Reforming the UN: The Struggle for Legitimacy And Effectiveness

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Reforming the United Nations The Struggle for Legitimacy and Effectiveness

edited by

Joachim Müller

MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS LEIDEN / BOSTON

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Printed on acid-free paper.

ISBN 10 ISBN 13

90 04 15131 1 978 90 04 15131 4

© 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. http://www.brill.nl All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill Academic Publishers provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. Printed and bound in The Netherlands.

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PREFACE The United Nations has undergone a new phase of adjustment and repositioning in recent years. The legitimacy and effectiveness of the Organization were questioned in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The investigation of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme raised issues of integrity and management competence. Apparent shortcomings in the human rights machinery and peacekeeping came to the forefront. At the same time, the services of the Organization were in demand; for example, peacekeeping operations doubled during recent years and now account for half of the Organization’s activities. In response to this crisis, the very foundations of the Organization were questioned and there were discussions on the nature of new threats, the right of self-defence, the legitimacy of preventive and pre-emptive action, the response to terrorism and the reform of the Security Council. The search for new concepts and proposals included a number of high-level United Nations expert groups and certain congressional initiatives in the United States. The Secretary-General’s reform package was proposed to the World Summit in September 2005, linking security, human rights and development matters. The 2005 World Summit was able to reach agreement on some important new directions to strengthen the United Nations and multilateralism. Innovative concepts were approved such as a ‘new security consensus’ and the collective ‘responsibility to protect’ and new institutional arrangements were established, including the Peacebuilding Commission and the new Human Rights Council. The grand bargain, however, was not achieved as initially intended. Key institutional adjustments were not approved, such as the reform of the Security Council; there was a lack of progress on the issue of terrorism and few new commitments with regard to development. Finally, progress on management reform was painfully slow. The Secretary-General has often initiated and facilitated reform processes, which fall into the realm of national sensitivities and require the close involvement and approval of member states. The cautious approach suitable for diplomatic negotiations has also been applied in the case of management reform. Past and recent initiatives have been modest and late, and tended to be imposed rather than developed from the inside. Clearly, there is a need for leadership and a more proactive approach. The fragmentation of the United Nations and of the organizations within the United Nations system raises further barriers to implementing reforms. Initiatives approved centrally are often watered down or not implemented by independent or semi-independent sister organizations. Reconciling the different priorities and national interests of 191 member states is, however, the basic challenge for United Nations reform. Proposals for fundamental reforms in the areas of security, human rights and management were put forward primarily by the United States. The developed countries of the North, in particular Japan and a number of European countries have, in general, been positive to such initiatives. The developing countries of the South, however, have adopted a more cautious and reserved approach. Agreement to reforms was coupled with demands for concessions in the area of development, trade and debt relief – the logic of the proposed grand bargain. Some, however, saw reform as an attempt to facilitate intervention by the powerful countries into their national sovereign domains. In parallel, weakening the position of the developing countries within the United Nations was seen as the driving force of institutional reform

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that involved limiting the role of the General Assembly and strengthening the 15-member Security Council as well as increasing the prerogatives of the Secretary-General. The developing countries perceived this package of changes as a loss of policy space at home and in the United Nations. In response, efforts to preserve the status quo were seen by other nations as blocking progress or negativism. The condition for reaching agreement on reform, however, is consensus and the price to be paid is the adjustment of proposals to the lowest common denominator. To do otherwise may require the extraordinary circumstances of a catalytic event, such as the end of the Cold War, which allowed for the revitalization of the United Nations in the early 1990s. It might also require a group of visionary leaders who are prepared to make the necessary compromises. In the absence of those factors, for all the logic and promise of a grand bargain, such as the World Summit attempted to reach, it is destined to fail and reform in the United Nations will remain a cumbersome and lengthy step-by-step process. The publication Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Effectiveness captures the recent reform efforts, which unfolded during the period from 2003 to 2006. Events leading up to the 2005 World Summit and the subsequent follow-up are described in Part I of the publication. In Part II, the key reform documents are presented. This focus makes the publication unique. It provides an authentic, comprehensive, in-depth description of important reform initiatives based on primary sources. In so doing, it brings together a wealth of information, identifying the major interest groups, the mechanisms and constraints of the reform process and the impact of major reform initiatives. A short summary of previous reform efforts is presented in Chapter 1 (The History of United Nations Reform Efforts, 1950 to 2002) of Part I. In Section 1.1 (Cold War, NorthSouth Conflict and the Revitalization of the United Nations, 1950 to 1996), there is a discussion of the initiatives launched by the Soviet Union during the East-West antagonism in the 1950s, the expansion of the United Nations in the development field following the decolonization period in the 1960s and negotiations on a New International Economic Order as part of the North-South conflict in the 1970s. The 1980s were characterized by financial crisis, stagnation and the retreat of the United States, which triggered a reform of the budgetary process and the downsizing of the Organization. With the end of the Cold War, the rediscovery and renaissance of the United Nations was hailed; there was a major expansion of the Organization and the reform associated with the Agenda for Peace launched by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in the first half of the 1990s. In the wake of disappointment with the peacekeeping operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, there was a marked retreat from assertive multilateralism in the second half of the 1990s, followed by renewed financial withholding and budgetary adjustments. As outlined in Section 1.2 (Structural Adjustments and a New Vision: The Quiet Revolution, 1997 to 2002) of Chapter 1, the incoming Secretary-General Kofi Annan moved quickly in the late 1990s to address some of the Organization’s structural shortcomings. In an initiative known as the Quiet Revolution, he made the fragmented Organization more coherent, pulled together the development system, created more effective humanitarian structures, improved the capacity to manage peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, energized the fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic and improved partnership between the United Nations and international business as part of a Global Compact. Other reforms included the upgrading and revamping of peacekeeping operations following the Brahimi Report and the introduction of a new assessment scale to meet the United States’ demands. The initiative led to the Millennium Summit in 2000,

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which approved the Millennium Development Goals to combat poverty, hunger, disease and environmental degradation. As outlined in Section 1.3 (Security Council Reform: The Unfinished Business) of Chapter 1, the efforts launched initially launched in 1992 to reform the Security Council had not been successful by the time of the 2000 Millennium Summit, as initially planned. This was particularly discouraging for the aspiring new permanent members Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. Chapter 2 (New Reform Initiatives: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 2003 to 2006) of Part I reviews the most recent reform initiatives and discusses in more detail the key reform documents presented in Part II. As outlined in Section 2.1 (September 11, Iraq and the Issue of Collective Security), the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had a profound impact on the United States, the world and thereby the United Nations. Because of the new threats, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the traditional strategies of deterrence and containment were no longer considered sufficient. The understanding of self-defence as stipulated in the United Nations Charter was seen to include pre-emptive action against potential aggressors. The invasion of Iraq marked the end of a long process starting with the occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in 1990. It also split the United Nations and was seen as a test of its relevance. Following the terrorist attacks against the United Nations office in Baghdad, the United Nations pulled out of Iraq. As Section 2.2 (A Fork in the Road: The Need for a Fundamental Assessment of the United Nations) reveals, the inability of the Security Council to either endorse or prevent military action in Iraq resulted in a crisis of relevance in the United Nations. Moreover, scepticism with regard to its relevance was linked to the failure to act promptly and decisively to deal with the situation in Darfur, as had previously been the case in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In September 2003, in the middle of his second term, the Secretary-General announced the need to fundamentally reassess the functioning of the Organization and to forge a new consensus on collective security. To this end, the Secretary-General gave two groups of experts a mandate to formulate proposals, based on which he intended to present his own reform report to the World Summit in 2005. This included the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to set out a new vision of collective security for the twenty-first, century as described in Section 2.3, and the UN Millennium Project, headed by Jeffrey Sachs, to recommend a global plan for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, as described in Section 2.4. Section 2.3 (High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure World) presents the High-level Panel’s report ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ (shown in Part II as document 1), issued in December 2004. The proposed reform proposals are highlighted, including the new security consensus, a new concept known as responsibility to protect, the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, a definition of terrorism considered essential to move towards a comprehensive convention against terrorism, and options for the reform of the Security Council. Also presented are the Panel’s consideration of the need to amend the United Nations Charter in view of the new threat and its interpretation of the use of force. Additional comments are made on the issues of development and management reform. Section 2.4 (UN Millennium Project: Investing in Development) presents the report of the UN Millennium Project ‘Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals’ (shown in Part II as document 2), issued in 2005. Details are provided on the work of the Millennium Project and the 10 recommendations put forward by the Project are discussed. This included recommendations that developing

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countries should put in place poverty reduction strategies based on the Millennium Development Goals and that developed countries should increase official development assistance and debt relief. Other recommendations include the launch of quick win actions, the identification of fast-track countries, and the involvement of civil society and private sector. Section 2.5 (United Nations Secretary-General: In Larger Freedom) presents the report of the Secretary-General entitled ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’ (shown in Part II as document 3), issued in March 2005. The concept of the proposed grand bargain is presented, covering issues of security, human rights and development. In order to facilitate comparison with the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the format of the presentation follows that used for the report of the High-level Panel. This includes details on the new security consensus, the responsibility to protect and humanitarian issues, the Peacebuilding Commission and peacekeeping, the Human Rights Council and the rule of law, terrorism and security threats, Security Council reform, the use of force, development and management. Similarities to and differences from the recommendations of the High-level Panel and the Millennium Project are highlighted, such as a more restricted mandate and power for the Peacebuilding Commission or a new concept for a smaller Human Rights Council. On the issue of management, the link is highlighted between the report of the Secretary-General and some of the demands developed in the United States in response to the Volcker Inquiry, as described in Section 2.6. Section 2.6 (United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme: The Volcker Inquiry and Congressional Initiatives) describes the events during the crucial months preceding the World Summit when the Secretary-General came under attack as a result of speculations concerning the outcome of the inquiry by the Volcker Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-food Programme. The final report of the Volcker Committee is presented, entitled ‘The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme’ (shown in Part II as document 4) and issued in September 2005. As described, the Committee issued a strong indictment, concluding that the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the United Nations agencies had not been up to the extraordinary challenges posed by the Oil-forFood Programme. This section also covers the investigations launched by the United States Congress into the United Nations in parallel to the Volcker Committee, including the bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations chaired by George Mitchell and Newt Gingrich. The United States Congress considered the establishment of benchmarks for United Nations reform, coupled with the withholding of funding to the United Nations in case of non-compliance. In addition, the United States administration pushed for a strong package of United Nations management reforms in the areas of fraud prevention, oversight and accountability. Section 2.7 (Security Council Reform: The Collapse of Aspirations) covers the continuous efforts to reach agreement on the Security Council reform. Taking into account the proposals of the High-level Panel, three draft reform resolutions were considered. The Group of 4, including Germany, Brazil, Japan and India, pushed for a proposal that would provide them with new permanent seats. In order to improve the acceptability of the proposal, no veto right was demanded for the new permanent seats. A larger group of member states, called Uniting for Consensus and led by Italy, Pakistan, Canada, Mexico, South Korea, Spain, Turkey and Argentina, favoured the establishment of a larger number of semi-permanent seats, again without veto rights. Whereas those countries were unlikely to gain one of the proposed new permanent seats, they would be stronger candidates in a semi-permanent arrangement. The two proposals did not, however, gain the support of the

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African states, which demanded permanent seats for Africa with veto rights. As described, in the end, no proposal was submitted to the World Summit, and the attempt to reform the Security Council had failed once again after its previous collapse in the context of the 1995 Summit. Section 2.8 (2005 World Summit: A Once-in-a-Lifetime Opportunity) describes the negotiations during the months leading up to the World Summit and the decisions reached with the approval of the ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (shown in Part II as document 5) in September 2005. This covers the new emphasis introduced when compared to the previous proposals, such as the last-minute demands by the United States including increased emphasis on management reform by strengthening internal oversight and accountability. It also covers issues for which no agreement could be reached. Most important are the consensus on terrorism, Security Council reform, the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and new commitments on development. Section 2.9 (Follow-Up to the World Summit: Continued and New Reform Efforts) describes the outcome of continued negotiations on issues, which remained unresolved during the Summit. This included essential elements of the Human Rights Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, ECOSOC and the management reform. With regard to the latter, the report of the Secretary-General is presented entitled ‘Investing in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide’ (shown in Part II as document 6) and issued in March 2006. Moreover, events following upon the failed Security Council reform are recalled. Finally, Section 2.10 (Concluding Comments: Incremental Steps Towards Legitimacy and Effectiveness) provides some observations on the outcome of the reform process, in particular on the result of the World Summit. It is argued that some significant agreements were reached on important new directions to strengthen the United Nations and multilateralism. The grand bargain, however, was not achieved as initially intended. This publication constitutes the fifth volume of Reforming the United Nations. The first three volumes 1 present a detailed review of 50 earlier reform initiatives and of key reform documents originating during the period from 1950 to 1995. The period from 1996 to 2000 is captured in the fourth volume, 2 which presents, in particular, the reform efforts of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan known as the Quiet Revolution. Together, the five volumes provide over 5,000 pages of material and constitute the most complete documentation of their kind. I trust that Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle for Legitimacy and Effectiveness will be of use to all those interested in the reform of the United Nations. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the Organization I am affiliated with.

Geneva, 2006

Joachim Müller

1 Joachim Müller, Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, volumes I to III, 1997. 2 Joachim Müller, Reforming the United Nations: The Quiet Revolution, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, volume IV, 2001.

Table of Contents

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE....................................................................................................................

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS......................................................................................

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PART I REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS ............................

3

1.

THE HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS REFORM EFFORTS, 1950 TO 2002 ....................................................................................................

4

1.1 COLD WAR, NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT AND THE REVITALIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1950 TO 1996 ..................................................

4

1.2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS AND A NEW VISION: THE QUIET REVOLUTION, 1997 TO 2002.........................................................................

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1.3 SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS.............

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2.

NEW REFORM INITIATIVES: THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS, 2003 TO 2006..........................................................

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2.1 SEPTEMBER 11, IRAQ AND THE ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY .

21

2.2 A FORK IN THE ROAD: THE NEED FOR A FUNDAMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS .................................................

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2.3 HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE: A MORE SECURE WORLD ............................................................................

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2.4 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT: INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT..............

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2.5 UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL: IN LARGER FREEDOM ..

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2.6 UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME: THE VOLCKER INQUIRY AND CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES.......................................

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2.7 SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: THE COLLAPSE OF ASPIRATIONS ...

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2.8 2005 WORLD SUMMIT: A ONCE-IN-A-LIFETIME OPPORTUNITY........

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Table of Contents

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Page 2.9 FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD SUMMIT: CONTINUED AND NEW REFORM EFFORTS .........................................................................................

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2.10 CONCLUDING COMMENTS: INCREMENTAL STEPS TOWARDS LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS .........................................................

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PART II DOCUMENTS.............................................................................................................

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1.

A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004 ........

2.

INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS UN Millennium Project, 2005............................................................................

3.

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2005 WORLD SUMMIT OUTCOME United Nations World Summit, 16 September 2005...........................................

6.

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THE MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, 7 September 2005..........................................................................

5.

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IN LARGER FREEDOM: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL Secretary-General, United Nations, 21 March 2005 .........................................

4.

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442

INVESTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS: FOR A STRONGER ORGANIZATION WORLDWIDE Secretary-General, United Nations, 7 March 2006 ...........................................

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INDEX OF NAMES ....................................................................................................

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List of Abbreviations

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACABQ ADB AIDS APDF APRM AU BBC BNP BOA CGIAR CIESIN CIS COO CORE CPA CPMD DAC DAWN DESA DHA DNA DPA ECOSOC EU FAO FATF G 24 G4 G7 G 77 GATS GATT GDP GNI GNP HEU HIPC HIV IAD IAEA ICT IDA IDP IFAD IMF IPPF ISCWT ITU

Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions African Development Bank Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome African Project Development Facility African Peer Review Mechanism African Union British Broadcasting Corporation Banque Nationale de Paris Board of Auditors Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research Centre for International Earth Science Information Network Commonwealth of Independent States Chief Operating Officer Centre for Operations Research and Econometrics Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq) Contract Processing and Monitoring Division Development Assistance Committee Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs Department of Humanitarian Affairs Deoxyribonucleic Acid Department of Political Affairs Economic and Social Council European Union Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Group of Twenty-Four Group of Four Group of Seven Group of Seventy-Seven General Agreement on Trade in Service General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product Gross National Income Gross National Product Highly Enriched Uranium Heavily Indebted Poor Country Human Immonodeficiency Virus Internal Audit Division International Atomic Energy Agency Information and Communication Technology International Development Association Internally Displaced Person International Fund for Agricultural Development International Monetary Fund International Planned Parenthood Federation Iraq State Company for Water Transport International Telecommunication Union

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List of Abbreviations

KDP MCC MDG MIF MOU NATO NEPAD NGO OAS ODA OECD OIOS ID OIOS OIP OPCW OSCE PLACE PMD PRSP PSC PUK SARS SOMO TaR TB UN UNAIDS UNCC UNCTAD UNDG UNDP UNESCO UNFPA UN-Habitat UNHCR UNIAHP UNICEF UNIDO UNMOVIC UNOHCI UNPROFOR UNSCOM WFP WHO WMD WTO

Kurdistan Democratic Party Millennium Challenge Corporation Millennium Development Goal Maritime Interception Force Memorandum of Understanding North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Partnership for Africa’s Development Non-governmental Organization Organization of American States Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Investigation Division of OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services Office of Iraq Programme Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe Population, Landscape and Climate Estimates Programme Management Division Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Programme Support Costs Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome State Oil Marketing Organization (Iraq) Transaction and Relations System Tuberculosis United Nations United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS United Nations Compensation Commission United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Group United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation United Nations Fund for Population Activities United Nations Centre for Human Settlements United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund United Nations Industrial Development Organisation United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator United Nations Protection Force United Nations Special Commission World Food Programme World Health Organisation Weapons of Mass Destruction World Trade Organisation

$

All monetary amounts are presented in United States dollars

PART I

REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS ________________________________________________________________________

Reforming the United Nations

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REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS The United Nations was established to maintain peace and security, foster economic and social development and promote respect for human rights. These issues were addressed by providing states with a meeting place where they could discuss global issues and set global standards. Although this work continues, the United Nations has undergone a dramatic expansion of its operations, budgets and functions. Today, the Organization is involved in a wide range of activities from peacekeeping and peacebuilding to the struggle against poverty and HIV/AIDS and the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals. To carry out its activities, it works together with a wide range of partners, including national governments, regional organizations, civil society groups, philanthropic foundations and private-sector companies. Despite the apparent support for the United Nations indicated by its growing membership and increased allocation of resources, dissatisfaction has been expressed with the workings of the Organization since its inception, frequently triggering demands for fundamental reforms. Some critics call the United Nations a talking shop where nothing ever gets done. Others suggest that the United Nations has become too powerful, that it over-regulates the global system. Supporters of assertive multilateralism call for an expansion of the United Nations’ responsibilities and operations and see the Organization as a tool for solving global problems through joint action. Others express their concern that the United Nations is becoming increasingly interventionist and encroaching on affairs of member states that are considered to be strictly internal matters. Some assessments emphasize the need to strengthen the United Nations in the security area, while others see the Organization as an instrument through which economic development and social progress can be achieved. Recently, the institution has been criticized as lacking legitimacy. There was public debate concerning proposals to enlarge the Security Council and establish new collective mechanisms to protect human rights, counter terrorism and respond to crimes against humanity. Finally, the United Nations has frequently been judged to be inefficient, with a bloated bureaucracy and incompetent staff, resulting in calls for management reform and downsizing the bureaucracy. Recently, new concerns have been expressed about the perceived lack of accountability and openness of international institutions. Allegations of mismanagement and corruption in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme have led to calls to strengthen oversight, governance and management practices. Reform proposals are often advanced in a technocratic manner, with the aim of improving productivity and relevance through reorganization or reengineering. The political dimensions are not readily apparent. Budget cuts, downsizing and identifying duplicate activities can be seen as mechanisms to de-emphasize activities that are not considered to be in a particular nation’s interest. Efforts to improve efficiency in decisionmaking may have implications for the representation of member states in governing bodies by reducing the size of these bodies or merging organizational entities. Management changes which seem likely to make the Organization increasingly interventionist are strongly rejected. In this politically charged environment, it is the role of the SecretaryGeneral to propose and implement management reforms. Indeed, according to the United Nations Charter, the Secretary-General is the Organization’s chief administrative officer. There has been a series of reform efforts originating mainly in the United States. Indeed, the United States’ policy vis-à-vis the United Nations has dominated reform

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discussions in recent years. The context of United Nations reform is, however, more complex. The rich and powerful countries, located in the Northern Hemisphere, and the poor and powerless nations, often located in the South, have different interests and often disagree. The reform discussion mirrors the split in support for a strong government, in the tradition of Keynesianism, versus neoliberalism with its distaste for public programmes, taxes and regulations. Finally, ideological debate and a conflict over fundamental values come into play as well. This includes different perceptions of justice and equity, conflict over the values of individualism and collectivism, and the definition of concepts such as human rights and democracy. The object of reform is the United Nations, a complex and fragmented organization with a global presence. It membership has increased from 51 in 1945 to 191 in 2006. Among its main governing bodies are the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Secretary-General heads a Secretariat of international civil servants and administered a budget of $18.5 billion in 2004–2005, double what it was in 1996–1997. Approximately 20 per cent is administered under the regular budget and funded from assessed contributions. Activities are mainly directed towards maintaining the United Nations as a meeting place for discussing global issues, setting global standards and forwarding the work of intergovernmental bodies. A total of 30 per cent consists of extrabudgetary expenditure funded by voluntary contributions and is devoted to activities such as refugee and humanitarian relief, criminal justice, human rights monitoring, capacity-building, and electoral assistance. Approximately half of the United Nations’ budget is used to fund peacekeeping operations and is financed by assessed contributions. These activities have experienced tremendous growth during recent years and employed approximately 80,000 civilian and military personnel during 2004– 2005. In addition to the United Nations Secretariat, the Organization includes a number of semi-independent funds and programmes such as the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP). The total budget for those entities amounts to $10 billion annually. Finally, the United Nations system includes, alongside the United Nations Organization, a number of independent specialized agencies, each with its own intergovernmental bodies and secretariat: the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization and the International Labour Organization are among the biggest. Chapter 1 provides a brief summary of previous reform efforts, which have been described in detail in the preceding publications in this series. 1 Chapter 2 describes the new reform efforts, capturing events from 2001 to 2006.

1. THE HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS REFORM EFFORTS, 1950 TO 2002 1.1 COLD WAR, NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT AND THE REVITALIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1950 TO 1996 In the first years after the founding of the United Nations, the Secretariat decentralized from New York to regional centres in Geneva, Bangkok, Addis Ababa and 1 Joachim Müller, Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives and Past Efforts, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, Volumes I to III, 1997, and Joachim Müller, Reforming the United Nations: The Quiet Revolution, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, Volume IV, 2001.


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Santiago de Chile. In addition, a number of activities became semi-independent from the United Nations Secretariat such as UNICEF, which was set up as early as 1946. New challenges came with the development of peacekeeping measures. The United Nations first experiences with the new peacekeeping instrument came in 1949 in the Middle East and one year later in the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. East-West antagonism during the 1950s caused the Soviet Union to demand organizational reforms with a political overtone. At that time, the United States and its Western allies constituted an overwhelming majority within the United Nations. The socialist states charged that the independence of the Secretariat should be ensured by replacing the post of Secretary-General with a troika of one representative each from the socialist states, the Western military alliance and the non-aligned states. It was further argued that peacekeeping operations were staffed with persons from NATO countries and socialist countries were rejected in technical co-operation with developing countries so as to further the influence of Western industrialized nations on the countries of the Third World. The situation escalated when the Soviet Union and its allies refused to share in the cost of peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly appointed a group of experts in 1961, which resulted in the approval of a number of management changes. Although demands for curtailing the Secretary-General’s independence were rejected, agreement was reached by providing a greater proportion of Secretariat posts for persons from socialist countries and new arrangements were introduced to fund the cost of peacekeeping operations. A review of the efficiency of the Secretariat suggested curbing the growth in expenditures and cutting the number of posts. Decolonization resulted in rapid growth in United Nations membership, and by 1965 membership stood at 118, twice as many as at its founding. With states from Africa and Asia joining the United Nations, development issues became increasingly important, resulting in the expansion of the technical co-operation programmes. This led to the creation of new bodies and programmes, including UNDP, established in 1965, which was to provide the framework for technical co-operation with developing countries. On the initiative of the Governing Body of UNDP, Sir Robert Jackson was requested to develop proposals to build up the management capacity of the United Nations system in order to facilitate the delivery of technical co-operation. 2 These proposals recommended giving UNDP a co-ordinating role in the United Nations system, with all funding for development projects to be channelled through it to the specialized agencies. The lack of global planning and priority setting was to be addressed by developing ECOSOC into a central forum for economic questions. The specialized agencies rejected the curtailment of their independence and member states showed very little interest in centralization. Some headway was made in improving the work of UNDP itself by the introduction of country programme planning. UNDP offices were set up in developing countries. Towards the mid-1970s, the United Nations was increasingly becoming the forum for global negotiations on issues involving development. Whereas technical co-operation remained of the highest importance to the developing countries, development was to be achieved by addressing new issues such as trade and development, energy, a common fund for raw materials, industrialization, the transfer of technology, a code of conduct for transnational corporations, the Law of the Sea Convention and the establishment of a New International Economic Order. Negotiations on these issues between developing states, organized as the Group of 77, and the industrialized countries, took place within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). At the insistence of the 2

United Nations document: A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System, DP/5, 1969.


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developing countries, the General Assembly established a group of 25 experts to adapt the governance and organizational structure of the United Nations system to address the economic and social problems of developing countries. 3 Under a compromise reached in 1977, it was agreed that the role of the General Assembly would be strengthened as proposed by the Group of 77, but without addressing the key demand to vest control over the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the General Assembly. The post of Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation was created, albeit without the powers and means that had been wished for by developing countries. In ECOSOC and UNCTAD, things remained the same. The developing countries blocked any reduction in the number of committees demanded by the industrialized countries, while the industrialized countries prevented any upgrading of UNCTAD. The Soviet Union supported the call for a New International Economic Order, while the United States argued that where reform was really needed was in management, planning and co-ordination. On balance, the 1977 compromise must be viewed as a half-hearted attempt at reform. Thereafter, political confrontation became pervasive. Disappointed Third-World countries deplored the ‘ignorance of the minority’, while the industrialized countries deplored the ‘tyranny of the majority’. From the beginning of the 1980s, the Reagan administration and the United States Congress were less and less willing to support the United Nations, following the adoption of some decisions which the United States construed as anti-Western and contrary to its national interests, levelling accusations of politicization and mismanagement of the Organization. Specifically, the United States called for a change in United Nations budget practices. The United Nations budget is approved by a two-thirds majority of all member states, with all votes having equal weight. The countries making the largest financial contributions, including the United States, were often outvoted on budget questions. The United States reacted by withholding payments and demanded voting power in the approval of the budget proportionate to its contribution. The financial withholding resulted in a budget crisis, and so the General Assembly mandated a group of 18 experts to review the United Nations’ administrative and financial efficiency. 4 Recommendations were approved by the General Assembly in 1986, including a new two-tier budget procedure. A new outline budget was introduced, sketching priorities and appropriations one year prior to approving the detailed budget so that member states could be involved with the budget process at an earlier stage. In addition, the new outline budget was to be approved by a consensus giving greater weight to countries paying the largest quotas. Discussion of the budget process revealed that East and West had similar interests in certain important areas. The major obstacle to unity was the attitude of the third-world countries, many of which perceived a threat to the principles of sovereign equality and majority decision-making. Other decisions covered the 15-percent reduction in the number of posts and the merging and restructuring of organizational entities in the areas of political, economic and information services. A number of recommendations were not implemented, such as the proposed reduction in staff benefits and entitlements and the simplification of the ECOSOC committee structure. The introduction of the new consensus-based budget process, budget reductions and management reforms gave rise to a greater convergence of views among member states during the second half of the 1980s and paved the way for major changes to come. 3

United Nations document: A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Co-operation, E/AC.62/9, 28 May 1975. 4 United Nations document: Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations, A/41/49, August 1986.


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The end of the Cold War resulted in a rediscovery and renaissance of the United Nations. The perceived new opportunities were addressed by a host of new reform initiatives, including government-sponsored efforts, and proposals by heads of government, groups of ambassadors, non-governmental organizations and individual experts. In 1992, all these studies were submitted to incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt, who took office at a time when the Security Council was displaying hitherto unaccustomed unity. The Secretary-General was called upon to work out ways of reforming and reinforcing the Secretariat structure in the area of peacekeeping. He responded by presenting the Agenda for Peace 5 containing suggestions for reform in the area of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. With many of his proposals, the Secretary-General was breaking new ground, in particular, with the idea of preventive deployments, establishment of demilitarized zones, dispensing with the principle of consensus observed hitherto and allowing interventions without the agreement of all the parties and even in situations of internal crisis. Originally described as going too far, the Agenda for Peace gave direction and allowed new activities such as the deployment of United Nations troops in Somalia. The United Nations experienced an unprecedented increase in peacekeeping and highlighted the need to introduce management reforms at the operational level. The new emphasis on peace and security also stimulated interest in a reform of the Security Council. Boutros Boutros-Ghali forcefully reorganized the Secretariat in 1993. A series of independent units in the economic and social domains were consolidated into three major departments and the number of senior posts was reduced. The funds freed up in this way were allocated to the strengthening of the security area. Part of the restructuring also consisted of cancelling the post of Director-General for Development and Economic Cooperation, the creation of which had been a central concern of the Group of 77 in the 1970s. In December 1993, member states agreed to reduce the number of bodies for the supervision of development programmes. As demanded by the group of developed countries, the UNDP and UNICEF governing councils were replaced by smaller executive councils. Following on a key concern of the United States, Boutros Boutros-Ghali agreed to establish the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which was to be responsible for audit and investigation. Finally, the merged United Nations units set up representations in member states and gave them a more comprehensive mandate, which also included political briefs. As quasi–United Nations ambassadors, they were to underpin the authority of the Secretary-General and contribute to a better co-ordination of United Nations work. The developing countries strongly criticized the creation of United Nations representations as constituting interference in their national sovereignty. Moreover, they were disappointed with the restructuring of the Secretariat, in which they perceived a contraction and weakening of the economic and social areas in favour of the security priorities of industrial countries. In fact, there was a widespread feeling that development had been marginalized. By the 50th anniversary of the United Nations in 1995, the environment had changed with astonishing speed. In the wake of widespread disappointment with peacekeeping efforts, there was a marked retreat from assertive multilateralism. Faced with increased reluctance by the United States Congress, the Clinton administration took a more cautious approach. Reform proposals emphasized the need to reduce budget provisions, increase efficiency and effectiveness, streamline intergovernmental bodies, and de-emphasize programmes considered not to be in the American interest. As in the 1980s, the demands for reform were coupled with the renewed withholding of funds. And a new factor came 5

United Nations document: Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277 – S/24111, 17 June 1992.

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into play. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States was increasingly retreating from multilateral solutions, not engaging in new peacekeeping operations, and insisting on a reduction in its contributions to the United Nations budget. Response to the new concerns included the launch of negotiations for an Agenda for Development as counterpart to the Agenda for Peace. Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced major budget reductions by cutting about 10 per cent of the Organization’s staff. Towards the end of his term, the General Assembly approved procedural and structural measures to improve the workings of the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies as well as the Secretariat. Some of the more controversial proposals were later taken up by subsequent reform efforts, such as proposals to establish the position of Deputy Secretary-General. This initiative for the strengthening of the United Nations system was strongly supported by the United States. However, further initiatives for management reform now had to await the incoming Secretary-General.

1.2 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS AND A NEW VISION: THE QUIET REVOLUTION, 1997 TO 2002 The appointment of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General in 1997 represented a chance for a new start. In his acceptance speech, Annan expressed his wish to make the United Nations leaner, more efficient and more effective, more responsive to the wishes and needs of its members and more realistic in its goals and commitments. Jesse Helms, Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, presented some demands for change. They included demands that the United Nations stop encroaching on the sovereignty of nation-states, make major budget reductions and change the budget process, and overhaul peacekeeping. The Helms-Biden Reform Act of 1999 called for zero-growth budgets and reductions in the United States’ assessed contribution. The Act made payment of the United States’ arrears contingent on benchmarks related to United Nations financial, administrative and programme reforms. Soon after taking office, the Secretary-General introduced new management mechanisms by establishing a cabinet-style body to assist him and by grouping 30 United Nations departments, funds and programmes into four sectoral areas: peace and security, economic and social affairs, humanitarian affairs, and development. An Executive Committee was established to co-ordinate the work of each. The Committees were later linked directly to the Secretary-General’s Office through the establishment of a Senior Management Group composed of the heads of all United Nations departments, funds and programmes. The Group improved co-ordination and coherence within the United Nations family. In practice, however, it proved too large for effective and timely decision-making. In May 2005, two new senior committees, chaired by the Secretary-General, were created, one dealing with policy and the other with management issues. The limited-size committees were seen as ensuring clear, action-oriented outcomes with a better definition of areas of responsibility and timelines for implementation. After six months in office, the Secretary-General issued his report on ‘Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform’, which was endorsed by the General Assembly. 6 The report presented new initiatives and recommendations advanced by the numerous study groups and carried forward reforms launched by Boutros-Ghali. Key 6 United Nations document: Secretary-General, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, A/51/950, 14 July 1997.


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proposals included the establishment of a position of Deputy Secretary-General, a 10-percent reduction in posts, a decrease in administrative costs from 38 to 25 per cent, the establishment of a development account funded through savings and the introduction of a performance-based management culture. In order to address more fundamental problems, the Secretary-General proposed to hold a Millennium Summit and Assembly in 2000 and to review new concepts of trusteeship and the United Nations system. Reorganization, consolidation of country-level efforts and reaching out to civil society and the private sector as partners were at the centre of the reform effort. A series of reorganization efforts started right at the outset with the merging of three departments into one Department of Economic Social Affairs and the consolidation of Vienna-based activities into the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The work and structure of the Department of Public Information were reoriented to convey the United Nations’ story with more vigour and purpose. In early 1998, the Department for Disarmament Affairs was established, and in August 1998, a Strategic Planning Unit within the Office of the Secretary-General. In September 1999, the Geneva-based human rights programmes were merged into a single Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In tandem with the consolidation of the human rights office, steps were taken through the Senior Management Group and the Executive Committees to integrate human rights advocacy into peacekeeping and development and other areas of United Nations operations. The country-level consolidation covered the country teams of United Nations funds, programmes and specialized agencies operating in over 100 developing countries. In 1997, most of them occupied separate offices. To save money, improve operational synergy and project a unified image of the United Nations, the teams were instructed to move as rapidly as feasible towards sharing common office space and utilizing common service providers. By 2005, nearly 60 common United Nations Houses had been established in the developing countries, each occupied by three or more agencies. Other efforts focused on strengthening the role of Resident Co-ordinator as leader of United Nations country teams. Two additional tools were established to facilitate co-ordination and to bring United Nations assistance more closely into line with the priorities of the host countries: a Common Country Assessment, which clarified national needs, and a United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which set out the division of labour among United Nations entities in assisting governments to promote development and implement goals arising from the United Nations global conferences. In recent years, many country assessments and development assistance frameworks have been completed with some form of joint programming in over 100 countries. Reaching out to civil society and the private sector as partners was an innovative initiative. In 1997, the Secretary-General challenged corporations that were beneficiaries of globalization to meet their responsibilities as global citizens. Under the terms of the Global Compact that he later proposed, participating businesses were to put into place activities that would advance the core values of the United Nations in the areas of human rights, labour standards and the environment. By 2005, more than 300 businesses were participating. The new openness of the United Nations to interaction with civil society and the private sector has resulted in gains in a number of areas. One outcome was the establishment in March 1998 of the United Nations Fund for International Partnership established by Ted Turner’s donation of $1 billion, which supports programming in the areas of children’s health, population and women, environment and peace, and security and human rights.


10 The Millennium Summit

Initially proposed as part of the Secretary-General’s reform agenda, the Millennium Summit was held in September 2000 and attended by an unprecedented 144 heads of state or government. The summit approved the Millennium Declaration 7 , reaffirming the Organization’s values and principles and rededicating it to the promotion of peace and security, sustainable development, human rights, democracy, and good governance. Stating that the ‘central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people’, world leaders pledged in the Millennium Declaration to ‘create an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty’. They also included in the declaration a set of clear, time-bound, and measurable development targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, and environmental degradation, among other things. Subsequently referred to as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), these targets provided a common global development strategy that generated an unprecedented level of co-ordinated action within the United Nations system, the donor community, and developing countries. The MDGs include the following: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger x By 2015, halve the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day and those suffering from hunger. Achieve Universal Primary Education x By 2015, ensure that all boys and girls complete primary school. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women x Eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015. Reduce Child Mortality x By 2015, reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five. Improve Maternal Health x By 2015, reduce by three quarters the ratio of women who die during childbirth. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Other Diseases x By 2015, halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

7 United Nations document: United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly resolution 55/2, 8 September 2000.


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Ensure Environmental Sustainability x Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources. x By 2015, halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water. x By 2020, achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. Develop a Global Partnership for Development x Further develop an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory, and includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction – nationally and internationally. x Address the special needs of the least developed countries, including tariff- and quota-free access for their exports, enhanced debt relief, and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction. x Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing states. x Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt problems. x Develop decent and productive work for youth. x In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries. x In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies – especially information and communications technologies. In addition to the political declaration, the Millennium Assembly approved a number of organizational matters. At the end of 1999, following recent failure in peacekeeping, the Secretary-General had convened a blue-ribbon panel to come up with practical and achievable prescriptions for future peace operations. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) 8 recommended sweeping changes in peacekeeping strategy, doctrine and operations. The prescription was for greater numbers of well-equipped and well-trained troops, whenever a credible military posture is required. The panel argued for more support staff at Headquarters and stronger political, financial and material support from the member states, particularly members of the Security Council. At the same time, it set more stringent standards for judging the performance of peacekeepers in the field and at Headquarters. The Millennium Assembly responded positively, approving a 50-per-cent increase in staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and nearly $150 million for equipping the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. To provide more flexibility in management and logistics, the Secretariat 8 United Nations document: Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305 – S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.


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delegated greater authority at the field level. Among the changes in peacekeeping management, and on the insistence of developing countries, gratis personnel attached to the Secretariat under the sponsorship mainly of developed countries were phased out. The Millennium Assembly also approved a new scale of assessment in December 2000. In accordance with the conditions outlined in the Helms-Biden agreement, the United States’ assessment for the regular budget was reduced from 25 to 22 per cent in exchange for the payment of arrears. The decision was seen as putting the United Nations back on a solid financial footing for the years to come. Finally, after a long process of negotiations, the Assembly approved the introduction of results-based budgeting.

Follow-Up to the Millennium Summit and the 2002 Reform Package The Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the Secretary-General’s Road Map for implementation of the Millennium Declaration provided the overall priorities for United Nations activities in the coming years. In September 2002, the Secretary-General’s second major package of reforms entitled ‘Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change’, 9 was approved by the General Assembly. 10 The efforts aimed at expanding the on previous reform initiatives introduced in 1997 and reflecting new priorities for the Organization. The overall goal was to align the United Nations’ activities with the priorities defined by the Millennium Declaration, to follow up on a number of specific requests from the General Assembly and to continue improving some housekeeping functions. Development and implementation of the reforms were overseen by the Deputy Secretary-General and approved by the General Assembly at the end of 2003 and the changes were reflected in the revision of the proposed budget for the biennium 2004–2005. Specific changes covered public information, the budgeting and planning system, human rights, management and staff, technical co-operation, civil society and the private sector. With regard to public information, the network of United Nations information centres was rationalized around regional hubs, starting with Western Europe, where nine individual centres were replaced by a regional office in Brussels. The Department of Public Information was restructured by establishing a Division of Strategic Communications to focus on United Nations messages around priority themes and an Outreach Division to group together services for delegations, civil society and general public. The Secretary-General also introduced improvements in the management of United Nations libraries and the Secretariat’s publications programme. The management of United Nations libraries was improved by having the Dag Hammarskjöld Library in New York assume responsibility for setting policy and co-ordinating the work of all United Nations libraries and by improving electronic access to United Nations collections. The publication programme was upgrading by entrusting the Executive Committees with the co-ordination of all publications within their respective thematic areas in order to reduce the number of and improve the coherence, focus and scheduling of publications. The Publications Board was reconstituted as a standard-setting body. The planning and budgeting system was considered to be complex and labourintensive, involving too many committees, voluminous documentation and hundreds of 9

United Nations document: Secretary-General, Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change, A/57/387, 9 September 2002. 10 United Nations document: Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change, General Assembly resolution A/57/300, 20 December 2002.


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meetings. The General Assembly decided to make the intergovernmental review of plans and budgets, previously performed by both the Fifth Committee and the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination, the responsibility of the Fifth Committee alone. The Assembly also approved the introduction of a shorter, more strategic medium-term plan covering two years rather than four, which was combined with the budget outline submitted one year before the actual budget is tabled. The budget document itself was to be less detailed and more strategic and the Secretary-General was given more flexibility to move resources according to needs. In the area of human rights, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was given additional resources to strengthen the United Nations’ human rights– related actions at the country level. The Commissioner, in consultation with treaty bodies, developed new, streamlined reporting procedures. The reform of the human resources management function had previously been submitted to the Millennium Assembly for consideration. Some of the proposals were acted upon starting in 2001. In order to strengthen the internal staff justice system, the office of the Ombudsman was established and an informal mediation process was set up. A new staff selection system was introduced to shorten the recruitment process while giving more priority to merit and competence and less to tenure. The system gave programme managers the authority to select their own staff, as part of a compact with the SecretaryGeneral that also held them accountable for the delivery of key activities and results. The new system was implemented despite concerns that pushing greater responsibility for decision-making downward to the operational level would make it impossible to achieve equitable distribution of national representation among staff members and improve the gender balance. In order to produce a more versatile and multi-skilled civil service, term limits were placed on post occupancy and incentives were provided for duty station postings away from Headquarters. United Nations managers also received intensive training in people management, in tandem with the introduction of a new personnel appraisal system. The 2002 reform package included new arrangements intended to encourage and reward staff mobility between different locations, functions and even organizations. More opportunities were made available to General Service staff, who were henceforth officially known, like their professional colleagues, as international civil servants. Other measures were intended to help staff to balance their professional and private lives through the introduction, for example, of flexible working arrangements in all Secretariat departments and the broadening the opportunities for part-time employment for Secretariat staff. Additional steps were taken to further empower managers by increasing their flexibility and capacity to manage the resources allocated to them. The United Nations’ capacity to deal with HIV/AIDS in the workplace and to better resolve internal disputes between management and staff was strengthened. With regard to technical co-operation, the United Nations Development Group developed an implementation plan to strengthen the Organization’s presence in developing countries, including features such as joint programming, pooling of resources, common databases and knowledge networks, dedicated support for the Resident Co-ordinator and integrated planning, budgeting and resource mobilization tools for countries emerging from conflict. Finally, in the area of civil society and the private sector, the United Nations’ interaction with these sectors had grown significantly in the past decade, including the Global Compact initiative and the establishment of many collaborative partnerships with companies and foundations, such as the United Nations Foundation. In order to take stock and find better ways of organizing the relationship, the Secretary-General established a


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high-level panel to review the relationship between the United Nations and civil society and offer practical recommendations for improved modalities of interaction. In addition, a Partnerships Office was created to group private-sector activities under a common umbrella, including the Global Compact Office and the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships. The reforms launched by the Secretary-General in 1997 and 2002 were acknowledged. In 2002, the United Nations met the last of the Helms-Biden benchmarks, prompting the United States Congress to release the third and final instalment of its more than $1 billion in assessed contributions to the United Nations. In response to a request by the United States Congress, the United States General Accounting Office reported in February 2004 on the overall status of the 1997 and 2002 reforms. 11 The Office had already reported in May 2000 12 that the Secretariat had substantially restructured its leadership and operations and partly implemented a performance-oriented human capital management system. However, performance-oriented programming and budgeting proposals had not been adopted at that time. The new report noted that as of December 2003, 60 per cent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda and 38 per cent of the 66 initiatives in the 2002 agenda were in place. In general, the reforms under the SecretaryGeneral’s authority were seen as progressing more quickly than those requiring member states’ approval. Since 1997, the Secretariat had implemented reforms to provide more unified leadership and co-ordination across departments and offices. Comments focused on reforms in four key areas of United Nations operations. First, it was stated that the Secretariat had taken positive steps to strengthen its human capital management, but reforms in the area were ongoing and additional challenges remained. Second, the United Nations had begun to adopt results-oriented budgeting, but its monitoring and evaluation system did not measure programme impact. Third, although the Secretariat had reorganized its public information department, reforms of library management and publications were not fully in place. Fourth, the Secretariat’s human rights office has implemented the majority of its management reforms but did not have the authority to implement reforms outside the Secretariat. Finally, it was argued that United Nations reforms faced several challenges. For example, the Secretariat did not conduct comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of United Nations reforms. In addition, the reform agendas lacked clearly stated priorities, interim goals, and target dates for overall completion. Other challenges included resistance to change by programme managers and possible resource constraints.

1.3 SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS The reform of the Security Council was potentially the most important and politically charged issue facing the United Nations. The Security Council is the Organization’s principal organ dealing with peace and security issues. The Council can call on members to apply economic sanctions and undertake military action, such as peacekeeping missions. With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council had become more active and influential, often overshadowing the General Assembly member states, which had been largely excluded from this centre of power; this situation had increased their dissatisfaction 11

United States General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments Needed to Measure Impact, GAO-04-339, Washington, DC, February 2004. 12 United States General Accounting Office, United Nations: Reform Initiatives Have Strengthened Operations, but Overall Objectives Have Not Yet Been Met, GAO/NSIAD-00-150, Washington, DC, May 2000.


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with the Council’s structure and decision-making process. Most countries saw increasing the size of the Security Council as key to improving its representativeness. When the Council was established in 1945, it had 11 members, including five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and six non-permanent members, each elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term. The Council was expanded to a total of 15 members by the inclusion of four additional non-permanent members in 1964. Decisions require nine votes, including those of all five permanent members, which therefore have the right of veto. At the time when the Security Council was established, the membership of the United Nations totalled 51 states. When the Council was expanded in 1964, membership in the United Nations had grown to more than 100. With membership standing at 185 in the early 1990s, most countries saw increasing the size of the Council as essential for improving its legitimacy, and reflecting the economic and political changes that had taken place. Any change in the size and composition of the Security Council requires an amendment to the Charter. According to Article 108 of the Charter, such amendments require approval by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly, including all the permanent members of the Council. In December 1992, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/62, entitled ‘Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council’. Developing countries in particular emphasized the need to broaden the Council’s membership. In response to the resolution, the Secretary-General reported back to the Assembly on a possible review of the membership based on written comments he had received from 75 member states. In December 1993, the General Assembly decided to establish the ‘Open-ended Working Group on Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters’. The Assembly recognized that the main reason for the review was the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries, as well as the changes in international relations. The Working Group became the principal forum for discussion of the issue of Council reform during the coming years. 13 Work was organized according to clusters, including voting arrangements, the veto, the size and composition of the Security Council, and other questions related to improving working methods and procedures. During the discussions from 1993 to 1996, participants were optimistic that agreement could be reached. However, the five permanent members of the Council adopted a cautious stance without clearly coming out in support of any extension of the permanent membership or any curtailment of their veto power. Some support was given for a modest increase in the number of non-permanent members, as was the case in the previous expansion of the Security Council back in 1963. This was considered sufficient by neither the developing countries nor some industrialized countries. Germany and Japan, the most formidable contenders, were making a major push for permanent seats, insisting that as the second- and third-largest dues-payers they were entitled to special treatment. Permanent membership was also deemed to be an essential prerequisite if they were to take up the financial slack created by a reduction in the United States’ assessment. However, there was some domestic opposition in the aspirant countries themselves. In Japan, a large sector of the public feared that a permanent Security Council seat might draw Japan into

13 Bardo Fassbender, ‘On the Boulevard of Broken Dreams: The Project of a Reform of the UN Security Council after the 2005 World Summit’, International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005, pp. 391– 402.

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international conflicts. In Germany, similar currents influenced even mainstream politicians and the German government was not seeking a permanent seat at any price. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia eventually supported permanent membership for Germany and Japan and an additional three non-permanent seats for the rest of the world community – the so-called ‘quick-fix’ solution, which would increase the total number to 20. The Non-Aligned Movement came out against any ‘quick fix’ limited to Germany and Japan. The members of the Non-Aligned Movement demanded that the existing Eurocentric bias of the permanent membership be addressed and came out strongly in favour of increasing the number of seats to 26, including permanent seats for developing countries. Whereas India was considered the main contender, agreement on a limited number had not been achieved as yet due to regional rivalries. In Latin America, the choice would be between Brazil, Argentina and Mexico; in Asia, between India, Indonesia and Pakistan; in Africa, between Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa. Those who aspired to permanent membership but were not likely to be successful, such as Pakistan and Mexico, started to oppose any expansion of permanent membership. This was also the case for many countries that had traditionally supported the United Nations, but that would not themselves profit from an expansion, but would actually be faced with an implicit downgrading of their own status. Such countries included Canada, New Zealand, Italy and Spain, which argued that a decision to increase the number of permanent members would aggravate an elitist, anti-democratic and anachronistic system. Italy came out strongly against the aspirations of Germany. Instead, it proposed the introduction of a special class of intermediate states, which would rotate in and out of Security Council seats, and of which Italy could be a member. Establishing more frequently rotating non-permanent seats was seen as formalizing a de facto situation, since some states had been elected to nonpermanent seats more frequently than others. This formula was criticized for trying to introduce a third category of Security Council membership. If no solution on permanent seats could be found, many countries proposed simply enlarging the council by increasing the number of non-permanent members. This was rejected by for the aspirants to permanent membership, in particular Germany and Japan, and those permanent members that supported the claims of both countries. With regard to the voting arrangement, all permanent members except China defended the veto power of the current permanent members. It was argued that this arrangement ruled out the possibility of disagreement among the permanent members and ensured that when the Security Council did act, it acted with the support of its most powerful members. Japan and Germany insisted that new permanent membership would have to be associated with the right to veto. Although the current permanent members supported this, Italy and New Zealand argued against extending the veto right to new permanent members. Nigeria, Brazil and India argued for the granting of veto power to new permanent members, which was opposed by their regional rivals. The proposals to limit the scope and the use of veto were widely supported, in particular by the Non-Aligned Movement. This included limiting the scope of the veto to a smaller number of issues considered to be of vital importance to the great powers, such as the approval of enforcement measures under Chapter VII or other decisions involving the use of military force. The right of veto would thus be eliminated for a number of issues, such as the admission of new members or the election of the Secretary-General. Italy and Mexico supported a change that would require two negative votes by permanent members to constitute a veto. Many countries also supported increasing the number of votes required to pass a resolution, in order to enhance the power of non-permanent members. Most other members, including the African nations and the Non-Aligned Movement, viewed the veto


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arrangement as an anachronism and favoured its eventual elimination. The United States strongly opposed modifying the veto arrangement, arguing that veto power was not subject to negotiation and did not fall within the mandate of the Working Group. Important factors in the reform of the Security Council were the efforts to increase the transparency of its operations and improve consultations with non-Council members. Dozens of countries that had contributed troops to peacekeeping operations demanded that they be consulted on Council actions that affected their forces. As a result, meetings were organized between members of the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat to facilitate the exchange of information and views on peacekeeping operations, including all mandate renewals. In December 1994, the Council decided, on the recommendation of France, to meet more often in open session, especially at the early stages of its consideration of a particular subject. The United States and the United Kingdom initially viewed this with some reservations, as they were reluctant to open the inner circle of deliberation to the wider membership. Other measures for increased transparency were introduced subsequently, including daily or twice-weekly briefings by the President of the Security Council for non-members. The provisional agendas of both formal meetings of the Security Council and informal consultations of Council members were published daily in the Journal. The Security Council’s tentative forecast of its programme of work for the upcoming months was circulated monthly, as was the schedule of forthcoming reviews and renewals of mandates for peacekeeping operations and sanction regimes. Draft resolutions of the Security Council were made available to member states in their ‘blue’, or provisional, form at the same time as Council members received them. Finally, the Arria formula of having Council members meet informally with nonmembers under the chairmanship of someone other than the current President at a location different from the Council chamber was approved. This formula allowed the Council to hear from anyone it wanted to, without setting a precedent; it was named after Diego Arria of Venezuela, who was credited with introducing this mechanism. A number of other issues were covered during the reform of the Security Council. The easiest proposal to implement was the repeal of Articles 53 and 107, which referred to Germany, Japan and Italy as states which during the Second World War had been enemies of signatories to the Charter. The ‘enemy clause’ was universally viewed as anachronistic. There was a whole package of other issues for further consideration. They included increased transparency of the sanctions committees and the development of a mechanism under Article 50 for compensating third parties affected by United Nations–authorized sanctions, consultations with troop-contributing countries, and open meetings of the Security Council. They also included the elimination of Article 23 (2) of the Charter, which prohibited the immediate re-election of a non-permanent member whose term had expired. While this would favour some middle-sized countries, it would delay the election of smaller countries into the Council. Finally, proposals were considered to enhance the Council’s information-gathering and analysis capability, particularly for the benefit of those member states serving on the Council that do not possess adequate facilities themselves. Initially, it had been anticipated that the momentum associated with the 50th anniversary of the United Nations in 1995 and 1996 would result in an agreement on the reform of the Security Council. Whereas progress had been achieved on a number of changes in working methods, leading to more transparency in the Council’s procedures, disagreement persisted on virtually all of the main issues. These included the composition and size of the Security Council, principles governing the possible increase in numbers of permanent and non-permanent members, new categories of membership, limitations in the

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scope and use of the veto, the extension of the veto to possible new permanent members, de facto privileges, and the voting majority. In early 1997, General Assembly President Razali Ismail, serving as Chairman of the Open-ended Working Group, launched a determined push to break the deadlock on Security Council expansion. The initiative was based on informal consultations with 165 delegations to solicit their views on the reform of the Security Council. Since the establishment of the Working Group back in early 1994, only about 30 per cent of the full membership of the United Nations had actively spoken on the issue; the overwhelming but silent majority constituted over 100 member states. Involving more member states in the discussion was seen as a way to break the deadlock in the negotiations. The consultations revealed that an overwhelming majority supported a representative increase in both permanent and non-permanent membership. This did not please members that were opposed to any expansion of the permanent membership. In particular, Italy and Pakistan were critical of the initiative to conduct informal consultations. Despite this criticism, Ambassador Razali Ismail pushed on with a bold attempt to move Group discussions forward by proposing a draft framework resolution, also known as the Razali plan, for consideration by the General Assembly in September 1997. The draft resolution attempted to balance three controversial issues – permanent and non-permanent membership in the Council, its working methods and the power of veto – and to place all elements in a time-bound framework. It was proposed that membership of the Council would increase from 15 to 24 with the addition of five permanent (one each from the developing states of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean and two from the industrialized states, generally assumed to be Germany and Japan), and four non-permanent members (one each from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean). The total of 24 compares with the 26 supported by the Non-Aligned Movement and the 21 the United States had set as a maximum. The new permanent members would not have veto rights. Although the original five permanent members would retain their veto power, they would be urged to limit the exercise of the veto to actions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, which deals with the Council’s enforcement powers. The current permanent member states had made it clear that they would not accept any changes in their prerogatives and the aspirants to permanency insisted that they would not accept second-class status. Finally, ten years after the amendments came into force, a review conference under Article 109 of the Charter would be convened. The Razali plan also included a major change in the procedure for the adoption of the draft resolution. Initially, the intention had been to obtain consensus support among all member states for a reform of the Security Council. Changes in the size and voting rights of the Council required amendments to the Charter of the United Nations. Technically, this would need to be approved by all five permanent members of the Security Council and by at least a two-thirds majority of all member states. Recognizing that the prerequisite of consensus was practically impossible to achieve, the following three proposals were advanced. First, it was suggested that voting be resorted to, which would allow opposition from a small number of countries to be overcome. Second, all new permanent members would need to be jointly elected in order to prevent the election of only Germany and Japan to permanent membership, the ‘quick fix’ concern raised by the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. Third, the Council would be enlarged in three separate stages with different majorities. Initially, a framework resolution was to be approved by a majority of two-thirds of those present and voting. This was to be followed by the selection of new permanent members by a two-thirds majority of all members or a minimum of 124 votes. Finally, the amendment and ratification of the Charter was to be approved by a two-thirds majority of all


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member states and the current permanent members of the Council in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter. The last time the Council had been expanded, back in 1963, the Assembly decided by a simple majority to add four new seats, followed by the Charter ratification according to Article 108. The procedural approach was important. Germany and Japan were hopeful that they could muster a two-thirds majority of present and voting members for a framework resolution, especially since there was general support for the proposal to enlarge the Security Council. The approval of a framework resolution could build momentum, based on which other new members would join later, and facilitate approval under Article 108 during the final amendment process. Approval of a framework resolution under Article 108 was much less likely. It was also understood that in controversial issues, a significant number of delegations would be absent or would abstain from voting in the Assembly. The presentation of the draft resolution was widely acknowledged and considered to be a good starting point for negotiations. The hopeful candidates for permanent membership, namely Germany and Japan as well as Brazil and India, considered it as an opportunity to successfully conclude the reform discussion. However, Germany and Japan expressed their disappointment that the new permanent members would not be granted the veto right. The veto issue remains a sticking point – some countries believe the new permanent members should possess equal rights – as does the means of determining who the new permanent members should be. The United States and United Kingdom welcomed the input but added that the proposed increase was too large, arguing that the Council should not have more than 20 members. The United States had proposed adding Japan and Germany and three developing countries as permanent members, without a right to veto, thus increasing the permanent members to 10 and the overall membership to 20. A few countries vehemently opposed the Razali plan, notably Italy, Pakistan and Mexico, which were against any expansion of the permanent category. In response and to counteract this initiative, Italy organized a group that opposed the Razali plan. In particular, Italy opposed the proposed break-up of the reform into different stages to be approved by the General Assembly at different times and with different majorities. This was seen to be a piecemeal strategy and an attempt to convey the misleading impression that the enlargement was inevitable. The Razali plan received a serious blow as early as April 1997, when the foreign ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement nations, which form a majority of United Nations members, issued a joint declaration on Security Council reform which emphasized the demand that new permanent members should be given the same veto power as current permanent members and that a partial or selective expansion or enlargement of the membership of the Council should not be approved to the detriment of developing countries. Moreover, the Organization of African Unity introduced demands for two permanent regional rotating seats with veto power. The United States modified its position somewhat. Previously, it had expressed its support for a five-member increase in the Security Council, with Germany and Japan as new permanent members. While maintaining a ceiling of five, the United States now supported the proposal that in addition to Germany and France, three developing countries could join as new permanent members, either named or rotational. Three other permanent members, namely the United Kingdom, France and Russia, agreed in general with this position. On the critical matter of veto power for the new permanent members, the United States was still not ready to take a position. In an attempt to facilitate reaching a conclusion, Senegal proposed discussing the issue of veto right in a subgroup. This did not happen since Canada, Italy, New Zealand and Pakistan objected to decoupling the issue of veto right from the expansion of membership.

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Early hopes that there could be agreement on the principle of an expanded Security Council had faded by the end of 1997. In September 1997, Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi urged the Assembly to agree on at least a framework for Security Council reform and affirmed his country’s readiness to increase its financial contribution. He advocated a shift from ‘capacity to pay’ to ‘responsibility to pay’. Japan’s assessment was about to become almost as high as the United States’ and was almost as great as the assessments of the other four permanent members combined. Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini of Italy stated that there could be absolutely no link between members’ contributions and Security Council reform. Rather than a seat for Germany, he envisaged a permanent seat on the Council for the European Union as a natural evolution of its common foreign and security policy. Italy, supported by Canada, Egypt, Guatemala, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Qatar, Syria and Turkey, proposed to stipulate that Article 108 of the Charter should be applied to all decisions related to the Charter revision, namely approval by a two-thirds majority of all members of the Assembly, including the current five permanent members of the Council. As noted, the Razali plan had required a two-thirds majority of members present and voting for the approval of a framework resolution – a majority likely to be achieved. Only the actual ratification of Charter amendments was seen as falling under Article 108. There was little visible sign of progress in the negotiations during 1998. On the use of the veto, the five states that have it remained adamant about not entertaining any changes. As for expansion, talks on the issue of numbers were still stymied. The United Kingdom stated for the first time that it could agree to five new permanent members and an appropriate expansion in the non-permanent category. Previously, the United Kingdom, like the United States, had insisted on a maximum of 21 members. Italy supported the eventual establishment of a common European seat, arguing that the Italian claim to a permanent seat was as valid as Germany’s and noting that Italy’s contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations exceeded the United Kingdom’s. China proposed that if there was deadlock on the expansion of the permanent category, the option of expanding the non-permanent category should be explored. The other permanent members of the Security Council, however, insisted that both categories must be expanded at the same time. In May 1998, India tested five nuclear devices, followed shortly thereafter by Pakistan. In response, the United States stated its opposition to India’s candidacy for permanent Security Council membership. Meanwhile, Germany and Japan were prepared to push ahead with a resolution calling for a larger expansion. As was the case in late 1997, the crucial discussion focused on what majorities would be required at what stages of the decision-making process. The position of the Non-Aligned Movement was crucially important for a decision on the matter of voting majority. In September 1998, the Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement affirmed that any resolution with Charter amendment implications would need to be adopted by the two-thirds majority of the United Nations membership referred to in Article 108 of the Charter. The countries opposed any partial or selective expansion of the membership and demanded an increase by no less than 11 seats up to a total of at least 26. If no agreement could be reached on permanent seats, expansion could take place in the non-permanent category for the time being. It was further argued that the veto should be curtailed with a view to its elimination and, as a first step, the Charter should be amended so that veto power should only apply to actions taken under Chapter VII. When the issue of majority vote came up for decision in November 1998, the General Assembly determined not to adopt any resolution or decision on the question of equitable representation on or increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters without an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the 185 members of the


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General Assembly. The General Assembly decision represented a severe setback for Germany and Japan after five years of negotiations. Their move to secure permanent seats was judged to have failed. Given the probable difficulty of gathering a two-thirds majority for expansion, it was hard to foresee any increase in Council membership for years to come. Italy welcomed the General Assembly’s decision, arguing that this had eliminated once and for all the threat of a legal anomaly affecting the problem of the majority needed for decisions concerning Security Council reform. After this decision, there were few changes of views as to which category of membership should actually be enlarged and how. In April 2000, the United States expressed its willingness to consider proposals involving slightly more than 21 members, by which it considered that it was making a significant effort to generate additional momentum for reform. Japan and Germany reiterated their readiness to become permanent members. Germany, however, also noted that it would favour a permanent seat held by the European Union acting as a legal entity that could speak with one voice. Russia supported permanent member status for India. With regard to the veto right for new permanent members, Germany suggested establishing a high-level working group. It also supported periodic reviews of the structure and functioning of the Security Council every 15 years, including the conclusions of the high-level working group on the veto. As an alternative to the concept of rotating non-permanent seats, Italy suggested an expansion of nonpermanent seats only, as proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement as a fallback position. The number could increase by five to six non-permanent members for a total of 20 or 21, as compared to previous proposals to add eight to ten new non-permanent seats. A larger increase was now considered likely to result in inefficiency. Compared to the initial expectations, the Working Group had achieved very little. There was an impasse on certain critical issues. During the General Assembly debate in November 2000, the United States noted that as yet there was not even an emerging consensus on how to proceed.

2. NEW REFORM INITIATIVES: THE STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS, 2003 TO 2006 2.1 SEPTEMBER 11, IRAQ AND THE ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY On 11 September 2001, a series of co-ordinated suicide attacks was carried out upon the United States of America, in which hijackers took control of four domestic commercial airliners. The hijackers crashed two planes into the World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York City. Within two hours, both towers had collapsed. A third aircraft crashed into the United States Department of Defense headquarters, the Pentagon, in Arlington County, Virginia, while a fourth plane crashed into a rural field in Pennsylvania. The official count records 2,986 deaths in the attacks. September 11 had profound economic, social, political and military impacts on the United States and many other parts of the world. It had also a major effect on the work of the United Nations. The United States declared a war on terrorism. The immediate post-9/11 efforts included military action, notably the invasion of Afghanistan by a United States-led coalition to topple the Taliban and pursue Al-Qaida. Within the United States, President Bush created the Department of Homeland Security, representing the largest re-structuring of the United States government in contemporary history. Congress passed a number of anti-terrorist laws, including the Patriot Act on 24 October 2001. The act expands the authority of United States law enforcement for the stated purpose of fighting terrorist acts

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in the United States and abroad. Among the laws the Patriot Act amended are immigration laws and banking and money laundering legislation. With respect to terrorism, the act defines the crime category of domestic and international terrorism and related concepts such as terrorist activity and terrorist organization, and provides for the designation of foreign terrorist organizations. These provisions criminalize material support to terrorists and to foreign terrorist organizations. Follow-up included economic and military sanctions against states perceived as harbouring terrorists and increased global surveillance and intelligence sharing. The World Trade Center attacks strengthened, although perhaps only briefly, the sense of international community. The Security Council responded immediately by passing resolution 1368 on September 12, condemning the attacks and obliging states to ‘combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist attacks’ stressing that ‘those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of such acts will be held accountable’. On 28 September 2001, Security Council resolution 1373 called on states to control ‘the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism’, and to ratify and implement all relevant United Nations protocols and conventions. The United Nations expressed broad international support for and cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism, including military action against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. This global solidarity reawakened the United States’ interest in multilateral co-operation. President George W. Bush’s address to the General Assembly on 10 November 2001 asked for a comprehensive commitment and a coalition of all member states to fight all terrorism. But the resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the days following the attacks also sowed the seeds of trouble for the future. The United States did not want its military actions to be curbed by multilateral constraints. Rather, the Security Council had recognized for the first time cross-border military action against terrorists was compatible with ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence’ against armed attack set out in Article 51. Indeed, military action to destroy the Al-Qaida terrorist sanctuary in Taliban Afghanistan was widely accepted as legitimate and necessary. However, this was clearly a break from the past, for the United Nations General Assembly repeatedly condemned retaliatory strikes. Moreover, the anti-terrorist measures demanded by the Security Council, such as the suppression of the financing and recruitment networks supporting terrorist organizations, had one major shortcoming. There was no common understanding of what constituted a terrorist threat. Indeed, there was a continuing impasse on a global definition of ‘terrorism’. This was to be determined in negotiations of the General Assembly on a comprehensive convention against terrorism. Consensus could not be reached. The United States and allied delegations sought to exclude the activities of regular armed forces from the provisions of the treaty, fearing that military actions that entailed unpleasant ‘collateral damage’ could be accused of terrorism. The Organization of the Islamic Conference emphasized that armed struggle ‘in the situation of foreign occupation’, or national liberation, should be treated as an exception in the definition of terrorism. The United States and many other Western countries were firmly opposed to such an open exception. In November 2002, the United States Congress and President George W. Bush established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (also known the 9/11 Commission) to, among other things, make recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism. The 9/11 Commission’s final report, released in July 2004, called for efforts to root out actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries, prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by strengthening counter-proliferation efforts,


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track terrorist financing and engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against terrorism.

Iraq Because of the new threats that the United States faced following the September 11 terrorist attacks, a shift in its foreign policy took place. The traditional strategies of deterrence and containment were no longer considered sufficient. According to the Bush Doctrine, the understanding of the right of self-defence was extended to include preemptive actions against potential aggressors, with the goal of striking first to eliminate threats. In early 2002, the Bush administration announced that it considered Iraq to be part of an ‘axis of evil’ of regimes that sponsored terror. By September 2002, the United States Congress authorized possible military action in order to rid Iraq of all weapons of mass destruction. The Iraq war started on 20 March 2003, a date marking the conclusion of a long process that dated back to August 1990, when Iraqi troops had invaded Kuwait. The Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops in resolution 660. This was followed in November 1990 by Security Council resolution 678, which gave Iraq a withdrawal deadline of 15 January 1991 and authorized ‘all necessary means’ to uphold and implement resolution 660. Kuwait was liberated in early 1991 by Coalition forces followed by a Cease Fire Agreement approved by the Security Council in resolution 687. The Council imposed a disarmament and sanctions regime on Iraq designed to destroy any weapons of mass destruction it had and deny it the capability to reconstitute, or the resources to purchase, such weapons in the future. Iraq was required to stop supporting international terrorism. The resolution also created the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to inspect Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear facilities. On the basis of resolution 678, the United States, Britain, and France imposed a ban on Iraqi military flights over the northern and southern thirds of the country in an attempt to halt the Baghdad government’s violent suppression of Shiite unrest in southern Iraq and Kurdish disaffection in the north. During the following years, the United States and the United Kingdom maintained continuous pressure on Iraq and launched major air strikes against it on several occasions, as well as operating military air patrols to enforce ‘nofly zones’. With the sanctions remaining in place longer than initially anticipated, the Security Council established the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme to respond to the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians and help the unintended victims of the international sanctions against the Iraqi regime. Under the Programme negotiated and agreed upon by the United Nations and the Iraqi authorities, food and health supplies were provided to Iraq; they were funded by the supervised sale of Iraqi oil. A percentage of the oil revenue was allocated to making reparation payments to Kuwait and the cost of administering the United Nations oversight. The United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme was seen as providing better guarantees that oil revenue would be used for humanitarian needs than a lifting of the sanctions, which would have allowed the Iraqi regime to divert such revenues to rebuilding its military forces. In the decade following the Gulf War, the United Nations displayed obvious frustration that Iraq was not only failing to disarm but interfering with the work of weapons inspectors. In October 1998, United States President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, which stated that the United States intended to remove Saddam Hussein

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from office and replace the government with a democratic institution – a call for ‘regime change’. In response, Iraq announced it would no longer co-operate with UNSCOM teams and refused to give United Nations arms inspectors unfettered access to facilities. In response, inspectors from UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were evacuated in December 1998 and, on the basis of resolution 678, the United States and the United Kingdom hit 100 Iraqi targets in four days of bombing under Operation Desert Fox. One year later, in December 1999, Security Council resolution 1284 ordered Iraq once again to give inspection teams immediate and unconditional access to any weapons sites and facilities. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was created to replace UNSCOM. When Iraq rejected the resolution, UNMOVIC was denied access to the country. After nearly three years, and based on an initiative by the United States and the United Kingdom, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1441 in November 2002, which set a new timetable and a new inspection regime for Iraq. The Council decided that Iraq ‘was and remains’ in ‘material breach’ of prior resolutions calling for the elimination of Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the resolution recalled that the Council had repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face ‘serious consequences’ as a result of its continued violation of its obligations. The weapons inspectors then returned to Iraq for the first time in four years, headed by Hans Blix, Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Mohamed El Baradei, Director-General of the IAEA. Diplomatic pressure to make Iraq comply with Security Council resolution 1441 quickly created a diplomatic crisis in the United Nations, where some members were in agreement with the United States position, while others dissented, notably the permanent Security Council members France, Russia and the People’s Republic of China and fellow NATO members Germany and Belgium. In early December 2002, Iraq filed a 12,000-page weapons declaration with the United Nations. After reviewing the document, United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and many other countries thought that this declaration failed to account for all of Iraq’s chemical and biological agents. On 19 December, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that Iraq was in material breach of the Security Council resolution. On 27 January 2003, Hans Blix and Mohamed El-Baradei reported to the Security Council that Iraq had co-operated on a practical level with the monitors, but had not demonstrated a ‘genuine acceptance’ of the need to disarm. The report intensified the pressure on Iraq to comply with the Council’s mandates for verified elimination of its weapons of mass destruction. In contrast to El-Baradei, who urged the Council to give the inspectors a few more months to work, Blix did not ask for more time. On 5 February 2003, Colin Powell presented a case for military intervention in Iraq to the Security Council. Powell presented satellite images and intercepted military communications and computer-generated images depicting mobile biological weapon production systems. The Iraqi government continued to claim that it had no weapons of mass destruction and was fully co-operating with United Nations resolution 1441. On 24 February 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain proposed another resolution on Iraq to the Security Council, known as the ‘second resolution’. The draft resolution declared that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in resolution 1441. There was a fierce debate on the need for a second resolution to authorize military action. Some argued that military action could be justified on the basis of resolution 1441,


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which had warned Iraq that it would ‘face serious consequences’ if it continued to violate the obligations spelled out in the resolution. Moreover, resolution 1441 referred in its preamble to resolution 678, which authorized the use of force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1990 and ‘to restore international peace and security in the area’. Finally, military actions and pre-emptive strikes were seen to be justified on the basis of selfdefence. Some members argued that military action was already authorized but supported the approval of a second resolution for political reasons. Others argued that a second resolution authorizing military force was needed since resolution 1441 did not contain the critical words ‘by all necessary means’, the traditional United Nations euphemism for armed force. Moreover, it was argued that there was no actual or imminent threat from Iraq that would justify a ‘self-defence’ response. A week before the invasion, Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that war on Iraq without a new resolution endorsing it would ‘not be in conformity with the Charter’. The draft resolution split the United Nations, with the United States and the United Kingdom coming under sustained criticism from France, Russia and Germany. Indeed, the draft ‘second resolution’ was seen as a test of the United Nations’ relevance. The United Nations ran a very real risk that refusal to act against Iraqi defiance might convince Washington policymakers that it was too weak an instrument to rely on for serious security problems, encouraging a tendency to bypass it. The United States, the United Kingdom and Spain eventually dropped their efforts to get a second resolution passed, given that not enough countries would have supported it. The United States announced, ‘diplomacy has failed’. The United Nations pulled out all of its inspectors out of Iraq and the 2003 Iraq war officially started on 20 March 2003 with a ground force of about 300,000, which had been established after a long military build-up. The invasion was supported by a ‘coalition of the willing’: initially 49 countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, Italy and Spain. 14 The war faced strong opposition, in particular from France, Germany, Russia and China. Even after the end of major combat operations, fierce Iraqi resistance, persistent economic and political problems, and international criticism continued. Two months after the war, the United Nations was requested to assist and participate in Iraqi political and humanitarian affairs. Following the diplomatic meltdown in the United Nations, the resulting paralysis was partly resolved when the Security Council adopted its resolution 1483 on 22 May 2003, which provided for the basis for future United Nations involvement in Iraq. In this resolution, the Council gave the United States and the United Kingdom the power to govern Iraq and use its oil resources to rebuild the country and lifted the nearly 13-year-old economic sanctions originally imposed after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Everything was done to avoid any implied approval or ex post facto authorization of the invasion. As requested by the resolution, the Secretary-General appointed a special representative to work with United States and British administrators on reconstruction, humanitarian aid, and the creation of a new government. On 19 August 2003, a terrorist attack on the United Nations office in Iraq killed 22 people, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the United Nations Special Representative.

As of 27 March 2003, the following countries were part of the coalition: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Spain, Tonga, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan. 14

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Following that terrorist attack, the United Nations pulled out of Iraq. Security of United Nations staff members became an overriding concern. In 2000, the Assembly had already endorsed the Secretary-General’s two-year programme for reinforcement of the United Nations Security Management System, by insisting on basic standards in all United Nations duty stations regarding planning, staff training, telecommunications and security equipment. A full-time United Nations Security Co-ordinator at the Assistant SecretaryGeneral level had been appointed in August 2002. On the basis of proposals by the Secretary-General, the Assembly approved in December 2003 proposals for a major overhaul of the United Nations’ security system, including a substantial increase in funding and a clear chain of command. The United Nations returned to Iraq in February 2004. At the request of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq and the Iraqi Governing Council, the Secretary-General dispatched a fact-finding mission in February 2004, led by Special Advisor Lakhdar Brahimi, to assess the feasibility of holding direct elections. After the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004, the United Nations was asked to play a larger role in planning national elections, but security risks and the reluctance of the SecretaryGeneral and United Nations staff kept the United Nations’ role to a minimum. In October 2004, the Security Council voted to approve a resolution sponsored by the United States to expand international support for Iraq. But France, Germany and Russia stated that they were not in a position to pledge peacekeeping troops or further funds for Iraq. Meanwhile, United Nations foreign staff remained outside Iraq, in part because the Secretary-General was awaiting clear directions from the Security Council. On 16 September 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared in an interview with the BBC World Service ‘I have indicated it was not in conformity with the United Nations Charter. From our point of view and from the Charter point of view it was illegal.’ His remarks came amid an upsurge in violence in Iraq. Key members of the coalition forces expressed their strong disapproval of the Secretary-General’s comments and the relationship with the United States in particular became more difficult. On the Sunday before the presidential elections in the United States, the Secretary-General sent letters to the United States, the United Kingdom and Iraq, urging them not to send forces go after rebels in Fallujah. The Secretary-General subsequently insisted that he was not trying to interfere with the electoral process in favour of John Kerry, but subsequently admitted that the timing of the letter was not the best. George W. Bush was re-elected President of the United States on 2 November 2004.

2.2 A FORK IN THE ROAD: THE NEED FOR A FUNDAMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS The brief moment of global solidarity against terrorism in 2001 had quickly been replaced by acrimonious arguments. The inability of the Security Council to either endorse or prevent military action in Iraq left the United Nations and the international system profoundly shaken. According to the Secretary-General, there were ‘deep divisions among the Member States on the use of force to address those threats’. 15 Those issues had already been debated in the 1990s when considering the principle of state sovereignty against the 15 United Nations document: Secretary-General, Note Transmitting Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, para. 1.


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international community’s responsibility to prevent or resolve conflicts within states, especially when they involve genocide or other comparable atrocities. Failure to act promptly and decisively in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995 had raised questions of credibility and pointed to the need to reform peacekeeping capabilities. With massacres of genocidal proportions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Darfur (Sudan) in recent years, the discussion appeared to have gained momentum once again. Articles were surfacing in the media pondering the future of the United Nations. The United Kingdom came out with a proposal to set up a United Nations organization to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and supported the expansion of the Security Council. The heads of state of Russia and China called for a reform of the United Nations to uphold its pivotal role in world affairs in March 2003, at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the opening of the General Assembly in September 2003, it was argued in an editorial in The New York Times that ‘global policing can acquire legitimacy only through multinational endorsement’, but that ‘the General Assembly and the Security Council have little to show that this is the place to find that sort of legitimacy in the 21st Century’. In his annual report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General called for radical reform at the United Nations, arguing that the Iraq crisis had highlighted the need to rescue the United Nations’ credibility by adapting outdated structures to modern realities. He personally appealed to world leaders to attend the 2003 General Assembly debate and to bring their ideas for overhauling the institution. George W. Bush, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, among other world leaders, attended the General Assembly session in September 2003, at which Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave his well-known ‘fork in the road’ speech: Excellencies, we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded. At that time, a group of far-sighted leaders, led and inspired by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were determined to make the second half of the twentieth century different from the first half. They saw that the human race had only one world to live in, and that unless it managed its affairs prudently, all human beings may perish. So they drew up rules to govern international behaviour, and founded a network of institutions, with the United Nations at its centre, in which the peoples of the world could work together for the common good. Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed then, or whether radical changes are needed. 16 Such radical changes would need to be based on a fundamental assessment of the Organization’s functioning. In fact, a major assessment was already under way. Back in 2000, the world leaders had committed themselves during the Millennium Summit to achieve the anti-poverty Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the year 2015, including specific targets for the reduction of extreme poverty, hunger and child mortality. The Secretary-General was to hold a ‘Plus Five’ Summit in 2005 in accordance with the practice of routinely reconvening every five years after a major United Nations conference to assess the progress achieved. The preparation of the progress report on the MDGs had been commissioned by the Secretary-General in 2002, together with the task of 16 As cited in: Hans Corell, ‘Reforming the United Nations’, International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005, pp. 373–390.

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formulating a global plan for achieving the MDGs by 2015. The study was carried out by the UN Millennium Project, an independent advisory body directed by Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University and sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme on behalf of the United Nations Development Group. In order to address the criticisms of the United Nations, the Secretary-General was looking for a way to marry the economic development issues that preoccupied most of the member states with the United States’ concerns with security and terrorism. In November 2003, the Secretary-General announced to the General Assembly his decision to convene a ‘High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, composed of 16 eminent persons. 17 The members of the Panel included heads of state, foreign ministers, and foreign policy officials. They were independent and did not represent the positions of their national governments. The Panel was to generate new ideas about the kinds of policies and institutions required for the United Nations to be effective and to set out no less than a new vision of collective security for the twenty-first century. The report of the Panel was to be transmitted to member states, together with comments and suggestions by the SecretaryGeneral concerning the recommendations of the Panel and the decisions to be taken thereon. Specifically, the Panel was charged with three tasks: x Examine today’s global threats and analyse future challenges to international peace and security; x Clearly identify the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges; and x Recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including but not limited to a review of the principal organs of the United Nations. In May 2004, the General Assembly decided to convene a World Summit in September 2005 at the commencement of the 60th session of the Assembly. The Summit was to review the implementation of the Millennium Declaration and the integrated follow-up of the major United Nations conferences, including, in particular, the Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, and the Conference on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. The Secretary-General was to submit a comprehensive report on the Millennium Declaration, including a review of the progress made in financing and achieving the MDGs. The Secretary-General announced that this report would also draw on the findings of the ‘High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, in particular in the area of peace and security.

17 Chairperson: Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand; Eminent persons: Robert Badinter (France), João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana), Gareth Evans (Australia), David Hannay (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay), Amre Moussa (Egypt), Satish Nambiar (India), Sadako Ogata (Japan), Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation), Qian Qichen (China), Salim Ahmed Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Nafis Sadik (Pakistan) and Brent Scowcroft (United States of America).


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2.3 HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE: A MORE SECURE WORLD The ‘High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ had deliberated in relative secrecy for nearly a year. Anand Panyarachun, chairperson and former Prime Minister of Thailand report, issued the report ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ in December 2004 (see Part II, Document 1). The Panel drew on input from a wide range of sources, including governments, academic experts and civil society organizations across the globe and received financial and in-kind contributions from various sources. 18 In addition, the Panel had held consultations in each region, both individually and as a group. The report was considered a constructive and far-sighted contribution. Members of the Panel clearly took pains to agree on innovative proposals, which could close up the deep divisions among member states. The Panel illustrated the new nature of threats and their unprecedented interconnection with a number of concrete illustrations. 19 One scenario presented a nuclear attack by terrorists on New York City, with its implications in terms of deaths and worldwide economic damage amounting to trillions of dollars. The report also pointed out that the biological security of the United States and Europe depends on the ability of the poorest countries to monitor, respond to and contain emerging infectious diseases. Moreover, the fact that the amount of highly enriched uranium required to create an improvised nuclear device could fit in six one-litre milk cartons points to the problem of nuclear terrorism and the need to strengthen anti-proliferation measures. In its assessment of the United Nations’ performance in recent years, the Panel noted that the Organization’s success at ending civil wars and preventing nuclear proliferation was mixed. Since 1990, mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and the implementation of peace agreements had been the operational face of the United Nations. The number of civil wars worldwide had decreased since 1992 and the number of negotiated settlements of civil wars had increased. However, there had also been tremendous failures in Rwanda, Angola and Srebrenica. This indicates the crucial importance of investing in the implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding. With regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the non-proliferation regime and the role played by IAEA were credited with reducing both the demand for these weapons and the supply of materials necessary to create them. However, it was recognized that there had recently been a proliferation of nuclear weapons, emphasizing the need for new measures. The Panel’s report was divided into five parts. Part 1 outlined the need to develop a new security consensus. The following parts covered the issues of collective security and the challenge of prevention (Part 2), collective security and the use of force (Part 3) and a more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century (Part 4). The Panel made 101 recommendations, including many related to strengthening the United Nations. The main proposals addressing the areas of security, human rights, development and management are described below. 18 Support was received from the governments of Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey and the United Kingdom, as well as from following foundations and think tanks: Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, International Peace Academy, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, New York University Center on International Cooperation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Rockefeller Foundation, Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanley Foundation, United Nations Foundation and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. 19 Stephen Stedman, ‘Strengthening the United Nations to Provide Collective Security for the 21st Century’ UNA-USA Policy Brief, No. 4, 16 December 2004.


30 Development

The High-level Panel asserted that development was the first line of defence for collective security (see Part II, Document 1, Synopsis). Increased development would counteract the most pressing human security threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation. Achieving the MDGs was seen as part of a long-term strategy for preventing civil war and addressing the environment in which both terrorism and organized crime flourished. Development would build developing countries’ capacity to exercise their sovereignty responsibly. A number of specific recommendations were advanced, some of which had been discussed and approved earlier.

Increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA), Debt Relief and Trade Facilitation This recommendation included demands that donor countries should provide 0.7 per cent of GNP (Gross National Product) for ODA (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 60). Lender governments and the international financial institutions should provide highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer rescheduling and improved access to global markets (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 62–63).

Climate Change, HIV/AIDS With regard to global warming, the High-level Panel suggested that member states should reflect on the gap between the promise of the Kyoto Protocol and their actual performance, re-engage with the problem of global warming and begin negotiations to develop a new long-term strategy for reducing global warming beyond the period covered by the Protocol (2012 horizon) (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 72). International resources for HIV/AIDS should increase from $2.8 billion in 2002 to $10 billion annually and the Security Council should host a second special session on HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security. Finally, international donors should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild local and national public health systems throughout the developing world and provide greater resources to the WHO to increase its capacity to cope with potential outbreaks of disease (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 64–70).

Economic and Social Council Finally, the High-level Panel argued that ECOSOC was finding it difficult to function effectively despite the many previous reform attempts. One reason was the large number of actors at the international level with functions closely related to those of ECOSOC, in particular the Bretton Woods institutions. The Panel proposed that ECOSOC should provide a regular venue for engaging the development community at the highest level, in effect transforming itself into a ‘development co-operation forum’ (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 276–278). Specifically, the Council should establish a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats.


31 Security

New Security Consensus Although the United Nations founders had been preoccupied with state security in the traditional military sense, the central challenge for the Panel was to fashion a new vision of collective security (see Part II, Document 1, Synopsis). Thus, it was argued that issues of security, economic development and human freedom were indivisible. Moreover, the Panel suggested that the nature of threats had changed, recognizing no national boundaries, and that seemingly diverse threats were interconnected. The Panel argued that no state could address the new threats alone, nor could it be assumed that states will always be able or willing to meet their responsibility to protect their own people. Hence, it considered collective strategies, institutions and responsibility to be indispensable in addressing the following six clusters of threats, which will affect the world in the decades ahead: (i) economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; (ii) interstate conflict; (iii) internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; (iv) nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; (v) terrorism; and (vi) transnational organized crime. Although not all states face these threats to the same extent, a collective security system must take threats to all member states equally seriously. The United Nations had not always been equitable in its response to threats, as shown by the difference in the speed with which it responds with peacekeepers to civil wars in Africa versus in Europe, and the slow response to HIV/AIDS. This inequitable response undermines confidence in the legitimacy of the United Nations. Finally, it was suggested that members of the General Assembly should use the opportunity provided by the World Summit in 2005 to forge a new consensus on broader and more effective collective security.

Terrorism One of the most contentious issues in the United Nations in the past few years had been the definition of terrorism (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 145–164). The Panel argued that the United Nations is not a key operational actor in the fight against terrorism, but it could be a strong normative voice. A total of 12 international conventions against terrorism had been adopted, each of which addressed a specific issue. Now, however, the aim was to negotiate a comprehensive convention against terrorism. The text of such a convention had already been completed in October 2001, except for the crucial definition of terrorism and the issue of freedom fighting. Despite the September 11 events, agreement could not be reached. Some members had argued that the definition must include the use of armed force against civilians; on the other hand, Arab and Muslim states in particular insisted that the definition must acknowledge the right to resist foreign occupation. But the High-level Panel, which included several eminent Muslim representatives, proposed a consensus definition that asserts that there is no justifiable reason for killing civilians, defining terrorism as any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Convention and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its

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Reforming the United Nations nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 164).

On the basis of this definition, which excluded any reference to freedom fighting, the High-level Panel urged the United Nations to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism and forge a counter-terrorism strategy that would be respectful of human rights and the rule of law. The strategy should include dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, working to end occupations and address major political grievances, combating organized crime, reducing poverty and unemployment, and stopping state collapse. The Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council, established in late 2001, should act as a clearing house for state-to-state provision of military, police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counterterrorism capacities and the Security Council should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions for state non-compliance with the Council’s counter-terrorism resolutions.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Threats and Catastrophic Terrorism The High-level Panel elaborated on the risks of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Concern was expressed about the erosion and possible collapse of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime as a result of the nuclear arms race. In particular, the risk was highlighted that members of the Treaty would covertly and illegally develop full-scale weapons programmes or acquire the materials and expertise to proceed with weaponization. In this context, the inspection and verification rules applied by IAEA were seen to be increasingly inadequate. Moreover, the mounting tension was highlighted between the goal of achieving a more effective non-proliferation regime and the right of Treaty members to develop civilian nuclear industries. The Panel proposed that the IAEA Board of Governors should recognize the more stringent inspection rules outlined in the Model Additional Protocol to the Treaty as a new standard for IAEA safeguards. At that time, only one-third of the states that were party to the Treaty had ratified the Protocol. In addition, it was proposed that the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over failure to comply with non-proliferation and safeguards standards. At the same time, nuclear-weapon states were urged to honour their commitment under the Treaty and restart nuclear disarmament. Finally, in an apparent reference to the crisis over Iran’s nuclear programme, the High-level Panel called for measures to help states develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy, if they would agree to voluntarily forgo the development of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing capacities that could be used to build atomic weapons. IAEA was to act as a guarantor for the supply of supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 129–131). Other specific recommendations covered chemical weapons and biological and toxin weapons. The Panel recognized that the ease of manufacture of those weapons makes it difficult to address this problem through an international treaty with verification and monitoring. Rather, it was suggested that the threat should be addressed through a robust health system. This would require significant investment throughout the developing world. Such a program would also address the developing world’s concerns with infectious disease and would be one of the best defences against bioterrorism. One of the more controversial recommendations was a call for close ties between the WHO Director-


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General and the Security Council if in the future there is either an outbreak of a deadly disease that raises suspicions that it may have been manufactured or a massive outbreak of naturally occurring infectious disease (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 142–144). The High-level Panel proposed a set of recommendations to strengthen international regimes and norms to govern some of the sources and accelerators of conflict and wars (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 96). Among other things, the Panel suggested that member states should expedite and conclude negotiations to achieve legally binding agreements on the marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons. Finally, the Highlevel Panel called for action to defend against the possible terrorist use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 135). Although this issue was not further elaborated, it would receive more attention from the Secretary-General in the period prior to the World Summit.

The Use of Force The United Nations is uniquely placed to confer collective, multilateral authority on the use of force. This function had been severely weakened by the failure to reach consensus on Iraq. There had also been debates concerning the definition of ‘armed attack’ and the concepts of the pre-emptive and preventive use of force following September 11. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides the framework for the use of force. This chapter had been virtually inoperative during the Cold War. Since then, Chapter VII had been applied unsystematically and inequitably. In the cases of Kosovo and Iraq, it had proven impossible to take collective decisions authorizing the use of force even when mandatory Security Council resolutions were being violated. In Bosnia, Rwanda and Darfur, the Security Council had not been able to generate the will and the resources to prevent atrocities. Four articles are of particular interest. Article 39 20 specifies that the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. What constituted such a threat or act of aggression was at the centre of the recent debate. The Council is to decide on the measures to maintain or restore international peace in accordance with Articles 41 and 42. The Security Council has the authority to act preventively. Article 41 21 governs decisions on the use of force not involving armed forces. Article 42 22 governs decisions involving armed forces. Finally,

20

21

22

Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.


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Article 51 23 describes the inherent right of any country to take military action against another country which has unlawfully used armed force against it. In the case of collective self-defence, a group of countries may take military action in support of a country that has been the victim of an armed attack. In addition, the definition of ‘armed attack’ determines whether Article 51 can be applied. The day after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Security Council adopted the groundbreaking resolution 1368, which implicitly recognized that the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence applies to terrorist attacks. This crucial precedent enhances the legitimacy of military actions taken in response to terrorist attacks, such as the United States campaign against Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. A literal reading of Article 51 on self-defence requires waiting until an attack happens before one is able to respond in self-defence. In light of the evolution of warfare since the Charter was drafted, Article 51 was interpreted to allow for the anticipatory use of force: the use of force to eliminate an overwhelming and imminent threat. The Panel agreed with this view, pointing out that if a threat is truly imminent, then a state need not wait to be attacked. In other words, states can engage in anticipatory selfdefence as long as the threat is imminent. The debate surrounding anticipatory self-defence was dramatically altered with the announcement of the Bush Doctrine in September 2002. This doctrine adapts a traditional interpretation of anticipatory self-defence to the new threats resulting from a combination of weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, and rogue states. Whereas imminent threats are visible, for example, in the case of mobilization of armies, weapons of mass destruction can be easily concealed, covertly delivered and used without warning by terrorists and rogue states. Thus, the nature of the new threat makes it untenable to wait for evidence of an imminent attack. There is a compelling case for taking anticipatory action to defence, even if the time and place of the enemy’s attack remain uncertain. The Bush Doctrine calls for the preventive use of force to ensure that a serious threat, which may reasonably be imagined but is not yet real, does not emerge. The Panel noted that the Charter did not provide the right to use preventive force. It recognized, however, that no state would want to wait to the point where a threat, such as a nuclear attack by terrorists, became imminent. In these cases, a collective response was recommended. When faced with a threat that is not imminent, a state should take the matter to the Security Council to provide collective authority for the use of force for preventive reasons. In these cases, the Security Council would have to be proactive (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 183–191). The Panel considered the need to amend the articles under Chapter VII in order to reflect a new understanding of the use of force. 24 The possibilities included either making these provisions more restrictive, or to making them more expansive. The Panel concluded, however, that rewriting Article 51 was neither necessary nor desirable nor practicable (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 192).

23

Article 51 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 24 David Hannay, ‘Collective Security and the Use of Force’, International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 367–372.


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Peacebuilding Commission Since the mid-1990s, it had been recognized that the Charter suffered from a structural shortcoming in the area of peace maintenance, namely the lack of a United Nations organ to address the challenge of helping countries with the transition from conflict to lasting peace. Various proposals had been made to close this gap. The consequences of the United Nations intervention in Rwanda and Somalia in the mid- and late 1990s sparked calls for an extension of the Trusteeship Council’s mandate to ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ states. The option to revitalize the Trusteeship Council contrasted not only with the growing aversion to notions of tutelage and foreign governance, but also with the practical challenges of United Nations peace maintenance. The process of peacebuilding was inextricably linked to a threat or breach of international peace and security, involving either the Security Council or the General Assembly in peacemaking activities. The notion of strengthening organizational arrangements for peace maintenance had already been elaborated in the Brahimi report. It was recommended that a dedicated and distinct responsibility centre be established within the United Nations system in order to deal with the challenge of transitional administrations. Other ideas included the creation of a permanent Security Council Committee under Article 29 of the Charter to address the problem posed by failing states. The Committee would temporarily take over some or all of the state’s sovereignty in the name of the international community; it would also handle administrative tasks. The High-level Panel expressed support for the idea of the creation of a new subsidiary body of the Security Council in the area of peacebuilding (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 261–269). The Panel recognized that there is an institutional gap in the United Nations system, caused by the absence of a mechanism ‘to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in the transition from war to peace’. It was understood that a mandate to prevent the collapse of state institutions may require intervention in the domestic affairs of societies in transition, including action without or against the will of United Nations member states. To do so, the Commission would have required a further Chapter VII authorization in order to discharge its mandate effectively. The Peacebuilding Commission was to bring together the efforts of the Security Council and ECOSOC, the international financial institutions, the main donors and troop contributors and the relevant regional organizations. The High-level Panel proposed to entrust the Commission with the mandate to: x identify countries that are under stress and risk sliding towards state collapse, x organize, in partnership with the national government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further, x assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding, and x marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary. The Commission should be reasonably small; meet in different configurations, to consider both general policy issues and country-by-country strategies; be chaired by a member approved by the Security Council; and include representation from ECOSOC. A


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Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat to give the new Commission appropriate support and to ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations. To complement the new Peacebuilding Commission, the Panel proposed the establishment of a Fund for Peacebuilding of at least $250 million that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a newly established government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration.

Peacekeeping The High-level Panel recognized that many of the recommendations of the Brahimi report on peacekeeping remained either unimplemented or only partially implemented (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 210–220). The Panel recommended that the funds for disarmament and demobilization, crucial tasks for almost every peacekeeping mission, should be met from assessed budgets for United Nations peacekeeping operations. Moreover, it was proposed that the United Nations should have at its disposal a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50 to 100 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations, and the General Assembly should authorize this capacity. It was suggested that developed states should do more to transform their existing force capacities into suitable contingents for peace operations, including the establishment of standby high-readiness, self-sufficient battalions at up to the brigade level that can reinforce United Nations missions, and should place them at the disposal of the United Nations. Additional resources and new capacities were to be provided so that the United Nations could develop an effective mediation role. This included training and briefing facilities for special representatives of the SecretaryGeneral and support for professional mediation support. Finally, the Panel urged the Organization to engage more closely and support regional organizations in peacekeeping operations, including capacity building and equipment support or the financing of regional operations authorized by the Security Council with assessed contributions.

Security Council Reform The High-level Panel addressed two main issues. First, the legitimacy of the Security Council in authorizing or endorsing the use of military force was reviewed. Second, the reform and expansion of the Security Council were covered. With regard to the Security Council’s legitimacy, the Panel argued that the Council was fully empowered under Chapter VII to deal with the full range of security threats (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 193–198 and 204–209). The task was not to find alternatives to the Council as a source of authority, but to make it work better by proposing the following five basic criteria of legitimacy, which the Council should address in considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force: x seriousness of the threat (sufficiently clear and serious threat to state or human security, involving genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law),


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x proper purpose (the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question), x last resort (exploration of every non-military option), x proportional means (proposed military action as the minimum necessary to meet the threat), x balance of consequences (consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction). The guidelines were seen as maximizing the likelihood of achieving consensus among the members of the Security Council on the decisive and proactive use of force in case of mass atrocities within states or ‘nightmare scenarios’ such as those combining terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. With regard to Security Council reform, the Panel’s recommendations covered membership criteria, models for enlargement, and a follow-up review to the reform (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 244–260). The panel suggested financial, military and diplomatic criteria for selection and re-election to membership, including, in the case of developed countries, progress towards the internationally agreed-upon level of 0.7 per cent of the GNP for ODA. Moreover, the reform should make the Council more representative of the broader membership, especially in the developing world. The United Nations Charter did not specify criteria for membership. With regard to enlargement, the Panel suggested that the Security Council should be expanded from 15 to 24 members. However, not just one but two models were recommended: Model A involved new permanent members, Model B involved new long-term renewable non-permanent seats. Specifically, Model A provided for six new permanent seats and three new two-year non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. Model B provided for a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and nonrenewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. Neither option, however, extended the veto power beyond the existing five countries. Finally, the Panel suggested a full review of the new arrangement in 2020. Some members of the Panel, most likely from countries hoping for a permanent seat such as Brazil, Egypt, India and Japan, strongly supported the expansion of permanent membership set out in Model A. A majority of panel members, however, preferred an expansion according to the alternative Model B. The panel members did not support a change in the veto rights. While the Panel did not see a practical way of changing the existing members’ veto power, it considered the veto anachronistic in an increasingly democratic age. The permanent members were urged to limit the use of the veto to matters where vital interests were at stake. The High-level Panel did not, however, confront the essential deformity at the heart of the Security Council, namely permanent membership by major powers that control Council decisions but have no obligation to contribute to their implementation.


38 Human Rights Responsibility to Protect

The most sensitive area covered by the Panel has come to be called the responsibility to protect human security. This notion, formerly referred to as humanitarian intervention, was developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and is generally defined as the use of armed force without the consent of the affected state to address a humanitarian emergency, in particular large-scale loss of life, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing. The Charter does not authorize intervention in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. A number of member states, especially smaller countries, consider the primacy of national sovereignty as the only viable defence against political intervention by powerful states. The principle dilemma with humanitarian interventions is whether a country’s sovereignty should prevent foreign action to halt massive breaches of international humanitarian law. This kind of intervention has been controversial both when it occurred and when it did not. 25 The list of interventions in the 1990s, by different actors and with varying degrees of success, includes Liberia (1990), northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), Sierra Leone (1997) and East Timor (1999). The High-level Panel endorsed the emerging consensus that a responsibility exists to protect civilians from large-scale violence (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 199–203). The Panel recognized that sovereignty cannot be used as a shield for member states to hide behind in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, large-scale loss of civilian life, or massive violations of international humanitarian law. When a state fails to protect its civilians, the international community has a responsibility to act, through humanitarian operations, monitoring missions, and diplomatic pressure. If this fails, the responsibility should be enforced by the Security Council, which can authorize military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide or other serious violations of humanitarian law. And in the case of conflict or the use of force, this also implies a clear international commitment to rebuilding shattered societies. The agreement of the High-level Panel was significant since it reflected the consensus views of its diverse membership. No prescription was provided on how to apply this new concept, but the Panel believed that it represented the direction in which the international community needed to move.

Human Rights Council The High-level Panel was aware that the human rights mechanisms lacked credibility and effectiveness. Criticism focused in particular on the poor human rights records of some member states that had been elected to the Commission on Human Rights. Indeed, it had been argued that member states had had themselves elected in the past in order to prevent human rights issues related to themselves or friendly states from being raised in the Commission. The Commission of Human Right is a subsidiary body of ECOSOC and the principal mechanism and international forum concerned with promoting and protecting human rights. It is composed of representatives drawn from 53 member states, elected by the 25 Alan Avery, ‘The Use of Force, Legitimacy and the U.N. Charter’, The InterDependent, Vol. 29, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 13–14.


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members of ECOSOC. There are no permanent members; and members are elected for three-year terms. Seats on the Commission are apportioned by region, including 15 from African states, 12 from Asian states, 5 from Eastern European states, 11 from Latin American and Caribbean states, and 10 from Western European and Other States. The Commission meets each year in regular session for six weeks. In order to address the shortcomings, the High-level Panel proposed making membership of the Commission universal and including all 191 member states (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 282–291). All member states should designate prominent and experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations and an advisory council or panel should support the Commission in its work. The Panel also proposed to strengthen the role of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Rule of Law In the context of protecting individual human rights, the Panel addressed member states’ obligation under international law to combat terrorism (see Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 178–182). One of the measures that the Security Council had previously taken to combat terrorism was to place suspect individuals and entities on sanctions lists. This had jeopardized the human rights of such individuals and entities, as highlighted in a judgement by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities. 26 The Panel suggested that, where sanctions apply to lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees should establish procedures to review the cases of persons or groups who claimed to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists; this related to the AlQaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Moreover, the Security Council sanctions committees should improve their procedures for maintaining accurate lists of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions and for providing humanitarian exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the humanitarian impact of sanctions. In order to strengthen the rule of law, the Panel recommended that the Security Council should refer cases of suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 90). Finally, it was recommended that the United Nations establish a robust capacity-building mechanism for rule-of-law assistance (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 177).

Management The High-level Panel recognized that the workload of the United Nations had increased exponentially over the past decade without any corresponding increase in resources. The Panel emphasized the need to strengthen the United Nations through structural adjustments, give it additional resources and increase its efficiency. The Highlevel Panel called for the Secretary-General to be given more responsibility for the management of the Secretariat, in particular a substantial increase in the flexibility to manage staff. In addition, to the report recommended establishing a second Deputy Secretary-General position (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 293). With the existence of two positions, it would be possible to have one focus on development and another on international peace and security. The latter would play a role analogous to the United 26

Corell, op. cit., p. 380.


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States National Security Advisor, co-ordinating and scrutinizing policy-making on peace and security issues. In addition, the Panel called for the immediate implementation of the human resources reform proposals approved in 1997 and 2002 and supported a one-time buy-out plan to ensure that the Secretariat is staffed with the right people (see Part II, Document 1, paragraph 296).

Reactions to the Report of the High-level Panel The Secretary-General strongly endorsed the recommendations of the High-level Panel and transmitted its report to member states, together with his comments and suggestions. The Secretary-General pledged to draw on the report when submitting his own set of recommendations to the 2005 World Summit. This would relate to issues that called for attention at the highest levels of government and were essential, such as the new consensus on collective security, an agreement on rules and norms governing the use of force, and the reform of the Security Council. The Secretary-General pointed to the Panel’s failure to come up with a unified proposal for expanding the Council and noted that debate on this issue was continuing. He suggested that this should not overshadow the consideration of the many proposals contained in the High-level Panel’s report. A number of the High-level Panel’s recommendations had been addressed to intergovernmental organs or specialized agencies of the United Nations. This included the proposal that the Security Council approve a second special meeting on HIV/AIDS and international peace and security and that ECOSOC create a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats. The Panel recommended that the Assembly of WHO should consider increasing resources for global monitoring and response to emerging infectious disease and launching a major initiative to rebuild global public health. The Board of Governors of IAEA was asked to recognize the Additional Protocol as a standard for Agency safeguards. The Secretary-General announced that he would undertake consultations with the heads of those agencies to facilitate the implementation of those recommendations. With regard to the recommendations within his purview, the Secretary-General pledged to move quickly. For example, he emphasized his commitment to promote a new comprehensive strategy against terrorism and to present a vision of such a strategy for consideration by member states in the following year. As for recommendations that pertained to the Secretariat, such as enhancing the Secretariat’s capacity in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, the Secretary-General needed the approval of the legislative bodies of the United Nations. The report of the High-level Panel’s reception in the United States was mixed. 27 The United States was pleased by the Panel’s support for a definition of terrorism, for recognizing the responsibility to protect and for establishing a new Peacebuilding Commission reporting to the Security Council. On the issue of use of force, the Panel’s efforts to introduce a new mechanism for the sanctioning of pre-emptive wars were appreciated. The Panel had argued that this could be done by international legal consensus through the Security Council within the existing provision and without a revision of the United Nations Charter. Rather, the Panel had called for the approval of a checklist of criteria to govern the use of armed force. On major security concerns like nuclear proliferation, the Panel’s endorsement of the proliferation security initiative was 27

Jeffrey Laurenti, ‘Fork in the Road’, The World Today, August/September 2005, pp. 4–7.


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welcomed, as was the call for IAEA to undertake mandatory verification of nuclear facilities in any state withdrawing from the Non-proliferation Treaty. The United States opposed the Panel’s call for industrialized countries to drastically increase their development funding by committing themselves to meet the long-established target of 0.7 per cent of GNP. This also applied to the proposal on the marking and tracing of small arms. On human rights, the Panel’s recommendation to expand the Commission for Human Rights to universal membership was harshly reviewed by the United States and human rights organizations. When the Panel’s report was considered by the General Assembly, the 97 speakers expressed wide-ranging critiques. Many developing countries, while recognizing the central role of development in the system of collective security, expressed concern that this issue was not examined more extensively but was approached only from a narrow security angle. The President of the Assembly, Jean Ping of Gabon, argued that the Panel did not adequately address the role that economic development plays in safeguarding collective security. The focus on the Security Council was seen as altering the role and authority of the General Assembly as the principal deliberative body of the United Nations. Many members expressed concern that the emphasis on limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had to be at the expense of promoting disarmament. Similarly, a number of countries expressed their disappointment that the Panel had failed to examine in more detail the dangers of the flood of small arms around the world. Many delegations felt that consultations on the form and restructuring of the United Nations should not be limited solely to the recommendations contained in the Panel’s report.

2.4 UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT: INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT In addition to the High-level Panel, the Secretary-General had given the UN Millennium Project the mandate of preparing a status report on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and elaborating proposals on how to reach those goals. Both studies were to serve as input to the comprehensive report on the Millennium Declaration, to be submitted by the Secretary-General to the World Summit in 2005. The UN Millennium Project was an independent advisory body directed by Professor Jeffrey Sachs 28 of Columbia University. Professor Sachs, an economist was identified with his advocacy of ‘shock therapy’, or a quick application of market-oriented policies in troubled economies. From 1991 to 1994, he had been an economic adviser to the Russian government. The project was sponsored by UNDP on behalf of the United Nations Development Group and constituted a unique effort involving an enormous range of experts from different countries, disciplines and organizations; the use made of practical experience and the funding and support arrangement were also unprecedented. Ten task forces carried out the main part of the analytical work. Each task force was chaired by two to five co-ordinators who guided the research effort, building on the contributions made by hundreds of scholars, development practitioners, scientists, political leaders, policymakers, and representatives of non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies and the private sector. In order to facilitate participation by United Nations agencies in the various task forces, the United Nations Experts Group was established, comprising senior 28

The UN Millennium Project Team included Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director; John W. McArthur, Deputy Director; Guido Schmidt-Traub, Associate Director; Eric Kashambuzi, Senior Policy Advisor; Chandrika Bahadur, Policy Advisor; Yassine Fall, Policy Advisor, Gender Equality; Joanna Rubinstein, Director, Health and Science Initiatives.


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representatives from each participating United Nations agency. The project was led by a secretariat housed at UNDP headquarters in New York. Intellectual, administrative, financial, and in-kind support to the project secretariat and to many of the task forces was provided by the Earth Institute at Columbia University. The project was financially supported by several governments and foundations, including the Ford Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 29 The Project worked with developing countries to identify vital statistics, such as the number of mothers in need of access to health clinics or the number of children who needed immunizations. This information was used to detail the requirements for individual countries to meet the MDGs by 2015, such as the number of teachers in a district, the need for additional roads or the need to install water pumps. In 2004, the Project began working with the United Nations system in selected pilot countries to test many of its ideas for reducing poverty and to identify the best ways to integrate MDG targets and timelines into national strategies. The pilot countries were the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Tajikistan and Yemen. The aim was for these national strategies to serve as models for similar undertakings in developing countries throughout the world. In January 2005, the UN Millennium Project presented its findings to the SecretaryGeneral in its report ‘Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals’ (see Part II, Document 2). The report was co-authored by the co-ordinators of the UN Millennium Project’s 10 task forces. The report contained a comprehensive strategy for combating extreme poverty, hunger and disease. It was based on the global consensus manifested at the Millennium Summit in 2000, and the United Nations conferences on financing for development in Monterrey and sustainable development in Johannesburg in 2002. The eight MDGs approved by the Millennium Summit were considered to be the benchmarks for measuring progress in development by 2015. They include halving the proportion of people who suffer from extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary schooling; increasing the power and status of women; slashing infant and maternal mortality; halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria; getting all countries to adopt policies that are socially and environmentally sustainable; and creating a global partnership between rich and poor countries, based on open markets, debt relief, investment, and carefully targeted financial aid. The core recommendation of the UN Millennium Project was that the MDGs must be at the centre of national and international poverty reduction strategies. At the end of the first five years, it was clear that East Asia would not only meet but exceed the MDG targets before 2015, thanks in large part to China’s spectacular growth. 30 With India’s economic engine gaining momentum, South Asia also appeared to be on track. In both regions, the progress was uneven; some countries still needed to pay more attention to reducing maternal mortality, others to getting all primary-school-aged children into classrooms. Headway on the MDGs was spottier in Latin America, where negligible economic growth overall meant few domestic resources for investment, and slightly negative in Arab countries that lack oil wealth. Africa, most conspicuously, had gone into a deep decline, with conditions for most of the MDGs worsening in a large number of strife29

Additional financial support were provided by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, and the Open Society Institute, and other support by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Partners in Health, the International Centre for Research on Women, the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University, and the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. 30 Jeffrey Laurenti, ‘Grand Goals, Modest Results: The UN in Search of Reform’, Current History, December 2005, p. 431–437.


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torn countries. Sub-Saharan Africa was caught in a poverty trap, which required coordinated investments in infrastructure, health, agricultural productivity and education. The report of the UN Millennium Project was convincing in its optimism and simplicity. The report argued against the familiar sceptical assumption that development aid, even in large amounts, made little difference. It stated that the MDGs could indeed be reached by 2015, and many successes had already been achieved in the fight against HIV/AIDS and in the education of children. What was needed was a big push, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, with the goal of halving extreme poverty, radically improving the lives of at least one billion people in poor developing countries and saving tens of millions of lives. For this to happen, developing countries had to conduct needs assessments to identify the required interventions, improve their own governance, uphold the rule of law and spend more of their own money to combat poverty. Donor countries would need to live up to previous promises, in particular to provide 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA, cancel debts and a initiate development-based trade round. The proposed package included a crash development programme starting in 2005 with at least a dozen poor, well-governed nations. All that was needed was to upgrade some successful pilot projects that were already in place. Ghana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Senegal were among the cases most often mentioned. In addition, quick and simple proposals that were easy to implement were suggested such as the provision of mosquito nets for children who live in malaria-infested regions or the elimination of school and uniform fees to ensure that poor children can afford to go to school. The report has four main parts. 31 The first is a diagnosis of why the MDGs are not being achieved in many regions – almost worldwide in the case of some goals. The second identifies the key investments and policies that could make the difference in achieving the MDGs. The third outlines the international processes and policy changes that could help scale up the needed investments at the country level, if backed by the necessary increases in development financing. The fourth estimates the costs and benefits, describing the tens of millions of lives that could be saved, and the hundreds of millions improved, at a cost that is clearly within the financial targets agreed upon in the Monterrey Consensus. The following 10 key recommendations were put forward (see Part II, Document 2, Ten Key Recommendations):

MDG-Based Poverty Reduction Strategies (Recommendation 1) Developing country governments should adopt development strategies bold enough to meet the MDG targets for 2015. To meet the 2015 deadline, all countries should have these strategies in place by 2006. Where Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers already exist, they should be aligned with the MDGs.

Scaled-Up Focus of MDG-Based Poverty Reduction Strategies (Recommendation 2) The MDG-based poverty reduction strategies should anchor the scaling-up of public investments, capacity building, domestic resource mobilization, and official development assistance. They should also provide a framework for strengthening governance, 31 J. D. Sachs, J. W. McArthur, ‘The Millennium Project: A Plan for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals’, Lancet, Volume 365, 22 January 2005, pp. 347–353.

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promoting human rights, engaging civil society, and promoting the private sector. The MDG-based poverty reduction strategies should be founded, among other things, on an assessment of investments and policies needed to reach the MDGs by 2015, spell out the detailed national investments, policies, and budgets for the coming three to five years, and focus on rural productivity, urban productivity, health, education, gender equality, water and sanitation, environmental sustainability, and science, technology, and innovation.

Civil Society and Private Sector (Recommendation 3) Developing country governments should craft and implement the MDG-based poverty reduction strategies in transparent and inclusive processes, working closely with civil society organizations, the domestic private sector, and international partners. Civil society organizations should contribute actively to designing policies, delivering services, and monitoring progress. Private-sector firms and organizations should contribute actively to policy design, transparency initiatives and, where appropriate, public-private partnerships.

Fast-Track Countries (Recommendation 4) International donors should identify at least a dozen MDG ‘fast-track’ countries for a rapid scale-up of ODA in 2005, recognizing that many countries are already in a position for a massive scale-up because of their good governance and absorptive capacity.

Quick Win Actions (Recommendation 5) In 2005, developed and developing countries should jointly launch some quick win actions to save and improve millions of lives and to promote economic growth, including free mass distribution of malaria bed-nets and anti-malaria medicines for all children in malaria transmission regions by the end of 2007, elimination of user fees for primary schools and essential health services no later than the end of 2006, successful completion of the 3 by 5 campaign to bring 3 million AIDS patients in developing countries onto antiretroviral treatment by the end of 2005, expansion of school meal programmes to cover all children in hunger hotspots by no later than the end of 2006, a massive replenishment of soil nutrients for smallholder farmers on lands with nutrient-depleted soils by no later than the end of 2006, and the launch of a massive training programme for community-based workers to ensure, by 2015, that each local community has expertise in health, education, agriculture, nutrition, infrastructure, water supply and sanitation, environmental management, public sector management and the promotion of gender equality and participation.

Align National Strategies with Regional Initiatives (Recommendation 6) Developing country governments should align national strategies with such regional Initiatives as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the Caribbean Community (and Common Market), and regional groups should receive increased direct donor support for regional projects. Regional development groups should be supported in


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identifying, planning, and implementing high-priority cross-border infrastructure projects (roads, railways, watershed management), receive direct donor support to implement crossborder projects and be encouraged to introduce and implement peer-review mechanisms to promote best practices and good governance.

Increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Debt Relief (Recommendation 7) High-income countries should increase ODA from 0.25 per cent of donor GNP in 2003 to around 0.44 per cent in 2006 and 0.50 per cent in 2010 in order to support the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in low-income countries, with improved ODA quality. Each donor should reach 0.7 per cent no later than 2015 to support the goals and other development assistance priorities. Debt relief should be more extensive and generous. ODA should be based on actual needs to meet the MDGs and on countries’ readiness to use the ODA effectively. Criteria for evaluating the sustainability of a country’s debt burden must be consistent with the achievement of the MDGs. Aid should be oriented to support the MDG-based poverty reduction strategy, rather than donor-driven projects. Donors should measure and report the share of their ODA that supports the actual scale-up of MDG-related investments. Middle-income countries should also seek opportunities to become providers of ODA and give technical support to low-income countries.

Opening of Markets in High-Income Countries and the Doha Trade Round (Recommendation 8) High-income countries should open their markets to developing country exports through the Doha trade round and help Least Developed Countries raise export competitiveness through investments in critical trade-related infrastructure, including electricity, roads, and ports. The Doha Development Agenda should be fulfilled and the Doha Round completed no later than 2006.

Support for Research to Address the Needs of the Poor (Recommendation 9) International donors should mobilize support for global scientific research and development to address the special needs of the poor in the areas of health, agriculture, natural resource and environmental management, energy, and climate. It is estimated that the total needs will rise to approximately $7 billion a year by 2015.

Strengthening of Co-ordination Mechanisms (Recommendation 10) The United Nations Secretary-General and the United Nations Development Group should strengthen the co-ordination of United Nations agencies, funds, and programmes to support the MDGs, at Headquarters and country level. The United Nations Country Teams should be strengthened and should work closely with the international financial institutions to support the goals. The United Nations Country Teams should be properly trained, staffed, and funded to support programme countries in achieving the goals. The United


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Nations Country Team and the international financial institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, regional development banks) should work closely at the country level to improve the quality of technical advice.

Reaction to the Report Although the report served as input to the report of the Secretary-General to the World Summit, reaction ranged from harshly critical to cautiously supportive. Given the apparent reluctance of big donors to reach the aid level of 0.7 per cent of GNP, the report was described as a utopian overreach. Only five countries – Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Luxembourg – have honoured the 0.7-per-cent pledge. The United States devotes 0.15 per cent, and Japan and Germany less than 0.3 per cent of GNP to aid. According to the proposals presented, current donations of $70 billion annually would need to increase to $200 billion annually, sustained for 10 years. For the United States, this would imply a more than fourfold increase in development aid. Professor Sachs had also suggested that meeting the 0.7-per-cent aid target should also be a requirement for all permanent Security Council members, a move that caused consternation in Japan, Germany and India, which were seeking permanent seats. Questions were raised about the limits to aid absorption and doubt was expressed that poor countries could handle such a sharp increase in development aid. Too little weight is given to institutions and incentives. World Bank research supports the idea that many countries could absorb some more aid. This was especially true in the health sector, where interventions can be delivered without advanced systems to support them. In other cases, initial development aid was seen as building absorptive capacity. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development warned of the risk of creating aid-dependent economies. Some critics argued that an incremental approach with more modest goals would be more effective. Others suggested that the proposals were based on a sort of utopian central planning by global bureaucrats, which was destined to fail. In particular, it was argued that the report placed little emphasis on the need for poor countries to make deep political and social changes to reduce poverty. On the other hand, the report quickly won praise from the heads of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. President Jacques Chirac of France and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom supported the report. President Chirac commissioned a report on the financing mechanisms for development. The United Kingdom, in particular, has recently seized the leadership on these issues. Tony Blair appointed a commission on Africa and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, was campaigning for a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Africa that includes debt relief and his own proposal to nearly double aid from rich nations. He pledged to make 2005 a breakthrough year, especially at the forthcoming Group of 8 Summit. In July 2005, the Group of 8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, agreed to double aid to Africa and to eliminate outstanding debts by the poorest countries. As a result, the Group of 8 nations would together increase aid to developing countries by around $50 billion a year by 2010. Of this amount, at least $25 billion would go to Africa. The Group of 8 also agreed that all of the debts owed by eligible heavily indebted poor countries should be cancelled. In addition, the Summit pledged additional investment in education and the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other killer diseases. Finally, the Group of 8 agreed to take this spirit forward to the 2005 World Summit and ensure a successful conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda. A key breakthrough in 2005 was the


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European Union’s commitment to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of GNP in ODA by the year 2015. An intermediate benchmark of 0.5 per cent of GNP in aid as of 2010 was established. The United Kingdom, France, Finland, Ireland, Belgium and Spain set timetables to honour those commitments. This situation constituted the backdrop for world leaders at the Summit to review progress on the Millennium Declaration.

2.5 UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL: IN LARGER FREEDOM In March 2005, the Secretary-General presented his report ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’ (see Part II, Document 3) to serve as a basis for negotiations among governments in the run-up to the World Summit in September of that year. Initially, the Secretary-General’s mandate had been to prepare a status report on the achievement of the MDGs and formulate proposals on how to reach those goals. The 62-page report covered a much wider area, emphasizing the increased interconnection between progress in the areas of development, security and human rights and the rule of law. With a few important exceptions, the Secretary-General’s report reflected the recommendations previously advanced by the ‘High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ (see Part II, Document 1) and the work of the UN Millennium Project (see Part II, Document 2). The report also included some initial responses to the demands arising out of ongoing investigations (see Chapter 2.6). Indeed, the United Nations had experienced a dire year. The Organization was under investigation by the Volcker Inquiry on mismanagement and corruption in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq. It had also faced criticism over allegations of sexual harassment by senior United Nations staff and by peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The report was released only days before an investigation report by the Volcker Inquiry on charges of nepotism against the Secretary-General in the awarding of contracts to a company his son worked for. Its release provided an opportunity for the United Nations to seize the initiative after this difficult year. The Secretary-General proposed a ‘grand bargain’ between rich and poor nations, promising more development aid in return for tougher action on human rights, terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and United Nations management reform. This was to be in the outcome of a comprehensive strategy, which gave equal weight and attention to the three great purposes of the United Nations: development, security and human rights, underpinned by the rule of law. The Secretary-General argued, ‘we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights’. The Secretary-General stressed that the report’s proposals should be viewed as an achievable package, which allowed for trade-offs among national groups and functional issue areas. The title and structure of the report were presented by analogy with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous ‘Four Freedoms’ speech. It asserted that all states and their collective institutions must advance the cause of larger freedom. The three chapters of the report on freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity are complemented by a chapter containing institutional proposals for a more efficient, open and accountable United Nations. 32 The first part of the report, entitled ‘Freedom from Want’, contained the five-year progress report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration and 32 United Nations document: ‘Secretary-General presents report “In Larger Freedom” to General Assembly, outlining ambitious plan for United Nations reform’, Press Release, GA/10334, 21 March 2005.

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recommendations for action. Developing countries were to strengthen governance, combat corruption, promote private sector–led growth and maximize domestic resources to fund national development strategies, while developed countries were to support these efforts through increased development assistance, a new development-oriented trade round, and improved debt relief. Additional efforts were urged in the area of HIV/AIDS. This part covered issues related to the degradation of the environment and the depletion of natural resources, and proposed to develop a more inclusive international framework to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions. In the second part, entitled ‘Freedom from Fear’, member states were asked to agree on a new security consensus, whereby they committed themselves to work together to prevent catastrophic terrorism, stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, end civil wars, and build lasting peace in war-torn countries. Among the specific proposals, member states were asked to agree on a comprehensive convention against terrorism, based on a clear and agreed-upon definition. Other proposals included the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission to help win the peace in post-conflict countries and to agree on a fissile material cut-off treaty to reduce the risks of proliferation of nuclear materials. The Security Council was requested to clarify the principles by which it intended to be guided when deciding on the use of force. In the third part of the report, entitled ‘Freedom to Live in Dignity’, member states were requested to embrace the principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This part also covered the establishment of a Democracy Fund to provide funding and technical assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen democracy. In the final and fourth part of the report, entitled ‘Strengthening the United Nations’, member states were asked to adopt a package of institutional and management reforms. This included the revitalization of the General Assembly and the overhaul and upgrading of the human rights machinery. One of the proposed measures was to replace the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller Human Rights Council, the members of which would be elected directly by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. With regard to Security Council reform, member states were asked to decide on one or other of the options presented in the report of the ‘High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’. Proposals were made for enabling ECOSOC to play the leading role that should be expected of it, in making and implementing coherent United Nations policies for development. The proposal on reforming the Secretariat’s management included a commitment to make the Organization more flexible, transparent and accountable in serving the priorities of member states and to introduce greater coherence into the work of the United Nations system as a whole, especially its response to humanitarian emergencies and its handling of environmental issues. The main reform proposals are presented below in accordance with the main emphases on development, security, human rights and management reform. The report contains considerably more proposals of various degrees of importance or levels of detail, covering such issues as improving the work of the General Assembly, more effective cooperation to combat organized crime, the prevention of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and a number of technical and long overdue revisions of the Charter, such as the abolishment of the ‘enemy clauses’, the Trusteeship Council and the Military Staff Committee.


49 Development

In the chapter of Freedom from Want, the Secretary-General presented his proposals on development, which were largely inspired by the proposals of the UN Millennium Project. Contributions from the High-level Panel related to the relationship between economic development and security threats as well as the need to reform ECOSOC. The anticipated outcome of the Group of 8 Summit in Gleneagles was also taken into consideration. The report acknowledged that the last 25 years had seen the most dramatic reduction in extreme poverty the world had ever experienced. Yet dozens of countries had become poorer. More than a billion people still lived on less than a dollar a day. The SecretaryGeneral suggested that to achieve the ‘global partnership for development’, the MDGs needed to be implemented fully (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 32). The goals have become globally accepted benchmarks of broader progress, embraced by donors, developing countries, civil society and major development institutions alike. On the basis of the five-year progress report, it was argued that the goals could be achieved, but only if member states were willing to adopt a package of specific, concrete decisions.

MDG-Based Poverty Reduction Strategies and Quick Wins Every developing country was asked to adopt a national MDG-based poverty reduction strategy bold enough to achieve the MDGs by 2015 and improve its governance, uphold the rule of law and combat corruption (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 34). Each strategy needs to take into account seven clusters of public investments and policies: gender equality, the environment, rural development, urban development health systems, education, and science, technology and innovation. Immediate action should be taken to support a series of ‘quick win’ (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 52) initiatives to make immediate progress towards the MDGs through such measures as the free distribution of malaria bed-nets and effective anti-malaria medicines, the expansion of home-grown school meal programmes and the elimination of user fees for primary education and health services. Starting in 2005, developing countries that proposed sound national strategies and required increased development assistance should receive enough aid to enable them to achieve the MDGs.

Increase of Official Development Assistance (ODA), Debt Relief and Trade Facilitation Developed countries were asked to support the MDG-based poverty reduction strategies by increasing the amounts they spent on development and debt relief, and to facilitate trade by providing duty-free access to developing countries. ODA was to more than double over the next few years. This did not require new pledges from donor countries, but meeting pledges they had already made. Each developed country that had not already done so should establish a timetable to achieve the 0.7-per-cent of GNP target for ODA no later than 2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006, and reaching 0.5 per cent by 2009 (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 49). This increase should be front-loaded through an International Finance Facility, and other innovative sources of financing should be considered for the longer term. Debt sustainability should


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be redefined as the level of debt that allows a country to achieve the MDGs by 2015 without an increase in its debt ratios; this would require an increase in grant-based finance and significantly more debt reduction (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 54). Highincome countries were to open their markets to developing countries (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 55). As a first step, immediate duty-free and quota-free market access should be provided for all exports from the least developed countries. Developed countries were asked to complete the Doha Round of trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization no later than 2006.

Climate Change, Disaster Prevention, HIV/AIDS It was argued that development must be sustainable, and should not be reversed by continued degradation of the environment. Although the Kyoto Protocol had entered into force, it was extended only until 2012 and some major emitters of carbon remained outside it. States were asked to agree that scientific advances and technological innovations must be mobilized to develop tools for mitigating climate change and that a more inclusive international framework must be developed for stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions beyond 2012, with broader participation by all major emitters and by both developed and developing countries (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 61). Other priorities for global action include a worldwide early warning system for natural disasters (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 66). Member states were requested to consider setting up $1billion voluntary funds to allow the Organization to bring rapid and effective relief to the victims of sudden disasters, whether natural or man-made. It had been able to do just that after the recent tsunami thanks to the rapid response from donors. Finally, it was proposed that the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria should be fully funded and the resources provided for the expanded comprehensive strategy on prevention and treatment to fight HIV/AIDS (see Part II, Document 3, Box 3).

Economic and Social Council As suggested by the High-level Panel, the Secretary-General endorsed the proposal that ECOSOC should be reformed so that it could effectively assess progress in the United Nation’s development agenda, serve as a high-level development co-operation forum and provide direction for the efforts of the various intergovernmental bodies in the economic and social areas throughout the United Nations system (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 175). ECOSOC’s capacity to assess progress in the United Nations’ development agenda should be strengthened. Moreover, it should provide direction for economic and social development efforts through the United Nations system. By focusing on development issues alone, ECOSOC’s role on issues related to development and trade, development and finance, and development and the environment would be reduced.

Security While progress on development was hampered by weak implementation, on the security side, despite a heightened sense of threat, the world lacks even a basic consensus; moreover, implementation, where it occurs, is all too often contested. The Secretary-


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General fully embraces a broad vision of collective security. The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century included not just international war and conflict, but terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and civil violence. They also included poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation, which can have equally catastrophic consequences. Collective security depends on accepting that the threats each specific region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all regions.

New Security Consensus In the chapter on Freedom from Fear, the Secretary-General embraces the comprehensive vision of collective security put forward by the High-Level Panel including the need for a new security consensus (see Part II, Document 3, paragraphs 76–86). This was based on the recognition that threats are interlinked, that development, security and human rights are mutually interdependent, that no state can protect itself acting entirely alone, and that all states need an equitable, efficient and effective collective security system. Member states were therefore to commit themselves to confront the whole range of threats, from international war through weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state collapse and civil conflict to deadly infectious diseases, extreme poverty and the destruction of the environment. On the basis of this broad mandate, institutional priorities were advanced to transform the United Nations into an effective instrument for preventing conflict.

Terrorism The High-level Panel had addressed one of the most contentious issues of the past years by proposing a definition of terrorism. The proposal was endorsed by the SecretaryGeneral, who stated that the definition has clear moral force (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 91). The decision to stick with the tough language in the terrorism definition that would bar any attacks on civilians was taken despite considerable objections by Arab member states. As proposed by the High-level Panel, the Secretary-General recommended that member states should commit to a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy based on five pillars: dissuading people from resorting to or supporting terrorism; denying terrorists access to funds and materials; deterring states from sponsoring terrorism; developing state capacity to defeat terrorism; and defending human rights. They should also complete a convention on terrorism, based on a clear and agreed-upon definition.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Threats and Catastrophic Terrorism The Secretary-General gave a general endorsement of the Panel’s proposal with regard to the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. He emphasized the need to revitalize the non-proliferation and disarmament framework and prevent catastrophic terrorism. This included strengthening IAEA’s verification authority. To this end, the Model Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provided for more stringent inspection rules (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 99), should be


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approved. With regard to the spread of civilian nuclear technology, it was noted that its possible use for the development of nuclear weapons had exacerbated a long-standing tension within the non-proliferation regime. As recommended by the High-level Panel, the Secretary-General called for measures to guarantee the supplies of fuel necessary to help develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy for states that voluntarily forgo the development of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capacities that could be used to build atomic weapons. As for efforts to prevent deadly conflicts, the Secretary-General endorsed the recommendation of the High-level Panel that the flow of small arms and light weapons be curbed. He urged member states to agree on an instrument to regulate the marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons in 2006 (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 120). He also pointed to the danger of terrorist access to nuclear materials. To deny such access, an effective control system would need to be established. Whereas measures had already been taken the Security Council and the Group of 8, the SecretaryGeneral now called on member states to approve an international convention on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 92).

Use of Force Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter deals with the use of force. The High-level Panel had considered the need to amend the articles under Chapter VII in order to reflect a new understanding of the use of force. The Panel stated that pre-emptive or preventive action by individual states was not authorized under Article 51 of the Charter, which covers the right of individual or collective self-defence. Introducing a new concept, the Panel proposed that pre-emptive or preventive action, could, however, be authorized by the Security Council in matters concerning relations between states and in cases of pressing humanitarian necessity. This was considered to be covered under the existing Chapter VII and therefore no rewriting of the Charter was necessary. Rather, the Panel suggested five basic criteria for legitimacy, which the Council should address when considering the use of military force. The Secretary-General endorsed the proposed precautionary principle that only the Security Council, rather than individual states, could authorize the pre-emptive or preventive use of force (see Part II, Document 3, paragraphs 122–126). The SecretaryGeneral also adopted the recommendation that the Security Council should adopt a resolution setting out the principles to be applied in decisions relating to the use of force and express its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force. Such principles should include a reaffirmation of the provisions of the Charter, including those of Article 51; a reaffirmation of the central role of the Security Council in the area of peace and security; a reaffirmation of the right of the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity; and the need to consider the seriousness of the threat, the purpose of the proposed military action, whether means short of the use of force might succeed in stopping the threat, whether the military option is proportional to the threat, and whether there is a reasonable chance of success.

Peacebuilding Commission and Peacekeeping The High-level Panel expressed its support for the creation of a new Peacebuilding Commission as a subsidiary body of the Security Council (see Part II, Document 3,


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paragraphs 114–119). It was understood that a mandate to prevent the collapse of state institutions might require interventions in the domestic affairs of societies in transition, including action without or against the will of United Nations member states. To do this, the Commission would require a further Chapter VII authorization in order to discharge its mandate effectively. The Secretary-General supported the general idea of establishing an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission. Reflecting the wishes of developing countries, the Secretary-General proposed some limitations on the role of the Peacebuilding Commission out of concerns and fears about the potential scope of the Commission’s power and institutional overlaps with the mandates of the Security Council and ECOSOC. It was recommended that the Commission’s role be focused on tasks of advice and co-ordination. This shift in methodology is captured in paragraph 115 of the report, where the Secretary-General cautioned against giving the Commission ‘an early warning or monitoring function’, while favouring a mechanism under which ‘Member States could at any stage make use of the Peacebuilding Commission’s advice and could request assistance from a standing fund for peacebuilding to build their domestic institutions for reducing conflict, including through strengthening the role of law institutions’. 33 Rather than reporting to the Security Council, the Secretary-General proposed a mixed arrangement involving the Security Council and ECOSOC. Also unlike the Panel, the Secretary-General proposed that the Peacebuilding Commission include members that were in the process of peace consolidation. The proposal included the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office within the Secretariat to better meet the challenge of helping countries in the transition from war to peace.

Security Council Reform The Secretary-General suggested that the principles for reform set out in the report of the High-level Panel should be applied. Member states should consider both options, Models A and B, presented in the report (see Part II, Document 3, paragraphs 167-170). The Secretary-General explicitly stated that any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that had emerged on the basis of either model should be considered. Member states should agree to make a decision on this important issue before the World Summit in September 2005 and, if consensus could not be reached, a decision should be taken by voting. The Secretary-General did not provide for the option of veto powers for new permanent members, which disappointed the hopeful candidates.

Human Rights As noted in the chapter on Freedom to Live in Dignity, an impressive treaty-based normative framework had been created over the last six decades. The Secretary-General argued that the world needed to move from an era of legislation to one of implementation. Concrete steps were required to reduce selective application, arbitrary enforcement and breaches without consequence.

33 Carsten Stahn, ‘Institutionalizing Brahimi’s “Light Footprint”: A Comment on the Role and Mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission’, International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 403–415.


54 Responsibility to Protect

The Secretary-General adopted the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ as developed by the High-level Panel and recommended that the international community should embrace the new concept as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 132). This included enforcement action decided upon by the Security Council if national authorities were unwilling or unable to protect their citizens.

Human Rights Council The Secretary-General expressed his agreement with the High-level Panel on the need to introduce institutional reforms in the area of human rights in order to address the criticisms of the Commission on Human Rights. However, he presented a completely different reform concept than the Panel. The Panel had proposed universal membership of the currently 53-member Commission, the designation of prominent and experienced human rights figures as heads of delegations and the establishment of an advisory councillor panel. The Secretary-General proposed to do away with the Commission altogether and to replace it by a standing Human Rights Council, whose members would be elected directly by the General Assembly, by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, rather than by regional groups (see Part II, Document 3, paragraphs 181–183). He indicated that member states would need to decide whether they wanted the new Council to be a subsidiary body of the General Assembly or a principal organ of the United Nations of equal standing with the Security Council and ECOSOC. The latter option would accord human rights a more substantive position, corresponding to the issue’s primacy in the United Nations Charter. Moreover, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should be strengthened with more resources and staff, and should play a more active role in the deliberations of the Security Council and the proposed Peacebuilding Commission. The human rights treaty bodies of the United Nations system should also be made more effective and responsive.

Rule of Law and Democracy In order to strengthen the rule of law, the Secretary-General recommended moving from a period of legislation to implementation by reducing selective application, arbitrary enforcement and breaches without consequences. To this end, he suggested bolstering cooperation with the International Criminal Court and other international or mixed war crimes tribunals and strengthening the International Court of Justice. The SecretaryGeneral also intends to create a dedicated Rule of Law Assistance Unit to support national efforts to re-establish the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 137). Finally, a Democracy Fund should be created at the United Nations to assist countries seeking to establish or strengthen democracy (see Part II, Document 3, paragraph 151).


55 Management

In the chapter entitled ‘The Imperative for Collective Action: Strengthening the United Nations’, the Secretary-General proposed a number of management reforms with the aim of making the United Nations more effective and accountable. This chapter reflected proposals by the High-level Panel, responded to the ongoing Volcker investigation and initiatives by the United States Congress and included some earlier proposals by the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, the overall package was rather limited, reflecting a reactive and unco-ordinated approach rather than a new beginning. A number of reviews were to be undertaken. In the shadow of the inquiry of the United Nations Oilfor-Food Programme, the Secretary-General proposed a review of the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) with a view to strengthening its independence and authority, as well as its expertise and capacity. A similar proposal had already been made to the General Assembly in November 2004. In addition, member states were asked to work with the Secretary-General in a comprehensive review of the budget and human resources rules. This was clearly overdue, but in large part, did not appear to need the approval or involvement of member states, particularly at the initial stage. It was further suggested that the General Assembly review all mandates more than five years old to see whether the activities and resources concerned were still needed. This proposal had already been on the agenda during previous reform efforts but had not resulted in major programme adjustments. Too often, member states had objected to the discontinuation of specific mandates, resulting in the continuation of the status quo. Finally, approval of a staff buyout plan was proposed so as to refresh and realign the staff. The United Nations had already gone through a number of such buyouts, especially during financial crises. The success rate of such buyouts was generally not considered to be encouraging. The report did not include a key proposal by the High-level Panel: establishing a second Deputy Secretary-General in charge of all activities in the area of peace and security. This proposal had received no support, in particular from developing countries.

Initial Response to the Secretary-General’s Report The Secretary-General’s plans to reform the United Nations were welcomed cautiously by member states. The Secretary-General had excluded a number of controversial proposals, which could not possibly succeed, such as the French recommendation to create a specialized United Nations agency for the environment; he had modified others to ensure wider acceptance, such as the reform of human rights machinery. Most governments expressed their support for recommendations to strengthen the Organization’s capabilities for mediation, humanitarian response and peacekeeping. The 25-member European Union expressed general support for the Secretary-General’s proposals. The United Kingdom stated that the proposals should be viewed as a package. The initial reaction by the United States administration was positive. Many of the proposals were seen as supporting United States foreign policy. The proposals did not come as a surprise since the ideas had been the subject of quiet discussions with the United States administration for months. A State Department spokesman said, ‘We very much appreciate the serious effort that Secretary-General’s report represents … For now what we’ll be focusing on is assessing the report, engaging with other member states and United Nations officials in the months ahead and hoping to act … on this report in a way that

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improves the organization’. There was no doubt, however, that the proposal that donor countries earmark 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA would not be well received. The Secretary-General established a team of special envoys to tour the world drumming up support for his proposals to reform the United Nations, including Ms. Vaira Vike-Fraiberga, President of Latvia, Ernesto Zedillo, former President of Mexico, Joaquim Chissano, former President of Mozambique, Ali Alatas, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia, and Dermont Ahern, former Foreign Minister of Ireland. Their main objective was to obtain the support of the politicians who would take part in the Millennium Summit. Diplomats prepared for six months of intense negotiations to further refine the proposals into a form on which the majority of the Assembly could agree.

2.6 UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME: THE VOLCKER INQUIRY AND CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES In the crucial months preceding the September Summit, the Secretary-General came under severe attack as a result of speculations concerning the outcome of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme scandal. The Committee charged with its investigation, known as the Volcker Committee, issued its report in instalments, which created uncertainty and prompted a wide array of rumours and speculations. The SecretaryGeneral’s position was seriously weakened, which also affected his leadership of the reform process. Following the 1991 Gulf War, the international community imposed a disarmament and sanctions regime on Iraq, designed to destroy weapons of mass destruction and deny it the capability to reconstitute, or the resources to purchase, such weapons in the future. Since the sanctions remained in place longer than initially anticipated, the Security Council established the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme to respond to the humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians and help the unintended victims of the international sanctions against the Iraqi regime. Under the Programme negotiated and agreed upon by the United Nations and the Iraqi authorities, Iraq would obtain food, medicine and humanitarian goods, funded by the supervised sale of Iraqi oil. The Security Council had ultimate oversight authority for the United Nations Oil-forFood Programme. Implementation of the Programme was the responsibility of the United Nations Office of Iraq Programme (OIP). Iraqi authorities would only consent to the establishment of the Programme if they were able to select the contractors and negotiate the terms. This was the compromise, which resulted after several years of stalemate between the Iraqi government and the Security Council over the implementation of the Programme. The members of the Security Council’s 661 Committee approved roughly 36,000 contracts forwarded by OIP for review. Every member had the right to hold up contracts if they detected irregularities. This was done in approximately 5,000 cases of suspected imports of materials for weapons of mass destruction, including dual-use technology. On numerous occasions, OIP delayed contracts for further investigation and alerted the 661 Committee to unresolved pricing concerns in Iraq’s purchase of humanitarian goods. The committee itself, however, seemed not to have held up any contracts on these grounds. In addition, OIP first alerted the 661 Committee to a possible oil-pricing scam by Iraqi authorities, in which some buyers were undercharged and the illegal profits on resale were shared. In response, steps were taken to prevent this problem. Illegal profits were also made from the smuggling of oil out of the country through Jordan, Turkey, Syria and Iran. Although OIP had no responsibility to prevent smuggling, the


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United States set up a special maritime force in the Persian Gulf for that purpose, but according to the United States General Accounting Office, it interdicted only about 25 per cent of the outflow. At a cost of $69 billion, that the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme was the largest, most complex and most ambitious humanitarian relief effort in the history of the United Nations. The Programme achieved its purpose. Enough food was imported to feed 27 million Iraqis. Malnutrition among Iraqi children dropped by 50 per cent during the life of the Programme from 1996 to 2002. In addition, it substantially increased the availability of potable water, electricity, medicine and health care, transportation and telephones. As was later indicated by the United States General Accounting Office, Iraq gained $10.1 billion from illegal oil revenues and kickbacks, with $5.7 billion of this amount coming from smuggling and $4.4 billion directly associated with the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. In early 2004, the United Nations faced an unprecedented series of allegations of mismanagement and corruption in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, which exposed major flaws in the way the Organization was doing business. Charles Duelfer, the head of the United States weapons inspectors in Iraq, reported that the United Nations system for controlling Iraqi oil exports had the unintended consequences of allowing ample opportunities for corruption. In April 2004, United States Senator Norm Coleman was instrumental in establishing the Independent Inquiry Committee, which was charged by the Secretary-General and the Security Council with the task of thoroughly reviewing the management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. The Committee was chaired by former United States Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker; its mandate was to investigate all charges, including accusations against members of the Security Council, the Iraqi government, several other United Nations agencies, numerous private corporations, United Nations officials and the Secretary-General’s son, Kojo Annan. The other two members of the Independent Inquiry Committee were Justice Richard Goldstone of South Africa, and Swiss law professor Mark Pieth, an internationally recognized expert on money laundering. The Secretary-General instructed all United Nations staff to co-operate or risk dismissal. The Volcker Committee issued a series of reports. A briefing paper was released on 9 January 2005, which provided a provisional assessment and an overview of 58 internal audit reports on various aspects of OIP, conducted by the Internal Audit Division of OIOS. The first interim report was released on 3 February 2005 and covered the procurement of United Nations contractors, evaluations of the internal audits and the administrative expenditures and allegations regarding Benon Sevan, the Executive Director of OIP. The report was based on the review of more than five million pages of United Nations documents by over 75 investigators and some 400 interviews conducted in 25 countries. According to the interim report, the United Nations Secretariat’s use of funds to administer the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme was generally disciplined and the funds appear to have been appropriately accounted for. However, other findings and conclusions were troubling. The Committee stated that ‘the major source of external financial resources to the Iraqi regime resulted from sanctions violations outside the Programme’s framework’. Revenue from illicit oil sales or ‘smuggling’ far outweighed that from surcharges or kickbacks within the programme. The Committee also confirmed that the Security Council was made aware of ‘the existence, but not necessarily the amounts, of sales and purchases under these [illicit trade] protocols … and at least in the case in Jordan, it was “noted”.’ The Committee found that resources committed to auditing the programme were inadequate; some important areas of the Programme were not reviewed; and the audit

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of the Programme’s work should have been more independent and transparent. The procurement process of three United Nations contractors did not conform to established rules or to reasonable standards of fairness and transparency. The report sharply criticized the head of the programme, Benon Sevan, for creating ‘a grave and continuing conflict of interest’ by repeatedly soliciting oil allocations from Iraq under the programme. Another senior official, Joseph Stephanides, a senior official on the Security Council staff, was criticized for failing to ensure that the Organization’s own rules for buying oil, selling goods and selecting contractors were followed. The Secretary-General pledged to take swift and appropriate action with regard to any United Nations employee found to have violated the Organization’s rules or engaged in improper activities, including waiving diplomatic immunity. He ordered disciplinary action against Benon Sevan and some other United Nations officials. A second interim report was released on 29 March 2005 dealing, among other things, with the conduct of the Secretary-General. It covered the procurement of the humanitarian goods inspection contracts and, in particular, the award of an inspection contract to the Swiss-based company Cotecna, which employed Kojo Annan, the Secretary-General’s son. The report also dealt with the conduct of Iqbal Riza, the long-time Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, and Dileep Nair, the Under-Secretary-General for OIOS. The investigation had found no evidence that the Secretary-General had used his influence to help Cotecna get any contracts with the government of Iraq in the late 1990s. But the investigators faulted the Secretary-General for failing to begin a serious investigation six years before when his son’s involvement first became known. The report also noted that the further oversight could have prevented some of the gross mismanagement of the programme. And it accused Iqbal Riza of shredding thousands of documents from a threeyear period after the inquiry into the Programme was announced. Following the issuance of the report, the Secretary-General issued a statement saying ‘the inquiry has cleared me of any wrongdoing’. He did, however, accept the criticism in the report for not referring the issue of his son’s involvement to OIOS or its legal office for formal investigation after being made aware that Cotecna had been awarded a contract in January 1999. Asked if he would resign, the normally formal Secretary-General responded ‘Hell no’. European and other nations rallied behind him. The United States administration reaffirmed its continued support for the Secretary-General and his work. Some United States lawmakers, however, did not share this view and called for his resignation. The African Union declared that there could be no reform at the United Nations without its Secretary-General Kofi Annan. On 7 September 2005, the Volcker Committee issued its final report, entitled ‘The Management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme’ (see Part II, Document 4), just before the start of the World Summit, concluding that the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the United Nations Secretariat were ‘not fit to meet the truly extraordinary challenges’ of the task. The Committee found ‘serious instances of illicit, unethical and corrupt behaviour within the United Nations’. It was further noted that ‘most notable among the United Nations’ structural faults is a grievous absence of effective auditing and management controls’ and that instances of corruption ‘extend to the top of the Programme administration’. It was considered that the ‘the Organization requires stronger executive leadership, thoroughgoing administrative reform, and more reliable controls and auditing’ (see Part II, Document 4, all quotes from Preface). The Volcker Committee recommended creating the position of United Nations Chief Operating Officer to handle management responsibilities for the Secretary-General and setting up an Independent Auditing Board, which should go beyond financial audits and review the


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staffing and budgeting of accounting and auditing services (see Part II, Document 4, Preface, point 5).

Procurement Scandal On 8 August 2005 and subsequent to the final report, the Volcker Committee issued a third interim report analysing in detail the illicit activities of Benon Sevan, the Executive Director of OIP, and the United Nations procurement officer, Alexander Yakovlev. At the same time, at the request of the Secretary-General, the external audit company Deloitte carried out a review of procurement processes and published its report in November 2005. In addition, the General Assembly had ordered OIOS to conduct an audit of peacekeeping procurement operations. The Volcker Committee provided further evidence suggesting that Sevan had benefited financially from Iraqi oil allocations while serving as the Executive Director of OIP. At that time, he was the subject of a criminal investigation and the Volcker Committee recommended that the Secretary-General waive Sevan’s immunity if criminal charges were brought against him. Just hours before the report was released, Benon Sevan resigned from the United Nations. The Volcker Committee found that Yakovlev had unsuccessfully solicited a bribe from a company seeking an oil-for-food contract. It concluded that he had received more than $950,000 in payments from companies that won contracts in other United Nations programmes. Much of the evidence against Yakovlev seems to have been uncovered by the United Nations’ own internal investigators, who gave leads to the Volcker Committee. Alexander Yakovlev pleaded guilty to federal charges of corruption, wire fraud and money laundering. Vladimir Kuznetsov, Chairman of the United Nations Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) was indicted on charges of laundering hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of bribes paid by companies seeking contracts with the United Nations. The guilty plea had little to do with the Oil-for-Food Programme, but underscored the fact that corruption might have infected many procurement programmes. In January 2006, after the four-month investigation, OIOS reported substantial evidence of abuse in procurement for peacekeeping operations, including bid rigging, favouritism and overpayment. The investigations also found that staff were underresourced and overworked. In conclusion, it was stated that management systematically failed to take corrective action, leading to a culture of impunity. Eight staff members were put on special leave pending ongoing investigations and United Nations and United States authorities were looking into more than 200 cases of alleged fraud. The alleged irregularities in procurement involved possible waste and fraud of up to $300 million. These findings did more damage to the United Nation’s reputation, however, than the more widespread abuse under the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme for Iraq, in which more than 2,000 companies received illicit payments of $1.8 billion. In the latter case, the Security Council shared in the blame for the way the United Nations Oil-for-Food programme had operated, whereas the mismanagement of peacekeeping procurement was within the full control of the Secretariat.

Task Force on the United Nations In addition to the allegations of corruption under the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, other allegations surfaced, including revelations of sexual exploitation in

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peacekeeping missions, the misconduct of senior officials and harassment in the workplace. Concerned about the United Nations’ inaction on many fronts, the United States Congress launched numerous investigations into the Organization, which at one time included five committees in the House of Representatives. In addition, the United States administration pushed for a strong package of United Nations management reforms in the areas of fraud prevention, oversight and accountability. In January 2004, the bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations authorized by the United States Congress came into being. The Task Force was chaired by former Senate majority leader George Mitchell and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, and was mandated to examine the extent to which the United Nations was fulfilling its mission. The Task Force, staffed by the respected United States Institute for Peace, was to develop recommendations to ensure the effectiveness, integrity, transparency and accountability of the United Nations system. In June 2005, the Task Force released its report ‘American Interests and UN Reform’, 34 which contained numerous recommendations on how to improve the United Nations. The Task Force stated that the United Nations was in urgent need of sweeping reforms. The report found tragic failures related to peacekeeping and the work of the Human Rights Commission, as well as systematic hostility towards Israel. The United Nations was considered to be bogged down by the deadwood of useless programmes because, once programmes were mandated, they faced little further scrutiny and could live on forever without having to justify their existence. The report noted that the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme was flawed by a combination of incompetence, gross mismanagement and alleged corruption and criminality. It was testimony to the importance of the long overdue managerial reforms. The United Nations was found to lack management systems that are common throughout the world in both public and private institutions. There was a lack of accountability and transparency and the overly numerous staff members lacked the skills and motivation to perform their duties. There was a high level of discontent, distrust and pessimism among staff concerning the integrity of the Organization and morale was dismal, according to the report. The United Nations’ problems stemmed from the politicization and bureaucratic unwieldiness of decisionmaking in the General Assembly and the Security Council, and from micro-management as much as from the failures in the Secretary-General’s leadership. While crediting the Secretary-General with proposing major changes, the report faulted him for lack of followthrough. Reform initiatives were seen to be blocked by the large number of small member states, who collectively paid less than one per cent of United Nations contributions but commanded a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. The report recommended the abolition of the Human Rights Commission and the reorientation of ECOSOC. The United Nations was seen as a potential partner in fighting terror and halting weapons proliferation. As a key test, the General Assembly would need to agree on a comprehensive definition of terrorism. The Task Force called for developing a rapid reaction capability to address threats of genocide. With regard to management, the Task Force called for the creation of the post of chief operating officer, in charge of daily operations, to provide strong operational management. The Secretary-General should be given more flexibility in the management of staff. Larger contributors should be given a greater say in budgetary matters, through the institution of weighted voting; programmes mandated by the General Assembly should include sunset provisions; and operational 34 Report of the Task Force on the United Nations, American Interests and UN Reform, United States Institute of Peace, June 2005.


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programmes should be funded by voluntary contributions. The Task Force supported the creation of an Independent Oversight Board that would function in a manner similar to a corporate independent audit committee. Other recommendations included the call for additional resources for OIOS, effective protection for whistleblowers, access to oversight reports by member states, the establishment of an Office of Personnel Ethics, and zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. There were a multitude of other proposals such as support for United Nations field offices to move towards common services, simplification of project funding arrangements, application of new business models for delivering assistance and greater emphasis on external evaluation. The Secretary-General welcomed the report, especially its conclusion, and supported many of the recommendations. This was not surprising since, in general, the Task Force had supported the management reform proposals initiated or proposed by the SecretaryGeneral in his March 2005 report. These included, in particular, the establishment of a Human Rights Council, the proposal to review all mandates dating back more than five years, the creation of a Management Performance Board and for the possibility of a buyout plan.

Hyde Reform Act In June 2005, shortly after the Task Force issued its report, the House of Representatives passed the United Nations Reform Act of 2005, calling for the automatic withholding of 50 per cent of its assessed United Nations contributions unless the Organization adopted at least 32 of the 39 specific reform proposals. The Reform Act was introduced by Henry Hyde, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, noting that ‘we are opposed to legendary bureaucratization, to political grandstanding, to billions of dollars spent on multitudes of programmes with meagre results, to the outright misappropriation of funds represented by the emerging scandal regarding the Oil-for-Food Programme’. 35 The legislation was passed by a vote of 221 to 184, essentially along party lines, and was seen as a pre-emptive legislative move against the congressionally mandated bipartisan Task Force of Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell. 36 As intended, with the passing of the Hyde Reform Act, the House of Representatives did not take up the recommendations of the Gingrich-Mitchell Task Force. With regard to oversight and accountability, the Hyde legislation called for the designation of OIOS as an independent entity within the United Nations and expansion of its mandate to cover specialized agencies, procedures for protecting whistleblowers, the introduction of financial disclosure requirements for senior United Nations officials, the creation of an Office of Ethics, the cessation of the issuance of single bid contracts, the adoption of a new Code of Conduct for personnel serving on peacekeeping missions, a global audit of all peacekeeping operations, and access by member states to report and audits. With regard to programmes and budgets, the Hyde legislation urged that 18 programmes be shifted from the regular assessed budget to voluntary funding, that voting on budgetary and financial matters be weighted, that mandates more than five years old be reviewed and sunset provisions for programmes introduced, and that the budget for conferences be reduced. With regard to management, the establishment of the position of 35 Committee on International Relations, ‘Hyde Introduces UN Reform Legislation’, News Release, United States House of Representatives, Washington, 9 June 2005. 36 Laurenti, ‘Fork in the Road’, op. cit., p. 5.

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chief operating officer was recommended. This officer would be subordinate to the Secretary-General but would have broad powers over finances and the Organization’s operations. This was seen as insulating the United Nations administration from the political pressures faced by the Secretary-General and ensuring that hiring decisions were based on talent rather than political convenience. Moreover, the modernization of human resource practices was proposed, including a rotation requirement. Other legislation stipulated that a member state should be excluded from membership in the Human Rights Commission if it was under United Nations investigation for human rights violations and that committee structure be streamlined. Other than the provision for the automatic withholding of contributions, the reforms sought were quite similar to those of the Gingrich-Mitchell Task Force. In parallel to the Hyde legislation in the House, a second piece of legislation on United Nations reform was introduced in the United States Congress in July 2005 by Senators Norm Coleman and Richard Lugar, known as the UN Management, Personnel, and Policy Reform Act of 2005. The legislation supported institutional changes in the management of programmes like the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, financial oversight and human rights monitoring. Unlike the automatic withholding mandated in the Hyde legislation, the Coleman-Lugar legislation did not foresee automatic withholding but left the withholding of assessed contributions to the President’s discretion. In response to the passing of the Hyde legislation, the United Nations issued a statement that withholding assessed contributions would not be a solution. This was seen as counter-productive, particularly at a time when reform was such a crucial agenda item. Rather, it was suggested that member states advance reform by engaging in discussion among themselves. The Bush administration was supportive of most of the GingrichMitchell report and the provisions of the Hyde and Coleman-Lugar legislation. The latter, however, was considered to be more workable. Automatic withholding was seen as infringing on the President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs. Moreover, withholdings to achieve specific reforms would undermine the United States’ efforts to play a leading role in reforming the United Nations. As of December 2005, neither bill had come to a vote.

The Secretary-General’s Response In light of issues raised by the Volcker Inquiry and the investigations by the United States Congress, efforts were initiated to respond directly to the demands that had been formulated. The main concern was with oversight and accountability. 37 In January 2004, the United States was able to get a decision approved that mandated OIOS to release any of its audit reports to member states upon request. The Secretary-General’s efforts included the development of an anti-fraud and corruption policy drawing on best practices, including the model recently developed by the World Bank. A policy to protect whistleblowers was being developed to guard against retribution and enable staff to come forward with confidence. The financial disclosure required of senior officials was expanded and additional rules were developed for staff engaged in procurement activities, coupled with the formulation of a United Nations Supplier Code of Conduct. New policies covered the provision of pro bono goods and services offered to the United Nations. 37 Joachim Müller, ‘Management Reform in the United Nations: Between Politics and Efficiency’, International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 417–436.


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In order to improve management and build a culture of performance and accountability, the Secretary-General established a number of new internal committees. An Oversight Committee was established to ensure that appropriate management actions were taken to implement the recommendations of OIOS, the Board of Audit and the Joint Inspection Unit. This Committee had its first meeting in the summer of 2005. A Committee on Management was established to review decisions on budget, oversight and major reform efforts to serve as catalysts for change, and develop mechanisms to ensure that reforms already identified were implemented quickly and completely. Finally, a Management Performance Board was created, chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General, to monitor individual offices and managers. The leadership failures by senior officials also highlighted by the Volcker Inquiry were traced back to the opaque selection process for high-level officials. A new system was proposed to help build a new generation of senior United Nations leaders, recruited on the basis of merit and skills. Once appointed, senior officials were to go through a formal induction programme on the entire system of United Nations rules, regulations, codes of conduct and managerial systems. In response to allegations of sexual misconduct by field personnel, the Office of Internal Oversight Services reviewed the state of discipline in peacekeeping missions in April 2005. Efforts were launched to introduce a unified standard of conduct across all categories of peacekeeping personnel, to integrate training into all mission induction programmes and to establish complaints mechanisms in all missions. Personnel Conduct Officers were appointed in missions and plans included the significant strengthening of the United Nations’ investigative capacity and the creation of conduct units in all peacekeeping missions. The existing policy on dealing with harassment was extended beyond the issue of sexual harassment and ‘ethical contracts’ were included in staff training programmes. The United States considered the ongoing reform efforts to be too little, too late and this country’s relationship with the United Nations was at a low point. In February 2005, 70 Nobel Laureates announced their support for the Secretary-General, citing his record of reform. In March 2005, Richard Holbrooke, the United States ambassador to the United Nations under Bill Clinton, invited several former United Nations officials and the Secretary-General to his Manhattan apartment for a three-and-a-half-hour discussion. The goal was no less than to save the Secretary-General and rescue the United Nations, as one participant told the New York Times. Holbrooke emphasized that the United Nations could not succeed if it was in open dispute and constant friction with United States. The Secretary-General was urged to clean house and be more forceful in his leadership. The United Nations then began a campaign to mend its relations with the United States administration and with congressional critics who had questioned the Secretary-General’s fitness to lead the Organization, including Senator Norm Coleman, who had called for his resignation. In addition, the United Nations undertook the most extensive personnel changes since the Secretary-General took office in 1997, forcing out several senior officials who had clashed with the United States or engaged in conduct that exposed the Organization to criticism.

2.7 SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: THE COLLAPSE OF ASPIRATIONS Since the failed attempt to reform the Security Council at the time of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations back in 2000, not much had changed. The Security Council still had 15 members, including five permanent members (China, France, Russia,

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United Kingdom, United States) and 11 non-permanent members. The politics involved in agreeing on an expansion of the Security Council were complicated. Britain, France and Russia had supported permanent membership for Germany, Brazil, India and Japan. China and South Korea had doubts about Japan. Pakistan opposed India, and Mexico and Argentina opposed Brazil. The United States supported Japan, but refrained from supporting Germany, which many believed was tied to their respective governments’ positions on the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The expansion of permanent membership would have marginalized a number of mid-sized countries, which at the same time were major peacekeeping contributors such as Italy, Pakistan, Canada, Argentina, South Korea and Spain. Led by Italy and Pakistan, those countries formed an alliance known as the ‘Coffee Club’, which rejected any increase in permanent membership and introduced a proposal for semi-permanent membership for which they would also qualify. Although the events of September 11 had focused attention away from a reform of the Council, the dramatic events leading up to the Iraq invasion again highlighted the central importance of the Security Council and of permanent membership, not to mention veto power. Germany and Japan appeared to have become more impatient with their restricted roles as leading donor countries without corresponding membership in the Security Council. While the United States paid 22 per cent of the regular budget, Japan was a close second with 19.5 per cent, and Germany third with 8.7 per cent. As for the other existing permanent members, Britain was at 6.1 per cent, France at 6.0 per cent, China at 2.1 per cent and Russia at 1.1 per cent. Germany, Japan, Brazil and India had been lobbying for permanent seats on the Council, with a seat reserved for an African country as well. In December 2004, Germany demanded, for the first time, that the new permanent members also be given veto rights. Considerations of Security Council reform oriented the work of the High-level Panel. As we saw in Section 2.3, when it presented its report in December 2004, the Panel advanced a recommendation consisting of three elements. First, the Panel suggested that there be selection and re-election criteria for membership such as financial, military and diplomatic considerations, and geographical balance. Second, the Panel suggested that the Security Council should be expanded from 15 to 24 members. Two possible models were recommended for the expansion: Model A involved new permanent members, Model B involved new long-term renewable non-permanent seats. Specifically, Model A provided for six new permanent seats and three new two-year-term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas; and Model B provided for a new category of eight fouryear renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. In neither option are any new vetoes created. Third, the Panel suggested a full review of the new arrangement in 2020. In March 2005, the Secretary-General endorsed the recommendations of the High-level Panel in his report In Larger Freedom. Without favouring a specific proposal, he urged member states to consider the two models or any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that might emerge on the basis of either model. He emphasized that no reform of the United Nations would be complete without a reform of the Security Council and remarked that the inability to reach consensus should not become an excuse for postponing action. In April 2005, thousands of furious Chinese protesters had broken windows at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and rampaged through Shanghai. Smaller demonstrations broke out in Hangzhou and Tianjin and two Japanese were reported to have been injured by an angry mob. The immediate cause of the protest was the revision of a junior-highschool textbook in Japan that was seen to gloss over Japan’s World War II record. Japan’s relations with China had sunk to their worst level in more than 30 years. At the centre of


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the simmering Japan-China dispute was struggle to influence the economic, diplomatic and military future of Asia. Japan’s quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council was one of the factors fuelling the anti-Japan protests. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that Japan must face up to history squarely and that the protests should give Japan reason to rethink its bid for a permanent Security Council seat. China stopped short of opposing Japan’s bid but had long held the view that Japan was unqualified for permanent Security Council membership since it had not acknowledged the burden of history. Japanese hopes were fading fast that the country would gain the necessary support from China for a permanent seat any time soon. In May 2005, the United States warned Japan, India, Germany and Brazil that it would not support their bids to join the Security Council unless they agreed not to ask for veto power. The Group of 4 wanted veto rights. They recognized, however, that the existing permanent members, whose ratification was required for a United Nations Charter amendment to take effect, would rebuff such a demand. So they opted to become permanent members of the Security Council first, and reconsider the issues as part of a mandatory reconsideration in 15 years. In their quest for the votes of 128 member states, the two-thirds majority necessary to amend the United Nations Charter, the Group of 4 had also agreed to add not only four permanent seats for themselves, but two more for undetermined African countries. On top of that, they proposed to expand by four the 10 existing seats elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, adding one each for Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, thereby bringing the total membership to 25. The Group of 4 proposal did not, however, gain the support of the African states. South Africa and Nigeria were the top candidates for one African seat and Egypt was pushing for the other, insisting that Arab nations must be permanently represented on the Council. Senegal and Kenya also expressed an interest in permanent membership. In March 2005, the Executive Council of the African Union adopted a common position on Security Council reform, known as the ‘Ezulwini Consensus’. According to the African proposal, the Security Council should be expanded from 15 to 26. The additional seats were to be allocated as follows: two permanent and two non-permanent seats for Africa, two permanent and one non-permanent seat for Asia, one non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe, one permanent and one non-permanent seat for Latin America and the Caribbean, and one permanent seat for Western Europe and Other States. The African proposal included one additional non-permanent seat for Africa as compared to the Group of 4 proposal. Most important, however, was the demand that all new permanent members should have the same prerogatives and privileges as the current permanent members, including the right of veto. Attempts to reach an agreement continued in July. Among other events, Italy’s Permanent Reprehensive to the United Nations alleged that Germany, India, Japan and Brazil were using blackmail and financial threats to win permanent seats on the Security Council. The German government reacted angrily. The differences between the Group of 4 and the African proposal essentially blocked agreement on the suggestions for new permanent seats. By mid-2005, the negotiations had not resulted in a promising outcome for any of the countries hoping to secure a permanent seat. When the negotiations reached a deadlock a few months before the Summit of Heads of State and Government, Japan, Germany, Brazil and India decided in July 2005 to force member states take a stance on Security Council reform. The Group of 4 tabled a draft resolution according to which membership of the Security Council would increase from 15 to 25, with six additional


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permanent members without veto rights and four additional non-permanent members. 38 This draft resolution was not supported by certain hoped-for co-sponsors, the most important of which were Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Poland and Portugal. 39 The African group put forward its own draft resolution, calling for an increase from 15 to 26, with six additional permanent members with veto rights and five additional non-permanent members, including two for Africa. 40 This division was to the advantage of Italy and the ‘Coffee Club’, which strongly objected to the establishment of new permanent seats. Italy had previously proposed a new category of ten non-permanent seats to be rotated among a select group of 30 states; essentially, these would constitute semi-permanent seats for middle-sized states. Organized under the slogan ‘Uniting for Consensus’, Italy, together with Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey, sponsored a third draft resolution on Security Council reform. 41 According to this proposal, the Security Council was to increase from 15 to 24. No additional permanent seats would be established. Unlike Italy’s previous proposal, the draft resolution did not include the establishment of semi-permanent seats, which the smaller states sponsoring the draft resolution did not support. Instead, the number of non-permanent seats would increase from 11 to 20, distributed as follows: six seats for Africa, five seats for Asia, four seats for Latin America and the Caribbean, three seats for Western Europe and Other States, and two seats for Eastern Europe. On 13 July 2005, the United States unexpectedly issued a sharp rejection of the Group of 4’s proposals. The United States House of Representatives weighed in with a directive that the United States must block any expansion that would extend the veto, undermine the effectiveness of the Security Council or diminish the influence of the United States. The United States formally backed Japan’s bid for permanent membership and expressed its willingness to consider two new permanent members and two or three additional nonpermanent members to expand the Security Council to 19 or 20. It cautioned on putting any proposals to a vote at that stage, but advocated a criteria-based approach under which potential permanent members would have to be well qualified, based on factors such as economic size, population, military capacity, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the United Nations, contributions to United Nations peacekeeping, and record on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. Although the overall geographic balance of the Council was an important criterion, the United States considered effectiveness to be the main benchmark for any Security Council reform. It was argued that management failure, corruption and lack of transparency did far more to undermine the effectiveness and reputation of the United Nations than any possible shortcomings in the composition of the Security Council. Hence, any vote on expansion should follow the implementation of other, more urgent reforms. The United States’ proposal seemingly supported permanent membership for Japan. Realizing that the success of a single candidacy would be unrealistic, however, Japan was reluctant to abandon the joint approach of the Group of 4. With the United States publicly opposed to the Group of 4 plan, it seemed extremely unlikely that the Group’s resolution could succeed. 38

United Nations document: Security Council Reform, General Assembly draft resolution A/59/L.64, 6 July

2005. 39

Fassbender, op. cit., p. 399. United Nations document: Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters, General Assembly draft resolution A/59/L.67, 14 July 2005. 41 United Nations document: Reform of the Security Council, General Assembly draft resolution A/59/L.68, 21 July 2005. 40


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In early August 2005, a breakthrough appeared possible during a meeting in London of the foreign ministers of the African Union and the Group of 4. They needed to reach an agreement in order to present a joint resolution to the United Nations on expansion of the Security Council after the African nations dropped their demand for veto rights for new permanent members. The Group of 4 reciprocated by acceding to the African Union’s proposals to add an additional non-permanent seat to the Security Council, bringing the total membership to 26. The additional seat would rotate among all developing countries and not just Africa, as initially demanded. At the following summit in Addis Ababa, the African Union did not endorse the London agreement but insisted on the veto right for all new permanent members. Countries that had little or no chance of getting permanent seats themselves strongly supported this position, including Zimbabwe and several countries from north Africa, notably Algeria, Egypt and Libya. The lack of veto was seen as relegating African permanent members to second-class status. As a result, Africa’s hopes of a permanent seat were lost. The sub-Saharan African states had accepted the Group of 4 proposal, in particular Nigeria and South Africa. Egypt accused Nigeria of abandoning the continent’s principles to win the support of the West and increase its own chances of obtaining a permanent seat on the Security Council. None of the three draft resolutions submitted in July 2005 was put to a vote during the World Summit. In August, China and the United States agreed to work together to defeat plans to expand the Security Council at that time. Given the deadlock in the reform situation, interest in pursuing this issue further appeared to diminish.

2.8 2005 WORLD SUMMIT: A ONCE-IN-A-LIFETIME OPPORTUNITY The September 2005 World Summit had been originally conceived of as a follow-up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approved by the 2000 Millennium Summit. The Summit ended up focusing on peacekeeping, terrorism, human rights and the reform of the Security Council. In the aftermath of September 11 and the invasion of Iraq, the Summit was seen as an opportunity to approve radical reform in order to adapt the United Nations to new threats and challenges. The World Summit was the last opportunity for Secretary-General Kofi Annan to introduce major changes and conclude his legacy since the following year, 2006, would be the last of his eight-year tenure. After the issuance of the Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom, a few months before the World Summit, the sphere of action moved to Jean Ping of Gabon, the President of the 59th General Assembly. 42 Ping was entrusted with the negotiations on the Summit document, to be approved by the assembled Heads of State and Government. The goal was to consult through April and May and to produce a draft outcome document by June, which would trigger intensive negotiations. Ping appointed ten facilitators from the group of permanent representatives to arrange the consultations on a draft outcome document. In doing so, he bypassed institutional structures such as the Bureau of the General Assembly and regional groups. Negotiations began during the summer months and fear was often expressed that failure to reach agreement on Security Council enlargement would block agreement on the other issues on the reform agenda. The major challenge, however, came from the United States.

42 Nico Schrijver, ‘UN Reform: A Once-in-a-Generation Opportunity?’, International Organizations Law Review, Volume 2, Number 2, pp. 271–275.


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Only the 25-member European Union, Australia, Canada and New Zealand appeared to be backing most of the key proposals presented by the Secretary-General. Member states pursuing conflicting positions were Cuba, Egypt, India, Jamaica, Pakistan, Algeria, Iran, Syria, Venezuela and the United States. Russia and China backed a more cautious approach with regard to a number of proposals. The United States administration had embraced most of the reform proposals presented by former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell. Both had largely endorsed the reform proposal presented by the Secretary-General. There were, however, important differences. The United States Department of State strongly supported the Secretary-General’s proposals to establish a Peacebuilding Commission, a Human Rights Council and a Democracy Fund, as well as his proposals to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and emphasis on Monterrey Consensus, including good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights, and a liberal, market-based economic structure. Like the Secretary-General, the United States strongly supported a robust definition of terrorism and the codification of a Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism, which would trigger legal obligations for member states. This was seen as an important symbolic achievement in the United Nations’ global effort to combat terrorism. 43 On the other hand, the administration rejected the Secretary-General’s call for a formal United States commitment to a big increase in development aid and the proposal to spell out the criteria according to which the Security Council could approve the use of military force. Prior to the World Summit, budget and management reforms were considered to be priority number one for the United States. 44 The United States administration considered that the Secretary-General’s proposals did not go far enough. In particular with regard to accountability, the United States wanted to boost OIOS’s resources and independence and expand its role in peacekeeping and small agencies. Other proposals included a clear mandate for the Oversight Advisory Committee, increased protection for whistleblowers, a clear policy on waiver of immunity, the consolidation of United Nations Information Centres, the rationalization of conferences and follow-through on the Secretary-General’s own call that old mandates be regularly reviewed before extension and the proposed comprehensive review of the budget and human resources rules that govern the United Nations’ operations. The United States did not support a costly buyout programme, arguing that people who were attracted to buyouts were likely to be the most qualified and capable staff. Supported by a number of developed countries, the United States put forward a new proposal to empower the Office of the Secretary-General with additional management and oversight responsibilities similar to those of a corporate chief executive officer. During the preparatory phase of the Summit, the United States administration argued a one stage that the Summit’s focal point should not be United Nations reform. Instead, its principal focus should be on the implementation of the MDGs. Delinking the various issues, it argued that United Nations reform should be approached pragmatically, building consensus around reforms and proceeding quickly with their implementation. If agreement could not be reached easily, there should not be artificial deadlines and unrealistic 43

‘US Priorities for a Stronger More Effective United Nations’, Press Release, United States Department of State, 17 June 2005. 44 R. Nicholas Burns, ‘Testimony on United Nations Reform’, Press Release, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 21 June 2005.


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expectations of adopting a package deal. Rather, those issues should be dealt with gradually. The reform proposals were also drawing criticism from developing countries that were wary of too much emphasis being placed on security and too little on poverty and inequities in the global financial system. The Non-Aligned Movement, a coalition committed to representing the political, economic and cultural interests of 116 developing countries, argued that development and social advancement, the centrepiece of United Nations deliberations, were not adequately reflected in the Secretary-General’s proposals. The Group of 77, a coalition of 132 developing countries, which jointly negotiate major economic issues in the United Nations system, stated that bolder and more far-reaching decisions needed to be taken in development-related areas. China argued that United Nations reform must effectively reverse the trend of giving priority to security over development that had characterized United Nations activities for a long time. It was argued that a consensus on development had already been established in the Monterrey and Johannesburg conferences. Linking development to the security agenda was viewed as eclipsing or submerging development concerns if the security reform failed. Development concerns could therefore become an unintended victim of security preoccupations. The developing countries also objected to reform proposals, which could impact on their national sovereignty. On behalf of a group of like-minded developing countries, China expressed caution about the proposed reform of the Human Rights Commission. It was argued that the key to reform was to change the current practice of politicizing human rights issues, as manifested by the selective naming and shaming of countries and the increasing number of the controversial specific-country resolutions. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were quick to embrace the proposal for a new Human Rights Council but cautioned that any overhaul should retain independent investigators and the ability for witnesses and victims to testify. Algeria and Pakistan were particularly critical of the new ‘responsibility to protect’ concept, which was seen as legitimizing outside military intervention and viewed as an instrument of coercion. Pakistan argued that the proposal for the authorization of the use of force by the Security Council was subjective and could be misused, mostly by powerful states against weaker ones. It was argued that the central issue was a political decision to halt and reverse the Security Council’s encroachment on the functions and prerogatives of the General Assembly. Russia and China also backed a more cautious approach in introducing the concept of intervening inside national borders to prevent human rights violations. In June 2005, the special ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement emphasized that the use of force must not be considered as the only instrument to achieve and maintain international peace and security and, if necessary, force should be used only as a last resort. Moreover, the ministers proposed that the General Assembly should oversee the Peacebuilding Commission and reaffirmed the importance of achieving the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction globally, in particular nuclear weapons. Other criticism came in particular from Muslim nations, which resisted a broad enunciation of terrorism against civilians, and wanted to include the right to resist foreign occupation. Finally, developing countries rejected the proposed increase in the executive power of the Secretary-General, wanting to retain their traditional control over budget and personnel issues exercised through the General Assembly.


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Proposed Amendments by the United States Negotiations between member states resulted in various versions of draft agreements informally known as Ping-1, Ping-2 and Ping-3. In early August, the advanced Ping-3 was unveiled, which was considered to reflect the final stage of negotiations. Once approved, the final document would be translated and produced for submission to the mid-September Summit. In August 2006, President George W. Bush named John Bolton in a recess appointment to be the United States’ representative to the United Nations. Ambassador Bolton, an outspoken critic of multinational institutions, had been nominated in early March, but his nomination had been blocked in the United States. The Summit process changed dramatically on 17 August with the submission by the United States of 750 alterations to the proposed reforms. 45 The late timing of this intervention might be attributed to the turmoil inside the United States foreign policy establishment. When the draft was being negotiated in 2005, the United States had no full permanent representative at the United Nations and attention had focused on persuading the Senate to confirm John Bolton. The United States now argued that the draft outcome document was inadequate 46 and endorsed statements and principles that it had long resisted in other fora. Line-by-line renegotiations were demanded. Alternatively, it was suggested that the idea of a wideranging document be scrapped in favour of a short declaration. The proposed amendments mirrored the United States’ foreign policy. The development section was considered not to adequately reflect the necessary partnership between the developing world and the developed world. The amendments included the systematic deletion of every specific reference to the MDGs. Instead, the United States proposed to highlight the significance of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, which had focused on free-market reforms and required governments to improve accountability in exchange for aid and debt relief. Moreover it proposed omitting all mention of the Kyoto Protocol, with the United States administration did not support, and drastically shortening the draft outcome document relating to the environment. With regard to the section on security, the United States resisted linking political and military issues with economic and social issues. The section focused too much on disarmament rather than non-proliferation and it was too long. In addition, the United States wanted to cut references to small arms controls. On the concept of the use of force, the United States rejected the statement that it should be considered as an instrument of last resort, which was seen to constrain the United States’ freedom of action. The Peacebuilding Commission should incorporate strong Security Council oversight. Regarding the human rights section, the United States supported a smaller Human Rights Council elected by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly with clear, objective criteria for membership, such as exclusion from membership of countries under United Nations sanctions. In addressing the concept of ‘responsibility to protect civilians’ it proposed cutting ‘the obligation’ to protect and replacing it with ‘the moral responsibility’. Any mention of the International Criminal Court, which the United States did not recognize, was resolutely blocked. The section on management was considered to be poorly organized. A number of proposals lacked clarity, such as the Oversight Advisory Committee, the policy on waiver 45

Jonas Hagen, ‘2005 World Summit’, UN Chronicle, No. 3, 2005, pp. 5–7. United States Mission to the United Nations, ‘Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Deputy US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on United Nations Reform’, Press Release, No. 147 (05), 2 August 2005. 46


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of immunity, the proper budget levels for OIOS and its independence of the bodies it audits, as well as the follow-through with regular reviews of old mandates.

Final Agreement on Outcome Document The developing countries lined up against the United States with unusual determination and strong support from Europe. 47 The United States was, however, not the only country with concerns about the outcome document. Countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Cuba and Venezuela had misgivings about Western priorities for the summit on human rights and security issues. The Arab nations disliked the terms defining terrorism. Russia objected to giving authority to intervene in cases of genocide. Others found that the guidelines on the use of force were not strong enough to preclude unwarranted and unjustified interference in their internal affairs. Management reform remained blocked by some developing countries, which were widely viewed as draining power from the General Assembly. A group of 32 ambassadors were involved in the last round of negotiations, which took place under the looming shadow of potential embarrassment and failure. Recriminations were expressed over a badly managed negotiation process that did not take account of political realities and lacked effective leadership from member states and the Secretariat. Many of the senior United Nations officials went on holiday for much of August, returning only three weeks before the Summit. With time running out before the World Summit, negotiations intensified on nearly all aspects of the draft outcome document. As they negotiated into the early hours of the days leading up to the deadline, many delegations feared that the only outcome would be a four-page document. The countries involved in the main negotiations dwindled to a core group of 15 ambassadors. Pressure mounted to simply drop any language still ‘in brackets’, that is, to which some delegations objected. The United Kingdom came back with compromise texts that resolved certain contested wording on terrorism and the Peacebuilding Commission, but notably stripped out most of the specific language about the Human Rights Council’s functions and makeup that had earlier been agreed to. At 2:00 a.m. on 12 September, the text still contained 50 brackets, or points that had not yet been agreed upon. On 13 September, on the eve of the Summit, a take-it-or-leave-it version was produced by a core group consisting of Jean Ping, the President of the General Assembly, Jan Eliasson, the incoming President of the General Assembly, Mark Malloch Brown on behalf of the Secretary-General and one or two core facilitators, including the Netherlands Permanent Representative. In the end, exhausted negotiators agreed to a consensus, though hardly with great enthusiasm. The original draft had lost 10 pages in the final version. With even the Europeans and Canadians in opposition to it, the United States finally agreed to backtrack on the MDGs. But it won the battle to limit any reference to a specific financial commitment by developed countries for international development. The issue of nonproliferation and disarmament was omitted altogether from the outcome document. Other deletions or watered-down wording covered the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and references to the Kyoto accords on greenhouse gases and the International Criminal Court, two international agreements rejected by the United States, which would have been dealbreakers. Most infuriating for many Western nations was the muddled language on combating terrorism. 47

Laurenti, ‘Grand Goals, Modest Results: The UN in Search of Reform, op. cit., p. 437.


72 The World Summit

On 14 to 16 September 2005, some 150 Heads of State and Government, the largestever assemblage of world leaders, gathered at United Nations Headquarters in New York for the 2005 World Summit, which marked the opening of the 60th session of the General Assembly. The Secretary-General addressed the Summit as follows: We must restore confidence in the Organization’s integrity, impartiality, and ability to deliver – for the sake of our dedicated staff, and those vulnerable and needy people throughout the world who look to the United Nations for support. It is to save their lives, to protect their rights, to ensure their safety and freedom, that we simply must find effective collective responses to the challenges of our time. I urge you, as world leaders, individually and collectively, to keep working on this reform agenda – to have the patience to persevere, and the vision needed to forge a real consensus. The Secretary-General called the Summit ‘a once-in-a-generation opportunity’ and proposed that the summit agree upon a global ‘grand bargain’ to take bold decisions in the areas of development, security, human rights and reform of the United Nations. At the conclusion of the Summit, world leaders adopted the Outcome Document (see Part II, Document 5). The 178-paragraph, 40-page document had been the result of intensive negotiations held over many months and reflected the compromise required to gain a consensus by all 191 member states. The Outcome Document consists of five parts. Part I deals with values and principles, describing the collective security consensus. The central role of the United Nations in an effective multilateral system was emphasized. Part II on development, at 18 pages accounts for nearly half of the document. Despite its length, the content is limited and noncommittal, consisting mainly of a list of previous intentions and commitments. The reaffirmation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, including the political endorsement of the MDGs, was considered significant, however, in view of the previous objections of the United States. Part III on peace and security highlights the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission. Aside from this institutional reform, it was impossible to hide the lack of progress on issues such as criteria for the use of force, the definition of terrorism and progress in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Part IV deals with human rights and the rule of law and outlines endorses the principle of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It also outlines the establishment of a Democracy Fund. Finally, Part V on strengthening the United Nations deals with institutional and management reform. It covers the establishment of a new Human Rights Council, which, surprisingly, is not mentioned in Part IV. Management reforms deal primarily with issues of oversight. In the following sections, the key Summit decisions are identified with regard to development, security, human rights and management issues. The Summit also addressed a number of rather technical matters, which could be dealt with as part of the wider amendment of the Charter. This included the deletion of Chapter XII of the Charter relating to the Trusteeship Council and the deletion of the ‘enemy states’ clauses in Articles 53, 77 and 107 of the Charter.


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The Summit reaffirmed member states’ support for the MDGs. Although this was solely a reaffirmation of previous decisions, it was considered a major success in view of the earlier opposition by the United States. Instead, the Summit recalled a long list of intentions and agreements previously adopted in other fora, such as the Monterrey Consensus and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. The development issues were explicitly framed in security terms. Emphasis was placed on good governance, the rule of law, the fight against corruption, domestic stability, respect for human rights, trade liberalization, gender equality, market-oriented policies and solid democratic institutions as essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger.

MDG-Based Poverty Reduction Strategies and Quick Wins Concepts originating from the UN Millennium Project included the recommendation by the Summit that by 2006 each country should adopt comprehensive national development strategies to achieve the MDGs. In addition, the Summit supported the idea of launching country-led quick-impact initiatives such as the free distribution of malaria bed-nets, anti-malarial treatments, the expansion of local school meal programmes or the elimination of user fees for primary education and health-care services.

Increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA), Debt Relief and Trade Facilitation By the time the Summit meeting took place, it had become apparent that, without accelerated implementation of new commitments, the prospects of achieving the MDGs by 2015 were slim. The High-level Panel, the UN Millennium Project and the SecretaryGeneral’s reform proposals all recommended that donor states commit themselves to a timetable for achieving the 30-year old target of ODA equivalent to 0.7 per cent of GNP. In view of the rejection of aid targets by the United States, no firm commitments were agreed upon with regard to ODA (see Part II, Document 5, paragraph 23). Instead, the Summit agreed to provide ‘a substantial increase in aid’ to assist developing countries to meet the MDGs and ‘welcomed that many developed countries’ had established timetables to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA by 2015. The Summit also expressed its ‘appreciation’ of the fact that ‘some governments have set an intermediate target of 0.5 per cent of GNP by 2010’. This fell short even of decisions taken at the Group of 8 Gleneagles Summit of July 2005, which had agreed on some bold statements about reaching the target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA by 2015. The decision reached by the World Summit was seen as indicating a United States retreat from the MDGs. As with ODA, the proclamation on debt cancellation fell short of previous agreements; the Summit stressed the ‘need to consider additional measures and initiatives aimed at ensuring longterm debt sustainability through increased grant-based financing, cancellation of 100 per cent of the official multilateral and bilateral debt of heavily indebted poor countries’ (see Part II, Document 5, paragraph 26 (c)). A commitment was expressed to develop innovative sources of financing for development, including efforts by groups of countries


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to implement an International Finance Facility to finance development projects, in particular in the health sector.

Climate Change, Disaster Prevention, HIV/AIDS With regard to climate change, the Summit reflected the United States’ objections to the Kyoto Protocol by emphasizing the need ‘for many of us’ to comply with this international agreements (see Part II, Document 5, paragraph 51). For those member states that were party to the Kyoto Protocol, the Summit stressed that they should meet all their commitments and obligations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The priorities of the Group of 8 Gleneagles Summit were recalled in that the report supported a sustained international response to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases and expressed a resolve to work expeditiously towards the establishment of a worldwide early warning system for natural hazards, including a tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean.

Economic and Social Council With regard to the reform of ECOSOC, the Summit followed the recommendations of the High-level Panel as endorsed by the Secretary-General. The Summit agreed that the Council should hold a biennial high-level Development Co-operation Forum to review trends in international development co-operation. The Council was to focus on the followup to major United Nations conferences and summits, including the internationally agreedupon development goals, and hold annual ministerial-level substantive reviews to assess progress. In addition, the Council was to support international efforts to address humanitarian emergencies, including natural disasters.

Security New Security Consensus Building on the proposals outlined by the High-level Panel and endorsed by the Secretary-General, the Summit reaffirmed the commitment ‘to work towards a new security consensus’, based on the recognition that many threats are interlinked, that development, peace, security and human rights are mutually reinforcing, that no state can best protect itself by acting entirely alone and that all states need an effective and efficient collective security system (see Part II, Document 5, paragraph 72).

Terrorism The Summit condemned ‘terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes’ and emphasized the need to conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism within a year (see Part II, Document 5, paragraph 81). This could not make up for its failure to agree on a definition of terrorism and thereby set the stage for the approval of a comprehensive convention against terrorism.


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Detailed recommendations had been prepared by the High-level Panel and subsequently endorsed by the Secretary-General. In the end, the issues, which had been contentious for several years, could not be resolved. Although many states were seeking a strong condemnation of all forms of violence against innocent civilians, some Islamic nations sought a special reference to liberation groups and the right to resist foreign occupation. Despite the lack of progress on a convention on international terrorism, the Summit agreed to develop a counter-terrorism strategy and acknowledged that a high-level conference could be convened to formulate an international response to terrorism. The SecretaryGeneral was invited to submit proposals for strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to assist states in combating terrorism and to enhance the co-ordination of United Nations activities. The Security Council was encouraged to consider ways to strengthen its monitoring and enforcement role in the area of counter-terrorism. Moreover, the Summit approved an increase in the capacity and regular budget resources for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to provide assistance to member states.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Catastrophic Terrorism One major omission by the Summit was an agreement on non-proliferation and disarmament, owing to the lack of consensus. The United States and other nations wanted to strengthen non-proliferation, but remove references to nuclear disarmament for big powers. This was objected to by the developing countries, which had the opposite priority. More stringent inspection rules under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were rejected due to concern about increased interference in legitimate nuclear energy production. No reference was included on establishing a system of controlled supply of fissile material for civilian use. All references to disarmament that had existed in the earlier draft versions of the Outcome Document had been deleted. Finally, the Secretary-General’s proposal to address the risk of catastrophic terrorism through an international convention on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism was not taken up forcefully. Rather, the Summit expressed its support of efforts to ensure the early entry into force of such a convention (see Part II, Document 5, paragraph 91).

Use of Force The Summit declared its determination to take effective collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace and suppress acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. In view of the new security threats following September 11, the need had been emphasized to revise and expand the right to self-defence and the concept of the preemptive and preventive use of force through an amendment of the Charter. The Summit decided not to amend the Charter in accordance with the recommendations of the Highlevel Panel, as endorsed by the Secretary-General. Rather, the Summit referred to the collective security system agreed upon 60 years ago and reaffirmed ‘that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace and security’ (see Part II, Document 5, paragraph 78). In particular, the powers attributed to the Security Council remain the same, and Article 51 of the Charter was not


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amended. 48 Indeed, the Summit did not even make any explicit reference to Article 51 in the few paragraphs devoted to the ‘use of force’ under the Charter (see Part II, Document 5, paragraphs 77-80). In addition, the Summit did not refer to the ‘basic criteria of legitimacy’ that the High-level Panel and the Secretary-General had suggested for consideration in situations where the Council contemplated the use of military force. This included a common view on how to weigh the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the proposed military action, whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat, whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand, and whether there is a reasonable chance of success. In not addressing the issue, the Summit avoided imposing any criteria, even highly flexible ones, on the permanent members.

Peacebuilding Commission and Peacekeeping One of the Summit’s main achievements was the decision to establish a Peacebuilding Commission, backed up by a support office and a standing fund. The idea of creating the Commission had enjoyed significant support among member states before the summit, including the United States. 49 The High-level Panel had expressed its support for the creation of a new subsidiary body of the Security Council with a responsibility for postconflict peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Such a body would have a mandate to prevent the collapse of state institutions by intervening in the domestic affairs of societies in transition, including action without or against the will of member states. Subsequently, the Secretary-General proposed a more cautious approach with regard to the possible early warning or monitoring function of the Commission and suggested restricting the mandate to a focus on tasks of advice and co-ordination. The mandate and power to be entrusted to the new Peacebuilding Commission was a major issue during the negotiations leading up to the World Summit. While some delegations supported early warning and conflict prevention functions for the Commission, most felt that priority should be accorded to post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. 50 Indeed, there was obviously some reluctance to grant the Commission independent powers. Another controversial issue was how the authority of the Commission might be triggered. The United States wanted the Security Council to have control over the Commission, while developing countries wanted the Commission to report to the General Assembly. The Summit finally agreed on a less ambitious approach in designing the framework for the Commission. This was achieved by agreeing on fairly detailed provisions. The Commission was established with a mandate focusing on post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery only, with no mandate to address prevention issues. This is reflected in the Outcome Document (see Part II, Document 5, paragraphs 98–99), which specifies that the ‘Commission should focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development and integrated strategies in order to lay the foundations for sustainable development’. Moreover, the Summit avoided linking the Commission expressly with the Security Council and stated that the Commission should operate as an intergovernmental advisory body, subject to certain reporting obligations vis-à-vis the General Assembly. The United States had proposed that 48

Niels Blokker and Sam Muller, ‘Forum: UN Reform’, International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005, pp. 361–365. 49 Stahn, op. cit., p. 403. 50 Ibid., p. 406.


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the Commission be placed under the authority of the Security Council, while India, Iran and Malaysia, for example, favoured an institutional link with the General Assembly or, as in the case of Uganda, with ECOSOC. 51 Although its decision-making powers would be limited, the Commission was to act on the basis of consensus of its members. It was to bring together all the relevant actors, develop best practices and ensure predictable financing. The Peacebuilding Commission was to begin its work no later than 31 December 2005. Supplementary to this, the Summit decided to establish a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, to be funded by voluntary contributions, and to establish a small peacebuilding support office to support the Peacebuilding Commission. The Summit endorsed the creation of a standing police capacity to provide start-up capability for the policing component of the United Nations peacekeeping missions and to assist existing missions. Agreement was also reached on strengthening the Secretary-General’s capacity for mediation and good offices.

Security Council Reform The Summit noted that the most ambitious reform effort – the reform of the Security Council – had failed and been abandoned after nine months of negotiations. From the start of the negotiations on the Outcome Document, substantial questions related to membership and working methods had been excluded from the negotiations on the Outcome Document as a result of earlier disagreement. 52 In response to the stalemate, Jean Ping, the President of the General Assembly, was quietly floating a compromise, which would enlarge the Council by five or six seats for 10 to 12 years. But Pakistan strongly rejected the initiative, stating that the Ping proposal would allow for a form of permanent membership through the back door. The lengthy Outcome Document makes only limited reference to the question of Security Council reform – in only two paragraphs in fact (see Part II, Document 5, paragraphs 153–154). The Summit supported an early reform of the Security Council as an essential element in the reform of the United Nations in general in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus further enhance its effectiveness and legitimacy. The Summit also expressed a commitment to continuing efforts to achieve a decision to this end and asked the General Assembly to review progress on the reform by the end of 2005. Given the deep divisions among major powers, this appeared not to be realistic. This result was a disappointment for governments that aspired to assume larger responsibilities and those that considered a reformed Security Council to be essential for the legitimacy of the United Nations. The result in 2005 actually fell short of the agreement already reached in 1995 on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations. At that time, the General Assembly decided that the Security Council should be expanded to further strengthen its capacity and effectiveness, enhance its representative character and improve its working efficiency and transparency. 53

51

Ibid. p. 407. Fassbender, op. cit., pp. 391–392. 53 United Nations document: Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, General Assembly resolution 50/6, 24 October 1995, paragraph 14. 52


78 Human Rights Responsibility to Protect

One of the main results of the Summit was the recognition of its ‘responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. This agreement was based on the proposals outlined by the High-level Panel and endorsed by the Secretary-General. Should national authorities fail to protect civilians from those four international crimes and peaceful means prove to be inadequate, the Summit agreed to take ‘collective action, in a timely and decisive manner’ under Chapter VII, which lists serious international crimes; such action would be taken through the Security Council (see Part II, Document 5, paragraph 139). The agreement was reached after considerable debate. The Iraq invasion and its rationalization on human security grounds created an atmosphere of distrust among developing countries that undermined the emerging norm that there is a Responsibility to Protect. 54 Intervention on the basis of the new norm was seen as clashing with the doctrine of national sovereignty. Prior to reaching the agreement, the Secretary-General told member states that they would ‘pledged to act if another Rwanda looms’, referring to the killing of an estimated 800,000 ethnic Tutsis from April to June 1994. The developing countries’ concerns were finally overcome. Furthermore, the Summit also indicated that the General Assembly should continue considering the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’. With regard to humanitarian issues, the Summit recognized the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons. In addition, new arrangements were approved for the Central Emergency Revolving Fund to ensure that relief arrives reliably and immediately when disasters happen.

Human Rights Council New arrangements for the Human Rights Commission possibly constituted the cornerstone of the reform efforts. In order to restore its credibility, the High-level Panel had proposed making membership of the 53-member Commission universal, including all 191 member states. The Secretary-General had proposed that the present Commission be replaced with a smaller standing Human Rights Council. Moreover, the Secretary-General also suggested that the Summit participants should decide whether they wanted the Council to be a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, or to upgrade the new Council to the status of a principal organ of the United Nations. In either case, the members of the Commission should be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. In the August draft of the Outcome Document presented by the President of the General Assembly, there were fairly elaborate provisions on the Human Rights Council, designated as a subsidiary organ under the General Assembly. These were, however, deleted from the Summit resolution. Instead, the Summit expressed a ‘resolve to create’ a Human Rights Council responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms (see Part II, Document 5, paragraphs 157–158). 54 Conference Report, ‘The UN: Adapting to the 21st Century, 3 to 5 April 2005’, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Canada, 2005.


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The President of the General Assembly was requested to conduct ‘open, transparent and inclusive negotiations to be completed as soon as possible during the sixtieth session, with the aim of establishing the mandate, modalities, functions, size, composition, membership, working methods and procedures of the Council’. In connection with the establishment of a new Human Rights Council, the Summit also pledged to strengthen the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights by doubling its regular budget resources over the next five years.

Rule of Law and Democracy As proposed by the High-level Panel, the Summit recognized that efforts to combat terrorism must comply with members’ obligations under international law, in particular human rights law. Although this issue was raised in the report of the High-level Panel, it was not taken up in the Secretary-General’s report. The Summit recommended that the Security Council improve the monitoring of the implementation and effects of sanctions. The Council was to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them again, and to develop a mechanism to address special economic problems arising from the application of sanctions. The Summit also reaffirmed democracy as a ‘universal value’, and welcomed the establishment of a Democracy Fund, which President George W. Bush had proposed to the General Assembly in September in 2004 and the Secretary-General supported. Entirely financed by voluntary contributions, the Fund was to provide assistance for projects that consolidate and strengthen democratic institutions and facilitate democratic governance in new or restored democracies. Finally, the Summit supported the establishment of a rule of law assistance unit within the Secretariat in order to strengthen the United Nations’ efforts to promote the rule of law, including technical assistance and capacity building.

Management The Secretary-General had presented his proposed management reforms in his report In Larger Freedom, released in March 2005. The report addressed some of the preliminary recommendations of the Volcker Inquiry into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme and of various United States initiatives. The Summit recognized the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General to improve management performance and transparency and reinforce ethical conduct. However, the report contained only a limited number of initiatives that were ready for approval and immediate implementation. The few submitted were questioned, such as the one-time staff buyout. Indeed, the United States considered the proposals by the Secretary-General to be too little, too late. 55 With the United States congressional actions in July 2005 and the release of the final Volcker report on 7 September 2005, pressure for substantial management changes increased. The United States entered the negotiations on the Summit agreement with two main priorities. First, new proposals were introduced to reinforce the accountability and oversight of the United Nations. The strengthening of OIOS in terms of resources, mandate and independence was considered urgent. Second, the United States and the European Union proposed to upgrade the managerial authority of the Secretary-General in setting 55

Joachim Müller, ‘Management Reform in the United Nations: Between Politics and Efficiency’, op. cit.

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priorities on spending and mandates, similar to a corporate chief executive officer. This included greater authority to hire, fire and transfer staff, a proposal partly inspired by mismanagement and corruption in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. Moreover, it was suggested that this authority could be entrusted to a new chief operating officer, as previously suggested by the Gingrich-Mitchell Task Force, while leaving political duties to the Secretary-General. The developing countries had agreed on strengthening audit arrangements, but on little else. Increasing the Secretary-General’s management authority and establishing the position of chief operating officer were specifically rejected. Also opposed was the proposal to establish an external expert team to work with the Secretary-General on the implementation of reform provisions and the convening by the President of the General Assembly of a group of United Nations Permanent Representatives to work with him on management and oversight issues. Such proposals were viewed as usurping the power of the General Assembly over major management decisions and enhancing the developed countries’ control of the Organization. Developing countries wanted to retain their traditional control over budget and personnel issues. Distrust had deepened since many developing countries believed that the Secretary-General’s office has been drawing too close to the United States in its effort to repair relations that had been damaged by the scandal-ridden United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. Due to the lack of agreement and the absence of concrete proposals ready for approval, the Summit requested a host of new studies to be carried out by the Secretariat based on which decisions could be taken by the General Assembly (see Part II, Document 5, paragraphs 161–165). The deadlines set for the preparatory work reflected the impatience with the lack of progress, with detailed reports being requested by the end of 2005, first quarter of 2006 and some by the end of the 60th session of the General Assembly in September 2006. The work assignment included the following: x An independent external evaluation of the audit and oversight arrangement of the United Nations system, including the specialized agencies; x Proposals on the creation of an independent oversight advisory committee; x Details on an ethics office and development of a system-wide code of ethics for all United Nations personnel; x Amendments to the United Nations budgetary, financial and human resource policies, regulations and rules to enable the efficient and effective conduct of its work; x Detailed proposal on a one-time staff buyout to improve personnel structure and quality, including an indication of the costs involved and mechanisms to ensure that it achieves its intended purpose; x Proposals on a comprehensive approach to assist victims of sexual exploitation. In addition, the Summit decided to have the General Assembly and other relevant organs review all mandates more than five years old during 2006. The Secretary-General was requested to facilitate this exercise with analysis and recommendations.


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2.9 FOLLOW-UP TO THE WORLD SUMMIT: CONTINUED AND NEW REFORM EFFORTS The Summit had turned out not to be a ‘once-in-a-generation opportunity’ to reform the United Nations. Contrary to the Secretary-General’s hopes, no grand bargain had emerged. Although he characterized the agreement as ‘a good start’, the Secretary-General noted that the Summit had ‘not achieved the sweeping and fundamental reform that I and many others believe is required’. 56 The ‘biggest failing’ of the Summit he considered to be the failure to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He urged continuous negotiations to address the growing risk of nuclear proliferation and catastrophic terrorism, noting that ‘weapons of mass destruction pose a grave danger to us all, particularly in a world threatened by terrorists with global ambitions and no inhibitions’. ‘Broadly speaking, we got much of what we wanted in the document’, United States Ambassador John Bolton told the House International Relations Committee on 28 September 2005, but ‘more importantly, succeeded in keeping out elements that directly conflicted with key United States policies and jeopardized our long-term interests’. 57 He argued that the necessary management reforms, in particular, had not been achieved and concluded, ‘This is not the end of the reform effort. It really is the beginning of a permanent reform effort that must be underway here at the United Nations’. 58 United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that the United States needed to bring a revolution of reform to the United Nations. Congressman Henry Hyde, Chairman of the International Relations Committee, noted the Outcome Document’s ‘lack of detail and definitive statements on critical areas such as oversight, accountability, management and budgeting do not inspire confidence’. 59 Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell stated that they were dismayed with the results of the World Summit and that the Outcome Document fell significantly short of the recommendations made by their task force. It did not give the Secretary-General additional executive management responsibility and was silent on the question of establishing a chief operating officer post and an independent internal audit board. Lack of progress was highlighted in particular with regard to the establishment of the Human Rights Council and the failure to address the threat from terrorist groups and potentially hostile regimes seeking weapons of mass destruction, which their task force considered to be the main security challenge facing the United States. Jamaica, representing the Group of 77 developing countries, expressed disappointment that the proposed declaration focused more heavily on the creation of new institutional structures and management reform than on a more expansive treatment of economic and trade issues.

56 United Nations document: ‘Address of the Secretary-General to the 2005 World Summit’, United Nations Press Release, 14 September 2005. 57 ‘U.S. Envoy Says United Nations Has Taken First Step in Reform’, USINFP.STATE.GOV, 28 September 2005. 58 Judy Aita, World Summit Concludes with Declaration of U.N. Goals, USINFO.STATE.GOV, 16 September 2005 59 ‘U.S. Envoy Says United Nations Has Taken First Step in Reform’, USINFO.STATE.GOV, 28 September 2005.

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Reforming the United Nations Organizing the Follow-Up Process to the World Summit

Due to the lack of agreement, the World Summit remained vague on many reform initiatives and concrete decisions were left to the subsequent negotiating process during the 60th session of the General Assembly. The President of the Assembly, Ambassador Jan Eliasson of Sweden, was in charge of co-ordinating the Assembly’s actions. This was done by entrusting a number of co-chairs with the necessary intergovernmental negotiations. Many of the reforms approved at the September Summit were still bogged down in the General Assembly, including the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council. With regard to the Peacebuilding Commission, the Summit had stipulated that the Commission should be in operation no later than 31 December 2005. Although agreement had been reached during the Summit, the Assembly still had to resolve a number of issues in order to establish the Peacebuilding. As for the Human Rights Council, the Summit had reached an agreement in principle only. Essential elements of the new body still needed to be negotiated by the Assembly. Other issues under negotiation were the reform of ECOSOC and the establishment of a convention on international terrorism, to be finalized by the end of 2006. The Summit had called on the Secretary-General to make recommendations to the General Assembly on a number of major management reforms. These included proposals on mandates, the budgetary, financial and human resources policies, regulations and rules, and the evaluation of system-wide oversight. The Secretary-General also provided further details on the independent oversight committee and the ethics office. In October 2005, shortly after the Summit, the Secretary-General had already issued a progress report on ‘Implementation of Decisions from the 2005 World Summit: Outcome for Action by the Secretary-General’. Much of the Summit follow-up was organized in accordance with four broad work streams or clusters: institutional innovations, oversight, administrative procedures and system-wide coherence. A principal task manager was put in charge of each work stream. To ensure a coherent response, the Deputy Secretary-General coordinated the overall exercise. In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Rajat Kumar Gupta, a Senior Partner and former Managing Director of McKinsey and Company, to help him move forward the reform agenda arising out of the World Summit. In this role, Gupta acted as a personal adviser to the Secretary-General on overall strategy, and participated in the Deputy Secretary-General’s post-summit co-ordination committee, helping to ensure that the overall management reform programme was in line with best global practices. The work streams on institutional innovations and oversight were considered particularly urgent. The World Summit had set deadlines for much of the follow-up work in the last quarter of 2006. That meant that the bulk of this work would need to be finalized and approved before the end of December 2005. Moreover, most of those items had immediate budgetary implications, in the amount of $80 million, for the 2006–2007 biennium. They included the implications of enhanced capacity for mediation and good offices; the strengthening of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; the stipulated doubling of the regular budget resources of Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights over the next five years; the new functions of ECOSOC; the establishment of a Peacebuilding Support Office; the establishment of the ethics office; and the provision of assistance for victims of sexual abuse. Moreover, there was an additional conference workload following the establishment of the new Human Rights Council. The work on administrative procedures and system-wide coherence was expected to take longer. A full report on the proposed changes in rules, regulations and mandates would only be ready for


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debate towards the end of the first quarter of 2006. The review of system-wide coherence and its implementation would take considerably longer still given the number of stakeholders to be consulted, and the implementation target was later in 2006. Give the range and scope of this set of reviews, extensive external consulting support was engaged.

Budget Crisis and Power Struggle In the first half of November 2005, the United States felt that the progress of the reforms was lagging, despite months of negotiations and meetings, due to the resistance of developing countries and inadequate efforts by the Secretariat. At that time, Paul Volcker noted in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on United Nations Reform that a ‘de facto alliance’ of member states demanding change and threatening to withhold their assessed contribution might be the only way to cut through the United Nations ‘culture of inaction’. The Summit had set the end of March 2006 as a deadline for the approval of a number of major reforms. The United States pressed for a number of major decisions by 31 December 2005. The Secretariat acknowledged that not all management and other reform proposals would be ready before February 2006. One of the most timeconsuming projects involved a review of all programmes more than five years old, as mandated by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In order to press for faster action, the United States Ambassador John Bolton suggested that talks on the 2006–2007 budget could be postponed unless significant progress were made by the end of the 2005. Specifically, progress was demanded in the establishment of an ethics office, an independent oversight advisory committee, stronger whistleblower protection, the new Human Rights Council and the new Peacebuilding Commission. The United Nations budget is approved on a biennial basis, usually by consensus, and at the end of 2005 a decision was expected from the General Assembly on the 2006–2007 regular budget of $3.8 billion. It was suggested that the General Assembly consider the approval of a three- or four-month interim budget by December 31, instead of approving the full two-year budget. The interim budget would keep the pressure on and force the Secretariat and member states to focus on the importance of management reform. This would also give member states more time to act on a comprehensive reform package before committing to a biennial budget. Moreover, the Ambassador indicated that lack of progress on reforms could prompt the United States to seek an alternative to the United Nations for solving international problems in future. This announcement caused havoc in the United Nations. The Secretary-General responded that any delay in approving the biennial budget would create a serious financial crisis. The United Nations would have to cut services, possibly delay salary payments and borrow from peacekeeping operations. Initially, the United States proposal received little support from the European Union, Japan, Canada or Australia. Several key members of the Group of 77, including Egypt, India and Jamaica, objected to any link between the new budget and management reform. A compromise was finally reached in December 2005. While authorizing the full amount of the biennial budget, the General Assembly approved by consensus an unprecedented spending cap of $950 million for the first six months of 2006. Release of the remaining budget balance was made contingent upon the fulfilment of management reforms by June 2006. The compromise averted a financial crisis for the time being. The United States had obtained something it had been striving for for the last three months, namely a clear linkage between management reform and the United Nations budget process.


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The simmering conflict between the United States and the developing countries resulting from the budget crisis came out in the open again in February 2006. OIOS had issued a damning audit report on peacekeeping procurement. It was noted that the procurement function lacked adequate controls, managerial supervision and strategic guidance, thus exposing the United Nations to serious risk of financial loss. OIOS also found indications of irregularities and conflict of interest with vendors that it said required urgent further investigation. The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly deals with management and budget issues. In this specific case, the United States Ambassador pressed for a public review by the Security Council on procurement fraud, as well as sexual abuse by peacekeepers. Although all 15 Council members agreed on the seriousness of the issue and the need for reform, there was disagreement on jurisdictional and procedural grounds. The NonAligned Movement formally protested that the Security Council was encroaching on issues that clearly fell within the functions and powers of the General Assembly. The United States Ambassador disagreed, saying the Security Council authorized peacekeeping operations and had a right to hold meetings on the matter, as did the General Assembly. Henry Hyde, the Republican Chairman of the United States House International Relations Committee, and Tom Lantos, a top Democrat, accused the Non-Aligned Movement of blocking efforts to clean up the United Nations and warned that they would be held accountable. The situation escalated further when the OIOS internal audit report on procurement fraud was made available to the media, bypassing the General Assembly. Many developing countries expressed outrage over what they saw as a decline in the power and influence of the General Assembly and a power grab by the Security Council, led by the United States.

Peacebuilding Commission The World Summit had already established the Peacebuilding Commission in its Outcome Document, to propose integrated strategies for stabilization, economic recovery and development, and making recommendations for improving the co-ordination of the United Nations system in those efforts. Decisions on the composition, modalities and functioning of the Commission were left to subsequent negotiations at the Assembly. Considerable debate arose over the composition of the Commission and whether it would report to the Security Council or the General Assembly, where developing countries play a larger role. Others believed that the Commission should report directly to ECOSOC, which is responsible for development issues. On 20 December 2005, the General Assembly, acting concurrently with the Security Council, reached agreement. The Commission was established as the first-ever intergovernmental advisory body to the General Assembly, the Security Council and ECOSOC. The Assembly was to hold one debate each year on the Commission’s work. All three organs would be able to place countries on the Commission’s agenda according to their individual mandates. Furthermore, individual countries on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict would be able to seek the Commission’s advice. The Commission, acting only by consensus, consists of 31 members, with seven Security Council members, including permanent members, selected by the Council; seven members of ECOSOC elected from regional groups; five top contributors to United Nations budgets, funds, programmes and agencies; and five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions. The General Assembly would elect seven additional members,


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with special consideration for states that have experienced post-conflict recovery. The Commission consisted of an Organizational Committee, performing an executive function and responsible for establishing country-specific sub-groups in which most of the work would be conducted. The Assembly also established a support office within the Secretariat to provide the Commission with the information and analysis it would need to co-ordinate the world body’s peacebuilding efforts. The Secretary-General noted that the establishment of the Commission was a historic development and the utmost care should be exercised in establishing country-specific groups. The United States supported the establishment of the Commission. The Commission’s main purpose was supposed to be to provide advice at the request of the Security Council. There was, however, considerable criticism of the new arrangement. Some developing countries expressed misgivings with regard to the central and authoritative role of the Security Council in addressing post-conflict peacebuilding vis-àvis the General Assembly and ECOSOC. The involvement of the Security Council was seen as an attempt to ensure permanent control over the new Commission by the rich and powerful countries. This was perceived as likely to discourage countries from seeking the Commission’s advice directly. The first meeting of the Commission was considerably delayed due to further lack of agreement on the membership issue. As noted above, ECOSOC was to elect seven members from the five regional groups, including the Asian Group, the African Group, the Latin American and Caribbean Group, the East European Group and the group that comprises Western European and Other States. Developing countries argued that the Western regional group should not be nominated by ECOSOC because it would already be represented either as members of the Security Council or as contributors to the United Nations budget. As a result, ECOSOC failed to come up with its seven candidates and until and unless all 31 members are aboard, the new body is unable to meet.

The New Human Rights Council On 15 March 2006, the General Assembly established the new Human Rights Council, to replace the commission on Human Rights, following contentious, months-long negotiations. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International also supported the plan. But because some developing countries still suspected Western nations of using the human rights issue to intervene in their internal affairs, action had been delayed. The President of the General Assembly, Ambassador Eliasson, wanted to achieve consensus on the new Council. He could put the text up to a vote, but that would also allow countries to introduce amendments that would fundamentally change the shape of the Council. Open diplomatic disagreement between the United States and a majority of member states threatened to sink proposals to create a new Human Rights Council. Independent human rights groups were urging the United States to accept the compromise rather than demand a General Assembly vote, which they feared could unravel five months of negotiations. Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell called on the United States not to agree with the compromise proposal and to press for United States demands for a strong Council in accordance with the principles formulated by their task force. The decision was reached by a vote of 170 in favour to 4 against (Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau, United States), with 3 abstentions (Belarus, Iran, Venezuela). The United States objected that the new Council did not do enough to exclude some of the world’s worst human rights abusers from membership. United States Ambassador John Bolton

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pledged that the United States would work co-operatively with other United Nations member states to make the Council as effective as possible. Although voting in favour, the developing countries were not enthusiastic and feared that the new Council might be yet another way for wealthier and more powerful nations to intrude in their affairs. This was the case in particular for Egypt and Pakistan. With the exception of the United States, support came mainly from the developed countries, which considered the new Council a good outcome of the negotiations with developing countries. The Assembly President called the decision on the new Council a decisive moment not only for human rights, but also for the standing of the United Nations as a whole. The new Council represented a major change as compared to the old Commission. It has 47 members individually elected by an absolute majority of 96 votes of the General Assembly’s 191 members. (The Commission had a membership of 53 elected by ECOSOC through a majority of those present and voting.) Membership is based on equitable geographic distribution including 13 seats for the African Group, 13 for the Asian Group, 6 for the Eastern European Group, 8 for the Latin American and Caribbean Group and 7 for the Western European and Other States Group. The members serve for a period of three years and are not eligible for immediate re-election after two consecutive terms. When electing members, the Assembly is asked to take into account the candidates’ contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights. Upon election, new members must commit themselves to co-operating with the Council and to upholding the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights. Candidates to the Council must also submit voluntary pledges and commitments with regard to the promotion and protection of human rights. These expectations did not exist for the Commission on Human Rights. Members of the Council will undergo its new universal review mechanism during their term of membership. The General Assembly has the right to suspend the rights and privileges of any Council member that it decides has persistently committed gross and systematic violations of human rights during its term of membership. This suspension process would require a two-thirds majority vote by the General Assembly. No process for suspension existed for the Commission. The Human Rights Council is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and is therefore directly accountable to the full membership of the United Nations. The Commission was a subsidiary body of ECOSOC. The Council will hold no fewer than three sessions per year for a total period of no less than ten weeks and will be able to convene to deal with urgent situations. The Commission met in one annual six-week session. The United States explained its No vote primarily because of the failure to demand a two-thirds majority of the Assembly to be eligible for membership. Initially, the SecretaryGeneral made the same recommendation. With a requirement for a two-thirds majority, one could more easily block human rights violators from being elected to the Council. In turn, one could sidestep the controversial issue of establishing standards for membership, which would be an alternative means of blocking such abusers. The idea of setting such standards had not received broad support even among the democracies. Moreover, the United States would have preferred a smaller Council of 20 members, but with no more than 30 members. Initially, it had suggested that the five permanent members of the Security Council should be guaranteed seats on the Human Rights Council. Whereas membership to the Council is open to all member states of the United Nations, the United States had suggested that any country under Security Council sanctions for human rights violations or terrorism should be excluded. The new Human Rights Council convened for


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the first time on 19 June 2006. The United States did not apply for membership and was therefore not represented in the new Council.

The Progress of the Reforms By late 2005 and early 2006, a number of important reforms had been put in place. By October 2005, the Democracy Fund had received pledges of $42.2 million and a first meeting of its Advisory Board was held in November 2005. The issue of better coordination of operational activities across the specialized agencies was discussed during the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Co-ordination on 28 and 29 October 2005. At the end of November 2005, the Secretariat had initiated the preparation of the new support offices in anticipation of a decision by the Assembly to establish the Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council. In December 2005, the Secretary-General proposed to the General Assembly the terms of reference for a comprehensive review of governance and oversight arrangements. The comprehensive review of governance and oversight arrangement, including an independent external evaluation of the auditing and oversight system for the United Nations and the specialized agencies, was to determine the adequate funding level of OIOS, the scope and nature of its activities, the roles and responsibilities of management and additional measures for operational independence of oversight. In December 2005, the General Assembly had already approved the establishment of an additional 39 positions to increase OIOS’s capacity. The review was to be carried out primarily by an external company. The Secretary-General appointed a steering committee of external public administration experts to co-ordinate and supervise the development and implementation of the entire project. The steering committee was assisted in its role by the external company that undertook the technical research and the drafting of the evaluation. The results of the external review would be forward to the General Assembly at its resumed session in June 2006. In December 2005, the Secretary-General also proposed the establishment of an Independent Audit Advisory Committee, including provisional terms of reference for the Committee, its composition, and the selection process and the qualification of experts. The Committee was to assist the Secretary-General and the General Assembly in better exercising their governance responsibilities, in particular to ensure that the United Nations audit process operates efficiently and effectively. It was proposed that the Committee should include five to seven members, all of whom are independent of the United Nations Secretariat and the governments of member states. Candidates will be nominated by the Secretary-General and approved by the General Assembly. All of the members are to have recent and relevant financial experience. Memberships are to reflect a broad geographical distribution and balance of representation with public- and private-sector experience. The Committee is to meet at least four times per year. The terms of reference will be reviewed within the context of the comprehensive review of governance and oversight arrangement. The first candidates for the Committee are to be nominated by the Secretary-General for approval by the General Assembly after the completion of the review. On 1 January 2006, the Secretary-General established an Ethics Office to ensure that all staff members observe and perform their functions consistently with the highest standards of integrity by fostering a culture of ethics, transparency and accountability. The Ethics Office is to administer the Organization’s financial disclosure programme, and to protect staff against retaliation for reporting misconduct and for co-operating with duly


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authorized audits or investigations. The Ethics Office started to take on its role of administering the whistleblower protection and financial disclosure policies and providing an ethics advisory and standard-setting capacity within the United Nations. The office reports directly to the Secretary-General. It must ensure that staff members are not subjected to reprisals because of any information they give it. The new whistleblower protection policy was approved on 19 December 2005, following many months of effort and wide-ranging consultations with staff and several outside expert bodies. The new financial disclosure policy and conflict of interest rules required of senior officials had been approved in November 2005. The General Assembly subsequently approved the expansion of the policy’s coverage to include Director-level staff; in addition, those with procurement and other fiduciary responsibilities were required to comply irrespective of level. Other efforts include the incorporation of ethics issues into the staff training programme, the introduction of mandatory training programmes on protection against harassment in the workplace, measures to reinforce the zero-tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse, and the approval of an anti-fraud and corruption policy, consolidating a series of staff rules and supporting instructions on these matters. In February 2006, the Secretary-General established a High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence in Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Environment. The Outcome Document had called upon him to commission work on how to improve coherence across the United Nations system. The High-level Panel comprises 15 members 60 and was asked to explore how the United Nations can shape a smootherrunning machine to carry out its functions worldwide, prepare the groundwork for a fundamental restructuring of the Organization’s operational work, and support member states’ efforts to achieve the MDGs in the coming years. The work of the Panel is supported by a small secretariat based in New York. The High-level Panel is to present its work for consideration by the General Assembly in September 2006. The recommendations could be implemented in 2007. This Panel was the highest of its kind ever constituted in the history of the United Nations, and it was seen as likely to contribute to a decisive breakthrough in realigning and revitalizing the United Nations in these crucial areas of work. On 30 March 2006, the Secretary-General presented his analysis and recommendations on how to facilitate the review of mandates. 61 The Summit had instructed the General Assembly to review all mandates more than five years old originating from resolutions of intergovernmental organs and requested the SecretaryGeneral to facilitate this with analysis and recommendations. The Secretary-General stated that the mandate-generating cycle whereby mandates are adopted, funded and implemented, and then considered for continuation, change or elimination, should be reexamined. The current system does not allow an intergovernmental organ, once it has adopted a resolution, to adequately analyse the effectiveness of its mandates and how they contribute to the Organization’s overall priorities as a basis for subsequent decisionmaking. This critical gap has contributed to, or exacerbated, certain problems. For one thing, burdensome reporting requirements and the large number of reports obscure their 60

Members of the Panel: Shaukat Aziz, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Luísa Dias Diogo, Prime Minister of Mozambique, and Jens Stoltenberg, Prime Minister of Norway, will serve as co-chairs. Other noted members of the panel include Gordon Brown, the United Kingdom’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Ricardo Lagos Escobar, President of the Republic of Chile; and Benjamin W. Mkapa, the former president of the United Republic of Tanzania. 61 United Nations document: Secretary-General, Mandating and Delivering: Analysis and Recommendations to Facilitate the Review of Mandates, A/60/733, 30 March 2006.


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quality and impact, overwhelming member states and overburdening the Secretariat. In 2005, almost 1,200 reports and policy documents were provided to member states. In addition, the Secretariat was required to provide hundreds of detailed briefings, often for deliberations on the same issue by different intergovernmental bodies. Sometimes the request for reports reflected a political compromise rather than a genuine need for information to illuminate a particular issue. The continuous adoption of new mandates year after year on the same issues by the General Assembly, ECOSOC and the Security Council results in overlapping, confusing, redundant and wasteful mandates. The fundamental challenge was the adoption of hundreds of mandates, which must be implemented with limited resources that do not keep pace. To address his problem, the Secretary-General proposed improving member states’ custodianship of their mandates through the use of better tools and interaction with the Secretariat. This was to be done by rationalizing documentation architecture through improved and consolidated reporting. Other recommendations included the improvement of mandate implementation through strategic evaluation. This would require the principal organ from which a mandate originated to obtain information on its effectiveness and an understanding of how it fits into the Organization’s overall programme of work in order to make decisions about future mandates. Finally, it was proposed that member states should provide strategic direction and state the objectives that they wish a mandate to achieve. In parallel with the United Nations’ efforts to follow through with the reform pledges from the World Summit, the members of the United States Congress revisited certain legislation on United Nations reform. The House had previously passed the Hyde bill, which would automatically withhold half of the United States’ contribution starting in 2007 if the United Nations did not make some 40 reforms, including greater financial transparency, independent oversight and the creation of a new human rights body. Representative Tom Lantos had introduced a similar bill that would grant the Secretary of State the discretion to withhold contributions if changes were not made. In the Senate, Richard Lugar, the Indiana Republican who chaired the Foreign Relations Committee, was known to be lukewarm to the Hyde bill. In March 2006, Henry Hyde and Tom Lantos agreed on a compromise plan, which would give the United States Secretary of State the final say on withholding, which would not be automatic. The Hyde/Lantos compromise provided some additional flexibility for dealing with the United Nations reform. If the United States administration was satisfied with the United Nations’ progress on reform, this flexibility could be instrumental in avoiding confrontation with other member states or major financial crises.

Continued Failure to Reform the Security Council After the Group of 4 had failed to gain its point before the September Summit, Japan distanced itself and did not join Germany, India and Brazil in a new bid for a permanent seat on an expanded Security Council. The United States had warned Japan that it would not support the Group of 4 proposal and that this association would compromise Japan’s aspirations. The three members resubmitted to the General Assembly a slightly updated draft of their initial proposal to expand the council from 15 to 26 seats, with increased representation for Africa, Asia and Latin America. Japan questioned the usefulness of this move when the African Union still had no candidate for a permanent seat and support for the proposal remained far short of the two-thirds majority that was needed. Instead, Japan decided to negotiate with the United States to come up with a new proposal.

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In late November 2005, the United States Ambassador told the General Assembly that the United States would oppose an effort to expand the Security Council beyond 20 members, allowing for two or three permanent, and two or three non-permanent members. The United States would insist that states meet certain criteria, including size of economy and population, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping operations, commitment to democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the United Nations, nonproliferation and counter-terrorism records, and equitable geographic balance. These criteria would appear to boost Japan’s candidacy. In January 2006, Japan developed a new proposal on Security Council reform. Security Council membership was to be expanded from the current 15 to 21. Of the six new seats, two each would go to Asia and Africa, and one each to Latin America and Europe. In this concept, the status of new permanent members would be given to countries that won the support of at least two-thirds of the United Nations membership, or 128 countries. The new permanent member would have no veto right. Other elected candidates would become semi-permanent members with renewable long-term membership. The current non-permanent membership was limited to two years and was non-renewable. In early February, the success of Japan’s campaign to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations was in doubt. China was adamantly opposed and the United States indicated that it could not support Japan’s proposal. Ambassador John Bolton stated that tackling management reform, rather than the restructuring the Security Council, should be the priority. By the end of March 2006, Japan gave up its plan to submit a new resolution on Security Council reform, having been unable to gain sufficient support from other member states. Japan had previously made clear that it would try to reduce its contributions to the United Nations regular budget if it failed to gain a permanent seat. In early October 2005, Japan indicated plans to cut its annual contribution from 19.5 per cent of the total assessment by as much as 5 percentage points for approval in June 2006 when the new table of assessment for 2007–2009 would be determined. By the end of March 2006, Japan put forward concrete plans for a new payment schedule by proposing a minimum level of contributions for the five permanent members of the Security Council of 3 to 5 per cent to the United Nations regular budget. Of the permanent Security Council members, the United States paid 22.0 per cent, Britain 6.1 per cent, France 6 per cent, China 2.1 per cent and Russia 1.1 per cent. As a result, the proposed payment plan would increase China’s and Russia’s payments, while those paid by the United States, Japan and the major European countries would decrease slightly. In addition, the United States put forward a plan for a new payment schedule that would alter the way contributions to the United Nations are calculated. Member states payments are calculated on the basis of the country’s GNP. The United States argued that this antiquated system did not correctly evaluate the strength and size of economies. A better method of determining a nation’s ability to pay, in the judgement of contemporary economists, is purchasing power parity. This calculation would move China’s current position of seventh in the world to second, Russia’s from sixteenth to tenth and India’s from twelfth to fourth according to International Monetary Fund figures. The proposal ran into fierce opposition from China, Russia, India and some developing countries. No agreement was reached by end of April as initially anticipated and the issue was deferred for consideration in autumn 2006.


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New Proposals by the Secretary-General On 7 March 2006, the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly his 33-page report on further management changes in the Secretariat entitled ‘Investing in the United Nations: For a Stronger Organization Worldwide’ (see Part II, Document 6). This proposal came when the Organization was under pressure to follow through with the reform initiatives launched during the World Summit and the recent findings of fraud in the procurement office. The Secretary-General stated that he had no hesitation in saying that, after successive efforts at reform, the Organization was more efficient and effective than it had been 10 years before. Those reforms had addressed an organization whose main function was to service conferences and meetings of member states and whose staff worked mainly at Headquarters. The report emphasized the dramatic expansion of the United Nations in operational activities in human rights, development and peacekeeping operations. Most notable had been a fourfold increase in peacekeeping. Such a radically expanded range of activities calls for a radical overhaul of the Secretariat, its rules, structure, systems and culture. After decades of piecemeal reform, there was a need for significant retooling and investment – a thorough strategic refit. This included reversing the years of underinvesting in people, systems and information technology to address operational deficiencies. The report contains 23 proposals on how to enable the Secretary-General to carry out his managerial responsibilities effectively. These proposals addressed investing in people, leadership, information and communication technology, new ways of delivering services, budget and finance, governance and change. The program requires additional funding of $510 million, some $120 million to upgrade the information and communication system under a new post of Assistant Secretary General for Technology, $280 million to provide better pay and benefits to staff in the field, $100 million to pay for buyouts for 1,000 people and $10 million to improve recruitment and training. A comparable amount of savings was expected. The report starts with recommendations (proposals 1 to 4) on human resource management (see Part II, Document 6, paragraphs 26–31). Recruitment was to become more proactive, targeted and faster. Staff management was to be revamped to bring conditions for field-based personnel up to par with those at other United Nations agencies. Mobility was to become a condition of service and a prerequisite for promotion. Reform of human resource management had been on the agenda for many years. In addition, 2,500 existing short-term peacekeeping positions were to be converted into a new flexible, mobile corps of dedicated specialists who can be deployed rapidly in urgent peacekeeping and special political missions. Proposals 5 to 7 concern the further delegation of the Secretary-General’s authority and accountability (see Part II, Document 6, paragraphs 32–46). This should result in a significant reduction in the number of entities reporting directly to him; currently there are 25. Rather than proposing the establishment of a new post of chief operating officer, as recommended by Paul Volcker, it was suggested that the function of Deputy SecretaryGeneral be redefined to cover responsibility for the management and overall direction of the Secretariat. The Secretary-General recognized the need for investment in information and communication technology (proposals 8 to 10) to replace outdated systems and move towards system integration (see Part II, Document 6, paragraphs 47–56). To oversee the creation and implementation of an effective information management strategy, the post of

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Chief Information Technology Officer should be created, at the Assistant SecretaryGeneral level. Some key proposals (proposals 11 to 15) covered more aggressively outsourcing and relocating administrative functions away from the Organization’s high-cost centres (see Part II, Document 6, paragraphs 57–69). Outsourcing some of the administrative tasks implied staff reductions at the headquarters in New York, Geneva and Vienna. Costbenefit analyses on this issue were to be done in the next 12 months. Translation and printing are two functions that lend themselves to moved placed offshore and the World Bank had already relocated accounting functions to India. This should be supported by improved and tightened procedures for procurement of goods and services, which was expected to realize $400 million through increased transparency. With regard to budget and finance (proposals 16 to 18), the Secretary-General suggested shortening the cycle for reviewing and adopting the budget and consolidating budget appropriation from 35 sections into 13 parts (see Part II, Document 6, paragraphs 71–79). The Secretary-General was to be given expanded authority to redeploy posts as necessary and to use savings from vacant posts. The peacekeeping accounts should be consolidated and trust fund management streamlined; the level of the working capital fund should be increased. The Organization’s financial processes should be re-engineered to allow significant delegation of authority within a framework of accountability. The budget and planning process should be explicitly linked to results and managerial performance, as part of a more rigorous monitoring and evaluation framework. On the issue of governance (proposals 19 to 21), the Secretary-General proposed to improve the reporting mechanism by developing a single, comprehensive annual report (see Part II, Document 6, paragraph 85). He suggested that member states should reconsider the need for the Committee on Programme and Co-ordination, given the extensive overlap with the work of the Fifth Committee and ACABQ. He also proposed to examine ways to allow strategic discussion on administrative matters to take place in meetings of manageable size by allocating work to selected working groups of limited membership or to an elected executive committee. Along the same lines, detailed involvement, or micro-management, should be avoided. Finally, in order to drive and implement the overall process of management reform (proposals 22 and 23), he proposed establishing a dedicated change management office (see Part II, Document 6, paragraphs 91–92). Moreover, the reform process was to be underpinned by a staff buyout to allow for a reinvigoration of the United Nations workforce. The Secretary-General’s report received a critical review from ACABQ, which noted that many of the recommended reform initiatives had their genesis in past proposals, some of which were still in the process of implementation. In other cases, the Secretary-General could proceed with seven proposals without any intergovernmental review or approval required. This was true of the proposals on expanded functions for the Deputy SecretaryGeneral (proposals 5 to 7) and on new ways of delivering services and the strengthening of procurement (proposals 11 to 15). With regard to the former and other related leadership issues, the Committee recommended that the proposals be further developed for the consideration of the next Secretary-General. The rationale for proposals in the area of budget and finance (proposals 16 to 18) was questioned, since the current process was considered to work well. As for the proposed buyout plan, the Committee again requested that the presentation of the proposals should include relevant experience in the United Nations system as well as a set of criteria for potential recipients of the buyout. Such a plan had initially been requested by the Summit for the first quarter of 2006. Finally, the


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ACABQ asked the Secretary-General to prepare a detailed report by May 2006 that would tie together the interrelated issues and incorporate all additional reports now contemplated. These proposals met with resistance from United Nations staff. The Staff Union passed a vote of ‘no confidence’ in the Secretary-General. Employees at the United Nations headquarters in New York were up in arms over proposals to hand over certain jobs and services to private businesses. Member states, however, were divided in their assessment, which reflected some of the bitterness between developed and developing countries still remaining from the negotiations in late 2005 on the six-month funding cap. The European Union welcomed the report as a bold and decisive step for the future of the United Nations and embraced the streamlining effort. Likewise, United States Ambassador John Bolton welcomed the proposals and called for their approval and stated, ‘We think the Secretary-General’s call for radical overhaul of the Secretariat is the right objective’. The Group of 77, led by South Africa, however, felt that the reforms were being forced on the United Nations in an effort to concentrate more power in the Secretariat and dilute the influence of developing countries. With regard to the governance proposal, the Group of 77 and others cautioned against proposals to establish new structures, which was seen as an attempt to transfer functions from the General Assembly to a small group of powerful countries. On 28 April 2006, the Group of 77, a coalition of 123 developing countries, put forward a draft resolution that essentially rejected the Secretary-General’s proposals. The Group stressed that setting the United Nations’ priorities was the prerogative of member states and reaffirmed the Assembly’s role in carrying out a thorough analysis and approval of human and financial resources and policies. The move broke a decades-long tradition not to seek a vote on administrative matters, but to taken decisions by consensus in order to ensure support by the main contributors. Despite attempts by the Secretary-General to address the concerns of developing countries by withdrawing the most contentious proposals involving redistribution of authority from the General Assembly to the Secretary-General, the resolution was brought to a vote. On 8 May 2006, the General Assembly approved the resolution 60/260 with 121 in favour, mainly developing countries but also China and the Russian Federation, to 50 against, including the United States, the members of the European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Switzerland and Turkey, with three abstentions. United States Ambassador John Bolton stated, ‘Proponents of the resolution will realize they won a pyrrhic victory’. Japan’s Ambassador, Kenzo Oshima, likewise commented, ‘It had not been a very positive development. It had been a rather sad day’. The Secretary-General deeply regretted that no consensus was reached but said he would ‘begin the process of seeking mutually agreed ways to pursue this agenda’. Concern was expressed that the approval of the resolution may trigger the United States, Japan and some of the larger contributors to reduce or suspend the payment of assessed dues. Mistrust was at an all-time high at the United Nations according to a coalition of 42 non-governmental organizations, including Oxfam America, CARE-USA, Refugees International, Citizens for Global Solutions and the United Nations Association of the USA. The coalition had written to United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in June 2006 urging the United States ‘to eschew brinksmanship’ and ‘to initiate diplomatic efforts to resolve differences so that the United Nations can continue its life-saving work’.

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Reforming the United Nations 2.10 CONCLUDING COMMENTS: INCREMENTAL STEPS TOWARDS LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS

A fundamental assessment of the United Nations’ operations was initiated by the Secretary-General following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the failure of the Security Council to either endorse or prevent military action in Iraq. At the centre of this assessment were concepts such as the nature of new threats, the right of self-defence, the legitimacy of preventive and pre-emptive action, the response to terrorism and the effectiveness of the Security Council. In the midst of this exercise, questions of integrity, ethics and management competence were raised in connection with the investigation of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, as well as apparent shortcomings in the human rights machinery and in peacekeeping operations. At the same time, demands for the Organization’s services were increasing. The Organization’s budget was at a record level of $18.5 billion during 2004–2005, double what it had been in 1996–1997. Budget growth was particular strong for peacekeeping operations, which account for half of total activities and employ approximately 80,000 staff members. The new reform effort brought together new concepts and proposals through the work of expert groups, in particular the ‘High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ and the UN Millennium Project. The Security Council’s deliberations on Iraq had underlined the importance of this United Nations body and re-energized initiatives for its expansion, led by Japan, Germany, India and Brazil, which hoped to gain permanent seats. The investigation of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme by the Volcker Commission and congressional initiatives in the United States generated a host of new proposals in the areas of oversight, accountability and management. The SecretaryGeneral’s reform proposals were presented as a global bargain linking security, human rights and development issues. Submitted to the World Summit for approval, the report was presented as package deal. In an effort to reach consensus, the initial proposals were watered down, as in the case of the Peacebuilding Commission; in other cases, no proposals were advanced because no consensus was apparent, as in the case of the Security Council reform. The Summit was significant and proved able to reach agreement on important new directions to strengthen the United Nations and multilateralism. Possibly the most important, albeit mainly symbolic, outcome of the World Summit was to recognize an international ‘responsibility to protect’ populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Following general endorsement by the Summit, member states established the Human Rights Council to replace the Commission on Human Rights on 15 March 2006, although the United States was not among the members that approved it. The Peacebuilding Commission came into being on 20 December 2005 to assist countries in the process of transition from war to peace. While the new body was advisory only and had a limited mandate power, it marked a shift in United Nations practice. The grand bargain, however, was not achieved as initially intended. In a number of areas, little or no progress was realized; in others, long-term reform efforts resulted in failure. Discussions on the right to self-defence and the pre-emptive and preventive use of force did not result in the approval of new concepts and corresponding Charter amendments. With regard to sustainable development, the Summit struggled to reaffirm, let alone advance, fundamental agreements that had been reached earlier, such as the commitment to achieve the MDGs. Specifically, many countries and non-governmental organizations were disappointed that the Summit did not reach agreement on a stronger


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commitment to achieving the previous established goal for developed countries to provide 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA. The World Summit failed to agree on a definition of terrorism that would open the way to negotiating a global convention against terrorism. No progress was achieved in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, which represent a formidable threat in the hands of terrorists. The Summit also failed to agree on a reform of the Security Council. The failure followed in the wake of a negotiation process that had initially been launched in 1987 and represented a deep disappointment for members that had hoped to get a permanent seat. Finally, little progress was achieved in the area of management reform. Fundamental disagreements resulted in further polarization of the membership after the Summit. The Secretary-General was called upon to initiate and facilitate reform processes, which are in the realm of member states and require their close involvement and approval. Those issues touch on national sensitivities, and diplomatic negotiations often proceed cautiously. Such a prudent approach was applied to management reform as well. Past and recent initiatives have been modest and late, being imposed rather than developed from the inside. This is true in particular of oversight, accountability and human resource management. In many cases, reform initiatives are limited to the announcement of the requirement for further studies and the need to formulate detailed implementation modalities. Clearly, proactive leadership of management reform is essential. Even when approved, management reforms are often watered down when confronted with the barrier of implementation. This is a consequence, in particular, of the fragmentation of the United Nations into a multitude of semi-independent programmes and funds. It also stems from the United Nations system, with its network of independent specialized agencies. Reconciling the different priorities and national interests of 191 member countries is, however, the basic challenge for United Nations reform. The support for United Nations reforms differs from one country or region to another. Proposals for fundamental reform in the areas of security, human rights and management were made primarily by the United States. The developed countries of the North, in particular Japan and a number of European countries have, in general, reacted positively to such initiatives. The developing countries of the South, however, have adopted a more cautious and reserved approach. Agreement on reforms was coupled with demands for concessions in the area of development, trade and debt relief – the logic of the proposed grand bargain. Some, however, saw reform as an attempt to facilitate intervention by the powerful countries in their national sovereign domain. In parallel, weakening the position of the developing counties within the United Nations was seen as the driving force of institutional reform, which would limit the role of the General Assembly and strengthen the 15-member Security Council, as well as increasing the prerogatives of the Secretary-General. Together, these measures were perceived by developing countries as constituting a loss of policy space at home and in the United Nations. In response, their efforts to preserve the status quo were seen by other nations as blocking progress or negativism. The condition for reaching agreement on reform, however, is consensus and the price to pay is the adjustment of proposals to the lowest common denominator. To do otherwise may require the extraordinary circumstances of a catalytic event, such as the end of the Cold War, which allowed for the revitalization of the United Nations in the early 1990s. It might also require a group of visionary leaders who are prepared to enter into the necessary compromises. In the absence of those factors, for all the logic and promise of a grand bargain, such as the World Summit attempted to reach, it is destined to fail, and reform in the United Nations will remain a cumbersome and lengthy step-by-step process.

PART II DOCUMENTS ____________________________________________________________________

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II.1

A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004 1

CONTENTS Chapter

Paragraphs Page

SYNOPSIS ..................................................................................................................

104

PART ONE: TOWARDS A NEW SECURITY CONSENSUS ..................................

109

I.

DIFFERENT WORLDS: 1945 AND 2005 ....................................

1–16

110

II.

THE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTIVE SECURITY ....................................................................................

17–43

114

A.

Threats without boundaries ....................................................

17–23

114

B.

The limits of self-protection ...................................................

24–28

116

C.

Sovereignty and responsibility ...............................................

29–30

116

D.

Elements of a credible collective security system ..................

31–43

117

1.

Effectiveness..................................................................

32–36

117

2.

Efficiency.......................................................................

37–39

118

3.

Equity.............................................................................

40–43

118

1

United Nations document: Secretary-General, Note of the Secretary-General, A/59/565, 2 December 2004.

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Chapter

Paragraphs Page

PART TWO: COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF PREVENTION............................................................................................................. III.

IV.

V.

120

POVERTY, INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION........................................

44–73

121

A.

The threats we face.................................................................

44–58

121

B.

Meeting the challenge of prevention ......................................

59–73

123

1.

More resources and action..............................................

59–65

123

2.

New initiatives................................................................

66–73

125

CONFLICT BETWEEN AND WITHIN STATES........................

74–106

126

A.

The threat of inter-State conflict ...........................................

74–83

126

B.

The threat of internal conflict.................................................

84–88

128

C.

Meeting the challenge of prevention ......................................

89–106

129

1.

Better international regulatory frameworks and norms..

89–97

129

2.

Better information and analysis .....................................

98–99

131

3.

Preventive diplomacy and mediation............................. 100–103

132

4.

Preventive deployment .................................................. 104–106

133

NUCLEAR, RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ........................................................... 107–144

133

A.

The threats we face................................................................. 107–116

133

1.

Nuclear weapons............................................................ 107–112

133

2.

Radiological weapons ....................................................

134

3.

Chemical and biological weapons ................................. 114–116

134

Meeting the challenge of prevention ...................................... 117–144

135

1.

135

B.

113

Better strategies to reduce demand.................................. 118–126

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Paragraphs Pages 2.

Better strategies to reduce supply .................................. 127–138

137

3.

Better enforcement capability........................................ 139–141

139

4.

Better public health defences......................................... 142–144

139

TERRORISM ................................................................................. 145–164

140

A.

The threat we face .................................................................. 145–146

140

B.

Meeting the challenge of prevention...................................... 147–164

141

1.

A comprehensive strategy.............................................. 147–148

141

2.

Better counter-terrorism instruments ............................. 149–153

142

3.

Assisting States in confronting terrorism ....................... 154–156

143

4.

Defining terrorism.......................................................... 157–164

143

VII. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME................................. 165–177

145

VI.

A.

The threat we face .................................................................. 165–170

145

B.

Meeting the challenge of prevention...................................... 171–177

146

1.

Better international regulatory frameworks ................... 172–176

146

2.

Better State capacity-building........................................

147

177

VIII. THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS ....................................................... 178–182

147

PART THREE: COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE USE OF FORCE ................

149

IX.

USING FORCE: RULES AND GUIDELINES ............................ 183–209

150

A.

150

The question of legality.......................................................... 185–203 1.

2.

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and self-defence.................................................................... 188–192

150

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and external threats............................................................... 193–198

151

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Chapters

Paragraphs Pages 3.

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, internal threats and the responsibility to protect .......... 199–203

152

The question of legitimacy ................................................... 204–209

153

PEACE ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY............................................................................... 210–220

154

B. X.

Regional cooperation............................................................ XI.

XII.

220

156

POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING ....................................... 221–230

156

A.

The role of peacekeepers...................................................... 221–223

156

B.

The larger peacebuilding task............................................... 224–230

157

PROTECTING CIVILIANS......................................................... 231–239

158

United Nations staff security ................................................

239

159

PART FOUR: A MORE EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ............................................................................

161

XIII. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY..................................................... 240–243

162

XIV

THE SECURITY COUNCIL ....................................................... 244–260

163

XV.

A PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION ........................................ 261–269

166

Peacebuilding Support Office ....................................................... 266–269

167

XVI. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ................................................ 270–273

168

XVII. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL............................. 274–281

169

Achieving policy coherence.......................................................... 280–281

170

XVIII. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS .............................. 282–291

171

XIX. THE SECRETARIAT................................................................... 292–296

173

A.

Strengthening support for the Secretary-General ................. 293–294

173

B.

A competent and professional Secretariat ............................ 295–296

173

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Chapters XX. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS........................

Pages 297–302

174

ANNEXES .................................................................................................................... 176 I.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................

176

II.

PANEL MEMEBRS AND TERMS OF REFERENCE .....................................

192

III.

PANEL SECRETARIAT ...................................................................................

194

IV.

PANEL MEETINGS, REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS AND ISSUE WORKSHOPS ...................................................................................................

195

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SYNOPSIS Towards a new security consensus The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” — to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security. The preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security. When they spoke of creating a new system of collective security they meant it in the traditional military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge that aggression against one is aggression against all, and commit themselves in that event to react collectively. But they also understood well, long before the idea of human security gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic development and human freedom. In the opening words of the Charter, the United Nations was created “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new and broader understanding, bringing together all these strands, of what collective security means — and of all the responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come with it if a collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable. If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the understanding that the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be individual sovereign States, whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected, are fully recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. But in the twenty-first century, more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, collective institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable. The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours.

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We must not underestimate the difficulty of reaching a new consensus about the meaning and responsibilities of collective security. Many will regard one or more of the threats we identify as not really being a threat to international peace and security. Some believe that HIV/AIDS is a horrible disease, but not a security threat. Or that terrorism is a threat to some States, but not all. Or that civil wars in Africa are a humanitarian tragedy, but surely not a problem for international security. Or that poverty is a problem of development, not security. Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help will rule, mistrust will predominate and cooperation for long-term mutual gain will elude us. What is needed today is nothing less than a new consensus between alliances that are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mistrust across an apparently widening cultural abyss. The essence of that consensus is simple: we all share responsibility for each other’s security. And the test of that consensus will be action.

Collective security and the challenge of prevention Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security. So defined, there are six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead: x x x x x x

Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation Inter-State conflict Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons Terrorism Transnational organized crime

In its first 60 years, the United Nations has made crucial contributions to reducing or mitigating these threats to international security. While there have been major failures and shortcomings, the record of successes and contributions is underappreciated. This gives hope that the Organization can adapt to successfully confront the new challenges of the twenty-first century.

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The primary challenge for the United Nations and its members is to ensure that, of all the threats in the categories listed, those that are distant do not become imminent and those that are imminent do not actually become destructive. This requires a framework for preventive action which addresses all these threats in all the ways they resonate most in different parts of the world. Most of all, it will require leadership at the domestic and international levels to act early, decisively and collectively against all these threats — from HIV/AIDS to nuclear terrorism — before they have their most devastating effect. In describing how to meet the challenge of prevention, we begin with development because it is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. It serves multiple functions. It helps combat the poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation that kill millions and threaten human security. It is vital in helping States prevent or reverse the erosion of State capacity, which is crucial for meeting almost every class of threat. And it is part of a long-term strategy for preventing civil war and for addressing the environments in which both terrorism and organized crime flourish.

Collective security and the use of force What happens if peaceful prevention fails? If none of the preventive measures so far described stop the descent into war and chaos? If distant threats do become imminent? Or if imminent threats become actual? Or if a non-imminent threat nonetheless becomes very real and measures short of the use of military force seem powerless to stop it? We address here the circumstances in which effective collective security may require the backing of military force, starting with the rules of international law that must govern any decision to go to war if anarchy is not to prevail. It is necessary to distinguish between situations in which a State claims to act in self-defence; situations in which a State is posing a threat to others outside its borders; and situations in which the threat is primarily internal and the issue is the responsibility to protect a State’s own people. In all cases, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task: Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the Security Council to deal with every kind of threat that States may confront. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better than it has.

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We also address here the other major issues that arise during and after violent conflict, including the needed capacities for peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the protection of civilians. A central recurring theme is the necessity for all members of the international community, developed and developing States alike, to be much more forthcoming in providing and supporting deployable military resources. Empty gestures are all too easy to make: an effective, efficient and equitable collective security system demands real commitment. That force can legally be used does not always mean that, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be used. We identify a set of guidelines — five criteria of legitimacy — which we believe that the Security Council (and anyone else involved in these decisions) should always address in considering whether to authorize or apply military force. The adoption of these guidelines (seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences) will not produce agreed conclusions with push-button predictability, but should significantly improve the chances of reaching international consensus on what have been in recent years deeply divisive issues.

A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to be a collective security system that worked. The Charter of the United Nations provided the most powerful States with permanent membership on the Security Council and the veto. In exchange, they were expected to use their power for the common good and promote and obey international law. As Harry Truman, then President of the United States, noted in his speech to the final plenary session of the founding conference of the United Nations Organization, “we all have to recognize — no matter how great our strength — that we must deny ourselves the licence to do always as we please”. In approaching the issue of United Nations reform, it is as important today as it was in 1945 to combine power with principle. Recommendations that ignore underlying power realities will be doomed to failure or irrelevance, but recommendations that simply reflect raw distributions of power and make no effort to bolster international principles are unlikely to gain the widespread adherence required to shift international behaviour. Proposed changes should be driven by real-world need. Change for its own sake is likely to run the well-worn course of the endless reform debates of the past decade. The litmus test is this: does a proposed change help meet the challenge posed by a virulent threat?

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Throughout the work of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, we have looked for institutional weaknesses in current responses to threats. The following stand as the most urgently in need of remedy: x x

x x x x x

The General Assembly has lost vitality and often fails to focus effectively on the most compelling issues of the day. The Security Council will need to be more proactive in the future. For this to happen, those who contribute most to the Organization financially, militarily and diplomatically should participate more in Council decision-making, and those who participate in Council decision-making should contribute more to the Organization. The Security Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy and representation to do all that we demand of it. There is a major institutional gap in addressing countries under stress and countries emerging from conflict. Such countries often suffer from attention, policy guidance and resource deficits. The Security Council has not made the most of the potential advantages of working with regional and subregional organizations. There must be new institutional arrangements to address the economic and social threats to international security. The Commission on Human Rights suffers from a legitimacy deficit that casts doubts on the overall reputation of the United Nations. There is a need for a more professional and better organized Secretariat that is much more capable of concerted action.

The reforms we propose will not by themselves make the United Nations more effective. In the absence of Member States reaching agreement on the security consensus contained in the present report, the United Nations will underachieve. Its institutions will still only be as strong as the energy, resources and attention devoted to them by Member States and their leaders.

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PART ONE TOWARDS A NEW SECURITY CONSENSUS

Synopsis The United Nations was created in 1945 above all else “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” — to ensure that the horrors of the World Wars were never repeated. Sixty years later, we know all too well that the biggest security threats we face now, and in the decades ahead, go far beyond States waging aggressive war. They extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; war and violence within States; the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. The threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security. The preoccupation of the United Nations founders was with State security. When they spoke of creating a new system of collective security they meant it in the traditional military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge that aggression against one is aggression against all, and commit themselves in that event to react collectively. But they also understood well, long before the idea of human security gained currency, the indivisibility of security, economic development and human freedom. In the opening words of the Charter, the United Nations was created “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new and broader understanding, bringing together all these strands, of what collective security means — and of all the responsibilities, commitments, strategies and institutions that come with it if a collective security system is to be effective, efficient and equitable. If there is to be a new security consensus, it must start with the understanding that the front-line actors in dealing with all the threats we face, new and old, continue to be individual sovereign States, whose role and responsibilities, and right to be respected, are fully recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. But in the twentyfirst century, more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, collective institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable. The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours.

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We must not underestimate the difficulty of reaching a new consensus about the meaning and responsibilities of collective security. Many will regard one or more of the threats we identify as not really being a threat to international peace and security. Some believe that HIV/AIDS is a horrible disease, but not a security threat. Or that terrorism is a threat to some States, but not all. Or that civil wars in Africa are a humanitarian tragedy, but surely not a problem for international security. Or that poverty is a problem of development, not security. Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help will rule, mistrust will predominate and cooperation for long-term mutual gain will elude us. What is needed today is nothing less than a new consensus between alliances that are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mistrust across an apparently widening cultural abyss. The essence of that consensus is simple: we all share responsibility for each other’s security. And the test of that consensus will be action.

I. DIFFERENT WORLDS: 1945 AND 2005 1. The United Nations was created in a spirit of optimism fuelled by the end of the Second World War and the will to avoid a repeat of its horrors and those of its predecessor. For many of the States most traumatized by two world wars, the experiment has been successful. Over the subsequent 60 years, many parts of the world have enjoyed unparalleled peace and prosperity. The dynamics and tensions that led to the Second World War were laid to rest, war between the great Powers was avoided and a stable peace emerged in Europe. Japan, Germany and Italy were successfully integrated into the family of nations and are currently the second, third and sixth largest financial contributors to the United Nations. 2. In the first 30 years of the United Nations, dozens of new States emerged from colonial systems that, until recent times, tied half of mankind to a handful of capitals. Assisting new States into being was a seminal contribution of the United Nations during this period. Decolonization in turn transformed the United Nations. At the creation of the United Nations in 1945, there were 51 members; today there are 191. The General Assembly was transformed from a body composed of States that largely resembled one another to one whose membership varied dramatically. By the mid-1960s, developing countries formed a majority in the General Assembly and through it gained a voice in international politics largely denied to them outside the institution.

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3. The second half of the twentieth century was a struggle for the viability of these new States and the well-being of their citizens. They inherited arbitrary colonial boundaries and colonial economies designed to serve the needs of the metropole. Independence was the start of a race to educate and develop the professional, scientific and technological expertise to run modern States and economies. All of this took place in an era of huge expectations about what States could and should deliver, when most models of economic growth relied on heavy State control. 4. In the last 40 years, life expectancy in developing countries has increased by 20 years, and per capita income has doubled in such countries as Botswana, Brazil, China, the Republic of Korea and Turkey in less than a third of the time it took to do so in the United Kingdom or the United States a century or more earlier. Despite such progress, however, large parts of the world remained mired in life-threatening poverty. Between 1975 and 1999, sub-Saharan Africa saw no overall increase in its per capita income. 5. By the 1980s, many of these new States faced crises of State capacity and legitimacy, reflected in the rise of internal wars as the dominant form of warfare in the second half of the twentieth century (see figure I). 6. As we enter the twenty-first century, these struggles are far from over. More than a billion people lack access to clean water, more than two billion have no access to adequate sanitation and more than three million die every year from water-related diseases. Fourteen million people, including six million children, die every year from hunger. There were 842 million undernourished people in 2000; 95 per cent lived in poor countries. 7. Almost 30 million people in Africa now have HIV/AIDS. In the worst-affected States, middle-aged urban elites are heavily afflicted, eroding State capacity and decimating the economic activity of what should be a State’s most productive group. The increasing number of infected women and girls is threatening food and agricultural production. If trends are not reversed, some of these States face collapse under the combined weight of poverty and HIV/AIDS. 8. Decolonization was only one of the forces that shaped the United Nations. The United Nations founders did not anticipate that the United States and the former Soviet Union would soon embark on a global rivalry, developing and deploying tens of thousands of nuclear weapons capable of destroying the world many times over. 9. Controlling the destructive capability of nuclear technology and harnessing its promise became central to the work of the United Nations. The very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 called for the disarmament of “weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. 10. The cold war shaped much of global politics for the next 45 years. The rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union blocked the Security Council from playing a dominant role in maintaining international peace and security. Nearly all armed conflicts and struggles for liberation were viewed through the prism of East-West rivalry until the historic collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe.

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Figure I: Wars, 1946-2002

–– Number of ongoing civil wars ---- Number of ongoing inter-State wars

Source: Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University; and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

11. Nonetheless, without the United Nations the post-1945 world would very probably have been a bloodier place. There were fewer inter-State wars in the last half of the twentieth century than in the first half. Given that during the same period the number of States grew almost fourfold, one might have expected to see a marked rise in inter-State wars. Yet that did not occur and the United Nations contributed to that result. The United Nations diminished the threat of inter-State war in several ways. Peace was furthered by the invention of peacekeeping; diplomacy was carried out by the Secretary-General; disputes were remedied under the International Court of Justice; and a strong norm was upheld against aggressive war. 12. The dramatic but peaceful end of the cold war opened an opportunity for collective security to flourish. The first years after the end of the cold war seemed to point towards a new role for the United Nations. In 1990, the Security Council authorized the use of force against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The Security Council broadened the interpretation of threats to international peace and security to authorize an intervention for humanitarian

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purposes in Somalia. The United Nations helped bring to an end several protracted wars in Central America and Southern Africa. 13. The moment was short-lived. It quickly became apparent that the United Nations had exchanged the shackles of the cold war for the straitjacket of Member State complacency and great Power indifference. Although the United Nations gave birth to the notion of human security, it proved poorly equipped to provide it. Long-standing regional conflicts, such as those involving Israel/Palestine and Kashmir, remained unresolved. Failures to act in the face of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia eroded international support. Optimism yielded to renewed cynicism about the willingness of Member States to support the Organization. 14. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington, D.C., brought with them a glimpse of the potential for renewed collective security. On 12 September 2001, France introduced and the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1368 (2001), which condemned the attacks and opened the way for United States-led military action against the Taliban regime in self-defence. On the same day, the General Assembly condemned terrorism and the attacks. On 28 September 2001, the Security Council adopted resolution 1373 (2001), which obligates all Member States, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to take specific actions to combat terrorism. Three months later, the United Nations presided over the Bonn Agreement, which created an interim government to replace the deposed Taliban regime. The United Nations stood behind the interim government in Afghanistan as custodian of the peace process and helped to draft the country’s new constitution. 15. This spirit of international purpose lasted only months and was eroded by divisions over the United States-led war in Iraq in 2003. 16. The attacks of 11 September 2001 revealed that States, as well as collective security institutions, have failed to keep pace with changes in the nature of threats. The technological revolution that has radically changed the worlds of communication, information-processing, health and transportation has eroded borders, altered migration and allowed individuals the world over to share information at a speed inconceivable two decades ago. Such changes have brought many benefits but also great potential for harm. Smaller and smaller numbers of people are able to inflict greater and greater amounts of damage, without the support of any State. A new threat, transnational organized crime, undermines the rule of law within and across borders. Technologies designed to improve daily life can be transformed into instruments of aggression. We have yet to fully understand the impact of these changes, but they herald a fundamentally different security climate — one whose unique opportunities for cooperation are matched by an unprecedented scope for destruction.

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II. THE CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTIVE SECURITY A. Threats without boundaries 17. Today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has never been clearer. 18. Global economic integration means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the developed world would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions of people in the developing world. The World Bank estimates that the attacks of 11 September 2001 alone increased the number of people living in poverty by 10 million; the total cost to the world economy probably exceeded 80 billion dollars. These numbers would be far surpassed by an incident involving nuclear terrorism. 19. Similarly, the security of the most affluent State can be held hostage to the ability of the poorest State to contain an emerging disease. Because international flight times are shorter than the incubation periods for many infectious diseases, any one of 700 million international airline passengers every year can be an unwitting global disease-carrier. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) spread to more than 8,000 people in 30 countries in three months, killing almost 700. The influenza pandemic of 1919 killed as many as 100 million people, far more than the First World War, over a period of a little more than a year. Today, a similar virus could kill tens of millions in a fraction of the time. 20. Every threat to international security today enlarges the risk of other threats. Nuclear proliferation by States increases the availability of the materiel and technology necessary for a terrorist to acquire a nuclear weapon. The ability of non-State actors to traffic in nuclear materiel and technology is aided by ineffective State control of borders and transit through weak States. 21. International terrorist groups prey on weak States for sanctuary. Their recruitment is aided by grievances nurtured by poverty, foreign occupation and the absence of human rights and democracy; by religious and other intolerance; and by civil violence — a witch’s brew common to those areas where civil war and regional conflict intersect. In recent years, terrorists have helped to finance their activities and moved large sums of money by gaining access to such valuable commodities as drugs in countries beset by civil war. 22. Poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation and war feed one another in a deadly cycle. Poverty (as measured by per capita gross domestic product (GDP)) is strongly associated with the outbreak of civil war (see figure II). Such diseases as malaria and HIV/AIDS continue to cause large numbers of deaths and reinforce poverty. Disease and poverty, in turn, are connected to environmental degradation; climate change exacerbates the occurrence of such infectious disease as malaria and dengue fever. Environmental stress, caused by large populations and shortages of land and other natural resources, can contribute to civil violence.

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Figure II The link between poverty and civil war

The Link between Poverty and Civil War Predicted probabilityofofCivil civil War war onset Predicted Probability Onset withinwithin five years (percentage) Five Years

14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%

$-

$1,000

$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

$5,000

GDP per capita (in US$)

Source: Research undertaken by Macartan Humphreys (Columbia University), based on data provided by the World Bank, the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

23. Transnational organized crime facilitates many of the most serious threats to international peace and security. Corruption, illicit trade and money-laundering contribute to State weakness, impede economic growth and undermine democracy. These activities thus create a permissive environment for civil conflict. The prospect of organized criminal groups providing nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons to terrorists is particularly worrying. Increasing drug trade partly accounts for rapidly increasing levels of HIV/AIDS infections, especially in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia. And organized criminal activities undermine peacebuilding efforts and fuel many civil wars through illicit trade in conflict commodities and small arms.

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116 B. The limits of self-protection

24. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. Every State requires the cooperation of other States to make itself secure. It is in every State’s interest, accordingly, to cooperate with other States to address their most pressing threats, because doing so will maximize the chances of reciprocal cooperation to address its own threat priorities. 25. Take, as one example, the threat of nuclear terrorism. Experts estimate that terrorists with 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), an amount that would fit into six one-litre milk cartons, need only smuggle it across borders in order to create an improvised nuclear device that could level a medium-sized city. Border controls will not provide adequate defence against this threat. To overcome the threat of nuclear terrorism requires the cooperation of States, strong and weak, to clean up stockpiles of HEU, better protect shipping containers at ports and agree on new rules regulating the enrichment of uranium. Cooperation in the sharing of intelligence by States is essential for stopping terrorism. 26. Similarly, in order to stop organized crime States must cooperate to fight moneylaundering, trafficking in drugs and persons, and corruption. International efforts to stem the problem are only as strong as the weakest link. Ineffective collective security institutions diminish the security of every region and State. 27. The most robust defence against the possible terrorist use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons would seek to control dangerous materials, deter and capture terrorists, and address the broader threats that increase the risk of terrorist action. Civil war, disease and poverty increase the likelihood of State collapse and facilitate the spread of organized crime, thus also increasing the risk of terrorism and proliferation due to weak States and weak collective capacity to exercise the rule of law. Preventing mass-casualty terrorism requires a deep engagement to strengthen collective security systems, ameliorate poverty, combat extremism, end the grievances that flow from war, tackle the spread of infectious disease and fight organized crime. 28. Thus all States have an interest in forging a new comprehensive collective security system that will commit all of them to act cooperatively in the face of a broad array of threats.

C. Sovereignty and responsibility 29. In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not only benefit from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community, acting in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration

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of Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case may be. 30. What we seek to protect reflects what we value. The Charter of the United Nations seeks to protect all States, not because they are intrinsically good but because they are necessary to achieve the dignity, justice, worth and safety of their citizens. These are the values that should be at the heart of any collective security system for the twenty-first century, but too often States have failed to respect and promote them. The collective security we seek to build today asserts a shared responsibility on the part of all States and international institutions, and those who lead them, to do just that.

D. Elements of a credible collective security system 31. To be credible and sustainable a collective security system must be effective, efficient and equitable. In all these respects, the multilateral system as we now know it, in responding to the major security threats which the world has confronted in recent decades, has shown that it can perform. But it must be strengthened to perform better — in all the ways we spell out in the present report.

1. Effectiveness 32. Whether by reducing the demand for nuclear weapons, mediating inter-State conflict or ending civil wars, collective security institutions have made critical contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security, although those contributions are often denigrated, both by those who would have the institutions do more and by those who would have them do less. 33. Collective security institutions are rarely effective in isolation. Multilateral institutions normally operate alongside national, regional and sometimes civil society actors, and are most effective when these efforts are aligned to common goals. This is as true of mediation as it is of post-conflict reconstruction, poverty-reduction strategies and non-proliferation measures. 34. States are still the front-line responders to today’s threats. Successful international actions to battle poverty, fight infectious disease, stop transnational crime, rebuild after civil war, reduce terrorism and halt the spread of dangerous materials all require capable, responsible States as partners. It follows that greater effort must be made to enhance the capacity of States to exercise their sovereignty responsibly. For all those in a position to help others build that capacity, it should be part of their responsibility to do so. 35. Collective action often fails, sometimes dramatically so. Collective instruments are often hampered by a lack of compliance, erratic monitoring and verification, and weak enforcement. Early warning is only effective when it leads to early action for prevention. Monitoring and verification work best when they are treated as complements to, not substitutes for, enforcement.

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36. Collective security institutions have proved particularly poor at meeting the challenge posed by large-scale, gross human rights abuses and genocide. This is a normative challenge to the United Nations: the concept of State and international responsibility to protect civilians from the effects of war and human rights abuses has yet to truly overcome the tension between the competing claims of sovereign inviolability and the right to intervene. It is also an operational challenge: the challenge of stopping a Government from killing its own civilians requires considerable military deployment capacity.

2. Efficiency 37. Some collective security instruments have been efficient. As the institutional embodiment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of considerable long-term success in preventing widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — with its regular budget of less than $275 million — stands out as an extraordinary bargain. Similarly, the Secretary-General’s mediation efforts, though grossly underresourced, have helped reduce international tensions. 38. But more collective security instruments have been inefficient. Post-conflict operations, for example, have too often been characterized by countless ill-coordinated and overlapping bilateral and United Nations programmes, with inter-agency competition preventing the best use of scarce resources. 39. The biggest source of inefficiency in our collective security institutions has simply been an unwillingness to get serious about preventing deadly violence. The failure to invest time and resources early in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflicts leads to much larger and deadlier conflagrations that are much costlier to handle later.

3. Equity 40. The credibility of any system of collective security also depends on how well it promotes security for all its members, without regard to the nature of would-be beneficiaries, their location, resources or relationship to great Powers. 41. Too often, the United Nations and its Member States have discriminated in responding to threats to international security. Contrast the swiftness with which the United Nations responded to the attacks on 11 September 2001 with its actions when confronted with a far more deadly event: from April to mid-July 1994, Rwanda experienced the equivalent of three 11 September 2001 attacks every day for 100 days, all in a country whose population was one thirty-sixth that of the United States. Two weeks into the genocide, the Security Council withdrew most of its peacekeepers from the country. It took almost a month for United Nations officials to call it a genocide and even longer for some Security Council members. When a new mission was finally authorized for Rwanda, six weeks into the genocide, few States offered soldiers. The mission deployed as the genocide ended.

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42. Similarly, throughout the deliberation of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, we have been struck once again by the glacial speed at which our institutions have responded to massive human rights violations in Darfur, Sudan. 43. When the institutions of collective security respond in an ineffective and inequitable manner, they reveal a much deeper truth about which threats matter. Our institutions of collective security must not just assert that a threat to one is truly a threat to all, but perform accordingly.

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PART TWO COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF PREVENTION

Synopsis Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security. So defined, there are six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead: x x x x x x

Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation Inter-State conflict Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons Terrorism Transnational organized crime

In its first 60 years, the United Nations has made crucial contributions to reducing or mitigating these threats to international security. While there have been major failures and shortcomings, the record of successes and contributions is underappreciated. This gives hope that the Organization can adapt to successfully confront the new challenges of the twenty-first century. The primary challenge for the United Nations and its members is to ensure that, of all the threats in the categories listed, those that are distant do not become imminent and those that are imminent do not actually become destructive. This requires a framework for preventive action which addresses all these threats in all the ways they resonate most in different parts of the world. Most of all, it will require leadership at the domestic and international levels to act early, decisively and collectively against all these threats — from HIV/AIDS to nuclear terrorism — before they have their most devastating effect. In describing how to meet the challenge of prevention, we begin with development because it is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. It serves multiple functions. It helps combat the poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation that kill millions and threaten human security. It is vital in helping States prevent or reverse the erosion of State capacity, which is crucial for meeting almost every class of threat. And it is part of a long-term strategy for preventing civil war, and for addressing the environments in which both terrorism and organized crime flourish.

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III. POVERTY, INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION A. The threats we face 44. Since 1990, while developing countries’ per capita income has increased an average of 3 per cent annually, the number of people living in extreme poverty has increased in some regions by more than 100 million people. In at least 54 countries, average per capita income has declined over the same period. Every year, almost 11 million children die from preventable diseases and more than half a million women die during pregnancy or childbirth. Increasing poverty is accompanied by an increase in global inequality and income inequality in many poor countries. In parts of Latin America, for example, the income of the wealthiest fifth of households is 30 times greater than that of the poorest fifth. Worldwide, women and youth are disproportionately poor. 45. When poverty is added to ethnic or regional inequalities, the grievances that stoke civil violence are compounded. While it may not reach the level of war, the combination of a surging youth population, poverty, urbanization and unemployment has resulted in increased gang violence in many cities of the developing world. As one woman poignantly asked during the Panel’s consultation with civil society organizations in Africa, “How have we let what should be our greatest asset, youth, become a threat to our security?” 46. The continent hardest hit by poverty is Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, average life expectancy has declined from 50 to 46 since 1990. Whereas in the developed world less than one in 100 children die before age five, in most of sub-Saharan Africa that number is one in 10, and in 14 countries it is one in five. In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of people living on less than $1 a day has increased since 1990. While undernourishment decreased worldwide in the 1990s, it increased in Africa. 47. Over the past three decades, the world has seen the emergence of new infectious diseases, a resurgence of older diseases and a spread of resistance to a growing number of mainstay antibiotic drugs. Recent outbreaks of polio threaten to undermine its near eradication, which was one of the great accomplishments of the twentieth century. These trends signify a dramatic decay in local and global public health capacity. 48. International response to HIV/AIDS was shockingly slow and remains shamefully illresourced. The first major international initiative on HIV/AIDS, the Global Programme on AIDS, came only in 1987, six years after the first cases of HIV were identified and after it had infected millions of people worldwide. Nine years and 25 million infections later, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) was created to coordinate United Nations agencies working on HIV/AIDS. By 2000, when the Security Council first discussed HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, the number of deaths per year from HIV/AIDS in Africa had outstripped the number of battle deaths in all the civil wars fought in the 1990s. By 2003, when the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was created, there were more than 11 million children orphaned by HIV/AIDS in Africa. 49. That Africa has borne the brunt of the HIV/AIDS pandemic raises the troubling question of whether international response would have been so slow if the disease had reduced life expectancy by 30 years in non-African countries.

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50. Progress in stemming other lethal infectious diseases remains elusive. The global drive to control tuberculosis has shown significant advances, including improvements in political commitment, financing, strategy formulation, access to medication and medical research. Yet more than 8.5 million new cases of tuberculosis emerge and more than two million people die of tuberculosis every year. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that, if current trends continue, between now and 2020 nearly one billion people will be newly infected, 150 million will develop the disease and 36 million will die. Further improvements in the affordability and accessibility of medicines — not just for tuberculosis — are still sorely needed. 51. The recent international experience in combating SARS shows how the spread of infectious disease can be limited when effective global institutions work in close partnership with capable national institutions. Rapid response by WHO and national agencies contained the spread of the disease and prevented a far more serious outbreak that could have threatened thousands of lives on several continents. No State could have achieved this degree of containment of the disease in isolation. 52. Current trends indicate persistent and possibly worsening food insecurity in many countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Population growth in the developing world and increased per capita consumption in the industrialized world have led to greater demand for scarce resources. The loss of arable land, water scarcity, overfishing, deforestation and the alteration of ecosystems pose daunting challenges for sustainable development. The world’s population is expected to increase from 6.3 billion today to 8.9 billion in 2050, with nearly all of that growth occurring in the countries least equipped to absorb it. Feeding such a rapidly growing population will only be possible if agricultural yields can be increased significantly and sustainably. 53. Environmental degradation has enhanced the destructive potential of natural disasters and in some cases hastened their occurrence. The dramatic increase in major disasters witnessed in the last 50 years provides worrying evidence of this trend. More than two billion people were affected by such disasters in the last decade, and in the same period the economic toll surpassed that of the previous four decades combined. If climate change produces more acute flooding, heat waves, droughts and storms, this pace may accelerate. 54. Rarely are environmental concerns factored into security, development or humanitarian strategies. Nor is there coherence in environmental protection efforts at the global level. Most attempts to create governance structures to tackle the problems of global environmental degradation have not effectively addressed climate change, deforestation and desertification. Regional and global multilateral treaties on the environment are undermined by inadequate implementation and enforcement by the Member States. 55. International institutions and States have not organized themselves to address the problems of development in a coherent, integrated way, and instead continue to treat poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation as stand-alone threats. The fragmented sectoral approaches of international institutions mirror the fragmented sectoral approaches of Governments: for example, finance ministries tend to work only with the international financial institutions, development ministers only with development programmes, ministers of agriculture only with food programmes and environment ministers only with environmental agencies. Bilateral donors correctly call for better

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United Nations coordination but show little enthusiasm for similar efforts on their own account. 56. Existing global economic and social governance structures are woefully inadequate for the challenges ahead. To tackle the challenges of sustainable development countries must negotiate across different sectors and issues, including foreign aid, technology, trade, financial stability and development policy. Such packages are difficult to negotiate and require high-level attention and leadership from those countries that have the largest economic impacts. At the moment, there is no high-level forum which provides leaders from large industrial and developing economies a regular opportunity for frank dialogue, deliberation and problem-solving. 57. The United Nations comparative advantage in addressing economic and social threats is its unparalleled convening power, which allows it to formulate common development targets and rally the international community around a consensus for achieving them. In recent years, the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa, and the International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico, have led to global understanding and ambitious programmes for alleviating poverty, providing food security, growing economies and protecting the environment in ways that benefit future generations. The United Nations Millennium Declaration contains an ambitious but feasible set of agreed targets and benchmarks, later consolidated into the Millennium Development Goals, ranging from halving extreme poverty and protecting the environment to achieving greater gender equality and halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015. 58. In 2002, world leaders agreed at Monterrey that aid donors and aid recipients both have obligations to achieve development. The primary responsibility for economic and social development lies with Governments, which must create a conducive environment for vigorous private-sector-led growth and aid effectiveness by pursuing sound economic policies, building effective and responsible institutions and investing in public and social services that will reach all of their people. In return for substantive improvements in the policies and institutions of developing countries, donor nations agreed to renew their efforts to reduce poverty, including by reducing trade barriers, increasing development assistance and providing debt relief for highly indebted poor countries.

B. Meeting the challenge of prevention 1. More resources and action 59. With the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the international community committed itself to dramatically reduce poverty by 2015. Assessments by the Millennium Project indicate that, while some regions of the world are on track to reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day, other regions have regressed. In the area of reducing child mortality and increasing primary education enrolment, the world continues to lag behind its commitments. Little has been done to address the gender aspects of the Millennium Development Goals. Although poor and rich countries have pledged to take action to address social and economic threats, pledges have not materialized into resources and action and long-term commitments are scant. All States

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must recommit themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development. 60. We believe that the Millennium Development Goals should be placed at the centre of national and international poverty-reduction strategies. The dramatic shortfall in resources required to meet the Millennium Development Goals must be redressed, and the commitments to sound policies and good governance at all levels must be fulfilled. For the least developed countries, official development assistance (ODA) will be crucial and should be structured to support countries’ Millennium Development Goal-based poverty reduction strategies. The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Nations 0.7 per cent gross national product (GNP) target for ODA should establish a timetable for reaching it. 61. After years of debate on whether to develop innovative approaches to financing for development, such as the International Financial Facility, donors have shifted to discussions of how to do so. We welcome this and encourage donors to move quickly to decisions on this issue. 62. In Monterrey and Johannesburg, leaders agreed that poverty alleviation is undermined by continuing inequities in the global trading system. Seventy per cent of the world’s poor live in rural areas and earn their income from agriculture. They pay a devastating cost when developed countries impose trade barriers on agricultural imports and subsidize agricultural exports. In 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Declaration explicitly committed signatories to put the needs and interests of developing countries at the heart of negotiations over a new trade round. WTO members should strive to conclude the Doha development round at the latest in 2006. 63. Governance reforms and improvements in trading opportunities will not by themselves bring about meaningful poverty alleviation in a significant number of the least developed countries — many of them in sub-Saharan Africa — where development efforts are undermined by poor infrastructure, low productivity agriculture, endemic disease and crippling levels of external debt. Developed countries will also have to do more to address the challenge in the poorest countries of debt sustainability — which should be redefined as the level of debt consistent with achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Lender Governments and the international financial institutions should provide highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer rescheduling and improved access to global markets. 64. Despite major international initiatives, the spread of HIV/AIDS is still rampant. In the most affected countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the impact of the pandemic is becoming more acute. In Asia, the number of infections exceeds seven million and is increasing rapidly. Although international resources devoted to meeting the challenge of HIV/AIDS have increased from about $250 million in 1996 to about $2.8 billion in 2002, more than $10 billion annually is needed to stem the pandemic. 65. The experience of some countries shows that properly funded and institutionalized efforts can yield remarkable successes in the fight against HIV/AIDS. By contrast, where Governments have refused to acknowledge the gravity of the threat and failed to address the problem, countries have experienced a dramatic turn for the worse and international

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efforts to address the problem have been hampered. Leaders of affected countries need to mobilize resources, commit funds and engage civil society and the private sector in disease-control efforts.

2. New initiatives 66. Despite all we know about the human toll of HIV/AIDS — the numbers of infections, the deaths, the children who are orphaned — we are left to guess what the long-term effect of the pandemic will be on the States most afflicted by the disease. While HIV/AIDS depletes the capacity of States and economies in Africa faster than it can be replenished, we do not know the cumulative effects of loss of government officials, skilled health professionals, teachers, service providers, caregivers, police, soldiers and peacekeepers. In the absence of good research into these questions, we cannot begin to develop a strategy for countering the long-term effects of HIV/AIDS on governance and State stability. 67. The Security Council, working closely with UNAIDS, should host a second special session on HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, to explore the future effects of HIV/AIDS on States and societies, generate research on the problem and identify critical steps towards a long-term strategy for diminishing the threat. 68. The fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria depends on capable, responsible States with functioning public health systems. The absence of health facilities is the primary factor spurring the proliferation of malaria. Funding gaps are preventing health-sector reforms in many heavily burdened countries, particularly those in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Inconsistent or partial treatment, resulting from insufficient funding, has allowed new strains of tuberculosis to develop that are far more difficult to treat. Even when programme funding for HIV/AIDS is available, inadequate or nonexistent health facilities in the poorest areas of sub-Saharan Africa hinder programmes from being effectively or sustainably implemented. International donors, in partnership with national authorities and local civil society organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild local and national public health systems throughout the developing world. 69. Such efforts should be undertaken simultaneously with improving global disease monitoring capabilities. This is triply imperative — as a means of fighting new emerging infectious disease, defending against the threat of biological terrorism and building effective, responsible States. Members of the World Health Assembly should provide greater resources to the WHO Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to increase its capacity to cope with potential disease outbreaks. 70. In extreme cases of threat posed by a new emerging infectious disease or intentional release of an infectious agent, there may be a need for cooperation between WHO and the Security Council in establishing effective quarantine measures (see sect. V below). 71. In order to address problems of climate change modern economies need to reduce their dependence on hydrocarbons and should undertake a special effort to devise climatefriendly development strategies. Member States should place special attention on the

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development of low-carbon energy sources, including natural gas, renewable power and nuclear power, and should place special emphasis on the development of low-greenhousegas technologies. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has encouraged the development of renewable energy sources that could gradually correct today’s excessive dependency on fossil fuels. To further encourage this, States should provide incentives for the further development of renewable energy sources and begin to phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, especially for fossil fuel use and development. 72. The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol after ratification by the Russian Federation is a positive development, even though the Protocol by itself is not sufficient to solve the challenge of limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The Protocol has encouraged the development of renewable energy sources that could gradually correct today’s excessive dependency on fossil fuels. Yet problems remain. Some advanced industrialized nations are on track to meet their Kyoto targets for reasons outside the realm of climate policy, e.g., a sharp reduction in their industrial production. The United States, which accounts for about one quarter of world emissions of greenhouse gases, refuses to ratify the Protocol. At the same time, developing countries, which now account for almost half of today’s net emissions of greenhouse gases (but only one tenth of per capita emissions), have been opposed to accepting any binding emission caps, which they perceive to be impediments to economic growth. Industrialized nations are likely to be more resistant to accepting costly reductions without increased developing country participation. Most importantly, the Protocol does not contain any obligations beyond 2012. We urge Member States to reflect on the gap between the promise of the Kyoto Protocol and its performance, re -engage on the problem of global warming and begin new negotiations to produce a new long-term strategy for reducing global warming beyond the period covered by the Protocol. 73. The United Nations and the international financial institutions should also do more to assist those States most vulnerable to severe natural disasters, the effects of which can be destablizing — as they were in 2004 in Haiti. The World Meteorological Organization has estimated that investments in vulnerability reduction could drastically reduce the number of deaths associated with natural disasters. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank should work in a more integrated fashion — and in partnership with Governments and outside research institutions — to improve vulnerability assessments and work with the most affected Governments to strengthen their adaptive capacity.

IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN AND WITHIN STATES A. The threat of inter-State conflict 74. Although the world has seen few inter-State wars over the past 60 years, the threat of inter-State war has not vanished. Unresolved regional disputes in South Asia, North-East Asia and the Middle East continue to threaten international peace and security. These disputes may unravel 40 years of efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and more than 75 years of efforts to banish the scourge of biological and chemical weapons. In turn, inter-State rivalry in some regions fuels and exacerbates internal wars,

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making them more difficult to bring to a close. Such rivalry, by promoting conventional weapons build-ups, diverts scarce resources that could be used to reduce poverty, improve health and increase education. 75. War and ongoing instability in Iraq and Palestine have fuelled extremism in parts of the Muslim world and the West. This issue is complex and multidimensional and defies any simplistic categorization. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the ability of extremist groups to foster perceptions within the West and within the Muslim world of cultural and religious antagonism between them, the dangers of which, if left unchecked, are profound. 76. In the past, the United Nations helped to reduce the threat of inter-State conflicts through the Secretary-General’s “good offices”, or quiet diplomacy aimed at defusing crises and providing hostile parties the opportunity to talk freely and test intentions. Successive Secretaries-General have played this role despite little capacity within the Organization to support it. 77. With the end of the cold war, the Security Council became increasingly active in addressing international threats. The average annual number of resolutions it passed increased from 15 to 60, or from one resolution a month to one a week. Before 1989, the Council applied sanctions twice; since then it has imposed sanctions 14 times and for an increasingly diverse range of stated purposes, including to reverse aggression, restore democratic Governments, protect human rights, end wars, combat terrorism and support peace agreements. 78. Several of these sanctions regimes were at least partially effective. In some cases, they helped to produce negotiated agreements. In others, they combined with military pressure to weaken and isolate rebel groups and States in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions. 79. Sanctions failed when they were not effectively targeted and when the Security Council failed to enforce them. Weak enforcement results from the strategic interests of powerful States; a lack of clarity about the purpose of sanctions; “sanctions fatigue” brought about by concern over their humanitarian impact; insufficient support from the respective sanctions committees; and insufficient State capacity to implement sanctions. 80. As a result of growing concern over the humanitarian impact of comprehensive sanctions, the Security Council stopped imposing them after the cases of Iraq, former Yugoslavia and Haiti, and turned exclusively to the use of financial, diplomatic, arms, aviation, travel and commodity sanctions, targeting the belligerents and policy makers most directly responsible for reprehensible policies. 81. Increased activity does not necessarily produce increased results. Not all situations that justified Security Council attention received it and not all its resolutions were followed by effective enforcement action. Yet two trends of the 1990s indicate increasing effectiveness in regulating international conflict. First, with the Council increasingly active and willing to use its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the balance between unilateral use of force and collectively authorized force has shifted dramatically. Collectively authorized use of force may not be the rule today, but it is no longer an exception. Second, and perhaps the most striking indicator of the growing

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importance of the role of the United Nations in regulating international conflict, is the recent expectation that the Security Council should be the arbiter of the use of force. 82. Many people assumed it was quite natural that the United States should seek Security Council support for going to war against Iraq in 2003. Superpowers, however, have rarely sought Security Council approval for their actions. That all States should seek Security Council authorization to use force is not a time-honoured principle; if this were the case, our faith in it would be much stronger. Our analysis suggests quite the opposite — that what is at stake is a relatively new emerging norm, one that is precious but not yet deeprooted. 83. The case of Iraq prompted much difference of opinion. Some contend that the Security Council was ineffective because it could not produce Iraqi compliance with its resolutions. Others argue Security Council irrelevance because the Council did not deter the United States and its coalition partners from waging war. Still others suggest that the refusal of the Security Council to bow to United States pressure to legitimate the war is proof of its relevance and indispensability: although the Security Council did not deter war, it provided a clear and principled standard with which to assess the decision to go to war. The flood of Foreign Ministers into the Security Council chambers during the debates, and widespread public attention, suggest that the United States decision to bring the question of force to the Security Council reaffirmed not just the relevance but the centrality of the Charter of the United Nations.

B. The threat of internal conflict 84. Since the end of the cold war, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in civil wars have become the operational face of the United Nations in international peace and security. 85. The rapid growth of United Nations activity in civil wars coincides with a sharp decline in their numbers (see figure III). Since 1992, civil wars have declined steadily, and by 2003 had dropped by roughly 40 per cent to less than 30 wars. In the last 15 years, more civil wars were ended through negotiation than in the previous two centuries — in large part because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination, and the resources needed for implementation. Hundreds of thousands of lives were saved, and regional and international stability were enhanced. 86. This unprecedented success, however, was also coupled with major failures. Mediation produced settlement in only about 25 per cent of civil wars and only some of those attracted the political and material resources necessary for successful implementation. As a result, many implementation efforts failed, sometimes with disastrous consequences. If two peace agreements, the 1991 Bicesse Agreement for Angola and the 1993 Arusha Accords for Rwanda, had been successfully implemented, deaths attributable to war in the 1990s would have been reduced by several million. If the Security Council had been seriously committed to consolidating peace in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, more lives could have been saved, the Taliban might never have come to power and Al Qaida could have been deprived of its most important sanctuary.

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Figure III Ending civil wars and building peace, 1970-2002

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Number of ongoing civil wars

50

Number of ongoing United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations deployed in civil wars

40

30

20

10

0

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

Source: Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University; and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

87. The biggest failures of the United Nations in civil violence have been in halting ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Rwanda, Secretariat officials failed to provide the Security Council with early warning of extremist plans to kill thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. When the genocide started, troop contributors withdrew peacekeepers, and the Security Council, bowing to United States pressure, failed to respond. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, United Nations peacekeeping and the protection of humanitarian aid became a substitute for political and military action to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Kosovo, paralysis in the Security Council led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to bypass the United Nations. Only in one instance in the 1990s — in East Timor — did the Security Council, urged on by the Secretary-General, work together with national Governments and regional actors to apply concerted pressure swiftly to halt largescale killing. 88. The large loss of life in such wars and outbreaks of mass violence obliges the international community to be more vigilant in preventing them. When prevention fails, there is urgent need to stop the killing and prevent any further return to war.

C. Meeting the challenge of prevention 1. Better international regulatory frameworks and norms 89. The role of the United Nations in preventing wars can be strengthened by giving more attention to developing international regimes and norms to govern some of the

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sources and accelerators of conflict. A very wide range of laws, norms, agreements and arrangements are relevant here, covering legal regimes and dispute resolution mechanisms, arms control and disarmament regimes, and dialogue and cooperation arrangements. Some examples are set out below. 90. In the area of legal mechanisms, there have been few more important recent developments than the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. In cases of mounting conflict, early indication by the Security Council that it is carefully monitoring the conflict in question and that it is willing to use its powers under the Rome Statute might deter parties from committing crimes against humanity and violating the laws of war. The Security Council should stand ready to use the authority it has under the Rome Statute to refer cases to the International Criminal Court. 91. More legal mechanisms are necessary in the area of natural resources, fights over which have often been an obstacle to peace. Alarmed by the inflammatory role of natural resources in wars in Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, civil society organizations and the Security Council have turned to the “naming and shaming” of, and the imposition of sanctions against, individuals and corporations involved in illicit trade, and States have made a particular attempt to restrict the sale of “conflict diamonds”. Evidence from Sierra Leone and Angola suggests that such efforts contributed to ending those civil wars. A new challenge for the United Nations is to provide support to weak States — especially, but not limited to, those recovering from war — in the management of their natural resources to avoid future conflicts. 92. The United Nations should work with national authorities, international financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict. 93. There should also be a focus on the development of rules, for example through the International Law Commission, for the use of transboundary resources, such as water, oil and gas. 94. The United Nations should seek to work closely with regional organizations that have taken the lead in building frameworks for prevention. The United Nations can benefit from sharing information and analysis with regional early-warning systems, but more importantly regional organizations have gone farther than the United Nations in setting normative standards that can guide preventive efforts. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU) agree on the need to protect elected Governments from coups. The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has developed operational norms on minority rights. The United Nations should build on the experience of regional organizations in developing frameworks for minority rights and the protection of democratically elected Governments from unconstitutional overthrow. 95. In the area of arms control and disarmament regimes, much more needs to be done, not only in the context of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (see sect. V below) but in relation to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In the 1990s, small arms, light weapons and landmines were the primary weapons in most civil wars. While

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concerted action by civil society organizations and concerned Member States led to a ban on landmines, efforts to limit the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons have barely moved beyond rhetoric to action. 96. A comprehensive approach to the small arms problem emerged in the late 1990s and seeks to create international action to limit their production and spread. The key global instrument for this approach is the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, a comprehensive set of recommendations aimed at preventing and eradicating the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons. The Programme of Action makes innovative use of regional bodies, such as the Nairobi Secretariat, which, inter alia, monitors the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, to report, monitor and verify State compliance. It should be considered a start rather than an end-point for United Nations efforts. Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations on legally binding agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the brokering and transfer, of small arms and light weapons. 97. The United Nations can also help to prevent inter-State conflict by increasing the transparency of Member States’ conventional weapons holdings and acquisitions. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, established in 1991, enhances military transparency by soliciting annual declarations of Member States on their sale and purchase of conventional weapons and existing weapons holdings, as well as their defence postures, policies and doctrines. However, the Register is marred by incomplete, untimely and inaccurate reporting. All Member States should report completely and accurately on all elements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the SecretaryGeneral should be asked to report annually to the General Assembly and Security Council on any inadequacies in the reporting.

2. Better information and analysis 98. Prevention requires early warning and analysis that is based on objective and impartial research. Although the United Nations has some early-warning and analysis capacity scattered among different agencies and departments, the Secretary-General has not been able to establish any properly-resourced unit able to integrate inputs from these offices into early-warning reports and strategy options for purposes of decision-making. The best option for creating a coherent capacity for developing strategic options is to strengthen the Office of the Secretary-General through the creation of a Deputy SecretaryGeneral for Peace and Security (see sect. XIX below). 99. Although some field-based agencies participate in early-warning mechanisms and international non-governmental organizations have played a major role in recent years in providing timely information, analysis and advocacy, the Secretary-General’s access to local analysis of conflict is sharply limited. Greater interaction by United Nations political, peacekeeping and humanitarian departments with outside sources of early-warning information and of local knowledge of conflicts would enhance United Nations conflict management. Also, in the past few years, research institutions (in academia and in other

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international organizations) have begun to compile both the necessary data and sophisticated analysis of various causes and accelerators of different kinds of conflict. United Nations policy sections should engage more actively with local sources of knowledge and outside sources of research.

3. Preventive diplomacy and mediation 100. United Nations efforts to prevent outbreaks of internal violence have met with less success than its efforts to prevent inter-State wars, and they are often inhibited by the reluctance of Member States to see their domestic affairs internationalized. But more effort could and should be made in this area, particularly through the appointment of skilled, experienced and regionally knowledgeable envoys, mediators and special representatives, who can make as important a contribution to conflict prevention as they do to conflict resolution. 101. In making such appointments, the Secretary-General should place high-level competence above all other criteria and do more to nurture internal and external expertise in this respect. This would be made easier by the establishment of a facility for training and briefing new or potential special representatives and other United Nations mediators, and we so recommend. 102. Mediators and negotiators need adequate support. Although the demand for United Nations mediation has skyrocketed in the past 10 years, resources devoted to this function have remained minimal. The deliberate underresourcing of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat by Member States is at odds with these same States’ professed desire for a strong United Nations. The Department of Political Affairs should be given additional resources and should be restructured to provide more consistent and professional mediation support. 103. While the details of such a restructuring should be left to the Secretary-General, it should take into account the need for the United Nations to have: (a) A field-oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity, comprised of a small team of professionals with relevant direct experience and expertise, available to all United Nations mediators; (b) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations, such as the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of monitoring arrangements, the sequencing of transitional arrangements and the design of national reconciliation mechanisms; (c) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations involved in conflict resolution; (d) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often neglected during negotiations.

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104. In cases of mounting tensions, the early deployment of peacekeepers can reassure parties seeking peaceful resolution to a conflict and deter would-be aggressors. It is notable that the only clear case of preventive deployment to date, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, was requested by the national authorities and was manifestly a success. We encourage national leaders and parties to conflict to make constructive use of the option of preventive deployment. 105. The Security Council should also note that in countries that have emerged from conflict, the deployment of small numbers of peacekeepers to train national armed forces can serve an important preventive function. 106. Good communication between mediators and peacekeeping planners can also help identify opportunities for preventive deployments. The now occasional practice of peacekeeping planners sitting in on mediation processes should be standardized.

V. NUCLEAR, RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS A. The threats we face 1. Nuclear weapons 107. Any use of nuclear weapons, by accident or design, risks human casualties and economic dislocation on a catastrophic scale. Stopping the proliferation of such weapons — and their potential use, by either State or non-State actors — must remain an urgent priority for collective security. 108. The threat posed by nuclear proliferation — the spread of nuclear weapons among States — arises in two ways. The first and most immediate concern is that some countries, under cover of their current Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons membership, will covertly and illegally develop full-scale weapons programmes, or that — acting within the letter but perhaps not the spirit of the Treaty — they will acquire all the materials and expertise needed for weapons programmes with the option of withdrawing from the Treaty at the point when they are ready to proceed with weaponization. 109. The second longer-term, concern is about the erosion and possible collapse of the whole Treaty regime. Almost 60 States currently operate or are constructing nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which would enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weapons at relatively short notice if the legal and normative constraints of the Treaty regime no longer apply. 110. Both concerns are now very real: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not as effective a constraint as it was. In 1963, when only four States had nuclear arsenals, the United States Government predicted that the following decade would see the emergence of 15 to 25 nuclear-weapon States; others predicted the number would be as high as 50. As of 2004, only eight States are known to have nuclear arsenals. The strong non-proliferation regime — embodied in IAEA and the Treaty itself — helped

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dramatically to slow the predicted rate of proliferation. It made three critical contributions: it bolstered a normative prohibition against the ownership, use and proliferation of these weapons; it ensured that States could benefit from nuclear technologies, but with oversight; and it reassured States about the capacities of neighbours and potential rivals, allowing them to avoid unnecessary arms races. 111. But the nuclear non-proliferation regime is now at risk because of lack of compliance with existing commitments, withdrawal or threats of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to escape those commitments, a changing international security environment and the diffusion of technology. We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation. 112. Regardless of whether more States acquire nuclear weapons, there are also grave risks posed by the existence of large stockpiles of nuclear and radiological materials. Today 1,300 kilograms of highly enriched uranium exist in research reactors in 27 countries. The total volume of HEU stockpiles is far greater, and many HEU storage sites in the world are inadequately secured. States have publicly confirmed 20 cases of nuclear material diversion and more than 200 incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials have been documented over the past decade. Scientists have repeatedly warned of the ease with which terrorists could, with parts from the open market, assemble a simple “gun-type” nuclear device that simply collides two quantities of HEU. Experts suggest that if a simple nuclear device were detonated in a major city, the number of deaths would range from tens of thousands to more than one million. The shock to international commerce, employment and travel would amount to at least one trillion dollars. Such an attack could have further, far-reaching implications for international security, democratic governance and civil rights.

2. Radiological weapons 113. A different threat is posed by radiological weapons, which are more weapons of mass disruption than mass destruction. Radiological weapons can use plutonium or highly enriched uranium but can rely simply on radioactive materials, of which there are millions of sources used in medical and industrial facilities worldwide. The immediate destructive effect of a radiological or “dirty” bomb is only as great as its conventional explosive, and even the radiation effects of such a bomb are likely to be limited. The more harmful effects of disruption and economic damage would be prompted by public alarm and the necessity of evacuating and decontaminating affected areas. The ubiquity of radiological materials and the crude requirements for detonating such a device suggest a high likelihood of use. This puts a premium on educating the public about the limited consequences of radiological weapons in order to mitigate some of the alarm and uncertainty that would be unleashed in the event of an attack.

3. Chemical and biological weapons 114. Chemical and biological materials also pose a growing threat: they share with nuclear weapons the awful potential of being used in a single attack to inflict mass casualties.

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Chemical agents are widespread and relatively easy to acquire and weaponize. There are almost 6,000 industrial chemical facilities worldwide, posing potential targets and opportunities for the acquisition of materials. Chemical-weapon States have lagged behind in the destruction of chemical weapons scheduled by the Chemical Weapons Convention: of the 70,000 metric tons of declared weapons agents, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has verified the destruction of only 9,600, and if the current pace persists, the Convention’s goal of the complete destruction of chemical weapons agents will not be met even by the agreed extended deadline of 2012. 115. While rapid growth and scientific advances in the biotechnology sector hold out the prospect of prevention and cure for many diseases, they also increase opportunities for the development of deadly new ones. Dramatic advances in recombinant DNA technology and direct genetic manipulation raise the spectre of “designer bugs”, which may be developed to reconstruct eradicated diseases and to resist existing vaccinations, antibiotics and other treatments. There are countless fermentation, medical and research facilities equipped to produce biological agents. Meanwhile, the biological toxin ricin has been discovered in several terrorist workshops. Unlike anthrax, which can be treated by antibiotics, ricin has no antidote and is lethal to humans in quantities smaller than the size of a pinhead. Use of similar materials to cause deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease could prove equally if not more lethal than a nuclear detonation. Under worst-case assumptions, an attack using only one gram of weaponized smallpox could produce between 100,000 and 1,000,000 fatalities. 116. That a high-damage attack has not occurred is not a cause for complacency but a call for urgent prevention.

B. Meeting the challenge of prevention 117. Multilayered action is required. The first layer of an effective strategy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons should feature global instruments that reduce the demand for them. The second layer should contain global instruments that operate on the supply side — to limit the capacity of both States and non-State actors to acquire weapons and the materials and expertise needed to build them. The third layer must consist of Security Council enforcement activity underpinned by credible, shared information and analysis. The fourth layer must comprise national and international civilian and public health defence.

1. Better strategies to reduce demand 118. Lacklustre disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States weakens the diplomatic force of the non-proliferation regime and thus its ability to constrain proliferation. Despite Security Council commitment to the contrary (resolution 984 (1995)), these nuclearweapon States are increasingly unwilling to pledge assurances of non-use (negative security assurances) and they maintain the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons against chemical or biological attack.

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119. Despite the end of the cold war, nuclear-weapon States earn only a mixed grade in fulfilling their disarmament commitments. While the United States and the Russian Federation have dismantled roughly half of their nuclear weapons, committed to large reductions in deployed strategic warheads and eliminated most of their non-strategic nuclear weapons, such progress has been overshadowed by recent reversals. In 2000, the nuclear-weapon States committed to 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, which were all but renounced by them at the 2004 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 120. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament: (a) They must honour their commitments under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments; (b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, to further diminish the perceived value of nuclear weapons, and secure robust international cooperation to staunch proliferation, formalizing such commitments in pending and future nuclear-weapon-free zones agreements. 121. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons. 122. In addition, we believe it would be valuable if the Security Council explicitly pledged to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear-weapon State. 123. Given the challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime posed by States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recognizing the impact of that challenge on regional insecurity, we recommend that negotiations to resolve regional conflicts include confidence-building measures and steps towards disarmament. 124. States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia.

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125. For biological and chemical weapons, there is both an obligation and a historic opportunity to fully eliminate all declared chemical weapons stockpiles: all chemicalweapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012. 126. Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention should also be further strengthened, and the long-standing impasse over a verification mechanism for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which has undermined confidence in the overall regime, should be overcome. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention must increase bilateral diplomatic pressure to universalize membership.

2. Better strategies to reduce supply 127. We recognize that nuclear energy, in the view of many, is an important source of power for civilian uses and may become even more crucial in the context of a worldwide effort to reduce dependency on fossil fuels and emissions of greenhouse gases. At the same time, the mounting tension between the goals of achieving a more effective nonproliferation regime and the right of all signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to develop civilian nuclear industries needs to be addressed and defused. 128. Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons guarantees States parties’ rights to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; this right must be preserved. The Treaty also specifies that this right must be used in conformity with its articles I and II; this obligation also must be respected. In recent years, it has become clear that the proliferation risks from the enrichment of uranium and from the reprocessing of spent fuel are great and increasing. These two processes in particular provide a route by which Treaty signatories can (and in some cases have) clandestinely pursued activities not in conformity with the Treaty and designed to give them the option of acquiring a nuclear-weapon capability. 129. Two remedies are required. First, the inspection and verification rules that have governed IAEA through the mid-1990s have proven increasingly inadequate. IAEA initiated more stringent inspection rules in the Model Additional Protocol, but as yet only one third of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have ratified the Protocol. The IAEA Board of Governors should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today’s standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards. 130. Second, we urge that negotiations be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of articles III and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. Such an arrangement would need to put the Agency in a position to meet, through suppliers it authorized, demands for

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nuclear fuel supplies of low enriched uranium and for the reprocessing of spent fuel at market rates and to provide a guarantee of uninterrupted supply of these services, as long as there was no breach of safeguard or inspection procedures at the facilities in question. 131. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to construct such facilities, voluntarily institute a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further enrichment or reprocessing facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates. 132. Recent experience of the activities of the A.Q. Khan network has demonstrated the need for and the value of measures taken to interdict the illicit and clandestine trade in components for nuclear programmes. This problem is currently being addressed on a voluntary basis by the Proliferation Security Initiative. We believe that all States should be encouraged to join this voluntary initiative. 133. In order to reinforce international legal provisions against the illicit trafficking of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, ongoing negotiations at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to amend the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation should be completed in a timely manner. The Security Council may need to be prepared to consider mandatory action if progress in the Convention negotiations is unsatisfactory. 134. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides the right of withdrawal from the Treaty, States should be urged not to do so. Those who withdraw should be held responsible for violations committed while still a party to the Treaty. A State’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn. 135. Urgent short-term action is needed to defend against the possible terrorist use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. High priority must be accorded to consolidating, securing, and when possible eliminating potentially hazardous materials, and implementing effective export controls. To that end, we welcome the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which facilitates (a) the reduction of global highly enriched uranium stockpiles, (b) the conversion of HEU research reactors to “proliferation-resistant” reactors, and (c) the “downblending” of existing HEU. The proposed timeline for implementing the Global Threat Reduction Initiative should be halved from 10 to 5 years. 136. The Security Council, acting under its resolution 1540 (2004), can offer States model legislation for security, tracking, criminalization and export controls, and by 2006 develop minimum standards for United Nations Member State implementation. To achieve that goal, the implementation committee of Council resolution 1540 (2004) should establish a permanent liaison with IAEA, OPCW and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

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137. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should also negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of such agents. Within a designated time frame, States parties to the Convention should refrain from participating in such biotechnology commerce with non-members. 138. IAEA member States should increase funding for its programmes that help to locate and secure radioactive sources and that assist States in establishing pertinent domestic legislation. Moreover, the Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes.

3. Better enforcement capability 139. The Security Council today has few arrows in its quiver other than sanctions and military force to enforce non-proliferation agreements. Moreover, a special referral to the Security Council that results in no action is worse than no referral. The ability of the Security Council to generate credible information about potential instances of proliferation should be strengthened. 140. To that end, links between IAEA and OPCW and the Security Council must also be strengthened. The Directors-General of IAEA and OPCW should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention. 141. The Security Council should also be prepared to deploy inspection capacities for suspected nuclear and chemical violations, drawing on the capacities of IAEA and OPCW. Until multilateral negotiations yield a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention verification mechanism, the Security Council should avail itself of the Secretary-General’s roster of inspectors for biological weapons, who should remain independent and work under United Nations staff codes. This roster of inspectors should also be available to advise the Council and liaise with WHO authorities in the event of a suspicious disease outbreak, as discussed below.

4. Better public health defences 142. Scientific advancements in biotechnology and the ubiquity of facilities capable of producing biological agents circumscribe prospects for the elimination of biological weapons and complicate verification efforts. But unlike nuclear weapons, many (though not all) biological agents can be countered by vaccinations and effective responses (including rapid diagnosis, quarantines and treatment). Well-prepared societies may thus be able to avoid the worst-case scenarios of biological attacks.

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143. However, at present, international aid for infectious disease monitoring, detection and response is lacking, security planning and spending are poorly coordinated with healthcare policies and budgets, and there is insufficient understanding that an inevitable, new biological future makes active bio-defence the most viable option against the likelihood of attack. 144. Given the potential international security threat posed by the intentional release of an infectious biological agent or an overwhelming natural outbreak of an infectious disease, there is a need for the WHO Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to keep the Security Council informed during any suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. In such an event, the Security Council should be prepared to support the work of WHO investigators or to deploy experts reporting directly to the Council, and if existing International Health Regulations do not provide adequate access for WHO investigations and response coordination, the Security Council should be prepared to mandate greater compliance. In the event that a State is unable to adequately quarantine large numbers of potential carriers, the Security Council should be prepared to support international action to assist in cordon operations. The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director-General to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.

VI. TERRORISM A. The threat we face 145. Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; it also flourishes in contexts of regional conflict and foreign occupation; and it profits from weak State capacity to maintain law and order. 146. Two new dynamics give the terrorist threat greater urgency. Al-Qaida is the first instance — not likely to be the last — of an armed non-State network with global reach and sophisticated capacity. Attacks against more than 10 Member States on four continents in the past five years have demonstrated that Al-Qaida and associated entities pose a universal threat to the membership of the United Nations and the United Nations itself. In public statements, Al-Qaida has singled out the United Nations as a major obstacle to its goals and defined it as one of its enemies. Second, the threat that terrorists — of whatever type, with whatever motivation — will seek to cause mass casualties creates unprecedented dangers. Our recommendations provided above on controlling the supply of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials and building robust global public health systems are central to a strategy to prevent this threat.

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147. Throughout the Panel’s regional consultations, it heard concerns from Governments and civil society organizations that the current “war on terrorism” has in some instances corroded the very values that terrorists target: human rights and the rule of law. Most of those who expressed such concerns did not question the seriousness of the terrorist threat and acknowledged that the right to life is the most fundamental of human rights. They did, however, express fears that approaches to terror focusing wholly on military, police and intelligence measures risk undermining efforts to promote good governance and human rights, alienate large parts of the world’s population and thereby weaken the potential for collective action against terrorism. The crucial need, in relation to the States in the regions from which terrorists originate, is to address not only their capacity but their will to fight terror. To develop that will — with States drawing support rather than opposition from their own publics — requires a broader-based approach. 148. A thread that runs through all such concerns is the imperative to develop a global strategy of fighting terrorism that addresses root causes and strengthens responsible States and the rule of law and fundamental human rights. What is required is a comprehensive strategy that incorporates but is broader than coercive measures. The United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, should promote such a comprehensive strategy, which includes: (a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, including through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform; working to end occupations and address major political grievances; combating organized crime; reducing poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse. All of the strategies discussed above for preventing other threats have secondary benefits in working to remove some of the causes or facilitators of terrorism; (b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through education and fostering public debate. One recent innovation by UNDP, the Arab Human Development Report, has helped catalyse a wide ranging debate within the Middle East on the need for gender empowerment, political freedom, rule of law and civil liberties; (c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights, including in the areas of law enforcement; intelligence-sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls; (d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations; (e)

Control of dangerous materials and public health defence.

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142 2. Better counter-terrorism instruments

149. Several United Nations anti-terrorist conventions have laid important normative foundations. However, far too many States remain outside the conventions and not all countries ratifying the conventions proceed to adopt internal enforcement measures. Also, attempts to address the problem of terrorist financing have been inadequate. While in the three months after 11 September 2001 $112 million in alleged terrorist funds were frozen, only $24 million were frozen in the two years that followed. Seized funds represent only a small fraction of total funds available to terrorist organizations. While many States have insufficient anti-money-laundering laws and technical capacity, the evasion techniques of terrorists are highly developed and many terrorist funds have a legal origin and are hard to regulate. 150. Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing and ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and should adopt the eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-supported Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering and the measures recommended in its various best practices papers. 151. The Security Council has played an important role in filling gaps in counter-terrorism strategy. Since the early 1990s, the Security Council has attempted to weaken State support for and strengthen State resistance to terrorism. From 1992 onwards, the Security Council applied sanctions against individuals and States that supported terrorism — including, in 1999 and 2000, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The initial response by the Security Council to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was swift and impressive. Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) imposed uniform, mandatory counterterrorist obligations on all States and established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor compliance and to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to States. 152. However, the Security Council must proceed with caution. The way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the Council and the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues and possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conventions. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists. 153. Sanctions imposed by the Security Council and the work of its Counter-Terrorism Committee have played an important role in ending the support of some States for terrorism and mobilizing other States in the fight against it. However, Council sanctions against Al-Qaida and Taliban suffer from lagging support and implementation by Member States and affect only a small subset of known Al-Qaida operatives, while a number of States are lagging behind in their compliance with the directives of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. We believe that further action is needed to achieve full implementation of these directives.

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143 3. Assisting States in confronting terrorism

154. Because United Nations-facilitated assistance is limited to technical support, States seeking operational support for counter-terrorism activities have no alternative but to seek bilateral assistance. A United Nations capacity to facilitate this assistance would in some instances ease domestic political constraints, and this can be achieved by providing for the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a clearing house for State-to-State provision of military, police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities. The Security Council, after consultation with affected States, should extend the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to perform this function. 155. Non-compliance can be a matter of insufficient will but is more frequently a function of lack of capacity. United Nations Member States and specialized bodies should increase their efforts to provide States with access to effective legal, administrative and police tools to prevent terrorism. To aid this process, the United Nations should establish a capacity-building trust fund under the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate. 156. If confronted by States that have the capacity to undertake their obligations but repeatedly fail to do so, the Security Council may need to take additional measures to ensure compliance, and should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions for State non-compliance.

4. Defining terrorism 157. The United Nations ability to develop a comprehensive strategy has been constrained by the inability of Member States to agree on an anti-terrorism convention including a definition of terrorism. This prevents the United Nations from exerting its moral authority and from sending an unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even for the most defensible of causes. 158. Since 1945, an ever stronger set of norms and laws — including the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court — has regulated and constrained States’ decisions to use force and their conduct in war — for example in the requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians, to use force proportionally and to live up to basic humanitarian principles. Violations of these obligations should continue to be met with widespread condemnation and war crimes should be prosecuted. 159. The norms governing the use of force by non-State actors have not kept pace with those pertaining to States. This is not so much a legal question as a political one. Legally, virtually all forms of terrorism are prohibited by one of 12 international counter-terrorism conventions, international customary law, the Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statutes. Legal scholars know this, but there is a clear difference between this scattered list of conventions and little-known provisions of other treaties and the compelling normative framework, understood by all, that should surround the question of terrorism. The United Nations must achieve the same degree of normative strength concerning non-State use of force as it has concerning State use of force. Lack of agreement on a clear and well-known

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definition undermines the normative and moral stance against terrorism and has stained the United Nations image. Achieving a comprehensive convention on terrorism, including a clear definition, is a political imperative. 160. The search for an agreed definition usually stumbles on two issues. The first is the argument that any definition should include States’ use of armed forces against civilians. We believe that the legal and normative framework against State violations is far stronger than in the case of non-State actors and we do not find this objection to be compelling. The second objection is that peoples under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a definition of terrorism should not override this right. The right to resistance is contested by some. But it is not the central point: the central point is that there is nothing in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians. 161. Neither of these objections is weighty enough to contradict the argument that the strong, clear normative framework of the United Nations surrounding State use of force must be complemented by a normative framework of equal authority surrounding nonState use of force. Attacks that specifically target innocent civilians and non-combatants must be condemned clearly and unequivocally by all. 162. We welcome the recent passage of Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), which includes several measures to strengthen the role of the United Nations in combating terrorism. 163. Nevertheless, we believe there is particular value in achieving a consensus definition within the General Assembly, given its unique legitimacy in normative terms, and that it should rapidly complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on terrorism. 164. That definition of terrorism should include the following elements: (a) Recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity; (b) Restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols; (c) Reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004); (d) Description of terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.

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145 VII. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME A. The threat we face

165. Transnational organized crime is a menace to States and societies, eroding human security and the fundamental obligation of States to provide for law and order. Combating organized crime serves the double purpose of reducing this direct threat to State and human security, and also constitutes a necessary step in the effort to prevent and resolve internal conflicts, combat the spread of weapons and prevent terrorism. 166. One of the core activities of organized criminal groups — drug trafficking — has major security implications. It is estimated that criminal organizations gain $300 to $500 billion annually from narcotics trafficking, their single largest source of income. In some regions, the huge profits generated through this activity even rivals some countries’ GDP, thus threatening State authority, economic development and the rule of law. Drug trafficking has fuelled an increase in intravenous heroin use, which has contributed in some parts of the world to an alarming spread of the HIV/AIDS virus. There is growing evidence of a nexus between terrorist groups’ financing and opium profits, most visibly in Afghanistan. 167. States and international organizations have reacted too slowly to the threat of organized crime and corruption. Statements about the seriousness of the threat have rarely been matched by action. Three basic impediments stand in the way of more effective international responses: insufficient cooperation among States, weak coordination among international agencies and inadequate compliance by many States. 168. Effectiveness in tackling specific incarnations of organized crime varies. Anticorruption efforts suffer from a lack of commitment and understanding about the types, levels, location and cost of corruption. In the effort to curb the supply of narcotics, successes in some countries are often offset by failures in others. National demandreduction initiatives in the industrialized world have been similarly ineffective, and the total number of opium and heroin users has remained relatively stable over the last decade. 169. Responses to organized crime during and after conflict have been decentralized and fragmented. In the post-war period, former belligerents seek to exploit criminal connections and know-how developed during the war, thus undermining international peacebuilding efforts. Entrenched corruption, the use of violence to protect criminal activities and close ties between criminal enterprises and political elites hinder establishing the rule of law and effective State institutions. International efforts in curbing arms trafficking have been insufficient and sanctions regimes are insufficiently enforced. 170. Organized crime is increasingly operating through fluid networks rather than more formal hierarchies. This form of organization provides criminals with diversity, flexibility, low visibility and longevity. Connections among different networks became a major feature of the organized crime world during the 1990s, thus creating networks of networks. The agility of such networks stands in marked contrast to the cumbersome sharing of information and weak cooperation in criminal investigations and prosecutions on the part of States.

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146 B. Meeting the challenge of prevention

171.Combating organized crime requires better international regulatory frameworks and extended efforts in building State capacity in the area of the rule of law. Concerted efforts against human trafficking are also required.

1. Better international regulatory frameworks 172. Several recent international conventions hold the potential to level the playing field by allowing quicker, closer cooperation by States. Such conventions, however, lack universal adherence and suffer from inadequate implementation and observance by participating States. There is a need for mechanisms to monitor Member States’ compliance with their commitments and to identify and remedy legislative and institutional deficiencies. The collective response to organized crime depends on the consolidation and strengthening of the international treaty framework. More than half of the Member States of the United Nations have not yet signed or ratified the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols and the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption, or adequately resourced the monitoring provisions of these Conventions and Protocols. Member States that have not signed, ratified or resourced these Conventions and Protocols should do so, and all Member States should support the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its work in this area. 173. Organized crime groups move freely across borders; legal cooperation is impeded by them. Member States should establish a central authority to facilitate the exchange of evidence among national judicial authorities, mutual legal assistance among prosecutorial authorities and the implementation of extradition requests. 174. Unlike terrorists, criminals are motivated by financial gain. The single best strategy for weakening organized crime is to eliminate its ability to launder money. Transnational organized crime generates income of about $500 billion a year, with some sources estimating triple that amount. In 2000, between $500 billion and $1.5 trillion were laundered. Despite the magnitude of these sums and their role in furthering organized crime, many States do not regulate money-laundering. Indiscriminate enforcement of bank secrecy and the rapid development of financial havens remains a serious obstacle to tackling this problem. A comprehensive international convention on money-laundering that addresses these issues needs to be negotiated, and endorsed by the General Assembly. 175. The most obscene form taken by organized crime is the traffic in human beings, and all Member States should take decisive action to halt it. Member States should sign and ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and parties to the Protocol should take all necessary steps to effectively implement it. 176. The United Nations should further promote technical cooperation among countries and international law enforcement agencies to secure the protection of and support for victims of trafficking in countries of origin, transit and destination. In particular, the

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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Labour Organization (ILO) should aggressively promote the human rights of women and children, and should integrate specific strategies to assist them into their programmes and help protect them against becoming victims of human trafficking.

2. Better State capacity-building 177. Lagging implementation is also a function, in some cases, of limited State capacity. In order to address this problem international organizations, most prominently the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, have set up technical assistance and training programmes aimed at the building of effective national law enforcement and judicial institutions. However, these activities are insufficiently resourced. The United Nations should establish a robust capacity-building mechanism for rule-of-law assistance. Regional organizations and multinational financial institutions should actively join these efforts.

VIII. THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS 178. In dealing preventively with the threats to international peace and security, sanctions are a vital though imperfect tool. They constitute a necessary middle ground between war and words when nations, individuals and rebel groups violate international norms, and where a failure to respond would weaken those norms, embolden other transgressors or be interpreted as consent. 179. Targeted sanctions (financial, travel, aviation or arms embargoes) are useful for putting pressure on leaders and elites with minimal humanitarian consequences, provide a less costly alternative to other options and can be tailored to specific circumstances. By isolating violators of international standards and laws, even modest sanctions measures (including sports embargoes) can serve an important symbolic purpose. The threat of sanctions can be a powerful means of deterrence and prevention. 180. The Security Council must ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced: (a) When the Security Council imposes a sanctions regime — including arms embargoes — it should routinely establish monitoring mechanisms and provide them with the necessary authority and capacity to carry out high-quality, in-depth investigations. Adequate budgetary provisions must be made to implement those mechanisms; (b) Security Council sanctions committees should be mandated to develop improved guidelines and reporting procedures to assist States in sanctions implementation, and to improve procedures for maintaining accurate lists of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions; (c) The Secretary-General should appoint a senior official with sufficient supporting resources to enable the Secretary-General to supply the Security Council

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with analysis of the best way to target sanctions and to assist in coordinating their implementation. This official would also assist compliance efforts; identify technical assistance needs and coordinate such assistance; and make recommendations on any adjustments necessary to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions; (d) Donors should devote more resources to strengthening the legal, administrative, and policing and border-control capacity of Member States to implement sanctions. These capacity-building measures should include efforts to improve air-traffic interdiction in zones of conflict; (e) The Security Council should, in instances of verified, chronic violations, impose secondary sanctions against those involved in sanctions-busting; (f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, should ensure that an appropriate auditing mechanism is in place to oversee sanctions administration. 181. Sanctions committees should improve procedures for providing humanitarian exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the humanitarian impact of sanctions. The Security Council should continue to strive to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions. 182. Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees should establish procedures to review the cases of those claiming to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists.

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149 PART THREE

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE USE OF FORCE

Synopsis What happens if peaceful prevention fails? If none of the preventive measures so far described stop the descent into war and chaos? If distant threats do become imminent? Or if imminent threats become actual? Or if a non-imminent threat nonetheless becomes very real and measures short of the use of military force seem powerless to stop it? We address here the circumstances in which effective collective security may require the backing of military force, starting with the rules of international law that must govern any decision to go to war, if anarchy is not to prevail. It is necessary to distinguish between situations in which a State claims to act in self-defence; situations in which a State is posing a threat to others outside its borders; and situations in which the threat is primarily internal and the issue is the responsibility to protect a State’s own people. In all cases, we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task: Article 51 needs neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope, and Chapter VII fully empowers the Security Council to deal with every kind of threat that States may confront. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better than it has. That force can legally be used, does not always mean that, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be used. We identify a set of guidelines — five criteria of legitimacy — which we believe the Security Council (and anyone else involved in these decisions) should always address in considering whether to authorize or apply military force. The adoption of these guidelines (seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences) will not produce agreed conclusions with push-button predictability, but should significantly improve the chances of reaching international consensus on what have been in recent years deeply divisive issues. We also address here the other major issues that arise during and after violent conflict, including the needed capacities for peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the protection of civilians. A central recurring theme is the necessity for all members of the international community, developed and developing States alike, to be much more forthcoming in providing and supporting deployable military resources. Empty gestures are all too easy to make: an effective, efficient and equitable collective security system demands real commitment.

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IX. USING FORCE: RULES AND GUIDELINES 183. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations recognized that force may be necessary for the “prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”. Military force, legally and properly applied, is a vital component of any workable system of collective security, whether defined in the traditional narrow sense or more broadly as we would prefer. But few contemporary policy issues cause more difficulty, or involve higher stakes, than the principles concerning its use and application to individual cases. 184. The maintenance of world peace and security depends importantly on there being a common global understanding, and acceptance, of when the application of force is both legal and legitimate. One of these elements being satisfied without the other will always weaken the international legal order — and thereby put both State and human security at greater risk.

A. The question of legality 185. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 2.4, expressly prohibits Member States from using or threatening force against each other, allowing only two exceptions: selfdefence under Article 51, and military measures authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII (and by extension for regional organizations under Chapter VIII) in response to “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”. 186. For the first 44 years of the United Nations, Member States often violated these rules and used military force literally hundreds of times, with a paralysed Security Council passing very few Chapter VII resolutions and Article 51 only rarely providing credible cover. Since the end of the cold war, however, the yearning for an international system governed by the rule of law has grown. There is little evident international acceptance of the idea of security being best preserved by a balance of power, or by any single — even benignly motivated — superpower. 187. But in seeking to apply the express language of the Charter, three particularly difficult questions arise in practice: first, when a State claims the right to strike preventively, in self-defence, in response to a threat which is not imminent; secondly, when a State appears to be posing an external threat, actual or potential, to other States or people outside its borders, but there is disagreement in the Security Council as to what to do about it; and thirdly, where the threat is primarily internal, to a State’s own people.

1. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and self-defence 188. The language of this article is restrictive: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security”. However, a threatened State, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate. The problem

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arises where the threat in question is not imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability. 189. Can a State, without going to the Security Council, claim in these circumstances the right to act, in anticipatory self-defence, not just pre-emptively (against an imminent or proximate threat) but preventively (against a non-imminent or non-proximate one)? Those who say “yes” argue that the potential harm from some threats (e.g., terrorists armed with a nuclear weapon) is so great that one simply cannot risk waiting until they become imminent, and that less harm may be done (e.g., avoiding a nuclear exchange or radioactive fallout from a reactor destruction) by acting earlier. 190. The short answer is that if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment — and to visit again the military option. 191. For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all. 192. We do not favour the rewriting or reinterpretation of Article 51.

2. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and external threats 193. In the case of a State posing a threat to other States, people outside its borders or to international order more generally, the language of Chapter VII is inherently broad enough, and has been interpreted broadly enough, to allow the Security Council to approve any coercive action at all, including military action, against a State when it deems this “necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. That is the case whether the threat is occurring now, in the imminent future or more distant future; whether it involves the State’s own actions or those of non-State actors it harbours or supports; or whether it takes the form of an act or omission, an actual or potential act of violence or simply a challenge to the Council’s authority. 194. We emphasize that the concerns we expressed about the legality of the preventive use of military force in the case of self-defence under Article 51 are not applicable in the case of collective action authorized under Chapter VII. In the world of the twenty-first century, the international community does have to be concerned about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible States, and much more besides, which may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively but preventively and before a latent threat becomes imminent. The question is not whether such action can be taken: it can, by the Security Council as the international community’s collective security voice, at any time it deems that there is a threat to international peace and security. The Council may well need to be prepared to be much more proactive on these issues, taking more decisive action earlier, than it has been in the past.

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195. Questions of legality apart, there will be issues of prudence, or legitimacy, about whether such preventive action should be taken: crucial among them is whether there is credible evidence of the reality of the threat in question (taking into account both capability and specific intent) and whether the military response is the only reasonable one in the circumstances. We address these issues further below. 196. It may be that some States will always feel that they have the obligation to their own citizens, and the capacity, to do whatever they feel they need to do, unburdened by the constraints of collective Security Council process. But however understandable that approach may have been in the cold war years, when the United Nations was manifestly not operating as an effective collective security system, the world has now changed and expectations about legal compliance are very much higher. 197. One of the reasons why States may want to bypass the Security Council is a lack of confidence in the quality and objectivity of its decision-making. The Council’s decisions have often been less than consistent, less than persuasive and less than fully responsive to very real State and human security needs. But the solution is not to reduce the Council to impotence and irrelevance: it is to work from within to reform it, including in the ways we propose in the present report. 198. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States are concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work better than it has.

3. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, internal threats and the responsibility to protect 199. The Charter of the United Nations is not as clear as it could be when it comes to saving lives within countries in situations of mass atrocity. It “reaffirm(s) faith in fundamental human rights” but does not do much to protect them, and Article 2.7 prohibits intervention “in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any State”. There has been, as a result, a long-standing argument in the international community between those who insist on a “right to intervene” in man-made catastrophes and those who argue that the Security Council, for all its powers under Chapter VII to “maintain or restore international security”, is prohibited from authorizing any coercive action against sovereign States for whatever happens within their borders. 200. Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), States have agreed that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish. Since then it has been understood that genocide anywhere is a threat to the security of all and should never be tolerated. The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing, which can properly be considered a threat to international security and as such provoke action by the Security Council.

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201. The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the immunities of sovereign Governments but their responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider international community. There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the “right to intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility to protect” of every State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe — mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. And there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community — with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies. The primary focus should be on assisting the cessation of violence through mediation and other tools and the protection of people through such measures as the dispatch of humanitarian, human rights and police missions. Force, if it needs to be used, should be deployed as a last resort. 202. The Security Council so far has been neither very consistent nor very effective in dealing with these cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly or not at all. But step by step, the Council and the wider international community have come to accept that, under Chapter VII and in pursuit of the emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to protect, it can always authorize military action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare that the situation is a “threat to international peace and security”, not especially difficult when breaches of international law are involved. 203. We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.

B. The question of legitimacy 204. The effectiveness of the global collective security system, as with any other legal order, depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the common perception of their legitimacy — their being made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for the right reasons, morally as well as legally. 205. If the Security Council is to win the respect it must have as the primary body in the collective security system, it is critical that its most important and influential decisions, those with large-scale life-and-death impact, be better made, better substantiated and better communicated. In particular, in deciding whether or not to authorize the use of force, the Council should adopt and systematically address a set of agreed guidelines, going directly not to whether force can legally be used but whether, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be. 206. The guidelines we propose will not produce agreed conclusions with push-button predictability. The point of adopting them is not to guarantee that the objectively best outcome will always prevail. It is rather to maximize the possibility of achieving Security

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Council consensus around when it is appropriate or not to use coercive action, including armed force; to maximize international support for whatever the Security Council decides; and to minimize the possibility of individual Member States bypassing the Security Council. 207. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security Council should always address — whatever other considerations it may take into account — at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy: (a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? (b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved? (c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed? (d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question? (e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? 208. The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be embodied in declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. 209. We also believe it would be valuable if individual Member States, whether or not they are members of the Security Council, subscribed to them.

X. PEACE ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY 210. When the Security Council makes a determination that force must be authorized, questions remain about the capacities at its disposal to implement that decision. In recent years, decisions to authorize military force for the purpose of enforcing the peace have primarily fallen to multinational forces. Blue helmet peacekeepers — in United Nations uniform and under direct United Nations command — have more frequently been deployed when forces are authorized with the consent of the parties to conflict, to help implement a peace agreement or monitor ceasefire lines after combat. 211. Discussion of the necessary capacities has been confused by the tendency to refer to peacekeeping missions as “Chapter VI operations” and peace enforcement missions as

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“Chapter VII operations” — meaning consent-based or coercion-based, respectively. This shorthand is also often used to distinguish missions that do not involve the use of deadly force for purposes other than self-defence, and those that do. 212. Both characterizations are to some extent misleading. There is a distinction between operations in which the robust use of force is integral to the mission from the outset (e.g., responses to cross-border invasions or an explosion of violence, in which the recent practice has been to mandate multinational forces) and operations in which there is a reasonable expectation that force may not be needed at all (e.g., traditional peacekeeping missions monitoring and verifying a ceasefire or those assisting in implementing peace agreements, where blue helmets are still the norm). 213. But both kinds of operation need the authorization of the Security Council (Article 51 self-defence cases apart), and in peacekeeping cases as much as in peace-enforcement cases it is now the usual practice for a Chapter VII mandate to be given (even if that is not always welcomed by troop contributors). This is on the basis that even the most benign environment can turn sour — when spoilers emerge to undermine a peace agreement and put civilians at risk — and that it is desirable for there to be complete certainty about the mission’s capacity to respond with force, if necessary. On the other hand, the difference between Chapter VI and VII mandates can be exaggerated: there is little doubt that peacekeeping missions operating under Chapter VI (and thus operating without enforcement powers) have the right to use force in self-defence — and this right is widely understood to extend to “defence of the mission”. 214. The real challenge, in any deployment of forces of any configuration with any role, is to ensure that they have (a) an appropriate, clear and well understood mandate, applicable to all the changing circumstances that might reasonably be envisaged, and (b) all the necessary resources to implement that mandate fully. 215. The demand for personnel for both full-scale peace-enforcement missions and peacekeeping missions remains higher than the ready supply. At the end of 2004, there are more than 60,000 peacekeepers deployed in 16 missions around the world. If international efforts stay on track to end several long-standing wars in Africa, the numbers of peacekeepers needed will soon substantially increase. In the absence of a commensurate increase in available personnel, United Nations peacekeeping risks repeating some of its worst failures of the 1990s. 216. At present, the total global supply of personnel is constrained both by the fact that the armed forces of many countries remain configured for cold war duties, with less than 10 per cent of those in uniform available for active deployment at any given time, and by the fact that few nations have sufficient transport and logistic capabilities to move and supply those who are available. For peacekeeping, and in extreme cases peace enforcement, to continue to be an effective and accepted instrument of collective security, the availability of peacekeepers must grow. The developed States have particular responsibilities here, and should do more to transform their existing force capacities into suitable contingents for peace operations. 217. Prompt and effective response to today’s challenges requires a dependable capacity for the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment for peacekeeping and law

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enforcement. States that have either global or regional air- or sea-lift capacities should make these available to the United Nations, either free of charge or on the basis of a negotiated fee-based structure for the reimbursement of the additional costs associated with United Nations use of these capacities. 218. Member States should strongly support the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat, building on the important work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305S/2000/809), to improve its use of strategic deployment stockpiles, standby arrangements, trust funds and other mechanisms to meet the tighter deadlines necessary for effective deployment. 219. However, it is unlikely that the demand for rapid action will be met through United Nations mechanisms alone. We welcome the European Union decision to establish standby high readiness, self-sufficient battalions that can reinforce United Nations missions. Others with advanced military capacities should be encouraged to develop similar capacities at up to brigade level and to place them at the disposal of the United Nations.

Regional cooperation 220. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a trend towards a variety of regional- and subregional-based peacekeeping missions. This trend holds the promise of developing regional capacity to address shortfalls in the numbers of peacekeepers, and it should augment and not detract from the ability of the United Nations to respond when blue helmets are requested. This poses a challenge for the Security Council and regional organizations to work closely with each other and mutually support each other’s efforts to keep the peace and ensure that regional operations are accountable to universally accepted human rights standards. We address this question in part four below.

XI. POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING A. The role of peacekeepers 221. It is often necessary to build confidence among former adversaries and provide security to ordinary people trying to rebuild their lives and communities after conflict. The mediation and successful implementation of a peace agreement offers hope for breaking long-standing cycles of violence that haunt many war-inflicted countries. Resources spent on implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding are one of the best investments that can be made for conflict prevention — States that have experienced civil war face a high risk of recurrence. 222. Implementing peace agreements to end civil wars poses unique challenges for peacekeepers. Unlike inter-State wars, making peace in civil war requires overcoming daunting security dilemmas. Spoilers, factions who see a peace agreement as inimical to their interest, power or ideology, use violence to undermine or overthrow settlements. Peacekeeping fails when resources and strategies are not commensurate to meeting the

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challenge they pose — as occurred repeatedly in the 1990s, for example in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. When peacekeeping operations are deployed to implement peace agreements, they must be equipped to repel attacks from spoilers. Contingency plans for responding to hostile opposition should be an integral part of the mission design; missions that do not have the troop strength to resist aggression will invite it. In some contexts, opposition to a peace agreement is not tactical but fundamental. We must learn the lesson: peace agreements by Governments or rebels that engage in or encourage mass human rights abuses have no value and cannot be implemented. These contexts are not appropriate for consent-based peacekeeping; rather, they must be met with concerted action. The Secretary-General should recommend and the Security Council should authorize troop strengths sufficient to deter and repel hostile factions. 223. Most peacekeeping situations also require policing and other law and order functions, and the slow deployment of police contingents has marred successive operations. The United Nations should have a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50 100 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations, and the General Assembly should authorize this capacity.

B. The larger peacebuilding task 224. Deploying peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not sufficient for long-term recovery. Serious attention to the longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions is critical; failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases the odds that a country will relapse into conflict. 225. In both the period before the outbreak of civil war and in the transition out of war, neither the United Nations nor the broader international community, including the international financial institutions, are well organized to assist countries attempting to build peace. When peacekeepers leave a country, it falls off the radar screen of the Security Council. While the Economic and Social Council has created several ad hoc committees to address specific cases, results have proven mixed and even the proponents of these committees acknowledge that they have not succeeded in generating crucial resources to assist fragile transitions. What is needed is a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace. We address this need in part four below. 226. Similarly, at the field level, many different elements of the United Nations system and the broader international community engage in some form of peacebuilding, but they work too slowly and without adequate coordination. Effective coordination is critical. National authorities should be at the heart of this coordination effort, and should be supported by coherent United Nations and international presences. Robust donor coordination mechanisms at the field level, involving Governments, bilateral donors, the international financial institutions and the United Nations coordinator (special representative of the Secretary-General or resident coordinator) representing the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, have proved their value for ensuring effective

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peacebuilding. Special representatives should have the authority and guidance to work with relevant parties to establish such mechanisms, as well as the resources to perform coordination functions effectively, including ensuring that the sequencing of United Nations assessments and activities is consistent with Government priorities. 227. Given that many peace operations can expect resource shortfalls, the efficient use of resources is all the more important. Demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals — such as democratization, justice and development — have little chance for success. In case after case, however, demobilization is not accorded priority by funders. When peace operations are deployed, they must be resourced to undertake the demobilization and disarmament of combatants; this is a priority for successful peace implementation. These tasks should be integrated into the assessed budget of peacekeeping operations, under the authority of the head of mission. The Security Council should mandate and the General Assembly should authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization programmes from assessed budgets. 228. But these programmes will be ineffective without the provision of resources for reintegration and rehabilitation. Failure to successfully implement such programmes will result in youth unemployment and fuel the development of criminal gangs and violence and ultimately a relapse into conflict. A standing fund for peacebuilding should be established at the level of at least $250 million that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a nascent Government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration. 229. Along with establishing security, the core task of peacebuilding is to build effective public institutions that, through negotiations with civil society, can establish a consensual framework for governing within the rule of law. Relatively cheap investments in civilian security through police, judicial and rule-of-law reform, local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation, and local capacity-building for public sector service delivery can greatly benefit long-term peacebuilding. This should be reflected in the policies of the United Nations, international financial institutions and donors, and should be given priority in long-term policy and funding. 230. To address this task, United Nations field representatives (including heads of peacekeeping operations) require dedicated support on the broader aspects of peacebuilding strategy, especially in the area of rule of law. The creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office (see part four below) would address this need.

XII. PROTECTING CIVILIANS 231. In many civil wars, combatants target civilians and relief workers with impunity. Beyond direct violence, deaths from starvation, disease and the collapse of public health dwarf the numbers killed by bullets and bombs. Millions more are displaced internally or across borders. Human rights abuses and gender violence are rampant. 232. Under international law, the primary responsibility to protect civilians from suffering in war lies with belligerents — State or non-State. International humanitarian law provides

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minimum protection and standards applicable to the most vulnerable in situations of armed conflict, including women, children and refugees, and must be respected. 233. All combatants must abide by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. All Member States should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection of civilians, such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and all refugee conventions. 234. Humanitarian aid is a vital tool for helping Governments to fulfil this responsibility. Its core purpose is to protect civilian victims, minimize their suffering and keep them alive during the conflict so that when war ends they have the opportunity to rebuild shattered lives. The provision of assistance is a necessary part of this effort. Donors must fully and equitably fund humanitarian protection and assistance operations. 235. The Secretary-General, based in part on work undertaken by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and strong advocacy efforts by non-governmental organizations, has prepared a 10-point platform for action for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The Secretary-General’s 10-point platform for action should be considered by all actors — States, NGOs and international organizations — in their efforts to protect civilians in armed conflict. 236. From this platform, particular attention should be placed on the question of access to civilians, which is routinely and often flagrantly denied. United Nations humanitarian field staff, as well as United Nations political and peacekeeping representatives, should be well trained and well supported to negotiate access. Such efforts also require better coordination of bilateral initiatives. The Security Council can use field missions and other diplomatic measures to enhance access to and protection of civilians. 237. Particularly egregious violations, such as occur when armed groups militarize refugee camps, require emphatic responses from the international community, including from the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Although the Security Council has acknowledged that such militarization is a threat to peace and security, it has not developed the capacity or shown the will to confront the problem. The Security Council should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. 238. Of special concern is the use of sexual violence as a weapon of conflict. The human rights components of peacekeeping operations should be given explicit mandates and sufficient resources to investigate and report on human rights violations against women. Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security and the associated Independent Experts’ Assessment provide important additional recommendations for the protection of women. The Security Council, United Nations agencies and Member States should fully implement its recommendations.

United Nations staff security 239. The ability of the United Nations to protect civilians and help end conflict is directly related to United Nations staff security, which has been eroding since the mid-1990s. To

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be able to maintain presence, and operate securely and effectively, the United Nations needs four things: the capacity to perform its mandated tasks fully; freedom from unwarranted intrusion by Member States into operations; full respect by staff of United Nations codes of impartiality; and a professional security service, with access to Member States’ intelligence and threat assessments. The Secretary-General has recommended the creation of such a service, headed by a Director who will report directly to him. Member States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary-General in implementing a new staff security system in 2005.

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A MORE EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Synopsis The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to be a collective security system that worked. The Charter of the United Nations provided the most powerful States with permanent membership on the Security Council and the veto. In exchange, they were expected to use their power for the common good and promote and obey international law. As Harry Truman, then President of the United States, noted in his speech to the final plenary session of the founding conference of the United Nations Organization, “we all have to recognize — no matter how great our strength — that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please”. In approaching the issue of United Nations reform, it is as important today as it was in 1945 to combine power with principle. Recommendations that ignore underlying power realities will be doomed to failure or irrelevance, but recommendations that simply reflect raw distributions of power and make no effort to bolster international principles are unlikely to gain the widespread adherence required to shift international behaviour. Proposed changes should be driven by real-world need. Change for its own sake is likely to run the well-worn course of the endless reform debates of the past decade. The litmus test is this: does a proposed change help meet the challenge posed by a virulent threat? Throughout the Panel’s work, we have looked for institutional weaknesses in current responses to threats. The following stand as the most urgently in need of remedy: x x

x x

The General Assembly has lost vitality and often fails to focus effectively on the most compelling issues of the day. The Security Council will need to be more proactive in the future. For this to happen, those who contribute most to the Organization financially, militarily and diplomatically should participate more in Council decisionmaking, and those who participate in Council decision-making should contribute more to the Organization. The Security Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy and representation to do all that we demand of it. There is a major institutional gap in addressing countries under stress and countries emerging from conflict. Such countries often suffer from attention, policy guidance and resource deficits. The Security Council has not made the most of the potential advantages of working with regional and subregional organizations.

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x x x

There must be new institutional arrangements to address the economic and social threats to international security. The Commission on Human Rights suffers from a legitimacy deficit that casts doubts on the overall reputation of the United Nations. There is a need for a more professional and better organized Secretariat that is much more capable of concerted action.

The reforms we propose will not by themselves make the United Nations more effective. In the absence of Member States reaching agreement on the security consensus contained in the present report, the United Nations will underachieve. Its institutions will still only be as strong as the energy, resources and attention devoted to them by Member States and their leaders.

XIII. The General Assembly 240. The General Assembly is, first and foremost, a universal body, representing almost every State in the world. Its unique legitimacy must be used to move us towards global consensus on the policy issues of greatest contemporary importance. We cannot overestimate the importance of holding a general debate every year in which the view of every Government is presented, providing a crucial opportunity to gauge the pulse of the international community. The General Assembly provides a unique forum in which to forge consensus. Members should use the opportunity provided by the Millennium Review Summit in 2005 to forge a new consensus on broader, more effective collective security. 241. The keys to strengthening the General Assembly’s role are focus and structure. Its norm-making capacity is often squandered on debates about minutiae or thematic topics outpaced by real-world events. Its inability to reach closure on issues undermines its relevance. An unwieldy and static agenda leads to repetitive debates. Although some resolutions, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration, are highly significant, many others are repetitive, obscure or inapplicable, thus diminishing the credibility of the body. But detailed procedural fixes are not going to make the General Assembly a more effective instrument than it is now. That can only be achieved if its Members show a sustained determination to put behind them the approach which they have applied hitherto. 242. Member States should renew efforts to enable the General Assembly to perform its function as the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. This requires a better conceptualization and shortening of the agenda, which should reflect the contemporary challenges facing the international community. Smaller, more tightly focused committees could help sharpen and improve resolutions that are brought to the whole Assembly. 243. We believe that civil society and non-governmental organizations can provide valuable knowledge and perspectives on global issues. We endorse the recommendation of the recently released report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-

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Civil Society Relations (see A/58/817) that the General Assembly should establish a better mechanism to enable systematic engagement with civil society organizations.

XIV. THE SECURITY COUNCIL 244. The founders of the United Nations conferred primary responsibility on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council was designed to enable the world body to act decisively to prevent and remove threats. It was created to be not just a representative but a responsible body, one that had the capacity for decisive action. The five permanent members were given veto rights but were also expected to shoulder an extra burden in promoting global security. Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations established that membership in the Council as a whole was explicitly linked not just to geographical balance but also to contributions to maintaining peace and security. 245. Since the Council was formed the threats and challenges to international peace and security have changed, as has the distribution of power among members. But the Security Council has been slow to change. Decisions cannot be implemented just by members of the Security Council but require extensive military, financial and political involvement by other States. Decisions taken and mandates given have often lacked the essential components of realism, adequate resources and the political determination to see them through. The Secretary-General is frequently holding out a begging bowl to implement Security Council decisions. Moreover, the paucity of representation from the broad membership diminishes support for Security Council decisions. 246. Since the end of the cold war, the effectiveness of the Council has improved, as has its willingness to act; but it has not always been equitable in its actions, nor has it acted consistently or effectively in the face of genocide or other atrocities. This has gravely damaged its credibility. The financial and military contributions to the United Nations of some of the five permanent members are modest compared to their special status, and often the Council’s non-permanent members have been unable to make the necessary contribution to the work of the Organization envisaged by the Charter. Even outside the use of a formal veto, the ability of the five permanent members to keep critical issues of peace and security off the Security Council’s agenda has further undermined confidence in the body’s work. 247. Yet recent experience has also shown that the Security Council is the body in the United Nations most capable of organizing action and responding rapidly to new threats. 248. Thus, the challenge for any reform is to increase both the effectiveness and the credibility of the Security Council and, most importantly, to enhance its capacity and willingness to act in the face of threats. This requires greater involvement in Security Council decision-making by those who contribute most; greater contributions from those with special decision-making authority; and greater consultation with those who must implement its decisions. It also requires a firm consensus on the nature of today’s threats, on the obligations of broadened collective security, on the necessity of prevention, and on when and why the Council should authorize the use of force.

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249. We believe that reforms of the Security Council should meet the following principles: (a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically — specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution; (b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world; (c)

They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council;

(d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body. 250. The Panel believes that a decision on the enlargement of the Council, satisfying these criteria, is now a necessity. The presentation of two clearly defined alternatives, of the kind described below as models A and B, should help to clarify — and perhaps bring to resolution — a debate which has made little progress in the last 12 years. 251. Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major regional areas, which we identify respectively as “Africa”, “Asia and Pacific”, “Europe” and “Americas”. We see these descriptions as helpful in making and implementing judgements about the composition of the Security Council, but make no recommendation about changing the composition of the current regional groups for general electoral and other United Nations purposes. Some members of the Panel, in particular our Latin American colleagues, expressed a preference for basing any distribution of seats on the current regional groups. 252. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Regional area Africa Asia and Pacific Europe Americas Totals Model A

No. of States

Permanent seats (continuing)

53 56 47 35 191

0 1 3 1 5

Proposed Proposed new two-year permanent seats (nonseats renewable) 2 2 1 1 6

4 3 2 4 13

Total 6 6 6 6 24

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253. Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Regional area Africa Asia and Pacific Europe Americas Totals Model B

No. of States

Permanent seats (continuing)

53 56 47 35 191

0 1 3 1 5

Proposed Proposed four-year two-year renewable seats (nonseats renewable) 2 2 2 2 8

4 3 1 3 11

Total 6 6 6 6 24

254. In both models, having regard to Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, a method of encouraging Member States to contribute more to international peace and security would be for the General Assembly, taking into account established practices of regional consultation, to elect Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longer-term seats to those States that are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions. 255. The Panel was strongly of the view that no change to the composition of the Security Council should itself be regarded as permanent or unchallengeable in the future. Therefore, there should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the contribution (as defined in para. 249 above) of permanent and non-permanent members from the point of view of the Council’s effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security. 256. Neither model involves any expansion of the veto or any Charter modification of the Security Council’s existing powers. We recognize that the veto had an important function in reassuring the United Nations most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded. We see no practical way of changing the existing members’ veto powers. Yet, as a whole the institution of the veto has an anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age and we would urge that its use be limited to matters where vital interests are genuinely at stake. We also ask the permanent members, in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. We recommend that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto. 257. We propose the introduction of a system of “indicative voting”, whereby members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action. Under this indicative vote, “no” votes would not have a veto effect, nor would the final tally of the vote have any legal force. The second formal vote on any

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resolution would take place under the current procedures of the Council. This would, we believe, increase the accountability of the veto function. 258. In recent years, many informal improvements have been made to the transparency and accountability of the Security Council’s deliberative and decision-making procedures. We also remind the Security Council that troop contributors have rights under Article 44 of the Charter to be fully consulted concerning the deployment of troops to Council-mandated operations. We recommend that processes to improve transparency and accountability be incorporated and formalized in the Council’s rules of procedure. 259. Many delegations on the Security Council lack access to professional military advice. Yet they are frequently called upon to take decisions with far-ranging military implications. We recommend therefore that the Secretary General’s Military Adviser and the members of his staff be available on demand by the Security Council to offer technical and professional advice on military options. 260. We welcome greater civil society engagement in the work of the Security Council.

XV. A PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION 261. Our analysis has identified a key institutional gap: there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace. That this was not included in the Charter of the United Nations is no surprise since the work of the United Nations in largely internal conflicts is fairly recent. But today, in an era when dozens of States are under stress or recovering from conflict, there is a clear international obligation to assist States in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly. 262. The United Nations unique role in this area arises from its international legitimacy; the impartiality of its personnel; its ability to draw on personnel with broad cultural understanding and experience of a wide range of administrative systems, including in the developing world; and its recent experience in organizing transitional administration and transitional authority operations. 263. Strengthening the United Nations capacity for peacebuilding in the widest sense must be a priority for the organization. The United Nations needs to be able to act in a coherent and effective way throughout a whole continuum that runs from early warning through preventive action to post-conflict peacebuilding. We recommend that the Security Council, acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and after consultation with the Economic and Social Council, establish a Peacebuilding Commission. 264. The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify countries which are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the

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efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary. 265. While the precise composition, procedures, and reporting lines of the Peacebuilding Commission will need to be established, they should take account of the following guidelines: (a)

The Peacebuilding Commission should be reasonably small;

(b) It should meet in different configurations, to consider both general policy issues and country-by-country strategies; (c) It should be chaired for at least one year and perhaps longer by a member approved by the Security Council; (d) In addition to representation from the Security Council, it should include representation from the Economic and Social Council; (e) National representatives of the country under consideration should be invited to attend; (f) The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the President of the World Bank and, when appropriate, heads of regional development banks should be represented at its meetings by appropriate senior officials; (g) Representatives of the principal donor countries and, when appropriate, the principal troop contributors should be invited to participate in its deliberations; (h) Representatives of regional and subregional organizations should be invited to participate in its deliberations when such organizations are actively involved in the country in question.

Peacebuilding Support Office 266. A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat to give the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support and to ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations. 267. The Office should comprise about 20 or more staff of different backgrounds in the United Nations system and with significant experience in peacebuilding strategy and operations. In addition to supporting the Secretary-General and the Peacebuilding Commission, the Office could also, on request, provide assistance and advice to the heads of peace operations, United Nations resident coordinators or national Governments — for example in developing strategies for transitional political arrangements or building new State institutions. It should submit twice-yearly early warning analyses to the Peacebuilding Commission to help it in organizing its work.

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268. The Peacebuilding Support Office should also maintain rosters of national and international experts, particularly those with experience in post-conflict cases. 269. The Office should have an inter-agency advisory board, headed by the Chair of the United Nations Development Group, that would ensure that the Office worked in effective cooperation with other elements of the system that provide related support.

XVI. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 270. The ability of the Security Council to become more proactive in preventing and responding to threats will be strengthened by making fuller and more productive use of the Chapter VIII provisions of the Charter of the United Nations than has hitherto been the case. 271. Since the establishment of the United Nations, a considerable number of regional and subregional groupings have been established. Some of these groupings have made important contributions to the stability and prosperity of their members, and some of them have begun to address directly threats to peace and security. We believe the United Nations should encourage the establishment of such groupings, particularly in highly vulnerable parts of the world where no effective security organizations currently exist. 272. Recent experience has demonstrated that regional organizations can be a vital part of the multilateral system. Their efforts need not contradict United Nations efforts, nor do they absolve the United Nations of its primary responsibilities for peace and security. The key is to organize regional action within the framework of the Charter and the purposes of the United Nations, and to ensure that the United Nations and any regional organization with which it works do so in a more integrated fashion than has up to now occurred. This will require that: (a) Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations, recognizing that in some urgent situations that authorization may be sought after such operations have commenced; (b) Consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement, covering such issues as meetings of the heads of the organizations, more frequent exchange of information and early warning, co-training of civilian and military personnel, and exchange of personnel within peace operations; (c) In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor countries should commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacity-building support, within the African Union strategic framework; (d) Regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping should place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;

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(e) Member States should agree to allow the United Nations to provide equipment support from United Nations-owned sources to regional operations, as needed; (f) The rules for the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council with assessed contributions. 273. In recent years, such alliance organizations as NATO (which have not usually been considered regional organizations within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter but have some similar characteristics) have undertaken peacekeeping operations beyond their mandated areas. We welcome this so long as these operations are authorized by and accountable to the Security Council. In the case of NATO, there may also be a constructive role for it to play in assisting in the training and equipping of less well resourced regional organizations and States.

XVII. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL 274. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations understood that peace and security were inseparable from economic development. The institutional problem we face is twofold: first, decision-making on international economic matters, particularly in the areas of finance and trade, has long left the United Nations and no amount of institutional reform will bring it back; and second, the Charter allowed for the creation of specialized agencies independent of the principal United Nations organs, reducing the role of the Economic and Social Council to one of coordination. The fragmentation of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies makes this a difficult proposition in the best of times. It would not, however, be realistic to aim for the Economic and Social Council to become the centre of the world’s decision-making on matters of trade and finance, or to direct the programmes of the specialized agencies or the international financial institutions. 275. And yet the United Nations does have potential assets in the areas of economic and social development. First, the United Nations is the only place where the issues of peace, security and development can be addressed together at the global level. Second, the United Nations has an unrivalled convening power, on the basis of which the General Assembly and the major conferences and summits it has convened in the last three decades have generated consensus around internationally accepted goals, especially in the social field. Third, the United Nations shows that it has strong grass-roots support for its goals and can thus mobilize public opinion in their favour. Three strategies can help the Economic and Social Council enhance its relevance and contribution to collective security, building on United Nations comparative advantages, as described below. 276. First, the Economic and Social Council can provide normative and analytical leadership in a time of much debate about the causes of, and interconnections between, the many threats we face. To that end: (a) We recommend that the Economic and Social Council establish a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats, and that it use its powers to commission research and develop better understanding about the economic and

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social threats to peace, and about the economic and social aspects of other threats, such as terrorism and organized crime; (b) We welcome the recent improvement in the exchange of information between the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council, for example through regular meetings of their Presidents, and encourage both bodies to regularize these exchanges. 277. Second, it can provide an arena in which States measure their commitments to achieving key development objectives in an open and transparent manner. 278. Third, it can provide a regular venue for engaging the development community at the highest level, in effect transforming itself into a “development cooperation forum”. To that end: (a) A new approach should be adopted within the Economic and Social Council agenda, replacing its current focus on administrative issues and programme coordination with a more focused agenda built around the major themes contained in the Millennium Declaration; (b) A small executive committee, comprising members from each regional group, should be created in order to provide orientation and direction to its work and its interaction with principal organs, agencies and programmes; (c) The annual meetings between the Economic and Social Council and the Bretton Woods institutions should be used to encourage collective action in support of the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus; (d) The Economic and Social Council, with inputs from its secretariat and the United Nations Development Group, should aim to provide guidance on development cooperation to the governing boards of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies; (e) The Economic and Social Council should provide strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Development Group to strengthen the coherence of United Nations action at the field level and its coordination with the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors. 279. We believe the time has arrived to reconsider the manner of and quantity of funding for the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. New initiatives in this regard have been explored recently and deserve the special attention of the international community.

Achieving policy coherence 280. While the strategies above are important for a better functioning Economic and Social Council, we appreciate that historical developments in the governance of the multilateral system have limited the capacity of that body to influence international policies in trade, finance and investment. There still remains a need for a body that brings together the key developed and developing countries to address the critical interlinkages between trade,

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finance, the environment, the handling of pandemic diseases and economic and social development. To be effective, such a body must operate at the level of national leaders. 281. While the annual meetings of the G8 group at head of State or Government level fulfil some of the characteristics required to give greater coherence and impetus to the necessary policies, it would be helpful to have a larger forum bringing together the heads of the major developed and developing countries. One way of moving forward may be to transform into a leader’s group the G20 group of finance ministers, which currently brings together States collectively encompassing 80 per cent of the world’s population and 90 per cent of its economic activity, with regular attendance by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, WTO and the European Union. In such meetings, we recommend the inclusion in the group of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Economic and Social Council to ensure strong support for United Nations programmes and initiatives.

XVIII. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 282. One of the central missions of the United Nations is to protect human rights, a mission reaffirmed by the Millennium Declaration. The Commission on Human Rights is entrusted with promoting respect for human rights globally, fostering international cooperation in human rights, responding to violations in specific countries and assisting countries in building their human rights capacity. 283. In recent years, the Commission’s capacity to perform these tasks has been undermined by eroding credibility and professionalism. Standard-setting to reinforce human rights cannot be performed by States that lack a demonstrated commitment to their promotion and protection. We are concerned that in recent years States have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others. The Commission cannot be credible if it is seen to be maintaining double standards in addressing human rights concerns. 284. Reform of this body is therefore necessary to make the human rights system perform effectively and ensure that it better fulfils its mandate and functions. We support the recent efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to ensure that human rights are integrated throughout the work of the United Nations, and to support the development of strong domestic human rights institutions, especially in countries emerging from conflict and in the fight against terrorism. Member States should provide full support to the Secretary General and the High Commissioner in these efforts. 285. In many ways, the most difficult and sensitive issue relating to the Commission on Human Rights is that of membership. In recent years, the issue of which States are elected to the Commission has become a source of heated international tension, with no positive impact on human rights and a negative impact on the work of the Commission. Proposals for membership criteria have little chance of changing these dynamics and indeed risk further politicizing the issue. Rather, we recommend that the membership of the Commission on Human Rights be expanded to universal membership. This would underscore that all members are committed by the Charter to the promotion of human

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rights, and might help to focus attention back on to substantive issues rather than who is debating and voting on them. 286. In the first half of its history, the Commission was composed of heads of delegation who were key players in the human rights arena and who had the professional qualifications and experience necessary for human rights work. Since then this practice has lapsed. We believe it should be restored, and we propose that all members of the Commission on Human Rights designate prominent and experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations. 287. In addition, we propose that the Commission on Human Rights be supported in its work by an advisory council or panel. This council or panel would consist of some 15 individuals, independent experts (say, three per region), appointed for their skills for a period of three years, renewable once. They would be appointed by the Commission on the joint proposal of the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner. In addition to advising on country-specific issues, the council or panel could give advice on the rationalization of some of the thematic mandates and could itself carry out some of the current mandates dealing with research, standard-setting and definitions. 288. We recommend that the High Commissioner be called upon to prepare an annual report on the situation of human rights worldwide. This could then serve as a basis for a comprehensive discussion with the Commission. The report should focus on the implementation of all human rights in all countries, based on information stemming from the work of treaty bodies, special mechanisms and any other sources deemed appropriate by the High Commissioner. 289. The Security Council should also more actively involve the High Commissioner in its deliberations, including on peace operations mandates. We also welcome the fact that the Security Council has, with increasing frequency, invited the High Commissioner to brief it on country-specific situations. We believe that this should become a general rule and that the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should request the High Commissioner to report to them regularly about the implementation of all human rights-related provisions of Security Council resolutions, thus enabling focused, effective monitoring of these provisions. 290. More also needs to be done with respect to the funding situation of the Office of the High Commissioner. We see a clear contradiction between a regular budget allocation of 2 per cent for this Office and the obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to make the promotion and protection of human rights one of the principal objectives of the Organization. There is also a need to redress the limited funding available for human rights capacity-building. Member States should seriously review the inadequate funding of this Office and its activities. 291. In the longer term, Member States should consider upgrading the Commission to become a “Human Rights Council” that is no longer subsidiary to the Economic and Social Council but a Charter body standing alongside it and the Security Council, and reflecting in the process the weight given to human rights, alongside security and economic issues, in the Preamble of the Charter.

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292. A strong Secretary-General at the head of a more professional and better organized Secretariat is an essential component of any effective system for collective security in the twenty-first century.

A. Strengthening support for the Secretary-General 293. The creation of the post of Deputy Secretary-General in 1996 helped bring far greater coherence to the work of the United Nations in the economic, social and development fields and on issues of management reform. Given the enormous increase in the workload of the Secretary-General in the area of peace and security in the 1990s, creating a second Deputy Secretary-General post for peace and security would ensure that the SecretaryGeneral’s efforts in this area are equally well supported. To assist the Secretary-General, an additional Deputy Secretary-General position should be created, responsible for peace and security. 294. With one Deputy Secretary-General focusing on the economic and social development work of the United Nations, the additional Deputy Secretary-General and his/her office would assist the Secretary-General in systematically overseeing the work of the United Nations system in the area of peace and security, with the aim of formulating integrated strategies and ensuring concerted action. Such an office should not be operational and would not duplicate, but instead rationalize and make more effective, existing bureaucratic functions. It would integrate inputs from the various departments and agencies and prepare early-warning reports and strategy options for decision by the Secretary-General. It should comprise approximately 15 Professionals able to perform strategic analysis, planning and coordination tasks. It should also provide the SecretaryGeneral with new expertise to deal with new threats — for example, the scientific advice necessary to address questions of environmental and biological security.

B. A competent and professional Secretariat 295. The burden of implementing the decisions of Member States and providing them with timely analysis and advice rests not only on the Secretary-General but on the Secretariat as a whole. If the United Nations is to be effective, it needs a professional and well-trained Secretariat whose skills and experiences have been adapted to match the tasks at hand. The last 15 years have witnessed a large expansion in work related to conflict prevention and peacekeeping, the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, and peacebuilding. And yet, despite the increase in demand since the end of the cold war total Secretariat staff has declined since 1990, while only 6 per cent of the staff of the Secretariat are responsible for the entire range of issues that include mediation, the organization and management of peacekeeping operations, support for the Security Council, disarmament, elections support and sanctions. Many of those based at Headquarters have no field experience or training and the existing rules militate against their gaining it. In addition, there is little or no expertise for tackling many of the new or emerging threats addressed in the present report.

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296. The Secretary-General should be provided with the resources he requires to do his job properly and the authority to manage his staff and other resources as he deems best. To meet the needs identified in the present report, we recommend that: (a) Member States recommit themselves to Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) Member States review the relationship between the General Assembly and the Secretariat with the aim of substantially increasing the flexibility provided to the Secretary-General in the management of his staff, subject always to his accountability to the Assembly; (c) The Secretary-General’s reform proposals of 1997 and 2002 related to human resources should now, without further delay, be fully implemented; (d) There should be a one-time review and replacement of personnel, including through early retirement, to ensure that the Secretariat is staffed with the right people to undertake the tasks at hand, including for mediation and peacebuilding support, and for the office of the Deputy Secretary-General for peace and security. Member States should provide funding for this replacement as a cost-effective longterm investment; (e) The Secretary-General should immediately be provided with 60 posts — less than 1 per cent of the total Secretariat — for the purpose of establishing all the increased Secretariat capacity proposed in the present report.

XX. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 297. Our recommendations on Security Council reform will require the amendment of Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations. In addition, we suggest the following modest changes to the Charter: 298. Articles 53 and 107 (references to enemy States) are outdated and should be revised — revisions should be appropriately drafted to avoid retroactively undermining the legal provisions of these articles. The Charter should reflect the hopes and aspirations of today, not the fears of 1945. 299. Chapter 13 (The Trusteeship Council) should be deleted. The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations performed an important task in helping the world emerge from the era of colonialism and steering many cases of successful decolonization. The United Nations should turn its back on any attempt to return to the mentalities and forms of colonialism. 300. Article 47 (The Military Staff Committee) should be deleted, as should all references to the body in Articles 26, 45 and 46. It is no longer appropriate for the joint chiefs of staff of the five permanent members to play the role imagined for them in 1945. We have in paragraph 258 above addressed the need for the Security Council to have better military advice.

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301. We believe, however, that the Charter as a whole continues to provide a sound legal and policy basis for the organization of collective security, enabling the Security Council to respond to threats to international peace and security, both old and new in a timely and effective manner. The Charter was also farsighted in its recognition of the dependence of international peace and security on economic and social development. 302. All Member States should rededicate themselves to the purposes and principles of the Charter and to applying them in a purposeful way, matching political will with the necessary resources. Only dedicated leadership within and between States will generate effective collective security for the twenty-first century and forge a future that is both sustainable and secure.

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176 ANNEX I SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Note: The number in parentheses that appears after each summarized recommendation refers to the paragraph in the main report that contains the complete text of the recommendation. Contents Recommendations Page PART TWO COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF PREVENTION Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation Conflict between and within States Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons Terrorism Transnational organized crime The role of sanctions

1–11 12–20 21–37 38–44 45–49 50–52

79 79 80 81 82 84 84

53–57 58–62 63–65 66–69

85 85 86 86 87

PART THREE COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE USE OF FORCE Using force: rules and guidelines Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability Post-conflict peacebuilding Protecting civilians

PART FOUR A MORE EFFECTIVE UNITED NAITONS FOR THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY The General Assembly The Security Council A Peacebuilding Commission Regional organizations The Economic and Social Council The Commission on Human Rights The Secretariat The Charter of the United Nations

70–72 73–81 82–85 86 87–89 90–94 95–96 97–101

87 87 87 89 89 90 91 91 92

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COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF PREVENTION Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation 1. All States must recommit themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development. (59) 2. The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Nations 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) for official development assistance (ODA) should establish a timetable for reaching it. (60) 3. World Trade Organization (WTO) members should strive to conclude the Doha development round of multilateral trade negotiations at the latest in 2006. (62) 4. Lender Governments and the international financial institutions should provide highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer rescheduling and improved access to global markets. (63) 5. Although international resources devoted to meeting the challenge of HIV/AIDS have increased from about $250 million in 1996 to about $2.8 billion in 2002, more than $10 billion annually is needed to stem the pandemic. (64) 6. Leaders of countries affected by HIV/AIDS need to mobilize resources, commit funds and engage civil society and the private sector in disease-control efforts. (65) 7. The Security Council, working closely with UNAIDS, should host a second special session on HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, to explore the future effects of HIV/AIDS on States and societies, generate research on the problem and identify critical steps towards a long-term strategy for diminishing the threat. (67) 8. International donors, in partnership with national authorities and local civil society organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild local and national public health systems throughout the developing world. (68) 9. Members of the World Health Assembly should provide greater resources to the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to increase its capacity to cope with potential disease outbreaks. (69) 10. States should provide incentives for the further development of renewable energy sources and begin to phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, especially for fossil fuel use and development. (71) 11. We urge Member States to reflect on the gap between the promise of the Kyoto Protocol and its performance, re-engage on the problem of global warming and begin new negotiations to produce a new long-term strategy for reducing global warming beyond the period covered by the Protocol (2012). (72)

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12. The Security Council should stand ready to use the authority it has under the Rome Statute to refer cases of suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court. (90) 13. The United Nations should work with national authorities, international financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict. (92) 14. The United Nations should build on the experience of regional organizations in developing frameworks for minority rights and the protection of democratically elected Governments from unconstitutional overthrow. (94) 15. Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations on legally binding agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the brokering and transfer, of small arms and light weapons. (96) 16. All Member States should report completely and accurately on all elements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the Secretary-General should be asked to report annually to the General Assembly and Security Council on any inadequacies in the reporting. (97) 17. A training and briefing facility should be established for new or potential special representatives of the Secretary-General and other United Nations mediators. (101) 18. The Department of Political Affairs should be given additional resources and should be restructured to provide more consistent and professional mediation support. (102) 19. While the details of such a restructuring should be left to the Secretary-General, it should take into account the need for the United Nations to have: (a) A field-oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity, comprised of a small team of professionals with relevant direct experience and expertise, available to all United Nations mediators; (b) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations, such as the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of monitoring arrangements, the sequencing of transitional arrangements and the design of national reconciliation mechanisms; (c) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional organizations and nongovernmental organizations involved in conflict resolution; (d) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often neglected during negotiations. (103)

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20. National leaders and parties to conflict should make constructive use of the option of preventive deployment of peacekeepers. (104)

Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons 21. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament: (a) They must honour their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments; (b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. (120) 22. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons. (121) 23. The Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear weapon State. (122) 24. Negotiations to resolve regional conflicts should include confidence-building measures and steps towards disarmament. (123) 25. States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia. (124) 26. All chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012. (125) 27. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. (126) 28. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today’s standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards. (129) 29. Negotiations should be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Articles III and IX of

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the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. (130) 30. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to construct uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, voluntarily institute a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further such facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates. (131) 31. All States should be encouraged to join the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative. (132) 32. A State’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn. (134) 33. The proposed timeline for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert highly enriched uranium reactors and reduce HEU stockpiles should be halved from 10 to five years. (135) 34. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of such agents. (137) 35. The Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes. (138) 36. The Directors-General of IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention. (140) 37. The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director-General to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. (144)

Terrorism 38. The United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, should promote a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, including: (a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, including through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform;

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working to end occupations and address major political grievances; combating organized crime; reducing poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse; (b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through education and fostering public debate; (c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights, including in the areas of law enforcement; intelligence-sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls; (d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations; (e)

Control of dangerous materials and public health defence. (148)

39. Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing and ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and should adopt the eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-supported Financial Action Task Force on MoneyLaundering and the measures recommended in its various best practices papers. (150) 40. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists. (152) 41. The Security Council, after consultation with affected States, should extend the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a clearing house for State-to-State provision of military, police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities. (154) 42. To help Member States comply with their counter-terrorism obligations, the United Nations should establish a capacity-building trust fund under the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate. (155) 43. The Security Council should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions for State non-compliance with the Council’s counter-terrorism resolutions. (156) 44. The General Assembly should rapidly complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on terrorism, incorporating a definition of terrorism with the following elements: (a) Recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity; (b) Restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols;

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(c) Reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004); (d) Description of terrorism as “any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. (163-164)

Transnational organized crime 45. Member States that have not signed, ratified or resourced the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols, and the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption should do so, and all Member States should support the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its work in this area. (172) 46. Member States should establish a central authority to facilitate the exchange of evidence among national judicial authorities, mutual legal assistance among prosecutorial authorities and the implementation of extradition requests. (173) 47. A comprehensive international convention on money-laundering that addresses the issues of bank secrecy and the development of financial havens needs to be negotiated, and endorsed by the General Assembly. (174) 48. Member States should sign and ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and parties to the Protocol should take all necessary steps to effectively implement it. (175) 49. The United Nations should establish a robust capacity-building mechanism for ruleof-law assistance. (177)

The role of sanctions 50. The Security Council must ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced: (a) When the Security Council imposes a sanctions regime — including arms embargoes — it should routinely establish monitoring mechanisms and provide them with the necessary authority and capacity to carry out high-quality, in-depth investigations. Adequate budgetary provisions must be made to implement those mechanisms; (b) Security Council sanctions committees should be mandated to develop improved guidelines and reporting procedures to assist States in sanctions implementation, and to improve procedures for maintaining accurate lists of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions;

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(c) The Secretary-General should appoint a senior official with sufficient supporting resources to enable the Secretary-General to supply the Security Council with analysis of the best way to target sanctions and to assist in coordinating their implementation. This official would also assist compliance efforts; identify technical assistance needs and coordinate such assistance; and make recommendations on any adjustments necessary to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions; (d) Donors should devote more resources to strengthening the legal, administrative, and policing and border-control capacity of Member States to implement sanctions. Capacity-building measures should include efforts to improve air-traffic interdiction in zones of conflict; (e) The Security Council should, in instances of verified, chronic violations, impose secondary sanctions against those involved in sanctions-busting; (f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, should ensure that an appropriate auditing mechanism is in place to oversee sanctions administration. (180) 51. Sanctions committees should improve procedures for providing humanitarian exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the humanitarian impact of sanctions. The Security Council should continue to strive to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions. (181) 52. Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees should establish procedures to review the cases of those claiming to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists. (182)

PART THREE COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE USE OF FORCE Using force: rules and guidelines 53. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations should be neither rewritten nor reinterpreted, either to extend its long-established scope (so as to allow preventive measures to non-imminent threats) or to restrict it (so as to allow its application only to actual attacks). (192) 54. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States are concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work better than it has. (198) 55. The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic

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cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. (203) 56. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security Council should always address — whatever other considerations it may take into account — at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy: (a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? (b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved? (c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed? (d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question? (e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? (207) 57. The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be embodied in declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. (208)

Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability 58. The developed States should do more to transform their existing force capacities into suitable contingents for peace operations. (216) 59. Member States should strongly support the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat, building on the important work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), to improve its use of strategic deployment stockpiles, standby arrangements, trust funds and other mechanisms in order to meet the tighter deadlines necessary for effective deployment. (218) 60. States with advanced military capacities should establish standby high readiness, selfsufficient battalions at up to brigade level that can reinforce United Nations missions, and should place them at the disposal of the United Nations. (219) 61. The Secretary-General should recommend and the Security Council should authorize troop strengths for peacekeeping missions that are sufficient to deter and repel hostile factions. (222)

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62. The United Nations should have a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50-100 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations, and the General Assembly should authorize this capacity. (223)

Post-conflict peacebuilding 63. Special representatives of the Secretary-General should have the authority and guidance to work with relevant parties to establish robust donor-coordinating mechanisms, as well as the resources to perform coordination functions effectively, including ensuring that the sequencing of United Nations assessments and activities is consistent with Government priorities. (226) 64. The Security Council should mandate and the General Assembly should authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization programmes from assessed budgets for United Nations peacekeeping operations. (227) 65. A standing fund for peacebuilding should be established at the level of at least $250 million that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a nascent Government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration. (228)

X. PROTECTING CIVILIANS 66. All combatants must abide by the Geneva Conventions. All Member States should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection of civilians, such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and all refugee conventions. (233) 67. The Security Council should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. (237) 68. The Security Council, United Nations agencies and Member States should fully implement resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. (238) 69. Member States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary-General in implementing a new staff security system in 2005. (239)

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A MORE EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY The General Assembly 70. Members of the General Assembly should use the opportunity provided by the Millennium Review Summit in 2005 to forge a new consensus on broader and more effective collective security. (240) 71. Member States should renew efforts to enable the General Assembly to perform its function as the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. This requires a better conceptualization and shortening of the agenda, which should reflect the contemporary challenges facing the international community. Smaller, more tightly focused committees could help to sharpen and improve resolutions that are brought to the whole Assembly. (242) 72. Following the recommendation of the report of the Panel on Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations (see A/58/817), the General Assembly should establish a better mechanism to enable systematic engagement with civil society organizations. (243)

The Security Council 73. Reforms of the Security Council should meet the following principles: (a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically — specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to the voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution; (b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world; (c)


(d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body. (249) 74. A decision on the enlargement of the Council, satisfying these criteria, is now a necessity. The presentation of two clearly defined alternatives, of the kind described below as models A and B, should help to clarify — and perhaps bring to resolution — a debate which has made little progress in the last 12 years. (250)

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75. Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major regional areas, which we identify, respectively, as “Africa”, “Asia and Pacific”, “Europe” and “Americas”. We see these descriptions as helpful in making and implementing judgements about the composition of the Security Council, but make no recommendation about changing the composition of the current regional groups for general electoral and other United Nations purposes. Some members of the Panel, in particular our Latin American colleagues, expressed a preference for basing any distribution of seats on the current regional groups. (251) 76. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. Model B provides for no new permanent seats, but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. (252-253) 77. In both models, having regard to Article 23 of the Charter, a method of encouraging Member States to contribute more to international peace and security would be for the General Assembly, taking into account established practices of regional consultation, to elect Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longer-term seats to those States that are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions. (254) 78. There should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the contribution (as defined in paragraph 249 of the main report) of permanent and non-permanent members from the point of view of the Council’s effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security. (255) 79. The Panel recommends that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto. (256) 80. A system of “indicative voting” should be introduced, whereby members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action. (257) 81. Processes to improve transparency and accountability in the Security Council should be incorporated and formalized in its rules of procedure. (258)

A Peacebuilding Commission 82. The Security Council, acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and after consultation with the Economic and Social Council, should establish a Peacebuilding Commission. (263) 83. The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify countries that are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from

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developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and postconflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary. (264) 84. While the precise composition, procedures and reporting lines of the Peacebuilding Commission will need to be established, they should take account of the following guidelines: (a)

The Peacebuilding Commission should be reasonably small;

(b) It should meet in different configurations, to consider both general policy issues and country-by-country strategies; (c) It should be chaired for at least one year and perhaps longer by a member approved by the Security Council; (d) In addition to representation from the Security Council, it should include representation from the Economic and Social Council; (e) attend;

National representatives of the country under consideration should be invited to

(f) The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the President of the World Bank and, when appropriate, heads of regional development banks should be represented at its meetings by appropriate senior officials; (g) Representatives of the principal donor countries and, when appropriate, the principal troop contributors should be invited to participate in its deliberations; (h) Representatives of regional and subregional organizations should be invited to participate in its deliberations when such organizations are actively involved in the country in question. (265) 85. A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat to give the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support and to ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations. (266)

Regional organizations 86. In relation to regional organizations: (a) Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations; (b) Consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement, covering such

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issues as meetings of the heads of the organizations, more frequent exchange of information and early warning, co-training of civilian and military personnel, and exchange of personnel within peace operations; (c) In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor countries should commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacity-building support, within the African Union strategic framework; (d) Regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping should place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System; (e) Member States should agree to allow the United Nations to provide equipment support from United Nations-owned sources to regional operations, as needed; (f) The rules for the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council with assessed contributions. (272)

The Economic and Social Council 87. The Economic and Social Council should provide normative and analytical leadership in a time of much debate about the causes of, and interconnections between, the many threats we face. To that end, the Economic and Social Council should establish a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats. (276) 88. The Economic and Social Council should provide an arena in which States measure their commitments to achieving key development objectives in an open and transparent manner. (277) 89. The Economic and Social Council should provide a regular venue for engaging the development community at the highest level, in effect transforming itself into a “development cooperation forum”. To that end: (a) A new approach should be adopted within the Economic and Social Council agenda, replacing its current focus on administrative issues and programme coordination with a more focused agenda built around the major themes contained in the Millennium Declaration; (b) A small executive committee, comprising members from each regional group, should be created in order to provide orientation and direction to the work of the Economic and Social Council and its interaction with principal organs, agencies and programmes; (c) The annual meetings between the Economic and Social Council and the Bretton Woods institutions should be used to encourage collective action in support of the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus;

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(d) The Economic and Social Council, with inputs from its secretariat and the United Nations Development Group, should aim to provide guidance on development cooperation to the governing boards of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies; (e) The Economic and Social Council should provide strong support to the efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Development Group to strengthen the coherence of United Nations action at the field level and its coordination with the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors. (278)

The Commission on Human Rights 90. Membership of the Commission on Human Rights should be made universal. (285) 91. All members of the Commission on Human Rights should designate prominent and experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations. (286) 92. The Commission on Human Rights should be supported in its work by an advisory council or panel. (287) 93. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights should be called upon to prepare an annual report on the situation of human rights worldwide. (288) 94. The Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should request the High Commissioner for Human Rights to report to them regularly on the implementation of all human rights-related provisions of Security Council resolutions, thus enabling focused, effective monitoring of those provisions. (289)

The Secretariat 95. To assist the Secretary-General, an additional Deputy Secretary-General position should be created, responsible for peace and security. (293) 96. The Secretary-General should be provided with the resources he requires to do his job properly and the authority to manage his staff and other resources as he deems best. To meet the needs identified in the present report, the Panel recommends that: (a) Member States recommit themselves to Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) Member States review the relationship between the General Assembly and the Secretariat with the aim of substantially increasing the flexibility provided to the Secretary-General in the management of his staff, subject always to his accountability to the Assembly; (c) The Secretary-General’s reform proposals of 1997 and 2002 related to human resources should now, without further delay, be fully implemented;

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(d) There should be a one-time review and replacement of personnel, including through early retirement, to ensure that the Secretariat is staffed with the right people to undertake the tasks at hand, including for mediation and peacebuilding support, and for the office of the Deputy Secretary-General for peace and security. Member States should provide funding for this replacement as a cost-effective long-term investment; (e) The Secretary-General should immediately be provided with 60 posts — less than 1 per cent of the total Secretariat capacity — for the purpose of establishing all the increased Secretariat capacity proposed in the present report. (296)

The Charter of the United Nations 97. In addition to any amendment of Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations required by proposed reform of the Security Council, the Panel suggests the following modest changes to the Charter: 98. Articles 53 and 107 (references to enemy States) are outdated and should be revised. (298) 99. Chapter XIII (The Trusteeship Council) should be deleted. (299) 100. Article 47 (The Military Staff Committee) should be deleted, as should all references to the Committee in Articles 26, 45 and 46. (300) 101. All Member States should rededicate themselves to the purposes and principles of the Charter and to applying them in a purposeful way, matching political will with the necessary resources. Only dedicated leadership within and between States will generate effective collective security for the twenty-first century and forge a future that is both sustainable and secure. (302)

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192 ANNEX II

PANEL MEMBERS AND TERMS OF REFERENCE Members Anand Panyarachun (Thailand) (Chair) Robert Badinter (France) João Clemente Baena Soares (Brazil) Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway) Mary Chinery-Hesse (Ghana)

Gareth Evans (Australia) David Hannay (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Enrique Iglesias (Uruguay)

Amre Moussa (Egypt) Satish Nambiar (India) Sadako Ogata (Japan)

Yevgeny Primakov (Russian Federation) Qian Qichen (China) Nafis Sadik (Pakistan)

Salim Ahmed Salim (United Republic of Tanzania) Brent Scowcroft (United States of America)

Former Prime Minister of Thailand Member of the French Senate and former Minister of Justice of France Former General Secretary of the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil and former Secretary-General of the Organization of American States Former Prime Minister of Norway and former Director-General of the World Health Organization Vice-Chairman of the National Development Planning Commission of Ghana and former Deputy DirectorGeneral of the International Labour Organization President of the International Crisis Group and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia Former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations and former United Kingdom Special Envoy to Cyprus President of the Inter-American Development Bank and former Minister for Foreign Relations of Uruguay Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt Former Lt. General in the Indian Army and Force Commander of UNPROFOR President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency and former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Former Vice Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China Special Envoy of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral for HIV/AIDS in Asia and former Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund Former Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania and former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity Former Lt. General, United States Air Force, and former United States National Security Adviser

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193 Terms of reference

1. The past year has shaken the foundations of collective security and undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems and challenges. It has also brought to the fore deep divergences of opinion on the range and nature of the challenges we face and are likely to face in the future. 2. The aim of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change is to recommend clear and practical measures for ensuring effective collective action, based upon a rigorous analysis of future threats to peace and security, an appraisal of the contribution collective action can make and a thorough assessment of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including the principal organs of the United Nations. 3. The Panel is not being asked to formulate policies on specific issues, nor on the role of the United Nations in specific places. Rather, it is being asked to provide a new assessment of the challenges ahead and to recommend the changes which will be required if these challenges are to be met effectively through collective action. 4.

Specifically, the Panel will:

(a) Examine today’s global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges to international peace and security. While there may continue to exist a diversity of perception on the relative importance of the various threats facing particular Member States on an individual basis, it is important to find an apropriate balance at the global level. It is also important to understand the connections between different threats; (b) Identify clearly the contribution that collective action can make in addressing these challenges; (c) Recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including but not limited to a review of the principal organs of the United Nations. 5. The Panel’s work is confined to the field of peace and security, broadly interpreted. That is, it should extend its analysis and recommendations to other issues and institutions, including economic and social ones, to the extent that they have a direct bearing on future threats to peace and security.

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194 ANNEX III PANEL SECRETARIAT

Stephen Stedman (Research Director) Loraine Rickard-Martin (Secretary to the Panel) Bruce Jones (Deputy Research Director) Muhammad Zeeshan Amin Tarun Chhabra Sebastian Graf von Einsiedel Angela Irving Graham Maitland Angelica Malic Thant Myint-U Maria Zaroui

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195 ANNEX IV

PANEL MEETINGS, REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS AND ISSUE WORKSHOPS A. Panel meetings Date

Place

5-7 December 2003 13-15 February 2004 30 April-2 May 2004 16-18 July 2004 24-26 September 2004 3-5 November 2004

Princeton, United States of America Mont Pelerin, Switzerland Addis Ababa Baden, Austria Tarrytown, United States of America New York, United States of America

B. Regional consultations and issue workshops Date (2004) Meeting/theme

Place

Organizer

13-14 January

Harriman, United States of America

Stanley Foundation

New York

Department of Public Information of the United Nations Secretariat

Paris

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

West Sussex, United Kingdom

Wilton Park

New Haven, United States of America Stanford, United States of America Harriman

Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

“The SecretaryGeneral’s High-level Panel: maximizing prospects for success” 29 January Briefing to NGOs on United Nations reform initiatives and the Highlevel Panel 16 February Meeting of the Highlevel Panel with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 23-25 “Addressing February contemporary security threats: what role for the United Nations?” 27 February “Security Council reform” 1 March

“Nuclear proliferation”

1 and 2 March

“Use of force”

Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanley Foundation and United Nations Foundation

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Date (2004) Meeting/theme

Place

Organizer

2 and 3 March 4 March

“Intervention in humanitarian crises” “Terrorism and nonState actors”

Harriman

5 March

“The future of the weapons of mass destruction regimes” Regional consultations

Stanley Foundation and United Nations Foundation Stanley Foundation, United Nations Foundation and Ralph Bunche Institute of International Studies Government of New Zealand and International Peace Academy Viva Rio and New York University Center on International Cooperation Governments of Australia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Singapore and South Africa, and International Peace Academy

7 and 8 March 12-14 March 26-27 March 18-20 March

28-30 March

29 and 30 March 2-4 April

5 April

8 April

Retreat for permanent representatives and Panel members to discuss the work of the High-level Panel Regional consultations

Workshop on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and future threats to international security “Small arms and light weapons” Asia High-level Symposium on Threats, Challenges and Change “Nuclear arms control and proliferation”

New York

New York

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Manhasset, United States of America

Oslo

Geneva

Harriman Hangzhou, China Cambridge, United States of America

Outreach to New York humanitarian and human rights NGOs

Norwegian Institute for International Affairs and New York University Center on International Cooperation Government of Switzerland

Stanley Foundation and United Nations Foundation Government of China

Harvard University Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Nuclear Threat Initiative and United Nations Foundation Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and United Nations Foundation

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Date (2004) Meeting/theme

Place

Organizer

16 and 17 April 19 April

Stanford

Stanford Institute for International Studies United States National Academies of Sciences, Nuclear Threat Initiative and United Nations Foundation Singapore Institute for International Affairs and New York University Center on International Cooperation Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

Governance and sovereignty “Bio-security”

21-24 April “Dialogue on security in Asia: concepts, threats and assurances after 9/11” 25-27 April Meeting on the work of the High-level Panel at the sixtieth session of ESCAP 27-29 April Regional consultations

30 April

Washington, D.C.

Singapore

Shanghai, China

Addis Ababa

10 and 11 May

High-level meeting with the Commission of the African Union Meeting with African civil society organizations Outreach to civil society, economic and social development NGOs “Development, poverty and security”

13 and 14 May

Conference on Security Council change

17-19 May

“Governance, democracy and free markets”

Mexico City

21-23 May

“The United Nations, regional organizations and future security threats in Africa” “New threats, new responses”

Cape Town, South Africa

2 May

6 May

24 and 25 May

Addis Ababa

Addis Ababa

Inter-Africa Group and New York University Center on International Cooperation High-level Panel secretariat and Bureau of the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Panel secretariat

New York

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and United Nations Foundation

Warrenton, United States of America Washington, D.C.

Stanley Foundation and United Nations Foundation

Warsaw

Johns Hopkins University Institute for Transatlantic Relations Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and United Nations Foundation Center for Conflict Resolution, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and United Nations Foundation Government of Poland

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198 Date (2004) Meeting/theme

Place

27-29 May

“The United Nations and Rome new threats: rethinking security”

2 June

“Environment and security”

8 and 9 June “Strengthening United Nations capacity for crisis management” 11-16 June Thirty-ninth Conference on the United Nations for the Next Decade 17 and 18 “Poverty and security: June an integrated approach”

28 and 29 June

“Security for the billion at the bottom”

Washington, D.C. Copenhagen

Prouts Neck, United States of America London

Oxford, United Kingdom 1-3 July “United Nations and the New Delhi new threats: rethinking security” 6 and 7 July “Threats, challenges and Kyoto, Japan change: internal violence” 11 and 12 “Threats, challenges and Cairo September reform: building security in the Mediterranean and Gulf region”

Organizer Istituto Affari Internazionali, Aspen Institute Italia, Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, United Nations Foundation and United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and United Nations Foundation Government of Denmark

Stanley Foundation

London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom Department of International Development and United Nations Foundation Oxford University and Stanford Institute for International Studies Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies and United Nations Foundation Government of Japan

Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, United Nations Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Istituto Affari Internazionali

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II.2 INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS UN Millennium Project, 2005 1

CONTENTS Chapter

Page

PREFACE ....................................................................................................................

202

CONTRIBUTORS .......................................................................................................

203

TASK FORCE REPORTS ...........................................................................................

205

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS................................................................

206

TEN KEY RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................

208

OVERVIEW.................................................................................................................

212

1.

WHY THE GOALS ARE IMPORTANT AND WHY WE’RE FALLING SHORT...............................................................................................................

216

The fulcrum of international development policy ..............................................

216

The means to a productive life ...........................................................................

216

A linchpin to global security ..............................................................................

219

Where we stand with only a decade to go ..........................................................

221

Why progress is so mixed...................................................................................

224

Four reasons for shortfalls in achieving the Goals .............................................

227

1 UN Millennium Project 2005, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, Overview, 2005.


200

Chapter 2.

Page

COUNTRY-LEVEL PROCESSES TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS ....................

235

Designing a national strategy to achieve the Goals............................................

235

Working back from the 2015 targets and timelines............................................

236

Priority public investments to empower poor people.........................................

237

The key elements for rapid scale-up...................................................................

244

Good governance to achieve the Goals ..............................................................

246

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM TO SUPPORT COUNTRY-LEVEL PROCESSES .................................................

247

Fixing the aid system .........................................................................................

247

Key measures to improve aid delivery ...............................................................

253

A breakthrough in global trade...........................................................................

259

Regional and global public goods ......................................................................

260

Getting started in 2005 -- launching a decade of bold ambition.........................

263

THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS ................................................................................

268

Expanding the financial envelope to achieve the Goals .....................................

268

The benefits: the case for a decade of bold ambition .........................................

272

REFERENCES.............................................................................................................

279

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................................

282

3.

4.

BOXES 1.

The Monterrey Consensus as a framework for global partnership ......................

217

2.

Poverty reduction and global security .................................................................

220

3.

The means to a productive life ............................................................................

225

4.

Partners in pursuing the Goals.............................................................................

229

Investing in Development BOXES

201 Page

5.

MDG priorities for each region ..........................................................................

242

6.

Scaling up success ..............................................................................................

245

7.

What advanced economies can do to achieve the Goals.....................................

251

8.

Large-scale aid works -- when done properly ....................................................

252

9.

Differentiating development support by country needs......................................

255

10.

Identifying MDG fast-track countries ................................................................

263

11.

The 0.7 percent official development assistance target and the Millennium Development Goals ........................................................................

273

TABLES 1.

Major trends in the Goals, by region ..................................................................

212

2.

Population living below the poverty line............................................................

222

3.

Agriculture risk, transport risk, and malaria risk, by region...............................

233

4.

Recommendations for reforming development partnership ...............................

248

5.

Estimated official development assistance for direct MDG support and MDG capacity building, 2002 ............................................................................

257

6.

Financing the Millennium Development Goals in Ghana ..................................

269

7.

Estimated cost of meeting the Millennium Development Goals in all countries .............................................................................................................

270

Plausible official development assistance needs to meet the Millennium Development Goals ............................................................................................

271

9.

The benefits of meeting the Millennium Development Goals, by region...........

274

10.

Estimated official development assistance flows and gaps of Development Assistance Committee members based on existing commitments .....................

276

8.


202 PREFACE

The UN Millennium Project has been a unique undertaking. Its 10 task forces, Secretariat, and broad array of participants from academia, government, UN agencies, international financial institutions, nongovernmental organizations, donor agencies, and the private sector created a worldwide network of development practitioners and experts across an enormous range of countries, disciplines, and organizations. The Project was made possible by the unique commitment, skills, and convictions of the task force coordinators, who led their groups to take on some of the most challenging development questions of our generation, and by the task force members, who gave remarkably of their time. This has been a global effort, in the service of a great global cause -- the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Our Project has been a microcosm of a larger truth: achieving the Millennium Development Goals will require a global partnership suitable for an interconnected world. The world truly shares a common fate. This has been a labor of love for the many participants in the task forces and Secretariat. Individuals have volunteered vast amounts of effort and expertise to the Project. Their contributions, far beyond any reasonable expectation, have immeasurably sharpened and strengthened the messages contained in the Project's many outputs, including this report, the task force final reports, the newly developed tools for needs assessment, and the advisory support for MDG-based planning in several countries. I believe that all of the participants have contributed in such a manner because they recognize the special nature of this effort. Part of that is the honor and privilege of working on behalf of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who launched the UN Millennium Project and who has played an unparalleled role in promoting the global fight against extreme poverty. Part is the delight of working for and together with UNDP Administrator Mark Malloch Brown, whose tenacity, vision, and leadership have guided the UN Development Group’s efforts for several years. We have also enjoyed, admired, and richly benefited from the leaders of other UN agencies, who direct teams that save lives and ease burdens of poverty and despair throughout the world on a daily basis. Another special aspect of the Project is the rare and powerful opportunity to help give voice to the hopes, aspirations, and vital needs of the world's poorest and most voiceless people. We have met countless heroes and heroines of development in the three years of our work -- in the villages and slums of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and other parts of the developing world. We have seen people preserving their spirit, integrity, commitment, and hope for the future even when they have little else, when tragic circumstances have left them bereft of health, education, possessions, and a means of livelihood. The human spirit, we have seen on innumerable occasions, is truly indomitable. This triumph of the human spirit gives us the hope and confidence that extreme poverty can be cut by half by the year 2015, and indeed ended altogether within the coming years. The world community has at its disposal the proven technologies, policies, financial resources, and most importantly, the human courage and compassion to make it happen. Jeffrey D. Sachs January 2005


203 CONTRIBUTORS

This document presents an overview of the findings and recommendations of the UN Millennium Project, an independent advisory body to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for initiating and supporting the UN Millennium Project, for his unswerving commitment to the objective of global poverty reduction, and for his remarkable and tireless leadership of the United Nations system. We also thank Mark Malloch Brown, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Chair of the United Nations Development Group, for his sage guidance and support at every step of the project. We also wish to express our profound appreciation to members of the UN Development Group's Executive Committee for their ongoing support: Carol Bellamy, United Nations Children's Fund; Jim Morris, World Food Programme; and Thoraya Obaid, United Nations Population Fund. We are further grateful to Louise Frechette, Deputy Secretary-General, Jose Antonio Ocampo, Department of Social and Economic Affairs; his predecessor Nitin Desai; and Shashi Tharoor, Department of Public Information, for their generous guidance and advice. This report has been co-authored by the coordinators of the UN Millennium Project’s 10 task forces and Secretariat, building on the contributions made by hundreds of scholars, development practitioners, scientists, political leaders and policy leaders involved since the Project's inception in July 2002. A large number of task force associates and task force members made tremendous contributions to many parts of this report, including Gabriella Carolini, Glenn Denning, Helen de Pinho, Philip Dobie, Lisa Dreier, Rafael Flor, Lynn Freedman, Caren Grown, Ruth Levine, Kristen Lewis, Joan Paluzzi, Robin Sears, Smita Srinivas, Yesim Tozan, Ron Waldman, Haynie Wheeler, Paul Wilson, and Nalan Yuksei. In the UN Millennium Project Secretariat, Albert Hyunbae Cho, Michael Faye, Michael Krouse, Fatou Lo, Gordon McCord, Luis Javier Montero, Rohit Wanchoo, Emily White, and Alice Wiemers worked around the clock for many months to provide invaluable research assistance. Erin Trowbridge provided extremely important comments and inputs. Prarthna Dayal, Maria Beatriz Orlando, Nora Simpson, Kelly Tobin, and Brian Torpy also made essential efforts in further supporting task force contributions. This report also directly integrates many of the ideas developed by the UN Millennium Project's Task Force on Poverty and Economic Development, including many outlined by its interim report of February 2004. The members and associates of the Task Force on Poverty and Economic Development who contributed include Kwesi Botchwey, Haidari Amani, Ernest Aryeetey, George Cahuzac, Andrew Cassels, Jamie Drummond, Richard Freeman, Rebecca Grynspan, Pekka Haavisto, Aynul Hasan, Peter Heller, Macartan Humphreys, John Langmore, Ruth Jacoby, Carlos Jarque, Allan Jury, Eddy Lee, Zhu Ling, Thomas Merrick, Vijay Modi, John Okidi, Hafiz Pasha, Michael Platzer, Steven Radelet, Atiqur Rahman, Frederic Richard, Ana-Teresa Romero, Rabbi Royan, Ratna Sahay, Francisco Sercovich, Sudhir Shetty, David Simon, Suresh Tendulkar, Michael Usnick, Ashutosh Varshney, and Xianbin Yao. Several of them wrote crucial background papers that formed the basis for important sections of the text. These include Philip Alston (human rights), Macartan Humphreys and Ashutosh Varshney (conflict), Vijay Modi (rural infrastructure), David Simon (aid flows), and Steven Radelet (governance and official development assistance). The Economic Commission for Africa (together with UNDP Ethiopia) and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the

204


Pacific (in collaboration with UNDP Thailand) hosted the task force meetings where many of the ideas in this report were developed. UNDP offered a gracious home to the UN Millennium Project in addition to providing instrumental financial, in-kind, and intellectual contributions on behalf of the UN Development Group. For this we thank all members of the senior management team including Abdoulie Janneh, Rima Khala Hunaidi, Elena Martinez, Jan Mattson, Kalman Mizsei, Shoji Nishimoto, Hafiz Pasha, Julia Taft, and their respective bureau teams. Under the leadership of Bruce Jenks, the Bureau for Resources and Strategic Partnerships provided tireless support to the project, particularly from Turhan Saleh, Amina Tirana and the rest of the MDGs Unit. Mark Suzman in the Office of the Administrator provided daily doses of patient and thoughtful advice. The Millennium Trust Fund at UNDP was supported by several governments and foundations and provided the core financial support for the Project since its inception in 2002. The Project is also deeply grateful for the contributions from the Ford Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, the Open Society Institute, and the Rockefeller Foundation. The UN Millennium Project would like to give special thanks to the Earth Institute at Columbia University for its intellectual, administrative, financial, and in-kind support to the Project Secretariat and to many of the task forces. The project also thanks the Center for Global Development, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Partners in Health, the International Centre for Research on Women, the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University, and the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization for their crucial role in supporting the activities of the Project's task forces. The UN Millennium Project is indebted to the staff of the United Nations system and to members of governments, civil society, and the private sector, too numerous to mention by name, who have contributed directly or indirectly to the report. All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.


205 TASK FORCE REPORTS

Task Force on Hunger Halving hunger: it can be done Task Force on Education and Gender Equality Toward universal primary education: investments, incentives, and institutions Task Force on Education and Gender Equality Taking action: achieving gender equality and empowering women Task Force on Child Health and Maternal Health Who’s got the power? Transforming health systems for women and children Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Access to Essential Medicines, Working Group on HIV/AIDS Combating AIDS in the developing world Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Access to Essential Medicines, Working Group on Malaria Coming to grips with malaria in the new millennium Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Access to Essential Medicines, Working Group on TB Investing in strategies to reverse the global incidence of TB Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Access to Essential Medicines, Working Group on Access to Essential Medicines Prescription for healthy development: increasing access to medicines Task Force on Environmental Sustainability Environment and human well-being: a practical strategy Task Force on Water and Sanitation Health, dignity, and development: what will it take? Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers A home in the city Task Force on Trade Trade for development Task Force on Science, Technology, and Innovation Innovation: applying knowledge in development


206

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2015, and in all levels of education no later than 2015

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

Goal 5: Improve maternal health Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation


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Target 11: Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and financial system (including a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction – both nationally and internationally) Target 13: Address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries (includes tariff- and quota-free access for Least Developed Countries’ exports, enhanced program and debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction) Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing states (through the Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and 22nd General Assembly provisions) Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term. Some of the indicators are monitored separately for the least developed countries, Africa, landlocked developing countries, and small island developing states. Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop ad implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications technologies


208 TEN KEY RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation 1

Developing country governments should adopt development strategies bold enough to meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets for 2015. We term them MDGbased poverty reduction strategies. To meet the 2015 deadline, we recommend that all countries have these strategies in place by 2006. Where Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) already exist, those should be aligned with the MDGs.

Recommendation 2 The MDG-based poverty reduction strategies should anchor the scaling up of public investments, capacity building, domestic resource mobilization, and official development assistance. They should also provide a framework for strengthening governance, promoting human rights, engaging civil society, and promoting the private sector. The MDG-based poverty reduction strategies should: x Be based on an assessment of investments and policies needed to reach the Goals by 2015. x Spell out the detailed national investments, policies, and budgets for the coming three to five years. x Focus on rural productivity, urban productivity, health, education, gender equality, water and sanitation, environmental sustainability, and science, technology, and innovation. x Focus on women’s and girls’ health (including reproductive health) and education outcomes, access to economic and political opportunities, right to control assets, and freedom from violence. x

Promote mechanisms for transparent and decentralized governance.

x Include operational strategies for scale-up, such as training and retaining skilled workers, involve civil society organizations in decision-making and service delivery, and provide resources for monitoring and evaluation. x Outline a private sector promotion strategy and an income generation strategy for poor people. x Be tailored, as appropriate, to the special needs of landlocked, small island developing, least developed, and fragile states. x Mobilize increased domestic resources by up to four percentage points of GNP by 2015.

Investing in Development x

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Calculate the need for official development assistance.

x Describe an “exit strategy” to end aid dependency, appropriate to the country’s situation. Note: Recommendations for sector-specific policies and investments are summarized in this report and described at length in the individual reports of the UN Millennium Project task forces.

Recommendation 3 Developing country governments should craft and Implement the MDG-based poverty reduction strategies in transparent and inclusive processes, working closely with civil society organizations, the domestic private, and international partners. x Civil society organizations should contribute activity to designing policies, delivering services, and monitoring progress. x Private sector firms and organizations should contribute actively to policy design, transparency initiatives and, where appropriate, public-private partnerships.

Recommendation 4 International donors should identify at least a dozen MDG “fast-track” countries for a rapid scale-up of official development assistance (ODA) In 2005, recognizing that many countries are already in a position for a massive scale-up on the basis of their good governance and absorptive capacity.

Recommendation 5 Developed and developing countries should jointly launch, in 2005, a group of Quick Win actions to save and improve millions of lives and to promote economic growth. They should also launch a massive effort to build expertise at the community level. The Quick Wins include but are not limited to: x Free mass distribution of malaria bed-nets and effective anti malaria medicines for all children in regions of malaria transmission by the end of 2007. x Ending user fees for primary schools and essential health services, compensated by increased donor aid as necessary, no later than the end of 2006. x Successful completion of the 3 by 5 campaign to bring 3 million AIDS patients in developing countries onto antiretroviral treatment by the end of 2005.


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x Expansion of school meals programs to cover all children in hunger hotspots using locally produced foods by no later than the end of 2006. x A massive replenishment of soil nutrients for smallholder farmers on lands with nutrient-depleted soils, through free or subsidized distribution of chemical fertilizers and agroforestry, by no later than the end of 2006. The massive training program of community-based workers should aim to ensure, by 2015, that each local community has: x Expertise in health, education, agriculture, nutrition, infrastructure, water supply and sanitation, and environmental management. x

Expertise in public sector management.

x

Appropriate training to promote gender equality and participation.

Recommendation 6 Developing country governments should align national strategies with such regional Initiatives as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the Caribbean Community (and Common Market), and regional groups should receive Increased direct donor support for regional projects. Regional development groups should: x Be supported to identify, plan, and implement high-priority cross-border infrastructure projects (roads, railways, watershed management). x Receive direct donor support to implement cross-border projects. Be encouraged to introduce and implement peer-review mechanisms to promote best practices and good governance.

Recommendation 7 High-income countries should increase official development assistance (ODA) from 0.25 percent of donor GNP in 2003 to around 0.44 percent in 2006 and 0.54 percent in 2015 to support the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in low-income countries, with improved ODA quality (including aid that is harmonized, predictable, and largely In the form of grants-based budget support). Each donor should reach 0.7 percent no later than 2015 to support the Goals and other development assistance priorities. Debt relief should be more extensive and generous. x ODA should be based on actual needs to meet the Millennium Development Goals and on countries’ readiness to use the ODA effectively. x Criteria for evaluating the sustainability of a country's debt burden must be consistent with the achievement of the Goals.


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x Aid should be oriented to support the MDG-based poverty reduction strategy, rather than to support donor-driven projects. x Donors should measure and report the share of their ODA that supports the actual scale-up of MDG-related investments. x Middle-income countries should also seek opportunities to become providers of ODA and give technical support to low-income countries.

Recommendation 8 High-income countries should open their markets to developing country exports through the Doha trade round and help Least Developed Countries raise export competitiveness through Investments in critical trade-related Infrastructure, including electricity, roads, and ports. The Doha Development Agenda should be fulfilled and the Doha Round completed no later than 2006.

Recommendation 9 International donors should mobilize support for global scientific research and development to address special needs of the poor in areas of health, agriculture, natural resource and environmental management, energy, and climate. We estimate the total needs to rise to approximately $7 billion a year by 2015.

Recommendation 10 The UN Secretary-General and the UN Development Group should strengthen the coordination of UN agencies, funds, and programs to support the MDGs, at headquarters and country level. The UN Country Teams should be strengthened and should work closely with the international financial institutions to support the Goals. x The UN Country Teams should be properly trained, staffed, and funded to support program countries to achieve the Goals. x The UN Country Team and the international financial institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, regional development banks) should work closely at country level to improve the quality of technical advice.


212 OVERVIEW

We have the opportunity in the coming decade to cut world poverty by half. Billions more people could enjoy the fruits of the global economy. Tens of millions of lives can be saved. The practical solutions exist. The political framework is established. And for the first time, the cost is utterly affordable. Whatever one's motivation for attacking the crisis of extreme poverty -- human rights, religious values, security, fiscal prudence, ideology -the solutions are the same. All that is needed is action. This report recommends the way forward. It outlines a way to attain this bold ambition. It describes how to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the world's time-bound and quantified targets for addressing extreme poverty in its many dimensions -- income poverty, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion -- while promoting gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability. They are also basic human rights -the rights of each person on the planet to health, education, shelter, and security as pledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Millennium Declaration. How will the world look in 2015 if the Goals are achieved? More than 500 million people will be lifted out of extreme poverty. More than 300 million will no longer suffer from hunger. There will also be dramatic progress in child health. Rather than die before reaching their fifth birthdays, 30 million children will be saved. So will the lives of more than 2 million mothers. There's more. Achieving the Goals will mean 350 million fewer people are without safe drinking water and 650 million fewer people live without the benefits of basic sanitation, allowing them to lead healthier and more dignified lives. Hundreds of millions more women and girls will go to school, access economic and political opportunity, and have greater security and safety. Behind these large numbers are the lives and hopes of people seeking new opportunities to end the burden of grinding poverty and contribute to economic growth and renewal. Many countries are on track to achieve at least some of the Goals by the appointed year, 2015. Yet broad regions are far off track (table 1). Sub-Saharan Africa, most dramatically, has been in a downward spiral of AIDS, resurgent malaria, falling food output per person, deteriorating shelter conditions, and environmental degradation, so that most countries in Africa are far off track to achieve most or all of the Goals. Climate change could worsen the situation by increasing food insecurity, spreading vector-borne diseases, and increasing the likelihood of natural disasters, while a prolonged decline in rainfall in parts of Africa has already wreaked havoc. Meanwhile, for some Goals, such as reducing maternal mortality and reversing the loss of environmental resources, most of the world is off track. The early target for gender parity in primary and secondary education -with a deadline of 2005 -- will be missed in many countries. The Millennium Development Goals are too important to fail. It is time to put them on the fast-track they require and deserve. The year 2005 should inaugurate a decade of bold action. Based on work conducted by more than 250 of the world's leading

On track Progress but lagging Progress but lagging Progress but lagging Progress but lagging Lagging

On track Progress but lagging Lagging

On track

Met

Met

Southern

Southeastern

Asia

Lagging

Progress but lagging Little change

High but no change

Increasing

Increasing

Western

Progress but lagging Lagging

On track

Progress but lagging

Moderate, non change

No data

Oceania

Met

On track

On track

On track

Low, minimal improvements On track

Latin America & Caribbean

Met

Met

Met

Declining

Low, no change

Increasing

Met

Met

On track

On track

Increasing

Increasing

Commonwealth of Independent States Europe Asia

1 Results based on measurements of enrolment rate. Results may change if based on measurements of primary completion rates. For example, estimates of completion rates in Latin America show that 8-10 percent of the school-age population will not complete primary school, which implies that the region is off track for reaching the goal of universal primary education.

SubEastern Saharan Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Reduce extreme On track High, no Met poverty by half change Reduce hunger by High, no Very Progress half change high, little but change lagging Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Universal primary On track Progress On track schooling 1 but lagging Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Girls’ equal On track Progress Met enrolment in primary but school lagging Girls’ equal Met Progress No data enrolment in but secondary school lagging Literacy parity Lagging Lagging Met between young women and men

Northern

Africa

Table 1. Major trends in the Goals, by region

Very high, no change Low, no change

SubSaharan Progress but lagging Progress but lagging No data

Declining

Eastern

Goal 5: Improve maternal health Reduce maternal Moderate Very high Low mortality by threequarters Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases Halt and reverse No data Stable Increasing spread of HIV/AIDS Halt and reverse Low High Moderate spread of malaria Halt and reverse Low, High, Moderate, spread of TB declining increasing declining

Women’s equal Progress representation in but national parliaments lagging Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Reduce mortality of On track under-five-year-olds by two-thirds Measles Met immunization

Northern

Africa

Very high

Increasing Moderate High, declining

Stable Moderate High, declining

Progress but lagging Progress but lagging

Very low, no change

Southern

High

On track

On track

Southeastern Progress but lagging

Asia

Low, declining

Low

No data

Moderate

On track

Moderate, no change

Very low, no change

Western

High, increasing

Low

Increasing

High

Declining

Moderate, no change


Oceania

Low, declining

Moderate

Stable

Moderate

Met

On track



Moderate, increasing

Low

Increasing

Low

Met

Low, no change

Recent progress

Moderate, increasing

Low

Increasing

Low

Met

Increasing

Declining


Rising numbers

Source: UN Statistics Division, UNDESA 2004.

Low, increasing

Progress but lagging Progress but lagging Progress but lagging

Low access, no change No change

Progress but lagging On track



High access, little change On track

Declining access

Rapidly increasing

Progress but lagging On track

On track


High access, no change

Declining

Met

No change

Southeastern

Progress but lagging Some progress

On track

Met

Small decline

Southern

Low, increasing

Asia Eastern

Met

Goal 8: A global partnership for development Youth unemployment High, no High, no change change

Halve proportion without improved drinking water in urban areas Halve proportion without improved drinking water in rural areas Halve proportion without sanitation in urban areas Halve proportion without sanitation in rural areas Improve the lives of slum dwellers

SubSaharan Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Reverse loss of Less than Declining forests 1% forest

Northern

Africa

High, increasing

Rising numbers

No change

Met


Met

Less than 1% forest

Western

Low, increasing

No data

High access, no change No change

Low access, no change


Declining

Oceania

Increasing





Declining except Caribbean Met


Low, rapidly increasing

Low but no change

High access, no change Little change


Met

Met

Low, rapidly increasing

Low but no change

High access, no change Little change


Met

Met



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development practitioners over the past two years in the context of the UN Millennium Project, this report presents a practical plan for achieving the Goals. Throughout, we stress that the specific technologies for achieving the Goals are known. What is needed is to apply them at scale. To that end, we present 10 key recommendations at the front of the report. More elaborate analysis and recommendations are set out in the 13 thematically oriented task force reports that underpin this plan. This overview has four parts. The first describes why the Millennium Development Goals are important and the varied progress so far in achieving them. It then offers a diagnosis of why progress has been so mixed across regions and across Goals. The second presents the recommendations to be implemented at the country level, focusing on the processes, investments, policies, and scale-up strategies required to achieve the Goals. The third provides recommendations to guide the international system's support for countrylevel processes. The fourth estimates the costs and benefits of achieving the Goals, outlining the millions of lives that could be saved -- and the billions of lives improved -through a very affordable but substantial increase in worldwide investments.

1. WHY THE GOALS ARE IMPORTANT AND WHY WE’RE FALLING SHORT The Millennium Development Goals are the most broadly supported, comprehensive, and specific poverty reduction targets the world has ever established, so their importance is manifold. For the international political system, they are the fulcrum on which development policy is based. For the billion-plus people living in extreme poverty, they represent the means to a productive life. For everyone on Earth, they are a linchpin to the quest for a more secure and peaceful world.

The fulcrum of international development policy At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the largest gathering of world leaders in history adopted the UN Millennium Declaration, committing their nations to a global partnership to reduce poverty, improve health, and promote peace, human rights, gender equality, and environmental sustain ability. Soon after, world leaders met again at the March 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, establishing a landmark framework for global development partnership in which developed and developing countries agreed to take joint actions for poverty reduction (box 1). Later that same year, UN member states gathered at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, where they reaffirmed the Goals as the world’s time-bound development targets.

The means to a productive life For the billion-plus people still living in extreme poverty, the MDGs are a life-anddeath issue. Extreme poverty can be defined as “poverty that kills,” depriving individuals of the means to stay alive in the face of hunger, disease, and environmental hazards. When


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Box 1 The Monterrey Consensus as a framework for global partnership The Monterrey Consensus offers a valuable framework for action, though many of its key commitments remain unfulfilled. Six important highlights are: First, the world committed to a broad-based development agenda: “Our goal is to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic growth and promote sustainable development as we advance to a fully inclusive and equitable global economic system.” Second, the world recognized the need for a new partnership of rich and poor countries based on good governance and expanded trade, aid, and debt relief: “Achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, demands a new partnership between developed and developing countries. We commit ourselves to sound policies, good governance at all levels, and the rule of law. We also commit ourselves to mobilizing domestic resources, attracting international flows, promoting international trade as an engine for development, increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development, sustainable debt financing and external debt relief, and enhancing the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial, and trading systems.” Third, the Monterrey Consensus distinguished between developing countries that have adequate infrastructure and human capital to attract private investment (mainly middle-income countries) and those that must rely on official development assistance to build up infrastructure and human capital (mainly low-income and especially Least Developed Countries): “Official development assistance (ODA) plays an essential role as a complement to other sources of financing for development, especially in those countries with the least capacity to attract private direct investment. ODA can help a country to reach adequate levels of domestic resource mobilization over an appropriate time horizon, while human capital, productive, and export capacities are enhanced. ODA can be critical for improving the environment for private sector activity and can thus pave the way for robust growth. ODA is also a crucial instrument for supporting education, health, public infrastructure development, agriculture, and rural development, and to enhance food security.” Fourth, the Monterrey Consensus identified several regions where ODA is particularly necessary to meet the Goals: “For many countries in Africa, Least Developed Countries, small island developing states, and landlocked developing countries, ODA is still the largest source of external financing and is critical to the achievement of the development goals and

218


targets of the Millennium Declaration and other internationally agreed development targets.” Fifth, the Monterrey Consensus recognized that significant increases of ODA would therefore be needed, and the donor countries committed to provide those additional resources, including the long-standing target of 0.7 percent of GNP: “We recognize that a substantial increase in ODA and other resources will be required if developing countries are to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration. To build support for ODA, we will cooperate to further improve policies and development strategies, both nationally and internationally, to enhance aid effectiveness. “In that context, we urge developed countries that have not done so to make concrete efforts toward the target of 0.7 percent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries.” Sixth, the Monterrey Consensus noted that trade is a critical engine of growth and that low-income countries need two kinds of help to improve trade: improved market access in high-income markets, and financial resources to remove supply-side constraints through investments in trade infrastructure, technology, and institutions: “In cooperation with the interested governments and their financial institutions and to further support national efforts to benefit from trade opportunities and effectively integrate into the multilateral trading system, we invite multilateral and bilateral financial and development institutions to expand and coordinate their efforts, with increased resources, for gradually removing supply-side constraints; improve trade infrastructure; diversify export capacity and support an increase in the technological content of exports; strengthen institutional development and enhance overall productivity and competitiveness.” With these six principles, the Monterrey Consensus provides a balanced approach to economic growth and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (UN 2000: paragraphs 1, 4, 39, 41, 42, and 36). The UN Millennium Project supports these balanced principles. In this document we build on them to recommend the practical steps that can result in the achievement of those Goals.

individuals suffer from extreme poverty and lack the meager income needed even to cover basic needs, a single episode of disease, or a drought, or a pest that destroys a harvest can be the difference between life and death. In households suffering from extreme poverty, life expectancy is often around half that in the high-income world, 40 years instead of 80. It is common that of every 1,000 children born, more than 100 die before their fifth birthday, compared with fewer than 10 in the high income world. An infant born in SubSaharan Africa today has only a one third chance of surviving to age 65.


219

The Goals are ends in themselves, but for these households they are also capital inputs -- the means to a productive life, to economic growth, and to further development. A healthier worker is a more productive worker. A better educated worker is a more productive worker. Improved water and sanitation infrastructure raises output per capital through various channels, such as reduced illness. So, many of the Goals are part of capital accumulation, defined broadly, as well as desirable objectives in their own right. The Goals for hunger and disease are part of human capital. The Goals for water and sanitation and slum dwellers are part of infrastructure. The Goal for environmental sustainability is part of natural capital. The first Goal for income poverty is part of economic growth. And because meeting the Goals for hunger, education, gender equality, environment, and health is vital for overall economic growth and development, it is a mistake to talk simply about the rate of economic growth needed to achieve the Goals in a country. It is more helpful, particularly for the poorest countries caught in economic stagnation, to describe the range and levels of investments needed to achieve the Goals and thus to support overall economic growth.

A linchpin to global security The Goals not only reflect global justice and human rights -- they are also vital to international and national security and stability, as emphasized by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. Poor and hungry societies are much more likely than high-income societies to fall into conflict over scarce vital resources, such as watering holes and arable land -- and over scarce natural resources, such as oil, diamonds, and timber. Many world leaders in recent years have rightly stressed the powerful relationship between poverty reduction and global security (box 2). Achieving the Millennium Development Goals should therefore be placed centrally in international efforts to end violent conflict, instability, and terrorism. As the High-Level Panel recommends, countries that aspire to global leadership through permanent membership on the UN Security Council have a special responsibility to promote the Goals and to fulfill international commitments to official development assistance and other kinds of support vital for achieving them. We endorse the Panel’s recommended criterion of 0.7 percent of GNP in official donor assistance for developed countries aspiring to permanent membership. Poverty increases the risks of conflict through multiple paths. Poor countries are more likely to have weak governments, making it easier for would-be rebels to grab land and vital resources. Resource scarcity can provoke population migrations and displacements that result in conflicts between social groups, as in Darfur, Sudan, in the wake of diminishing rainfall. Without productive alternatives, young people may turn to violence for material gain, or feel a sense of hopelessness, despair, and rage. Poor farmers who lack basic infrastructure and access to agricultural markets may turn in desperation to narcotics production and trade, such as growing poppy in Afghanistan or coca in the Andes. Many slums are controlled by gangs of drug traffickers and traders, who create a vicious cycle of insecurity and poverty. The lack of economically viable options other than criminal activity creates the seedbed of instability -- and increases the potential for violence.


220

Box 2 Poverty reduction and global security Many world leaders have stressed the fact that the fight for global security -- to stop war, internal violence, terror, and other ills of profound instability -- requires success in the battle against poverty as well. Here are some of their statements, emphasizing the broad range of agreement on this vital point. King Abdullah of Jordan, January 23, 2004 “Opportunity is a powerful force in giving people a stake in a peaceful future. It is in our hands to create a global growth economy, access to education and technology, and, most important, justice, to show young people that ours is a world of fairness, openness, and hope. The Millennium Development Goals need to be reinforced with new benchmarks for assessing progress, for ensuring better and fairer trade, and for forging new global links.” Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, October 7, 2004 “The rest of the world cannot stand by -- because we cannot afford to, because what happens in Africa affects and will affect the rest of the world. Poverty and instability leads to weak states which can become havens for terrorists and other criminals.” President George W. Bush of the United States, March 14, 2002 “Poverty doesn’t cause terrorism. Being poor doesn’t make you a murderer. Most of the plotters of September 11th were raised in comfort. Yet persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair. And when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror. “Poverty prevents governments from controlling their borders, policing their territory, and enforcing their laws. Development provides the resources to build hope and prosperity, and security.... Successful development also requires citizens who are literate, who are healthy, and prepared and able to work. Development assistance can help poor nations meet these education and health care needs.” President Jacques Chirac of France, May 26, 2004 “The world economy as a whole is held back when the lack of development condemns entire regions to poverty and a seeming lack of prospects. It is also a political necessity, because the security and stability of the world are under threat from the reactions of populations that are deprived of their basic rights.” President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, September 21, 2004 “The path to lasting peace must encompass a new political and economic international order, one that extends to all countries real opportunities for economic and social development.”


221

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan, September 21, 2004 “The protection and empowerment of individuals and communities is the foundation of international peace and security…. There will be no stability and prosperity in the world unless the issues of Africa are resolved…. Peace and security, economic and social issues are increasingly intertwined.” President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, January 10, 2003 “We should address the situations and factors that have the potential to sow terrorism, namely, poverty, denial, deprivation, oppression, and injustice.” President Olusagun Obasanjo of Nigeria, September 23, 2004 “Our quest for global peace and security will prove unsuccessful unless we intensify international cooperation for development and the reduction of poverty.” Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany, 2001, Program of Action 2015 “Extreme poverty, growing inequality between countries, but also within countries themselves, are great challenges of our times, because they are a breeding ground for instability and conflict. So reducing worldwide poverty is, not least, essential to safeguarding peace and security.”

Research suggests a strong causal impact of poverty and adverse income shocks on the onset of conflict. On average a negative economic growth shock of 5 percentage points increases civil war risks by about 50 percent. And the risk of violent civil conflict declines steadily as national incomes increase. While violent conflicts surely result from a combination of factors, poverty creates conditions for igniting and sustaining conflict. The implications are twofold: investing in development is especially important to reduce the probability of conflict, and development strategies should take into consideration their possible effects on reducing the risk of conflict-or inadvertently increasing it.

Where we stand with only a decade to go The world has made significant progress in achieving many of the Goals. Between 1990 and 2002 average overall incomes increased by approximately 21 percent. The number of people in extreme poverty declined by an estimated 130 million. 1 Child mortality rates fell from 103 deaths per 1,000 live births a year to 88. Life expectancy rose from 63 years to nearly 65 years. An additional 8 percent of the developing world's people received access to water. And an additional 15 percent acquired access to improved sanitation services. But progress has been far from uniform across the world -- or across the Goals. There are huge disparities across and within countries. Within countries, poverty is greatest for rural areas, though urban poverty is also extensive, growing, and underreported by traditional indicators (table 2). 1

Extreme poverty figures are for $1.08 per day in 1990 and 2001.


222

Table 2. Population living below the poverty line Share of poor people living in rural areas 2 (%)

Rural population as share of total (%)

2001

2001 3

2001

30 1

15 4

80 53

63 37

50

11

10

42

24

6

7

2

2

63

42

462 227

431 313

41 45

31 46

77 73

72 67

$1.08 a day poverty line 1

Million of people

Share of total population (%)

Region

1990

2001

1990

East Asia Eastern Europe and Central Asia Latin America and Caribbean Middle East and North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa

472 2

271 17

49

$2.15 a day poverty line 4 Region East Asia Eastern Europe and Central Asia Latin America and Caribbean Middle East and North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa

Millions of people

Share of total population (%)

1990

2001

1990

2001

1,116 23

865 93

70 5

47 20

125

128

28

25

51

70

21

23

958 382

1,064 516

86 75

77 77

Source: Columns 1-4 and 7-10: Chen and Ravallion 2004. Columns 5-6: Calculated from World Bank 2004d.

1

Poverty lines set in 1993 US$ adjusted for purchasing power parity. Calculated as rural poverty rate x (100 – urbanization rate)/national poverty rate. Note that published poverty rates often underreport urban poverty. 3 Where 2001 data are not available, uses most recent year available. 4 Poverty lines set in 1993 US$ adjusted for purchasing power parity. 2


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Sub-Saharan Africa is the epicenter of crisis, with continuing food insecurity, a rise of extreme poverty, stunningly high child and maternal mortality, and large numbers of people living in slums, and a widespread shortfall for most of the MDGs. Asia is the region with the fastest progress, but even there hundreds of millions of people remain in extreme poverty, and even fast-growing countries fail to achieve some of the non-income Goals. Other regions have mixed records, notably Latin America, the transition economies, and the Middle East and North Africa, often with slow or no progress on some of the Goals and persistent inequalities undermining progress on others. There is also significant variation in progress toward the MDGs: x The proportion of undernourished people is falling slowly in most regions of the world. Western Asia, Oceania, and CIS Asia are the exceptions, where the proportion has actually risen over the past decade. In Sub-Saharan Africa, some countries have seen progress, but overall proportions of undernourishment remain high with little change. x In primary education there is progress in most regions, but Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are still significantly off track. Most poor children who attend primary school in the developing world learn shockingly little. x Gender equality remains an unfulfilled goal, and the education parity target for 2005 will be missed in many countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. x Child mortality rates have generally declined, but progress has slowed in many regions, and reversals are being recorded in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Progress has also been limited in West Asia and Oceania, and mortality remains extremely high in Sub-Saharan Africa. x Maternal mortality remains unacceptably high in every region, reflecting low public attention to women's needs and inadequate access to sexual and reproductive health information and services, including emergency obstetric services. x HIV/AIDS now infects about 40 million people. It is pandemic in southern Africa, and it poses a serious threat, particularly to women and adolescents, in every other developing region. The incidence of tuberculosis, still extremely high, is increasing as an opportunistic infection associated with HIV/AIDS. Malaria, an ecologically based parasite, remains a significant threat to health in many tropical regions and is pandemic in SubSaharan Africa. x The share of population with access to improved drinking water supply has increased substantially. Most regions are now on track, except for Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania, and rural areas in most regions. x The world is not on track to meet the sanitation goal. Progress has been too slow in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and much of the rest of Asia. x About 900 million people are estimated to live in slum-like conditions characterized by insecure tenure, inadequate housing, and a lack of access to water or


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sanitation. The highest share of slum dwellers is in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, accounting for more than 70 percent of the urban population in many cities. Both West and East Asia (excluding China) have registered a rise in the number of slum dwellers since 1990 but a slight decline in the proportion. The same phenomenon is occurring in landlocked developing countries, small island developing states, and Least Developed Countries. In most other subregions, progress is either absent or lagging. x All developing regions have experienced substantial environmental degradation over the past decade, which could very well worsen as a result of long-term, manmade global climate change. Many countries are struggling because their natural resource basespecifically the forests, fisheries, soil, and water that survival and livelihoods depend on -is progressively degraded and subject to rising levels of pollution. Each year, roughly 15 million hectares of forest are cleared, generally in developing countries, resulting in increases in vector-borne diseases, declines in the quantity and quality of water, and more floods, landslides, and local climate changes. The lack of good data and indicators on the environment hides the extent to which most developing regions have suffered extensive environmental degradation over the past decade and are not on track to achieving environmental sustainability.

Why progress is so mixed The key to achieving the Goals in low-income countries is to ensure that each person has the essential means to a productive life. In today's global economy, these means include adequate human capital, access to essential infrastructure, and core political, social, and economic rights (box 3). In the process of economic growth, the Millennium Development Goals play two roles. First, the Goals are “ends in themselves,” in that reduced hunger, improved health and education, and access to safe water and sanitation are direct goals of society. Second, the Goals are also inputs to economic growth and further development. When suitably empowered with human capital, infrastructure, and core human rights in a market-based economy, women and men can secure productive and decent employment through personal initiative. When infrastructure, health, and education are widely available, poor countries can join the global division of labor in ways that promote economic growth, raise living standards, and increase technological sophistication. But when individuals and whole economies lack even the most basic infrastructure, health services, and education, market forces alone can accomplish little. Households and whole economies remain trapped in poverty, and fail to reap the benefits of globalization. Without basic infrastructure and human capital, countries are condemned to export a narrow range of low-margin primary commodities based on natural (physical) endowments, rather than a diversified set of exports based on technology, skills, and capital investments. In such circumstances, globalization can have significant adverse effects -- including brain drain, environmental degradation, biodiversity loss, capital flight, and terms-of-trade declines -- rather than bring benefits through increased foreign direct investment inflows and technological advances.


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Box 3 The means to productive life The key elements of adequate human capital include: x

Basic nutrition.

x

A health system that enables people to live a long and healthy life.

x

Sexual and reproductive health.

x

Literacy, numeracy, and marketable skills for twenty-first century jobs.

x Technical and entrepreneurial skills to adopt existing but underused technologies and scientific expertise to advance new knowledge. The essential infrastructure services include: x

Safe drinking water and basic sanitation.

x

A sustainably managed and conserved natural environment.

x Farm inputs, including soil nutrients, reliable water for agriculture, and improved seed varieties, plus vaccines, veterinary pharmaceuticals, and feed and fodder for livestock. x

Energy, including electricity and safe cooking fuels.

x Paved roads and transport services that are safe and reliable, including nonmotorized options. x

Modern information and communications technology.

The core political, social, and economic rights include: x

Equal rights, including reproductive rights, for women and girls.

x

Freedom from violence, especially for girls and women.

x

A political voice for every citizen, often through civil society organizations.

x

Equal access to public services.

x

Security of tenure and property rights for shelter, businesses, and other assets.

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Consider a typical village of subsistence farm households in a poor country, such as Afghanistan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, or Papua New Guinea. The village lacks access to a paved road and motor transport. Also lacking electricity, its energy needs are met by extracting wood from the diminished secondary forests and woodlands. Drinking water is unsafe and latrines regularly serve as a reservoir of infection through contamination of food and the local water supply. The children are sick from diarrhea, pneumonia, and malaria. In an African village, adults are dying of AIDS and tuberculosis, without hope of treatment. Farmers toil but do not even produce enough food to feed their families. The soils were long ago depleted of nutrients, especially nitrogen. The rains fail, and there is no backup irrigation. In these village settings, women carry a triple burden, caring for children, the elderly, and the sick, spending long hours to gather water and fuelwood, to process and produce food, and working on farms or in family enterprises for little or no income. Impoverished families have more children than they desire because of poor access to education, contraception, decent employment opportunities, and sexual and reproductive health information and services. Education seems at best a luxury to most citizens. And since there is no emergency obstetric care, mothers die in childbirth at a hundred or more times the rate in the rich world. Market forces alone will not rescue the village. Indeed, markets tend to bypass villages with little if any monetary income, and no ready means to earn it, given the low productivity and poor connections with the regional and world economy. The village barely lives off its own food production. Without money it cannot attract doctors, teachers, or transport firms. Without electricity or access to modern fuels it cannot run food processing equipment, irrigation pumps, computers, or electric tools for carpentry or apparel. Villagers do not have enough income to save. And since infrastructure and a skilled workforce are lacking, private investors do not come. Young men and women, particularly the literate, leave the village for cities -- and the best educated leave the country. The same downward spiral applies to many urban areas. On arrival, migrants from rural areas might find employment, though informal and insecure, and they are faced with inaccessible and unaffordable housing. They take refuge in ill-serviced and overcrowded informal settlements. Many of the largest urban agglomerations in the low-income world are like extended villages, and rapidly growing cities in middle-income countries are often very poorly planned, with large areas bereft of functioning infrastructure, employment, and environmental management. A generation or more of migrants from the countryside, combined with rapid natural population growth, results in a sprawl of densely settled humanity lacking the basics of healthcare, education, electricity, water supply, sanitation, solid waste disposal, and access to transport. People living in slums are largely excluded from enjoying their political, social, and economic rights. Some slums are so densely populated that it is not even possible to drive an ambulance into them. Diseases like tuberculosis spread like wildfire. HIV/AIDS is often rampant.


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Yet practical steps can be taken to turn the tide. Both villages and cities can become part of global economic growth if they are empowered with the infrastructure and human capital to do so. If every village has a road, access to transport, a clinic, electricity, safe drinking water, education, and other essential inputs, the villagers in very poor countries will show the same determination and entrepreneurial zeal of people all over the world. If every city has a reliable electricity grid, competitive telecommunications, access to transport, accessible and affordable housing for the poor, a water and sanitation system, and access to global markets through modern ports or roads, jobs and foreign investment will flow in -- rather than educated workers flowing out. Investing in core infrastructure, human capital, and good governance therefore accomplishes several things: x x growth. x

It converts subsistence farming to market-oriented farming. It establishes the basis for private sector-led diversified exports and economic

It enables a country to join the global division of labor in a productive way.

x It sets the stage for technological advance and eventually for an innovationbased economy. Achieving the Goals is largely about making core investments in infrastructure and human capital that enable poor people to join the global economy, while empowering the poor with economic, political, and social rights that will enable them to make full use of infrastructure and human capital, wherever they choose to live.

Four reasons for shortfalls in achieving the Goals There is no one-size-fits-all explanation for why the Goals are failing or succeeding. Each region and each Goal requires a careful analysis. We can, however, identify four overarching reasons why the Goals are not being achieved. Sometimes the problem is poor governance, marked by corruption, poor economic policy choices, and denial of human rights. Sometimes the problem is a poverty trap, with local and national economies too poor to make the needed investments. Sometimes progress is made in one part of the country but not in others, so that pockets of poverty persist. Even when overall governance is adequate, there are often areas of specific policy neglect that can have a monumental effect on their citizens’ well-being. Sometimes these factors occur together, making individual problems all the more challenging to resolve.

Governance failures Economic development stalls when governments do not uphold the rule of law, pursue sound economic policy, make appropriate public investments, manage a public administration, protect basic human rights, and support civil society organizations -including those representing poor people -- in national decisionmaking.

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The rule of law involves security in private property and tenure rights, safety from violence and physical abuse, honesty and transparency in government functions, and predictability of government behavior according to law. Too many countries fail to achieve these basic standards, sometimes due to authoritarian rulers who use violence and corruption to hold on to power-but often because upholding the rule of law requires institutions for government accountability, and those institutions are missing. Political and social rights should ensure equality before the law and fairness in society across groups. These rights must be substantive and not merely formal. The poor must have a meaningful say in the decisions that affect their lives. Women and girls must be assured freedom from violence and from legal, economic, and social discrimination. In many places, access to public goods and services is restricted for certain groups. Minority groups, for their language, religion, or race, suffer discrimination at the hands of more powerful groups. Sound economic policies involve a rational balance of responsibilities between the private sector and the public sector to secure sustained and widespread economic progress. The private sector is the engine of growth in production. The public sector establishes the framework and enabling environment for growth by setting sound macroeconomic policies and providing such public goods as infrastructure, public health and education, and support for science and technology. Public investments are crucial for a “private-based” market economy. Every successful economy relies heavily on public spending in critical areas including health, education, infrastructure (electricity grid, roads, seaports), environmental management (national parks and protected reserves, water and sanitation), information and communications, scientific research, and land for affordable housing. Accountable and efficient public administration requires transparency and administrators who are qualified, motivated, and adequately paid. It also requires efficient management systems, to disburse and track large investments, and monitoring and evaluation systems. Many poor countries without adequate resources for decent salaries -or the checks on political abuse that provide the incentives for performance and the ability to weed out the inept and corrupt -- are unable to afford an effective public sector, so they end up suffering from large-scale inefficiencies and wasted resources. Strong civil society engagement and participation are crucial to effective governance because they bring important actors to the fore, ensure the relevance of public investments, lead to decisions that best address the people's needs as they perceive them, and serve as watchdogs for the development and implementation of government policies. Achieving the Goals requires that all these areas of governance be properly addressed. There is no excuse for any country, no matter how poor, to abuse its citizens, deny them the equal protection of the law, or leave them victims of corruption, mismanagement, and economic irrationality. Some improvements in governance do not cost much money, if any, and some actually save money (by cutting corruption or granting land tenure, for example). Some improvements in economic outcomes are thus available at low cost, and such opportunities must not be squandered.


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To achieve the Goals, governments must work actively with all constituencies, particularly civil society organizations and the private sector. Civil society organizations can help design national strategies, deliver services, defend human rights, and supervise government in the fight against corruption and misrule. And the private sector is, plainly, the place for job creation and long-term income growth (box 4).

Box 4 Partners in pursuing the Goals Civil society ActionAid, Bread for the World, CIVICUS, DATA, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), Médecins sans Frontières, InterAction, Oxfam, RESULTS International, and Social Watch are among the many remarkable and dedicated civil society organizations that have contributed mightily to development progress around the world. National strategies to achieve the Goals will not succeed without their active engagement and that of other civil society organizations. Civil society organizations can raise public and political awareness about the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), maintaining constructive pressure on governments to follow through on their commitments. They can help design national MDG-based poverty reduction strategies, ensuring that investment strategies attend to the needs of historically excluded regions, groups, and policy issues. Many can also take on key tasks in public service delivery, particularly those that hinge on person-to-person training, community-level systems, and the mobilization of young people. In monitoring progress, they can be public watchdogs, ensuring transparency in investment programs and accountability in budget management. Internationally, civil society organizations can mobilize support among young people and other key constituencies to keep pressure on world leaders to follow through on political commitments. Through their work on the ground, they can be instrumental in sharing best practices and technical expertise. And they can help with direct service delivery, as they do already, for example, through humanitarian relief efforts in times of crisis in the world’s poorest regions.

Private sector Private businesses are important partners in achieving the Goals. Long-term poverty reduction in developing countries will not happen without sustained economic growth, which requires a vibrant private sector. In low-income countries, the majority of the labor force works in rural agriculture, so one powerful route to growth is through a boost in farm productivity and a transition from subsistence farming to commercial farming. In urban areas the transition should be from informal employment to formal employment in internationally competitive manufacturing and services.


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Strong public systems are needed to provide the human capital and infrastructure needed for firms to thrive and have access to world markets. The domestic private sector can support the Goals by making investments to increase productivity and create jobs. In some situations, it can also help support service delivery through public-private partnerships. The private sector should furthermore support the Goals by promoting transparency and corporate governance initiatives, by advocating for the Goals, and by engaging responsibly with the government in economic policy discussions. Major international businesses should support the Goals through corporate philanthropy, such as donations of life-saving technologies, and through differential pricing to enable the poor to gain access to needed technologies. When investing in developing countries, multinational firms should be responsible, law-abiding corporate citizens. As an important demonstration of corporate social responsibility, we recommend that all large international businesses, especially those that have signed up to the UN Global Compact, report their contributions through a Millennium Development Goals scorecard in their annual reports.

Poverty traps Many well governed countries are too poor to help themselves. Many well intentioned governments lack the fiscal resources to invest in infrastructure, social services, environmental management, and even the public administration necessary to improve governance. Further, dozens of heavily indebted poor and middle-income countries are forced by creditor governments to spend large proportions of their limited tax receipts on debt service, undermining their ability to finance vital investments in human capital and infrastructure. In a pointless and debilitating churning of resources, the creditors provide development assistance with one hand and then withdraw it in debt servicing with the other. In an important recent policy initiative, the U.S. government established a set of transparent indicators that identifies poor but reasonably well governed countries that can qualify for funding from its new Millennium Challenge Account. The list of 30 countries includes Bolivia, Ghana, Mali, and Mozambique. Despite significant efforts and real progress, these countries, and many like them, pass the governance test but still fail to make adequate progress toward the Goals. The reasons are clear. They lack the basic infrastructure, human capital, and public administration -- the foundations for economic development and private sector -- led growth. Without roads, soil nutrients, electricity, safe cooking fuels, clinics, schools, and adequate and affordable shelter, people are chronically hungry, burdened by disease, and unable to save. Without adequate public sector salaries and information technologies, public management is chronically weak. These countries are unable to attract private investment flows or retain their skilled workers. The Goals create a solid framework for identifying investments that need to be made. They point to targets of public investment -- water, sanitation, slum upgrading, education,


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health, environmental management, and basic infrastructure -- that reduce income poverty and gender inequalities, improve human capital, and protect the environment. By achieving the Goals, poor countries can establish an adequate base of infrastructure and human capital that will enable them to escape from the poverty trap. Escaping the poverty trap. When a country's capital stock (including physical, natural, and human capital) is too low, the economy is unproductive. Households are impoverished, and the environment is degraded. This leads to several problems: x Low saving rates. Poor households use all their income to stay alive, and so cannot save for the future. The few who can afford to save often have no access to formal banking. x Low tax revenues. Governments lack the budgetary resources for public investments and public administrations using qualified managers and modern information systems. x Low foreign investment. Foreign investors stay away from economies without basic infrastructure -- those with costly and unreliable roads, ports, communication systems, and electricity. x Violent conflict. Resource scarcity can often fuel latent tensions among competing groups. x Brain drain. Skilled workers leave the country because of low salaries and little hope for the future. x Unplanned or ill-timed births and rapid population growth. Impoverished people living in rural areas have the highest fertility rates and the largest families. Rapid population growth and shrinking farm sizes make rural poverty worse. Poor people (in rural and urban areas) have less access to information and services to space or limit their pregnancies in accord with their preferences. x Environmental degradation. People in poverty lack the means to invest in the environment and the political power to limit damage to local resources, resulting in soil nutrient depletion, deforestation, overfishing, and other environmental damage. These degraded conditions undermine rural incomes, and contribute to poor health and ruralurban migration, leading to new settlement in environmentally fragile periurban areas. All these adverse results reinforce and amplify poverty. Without private saving, public investment, and foreign investment, there is no improvement in productivity. With brain drain, population growth, environmental degradation, and ongoing risk of violence, the situation continues to degenerate. The key to escaping the poverty trap is to raise the economy’s capital stock to the point where the downward spiral ends and self-sustaining economic growth takes over. This requires a big push of basic investments between now and 2015 in public administration, human capital (nutrition, health, education), and key infrastructure (roads,


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electricity, ports, water and sanitation, accessible land for affordable housing, environmental management). This process is helped by a voluntary reduction in fertility, which promotes greater investments in the health, nutrition, and education of each child. We thus strongly support programs that promote sexual and reproductive health and rights, including voluntary family planning. Critical to overall success in economic growth and poverty reduction, they can help countries meet the Goals, freeing them from the poverty trap and their dependence on aid. Geographical conditions make poverty traps more likely. Some countries and regions are more vulnerable than others to falling into a poverty trap. While a history of violence or colonial rule or poor governance can leave any country bereft of basic infrastructure and human capital, physical geography plays special havoc with certain regions. Some regions need more basic infrastructure than others simply to compensate for a difficult physical environment. Here are some of the barriers that must be offset by investments: Adverse transport conditions: x

Landlocked economies.

x

Small island economies far from major markets.

x

Inland populations far from coasts and navigable rivers.

x

Populations living in mountains.

x

Long distances from major world markets.

x

Very low population densities.

Adverse agroclimatic conditions: x

Low and highly variable rainfall.

x

Lack of suitable conditions for irrigation.

x

Nutrient-poor and nutrient-depleted soils.

x

Vulnerability to pests and other post-harvest losses.

x

Susceptibility to the effects of climate change.

Adverse health conditions: x High ecological vulnerability to malaria and other tropical diseases. High AIDS prevalence.


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Other adverse conditions: x Lack of domestic energy resources (fossil fuels, geothermal or hydro-power potential). x

Small internal market and lack of regional integration.

x

Vulnerability to natural hazards (tropical storms, earthquakes, volcanoes).

x

Artificial borders that cut across cultural and ethnic groups.

x

Proximity to countries in conflict.

Sub-Saharan Africa is especially burdened by poor geographical endowments (table 3). Africa has the highest agriculture risk (tied with South Asia), the highest transport risk, and by far the highest malaria risk. Africa is also uniquely vulnerable to drought conditions. Human vulnerability in 1980 was inversely correlated with economic growth during 1980-2000.

Table 3. Agriculture risk, transport risk, and malaria risk, by region Region

Central Asia East Asia and Pacific Europe Latin America and Caribbean Middle East and North Africa North America South Asia Sub-Saharan Asia

Agriculture risk 1

Transport risk 2

Malaria risk 3

Human vulnerability index 4

0.31 0.68 0.38 0.76

0.41 0.27 0.27 0.37

0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03

0.24 0.33 0.22 0.39

0.71

0.36

0.02

0.36

0.51 0.86 0.86

0.23 0.26 0.52

0.00 0.02 0.42

0.25 0.38 0.60

Note: Indexes range form 0 to 1, with a higher value indicting higher risk. Country averages are weighted by population. Source: Calculated from World Bank 2004d, CIESIN 2002; Kiszewski and others 2004.

1

Averages indexes for share of cropland under irrigation in 1980, fertilizer use per capital in 1980, and share of population living in subhumid ecological zone. 2 Average indexes for share of population living near the coast, share of population living in low-density areas, share of population living above 800 meter elevations, and paved roads per capital in 1990 (earliest available data). 3 A 0-1 index for malaria ecology. 4 Averages agriculture risk, transport risk, and malaria risk.


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Africa’s vulnerability is very high but not insurmountable. Indeed, our message is that geographical vulnerabilities can and need to be offset by targeted investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and health. Countries far from markets can be brought closer by adequate investments in roads and railways. Countries with nutrient-depleted soils and inadequate rainfall can be helped by special programs for soil nutrient replenishment and water management for agriculture (such as irrigation and water harvesting). Countries suffering from malaria and other endemic diseases can combat them with appropriate programs of prevention and control. Yet such investments are costly -- too costly for the poorest countries to bear on their own -- and so require much greater help from the donor countries.

Pockets of poverty Most economies experience considerable variation in household incomes, so even middle-income countries may have large numbers of extremely poor households, especially large countries with considerable regional and ethnic diversity. Economic development often leaves some parts of an economy, or some groups in society, far behind. This occurs both in lagging regions and in cities, where a growing proportion of the poor live in slums. In many countries there are cities within cities -- a dual reality of haves and have-nots in close proximity. In many cases, geographical disadvantages (distance from markets) are worsened by the political disempowerment of minority groups. The major policy implication for middle-income countries is to ensure that critical investments -- in infrastructure, human capital, and public administration -- get channeled to lagging regions, including slums, and to social groups excluded from the political process and economic benefits. Some notable lagging regions include: x

Western China, burdened by great distance from the eastern coast.

x Southern Mexico, burdened by tropical diseases, agronomic risks, great distances from the major U.S. market, and political marginalization of the indigenous peasant populations. x Northeastern Brazil, burdened by vulnerability to drought and a long history of heavily concentrated land ownership. x The Gangetic states in India, burdened by low-productivity agriculture, long distances to coastal trade, and a large landless population.

Areas of specific policy neglect Some Goals are not being met simply because policymakers are unaware of the challenges, unaware of what to do, or neglectful of core public issues. Environmental policy is often grossly neglected because of politically weak environmental ministries, even weaker law enforcement, and considerable deficiencies in information and in the


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capacity to act on that information. Also common are gender biases in public investment and social and economic policies. Throughout the developing world and even in middle-income countries, maternal mortality ratios remain appallingly high. High maternal mortality and morbidity have a specific major remedy: access to emergency obstetric care. Despite its life-saving potential, there has been a pervasive underinvestment in this service and in the health systems to deliver it. Adolescents are also widely underserved for life skills, nutrition information, education and employment opportunities, and sexual and reproductive health information and services. Investments in child and neonatal health have also been grossly insufficient. All of these areas of neglect could be addressed through strengthening the management and service delivery of district-level health systems.

2. COUNTRY-LEVEL PROCESSES TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS To enable all countries to achieve the MDGs, the world must treat them not as abstract ambitions but as practical policy objectives. The practical steps to achieve the Goals in each country can and should be diagnosed, planned, and implemented with the proper focus and actions, combined with suitable support from the international community. Many well-governed developing countries are poised to make dramatic progress beginning in 2005 -- if their development partners deliver on long-standing promises to increase assistance.

Designing a national strategy to achieve the Goals In every country that wants to achieve the MDGs, the starting assumption should be that they are feasible unless technically proven otherwise. In many of the poorest countries, the Goals are indeed ambitious, but in most or even all countries they can still be achieved by 2015 if there are intensive efforts by all parties -- to improve governance, actively engage and empower civil society, promote entrepreneurship and the private sector, mobilize domestic resources, substantially increase aid to countries that need it to support MDG-based priority investments, and make suitable policy reforms at the global level, such as those in trade. It is crucial that technical constraints to meeting the Goals not be confused with financial constraints. Although poverty reduction is the primary responsibility of developing countries themselves, achieving the Goals in the poorest countries -- those that genuinely aspire to achieve the MDG targets -- will require significant increases in official development assistance to break the poverty trap. We urge all low-income countries to increase their own resource mobilization for the Goals by devoting budget revenues to priority investments. And in countries where governance is adequate but domestic resources are not, we call on donors to follow through on their long-standing commitments to increase aid significantly. In short, we call for co-financing the scale up of MDG-based investments. The rich countries must no longer delay on their side of the bargain. Our core operational recommendation is that each developing country with extreme poverty should adopt and implement a national development strategy ambitious enough to


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achieve the Goals. The country’s international development partners -- including bilateral donors, UN agencies, regional development banks, and the Bretton Woods institutions -should give all the support needed to implement the country’s MDG-based poverty reduction strategy. In particular, official development assistance should be generous enough to fill the financing needs, assuming that governance limitations are not the binding constraint and that the recipient countries are making their own reasonable efforts at increasing domestic resource mobilization. If countries already have a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), it should be revised so that it is ambitious enough to achieve the Goals. Where the Goals are already within reach and greater progress is sought, we suggest that countries adopt an “MDG plus” strategy, with more ambitious targets. Where countries are in conflict or emerging from conflict, we suggest that development strategies be balanced with urgent humanitarian efforts, especially for displaced populations.

Working back from the 2015 targets and timelines Serious implementation of the MDG targets and timelines implies a major shift in development practice. Low-income countries and their development partners now plan around modest incremental expansions of social services and infrastructure. We recommend instead a bold, needs-based, goal-oriented investment framework over 10 years aimed at achieving the quantitative targets set out in the MDGs. Rather than strategies to “accelerate progress toward the Goals,” we need strategies to “achieve the Goals.” We recommend a four-step approach. x First, each country should map the key dimensions and underlying determinants of extreme poverty -- by region, locality, and gender -- as best as possible with available data. x Second, consistent with the poverty maps, each country should undertake a needs assessment to identify the specific public investments necessary to achieve the Goals. x Third, each country should convert the needs assessment into a 10-year framework for action, including public investment, public management, and financing. x Fourth, each country should elaborate a 3-to-5-year MDG-based poverty reduction strategy within the context of the 10-year framework. This MDG-based poverty reduction strategy should be a detailed, operational document, attached to a medium-term expenditure framework which translates the strategy into budgetary outlays. Crucially, the 10-year framework and 3-to-5-year poverty reduction strategy should include a public sector management strategy -- with a key focus on transparency, accountability, human rights, and results-based management. They should also include a


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clear strategy for decentralizing target-setting, decision-making, budgeting, and implementation responsibilities to the level of local governments. Further, there should be a clear private sector strategy to promote economic growth and have countries “graduate” from donor assistance in the longer term. Importantly, we are not advocating new development processes or policy vehicles. We are simply recommending that the current processes be truly MDG-oriented. We support the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as an important framework for the Goals. But these PRSPs urgently need revision to align them with the Millennium Development Goals. Very few PRSPs are ambitious or comprehensive enough to achieve the Goals, largely because they have been prepared in a context of insufficient donor assistance. The process of developing an MDG-based poverty reduction strategy needs to be open and consultative, including all key stakeholders, domestic and foreign. Each country should convene an MDG strategy group chaired by the national government -- but also including bilateral and multilateral donors, UN specialized agencies, provincial and local authorities, and domestic civil society leaders, including women's organizations, which are traditionally underrepresented.

Priority public Investments to empower poor people Every country’s MDG-based poverty reduction strategy needs to outline the specific and practical steps required to reach the Goals. Fortunately, these steps are known. For example, we know how to prevent mothers from dying in pregnancy and childbirth. We know how to encourage girls to enroll in and complete a full cycle of basic education. We know how to triple African maize yields. We know how to provide rural clinics and hospitals with uninterrupted electricity. And we know how to increase tree coverage in deforested areas. The same is true for the other Goals as well. The task forces of the UN Millennium Project describe these proven investments and policies in considerable detail in their reports, essential accompaniments to this report. At first glance the list of what is needed may seem long. Fighting hunger, for example, requires training farmers, providing fertilizer, improving roads and transport services, managing water resources more effectively, providing good nutrition, and many other things. There are comparable lists for health, education, water, sanitation, environmental management, and other areas of concern. Implementing the full set of interventions and policies will take time and work across many sectors. Fortunately, we have 10 years to reach the Goals. This is enough time for most countries, if not all. But we need to get started in 2005. It is possible for developing countries to start implementing some elements of this package immediately and to see breathtaking results within three or fewer years. Although far from comprehensive, some Quick Wins could bring vital gains in well-being to millions of people and start countries on the path to the Goals. With adequate resources, the Quick Wins include:


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x Eliminating school and uniform fees to ensure that all children, especially girls, are not out of school because of their families’ poverty. Lost revenues should be replaced with more equitable and efficient sources of finance, including donor assistance. x Providing impoverished farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa with affordable replenishments of soil nitrogen and other soil nutrients. x Providing free school meals for all children using locally produced foods with take-home rations. x Designing community nutrition programs that support breastfeeding, provide access to locally produced complementary foods and, where needed, provide micronutrient (especially zinc and vitamin A) supplementation for pregnant and lactating women and children under five. x Providing regular annual deworming to all schoolchildren in affected areas to improve health and educational outcomes. x Training large numbers of village workers in health, farming, and infra-structure (in one-year programs) to ensure basic expertise and services in rural communities. x Distributing free, long-lasting, insecticide-treated bed-nets to all children in malaria-endemic zones to cut decisively the burden of malaria. x Eliminating user fees for basic health services in all developing countries, financed by increased domestic and donor resources for health. x Expanding access to sexual and reproductive health information and services, including family planning and contraceptive information and services, and closing existing funding gaps for supplies and logistics. x Expanding the use of proven effective drug combinations for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. For AIDS, this includes successfully completing the 3 by 5 initiative to bring antiretrovirals to 3 million people by 2005. x Setting up funding to finance community-based slum upgrading and earmark idle public land for low-cost housing. x Providing access to electricity, water, sanitation, and the Internet for all hospitals, schools, and other social service institutions using off-grid diesel generators, solar panels, or other appropriate technologies. x Reforming and enforcing legislation guaranteeing women and girls property and inheritance rights. x

Launching national campaigns to reduce violence against women.


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x Establishing, in each country, an office of science advisor to the president or prime minister to consolidate the role of science in national policymaking. x Empowering women to playa central role in formulating and monitoring MDGbased poverty reduction strategies and other critical policy reform processes, particularly at the level of local governments. x Providing community-level support to plant trees to provide soil nutrients, fuelwood, shade, fodder, watershed protection, windbreak, and timber. These Quick Wins are not the only interventions needed to reach the Goals -- just the ones with very high potential short-term impact that can be immediately implemented. Other interventions are more complicated and will take a decade of effort or have delayed benefits. The world cannot afford to let another year go by without investing in these simple and proven strategies. The Quick Wins need to be embedded in the longer term investment policy framework of the MOG-based poverty reduction strategy. The UN Millennium Project has identified “best practices” in seven investment-and-policy clusters that are key to achieving the Goals. The UN Millennium Project has also produced a companion Handbook of Best Practices to Meet the Millennium Development Goals. 1 Here are the seven main investment-and-policy clusters.

Rural development: increasing food output and incomes Smallholder farmers and their families constitute perhaps half of the world's people living with chronic hunger, and an even larger share in Sub-Saharan Africa. These farmers often do not have access to soil nutrient replenishment, such as chemical fertilizers and agroforestry techniques. Their yields are therefore dramatically reduced. We recommend raising their productivity through a “Twenty-first Century African Green Revolution” to supply them with soil nutrients and related technologies. Investments are also needed to increase rural access to transport, information and communications, safe drinking water, sanitation, modern energy, and reliable water for agriculture and agriculture-related small and medium-size enterprises. All this can -- and should -- be done in an environmentally sustainable manner.

Urban development: promoting jobs, upgrading slums, and developing alternatives to new slum formation The package of interventions should include improving the security of tenure for slum dwellers, supporting poor people's own efforts to build decent new housing, strengthening urban planning with strong community and especially women’s participation, expanding core urban infrastructure services, reducing the pollution of air and water, and promoting special investment zones to attract private companies and promote indigenous enterprises. A central focus should be to strengthen the operational 1

Scheduled for publication in early 2005.

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capacity of local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), women’s organizations, and other civil society groups, and to include them in the formulation of relevant national policies.

Health systems: ensuring universal access to essential services Health interventions are best provided through an integrated district health system centered on primary care and first-level referral hospitals with special measures to ensure that the health system reaches all groups in the population, including the poor and marginalized. The number of doctors and the coverage of antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS are exceedingly low in the places most affected by endemic diseases. Practical investments and policies for a functioning health system include training and retaining competent, motivated health workers, strengthening management systems, providing adequate supplies of essential drugs, and building clinics and laboratory facilities. Eliminating user fees for essential health services, improving community health education, promoting behavior change, and involving communities in decisionmaking and service delivery are also critical measures. There is increasing international consensus, for example, that community workers should be trained to recognize and treat diarrhea, pneumonia, and malaria in children. Effective planning and management of district-level health systems requires an integrated monitoring, surveillance, and evaluation system. Education: ensuring universal primary, expanded post primary, and expanded higher education Governments should ensure that every child, boy or girl, completes basic schooling of good quality, that a substantial proportion also completes postprimary education, and that a significant number are enrolled in tertiary education by 2015. In many countries, this will require political transformation to support an inclusive and egalitarian society and changes in the institutional and political incentives that now undermine the performance of school systems. As a start, governments should create and reinforce rules and rights that enable parents and communities to hold their local schools accountable; improve the content, quality, mode of delivery, and relevance of curricula while eliminating gender biases; build schools and train teachers where necessary; eliminate primary school fees; and institute special incentives to reach vulnerable out-of-school children. Governments should also recognize civil society organizations as legitimate partners in debates about the education system.

Gender equality: investing to overcome pervasive gender bias Specific interventions to address gender inequality should be an intrinsic part of all MDG-based investment packages. They should also address systemic challenges such as protection of sexual and reproductive health and rights (including access to information and family planning services), equal access to economic assets such as land and housing, increased primary school completion and expanded access to postprimary education for girls, equal labor market opportunities, freedom from violence, and increased


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representation at all levels of governance. One essential step to addressing these systemic challenges is the collection of gender-disaggregated data for monitoring progress.

Environment: investing in improved resource management Countries should integrate environmental strategies into all sector policies, promote direct investments in environmental management, promote regulatory and market reforms to reduce environmental degradation, and improve environmental monitoring. In each of these intervention areas, countries will need to consider their growing need to adapt to climate change. Examples of direct investments in environmental management are replanting forests, treating wastewater, curbing chemical pollution, and conserving critical ecosystems. Well designed sector strategies, including agriculture and infrastructure services, can use strategic impact assessments to minimize negative environmental tradeoffs. The removal of environmentally damaging subsidies can further improve environmental management.

Science, technology, and innovation: building national capacities Sustainable MDG-based strategies require the buildup of indigenous institutions and skills to advance science, technology, and innovation. Practical measures to increase a country’s scientific capacity include creating science advisory bodies to the national government, expanding science and engineering faculties in universities and polytechnics, strengthening development and entrepreneurial focus in science and technology curricula, promoting business opportunities in science and technology, and promoting infrastructure development as a technology learning process.

Interdependence of investment clusters Each investment cluster depends on the others. To achieve any particular Goal, it is not enough to invest merely in the corresponding sector. 1 Conversely, most interventions have effects on several Goals. For example, reducing gender inequality is essential for reducing hunger, containing HIV/AIDS, promoting environmental sustainability, upgrading slums, and reducing child and infant mortality. Ready access to clean water, electricity, and modern cooking and heating fuels are essential for ensuring that clinics and hospitals function, for reducing women’s and girls’ time burdens so that they can engage in productive economic activity and attend school, and so forth. Reaching the Millennium Development Goals thus depends on ambitious action across many sectors. This point must be kept in mind when evaluating MDG priorities in any country or region (box 5).

1 Language often fosters confusion in distinguishing between inputs and outcomes. “Health,” for instance, describes both a sector (or ministry) and an outcome resulting from a complex set of inputs across sectors. “Education” is similar. “Hunger,” in contrast, is a complex outcome but not a sector or ministry.


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Box 5 MDG priorities for each region Each country has its own specific set of challenges, but some broad trends can be identified as priorities. One universal challenge is to ensure that ethnic minorities, regional pockets of poverty, and slums receive targeted investments for the Goals. Some regional priorities are highlighted below and discussed in more detail across the UN Millennium Project's series of final reports. Sub-Saharan Africa. The standard diagnosis of Sub-Saharan Africa is that it is suffering from a governance crisis. This is too simplistic. Many parts of Africa are well governed considering the income levels and extent of poverty, yet are caught in a poverty trap. The region’s development challenges are much deeper than “governance.” Many countries require a big push in public investments to overcome the region’s high transport costs, generally small markets, low-productivity agriculture, adverse agroclimatic conditions, high disease burden, and slow diffusion of technology from abroad. An MDG-based strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa needs to focus on rural development for a Twenty-first Century African Green Revolution and strategies to make Africa’s fast-growing cities much more productive, especially for labor-intensive exports. Africa’s public health systems require major investments to address the pandemics of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria; to tackle the unconscionably high levels of child and maternal mortality; and to provide sexual and reproductive health services that will enable better timing and spacing of births and a voluntary reduction to desired family sizes. Education strategies need to focus on increasing the supply of infrastructure and human resources and the demand-side incentives for girls and vulnerable students. The continent also requires major investments in infrastructure for water resources management and energy. Mobilization of science and regional integration also need to be energized. In all aspects of development, Africa’s strategies need to pay special attention to the situation of girls and women, who tend to face major legal, social, and political barriers and biases. East and Southeast Asia. East and Southeast Asia have made tremendous progress toward many of the Goals, especially in reducing income poverty, hunger and gender inequality. China’s economy has been growing rapidly, but it still requires large investments in public health systems, rural infrastructure, education, and environmental management, the latter to address some of the adverse consequences of rapid industrialization. The environmental challenges include managing forests and biodiversity and reducing the pollution of air and water. Other parts of East and Southeast Asia require similar investments in infrastructure, environment, and social services, plus a focus on public management systems and increased capacity for science and technology. South Asia. South Asia is making rapid overall advances in poverty reduction, driven especially by dynamic growth in India. Yet extensive extreme poverty remains in


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both rural and urban areas. Priority investments include improved basic health infrastructure and services; increased access to high-quality schools; farm infrastructure (feeder roads, storage facilities); improved water management for agriculture (irrigation, water harvesting, management of groundwater supplies); slum upgrading; and improved public sector management. Investment programs should also focus on achieving gender equality, including reproductive health and rights, and integrating marginalized populations, including low-caste and outcaste communities, and tribal populations. CIS, Central Asia. Countries of Central Asia have suffered from the multiple effects of post-Soviet economic collapse, unfavorable landlocked geography, and insufficient investments in transport infrastructure to link the region to world markets. After a decline in many human development indicators during the past 15 years or more, a broad suite of investments is needed in basic transport and energy infrastructure, improved water and sanitation facilities, and more effective health and educational systems. Countries need to strengthen public sector management capacity, reduce corruption, and increase cross-border cooperation to improve regional integration and environmental management. Moreover, many countries need to improve the policy environment for private sector development. CIS, Europe. Many of these countries are still recovering ground lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but overall the region is on track to achieving the Goals. Investment strategies should focus on capacity in public management systems, resources for strained health and education systems, and environmental management and planning. Many transition countries also need to target services toward excluded and marginalized groups. Middle East and North Africa. This region is moving in the right direction on most indicators, but overall progress needs to be accelerated to achieve the Goals. Priorities include interventions to support gender equality, a major expansion of quality health services, and programs to address desertification and water scarcity. Other priorities are to expand educational and employment opportunities for young people, improve rural livelihoods, and invest in indigenous science and technology development. Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin America, the most developed of the developing regions, has seen limited progress toward the Goals. Inequalities are extreme, often linked to ethnic divisions, and economic growth challenges remain particularly severe in the Andean, Central American, and some Caribbean countries. Throughout the region, improving environmental management and health systems are top priorities, especially in Caribbean countries where HIV/AIDS is prominent or threatening. With a majority of the region’s poor people living in urban areas, urban infrastructure and slum upgrading are major needs. Countries must also make significant investments in basic rural infrastructure, targeting marginalized areas and populations. Major public investments are needed to spur local scientific innovation and technological development. Least Developed Countries. The Least Developed Countries require special assistance because they cannot meet their basic needs from domestic resources regardless of their own policies or quality of governance. Support for them should be consistent with the United Nations Brussels Programme of Action, which outlines key


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areas to help break the Least Developed Countries’ poverty trap, including human resource development, investments in supply-side constraints, environmental protection, and investments for food security. Landlocked developing countries. Landlocked countries have a unique need for transport infrastructure, regional market integration, and harmonized trade procedures. Many relevant issues are outlined in the 2003 Almaty Programme of Action. Major improvements in rail, road, energy, and communication infrastructure are needed to reduce transport costs. Small island developing states. Concentrated in the Caribbean and Oceania, these states face challenges posed by size and geography that limit possibilities for economic diversification and leave them highly vulnerable to environmental risks. The 1995 Barbados Programme of Action for small island developing states should receive global financial and political support. In addition to the needed MDG-focused investments, small island developing states are vulnerable to rising sea levels and coral bleaching from climate change. They will require targeted investments to adapt to the effects of global warming. Countries vulnerable to natural hazards. Countries highly vulnerable to natural hazards (such as severe weather events, droughts, earthquakes, volcanoes, flooding, and pests) require special investments in social safety nets, disaster-mitigating infrastructure, early warning systems, precrisis emergency and contingency planning, and postcrisis emergency support. These investments need to be in place well before disasters strike, both to anticipate and mitigate disasters and to react to them in the immediate aftermath, when lives are most at stake.

The key elements for rapid scale-up The core challenge of the Goals lies in financing and implementing the interventions at scale -- for two reasons. One is the sheer range of interventions that should be implemented simultaneously to reach the Goals. The second is the need to reach large proportions of the population. National scale-up is the process of bringing essential MDGbased investments and services to most or all of the population, on an equitable basis, by 2015. Scale-up needs to be carefully planned and overseen to ensure successful and sustainable implementation. The level of planning is much more complex than for any single project. Scaling up for the Goals requires a working partnership within and between government, the private sector, NGOs, and civil society. Scaling up works (box 6). But a close reading of success reveals that scaleup cannot begin without political leadership and clear government commitment. This is an absolutely necessary (though far from sufficient) condition. Once the government has committed to reaching the Goals, four specific actions are required:


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Box 6 Scaling up success Nationwide scale-ups of intervention programs generally require several key factors, ranging from political commitment to sequenced work plans and to long-term predictable funding. There are innumerable instances where developing countries harnessed these elements to deliver interventions that have dramatically improved the lives of the poor at a national scale. x Viet Nam’s success in fighting malaria. In 1991 Viet Nam suffered from an intense malaria epidemic that infected more than a million people. In response, the government made malaria one of its national priorities and dedicated significant funding to its control. It distributed insecticide-treated bed-nets for free, provided preventive malaria treatment for pregnant women, and developed and distributed new artemisininbased malaria drugs. It also created 400 mobile teams to supervise health workers in malaria-endemic areas and mobilized volunteer health workers at the community level. As a result of these and other efforts, malaria mortality declined by 97 percent, morbidity by 60 percent, and the incidence of epidemics by 92 percent. x Tanzania’s plan to achieve universal basic education by 2006. In 2001 Tanzania increased the education budget by 130 percent and eliminated school fees. The number of children in primary school is up 50 percent. Net enrollments have risen from 59 percent to nearly 90 percent. There are as many girls enrolled as boys. More than 30,000 new classrooms have been built. About 18,000 new teachers have been recruited. And more than 9,000 science-teaching kits have been supplied to schools. These examples highlight the key success factors of a nationwide scale-up: x High-level political vision and commitment -- Viet Nam’s political focus and leadership on combating malaria. x A significant increase in funding -- Tanzania's 130 percent increase in the education budget. x The abolition of user fees -- Tanzania's elimination of school fees. x A focus on upgrading human resource and infrastructure capacity – Tanzania’s recruitment of new teachers and construction of new classrooms. x Coordination among the government, community organizations, international agencies, and the private sector. Source: Mkapa 2004; WHO 2002.


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Setting concrete objectives and plans of work. Scaling up requires specific deliverables, work plans, and timelines. In sequencing investments the focus should initially be on implementing the list of Quick Win investments and on building long-term capacity to deliver basic services to the entire population. x Building national and local capacity in public management, human resources, and infrastructure. Expanding each country’s capacity to deliver services at scale will require up-front investments in strengthening public sector management (such as training, information technology, and higher salaries for civil service workers), building and renovating infrastructure (roads, clinics, schools), and critically, training and retaining adequate numbers of workers (community health workers, teachers) to deliver services on the ground. Decentralized training efforts based on open distance learning, radio, and computer-assisted education are key to a massive build-up of human resource capacity at the local level. x Adopting replicable and locally appropriate delivery mechanisms. Scalability is significantly aided by choosing highly replicable service protocols where possible. Thus TB treatment protocols (DOTS) are typically standardized, as are malaria control measures, family planning programs, and fertilizer combinations. Standardization also enables comparison of performance across regions, enhancing quality control. x Monitoring to measure progress and allow for mid-course corrections. Improving the flow of information within the government is critical for fighting corruption and increasing program effectiveness. Investments in statistical services are required to provide the data needed for results-based planning, management, and assessment of the equity of program impacts. Communities and civil society organizations are ideally positioned to report on the impact of investments and the flow of funds, and should actively participate in monitoring. Two other conditions necessary for scale-up are involvement and ownership of communities and long-term predictable donor funding and technical assistance. Communities should be both architects as well as recipients of the scaling-up process, by participating in the design of programs and services. The participation of women in community planning activities is essential for success. Community members can also play an important role in implementation of these programs, either as paid workers or volunteers. Long-term and predictable funding and technical assistance from donors is crucial to provide countries with the means to proceed. Financing needs to be both increased and predictable over the period 2005-15, covering both capital and recurrent costs, including civil service salaries. Technical assistance will also be required to reinforce local management and service delivery skills.

Good governance to achieve the Goals Discussions of governance in development typically confuse inputs and outcomes. The outcome of “poor governance” has two very distinct underlying causes. One is genuinely “corrupt” leadership where political power is held by larcenous or brutal leaders. The state may be run for the personal plunder of a narrow elite, or a particular interest


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group or ethnic group. In some of the worst cases this corruption becomes endemic over many years. These are the cases where there is no will of the leadership to achieve broadbased development goals, and there is little hope for major reductions in poverty. The second cause, at the other end of the spectrum, is governance that is weak not because of the ill will of the leaders, but because the state lacks the financial resources and technical capacity to manage an efficient public administration. Many of the world's poorest countries lie closer to this second category, where governments lack the resources to run the public sector effectively. The key in such cases is to invest in improving governance. The following areas should be targeted: x Promoting the rule of law. Legal and administrative systems require a properly resourced and adequately staffed legislature, judiciary, and executive branch of government. x Promoting political and social rights. The Goals reflect human rights norms, which can be supported at the country level through a human rights assessment that checks MDG-based strategies for their national commitments to human rights principles. x Promoting accountable and efficient public administration. Better governance depends on the systems of political and bureaucratic accountability, transparency, and participation, especially by poor people. x Promoting sound macroeconomic management, delivery of public services -report of the Commission on Report 2005.

economic policies. Government actions -- such as proper investments in infrastructure, and corruption-free are key to private sector development, as outlined in the Private Sector and Development and World Development

x Supporting civil society. Governments have a special responsibility to provide civil society with the political freedom to express its views, a policy voice to participate in the planning and review and of MDG-based strategies, and institutional space to support the implementation of public investment strategies.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM TO SUPPORT COUNTRY-LEVEL PROCESSES Fixing the aid system The development aid system has the potential to help countries achieve the Goals, but it needs a much more focused approach to do so. Here are the 10 main problems with the system today (table 4).


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Table 4. Recommendations for reforming development partnership Shortcoming 1. Aid processes are not MDG-based

2. Support strategies are inadequately differentiated by country need 3. Development is a long-term process, but short-run processes dominate Technical support 4. Technical support is not adequate for scaling up to the MDGs 5. Multilateral agencies are inadequately coordinated Development finance 6. Development finance is not needsbased or set to meet the MDGs 7. Debt relief is not aligned with the MDGs

8. Development finance is of very poor quality System issues 9. Major MDG priorities are systematically overlooked 10. Donor countries show a persistent lack of coherence in their policies

Recommendations Development partners should affirm the MDGs as the operational objective of the development system, with country-level MDG-based poverty reduction strategies as the anchoring process for development support, based on needs. Development partners should differentiate support by country needs, whether for budget support, emergency assistance, or simply technical support. Development partners should support countries to put forward 3- to 5-year MDG-based poverty reduction strategies that are anchored in a 10-year needs-based framework through 2015. In conflict countries, a shorter time frame may be more appropriate. Technical support should focus on supporting governments to develop and implement nationally owned MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. The UN Resident Coordinator system should be dramatically strengthened to coordinate agencies' technical contributions to the MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. ODA should be set by the MDG financing gaps outlined in the MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. For many well governed low-income countries, this will imply a substantial increase in ODA and funding of recurrent costs. “Debt sustainability,” particularly Paris Club debt, should be evaluated as the debt level consistent with countries achieving the MDGs. This will imply a dramatic acceleration of debt relief for many heavily indebted countries. For well governed countries, a much larger share of ODA should take the form of budget support. For all developing countries, donor agencies should also follow through on their commitments outlined in the Rome harmonization agenda. Within the needs-based approach to development assistance, development partners should increase attention to issues like longterm scientific capacities, environmental conservation, regional integration, sexual and reproductive health, and cross-border infrastructure. Donors should evaluate their development, finance, foreign, and trade policies for coherence with respect to supporting the MDGs. Donors should subject themselves to at least the same standards of transparency as they expect of developing countries, with independent technical reviews.

Lack of MDG-based aid processes The system lacks a coherent MDG-based approach to reducing poverty. For example, the Bretton Woods institutions should do much more to help countries design and


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implement MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. International Monetary Fund (IMF) program design has paid almost no systematic attention to the Goals when considering a country’s budget or macroeconomic framework. In the vast number of country programs supported by the IMF since the adoption of the Goals, there has been almost no discussion about whether the plans are consistent with achieving them. In its country-level advisory work, the UN Millennium Project has found that multilateral and bilateral institutions have not encouraged the countries to take the Millennium Development Goals seriously as operational objectives. Many low-income countries have already designed plans to scale up their sector strategies, but due to budget constraints could not implement them. In other cases, countries are advised not even to consider such scaled-up plans. Fortunately, the Bretton Woods institutions are now showing more interest in basing the country programs that they support on the Millennium Development Goals, and it is important for them to follow through on that expressed interest.

Development partners do not approach country-level needs systematically Since development partnership is not driven by a coherent set of operational targets, there are no clear criteria for evaluating the types or amounts of development assistance required by individual countries. There is no established framework, for instance, for differentiating support to countries with corrupt governments as opposed to those that are weak but willing.

Most development processes are stuck in the short run Development is a long-term process, but the key processes for international partnership are short term in their orientation. Most important for low-income countries, PRSPs are typically three-year strategies, tending to take many constraints as given rather than identifying ways to overcome them over time. In many cases the actual planning cycles are even shorter, dictated by the annual meetings of Consultative Groups.

Technical support is inadequate for MDG scale-up Most low-income countries require technical support from the international system to put forward scaled-up investment plans to achieve the Goals. Yet the international agencies that are the global repositories of sector-specific knowledge -- such as FAO or IFAD for agriculture, UNICEF for child health, UNIDO for industrial development, or WHO for health systems and disease control-are usually asked instead to focus on small pilot projects. In general, the technical UN agencies on the ground are not prepared to help countries scale up national programs.


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Multilateral agencies are not coordinating their support Multilateral organizations frequently compete for donor government funding to implement small projects, instead of supporting country-scale plans and budgets. The various UN agencies, programs, and funds have begun to coordinate their efforts through the structure of the UN Development Group at headquarters and the UN Country Teams at country level, but this is still often more a forum for dialogue rather than real coordination. Moreover, the UN agencies are frequently not well linked to the local activities of the Bretton Woods institutions and regional development banks, which tend to have the most access in advising a government since they provide the greatest resources.

Development assistance is not set to meet the Goals As the IMF Managing Director has recently written, it is the developed world that has the greatest responsibility for ensuring the achievement of the Goals (box 7). Public investments cannot be scaled up without greatly increased official development assistance. This is particularly important in low-income countries where assistance levels are generally set more by donor preferences than by developing country needs. Although longterm sustainability and capacity building in the poorest countries require support for recurrent costs -- such as salaries and maintenance -- donors have historically refused to support them, thus preventing any hope of true sustainability. Similarly, even though worker shortages are often the major bottleneck for countries trying to deliver basic social services, donors do not systematically invest in preservice training of health, education, and other key workers. Aid flows are also not growing as fast as promised. Since even the much-heralded Monterrey commitments have not fully materialized, developing countries wonder whether developed countries are genuinely committed to the Goals.

Debt relief is not aligned with the Goals The targets for debt relief are based on arbitrary indicators (debt-to-export ratios) rather than MDG-based needs. Many heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) retain excessive debt owed to official creditors (such as the Bretton Woods institutions) even after relief. Many middle-income countries are in a similar situation and receive little or no debt relief.

Development finance is of very poor quality The quality of bilateral aid is often very low. It is too often: x

Highly unpredictable.

x Targeted at technical assistance and emergency aid rather than investments, long-term capacity, and institutional support. x

Tied to contractors from donor countries.


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Box 7 What advanced economies can do to achieve the Goals In a recent opinion piece published throughout Africa, IMF Managing Director Rodrigo de Rato y Figadero described how developed countries bear the greatest responsibility for supporting developing countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. “If we are to achieve the Millennium Goals, the heaviest responsibility inevitably must fall on the advanced economies, which have a dual task. First, they must meet their commitment to provide higher levels of aid, whenever possible on grant terms. Current aid flows are insufficient, unpredictable, and often uncoordinated among donors. Better coordination and multiyear commitments are keys to making development assistance more effective. “Second, the developed countries must improve access to their markets for developing country exports and dismantle trade-distorting subsidies. The framework agreements reached at the World Trade Organization last July are welcome, and place the Doha Round back on track. This needs to be followed by determined progress to maintain the momentum and achieve the goals of the Doha development agenda. In doing so, both rich and poor countries carry responsibilities in promoting the fuller integration of developing countries into the global trading system.” Source: de Rato y Figaredo 2004.

x Driven by separate donor objectives rather than coordinated to support a national plan. x

Overly directed to poorly governed countries for geopolitical reasons.

x

Almost never evaluated or documented systematically for results.

Low-quality official development assistance has fostered the serious misperception that aid does not work and has thereby threatened long-term public support for development assistance. Aid works, and promotes economic growth as well as advances in specific sectors, when it is directed to real investments on the ground in countries with reasonable governance (box 8). The problem is not aid -- it is how and when aid has been delivered, to which countries, and in what amounts. For low-income countries, only 24 percent of bilateral aid can actually finance investments on the ground (table 5). The proportion for multilateral aid is better, at 54 percent, though still well short of ideal.

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Box 8 Large-scale aid work -- when done properly Criticisms of aid come in many forms. Some critics charge that aid is inherently flawed because it strengthens governments, often corrupt governments, at the expense of the private sector. This is the famous argument of the late British economist Peter Bauer. Some charge that aid is not needed, since private saving and investment can and should be the backbone of economic growth. Some have taken the middle ground that aid works when it is channeled to well governed countries. This is the conclusion of the highly influential study by Burnside and Dollar (2000). Our view, explained in the text, is that aid is most useful if channeled to the countries that truly need it (mainly those stuck in a poverty trap) and channeled to the right sectors (mainly infrastructure and human capital). It works best when delivered to well governed countries. And aid used to support public investment complements private saving and investment, rather than competing with private capital. Many negative conclusions about the link between aid and economic growth have come from cross-country regressions of economic growth on aid volumes (and other variables). The volume of aid is often found to be statistically insignificant as a determinant of economic growth, leading some authors to conclude that “aid is ineffective” in promoting economic growth. An important weakness in such studies is that they tend to examine the links of growth to overall volumes of aid without paying attention to how the aid is actually delivered. Specifically, much aid comes in the form of technical assistance (for consultants from the donor country), administrative costs of running bilateral and multilateral agencies, and emergency food aid. It is not really surprising that such aid is not correlated with economic growth in the recipient country. Food aid, especially, is given in the midst of deep crises. So a regression of economic growth on food aid would tend to prove (erroneously) that aid causes output to decline, instead of the correct conclusion that an output decline (caused by drought, for example) causes emergency aid to rise! In an important new study, Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) correct for this typical shortcoming by considering only aid volumes that effectively support investments and services on the ground in the recipient country, taking out emergency aid, technical assistance, and other kinds of aid that do not translate into growthpromoting investments and services. They find that aid, when measured properly, contributes significantly to economic growth. This suggests that aid is effective, if it is well targeted and administered as direct support for country-level investments. Of course, a minimum adequacy of governance is required for a country to be able to channel aid into investments. Aid can and must be disbursed in ways that align the incentives of donors and recipients to support positive development outcomes. As this report argues, elements of a successful disbursement strategy include aid in the form of budget support for national poverty reduction strategies based on the Millennium Development Goals. While there


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have been real problems with the way that aid has been distributed in the past, governments in rich and poor countries alike are learning from their mistakes to design more effective ways of delivering financial assistance to those who need it most. In sum, foreign aid can play a hugely positive part in growth and poverty reduction when properly targeted and administered toward vital infrastructure and human capital. This finding is underlined by the recent experience of Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, which all experienced substantial social sector improvements financed largely through development assistance. Mozambique is a particular success story over the past decade, having averaged real per capita economic growth rates of 5 percent while receiving aid ranging from 20 percent to 60 percent of GNP every year since 1993.

Major MDG priorities are systematically overlooked Development programs routinely overlook needed investments in regional integration, environmental management, technological upgrading, efforts to promote gender equality, and even such core investments as roads, electricity, adequate shelter, disease control, soil nutrients, and sexual and reproductive health.

Policy incoherence is pervasive Many developed countries have identified incoherence as a core problem in their policies. For instance, a government might provide aid to support agriculture in a foodexporting country while also applying market access barriers to the same agricultural exports. Similarly, a finance ministry might collect debt payments that negate the benefits of aid being disbursed by the development ministry. Incongruous policies highlight the need for a clear set of measurable objectives to align developed country policies.

Key measures to improve aid delivery Each of these problems is significant. But each is also solvable through committed and specific actions on the side of development partners. Here are 10 key “to do’s” for the donors.

Confirm the Goals as concrete operational targets for countries The multilateral and bilateral development agencies and other relevant international institutions need to make explicit their support for MDG-based poverty reduction strategies.

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Investing in Development Differentiate donor support according to country-level needs

Donor governments need to distinguish among countries so that aid is focused where it will make a difference, and so that donors do not shortchange the countries that need the most help by focusing on those with greater geopolitical attention. Different types of support will be needed for middle-income countries, well governed poverty trap countries, and poorly governed poverty trap countries (box 9). Special attention should also go to conflict countries and countries with special needs, such as landlocked or small island economies. Support 10-year frameworks to anchor 3-to-5-year strategies To address long-term development needs systematically, countries should produce an MDG needs assessment through 2015 and a corresponding 10-year policy framework. This framework should then guide the more detailed and shorter term MDG-based poverty reduction strategy

Coordinate technical support around the Goals The multilateral and bilateral agencies should organize their technical efforts around supporting countries to develop and implement MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. The UN Development Group (UNDG) should guide resident UN Country Teams in their MDG support, and the UN Development Assistance Framework should identify the specific ways in which the Country Team will support the government to achieve the Goals. We recommend that agency specialists be trained to complement their existing sector-specific knowledge with basic skills to support country-level budgeting processes. We also recommend the establishment of multi-agency, cross-sectoral regional technical centers to support governments and UN Country Teams in developing, financing, and implementing MDG-based PRSs.

Strengthen the UN Development Group and the UN Resident Coordinator As the senior UN representative on the ground, the UN Resident Coordinator’ office needs dramatic strengthening, both to coordinate among UN organizations through the UN Country Team and to manage a core technical staff to support the host government in developing and implementing the MDG-based poverty reduction strategy. The local representatives of the international financial institutions should work closely with the UN Country Team in support of the host-country poverty reduction programs. The UNDG at headquarters level should support the strengthening of the Resident Coordinator position.


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Box 9 Differentiating development support by country needs Middle-Income countries Most middle-income countries can finance the Goals largely through their own resources, nonconcessional flows (market-based loans from the World Bank and regional development banks), and private capital flows. Donor efforts should be directed at helping these countries to eliminate the remaining “pockets of poverty.” Some middle-income countries also need further debt cancellation, especially on debts owed to creditor governments (Paris Club debt). The successful conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda of multilateral trade negotiations, with increased access to rich world markets, will bring benefits to middle-income countries. Many middle-income countries, such as Brazil, China, and Malaysia, already are donor countries. We recommend that they and other successful poverty-reducing countries, such as India, step up their donor efforts, including financial contributions and technical training for low-income country partners.

Well governed poverty trap countries For well governed countries caught in a poverty trap, even a significant increase in domestic resource mobilization will not be enough to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Substantial co-financing through official development assistance is required, especially for Least Developed Countries, to scale up the needed investments in infrastructure, human capital, and public administration. The key for well governed poverty trap countries is to base aid on a true MDG-needs assessment, and then to ensure that aid is not the binding constraint to scaling up. These countries should be fast-tracked in 2005.

Poorly governed poverty trap countries: lack of volition For countries like Belarus, Myanmar, the Democratic People’ Republic of Korea, and Zimbabwe, where the problem is the will of the political leadership, there is little case for large-scale aid. Aid should be directed to humanitarian efforts or through NGOs that can ensure delivery of services on the ground. Any aid directed through the government should be conditional on significant improvements in human rights and economic policies.

Poorly governed poverty trap countries: weak public administration When the volition exists in government leadership but public administration is poor because of a lack of sound public management, one key step is to invest in publicsector capacity. This will also raise the “absorptive capacity” for aid in later years. Donors should view the poor public administration as an investment opportunity, not a


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barrier to achieving the Goals. Early efforts should be directed at building the government's analytical and administrative capacity at national, regional, and local levels-and building the technical expertise at the grass roots level in health, education, agriculture, and infrastructure. We expect that these countries will significantly outperform current expectations. In many countries international expectations are low but the country's potential is very high if timely donor support and debt cancellation are brought to bear, and phased in over time.

Conflict countries Countries in conflict, just out of conflict, or falling into conflict present urgent special cases for the international community. Rapid responses are essential. A delay in well targeted aid can mean the difference between a consolidated peace process and a resurgence of conflict. Aid should be targeted at ending the violence and restoring basic services, directed in a manner to ease tensions among competing groups. Carrots (offers of an expanding aid effort) generally are much more powerful than sticks (international sanctions) in such crisis countries as Haiti and Sudan. Yet sticks are more typically applied, with few lasting results.

Geopolitical priorities Countries with geopolitical priority (such as Afghanistan and Iraq) have urgent needs, to be sure, but may take up a disproportionate share of donor funding and public attention. If the major donors are to devote substantial efforts to these countries, they must ensure that the efforts do not divert attention and financial resources from other worthy countries. Debt cancellation for Iraq, for example, without similar debt cancellation for Nigeria would be unjustified on grounds of equity, merit, and relative need.

Countries with special needs Developing states with special needs include: x Small island states (isolation, small markets, natural hazards). x Landlocked states (isolation and high transport costs). x Mountain states (isolation and high transport costs). x States vulnerable to natural disasters. The geographically isolated states require special investments in transport and communications -- and geopolitical help to support regional cooperation and regional integration. Hazards are rising in frequency, intensity, and impact, and traditional ad hoc responses are too slow and underfinanced. Donors should establish special emergency funds for natural hazards (droughts, floods, pests, disease) and steady funds for long-term improvements to cope with disasters.


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Table 5 Estimated official development assistance for direct MDG support and MDG capacity building, 2002 (Billions of 2002 US$) LowIncome countries From From multibilateral Total lateral sources sources Estimated ODA for direct MDG support Grants 16.7 Gross loans 3.3 Principal repayments -1.9

4.2 9.8 -2.8

20.9 13.2 -4.7

Middle-Income Countries From bilateral sources

From multilateral sources

Total

12.2 4.5 -4.2

2.8 2.8 -1.1

15.0 7.3 -5.3

Net ODA 18.1 11.3 29.4 12.6 4.4 17.0 Interest payments -0.8 -0.9 -1.7 -1.7 -0.5 -2.2 Technical cooperation -5.4 -0.8 -6.2 -6.2 -0.5 -6.8 Development food aid -0.8 -0.2 -1.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.3 Emergency aid -1.9 -0.9 -2.8 -0.5 -0.3 -0.8 Debt forgiveness grants -3.2 -0.3 -3.5 -2.0 -0.0 -2.0 Support through nongovernmental -0.9 0.0 -0.9 -0.8 0.0 -0.8 organizations 1 Estimated maximum support 5.2 8.1 13.4 1.1 3.1 4.2 through government budgets 25 percent of non-MDG support -1.3 -2.0 -3.3 -0.3 -0.8 -1.0 through government budgets 2 40 percent of support through NGOs 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.3 for MDG investments 3 Total ODA for direct MDG 4.3 6.1 10.4 1.2 2.3 3.5 support Share of net ODA (percent) 24 54 35 9 52 20 Estimated ODA for MDG capacity building Technical cooperation for capacity 3.2 0.5 3.7 3.7 0.3 4.1 building in support of MDG 4 MDG capacity building through 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 NGOs 5 Total ODA for MDG capacity 3.8 0.5 4.3 4.2 0.3 4.5 building Share of net ODA (percent) 21 4 14 33 7 27 Note: Number in table may not sum to totals because of rounding. Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee and authors’ calculations.

1

Based on DAC estimates. Assumes that 75 percent of “maximum support through government budgets” directly finances MDG investment needs. 3 Assumes that 40 percent of official development assistance provided through NGOs directly supports MDG investments. 4 Assumes that 60 percent of technical cooperation contributes to MDG capacity building (OECD – DAC assumption). 5 Assumes that 60 percent of official development assistance provided through NGOs contributes to MDG capacity building. 2

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Investing in Development Set ODA levels according to proper needs assessment

ODA levels should be guided by the MDG needs assessment, rather than being picked for political reasons or on the basis of incremental budgeting, as is now the case. By partnering with local research institutes, the UN Millennium Project has undertaken the first ever bottom-up needs assessments of the country-level investments required to achieve the Goals. Although these first estimates need to be refined through the real country-level processes we are recommending in this report, the results show that the total cost of investments in low-income countries is on the order of $70-$80 per capita per year in 2006, increasing to $120-$160 per capita per year in 2015 (see, for example, the results for Ghana in table 6). Middle-income countries will generally be able to afford these investments on their own. But the low-income countries, even after they initiate a major increase in their resource mobilization, will require $40-$50 per capita in external finance in 2006, rising to $70-$100 in 2015. To ensure the sustainability of programs, development assistance should also cover recurrent costs (such as public sector salaries, operations and maintenance) in addition to capital costs.

Deepen and extend debt relief and provide grants rather than loans “Debt sustainability” should be redefined as “the level of debt consistent with achieving the Millennium Development Goals,” arriving in 2015 without a new debt overhang. For many heavily indebted poor countries, this will require 100 percent debt cancellation. For many heavily indebted middle-income countries, this will require more debt relief than has been on offer. For some poor countries left off the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPe) list, such as Nigeria, meeting the Goals will require significant debt cancellation. A corollary for low-income countries is that current and future ODA should be grants rather than loans.

Simplify and harmonize bilateral aid practices to support country programs To empower national ownership of MDG-based strategies and to limit the transaction costs of providing financial support, bilateral donors should use simplifying coordination mechanisms -- such as sector-wide approaches, direct budget support, and multilateral financing such as that through the European Development Fund and the International Development Association. They should also follow through urgently on the actions they set for themselves in the Rome harmonization agenda.

Focus on overlooked priorities and neglected public goods Development partners should support developing countries in promoting overlooked priorities such as maternal health, gender equality, and reproductive health, and addressing neglected public goods, including long-term scientific capacities, environmental management, regional integration, and cross-border infrastructure.


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Measure policy coherence against the Millennium Development Goals Donors should evaluate their development, foreign, and financial policies with specific reference to the Goals. Donors should subject themselves to at least the same standards of transparency and coherence as they expect of developing country governments. Some countries have made progress by initiating their self-evaluating Goal 8 reports, but independent technical groups should publish independent evaluations of donor policy impacts and donor coherence, with data made publicly available to permit reanalysis.

A breakthrough in global trade Trade is among the most politically charged of international issues for development. Though hugely important, it is far from a magic bullet for achieving development. The slogan “trade, not aid” is misguided, particularly in the poorest countries. Trade reforms are complementary to other parts of development policy, such as infrastructure investments and social programs to develop a healthy and well educated workforce. As outlined in Monterrey, an MDG-based international trade policy should focus on two overarching Issues: x

Improved market access and terms of trade for the poor countries.

x Improved supply-side competitiveness for low-income country exports, through increased investments in infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports) and trade facilitation. To establish an overarching framework for progress, we recommend that global political leaders first agree to a conveniently distant long-term target (for example, 2025) for the total removal of barriers to merchandise trade, a substantial and across-the-board liberalization of trade in services, and the universal enforcement of the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. In the nearer term context of the Doha Development Agenda and the Goals, we recommend that the following key outcomes be agreed upon before mid-2005.

Agriculture Among agricultural trade issues, highest priority should go to improved market access, with very significant reductions in tariff peaks and escalation and the phasing out of specific duties on the exports of low-income countries (such as cotton). A binding commitment to abolish export subsidies and two-tier price schemes should also be made in the near term.

Nonagricultural merchandise Developing countries' exports to developed countries face tariffs that are, on average, four times higher than those faced by the exports of other developed countries. Developing countries also suffer from their own protection, which not only reduces competitiveness in


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world markets but also limits opportunities for more trade among themselves. In the Doha Round developed countries should aim to bind all tariffs on nonagricultural merchandise at zero by 2015. A mid-term goal could be for no tariff higher than 5 percent by 2010. Developing countries could then aim for a zero tariff by 2025. If absolutely indispensable, the poorest countries should aim to bind all tariffs at a uniform and maximum rate for a reasonable period.

Services Getting service liberalization right requires careful attention to the nature, pace, and sequencing of reform. The liberalization of mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS) -- temporary movement of labor to provide services -- should be adopted as a high priority in the Doha Round. We encourage developing countries to trade commitments to open mode 1 (crossborder supply of services) and mode 3 (foreign direct investment in services) in return for developed countries' real offers on mode 4.

Special and differential treatment Special and differential treatment makes sense for developing economies that generally have a more limited ability to take advantage of new trade opportunities and to bear adjustment costs. It should encourage flexibility, time, and assistance for implementation. The focus should be on longer terms to adjust to liberalization and improve technology. A temporary “Aid for Trade Fund” commensurate with the size of the task would allow commitments to be made to address adjustment costs associated with the implementation of a Doha reform agenda.

Promotion of export competitiveness in developing countries Countries should continue to pursue open trade. But they should also continue to receive additional aid to overcome their supply-side production barriers, with special emphasis on investments in agricultural productivity, infrastructure (such as roads, ports, telecommunications, and power), and labor-intensive exports. This is particularly important for the Least Developed Countries. Export competitiveness must not be pursued in a way that encourages discriminatory or coercive labor practices or adversely affects the natural environment -- say, through unsustainable forestry or fisheries practices.

Regional and global public goods The Millennium Development Goals cannot be achieved solely through country-level investments, debt relief, and trade reform. National strategies need to link with one another and with international coordination mechanisms to provide regional and global public goods.


261 Regional infrastructure and institutions

A country’s immediate neighbors tend to be among its most important trading partners. These ties can be strengthened through regional infrastructure and policy cooperation, both of which are critical for economic growth and poverty reduction when an economy has a small population or if it is landlocked, a small island state, or dependent on neighbors for food, water, or energy. Similarly, transboundary watersheds, desertification, air pollution, and biodiversity can only be managed through regional strategies. And since many local conflicts have repercussions on entire regions or are driven by regional tensions, conflict management requires greater regional cooperation to detect conflicts before they erupt and to develop coordinated responses from neighboring countries to end them. To address these needs, we recommend that four types of regional public goods be supported internationally and integrated into national MDG-based poverty reduction strategies: x

Infrastructure for transport, energy, or water management.

x

Coordination mechanisms to manage transboundary environmental issues.

x Institutions to promote economic cooperation, including coordination and harmonization in trade policies and procedures. x Political cooperation mechanisms for regional dialogue and consensus-building, as exemplified by the African Peer Review Mechanism. Strengthening the provision of regional goods requires substantial investment. For low-income countries, this typically implies the need for external funding. Countries also need to strengthen their regional institutions by streamlining responsibilities and conferring some sovereignty into partnerships where necessary.

Mobilizing global science and technology for the Millennium Development Goals Advances in science and technology allow society to mobilize new sources of energy and materials, fight disease, improve and diversify agriculture, mobilize and disseminate information, transport people and goods with greater speed and safety, limit family size as desired, and much more. But these technologies are not free. They are the fruits of enormous social investments in education, scientific discovery, and targeted technological projects. Every successful high-income country makes special public investments to promote scientific and technological capacities. Unfortunately, poor countries have largely been spectators, or at best users, of the technological advances produced in the high-income world that are relevant. Poor countries have tended to lack large scientific and technological communities. Their scientists and engineers, chronically underfunded, move abroad for satisfying employment in scientific research and development. Private

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companies, moreover, focus their innovation activities on rich-country problems and projects, since that is where adequate financial returns exist. Any strategy to meet the Goals requires a special global effort to build scientific and technological capacities in the poorest countries, both to help drive economic development and to help forge solutions to developing countries' own scientific challenges. A focus should be on strengthening institutions of higher education. A special global effort is also required to direct research and development towards specific challenges facing the poor in disease, climate, agriculture, energy, and environmental degradation. Realistic prospects exist to develop new vaccines and medicines for malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and other killer diseases in poor countries. Improved sexual and reproductive health products would include microbicides, new female-controlled methods, and male contraceptives. Improved agricultural varieties and cropping systems can increase food productivity of rainfed agriculture. Accurate environmental monitoring and forecasting can help focus actions with the greatest positive impact. Other examples abound. To address these most pressing of scientific issues, direct public financing of research needs to increase. A preliminary estimate suggests that by 2015, at least $7 billion a year will be required, of which perhaps $4 billion would be directed at public health. Another $1 billion would go toward agriculture and improved natural resource management by nearly tripling the current budget of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Roughly another $1 billion would go toward improved energy technologies. And perhaps $1 billion is needed for greater understanding of seasonal, interannual, and long-term climate change.

An international strategy to mitigate climate change Climate change is a major development issue that needs to be addressed urgently. Unless global warming slows down, the incidence of droughts and floods will likely increase, vector-borne diseases will probably expand their reach, and many ecosystems, such as mangroves and coral reefs, will likely be put under great strain. In short, achievements in the fight against disease, hunger, poverty, and environmental degradation risk being unraveled by climate change. In addition to improving scientific understanding of climate change and helping countries adapt to the effects of climate change, the world must mitigate climate change by stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions and promoting carbon sequestration. Additional measures must be implemented to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere in the near future. As agreed at Johannesburg, primary responsibility for mitigating climate change and other unsustainable patterns of production and consumption, such as the overharvesting of global fisheries, must lie with the countries that cause the problems. Those are the high-income and some of the rapidly growing middle-income countries.


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Getting started in 2005 -- launching a decade of bold ambition There is still enough time to meet the Millennium Development Goals -- though barely. With a systematic approach and decade-long horizon, many countries now dismissed as too poor or too far off track could still achieve the Goals. The UN Millennium Project argues strongly for introducing a longer term horizon into international development policy, one that focuses on overcoming short-term constraints by scaling up approaches to meet basic needs. But the need for longer term horizons should not be confused with, or detract attention from, the need for urgent action. Without a bold breakthrough in the coming year, a large number of countries that could still achieve the Goals will be consigned to failure. Major challenges of global policy cooperation need to be addressed in 2005. The Doha trade agenda needs a breakthrough for development. Immediate action is needed to start tackling long-term environmental challenges, such as climate change and fisheries depletion. The world also needs to move urgently with specific actions of scale-up toward the Goals. Only by acting now can sufficient numbers of doctors or engineers be trained, service delivery capacity strengthened, and infrastructure improved to meet the Goals. To start the decade of bold ambition toward 2015, we recommend a series of worldwide initiatives to kickstart progress, translating the Goals quickly from ambition to action. For all of this, we recommend that they be led by the Secretary-General, with UN system contributions coordinated under the strengthened guidance of the UN Development Group.

Identify fast-track countries Bold MDG-based investment programs cannot be scaled up in developing countries with extremely poor governance. But the international community has recognized many low-income countries as having strong governance and the potential for much more ambitious investment programs. In 2005 we recommend that these well governed lowincome countries be granted “fast-track MDG status” by the international community and receive the massive increase in development assistance needed for them to implement MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. Several preexisting criteria could be used to help identify the fast-track countries (box 10). They include countries that have reached completion point under the HIPC Initiative, those that have qualified for support from the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation; those that have acceded to the African Peer Review Mechanism of the New Partnership for

Box 10 Identifying MDG fast-track countries The UN Millennium Project recommends that in 2005, the international community designate fast-track status to a significant number of low-income countries that are ready for scale up. At least four criteria could be used to identify these

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countries, as listed in the table. One of the first international efforts to reward strong governance with increased foreign assistance was the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative to reduce debt burdens. As part of the HIPC process, country eligibility to receive debt relief hinges not only on having an extremely high debt burden but also on a positive joint evaluation by the World Bank and IMF of the country's governance quality and economic policies. Countries are granted debt relief when they reach their “completion point,” and thus are “recognized by the international community for their satisfactory progress in implementing sound economic and structural policies,” A second mechanism that evaluates and validates strong governance as a precondition to aid disbursement is the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC disburses funds only to countries surpassing thresholds for various indicators measuring governance, investment effort in health and education, and economic policies. Seventeen countries have already been deemed eligible for ambitious investment programs. Another 13 “threshold” countries have been assessed as committed to under taking the reforms necessary to improve policy performance and eventually qualify for MCC assistance. A third example is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). African Union member states join the APRM to foster the adoption of policies, standards, and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development, and accelerated subregional and continental economic integration through sharing experiences and reinforcing successful practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building. A key criterion for acceding to the APRM is submitting to periodic peer reviews and facilitating such reviews to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic, and corporate values, codes, and standards. As of mid.2004, 23 African countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding as the first step to accession and submitting their policies and institutions to regular peer review. The PRSP process offers a fourth mechanism for identifying countries to include on an MDG fast track. The World Bank and IMF conduct Joint Staff Assessments of the PRSPs, and have given high praise to several low-income countries. For example, “[Mali’s] PRSP represents a credible policy framework to reduce poverty, integrating for the first time the country's various poverty-focused programs within the context of a sound macro economic framework,” Other countries recently praised for having strong PRSPs include Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mauritania, and Yemen. In addition, the World Bank recently published a paper arguing that developing countries are ready to absorb an additional $30 billion in foreign assistance. The study selected a sample of 18 countries that have recently “improved their policies significantly ... used aid productively ... and continue to have substantial unmet development needs,” The paper concludes that a significant increment of aid could be used effectively in all 18 countries.


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Potential candidates for MDG fast-tracking Governance qualification African Millennium Millennium Poverty World Bank Peer HIPC Challenge Reduction Absorptive Challenge Review completion Corporation Corporation Strategy Capacity Mechanism point b/ Paper Study d/ Qualifier c/ Threshold a/ Albania X X X Algeria X Angora* X Armenia X X Azerbaijan X Bangladesh* X Benin* X X X X X Bhutan* X Bolivia X X X X Bosnia & Herze. X Burkina Faso* X X X X X Cambodia* X Cameroon* X X Cape Verde X Chad* X Congo, Rep.* X Djibouti X Egypt X Ethiopia* X X X X Gabon X Gambia* X Georgia X X Ghana* X X X X Guinea* X Guyana X X X Honduras X X X India* X Indonesia X Kenya* X X Kyrgyzstan* X X Leo PDR* X Lesotho* X X Madagascar* X X X X Malawi* X X X Mall* X X X X X Mauritania* X X X Mauritius X Moldova* X Mongolia* X X * Low-income country. a/ Countries are from www.nepad.or, retrieved on December 20, 2004. b/ ountries are from www.worldbank.org, retrieved on December 20, 2004. c/ ountries are from www.mca.org, retrieved on December 20, 2004. d/ orld Bank 2003. Notes: See notes a-d.

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Africa’s Development; or those with favorable reviews through the World Bank-IMF Joint Staff Assessments of PRSPs. These or other performance-based criteria will yield at least a couple of dozen low-income countries that have reached governance standards sufficient for including them on a fast-track for scaling up MDG-based investments beginning in 2005. It is with these MDG fast-track countries that the international community, particularly the donor countries, will face the clearest test of their commitment to achieving the Goals. If donors cannot provide the support that these countries require to achieve the Goals, the undertaking to achieve those Goals will be in peril. Moreover, the system for international development assistance needs to consolidate its incentives for countries with weaker governance levels, showing that good performance is indeed rewarded by financial support consistent with the Goals.

Prepare MDG-based poverty reduction strategies In addition to supporting fast-track countries, we recommend that every interested developing country produce, before the end of 2005, an MDG needs assessment and an MDG-based poverty reduction strategy. We further recommend that the Secretary-General request each resident UN Country Team to assist in this process. Most often the outcome will be a revised version of an existing national strategy, including the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), where appropriate. It should contain a strategy for enhanced investments at the village, town, and city levels, a financing scenario, and a governance strategy to ensure implementation of the program with minimized corruption, based on fundamental principles of human rights. The host country should lead and own the effort to design the MDG strategy, drawing in civil society organizations; bilateral donors; the UN specialized agencies, programs, and funds; and the international financial institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the appropriate regional development bank. The contributions of the UN specialized agencies, programs, and funds should be coordinated through the UN Country Team, and the UN Country Team should work closely with the international financial institutions. At the headquarters level, the UN Development Group should coordinate the activities among all UN agencies, programs, and funds -- with the UNDP Administrator continuing to playa special coordination role.

Launch a global human resource training effort for the Millennium Development Goals With the design of national strategies, a major worldwide effort in preservice skill training should be launched simultaneously in 2005 to overcome the immediate scale-up constraints in human resources. International agencies and bilateral donors should work with low-income countries to prepare serious strategies and training materials for use at the village and city level. Global champions are needed for this initiative to set targets and confirm financial commitments to train, as first priorities:


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x Village specialists in health, soil nutrients, irrigation, land reclamation, drinking water, sanitation, electricity, vehicle repair, road maintenance, and forest management. x Managers in investment planning, budgeting, computer-based information systems, poverty mapping, and sector needs assessments. x Teachers, doctors, and other skilled professionals to provide services in education and health. x Professionals for urban planning and urban infrastructure and services (such as electricity, transport, water, waste management, and industrial zoning) and community development agents to promote local participation, gender equality, and minority rights. A sharp focus on the short-term training of young workers, where appropriate, will provide the added benefits of bringing them into the formal labor market. It will also help them develop a skill base that will contribute to longer term development processes.

Launch the Quick Wins initiatives We have noted the chance for early breakthroughs in many areas: school attendance, malaria control, school meals, soil nutrients, to name just a few. Each should be championed, and explicit and bold targets should be set on a three-year horizon. For example, it would certainly be possible to make a free antimalaria bed-net available to every African child in an endemic malaria region by the end of 2007. It would also be possible to have every subsistence farmer given the chance to replenish soil nutrients using fertilizers or agroforestry or related techniques by the end of 2007. We have identified a large number of additional Quick Wins. The relevant UN agencies, together with bilateral agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions, should grasp the opportunity to launch these initiatives in 2005.

Engage the middle-income countries in the challenge of meeting the Goals Middle-income countries are challenged to complete the process of eradicating extreme poverty within their own countries and to join the ranks of donor countries at the same time. Most large middle-income countries suffer from pockets of poverty that must be targeted for elimination. Grants in support of high debt burdens for heavily indebted middle-income countries can support that process. But leading middle-income countries -- such as Brazil, China, Malaysia, Mexico, and South Africa -- also have expertise of direct benefit to the poorer countries. For example, China should help to ensure a steady flow of artemisinin-based anti malaria medicines for Africa in the coming years. It can also assist countries in expanding transport or other infrastructure. Brazil can contribute to development in Lusophone Africa, including the training of Portuguese-speaking professionals. Malaysia can help promote increased competitiveness in labor-intensive manufacturing exports and strengthen science advice mechanisms. South Africa has recently gained unique experience in the rapid scaling-up of infrastructure services for water and electricity in rural areas. It could assist countries in the

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rest of Africa in designing ambitious investment plans. Many other examples of the tremendous potential for developing country cooperation abound-and should be seized in 2005.

4. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS In line with the Monterrey Consensus, developing countries will need to expand their domestic resource mobilization to finance MDG-based poverty reduction strategies by drawing on government revenues, household contributions, and private sector investment to the greatest extent possible. In many low-income countries, and practically all Least Developed Countries, domestic resources alone will not be enough to meet the Goals.

Expanding the financial envelope to achieve the Goals The central questions are: How much will it cost to achieve the Goals? And what share of total costs can be borne through increased domestic resources, and what must be provided by donors? Since there is no “one-size fits-all” in meeting the Goals, the questions can be properly answered only through detailed needs assessments that must be carried out at the country level. In a first attempt, the UN Millennium Project collaborated with local research organizations to prepare MDG needs assessments for five countries to quantify infrastructure, human resource, and financial needs. For Ghana the required annual public investments for reaching the Goals add up to $80 per capita in 2006, scaling up to $124 in 2015 (table 6). Needs assessments for other low-income countries show similar levels of required investment. Note that this figure does not include technical cooperation for capacity building and other purposes, emergency assistance, or other ODA that does not directly finance the capital or operating costs of MDG interventions. To finance these investments, we assume a major increase in domestic resource mobilization by increasing government expenditures on the Goals by up to four percentage points of GDP through 2015. These added resources will likely need to be raised through a broad-based revenue source such as a value-added tax, as well as by rechanneling current low-priority spending into higher priority MDG investments. This increase in domestic resources, even though very large as a percentage of domestic income, is not enough to achieve the Goals in poor countries. For that, increased official development assistance is needed. Our results suggest that in a typical low-income country with an average per capita income of $300 in 2005, external financing of public interventions will be required on the order of 10-20 percent of GNP. For these countries, the costs of achieving the Goals will need to be split roughly evenly between domestic finance and ODA. Meanwhile, middleincome countries will be able to finance essentially all investments in the Goals without resorting to external finance-unless excessive debt burdens constrain them. In some cases, primary surplus requirements for government budgets may need to be adjusted to allow countries to increase public investments for the Goals. Modest levels of ODA may be needed to help middle-income countries redress especially difficult “pockets of poverty.”


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Table 6. Financing the Millennium Development Goals in Ghana 2003 US$ per capital Estimated Projected in 2002 for 2006 MDG investment needs Hunger Education Gender equality Health Water supply and sanitation Improving the lives of slum dwellers Energy Roads Others 1 Total Source of financing Household contributions Government expenditures Total MDG financing gap ODA for direct MDG support (2002) 2 Shortfall in ODA for direct MDG support over 2002 level

Projected for 2010

Projected for 2015

Average 2006-15

Na Na Na Na Na

3 17 2 18 6

5 19 3 24 7

12 22 3 34 10

6 20 3 25 7

Na

2

2

3

2

Na Na Na Na

13 11 8 80

15 10 9 94

18 10 13 124

15 10 10 99

-14 -Na

9 19 28 52

11 27 38 57

15 39 54 70

11 29 40 59

16

Na

Na

Na

Na

Na

36

41

54

43

-- = Not available, Na = Not applicable Note: Numbers in table may not sum to totals because of rounding. Source: OECD 2004 and author’s calculations prepared in collaboration with the Institute of Social Statistics and Economic Research, Ghana.

According to our estimates, the total cost of supporting the MDG financing gap for every low-income country would be $73 billion in 2006, rising to $135 billion in 2015 (table 7). Middle-income countries are projected to require $10 billion in direct support for MDG investments. In addition to these direct costs of investments in the Goals, there are added costs at the national and international level-in capacity-building expenditures of bilateral and multilateral agencies, outlays for science and technology, enhanced debt relief, and other areas. In total, we find that costs of meeting the MDGs in all countries are on the order of $121 billion in 2006, rising to $189 billion in 2015, taking into account cofinanced increases at the country level. Our results show that several countries will “graduate” from the need for aid to finance investments in the MDGs before 2015.

1 For MDG interventions not yet included in needs assessment (such as large infrastructure projects, higher education, environmental sustainability. 2 Calculated using methodology described in table 5.


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Table 7 Estimated cost of meeting the Millennium Development in all countries 2003 US$ billion Estimated in 2002 MDG support needs in low-income countries MDG financing gap 12a Capacity building to achieve the MDGs 5 Grants in support of heavy debt burden -Debt relieve 4 Repayments of concessional loans -5 Subtotal 15 MDG support needs in middle-income countries Direct support to government 4 Capacity building to achieve the MDGs 5 Repayments of concessional loans -6 Subtotal 3 MDG support need a the international level Regional cooperation and infrastructure 2 Funding for global research 1 Implementation of Rio Conventions 1 Technical cooperation by international 5 organizations Subtotal 10 Estimated cost of meeting the MDGs 28 in all countries

Projected for 2006

Projected Projected for 2010 for 2015

73 7 7 6 0 94

89 7 6 6 0 108

135 7 1 6 0 149

10 5 -3 12

10 5 -4 11

10 5 -6 9

3 5 2

7 7 3

11 7 5

5

7

8

15

23

31

121

143

189

-- = Not available, Na = Not applicable Note: Numbers in table may not sum to totals because of rounding. Source: 2002 data based on OECD-DAC 2004. Projections for 2006-15 are authors’ calculations.

In table 8 we estimate a plausible level of overall ODA flows implied by the Goals, by making three adjustments to table 7. First, we recognize that in addition to MDG-based ODA, other forms of ODA will continue to be warranted. Second, we recognize that some of the MDG needs will be satisfied by reprogramming existing aid rather than by increasing aid. Third, we recognize that some countries will not qualify for increased aid because of their poor governance. Making these three corrections, we suggest that a plausible level of overall ODA required for the MDGs during the coming decade will be $135 billion in 2006, rising to $195 billion in 2015. These figures are respectively equivalent to 0.44 and 0.54 percent of donor GNP. These ODA estimates suggest that donors should prepare to double their ODA-toGNP ratios during 2006-15 compared with today. That is, the ratio of ODA to donor GNP should be 0.5 percent of GNP or above, approximately twice the current level. Since our calculations leave out certain major categories of aid that are likely required in the future --


271

Table 8. Plausible official development assistance needs to meet the Millennium Development Goals 2003 US$ billions

Baseline ODA for the MDGs in 2002 Incremental MDG investment needs Adjustment for nonqualifying countries due to inadequate governance Reprogramming of existing ODA Emergency and distress relief Other ODA 1 Total Indicative ODA needs for the MDGs 2 Share of OECD-DAC countries’ GNI (percent) ODA to Least Developed Countries (% of OECD-DAC countries’ GNI) Absolute increase in ODA required (compared with 2002) Difference between total ODA needs and existing commitments

Estimated ODA in 2002

Projected for 2006

Projected for 2010

Projected for 2015

28

28

28

28

Na

94

115

161

Na

-21

-23

-25

Na 4 34 65

-6 4 36 135

-7 5 34 152

-9 6 35 195

0.23

0.44

0.46

0.54

0.06

0.12

0.15

0.22

Na

70

87

130

Na

48

50

74

Na = Not applicable. Note: Numbers in table may not sum to totals because of rounding. Source: 2002 data based on OECD-DAC 2004. Projections for 2006-15 are authors’ calculations.

major infrastructure projects, increased spending on adjustments to climate change, post conflict reconstruction, and other high-profile geopolitical priorities -- we believe that donors should commit to reaching the long-standing target of 0.7 percent of GNP by 2015. Roughly three-quarters of that will be directed to the Goals, and the rest to other ODA needs. While clearly not sufficient in themselves, substantial increases in aid are necessary for countries to achieve the Goals. Just as developing countries need to honor their commitments in terms of improved governance, rich countries must meet the commitment made in Monterrey by making “concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 percent of gross 1 Includes assistance that does not contribute directly to the Goals and operating expenditures of donor agencies. 2 Does not include several important official development assistance needs, such as responding to crises of geopolitical importance (such as in Afghanistan or Iraq), mitigating the impact of climate change, protecting biodiversity and conserving global fisheries, and so on.

272


national product as ODA to developing countries.” To achieve the Goals, donors need to make credible and long-term commitments to substantially higher ODA, with access to the increased funding contingent on the quality of MDG-based poverty reduction strategies and the credible commitments of countries to undertaking the necessary reforms. Five high-income countries have already reached the 0.7 percent international target, while six others have committed themselves to specific timelines to reach this level of ODA (box 11). But even if all existing commitments were met over the next five years, the world would still experience a financing shortfall. Several initiatives have explored innovative financing mechanisms to overcome fiscal constraints to a rapid scaling-up of aid volumes. Among them we consider the International Finance Facility (IFF), proposed by the British government, as the most advanced proposal for achieving a rapid increase in development assistance. The IFF would be a time-limited financing mechanism designed to at least double development assistance between now and 2015. It would leverage additional money from the international capital markets by issuing bonds, based on legally binding long-term donor commitments. It responds to the need for rapid scaling-up, or “frontloading,” development assistance without placing undue constraints on rich countries’ budgets, while permitting donor countries to achieve the target of 0.7 percent of GNP by 2015.

The benefits: the case for a decade of bold ambition The Millennium Development Goals layout a challenging and achievable vision for dramatically reducing poverty in all its forms, with tremendous benefits for the entire world. We noted at the outset of this Overview that if the Goals are achieved, more than 500 million people will be lifted out of poverty and millions of lives will be saved, with a great proportion of the improvements experienced in Africa. Millions of children will be given an opportunity to attend primary school if the Goals are met. Other benefits are quantified in the simple extrapolations presented in table 9. Not captured in such a table is the reversed environmental degradation brought about by the Goals, or the hundreds of millions more women and girls who will lead their lives in freedom, with more security and more opportunity, if the Goals are achieved. Behind these achievements are the lives and hopes of people with new opportunities to end the burden of grinding poverty. But the Millennium Development Goals are only a mid-station to ending absolute poverty. Even if the Goals are achieved in every country, extreme poverty will remain a major issue requiring ongoing attention. Although a scale-up in high-quality development assistance will allow many countries to graduate from the need for large-scale external budget support, the poorest countries will still require ongoing support equal to 10-20 percent of their GDP to graduate from external assistance sometime after 2015 -- likely by 2025. Until then, and to eventually make development assistance obsolete, sustained aid will be crucial. To that end, high-income countries will need to maintain support at close to 0.7 percent of their GNI for some period beyond 2015 (table 10). By 2015 extreme poverty can be cut by half. By 2025 extreme poverty can be substantially eliminated.


273

Box 11 The 0.7 percent official development assistance target and the Millennium Development Goals Although the UN Millennium Project focuses its estimate of needed official development assistance on country-level MDG needs assessments, we do so within the context of developed countries’ long-established international target of providing 0.7 percent of their national income as ODA. 2005 marks 35 years since this target was first affirmed by UN member states in a 1970 General Assembly Resolution: “In recognition of the special importance of the role which can be fulfilled only by official development assistance, a major part of financial resource transfers to the developing countries should be provided in the form of official development assistance. Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 percent of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the decade.” This first deadline passed. Having fallen from 0.51 percent as a share of donor GNP in 1960 to 0.33 percent in 1970, official development assistance reached 0.35 percent in 1980. By 1990 it was at 0.34 percent and then fell to 0.23 percent by 2002, the same year the 0.7 target was reconfirmed by all countries in the Monterrey Consensus. So far, only five countries have met or surpassed the 0.7 target: Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. In the past two years, however, six other countries have committed themselves to specific timetables to achieving the target before 2015: Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Thus nearly half the membership of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee has now set a firm timetable for reaching 0.7. The UN Millennium Project urges all developed countries to follow through on the Monterrey commitment “to make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7.” We urge that “concrete efforts” require a specific timetable for reaching 0.7, and specifically a timetable before 2015, the target date for the Goals. The confluence of the 0.7 target and the Goals is an important one. As this report outlines, ours is the first generation in which the world can halve extreme poverty within the 0.7 envelope. In 1975, when the donor world economy was around half its current size, the Goals would have required much more than 1 percent of GNP from the donors. Today, after two and a half decades of sustained economic growth, the Goals are utterly affordable. No new promises are needed -- only following through on commitments already made.


274

Table 9. The benefits of meeting the Millennium Development Goals, by region Poverty headcount (millions of people) 2005 estimate Current trend extrapolated to 2015 Eastern Europe and Central Asia 92 88 East Asia and the Pacific* 182 0 Latin America and the Caribbean 128 123 Middle East and North Africa 8 9 South Asia* 407 317 Sub-Saharan Africa 345 431 Total 1,162 968 Region

GDP per capita (2003 U5$) 2005 estimate Current trend extrapolated to 2015 Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2,980 3,827 East Asia and the Pacific* 1,313 2,139 Latin America and the Caribbean 3,724 4,104 Middle East and North Africa 2,447 2,727 South Asia* 602 980 Sub-Saharan Africa 520 509 Region

MDG scenario for 2015 49 0 90 4 317 198 658

MDG scenario for 2015 4,084 2,139 5,102 3,352 980 712

Individuals suffering form undernourishment (millions) 2005 estimate Current trend extrapolated to 2015 Eastern Europe and Central Asia 52 61 East Asia and the Pacific* 162 65 Latin America and the Caribbean 49 38 Middle East and North Africa 32 46 South Asia* 301 285 Sub-Saharan Africa 228 255 Total 824 749

MDG scenario for 2015 20 65 38 14 228 155 520

Child mortality (millions of lives lost) 2005 estimate Current trend extrapolated to 2015 Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.2 0.1 East Asia and the Pacific* 1.1 0.7 Latin America and the Caribbean 0.3 0.1 Middle East and North Africa 0.4 0.2 South Asia* 3.1 2.0 Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 4.7 Total 9.8 7.9

MDG scenario for 2015 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 1.6 1.9 4.4

Region

Region

Region Total

2005 estimate 0.54

Maternal mortality (millions of lives lost) Current trend extrapolated to 2015 0.54

MDG scenario for 2015 0.15

Investing in Development New HIV Infections 2002-10 (millions) Current trend extrapolated to 2010 Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2.8 Latin America and the Caribbean 2.3 Middle East and North Africa 0.9 South Asia 18.5 Sub-Saharan Africa 21.0 Total 45.5 Region

275 MDG scenario for 2010 1.3 0.7 0.3 5.7 8.8 16.8

Individuals without access to safe water (millions) 2005 estimate Current trend extrapolated to 2015 Eastern Europe and Central Asia* 23 20 East Asia and the Pacific 388 305 Latin America and the Caribbean* 49 26 Middle East and North Africa 40 46 South Asia* 160 0 Sub-Saharan Africa 280 270 Total 939 647

MDG scenario for 2015 10 299 16 26 0 230 581

Individuals without access to improved sanitation (millions) 2005 estimate Current trend extrapolated to 2015 Eastern Europe and Central Asia 69 73 East Asia and the Pacific* 873 608 Latin America and the Caribbean 128 107 Middle East and North Africa 80 84 South Asia 877 770 Sub-Saharan Africa 454 531 Total 2,481 2,172

MDG scenario for 2015 32 608 103 61 718 305 1,827

Region

Region

Individuals living in slum conditions (millions) 2001 Current trend MDG scenario extrapolated to 2020 for 2020 Eastern Europe and Central Asia 44 47 41 East Asia and the Pacific 237 385 210 Latin America and the Caribbean 128 173 116 Middle East and North Africa 61 97 54 South Asia 235 398 207 Sub-Saharan Africa 167 325 144 Total 872 1,425 772 * Region on track to meet MDG target. Note: Numbers in table may not sum to totals because of rounding. Source: Poverty headcount data from Chen and Ravallion 2004. GDP per capital and child mortality data from World Bank 2004d. Undernourishment data from FAO 2003. Maternal mortality data from WHO and UNICEF 1996 and WHO, UNICEF, and UNFPA 2003. Water and sanitation data from WHO and UNICEF 2004. HIV/AIDS data from Stover and others 2002. Slum dweller data from United Nations Population Division 2001, 2003 and UN-HABITAT 2003. All population projections from United Nations Population Division 2003. Region


276

Table 10. Estimated official development assistance flows and gaps of Development Assistant Committee members based on existing commitments (constant 2003 US$ billions) Assistance Assistance Assistance Assistance at 0.44 Gap in at 0.54 Country commitment commitment percent of 2006 percent of for 2005 for 2015 2006 GNI 1 2015 GNI 2 Australia 2.4 1.4 1.0 3.4 1.6 Austria 3 1.2 0.9 0.3 1.7 1.1 Belgium 4 1.5 2.1 None 2.1 2.7 Canada 5 4.2 2.6 1.7 6.1 3.7 Denmark 6 1.0 1.8 None 1.5 2.2 Finland 0.8 0.7 0.1 1.1 0.9 France 8.5 8.8 None 12.3 15.6 Germany 11.6 8.4 3.2 16.7 10.0 Greece 0.9 0.6 0.2 1.3 0.8 Ireland 7 0.6 0.8 None 0.9 1.1 Italy 7.0 5.1 1.9 10.1 6.1 Japan 8 19.9 9.5 10.4 28.7 9.5 Luxembourg 9 0.1 0.2 None 0.2 0.3 Netherlands 2.4 4.2 None 3.5 5.1 New Zealand 10 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 Norway 11 1.1 2.4 None 1.6 2.8 Portugal 0.7 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.6 Spain 4.1 2.9 1.1 5.9 7.5 Sweden 12 1.5 3.2 None 2.1 3.8 Switzerland 13 1.6 1.4 0.3 2.4 1.7 United Kingdom 9.2 8.5 0,7 13.2 16.8 United States 14 54.5 22.3 32.2 78.7 27.2 Total 135.0 88.4 195.0 121.5

Gap in 2015 1.8 0.7 None 2.4 None 0.2 None 6.7 0.5 None 4.1 19.2 None None 0.3 None 0.4 None None 0.6 None 51.5

Source: OECD/DAC forthcoming.

1

Assumes 2 percent real annual GNI growth. 2006 ODA/GNI target held constant through 2015. 3 2006 ODA/GNI target held constant at 0.33 percent through 2015. 4 2010 ODA/GNI target of 0.7 percent; commitment level held constant through 2015. 5 Assumes 5.5 percent real annual ODA increase (8 percent nominal increase less 2.5 percent inflation) through 2010; 2010 ODA/GNI target held constant through 2015. 6 2006 ODA/GNI target of 0.8 percent held constant through 2015. 7 2007 ODA/GNI target of 0.7 percent held constant through 2015. 8 2006 ODA level held constant at $9.5 billion through 2015. 9 2006 ODA/GNI commitment of 1 percent held constant through 2015. 10 Assumed 2006 ODA/GNI level of 0.26 percent held constant through 2015. 11 2005 ODA/GNI target of 1 percent held constant through 2015. 12 2006 ODA/GNI target of 1 percent held constant through 2015. 13 2010 ODA/GNI target of 0.4 percent held constant through 2015. 14 Assumes 3 percent real GNI growth to2006; for 2006 includes over $1.5 billion for the Millennium Challenge Account nearly $3 billion for the Global AIDS initiative, increased multilateral aid, and rephrased expenditure on reconstruction in Iraq. ODA/GNI share projected to remain constant through 2015. 2


277

In laying out tangible targets, the Goals make explicit the most obvious costs of inaction in terms of lives and opportunities lost. They also form a centerpiece for the world’s security agenda. As the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change and many others have noted, human development and environmental management are intricately linked to peace and security. Only by reducing poverty and improving environmental management over the coming decades can a rise in the number of conflicts and state failures be averted. If the Goals are not met, millions will die who would otherwise live. Countries that would be stable will descend into conflict. And the environment will continue to be degraded. The risks and benefits will be shared across the entire world, so genuine international leadership and responsibility will need joint action on both development and security policy. As mentioned earlier, in line with the High-Level Panel's recommendation, developed countries aspiring to permanent seats on the UN Security Council, for example, should be prepared to fulfill the commitment to 0.7 percent of GNP in ODA by 2015 as part of their leadership responsibilities. Fortunately, the costs of achieving the Goals are entirely affordable and well within the promises of 0.7 percent made at Monterrey and Johannesburg. The required doubling of annual official development assistance to $135 billion in 2006, rising to $195 billion by 2015, pales beside the wealth of high-income countries -- and the world’s military budget of $900 billion a year. Indeed, the increased development assistance will make up only half a percent of rich countries' combined income. Of course money alone will not be sufficient to meet the Goals, but increased investments need to accompany institutional reform, good policies, and increased efforts to improve the accountability of governments. Unless more financial assistance is available effectively, low-income countries and their development partners will not be able to have serious and honest discussions about the reforms and investments required to meet the Goals. For countries where such reforms and good policies are in place, high-income countries should, in the spirit of the Monterrey Consensus, make good on their commitment to increasing ODA for them to work toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals. At stake is the credibility and functioning of the international system. Without a breakthrough in 2005, if poor countries that have met their Monterrey commitments are not effectively supported in pursuing an MDG-oriented strategy, the already dwindling faith in international commitments to reduce poverty will likely vanish. In that case, the Goals will not be met and the trust in rich countries’ sincerity to support well governed countries in need of external assistance will be deeply, if not fatally, damaged. If we do not act now, the world will live without goals. To ensure success, in 2005 the world must start building capacity, improving policies, and delivering the investments needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals. This effort will need to be sustained at the global, national, and local level over the next 10 years. And only by acting now can long-term environmental challenges, such as climate change and fisheries depletion, be contained before they inflict irreparable harm on the poor countries able to protect themselves the least. Urgent action is needed if we are to usher in a decade of bold ambition to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Developing countries need to make every effort to

278


mobilize around the Goals. Rich countries need to ask themselves if they should be more concerned, as many of them are today, with pointing fingers at the responsibilities of poor countries than with meeting their own commitments. In 2005 the world needs desperately to follow through on its commitments, taking quick practical steps at scale before the Goals become impossible to achieve. If we fail to invest now, it will be a very long way to the next Millennium Summit in the year 3000.


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-- 2005g. Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development. Task Force on Science, Technology, and Innovation. New York. -- 2005h. Investing in Strategies to Reverse the Global Incidence of TB. Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Access to Essential Medicines, Working Group on TB. New York. -- 2005i. Prescription for Healthy Development: Increasing Access to Medicines. Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Access to Essential Medicines, Working Group on Access to Essential Medicines. New York. -- 2005j. Taking Action: Achieving Gender Equality and Empowering Women. Task Force on Education and Gender Equality. New York. -- 2005k. Toward Universal Primary Education: Investments, Incentives, and Institutions. Task Force on Education and Gender Equality. New York. -- 20051. Trade for Development. Task Force on Trade. New York. -- 2005m. Who's Got the Power? Transforming Health Systems for Women and Children. Task Force on Child Health and Maternal Health. New York. -- 2005n. Handbook for MDG Best Practice. New York. United Nations Population Division. 2001. World Population Prospects: The 2001 Revision. Percentage of the Population at Mid-Year Residing in Urban Areas by Major Area, Region and Country, 1950-2030. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York. -- 2003. World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision. Population Database. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York. [http://esa.un.org/unpp/]. USAID (United States Agency for International Development), UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS), WHO (World Health Organization), UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), and the POLICY Project. 2004. “Coverage of Selected Services for HIV/AIDS Prevention, Care and Support in Low and Middle Income Countries in 2003.” Washington, D.C. WHO (World Health Organization). 2002. “Scaling Up the Response to Infectious Diseases.” Geneva. [www.who.intlinfectious-disease-report/2002/]. WHO (World Health Organization), UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), and UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund). 2003. “Maternal Mortality in 2000: Estimates Developed by WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA.” Geneva. [www.reliefweb.int]. World Bank. 2003. “Supporting Sound Policies with Adequate and Appropriate Financing.” Report DC2003-0016 prepared for the Development Committee. [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation] -- 2004a. World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone. New York: Oxford University Press. -- 2004b. Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation. Washington, D.C. -- 2004c. Global Development Finance 2004. Washington, D.C. -- 2004d. World Development Indicators 2004. Washington, D.C.


282 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Several people made particularly noteworthy contributions in the drafting process for this overview and the full-length version of the report. Macartan Humphreys played a central role in the drafting of chapter 12 on strategies for countries affected by conflict. Nirupam Bajpai, Shuming Bao, and Wing Thye Woo provided important analysis to inform chapter 11 on investment priorities in other regions. Deborah Balk, Bob Chen, Marc Levy, Alex de Sherbinin, Adam Storeygard, and their colleagues at the Center for International Earth Science Information Networks (CIESIN) at Columbia University conducted much of the report’s geospatial data analysis. Brian Hammond and his colleagues at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) gave tremendously of their time and expertise to inform the analysis in chapter 13 on fixing the donor system. Dani Kaufmann provided very helpful inputs to chapter 7 on governance. For all these chapters any remaining errors are the authors’ own. The UN Millennium Project benefited from active intellectual collaboration with Francois Bourguignon, Chief Economist of the World Bank; Nicholas Stern, his distinguished predecessor in that position and now at the U.K. Treasury; and Raghuram Rajan, Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All were marvelously collaborative and thoughtful in sharing insights and comments on interim products and jointly pursuing the best possible analytical frameworks for achieving the MDGs. Many co-organized seminars and meetings benefited from the contributions of several of their colleagues, including Jim Adams, Shaida Badiee, Barbara Bruns, Mariam Claeson, Shanta Devarajan, Shahrokh Fardoust, Pablo Gomet, Rudolf Knippenberg (UNICEF), Ibrahim Levent, Hans Lofgren, Gobind Nankani, John Page, Ramahatra Rakotomalala, Peter Roberts, Agnes Soucat, Eric Swanson, Jee-Peng Tan, Hans Timmer, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe at the World Bank; and Sanjeev Gupta, Peter Heller, and Arvind Subramanian from the IMF. The UN Millennium Project also thanks its partners in developing a country-level MDG needs assessment methodology, the summary results of which are presented in chapter 17 on expanding the financial envelope to achieve the MDGs: Anwara Begum and M. Salimullah from the Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies; Kao Kim Hourn and Ray Zepp from the University of Cambodia; Ernest Aryeetey and Michael Nimo from the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research in Ghana; Samar Datta, Ravindra Dholakia, and Akhilesh Kumar from the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad; Haidari K. R. Amani, Flora Lucas Kessy, and Deogratias Macha from the Economic and Social Research Foundation in Tanzania; and Godfrey Bahiigwa, Lawrence Bategeka, and Nathan Okarut from the Economic Policy Research Center in Uganda. The UN Millennium Project is indebted to McKinsey & Company, which developed the analysis underlying the energy section of the needs assessment; to Eva Weissman for invaluable assistance in the child health and maternal health analyses; and to David Simon for analysis of official development assistance flows and their sectoral allocation. Shan Cao, Andrew Charlton, Stacy Fehlenberg, Joseph Kennedy, and Pierre Yared performed excellent research assistance in the needs assessment effort. Countless UNDP staff supported the Project’s efforts. Elli Kaplan was invaluable in supporting the Project’s early stages. Jeffrey Avina, Ade Lekoetje, Elizabeth Lwanga, Jacques Loup, Lamin Manneh, and Comfort Tetteh were also tremendous contributors to


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the UN Millennium Project’s day-to-day work. Sally Fegan-Wyles and her team at the UN Development Group were ever helpful and supportive. Major substantive contributions were made from throughout the Bureau for Development Policy, including: Susan McDade and the energy group; Antoine Heuty, Terry McKinley, Rathin Roy, and colleagues in the poverty group; Gita Welch and the institutional development group; and Terence Jones and his team from the capacity development group. Djibril Diallo, David Morrison, Bill Orme, and their COA colleagues provided invaluable communications support. The Project also thanks the MDG focal points from the other regional bureaus: Ghaith Fariz, Enrique Ganuza, Balasubramanium Murali, and Norimasa Shimomura. Pedro Conceiao, Moez Doraid, Gulden Turkoz-Cosslett, Mattias Johansson, Inge Kaul, Ronald Mendoza, Omar Noman, Alejandra Pero, Bharati Sadasivam, Amina Tirana, and Caitlin Wiesen were also extremely generous with their contributions. Nissim Ezekiel and the secretariat of the Commission on Private Sector and Development offered many helpful suggestions, including Jan Krutzinna, Naheed Nenshi, Yann Risz, and Sahba Sobhani. The UN Millennium Project collaborated closely with the staff of the Human Development Report Office in the production of Human Development Report 2003. Several parts of this report build on work conducted during the production of that Report. We thank Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and her team, including: Silva Bonacito, Emmanuel Boudard, Carla De Gregorio, Haishan Fu, Claes Johannsson, Christopher Kuonqui, Santosh Mehrotra, Tanni Mukhopadhyay, Stefano Pettinato, David Stewart, Aisha Talib, Nena Terrel, and Emily White. This report was edited and produced by the stellar team of Bruce Ross Larson, Meta de Coquereaumont, Mary Goundrey, Thomas Roncoli, Christopher Trott, Timothy Walker, and Elaine Wilson at Communications Development Incorporated in Washington, D.C.

Advisory inputs Many colleagues shared important comments on earlier drafts of this report. Members of the UN Millennium Project's United Nations Experts Group have provided invaluable advice since the Project's inception, always under the skilled chairmanship of Jan Vandemoortele. We thank all Experts Group members for their generous and consistent contributions: Ifzal Aii, Adnan Z. Amin, Patrick Asea, Daniel Biau, Francois Bourguignon, James P. Callahan, Andrew Cassels, Jan Cedergren, Hans D’Orville, David T. Edwards, Marika Fahlen, Orobola Fasehun, Luiz L. Fernandes Pinheiro, Charles Gore, Edward Heinemann, Raj Jumar, Ian Kinniburgh, Eddy Lee, Patrick Low, Richard Morgan, Harish Parvathaneni, Prabhu Pingali, Raghuram Rajan, Joanne Sandler, Francisco Sercovich, Mari Simonen, Joseph Smolik, Dianne Spearman, Carlos Eduardo Velez, and Gustavo R. Zlauvinen. Special thanks are also due to colleagues at the UN Secretariat: in particular HenkJan Brinkman, Marta Mauras, Robert Orr, and Abiodun Williams in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. Ibrahim Gambari, Eloho Otobo, and Yvette Stephens provided tremendous support from the office of the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on Africa. In the Department of Public Information, Sue Markham, Pragati Pascale, and Tim Wall offered tremendous assistance. Numerous colleagues in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs provided tremendous support throughout the Project, including Joseph


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Chamie and his team at the Population Division; Robert Johnston, Francesca Perucci, and the team in the Statistics Division; and Johan Scholvinck. The UN Millennium Project also benefited from collaboration with colleagues at the Millennium Campaign: including Eveline Herfkens, Salil Shetty, Fernando Casado, Nisha Chatani-Rizvi, Patricia Garce, Lucille Merks, Marina Ponti, Ingrid Sanders, Marisol Sanjines, Hellen Wangusa, Carol Welch, and Erna Witoelar. The UN Millennium Project is grateful for its collaboration with and comments from the Secretariat of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), including its distinguished chair Wiseman Nkuhlu, its agricultural advisor Richard Mkandawire, and its indefatigable MDG specialist, Khadija Bah. The UN Millennium Project benefited from several high-level consultations with members of the OECD/DAC. The Project gratefully acknowledges the Government of Sweden for hosting a high-level discussion in Stockholm in February 2004. The Project also thanks Richard Manning, Brian Hammond, and colleagues for convening a meaning of DAC leaders in Paris in July 2004. Masood Ahmed, Richard Martini, Sharon White, and colleagues in the UK Department for International Development also hosted an extremely constructive final consultation with DAC members in London during October 2004. The Project also thanks Jean-Pierre Landau for numerous helpful conversations.

Pilot country inputs The UN Millennium Project’s pilot country work provided an invaluable forum for testing many of the ideas highlighted in this report and for gathering new information. In Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Yemen, the UN Resident Coordinator, UN Country Team members, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund all provided significant support to the collaboration. The Project is especially grateful to the heads of government in several countries for their direct and active support, including President Leonel Fernandez of the Dominican Republic, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, President John Kufuor of Ghana, President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, and President Emomali Rakhmonov of Tajikistan. Government focal points in the pilot countries include John Gagain in the Dominican Republic; Ato. Mekonnen Manyazewal and Ato. Getachew Adem in Ethiopia; S. Nii-Noi Ashong and George Gyan-Baffour in Ghana; David Nalo and George Anyango in Kenya; Abou Lorn in Senegal; Nozigul Khushvakhtova in Tajikistan; and Ahmed Mohammed Sofan and Mutahar Al-Abassi in Yemen. The UN Resident Coordinator and the UN Country Teams have been instrumental in leading the pilot country work. We particularly thank Douglas Gardner and Barbara Orlandini in Cambodia; Niky Fabiancic in the Dominican Republic; Samuel Nyambi, Modibo Toure, Bjorn Ljungqvist, and Vinetta Robinson in Ethiopia; Alfred Fawundu and Kamil Kamaluddeen in Ghana; Paul Andre de la Porte and Ojijo Odhiambo in Kenya; Ahmed Razhaoui, Alberic Kacou, Luc Gregoire, and Diene Keita in Senegal; William Paton, Tuya Altangerel, Oliver Babson, Temur Basilia, and Johannes Chudoba in


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Tajikistan; and Flavia Pansieri, James Rawley, Samuel Choritz, Sammy Khan, and Abdo Seif in Yemen. The UN Millennium Project’s MDG Technical Support Center in Nairobi has helped to guide the pilot country work in Africa. We thank Glenn Denning, Mi Hua, Patrick Milimo, Eileen Petit-Mshana, and Salina Sanou for their contributions. The Project thanks Lenora Suki and Tarik Yousef for their efforts in helping to lead the Project’s collaborations in the Dominican Republic and Yemen respectively. Several WHO staff, especially Rebecca Dodd, Jeanette de Putter, and Sergio Spinaci, have collaborated closely on the health-related activities in Yemen.

Report comments We gratefully acknowledge the thoughtful comments and suggestions received from many governments; UN agencies, funds, and programs; civil society organizations; and individuals. We thank the governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, CARICOM member states, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the members of the European Commission for their comments. The UN Millennium Project benefited tremendously from many group consultations at the United Nations and thanks all who participated in and organized these events. This includes meetings with the ambassadors of the African Union, convened by Michel Kafando and Crispin Grey-Johnson; the ambassadors of the Caribbean Community, convened by Christopher F. Hackett; the ambassadors of the Pacific Islands Forum Group, convened by Ali’ioaiga Feturi Elisaia; ambassadors of the UN Economic and Social Council, convened by Marjatta Rasi; members of the Second Committee of the General Assembly, convened by Marco Balarezo; and members of the Group of 77 and China, convened by Abdulaziz AI-Nasser. We also thank UN delegates representing member states of the European Union, as convened by Koen Davidse. We would also like to thank Kanta Adhin, Javed Ahmad, Benjamin Allen, Ifzal Ali, Aasmund Andersen, William Andrianasolo, James Banda, Tony Banks, Pierre Belanger, Clements Bidonge, Kate Bird, Bineswaree (Aruna) Bolaky, Catherine Budgett-Meakin, Barbara Burungi, M. Bukuru, Eva Busza, Bernardo Cachaca, Wendy Caird, Joana Chamusca, Erin Chapman, Bill Christeson, Anthony Costello, Jacek Cukrowski, Susanne Dam-Hansen, Denis Daumerie, Rossana Dudziak, Zamira Eshmambetova, Marcos A Espinal, Udo Etukudo, Richard Feachem, Virginia Floyd, Luc Franzoni, Dennis Garrity, Axumite Gebre-Egziabher, Adrienne Germain, Linda Ghanime, Stefan Giljum, Genevieve Grabman, Peter Gustafsson, Toni Haapane, Lawrence Haddad, Ronnie Hall, Afaf AbuHasabo, Cecil Haverkamp, Ron Heller, Karen Judd, Inge Kaul, Jeff Keenan, Augusta Khew, Shannon Kowalski-Morton, Hannu Kyrolainen, Robert Leigh, Jostein Leiro, Lim Li Lin, Jon Linden, Dermot Maher, James Manor, Mariam Mayet, Christine McNab, Lenni Montiel, Tadayuki Miyashita, Ronan Murphy, Adib Nehmeh, Norm Nicholson, Samantha Page, Erik Parsons, Joanna Patrick, Bob Perciasepe, Peter Piot, Rathi Ramanathan, Mary Robinson, Rick Rowden, Rabbi Royan, Domenico Siniscalco, Charlotte Hord Smith, William Smith, Jamil Sofi, Elsa Stamatopoulou, Carsten Staur, Thomas Theisohn, Adama


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Toe, John Tucker, Happy James Tumwebaze, Therese Turner-Jones, Andras Uthoff, Louisa Vinton, Rob Ward, Robert Watson, Patrick Webb, Diana Weil, Pera Wells, Caron Whitaker, and David Woollcombe. We also thank faculty at the Institute for Development Studies, Sussex, and the faculty and students of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver for their detailed analysis and comments on previous drafts. For the needs assessment work, in addition to task force members, we also gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions by Tahgreed Adam, Walid Badawi, Christopher Banes, Stefano Bertozzi, Razina Bilgrami, Jonathan Campaign, Tamo Chattopadhay, Mark Connolly, Ingrid Cyimana, Billy Cobbett, Joel Cohen, Chris Curtis, Ernest Darkoh, Don de Savigny, Richard Deckelbaum, Simon Ellis, Patrice Engle, David Evans, Katherine Floyd, Joe Flood, Tamara Fox, Linda Ghanime, Rainer Gross, Juan Pablo Gutierrez, Charlie Heaps, John Hendra, Mark Henderson, Andrew Hudson, Jose Hueb, Todd Johnson, Eileen Kennedy, Will Keogh, Zahia Khan, Chistoph Kurowski, Lilani Kumuranyake, Valerie Leach, Rolf Luyendijk, Pim van der Male, William McGreevey, Metsi Mekheta, Takaaki Miyaguchi, Cielo Morales, Maryam Niamir-Fuller, Elizabeth Anne Paxton, Vinod Paul, Kyoko Postill, David Redhouse, Sanjay Reddy, Harri Seppanen, Kavita Sethuraman, Manohar Sharma, Susmita Shekhar, Henri Smets, Lara Stabinski, John Stover, Daouda Toure, Juha Uitto, Meike van Ginneken, Netsanet Walelign, Jake Werksman, Edward Wilson, Meg Wirth, and Aster Zaoude.

Administrative support This report could not have been produced without the tireless administrative support of Jennifer Copeland, Rosemary Estevez-Vidal, Hnin Hla Phyu, and Ferima Traore in the UN Millennium Project Secretariat; Lauren Canning-Luckenbach and Alan Lee in the Office of the UNDP Administrator; Patricia Maw and Alex Nitorreda in the MDGs Unit of UNDP; and Ji Mi Choi, Deborah Creque, Heidi Kleedtke, and Martha Synnott at the Earth Institute at Columbia University. Dan Nienhauser of the Earth Institute was a staunch supporter of the Project, helping to streamline many of its administrative needs.

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II.3 IN LARGER FREEDOM: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL Secretary-General, United Nations, 21 March 2005 1

CONTENTS Chapters I.

II.

Paragraphs Page

INTRODUCTION: A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY IN 2005.......

1–24

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A.

The challenges of a changing world.......................................

6–11

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B.

Larger freedom: development, security and human rights .....

12–17

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C.

The imperative of collective action........................................

18–22

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D.

Time to decide........................................................................

23–24

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FREEDOM FROM WANT............................................................

25–73

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A.

A shared vision of development.............................................

28–32

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B.

National strategies..................................................................

33–46

298

C.

Making goal 8 work: trade and financing for development ...

47–56

302

D.

Ensuring environmental sustainability ...................................

57–61

305

E.

Other priorities for global action............................................

62–71

306

F.

The implementation challenge ...............................................

72–73

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1 United Nations documentation: Report of the Secretary-General, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, (A/59/2005), 21 March 2005.

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Chapters

Paragraphs Page

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

FREEDOM FROM FEAR .............................................................

74–126

311

A.

A vision of collective security ...............................................

76–86

311

B.

Preventing catastrophic terrorism ..........................................

87–96

312

C.

Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons............................

97–105

314

D.

Reducing the risk and prevalence of war ............................... 106–121

316

E.

Use of force............................................................................ 122–126

320

FREEDOM TO LIVE IN DIGNITY.............................................. 127–152

321

A.

Rule of law............................................................................. 133–139

322

B.

Human rights ......................................................................... 140–147

324

C.

Democracy............................................................................. 148–152

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STRENGTHENING THE UNTIED NATIONS............................ 153–219

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A.

General Assembly.................................................................. 158–164

327

B.

The Councils.......................................................................... 165–183

329

C.

The Secretariat ....................................................................... 184–192

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D.

System coherence .................................................................. 193–212

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E.

Regional organizations .......................................................... 213–215

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F.

Updating the Charter of the United Nations .......................... 216–219

340

CONCLUSION: OUR OPPORTUNITY AND OUR CHALLENGE................................................................................ 220–222

340

ANNEX FOR DECISION BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT............................

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I. INTRODUCTION: A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY IN 2005 1. Five years into the new millennium, we have it in our power to pass on to our children a brighter inheritance than that bequeathed to any previous generation. We can halve global poverty and halt the spread of major known diseases in the next 10 years. We can reduce the prevalence of violent conflict and terrorism. We can increase respect for human dignity in every land. And we can forge a set of updated international institutions to help humanity achieve these noble goals. If we act boldly — and if we act together — we can make people everywhere more secure, more prosperous and better able to enjoy their fundamental human rights. 2. All the conditions are in place for us to do so. In an era of global interdependence, the glue of common interest, if properly perceived, should bind all States together in this cause, as should the impulses of our common humanity. In an era of global abundance, our world has the resources to reduce dramatically the massive divides that persist between rich and poor, if only those resources can be unleashed in the service of all peoples. After a period of difficulty in international affairs, in the face of both new threats and old ones in new guises, there is a yearning in many quarters for a new consensus on which to base collective action. And a desire exists to make the most far-reaching reforms in the history of the United Nations so as to equip and resource it to help advance this twenty-first century agenda. 3. The year 2005 presents an opportunity to move decisively in this direction. In September, world leaders will come together in New York to review progress made since the United Nations Millennium Declaration, 1 adopted by all Member States in 2000. In preparation for that summit, Member States have asked me to report comprehensively on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration. I respectfully submit that report today. I annex to it a proposed agenda to be taken up, and acted upon, at the summit. 4. In preparing the present report, I have drawn on my eight years’ experience as Secretary-General, on my own conscience and convictions, and on my understanding of the Charter of the United Nations whose principles and purposes it is my duty to promote. I have also drawn inspiration from two wide-ranging reviews of our global challenges — one from the 16-member High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, whom I asked to make proposals to strengthen our collective security system (see A/59/565); the other from the 250 experts who undertook the Millennium Project, which required them to produce a plan of action to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. 5. In the present report, I have resisted the temptation to include all areas in which progress is important or desirable. I have limited myself to items on which I believe action is both vital and achievable in the coming months. These are reforms that are within reach — reforms that are actionable if we can garner the necessary political will. With very few exceptions, this is an agenda of highest priorities for September. Many other issues will need to be advanced in other forums and on other occasions. And, of course, none of the proposals advanced here obviate the need for urgent action this year to make progress in resolving protracted conflicts that threaten regional and global stability.

1

General Assembly resolution 55/2.

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6. In the Millennium Declaration, world leaders were confident that humanity could, in the years ahead, make measurable progress towards peace, security, disarmament, human rights, democracy and good governance. They called for a global partnership for development to achieve agreed goals by 2015. They vowed to protect the vulnerable and meet the special needs of Africa. And they agreed that the United Nations needed to become more, not less, actively engaged in shaping our common future. 7. Five years later, a point-by-point report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration would, I feel, miss the larger point, namely, that new circumstances demand that we revitalize consensus on key challenges and priorities and convert that consensus into collective action. 8. Much has happened since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration to compel such an approach. Small networks of non-State actors — terrorists — have, since the horrendous attacks of 11 September 2001, made even the most powerful States feel vulnerable. At the same time, many States have begun to feel that the sheer imbalance of power in the world is a source of instability. Divisions between major powers on key issues have revealed a lack of consensus about goals and methods. Meanwhile, over 40 countries have been scarred by violent conflict. Today, the number of internally displaced people stands at roughly 25 million, nearly one third of whom are beyond the reach of United Nations assistance, in addition to the global refugee population of 11 to 12 million, and some of them have been the victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 9. Many countries have been torn apart and hollowed out by violence of a different sort. HIV/AIDS, the plague of the modern world, has killed over 20 million men, women and children and the number of people infected has surged to over 40 million. The promise of the Millennium Development Goals still remains distant for many. More than one billion people still live below the extreme poverty line of one dollar per day, and 20,000 die from poverty each day. Overall global wealth has grown but is less and less evenly distributed within countries, within regions and in the world as a whole. While there has been real progress towards some of the Goals in some countries, too few Governments — from both the developed and developing world — have taken sufficient action to reach the targets by 2015. And while important work has been done on issues as diverse as migration and climate change, the scale of such long-term challenges is far greater than our collective action to date to meet them. 10. Events in recent years have also led to declining public confidence in the United Nations itself, even if for opposite reasons. For instance, both sides of the debate on the Iraq war feel let down by the Organization — for failing, as one side saw it, to enforce its own resolutions, or as the other side saw it, for not being able to prevent a premature or unnecessary war. Yet most people who criticize the United Nations do so precisely because they think the Organization is vitally important to our world. Declining confidence in the institution is matched by a growing belief in the importance of effective multilateralism.

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11. I do not suggest that there has been no good news in the last five years. On the contrary, there is plenty we can point to which demonstrates that collective action can produce real results, from the impressive unity of the world after 11 September 2001 to the resolution of a number of civil conflicts, and from the appreciable increase of resources for development to the steady progress achieved in building peace and democracy in some war-torn lands. We should never despair. Our problems are not beyond our power to meet them. But we cannot be content with incomplete successes and we cannot make do with incremental responses to the shortcomings that have been revealed. Instead, we must come together to bring about far-reaching change.

B. Larger freedom: development, security and human rights 12. Our guiding light must be the needs and hopes of peoples everywhere. In my Millennium Report, “We the peoples” (A/54/2000), I drew on the opening words of the Charter of the United Nations to point out that the United Nations, while it is an organization of sovereign States, exists for and must ultimately serve those needs. To do so, we must aim, as I said when first elected eight years ago, “to perfect the triangle of development, freedom and peace”. 13. The framers of the Charter saw this very clearly. In setting out to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, they understood that this enterprise could not succeed if it was narrowly based. They therefore decided to create an organization to ensure respect for fundamental human rights, establish conditions under which justice and the rule of law could be maintained, and “promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. 14. I have named the present report “In larger freedom” to stress the enduring relevance of the Charter of the United Nations and to emphasize that its purposes must be advanced in the lives of individual men and women. The notion of larger freedom also encapsulates the idea that development, security and human rights go hand in hand. 15. Even if he can vote to choose his rulers, a young man with AIDS who cannot read or write and lives on the brink of starvation is not truly free. Equally, even if she earns enough to live, a woman who lives in the shadow of daily violence and has no say in how her country is run is not truly free. Larger freedom implies that men and women everywhere have the right to be governed by their own consent, under law, in a society where all individuals can, without discrimination or retribution, speak, worship and associate freely. They must also be free from want — so that the death sentences of extreme poverty and infectious disease are lifted from their lives — and free from fear — so that their lives and livelihoods are not ripped apart by violence and war. Indeed, all people have the right to security and to development. 16. Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other. This relationship has only been strengthened in our era of rapid technological advances, increasing economic interdependence, globalization and dramatic geopolitical change. While poverty and denial of human rights may not be said to “cause” civil war, terrorism or organized crime, they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence. Similarly, war and atrocities are far from the only reasons that countries are

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trapped in poverty, but they undoubtedly set back development. Again, catastrophic terrorism on one side of the globe, for example an attack against a major financial centre in a rich country, could affect the development prospects of millions on the other by causing a major economic downturn and plunging millions into poverty. And countries which are well governed and respect the human rights of their citizens are better placed to avoid the horrors of conflict and to overcome obstacles to development. 17. Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed. In this new millennium, the work of the United Nations must move our world closer to the day when all people have the freedom to choose the kind of lives they would like to live, the access to the resources that would make those choices meaningful and the security to ensure that they can be enjoyed in peace.

C. The imperative of collective action 18. In a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each country’s selfinterest that all of them are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global cooperation among States. Such cooperation is possible if every country’s policies take into account not only the needs of its own citizens but also the needs of others. This kind of cooperation not only advances everyone’s interests but also recognizes our common humanity. 19. The proposals contained in the present report are designed to strengthen States and enable them to serve their peoples better by working together on the basis of shared principles and priorities — which is, after all, the very reason the United Nations exists. Sovereign States are the basic and indispensable building blocks of the international system. It is their job to guarantee the rights of their citizens, to protect them from crime, violence and aggression, and to provide the framework of freedom under law in which individuals can prosper and society develop. If States are fragile, the peoples of the world will not enjoy the security, development and justice that are their right. Therefore, one of the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all States are strong enough to meet the many challenges they face. 20. States, however, cannot do the job alone. We need an active civil society and a dynamic private sector. Both occupy an increasingly large and important share of the space formerly reserved for States alone, and it is plain that the goals outlined here will not be achieved without their full engagement. 21. We also need agile and effective regional and global intergovernmental institutions to mobilize and coordinate collective action. As the world’s only universal body with a mandate to address security, development and human rights issues, the United Nations bears a special burden. As globalization shrinks distances around the globe and these issues become increasingly interconnected, the comparative advantages of the United Nations become ever more evident. So too, however, do some of its real weaknesses. From overhauling basic management practices and building a more transparent, efficient and effective United Nations system to revamping our major intergovernmental institutions so

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that they reflect today’s world and advance the priorities set forth in the present report, we must reshape the Organization in ways not previously imagined and with a boldness and speed not previously shown. 22. In our efforts to strengthen the contributions of States, civil society, the private sector and international institutions to advancing a vision of larger freedom, we must ensure that all involved assume their responsibilities to turn good words into good deeds. We therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability — the accountability of States to their citizens, of States to each other, of international institutions to their members and of the present generation to future generations. Where there is accountability we will progress; where there is none we will underperform. The business of the summit to be held in September 2005 must be to ensure that, from now on, promises made are promises kept.

D. Time to decide 23. At this defining moment in history, we must be ambitious. Our action must be as urgent as the need, and on the same scale. We must face immediate threats immediately. We must take advantage of an unprecedented consensus on how to promote global economic and social development, and we must forge a new consensus on how to confront new threats. Only by acting decisively now can we both confront the pressing security challenges and win a decisive victory in the global battle against poverty by 2015. 24. In today’s world, no State, however powerful, can protect itself on its own. Likewise, no country, weak or strong, can realize prosperity in a vacuum. We can and must act together. We owe it to each other to do so, and we owe each other an account of how we do so. If we live up to those mutual commitments, we can make the new millennium worthy of its name.

II. FREEDOM FROM WANT 25. The past 25 years have seen the most dramatic reduction in extreme poverty that the world has ever experienced. Spearheaded by progress in China and India, literally hundreds of millions of men, women and children all over the world have been able to escape the burdens of extreme impoverishment and begin to enjoy improved access to food, health care, education and housing. 26. Yet at the same time, dozens of countries have become poorer, devastating economic crises have thrown millions of families into poverty, and increasing inequality in large parts of the world means that the benefits of economic growth have not been evenly shared. Today, more than a billion people — one in every six human beings — still live on less than a dollar a day, lacking the means to stay alive in the face of chronic hunger, disease and environmental hazards. In other words, this is a poverty that kills. A single bite from a malaria-bearing mosquito is enough to end a child’s life for want of a bed net or $1 treatment. A drought or pest that destroys a harvest turns subsistence into starvation. A world in which every year 11 million children die before their fifth birthday and three million people die of AIDS is not a world of larger freedom.

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27. For centuries, this kind of poverty has been regarded as a sad but inescapable aspect of the human condition. Today, that view is intellectually and morally indefensible. The scale and scope of progress made by countries in every region of the world has shown that, over a very short time, poverty and maternal and infant mortality can be dramatically reduced, while education, gender equality and other aspects of development can be dramatically advanced. The unprecedented combination of resources and technology at our disposal today means that we are truly the first generation with the tools, the knowledge and the resources to meet the commitment, given by all States in the Millennium Declaration, “to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from want”.

A. A shared vision of development 28. The multifaceted challenge of development cuts across a vast array of interlinked issues — ranging from gender equality through health and education to the environment. The historic United Nations conferences and summits held in the 1990s helped build a comprehensive normative framework around these linkages for the first time by mapping out a broad vision of shared development priorities. These laid the groundwork for the Millennium Summit to set out a series of time-bound targets across all these areas — ranging from halving extreme poverty to putting all children into primary school, all with a deadline of 2015 — that were later crystallized into the Millennium Development Goals (see box 1). 29. The Millennium Development Goals have galvanized unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of the world’s poorest, becoming globally accepted benchmarks of broader progress embraced by donors, developing countries, civil society and major development institutions alike. As such, they reflect an urgent and globally shared and endorsed set of priorities that we need to address at the September 2005 summit. Thanks to the work done by the Millennium Project, whose report, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, 1 was delivered to me in January 2005, there is now an action plan to achieve them. There are also encouraging signs that the critical ingredient — political will — is emerging. The real test will be whether broad-based actions by developed and developing countries to address this agenda are supported by global development assistance being more than doubled over the next few years, for this is what will be necessary to help achieve the Goals. 30. At the same time, we need to see the Millennium Development Goals as part of an even larger development agenda. While the Goals have been the subject of an enormous amount of follow-up both inside and outside the United Nations, they clearly do not in themselves represent a complete development agenda. They do not directly encompass some of the broader issues covered by the conferences of the 1990s, nor do they address the particular needs of middle-income developing countries or the questions of growing inequality and the wider dimensions of human development and good governance, which all require the effective implementation of conference outcomes.

1 Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations publication, Sales No. 05.III.B.4); see also http://www.unmillenniumproject.org.

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Box 1 The Millennium Development Goals Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Target 5: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

Goal 5: Improve maternal health Target 6: Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources

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Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers

Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system (includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction — both nationally and internationally) Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developed countries (includes tariffand quota-free access for least developed countries exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction) Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly) Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications

31. Nevertheless, the urgency of achieving the Millennium Development Goals cannot be overstated. Despite progress in many areas, overall the world is falling short of what is needed, especially in the poorest countries (see box 2). As the Millennium Project’s report makes clear, our agenda is still achievable globally and in most or even all countries — but only if we break with business as usual and dramatically accelerate and scale up action until 2015, beginning over the next 12 months. Success will require sustained action across the entire decade between now and the deadline. That is because development successes cannot take place overnight and many countries suffer significant capacity constraints. It takes time to train the teachers, nurses and engineers, to build the roads, schools and

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hospitals, and to grow the small and large businesses able to create the jobs and income needed.

Box 2 Progress on the Millennium Development Goals Progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals has been far from uniform across the world. The greatest improvements have been in East Asia and South Asia, where more than 200 million people have been lifted out of poverty since 1990 alone. Nonetheless, nearly 700 million people in Asia still live on less than $1 a day — nearly two thirds of the world’s poorest people — while even some of the fastestgrowing countries are falling short on non-income Goals, such as protecting the environment and reducing maternal mortality. Sub-Saharan Africa is at the epicentre of the crisis, falling seriously short on most Goals, with continuing food insecurity, disturbingly high child and maternal mortality, growing numbers of people living in slums and an overall rise of extreme poverty despite some important progress in individual countries. Latin America, the transition economies, and the Middle East and North Africa, often hampered by growing inequality, have more mixed records, with significant variations in progress but general trends falling short of what is needed to meet the 2015 deadline. Progress in the achievement of the different Goals has also varied. Although subSaharan Africa and Oceania are lagging in almost all areas, elsewhere major advances are being made in reducing hunger, improving access to drinking water and expanding the number of children in primary school. Child mortality rates have also generally declined, but progress has slowed in many regions and has even been reversed in parts of Central Asia. Meanwhile, despite dramatic progress in some countries overall access to sanitation is off track, particularly in Africa and Asia, where the number of slumdwellers is also increasing rapidly. Maternal mortality remains unacceptably high throughout the developing world, as do the incidence and prevalence of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Gender equality remains unfulfilled, the 2005 education parity target was missed in many countries. Environmental degradation is an extreme concern in all developing regions.

32. In 2005, the development of a global partnership between rich and poor countries — which is itself the eighth Goal, reaffirmed and elaborated three years ago at the International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, South Africa — needs to become a reality. It is worth recalling the terms of that historic compact. Each developing country has primary responsibility for its own development — strengthening governance, combating corruption and putting in place the policies and investments to drive private-sector-led growth and maximize domestic resources available to fund national development strategies. Developed countries, on their side, undertake that developing countries which adopt transparent, credible and properly costed development strategies will receive the full support they need, in the form of increased development assistance, a more development-oriented trade system and

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wider and deeper debt relief. All of this has been promised but not delivered. That failure is measured in the rolls of the dead — and on it are written millions of new names each year.

B. National strategies 33. Extreme poverty has many causes, ranging from adverse geography through poor or corrupt governance (including neglect of marginalized communities) to the ravages of conflict and its aftermath. Most pernicious are poverty traps that leave many of the poorest countries languishing in a vicious circle of destitution even when they have the benefit of honest, committed Governments. Lacking basic infrastructure, human capital and public administration, and burdened by disease, environmental degradation and limited natural resources, these countries cannot afford the basic investments needed to move onto a new path of prosperity unless they receive sustained, targeted external support. 34. As a first step towards addressing these problems, countries need to adopt bold, goaloriented policy frameworks for the next 10 years, aimed at scaling up investments to achieve at least the quantitative Millennium Development Goals targets. To that end, each developing country with extreme poverty should by 2006 adopt and begin to implement a national development strategy bold enough to meet the Millennium Development Goals targets for 2015. This strategy should be anchored in the practical scaling up of public investments, capacity-building, domestic resource mobilization and, where needed, official development assistance. This recommendation may not sound revolutionary, but by linking actions directly to the needs derived from ambitious and monitorable targets, its implementation would mark a fundamental breakthrough towards greater boldness and accountability in the fight against poverty. 35. It is important to stress that this does not require the creation of any new instruments. All that is required is a different approach to their design and implementation. Countries that already have poverty reduction strategy papers — nationally owned and developed three-year spending frameworks agreed with the World Bank and other international development partners — should align them with a 10-year framework of policies and investments consistent with achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. In middle-income countries and others where the Goals are already within reach, Governments should adopt a “Millennium Development Goals-plus” strategy, with more ambitious targets.

A framework for action 36. However well crafted on paper, investment strategies to achieve the Millennium Development Goals will not work in practice unless supported by States with transparent, accountable systems of governance, grounded in the rule of law, encompassing civil and political as well as economic and social rights, and underpinned by accountable and efficient public administration. Many of the poorest countries will need major capacitybuilding investments to put in place and maintain the necessary infrastructure and to train and employ qualified personnel. But without good governance, strong institutions and a

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clear commitment to rooting out corruption and mismanagement wherever it is found, broader progress will prove elusive. 37. Similarly, without dynamic, growth-oriented economic policies supporting a healthy private sector capable of generating jobs, income and tax revenues over time, sustainable economic growth will not be achieved. This requires significantly increased investments in human capital and development-oriented infrastructure, such as energy, transport and communications. In addition, small and medium-sized firms require a favourable legal and regulatory environment, including effective commercial laws that define and protect contracts and property rights, a rational public administration that limits and combats corruption, and expanded access to financial capital, including microfinance. As two important Commissions — the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 1 and the Commission on the Private Sector and Development 2 — reported to me last year, this is crucial for providing decent jobs that both provide income and empower the poor, especially women and younger people. 38. Civil society organizations have a critical role to play in driving this implementation process forward to “make poverty history”. Not only is civil society an indispensable partner in delivering services to the poor at the scope required by the Millennium Development Goals but it can also catalyse action within countries on pressing development concerns, mobilizing broad-based movements and creating grass-roots pressure to hold leaders accountable for their commitments. Internationally, some civil society organizations can help create or galvanize global partnerships on specific issues or draw attention to the plight of indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups, while others can work to share best practices across countries through community exchanges and providing technical support and advice to Governments.

National investment and policy priorities 39. Each national strategy needs to take into account seven broad “clusters” of public investments and policies which directly address the Millennium Development Goals and set the foundation for private sector-led growth. As elaborated in the Millennium Project, all are essential for meeting the Goals, as well as wider development needs.

Gender equality: overcoming pervasive gender bias 40. Empowered women can be some of the most effective drivers of development. Direct interventions to advance gender equality include increasing primary school completion and secondary school access for girls, ensuring secure tenure of property to women, ensuring access to sexual and reproductive health services, promoting equal access to labour markets, providing the opportunity for greater representation in government decisionmaking bodies and protecting women from violence.

1

A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All (Geneva, International Labour Organization, 2004). Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor (United Nations publication, Sales No. 04.III.B.4). 2

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41. Countries should adopt time-bound environmental targets, particularly for such priorities as forest replanting, integrated water resources management, ecosystem preservation and curbing pollution. To achieve targets, increased investments in environmental management need to be accompanied by broad policy reforms. Progress also depends on sector strategies, including strategies for agriculture, infrastructure, forestry, fisheries, energy and transport, which all require environmental safeguards. Further, improving access to modern energy services is critical for both reducing poverty and protecting the environment. There is also a need to ensure that enhancing access to safe drinking water and sanitation forms a part of development strategies.

Rural development: increasing food output and incomes 42. Smallholder farmers and others living in impoverished rural areas require soil nutrients, better plant varieties, improved water management and training in modern and environmentally sustainable farming practices, along with access to transport, water, sanitation and modern energy services. In sub-Saharan Africa, these elements must be brought together to launch a twenty-first century African green revolution commencing in 2005.

Urban development: promoting jobs, upgrading slums and developing alternatives to new slum formation 43. For the large and growing number of urban poor, core infrastructure services, such as energy, transport, pollution control and waste disposal, are needed alongside improved security of tenure and community-led efforts to build decent housing and support urban planning. To this end, local authorities need to be strengthened and work closely with organizations of the urban poor.

Health systems: ensuring universal access to essential services 44. Strong health systems are required to ensure universal access to basic health services, including services to promote child and maternal health, to support reproductive health and to control killer diseases, such as AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (see box 3). This requires sufficient investments, large numbers of motivated and adequately paid health workers, scaled-up infrastructure and supplies, strong management systems and the elimination of user fees.

Education: ensuring universal primary, expanded secondary and higher education 45. To advance education at all levels, parents and communities should be able to hold their schools accountable while Governments improve curricula, educational quality and

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Box 3 The Tragedy of HIV/AIDS The HIV/AIDS pandemic now kills more than 3 million people each year and poses an unprecedented threat to human development and security. The disease is wrecking millions of families and leaving tens of millions of orphans. More than just a public health crisis, AIDS undermines economic and social stability, ravaging health, education, agriculture and social welfare systems. While placing an enormous drag on economic growth, it also weakens governance and security structures, posing a further threat. The epidemic demands an exceptional response. In the absence of a cure, only the mass mobilization of every section of society — unheard of to date in the history of public health — can begin to reverse AIDS. This requires comprehensive prevention, education, treatment and impact mitigation programmes, which in turn will not succeed without the personal commitment of Heads of State and Government to support and lead genuinely multisectoral AIDS responses. Since 2000, the world has begun to achieve some successes in the fight against AIDS. More Governments have made it a strategic priority and set up integrated administrative structures to lead and coordinate the struggle. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which I called for in 2001, now plays a leading role in the global effort, while also focusing attention on and fighting other killer pandemics. Altogether, as of December 2004, 700,000 people in the developing world were receiving antiretroviral treatment — a nearly 60 per cent increase in just five months. This reflects the priority that the international community has now placed on rapidly expanding treatment, and shows that a real difference can be made in a very short time. However, much remains to be done if we are to have any realistic hope of reducing the incidence of HIV and providing proper antiretroviral treatment to all who need it within the coming decade. Many Governments have yet to tackle the disease and its stigma publicly, or are not sufficiently committed to the kind of frank discussion and action on gender equality that is needed. In particular, resources for AIDS remain far short of what is needed to mount a full inclusive response. National Governments, as well as multilateral and bilateral donors, must now take steps to meet these costs. Four years ago, I called on the international community to provide $7 billion to $10 billion annually to address the projected needs to fight HIV/AIDS in the developing world. This amount has not been fully funded. In the meantime, the disease has spread. As a result, we have an ever increasing gap between what is needed and what is provided. This cannot continue. We need a more ambitious and balanced strategy of both prevention and treatment. Therefore, I call on the international community to provide urgently the resources needed for an expanded and comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS, as identified by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and its partners, and to provide full funding for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

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mode of delivery; build human resource and infrastructure capacity, where needed; and institute incentives for bringing vulnerable children to school, including the elimination of user fees.

Science, technology, and innovation: building national capacities 46. To increase countries’ indigenous capacity for science and technology, information and communications technology, Governments should establish advisory bodies, promote infrastructure as an opportunity for technological expand science and engineering faculties, and stress development and applications in science and technology curricula.

including scientific learning, business

C. Making goal 8 work: trade and financing for development 47. For many middle-income countries and some poorer ones, most of the resources needed to fund these strategies can and should be mobilized domestically from reallocated government revenues, household contributions and private-sector investment, supplemented by borrowing. But in most low-income countries and in nearly all the least developed countries, the maximum that can be raised by such efforts will fall far short of what is needed to reach the Millennium Development Goals. According to the Millennium Project, the investment costs for the Goals alone in a typical low-income country will be roughly $75 per capita in 2006, rising to approximately $140 in 2015 (in constant dollar terms). These small sums, equivalent to one third to one half of their annual per capita incomes, are far beyond the resources of most low-income countries. To create the conditions for greater private investment and an “exit strategy” from aid in the longer term for these countries, a big push in development assistance is needed.

Aid 48. One of the most encouraging shifts in recent years has been the increase in official development assistance (ODA), after a decade of steady decline in the 1990s. Expressed as a percentage of developed countries’ gross national income, global ODA currently stands at 0.25 per cent — still well short of the 0.33 per cent reached in the late 1980s, let alone the long-standing target of 0.7 per cent that was reaffirmed in the Monterrey Consensus in 2002. 1 5 On the basis of recent commitments to future increases by several donors, annual ODA flows should increase to about $100 billion by 2010 — nearly double their levels at the time of the Monterrey Conference. But a significant portion of this amount reflects debt write-offs and dollar depreciation rather than net long-term finance, and in any case the total would still be about $50 billion short of the ODA levels that the Millennium Project calculates will be needed just to meet the Millennium Development Goals, let alone broader development priorities.

1 See Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002 (United Nations publications, Sales No. E.02.II.A.7), chap. I, resolution 1, annex.

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49. Happily, there are signs of further progress. A new group of donors has emerged, including new members of the European Union (EU) and some of the wealthier developing countries, such as Brazil, China and India, all of which are increasingly offering their expertise to other developing countries through technical cooperation. Five donor countries have already reached the 0.7 per cent target and six more have recently set timetables to achieve it. Developed countries that have not already done so should establish timetables to achieve the 0.7 per cent target of gross national income for official development assistance by no later than 2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006 and reaching 0.5 per cent by 2009. 50. While there are clearly capacity constraints in many developing countries, we must ensure that those countries that are ready receive an immediate scale up in assistance. Starting in 2005, developing countries that put forward sound, transparent and accountable national strategies and require increased development assistance should receive a sufficient increase in aid, of sufficient quality and arriving with sufficient speed to enable them to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. 51. The most direct way to increase ODA volumes is to allocate increasing shares of donor countries’ national budgets to aid. However, because the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals requires a sharp upward turn in overall ODA spending over the next few years, new ways to finance a steep increase in the short and medium terms are well worth exploring. Several longer-term ideas for innovative sources of finance to complement ODA have been proposed, and an important initiative led by Brazil, Chile, France, Germany and Spain is currently exploring some of them. But what is needed now is a mechanism to ensure the immediate scale-up of financing. The proposed International Finance Facility has the potential to do this by “front-loading” future flows of ODA while still using existing disbursement channels. The international community should in 2005 launch an International Finance Facility to support an immediate front-loading of ODA, underpinned by scaled-up commitments to achieving the 0.7 per cent ODA target no later than 2015. In the longer term, other innovative sources of finance for development should also be considered to supplement the Facility. 52. These steps can and should be supplemented by immediate action to support a series of “quick wins” — relatively inexpensive, high-impact initiatives with the potential to generate major short-term gains and save millions of lives. These range from the free mass distribution of malaria bed nets and effective antimalaria medicines to the expansion of home-grown school meal programmes using locally produced food and the elimination of user fees for primary education and health services. Such rapid steps would provide a critical support for national Millennium Development Goals strategies. They would generate rapid momentum and early success stories that would broaden commitment to the Millennium Development Goals, although they would not be a substitute for longer-term, sustained investments. 53. At the same time, urgent steps are needed to increase the quality, transparency and accountability of ODA. Aid should be linked to the local needs identified in countries’ national strategies and to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, not to the interests of suppliers in donor countries. This is obviously for the benefit of developing countries, but developed countries themselves also have an interest in being able to show their taxpayers that aid is effective. In follow-up to the March 2005 Paris High-level

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Forum on Aid Effectiveness, donor countries should set, by September 2005, timetables and monitorable targets for aligning their aid delivery mechanisms with partner countries’ Millennium Development Goals-based national strategies. This includes commitments to Millennium Development Goals-based investment plans, a 2015 time horizon, predictable multi-year funding, dramatically simplified procedures and direct budget support for countries with appropriate mechanisms in place.

Debt 54. Closely related to ODA is the issue of external debt. Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), $54 billion has so far been committed for debt relief to 27 countries that have reached decision or completion points. But even though the evidence is persuasive that this unlocks resources which are critical for the Millennium Development Goals, it still falls far short of what is needed. To move forward, we should redefine debt sustainability as the level of debt that allows a country to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and reach 2015 without an increase in debt ratios. For most HIPC countries, this will require exclusively grant-based finance and 100 per cent debt cancellation, while for many heavily indebted non-HIPC and middle-income countries, it will require significantly more debt reduction than has yet been on offer. Additional debt cancellation should be achieved without reducing the resources available to other developing countries, and without jeopardizing the long-term financial viability of international financial institutions.

Trade 55. While trade does not obviate the need for large scale ODA-supported development investments, an open and equitable trading system can be a powerful driver of economic growth and poverty reduction, especially when combined with adequate aid. Development therefore rightly lies at the heart of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. At present, developing countries are often denied a level playing field to compete in global trade because rich countries use a variety of tariffs, quotas and subsidies to restrict access to their own markets and shelter their own producers. The December 2005 WTO ministerial meeting offers a chance, which must not be missed, to map out agreement on how to correct these anomalies. An urgent priority is to establish a timetable for developed countries to dismantle market access barriers and begin phasing out trade-distorting domestic subsidies, especially in agriculture. To address this priority, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations should fulfil its development promise and be completed no later than 2006. As a first step, Member States should provide duty-free and quota-free market access for all exports from the least developed countries. 56. The Monterrey Consensus stressed that for many developing countries, particularly the poorest, which rely on a few commodity products, there is also a supply-side problem which manifests itself in a lack of capacity to diversify exports, a vulnerability to price fluctuations and a steady decline in terms of trade. To build trade competitiveness, national Millennium Development Goals strategies need to emphasize investments in agricultural productivity, trade-related infrastructure and competitive export industries, particularly for

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the least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing States. While a number of initiatives exist to address these problems, encourage diversification and reduce vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations, support for them has fallen far short of what is necessary.

D. Ensuring environmental sustainability 57. We fundamentally depend on natural systems and resources for our existence and development. Our efforts to defeat poverty and pursue sustainable development will be in vain if environmental degradation and natural resource depletion continue unabated. At the country level, national strategies must include investments in improved environmental management and make the structural changes required for environmental sustainability. For many environmental priorities, such as shared waterways, forests, marine fisheries and biodiversity, regional and global efforts must be strengthened. We already have one encouraging example showing how global solutions can be found. Thanks to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1 the risk of harmful radiation appears to be receding — a clear demonstration of how global environmental problems can be managed when all countries make determined efforts to implement internationally agreed frameworks. Today, three major challenges for the international community require particularly urgent action, as described below.

Desertification 58. The degradation of more than a billion hectares of land has had a devastating impact on development in many parts of the world. Millions of people have been forced to abandon their lands as farming and nomadic lifestyles have become unsustainable. Hundreds of millions more are at risk of becoming environmental refugees. To combat desertification, the international community must support and implement the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa. 2

Biodiversity 59. Another serious concern is loss of biodiversity, which is occurring at an unprecedented rate within and across countries. Worrying in its own right, this trend also severely undermines health, livelihoods, food production and clean water, and increases the vulnerability of populations to natural disasters and climate change. To reverse these trends, all Governments should take steps, individually and collectively, to implement the Convention on Biological Diversity 3 and the Johannesburg commitment to achieve a significant reduction in the rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010. 4 1

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1522, No. 26369. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1954, No. 33480. See United Nations Environment Programme, Convention on Biological Diversity (Environmental Law and Institution Programme Activity Centre), June 1992. 4 See Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September 2002 (United Nations publications, Sales No. E.03.II.A.1), chap. I, resolution 2, annex, para. 44. 2 3

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60. One of the greatest environmental and development challenges in the twenty-first century will be that of controlling and coping with climate change. The overwhelming majority of scientists now agree that human activity is having a significant impact on the climate. Since the advent of the industrial era in the mid-eighteenth century, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased significantly, the earth has warmed considerably and sea levels have risen measurably. The 1990s were the warmest decade on record, forcing glaciers and Arctic ice to retreat. With the concentration of greenhouse gases projected to rise still further over the next century, a corresponding increase in the global mean surface temperature is likely to trigger increased climate variability and greater incidence and intensity of extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and droughts. The countries most vulnerable to such changes — small island developing States, coastal nations with large numbers of people living in low-lying areas, and countries in the arid and semi-arid tropics and subtropics — are least able to protect themselves. They also contribute least to the global emissions of greenhouse gases. Without action, they will pay a bitter price for the actions of others. 61. The entry into force in February 2005 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 1 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2 is an important step towards dealing with global warming, but it only extends until 2012. The international community must agree on stabilization targets for greenhouse gas concentrations beyond that date. Scientific advances and technological innovation have an important role to play in mitigating climate change and in facilitating adaptation to the new conditions. They must be mobilized now if we are to develop the tools needed in time. In particular, research and development funding for renewable energy sources, carbon management and energy efficiency needs to increase substantially. Policy mechanisms, such as carbon trading markets, should also be expanded. As agreed at Johannesburg, the primary responsibility for mitigating climate change and other unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must lie with the countries that contribute most to the problems. We must develop a more inclusive international framework beyond 2012, with broader participation by all major emitters and both developed and developing countries, to ensure a concerted globally defined action, including through technological innovation, to mitigate climate change, taking into account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

E. Other priorities for global action 62. To address broader development needs, action is also needed in a number of other areas, as set out below.

1 2

FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, decision 1/CP.3, annex. A/AC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.1 and Corr.1, annex I.

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63. The overall international response to evolving pandemics has been shockingly slow and remains shamefully underresourced. Malaria continues to rage throughout the tropical world, despite the availability of highly effective measures for prevention and treatment. Many infectious diseases that ravage developing countries today, notably HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, pose severe risks for the entire world, particularly in the light of emerging drug resistance. Both familiar and new infectious diseases require a concerted international response. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003 drew attention to the fact that even long-distance flight times are shorter than the incubation periods for many infectious diseases, so that any one of the 700 million passengers who take international flights each year can be an unwitting disease carrier. 64. The rapid response to SARS also showed that the spread of infectious disease can be contained when effective global institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), work in close partnership with functioning national health agencies and expert technical institutions. No State could have achieved this degree of containment on its own. To strengthen existing mechanisms for timely and effective international cooperation, I call on Member States to agree on the revision of the International Health Regulations at the World Health Assembly to be held in May 2005. To contain the risk of future outbreaks, greater resources should also be given to the WHO Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network so that it can coordinate the response of a broad international partnership in support of national health surveillance and response systems.

Natural disasters 65. The devastating impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami has reminded us all of the vulnerability of human life to natural disasters, and also of the disproportionate effect they have on poor people. Unless more determined efforts are made to address the loss of lives, livelihoods and infrastructure, disasters will become an increasingly serious obstacle to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in early 2005, adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, which identifies strategic objectives and priority areas to reduce disaster risk in the next 10 years. We must proceed with its implementation. 66. The countries of the Indian Ocean region, with the help of the United Nations and others, are now taking steps to establish a regional tsunami early warning system. Let us not forget, however, the other hazards that people in all regions of the world are exposed to, including storms, floods, droughts, landslides, heat waves and volcanic eruptions. To complement broader disaster preparedness and mitigation initiatives, I recommend the establishment of a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards, building on existing national and regional capacity. To assist in its establishment, I shall be requesting the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction secretariat to coordinate a survey of existing capacities and gaps, in cooperation with all United Nations system entities concerned, and I look forward to receiving its findings and recommendations. When disasters strike, we also need improved rapid response arrangements for immediate humanitarian relief, which are considered in section V below.

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67. To help drive economic development and to enable developing countries to forge solutions to their own problems, a significantly increased global effort is required to support research and development to address the special needs of the poor in the areas of health, agriculture, natural resource and environmental management, energy and climate. Two particular priorities should be to mount a major global initiative on research in tropical diseases and to provide additional support to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) for research on tropical agriculture. 68. Information and communication technologies can significantly contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. To fully utilize the potential of information and communication technology (ICT), we need to address the digital divide, including through voluntary financing mechanisms, such as the recently launched Digital Solidarity Fund.

Regional infrastructure and institutions 69. Regional infrastructure and policy cooperation are essential for supporting economic development. This is particularly so when developing countries are landlocked or small islands, both of which need special support. But other countries that may simply have small populations or are dependent on their neighbours for transport, food, water or energy, also need assistance. International donors should support regional cooperation to deal with these problems, and developing countries should make such cooperation an integral part of their national strategies. This should cover not only economic cooperation but also mechanisms for regional political dialogue and consensus-building, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

Global institutions 70. The international financial institutions are essential to ensuring development around the world and successful implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. I encourage them to ensure that the country programmes they support are ambitious enough to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In addition, these institutions and their shareholders should consider what changes they might undergo in order to better reflect the changes in the world’s political economy since 1945. This should be done in the context of the Monterrey Consensus agreement to broaden and strengthen the participation of developing and transition countries in international economic decision-making and normsetting. The Bretton Woods institutions have already taken some steps to strengthen the voice and participation of developing countries. But more significant steps are needed to overcome the widespread perception among developing countries that they are underrepresented in both bodies, which in turn tends to put their legitimacy in doubt.

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Box 4 The special needs of Africa The problems discussed in the present report are global in nature, and solutions must be global. Yet almost all of them affect Africa disproportionately. If we are to achieve truly global solutions, we must recognize Africa’s special needs, as world leaders did in the Millennium Declaration. From action to achieve the Millennium Development Goals to better collective capacity to build peace and strengthen States, the special needs of Africa lie at the heart of every part of the present report. There have been some positive developments in Africa in the past five years. Today, more African States have democratically elected Governments than ever before and the number of military coups on the continent has declined significantly. Some long-standing conflicts, such as those in Angola and Sierra Leone, have been resolved. From Uganda to Mozambique, many individual countries are experiencing rapid and sustained economic and social recovery. And throughout the continent, ordinary people are organizing themselves and making their voices heard. And yet much of Africa — especially South of the Sahara — continues to suffer the tragic effects of persistent violent conflict, extreme poverty and disease. Some 2.8 million refugees — and fully half of the world’s 24.6 million internally displaced people — are victims of conflict and upheaval in Africa. Africa continues to lag behind the rest of the developing world in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. About three quarters of the world’s AIDS deaths every year occur in Africa, with women the most affected. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in many African countries is both a human tragedy and a major obstacle to development. Of the one million or more people in the world killed by malaria each year, roughly 90 per cent are killed in sub-Saharan Africa, most of them children less than five years old. Much of sub-Saharan Africa continues to face a combination of high transport costs and small markets, low agricultural productivity, a very high disease burden and slow diffusion of technology from abroad. All these make it particularly prone to persistent poverty. Today, African States are addressing these problems with new energy and determination. They are adopting more robust development strategies to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Africa is building a new architecture of institutions, including the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, through which to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict, promote good governance and democracy, and create the right conditions for its economies to grow and thrive in a sustainable way. As the Commission on Africa set up by the United Kingdom reported in March 2005, Africa’s leaders and people will need special support from the rest of the world to succeed in these pioneering efforts. The international community must respond to this need. It must give tangible and sustained support to African countries and regional and subregional organizations, in a spirit of partnership and solidarity. This means ensuring follow-through on existing and needed commitments on debt relief, opening markets

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and providing greatly increased official development assistance. It also means contributing troops for peacekeeping operations and strengthening the capacity of African States to provide security for their citizens and to meet their needs.

Migration 71. Today, more people live outside their countries of origin than at any time in history and their numbers are expected to increase in the future. Migration offers many opportunities — to the migrants themselves, to the countries that receive younger workforce and also — notably in the form of remittance payments, which have grown spectacularly in recent years — to their countries of origin. But it also involves many complex challenges. It can contribute simultaneously to unemployment in one region or sector and to labour shortages and “brain drains” in another. If not carefully managed, it can also provoke acute social and political tensions. The impact of these trends is not yet well understood, but I believe that the report of the Global Commission on International Migration, which I shall receive later in 2005, will provide some valuable guidance. The high-level dialogue on the subject to be held by the General Assembly in 2006 will provide an important opportunity to tackle the hard questions on this issue.

F. The implementation challenge 72. The urgent task in 2005 is to implement in full the commitments already made and to render genuinely operational the framework already in place. The principles of mutual responsibility and mutual accountability that underpinned the Monterrey Consensus are sound and need to be translated into deeds. The September summit must produce a pact for action, to which all nations subscribe and on which all can be judged. The Millennium Development Goals must no longer be floating targets, referred to now and then to measure progress. They must inform, on a daily basis, national strategies and international assistance alike. Without a bold breakthrough in 2005 that lays the groundwork for a rapid progress in coming years, we will miss the targets. Let us be clear about the costs of missing this opportunity: millions of lives that could have been saved will be lost; many freedoms that could have been secured will be denied; and we shall inhabit are more dangerous and unstable world. 73. By the same token, development would be at best hindered and at worst reversed in a world riven by violent conflict or mesmerized by the fear of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, or one in which human rights were trampled, the rule of law was disregarded and citizens’ views and needs were ignored by unresponsive and unrepresentative Governments. Progress on the issues covered in sections III and IV below, therefore, is essential to realizing the objectives set out above, just as development is itself an indispensable underpinning for longer-term security, human rights and the rule of law.

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74. While, in the development sphere, we suffer from weak implementation, on the security side, despite a heightened sense of threat among many we lack even a basic consensus and implementation, where it occurs, is all too often contested. 75. Unless we can agree on a shared assessment of these threats and a common understanding of our obligations in addressing them, the United Nations will lag in providing security to all of its members and all the world’s people. Our ability to assist those who seek freedom from fear will then be partial at best.

A. A vision of collective security 76. In November 2003, alarmed by the lack of agreement among Member States on the proper role of the United Nations in providing collective security — or even on the nature of the most compelling threats that we face — I set up the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The Panel delivered its report, “A more secure world: our shared responsibility” (A/59/565), in December 2004. 77. I fully embrace the broad vision that the report articulates and its case for a more comprehensive concept of collective security: one that tackles new threats and old and that addresses the security concerns of all States. I believe that this concept can bridge the gap between divergent views of security and give us the guidance we need to face today’s dilemmas. 78. The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system. 79. Depending on wealth, geography and power, we perceive different threats as the most pressing. But the truth is we cannot afford to choose. Collective security today depends on accepting that the threats which each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all. 80. In our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected. The rich are vulnerable to the threats that attack the poor and the strong are vulnerable to the weak, as well as vice versa. A nuclear terrorist attack on the United States or Europe would have devastating effects on the whole world. But so would the appearance of a new virulent pandemic disease in a poor country with no effective health-care system. 81. On this interconnectedness of threats we must found a new security consensus, the first article of which must be that all are entitled to freedom from fear, and that whatever threatens one threatens all. Once we understand this, we have no choice but to tackle the whole range of threats. We must respond to HIV/AIDS as robustly as we do to terrorism and to poverty as effectively as we do to proliferation. We must strive just as hard to

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eliminate the threat of small arms and light weapons as we do to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, we must address all these threats preventively, acting at a sufficiently early stage with the full range of available instruments. 82. We need to ensure that States abide by the security treaties they have signed so that all can continue to reap the benefit. More consistent monitoring, more effective implementation and, where necessary, firmer enforcement are essential if States are to have confidence in multilateral mechanisms and use them to avoid conflict. 83. These are not theoretical issues but issues of deadly urgency. If we do not reach a consensus on them this year and start to act on it, we may not have another chance. This year, if ever, we must transform the United Nations into the effective instrument for preventing conflict that it was always meant to be by acting on several key policy and institutional priorities. 84. We must act to ensure that catastrophic terrorism never becomes a reality. This will require a new global strategy, which begins with Member States agreeing on a definition of terrorism and including it in a comprehensive convention. It will also require all States to sign, ratify, implement and comply with comprehensive conventions against organized crime and corruption. And it will require from them a commitment to take urgent steps to prevent nuclear, chemical and biological weapons getting into the hands of terrorist groups. 85. We must revitalize our multilateral frameworks for handling threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The threat posed by these weapons is not limited to terrorist use. The existence of multilateral instruments to promote disarmament and prevent proliferation among States has been central to the maintenance of international peace and security ever since those instruments were agreed. But they are now in danger of erosion. They must be revitalized to ensure continued progress on disarmament and to address the growing risk of a cascade of proliferation, especially in the nuclear field. 86. We must continue to reduce the prevalence and risk of war. This requires both the emphasis on development outlined in section II above and the strengthening of tools to deliver the military and civilian support needed to prevent and end wars as well as to build a sustainable peace. Investment in prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding can save millions of lives. If only two peace agreements had been successfully implemented in the early 1990s — the Bicesse Accords in Angola and the Arusha Accords in Rwanda — we could have prevented the deaths of almost three million people.

B. Preventing catastrophic terrorism Transnational terrorism 87. Terrorism is a threat to all that the United Nations stands for: respect for human rights, the rule of law, the protection of civilians, tolerance among peoples and nations, and the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is a threat that has grown more urgent in the last five years. Transnational networks of terrorist groups have global reach and make common

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cause to pose a universal threat. Such groups profess a desire to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and to inflict mass casualties. Even one such attack and the chain of events it might set off could change our world forever. 88. Our strategy against terrorism must be comprehensive and should be based on five pillars: it must aim at dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; it must deny terrorists access to funds and materials; it must deter States from sponsoring terrorism; it must develop State capacity to defeat terrorism; and it must defend human rights. I urge Member States and civil society organizations everywhere to join in that strategy. 89. Several steps are urgently required, as described below. 90. We must convince all those who may be tempted to support terrorism that it is neither an acceptable nor an effective way to advance their cause. But the moral authority of the United Nations and its strength in condemning terrorism have been hampered by the inability of Member States to agree on a comprehensive convention that includes a definition. 91. It is time to set aside debates on so-called “State terrorism”. The use of force by States is already thoroughly regulated under international law. And the right to resist occupation must be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians. I endorse fully the High-level Panel’s call for a definition of terrorism, which would make it clear that, in addition to actions already proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. I believe this proposal has clear moral force, and I strongly urge world leaders to unite behind it and to conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. 92. It is vital that we deny terrorists access to nuclear materials. This means consolidating, securing and, when possible, eliminating hazardous materials and implementing effective export controls. While the Group of Eight Major Industrialized Countries (G8) and the Security Council have taken important steps to do this, we need to make sure that these measures are fully enforced and that they reinforce each other. I urge Member States to complete, without delay, an international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. 93. The threat of biological terrorism differs from that of nuclear terrorism. There will soon be thousands of laboratories around the world capable of producing designer bugs with awesome lethal potential. Our best defence against this danger lies in strengthening public health, and the recommendations to this end contained in section II above have a double merit: they would both help to address the scourge of naturally occurring infectious disease and contribute to our safety against manmade outbreaks. As we commit ourselves to strengthen local health systems — a task that will take us a generation — we must also ensure that our existing global response is adequate. The World Health Organization Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network has done an impressive job in monitoring

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and responding to outbreaks of deadly infectious disease, whether natural or suspicious. But it has done so on a shoestring. I urge Member States to give it the resources it needs to do the job thoroughly, in all our interests. 94. Terrorists are accountable to no one. We, on the other hand, must never lose sight of our accountability to citizens all around the world. In our struggle against terrorism, we must never compromise human rights. When we do so we facilitate achievement of one of the terrorist’s objectives. By ceding the moral high ground we provoke tension, hatred and mistrust of Governments among precisely those parts of the population where terrorists find recruits. I urge Member States to create a special rapporteur who would report to the Commission on Human Rights on the compatibility of counter-terrorism measures with international human rights laws.

Organized crime 95. The threat of terrorism is closely linked to that of organized crime, which is growing and affects the security of all States. Organized crime contributes to State weakness, impedes economic growth, fuels many civil wars, regularly undermines United Nations peacebuilding efforts and provides financing mechanisms to terrorist groups. Organized criminal groups are also heavily involved in the illegal smuggling of migrants and trafficking in firearms. 96. In recent years, the United Nations has made important progress in building a framework of international standards and norms for the fight against organized crime and corruption, with the adoption or entry into force of several major conventions and protocols. However, many of the States parties to these treaties have not implemented them adequately, sometimes because they genuinely lack the capacity to do so. All States should both ratify and implement these conventions, while helping each other to strengthen their domestic criminal justice and rule-of-law systems. And Member States should give adequate resources to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for its key role in overseeing implementation of the conventions.

C. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 97. Multilateral efforts to bridle the dangers of nuclear technology while harnessing its promise are nearly as old as the United Nations itself. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 35 years old this month, has proved indispensable: it has not only diminished nuclear peril but has also demonstrated the value of multilateral agreements in safeguarding international peace and security. But today, the Treaty has suffered the first withdrawal of a party to the Treaty and faces a crisis of confidence and compliance born of a growing strain on verification and enforcement. The Conference on Disarmament, for its part, faces a crisis of relevance resulting in part from dysfunctional decision-making procedures and the paralysis that accompanies them.

1

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

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98. Progress in both disarmament and non-proliferation is essential and neither should be held hostage to the other. Recent moves towards disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States should be recognized. Bilateral agreements, including the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, have led to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons, accompanied by commitments to further sharp reductions in stockpiles. However, the unique status of nuclear-weapon States also entails a unique responsibility, and they must do more, including but not limited to further reductions in their arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and pursuing arms control agreements that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility. They should also reaffirm their commitment to negative security assurances. Swift negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty is essential. The moratorium on nuclear test explosions must also be upheld until we can achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. I strongly encourage States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to endorse these measures at the 2005 Review Conference. 99. The spread of nuclear technology has exacerbated a long-standing tension within the nuclear regime, arising from the simple fact that the technology required for civilian nuclear fuel can also be used to develop nuclear weapons. Measures to mitigate this tension must confront the dangers of nuclear proliferation but must also take into account the important environmental, energy, economic and research applications of nuclear technology. First, the verification authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be strengthened through universal adoption of the Model Additional Protocol. Second, while the access of non-nuclear weapon States to the benefits of nuclear technology should not be curtailed, we should focus on creating incentives for States to voluntarily forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capacities, while guaranteeing their supply of the fuel necessary to develop peaceful uses. One option is an arrangement in which IAEA would act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users at market rates. 100. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the foundation of the non-proliferation regime, we should welcome recent efforts to supplement it. These include Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), designed to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, technology and materials, and their means of delivery; and the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative, under which more and more States are cooperating to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 101. The availability of ballistic missiles with extended range and greater accuracy is of growing concern to many States, as is the spread of shoulder-fired missiles which could be used by terrorists. Member States should adopt effective national export controls covering missiles and other means of delivery for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, rockets and shoulder-fired missiles, as well as a ban on transferring any of them to non-State actors. The Security Council should also consider adopting a resolution aimed at making it harder for terrorists to acquire or use shoulder-fired missiles. 102. Where progress has been made, it should be consolidated. The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical

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Weapons and on Their Destruction 1 calls for the complete elimination and destruction of chemical weapons by all States parties, thus offering a historic opportunity to complete a task begun more than a century ago. States parties to the Convention on Chemical Weapons should recommit themselves to achieving the scheduled destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles. I call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention. 103. The 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction 2 has enjoyed a remarkable degree of support and adherence, and has been strengthened further through recent annual meetings. States parties should consolidate the results of these meetings at the 2006 Review Conference and commit themselves to further measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. I also call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention and to increase the transparency of bio-defence programmes. 104. Further efforts are needed to bolster the biological security regime. The capability of the Secretary-General to investigate suspected use of biological agents, as authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37, should be strengthened to incorporate the latest technology and expertise; and the Security Council should make use of that capability, consistent with Security Council resolution 620 (1988). 105. Indeed, the Security Council must be better informed on all matters relevant to nuclear, chemical and biological threats. I encourage the Council to regularly invite the Director-General of IAEA and the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to brief the Council on the status of safeguards and verification processes. And I myself stand ready, in consultation with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, to use my powers under Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations to call to the attention of the Security Council any overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease that threatens international peace and security.

D. Reducing the risk and prevalence of war 106. No task is more fundamental to the United Nations than the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Prevention, in particular, must be central to all our efforts, from combating poverty and promoting sustainable development; through strengthening national capacities to manage conflict, promoting democracy and the rule of law, and curbing the flow of small arms and light weapons; to directing preventive operational activities, such as the use of good offices, Security Council missions and preventive deployments. 107. Member States must ensure that the United Nations has the right structure and sufficient resources to perform these vital tasks.

1 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27), appendix I. 2 General Assembly resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

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108. Although it is difficult to demonstrate, the United Nations has almost certainly prevented many wars by using the Secretary-General’s “good offices” to help resolve conflicts peacefully. And over the past 15 years, more civil wars have ended through mediation than in the previous two centuries, in large part because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities for negotiation, strategic coordination and the resources to implement peace agreements. But we could undoubtedly save many more lives if we had the capacity and personnel to do so. I urge Member States to allocate additional resources to the Secretary-General for his good offices function.

Sanctions 109. Sanctions are a vital tool at the disposal of the Security Council for dealing preventively with threats to international peace and security. They constitute a necessary middle ground between war and words. In some cases, sanctions can help to produce agreements. In others, they can be combined with military pressure to weaken and isolate rebel groups or States that are in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions. 110. The use of financial, diplomatic, arms, aviation, travel and commodity sanctions to target belligerents, in particular the individuals most directly responsible for reprehensible policies, will continue to be a vital tool in the United Nations arsenal. All Security Council sanctions should be effectively implemented and enforced by strengthening State capacity to implement sanctions, establishing well resourced monitoring mechanisms and mitigating humanitarian consequences. Given the difficult environments in which sanctions are often used and the lessons learned in recent years, future sanctions regimes must also be structured carefully so as to minimize the suffering caused to innocent third parties — including the civilian populations of targeted States — and to protect the integrity of the programmes and institutions involved.

Peacekeeping 111. Over the decades, the United Nations has done a great deal to stabilize zones of conflict, and in the last 15 years or so also to help countries emerge from conflict, by deploying peacekeeping forces. Since the issuance of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, annex), which led to important reforms in the management of our peacekeeping operations, the renewed confidence of Member States in United Nations peacekeeping has led to a surge in demand, with the result that the United Nations now has more missions on the ground than ever before. The majority of these are in Africa, where — I regret to say — developed countries are increasingly reluctant to contribute troops. As a result, our capacity is severely stretched. 112. I appeal to Member States to do more to ensure that the United Nations has effective capacities for peacekeeping, commensurate with the demands that they place upon it. In particular, I urge them to improve our deployment options by creating strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly, within the framework of United Nations arrangements. United Nations capacity should not be developed in competition with the

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admirable efforts now being made by many regional organizations but in cooperation with them. Decisions by the European Union to create standby battle groups, for instance, and by the African Union to create African reserve capacities, are a very valuable complement to our own efforts. Indeed, I believe the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships. 113. Since the rule of law is an essential element of lasting peace, United Nations peacekeepers and peacebuilders have a solemn responsibility to respect the law themselves, and especially to respect the rights of the people whom it is their mission to help. In the light of recent allegations of misconduct by United Nations administrators and peacekeepers, the United Nations system should reaffirm its commitment to respect, adhere to and implement international law, fundamental human rights and the basic standards of due process. I will work to strengthen the internal capacity of the United Nations to exercise oversight of peacekeeping operations, and I remind Member States of their obligation to prosecute any members of their national contingents who commit crimes or offences in the States where they are deployed. I am especially troubled by instances in which United Nations peacekeepers are alleged to have sexually exploited minors and other vulnerable people, and I have enacted a policy of “zero tolerance” towards such offences that applies to all personnel engaged in United Nations operations. I strongly encourage Member States to do the same with respect to their national contingents.

Peacebuilding 114. Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements is sadly blemished by some devastating failures. Indeed, several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements — for instance in Angola in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994. Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years. These two points drive home the message: if we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner. Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace. I therefore propose to Member States that they create an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office within the United Nations Secretariat, to achieve this end. 115. A Peacebuilding Commission could perform the following functions: in the immediate aftermath of war, improve United Nations planning for sustained recovery, focusing on early efforts to establish the necessary institutions; help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, in part by providing an overview of assessed, voluntary and standing funding mechanisms; improve the coordination of the many postconflict activities of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies; provide a forum in which the United Nations, major bilateral donors, troop contributors, relevant regional actors and organizations, the international financial institutions and the national or transitional Government of the country concerned can share information about their

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respective post-conflict recovery strategies, in the interests of greater coherence; periodically review progress towards medium-term recovery goals; and extend the period of political attention to post-conflict recovery. I do not believe that such a body should have an early warning or monitoring function, but it would be valuable if Member States could at any stage make use of the Peacebuilding Commission’s advice and could request assistance from a standing fund for peacebuilding to build their domestic institutions for reducing conflict, including through strengthening the rule-of-law institutions. 116. I believe that such a body would best combine efficiency with legitimacy if it were to report to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in sequence, depending on the phase of the conflict. Simultaneous reporting lines should be avoided because they will create duplication and confusion. 117. The Peacebuilding Commission would be most effective if its core membership comprised a sub-set of Security Council members, a similar number of Economic and Social Council members, leading troop contributors and the major donors to a standing fund for peacebuilding. In its country-specific operations, the Peacebuilding Commission should involve the national or transitional authorities, relevant regional actors and organizations, troop contributors, where applicable, and the major donors to the specific country. 118. The participation of international financial institutions is vital. I have started discussions with them to determine how best they can be involved, with due respect for their mandates and governing arrangements. 119. Once these discussions are completed, in advance of September 2005, I will present Member States a more fully developed proposal for their consideration.

Small arms, light weapons and landmines 120. The accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues to be a serious threat to peace, stability and sustainable development. Since the adoption in 2001 of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 1 awareness of the problem has grown and there have been various initiatives to tackle it. We must now begin to make a real difference by ensuring better enforcement of arms embargoes, strengthening programmes for the disarmament of ex-combatants and negotiating a legally binding international instrument to regulate the marking and tracing of small arms and light weapons, as well as one to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit brokering. I urge Member States to agree on an instrument to regulate marking and tracing no later than next year’s Review Conference on the Programme of Action, and to expedite negotiations on an instrument on illicit brokering. 121. We must also continue our work to remove the scourge of landmines, which — along with other explosive remnants of war — still kill and maim innocent people in nearly half 1 See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001 (A/CONF. 192/15), chap. IV.

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the world’s countries and hold back entire communities from working their way out of poverty. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1 supplemented by Amended Protocol II 2 to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 3 now has 144 States parties and has made a real difference on the ground. Transfers of mines have virtually halted, large tracts of previously mined lands have been cleared and more than 31 million stockpiled mines have been destroyed. Yet not all States parties to the Convention have fully implemented it and there are vast stockpiles of mines in the arsenals of States that remain outside it. I therefore urge States parties to implement their obligations in full, and call on those States that have not yet done so to accede to both the Convention and the Protocol at the earliest possible moment.

E. Use of force 122. Finally, an essential part of the consensus we seek must be agreement on when and how force can be used to defend international peace and security. In recent years, this issue has deeply divided Member States. They have disagreed about whether States have the right to use military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; whether they have the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminent threats; and whether they have the right — or perhaps the obligation — to use it protectively to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable crimes. 123. Agreement must be reached on these questions if the United Nations is to be — as it was intended to be — a forum for resolving differences rather than a mere stage for acting them out. And yet I believe the Charter of our Organization, as it stands, offers a good basis for the understanding that we need. 124. Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already happened. 125. Where threats are not imminent but latent, the Charter gives full authority to the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and security. As to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity, are they not also threats to international peace and security, against which humanity should be able to look to the Security Council for protection? 126. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make it work better. When considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Council should come to a common view on how to weigh the seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed military action; whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; whether the 1

CD/1478. CCW/CONF.I/16 (Part I), annex B. 3 See The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 5: 1980 (United Nations publications, Sales No. E.81.IX.4), appendix VII. 2

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military option is proportional to the threat at hand; and whether there is a reasonable chance of success. By undertaking to make the case for military action in this way, the Council would add transparency to its deliberations and make its decisions more likely to be respected, by both Governments and world public opinion. I therefore recommend that the Security Council adopt a resolution setting out these principles and expressing its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force.

IV. FREEDOM TO LIVE IN DIGNITY 127. In the Millennium Declaration, Member States stated that they would spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. In so doing, they recognized that while freedom from want and fear are essential they are not enough. All human beings have the right to be treated with dignity and respect. 128. The protection and promotion of the universal values of the rule of law, human rights and democracy are ends in themselves. They are also essential for a world of justice, opportunity and stability. No security agenda and no drive for development will be successful unless they are based on the sure foundation of respect for human dignity. 129. When it comes to laws on the books, no generation has inherited the riches that we have. We are blessed with what amounts to an international bill of human rights, among which are impressive norms to protect the weakest among us, including victims of conflict and persecution. We also enjoy a set of international rules on everything from trade to the law of the sea, from terrorism to the environment and from small arms to weapons of mass destruction. Through hard experience, we have become more conscious of the need to build human rights and rule-of-law provisions into peace agreements and ensure that they are implemented. And even harder experience has led us to grapple with the fact that no legal principle — not even sovereignty — should ever be allowed to shield genocide, crimes against humanity and mass human suffering. 130. But without implementation, our declarations ring hollow. Without action, our promises are meaningless. Villagers huddling in fear at the sound of Government bombing raids or the appearance of murderous militias on the horizon find no solace in the unimplemented words of the Geneva Conventions, to say nothing of the international community’s solemn promises of “never again” when reflecting on the horrors of Rwanda a decade ago. Treaties prohibiting torture are cold comfort to prisoners abused by their captors, particularly if the international human rights machinery enables those responsible to hide behind friends in high places. A war-weary population infused with new hope after the signing of a peace agreement quickly reverts to despair when, instead of seeing tangible progress towards a Government under the rule of law, it sees war lords and gang leaders take power and become laws unto themselves. And solemn commitments to strengthen democracy at home, which all States made in the Millennium Declaration, remain empty words to those who have never voted for their rulers and who see no sign that things are changing.

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131. To advance a vision of larger freedom, the United Nations and its Member States must strengthen the normative framework that has been so impressively advanced over the last six decades. Even more important, we must take concrete steps to reduce selective application, arbitrary enforcement and breach without consequence. Those steps would give new life to the commitments made in the Millennium Declaration. 132. Accordingly, I believe that decisions should be made in 2005 to help strengthen the rule of law internationally and nationally, enhance the stature and structure of the human rights machinery of the United Nations and more directly support efforts to institute and deepen democracy in nations around the globe. We must also move towards embracing and acting on the “responsibility to protect” potential or actual victims of massive atrocities. The time has come for Governments to be held to account, both to their citizens and to each other, for respect of the dignity of the individual, to which they too often pay only lip service. We must move from an era of legislation to an era of implementation. Our declared principles and our common interests demand no less.

A. Rule of law 133. I strongly believe that every nation that proclaims the rule of law at home must respect it abroad and that every nation that insists on it abroad must enforce it at home. Indeed, the Millennium Declaration reaffirmed the commitment of all nations to the rule of law as the all-important framework for advancing human security and prosperity. Yet in many places, Governments and individuals continue to violate the rule of law, often without consequences for them but with deadly consequences for the weak and the vulnerable. In other instances, those who make no pretence of being bound by the rule of law, such as armed groups and terrorists, are able to flout it because our peacemaking institutions and compliance mechanisms are weak. The rule of law as a mere concept is not enough. New laws must be put into place, old ones must be put into practice and our institutions must be better equipped to strengthen the rule of law. 134. Nowhere is the gap between rhetoric and reality — between declarations and deeds — so stark and so deadly as in the field of international humanitarian law. It cannot be right, when the international community is faced with genocide or massive human rights abuses, for the United Nations to stand by and let them unfold to the end, with disastrous consequences for many thousands of innocent people. I have drawn Member States’ attention to this issue over many years. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, I presented a five-point action plan to prevent genocide. The plan underscored the need for action to prevent armed conflict, effective measures to protect civilians, judicial steps to fight impunity, early warning through a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, and swift and decisive action when genocide is happening or about to happen. Much more, however, needs to be done to prevent atrocities and to ensure that the international community acts promptly when faced with massive violations. 135. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and more recently the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, with its 16 members from all around the world, endorsed what they described as an “emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect” (see A/59/565, para. 203). While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I strongly agree with this approach. I believe that

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we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual State, whose primary raison d’être and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such methods appear insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so required. In this case, as in others, it should follow the principles set out in section III above. 136. Support for the rule of law must be strengthened by universal participation in multilateral conventions. At present, many States remain outside the multilateral conventional framework, in some cases preventing important conventions from entering into force. Five years ago, I provided special facilities for States to sign or ratify treaties of which I am the Depositary. This proved a major success and treaty events have been held annually ever since. This year’s event will focus on 31 multilateral treaties to help us respond to global challenges, with emphasis on human rights, refugees, terrorism, organized crime and the law of the sea. I urge leaders especially to ratify and implement all treaties relating to the protection of civilians. 137. Effective national legal and judicial institutions are essential to the success of all our efforts to help societies emerge from a violent past. Yet the United Nations, other international organizations and member Governments remain ill-equipped to provide support for such institutions. As I outlined in my report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616), we lack appropriate assessment and planning capacities, both in the field and at Headquarters. As a result, assistance is often piecemeal, slow and ill-suited to the ultimate goal. To help the United Nations realize its potential in this area, I intend to create a dedicated Rule of Law Assistance Unit, drawing heavily on existing staff within the United Nations system, in the proposed Peacebuilding Support Office (see sect. V below) to assist national efforts to reestablish the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies. 138. Justice is a vital component of the rule of law. Enormous progress has been made with the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the continuing work of the two ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the creation of a mixed tribunal in Sierra Leone and hopefully soon in Cambodia as well. Other important initiatives include commissions of experts and inquiry, such as those set up for Darfur, Timor-Leste and Côte d’Ivoire. Yet impunity continues to overshadow advances made in international humanitarian law, with tragic consequences in the form of flagrant and widespread human rights abuses continuing to this day. To increase avenues of redress for the victims of atrocities and deter further horrors, I encourage Member States to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court and other international or mixed war crimes tribunals, and to surrender accused persons to them upon request. 139. The International Court of Justice lies at the centre of the international system for adjudicating disputes among States. In recent years, the Court’s docket has grown significantly and a number of disputes have been settled, but resources remain scarce. There is a need to consider means to strengthen the work of the Court. I urge those States that have not yet done so to consider recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the

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Court — generally if possible or, failing that, at least in specific situations. I also urge all parties to bear in mind, and make greater use of, the Court’s advisory powers. Measures should also be taken, with the cooperation of litigating States, to improve the Court’s working methods and reduce the length of its proceedings.

B. Human rights 140. Human rights are as fundamental to the poor as to the rich, and their protection is as important to the security and prosperity of the developed world as it is to that of the developing world. It would be a mistake to treat human rights as though there were a tradeoff to be made between human rights and such goals as security or development. We only weaken our hand in fighting the horrors of extreme poverty or terrorism if, in our efforts to do so, we deny the very human rights that these scourges take away from citizens. Strategies based on the protection of human rights are vital for both our moral standing and the practical effectiveness of our actions. 141. Since its establishment, the United Nations has committed itself to striving for a world of peace and justice grounded in universal respect for human rights — a mission reaffirmed five years ago by the Millennium Declaration. But the system for protecting human rights at the international level is today under considerable strain. Change is needed if the United Nations is to sustain long-term, high-level engagement on human rights issues, across the range of the Organization’s work. 142. Important change is already under way. Since the Millennium Declaration, the United Nations human rights machinery has expanded its protection work, technical assistance and support for national human rights institutions, so that international human rights standards are now better implemented in many countries. Last year, I launched “Action 2”, a global programme designed to equip United Nations inter-agency country teams to work with Member States, at their request, to bolster their national human rights promotion and protection systems. This programme urgently needs more resources and staff, including a stronger capacity to train country teams within the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 143. But technical assistance and long-term institution-building are of little or no value where the basic principle of protection is being actively violated. A greater human rights field presence during times of crisis would provide timely information to United Nations bodies and, when necessary, draw urgent attention to situations requiring action. 144. The increasing frequency of the Security Council’s invitations to the High Commissioner to brief it on specific situations shows that there is now a greater awareness of the need to take human rights into account in resolutions on peace and security. The High Commissioner must play a more active role in the deliberations of the Security Council and of the proposed Peacebuilding Commission, with emphasis on the implementation of relevant provisions in Security Council resolutions. Indeed, human rights must be incorporated into decision-making and discussion throughout the work of the Organization. The concept of “mainstreaming” human rights has gained greater attention in recent years, but it has still not been adequately reflected in key policy and resource decisions.

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145. These observations all point to the need to strengthen the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. While the role of the High Commissioner has expanded in the areas of crisis response, national human rights capacity-building, support for the Millennium Development Goals and conflict prevention, her Office remains woefully illequipped to respond to the broad range of human rights challenges facing the international community. Member States’ proclaimed commitment to human rights must be matched by resources to strengthen the Office’s ability to discharge its vital mandate. I have asked the High Commissioner to submit a plan of action within 60 days. 146. The High Commissioner and her Office need to be involved in the whole spectrum of United Nations activities. But this can only work if the intergovernmental foundations of our human rights machinery are strong. In section V below, therefore, I shall make a proposal to transform the body which should be the central pillar of the United Nations human rights system — the Commission on Human Rights. 147. But the human rights treaty bodies, too, need to be much more effective and more responsive to violations of the rights that they are mandated to uphold. The treaty body system remains little known; is compromised by the failure of many States to report on time if at all, as well as the duplication of reporting requirements; and is weakened further by poor implementation of recommendations. Harmonized guidelines on reporting to all treaty bodies should be finalized and implemented so that these bodies can function as a unified system.

C. Democracy 148. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1 adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, enunciated the essentials of democracy. Ever since its adoption, it has inspired constitution-making in every corner of the world, and it has contributed greatly to the eventual global acceptance of democracy as a universal value. The right to choose how they are ruled, and who rules them, must be the birthright of all people, and its universal achievement must be a central objective of an Organization devoted to the cause of larger freedom. 149. In the Millennium Declaration, every Member State pledged to strengthen its capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy. That same year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on promoting and consolidating democracy. 2 More than 100 countries have now signed the Warsaw Declaration of the Community of Democracies (see A/55/328, annex I), and in 2002 that Community endorsed the Seoul Plan of Action (see A/57/618, annex I), which listed the essential elements of representative democracy and set forth a range of measures to promote it. Regional organizations in many parts of the world have made democracy promotion a core component of their work, and the emergence of a strong community of global and regional civil society organizations that promote democratic governance is also encouraging. All of which reinforces the principle that democracy does not belong to any country or region but is a universal right.

1 2

General Assembly resolutions 217 A (III). General Assembly resolution 55/96.

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150. However, commitments must be matched by performance and protecting democracy requires vigilance. Threats to democracy have by no means ceased to exist. As we have seen time and again, the transition to democracy is delicate and difficult and can suffer severe setbacks. The United Nations assists Member States by supporting emerging democracies with legal, technical and financial assistance and advice. For example, the United Nations has given concrete support for elections in more and more countries, often at decisive moments in their history — more than 20 in the last year alone, including Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq and Burundi. Similarly, the Organization’s work to improve governance throughout the developing world and to rebuild the rule of law and State institutions in war-torn countries is vital to ensuring that democracy takes root and endures. 151. The United Nations does more than any other single organization to promote and strengthen democratic institutions and practices around the world, but this fact is little known. The impact of our work is reduced by the way we disperse it among different parts of our bureaucracy. It is time to join up the dots. But there are significant gaps in our capacity in several critical areas. The Organization as a whole needs to be better coordinated and should mobilize resources more effectively. The United Nations should not restrict its role to norm-setting but should expand its help to its members to further broaden and deepen democratic trends throughout the world. To that end, I support the creation of a democracy fund at the United Nations to provide assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy. Furthermore, I intend to ensure that our activities in this area are more closely coordinated by establishing a more explicit link between the democratic governance work of the United Nations Development Programme and the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs. 152. In sections II to IV, I have outlined the interconnected challenges of advancing the cause of larger freedom in the new century. I have also indicated what I believe to be the essential elements of our collective response, including many areas where I believe the United Nations should be better equipped to make its proper contribution. In section V below, I shall focus in some detail on the specific reforms that I believe are needed if our Organization is to play its due part in shaping and implementing such a collective response across the whole range of global issues.

V. STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS 153. In the present report, I have argued that the principles and purposes of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter, remain as valid and relevant today as they were in 1945, and that the present moment is a precious opportunity to put them into practice. But while purposes should be firm and principles constant, practice and organization need to move with the times. If the United Nations is to be a useful instrument for its Member States and for the world’s peoples, in responding to the challenges described in sections II to IV above it must be fully adapted to the needs and circumstances of the twenty-first century. It must be open not only to States but also to civil society, which at both the national and international levels plays an increasingly important role in world affairs. Its strength must be drawn from the breadth of its partnerships and from its ability to bring those partners

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into effective coalitions for change across the whole spectrum of issues on which action is required to advance the cause of larger freedom. 154. Clearly our Organization, as an organization, was built for a different era. Equally clearly, not all our current practices are adapted to the needs of today. That is why Heads of State and Government, in the Millennium Declaration, recognized the need to strengthen the United Nations to make it a more effective instrument for pursuing their priorities. 155. Indeed, ever since I took office as Secretary-General in 1997, one of my main priorities has been to reform the internal structures and culture of the United Nations to make the Organization more useful to its Member States and to the world’s peoples. And much has been achieved. Today, the Organization’s structures are more streamlined, its working methods more effective and its various programmes better coordinated, and it has developed working partnerships in many areas with civil society and the private sector. In the economic and social spheres, the Millennium Development Goals now serve as a common policy framework for the entire United Nations system, and indeed for the broader international development community. United Nations peacekeeping missions today are much better designed than they used to be, and have a more integrated understanding of the many different tasks involved in preventing a recurrence of fighting and laying the foundations of lasting peace. And we have built strategic partnerships with a wide range of non-State actors who have an important contribution to make to global security, prosperity and freedom. 156. But many more changes are needed. As things stand now, different governance structures for the many parts of the system, overlapping mandates and mandates that reflect earlier rather than current priorities all combine to hobble our effectiveness. It is essential to give managers real authority so that they can fully align the system’s activities with the goals endorsed by Member States — which I hope will be those outlined in the present report. We must also do more to professionalize the Secretariat and to hold its staff and management more rigorously accountable for their performance. And we need to ensure greater coherence, both among the various United Nations representatives and activities in each country and in the wider United Nations system, particularly in the economic and social fields. 157. But reform, if it is to be effective, cannot be confined to the executive branch. It is time to breathe new life also into the intergovernmental organs of the United Nations.

A. General Assembly 158. As the Millennium Declaration reaffirmed, the General Assembly has a central position as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations. In particular, it has the authority to consider and approve the budget and it elects the members of the other deliberative bodies, including the Security Council. Member States are therefore rightly concerned about the decline in the Assembly’s prestige and its diminishing contribution to the Organization’s activities. This decline must be reversed, and that will only happen if the Assembly becomes more effective.

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159. In recent years, the number of General Assembly resolutions approved by consensus has increased steadily. That would be good if it reflected a genuine unity of purpose among Member States in responding to global challenges. But unfortunately, consensus (often interpreted as requiring unanimity) has become an end in itself. It is sought first within each regional group and then at the level of the whole. This has not proved an effective way of reconciling the interests of Member States. Rather, it prompts the Assembly to retreat into generalities, abandoning any serious effort to take action. Such real debates as there are tend to focus on process rather than substance and many so-called decisions simply reflect the lowest common denominator of widely different opinions. 160. Member States agree, as they have for years, that the Assembly needs to streamline its procedures and structures so as to improve the deliberative process and make it more effective. Many modest steps have been taken. Now, new proposals to “revitalize” the Assembly have been put forward by a wide range of Member States. The General Assembly should now take bold measures to rationalize its work and speed up the deliberative process, notably by streamlining its agenda, its committee structure and its procedures for holding plenary debates and requesting reports, and by strengthening the role and authority of its President. 161. At present, the General Assembly addresses a broad agenda covering a wide range of often overlapping issues. It should give focus to its substantive agenda by concentrating on addressing the major substantive issues of the day, such as international migration and the long-debated comprehensive convention on terrorism. 162. It should also engage much more actively with civil society — reflecting the fact that, after a decade of rapidly increasing interaction, civil society is now involved in most United Nations activities. Indeed, the goals of the United Nations can only be achieved if civil society and Governments are fully engaged. The Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, which I appointed in 2003, made many useful recommendations for improving our work with civil society, and I have commended its report (see A/58/817 and Corr.1) to the General Assembly together with my views. The General Assembly should act on these recommendations and establish mechanisms enabling it to engage fully and systematically with civil society. 163. The Assembly also needs to review its committee structure, the way committees function, the oversight it provides to them and their outputs. The General Assembly needs a mechanism to review the decisions of its committees so as to avoid overloading the organization with unfunded mandates and continuing the current problem of micromanagement of the budget and the allocation of posts within the Secretariat. If the General Assembly cannot solve these problems it will not have the focus and flexibility it needs to serve its members effectively. 164. It should be clear that none of this will happen unless Member States take a serious interest in the Assembly at the highest level and insist that their representatives engage in its debates with a view to achieving real and positive results. If they fail to do this the Assembly’s performance will continue to disappoint them and they should not be surprised.

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165. Its founders endowed the United Nations with three Councils, each having major responsibilities in its own area: the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council. Over time, the division of responsibilities between them has become less and less balanced: the Security Council has increasingly asserted its authority and, especially since the end of the cold war, has enjoyed greater unity of purpose among its permanent members but has seen that authority questioned on the grounds that its composition is anachronistic or insufficiently representative; the Economic and Social Council has been too often relegated to the margins of global economic and social governance; and the Trusteeship Council, having successfully carried out its functions, is now reduced to a purely formal existence. 166. I believe we need to restore the balance, with three Councils covering respectively, (a) international peace and security, (b) economic and social issues, and (c) human rights, the promotion of which has been one of the purposes of the Organization from its beginnings but now clearly requires more effective operational structures. These Councils together should have the task of driving forward the agenda that emerges from summit and other conferences of Member States, and should be the global forms in which the issues of security, development and justice can be properly addressed. The first two Councils, of course, already exist but need to be strengthened. The third requires a far-reaching overhaul and upgrading of our existing human rights machinery.

Security Council 167. By adhering to the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States recognize that the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree to be bound by its decisions. It is therefore of vital importance, not only to the Organization but to the world, that the Council should be equipped to carry out this responsibility and that its decisions should command worldwide respect. 168. In the Millennium Declaration, all States resolved to intensify their efforts “to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects” (see General Assembly resolution 55/2, para. 30). This reflected the view, long held by the majority, that a change in the Council’s composition is needed to make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical realities of today, and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of the world. Its working methods also need to be made more efficient and transparent. The Council must be not only more representative but also more able and willing to take action when action is needed. Reconciling these two imperatives is the hard test that any reform proposal must pass. 169. Two years ago, I declared that in my view no reform of the United Nations would be complete without reform of the Security Council. That is still my belief. The Security Council must be broadly representative of the realities of power in today’s world. I therefore support the position set out in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats,

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Challenges and Change (A/59/565) concerning the reforms of the Security Council, namely: (a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically, specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution; (b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world; (c)


(d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body. 170. I urge Member States to consider the two options, models A and B, proposed in that report (see box 5), or any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model. Member States should agree to take a decision on this important issue before the summit in September 2005. It would be very preferable for Member States to take this vital decision by consensus, but if they are unable to reach consensus this must not become an excuse for postponing action.

Economic and Social Council 171. The Charter of the United Nations gives the Economic and Social Council a range of important functions that involve coordination, policy review and policy dialogue. Most of these seem more critical than ever in this age of globalization, in which a comprehensive United Nations development agenda has emerged from the summits and conferences of the 1990s. More than ever, the United Nations needs to be able to develop and implement policies in this area in a coherent manner. The functions of the Council are generally thought to be uniquely relevant to these challenges, but it has not as yet done justice to them. 172. In 1945, the framers of the Charter did not give the Economic and Social Council enforcement powers. Having agreed at Bretton Woods in the previous year to create powerful international financial institutions and expecting that these would be complemented by a world trade organization in addition to the various specialized agencies, they clearly intended that international economic decision-making would be decentralized. But this only makes the Council’s potential role as coordinator, convener, forum for policy dialogue and forger of consensus the more important. It is the only organ of the United Nations explicitly mandated by the Charter to coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies and to consult with non-governmental organizations. And it has a network of functional and regional commissions operating under its aegis which are increasingly focused on the implementation of development goals.

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Box 5 Security Council reform: models A and B Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Regional area

Proposed Proposed new two-year seats Permanent seats permanent (nonNo. of States (continuing) seats renewable)

Total

Africa Asia and Pacific Europe Americas

53 56 47 35

0 1 3 1

2 2 1 1

4 3 2 4

6 6 6 6

Total model A

191

5

6

13

24

Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and nonrenewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Regional area

Proposed Proposed four- two-year seats Permanent seats year renewable (nonNo. of States (continuing) seats renewable)

Total

Africa Asia and Pacific Europe Americas

53 56 47 35

0 1 3 1

2 2 2 2

4 3 1 3

6 6 6 6

Total model A

191

5

8

13

24

173. The Economic and Social Council has put these assets to good use in the recent years, building bridges through an annual special high-level meeting with the trade and financial institutions, for instance, and establishing a unique Information and Communications Technology Task Force. It has also contributed to linking the issues of security and development by establishing country-specific groups.

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174. These initiatives have helped to promote greater coherence and coordination among various actors, but there are still visible gaps to be addressed. 175. First, there is an increasing need to integrate, coordinate and review the implementation of the United Nations development agenda that has emerged from the world conferences and summits. To this end, the Economic and Social Council should hold annual ministerial-level assessments of progress towards agreed development goals, particularly the Millennium Development Goals. These assessments could be based on peer reviews of progress reports prepared by member States, with support from United Nations agencies and the regional commissions. 176. Second, there is a need to review trends in international development cooperation, promote greater coherence among the development activities of different actors and strengthen the links between the normative and operational work of the United Nations system. To address this gap, the Economic and Social Council should serve as a highlevel development cooperation forum. Such a forum could be held biennially by transforming the high-level segment of the Council. 177. Third, there is a need to address economic and social challenges, threats and crises as and when they occur. To this end, the Council should convene timely meetings, as required, to assess threats to development, such as famines, epidemics and major natural disasters, and to promote coordinated responses to them. 178. Fourth, there is a need to systematically monitor and deal with the economic and social dimensions of conflicts. The Economic and Social Council has tried to fulfil this need by establishing country-specific ad hoc advisory groups. But given the scale and the challenge of long-term recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, ad hoc arrangements are not enough. The Economic and Social Council should institutionalize its work in post-conflict management by working with the proposed Peacebuilding Commission. It should also reinforce its links with the Security Council in order to promote structural prevention. 179. Finally, while the normative and strategy-setting role of the Economic and Social Council is clearly different from the managerial and policy-making role played by the governing bodies of the various international institutions, I would hope that, as the Council starts to assert leadership in driving a global development agenda it will be able to provide direction for the efforts of the various intergovernmental bodies in this area throughout the United Nations system. 180. Implementing all these recommendations would require the Economic and Social Council to function with a new and more flexible structure, not necessarily restricted by the current annual calendar of “segments” and “substantive session”. In addition, the Council needs an effective, efficient and representative intergovernmental mechanism for engaging its counterparts in the institutions dealing with finance and trade. This could either be achieved by expanding its Bureau or by establishing an Executive Committee with a regionally balanced composition.

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181. The Commission on Human Rights has given the international community a universal human rights framework, comprising the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the two International Covenants 1 and other core human rights treaties. During its annual session, the Commission draws public attention to human rights issues and debates, provides a forum for the development of United Nations human rights policy and establishes a unique system of independent and expert special procedures to observe and analyse human rights compliance by theme and by country. The Commission’s close engagement with hundreds of civil society organizations provides an opportunity for working with civil society that does not exist elsewhere. 182. Yet the Commission’s capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. In particular, States have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others. As a result, a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole. 183. If the United Nations is to meet the expectations of men and women everywhere — and indeed, if the Organization is to take the cause of human rights as seriously as those of security and development — then Member States should agree to replace the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights Council. Member States would need to decide if they want the Human Rights Council to be a principal organ of the United Nations or a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, but in either case its members would be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. The creation of the Council would accord human rights a more authoritative position, corresponding to the primacy of human rights in the Charter of the United Nations. Member States should determine the composition of the Council and the term of office of its members. Those elected to the Council should undertake to abide by the highest human rights standards.

C. The Secretariat 184. A capable and effective Secretariat is indispensable to the work of the United Nations. As the needs of the Organization have changed, so too must the Secretariat. That is why in 1997 I launched a package of structural reforms for the Secretariat and followed up with a further set of managerial and technical improvements in 2002, aimed at giving the Organization a more focused work programme and a simpler system of planning and budgeting and enabling the Secretariat to provide better service. 185. I am glad that the General Assembly has given broad support to these changes and I believe they have improved our ability to do the job the world expects of us. Thanks to changes in budgeting, procurement, human resources management and the way peacekeeping missions are supported, we now do business in a new and different way. But these reforms do not go far enough. If the United Nations is to be truly effective the Secretariat will have to be completely transformed. 1

General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI).

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186. Those with the power to make decisions — essentially the General Assembly and the Security Council — must take care, when they assign mandates to the Secretariat, that they also provide resources adequate for the task. In return, management must be made more accountable and the capacity of intergovernmental bodies to oversee it must be strengthened. The Secretary-General and his or her managers must be given the discretion, the means, the authority and the expert assistance that they need to manage an organization which is expected to meet fast-changing operational needs in many different parts of the world. Similarly, Member States must have the oversight tools that they need to hold the Secretary-General truly accountable for his/her strategy and leadership. 187. Member States also have a central role to play in ensuring that the Organization’s mandates stay current. I therefore ask the General Assembly to review all mandates older than five years to see whether the activities concerned are still genuinely needed or whether the resources assigned to them can be reallocated in response to new and emerging challenges. 188. Today’s United Nations staff must be: (a) aligned with the new substantive challenges of the twenty-first century; (b) empowered to manage complex global operations; and (c) held accountable. 189. First, I am taking steps to realign the Secretariat’s structure to match the priorities outlined in the present report. This will entail creating a peacebuilding support office and strengthening support both for mediation (my “good offices” function) and for democracy and the rule of law. In addition, I intend to appoint a Scientific Adviser to the SecretaryGeneral, who will provide strategic forward-looking scientific advice on policy matters, mobilizing scientific and technological expertise within the United Nations system and from the broader scientific and academic community. 190. Achieving real progress in new areas requires staff with the skills and experience to address new challenges. It also requires a renewed effort to secure “the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity”, as required by Article 101.3 of the Charter of the United Nations, while “recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible” and, we must add today, ensuring a just balance between men and women. While existing staff must have reasonable opportunities to develop within the Organization we cannot continue to rely on the same pool of people to address all our new needs. I therefore request the General Assembly to provide me with the authority and resources to pursue a one-time staff buyout so as to refresh and realign the staff to meet current needs. 191. Second, the Secretariat must be empowered to do its work. The High-level Panel suggested that I appoint a second Deputy Secretary-General to improve the decisionmaking process on peace and security. Instead, I have decided to create a cabinet-style decision-making mechanism (with stronger executive powers than the present Senior Management Group) to improve both policy and management. It will be supported by a small cabinet secretariat to ensure the preparation and follow-up of decision making. In this way, I expect to be able to ensure more focused, orderly and accountable decisionmaking. This should help but will not by itself be enough to ensure the effective management of the worldwide operations of such a complex Organization. The SecretaryGeneral, as Chief Administrative Officer of the Organization, must be given a higher level

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of managerial authority and flexibility. He or she needs to have the ability to adjust the staffing table as necessary and without undue constraint. And our administrative system needs to be thoroughly modernized. Therefore, I ask Member States to work with me to undertake a comprehensive review of the budget and human resources rules under which we operate. 192. Third, we must continue to improve the transparency and accountability of the Secretariat. The General Assembly has taken an important step towards greater transparency by making internal audits available to Member States upon request. I am in the process of identifying other categories of information that could be made available routinely. I am establishing a Management Performance Board to ensure that senior officials are held accountable for their actions and the results their units achieve. A number of other internal improvements are under way. These aim to align our management systems and human resource policies with the best practices of other global public and commercial organizations. In order to further improve accountability and oversight I have proposed that the General Assembly commission a comprehensive review of the Office of Internal Oversight Services with a view to strengthening its independence and authority as well as its expertise and capacity. I hope the Assembly will act promptly on this proposal.

D. System coherence 193. Beyond the Secretariat, the United Nations system of funds, programmes and specialized agencies brings together a unique wealth of expertise and resources, encompassing the full spectrum of global issues. And what is true for the United Nations proper is valid also for the other parts of the system. All must be clearly accountable to both their governing bodies and the people they serve. 194. Over the past few decades, responding to steadily growing demand, the system has seen a welcome expansion in its membership as well as in the scale and scope of its activities. One unfortunate side-effect of this has been that there is now often significant duplication of mandates and actions between different bodies within the system. Another has been significant shortfalls in necessary funding. 195. To try to address some of these problems I have launched two sets of major reforms during my time as Secretary-General. First, in my 1997 report, entitled “Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform” (A/51/950), I introduced several measures, including notably the creation of executive committees, to strengthen the leadership capacity of the Secretariat and provide better coordination in the humanitarian and development fields. Then in 2002, in a second report, entitled “Strengthening the United Nations: an agenda for further change” (A/57/387 and Corr.1), I set out further steps aimed more directly at improving our work at country level, particularly by strengthening the resident coordinator system. I have also given more authority to my special representatives and instituted a system of integrated peace operations. 196. These efforts have paid significant dividends by enabling the various agencies to work more closely together at the country level, both with each other and with other partners, such as the World Bank. Nevertheless, the United Nations system as a whole is

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still not delivering services in the coherent, effective way that the world’s citizens need and deserve. 197. Part of the problem is clearly related to the structural constraints we face. In the medium and longer term, we will need to consider much more radical reforms to address these. Such reforms could include grouping the various agencies, funds and programmes into tightly managed entities, dealing respectively with development, the environment and humanitarian action. And this regrouping might involve eliminating or merging those funds, programmes and agencies which have complementary or overlapping mandates and expertise. 198. Meanwhile, there are more immediate actions that we can and should take now. In particular, I am introducing further improvements in the coordination of the United Nations system presence and performance at the country level, based on a simple principle: at every stage of United Nations activities, the senior United Nations official present in any given country — special representative, resident coordinator or humanitarian coordinator — should have the authority and resources necessary to manage an integrated United Nations mission or “country presence” so that the United Nations can truly function as one integrated entity.

The United Nations at the country level 199. In every country where the United Nations has a development presence, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes should organize their technical efforts to help that country develop and implement the national Millennium Development Goals-based poverty reduction strategies set out in section II above. While the management of the resident coordinator system should remain with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which is our principal development institution, the broader United Nations Development Group (UNDG) should guide resident United Nations country teams, led by properly resourced and empowered resident coordinators. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework should identify a clear set of strategic objectives and define the specific assistance that each United Nations entity must give to help our national partners achieve the Goals and meet their broader development needs. Governments and the United Nations itself can then use this “results matrix” to monitor and assess the performance of the United Nations system at the country level and hold its representatives accountable.

Strengthening the resident coordinator system 200. To drive this process, I shall further strengthen the role of my resident coordinators, giving them more authority so that they can coordinate better. But the governing boards of different agencies also need to provide guidance to support this process. I call on Member States to coordinate their representatives on these governing boards so as to make sure that they pursue a coherent policy in assigning mandates and allocating resources throughout the system. I also urge Member States to increase core funding and reduce the proportion of earmarked funds so as to help increase coherence in the system.

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As mentioned above, I hope a reinvigorated Economic and Social Council will give overall direction to this new coherence. 201. In recent years, I have been gratified by the benefits that the United Nations system has derived from working closely with independent scientists, policy makers and political leaders around the world. This is particularly true in the field of development, where we need constantly to integrate the latest advances in science and technology into the practice of our organizations and programmes. In 2005, to consolidate the links between United Nations development efforts and the world’s leading minds in relevant fields I intend to launch a Council of Development Advisers. This Council, working in close cooperation with the Secretary-General’s Scientific Adviser mentioned above, will comprise some two dozen people, who should represent a cross-section of leading world scientists, policymaking officials and political leaders. They will advise both me and UNDG on the best ways to support the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, will issue periodic reports and commentaries, and will liaise with scientific, civil society and other bodies with relevant expertise. Their advice will also be available to the Economic and Social Council.

Humanitarian response system 202. From the Indian Ocean tsunami to the crises in Darfur and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, recent months have provided eloquent testimony to the evergrowing range and scale of demands being placed on the international humanitarian response system. With leadership and coordination from the United Nations, the system that comprises the humanitarian community of agencies and non-governmental organizations has been performing reasonably well, under the circumstances. Expert humanitarian workers get deployed and large quantities of food and other relief items are now provided to victims of war and natural disasters anywhere in the world within a matter of days. There is less overlap between agencies and a more effective coordination between non-governmental and intergovernmental actors on the ground. 203. The system was able to provide massive relief to all tsunami-affected communities in the Indian Ocean, against all odds, in the course of a few weeks. Yet at the same time, assistance to displaced people in Darfur is falling well short of what had been pledged, while major crises, such as the one in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where more than 3.8 million people have been killed and 2.3 million displaced since 1997, remain woefully underfunded. Humanitarian response needs to become more predictable in all emergencies. To achieve that we need to make rapid progress on three fronts. 204. First, the humanitarian system needs to have a more predictable response capacity in areas where now there too often are gaps, ranging from the provision of water and sanitation to shelter and camp management. When crises are already under way there is a need to operate quickly and flexibly. This is particularly the case in complex emergencies, during which humanitarian requirements are linked to the dynamics of conflict and circumstances can change rapidly. In general, it is the relevant United Nations country team, under the leadership of the humanitarian coordinator, which is best placed to identify the opportunities and constraints. However, there is a clear need to strengthen field coordination structures, notably by better preparing and equipping United Nations country

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teams, strengthening the leadership of the humanitarian coordinator and ensuring that sufficient and flexible resources are immediately available to support these field structures. 205. Second, we need predictable funding to meet the needs of vulnerable communities. We need to ensure that the generous outpouring of global support to the tsunami crisis becomes the rule, not the exception. This means building on the humanitarian community’s work with the donor community and more systematically engaging with new donor Governments and the private sector. Ensuring consistent and timely responses to crises requires both that pledges be rapidly converted into tangible resources and that more predictable and flexible funding be made available for humanitarian operations, particularly in the initial emergency phases. 206. Third, we need to have a predictable right of access and guaranteed security for our humanitarian workers and operations in the field. Humanitarian personnel are too often blocked from providing assistance because government forces or armed groups prevent them from doing their jobs. Elsewhere, terrorists attack our unarmed aid workers and paralyse operations, in violation of basic international law. 207. I am working with my Emergency Relief Coordinator to address these issues and to come up with concrete recommendations for strengthened action. A comprehensive humanitarian response review is currently under way and its findings will be made available in June 2005. I expect them to include a series of proposals for new standby arrangements for personnel and equipment to ensure the capacity to respond immediately to major disasters and other emergencies, if need be in several areas at the same time. I shall work with Member States and agencies to ensure that these proposals, once finalized, will be implemented without delay. 208. To enable immediate response to sudden disasters or large unmet needs in neglected emergencies, we need to consider the adequacy of the financial tools at our disposal. We should examine whether the existing Central Emergency Revolving Fund should be upgraded or a new funding mechanism should be established. In the latter case, the proposal put forward by donors to set up a $1 billion voluntary fund deserves serious consideration. 209. Special attention is due to the growing problem of internally displaced persons. Unlike refugees, who have crossed an international border, those displaced within their own countries by violence and war are not protected by established minimum standards. 210. Yet this acutely vulnerable group now totals roughly 25 million, more than double the estimated number of refugees. I urge Member States to accept the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2) prepared by my Special Representative as the basic international norm for protection of such persons, and to commit themselves to promote the adoption of these principles through national legislation. Unlike refugees, who are looked after by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, internally displaced persons and their needs often fall into the cracks between different humanitarian bodies. Recent steps have been taken to ensure that agencies provide assistance to such groups within their respective areas of competence, on a collaborative basis. But, as we have seen most recently in Darfur, more is needed. I intend to strengthen further the inter-agency response to the needs of

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internally displaced persons, under the global leadership of my Emergency Relief Coordinator, and at the country level through the humanitarian coordinator system. I trust that Member States will support me in this effort. 211. Finally, I intend to call more systematically on Member States in general and the Security Council in particular to address the unacceptable humanitarian access blockages that we are too often facing. In order to save unnecessary pain and suffering it is essential to protect humanitarian space and ensure that humanitarian actors have safe and unimpeded access to vulnerable populations. I shall also take measures, through the newly established Secretariat Department of Safety and Security, to make our risk management system more robust so that humanitarian workers can undertake their life-saving operations in high risk areas without unduly endangering their own lives.

Governance of the global environment 212. Given the number and complexity of international agreements and agencies that cover it, the environment poses particular challenges to coherence. There are now more than 400 regional and universal multilateral environmental treaties in force, covering a broad range of environmental issues, including biodiversity, climate change and desertification. The sectoral character of these legal instruments and the fragmented machinery for monitoring their implementation make it harder to mount effective responses across the board. There is a clear need to streamline and consolidate our efforts to follow up and implement these treaties. Already in 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, emphasized the need for a more coherent institutional framework of international environmental governance, with better coordination and monitoring. It is now high time to consider a more integrated structure for environmental standard-setting, scientific discussion and monitoring treaty compliance. This should be built on existing institutions, such as the United Nations Environment Programme, as well as the treaty bodies and specialized agencies. Meanwhile, environmental activities at the country level should benefit from improved synergies, on both normative and operational aspects, between United Nations agencies, making optimal use of their comparative advantages, so that we have an integrated approach to sustainable development, in which both halves of that term are given their due weight.

E. Regional organizations 213. A considerable number of regional and subregional organizations are now active around the world, making important contributions to the stability and prosperity of their members, as well as of the broader international system. The United Nations and regional organizations should play complementary roles in facing the challenges to international peace and security. In this connection, donor countries should pay particular attention to the need for a 10-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union. To improve coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, I intend to introduce memoranda of understanding between the United Nations and individual organizations, governing the sharing of information, expertise and resources, as appropriate in each case. For regional

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organizations that have a conflict prevention or peacekeeping capacity, these memoranda of understanding could place those capacities within the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System. 214. I also intend to invite regional organizations to participate in meetings of United Nations system coordinating bodies, when issues in which they have a particular interest are discussed. 215. The rules of the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option, in very exceptional circumstances, to use assessed contributions to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council, or the participation of regional organizations in multi-pillar peace operations under the overall United Nations umbrella.

F. Updating the Charter of the United Nations 216. As I remarked at the beginning of section V, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations remain fully valid, and the Charter itself, in the main, continues to provide a solid foundation for all our work. It is still essentially the document that was drafted at the San Francisco Conference six decades ago. Much has been achieved by changes in practice without the need for amendment. In fact, the Charter has been amended only twice during the history of the Organization — for the purpose of enlarging the membership of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. 217. Nonetheless, the United Nations now operates in a radically different world from that of 1945, and the Charter should reflect the realities of today. In particular, it is high time to eliminate the anachronistic “enemy” clauses in Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter. 218. The Trusteeship Council played a vital role in raising standards of administration in the trust territories and promoting the wider process of decolonization. But its work is long since complete. Chapter XIII, “The Trusteeship Council”, should be deleted from the Charter. 219. For similar reasons, Article 47 on The Military Staff Committee should be deleted, as should all references to this Committee in Articles 26, 45 and 46.

VI. CONCLUSION: OUR OPPORTUNITY AND OUR CHALLENGE 220. At no time in human history have the fates of every woman, man and child been so intertwined across the globe. We are united both by moral imperatives and by objective interests. We can build a world in larger freedom — but to do it we must find common ground and sustain collective action. This task can seem daunting, and it is easy to descend into generalities or stray into areas of such deep disagreement that differences are reinforced not overcome. 221. Yet it is for us to decide whether this moment of uncertainty presages wider conflict, deepening inequality and the erosion of the rule of law, or is used to renew our common

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institutions for peace, prosperity and human rights. Now is the time to act. Enough words and good intentions: in the present report I have largely limited myself to the decisions that I believe are both needed and achievable in 2005. In the annex, I have listed a number of specific items for consideration by Heads of State and Government. 222. To make the right choice, leaders will need what United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose vision was so central to the founding of the United Nations, called “the courage to fulfil [their] responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world”. 1 They will also need the wisdom to transcend their differences. Given firm, clear-sighted leadership, both within States and among them, I am confident that they can. I am also certain that they must. What I have called for here is possible. It is within reach. From pragmatic beginnings could emerge a visionary change of direction in our world. That is our opportunity and our challenge.

1

See message of the United States President to Congress dated 6 January 1945.

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FOR DECISION BY HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT 1. The Summit will be a unique opportunity for the world’s leaders to consider a broad range of issues and make decisions that will improve the lives of people around the world significantly. This is a major undertaking — one worthy of the world’s leaders collectively assembled. 2. In the twenty-first century, all States and their collective institutions must advance the cause of larger freedom — by ensuring freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development without security and no security without development. And both development and security also depend on respect for human rights and the rule of law. 3. No State can stand wholly alone in today’s world. We all share responsibility for each other’s development and security. Collective strategies, collective institutions and collective action are indispensable. 4. Heads of State and Government must therefore agree on the nature of the threats and opportunities before us and take decisive action.

I. Freedom from want 5. In order to reduce poverty and promote global prosperity for all, I urge Heads of State and Government to: (a) Reaffirm, and commit themselves to implementing, the development consensus based on mutual responsibility and accountability agreed in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa. Consistent with that historic compact, centred on the Millennium Development Goals: (i) Developing countries should recommit themselves to taking primary responsibility for their own development by strengthening governance, combating corruption and putting in place the policies and investments to drive private-sector led growth and maximize domestic resources to fund national development strategies; (ii) Developed countries should undertake to support these efforts through increased development assistance, a more development-oriented trade system and wider and deeper debt relief; (b) Recognize the special needs of Africa and reaffirm the solemn commitments made to address those needs on an urgent basis;

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(c) Decide that each developing country with extreme poverty should by 2006 adopt and begin to implement a comprehensive national strategy bold enough to meet the Millennium Development Goals targets for 2015; (d) Undertake to ensure that developed countries that have not already done so establish timetables to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development assistance by no later than 2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006 and reaching at least 0.5 per cent by 2009; (e) Decide that debt sustainability should be redefined as the level of debt that allows a country to both achieve the Millennium Development Goals and reach 2015 without an increase in its debt ratios; that, for most HIPC countries, this will require exclusively grant-based finance and 100 per cent debt cancellation, while for many heavily indebted non-HIPC and middle-income countries it will require significantly more debt reduction than has yet been on offer; and that additional debt cancellation should be achieved without reducing the resources available to other developing countries and without jeopardizing the long-term financial viability of international financial institutions; (f) Complete the World Trade Organization Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations no later than 2006, with full commitment to realizing its development focus, and as a first step provide immediate duty-free and quota-free market access for all exports from the least developed countries; (g) Decide to launch, in 2005, an International Financial Facility to support an immediate front-loading of official development assistance, underpinned by commitments to achieving the 0.7 per cent ODA target no later than 2015; and to consider other innovative sources of finance for development to supplement the Facility in the longer term; (h) Decide to launch a series of “quick win” initiatives so as to realize major immediate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals through such measures as the free distribution of malaria bednets and effective antimalaria medicines, the expansion of home-grown school meals programmes using locally produced foods and the elimination of user fees for primary education and health services; (i) Ensure that the international community urgently provides the resources needed for an expanded and comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS, as identified by UNAIDS and its partners, and full funding for the Global Fund to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria; (j) Reaffirm gender equality and the need to overcome pervasive gender bias by increasing primary school completion and secondary school access for girls, ensuring secure tenure of property to women, ensuring access to reproductive health services, promoting equal access to labour markets, providing opportunity for greater representation in government decision-making bodies, and supporting direct interventions to protect women from violence; (k) Recognize the need for significantly increased international support for scientific research and development to address the special needs of the poor in the areas of health, agriculture, natural resource and environmental management, energy and climate;

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(l) Ensure concerted global action to mitigate climate change, including through technological innovation, and therefore resolve to develop a more inclusive international framework for climate change beyond 2012, with broader participation by all major emitters and both developing and developed countries, taking into account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; (m) Resolve to establish a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards, building on existing national and regional capacity; (n) Decide that, starting in 2005, developing countries that put forward sound, transparent and accountable national strategies and require increased development assistance should receive a sufficient increase in aid, of sufficient quality and arriving with sufficient speed to enable them to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

II. Freedom from fear 6. In order to provide effective collective security in the twenty-first century, I urge Heads of State and Government to pledge concerted action against the whole range of threats to international peace and security, and in particular to: (a) Affirm and commit themselves to implementing a new security consensus based on the recognition that threats are interlinked, that development, security and human rights are mutually interdependent, that no State can protect itself acting entirely alone and that all States need an equitable, efficient and effective collective security system; and therefore commit themselves to agreeing on, and implementing, comprehensive strategies for confronting the whole range of threats, from international war through weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, State collapse and civil conflict to deadly infectious disease, extreme poverty and the destruction of the environment; (b) Pledge full compliance with all articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention in order to further strengthen the multilateral framework for nonproliferation and disarmament, and in particular: (i) Resolve to bring to an early conclusion negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; (ii) Reaffirm their commitment to a moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to the objective of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; (iii) Resolve to adopt the Model Additional Protocol as the norm for verifying compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (iv) Commit themselves to expediting agreement on alternatives, consistent with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons principles of the right to peaceful uses and the obligations for non-proliferation, to the acquisition of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities;

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(v) Commit themselves to further strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; (vi) Urge all chemical-weapon States to expedite the scheduled destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles; (c) Develop legally binding international instruments to regulate the marking, tracing and illicit brokering of small arms and light weapons; and ensure the effective monitoring and enforcement of United Nations arms embargoes; (d) Affirm that no cause or grievance, no matter how legitimate, justifies the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants; and declare that any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, constitutes an act of terrorism; (e) Resolve to implement the comprehensive United Nations counter-terrorism strategy presented by the Secretary-General to dissuade people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it; deny terrorists access to funds and materials; deter States from sponsoring terrorism; develop State capacity to defeat terrorism; and defend human rights; (f) Resolve to accede to all 12 international conventions against terrorism; and instruct their representatives to: (i)

Conclude a convention on nuclear terrorism as a matter of urgency;

(ii) Conclude a comprehensive convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly; (g) Commit themselves to acceding, as soon as possible, to all relevant international conventions on organized crime and corruption, and take all necessary steps to implement them effectively, including by incorporating the provisions of those conventions into national legislation and strengthening criminal justice systems; (h) Request the Security Council to adopt a resolution on the use of force that sets out principles for the use of force and expresses its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force; such principles should include: a reaffirmation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to the use of force, including those of Article 51; a reaffirmation of the central role of the Security Council in the area of peace and security; a reaffirmation of the right of the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and security, including in cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity; and the need to consider — when contemplating whether to authorize or endorse the use of force — the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the proposed military action, whether means short of the use of force might reasonably succeed in stopping the threat, whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand and whether there is a reasonable chance of success;

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(i) Agree to establish a Peacebuilding Commission along the lines suggested in the present report, and agree to establish and support a voluntary standing fund for peacebuilding; (j) Create strategic reserves for United Nations peacekeeping; support the efforts by the European Union, the African Union and others to establish standby capacities as part of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities; and establish a United Nations civilian police standby capacity; (k) Ensure that Security Council sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced, including by strengthening the capacity of Member States to implement sanctions, establishing well resourced monitoring mechanisms, and ensuring effective and accountable mechanisms to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions.

III. Freedom to live in dignity 7. I urge Heads of State and Government to recommit themselves to supporting the rule of law, human rights and democracy — principles at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To this end, they should: (a) Reaffirm their commitment to human dignity by action to strengthen the rule of law, ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and promote democracy so that universally recognized principles are implemented in all countries; (b) Embrace the “responsibility to protect” as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this responsibility, recognizing that this responsibility lies first and foremost with each individual State, whose duty it is to protect its population, but that if national authorities are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if such methods appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required; (c) Support the 2005 treaty event, focusing on 31 multilateral treaties, and encourage any Government that has not done so to agree to ratify and implement all treaties relating to the protection of civilians; (d) Commit themselves to supporting democracy in their own countries, their regions and the world, and resolve to strengthen the United Nations capacity to assist emerging democracies, and to that end welcome the creation of a Democracy Fund at the United Nations to provide funding and technical assistance to countries seeking to establish or strengthen their democracy; (e) Recognize the important role of the International Court of Justice in adjudicating disputes among countries and agree to consider means to strengthen the work of the Court.

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IV. The imperative for collective action: strengthening the United Nations 8. To make the United Nations a more effective and efficient instrument for forging a united response to shared threats and shared needs, I urge Heads of State and Government to: (a) Reaffirm the broad vision of the founders of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, for it to be organized, resourced and equipped to address the full range of challenges confronting the peoples of the world across the broad fields of security, economic and social issues, and human rights, and in that spirit to commit themselves to reforming, restructuring and revitalizing its major organs and institutions, where necessary, to enable them to respond effectively to the changed threats, needs and circumstances of the twenty-first century;

General Assembly (b) Revitalize the General Assembly by: (i) Instructing their representatives to adopt, at its sixtieth session, a comprehensive package of reforms to revitalize the General Assembly, including by rationalizing its work and speeding up the deliberative process, streamlining its agenda, its committee structure and its procedures for plenary debates and requesting reports, and strengthening the role and authority of its President; (ii) Resolving to give focus to the substantive agenda of the General Assembly by concentrating on addressing the major substantive issues of the day, such as international migration and the long-debated comprehensive convention on terrorism; (iii) Establishing mechanisms enabling the Assembly to engage fully and systematically with civil society;

Security Council (c) Reform the Security Council to make it more broadly representative of the international community as a whole and the geopolitical realities of today, and to expand its membership to meet these goals, by: (i) Supporting the principles for the reform of the Council and considering the two options, models A and B, proposed in the present report, as well as any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model; (ii) Agreeing to take a decision on this important issue before the summit in September 2005. It would be far preferable for Member States to take this vital decision by consensus. If, however, they are unable to reach consensus, this must not become an excuse for postponing action;

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348 Economic and Social Council (d) Reform the Economic and Social Council by:

(i) Mandating the Economic and Social Council to hold annual ministeriallevel assessments of progress towards agreed development goals, particularly the Millennium Development Goals; (ii) Deciding that it should serve as a high-level development cooperation forum, reviewing trends in international development cooperation, promoting greater coherence among the development activities of different actors and strengthening the links between the normative and operational work of the United Nations; (iii) Encouraging it to convene timely meetings, as required, to assess threats to development, such as famines, epidemics and major natural disasters, and to promote coordinated responses to them; (iv) Deciding that the Council should regularize its work in post-conflict management by working with the proposed Peacebuilding Commission;

Proposed Human Rights Council (e) Agree to replace the Commission on Human Rights with a smaller standing Human Rights Council, as a principal organ of the United Nations or subsidiary body of the General Assembly, whose members would be elected directly by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting;

Secretariat (f)

Reform the Secretariat by:

(i) Endorsing the Secretary-General’s request that the General Assembly review all mandates older than five years to see if the activities concerned are still genuinely needed or whether resources assigned to them can be reallocated in response to new and emerging challenges; (ii) Agreeing to provide the Secretary-General with the authority and resources to pursue a one-time staff buyout so as to refresh and realign the staff to meet current needs; (iii) Deciding that Member States should work with the Secretary-General to undertake a comprehensive review of the budget and human resources rules under which the Organization operates; (iv) Endorsing the package of management reforms that the Secretary-General is undertaking to improve accountability, transparency and efficiency within the Secretariat;

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(v) Commissioning a comprehensive review of the Office of Internal Oversight Services with a view to strengthening its independence and authority, as well as its expertise and capacity;

System-wide coherence (g) Ensure stronger system-wide coherence by resolving to coordinate their representatives on the governing boards of the various development and humanitarian agencies so as to make sure that they pursue a coherent policy in assigning mandates and allocating resources throughout the system; (h) Commit themselves to protecting humanitarian space and ensuring that humanitarian actors have safe and unimpeded access to vulnerable populations; resolve to act on proposals to accelerate humanitarian response by developing new funding arrangements to ensure that emergency funding is available immediately; and support the Secretary-General’s effort to strengthen the inter-agency and country-level responses to the needs of internally displaced persons; (i) Recognize the need for a more integrated structure for environmental standardsetting, scientific discussion and monitoring, and treaty compliance that is built on existing institutions, such as UNEP, as well as the treaty bodies and specialized agencies, and that assigns environmental activities at the operational level to the development agencies to ensure an integrated approach to sustainable development;

Regional organizations (j) Support a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, including by, as a first step, developing and implementing a 10-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union, and by ensuring that regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping consider the option of placing such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;

Charter of the United Nations (k) Decide to eliminate the references to “enemy States” contained in Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter of the United Nations; to delete Article 47 on the Military Staff Committee and the references to the Committee contained in Articles 26, 45 and 46; and to delete Chapter XIII on The Trusteeship Council.

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II.4 THE MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, 7 September 2005 1

CONTENTS Chapter

Page

PREFACE TO REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE.......................................................

354

CHAPTER 1 – REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ......................................................

359

I.

INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................

359

II.

HISTORY...........................................................................................................

365

A.

The formal negotiations .............................................................................

366

B.

The backchannel discussions and Iraq’s plan to pass money to SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali ...............................................................................

366

III.

THE PROGRAMME FRAMEWORK...............................................................

368

IV.

THE KEY ACTORS ..........................................................................................

369

A.

The Security Council and its 661 Committee ............................................

369

B.

The Secretary-General, the Secretariat, and the Office of the Iraq Programme .................................................................................................

372

The UN-related Agencies...........................................................................

374

C.

1 Paul A. Volcker, Richard J. Goldstone, Mark Pieth, The Management of the United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme, The Report of the Committee, Volume I, 7 September 2005.

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Page

APPROVAL OF CONTRACTS UNDER THE PROGRAMME ......................

374

A.

Oil sales......................................................................................................

374

B.

Goods purchases ........................................................................................

375

THE SCHEMES TO DERIVE ILLICIT INCOME AND RESPONSE OF THE SECURITY-COUNCIL.............................................................................

375

A.

Manipulation of Programme transactions ..................................................

377

B.

Smuggling ..................................................................................................

380

C.

Sources and amounts of illicit income to Iraq ............................................

382

VII. MALADMINISTRATION OF THE PROGRAMME .......................................

388

VI.

A.

The Executive Director and OIP ................................................................

388

B.

Oversight from the 38th Floor.....................................................................

391

C.

Summation .................................................................................................

395

VIII. AGENCIES: THE PROGRAMME IN THE THREE NORTHERN GOVERNORATES............................................................................................

395

IX.

PROGRAMME ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ..................................................

398

A.

Agency administrative expense recovery...................................................

398

B.

Post-invasion Programme ..........................................................................

400

C.

Misstatement of Programme administrative costs......................................

401

CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT ........................................................................

401

A.

Internal audits of the agencies....................................................................

402

B.

External audits............................................................................................

403

C.

United Nations Investigations Division .....................................................

403

D.

Conclusions................................................................................................

404

X.

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Chapter XI.

Page

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................

405

A.

The Security Council struggled .................................................................

405

B.

Administrative and personnel structure not adequate ................................

406

C.

Lack of effective controls ..........................................................................

407

D.

Instances of corruption reflect control weaknesses....................................

407

E.

Lack of inter-agency coordination .............................................................

407

XII. MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................................................

407

A.

Create the position of chief operating officer ............................................

407

B.

Strengthen independence of oversight and auditing ..................................

408

C.

Improve coordination and the oversight framework for cross-agency programs ....................................................................................................

408

D.

Reform and improve management performance........................................

409

E.

Expand conflict-of-interest and financial disclosure requirements............

409

F.

Cost recovery .............................................................................................

410

XIII. ANNEX 1: BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ...........................

411

XIV. ANNEX 2: THE MANDATE OF THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMMITTEE....................................................................................................

413

XV. ANNEX 3: FINDINGS ......................................................................................

415

A.

The Secretariat and OIP.............................................................................

415

B.

The selection of Cotecna Inspection S.A. ..................................................

416

C.

The cost of administering the Programme .................................................

418

D.

Assessment of Programme oversight.........................................................

418

E.

Management of Programme funds.............................................................

421

F.

Performance of the UN-related agencies ...................................................

421

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Page

XVI. ANNEX 4: SUMMARY OF THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMME (“WORKING GROUP” STUDY) ...........................................

423

A.

Positive impacts .........................................................................................

423

B.

Negative aspects.........................................................................................

424

CHAPTER II – SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ILLICIT INCOME TO IRAQ .....

426

I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY...............................................................

426

II.

ILLICIT PAYMENT ON PROGRAMME CONTRACTS................................

427

A.

Illicit income from oil surcharges ..............................................................

427

B.

Illicit income from humanitarian contract kickbacks .................................

429

ILLICIT INCOME FROM SMUGGLING ........................................................

434

A.

Volume of oil available for smuggling.......................................................

434

B.

Estimated income from oil smuggled.........................................................

435

THE IMPACT OF DISTORTED PRICES.........................................................

435

A.

Underpricing of oil sold under the Programme..........................................

436

B.

Underpricing of oil sold outside of the Programme ...................................

439

C.

Overpricing of humanitarian goods............................................................

439

SUMMARY OF ILLICIT INCOME EARNED.................................................

441

III.

IV.

V.

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In April of 2004, the Independent Inquiry Committee was charged by the SecretaryGeneral and the Security Council with the task of thoroughly reviewing the management of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. That Programme was certainly the largest, most complex, and most ambitious humanitarian relief effort in the history of the United Nations Organization. In the Programme’s administration, the Organization had to deal with a mixture of political, security, financial, and economic concerns. Almost every part of the United Nations family was involved, beginning with the Security Council, the central Secretariat under the Secretary-General, and nine of the UN-related Agencies, with varying degrees of financial and operational independence. The Committee Report provides a broad and intensive review and analysis of the Programme. It reflects more than a year’s work by dozens of experienced attorneys, seasoned investigators, and forensic specialists drawn from twenty-eight countries. Constraints of time, concerns for personnel security in Iraq, and lack of full cooperation by some member states and individuals, means that examination of some parts of the Programme has been less detailed than others. However, the Committee firmly believes that its investigation and this Report provide a solid base for fairly evaluating the Programme’s administration. Moreover, given the breadth of the Programme, and the involvement of so many arms of the United Nations, the difficulties encountered -- the politicization of decision-making, the managerial weaknesses, the ethical lapses -- are symptomatic of systemic problems in United Nations administration. Consequently, the lessons drawn are broadly applicable to the Organization as a whole. The main conclusions are unambiguous. The Organization requires stronger executive leadership, administrative reform, and more reliable controls and auditing.

thoroughgoing

At stake is the United Nations’ ability to respond promptly and effectively to the responsibilities thrust upon it by the realities of a turbulent, and often violent, world. In the last analysis, that ability rests upon the Organization’s credibility -- on maintaining a widely -- held perception among member states and their populations of its competence, honesty, and accountability. It is precisely those qualities that too often were absent in the administration of the Oil-for-Food Programme. Conceived as a means for reconciling strong sanctions against a corrupt Iraqi regime with needed supplies of food and medicines to an innocent and vulnerable population, the Programme did achieve important successes. Its existence helped maintain the international effort to deprive Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, a new study commissioned by the Committee confirms that minimal standards of nutrition and health were maintained in the face of a potential crisis.

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Those were real accomplishments. They were achieved despite uncertain, wavering direction from the Security Council, pressures from competing political forces in Iraq, and endemic corruption on the ground. Sadly, those successes fell under an increasingly dark shadow. As the years passed, reports spread of waste, inefficiency, and corruption, even within the United Nations itself. Some was rumor and exaggeration, but much -- too much -- has turned out to be true. The Committee Report documents how differences among member states impeded decision-making, tolerated large-scale smuggling, and aided and abetted grievous weaknesses in administrative practices within the Secretariat. An adequate framework of controls and auditing was absent. There were, in fact, instances of corruption among senior staff as well as in the field. As a result, serious questions have emerged about the United Nations’ ability to live up to its ideals. One perspective is that the United Nations Organization was simply asked to do too much, too soon, without any clear sense of how long the Programme would continue; it was authorized only in six-month increments. As time passed, the huge flow of funds far exceeded that of ordinary United Nations operations. Thousands of staff were hired and deployed in the field, overtaxing weak management oversight and accountability. The Committee’s investigation clearly makes the point that, as the Programme expanded and continued, Saddam Hussein found ways and means of turning it to his own advantage. For the UN-related Agencies, the work went beyond their core competencies -from monitoring, planning, and consulting -- to rebuilding of infrastructure, thereby multiplying problems. Nor was there much success in coordinating so large a program among the Agencies, which are accustomed to defending zealously their individual autonomy. In the light of those failures, the Committee has asked itself a simple question: Should the United Nations -- the Secretariat and its Agencies -- simply put their collective feet down, and refuse to take on such costly and complicated operational programs for which it is ill-equipped? Of course, a realistic answer cannot be so simple. Fresh emergencies, cutting across particular agency missions will surely recur. Differences in political priorities among members of the Security Council are a fact of life. In the absence of the United Nations, no other organization or nation, or no grouping of organizations or nations, may be readily available, or available at all, to take on the complex missions cutting across national boundaries and diverse areas of competence. And, singly or together, the Agencies do have skills and experience -- and a presumption of legitimacy -- difficult or impossible to match. Interestingly, in at least one large area, peacekeeping and nation-building, the United Nations is called upon more and more frequently. The “blue helmets” do convey a sense of international legitimacy, and the United Nations over time has built some infrastructure and professional management. In the case of the Oil-for-Food Programme, no similar structure, no adequate capacity for planning within or among the Agencies, and no adequate control or auditing framework was in place.

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The basic lessons the Committee has drawn from its review are both pointed and broad. In sum: 1. However well-conceived the Programme was in principle, the Security Council failed to define clearly the practical parameters, policies, and administrative responsibilities. Far too much initiative was left to the Iraqi regime in the Programme’s design and subsequent implementation. Compounding that difficulty, the Security Council, in contrast to most past practice, retained within its own sanctions committee of national diplomats substantial elements of operational control. Neither the Security Council nor the Secretariat leadership was clearly in command. That turned out to be a recipe for the dilution of Secretariat authority and evasion of personal responsibility at all levels. When things went awry-and they surely did-when troublesome conflicts arose between political objectives and administrative effectiveness, decisions were delayed, bungled, or simply shunned. 2. The administrative structure and the personnel practices of the Organization -certainly within the Secretariat-were simply not fit to meet the truly extraordinary challenges presented by the Oil-for-Food Programme, or even programs of much lesser scope. The Committee Reports reveal serious instances of illicit, unethical, and corrupt behavior within the United Nations, but the pervasive administrative difficulties were not only, or even primarily, related to personal malfeasance. As will become evident in the Committee’s next, and final, report, the wholesale corruption within the Programme took place among private companies, manipulated by Saddam Hussein's government. The United Nations Charter designates the Secretary-General as Chief Administrative Officer. Whatever the founders had in mind, the Secretary-General -- any SecretaryGeneral-has not been chosen for his managerial or administrative skills, nor has he been provided with a structure and instruments conducive to strong executive oversight and control. That is most clearly evident in the area of personnel management, where professional competence must compete with, and often take second place to, the narrow political interests of member states. The reality is that the Secretary-General has come to be viewed as chief diplomatic and political agent of the United Nations. The present Secretary-General is widely respected for precisely those qualities. In these turbulent times, those responsibilities tend to be all consuming. The record amply reflects consequent administrative failings. 3. Most notable among the United Nations’ structural faults is a grievous absence of effective auditing and management controls. In both areas, the General Assembly has taken steps to develop competence and accountability, but that belated effort has fallen far short of what is needed. The Oil-for-Food Programme has exposed chronic weakness of planning, sorely inadequate funding, and the simple absence of enough professional personnel to implement controls and auditing. That remained true even as the Programme grew exponentially in its financial magnitude, eclipsing in size ordinary United Nations operations. As important was the palpable absence of authority for the auditors and the lack of clear, if any, reporting lines to “the Top.” As a consequence, needed independence was absent. Line managers could and did divert auditing initiatives. Follow-up to critical findings was erratic or non-existent.

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4. The isolated instances of corruption detailed in the earlier Committee Reports extend to the top of the Programme administration -- one important reflection of the managerial weaknesses. Those egregious lapses signal the absence of a sufficiently strong organizational ethic -- an ethic that should permeate its leadership and staff if the United Nations is to command the respect upon which its work depends. Corrosive corruption -- private and public -- has been far too common, not least in member states in which the United Nations has programs of economic and humanitarian assistance. In that environment, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat management have been insufficiently conscious of the need to seize the Organization’s unique opportunity to exemplify and encourage the highest standards of conduct in international affairs. 5. Finally, the particular nature of the Oil-For-Food Programme placed in stark relief the difficulties of effective cooperation among United Nations Agencies. There was and is no simple way accurately to track Programme expenditures across agency lines. The presumption of central budgetary authority for the Oil-for-Food Programme was not matched by an ability to assess actual spending (much less the effectiveness of spending), or to insist on uniform accounting standards or treatment. Surely the difficulties perceived should not be tolerated in any other programs, however large or small. The inescapable conclusion from the Committee’s work is that the United Nations Organization needs thoroughgoing reform -- and it needs it urgently. That is not surprising. It is a central point in all recent studies of the United Nations, including those initiated by the Secretary-General himself. The work of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-forFood Programme does bring new dimensions to the discussion. Its investigation is unprecedented in its breadth and depth. It has involved not only the Security Council and the Secretariat in New York, but has touched directly upon nine other members of the United Nations family. The urgent need for action can be summarized in four broad recommendations: x The Security Council, in making decisions about United Nations intervention in critical areas, should clarify each program’s purpose and criteria. The execution should be delegated to the Secretariat and appropriate Agencies, with clear lines of reporting responsibility. x To provide the needed focus for the administrative responsibilities of the Secretariat, there should be a Chief Operating Officer (“COO”), nominated by the Security Council and approved by the General Assembly. While ultimately reporting to the Secretary-General, the new COO should have access to the Security Council, and should have clear authority for planning and for personnel practices that emphasize professional and administrative talent over political convenience. x A strong “Independent Auditing Board,” with adequate staff support, must be built. That Board should go well beyond financial audits to full review of the staffing and

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budgeting of accounting and auditing services. Auditing, control, and investigatory staffs should have direct access to that Board and be subject to its oversight. x In programs extending over more than one agency, effective coordination should be required from the start by clear and agreed memoranda of understanding and enforced by common accounting and auditing standards. Most of these measures could be accomplished by decision of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the individual Agencies. But if changes in the Charter are required to implement reform and to underscore its importance, then member states should not shrink from that effort. What is important -- what has been recognized by one investigation after another -- is that real change take place, and change over a wide area. Clear benchmarks for measuring progress must be set. The General Assembly should insist, in its forthcoming meeting, that key reforms be put in place no later than the time of its regular meeting in 2006. To settle for less, to permit delay and dilution, will invite failure, further erode public support, and dishonor the ideals upon which the United Nations is built. The time for action is now. Paul A. Volcker, Chairman Richard J. Goldstone, Member Mark Pieth, Member

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Henceforth, the most comprehensive coercive economic measures ever devised by the UN were tempered by the largest humanitarian relief operation in the UN’s history. Netherlands Ambassador to the United Nations, Peter van Walsum, 661 Committee Chair (1999-2000). Yesterday’s Iraqi oil agreement was a great plus for the UN and you personally. Congratulations. But a word of caution! The story the press will be looking for next is how Saddam Hussein circumvents the agreement and diverts the oil for his own, or military, use. It will be critical for the UN’s monitoring of the agreement, and delivery of medical aid to the needy, to be watertight. If there are flaws, the story will quickly turn negative. Note to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali from an adviser on May 21, 1996, the day after signing of the agreement between Iraq and the United Nations to start the Oilfor-Food Programme.

I. INTRODUCTION A temporary United Nations program to provide urgent humanitarian relief to Iraq stretched to seven years and more than $100 billion in transactions (over $64 billion in oil sales and almost $37 billion for food, medicines, and equipment). A rising chorus of complaints and allegations of corruption and maladministration led the Secretary-General - with the support of the Security Council -- to appoint a committee to conduct an independent inquiry. The three-member Independent Inquiry Committee (Paul A. Volcker, Chair, and Justice Richard J. Goldstone and Prof. Mark Pieth, Members), 1 supported by an international staff of over seventy-five investigators, lawyers, forensic accountants, and support personnel, thus came into being. At the time of their appointment, the Committee members well appreciated the magnitude of what they were called upon to do. In the words of the Committee’s Chair, Paul Volcker: Each of us well understands that serious charges so widely aired could threaten the effectiveness of the UN in contributing to a constructive resolution of the Iraqi situation and in other areas. It is the need for prompt, convincing, and truthful responses to these charges which leads to our willingness to respond positively to your invitation to serve on the Committee. Equally, the Committee was fully cognizant that the seriousness of the allegations swirling about the Oil-for-Food Programme demanded an inquiry that was efficient and comprehensive, yet fair and impartial towards each individual and entity within the scope of the investigation. The Committee members were also mindful of the need for full 1

Short biographies of the Committee members are attached as Annex 1 to this Chapter.

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disclosure of the Committee’s findings, for cooperation with other official inquiries within the limits imposed by investigative requirements, and for providing the international community with a full and accurate accounting of what occurred within the Programme. Consistent with the Committee’s mandate, 1 the central issues to be addressed were: 1. Whether there was mismanagement and maladministration in the execution of the Programme by the United Nations, its personnel, and agents; 2. Whether any United Nations officials, personnel, or agents engaged in any illicit or corrupt activities in connection with the Programme; and 3. Whether contractors of the United Nations, purchasers of oil, or providers of humanitarian aid engaged in any illicit or corrupt activities in connection with the Programme. As this Report amply demonstrates, the answer to each of these questions is yes. But that simple answer cannot convey the virtually unprecedented complexities of the challenge presented to the United Nations, nor the magnitude of what was actually accomplished. Moreover, this Report contains criticisms of the actions of certain United Nations officials. However, the Committee is well aware that a great many United Nations staff members performed their responsibilities with devotion and diligence amidst considerable challenges posed by the size of the Programme and, at times, defiance from the former Government of Iraq. Given its mandate, it should not be surprising that the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations focus on the Programme’s flaws and weaknesses. Based partly on a study commissioned by the Committee to test the premises of the Programme 2 and partly on its investigation, it is clear to the Committee that the Programme achieved considerable successes, notably in maintaining minimal standards of nutrition and health. The Programme also contributed to the maintenance and longevity of sanctions against Iraq, helping to ensure that Iraq would not obtain weapons of mass destruction. However, success came at substantial cost. From the outset, Iraq, ever desirous of ways to lighten or remove the sanctions, tried to manipulate political differences within the Security Council. The Iraqi regime siphoned off substantial funds. Companies, registered with national governments for the purpose of doing business under the Programme, were complicit in providing illicit payments to Iraq. There was corruption within the United Nations at a critical management point. There was exposure of important administrative and control weaknesses both within the United Nations Secretariat and among the constituent parts of the United Nations family operating in Iraq. The consequences? An avoidable loss of assistance to Iraq’s population and a grievous loss of credibility to the United Nations. The Committee began work in May 2004 and will conclude its investigation in October 2005. In the course of its investigation, the Committee has interviewed over 1 2

See Annex 2 to this Chapter, A summary is provided as Annex 4 to this Chapter.

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1,100 individuals, companies, and governments in many countries on six continents. It has collected over twelve million pages of documents, both paper and electronic. The vast majority of these documents originated with the United Nations, but governments and private third parties provided approximately a half million such documents. By the conclusion of its work, the Committee will have issued eight reports or briefing papers, of which this Report is the seventh. At the outset of its work, the Committee requested, and received, an instruction from the Secretary-General to all United Nations staff requiring their cooperation with the Inquiry. In the main, United Nations staff members have responded positively. On those rare occasions where there has been an initial reluctance to respond, it usually has been possible to resolve the matter to the Committee’s satisfaction. In this last context, Security Council Resolution 1538 welcomed the Committee’s appointment and, inter alia, called “upon the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, and all other member states including their national regulatory authorities, to cooperate fully by all appropriate means with the inquiry.” The Committee has sought the cooperation of various governments and their law enforcement and regulatory bodies. The Committee has worked closely with a wide range of national regulatory and law enforcement bodies and has received considerable help from numerous governments. 1 Among the latter, the Committee wishes, in particular, to note the help it has received from the Governments of Iraq which have succeeded the CPA, despite the violent and volatile conditions in that country. France, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have furnished substantial cooperation. There have also been several instances in which the Committee has received little or no help from governments or their internal agencies. Russia and China, while receiving investigators in their capitals, have not granted requests for important information and have refused to arrange access to some state-owned companies of interest to the Inquiry. The Committee has received significant assistance from the United States federal government through the United States Mission to the United Nations, and from the Department of State, and, at the state level, from the New York County District Attorney’s Office. Other organs of the United States federal government have refused cooperation. This Report focuses particularly on the management and oversight of the Programme amidst the Programme’s manipulation by Iraq. While not every aspect of the Programme could be examined in the same detail (as, for example, operations on the ground in Iraq), the Committee has a firm basis for reaching its conclusions leading to important recommendations. It also calls to account those involved who were found to be corrupt, broke the rules, or contributed to the Programme’s maladministration, wherever they are found, be it the top or the bottom of the Organization, inside or outside of the United Nations Secretariat. 2

1 For specifics on the cooperation received from different countries, see the Investigation Preface in Volume II of this Report. 2 The Committee’s conclusions and findings are detailed throughout this Report. The findings are also listed in Annex 3 to this Chapter. The Committee's major recommendations are presented in Part XII of this Chapter, and recommendations are addressed further in Chapter 6 of Volume IV.

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The Committee recognizes that United Nations staff administering the Programme were operating within an institutional structure that had not kept pace with the expansion of the scope of United Nations operations and the demands made on the Organization. This consideration is reflected in the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations. So far as management of the Programme was concerned, the Secretariat’s role and responsibility for the administration of the Programme must be viewed within the framework of the actions of the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council designed and outlined the basic requirements of the Programme. It charged its Iraq sanctions committee (known as “the 661 Committee”), which was made up of diplomats from each of the Security Council member states, with the monitoring of sanctions observance as well as primary supervision and operational approval of most transactions taking place under the Programme. Specifically, under the Programme, the 661 Committee enacted rules for the review and approval of contracts, approved the price at which oil was sold, and reviewed individual contracts for humanitarian goods. To a significant degree, reports of Iraq’s manipulation of the Programme were not redressed by the Security Councilor the 661 Committee. As the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations, the Secretary-General carried out oversight and management responsibilities for the entire Secretariat. That particularly included auditing and controls functions that had demonstrable problems with respect to the Programme, as discussed elsewhere in this Report. The Secretariat -- and, in particular, the Office of Iraq Programme (“OIP”) headed by Executive Director Benon Sevan -- had significant responsibilities to implement and administer the Programme, responsibilities that in some material places intersected with the role and activities of the Security Council and its 661 Committee. This Report describes at length the large number of failures of Mr. Sevan in his duty to report and respond to information of violations of the sanctions against Iraq and of the rules governing transactions under the Programme. As problems arose with the Programme, the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General were reluctant to recognize their own responsibility for the Programme’s shortcomings. They did not ensure that critical evidence was brought to the attention of the Security Council and the 661 Committee. Moreover, they made minimal efforts to address sanctions violations with Iraqi officials, and they inadequately oversaw the activities of Mr. Sevan and OIP in the administration of more than $100 billion of transactions under the programme. 1 In sum, in light of these circumstances, the cumulative management performance of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General fell short of the standards that the United Nations Organization should strive to maintain. In making these findings, the Committee has recognized both the difficult administrative demands imposed upon the Secretariat and the Secretary-General both by the design of the Programme, and the overlapping Security Council responsibilities. 1

For the investigative report on these matters, see Chapters 1 to 6 of Volume III of this Report.

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One chapter of this Report returns to the award to Cotecna Inspection S.A. -a company that employed Kojo Annan, the son of the Secretary-General -- of a Programme contract to conduct inspections of humanitarian goods entering Iraq. 1 Since a prior report by the Committee on this issue, investigations have gone forward to determine whether Kojo Annan was involved with the Programme. In addition, new information emerged that, taken at face value, bore directly on the question of whether the Secretary-General was aware that the firm employing his son was actively bidding for a United Nations inspection contract. The Committee carefully reviewed additional telephone billing records of Kojo Annan that make clear that, in the autumn of 1998, Kojo Annan placed calls to the United Nations procurement department and that, at other times, he also called the SecretaryGeneral. However, the pattern of calling times is not clearly suggestive that Kojo Annan discussed Cotecna’s interest with the Secretary-General. The remaining documents newly disclosed by Kojo Annan do not reflect communications between Kojo Annan and the Secretary-General about Cotecna’s contract bid. With respect to a memorandum of December 4, 1998 that was written by Michael Wilson of Cotecna, its description of “discussions” with the “SG and his entourage” about Cotecna’s contract bid has not been corroborated. The witnesses do not support Mr. Wilson’s account, and he himself has refuted it. This supports the Secretary-General’s denial that such a meeting occurred. Moreover, there is no evidence that Cotecna credited or acted upon Mr. Wilson’s message. Serious questions persist about the character and credibility of Mr. Wilson. The Committee therefore has little assurance that he did not conjure an account of discussions with the Secretary-General in order to make himself appear more important to his principals at Cotecna. The Committee therefore affirms its prior finding that, weighing all of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, the evidence is not reasonably sufficient to show that the Secretary-General knew that Cotecna had submitted a bid on the humanitarian inspection contract in 1998. The Committee also affirms its prior finding that no credible evidence exists that the Secretary-General influenced, or attempted to influence, the procurement process in 1998 leading to the selection of Cotecna. As to the adequacy of the Secretary-General’s response to press reports in January 1999 of a possible conflict of interest, the Committee reemphasizes its earlier conclusion that the Secretary-General was not diligent and effective in pursuing an investigation of the procurement of Cotecna. What is now known about Kojo Annan’s efforts to intervene in the procurement process underscores the Committee's prior finding that a thorough and independent investigation of the allegations regarding Kojo Annan’s relationship with Cotecna was required in 1999. An investigation likely would have resolved the issues arising from the Cotecna bid process and the consequent conflict-of-interest concerns.

1 Independent Inquiry Committee, “Second Interim Report” (Mar. 29, 2005) (hereinafter “Second Interim Report”).

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The Inquiry’s investigation of Programme administration has been less intensive on the ground in Iraq. Largely due to the disturbed conditions in Iraq, it has not been possible to access witnesses or review financial records (where they exist) to the extent the investigation believed warranted. In fact, given the size and complexity of the Programme, it is doubtful that the Inquiry would have been able to render a full accounting within the timeframe of the work in Iraq, even in ideal conditions. However, the Committee has gathered sufficient information to comment on organizational and management gaps and lapses on the part of the United Nations and its Agencies and on the prejudicial behavior of Saddam Hussein’s government in relation to the Programme. The details of outright corruption by contractors will be dealt with in the Committee’s final report in October, which will describe how companies doing business under the Programme acquiesced in Iraqi demands for surcharges on oil contracts and kickbacks on humanitarian goods contracts. The Committee believes that its comments, criticisms, conclusions, and recommendations will be, and should be, seen against the wider canvas of United Nations reform. Moreover, the Committee’s conclusions and the recommendations arising from them, are generally consonant with recommendations by others who have urged and are urging early action on United Nations reform. However, the Committee has a unique contribution to make to this topic as a result of the depth and detail to which the Committee has analyzed the Programme. Reform is imperative if the United Nations is to regain and retain the measure of respect among the international community that its work requires. Broadly, the Committee’s conclusions address the adequacy of political oversight and direction, the capacity of the Secretariat to manage the Programme, the United Nations’ ability to provide financial oversight and control of the Programme, and the capacity of the disparate bodies within the United Nations system to work effectively and efficiently together in an enterprise of this complexity and size. The Committee recognizes that the United Nations was faced with an extraordinary challenge for which it was ill-equipped in terms of experience and administrative capacity, and that it faced conflicting political pressures that heightened the management challenges. The Committee also believes that the successes of the Programme, although not extensively chronicled here, should not be buried by the allegations of corruption that have enjoyed so much attention in the media and elsewhere. That said, the Committee believes: first, “professional disciplines” at the United Nations are weak and eroded, and the Secretariat, from its senior levels on down, proved unable to deal effectively with political pressures on its administrative processes; second, there appears to be a pervasive culture of responsibility avoidance and resistance to accountability; third, there was, at the time, an absence of suitable administrative infrastructure for dealing with the exceptional and sudden demands of this “temporary” operational program; and fourth, there was an absence of adequate and independent control and auditing capacity -- and little or no desire by the Programme’s Executive Director to develop one. From these conclusions, and others in the same vein, there arise a number of basic questions. To what extent can professional competence, disciplined management, and

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effective controls be achieved in an Organization deeply influenced by national, and often conflicting, political interests? Should the United Nations (including the Security Council and the Secretariat) strictly limit operational responsibility (to say, peacekeeping) in light of its inherent limited administrative capacity? If so, can others (e.g., United Nations specialized agencies) be delegated to meet operational challenges? With what oversight? If not, how can the administrative capacity of the United Nations be strengthened? Does the Secretary-General have enough authority? Should the role of Deputy Secretary-General be strengthened and made more explicit? Should the Deputy Secretary-General be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, as is the case with the Secretary-General? Should there not be radical change in the hiring and evaluation practices of the personnel system, especially at senior levels? These questions can be constructively answered only by proceeding with needed and fundamental administrative reforms.

II. HISTORY In the early morning hours of August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein sent thousands of Iraqi soldiers across the desert to invade and occupy Kuwait. Four days later in New York City, the Security Council responded with a landmark measure -- Resolution 66l -- to prohibit most forms of trade and financial transactions with Iraq. After a multilateral coalition of forces liberated Kuwait in February 1991, the Security Council passed Resolution 687 to continue the sanctions subject to Saddam Hussein’s compliance with conditions for disarmament and his cooperation with international weapons inspections. Saddam Hussein did not comply, and the broad sanctions regime remained with little effective action to respond to the humanitarian consequences through the first half of the 1990s. Two initial resolutions by the Security Council in 1991 to authorize Iraq to sell oil in return for food and medicine for its people were not accepted by Iraq, ostensibly on the grounds that they infringed its sovereignty. However, it is clear that the Iraqi leadership viewed those efforts as an impediment to its overriding goal of persuading the Security Council that sanctions should be lifted entirely. Thus, the Iraqi leadership feared that agreement to a relief program would take the pressure off the Security Council to lift sanctions in their entirety. What led to success in establishing an oil-for-food program over time? Beyond the worsening economic and humanitarian condition in Iraq, two events interposed. The first took place early in 1995. To counter eroding support for the maintenance of sanctions and an inclination among some Security Council members to significantly reduce them, the United States, with other members of the Security Council, put forward a new resolution for an oil-for-food program that was intended to be more palatable to the Iraqi leadership than the initial oil-for-food resolutions that had been adopted in 1991. This proposal was adopted by the Security Council, becoming Resolution 986 -- the basic operational template for the Oil-for-Food Programme. In the summer of 1995, the second significant event occurred -- the defection of a high-level Iraqi official, General Hussein Kamel, son-in-law to Saddam Hussein. His disclosures of Iraq’s illicit weapons programs caused the Security Council to defer

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indefinitely any consideration of modifying or lifting sanctions, and this in turn caused Iraq to reconsider its stance and consider entering into negotiations with the United Nations about implementing the Programme. Through the autumn of 1995, both Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and such countries as France and Russia urged Iraq to negotiate pursuant to Resolution 986. Others also put pressure on Iraq to negotiate. The upshot was that the Iraqi leadership eventually changed tack and, by January 1996, agreed to negotiate on the basis of Resolution 986, under the direct aegis of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. 1

A. The formal negotiations On the eve of negotiations in early 1996, the Secretary-General gathered his senior staff, including Hans Corell, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, and directed a “flexible” approach with Iraq. Negotiations eventually involved some fifty meetings from February to May 1996. They involved mostly highly technical discussions of the mechanics of the Programme’s operation, before the two sides reached agreement on May 20, 1996 on the terms of a formal memorandum of understanding (the “Iraq-UN MOU”). Before negotiations began, the Secretary-General instructed his delegation to keep the talks confidential so as to not to provide an opportunity for members of the Security Council to obstruct or “micro-manage” developments. Throughout negotiations, the United States and the United Kingdom made their respective views well known to both the Secretary-General and Mr. Corell. In addition, the two governments, given access to a draft memorandum of understanding at a late stage in the negotiations, were able to tighten some of the provisions in the draft agreement, including those concerning the in-country monitoring and in-country distribution systems. Their additions to the draft consistently shifted decision-making and oversight from Baghdad to the Secretary-General or the 661 Committee. Their comments, however, neither altered nor addressed the basic design of the Programme or its inherent flexibility. In accordance with a basic presumption that the export of oil and the import of humanitarian goods under the Programme would be governed by fair market value, the Iraq-UN MOU affirmed that it would fall to Iraq, and not the United Nations, to choose the parties to whom it would sell oil and, except in northern Iraq, the parties from whom Iraq would purchase humanitarian goods.

B. The back channel discussions and Iraq’s plan to pass money to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali During the early 1990s, two men -- Samir Vincent and Tongsun Park -- insinuated themselves into the discussions between the United Nations and Iraq that led to the IraqUN MOU and implementation of the Oil-for-Food Programme. Samir Vincent, an Iraqiborn American businessman, maintained close ties to members of the Iraqi leadership. 1

A more detailed account of these negotiations is contained in Chapter 2 of Volume II of this Report.

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Tongsun Park was a Korean lobbyist in the United States who had developed a friendship with Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. The evidence gathered by the Committee reveals that both men served as a backchannel of communication between Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and Iraqi officials. As noted above, after the highly damaging disclosures resulting from the defection of General Hussein Kamel in August 1995, Iraq decided to enter into negotiation with the United Nations for an Oil-for-Food Programme. But with this choice came another decision from the Iraqi leadership: to attempt to pass money to the Secretary-General in order to ensure, in the words of Iraqi Oil Minister Amer Rashid, that the Secretary-General would be “more flexible” and would take steps to “ease the conclusion” of oil-for-food negotiations. In November 1995, before the beginning of negotiations and with the consent and approval of Saddam Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz instructed Mr. Rashid to enter into an agreement with Samir Vincent to pay Mr. Vincent $13.5 million or $15 million, with the understanding that at least part of the money would be paid to the Secretary-General to encourage him to be more favorable to Iraq in connection with the negotiation and implementation of the Programme. The Committee has determined that during 1996, as the Iraq-UN MOU was signed and the Programme first implemented, well over $1 million was paid to Mr. Vincent and Mr. Park in three installments. During this time, these individuals continued to act as a valuable backchannel of communication between Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and Iraqi officials. But the Committee has not found evidence that Secretary-General BoutrosGhali received or agreed to receive monies from Mr. Park and Mr. Vincent or that he was aware that Iraq was paying money to Mr. Park and Mr. Vincent. The former SecretaryGeneral denies that he was ever offered or received any money from these men or Iraqi officials. However, the Committee has determined that in 1996, during the time that Mr. Park received a series of payments from the Iraqi regime, he worked to garner support for the Secretary-General’s reelection campaign, which was strongly opposed by the United States. 1 Shortly after the departure of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, Iraq also sought to secure another high-level contact at the United Nations in 1997. Mr. Park introduced his Iraqi contacts to a Canadian, Maurice Strong -- Secretary-General Annan’s newlyappointed Executive Coordinator for United Nations Reform. Mr. Park had been talking to Mr. Strong about purchasing $1 million in shares of Cordex Petroleum, a company controlled by the Strong family, from a third party. Mr. Park, through his continuing relationship with Iraqi officials, obtained $1 million in cash, which he immediately used to consummate his stock purchase. Mr. Strong has indicated that he had no relationship to the Government of Iraq and has emphasized that he declined invitations to visit Iraq. While there is an indication that Iraqi officials tried to establish a relationship with Mr. Strong, the Committee has found no evidence that Mr. Strong was involved in Iraqi affairs or matters relating to the Programme or took any actions at the request of Iraqi officials. 2 1

Further discussion on this matter can be found in Chapter 2 of Volume II. Further discussion on this matter, including an analysis of the payment for Cordex stock, can be found in Chapter 2 of Volume II. 2

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Resolution 986 did not authorize Saddam Hussein to receive money directly from oil sales. Instead, it directed the Secretary-General to establish an escrow account to receive the oil sales proceeds. In accordance with a distribution plan to be proposed by Iraq and approved by the Secretary-General, approximately two-thirds of the money in the escrow account could be used to buy medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and essential civilian needs for the Iraqi people: fifty-three percent for the population in southern and central Iraq and thirteen percent for northern Iraq. The remainder was devoted to the United Nations Compensation Commission (“UNCC”) to pay victims of the war with Kuwait, to pay the costs of weapons inspections, and to defray other administrative and assistance costs, including 2.2 percent allocated to cover the costs of the United Nations for its administration of the Programme. Although described in Resolution 986 as “a temporary measure” for the Iraqi people, the Programme endured for seven years through to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003. Later resolutions of the Security Council repeatedly re-authorized the Programme in approximate half-year “phases” (each 180 days), resulting in a total of thirteen phases by the Programme’s end. Oil was first lifted under the Programme in December 1996, and the first shipment of humanitarian goods arrived in Iraq in March 1997. Initially, Iraq could export only $2 billion of oil per 180-day phase. Beginning in February 1998, the Security Council more than doubled the amount, to allow Iraq to sell up to $5.256 billion of oil per phase. Then, with the passage of Resolution 1284 in December 1999, the Security Council removed any limitation on the amount of oil that Iraq could sell under the Programme. As the Security Council authorized more oil sales, Iraq imported a wider range of humanitarian goods under the Programme. In early 1998, the Secretary-General’s review of the Programme noted that “the deterioration of basic infrastructure in other sectors [was] undermining the value of humanitarian inputs.” Consequently, in May 1998, the “Enhanced Distribution Plan,” extended the Programme to include infrastructural support. Throughout the Programme, the United Nations continued adding “sectors,” such as resettlement, settlement rehabilitation, demining, and housing. In 2002, the United Nations approved the addition often new sectors, including construction, the Board of Youth and Sports, culture, religious affairs, and justice. By 2003, after seven years of the Programme, the United Nations had enhanced the Programme’s scope to twenty-four sectors, far beyond the basics of food and medicine ordinarily associated with a humanitarian relief operation. At the outset of the Programme, the United Nations declined Iraq’s request to use proceeds from the Programme for the purchase of parts and equipment to maintain its oil industry infrastructure. But, in June 1998, the Security Council decided to authorize a limited “oil spare parts” program to allow Iraq to import up to $300 million of parts and equipment for the maintenance and improvement of its oil production and transport facilities. In March 2000, the Security Council doubled the “oil spare parts” exemption to $600 million per phase.

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From 1996 to 2003, Iraq sold more than $64 billion of oil under the Programme to 248 companies. Of these proceeds, approximately $32 billion was spent for southern and central Iraq, and nearly $5 billion was spent for northern Iraq. These funds purchased supplies from approximately 4,510 companies. After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Security Council terminated the economic sanctions against Iraq on May 22, 2003, and it directed the phase-out of the Programme’s ongoing operations by November 2003.

IV. THE KEY ACTORS The Programme required complex coordination efforts among three sets of institutions within the overall United Nations organizational framework: x

The Security Council and its 661 Committee;

x The United Nations Secretariat (including the Secretary-General and the Office of the Iraq Programme); and x

Nine United Nations humanitarian agencies.

A. The Security Council and its 661 Committee The fifteen-member United Nations Security Council has five permanent members -China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- known collectively as “the P-5.” The remaining ten member countries are elected by the General Assembly to serve two-year terms. The Security Council has authority under the United Nations Charter to impose economic sanctions -- a “complete or partial interruption of economic relations”-- where necessary to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” The member states of the United Nations are bound to “accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council” as provided under the United Nations Charter. With the passage of Resolution 661 imposing comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, the Security Council created a special sanctions committee -- the “661 Committee” -comprised of all fifteen Council members, in order to conduct ongoing oversight of the sanctions regime. Over time, the 661 Committee was entrusted with “monitoring the implementation of the sanctions regime in all its aspects,” in conjunction with “the cooperation of Member States and international organizations.” For the first several years of the 661 Committee’s existence -- before the creation of the Programm -- its principal role was to address various notifications and requests for exceptions from the sanctions regime (e.g., donations of food stuffs or other humanitarian goods). The 661 Committee was also charged with examining requests, under Article 50 of the United Nations Charter, for assistance by states adversely affected by the sanctions regime. Travel by airplane to Iraq also was ordinarily subject to notification to the 661 Committee. Finally, the 661 Committee was charged with reporting to the Security

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Council every ninety days on any reports it received from member states of sanctions violations involving the illegal trafficking of arms. The advent of the Programme fundamentally altered the 661 Committee's responsibilities. The Security Council assigned to the 661 Committee a central and virtually unprecedented operational role in the review and approval of billions of dollars of transactions that eventually would be conducted under the Programme. For oil sales transactions, the 661 Committee was in charge of reviewing and approving a monthly pricing mechanism and, in some cases, with reviewing and approving individual oil contracts. The 661 Committee’s rules provided for the assistance of four oil overseers -“independent experts in international oil trade” -- in these duties. In addition, “independent inspection agents” in Iraq were to monitor oil exports on-site and report weekly to the 661 Committee through the oil overseers in New York. For transactions of goods entering Iraq, during the first three years of the Programme (from 1997 to 1999), the 661 Committee was charged with reviewing all contracts and determining which ones were consistent with the relevant resolutions and therefore could be approved. Before the 661 Committee acted upon a contract, OIP was responsible in the first instance for reviewing each contract for the details of price and value and for determining if the goods identified in the contract were on the approved distribution plan. Several years into the Programme, the Security Council streamlined the approval procedures for goods contracts, progressively shifting approval responsibilities for certain kinds of goods from the 661 Committee to OIP. The 661 Committee remained responsible for reviewing for approval all contracts containing potential “dual use” goods (i.e., civilian goods with potential military use). The 661 Committee conducted two types of meetings: formal and informal. Formal meetings were recorded on audiotape and in the form of written minutes composed by the Secretariat and circulated to all members of the 661 Committee. By contrast, informal or “experts” meetings were not recorded in any regular fashion; what is known about these meetings can be determined only from individual notes of persons present at these meetings as well as from interviews of those with knowledge of what transpired. Predictably enough, the give-and-take among 661 Committee members at informal meetings was more open than at formal meetings. The 661 Committee conducted more than one hundred formal meetings during the Programme, and many more informal meetings. The proceedings of the 661 Committee are best understood in light of three procedural realities that materially influenced the manner in which it chose to resolve -- or not to resolve -- issues that came before it: x

The 661 Committee’s consensus rule of decision-making;

x The absence of genuine executive authority for the 661 Committee’s chairman; and x

The domination by the P-5 countries of the 661 Committee’s affairs.

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Very soon after its creation in August 1990, the 661 Committee decided that it would make decisions only by means of unanimous consent among all fifteen of its members. The Committee’s minutes do not make clear why it settled on a blanket consensus requirement. The 661 Committee was chaired by the permanent representative (ambassador) of a member country of the Security Council, excluding the five permanent members. In practice, the chair usually came from a western European country and normally served for two years. Given the inherent risk of controversy, it was not a widely sought-after appointment. The remaining representatives to the 661 Committee ordinarily were more junior diplomats from the remaining Security Council countries. Given its important operational responsibilities under the Programme, the 661 Committee's make-up of local diplomats, most with little experience in overseeing complex projects of this nature, diminished its effectiveness as a major building block of the Programme’s overall governance. Despite the title and ambassador-level rank, chairmen of the 661 Committee wielded little real authority. One chairman of the 661 Committee lamented his “most miserable” role because of the degree to which the 661 Committee was “polarized” and “dominated” by the P-5 who were most active and carried the bulk of the debate. This imbalance resulted in part from the more powerful position of P-5 members within the Security Council, coupled with the fact that the P-S members -- because of their permanency -- had longer institutional memories and records of participation in the affairs of the 661 Committee. Perhaps as important, they had a more sustained interest in the issue. 661 Committee Chairmen often have wry memories of their tenure. As one chairman remarked about his power as chairman: “I could say yes to consensus” among the P-5 countries. Another chairman asserted that the Secretariat of the United Nations was also an “instrument” of the P-5 and that the full 661 Committee was sometimes sidelined by the P -5 countries acting with the Secretariat. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the 661 Committee’s rules and procedures was what they did not require. Although established as a monitoring body, the 661 Committee’s rules did not require it to take action of any kind in response to a report of a violation of the sanctions regime or a violation of the Programme. With the exception of information indicating illegal arms trafficking, the 661 Committee rules were silent on any obligation to inquire or investigate -- much less to report or redress -- evidence of illegal activity undermining the sanctions and the Programme. An effort by one ambassador who briefly served as President of the Security Council to make the 661 Committee more responsive to such violations went nowhere. As discussed in the analytic Volumes that follow this Report, all these themes -- the consensus rule, the lack of chairmanship authority, the preeminence of the P-5 countries, and the lack of requirement for action in response to allegations of violations -- recurred throughout the Programme as the 661 Committee faced continuing challenges from Iraq’s effort to manipulate transactions for its political and economic gain.

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The United Nations Charter provides that the Secretary-General acts as the “chief administrative officer of the Organization.” The Secretary-General, in turn, is a member of the “Secretariat,” which comprises, to quote the Charter, “such staff as the Organization may require.” Although the 661 Committee retained a central role in the review and approval of transactions occurring under the Programme, the Secretary-General and the Secretariat were assigned significant administrative responsibilities for the Programme -- these included: (1) the selection of a bank to manage the escrow account (along with accountants to audit the account); (2) the appointment of inspection companies to monitor oil exported from Iraq and goods entering Iraq under the Programme; (3) the review and approval of Iraq’s distribution plan for goods imported under the Programme; (4) the preliminary review of goods contracts submitted for the 661 Committee's approval and, in the later years of the Programme, with the authority to approve a wide range of goods contracts; (5) the in-country observation and monitoring of goods that entered Iraq under the Programme; and (6) reporting to the Security Council through 90 and 180 day report requirements. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was Secretary-General when the Security Council passed Resolution 986 in April 1995 and when the United Nations entered into the memorandum of understanding with Iraq in May 1996. In June 1996, he selected a French bank -Banque Nationale de Paris (“BNP”) -- to manage and administer the escrow account. This was followed in July 1996 by the selection of a Dutch company -- Saybolt Eastern Hemisphere BV (“Saybolt”) -- to inspect and monitor oil exports from Iraq, and then the selection in August 1996 of a British firm -- Lloyd’s Register Inspection Ltd. (“Lloyd’s”) - to inspect and monitor the humanitarian goods that would enter Iraq under the Programme. The politicized manner in which these three contractors were selected contrary to the United Nations’ own rules and regulations, was a subject of the Committee’s First Interim Report. 1 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s term expired at the end of 1996, just as the first oil sales transactions took place under the Programme. Because of opposition, chiefly from the United States, he was not re-appointed to a second term. His successor, Kofi Annan, was appointed to serve as the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations beginning in January 1997. When Secretary-General Annan inherited the Programme, it was run jointly by two different departments of the Secretariat: the Department of Political Affairs (“DPA”) and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (“DHA”). Ten months later, in October 1997, the Secretary-General decided to create OIP, thereby consolidating the Secretariat’s coordination of Iraq-related activities into a single organizational entity. OIP assumed administration of both the Secretariat’s roles for administration of sanctions under Resolution 661 and for administration of the Programme under Resolution 986.

1 Independent Inquiry Committee, “Interim Report” (Feb. 3, 2005) (hereinafter “First Interim Report”), pp. 63-120.

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The Secretary-General appointed Benon Sevan to the position of Executive Director of OIP, and he served in that position until the end of the Programme in 2003. Mr. Sevan had a reputation in United Nations circles as a troubleshooter who had operated effectively in difficult assignments, such as Afghanistan. He also had extensive experience in a variety of fields during a long career within the Organization. As the Committee concluded in its First and Third Interim Reports, Mr. Sevan compromised his position by secretly soliciting and financially benefiting from Iraqi oil allocations during the course of the Programme. 1 In March 1998, the Secretary-General appointed Louise Frechette to the newly created position of Deputy Secretary-General. Mr. Sevan reported directly to Ms. Frechette, who in turn reported to the Secretary-General. However, these reporting lines rapidly became blurred. Mr. Sevan dealt with both the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General directly and, on occasion, used the Secretary-General’s Chef de Cabinet, S. Iqbal Riza, to facilitate decisions for which Mr. Riza, acting as the Secretary-General’s alter ego, had authority. From its inception in October 1997 through to the termination of the Programme in November 2003, OIP’s basic structure remained the same and consisted of the Contracts Processing and Monitoring Division (“CPMD”) and the Programme Management Division (“PMD”) in New York, plus the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator (“UNOHCI”) located in Iraq. Just as the oil overseers conducted a review of proposed oil contracts under the Programme, CPMD performed a similar function for humanitarian contracts under the Programme. This included a review to ensure that contracts contained the required information for the 661 Committee to determine whether to approve the contracts and that goods selected for purchase by the Government of Iraq were consistent with the overall objectives of the Programme and an approved distribution plan. Within CPMD, a group of customs experts reviewed contracts, interfaced with mission representatives on matters pertaining to suppliers from their respective countries, and prepared customs reports for review by members of the 661 Committee. PMD, in theory, provided policy and management advice to OIP’s Executive Director in New York, and also consulted with UNOHCI officials to gain an understanding of the Programme’s field operations in Iraq. UNOHCI administered the Programme’s field operations in Iraq and was run by a Humanitarian Coordinator in Baghdad and Deputy Humanitarian Coordinators stationed in Baghdad and in Erbil in northern Iraq. UNOHCI’s key functions included implementing observation and reporting mechanisms and ensuring the efficient and equitable distribution of supplies to Iraq. UNOHCI was also responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Programme in northern Iraq by the Agencies. Apart from OIP, the administration of the Programme also drew on services from several other offices within the Secretariat, including for accounting, legal, payroll,

1 Ibid., pp. 121-64; Independent Inquiry Committee, “Third Interim Report” (Aug. 8,2005) (hereinafter “Third Interim Report”), pp. 5-52.

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treasury, and internal audit functions. More than fifty administrative posts in various units of the Secretariat outside OIP were funded from the Programme’s administrative account.

C. The UN-related agencies While the Saddam Hussein government administered and distributed humanitarian goods in southern and central Iraq, because of its mistreatment of and animosity towards the Kurds in northern Iraq and the semi-autonomous status of that region, a separate administration, procurement, and distribution system existed for goods furnished to the northern governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, and Suleimaniyah. This system was administered in the name of the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme (“UNIAHP”) and involved nine United Nations entities (hereinafter referred to as “the UN-related Agencies” or “the Agencies”). 1 In addition to their administrative responsibilities in northern Iraq, the Agencies were tasked with observing the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies throughout the entirety of Iraq.

V. APPROVAL OF CONTRACTS UNDER THE PROGRAMME In light of Iraq’s agreement to participate in the Programme, the 661 Committee approved internal rules to govern the 661 Committee’s review of oil and humanitarian contracts under the Programme. The operation of these rules is significant to an understanding of the manner in which Iraq eventually was able to subvert the Programme by means of soliciting payments from companies outside of the United Nations escrow account.

A. Oil sales A company that wished to buy oil could negotiate and enter into a contract with Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (“SOMO”). The company then sought approval of the contract from the United Nations. In the ordinary course, the company had to register or already be registered with the United Nations through the diplomatic mission of its home country. This registration allowed the company to deal directly with and secure approval of its contract from expert oil overseers who worked at the United Nations and who advised the 661 Committee. The overseers’ job was to negotiate on a monthly basis a fair market oil pricing formula with SOMO. The overseers then submitted their recommendation for approval of the monthly pricing mechanism to the 661 Committee. 2

1 Food and Agricultural Organization ("FAO"); International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”); United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”); United Nations Human Settlements Programme (“UN-Habitat”); United Nations Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”); United Nations Office for Project Services (“UNOPS”); World Food Programme (“WFP”); and World Health Organization (“WHO”). 2 As discussed below, beginning in October 2001, the United States and the United Kingdom altered the approval process with the adoption of a “retroactive pricing” policy that was designed to restrict Iraq’s ability to profit from illegal oil surcharges.

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Once the 661 Committee approved the pricing mechanism, two or more overseers could approve jointly any particular contract between a company and SOMO, if the contract terms included the approved pricing mechanism, the details of a confirmed irrevocable letter of credit, and a quantity of oil that would not result in exceeding the overall dollar limitations authorized under the Programme. Once a contract was approved, the oil was loaded (i.e., “lifted”) by seagoing oil tankers from one of two approved oil port terminals: the port of Ceyhan in Turkey (the terminal point for the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline from Iraq to Turkey) or Mina al-Bakr (an offshore loading platform in the Persian Gulf). Each transfer of oil from Ceyhan or Mina al-Bakr was subject to on-site monitoring by Saybolt’s inspectors. A company purchasing oil under the Programme was required to pay the full amount of the contract price by means of a letter of credit from its bank in favor of the escrow account maintained by BNP.

B. Goods purchases A company that wished to sell humanitarian or other civilian goods under the Programme contracted with a domestic ministry or state agency of the Government of Iraq or, for most goods intended to be distributed in northern Iraq, with one of the UN-related Agencies (discussed above). The goods were required to have been identified in advance on a distribution plan that the Secretary-General approved for each phase. The contract was forwarded through the company’s home country mission to CPMD at the United Nations, where it was subject to review for the details of pricing and value. If the contract’s paperwork was in order, the contract was then subject to the 661 Committee’s review and approval under a “no objection” procedure (i.e., the contract was deemed approved if no member of the 661 Committee lodged an objection within a prescribed time period). As noted above, in later years of the Programme, all was authorized to review and approve a range of contracts involving goods without dual-use potential. Upon approval of a goods contract, the goods could be transported into Iraq. The goods were required to be certified for entry by Lloyd’s (and by Cotecna beginning in January 1999) at one of four border inspection points: (1) Zakho on the border of Turkey; (2) Trebil on the border of Jordan; (3) Al-Waleed on the border of Syria; or (4) the port of Umm Qasr on the Persian Gulf. Once entry was approved, BNP could make payment to the supplier of the goods from the escrow account.

VI. THE SCHEMES TO DERIVE ILLICIT INCOME AND RESPONSE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL It was a basic but flawed assumption of the Programme that Iraq -- not the United Nations -- would choose, and negotiate with, the parties to whom it would sell oil and, except in northern Iraq, the parties from whom Iraq would purchase humanitarian and oilspare-parts goods. The United Nations may have been right to acknowledge that “[t]he most efficient way of selecting Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products is for Iraq to carry out the marketing ... in conformity with its normal trading practices” and that “[i]t would be highly unusual if the United Nations were to engage in trading Iraqi oil directly or

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through a third party.” 1 However, the decision to allow Iraq to choose its contracting partners empowered Iraq with undue economic leverage to advance its broader interests in overturning the sanctions regime and obtaining illicit funds. According to numerous Iraqi witnesses interviewed by the Committee, Iraq decided early in the Programme to give contract preferences to companies from countries that it perceived as sympathetic to the lifting of sanctions, including most prominently some members of the Security Council. Companies from Russia, France, and China -- all permanent members of the Security Council that were more sympathetic to Iraq’s wish for an end to sanctions than the United Kingdom and the United States -- were accorded highly favored access to Iraq’s business under the Programme. At first glance, companies from Russia far outdistanced companies from either France or China in the small cluster of nations whose companies were purchasing oil from Iraq. Others in the P-5 lagged significantly behind the three front-runners. In fact, with respect to the United States, with one exception (for a company controlled by Samir Vincent), Iraq blacklisted United States oil companies after Phase III of the Programme ended in May 1998. Nevertheless, although Iraq chose not to sell directly to United States companies, approximately thirty-six percent of Iraq’s oil ultimately was shipped to the United States. According to Iraqi officials, a similar pattern of preference prevailed for Iraq’s choice of suppliers for humanitarian and oil-spare-parts goods, with Russia and France clustered at the top. Russian officials maintain that a sizeable number of supplier companies were in fact front or shell companies using Russia as a convenient home country. For humanitarian and oil-spare-parts goods, Iraq’s top officials frequently instructed its civilian ministries to procure goods on behalf of government organs that could not participate legitimately in the Programme, such as the Ministry of Military Industrialization, the Ministry of Defense, and the Mukhabarat, or Intelligence Services. The most common purchaser of “diverted” goods was the Ministry of Agriculture, but many other ministries, including the Ministries of Transportation and Electricity, also played a part in diverting goods. The most common class of diverted goods was automobiles, especially trucks. In addition to directing oil contracts in favor of certain countries, Iraq’s Ministry of Oil also pursued a policy beginning in 1998 of furnishing “allocations” of oil to certain individuals that it believed could assist its effort to lift the sanctions regime. This group of beneficiaries prominently included Benon Sevan -- the principal United Nations official charged with the Programme’s oversight -- as well as present and former politicians and diplomats, members of organizations supportive of Iraq, relatives of influential families in the Middle East, lobbyists, and media figures. The individual allocation recipients, in turn, would designate a company to enter into the contract for oil with SOMO and receive a commission from the company for the rights to the allocation.

1 “Report by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution 706 (1991),” S/23006, paras. 20-21 (Sept. 4, 1991).

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377 A. Manipulation of Programme transactions

As indicated earlier, among the most potent challenges to the Programme’s integrity were Iraq’s often successful efforts to manipulate transactions with companies in order to extract funds that otherwise would flow to the escrow account.

1. Oil surcharges In approximately August 2000, Iraq started requesting its oil customers to pay a surcharge of ten cents per barrel -- separate from their required payments to the escrow account. Because the request was made in the middle of a Programme phase, many buyers chose not to comply. In early November 2000, Iraq proposed to the Secretary-General to include a payment of 1.5 euros per barrel to meet Iraq’s costs to operate its oil production and distribution facilities and for this to “be remitted to a special account designated by SOMO.” The Secretary-General passed this request on to the Security Council, which declined to act on it favorably for Iraq. In the face of this rejection and the refusal by some oil buyers to pay the ten-cent surcharge, Iraq decided by the end of November 2000 to require the buyers’ payment of a surcharge and also to raise the surcharge to fifty cents per barrel -- all without notice to or approval of the United Nations. In order to allow oil buyers a sufficient margin from which to pay the surcharge, SOMO proposed below-market prices for the upcoming month of December 2000 to the United Nations oil overseers. The oil overseers and 661 Committee declined to agree to these low prices, and this led to a shutdown of Iraq’s oil trade for the first twelve days of December 2000. When exports resumed, far fewer companies elected to lift oil because of the instability and general reluctance to accede to Iraq’s surcharge demand. Total exports plummeted, and it cost the Programme more than $2 billion in expected revenues from December 2000 through February 2001. This imposition of surcharges was widely reported in the media and confirmed to the 661 Committee by its overseers based on the overseers’ industry contacts. The 661 Committee agreed to have the oil overseers send a warning to oil buyers, but it could not agree on any other remedial steps. Russia -- the country with the largest number of oil buyers under the Programme -- asserted that there was a lack of evidence that Iraq actually was imposing surcharges. As a result, the 661 Committee could not reach consensus on a United States proposal that would have restricted the group of oil buyers to established and creditworthy companies. Iraq decided in January 2001 to lower its surcharge demands to between twenty-five and thirty cents per barrel, and oil exports steadily rose again to near pre-surcharge levels at the end of the Programme’s ninth phase in June 2001. The return to stability was accomplished in part by a small group of companies that were willing to go along with the surcharge scheme, but to do so by using various shell companies to mask their involvement with these illegal payments. The United Nations oil overseers warned the Security Council that “practically all” Iraqi oil was sold to “contract holders” that “do not get involved in shipping, financing or other risk bearing activity,” and that “[t]his is rather unprecedented in the oil industry and only exists in this shape and form in the case of Iraq.” The Security Council took no action on the basis of this information.

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The Security Council declined to act on draft resolutions sponsored by the United Kingdom and France to tighten buyer registration requirements. Nor would the 661 Committee or Security Council agree to other pricing reform proposals designed to reduce the potential for middlemen buyers to earn large profits from which surcharges could be paid. The Security Council was briefed by the oil overseers on the dominant role of middlemen buyers, and the unprecedented gap between what end-users were paying for Iraqi oil and what the middlemen buyers were paying for oil under the Programme. In October 2001, the United Kingdom and the United States -- acting over the objections of China and Russia -- imposed “retroactive pricing.” This entailed withholding approval of the pricing mechanism until after the oil had been lifted -- when it could be determined what the true fair market value of the oil was at the time of actual lifting. Retroactive pricing made it less profitable for buyers to pay surcharges, and Iraq’s gains from surcharges decreased as fewer companies chose to lift oil. In September 2002, Iraq decided to terminate the surcharge policy in the midst of continued lower oil sales. Ultimately, apart from the imposition of retroactive pricing by the United Kingdom and the United States, the 661 Committee did not redress Iraq’s illegal surcharge policy. Most of the surcharge payments were sent by wire to Iraqi-controlled accounts at banks in Jordan and Lebanon, often for concealment purposes to accounts established in the names of SOMO officials or other Iraqi individuals. Money from these accounts went to Baghdad. Apart from these bank wire payments, according to payment records and receipts produced to the Committee by SOMO, nearly one-third of the surcharge payments were made by cash delivery to various Iraqi embassies abroad, including in Egypt, Greece, Italy, Malaysia, Russia, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, and Vietnam. By far the largest number of payments was from Russian companies (including several Russian state-owned companies) to Iraq’s embassy in Moscow -- more than $52 million from March 2001 to December 2002. 1

2. Kickbacks - after-sales-service fees and inland transport costs In August 2000, Iraqi ministries were ordered to collect kickbacks on all contracts signed by suppliers of humanitarian and oil-spare-part goods to Iraq. Typically, these kickbacks were styled as “after-sales-service fees,” and this scheme was introduced ostensibly to cover internal expenses incurred by the Government of Iraq in administering the Programme, but the Committee has not been able to verify that the funds derived were spent in such a manner. Regardless of the use to which these payments were put, they were payments directly to Iraq and outside the Programme’s authorized escrow account. By late 2000, prospective vendors of goods to Iraq generally would not see their bids approved by the ministries without agreeing to pay an after-sales-service fee of at least ten percent of the contract value. Once the vendor agreed to pay the kickback, the contract price would be inflated by a set percentage and submitted to the United Nations for approval. In this way, vendors could pay the kickback without affecting their anticipated 1

For details on the mechanics of these transactions, see Chapter I of Volume II of this Report.

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margins of profit. From the perspective of Iraqi officials, the kickback scheme was a means of reclaiming money held in the escrow account, which they viewed as the legitimate property of the Government of Iraq. In addition to this formal kickback scheme, a parallel means of collecting illegal revenues began as early as June 1999 and expanded significantly in summer 2000. This mechanism involved the imposition of fees for the transportation of those commodities imported at Iraq’s port at Umm Qasr to inland destinations such as Baghdad inside Iraq. These inland transportation fees, which in practice should have been borne by the Government of Iraq rather than the contractor, were incorporated into contract values, but paid outside the authorized escrow account to companies or bank accounts controlled by the Iraqi regime. The 661 Committee devoted even less attention to kickbacks on humanitarian contracts than it did to oil surcharges -- yet these kickbacks eventually turned out to be a far greater source of illicit revenue for Iraq than oil surcharges. Company complaints and media reports of demands for kickbacks surfaced as early as 1997, and, in November 1999, the United States and the United Kingdom publicly expressed concerns about the Iraqi regime’s exploitation of the Programme to obtain payments from goods suppliers outside the escrow account. However, it was not until the first half of 2001 that the 661 Committee addressed humanitarian kickbacks; even then, discussion was limited to a few meetings. No action was taken. In March 2001, the United States introduced a proposal with steps that could be taken to curtail kickbacks, but the 661 Committee never seriously considered the merits of these or any other proposals to redress the payment of kickbacks. The following month, the United Kingdom sent a letter to OIP identifying fifteen humanitarian contract applications with payment and service clauses that might mask kickbacks, but all except one of these applications were approved. In 2001 and 2002, OIP submitted to the 661 Committee at least seventy customs reports that identified pricing concerns, but it appears that 661 Committee members placed a pricing-related hold on only one of these applications. This was during a period when all contracts were subject to kickbacks. The kickback schemes remained in place for the duration of the Programme until after the military invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in the spring of 2003. In the end, there was no sustained effort by the Security Council and its 661 Committee to investigate allegations of humanitarian contract kickbacks or to take remedial steps to curb Iraq’s ability to derive illegal income outside the sanctions regime. The final report of the Committee in October 2005 will present comprehensive data with respect to purchases of oil and sales of goods to Iraq, including evidence concerning Iraq’s grant of allocations to particular individuals. That report will also address the operation of the surcharge and kickback schemes in more detail and, in particular, the degree to which particular companies and individuals were complicit in making illegal payments outside the Programme.

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380 B. Smuggling

It is now well known that the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein derived far more revenues from smuggling oil outside the Programme than from its demands for surcharges and kickbacks from companies that contracted within the Programme. 1 Thousands of vessels, vehicles, and trucks carried smuggled oil and goods -- in both directions across the Iraqi border -- without any kind of inspection or oversight by the United Nations. By the Programme's design, inspectors were charged only with the inspection of oil and goods that were financed under the Programme. They had no directions or mandate to inspect or report on cargo smuggled in violation of United Nations sanctions outside the Programme. This was true despite the fact that the 661 Committee had responsibilities for the oversight of sanctions observance as well as oversight of the Programme. Because smuggling occurred outside the Programme, it has not constituted a major focus of the Committee’s work. But smuggling cannot be completely excluded from the purview of the Committee because-in the words of one United States ambassador -“[s]muggling steals money from the oil-for-food programme and puts it to illicit purposes.” At least as important, turning a blind eye to smuggling surely undercut a sense of discipline in conducting the Programme generally. Accordingly, to the extent that smuggling was known by the responsible authorities, and it was, it posed a vital management and political question, to wit: what steps could -- and should-have been taken to stop the smuggling or “capture” the smuggling revenues for the Programme in order to advance the Programme’s humanitarian goals and to restrict these funds from being used for the corrupt and potentially lethal purposes of Saddam Hussein? Here the spotlight is on the role of the Security Council -- including its 661 Committee -- as it was the body that possessed primary authority to determine the scope of the Programme and the degree to which it would acquiesce to a parallel universe of trade outside the Programme. For all these reasons, it is important to know: (1) What smuggling occurred during the course of the Programme?; (2) What did the Security Council and member states know about this smuggling activity?; and (3) What did the Security Council and member states do in response to smuggling activity?

1. The neighborhood Consideration should be given first to Iraq’s smuggling trade with three of its neighbors who faced a disproportionate burden from sanctions -- Jordan, Turkey, and Syria -- and Iraq’s smuggling of oil by sea through the Persian Gulf. The names of the countries and the means of smuggling may vary, but several common themes emerge: x The awareness of the Security Council of large and increasing amounts of border trade activity outside the Programme;

1 See “First Interim Report,” pp. 41-42 (summarizing smuggling estimates compiled by the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the United States General Accountability Office, the United States Iraq Survey Group, and the Coalition for International Justice).

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x The constraints of the consensus rule of decision-making in the 661 Committee, diminishing the effectiveness of the Security Council and the 661 Committee in their responses to reports of illegal smuggling activity; x The primacy of political preference over evenhanded enforcement of sanctions against Iraq and its neighboring countries -- as most prominently demonstrated by the United States’ tolerance for trade with Jordan and Turkey (but not Syria), and by Russia’s and France’s reluctance to redress smuggling activity between Iraq and Syria; and x The degree to which Iraq and its neighbor states ultimately were emboldened by Security Council inaction to increase their illicit trading relationships and to expand their illicit trade for the benefit of Saddam Hussein’s government. In the case of Jordan, the Security Council declined to act on Jordan’s repeated requests, under Article 50 of the Charter, for official authorization to import oil from Iraq. Instead, the 661 Committee ambiguously “took note” of Jordan’s intent to import Iraq oil. This furnished sufficient cover for Jordan to acquire nearly $6 billion of oil from Iraq (much of it during the Programme, from 1996 to 2003). There was no genuine effort by the Security Council to monitor these transactions or the goods that Jordan in turn shipped back to Iraq. By September 2002, Jordan abandoned a pure barter arrangement, and it started paying cash to Iraq. In the case of Turkey, the 661 Committee turned a blind eye to widespread reports of oil smuggling through Iraq’s Kurdish area and across its northern border. When Turkey sought formal permission in 1996 to trade with Iraq under Article 50, the 661 Committee repeatedly deferred consideration of the request for several years. Then it simply removed the item from its agenda. The illegal and unmonitored border trade continued. A belated effort in 1999 by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to bring Turkey’s trade within the Programme failed for lack of support among other members of the Security Council. Thereafter, Turkey negotiated a formal border trade protocol with Iraq in January 2000, and Iraq ultimately derived more than $800 million in estimated oil sales proceeds outside the Programme from this illegal trade with Turkey. In the case of Syria, Iraq long harbored ambitions to reopen and use a pipeline that stretched from Iraq’s northern Kirkuk fields to the Mediterranean coast in Syria and that had closed in the early 1980s. To this end, Iraq sought approval at the outset of the Programme, in 1996, to export oil through the Syrian pipeline. But the Security Council allowed only two points for export of Iraqi oil -- one through a pipeline into Turkey and one through a pipeline to a loading terminal in the Persian Gulf. So Iraq and Syria later decided to take matters into their own hands. They negotiated a formal border trade protocol in 2000 and then refurbished and reopened the pipeline in November of that year. The reopening of the pipeline was widely reported in the press and also raised in the 661 Committee, but the 661 Committee dissolved in discord over how to respond. It could not agree even to send a letter of inquiry to Syria about the matter, much less to initiate any true investigation of the matter. In light of the smuggling that already was occurring through Jordan and Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States sought, in mid2001, to modify the Programme by establishing new arrangements by which all of Iraq’s border trade could be limited and controlled. But this effort failed in the face of opposition

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from China, France, and Russia, as well as the entrenched interests of the affected border countries, which had long since accustomed themselves to trading freely outside the Programme. In the meantime, because of the economies of scale afforded by the pipeline, Syria soon became Iraq’s largest illegal oil export outlet. Syria joined the Security Council in 2002 and thereby automatically the 661 Committee. It was then easily able -- because of the 661 Committee’s consensus voting rule -- to block any inquiry by the Committee. During the last four years of the Programme, Iraq derived more than $3 billion of smuggling revenue from Syria. In the case of smuggling through the Persian Gulf, the naval advantage of the United States and other members of the Maritime Interception Force (the “MIF”) allowed the Security Council to exercise a greater degree of control over smuggling by sea than over smuggling by land with Jordan, Turkey, and Syria. Smuggling by sea remained a constant occurrence but, over time and with the active diplomatic efforts of 661 Committee chairmen and the cooperation of Iran, the level of smuggling by sea, with one notable exception, 1 was effectively reduced.

2. Volume of oil available for protocols and smuggling The first and most obvious question regarding Iraq’s smuggling of oil is how much oil was available for smuggling. Iraq engaged in unofficial trade involving oil transactions throughout the sanctions period. The transactions ranged from those based on relatively formalized arrangements, such as the protocols with governments of several countries, to less formalized, smaller scale arrangements, such as selling crude and refined products in smaller lots to private parties. Between 1991 and 2003, Iraq produced more than 7.3 billion barrels of oil. Some 3 billion barrels were used internally during this period, mainly either as refined products or to produce power. Consequently, nearly 4.3 billion barrels were available for trade. Backing out the 3.4 billion barrels sold through the Programme, nearly 900 million barrels were available for unofficial trade, of which nearly 650 million barrels were available during the Programme period.

C. Sources and amounts of illicit income to Iraq Much interest has been expressed, a number of estimates have been set forth, and considerable confusion exists with respect to the illicit earnings of the former Iraq regime from the Programme. Part of the difficulty is that the distinction has been lost between gains from “smuggling” -- that is from violations of the sanctions against Iraqi oil exports that began well before the Programme started -- and gains from manipulation of sales of oil and purchase of humanitarian goods under the Programme itself.

1

For a discussion of this exception, please see Section II.I in Chapter 4 of Volume II.

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Table 1. Iraqi Oil Available for Smuggling (in millions of barrels)

Year

Total Production

Internal Consumption

Re-Injection Oil Sold Total Oil of Crude & Under the Available for Fuel Oil Programme Smuggling

Prior to the Programme 1991 191.38 1992 385.06 1993 370.55 1994 377.01 1995 387.63 1996 420.22 Sub-total 2,131.85

86.61 112.00 110.19 104.54 107.68 104.3 7 625.41

87.31 237.42 235.69 237.84 253.98 238.34 1,290.57

--------

17.46 35.64 24.67 34.63 25.97 77.51 215.87

During the Programme 1997 546.64 1998 791.58 1999 927.62 2000 952.05 2001 943.76 2002 812.80 2003 226.18 Sub-total 5,200.63 Total 7,332.48

115.15 121.75 124.25 132.59 149.59 171.34 17.46 832.13 1,457.55

145.59 70.64 7.78 10.71 23.93 28.36 8.50 295.51 1,586.07

246.46 545.75 728.16 703.58 619.61 461.50 125.66 3,430.72 3,430.72

39.44 53.45 67.43 105.17 150.63 151.59 74.56 642.27 858.14

In gross terms, by far the largest source of illicit income to Iraq during the period of the Programme was from “trade protocols” with its neighbors and from clandestine smuggling with unofficial parties. The trade protocols involved Iraq’s sale of oil in return for goods and for cash. In addition, it is well known that sources of illicit income within the framework of the Programme itself were also substantial. Identifying these latter flows is relevant not only for judging the extent to which the Iraqi regime benefited from manipulating the Programme, but also to provide an index to the degree the United Nations failed to thwart corruption and fraud in administering the Programme. Consequently, the Committee has made a concentrated effort, with the cooperation of the Government of Iraq, to make a definitive estimate of the amounts of illicit income involved, largely through oil surcharges and humanitarian kickbacks. Given the amount of empirical data available to it from the extensive investigation, the Committee believes these new estimates are more reliable than the previous estimates made by other investigators and private organizations. The following table itemizes the sources of Iraq’s derivation of illicit income -- about $10.2 billion during the period of the Programme from 1997 to 2003 in the form of surcharges on oil contracts under the Programme, kickbacks on humanitarian contracts under the Programme, and smuggling of oil outside the bounds of the Programme. In the

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Table 2 -Illicit Income Received by Iraq Prior to and During the Programme (in USD millions) Revenue Revenue Prior to the During the Programme Programme Protocol & Private Sales Revenue Protocol Revenue Jordan Egypt Turkey Syria Sub-total of Protocol Revenue Border Trade Total Protocol and Private Sales Revenue Programme-Related Revenue Transaction Fees on Oil Sales Surcharges on Oil Sales Transaction Fees on Humanitarian Purchases After-Sales-Service Fees Inland Transportation Fees Sub-total of Transaction Fees on Humanitarian Purchases Total Programme-Related Revenue Total Estimated Illicit Income

2,599.8

2,599.8 2,599.8

3,376.6 44.8 806.7 3,132.1 7,360.0 1,030.4 8,390.4

228.8

2,599.8

1,055.9 527.5 1,583.4 1,812.2 10,202.6

An explanation of the basis for these figures is set forth below.

several years prior to the Programme, Iraq derived another $2.6 billion of revenue from the sale of oil to its neighboring states in contravention of the sanctions regime.

1. Income from oil surcharges on programme contracts As described elsewhere, as the Programme proceeded, Iraq moved aggressively to impose and regularize transaction charges on both oil sales and goods imports. The net effect of these measures was to provide income to the Iraqi regime free of the constraints imposed by the Programme on the nature of imports. In the case of oil sales, involving a standard and widely traded commodity, the approach was relatively simple and straightforward: a charge ranging generally from ten cents to fifty cents per barrel over time was exacted from those purchasing oil. For goods imports, arrangements were more complicated. Many of the goods themselves were not freely traded commodities and were not standard in quality. One implication was that pricing decisions agreed upon by Iraq and the supplier were much more difficult to review

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Table 3 - Confirmed Deposits of Surcharges (in USD millions) Total

% of Total

1.1 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.7 3.0 0.9 52.8 0.1 0.5 0.1

0.5 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.3 1.3 0.4 23.1 0.0 0.2 0.1

61.3

26.8

128.8 29.8 6.0

56.3 13.0 2.6

Surcharges confirmed

225.9

98.7

Unconfirmed surcharges Total surcharges paid

2.9 228.8

1.3 100.0

Embassies and representative offices of Iraq Ankara, Turkey Athens, Greece Cairo, Egypt Damascus, Syria Geneva, Switzerland Hanoi, Vietnam Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Moscow, Russia Rome, Italy Sana’a, Yemen Vienna, Austria Sum of deposits via embassies and representative offices of Iraq Jordan National Bank, Jordan Fransabank, Lebanon Company records

by United Nations staff. The opportunity for illicit income -- through a variety of transaction charges -- thus was much greater than through the widely known oil surcharges. In the case of oil surcharges, detailed Iraqi records show not only the total funds collected, but those responsible for the payments and the method of payment. In sum, approximately $263 million was levied and expected in surcharge revenue on nearly 400 oil contracts. Actual payments of $229 million were made by 138 contractors on 309 contracts. This data corresponds to the figures published earlier by the Iraq Survey Group of the United States government. The table below also identifies these payments by avenue of payment, highlighting cash payments through Iraqi embassies. In the case of humanitarian goods imports, as discussed above, the Iraqi regime derived illicit revenue principally from after-sales-service fees (generally in an amount of at least ten percent of the contract price) and inland transportation fees. Other miscellaneous “tender fees” and less coordinated payments to Iraqi officials are known to have happened. Reliable estimates of the amounts involved are not possible, but are believed to be relatively small in total.

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2. Income from kickbacks on humanitarian goods contracts Information for these humanitarian kickbacks is less complete and precise than that for oil surcharges. However, the Committee’s large information base includes: (1) the actual amount spent on import contracts, (2) the policies put in place by Iraq at particular times, and (3) accounting and banking records from a number, but not all, of the ministries dealing with levying and collecting the fees and charges. The availability of this material data largely explains the differences in the Committee’s estimate from earlier estimates of others. In total, the Committee estimates the former Iraqi regime illicitly obtained approximately $1.6 billion through exploitation of humanitarian transactions under the Programme.

3. Income from smuggling during the programme The estimates presented here of revenue from trade protocols and other smuggling activity is derived directly from comprehensive data recently made available by SOMO. Jordan, Syria, and Turkey have not responded to repeated requests for similar data. However, this data from SOMO have been tested against more limited data available from a variety of other sources, tending to confirm the reliability of the new and more detailed data. Most of this smuggling took place within the terms of intergovernmental “trade protocols” with the neighboring states of Iraq. Analysis of those protocols, together with data on the volume of oil sales, makes clear that the pricing of the oil was well below prevailing market prices. In the early years of the sales to Jordan, the proceeds were used substantially for debt repayment and for the purchase of goods. Because the pricing on both sides was not anchored in market prices, the data must be interpreted with care.

4. Distorted pricing Unlike the transaction costs -- surcharges and kickbacks -- described above, there was also underpricing of oil exports and overpricing of goods imports. Similarly reliable estimates are not possible with regard to the costs to the Iraqi people resulting from deliberate underpricing of oil exports or overpricing of goods imports. In effect, the government of Saddam Hussein was willing to forego revenue from oil sales or to overpay for imports to reward or encourage certain foreign politicians, journalists, and businesses to exert influence in its favor, most especially in advocating a lifting of the sanctions. There are also allegations that some of these illicit profits found their way to the benefit individual Iraqi officials, presumably in the form of cash or disguised foreign bank accounts. Generally, the Committee notes that substantially more funds illicitly flowed to the Saddam Hussein regime through its sanctions-busting activities than through bribery on the part of individuals. In any event, the Committee has not found evidence to suggest that individual bribery by Government of Iraq officials was of a magnitude sufficient in itself to materially alter the overall financial picture set out in this Report.

B

A $ 333.51 472.37 405.11 377.69 423.26 587.87 $ 2,599.81 $653.06 331.85 420.20 687.16 509.63 623.35 151.30 $ 3,376.55 $ 5,976.36

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Sub-total 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Sub-total Total

$ ------$ -$ ---197.30 1,131.02 1,350.01 453.74 $ 3,132.07 $ 3,132.07

Syria

Jordan

Year

$ ------$ -$ ---98.29 281.58 373.41 43.37 $ 806.65 $ 806.65

C $ ------$ -$ ----5.74 39.02 -$ 44.76 $ 44.76

D

Protocols Turkey Egypt E+A+B+C+D $ 333.51 472.37 405.11 377.69 423.26 587.87 $ 2,599.81 $ 653.06 331.85 420.20 982.75 1,927.97 2,385.79 658.41 $ 7,360.03 $ 9,959.84

Total

Border Trade F $ ------$ -$ 11.84 16.70 236.86 396.32 183.11 98.68 86.87 $ 1,030.38 $ 1,030.38

Total G+E+F $ 333.51 472.37 405.11 377.69 423.26 587.87 $ 2,599.81 $664.90 348.55 657.06 1,379.07 2,111.08 2,484.47 745.28 $ 8,390.41 $ 10,990.22

Table 4 - Oil Sold Outside of the Programme (in USD millions)

$ 157.51 253.37 224.11 196.69 220.26 257.87 $ 1,309.81 $ 403.06 82.85 216.20 505.40 776.97 1,028.31 225.85 $ 3,238.64 $ 4,548.45

Actual Cash Received

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Before the introduction of retroactive pricing, Iraq underpriced oil sold through the Programme relative to market prices by increasing amounts over time. To some degree, some discount from market prices early in the Programme was necessary, and accepted by the oil overseers, to encourage buyers amidst political and market uncertainties inherent in Iraqi trade. Later, there was direct and indirect (from econometric analyses) evidence of buyer discounts. The discounts increased particularly at the time the surcharges were introduced and established commercial buyers backed out of the market. At least in part, the discounts from market prices provided large profit opportunities to trading companies, some of which were clearly acting on behalf of persons or entities that Iraq wished to benefit, which is discussed elsewhere in the Report. A similar process took place for humanitarian goods with respect to overpricing. In contrast to the broadly traded, standard commodity nature of the oil market, however, it is difficult to generalize about the pricing and quality of the wide variety of humanitarian and other goods imported. While the United Nations, through a division of the OIP, made efforts to monitor the pricing, the investigation suggests that these efforts had limited success.

VII. MALADMINISTRATION OF THE PROGRAMME On October 1, 1997, Secretary-General Annan indicated that the Secretariat’s management of all activities relating to the Programme would be consolidated in OIP under Mr. Sevan. Thus, OIP assumed administration of both the sanctions aspects of Resolution 661 and the humanitarian aspects of the Programme under Resolution 986. When she arrived as Deputy Secretary-General in March 1998, Ms. Frechette was given overall responsibility for the Secretariat’s role in the Programme and it was to her that Mr. Sevan formally reported. However, Mr. Sevan continued to have direct access to the Secretary-General about Programme-related issues.

A. The Executive Director and OIP Mr. Sevan served in the position of Executive Director of OIP from its inception in October 1997 until the end of the Programme in 2003. In his capacity as the Executive Director, Mr. Sevan played an active role in the Programme’s administration. He participated in the preparation of the Secretary-General’s 90 and l80-day reports to the Security Council. According to all officials, Mr. Sevan would edit and scrutinize the reports before further review by the Deputy Secretary-General and signature by the Secretary-General. Similarly, Mr. Sevan took the lead in addressing the 661 Committee on matters that were critical to the Programme. For example, Mr. Sevan routinely addressed the 661 Committee on the subject of expediting the approval of Programme-related contracts and the need to authorize funding for the Iraqi regime’s oil production infrastructure. His subordinates regarded him as the person responsible for reporting sanctions and Programme violations, including the Iraqi regime’s receipt of kickbacks, to the Security Council and the 661 Committee. In addition, Mr. Sevan often discussed matters concerning the Programme with senior Iraqi officials.

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Mr. Sevan had access to the United Nations’ highest officers -- Secretary-General Annan and Deputy Secretary-General Frechette as well as Mr. Riza, who was then Chef de Cabinet. Mr. Sevan spoke to Ms. Frechette nearly every day on matters pertaining to the Programme and frequently met with Secretary-General Annan and Mr. Riza. Mr. Sevan enjoyed Deputy Secretary-General Frechette’s trust, as a result of which she granted Mr. Sevan substantial discretion to make decisions regarding the direction of the Programme and to interact as he saw fit with the 661 Committee. It seems clear to the Committee that, throughout the implementation of the Programme, there were various management failures and challenges occurring within all under Mr. Sevan’s leadership. For example, Mr. Sevan: (1) failed to embrace all’s responsibilities with respect to sanctions monitoring; (2) withheld critical evidence from the 661 Committee of reports of kickbacks on humanitarian contracts; (3) marginalized the important oversight role of the Programme Management Division; and (4) did not ensure that the Contracts Processing and Monitoring Division possessed adequate resources and expertise to scrutinize Programme-related contracts. Mr. Sevan’s failures are all the more troubling when considered against his corrupt receipt of oil allocations from the Iraqi regime from which he profited. Within OIP, the customs experts were responsible for “examin[ing] each contract, in particular the details of price and value, and whether the items to be exported [were] on the [distribution plan].” These customs experts, moreover, were expected to scrutinize contracts for possible fraud and deception by the Iraqi regime. In February of 1998, the Secretary-General recommended an increase in the size and scope of the Programme, and process improvements to alleviate existing problems and support the increased size and scope of the Programme. These changes and augmentation to the Programme required CPMD to adapt, through increased staffing and revised review and approval procedures. The Security Council then authorized an increase to the ceiling on oil exports from $2 billion to $5.256 billion dollars per phase, causing a dramatic increase in the number of contract applications flowing into CPMD for review. With the increased funding, the Secretary-General also approved the addition of several new sectors beyond the original focus on food and medicine. These sectors brought about more complex contracts for highly-specialized goods intended to upgrade the infrastructure of Iraq. On June 19, 1998, the scope of the Programme was further enlarged when the Security Council, for the first time, authorized funding for oil spare parts. The impact was felt most intensely by the customs experts. From some hundreds of contracts, volume grew over time to 4,000 contracts, while items covered by those contracts grew from a low of about 8,500 to a high of nearly 185,000 line items from a greatly expanded list of permissible import sectors. Moreover, the contracts became more complex, with the inclusion of deferred payments, performance bonds, training elements, etc. Whatever the growth elsewhere in CPMD, there was no commensurate increase in size or broadening of the customs experts’ expertise. The net result was that price evaluations on contracts were not accurate -- though it was recognized within OIP that this constituted a major responsibility, and it was

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recognized that the “customs experts” in place were not actually experts in international commodities markets. Limited reviews were therefore the norm. In other words, OIP could not determine if the price in a given contract had enough head room to permit the payment of kickbacks, and detailed information was not given to the 661 Committee. After OIP began administering the Programme on behalf of the Secretariat, coordination of the Programme’s field operations occurred across several divisions. In the field, operations were carried out by a Humanitarian Coordinator who was charged with running UNOHCI. From New York, Mr. Sevan’s Executive Office and the Programme Management Division (“PMD”) interfaced with UNOHCI. The key functions of PMD were to provide policy and management advice to OIP’s Executive Director and to support the work of UNOHCI relating to the implementation and observation of the Programme in the field. PMD was also tasked with coordinating the preparation of the 90 and 180-day reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and ensuring that the Programme was effectively implemented. PMD further was charged with providing strategic thinking on the development and planning of the Programme and identifying Programme-related issues. At least, that was how it was supposed to work. In practice, PMD’s mandate, as interpreted and directed by the Executive Director, Mr. Sevan, was much woollier and more circumscribed. There was never an agreement on the structure and relationships in OIP, an organizational confusion that was compounded by unilateral adjustments made by Mr. Sevan. As an example, there was a major decision by Mr. Sevan, who is described elsewhere in this Report by Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette as “a one-man band,” to sever communication lines between UNOHCI and PMD. This effectively emasculated PMD in fulfilling many of its roles. The overall effect was to marginalize PMD -- whose name was even changed by Mr. Sevan to remove the word “Management” from its title. On the ground in Iraq, operations were carried out by a Humanitarian Coordinator who was charged with running UNOHCI and also served as the Secretariat’s representative in Iraq. He was accountable to Mr. Sevan and was responsible for managing the Programme’s implementation in Iraq. Each succeeding Humanitarian Coordinator was based in Baghdad and supported by a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator, also located in Baghdad, as well as one in the northern Iraqi governorate of Erbil. Resolution 986 and the Iraq-UN MOU provided that while the United Nations was responsible for implementing the Programme in the three northern governorates, the regime would be responsible for implementing the Programme in the fifteen governorates in the southern and central regions of Iraq. UNOHCI’s role was to observe the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies by the former Iraqi regime, verify the efficiency of the operation, and determine the adequacy of available resources to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. In order to accomplish these functions, the Humanitarian Coordinator was responsible for managing the United Nations’ observation mechanism in Iraq. Here again, the picture on the ground differs from the theory described above. UNOHCI did develop procedures for managing the Programme, but its authority to enforce

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them was compromised by OIP’s overriding authority over the purse strings, effectively holding a veto over the funding of the Agencies’ projects. Beyond these basic management breakdowns within OIP, perhaps most significant was the failure of Mr. Sevan to respond appropriately to the serious reports of large-scale Programme violations as Iraq initiated its various schemes to derive illicit income from contractors under the Programme. With respect to the kickback scheme, the 661 Committee undoubtedly had a degree of awareness and bore some responsibility. However, OIP was particularly well-positioned to receive information and to confirm the true scope of the Iraqi regime’s activities. Further, under Resolutions 661 and 986, the Secretariat was required to report to the Security Council regarding the Programme’s implementation, including sanctions violations. Notwithstanding such responsibility, the Secretariat did not divulge the full extent of the information in its possession -- despite numerous requests by the 661 Committee for it to do so. More particularly, during the Programme, OIP received a significant amount of written evidence regarding illicit payments in connection with Programme-related contracts from both suppliers and numerous member state missions. This documentation indicated that the kickback scheme, which was pervasive and extended to almost all contracts executed from mid-2000 onward, included specific company names, contract numbers, bank accounts, and amounts paid. However, no meaningful action was taken, and not one of the numerous 90 or 180-day reports submitted to the Security Council mentioned the illicit payment demands in connection with Programme contracts. B. Oversight from the 38th floor Management failures in OIP under the direction of Mr. Sevan have been recorded. But Mr. Sevan does not bear all responsibility alone. His management of the Programme was subject to oversight from the 38th Floor of the United Nations -- from the SecretaryGeneral and Deputy Secretary-General. In particular, the Secretary-General designated the Deputy Secretary-General to oversee Mr. Sevan and OIP, including approval of the 90 and 180-day reports to the Security Council. Mr. Sevan spoke to the Deputy Secretary-General about the Programme nearly every day and routinely provided her with notes and memoranda concerning significant Programme-related issues. Mr. Riza, the SecretaryGeneral’s Chef de Cabinet, also frequently involved himself in issues pertaining to the Programme and advised the Secretary-General accordingly. As Chef de Cabinet, Mr. Riza headed the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. His responsibilities included assisting both the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General “in the exercise of executive direction in relation to the work of the Secretariat and of United Nations programmes and other entities within the Organization.” Both the Deputy Secretary-General and Mr. Riza served with other officials as members of the Secretary-General’s Senior Management Group, which was required to meet on a weekly basis “to ensure strategic coherence and direction in the work of the Organization” and, in part, to “advise the Secretary-General on all matters of policy that affect the Organization as a whole.” When interviewed by the Committee, the Secretary-General, the Deputy SecretaryGeneral, and Mr. Riza each struggled to rationalize the role of the 38th Floor in overseeing

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OIP. Instead, they offered conflicting views of their own responsibilities as well the functions of Mr. Sevan vis-à-vis the Programme. These inconsistencies demonstrate a basic confusion within the highest offices of the Secretariat. The Secretary-General told the Committee that the Programme was managed by the 661 Committee, and he went as far as to assert that Mr. Sevan “worked” for the 661 Committee. While clearly Mr. Sevan was the United Nations official who worked most closely at senior levels with the 661 Committee, his responsibilities did not dilute in any way the Secretary-General’s administrative and management responsibilities for Mr. Sevan. He, after all, both appointed and promoted Mr. Sevan. Moreover, the Secretary-General, not the 661 Committee, had authority to remove Mr. Sevan and otherwise to supervise his management of the Programme. The Secretary-General has acknowledged, as he must, that the 38th Floor had a role to play with respect to the Programme. He explained that the Deputy Secretary-General served as “an extra pair of eyes” for the Secretariat. The Secretary-General expected his Deputy to ensure that Mr. Sevan raised issues with the Government of Iraq and reported Programme-related matters to the 661 Committee. The Deputy Secretary-General was also charged with reviewing and clearing the 90 and 180-day Reports for the SecretaryGeneral’s signature and transmittal to the Security Council. The Deputy Secretary-General, like the Secretary-General, also has described a limited role for the 38th Floor in managing the Programme. She explained to the Committee that Mr. Sevan worked “very closely with the 661 Committee.” She noted that she was theoretically charged with overseeing the Programme. However, the Deputy Secretary-General told the Committee that it never actually worked that way. She stated that Mr. Sevan had an ongoing relationship with the Secretary-General and Mr. Riza. Questions concerning Mr. Sevan’s decision-making were to be addressed to the SecretaryGeneral. More generally, according to Ms. Frechette, “if the Secretariat is performing to the satisfaction of the member states, the 38th Floor does not get involved.” Because the Deputy Secretary-General did not receive any complaints about Mr. Sevan, she assumed that there were no issues and therefore left Mr. Sevan to handle matters with 661 Committee. She saw the 38th Floor as becoming involved only if the future and viability of the Programme was threatened. In her view, the Programme was “well run”; therefore, there was no reason for her proactive supervision of OIP. The Deputy Secretary-General ultimately conceded that, in hindsight, she should have asked more questions and played a greater role in ensuring that sanctions violations were addressed. But, throughout her interviews with the Committee, the Deputy SecretaryGeneral maintained that she was not responsible for overseeing the Programme on behalf of the Secretariat or for supervising Mr. Sevan. Her description of her own role contrasts dramatically with the Secretary-General’s express delegation of supervisory authority -however unclearly that may have been expressed. In her interviews with the Committee, Ms Frechette maintained that despite the Secretary-General's delegation of oversight authority, “[i]t never happened that way.” Mr. Riza similarly distanced himself from responsibility for OIP. Mr. Riza acknowledged involvement in the creation of OIP in October 1997 and discussions with the Secretary-General and the Iraqi ambassador regarding the regime’s intent to impose

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surcharges on oil sales in November 2000. Otherwise, he claimed no substantive involvement. But Mr. Riza played a greater role than he was willing to state. He routinely received copies of significant documents and memoranda concerning the Programme. His role was to screen for materials that warranted the Secretary-General’s attention. His own handwritten notes reveal that he closely reviewed the materials that Mr. Sevan forwarded and frequently met with the Secretary-General and Mr. Sevan to discuss major matters concerning the Programme. With far greater frequency than the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Riza also participated in meetings with Iraqi officials relating to the Programme. When viewed against the basic mechanics of OIP and its role in managing the Programme on behalf of the Secretariat, the competing descriptions of the 38th Floor’s role evince a reluctance to accept responsibility for the significant management failures that occurred within OIP during the life of the Programme. One of the primary functions of the Secretariat in its administration of the Programme was to ensure that information gathered by OIP through its operations in the field and through its review of Programme-related contracts flowed to the 661 Committee. As the Secretary-General explained, 90 and 180-day reports on the implementation of the Programme were designed to provide the Security Council with a sense of the effectiveness of the Programme “on the ground,” and “to share with [the Security Council] what has happened and what we’re doing and what we're achieving or not achieving.” When interviewed by the Committee, the Secretary-General insisted that the Programme was “a very transparent operation” -- “one of the most transparent programs [he has] seen” in terms of the process it required for reports to be made by the Secretariat to the Security Council. However, significant information was routinely withheld from the 661 Committee. Despite mounting evidence of a widespread kickback scheme, the Secretary-General’s quarterly reports never mentioned the emerging problem. In hindsight, the Secretary-General told the Committee that detailed information concerning the Iraqi regime’s receipt of kickbacks should have been conveyed to the 661 Committee and should have been discussed in his quarterly reports or even a special report to the Security Council. The Deputy Secretary-General and Mr. Riza similarly acknowledged that such detailed information in the possession of OIP needed to be transmitted to the 661 Committee. The impression on the 38th Floor may have been that the Programme was transparent. In fact, it was not. The Secretary-General, Mr. Riza, and to a lesser extent the Deputy SecretaryGeneral, each appreciated the importance of ensuring the transparency of OIP’s operations and any difficulties that all encountered. Despite confusion as to the responsibilities of the 38th Floor, there was relative clarity about the Secretariat’s role in reporting issues concerning the Programme to the Security Council. Nonetheless, pertinent information was omitted from the reports, information that Secretary-General Annan, Deputy SecretaryGeneral Frechette, and Mr. Riza each knew about and that, when interviewed, each agreed in retrospect should have been communicated to members of the Security Council. To be sure, the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General were apparently not aware of the full scope of evidence that OIP had accumulated, and, clearly, Mr. Sevan

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bears responsibility for withholding information. There is no indication, for example, that Mr. Sevan advised the Secretary-General or the Deputy Secretary-General of the detailed information concerning kickback payments that the director of PMD accumulated in December 2000 and the even clearer evidence that OIP’s chief customs expert documented in October 2001. But the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General (and Mr. Riza) were aware of the kickback scheme at least as early as February 2001. The Secretary-General discussed the kickback allegations and other sanctions violations with Mr. Sevan on numerous occasions. Indeed, from recent interviews, it is evident that the Secretary-General paid attention to the Programme and was familiar with many of the key issues, such as the expansion of the Programme and the need to eliminate barriers to processing humanitarian contracts. Furthermore, on one occasion, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council the Iraqi regime’s illicit receipt of oil surcharges, albeit in an abbreviated form. He further recalled discussing the kickback allegations with members of the Security Council on an informal basis. When asked to reflect on his handling of the Programme, the SecretaryGeneral explained that he believed that he acted properly. The fact remains, however, that despite multiple opportunities, the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General, and Mr. Sevan never formally reported the kickback scheme to the Security Council through quarterly reports or otherwise. The Secretary-General recognized concerns about the Iraqi regime taking unilateral action. He further told the Committee that “giving Saddam Hussein the right to select” contractors was a significant design flaw in the Programme. While recognizing the United Nations’ exposure to abusive practices by the Iraqi regime, the 38th Floor failed to take meaningful steps to ward off and minimize such threats to the Programme. For example, no evidence has been found that the 38th Floor confronted Iraqi officials when reports of Programme abuses surfaced. The Deputy Secretary-General’s claim, when interviewed, that there were no issues requiring her attention is at odds with her own concessions that she knew at the time of significant Programme related issues. For example, the Deputy Secretary-General was well aware of the Iraqi regime’s smuggling of oil and told the Committee that, as of November 2000, the re-opening of the Syrian pipeline diverted revenue streams away from the United Nations’ humanitarian effort. She admitted knowledge of the regime’s receipt of surcharge payments and, in fact, received numerous notes from Mr. Sevan on the subject of payments to the regime generated from oil sales. Similarly, Ms. Frechette eventually conceded that she was aware of the kickback scheme as of March 2001. Apart from reports and evidence of sanctions violations, the Deputy SecretaryGeneral also knew of disputes within OIP, including complaints that PMD’s director J. Christer Elfverson raised about Mr. Sevan’s style of management and the deep resentment that existed between Mr. Sevan and Humanitarian Coordinator Hans von Sponeck. Still further, the Deputy Secretary-General knew of the Government of Iraq’s delays in issuing visas for United Nations personnel to operate in Iraq. The Deputy Secretary-General had many reasons to question Mr. Sevan and, in fact, eventually conceded that there “were a few signals” indicating that the Programme was amiss. The documents and witness accounts chronicled herein reveal more than just “a few

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signals.” The Deputy Secretary-General knew about -- but did not act upon -- many reports of major Programme violations.

C. Summation In the final analysis, Mr. Sevan ran a $100 billion Programme with very little oversight from the supervisory authority that created his position and OIP. Through a combination of an unclear reporting structure, a lack of supervision by the 38th Floor, and a general unwillingness to recognize and address significant issues on the part of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Sevan had substantial autonomy to shape the Programme’s direction. He failed to resist and challenge the Iraqi regime’s rampant sanctions violations through which the regime diverted billions of dollars away from the humanitarian effort. He failed to properly investigate and monitor sanctions violations. And he failed to disclose pertinent information to the 661 Committee about the actions by the Iraqi regime. Mr. Sevan’s failures should have been evident on the 38th Floor. The Deputy Secretary-General suggested that the Programme was “well run,” but in the end acknowledged that “in retrospect there was a growing problem of kickbacks that should have been given greater prominence ... with respect to myself and the Secretary-General.” There was little real oversight from the 38th Floor of Mr. Sevan’s activities and, in particular, of his response, or lack thereof, to reports of Iraqi abuses of the Programme to obtain illicit income from oil surcharges and humanitarian kickbacks. The record amply demonstrates a number of instances where there was a lack of support for and oversight of the Programme by the Secretary-General. Some of the problems identified by the Committee are: (1) a delegation to Deputy Secretary-General Frechette that was neither clear nor appropriately monitored; (2) an inadequate response to and investigation of reports of Iraqi abuses and corruption of the Programme, in part by failing to ensure that reports of Programme violations were brought to the attention of the 661 Committee and the Security Council; (3) a lack of adequately ensuring that the sanctions objective of the Programme received appropriate attention; and (4) a failure to provide adequate oversight of the Executive Director of OIP, Benon Sevan. This is not to say that had the 38th Floor more aggressively supervised Mr. Sevan the failures of OIP would have been eliminated. Nor is it to overlook the significant role and authority of the 661 Committee in guiding the Programme’s affairs. But Mr. Sevan and OIP retained an immensely important role in the day-to-day administration of the Programme and interaction with the Government of Iraq. The 38th Floor had a substantially greater role to play. A check on Mr. Sevan was clearly needed, but no meaningful control was exercised.

VIII. AGENCIES: THE PROGRAMME IN THE THREE NORTHERN GOVERNORATES During the 1980s, Saddam Hussein began a systematic relocation and genocide of Kurdish populations in northern Iraq. Tens of thousands of Kurds were killed during this

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campaign. In 1991, after the first Gulf War, the Kurds rebelled, resulting in the Government of Iraq’s withdrawal of its military forces and political officials. The United States subsequently created and enforced a no-fly zone over the three northern governorates. As acknowledged by Security Council Resolution 986, the situation in the three northern governorates of Erbil, Dohuk, and Suleimaniyah presented special problems for the architects of the Oil-for-Food Programme. Because of the oppression suffered by Kurds in northern Iraq at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s government and the implied protection of coalition forces, these governorates operated semi-autonomously, while still legally part of Iraq. After parliamentary elections in 1992, the two largest Kurdish parties -- the Kurdistan Democratic Party (“KDP”) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (“PUK”) -- formed a coalition government. However, the parties had a long history of mutual acrimony. This pattern continued in spite of the coalition, resulting in two separate regional centers: one including Erbil and Dohuk, controlled by the KDP; and the other including Suleimaniyah, controlled by the PUK. In addition, following the first Gulf War and the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the three northern governorates, Saddam Hussein imposed an embargo on the region, which remained in effect until the Programme began. As a result, the Kurdish population in the north suffered doubly -- from sanctions imposed by the Security Council and those imposed by Baghdad. For the reasons cited above, Resolution 986 and the Iraq-UN MOU established a framework for delivering humanitarian aid in the north that differed from that projected for the southern and central governorates. Specifically, the United Nations Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme (“UNIAHP”), on behalf of the Government of Iraq, was given full responsibility for delivering humanitarian aid in the three northern governorates. The Agencies achieved crucial successes early in the Programme in the northern governorates -- most notably managing a humanitarian crisis and distributing much-needed goods and services throughout the region. However, their implementation of the Programme in the north also yielded a number of notable failures. These can be ascribed primarily to: (1) the Agencies tackling problems and projects beyond their core competencies; and (2) the fact that the Agencies’ activities in northern Iraq were fraught with insufficient management, coordination, and oversight within and among the Agencies. Some of the Agencies were either advisory or regulatory bodies with little or no experience in the implementation of actual infrastructure projects involving construction or engineering components. The consequences were outright failures of projects, or projects delayed and poorly managed, at best. Illustrations are numerous. ITU failed to rehabilitate the telecommunications system in the north. UNESCO could not construct a functional chalk factory, the need for which was questionable in any case, nor could WHO deliver either one large (400-bed) hospital or a series of smaller ones. UN-Habitat, charged with finding housing for internally displaced persons (“IDPs”), did not maintain and vet eligibility lists, making it susceptible to the pressures of local authorities, which had their own priorities and favorites, usually not including IDPs. UN-Habitat also seems to have

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bent to the priorities of the local authorities, who favored infrastructure projects (e.g., roads, bridges) rather than increases in the housing stock. Among the Agencies, ineffective coordination and oversight compounded the problems of extending their activities beyond their normal parameters. It is probably no exaggeration that the kinds of projects for which they assumed responsibility under the Programme were unique in their scope and magnitude. For many it was the largest project ever undertaken and also designed with a very different funding model. Normally, in undertaking projects in countries outside Iraq, Agencies would get approval and voluntary funding from governments and other donors. In this construct, governments and donors would expect, and get, periodic progress reports. For the implementing agency, there would be an incentive to perform well as performance history would impact on the funding of future projects. By contrast, for Agencies’ projects under the Programme, funds were sourced from the proceeds of oil sales, but the Agencies were not in any way directly responsible to the Government of Iraq. There was also a muddled answer to the basic management question -- who is in charge? Supposedly, OIP was, overall, but it was thousands of miles away in New York. On the ground, OIP had delegated responsibilities to UNOHCI. In the end, the responsibility for wasted resources, duplicative efforts, and failed project implementation was not clear. Neither OIP nor UNOHCI seemed prepared to use their control of the source of project funding to manage the largely autonomous Agencies. There was no real system or framework within which UNOHCI (or anyone else) could effectively coordinate the Agencies’ activities. The Agencies themselves resisted coordination or oversight from outside their own organizations. These factors were complicated or compounded by poorly defined relationships between and among Agencies, with the Iraqi government, and with the local authorities in the three northern governorates. The Agencies, with the exception of WFP, also suffered from a lack of sufficient qualified senior staff. This was, in part brought about by high turnover, largely due to the short-term nature of personnel contracts. The Programme had to be renewed every 180 days, and the Agencies, except UNICEF, were unwilling to risk contracts with staff, which exceeded this six month period. The result: lack of knowledge of conditions in the areas in which the Agencies were operating; this in turn slowed procurement, contributing to delays in project implementation, low morale, and unhappy local authorities. Throughout, the job was made harder for United Nations entities implementing the Programme because of the manipulative and unhelpful actions of the Government of Iraq. Always resistant to a large United Nations presence in Iraq, the Government of Iraq systemically delayed granting visas for United Nations personnel -- even though this was promised in the Iraq-UN MOD. The Iraqis also capriciously declared certain United Nations personnel “personae non gratae” (especially British and American citizens), delayed clearance for the delivery of goods and services, exerted selective pressures on local hires, and resisted projects that might benefit the northern population. To some degree, no doubt largely to entice cooperation from the Government of Iraq, the Agencies adjusted their activities to accommodate these pressures.

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In spite of many of these inhibiting factors, the Programme largely achieved its immediate purpose of distributing food. While successful at basic food distribution, the Programme fell well short of what should have been accomplished, given the substantial funds available. The Agencies failed to take advantage of the substantial funds available, and, in many cases, their implementation of projects was poor. At another level, the Committee has not singled out individual corruption in the Programme in Iraq, largely because of limitations resulting from the unsettled conditions prevailing in Iraq throughout the period of the Inquiry (as well as time constraints). However, particularly in the north, even greater access to witnesses may not have taken possible cases of corruption forward, due to the lack of a banking system and the difficulties of tracing financial transfers in the resultant cash economy. At the same time, weakness in control and oversight contributed to an environment conducive to corruption. Certainly, there were thefts of large amounts of cash from various offices of the Agencies (e.g., $300,000 from UNESCO, $90,000 from an FAO office plus $40,000 after a car accident, and $64,000 from a WHO sub-office). Added to these events, it appears that the Agencies did not thoroughly investigate allegations of the misappropriation of funds, mismanagement, or conflicts of interest. In fact, a legal consultant to UNDP stated that conditions in Iraq required flexibility in interpreting and executing rules.

IX. PROGRAMME ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS A. Agency administrative expense recovery In general, “various operational and administrative costs” of the United Nations in implementing the Programme were intended to be paid from a special account for administrative expenses, known as the ESD Account. That account was funded with 2.2 percent of the proceeds generated by Iraqi oil sales under the Programme. In its First Interim Report, the Committee reviewed in detail the Secretariat’s spending from this account, mainly by OIP and UNOHCI. The forensic analysis concluded that expenditures of ESD funds were properly accounted for and, with rare exceptions, made in accordance with policy and budget decisions. The actual expenditures were related to direct Programme costs, mainly for personnel. In the case of the Agencies involved in the Programme, the question of how to compensate them for certain overhead costs was raised at an early stage. The Agencies maintained that these indirect costs, known as Programme Support Costs (“PSC”), should be added to reimbursement of direct costs to compensate fully their Programme work. In part, the Agencies argued that because PSC are based on indirect expenses, such as headquarters management time, they are not precisely quantifiable and could not be billed directly to the Programme. In addition, the Agencies asserted that they had no source for financing such costs and that ordinarily in undertaking projects like the Oil-for-Food Programme they include a charge for PSC based on total expenditures. Paying PSC was vigorously opposed by Jean-Pierre Halbwachs, the United Nations Controller, as inconsistent with both Resolution 986 and the practice within the Secretariat,

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and as possibly dangerous in terms of disturbing the balance struck with the Iraqi regime on the relationship between humanitarian expenditures and administrative expenditures. At the urging of Security Council members anxious to get the Programme underway rapidly and effectively, the resistance of Mr. Halbwachs to the payment of PSC was overcome, with the apparent concurrence of Secretary-General Annan. The Agencies, therefore, were ultimately reimbursed for their direct expenses and for a percentage, generally three percent, of both their direct expenses and their Programme expenditures for humanitarian assistance. Further, the amounts reimbursed to the Agencies for direct expenses included a substantial number of headquarters staff. The resulting reimbursements are reflected in the table below:

Table 5 - Administrative Costs of the Agencies (in USD thousands)

WFP FAO UNICEF UNDP UN-HABITAT WHO UNOPS UNESCO ITU TOTAL

Direct Costs

Total PSC

$96,568 $90,938 $68,208 $61,531 $62,823 $50,653 $37,699 $28,773 $8,890 $506,083

$11,361 $16,491 $13,922 $18,721 $15,127 $10,461 $10,483 $4,246 $1,138 $101,950

Total Administrative Costs $107,929 $107,429 $82,130 $80,252 $77,950 $61,114 $48,182 $33,019 $10,028 $608,033

% PSC to Direct Costs 11.8% 18.1% 20.4% 30.4% 24.1% 20,7% 27.8% 14.8% 12.8% 20.1%

As can be seen above, about $102 million was paid to the Agencies for PSC. On the average, they were paid about twenty percent over and above direct costs. The substantial differences among the Agencies were influenced by the volume and value of expenditures for goods in northern Iraq. The investigation has found that PSC provisions for other programs or projects of the Agencies generally have been negotiated with fund donors in a range of three to thirteen percent. The Committee agrees that the Agencies’ rationale has force and that there is precedence for departing from the strict and narrow interpretation of “operating and administrative” expenses employed by the Secretariat itself in confining reimbursement only to direct costs. However, the method chosen -- the levy of a fixed percentage of total project expenditures on top of direct cost reimbursement -- is highly arbitrary, without explicit rationale, and appears generous in consideration of the number of headquarter staff costs that were reimbursed directly.

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After the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) assumed responsibility for winding down the Programme in the summer of 2003, the Security Council mandated that the United Nations perform two significant tasks: first, contract for and provide emergency supplies; and, second, prioritize and amend contracts already in place. For its part, the United Nations decided to employ the Agencies. Moreover, a different approach towards reimbursing the Agencies was taken, an approach that is difficult to defend. Rather than reimburse the Agencies for their direct costs plus PSC, the United Nations decided to pay the Agencies a flat percentage of the value of the contracts for emergency supplies they would purchase and of contracts that they would be prioritizing and amending. The United Nations decided on a seven percent rate for work performed to acquire and distribute emergency supplies immediately after the invasion (Resolutions 1472 and 1476), and proposed a three percent rate for work performed to prioritize and amend existing contracts (Resolution 1483). The percentage allocation for Resolution 1483, after strong internal debate, was dropped from three to one percent. The two tasks combined produced $179 million for work over a five-month period. The amounts reimbursed for the earlier amendment required more complex work from the Agencies, and there appears to be a consistent relationship between direct expenditures and reimbursements, agency by agency. However, for the later work, there appears to be no consistent relationship between costs and reimbursements. In total, the amount of fees paid under Resolution 1483 was clearly excessive, as admitted to the Committee's investigators. Direct costs and overhead were approximately $17.5 million and fees collected were $66 million.

Table 6 - Resolutions 1472,1476, and 1483 Costs (in USD thousands)

WFP UNDP UNOPS FAO WHO UNICEF UN-HABITAT UNESCO ITU Total

SCR 1472 Fees 55,851 23,340 3,590 15,149 10,810 4,119 ---112,859

SCR 1483 Fees 16,876 10,655 19,019 6,293 3,270 4,082 3,928 1,956 385 66,464

Total 72,727 33,995 22,609 21,442 14,080 8,201 3,928 1,9556 385 179,323

In that light, and after consultation with officials of the United Nations and the Agencies, the Committee strongly recommends that the equivalent of up to $50 million in the aggregate be made available by Agencies for the benefit of Iraq, either by program support or by cash payment. Fair compensation to third parties is necessary to enable the United Nations to complement its core resources with competent outside specialists, such

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as the Agencies. However, the United Nations should ensure that such compensation does not result in egregious profits.

C. Misstatement of Programme administrative costs A decision was made at the start of the Programme that, in seeking reimbursement for PSC, only the portion related to direct administrative costs would be taken from the ESD Account (2.2 percent Account). The payment of PSC on three percent of the costs of humanitarian goods would instead be charged against the humanitarian account for the northern governorates (ESC Account). Similarly, and for reasons not entirely clear to the Committee, a decision was made also to pay other administrative fees from the humanitarian account for central and southern Iraq (ESB Account). The United Nations’ financial statements and accounting records reflect Programme administrative costs of $902 million. However, the net effect of the decisions just cited has been, as an accounting matter, to understate by $313 million administrative expenses in the United Nations accounts. The accounts reserved for the purchase of humanitarian goods were reduced by the use of the accounts for some administrative costs.

Table 7 - Programme Funding for Administrative Charges (in USD thousands)

Agency Admin. Charges UN/OIP/UNOHCI Admin. Charges Total

ESD 474,329 428,160 902,489

Funding for Administrative Charges ESC ESB Total 133,703 179,324 787,356 --428,160 133,703

179,324

1,215,516

X. CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT The Committee’s earlier Briefing Paper and its First Interim Report covered certain critical aspects of the Programme’s internal audits. These earlier reports concentrated on the scope and effectiveness of the Internal Audit Division (“IAD”) within the Office of Internal Oversight Services (“OIOS”), located in the Secretariat under the authority of an Under-Secretary-General. Created in July 1994, OIOS is the first United Nations office specifically concerned with fraud, abuse, waste, and corruption within the Organization. Further investigation reviewed in this Report extends the analysis to the internal and external audits of the nine UN-related Agencies engaged in implementing the Programme, the work of the Board of Auditors (“BOA”), and the Investigations Division of OIOS (“OIOS ID”).

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402 A. Internal audits of the agencies

The internal auditing efforts of the Agencies’ had much in common with the IAD audits discussed in the First Interim Report: too little, too late, and with too few resources. Planned or requested audits were frustrated by lack of funding, staff, and management support. The resources devoted to Programme audits by the nine UN-related Agencies varied substantially, and the scope of their audits ranged from the small and specific (e.g., the hiring of water tankers) to Programme-wide. In total, there were only sixty-six internal audits -- less than one audit per agency per year. FAO alone accounted for half of these internal audits; several of the Agencies only had two or three, and ITU had none. Despite the size of Programme expenditures, the established auditing resources of the Agencies were increased little, if at all, so coverage fell below their normal standards and well below private sector standards. There were instances in which audits were curtailed by lack of staff, and, in some instances, the Agencies’ management failed to respond to requests for extra funding. The audit reports made over 1,150 recommendations. There was a striking similarity in these audit findings and recommendations across the Agencies and the years. About half of the audit findings were related to internal control deficiencies in operating and financial policies. Some of these problems can be attributed to the difficult operating environment. However, an apparent absence of follow-up to audit findings in many cases or consequences for managers who failed to address deficiencies were symptomatic of the lack of authority and status for internal audit. Appropriately, the top audit or oversight officials in the Agencies were responsible to the relevant Agencies’ executive heads and reported to the Agencies’ external governing body. With one exception, the Agencies’ auditing committees were chaired and staffed by insiders rather than qualified independent members. Concerns were raised at one point by the 661 Committee about transparency and accountability as the Programme greatly increased in size. OIP generally met with resistance when attempting to obtain the Agencies' internal audit reports. It is unclear if the Agencies ever provided OIP with these reports. Similarly, extensive discussion among OIOS and the Agencies about the value of “horizontal audits,” covering activity across the Agencies, never led to concrete results. Clearly, Agencies value their relative independence, and resist change that might place organs of the Secretariat -- in this case OIP or OIOS -- in a supervisory role over their own staff. In addition, member states were not as well positioned as usual to monitor the Agencies’ activities. Ordinarily, when member states provide voluntary contributions to particular agencies, they have an understandable incentive to exercise appropriate -- and potentially more effective -- oversight. But in the specific case of the Programme, the Agencies’ financing came from a common source (Programme funds), and concerns of particular member states therefore may have been diluted or even absent.

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403 B. External audits

Almost from its beginning, the United Nations Organization has had independent auditors responsible for auditing the financial statements of both the Secretariat and the Agencies. The United Nations is audited by the Board of Auditors (“BOA”), which is composed of three rotating auditors general of member states who draw on their national staffs for specific audits. The Agencies are audited by members of the Panel of External Auditors of the United Nations (“the Panel”), on which members of the BOA also sit. In concept, it was recognized that the Programme required oversight and review, and formal reports were addressed to the Secretary-General and forwarded to the General Assembly, OIP, the 661 Committee, and the Government of Iraq. Unfortunately, the scope of the external audits of the Programme was limited to the escrow accounts and the Secretariat; these audits did not encompass the Agencies’ operations. The mandate of the BOA is broad, and its stated policy is that staffing and funding are determined by perceived needs. The difficulty is that, in practice, they have accepted a limitation on their budget and, in respect of the Programme, the BOA purview was defined narrowly, focusing particularly on the accuracy of financial statements. That is reflected both in the limited amount spent by the BOA in connection with the Programme (approximately $1 million or an average of $110,000 per audit) and the complete failure to identify any fraud or corruption. The internal control environment of Programme activity received little attention and even seemed to diminish as the Programme grew, and serious problems began to be rumored or known. External auditors from the Panel performed biennial audits on the Agencies’ financial statements, and all such statements received unqualified audit opinions. The external auditors also submitted management letters that addressed financial and management issues arising during their work. On the average, Agency administrative expenditures for Programme activities only accounted for five percent of their total spending. As a consequence, there appeared to be no specific focus on auditing Programme-related activities. In any event, an opportunity was lost: the United Nations bodies conceptually most equipped to provide a disciplined, professional view of the management of the Oil-forFood Programme failed to rise to the challenge.

C. United Nations Investigations Division Significantly, even though located in the Secretariat, the authority of OIOS ID extends to separately administered funds and programs. Because of funding limitations, however, OIOS ID mainly reacts to specific indications of problems rather than initiating proactive program reviews. The mission of OIOS ID is essentially fact-finding. Reports may be made to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, and -- in the case of suspected criminal activity -- appropriate national authorities. United Nations staff members are obligated to cooperate with investigations, and OIOS has access to all United Nations documents. But there is no

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obligation for outside parties, including contractors, to cooperate, and there is no record of disciplinary action against United Nations employees for non-cooperation. During the years of its existence, OIOS ID has received a growing number of complaints, and its staff has more than doubled to a current total of thirty-four in four locations. However, only a fraction of complaints are actively investigated. Significantly, for extra-budgetary activities like the Programme, funding is controlled by managers whose program the OIOS ID intends to investigate. Requests for greater funding and staffing during the Programme years were denied by Mr. Sevan. Given what is known, it is striking that OIOS ID received relatively few Programmerelated cases, most of them as late as 2002 and 2003. Moreover, only limited investigation was undertaken. Some of the problem was absence of cooperation by the Iraq authorities, but it is evident that lack of funding and other resources were important constraints. The conclusion is unavoidable that the United Nations Organization up and down the line did not fully accept or support the mission of OIOS ID. Financing and staffing were inadequate, “whistle blower” protection non-existent, and the willingness of program managers to support aggressive investigation was generally absent, certainly in the case of the Oil-for-Food Programme. Moreover, the authorized ability of OIOS ID to extend the scope of its work throughout the United Nations Organization has never been exploited. These clear limitations on OIOS ID’s performance were not balanced by the two other United Nations offices with inspection and oversight authority. Neither the Monitoring, Evaluation and Consulting Division of OIOS nor the Joint Inspection Unit performed any review or evaluation of the Programme.

D. Conclusions The review of the oversight of the Programme, particularly auditing, reveals clear inadequacies in staffing and financing in the UN-related Agencies as well as in the Secretariat. Little effort was spent to achieve consistency and coordination over Agencies participating in the Programme. Programme managers could frustrate initiatives of both auditors and investigators, and there was an absence of, or inability to use, clear reporting lines to “the top” or to a truly independent board. At least as important, these failings appear symptomatic of the absence of a strong organizational concern with maintaining protection against inefficiencies, fraud, and corruption. For example, the BOA, which was the longstanding independent oversight body with extensive authority and mandate for auditing the Organization as a whole, interpreted its mandate narrowly, focusing mainly on the financial accounts of the Programme. The oversight functions of the Organization need to be greatly strengthened, and the Committee’s recommendations in this respect are set forth later in this Report.

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405 XI. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Broadly, the Committee’s conclusions address the adequacy of political oversight and direction, the capacity of the Secretariat to administer its responsibilities under the Programme, the United Nations’ ability to provide financial oversight and control to the Programme, and the question of persuading the entities in the United Nations’ highly decentralized system to work effectively and efficiently together in an enterprise of this complexity and size. The Committee’s conclusions and recommendations are generally consonant with recommendations by others who have urged and are urging early action on United Nations reform. However the Committee cannot help but note that many of these recommendations, some of which are both detailed and holistic, have in large measure lain fallow for long periods of time, some for over a decade. The Committee makes two contributions to the reform debate. First, the depth to which the Committee has analyzed the Programme leads uniquely to a detailed background from which the Committee’s recommendations have come. Second, the Committee’s analysis of the Programme confirms that reform is urgent. It suspects that the weaknesses in structure and ethic within the Programme may well be symptomatic of a wider malaise throughout the United Nations. In short, this investigation leads to the firm belief that reform is necessary if the United Nations is to regain and retain the measure of respect among the international community that its work requires. As important, the Committee believes that action must be taken now. The urgency to pursue fundamental reform of the Organization is heightened by a sense that, in this volatile world, roughly analogous situations demanding sanctions, enforcement of sanctions, and/or humanitarian relief are more than likely to recur.

A. The Security Council struggled The Security Council struggled in clearly defining the broad purposes, policies, and administrative control of the Programme. Resolution 986 followed prior failed efforts to engage the Government of Iraq in an oil-for-food program. As a result, there appears to have been conflicting sentiments between treating Iraq with enough “flexibility” to get its agreement to a program and a concern to retain sufficient control that any program would not become a doorway to the clandestine reinvigoration of Iraq’s ambitions for weapons of mass destruction. In the end, on one hand, far too much initiative and decision-making was left to the Iraqi regime while on the other, the Security Council took the extraordinary step of retaining, through its 661 Committee, substantial elements of administrative, and therefore operational, control. That turned out to be a recipe for the dilution of individual and institutional responsibility. When things went awry -- and they did -- when troublesome questions of conflict between political objectives and administrative effectiveness arose, decisions were delayed, bungled, or simply avoided -- no one was in charge.

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Volcker Report B. Administrative and personnel structure not adequate

The Committee recognizes that the United Nations was faced with an extraordinary challenge, replete with conflicting political pressures, for which it was ill-equipped in terms of experience and administrative capacity. Indeed, the Committee believes that “professional disciplines” at the United Nations are weak and eroded. As a consequence, the Secretariat, from its most senior levels, proved unable to deal effectively with the political pressures. There also appears to be a pervasive culture resistant to accountability and prone to escaping responsibility. The Secretariat was also hampered in effectively carrying out its functions under the Programme through an absence, at the time, of suitable administrative infrastructure for dealing with the sudden demands of this exceptionally large and complex “temporary” humanitarian program. From what it has seen of the Programme’s operations, the Committee considered whether the United Nations could reasonably limit operational responsibility to such areas as peacekeeping, where experience has led to the creation of some degree of permanent infrastructure. Ultimately, the Committee was convinced that, in a world where a myriad of considerations inform crises in a volatile and often violent environment, that approach would deprive the world of a needed resource. If the United Nations is to fulfill that mission, the fault lines and flaws uncovered during the investigation clearly demand that the Organization’s administrative capacity be strengthened. To this end, the Committee has made a series of recommendations, which are outlined elsewhere in this Report. The key point is that the Organization and its Secretary-General need a stronger structure at the top. A Secretary-General is, de facto, the Organization’s chief political and diplomatic officer. In unsettled times, those responsibilities tend to be all consuming. The present Secretary-General, widely respected for precisely those very qualities, has regrettably been undercut by lapses in the administration of the Organization. The United Nations Charter designates the Secretary-General as Chief Administrative Officer. But whatever the founders had in mind, the Secretary-General -- any SecretaryGeneral -- has not been chosen for managerial or administrative skills, nor has he been provided with the instruments needed for strong executive control, most clearly in the area of personnel, where professional competence must compete with the political demands of member states. A Secretary-General needs stronger support. That need has been recognized, in part, by the creation in 1998 of the new post of Deputy Secretary-General. However, the results of the investigation suggest that the role of Deputy Secretary-General as “Chief Operating Officer” must be strengthened and made more explicit. The Committee proposes that the Deputy Secretary-General be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, as is the case with the Secretary-General. While ultimately responsible to the Secretary-General, the Chief Operating Officer should have direct authority for personnel, budgeting, and other key administrative functions with access to the Security Council and General Assembly as needed.

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407 C. Lack of effective controls

Most notable among the administrative failures of the Programme was a grievous absence of effective controls and audits. In both areas, the Organization has in recent years worked to develop competence, but it has been from a standing start. The Oil-for-Food Programme exemplified the weakness of planning, the lack of adequate funding, and the paucity of manpower, even after the Programme went on and on. As important structurally was a palpable absence of authority and clear, if any, reporting lines, especially to the Secretariat’s senior management. As a consequence, needed independence was lost. Line managers could and did divert auditing initiatives, and follow-up to critical findings was erratic at best.

D. Instances of corruption reflect control weaknesses The instances of corruption detailed in the Committee Reports -- corruption that reached to the top of the Programme management -- are an important reflection of control weaknesses. The Committee’s concern is that these influences are symptomatic of an absence of a strong institutional ethic -- an ethic that should reflect the unique and crucial role of the United Nations system in exemplifying and encouraging the highest standards in which corrosive corruption -- private and public -- has been far too common. The General Assembly, Security Council, and Secretariat have been insufficiently conscious of the serious risks posed by not enforcing ethical standards, both to the Organization’s credibility and to its internal morale.

E. Lack of inter-agency coordination The particular nature of the Oil-For-Food Programme placed in stark relief the difficulties of effective cooperation across the Agencies. There was and is no simple way accurately to track Programme expenditures across agency lines. The presumption of central budget authority was not matched by an ability to assess actual spending (much less the effectiveness of spending), or to insist on common accounting standards or treatment. Clearly, the demand for inter-agency action inherent in the Oil-for-Food Programme was exceptional. Arguably, such demands are unlikely to be repeated in so dramatic a fashion. But surely the difficulties perceived should not be tolerated in lesser programs.

XII. MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS A. Create the position of chief operating officer Create the position of Chief Operating Officer (“COO”). The COO would have authority over all aspects of administration and would be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The position would report to the Secretary-General, and the United Nations Charter should be amended as appropriate. Creation of this position would serve to better insulate United Nations administrators from political pressures distorting management decisions. It would provide sufficient

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authority for effective management discipline and would free the Secretary-General of some of the duties inherent in the role of the chief administrative officer.

B. Strengthen independence of oversight and auditing Establish an Independent Oversight Board (“IOB”) with a majority of independent members and an independent chairman. In discharging its mandate, the IOB should have functional responsibility for all audit, investigation, and evaluation activities, both internal and external, across the United Nations Secretariat and agencies substantially funded by the United Nations and whose leadership is appointed by the Secretary-General. The IOB should be particularly concerned with overseeing and monitoring: 1.

Implementation of risk-based planning across the United Nations system;

2.

Implementation of oversight, audit, and investigation best practices;

3. Implementation of a consistent framework for assessing findings and recommendations and bringing significant oversight issues to the attention of the Secretary-General Director-Generals and the General Assembly/Governing Bodies; 4.

Investigations and improvements in the ethics and integrity of the Organization;

5.

The efficiency and effectiveness of the oversight function.

and

In the interests of transparency, there should be annual disclosure from the IOB to the General Assembly of the planned audit coverage and the actual results of oversight activity. IOB oversight reports should be publicly accessible. The IOB should consult with and coordinate as appropriate with all UN-related agencies.

C. Improve coordination and the oversight framework for cross-agency programs The Programme demonstrated the need for significant improvements in the oversight of cross-agency programs, particularly regarding common principles, planning, transparent financials, and resources. The IOB should provide the needed coordination. 1. Establish high level coordinating bodies for all major cross-agency relief and emergency programs and provide them with real decision making ability, agreed to by all participating entities; these coordinating bodies should be empowered to set, implement, and enforce principles and policies; 2.

Improve the following aspects of cross-agency programs by:

x

Promulgating, subject to audit, appropriate policies and procedures;

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x Documenting processes for rapid deployment and rapid response projects identifying areas of risk and applicable critical controls necessary to be in place to mitigate exposure; and x

Developing standard audit plans for programs;

3. Ensure that each program has consolidated financial statements that are subject to external and internal audit; and 4. Make sufficient oversight resources available immediately and integrate them into the management and implementation of a new program. Mandate the creation of a rapid deployment audit program with investigatory presence (“rapid integrity”) that allows oversight to begin at the inception of a new program.

D. Reform and improve management performance Strong and effective leadership and management is essential to the success of the United Nations’ mission. There is a need for the United Nations to strengthen the quality of its management and management practices. To this end: 1. Improve the scope and quality of the internal management review processes by mandating periodic, high-level executive reviews against clear objectives of all major initiatives and activities; 2. Ensure that senior management and professional staff adhere to the highest standards of accountability and transparency in their performance, and remove those who do not meet these performance requirements; 3.

Seek opportunities for peer review of management performance; and

4. Overhaul the management hiring, promotion, evaluation, and reward methodology basing each on key tasks, and agreed measures of performance.

E. Expand conflict-of-interest and financial disclosure requirements The financial disclosure requirement must extend well below the current Assistant Secretary-General level within the Organization and should also specifically include the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General. Financial disclosure requirements must include all United Nations staff who have any decision-making role in the disbursement or award of United Nations funds (e.g., Procurement Department, Office of the Controller). A strong financial disclosure program is an integral part of creating an institutional culture that recognizes and understands actual, potential, and apparent conflicts of interest. The United Nations’ conflict-of-interest rules and regulations need to be expanded and better defined so that they encompass actual, potential, and apparent conflicts of interest.

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410 F. Cost recovery

The Committee recognizes that fair compensation to third parties is necessary to enable the United Nations to complement its core resources with competent outside specialists, such as the Agencies. However, the United Nations should ensure that such compensation does not result in egregious profits. Agencies involved in the Programme should return up to $50 million in excess compensation secured as a result of work performed under Security Council Resolution 1483.

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XIII. ANNEX 1: BIOGRAPHIES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS Chairman Paul A. Volcker In the course of his career, Mr. Volcker worked in the United States federal government for almost 30 years, culminating in two terms as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve System from 1979-1987. He divided the earlier stages of his career among the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the United States Treasury Department, and the Chase Manhattan Bank. Mr. Volcker retired as Chairman of Wolfensohn & Co. upon the merger of that firm with Bankers Trust. Currently, he is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the International Accounting Standards Committee, overseeing a renewed effort to develop consistent, highquality accounting standards acceptable in all countries. In 2003, he headed a private Commission on the Public Service, recommending a sweeping overhaul of the organization and personnel practices of the United States federal government. Educated at Princeton University, Harvard University, and the London School of Economics, Mr. Volcker is Professor Emeritus of International Economic Policy at Princeton University and was the first Henry Kaufman Visiting Professor at the Stern School of Business at New York University.

Member Justice Richard Goldstone After practicing at the Johannesburg Bar in South Africa, Justice Goldstone was appointed to the Transvaal Supreme Court in 1980. In 1989 he was appointed Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal and from July 1994 to October 2003, he was a Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. He is currently Distinguished Jurist-in-Residence at the University of San Diego in the United States. From 1991 to 1994, he served as Chairperson of the Commission of Inquiry regarding Public Violence and Intimidation in South Africa. From August 1994 to September 1996, he served as the Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. During 1998, he was the chairperson of a high level group of international experts that met in Valencia, Spain, and drafted a Declaration of Human Duties and Responsibilities for the Director General of UNESCO (the Valencia Declaration). From August 1999 until December 2001, he was the chairperson of the International Independent Inquiry on Kosovo. In December 2001, he was appointed as the chairperson of the International Task Force on Terrorism that was established by the International Bar Association and is now the co-chairman of its Human Rights Institute. Among awards he has received are the International Human Rights Award of the American Bar Association (1994) and Honorary Doctorates of Law from universities in Canada, Israel, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

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He is an Honorary Bencher of the Inner Temple, London, an Honorary Fellow of St Johns College, Cambridge, and an Honorary Member of the Association of the Bar of New York. He is a Foreign Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He serves on the boards of Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, and the International Center for Transitional Justice.

Member Mark Pieth Mark Pieth has been Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology at the University of Basel, Switzerland. He completed his studies, his PhD in criminal procedure and his habilitation thesis on sanctioning and broader criminological topics at this University; after an extensive period abroad at the Max-Planck-Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, Germany and the Cambridge Institute of Criminology, United Kingdom, and a time in private practice at the Bar, he was Head of Section on Economic and Organised Crime in the Swiss Federal Office of Justice from 1989 to 1993. In this position he was involved in drafting legislation against money laundering, organised crime, drug abuse and corruption and on the confiscation of assets. Prof. Pieth has acquired extensive experience in international fora, most notably as a member of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) between 1989 and 1993 and as Chair of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions since 1990. Prof. Pieth has served as Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Basel. He has also assumed various presidencies and memberships of national commissions in Switzerland (President of the Expert Group of the National Research Programme on Violence and Organised Crime, Former President of the Federal Commission on Data Protection in the Medical Profession, Member of the Swiss Federal Gaming Commission, Member of the Consultative Commission to the Federal Administration of Finances on the Prevention of Money Laundering). He has been a consultant to corporations, international organisations and foreign governments on issues related to governance and a facilitator to the Wolfsberg AML Banking Initiative.

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XIV. ANNEX 2: THE MANDATE OF THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMMITTEE The Committee is tasked with collecting and examining information relating to all aspects of the administration and management of the Programme, from its inception to its transfer to the CPA, including allegations of fraud and corruption on the part of United Nation officials, personnel and agents, as well as contractors of the United Nations or Iraq under the Programme. Committee reports are submitted to the Secretary-General with the understanding that they will be made public. Such reports shall provide a full explanation of the support for its findings. The rights of those implicated to respond to findings and any undertaking by the Committee as to confidentiality of interviews or other information are to be respected. The Committee’s investigation proceeds on the authority of the terms of reference agreed between its Chairman and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, buttressed by the unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 1538 of April 21, 2004. That resolution welcomed the appointment of the Independent Inquiry and called upon all member states (including their regulatory authorities) to cooperate fully, by all appropriate means, with the Inquiry. The Secretary-General has explicitly and repeatedly instructed United Nations employees to cooperate fully and to preserve and make available to the Committee United Nations records of all kinds. He was also explicit in his expectation that all United Nations staff will cooperate fully. He has been clear that violation of this instruction would lead to disciplinary action. The Secretary-General set forth the following terms of reference to guide the Committee’s investigation: The independent inquiry shall collect and examine information relating to the administration and management of the Oil-for-Food Programme, including allegations of fraud and corruption on the part of United Nations officials, personnel and agents, as well as contractors, including entities that have entered into contracts with the United Nations or with Iraq under the Programme: (a) to determine whether the procedures established by the Organization, including the Security Council and the Security Council Committee Established by Resolution 661 (1990) Concerning the Situation between Iraq and Kuwait for the processing and approval of contracts under the Programme, and the monitoring of the sale and delivery of petroleum and petroleum products and the purchase and delivery of humanitarian goods, were violated, bearing in mind the respective roles of United Nations officials, personnel and agents, as well as entities that have entered into contracts with the United Nations or with Iraq under the Programme; (b) to determine whether any United Nations officials, personnel, agents or contractors engaged in any illicit or corrupt activities in the carrying out of their respective roles in relation to the Programme, including, for example, bribery in relation to oil sales, abuses in regard to surcharges on oil sales and illicit payments in regard to purchases of humanitarian goods;

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Volcker Report (c) to determine whether the accounts of the Programme were in order and were maintained in accordance with the relevant Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations.

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415 XV. ANNEX 3: FINDINGS

The Committee makes no formal findings with respect to the Security Council. However, the Committee does believe that the Security Council failed to clearly define the broad parameters, policies, and administrative responsibilities for the Programme. This lack of clarity was exacerbated by permitting the Iraqi regime to exercise too much initiative in the Programme design and its subsequent implementation. Compounding that difficulty, the Security Council, in contrast to most past practice, retained through its 661 Committee substantial elements of administrative control. Neither the Security Council nor the Secretariat leadership was in overall control.

A. The Secretariat and OIP Secretary-General Kofi Annan As the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations, the Secretary-General carried oversight and management responsibilities for the entire Secretariat. That particularly included auditing and controls functions that had demonstrable problems with respect to the Programme, as discussed elsewhere in this Report. In terms of the Programme itself, the record amply demonstrates a number of instances where there was a lack of support for and oversight of the Programme by the Secretary-General. Some of the problems identified by the Committee are: (1) a delegation to Deputy Secretary-General Frechette that was neither clear nor appropriately monitored; (2) an inadequate response to and investigation of reports of Iraqi abuses and corruption of the Programme, in part by failing to ensure that reports of Programme violations were brought to the attention of the 661 Committee and the Security Council; (3) a lack of adequately ensuring that the sanctions objective of the Programme received appropriate attention; and (4) a failure to provide adequate oversight of the Executive Director of OIP, Mr. Sevan. In sum, in light of these circumstances, the cumulative management performance of the Secretary-General fell short of the standards that the United Nations Organization should strive to maintain. In making these findings, the Committee has recognized both the difficult administrative demands imposed upon the Secretariat and the Secretary-General both by the design of the Programme, and the overlapping Security Council responsibilities.

Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette With respect to Deputy Secretary-General Frechette, the Committee finds that the Deputy Secretary-General, apparently uncertain of her role, did not provide the degree of leadership and oversight that the complex Programme required. The scope of the delegation by the Secretary-General to the Deputy Secretary-General was not a model of clarity, but the Deputy Secretary-General failed to seek clarification. Moreover, the Deputy Secretary-General knew that it was her role to oversee Mr. Sevan. The Deputy Secretary-

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General’s oversight of Mr. Sevan was not adequate. The Deputy Secretary-General offered very little direction to Mr. Sevan, particularly on matters concerning the sanctions violations. The Deputy Secretary-General acknowledged that it was her role to ensure that the Secretary-General’s quarterly reports to the Security Council were accurate and complete. Yet the Deputy Secretary-General failed to have included any reference to the kickback scheme in the many reports forwarded to the Security Council during the Programme.

Benon Sevan Mr. Sevan failed to maintain and support OIP’s responsibilities with respect to sanctions monitoring and to properly investigate and monitor sanctions violations, withheld critical evidence from the 661 Committee and the Security Council of reports of kickbacks on Programme-related contracts, marginalized the important role of the Programme Management Division, and did not ensure that the Contracts Processing and Monitoring Division possessed adequate resources and expertise to scrutinize Programmerelated contracts.

B. The selection of Cotecna Inspection S.A. Secretary-General Kofi Annan Recent evidence raised further questions about whether the Secretary-General was aware of Cotecna’s contract bid, leading the Committee to re-examine the issue. After careful examination, this new evidence does not change the Committee's prior finding on this issue. The Committee carefully reviewed the additional Kojo Annan telephone billing records that make clear that in the autumn of 1998 Kojo Annan placed calls to the procurement department and that at other times he also called the Secretary-General. However, the pattern of calling times is not clearly suggestive that Kojo Annan discussed Cotecna’s interest with the Secretary-General. The remaining records disclosed by Kojo Annan do not reflect communications between Kojo Annan and the Secretary-General about Cotecna’s contract bid. With respect to the memorandum of December 4, 1998, Mr. Wilson’s description of “discussions” with the “SG and his entourage,” the witnesses do not support Mr. Wilson’s account, and he himself has refuted it. This supports the Secretary-General’s denial that such a meeting occurred. Moreover, there is no evidence that Cotecna credited or acted upon the Wilson message. Serious questions persist about the character and credibility of Mr. Wilson. The Committee thus has little assurance that he did not conjure an account of discussions with the Secretary-General in order to make himself appear more important to his principals at Cotecna. The Committee therefore affirms its prior finding that weighing all of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, the evidence is not reasonably sufficient to conclude that

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the Secretary-General knew that Cotecna had submitted a bid on the humanitarian inspection contract in 1998. The Committee also affirms its prior finding that no credible evidence exists that the Secretary-General influenced, or attempted to influence, the procurement process in 1998 leading to the selection of Cotecna. As to the adequacy of the Secretary-General’s response to press reports in January 1999 of a possible conflict of interest, the Committee reemphasizes its earlier conclusion that the Secretary-General was not diligent and effective in pursuing an investigation of the procurement of Cotecna. What is now known about Kojo Annan’s efforts to intervene in the procurement process underscores the Committee’s prior finding that a thorough and independent investigation of the allegations regarding Kojo Annan’s relationship with Cotecna was required in 1999. A resolution of the questions much earlier would likely have resolved the issues arising from the Cotecna bid process and the consequent conflict of interest concerns.

Kojo Annan Contrary to earlier statements by Kojo Annan to the Committee, the evidence now indicates that at relevant times Kojo Annan had contacts with the section of the United Nations procurement office directly concerned with the 1998 humanitarian inspection contract to be awarded under the Programme. Kojo Annan was not forthcoming to the Committee with respect to his statements to the Committee that he had no involvement with Cotecna’s bid for the humanitarian inspection contract. Also in 1998, Kojo Annan used his father’s name and position in the purchase and delivery of a car, which resulted in a reduced price and a remission of duties. There is no record that his direct request to his father to permit him to purchase the car in the name of the Secretary-General was granted.

Cotecna, Elie Massey, Robert Massey Despite numerous requests made by the Committee, Cotecna failed to timely disclose critical documents, including: (1) a November 1998 memorandum from Robert Massey to Elie Massey and Mr. Wilson, copied to Kojo Annan; (2) a December 4, 1998 memo from Mr. Wilson to Cotecna senior management; and (3) a Cotecna Consultancy Agreement with Kojo Annan effective March 1, 1999. The Committee further finds that Elie Massey was not forthcoming to the Committee regarding Kojo Annan’s involvement in the inspection contract selection process. Finally, Robert Massey was not forthcoming to the Committee regarding Kojo Annan’s involvement in the inspection contract selection process and his employment with Cotecna in 1999.

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Mr. Wilson has not been forthcoming and has offered conflicting statements to the Committee with respect to: (1) his own involvement in the process by which Cotecna was awarded the humanitarian inspection contract; (2) whether Kojo Annan was involved in the contract process; and (3) whether he authored a December 4, 1998 memo of mission activities in Paris.

C. The cost of administering the Programme 1. The Committee finds that there were inadequate controls in place to ensure a sound review of important financial decisions relating to the Programme. The United Nations Controller was placed in the position of having to take sole responsibility for important decisions that ultimately had a material effect on the Programme’s expenditures and its financial reporting. Responsibility for large-scale financial decisions should not rest on one individual alone. In particular, the Programme would have benefited from review by ACABQ or some other authoritative budgetary body. 2. The Committee finds that there was inadequate support and justification for the establishment of the three percent rate for PSC and that, as the Programme grew in size and duration, this rate should have been reviewed and reassessed for reasonableness. The three percent PSC rate resulted in nearly $102 million in payments to the Agencies -- in addition to the $500 million paid to them for direct administrative costs relating to their administration of the Programme. The Committee finds also that there was inadequate support and justification for the rates adopted to compensate the Agencies for work performed under Resolutions 1472, 1476, and 1483. Although the United Nations found that the original three percent rate established for Resolution 1483 was excessive and reduced it to one percent, the resulting payments to the Agencies still were grossly higher than their costs. The Committee estimates that the United Nations overpaid the Agencies by nearly $49 million for work performed under Resolution 1483. 3. The Committee finds that the funding for administrative costs was neither transparent nor in accordance with the relevant resolutions. The Committee identified over $300 million in administrative costs and fees that were charged to the humanitarian accounts for northern Iraq (“ESC Account”) and for central and southern Iraq (“ESB Account”) rather than to the Programme’s administrative account (“ESD Account”). This resulted in a significant misstatement of the Programme’s accounts and decreased the balance of funds available for the purchase of humanitarian goods.

D. Assessment of Programme oversight 1. The Committee finds that the funding and staffing levels for Programme oversight services, including internal audit, external audit, and investigations, were insufficient.

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Extra-budgetary endeavors, such as the Programme, did not have an independent mechanism to determine the necessary funding for oversight. Considered both in relation to United Nations and public company benchmarks, an endeavor of the Programme’s magnitude and complexity required internal audit resources many times greater than what actually was in place. The refusal of OIP’s management to allocate sufficient funds and its reluctance to obtain visas for investigations staff particularly impeded the achievement of adequate staffing levels and prevented OIOS ID from fully carrying out its duties. Although BOA is not subject to any restraint on levels of staffing and funding, in the Committee’s view, the resources it applied to Programme auditing were inadequate and well below public company benchmarks. Because none of the existing governing bodies -- the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Agencies’ governing bodies -- addressed all of the Programme’s many inter-connected aspects, appropriate funding and staffing were never allocated for the coordinated review of risks and audit planning across the Programme. 2. The Committee finds that key areas of the Programme were neither adequately nor timely reviewed. Internal and external auditors failed to audit and test properly some of the Programme’s most critical areas -- including pricing of oil and humanitarian goods -- and to assess their impact on the Programme’s financial statements. For the most part, the Agencies’ internal audits began far too late in the Programme. BOA audit planning appears to have been inconsistent, and the areas subject to review varied by year. Furthermore, despite the Programme’s increasing complexity in 2000, the number of areas addressed in BOA’s audit reports declined significantly. External audit review of Programme activities in the Agencies was very limited because the reviews were carried out within the context and materiality of the Agencies’ overall operations. Audit coverage was further limited by the absence of any agreement that the Agencies, OIOS, and OIP coordinate Programme internal oversight and the fact that no policy mandates required coordination and communication across the various UN-related Agencies. 3. The Committee finds that OIP management, the General Assembly, and the Security Council, were not provided with audited financial statements and internal audit reports that comprehensively covered all aspects of the Programme and highlighted deficiencies impacting the Programme’s effectiveness.

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BOA’s audits of the Programme’s accounts were reported in a timely manner, but internal audit reports were not published in a timely manner and in a consistent format, and they were not made available to all, the General Assembly, or the Security Council. Moreover, audit findings and recommendations were frequently not implemented in a timely fashion, and often were ignored. There is no evidence suggesting that there were consequences for managers responsible for programs subject to adverse audit comments or for managers who failed to implement audit recommendations. The Programme had potentially quantifiable aims such as effective and efficient humanitarian relief, and improving the health and nutrition of the Iraqi people. However, the Programme’s overall goals were not specified and were not subject to evaluation and monitoring by internal oversight. 4. The Committee finds that the disjointed and sometimes overlapping approach to oversight left a number of contentious issues unresolved, including: OIP and the 661 Committee were very concerned that they were not receiving copies of the Agencies’ audit reports. OIP attempted to amend its memoranda of understanding with the Agencies to require the Agencies to share their audit reports with OIP. The Agencies resisted this attempt, and the issue never was fully resolved. OIOS likewise requested copies of the Agencies’ audit reports in order to better coordinate and audit the Programme. The Agencies similarly resisted this request, and the issue was not resolved. 5.

The Committee finds several deviations from “best practices.”

Areas in which internal oversight did not conform to best practice included: (a) lack of direct reporting to an independent oversight board; (b) failure to perform risk assessments to professional IIA standards; and (c) lack of budgetary independence. The evidence available to the Committee suggests that BOA did not consistently follow its audit standards and that there were technical shortfalls in its approach to risk assessment, planning and testing during the Programme. This finding is supported by the variability of the areas covered in BOA’s audit reports from year to year, the high risk areas not consistently addressed in its reports, its approach to detection and reporting of fraudulent transactions, and the lack of comment on the internal control weaknesses described in internal audit reports. The Committee finds that BOA paid insufficient attention to the risks of fraudulent manipulations of Programme income and spending by the Iraqi regime and that, by the 2000-01 biennium, should have qualified its attestations regarding the Programme’s financial statements. OIOS ID is generally not supported and accepted across the United Nations by both management and staff. This, together with a lack of a whistleblower protection policy, prevents OIOS ID from successfully carrying out its mandate.

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1. The Committee finds that, in managing Programme funds, Treasury adhered to all aspects of CPPI -- except in respect to the concentration of funds on deposit at BNP and at the five other investing institutions, which well exceeded the limits allowable under CPPI. 2. The Committee finds that Treasury was cognizant of credit risks very early in the Programme and actively sought to resolve the matter with the Government of Iraq, which initially resisted Treasury’s attempts at letter-of-credit and investment diversification. As early as 1997 and repeatedly thereafter, Treasury notified the Secretariat, the 661 Committee, and the Government of Iraq of this issue. Treasury succeeded in partially mitigating this credit risk by, soon after the Government of Iraq’s approval, expeditiously diversifying a portion of the funds held at BNP. However, the Committee further finds that the United Nations’ inability to diversify the Programme’s letter-of-credit operations, once approved by the Government of Iraq in late 2000, unnecessarily subjected Programme funds to continued risk. 3. The Committee further finds that Treasury adequately assessed the risks relating to the Government of Iraq’s request to shift to euro-denominated oil sales. Treasury analyzed the possible impact of this shift on several critical areas, including oil pricing, the receipt and investment of funds, financial reporting, and humanitarian goods purchases. In addition, Treasury estimated the monetary impact from pricing crude in euros and earning lower returns on euro-denominated investments. The Committee finds that Treasury’s overall investment results compared favorably to the relevant market indices. Funds held in the ESB Account earned a rate of return slightly higher than the Fed Funds and EONIA rates. Returns on the other Programme accounts far outpaced the Fed Funds rate and other market benchmarks, most notably after the United Nations’ pooling of investments, which provided for longer maturities, larger tranches of investments, more favorable rates, and lower fees. Based on BOA’s testing and the Committee’s sample testing, investment earnings appear to have been properly credited back to each Programme fund. Finally, even though the amounts in question were not systematically verified, all and the Accounts Department diligently ensured that interest earned and reported by the Agencies on Programme funds was properly credited back to the escrow account.

F. Performance of the UN-related agencies 1. The Committee finds that the Agencies were responsible for many successful initiatives that had a significant and beneficial effect on the lives of the citizens in the three northern governorates. These included the implementation of a successful food distribution program and the construction and rehabilitation of vital infrastructure in the three northern governorates. 2. Nevertheless, the Committee finds that the Agencies’ delivery of aid suffered from several significant shortcomings that substantially reduced the Programme’s effectiveness and resulted in wasted resources:

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Volcker Report a. Some of the Agencies undertook projects for which they lacked relevant experience and technical expertise, often resulting in those Agencies’ failure to implement important projects. Responsibility for this shortcoming rests not only with the Agencies, but also with OIP and UNOHCI, which in some cases chose the ill-equipped Agencies and failed to respond adequately when an agency was unable to complete successfully a particular initiative. b. The humanitarian program in the three northern governorates suffered from defects in management, coordination, and oversight. These defects manifested themselves in several different ways: i. OIP and its arm in the field, UNOHCI, failed to adequately control and supervise the activities of the Agencies, who resisted any attempts at supervision by OIP and UNOHCI. To a large degree, this was because the Programme’s design did not specifically provide avenues for this control and supervision, and OIP and UNOHCI were reluctant to utilize the one tool at their disposal -- the control over Programme funds -- to manage the activities of the Agencies. Moreover, the Agencies were resistant to OIP’s and UNOHCI’s attempts at supervision. ii. Management defects within some of the Agencies themselves included undefined lines of authority, poor communication among various departments or sections within some of the Agencies, and ineffective controls and oversight that contributed to the existence of a corruption-prone environment. iii. Both the Government of Iraq and the local authorities in the three northern governorates sometimes influenced inappropriately the Programme’s implementation in the three northern governorates for personal or political benefit. Occasionally, some of the Agencies yielded to this influence.

3. The Committee also finds that there were significant instances where the Agencies failed to implement successfully projects and initiatives -- even though the projects fell within the Agencies’ traditional spheres of competency. These failures both wasted resources and delayed the provision of needed aid to the three northern governorates.

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XVI. ANNEX 4: SUMMARY OF THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMME (“WORKING GROUP” STUDY) With the publication of this Report on the Management of the Oil-for-Food Programme, the Committee has issued also a report by an independent “Working Group” of experts comprising eight researchers at institutions worldwide. The Working Group’s study is titled: “The Impact of the Oil-for-Food Programme on the Iraqi People.” The following is the Working Group’s summary of its study; the full version is published in a separate volume.

A. Positive impacts The food supplies provided through the Programme reversed a serious and deteriorating food crisis, preventing widespread hunger and probably reducing deaths to which malnutrition was contributing. By 1994-1995, the average food supplies had fallen to a level where inadequacy was inevitable (estimated as below 2,000 kcal). Without the Programme, the drop in food supplies would have continued, falling even further with the severe drought in 1999-2001. After food supplies funded by the Programme started arriving in 1997, the average supplies climbed to between 2,500 and 3,000 kcal, a level likely to have covered the needs of most of the population. The supplies stayed at that level, including compensation for a collapse in local production in 1999-2002 due to infrastructure failure and drought. The numbers of people for whom hunger was mitigated cannot be estimated from the data, but most of the Iraqi population undoubtedly benefited. While food intakes may have been nearly adequate in quantity with the Programme, the diet quality was very unsatisfactory for extended periods. It is likely that malnutrition due to deficiencies in vitamins and minerals increased, particularly anemia in women and young children, and subclinical deficiencies of a range of nutrients are probable. Equipment and medical supplies from the Programme were delivered sporadically and in an uncoordinated manner, which reduced much of their effectiveness. This was in part due to administrative procedures and “holds” imposed by the 661 Committee, and a number of other factors that complicated the ordering and delivery procedures, including lack of cooperation by the Government of Iraq. The medical supplies undoubtedly also saved many lives -- there is no way of estimating the number -- but at the same time many preventable deaths and unnecessary suffering occurred. The percentage of children under five years of age with growth retardation (i.e., “stunting” or reduced height growth) is an indicator of malnutrition. This measures the combination of inadequate diet and sickness (primarily the common childhood illnesses of diarrhoeal and respiratory infections). The prevalence of stunting had risen from around eighteen percent in southern/central Iraq in 1991 to more than thirty percent in 1996. This increase in child malnutrition (rapid in comparison with the changes usually seen) is attributed to the effects of war damage and sanctions on health environment and food availability. It is reasonable to assume that, without the Programme, the prevalence would have stayed high or continued to rise. By 1999, after two years or so of the Programme, the prevalence had fallen back close to that of 1991 (about twenty-two percent). This reduction in prevalence can probably be attributed to the Programme, and indeed is one of the

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clearest positive impacts of the Programme. In terms of numbers, it can be estimated, for example, that there were some 360,000 fewer malnourished children in 2000 than there otherwise would have been. In the three northern governorates, child nutrition was initially worse, with stunting estimated at around thirty percent in 1991. Malnutrition prevalences fell in the period 1991-1996, then faster in 1996-2002. The latter acceleration is also likely to be due to additional resources and program activities supported by the Programme. Health impacts are problematic to assess because of lack of comparable data. Immunization rates for children were maintained during the 1990s, despite all the difficulties, and the Programme contributed to sustaining the coverage. Because of damage to sewage disposal and water purification plants, diarrhoeal disease was a major problem. Reports are in line with increases in 1991 in some cases (e.g., giardiasis) and in 1994-1995 in other cases (e.g., amoebic dysentery), as the situation deteriorated further. But then there was a reduction in dysentery in 1996-1998, possibly due to improvements supported by the Programme. Reported incidences rose again in 1999-2001, probably due to the drought and the much-reduced (and contaminated) water supplies. Perhaps surprisingly, conclusions on mortality in relation to the Programme cannot be reached. The data on mortality are the least consistent (only children under five years old were considered, for whom there are more data than for other ages). A new realization (for the Working Group) was that the child mortality rates by 1990 had remained high (about 85/1,000 live births) in Iraq during the 1980s (while declining almost everywhere else), so that by the 1990s the underlying rate -- even without war and sanctions -- is expected to have been at this level. This affects estimates of the “excess mortality” rates in the 1990s. On balance, the total additional child deaths (above the pre-1991-war rate) during 19911995 are thought to be up to 68,000 deaths of children under five. No estimates considered reliable of under-five mortality were found for the period of the Programme, and thus no estimates of lives possibly saved by the Programme can be made. The likelihood of reduced mortality is indicated by the improvement in child nutrition and from the increased availability (although still inadequate) of medicines.

B. Negative aspects The short-term approach of the Programme, essentially as a relief operation, led to many missed opportunities for greater impact and indeed to some actual harm. A more effective humanitarian approach would have aimed to restore productive capacity, repair infrastructure, generate employment, and use the extensive capabilities of the Iraqi people to support their own livelihood. The basis for the “relief” approach was presumably at first the perceived urgency of the deteriorating situation -- food had to be supplied -- but the opportunity to move towards support to livelihood was not taken, for reasons such as the policy of reducing the Government of Iraq’s access to hard currency. While it is well recognized, in principle, that relief operations efforts are needed to move from handouts to employment and local production -- and this does not need stressing from the Iraq experience -- nonetheless, the results in Iraq from 1996 to 2003 do provide an

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example of the ineffectiveness of long-drawn-out relief: investment in people undoubtedly would have reduced deprivation more effectively, and with more dignity. The centralized distribution operation in southern and central Iraq shifted more control into the hands of the central government. It is widely reported that, in practice, the effect of consigning control of the resources needed for people to stay alive (food rations) to a regime as intent on controlling its population as the Government of Iraq was, leads predictably to increasing the degree of control; this in turn had negative effects on the population's well-being, not least for nutrition and health. The “relief” approach led to low priority for repairing infrastructure needed to protect health -- even for repairs for which there was no arguable “dual use” constraint. However, the Programme’s failure to do more to repair infrastructure was indeed constrained by the “holds” imposed by the 661 Committee as well as other obstructions. It appears that the Programme was somewhat unresponsive to evolving needs deriving from possible changing disease patterns, at least in terms of equipment. For example, by 2000, WHO was formally highlighting reports of increases in cancers and birth defects and the absence of medicines and equipment to deal with these illnesses.

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CHAPTER 2 -- SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ILLICIT INCOME TO IRAQ I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY The value of the illicit revenues collected by the former Iraqi regime during the Programme has been a subject of considerable interest and speculation in recent years. In addition to figures appearing in press and media sources, a number of formal estimates of the funds acquired by the Iraqi regime in contravention of Security Council resolutions have been put forward. As noted in the First Interim Report, these estimates vary considerably in their methodologies and quantitative conclusions. 1 This Chapter sets out a comprehensive estimate of Iraq’s illicit income during the sanctions period from 1990 to 2003 by drawing on a vast range of Iraqi records, banking documents, and interviews. Much of the information used to calculate this estimate has only recently come to light and therefore was not included in earlier estimates by other organizations. Nevertheless, the data assembled by the Committee is not complete and, in all respects, may be subject to additional refinement. 2 In describing sources of illicit income, a key distinction exists between illicit income from transactions that occurred under the Programme (i.e., oil contract surcharges and humanitarian contract kickbacks) and illicit income from transactions that occurred outside the Programme (i.e., smuggling of oil and other goods in contravention of the sanctions regime). The distinction matters in part because of the difference in degree to which United Nations officials were on notice and positioned to redress these different schemes of the Iraqi regime to reap revenue outside the United Nations escrow account. This Chapter addresses three questions: 1. How much income did Iraq derive from surcharges imposed on oil contracts and kickbacks imposed on humanitarian goods contracts? 2.

How much income did Iraq derive from oil sales outside of the Programme?

3. To what extent did Iraq manipulate the pricing of oil and other commodities under the Programme in order to facilitate the collection of illicit revenues?

1 “First Interim Report,” pp. 41-42; Independent Inquiry Committee, “Comparison of Estimates of Illicit Iraqi Income During United Nations Sanctions,” http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/ComparisonofEstimates.pdf (Feb. 3, 2005); Coalition for International Justice, “Sources of Revenue for Saddam and Sons” (Sept. 2002) (hereinafter “CIJ Report”); United States General Accounting Office, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.N. Confronts Significant Challenges in Implementing Sanctions against Iraq” (May 2002) (hereinafter “GAO Report”); Iraq Survey Group, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD” (Sept. 30, 2004) (hereinafter “ISG Report”); United States Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations - Committee on Governmental Affairs, “Methodology for Estimate of Total Illicit Iraqi Income During UN Sanctions (19912003)” (Nov. 15,2004) (hereinafter “Senate PIC Report”). 2 The Committee has obtained records from the Government of Iraq, including financial records, internal Iraqi Ministry correspondence and directives, side agreements and correspondence between Iraqi Ministries and companies, bank statements, and bank receipts (hereinafter referenced collectively as “Iraqi records”).

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The answers to these three questions reflect not only the extent of Iraq’s manipulation of the Programme but also the consequences of the United Nations’ inadequacy in enforcing its rules and the imposed economic sanctions. Part II of this Chapter estimates the monetary value of the illicit fees collected by Iraq in connection with sales of oil and purchases of humanitarian goods and oil spare parts under the Programme. Part III calculates the amount of oil the Government of Iraq had at its disposal for smuggling and estimates the revenues generated by this illegal trade. Part IV examines the possibility of deliberate underpricing of oil and overpricing of goods sold under the Programme and evaluates the effects of this price manipulation in terms of lost revenue to the escrow account. Part V includes the Committee's estimate of total illicit income earned.

II. ILLICIT PAYMENTS ON PROGRAMME CONTRACTS As depicted in Chart A [not shown in the document], the Committee estimates that the total illicit income the Iraqi regime extracted under the Programme from oil buyers and humanitarian suppliers was $1.8 billion. This figure reflects $229 million in oil surcharges, $1.06 billion in after-sales-service fees, and $527 million in inland transportation fees paid to the Iraqi regime.

A. Illicit income from oil surcharges The Committee estimates that the former Government of Iraq earned approximately $229 million in surcharges on oil sold by Iraq under the Programme. As described in Chapter I of Volume II, surcharges were levied on a volumetric basis and ranged from ten to fifty cents per barrel. They commenced in the latter part of 2000 and ended in the fall of 2002 after the advent of “retroactive pricing” made the surcharge scheme less profitable for Iraq to pursue. 1 This figure of $229 million is derived from three complementary sources: (1) internal SOMO documents that record levied and collected surcharges (“SOMO surcharge records”); (2) transaction histories of bank accounts used by SOMO to receive surcharge payments; and (3) Iraqi records of receipts for cash deposits made by oil companies at various Iraqi embassies in cities worldwide. In the first instance, the SOMO surcharge records comprehensively identify the amounts of surcharges levied and paid and the oil 1 Iraq Ministry of Oil record, SOMO ledger of collection of surcharges from September 2000 to March 2003 (Aug. 23, 2004) (translated from Arabic) (hereinafter “SOMO surcharge records”); Independent Inquiry Committee, “Transactions and Relations System” (hereinafter “TaR”) (1996-2003); Iraq Ministry of Oil record, Shamkhi H. Faraj report to the Minister of Oil, “Allocations and Sales of Crude Oil in the phases of the Memorandum of Understanding 1996-2003,” pp. 3-4 (Feb. 19,2004) (translated from Arabic) (including a summary by SOMO officials of Iraq’s oil allocation and sales practices during the Programme) (hereinafter “SOMO Summary Report”). TaR is an analytical database maintained by the Committee that contains information gathered in the course of its investigation, including data from the United Nations Treasury database of payments, the Office of the Iraq Programme (“OIP”) database of contracts, correspondence and data from Iraqi files, data from third-party sources such as Dun & Bradstreet and Platts, correspondence and records from certain companies involved in the Programme, and records from selected banks. Section III.D of Chapter 3, in Volume II, details the advent of retroactive pricing.

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contracts for which surcharges were paid. The Committee has corroborated more than ninety-eight percent of these listed transactions by cross-reference to further bank account documentation and embassy receipt records. This data reflects that all but a small percentage of surcharges were paid to Iraqi bank accounts in neighboring countries ($129 million to the Jordan National Bank in Amman and $30 million to Fransabank in Lebanon) and to Iraq’s embassy in Moscow (more than $52 million in cash). 1

Table 1 - Confirmed and Unconfirmed Deposits of Surcharges (in USD millions) 2 Total

% of Total

$1.1 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.7 3.0 0.9 52.8 0.1 0.5 0.1

0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.3% 1.3% 0.4% 23.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1%

61.3

26.8%

128.8 29.8 6.0

56.3% 13.0% 2.6%

Surcharges confirmed

225.9

98.7%

Unconfirmed surcharges Total surcharges paid

2.9 $228.8

1.3% 100.0%

Embassies and representative offices of Iraq Ankara, Turkey Athens, Greece Cairo, Egypt Damascus, Syria Geneva, Switzerland Hanoi, Vietnam Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Moscow, Russia Rome, Italy Sana’a, Yemen Vienna, Austria Sum of deposits via embassies and representative offices of Iraq Jordan National Bank, Jordan Fransabank, Lebanon Company records

SOMO levied more in surcharges than it was eventually paid. SOMO surcharge records, banking data, and embassy records reflect that 919 individual surcharges valued at $263 million were levied on 169 companies that contracted for the purchase of oil. Of these 169 companies, 138 ultimately made payments in connection with 309 contracts. The remaining thirty-one companies succeeded in lifting oil without remitting funds to Iraq. Ninety of the companies that lifted oil paid surcharges only in part rather than the full 1 SOMO surcharge records; Iraq Ministry of Oil record, receipts of payments collected by Iraqi embassies (Mar. 2001 to Dec. 2002) (translated from Arabic); Iraq Ministry of Oil record, Iraqi accounts at Jordan National Bank, bank advices and statements (Oct. 2000 to Mar. 2003) (translated from Arabic); Iraq Ministry of Oil record, Iraqi accounts at Fransabank, bank advices and statements (Sept. 2000 to July 2004) (translated from French and Arabic); Jordan National Bank record, Iraqi accounts, bank advices, statements and correspondences (Oct. 2000 to Mar. 2003) (translated from Arabic); Fransabank record, Iraqi accounts, bank advices, statements and correspondences (Sept. 2000 to Aug. 2002) (translated from French and Arabic); Company record, correspondences and bank advices (Dec. 2000 to Sept. 2001) (translated from Arabic); TaR (1996-2003). 2 Ibid.

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amount levied. A few companies were less fortunate, however, and paid surcharges of $588,800 on contracts that were never executed. The net amount of underpayment -- i.e., the difference between the total surcharges levied ($263 million) on executed contracts and total surcharges received on both executed and unexecuted contracts ($229 million) -- was $34 million. 1 The Committee’s final report will examine at length some of the individual companies that made surcharge payments as well as the structure of underlying purchase deals, financing arrangements, and payment arrangements.

B. Illicit income from humanitarian contract kickbacks The Iraqi regime derived far more illicit income from kickbacks on humanitarian contracts (including contracts for oil spare parts) under the Programme than from oil surcharges. The Committee estimates that the former Iraqi regime received approximately $1.6 billion in illicit income by requiring suppliers to pay fees -- all outside the United Nations escrow account -- in connection with their sales of goods to Iraq under the Programme. As described in more detail in Chapter I of Volume II of this Report, these fees included: (1) mandatory “after-sales-service” fees, usually in the amount of ten percent of contract values negotiated between the supplier and Iraq prior to the submission of a contract for approval by the United Nations; and (2) “transportation” fees levied on the basis of the volume, weight or quantity of goods imported into Iraq at its port of Umm Qasr. Both “after-sales-service” fees and “transportation” fees are misleading terms for these forms of kickbacks, inasmuch as they imply that the levied fees corresponded to actual costs incurred by the Government of Iraq. In reality, an after-sales-service fee was merely a euphemism for “kickback” devised by the Iraqi regime; it did not actually relate to the performance of any services. Likewise, the cost of transporting goods inside Iraq was far less than the amounts demanded of suppliers. In any event, all such kickbacks were paid by suppliers to Iraq outside the United Nations escrow account. 2 The Committee’s estimate of illicit income associated with humanitarian contracts draws upon the following evidence: x United Nations accounting records detailing the actual amounts spent on humanitarian contracts during the course of the Programme; x Extensive Iraqi records detailing the policies put in place by the former regime regarding illicit income, including policies relating to transportation fees; x Accounting records and data from a number of Iraqi ministries that detail levied and collected kickbacks; and 1

SOMO surcharge records (2000-2002); TaR (1996-2003). Iraq Ministry of Oil record, Taha Yassin Ramadan memorandum to Iraqi Ministries (Aug. 3, 2000) (translated from Arabic) (instructing Iraqi Ministries to impose kickbacks under the moniker “After-SalesService”); Iraq officials interviews. Figures in this Chapter are reported at the summary level and not by company. 2

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x Banking records confirming and quantifying the deposit of kickbacks into collection accounts. 1 Subsection II.B.l reviews Iraq’s revenue from the after-sales-service fees, and Subsection II.B.2 reviews Iraq’s revenue from transportation fees.

1. Revenue from after-sales-service fees The Committee estimates that the Iraqi regime collected nearly $1.06 billion from after-sales-service fees that it levied in connection with humanitarian contracts under the Programme. This estimate is based on: (1) financial summaries compiled by various Government of Iraq ministries that bought goods under the Programme; (2) confidential directives and policy documents issued by high-level Iraqi bodies; (3) a collection of more than 1,600 “side agreements” (i.e., contracts between a company and an Iraqi ministry to pay a kickback outside of the escrow account); and (4) numerous interviews with Iraqi officials and goods suppliers. 2 Unlike the oil surcharge scheme -- which was overseen principally by SOMO -- the collection of after-sales-service fees involved numerous Iraqi ministries and government organs, many of which have not retained detailed records of their received kickbacks. Despite these difficulties, the Committee has obtained records reflecting payments of nearly $200 million in after-sales-service fees by contractors under the Programme. In addition, the Committee has identified extensive documentation pertaining to levied aftersales-service fees. This second group of records does not indicate which fees were ultimately collected. 3 In view of the incomplete nature of evidence on after-sales-service fees, the Committee drew on records of actual payments of fees and applied that information to contracts for which the Committee does not have specific kickback data. In doing so, the Committee used a six-step process: 1. Determined which contracts were subject to after-sales-service fees (referred to as the “Population” for the purposes of this analysis); 2. Identified contracts within the Population for which the Committee had contract-specific evidence from an Iraqi ministry of the levying or collection of an aftersales-service fee;

1 TaR (1996-2005); Iraqi records; Ministry of Oil record, Taha Yassin Ramadan memorandum to Iraqi Ministries (Aug. 3, 2000) (translated from Arabic); Iraq officials interviews; Rafidain Bank record, Iraqi State Company for Water Transportation bank accounts and statements (1999-2003) (translated from Arabic). 2 Iraqi records (1996-2005); TaR (1996-2005). The Committee collected data on kickbacks levied on more than 6,500 contracts and kickbacks paid on more than 2,500 contracts. The contracts were executed by thirteen Iraqi Ministries and entities including: Agriculture, Education, Electricity, Health, Housing, Industry, Interior, Municipality of Baghdad, Oil, Trade, Transportation, and Youth. The $1.06 billion in collected after-sales-service fees is consistent with the estimated amount provided by Iraqi officials involved in the collection of these fees. Iraq officials interviews. 3 Ibid.; TaR (1996-2005).

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3. Used the known after-sales-service fees to estimate the rate (in terms of a percentage of contract values) of the fees levied on the contracts for which the Committee does not have specific evidence; 4. Applied the rate described in Step 3 to the contracts not identified in Step 2 and calculated the total levied after-sales-service fees; 5. Estimated the ratio of after-sales-service fees levied to after-sales-service fees collected; and 6. Applied the ratio described in Step 5 to the total levied after-sales-service fees calculated in Step 4. The “Population” noted in Step 1 refers to contracts executed after August 2000 that resulted in the delivery of goods prior to July 2003. This constraint encompasses the point when after-sales-service fees were first levied and the date when CPA effectively announced the end of this scheme in conjunction with renegotiating contracts after the war. Of the 18,458 contracts funded out of the ESB Account (also known as the fifty-nine percent account for humanitarian goods for southern and central Iraq), 6,786 contracts valued at $13.8 billion fall within the parameters of the Population. 1 With regard to Step 2, the Committee has identified $552.65 million in after-salesservice fees levied on 3,499 contracts. These contracts have a total value of $5.9 billion. The Committee does not have specific kickback information on the remaining 3,287 contracts in the Population, valued at $7.9 billion. The rate described in Step 3 was calculated by taking a weighted average of identified after-sales-service fees for all contracts for which the Committee had data -- i.e., the 3,499 contracts noted above as well as 863 contracts that fall outside the Population. This weighted average equaled 10.21 percent of contract values, indicating that the Iraqi regime in some instances chose to levy after-sales-service fees at rates higher than ten percent. 2

1 Iraq Ministry of Oil Record, Taha Yassin Ramadan memorandum to Iraqi Ministries (Aug. 3, 2000) (translated from Arabic); CPA note verbale to Kofi Annan (July 5, 2003); TaR (1998-2005). Most contracts for goods delivered subsequent to July 2003 were not included in the Population on the assumption that any kickbacks they might have contained were eliminated by CPA. However, ninety-five contracts-seven in 2003, eighty-two in 2004, and six in 2005-for which the Committee has specific evidence relating to kickback payments were included in the Population. TaR (2003-2005). On the other hand, certain types of contracts were not included in the Population. First, Iraqi records reflect the payment of approximately $15 million in after-salesservice fees on contracts that were executed prior to the formal initiation ofIraq's kickback policy in August 2000. Because of the date limitation, these pre-kickback-policy contracts were not included in the Population, and the most likely explanation for this aberrant data resides in the fact that all of the goods procured under the contracts in question arrived in Iraq after August 2000. Second, there were 5,355 contracts executed prior to Phase VIII with goods delivered after July 2003. Since the Committee only had specific information regarding kickbacks paid for 156 of these contracts, it considered that these were exceptions and did not extend the Population to project levied and collected amounts on the remaining 5,199 contracts. Ibid. (1998-2005). 2 Ibid. (1996-2005). The 863 contracts that fell outside of the Population are largely contracts where the goods were delivered after July 2003.

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Table 2 - Estimated After-Sales-Service Fees Paid (in use millions) 1 Phase

Evidence of AfterSales-Services Fees Paid 1 N/A 2 N/A 3 N/A 4 N/A 5 $0.12 6 5.68 7 8.89 8 68.55 9 50.46 10 32.40 11 13.49 12 4.76 13 0.13 Various 13.17 Total $197.65

Projected After-SalesService Fees Paid N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A $249.28 208.69 194.25 136.97 56.46 12.62 -$858.26

Total Estimated AfterSales-Service Fees Paid N/A N/A N/A N/A $0.12 5.68 8.89 317.83 259.15 226.65 150.46 61.21 12.75 13.17 $1,055.91

Step 4 involves the multiplication of this weighted average of 10.21 percent times $7.9 billion, the value of the contracts in the Population for which no specific after-salesservice data were accumulated by the Committee. The result of this tabulation is $731.6 million. Adding this amount to the $552.65 million in known after-sales-service fees yields an estimated $1.3 billion in total levied fees.2 With regard to Step 5, the Committee analyzed records showing actual payments of kickbacks and calculated a recovery rate that represents the average amount of the levied fee that the regime in fact collected. The sum of actual kickback payments was divided by its corresponding levied amount, yielding a recovery rate of 84.25 percent. This recovery rate was applied to the actual and estimated levied amounts for all remaining contracts for which no actual payment data was available. As illustrated in Table 2, this produced a total of $1.056 billion in estimated payments: $198 million actual and $858 million estimated.3 The Committee’s final report will examine some individual companies at length and will report in detail on the companies known to have paid after-sales-service fees.

1

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. In addition, Iraqi records also note $13 million in fees (shown in Table 3 under the classification “various”) paid in connection with contracts that appear not to have been forwarded to the United Nations. These payments suggest that, as was the case with oil surcharges, in some instances after-sales-service fees were collected on unexecuted contracts. 2 3

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433 2. Inland transportation fees

On the basis of high-level Iraqi directives, detailed records reflecting transportation fees collected on a large number of contracts, summary memoranda prepared by Ministry of Transportation officials and banking data, the Committee estimates that the Iraqi regime collected $527 million in inland transportation fees between June 1999 and July 2003. 1 Three documents are especially significant to this estimation: (1) a document dated March 11, 2003 and prepared by the Ministry of Transportation for the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance stating that the Iraq State Company for Water Transport (“ISCWT”), a government body that oversaw activities at all Iraqi ports, had collected $651 million in after-sales-service and transportation fees since June 1999; (2) a summary analysis of the total funds transferred out of ISCWT’s accounts at Rafidain Bank to the Central Bank of Iraq between December 31, 2002 and February 28, 2003; and (3) the transaction histories of ISCWT’s accounts at Rafidain Bank. 2 The Rafidain Bank accounts reflect that ISCWT received $919 million in kickbacks between 1999 and 2003, but do not specify what percentage of these funds was derived from transportation fees. By contrast, the Ministry of Transportation document and the Rafidain Bank summary analysis distinguish between after-sales-service fees and transportation fees, but they do not appear to reflect the totality of the funds that ISCWT collected. In tabulating the figure of $527 million, the Committee made use of complementary information by applying the ratio of after-sales-service fees to transportation fees noted in the first two documents to the $919 million recorded in the account statements. 3

3. Other fees Certain types of fees have not been included in the Committee’s estimate of humanitarian-kickback-related revenues because systematic evidence of the use of these fees across ministries and contracts could not be identified. For example, one Iraqi ministry appears to have assessed “tender fees,” averaging 0.3 percent of contract values, in addition to after-sales-service fees and inland transportation fees. It is unclear when and why tender fees were first imposed or if they were collected by other ministries. 4 Also not included in the Committee’s estimate are several types of fees or costs included in earlier estimates and summarized in its First Interim Report for which the Committee’s further investigation has not found adequate evidence. Some estimates 1 Ibid.; Ministry of Transportation and Communication record, Iraqi Minster of Transport letter to Iraqi Minister of Finance (Mar. 11,2003) (translated from Arabic); Rafidain Bank record, Iraqi State Company for Water Transportation bank accounts and statements (1999-2003) (translated from Arabic); Iraq official interview. 2 TaR (1996-2005); Ministry of Transportation and Communication record, Iraqi Minster of Transport letter to Iraqi Minister of Finance (Mar. 11, 2003) (translated from Arabic); Rafidain Bank record, Iraqi State Company for Water Transportation bank accounts and statements (1999-2003) (translated from Arabic); Iraq official interview. 3 TaR (1996-2005). 4 Ibid. (2000-2003). Of the 1,620 side letters collected by the Committee, 339 letters mentioned the vendor’s obligation to pay “tender charges” that amounted on average to 0.3 percent of the contract value. See, e.g., Ministry of Trade record, Side agreements for COMM nos. 1101935, 1201802.

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assume, for example, that the Iraqi regime derived illicit revenues by procuring substandard goods. The Committee understands that there is some anecdotal evidence for this hypothesis and that spoilage occurred and out-of-date goods were delivered. Despite these reports, the Committee has not identified any evidence in the form of Iraqi documents or statements made by Iraqi officials that an organized scheme existed to procure goods of inferior quality. Nor has the Committee obtained corroborative evidence that purchasing any substandard goods resulted in a pecuniary benefit to the Iraqi regime. 1 Finally, some earlier estimates of Iraq’s illicit income overbroadly assumed that there were kickbacks or other forms of illicit payments collected in connection with purchases of goods from monies in the ESC Account (13 percent Account) by the Agencies operating in the three northern governorates of Iraq. The Committee has not found any evidence suggesting that the Iraqi regime derived funds from such practices. In fact, such collections are highly improbable given that all but the bulk goods and spare parts purchased out of the ESC Account were procured under contracts between the Agencies and individual suppliers. The Iraqi regime had no role in the negotiations or executions of these contracts. 2

III. ILLICIT INCOME FROM SMUGGLING As described in Chapter 4 of Volume II, Iraq sold oil to neighboring countries and private entities during the entire sanctions period. This trade, often described as smuggling, included sales based on formal arrangements, such as protocols with the governments of Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt, as well as informal, smaller scale arrangements, such as selling crude oil and refined products in smaller lots to private parties. 3 The Committee estimates that the value of oil and oil products sold outside the sanctions regime from 1991 to 2003 was about $11 billion, of which approximately $8.4 billion was during the years of the Programme between 1997 and 2003. The calculations behind this estimate are described below.

A. Volume of oil available for smuggling The Ministry of Oil has provided the Committee with data concerning Iraq’s production, internal consumption, and foreign trade of oil. Based on this information, the Committee estimates the amount of oil Iraq produced, used, and made available for trade in the years prior to and during the Programme. As reflected in Table 3 below, Iraq produced more than 7.3 billion barrels of oil between 1991 and 2003. Of this total volume, nearly 1.5 billion barrels were consumed internally, about 1.6 billion barrels were re1 “First Interim Report,” pp. 41-42; Senate PIC Report; Tun Myat interview (July 28,2005); Frances Kinnon interview (Dec. 15, 2004); Ahmed Murtada Ahmed AI-Khalil interview (Nov. 5, 2005); Iraq officials interviews. Mr. Myat served as Humanitarian Coordinator, United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, from 2000 to 2002. Ms. Kinnon served as a Political Analyst within OIP. Mr. AI-Khalil served as Iraqi Minster of Transport. Tun Myat interview (July 28, 2005); Ahmed Murtada Ahmed AI-Khalil interview (Nov. 5, 2005). 2 Senate PIC Report, p. 4. For a detailed discussion of the Agencies’ roles in administering the Programme, see Chapter 4 of Volume IV. 3 Smuggling is reviewed in Chapter 4 of Volume II.

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injected into the ground for later use, and more than 3.4 billion barrels were sold under the Programme. Based on these figures, it appears that just over twelve percent, or 858 million barrels, of Iraq’s oil production during the sanctions period was available for smuggling. Of these 858 million barrels, about 642 million were smuggled out of Iraq during the Programme. 1

B. Estimated income from oil smuggled SOMO has provided the Committee with summary sales data on oil and oil products sold outside and prior to the Programme. As illustrated in Table 4 below, oil was sold under protocols with neighboring states and through “border trade” with private parties. Prior to the Programme, Iraq sold a total of $2.6 billion in oil and oil products exclusively to Jordan in exchange for cash, goods, or reduction of debt. During the Programme, Iraq’s smuggling grew to encompass trade protocols principally with Turkey, Syria, and Egypt. Accordingly, between 1997 and 2003, annual smuggling rates more than tripled, resulting in total sales of about $8.4 billion worth of oil and oil products during these years. This increase is largely attributable to the reactivation of the Syrian pipeline in 2000, which is discussed at length in Chapter 4 of Volume II of this Report. 2 In total, smuggling generated nearly $11 billion in illicit revenues for the Iraqi regime. Of this $11 billion, more than $4.5 billion was paid in cash and the equivalent of approximately $6.5 billion was largely paid in goods although some portion might be still owed to Iraq. 3

IV. THE IMPACT OF DISTORTED PRICES In addition to estimating the illicit income acquired by the Iraqi regime during and prior to the Programme, this Chapter examines how Iraq’s pricing of commodities under the Programme facilitated the collection of surcharges and kickbacks. Iraq’s efforts to sell oil and purchase goods at prices inconsistent with market values are one measure of the costs the regime was willing to pay in its pursuit of illicit income. While the Committee is not able to quantify the extent of price distortions, the impact is clear -- a direct loss of funds to the escrow account.

1 Iraq Ministry of Oil record, “Oil production & internal consumption of crude,” “Domestic consumption of refined petroleum products,” and “Total oil production” (providing various Iraqi oil statistics for 1991 to 2003) (hereinafter “Ministry of Oil Production Tables”); United States official #24 interview (Sept. 1, 2005). The Committee’s summary in Table 3 is based on Ministry of Oil Production Tables. The information on amounts of oil re-injected for later use was provided by a former CPA employee who is highly familiar with the activities of Iraq’s Ministry of Oil. As discussed in Chapter 4 of Volume II, Iraq’s major border trading partners -- Jordan, Turkey, and Syria -- declined to furnish information concerning their trade with Iraq, other than to confirm that trade protocols with Iraq existed, notwithstanding the United Nations sanctions regime. Internal consumption is the total domestic consumption of fuel oil, gasoline, benzene, and light gas in addition to power used to produce the crude. “Re-injection” refers to the process whereby oil is returned to reservoirs. 2 Iraq Ministry of Oil record, SOMO tables, “Value of Iraqi Oil and Oil Products Sales Outside of 'MOU' from 1991 - April 2003” (Aug. 30, 2005) (attached to SOMO letter to the Committee (Aug. 30, 2005)) (hereinafter “SOMO Table on Oil Sales Outside of MOU”); SOMO record, Jordan, Syrian, Turkey, Egypt and border trade invoices and payments. 3 Ibid.

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Table 3 - Iraqi Oil Available for Smuggling (in millions of barrels) 1

Year

Total Internal Production Consumption

Re-Injection Oil Sold Total Oil of Crude & Under the Available for Fuel Oil Programme Smuggling

Prior to the Programme 1991 191.38 1992 385.06 1993 370.55 1994 377.01 1995 387.63 1996 420.22 Sub-total 2,131.85

86.61 112.00 110.19 104.54 107.68 104.3 7 625.41

87.31 237.42 235.69 237.84 253.98 238.34 1,290.57

During the Programme 1997 546.64 1998 791.58 1999 927.62 2000 952.05 2001 943.76 2002 812.80 2003 226.18 Sub-total 5,200.63 Total 7,332.48

115.15 121.75 124.25 132.59 149.59 171.34 17.46 832.13 1,457.55

145.59 70.64 7.78 10.71 23.93 28.36 8.50 295.51 1,586.07

17.46 35.64 24.67 34.63 25.97 77.51 215.87 246.46 545.75 728.16 703.58 619.61 461.50 125.66 3,430.72 3,430.72

39.44 53.45 67.43 105.17 150.63 151.59 74.56 642.27 858.14

A. Underpricing of oil sold under the Programme Even if Iraq had not chosen to systematically underprice its oil, it is likely that oil prices under the Programme would still have been low in comparison with market rates. At the outset of the Programme, prices were likely set low in order to attract participation in a newly revived Iraqi oil market. In addition, even after the Programme was underway, the market was irregular and unpredictable in that it operated on l80-day approvals by the Security Council. Finally, the quality of Iraqi crude oil purportedly declined between 1996

1 Ministry of Oil Production Tables; United States official #24 interview (Sept. 1, 2005). The Programme commenced on December 10, 1996, and 9.66 million barrels were sold between this date and January 1, 1997. For simplicity of analysis, these barrels have been categorized as sales during the Programme. TaR (Dec. 10, 1996 to Jan. 1, 1997).

1

Jordan A $333.51 472.37 405.11 377.69 423.26 587.87 $2,599.81 $653.06 331.85 420.20 687.16 509.63 623.35 151.30 $3,376.55 $5,976.36

Syria B $ ------$ -$ ---197.30 1,131.02 1,350.01 453.74 $3,132.07 $3,132.07

SOMO Table on Oil Sales Outside of MOU.

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Sub-total 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Sub-total Total

Year

Protocols Turkey C $ ------$ -$ ---98.29 281.58 373.41 53.37 $806.65 $806.65 Egypt D $ ------$ -$ ----5.74 39.02 -$44.76 $44.76

Total E=A+B+C+D $333.51 472.37 405.11 377.69 423.26 587.87 $2,599.81 $653.06 331.85 420.20 982.75 1,927.97 2,385.79 658.41 $7,360.03 $9,959.84

Total G=E+F $333.51 472.37 405.11 377.69 423.26 587.87 $2,599.81 $664.90 348.55 657.06 1,379.07 2,111.08 2,484.47 745.28 $8,390.41 $10,990.22

Border Trade F $ ------$ -$11.84 16.70 236.86 396.32 183.11 98.68 86.87 $1,030.38 $1,030.38

$157.51 253.37 224.11 196.69 220.26 257.87 $1,309.81 $403.06 82.85 216.20 505.40 776.97 1,028.31 225.85 $3,238.64 $4,548.45

Actual Cash Received

Table 4 - Value of Oil and Oil Products Sold Outside of the Programme, 1991 through March 2003 (in USD millions) 1

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and 2003, which would have resulted in a corresponding decrease in value. For these reasons, Iraqi oil sold during the Programme was, to some extent, discounted. 1 However, there is considerable reason to believe that Iraq did underprice its oil. In 2001, the United Nations oil overseers concluded that Iraq was setting prices lower than necessary to create a margin that the oil purchasers could use to pay surcharges. Indeed, the oil overseers highlighted consistent underpricing of Iraqi oil's official selling price relative to the end-user price, a discrepancy that the oil overseers called “excessive premia.” Furthermore, a comparison of Programme prices of Basrah Light crude destined for the North American market with the market rate for MARS (a crude with a chemical consistency and trade value similar to that of Basrah Light crude) reveals that Programme prices were consistently lower than the market prices -- in some instances by very large margins. Chart B [not shown in document] compares Basrah Light priced for the North American market, the lower series of data points, to MARS prices, the upper series of data points. The critical period in which surcharges were in effect, September 2000 through August 2002, is denoted by shading. 2 As illustrated in Chart B [not shown in document], the gap between MARS and Basrah Light prices widened significantly during the surcharge period, especially in the months between November 2000 and November 2001. In April 2001, for example, the difference between MARS and Basrah Light prices exceeded $4 per barrel. Following the imposition of retroactive pricing, the difference between these two prices narrowed to as little as $1-2 per barrel. 3 Adjusting prices to permit the payment of a surcharge would have required relatively little underpricing -- the $229 million paid in surcharges is less than one percent of the total oil sales during the period when surcharges were being imposed. However, the other manipulations of the Programme that Iraq pursued through its oil sales necessitated further downward revisions. In particular, the prices below market value facilitated the Iraqi regime’s effort to gain influence and support from government figures, journalists, and others through its oil allocation scheme. The prices proposed by SOMO allowed recipients of oil allocations to obtain a profit when their allocations were sold on the market. The additional underpricing required by Iraq to implement its oil-for-influence scheme was approximately $130.3 million. This is based on an assumption of an average commission of $.10 per barrel paid to allocation holders for their right to purchase around 1.3 billion barrels of oil. 4 1

SOMO Summary Report; Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti, “Did Iraq Cheat the United Nations? Underpricing, Bribes, and the Oil for Food Program,” National Bureau o/Economic Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper 11202, Mar. 2005, pp. 3-4. 2 Oil overseers letter to 661 Committee Chairman (Feb. 13,2001) (signed by Michel Tellings, Morten BuurJensen, and Alexandre Kramar); Morten Buur-Jensen interview (Aug. 12, 2005). For a discussion of the overseers' concerns in light of Iraq’s surcharge policy, see Chapter 3 of Volume II. Platts, MARS spot prices (May 26, 1999 to Mar. 31, 2003). MARS is used for this comparison because it is a crude similar to Basrah Light, and it is produced in the Western Caribbean, reducing the impact of pricing issues associated with transportations delays and costs. Hence, its price is largely independent of transportation costs for sales to the North American market. 3 Platts, MARS spot prices (May 26,1999 to Mar. 31, 2003); TaR (1996-2003). 4 TaR (1996-2003). The contracts and number of barrels for recipients of oil allocations are subsets of TaR derived from Ministry of Oil records between 1997 and 2003. For a detailed discussion of Iraq’s oil pricing policy and the market conditions that it created, see Part II of Chapter 3 in Volume II.

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However, this figure does not in and of itself justify the magnitude of Iraq’s underpricing of its oil. In all likelihood, the majority of Iraq’s underpricing was intended to facilitate the involvement of oil trading firms in the Programme, which by definition needed a significant price differential in order to resell oil to third-parties and retain a profit. 1

B. Underpricing of oil sold outside of the Programme It is clear that oil smuggled during the Programme was priced at below-market rates. However, protocol and border sales during the Programme should properly be analyzed in terms of lost revenue to the escrow account. Following the passage of Security Council Resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999, Iraq could sell unlimited volumes of oil under the Programme. Had Iraq sold the oil it smuggled to Jordan, Syria, and other parties between January 2000 and March 2003 under the Programme at prices approved by the United Nations, the escrow account would have benefited from an additional $1.78 billion in oil sales. 2

C. Overpricing of humanitarian goods In order to identify instances where Iraq may have purchased goods at inflated prices, the Committee compared the Programme prices of three key commodities with corresponding market prices. The results of this analysis with respect to one commodity are illustrated in Chart C [not shown in document] below. This chart [not shown in document] plots three values: (1) the market rate of the commodity; (2) the “expected” Programme price, calculated by adding the costs of sea freight to market prices; and (3) the actual Programme price. 3 As noted in the chart [not shown in document], in Phases I through V, the actual Programme prices were generally aligned with the expected Programme prices. The price

1

This is discussed further in Chapter 3 of Volume II. S/RES/1284, para. 15 (Dec. 17, 1999); SOMO records. For a discussion of the concessional prices at which Iraq sold oil that was smuggled to its neighbors, see Chapter 4 of Volume II. The quantity estimate is based on the crude oil sold only through protocols and private sales. Many other products were sold through the protocols and in private sales. However, only crude oil could be sold through the Programme. Prices were derived by taking the weighted average prices of crude oil sold in the Programme for each of the Programme’s price categories (Year, Oil Type, and Destination) and multiplying those by the amounts of crude oil sold annually in the protocols and through private sales, as reflected in the SOMO database. The total additional profit $1.78 billion is the difference between $5.3 billion invoiced compared to $7.1 billion if the same number of barrels (326 million) were sold at the higher prices that prevailed under the Programme. 3 TaR (1996-2005). Market information was obtained from historical commodity data on Capital Commodity Services, Inc. from March 1997 to March 2003, which were averaged over each phrase of the Programme. Capital Commodity Services, Inc. “Historical Futures Charts,” http://www.ccstrade.com/quotes/ historical. Transportation costs were calculated by averaging transportation costs from historical information from the Grain Transportation Reports of the Agricultural Marketing Service and from records obtained by the Committee and averaged over each phase of the Programme. Agricultural Marketing Service, “Grain Transportation Report,” http://www.ams.usda.gov/tmdtsb/grain/Archive.htm. The average cost of vessel freight was then calculated by applying a twelve percent premium per metric ton to the commodity market price to determine the expected price of the commodity. 2

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440 Table 5 – Summary of Estimate of Illicit Income (in USD millions)

Revenue Revenue Prior to the During the Programme Programme Protocol & Private Sales Revenue Protocol Revenue Jordan Egypt Turkey Syria Sub-total of Protocol Revenue Border Trade Total Protocol and Private Sales Revenue Programme-Related Revenue Transaction Fees on Oil Sales Surcharges on Oil Sales Transaction Fees on Humanitarian Purchases After-Sales-Service Fees Inland Transportation Fees Sub-total of Transaction Fees on Humanitarian Purchases Total Programme-Related Revenue Total Estimated Illicit Income

2,599.8

2,599.8 2,599.8

2,599.8

Total Revenue

3,376.6 44.8 806.7 3,132.1 7,360.0 1,030.4 8,390.4

5,976.4 44.8 806.7 3,132.1 9,959.8 1,030.4 10,990.2

228.8

228.8

1,055.9 527.5

1,055.9 527.5

1,583.4

1,583.4

1,812.2 10,202.6

1,812.2 12,802.4

differences that did exist between these two values in all likelihood reflected the cost of doing business in a high-risk and uncertain legal and political environment. Beginning in Phase VI, around the time of the introduction of transportation fees, the difference between expected Programme prices and actual Programme prices increased significantly. In the summer of 2000, or Phase VIII, when after-sales-service fees were imposed, these two prices diverged markedly. By early 2003, or Phase XIII, the difference between expected and actual Programme prices was nearly three times greater. The increases in actual Programme prices observed in 2002-2003 can be partially attributed to the kickback schemes described above. However, the sheer size of the price differential seems to exceed the requirements for collecting after-sales-service and transportation fees. The reasons for this excessive overpricing are largely unclear, but may relate to the Government of Iraq’s efforts to retain the business of suppliers uncomfortable with their continued obligation to pay kickbacks.

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441 V. SUMMARY OF ILLICIT INCOME EARNED

Table 5 provides a summary of the Committee’s estimate of the illicit income earned by the Iraqi regime during the sanctions period. The table is divided into two sections: (1) smuggling revenue; and (2) Programme-related revenue. 1 This estimate of illicit income -- $12.8 billion -- sets out in quantitative terms the consequences of the United Nations’ failure to properly oversee the Programme and maintain the integrity of the sanctions regime.

1

The Committee considered the question of interest earnings on the cash components of illicit income. Testing of accounts in Jordan show that there was some amount of interest earned; however, the amounts were relatively negligible in regard to the totals above. For this reason, the Committee does not include interest as a component in its estimate of illicit income.

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442

II.5 2005 WORLD SUMMIT OUTCOME United Nations World Summit, 16 September 2005 1

CONTENTS Chapter

Paragraphs Page

I.

VALUE AND PRINCIPLES .........................................................

1-16

445

II.

DEVELOPMENT ..........................................................................

17-68

446

Global Partnership for development...............................................

20-22

447

Financing for development.............................................................

23

448

Domestic resource mobilization .....................................................

24

450

Investment ......................................................................................

25

450

Debt ................................................................................................

26

451

Trade ..............................................................................................

27-32

452

Commodities ..................................................................................

33

453

Quick-impact initiatives .................................................................

34

453

Systemic issues and global economic decision-making .................

35-39

453

South-South cooperation ................................................................

40-42

454

Education........................................................................................

43-45

454

Rural and agricultural development ...............................................

46

455

1 United Nations documentation: Draft Resolution referred to the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session (A/60/L.1), 20 September 2005.

Summit Outcome Chapter

III.

IV.

.

443 Paragraphs Page

Employment ...................................................................................

47

455

Sustainable development: management and protecting our common environment.....................................................................

48-56

455

HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other health issues ..............

57

459

Gender equality and empowerment of women...............................

58-59

460

Science and technology for development .......................................

60

461

Migration and development............................................................

61-63

462

Countries with special needs ..........................................................

64-67

462

Meeting the special needs of Africa ...............................................

68

463

PEACE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY....................................

69-118

464

Pacific settlement of disputes .........................................................

73-76

465

Use of force under the Charter .......................................................

77-80

465

Terrorism........................................................................................

81-91

466

Peacekeeping ..................................................................................

92-96

467

Peacebuilding .................................................................................

97-105

468

Sanctions ........................................................................................ 106-110

470

Transnational crime ........................................................................ 111-115

470

Women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts.....................

471

116

Protecting children in situation of armed conflicts......................... 117-118

471

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW............................ 119-145

472

Human rights .................................................................................. 121-131

472

Internally displaced persons ...........................................................

132

473

Refugee protection and assistance..................................................

133

473

Rule of law .....................................................................................

134

474

Summit Outcome

444 Chapter

.

V.

Paragraphs Page

Democracy ..................................................................................... 135-137

474

Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity................................ 138-140

475

Children’s rights ............................................................................. 141-142

475

Human security...............................................................................

476

143

Culture of peace and initiatives on dialogue among cultures, civilizations and religions............................................................... 144-145

476

STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS............................ 146-178

476

General Assembly .......................................................................... 149-151

477

Security Council ............................................................................. 152-154

477

Economic and Social Council ........................................................ 155-156

477

Human Rights Council ................................................................... 157-160

478

Secretariat and management reform ............................................... 161-167

479

System-wide coherence .................................................................. 168-169

481

Regional organizations ...................................................................

170

483

Cooperation between the United Nations and parliaments.............

171

483

Participation of local authorities, the private sector and civil society, including non-governmental organization......................... 172-175

483

Charter of the United Nations......................................................... 176-178

484

Summit Outcome

445 I. VALUES AND PRINCIPLES

1. We, Heads of State and Government, have gathered at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 14 to 16 September 2005. 2. We reaffirm our faith in the United Nations and our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law, which are indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world, and reiterate our determination to foster strict respect for them. 3. We reaffirm the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which we adopted at the dawn of the twenty-first century. We recognize the valuable role of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields, including the Millennium Summit, in mobilizing the international community at the local, national, regional and global levels and in guiding the work of the United Nations. 4. We reaffirm that our common fundamental values, including freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for all human rights, respect for nature and shared responsibility, are essential to international relations. 5. We are determined to establish a just and lasting peace all over the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all States, respect their territorial integrity and political independence, to refrain in our international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, to uphold resolution of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the right to selfdetermination of peoples which remain under colonial domination and foreign occupation, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the equal rights of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and the fulfilment in good faith of the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter. 6. We reaffirm the vital importance of an effective multilateral system, in accordance with international law, in order to better address the multifaceted and interconnected challenges and threats confronting our world and to achieve progress in the areas of peace and security, development and human rights, underlining the central role of the United Nations, and commit ourselves to promoting and strengthening the effectiveness of the Organization through the implementation of its decisions and resolutions. 7. We believe that today, more than ever before, we live in a global and interdependent world. No State can stand wholly alone. We acknowledge that collective security depends on effective cooperation, in accordance with international law, against transnational threats. 8. We recognize that current developments and circumstances require that we urgently build consensus on major threats and challenges. We commit ourselves to translating that

Summit Outcome

446

consensus into concrete action, including addressing the root causes of those threats and challenges with resolve and determination. 9. We acknowledge that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and wellbeing. We recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. 10. We reaffirm that development is a central goal by itself and that sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental aspects constitutes a key element of the overarching framework of United Nations activities. 11. We acknowledge that good governance and the rule of law at the national and international levels are essential for sustained economic growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger. 12. We reaffirm that gender equality and the promotion and protection of the full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all are essential to advance development and peace and security. We are committed to creating a world fit for future generations, which takes into account the best interests of the child. 13. We reaffirm the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights. 14. Acknowledging the diversity of the world, we recognize that all cultures and civilizations contribute to the enrichment of humankind. We acknowledge the importance of respect and understanding for religious and cultural diversity throughout the world. In order to promote international peace and security, we commit ourselves to advancing human welfare, freedom and progress everywhere, as well as to encouraging tolerance, respect, dialogue and cooperation among different cultures, civilizations and peoples. 15. We pledge to enhance the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and credibility of the United Nations system. This is our shared responsibility and interest. 16. We therefore resolve to create a more peaceful, prosperous and democratic world and to undertake concrete measures to continue finding ways to implement the outcome of the Millennium Summit and the other major United Nations conferences and summits so as to provide multilateral solutions to problems in the four following areas: x x x x

Development Peace and collective security Human rights and the rule of law Strengthening of the United Nations

II. DEVELOPMENT 17. We strongly reiterate our determination to ensure the timely and full realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major United Nations conferences and

Summit Outcome

447

summits, including those agreed at the Millennium Summit that are described as the Millennium Development Goals, which have helped to galvanize efforts towards poverty eradication. 18. We emphasize the vital role played by the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields in shaping a broad development vision and in identifying commonly agreed objectives, which have contributed to improving human life in different parts of the world. 19. We reaffirm our commitment to eradicate poverty and promote sustained economic growth, sustainable development and global prosperity for all. We are encouraged by reductions in poverty in some countries in the recent past and are determined to reinforce and extend this trend to benefit people worldwide. We remain concerned, however, with the slow and uneven progress towards poverty eradication and the realization of other development goals in some regions. We commit ourselves to promoting the development of the productive sectors in developing countries to enable them to participate more effectively in and benefit from the process of globalization. We underline the need for urgent action on all sides, including more ambitious national development strategies and efforts backed by increased international support.

Global partnership for development 20. We reaffirm our commitment to the global partnership for development set out in the Millennium Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. 21. We further reaffirm our commitment to sound policies, good governance at all levels and the rule of law, and to mobilize domestic resources, attract international flows, promote international trade as an engine for development and increase international financial and technical cooperation for development, sustainable debt financing and external debt relief and to enhance the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems. 22. We reaffirm that each country must take primary responsibility for its own development and that the role of national policies and development strategies cannot be overemphasized in the achievement of sustainable development. We also recognize that national efforts should be complemented by supportive global programmes, measures and policies aimed at expanding the development opportunities of developing countries, while taking into account national conditions and ensuring respect for national ownership, strategies and sovereignty. To this end, we resolve: (a) To adopt, by 2006, and implement comprehensive national development strategies to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals; (b) To manage public finances effectively to achieve and maintain macroeconomic stability and long-term growth and to make effective and transparent use of public funds and ensure that development assistance is used to build national capacities;

Summit Outcome

448

(c) To support efforts by developing countries to adopt and implement national development policies and strategies through increased development assistance, the promotion of international trade as an engine for development, the transfer of technology on mutually agreed terms, increased investment flows and wider and deeper debt relief, and to support developing countries by providing a substantial increase in aid of sufficient quality and arriving in a timely manner to assist them in achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals; (d) That the increasing interdependence of national economies in a globalizing world and the emergence of rule-based regimes for international economic relations have meant that the space for national economic policy, that is, the scope for domestic policies, especially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development, is now often framed by international disciplines, commitments and global market considerations. It is for each Government to evaluate the trade-off between the benefits of accepting international rules and commitments and the constraints posed by the loss of policy space. It is particularly important for developing countries, bearing in mind development goals and objectives, that all countries take into account the need for appropriate balance between national policy space and international disciplines and commitments; (e) To enhance the contribution of non-governmental organizations, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders in national development efforts, as well as in the promotion of the global partnership for development; (f) To ensure that the United Nations funds and programmes and the specialized agencies support the efforts of developing countries through the common country assessment and United Nations Development Assistance Framework process, enhancing their support for capacity-building; (g) To protect our natural resource base in support of development.

Financing for development 23. We reaffirm the Monterrey Consensus and recognize that mobilizing financial resources for development and the effective use of those resources in developing countries and countries with economies in transition are central to a global partnership for development in support of the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. In this regard: (a) We are encouraged by recent commitments to substantial increases in official development assistance and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimate that official development assistance to all developing countries will now increase by around $50 billion a year by 2010, while recognizing that a substantial increase in such assistance is required to achieve the internationally agreed goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, within their respective time frames; (b) We welcome the increased resources that will become available as a result of the establishment of timetables by many developed countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance by 2015 and to

Summit Outcome

449

reach at least 0.5 per cent of gross national product for official development assistance by 2010 as well as, pursuant to the Brussels Programme of Action for the least developed countries, 0.15 per cent to 0.20 per cent for the least developed countries by no later than 2010, and urge those developed countries that have not yet done so to make concrete efforts in this regard in accordance with their commitments; (c) We further welcome recent efforts and initiatives to enhance the quality of aid and to increase its impact, including the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and resolve to take concrete, effective and timely action in implementing all agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, with clear monitoring and deadlines, including through further aligning assistance with countries’ strategies, building institutional capacities, reducing transaction costs and eliminating bureaucratic procedures, making progress on untying aid, enhancing the absorptive capacity and financial management of recipient countries and strengthening the focus on development results; (d) We recognize the value of developing innovative sources of financing, provided those sources do not unduly burden developing countries. In that regard, we take note with interest of the international efforts, contributions and discussions, such as the Action Against Hunger and Poverty, aimed at identifying innovative and additional sources of financing for development on a public, private, domestic or external basis to increase and supplement traditional sources of financing. Some countries will implement the International Finance Facility. Some countries have launched the International Finance Facility for immunization. Some countries will implement in the near future, utilizing their national authorities, a contribution on airline tickets to enable the financing of development projects, in particular in the health sector, directly or through financing of the International Finance Facility. Other countries are considering whether and to what extent they will participate in these initiatives; (e) We acknowledge the vital role the private sector can play in generating new investments, employment and financing for development; (f) We resolve to address the development needs of low-income developing countries by working in competent multilateral and international forums, to help them meet, inter alia, their financial, technical and technological requirements; (g) We resolve to continue to support the development efforts of middle-income developing countries by working, in competent multilateral and international forums and also through bilateral arrangements, on measures to help them meet, inter alia, their financial, technical and technological requirements; (h) We resolve to operationalize the World Solidarity Fund established by the General Assembly and invite those countries in a position to do so to make voluntary contributions to the Fund; (i) We recognize the need for access to financial services, in particular for the poor, including through microfinance and microcredit.

Summit Outcome

450 Domestic resource mobilization

24. In our common pursuit of growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development, a critical challenge is to ensure the necessary internal conditions for mobilizing domestic savings, both public and private, sustaining adequate levels of productive investment, increasing human capacity, reducing capital flight, curbing the illicit transfer of funds and enhancing international cooperation for creating an enabling domestic environment. We undertake to support the efforts of developing countries to create a domestic enabling environment for mobilizing domestic resources. To this end, we therefore resolve: (a) To pursue good governance and sound macroeconomic policies at all levels and support developing countries in their efforts to put in place the policies and investments to drive sustained economic growth, promote small and medium-sized enterprises, promote employment generation and stimulate the private sector; (b) To reaffirm that good governance is essential for sustainable development; that sound economic policies, solid democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people and improved infrastructure are the basis for sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and employment creation; and that freedom, peace and security, domestic stability, respect for human rights, including the right to development, the rule of law, gender equality and market-oriented policies and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies are also essential and mutually reinforcing; (c) To make the fight against corruption a priority at all levels and welcome all actions taken in this regard at the national and international levels, including the adoption of policies that emphasize accountability, transparent public sector management and corporate responsibility and accountability, including efforts to return assets transferred through corruption, consistent with the United Nations Convention against Corruption. We urge all States that have not done so to consider signing, ratifying and implementing the Convention; (d) To channel private capabilities and resources into stimulating the private sector in developing countries through actions in the public, public/private and private spheres to create an enabling environment for partnership and innovation that contributes to accelerated economic development and hunger and poverty eradication; (e) To support efforts to reduce capital flight and measures to curb the illicit transfer of funds.

Investment 25. We resolve to encourage greater direct investment, including foreign investment, in developing countries and countries with economies in transition to support their development activities and to enhance the benefits they can derive from such investments. In this regard: (a) We continue to support efforts by developing countries and countries with economies in transition to create a domestic environment conducive to attracting

Summit Outcome

451

investments through, inter alia, achieving a transparent, stable and predictable investment climate with proper contract enforcement and respect for property rights and the rule of law and pursuing appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks that encourage business formation; (b) We will put into place policies to ensure adequate investment in a sustainable manner in health, clean water and sanitation, housing and education and in the provision of public goods and social safety nets to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged sectors of society; (c) We invite national Governments seeking to develop infrastructure projects and generate foreign direct investment to pursue strategies with the involvement of both the public and private sectors and, where appropriate, international donors; (d) We call upon international financial and banking institutions to consider enhancing the transparency of risk rating mechanisms. Sovereign risk assessments, made by the private sector should maximize the use of strict, objective and transparent parameters, which can be facilitated by high-quality data and analysis; (e) We underscore the need to sustain sufficient and stable private financial flows to developing countries and countries with economies in transition. It is important to promote measures in source and destination countries to improve transparency and the information about financial flows to developing countries, particularly countries in Africa, the least developed countries, small island developing States and landlocked developing countries. Measures that mitigate the impact of excessive volatility of short-term capital flows are important and must be considered.

Debt 26. We emphasize the high importance of a timely, effective, comprehensive and durable solution to the debt problems of developing countries, since debt financing and relief can be an important source of capital for development. To this end: (a) We welcome the recent proposals of the Group of Eight to cancel 100 per cent of the outstanding debt of eligible heavily indebted poor countries owed to the International Monetary Fund, the International Development Association and African Development Fund and to provide additional resources to ensure that the financing capacity of the international financial institutions is not reduced; (b) We emphasize that debt sustainability is essential for underpinning growth and underline the importance of debt sustainability to the efforts to achieve national development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, recognizing the key role that debt relief can play in liberating resources that can be directed towards activities consistent with poverty eradication, sustained economic growth and sustainable development; (c) We further stress the need to consider additional measures and initiatives aimed at ensuring long-term debt sustainability through increased grant-based financing,

Summit Outcome

452

cancellation of 100 per cent of the official multilateral and bilateral debt of heavily indebted poor countries and, where appropriate, and on a case-by-case basis, to consider significant debt relief or restructuring for low- and middle-income developing countries with an unsustainable debt burden that are not part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, as well as the exploration of mechanisms to comprehensively address the debt problems of those countries. Such mechanisms may include debt for sustainable development swaps or multicreditor debt swap arrangements, as appropriate. These initiatives could include further efforts by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to develop the debt sustainability framework for low-income countries. This should be achieved in a fashion that does not detract from official development assistance resources, while maintaining the financial integrity of the multilateral financial institutions.

Trade 27. A universal, rule-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system, as well as meaningful trade liberalization, can substantially stimulate development worldwide, benefiting countries at all stages of development. In that regard, we reaffirm our commitment to trade liberalization and to ensure that trade plays its full part in promoting economic growth, employment and development for all. 28. We are committed to efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, especially the least-developed countries, participate fully in the world trading system in order to meet their economic development needs, and reaffirm our commitment to enhanced and predictable market access for the exports of developing countries. 29. We will work towards the objective, in accordance with the Brussels Programme of Action, of duty-free and quota-free market access for all least developed countries’ products to the markets of developed countries, as well as to the markets of developing countries in a position to do so, and support their efforts to overcome their supply-side constraints. 30. We are committed to supporting and promoting increased aid to build productive and trade capacities of developing countries and take further steps in that regard, while welcoming the substantial support already provided. 31. We will work to accelerate and facilitate the accession of developing countries and countries with economies in transition to the World Trade Organization consistent with its criteria, recognizing the importance of universal integration in the rules-based global trading system. 32. We will work expeditiously towards implementing the development dimensions of the Doha work programme.

Summit Outcome

453 Commodities

33. We emphasize the need to address the impact of weak and volatile commodity prices and support the efforts of commodity-dependent countries to restructure, diversify and strengthen the competitiveness of their commodity sectors.

Quick-impact initiatives 34. Given the need to accelerate progress immediately in countries where current trends make the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals unlikely, we resolve to urgently identify and implement country-led initiatives with adequate international support, consistent with long-term national development strategies, that promise immediate and durable improvements in the lives of people and renewed hope for the achievement of the development goals. In this regard, we will take such actions as the distribution of malaria bed nets, including free distribution, where appropriate, and effective anti-malarial treatments, the expansion of local school meal programmes, using home-grown foods where possible, and the elimination of user fees for primary education and, where appropriate, health-care services.

Systemic issues and global economic decision-making 35. We reaffirm the commitment to broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in international economic decision-making and norm-setting, and to that end stress the importance of continuing efforts to reform the international financial architecture, noting that enhancing the voice and participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in the Bretton Woods institutions remains a continuous concern. 36. We reaffirm our commitment to governance, equity and transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems. We are also committed to open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial systems. 37. We also underscore our commitment to sound domestic financial sectors, which make a vital contribution to national development efforts, as an important component of an international financial architecture that is supportive of development. 38. We further reaffirm the need for the United Nations to play a fundamental role in the promotion of international cooperation for development and the coherence, coordination and implementation of development goals and actions agreed upon by the international community, and we resolve to strengthen coordination within the United Nations system in close cooperation with all other multilateral financial trade and development institutions in order to support sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and sustainable development. 39. Good governance at the international level is fundamental for achieving sustainable development. In order to ensure a dynamic and enabling international economic environment, it is important to promote global economic governance through addressing

Summit Outcome

454

the international finance, trade, technology and investment patterns that have an impact on the development prospects of developing countries. To this effect, the international community should take all necessary and appropriate measures, including ensuring support for structural and macroeconomic reform, a comprehensive solution to the external debt problem and increasing the market access of developing countries.

South-South cooperation 40. We recognize the achievements and great potential of South-South cooperation and encourage the promotion of such cooperation, which complements North-South cooperation as an effective contribution to development and as a means to share best practices and provide enhanced technical cooperation. In this context, we note the recent decision of the leaders of the South, adopted at the Second South Summit and contained in the Doha Plan of Action and the Doha Declaration, to intensify their efforts at South-South cooperation, including through the establishment of the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership and other regional cooperation mechanisms, and encourage the international community, including the international financial institutions, to support the efforts of developing countries, inter alia, through triangular cooperation. We also take note with appreciation of the launching of the third round of negotiations on the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries as an important instrument to stimulate South-South cooperation. 41. We welcome the work of the United Nations High Level Committee on South-South cooperation and invite countries to consider supporting the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation within the United Nations Development Programme in order to respond effectively to the development needs of developing countries. 42. We recognize the considerable contribution of arrangements such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries fund initiated by a group of developing countries, as well as the potential contribution of the South Fund for Development and Humanitarian Assistance, to development activities in developing countries.

Education 43. We emphasize the critical role of both formal and informal education in the achievement of poverty eradication and other development goals as envisaged in the Millennium Declaration, in particular basic education and training for eradicating illiteracy, and strive for expanded secondary and higher education as well as vocational education and technical training, especially for girls and women, the creation of human resources and infrastructure capabilities and the empowerment of those living in poverty. In this context, we reaffirm the Dakar Framework for Action adopted at the World Education Forum in 2000 and recognize the importance of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization strategy for the eradication of poverty, especially extreme poverty, in supporting the Education for All programmes as a tool to achieve the millennium development goal of universal primary education by 2015.

Summit Outcome

455

44. We reaffirm our commitment to support developing country efforts to ensure that all children have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality, to eliminate gender inequality and imbalance and to renew efforts to improve girls’ education. We also commit ourselves to continuing to support the efforts of developing countries in the implementation of the Education for All initiative, including with enhanced resources of all types through the Education for All fast-track initiative in support of country-led national education plans. 45. We commit ourselves to promoting education for peace and human development.

Rural and agricultural development 46. We reaffirm that food security and rural and agricultural development must be adequately and urgently addressed in the context of national development and response strategies and, in this context, will enhance the contributions of indigenous and local communities, as appropriate. We are convinced that the eradication of poverty, hunger and malnutrition, particularly as they affect children, is crucial for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Rural and agricultural development should be an integral part of national and international development policies. We deem it necessary to increase productive investment in rural and agricultural development to achieve food security. We commit ourselves to increasing support for agricultural development and trade capacitybuilding in the agricultural sector in developing countries. Support for commodity development projects, especially market-based projects, and for their preparation under the Second Account of the Common Fund for Commodities should be encouraged.

Employment 47. We strongly support fair globalization and resolve to make the goals of full and productive employment and decent work for all, including for women and young people, a central objective of our relevant national and international policies as well as our national development strategies, including poverty reduction strategies, as part of our efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. These measures should also encompass the elimination of the worst forms of child labour, as defined in International Labour Organization Convention No. 182, and forced labour. We also resolve to ensure full respect for the fundamental principles and rights at work.

Sustainable development: managing and protecting our common environment 48. We reaffirm our commitment to achieve the goal of sustainable development, including through the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. To this end, we commit ourselves to undertaking concrete actions and measures at all levels and to enhancing international cooperation, taking into account the Rio principles. These efforts will also promote the integration of the three components of sustainable development — economic development, social development and environmental protection — as interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars. Poverty eradication, changing unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and protecting

456

Summit Outcome

and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development are overarching objectives of and essential requirements for sustainable development. 49. We will promote sustainable consumption and production patterns, with the developed countries taking the lead and all countries benefiting from the process, as called for in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. In that context, we support developing countries in their efforts to promote a recycling economy. 50. We face serious and multiple challenges in tackling climate change, promoting clean energy, meeting energy needs and achieving sustainable development, and we will act with resolve and urgency in this regard. 51. We recognize that climate change is a serious and long-term challenge that has the potential to affect every part of the globe. We emphasize the need to meet all the commitments and obligations we have undertaken in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and other relevant international agreements, including, for many of us, the Kyoto Protocol. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the appropriate framework for addressing future action on climate change at the global level. 52. We reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate objective of the Convention: to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 53. We acknowledge that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation and participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with the principles of the Convention. We are committed to moving forward the global discussion on long-term cooperative action to address climate change, in accordance with these principles. We stress the importance of the eleventh session of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, to be held in Montreal, Canada, in November 2005. 54. We acknowledge various partnerships that are under way to advance action on clean energy and climate change, including bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives. 55. We are committed to taking further action through practical international cooperation, inter alia: (a) To promote innovation, clean energy and energy efficiency and conservation; improve policy, regulatory and financing frameworks; and accelerate the deployment of cleaner technologies; (b) To enhance private investment, transfer of technologies and capacity-building to developing countries, as called for in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, taking into account their own energy needs and priorities; (c) To assist developing countries to improve their resilience and integrate adaptation goals into their sustainable development strategies, given that adaptation to the effects of climate change due to both natural and human factors is a high priority for all

Summit Outcome

457

nations, particularly in those most vulnerable, namely, those referred to in article 4.8 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; (d) To continue to assist developing countries, in particular small island developing States, least developed countries and African countries, including those that are particularly vulnerable to climate change, in addressing their adaptation needs relating to the adverse effects of climate change. 56. In pursuance of our commitment to achieve sustainable development, we further resolve: (a) To promote the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development and the International Decade for Action, “Water for Life”; (b) To support and strengthen the implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, to address causes of desertification and land degradation, as well as poverty resulting from land degradation, through, inter alia, the mobilization of adequate and predictable financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity-building at all levels; (c) That the States parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety should support the implementation of the Convention and the Protocol, as well as other biodiversity-related agreements and the Johannesburg commitment for a significant reduction in the rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010. The States parties will continue to negotiate within the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, bearing in mind the Bonn Guidelines, an international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. All States will fulfil commitments and significantly reduce the rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010 and continue ongoing efforts towards elaborating and negotiating an international regime on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing; (d) To recognize that the sustainable development of indigenous peoples and their communities is crucial in our fight against hunger and poverty; (e) To reaffirm our commitment, subject to national legislation, to respect, preserve and maintain the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, promote their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their utilization; (f) To work expeditiously towards the establishment of a worldwide early warning system for all natural hazards with regional nodes, building on existing national and regional capacity such as the newly established Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System; (g) To fully implement the Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 adopted at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, in particular

458

Summit Outcome

those commitments related to assistance for developing countries that are prone to natural disasters and disaster-stricken States in the transition phase towards sustainable physical, social and economic recovery, for risk-reduction activities in post-disaster recovery and for rehabilitation processes; (h) To assist developing countries’ efforts to prepare integrated water resources management and water efficiency plans as part of their national development strategies and to provide access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation in accordance with the Millennium Declaration and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, including halving by 2015 the proportion of people who are unable to reach or afford safe drinking water and who do not have access to basic sanitation; (i) To accelerate the development and dissemination of affordable and cleaner energy efficiency and energy conservation technologies, as well as the transfer of such technologies, in particular to developing countries, on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed, bearing in mind that access to energy facilitates the eradication of poverty; (j) To strengthen the conservation, sustainable management and development of all types of forests for the benefit of current and future generations, including through enhanced international cooperation, so that trees and forests may contribute fully to the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, taking full account of the linkages between the forest sector and other sectors. We look forward to the discussions at the sixth session of the United Nations Forum on Forests; (k) To promote the sound management of chemicals and hazardous wastes throughout their life cycle, in accordance with Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, aiming to achieve that by 2020 chemicals are used and produced in ways that lead to the minimization of significant adverse effects on human health and the environment using transparent and science-based risk assessment and risk management procedures, by adopting and implementing a voluntary strategic approach to international management of chemicals, and to support developing countries in strengthening their capacity for the sound management of chemicals and hazardous wastes by providing technical and financial assistance, as appropriate; (l) To improve cooperation and coordination at all levels in order to address issues related to oceans and seas in an integrated manner and promote integrated management and sustainable development of the oceans and seas; (m) To achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slumdwellers by 2020, recognizing the urgent need for the provision of increased resources for affordable housing and housing-related infrastructure, prioritizing slum prevention and slum upgrading, and to encourage support for the United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation and its Slum Upgrading Facility; (n) To acknowledge the invaluable role of the Global Environment Facility in facilitating cooperation with developing countries; we look forward to a successful

Summit Outcome

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replenishment this year along with the successful conclusion of all outstanding commitments from the third replenishment; (o) To note that cessation of the transport of radioactive materials through the regions of small island developing States is an ultimate desired goal of small island developing States and some other countries and recognize the right of freedom of navigation in accordance with international law. States should maintain dialogue and consultation, in particular under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Maritime Organization, with the aim of improved mutual understanding, confidence-building and enhanced communication in relation to the safe maritime transport of radioactive materials. States involved in the transport of such materials are urged to continue to engage in dialogue with small island developing States and other States to address their concerns. These concerns include the further development and strengthening, within the appropriate fora, of international regulatory regimes to enhance safety, disclosure, liability, security and compensation in relation to such transport.

HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other health issues 57. We recognize that HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases pose severe risks for the entire world and serious challenges to the achievement of development goals. We acknowledge the substantial efforts and financial contributions made by the international community, while recognizing that these diseases and other emerging health challenges require a sustained international response. To this end, we commit ourselves to: (a) Increasing investment, building on existing mechanisms and through partnership, to improve health systems in developing countries and those with economies in transition with the aim of providing sufficient health workers, infrastructure, management systems and supplies to achieve the health-related Millennium Development Goals by 2015; (b) Implementing measures to increase the capacity of adults and adolescents to protect themselves from the risk of HIV infection; (c) Fully implementing all commitments established by the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS through stronger leadership, the scaling up of a comprehensive response to achieve broad multisectoral coverage for prevention, care, treatment and support, the mobilization of additional resources from national, bilateral, multilateral and private sources and the substantial funding of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as well as of the HIV/AIDS component of the work programmes of the United Nations system agencies and programmes engaged in the fight against HIV/AIDS; (d) Developing and implementing a package for HIV prevention, treatment and care with the aim of coming as close as possible to the goal of universal access to treatment by 2010 for all those who need it, including through increased resources, and working towards the elimination of stigma and discrimination, enhanced access to affordable medicines and the reduction of vulnerability of persons affected by HIV/AIDS and other health issues, in particular orphaned and vulnerable children and older persons;

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(e) Ensuring the full implementation of our obligations under the International Health Regulations adopted by the fifty-eighth World Health Assembly in May 2005, including the need to support the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network of the World Health Organization; (f) Working actively to implement the “Three Ones” principles in all countries, including by ensuring that multiple institutions and international partners all work under one agreed HIV/AIDS framework that provides the basis for coordinating the work of all partners, with one national AIDS coordinating authority having a broad-based multisectoral mandate, and under one agreed country-level monitoring and evaluation system. We welcome and support the important recommendations of the Global Task Team on Improving AIDS Coordination among Multilateral Institutions and International Donors; (g) Achieving universal access to reproductive health by 2015, as set out at the International Conference on Population and Development, integrating this goal in strategies to attain the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, aimed at reducing maternal mortality, improving maternal health, reducing child mortality, promoting gender equality, combating HIV/AIDS and eradicating poverty; (h) Promoting long-term funding, including public-private partnerships where appropriate, for academic and industrial research as well as for the development of new vaccines and microbicides, diagnostic kits, drugs and treatments to address major pandemics, tropical diseases and other diseases, such as avian flu and severe acute respiratory syndrome, and taking forward work on market incentives where appropriate through such mechanisms as advance purchase commitments; (i) Stressing the need to urgently address malaria and tuberculosis, in particular in the most affected countries, and welcoming the scaling up of all efforts in this regard of bilateral and multilateral initiatives.

Gender equality and empowerment of women 58. We remain convinced that progress for women is progress for all. We reaffirm that the full and effective implementation of the goals and objectives of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly is an essential contribution to achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, and we resolve to promote gender equality and eliminate pervasive gender discrimination by: (a) Eliminating gender inequalities in primary and secondary education by the earliest possible date and at all educational levels by 2015; (b) Guaranteeing the free and equal right of women to own and inherit property and ensuring secure tenure of property and housing by women; (c)

Ensuring equal access to reproductive health;

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(d) Promoting women’s equal access to labour markets, sustainable employment and adequate labour protection; (e) Ensuring equal access of women to productive assets and resources, including land, credit and technology; (f) Eliminating all forms of discrimination and violence against women and the girl child, including by ending impunity and by ensuring the protection of civilians, in particular women and the girl child, during and after armed conflicts in accordance with the obligations of States under international humanitarian law and international human rights law; (g) Promoting increased representation of women in Government decision-making bodies, including through ensuring their equal opportunity to participate fully in the political process. 59. We recognize the importance of gender mainstreaming as a tool for achieving gender equality. To that end, we undertake to actively promote the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres, and further undertake to strengthen the capabilities of the United Nations system in the area of gender.

Science and technology for development 60. We recognize that science and technology, including information and communication technology, are vital for the achievement of the development goals and that international support can help developing countries to benefit from technological advancements and enhance their productive capacity. We therefore commit ourselves to: (a) Strengthening and enhancing existing mechanisms and supporting initiatives for research and development, including through voluntary partnerships between the public and private sectors, to address the special needs of developing countries in the areas of health, agriculture, conservation, sustainable use of natural resources and environmental management, energy, forestry and the impact of climate change; (b) Promoting and facilitating, as appropriate, access to and the development, transfer and diffusion of technologies, including environmentally sound technologies and corresponding know-how, to developing countries; (c) Assisting developing countries in their efforts to promote and develop national strategies for human resources and science and technology, which are primary drivers of national capacity-building for development; (d) Promoting and supporting greater efforts to develop renewable sources of energy, such as solar, wind and geothermal;

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(e) Implementing policies at the national and international levels to attract both public and private investment, domestic and foreign, that enhances knowledge, transfers technology on mutually agreed terms and raises productivity; (f) Supporting the efforts of developing countries, individually and collectively, to harness new agricultural technologies in order to increase agricultural productivity through environmentally sustainable means; (g) Building a people-centred and inclusive information society so as to enhance digital opportunities for all people in order to help bridge the digital divide, putting the potential of information and communication technologies at the service of development and addressing new challenges of the information society by implementing the outcomes of the Geneva phase of the World Summit on the Information Society and ensuring the success of the second phase of the Summit, to be held in Tunis in November 2005; in this regard, we welcome the establishment of the Digital Solidarity Fund and encourage voluntary contribution to its financing.

Migration and development 61. We acknowledge the important nexus between international migration and development and the need to deal with the challenges and opportunities that migration presents to countries of origin, destination and transit. We recognize that international migration brings benefits as well as challenges to the global community. We look forward to the high-level dialogue of the General Assembly on international migration and development to be held in 2006, which will offer an opportunity to discuss the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximize their development benefits and minimize their negative impacts. 62. We reaffirm our resolve to take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and members of their families. 63. We reaffirm the need to adopt policies and undertake measures to reduce the cost of transferring migrant remittances to developing countries and welcome efforts by Governments and stakeholders in this regard.

Countries with special needs 64. We reaffirm our commitment to address the special needs of the least developed countries and urge all countries and all relevant organizations of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, to make concerted efforts and adopt speedy measures for meeting in a timely manner the goals and targets of the Brussels Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010. 65. We recognize the special needs of and challenges faced by landlocked developing countries and therefore reaffirm our commitment to urgently address those needs and challenges through the full, timely and effective implementation of the Almaty Programme

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of Action and the São Paulo Consensus adopted at the eleventh session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. We encourage the work undertaken by United Nations regional commissions and organizations towards establishing a time-cost methodology for indicators to measure the progress in implementation of the Almaty Programme of Action. We also recognize the special difficulties and concerns of landlocked developing countries in their efforts to integrate their economies into the multilateral trading system. In this regard, priority should be given to the full and timely implementation of the Almaty Declaration and the Almaty Programme of Action: Addressing the Special Needs of Landlocked Developing Countries within a New Global Framework for Transit Transport Cooperation for Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries. 66. We recognize the special needs and vulnerabilities of small island developing States and reaffirm our commitment to take urgent and concrete action to address those needs and vulnerabilities through the full and effective implementation of the Mauritius Strategy adopted by the International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, the Barbados Programme of Action and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly. We further undertake to promote greater international cooperation and partnership for the implementation of the Mauritius Strategy through, inter alia, the mobilization of domestic and international resources, the promotion of international trade as an engine for development and increased international financial and technical cooperation. 67. We emphasize the need for continued, coordinated and effective international support for achieving the development goals in countries emerging from conflict and in those recovering from natural disasters.

Meeting the special needs of Africa 68. We welcome the substantial progress made by the African countries in fulfilling their commitments and emphasize the need to carry forward the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development to promote sustainable growth and development and deepen democracy, human rights, good governance and sound economic management and gender equality and encourage African countries, with the participation of civil society and the private sector, to continue their efforts in this regard by developing and strengthening institutions for governance and the development of the region, and also welcome the recent decisions taken by Africa’s partners, including the Group of Eight and the European Union, in support of Africa’s development efforts, including commitments that will lead to an increase in official development assistance to Africa of $25 billion per year by 2010. We reaffirm our commitment to address the special needs of Africa, which is the only continent not on track to meet any of the goals of the Millennium Declaration by 2015, to enable it to enter the mainstream of the world economy, and resolve: (a) To strengthen cooperation with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development by providing coherent support for the programmes drawn up by African leaders within that framework, including by mobilizing internal and external financial resources and facilitating approval of such programmes by the multilateral financial institutions;

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(b) To support the African commitment to ensure that by 2015 all children have access to complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality, as well as to basic health care; (c) To support the building of an international infrastructure consortium involving the African Union, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development as the main framework, to facilitate public and private infrastructure investment in Africa; (d) To promote a comprehensive and durable solution to the external debt problems of African countries, including through the cancellation of 100 per cent of multilateral debt consistent with the recent Group of Eight proposal for the heavily indebted poor countries, and, on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate, significant debt relief, including, inter alia, cancellation or restructuring for heavily indebted African countries not part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative that have unsustainable debt burdens; (e) To make efforts to fully integrate African countries in the international trading system, including through targeted trade capacity-building programmes; (f) To support the efforts of commodity-dependent African countries to restructure, diversify and strengthen the competitiveness of their commodity sectors and decide to work towards market-based arrangements with the participation of the private sector for commodity price-risk management; (g) To supplement the efforts of African countries, individually and collectively, to increase agricultural productivity, in a sustainable way, as set out in the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development as part of an African “Green Revolution”; (h) To encourage and support the initiatives of the African Union and subregional organizations to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts with the assistance of the United Nations, and in this regard welcomes the proposals from the Group of Eight countries to provide support for African peacekeeping; (i) To provide, with the aim of an AIDS-, malaria- and tuberculosis-free generation in Africa, assistance for prevention and care and to come as close as possible to achieving the goal of universal access by 2010 to HIV/AIDS treatment in African countries, to encourage pharmaceutical companies to make drugs, including antiretroviral drugs, affordable and accessible in Africa and to ensure increased bilateral and multilateral assistance, where possible on a grant basis, to combat malaria, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases in Africa through the strengthening of health systems.

III. PEACE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY 69. We recognize that we are facing a whole range of threats that require our urgent, collective and more determined response.

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70. We also recognize that, in accordance with the Charter, addressing such threats requires cooperation among all the principal organs of the United Nations within their respective mandates. 71. We acknowledge that we are living in an interdependent and global world and that many of today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are interlinked and must be tackled at the global, regional and national levels in accordance with the Charter and international law. 72. We therefore reaffirm our commitment to work towards a security consensus based on the recognition that many threats are interlinked, that development, peace, security and human rights are mutually reinforcing, that no State can best protect itself by acting entirely alone and that all States need an effective and efficient collective security system pursuant to the purposes and principles of the Charter.

Pacific settlement of disputes 73. We emphasize the obligation of States to settle their disputes by peaceful means in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, including, when appropriate, by the use of the International Court of Justice. All States should act in accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter. 74. We stress the importance of prevention of armed conflict in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and solemnly renew our commitment to promote a culture of prevention of armed conflict as a means of effectively addressing the interconnected security and development challenges faced by peoples throughout the world, as well as to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for the prevention of armed conflict. 75. We further stress the importance of a coherent and integrated approach to the prevention of armed conflicts and the settlement of disputes and the need for the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the SecretaryGeneral to coordinate their activities within their respective Charter mandates. 76. Recognizing the important role of the good offices of the Secretary-General, including in the mediation of disputes, we support the Secretary-General’s efforts to strengthen his capacity in this area.

Use of force under the Charter 77. We reiterate the obligation of all Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. We reaffirm that one of the purposes and principles guiding the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace, and to that end we

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are determined to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace. 78. We reiterate the importance of promoting and strengthening the multilateral process and of addressing international challenges and problems by strictly abiding by the Charter and the principles of international law, and further stress our commitment to multilateralism. 79. We reaffirm that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace and security. We further reaffirm the authority of the Security Council to mandate coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security. We stress the importance of acting in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. 80. We also reaffirm that the Security Council has primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security. We also note the role of the General Assembly relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.

Terrorism 81. We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. 82. We welcome the Secretary-General’s identification of elements of a counterterrorism strategy. These elements should be developed by the General Assembly without delay with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the national, regional and international levels, to counter terrorism, which also takes into account the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. In this context, we commend the various initiatives to promote dialogue, tolerance and understanding among civilizations. 83. We stress the need to make every effort to reach an agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. 84. We acknowledge that the question of convening a high-level conference under the auspices of the United Nations to formulate an international response to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations could be considered. 85. We recognize that international cooperation to fight terrorism must be conducted in conformity with international law, including the Charter and relevant international conventions and protocols. States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism

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comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. 86. We reiterate our call upon States to refrain from organizing, financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting terrorist activities and to take appropriate measures to ensure that their territories are not used for such activities. 87. We acknowledge the important role played by the United Nations in combating terrorism and also stress the vital contribution of regional and bilateral cooperation, particularly at the practical level of law enforcement cooperation and technical exchange. 88. We urge the international community, including the United Nations, to assist States in building national and regional capacity to combat terrorism. We invite the SecretaryGeneral to submit proposals to the General Assembly and the Security Council, within their respective mandates, to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and to enhance the coordination of United Nations activities in this regard. 89. We stress the importance of assisting victims of terrorism and of providing them and their families with support to cope with their loss and their grief. 90. We encourage the Security Council to consider ways to strengthen its monitoring and enforcement role in counter-terrorism, including by consolidating State reporting requirements, taking into account and respecting the different mandates of its counterterrorism subsidiary bodies. We are committed to cooperating fully with the three competent subsidiary bodies in the fulfilment of their tasks, recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing relevant Security Council resolutions. 91. We support efforts for the early entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and strongly encourage States to consider becoming parties to it expeditiously and acceding without delay to the twelve other international conventions and protocols against terrorism and implementing them.

Peacekeeping 92. Recognizing that United Nations peacekeeping plays a vital role in helping parties to conflict end hostilities and commending the contribution of United Nations peacekeepers in that regard, noting improvements made in recent years in United Nations peacekeeping, including the deployment of integrated missions in complex situations, and stressing the need to mount operations with adequate capacity to counter hostilities and fulfil effectively their mandates, we urge further development of proposals for enhanced rapidly deployable capacities to reinforce peacekeeping operations in crises. We endorse the creation of an initial operating capability for a standing police capacity to provide coherent, effective and responsive start-up capability for the policing component of the United Nations peacekeeping missions and to assist existing missions through the provision of advice and expertise.

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93. Recognizing the important contribution to peace and security by regional organizations as provided for under Chapter VIII of the Charter and the importance of forging predictable partnerships and arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations, and noting in particular, given the special needs of Africa, the importance of a strong African Union: (a) We support the efforts of the European Union and other regional entities to develop capacities such as for rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangements; (b) We support the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-building with the African Union. 94. We support implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. 95. We urge States parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to fully implement their respective obligations. We call upon States in a position to do so to provide greater technical assistance to mine-affected States. 96. We underscore the importance of the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s adviser on sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping personnel, and urge that those measures adopted in the relevant General Assembly resolutions based upon the recommendations mentioned above be fully implemented without delay.

Peacebuilding 97. Emphasizing the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to postconflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace, recognizing the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development, and recognizing the vital role of the United Nations in that regard, we decide to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body. 98. The main purpose of the Peacebuilding Commission is to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for postconflict peacebuilding and recovery. The Commission should focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development. In addition, it should provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery. The Commission should act in all matters on the basis of consensus of its members.

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99. The Peacebuilding Commission should make the outcome of its discussions and recommendations publicly available as United Nations documents to all relevant bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions. The Peacebuilding Commission should submit an annual report to the General Assembly. 100. The Peacebuilding Commission should meet in various configurations. Countryspecific meetings of the Commission, upon invitation of the Organizational Committee referred to in paragraph 101 below, should include as members, in addition to members of the Organizational Committee, representatives from: (a)

The country under consideration;

(b) Countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue, as well as relevant regional and subregional organizations; (c) The major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort; (d) The senior United Nations representative in the field and other relevant United Nations representatives; (e)

Such regional and international financial institutions as may be relevant.

101. The Peacebuilding Commission should have a standing Organizational Committee, responsible for developing its procedures and organizational matters, comprising: (a)

Members of the Security Council, including permanent members;

(b) Members of the Economic and Social Council, elected from regional groups, giving due consideration to those countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery; (c) Top providers of assessed contributions to the United Nations budgets and voluntary contributions to the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, including the standing Peacebuilding Fund, that are not among those selected in (a) or (b) above. (d) Top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions that are not among those selected in (a), (b) or (c) above. 102. Representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors should be invited to participate in all meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission in a manner suitable to their governing arrangements, in addition to a representative of the Secretary-General. 103. We request the Secretary-General to establish a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions and taking due account of existing instruments. The objectives of the Peacebuilding Fund will include ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery.

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104. We also request the Secretary-General to establish, within the Secretariat and from within existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission. The office should draw on the best expertise available. 105. The Peacebuilding 31 December 2005.

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Sanctions 106. We underscore that sanctions remain an important tool under the Charter in our efforts to maintain international peace and security without recourse to the use of force, and resolve to ensure that sanctions are carefully targeted in support of clear objectives, to comply with sanctions established by the Security Council and to ensure that sanctions are implemented in ways that balance effectiveness to achieve the desired results against the possible adverse consequences, including socio-economic and humanitarian consequences, for populations and third States. 107. Sanctions should be implemented and monitored effectively with clear benchmarks and should be periodically reviewed, as appropriate, and remain for as limited a period as necessary to achieve the objectives of the sanctions and should be terminated once their objectives have been achieved. 108. We call upon the Security Council, with the support of the Secretary-General, to improve its monitoring of the implementation and effects of sanctions, to ensure that sanctions are implemented in an accountable manner, to review regularly the results of such monitoring and to develop a mechanism to address special economic problems arising from the application of sanctions in accordance with the Charter. 109. We also call upon the Security Council, with the support of the Secretary-General, to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions. 110. We support efforts through the United Nations to strengthen State capacity to implement sanctions provisions.

Transnational crime 111. We express our grave concern at the negative effects on development, peace and security and human rights posed by transnational crime, including the smuggling of and trafficking in human beings, the world narcotic drug problem and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and at the increasing vulnerability of States to such crime. We reaffirm the need to work collectively to combat transnational crime. 112. We recognize that trafficking in persons continues to pose a serious challenge to humanity and requires a concerted international response. To that end, we urge all States to devise, enforce and strengthen effective measures to combat and eliminate all forms of

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trafficking in persons to counter the demand for trafficked victims and to protect the victims. 113. We urge all States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the relevant international conventions on organized crime and corruption and, following their entry into force, for them to implement them effectively, including by incorporating the provisions of those conventions into national legislation and by strengthening criminal justice systems. 114. We reaffirm our unwavering determination and commitment to overcome the world narcotic drug problem through international cooperation and national strategies to eliminate both the illicit supply of and demand for illicit drugs. 115. We resolve to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, within its existing mandates, to provide assistance to Member States in those tasks upon request.

Women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts 116. We stress the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding. We reaffirm our commitment to the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security. We also underline the importance of integrating a gender perspective and of women having the opportunity for equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security, as well as the need to increase their role in decision-making at all levels. We strongly condemn all violations of the human rights of women and girls in situations of armed conflict and the use of sexual exploitation, violence and abuse, and we commit ourselves to elaborating and implementing strategies to report on, prevent and punish gender-based violence.

Protecting children in situations of armed conflicts 117. We reaffirm our commitment to promote and protect the rights and welfare of children in armed conflicts. We welcome the significant advances and innovations that have been achieved over the past several years. We welcome in particular the adoption of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). We call upon States to consider ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. We also call upon States to take effective measures, as appropriate, to prevent the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, contrary to international law, by armed forces and groups, and to prohibit and criminalize such practices. 118. We therefore call upon all States concerned to take concrete measures to ensure accountability and compliance by those responsible for grave abuses against children. We also reaffirm our commitment to ensure that children in armed conflicts receive timely and effective humanitarian assistance, including education, for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

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472 IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW

119. We recommit ourselves to actively protecting and promoting all human rights, the rule of law and democracy and recognize that they are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations, and call upon all parts of the United Nations to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their mandates. 120. We reaffirm the solemn commitment of our States to fulfil their obligations to promote universal respect for and the observance and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments relating to human rights and international law. The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question.

Human rights 121. We reaffirm that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing and that all human rights must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, all States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, have the duty to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 122. We emphasize the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the Charter, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language or religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 123. We resolve further to strengthen the United Nations human rights machinery with the aim of ensuring effective enjoyment by all of all human rights and civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development. 124. We resolve to strengthen the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, taking note of the High Commissioner’s plan of action, to enable it to effectively carry out its mandate to respond to the broad range of human rights challenges facing the international community, particularly in the areas of technical assistance and capacity-building, through the doubling of its regular budget resources over the next five years with a view to progressively setting a balance between regular budget and voluntary contributions to its resources, keeping in mind other priority programmes for developing countries and the recruitment of highly competent staff on a broad geographical basis and with gender balance, under the regular budget, and we support its closer cooperation with all relevant United Nations bodies, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council. 125. We resolve to improve the effectiveness of the human rights treaty bodies, including through more timely reporting, improved and streamlined reporting procedures and

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technical assistance to States to enhance their reporting capacities and further enhance the implementation of their recommendations. 126. We resolve to integrate the promotion and protection of human rights into national policies and to support the further mainstreaming of human rights throughout the United Nations system, as well as closer cooperation between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and all relevant United Nations bodies. 127. We reaffirm our commitment to continue making progress in the advancement of the human rights of the world’s indigenous peoples at the local, national, regional and international levels, including through consultation and collaboration with them, and to present for adoption a final draft United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples as soon as possible. 128. We recognize the need to pay special attention to the human rights of women and children and undertake to advance them in every possible way, including by bringing gender and child-protection perspectives into the human rights agenda. 129. We recognize the need for persons with disabilities to be guaranteed full enjoyment of their rights without discrimination. We also affirm the need to finalize a comprehensive draft convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. 130. We note that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to political and social stability and peace and enrich the cultural diversity and heritage of society. 131. We support the promotion of human rights education and learning at all levels, including through the implementation of the World Programme for Human Rights Education, as appropriate, and encourage all States to develop initiatives in this regard.

Internally displaced persons 132. We recognize the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons and resolve to take effective measures to increase the protection of internally displaced persons.

Refugee protection and assistance 133. We commit ourselves to safeguarding the principle of refugee protection and to upholding our responsibility in resolving the plight of refugees, including through the support of efforts aimed at addressing the causes of refugee movement, bringing about the safe and sustainable return of those populations, finding durable solutions for refugees in protracted situations and preventing refugee movement from becoming a source of tension among States. We reaffirm the principle of solidarity and burden-sharing and resolve to support nations in assisting refugee populations and their host communities.

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474 Rule of law

134. Recognizing the need for universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international levels, we: (a) Reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law and to an international order based on the rule of law and international law, which is essential for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among States; (b) Support the annual treaty event; (c) Encourage States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to all treaties that relate to the protection of civilians; (d) Call upon States to continue their efforts to eradicate policies and practices that discriminate against women and to adopt laws and promote practices that protect the rights of women and promote gender equality; (e) Support the idea of establishing a rule of law assistance unit within the Secretariat, in accordance with existing relevant procedures, subject to a report by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, so as to strengthen United Nations activities to promote the rule of law, including through technical assistance and capacity-building; (f) Recognize the important role of the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, in adjudicating disputes among States and the value of its work, call upon States that have not yet done so to consider accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with its Statute and consider means of strengthening the Court’s work, including by supporting the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of Justice on a voluntary basis.

Democracy 135. We reaffirm that democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. We also reaffirm that while democracies share common features, there is no single model of democracy, that it does not belong to any country or region, and reaffirm the necessity of due respect for sovereignty and the right of self-determination. We stress that democracy, development and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 136. We renew our commitment to support democracy by strengthening countries’ capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy and resolve to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to assist Member States upon their request. We welcome the establishment of a Democracy Fund at the United Nations. We note that the advisory board to be established should reflect diverse geographical representation. We invite the Secretary-General to help ensure that practical arrangements for the Democracy Fund take proper account of existing United Nations activity in this field.

Summit Outcome

475

137. We invite interested Member States to give serious consideration to contributing to the Fund.

Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.

Children’s rights 141. We express dismay at the increasing number of children involved in and affected by armed conflict, as well as all other forms of violence, including domestic violence, sexual abuse and exploitation and trafficking. We support cooperation policies aimed at strengthening national capacities to improve the situation of those children and to assist in their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. 142. We commit ourselves to respecting and ensuring the rights of each child without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status of the child or his or her parent(s) or legal guardian(s). We call upon States to consider as a priority becoming a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Summit Outcome

476 Human security

143. We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.

Culture of peace and initiatives on dialogue among cultures, civilizations and religions 144. We reaffirm the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace as well as the Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations and its Programme of Action adopted by the General Assembly and the value of different initiatives on dialogue among cultures and civilizations, including the dialogue on interfaith cooperation. We commit ourselves to taking action to promote a culture of peace and dialogue at the local, national, regional and international levels and request the Secretary-General to explore enhancing implementation mechanisms and to follow up on those initiatives. In this regard, we also welcome the Alliance of Civilizations initiative announced by the Secretary-General on 14 July 2005. 145. We underline that sports can foster peace and development and can contribute to an atmosphere of tolerance and understanding, and we encourage discussions in the General Assembly for proposals leading to a plan of action on sport and development.

V. STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS 146. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen the United Nations with a view to enhancing its authority and efficiency, as well as its capacity to address effectively, and in accordance with the purposes and principles of its Charter, the full range of challenges of our time. We are determined to reinvigorate the intergovernmental organs of the United Nations and to adapt them to the needs of the twenty-first century. 147. We stress that, in order to efficiently perform their respective mandates as provided under the Charter, United Nations bodies should develop good cooperation and coordination in the common endeavour of building a more effective United Nations. 148. We emphasize the need to provide the United Nations with adequate and timely resources with a view to enabling it to carry out its mandates. A reformed United Nations must be responsive to the entire membership, faithful to its founding principles and adapted to carrying out its mandate.

Summit Outcome

477 General Assembly

149. We reaffirm the central position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations, as well as the role of the Assembly in the process of standard-setting and the codification of international law. 150. We welcome the measures adopted by the General Assembly with a view to strengthening its role and authority and the role and leadership of the President of the Assembly and, to that end, we call for their full and speedy implementation. 151. We call for strengthening the relationship between the General Assembly and the other principal organs to ensure better coordination on topical issues that require coordinated action by the United Nations, in accordance with their respective mandates.

Security Council 152. We reaffirm that Member States have conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, acting on their behalf, as provided for by the Charter of the United Nations. 153. We support early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions. We commit ourselves to continuing our efforts to achieve a decision to this end and request the General Assembly to review progress on the reform set out above by the end of 2005. 154. We recommend that the Security Council continue to adapt its working methods so as to increase the involvement of States not members of the Council in its work, as appropriate, enhance its accountability to the membership and increase the transparency of its work.

Economic and Social Council 155. We reaffirm the role that the Charter and the General Assembly have vested in the Economic and Social Council and recognize the need for a more effective Economic and Social Council as a principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on issues of economic and social development, as well as for implementation of the international development goals agreed at the major United Nations summits and conferences, including the Millennium Development Goals. To achieve these objectives, the Council should: (a) Promote global dialogue and partnership on global policies and trends in the economic, social, environmental and humanitarian fields. For this purpose, the Council should serve as a quality platform for high-level engagement among Member States and with the international financial institutions, the private sector and civil society on emerging

Summit Outcome

478

global trends, policies and action and develop its ability to respond better and more rapidly to developments in the international economic, environmental and social fields; (b) Hold a biennial high-level Development Cooperation Forum to review trends in international development cooperation, including strategies, policies and financing, promote greater coherence among the development activities of different development partners and strengthen the links between the normative and operational work of the United Nations; (c) Ensure follow-up of the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits, including the internationally agreed development goals, and hold annual ministerial-level substantive reviews to assess progress, drawing on its functional and regional commissions and other international institutions, in accordance with their respective mandates; (d) Support and complement international efforts aimed at addressing humanitarian emergencies, including natural disasters, in order to promote an improved, coordinated response from the United Nations; (e) Play a major role in the overall coordination of funds, programmes and agencies, ensuring coherence among them and avoiding duplication of mandates and activities. 156. We stress that in order to fully perform the above functions, the organization of work, the agenda and the current methods of work of the Economic and Social Council should be adapted.

Human Rights Council 157. Pursuant to our commitment to further strengthen the United Nations human rights machinery, we resolve to create a Human Rights Council. 158. The Council will be responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal manner. 159. The Council should address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, and make recommendations thereon. It should also promote effective coordination and the mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system. 160. We request the President of the General Assembly to conduct open, transparent and inclusive negotiations, to be completed as soon as possible during the sixtieth session, with the aim of establishing the mandate, modalities, functions, size, composition, membership, working methods and procedures of the Council.

Summit Outcome

479 Secretariat and management reform

161. We recognize that in order to effectively comply with the principles and objectives of the Charter, we need an efficient, effective and accountable Secretariat. Its staff shall act in accordance with Article 100 of the Charter, in a culture of organizational accountability, transparency and integrity. Consequently we: (a) Recognize the ongoing reform measures carried out by the Secretary-General to strengthen accountability and oversight, improve management performance and transparency and reinforce ethical conduct, and invite him to report to the General Assembly on the progress made in their implementation; (b) Emphasize the importance of establishing effective and efficient mechanisms for responsibility and accountability of the Secretariat; (c) Urge the Secretary-General to ensure that the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity shall be the paramount consideration in the employment of the staff, with due regard to the principle of equitable geographical distribution, in accordance with Article 101 of the Charter; (d) Welcome the Secretary-General’s efforts to ensure ethical conduct, more extensive financial disclosure for United Nations officials and enhanced protection for those who reveal wrongdoing within the Organization. We urge the Secretary-General to scrupulously apply the existing standards of conduct and develop a system-wide code of ethics for all United Nations personnel. In this regard, we request the Secretary-General to submit details on an ethics office with independent status, which he intends to create, to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session; (e) Pledge to provide the United Nations with adequate resources, on a timely basis, to enable the Organization to implement its mandates and achieve its objectives, having regard to the priorities agreed by the General Assembly and the need to respect budget discipline. We stress that all Member States should meet their obligations with regard to the expenses of the Organization; (f) Strongly urge the Secretary-General to make the best and most efficient use of resources in accordance with clear rules and procedures agreed by the General Assembly, in the interest of all Member States, by adopting the best management practices, including effective use of information and communication technologies, with a view to increasing efficiency and enhancing organizational capacity, concentrating on those tasks that reflect the agreed priorities of the Organization. 162. We reaffirm the role of the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, in accordance with Article 97 of the Charter. We request the SecretaryGeneral to make proposals to the General Assembly for its consideration on the conditions and measures necessary for him to carry out his managerial responsibilities effectively. 163. We commend the Secretary-General’s previous and ongoing efforts to enhance the effective management of the United Nations and his commitment to update the Organization. Bearing in mind our responsibility as Member States, we emphasize the

480

Summit Outcome

need to decide on additional reforms in order to make more efficient use of the financial and human resources available to the Organization and thus better comply with its principles, objectives and mandates. We call on the Secretary-General to submit proposals for implementing management reforms to the General Assembly for consideration and decision in the first quarter of 2006, which will include the following elements: (a) We will ensure that the United Nations budgetary, financial and human resource policies, regulations and rules respond to the current needs of the Organization and enable the efficient and effective conduct of its work, and request the Secretary-General to provide an assessment and recommendations to the General Assembly for decision during the first quarter of 2006. The assessment and recommendations of the Secretary-General should take account of the measures already under way for the reform of human resources management and the budget process; (b) We resolve to strengthen and update the programme of work of the United Nations so that it responds to the contemporary requirements of Member States. To this end, the General Assembly and other relevant organs will review all mandates older than five years originating from resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs, which would be complementary to the existing periodic reviews of activities. The General Assembly and the other organs should complete and take the necessary decisions arising from this review during 2006. We request the Secretary-General to facilitate this review with analysis and recommendations, including on the opportunities for programmatic shifts that could be considered for early General Assembly consideration; (c) A detailed proposal on the framework for a one-time staff buyout to improve personnel structure and quality, including an indication of costs involved and mechanisms to ensure that it achieves its intended purpose. 164. We recognize the urgent need to substantially improve the United Nations oversight and management processes. We emphasize the importance of ensuring the operational independence of the Office of Internal Oversight Services. Therefore: (a) The expertise, capacity and resources of the Office of Internal Oversight Services in respect of audit and investigations will be significantly strengthened as a matter of urgency; (b) We request the Secretary-General to submit an independent external evaluation of the United Nations, including the specialized agencies’, auditing and oversight system, including the roles and responsibilities of management, with due regard to the nature of the auditing and oversight bodies in question. This evaluation will take place within the context of the comprehensive review of the governance arrangements. We ask the General Assembly to adopt measures during its sixtieth session at the earliest possible stage, based on the consideration of recommendations of the evaluation and those made by the Secretary-General; (c) We recognize that additional measures are needed to enhance the independence of the oversight structures. We therefore request the Secretary-General to submit detailed proposals to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session for its early consideration on the

Summit Outcome

481

creation of an independent oversight advisory committee, including its mandate, composition, selection process and qualification of experts; (d) We authorize the Office of Internal Oversight Services to examine the feasibility of expanding its services to provide internal oversight to United Nations agencies that request such services in such a way as to ensure that the provision of internal oversight services to the Secretariat will not be compromised. 165. We insist on the highest standards of behaviour from all United Nations personnel and support the considerable efforts under way with respect to the implementation of the Secretary-General’s policy of zero tolerance regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations personnel, both at Headquarters and in the field. We encourage the Secretary-General to submit proposals to the General Assembly leading to a comprehensive approach to victims’ assistance by 31 December 2005. 166. We encourage the Secretary-General and all decision-making bodies to take further steps in mainstreaming a gender perspective in the policies and decisions of the Organization. 167. We strongly condemn all attacks against the safety and security of personnel engaged in United Nations activities. We call upon States to consider becoming parties to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and stress the need to conclude negotiations on a protocol expanding the scope of legal protection during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly.

System-wide coherence 168. We recognize that the United Nations brings together a unique wealth of expertise and resources on global issues. We commend the extensive experience and expertise of the various development-related organizations, agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system in their diverse and complementary fields of activity and their important contributions to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the other development objectives established by various United Nations conferences. 169. We support stronger system-wide coherence by implementing the following measures:

Policy x Strengthening linkages between the normative work of the United Nations system and its operational activities x Coordinating our representation on the governing boards of the various development and humanitarian agencies so as to ensure that they pursue a coherent policy in assigning mandates and allocating resources throughout the system

Summit Outcome

482

x Ensuring that the main horizontal policy themes, such as sustainable development, human rights and gender, are taken into account in decision-making throughout the United Nations

Operational activities x Implementing current reforms aimed at a more effective, efficient, coherent, coordinated and better-performing United Nations country presence with a strengthened role for the senior resident official, whether special representative, resident coordinator or humanitarian coordinator, including appropriate authority, resources and accountability, and a common management, programming and monitoring framework x Inviting the Secretary-General to launch work to further strengthen the management and coordination of United Nations operational activities so that they can make an even more effective contribution to the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, including proposals for consideration of Member States for more tightly managed entities in the field of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment

Humanitarian assistance x Upholding and respecting the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and ensuring that humanitarian actors have safe and unhindered access to populations in need in conformity with the relevant provisions of international law and national laws x Supporting the efforts of countries, in particular developing countries, to strengthen their capacities at all levels in order to prepare for and respond rapidly to natural disasters and mitigate their impact x Strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations humanitarian response, inter alia, by improving the timeliness and predictability of humanitarian funding, in part by improving the Central Emergency Revolving Fund x Further developing and improving, as required, mechanisms for the use of emergency standby capacities, under the auspices of the United Nations, for a timely response to humanitarian emergencies

Environmental activities x Recognizing the need for more efficient environmental activities in the United Nations system, with enhanced coordination, improved policy advice and guidance, strengthened scientific knowledge, assessment and cooperation, better treaty compliance, while respecting the legal autonomy of the treaties, and better integration of environmental activities in the broader sustainable development framework at the operational level,

Summit Outcome

483

including through capacity-building, we agree to explore the possibility of a more coherent institutional framework to address this need, including a more integrated structure, building on existing institutions and internationally agreed instruments, as well as the treaty bodies and the specialized agencies

Regional organizations 170. We support a stronger relationship between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter, and therefore resolve: (a) To expand consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations through formalized agreements between the respective secretariats and, as appropriate, involvement of regional organizations in the work of the Security Council; (b) To ensure that regional organizations that have a capacity for the prevention of armed conflict or peacekeeping consider the option of placing such capacity in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System; (c)

To strengthen cooperation in the areas of economic, social and cultural fields.

Cooperation between the United Nations and parliaments 171. We call for strengthened cooperation between the United Nations and national and regional parliaments, in particular through the Inter-Parliamentary Union, with a view to furthering all aspects of the Millennium Declaration in all fields of the work of the United Nations and ensuring the effective implementation of United Nations reform.

Participation of local authorities, the private sector and civil society, including nongovernmental organizations 172. We welcome the positive contributions of the private sector and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in the promotion and implementation of development and human rights programmes and stress the importance of their continued engagement with Governments, the United Nations and other international organizations in these key areas. 173. We underline the important role of local authorities in contributing to the achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. 174. We encourage responsible business practices, such as those promoted by the Global Compact.

Summit Outcome

484

175. We welcome the dialogue between those organizations and Member States, as reflected in the first informal interactive hearings of the General Assembly with representatives of non-governmental organizations, civil society and the private sector.

Charter of the United Nations 176. Considering that the Trusteeship Council no longer meets and has no remaining functions, we should delete Chapter XIII of the Charter and references to the Council in Chapter XII. 177. Taking into account General Assembly resolution 50/52 and recalling the related discussions conducted in the General Assembly, bearing in mind the profound cause for the founding of the United Nations and looking to our common future, we resolve to delete references to “enemy States” in Articles 53, 77 and 107 of the Charter. 178. We request the Security Council to consider the composition, mandate and working methods of the Military Staff Committee.

Investing in the United Nations

485

II.6 INVESTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS: FOR A STRONGER ORGANIZATION WORLDWIDE Secretary-General, United Nations, 7 March 2006 1

CONTENTS Chapter

Paragraphs Page

INTRODUCTION .........................................................................

1-19

487

Box 1. Ensuring ethics and accountability.........................................................

492

I.

INVESTING IN PEOPLE .............................................................

20-31

493

II.

INVESTING IN LEADERSHIP ...................................................

32-46

498

III.

INVESTING IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY ............................................................................

47-569

501

INVESTING IN NEW WAYS OF DELIVERING SERVICES ...

57-68

505

A.

New sourcing options............................................................

57-64

505

B.

Strengthening procurement ...................................................

65-68

507

V.

INVESTING IN BUDGET AND FINANCE................................

69-80

509

VI.

INVESTING IN GOVERNANCE ................................................

81-85

513

IV.

Box 2. Strengthening oversight and audit..........................................................

517

VII. THE WAY FORWARD: INVESTING IN CHANGE ..................

86-92

518

A. Overall resource requirements ...............................................

86-87

518

1

United Nations documentation: A/60/692 of 7 March 2006.


486 Chapter B.

Paragraphs Page Early and visible change .......................................................

VIII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................

88-92

518

93

521

Box 3. Proposals requiring General Assembly action and support....................

520


487 INTRODUCTION

A changing world and a changing United Nations 1. Throughout its history, the United Nations has played a vital role as a meeting place for the discussion of global issues and setting of global standards, and for much of that history the key function of its Secretariat and staff, working mainly at Headquarters, has been to service those conferences and meetings. Much of this work has been, and is, important and substantive. The global norms set during this period have changed the world profoundly. 2. But the global political and social environment of today is very different, and our Organization reflects that. In the last 20 years, it has lived through a dramatic expansion of operations, budgets and functions. The United Nations today carries out complex operations and directly delivers critical services around the world. In so doing, it works with a wide range of partners — including national Governments, regional organizations, civil society groups, philanthropic foundations and private-sector companies — on an equally wide range of activities, from peacekeeping and peacebuilding to the struggle against poverty and HIV/AIDS and the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals. 3. Peacekeeping, it is true, dates back to the early days of the cold war. But the typical peacekeeping operation of that time involved a simple interposition of soldiers between the armed forces of warring States to monitor the observance of a ceasefire. And in the first 44 years of the history of the United Nations, only 18 peacekeeping missions were set up. 4. In the 16 years since 1990, 42 new missions have been authorized (see figure 1). Yet today’s peacekeeping is a far more complex matter. It usually involves restoring institutions, organizing elections and training the police; and it includes many other tasks needed to turn a peace agreement signed by the leaders of armed factions into real security and at least a chance of prosperity for the people of a country ravaged by long years of conflict. In two recent cases — one of them still current — the United Nations has even been required to supply the executive functions of government in the territory concerned. 5. Even though independent studies show that the United Nations performs these tasks at a lower cost than nations working on their own or working in ad hoc coalitions, these new more complex missions require more people to run them. Just in the nine years since I became Secretary-General, the number of personnel —civilians and soldiers — deployed on peacekeeping missions has risen from under 20,000 to over 80,000, driving up the total peacekeeping budget from $1.25 billion to over $5 billion (see figure 2). Indeed, the number of civilian staff employed in peacekeeping missions in the field is now more than double the number of all Secretariat staff employed in New York, while peacekeeping expenditure amounts to more than half of all United Nations spending. 6. By contrast, the regular budget, which is at the heart of so many of the intergovernmental debates about the control and direction of United Nations activities, represents less than 20 per cent of total spending. The remaining share, excluding the criminal tribunals and the capital master plan, consists of extrabudgetary expenditure funded by voluntary contributions (see figure 3) and is devoted mainly to “operational” activities — refugee and humanitarian relief, criminal justice, human rights monitoring and capacity-building, and electoral assistance. In general, these are new activities and complement growing spending by United Nations funds and programmes such as the


488

Figure 1 Significant increase in peacekeeping missions authorized in the last 16 years

UNGOMAP UNIIMOG UNAVEM I UNTAG ONUCA

Figure 2 Rapid growth in peacekeeping budget and personnel

Total mission personnela

total mission personnel peacekeeping budget

Peacekeeping budgetb ($M)

Average no. of personnel per missiona a Average b Annual

of two years’ military and civilian staff in missions, and support account posts at Headquarters. budget reflects July-to-June budget starting in that year; e.g., 1996 budget reflects budget from July 1996 to June 1997.


489

Figure 3 Rapid growth in United Nations budgets over the last 10 years United Nations biennial budgets, 1996-2005 (Millions of United States dollars)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP), which is currently of the order of $10 billion per annum. The United Nations therefore spends almost $20 billion a year overall. The present report addresses only the Secretariat half of that figure. A once-in-a-generation opportunity 7. Such a vastly expanded and altered range of activities calls for a radical overhaul of the United Nations Secretariat — its rules, its structure, and its systems and culture. This has begun to happen in the United Nations funds and programmes but not sufficiently in the Secretariat. Our staff are working all round the world and doing more than ever before, many of them in difficult and dangerous situations and with great idealism and integrity, but our management system does not do justice to them. It lacks the capacity, controls, flexibility, robustness and indeed transparency to handle multi-billion-dollar global operations, which often have to be deployed at great speed. 8. There have been many efforts at reform. I myself have introduced two main sets of reform proposals during my time in office — one in 1997 (see A/51/950) and a second in 2002 (see A/57/387) — as well as the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), issued in 2000, and the report on a strengthened and unified security management system (see A/59/365), issued in 2004. In partnership with Member States, important changes have been made, and I believe the Organization is more efficient and effective than it was 10 years ago.

490


9. But these earlier efforts addressed the symptoms and not the causes of our underlying weaknesses. They were not sufficiently comprehensive and strategic to meet the demands of an era of such rapid change. In several key areas — notably the management of human resources, the basic structures of management itself, the mechanisms of intergovernmental control and perhaps above all the management culture — the operating model has not changed significantly since at least the 1970s. Indeed, systems have continued to weaken as challenges have grown. 10. As a result, the Secretariat has struggled to cope with the changed environment. It has faced many operational problems and a number of crises. Against the odds, a dedicated staff have delivered more every year. The time has now come for fundamental reform, designed explicitly to enable the Secretariat to meet the new operational requirements of the United Nations in the twenty-first century. Just as our iconic Headquarters building, after more than 50 years of ad hoc repair and maintenance, now needs to be fully refurbished from top to bottom, so our Organization, after decades of piecemeal reform, now needs a thorough strategic overhaul, which can only be achieved through a consistent, sustained commitment at all levels of leadership. 11. Member States have clearly understood this. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome (General Assembly resolution 60/1), the Heads of State and Government of all Member States invited the Secretary-General to frame a comprehensive blueprint for change. In paragraph 162 of the Summit Outcome, they requested me to make proposals to the General Assembly, for its consideration, on the conditions and measures necessary for me — and my successors — to carry out my managerial responsibilities effectively. In paragraph 163 of the Summit Outcome, they also called on me to submit proposals for implementing management reforms, aimed particularly at making more efficient use of the Organization’s financial and human resources, for consideration and decision in the first quarter of 2006. Such an opportunity for much-needed change may not soon recur. We must seize it and exploit it to the full. 12. The present report responds to both of these requests and seeks to reinforce other more specific policy reviews already commissioned by the General Assembly. It aims to provide the blueprint for comprehensive management reform that I believe most — indeed all — Member States genuinely wish to see. It contains proposals in seven main areas: people (sect. I), leadership (sect. II), information and communications technology (sect. III), ways of delivering services (sect. IV), budget and finance (sect. V), governance (sect. VI) and the process of change itself (sect. VII). These areas are all interrelated and also relate to the ethical standards of the Secretariat — which with the help of Member States I have already taken steps to reform — and the systems of oversight and internal justice, which are the subject of separate reviews. Failure to carry through reform in any one of these areas can greatly reduce or even nullify the value of reform in all the others. Accordingly, even though they are not the subject of its proposals, I have included in the present report brief summaries of the reforms already enacted or envisaged in the areas of ethics and oversight, as well as an appeal for a far-reaching reform of the internal justice system. In this way I have presented a complete tableau of all the changes that I believe are needed. 13. I recognize that if the General Assembly were to enact all the changes in the rules and regulations that I request, that action alone would not transform our Organization. We have to build a modern, empowered management capacity, which will not be achieved by a vote but by sustained organizational change over time. Indeed, nearly every process in the Organization will need to be revisited as we seek to eliminate redundant steps and engineer


491

more efficient ways of doing things. The present report must be the beginning of a process of change management that will be implemented over the next several years. One of the weaknesses of the old culture is precisely the view that a report or a vote in itself represents change. In practice, reports and votes enable and authorize change, but change itself is the long march that follows. Working together 14. Let me state this clearly: strong management can only work if it responds to strong governance. These reforms are in danger of failing unless there is a trusting relationship, a strategic partnership, between this institution’s governance — the Member States’ intergovernmental mechanisms — and its management, namely myself and my colleagues. 15. Two developments threaten this partnership, and must be resolved. First, many States have cause to feel excluded from any real say in the affairs of the Organization and are driven to assert their influence by using the only means they believe is available to them — that is, by withholding their support from some of the many decisions, particularly on administrative and budgetary matters, for which consensus is required. This puts them at loggerheads with other States who feel, on the contrary, that their financial contribution entitles them to a decisive say on these same issues. This dispute is undermining what should be a common commitment to an effective United Nations. 16. Second, this conflict has broken down the division of labour between myself, as Chief Administrative Officer, and Member States. It has led to intervention in almost every decision about the allocation of financial and human resources. It is vital that we find — or rediscover — a basis for partnership. Effective oversight and ability to set the Organization’s direction must be restored to Member States, while the right of the Secretary-General to manage the affairs of the Organization in a manner that delivers the goals set for him by Member States must be respected. 17. Indeed, if change is to happen, it is vital that the Secretariat and Member States work together to make it happen. The details of all the proposed changes remain to be worked out and they must be worked out in full consultation, including consultation with those to whom they will make the most immediate difference and on whose continued loyalty and dedication their success will most directly depend — namely, the United Nations staff. The process of change must be based on full and clear communication between all stakeholders, leading to well-defined roadmaps and transparent lines of accountability for all the leaders involved. 18. These reforms have been developed in the context of a debate about how the United Nations can achieve savings through reform. Indeed, there are real savings to be made through these proposals, which over time will reduce the costs of many activities by ensuring that they are carried out more simply. But the present report is not a cost-cutting exercise: its primary financial message is that there has been massive underinvestment in people, systems and information technology, and that these deferred expenditures must now be made up for if the United Nations is to operate effectively. To reach the level of effectiveness that our staff, our clients, our Member States and our peoples are entitled to expect, will cost significant amounts of money. 19. My intention is to ensure that all Member States have at their command an Organization that, because it is well organized and transparent, is easy for them to direct


492

and can be relied on to respond quickly and effectively to their instruction. Above all, my intention is to ensure that the United Nations delivers the best possible value to the hundreds of millions of people throughout the world who, through no fault of their own, find themselves in need of its services: those threatened by extreme poverty; by hunger, malnutrition and endemic or epidemic disease; by desertification and other forms of environmental degradation; by natural disasters; by civil conflict, anarchy, violence and transnational organized crime; by terrorism; by oppression and misgovernment; and by genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity. It is these people who are the true stakeholders in an effective and democratically controlled United Nations. Box 1 Ensuring ethics and accountability A key ingredient of any successful Organization is an ethical and accountable culture pervading its staff from top to bottom. For the United Nations, as an Organization founded on the high ideals of its Charter and seeking to set an example in the countries where it works around the world, this is doubly important. Unfortunately, in recent years it has become clear that we have too often fallen short of these high standards. An internal staff survey in 2004 contained disturbing perceptions of management weaknesses. In addition, disclosures ranging from the findings of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme to the absolutely impermissible acts of sexual exploitation by some of our peacekeepers in the field have all too clearly demonstrated the need for a more rigorous, enforceable set of rules and regulations, and tougher sanctions. In response, during the course of 2005 I introduced a number of changes aimed at correcting the situation and giving senior management the tools necessary to ensure that all employees of the Organization adhere to the highest standards. In particular, the United Nations has: •

Established a dedicated Ethics Office, approved by Member States.

• Promulgated strengthened rules to ensure protection against retaliation for those who report misconduct through a new “whistleblower” protection policy. • Put in place more stringent requirements for financial disclosure and declaration of interests, covering broader categories of senior officials and the entire procurement staff. • Established strict guidelines for the acceptance of pro-bono services from private-sector companies. • Implemented a comprehensive set of measures to prevent sexual exploitation in field missions, investigate allegations and hold perpetrators accountable; over the past 14 months, in response to such violations more than 100 individual United Nations staff and peacekeepers have been either dismissed or expelled and a number of entire military units have been repatriated. This package of reform will shortly be supplemented by the enactment of a new code of conduct on post-employment contacts with the Secretariat for business purposes, and by new measures to strengthen our capacity to detect and prevent fraud and corruption.


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I. INVESTING IN PEOPLE Context and challenges 20. The need for a highly qualified, independent and international civil service is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. This is as important today as it was 60 years ago. The quality of our staff determines the success of the Organization, since it cannot succeed unless it attracts and retains the right people to carry out the increasingly complex mandates entrusted to it. 21. During my term in office, I have introduced a number of initiatives to improve the way the Organization manages and develops its human resources, including the definition of organizational core values and competencies and their integration into all human resources systems — recruitment, development and performance appraisal; the introduction of a web-based recruitment system; empowerment of managers to select their own staff; policies to encourage staff mobility; and measures to strengthen the security and safety of staff at all United Nations work locations. 22. All of this is important progress. But we have to acknowledge that our systems have not kept pace with the operational demands being placed on us. The existing human resources management framework was designed for a stable, largely Headquarters-based environment, whereas currently more than half of our 30,000 staff members are serving in the field (see figure 4). The Organization’s increasingly complex mandates require a new skills profile, that will enable it to respond in an integrated way to new needs in areas as diverse as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, electoral assistance, and drugs and crime. It needs to be able to recruit and retain leaders, managers and personnel capable of handling large, complex multidisciplinary operations with increasingly high budgets. Too many staff turn away from the United Nations, frustrated by the lack of a career path across the full range of opportunities in our global Organization. 23. A survey entitled “A Picture of United Nations Staff”, which was published in 2005 and based on 5,320 responses, revealed that two of the most de-motivating aspects of employment with the United Nations are the lack of career and promotions prospects and the frustrations caused by excessive bureaucracy. 24. Most United Nations staff are acutely aware of the employment and administrative problems faced by colleagues and external applicants alike. For example: (a) A qualified Professional applies for a position at the United Nations but is not informed of the outcome for a very long time and decides to accept a job elsewhere. Despite maximum efforts to fill the post rapidly, the thousands of applications received have not been processed quickly enough; (b) A colleague has spent many years serving the Organization in a number of conflict zones and decides that the next posting should allow her to join her family, only to find that her field experience gives her no advantage in applying for a post at a family duty station; (c) A General Service staff member has diligently served the United Nations for many years and during that period has earned the necessary academic qualifications and performance criteria to be employed as a Professional, including doing well in the annual G to P exams, but never manages to get promoted because of the limits on the number of


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posts that can be used. He is advised that resignation from the United Nations and reapplication at the Professional level would increase his chances, but he cannot afford to risk his current income for the sake of a possible future promotion. Figure 4 Staff by type of location

Fast facts Total: 29,125 staff members Headquarters (includes UNOG, UNOV, UNON) 10,340 Regional commissions 2,505 Field locations 16,280

10,340 (36%)

16,280 (55%)

2,505 (9%)

Date: As of 30 November 2005. Population: Includes internationally and locally recruited staff, regardless of length of contract; excludes United Nations staff administered by other organizations.

25. The Organization’s ability to respond to changing requirements is hampered by complex, outmoded and fragmented systems and processes. In particular: (a) The Secretary-General does not have the resources and authority to manage the Organization effectively, as its Chief Administrative Officer, in accordance with Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations. His freedom of action is handicapped by multiple, restrictive and often contradictory legislative mandates. Accountability is diffuse. The rules are complicated and incoherent and often lack transparency; (b) Recruitment is simply too slow and reactive for the dynamic, frequently changing demands of a highly operational Organization. The processes are complex and administratively time-consuming. On average, it takes 174 days from the time a vacancy announcement is issued to the time a candidate is selected; (c) Inadequate progress is being made to improve geographical distribution and gender balance, both of which are essential for a truly diverse international civil service. Targets for increasing recruitment for unrepresented and underrepresented Member States have been met by one fifth of Secretariat departments. The proportion of women at the Professional levels and above is still unacceptably low, at 38 per cent; (d) Vital positions in key locations remain vacant far too long, which has an adverse impact on the Organization’s ability to carry out its mandates. For example, at any given time one third of all Professional posts in peacekeeping operations are vacant — an


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unacceptable and unsustainable state of affairs. By contrast at established duty stations and headquarters there are low vacancy rates and too little staff movement, which inhibits career development; (e) Different procedures from those at Headquarters are in place for appointments in the field. This prevents the Organization from developing an integrated workforce and leads to the inconsistent application of organizational standards; (f) Complex eligibility requirements limit staff — in particular field staff — from being given equal consideration for opportunities elsewhere in the Organization. This means that (i) managers do not have access to the broadest pools of talent; (ii) career opportunities for staff are limited; and (iii) divisions between field and Headquarters are reinforced; (g) Staff are not sufficiently mobile. Their movement is hampered by multiple and restrictive mandates, including those that limit the Secretary-General’s ability to move them when this would be in the interests of the Organization. Occupational groups have largely become “silos”, with limited opportunities for staff to move from one occupational group to another, even in the early stages of their careers; (h) The Organization uses a plethora of different types of contractual arrangements for hiring staff, which are cumbersome and difficult to administer and result in staff being treated unfairly. This creates divisions, breeds resentment, burdens administrators and hampers our ability to attract and retain the best people; (i) Staff members serve side by side with colleagues from other parts of the United Nations system who enjoy better conditions of service, both financially and from the work/life perspective. The main differences occur in the treatment of family members and provisions for rest and recuperation breaks in the field; (j) Investment in developing and managing talent at all levels of the Organization is inadequate. The United Nations spends just 1 per cent of its staff budget on training and development, compared to three or four times that amount in other international organizations; (k) The information and communications (ICT) systems underpinning our management of human resources do not meet the stringent demands imposed by the global reach of today’s United Nations; (l) The internal justice system is slow and cumbersome, and fails to strike the necessary balance between effective managerial control and staff members’ right to due process. Vision 26. My vision is of an independent international civil service which will once again be known for its high standards of ethics, fairness, transparency and accountability, as well as its culture of continuous learning, high performance and managerial excellence. The Secretariat will be truly an integrated, field-oriented operational Organization. Its multiskilled, versatile and mobile staff will be working across disciplines to fulfil the Organization’s complex and interrelated mandates in an efficient and cost-effective

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manner. The United Nations will be an employer of choice in the international public sector. 27. To achieve this vision, the Organization will need to introduce a new human resources framework which, building on reforms to date, will give the Organization the ability to respond to changing requirements. 28. The future United Nations workforce will have a core of career international civil servants performing long-term functions, supplemented by others who will join and leave the Organization for shorter periods of time when needed. A key part of this core will be the staff required to meet the needs of urgent peacekeeping and special political missions. Experienced staff who are able to be deployed rapidly and work effectively under pressure in unfamiliar circumstances will be in constant demand. Approximately 2,500 internationally recruited positions in peacekeeping and special political missions will be identified to form the heart of this capacity. Additional positions within the humanitarian and human rights sectors could form a smaller yet critical part of this core capacity in the field. 29. The Organization will need to integrate field and Headquarters staff into one global Secretariat with competitive conditions of service. Proactive, rapid and targeted recruitment must satisfy the demands of a largely field-based Organization and improve geographical and gender balance. Artificial barriers created by different contractual arrangements must be eliminated. Measures will be introduced to minimize the amount of time staff are required to spend away from their families. Willingness to serve the United Nations wherever needed will be a cornerstone of service with the Organization. Mobility will be facilitated and rewarded. The staff profile will be realigned to meet the evolving needs of the Organization, with substantially increased investment in staff development and talent management. 30. My package of human resources proposals must be considered in a holistic manner since they are all interrelated. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the success of this vision depends on progress in all other areas, particularly results-based management and the availability of an integrated, reliable information technology system. The redesign panel currently looking at the internal justice system is also critical to the success of these changes. Without a justice system that delivers fair resolution of staff/management disputes in a timely way, the other reforms will be undermined. Furthermore, administrative benefits should be simplified and streamlined — including through adoption of practices such as “lump-summing” of benefits. 31. The projected recurring costs of harmonizing benefits for staff in the field, including the proposed new cadre of peacekeepers, would be of the order of $280 million per annum, to be funded largely from the peacekeeping assessment or extrabudgetary contributions. Further, a much needed doubling of resources dedicated to training and developing United Nations staff would amount to an additional $10 million per annum.


497 Proposals and actions Proposal 1

I propose to develop a more proactive, targeted and speedy recruitment system, through: •

More extensive outreach based on strategic workforce planning.

•

Use of rosters of pre-screened candidates.

• Establishment of a dedicated recruitment service to support managers in their selection of staff. •

Reduction of the advertising time for vacancy announcements to 30 days.

•

Expedited recruitment processes for surge needs.

• Expanded career opportunities for serving staff, and the creation of a broader pool of talent by eliminating eligibility restrictions based on contractual status, category, location or duration of service. This would include eliminating the existing restrictions for applicants to junior Professional posts that are not subject to the examination requirements. •

Revision of examinations and job profiles to match current needs.

•

Strictly enforced compliance with gender and geography targets.

•

Aiming to reduce average recruitment times by one half. Proposal 2

I propose a more integrated approach to mobility, including: • needed.

Authority for the Secretary-General to move staff members wherever they are

• Strict enforcement of current post-occupancy limits, designation of a majority of international Professional posts as rotational, and integration of Headquarters and field operations into an Organization-wide mobility programme. • Expanded training and improved work/life conditions — the training budget should initially be doubled — costing an additional $10 million per annum. •

Greater opportunities for General Service mobility. Proposal 3

I propose to nurture talent and foster career development, through: •

A significant increase in resources for staff development and career support.


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• Systematic development of entry-level Professionals requirements for advancement to successive levels of responsibility. • points. •

and

mandatory

Development of career models, with potential career paths and cross-over Mandatory induction and training requirements for managers. Proposal 4

I propose to modify contractual arrangements and harmonize conditions of service to meet the needs of an increasingly field-based Organization, through: • Introduction of one United Nations Staff Contract under one set of Staff Rules. The conditions of service would mirror the current 100 series and would vary according to the length of continuous service. Where mandates of particular projects or missions are clearly finite, appointments would still be limited in order to prevent undue expectations of long-term employment. • Replacing permanent contracts with open-ended “continuing appointments”, as previously recommended to the General Assembly (see A/59/263/Add.1). • Harmonization of the conditions of service of Secretariat staff in the field with those of the United Nations funds and programmes by designating field missions in line with security phases, introducing the special operations approach for non-family duty stations, where appropriate, and revising the scheme for rest breaks and streamlining administration, including through lump-summing. The annual recurrent cost would be of the order of $280 million. II. INVESTING IN LEADERSHIP Context and challenges 32. If the end of the cold war and the advent of globalization ushered in a new era for the work of the United Nations, it also had direct implications for the role of the SecretaryGeneral. As Chief Administrative Officer of the Organization, I have managerial responsibilities which have grown far more demanding with the extraordinary increase in the number and complexity of field missions and other operational activities. Yet at the same time the direct and active involvement of the United Nations in a far wider range of issues than in the past has placed enormous calls on my time and capacity in my role as a political instrument of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other United Nations organs. In short, I am expected to be the world’s chief diplomat and at the same time to run a large and complex Organization, as it were, in my spare time. This will hardly be less true for my successors. 33. Unmanageable span of control. There are now more than 25 departments and offices reporting directly to the Secretary-General, of vastly different size, scale and complexity. The biggest controls billions of dollars and tens of thousands of people; the smallest a handful of people and almost no resources. In practice, many heads of department receive


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very little direct guidance from me, and are consigned to operate in isolated “silos” or expected to work together in loose “executive committees”, without management support strong enough to ensure any real synergy. In addition, there are a large number of special advisers, envoys and representatives who report to me periodically. 34. There are also 10 heads of programmes and funds who at present report to me and require my strategic guidance. The recently established High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence is likely to recommend changes to the structure, governance and reporting lines of these United Nations system organizations. 35. Insufficient operational capacity. The post of Deputy Secretary-General, created by the General Assembly at the end of 1997 to support the Secretary-General, has provided a much needed increase in capacity at the top of the Organization. The terms of reference were broad: to help manage Secretariat operations, ensure coherence of activities and programmes, and elevate the Organization’s profile and leadership in the economic and social spheres. Yet the Deputy Secretary-General was assigned no explicit statutory authority. There has been no clear division of labour between me and my Deputy, and all senior managers have continued to be accountable directly to me. The position, therefore, could do much more to strengthen management capacity at the very top of the Secretariat if it were given a wider set of responsibilities and authority to carry them out on the Secretary-General’s behalf. Similarly, the Chef de Cabinet post could be more clearly defined in terms of supporting the Secretary-General directly in the day-to-day management of his or her immediate office and workflow. 36. Inadequate senior-level development. There are many other levels of leadership in the United Nations that also need attention. A damaged culture, which is seen as limiting creativity, enterprise, innovation and indeed leadership itself, has meant that many managers have simply lost the capacity to manage. 37. Some have been trapped in a static headquarters environment, with little challenge or opportunity to develop the needed skills and experience. Others have had to operate in difficult field environments without the training or the environment of user-friendly, human-resources and financial rules that would enable them to do their job. There is nothing more heartbreaking than to see able young staff become demoralized and disenchanted as the path to management is strewn with apparently impassable obstacles. 38. Many of these issues are addressed in other sections of the present report. In the present chapter, I propose some specific changes that I believe should be given special priority because they are directed at building our future leaders. Vision 39. My vision is of an Organization whose Secretary-General will be given the means he or she requires to meet fast-changing needs and expectations in all parts of the world — from terrorism to human rights, from intra-State conflict to HIV/AIDS. A reduced number of people reporting directly to the Secretary-General will to enable him or her to manage at the level of strategy and policy. 40. This will have been achieved by two principal changes: delegating authority to the Deputy Secretary-General in a more systematic manner and regrouping departments and other entities around broad functional areas. The Secretary-General will continue to fully

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lead the Organization and direct political and policy matters, but the Deputy will assume delegated responsibility for management policies and overall operational matters — thereby obviating the need that some have discerned for a new post of Chief Operating Officer. While each group should comprise a cohesive range of functions and activities, headed by an Under-Secretary-General, the intention is to reduce the direct senior reporting span to about eight line and support functions. This can be done by reorganizing departments and in some cases by clustering departments. In addition, the Deputy Secretary-General would, therefore, assume formal chairmanship of the Organization’s Management Committee, which I currently chair. 41. While this reform can be more appropriately introduced when a new SecretaryGeneral assembles his or her cabinet at the end of 2006, I believe it can be accomplished within the existing Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General headcount and would not require new posts. This arrangement will improve operational accountability and performance management; help to ensure greater substantive coherence and policy direction for Secretariat operations; and allow all heads of department to work in a more effective way. Managers more rigorously selected ... 42. Last year, I introduced new procedures for improving the transparency and quality of selection for the heads of the United Nations funds and programmes. Interview boards were created. Extensive reference checking was undertaken. Several senior officials have since been appointed following these new procedures — including the Administrator of UNDP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Under-SecretaryGeneral for Internal Oversight Services. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has also put in place new measures for improving the appointment system for heads of peace missions in the field. 43. In my vision of the future, such practices — combined with much better organized recruitment outreach than in the past and thus achieving the geographical and gender balance that must characterize the Secretary-General’s own leadership team — will be followed for all senior appointments. … better trained and supported … 44. The Organization will also do a better job of training and supporting its managers. Mandatory induction of new managers is already being introduced. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has held two sessions for field managers and a similar session was held recently for new Directors at the D-1 and D-2 levels at Headquarters. This will be supplemented by periodic training opportunities, allowing managers to reflect on their management, learn the most modern techniques and compare notes with peers. Other Secretariat training programmes targeted at leaders and managers are also under way. The Secretariat will also have a strong management advisory service, to which managers can turn for help. This function, and the resources dedicated to it at the time, were given to the Office of Internal Oversight Services when it was created 10 years ago. With experience, I have come to the conclusion that combining the roles of auditor, investigator and management adviser in a single entity is not the best formula. I hope that the external review of oversight bodies which was launched by the General Assembly in December 2005 will address this problem and offer alternative approaches.


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… and firmly but fairly assessed 45. A more rigorous selection process, increased training opportunities and sustained support for managers, combined with a clear statement of their responsibility and authority, will enable the United Nations of the future to enforce stricter but also fairer accountability rules for its managers. The Management Performance Board, which I established recently, is in the process of designing clear criteria for assessing the performance of senior managers, who will be required to do the same for the junior managers working under them. 46. Nearly 15 per cent of Professional staff with contracts of one year or longer will reach retirement age by 2010. This will have a major impact at the P-5 and Director levels. Such retirements, combined with a buyout programme, will give the Organization the opportunity to bring in new talent at those levels, in line with future leadership needs. Proposals Proposal 5 I propose to redefine the role of Deputy Secretary-General and delegate to him or her formal authority and accountability for the management and overall direction of the operational functions of the Secretariat. The Secretary-General would continue to lead the political and policy dimensions of the Organization’s work. Proposal 6 I propose that my successor regroup the 25 departments and entities currently reporting directly to the Secretary-General into about eight organizational groups or clusters. Each group would be headed by an Under-Secretary-General. Proposal 7 I propose to strengthen leadership recruitment as well as training and development plans to build the cadre of senior and middle managers required for the modern complex global operations of the United Nations. III. INVESTING IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY Context and challenges 47. No global organization, let alone one as deeply involved in the management of information as this one, can function adequately without an effective infrastructure. Most of the reform proposals set out in the present report cannot be implemented without appropriate information and communications technology (ICT) support. And our very ability to carry on the work we are doing now depends on getting our ICT component right. There has been a chronic underinvestment in information systems which, if it is not


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urgently addressed, will come to threaten the operational viability of the United Nations as a whole. 48. A number of improvements have been achieved since I submitted an ICT strategy to the General Assembly in 2002 (see A/57/620). Regular budget expenditure on ICT now amounts to more than $100 million per annum and has yielded significant returns. All systems now operate with little downtime, at rates similar to those in large, informationintensive organizations, both public and private, with effective protection from unauthorized intrusions. Internal communications and staff management tools, such as iSeek and ePAS, have been successfully developed and implemented. Standards on critical infrastructure elements are in place and are being followed by all offices worldwide, managed by more effective internal governance review mechanisms. We should also acknowledge that the United Nations does a remarkable job in establishing rapid connectivity in the remotest parts of the world, where the existing infrastructure is either non-existent or damaged. 49. However, the benefits of improvements at the technical level have been reduced by lack of an effective information management strategy, which has meant that staff in disparate locations and departments have been unable to share their knowledge. Neither the culture nor the technology encourage or enable knowledge-sharing. 50. Outdated and fragmented information technology systems still prevail, with limited ability to share and process data and information. United Nations investment in ICT, at 7 per cent of the administrative budget, is underfunded in comparison with organizations of similar size, in which ICT investment levels range from 12 to 17 per cent. The absence of an organized, top-down strategic approach to ICT has contributed to a proliferation of stand-alone systems that often support similar functions. ICT applications comprise one main administrative system, the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), for basic financial and human resources data and numerous ancillary systems for more specific purposes. These systems are not integrated with one another. Even IMIS is maintained autonomously in several different locations (see figure 5). There is no integrated system designed to store, search and retrieve information generated at the United Nations, much less to do so rapidly and in real time. This limits our ability to translate data and facts into informed policy and management decisions. 51. The areas of ICT organization, governance and support are equally fragmented, resulting in duplication of efforts. At least six separate departments have their own ICT units, with no functioning integrating mechanism in place among them. Furthermore, ICT management is positioned relatively low within the Secretariat hierarchy. As a result, few senior managers have understood what an enormous difference ICT could make if it were used strategically to improve Secretariat operations and decision-making. 52. This largely dysfunctional ICT situation in the United Nations stems from legacy systems and practices built up over decades. As a result, the United Nations has been unable to exploit the potential of ICT as an enabler of effective management reform. Vision 53. My vision is of a United Nations in which this inability has been cured by bringing in a new, top-rank technology leadership, able to develop and implement an ICT strategy for the United Nations as a whole. Recent deliberations by the General Assembly on the


503

creation of a Chief Information Technology Officer are a welcome step forward in this direction.

Figure 5 Current ICT systems landscape is complex

• Autonomous IMIS maintenance in eight different locations further complicates data integration


505

54. Under the leadership of such a Chief Officer, the heads of all departments and offices will need to be actively and cooperatively engaged in each phase of a comprehensive ICT roll-out. The ICT leadership and entity will need to be closely aligned with departments and other entities, involving all levels of management in a continuous dialogue that covers strategic as well as operational needs and issues. 55. The Secretariat will need to ensure much greater integration of its workflow and knowledge management, allowing managers to integrate programme objectives, knowledge assets and budgetary and financial data into one integrated technology-assisted process. This is essential if the Secretariat is to act more transparently and efficiently in managing staff and to procure goods and services of greater quality and quantity, at lower levels of risk. And it is an absolute condition for the adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards. 56. Experiences in other United Nations entities show that such integration is feasible. Very preliminary estimates of the cost of such a system are of the order of $120 million additional investment over several years. While significant, this estimate is consistent with investments made in other parts of the United Nations system. For example, UNDP — a smaller but more globally dispersed entity — has spent $80 million on a similar system. In the context of annual activity currently approaching $10 billion, the investment is reasonable. Indeed, maintaining the current failing system is rapidly becoming more costly and carries with it the risk of an even more expensive collapse. The design of such a system will need to take account of the very rudimentary infrastructure available in certain field locations — particularly in the peacekeeping missions. Further, we expect the implementation of the new system to reduce annual operating costs over time as the legacy systems are phased out. Proposals Proposal 8 I ask the General Assembly to revive its discussion of creating the post of Chief Information Technology Officer, and to approve the creation of that post as soon as possible, at the level of Assistant Secretary-General. That rank will enable him or her to have a full voice in the decision-making processes of Secretariat bodies, such as the Management Committee. The position should carry with it sufficient resources — human and financial — to define and implement a comprehensive information management strategy for the entire Secretariat. Proposal 9 I propose a sustained effort, starting immediately, to align ICT priorities with Secretariat performance objectives by incorporating better managerial decision-support tools; implementing an Organization-wide document/content management system; and recruiting or training people with skills in information management and analysis.


506 Proposal 10

Subject to the final results of soon-to-be-completed feasibility studies, I propose to replace IMIS, Galaxy and other stand-alone ICT management support systems with a fully integrated global system. I propose that such a system, supporting the full range of management functions, be introduced by 2009. IV. INVESTING IN NEW WAYS OF DELIVERING SERVICES A. New sourcing options Context and challenges 57. Recent advances in technology and management practices have enabled many public and private sector institutions to adopt entirely new ways of getting services. These have allowed employers to focus their resources on their core mission, improve their performance in achieving mandates and allocate resources optimally. Increasingly common practices include moving certain administrative functions to other locations (relocating or offshoring); contracting out to external providers a range of services previously performed internally (outsourcing); allowing some categories of staff to work from home (telecommuting); and making more effective use of facilities already established around the world. 58. Yet at the United Nations, progress in exploring these options has been piecemeal and slow. Most administrative and support services are performed in-house, often in high-cost locations, such as New York or Geneva. The overall United Nations mindset has been one that discourages even exploring the options that exist. As a global organization, there is no reason why we should not carry out our business globally. However, in its resolution 55/232 of 23 December 2000, the General Assembly established a number of conditions for outsourcing that severely restrict the circumstances under which it can be contemplated. No comprehensive feasibility study or cost-benefit assessment has even been conducted of the possibility of relocating major services. Vision 59. My vision is of a United Nations which has achieved gains on several fronts by introducing new practices, such as relocating activities to new work stations. By so doing, it will disperse the economic and employment benefits of those activities more equitably among its Member States, while at the same time making it more effective and efficient. In particular, it will redistribute some of the very large share of those benefits that currently flows to the richest Member State of the United Nations because it hosts a large United Nations presence. Redistributing and relocating the Headquarters workload to other parts of the world will benefit more countries and economies; allow the United Nations to widen and deepen the skills pool from which it recruits; and enable it to reduce the overall costs of its operations. 60. Relocating offers an unusually precise tool to fulfil Article 101 of the Charter of the United Nations: “The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest


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standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible”. 61. The United Nations family has only just started experimenting with this practice, but examples are encouraging. The World Bank relocated some of its accounting functions to Chennai, India. Aside from dollar savings, relocation has brought other improvements, as observed by UNDP following the transfer to Copenhagen of its benefits, entitlements and payroll functions in the biennium 2003-2004. Transactions were found to be 25 per cent more efficient, and UNDP staff worldwide gave the quality and responsiveness of the services offered in Copenhagen a satisfaction mark of 92 out of 100 in 2005. UNDP is now considering relocating some knowledge and learning divisions, as well as regional human resource support units, to regional centres such as Johannesburg and Bangkok. 62. In the Secretariat, the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Management, for instance, recently commissioned an external study to review options concerning the document production cycle. Preliminary estimates suggest that possible savings from relocating the full range of document production services could approach 25 per cent of existing personnel and location costs, representing a net saving in the range of up to $35 million per annum. 63. Outsourcing — that is, contracting out to external providers — is an option that should be considered only for those functions that do not fall within the core competencies of the United Nations. Printing functions, which still take place in-house, may be a suitable candidate for outsourcing. Other steps of the document production cycle, such as translation, may be candidates for relocation to lower-cost duty stations — but not necessarily for outsourcing because of quality control and other issues. 64. Any decision to relocate or outsource a function depends on a broad range of factors, of which cost is only one. Reliability of service and guaranteed standards of quality are of primary importance. Consultations will need to be conducted with staff and their representatives, and then appropriate transitional support will need to be put in place to help any staff members whose jobs may ultimately be affected. Proposals Proposal 11 I ask the General Assembly to modify its previous guidance and allow the Secretariat to consider all options for alternative service delivery, including identifying the potential for relocating work to lower-cost duty stations and for outsourcing. Proposal 12 I propose to undertake systematic and detailed cost-benefit analyses of relocation, outsourcing and telecommuting opportunities for select administrative services, as follows: •

Translation, editing and documents production by September 2006.

•

Internal printing and publishing processes by September 2006.


508 •

Medical insurance plan administration by September 2006.

•

Information technology support services by December 2006.

•

Payables, receivables and payroll processes by March 2007.

•

Staff benefits administration by March 2007. B. Strengthening procurement Context and challenges

65. One of the most daunting challenges of the past decade for the United Nations has been the extraordinary expansion in the scale and scope of procurement. Driven largely by the huge growth in peacekeeping — which today accounts for 85 per cent of all procurement — but also encompassing growing support to other field operations and relief initiatives, the value of United Nations global procurement has increased steadily from about $400 million in 1997 to over $1.6 billion in 2005. The trend is still heavily upward: in 2006, it is expected to exceed $2 billion. During the same period, however, the number of dedicated procurement staff at Headquarters has in fact fallen. In peacekeeping missions, there is a 50 per cent vacancy rate for procurement officers in the field. 66. Inevitably, this has tested the robustness and effectiveness of both systems and controls — and both have been found lacking. On the one hand, it has become clear that our procurement rules and regulations are too complex and cumbersome for the kind of quick actions often required in field missions. To take one glaring example, otherwise sensible requirements on seeking bids from multiple vendors can prove a real obstacle to the effective and timely delivery of critical goods and services from food to fuel in inaccessible and isolated places, such as parts of the Sudan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On the other hand, it has also become clear that some of the limited steps we have taken to try to deal with this in recent years, such as providing more authority for field-based procurement, have not been accompanied by sufficient support and controls to prevent mismanagement and possible abuse. As a result, despite the hard work and dedication of the vast majority of our staff, often in extremely complex and difficult situations in the field, we have too often fallen short of the high standards that the United Nations needs to set itself. Vision 67. While some of the procurement problems documented in the reports of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme have already been corrected, significant problems remain. A separate review conducted late in 2005 by external experts found major weaknesses in culture, management oversight and controls, including outdated procurement processes, a failure to align and support the procurement needs of clients, an inconsistent execution of processes, a poor governance structure and lack of sufficient resources. Equally worrying, a recent audit by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into peacekeeping procurement has raised significant additional concerns with regard to both mismanagement and possible fraud.


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68. Quite apart from correcting systems and implementing robust internal controls to prevent potential wrongdoing, there is also significant potential for the United Nations to purchase goods and services more cheaply and efficiently if systems and procedures are properly modernized. To take one example, although a contractor performance rating system exists the results are not yet easily accessible across the United Nations system, nor have such performance reports been routinely examined to provide a measure of the future worthiness of United Nations contractors. Indeed, from outdated master contracts to overstretched data systems, an overworked team lacks the tools it needs to provide the highest quality procurement services. And as in other areas of the United Nations, spending on training — just $20,000 annually for the 70 staff at United Nations Headquarters — is also well short of what is needed. Proposals and actions 69. To respond to these problems, the following investigations are already under way: (a) To ensure that the recent audit and review findings about possible irregularities are urgently addressed, the Office of Internal Oversight Services is currently undertaking, on my instruction, an accelerated review of these cases and additional allegations of possible procurement-related wrongdoing by staff. (b) A more comprehensive, forensic audit is being carried out by external experts and the United Nations is, also on my instruction, fully cooperating with national law enforcement bodies in their own investigations. Proposal 13 I propose that these investigations be concluded quickly and that swift action be taken against any United Nations staff members found to have acted inappropriately. Proposal 14 More broadly, in order to address the underlying weaknesses that have been identified, I propose to continue a comprehensive review of procurement rules, regulations and policies that is also already under way, focused on six broad areas: • Updating procurement procedures to reflect the new environment and operational requirements of the United Nations, including the need for greater transparency and accountability, through, for example, the establishment of a more independent bid protest system to ensure that vendors have recourse if they believe a procurement process was undertaken unfairly. • Implementing a risk-management framework, including diagnostic tools to detect problematic transactions, more systematic rotation of staff serving in procurement and the strengthening of the Headquarters Contracts Committee that oversees the bidding process. This will ensure the Committee has the stature, professionalism and expert capacity it needs to review the recommendations of the Procurement Service.


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• Continuing and improving the training of procurement staff in both procurement processes and ethics and integrity; extending personal financial disclosure requirements to procurement staff; and paying more attention to staff career development issues. • Reprofiling procurement staff requirements, particularly with a view to attracting high-quality people willing to serve in the field and supported by regular training and routine rotation. • Increasing information-sharing on procurement matters within the United Nations common system with a view to unlocking significant potential cost and efficiency savings — estimated at 5 to 20 per cent, or $100 million to $400 million — including through such steps as more systematic matching between vendors and destinations where goods and services are being used, vendor consolidation, redefinition of specifications and stronger enforcement of contract compliance. • Using a lead agency concept to create specialist buyers for the whole system. For example, the United Nations might ask the Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office to handle all vehicle purchasing, WFP to handle air transport needs and the United Nations Office for Project Services to handle consulting and certain other personnel needs. Proposal 15 Early elements of the strategy described above are already being implemented and I propose to produce by June 2006 a more comprehensive report, with more detailed corrective actions, incorporating the recommendations of the current review and reflecting the conclusions of the outstanding investigations and audit. V. INVESTING IN BUDGET AND FINANCE 70. Budgetary and financial arrangements underpin the functioning of the United Nations. First and foremost, it is imperative that Member States pay their contributions in full and on time. The quality of the decisions Member States take on how best to deploy resources is also critical. Yet as the world and our mission change, as overall spending grows and as knowledge of international management best practices widens, our budget and finance functions have not kept pace. Context and challenges 71. Past reforms have aimed at improving the system of budgeting, the cycle of budget preparation and review and the management of trust funds. Recent improvements notwithstanding, our current budgetary and financial arrangements do not properly enable the Secretariat to do its job. Key challenges include those described below. 72. An inflexible budget implementation process that limits the ability of the United Nations to allocate funds strategically for operational needs. Although previous reforms have enabled greater upfront focus on indicators of performance and the potential impact of a given programme or function, the new methodology has not led to any significant shift in the way Member States review the Secretary-General’s budget proposals or assess how budgeted money was spent. The budget process is hampered by debate on line-item details,


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too much iteration within a lengthy review period and a paper-intensive approach. The preparation of the budget currently begins 15 months ahead of each biennium, which is too far in advance to respond to the fast-changing nature of United Nations business and can lead to resources being misaligned with actual needs. The majority of our finance staff are employed in supporting this cumbersome process, leaving little capacity for proactive financial planning and analysis in support of programme goals. 73. Highly restricted authority of the Secretary-General to shift resources to meet emerging needs. The ability of the Secretary-General to shift money between programmes and reallocate posts without Member State approval is weaker today than before 1974, when the need for such flexibility was far less. Recognizing the need for greater fluidity, Member States agreed in 2003 to grant the Secretary-General, on an experimental basis, the ability to move up to 50 posts within the biennium. But this concession has proved both insufficient and unwieldy, in part because of the large number of restrictive conditions imposed and the absence of any authority to reclassify positions according to need. 74. No single, coherent and commonly understood notion of accountability for programme performance. The achievement of programme objectives has few consequences for resource allocation, work planning or assessments of managerial performance. 75. Cumbersome practices emerging from the Financial Rules and Regulations. As we move from a centrally controlled institution to a more decentralized one, we may need to revisit the rules themselves in a more fundamental way. Adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards by the United Nations, which will be sought from Member States later in 2006, would require significant adaptation of the Organization’s Financial Rules and Regulations. 76. Insufficient transparency and availability of relevant financial information to provide clear guidance either to Member States or to Secretariat managers on the Organization’s financial picture. An archaic and fragmented IT infrastructure, outdated manual processes and fragmented accounts in peacekeeping and trust funds create delays but also, more importantly, prevent the collection and tracking of key data needed for management decisions and proper oversight and audit. 77. Among many examples of these problems, let me cite the following: (a) The Secretariat delivers many thousands of pages of reports to the Fifth Committee each year, many of them overlapping in content (see figure 6); for example, during the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, 275 separate reports were delivered; (b) Budget preparation precedes — and does not incorporate — the lessons of the programme performance report on the previous budget period; (c) There are more than 150 separate trust funds and 37 individual peacekeeping special accounts, each with its own support arrangements and costs; (d) Inadequate working capital funds cover just two or three weeks of United Nations operations;


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(e) Cash flows are slow and unpredictable, with less than half the amount assessed for the regular budget received within the first quarter. For peacekeeping assessments, which are issued throughout the year, significant payments take several months and the total amount outstanding usually stands at between $1 billion and $2 billion; (f) The formal budgetary discretion of the Secretary-General has remained unchanged for more than 30 years; (g) Less than half of the 30 offices and departments in the Secretariat have specific units or staff dedicated to programme evaluation. Figure 6 Both Member States and Secretariat are overwhelmed with the number of reports Report load of the Fifth Committee at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly Total: 275 in one year Reporting Unit

Number submitted

Peacekeeping Finance Division Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions Joint Inspection Unit Board of Auditors Office of Internal Oversight Services Office of Human Resources Management Programme Planning and Budget Division Budget report Other units of the Department of Management (and written responses to questions) Other departments ... and 80 Secretariat oral statements

45 reports 78 reports (16,000 pages) 13 reports 21 reports 25 reports 13 reports 28 reports 35 sections (26,000 pages) 31 reports 21 reports

Vision 78. My vision is of a United Nations that has addressed these fundamental problems and in which: (a) There will be a flexible and strategy-focused budgeting process, building on the earlier reforms that implemented results-based budgeting within the Secretariat; (b) Member States and the Secretariat will strike the right balance between control and managerial freedom, and between the direction and guidance provided by Member States and the flexibility needed by the Secretariat to fulfil those wishes. Thus, the Secretariat will have the authority needed to deploy and shift resources to implement effectively the mandates given to it by the Member States; (c) There will be clear links between performance and resource allocation, enabling the best possible stewardship of Member State investments in the United Nations. This would give Member States greater confidence in the transparency and availability of


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relevant information on which to base their decisions, enable them to hold managers accountable for specific results and assure them that their financial contributions are being used in an efficient manner. 79. The proposals set out below are meant as first steps towards this vision. Proposals Proposal 16 In the area of strategic budgetary planning and implementation, I propose that: • The Member States and the Secretariat work together to find ways to further increase the strategic nature of the budgeting review, reduce duplicative, detailed and labour-intensive processes, and align key inputs across the regular, peacekeeping and extrabudgetary processes. • The budget cycles be shortened and aligned with the calendar year. Regular budget preparation and adoption should be shortened to 12 months, and all stages of the budget review process should take place during the main part (September through December) of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. The peacekeeping budgetary cycle would be aligned with the calendar year. •

Budget appropriation be consolidated from the current 35 sections into 13 parts.

• Posts be approved in aggregate numbers and grouped into four broad grade categories. The Secretariat would submit an indicative staffing table for information purposes only. The Secretary-General should have the authority to redeploy posts as necessary, and to reclassify up to 10 per cent of posts within each broad category within a given budget period. • The Secretary-General be given the authority, within a given budget period, to use the savings from vacant posts, with a value not to exceed 10 per cent of the overall post budget, for emerging priorities or unanticipated activities. Proposal 17 In the area of financial management practices, I propose that: • Peacekeeping accounts for separate field missions be consolidated into a single set of accounts and reports, starting in 2007, to improve cash management and operational flexibility. • A new policy be introduced in July 2006, replacing four existing administrative instructions, to govern the streamlined management of trust funds. Key objectives would include simplified rules and procedures, the introduction of a single, consistent and flexible trust fund category, and the establishment of a new standard for support costs, lower than the current 13 per cent, to bring it more in line with the fee structure in force in the United Nations funds and programmes.


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• The ceiling of the commitment authority granted by the General Assembly for peacekeeping operations be increased from $50 million to $150 million and de-linked from a specified number of Security Council decisions. • The level of the Working Capital Fund for the regular budget be increased from $100 million to $250 million. • Budget surpluses, including those from peacekeeping operations, be retained for use in subsequent periods, pending Member State approval. • A separate fund be created to cover unanticipated expenditures arising from exchange rate fluctuations and inflation, to be financed through the transfer of budget surpluses. •

Interest be charged on arrears in a Member State’s assessed contributions. Proposal 18

In the area of performance evaluation and reporting, I propose that: • United Nations activities in the areas of performance measurement be given increased resources but also rationalized. • Monitoring and evaluation tools be reformed and synchronized so that their results can be evaluated in the formation of the subsequent budget. • The budget and planning process be explicitly linked to the results of performance, work planning and the assessment of managerial performance in order to ensure the effective stewardship of resources provided by Member States. • A new annual report be introduced (see more detailed discussion in sect. VI below), along with other steps to consolidate and simplify financial reporting. 80. Re-engineering the financial platform of the Secretarial around these key principles of transparent budgeting and results and flexible but accountable management will require a process of continuous change. The experience of the United Nations in funds and programmes shows that re-engineering core business processes of this kind requires changes in attitude and culture that cannot be achieved overnight. In particular, managers must learn to take responsibility and to master ICT-based management systems. VI. INVESTING IN GOVERNANCE 81. In sections II to V above, I have described the major changes that I believe are needed in the management of the United Nations Secretariat and the resources entrusted to it by Member States. In the present section, I shall suggest improvements in the way the Secretariat explains itself to Member States and to the public, and the way Secretariat and Member States work together on management and budgetary issues. My objective is to ensure that Member States receive high-quality, accurate and timely reports on the Secretariat’s performance, and have in their hands effective tools for holding the Secretariat genuinely accountable for its fulfilment of their mandates and stewardship of


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their resources. The United Nations should be accessible to its owners — the Member States — and to its users — all who rely on its services or have dealings with it. This requires an effort of transparency on the part of the Secretariat, but also requires some adjustment by the intergovernmental bodies themselves. Context and challenges 82. The present budgeting and decision-making processes are characterized by an acute lack of clarity and transparency. Member States are subjected to a blizzard of reports from the Secretariat, which contain a great deal of information but are not arranged strategically and are therefore of very limited use as analytical tools. The Fifth Committee, in particular, currently receives over 270 reports each year, none of which gives a single, comprehensive and coordinated view of Secretariat management performance. This plethora of reports overwhelms both the Secretariat and the Member States alike (see figure 6). It obliges Member States to probe officials with very detailed questions in an effort, which even then is only partly successful, to get at the full picture. Reports are too long, there are too many of them and they often arrive late, leaving Member States too little time to review them. 83. The public, too, is ill served by current United Nations policy on outside access to documentation. This policy is neither clear nor systematic. Existing rules establish a theoretical presumption in favour of releasing documents to the public on request but do not set forth precise criteria for deciding when access should be refused. In practice, individual department or office heads take these decisions on an ad hoc basis, with no review or appeal process for people who feel that access to a given document has been wrongly denied. 84. The current system of interaction between the Secretariat and Committees of the General Assembly is at times dysfunctional because the different committees are too numerous, too large and often have overlapping agendas. In particular: (a) The Fifth Committee’s interface with the Secretariat suffers from excessive focus on details. This is partly due to the size of the Committee (191 members) and partly to the lack of time limits on discussion, which prevent a strategic dialogue and frequent head of mission involvement; (b) The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), which gives expert technical advice to the Fifth Committee, also spends much of its time on a parallel and detailed line-by-line cross-examination of officials, again without always reaching a strategic judgement. So often the same ground is covered — once in ACABQ and again in the Fifth Committee; (c) The Committee for Programme and Coordination absorbs significant resources and time but no longer fulfils either its mandate of coordinating the activities of different programmes under the regular budget or its mandate of assessing the performance of the Secretariat. Earlier efforts to reform it have proved unsuccessful. Vision 85. My vision is one of Member States and Secretariat working together, on the following terms:


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(a) Workable decision-making processes. When discussing matters of detail, Member States would work in small but representative groups, keeping to a strict timetable and supported by knowledgeable expertise, with a clear mandate to approve or disapprove proposals so that larger bodies could focus on strategic issues; (b) A clear division of labour. Intergovernmental bodies would govern the Organization in the sense of making high-level decisions on priorities, policies and the overall allocation of resources, and would provide substantive expert input. They would discharge these tasks better by leaving operational details to be managed by the Secretariat and judging managers on results rather than through a line-by-line review of each item of expenditure; (c) A credible reporting mechanism. Member States would receive accurate and timely analysis and information from the Secretariat — as they need to more than ever now that it has so many more tasks to perform and demands to meet. This would be achieved not by more reports but by fewer, better and clearer reports that would enable Member States to evaluate Secretariat actions and ensure that their mandates were properly implemented; (d) Transparency. The public would be told clearly that they could request United Nations Secretariat documents, how to make such requests and on what principles they would be granted or denied, and all such requests would receive a prompt response. Proposals Proposal 19 I propose to improve our reporting mechanisms by developing a single, comprehensive annual report, including comprehensive financial and programme information; identifying opportunities to streamline all Secretariat reports; making realtime financial performance reports available to Member States; and improving public access to United Nations documentation. More specifically: • A single, comprehensive annual report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization, as mandated by the Charter, will consolidate the information currently presented in five different reports, enabling the financial and operational work of the Secretariat to be readily measured against the strategic objectives set by Member States. It will thus not only improve the quality of communication between the Secretariat and Member States but also enable Member States to conduct more meaningful strategic discussions among themselves. • Over 30 existing reports on management and finance issues will be consolidated into six reports. • We will also provide Member States with real-time, consolidated accounts of our financial performance on a regular quarterly basis, as soon as the necessary information systems are in place. • In May 2006, I shall submit to Member States, for discussion and approval, a detailed policy proposal containing new and clear rules on public access to United Nations documentation.


517 Proposal 20

I propose three new principles for interaction between the Secretariat and the key General Assembly budget committees: • The committees should agree to focus on core budget issues, with emphasis on planning and the analysis of performance. • Both plenary and working groups should respect strict time limits for budget discussion and decision-making. • Plenary sessions should be used for decisions on core budget issues and not for prolonged debates on each line item. Proposal 21 I urge the General Assembly to consider ways to reform its structures for interacting with the Secretariat on management and budgetary issues. Accordingly, while this is clearly a matter for them to decide, Member States may wish to: • Reconsider the need for a separate Committee for Programme and Coordination given the extensive overlap of this Committee’s work with that of the Fifth Committee and ACABQ. • Establish a programme evaluation capacity to strengthen the ability of the Fifth Committee to review all $10 billion Secretariat resources and allow a linkage between programme performance and budget review. • Raise the level of their representation on the Fifth Committee, encouraging heads of mission to participate more directly. • Review the level of technical expertise required for service on ACABQ with a view to ensuring that it fully carries out its function as an expert group, supporting and advising the Fifth Committee. • Elevate the agenda of both the Fifth Committee and ACABQ and impose time limits on their sessions with a view to spending less time on detailed review and more on key strategic issues. • Examine ways to allow strategic discussion to be held in meetings of manageable size, possibly through dividing up the workload of the Fifth Committee among select working groups of limited membership, or consider whether an executive committee could be elected from among its members and asked to bring agreed recommendations before the Committee as a whole.

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Investing in the United Nations Box 2 Strengthening oversight and audit

Critical both to good management and to ensuring the highest standards of integrity and accountability is a system of proper oversight and audit. Currently, the United Nations is subject to multiple internal and external audit and review bodies — including the Board of Auditors, the Joint Inspection Unit and the Office of Internal Oversight Services — with varying and somewhat overlapping mandates and remits. In addition, the Office of Internal Oversight Services itself has a complex set of responsibilities that is subject to potential conflicts of interest between its role in providing management advisory services to United Nations departments and its investigatory and audit functions. This latter role, in which the Office of Internal Oversight Services has traditionally provided internal audits for use by senior management, has also become blurred as a result of the General Assembly’s recent decision to have the Office report directly to Member States as well as to the Secretary-General, and to allow Member States direct access to its reports. This complex set of arrangements, as well as the problems uncovered in the management of the oil-for-food programme, the sexual exploitation scandal in some of our peacekeeping missions and troubling evidence of misconduct in our procurement system has reinforced my long-standing conviction that the independent audit and investigatory capacity of the United Nations needs to be significantly strengthened. That is why I initially proposed a comprehensive review of the Office of Internal Oversight Services in 2004; and I repeated the request in my 2005 report to the General Assembly entitled “In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all” (A/59/2005). I was very pleased to see this proposal fully endorsed by Heads of State and Government in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, and I very much welcome the fact that they decided to combine this review with the comprehensive assessment of the governance arrangements of the United Nations already recommended by the Board of Auditors. By the same token, I was also very pleased by the General Assembly’s decisions to approve significant new resources for the Office of Internal Oversight Services in both June and December 2005, and to endorse the creation of an Independent Audit Advisory Committee as an additional resource to ensure that Member States have the independent expert advice that they need in order to better exercise their oversight responsibilities. In my report to the General Assembly in November 2005 on the implementation of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, I set out detailed terms of reference for this new Committee, based on a review of best practices and benchmarks used by similar bodies in comparable organizations. I also provided terms of reference for the governance and oversight review that is now under way. I sincerely hope that this review will identify a more rational division of labour and responsibilities among the various audit and oversight bodies, and that it will ensure they are fully equipped with the resources and capacity to carry out their very important role. With specific regard to the Office of Internal Oversight Services, in addition to looking at how to bolster its audit and investigatory capacity, which I believe is essential, I also hope the review will (a) explore the implications of the Office’s new direct reporting line to the General Assembly for the Secretariat’s ability to draw on its internal audit capacity as an input for management decisions; and (b) explicitly review the appropriateness of the Office retaining its management advisory functions.


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VII. THE WAY FORWARD: INVESTING IN CHANGE A. Overall resource requirements 86. Processes of change such as those outlined in the present report, involving farreaching reform of a large organization, can be successfully implemented only by deploying substantial resources. As I noted at the beginning of the present report, the United Nations has suffered from underinvestment. The bill for that is now inevitably due. The precise cost of all these reforms will obviously depend on the details still to be worked out. Nevertheless, I have itemized several major and vital cost increases: (a)

Improving field benefits and conditions to create a single global staff.

(b) Increasing development. (c)

investments

in

training,

recruitment

and

human

resource

Strengthening key functions, such as procurement and overall management.

(d) Introducing a new information technology platform. (e)

Approving a staff buyout programme.

87. The sums required may seem large, but: (a) They would, over time, pay for themselves through the substantial savings in running costs that the reforms will bring; (b) They will be offset by very large savings in procurement reform, relocation of work and administration simplification; (c) When combined with the current General Assembly exercise of mandate review, they offer the prospect of a much more focused, professional Secretariat that can deliver on the tasks Member States set it; (d) Without these comprehensive reforms, we would almost certainly end up spending considerable sums on further piecemeal efforts that would not address fundamental issues; (e) Most importantly, these reforms will give us a much more productive Organization, with much more highly motivated staff. In fact, this would be a very modest investment compared to the cost of not reforming the United Nations. The return on investment, in terms of the benefit that all Member States and their peoples can expect from a truly effective United Nations, attuned to the needs of the twenty-first century, will be of immeasurable importance to the world. B. Early and visible change 88. Experience within the United Nations system and elsewhere tells us that reform or change initiatives often fall apart or are not sustained over time unless there is strong leadership from the top, supported by a group of managers and responsible officials assigned full-time to making change happen. It would therefore be naive to expect the


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comprehensive transformation described in the present report to happen by itself. The Secretariat and Member States, working closely together, will have to refine the blueprint and convert it into detailed proposals, with a disciplined implementation strategy — which must itself be the product of consultation, both among Member States and with the staff at all levels. For the change I propose, which is above all a change of culture, cannot be achieved overnight. It is urgent, and I am determined to implement as much of it as I can in the nine months left to me as Secretary-General. But it needs to continue steadily over a period of years. And this will not happen without an appropriate structure to manage it and drive it forward. 1. Change management office 89. Managing change of this magnitude is not a part-time responsibility. It will be necessary to set up a dedicated capacity within the Secretariat — a change management office, with clear terms of reference and a time limit — which I propose should work closely with a small but representative group of Member States to provide support and guidance. 90. This office, which would report to the Deputy Secretary-General, would work with heads of department and other key leaders within the Secretariat to plan and coordinate the implementation of the reforms. It would monitor performance and hold heads of department accountable for their delivery. It would establish task forces to identify and resolve specific challenges and would supervise their work. It should be led by a highly respected, senior-level manager with deep organizational knowledge and a full understanding of the context as well as the content of the reform agenda, who would be respected by, and have access to, the key decision makers in the Secretariat. 2. A staff buyout 91. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, Heads of State and Government called on the Secretary-General to submit “a detailed proposal on the framework for a one-time staff buyout to improve personnel structure and quality, including an indication of costs involved and mechanisms to ensure that it achieves its intended purpose” (see General Assembly resolution 60/1, para. 163 (c)). I expect to place such a proposal before the General Assembly soon. It will be an essential tool for implementing the reforms proposed in the present report and the conclusions of the review of mandates on which the Assembly is about to embark. Full consultation with staff representatives will be required before my proposals are finalized and they will be based on four principles: (a) The Secretary-General must be able to realign the staff in accordance with the Organization’s priorities. The staff to whom the targeted buyout is offered must therefore be selected on the basis of an analysis of the skills needed in the light of both the management reforms — including business process simplification, changing skills needs, relocation of work and outsourcing — and the mandate review. The decisions that Member States may wish to make on my proposals in this area will also determine the scale of the programme; (b) The Organization’s interests must be protected by ensuring that the buyout does not result in the loss of staff whose skills, experience or knowledge are aligned with operational needs;


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Box 3 Proposals requiring General Assembly action and support We offer Member States a short checklist of issues that will require their action and support. To ensure that the Organization hires the best people and gets the best from them: • Modifying the existing requirements in the system of recruiting, promoting and placing United Nations staff. • Explicit authority for the Secretary-General to move staff members according to organizational need. • Broadening current mobility requirements and approving a simplified contract system. •

Investing more in staff development and training programmes.

• Aligning benefits for United Nations staff in the field with those of the United Nations funds and programmes. To equip the Organization with up-to-date information and communications technology: •

Creating a Chief Information Technology Officer.

• Commitment to developing a fully integrated global ICT management support system, subject to the results of the current feasibility study. To ensure that the Organization gets the best value for money spent on services: • Reviewing guidance on alternative service delivery and agreeing to the preparation of cost/benefit analyses in certain administrative areas. To ensure transparent and efficient financial and budgetary management: • Shortening of the cycle for review and adoption of the Organization’s programme budget. • Giving greater budgetary discretion to the Secretary-General in consolidating peacekeeping accounts for separate field operations. • Introducing improvements in the system of financial management — including delegation of financial authority with a clear framework of controls. •

Increasing capacity for performance monitoring and evaluation.


522

To improve the Secretariat’s accountability to Member States: •

Approving improved reporting mechanisms to intergovernmental bodies.

• Agreeing to identify ways to improve interactions with the Secretariat on management issues. To ensure that change is carried through in a resolute and sustained manner: •

Supporting the creation of change management capacity.

•

Continuing support to the change management process.

(c) The anticipated attrition of staff, particularly at the senior levels through retirement, may affect the scale of the proposed buyout; (d) The mechanisms for implementing the buyout must be transparent and equitable, with safeguards to prevent arbitrary decisions and preserve the Organization’s strategic goals. 92. My proposal will offer options for the buyout; the precise cost will depend on which option Member States prefer. A buyout cost of approximately $100,000 per staff member would be anticipated. Therefore, a buyout of 500 staff would cost approximately $50 million; a buyout of 1,000 staff would cost approximately $100 million. I believe this is fully justified as an investment in the United Nations of the future, which must be staffed by people whose skills and aptitudes respond to its priorities. Proposal 22 I therefore propose that dedicated resources be appropriated in order to ensure complete implementation of the detailed proposals resulting from this process. In particular, resources will be needed at an early stage for a change management office and a staff buyout. Proposal 23 I urge Member States to lose no time in providing dedicated resources for the change management office and setting up an appropriate intergovernmental mechanism to work with it. Such prompt decisions would make it clear, to both our staff and the outside world, that the overall programme of reform is serious and credible. VIII. CONCLUSION 93. Only by an effort on this scale — a management reform as broad as it is deep — can we create a United Nations Secretariat that is fully equipped to implement all its mandates,


523

using the resources of its Member States wisely and accounting for them fully, and winning the trust of the broader world community. In an age when more and more of the problems facing humanity are global and the world has more and more need for a global institution through which to forge and implement global strategies, it is more than ever necessary for the United Nations to live up to the promise of its Charter — and, above all, to the demands and hopes of present and future generations.

Index of Names

525

INDEX OF NAMES

Abdullah, King, 220 Abu-Hasabo, Afaf, 285 Adam, Tahgreed, 286 Adams, Jim, 282 Adem, Getachew, 284 Adhin, Kanta, 285 Ahern, Dermont, 56 Ahmad, Javed, 285 Ahmed, Masood, 284 Ahmedabad, 282 Aii, Ifzal, 283 Al-Abassi, Mutahar, 284 Alatas, Ali, 56 Ali, Ifzal, 285 Allen, Benjamin, 285 Al-Nasser, Abdulaziz, 285 Alston, Philip, 203 Altangerel, Tuya, 284 Amani, Haidari K. R., 203, 282 Amin, Adnan Z., 283 Amin, Muhammad Cesan, 194 Andersen, Aasmund, 285 Andrianasolo, William, 285 Annan, Kofi, vi, 8, 25-27, 58, 203, 372, 388, 415, 416 Annan, Kojo, 57, 58, 363, 416, 417 Anyango, George, 284 Arria, Diego, 17 Aryeetey, Ernest, 203, 282 Asea, Patrick, 283 Ashong, S. Nii-Noi, 284 Avina, Jeffrey, 282 Aziz, Tariq, 367

Banes, Christopher, 286 Banks, Tony, 285 Bao, Shuming, 282 Basilia, Temur, 284 Bategeka, Lawrence, 282 Begum, Anwara, 282 Belanger, Pierre, 285 Bellamy, Carol, 203 Bertozzi, Stefano, 286 Biau, Daniel, 283 Bidonge, Clements, 285 Bilgrami, Razina, 286 Bird, Kate, 285 Blair, Tony, 46, 220 Bolaky, Bineswaree (Aruna), 285 Bolton, John, 70, 81, 83, 85, 90, 93 Bonacito, Silva, 283 Botchwey, Kwesi, 203 Boudard, Emmanuel, 283 Bourguignon, Francois, 282, 283 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, vi, 7-9, 359, 366, 367, 372 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 26 Brinkman, Henk-Jan, 283 Brown, Gordon, 46 Brown, Mark Malloch, 71, 203 Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 192 Bruns, Barbara, 282 Budgett-Meakin, Catherine, 285 Bukuru, M., 285 Burungi, Barbara, 285 Bush, George W., 22, 26, 27, 70, 79, 220 Busza, Eva, 285

Babson, Oliver, 284 Badawi, Walid, 286 Badiee, Shaida, 282 Badinter, Robert, 192 Baena Soares, João Clemente, 192 Bah, Khadija, 284 Bahiigwa, Godfrey, 282 Bajpai, Nirupam, 282 Balarezo, Marco, 285 Balk, Deborah, 282 Banda, James, 285

Cachaca, Bernardo, 285 Cahuzac, George, 203 Caird, Wendy, 285 Callahan, James P., 283 Campaign, Jonathan, 286 Canning-Luckenbach, Lauren, 286 Cao, Shan, 282 Carolini, Gabriella, 203 Casado, Fernando, 284 Cassels, Andrew, 203, 283

Index of Names

526 Cedergren, Jan, 283 Chamie, Joseph, 284 Chamusca, Joana, 285 Chapman, Erin, 285 Charlton, Andrew, 282 Chatani-Rizvi, Nisha, 284 Chattopadhay, Tamo, 286 Chen, Bob, 282 Chhabra, Tarun, 194 Chinery-Hesse, Mary, 192 Chirac, Jacques, 27, 46, 220 Chissano, Joaquim, 56 Cho, Albert Hyunbae, 203 Choi, Ji Mi, 286 Choritz, Samuel, 285 Christeson, Bill, 285 Chudoba, Johannes, 284 Claeson, Mariam, 282 Cobbett, Billy, 286 Cohen, Joel, 286 Coleman, Norm, 57, 62, 63 Conceiao, Pedro, 283 Connolly, Mark, 286 Copeland, Jennifer, 286 Coquereaumont, Meta de, 283 Corell, Hans, 366 Costello, Anthony, 285 Creque, Deborah, 286 Cukrowski, Jacek, 285 Curtis, Chris, 286 Cyimana, Ingrid, 286 Dam-Hansen, Susanne, 285 Darkoh, Ernest, 286 Datta, Samar, 282 Daumerie, Denis, 285 Davidse, Koen, 285 Dayal, Prarthna, 203 de Mello, Sergio Vieira, 25 Deckelbaum, Richard, 286 Denning, Glenn, 203, 285 Desai, Nitin, 203 Devarajan, Shanta, 282 Dholakia, Ravindra, 282 Diallo, Djibril, 283 Dini, Lamberto, 20 Dobie, Philip, 203 Dodd, Rebecca, 285 Doraid, Moez, 283

D’Orville, Hans, 283 Dreier, Lisa, 203 Drummond, Jamie, 203 Dudziak, Rossana, 285 Duelfer, Charles, 57 Edwards, David T., 283 Einsiedel, Sebastian Graf von, 194 Elfverson, J. Christer, 394 Eliasson, Jan, 82, 85 Elisaia, Ali’ioaiga Feturi, 285 Ellis, Simon, 286 Engle, Patrice, 286 Eshmambetova, Zamira, 285 Espinal, Marcos A., 285 Estevez-Vidal, Rosemary, 286 Etukudo, Udo, 285 Evans, David, 286 Evans, Gareth, 192 Ezekiel, Nissim, 283 Fabiancic, Niky, 284 Fahlen, Marika, 283 Fardoust, Shahrokh, 282 Fariz, Ghaith, 283 Fasehun, Orobola, 283 Fawundu, Alfred, 284 Faye, Michael, 203 Feachem, Richard, 285 Fegan-Wyles, Sally, 283 Fehlenberg, Stacy, 282 Fernandez, Leonel, 284 Flood, Joe, 286 Flor, Rafael, 203 Floyd, Katherine, 286 Floyd, Virginia, 285 Fox, Tamara, 286 Francesca, Perucci, 284 Franzoni, Luc, 285 Frechette, Louise, 203, 373, 388-390, 392-394, 415 Freedman, Lynn, 203 Freeman, Richard, 203 Fu, Haishan, 283 Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, 283 Gagain, John, 284 Gambari, Ibrahim, 283 Ganuza, Enrique, 283

Index of Names Garce, Patricia, 284 Gardner, Douglas, 284 Garrity, Dennis, 285 Gebre-Egziabher, Axumite, 285 Germain, Adrienne, 285 Ghanime, Linda, 285, 286 Giljum, Stefan, 285 Gingrich, Newt, viii, 61, 68, 81, 85 Ginneken, Meike van, 286 Goldstone, Richard J., 57, 358, 359, 411 Gomet, Pablo, 282 Gore, Charles, 283 Goundrey, Mary, 283 Grabman, Genevieve, 285 Gregoire, Luc, 284 Gregorio, Carla De, 283 Grey-Johnson, Crispin, 285 Gross, Rainer, 286 Grown, Caren, 203 Grynspan, Rebecca, 203 Gupta, Rajat Kumar, 82 Gupta, Sanjeev, 282 Gustafsson, Peter, 285 Gutierrez, Juan Pablo, 286 Gyan-Baffour, George, 284 Haapane, Toni, 285 Haavisto, Pekka, 203 Hackett, Christopher F., 285 Haddad, Lawrence, 285 Halbwachs, Jean-Pierre, 398, 399 Hall, Ronnie, 285 Hammond, Brian, 284 Hannay, David, 192 Hasan, Aynul, 203 Haverkamp, Cecil, 285 Heaps, Charlie, 286 Heinemann, Edward, 283 Heller, Peter, 203, 282 Heller, Ron, 285 Helms, Jesse, 8 Henderson, Mark, 286 Hendra, John, 286 Herfkens, Eveline, 284 Heuty, Antoine, 283 Holbrooke, Richard, 63 Hourn, Kao Kim, 282 Hua, Mi, 285 Hudson, Andrew, 286

527 Hueb, Jose, 286 Humphreys, Macartan, 203, 282 Hunaidi, Rima Khala, 204 Hussein, Saddam, 364, 365, 368, 369, 380, 386, 395, 396 Hyde, Henry, 61, 81, 84, 89 Iglesias, Enrique, 192 Irving, Angela, 194 Ismail, Razali, 18 Jackson, Sir Robert, 5 Jacoby, Ruth, 203 Janneh, Abdoulie, 204 Jarque, Carlos, 203 Jenks, Bruce, 204 Jiabao, Wen, 65 Johannsson, Claes, 283 Johansson, Mattias, 283 Johnson, Todd, 286 Johnston, Robert, 284 Jones, Bruce, 194 Jones, Terence, 283 Judd, Karen, 285 Jumar, Raj, 283 Jury, Allan, 203 Kacou, Alberic, 284 Kafando, Michel, 285 Kamaluddeen, Kamil, 284 Kamel, Hussein, 365, 367 Kaplan, Elli, 282 Kaufmann, Dani, 282 Kaul, Inge, 283, 285 Keenan, Jeff, 285 Keita, Diene, 284 Kennedy, Eileen, 286 Kennedy, Joseph, 282 Keogh, Will, 286 Kerry, John, 26 Kessy, Flora Lucas, 282 Khan, Sammy, 285 Khan, Zahia, 286 Khew, Augusta, 285 Khushvakhtova, Nozigul, 284 Kibaki, Mwai, 284 Kinniburgh, Ian, 283 Kleedtke, Heidi, 286 Knippenberg, Rudolf, 282

528 Koizumi, Junichiro, 220 Kowalski-Morton, Shannon, 285 Krouse, Michael, 203 Krutzinna, Jan, 283 Kufuor, John, 284 Kumar, Akhilesh, 282 Kumuranyake, Lilani, 286 Kuonqui, Christopher, 283 Kurowski, Chistoph, 286 Kuznetsov, Vladimir, 59 Kyrolainen, Hannu, 285

Index of Names

Landau, Jean-Pierre, 284 Langmore, John, 203 Lantos, Tom, 84, 89 Larson, Bruce Ross, 283 Leach, Valerie, 286 Lee, Alan, 286 Lee, Eddy, 203, 283 Leigh, Robert, 285 Leiro, Jostein, 285 Lekoetje, Ade, 282 Levent, Ibrahim, 282 Levine, Ruth, 203 Levy, Marc, 282 Lewis, Kristen, 203 Lin, Lim Li, 285 Linden, Jon, 285 Ling, Zhu, 203 Ljungqvist, Bjorn, 284 Lo, Fatou, 203 Lofgren, Hans, 282 Lorn, Abou, 284 Loup, Jacques, 282 Low, Patrick, 283 Lugar, Richard, 62 Luyendijk, Rolf, 286 Lwanga, Elizabeth, 282

Martinez, Elena, 204 Martini, Richard, 284 Massey, Elie, 417 Massey, Robert, 417 Mattson, Jan, 204 Mauras, Marta, 283 Maw, Patricia, 286 Mayet, Mariam, 285 McCord, Gordon, 203 McDade, Susan, 283 McGreevey, William, 286 McKinley, Terry, 283 McNab, Christine, 285 Mehrotra, Santosh, 283 Mekheta, Metsi, 286 Mendoza, Ronald, 283 Mensbrugghe, Dominique van der, 282 Merks, Lucille, 284 Merrick, Thomas, 203 Milimo, Patrick, 285 Mitchell, George, viii, 61, 68, 81, 85 Miyaguchi, Takaaki, 286 Miyashita, Tadayuki, 285 Mizsei, Kalman, 204 Mkandawire, Richard, 284 Mkapa, Benjamin, 220 Modi, Vijay, 203 Montero, Luis Javier, 203 Montiel, Lenni, 285 Morales, Cielo, 286 Morgan, Richard, 283 Morris, Jim, 203 Morrison, David, 283 Moussa, Amre, 192 Mukhopadhyay, Tanni, 283 Murali, Balasubramanium, 283 Murphy, Ronan, 285 Myint-U, Thant, 194

Macha, Deogratias, 282 Maher, Dermot, 285 Maitland, Graham, 194 Male, Pim van der, 286 Malic, Angelica, 194 Manneh, Lamin, 282 Manning, Richard, 284 Manor, James, 285 Manyazewal, Mekonnen, 284 Markham, Sue, 283

Nair, Dileep, 58 Nalo, David, 284 Nambiar, Satish, 192 Nankani, Gobind, 282 Nehmeh, Adib, 285 Nenshi, Naheed, 283 Niamir-Fuller, Maryam, 286 Nicholson, Norm, 285 Nienhauser, Dan, 286 Nimo, Michael, 282

Index of Names Nishimoto, Shoji, 204 Nitorreda, Alex, 286 Nkuhlu, Wiseman, 284 Noman, Omar, 283 Nyambi, Samuel, 284 Obaid, Thoraya, 203 Obasanjo, Olusagun, 220 Obuchi, Keizo, 20 Ocampo, Jose Antonio, 203 Odhiambo, Ojijo, 284 Ogata, Sadako, 192 Okarut, Nathan, 282 Okidi, John, 203 Orlandini, Barbara, 284 Orlando, Maria Beatriz, 203 Orme, Bill, 283 Orr, Robert, 283 Oshima, Kenzo, 93 Otobo, Eloho, 283 Page, John, 282 Page, Samantha, 285 Paluzzi, Joan, 203 Pansieri, Flavia, 285 Panyarachun, Anand, 29, 192 Park, Tongsun, 366, 367 Parsons, Erik, 285 Parvathaneni, Harish, 283 Pascale, Pragati, 283 Pasha, Hafiz, 203, 204 Paton, William, 284 Patrick, Joanna, 285 Paul, Vinod, 286 Paxton, Elizabeth Anne, 286 Perciasepe, Bob, 285 Pero, Alejandra, 283 Petit-Mshana, Eileen, 285 Pettinato, Stefano, 283 Phyu, Hnin Hla, 286 Pieth, Mark, 57, 358, 359, 412 Ping, Jean, 41, 67, 71, 77 Pingali, Prabhu, 283 Pinheiro, Luiz L. Fernandes, 283 Pinho, Helen de, 203 Piot, Peter, 285 Platzer, Michael, 203 Ponti, Marina, 284 Porte, Paul Andre de la, 284 Postill, Kyoko, 286

529 Primakov, Yevgeny, 192 Putter, Jeanette de, 285 Qichen, Qian, 192 Radelet, Steven, 203 Rahman, Atiqur, 203 Rajan, Raghuram, 282, 283 Rakhmonov, Emomali, 284 Rakotomalala, Ramahatra, 282 Ramanathan, Rathi, 285 Rashid, Amer, 367 Rasi, Marjatta, 285 Rawley, James, 285 Razhaoui, Ahmed, 284 Reddy, Sanjay, 286 Redhouse, David, 286 Rice, Condoleezza, 81, 93 Richard, Frederic, 203 Rickard-Martin, Loraine, 194 Risz, Yann, 283 Riza, S. Iqbal, 58, 373, 389, 391-394 Roberts, Peter, 282 Robinson, Mary, 285 Robinson, Vinetta, 284 Romero, Ana-Teresa, 203 Roncoli, Thomas, 283 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 27, 47 Rowden, Rick, 285 Roy, Rathin, 283 Royan, Rabbi, 203, 285 Sachs, Jeffrey, vii, 28, 41, 202 Sadasivam, Bharati, 283 Sadik, Nafis, 192 Sahay, Ratna, 203 Saleh, Turhan, 204 Salim, Salim Ahmed, 192 Salimullah, M., 282 Sanders, Ingrid, 284 Sandler, Joanne, 283 Sanjines, Marisol, 284 Sanou, Salina, 285 Savigny, Don de, 286 Scholvinck, Johan, 284 Schröder, Gerhard, 27, 220 Scowcroft, Brent, 192 Sears, Robin, 203 Seif, Abdo, 285

Index of Names

530 Seppanen, Harri, 286 Sercovich, Francisco, 203, 283 Sethuraman, Kavita, 286 Sevan, Benon, 57-59, 362, 373, 376, 388-395, 404, 416, Sharma, Manohar, 286 Shekhar, Susmita, 286 Sherbinin, Alex de, 282 Shetty, Salil, 284 Shetty, Sudhir, 203 Shimomura, Norimasa, 283 Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da, 220 Simon, David, 203, 282 Simonen, Mari, 283 Simpson, Nora, 203 Siniscalco, Domenico, 285 Smets, Henri, 286 Smith, Charlotte Hord, 285 Smith, William, 285 Smolik, Joseph, 283 Sobhani, Sahba, 283 Sofan, Ahmed Mohammed, 284 Sofi, Jamil, 285 Soucat, Agnes, 282 Spearman, Dianne, 283 Spinaci, Sergio, 285 Srinivas, Smita, 203 Stabinski, Lara, 286 Stamatopoulou, Elsa, 285 Staur, Carsten, 285 Stedman, Stephen, 194 Stephanides, Joseph, 58 Stephens, Yvette, 283 Stern, Nicholas, 282 Stewart, David, 283 Storeygard, Adam, 282 Stover, John, 286 Strong, Maurice, 367 Subramanian, Arvind, 282 Suki, Lenora, 285 Suzman, Mark, 204 Swanson, Eric, 282 Synnott, Martha, 286 Taft, Julia, 204 Talib, Aisha, 283 Tan, Jee-Peng, 282 Tendulkar, Suresh, 203 Terrel, Nena, 283

Tetteh, Comfort, 282 Tharoor, Shashi, 203 Theisohn, Thomas, 285 Timmer, Hans, 282 Tirana, Amina, 204, 283 Tobin, Kelly, 203 Toe, Adama, 286 Torpy, Brian, 203 Toure, Daouda, 286 Toure, Modibo, 284 Tozan, Yesim, 203 Traore, Ferima, 286 Trott, Christopher, 283 Trowbridge, Erin, 203 Tucker, John, 286 Tumwebaze, Happy James, 286 Turkoz-Cosslett, Gulden, 283 Turner, Ted, 9 Turner-Jones, Therese, 286 Uitto, Juha, 286 Usnick, Michael, 203 Uthoff, Andras, 286 Van Walsum, Peter, 359 Vandemoortele, Jan, 283 Varshney, Ashutosh, 203 Velez, Carlos Eduardo, 283 Vike-Fraiberga, Vaira, 56 Vincent, Samir, 366, 367, 376 Vinton, Louisa, 286 Volcker, Paul A., 57, 83, 91, 358, 359, 411 von Sponeck, Hans, 394 Wade, Abdoulaye, 284 Waldman, Ron, 203 Walelign, Netsanet, 286 Walker, Timothy, 283 Wall, Tim, 283 Wanchoo, Rohit, 203 Wangusa, Hellen, 284 Ward, Rob, 286 Watson, Robert, 286 Webb, Patrick, 286 Weil, Diana, 286 Weissman, Eva, 282 Welch, Carol, 284 Welch, Gita, 283

Index of Names Wells, Pera, 286 Werksman, Jake, 286 Wheeler, Haynie, 203 Whitaker, Caron, 286 White, Emily, 203, 283 White, Sharon, 284 Wiemers, Alice, 203 Wiesen, Caitlin, 283 Williams, Abiodun, 283 Wilson, Edward, 286 Wilson, Elaine, 283 Wilson, Michael, 363, 416, 418 Wilson, Paul, 203 Wirth, Meg, 286 Witoelar, Erna, 284

531 Woo, Wing Thye, 282 Woollcombe, David, 286 Yakovlev, Alexander, 59 Yao, Xianbin, 203 Yared, Pierre, 282 Yousef, Tarik, 285 Yuksei, Nalan, 203 Zaoude, Aster, 286 Zaroui, Maria, 194 Zedillo, Ernesto, 56 Zenawi, Meles, 284 Zepp, Ray, 282 Zlauvinen, Gustavo R., 283

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