Religion and Security in South and Central Asia

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Religion and Security in South and Central Asia

Religion and security play an important role in traditional societies. In South and Central Asia, traditional and moderate Islamic beliefs and practices with strong indigenous and Sufi content are diametrically opposed to radical Wahabi and Taliban brands of Islam intolerant of other cultures and groups. The emergence of radical extremist and violent Islamist movements poses serious challenges to the secular and democratic polity, inter-religious harmony, security and territorial integrity of states in the region. As such, religious extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking and arms smuggling are viewed by various countries in South and Central Asia and also in the West as the main threats to their security. Against this backdrop, this book provides local perspectives on religion, security, history and geopolitics in South Asia and Central Asia in an integrated manner. Presenting a holistic and updated view of the developments inside and across South and Central Asia, it offers concise analyses by experts on the region. Contributors discuss topics such as the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the politics and practice of Islamist terrorism in India, and the security challenges posed by religious radicalism in Bangladesh. The book makes a significant contribution to South and Central Asian Studies, as well as studies on regional security. K. Warikoo is Director of the Central Asian Studies Programme at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He has authored several books on Kashmir, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and is the founding editor of the quarterly journal Himalayan and Central Asian Studies.

Central Asia research forum


Series Editor: Shirin Akiner, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

Other titles in the series Sustainable Development in Central Asia Edited by Shirin Akiner, Sander Tideman & John Hay Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia Michal Biran Tajikistan Edited by Mohammad-Reza Djalili, Frederic Gare & Shirin Akiner Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century Tradition and survival Islam Karimov Tradition and Society in Turkmenistan Gender, oral culture and song Carole Blackwell Life of Alimqul A native chronicle of nineteenth century Central Asia Edited and translated by Timur Beisembiev Central Asia Aspects of transition Edited by Tom Everrett-Heath The Heart of Asia A history of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the earliest times Frances Henry Skrine and Edward Denison Ross

The Caspian Politics, energy and security Edited by Shirin Akiner & Anne Aldis


Islam and Colonialism Western perspectives on Soviet Asia Will Myer Azeri Women in Transition Women in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan Farideh Heyat The Post-Soviet Decline of Central Asia Sustainable development and comprehensive capital Eric Sievers Prospects for Pastoralism in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan From state farms to private flocks Edited by Carol Kerven Muslim Reformist Political Thought Revivalists, modernists and free will Sarfraz Khan Economic Development in Kazakhstan The role of large enterprises and foreign investment Anne E. Peck

Energy, Wealth and Governance in the Caucasus and Central Asia Lessons not learned Edited by Richard Auty and Indra de Soysa The Politics of Knowledge in Central Asia Science between Marx and the market Sarah Amsler The Economics and Politics of Oil in the Caspian Basin The redistribution of oil revenues in Azerbaijan and Central Asia Edited by Boris Najman, Richard Pomfret and Gaël Raballand

The Political Economy of Reform in Central Asia Uzbekistan under authoritarianism Martin C. Spechler


Religion and Security in South and Central Asia Edited by K.Warikoo


Religion and Security in South and Central Asia

Edited by K. Warikoo

First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016


Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2011. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

© 2011 K. Warikoo The right of K. Warikoo to be identified as editor of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Religion and security in South and Central Asia / [edited by] K. Warikoo. p. cm. – (Central Asia research forum) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Islam and state–South Asia. 2. Islam and state–Asia, Central. 3. National security–South Asia. 4. National security–Asia, Central. 5. Islamic fundamentalism–South Asia. 6. Islamic fundamentalism–Asia, Central. I. Warikoo, K. (Kulbhushan), 1951– DS341.R47 2011 320.5’570954–dc22 2010018047 ISBN 0-203-84023-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN: 978-0-415-57590-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-84023-8 (ebk)


Contents

1

List of tables List of contributors Acknowledgements

ix x xi

Introduction

1

K. WARIKOO

2

Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan and Pakistan

10

FREDERIC GRARE

3

Pakistan’s slide towards Talibanisation

23

SUSHANT SAREEN

4

Resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan: implications for regional security

37

DEEPALI GAUR SINGH

5

Roads to perdition?: the politics and practice of Islamist terrorism in India

52

PRAVEEN SWAMI

6

Islamist extremism in Kashmir

67

K. WARIKOO

7

Communal peace in India: lessons from multicultural Banaras

83

PRIYANKAR UPADHYAYA

8

Islamist extremism and the terror network in Bangladesh SMRUTI S. PATTANAIK

96

viii

Contents

9 Religious radicalism in Bangladesh: security challenges to India

115

C. A. JOSUKUTTY

10 Hizb ut-Tahrir: the destabilising force in Central Asia

124

MAHESH RANJAN DEBATA

11 Islamic radicalism in Central Asia

139


MURAT LAUMULIN

12 Islam in contemporary Tajikistan: role of Muslim leaders

150

MUZAFFAR OLIMOV

13 Ethnic-religious separatism in Xinjiang: challenge to China’s security 164 K. WARIKOO

Notes Bibliography Index

183 207 212


Tables

2.1 Coalition forces across the world 13.1 Population of main ethnic groups in Xinjiang 13.2 Nationality structure of the districts in Xinjiang in 1994

18 167 168


Contributors

Dr. Mahesh Ranjan Debata is Assistant Professor, Central Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Dr. Frederic Grare is associated with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, USA. Dr. C.A. Josukutty teaches in Maharajas College, Ernakulam, Kerala. Dr. Murat Laumulin is Director, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, Almaty, Kazakhstan. Dr. Muzaffar Olimov is the Director, Research Centre SHARQ, Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Dr. Smruti S Pattanaik is Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Sushant Sareen is Executive Editor, Public Opinion Trends, New Delhi. Dr. Deepali Gaur Singh is a specialist on Afghanistan and author of the book Drugs Production and Trafficking in Afghanistan, (Pentagon Press, 2007). Praveen Swami, Deputy Editor, Frontline and the author of India, Pakistan and the Secret of Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004, (Routledge, 2006). Professor Priyankar Upadhyaya is Director, Malaviya Center for Peace Research, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi. Professor K. Warikoo is Director, Central Asian Studies Programme, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.


Acknowledgements

I acknowledge with thanks all the contributors to this book, for sharing their expertise, knowledge and experience through their papers. I am particularly grateful to the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation for having authorised me to produce this book, which is based on the papers presented at a Seminar organised by this Foundation, published by Routledge both in print and electronic editions. Last but not least, I would like to thank Dr. Mahesh Ranjan Debata for his assistance. K. Warikoo, 30 December 2009


1

Introduction


K. Warikoo

Religion and culture play an important role in traditional societies. The traditional and moderate Islamic beliefs and practices with strong indigenous and Sufi content in South and Central Asia are diametrically opposed to the radical Wahhabi and Taliban ideologies and practices which are intolerant of other cultures and groups. The emergence of radical and extremist Islamist movements in South and Central Asia is the main source of instability and conflict in this region. The rise of radical Islamist groups has been influenced by the leading ideologues of Islamic fundamentalist thought – Sheikh Muhammad ibn-Abd-al-Wahab (1703–91), Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (1839–97), Ali Shariati (1933–77), Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini (1909–89) – leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Party of Iran, Hassan-al-Banna (1906–49) – founder of the Ikhwan-al-Muslameen (Muslim Brotherhood) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and Maulana Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903–79) of Pakistan – the first Amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami. These ideologues emphasised that political power is indispensable to the establishment of an Islamic state. The emphasis by the Islamist radicals on the supremacy of their ideology and practice of pan-Islamism which is based on the concept of Ummah (community of believers), transcending national boundaries, ethnicities, creeds, race and all other distinctions, is at the root of violence, conflict and instability in parts of South and Central Asia and elsewhere. If one goes by the strict definition of the term “Islamic fundamentalism”, it stands for a return to the doctrines of Islam in their original form as were practised in medieval times. It could also mean idealising the historical past of Islam and calling for a return to “pure and original Islam”, which can be achieved through peaceful, lawful, cultural and spiritual means. But in practice, the focus of religious radicals has been Islamisation of the state rather than the reform of individuals. Though Muslims like any other non-Muslims have multiple identities – religious, ethnic, tribal, linguistic or territorial – the emphasis by the religious extremists on the Islamic communal identity puts them on a collision course with the state and other groups. A section of Islamist intellectuals, Ulemma and activists have been seeking to blur the distinction between Islam as a religion and nationalism. They prop up the


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Islamic political consciousness by politicising already existing religious traditions and practices and by resisting change and modernisation. The concept of Ummah or Millat is being invoked to abet, support and legitimise the secessionist movements of Muslims living in non-Muslim states. Religious extremism poses a major challenge to the secular and democratic polity, pluralistic social order and inter-religious harmony. The concepts of Dar-al-Islam (country where Islamic law prevails) and Dar-al-Harb (country where Islamic law does not prevail) and jihad (holy war) as advocated by the Islamists envisage a perpetual state of confrontation between Islamic and non-Islamic states. The division of humanity into two clear cut groups – the faithful (momin) and the un-faithful (kafir) and the stringent rules laid down for the aliens (zimmis) or the subjugated communities, thus drawing a dividing line between the Muslims and nonMuslims, is at the core of Islamic fundamentalist ideology propounded and practised by the extremists. While propagating puritanism and puritan life style and the meticulous observance of the prescribed code of conduct, the Islamist extremists isolate the liberal Muslims from the faithful (momin) and try to coerce them into submission. In pursuit of this ideology, stress is laid on construction of mosques, acquisition of land for congregational prayers and graveyards, building of madrassas, teaching of Islamic theology, enforcement of their injunctions at gun-point, censuring the veneration of ziarats (shrines) and sufis, closure of places of entertainment, exclusion of music and fine arts, strict observance of hadith or tradition, and indoctrination of Muslim minds at all levels, making religion and politics essentially complementary to each other and negating the achievements of democracy, secularism and modernisation. The Islamists do not agree with the modern concept of democracy and secularism. To a jihadi, Islam is his religion and his nation. To him, Islam transcends geographical boundaries, ethnicities, creed, race and all other distinctions. Maulana Mawdudi, while describing all other systems as irredeemably flawed, floated the idea of pan-Islamic jihad and gave the call for use of arms. He believed that democracy led to chaos, greed and mob rule, that capitalism fostered class warfare and inequalities and that communism stifled human initiative and curbed freedom of religion. So, Mawdudi proposed jihad and an Islamic state as the only remedy to these ills of modern times. In theory, jihad in Islam was meant to cerate an egalitarian social order where the poor and the deprived would be treated fairly and with dignity. But what would have been a social, political or economic struggle against inequality, injustice and deprivation, has been turned into Qital (violence) by Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other Islamist militant groups which have been spearheading extremism and terrorism. The rhetoric of political Islam gained popularity due to its response to growing economic disparity and discontent, corruption, political failures, and the moral bankruptcy of modern and Western material culture and value system. The Cold War era witnessed the rise of Islamic fundamentalists to


Introduction

3

power – in Iran through Islamic revolution, in Sudan through military coup and in Algeria through democratic means. And the post-Cold War era saw the resurgence of Islam in Central Asia particularly in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, radicalisation of society and politics in Bangladesh and Pakistan, and the rise of Mujahideen and the Taliban to power in Afghanistan. The Islamic challenge is further compounded by the booming Muslim population, and the growing number of devout, conservative and assertive individuals making up the Muslim middle class alongwith their rising socio-economic profile. Wahhabi social and cultural conservatism, Qutbist political radicalism, Khomeini’s ideology of exporting Islamic revolution, Jamaat-e-Islami’s panIslamism and Hizb ut-Tahrir’s concept of an Islamic Caliphate based on Shariah provided the ideological foundation of militant political Islam which in turn provided a fertile base for the militarised form of Islam represented by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. It hardly needs to be emphasised that the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other extremist terrorist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, East Turkestan Liberation Organization, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) etc. have been in the forefront of violence and terrorism in South and Central Asia. With the disintegration of the former USSR and the emergence of newly independent Central Asian states – all having a predominantly Muslim population – a new geopolitical situation arose in the region. Due to its geostrategic proximity to Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and China, and being a distinct geopolitical entity, developments in Central Asia and adjoining regions have a direct bearing on South Asia. The rise of the Taliban to power in Kabul in September 1996, which turned Afghanistan into the centre of religious extremism, global terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking, brought the entire region into the focus of global attention. The establishment of a radical Islamist order in Afghanistan and the active involvement of armed Islamist militants in cross-border terrorism and jihad (holy war), whether in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan or some other CIS countries, has adversely affected regional security, peace and stability in South and Central Asia. The Afghanistan crisis influenced all the Central Asian Republics. The rise to power of the Taliban affected those countries, which were seeking to build secular democratic states. In Central Asia, pan-Islamic ideology gained popular appeal due to its rejection of moral degradation, erosion of values and corruption caused by modernisation, communism, and economic and political failures. It was also a reaction to the moral bankruptcy of modernity and alien Western values. Islam came to be projected as a better alternative to secularism, materialism and communist social and political order. Islamic revivalism offered a viable route to the Central Asian Muslims in their rediscovery of Islamic roots and cultural heritage and in their search for Central Asian identity in the post-Soviet order. However, the majority of the


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Central Asian Muslims who belong to the Hanafi sect of Sunni Muslims and are mostly the followers of indigenous Sufi orders, are averse to adopting the rigid puritan brand of Islam being propagated by extraneous pan-Islamist zealots. The strong national consciousness of Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kyrgyz identities is deep rooted in the respective Central Asian Republics which are unlikely to allow the collective pan-Islamic Caliphate sought by the Islamists. Besides, the experience of violent conflict, bloodshed and huge economic losses suffered by Tajikistan and Afghanistan acts as a stark reminder to the Central Asian people of the worst possible implications of Islamist extremism in the region. Though the Central Asian Republics followed different approaches to the Afghan conflict, they have shown unanimity over the threats posed by the religious radicalism of Taliban, terrorism and drug trafficking. The first wave of political Islam appeared in Tajikistan in 1992 seeking to make the country an Islamic state. Tajikistan witnessed bloody civil war and conflict during the early and mid-1990s, which fragmented the society and polity, besides causing severe economic damage to the country. In the late 1990s, the country moved forward towards reconciliation between Islamic opposition and the government. After the Tajik settlement, the Uzbek militants who fought alongside the Tajik Islamists broke away and openly linked up with the Taliban. The crisis deepened during the Taliban period when Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda turned Afghanistan into the hub of international terrorism and narco-trafficking. Even though war against terror in Afghanistan was launched over seven years ago, Al Qaeda and the Taliban are now posing even greater threat to peace and stability in Afghanistan and the entire region. The new disturbing trend is that the resurgent Taliban are adopting Iraq style suicide bomb attacks resulting in large scale death and destruction. Since early 2004, Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Waziristan areas of Pakistan have become the havens from where armed bands of Pashtun, Uzbek, Chechen, Uyghur and Arab extremists and terrorists belonging to bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) have been operating and striking at different places. These groups support bin Laden’s pan-Islamic ideology and work for the establishment of an independent Islamic Caliphate comprising Central Asia, Afghanistan and Xinjiang. The events in Pakistan have demonstrated that by using extremist ideology and terrorism as the tools to expand the strategic, ideological and even economic frontiers in South and Central Asia, the patron state has brought peril to itself. So much so that Pakistan’s parliament for the first time recognized the threat from extremism and terrorism, when in a joint session it unanimously passed a resolution on 22 October 2008 stating that “extremism, militancy and terrorism in all forms and manifestations pose a grave danger to the stability and integrity of the nation state”. During 2009, a record number of Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces died in militant violence, propelling Pakistan into the ranks of


Introduction

5

the world’s most perilous places. There were over 12,600 violent deaths across Pakistan, which is 14 times more than in 2006, in the spate of suicide bombings and militant attacks by the Taliban and Pakistan-based Tehrik-eTaliban. The Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Jaishe-Mohammad and Al Qaeda are closely allied and have been pursuing a common anti-west and anti-India agenda. The Pakistani establishment, particularly the army and intelligence agencies, seeks to use these jihadi groups as instruments of securing Pakistan’s strategic depth in Afghanistan and Central Asia vis-à-vis India. This explains Pakistan’s military’s reluctance to take on Siraj Haqqani, the Afghan jihadi chief, who has been operating from North Waziristan. To quote the well known Pakistani analyst Ahmed Rashid, the Pak army is loath to even acknowledge the presence of the Afghan Taliban leadership that is based in Baluchistan province and North Waziristan. The Pakistan army is likely to push Afghan President, Hamid Karzai to accept a Pakistani brokered deal to form a pro-Pakistan government with the Taliban in Kabul. Hence, the continuing state of violence, conflict and instability in the region. Central Asia has been experiencing turbulence, though the existing governments have managed to control the religious extremist eruptions. Historically speaking, Islam has had deep roots in Uzbekistan. Even during the Soviet period, the structural relationship between religion (in the form of Mufti) and state was retained. The clergy is strong and can influence society and politics in Uzbekistan. In Central Asia, the focus of Islamic revivalist and radical groups has been the Ferghana valley, a densely populated and Uzbek dominated territory divided between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Religious radicals and Hizb ut-Tahrir have been quite active in Uzbekistan which has been a centre of traditional Islamic learning and scientific knowledge. Way back in December 1991, some Uzbek Muslim youth led by Tohir Yuldashev and Jumaboi Khojaev (alias Juma Namangani) organised protests in Namangan. Later on, they formed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which started receiving funds from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Whereas Juma Namangani fought alongside the Islamist radicals in Tajikistan, Yuldashev went to Chechnya to fight against the Russians. After the rise of Taliban to power in Kabul in September 1996, both Namangani and Yuldashev announced the formation of the IMU at Kabul, with Namangani as the Amir and Yuldashev as its military commander. In 1998, the IMU joined the IIF of bin Laden. The IMU aimed at the overthrow of President Islam Karimov and the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. The period 1996–2001 saw the IMU operating from Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan and stepping up its activities inside Central Asia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular. Later in 2001, the IMU changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT), calling for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia comprising five Central


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Asian Republics and Xinjiang province of China. After Namangani and a number of IMU cadres were reportedly killed in a US military strike in October 2001, Yuldashev along with remaining IMU cadres shifted his base to South Waziristan in Pakistan. Though the Islamist groups have gone underground due to strong and tough government measures, the ideological influence of these groups and organizations over the people in Uzbekistan remains strong. Islam Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan in his prognosis of the situation in Central Asia, dilates upon the “deceptive attraction” of Islamic fundamentalist Wahhabi ideology to a section of Muslims in Central Asia ascribing the same to its populist ideas of justice, rejection of luxury, greed and corruption. He, in unambiguous terms, rejects the ideas of “politicisation of Islam and Islamisation of politics”, drawing a clear distinction between the cultural and spiritual values of Islam and its misuse for gaining and exercising political power. Karimov views Islamic fundamentalism as a threat to Uzbekistan as it would disrupt peace, stability and civil and inter-ethnic harmony, and also discredit democracy, secular polity, and the multi-ethnic and multi-religious state of independent Uzbekistan. He stressed the need to promote traditional Islam in order to neutralise the threat of Islamic fundamentalists and extremists. Islam Karimov’s prognosis of the situation in Central Asia demonstrates the fact that the leadership in Central Asian states is alive to the threats to security and stability of these newly independent countries. The void left by the setback and casualties suffered by the IMU after 9/11, has been filled up by a new wave of political and militant Islam represented by the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party). Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to be a pan-Islamic movement seeking to overthrow the existing political order and to build an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia. The religious extremists and terrorists have been operating under the banners of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Akromiya, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Tableeghi Jamaat in Central Asia. President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan has been expressing his concern over the existence of extremism, separatism and terrorism in the region, which he describes as “forms of war”. Nazarbayev points to the “agitation by Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-Tahrir in South Kazakhstan and Zhambyl oblasts”. Religious radicals in Central Asia are reported to have joined together in 2002, under the umbrella of a new underground organisation called the Islamic Movement of Central Asia which brings together the IMU, Kyrgyz and Tajik radicals and Uyghur separatists, sharing a common objective of forming the Islamic State in Central Asia. Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Tajikistan joined the Tajik government after the peace accord was signed in 1997. As such the Islamic movement in Tajikistan used both its political organisation and armed wing to secure power. Today it has both the legally recognised political party and also an illegal political group which are operating clandestinely. Religious radicals and secessionists have been challenging China’s sovereignty in its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. China is concerned over


Introduction

7

the three evils of religious extremism, international terrorism and separatism, which are seen as major challenges to regional peace and security. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China occupies a pivotal position in Asia with its borders touching Mongolia, the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, Afghanistan and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Holding the distinction of being the largest province of China, Xinjiang is still the only autonomous region where Muslims are in the majority. Such a curious interplay of geography and history has turned Xinjiang into the crossroads of Central, South and East Asia. Chinese fears of the rise of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkic consciousness among the Muslims of Xinjiang are compounded by the recurrent clashes between the Han Chinese and local Uyghur/Kazakh/Kyrgyz Muslims in Xinjiang. Though there prevails an aura of general peace and stability in Xinjiang, Chinese sovereignty over this region is being questioned by the local Turkic Muslim separatists, who receive support from the Uyghur and Kazakh emigrés settled abroad. China considers herself to be an important player in the new geopolitics of the region not only because it shares nearly 3,000 kms of its strategic frontiers in Xinjiang with the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but also due to cross-border fraternisation of the Muslim-Turkic population inhabiting this area, which makes China’s borders vulnerable to ethnic and religious separatism. Terrorism when blended with the fire and zeal of jihad becomes a deadly mix posing a major challenge to security in South and Central Asia. One can only imagine the situation that would have been created by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations in the region had there been no 9/11 and the consequent US-led global campaign against terrorism. The emergence of radical and violent religious movements poses serious challenge to secular and democratic polity, pluralistic social order, inter-religious harmony, security and territorial integrity of states in the region. As such, the international community and the Central Asian Republics, China, India and Russia in particular view religious extremism, separatism, terrorism, drug trafficking and arms smuggling as the main threats to their security. It is high time that the academics, media, civic society, states and international community distinguished between the traditional Islam and the one propounded by the jihadis and their mentors. It may be pointed out that Sufism and moderate traditional Islam, which is syncretic, pluralistic and against political and radical Islam, has been facing the brunt of violence unleashed by the Islamist radicals, whether in Kashmir, Afghanistan or Pakistan. Whereas the Islamist militants burnt down several historical Muslim shrines in Kashmir few years ago, in early 2009 the Taliban bombed the famous shrine of seventeenth-century Sufi Rehman Baba, the most widely read Pashto poet on both sides of the Durand Line. Needless to say, the jihadis, by their barbaric acts of terror, bring into disrepute the religion they claim to profess. The silent majority of traditional, moderate and liberal Muslims, who practise Islam in accordance with the principles of tolerance


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and non-discrimination, assert and organise themselves against the extremist Islamists. For their part, governments and secular societies need to help in preserving, restoring and emphasising the indigenous, traditional and diverse Islamic practices and institutions, which have been prevalent in different parts of the world. It is against this background that this book presents coherent and concise yet detailed analyses of religion, security, geopolitics and geostrategy in South and Central Asia, in an integrated manner. Eminent academia, area specialists and experts from Jawaharlal Nehru University, Banaras Hindu University and the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses at New Delhi besides prominent experts from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the USA, have contributed to this volume. Dr Frederic Grare makes a critical analysis of the resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan, which can prove extremely destructive both for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Sushant Sareen, while tracing Pakistan’s slide towards Talibanisation, examines the rapid expansion of Taliban influence from the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan into the settled districts of NWFP and even in Punjab and Sindh. Resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and its implications for regional security are analysed by Dr Deepali Gaur Singh. Praveen Swami, a noted commentator and author, focuses on the politics and practice of Islamist terrorism in India. He explains that the well tempered jihad’s impact on Indian political life has been considerable – and bearing in mind its close relationship with Pakistan, could have serious consequences for regional stability. Professor K. Warikoo traces the rise of Islamist extremism in Kashmir, which was till only two decades back the valley of composite culture and harmony. He discusses the implications of the ideology and policy of pan-Islamism which is based on the concept of Ummah transcending national boundaries, practised by the Islamist fundamentalist and secessionist groups in Kashmir, for peace and stability in the region. Professor Priyankar Upadhyaya presents an empirical study of the holy city of Banaras (Uttar Pradesh, India) as a unique example of intercultural harmony and communal peace. Dr. Smruti S. Pattanaik’s paper on Islamist extremism and the terror network in Bangladesh takes up the case of Bangladesh, which has the potential to emerge as a hotbed of international terrorist networks. C. A. Josukutty pursues the study on Bangladesh further by focusing on the security challenges posed for India by religious radicalism in Bangladesh. He traces the linkages of the terrorist attacks in India to the fundamentalist outfits in Bangladesh. Dr Mahesh Ranjan Debata has analysed the extremist and terrorist activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir and its security implications for Central Asia. Dr. Murat Laumulin of Kazakhstan provides a well considered Central Asian perspective on the development of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia. Dr Muzaffar Olimov of Tajikistan presents an insider view of the upsurge of Islamic movements in Central Asia over the last two decades, particularly in Tajikistan. He also draws attention to the dilemma faced by the Central Asian Republics over the definition of the place

Introduction

9


of Islam in public life, relations between Islam and the state, and the place and role of Mullahs in the modern society of Tajikistan and Central Asia. The book concludes with a chapter by Professor K. Warikoo on the problem of ethno-religious separatism in Xinjiang and its challenge to China’s security. With Xinjiang becoming as the hub of trans-Asian trade and traffic and also due to its energy resources, the Muslims of Xinjiang are poised to assert their socio-economic and political position, thereby leading to the Chinese fears of Pan-Turkic solidarity in the region.

2



Frederic Grare

More than eight years after the international intervention which followed 9/11, the Taliban are back in Afghanistan and, although they are in no position to challenge the regime, are increasingly assertive. Once thought defeated, they have regained strength. Regrouped and reorganized, better equipped and financed, and tactically more sophisticated, they are now threatening the reconstruction process. As the Carnegie expert Ashley Tellis has observed, “since the successful presidential election in October 2004, the Taliban insurgency has metastasized in scale, intensity and fury.”1 With the exception of the summer 2006, when the Taliban confronted ISAF forces frontally, their tactics remain limited to “hit-and-run attacks.” Yet their influence is increasingly being felt in areas from where it was previously absent. A new phenomenon is equally worrisome: the emergence and rise of Taliban movement within Pakistan itself. The novelty though is not its presence on Pakistan territory but the fact that the objective is no longer “limited” to Afghanistan alone: the Taliban is targeting Pakistani forces themselves, historically their main source of support. The two phenomena are linked and share some characteristics but follow different logics in each of the two countries. Moreover, although the Pakistani Taliban do swear allegiance to Mullah Omar, there seems to be no real unity of command between the two. Organizational links between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban remain also very limited. In both the Afghan and Pakistani cases, however, the Taliban’s resurgence is facilitated by the gradual loss of legitimacy of the central authorities. In this context, the result of the February 18, 2008 Pakistani elections, which saw a spectacular rejection of Pervez Musharraf and his cronies, takes on a particular significance, opening new venues for hope but also for uncertainty. What is at stake is nothing less than the redefinition of Pakistan’s national interest in Afghanistan but also the fundamental issue of civil–military relations in Pakistan whose evolution will be decisive for the evolution of Islamabad’s policy towards Kabul. The present chapter examines the characteristics of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and analyzes the reasons behind the development of the two movements as well as their strengths and limitations. It also analyses the


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role of outside actors, in Pakistan in particular. It argues that the counterinsurgency operations have had a determining impact on the evolution of the movements themselves. Finally, the paper examines some of the potential consequences of the Pakistani elections for the future of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations.


Ethnic versus tribal factors in the Taliban phenomenon The Afghan Taliban movement is often portrayed as a phenomenon resulting from Pashtun alienation. Assessed through the lens of their participation in the successive governments which followed the Taliban overthrow in 2001, this is debatable. There were 14 Pashtun Ministers in the first Karzai government, and their number increased as time passed. Yet it is clear that Pashtuns were targeted as an ethnic group during and immediately after the international intervention. As asserted by Gilles Dorronsorro, the ethnic cleansing to which they have been subjected in the north has been tolerated or even connived at by the two principal backers of the government, Jamiat-e-Islami and Jombesh. In February 2002 some 20000 people fled from northern Afghanistan because of ethnic persecution. Today, there are several tens of thousands of Pashtun refugees in the South of the country.2 Because the Taliban were Pashtuns, the latter were systematically suspect in the eyes of both their Afghan compatriots of other ethnic groups but also of the international community. This undoubtedly played a role in the perception of their victimization. Yet, to characterize the Taliban as an ethnic movement is partly misleading. The Taliban is perhaps better understood as an intra-Pashtun rivalry between the two main tribes, the Ghilzai and the Durranis. Durrani Pashtuns have traditionally been considered the elite of Afghan society. President Karzai belongs to that specific tribe. By contrast, the Taliban primarily consist of rural Pashtuns from the Ghilzai confederation, who have historically been at odds with the smaller Durrani tribes. Within the Ghilzai tribes, the Taliban leadership comes primarily from the Hotaki, the tribe to which Mullah Omar belongs. Other components of the insurgency share the same tribal affiliation. Hizb-i-Islami’s Khalis faction was overwhelmingly composed of Ghilzai (and other eastern Pasthun tribesmen). Hizb-i-Islami’s Hekmatyar faction was 75 percent Pashtun, most of them Ghilzai.3 The Taliban areas of influence coincide closely with Ghilzai land. They include Uruzgan, Zabul, Dai Kundi and Gardez provinces as well as the Katawaz region of Paktika province. But a comparison with the area where the insurgency is the most active (northern districts of Kandahar, the northeastern districts of Helmand, the southern district of Zabul, and districts of

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Paktika, Paktia, Wardak and Logar), shows that, for the time being, the Taliban insurgency is focusing more on establishing their political dominance over Durrani lands in Kandahar and Helmand rather than trying to overthrow the Karzai government in Kabul.4


Motivations of the actors Different motivations characterize different groups of combatants all commonly defined as Taliban but the qualification covers various realities. It is today commonly admitted that the Afghan Taliban can be classified in three main categories: the radical leadership, based in Pakistan, the local recruits, and the spoilers. The radical leadership of the insurgency is composed of survivors from the anti-Soviet jihad who regrouped in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt after they fled Kabul in 2001. Not all of them were originally Taliban and they remain independent from each other, but their de facto division of labor is extremely effective. The Shura controlled by Mullah Omar, the “historic” leader of the Taliban, in Quetta, operates in Kandahar, Uruzgan and Helmand; Jallaludin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin, originally from the Hizb-i-Islami (Khales faction) but who later shifted to the Taliban, are particularly active in Paktia and Paktika; Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, who fought against the Taliban between 1994 and 1996, operates essentially in Kunar and Nuristan but also reaches as far as Loghman, Ghazni and Logar. All derive a substantial part of their support from the Deobandi networks based on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line and controlled by figures such as Fazl ur Rehman and Sami ul Haq.5 The local recruits are essentially the cannon fodder of the Taliban, although they also include mid-level commanders. Their policies are not devoid of opportunism; alignments may vary depending on threats or, conversely, on rewards they are likely to receive from one group or another, as well as on bonds of solidarity with other groups.6 Local recruits come essentially from the Afghan population. They belong to the people and are drawn into the insurgency for various reasons, ranging from political disenfranchisement or disputes over resources, to corruption or abuse by the local or international security forces.7 Much of the Taliban’s success in recruitment can be attributed to the inability or lack of political will of the Afghan central government itself. They all result in a gradual and sometimes complete alienation from the national government and its local representatives. The last group is essentially composed of opportunists whose motivations are neither ideological nor political but essentially self-interested. They do not necessarily seek to overthrow the government, but, rather to protect their lucrative businesses or local power positions. These characteristics hardly make the Taliban a cohesive group but rather an agglomeration of various motivations and frustrations, difficult – if not impossible – to channel into one single political project.


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Taliban tactics in Afghanistan It would, however, be a mistake to see the current Taliban movement as a simple repeat of the 1990s. Historical figures like Mullah Omar still dominate the scene and the link with Al Qaeda is stronger than ever. Yet the movement is also experiencing a real evolution and is increasingly influenced by other conflicts elsewhere in the Muslim world. After a few months during which guerilla actions were limited to ineffectual mortar attacks against US positions, the Taliban changed their strategy. As observed by Thomas H. Johnson, the past few years “have provided ample evidence of increasingly sophisticated insurgent tactics being imported from Iraq and grafted onto classic Mujahideen-style guerilla warfare.”8 Between 2001 and 2005, there were only 51 suicide attacks. The figure increased to 17 in 2005. There were 123 actual attacks in 2006 and some 77 between January 1 and June 30, 2007.9 They have become common-place throughout the country although they tend to be more frequent in Kandahar, Kabul and Khost. Similarly, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), both bodyborne and vehicle-borne, has increased. Taliban operations also involve larger units than was previously the case. After they were defeated by Operation Medusa, in which they tried to confront ISAF frontally, the Taliban changed their tactics in 2006 and resorted predominantly to suicide attacks and IEDs. As they regained confidence they started to operate again in larger units. The number of attacks involving more than 50 insurgents dramatically increased; battalion-size formations, 300 to 400 fighters, have occasionally been reported.10 The village of Musa Qala, in Helmand province, was taken over by such a unit in early February 2007. The village elders had previously concluded an agreement with the Helmand governor and the British forces. The local police were supposed to keep the Taliban out of the area if NATO forces remained outside the village. After the Taliban take-over, some 8,000 people fled Musa Qala out of fear of a NATO counter-attack which took place later in the year, forcing the Taliban out of the village.11 Unlike the Kabul government, the Taliban intuitively understood that the key to the insurgency was to deny the coalition and Afghan forces control of rural Pashtun territories. They rely essentially on intimidation and have convinced NGOs and international organizations to withdraw their personnel from the South, and are threatening to eliminate all who have collaborated with NATO or the Karzai government. The Taliban are also active on the propaganda front, using technologies ranging from the most traditional “night letters”12 to the most advanced, including satellite television and telephones. Unlike the previous Taliban generation, who were concerned only with their districts and whose preoccupations extended at most to the Afghan territory, the present one is succeeding in linking local frustrations with the fate of the global Muslim Ummah, using the internet and DVDs to merge Afghans’ daily frustrations


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and concerns with the humiliation and oppression of Muslims elsewhere in the world, including in Palestine and Iraq. The result is not a sudden conversion of the masses to the Taliban cause, but a slow yet steady contribution to the erosion of the Karzai government’s legitimacy as well as that of Western forces.13 The Taliban also provoke air strikes and collateral damages by fighting within the villages. The trade off between the killing of a few insurgents and the permanent loss of loyalty of any given village is always in favor of the Taliban, since civilian deaths always generate potential recruits.14 These developments show a growing sophistication in the way the Taliban think about guerilla warfare. Some have interpreted this as evidence of the influence of either Al Qaeda or Pakistan on the movement. What they do not show, however, beyond the Islamist rhetoric and the denunciation of the country’s occupation by international forces, is a better articulation of a coherent political project. Their objective remains to prevent the reconstruction of the central state.15

Pakistan’s role in the resurgence of the Afghan Taliban Pakistan cannot be held primarily responsible for the continuously deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Afghans of all ethnic and political affiliations view the domestic situation as the main cause of the insurgency and hold their government responsible for it. Indeed, Pakistan is correct in asserting that the Afghanistan government is trying to place the blame for its own failure on its neighbor. Yet Pakistan is partially responsible for the ongoing insurgency’s success. The insurgency started developing in a corridor 35 miles wide along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, across the provinces of Konar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand. Not only could the guerillas not operate without sanctuaries in Pakistan, but it is now obvious that insurgency benefits from active Pakistani support. It is probably no coincidence that the emergence of the Taliban took place between 2002 and 2004, when Pakistani forces were busy trying to eliminate “foreigners” linked to Al Qaeda from the FATA. With US attention focused on capturing Al Qaeda leaders, Islamabad tacitly allowed Afghan militants to regroup in Pakistan’s tribal regions. They were asked to lie low until they were gradually reactivated, Pakistani authorities cooperating with Taliban commanders who served Pakistani objectives. NATO officials considered Quetta as one of the epicenter of Taliban activity. It is not clear whether Pakistan has identified its final objectives in Afghanistan. Several factors are at play in Pakistan’s motivation to remain a dominant player in Afghan politics. The Pashtun question is one of them. It is a multidimensional issue. It is an ethnic, political and geopolitical problem. By supporting the Afghan Taliban, Islamabad is sending a signal to the Pashtuns that their land is in Afghanistan, and that every claim over any part



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of Pakistani territory based on the ethnic factor should be forgotten. It is also trying to promote the political interests of its Ghilzai clientele to make sure that Islamabad’s interests will be taken into account by the Afghan government. But it is also a brinkmanship strategy; by keeping Afghanistan in a state of low intensity conflict, Pakistan ensures the continuation of the foreign presence, its best guarantee against the dominance of any of its neighbors, in particular India. In this perspective, the decision to erect a fence along the Afghan–Pakistan border, announced by Pervez Musharaf at a conference in Rawalpindi in February 2006, was essentially a public relations exercise aimed at mollifying critics, both Afghan and Western, as well as allowing Pervez Musharraf to pretend that any subsequent Taliban activity originating from Pakistan was out of his control. In practice, fencing such a border is ineffective without cover of observation and fire. Moreover, the length of 35 kilometers planned in Waziristan or even 285, as planned for Balochistan, out of a 2,500 km.-long border, will have little impact on the cross border movement of militants.

Emergence of the Taliban in Pakistan The new phenomenon however, is the emergence of the Taliban movement in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. This emergence was primarily the result of Pakistan’s own involvement in Afghan affairs and of its ambivalence in the support it gave to the US effort in eliminating Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The coalition attack against Taliban forces in October 2001 came from the northern part of the country. The military objective was to sandwich Al Qaeda and the Taliban to eliminate them. Sealing the border as much as possible was from this perspective an absolute imperative. In Waziristan, however, the Miran Shah and Mirali routes were left open. These two routes were known for having been intensively used by the Mujahideen during the anti-Soviet jihad. Keeping them open was therefore a deliberate move on the part of a military establishment that had been forced to make a U-turn in its Afghan policy only a few weeks earlier.16 The emergence of the Pakistani Taliban also took place against a background of slow erosion of the tribal structures. The situation in South Waziristan is particularly significant of this development. Since the 1950s the demographic balance between the two main tribes, Mehsuds and Wazirs changed from 75–25 percent to roughly 50–50 percent, while the proportion of resources allocation from the center remained unchanged. In this context, the war in Afghanistan favored the emergence of a new kind of leadership, religiously colored but benefiting from the resources drawn from various trafficks in, or in relation with, Afghanistan. In this context, the Pakistani government’s decisions had a dramatic impact on the political landscape of the FATAs. Universal adult franchise was introduced in 1996 but political parties were banned from exercising


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their activities in the area. Operating from mosques and madrassas and not considered political parties, religious organizations such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam could continue to proselytize, as well as to support the Afghan Taliban, and to prepare the ground for the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban. The erosion of social structures was further amplified in recent years by the assassination of some 200 tribal leaders, often under charges of being Pakistani or American spies. Disoriented, and deprived of any alternative political presence, entire communities were left to the sole influence of the religious entrepreneurs, such as Nek Mohammed and others who made a fortune sheltering foreign combatants, and were able to provide locals with some security. The emergence of the Pakistani Taliban as a significant organization was however, a gradual phenomenon and partially the result of the oscillation between military operations and “peace agreements” taking place in the area. The former provided the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies with a local support that would have been more difficult to mobilize otherwise, the latter gave them the opportunity to reorganize and extend their networks. As late as December 2006, the International Crisis Group estimated the total figure for the militancy in the FATA at about 1,100 people, including no more than 100 hardened foreign fanatics and about 1,000 local accomplices.17 There were between 15 to 20 local militant groups in South Waziristan, and 10 to 12 in North Waziristan. The phenomenon took, however, a new turn in 2007 with the networking of all these small militant groups operating in the FATAs.18 They were soon joined by many other local extremist groups banned in Pakistan. Even groups of national importance such as the Jaish-eMohammad were attracted to the FATAs.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan One group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), deserves particular attention, not merely because it was held responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto by the Pakistani government, for which the leader of the TTP, Baitullah Mehsud, denied any responsibility, but more importantly because this organization now embodies the entire Taliban movement in Pakistan. Although the name was not new, the organization appeared in its present form as late as December 2007. It is essentially an umbrella organization regrouping existing local militant formations covering thus a very vast geographic area, including South Waziristan, all of FATA’s seven tribal agencies but also the Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki, Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buneer and Malakand from the settled areas of the NWFP. The TTP is moreover said to have some 5,000 combatants but it remains difficult to assess its real strength. Local youth sometimes join the militants as a way of earning a living or enhancing their social importance and power.19 The TTP’s main objective however is to “enforce Shariah, unite


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against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform defensive jihad against the Pakistan army.”20


Afghan and Pakistani Taliban: One organization? The link with the organization of Mullah Omar in Afghanistan is unclear. The organizations which comprise today the TTP support and are inspired by the Afghan Taliban. Former commanders such as the late Nek Mohammad or Abdullah Mehsud had participated in the anti-Soviet jihad, and later, against the Northern Alliance. Yet organizational links were always thin. They remain limited today. This is not in contradiction with the possibility, as some experts believe, that the TTP is bound to refocus on Afghanistan “if and when its position strengthens in FATA and the NWFP.”21 The militants have now clearly turned their attacks against military organizations. As underlined by Hassan Abbas, a Harvard fellow and expert on Pakistan affairs, of the 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan in 2007, 36 were against military related targets, including two against the ISI; two against the army headquarters in Rawalpindi; one aimed at the air force in Sargodha; and one directed at the facility of the Special Service Group (SSG) in Tarbela.22

Impact of counter-insurgency operations Over the years the organizational strength, leadership quality and military strategy of the Taliban have considerably improved on both sides of the border, but the development of the religious militia also benefitted paradoxically from the policies adopted by the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Although for different reasons, in both cases the erosion of the government’s legitimacy played a central role. In Afghanistan … In Afghanistan, the primary reason for the resurgence “en masse” of the Taliban is the inability of ISAF to hold the ground, due to insufficient numbers of troops, reinforced by the restrictions and rules of engagement imposed by a number of countries members of the international coalition. Because ISAF can’t prevent intimidation tactics by Taliban who often “own the night,” and because ISAF is largely powerless in countering suicide attacks and use of IEDs, the coalition forces are obliged to resort to their firepower superiority, increasing the collateral damage or to counter-insurgency tactics, inevitably costly for the non combatants (see Table 2.1). However, the political failures of the Afghan government must also be accounted for in relation to the progress of the Taliban. Although public

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Table 2.1 Coalition forces across the world Location

Peak number of international troops

International troops per kilometer

International troops per population

Kosovo Bosnia East Timor Iraq Somalia Liberia Sierra Leone Haiti Afghanistan

40,000 60,000 9,000 155,000 40,000 11,000; 2200 (MEF) 18,000 20,000 49,000

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

per per per per per per per per per

0.3 km 0.85 km 1.6 km 2.8 km 16.0 km 8.0 km 4.0 km 1.5 km 13.21 km

per per per per per per per per per

50 66 111 161 200 265 300 375 653

Source: Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 5 (2), 2007, p. 107.

expectations from the government may have been exaggerated, after three decades of continued war, the inability of the Karzai government to satisfy or simply manage even the most basic of them – education, justice, economic development even in areas not directly threatened by the insurgency – is gradually but steadily eroding the trust in the government despite a still strong rejection of the Taliban by the vast majority of the population. Corruption remains endemic, including at the top echelons of the administration which President Karzai is unwilling or incapable of purging despite the support of the population and of the international community. More importantly, Afghan security forces remain weak and incapable of fulfilling their tasks. According to United States Government Accountability Office, no army combat units are fully capable of operating independently and less than 20 percent are fully capable of leading operations with coalition support. No Afghan police units are fully capable of operating independently and only 1 of 72 police unit is fully capable to lead operations with coalition support. Moreover, due to attrition and absenteeism, the number of forces on hand is less than those trained. For example, although 20,000 combat troops had been assigned to combat units as of mid-January 2007, Defence officials stated that approximately 15,000 were actually present for duty. 23 Similarly the equipment of the Afghan forces remains insufficient, and the Afghan security forces are incapable of holding the ground conquered by ISAF forces. As a result, all counter-narcotic efforts are a failure as the dramatic development of poppy cultivation over the past few years can be traced to a series of factors ranging from the lack of alternative livelihood to anti-state tactics of the Taliban, and made impossible to combat by the quasi absence


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of a functioning judiciary, the weakness of the police and the corruption of a number of top officials sometimes involved themselves in drug trafficking. The drug economy contributes in turn to a climate of insecurity which benefits the Taliban.


In Pakistan In Pakistan, anti-insurgency operations are handicapped by a number of deficiencies, starting with their intelligence capabilities, both technical and human. The latter has moreover been particularly affected by the physical elimination of a number of tribal leaders as well as the demise of the political agents in the FATA. Similarly, with the exception of the Special Service Group, the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism skills of the Pakistani army, trained primarily for a conventional war against India, are said to be limited despite years of engineering insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Finally, the hostile topography of the FATA constitutes an additional difficulty. As a result, Pakistani forces lost some thousands of men since the beginning of the operations in the FATA. These weak operational capacities, combined with the strong firepower of the militants resulted in the complete incapacity to conduct calibrated operations and had political side effects. Pakistani forces had to use heavier weapons than anticipated, including “mortars, antitank recoilless rifles and guided missiles, field artillery-and aircraft-fired cannon and unguided rockets, and occasionally, even general purpose bombs delivered by tactical aircraft.”24 The outcome was inevitably an increased alienation of the local populations, comparable to the impact of the collateral damage caused by ISAF air strikes in Afghanistan, taking place moreover in a context of increasing and general hostility toward the regime in Pakistan, which was in turn reinforced by such actions. In the FATA, people started siding with the Taliban and launching attacks against the army. In order to regain control of the area, the Pakistani intelligence agencies seem to be willing to experiment with a new facet of the Taliban mixed with the tribal card. The most effective anti-Al Qaeda (or anti-foreigners) operations in 2007 were conducted in South Waziristan where Maulvi Nazir, a former Mujahideen from the Hikmetyar faction of Hizb-i-Islami who later joined the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, eliminated some 200 Uzbek militants, using local grudges to mobilize locals against them. Given his background, there is little doubt that Maulvi Nazir, if acting for his own interest, was also doing so on behalf of security agencies and the army. Major General Gul Muhammad, commanding officer of Pakistani troops in the area, soon declared that “Wana town will become a model for the entire Waziristan region as far as the campaign against foreign militants is concerned.”25 This strategy proved, however, to be short lived and came at a cost. Maulvi Nazir remains independent and in a context characterized by a deep


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opposition to the central government, has to maintain his credibility by demonstrating his own opposition to Federal policies. In March 2005, he warned the Pakistani military by declaring “do not become a party to the conflict, otherwise, we will sign out from the peace agreement we reached with the government”.26 Similarly, although it would probably be a mistake to give too much importance to such a statement, he declared that he would provide protection to Osama Bin Laden, if he came to his area and lived according to tribal traditions.27 His contribution, though sincere because of his own vested interests, cannot be confused with an endorsement of Pakistani policy. In partnering with Maulvi Nazir, the Pakistani military only opted for the lesser evil. This move also has to be related to the larger policy of a regime which is constantly using expedients to weaken or eliminate its opponents – the MQM against the Jamaat-e-Islami or/and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), one sectarian group against another sectarian organization, etc. and which, by doing so inevitably but constantly undermines its own legitimacy. The creation and use of a militant organization to counter another militant organization inevitably alter over time the state claim of monopoly on the use of legitimate violence. In the short term, however, this strategy has produced only limited results and has not stopped the Talibanization of the FATA. Part of the problem is also that such a situation also provides the ISI more opportunities “to indirectly support some Taliban commanders sympathetic to Pakistan objectives”28 while at the same time embarrassing its own allies who cannot ignore the actual difficulties met by the Pakistani forces in the FATA but understand that the latter will try to resolve the issue at the expense of their own objectives in the area. This dilemma is also illustrated by Mullah Omar’s decision to sack Baitullah Mehsud from the TTP leadership while pressing all Taliban to focus their energies on fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan, not the Pakistani state.29 In this specific case it is difficult not to see the hand of the Pakistani agencies requesting the help of a man who, according to many analysts, is still their guest in Quetta and is dependent on them in many ways.

Impact of the Pakistani rlections on the Afghan conflict In such a context, the results of the Pakistani elections could have a significant impact on the evolution of the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The elections brought to power the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) at the center and the Awami National Party (ANP) in the NWFP, a province bordering Afghanistan. Both organizations had cooperated before the elections to bring about a positive change in the relations between the two countries. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had met President Karzai only a few hours before she was murdered and the ANP leader, Afsandyar Wali Khan, entertains excellent relations with the Afghan leadership. Both the PPP and the ANP, as well as most mainstream political parties, focused



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their electoral campaign on the maintenance of peace and gained a clear popular mandate on this basis. They will, however, be constrained on two sides. Peace has been understood by the electorate as a rejection of Musharraf and his allies’ strategies. But the US is unlikely to accept in the future the kind of deals concluded in 2004 and 2006 with the Taliban by the former Pakistani President, which led to the consolidation and strengthening of the organization in the FATA. But eliminating Al Qaeda and its allies in the FATA does remain a priority of the US and the newly elected Pakistani government is facing considerable pressure from Washington to deliver on the terrorist front. This does not mean that negotiations should not take place nor compromises be worked out but simply that the terms of the potential deals and the kind of obligations that they will eventually generate for the signatories will be central both for their own credibility and the future of the actual situation on the ground. The second difficulty is related to the evolution of civil–military relations in Pakistan itself. Although the present Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kiyani, observed a surprising neutrality in the February 2009 elections, indicating a willingness on the part of the military institution to restore its public image and its own professionalism, it remains unclear as to whether he is ready to accept a more decisive role in the definition of Pakistan’s national interest and the formulation of its security policies. More specifically, if he seems to be willing to combat terrorism on Pakistan’s soil, it remains unclear whether he will be willing to stop Islamabad’s support to the Taliban in Afghanistan, which he was previously implementing as Director General of the ISI. Last, there is a total asymmetry of priorities between the three main actors of the Pakistani side of the equation. The political actors want a normalization of relations with Afghanistan, are willing to bring peace to the area and, reflecting the views of the electorate, do not necessarily see the fight against Al Qaeda as a priority. For the US on the other hand, eliminating Al Qaeda prevails over every other consideration. Despite the official rhetoric, even stability in Afghanistan is secondary to this primary focus, or more precisely, stability in Afghanistan is important only to the extent that it is a precondition to prevent it becoming again a sanctuary for Al Qaeda. Finally, the Pakistani Army wants a degree of normalization with Afghanistan, but is not necessarily ready to renounce the means of pressure on the Afghan government that the Taliban constitute and sees the fight against Al Qaeda essentially as a means to buy Western goodwill. The final outcome will ultimately depend on the compromise reached between these three actors. The various statements by the new government, announcing that the border fight against the Taliban would continue, certainly reflects a realization by the Pakistani military and political elites that there was no coming back as far the Pakistani Taliban are concerned.30 It is not an indication that Pakistan would change its strategy in Afghanistan itself.

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Conclusion Neither in Afghanistan nor in Pakistan are the Taliban the vector of a national identity. The insurgency merges together in both countries a growing number of disenchanted and frustrated people but fails to truly unite them in a national political project. Their development and progress follow the decline of state legitimacy in both countries. It does in turn accelerate it, constantly benefitting from a power vacuum that it paradoxically continues to enlarge but is incapable of filling. This may turn out to be their ultimate weakness and it can be argued that irrespective of the military difficulties encountered by the Pakistani forces on one side of the border, and the international forces on the other, the Taliban movement is essentially a bubble which will ultimately explode but could prove extremely destructive in the process. Moreover, and partly as a result of the previous argument, fragmentation remains one of the striking features of the Taliban movement, be it Afghan or Pakistani. Devoid of any real grassroots beyond simple and possibly temporary allegiances of convenience, it is not clear whether it would survive the elimination of its ideological leadership. Yet, the disappearance of this leadership would not by itself stabilize the region if not accompanied simultaneously by a systematic effort to politically reengage the local populations. This effort will have to be matched by development and if not good then at least better governance. But the anti-Taliban effort cannot be limited to such means. Nor is it to be confused, on the Afghan side, with a dialogue with the so called “moderate Taliban.” Should the radical leadership be eliminated, there will be no Taliban leadership left to discuss with, nor anybody able to transform what will be then only an agglomeration of frustration into a political organization of some sort. Therefore, there will be a need for a more inclusive effort to allow the large population of leftovers on both sides of the Durand Line to be integrated in their respective polities. From this perspective, the still very fragile democratization process in Pakistan could be an opportunity that could and should be seized. The elections have demonstrated that extremism had no real constituency in Pakistan. Not only can the democratization process help reintegrate segments of the populations, in particular in the FATA, which so far have felt alienated from the larger political process and thus contribute to redefine the fight against the effectively radical elements but it could also, should civil–military relations be redefined in a meaningful way, lead to a new appreciation of Pakistan’s national interest and the regional situation. This will be an insufficient, yet indispensable part of any pacification of the whole region and eventual marginalization of the Taliban in the area.

3



Sushant Sareen

It would be a trivialisation of the problem to explain away the spectre of Talibanisation that haunts Pakistan as a blowback of the policy of using jihad as an instrument of state. The roots of the problem are far deeper and can be traced back at least a couple of centuries. The jihadis or Pakistani Taliban draw their inspiration from Syed Ahmed Barelvi who led the “Hindustani fanatics” in the first half of the nineteenth century. Barelvi’s followers were based in precisely the areas that are today in the vanguard of the Islamist insurgency that Pakistan confronts on its western borderlands.1 The historical roots of the jihadi movement have coupled with the ideological confusion that has confronted the Pakistani state since it came into existence. Pakistan has still not been able to settle the debate on whether it was created as a state for Muslims or as a state for Islam. The dalliance of an increasingly dysfunctional state with the Islamists (for both political and strategic reasons), the inability to forge and nurture modern institutions and the identification with global Islamic causes together with the sense of victimisation, alienation and resentment that these causes fuel, have all combined to bring Pakistan to the current pass. Under intense international pressure, the Pakistani government was forced in May 2009 to launch a military operation against the Taliban in the Swat valley. Alarm bells had been set off by the rapid advance of the Taliban who were merely 60 miles away from Islamabad after they moved into the Buner and Shangla districts of NWFP. The “Operation Rah-e-Rast” managed to wrest control of the Malakand division from the Taliban. But most of the top leaders and cadres of the Taliban have escaped the dragnet of the Pakistani authorities. With the military pressure mounting on Swat, the Taliban retaliated by launching a series of devastating terror attacks against targets in Pakistani cities, including on the General Headquarters of the Pakistan army in Rawalpindi. This forced the hand of the Pakistan army which was left with no choice but to launch another military operation against the Taliban – “Operation Rah-e-Nijat” in south Waziristan. This was an area that was widely seen to be the ground zero of the Taliban movement and over the last few years there was not even a semblance of state control in this area. Using their safe haven in south Waziristan, the


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Taliban were able to operate with impunity and attack the symbols of the Pakistani state. Despite claims by the Pakistan army of resounding success in Operation Rah-e-Nijat, there are enough reasons to be sceptical. As in Swat, in south Waziristan too almost the entire Taliban leadership and cadre has escaped. What is more, by its very nature the operation in south Waziristan was limited to targeting what the Pakistan army calls “Baitullah Mehsud’s network” of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This was the faction of the Taliban that was directing its attacks not against the US-led NATO troops in Afghanistan but against the Pakistan army and government. The more ideologically driven Taliban – based in north Waziristan and parts of Balochistan – have in fact entered into deals with the Pakistan army to not interfere in the operations in south Waziristan. As far as the Baitullah Mehsud network is concerned, they have simply packed up and shifted their base to Orakzai and Kurram agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Given the spread of the Islamist insurgency and given the estimates of the number of people associated with the Taliban both as combatants as well as supporters and sympathisers – Pashtun journalist Aqeel Yusufzai estimates over 100,000 Taliban combatants across various factions – the war against the Taliban is going to be a very long drawn out one.2 The military aspect is however only a small part, even a relatively insignificant part of stopping Pakistan’s slide into Talibanisation. More than anything else Talibanisation is a mindset and unless the state and society is able to take an unequivocal stand against the spread of this mindset, a military victory will mean nothing. Unfortunately, not even the first step has been taken so far in putting Pakistan back on a more moderate path. While much is made of madrassas fuelling fundamentalism, the fact of the matter is that the state educational system is spreading the virus of Talibanisation in equal if not greater measure. Indeed, the debate over Islamisation is increasingly so one-sided – even so-called secular and progressive politicians are constrained to say that as Muslims they cannot oppose the imposition of Shariah but that the way the Taliban are going about the job is unacceptable – that it is only the method of the Taliban and not their mentality that is being opposed. To an extent the Taliban have shot themselves in the foot by their brutality in places where they held sway, especially in FATA and NWFP. Although the Pashtuns by and large are not uncomfortable with the Taliban brand of Islam and the Taliban social mores, the depredations of the Islamists did turn public opinion against them. But if many Pashtuns no longer consider the Taliban to be Islamic heroes, the Punjabis continue to romanticise the Taliban, and this despite the social and cultural mores of Punjab being totally at odds with what the Taliban stand for. The attraction for Punjabis of a hard-line version of Islam is perhaps the biggest challenge for Pakistan. A lot of attention is now focused on what is called the Talibanisation of south Punjab.3 Perhaps the abysmal development indices in south Punjab, coupled with the domination of the feudal classes and the increasingly dysfunctional social and



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administrative structures, have contributed towards making this region a fertile recruiting ground for Islamists of all hues. More importantly, the rising attraction of radical Islam in a society deeply steeped in what is commonly known as “Sufi” Islam is an indication of the deep inroads being made by the Islamists. But the sweeping tide of radical Islamism is not limited to south Punjab. The fact is that Islamists have spread their wings all over Punjab. Most of the top Al Qaeda militants have been arrested not from the dirty backwaters of south Punjab, but from the bustling cities of central and north Punjab – Faisalabad, Rawalpindi and Gujranwala. The core support base of the fundamentalist Islamic party, Jamaat-e-Islami, is central and north Punjab. Not only is the Jamaat-e-Islami increasingly functioning like the political arm of Al Qaeda but cadres of this party have been found involved in sheltering Al Qaeda fugitives. Perhaps the biggest jihadi organisation in Pakistan, and one which is arguably far more dangerous than the TTP, is Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, which is headquartered in Muridke (just north of Lahore) and has a presence in every nook and corner of Punjab. Most of the LeT cadre comes from all parts of Punjab and not just from the much maligned south Punjab. An indication of the immense power that LeT wields has come from Pakistani journalist Shaheen Sehbai. In his recent write-up he throws some light on the immense power wielded by the LeT: the GHQ realises that if the Kerry-Lugar Bill was to be implemented as desired by Washington, Pakistani cities could soon turn into battlegrounds between the Army and the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Taliban forces combined. So far the GHQ has kept the Lashkare-Tayyeba quiet by not acceding to the US demands of attacking or even touching Muridke, arguing that once this sleeping elephant wakes up, it could turn around and trample our own forces. After all, the LeT was raised and trained by our military establishment to fight the Indians in Kashmir and they are good at it. Turning their guns inwards, with TTP suicide bombers roaming everywhere, would turn Pakistan into a burning inferno, ready to collapse.4 Unfortunately, instead of waking up to the alarming spread of radical Islamist forces in Punjab, the Pakistani state and society has slipped into a mode of total and complete denial of the problem. In many ways, the denial over the inexorable march of Talibanisation in Punjab is reminiscent of the dismissal of similar premonitions about the inevitable blowback of the policy of using the jihadists as instruments of state policy in Afghanistan and against India. Then, as now, the arguments given were more or less the same that we are hearing today: the state machinery is pretty much in control and remains effective enough to snuff out any challenge to state authority; the army and intelligence agencies are competent and powerful enough to turn

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off the tap of jihad with a snap of their fingers; the jihadists pose no threat to Pakistani state and people and are only fighting the enemies of Islam and oppressors of Muslims; a handful of jihadis are in any case in no position to bite the hand that feeds them, etc. But if all these arguments of yore have fallen flat today, then the arguments being made today to refrain from moving against the Islamists in Punjab, will almost certainly yield disastrous consequences tomorrow.


Misinterpreting the electoral verdict The rout of the religious parties in the February 2008 general elections in Pakistan has been widely touted as evidence that the people of Pakistan have rejected religious fundamentalism and extremism. But the spin being put on the elections results is as misleading as it is dangerous because if accepted unquestioningly it will only strengthen the denial in Pakistan of the rapidly spreading Talibanisation in the society. The victory of moderate political forces like the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in NWFP is a defeat not so much of the religious radicals as it is of political forces who were seen to be aligned, either openly as in the case of the Pakistan Muslim League – Qaed-eAzam (PML (Q)) and Pakistan Peoples Party (headed by A.H.K. Sherpao) or surreptitiously as in the case of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, with President Pervez Musharraf. More than supporting the ANP or PPP, the vote in NWFP was cast against the political mullahs who were seen to be plying both sides of the game, i.e., on the one hand paying lip-service to the cause of the radical Islamists, and on the other doing everything to prop up and facilitate the regime of a military dictator who was perceived to be acting on the behest of the “crusading” Americans against the forces of Islam. Quite aside the fact that the radical Islamists, who for the sake of convenience and for want of a better term can be grouped under the label of Taliban, are not interested in any sort of a popularity contest, the vote in the Pakistani elections was unmistakably anti-US, anti-Musharraf (who was seen as the flag-bearer of US policies in the region) and a reaction against the military operations being carried out against the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal badlands, the reverberations of which were being felt as far as Islamabad and Lahore. Bizarre though it may appear, the mood in Pakistan at the time of the elections was such that even the blame for the suicide attacks in urban centres of Pakistan and the attacks on security forces in the Pashtun belt of the country was not heaped on the heads of the Taliban; rather it was Pakistan army’s efforts to curb the rising power of the Islamists that was and is seen as being the root cause of the deteriorating security situation in the country. The feeling in the street is that Pakistan never had a problem with radical Islamists before the Musharraf regime launched an operation against the Taliban in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt. But the fact is that the Islamists did not create trouble inside Pakistan as long as the Pakistani authorities had let



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them operate with impunity. Since the Islamists were seen as valuable allies of the Pakistani state which used them as instruments to pursue its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan and Kashmir and also as a coercive force against liberal dissident elements within the country, they were pretty much allowed a run of the place. They openly collected funds, operated terror training camps, advertised for recruits for their jihad against the infidels, preached their sermons of hate from mosques, threatened anyone who raised a voice against them. No one – not the law enforcement machinery, not the politicians, not the civil society – was able to stop the jihad factory that was churning out fanatics by the thousands and transforming the social milieu of the country. It was only the events that followed 9/11 that forced the Pakistani army to turn against its proxies. Even then it made revery effort to soft-pedal on the issue, and treated the jihadis with kid gloves by refusing to act resolutely and decisively against the terror networks. If anything, the Pakistani state conveniently turned a blind eye to the activities of the jihadis by asking them to adopt a lower profile and suspend their offensive operations until such time that the heat that was being put on Pakistan by the international community was lowered. The problem, however, was that the Pakistani army never realised that the monster it had created would turn on its creator. The intransigence of the Islamists coupled with the pressure being put by the Americans on the Pakistani state to crack down on the Taliban sanctuaries inside Pakistan finally compelled the army to act against the Islamists. It would not be entirely far-fetched to say that had the army postponed the action against the Islamists for a few more years, the control of the Pakistani state would have gone into the hands of the Taliban. As things stand, the sway of the Taliban is no longer limited to a remote part of Pakistan. Starting from the tribal belt bordering Afghanistan, the Taliban influence has rapidly spread into the settled districts of NWFP. A sort of parallel administration has emerged in large parts of the province where the local Taliban representative decides on what is Islamic and what is unIslamic, forces people to say five prayers a day, forbids men to shave their beards, instructs women to stay in purdah, bans music, bombs video and music shops, forbids “un-Islamic” sports and so on. Until now this pernicious phenomenon has been limited to the Pashtun belt of Pakistan. But it is finding a resonance, albeit at the fringe of society, even in Punjab and Sindh. The organisations may be operating under different names and leadership and they might be affiliated to different schools of Islamic doctrine, but the philosophy driving them is the same – radical Islam of the Al Qaeda/ Taliban variety. What makes this trend so much more worrisome is the fact that a large number of people, at least in the Pashtun dominated areas, are quite comfortable with the Taliban brand of Islam, and they don’t see the Islamists as some sort of medieval barbarians. As for those who oppose the Taliban, they too fall in line simply because any dissent or questioning of “Islam” is considered


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apostasy and is punishable by death. The Taliban, after all, are interested in enforcing their version of Islam by winning an election; they don’t need to because they are convinced that they are enforcing the divine law and for this they don’t need the sanction of any ordinary mortal, much less any government. The fact is that much of what the Taliban are trying to impose was already being practised by the people since it is part of Pashtun culture and custom and as such has been internalised by the people. The only difference is that while earlier there was no compulsion, today no deviation is permitted from what the local Taliban deign to be “proper behaviour”. One reason why the Taliban have been able to impose these stifling social rules is the huge change that Pashtun society and culture has undergone over the last three decades. This is today reflected in the quiet acceptance of the edicts being issued by half-literate mullahs who are either wielding the gun themselves or leading those wielding the gun. Adding to the mullahs’ power is the fact that the mullah has always occupied a far more important place in Pashtun tribal society than in Punjab or Sindh or even the Baloch-dominated areas. The loss of the so-called pro-Taliban parties in the elections is, therefore, slightly more complicated than the easy, lazy and self-serving explanation that the people voted in favour of moderate parties. The ANP and PPP were voted in not because they promised to eliminate the Taliban but because they adopted an ambiguous stand on the militancy. While they condemned the violence, they always tried to draw some sort of moral equivalence between the efforts of the security forces to restore the writ of the state in the region and the terror that the insurgents were spreading. The Pashtun nationalists’ public stance was always that the conflict was a conspiracy against Pashtuns. They never tired of pointing out that Pashtun blood was being shed, and despite overwhelming historical and contemporary evidence, they insisted that Pashtuns were very peaceful people. Except for Badshah Khan there has been no icon of peace among the Pashtuns. They also made insinuations that the army was actually orchestrating the suicide attacks to justify their operations to enslave the Pashtuns. Both ANP and PPP were quite clear that they would open a dialogue with the Islamists to bring peace. This suited the Islamists. The people, while not opposed to the measures being imposed by the radicals, did not want their daily lives to be disrupted and disturbed by the spiralling violence.5 The fact that these parties were opposed to Musharraf and his policies coupled with the maladministration of the mullahs and their double-speak on terror policy tilted the balance in favour of the moderate parties. The voters were sure that if Musharraf ’s supporters won there would be no change in policy and there would be escalation in hostilities. They also did not trust the mullahs to oppose Musharraf ’s policy on terrorism. Here two things need to be noted: one, the ANP and PPP did not win as big a victory as the MMA had in 2002; two, if the MMA had not split, they would have still got more seats. The mullahs did suffer anti-incumbency, and



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despite the massive shift of public support away from them and the fact that a lot of their core supporters boycotted the elections, they managed to come second in nearly 35 provincial assembly constituencies. It would not be wrong to say that the vote in NWFP was against the pragmatic politics of Maulana Fazlur Rehman who wanted Shariah but through political means and not by the force of the gun. For Maulana Fazlur Rehman the militants were important only to the extent that they increased his political leverage. Beyond that, the wily Maulana saw the militants as a threat to his politics because they would rob him of his monopoly on religion. The double-game that the Maulana was playing ended up robbing him of his credibility especially in the militant camp. After having lost the election, Maulana Fazlur Rehman has been seeking to regain his lost credibility. He has gone on record saying that he had tried very hard to facilitate the militants and that had they listened to him they would have got much of what they wanted. Even though his credibility is severely dented and no one trusts him, there are many who believe that he still has a role to play in as an intermediary between the security forces and the Taliban. But his ability to play this role will depend on the ground situation: if the situation of nowwar-now-talks continues, the Maulana will get increasingly marginalised; on the other hand, if the ceasefire holds and negotiations begin then he will play a major role. The problem is that either way the march of extremism will continue unhindered. There is another major problem as far as Maulana Fazlur Rehman is concerned. While he is adept at taking ambiguous positions that give him adequate wriggle room, he has committed himself to not endorsing attacks from Pakistan into Afghanistan. He has taken the position that although he will lend moral and political support for the right of the Taliban to resist the American occupation of Afghanistan, he is opposed to use of Pakistani territory for the resistance movement being led by the Taliban. This is not acceptable to the Taliban.

Making inroads in Pakistani society “If Pakistan is an Islamic country, what is your objection to imposing Shariah law as being demanded by the Mullahs? As a believer, why are you afraid of Shariah law?” This was the question I posed to a former editor of an Urdu daily and currently the host of a TV programme during a visit to Pakistan in October 2007. His answer: “As an Indian, you obviously would like to see Pakistan to go into the Stone Age.” I persisted: “Isn’t the ideal concept of state in Islam the city state established by the Prophet in which Islamic law was the basic law?” He replied: “That would mean going back into the stone age.” I pushed a little further and asked: “Are you willing to say this outside the confines of your office, and stand up in public for what you believe?” He looked horrified and said: “Do you think I am mad? I won’t be alive one hour after I say this in public.”6


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Unlike this editor, there are many others who feel that an unnecessary scare is being spread over the issue of Islamisation. “Heavens will not fall if Shariah is imposed in Pakistan”, argued a senior advocate who belongs to a well known and highly respected political family, and is personally an extremely moderate and liberal person. He said most of the laws in Pakistan are already Islamised and there will be hardly any changes in basic law that Shariah can now bring about. He accepts that those demanding Shariah are basically aiming their guns at the women and culture. In other words, the big change will be that women will face Taliban-type restrictions and there will be a ban on TV, films and music. But in his view, this is not such a great issue simply because eventually Pakistani society will reject all such antediluvian measures. Jamaat-e-Islami’s information secretary, Ameerul Azeem, also scoffs at what moderate Pakistanis call Talibanisation. He claims that the Taliban, including those from Lal Masjid, were only exposing and opposing immorality, adultery and obscenity in society, something that many newspapers in Pakistan also do. He wondered why the “writ of the state” was never invoked against immorality in society. Maulana Fazlur Rehman also sees no threat from the radical groups. Whereas he has been backing the demand for imposition of Shariah, he is opposed to bringing in the Shariah through violence and force of arms. Former ISI chief Lt.-General Asad Durrani places his faith on the innate pragmatism and wisdom of the people, and feels this will eventually manage to moderate the extremists. Given the predominance of such views, it is hardly surprising that the Islamists are winning the ideological debate on the role of Islam in the state of Pakistan. The liberal and moderate sections of Pakistani society are unable to present any convincing argument against the Islamists, much less stand up to the polemics of the mullahs. They have no answer to the logic that “there was no need to divide united India and create Pakistan if the ultimate goal of the partition was to establish a secular society for the Muslims of subcontinent”. This was the question posed by Dr Sher Ali Shah, who is regarded as the spiritual leader of both Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. He went on to argue that Hundreds of thousands of people … had sacrificed their lives for an Islamic state and not for a secular one. On the other hand, this country [Pakistan] was neither established for looters and plunderers. It is our right, being religious leaders, to wage a struggle for a true Islamic state.7 Until the Lal Masjid episode, the Pakistani elite always saw Talibanisation as someone else’s problem. As far as they were concerned they could pretty much do what they felt like without anyone ever bothering them. The obnoxious Hudood laws or the plethora of other laws and regulations designed to usher in Islamisation really didn’t affect them. But now the mullahs are getting too close for comfort and in a desperate attempt to arrest



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the march of the mullahs, the “civil society” (mostly NGO sector, which after the Fauji Foundation is perhaps the second largest industry in Pakistan) is feeling compelled to try and put up at least a modicum of resistance before the mullahs start dictating their lives. But in a face-off against the 3M alliance (Mullahs-Military-Muslim League) that dominates Pakistan, it would appear that the Pakistani “civil society” is fighting a losing battle. The bottom line, therefore, is that the “civil society” of Pakistan just doesn’t have what it takes to confront and defeat the Islamists. True, Pakistani “civil society” has some exceptionally brave and committed people with the courage of their convictions to stand up against the onslaught of the mullahs. But their numbers are very small and their influence marginal. Compared to the “civil society”, the Islamists are better organised, are more committed to their beliefs, and have little to lose. Tilting the balance further in favour of the Islamists is the fact that they have the arms, ammunition and training to force their point of view on the people. On the other hand, the civil society depends on the state’s coercive apparatus – army, police and paramilitary forces – for its protection. But what if the state is either too weak or too compromised and sympathetic to, if not aligned with, the cause of the Islamists? The deal with the Taliban in Waziristan, the blind eye to activities of terrorist outfits like Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the impunity with which the jihadi press churns out its poisonous propaganda, the acceptance of the activities of the Taliban in the Pashtun belt, are a testament to the appeasement policy being followed towards the Islamists by the Pakistani establishment. Most importantly, the civil society has nothing except old and tired slogans to offer to the masses in Pakistan. The civil society talks of rule of law which everyone in Pakistan knows has never existed. In any case when weighed against the “rule of God” offered by the Islamists, the concept of “rule of law” doesn’t stand much of a chance. The civil society promises an independent judiciary. But the judiciary in Pakistan is dysfunctional and unable to provide even a modicum of justice. On the other hand the Islamists are running their own private courts which give quick and easy, even if rough and ready, justice to the people. The civil society talks of liberal values. But this is seen as promoting vulgarity by the masses. The civil society is unwilling to take an unambiguous stand in favour of keeping religion out of politics and promises a mish-mash of Islam and democracy. The Islamists, on the other hand, promise pristine Islamic system. Not surprisingly then, the signs of a social transformation are everywhere. But these are visible only if one wishes to see them, not so much in wellappointed areas of Lahore, Islamabad or Karachi, as in lower-middle-class colonies and small towns and villages around the country. Even in posh localities more and more people are gravitating towards a very conservative, puritan and intolerant version of Islam. There are more women in hijab (voluntarily and not out of compulsion), more bearded men in the streets, more people going to mosques for Friday prayers than ever before. Young people, even those educated in the West, are more religiously inclined than


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their parents. It is no longer advisable to shoo away a tablighi (someone who comes to your house to preach), because he just might belong to some jihadi outfit and could place a mark outside the house labelling the residents as non-believers, or worse, apostates. Many middle-class families, including military and civilian officers, no longer think twice before sending the children for a few years to madrassas. For instance, many of the girls in Jamia Hafsa, the madrassa for women attached to the Lal Masjid in Islamabad, were army officers’ daughters, who were spending a year there for becoming Alim (learned one), a prestigious degree that qualifies them to give dars (sermons). Parents feel that giving such education to their children will earn rewards for them in the afterlife! There are also earthly benefits in terms of extra marks in admissions and government jobs if they are qualified as Hafiz Quran. But people who have either directly or indirectly experienced the madrassas say that children come out brutalised, dehumanised and traumatised from these institutions. They are misfits in a modern society and even if they are subsequently given the best of modern education, it takes years to bring some semblance of normality in their attitude towards women, including their own mothers and sisters. And yet, the madrassa network continues to spread its tentacles all over Pakistan. Shockingly, in Islamabad alone, there are reported to be over 100,000 students in madrassas that are so strategically located that the day these students want, they can create a serious law and order problem To an extent, former President Pervez Musharraf did try to reverse the rising attraction of radical Islamic thought by selling the concept of ‘enlightened moderation’ to his people. But for all its talk of “enlightened moderation”, the fact is that the Pakistani establishment has been pandering to and surrendering to the demands of the Islamists. Take for instance a speech made by a junior minister in the last government, a government that espoused the ‘enlightened moderation’ slogan of President Pervez Musharraf. While participating in a debate on foreign policy in Pakistan’s national assembly, the former Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Major (retired) Tanveer Hussain said: Give a free hand to the jihadis so that they can free Kashmir … all foreign policy should be according to Quran and Sunnah … The Jews can never be friends of Muslims, it is written in the Quran … we should openly support the Taliban … we should counter a Pressler-type law by allowing jihad … be it the mountains of Waziristan, Kashmir or the land of Punjab, there should only be one slogan: Al Jihad, Al Jihad, Al Jihad. This was the state of Pervez Musharraf ’s “enlightened moderation”.8 Major Tanveer, who has been an avid supporter of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, was not the only “enlightened moderate” in the Pakistani government. Keeping him company was Ejaz ul-Haq, the religious affairs minister and son of the late military dictator General Zia ul-Haq. Speaking on an Indian



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television channel, Ejaz ul-Haq denied Pakistan’s inexorable slide into to the arms of Islamic radicalism and insisted that Pakistan remained a moderate Islamic state. But it was only the sheer ignorance of the TV channel anchor that allowed Haq to be so economical with the truth. Just a couple of days earlier Mr Haq had justified suicide attacks in Britain after the author Salman Rushdie was given a knighthood by the British government.9 Not to be left behind, the then Speaker of the Punjab Assembly, Afzal Sahi, said that he would not hesitate to kill Salman Rushdie if he ever came across him.10 Quite clearly then, the problem of religious fanaticism goes far deeper than anyone in Pakistan is willing to admit. This is not surprising because many of those who claim themselves to be moderates – people like Maj Tanveer, Ejaz ul-Haq and Afzal Sahi are prime examples – don’t even realise how extreme and fanatical they appear to rest of the world. And yet, if they are considered moderate it is only in comparison to those who are even more fanatical than them. Many Pakistanis spin the yarn that the extremists are a fringe element, a minuscule minority. But this argument misses the essential point that revolutions are normally carried out by a minuscule minority. And, in Pakistan’s case this minuscule minority is growing exponentially. Some years back Pervez Musharraf had said not more than 1 per cent (or 1.6 million people) were with the radicals. Later he stated that 90 per cent of Pakistanis were liberal (i.e., some 16 million are extremists). Even the Pakistani definition of a liberal is very different from how the rest of the world describes a liberal, what with people like Major Tanveer, Afzal Sahi and Ejaz ul-Haq being counted among liberals! While the involvement of above-named persons in the government did damage President Pervez Musharraf ’s somewhat half-hearted attempts to make his countrymen aware of the grave internal threat that Pakistan faces, his personal credibility went so low that most people believed that he was waving the threat of Talibanisation for self-serving reasons – to make himself indispensable to his American patrons as well as to keep the restive political opposition at bay. What is more, in spite of the clear and present danger that the Islamists pose to the stability of the Pakistani state, the ambivalence of the state towards the Islamists has still not ended. If anything, the Pakistani state is more than willing to tolerate the Islamists provided they kowtow to their erstwhile masters – the Pakistan army. This is so because the Pakistani state does not entirely want to give up the jihadi option in both Afghanistan and in Kashmir.11 It is hardly surprising then that the public debate is so partisan, distorted and also so far removed from the ground reality, that there is a total disconnect between the crises that confront Pakistan and the reasons and solutions that even sober and sensible people give for these crises. It is almost as though the Pakistani intelligentsia has lost the ability to think things through. For instance, a standard formulation in Pakistan today is that the war being waged in the Pashtun tribal belt between the Pakistan army and the radical Islamists (read Taliban and Al Qaeda) is a mercenary war, a war that


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Pakistan is waging not for itself but for America. Hence, the solution that is forwarded is equally nonsensical: the authorities should engage the Taliban in a dialogue or the Pakistani army should simply walk out of the tribal areas. The logic is that if Pakistan does not act against the Islamic radicals, they too will not retaliate against the Pakistani army. In other words, “leave them alone and they will not bother us” is the solution. None of the proponents of this solution are able to even comprehend that unless the Taliban threat is eliminated, it will only grow and will spread like wild-fire in rest of Pakistan, ultimately taking over the Pakistani state. They are also in denial about the intentions and objectives of the radical Islamists, which is to Talibanise Pakistan by imposing their version of puritanical Islam in the country.

No solution in sight Despite the fact that Pakistan has reached the crossroads, no one seems to have any concrete idea about how to counter the threat that the extremists pose to the state and society. Everyone in Pakistan talks of the future and makes plans that will yield results in 10 to 15 years, but there is utter confusion on what to do at this point in time. There are essentially just two options left, neither of them easy. The first option is that Pakistan decides that it will go down the path of jihad and become the champion of radical Islam. The second option is that Pakistan gives up its flirtation with radical Islam and uses its entire national power to emerge as a genuinely moderate and secular state. For the moment, the new Pakistani government has decided to initiate a dialogue with the Islamists and to try a policy that combines engagement with elimination. The problem is of course that the government will be negotiating from a position of weakness. Until now, the Pakistani authorities have been singularly unsuccessful in attempts to degrade the capabilities of the Islamists. If anything, the Islamists have managed to severely dent the morale of the Pakistani security forces by attacking them where it hurts the most – in their cantonments, blowing up their convoys, blasting their HQs, targeting officials almost at will (so much so that officials have stopped wearing uniforms in public and started traveling in unmarked cars). Because the Islamists have now resorted to attacks on the civilians, the fear and terror they have created in the public mind has led to increasingly shrill calls for a negotiated settlement with the militants. Given the upper hand that the Islamists have, it is still not clear why they will agree to lay down their arms after a dialogue with the new government. The government has neither any big incentive to offer to the insurgents nor is there any major disincentive that will make them accept and honour the demands that the Pakistani state is likely to insist upon. The jihadis are already sworn to die for the glory of Islam, so the fear of annihilation doesn’t worry them too much. In a situation where the militants have not been worsted militarily, the government will find it impossible to negotiate any deal



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that requires the Islamists to back down on their basic demands. Apart from wanting imposition of Shariah law in the tribal belt, the Islamists are demanding the release of all captured militants, they want the Pakistani state to disassociate from the war on terror, they want the American military presence in Pakistan to end and denial of military facilities to the Americans, and last but not the least, they not only want the Pakistan army to withdraw from the tribal belt but also want a free hand in mounting operations inside Afghanistan against the NATO troops. On the issue of Shariah, the government will not find it difficult to concede to the Islamists. The tribal belt was in any case out of the ambit of the normal constitutional and legal system that operated in rest of Pakistan. What is more, there are a number of places inside Pakistan where a parallel legal and constitutional system is in force. For instance, Gilgit-Baltistan has a different legal and constitutional system. Similarly, in the Malakand agency in NWFP a highly Islamised legal code is in operation. To the extent that such parallel systems have some sort of constitutional cover, the same can be extended to the tribal belt as well. In addition, representative government can be introduced in the area and political activities can be extended to the tribal belt. Many people in Pakistan believe that heightened political activity in the tribal areas will help tremendously in ushering in liberal values in the region. The contradiction between imposition of a medieval Islamic system and at the same time trying to usher in modern political activity is, however, just too big to reconcile. There is every chance that while trying to buy temporary peace, the political establishment will foster an irreversible and potentially devastating parallel system on a part of Pakistan. Of course, to the extent that laws in Pakistan are already Islamised (all laws have to be Shariah-compliant) imposing Shariah in the tribal areas will hardly make any difference. The problem is that the Shariah which the Islamists demand is extremely retrograde in the social and cultural sphere. The Talibanised-Shariah is essentially focused on banning all music, dance and video imagery, forcing women into purdah, not allowing women to work, limiting education for women and other such measures. The danger is that Islamists will slowly but surely want similar measures imposed on the rest of Pakistan. That is after all their ultimate aim. The politicians, however, generally have a very short-term perspective and what will happen five or ten years down the line hardly figures on their radar screens as long as they are able to show results in ending the violence wracking the country currently. The bigger issue will be the demands that the Islamists are making on the war on terror. If the Pakistani government concedes these demands, it will pit the country directly against the entire Western world. On the other hand, if these demands are not conceded, the fledgling peace process in the Pashtun belt will collapse. Given that the Islamists seem to be holding all the cards, it is highly unlikely that they will relent on their demands, something that the Pakistani state, caught as it is


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between a rock and a hard place, will find impossible to meet. Perhaps this is what the politicians are banking upon, because after all the peace gestures come a cropper, the political establishment will find the justification it needs for mounting massive and unrelenting military operations against the insurgents. Only this time, these operations will have popular support and the political backing they need to sustain a long and bloody war against the radical groups. The second option is to not wait until the peace process collapses but to eliminate jihadis. Accompanying this should be a massive national reconstruction and rejuvenation campaign. This means a complete overhaul of the structure of government and its delivery mechanisms. Huge amounts of money will have to be spent on education, health and economic infrastructure. A more fair, equitable and inclusive system of governance will have to be ushered in. The power of the feudal oligarchy will have to be broken and land reforms introduced. The system of police administration will have to be transformed and the bureaucracy will have to be made responsive. Most importantly, Pakistan will need an ideological reorientation of the state which will include getting off the hobby-horse of Islam. After all if Pakistan continues to insist that it is an Islamic country, then it will not only continue to struggle to define what this means but also have to contend with the mullahs who will stake their monopoly to decide over what is or is not Islamic. This is a tall order by any standard. A national government of the type that is currently in office and has the support of all the main political forces in the country may find it possible to take on this monumental task. But time is running out and unless a firm direction is set for the country, it won’t be long before the Islamists start ruling the roost in Pakistan.

4

Resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan Implications for regional security


Deepali Gaur Singh

“Our patience is running thin, thousands of people are sent to our country, our houses are burnt, our schools burnt … the Pakistani government should know we will come and hit him (Baitullah Mehsud) wherever he is. We will get them and we will defeat them and we will avenge all that they have done in Afghanistan for the past so many years.”1 And “hit him”, they did, a year later. But with these words Afghan President Hamid Karzai displayed a rare belligerence on the sidelines of the Donors’ Conference in Paris in June 2008 threatening the Pakistani administration with taking the war to their territory after having suffered years of a Taliban-led insurgency that refuses to die down. And even as the suicide attacks mount casualties with tragic regularity, the targets have been shifting from the foreign troops to now include even the Afghan forces increasingly seen as the new symbols of Karzai’s Western-supported puppet government. The stories of corruption within the government have grossly overshadowed instances, if any, of a competent administration, practically rendering these government functionaries ineffective. And if the presidential elections of 20 August 2009 – Afghanistan’s second in its electoral history – are anything to go by President Karzai seems all set to carry the additional ignominy of attempting to buy a presidency through horse-trading, backroom deals and selling out to ultraconservative forces rather than a popular vote. Karzai’s earlier threats happened to coincide both with the $21 billion aid2 promised to Afghanistan at the conference and the controversial American strikes in Pakistan killing eleven Pakistani security personnel. And that in a way has defined the geopolitics of the region in the past three decades with specific reference to these three actors who have, sometimes together and at other times disparately, guided the politics of this war-torn country and its neighbours. Former Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in November 2007, the Lal Masjid siege in 2007, the kidnapping of Tariq Azizuddin, Pakistan’s envoy to Afghanistan, in 2008, the two subsequent blasts at the heavily garrisoned Indian embassy in Kabul – in July 2008 and October 2009 – are all indications of the influence exerted by the Taliban on either side of the Durand Line. Taken hostage in early February 2008 from the Khyber Agency and released in mid-May 2008 after three months in


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captivity, Tariq Azizuddin’s freedom is believed to have cost the release of top Taliban militants – including possibly Mullah Omar’s deputy Mullah Obaidullah Akhund.3 This exchange, involving one of the most senior Pakistani and Taliban officials, was also supposedly linked to possible peace accords and a subsequent military pullout from South Waziristan – evidence of the serious problems that the Taliban and Al Qaeda sponsored insurgency poses for the region and in particular for both Pakistan and Afghanistan from their respective homegrown brands of the militia group. Moreover, dwindling faith in the governments and the men at the helm of affairs and the political fragility of the new democratically elected governments has ensured that the situation continues to get more volatile with every passing day. The persistent fear of nuclear material falling into the hands of these extra-national forces also came closer to being more real than perceived with the revelation of the abduction of two Pakistani nuclear officials of the Atomic Energy Commission from Dera Ismail Khan in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in February 2008.4 It is against this background that this chapter analyses the domestic and global situation that created the political space and encouraged the resurgence of the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the political gains that Al Qaeda has made from this resurgence, particularly in view of the diminished visibility of Al Qaeda supremo Osama bin Laden. The sporadic irregularity with which audio and video tapes with purportedly new messages from Osama himself surface appear more an exercise in motivation than any real political messaging from the Al Qaeda camp. The international troops are into their eighth year in the country. Even as many NATO countries look again at their Afghan mission, Afghanistan’s government believes that its army would be ready to take on the insurgency independently by 2013. US General Stanley McChrystal, the former head of NATO forces in Afghanistan, wanted to see the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) increased to 124,000 by 2011 and double that by the time the coalition troops are ready to leave even as he called for reinforcements for its ongoing mission.5 With the noises back home getting louder for their demilitarization, even as President Karzai himself has asked for continued assistance for at least another decade, an assessment of their role in the country so far would help unravel why the militia group continues to be a threat. What has and could be the role of the regional actors considering the course that geopolitics is taking in the region? In late 2001, soon after the American troops had moved into Afghanistan armed with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), a suicide bomber in Kabul rammed a motorcycle into a convoy of buses carrying Afghan military personnel killing 12 people. The attack immediately after Afghanistan’s landmark Loya Jirga would have been one of the forewarnings of the limitations of security in the country. Eight years and many civilian deaths later violence has returned to Afghan lives as a daily mundane occurrence. In fact, more Americans have been killed in Afghanistan since the invasion began


The Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

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than in the first nine years of the Vietnam War.6 As far as insurgency-related casualties were concerned, both civilian and ISAF, in 2009 these were already the highest since 2001, despite the large build-up of troops effected over the summer. Insurgent attacks soared 59 percent to 5,222 incidents between January and May 2008, according to a report by NATO’s ISAF. That is more than twice the rate of violence in Afghanistan between the same months in 2007 and 2008.7Even as NATO makes repeated claims of success against the militia, the Taliban appears to come back stronger. According to the US Department of Defense, by early October 2009, at least 764 members of the US military had died in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan as a result of the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001.8 Despite the killing of major Taliban leaders by the coalition forces it has barely reversed the Taliban’s momentum attributed by some analysts to the fact that most commanders killed – like Mullah Berader and Mullah Dadullah in 2007 – were those most capable of opposing the central Shura. Thus, the troops have unwittingly helped the Taliban maintain their cohesion and resilience.9 For the average Afghan the dismal slip from a situation when they were toasted by the world as a bunch of fierce guerrilla fighters who took on the mighty Soviet empire to the regular suicide bombings is a sorry tale of the sense of frustration and despondency that has come to mark life for them. But what is even more worrying than the violence itself is the increased sophistication of the methods, foreshadowing more violence in the coming days. General McChrystal’s request for additional troops to conclusively deal with the counter-insurgency in a way that it becomes manageable for the ANA post-2013 is seen to be a reaction to this potential resurgence. But what is it that the Taliban is really attempting in Afghanistan – a more permanent resurgence? While the American intelligence has been quick to predict the Taliban offensive what they seemed to have, till lately, missed out or deliberately ignored is that the offensive on the eastern side of the border (in Pakistan) was far more deliberate, organized and lethal. In overlooking Pervez Musharraf ’s position with regard to these insurgents, the situation in Pakistan only worsened. In fact, the success of the initial US campaign against the Taliban was marred by a serious tactical blunder. In mid-November 2001 the Bush administration sanctioned the evacuation of Pakistanis encircled in Kunduz in what eventually turned out to be the mass extraction of senior Taliban and Al Qaeda members by the Pakistani Air Force – nicknamed “Operation Evil Airlift” by the US troops – an indication of which side of the fence the Pakistani personnel were on.10 Musharraf ’s deal with the Taliban in December 2006 effectively allowed the latter respite from the east and space to regroup, reorganize and even send reinforcements as opposed to the earlier two-pronged pressure mounted on them by the Americans and the Pakistan administration. According to the peace deal that was being worked out between the government and Mehsud, Clause 10 (A) referred to the release of kidnapped Army and Frontier Corps soldiers by Baitullah Mehsud in earlier operations


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following which the Pakistan military would “withdraw completely” from his areas of South Waziristan.11 Such peace deals with the Taliban led to a threefold rise in attacks against NATO troops. Even after Mehsud’s death in August 2009 the Pakistani government has shown its reluctance for an all-out offensive in South Waziristan. Al Qaeda for its part has been increasingly acting as the parent body for the logistical support even as, operationally, the attacks are carried out by local insurgent groups some of whom showed signs of working in tandem with each other like the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) which is a dangerous trend for the region too.12 With very little heard or seen of Osama, the organization appears to operate and maintain its visibility through support to groups that are willing to act out their intentions. For instance, while Baitullah Mehsud, who gained instant infamy with his name linked to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, was quick to disclaim his involvement in the assassination, similar denials have not been so quick from the Al Qaeda. The actions attributed to Mehsud and Maulana Fazlullah – both prominent leaders of the Pakistan Taliban believed to have orchestrated the violence in south Waziristan and Swat since mid-2007 – reflect the ideological shift of the Pakistan Taliban which seems to be more in congruence and in response to domestic politics in the name of a pan-Islamic agenda. Mullah Omar had, in the past, been quick to distance himself from Mehsud for his priority is waging a jihad against the Pakistan military rather than focusing on the international forces in Afghanistan. And it is here that the conflict within these jihadi groups over fighting “the far enemy” – epitomized by Western governments like the Bush administration – or “the near enemy” has been waged.13 With Osama bin Laden missing from Al Qaeda’s communication and propaganda machinery, it is the second line of command consisting of Zawahiri and Sheikh Essa who have been calling the shots by propagating Takfirism; an ideology which amongst other things prioritizes the non-practising Muslims as the first enemy to be dealt with. Prior to 2003, the entire Al Qaeda camp in north and south Waziristan limited its battle to the foreign troops in Afghanistan. Sheikh Essa changed the stance raising armies of takfiris. In a matter of a few years, his ideology has taken hold and all perceived American allies in Pakistan have become prime targets. Former members of jihadi outfits such as JeM, LeT and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have declared him their ideologue, signalling the beginning of the new world of takfiriat, reborn in Waziristan many decades after having first emerged in Egypt in the late 1960s. Not surprising then that Musharraf ’s “Enlightening Moderation” failed to find favour with them and with the Lal Masjid seige in 2007, the priorities of Pakistan Taliban coincided with the Al Qaeda leadership – the latter issuing a fatwa against Musharraf for supporting the West’s anti-Islam agenda. While initially the Taliban had suffered setbacks due to the rollback in aid, lately the increased sophistication of the Taliban methods in Afghanistan and



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along the tribal border in Pakistan, which has included the use of remotecontrol detonation, indicate renewed funding and training. Not only are there Russian-built, surface-to-air missiles (SAM) in the grey markets along the volatile Pak-Afghan border in the mountainous weapons bazaars but the interception of these SAM-7 among the arms confiscated along the Iran border in April 2007 led to immense speculation about an alternative new source. And the American decision to set up missile systems in the continent to counter the Iranian threats was believed to be in response to this new threat. From protection money (as evidenced from the demands in early 2009 from the Sikhs in the NWFP),14 to extortion from poppy farmers and heroin traffickers involved in Afghanistan’s booming drug trade, the Taliban appear to be in a stronger financial shape than Al Qaeda through a wide range of these criminal activities to orchestrate attacks on coalition forces, according to recent reports by the US Treasury Department.15 But is the Taliban resurgence guided by political ambitions and a desire for political power? What might be difficult to ignore is that the warlords that the Taliban once fought during the internecine war in the 1990s today occupy seats in Parliament and enjoy decision-making power. With cabinet posts allocated as the spoils of war during the Bonn Agreement negotiation, it is not surprising that the upper echelons of the Taliban hierarchy are negotiating for their own political space. Accommodating rather than challenging the warlords and arming them with the reigns of governance sowed the seeds of the culture of impunity that has since flourished. Local disillusionment has drawn on the fact that despite international supervision, the 2005 parliamentary elections allowed candidates with a long criminal history of human rights violations, drug trafficking, and maintaining illegal armed groups and militias to contest. Leading up to the second presidential election in 2009, President Karzai is believed to have spent more time closing deals with warlords, commanders and influential conservative politicians, including the unpredictable Uzbek leader Rashid Dostum who has been in exile since kidnapping and assaulting a political rival in 2008 as chief of staff. Having watched the benefits of the government seal and its perks, which allow these warlords-turnedpoliticians to carry on with their unfinished agendas so brazenly, the Taliban probably see the possibility of a share in the political pie of Afghanistan. Moreover, the narcotics trade has acted as fodder to fuel insurgency as it did during the Soviet occupation for the Mujahideen. The constant rise in opium production in Afghanistan till 2007 – six years into NATO presence – is an indication of the failure of America’s “War on Drugs”, purportedly a corollary of the “War on Terror” since a substantial amount of the funding for the Taliban is believed to have come from this illegal economy sustaining the arms-for-drugs trade.16 In 2007, 477,000 acres were under poppy cultivation, yielding an estimated 8,200 tons of opium (a 34 percent rise since 2006).17 Even though opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was down by 22 percent in 2009 Afghanistan continues to produce the bulk of the global opium. World demand remains stable (at around 5,000 tonnes), which is still


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much lower than the 6,900 tonnes produced in 2009.18 And in growing testimony to the weakness of the new law enforcement agencies and a threat to their integrity are instances of even senior police positions in the drug-rich provinces being auctioned blatantly. Corruption allows the tenure to reap rich dividends. Complicating matters is that the NATO troops, due to their inability to win over the locals, are often seen using techniques at cross purposes with the government positions. For instance, poppy farmers in some regions have been allowed to maintain their crops in return for information on insurgents. Often these troops carry out operations without the knowledge of the local police leading to confusion, exploitation and corruption. So while the average Afghan views the police with a mixture of fear and trepidation, the warlords and politicians show utter disregard for the very same uniform. Marred by inability to agree on priorities and plans, international efforts are constantly working at cross purposes even with regard to counter insurgency, which has become the obstacle to every possible development plan for the country. What makes the situation complex is that the insurgency in Afghanistan, apart from the foreign fighters and the Taliban militia, consists of other groups like Hezb-i-Islami, the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, local tribes and criminal networks.19 The British troops, for instance, in 2007, held secret negotiations with surrendered Taliban militants for their possible recruitment in counter-insurgency operations, followed up by the ouster of two EU officials by the Karzai government for anti-national activity. Ironically not very long back President Karzai himself suggested holding talks with the insurgents, who had been criticized by the US in the wake of their continued military engagement with the Taliban. The Obama government showed a radical policy shift in October 2009 when they welcomed attempts by the Afghanistan government to negotiate with willing elements within the Taliban leadership towards a cessation of hostilities. With a pending requisition for additional troops against the background of an unpopular war, unwilling public opinion and Obama’s own resistance this could be the American President’s own exit strategy for not approving troop reinforcements. And even though in essence Washington could be perceived as approving deals with groups and individuals who killed Afghan civilians and coalition soldiers, many believe it could be a political price worth paying.20 An opposition group of the National Front, which included Burhanuddin Rabbani, Afghanistan’s President from 1992–6, and Mohammad Qasim Fahim, Karzai’s Security Adviser, also held meetings with “high level” militant leaders in early 2008.21 While both Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hikmetyar rebuffed these overtures, the Taliban have been generally receptive to the idea of negotiations proposed within Karzai’s “Peace Jirga” albeit with some conditions of their own.22 Adding to the atmosphere of uncertainty are the governments in both Afghanistan and Pakistan who have tended to rely on discredited power-brokers. This undermines not just the faith in the government but also the goal of sustainable institution building. Disagreements have also cropped up over vital areas such as counter-narcotics, with the



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Americans continuing to press for aerial eradication of opium poppies despite resistance. Violence and attacks (including suicide attacks) against poppy eradication teams in Afghanistan23 are indicative of the failure of this very strategy which insists on treating a problem which is only symptomatic of a larger issue which remains unaddressed despite the huge amount of aid purportedly spent on rebuilding Afghanistan. Former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s observation on the Bush administration’s ‘billion-dollarper-year’ counter-narcotics policy as the ‘single most ineffective programme in the history of American foreign policy’ really sums up the situation. Not only does it waste money, according to him, but also strengthens the Taliban and Al Qaeda as it pushes penniless farmers in the insecure south into the refuge of the Taliban for lack of any better options once their standing poppy crops are destroyed.24 As has been the case with Afghanistan while expensive schemes and projects to curb poppy production have failed, it is the rise in food prices in the recent months that have actually altered planting patterns in the country. With skyrocketing prices of wheat, its cultivation has become more lucrative for the farmers as an alternative option to poppy. Besides, with international aid agencies working at cross purposes with each other one of the frustrations of the reconstruction is that initiatives are taken but too often the tempo is not maintained, stymied by arbitrary policy changes guided by the domestic politics of every donor nation. There have been instances of parts of Afghanistan receiving 30 percent of its seeds under agricultural assistance after the planting season was over.25 And the haphazard implementation of policies has allowed the militia group to make inroads and garner support amidst the local population especially when growing instability and violence has isolated the national capital Kabul from many areas of the country. This to a large extent has been the problem with the troops – their endemic failure to engage villages – concentrating themselves around the cities while leaving the rural areas in the hands of the Taliban to freely stoke insurgency. For the earlier Bush administration, the diabolism in policy stemmed from the history of the official American positions vis-à-vis the Taliban over time that has enjoyed its share of ambiguity. “Enjoyed” because it has allowed them the space to negotiate and re-negotiate their alliances and counter alliances without really disturbing the endgame in Afghanistan and the larger Central Asian region. While having never taken a hard-line position against the Taliban despite the dangerous rise in poppy production, their misogynist policies, the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, the murder of Ahmed Shah Masoud – the face of the Northern Alliance and their ally – it was soon after the 11 September 2001 attacks that this position changed. Semantically, the expression “the war against terror” had its advantages, as the linkage between a doctrine of preventive action and a fluid definition of the enemy permitted the legitimisation as defensive of all kinds of steps, even those that were overtly hegemonic. In imposing this new international agenda by altering the course of the global response to terrorism the future of Afghanistan


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changed too. And in Hamid Karzai they seemed to have found a more willing spokesperson to back every policy or its sudden change as was evident from the threats that came immediately after the US strikes in Pakistani territory in June 2008.26 The Americans moved into Afghanistan in 2001 and what followed were aerial bombings, high civilian casualties, the uncontrolled use of mines – cluster bombs, claymore mines, butterfly mines – quite reminiscent of the Soviet war. The Western troops’ initial military engagement with the Taliban at Rashid Dostum’s Headquarters in the Qala-i-Jhangi fort at Mazar-eSharief would have been a clear indication of things to come in the years of their presence in Afghanistan. The Americans relied on excessive firepower, a policy that has over the years earned them more detractors than supporters in the country even drawing criticism from President Karzai himself. The results of such an engagement over the years of presence have been consolidated in high military and civilian casualties. For long fighting a conventional war, it is only recently that the American administration actually acknowledged the Taliban as an insurgent group as opposed to clubbing them together with Al Qaeda. This in turn has meant a complete change in strategy in combating them and, more significantly, it also alters the pretext under which the Americans first entered Afghanistan – for the “war on terror”. The shift in strategy has required imparting special training to the troops for specifically dealing with insurgency in Afghanistan involving community outreach and confidence-building measures, and incorporating structures of governance. While this new line is a welcome change, the fact that 3,572 bombs were still dropped in 2007 contradicts this theoretical change in approach.27 Back home, however, critics of this new approach believe that this might diminish the American army’s abilities in a conventional war. By early 2009, 42 percent of Americans believed that the war was a mistake, up from 6 percent in 2002.28 The civilian population finds itself trapped between the warring groups as civilian casualties have always been high whether in a military operation or asymmetrical attacks which in targeting government and military personnel end up claiming far more civilian lives. Besides, safety directives instructing development workers to avoid particularly volatile areas defeat the purpose of community-based development initiatives and influence public perceptions of security and the international community’s ability to counter these threats. The United Nations’ latest security map of Afghanistan is hardly encouraging as it places almost 40 percent of the country “at high risk”.29 Besides, troop shortages, potential withdrawals and infighting all feed perceptions of weakening international resolve, and thus influence the dynamics of the insurgency. While the events of 9/11 were an indication of the consequences that a failed state can have for global security, growing insurgency reflects a collective failure of both the international community and the national government to tackle the root causes of violence. Eight years after the Taliban’s ouster, the international community continues to lack a common diagnosis and common



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objectives of what is needed to stabilize the country. The Canadian troops intend to terminate their military presence in Afghanistan in 2011 even as the NATO might be looking at a time frame of 2013. The unceasing insurgency is the consequence of having waged another war in Afghanistan without a blueprint of what needed to be done once the Taliban were ousted; a scenario that does not appear very different from the situation just after the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan and the diverse Mujahideen groups scrambled in to fill the power vacuum. The Americans entered Afghanistan without a plan. Currently, with military and financial resources in the hands of the international community and the executive authority with all its pressures and counter-pressures in the hands of President Karzai, what is required is a coherent strategy between the two to build both Afghan capacity and accountability at not just the central but also the local levels, which would be the ultimate guarantor of a stable and sustainable state. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in its hunt for more crucial Al Qaeda and Taliban targets has shown constant reluctance to be engaged in nation building. But in a situation of counter insurgency, that shift is crucial for confidence building. Today following decades of conflict partly fuelled by a narcotics-driven war economy, Afghanistan, in particular its borderlands, has become a sanctuary and “breeding ground” for terrorists and extremists – a fact that was pointed out by former Afghan President Sibghatullah Al-Mojadidi in claiming that the roots of nearly 90 percent of terror activities or groups across the world can be traced to Pakistan.30 In the wake of the Iraq war, Afghanistan was virtually reduced to a sideshow. As a consequence, a reinvigorated insurgency threatens the gains made. According to Barnett Rubin, Washington’s appeasement of Pakistan, diversion of resources to Iraq, and perpetual underinvestment in Afghanistan – which gets less aid per capita than any other state with a recent post-conflict rebuilding effort – fuelled the suspicion that Afghanistan was not a priority.31 The level of non-securityrelated aid (i.e., police and army) reaching especially the Pashtun-dominated areas of Afghanistan since the US invasion has also been extremely low at less than 5 dollars per Pashtun per year.32 Ironically, the country now has more foreign soldiers than at any period during and since the Taliban’s overthrow. Even as financial aid increases, international resolve appears to be weakening. With the governments facing increasing pressure at home from a public unwilling to accept military casualties and beginning to explore endgames and exit strategies, the risk of losing Afghanistan is very real. Besides, the insurgency could deepen other fissures resulting from political fragmentation, the lack of government outreach at the provincial and district level and growing lawlessness and criminality. Despite elections, the population is as disenfranchised as ever in the absence of democratic institutions they can turn to, or tools of governance they fully comprehend. More laws are passed to protect the warlords from persecution (like the move for the passage of an amnesty bill protecting them from being persecuted for war crimes) than for the average Afghan. The controversial Afghan Shiite Woman’s Personal


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Status Law appears to have been passed at the cost of women’s rights for support from the radical Shiite politicians and behind the garb of cultural rights.33 The insurgents have successfully exploited local anger over civilian casualties and used propaganda to garner popular discontent against what they now see as a foreign invasion. The house searches and detentions by the foreign troops and accounts, factual or exaggerated, of abuse at detention facilities, desecration of the Quran, insensitivity towards indigenous customs and practices have only increased alienation.34 And this has encouraged many locals to find common cause with the Taliban whom they see as unaligned with the foreigners in that their monthly salaries do not come from international coffers and to that extent are more Afghan than anyone else and hence to be trusted more than anyone else. All the actors of the Afghan situation during the course of the Soviet War will have to take responsibility for what ensued inside and outside Afghanistan immediately after the Soviet withdrawal due to their lack of constructive engagement in the 1990s. Just as much as the older generation of Afghan Taliban was a consequence of the Soviet invasion, the new Taliban is a result of American intervention. Today, if the international community does not stay the course in Afghanistan, the price could be inordinately high; besides the potential threat of the country slipping back into an internecine civil war with factions divided along regional and ethnic lines the possibility of a narco-state with institutions controlled by multiple organized criminal gangs is also as real. Such an unstable Afghanistan, where extremists have a foothold, with easy accessibility to nuclear material would again pose a serious threat to global security.

Implications for regional security and role of regional players The stability in Afghanistan is treading a fragile path. With NATO commitments intermittently showing signs of shakiness, the regional neighbours also want to ensure their interests are protected. And for the regional neighbours, the possibility of talks with the Taliban will come with its own set of complications. Even as Iran, India and Russia could see their interests threatened, the Taliban’s support base in neighbouring Pakistan would be simultaneously emboldened. Pakistan’s support of Islamist Pashtun proxies is a response to the issue of “Greater Pashtunistan” along the Pashtun belt and the conflict over the Durand Line as the international border. The use of the bordering provinces as a sanctuary and base for operations continues to hamper statebuilding in Afghanistan. At the same time, these areas with their virtual autonomy from the administration at the centre have raised major security concerns for Pakistan as well especially in view of the increased Talibanbacked violence not just along the border but in the heart of the country as well. Pakistan’s thirty-year history of military rule, interspersed by an often elusive and at times fragile and corrupt democracy dictated by the deadly



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alliance between the clergy and the military, has been at conflict with a stable government. And ongoing instability and insecure democracy will continue to provide foot soldiers and suicide bombers who act not just in Pakistan but also make their way to Afghanistan – something that the Pakistani military has not been held accountable for simply by virtue of being America’s strongest ally in the region, much like during the Soviet invasion. India is yet to get rid of the bitter after taste of the Kandahar debacle of December 1999 and its fallout witnessed in a subsequent series of terror attacks. If the region has to be made safe against the possible ripple effects of the situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, then not only does the insurgency need to be contained but it also needs to be ensured that the staging posts for the militant attacks, the camps for training and recruitment and the source of reinforcements are shut down and their funding sources snapped. Often the efforts from the Pakistani administration to weed out the restive Taliban militants have coincided with escalation in terrorism in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Recent intelligence reports appear to suggest the option of “jail or jihad ” being offered to captured Taliban militants by the ISI – to be jailed in Pakistan or continue their jihad in the Indian side of Kashmir – as more evidence of the danger these captured militants could pose to stability across Pakistan’s eastern border.35 One cannot repeat Pakistan’s mistake of assuming that what was happening within Afghan borders would remain like that, insulated just there. These are lessons that the Central Asian Republics learnt the hard way after independence. India needs to increase its role in Afghanistan in promoting reconstruction and development projects. It should focus on peopleto-people relations and strengthen economic, cultural and historical bonds with the Afghan people. Even as talks of negotiations with the Taliban seem to be growing, India might find it useful to strengthen its relations with more moderate elements amongst Pashtuns and other dominant ethnic groups in order to pursue its interests in Afghanistan. While keeping out militarily, India is doing well by extending its assistance in terms of governance, infrastructure, humanitarian aid and vocational training that directly benefit the Afghans by translating into more sustainable livelihoods for them. India’s Border Roads Organization (BRO) is involved in the construction of the 218-km. Zaranj–Delaram road on the Iran–Afghanistan border, linking highways of the land-locked country to Iranian ports which would also function as an important trade route through Iran to the Central Asian Republics. Several Taliban attacks on the BRO point towards the significance of this project which is nearing completion in Afghanistan. While India continues to maintain its stand of keeping out of Afghanistan militarily, it has promised to follow up on its commitment towards the country in terms of humanitarian aid having already pledged over one billion dollars for the reconstruction of the country, making it the fifth largest donor.36 Over 4,000 Indians are engaged in activities relating to the construction of various infrastructure projects in Afghanistan such as bringing electricity from Central Asia. It has


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also committed to a $25-million renovation of Darul Aman Palace as the permanent house for Afghanistan’s Parliament.37 Afghan Defence Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak was in India in April 2008, to share, among other issues, both the governments’ perceptions about the situation in Afghanistan and its immediate neighbourhood.38 The Pakistani administration has expressed reservations over India’s growing role in Afghanistan and of using its consulates in Afghanistan to recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents. It is crucial that Afghanistan does not become the staging post for a low-intensity conflict between India and Pakistan especially given the background of the two attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul where fingers have been pointed towards Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). So far as the US–Iran confrontation in recent days has been concerned, the Bush administration paid more attention to the Iranian issue. When it comes to Afghanistan, Iran has had a significantly constructive role in the negotiation of the Bonn Agreement in 2001. Iran has pledged $560 million in grants and loans with a focus on road reconstruction and power supply projects mainly in western Afghanistan their traditional support base. The US administration for its part has been holding the Iranian Revolutionary Guards directly responsible for the rise in insurgency both in Afghanistan and Iraq with the confiscation of weapons bearing Iranian labels by the NATO troops in Afghanistan giving credence to the allegations. Iran historically has backed the Shia groups in Afghanistan and the Taliban killings of its diplomats in Mazar-e-Sharief in 1998 led to a warlike standoff. So how and what source these Iranian arms really came from might need to be investigated more deeply. The rise of militant Islam with fundamentalist overtones is something that has always worried both Russia and the Central Asian Republics. They have been struggling with the spillover effects of the trafficking routes for both drugs and arms through their territories and the accompanied narco-crime network in the country. Any resurgence of Al Qaeda and the Taliban poses a similar threat to their own governance and sovereignty especially in view of the porous borders linking these countries and so Russia has expressed strong desire to reassert itself strategically in its near and extended neighbourhood. While OEF was welcomed even by the regional actors in the hopes of getting rid of the Taliban, of late, Russia has strongly criticized the aggressive unilateral policies of the US. Russian Prime Minister Putin has been working through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to regain its influence in Afghanistan with a Russian-led Working Group of CSTO also holding talks with Afghan military and civilian officials in Kabul in March 2007. Among other things the assistance offered is to build its army, security agencies, and border protection units to combat terrorism and the drugs trade, the two important causes of instability in the region. Under this, one of the proposals would include delivering arms and military equipment – a situation that looks dangerously similar to the Cold War era.



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The constant state of chaos and disunity in Afghanistan is not merely an issue of the lack of infrastructure, the persistence of corrupt practices and the absence of tools and structures of governance, but is also about the misdirected priorities and preferences of each stakeholder, their personal goals, the means they employ to achieve these goals, endgames, exit strategies and, perhaps most importantly, the reasons for being in the country at all. With most money going towards maintaining the support structure for the international community to function in the still unsafe Afghanistan, what it means is that 75 percent of the aid money goes in providing the requisite infrastructure to the international workers to function and really acts as phantom aid rather than real aid. So for each dollar in aid, 86 cents are going back to the American government.39 Besides, there have been many instances of even the locals employed who have made it less on the merit of their background and work and more on their ability to influence the correct people at the correct places as is believed to be the case with Adib Farhadi, Director of the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) whose salary is believed to be 484 times that of an ordinary clerk in Afghanistan and twice (and even more) than that of top economic advisors in the USA.40 Besides, with insurgency taking up so much of the attention, very little focus has been given to areas where insurgency is relatively low. For instance, the drug-rich, insurgency-hit Helmand province, which is the world’s biggest producer of opium is also the fifth largest global recipient of USAID funding, quite symbolic of the flaws in distribution of international aid in Afghanistan. So is Helmand reaping benefits of growing poppy and harbouring insurgency? It is such lop-sided policies that not only are counter-productive but also help keep insurgency alive instead of working to plug it. However, recent reports from the UNODC suggest that the entire decline in poppy cultivation in the country can be attributed completely to the decline in the province of Helmand alone in 2009. This dramatic turnaround in one of Afghanistan’s most unstable provinces has been the result of the well-balanced combination of a strong political and administrative local leadership; favourable terms of trade for legal crops offset by a more aggressive counter-narcotics offensive; and the successful introduction of “food zones” to promote licit farming.41 With so many actors on the scene Afghanistan’s best interests might not be in tandem with each of their economic and geopolitical interests including that of the American administration. Their competing and conflicting visions of reform, with numbers and visible targets as a measure of success, are often put ahead of more difficult political issues, which undermine progress and highlight the lack of experienced, flexible institutions for any kind of reform. In a country where poppy translates into livelihood, i.e., food on the table for a family of eleven for five out of twelve months of the year, the destruction of standing poppy crop is more damaging to a family in the absence of a sustainable replacement strategy. And if these are the kind of achievements and deadlines the international community is looking at then the hopes of any change in Afghanistan are defeated from the start.


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With increasing anti-international sentiment and the ignominy surrounding Hamid Karzai’s political autonomy and the epithet of the “Mayor of Kabul” attached to his position, Karzai has increasingly sought to have his voice heard even if it is at the cost of the country’s development. Hence, one has witnessed frequent public disagreements between him and the international community over a variety of issues whether it be with regard to high-ranking appointments (such as the case of Paddy Ashdown as the UN envoy to the country) or the role of the NATO troops, which is a worrying development. Add to this the pressure from domestic politics demanding concrete results, and the countries might be losing the will to tackle vital structural issues. This increasing nonchalance or reluctance of the international community was reflected in their unwillingness to arbitrate despite the repeated protests of large-scale electoral fraud in the 2009 presidential elections. This is where regional players might need to work towards a more proactive programme for Afghanistan, which does not compromise Afghan peace in pursuance of their own perceived national interests especially when the Western international community is looking for exit strategies from Afghanistan. The Afghans have lived under the shadow of a constant war and if the foreign intervention has to appear different from the earlier situations then the first thing that needs to change is the element of fear that the Afghans live in; fear of the insurgents, fear of the foreign troops, fear of the warlordsturned-politicians and fear of police. Democratic tools of governance are a prerequisite for tackling a situation of insurgency and yet security and stability are as important for a democracy to function. For any kind of development goals to be sustainable, there has to be a sense of confidence in the government, confidence amongst the people, confidence in security and the stability of the country, in gender and minority rights. Equitable representation of the entire population needs to be reflected as a microcosm in the command structures with all imbalances – ethnic and gender – being addressed, which is what President Karzai did attempt in his early years as President but the pulls and pressures from all directions in a fractious Parliament and Cabinet made it tougher with each passing day, as reflected in constant cabinet reshuffles. The fragile consensus built around the politics of appeasement is one that can be withdrawn at any time and without warning should circumstances change given that many of the warlords enjoy the reputation since the Soviet war of changing alliances with the Afghan weather conditions. A legitimate government position should enjoy operational autonomy and provide a professional, consistent service to citizens rather than acting as a corrupt and coercive tool of governing elites. Today the media is under constant threat, reflected in the illegal detentions and murders of journalists and even women parliamentarians. According to Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC, “in post-election Afghanistan, the rural development push must be as robust as the current military offensive – to feed and employ farmers, not just to search and destroy their drugs”.42 This is an important lesson not just for the counter-narcotics offensive but also insurgency in Afghanistan. The primary



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objective has to shift its focus to the people and improving their daily lives, and not remain restricted to the finer nuances of whether the fight should be a narrow one against Al Qaeda or a broader battle against the Taliban-led insurgency. What Afghanistan requires is a comprehensive reform of the law enforcement agencies and courts; an increased investment in infrastructure and alternative agriculture and rural development to woo farmers away from poppy rather than working backwards by destroying poppy first. Investments should be channelled towards basic facilities like better roads, power supplies, clean water, micro-finance facilities for small businesses and funding for civic groups and community development projects to improve local and national government. It is time for the Afghan administration to strengthen its own institutions of governance for lasting peace and stability. The ANA is believed to be among the few institutions in the country that enjoys considerable respect amidst the people. Perhaps this is where one needs to start learning lessons. More importantly, it is the moderates who have to be brought into the fold of governance for democratic politics and any form of constitutionalism to survive, to pave the way for a system of government that also inspires faith in the average Afghan.

5

Roads to perdition? The politics and practice of Islamist terrorism in India


Praveen Swami

In the summer of 1985, inflamed by the wave of communal violence that had ripped apart the industrial town of Bhiwandi, activists of the Jamaat Ahle-eHadith ultra-right Gorba faction had gathered to discuss the need for Muslim reprisal. An obscure West Bengal-based cleric named Abu Masood announced the birth of what would become the Indian wing of the Lashkar-eTayyeba, the Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen (TIM), or the Organisation for the Improvement of Muslims. Most of the TIM’s membership consisted of young Mominpura (Mumbai) residents who felt upset at the perceived discrimination against Muslims in Mumbai. On 6 December 1992, the day the Babri Masjid was demolished, the TIM thought that the time had come to act.1 In 1993, a surgeon-turned-TIM bomb maker Jalees Ansari organised a series of 43 bombings in Mumbai and Hyderabad and seven separate explosions in inter-city trains. While most of the explosions were small, it was a demonstration of the group’s formidable discipline and skills. Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI) agents caught up with Ansari just 13 days before he had been ordered to set off a second series of reprisal bombings, this time scheduled for India’s Republic Day in 1994. Against this background, this chapter provides a detailed, in-the-woods view of the flowering of the seed sown in Mominpora: of the Islamist terror groups made up, in the main, of Indian nationals that have emerged outside Jammu and Kashmir. The chapter explores the relationship of this “Tempered Jihad” – one calibrated to advance Islamist political objectives without leading India and Pakistan to war and argues that their growth is founded on domestic political process on both sides of the border. Given the demonstrated ability of the new groups to execute terrorist strikes of considerable scale, the impact of “Tempered Jihad” on Indian political life has been considerable – and, bearing in mind its close relationship with Pakistan, could have consequences of significance for regional stability.

The birth of the “well tempered jihad” At 11.40 a.m. on 13 December 2001, a white Ambassador car – a brand of vehicle commonly used by Indian officials – pulled into the gates of India’s


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Parliament building in New Delhi.2 It bore a red command light, as do many official vehicles, as well as what appeared from a distance to be a label authorising entry into the complex. From the point of view of the five Jaish-eMohammad terrorists inside the car, armed with assault rifles, grenades and explosives, things could not have gone better. But they then made a small mistake. The excited driver rammed into the back of a vehicle used by India’s then Vice-President, Krishan Kant. Its driver protested, and a police guard ordered the white Ambassador car to back away. All the five terrorists were killed in the shootout that ensued, along with nine security personnel. Soon after, India mobilised its troops along the border with Pakistan, leading to a stand-off that was to last for almost a year. India’s threat of war stemmed from frustration at its failure to deter Pakistani support for Islamist terror groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as elsewhere in the country. Pakistan’s President, General Pervez Musharraf, had promised on more than one occasion to end hostile operations against India. In practice, though, he had, to use Hasan Abbas’ acidic phrase, proved “a master of half-measures”.3 Islamist violence had escalated sharply after the end of the Kargil war, undermining the political position of the centre-right National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government which then held power in New Delhi. Faced both with India’s military threat and intense diplomatic pressure from theUSA, Musharraf delivered a televised speech proscribing the two terrorist groups India had indicated for their role in the Parliament House attack.4 In addition, he promised that no individual or organisation would be allowed to indulge in acts of terrorism directed at India. While Musharraf ruled out handing over the 20 terrorists India had demanded, he offered to prosecute those who were found on Pakistani soil, and to consider their extradition. With this, the levels of terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir, measured both by fatalities and the number of violent incidents, declined steadily after 2002.5 Funds were choked off for major terrorist groups, like the Hizbul Mujahideen. In 2004, Musharraf signed a joint statement with the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, committing “not [to] permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner”.6 Within Pakistan’s establishment, a new awareness seemed to have dawned that the Islamists it had unleashed posed a threat to the state itself. In the wake of Operation Parakram, former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Chief Lieutenant-General Javed Ashraf Qazi candidly stated that “We must not be afraid of admitting that the Jaish was involved in the deaths of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, bombing the Indian Parliament, [the journalist] Daniel Pearl’s murder and even attempts on President Musharraf ’s life.”7 However, the period between 2004 and mid-2006 saw a steady escalation in terrorist attacks outside of Jammu and Kashmir – the “Tempered Jihad”. New Delhi, Varanasi, Ahmedabad and several other cities were targeted, culminating in the July 2006, “Maximum Terror” bombings in Mumbai – which draw their name from the author Suketu Mehta’s description of


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Mumbai as “Maximum City”.8 India responded to the “Maximum Terror” bombings by terminating dialogue with Pakistan. For many in India, the bombings were a painful reminder both of the hideous costs of the 1993 serial bombings of the city and of the role of Pakistan’s covert services in both facilitating its perpetrators and protecting them from justice.9 Soon afterwards, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and Musharraf signed a joint declaration in which they agreed to set up a joint counter-terrorism mechanism.10 It has long been suspected that the declaration came about as a consequence of quiet US guarantees that it would compel an end to Pakistan support for Islamist terror groups. Evidence of just how credible such promises might prove is ambiguous. Pakistan’s covert services do seem to have pressured organisations like the Lashkar to scale back offensive operations. For example, it is now known that a large Lashkar unit was present in Mumbai in March 2007, within striking distance of sensitive targets like the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC). However, although the group contained skilled operatives shipped across the Indian Ocean in an operation that involved considerable expense, it had orders to move north, to Jammu and Kashmir.11 Perhaps frustrated at the shackles imposed upon them, Islamist terror groups carried out three major strikes on mosques and Muslim civilians – at Malegaon in 2006, followed by the firebombing of a New Delhi-Lahore train and the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad in 2007. Islamist leaders in Pakistan have claimed these strikes were conducted by Hindu fundamentalists, an argument more likely than not intended to undermine President Musharraf ’s anti-jihad stance. Not surprisingly, perhaps, these attacks were followed by a major attack on civilians in Hyderabad in August 2007, which claimed 40 lives. Without a close examination of just who the perpetrators of these acts are, however, and the motivations that drive them, it is impossible to arrive at a coherent idea of where the “Tempered Jihad” might now head.

Circles of hate Weeks after his arrest, automobile mechanic Feroz Abdul Latif Ghaswala finally told his interrogators just why he had decided to help bomb Gujarat. In March 2002, when the Gujarat riots began, Ghaswala had been visiting an aunt in the city of Ahmedabad. According to official statistics, 793 Muslims and 254 Hindus died in the violence; another 223 people are still missing.12 Ghaswala vowed revenge, but found that getting it was less easy than he had hoped. Salafi clerics in Gujarat proved less than sympathetic to his appeals for contacts. Frustrated, Ghaswala travelled to Srinagar in September 2003, hoping to join one or the other terror group operating in Jammu and Kashmir. At a congregation organised by the ultra-conservative Jamaat Ahle-e-Hadith, the principal Salafi sect in South Asia, he met Rahil Abdul Rehman Sheikh, who is now wanted by Interpol for his central role in organising the 11 July 2006,



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“Maximum Terror” serial bombings that claimed 209 lives.13 Sheikh was then busy arranging for the training of over three dozen men Indian intelligence believes volunteered to join Islamist terror groups in the wake of the Gujarat riots. Most were drawn from the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), an Islamist student group that was proscribed in 2001 after evidence emerge of its Lashkar links. Ghaswala himself was despatched for training at a Harkat ul-Jihad Islami camp near Chittagong, under the tutelage of Mufti Abdul Hannan – a Peshawar-trained Afghan jihad veteran who was later held responsible for a 2002 assassination attempt on the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina as well as the 2005 serial bombings that rocked Bangladesh.14 From Bangladesh, Sheikh travelled on fake travel documents in July 2005, for training at a Lashkar camp in Pakistan. Over time, Sheikh arranged for the training of dozens of other Mumbai men, including key figures in the cell believed to have provided infrastructural support to the actual bombers. These include Faisal Sheikh, a Mumbai businessman who, police say, used his commercial operations to launder Lashkar funds from West Asia, and his brother, Bangalore-based computer engineer Muzammil Sheikh. Both men, like most other suspects arrested for the “Maximum Terror” bombings, trained with the Lashkar in Pakistan. In almost every case, Sheikh’s operatives flew to Tehran using legitimate travel documents normally used by Shia pilgrims, before being escorted by Lashkar operatives across the largely un-policed Iran–Pakistan border into Balochistan. From there, police in India believe, they were transferred to training facilities around Bahawalpur. Several of the recruits trained under the personal supervision of the Lashkar’s long-standing commander for operations targeting India, Azam Cheema.15 By late April 2005, Indian intelligence services began to receive a growing mass of evidence that Sheikh’s cells had reached a state of operational readiness. Late on 9 May 2005, the Maharashtra Police recovered over 24 kgs of RDX packed in computer cases, along with 11 AK-47 assault rifles, grenades and ammunition which had been shipped across the Indian Ocean to Aurangabad. While Zabiuddin Ansari, a long-time SIMI member who handled the consignment on Sheikh’s instructions, escaped, investigators soon learned that the consignment was just part of a larger wave of explosives the Lashkar was pushing into western India.16 Gujarat witnessed a parallel flow of explosives, again linked to the Maharashtra-based cells Sheikh was running. One such consignment of 9 kgs of RDX was delivered to Sheikh for use in a terror attack on Ahmedabad. Lashkar operative Mohammad Iqbal, a Bahawalpur resident who operated in Jammu and Kashmir in 2002–3 and whom the Delhi Police shot dead in May 2006, had arranged for mafia-linked traffickers to smuggle the RDX across the Rann of Kutch and deliver it to Sheikh.17 Sheikh, in turn, handed over the consignment to Ghaswala and another new recruit, Mohammad Ali Chippa. However, the Delhi Police succeeded in penetrating the cell, and arrested both Chippa and Ghaswala. But a part of an earlier consignment of explosives sent through the Rann of Kutch was used in a bomb that exploded


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on a railway platform in Ahmedabad on 19 February 2007, injuring 25 people.18 This was the first time an RDX-based explosive was used in Gujarat. Another of Sheikh’s Maharashtra recruits, Zulfikar Ahmad Kagazi, is thought to have carried out that operation. Most of these networks were crippled in the wake of the massive counter-terrorism operations sparked off by the “Maximum Terror” bombings. However, key figures still remain. Rahil Sheikh, Indian intelligence believes, flits between Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan, using an array of fake passports. Zabiuddin Ansari’s whereabouts are unknown, like those of Kagazi. Low-grade recruitment still continues. In September 2006, for example, four Lashkar recruits from Jammu and Kashmir and Gujarat were arrested from the Dar-ul-Uloom Falah-e-Darain seminary in Tarkeshwar, one of the great centres of the Deobandi sect in western India.19 Gujarat killings also shaped the course of the “Tempered Jihad” at the eastern end of the Deccan plateau. Starting from September 2002, at least 14 young men from Hyderabad set out on secret journeys to terror training camps in Pakistan. A decade earlier, the demolition of the Babri Masjid had led several recruits from Hyderabad to join the Lashkar. Mohammad Abdul Sahed – who, operating under the aliases “Bilal” and “Shahid” is now wanted by Interpol for the August 2007 bombings in Hyderabad and the May 2007 strike on the city’s Mecca Masjid – is thought to have been one of those men.20 His cross-organisational networks cast considerable insight into the evolving story of the “Tempered Jihad”’. Police records show Sahed dropped out of college less than a year after his graduation from the Asafiya High School in Hyderabad. He was amongst the first generation of his inner-city family to have access to higher education. His name only began figuring in intelligence records from January 2004. He had at least some knowledge of the networks that sustained the Islamist presence in the city. Rehman was related by marriage, through his brother Khaliq Rehman, to one of India’s most wanted men – the Gujarat Mafia Rasool Khan Yakub Khan Pathan.21 Better known by the alias Rasool “Party”, Pathan had long-standing links with the Karachi-based mafia Dawood Ibrahim Kaksar. In the wake of the Gujarat riots, Pathan took responsibility for transporting the new wave of jihadi recruits for training. According to the testimony of mafia operative Javed Hamidullah Siddiqui, who was arrested in 2004, Dawood lieutenant Shakeel Ahmad Babu arranged the new recruits’ passage on flights through Bangkok and Dhaka.22 Pathan, who has been wanted by Interpol ever since 1993, was waiting for them on their arrival in Karachi. While some recruits trained with the Lashkar, others were routed on to the Jaish and HuJI. Asad Yazdani, a resident of Hyderbad’s Toli Chowki area, helped execute the assassination of the former Gujarat Home Minister, Haren Pandya. Pandya, a CBI inquiry found, was killed in reprisal for his role in Gujarat violence.23 Although the new recruits had trained with the Lashkar and Jaish, they turned to the Bangladesh-based HuJI for operational support. Founded by



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Bangladeshi veterans of the anti-Soviet Union jihad in Afghanistan, HuJI operates at least six camps where several hundred Pakistani, Indian, Thai and Myanmar nationals are known to have trained. Its founder, Mufti Abdul Hannan, spent several years studying at the Dar-ul-Uloom seminary at Deoband, Uttar Pradesh, and developed a large network of contacts among Islamists in India. He also built links with key organised crime figures. Among the group’s most high-profile actions in India was the January 2002 terror attack near the American Centre in Kolkata, executed in collaboration with Dawood-linked mafia Aftab Ansari.24 In 2007, Delhi Police arrested two of Yazdani’s Bangladeshi recruits, the twin brothers Anishul Murshlin and Muhibbul Muttakin,25 who confirmed that Yazdani had executed several major strikes in India, including the bombing of the Delhi–Patna Shramjeevi Express at Jaunpur in June 2005 and also suicide bombing at the headquarters of the Andhra Pradesh Police’s counter-terrorism Special Task Force in October 2005. A Bangladeshi national, Mohtasin Bilal, had carried out the bombing – the first HuJI operation of its kind. They also confirmed the link between Yazdani and “Shahid” and “Bilal”. Between April and June 2005, investigators were able to establish that Sahed had been based in Bidar, Karnataka, organising safe houses, communications, infrastructure and escape routes that allowed HuJI’s Bangladeshbased cells to strike with efficiency and ease. Yazdani was shot dead in March 2006, just hours after the bombing of the Sankat Mochan temple in Varanasi by HuJI’s Bangladesh-based cells.26 Sahed’s brother, Mohammad Zahid, was arrested on charges of aiding this operation and is in jail now. Networks like those run by Sahed or Sheikh, as has been noted earlier, represent the flowering of a long-standing Islamist project – one which has some roots in India, but others in Pakistan. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the head of the Lashkar’s parent Jamaat-ud-Dawa, had from the outset seen the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir as launching pad for a campaign against all of India – and, indeed, a wider civilisation conflict that would “continue until Islam becomes the dominant religion”.27 By the account of the Pakistani journalist Zahid Husain, this world view was rooted in Saeed’s experience of the Partition of India: The horrors of the partition in 1947, which uprooted his family from their home in Shimla, left a huge imprint on Hafiz Saeed’s personality. Millions of people were massacred in the communal violence that followed the creation of the new Muslim state. Thirty-six members of his family were killed while migrating to Pakistan.28 At a February 2000 rally held just a few hundred metres from the Islamabad headquarters of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Saeed proclaimed that the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir had reached the stage for which he had long prepared. Kargil, he said, had been the first component of this new campaign; the wave of fidayeen suicide-squad attacks the organization had


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unleashed on major security and civilian installations was the second. “Very soon,” he promised, “we will be launching a third round.”29 His deputy, Abdul Rahman Makki, announced that the Lashkar would soon initiate operations in Hyderabad, a city claimed by Pakistan’s Islamist right-wing to have been seized illegally by Indian forces from the Nizam in 1948. For years, the Lashkar had been attempting to build a network using local Islamists. Perhaps the most successful of the Lashkar’s agents was Mohammad Ishtiaq, the son of a shopkeeper from Kala Gujran in Pakistan’s Jhelum district. Operating under the alias Salim Junaid, Ishtiaq obtained an Indian passport and even married a local resident, Momina Khatoon. Ishtiaq, however, was arrested before he could do real harm. In late 1998, responding to desperate pleas from Lashkar’s leadership, Hyderabad resident Mohammad Azam Ghauri returned to India to help rebuild its networks.30 Ghauri was one of the three co-founders of the Lashkar’s Indian networks. He had friends in Hyderabad’s organised crime cartels for help. In 1999, his long-standing friend, Dawood-linked hit-man Abdul Aziz Sheikh, attempted to assassinate the Shiv Sena leader Milind Vaidya. Another mafia, Mohammad Fasiuddin, had executed local Hindu fundamentalist leaders Papiah Goud and Nanda Raj Goud as retaliation for the 1992 anti-Muslim violence in Hyderabad. The Lashkar network set off bombs in cinema theatres of Karimnagar and Nanded. Eight weeks after these bombings, Ghauri was shot dead by the police. Jihadi organisations, however, attempted to build new networks in Hyderabad. In August 2001, Hyderabad police arrested one of the most intriguing figures in this effort, an unassuming electrician named Abdul Aziz. While working in Saudi Arabia, Aziz had come into contact with an Islamist recruiter looking for volunteers to join the global jihad. Aziz served in Bosnia in 1994 and then fought alongside Chechen Islamists in 1996. In 1999, Aziz again flew to Tbilisi (Georgia) in search of a second tour of duty. He was deported. With the help of funds from a Saudi Arabia-based Lashkar financier who had also paid for Ghauri’s work, Aziz returned home to try and initiate a jihad of his own.31 Aziz hoped to draw on the resources of the Darsgah Jihad-o-Shahadat, or Institute for Holy War and Martyrdom – an Islamist vigilante group set up in the mid-1980s. Although its website claims that the organisation’s purpose is “protecting the life and properties of [the] Muslim community”, and “preserving the honour and chastity of women”, the organisation candidly states that “Islamic supremacy is our goal.”32 While such groups have no large-scale legitimacy among Muslims in Hyderabad, their hardline polemic is attractive to young people infuriated by communal violence. In this, they are identical to hundreds of others, in cities across the country – and there is no shortage of Islamist infrastructure within and outside waiting to receive them. Both imperial and post-independence Indian politics prompted the Hyderabadi Islamism to flourish. Nominally independent of British India, Hyderabad’s last Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, administered a system in which religious affiliation was a key source of legitimacy building. Although Muslims



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made up just 10 per cent of his realm’s population, they held three-quarters of state jobs. And of the seven major feudal estates, six were controlled by Muslim notables. During the two decades before independence, Hyderabad witnessed a couple of communal movements which Hindu and Muslim elites used to strengthen their position. Speaking on behalf of the emerging Hindu industrialist class, the Arya Samaj led from the front. In response to the efforts of the Arya Samaj, Muslim elites set up the Majlis-e-Ittehad ulMuslimeen, or Organisation for the Unity of Muslims. The Majlis was founded on the doctrine that Hyderabad Muslims were its natural hakim kaum, or ruling race. Although much of the Hyderabad Muslim elite was Shia, it was deeply influenced by the work of the nineteenth-century revivalist Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareilly. Ahmad’s influential Sunni-chauvinist work, as the scholar Vali Nasr has recorded, “identified false Sufism, Shiism and errant popular customs as the sources of religious corruption and hence declining Muslim power”.33 These competing communal movements collided in April 1938, when the city saw its first communal riots. Besieged by the Congress’s demands for democratic elections, and Arya Samaj’s religious mobilisation, Osman Ali Khan responded to the growing violence by proscribing both. He turned to the Majlis for support. Rizvi now set up the Razakars as a paramilitary sword-arm of the Nizam. Lucien Benichou has recorded that the Majlis leaders candidly stated that their objective was to “keep the sovereignty of His Exalted Highness intact and to prevent Hindus from establishing supremacy over Muslims”. In 1947, Rizvi unleashed his forces in support of the Nizam’s claims to independence. Thousands – both Hindus and Muslims opposed to Osman Ali Khan – were killed before the Indian Army swept into the state in September 1948. Within five days, Hyderabad capitulated. While the Nizam became the titular head of state, Rizvi was captured and imprisoned. He was finally expelled to Pakistan in 1957. Despite Rizvi’s defeat, Islamists continued to flourish in Hyderabad. The Majlis was reborn in 1957, under the leadership of an affluent cleric and lawyer Abdul Wahid Owaisi, who drafted a new constitution committing it to the Union of India. Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi, his son, took over the organisation in 1976. Salahuddin Owaisi’s sons, Asaduddin Owaisi and Akbaruddin Owaisi, are in turn now its most visible faces. Starting from nothing, the Majlis rapidly established itself as the principal spokesperson for old-city Muslims. By 1977–8, the Congress – which had unleashed the Indian Army on the Majlis just three decades earlier – was seeking electoral alliances with it. In 1986, a Majlis–Congress alliance took charge of Hyderabad’s Municipal Corporation. The Majlis spoke for two distinct constituencies within the old city: a devout traditional elite disinherited by the coming of democratic rule, and an urban underclass. Varshney records how the party succeeded in re-establishing itself so fast: “in the 1960s, there were riots in eight out of ten years in Hyderabad. After 1978, the trend towards communal violence took a turn for the worse.


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Except for the period 1986–9, riots took place virtually every year between 1978 and 1993, often many times in the same year.”34 Communal parties, not surprisingly, acquired centre-stage. With growing support from Hyderabad Muslims based in West Asia, the Majlis grew into a formidable competitor to the Hindu right. With the Congress and Majlis locked in political embrace, Hindu nationalist forces were able to represent themselves as the sole credible defenders of Hindu interests. Violence became institutionalised, giving rise to what the historian Paul Brass has described as an “organised riot system”.35 For example, gangs of killers were set up to wage war on behalf of their respective religious communities, operating under political immunities granted by various groups, a phenomenon documented in Sudhir Kakkar’s book, The Colours of Violence.36 Violence, as described in historian Javeed Alam’s work on the Majlis, acquired growing legitimacy.37 “The distinction between crime and valour,” Ashutosh Varney has noted, “thus disappeared for a large mass of Muslims and Hindus in the old city of Hyderabad.”38 Islamist terrorism in Hyderabad represented a breakdown of faith in the Majlis’ riot-protection system. Muslim interests, recruits to terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba argued, could only be defended by integration in the global jihad. Majlis leaders have, in recent years, represented in opposition to the jihadists. In a recent interview, Majlis leader Asaduddin Owaisi noted that “these misguided youths call me a kafir”.39 “I am on their hit list,” he added. However, as journalist Kingshuk Nag noted in a recent essay, the Majlis has also resorted to competitive chauvinism. Nag stated, “the party practices politics of the strident variety in its Hyderabad pocket-borough. A good example is the fuss that Majlis MLAs [legislators] created when [the author] Taslima Nasreen came to Hyderabad, threatening even to behead her the next time she came to town.”40 In an effort to avoid political competition, Nag argued, Majlis leaders have used Islam as a political tool with which to resist the intrusion of the modern world. Both economic development and the rule of law were seen as adversaries of faith. As such: … in the environment created by the party in the old city terrorists from across the border find a safe haven. While the rest of Hyderabad is modernising very fast in terms of physical infrastructure, the lanes and bylanes of the old city remain as run down as they were 50 years ago. Hindus and Muslims, poverty and squalor, live side by side in this old city that started coming up in the 1590s. Recruits are not impossible to pick up in this environment, particularly when a shining Cyberabad flourishes not more than 15 kms away.41 However, addressing poverty in inner-city Hyderabad, or freeing policing from politics, may not be adequate responses to the “Tempered Jihad”. As Varshney pointed out in 1997,


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Hyderabad Muslims have done much better than their Lucknow counterparts. Their success, however, has led not to a reduction but an increase in communal tensions, partly through a strengthening of the Majlis. The relative economic betterment of Muslims is not a cause of increased tensions. An absence of symbiotic linkages is. The two communities do not constitute a web of interdependence.42 Little noticed and even less examined, an ideological infrastructure has emerged within India to feed the “Tempered Jihad”. To examine this infrastructure, it is useful to consider the case of Zakir Naik, perhaps the most influential Salafi ideologue in India. A doctor-turned-theologian who has made adroit use of religious television to spread the Salafi message, Naik has travelled across the world on his evangelical mission. While Naik has often condemned terrorism in unequivocal terms – the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States of America and the Mumbai serial bombings of 2006 – his Mumbai-based Islamic Research Foundation (IRF) has proved a magnet for Lashkar-linked figures. Rahil Sheikh, a key Lashkar organiser who helped plan the Mumbai serial bombings, used the 2003 Srinagar convention of the Salafi Jamaat Ahle-e-Hadith which was addressed by Naik to recruit cadres.43 Sheikh’s associate, Feroze Deshmukh, worked as a librarian at the IRF.44 Naik’s message has mesmerised violent Islamists. In Naik’s view, the Quran “is the instruction manual for the human being”.45 Writing on the IRF website, Naik insists that “we Muslims would prefer that in India the Islamic Criminal Law be implemented on all the Indians, since, chopping the hands of a thief will surely reduce the rate of robbery in India. Similarly, 80 lashes for giving false testimony will prevent a person from giving false witness.”46 Islam, he proceeds: gives you a solution showing how to prevent the crime, e.g. chopping the hands of a robber, death penalty for the rapist. The punishment is so severe that it is a deterrent for the criminal to commit the crime. He will think a hundred times before committing a crime. Thus if crime has to be reduced or stopped in India the best solution is to implement “The Common Islamic Criminal Law.”47 Such language is profoundly attractive to one element of Naik’s core audience: the pious petty bourgeoisie in India’s inner-city Muslim ghettos, who are hit by both organised crime and Hindu-fundamentalist violence. However, the preacher’s work argues that the interests of Muslims cannot be served through an accommodation with the Hindu world outside the ghetto. Although Naik’s work often points to common principles in Hindu scripture and Islam, it is also explicit in its rejection of pluralism of the kinds that suffuse popular religious practice in South Asia. In one pamphlet he writes: Even if the Vedas and the other scriptures were the revelations from God, they were only meant for people of that time and were to be followed

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P. Swami only for that particular period of time. Today all human beings through out the world including India should only follow the last and final Revelation of God, i.e. the Qur’an.48


Like Christian and Hindu neo-conservative theologians, Naik proceeds to make a politically-charged case against syncretism. He argues: Some Muslims, especially certain Muslim politicians who try to appease the Hindus, say Ram Alai-his-salaam, i.e. Ram, may peace be on him. This is totally wrong, since there is no authentic proof from the Quran and Sahih Hadith that he was a Prophet of God.49 Sheikh Ahmed Deedat, an Osama bin-Laden funded South African Salafi evangelist who mentored Naik, spent much of his career in similar efforts to rebut a founding principle of secular societies.50 Extensively republished by the IRF, his work has found wide currency in both India and Pakistan. At his death, even the Daily Times claimed the preacher’s “message was great”.51 In one essay, Deedat used the problem of alcoholism to illustrate the ethical inferiority of Christianity: which, like Naik’s attacks on Hinduism, is deeply attractive to young inner-city Muslims who find themselves deprived in terms of jobs, education and access to economic opportunity. Deedat approvingly cited the television evangelist Jimmy Swaggart as recording that the United States has 11 million alcoholics. Swaggart, Deedat wrote, “like a good Muslim, goes on to say that he sees no difference between the two. To him they are all drunkards!”52 Yet, “the Holy Ghost has not yet made its pronouncement on this evil through any Church. Christendom winks at drunkenness on three flimsy pretences based on the Holy Bible.” He defended polygamy against its critics in secular societies.53 It is tempting to dismiss these fulminations as absurd, were it not for the fact that they are widely read among young Salafis in India – and contain within them express calls for violence.

The ideology of the “Tempered Jihad” Pakistan’s Islamist press provides some insight into the wider ideological underpinnings of the “Tempered Jihad”. If the works of Naik and Deedat help make sense of the motivations of Indian recruits to the jihad, Islamist intellectual discourse in Pakistan points us in the direction of the intentions of the sponsors of the “Tempered Jihad”. From the perspective of the Pakistani sponsor-groups of terror cells in India, the literature suggests, the moderated jihad is a medium: a medium for messages intended for audiences in Pakistan. If vengeance against Hindu fundamentalism drives recruits to join the “Tempered Jihad”, the quest for power in Pakistan drives their patrons. In essence, three major themes can be discerned in Islamist literature: the need to educate audiences of the legitimacy of violence; the representation of



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Hindus, Jews and Christians as eternal enemies; and the proposition that the Pakistani state had under General Pervez Musharraf betrayed its historic role as a sponsor of the jihad. All three themes were laid out at a National Consultative Conference organised by the Jamaat ud-Dawa in January 2007 to formulate an Islamist response to the peace process – the first major Islamist gathering after the 2006 Mumbai serial blasts. Attended among others by the President of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Raja Zulqarnain Khan, the Conference “completely rejected President Pervez Musharraf ’s current suggestions regarding the resolution of the Kashmir issue”.54 Ghazwa magazine, a Lashkar mouthpiece, quoted a participant in the Conference, retired Pakistan Army General Faiz Ali Chishti, as asserting that “jihad remains the only solution of this conflict”. General Chishti noted that pursuit of this solution had been undermined by changing attitudes to India within Pakistan. He lamented, “we have neglected to educate our younger generations about the Hindu mindset. Hindus have never accepted Pakistan’s independence and are continually scheming to destroy it, one way or another.”55 It is possible that the successive strikes on Muslim civilians which preceded the Hyderabad bombings were intended to educate, that is, to persuade followers that the restrictions imposed on the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir posed an existential threat to Islam and Pakistan. Elaborately dressed to resemble an arson attack that could plausibly have been presented as the work of a Hindu fundamentalist mob, the Samjhauta Express bombing enabled Hafiz Saeed to represent it as part of “a plot to massacre Muslims”.56 India, Saeed said, was therefore attempting “to hide the real story behind the massacre”, a fact which in his view should serve as an “eye-opener for the Pakistani government, which was unilaterally trying to establish friendly relations with the country across the border”. Saeed’s sentiments were echoed by the United Jihad Council, which asserted that the bombing “can only be the handiwork of Indian agencies or the Hindu fundamentalists”.57 Perhaps significantly, the Samjhauta Express bombing was preceded by a thoroughgoing critique of India–Pakistan détente in the Islamist press. The editorial in Ghazwa noted: Indo-Pak negotiations on the Kashmir have never borne any fruit. Up until now, only India has enjoyed the benefits of the Islamabad Declaration. All Pakistan got from that agreement is an exchange of cultural troupes. And as if that wasn’t enough, Indian politicians have taken the exchange of such cultural troupes a step forward by suggesting eradication of borders between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, our own rulers are trying to weaken our ideological borders, instead of strengthening them. Efforts are under way by the Pakistani government to remove facts and materials from the curriculum which educates our youth about the designs of the Hindus, and exposes their real mindset about Muslims in general and Pakistan in particular.58

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Pakistan’s Islamists have, of course, long opposed India–Pakistan détente, fearful that it would undermine “ideological borders”. In the wake of a successful India–Pakistan cricket series in 2004, the Lashkar-affiliated Zarbe-Taiba magazine had rallied against the popular sport – and its political connotations. Cricket, Zarb-e-Taiba argued, was introduced to Muslim countries as part of a colonial project to emasculate South Asian Islam. Zarbe-Taiba saw in the cricket series evidence of profound moral degradation which in turn underpinned Musharraf ’s decision to rein in the jihad: The British gave the Muslims the bat and snatched the sword and said to them: You take this bat and play cricket. Give us your sword. With its help we will kill you and rape your women.’59 It is sad that Pakistanis are committing suicides after losing cricket matches to India. But they are not sacrificing their lives to protect the honour of the raped Kashmiri women. To watch a cricket match, we would take a day-off from work. But for jihad, we have no time! Israel is a very tiny country. It does not play cricket. Therefore, it is progressing. We should throw the bat and seize the sword and instead of hitting ‘six’ or ‘four,’ cut the throats of the Hindus and the Jews. The sports of a mujahid are archery, horse-riding and swimming. Apart from these three sports, every other hobby is un-Islamic. The above are not just sports but exercises for jihad. Cricket is an evil and sinful sport. Under the intoxication of cricket, Pakistanis have forgotten that these Hindu players come from the same nation that had raped our mothers, sisters, daughters, wives and daughter-in-laws. These Hindus had desecrated our mosques and copies of the Holy Koran. These are the same Hindus who had dismembered Pakistan. Despite the diminishing levels of violence seen in the course of the “Tempered Jihad”, this polemic has remained largely unaltered. Writing in Daily Jasarat, a Jamaat-e-Islami-linked publication which has an estimated circulation of 50,000, Lashkar political chief Abdul Rahman Makki demanded that General Musharraf ’s regime “discard the pro-USA policy that has weakened the Kashmir cause. It is time to adopt a pro-jihad and pro-jihadi policy. You give us the country for six months and we will conquer Kashmir. We will also force the Americans out from Afghanistan.”60 In an editorial published in its Friday supplement, the Daily Jasarat demanded that the “slogan of jihad should reverberate in every nook and corner of Pakistan. If Pakistan allows jihadis to infiltrate into India, then Kashmir could be liberated in six months.”61 “Within a couple of years,” the newspaper asserted, “the rest of the territories of India could be conquered as well, and we can regain our lost glory. We can bring back the era of Mughal rule. We can once again subjugate the Hindus like our forefathers.” Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, for his part, has made several similar calls. In his speech on 5 February 2007, Hafiz Saeed exhorted his followers saying



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“Remember my friends that the jihad has been ordained by Allah. It is not an order of a General that can be started one day and stopped the other day.”62 In the wake of the rape and murder of a teenager in northern Kashmir on 20 July 2007, he demanded that Musharraf ’s restraints on jihad be removed. “The Indian Army,” Saeed thundered in an article written two days after the crime, “is raping the daughters of Islam. How can we tolerate this? We will kill every single soldier of the Indian Army and take revenge for the honour of our sisters. Let India deploy more soldiers in Kashmir so that our Mujahideen have more pigs to hunt.”63 Along with appeals to issues of honour, the Islamist media has used concerns over water – an issue of profound significance to its audience among peasants in Punjab – to press home its argument that there is an existential threat from India. Weeks before the Samjhauta Express bombing, a World Bank-appointed arbitrator overruled Pakistani objections to a dam being constructed by India on the Chenab river. In a subsequent press release, the Lashkar political chief Abdul Rahman Makki claimed that the World Bank’s “impudent” decision was “a harbinger of ruin for Pakistan’s agriculture and economy”.64 Pakistan had failed to resist this, he went on, for “our timid rulers are so terrified of India”. Ghazwa linked the water dispute with India to the larger conflict over Jammu and Kashmir.65 Such ideas have long constituted part of the strategic consensus in Pakistan – and were a major reason for its 1947 attack on Jammu and Kashmir. To Pakistan’s fledgling strategic establishment, India’s control of the northern region threatened “the safety and wishes of our brethren in Kashmir”, but also “our own safety and welfare”.66 MajorGeneral Akbar Khan, who led Pakistan’s military assault in 1947, insisted that “Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan was not simply a matter of desirability but of absolute necessity for our separate existence.”67 Lashkar leaders have long argued that only jihad can reverse the threatening course of history. In April 2003, in an interview to The Friday Times, Saeed asserted that Pakistan ought not “bow before India and beg for dialogue”.68 Since “they only understood the language of jihad,” he continued, “we have no choice but to respond by killing Hindus.” “India and other foreign powers,” Saeed told a congregation at Lahore’s Al-Qadsia mosque, “are involved in a spate of bomb blasts in Pakistan in 2007. Only India could be behind the recent attacks, because only a Hindu could do it. No Muslim can think of shedding the blood of another Muslim.”69 Saeed further said: “Kashmir will be liberated by jihadis. The first Qibla will be liberated through jihad.”70

A path to perdition? From this complex landscape, two sets of lessons are perhaps important. First, the “Tempered Jihad” is driven, in part, by factors intrinsic to India. Notable among these are the continued economic marginalisation and ghettoisation of urban Muslims.


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While it would be mistaken to see these as the root causes of the proliferation of Islamist terror groups in the country – nothing like a significant number of Indian Muslims have, after all, joined one or the other organisation – there is little doubt that a climate of hatred has served to draw recruits to the cause and provided some degree of legitimacy to their actions. The process has been helped along by the willingness of some secular political parties to use Islamist political parties as electoral contractors. A complete understanding of these political processes is needed. Sadly, there is a shortage of literature on the causes and contexts of contemporary Islamist activity in India. Giles Kepel’s standard reference work on jihad, for example, makes no significant mention of India.71 Second, the “Tempered Jihad” serves as a medium through which Islamist political organisations in Pakistan seek to further their political interests. As has been discussed earlier, Islamists have cast themselves as valorous defenders of a besieged faith and nation, in contrast to a compromised secular elite. That Musharraf was able to part-deliver on promises to scale back terrorism against India suggests Pakistan’s covert services and armed forces continue to wield some influence with these organisations. None the less, he was either unwilling or was unable to dismantle the financial, military and ideological infrastructure of groups like the Lashkar. Indeed, the ability of Islamist terror cells in India to draw on the resources of ideologically disparate organisations like the Lashkar, Jaish and HuJI, as well as their fluid movements across national boundaries, may mean that powerful elements in Pakistan’s military establishment continue to back operations against India. Ever since 2001–2, much commentary has focused on the improvement of India–Pakistan relations. Yet, as the experience of the Parliament House terror strike demonstrates, even single acts of terror contain within them the potential for catastrophe. Should the “Tempered Jihad”’ gather momentum, the contours of the India–Pakistan relationship may bear little resemblance to the prosperous shared future so many characterise as inevitable.

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K. Warikoo

With the advent of Islam in Kashmir in the fourteenth century and due to its geographical proximity with Central Asia, there followed a strong cultural intercourse between Kashmir and Islamic centres of learning particularly Bukhara, Samarkand, Herat, Meshed, Khurasan and Baghdad. Islamic mysticism, which was introduced into Kashmir by Muslim Syeds and Sufis from Central Asia and Persia, came in contact with the indigenous Rishis and mystics. This interaction, in turn, led to the formation of Rishi thought in Kashmir, which believed in oneness of man and love of human beings and abhorred violence, laying stress on spiritual salvation rather than proselytisation. Thus came into being a common cultural tradition and literature which rejected communalism and promoted peace and harmony. It was due to this Rishi orientation of the Kashmiri psyche and the liberal and secular ethos of Kashmiri Muslims, that “two nation theory” and communal politics of M. A. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, did not find any acceptance in Kashmir during and after the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. So much so, that the Pakistani tribal raiders were resisted and hated during their attack on the Valley in 1947 by the Kashmiri Muslim masses, who raised the slogan Hamlavar Khabardar, hum Kashmiri hain tayar (Beware the raiders, we Kashmiris are ready to fight). Kashmiris demonstrated similar apathy to the Pakistani intruders during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, when Pakistan sent its armed infiltrations in the Valley under the plan codenamed “Operation Gibralter” to capture Kashmir. Kashmiri Muslims virtually handed over the Pakistani infiltrators to security forces, bringing to naught the Pakistani nefarious design. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and the consequent independence of Bangladesh, proved to be a turning point in Kashmir politics. Kashmiri Muslims witnessed the division of Pakistan into two nations and the abject failure of “two nation theory”. The dissident antiIndia groups in Kashmir including the Plebiscite Front realizing the ground reality, now began negotiations with the Government of India to find a solution to the Kashmir problem. This resulted in the February 1975 accord between Sheikh Abdullah and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Thus began a new chapter in Kashmir with Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference assuming power in the State. Sheikh Abdullah and other Kashmiri


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leaders declared that the creation of Bangladesh had vindicated the decision of National Conference to reject Jinnah’s “two nation theory” and go for the accession of Kashmir to Indian Union in 1947. The majority of Kashmiri Muslims saw reason in this argument and there ensued an atmosphere of general peace, tranquillity and social and economic development in Kashmir. But the communalized section of Kashmiri Muslim society and some political groups particularly the Jamaat-e-Islami and its front organizations though remaining dormant for quite some time, now revised their strategies. And these groups found an opportunity in the political vacuum created in the Valley following the death of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Notwithstanding the accession of Kashmir to a secular and democratic India, the Mullah (clergy) class in Kashmir was attracted towards the theocratic Pakistan. Traditionally, the clergy has been opposed to liberalism, democracy and modernization. Before 1947, Mullahism in Kashmir was symbolized by the institution of Qazi (administrator of justice), Mufti (responsible for issuing fatwa) and Maulavi (priest). Besides, there was the institution of Mirwaiz in Kashmir. Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah (grandfather of the current Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who is also leader of the secessionist group All Parties Hurriyat Conference), headed the Muslim Conference and migrated to Pakistan soon after 1947, as he was a vehement opponent of the popular party National Conference and its leader Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. After 1947, such Mullahism and its functionaries virtually became powerless and redundant in the new political and socio-economic order. This section of Kashmiri Muslim society which believed in religious identity, found its model in the neighbouring Islamic State of Pakistan. Whereas Sheikh Abdullah and his party ensured that Kashmir acceded to India, Yusuf Shah opposed this. The partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 led to the creation of Pakistan on the basis of two-nation theory. And Kashmir being contiguous to Pakistan besides having a predominantly Muslim population, was bound to be impacted by the thought of communal identity. Now the traditional Mullahism in Kashmir came to be subsumed and overwhelmed by the fundamentalism and fanaticism promoted by Jamaat-e-Islami, which had been following Mawdudi’s doctrine. It was during the late nineteenth century which witnessed the emergence of an urban and educated Muslim middle class that the Kashmiri Muslims began to question the Hindu Dogra rule and assert their political interests. Maulana Rasool Shah (1855–1909), the Mirwaiz of Kashmir and the head of Jamia Masjid, Srinagar established the Anjuman Nusrat-ul-Islam (Society for the Victory of Islam) in 1899 and started “spreading Islamic education based on the Shariah” and also “creating political awareness among the Muslims”.1 Later in 1909, the Anjuman set up the Islamiya High School in Srinagar, which subsequently set up “several branches in small towns in Kashmir”.2 Whereas, Rasul Shah’s younger brother Mirwaiz Ahmadullah set up an Oriental College in Srinagar, his successor Mirwaiz Maulana Mohammad Yusuf Shah “developed the links of the Anjuman with Islamic reformist



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groups in India”.3 Yusuf Shah, who returned to Kashmir in 1924 after his studies at the Dar-ul-Ulum at Deoband, “set up a branch of the Khilafat Committee to promote the cause of the Ottoman Caliphate among the Kashmiri Muslims”.4 Yusuf Shah also set up a Muslim printing press in Srinagar and started publishing two weeklies, al-Islam and Rahnuma, which campaigned against the “un-Islamic” practices of Kashmiri Muslims. Now educated Kashmiri Muslims began to have links with other Muslim groups in Aligarh, Punjab and Delhi. Such a “growing Islamic consciousness first manifested itself in the form of the Ahl-e-Hadith”, which campaigned against the un-Islamic practices and shrines, which in their view had emerged as “the chief centres of superstition and charlatanism, controlled by crafty, hypocritical and materialist mullahs”.5 But the Ahl-e-Hadith did not have any mass appeal and there were numerous instances of “violent opposition to them for their condemnation of Sufis, saints and shrines”.6 Ahl-e-Hadith even built their separate mosques in parts of Kashmir where they had a considerable following. It was the Ahl-e-Hadith that laid the ideological foundation of the future work of Jamaat-e-Islami which pursued the similar agenda of cleansing Kashmiri Muslims of their “un-Islamic” characteristics and for achieving the Islamic mission of Nizam-e-Mustafa. With the strengthening of materialistic culture, influx/generation of substantial wealth and growing economic affluence, power and authority among a wider section of Kashmiri Muslim society, particularly among the bureaucracy, business, contractor and neo-rich class and even intelligentsia, these sections of society achieved status and set the trends in new socio-economic life of Kashmir Muslims. They flaunted their wealth and status in almost every sphere of life, causing discomfiture to others who were not so affluent. The Islamic fundamentalists felt that these materialistic and extraneous influences debased the pristine teachings of Islam and led the Kashmiri Muslims to adopt un-Islamic ways of life. They believed that moral degradation and the rise of materialism among Muslims eroded the strength, appeal and influence of Islam and they called for cleansing Islam of such evil practices (called bidat). Ironically it was the middle and upper class of Kashmiri Muslims comprising the educated elite, who were exposed to the Aligarh school of thought and also to Middle Eastern society and polity – neo-rich, corrupt businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats and big estate holders – which has been the main support base of the extremists like the Jamaat-e-Islami. They doled out large donations to build mosques, madrassas and for social welfare schemes in order to cover their misdeeds and to gain legitimacy and influence in society and politics. Islamic fundamentalists devoted sufficient time and energy to carry out indoctrination through propaganda, persuasion and even intimidation. Writings on Islam, its doctrine, history, culture, society and politics started being produced and published in huge quantities, exhorting the Kashmiri Muslims to shun the un-Islamic way of life. They called for removing what they called the distortion of history. Islamic fundamentalists lay stress on fulfilling the obligations (farz) of namaz (five-times-a-day


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prayer), Ramzan fastings, halal and haram (allowed and disallowed), Haj, zakat (charity), ultimate faith in the Prophethood and Quran, absoluteness of Islamic ideology, congregational prayers, inseparability of religion and politics and non-territoriality of Islam. At the same time, alcoholism, dance, music, courts, the judiciary, earning of bank interest and various things associated with a secular, democratic and liberal order, were publicly decried and declared un-Islamic. But the problem and dilemma of the Islamic society arises from the fact that many Islamic doctrines and practices do not conform to the political and socio-economic realities of the present-day world with science, technology, modernization and globalization being order of the day. Many Muslim countries receive international loans and Muslims around the world are using banking facilities, saving their funds in bank deposits, earning interest etc. This dichotomy in belief and actual practices necessitated by the exigencies of modern times is clearly visible in Kashmir. Ignoring the Islamist calls forbidding Muslims to earn interest, Kashmiri Muslims have been making full use of the banking facilities; so much so that Jammu and Kashmir Bank now ranks among the top few banks in India, in terms of its deposits, loans and other services. And it achieved this status only after 1990, that is during and after the militancy in the Valley. Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir is one of the most influential Islamic movements in South Asia and it has played a key role in the transformation of society and politics of the Muslim majority Valley of Kashmir, from a traditional and composite culture based on reverence of indigenous religious traditions and practices including the shrines, ziarats and tombs and liberal secular political beliefs to a puritan Islamic religious and political order of an Islamic state based on the principles of Shariah. Jamaat-e-Islami was launched in 1942, when its leaders Qari Saifuddin, Saaduddin and Maulana Ghulam Ahmed Ahrar and a group of like-minded Kashmiri Muslims influenced by Mawdudi’s ideology, met together at Shopian in Kashmir. Soon after, Saaduddin and Maulana Ahrar and few other Kashmiris attended the All India Convention of Jamaat-e-Islami organized by Maulana Mawdudi in 1945 at Pathankot.7 Here it was decided that the Jamaat should organize itself in Kashmir, and Saaduddin was chosen as the Amir to lead the organization in the State, which position he held till 1985.8 In the beginning, the Jamaat in Kashmir did not get any response due to its pan-Islamic ideology which was not in tune with the Kashmiri way of Islam. Besides, the mass movement led by late Sheikh Abdullah against the feudal autocracy of the Maharaja had a sway over the people of Kashmir. During the postpartition period from 1947–53, Jamaat-e-Islami leaders remained content with propagating their pan-Islamic ideology, which, however, did not strike an immediate chord with the common Kashmiri, who was beginning to reap immense benefits from the revolutionary agrarian reforms, abolition of debt and mortgages introduced by the ruling National Conference led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. However, Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir



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maintained its independent political posture from the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind while retaining fraternal and ideological links with it. But it has been close to the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan and followed its agenda. The State witnessed political upheaval in 1953, when Sheikh Abdullah was arrested and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad assumed power in Jammu and Kashmir. To quell political turmoil in the Valley, Bakshi had used political and religious groups to gain popularity in the State and to overcome people’s displeasure over the Sheikh’s arrest. This provided an opportunity to the Jamaat-e-Islami, J & K to start building its cadres in villages and towns through madrassas and schools. In the subsequent years, the Jamaat-e-Islami network of madrassas increased along with the number of students and followers. These madrassas acted as centres of propagating Jamaat-e-Islami ideology in the Valley among the Muslim population, particularly the youth. Successive State governments did not take any steps to restrain the spread of Jamaat-e-Islami ideology among the youth. The Jamaat-e-Islami elements made steady inroads in almost all departments of the State administration, particularly education, revenue and public works. For the expansion of its cadres and ideology in the Valley, Jamaat-e-Islami leaders used mosques as the basic units in villages and towns. Since it is obligatory for every Muslim to take part in the collective prayers on Friday, Jamaat-e-Islami asked some of its vocal leaders well versed in Islamic theology to visit townships and villages to address the Friday congregations to propagate Islam and Islamic duties according to the Quran and Hadith. Until the year 1970–71, Jamaat-e-Islami, J & K did not have any share in the political spectrum of the State. It used the medium of spreading its ideology to grassroots in the farthest villages of the Valley and Muslim pockets in other regions to create a political vote bank in its areas of influence. Soon after Syed Mir Qasim became the Chief Minister, Jamaat-e-Islami, J&K was recognized as a political party enabling it to fight State Assembly elections in 1972. Many of the then Congress leaders of the State had opposed the idea of giving recognition to an organization like Jamaat-e-Islami in the State as the organization was communal. In the 1972 Assembly elections, Jamaat-e-Islami contested 20 seats in Kashmir and two seats in Jammu, but won five in the Valley and none in Jammu. Jamaat-e-Islami protested against the Sheikh Abdullah–Indira Gandhi Accord of 1975 on the grounds that Pakistan and the people of Jammu and Kashmir were not parties to it. The Jamaat raised the Kashmir issue asking for its solution through a plebiscite under the UN Charter. Even during the 1977 elections, Jamaat-e-Islami was critical of Sheikh Abdullah and advocated merger of the State with Pakistan. In 1977 Lok Sabha elections, it fielded two candidates, one each from Baramulla and Anantnag and one candidate in Jammu region from Udhampur, but failed to win any seat. However, the Jamaat-e-Islami candidates secured 38 per cent and 27 per cent of the valid votes in Baramulla and Anantnag respectively, whereas in Udhampur it obtained 6.1 per cent of the votes. In the subsequent State Assembly election


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of 1977, Jamaat-e-Islami contested 19 seats, 17 in the Valley and 2 from Jammu. It could secure only one seat from Sopore receiving only 3.59 per cent of the votes. In 1983, it fielded 26 candidates without any success, though it secured 7 per cent of total votes. However, its party candidates did well in Sopore, Kupwara, Langet, Shopian, Rafiabad, Budgam and Doru securing 35, 19, 16, 27, 11, 8.5 and 12 per cent of votes respectively. It was in April 1979 that the Jamaat-e-Islami received great setback in the aftermath of the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan. Bhutto’s supporters damaged and destroyed the properties of Jamaat and its workers in the Valley. The Jamaat-e-Islami strongholds in Aarvan (Bijbehara), Tral, Bichur, Kulgam, Shopian, Sri Gophwara (falling in Anantnag district) and Bummai, Zalura villages in Baramulla district and in Pandan, Nawhatta of Srinagar district, were the main targets of such mob attacks, which included assaults on the Jamaat workers, axing of orchards, burning of houses and even some Jamaat madrassas. The party remained in a state of shock for quite some time. The Jamaat revived its activities after the Imam of Mecca, Sheikh Al Salaya of Saudi Arabia visited Kashmir in May 1980 and persuaded late Sheikh Abdullah not to obstruct Jamaat-e-Islami’s propagation of Wahhabi Islam in the State. The Jamaat skilfully utilized the presence of religious leaders from Islamic countries to elevate its status and emerge as a powerful political force in the Valley. The Jamaat-e-Islami was now more vigorous in its communal propaganda through its units at various levels in mosques, madrassas, educational institutions and other front organizations. It questioned the accession of J & K with India and exhorted Kashmiri Muslims to launch jihad against India. They denounced the cardinal principles of Indian polity like secularism, democracy and socialism as un-Islamic concepts. They stood for the establishment of an Islamic order as the only means to achieve a final solution for Kashmir. Every social, economic or political issue was interpreted by these leaders in communal and pan-Islamic colours, even though the State government has remained in the hands of Muslim leaders ever since 1947. Jamaat-e-Islami now developed organizational links with Muslim organizations in Islamic countries of West Asia. In 1977, the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami – the Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba (IJT) was founded to develop transnational linkages with Islamist groups in India and abroad. In 1979, the IJT was admitted as member of the World Organisation of Muslim Youth. Jamaat and Tulba leaders attended conferences and seminars which were convened by international Islamic organizations in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Islamic countries. Jamaat-e-Islami also received a lot of funds from Islamic organizations for the spread of Islam, upliftment of Muslim students, construction of mosques, Islamic libraries and Islamic educational centres. In 1980, Jamaat-e-Tulba organized an international Islamic Conference in Srinagar which was attended by important delegates from West Asia including the Imam of the mosques of Mecca and Medina. The IJT also wanted to pass a resolution calling upon Kashmiri Muslims to wage jihad against India.



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To quote Praveen Swami, “by the end of the decade the IJT President, Sheikh Tajamul Hussain, called for the establishment of an Islamic state, through the medium of revolution.”9 All Islamic youth leaders of the world were invited to participate in it. Another large Islamic ijtemah (gathering) of Jamaat-eIslami took place at Idgah in Srinagar in September 1980. This was the triennial ijtemah attended by all Jamaat-e-Islami workers, members and sympathizers. The Jamaat cadres penetrated the administrative, revenue and police services and educational institutions. They started a mass campaign of indoctrination to wean away Kashmiri Muslims, particularly the young and educated professionals, from the indigenous traditions and towards full Islamization of Kashmiri society and politics. In 1985, the number of students enrolled in Jamaat-e-Islami schools was about 13,000, whereas this number was estimated to be around 33,000 in 1989. Flush with foreign funds mainly from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami expanded its reach in the Valley. Following the death of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the tallest figure in Kashmir politics and leader of National Conference, the Jamaat-e-Islami and its front organizations, buttressed by a liberal flow of Gulf money, galvanized their activities in order to fill the political vacuum in the State. By 1986, the Jamaat had 10,000 hardcore members, 25,000 ordinary members and about 50,000 persons under its ideological influence.10 By 1989, Jamaate-Islami had gained significant success in wooing the youth of impressionable age through its network of schools. By early 1990, the total number of such schools was found to be 250 with 1,300 teaching staff and about 40,000 students. Lamenting this state of affairs, a prominent Kashmiri politician and author Peer Ghyas ud Din writes, “when intellectuals are under the fear of gun, fundamentalism in Kashmir is serving the interests of reactionary forcescorrupt bureaucrats, Mulllas and lumpens.”11 Though the Jamaat succeeded in spreading its organizational network beyond the Valley in various parts of the State, it lacked the mass appeal required for the total Islamization of society and politics. Despite its formidable network of hundreds of study circles, schools and mosque committees, the majority of Kashmiri Muslims were Ahl-e-Itqad who venerated saints, Rishis and shrines in common with their Hindu compatriots and were thus alien to the extremist pan-Islamic ideology propagated by Jamaat-e-Islami. To overcome these vital lacunae, the Jamaat leaders and activists launched a sustained campaign against what they called as “un-Islamic” practices12 and specifically targeted secular liberal and traditionalist Muslims. As part of this campaign, they forced a ban on books which did not correspond with the Islamist world view. Various educational institutions, libraries and even the Kashmir University library were “cleansed” of such books which included all the “Books of Knowledge” series, Milton’s Paradise Lost, Bernard Shaw’s plays etc. Darwin’s Theory of Evolution was also decried. Jamaat-e-Islami also reacted against the notification of the Election Commission asking all political parties to get registered. Jamaat-e-Islami held that it was based on Islamic principles and was striving for establishment of


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Islamic system of governance. So it would not deviate from this line to include clauses of secularism and socialism. Thus it did not register as a party. Accordingly in 1987, Jamaat-e-Islami, J & K changed its strategy and formed the Muslim United Front (MUF) along with those Muslim political groups that harped on anti-India propaganda and Islamization and even challenged the finality of accession of the State to India. The MUF, which contested 41 seats against the NC (F) – Congress-I alliance, won only four seats. The MUF campaign was carried along strong communal and secessionist lines to sway the Muslim votes in its favour. The Front, however, did not function as a cohesive unit and was dogged by internal dissensions. Jamaat-eIslami made strong efforts to utilize the MUF platform to consolidate its grip in different parts of the Valley. At the organizational level, Jamaat-e-Islami has a well knit organization of central, provincial, district, tehsil and halka committees to run the party. Jamaat-e-Islami, J & K maintains separate wings to look after different issues: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Shoba-e-Parliamani (Parliamentary wing to monitor developments in Sate Assembly, Indian Parliament etc.) Shoba-e-Maktab (to publish and distribute books on Islamiyat) Kashmir Medical Trust (to look after medical treatment and assistance) Shoba-e-Tableeg (to propagate Islam) Shoba-e-Qanoon (to provide legal assistance) Shoba-e-Taleem (to promote education) Shoba-e-Maaliyat (to mobilize and look after finances) Shoba-e-Siyasat (political wing)

The main frontal organizations of Jamaat-e-Islami, J & K are: 1

2

3

4 5

The Islamic Study Circle, founded in July 1968 by Prof. Yusuf Khan, alias Dr. Yusuf-ul-Umar of Srinagar. It has functioned as the intellectual wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, seeking to educate the Muslims about Islamic teachings and philosophy through literature, speeches and a network of libraries. The Muslim Education Trust, which was founded in 1969, and runs the B.Ed. College at Sopore, besides two educational institutions at Barzulla (Srinagar) and Thanamandi (Rajouri). It also grants scholarships and interest-free loans to Muslim students. Falah-e-Aam Trust, set up in 1977. It runs over 250 schools with about 25,000 students taught by 800–1,000 teachers who are mostly Jamaat-eIslami activists and sympathizers. Jamaat-e-Tulba (student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami actively pursuing the cause of jihad ). Iqbal Memorial Trust, established in 1981 by Islamic Study Circle leaders to impart regular Islamic education and make available Islamic books to the Muslim students.


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6

Hilal-e-Ahmar, the public relief trust set up by Dr Yusuf-ul-Umar in March 1990. It is a welfare front of the Hurriyat providing financial assistance to Muslim detenues and those involved in/victims of militancy. 7 The Muslim Welfare Society, set up in 1982. It published an English magazine, Green Dome. It seeks to unite Muslims of different sects, work for their welfare and arrange jobs for Kashmiri youth in Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. 8 The Institute of Kashmir Studies, founded by G. M. Butt, Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami J & K. It publishes literature on human rights violations, anti-India and pro-Pakistan propaganda. 9 Hizbul Mujahideen, which was set up in September 1989 by Mohd Yusuf Shah alias Syed Salahuddin, and is the military arm of Jamaat-e-Islami. 10 Dukhtaran-e-Millat (women’s militant wing). Besides, the Jamaat-e-Islami, J & K has links with Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan and pan-Islamic organizations like Rabita Alam-e-Islamia, World Association of Muslim Youth, Kuwait (WAMY), Ikhwan-ul-Musalmeen (Egypt), Muslim Students Associations of Uganda and America, International Muslim Association (New Zealand) etc. Among the firebrand Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, Syed Ali Shah Gilani,G. M. Safi (now in Pakistan) and Ashraf Sahrai are the noted orators. Their public campaign through mosques, madrassas and Friday congregations gained momentum from 1974–5 onwards and this process continued unhindered and unabated throughout the Valley and also in the Muslim-dominated areas of Jammu province. Jamaat-e-Islami propaganda became more vociferous after 1980 leading to a phenomenal rise in the attendance of Muslims in mosques. Every township has at least one mosque which is particularly used by the Jamaat-eIslami workers, followers and sympathizers for Friday prayers. In Sopore, an exclusive Muslim Peer mosque for Jamaat-e-Islami followers was built in Pir Mohallah for Friday congregations and to listen to fiery speeches of S. A. S. Gilani and G. M. Safi, the then Amir-e-Jamaat, District Baramulla. Syed Ali Shah Gilani, former Chairman, All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and now leader of the Tehrik-e-Hurriyat secessionist organization is the most vocal and diehard Jamaat-e-Islami leader, who got elected to Jammu and Kashmir Assembly thrice from Sopore Assembly Constituency in 1972, 1977 and 1987. Gilani’s Friday congregational addresses at Muslim Pir mosque in Sopore were reverberating and electrifying. He claimed that: Islam admits only Islamic system of government (Nizam-e-Mustafa) where every system of governance would be according to the holy Quran and Hadith. Islam does not allow idol worship and does not believe in number of gods and deities. Islam’s constitution is Quran and Hadith is the manifesto which every true Muslim should follow.


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According to Syed Ali Gilani “democracy, secularism, socialism and all such isms are un-Islamic. Gilani has been spearheading the movement for the establishment of Nizam-e-Mustafa, with a puritan Islamic mode of governance including Islamic banking and Islamic judicial system headed by a Qazi.” Jamaat-e-Islami advocates that Islam being a universal religion, it does not believe in geographical boundaries. As regards India, Syed Ali Gilani ridicules Indian democracy and secularism as breeding corruption and anarchy, thus being redundant. He is critical of the central and state governments for adopting un-Islamic means of development such as family planning, pig farming, banking etc. This resulted in the silent erosion of liberal and traditional Islam in the Valley and its replacement by a fundamentalist and militarized form of Islam as propounded by the Jamaat-e-Islami and its front organizations, thereby subverting the unique indigenous socio-cultural ethos of Kashmir. Syed Ali Shah Gilani of the Jamaat-e-Islami of Kashmir has been stressing that the Muslims of Kashmir are part of Millat. Gilani’s practise of pan-Islamism, which is based on the concept of Millat/Ummah transcending national boundaries, is at the root of ongoing violence and turmoil in Kashmir. Gilani and his group are invoking the suzerainty of Muslim Millat in repudiation of the lawful democratic and secular polity and liberal and composite cultural tradition of Kashmiriyat based on the indigenous history, culture and ethos of Kashmir. This Islamic fundamentalist thought has been used to shape political consciousness among the Kashmiri Muslims. The “Hate Hindu” and “Hate India” campaign is part of this process of full Islamization. Resurgent Islamic conservatism and militancy is instrumentalized by fanning Islamist extremism and organizing jihad in Kashmir. It will be instructive to look at Syed Ali Gilani’s views on international affairs particularly after 9/11 and his vision of Islamic solidarity. Gilani expressed his grave indignation at the Muslim world’s response to US policies after 9/11 and he lashes out at the entire Muslim world “for their unconditional support to the US after 11 September 2001”.13 Gilani laments that “the thinking and action of the Islamic Ummah is disturbed, incoherent and deplorable”.14 Describing the situation as “a very great tragedy for the entire Ummah”, Gilani is dismayed as to why “they are compelled to follow the diktats of other countries in spite of the fact that they possess huge and immense material and manpower resources, oil and mineral wealth and enjoy very important strategic geographical position”.15 Gilani describes Pakistan as “the fortress of Islam and Afghanistan as its most important and strongest wall”.16 He wants Pakistan to “fulfil its fundamental responsibility and duty towards Islam and Muslim Ummah of more than a billion”, which in Gilani’s view, “has lost its identity after being divided into national, communal, linguistic and economic compartments”.17 Addressing a gathering of lawyers in Srinagar on 24 October 2009, Syed Ali Gilani stated that “fighting for Azadi (independence) without also demanding an Islamic State is useless”.18 It may be recalled that whenever there has been a flare-up in the Israel–Palestine



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dispute or any case of allegedly blasphemous reference to the Prophet and Quran (in Western publications or media) comes to light, Kashmiri Muslims have been holding demonstrations giving vent to their anger and hostility towards Israel and the West, besides expressing solidarity with the Palestinian cause. This is the result of sustained efforts by Jamaat-e-Islami and its firebrand leaders like Syed Ali Gilani to forge a common cause and solidarity between the Kashmiri Muslims and the outside Muslim world. Two important events that have shaped developments in Kashmir during the past three decades are the Khomeini revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan. Whereas the success of the Khomeini revolution and the dissemination of the ideology of Islamic revolution did influence the Muslim peoples in Asia, the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan (December 1979) brought home to them the threats still looming over the Islamic countries. It was in these circumstances of Islamic victory and despair, that the Jamaat-e-Islami and other Muslim fundamentalist groups of Kashmir like Students Islamic Federation, Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba, Muslim United Front, etc. through their sustained efforts of indoctrination and preaching in mosques, madrassas, Friday congregations and social and political assemblies ignited Islamic passions among the majority of Kashmiri Muslims and built the “youth cadres to achieve the objective of Islamisation of Kashmiri society”.19 The Islamic fundamentalist indoctrination of Kashmiri Muslims was channelled against India and anything that symbolized Indian culture, society and polity. Now the slogans of jihad (holy war) and for the establishment of Nizam-e-Mustafa (system based on Islamic Shariah) were openly raised in Kashmir. In mid-1988, Allahwale (the Islamic fundamentalist group based in northern India) alongwith Jamaat-e-Islami held a conference in Srinagar in which Muslim delegates from various parts of India and also from some West Asian countries participated. The delegates while highlighting the doctrinal purity of Islam, the delegates stressed the need to carry out jihad. Soon after hundreds of Imams from the fundamentalist Allahwale group were inducted into various mosques in Kashmir for tabligh (religious indoctrination),20 displacing the local Kashmiri Muslim Imams who still believed in indigenous culture and tolerant view of Islam. In this manner, the wide network of mosques was taken over by the Islamic extremists and subsequently used to galvanize Kashmiri Muslims for jihad. Many young Kashmiri Muslims were influenced by the pan-Islamic ideology being propagated through madrassas, Friday sermons in mosques, new Islamic literature/ideology disseminated through mass media and personal contacts/appeals. The view that extremist violence and terrorism is caused by economic deprivation or political alienation is not based on the ground realities. In this context, one may refer to numerous instances of young, affluent and highly educated Kashmiri Muslims who became the foot soldiers of jihad. The case of one Omar Sheikh Nadeem Khateeb, who turned out to be a fierce Islamist jihadi fighter, much before Osama bin Laden, and became the icon of the twenty-first century jihad, is


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an illustration.21 Being the son of a former Chief Engineer, resident of Srinagar’s posh colony at Rawalpora and educated in a well known Christian Missionary School (Tyndale Biscoe) at Srinagar, Nadeem belonged to a very affluent family of Kashmir.22 After his graduation from Srinagar, Nadeem trained himself as a commercial pilot in Georgia, USA. But having fallen to the Islamist propaganda and fired by the zeal of pan-Islamism, Nadeem left the USA to join the Al Badr arms training camp in Pakistan. Later he crossed over into Kashmir as part of an Al Badr terrorist group for jihad and he was killed in an encounter at Mahore, Jammu in early 1999.23 During the first phase of militancy in Kashmir which started in 1989, the Islamist militant groups strived to “bring structural changes at cultural levels of Kashmir society”,24 seeking to Islamicize the socio-political set-up in the Valley to bring it in tune with the Islamic state of Pakistan and the Muslim Ummah. Though militancy in Kashmir was launched initially by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) ostensibly to achieve azadi (independence), within a few months a number of militant groups emerged advocating Nizam-e-Mustafa as the objective of their struggle. Now the term azadi gave way to jihad. Various Islamist groups like Jamaat-e-Islami and its militant wing Hizbul Mujahideen, women’s wing Dukhtaran-e-Millat, Jamiatul-Mujahideen, Allah Tigers, Jamiat-ul-Ulemma Islam, Al Badr, Al Jihad Force, Al Umar Mujahideen, Muslim Mujahideen, Islamic Students League, Zia Tigers etc. proclaimed the objective of their struggle as Islamicization of socio-political and economic set-up, merger of Kashmir with Pakistan, unification of Ummah and establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Dukhtarane-Millat, the radical women’s organization, announced at a press conference in November 1992: the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan was the first step towards the unification of Ummah. Any other solution to Kashmir problem would be un-Islamic. Since we wanted to establish an Islamic Caliphate world over, the unity of Ummah was pre-requisite for that.25 Hizbul Mujahideen asserted that its aim “is the establishment of Islamic Caliphate world over. We do not believe in ideological or geographical boundaries.”26 Another group, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, stressed that “the demand for self-determination was distorting the image of ongoing movement. It is a struggle for the establishment of Caliphate.”27 Allah Tigers asserted that “the present struggle would continue until the goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate was achieved”.28 Open calls for the establishment of an Islamic Order were followed by the liquidation of central government officials, Kashmiri Pandits, liberal and nationalist intellectuals, social and cultural activists which was described necessary to rid the Valley of its un-Islamic elements. A number of Muslim social and political activists including Mohammad Yusuf Halwai, Mir Mustafa, Abdul Sattar Ranjoor, Ghulam Nabi Kullar, Bashir Ahmad Nengroo,



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Sheikh Mansoor, Mohammad Shafi and others were kidnapped and brutally killed. Thus the moderate voices and liberal tradition of composite culture and harmony and peaceful coexistence, were silenced through terror, leaving the field open for extremists. Simultaneously, all cinema houses, beauty parlours, wine shops, bars, video centres, use of cosmetics etc. were banned by the militant groups. Al Barq issued a ban order on the sale of cigarettes.29 The Peoples League asked Kashmiri girls not to take part in any cultural programmes outside the Valley.30 Allah Tigers threatened to throw bombs on houses where women would refuse to wear veils.31 The militants, through terror of their gun, coerced the local newspapers to highlight their activities. The Hizbul Mujahideen imposed a ban on the circulation of national and Jammu newspapers in Kashmir Valley. The Wahdat-i-Islami even banned the entry of Mark Tully, the former New Delhi Bureau Chief of the BBC into the Valley, asking the people to “stop listening to the BBC”.32 Offices of daily local newspapers like Aftab, Alsafa and Srinagar Times were attacked with bombs and even set on fire. Several prominent media persons including Mohammed Shaban Vakil, editor of Alsafa, Lassa Kaul, Station Director of Doordarshan, Srinagar were gunned down for not toeing the militant line. The militant groups used both terror tactics and Islamist ideology to control the local press, which projected the Islamist viewpoint on society, politics, governance, laws etc., as superior to the so-called corrupt and anarchic practices in the democratic and secular order. The Islamist orientation of insurgency in Kashmir became more pronounced after extremist and terrorist organizations like Hizbul Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Markaz Dawaul-Irshad, which launched a religious crusade against the non-Muslim minorities, publicly took pride in killing Hindus in the name of jihad. The Muslim extremists launched a malicious campaign against the Kashmiri Hindus through periodic write-ups in local newspapers and through sermons in mosques. And a final ultimatum was given to this minority community through the press on 14 April 1990 asking them to leave the Valley within two days or face retribution and death.33 The brutal killings, extortions, kidnappings, rape of women, destruction of properties and holy shrines, both Hindu and Muslim, by the terrorists and mercenaries caused revulsion among the common masses in Kashmir against the Jamaat-e-Islami brand of fundamentalism. This was more so because the Islamist groups like Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith directed their efforts to eliminate the traditional social and religious practices prevalent among the Kashmiri Muslims. These Islamist groups exhorted the Kashmiri Muslims to banish such un-Islamic practices as visiting ancient holy shrines of Sufis and Rishis. The people of Srinagar even resisted the attempts by some militant groups to stop the celebration of annual Urs at Batamol Rishi.34 Then followed the burning down of a part of Baba Rishi shrine near Tangmarg. In Aish Muqam, there was a bloody clash in which a few people got killed, when “militants tried to prevent the local villagers from celebrating the Urs of


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Baba Zainuddin Rishi”.35 And on 11 May 1995, Islamist mercenaries from Afghanistan and Pakistan led by Mast Gul, destroyed the ancient holy shrine of Sheikh Nooruddin Rishi at Charar-e-Sharif, 35 kms from Srinagar.36 This shrine had been a centre of pilgrimage for hundreds of thousands of devotees, both Hindus and Muslims, over the past six hundred years. In early July 1998, the terrorists made an abortive attempt to blow up the nearly 700-yearold shrine of Naqshband Sahib in Srinagar.37 Similarly, Hizbul Mujahideen and other such outfits have been holding out public threats against participation by Hindu pilgrims to the annual pilgrimage to the holy Amar Nath cave. They even resorted to mine blasts and firing upon the Hindu pilgrims on numerous occasions. These holy shrines of Kashmir have been targeted by the Islamist terrorists and mercenaries in order to obliterate the indigenous ethno-cultural and spiritual heritage of Kashmir and the traditional ethos of religious tolerance, harmony and peaceful coexistence, and to usher in the fundamentalist and radical Islamic practices. The possibility of establishing a new Islamic Caliphate running from Kashmir to Pakistan through Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia was being discussed by Islamist extremist groups in Kashmir at a time when Soviet troops had withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Muslim Central Asian Republics emerged as independent states following the disintegration of the USSR. They were echoing the ideas of the Amir (Chief) of Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, who, speaking on Kashmir Solidarity Day in Rawalpindi in February 1992 declared that “a great Islamic state, spreading from Kashmir to Central Asia would emerge after the independence of Kashmir.”38 Soon after new groups like Tehrik-i-Ahyay-i-Khilafat (the movement for revival of Caliphate) and Tehrik-i-Khilafat-i-Islamia (the movement for Islamic Caliphate) announced their presence in Kashmir.39 They propounded the ideology of transnational Islam and the Caliphate. Tehrik-iKhilafat-i-Islamia asserted that: Islam did not recognize nationalism or territorial patriotism. The slogans based on ethnicity, race, gender or nationalism were false … The real Islamic ideology was the ideology of Caliphate … The slogan that future of Kashmir would be decided by Kashmiris has given rise to an evil, which was distorting the Islamic identity of present movement, and reducing it to a mere democratic movement.40 The Amir of Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, went on record saying: “Democracy is among the menaces we inherited … These are all useless practices and part of the system we are fighting against. If God gives us a chance, we will try to bring in the pure concept of an Islamic Caliphate.”41 It is against this backdrop that there emerged close linkage between the Islamist insurgents from Kashmir and the Afghan mujahideen, That thousands of such Kashmiri militants exfiltrated to Pakistan and Afghanistan to undergo training in arms and guerrilla warfare, with some of them later fighting alongside



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the Afghan mujahideen, lent new dimensions to the ongoing militancy in Kashmir. with the pan-Islamic ideology binding them together. The war cry of jihad brought about the ideological unity between the Afghan mujahideen and Kashmiri militants. Now the insurgency in Kashmir was not only losing its indigenous character, but was also being simultaneously taken over by the Islamist radicals and Afghan and Pakistani mercenaries as part of the new Pakistani strategy. Hafiz Saeed, addressing a public meeting organized by Jamaat-ud-Dawa on 29 April 2004, declared that “jihad will never be stopped in the held territory (Indian Kashmir). On this issue, there is complete unity and solidarity in the ranks of the mujahideen.”42 The jihadi groups have been averse to the peace process and dialogue between India and Pakistan as also between Indian government and Kashmiri secessionists. The marginalization of Kashmiri militant outfits like Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was deftly brought about by Pakistan after failing to sustain the euphoria among Kashmiri Muslims about their movement against India. This was achieved by supporting the radical Islamist terrorist groups like Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat ul Ansar, Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad and its armed wing Lashkar-e-Tayyeba in Kashmir, their cadres being drawn from heavily armed and battle-hardened Afghan, Pakistani and other Islamist mercenaries all maintaining close linkages with the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan and Kashmir. To quote a Pakistani analyst Ishtiaq Ahmed, “most of the Islamist militant groups that are now fighting in Kashmir, including Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, are products of the Afghan war. The Taliban are an important external agent fuelling the fire of Islamic militancy in Kashmir.”43 Developments in neighbouring Pakistan, which has been the source of ideological inspiration, extremism, secessionism and infiltration of terrorists in Kashmir, have begun to dent the popular and idealised view of Pakistan as being “God’s own country”.44 Notwithstanding the continued attraction of Kashmiris to the religious programmes beamed by Pakistan TV and other Pakistani channels as opposed to the reality shows and soap operas portraying the degeneration of Indian family and society being shown on Indian TV channels, common Kashmiris are disillusioned with the turbulence and violence in Pakistan. The Lal Masjid siege, removal of Chief Justice of Pakistan Supreme Court, declaration of emergency followed by violent protests, Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, militancy in Swat, unabated terrorist attacks including suicide bombings in FATA and even the urban centres of Pakistan killing civilians and security forces alike, political turmoil and uncertainty have brought home to Kashmiri Muslims the bitter reality in Pakistan and potential threats to its integrity due to political and extremist violence. Yet the year 2009 saw rise in the incidents of cross-border infiltration of armed militants from Pakistan, who have been engaging in gun battles with the security forces across the Valley,45 which is part of Pakistan’s policy to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir. At the same time, those Kashmiri secessionist leaders who having realized the futility of armed movement sought to bring peace to the Valley through dialogue with the government, have been facing the wrath


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of hardliners. Abdul Gani Lone, a veteran Kashmiri politician and leader of All Parties Hurriyat Conference was shot dead in 2002 by a Lashkar-eTayyeba hit squad.46 Abdul Majid Dar, co-founder of the Tehrik-e-Jihad Islami (which merged into the Hizbul Mujahideen in 1991) was killed by Hizbul hardliners in 2003.47 More recently, Fazal-ul-Haq Qureshi, patriarch of jihadi movements in Kashmir, who “had transformed himself into a leading figure in the state’s search for peace”48 was shot in early December 2009, when he was coming out of a local mosque in Srinagar. The extensive network of hundreds of study circles, schools, madrassas and mosques propagating the puritan Islamic ideology and the fear of the terrorist’s gun, and the forced exodus of the indigenous minority of Kashmiri Hindus, has caused irreparable damage to the Kashmiri tradition of composite culture, communal harmony and peace. One finds Kashmiri Muslims being swayed by Islamic indoctrination which is discernible in the increasing number of people sporting beards, offering prayers in mosques, making Haj pilgrimage, a considerable proportion of women wearing burqas, youth taking extra interest in religious teachings and various chores of daily life. Yet, the common Kashmiri Muslims, with the exception of politically motivated and ideologically indoctrinated ones, are averse to accepting the Wahhabi brand of Islam which is alien to the liberal religious ethos. With almost all Kashmiri Pandits (numbering over 400,000)having been forced out of the Valley by the Islamists and living in various parts of India for the past 20 years now, the Islamization of the Valley is complete. In fact, a sizable number of traditional and liberal Kashmiri Muslims and educated youth belonging particularly to the middle and upper classes of the society (numbering over 100,000), also have opted to move out the Valley to live in an atmosphere of freedom, fearlessness and liberalism and also to avail themselves of huge educational and employment opportunities in various parts of India. There being no strong presence of liberal, democratic and secular alternative voices in the Valley to resist and fight the forces of obscurantism and extremism, the Islamists rule the roost. Such a civilizational and ideological divide between the extremist Islamists and the moderate, liberal and traditionalists in Kashmir is a continuing process going on ever since Islam was introduced in the Valley in the fourteenth century. In contemporary times, this divide has been turned into a violent conflict with the Islamists and gun-wielding terrorists targeting the simple, innocent and moderate voices in Kashmir just because they do not fall in line. And the future of the Kashmir crisis will be decided by the final outcome of this civilizational conflict and the resultant social and cultural dynamics in the Valley. It remains to be seen if the Valley regains its indigenous and composite cultural heritage, social structures and institutions that have faced the wrath of the Islamist extremists during the past 20 years.

7

Communal peace in India Lessons from multicultural Banaras


Priyankar Upadhyaya

I am proud of this city Banaras … where Hindus and Muslims live in perfect harmony like the confluence of Ganges and Yamuna-the two holy rivers. Ustad Bismillah Khan1

The politics of religious intolerance and fundamentalism has in recent times posed a worldwide challenge to inter-cultural harmony and peace. India is no exception to this trend. Although credited as a showcase of ethnic pluralism and heterodoxy of religious life, it has not escaped the scourge of communal and ethnic violence. Nonetheless India’s varied experience of dealing with cultural and religious identities offers instructive insights to understand the problems of inter-community peace and reconciliation. Drawing from India’s overarching perspectives to accommodate plural identities, this chapter focuses on the historical and current instances of communal peace in the holy city of Banaras.2 While tracing the unique lineage of communal rapport in Banaras where the pre-colonial multi-religious synergy is still vibrant, the chapter benchmarks the terrorist bombing of a sacred temple in March 2006, which posed an unprecedented provocation to communal harmony in the city. Amid the serious premonitions of communal violence, the people of Banaras showed remarkable inter-community understanding and forestalled any outbreak of frenzy. This case analysis, based in part on our fieldwork insights, has untangled some typical instances of peaceful civic engagement in Banaras to discover whether the city is uniquely poised towards peaceful communal coexistence, unlike in comparable cases of intimate communal relations. Such city-based analysis might identify the convergence and divergence between the peaceful and riot-prone cities, which face similar national and global provocations.3 The chapter argues that the Banaras experience may serve as a model to emphasize that the connect between cultures can ever be a source of tension as well as reward and the peaceful outcome of their interaction depends largely on the willingness of community leaders to demagnetize the religious discourse in favour of the benign resources of their respective cultures. It also aims to unravel the unique patterns of shared neighbourhood and common


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cultural practices in Banaras that discourage communal polarizations and accord a communitarian identity to the city dwellers.4 Such a line of enquiry does not undervalue the complex matrix of communal politics in India but moves the spotlight from the stereotype of Hindu– Muslim enmity to the living reality of their coexistence and quotidian peace.5 It highlights the imperceptible ways in which the cultural dimensions may contribute to the peacebuilding process in urban centres where the episodes of communal violence have occurred with greater frequency in recent times. In doing so, the present enquiry draws on the theory of civic engagement and the supposition that the civic and cultural interactions between religious and ethnic affinities keep a city away from communal conflicts.6 Indeed this is a less explored perspective on communal engagement in the Indian subcontinent and hence deserves attention.

Lineage of syncretism India, historically known for its pluralism and multi-religious synergy, has long been a cradle of syncretism (blending of different forms of religion or culture). The plural ethos of Hinduism enriched through its interface with Buddhism and Jainism and its creative encounter with Islam inspired a range of multi-religious rituals and practices. The fusion between the Hindu– Muslim cultures began with Mughal rulers forging tactical alliances with Hindu counterparts. However some Mughal rulers like Akbar (reigned AD 1556–1605) revealed a genuine commitment to religious harmony and respect to different faiths.7 Akbar’s espousal of Din-e-Ilahi (Religion of God), which combined the best elements of several religions, exemplified the ethos of ecumenism and secularism.8 The sway of such spiritual traditions as Sufism and Bhakti during this era paved the way for Hindus and Muslims to transcend their religious insularity and enrich each other’s cultural practices.9 The popular preaching of Sufi Saints like al-Hallaj, Baba Farid, and Kabir Das created an ethos of a composite culture in the sub-continent. During this historical passage, many Muslim scholars excelled in writing Hindi poetry, while Urdu became a favourite with scores of Hindu scholars.10 Muslim authors like Ras Khan and Rahim wrote in Awdhi (a local dialect) and expressed devotion for Lord Krishna, a Hindu god. Such streams of shared religious and cultural practices dominated the public space and facilitated a peaceful transaction of inter-community demotic superstitious and local practices.11 An instructive instance is the practice of Hindu and Muslim soldiers offering respective religious prayers side-by-side which often led to syncretistic modes of worship.12 The Indo-Islamic cultural confluence is manifest all over the country in thousands of inter-community shrines, dargahs and pilgrimages, which are revered by all communities.13 Banaras being a favourite destination of seekers of all religions is indeed a quintessential example of pan-Indian syncretism. According to one estimate,

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Banaras hosts over 3,000 Hindu shrines and temples, 1,400 Muslim shrines and mosques, 12 churches, 3 Jain temples, 9 Buddhist temples, 3 Sikh temples and 12 important churches.14 Embellished by a diverse demography and multicultural ethos, the city presents a multifaceted medley of cultural, lingual and regional diversity. No wonder the city defies its external image as an exclusive “Hindu” space, despite being a seat of orthodox Hinduism.15


Hindu-Muslim synergy Muslim presence in Banaras dates back to the eleventh century AD. The timeline of older mosques and tombs of the city coincides with the very first waves of Mughal conquest and conversion in northern India.16 Banaras, like some other north Indian cities, imbibed features of a “mughalizing city” under the socio-cultural sway of the Mughals and the subsequent rulers of Awadh. Sandria Freitag thus observes that “the close ties fostered in the Mughal courts with the Hindu people account for the close ties between the Muslim weavers with the Hindu Raj of Banaras later on”.17 No wonder the city received waves of Muslim arrival starting with late medieval times. Today it hosts a high percentage of Muslim population, which accounts for 35.7 per cent out of the city’s 1.2 million people.18 The iconoclasts and the religious reformers who stood for Hindu–Muslim unity have enhanced the reputation of Banaras as a gathering place of all religions. It was while living in Banaras that Dara Shikoh, the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan’s beloved son, translated the Upanishads (Hindu religious scriptures) into Persian with the aid of Hindu pundits. Kabir Das, the fifteenth-century poet, rejected the ramparts of religious and caste divide and espoused the essential unity of mankind. He was equally revered in both communities and legend is that both Hindu and Muslim sparred bitterly over his remains.19 The inter-community mingling in the everyday life of Banaras finds both Hindus and Muslims braided together in worship, culture, craft and commercial affairs. The city appears to sport a unique lifestyle woven around the sacred river Ganga that serves as a lifeline for the inter-community activities relating to leisure and pleasure (mauj or masti).20 The inter-community practice of common outdoors retreat (bahri-alang) is also a typical feature of Banarasi routine and as Nita Kumar observes: “to be a Banarsi means to enjoy bahri alang”.21 Clearly, the jest for celebration, festivities, and theatre and music concerts cuts across communal affiliations in Banaras.22 Muslim weavers have all along participated in Hindu rituals and festivities and it is customary for the skilled Muslim artisans to make the traditional masks for the annual Ram Lila – the dance-drama depicting the tale of the divine Hindu god-king, Ram. Muslim artists would also play the role of Hindu Gods in the religious drama.23 Similarly Hindus have traditionally participated in Muharram in the spirit of brotherhood and unity.24 Musicians from both Hindu and Muslim


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communities traditionally perform both in temples and shrines on important celebrations. Musical performance in Mushayara and Qavallis (Muslim musical events) and the celebrations of annual Urs are a part of everyday experience in the city drawing audiences as well as patronage from across the communities. Leading artists like Chand Putli and Majid Bharati have adorned both Biraha and Urs.25 Ustad Bismillah Khan would begin playing his Shehani with devotion to Hindu deities. Interestingly the devotees of both faiths funded such celebrations joining frequently on the same location to celebrate together their respective rituals. For instance, the marriage of the Laut (a Hindu shrine) would coincide with the tragic marriage of Ghazi Miyan (a Muslim icon).26 Yet another example is the famous Alamgir mosque, which embodies features of Hindu temple architecture in its lower portion. The Hindus who call it “Beni Madhav ka Dera” routinely visit this sacred site. This converging life style of Banarsi combined with the traditional norms of the “ritual performance crossover” has historically ushered in a remarkable inter-community synergy.27 Similarly the tradition of organizing youth clubs across community lines is yet another feature of Banaras which reflects the multicultural ethos of the city.28 These informal youth and sporting clubs organized around a shared neighbourhood ensure inter-caste and inter-community representations.29 Thus in so many ways people across all communities and castes would celebrate their common identity as the residents of particular neighbourhood (mohalla).Their religious and caste affiliation would not matter as much as the distinction between a city dweller (Banarsi) and an outsider (non-Banarsi).

Metaphors for composite identities The image of peaceful communal engagement in Banaras has been embellished through folklore and metaphors such as Ganga-Jamuni Tehzeeb (culture) and Tana Bana.30 The Ganga-Jamuni Tehzeeb compares the Hindu– Muslim harmony and friendship to the holy confluence of India’s major rivers – the Ganga and Yamuna.31 It assumes a peaceful merging of Hindu and Muslim culture and lifestyle in Banaras as expressed in their friendships, joint festivities and interdependence. As such, the Ganga-Jamuni Tehzeeb reminds people of the incomparable unison they share across religious communities. This in turn sets a parameter for the people to uphold the religious peace. The metaphor is especially popular in the intellectual discourse as it coincided well with the Nehruvian rhetoric of a composite culture.32 The other peace metaphor is Tana Bana, which describes the intimate communal relations between Hindus and Muslims as interlinked like the warp and weft of a Banaras silk sari (the six yards of shimmering silk).33 It draws from the intertwined lives of Hindu shopkeepers and Muslim weavers in silk textiles.34 The weavers depend on Hindu middlemen for supplies of yarn and



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for marketing their goods. Unlike the Ganga-Jamuni Tehzeeb, the metaphor of Tana Bana emphasizes the salience of business ties, making it seem that the brotherly relations between Hindus and Muslims are not only a matter of their personal conscious choice but are also driven by their social being. This interdependence has often dissuaded the Muslim weavers from participating in a communal quarrel of larger provincial dimensions. The other identity popular in the city life is that of Banarasipan (Banarasness). Unlike Ganga-Jamuni Tehzeeb or Tana Bana, Banarasipan does not focus exclusively on the relationship between Hindus and Muslims. Instead, it is an over-arching collective identity for all religions and ethnicities that call Banaras their home. It tries to bond all elements of Banarasi society together within a composite identity by drawing on the pride Banarasis have for the unique culture of their city. This is an integration born of proximity, interdependence, and of an understanding shaped by years of sharing each other’s cultural life and every day joys and sorrows.

Communal challenges The tracks of syncretism and communal peace have not been able to overcome the violent streaks of Hindu–Muslim enmity, not even in Banaras.35 The communal violence has often resulted as a consequence of the divisive policies of the rulers during and after the colonial times. The British used the attribution of communalism as a master narrative to explain all public disturbances in which Hindus and Muslims were involved.36 Fomented by the colonial policy of divide-and-rule even the petty issues of local factionalism took the ugly face of communal violence.37 The holy city’s reputation as a meeting point of multiple religions made it a preferred target of such divisive machination. The handling and projection of the Hindu–Muslim riot over Lat Bhairo in 1809 is cited as a case in point.38 The politics of communalization took new guise as India approached freedom amid a bloody partition. Notwithstanding its commitment to a democratic and secular polity, the post-independence India saw rampant communalization of politics for electoral dividends. Even the secular political parties could not resist from exploiting the communal divide.39 No wonder the public discourse on communal relations has remained heavily saddled with the narratives and episodes of communal enmity.40 Communal relations touched their lowest ebb in the early 1990s in the wake of the temple-mosque contention in Ayodhya. The issues embedded in the Ayodhya dispute had direct ramifications on Banaras which faced similar contentions in three religious spaces – the Lat Bhairo complex, the Alamgir Mosque, and the Gyanvapi mosque at the Vishwanath temple.41 The mosques in all these sites were either built on or around a temple during the Mughal era. The supposedly desecrated sites were seen as an affront to Hindu esteem. Thus the reclamation of the most sacred, Vishwanath temple, became a high priority in the Hindu resurgent agenda.

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Still Banaras lived in relative peace for several decades while many other cities with mixed population were struck by the communal violence.42 Freitag, who has observed Banaras for a long period recorded in 1989:


Peace is difficult to measure, and disturbances are not, but by any criteria most of the neighborhoods of Banaras are free of regular, annual, or even rarer tension … the nature of Hindu-Muslim relations in the city is exceptional – given the fact that “Hindu” and “Muslim” are already politicized identities.43 The city, however, succumbed to Hindu–Muslim riots twice during the early 1990s, in the wake of the temple–mosque controversy in Ayodhya.44 The riots in 1991 were triggered off during a religious procession of a Hindu Goddess when some Muslim youth objected to the processionists using firecrackers in their neighborhood. This altercation and the subsequent street fight snowballed into a full-blown riot. Wild rumours went the rounds in Hindu majority areas that some Hindu women who were dragged in the Muslim alleys were missing. The spree of subsequent violence, which continued for the next three days, saw the gruesome killing of innocent people from both communities. The riots took several lives and reminded the city dwellers of the grisly consequences of unmanaged communal conflict. The supposedly partisan role of police and administration lowered people’s trust of state agencies.45 Civil society too became polarized leading to being clueless on how to prevent the communalization of public life. Even the sari and silk industry, which traditionally stood as the vanguard of communitarian living, became a site of perceived communal rivalry.46 In a way, the intimate Hindu–Muslim relationships had shown the propensity of degenerating into the site of intimate hatred as has been the case in many other places.47

Peacebuilding and the temple blast The failure to anticipate and manage the riots in 1991 led to fresh resolves and initiatives at the civil society level.48 The disenchantment with administration and police resulted in the formation of many peace committees, which were to work as the first bulwark against communal conflagration. These communally integrated initiatives were meant to quash rumours and provide inter-community channels of communication and even mediation at the neighbourhood level.49 However, more important from the peacebuilding perspective were the initiatives to forge inter-religious understanding against communal violence. During the 1990s, the religious leaders had expanded the scope of inter-faith dialogue to include practical activities for communal peacebuilding. A significant initiative was launched at the behest of Maitri Bhavan (friendship house), a Church-run centre for inter-religious dialogue,



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which proposed regular gatherings of different religious leaders along with community opinion makers and intellectuals. The worsening communal situations due to the politicization of communal identities created a strong need to rebuild the edifice of communal understanding and conflict preventing mechanisms. Unlike the early 1990s, people in Banaras were not unwary when the twin bomb blasts rocked the city on 7 March 2006, just a week before the major Hindu festival of Holi. The first explosion occurred inside the Sankat Mochan temple – the highly revered Hindu shrine, also an epitome of the syncretic spirit of Banaras.50 The attacks were carried out with the clear intention of offending religious sensibilities among pilgrims in one of the most sacred sites in India.51 The blasts killed 28 and injured over 100 people. The strike on the temple on a pious day with numerous worshippers in attendance was well planned to inflame passions, to pit injured Hindu religious sentiment against perceived Muslim savagery. With thousands of shouting and crying devotees running away from the temple, the city became a site of anticipated communal turbulence. A curfew was clamped on the city and shops and schools were closed for two days in premonition of communal frenzy. Expectedly rightwing Hindu hardliners saw the desecration as a ripe opportunity to stir the communal pot. Firebrand leaders like Vinay Katiyar thus scheduled a sit-in within the temple compound and L.K. Advani, the BJP leader in parliament, announced he would lead a religious procession from the temple to mobilize Hindu sentiments against the sacrilege of one of the highest revered Hindu temple by the so-called “Islamist forces”. The bomb blasts coming in the wake of similar attacks elsewhere by Islamist militants were a sufficient provocation to ignite the communal violence nationwide.52 The most crucial element was the immediate response of the religious leaders who took upon themselves the responsibility of maintaining peace and communal harmony of the city as well as that of the whole nation. The proactive and timely role played by the two key religious leaders – Mahant Veer Bhadra Mishra (Chief Priest at the Sankat Mochan temple)53 and Maulana Abdul Batin Nomani (Mufti-e-Banaras), a respected cleric, became role models for the rest of the country. Within a few hours of the blast, the Mahant was quick to resume the divine worship (Aarti) in the temple and offered a special prayer for peace and equanimity for communal harmony. He and his colleagues were conscious that the resumption of the Aarti would quell the rumour-mongering and project the continuance of religious life as normal. This was extremely important, for if the temple had remained closed for days, it would have given troublemakers more time to incite violence and even led to a nationwide crisis. Mahant Mishra thwarted the politicization of the issue to whip up anti-Muslim feelings and made discreet and soothing public statements. He did not exaggerate the loss of life, nor did he blame Muslims for the attack. For local and national media the temple’s instant message was that of peace, not anger or blame lest the blast be construed as an assault on the whole Hindu community. He was deeply aware that the


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events at the temple could be negatively construed as an assault on the whole Hindu community, and might provoke a violent backlash. Mahant Mishra lost no time in signalling his willingness for a multireligious peace initiative. His personal rapport with the leading Muslim clerics made such a peace initiative easy. He came out of the temple to welcome the delegation of Muslim leaders led by Mufti-e-Banaras who led a Muslim delegation to Sankat Mochan temple to condemn the dastardly attack. The two religious leaders having their ideas in sync ruled out any misunderstanding between the two communities on this issue and declared the attack against the teachings of all religions. Their well-publicized camaraderie unleashed the synergy of Hindus’and Muslims’ solidarity. While receiving the holy water from the Ganges from Mahant, defying orthodox voices in his own community, Mufti time and again referred to the metaphors of Ganga Jamuni Tehzeeb and Tana Bana to underline the harmony and cordial relations between the two communities. In an interview he said: “If weavers are Muslims, traders are Hindus. Their economic bonds are very strong and they share a remarkable trust. This fabric should not be harmed by anyone.”54 The Muslims of Banaras could have taken such peace evocation only from the Mufti of Banaras – whom they regard as a true man of God. Mufti’s alacrity in condemning the culprits of the blasts and his visits to the temple and hospitals had a calming impact on both communities. Muslim Alims from all over the city joined the Mufti of Banaras in issuance of fatwa condemning the terrorist attacks. The Muslim community joined their Hindu counterparts in lighting the candles for peace and joined the city closure to express their solidarity with the victims of blasts. The unprecedented solidarity across the religious community acted as a shock absorber and reinforced the impulse of communal harmony. A recital of the Hanuman Chalisa (hymns in praise of the main temple deity Hanuman) by young Muslim women was staged on the premise of the Sankat Mochan temple at the very spot where the bombs had gone off to demonstrate their commitment to communal harmony.55 Prayers were held all over the city in different temples, mosques and churches to mourn the loss of lives. Women of various faiths met at the Church-run centre wherein they held an inter-religious prayer to promote religious harmony. The Muslim cleric, the Bishop and Hindu saints addressed these meetings and their followers resolved to maintain the communal peace in the town. About a hundred women from diverse religions met at Maitri Bhavan at the invitation of Tera Panth (a Jain group) to consider their responsibilities in maintaining religious harmony and peace.56 Similar meetings of Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and Christian leaders was convened at the Jamia Islamia madrassa which conveyed messages of unity and brotherhood. The local peace committees too brought in religious and spiritual figures from different neighbourhoods for maintaining calm in their respective areas. The evocation of peace by the religious leaders found ready acceptance among the common



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people for pragmatic reasons as well as emotional commitment to preserve a peaceful composite life in the city. Having known the practical possibilities of peacebuilding through religious confluence, the local peace networks and channels have continued the stream since then. In fact there are now over a dozen informal and yet dedicated organizational networks involving cultural, educational and religious groups and opinion makers, which come together sporadically and work as a watchdog for any episode of communal provocation anywhere in the city.57 There are initiatives at neighbourhood level which promote inter-community involvement to innovate and revitalize cultural events which engage both Hindu and Muslim communities. An instructive case in point is the intercommunity patronage and participation in the riverside birthday celebrations of the Hindu God Rama. In 2007, the religious procession (also known as Ram Katha Mandakini Shobha Yatra) was jointly led by the Mahant and Mufti-e-Banaras while Noor Fatima (a Muslim woman activist) was the chief guest at the ceremony. Mohammad Jamin Khan (son of Bismillah Khan) led the Hindu religious procession while playing the Ramdhun – a sacred Hindu hymn. The display of inter-community solidarity on streets and public places is yet another development that the city is getting used to. Noisy processions of local Muslim men and women joining their Hindu counterparts on the streets shouting, “We are a composite people, and no one can divide us” and young burqa-clad women yelling, “It is our promise to end terrorism.”58 There is also a rekindling of interest in the city to host composite Hindustani classical music and Urdu Mushayara. The annual musical festival at the Sankat Mochan temple has become a peace campaign with renowned musicians performing on the theme of cultural confluence in Banaras.

Banaras: A unique experience Should the Banaras experience be considered unique and, therefore, incomparable to other urban centres having similar intimate communal engagements? There are, of course, discernible features that accord the city of Banaras an inimitable character. For one, the city has maintained a live connection with its past heritage and the popular culture of having inter-community participation in rituals, festivals and performance is not entirely lost to its people.59 Despite the growing detachment of the middle class from the popular culture, certain sections of elite still join the working classes who have sustained the streams of past cultural impulses. The other distinctive demographic feature of the city is its resemblance to an extended village (Kasba) rather than to a modern urban center. And much like a characteristic rural community, the city has shown an impulse of social and cultural integration than makes it less prone to communal violence as compared to other urban centres.60 The city life in Banaras resembles a typical village setting where such everyday engagement involves most of the population. The fact that Banaras is located in India’s poorest and most


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populated region and is devoid of major industries has in many respects helped the city in overcoming potential communal turbulence, which impacted many other rich and industrialized urban centres. For the poor working-class people belonging mostly to the backward castes, the religious distinctions (Hindu/Muslim) have remained traditionally secondary.61 Such city environment in a way explains the people’s leanings for the everyday forms of mingling and communicating around tea and betel shops or during rituals and festivals. This indeed is an important if not a critical factor in ensuring inter-community amity amid difficult times. It is easy to see that the neighbourhood having popular public spaces thronged by members of all communities would not easily succumb to serious community violence. In fact there is hardly any reported episode of communal turbulence around the mixed neighbourhood of Chowk and Assi which hosts oft-visited tea and betel corners in the area. Conversely, the city of Banaras does not have prominent, associational forms of engagement, not even in the sari and silk industry, which provided a livelihood to over half a million people. And yet Banaras has revealed a remarkable capacity to deal with the severe communal challenges. This needs to be contextualized in terms of Banaras being more like a close-knit villagetype community rather than a city which is disconnected in terms of intercommunity interactions. Another feature that supplements this understanding is the geography of the city, which is connected through a labyrinth of narrow alleys and thus provides a village-like intimacy to people. At times when the main roads are blocked in a curfew situation, these alleys still remain open and provide easy communication to people from across the city. This in a way takes care of the “anonymity” argument that the modern cities tend to be less interconnected and more anonymous.62 Thus in the case of Banaras, the informal and quotidian civic interaction in tandem with cultural factors and inter-religious synergy, has been successful in taking on the “ethnic earthquakes” such as desecration of a holy place.

Religious peace work as a model The fact that Banaras has enjoyed uninterrupted communal peace after the riots of 1991 has become a proud statement of its multicultural population and a model for other urban centres in the country.63 The distinctive feature of this unique experience has been the proactive role of religious leaders in nurturing a tradition of inter-community dialogue and practical intervention to preempt the outbreak of communal frenzy during the turbulent times. Many religion-based organizations have developed a sustainable practice of organizing inter-faith prayers and dialogues round the year on different religious and cultural occasions.64 This in turn has forged a network of community leaders who draw on respective religious resources to evoke peace in the face of a communal provocation. These religious dialogues have now become a common event at the neighbourhood level engaging intellectuals,



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businessmen and professionals. There are a number of ways in which such confidence-building dialogues are arranged. At times these are held at the initiative of the top-level religious leaders and at times at the behest of the district administration. Much credit for such religious peace work goes to the Hindu Mahant and Maulana Mufti – the chief Muslim cleric. These two religious figures have become some kind of national figures across communities, which in a way vindicates people’s disillusionment with the politicians. Both religious leaders are invited across the country to deliver the message of peace and to recount how they dealt with the communal politicization in the aftermath of terrorist blasts. If the Mahant has lost count of the invitations for Muslim seminars and festivities, the Mufti too is a much sought after at Hindu gatherings. Mahant Mishra was invited in the wake of a terrorist bomb blast in Mumbai in July 2007 on a common platform with the Mufti Fazal-ur-Rehman Hilal Usmani, the Mufti-e-Azam of Punjab, to mobilize the public constituency in favour of peace. Subsequently the two leaders campaigned jointly against their respective co-religionists, who preach hatred and perpetrate violence against innocent citizens.65 The Banaras example of religious leaders acting as an effective catalyst of peace has now become an all-India flagship model. Shahi Imam (Chief Cleric) Syed Ahmad Shah Bukhari of the Grand Mosque in the wake of the terrorist attack on the famous Jama Masjid in New Delhi thus appealed to his followers to “emulate the people of Banaras, who did not react in anger and defeated the plans of communal forces”.66 Following a bomb explosion at the Sufi dargahs of Khawaja Moinuddin Chisti in the city of Ajmer in December 2007, the Sufi organization held a peace march to Parliament and resolved that the chains of Sufi shrines would be created to actively work for communal peace and amity.67 The prospects of religious leaders as peacemakers are however not without challenges. What if the religious leaders take the other way? In this case the Hindu Mahant Veer Bhadra Mishra was not only committed to communal peace but had an extraordinary stature to rebuff the communal forces. His wisdom on peacebuilding and his alacrity in handling the immediate crisis quelled any chances of communal disruption. Mahant’s tolerant stance also coincided with the secular and inclusive traditions of the Sankat Mochan temple – the very site of the blast.68 The Muslim leadership led by Muftie-Banaras Maulana Abdul Batin also matched the stature and stance of their Hindu counterpart. Mufti too reckoned with the media power and continually used it to promote peace. The post-temple blast peacebuilding also underlines the possible use of metaphors as a homegrown justification of communal peace. It has shown that the cultural metaphors, which at times serve as an exclusionary device to motivate violence, also have the potential to assuage animosities in conflictprone situations.69 For instance, the metaphors of composite identity such as Ganga-Jamuni Tehzeeb and Tana Bana effectively motivated the intrinsic


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communal peace in the city and created common grounds for Hindus and Muslims to think in a certain way about their common destiny. Most speeches made in the blast’s aftermath alluded to these metaphors and thus created the possibility of inter-community reconciliation. While the city elite preferred the Ganga-Jamuni Tehzeeb as an expression of communal peace, the common working people used the expression of Tana Bana more often, fearing that any repeat of communal riots would jeopardize their very survival.70 It also transpires that such metaphors of composite identity also constrain the capacities of political leaders to manipulate communal identities for their own interest. Thus the peace metaphors may not be a direct cause affecting communal peace but they do contribute in building a favourable public constituency for peace. This can be seen in a comparison between the circulation of negative communal rhetoric during the riots of 1991 and the stoic public response after the temple blast of 2006 wherein the religious leaders and media constantly resonate these peace metaphors.71 The Banaras experience is yet another endorsement of religion’s impressive power as a vehicle for peace.72 In this unique case, the religious leaders generated the religious synergy in favour of peace. However, it must be acknowledged that the religious leaders could do little without the proactive support of other peace constituencies. The media in particular has played a critical role in ensuring that the peace evocations of religious leaders are disseminated and received widely. In a way, the media itself acted as a peacebuilder working in tandem with the religious and community leaders to save any communal mishap in the city. The repeated media projection of the two religious leaders – Mahant and Mufti – as the national heroes of religious harmony and symbols of Ganga Jamuni Tehzeeb ensured the success of the religious peacemaking. A dozen or more TV channels jostled with each other to bring out the peace appeals and statements from prominent community leaders as well as of common people in favour of peace and tolerance. The emotive peace appeal of Bismillah Khan, the great Muslim musician and an icon of Banarasi culture was shown every half hour for several days in a row. This was in contrast to the riot times in the early 1990s when the local press and television riled the people on communal lines.73 The fact that the national news channels were able to broadcast directly from the temple within half an hour of the blasts showing that it was intact and the evening prayer was in preparation stemmed rumours and disinformation. What we could take from the Banaras experience is the possibility of building a sustainable inter-community amity through a nurturing of our multi-religious and multicultural ethos. The successful peacebuilding episode illustrates that the communal identities produced by the fusion of religious and cultural traditions may contribute to the communal peace process in various practical ways. These inter-cultural identities, which exemplify intersecting history and shared historicity, not only preempt the sectarian use of religion but also restore communal harmony once it is disrupted. This is indeed a less traversed peacebuilding trajectory and as such offers new ways



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of moving through cultural conflicts, ways that associate them with learning, growth and constructive social change.74 The unique multicultural life and communitarian living of Banaras may be attributed to its close-knit village-like community, which typically weaves intimate civic engagements across communities. This characteristic case in a way reflects on the negatives of modernity and urbanization, which have alienated the new generations, especially the upper classes, from the traditional community values and social capital. Modern city life is getting increasingly impersonal and hardly offers any opportunities for routine intercommunity mingling in public spaces that could promote communal peacebuilding.75 Indeed the city of Banaras, despite varied transference in its social and cultural practices still offers a glimpse of a “true community” bound together by a sense of neighbourhood – common values, norms, and experiences shared by the members in their quotidian experience.75 The spirit of such community would always sustain the streams of multiculturalism in which our differences become the source of our vitality and enrichment.

8

Islamic extremism and the terror network in Bangladesh


Smruti S. Pattanaik

Religion has remained a contested issue in Bangladesh and the debate between the “sacred” and the “secular” on the place of religion in politics has been one of the contentions. The “sacred” argue that Bangladesh was founded on Islam as its ideology, as the state creation cannot be separated from 1947, and therefore, it does not have a secular future. The “secularist” insists that the 1971 liberation war and the fact that Bangladesh broke away from the Islamic state of Pakistan affirms its secular future. Within this contested space, a legacy of highly divisive political culture has been nurtured which makes the politics in Bangladesh a zero sum game and reduces its capacity to fight Islamist extremism and terrorism in an effective manner. This political culture also has a historical legacy. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, known as the father of the nation, who shaped Bangladesh’s political destiny after its liberation, made secularism one of the founding principles of Bangladesh and General Zia-ur-Rahman, former Army Chief of Staff who became the President of Bangladesh and founder of the Bangladesh National Party amended its secular constitution, legalized religious parties and changed Bengali nationalism from an ethno-linguistic identity to Bangladeshi nationalism, a religion-based identity. Reconciliation between various groups, especially, the groups that considered themselves as liberators of Bangladesh from the “occupation forces” and collaborators – the religious party members who helped the Pakistan Army against the war of liberation – have made cooperation between the two main political contenders impossible. Therefore, one sees a polarized polity that is divided between the left oriented parties – the Awami League and other communist parties – and the centre right, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the religious parties. The religious parties were banned in 1972. However, Sheikh Mujib’s assassination paved the way for the legitimization of religious political parties for two reasons. First, Zia needed the help of the rightist elements to legitimize his rule and second, his Bangladeshi nationalism created a space for the religious political parties to play a role in the propagation and consolidation of this nationalism cradled in religion. Since 1977, the religious political parties have played important role in shaping the role of religion in Bangladesh’s politics. The political discourse of religious political parties has helped smaller


Extremism and the terror network in Bangladesh

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religious groups to grow and at times with their patronage but providing it with radical spin that gives space to radicalized debate. The Islamic political parties, stigmatized for their role in the liberation war, spread their network especially after 1990 with the restoration of democracy. In the 1980s, the religious political parties were consolidating their organization which was in disarray following the ban on them. Jamaat Islami was the most prominent party. However, other Islamic parties like the Muslim League and Nizam-e-Mushtafa were politically present. After the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Ulemma tried to play a politically more visible role by floating parties like Khilafat Andolan and later in 1990 Islami Shansontantra Andolan. Jihad became a catch-word against oppression and tyranny and was posed as the most successful instrument, particularly after the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union. And the religious political parties in Bangladesh could not remain immune to this call for jihad as some of these religious parties helped in dispatching jihadis to fight in Afghanistan. The ultra-radical Taliban regime in Afghanistan and their politico-religious success epitomized the ideal of a state governed by Shariat – a prospect of prototype Iran. It needs to be mentioned that some of the Jamaat leaders had played an important role in training and indoctrinating Bangladeshis who were willing to fight in Afghanistan. Some of the trained Mujahideen returned in 1990 and vowed to turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan by becoming the Bangladeshi Taliban. The social and political bases for resurgence of radical Islam had already been germinated during long period of military rule which patronized the religious political parties and co-opted them. Therefore, the confirmation of the existence of various Islamic groups was matter of time. Organizations like Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islam (HuJI) were created by these Afghan-returned warriors also known as Bangladeshi Taliban. In 1998, its leader Fazlur Rahman along with Osama bin Laden signed a document declaring “holy war” against the USA. Other organizations like the Ahl-e-Hadith Andolan Bangladesh (AHAB), which professes Wahhabi ideology, spread its network through generous funding from the Middle Eastern countries and later the Jamaat-ulMujaheedin Bangladesh (JMB) also spread its network in Bangladesh. Though HuJI has a transnational network and is aligned to various other groups in India and is fighting with a pan-Islamic agenda, groups like the AHAB and JMB are more focused on Bangladesh and want Bangladesh, which is a Muslim majority country, to be ruled by Shariat. The JMB earlier had come into media attention in 2003 when some of its members were arrested in Chittagong while undergoing training. However, the government had ignored the report and later these people were freed as the police failed to produce any evidence against them. The spread and network of JMB was evident when this obscure organization orchestrated 459 bomb blasts across 63 districts out of 64 in a matter of half an hour on 17 August 2005. The subsequent suicide killings, first of their kind in Bangladesh, attested to the dangers of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh. Institutional affiliation of


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these groups to Middle East based Islamic NGOs reveals its extra-regional linkages. Repeated denial by the government and its extreme reluctance to take action against these groups in spite of media reports helped the extremist elements to strengthen their network. For example, in 2004, the media also reported Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) that was involved in vigilante activities against the sarboharas with the patronage of the ruling parties and the government rejected these reports outright. The Jamaat and Islami Oikya Jote’s (IOJ) presence in the government as alliance partner helped the Islamists, as it deterred any action against them. To deal with the media criticism at one point in time, the government went to the extent of saying that the reports on extremism were a media creation and were meant to tarnish the image of Bangladesh and undermine the efforts of the BNP-led alliance government to promote good governance. Political rhetoric blaming one party or the other for militancy limited the scope of further enquiry. The politically motivated bureaucracy – divided along party lines with strong ideological affinity – further eroded the chance of any further investigation on this matter and the matter remained in limbo. The police force helped the JMJB operations against the radical left and the administrative machinery provided full support to the militants by providing logistical support to the meetings addressed by Bangla Bhai. The police claimed that the JMJB was helping them in maintaining law and order, which is a poor reflection on the state of affairs of the law-enforcing apparatus. This nexus with the BNP government further emboldened the Islamists. The government, dependent on donors, did not wish its image of a “moderate Muslim” country to be tarnished. It accused India of playing an aggressive role along with the Awami League to prove Bangladesh a failed state without going into the causes of militancy and its links with some of the Cabinet Ministers.1 Another problem was the emergence of a shadow government under the active patronage and support of Tarique Rahman, son of former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia. These young generations of politicians supported the BNP’s alliance with the Jamaat for sheer electoral calculations. In spite of their reported linkages with radical elements Tarique Rahman and his young coterie were reluctant to part ways with them, thus creating a division within the BNP. Moreover, Jamaat’s ascendancy to power and BNP’s dependency on it for political survival strengthened the power of the religious right. This chapter examines the factors that helped in the rise of Islamist militancy, the organizational structure of the militant groups, their network and transnational linkages. It also analyses the future of radical Islam in Bangladesh in the context of global war on terror and growth of radical Islam in general.

Political base of Islamist extremism Concerns regarding Islamist militancy and their network have drawn the attention of the world post 9/11. In this context, Bangladesh has increasingly



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come under international glare as a country that has the potential to emerge as a hotbed of international terrorist network. Unfortunately its demographic and economic profile as a poor country has been responsible for giving credence to this analysis. In the process it has been expediently forgotten that this is the country that was born against the basic principle of the Pakistani state – religion as the basis of state formation. Instead, Bangladesh embodied secularism among its four foundational principles as the raison d’être of the newly born Bangladesh state. The spirit of secularism, rooted in its cultural mooring, has undergone erosion over the period of time due to lack of institutional support structure and the direction the politics of religion has taken in the country. The adaptation of Islamic symbolism due to populist politics has in fact created political space for the radical elements to motivate them to demand that these be translated into concrete policy initiatives. For example, making Islam a state religion has given impetus to the battle cry for implementation of Shariat. In fact, such a declaration has facilitated the Bangladeshi state’s progression towards a more religious order and has emboldened the Islamists. Now the contest is between the secularists, nationalists and the fundamentalist forces. Whereas the secularists are opposed to the politics of religion, the nationalists want religious symbolism for crafting an exclusive national identity of “Bengali Muslims”. This has helped the cause of the fundamentalist forces rather than the cause of secularist elements even if the nationalistic elements are against fundamentalism. Interestingly, Bangladesh has a strong and vibrant civil society that has been at the forefront against the fundamentalist forces and has kept the discourse on secularism alive. General Zia-ur-Rahman, the military dictator, for reasons of political expediency in the ideological war between Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalism, initiated constitutional changes that have changed the character of the state from secularism to overt religious symbolism. It was Ershad’s government that introduced Islam as the state religion to take the initiative out of the hands of religious political parties and win political support for his embattled government in 1988 in the face of massive political uprising against his regime. However, the civil society has been at the forefront of a movement that is demanding the restoration of secularism in the constitution and trial of war criminals after the election of the Awami League to power in the December 2008 elections. The media has played an important role in upholding the spirit of civil society. The spread of the Islamist terrorist network has posed a serious challenge to civil society and it also reflects the political malaise that is afflicting society. The constitutional sanction given to religion-based politics, the promotion of Islam to the status of state religion, and the failure to protect minority rights and denial of political space to liberal secularists have all contributed to the weakening of the civil society. The battle lines in Bangladesh are clear. The fight is now between the militant organizations which in the past received political patronage and the civil society groups and some political parties that are demanding


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the government bans religious political parties given their role in the liberation war. After the legitimization of religious parties in politics, Bangladesh saw a spurt in the growth of these parties of various denominations. Only the Jamaat Islami emerged as a strong contender for power given its organizational structure and support base which its leaders cultivated over the period of time. Though Jamaat faced a major crisis in 1983, due to a split in the party over its stand on the Iranian revolution, it was able to emerge strong from the crisis. However, Islamic groups, other than a few non-descript parties led by Ulemmas, were small in number. It was the oil sector boom in the Middle East which saw a substantial flow of funds to Bangladesh for propagating Islam. After Bangladesh was recognized by the Islamic world, the Bangladeshi workers found employment opportunities in the West Asian Muslim countries lucrative. At the same time constitutional changes introduced by General Zia-ur-Rahman (Article 25) which emphasized that Bangladesh would endeavour to strengthen fraternal and friendly ties with the Islamic countries, strengthened the relations between Bangladesh and these countries. There was tremendous change in the outlook of these countries towards Bangladesh due to various factors. The deletion of secularism and incorporation of the Koranic inscription Bismilla ur Rahman ur Rahim endeared and assured the West Asian Muslim countries about Bangladesh’s credential as a Muslim country. Some of these Islamic countries were unhappy with Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan and later its adoption of secularism and its close relations with India and the former Soviet Union. With the constitutional changes and after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, these countries were relieved that Bangladesh had joined the fold of Islamic countries. Of course, Bangladesh’s formal participation in the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) conference in Lahore during Mujib’s period was a step in this direction. Even though Mujib wanted Bangladesh to be part of the Islamic world, he did not want to change secularism as one of its foundational principles. He had realized that it was important for Bangladesh to formally join the OIC as the country could not remain divorced from the sentiments of the majority Muslim population which wanted close ties. Moreover, the oil sector boom and also the attitude of the United States towards the Mujib government influenced his decision. The foreign aid-dependent economy of Bangladesh witnessed a spurt in the NGO activities. There was visible growth and spread of Western-funded NGOs that carried on developmental works and in some cases implementing the World Bank-sponsored projects. The NGOs have been playing an important role in political socialization, the economic empowerment of women and minorities. Taking their cue from the NGO boom, some of the Islamic NGOs based in the Middle East also opened their offices. Their effort was confined to charitable works, setting up hospitals, funding madrassas, spreading Islamic culture and thought. In fact, it is the dissemination of Islamic thought and values rooted in the West Asian socio-political milieu that have



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contributed to the changing face of Islam in Bangladesh. The religious political parties encouraged the Islamic NGOs which helped them to strengthen and broaden their constituencies. As a result of this propagation of puritanical Islamic ideals, Islam in Bangladesh is loosing its syncretic tradition and tolerant diacritics. One may recall that the Pirs played an important role in the spread of Islam in Bangladesh, as the Quran was not translated into Bengali and the Muslim aristocracy did not play any significant role in the spread of Islam among the poor peasants in the late eighteenth century. Islamic practices in Bangladesh have imbibed a certain socio-cultural ethos that is peculiar to this region and are drawn from Hindu religious practices as many Hindus had converted to Islam. As such there has been effort to rid Bengali Islam of these cultural denominations. The Islamic NGOs, remittance money from the Gulf region and the religious political parties have all played important role in shaping Islamic society in Bangladesh in recent years. However, all these agents of change have different motives, even though the religious political parties have benefited the most politically. The Middle East NGOs have a different agenda – to spread Wahhabi thought based on Middle Eastern tradition which is unfamiliar to this part of the world. Some of these NGOs are resource rich and have worked through local Islamic NGOs. Second, the remittance money which comes from the Bangladeshi workers in the Gulf has contributed in furthering some of the religious values they imbibed during their long stay in these countries. Though their contribution played an important role in economic development, the funds that have been contributed for zakat or building of madrassas and other dawat works have helped in the propagation of Islam that is alien to the cultural setting of the country. The Bangladeshi workers in the Middle East themselves have been influenced by the Islamic culture of Saudi Arabia (which absorbs more than 50 per cent of Bangladesh’s work force recruited abroad), considered as puritan, and have tried to emulate the dress code and in turn influenced their family members and relatives. In fact, workers of the religious political parties have been propagating such values to broaden their base. Islamic political parties, particularly, the Jamaat Islami have played a major role in shaping the religion-based politics, thereby creating their relevance in Bangladesh politics. The global political developments, the perceived exploitation and injustices meted out to the Muslims have also shaped the views of Bangladeshi Muslims. Though the post-1977 political developments shaped the role of religion in politics, it was not until the late 1980s that an extremist trend among the Bangladeshi Islamic political organizations was seen. Some of the organizations that are involved in extremist ideology have adopted terrorist methods to further their agenda are of recent origin. The jihad in Afghanistan was a landmark in the history of religion and politics as practised in this region. For the first time, religious ideologues were used to pursue strategic objectives beyond the geographical boundary of the nation state. The discourse on jihad shaped the mind of many Muslims in


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Asia and the Bangladeshi Muslims were not immune to this propagation. The Bangladeshi Muslims joined the jihad and some of them were trained in Pakistan. The withdrawal of the Soviet troops and success of US-backed jihad inspired these jihadis with a new zeal that now they wanted to shape the polity in their home countries. Many of them pursued transnational agendas (the concept of Ummah) as a fight to protect the Muslim Ummah in general and did not hesitate to fight for the Islamic cause elsewhere in the world. However, some of them returned to model their country on the lines of the Taliban regime. Organizations like the HuJI Bangladesh – born out of antiSoviet jihad – has both a domestic and a pan-Islamic international agenda. HuJI mounted attacks on symbols and groups considered to be un-Islamic and aligned with international terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in furthering their agenda of global jihad. Many Indian scholars believe that it is facilitating Inter Service Intelligence’s (ISI) agenda in its operations against India. The Afghan veterans who formed HuJI in Bangladesh have retained their linkages with the ISI. As was reported in May 2002, nine fundamentalist parties including HuJI met at Ukia in the south of Cox Bazaar and formed Bangladesh Islamic Manch of which some Indian groups like Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam were part – thus pointing to their transnational agenda.2

Support base The Islamist terrorist network does not have widespread popular support in Bangladesh, even though support for Islamist groups engaged in violence has grown. These groups like the HuJI and JMB are of recent origin and are products of post-1990 phenomena. Their targets to date have been the Awami League, the left political parties and cultural organizations, as these played a leading role in making secularism one of the foundational principles of the Bangladesh state and in the past had banned the participation of religious parties in politics (for their role against the liberation war). Though the Awami League has been one of the protagonists of secular politics, it has diluted its stance over the period of time to cultivate the constituency which is essentially religious-minded but not rightist. In the past, it cultivated the Islamic political parties to strengthen its support base before the abrogated January 2007 elections3 and to assure its political constituency4 that it is not against Islam. It has been bogged down by the campaign that Awami League’s support for secularism implies denying Muslims the right to practise Islam. This propaganda campaign has been carried out by the political opponents of Awami League, mainly the BNP and the rightist parties since 1972.5 However, the BNP was not supportive of the radical Islamic agenda of its rightist allies, but did not take any action that would have hampered its relations with its rightist allies – the Jamaat Islami and the Islamic Oikyo Jote. It was not opposed to the incorporation of Islam as state religion in 1988. Though the BNP banned the Ahmediya publications during its last



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tenure, it could not declare the Ahmediyas to be non-Muslims because of international pressure. Though religious political parties like the Jamaat Islami have been ambivalent in their support for radical Islam, some of its cadres, especially the ones belonging to Chhatra Shibir, have supported the activities of the Islamic extremist groups. This became evident when an investigation of the activities of JMB and JMJB revealed their linkages to Chhatra Shibir. Jamaat was quick to assert that these people are no longer members of their student organization. In the initial days of jihad in Afghanistan, one of its Members of Parliament, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, addressed many madrassa students to motivate them to join jihad in Afghanistan. Some of these Afghan returnees later formed HuJI. Though the Islamist radical groups retained their independent organizational identity, the ideological sympathy of the religious political parties was evident. The religious political parties and the radical Islamists represented by HuJI, JMB and JMJB have been working for a common goal of making the state more Islamic, but adopting different approaches to achieve their common goal. In the past decade and a half, all the political parties have paid lip service to the reports of extremism. Funding to madrassas was increased during the Awami League’s first term. Though the Awami League arrested some leaders of the Islamist groups, the BNP had them released during its tenure. Politicization of the judiciary and police has been impeding the process of law enforcement. The political parties have been reluctant to admit their failure in arresting the phenomena of radical Islam. This lack of ownership has led the political parties to engage in a blame game that has benefited these radical groups. Moreover, the issue of extremism has been evaluated in terms of political benefit – whether these groups are adding to their political constituency which in concrete terms means the vote bank politics. The issue of extremism has been raised from time to time by the civil society in Bangladesh which feels the country’s drift towards radical Islam will affect the liberal space that has allowed them to criticize the government policies and has kept alive the syncretic religio-cultural tradition of what is termed as “moderate” Islam in Bangladesh. International media reports and criticism regarding the growth of radical Islam have been dismissed by the government as a ploy to tarnish the image of Bangladesh. The gradual increase of a stringent voice that opposes the US war in Iraq and is trying to take an Ummah-centric view on various issues concerning the Muslims has become noticeable. For example, Jamaat Islami set up a fund in 2002 to help the “innocent victims of war on terror” and closed the fund after the Taliban was dislodged from power in Afghanistan. Given its aid dependency, the government has taken a more balanced view on many issues related to the Islamic world and USA. The close relations between the USA and Saudi Arabia have to a large extent tempered the criticism of the USA as many religious political parties maintain links with government and non-government organizations in Saudi Arabia.


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One of the reasons why some of the Islamist terror networks have spread their tentacles is the weak government reach at the rural level. The government has not been able to reach out economically and socially in terms of providing education and basic healthcare to the people. Against this, the NGOs (both Western-funded and the Islamic ones) have considerable presence moulding the socio-economic life of the rural folks. For example, some of the programmes are aimed at making the women economically self sufficient, providing them with education and making them self reliant, thus forcing the Islamic political parties to take a more liberal view on these issues or making the Islamic NGOs to adopt similar programmes thereby enabling them to expand their activities in Bangladesh. This in turn helps their front organization to establish madrassas and further their political activities. The problem of access to education has been one of the important reasons for the spread of madrassas that give religious education which is inadequate to get a job other than that of an Imam (prayer leader).6 The opening of madrassas both with the aid and support of the government and Islamic NGOs is important in the context of influencing the contours of religious politics. It also has been a main source of recruitment for the Islamic political parties. The problem with madrassa education pertains more to the structure of curricula than to the institution itself. Though there are studies which indicate that madrassa education per se does not contribute to extremism,7 it would not be far fetched to say that the curriculum which is inadequate to provide employment in an increasing globalized market oriented economy generates frustration which in turn is exploited by the extremists to induct these youth to their Islamist network. Islamist parties like the Islamic Oikya Jote, which was one of the alliance partners of the previous BNP-led four-party-alliance government, have resisted any attempt by the government to reform the curriculum or interfere in the quami madrassas. Dars-e-Nizami, a system that owes its origin to Mughal ruler Aurangzeb’s reign, continued until the independence of Bangladesh. The madrassa system based on this curriculum only taught Islamic jurisprudence and history; other subjects are not taught in the madrassa. Religious puritanism and rigid interpretation became a part of this education system. Bangladesh has two madrassa systems of education. First is Alia, which provides religious and secular education, and is funded by the government of Bangladesh. Its curriculum is designed by the Bangladesh Madrassa Education Board, which was established in 1979. Aliya madrassas apart from Dars-e-Nizami teach 22 other subjects including science and mathematics. It teaches al-ulum-an-naqliya and al-ulum-al-aqliya. The quami madrassas are largely private institutions and continue to be autonomous from the government control. It was only in 2005 that a private body, Befaqul Mudaressin of Bangladesh, was formed to coordinate the activities of the quami madrassas. It is the quami madrassas which teach only Dars-e-Nizami that are likely to pose a challenge to Bangladesh’s society. After independence, the government



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had set up an Education Commission under the chairmanship of Dr Kudrati-Khuda to examine the educational system including the madrassas and make recommendations to reform education system in independent Bangladesh. He recommended an integrated system of education which has not been implemented so far. The outgoing BNP government before the end of its tenure, in order to boost its vote bank among the Islamists, passed a bill to give recognition to the degrees conferred by the quami madrassas. Earlier, the students of quami madrassas had to appear for their exams under the Aliya madrassas to obtain their degrees for further education as the degrees of quami madrassa were not recognized. Now under the new system, the students of quami madrassa will enter the university and civil services without the broader secular education which is provided by the Aliya madrassas. The quami madrassas have succeeded in preventing the government from interfering in their course structure and have declined the government funding to prevent any state interference in their curriculum.

Popular support? It is evident from the reaction of the people to the execution of the six top leaders of the JMB and JMJB that popular support for the violent methods adopted by some of the Islamist radical groups is lacking. Bangladeshis are extremely religious people but the bomb blasts of 17 August 2005 and subsequent suicide attacks on the judiciary awakened them to the dangers of radical Islam lurking at their door. Few reasons could be ascribed to this lack of popular support. First, Islam practised in Bangladesh is tolerant and the local language and culture is syncretic in nature. Second, the liberal voice is strong at least in registering their protest against radicalization. Third, women have remained at the forefront of productive work force and have contributed to the economic wellbeing of their families. Fourth, the NGOs in rural areas doing developmental work have popular support and many in Bangladesh recognize their contribution. There is a realization that radical Islam will curtail their liberal tradition and threaten their livelihood in which women play a dominant role. This became evident when the leaders of JMB and JMJB were arrested and later hanged; there was no popular protest against this. Many Bangladeshis resent any comparison between Bangladesh and Pakistan as far as religious militancy goes. Even political parties like Jamaat with a widespread network of socio-economic front organizations have limited political support. Given its political past of opposing the creation of Bangladesh, it has been patient and cautious in its approach. Though some of the Jamaat cadres were linked to the militant groups, the party was quick to disassociate itself from these groups even though it was aware of the activities of these groups. The BNP while cultivating militants like the JMJB leader Bangla Bhai and using him against the left extremist groups like the sarboharas continued to deny the existence of these groups, describing them

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as a media creation and propaganda campaign of the opposition. Surprisingly, there has hardly been any thorough investigation into most of the bomb blasts that took place during the previous regimes. The investigations were mostly politically motivated to assuage public outrage and to exonerate the government from these incidents.

Major groups in Bangladesh


Harkat ul Jehadi Islami (HuJI) This organization was created in 1992 with Obaidur Rahman Nadvi alias Sheikh Farid, an Afghan war veteran, as its head. Abdur Rahman Farooqi had organized the Bangladeshi Mujaheedin group in Afghanistan in 1984 and he was killed in 1989. The main objective was to establish Islamic hukumat (rule) in Bangladesh on the lines of Taliban. The Bangladeshi jihadis fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan returned to Bangladesh and announced the formation of HuJI in a crowded press conference in Dhaka on 30 April 1992. Later they paraded through the crowded streets of Dhaka claiming victory over the Soviet forces. The leaders who attended the press conference are its President Abdus Salam, Field Commander Manzoor Hasan, Dhaka city unit President Maulana Delwar Hossain Sayeedi who was a Member of Parliament from Jamaat Islami in the last government, Publicity Secretary Mufti Shafiqur Rahman and Maulana Mufti Abdul Hye. A list of 24 Bangladeshi Mujaheedin killed in the Afghan war was announced by HuJI in the same press conference.8 HuJI is an organization with an international agenda unlike the JMB and JMJB whose main objectives are to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. Some of the HuJI cadres are involved in jihadi activities in other parts of the world and have extensive links with Students Islamic Movement in India (SIMI). The other section is involved in dawat work which publishes books and leaflets for distribution among the people to propagate Islamist ideals. Other than Bangladeshi nationals, some of its members are also the Rohingya refugees. Mufti Hanan was its supreme leader till he was arrested for attacking Sheikh Hasina. Hanan came in contact with HuJI in 1994 after he got to know some of its top leaders such as Mufti Abdul Hye, Saidur Rahman etc. He formed an NGO called the Al Faruq Islamic Foundation in 1996. The activities of HuJI came to light after around 50 of its militant cadres were arrested in Chittagong in 1996 and were sentenced to life imprisonment for possessing firearms. Later they got bail from the High Court after the BNP led alliance government came to power. This organization has links with the Al Qaeda. In 1998, HuJI signed a joint petition along with Osama bin Laden against the US. HuJI first entered into militant activities when it attacked Udichi, a cultural organization in Jessore in 1999 in which 12 people were killed. The HuJI considers cultural events organized by Udichi as “naked dance performance” to be against Islam. HuJI believes that such organizations are corrupting the



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youth of Bangladesh and driving them away from Islamic cultural values. Similarly, the bomb blasts in the Ramana Botamul in 2000, where Pohela Boisakh (Bengali New Year) was being celebrated were done as such celebrations are considered to be un-Islamic. This attack, in which 10 people were killed, targeted the Awami League which is seen as an enemy of the Islamists due to its stance on secularism and the ban it had earlier imposed on religionbased politics and religious parties. Moreover, it was during the Awami League’s rule that the High Court had declared the fatwas issued by Islamic scholars to be illegal. HuJI targeted Sheikh Hasina in Kotalipara in Gopalganj on 20 July 2000 and she narrowly escaped death. Later, HuJI’s involvement in the Shahjalal Shrine attack in which the British envoy Anwar Chowdhury was injured, indicated the breadth of its network and also its deep penetration. Its leaders Mufti Hanan had fled after the Awami League government announced a reward of 5 lakh rupees for his arrest. He returned and started staying in Dhaka after receiving assurance from the then BNP Home Minister Altaf Hossain Choudhury.9 His safety was mediated by Maulana Mohiuddin, the editor of monthly magazine Madina, with the Home Minister. HuJI was also involved in an attack on Sheikh Hasina on 21 August 2004. The then government was reluctant to admit HuJI’s involvement and blamed the Indian militant group United Liberation Front of Assam for the attack. There are also reports that the brother of the Deputy Minister of BNP, Abdus Salam Pintu, who is in the police custody now, handed over the bombs that were used in the attack against Sheikh Hasina rally on 21 August 2004. However, the erstwhile BNP government did not want to go deeper into the assassination bid on Sheikh Hasina and initially accused both India and the Awami League of orchestrating the attack. HuJI’s activities first came to light when it attacked poet Shamsur Rahman in 1999. However, the Bangladeshi government denied its existence at that point in time. The USA had put HuJI on the terrorist watch list in 2002. Reacting to the US action, the then Foreign Minister Morshed Khan said, “the way Bangladesh is being painted with the same brush time and again, it seems that it is a conspiracy and an orchestrated campaign by some vested quarters reflecting government approach to the issue of terrorism even after there were intelligence report in 2003 suggesting to ban this group.10 Some HuJI leaders like Habibur Rahman along with Allama Azizul Haq whose party was a coalition partner of the BNP government met Begum Khaleda Zia when she was the Prime Minister a few days before the ban on HuJI on 17 October 2005. A year after its ban in 2006, HuJI reappeared in its reincarnated version of Sachetan Islami Janata in front of the Baitul Moquarram mosque with the knowledge and permission of the government. The HuJI asked the government to allow some of its leaders who were not involved in terrorist activities, to carry out their political activities under


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a different name. The government also gave them the assurance that it would not arrest its leaders if they held meetings under the banner of a different organization. Home Minister Lutfozzaman Babar in a statement later said that he had learnt about HuJI’s appearance in front of the mosque from the newspaper reports. The relevance of these religious groups to the electoral politics is evident from the fact that the Awami League even did not hesitate to sign a pre-poll arrangement with Bangladesh Khilafat Majlis and also announced the candidature of Habibur Rahman, a known HuJI face, for the postponed general elections of 2007. Later on, this pre-poll alliance was cancelled under tremendous public pressure. HuJI is still active. It also established a charity called Faruqi Welfare Foundation to channell its funds and even managed to obtain a certificate from the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies on 29 June 2009. This was later cancelled after the security agencies discovered it. Its Chairman Maulana Abdus Salam, who was convenor of the Islamic Democratic Party formed during the caretaker government, was arrested in July 2009. Ahle Hadith Andolan Bangladesh (AHAB) The Ahle Hadith Andolan Bangladesh has been involved in propagating puritan Islam in Bangladesh for quite some time. It rejects “little tradition” and advocates the strict following of Shariat.11 Its core ideology is to purify the Bengal Islam from the contamination of Hindu and other cultural practices that are considered un-Islamic. However, the links between its supreme leader Asadullah al Ghalib to militancy and religious extremism discredited the organization. AHAB has been closely associated with the JMB and JMJB, the organizations associated with the country-wide bomb blasts. In 1997, AHAB organized a conference which was sponsored by Matin Salafi, an Islamic leader expelled from Bangladesh during General H. M. Ershad’s regime. In this conference, the AHAB had invited Abdullah Naseer Al Rahmani, a close associate of Osama bin Laden. It is also reported that it had links with the military officers of Bangladesh UN Peace Keeping Mission operating in Kuwait. Ghalib stated in the 1997 conference that he sent Akramuzzaman, then Director of the banned Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), to Kuwait to work with the military men. He claimed that two of his cadres from the youth wing were able to convert 4,000 people to AHAB ideology and 3,000 of them are military personnel of Bangladesh.12 This organization was banned on 23 February 2005 by the government after its links to the JMB were unearthed and for its involvement in the countrywide bomb blasts on 17 August 2005. Dr Asadullah al Ghalib established AHAB after splitting from Jamiat-ul-Ahle-Hadith headed by Dr. M. A. Bari. The Kuwait-based RIHS also has close association with AHAB and has funded some of their activities. It patronized AHAB-run Towhid Trust and Hadith Foundation. Interestingly, the RIHS continued to function in Bangladesh after it was banned by the USA in 2002 following the reports of



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its linkages with Al Qaeda. After the government banned Al-Haramain Foundation in 2003, some of its officials joined the RIHS. Even after the RIHS was banned, their patrons and Kuwaiti officials visited Bangladesh and the organization continued to transfer funds to AHAB. After the government stopped releasing its funds, the RIHS used hundi to transfer its money.13 The RIHS funded several madrassas and orphanages and an Islamic University. Some of these madrassas being strongholds of AHAB were used by the JMB to train its cadres. Reportedly, Abdur Rahman, the supreme commander of the JMB, was asked to join the AHAB, but he formed a separate organization as he differed with the AHAB leaders regarding the timing of armed jihad in Bangladesh. AHAB is now operating under the name of Insaf Party and Allar Dal.

JMB/JMJB The Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh and the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh are of very recent origin. In 2001, a meeting of its Shura committee that was headed by Sheikh Abdur Rahman took place in Dhaka and it was decided that the organization should be rechristened as the JMB.14 After its creation, its Shura members visited the northern districts of Bruhatar Rajshahi, Ranjpur, Dinajpur, Bogra, Pabna and delivered lectures on jihad in various madrassas, most of which were managed by the AHAB. The objective of this organization is to bring Islamic revolution in Bangladesh. The main protagonists of this organization were disillusioned by Islamic political parties and their commitment to Islamic revolution in Bangladesh. Sheikh Abdur Rahman, who was trained in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), has also visited Afghanistan. After his return to Bangladesh, he was invited by AHAB to join their organization and work with them. However, Asadullah al Ghalib, the supreme leader of AHAB and Sheikh Rahman differed on the timing of qital (armed revolution) in Bangladesh. Ghalib’s opinion was that Bangladesh is not yet ready for qital. However, both the organizations maintained organizational links with each other and later some of the madrassas managed by AHAB were used for training of the JMB cadres. It may be stated here that it was on the recommendation of Asadullah al Ghalib, that Bangla Bhai Sidiqur Rahman studied in the Medina University. The JMJB is considered to be a military wing of the JMB. Bangla Bhai who was earlier a member of Islamic Chatra Shibir left the organization after he was disillusioned with its activities. He felt that Jamaat after accepting female leadership under Begum Khaleeda Zia has been drifting from Islamic ideology. Media reports in Bangladesh suggest that religious political parties like the Jamaat Islami have linkage with the JMB. Even though Jamaat has denied its links with the JMB, it is well known that the Habiganj Amir of Jamaat, Saidur Rahman, was involved with the JMB and has been on the run after Bangla Bhai was arrested. According to the probe conducted by the Bangladesh Bank to investigate into the financial linkages of the militants, it was found


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that suspected transactions of money related to militancy took place from an account which was in the name of Sabbir Ahmed. But after investigations, it was found that this account was actually being operated by Saidur Rahman, the Jamaat Amir of Habiganj. Another former Jamaat Islami lawmaker, Abdul Khaleque, interfered with the investigation process as a result of which the police could not arrest the JMB operatives in Khulna and Satkhira. It is also reported that he personally helped and trained women JMB cadres at Chhoygharia Mahila Madrassa in Khulna and Satkhira. The Jamaat was quick to deny its links with the JMJB. Kamaruzzaman, the Joint General Secretary of the Jamaat Islami said that “the party cannot stay guarantee to the activities of some of its erstwhile Shibir members and cannot take responsibility for those who have left the Shibir.”15 As has already been mentioned, the JMJB was actively engaged in operations against the radical left organizations like the Purba Banglar Communist Party and the sarboharas in North Bengal with active help and encouragement of a BNP Minister. The pamphlets that were distributed along with the bombs on 17 August 2005 specify the objectives of this organization. The JMB advised the countrymen through its pamphlet campaign: The Jamaat ul Mujaheedin Bangladesh, keeping in mind the laws of Allah, do not recognise the prevalent system. In addition, the constitution under which the state is functioning, that is contradictory/do not conform to Allah’s system, The JuM calls all those who are cognizant to shape the country as per Allah’s order and Prophet’s way and to reject the rule of law and the so called electoral system and function. Otherwise the JuM has resolved to implement Allah’s law in Allah’s land through comprehensive realisation of Allah’s directed qital method. To conclude, till the time the Islamic law becomes a reality, do not go to the judiciary created by the Taghut.

According to the JMB pamphlet, the elected government in Bangladesh is Taghut. It stated, “[a] person who sidelines the law of Allah and ruled by the law of Kafir/Mushrek (polytheist) is referred as a Taghut who is in power.”16 It disagreed with the judicial system and wanted to establish a system ordained by the Quran. To quote the pamphlet, In any Muslim country, other than the law of Allah, nothing can prevail. But this is a matter of regret that in spite of the fact that 90 per cent of the people who reside in our country are Muslims, we have not implemented the laws of Allah. In this country from district to the capital city in a systematic manner, both lower and higher courts have been established which is founded under a constitution that is created by the human being and they are dispensing justice. This constitution has been promulgated by some conscious sinners.



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Obviously, the state rather than the civilians and judiciary were targeted. Even the pamphlets that were distributed with the 17 August bomb blasts were wrapped carefully and the bombs did not contain any shrapnel in order to keep the pamphlets intact to spread the message of the JMB. It was believed that the blasts would give the organization publicity and since there would not be any casualties it would not attract government action. However, the organization soon changed its strategy and mounted suicide attacks on the judiciary, killing two judges and injuring several others. As suicide bombing was largely unknown in Bangladesh, it shocked the entire nation which took note of growing fundamentalism that was earlier dismissed as a malafide campaign by vested quarters. Hizb ut-Tahrir Hizb ut-Tahrir is a close-knit organization in Bangladesh. It is more confined to the urban centres and has an office in Dhaka. Its followers are among the young educated Muslims. This organization is banned in most of the Middle Eastern countries and Pakistan. Its prime objective is establishing Khilafat. Not directly linked to terrorism, it propagates a radical Islamist ideology that questions the state structure. Till now it has not had any conflictual relations with Jamaat Islami Bangladesh. It is currently headed by Mohiuddin Ahmad who is a lecturer at the Institute for Business Administration in Dhaka University. Supporters have restricted themselves to campaigning by distributing pamphlets in front of mosques on Friday. It has largely limited its activities to run awareness campaign for establishing Islamic way of life. They reject democracy and the election process as they feel that democracy ensures change of leadership but does not change the system. Interestingly, they supported the mutiny by Bangladesh Rifles in February 2009. Hizb ut-Tahrir has been supportive of various Islamic parties and their agenda. It has recently published an agenda asking all the Islamic political parties to put forward a demand to their respective coalition partner that all the laws in Bangladesh should be based on Quran and Sunnah. It took a cue from the 2001 election pledge made by both the major parties like the BNP and Awami Leauge that there should not be any law that is in contradiction to Quran and Sunnah as a precondition to forming alliance with the religious political parties.17 The Hizb ut-Tahir is known for its radical Islamic agenda even though it is not involved in any militant activities as of now. It was banned by the present Awami League government on 22 October 2009 as they are “destabilising” Bangladesh. Its bank accounts were frozen by the Bangladesh bank following the government order. HT has been campaigning against the Awami League for a very long time.

Tackling religious extremism in Bangladesh The government in Bangladesh, especially the last BNP regime, was not interested and initially it did not take any action against these groups that


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were operating openly. The government adopted two methods: first, it kept on denying the existence of these groups. Second, it accused the opposition party and foreign countries of conspiring to malign the government. While the government kept on denying the existence of Bangla Bhai and his activities against the sarboharas, some ministers were using the JMJB supremo to tackle the issue of radical left in North Bengal. Bangla Bhai was not only given government patronage but was provided with government vehicles for transporting people to the operation conducted by him. Three BNP lawmakers, former Telecom Minister Barrister Aminul Haque, former Deputy Minister of Land Ruhul Kuddus Talukdar Dulu, and former Parliamentarian, Nadim Mostafa, who provided patronage, especially in the Rajshahi area, with the knowledge of the BNP leaders are now in jail for their involvement. In fact, the BNP senior leaders like Oli Ahmed and Abdul Hye accused the government of inaction. However, the young leaders headed by Begum Zia’s son were in favour of maintaining party ties with the Islamists due to the vote bank politics. The caretaker government which assumed power on 11 January 2007 carried out the death sentence given by the judiciary and hanged six top leaders belonging to JMB and JMJB. However, its approach to the issue of religious fundamentalism was more law and order-centric, as it did not want to go deeper into the factors contributing to the growth of fundamentalism, their financial sources and patrons. To quote one of Bangladesh’s top police officers, former Inspector General of Police, ASM Shahjahan, there had been a lot of progress in the JMB case, we may have hanged some top JMB leaders, but its origin has not been unveiled. We have to find out the masterminds who have sown the seeds of this poisonous tree. We should not just limit our arrests within the patrons and leaders of JMB – we must find out the masterminds to end this episode.18 The arrest of militants from all over the country during the caretaker government’s tenure suggests that the network of these groups is spread all over. The law-enforcing authorities have recovered explosives and grenades from time to time by raiding their hideouts. During the investigations, it was found that most of these organizations especially the JMJG, JMJB and AHAB were generously funded by the NGOs from the Middle East. The media has reported that the militants received funds for setting up madrassas and maktabs from United Arab Emiratesbased welfare organizations like Al Fauzia and the Khairul Ansar al Khairia Foundation; Kuwait based Daulatul Kuwait and Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), and Bahrain-based Daulatul Bahrain. In spite of having a separate NGO Affairs Bureau that regulates the foreign funded NGOs, the government did not consider it important to scrutinize the activities of these organizations especially the RIHS, which is banned in many countries. For example, the RIHS-funded and AHABpatronised Tawhid and Hadith foundation expelled Asadullah al Ghalib



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in 2002 for embezzlement of funds, but he continued to receive funds indirectly from these organizations. Instead of account payee cheques, RIHS issued bearer cheques to AHAB even after its linkages to militancy were exposed. Some of the foreign employees, who worked earlier for Al Haramain Foundation until it was closed by the government due to its links to Al Qaeda, were employed thereafter by the RIHS. It was only in July 2005 that they were asked to leave when the government got specific information on their direct involvement in fuelling Islamic militancy.19 Earlier, the government had blocked the funds of RIHS and only agreed to release the funds after its Regional Director and Country Director lobbied for it.20 Bangladesh is going through its own evolution as nation state. The electoral politics and uncompromising attitude of the political parties have made politics a zero sum game. In the process, it has affected the state’s ability to fight religious extremism and terrorism. At the same time, it is important to recognize that Bangladesh has a largely secular culture. The religiosity of Bangladeshis has nothing to do with radicalism. However, the remittances from the Middle East and the role of the Middle Eastern countries which have remained an important source of employment of Bangladeshi workers have made the government be lenient with the questionable activities of some of these NGOs. Though some of them are operating as charitable organizations, these are propagating a form of Islam which is not known in Bangladesh. The Hadith Foundation and Tawhid Foundation which are supported by some Kuwaiti NGOs are operating with a missionary zeal to teach puritan Islamic culture that are not rooted in the syncretic tradition of Bangladesh. Though the civil society has played an important role in garnering popular support against religious radicalism, its efforts remain confined to urban areas only. The Awami League government assumed office in January 2009 with its pledge to fight against fundamentalism. It has pledged to try the war criminals who are currently members of the religious political parties. The government has massive majority and received 49.2 per cent of the popular votes. The election also clearly demonstrated the political preferences of Bangladesh who wanted a change – as pledged by the AL in its election manifesto. Begum Khaleda Zia’s maiden election speech in which she gave a call to the electorate to elect her to save Islam in Bangladesh did not cut much ice with the electorate. The election saw the rout of both BNP and Jamaat, which received 31 and 2 seats respectively, indicating that the people do not support the politics practised by these parties. Already there has been external pressure not to try the people involved in war crimes. Pakistan has asked Bangladesh not to go ahead with the trial of war criminals. Similarly Middle Eastern countries are putting pressure not to try the war criminals as some of the religious party leaders who could be targeted have deep ties with these countries.


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S.S. Pattanaik However, a trial of this nature will restore the rule of law which has long been flouted with impunity in Bangladesh. The government is also finding ways and means to restore the four fundamental principles of the 1972 constitution that was amended by the military government which took over power in 1975.21 Commitment of the government, and its ability to provide political space to vibrant civil society to function would go a large way in checking militancy. However, the most important point remains that only after the government recognizes militancy as a serious problem and recognizes the challenge it poses to the country’s stability, can action and methods to address the challenge be envisaged. The bomb blasts on 17 August 2005 and subsequent suicide attacks were wake-up calls for Bangladesh. It remains to be seen how the government with its secular credentials is going to deal with the issue of religious radicalism and whether it is going to adopt strict measures to control the activities of Islamic NGOs that have furthered the agenda of religious radicals.22 The people of Bangladesh have given a huge mandate to this government – the massive victory only the second such victory after the 1973 elections on the promise of change. This mandate is given by the first time to young voters who constitute one third of the total voters in Bangladesh, for a secular Bangladesh and clean government free of corruption. in This popular support needs to be converted into strength as the Awami League holds the promise of secular Bangladesh which will change the political culture and address the larger issue of religious radicalism that is born out of politics rather than the societal impetus of the nation state.

9

Religious radicalism in Bangladesh Security challenges to India


C.A. Josukutty

Ever since independence in 1947, India’s security strategies and debates have been Pakistan-centric as it has been an emanating point for all kinds of anti-India activities ranging from fake currencies to terror strikes. Of late, Bangladesh has emerged as an equally threatening epicentre of anti-India activities spearheaded particularly by Islamic fundamentalist organisations. Their geographic location and cultural proximity have made close contacts between India and Bangladesh inevitable. But they are working towards entirely different concepts of state and society. There has been a continuous flow of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh to India. This has been a safe conduit for the radical Islamists to reach India. Bangladesh is dangerously infected with the virus of religious radicalism. Most of the radical Islamic parties in Bangladesh are anti-India and anti-Hindu. In addition to serving political Islam in general, some terrorist organisations dream of a greater Bangladesh, which includes some parts in the North Eastern region of India. Some others have reunion with west Pakistan as their political agenda. Most of the recent terrorist attacks in India are in one way or another related to fundamentalist outfits in Bangladesh. The frequent failure of the government to prevent recurring incidence of unacceptable damage to the life and property of people have multiple impacts on India’s security. It ranges from doubts about the legitimacy and efficacy of the democratic system to the fanning of Hindu and Muslim extremism in India. The spillover effects of the emerging volatile situation will have unpredictable consequences to security, plurality and democratic practices in India and beyond in the entire South Asia region. This chapter attempts to examine the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh and the security implications it poses for India.

Rise of radical Islam Islam-based political and social demands are not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh. One of the earliest demands of the “Muslim Bengal” was a desire for a separate treatment from the Hindus.1 This desire was articulated through their support for Lord Curzon’s partition of Bengal in 1905, separate electorate and representation for Muslims in the elective bodies and the key


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role they played in the partition of the country in 1947. In fact, this desire was more assertive in Bengal than in Pakistan. The All India Muslim League was established in December 1906 in Dhaka at the initiative of the Nawab Salimullah, “to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Muslims of India”.2 It was a Bengali Muslim leader, A. K. Fazlal Haq, who moved the resolution at the Lahore session of the Muslim League in 1940, which demanded a separate state of Pakistan and that finally resulted in the partition of the country. The victory of the Muslim League candidates in the election on the question of Pakistan and Two Nation Theory in 1946 was a popular acceptance of Islamic line of thinking. The partition of India in 1947 further cemented Islamic religious assertion. As part of Pakistan, Bangladesh witnessed many Islamic provisions in its constitution. In 1964, an amendment to the constitution proclaimed Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic. During 1969–70, Muslim fundamentalists, spearheaded by Jamaat-e-Islami, denounced the Awami League and its demand for autonomy as separatism and un-Islamic.3 In 1971, East Pakistani freedom fighters were accused by Jamaat-e-Islami of destroying Islam by destroying Pakistan and they accused the movement of infiltration and intervention by Indians.4 The Jamaat set up fundamentalist groups like Razakar force and the Al-Badr group to defeat freedom fighters. On 7 November 1971, Al Badr declared that Hindustan should be wiped out from the world map.5 Hence, hostility towards India and the native culture was a motivator for Islamist organisations in Bangladesh since its inception as a separate state. After independence in 1972, Bangladesh adopted a constitution with secularism as one of its cardinal principles and took a number of measures aimed at the larger secularisation of society.6 An important result of the adoption of secular government was identification of the Mujib government in the public mind with India of “fanatical Hindu” and “godless” Soviet Union.7 India was pointedly attacked for its “evil” designs and hegemonic ambitions on Bangladesh.8 Islam became a rallying point for those who opposed Mujib and his policies.9 Mujib attempted to placate the “Islamic” elements by following certain Islamic policies and identifying with Islamic style and practices. But his friendly advances towards Islamisation could not cover up the gigantic failure of his government to deliver economic and political goods, which brought about his downfall by a military coup in 1975. The coup was a victory for the fundamentalists. Mujib’s ouster marked the beginning of a long period of blatant military rule, successively under Major General Zia-ur-Rahman (1976–81) and General Hussein Muhammad Ershad (1982–91). Both these strongmen used religion for political legitimacy. Consequently, Islam bounced back with renewed vigour. The constitution of 1973 was amended to replace “secularism” with the solemn proclamation, “Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be basis of all action”, as well as to declare that “solidarity with Muslim states” should become a fundamental objective of the state. The term Bengali nationalism was


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replaced with “Bangladeshi” which in reality means some amount of antiIndianism in the name of separate religious identity.10 Five fundamentalist parties, the Muslim League, the Islamic Democratic League, Khilaphat-iRabbani, Nizam-i-Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami, which were banned in 1972 for opposition to the liberation struggle, were granted legal recognition. In return, they extended complete support to the policy of Islamisation. However, only Jamaat-e-Islami thrived steadily on the political platform of fundamentalism, the Islamic state, staunch pro-Pakistan and rabid anti-India feelings. Zia-ur-Rahman systematically uprooted secularism from the Bangladeshi constitution, and presided over the gradual consolidation of Islamic fundamentalism. General Ershad went a step further. He started the repair and beatification of mosques. He put posters and wall hangings of excerpts from the Koran in government offices and public buildings. There was a proliferation of Islamic-religious-cultural associations, mosque societies and Islamic societies.11 At least 61 religious parties and organisations were active at that time.12 In his desperate bid to remain in power, he brought out the eighth amendment to the constitution in 1988, declaring Islam to be the state religion. He even went to the extent of instigating communal riots against the Hindu minorities.13 In parliamentary elections held in 1991, after the overthrow of Ershad in 1990, the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP) came to power with the support of Jamaat-e-Islami. In the election, while the pro-Islamic parties, got 54.13 per cent of the votes, the Awami League-led eight-party alliance, despite its Islamic rhetoric, managed to poll only around 34.81 per cent of votes.14 The Jamaat won 18 seats with 12 per cent of votes and became the third largest party.15 The Awami League won the 1996 election after a gap of 21 years. But the party did not try to secularise the polity and society. Instead, they compromised with Islam. In the 2001 elections, the Jamaat won 17 seats and had two ministers in the government formed by the BNP. Besides the Jamaat, the Islamic Oikkyo Jote (a coalition of some Islamic parties) won two seats. In spite of their representation in parliament, these parties campaigned against the syncretic traditions of the country. In one of the public meetings Jamaat-e-Islami’s Member of Parliament, Dalwar Hussein Savidi said that various traditions and cultural practices related to Bengali culture were un-Islamic and originated from Hindu traditions and culture.16 In Bangladesh, political parties and military rulers at different points of time, patronised Islam to advance their own agenda. The Islamist parties took advantage of state’s patronage to build their party structures and propagate their brand of polity and society. In spite of their ideological differences, all the Islamic parties in Bangladesh repudiate all identities that are not Islamic. They have been using various institutions, such as colleges and universities, seminaries, mosques, religious assemblies and NGOs as platforms to propagate their political and religious ideals in civil society.17 They promote Islamist education. There has been considerable growth of madrassas, most of them


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funded by charitable trusts from Gulf countries. There are 60,000 madrassas working in the country, independently of the government.18 The education imparted by these religious schools threatens the secular fabric of the country. To Sabir Hossain Choudhary, a liberal and secular political activist, Bangladesh is undergoing a “creeping Islamisation”.19 On the State Television of Bangladesh, more presenters are wearing beards and there are more and more recitals from the Koran. In Dhaka Airport, more and more signs are written in Arabic, but no one speaks it. Under political patronage, a number of radical Islamist outfits flourished in Bangladesh. The Harkat-ul-Jihadi-al-Islami (HuJI) is one such organisation well connected to international terror networks. It is an active member of the International Islamic Front of Osama Bin Laden. A HuJI slogan reads that “we all will become the Taliban and turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan”.20 It is suspected of working in concert with the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the ULFA in Assam. The US State Department has declared the HuJI to be a terrorist organisation with strong links to the jihadi groups in Pakistan and the Middle East.21 Jamaat-ulMujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Jagrata Janata Muslim Bangladesh (JJMB), two important Islamist organisations at the moment, seek to capture power through armed rebellion and establish Islamic rule by a Majilis-eShura. The outfit has 300,000 activists and 10,000 full time activists across the country.22 Other active radical Islamist organisations include ShahaudatAl-Hiqma, Hizb ut-Towhid, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic Biplobi Parshad. Besides Islamism, a factor that unites these organisations is their hostility towards India. It is suspected that some Islamic parties and underground groups have been trying to develop armed branches to organise an armed Islamic revolution.23 Most of these organisations are influenced by Islamic fundamentalist organisations in different parts of the world. With political patronage at home and financial assistance from across the globe, Bangladesh has gradually become a recruiting ground for the export of foot soldiers for Islamic radicalism during the past few decades. In the early 1980s, hundreds of young jihadis were sent to Palestine to help create an “Islamic Palestinian” state. During the Afghan war, hundreds of Bangladeshi youth were recruited and brought into Pakistan, with the full knowledge of Bangladesh military intelligence and passive support from pro-Islamist political parties, to join the Islamic militants for jihad. Today jihadis from Bangladesh are present in countries such as Indonesia, Burma, Chechnya, Bosnia, Egypt and Tajikistan. More importantly, they are found almost everywhere in India – in Kashmir, in the North Eastern states and possibly in every site of terrorist attack. The fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and the capture of power in Bangladesh by the pro-fundamentalist coalition led by the BNP turned Bangladesh into a safe sanctuary for jihadi elements. Under pressure from the US forces, hundreds of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters arrived in Bangladesh in April 2002.24 In the words of Bertil Lintner,


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A revolution is taking place in Bangladesh that threatens trouble for the region. Islamic fundamentalism, religious intolerance, militant Muslim groups with links to international terror groups, a powerful military with ties to the militants, the mushrooming of Islamic schools churning out radical students, middle class apathy, poverty and lawlessness – all are trying to transform the nation.25 The above account of the rise of radical Islam in Bangladesh points to a very dangerous tendency. The legitimacy and acceptability of any political party or organisation is measured in terms of its loyalty to the Islamic cause, that too as per the dictates of the radical Islamists. Consequently, no political party in the country can hope to maintain the political momentum, unless they engage in some Islamic rhetoric. That is why, even Awami League, the party that led the liberation movement on a liberal and secular plank, uses Islamic symbols as a political tool. Nobody dare oppose a party that uses the religious mantle to advocate its cause. In fact, it is a pointer to the process of Islamisation that the society and polity in Bangladesh has been undergoing. Two features of the entire process have specific implications for India: (1) the anti-India stand of all the Islamic groups, and (2) their connectivity to terrorist outfits in India.

Neighbourhood realities Whatever happens in Bangladesh has its definite reverberations in India. There are three factors that function as feasibility catalysts for terror operators between India and Bangladesh: (1) the geographical contiguity of India and Bangladesh, (2) a large presence of Bangladeshi settlers and illegal immigrants in India and (3) the presence of a huge conglomeration of Muslim population in India with close cultural similarity to Bangladesh. Geographical proximity, Bangladeshi immigrants and Muslim fraternity provide a convenient platform for radical Islamists to operate across the border smoothly. These factors put India in a difficult spot. Geographically, India surrounds Bangladesh. It is an “India-locked” country. These two neighbours share 4,095 kms of boundary. Even though India has fenced about one-third of the boundary, still it continues to be an easy route for illegal immigrants, insurgents in the Northeast, anti-India radical Islamist elements and smugglers to cross through the border. The riverine border in the Suderbans is particularly porous. According to reports, there are as many as 7.9 million Bangladeshi illegal immigrants in West Bengal, 5 millions in Assam, 5 millions in Bihar and Jharkhand and many more millions in other parts of India.26 The illegal immigrants consist of Islamist terrorists, smugglers, anti-India insurgents and those crossing the border for economic reasons. Between August 2006 and April 2007, ten militants belonging to Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizbul Mujahideen and Jamaat-ulMujahideen of Bangladesh were caught while trying to cross over to India.27 There are reliable reports that the ISI is using Bangladesh as a transit point

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for pushing terrorists into India.28 The illegal immigrants have the potential to destabilise the demographic, social, ethnic and linguistic balance in many Indian states.29 At a conference organised by the Border Security Force (BSF) in Kolkata on 23 June 2005, West Bengal Chief Minister, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya admitted that: in many places, there are more Bangladeshi settlers than Indians. There are groups who spread the message of Islamic fundamentalism. Other groups are directly involved in subversive activities. They are recruiting jihadis from India and sending their leaders to campaign in bordering states of India.30 It is impossible to separate the terrorists and militants who sneak in with an anti-India agenda as against the truly poor people who migrate for economic reasons. Also because of linguistic, racial and cultural similarities, Bangladeshi immigrants easily mix with Indians making it almost impossible to identify them. Some of them have joined the ranks of militants in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere, while some others are working as “sleeper cells”, who provide or arrange for shelter for fundamentalist operations from Bangladesh. Their presence has greatly facilitated the harbouring of militants antagonistic to India. India accuses Bangladesh of allowing access to the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). Bangladeshi security agencies and radical Islamists have a strong nexus with the insurgent groups in India.31 India has already given a list of 172 camps active inside Bangladesh territory, which are run by 18 outfits from North-East India.32 Some of these organisations, who operate from Bangladesh with impunity, want to create Brihat Bangladesh (Greater Bangladesh) by merging Muslim communities in North-East India.33 The rapid rise in fundamentalism in Bangladesh and its growing nexus with the ISI has added to India’s grave concerns over its eastern neighbour. Fragmenting the North Eastern states of India or the Indian Republic has been a strategic objective of Pakistan’s policies. Bangladesh collaborating with the ISI in such evil designs is a security challenge to India. The spread of radical Islam in India’s neighbourhood has its spillover effects over the Muslim inhabitants in the country. India has the second largest Muslim population in the world. Economic backwardness, growth of Islamic extremism and the rise of Hindu fundamentalism have led a small section of Indian Muslims to become identified with pan-Islamic organisations and movements. That is why there have been increasing incidents of Indian-born terrorists getting involved in terrorist activities.34 It is further accelerated by the strong anti-India feeling of the militants from across the border. Anti-India feeling and India bashing, which is synonymous with all the fundamentalist organisations in Bangladesh, mirrors the rise of Jamaat. The majority in Bangladesh hate India because Jamaat hates India.35 Increasing incidence of domestic fundamentalism and violence which include explosions and attacks


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on government offices across Bangladesh by groups demanding the implementation of Islamic law in the social and political life of the country is matched by virulent anti-India rhetoric.36


Bangladeshi connection and fundamentalist postures Most of the terror strikes in India have been found to be linked to outfits in Bangladesh. Am attack near the American Centre in Calcutta in January 2002, a role in the assassination of Haren Pandya, former Home Minister of Gujarat in 2003, the bombing of the Delhi–Patna Shramjeevi Express at Jaunpur in June 2005, the attack on the campus of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore in December 2005, the bombing of the Sankat Mochan temple in Varanasi in March 2006 and the bombings in Hyderabad on 25 August 2007 all have some Bangladeshi connection.37 According to intelligence reports, Shariffuddin alias Abu Hamza, a suspected operative of Bangladesh-based Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami is said to have played a key role in the Hyderabad blasts. He is said to have operated as per the orders of HuJI Commander Abdul Shahid Muhammed alias Bilal, who was also involved in the attack on Special Task Force (STF) headquarters.38 The arrest of a Karnataka resident in January 2008 on car theft charges has revealed that HuJI was responsible for a string of terrorist bombings in 2005–6. Further, the interrogation of Hyderabad-born Ziauddin Nasir, a key HuJI activist, revealed that after training he reached India in August 2007 through Bangladesh.39 Terror outfits in Bangladesh are related to their counterparts in India. Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), whose origin can be traced to the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, is an umbrella organisation with the proclaimed aim of organising a Shariah-governed state in India. SIMI is well connected to Lashkar-e-Mohammed and HuJI in Bangladesh and is the recipient of financial assistance from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The SIMI has floated a number of frontal organisations like the National Democratic Front in Kerala, the Muslim Defence Force in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Forum for Dignity in Karnataka. More importantly, most of the terror modules in India comprise young Indian nationals from urban areas with some degree of education. They are inspired with a jihadi call for a war against Hindus and the Indian state.40 The destruction of Babri Masjid in December 1992 is exploited by the radical elements as a focal point for articulating Indian Muslim identity.41 After the destruction of the Babri Masjid, a section of the Muslim opinion in India, particularly in Hindu majority states, veered to the view that Islamic religious identity gives something more than mere democratic participation in secular India.42 Islam is hailed as everything, and Hinduism is claimed to be not rational, systematic, logical, egalitarian or just. Radical Islamists propagate that it is the irrationality of Hinduism that resulted in the destruction of Babri Masjid and the same continues as a permanent threat to Islam.43

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Security implications The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh poses two broad categories of security threats to India – physical and philosophical. Physical security is related to the security of the state and human security.44 Physical threat perception includes the possibility of external aggression and hiccups in the domestic security front. The fundamentalist organisations in Bangladesh, by aligning with the anti-India insurgents and terror outfits in India, challenge India’s unity and territorial integrity. Human security is threatened when vital scientific and industrial installations are targeted by terrorists as happened in the attack on the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore. The loss of human lives and public property due to terror strikes puts constraints on human security, which range from poverty to religious and political oppression. State security and human security are complementary to each other. State security is a pre-condition for human security. In this sense, Muslim fundamentalism from across the border is a double-edged weapon, as it negates state security as well as human security. Philosophically, there is a contradiction between political Islam and the normative foundations of the Indian state, which will have many long-term security implications for India. Radical Islam propagated in Bangladesh questions the normative foundations of Indian democracy. The aim of all the terrorist outfits is essentially the same – the creation of a Shariah-governed state. Accordingly Islam is a political project aiming to establish a Caliphate for the whole world. The radical Islamists even proclaim that “Islam is our nation, not India”.45 They propagate the idea that Muslims will get no justice in secular India. According to them, secular elements in Bangladesh are pawns in India’s hands. They dub India a Hindu monster threatening Muslim Bangladesh. This has provided a common cause and rationale for the radical Islamists in both countries for collaborative terror networks based on political Islam. Islamic fundamentalism from across the border combines in itself a dangerous mix of internal and external, and philosophical underpinnings of security challenges to India. The resultant security concern is a challenge to the legitimacy of the state. Legitimacy depends on the loyal and willing support to the state from all categories of citizens and their acceptance of the authority of the existing institutions of the state.

Conclusion Bangladesh with radical Islam as its political ideology, anti-India activities and sentiments, anti-secularism, anti-democracy and anti-Hinduism well connected to international terror outfits is a safe haven for Islamist terrorism. It is the new hotbed of international Islamist terrorism. Bangladesh is a major transit point for terrorist organisations in the whole of South Asia and even beyond. As the Bangladeshi brand of radical Islam is anti-Indian, Bangladesh has emerged as a security concern to India as dangerous as Pakistan.


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Further, the resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan, deepening Islamisation of polity and society in Pakistan, slow but steady radicalisation taking place in the Maldives, rapidly rising local jihadi cells in India and the Islamisation of Bangladesh have tremendous potential to complicate the security scenario in entire South Asia.

10 Hizb ut-Tahrir The destabilising force in Central Asia


Mahesh Ranjan Debata

Even after the eighth anniversary of the deadly 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, the threat that the world faces from extremism and terrorism is looming large. Whilst Al Qaeda terror network is recognised as the fountainhead of international terrorism, an organisation that epitomises and glorifies extremism is Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). HT, also known as the Party of Liberation in Arabic language, is an international organisation with a global outreach. Named as one of the world’s most innovative extremist groups, HT has its presence in more than 45 countries, including Central Asia, with an ever increasing number of its members. Against this background, this chapter highlights the nature of the extremist ideology espoused by HT and the dangers and challenges it poses to mankind. With much controversy and little understanding surrounding the dynamic nature of HT, this paper explores its role in the global jihadi movement, especially as a vital launching pad for pan-Islamic radicalisation. This chapter analyses and explores HT’s global network and influence, and the tactical and systematic use of propaganda by the HT to achieve its long cherished goal, an Islamic Caliphate, and its potential and ability to radicalise individuals. The chapter also explores the critical regional security implications of HT for Central Asia besides shedding light on the possible sources of financial assistance to HT. Hizb ut-Tahrir was established in Bayt ul-Maqdis (Syria) in 1953 by Sheikh Taqi Al-Din Al-Nabhani, a Palestinian radical activist and Shariah judge in the Jerusalem Appeals Court. He was the chief ideologue and the leader of HT for life till his death in 1979, besides being a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood.1 Among others, who were instrumental for creation of HT, were Haled Hasan, the leader of Fatah2 and Assad Tahmimi, the spiritual leader of Islamic Jihad. Nabhani was succeeded by Abd al-Qadim Zallum who was later succeeded by Ata Khalil Abu-Rashta3 when Zallum died in 2003.4

Structure The HT is organised in a secretive and hierarchical pyramid structure made up of a number of cells. Each cell consists of five members. After completion


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of a preliminary six-month study on the book Islom Nizomi (The Structure of Islam), each member of the HT swears that “in the name of Allah, I swear to carry out any orders of HT leaders even if these orders do not correspond to my belief.”5 This demonstrates the fidelity and loyalty of each member to the HT. HT’s structure, programme and tactics do not allow insubordination or self-initiated actions of its members. No member of HT is authorised to act independently. Members of HT, whether they are of ordinary rank or heads of regions, strictly coordinate their actions with their leaders.6 After completion of preliminary training, members form their own groups or halka7– also of five or six members. Each halka has a pseudonym, and only its leader has a link and access to higher members of the organisation. Only the mushrif (supervisor of the halka) knows the next level of leadership, not the whole hierarchy. The mushrif supervises its members who study HT’s ideology. Naqib, who heads the local committee at the district level, is responsible for the administration of group affairs in the relevant urban centre and the villages adjacent to it. Mutamad, who is a provincial representative of a committee and supervises HT’s activities, is appointed by the Amir of HT.8 Study of the organisation’s programme, strategy and literature, as well as geography, politics, religion and history are mandatory for new members. Women cadres, who are important constituent of HT’s cadre, have separate cells for themselves. Starting from the ordinary functionary and moving up to the heads at a regional level, HT cadres comply with the orders and instructions of so-called Kiedat (HT Legislative Assembly) and Amir.9 Membership of the HT is usually expanded directly through a loose association of close friends, family members and relatives, and also through traditional social networks. Meetings or get-togethers are often held under the guise of traditional weekly meetings of men who share food, either at home or in a restaurant. Some halkas – primarily those composed of 17–25-year old youths – are occasionally paid small amount of money for delivering and distributing leaflets.10 Members also contribute handsomely to the purchase of equipment and printing costs of literature.11 Overseas sponsors provide money and material to HT cells for publication of books, pamphlets, leaflets and other literature.12

Aims and objectives Various religious-extremist structures which acted locally and separately, and international terrorist networks have united into a uniform and widely ramified transnational system under the aegis of International Jihad’s Front. In this context, HT holds a markedly extremist position, protects Islamic terrorists and calls upon the Muslim world to wage jihad against infidels. Every leaflet, brochure, book etc. distributed by HT and Internet sources and websites maintained by this organisation propagates the idea of jihad, aimed at transforming all states from Dar al-Kufr (the country of unbelievers)


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into Dar al-Islam (the country of Islam). It also vows to wage armed struggle against “faithless people”, if they refuse to follow Islam. The HT uses Koranic verses frequently to mobilise Muslims across the world.13 HT’s ideology is based on two principles: first, the Shariah should regulate all aspects of human life, be it politics, economics or social systems, and second, the creation of an Islamic state. HT has an international Sunni panIslamist agenda that endeavours to unite all Muslim countries in the world. HT aims at establishing a theocratic single Islamic Caliphate incorporating all Central Asian Republics along with the Muslim regions of Russia (Chechnya), China (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region), and the northern Caucasus. The model for HT’s Islamic state existed in the seventh century under Prophet Mohammad and his four successors. HT’s proposed Caliphate would be led by a Caliph, who would combine religious and political powers, elected by the Majlis al-Ummah (assembly), which would in turn be elected by the people. The Caliph would appoint an Emir who would declare jihad against all non-Muslims.14 Sheikh Taqi Al-Din Al-Nabhani, the founder of HT, even prepared a draft constitution for the proposed Caliphate. The draft constitution combined Islamic concepts with some socialist elements. Article 149 of the draft constitution reads that “the State should guarantee employment for all citizens.” Article 160 provides for free health care for all by the State.15 The HT, however, differs with the Wahhabi movement, after which it has been modelled. The main difference between the two is that Wahhabi movement abolished the Caliphate, whereas HT wants to reinstate the Caliphate. However, Hizb ut-Tahrir employs the Wahhabi model of deposing a government, which is a prelude to the establishment of the Caliphate.16 Completely anti-Zionist, anti-West, anti-Shia, anti-Semitic and anti-holocaust in its stance, HT believes that the formation of an Islamic Caliphate would resolve the problems of insecurity and instability across the world.17 HT has projected its goals in three stages: The first stage is the recruitment and indoctrination of new members. The second stage would be the interaction stage wherein Islam is described as a panacea for all social evils. It provides Islamic prescriptions for all the social maladies of the current turbulent times which attract the attention of the young and less educated population.18 The HT promotes a utopian view of political Islam firmly believing that the application of Islamic law and government can root out social problems such as corruption and poverty.19 In the final stage, HT seeks to take over power in a peaceful manner to establish an Islamic Caliphate based on Shariah law, by overthrowing the current system and giving up the modern life style.20 However, HT’s claim of achieving its goal by peaceful means has been belied. Toigonbek Kalmatov, Director of Kyrgyz State Agency on Religious Affairs, who is highly critical of HT’s tall claims, points out that the HT seeks to change the constitutional system only by means of force; not through peaceful means, but by taking up arms. He further stated that the HT is using all means to grab political power.21 Arms and ammunition, bullets and grenade

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launchers found in some HT members’ houses are concrete evidence belying HT’s claims.22


Tactics and techniques The HT relies on underground meetings rather than public speeches or appearances. The HT members pass on messages quickly before the government can suppress or discredit them. HT disseminates its ideas through leaflets, books and magazines, which usually contain HT’s religious ideology, passages and Koranic verses, description of current events across the globe, particularly the conflicts in Palestine and Chechnya, as an important means to mobilise local support. The notion of international Muslim solidarity has been the quintessence of HT’s mobilisation efforts, and it has tried to use its international character and stature to lend moral authority to the cause it espouses. For example, some leaflets argue that all Muslims around the world have common problems, and conflicts in Chechnya, Palestine and Afghanistan are relevant to all Muslims.23 However, HT’s propaganda work through leaflets and other non-violent methods has been criticised by its own members. A source in the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh reported the disillusionment of individual HT members with the party’s commitment to non-violent methods. When HT’s main tactic of distributing leaflets led to arrest of a number of its young cadres, the Hizb-an-Nusra24 decided to adopt more radical efforts. Hizb-an-Nusra leaders believe that non-violent tactics will never be sufficient to overthrow the Uzbek government led by Islam Karimov. Meanwhile, Akromiya’s founder Akram Yuldashev, in a pamphlet titled Yimonga Yul (Way to Faith), argued that HT’s non-violent tactics were devised for Arab states only and were ill-suited for success in Central Asia.25 The illegally distributed brochures such as The Structure of Islam, Democracy is a Charter of Heresy, Al-Vay? and Hadar magazines and leaflets propagate political Islam, give a clarion call for civil disobedience and promote puritan religious dogmas. Some examples include: “Without Islamic state there is no opportunity anew to begin life on canons of Islam” (Structure of Islam, p. 59); “All Islamic, including Arabian countries, to a deep regret, are governed by heretical laws and conclusions” (Structure of Islam, p. 5); “Democracy is a product of human mind. Allah did not grant it. It is not based on suggestion from outside and not connected to any religion, granted by Allah through the Prophet” (Democracy is a Charter of Heresy, p. 12); “Islamic Caliphate is a defender of all Muslim countries. Its construction is duty and the delay in its recovery is not allowed” (a leaflet distributed on 16 January 2000); “ … If so, hurry up with practical acts, blessed by Allah and his Prophet, act with those who are on a correct way of Prophet and Allah, a way to reconstruct Caliphate.”26 HT publishes a newspaper called Ong-Al-Waie (Awareness) in the Uzbek language. It is mandatory for each and every member to buy every issue.


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For potential members and interested parties, the newspaper is distributed for free. HT sends Ong-Al-Waie to media organisations and embassies. Besides the issues of faith and Islam, the newspaper addresses a wide range of political issues. It criticises the West, especially the United States, the local governments in Central Asia and their leaders, and describes Uzbek President Islam Karimov and former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf as Jews.27 A number of HT publications express open support for religious extremists and terrorists and even terrorist activities such as suicide bombings. An article entitled “The Mother Stepped into Suicide Bombing Act” in Al-Vaya in February 2004 praised 22-year-old Palestinian woman Riym Solih ar-Rieshiy for her suicide bomb attack in Israel’s industrial district of Erets, which killed four and injured 11 civilians. This article became a source of inspiration for women-suicide bombers to accomplish similar terrorist acts in Tashkent in March 2004. Another article titled “Prepare for them” published in Al-Waie in April 2004 justified the use of modern and sophisticated arms and ammunition such as tanks, rockets, weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and chemical weapons during jihad. In the same article, which has now been used in sermons during Friday prayers of Muslims, HT ideologues declared that Muslims should be ahead of others in the purchase and possession of weapons.28 HT also tries to mobilise the common people by socialising with them in various ways. HT member Sabirov feels that his organisation is able to achieve its goal through peaceful means and that there is no need to take up arms. To him, the HT has been successful because, “We speak with people in their language.” Quoting an HT representative of Uzbekistan’s Fidokorlar, Sabirov said that HT members go to the cotton field on bikes and pick cotton with farmers, share computer desks with Information and Technology specialists, play computer games together and disseminate their ideas. Some members in Fidokorlar even “go to meet cotton-growers in luxurious Mercedes Benz cars wearing white suits”.29 Another important aspect of HT’s activities that has helped it to gain more sympathy among the masses is its charity work for protecting the socially vulnerable people.30 HT distributes audio cassettes, Visual Compact Discs (VCDs) and Digital Video Discs (DVDs) in the cities as well as in villages. Advanced and sophisticated technology, often with computers and printers, has made printing easier and cheaper.31 Shavkat Kochkorov of the Kyrgyz National Security Service, while addressing journalists in the southern Kyrgyz city of Jalalabad in August 2007, claimed that the HT cadres have modern means of transportation and the best audio visual equipment.32 The effective e-mailing system is used for speedy communication and various issues are sorted out by sending mail through the Internet to the secret addresses of HT leaders.33 In recent years, the group has been using the Internet to increase its influence in Central Asia.34 The analysis of HT’s present-day activities shows that HT has extended its ideological support to Islamic terrorist organizations, and has succeeded in training/indoctrinating its cadres in the religious-extremist spirit.

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Recruitment of cadres HT is active in more than 45 countries with 5,000–10,000 core members.35 The group has tens of thousands of members and many sympathisers in Central Asia. Official statistics published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan put HT membership as high as 10,000 in Kyrgyzstan alone.36 ITAR-TASS reported that there were some 2,000 HT members in Kyrgyzstan, but that the number could be many times higher,37 maybe as many as 20,000.38 HT collects membership fees, each member paying 10 per cent of his/her income in this way.39 Seven women were sentenced on 9 July 2007 by a Tashkent court for being members of HT. Similarly, in Tajikistan, a woman from Isfisor region named Mutabar Bobojonova was arrested in June 2007 for supporting the HT.40 An analyst in the ICG office in Osh said that this is because there is least possibility of women being prosecuted as authorities do not usually suspect women of being involved in the activities of HT. However, Ikbal Mirsaidov, an expert at the Presidential Centre for International Strategic Studies in Bishkek has a different view. To his way of thinking, HT tries to mobilise the wives and daughters of arrested HT members, as most of these women are miffed at the prosecution of their husbands, fathers or brothers for being members of HT. However, Dilbar Samadova, leader of Social Democratic Party in the Soghd region of Tajikistan, gives a different perspective. According to her, the appalling socioeconomic situation including widespread poverty compel the womenfolk to fall prey to HT, which provides them money and material to gain their support.41 The recruitment of HT members primarily takes place by recommendation from other members. A female member of HT indicated that she persuaded some pork-eaters or alcohol-drinkers in restaurants and cafes to live properly in accordance with the principles of Islam.42 Members of the HT are encouraged to view their efforts as a way of life. Many members state an inner jihad or psychological transformation or emotional revolution as the motivations for joining the group. According to them, this inner jihad completely changed their behaviour, and they claim to have become much more disciplined people, free of alcoholism and other social evils.43 Shavkat Kochkorov of the Kyrgyz National Security Service, while addressing journalists in Jalalabad in August 2007, revealed that the HT cadres come to places where Muslim elders and Imams gather and propagate their ideology among the people. They openly claim: “There’s little time left until we will have a Caliphate, and then in the Caliphate you all live very well, your life will improve, and you will have freedom.”44 Most members of HT are young and unemployed. In recent years, mostly women and youth aged between 18–35 years and former convicts have joined HT.45 Given the lack of economic opportunity, many young and impressionable minds join the HT out of motivations as simple as boredom, frustration and dissatisfaction. New recruits are particularly attracted to the HT’s


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emphasis on just social order, equality and assistance to the poor, which they believe would be institutionalised in a Caliphate. Most members come from uneducated and working-class backgrounds. Recruitment in rural areas, where poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to education leading to illiteracy, are acute, has been quite active. Initially, HT cadres concentrated on building a grassroots support base by proselytising during the winter months when farmers and craftsmen were idle.46 HT member Sabirov admits that lectures and seminars or “lessons” delivered in halkas are the group’s most used means of attracting new members. Besides, group gatherings are held in accordance with the Shariah to attract new members.47 Most HT members are ethnic Uzbeks, but the organisation also includes ethnic Kyrgyzs and Tajiks. Analysts say ethnic Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley make up HT’s core membership. However, one-fifth of HT’s members are representatives of non-indigenous ethnic groups such as Tatars, Chechens, Meskhetian Turks and Kurds.48 Nevertheless, ethnicity is not emphasised by members, who instead cite religious grievances against the respective governments in Central Asia.49 Toigonbek Kalmatov, Director of Kyrgyz State Agency on Religious Affairs, said in August 2007 that many prominent people such as Members of Parliament, well-known businessmen and government officials have been providing financial, moral and other logistical support to the HT.50 A 33-year-old HT member, speaking to RFE/RL from the southern Kyrgyz town of Karasu, while admitting his association with HT since 1997, claimed to have prepared HT’s perspective on the Bishkek summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2007.51

HT’s transnational terrorist activities That HT has had its active presence in a number of Muslim countries such as Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Jordan, shows its transnational character. But HT’s anti-government activities, aversion to local laws, including the laws of Islamic states, attempts to seize power, discrediting of official authority and support to terrorist organizations compelled the above mentioned countries to ban this organisation.52 However, it still enjoys considerable support among a section of people in these countries. The HT has also linkages with international terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda, Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In 1997, IMU leader Tohir Yuldashev met Nizamiddin Jusupov, leader of HT’s Kyrgyzstan branch in Rawalpindi to discuss the issue of coordination of their activities in establishing the Islamic state in Uzbekistan. Yuldashev’s plan to overthrow the governments in Central Asian countries through military means was supported by Jusupov who continuously referred to a similar goal nurtured by HT’s armed wing Harakat ul-Muhojirinfi Britaniya. Rustam Mahmud (alias Zubayr ibn Abdurahim), an IMU ideologue and also the head of HT’s Namangan branch, was a close confidant of Tohir Yuldashev.


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Tajikistan Special Forces received documentary evidence of link between HT and IMU members.53 Members of HT’s Jordan chapter attempted armed revolution in the country in 1968 and 1974. In 1993, Jordanian Special Forces foiled a bid by 30 HT activists to assassinate King Hussein of Jordan. Following the armed conflict between HT insurgents and the Lebanese Special Forces and Syrian army in the north of Lebanon from December 1999–January 2000, 800 HT members were arrested. In April 2000, Egyptian Special Forces arrested 26 HT militants who were plotting armed revolution in Egypt. In 2002, HT members in Indonesia were detained for allegedly carrying explosives and weapons. The most important thing to be noted here is that all terrorist acts committed by the arrested HT members were coordinated by Al Qaeda’s regional network. In April 2003, Osif Khanif and Omar Sherif, two militants from HT’s military wing Al-Muhadjirun, exploded bombs in Mike’s Place Café in Tel Aviv. In December 2003, HT supporters led by leader of HT’s Jerusalem branch, Muhammad Hammuri, attacked Ahmad Maher, Foreign Affairs Minister of Egypt, inside Al Aksa mosque (Jerusalem).54 HT is outlawed in Denmark and Germany for its anti-Semitic activities. In Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and in some Arab countries, HT is treated as a terrorist organisation.55 Russia undertook several military operations to suppress HT’s anti-government activity in 2003 and arrested 121 HT members (mostly citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). A huge cache of arms and explosives, detonators, counterfeit passports and propaganda leaflets and brochures calling upon the Russian Muslims to fight against infidels and to create an Islamic State in Russia were recovered from them. In February 2003, the Supreme Court of Russia designated HT as a terrorist organisation and banned its activities on the territory of Russia.56 Chinese authorities put spray-painting signs, both in Chinese and Uyghur scripts, on the walls of Kashghar city to issue warnings against the HT. The signs read “Strike hard against the Islamic Liberation Party (HT)” and “the Islamic Liberation Party is a violent terrorist organization.” The Kashghar local government in its official website put a notice for the people to be careful about the HT’s reactionary nature and the pervasive and actual threat it poses to Xinjiang in general and Kashghar in particular.57 Expressing grave concern over the emergence of HT in Xinjiang, Nicholas Bequelin of Human Rights Watch said that the HT is extremely resilient and its influence, although limited to southern Xinjiang, seems to be growing. Even the prison authorities in Xinjiang are worried about the influence of HT followers on other inmates in the jails across the region.58 Earlier in November 2007, China’s Xinhua news agency had accused the HT of splittism and organizing and leading terrorist groups in Xinjiang. In April 2008, the Xinjiang government blamed the HT for inciting local people of Khotan for a protest demonstration, in which over a thousand people took part.59 HT, which is a close-knit organisation in Bangladesh, is more confined to the urban centres and has an office in Dhaka. On 22 October 2009,


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HT Bangladesh made headline news in all electronic and print media, across Bangladesh and abroad.60 The Bangladesh Home ministry issued a notice clamping a ban on all activities of the HT Bangladesh, describing it as a threat to national security. Subsequently, its bank accounts were frozen by the Bangladesh Bank. The head of HT Bangladesh is Mohiuddin Ahmad, who teaches at the Institute for Business Administration in Dhaka University. In a matter of a few years, the HT has built a strong movement comprising young, educated, committed and hard-working people. It has gained widespread support, respect and trust amongst the people including doctors, teachers, lawyers, businessmen, students and Ulemma, and covering all sections of society. HT has been supportive of various Islamic parties and their agenda. It has recently published an agenda asking all the Islamic political parties to put forward a demand to their respective coalition partner that all the laws in Bangladesh should be based on Quran and Sunnah. Interestingly, they had supported the Bangladesh Rifles mutiny in February 2009.61 HT operates freely in many Western states. Its website in the UK seeks to present a modern image of the organisation and engage Western thinkers, policymakers and academics in dialogue on Islam.62 HT declares the USA, Israel, Great Britain and France as its inveterate enemies. An article titled “General Principles of Self-Sacrifice in the Name of Allah”, published in Al-Waie just few days before the 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA, eulogised terrorist attacks especially suicide bombing.63 Since the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent US-led campaign against terrorism, the HT is becoming more confrontational in its approach64 and changing its tactics according to the situation. The US-led military campaign in Iraq provoked the HT to call for more active and radical steps.65 HT has an armed wing called Harakat ul-Muhojirinfi Britaniya, which was established by Abdulkaddum Zaium, former world leader of HT, who died in March 2003. The present leader of Harakat ul-Muhojirinfi Britaniya is Muhammad Abu Bakr, a 50-year-old native of Palestine, who is also one of the founders of HT terror cells in Great Britain. Harakat ul-Muhojirinfi Britaniya now trains its cadres to conduct chemical, bacteriological and biological war, besides dealing with sophisticated weapons including bombs and landmines.66

HT in Central Asia HT is one of the most mobile, widespread religious-extremist organisations spread all over Central Asia. Leaflets, HT’s main weapon of radicalisation, are translated into Central Asian languages from identical leaflets distributed by HT in the Middle East.67 Under the leadership of Abd al-Kadim Zallum, HT started its activities in former Soviet Central Asia. Though a small number of HT cells existed throughout the early and mid-1990s in Central Asia, the organisation began to expand dramatically in the late 1990s. In an interview with Kazakhstan newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, Beksultan Sarsekov, the first Deputy Head of the CIS Anti-terrorist Centre, stated that


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“The HT, which does not describe itself a terrorist organisation, aims at setting up an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia by overthrowing the existing constitutional order. This problem also concerns Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.”68 HT’s advocacy of regional cooperation across borders, the idea of a unified state, reminiscent of the Soviet era with no national borders between Central Asian states is supported by traders, consumers and many others involved in cross-border trade, which provides the livelihood to a significant portion of Central Asia’s population. The anti-government agenda and the use of catchy themes such as corruption, inequality and religious intolerance have become popular, especially in areas where political parties are not allowed. In such regions, HT has effectively substituted the legalised political parties.69 HT has had some success at grassroots level because of its well-organised underground activity, financial support, sponsorship and training. It has also been able to mobilise support in its favour by raising certain issues such as the political exclusion of youth, increasing poverty and unemployment in Central Asia. HT’s call for social justice strikes an emotional chord with hundreds of thousands of workers in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who have been forced to become migrant workers due to unemployment at home, as well as poor and impoverished people in the provincial towns and villages of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.70 Its idea of an Islamic Caliphate advocates free trade and no borders between Muslim states. HT cells are actively functioning in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, disseminating anti-Western and antigovernment propaganda in local and Russian languages, calling for disobedience to authorities and boycotting any elections. However, there is internal bickering within the HT, which cropped up recently. Two dissenting groups that trace their origins to HT – Hizb-anNusra and Akromiya71- are important to this study. According to an International Crisis Group report, “Hizb-an-Nusra, which appeared in the Tashkent region in 1999,”72 criticises the non-violent tactics espoused by HT. Akromiya was founded in 1996 by Akram Yuldashev, a former HT member from Andijan, Uzbekistan’s third largest city. For Yuldashev, HT’s non-violent tactics were ill-suited for achieving the goal in Central Asia. Terming HT’s goal of creating an international Caliphate impracticable, Yuldashev argues in favour of creating an Islamic state at the local level. Yuldashev attempted to develop tactics suited to the specific socio-economic conditions of the Ferghana Valley, which is Central Asia’s breadbasket. Yuldashev based his tactics on the formation of cells that grouped individuals from the same professional background. Yuldashev sought legal status for his organisation so that it could operate openly at the grassroots level.73 Hizb-an-Nusra’s and Akromiya’s departure from HT’s core ideology and activities symbolises factionalism within HT, which according to analysts, could lead this organisation to adopt more confrontational tactics, or result in new radical groups that adopt terrorist methods akin to Al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.74

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Authorities in the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have taken steps to curb the clandestine activities of HT. Despite the measures by the Central Asian governments at individual, regional, national, bilateral and multilateral levels, HT’s activity has been growing day by day. Authorities in Soghd province of northern Tajikistan unearthed an underground printing press on 30 January 2003 and recovered high-tech desktop publishing equipment and confiscated over 31,000 copies of books, pamphlets and leaflets, besides arresting three male members of HT.75 Pamphlets confiscated by Tajik authorities in 2003 contained anti-American slogans and support for jihad against the West.76

HT in Kazakhstan The first emissaries of HT appeared in southern Kazakhstan in 1998, where the organization now claims to have thousands of members. Initially, the members of the HT were mostly Uzbeks living in southern Kazakhstan, but later on unemployed Kazakh males in the age group of 20–30 years joined the organization.77 HT has been distributing leaflets in Kentau, Turkestan and Shymkent cities in southern Kazakhstan. During the first week of April 2003, Kazakh authorities detained two HT members in the Southern Kazakhstan for allegedly distributing extremist leaflets written in Kazakh in Kentau and Turkestan. They specifically referred to the US war against Iraq and the American and British foreign policy towards the Muslim world, and called for jihad against the USA and UK.78 Kentau, which is known as “Little Athens” due to its relatively large Greek population, has been a hub of HT activities. Socio-economic problems such as poverty and unemployment among the miners and the process of de-industrialisation prompted the HT to expand its base in this region. Other factors which paved the way for HT were the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the failure of Kazakh government to handle the situation immediately after its independence in 1991.79 In August 2003, Kazakh security forces discovered HT’s underground printing press in Shymkent and seized a copying machine, a computer, a printer, laminating machine, a printing press guillotine and book-binding equipment.80 According to a report by the Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency on 15 October 2003, authorities in Shymkent confiscated leaflets and arrested three alleged HT cadres on charges of fomenting inter-ethnic and interreligious hostility.81 In 2004 alone, HT members were found distributing leaflets and other printed matter on more than 180 occasions.82 On 6 July 2001, on the occasion of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s sixty-first birthday, HT’s leaflets were found in thousands of mailboxes in Almaty.83 Political commentator Andrei Gubenko, writing in an Almatybased newspaper Novoye Pokoleniye, in December 2002, opined that HT is growing in Kazakhstan like a hydra with the emergence of several new cells. Abysmal socio-economic conditions in southern Kazakhstan such as illiteracy


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and poverty compelled the people, particularly the youth, to fall into to HT’s trap.84 That the group has also spread its tentacles in northern Kazakhstan is indicated by the arrest of three HT members in November 2003 at the central mosque in Pavlodar city while distributing leaflets. Similarly, in the last week of January 2005, as many as ten HT members were arrested outside the central mosque in Almaty while demonstrating against the Kazakh government. In another incident on 8 February 2005, a printing press run by HT was seized by Kazakh security forces in Almaty. During the raid, two HT members were arrested and over 12,000 leaflets confiscated.85 HT’s ties with regional militant organisations stem from its links with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Though HT condemns the activities of the IMU and an HT delegation was reportedly dispatched to the Ferghana valley to dissuade IMU cadres from militant and terrorist activities,86 its links with IMU are well known. In October 2000, Kazakhstan Committee for National Security arrested a group of HT members led by Abduali Ismailov from Turkestan, who planned to distribute leaflets among visitors and citydwellers with appeals for the violent overthrow of the constitutional system during the celebration of Turkestan’s 1500th anniversary. Chechen-made Automatic pistol Borz, hand-made bombs and extremist literature and leaflets were seized from one HT cadre, Mamatsafo Abdukarimov.87 In order to curb HT’s activities in Kazakhstan, the City Court of Astana approved the Kazakh government’s request to recognise HT as an extremist organisation and banned its activity in the country.88 Though the Kazakh government has taken stringent action against the HT terrorists operating in its territory, some arrested HT terrorists in Kazakhstan continue their mission of indoctrination and recruitment of cadres from among the inmates inside the prisons.89

HT in Tajikistan HT, which operates via semi-autonomous cells,90 has been a security threat to Tajikistan. It is increasingly active in the capital region of Dushanbe. The rise and growth of HT has also been a source of grave concern for mainstream Islamic political leaders. Even the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) leader, Said Abdullo Nuri, on 4 September 2002 portrayed the HT as a threat to peace and stability of Tajikistan.91 On 13 August 2002, residents of several districts of Dushanbe found white folded sheets of paper with HT signature on each statement describing mass disturbances in Tashkent and other Uzbek cities as a result of President Islam Karimov’s unpopular policies. The leaflets cited the Uzbek government’s decision to double customs tariffs on imports as the cause of widespread bankruptcy in small scale business sector.92 Tajik security officials clamped down in Soghd 30 January 2003, which is located in the Tajik portion of the Ferghana Valley. In Isfara District, authorities took stern action against mosques, religious schools and seminaries

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that lacked proper registration documentation. Investigations into 63 clerics accused of administrative violations were initiated. Over 600 members of Hizb ut-Tahrir were arrested in Tajikistan between 1998 and 2002.93 During 2000–4, over 120 individuals were arrested for their links with the HT.94 As reported by the Tajik authorities on 16 January 2006, 99 HT members, including 16 women were arrested in the year 2005 and many of them were sentenced to lengthy jail terms for extremist activities.95 In a major development, the Supreme Court of Tajikistan proclaimed Hizb ut-Tahrir an extremist organisation, outlawed its website, and banned import of its ideological materials (audio, video, brochures etc.).96

HT in Uzbekistan HT, which has been very popular among Uzbeks particularly in the Ferghana region of Uzbekistan, claims that up to 100,000 Muslims have been interned in Uzbekistan on the basis of their religious beliefs.97 Uzbek authorities blamed religious extremists, particularly the IMU and HT, for the deadly bombings in Tashkent in February 1999 and in the spring of 2004 and in Bukhara in summer of 2004 that killed at least 47 people. They accused HT of involvement in riots and violence in Andijan in May 2005.98 Uzbek President Islam Karimov, while accusing HT of trying to topple his government, stated during his nationwide address on 31 July 2004: “Evidence from the March and July 2004 incidents indicates that they were organized by members of the same group, that they acted in accordance with one plan and that they were pursuing the same aim.”99 Kurbonali Muhabbatov, former prosecutor of the Soghd region, stated that over 100 HT leaders and members of HT were arrested in the north of Uzbekistan between 1999 to 2002.100 Between 1998 and 2002, law enforcement agencies seized about 600,000 leaflets and 300,000 copies of religiousextremist literature. In March 2004 alone, more than 30,000 copies of leaflets and literature propagating religious intolerance, anti-Semitism, jihad, establishment of a Caliphate, etc. were seized.101 In August 2004, the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan sentenced 15 persons on the charges of terrorist and subversive activities, religious extremism, possession of weapons and ammunition, manufacturing, carrying, storage and smuggling of explosive devices.102 According to a report by the Interfax news agency on 18 November 2008, the Uzbek Interior Ministry disclosed the presence of an all-female Islamic radical cell of HT in several districts of Tashkent. The cell, allegedly headed by 35-year-old Karima Hikmatova and 26-year-old Muhabbat Sodiqova, comprised 27 women cadres.103 The investigation began after a tipoff from two alleged members of the cell, who complained to the authorities that both of them were forced to carry out extremist activities, including the distribution of banned religious literature, recruiting cadres and raising funds.104

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HT in Kyrgyzstan In Kyrgyzstan, HT’s activity is concentrated in the southern part of the country, in and around Kyrgyzstan’s portion of the Ferghana Valley. Vechernii Bishkek website reported on 19 January 2003 that HT cadres are “complicating the socio-political situation in the [southern] Osh Region”. About 20 HT loyalists were arrested in 2002.105 Michael Hall, the Director of the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) Central Asia Project, speaking from Bishkek, told RFE/RL that the main reason behind HT’s popularity in more open societies like Kyrgyzstan is HT’s focus on political expression, justice, accountability and fairness. When people feel the dearth of these under the current system, it makes them believe that a Caliphate would provide a better alternative. In Kyrgyzstan, weak state institutions and uncertainty about the future, lack of political will and resources for solving problems like unemployment among youth aggravate the situation further. Hall believes that unless citizens’ perceptions of unfair political systems across the Central Asian region change, support for HT will continue to grow.106 The number of HT members in the two southern Kyrgyz regions rose from 1,393 to 1,598 in the past few years. For instance, In Kara-Suu, a trader and tailor-turned-HT-member Dilyar Jumabayev, while supporting the IMU or even Al Qaeda supremo Osama bin Laden, stated: “He (Osama) is certainly my brother. Saddam Hussein is also my brother. No matter whether he is Arab, Kurd, Turk or Palestinian, he is first of all a Muslim.” Jumabayev joined HT in 2000 because it “explained the meaning of life”. He claimed that he pays one-tenth of his income as membership fees and is an active member of a five-person cell. A leaflet titled “All Muslims of the world unite against the infidels” posted on the concrete telephone pole outside Jumabayev’s home leaves no doubt about his sentiments.107 In 1999, during combat operations in Babkent, Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies found HT leaflets under the forward seats of the vehicle driven by Kahramon Yakubovich Abdusamatov, who claimed to be a messenger of HT cells in Tashkent and Osh. In 2001, Ilhom Toirovich Izatullaev, an HT cadre from Kokand, was arrested in connection with an explosion in a branch of Ineksim bank in Osh.108 Kyrgyzstan too has made efforts to control the spread of Islamic radical ideas. The HT, which has been branded an anti-state movement in Kyrgyzstan, is banned under the national constitution that prohibits religious organisations from setting up political parties.109 Even the country’s foremost spiritual body for Islamic affairs, the Ulemma Council, adopted in November 2002 a strict licensing system to regulate the publication of printed religious matters.110 On 20 August 2003, the Kyrgyz Supreme Court designated HT as a terrorist entity.111 In July 2005, HT members in southern Kyrgyzstan organised a campaign to support a candidate in the country’s presidential election. The same year, HT’s representative in Osh managed to register a television and


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radio broadcasting company called Ong (consciousness), but it had to stop its operations after pressure from authorities.112 In November 2003, the Kyrgyz Supreme Court banned four extremist and terrorist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Islamic Party of Turkestan, East Turkestan Liberation Organization and East Turkestan Islamic Party. Kyrgyz security services suspect HT of planning an attack on an airbase near Bishkek where American-led coalition forces were stationed.113 During the celebration of Eid Al-Adha or the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice in the second week of January 2006, Kyrgyz authorities detained several HT members in Osh.114 The Nookat incident on 1 October 2008, during which many HT cadres were arrested for protesting against the government, led the Kyrgyz authorities to believe that HT was an internal threat and had spread radicalisation among women and young people.115 Eight months earlier, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Viktor Chudinov, while identifying HT as a religious extremist party, unveiled a three-year plan on 28 January 2008 to combat religious extremism, in which ministries, state committees, administrative departments, and other organs of the executive branch, local governments and authorities would be involved.116 HT activism in Central Asia in conjunction with the activities of other terrorist groups like IMU, Taliban and Al Qaeda poses a serious challenge to peace, stability and security in Central Asia. Many analysts, particularly in the West, who view HT as a non-violent group need to be cautious about their approach towards this extremist organisation. As such, the Western nations including the United States need to coordinate with the Central Asian countries so as to contain the spread of Islamic radicalism and militancy in Central Asia. Besides, there is an urgent need to step up the efforts at the regional, national and global level to ward off threats from the abovementioned extremist and terrorist groups.

11 Islamic radicalism in Central Asia


Murat Laumulin

Islamic radicalism has become a serious problem in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Though these areas are bastions of moderate and traditional Islam and among the most secularized areas of the Muslim world, radicalism has made a forceful comeback in the past two decades. Beginning in the late 1980s, alien Islamic proselytizing gathered speed across the Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union, and has resulted in the spread of radical ideologies, militancy and even terrorism. Worst hit have been the Russian North Caucasus and some parts of Central Asia, especially the Ferghana Valley shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Why do Islamist terrorist organizations emerge? This question was inspired by the appearance of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia. Since the end of the 1980s, Central Asian states have faced the emergence of terrorist Islamist organizations. This trend became particularly noticeable after the breakup of the Soviet Union and was equally important in all five Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the Islamist terrorist organizations emerged only in Uzbekistan. The reasons for this lie in the country’s social, economic and political trajectories. Militant Islam did not exist in Central Asia since the seventh century when Arabs brought their religion to the region. The radicalization of Islam and the emergence of terrorist organizations in Central Asia are modern trends. During the last decade Central Asian states have undergone profound economic and political changes caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Central Asian societies experienced a sharp decline in living standards, social disintegration and a deep ideological vacuum that led to the identity crises both for the elite and society at large. The collapse of the former Soviet Union exacerbated various social cleavages in each Central Asian country, revealing weak societal cohesion. Ethnic, clan and religious rivalries within each state undermined the legitimacy of the secular regimes and national security of the state. For that reason, Islam as a traditional religion of the Central Asian societies has become principally important. Many people turned to Islam as a source of a new identity that would unite them not only with their conationals but with the entire Muslim world. However, secular


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regimes that replaced the communist government perceived Islam as a threat to their power. In particular, repression of religious organizations in Central Asia caused their radicalization and forced them to use previously forbidden forms of violence. External factors were equally important in the radicalization of Islam in Central Asia. Penetration of radical ideas, literature and the rise of Islamist organizations became possible under Gorbachev’s “perestroika” when more opportunities emerged for the people to mobilize. The process deepened and accelerated in the beginning of the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union. The war in Afghanistan and later in Tajikistan exacerbated the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia. Central Asia has seen stronger external links, as foreign radical groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al Qaeda have established a presence directly or through local allies. Adding to the problem, these groups in Central Asia have splintered into smaller entities difficult to identify let alone counteract. The causes of this radicalization are hotly debated. In the West, radicalization is often blamed on the socio-economic crisis, or political repression radicalizing the opposition forces. These explanations are only of limited validity. Complex post-Soviet identity crises, personal vendettas, regional rivalries, relative deprivation, and most importantly foreign proselytizing, are the factors which are widely underestimated in the West. To this should be added the criminalization of many of the most notorious militant armed groups, whose involvement in drug trafficking and other organized crime has been well documented. In Central Asia, the West has shown little understanding of the seriousness of the radical and militant challenge faced by Central Asian states. Instead, the West has focused on the governments’ mismanagement of the situation, while refraining from responding to calls for assistance. This culminated in 2005 following the insurgency and crackdown in Andijan in Uzbekistan, which left several hundred people dead, mainly civilians. The result of the episode and the mismanagement of the crisis by both the Uzbek and Western governments was the loss of Western influence and presence in Uzbekistan. It is apparent that radical groups now seek to emulate the “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, aware of the fact that popular rebellion against authoritarian governments attracts support and not condemnation from the West. Hence, several groups appear to have adapted to this environment and benefited from the deterioration in Uzbekistan’s relations with the West. In Central Asia, the focus of Islamic revival and of radical groups has been the Ferghana Valley, a densely populated and ethnically mainly Uzbek territory divided politically between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The valley has traditionally been a center of Islamic fervor, and where foreign radicals first established a presence in this area. There are other factors besides tradition at work here. Aside from the Ferghana Valley, the main other localities of radicalism have been Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan. The spread of radical Islamic


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political movements in Tajikistan in the 1980s was very much a result of the growing interaction between Afghanistan and Tajikistan during the Soviet occupation there. Islamic radicalism was the key force behind the resistance to the Soviet occupation, and spread to Tajikistan where important political movements on an Islamic basis emerged. South Kyrgyzstan is exposed to most of the same currents that prevail in neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. By contrast, northern Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have seen considerably lower levels of Islamic activity. Radical Islamic groups active in the region include groups across a political spectrum ranging from self-proclaimed peaceful groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat, to militant and terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Since 2001, there has been a clear and consistent trend toward the radicalization of HT. In June 2001, the HT publication Al-Waie (Consciousness) stated unequivocally that it is acceptable to carry out suicide attacks with explosive belts. In March 2002, HT argued that suicide bombs in Israel are a legitimate tactic of war. Over the next two years, HT leaflets and writings continuously emphasized that in the context of a clash of civilizations, offensive jihad against the Americans and the Jewish people is acceptable. It went as far as declaring, in a May 2003 leaflet, that jihad against unbelievers is the only type of jihad. An HT website displayed an image of American soldiers superimposed over the burning of the twin towers, carrying the legend “U.S. Troops: Die Hard.” It is yet to be established whether HT has already formed a militant wing or whether it is simply “inspiring” members independently to join terrorist groups or engage in terrorist acts.1 HT has made Central Asia its main battleground. The post-Communist identity crisis there implies a limited popular knowledge of the tenets of traditional Islam, which benefits a radical, unorthodox movement such as HT. Furthermore, poor economic performance by some Central Asian governments has denied them a high level of popular support among people who feel they lack opportunities for socio-economic improvement. HT’s public relations campaign has already succeeded in diverting the world community’s attention away from its activities in Uzbekistan. As a result of this propaganda effort, Western observers are concerned more with the prison conditions of HT supporters than the possibility of a successful HT coup détat. Also assisting HT’s campaign in Central Asia is the proximity of Afghanistan and Pakistan, two primary bases for terrorists and radical sympathizers. The precise number of Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Central Asia today is difficult to estimate. HT is numerically strongest in Uzbekistan, with estimates there ranging from 7,000 up to 60,000 members. There are 3,000–5,000 members in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The number in Kazakhstan is no more than a few hundred. But numbers are not central to HT’s strategy which is based on penetrating political power centers as a method of obtaining power. Recent arrests indicate that support for HT is growing throughout the


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region, including among teachers, military officers, politicians (especially those whose relatives have been arrested), and other members of the elite. Akromiya is named after its leader Akram Yuldashev, born in 1963 in Andijan. Yuldashev is believed to have been a member of HT for one year before founding a splinter group in 1992. He is believed to be profoundly influenced by al-Nabhani, and founded Akromiya in his native Andijan region, preaching widely among the youth of the area. He was first arrested in 1993 and later that year received amnesty and was released. Following the bomb attacks in February 1999, he was re-arrested and sentenced to over ten years in prison. Akromiya seems to have been rather successful in developing a following by delivering on socio-economic promises that the Uzbek government has been unable to fulfil – jobs and money. Wealthier followers set up small businesses such as bakeries, cafeterias, or shoe factories, in which they employ young males who are then required to attend study groups after work – a practice also known from other Islamic movements across the world to recruit followers. The owners of these businesses contribute about a fifth of their profits to a fund, which then assists poorer members of the group. This is one of the most successful examples of the bottom-up approach of pro-Islamic social engineering. Hizb an-Nusra (the Party of Assistance) was founded by a group of HT members in Tashkent in 1999. Its current leader and founder is believed to be Sharipzhon Mirzazhanov. Like HT, this group is fundamentally clandestine in nature, and prospective members must undergo six months of training in The System of Islam, HT’s guidebook. Members are also required to donate money to the party’s communal fund. Unlike HT, this group does not spread propaganda among the general public. Instead, it only recruits those whose backgrounds are first investigated. The group is thus mainly composed of former members of other Islamic fringe groups, and those accused by Uzbekistan’s government of engagement in Islamic radical activities. Its supporters also include HT sympathizers who fear public exposure. The IMU was formed in 1992 by Tohir Yuldashev, an underground Islamic cleric who operated out of the Otavalihon mosque, in the Namangan region of Uzbekistan. He established an IMU training camp. Militants from all over the Ferghana Valley began to flock to the camp to receive instruction in terrorist tactics, under the guidance of the Taliban. In the only interview he has ever given, Yuldashev declared, “The goal of IMU activities is the creation of an Islamic State. We declared a jihad in order to create a religious system and government. We want the model of Islam which is nothing like in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.” In late 2001, the IMU joined forces with the Taliban and Al Qaeda against US-led forces during the Afghanistan campaign. After suffering grave losses (including the death of Namangani in Afghanistan), some IMU fighters fled to South Waziristan (a Federally Administered Tribal Area in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province along the border with Afghanistan), along with



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other jihadis who also escaped US entrapment at Tora Bora. On orders from bin Laden, IMU militants played a leading role in South Waziristan, with Yuldashev in command of military activities. Due to the Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU’s infrastructure and manpower has been significantly weakened, but today there are at least 150 IMU militants who still have the capacity to fight. HT and the IMU do not have a formal alliance, as it runs contrary to HT’s interests to be directly associated with a terrorist group. The main difference between the two groups is one of focus: the IMU openly advocates and carries out militant operations, while HT concentrates on the ideological battle. The two nonetheless admit to the closeness of their goals, and both are propelled closer to the achievement of their ends by the weakness of Central Asian states. Central Asian governments believe that in 2002 the region’s Islamic radicals united in a framework of a new underground organization called the Islamic Movement of Central Asia (IMCA), which would bring together the IMU, Kyrgyz and Tajik radicals, and Uyghur separatists from China, whose East Turkestan Islamic Movement had recently broadened to include Afghans, Chechens, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Kazakhs who share its new goal of forming an Islamic state in Central Asia. Kyrgyz authorities believe that the IMCA was indeed formed in 2002, with the immediate goal of creating a Caliphate in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, while reserving expansion to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and northwest China for a second stage. The headquarters of IMCA, which is led by Yuldashev, are believed to be located in Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan province. This unified, militant Islamic force seeks to destabilize Central Asian governments by attacking American and Israeli targets. The main insurgent targets are the American bases in the region as well as the embassies in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. While many other radical Islamist organizations have mushroomed in the region over the last few years, they can all be considered, in one way or another, to be under the IMCA umbrella. Radical Islamist and terrorist activity in Central Asia has increased markedly since early 2004. Having seen no major terrorist activity since 2000, Uzbekistan was hit by two waves of terrorist attacks between March 28 and March 31, 2004 including the region’s first ever female suicide bombing. The attacks, which caused 47 fatalities in total, were aimed primarily at police and Uzbek private and commercial facilities. A subsequent attack on 30 July 2004 targeted the American and Israeli embassies as well as the Prosecutor General’s office. The scale and level of preparation for these attacks suggests strongly that they received support from outside Uzbekistan. The country’s chief prosecutor alleged that all 85 individuals (including 17 women) arrested had been trained as suicide bombers. Despite all this information, most of the attention in the West from the spring of 2004 onwards was on the Uzbek government’s reaction and not on


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the terrorists – even though these attacks were the first major violence in Uzbekistan since the 2000 insurgency. And despite being in the midst of the “war on terror,” the US, a self-avowed strategic partner of Uzbekistan, highlighted the need to improve democracy and human rights while doing very little to help the Uzbek government in its investigation or its response to the attacks. Overall, the terrorists were greatly emboldened, concluding that Western opinion would allow them literally to get away with murder. In November 2004, in Jalalabad, where some of the strongest antigovernment protests took place in March 2005, HT reportedly collected some 20,000 signatures on a petition calling for more Islamic instruction in schools and segregation of sexes. In the February 2005 parliamentary elections, candidates who supported this view received backing from HT. While there was almost no overt Islamist activity during the revolution, the events began and gained momentum in the southern part of the country, which is where HT and other groups have, for several years, been urging people to rise against poverty, corruption and injustice – all of which were blamed on the central government. Following the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions, opposition forces in the Kyrgyz Republic overthrew their government in March 2005. Unlike the Georgians and the Ukrainians, however, the Kyrgyz opposition used violence, and in the post-revolutionary period failed to bring stability and order to the country. Indeed, the March 24, 2005 revolution ushered in a period of chaos, with the new government unable to control the country’s borders or to bring about internal stability. This only led to even deeper popular disappointment with secular politics in Kyrgyzstan. In these circumstances, HT and others are certain to gain strength from this growing disillusionment. The third significant event of lasting importance to the region took place in Andijan in May 2005. In fact, Andijan became a turning point in the West’s loss of influence in Central Asia and the further strengthening of the radical groups. According to reports from the region, Akromiya organized the uprising in a carefully planned way: the accused businessmen promised to pay their staff a full day’s salary if they attended the protests. Moreover, their relatives organized transport for others to come from more distant regions. The protesters were orderly and asking merely for “justice” for their relatives and friends. By May 12, 2005, the presumed final week of the trial, there were already several thousand peaceful demonstrators. That night, the Uzbek government arrested some demonstrators. This arrest marked the start of the uprising. On the morning of May 13, 2005, armed militants first seized a police station, then a military post, and then a high-security prison, collecting weaponry in each place and killing officials and others along the way. Over a year later, many in the West still do not have a sense of who the insurgents were. In fact, few have shown much interest in the insurgents, and instead blamed only the Karimov regime for conducting what was immediately labeled a massacre of peaceful protestors. The number of people killed by both sides is still contested, although



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the Moscow-based human rights organization Memorial estimated it to be around 200. The end result of Andijan is that the US military lost its base in Uzbekistan, a major setback for essential intelligence and counterterrorism work. No less significant, the West lost whatever possibility it previously had to influence the Uzbek government to reform or open up the system. Its precipitous condemnation of the government’s actions, without corresponding attention to the insurgents, effectively discredited whatever reformist currents had existed earlier within the Uzbek government. Instead, Uzbekistan now leans on Russian and Chinese guidance, which gives carte blanche to the most repressive forces within the Uzbek government. Indeed, the pro-Western liberal forces that had slowly strengthened their positions within the Uzbek elite over that past decade have now been almost purged and marginalized.2 It is also important to understand the growing role of women in Islamic radicalism. The first suicide killings in Central Asia took place in 2005, and were conducted by women who did not fit the traditional profile of poor, uneducated and repressed. There have been numerous reports of Uzbek militants trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan going back to Uzbekistan. The militants are using networks of terrorists, criminals, as well as Islamist sympathizers to cross borders, traveling either via Tajikistan or Iran. Former IMU members have identified Mashad, Iran’s second largest city, as the transit center for Uzbek militants. In this context, mention may be made of the May 2006 incursion of militants from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region. Armed men attacked a border post killing several guards, before seizing a stockpile of weapons and killing additional people while crossing into the Kyrgyz Republic. It is surely not accidental that the site of these events lies astride an important and contested drug route. These events were reminiscent of a January 2006 incident, when militants raided a Tajik prison, killed the warden, and freed a prisoner with alleged IMU ties. It is clear that numbers of heavily armed people are operating in and around the borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It is less clear who these are, given the interaction of organized crime and radicalism, and whether they have any links with the Andijan uprising. Government officials in all three countries seemed to be confused, variously blaming different radical groups. The “Drugs-Crime-Radical Islamist Nexus” is important in terms of links of the Islamist radicals with drug traffickers and criminal groups in general. It is not clear to what extent this is cause or effect but the close linkage between the more violent Islamist groups and organized crime have been undeniable from the time the IMU emerged as a major drug-dealing enterprise. Indeed, in this sense Central Asia and the Caucasus are examples of a worldwide trend, the increasing involvement of violent groups in organized crime, particularly the drug trade. In fact, the traditional division of non-state armed groups into mutually exclusive ideal types – the ideological and the criminal – is an increasingly misleading description of most armed groups today.


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A criminal element is increasingly visible in the financing of most groups, but also in the motivations of many. This fusion of crime and terrorism or insurgency can be most clearly seen as regards the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and certain formations in the North Caucasus. For some of these groups, it is unclear whether they are mainly driven by ideological zeal or by criminal pursuits. Though the IMU incursions of 1999 and 2000 were ostensibly waged in the name of the creation of a Caliphate with a base in the Ferghana Valley, a strong body of evidence suggests they are in fact best explained by more mundane motivations, especially the drug trade. The geographical areas targeted, the timing of the attacks, as well as the tactics used, all point in this direction. The IMU’s insurgencies into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were in the form of simultaneous but small-scale incursions by comparatively small groups of fighters. This makes little military sense as the IMU could neither hope to defeat government forces nor to trigger an uprising that way. However, considered as a diversionary measure intended to create instability, confuse law enforcement and military structures, and gain access to mountain passes for trafficking, the incursions make perfect sense. There is a significant consensus that the IMU was strongly involved in drug trafficking from Afghanistan towards Osh in Kyrgyzstan, where opiates are handed to trafficking networks that ship them further north and west. Drug control experts concurred with the estimate that the IMU controlled up to two thirds of opiates entering the Kyrgyz Republic. Interpol labeled the IMU “a hybrid organization in which criminal interests often take priority over ‘political’ goals,” whose “leaders have a vested interest in ongoing unrest and instability in their area in order to secure the routes they use for the transportation of drugs.” Kyrgyz government officials noted that the volume of drugs trafficked into Kyrgyzstan increased significantly after the 1999 incursion. This does not mean, however, that the IMU completely jettisoned its religious ideology. In fact, the IMU was not a monolithic organization. Most studies of the movement indicate the coexistence of a more guerrilla-oriented and criminal faction and a more religious one within the group. As such, different actions attributed to the IMU were likely caused by different motivations. The IMU is best understood as an amalgam of personal vendetta, Islamism, drugs, geopolitics and terrorism. The regional scene is also far from positive. The insurgency along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan has escalated, and Western countries have shown a disturbing inability to deal with the ideological element of the war on terror. Aside from the energy-rich countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the region’s governments are failing to meet their citizens’ basic socio-economic needs. All this fosters an environment in which Islamic radical groups can thrive. Islamist and terrorist organizations have also shown an ability to modify their tactics and increasingly cooperate with one another



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based on the needs of the local conditions. For example, HT distributed free meals and toys during the Islamic holiday in Kyrgyzstan, in spite of never having done any social work before. It is, therefore, essential to regularly review assumptions and analyses as the radical groups are constantly adopting their tactics based on changing conditions on the ground. Meanwhile, Western influence in Central Asia has been decreasing, and is non-existent in the North Caucasus. Only Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan can be said to be increasingly linked with the western realm. With the West more or less out of the picture, and Russian and Chinese influence growing, the Central Asian governments are likely to become more repressive and less reformist. Thus, the regional environment is moving in a direction where the worst authoritarian tendencies of the local governments will come out, while it will do little to improve the economic conditions. This will make the Islamist message of injustice increasingly appealing, and help the Islamists to grow stronger. In comparison, the carrots that the EU and the US can offer the Central Asian governments will not be attractive enough, while the sticks that the West can use will not be painful enough to induce change. If this general situation is less than rosy, there are indeed areas where the West in general and the EU in particular can be effective. The radical and externally sponsored Islamic movements and organizations existing in the region offer little hope for a meaningful dialogue. Even if they were prepared to engage in such dialogue with the West (for which there is no evidence), it would constitute a gross breach of normal diplomatic relations with countries of the region. The moderate majority is less organized and much weaker financially. However, it is quite possible to engage representatives of this majority, and also of the secular sections of the population, in dialogue. This could prove useful and should be pursued. The link between drug trafficking and religious extremism is proven beyond doubt. While most drug traffickers may have no connection to religious extremism, those who do are sufficiently important to provide a steady income stream for Islamic militant and terrorist groups. The drug trade in Afghanistan and Central Asia is demand-driven, with the majority of the demand arising from EU member countries. The one action by the EU that would do most to address the problem of religious extremism in the region would be to lend major financial support to counter-narcotics efforts. Such support must be commensurate with the huge European demand that sustains the industry and, indirectly, much of the extremism. The EU may find it useful to look at the Turkish example, which is relevant to understanding the tension between trying to create a modern and open democratic system and dealing with the threat of fundamentalist and militant Islamic political ideology. Eurasia’s Muslim majority countries that want to maintain their secular regime, are not likely to listen to naïve suggestions from Western countries that have never dealt with the holistic nature of Islam. They will, however, listen to advice on creating the right legal and constitutional safety nets so that radical groups, or “sleeper cells,” cannot take over


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secular systems. To this end, the EU should engage Turkey while addressing the issues of radical Islam in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Besides underscoring a common interest between Turkey and the EU, this would bring benefit in the form of better focused initiatives on the EU’s part, and even possibly to initiatives that are coordinated between the EU and Turkey. The emergence of the terrorist organization Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan can be best explained by Insecurity Dilemma theory rather than Relative Deprivation and Repression theories. The latter two give only a partial explanation focusing on a limited set of factors. Relative Deprivation theory concentrates mainly on motivations of individuals ignoring processes and dynamics that might be important. Repression Theory is not adequate because it does not explain a precise causal path when repression leads to the escalation or deterrence of violence. Some countries can have a very high level of repression, however they might lack terrorism and vice verse. Therefore, Insecurity Dilemma theory is better to address these problems. It gives a causal mechanism explaining why the emergence of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan became possible incorporating different variables. According to Insecurity Dilemma theory, the main internal factors that brought Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into existence were lack of social cohesion within society and absence of domestic consensus. The existence of ethnic, subethnic, and supranational cleavages undermined the legitimacy of the regime. In addition, unpopular economic and political reforms of the government worsened the authority of Karimov. Lack of legitimacy in turn caused a high level of repression on the part of the state. Repression and persecution led to the radicalization of the religious organizations. Uzbekistan possesses all these characteristics. It is divided over a number of identities, one of which is an Islamic identity. The Karimov regime does not provide the population of Uzbekistan with the basic well-being needs and as a result it faces a lack of legitimacy. The fear of losing power drives Islam Karimov to use coercion and repression towards religious groups. Excessive repression in turn causes the radicalization of religious groups; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a good example of it. Thus, insecurity for Uzbekistan emanates internally and further repression might worsen the situation within the country. It is also important to note that the threat of terrorism in the region is not diminished. For that reason, a number of measures should be taken to solve the problem. First of all, Central Asian states have to accommodate and find a compromise with Islam as one of the main sources of new identity in the region. The emergence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan shows that religion plays a key role in the daily life of many people and that it can be a real threat to the security of the secular state. For this purpose, the leaders of the Central Asian states should work out certain policies toward religious organizations that would not discriminate against them. This is particularly important for Uzbekistan that has a very high level of religiosity among the population and where religion will remain an important component of



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political and social life. The continuing repression of the religious organizations as well as people’s political rights and freedoms will exacerbate the problem of radical Islam in the region and increase the threat of terrorist attacks in the future. The next step for Uzbekistan would be to conduct extensive economic reforms to better the standards of living of the population. The command economy, which still exists in Uzbekistan, has proved its insolvency and invalidity. It impedes the development of the country and makes Uzbekistan uncompetitive with other states of the region. Poverty serves as an additional factor that might contribute to the process of radicalization of social organizations whether religious or non-religious. Another policy recommendation would be to increase the level of cooperation among the Central Asian states to curb the phenomena of religious extremism and terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. All these measures taken together might reduce the threat of militant Islam and terrorism in the region.

12 Islam in contemporary Tajikistan Role of Muslim leaders


Muzaffar Olimov

The upsurge of the Islamic movement in Central Asia over the last two decades has been a result of large-scale Islamic activities which include the construction of numerous mosques, spread of religious education, reinstatement of Islamic law in some areas of social and private life, activities of religious organizations and parties, anti-government activities on the part of Islamic groups in opposition to government, activities of armed extremist groups, terrorist acts which involve suicide bombers and, finally, participation of legitimate Islamic parties such as Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) in the government of secular states. The usage of popular terms such as “Revivalism,” “Islamic Renaissance,” “Re-Islamization,” “Secondary Islamization,” and the spread of the term “fundamentalism” has been a matter of debate among researchers.1 Animated discussions also go on as to whether the revival of Islam in Central Asia was a result of independent spiritual, social and political development of the region or was a phenomenon imposed from the outside. Similarly divergent positions are held by researchers with regard to the question whether Soviet Central Asia can be considered a part of the unified Islamic world or whether it was developing autonomously from other parts of the Islamic world but within atheistic boundaries of the communist experiment.2 Up till now there has been a prevailing opinion that as a result of mass scale elimination and emigration of institutional clergy in the first years of the Soviet regime, Islamic thought in Central Asia virtually froze down, and Islam in Central Asian societies started to function predominantly as a way of life and the basis for cultural identity, but not as a world view or an ideology.3 If we proceed from this point of view, we need to concur with the overwhelming majority of researchers who believe that the revival of Islam in 1980s–1990s in Central Asia was a result of external influence or proselytization. It is assumed that activities of international Islamic organizations were particularly successful in such a spiritual vacuum, which appeared in the region after the downfall of communist ideology. However, this explanation is hardly satisfactory since it does not offer the key to understanding the scale and diversity inside the Islamic movement in the region and does not account for the spread of such obscure Islamic trends as Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia.

Islam in contemporary Tajikistan

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In order to understand the nature of the Islamic movement in Central Asia one needs to study the role and place of Islam in social, political and spiritual life of contemporary societies in the region. The key issue here is to define the role, place and significance of Muslim spiritual leaders, including Islamic intellectuals who laid the groundwork for Islamic revival in the region. They have been instrumental in the functioning and development of Islamic institutions, norms, articles of faith and traditions in Central Asian societies, in the development of Islamic thought and facilitating links between Central Asia and the outside Islamic world.

Islamic spiritual leaders and the Soviet power After the 1917 February revolution in Russia, Central Asia was overcome by revolutionary transformations as well. From the first years of establishment of Soviet power, the question of attitude toward Islam had emerged as the main issue for the possibility of asserting the new regime in Muslim regions and, particularly, in such strongholds of Islam as Bukhara.4 During the first decade after the revolution, the Soviet power treated Islam in a more tolerant way than other religions. Both in the Turkestan Republic and Bukhara People’s Republic, the Muslim system of education and Shariah courts continued to function. Moreover, attempts to combine Muslim law and revolutionary justice entailed attempts to codify Shariah law. Thus, on July 17, 1922, the authorized representative of the Central Muslim Directorate of Turkestan, Muhammadkhoja Norkhojaev, filed a complaint with the People’s Commissariat for Ethnic Affairs of the RSFSR about the oppression suffered by Qazi courts in Turkestan. In his letter Norkhojaev wrote: In 1922, Narcomyust (People’s Commissariat of Justice of the Turkestan ASSR) convened a Congress of Qazis and Muftis where it was resolved to compile a complete code of the Shariah, but for some unknown reasons this work has not been finished. Therefore, we are asking you to invite local authorities of Turkestan for active cooperation and, until the same code is compiled, to allow the use of other Shariah books by which we were guided hereunto.5 With the strengthening of the Soviet power in Central Asia, an offensive on Islam was mounted during the period 1928–30. The period of dalliance with Islam and Muslims was over. Repressions on Muslim clergy started. Waqfs were sequestered and Shariah courts closed down. Both traditionalist and the new method (jadid) religious schools were prohibited, most clerics in Uzbekistan and Southern Kyrgyzstan were sent to labor camps, a vast number of religious manuscripts and books were destroyed, mosques and madrassas were closed and holy relics were impounded. In those years, Arabic script was officially declared an ideological enemy of the state. Owners of books in the Arabic language, in cases where they were uncovered, were


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sentenced to 10–15 years of imprisonment. Many large libraries were destroyed during that period. For example, in the course of our field work we obtained information about the destruction in 1938 of a private library of Khalifas in the village of Bidiz, which was considered to be the biggest in Badakhshan.6 In Tajikistan, where the war to establish Soviet power was more fierce and ended much later than in other parts of Central Asia, the most severe repressions of clergy occurred in 1936–38. All biographies collected in the course of this survey contain episodes of persecution and reprisals imposed during those years. Many respondents were referring to 1936, 1937 and 1938 as the years of great tragedy. Of particular intensity was the fight against Ismaili religious authorities. Many mullahs had to move to other places, settle in remote mountain villages, or go abroad. Maulavi Hindustani’s adopted son, Ubaidullo Muhammadjonov recalls those times: Uptill 1936 we stayed in Angren. At that time my sister Azizahon was born. We would live for one month in one village, then for two months in another one. It was dangerous to stay in one place all the time. Very difficult times had come and our living conditions were at their worst. Of all the property in the whole world we only had one Kyrgyz yurt and a donkey. We would load the yurt on our donkey and roam from place to place. We would pitch our yurt and live in it. We had only one cauldron but we could not use it for cooking inside the yurt. Not only did we cook our meals in that cauldron but we also baked bread in there.7 Clerics from the Ferghana valley were seeking refuge in mountainous areas of the Kyrgyz part of Ferghana, in Dushanbe, and later, in mountainous and remote areas of Southern Tajikistan, such as Baljuvon, Khovaling and Dangara. Kyrgyzs provided mullahs, who fled from persecution of authorities in mountainous areas, with clothes and food and the mullahs would teach them Islam in return. That was how Abdurahim Mahsum from Isfara, Qori Ne’mat from Kistakuz, Domullo Ne’matjon from Kanibadam saved their lives. Domullos greatly contributed to religious education of Kyrgyzs.8 Afghanistan along with Kyrgyzstan became the country of destination for emigrating mullahs. Emigration to Afghanistan continued after the end of the civil war and became particularly intensive in 1937–38. Return of mullahs to their homes started only during the years of the “Thaw,” i.e. in 1960–64.9 Refugees were often killed on the Tajik-Afghan border when they were trying to cross over into Afghanistan. Thus, according to Ishan Said Ismoil (Bokhtar district of Tajikistan) the well-known theologician Hoja Yahyo Karategini was killed by the Red Army in Khamadoni district of Khatlon region during his attempt to flee to Afghanistan. Some mullahs were captured and sent to prison. We have information about several groups which managed to escape to Afghanistan and became accomplished prominent spiritual leaders.



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Up till 1943 clerics were not allowed to carry out their activities openly. However, taking into account the fact that a significant portion of Central Asia’s population continued to consider themselves Muslims and that the fight against Islam engendered the threat of downfall of the Soviet power in the region, the Soviet leadership decided to allow a certain “indulgence” with respect to religious leaders. This decision resulted in the establishment of centralized religious directorates on the territory of the former USSR, specifically, the former Central Asian Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (CASDM). A Preparatory Commission was established which included prominent theologians of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. On October 20, 1943, the Congress of Muslim Ulemma of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was held. It was attended by more than 160 delegates from all over the region. Sheikh Eshon Babakhan ibn Abdulmajidhan was elected the CASDM Chairman and was given the title of Mufti of the five republics. It was also decided that CASDM branches would be established in each of region’s republics headed by Qazis. The following persons were elected Qazis: for Uzbekistan – Sheikh Ziyauddinkhan ibn Eshon Babahan; for Kazakhstan – Sheikh Abdul Gaffar Shamsutdin; for Tajikistan – Sheikh Saleh Bobokalon; for Kyrgyzstan – Sheikh Olimkhan Tura Shakir and for Turkmenistan – Sheikh Anna Ishan.10 CASDM focused its activities on control and management of Islam in the region, providing for the needs of the population and carrying out religious ordinances and ceremonies. In 1945, a plenary assembly of Muslim theologians and CASDM members was held. It discussed the role of Ulemma in the spiritual life of Muslims in the region. At the second CASDM Kurultai in December 1948, the delegates focused their attention on issues pertaining to functioning of mosques. At this meeting, the participants developed regulations and procedures for mosques. These regulations specified the status and functions of Khatibs and Imams and also those of Naib Imams and Muezzins with regard to five-time namoz (prayers) in jami mosques. Despite repression, authorities in Tajikistan treated Islam and clerics in a more discreet fashion than in other parts of Central Asia. Moreover, authorities could not exercise complete control over the situation in mountainous, remote and inaccessible areas. Therefore, hundreds of mullahs and Muslim intellectuals continued their activities in southern and central Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, outside the control of CASDM. Muslim unity and solidarity have been important factors in preserving the influence of Islam on society. Muslim clerics would move from one republic to another finding adherents, followers and disciples everywhere. A significant number of prominent mullahs who continued their activities in the remote and mountainous areas of Tajikistan were natives of Uzbekistan, mainly from the Ferghana valley. For example, we found information about fiqh writings authored in late 1940 by theologian Mullo Toshkandi, who was in hiding in the high mountain valley of Komarou, and also data about other prominent Muslim scholars and poets who lived in remote mountain and steppe areas.


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After the establishment of the CASDM and republican Qaziyats some mullahs decided to cooperate with the new authority within the framework of official religious institutions. This was how the native of Kokand, Maulavi Hindustoni turned up in Tajikistan through CASDM’s assistance after years of wandering, imprisonment and military service. His step-son informed that it was in late 1945 that his father had come back from the front and upon his return he stated, “We won’t be able to live here. I will go to Tashkent, to the Central Asian Directorate for religious affairs. Maybe they can find an adequate job for me. He went to Tashkent and performed the remembrance ceremony (Hatm-i Qoran) there during the month of Ramzan. At that remembrance ceremony he made his acquaintance with the Mufti of Central Asia, Imam Babakhan. He gave my father a referral to Stalinabad (Dushanbe) and said: ‘Go there and you will be given a job. They need you badly there. There are a lot of true-hearted people there studying Islamic disciplines.’ After that, father together with my mother and younger brother Khairullo went to Dushanbe.”11 In 1947, Maulavi Hindustoni came to the city of Dushanbe with a referral from the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (CASDM). Directorate for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers of Tajik SSR appointed him a Mutawalli (a minister in a mosque who, in religious hierarchy, is one step below Imam) in the mosque of Mavlono Yakub Charhi. In 1948, he was appointed Imam Khatib in the mosque of Khaji Yakub in the city of Dushanbe, and he worked upto the year 1950.

Islam and society in Soviet Central Asia The elimination of institutional clergy and the ensuing rigid ideological control on the part of the state and atheistic persecution drove Islam underground. The Soviet power brought with it not only state atheism, but also a fundamentally new political, legal and economic mode of life in the region. In the course of a precipitous forced modernization, the society was subjected to changes that engendered, by way of response, the urge to preserve existing identity, with Islam being its central element. This caused disproportionate strengthening of “popular” Islam that had found a way to coexist with the Soviet power through conformist clergy controllable by authorities. “Popular” or “traditional” Islam became, primarily, the way of life and a means of adjustment to the atheistic regime. On the other hand, it provided an opportunity to Central Asian societies to resist forced modernization by Soviet authorities. Our field survey shows an exceptionally high degree of support in the societies of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan of formal and informal Muslim religious teachers. Alongside of official religious institutions, informal religious leaders were active in the majority of cities in Central Asian Republics during the Soviet period. They performed religious ceremonies and taught theological disciplines. Among them, there were Sufi Ishans, unregistered Mullahs and



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Muslim intellectuals. They began criticizing the inconsistent and conformist position of the CASDM. First of all, religious ceremonies held with the participation of CASDM members were subjected to criticism. Later, provisions of Madhhab Hanifah underwent revision. Step by step, informal spiritual authorities, who gained wide recognition, started to come to the fore and carried out their activities. Central Asian society, having learnt from the bitter experience of repressions, tried to spare and preserve Islamic intellectuals, theologians and fiqh experts who continued to develop theological thought of Islam. Qori Muhammadjon Rustamov (1892–1989) known as Maulavi Hindustoni was one of them.12 The key role of Muslim spiritual leaders in the Central Asian societies of the Soviet time, aside from purely religious functions, consisted in retaining the collective identity of the society. Daily five-time joint prayers were still practiced in secret. Worshipping in groups was forbidden but we would always perform namoz jointly by the entire village. We assembled in one another’s houses by turns. During the Soviet years, Islam developed here at a speedy rate because there were no traitors and informants among us.13 During the religious holidays, unregistered (informal) mullahs conducted feast prayers outside settlements. Thousands of believers would assemble for such prayers.14 Theological discourses were held as before in private houses in secret. Later, starting from the second half of 1960s, those discourses were becoming increasingly popular. By the late 1970s thousands of people were coming to attend them, many from far away, from other republics. The discourses were recorded on audio cassettes that were afterwards replicated and distributed throughout Central Asia.

Islamic movements in Central Asia before the collapse of the USSR The emergence of Islamic movements and Islamic religious and political parties in Muslim countries of the Near and Middle East after World War II had an awakening effect on Muslims of Central Asia. There existed different channels through which new ideas penetrated through the “iron curtain” into Soviet Central Asia. These were books brought back by pilgrims and persons traveling abroad on business trips, and news from the media. A lot of books and materials pertaining to Islam were brought by Tajiks who worked in Afghanistan during the presidency of Muhammad Daud (1973–78). Our field work showed that in defiance of the tightly guarded borders, there still existed some routes that were used by the people to travel to Afghanistan and go back. By the mid-1970s, the impact of the world Islamic thought began to be felt rather stronglybecause by that time, there had grown up a new generation of Muslim theologians most of whom had received underground education in hujras and founded close-knit circle of followers – dovra. Maulavi Hindustoni


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alone, during the period of his teaching practice in 1950s–1980s, trained more than 200 consummate disciples, some of whom later became founders of various currents in Islam in Central Asia called Mujaddadiya, Wahhabbiya, Akromiya, leaders of Islamic parties and organizations such as Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, etc. Starting from the mid-1970s, as a result of internal developments and influence of world Islamic thought and studies in the sphere of theoretical Islam, religious discourses at regular intervals attracted increasing number of participants and listeners, including major Muslim theologians from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As a rule the discourses were organized in private gardens in the country and were disguised as private family memorial ceremonies. Those discussions covered a wide range of the most pressing issues of Islam such as existence of Islam in an atheistic state, the problem of bid’a (innovation) and unorthodox trends, reformation of Islam, interrelations between different trends in Islam. One of the largest events devoted to commemoration of Hazrati Eshon took place in Obi-Garm. More than 10,000 people attended it. As there was not enough space in the village to receive all the attendees, the meeting was held in a clover field where microphones were set up and khutbas read.15 Apart from public religious disputes, readings of poetry by Muslim mystics were also a common practice. The most popular were the readings of Bedil organized in Dushanbe by Maulavi Hindustoni in 1980s.The formation of the first illegal Muslim groups also dates back to early 1970s. The first such group in Tajikistan emerged in 1973 in the former Kurgan-Tube region (group of Said Abdullo Nuri). The emergence of illegal Islamic groups in the Ferghana valley of Uzbekistan dates back to the late 1970s. The most influential group of that time was founded by Rahmatulla-alloma and Abduvali-qori (both from Andizhan).16 Over time, this movement came to be known as Mujaddidiya (derived from the Arabic word for renewal, reform). Another section of mullahs, known as traditionalists, opposed the ideas of Islam’s renovation. One of the leading theologians of that trend was Qozi Abdurashid. After the demise of Maulavi Hindustoni (in 1989) the rift between traditionalists and the so-called Wahhabis grew wider and in the early 1990s it acquired an antagonistic nature.

Muslim clergy in independent Tajikistan The history of the Islamic movement in post-Soviet Central Asia was at its most vibrant and dramatic in Tajikistan, where Islamists became one of the parties in an armed conflict. One can distinguish several stages of the development of Islamic movement in Tajikistan.

1988–92 The process of Islamic revival already started several years before the collapse of the former USSR. The majority of the population, who in the Soviet


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period had to conceal their beliefs, now had the opportunity to openly manifest their commitment towards Islam. This period was characterized by the trend of enlightenment. At this time the main components of Islamic movement were formed which were as follows:


1

2 3 4 5

Official clergy, who included members and local representatives of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Tajikistan or Qaziyat of the Republic. Islamic reformers from the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). Sufi Sheikhs – Ishons. Wahhabis Young believers.

During this period, a lot of study groups and societies emerged independently of one another, and these groups were organized and led by young Islamic believers. The latter believed that the foremost task in independent Tajikistan was to teach Islam. Ismaili theologian Domullo Haknazar Sobir informed us that from 1989–1995 there existed a study group called Ihvon-us-Safo in a school under his supervision. This study group which included both boys and girls discussed issues related to Islam and its philosophy.17

1991–97 (Inter-Tajik conflict) During the second stage of the political Islamic movement, which is characterized by the escalating civil war in Tajikistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islam became a mobilizing force in the political process, and an integral part of the opposition forces against the existing political establishment. The logic of struggle unified all trends of Islamic movement in Tajikistan. The Islamic movement demonstrated its uniform position during Presidential elections of 1991. At that time the Islamic movement took the first practical steps towards establishment of a new Islamic political organization – the Islamic Revival Movement of Tajikistan (IRMT) which was later to become the core of Unified Tajik Opposition (UTO). In early 1993, IRPT announced its voluntary dissolution and the establishment of the IRMT (which functioned from early 1993 up until late 1999). Thus, in the process of strife and conflict in Tajikistan a broad alliance of Islamic forces of different orientations had appeared.

1997–2004 The main characteristic of the third stage of the Islamic political movement in Tajikistan was the legalization of political Islam in the country. This became possible as a result of Peace Agreements signed in 1997 and in their aftermath. The IRMT representatives actively participated in the work of Commission for National Reconciliation (CNR), took part in preparation


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of amendments to the Constitution of Tajikistan, and received 20 percent of positions in all executive agencies. The IRPT was legalized and it participated in presidential and parliamentary elections securing two seats in the Parliament. At the same time, the fragmentation of the Islamic movement, the dissolution of the IRMT and the weakening of the IRPT took place. In the process of elections the IRPT had to face difficulties of legal political work pertaining to the lack of party organizers and the absence of lower-level functionaries. The IRPT leaders acknowledge that incompetence of most of their representatives in the government and the parliament allowed authorities to replace them later. Many failures in the presidential and parliamentary election campaigns and extreme weakness in the IRPT’s analytical work bear testimony to the insufficiency of intellectual capacity of political Islam in Tajikistan. The Government, which was struggling against the UTO and striving to split the Islamic political movement, took several steps to achieve its goals. In 1998, it abolished the Muftiyat and the institution of Sar-Khatibs (heads of regional and district mosques responsible to Muftiyat). It also replaced the Muftiyat by the Council of Ulamahs, which from now on bore strictly advisory functions.

2005–08 This period can be characterized by the expansion in all directions of the Islamic political movement in Tajikistan (including IRPT, Salafiya, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) and the growing discord among various groups. The problems which accompanied IRPT in the transformation from military movement to a political party with representation in the parliament were exacerbated by the death of its leader Said Abdullo Nuri on 9 August 2006. The leadership over the party was assumed by Muhiddin Kabiri, an Islamic intellectual with democratic views. Kabiri’s attempts to transform IRPT into a political party of moderate Islamists operating in democratic political process faced certain impediments. First of all, the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2004 strengthened the authoritative power of the president of Tajikistan for the next 14 years, which resulted in the curtailment of democratic reforms, expansion of authoritarianism, and contraction of opportunities for operation by opposition political parties. Second, the ideological separation between the democratically oriented leadership of IRPT and its members grew deeper. Several sub-groups with distinct views on the goals of the Islamic political movement appeared within IRPT. Nevertheless, IRPT remained the only legal Islamic political movement in Tajikistan. It is necessary to keep in mind that the expansion in variety of Islamic political movements took place against the backdrop of rapid Islamization of



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society in Tajikistan and the emergence of national self-identification as an inherent element of the Islamic and Iranian worlds.18 By the year 2005, the social life of local communities was dominated by mosques, which resulted in the growing influence of local religious leaders and traditional Islam in general. At the same time, the absence of centralized bodies regulating and coordinating religious communities and the weakness of municipal and regional governing bodies led to a wide diversity of opinions about the future form of development of Islam and its relations with the state. The role of the international Islamic movement grew as well. This was partly facilitated by the implementation of a series of projects for the reconstruction of the Silk Road. The construction of roads connecting Tajikistan with China, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan and expansion of mutual ties with other countries in Middle East and South Asia had a stimulating effect not only on the rapid growth in the volume of transportation, commercial and human traffic flows but also by encouraging the inflow of ideas from foreign Islamic movements. The introduction of new technologies such as the Internet and mobile telephone communication as well as intensification of economic, cultural and inter-personal ties with other Muslim countries placed Tajikistan within the sphere of the global Islamic movement. The government authorities of Tajikistan also took steps to make Tajikistan a part of the Islamic world by taking active part in international Islamic organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Islamic Development Bank, Sports Federation of Islamic Solidarity Games etc. At the same time, there was a growing trend of “privatizing” or individualizing Islam especially among young people in Tajikistan. This trend reflects the deep socio-cultural shifts within the society of Tajikistan and the inability of traditional Islam to cater to new intellectual, spiritual, social and political needs and interests of younger believers. The mass consciousness and solidarity of Muslim believers is in conflict with the growing individualism, which emerges along with the advancement of market reforms. This conflict stimulates the diversification of Islamic thought and produces new young religious leaders, who view Islam not as a tradition and a way of life but as an ideology and philosophical construct. This explains the fact that the core of the Salafiya movement in Tajikistan is made up of graduates of religious universities and schools of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Jordan and other countries. These young individuals returned to Tajikistan after studying abroad and started to act against local Imams, who view Islam in the traditional way. The conflict between the communal consciousness and the growing individualism also reduces the role of traditional Islam as a measure of social control, which allows more radical Islamic movements such as Salafiya and Hizb ut-Tahrir to expand their influence. As a result there is a growing discord between young and traditional Muslim leaders. In response to the growing influence of Islamic leaders and the general Islamization of society in Tajikistan, government authorities intensified their efforts to acquire control over religious life and religious leaders.

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Post-2008 situation: the struggle among various branches and movements in Islam in the context of a virtual adoption of Islam as a state religion In September 2008 President Emomali Rahmon made an official speech commemorating the seventeenth anniversary of independence of Tajikistan. The speech contained a number of new formulations, terms and ideas which were previously absent in official statements. President Rahmon expressed an idea about interconnection between Islam and the national culture and claimed that it was incorrect to separate Islam from the national culture and vice versa. After this speech, the government authorities embarked on a series of new projects demonstrating their adoption of Islam. The year 2009 was dedicated to the Great Imam Abu Hanifa, the founder of Hanafi branch of Islam (8th century). In March 2009 the Hanafi branch of Islam was legally recognized as a priority branch of Islam in Tajikistan in the new law “On Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations.” Thus, the Hanafi branch of Islam virtually became a state religion in Tajikistan. At the same time, the government of Tajikistan is making attempts to impose tighter control over all aspects of religious life. For instance, according to the new law on religion, religious literature has to undergo censorship and contacts with foreign religious leaders have to be approved by government officials. However, these restrictions as well as a ban on attendance of mosques by children and women,19 ban on the use of headscarves (hijab) in officials institutions,20 the closing of mosques21 and other restrictions have caused the opposite reaction – the number of adherents of radical Islam (including followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Salafiya, and other radical religious organizations) has increased. Over the last several years the influence of the Salafiya movement has been growing particularly fast among younger believers, and has been changing into a potent political movement. The rejection of other movements and schools in Islam by Salafiya followers resulted in the deep religious conflict among believers in Tajikistan. To resolve the conflict, the government of Tajikistan banned the Salafiya movement in Tajikistan and formally supported local Imams. In addition to these steps, the government banned Tableeghi Jamaat and intensified prosecution of Hizb utTahrir.22 During April–June 2009, 40 followers of Salafiya, 93 members of Tableeghi Jamaat, and 19 followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir were arrested. On the one hand, the government policies reflect the crisis of secularism in Tajikistan, but on the other hand, they reflect concern over Islamic extremism and the desire to minimize the influence of Islamic oppositional movements prior to parliamentary elections in 2010. The main collision arises when attempts are made to resolve the issue of the place and role of Islam and Islamic leaders in the authoritative political system of Tajikistan. In view of these developments, today one can see that some problems have been solved, and the main directions of religious policy of new Central Asian states have been defined. However, many issues remain unsolved and some


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past issues have come to the fore.23 The major problems are the lack of clear definition of the place of Islam in public life, relation between Islam and the state, the place and role of spiritual leaders in the modern society of Tajikistan and in Central Asia in general.


Syncretism of functions of spiritual leaders Materials of our survey confirm syncretism of functions performed by Muslim figures, which is typical of Islam in general and which is rooted in its nature. Major Muslim leaders of post-Soviet Central Asia often combine activities of theologians and religious teachers, military/field commanders, entrepreneurs and political figures at the same time. The basis of this syncretism lies in the fact that a spiritual leader who leads a certain group, either directly or indirectly, is the very person who expresses opinion (saahib almakala in terms of Shahristani and other doxographers) on various issues, particularly those that become urgent as a result of some circumstances vital for the world of Islamic Ummah or its separate parts.24 Since a group is an organized expression of some opinion,25 it is logical for it to have a spiritual leader both in the capacity of a direct commander and as a spiritual guide. This can be easily pinpointed using the example of Tajikistan, because in Tajikistan the Muslim movement used to have armed formations and political bodies, and today it has legal political party and illegal political factions. This study shows that syncretic nature of functions of spiritual leaders in Tajikistan not only follows the practices common in the Muslim world, but also has specifics of its own. A. Ignatenko in his article “Epistemology of Islamic radicalism” while classifying radical groups emphasizes the existence of a spiritual leader in these groups, i.e. a person who lets them to partake in religious repast.26 Based on the experience of inter-Tajik conflict, one can contend that all irregular military regiments that took part in the inter-Tajik conflict on both sides (democrats-Islamists on the one side and proponents of the government on the other side) were associated with certain spiritual leaders. A.Ignatenko refers to existing groups that are headed directly by religious authorities, for example: in Palestine – Sheikh Yasin (Hamas), in Algeria – Sheikh Nahnah, in Afghanistan – Mullah Omar (Taliban). Within the inter-Tajik conflict, spiritual leaders often became military commanders: for example, the head of the IRMT Mullo Abdullo Nuri, field commanders – people’s general Eshon Kiyomiddini Gozi, Mullo Abdullo, Mullo Abdurahim (Abdurahim Karimov), Mullo Ajik from Nurek. More often spiritual leaders were associated with armed groups at a distance. For example, Qozikalon Hoji Akbar Turajon-zoda was the spiritual counselor of the IRMT field commanders Muakkalov and Sanginov, whereas spiritual counselor of the pro-government Popular Front led by Sangak Safarov was Mullo Haidar Sharif-zoda. However, as opposed to other Muslim countries, there was not a single case in Tajikistan when in an armed group led by a field commander

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(Amir), there would be also a reputable spiritual leader (Mufti) who was not in the command.


Conclusions First, despite severe atheistic pressure, Islam and Islamic thought developed in Central Asia during the Soviet period. The tradition and succession were never discontinued. Islam existed as a way of life and identification of indigenous population of Central Asia. Starting with Kokand Mullahs, who found refuge in Eastern Bukhara in 1920s–1930s, and through Ishans and Hojas, who supported those Islamic intellectuals who had fallen out of grace in the 1950s–1960s, the Islamic theological and legal world view thought continued to develop in different forms including reformation. In the course of this development, the most vexed and pressing issues of Islamic existence in Soviet Central Asia (such as relations between Islam and authorities, Islam’s place in society, the place and role of Islamic spiritual leaders in the social and political life of society) were addressed. As this quest for religious and world view evolved, different trends would form and sometimes enter into poignant conflicts with one another. In the 1960s–1970s, there occurred a discord in the Islamic community that led to the advent of a generation of new Islamic intellectuals and spiritual leaders of various trends. They subsequently formed Islamic political organizations such as the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), Adolat (Justice), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), etc. The analysis of biographies of formal and informal Muslim leaders of Central Asia shows that the main task of spiritual leaders, apart from purely religious functions, is preservation of the collective identity of society and making sure of its survival even under most adverse circumstances. Main attention is paid to the preservation of religious identity of this society, of the system of coordinates wherein it exists as well as ensuring collective understanding of the meaning of life. Thus, spiritual leaders (representatives of formal or informal clergy, Islamic intellectuals, hereditary Ishans, Hojas or Pirs) are:

the bearers, keepers and communicators of traditions, spiritual values, ordinance, rites and knowledge, handing them down from generation to generation; the bearers, keepers, communicators and elucidators of ethics, the system of moral values generally recognized in the society; organizers of spiritual life of communities; those who regulate social life of communities and bring life of the society within the bounds of established tradition and law.

Spiritual leaders exert their influence through: 1

organization and participation in rites which represent the main organizing force in personal, public and, to greater extent, political life of Muslim society; and



2

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the system of private religious education, which moulds adherents of the Islamic movement, who enjoy immense authority in society. The example of Talibs, Iranian madrassa students, shows that the traditional system of private religious education is, at the same time, an important part of traditional self-organization of Central Asian societies.

The revival of economic functions of Muslim leaders in the independent republics of Central Asia is becoming increasingly pronounced. The new forms of Islamic organization of businesses and finances spring to life, such as Akromiya in Uzbekistan. In general, the influence of spiritual leaders on the society is fairly significant, and it continues to determine evolution of societies in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan today.

13 Ethno-religious separatism in Xinjiang Challenge to China’s security


K. Warikoo

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China occupies a pivotal position in Asia with its borders touching Mongolia: the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan; Afghanistan and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, part of which is under the illegal occupation of Pakistan. Holding the distinction of being the largest province of China, Xinjiang is still the only autonomous region where Muslims are in a majority.1 Xinjiang presents a unique case of geographical and ethno-cultural diversity. The Tien Shan range of mountains cuts the region into two distinct but unequal parts, the northern region being traditionally dominated by pastoral nomads and the southern region possessing numerous fertile oasis settlements with well established agricultural and trading traditions. The people of the northern region generally known as Dzungaria have had close affinities with the Mongols living across the border in the east and with the Kazakhs in the west, both maintaining strong commercial and nomadic connections.2 Similarly the Muslims of the southern region of Xinjiang also known as the Tarim basin, maintained through history intimate relations with the adjoining areas of Central Asian Khanates of Kokand and Bukhara, Afghanistan and northern India due to their religious and kinship ties and active trade contacts.3 Such a curious interplay of geography and Xinjiang’s historical role as the crossroads of Central and South Asia, resulted in its ethno-cultural diversity and cross-border movements.

Historical perspective Chinese interest in Xinjiang had originated out of their need to safeguard mainland China from foreign incursions. As such this westernmost border region, then known as Hsi Yu was regarded as a buffer zone against these attacks from beyond the Great Wall.4 However, the imperial government never lost sight of the importance of fostering trade relations with the outlying Central Asian states, as it enabled China to “civilise” the turbulent nomadic tribes and to extend its political influence over them. Central Asian chiefs and trading delegations were encouraged to visit China and were given costly presents and even subsidies in return for their “gifts” for the


Ethno-religious separatism in Xinjiang

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Chinese Emperor. This was a deliberate move aimed at bringing the outlying border states into the ambit of “tributary relationship” with imperial China.5 The Mings consistently followed this policy and they set up a separate Board of Rites to supervise the conduct of relations with Central Asia. The Qings perfected this system by establishing a full-fledged Court of Colonial Affairs (Li-fan Yuan) to look after the affairs of the Central Asian dependencies of Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet. Qings considered the possession of Xinjiang as a pre-requisite for safeguarding their position in Central Asia. They successfully used both military and diplomatic means to ensure the occupation of Xinjiang. Social segregation of numerous oasis-settlements and their respective populations hindered the formation of a united resistance movement against the Qing authorities.6 Besides, the Qing policy of permanent settlement of Manchus, Han Chinese civil and military personnel, traders, artisans and Chinese Muslims (Hui) along with their families in Xinjiang altered the ethnographic and demographic composition of Xinjiang and diluted the local Muslim resistance to Chinese rule. Though Xinjiang’s connection with China dates back to more than 2,000 years, the area has remained under the effective control of China only intermittently for about five centuries.7 Even during the Qing rule (1755–1911), Chinese authority was subverted for brief periods by successful rebellions led by Khoja Muslim leaders like Jahangir, Yousuf Katta Tora and Walli Khan Tora (in the early nineteenth century) and Yakub Beg (1865–77),8 all having come from Kokand. During their short-lived successes, these Khoja leaders set in motion a process of religious frenzy and a number of Chinese soldiers, civilians, artisans and traders were killed. It was only in 1884 that Xinjiang was brought within the regular administrative structure of the Chinese empire and made a full-fledged province. After the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the consequent extermination of Qing rule, Xinjiang entered into an era of warlordism which lasted until the mid-1940s. All the successive provincial leaders were Han Chinese – such as Yang Tseng-hsin (1911–28) and Sheng Shih-tsai (1933–44), whose authoritarian and exploitative policies acted as a catalyst for a series of Muslim uprisings, that rocked Xinjiang from 1931 to 1949. By 1932 Chinese authority in Xinjiang was successfully subverted by the Muslim rebellion of Tungans and Uyghurs. The Tungans besieged Urumqi, the headquarters of provincial administration. Khoja Niaz and Sabit Damulla set up a Muslim administration in Kashghar under the name of “Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan”. Three Khotanlik brothers, Abdullah Boghra, Noor Ahmadjan Boghra and Mohammad Amin Boghra, calling themselves Amirs, held power from Yangi Hissar to Khotan in southern Xinjiang under the title of “Committee for National Revolution” later renamed as the “Khotan Islamic Government”. In the wake of this serious political disorder in Xinjiang, Chinese and other non-Muslims particularly the Hindu traders9 were massacred by the Muslim separatists. It was only in late 1934 that the Chinese provincial administration could crush these Muslim rebellions with Soviet military support. However,


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new centres of Muslim resistance emerged soon after. In 1937, General Mahmud, leading the pan-Turkic and Islamic forces and General Ma Hushan, leader of the Tungans, realigned themselves in combined endeavour to oust the “infidel” Chinese from the Xinjiang region. But they suffered crushing defeat at the hands of Chinese troops who received active military and aerial support from the Soviets. The establishment of the Turkic Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan (TIRER) between 1933–4, which was based on the principles of Islamic Shariah, was an abortive attempt to establish an independent Islamic government in Xinjiang.10 Efforts to set up the Independent Republic of East Turkestan in 1933 and 1944 ended in failure and Xinjiang was completely brought under control by the Chinese Communist forces in 1949. China views Xinjiang as a continental bridge which “extends China’s reach to Central Asia and simultaneously serves as a security buffer to China proper”.11 Besides being used as the site for nuclear testing, Xinjiang is a region of vast unexploited petroleum and mineral reserves and immense agricultural potential. Following the disintegration of USSR, China’s position in Central Asia and the Middle East has been enhanced by its possession of Xinjiang. China has been following the time-tested policy of large-scale Han settlement in Xinjiang “as a means to work towards regional stability and bring the new Central Asian republics and peoples of Xinjiang closer to China’s world view”.12 However, the main hurdle in achieving China’s economic, political and strategic objectives in this region is the ethno-religious resurgence which feeds the pan-Turkic and Islamic secessionist movement in Xinjiang. Whereas Muslim Uyghurs are predominant in the southern part of Xinjiang particularly in Kashghar and Khotan Autonomous Prefectures, the Muslim Kazakhs are concentrated in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture (adjoining Kazakhstan), Mori Kazakh Autonomous country/town of the Changji Hiu Autonomous Prefecture, and Barkol Kazakh Autonomous County/Town of the Hami Prefecture.13 Similarly the Muslim Kyrgyzs inhabit the Kyzylsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture (adjoining Kyrgyzstan) and the Muslim Tajiks have been provided an Autonomous County of Tashkurghan (adjoining Tajikistan) within the Kashghar Prefecture.14 Mongols reside mainly in Bayangol and Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefectures. The regional concentration of various ethnic-religious groups has been consolidated by the Chinese policy of creating separate administrative divisions – Autonomous Prefectures, Autonomous Counties and towns within Prefectures, where a particular ethnic or religious group is in the majority. In fact fthese divisions were created during 1954, i.e. more than a year before Xinjiang was declared as the Uyghur Autonomous Region.15 Uyghurs are in a majority in the southern parts of Xinjiang (Kashghar, Khotan, Kyzylsu Kyrgyz District, Aksu) as well as in Turfan, which has turned this region into a centre of separatist forces. Hans are in the majority in northern and eastern parts of Xinjiang, mainly concentrated in urban areas. Notwithstanding their


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intra-ethnic differences, most of the non-Han population of Xinjiang are of Turkic stock and are Muslims by faith sharing their religion, Turkic language and culture with their counterparts in the neighbouring Central Asian countries. Given China’s tenuous historical position in this region, any crossborder fraternisation on ethnic-religious grounds between the Muslims of Xinjiang and their Central Asian, Afghan and Pakistani neighbours is a potential source of instability for China on its strategic frontier.


Inter-ethnic relations Notwithstanding the massive Han settlement in Xinjiang region of China which has increased their ratio of population from 5 per cent in 1941 to about 40.6 per cent in 2000, the relations between the indigenous people and the Hans in Xinjiang are adverse. The problem gets accentuated by the large concentration of Muslim Uyghurs in the southern part of Xinjiang (to the extent of about 90 per cent – see Table 13.2) whereas they constitute only about 46 per cent of the total population in the entire province. Race relations between the Hans and the Turkic peoples in Xinjiang have been marked by mutual distrust and hatred. This is clearly reflected in the isolation of Hans and the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs and Tajiks from each other, as they live in separate settlements in their respective areas Table 13.1 Population of main ethnic groups in Xinjiang Ethnic Group 1941*

1953**

1964**

1982**

1990**

2000***

Uyghur

3,640,000 74.7% 299,000 6.1% 492,000 10.1% 150,000 3.1% 68,000 1.4% 225,000 4.6%

4,021,200 54% 2,445,400 32.9% 501,400 6.7% 271,100 3.6% 69,200 0.9% 133,500 1.8%

5,995,000 45.8% 5,284,000 40.4% 903,000 6.9% 567,000 4.3% 112,000 0.9% 220,500 1.7%

7,195,000 47.5% 5,696,000 37.6% 1,106,000 7.3% 682,000 4.5% 140,000 0.9% 337,900 2.2%

8,345,622 45.21% 7,489,919 40.6% 1,245,023 6.74% 839,837 4.55% 158,775 0.86% 368,674 2.04%

2,984,000 80% Han 187,000 5% Kazakh 326,000 8.7% Hui 92,000 2.5% Kyrgyz 65,000 1.7% Others (Tajik, 76,000 Mongol etc.) 2% Total

3,730,000 4,874,000 7,441,800 13,081,500 15,156,900 18,459,511

Sources: *Chang Chih-yi, “Land Utilisation and Settlement Possibilities in Xinjiang”, Geographical Review, vol. 39, 1949. ** Yuan Qingli, Population Changes in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1949-1984), Central Asian Survey, vol. 9, no.1, 1990. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics, Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 1996, Beijing. 1996. *** Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics of China, Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China, Beijing, 2003 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang#Demographics)

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Table 13.2 Nationality structure of the districts in Xinjiang in 1994 (in %) District

Uyghur

Han

Kazakh

Dunghan Kyrgyz

Mongolian

Ili Kazakh Ili County Tarbagatay Altay County Boratola Mongolian Dist. Sandji-Huai District Khamit County Bayangol Mongolian Dist. Turfan County Aksu County Kyzylsu Kyrgyz Dist. Kashghar County Khotan County

16.01 26.90 4.63 1.82 13.34

44.33 32.70 57.83 42.38 65.30

26.32 23.13 25.13 50.53 10.32

8.09 10.81 6.54 3.43 3.25

0.47 0.76 0.23 0.01 0.02

1.92 1.42 3.73 0.97 7.03

4.13

74.76

8.35

11.51

0

0.36

20.27 34.90

66.26 54.63

9.45 0.12

3.04 8.54

0 0.02

0.44 4.65

73.0 77.04 64.63

20.20 21.66 4.56

0.04 0 0.01

6.61 0.84 0.08

0 0.48 29.56

0 0.02 0

89.76 97.13

8.75 2.67

0 0

0.15 0.06

0.17 0

0 0

Source: Xinjiang Annual, Urumqi, 1995.

of concentration. Uyghurs in Xinjiang continue to nourish aspirations of ethno-political independence and have not come closer to the Chinese national mainstream, notwithstanding some economic upliftment due to increased Chinese/foreign investments and cross-border trade. All Uyghur, Kazakh and Kyrgyz Muslims in Xinjiang observe local Xinjiang time which is two hours behind the Beijing time. This is in marked contrast to various offices and institutions and the Han Chinese people settled in Xinjiang who observe Beijing time. There exist separate hostels for Han and Muslim students in Universities and Institutes as well. Similarly, there are exclusive restaurants for Muslims and Hans. In Muslim restaurants, smoking or drinking are not allowed. During a visit to Beijing, this author was told by Prof. Wu Hongwei that in Xinjiang even the government organisations have separate cafeteria for Hans and Uyghurs. Prof. Wu informed me that in Ili city, a Uyghur Muslim killed a neighbouring Han (even though both had lived together for a long time) at the instigation of some Uyghurs to kill the Hans as it would be tantamount to making Haj pilgrimage. Prof. Wu affirmed that religious extremists are exclusive, aggressive and opposed to non-Muslims and even opposed to other sects of Muslims. Few Uyghurs can speak Chinese and very few Chinese know the local language. Dru Gladney found during his visit to Kashghar Teachers College that “young Uyghurs would rather learn Urdu than Chinese”, as it would facilitate their trading with Pakistan.16 Hans find it inconvenient when passing through the localities dominated by the Turkic peoples.17AQ The Kazakhs in Ili region of northern Xinjiang still retain their bitter memories of the 1960s when about 100,000 Muslim Kazakhs and


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Uyghurs migrated to the neighbouring region of Kazakhstan, then part of the former USSR. There are more than one million Kazakhs in Xinjiang and about 200,000 Uyghurs in Kazakhstan, maintaining family and ethnic ties across the border. Besides, several hundred Uyghurs have settled in Pakistanoccupied Kashmir (PoK), where they use the Karakoram Highway to keep their family ties and trading connections alive with Xinjiang.


Rise of ethno-religious separatism Even though China liberalized its religious and cultural policies after 1978, there were reports about violent demonstrations against Chinese authorities and the local Han population. Riots occurred in Aksu in April 1980 when Han settlers were beaten up, their homes looted and a factory run by them damaged.18 The Aksu riots, in which several hundred civilians and soldiers were reported to have been killed or wounded,19 terrified the local Chinese settlers forcing thousands of them to demonstrate and demand permission to return to their homes.20 And by early 1981 more than 30,000 Hans were reported to have left Xinjiang for Shanghai.21 In October 1980 an accident in which an Uyghur pedestrian was killed by a Chinese truck driver, provoked local unrest particularly after the Chinese police refused to execute the driver even though the local court had sentenced him to death.22 Further trouble was averted when the sentence was commuted. In June 1981 Uyghur demonstrators attacked the Han settlers and even a PLA army base in Kashghar.23 The inter-ethnic discord between Uyghurs and Han Chinese did not leave the Provincial Communist Party unaffected. The situation worsened in August 1981 when the Uyghur Provincial Committee members virtually revolted against the Chinese ruling majority which forced the then Vice Chairman, Deng Xiaoping, to visit Xinjiang for nine days to resolve the political crisis. Deng ordered a reorganization of the Provincial Committee and Xinjiang’s First Party Secretary, Wang Feng (1978–81) was replaced by Wang Enmao who had worked in Xinjiang from 1949–69.24 Wang Enmao’s task was cut out to re-establish political stability and strengthen security. In 1985 and 1986, Uyghur students organised public demonstrations in Urumqi demanding a ban on nuclear testing in Lop Nor and settlement of Hans in Xinjiang.25 It was in May 1989 that Muslim students in Xinjiang University at Urumqi protested against the application of Chinese policy of birth control to non-Han peoples also. Slogans like “Han people leave Xinjiang” were also raised then. Despite such incidents, Xinjiang remained quiet and peaceful and China continued with its liberalised policy of allowing freedom of religion, restoration of old mosques and construction of new mosques. The number of new mosques being built with the help of voluntary donations in various settlements has increased manifold. In 1988, their number was reported to have reached 24,000.26 Uyghur and Arabic editions of the Koran, besides other Islamic scriptures have been circulated in hundreds of thousands after 1980, when the Regional


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Islamic Association resumed its activity.27 Haj pilgrimage to Mecca is also allowed and thousands of Xinjiang Muslims have undertaken the Haj pilgrimage. Most of the mosques in Muslim-dominated areas have madrassas attached for teaching the Koran, Arabic and also for training of young ones in Islamic doctrine. This has had a considerable impact on the society and politics in the region. Uyghur academics, intellectuals and literary figures have been voicing their dissenting views on historical, cultural and socio-economic aspects of Xinjiang. Three books namely The Uyghurs, A Short History of Xiongnu (Turk) and The Literature of the Uyghurs written and published between 1986 and 1989 by Turghun Almass, an Uyghur expert on local history and culture, created ripples in Xinjiang. Almass describes the Uyghurs as “indigenous nation” which was “Independent of China” in the past.28 Referring to the Great Wall being the national boundary of China, he described the area highlighting the inter-ethnic/racial conflict between Turkic peoples and the Hans. Almass espouses the case for an “independent state” of all “Turkic people”.29 By eulogising the conversion of Uyghurs from Buddhism to Islam, which in his opinion turned them into a “powerful and unified nation”, Almass sought to link Pan-Islam to Pan-Turkism.30 As expected, Almass’s books evoked sharp reaction from Chinese party and government circles and Han academics. He was accused of twisting and fabricating Xinjiang’s history and threatening national unity.31 Almass’s works were dubbed as a “vain attempt to incite racial conflict and fan flames of Xinjiang’s independence”. He was accused of manipulating history to incite “secession of Xinjiang from China”.32 Even though Turghun Almass’s three books were banned by the Chinese government, they were sold at premium due to large demand among the Uyghurs, particularly after the ban. This author was informed by an Uyghur teacher in Urumqi (during a visit in 1998) that almost every Uyghur household possesses his books. This indicates the sustenance of popular Uyghur dissent and opposition to Chinese control in Xinjiang. To meet this ideological threat, Xinjiang Academy of Sciences published the Educational Textbook of Atheism for use by the young masses in Xinjiang. This book, which highlights the negative role of religion in the long history of Xinjiang, nevertheless foresees a “long struggle to eliminate religion”.33 However, Chinese books on history, culture and traditions of Xinjiang provoked strong reaction from the Muslims in Xinjiang. In April 1987 several Kazakh students in Ili went on strike to protest against the publication of novel White House in the Distance (in Chinese) describing it as a distortion of Kazakh customs and an insult to the national pride of Turkic people.34 Similarly in December 1988, Uyghur students staged a protest march in Beijing against the exhibition of two historical films which they found “disrespectful to their race”.35 The publication of Sex Habits by the Shanghai Cultural House caused resentment among the Muslims throughout China and protest marches were organised in Beijing, Lanzhou and several cities in Xinjiang.36 Taking advantage of the freedom of religion and culture



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allowed after 1978, there has been rise in ethno-nationalist tendencies in Xinjiang often using Islam as a means of common identity and a rallying point to forge unity among diverse Muslim ethnic groups. A report from Turfan which is predominantly Muslim, suggested that more than 25 per cent of local party members were taking active part in religious activities since 1990. And 40 per cent of such members were from a rural background. Chinese efforts to reduce the number of such Islamic party members were not bearing any fruit.37 Increased trans-border trade and traffic between Xinjiang and adjoining regions of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan (via the Karakoram Highway passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) has resulted in greater interaction between the Turkic peoples of Xinjiang and their ethnic counterparts and co-religionists in Central Asia, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Uyghur and Kazakh exiles from Xinjiang settled in the Middle East, Turkey, Europe, USA and Australia have been keeping close contact with their counterparts in Xinjiang and are running scores of organisations aimed at achieving the goal of separation of Xinjiang from China. A publication, Voice of Eastern Turkestan is being published from Istanbul, the headquarters of the East Turkestan Liberation Front which had been led by the old Uyghur politician in exile, Isa Yusuf Alptekin. Undaunted by his old age and bad health, Isa Alptekin mobilised diplomatic support in Turkey for the independence of Eastern Turkestan. Alptekin met the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) leaders during the Islamic Foreign Ministers’ meeting at Istanbul in August 1991, and asked for an Observer status for Eastern Turkestan in the OIC. Subsequently, he met Turkey’s leaders including former President, Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister, S. Demirel seeking their support. Uyghurs settled in Turkey, western countries, Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan revitalised their activities soon after the independence of these former Soviet Republics. An International Uyghur Union of CIS was set up in early 1992 in Almaty with the objective of protecting human rights and seeking self-determination for Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The Nevada Semipalatinsk Movement in Kazakhstan had a separate department to mobilise opinion against the Lop Nor nuclear tests. In Kyrgyzstan a new Uyghur party “For a Free Uyghuristan” was set up in June 1992 aimed at the creation of Independent State of Eastern Turkestan. Besides, several newspapers in Uyghur language such as Uyghur Awazi (Voice of Uyghur) were being published in Almaty. A number of Uyghurs are reported to be migrating to Turkey, Middle East and Central Asian states from Xinjiang. This is in addition to the defection of more than 100 prominent Xinjiang Muslims to Turkey during the decade 1980–90.38 Following the dismantling of the USSR, China’s borderlands have attracted renewed western interest. In Munich (Germany) the Eastern Turkestan Cultural and Social Association was established in January 1991 by Erkin Alptekin, son of late Isa Alptekin. It publishes a periodical called Eastern Turkestan Information. Earlier in February 1990, Erkin Alptekin became the founding Vice Chairman


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of Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) which seeks self-determination for Eastern Turkestan and Tibet, among others. Piqued at the ethno-religious resurgence in Xinjiang and taking an alarmist view of ethnic conflict and Islamic resurgence in the newly independent Central Asian states across the border, the Chinese authorities, party functionaries and officially controlled educational and media establishment in Xinjiang openly denounced the “infiltration, subversion and sabotage by hostile foreign Islamic elements” for fanning the separatist movement in Xinjiang.39 A local newspaper, Xinjiang Ribao in its editorial dated 9 February 1990 called for an end to religious interference in matters pertaining to education, judiciary and administration and stressed the need to prevent all “unfriendly foreign organizations and individuals and their local supporters from using religion for their dangerous designs”.40 A local Chinese commentator, Shi Jian, writing in the same paper on 18 March 1990 ascribed the rise of ethno-religious separatism in Xinjiang to lax control on religious activities of mosques and madrassas.41 The Deputy Secretary of Xinjiang Region CPC Committee, A. Niyaz, who led a fact-finding visit to various areas in Xinjiang, also emphasised the need to follow strictly the “Policy of Freedom of Religious Beliefs”. Elucidating the policy, he warned that religion would not be allowed to interfere in state affairs, administration of justice, education and culture, marriage, public health and family welfare and the system of privileges or discrimination.42 Niyaz also held the foreign hostile Islamic groups responsible for infiltration and internal subversion.43 The 7th Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional People’s Congress held in March 1990 at Urumqi identified the ethno-religious separatist movement as the greatest danger facing Xinjiang.44 Earlier in August 1989, the Chinese Minister of Public Security, Wang Feng, had held the “conspiratorial separatist elements” responsible for instability in Xinjiang.45 Gorbachev’s policy of perestroika and glasnost was also seen as a contributory factor for ethno-religious resurgence in Central Asia. Tomur Dawamat, the head of Xinjiang government cited “global changes in pursuit of bourgeois liberalisation” alluding to Gorbachev’s reforms in the ex-USSR, as one of the factors behind unrest in Xinjiang.46 Speaking at a news conference in Beijing on 24 March 1990, Tomur Dawamat confirmed the arrest of some separatist activists belonging to East Turkestan Liberation Front for “distributing reactionary leaflets and raising slogans”.47 However, it was after the violent riots that rocked the Baren township in Kashghar district of south Xinjiang in early April 1990, that the Chinese authorities made a thorough reappraisal of the situation. The anti-Chinese riots which were reportedly sparked off after the local authorities banned construction of a mosque near Kashghar airport, coincided with Ramzan – the month of fasting for the Muslims.48 The riots which soon fanned to other towns were described as “armed counter revolutionary rebellion” by local television broadcasts. Activists and supporters of the Islamic Party of Eastern Turkestan, which has a declared object of establishing an independent



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Islamic Republic in Xinjiang, proclaimed jihad to “eliminate infidels” from Xinjiang.49 The activities of stockpiling weapons and arming young recruits had increased in March 1990.50 The Chinese language channel of Xinjiang Television showed on 22 April 1990 a video film of Uyghur language documents which it claimed gave instructions for a jihad combined with an armed Turkic nationalist uprising for an East Turkestan Republic. General Wang Enmao, who headed the region for three decades, later confirmed that seven separatist groups, some having foreign links had been uncovered.51 Banners of “Revive Islam”, “Independent East Turkestan Islamic Republic” were raised during these disturbances. It was believed that the arms for the uprising came from the Afghan Mujahideen routed through Pakistan via Karakoram Highway. In fact two Pakistani nationals alleged to be operatives of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were reported to have been arrested for fanning unrest in Xinjiang.52 Karakoram Highway was also closed by the Chinese for some time, so as to curb the influx of Islamic militants from the Pakistani side. The issue of ethno-religious separatism in Xinjiang dominated the fifteenth session of the Regional Party Central Committee on 19 July 1990. In their speeches, both Tomur Dawamat, the head of the Xinjiang government and Janabil, the Deputy Secretary of Xinjiang Regional Communist Party, exhorted the delegates to “take clear-cut stand against separatism and defend country’s integrity”.53 While referring to misuse of religious slogans for antiChinese and secessionist activities, Tomur condemned the Islamists’ opposition to tapping Xinjiang’s resources for its development and also to family planning practices. Janabil was more forthright in admitting that the separatist campaign inside and outside Xinjiang was “rampant”. He stated that some foreign organisations would use visits to China to see relatives, or to do business, as opportunities for sending subversive agents into Xinjiang and to incite local people against Hans. Also that some local scholars, educationists, artists and litterateurs have been using their lectures, articles, discussions and works of art and literature to “distort history” and propagate about independence of Xinjiang.54 Janabil was particularly distressed about increasing influence of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic elements over young generations. He condemned the slogans – “Exclusion of Hans”, “eradicate infidels”, “East Turkestan Islamic Republic”, that were witnessed in April 1990 riots. The common features of May 1989 and April 1990 disturbances in Xinjiang were the unfurling of Islamic banners, the war cry of jihad (holy war), demands to expel the Hans and open calls for establishing the Independent Eastern Turkestan Islamic Republic. Incidents of bomb blasts were reported to have occurred in Urumqi (February 1992), Yining, Khotan, Kashghar, Kuqa, Korla and Bortala (5–8 March 1992), wounding a number of people and causing substantial damage to property. Tomur Dawamat, the Uyghur Chairman of Xinjiang Regional Government in a statement in March 1992, accused the Muslim separatists of sabotage and subversion. That 1993 also witnessed bomb blasts


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in Kashghar and some other towns indicated the persistence of organised movement of Islamic militants against the Chinese authority in Xinjiang. In 1996, there were several reports of bomb blasts and clashes between the Muslim separatists and security forces in Xinjiang. Chinese authorities responded firmly by arresting about 3,000 Uyghurs and seizing arms and ammunition. The biggest ever riot in Xinjiang since 1949 took place in Yining town near the Kazakhstan border on 5–6 February 1997 during the Muslim festival of Ramzan when more than 1,000 youth demanding independence and shouting anti-China and Islamic slogans took to the streets and indulged in arson and beating / killing of Hans. Over 100 persons (all Hans) were injured and 10 Hans were beaten to death.55 Subsequently there were a number of bomb blasts in Urumqi on 25 February 1997, that is on the day of funeral of Deng Xiaoping, killing nine and injuring 70 persons. This was followed by a bomb blast in Beijing on 7 March 1997 injuring 30 persons. Uyghurs in exile pressing for independence of Eastern Turkestan claimed responsibility for these attacks.56 Chinese authorities took quick action by arresting thousands of Uyghur Muslim activists. Summary trials were organised to award punishments to those found guilty of terrorist activities. Qio Shi, head of China’s Parliament and top political leader, made an unscheduled visit to Urumqi in mid-April 1997. Expressing concern over the worsening situation in Xinjiang, he declared China’s firm resolve to “oppose national separatism and religious extremist forces”.57 Chinese official sources reported in May 1997 about the execution of eight members of a Muslim Uyghur separatist group for being involved in terrorist activities, bomb blasts and other criminal acts. The surge of ethno-religious separatism in Xinjiang is linked to the part played by Uyghur ranks along with the Afghan Mujahideen in the jihad against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. According to a Pakistani analyst, many Uyghur Muslims were trained by Afghan and Pakistani fundamentalists during the Afghan war in the 1980s.58 One of the Uyghur youths who received training in one of the madrassas in Pakistan, vowed that after his return to his hometown in Khotan he would cleanse it of Communism. “We want to make a new Islamic state for Uyghurs and leave China”, he declared.59 Hundreds of Uyghur Muslims from Xinjiang were reportedly sponsored by Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami and Tableeghi Jamaat for educating and training them in jihad (holy war against un-Islamic systems) at the Islamic University, Islamabad, Syed Mawdudi International Institute, Lahore and other madrassas and training centres. China took up the issue with Pakistan, protesting against Pakistan’s Islamic parties’ involvement in infiltration of Islamic militants into Xinjiang.60 China’s tough stand on this issue paid dividends, when the Pakistani authorities arrested 12 Chinese Muslims who had sought asylum in Pakistan after sneaking through Gilgit. These Uyghurs were handed over to the Chinese authorities.61 That a ringleader of a Pakistani Islamic group operating in Xinjiang was executed in mid-199962 further establishes the Pakistani connection of Islamic militancy in Xinjiang.



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In an interaction with the Chinese specialists in Beijing including those from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, this author was told that “Xinjiang is a hotbed of separatists, terrorists and foreign Islamic extremists.” The number of mosques in Xinjiang has increased to 25,000. This author learnt that some extremist Imams preach violence and hatred and some good Imams have even been assassinated by the extremists. Prof. Pinyan stated that the separatists act in the guise of religion, killing innocent people. The suicide bombers are convinced that they would go to heaven after their sacrifice. While highlighting the problem of religious extremism in Xinjiang, Prof. Pinyan pointed out that though there are very few extremists, yet there are very few Muslims ready to stand up or rise up against such extremists. From 1980s onwards, the religious situation in Xinjiang has become more tense. Eighty per cent of villagers go to mosques and there is social pressure on people to attend mosques, as the extremists try to isolate non-followers from the community. Religious extremists are gaining foothold in Xinjiang, and they advocate violence, causing tension. Dr Zhao Shuqing, Director, Institute of Ethnic Minority Groups Development Research, Beijing informed me that Islamic groups which penetrated Xinjiang in the 1980s and joined ethnic separatists, pose a great threat to stability in Xinjiang. These Islamist extremist groups have set up Islamic schools, where extremist ideology is taught and arms training is also given. These groups have broadcasting stations and also publish books to disseminate jihadi ideology. Even handwritten material is circulated among the Muslims in Xinjiang, advocating jihad and for establishing an Islamic state. They encourage the people to join this movement. In some cases, school teachers and headmasters from other Muslim countries preach in these schools. Some students are even sent abroad for training, who on their return become the backbone of the jihadi movement. Some religious schools in the name of Arabic teaching recruit Uyghur students. Neighbouring countries provide hospitality to the Uyghur Muslims. High-tech means are employed to promote jihad in Xinjiang. Hizb ut-Tahrir, the transnational Islamist group has also penetrated Xinjiang, particularly in schools and universities. Whereas in mainland China, administration is separate from religion, in Xinjiang administration at the grassroots is linked with religion. Islamic extremism is being used as a weapon against Hans and other non-Muslim groups and administrative organs. Islamists believe that it would take them 30 years to achieve their goal of Islamic state in Xinjiang, out of which the first ten years would be utilized for indoctrination. Even Muslims advocating traditional Islam are targeted and killed. If Islamist extremists gain strength in Xinjiang, it would cause instability and hamper economic development and even lead to the exodus of Chinese business community from Xinjiang. Prof. Jin Yijiu, a veteran Chinese expert on Islam, stated that Osama bin Laden will continue to influence the Muslims around the world. “As war against terrorism continues, Islamic extremism will also continue.” Pointing to the existence of religious seminaries in Peshawar, Prof. Yijiu stated that these


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Islamic militants are sent to Kashmir for jihad. In Prof. Yijiu’s assessment, “radical Islam will be transferred from generation to generation. Jihadis will train female jihadi soldiers. They will attack Western targets and also expand their targets.” He stressed that the “radical forces in Kashmir have been thinking of an Islamic state from Kashmir to Central Asia. The Islamist organizations want to set up Islamic state in South and Central Asia and also in Xinjiang province of China where Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement has forged links with Al Qaeda.” The State Council of China released an official report on 21 January 2002 detailing the terrorist incidents involving East Turkistan separatist forces in Xinjiang from 1990 to 2001 in which 162 persons were reported to have been killed and 440 injured.63 The report stated that in the 1990s, under the influence of extremism, separatism and international terrorism, part of the East Turkistan forces inside and outside the Chinese territory turned to splittist and sabotage activities with terrorist violence as the main means, even brazenly declaring that terrorist violence is the only way to achieve their aims. The programmes of the East Turkistan Islamic party and the East Turkistan Opposition Party seized by the police clearly point out that they will take the road of armed struggle and conduct various terrorist activities in densely populated regions. In a booklet What is the Hope for Our Independence compiled by them, they openly declared that they would create a terrorist atmosphere at kindergartens, hospitals and schools at any cost.64 That the Uzbek authorities arrested in March 2006 an ethnic Uyghur, Hussein Celil, who holds Canadian citizenship and later extradited him to China to face charges of “terrorism”,65 is evidence of close cooperation between Uzbekistan and China on the issue of religious extremism and terrorism. Similarly, China persuaded the Saudi government not to issue visas to those Uyghur pilgrims who applied for their visas in third countries, particularly in Pakistan.66 As a result, over 6,000 Uyghurs were stranded in Pakistan due to the denial of their visas by the Saudi Embassy in Islamabad.67 The Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang were reported to be involved in a series of terrorist acts to coincide with the opening of Olympic Games in Beijing. On 4 August 2008, in one such terror attack in Kashghar, 16 police personnel were killed. In another attack on 10 August 2008, the terrorists, who included two Uyghur women, targeted supermarkets, hotels and government offices in Kuqa town.68 Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan was quoted as saying that “the fight against separatist forces in Xinjiang is long term, arduous and complex”.69 On the eve of Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to Beijing in the third week of October 2008, Chinese authorities listed major terrorist leaders of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The United Nations has listed ETIM as a terrorist group, which is reported to be headquartered in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)



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of Pakistan.70 China indicated that most of the Uyghur terrorists operating in Xinjiang have close links with similar groups in Pakistan.71 Mushahid Husain, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) [PML(Q)] leader who visited China in April 2009, confirmed that the Chinese officials told him that “the ETIM has its military headquarters in (the tribal areas) and is planning to attack China on the 60th anniversary celebration of the Communist revolution in October”.72 Husain further revealed that Meng Jianzhu, Chinese Minister for Public Security, had flown from Beijing to Shanghai to discuss the threat with Pakistan’s President Zardari during latter’s visit to China in late February 2009.73 Concerned over the threat of terror attacks from the territory of Pakistan, China stressed the need for Islamabad to take action against the Islamist militants plotting attacks inside China from within Pakistan. The worst ethnic violence in decades that erupted in July 2009 between the Han Chinese and Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang, coincided with the sixtieth anniversary of Communist rule in China. The simmering tensions between the two communities broke into full-blown riots in Urumqi on 5 July 2009, when over 10,000 Uyghurs demonstrated to protest against the death of two Uyghur workers in a brawl between migrant Uyghur workers and Han Chinese in a toy factory in south China’s Guangdong province in late June 2009. At least 184 people – 137 Han Chinese, 46 Uyghurs and one Hui Muslim – were reported to have been killed and thousands injured in those ethnic clashes.74 Thousands of Han Chinese living in Urumqi responded by organising counter protests, smashing Uyghur stores and restaurants and seeking revenge for the Han deaths. The Chinese authorities, which put the blame for the riots on the “separatist forces”, were quick to impose a curfew and arrested hundreds of Uyghur suspects in Urumqi. The Chinese foreign ministry, which also distributed videos of the violence depicting gruesome scenes of people being beheaded and set on fire, accused the World Uyghur Congress and its US-based head Rebiya Kadeer as being behind these riots.75 Chen Guangyuen, President of the Islamist Association of China (IAC) in his statement issued at Beijing condemned the riots as a “serious crime and against the basic doctrine of Islam”.76 He stated that “it was a violent crime which was instigated and directed by separatist forces abroad, and carried out by outlaws inside the country”.77 Worried over the alarming situation in Xinjiang, Hu Jintao, the President of China and Secretary General of Communist Party of China, cut short his visit to the G-8 summit in Italy and rushed back to Beijing to deal with the crisis.78 That Hu decided not to attend the G-8 summit and also postpone a subsequent state visit to Portugal indicates China’s concern and also its resolve to defuse the crisis in Xinjiang, before it got out of hand. At the same time, the Chinese foreign ministry sought the cooperation of several countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Germany and the US to help unearth links between their citizens and the World Uyghur Congress.79 The Chinese government had earlier issued a white paper,


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which claimed that several Xinjiang terrorists were trained in bases in Pakistan.80 An urgent nine-member Politburo Standing Committee meeting led by President Hu Jintao asked the Communist Party members and officials at all levels to mobilise and restore order.81 It promised punishment to rioters and leniency to those “misled by agitators”82 in a bid to isolate the hardcore separatist elements from the common masses. Zou Yonghong, Press Officer at the Chinese Embassy in Beijing, at New Delhi in his signed article explained the role of World Uyghur Congress and its leader Rebiya Kadeer, stating that the Urumqi riot was “premeditated and remotely manipulated and instigated by separatist forces from abroad”.83 There was renewed unrest in Urumqi following protests by thousands of Han Chinese in the capital city of Xinjiang in the first week of September 2009, demanding security. According to Bingtuan Television, a Xinjiang based station, reports of syringe attacks had been coming from local disease control centres since 20 August 2009.84 Local officials stated that over 500 people, mostly Hans, were stabbed with needles,85 rumoured to have been infected, triggering panic and fresh unrest. Massive protests by Han Chinese in Urumqi on 2–4 September 2009, accusing the local authorities of failure to prevent mysterious “syringe attacks” on them, forced the government to sack two senior officials. Xinhua news agency announced on 5 September 2009 that Li Zhi, Secretary of the Urumqi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China and Liu Yaohua, the provincial Director of Public Security Department, were replaced. Simultaneously, trials of detainees, mostly Uyghur suspects, were initiated. The Intermediate Peoples Court in Urumqi sentenced six Uyghurs to death and one Uyghur with life imprisonment for their involvement in the July 5 ethnic riots. At the same time, a court in Guangdong sentenced to death a Han Chinese for his role in violence on Uyghur workers which sparked the Urumqi riots. The magnitude and intensity of ethnic clashes in Xinjiang came as a rude shock to the Chinese leadership. China’s response to the crisis has been swift, tough and calibrated – taking security measures to control the situation, detaining hundreds of people, summary trials and deterrent punishment to the convicted rioters, restricting internet and telephone communication, controlling the flow of information on the riots to the media and the outside world, taking steps to reassure Han Chinese settlers in Urumqi and reaching out to Muslim countries in Central Asia and South Asia seeking their cooperation. Squarely blaming the three forces of “extremism, separatism and terrorism” for the riots, the Chinese leadership reaffirmed existing policies in the region. That Cambodia, ignoring US pleas, deported back to China 20 Uyghur Muslims, who had sought asylum in Cambodia and were under the protection of the UNHCR following the July riots in Urumqi,86 on the eve of a visit to Phnom Penh by Chinese Vice President, Xi Jinping points to the success of China’s diplomacy. Notwithstanding China’s claims, Uyghurs continue to challenge Beijing’s authority in Xinjiang. The Uyghur Muslim separatists have adopted


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a new modus operandi of soft terror, i.e. spreading social hatred, intimidating and threatening the local Han Chinese settlers, discrediting the Chinese security agencies and creating scares like “syringe attacks”, which is somewhat similar to the anthrax scare in the US after 9/11.


Conclusion The demise of the former USSR and establishment of independent Central Asian Republics which share their history, religion, culture and above all the Silk Route connection with Xinjiang created a new awakening among the indigenous Muslims of Xinjiang (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs etc.) about their Islamic and pan-Turkic identity. Being conscious of the strategic position of Xinjiang as the hub of trans-Asian trade and traffic and also about its huge economic resources, the Muslims of Xinjiang seek to assert their socio-economic and political position. Liberalised Chinese policy towards religion, new initiatives for modernisation and economic development, better communication, linkages with Pakistan, Turkey and Central Asian states, and developing cross-border trade of Xinjiang with its neighbouring Muslim countries, have resulted in greater mobilisation and assertion by the Muslims of Xinjiang on ethno-religious basis. That the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, particularly Kashghar, Yarkand, Khotan, Bachu, Kucha, Turfan and even Urumqi, give the credit for Chinese liberalised policy towards Islam to Pakistan’s former President Zia-ul Haq was explained to this author during his visit to these areas in June 1994. Local Muslim perception is based on the fact that Zia-ul-Haq, who timed his visit to Kashghar in July 1984 to coincide with Friday, persuaded the local Chinese authorities to unlock the big Friday Mosque in Kashghar to enable him to offer prayers. The lock was duly opened and he offered prayers along with local Muslims in the Kashghar mosque, which had remained locked for a long time. Besides, Pakistani traders, travellers and Islamic activists who have been thronging the towns of Xinjiang, have been contributing by financing the construction of mosques and distributing Islamic literature. In fact, this author witnessed a sort of co-relation between the extent of Pakistani influence particularly in Kashghar, Yarkand, Khotan, Turfan etc. to the degree of Islamic resurgence in these areas. Pakistani presence in Xinjiang is quite visible in the form of businessmen, traders and visitors who fly to Urumqi from Islamabad or come from Gilgit via the Karakoram Highway. Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami, Tableeghi Jamaat and other fundamentalist groups have easy access to and influence over the anti-Chinese Muslim separatists in Xinjiang. The emergence of independent Central Asian states, ethnic-religious resurgence particularly in Tajikistan and the Ferghana valley of Uzbekistan and the mobilisation of Uyghurs in these states, caused discomfitures in China. The fear of rise of Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Turkic consciousness in Xinjiang is compounded by the recurrent clashes between Han Chinese and local Uyghur/Kazakh/Kyrgyz Muslims in Xinjiang since 1980s. Han settlers


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are being browbeaten in southern Xinjiang where Uyghurs are in majority. The new Chinese policy of giving preferential treatment to local Muslims in admissions, employment etc. is yet another source of anxiety for the Han settlers. Finding themselves in an uneasy situation these Hans are keen to leave the area and go back to their original homes or migrate to these areas where Muslims are not dominant. At the same time, Hans have consolidated their position in northern Xinjiang and Han traders/businessmen are making profits due to the Chinese “open door policy” and encouragement of crossborder trade with the CIS countries. China considers herself to be an important player in the new geopolitics of the region not only because it shares nearly 3,000 kms of its strategic frontiers in Xinjiang with the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but also due to cross-border fraternisation of Muslim– Turkic population inhabiting this area, which makes China’s borders vulnerable to ethnic religious separatism. Religious radicals and secessionists have been challenging China’s sovereignty in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The Chinese are concerned over the issues of Islamic fundamentalism, pan-Turkic revivalism, cross-border infiltration of drugs, arms and subversives, and external initiatives to resurrect the movement for “Independence for Eastern Turkestan”, which question China’s sovereignty over Xinjiang. Use of arms and ammunition and involvement of foreign subversives from Turkey, Taliban and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami and other Uyghur groups in Central Asian states, whose activists have been working in Xinjiang to propagate pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic views, have lent an extraneous dimension to the domestic Muslim resentment against Han Chinese. That China was incensed over the activities of the Pakistani Islamic parties in Xinjiang and expressed its concern to Pakistan describing these as interference in its internal affairs, was reported by the Pakistani press itself.87 Many Uyghurs are counting on the negative impact of the Soviet break-up on the domestic politics of China, Western, Turkic and Islamic support to their independence movement, growing indiscipline in PLA, people’s emerging disaffection against the Communist system particularly among the younger generation of China, desire of the Han settlers in Xinjiang to go back to their original place of birth as key factors which could assist the process of secession of Xinjiang from China. Uyghur separatists hope that growing economic disparity between the coastal and economically rich provinces of China and the backward inner and central provinces is likely to contribute to the weakening of Central authority in China. China for its part is quite conscious of the new threat to its territorial integrity as a result of the changed geopolitical situation in Central Asia. China has been pursuing an elaborate set of policies in Xinjiang to ensure its political stability. The main elements of this policy are: 1

A policy of intensive exploitation of Xinjiang has been followed, keeping in view its huge oil resources (18 billion tonnes) and its potential



2

3

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for economic growth. Agreements have been concluded with Britain, Japan and other countries for joint exploration of oil and setting up of ethylene and other petro-chemical projects. Funds from the Middle East countries are also being attracted for investment in Xinjiang and for this purpose local pro-government Muslim specialists are encouraged to develop linkages abroad. Special economic zones have been created to facilitate cross-border trade of Xinjiang with adjoining Central Asian Republics and the CIS, in a manner that most of the business and trade remain in the hands of Chinese. This has also provided economic incentive to sustain the increasing influx of Hans into Xinjiang. Not only that, Xinjiang is used as a spring-board to penetrate and influence Central Asian economy, polity and society. In fact China’s “Open Door Policy” for promoting Xinjiang’s foreign trade is designed to carve out a definite Chinese influence in the Central Asian Republics. Chinese consumer and other goods are flooded into Central Asia. Thousands of Chinese Hans are reported to have migrated to the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for trade and business purposes. They are reported to have married local girls, purchased properties, shops and business and mixed with the local population. This has made these Republics apprehensive of big Chinese influx, which they see as a repetition of “Russian colonialism” in the past and an extension of Chinese “colonialism” in Xinjiang at present. Though at the official level, Central Asian Republics maintain close ties with their giant neighbour, China, at the popular level, the Muslim population of these republics empathisesx with the Uyghurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs of Xinjiang due to their common ethnicity, religion and culture. China seeks to secure its troubled frontiers and to neutralise the threat to political stability in Xinjiang by consolidating its military presence and by encouraging more Hans to settle there. On an average, 250,000– 300,000 Hans immigrate to Xinjiang each year in search of better fortunes.88 China has to a great extent influenced the Muslim countries like Iran, Pakistan and the Middle East by sale of arms and other incentives in return for their dollars and has succeeded in securing their political support to China’s presence in Xinjiang. Several Muslim leaders and highpowered delegations from Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics have visited Xinjiang during the past few years. During Iranian President Rafsanjani’s visit to Xinjiang it was decided to create a direct trans-Asian railway between Beijing and Iran through Central Asia. China has not only warded off any Islamic criticism of its policies in Xinjiang but has even succeeded in having its position in Xinjiang legitimised and endorsed by Muslim countries like Iran, Pakistan and the adjoining Central Asian Republics. Moreover China and the Central Asian Republics have taken a common stand against trans-border terrorism,

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K. Warikoo Islamic extremism, ethno-religious separatism, drugs and arms trafficking. And China has institutionalized this process of cooperation through the setting up of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China sees religious extremism, international terrorism and national separatism as the main challenges to its security. Concerned that separatists are using religion as a banner to seek separation or independence for Xinjiang, China is firm in its resolve to maintain its “One China” policy in Xinjiang using both its security forces and its economic, political and diplomatic prowess to retain its position there.


Notes

2 Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan and Pakistan 1 Ashley Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), p. 20. 2 Gilles Dorronsorro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present (London: Hurst/CERI, 2000), p. 339. 3 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 61–62. 4 See Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Winter 2007, pp. 76–79. 5 International Crisis Group, “Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes,” Asia Report No 123, November 2, 2006, p. 9. 6 Ibid., p. 11. 7 For a description of these phenomena, see ibid., pp. 11–12. 8 Thomas H. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 5 (2), 2007, p. 98. 9 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001–2007), September 9, 2007, p. 10. 10 Thomas H. Johnson, op. cit., p. 99. 11 Ibid. 12 See Thomas H. Johnson, ‘The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (night letters),” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18 (3), pp. 317–44, September 2007. 13 See Elizabeth Rubin, “In the Land of the Taliban,” The New York Times, October 22, 2006. 14 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, op. cit., pp. 86–88. 15 Gilles Dorronsorro, op. cit., p. 339. 16 Frederic Grare, “Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post 9–11 Era,” Carnegie Papers, 72, October 2006, p. 6. 17 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” Asia Report No 125, December 11, 2006, p. 21. It should be observed that at the time, the President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, insisted that there would be no Taliban activity in Pakistan, no Talibanization. 18 Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008, 1 (2), p. 1. 19 International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 21. 20 Hassan Abbas, op. cit., p. 2. 21 Ibid, p. 3.


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Notes

22 Ibid. 23 United States Government Accountability Office, Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, Report to Congressional Committees, May 2007, pp. 14–15. 24 Ashley Tellis, op. cit., p. 29. 25 Hassan Abbas, “South Waziristan’s Maulvi Nazir: The New Face of the Taliban,” Terrorism Monitor, 5 (9), May 10, 2007, pp. 8–9. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Hassan Abbas, “Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies,” Global terrorism Analysis, 5 (18), 27 September 2007, pp. 1–5. 29 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban Wield the ax ahead of New Battle,” Asia Times Online, January, 24, 2008. 30 Financial Times, April 19, 2008. 3 Pakistan’s slide towards Talibanisation 1 See Charles Allen, God’s Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad (UK, Time Warner, 2006); Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia (Harvard University Press, 2008). 2 Daily Times editorial, 2 June 2009. 3 Newsline, September 2009. 4 The News International, 23 October 2009. 5 Nicholas Schmidle, To Live or Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years in Pakistan (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2009). 6 Sushant Sareen, The Pioneer, 8 January 2008. 7 The News International, 28 July 2007. 8 The News International, 8 August 2007. 9 The News International, 23 June 2007. 10 The News International, 22 June 2007. 11 Fareed Zakaria in Newsweek, reproduced in Indian Express on 23 November 2009. He reports a conversation between the Director, National Intelligence of USA and a Pakistani General who tells the former that Pakistan had to support Taliban in Afghanistan, ‘otherwise India will reign’. 4 Resurgence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan 1 ‘Karzai Vows to Take War to Pakistani Soil’, Indo-Asian News Service, 15 June 2008. 2 John Ward Anderson, ‘International Donors Pledge Additional $21 Billion for Afghanistan’, Washington Post Foreign Service, 13 June 2008. 3 Bruce London, ‘Pakistan Swaps Taliban for Envoy’, The Australian, 19 May 2008. 4 ‘Now 2 Nuclear Officials Abducted in Pak, Search is on for Ambassador’, Indian Express, 12 February 2008. 5 Jack Farchy, ‘McChrystal warns of long Afghan Haul’, The Financial Times, 2 October 2009. 6 Thomas H. Johnson and M.Chris Mason, ‘All Counter Insurgency is Local’, The Atlantic, October 2008. 7 ‘Afghan Insurgent Violence Accelerates in 2009’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 12 June 2009, 8 ‘Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) U.S. Casualty Status’ 13 October 2009.


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9 Gilles Dorronsoro, ‘The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, p. 10. 10 Thomas H. Johnson, ‘On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 5 (2), 2007, 95. 11 ‘Army to Leave Mehsud Areas after Deal Inked’, Daily Times, 12 June 2008. 12 Times of India, 25 February 2008. 13 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 21. 14 Abdul Sami Paracha, ‘Taliban Raise Houses of Sikhs, in Orakzai,’ The Dawn, 30 April 2009. 15 ‘Al Qaeda faces funding crisis’, BBC News, 13 October 2009, 16 UNODC Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghanistan, February 2008, p. 3. 17 UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2007, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghanistan, August 2007, p. 15. 18 UNODC Afghan Opium Survey 2009, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghanistan, 2 September 2009, p. 5. 19 Seth G. Jones, ‘Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’, 20 Daniel Byman, ‘Talking With Insurgents: A Guide for the Perplexed’, Washington Quarterly, April 2009, p. 134. 21 Jason Straziuso, ‘Afghan Opposition Says its been Talking to the Taliban’, Associated Press, 16 April 2008. 22 ‘New Report on The Forgotten War’, Afghanistan Watch, 7 February 2008, <www.afghanistanwatch.org/2008/01/theforgotten-war.html> 23 John Hemming, ‘Suicide Bomb on Poppy Team Kills 19 Afghans’, Reuters, 29 April 2008. 24 ‘Holbrooke on Bush’s Ineffective’ Counter-Narcotics Plan”, Afghanistan Watch, 23 January 2008, <www.afghanistanwatch.org/2008/01/holbrooke-on-bu.html> 25 ‘Hunger adds to Afghanistan’s Nightmare’, International Herald Tribune, 14 May 2008. 26 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, Afghanistan 1979 to the Present (London: Hurst and Company, 2005), p. 318. 27. ‘Assessing the Overall Security Situation in Afghanistan’, Speech by Nick Grono, Deputy President, International Crisis Group, DCAF – NATO Parliamentary Assembly Seminar on ‘Stabilising Afghanistan: Developing Security, Securing Development’, 17 April 2008. 28 Peter Bergen, ‘Winning the Good War’, The Washington Monthly, 7 October 2009. 29 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, ‘Commentary: More troops needed for Afghan war’, CNN, 4 August 2009, 30 ‘Clip ISI’s Wings: Former Afghan President tells US’, Press Trust of India, 2 June 2008. 31 Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, 86 (1), January/ February 2007. 32 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier’, International Security 32 (4), (Spring 2008), 74. 33 Deepali Gaur Singh, ‘Women Made Pawns in Afghan Election’, Deccan Herald, 24 August 2009. 34 Seth G. Jones, op. cit.


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35 ‘Jail or Jihad against India: ISI tells Taliban’, Headlines Today, 7 October 2009. 36 ‘India and Afghanistan Sign Pact on Local Governance’, The Hindu, 19 May 2008. 37 Lalit K. Jha, ‘India’s Role in Afghanistan is Constructive: US Report’, Business Standard, 28 May 2009. 38 ‘Defence Lessons: Afghanistan’s Minister Meets Antony’, 7 April 2008. 39 Ann Jones, ‘Why Its Not Working In Afghanistan’, August 2006, 40 ‘Exorbitant Salaries for Consultants and Officials in Afghanistan, Part I’, Kabul Press, 21 June 2008, 41 UNODC, Afghan Opium Survey 2009, Ministry of Counter Narcotics, Afghanistan, 2 September 2009, p. 5. 42 Ibid., p. 7. 5 Roads to perdition? 1 “Life Sentences for 15 for 1993 Serial Train Blasts”, 28 February 2004, 2 For a full account of the Parliament House attack, see State v. Afsan Guru and others, Appeal (Criminal) 373–375 of 2004, New Delhi: Supreme Court of India, 2005. 3 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 221. 4 B. Muralidhar Reddy, “Musharraf Bans Lashkar, Jaish; Invites Vajpayee for Talks”, The Hindu (Chennai), 13 January 2002, 5 See “Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence”, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 6 “Pakistan, India Joint Statement”, The Dawn (Karachi), 7 January 2004, 7 B. Muralidhar Reddy, “Jaish behind Parliament attack”, The Hindu (Chennai), 7 March 2004, 8 Suketu Mehta, Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found (New York: Knopf, 2004). 9 S. Hussain Zaidi, Black Friday: The True Story of the Bombay Bomb Blasts (New Delhi: Penguin, 2003). 10 For a critical account, see G. Parthasarathy, “A Prime Minister Surrenders”, South Asia Intelligence Review (New Delhi), 25 September 2006, 11 Praveen Swami, “Signs of Another Kind of Line of Control”, The Hindu (Chennai), 14 May 2007. 12 Statement in the Parliament of India, 11 May 2005. 13 “Interpol Notice”, The Hindu (Chennai), 28 May 2007. 14 “Bangladesh Police Arrest Fugitive”, 2 October 2005, 15 “For the Record: The 11/7 Charge-Sheet”, 11 July 2007, 16 Stavan Desai, Anuradha Nagaraj and Sagnik Chowdhury, “Cops Follow Aurangabad Arms Trail”, The Indian Express (New Delhi), 16 July 2006.


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17 “Business Centres were on Terrorists’ Hit-List”, The Times of India (Mumbai), 9 May 2006. 18 Rajeev Khanna, “Blast Hits Gujarat Train Station”, 19 February 2006, 19 Praveen Swami, “Fortresses of Faith”, Frontline (Chennai), 20 October 2007. 20 “Fugitive Wanted For Prosecution: A-427/3–2007” (New Delhi: INTERPOL, 2007). 21 “Wanted by CBI: RC.1&2(S)/93.SIU.III.” (New Delhi: Central Bureau of Investigations, 2005). 22 [SECRET] “Note on interrogation of Javed Hamidullah Siddiqui”, (Ahmedabad: Gujarat Police Headquarters, 2004). 23 “Life for Nine in Haren Pandya Murder Case”, The Times of India (New Delhi), 26 June 2007. 24 For a full profile of the organisation, see South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Harkat ulJihad-Islami: Evolution of the Outfit”, 25 Devesh K. Pandey, “Blast Suspect was Trained at Jaish Camp”, The Hindu (Chennai), 21 May 2007. 26 Muzamil Jaleel and Siddhartha Sarma, “Pieces in Terror Jigsaw, Two Top Lashkar Men Shot in UP, Delhi”, The Indian Express (New Delhi), 9 March 2006. 27 Zahid Husain, Frontline Pakistan (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007), p. 53. 28 Ibid. 29 Amit Baruah, “Militant Chiefs Warn Musharraf”, The Hindu (Chennai), 6 February 2000. 30 Praveen Swami, “The Liberation of Hyderabad”, Frontline (Chennai), 26 May 2000. 31 “ISI Agents’ Plans Scuttled”, The Times of India (Mumbai), 30 August 2001. 32 “Darsgah Jihad-o-Shahadat: DJC Activities”, 33 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2006), pp. 99–100. 34 Ashutosh Varshney, “Postmodernism, Civic Engagement and Ethnic Conflict”, Comparative Politics, 30 (1), October 1997, p. 10. 35 Paul Brass, Riots and Pogroms (Introduction), (London: Macmillan, 1996). 36 Sudhir Kakkar, The Colors of Violence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 37 Javeed Alam, “The Majlis Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and the Muslims of Hyderabad”, in Gyan Pandey, ed., Hindus and Others (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993). 38 Ashutosh Varshney, op. cit. 39 Abhishek Sharan, “Owaisi Sees Bilal’s Hand”, The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 4 September 2007. 40 Kingshuk Nag, “Hyderabad Blues”, The Times of India (Mumbai), 1 September 2007. 41 Ibid. 42 Ashutosh Varshney, op. cit, p. 14. 43 Praveen Swami, “New proof on Mumbai blasts”, The Hindu (Chennai), 1 August 2006. 44 S. Husain Zaidi, “First Clues from Chat Room”, The Indian Express (New Delhi), 30 September 2006. 45 Zakir Naik, Comparative Study between Islam and Hinduism: Presenting Islam to the Hindus (Mumbai: Islamic Research Foundation), p. 20. 46 Zakir Naik, Common Questions Asked by Hindus about Islam, (Mumbai: Islamic Research Foundation), http://www.irf.net/irf/faqonislam/index.htm

188 47 48 49 50 51 52


53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

Notes Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Buddy Naidu, “SA Activist’s bin Laden Ties”, The Sunday Times (Durban), 16 September 2001. ‘Editorial #2,’ The Daily Times (Lahore), 10 August 2005, ://www.dailytimes. com.pk/default.asp?page=story_10-8-2005_pg3_1 Ahmed Deedat, Muhammad the Natural Successor to Christ, (Mumbai: Islamic Research Foundation), p. 22. Ibid. “Pakistanis Reject General Musharraf ’s Kashmir Policy”, DAWA News (Muridke), 31 January 2007. “Editorial”, Ghazwa (Muridke), 31 January 2007. “Hafiz Saeed Wants Joint Indo-Pak Probe into Train Blast”, The Daily Times (Lahore), 21 February 2007. Praveen Swami, “Hunt for Bombers Gathers Momentum”, The Hindu (Chennai), 21 February 2007. “Editorial”, Ghazwa, op. cit. “Throw the Bat, Seize the Sword”, Zarb-e-Taiba (Muridke), April 2004. Abdul Rehman Makki, “Time to Discard pro-US Policy”, Daily Jasarat (Lahore), 30 July 2007. “Kashmir can be Conquered in Six Months through Jihad”, Daily Jasarat Friday Special (Lahore), 19 August 2007. See Praveen Swami, “Indian Elections and the Islamist Terror Threat”, Asian Conflict Reports, April 9. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, “LOC is not the Line of Control, but the Line of Conflict”, DAWA News (Muridke), 22 July 2007. “Ineptitude of Pakistani Rulers Manifests itself again in Baghliar Dam Issue”, DAWA News (Muridke), 15 February 2007. “Editorial”, Ghazwa, op. cit. Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1970), p. 9. Ibid., p. 10. “Killing Hindus Part of Jihad: LeT Chief”, The Hindu (Chennai), 14 April 2003. “Even Heaps of Corpses will not Please the Foreign Powers: Hafiz Saeed”, Pakistan Media Monitor (Islamabad), 165, July 2007, p. 2. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, “What are Muslims Waiting for after the Threat to Attack Holy Sites”, DAWA News (Muridke), 8 August 2007. Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2002).

6 Islamist extremism in Kashmir 1 Yoginder Sikand, “Popular Kashmiri Sufism and the Challenge of Scripturalist Islam (1900–989)”, in Aparna Rao (ed.) The Valley of Kashmir: The Making and Unmaking of a Composite Culture (Delhi: Manohar, 2008), p. 499. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, p. 500. 5 Ibid, p. 501. 6 Ibid, p. 504. 7 Yoginder Sikand, “The Emergence and Development of the Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940s-1990)”, Modern Asian Studies, 36 (3), 2002, p. 718.


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8 Ibid, p. 721. 9 Praveen Swami, “Kashmir: The Autumn of the Jihad”, The Hindu, 19 February 2008. 10 Anil Maheshwari, Crescent over Kashmir: Politics of Mullahism (New Delhi, 1993), p.104. 11 Peer Ghyas ud Din, Kashmir: Islam, Ideology and Society, (Jammu, 1994), p. 66 12 Such practices which were condemned by the Islamists, included prostrating before graves of saints, singing Sufi music at shrines, sacrificing animals, offering Tahar (cooked yellow rice), lighting lamps, distributing roth ka nazar (home made bread), tonsuring the heads of infants such as at the shrine of Baba Reshi near Tangmarg, revering relics attributed to saints and to the Prophet and so on. See Sikand, “Popular Kashmiri Sufism”, pp. 489–520. 13 Syed Ali Gilani, 11 September 2001: What should be done? (Srinagar: Tulu Publication, 2001), p. 19. 14 Ibid., p. 20. 15 Ibid., p. 27. 16 Ibid., p. 50. 17 Ibid., p. 53. 18 Praveen Swami, “In Kashmir, the Price of Peace isn’t Right”, The Hindu, 6 November 2009. 19 Riyaz Punjabi, “The Concept of an Islamic Caliphate: The Religious and Ethnic pulls of Kashmir Militant Movement”, Journal of Peace Studies, 1 (1), Nov.–Dec. 1993, 42. 20 D. N. Dhar, Dynamics of Political Change in Kashmir (New Delhi, 2001), p. 204. 21 Muzamil Jaleel, “The Fight to Finish: Mind and Motivation of a Jihadi”, Indian Express, 21 October 2001. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Riyaz Punjabi, op. cit., p. 43. 25 Afaq, Srinagar, 16 November 1992. 26 Nida-e-Mashriq, Srinagar, 30 January 1993. 27 Srinagar Times, 23 June 1993. 28 Ibid., 6 May 1993. 29 D. P. Kumar, Kashmir: Pakistan’s Proxy War (New Delhi: Har Anand, 1992), pp. 149–50. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Srinagar Times, 23 September 1992. 33 Alsafa, Srinagar, 14 April 1990. 34 Riyaz Punjabi, “Charar-e-Sharif Tragedy: The Ideological Complicities”, Bulletin of Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, Spring 1996, pp. 16–18. 35 Ibid. 36 A Pakistani mercenary, Abdul Rahman, confirmed in an article in Urdu Digest of Lahore that the shrine of Charar-e-Sharif was destroyed by Pakistani mercenaries led by Mast Gul. Cited in The Hindu and Indian Express, 2 March 1998. 37 The Hindu, 12 July 1998. 38 Riyaz Punjabi, op. cit., p.46. 39 Alsafa, Srinagar, 13 March 1993. 40 Srinagar Times, 18 July 1993 cited in Riyaz Punjabi, op. cit., p. 45. 41 The Herald Annual, Karachi, January 1998. 42 “Jihad to Continue in IJK”, The Dawn, Karachi, 30 April 2004. 43 Ishtiaq Ahmed, “Containing the Taliban: Path to Peace in Afghanistan”, Perceptions, 5 (4), December 2000–February 2001, 70–71.

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44 Riyaz Wani, “Pakistan: The Reality Show”, Indian Express, 11 February 2008. 45 One hundred and ninety-nine militants were reported to have infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir in the first six months of 2009, as against 117 in the same period of 2008. See Arun Joshi, “Autumn of Disquiet”, Hindustan Times, 28 September 2009. 46 Praveen Swami, “Patriarch of Jammu & Kashmir jihad turned peacemaker”, The Hindu, 5 December 2009, p. 10. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.


7 Communal peace in India 1 Bismillah Khan, a world-renowned Muslim musician from Banaras, was a devout Shia Muslim who also worshipped Saraswati (Hindu Goddess of music). He learned Shehnai (musical instrument) from his uncle, who served as the official musician at famed Hindu Vishwanath temple. 2 Since 1956 the city of Banaras is officially designated as Varanasi. Also known in ancient times as Kasi, it is hailed as India’s Cultural Capital and the ‘city of light’. Mark Twain famously remarked that Banaras is “older than history, older than tradition, older even than legend and looks twice as old as all of them put together”. 3 Ashutosh Varshney in his pioneering study has taken six pairs of Indian cities – each city comparable demographically to the other in the pair, but one prone to communal riots and the other not. See Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002). 4 Communitarian or collective identity involves such values as cooperation, filial piety, and participation in shared progress, reputation of the group interdependence. See Michelle LeBaron, “Culture and Conflict”, <www.// Beyondintractibilty.org/action// author. jsp?d=763> accessed 2 January, 2009. 5 Most perspectives hinge around the irreconcilable differences between Hindus and Muslims on the sub-continent. See for instance Stanley Tambiah, Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (New Delhi: Vistar Publications, 1996), Asghar Ali Engineer, Lifting the Veil: Communal Violence and Communal Harmony in Contemporary India (Bombay: Sangam Books, 1995), Sudhir Kakar, The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion and Conflict (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996). 6 Varshney shows that the prior existence of social networks of civic engagement across communal lines is the key to prevent violence: op. cit., p. 9, n. 3. This contests the instrumentalist emphasis on political agency, ideology and pressures for explaining the acts of communal violence. See Paul Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 30–37. 7 See Tara Chand, History of the Freedom Movement, 4 vols. (New Delhi: Government of India, Publications Division, 1961–72), Vol. 1, pp. 111–12. Also Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Calcutta : Signet Press, 1946); reprint ed. (Delhi: Oxford University Press/Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1981), p. 270. 8 In addition to Islam, the Din-e-Ilahi also contained aspects of Jainism, Zoroastrianism, and Hinduism. Sikh religion too blends elements of Islam and Hindus. 9 See Yoginder Sikand, Sacred Spaces : Exploring Traditions of Shared Faith in India (Delhi, Penguin, 2003). Also see Javed Alam, “The Composite Culture and its Historiography”, South Asia, 22, Special Issue 1999, 29–37; J. J. Roy Burman,

Notes

10 11 12


13

14

15

16 17

18

19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26

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“Hindu-Muslim Syncretism in India”, Economic and Political Weekly, 18 May 1996. Urdu itself is a syncretistic language which combines Persian and Hindi and is written in Arabic script. Imtiaz Ahmad, ed., Ritual and Religion among Muslims in India (Delhi: Manohar, 1984), p. 7. Chris Bayly, “The Prehistory of ‘Communalism’ ? Religious Conflict in India, 1700–1860”, Modern Asian Studies, 19 (2),1985, 81–4. The dargah of Moin-ud-din Chisti in Ajmer, Bahadur Shahid shrine, dargah of Saiyid Abd al-Qadir Shahul Hamid Nagoori in Nagore attract both Hindu and Muslim pilgrims. According to recent estimates, around 90 per cent of Muslims in India and Pakistan visit dargahs of Sufi saints. See Markandey Katju, “Take on this Intellectual Challenges”, The Hindu, 25 November 2008. Rana P. B. Singh, ‘Banaras as Heritage City (India) on the scale the UNESCO World Heritage List: From Contestation to Conservation’, accessed 2 January 2009, Also see Hans Bakker, “Construction and Reconstruction of Sacred Spaces in Banaras”, Numen, 43 (1), 1996, 32–55. See Diana L. Eck, “The imagined landscape: Patterns in the Construction of Hindu Sacred Geography” in Veena Das, Dipankar Gupta and Patricia Uberoi (eds.), Tradition, Pluralism and Identity (New Delhi: Sage, 1999), pp. 24–9. In addition to being the city of the Hindu God Shiva, it is a holy place for many religions. Sarnath, the famous place where Buddha preached his first sermon, is within 10 miles of the city. The city is located rather close to important centres of Indian Islam, including Aligarh, Deoband, Bareilly, Jaunpur and Lucknow. Sandria B Freitag, “History and Political Economy of Banaras” in Sandria B Freitag (ed.) Culture and Power in Banaras: Community, Performance, and Environment, 1800–1980 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 9–10. The ratio of Muslim population in Banaras is noticeably higher than that of the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) where the city is located and the nation as a whole, where Muslims comprise only 11.2 per cent of the population, respectively. (Indian Census 2001, accessed 2 January 2009, ) He is revered as a Vaishnavite Bhakta by Hindus while the Muslims revere him as a peer, the Sikhs call him a Bhagat and the Kabir Panthis worship him as God incarnate. These merriment activities include wrestling, bodybuilding, sword and stick wielding, and folk music concerts. See Nita Kumar, “Work and Leisure in the Formation of Identity: Muslim Weavers in a Hindu City”, in Freitag, Culture and Power in Banaras, pp 165–6. Nita Kumar, The Artisans of Banaras: Popular Culture and Identity, 1880–1986 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 89. A famous saying in Banaras is that there are thirteen festivals in a week. See Shashi Tharoor, India: From Midnight to Millennium (Delhi: Penguin Books, 1997), pp. 123–33. See Marc Katz, Banaras Muharram and the Coals of Karbala (DVD), (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2004). Biraha is a Hindu celebration, Urs is an annual celebration to honour the death anniversary of the distinguished man entombed in the shrine. In many ways, it is similar to Hindu’s Shringar – an annual Hindu community celebration. The pillar of Laut Bhairav (Hindu Shrine) is located in the midst of a Muslim Idgah. See Sunthar Visuvalingam (with Elizabeth-ChalierVisuvalingam), Between Mecca and Banaras: The Marriage of Lat Bhairava and Ghazi Miyan,

192

27

28


29

30 31

32 33 34 35

36

37

38 39

40 41

Notes accessed 24 October 2008, For an outstanding analysis of religious and cultural transference in Banaras see Marc Katz, The Children of Assi: The Transference of Religious Traditions and Communal Inclusion in Banaras (Varanasi: Pilgrims Publishing, 2007) (Second Reprint). Marc Katz, “Harnessing the Vigor of Youth: Indian Tradition of Cultural Transmission: A learning Example for the New Multicultural Communities of the West”, Journal of Conflict Management and Development, 2 (2), 2006, 59–80. These clubs would sprout a few weeks before the festive celebrations such as Durga Pooja, Saraswati Pooja, Nakkatayya, Ramleela (Hindu festivals) and Muharram and Eid-ul-Fitr (Muslim festivals) and would sport their own distinct insignia. Bismillah Khan, the legendary shehani maestro, on being questioned about his identity said that he is first a Banarasi before being a Hindu or Muslim. The Ganga and Yamuna Rivers actually meet in Allahabad, 100 kms north of Banaras. After the “black” water of the Yamuna merges with the “white” water of the Ganga, the rivers become indistinguishable and flow peacefully through Banaras. Rafiq Zakaria, The Widening Divide: An Insight into Hindu-Muslim Relations (New Delhi: Viking, 1995), p. 22. “Kashi jahan banti hai yeh saadi, Hindu uska tana hai, Muslim uska bana hai” (Kashi where the Banarasi saree is made, Hindu is its warp and Muslim its weft). Muslim community is central to the performance of the silk industry in Banaras which employs over half million people as weavers, dyers, saree polishers and traders in and around Banaras. See K. N Panikkar, “Religious Symbols and the Political Mobilization: The Agitation for a Mandir at Ayodhya”, Social Scientist, 21 (7/8), July–Aug. 1993, 63–78; Sandria Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989). See Gyanendra Pandey, “The Colonial Construction of ‘Communalism’: British Writings on Banaras in the Nineteenth Century”; in Veena Das (ed.), Mirrors of Violence : Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 94–134. Unsurprisingly “the baneful impact of communalism was less pronounced in princely India than in British India”. Ian Copland, “Communalism’ in Princely India: The Case of Hyderabad (1930–40)”; in Mushirul Hasan, India’s Partition: Process, Strategy And Mobilization (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 361. See Chalier-Visuvalingam and Sunthar Visuvalingam, “Between Mecca and Banaras: ‘Towards an Acculturation-Model of Muslim-Hindu Relations”, Islam and the Modern Age, 24 (1), February 1983, 20–69. It was the Congress Party led by Rajeev Gandhi, which in a way, reopened the Ayodhya dispute by ordering the unlocking of the disputed mosque. See Ramesh Thakur, “Ayodhya and the Politics of India’s Secularism: A Double-Standards Discourse”, Asian Survey, 33 (7), July 1993, 645–64. Also see Bidyut Chakrabarty, Communal Identity in India: Its Construction and Articulation in the Twentieth Century (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2003). For instance, the destruction of Hindu temples by Muslim rulers is a part of popular imagination, whereas the building or rebuilding of Hindu temples with the grants given by the local Muslim rulers is seldom acknowledged. Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb partially razed the Kashi Vishwanath Temple and replaced it by a mosque in 1669.


Notes

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42 Ashutosh Varshney has listed Banaras as a third degree riot-prone city meaning that it has experienced a minimum of 25 deaths from five riots over a 20-year period. Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, p.104. Also see Asghar Ali Engineer, Communal Riots After Independence: A Comprehensive Account (Delhi: Shipra, 2004). 43 Freitag, Culture and Power in Banaras, p. 168. 44 In November 1991 the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) along with rightwing Hindu organizations namely the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) spearheaded a massive campaign (often referred as the Hindutva campaign) to rebuild the Ram temple which was razed by the Mughal Emperor Babur in the sixteenth century. See Paola Bacchetta, “Sacred Space in Conflict in India: The Babri Masjid Affair”, Growth and Change, 31 (2), 255–84. Also see Sushil Srivastava, Disputed Mosque (Delhi : Sage Publications, 1990). 45 Anjoo S. Upadhyaya, “Recent Trends in Communal Violence : A Case Study of Banaras” cited in Donald L Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 353. 46 A section of Hindu traders who traditionally owned the entrepreneurship felt threatened as the Muslim weavers began to own looms as well as business. Dildar Khan “Banaras Riots”, Link, 15 December 1991. This role changeover is often seen as one the cause of communal conflict during 1970–90. See Engineer, Communal Riots after Independence, 1995, pp. 197–206. 47 Bosnia, Rwanda and Jerusalem are some of the examples where intimate communal relations turned into brutal violence. 48 The academics of the Banaras Hindu University led by the then Vice Chancellor held a peace procession in the wake of the demolition of the mosque in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992 to reiterate the communal unity and the secular character of the city. (The Pioneer, 15 December 1992.) 49 For instance, the Sadbhavana Committee led by Rajendra Tivari claims to have offered mediation in several contentious issues including the conflict over the replacement of a Shiv ling within the temple-mosque complex, conflict between boatmen and a Muharram procession, and the harassing of Mufti Batein on the way to namaz. See Megan Ribeiro and Ganga-Jamuni Tahzeeb, “Conflict Resolution between Hindus and Muslims in Banaras, A Fieldwork Project conducted under the supervision of Priyankar Upadhyaya”; (Wisconsin/MCPR :Banaras: 2007), pp. 43–5. 50 The Sankat Mochan temple is dedicated to the Hindu God Hanuman having the reputation of the deliverer from troubles. It was founded by a great sixteenthcentury poet named Tulsidas from the Bhakti tradition who promoted caste and communal inclusion and whose Ramacharitamanasa (Religious saga of Lord Rama) is still read in millions of Indian households. 51 The second bomb was set off a few miles away at the Banaras train station thronged by hundreds of travellers. Meanwhile, a third bomb was retrieved before it exploded in the busy shopping district of Godawlia. It was dismantled as nearly 5,000 people crowded around the bomb team to watch. 52 On 30 March 2002 seven people were killed in an attack on Raghunath temple in Kashmir, on 6 August 2002 nine pilgrims were killed in Srinagar. On 24 September, militants attacked Akshardham temple in Gujarat killing 30 people and seriously injuring 40. On 24 November 2002, terrorists attacked Raghunath and Shiva temple in Jammu. On 25 August 2003 twin blasts near Mumbai’s Mumba Devi temple killed 52 people and hurt 167. On 5 July 2005, six terrorists attempted to storm a temple in Ayodhya. On 28 October 2005 and 14 April 2006 terrorist attacks on the Jama Masjid, Delhi killed one person. See Samrat Sinha, “Major Terrorist Attacks in India (2000–2006): A Profile, IPCS Special

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57

58 59

60

61 62

63 64 65 66 67 68

69

Notes Report 27, July 2006”, accessed 24 October 2008, Mahant also served as the Head of the Civil Engineering Department at the Banaras Hindu University and is known globally for his dedication to the cleaning of the river Ganga. The Hindu, 10 March 2006. “Muslim Women Recite Hanuman Chailisa”, The Times of India (Lucknow) 19 April 2006, p. 2. , accessed 24 October 2008. Most remarkable is the peace network led by the Maitri Bhavan (friendship house), a Church-run centre for peace and inter-religious dialogue which provides a hub of peace work and collaborates with over two dozen inter-religious organizations.Some other groups engaged in the peace work are: Serva Seva Sangh, Ramkrishna Mission,Bahai Sansthan, Kabir Kirti Mandir, The Art of Living, Sankat Mochan foundation, Acharyakul, Rashtriya Sadbhavana Manch, Institute of Gandhian Studies and Malaviya Centre for Peace Research. See India Today (Hindi Edition), 10 May 2006, p. 16. A field study led by Katz and Upadhyaya during 2006–8 brings out the continuing participation of all communities and castes in such religious festivals. A SASNET Project Report on “The Vitality and Role of ‘Sporting Clubs’ in the Multi-Cultural Community: A Study of the Traditional Youth Organizations of Banaras”, Malaviya Centre for Peace Research, BHU, Varanasi, 2008. Studies confirm that the Hindu–Muslim antagonism is significantly attenuated in small rural communities where forces of social and cultural integration are greater than in large urban centres. See for instance Lowell Martin Bookman, “Hindus and Muslims: Communal Relations and Cultural Integration”; in Steven I Wilkinson (ed.), Religious Politics and Communal Violence (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 143. The lower strata in Hindu and Muslim community have closer sharing in life and work which traditionally reflects in better inter-religious relations than the upper classes. Varshney finds that “Informal engagement may often work in village in keeping peace, but it does not in cities, which tend to be less interconnected and more anonymous. Size, it can be shown, reduces the effectiveness of quotidian interaction. Associations are critical when village like intimacy is impossible.” Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, p. 10. Author’s Interview with Mufti-e-Banaras Abdul Batein Nomani, 15 November 2007. On an average, the Maitri Bhavan alone organizes at least two such events each month and involves leading persons from all faiths and religions. Venkat Parsa, “Religious leaders issue fatwa on terror”, Asian Age, 28 July 2006. Ram Puniyani, “Tackling Terrorism – Banaras, Jama Masjid Show the Way”, accessed 21 April 2006, <www.countercurrents.org> , accessed 21 January 2008. A Muslim family supplies the flowers to the temple and Sikh and Hindu families lead a special procession for the birthday celebrations of Lord Hanuman. Bismillah Khan, the great Shehanai player from the Muslim community, would often hold his concerts there. There are negative communal identities as well relating to the population growth among the Muslims and the idea that most of them are “Pakistani agents”. See “Roshni Sengupta, Communal Violence in India: Perspectives on the Causative Factors”, Paper presented at 18th European Conference on Modern

Notes

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72

73 74 75

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South Asian Studies, at Lund, Sweden, 6–9 July 2004 (Panel 32), , accessed 21 April 2008. Ibid. Sandria Freitag also reports that in the past too Tana Bana is comparatively less commonly used to defuse the communal tension. Freitag, Culture and Power in Banaras, pp. 168–9. During 1991 the city was agog with communally inciting narratives of antinational and pro-Pakistani Muslim conspiracies, whereas the aftermath of temple blast hardly saw any such negativities. See for instance R. Scott Appleby, “Ambivalence of the Sacred, The: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation”, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. , accessed 21 April 2008. Also Audrey R Chapman and Bernard Sponge (eds) Religion and Reconciliation in South Africa: Voices of Religious Leaders (Radnor, PA : Templeton Foundation Press, 2003). See Sevanti Ninan, Headlines from the Heartland: Reinventing the Hindi Public Sphere (New Delhi : Sage), pp. 223–7. See Michelle Le Baron, Bridging Cultural Conflicts: A New Approach for a Changing World (San-Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), p. 7. “The deeper and more strongly those common values are held, the stronger the sense of community”. See Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human nature and the Reconstitution of the Social Order (London: Free Press, 1999), p. 5.

8 Islamist extremism and the terror network in Bangladesh 1 Chaitanya Chandra Halder and Sharful Islam, Babar, “Salam helped HuJI Execute Plot”, Daily Star, 2 December 2009. 2 “Bangladesh: Breeding Ground for Muslim Terror”, , accessed on 30 July 2008. Mufti Obaidullah, a recently arrested Lashkar terrorist, has confessed his links to Pakistan. For details, see Kailash Sarkar and Mukheleswar Rahman, “Lashkar Leader Used six mobile phones”, Daily Star, 19 July 2009. 3 The Awami League (AL) had entered into an agreement with Khilafat Majlis, a religious fundamentalist party whose leaders had participated in the Afghan war in December 2006 and had seat arrangement with it. It created furore within Awami League and its alliance partners forcing AL to cancel the political understanding. Later AL refused to participate in the scheduled election that was supposed to be held on January 22, 2007. 4 The term religious constituency here denotes people who are religious in their personal practices but are not fundamentalists or do not have radical views on Islam. The Awami League’s association with secularism as a political concept has led the religious political parties and BNP to orchestrate a campaign that it is anti-Islam, pro-Hindu and pro-India. In a country with more than 80 per cent Muslim population, such a campaign has made the Awami League try and improve its image as a party that is not against Islam. 5 For instance see the election speech of BNP Chairman and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia who urged the voter to vote for the BNP to save Islam. “Vote for BNP to Save Islam”, Daily Star (internet edition), 23 December 2008. 6 The Awami League governemt has decided to establish a separate directorate for madrassa education to modernize them to enable them to meet the challenge of the modern world. See “Separate Directorate for Madrassa Education”, Daily Star, 12 December 2009. 7 This study was done in the context of Pakistan which would be true in the case of Bangladesh. See K. Alan Kronstadt, “Education Reform in Pakistan”, CRS Report, 23 December 2004.

196 8 9 10 11 12 13 14


15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22

Notes “HuJI man Holed up in Other Militant Groups”, Daily Star, 19 September 2005. “Mufti Hanan Captured”, Daily Star, 2 September 2005. “Harkat-ul Jihad Banned at Last”, Daily Star, 18 September 2005. For a detailed discussion on Ahle Hadith Movement in Bangladesh see Rana Razzaque and Asha Islam Nayeem, “Some Aspects of the Ahl-e-Hadith Movement in Bengal”, Journal of Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 51 (2), 2006, 215–30. “Militant Outfit Ahab Demands Ghalib’s Release”, Daily Star, 24 December 2005. See “Kuwait-based NGO Using Funds despite Government Ban”, Daily Star, 28 March 2006. Mehdi Hasan Polash, “JMBer Ulekhyojog Operational Karyakram (JMB’s Significant Operational Work)”, Inquilab, 13 January 2007. In an interview with Kamruzzaman (Joint Secretary, JI, International Affairs) on 29 June 2007, in Dhaka. “Call to Implement Islamic Law in Bangladesh”, JMB Pamphlet, page 1. See “In the next Election how the Islamic Parties can be more People Oriented” (article in Bengali), Julfikar Ali Manik, “JMB Masterminds yet to be Identified”, Daily Star, 17 August 2007. Anwar Ali, “Agencies for Banning Kuwait based Group”, Daily Star, 21 August 2005. “Government Okays Release of ‘Terror Fund’”, Daily Star, 5 December 2005. The four fundamental principles are democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism. An appeal against the High Court decision is pending before the Appellate Court. Law Minister Mr Shafiq Ahmed said that the constitution will retain Bismalluh Rahman ur Rahim as opening sentence which the military dictator had incorporated in 1977. During the four-party-led BNP government 473 local and 25 international NGOs were registered. “NGOs Under Scanner for Funding militancy”, Daily Star, 19 March 2009.

9 Religious radicalism in Bangladesh 1 I. P. Khosla, “Bangladesh-India Relationship”, South Asia Journal, July– September 2006 (13), 36. 2 Ibid. 3 Muntasir Mammoon and Jayant Kumar Ray, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh”, in Verinder Grover (ed.), Bangladesh: Government and Politics (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 2001), p. 329. 4 Ibid., p. 330. 5 Sirajul Islam Choudhary, Mukhosh o Mukhashree (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1985), p. 193. 6 The constitution amendment passed on 4 November 1972 abolished (a) all kinds of communalism (b) political recognition of religion by the state (c) exploitation of religion for political purposes and(d) domination on religious grounds. Syed Anwar Husain, “Religion and Ethnicity in Bangladesh Politics”, in Verinder Grover (ed.), op.cit., p. 377. 7 Asim Roy, Islam in South Asia: A Regional Perspective (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1996), p. 154. 8 Ibid. 9 M. Rashiduzzaman, “Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constrains and External Fears”, Asian Survey, September 1977, 7 (9), 42. 10 Ajoy Roy, “Nation-Building Process in Bangladesh”, in Ramakant and B. C. Upreti (eds.), Nation Building in South Asia, Vol. 2, (New Delhi: South Asian

Notes

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Publishers, 1991), p. 255. The concept of Bangladeshi nationalism owes its origin to the two nation theory, which envisaged religion as the basis of the state. But Bengali nationalism traces its origin to the history, culture and tradition of ancient Bengal. K. N. Mohsin, “Trends of Islam in Bangladesh”, in R. Ahmed (ed.), Islam in Bangladesh Society, Culture and Politics (Dhaka: Bangladesh Itihas Samiti, 1983), p. 233. The Daily Janakanta, 8 February 2002. Imtiaz Ahmed, “Bangladesh: Amid Hope and Despair”, South Asia Journal, no.13, July–September 2006, p.76. Hashmi, “Islam in Bangladesh Politics”, in Mutalib Hussin and Jay I. Hashmi (eds), Islam, Muslims and Modern State (London: Macnillan, 1994), pp. 125–7. Ibid. The Daily Janakanta, 8 February 2002. According to one estimate, 500 Islamic NGOs are working in the country. See Rashed Khan Menon, Bijoyer Maser Bhabna (Thoughts of the Month of Victory). USAID, “Bangladesh Current Conditions: Education” (August 2006) Dean Nelson, “India Fences off to Keep out Muslim Terror”, The Sunday Times, 13 November 2005, Sumit Ganguly, “The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh”, Special Report 171, prepared by the Centre for Conflict Analysis and Prevention of the US Institute for Peace, August 2006, <www.uspi.org> The Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, Partners of Global Terrorism, 2001, 21 May 2001. Ramananda Sengupta, “Bangladesh: The Rise of the Right”, 20 December 2005, At present there are at least 17 Islamist groups active in Bangladesh According to one estimate, 500 Islamic NGOs are working in the country. See Rashed Khan Menon, op. cit. Alex Perry, “Deadly Cargo”, Time Asia, 14 October 2002. Bertil Lintner, “Beware of Bangladesh: a Cocoon of Terror”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 April 2002. Sumit Ganguly, op. cit. “Building New Bases”, Frontline, 21 December 2007, p. 13. Sheela Bhatt, “ISI Now Outsources Terror to Bangladesh” J. N. Dixit, “Back to Square One: Being Prisoners of Attitude, India and Bangladesh find it difficult to Solve their Problems”, The Telegraph, 12 March 2003, Ramananda Sengupta, “Why India is concerned about Bangladesh”, 22 December 2005. Imtiaz Ahmed, “The Indo-Bangla SAARC Puzzle”, Himal South Asian, March 2007, Suman K Chakrabarti, “Bangladesh: The Terror Hotbed”, Chris Blackburn, “Terrorism in Bangladesh: the Region and Beyond”, Sheela Bhatt, op. cit. Ramananda Sengupta, “Why Bangladesh Hates India”, 21 December 2005,


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36 On 17 August 2005, radical Islamists under the leadership of Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh launched a nationwide attack by exploding 500 bombs. The blasts hit 63 of 64 districts in the country. In late 2005, a series of suicide bomb attacks were carried out in Bangladesh. Retrieved from 37 P.G. Rajamohan, “Terrorist Attack in Bangalore: A Profile”, IPCS Special Report, 10 January 2006, 38 39 The Hindu, 29 January 2008. 40 The Hindu, Editorial, Kochi, 14 February 2008. 41 Rohit Chopra, “The Cyber Presence of Babri Masjid: History, Politics and Difference in Online Indian Islam”, Economic and Political Weekly, 19–25 January 2008, XL111 (3), p. 47. 42 Swapan Das Gupta, “Islam versus India”, Seminar, 569, January 2007, p. 40. 43 Rohit Chopra, op. cit., p.53. 44 The conventional understanding of security focused more on military and physical security dimensions. In modern times human security is considered as an important attribute of security. The concept of human security became popular with the 1994 Human Development Report from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). According to the report human security broadly involves safety from threats such as poverty, disease and repression, and protection from harmful disruptions of daily life in both the public and private realms. For more details see United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 23. 45 Praveen Swami, “Terror Links”, Frontline, 21 December 2007, pp. 4–6. The proclamation was made by Mohammed Amir Shakeel Ahmad, a key SIMI activist who is connected to militants across the border.

10 Hizb ut-Tahrir 1 The Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) is the world’s oldest, largest, and the most influential Islamist organization. Since its founding in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood has sought to fuse religious revival with anti-imperialism, and resistance to foreign domination through exaltation and glorification of Islam. The Brotherhood differs from earlier reformers by combining a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political activism. The Muslim Brotherhood pursued an Islamic society through tarbiyya (preaching and educating), concentrating first on changing the outlook of individuals, then families, and finally societies. Although the Muslim Brotherhood’s origins were lower-middle class, it soon pushed Islamization into the local bourgeoisie. At the same time, it formed the armed Special Apparatus, replicating Young Egypt’s Greenshirts, the Wafd’s Blueshirts, nascent Nazi Brown-shirts, and other paramilitary organizations. For further details see, Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, Foreign Affairs, 86 (2), March/April 2007, 107–71. 2 Fatah, meaning “victory”, is a major Palestinian political party and the largest faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The founders included Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, Khaled Yashruti. Yasser Arafat led the group until his death in 2004. The Fatah, which espouses a Palestinian nationalist ideology in which Palestine would be liberated by the actions of Palestinian Arabs, was founded in 1954 by members of the Palestinian diaspora – principally professionals working in the Gulf States who had been refugees in Gaza and had gone on to study in Cairo or Beirut.


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3 Born in 1943 in the small village of Ra’na, Abu Yasin Ata ibn Khalil ibn Ahmad ibn Abdul Qadir al-Khatib Abu Rashta alias Ata Abu Rashta is an Islamic jurist, scholar and writer. He joined Hizb ut-Tahrir in the mid-1950s and subsequently carried out party activities throughout the Arab world. He worked closely with Taqi Al-Din Al-Nabhani, the founder of HT and Abdul Qadeem Zallum who succeeded Nabhani after his death in 1977. In the 1980s, Ata became a leading member of HT in Jordan and was appointed as its first official spokesperson. Abu Rashta came to prominence in Jordan during the Persian Gulf War when he convened press conferences, lectures and debates at public venues throughout the country. Abu Rashta became the global leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir on 13 April 2003 following the death of Abdul Qadeem Zallum. For further details, see accessed on 10 February 2008. 4 Ibid. 5 “Materials on Religious-Extremist Organization Hizb ut-Tahrir with proofs of its participation in terrorist activity”, <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc>, accessed on 10 February 2008. 6 Ibid. 7 Halka, literally meaning ‘circle’, is a forum for the study of Islamic sciences, in which a teacher or preacher delivers lessons on the basis of certain books. 8 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “The Rise of Political Islam in Kazakhstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir Al Islami”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 13, 303–4. 9 <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> 10 “The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign”, Central Asia Briefing Paper (Osh/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 30 January 2002), p. 7. 11 Ibid. 12 Anara Tabyshalieva, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s Increasing Activity in Central Asia”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 14 January 2004, 10, p. 9. 13 <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> 14 Emmanuel Karagiannis, op. cit., p. 315. 15 Ibid, p.306. 16 Mateen Siddiqui, “The Doctrine of Hizb ut-Tahrir”, in Zeyno Baran (ed.), The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology (Washington DC: The Nixon Center, September 2004), p. 3. 17 Central Asia Briefing Paper, p. 6. 18 Anara Tabyshalieva, op. cit. 19 Central Asia Briefing Paper, p. 6. 20 Ibragim Alibekov, “Karimov Believes Hizb-ut-Tahrir Behind Most Recent Tashkent Bombings”, Eurasia Insight, 2 August 2004, < www.eurasianet.org> accessed on 5 February 2008. 21 Gulnoza Saidazimova, “Central Asia: Banned Islamic Group Hizb ut-Tahrir Continues to Gain Members”, Eurasia Insight, 14 August 2007, <www.eurasianet. org> accessed on 14 August 2007. 22 Ibid. 23 Central Asia Briefing Paper, p. 7. 24 Hizb-an-Nusra (Party of Support) is an Islamist organization which the Uzbek government considers to be terrorist in nature that has operated in Uzbekistan since 1999. Some members of HT created Hizb-an-Nusra in Tashkent out of dissatisfaction with HT’s inability to overthrow the Government of Uzbekistan. 25 Alisher Khamidov, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir Faces Internal Split in Central Asia”, Eurasia Insight, 21 October 2003, <www.eurasianet.org> accessed on 10 October 2008.

200 26 27 28 29 30


31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

Notes <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. Saule Mukhametrakhimova, “Perception and Treatment of the ‘Extremist’ Islamic Group Hizb ut-Tahrir by Central Asian Governments”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4 (2), 2006, 53. Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. Ibid. <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. “Hizb ut-Tahrir on the Rise, Threatening European Nations – Russian Official”, accessed on 10 August 2008. Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. Bruce Pannier, “Kyrgyzstan: New Effort Aggressively Counters Hizb ut-Tahrir, Religious Extremism”, 15 February 2008 <www.eurasianet.org> accessed on 10 May 2008. Burt Herman, “Islamic Extremism Spreads in Central Asia”, 15 December 2003, accessed on 10 May 2008. Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. Farangis Najibullah, “Central Asia: Hizb ut-Tahrir Gains Support from Women”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 July 2007. Ibid. Central Asia Briefing Paper, p. 7. Ibid. Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. Ibid. Central Asia Briefing Paper, pp. 7–8. Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. Ibid. Central Asia Briefing Paper, pp. 7–8. Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. Ibid. <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> Ibid. Ibid. “Tajikistan: Hizb-ut-Tahrir Proclaimed an Extremist Organization”, 12 March 2008, accessed on 13 March 2008. <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> “Chinese Government Concerned about Hizb ut-Tahrir in Xinjiang”, <www. enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2434& print = 1> accessed on 31 July 2008. Ibid. Ibid. “Bangladesh Bans Hizb ut-Tahrir – Why?” Khilafah Magazine, <www.khilafah. org> accessed on 1 December 2009. Ibid. “Women and Radicalisation in Kyrgyzstan”, ICG Asia Report No. 176, Osh/ Brussels, 3 September 2009, p. 1. www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc Alexei Igushev, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir Remains Active in Central Asia”, Eurasia Insight, 4 February 2003, <www.eurasianet.org>, accessed on 8 August 2003.


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65 Kyrgyz special services information that the developments like the one in Iraq gave HT an opportunity to further expand its base by recruiting more members. For further details, see Alisher Khamidov, op. cit. 66 <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> 67 Mike Redman, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Making Inroads into Kazakhstan?”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, Issue 3, 4 June 2003. 68 “Hezb, Uighur Nationalists Seen as Kazakh Security Challenges”, Komsomolskaya Pravda Kazakhstan, Almaty, 27 January 2005, reproduced by BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 5 February 2005. 69 Anara Tabyshalieva, op. cit. 70 Saule Mukhametrakhimova, op. cit, p. 50. 71 Akromiya (sometimes referred as Akramiya) is an Islamist organisation founded by Akrom Yuldashev that has been designated as terrorist by the Government of Uzbekistan. Akromiya broke away from Hizb ut-Tahrir, when Yuldashev formed Akromiya in the Ferghana Valley area in Uzbekistan in 1996. 72 Central Asia Briefing Paper, pp. 7–8. 73 Alisher Khamidov, op. cit. 74 Ibid. 75 Alexei Igushev, op. cit. 76 Ibid. 77 Emmanuel Karagiannis, op. cit., p. 303. 78 Mike Redman, op. cit. 79 Emmanuel Karagiannis, op. cit, pp. 306–7. 80 Ibid., p. 308. 81 Alisher Khamidov, op. cit. 82 Emmanuel Karagiannis, op. cit., p. 303. 83 Ibid. 84 Alexei Igushev, op. cit. 85 Emmanuel Karagiannis, op. cit., p. 303. 86 Alisher Khamidov, op. cit. 87 <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> 88 Emmanuel Karagiannis, op. cit., p. 304. 89 Saule Mukhametrakhimova, op. cit., p. 51. 90 Davron Vali, “Banned Islamic Movement Increasingly Active in Tajikistan”, Eurasia Insight, 5 September 2002. <www.eurasianet.org>, accessed on 10 August 2008. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Anara Tabyshalieva, op. cit. 94 Alexei Igushev, op. cit. 95 Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. 96 97 Alexei Igushev, op. cit. 98 Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. 99 Ibragim Alibekov, op. cit. 100 Davron Vali, op. cit. 101 <www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc> 102 Ibid. 103 “Uzbekistan: Islamic Radical Cell Broken up in Tashkent”, 18 November 2008, Eurasia Insight accessed on 1 May 2009. 104 Ibid. 105 Alexei Igushev, op. cit. 106 Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. 107 Materials on Religious-Extremist Organization “Hizb ut-Tahrir”, op. cit.

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108 109 110 111 112 113

Ibid. ICG Asia Report No. 176, p. 1. Alexei Igushev, op. cit. ICG Asia Report No. 176, p. 1. Saule Mukhametrakhimova, op. cit, p. 52. Aisha Aslanbekova, “Islamic Groups Banned in Kyrgyzstan”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 14 January 2004, 9, p. 8. 114 Gulnoza Saidazimova, op. cit. 115 On 1 October 2008, people in Nookat village to the southwest of Osh were preparing for Orozo Ait (the local name for Eid al Fitr). HT cadres – with women forming the first row – protested against the government decision to cancel the festivities. In a bid to control the protesters, security officials took drastic action arresting 32 HT members, including two women, being charged with offences such as incitement to mass unrest, to overthrow the government and to foment religious strife. For details, see ICG Asia Report No. 176, pp. 3–4. 116 Bruce Pannier, op. cit. 11 Islamic radicalism in Central Asia 1 Zeyno Baran, F. S. Starr and S.E. Cornell, Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Implications for the EU (Washington DC: Central AsiaCaucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Programme, 2006). 2 Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment (Washington DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Programme, 2005). 12 Islam in contemporary Tajikistan 1 Abdujabbarov, “Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan” in Dale F. Eickelman (ed.), Russia’s Muslim Frontiers, Indiana University Press, 1993; Marta B. Olcott, “Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia,” in Yaacov Ro’i. (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (London, 1995). 2 The rigid position in these arguments is maintained by the American researchers, Allen Hetmanek and Muriel Atkin: see Allen Hetmanek, “Islamic Revolution and Jehad come to the former Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Tajikistan,” Central Asian Survey, 12 (18), 1994; Muriel Atkin, “Religious and Other Identities in Central Asia,” in Jo. Ann Gross (ed.), Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1992). Muriel Atkin, “Tajikistan: Reform, Reaction and Civil War,” in Ian Bremmer and Roy Taras (eds.), New States, New Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Stephane Dudoignon’s view that Islamic revival in Central Asia had roots of its own seems to be fairly sound: see Stephane Dudoignon, “Political Parties and Forces in Tajikistan, 1989–93,” in Mohammad Reza Djahlili, Frederic Grare and Shirin Akiner (eds.), Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998). 3 For example, see Yaacov Roi, “Islam in the Soviet Union after the Second World War,” in M.V. Iordan, R.G. Kuzeev, and S.M.Chervonnaya, Islam in Eurasia: Contemporary Ethic and Aesthetic Concepts of Sunni Islam, Their Transformation in Mass Perception and Expression in the art of Muslim Peoples of Russia (Moscow: Progress – Traditziya, 2001), pp. 157–70. 4 F. Khojaev, “About History of Revolution in Bukhara and National Division in Central Asia,” in F. Khojaev, Selectas (Tashkent, 1970), vol.1, part 1; Carrere D’Encause, Islam and Russian Empire. Reform and Revolution (London, 1988); E. Allworth (ed.), Central Asia: 130 years of Russian Dominance (London, 1994). 5 Central State Archive RF, f.1318. OP.I archive unit1694, l. 17


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6 Just a small part of that library survived until now, which is kept in houses of Khalifa Akhmadbek’s friends and relatives. 7 Interview by this author with Ubaidullo Mahammadjonov in Dushanbe. 8 Interview by this author with Marasul Aldirov in Isfara. 9 Interview by this author with Khalifa Juma Rahmatulloev, Porshnev, GBAO. 10 Shamsuddin Babahanov. Mufti Ziyauddinhan ibn Eshon Babahan. Uzbekiston millii entziclopediasi, Tashkent, 1999, pp. 22–23. 11 Interview by this author with Ubaidullo Mahammadjonov, Dushanbe. 12 A British researcher and journalist, Monica Whitlock, published a book in London in 2002 describing impetuous developments in the 1990s in Central Asian countries of which she became a witness herself by virtue of her journalistic activities. The book provides insights into the history of the region over the last 100 years with particular reference to enlighteners. The author was the first to present to the English-speaking reader autobiographical data on Muhammadjon Rustamov. The book is called Beyond the Oxus. The Central Asians (London: John Murray, 2002). 13 Interview by this author with Hasan Hakamov, Bokhtar district. 14 Interview by this author with Mullo Muhsin, Mullo Dodarbek, Mullo Abdulhai and others. 15 Interview with Mavlavi Ishoqjon Kukandi, Kokand, Uzbekistan. 16 Brief information about them is available in A. Abdujabbarov, “Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan,” in Dale F. Eickelman, op. cit., pp. 79–100; A. Abdujabbarov, “Independent Uzbekistan: A Muslim Community in Development,” in Michael Bordeaux (ed.), The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (New York, 1995), pp. 293–305; Martha B. Olcott, “Islam and Fundamentalism in Independent Central Asia,” in Yaacov Roi, op. cit., pp. 21–40. 17 Interview by this author with Domullo Haknazar Sobir. 18 According to the public opinion poll in May 2009, 94.8 percent of respondents reported themselves as Muslims, although the degree of adherence to religious norms varied quite widely. 89.2 percent of the population of Tajikistan are followers of Hanafi branch of Sunni Islam, 3.9 percent of population are Shi’a Muslims including 1.4 percent of Ismaili Muslims, and 0.2 percent are Christians, who comprise mostly ethnic Russians and other ethnic minorities. According to some estimates, there are about 20,000 Salafiya followers. The Ministry of Culture reports that there are currently 3,242 officially operating mosques including 259 Friday mosques in addition to 18 religious educational institutions. 19 In 2004, the Council of Ulemma issued a fatwa (edict) prohibiting women from praying in mosques. The fatwa is still in effect, although a number of unregistered mosques allow women to pray. The Council of Ulemma justified the fatwa by arguing that traditionally women did not pray in mosques. 20 In 2007, the Minister of Education announced that according to the new dress code, female students could not wear hijab in public educational institutions. This announcement followed the official ban on wearing of hijab in educational institutions, which was introduced in 2005. Although the implementation of the ban in 2005–7 was not uniform in different regions of Tajikistan, since 2007 many female students and instructors were expelled from educational institutions for wearing hijab. 21 In 2005–8, the government authorities closed down many unregistered mosques and prayer rooms and demolished three unregistered mosques in Dushanbe. However, most of the previously closed down mosques were permitted to function later. 22 Although Hizb ut-Tahrir has been legally banned since 2000, the Supreme Court gave punishment for distribution and popularization of information about Hizb ut-Tahrir in mass media and on the Internet in 2008.

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23 Arne C. Seifert and Anna Kreikemeyer, “Preventive stabilization through secular and Islamist compromises,” in Arne C. Seifert and Anna Kreikemeyer, eds., O sovmestimosti politicheskogo islama i bezopasnosti v prostranstve OBSE. Dokumenti svetsko-islamskogo dialoga v Tadjikistane. [On compatibility of Political Islam and Security in Space of OSCE. Documents of Secular – Islamic Dialogue in Tajikistan], Dushanbe, 2003, pp. 8–26. 24 A. Malashenko and S. Filatov (eds.), Religion and Globalization in the Expanses of Eurasia (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2005), p. 201. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., p. 199.


13 Ethnic-religious separatism in Xinjiang 1 Yuan Qingli, “Population Change in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (1949–89)”, Central Asian Survey, 9 (1), 1990, p. 49. 2 K. Warikoo, “China and Central Asia: A Review of Ching Policy in Xinjiang, 1755–1884”, in K. Warikoo and Dawa Norbu, Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia (New Delhi, 1992), pp. 2–20. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 Owen Lattimore, “Chinese Turkestan”, in his Studies in Frontier History, Collected Papers, 1928–58 (London, 1962), p. 184. 8 K. Warikoo, “Chinese Turkestan during the Nineteenth Century: A Socioeconomic study”, Central Asian Survey, 4 (3), 1985, 74–5. 9 K. Warikoo, “Muslim Migrations from Xinjiang to Kashmir”, Strategic Analysis, 14 (1), April 1991, 18. 10 Ibid., p. 29. 11 Lillian Craig Harris, “Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China’s Policy in the Islamic World”, China Quarterly, March 1993, 115. 12 Ibid., p. 116. 13 Yuan Qing Li, op cit., p. 59. 14 Xinjiang Government, Xinjiang: A General Survey, (Beijing, 1989), pp. 28–43. 15 Ibid. 16 Xinjiang Annual Urumqi, 1995. 17 Dru Gladney, “The Muslim Face of China”, Current History, September 1993, p. 280. 18 “The Other China”, Newsweek, 23 April 1990. The reporter found Han cabbies reluctant to pass through the Uyghur-dominated areas. 19 Washington Post, 12 September 1981. 20 Donald H. Mc. Millian, “Xinjiang and Wang Enmao”, China Quarterly, September 1984, 575–6, 581. 21 Los Angeles Times, 4 November 1981. 22 Ibid. 23 Washington Post, 12 September 1981. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Yan Dig, “Nuclear Pollution and Violation of Human Rights in Xinjiang”, Minzhu Zhongguo, Paris (in Chinese). February 1992, 19–21. 27 Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 August 1988. 28 Ibid. 29 JPRS-CZR-91-009, 25 February 1991. 30 Ibid.


Notes 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

205

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Eastern Turkestan Information, Munich, January 1992, p. 5. Ibid., October 1992, p. 1. Ibid. Ibid. Xinjiang Ribao, Urumqi, 27 September 1996. Ibid. JPRS-CAR-90-035 dated 7 May 1990. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Xinjiang Ribao, 18 March 1990. Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 April 1990. Ibid. Ibid. FBIS-CHI-90-070 dated 11 April 1990. Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 May 1990. Ibid. FBIS-CHI-90-070 dated 11 April 1990. Ibid. Xinjiang Ribao, 20 July 1990. Xinjiang Ribao, 2 August 1990. See also JPRS-CAR, 90–073 dated 28 September 1990. Ming Pao, Hong Kong, 10 February 1997. International Herald Tribune, 10 March 1997, p. 4. Cited in Hindu, 15 April 1997. Ahmed Rahid, “The Chinese Connection”, The Herald, Karachi, December 1995. Ibid. Hindustan Times, 13 August 1997. Pioneer, 6 May 1997. China Daily, 28 June 1999. China State Council “‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity” (21 January 2002), (Reproduced in News from China, Beijing, 29 January–11 February 2002), p. 8. Ibid., p. 7. See statement by Rebiya Kadeer, President, World Uyghur Congress at the 4th Session of UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, 12–30 March 2007, p. 3. Ibid. Ibid. “Xinjiang Attack: China Looking at Qaida Link”, Times of India, New Delhi, 12; August 2008. Lindsay Beck, “Xinjiang: China Admits ‘Life and Death Battle’”, Indian Express, New Delhi, 15 August 2008. Saibal Dasgupta, “China Finds Pak Link to Uyghur Terror”, Times of India, 23 October 2008, p. 23. Ibid. Cited in Indian Express, 10 April 2009. Ibid The official Xinhua News Agency gave these details. See Times of India, 12 July 2009. See also Zou Yonghong, “What really happened at Urumqi on July 5”, The Hindu, 12 July 2009, p. 9.


206 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

Notes See Times of India, 8 July 2009. Cited in The Hindu, 8 July 2009. Ibid. Hindustan Times, 9 July 2009. Times of India, 9 July 2009. Ibid. Hindustan Times, 10 July 2009. Ibid. Zou Yonghong, op. cit. Cited in Hindustan Times, 4 September 2009. The Hindu, 5 September 2009. Times of India, 23 December 2009. Dawn, Karachi cited in Times of India, New Delhi, 7 March 1992. Linda Benson, Justin Rudelson and Stenely W. Toops, “Xinjiang in the Twentieth Century” Woodrow Wilson Centre Occasional Paper, 65, p. 17.


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Index

9/11 6, 7, 10, 27, 44, 76, 98, 124, 132, 169 Abd-al-Wahab 1 Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad 67, 68, 70, 71, 73 Abdur Rahmen, Sheikh 109 Abu Masood 52 Adolat 162 Afghan conflict 4 Afghan Taliban 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17 Afghani, Jamal-ud-din 1 Afghanistan 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10–22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 33, 35, 37–51, 57, 64, 76, 77, 80, 97, 101, 103, 106, 109, 118, 123, 127, 130, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153, 155, 156, 159, 161, 164, 174, 177 Ahl-e-Hadith Andolan Bangladesh (AHAB) 97, 108–109, 113 Ahl-e-Hadith 52, 54, 61, 69, 79 Ahl-e-Itqad 73 Ahmed Rashid 5 Akbar 84 Akromiya 6, 127, 133, 142, 144, 156, 163 Aksu 169 Al Badr 78, 116 Al Barq 79 Al Jihad Force 78 Al Qaeda 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 25, 27, 33, 37–51, 102, 106, 109, 113, 118, 124, 130, 131, 133, 137, 138, 140, 142, 176 Al Umar Mujahideen 78 Algeria 3 Al-Haramain Foundation 109, 113 Aliya madrassas 104, 105 All India Muslim League 116

All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) 68, 75, 82 Allah Tigers 78, 79 Almass, Turghun 170 Al-Muhadjirun 131 Al-Nabhani, Sheikh Taqi Al-Din 124, 126, 142, 145, 148 Alptekin, Erkin 171 Alptekin, Isa Yusuf 171 Al-Waie 128, 132, 141, 128 America (see USA) Amir 125 Andijan 140, 142, 144, 145 Anjuman Nusrat-ul-Islam 68 Ansari, Jalees 52 Arya Samaj 59 Asad Durrani 30 Ashley Tellis 10 Aurganzeb 104 Awami League (AL) 96, 99, 102, 103, 107, 111, 113, 114, 116, 119 Awami National Party (ANP) 20, 26, 28 Baba Farid 84 Babri Masjid 121 Badakhshan 143, 152 Baitullah Mehsud 16, 19, 20, 24, 37, 39, 40 Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad 71 Balochistan 15, 55 Bamiyan Buddhas 43 Banaras 8, 57, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95 Bangla Bhai 105, 112 Bangladesh Islamic Manch 102 Bangladesh National Party (BNP) 96, 98, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 113, 117

Index


Bangladesh 3, 8, 55, 56, 57, 67, 68, 96–123, 131, 132 Bengal 115, 116 Bhutto, Benazir 16, 20, 37 Bhutto, Z. A. 72 Bidat 69 Bismillah Khan, Ustad 83, 86, 91, 94 Bonn Agreement 41, 48 Bortala 173 Bukhara 67, 136, 151, 162, 164 Bush, George 43 Caliphate (see Islamic Caliphate) Cambodia 178 Central Asia 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 47, 48, 67, 80, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139–149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 171, 172, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182 Central Asian Republics (see Central Asia) Central Asian Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (CASDM) 153, 154, 155 Chechnya 126, 127 China 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 126, 131, 143, 159, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182 Coalition Forces 18 Cold War 2, 3, 48 CSTO 48 Curzon, Lord 115 Damulla, Sodit 165 Daniel Pearl 53 Dar al-Islam 2, 126 Dar al-Kufr 125 Dara Shikoh 85 Dar-al-Harb 2, 126 Dars-e-Nizami 104 Dar-ul-Ulum 69 Dawamat, Tomur 172, 173 Dawat 101, 106 Deedat, Sheikh Ahmed 62 Deng Xiaoping 169 Din-e-Ilahi 84 Dukhtaran-e-Millat 75, 78 Durand Line 7, 12, 22, 37, 46 Durrani 11, 12 Dzungaria 164 East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 3, 143, 176

213

East Turkestan Islamic Republic 165, 166, 173 Ejaz-ul-Haq 32, 33 Ershad, General Hussain Muhammad 116, 117 Ethno-Religious separatism in Xinjiang 164–182 EU 42, 147, 148 Fahim, Mohammad Qasim 42 Falah-e-Aam Trust 74 FATA 4, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 177 Fauji Foundation 31 Fazlur Rehmen 97 Ferghana 5, 135, 136, 139, 140, 146, 152, 156 Fidayeen 57 Fidokarlar 128 Ganga 85 Ganga-Jamuni Tehzeeb 86, 87, 90, 93, 94 Ghaswala 54, 55 Ghilzai 11, 15 Gilani, Syed Ali Shah 75, 76, 77 Gilgit-Baltistan 35 Gorbachev 172 Great Wall 164 Gujarat 54, 55 Hadith 2, 71, 75 Halqa 125, 130 Hanafi 4, 160 Hans 7, 167, 168, 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 181 Haqqani 5, 12 Harkat ul-Muhojirinfi Britaniya 130, 132 Harkat-ul-Ansar 79, 81 Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami (HuJI) 3, 55, 56, 97, 102, 103, 106–108, 118, 121 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) 3, 81 Hassan Abbas 17, 53 Hassan-al-Banna 1 Hekmatyar, Gulbudin 11, 12, 42 Hijab 31 Hilal-e-Ahmar 75 Hizb ut-Tahrir 3, 5, 6, 111, 118, 124–138, 140, 141, 150, 158, 160, 175 Hizb-an-Nusra 127, 133, 142 Hizb-i-Islami 11, 12, 19, 42 Hizbul Mujahideen 3, 53, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 119

214

Index


Holbrooke, Richard 43 Hotaki 11 Hu Jintao 177, 178 Hudood 30 Hyderabad 52, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 121 Ikhwan-ul-Musalmeen 1, 75 Ili 170 Indira Gandhi 67, 71 Indonesia 131 Indo-Pakistan war, 1965 67 International Islamic Front (IIF) 4, 118 Iqbal Memorial Trust 74 Iran 3, 47–48, 77, 80, 145, 159, 181 ISAF 10, 13, 17, 19, 39 Islam in Tajikistan 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163 Islam Karimov 5, 6, 127, 128, 135, 136, 148 Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba (IJT) 72, 74, 77 Islami Okiye Jote (IOJ) 98, 102, 104, 117 Islamic Biplobi Parishad 118 Islamic Caliphate 3, 4, 6, 78, 80, 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 133, 136, 143, 146 Islamic extremism in Bangladesh 96–114 Islamic extremism in Central Asia 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149 Islamic Extremism in Kashmir 67–82 Islamic Liberation Party 131 Islamic Movement of Central Asia 143 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 3, 5, 6, 130, 133, 135, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 156, 158, 162 Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) 6, 135 Islamic Revival Movement of Tajikistan (IRMT) 157, 158, 162 Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) 150, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162 Islamic Revolutionary Party of Iran 1 Islamic state 1, 2, 143 Islamic Students League 78 Islamic Study Circle 74 Islom Nizami 125 Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) 98, 103, 105, 109–111, 112, 118 Jaish-e-Mohammad 3, 5, 16, 25, 53 Jalalabad 128, 129, 144

Jamaat-e-Islami Hind 71 Jamaat-e-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79 Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan 1, 3, 20, 25, 30, 71, 80, 174, 180 Jamaat-e-Islami 116, 117 Jamaat-ud-Dawa 31, 57, 63 Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) 97, 102, 103, 105, 109, 110, 111, 113 Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam 16, 26 Jamiat-ul-Ahle-Hadith 108 Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen 78, 79 Jammu and Kashmir (see Kashmir) Janabil 173 Jihad 2, 3, 7, 8, 12, 15, 17, 23, 25, 27, 32, 34, 47, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 64–66, 72, 76, 77, 81, 97, 101–103, 118, 125, 126, 128, 129, 134, 136, 141, 142, 173–176 Jinnah, M. A. 67 Jombesh 11 Jordan 130, 131, 159 Kabir Das 84, 85 Kabiri, Muhiddin 158 Kafir 2, 60, 110 Karakoram Highway 171, 173, 179 Kargil 57 Karnataka Forum for Dignity 121 Karzai, Hamid 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 50 Kashghar 131, 165, 169, 172, 173, 174, 176, 179 Kashmir 3, 7, 8, 25, 27, 32, 33, 47, 52, 53, 56, 57, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67–82, 118, 120 Kashmiri Pandits 82 Kashmiriyat 76 Kayani, General 21 Kazakhstan 6, 7, 132, 133, 134–135, 141, 143, 147, 169, 171 Khaleda Zia 98, 107, 113 Khan, Usman Ali 58, 59 Khilafat 111 Khoja Niaz 165 Khomeini revolution 77 Khomeini, Ayatollah 1 Khotan 131, 165, 173 Kiedat 125 Kokand 164, 165 Korla 173 Kuqa 173, 176

Index


Kuwait 72, 75, 108, 112, 121 Kyrgyz National Security Service 128, 129 Kyrgyzstan 3, 5, 7, 128, 129, 130, 133, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 151, 152, 153, 171 Lal Masjid 30, 32, 37, 40, 81 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 40 Lashkar-e-Tayyeba 3, 5, 25, 32, 40, 52, 60, 79, 80, 81, 119 Lebanon 131 Li-fan yuan 165 Lone, Abdul Gani 82 Lop Nor 169 Madrassas 2, 16, 24, 32, 69, 71, 72, 75, 77, 82, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109, 112, 117, 118, 151, 163, 170, 172, 174 Majlis al-Umaah 126 Majlis-e-Ittehad ul-Muslimeen 59 Makki, Abdul Rahman 58, 64, 65 Malakand 23, 35 Manmohan Singh 54 Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad 79, 81 Masoud, Ahmed Shah 43 Mast Gul 80 Maulana Fazlur Rehman 29, 30 Maulavi Hindustoni 154, 155, 156 Maulavi Nazir 19, 20 Mawdudi, Maulana 1, 2, 68, 70 Mazar-e-Sherif 48 McChrystal, General 38, 39 Middle East 100, 101, 132, 159, 166, 181 Millat 2, 76 Mings 165 Mir Qasim, Syed 71 Mirwaiz 68 Momin 2 Mominpura 52 Mongolia 165 Motaki 11 MQM 20 Muharram 85 Mujaddadiya 156 Mujahideen 3, 13, 15, 19, 41, 45, 79, 80, 81, 97, 106, 173, 174 Mujibur Rehman, Sheikh 96, 100, 116 Mullah Omar 10, 12, 13, 17, 30, 38, 161 Mullahs 9, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 36, 68, 73, 152, 155, 156, 162 Mumbai 52, 53, 54, 55, 63 Muridke 25

215

Musharraf, Pervez 10, 15, 21, 26, 28, 32, 33, 39, 53, 63, 64, 65, 66, 128 Mushrif 125 Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt 1 Muslim Conference 68 Muslim Education Trust 74 Muslim League 97, 116, 117 Muslim United Front 74, 77 Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam 102 Muslim Welfare Society 75 Mutamad 125 Nadeem, Omar Sheikh 77, 78 Naik, Zakir 61, 62 Namangan 5 Namangani, Juma 5, 6 Naqib 125 National Conference 67, 70, 73 National Democratic Front 121 NATO 13, 14, 20, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 50 Nazarbayev, Nursultan 6, 134 Niyaz, A. 172 Nizam-e-Mustafa 69, 75, 76, 77, 78, 97 North East India 120 Northern Alliance 17, 43 NSCN 120 Nuri, Said Abdullo 135, 156, 158, 161 NWFP 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 26, 29, 35, 38 Obama, Barak 42 Ong-al-Waie 126, 127 Operation Enduring Freedom 38, 45, 143 Operation Gibralter 67 Operation Medusa 13 Operation Parakram 53 Operation Rah-e-Nijat 23, 24 Operation Rah-e-Rast 23 Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) 100, 159, 171 Osama bin Laden 2, 4, 20, 30, 38, 40, 62, 77, 97, 106, 108, 118, 137 Osh 127, 137, 146 Pakistan Muslim League (Q) 26, 177 Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) 109, 171 Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) 20, 26, 28 Pakistan 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23–36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64,


216

Index

65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 96, 99, 100, 102, 105, 109, 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 121, 122, 123, 130, 141, 142, 145, 146, 159, 164, 168, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182 Pakistani Taliban 15, 16, 17, 23, 40 Palestine 118, 161 Pashtun 11, 14, 24, 26, 27, 28 Pashtunistan 46 Peoples League 79 Plebiscite Front 67 Punjab 24, 25 Qings 165 Qital 2, 109, 110 Quami madrassas 104, 105 Rabbani, Burhanuddin 42 Rabita Alam-e-Islamia 75 Rafsanjani 181 Rahim, Mohammad Qasim 42 Rahmon, Emomali 160 Ram Lila 85 Rashid Dostum 41, 44 Rasool shah, Maulana 68 Razakars 59 Rebiya Kadeer 177, 178 Rishis 67, 79, 80 Russia 131 Sachetan Islami Janata 107 Saeed, Hafiz Mohammad 57, 63, 64, 80, 81 Sahrai, Ashraf 75 Salafi 54, 61, 62 Salafiya 160 Salman Rushdie 33 Sankat Mochan Temple 89, 90, 93, 121 Sarboharas 110, 112 Saudi Arabia 5, 101, 103 Saudi Arabia 58, 72 Sayyid Qutb 1 SCO 130, 182 Shanghai 169, 177 Shariah 3, 16, 24, 29, 30, 35, 68, 70, 77 Shariat 97, 98, 108 Sheikh Hasina 107 Sheikh, Rahil Abdul Rehman 53, 54, 56, 61 Shura 12, 109 Students Islamic Federation 77 Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) 55, 106, 121

Sudan 3 Sufi Rehman Baba 7 Sufis 7, 84 Swat 23, 24 Syed Ahmed Barelvi 23 Syncretism 84, 161 Tableeghi Jamaat 6 Taghut 110 Tahmini, Assad 124 Tajikistan 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141, 145, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163 Taliban 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10–22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 33, 34, 37–51, 97, 102, 103, 106, 118, 123, 130, 138, 142, 161, 180 Tana Bana 86, 87, 90, 93, 94 Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen 52 Tariq Azizuddin 37, 38 Taslima Nasreen 60 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 5, 16, 17, 24, 25 Tibet 165 Turfan 166, 179 Turkey 148, 171, 177, 179, 180 Ulemma 1, 97, 122, 153, ULFA 118, 120 Umar Farooq, Mirwaiz 68 Ummah 1, 2, 8, 13, 76, 78, 102, 103 United Tajik Opposition (UTO) 157 UNODC 49, 50 UNPO 172 Urumqi 169, 173, 174, 177, 178, 179 USA 8, 49, 53,64, 78, 97, 103, 107, 108, 124, 132, 134, 171 USAID 49 Uyghur 7, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 170, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180 Uzbekistan 3, 5, 6, 128, 130, 133, 136, 140, 141, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 176 Vajpayee, Atal Behari 53 Varanasi (see Banaras) Vishwanath Temple 87 Wahdat-i-Islami 79 Wahhabi 1, 6, 82, 101, 126, 156 Wali Khan 20 Wang Enmao 169, 173 Wang Feng 169, 172

Index Wang Lequan 176 Waqf 151 Waziristan 4, 5, 6, 15, 19, 23, 24, 31, 32, 38, 40, 142, 143 West Bengal 119, 120 World Uyghur Congress 177, 178 Xi Jinping 179 Xinjiang 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 131, 146–182


Yining 173, 174 Yuldashev, Akrom 127

Yuldashev, Tohir 5, 6, 130, 142, 143 Yusuf Shah, Mirwaiz 68, 69 Zakat 101 Zallum, Abd al-Qadim 124, 132 Zarb-e-Taiba 64 Zardari, Asaf Ali 176, 177 Ziarat 2, 70 Zia-ul-Haq 179 Zia-ur-Rahman 96, 99, 100, 116, 117 Zimmi 2

217

Religion and Security in South and Central Asia

South Asia and Central Asia: Geopolitical Dynamics

South Asia and Central Asia: Geopolitical Dynamics

Religion And Violence In South Asia

Religion and Conflict in South and South-East Asia: Disrupting Violence (Asian Security Studies)

Religion and Ecology in India and South East Asia

Religion in Literature and Film in South Asia

Central Asia and Caucasus

Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia

Media and the Transformation of Religion in South Asia

Climate Change and Food Security in South Asia

Media and the transformation of religion in South Asia

War and Escalation in South Asia

Language in South Asia

Globalisation and Employment in South Asia: The South Asian Experience

Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Contemporary South Asia)

A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security Discourse (Politics in Asia)

Civil Society In Central Asia

Boats of South Asia (Routledge Studies in South Asia)

Energy Security in Asia (Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series)

Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge Security in Asia Series)

Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror? (Routledge Contemporary South Asia)

Strategies for Achieving Food Security in Central Asia

South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora (Routledge South Asian Religion)

Language Variation in South Asia

War Escalation in South Asia

Magmatism geodynamics, and metallogeny of Central Asia

Lizards and Turtles of South Central Texas

People In Nature: Wildlife Conservation in South and Central America

Politics and Religion in the White South (Religion in the South)

Religion and Security in South and Central Asia

South Asia and Central Asia: Geopolitical Dynamics

South Asia and Central Asia: Geopolitical Dynamics

Religion And Violence In South Asia

Religion and Conflict in South and South-East Asia: Disrupting Violence (Asian Security Studies)

Religion and Ecology in India and South East Asia

Religion in Literature and Film in South Asia

Central Asia and Caucasus

Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia

Media and the Transformation of Religion in South Asia

Climate Change and Food Security in South Asia

Media and the transformation of religion in South Asia

War and Escalation in South Asia

Language in South Asia

Globalisation and Employment in South Asia: The South Asian Experience

Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Contemporary South Asia)

A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security Discourse (Politics in Asia)

Civil Society In Central Asia

Boats of South Asia (Routledge Studies in South Asia)

Energy Security in Asia (Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series)

Maritime Security in Southeast Asia (Routledge Security in Asia Series)

Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror? (Routledge Contemporary South Asia)

Strategies for Achieving Food Security in Central Asia

South Asian Religions on Display: Religious Processions in South Asia and in the Diaspora (Routledge South Asian Religion)

Language Variation in South Asia

War Escalation in South Asia

Magmatism geodynamics, and metallogeny of Central Asia

Lizards and Turtles of South Central Texas

People In Nature: Wildlife Conservation in South and Central America

Politics and Religion in the White South (Religion in the South)

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