czech and international law. It was argued that the District Court’s cramped anthropological interpretation of the concept of “race” was out of step with international *

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jurisprudence, which has confirmed that “race” and “ethnicity” are interrelated and overlapping concepts and to be interpreted broadly. The Supreme Court heard the case on October 9, 1997, annulled the District Court opinion and ordered that the case be returned to the District Court for further proceedings. 3 Van Dijk, Teun A., Ideology. A Multidisciplinary Approach, SAGE, 1998, p.98. 4 See Cohen, Stanley, Denial and Acknowledgement: The Impact of Information about Human Rights Violations, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1995, p. I. The concept of denial is analysed in Chapter 2, pp.19-58. 5 In 1911, the U.S. Congress commissioned a study to document the “deterioration” of the “American stock” due to immigration; in the fortyvolume report, the contribution of Franz Boas was the only one that argued against racial determinism. At least, we can register progress in that the EU today is engaging in a different kind of prevention of immigration. The socalled “Budapest process”, which started in 1994, and involves to date around 40 states and 10 international organisations, has as its purpose to “harmonise” pan-European migration policies in an effort to avoid illegal migration. The currently sensitive issue of Romani migration is closely linked to the enlargement process of the European Union. In several incidents in the past few years, groups of Roma numbering from around twenty to over a thousand, travelled to EU member states, USA and Canada, and applied for asylum. In some cases, states responded by re-introducing visa obligation against the relevant Associated states, like Slovakia. On the other hand, it has been suggested at EU fora that “also the fear of a sudden ‘exodus’ of Roma is one of the main reasons why e.g. Romanians still need visa to enter the EU. And EU visa regimes will indeed be maintained in all cases where there is a justifiable fear of irregular migration.” (See Martijn Pluim , Presentation on behalf of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) at the OSCE conference entitled “Roma in the EU Candidate Countries — Challenges of Integration”, Vienna, September 26, 2000, p.2.) 6 Eurocentric racism has a long ancestry. As Ascherson argues, it can be derived from the ancient assumption — still widespread in Europe — that settled agriculture and the existence of a crop-growing peasantry represented a huge forward development from an earlier stage of nomadism. “Here pseudoanthropology feeds the basic European nightmare: a terror of people who move. (…) That nightmare survives in the new Europe after the revolutions of 1989. It survives as Western fear of all travelling people, of the millions pressing against Europe’s gates as ‘asylum seekers’ or ‘economic migrants’, of a social collapse in Russia which would send half the population streaming hungrily towards Germany.” The origins of Euro-racism are traced back to the construction of “Europe” by the ancient Greeks: “On the shores of the Black Sea, there were born a pair of Siamese twins called ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’. This is where Greek colonists met the Scythians. A settled culture of small, maritime city-states encountered a mobile culture of steppe-nomads. People who had lived in one place for unaccounted generations, planting crops and fishing the coastal sea, now met people who lived in wagons and tents and

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wandered about infinite horizons of grassy prairie behind herds of cattle and horses. This was not the first time in human history that farmers had met pastoralists. Since the Neolithic revolution, the beginning of settled agriculture, there must have been countless intersections of these two ways of life. Nor was it the first witnessing of nomadism by people of an urban culture: that was an experience already familiar to the Chinese on the western borders of Han dominions. But in this particular encounter began the idea of‘Europe’, with all its arrogance, all its implications of superiority, all its assumptions of priority and antiquity, all its pretensions to a natural right to dominate.” See Ascherson, Neal, Black Sea, London: Vintage, 1996, p.49. On Eurocentrism as a racist view, see also Joseph ,G.G., Reddy V. and Searle-Chatterjee, M., (1990) “Eurocentrism in the Social Sciences”, Race and Class, 31 (4): 1-26. 7 In the work of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, the idea of “transcendental apperception”, or self-consciousness accompanying the mental possession of the “object”, is one possibility for discussing the possibility of denial. The psychoanalytic metaphor of the “sub-conscious”, the phenomenological theories of perception as constitution of the object, and the existential idea of the self are other possible conceptual frames. The psychoanalytical tradition, which apparently is the one that is most familiar to the Western general public, insists that denial — in our case, denial of the existence or meaning of racist abuse — is a kind of unconscious defence mechanism for coping with disturbing mental contents. This approach has its limitations. One such assumption is that if people were not prevented by various barriers raised by the imperatives of survival and well-being, they would have seen the “denied” as “existing”. Along these lines, any person in principle should be able to grasp the simple truth that people belonging to different racial or ethnic groups are equal as humans and have dignity and rights. The fact that they “deny” this is due to a need to avoid the shock of the “truth” being consciously realised. But, why should we assume, together with the psychoanalysts, that people, unhindered by anything, should see the “truth” of each state of affairs; specifically, that they should see the basic human rights principles as a clear and universal truth? In most cultures throughout history, “truths” about human life and society are not “unveiled” but rather “developed”. Further, why should we assume, with the psychoanalysts, that people suffer when they see other people’s unjust suffering? The definition of denial as developed by Cohen and as applied by this author is based on the universal validity of human rights and on the understanding of human nature as emotionally responsive to the suffering of others. It ignores or, in the case of this author, deliberately brackets the possibility that, for example, people’s deepest and basic emotions are not altruistic, but organically and inherently consistent with their own “interest”. Thus, not noticing racist practices may be due not to the attempt to avoid suffering that would accompany acknowledgement, but to a more holistic reaction in the direction of one’s own life interests. Could it be that the psychoanalytic perspective endows us with more “humanity” than we really bear?

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Cohen, S., Op cit., p.39. Ibid., p.27. 10 In acknowledgement and in order to overcome this obstacle, public interest law has rapidly developed in the area of racial discrimination in the United States, the UK and elsewhere, enabling victims to obtain remedy even if their formal access to justice is rendered meaningless by the costs. On the prospects of a similar development of public interest law in Central and Eastern Europe, see Petrova, Dimitrina, “Political and Legal Limitations to the Development of Public Interest Law in Post-Communist Societies”, The Parker School Journal of East European Law, 1996/Vol. 3, No. 4-5. 11 For more details, see European Roma Rights Center, A Special Remedy: Roma and Schools for the Mentally Handicapped in the Czech Republic, Country Report series No. 8, June 1999. 12 Osler, Audrey, “School Exclusions: a Denial of the Right to Education”, Human Rights Education Newsletter, No. 18, Autumn 1997. 8 9

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Appendix Human Rights Standards

The texts included in the section that follows are three of the documents most fundamental to Roma rights work in Europe. They are: ❖ The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) ❖ The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) ❖ The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights

PREAMBLE Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people, Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law, Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations, Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 229 of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge, Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

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Article 1 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Article 2 Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, nonself-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. Article 3 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 4 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms. Article 5 No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 6 Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. Article 7 All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. Article 8 Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 231 Article 9 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. Article 10 Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. Article 11 (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed. Article 12 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. Article 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Article 14 (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Article 15 (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

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Article 16 (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. Article 17 (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Article 18 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Article 19 Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Article 20 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association. Article 21 (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 233 Article 22 Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality. Article 23 (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work. (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. Article 24 Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay. Article 25 (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. Article 26 (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

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(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. Article 27 (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. Article 28 Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. Article 29 (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30 Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 235

DEBATE QUESTIONS:

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Where cultural or religious beliefs and/or practices conflict with human rights provisions, should human rights take precedence? For example, Article 16 of the UDHR provides for equal rights during marriage and requires that marriage be freely entered into, both of which may conflict with traditional beliefs or religious beliefs; yet Islamic law allows arranged marriages, in which women are not accorded equal rights with their husbands. Is it possible to reconcile such a conflict? It has been argued that the notion of universal human rights is a Western construct. Should these principles then apply to nonWestern cultures? Consider this question in relation to question 1. It has been argued that the UDHR is vaguely worded. Do you agree or disagree? If so, why might that be?

FURTHER INFORMATION:

For more information about the UDHR and issues relating to the UDHR, see the following websites: www.universalrights.net/home.php3 www.derechos.net/links/issues/udhr.html Examples of differing views regarding the UDHR can be found at the following sites: www.human-rights.f2s.com/UDHR-comment.html www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m2242/1595_273/53590215/p1/article.jh tml?term= For information on the idea of universal human rights as a western construct, see: www.ed.gov/databases/ERIC_Digests/ed421447.html civnet.org/journal/vol3no1/ftasen.htm

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2. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

The States Parties to this Convention, Considering that the Charter of the United Nations is based on the principles of the dignity and equality inherent in all human beings, and that all Member States have pledged themselves to take joint and separate action, in co-operation with the Organization, for the achievement of one of the purposes of the United Nations which is to promote and encourage universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out therein, without distinction of any kind, in particular as to race, colour or national origin, Considering that all human beings are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law against any discrimination and against any incitement to discrimination, Considering that the United Nations has condemned colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith, in whatever form and wherever they exist, and that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December 1960 (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) has affirmed and solemnly proclaimed the necessity of bringing

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them to a speedy and unconditional end, Considering that the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 20 November 1963 (General Assembly resolution 1904 (XVIII)) solemnly affirms the necessity of speedily eliminating racial discrimination throughout the world in all its forms and manifestations and of securing understanding of and respect for the dignity of the human person, Convinced that any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere, Reaffirming that discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin is an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among nations and is capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples and the harmony of persons living side by side even within one and the same State, Convinced that the existence of racial barriers is repugnant to the ideals of any human society, Alarmed by manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas of the world and by governmental policies based on racial superiority or hatred, such as policies of apartheid, segregation or separation, Resolved to adopt all necessary measures for speedily eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations, and to prevent and combat racist doctrines and practices in order to promote understanding between races and to build an international community free from all forms of racial segregation and racial discrimination, Bearing in mind the Convention concerning Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation adopted by the International Labour Organisation in 1958, and the Convention against Discrimination in Education adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1960, Desiring to implement the principles embodied in the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and to secure the earliest adoption of practical measures to that end,

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 239 Have agreed as follows:

PART I Article 1 (1) In this Convention, the term “racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life. (2) This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens. (3) Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality. (4) Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. Article 2 (1) States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races, and, to this end: (a) Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to en sure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation; (b) Each State Party undertakes not to sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination by any persons or organizations; (c) Each State Party shall take effective measures to review

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governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists; (d) Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization; (e) Each State Party undertakes to encourage, where appropriate, integrationist multiracial organizations and movements and other means of eliminating barriers between races, and to discourage anything which tends to strengthen racial division. (2) States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case en tail as a con sequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.

Article 3 States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction. Article 4 States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 241 violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; (c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.

Article 5 In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: (a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice; (b) The right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or institution; (c) Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for election-on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service; (d) Other civil rights, in particular: (i) The right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State; (ii) The right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s country; (iii) The right to nationality; (iv) The right to marriage and choice of spouse; (v) The right to own property alone as well as in association with others; (vi) The right to inherit; (vii) The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; (viii) The right to freedom of opinion and expression;

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Article 6 States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination. Article 7 States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical groups, as well as to propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and this Convention.

PART II Article 8 (1) There shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (hereinafter referred to as the Committee)

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 243 consisting of eighteen experts of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality elected by States Parties from among their nationals, who shall serve in their personal capacity, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the representation of the different forms of civilization as well as of the principal legal systems. (2) The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by the States Parties. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals. (3) The initial election shall be held six months after the date of the entry into force of this Convention. At least three months before the date of each election the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit their nominations within two months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties. (4) Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General at United Nations Headquarters. At that meeting, for which two thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be nominees who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting. (5) (a) The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. However, the terms of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election the names of these nine members shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee; (b) For the filling of casual vacancies, the State Party whose expert has ceased to function as a member of the Committee shall appoint another expert from among its nationals, subject to the approval of the Committee. (6) States Parties shall be responsible for the expenses of the members of the Committee while they are in performance of Committee duties. (amendment (see General Assembly resolution 47/111 of 16 December 1992);)

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Article 9 (1) States Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for consideration by the Committee, a report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted and which give effect to the provisions of this Convention: (a) within one year after the entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned; and (b) thereafter every two years and whenever the Committee so requests. The Committee may request further information from the States Parties. (2) The Committee shall report annually, through the Secretary General, to the General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of the reports and information received from the States Parties. Such suggestions and general recommendations shall be reported to the General Assembly together with comments, if any, from States Parties Article 10 (1) The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure. (2) The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. (3) The secretariat of the Committee shall be provided by the Secretary General of the United Nations. (4) The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at United Nations Headquarters. Article 11 (1) If a State Party considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention, it may bring the matter to the attention of the Committee. The Committee shall then transmit the communication to the State Party concerned. Within three months, the receiving State shall submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State. (2) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties, either by bilateral negotiations or by any other procedure open to them, within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter again to the Committee by notifying the Committee and also the other State.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 245 (3) The Committee shall deal with a matter referred to it in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the case, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged. (4) In any matter referred to it, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned to supply any other relevant information. (5) When any matter arising out of this article is being considered by the Committee, the States Parties concerned shall be entitled to send a representative to take part in the proceedings of the Committee, without voting rights, while the matter is under consideration.

Article 12 (1) (a) After the Committee has obtained and collated all the information it deems necessary, the Chairman shall appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) comprising five persons who may or may not be members of the Committee. The members of the Commission shall be appointed with the unanimous consent of the parties to the dispute, and its good offices shall be made available to the States concerned with a view to an amicable solution of the matter on the basis of respect for this Convention; (b) If the States parties to the dispute fail to reach agreement within three months on all or part of the composition of the Commission, the members of the Commission not agreed upon by the States parties to the dispute shall be elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds majority vote of the Committee from among its own members. (2) The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity. They shall not be nationals of the States parties to the dispute or of a State not Party to this Convention. (3) The Commission shall elect its own Chairman and adopt its own rules of procedure. (4) The meetings of the Commission shall normally be held at United Nations Headquarters or at any other convenient place as determined by the Commission. (5) The secretariat provided in accordance with article 10, para-

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graph 3, of this Convention shall also service the Commission whenever a dispute among States Parties brings the Commission into being. (6) The States parties to the dispute shall share equally all the expenses of the members of the Commission in accordance with estimates to be provided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (7) The Secretary-General shall be empowered to pay the expenses of the members of the Commission, if necessary, before reimbursement by the States parties to the dispute in accordance with paragraph 6 of this article. (8) The information obtained and collated by the Committee shall be made available to the Commission, and the Commission may call upon the States concerned to supply any other relevant information.

Article 13 (1) When the Commission has fully considered the matter, it shall prepare and submit to the Chairman of the Committee a report embodying its findings on all questions of fact relevant to the issue between the parties and containing such recommendations as it may think proper for the amicable solution of the dispute. (2) The Chairman of the Committee shall communicate the report of the Commission to each of the States parties to the dispute. These States shall, within three months, inform the Chairman of the Committee whether or not they accept the recommendations contained in the report of the Commission. (3) After the period provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, the Chairman of the Committee shall communicate the report of the Commission and the declarations of the States Parties concerned to the other States Parties to this Convention. Article 14 (1) A State Party may at any time declare that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in this Convention. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration. (2) Any State Party which makes a declaration as provided for in

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 247 paragraph I of this article may establish or indicate a body within its national legal order which shall be competent to receive and consider petitions from individuals and groups of individuals within its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in this Convention and who have exhausted other available local remedies. (3) A declaration made in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article and the name of any body established or indicated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article shall be deposited by the State Party concerned with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General, but such a withdrawal shall not affect communications pending before the Committee. (4) A register of petitions shall be kept by the body established or indicated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, and certified copies of the register shall be filed annually through appropriate channels with the Secretary-General on the understanding that the contents shall not be publicly disclosed. (5) In the event of failure to obtain satisfaction from the body established or indicated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the petitioner shall have the right to communicate the matter to the Committee within six months. (6) (a) The Committee shall confidentially bring any communication referred to it to the attention of the State Party alleged to be violating any provision of this Convention, but the identity of the individual or groups of individuals concerned shall not be revealed without his or their express consent. The Committee shall not receive anonymous communications; (b) Within three months, the receiving State shall submit to the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State. (7) (a) The Committee shall consider communications in the light of all information made available to it by the State Party concerned and by the petitioner. The Committee shall not consider any communication from a petitioner unless it has ascertained that the petitioner has exhausted all available

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domestic remedies. However, this shall not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged; (b) The Committee shall forward its suggestions and recommendations, if any, to the State Party concerned and to the petitioner. (8) The Committee shall include in its annual report a summary of such communications and, where appropriate, a summary of the explanations and statements of the States Parties concerned and of its own suggestions and recommendations. (9) The Committee shall be competent to exercise the functions provided for in this article only when at least ten States Parties to this Convention are bound by declarations in accordance with paragraph I of this article.

Article 15 (1) Pending the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, the provisions of this Convention shall in no way limit the right of petition granted to these peoples by other international instruments or by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. (2) (a) The Committee established under article 8, paragraph 1, of this Convention shall receive copies of the petitions from, and submit expressions of opinion and recommendations on these petitions to, the bodies of the United Nations which deal with matters directly related to the principles and objectives of this Convention in their consideration of petitions from the inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories and all other territories to which General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) applies, relating to matters covered by this Convention which are before these bodies; (b) The Committee shall receive from the competent bodies of the United Nations copies of the reports concerning the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures directly related to the principles and objectives of this Convention applied by the administering Powers within the Territories mentioned in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, and shall express opinions and make recommendations to these bodies. (3) The Committee shall include in its report to the General

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 249 Assembly a summary of the petitions and reports it has received from United Nations bodies, and the expressions of opinion and recommendations of the Committee relating to the said petitions and reports. (4) The Committee shall request from the Secretary-General of the United Nations all information relevant to the objectives of this Convention and available to him regarding the Territories mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) of this article.

Article 16 The provisions of this Convention concerning the settlement of disputes or complaints shall be applied without prejudice to other procedures for settling disputes or complaints in the field of discrimination laid down in the constituent instruments of, or conventions adopted by, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and shall not prevent the States Parties from having recourse to other procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with general or special international agreements in force between them.

PART III Article 17 (1) This Convention is open for signature by any State Member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies, by any State Party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State which has been invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to this Convention. (2) This Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Article 18 (1) This Convention shall be open to accession by any State referred to in article 17, paragraph 1, of the Convention. 2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Article 19 (1) This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the

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United Nations of the twenty-seventh instrument of ratification or instrument of accession. (2) For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of the twenty-seventh instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.

Article 20 (1) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States which are or may become Parties to this Convention reservations made by States at the time of ratification or accession. Any State which objects to the reservation shall, within a period of ninety days from the date of the said communication, notify the Secretary-General that it does not accept it. (2) A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation of any of the bodies established by this Convention be allowed. A reservation shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if at least two thirds of the States Parties to this Convention object to it. (3) Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this effect addressed to the Secretary-General. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received. Article 21 A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary General. Article 22 Any dispute between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to another mode of settlement. Article 23 (1) A request for the revision of this Convention may be made at

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 251 any time by any State Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (2) The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request.

Article 24 The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred to in article 17, paragraph 1, of this Convention of the following particulars: (a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under articles 17 and 18; (b) The date of entry into force of this Convention under article 19; (c) Communications and declarations received under articles 14, 20 and 23; (d) Denunciations under article 21. Article 25 (1) This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations. (2) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies of this Convention to all States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in article 17, paragraph 1, of the Convention.

FURTHER INFORMATION: For information on the status of ratification of ICERD by individual states, see: www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf For a listing of reservations, declarations and objections of individual states regarding ICERD, see: www.hri.ca/fortherecord1999/documentation/reservations/cerd.htm To access Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and read about his concept of the “tyranny of the majority”, see: xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/toc_indx.html

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DEBATE POINTS:

?

In signing this convention, many states included reservations and objections to certain items in the convention, effectively refusing to be bound by certain elements of the convention. Does allowing this not defeat the purpose of the convention?

Many states sign conventions such as the ICERD, but never bring into effect the changes necessary in their laws to enforce the convention. A treaty is, by its nature, legally binding upon signatories, and when such a convention has been signed by a state, the provisions of the treaty override domestic laws. Bearing in mind that a state’s decision to sign a treaty is entirely voluntary, do you think it right that international commitments supercede domestic laws, and thereby effectively limit national sovereignty? Is this undemocratic?

The ICERD is very strongly worded in that it demands that states go to great lengths to crush the often elusive phenomenon of racial discrimination. However, some of the wording of the convention is so strong that it may seem to encourage harsh measures by states — measures that may stamp out individual freedoms. Many argue that precisely in the area of minority issues, where what is at stake is the necessity to counter the effects of the so-called “tyranny of the majority”, the wording of the convention is fully justified. Do you agree or disagree?

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3. The European Convention on Human Rights

The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of Europe, Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948; Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared; Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its Members and that one of the methods by which the aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realization of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Reaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend; Being resolved, as the Governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration; Have agreed as follows: Article 1 The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.

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SECTION I Article 2 Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. Article 3 No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 4 (1) No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. For the purpose of this article the term forced or compulsory labour’ shall not include: (a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such detention; (b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognized, service exacted instead of compulsory military service; (c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community; (d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 255 Article 5 (1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. (2) No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority of reasonable suspicion of having committed and offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and the charge against him. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.

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Article 6 (1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be pronounced publicly by the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court. Article 7 (1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 257 Article 8 (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 9 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 10 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. this right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information an ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Article 11 (1)Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and

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to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. this article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State. Article 12 Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. Article 13 Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. Article 14 The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. Article 15 (1) In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 259 therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed. Article 16 Nothing in Articles 10, 11, and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens. Article 17 Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction on any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention. Article 18 The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.

PROTOCOLS 1. ENFORCEMENT OF CERTAIN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS NOT INCLUDED IN SECTION I OF THE CONVENTION The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of Europe, Being resolved to take steps to ensure the collective enforcement of certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4th November, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Convention’), Have agreed as follows: Article 1 Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provid-

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ed for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. Article 2 No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions. Article 3 The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. Article 4 Any High Contracting Party may at the time of signature or ratification or at any time thereafter communicate to the SecretaryGeneral of the Council of Europe a declaration stating the extent to which it undertakes that the provisions of the present Protocol shall apply to such of the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible as are named therein. Any High Contracting Party which has communicated a declaration in virtue of the preceding paragraph may from time to time communicate a further declaration modifying the terms of any former declaration or terminating the application of the provisions of this Protocol in respect of any territory. A declaration made in accordance with this article shall be deemed to have been made in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 63 of the Convention. Article 5 As between the High Contracting Parties the provisions of Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional articles to the convention and all the provisions of the Convention shall apply accordingly.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 261 Article 6 This Protocol shall be open for signature by the Members of the Council of Europe, who are the signatories of the Convention; it shall be ratified at the same time as or after the ratification of the Convention. It shall enter into force after the deposit of ten instruments of ratification. As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the Protocol shall enter into force at the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, who will notify all the Members of the names of those who have ratified.

Done at Paris on the 20th day of March 1952, In English and French, both text being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary-General shall transmit certified copies to each of the signatory Governments

2. CONFERRING UPON THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMPETENCE TO GIVE ADVISORY OPINIONS The Member States of the Council of Europe signatory hereto: Having regard to the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Convention’), and in particular Article 19 instituting, among other bodies, a European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Court’); Considering that it is expedient to confer upon the Court competence to give advisory opinions subject to certain conditions; Have agreed as follows: Article 1 (1) The Court may, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto. Such opinions shall not deal with any question relating to the con-

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tent or scope of the rights or freedoms defined in Section I of the convention and in the Protocols thereto, or with any other question which the Commission, the Court, or the committee of Ministers might have to consider in consequence of any such proceedings as could be instituted in accordance with the Convention. Decisions of the Committee of Ministers to request an advisory opinion of the Court shall require a two-thirds majority vote of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. Article 2 The Court shall decide whether a request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Committee of Ministers is within its consultative competence as defined in Article 1 of this Protocol. Article 3 (1) For the consideration of requests for an advisory opinion, the Court shall sit in plenary session. Reasons shall be given for advisory opinions of the Court. If the advisory opinion does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. Advisory opinions of the Court shall be communicated to the Committee of Ministers. Article 4 The powers of the Court under Article 55 of the Convention shall extend to the drawing up of such rules and the determination of such procedure as the Court may think necessary for the purposes of this Protocol. Article 5 (1)This Protocol shall be open to signature by member States of the Council of Europe, signatories to the Convention, who may become Parties to it by: (a) signature without reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance; (b) signature with reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance, followed by ratification or acceptance. Instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 263 This Protocol shall enter into force as soon as all the States Parties to the Convention shall have become Parties to the Protocol in accordance with the Provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. From the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, Articles 1 to 4 shall be considered an integral part of the Convention. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall notify the Member States of the Council of: (a) any signature without reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance; (b) any signature with reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance; (c) the deposit of any instrument of ratification or acceptance; (d) the date of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Protocol. Done at Strasbourg, this 6th day of May 1963, in English and French, both text being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary-General shall transmit certified copies to each of the signatory States.

3. AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 30, AND 94 OF THE CONVENTION The member States of the Council, signatories to this Protocol, Considering that it is advisable to amend certain provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at rome on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Convention’) concerning the procedure of the European Commission of Human Rights, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 (1) Article 29 of the Convention is deleted. The following provision shall be inserted in the Convention:

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“ARTICLE 29 After it has accepted a petition submitted under Article 25, the Commission may nevertheless decide unanimously to reject the petition if, in the course of its examination, it finds that the existence of one of the grounds for non-acceptance provided for in Article 27 has been established. In such a case, the decision shall be communicated to the parties.” Article 2 (1) At the beginning of Article 34 of the Convention, the following shall be inserted: “Subject to the provisions of Article 29...” At the end of the same article, the sentence “the Sub- commission shall take its decisions by a majority of its members” shall be deleted. Article 4 (1) The Protocol shall be open to signature by the member States of the Council of Europe, who may become Parties to it either by: (a) signature without reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance, or (b) signature with reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance, followed by ratification or acceptance. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. This Protocol shall enter force as soon as all States Parties to the Convention shall have become Parties to the Protocol, in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall notify the Member States of the Council of: (a) any signature without reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance; (b) any signature with reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance; (c) the deposit of any instrument of ratification or acceptance; (d) the date of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Protocol.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 265 Done at Strasbourg, this 6th day of May 1963, in English and French, both text being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary-General shall transmit certified copies to each of the signatory States

4. PROTECTING CERTAIN ADDITIONAL RIGHTS The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of Europe, Being resolved to take steps to ensure the collective enforcement of certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in Section 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Convention’) and in Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention, signed at Paris on 20 March 1952, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 No one shall be deprived of his liberty merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation. Article 2 (1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety for the maintenance of ‘ordre public’, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of rights and freedoms of others. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, in particular areas, to restrictions imposes in accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic society. Article 3 (1) No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or

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of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he is a national. No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national. Article 4 Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited. Article 5 (1) Any High Contracting Party may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Protocol, or at any time thereafter, communicate to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe a declaration stating the extent to which it undertakes that the provisions of this Protocol shall apply to such of the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible as are named therein. Any High Contracting Party which has communicated a declaration in virtue of the preceding paragraph may, from time to time, communicate a further declaration modifying the terms of any former declaration or terminating the application of the provisions of this Protocol in respect of territory. A declaration made in accordance with this article shall be deemed to have been made in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 63 of the Convention. The territory of any State to which this Protocol applies by virtue of the ratification or acceptance by that State, and each territory to which this Protocol is applied by virtue of a declaration by that State under this article, shall be treated as separate territories for the purpose of the references in Articles 2 and 3 to the territory of a State. Article 6 (1) As between the High Contracting Parties the provisions of Articles 1 to 5 of this Protocol shall be regarded as additional articles to the convention, and all the provisions of the Convention shall apply accordingly. Nevertheless, the right of individual recourse recognized by a declaration made under Article 25 of the convention, or the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the court by a declaration made under Article 46 of the convention, shall not be effective in relation to this Protocol unless the High Contracting Party concerned has made a statement recognizing such a right, or accepting

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 267 such jurisdiction, in respect of all or any of Articles 1 to 4 of the Protocol. Article 7 (1) This Protocol shall be open for signature by the members of the Council of Europe who are the signatories of the Convention; it shall be ratified at the same time as or after the ratification of the Convention. It shall enter into force after the deposit of five instruments of ratification. As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the Protocol shall enter into force at the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, who will notify all members of the names of those who have ratified.

In witness thereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Protocol. Done at Strasbourg, this 16th day of September 1963, in English and French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary-General shall transmit certified copies to each of the signatory States.

5. AMENDING ARTICLES 22 AND 40 OF THE CONVENTION The Governments signatory hereto, being Members of the Council of Europe, Considering that certain inconveniences have arisen in the application of the provisions of Articles 22 and 40 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and fundamental Freedoms signed at Rome of 4th November 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Convention’) relating to the length of the terms of office of the members of the European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commission’) and of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Court’); Considering that it is desirable to ensure as far as possible an elec-

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tion every three years of one half of the members of the Commission and of one third of the members of the Court; Considering therefore that it is desirable to amend certain provisions of the Convention, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 In Article 22 of the Convention, the following two paragraphs shall be inserted after paragraph (2): “(3) In order to ensure that, as far as possible, one half of the membership of the Commission shall be renewed every three years, the Committee of Ministers may decide, before proceeding to any subsequent election, that the term or terms of office of one or more members to be elected shall be for a period other than six years but not more than nine and not less than three years. (4) In cases where more than one term of office is involved and the Committee of Ministers applies the preceding paragraph, the allocation of the terms of office shall be effected by the drawing of lots by the Secretary-General, immediately after the election.” Article 2 In Article 22 of the Convention, the former paragraphs (3) and (4) shall become respectively paragraphs (5) and (6). Article 3 In Article 40 of the Convention, the following two paragraphs shall be inserted after paragraph (2): “(3) In order to ensure that, as far as possible, one half of the membership of the Court shall be renewed every three years, the Consultative Assembly may decide, before proceeding to any subsequent election, that the term or terms of office of one or more members to be elected shall be for a period other than nine years but not more than twelve and not less than six years. (4) In cases where more than one term of office is involved and the Consultative Assembly applies the preceding paragraph, the allocation of the terms of office shall be effected by the drawing of lots by the Secretary-General, immediately after the election.” Article 4 In Article 40 of the Convention, the former paragraphs (3) and (4)

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 269 shall become respectively paragraphs (5) and (6). Article 5 (1) This Protocol shall be open to signature by Members of the Council of Europe, signatories to the Convention, who may become Parties to it by; (a) signature without reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance; (b) signature with reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance, followed by ratification or acceptance. Instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. This Protocol shall enter into force as soon as all Contracting Parties to the Convention shall have become Parties to the Protocol, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe shall notify the Members of the Council of: (a) any signature without reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance; (b) any signature with reservation in respect of ratification or acceptance; (c) the deposit of any instrument of ratification or acceptance; (d) the date of entry into force of this Protocol in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Protocol. Done at Strasbourg, this 20th day of January 1966, in English and French, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary-General shall transmit certified copies to each of the signatory Governments.

FURTHER INFORMATION: For information on the status of ratification of the ECHR by

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individual states, see: conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm For information on the background of the ECHR, see: press.coe.int/ECHR50/Default.asp?L=2&ID=35 The ICCPR can be viewed at: www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm The ICESCR can be viewed at: www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm

DEBATE POINTS:

?

A majority of those states which are a party to the ECHR are also signatories of global human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Where the rights set out in this regional convention are interpreted differently from those in other international conventions and agreements between states, which convention should take precedent? Legally, the issue of precedence, and also of interpretation of treaties, is complex and, in reality, the enforcement bodies work hard to try and ensure that they do not conflict one another. But, should local and regional laws — in line with local democratic will — rule, or should truly international agreements, in which the broadest possible consensus has been sought, take priority? Do you agree that the Convention has been successful, in light of the multitude of abuses of fundamental rights and freedoms by both state and non-state actors frequently reported in Europe? How can the existence of laws and standards such as the ECHR and the facts of human rights abuse be reconciled?

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Glossary Amicus Curiae: a party that is not involved in a particular litigation but that is allowed by the court to advise it on a matter of law or fact directly affecting the litigation. Anachronism: the representation of someone as existing or something as happening in other than chronological, proper, or historical order. Apartheid: policies of racial segregation formerly practiced in the Republic of South Africa, involving political, legal, and economic discrimination against nonwhites. Ashkali/Ashkalija: a group in southeastern Europe claiming to have an identity separate from the Roma, but are generally regarded as “Gypsies” by non-Roma; considered by many Roma to be Albanianspeaking Roma who deny their origins and are in search of an identity distinct from the stigmatised Romani identity. Assimilation: the process whereby a minority group gradually adopts the customs and attitudes of the majority culture. Asylum: a place offering protection and safety; shelter; protection and immunity from extradition accorded to a person fleeing persecution in another country. Bureaucracy: administration of a government chiefly through bureaus or departments staffed with non-elected officials, the departments and their officials as a group. Caste: a social system or the principle of grading society based on castes; a social class separated from others by distinctions of hereditary rank, profession, or wealth.

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De facto: in reality or fact; actually. De jure: according to law; by right. Defamatory: containing defamation; injurious to reputation; calumnious; slanderous; intending with words to cause ill repute; as, defamatory words; defamatory writings. Degrade: to reduce in grade, rank, or status; to demote; to lower in dignity, dishonor or disgrace; to reduce in worth or value. Degradation: the act or process of degrading; the state of being degraded. Demagogue: a leader of the rabble; one who attempts to control the multitude by specious or deceitful arts; an unprincipled and factious mob orator or political leader. Desegregation: to abolish or eliminate segregation; to open (a school or workplace, for example) to members of all races or ethnic groups, especially by force of law. To adopt policies aimed at removing the forcible separation of legally separated groups. Determinism: the doctrine that the will is not free, but is inevitably determined by motives. Diaspora: a dispersion of a people from their original homeland; the community formed by such a people. Discrimination: the act of discriminating; treatment or consideration based on class or category rather than individual merit; partiality or prejudice: racial discrimination. Disparate: fundamentally distinct or different in kind, entirely dissimilar. Emigrate: to leave one country or region to settle in another.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 273 Endemic: prevalent in or peculiar to a particular locality, region, or people. Ethnic Cleansing: the systematic elimination of an ethnic group or groups from a region or society, as by deportation, forced emigration, or genocide. Ethnicity: an ethnic quality or affiliation resulting from racial or cultural ties. Ethnocentrism: belief in the superiority of one’s own ethnic group; overriding concern with race. Ethnogenesis: the processes by which ethnic groups are created. Eugenics: the study of hereditary improvement of the human race by controlled selective breeding. Forum: a medium of open discussion or voicing of ideas, such as a newspaper or a radio or television program; a public meeting or presentation involving a discussion usually among experts and often including audience participation; a court of law; a tribunal. Ghetto: a section of a city occupied by a minority group who live there especially because of social or economic pressure or by legal order. Ghettoisation: to make into a ghetto; processes causing a ghetto to come into existence. Gypsy: a term commonly used by non-Roma for Romani groups, as well as other groups historically on the margins of Euro-Atlantic societies; originally indicating the purported Egyptian origins of Roma. Among many Roma, “Gypsy” is a pejorative term. Ideology: a set of doctrines or beliefs that form the basis of a political, economic, social or other system.

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Impunity: exemption from punishment, penalty, or harm. Incursion: an aggressive entrance into foreign territory; a raid or invasion; the act of entering another’s territory or domain. Integration: the bringing of people of different racial or ethnic groups into unrestricted and equal association, as into a society or an organization; implied is that the cultural norms and values of the group being “integrated” are not lost — i.e., are fully respected — by the group doing the “integrating”, and that coercive measures are not undertaken. Internally Displaced Person (IDP): one who flees to a shelter, or place of safety, in times of persecution or political commotion, without crossing national boundaries. Libel: a false publication, as in writing, print, signs, or pictures, that damages a person’s reputation; the act of presenting such material to the public. Lynch: to execute without due process of law, especially to hang, as by a mob; lawless killing. Nomadic: of or pertaining to nomads, or their way of life; wandering; moving from place to place for subsistence. Persecution: the act or practice of inflicting serious harm, often on a systematic basis. Pogrom: an organized, often officially encouraged massacre or persecution of a minority group. Populism: a political philosophy supporting the rights and power of the people in their struggle against a privileged elite; often with negative connotations, implying rabble-rousing.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 275 Prejudice: an adverse judgment or opinion formed beforehand or without knowledge or examination of the facts; a preconceived preference or idea; the act or state of holding unreasonable preconceived judgments or convictions. Propaganda: information that is spread for the purpose of promoting some cause. Racism: (i) the belief that race accounts for differences in human character or ability; (ii) the belief that a particular race is superior to others. Recidivist: someone who is repeatedly arrested for criminal behavior (especially for the same criminal behavior). Refugee: one who flees to a shelter, or place of safety, beyond their home country’s national boundaries, in times of persecution, political upheaval or war. Repatriation: to restore or return to the country of birth, citizenship, or origin. Roma: a diverse community of peoples living in Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa, linked especially by (i) mutual recognition as Roma, (ii) historical origins in India (from which today’s Romani people are believed to have left no later than the 10th century CEE), (iii) language (many — though not all — Roma are native speakers of the Romani language) and (iv) culture. Romani (language): The only Indo-Aryan language spoken exclusively in Europe since the middle ages. Phonology and lexicon point to an ancient affinity with the so-called Central Indo-Aryan languages, such as Hindi. An early form of Romani must have been spoken in Asia Minor by the eleventh or twelfth centuries. It absorbed Iranian and Armenian influences. The strongest impact however was Greek, which has made a significant contribution to Romani. Owing to the

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Greek impact, Early Romani as spoken in the late Byzantine period was already a member of the Balkan linguistic area. With the decline of the Byzantine period, Romani-speaking populations began to emigrate away from the Balkans, settling in central and in western Europe during the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This emigration carried with it a split into dialect branches, as Romani came into contact with a number of other languages, most notably Turkish, Romanian, Hungarian, Western Slavonic, and German. For more information on the Romani language, please see: lings.ln.man.ac.uk/Html/RMS/proj.html#whatis Sedentary: remaining or living in one area. Sedentarisation: the act of becoming sedentary. Segregation: the policy or practice of separating people of different races, classes, or ethnic groups, as in schools, housing, and public or commercial facilities, especially as a form of discrimination. Sinti: The self-identifying term for groups and/or individuals believed to be of Romani descent or with close affiliation to Roma, especially in Germany or in areas where Germans have historically lived. Squat: to settle on unoccupied land without legal claim; to occupy a given piece of public land in order to acquire title to it. Stereotype: a conventional, formulaic, and oversimplified conception, opinion, or image; one that is regarded as embodying or conforming to a set image or type. Stigma: to characterize or brand as disgraceful or ignominious. Stigmatisation: the act of stigmatizing. Subjugate: to bring under control; conquer; to make subservient; repress or enslave.

SECTION 4. APPENDIX ❖ 277

A SHORT LIST OF ROMANI WORDS AND PHRASES Compiled by Dragan Ristic2 T’aves baxtalo/t’aves baxtali — “May you be happy” Sar san? — “How are you?” La?ho djes — “Good day” La?hi detharin — Good morning” La?hi ratji — “Good evening” Sar bu?hol tuke — “What is your name?” Katar san — “Where are you from?” ?ukar — nice, beautiful, pretty D?ungalo/d?ungali — ugly Xamos — food Pimos — drink Pakiv — trust, honor Jakha - eyes Nakh — nose Muj — face, mouth Kham — sun Bir?ind — rain ?erhain, (devleski memeli) — stars, (“God’s candles”) Kamav tut — “I love you.” Av manca - “Come with me.” Grast — horse Gurumni/guruvni — cow Kher — house Pustik — book Ramol — to write Ginavel — to read (also “drabarel”) Luma — the world Pani, paj — water Parno/parni - white Kalo/kali — black Galbeno — yellow Vareso aver — something else, something different

NOTES Only the substantive articles of the Convention and its Protocols have been included here. The full text of the Convention is available at: conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/WhatYouWant.asp?NT=005 2 Dragan Ristic is founder of the Romani theatre group Vareso Aver and Romani language consultant to the European Roma Rights Center. 1