Race, Power, and Political Emergence in Memphis (Race and Politics Series , Vol 1)

GARLAND STUDIES ON RACE AND POLITICS edited by TONI-MICHELLE C.TRAVIS A GARLAND SERIES RACE, POWER, AND POLITICAL...

Author: Sharon D Wright

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GARLAND STUDIES

ON

RACE AND POLITICS

edited by TONI-MICHELLE C.TRAVIS

A GARLAND SERIES

RACE, POWER, AND POLITICAL EMERGENCE IN MEMPHIS

SHARON D.WRIGHT

GARLAND PUBLISHING, I N C . A MEMBER OF THE

T AY L O R & F R A N C I S G R O U P

NEW YORK & LONDON/2000

Published in 2000 by Garland Publishing, Inc. A member of the Taylor & Francis Group 19 Union Square West New York, NY 10003 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. Copyright © 2000 by Sharon D.Wright All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 0-203-90503-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-90596-2 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-8153-3083-9 (Print Edition)

Dedicated to the memory of my father Mr. Willie James Wright November 16, 1938–March 4, 1998

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments Foreword List of Tables List of Illustrations

ix xiii xv xvii

Chapter 1: The Role of Race in Local Electoral Politics

1

Chapter 2: Black Politics and Race Relations in Memphis During Reconstruction

7

Chapter 3: The Crump Machine and Black Memphis

27

Chapter 4: The Civil Rights Movement in Memphis

55

Chapter 5: Racial Polarization and Electoral Behavior, 1975–87

85

Chapter 6: The 1991 Memphis Mayoral Election: W.W.Herenton Targets Black Mobilization

123

Chapter 7: The Limits of Mayoral Power and the Ethnoracial Transition in Memphis

149

vii

viii

Contents

Chapter 8: The Continuing Search for Full Incorporation in Memphis

173

Bibliography About the Author Index

181 197 199

Preface and Acknowledgments

In their study of Southern politics, Jack Bass and Walter Devries found that “the emergence of Southern blacks into the mainstream of political participation” led to a transformation of Southern politics. One of the more interesting transformations in a major Southern city has occurred in Memphis, Tennessee which has been used as a case study to examine the effects of racial conflict on black political development. An examination of Memphis’ black political scene allows for an understanding of the larger issues of politics, power, and race in urban America. The emergence of black Memphians as dominant actors in local electoral politics has differed from their emergence in other Southern cities. Voluntary desegregation occurred before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and blacks voted in large numbers long before passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This is not to suggest that the city of Memphis has been a great Utopia for African Americans. On the contrary, white voters and politicians alike resisted black political emergence. In addition, the black community had to end the internecine divisions and rivalries among its leadership to elect its first black mayor. The election and subsequent reelection of W.W.Herenton not only represented the political emergence of black voters, but the beginning of a new, majority black governing coalition as well. The task that remains for black Memphis is to translate its political power into economic power. If not, they will inherit a city which consists mostly of poor and working class residents who have few options for economic sustainability and growth. ix

x


This project began during the summer of 1992 while I was a doctoral candidate in the department of political science at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. I am greatly indebted to its faculty. Professors Paul Bergeron, John Scheb II, Otis Stephens, and William Lyons were particularly helpful in providing comments on my dissertation which analyze elements of racial polarization in Memphis mayoral elections from 1967–1991. I am also very grateful to my former colleagues in the department of Pan-African Studies at the University of Louisville—Chandra Alves, Deidre L.Badejo, Susan Broadhead, Carol M.Cummings, Robert L. Douglas, David E.Goatley, J.Blaine Hudson, Yvonne V.Jones, and Angela White. My friends in the department of political science and the black studies program at the University of Missouri at Columbia have also given me a tremendous amount of support over the last two years. In addition, the Offices of Research at both universities provided grants to fund this research. I would also like to thank my dear friends and mentors who read all or parts of this manuscript—Professors Thad Brown, Miriam DeCosta-Willis, James Jennings, Dennis Judd, Michael Kirby, Minion K.C.Morrison, William E.Nelson Jr., Marion Orr, Marcus Pohlmann, and Wilbur C.Rich. Also, a number of local activists and elected officials granted interviews and provided useful information. Members of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists provided constructive criticism of papers from this text at annual meetings. I would especially like to point out that the late Sara Roberta Church, the Reverend Dr. Benjamin L.Hooks, the Reverend Samuel B. Kyles, and Russell B.Sugarmon Jr. not only helped me with this research, but also paved the way for me and other young African Americans by challenging institutional racism in Memphis. I only hope that I can be a role model for the next generation as you have been for me. The staffs of the Hollis Price Library at LeMoyne-Owen College, the history section and Memphis Room at the Memphis Public Library and Information Center, Mississippi Valley Collection at the University of Memphis, Offices of Interlibrary Loan at the Universities of Louisville and Missouri at Columbia, Nate Hobbs and Claude Jones of the Memphis Commercial Appeal, and Era Switzler of the Shelby County Election Commission provided articles, data, texts, and other helpful information. My graduate research assistants—LaShonda Carter-Boone, Young Cho and Xin Guo—did a lot of the most timeconsuming work for this project. Two of my other graduate students, Richard T.Middleton IV and Kevin Anderson, have been a joy to work


xi

with over the years. Both of you have brilliant careers ahead of you in the field of African American politics. David Estrin, Laura Lawrie, Kristi Long, Toni C.Michelle-Travis, and anonymous reviewers at Garland provided helpful comments and constructive criticism. My best buddies—Carol Anderson, Russell Benjamin, Tony and Fatima Conard, Kitty Holland, Bobbie Holton, Joanne and Philip Joyner Jr., Charles Menifield, Helen Neville, Anna Riley, and Cassandra Veney—helped me to maintain my sanity when writing this book and searching for a publisher. My family has given me the emotional support that I needed to continue with this project—my mother Annie Ruth Wright, my babies Andrew, Austin, and Victoria Brown, my sister Janice Brown, my brother-in-law Donald Brown, and my brother and best friend Christopher Marvin Wright. Lastly, my special friend, Alfred Austin, motivates me to have a closer relationship with God and to be a better person.

Foreword Professor James B.Jennings, Ph.D. Director of the William Monroe Trotter Institute The University of Massachusetts at Boston

Several demographic and economic developments in the United States point to a continuing preoccupation with issues related to race in this country. The state of race relations will be discussed and debated for a long time to come, based on the fact that racial and ethnic diversity is increasing in this nation, and also due to a situation where blacks in many places have yet to enjoy the fruits of economic opportunity available to other groups. Dr. Sharon Wright’s study of black struggles for social and economic influence in a Southern city represents an important breakthrough for understanding historical antecedents to contemporary situation, as well as insight for possible future directions in urban politics. The author’s utilization of descriptive data and statistical analysis highlights relationships between institutions, culture, and political behavior. Her review of journalistic accounts of Memphis politics gives the reader insight into the racial thinking that is prevalent in some sectors of this city. Dr. Wright’s command of urban affairs theory and literature provide a framework for placing events related to black politics in Memphis in a conceptual framework that is coherent and comprehensive. Dr. Wright shows a keen understanding and scholarly involvement with key political developments in Memphis which allow her to provide important insights with the reader about the successes and failures of black political mobilization. This study shows that the struggle for black political xiii

xiv

Foreword

influence at the local level continues despite significant progress—and, retrogression—in the area of civil rights in the national arena. Thus, while this study focuses on one city, its lessons are applicable to many other cities, as well as to the nation. This book confirms that the struggle for black political power is not linear in terms of moving from one success to yet another one, but rather a constant back-and-forth struggle as pointed out earlier by other political scientists and observers. Finally, this book illustrates emphatically that blacks continue to insist on racial equality and social justice. Clearly the political victories that blacks realize in Memphis are important for all the citizens of this city, but significant for continuing struggles aimed at racial equality and social justice for all of society.

List of Tables

Table 2-1 Epidemics in Memphis Before 1880 Table 2.2 Racial and Ethnic Populations in Memphis During the Late 1800s Table 3.1 The Black and White Populations in Memphis, 1900–60 Table 5.1 Elective Offices Held by Members of the Ford Family Table 5.2 Harold Ford Sr.’s Total Vote Percentages, 1974–94 Table 5.3 Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1975 Memphis Mayoral Elections Table 5.4 Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1979 Memphis Mayoral Elections Table 5.5 Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1982 Memphis Mayoral Elections Table 5.6 Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1983 Memphis Mayoral Election Table 5.7 Black and White Populations of Memphis, 1960–90 Table 5.8 Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1987 Memphis Mayoral Election Table 5.9 Regression Estimates of Racial Turnout in General and Runoff Memphis Mayoral Elections, 1975–87 Table 5.10 City wide Results of At-Large Council Elections Table 6.1 1991 Memphis Mayoral Election Results xv

18 20 34 88 91 98 101 104 111 111 111 115 180 136

xvi

Table 6.2 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 7.6 Table 7.7

List of Tables

Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1991 Memphis Mayoral Election Socioeconomic Index of Cities Governed by Black Mayors in 1993 Cities with the Highest Poverty Rates, 1989 Socioeconomic Characteristics of All Families in Memphis, 1990 Socioeconomic Characteristics of Black and White Families in Memphis, 1990 Regression Estimates of Average Turnout in Mayoral Elections of Southern Cities, 1969–91 Regression Estimates of Results in the 1991 and 1995 Mayoral Elections Memphis Commercial Appeal Poll, 1995

139 153 155 156 157 165 166 168

List of Illustrations

Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2

Photo of Edward Hull Crump, 1930. Lieutenant George W.Lee and Robert R.Church Jr. in 1952. Figure 3.3 Photo of Henry C.Bunton, Benjamin L.Hooks, and Russell B. Sugarmon Jr. during the Volunteer Ticket Campaign of 1959. Figure 4.1 Members of the Memphis Committee on Community Relations after a meeting to negotiate desegregation. Figure 4.2 A.W.Willis Jr. on the campaign trail on August 17, 1967. Figure 4.3 Singer Rufus Thomas, A.W.Willis Jr., and A. Maceo Walker at a campaign appearance in 1967. Figure 4.4 Henry Loeb Jr. greets his supporters during the 1967 mayoral campaign. Figure 4.5 Mayor Henry Loeb speaks to a group of black students who protested one of his appearances at the University of Memphis in the spring of 1968. Figure 4.6 Mayor Loeb mobilized local policemen and national guardsmen on March 28, 1968. Figure 4.7 Trash and debris lay on Dunlap near Poplar Boulevard after the Elton Hayes riots. Figure 4.8 A police officer arrests a protester at a housing project near Crump Boulevard during the Elton Hayes riots. xvii

32 40 46

58 61 64 65 71

72 77 78

xviii

Figure 4.9

Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2

Figure 5.3 Figure 5.4 Figure 5.5

Figure 5.6 Figure 6.1 Figure 7.1

List of Illustrations

Four of the nine officers who were charged with Elton 79 Hayes’ death enter Judge Otis Higgs Jr.’s courtroom on January 21, 1972. State representative Emmitt Ford, State Senator 89 John Ford and Congressman Harold Ford in 1974. Harold Ford flashed a victory sign at the 92 Rivermont Hotel after defeating Dan Kuykendall for Congress on November 5, 1974. The candidates for mayor in 1975. 96 Otis Higgs concedes his loss for mayor in 99 November 1975. Wyeth and Linda Chandler appear at a victory 100 celebration after defeating Otis Higgs in the November 1975 runoff election. John Ford, Harold Ford, and Dorothy Ford after 110 the senator’s loss in the October 1983 mayor’s race. Mayor W.W.Herenton giving his victory speech 137 on October 4, 1991. Harold Ford gave an emotional speech to 163 supporters at the Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza hotel after his acquittal on mail and bank fraud charges in April 1993.

CHAPTER 1

The Role of Race in Local Electoral Politics

RACE, POWER, AND POLITICAL EMERGENCE IN AMERICA The issue of race has always been an important one in American politics. It continues to affect the amount of economic and political power that blacks and other minority groups receive in their respective cities. In this text, black political emergence refers to the black community’s efforts to elect representation in proportion to their numbers in the population. After achieving proportional representation, black electorates seek political incorporation—“an equal or leading role in a dominant coalition that is strongly committed to minority interests”.1 Three primary factors have hampered black power and political emergence. First, disfranchisement and political machines prevented the elections of black political figures and diluted the black vote. During the mid-1860s, the Fifteenth Amendment granted the right of suffrage to African Americans who then elected the first black political figures in the nation. Laws were implemented, however, to disfranchise black voters for decades. Also, whites used economic and physical intimidation to “keep blacks in their place.” In the majority of Southern and some Northern cities, blacks could neither vote nor elect representation after the Reconstruction years. In cities like Baltimore, Chicago, and Memphis, blacks voted but lacked power and political emergence primarily because of machine politics. Black bosses of “submachines” mobilized the black vote for the machine’s candidates; yet, the black community received few incentives. 2 Congressman William Dawson of Chicago stated the accommodating yet 1

2

Race, Power, and Political Emergence in Memphis

realistic view of many black politicians in machine-dominated cities, “We must play the game according to the rules. I always play it that way and I play with my team. If you are on a baseball team, you stick with your team or you may not be able to play much longer.”3 Black citizens realized that the only way to have a voice in local politics was through support of the machine. Some individuals and groups conducted independent political efforts to rebel against the machine’s stronghold, but were usually unsuccessful. Other obstacles to black power and political emergence were enacted after the ratification of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. At-large election systems, gerrymanders, majority vote requirements, and other measures were implemented to dilute the black vote. As a result of these vote dilution tactics, cities with large black populations failed to elect black representatives, especially in at-large or city wide races. Finally, the use of racial appeals and racially polarized voting blocs continues to hamper black political development. A racial appeal is one in which a candidate attacks his opponent because of his race and/or when the media exploits racial issues.4 Racial polarization occurs when black and white voters support candidates from their racial group.5 According to the U.S. Supreme Court case, Thornburg v. Gingles, white bloc voting is “legally significant” and thus suspect when it results in the defeat of “minority-preferred” candidates. 6 The Court also found that no discrimination occurs if the candidates favored by minorities usually win. Blacks and whites establish blocs when their voting patterns indicate that they have a “distinct group interest” and when the majority of each group’s members will probably support the same candidate.7 After an increasing number of blacks became viable contenders, voters supported candidates on the basis of race rather than class, as well as ideological, and partisan reasons. Blacks and whites became competing groups which perceived the other’s political successes as a threat to their group’s welfare. Thus, both black and white candidates used racial appeals to mobilize their constituencies. According to Katherine L.Tate (1995), black candidates used racial appeals in order to encourage a large turnout because of the refusal of many whites to vote for them.8 Whites used these appeals to exploit white fears of black governance. They were less concerned with turnout because whites constituted the majority of the voting-age population in cities. Today’s white candidate appeals seem more coded than previous ones. Few would openly state former Alabama Governor George Wallace’s view that he had been “out-nigguhed” by an opponent or ask voters to “Vote


3

White,” as did former Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo.9 Instead, the platforms of today’s white conservative or “Rainbow II” politicians promise law and order, ending quotas, and welfare reform.10 Although these issues appear to be racially neutral, they highlight race in a more covert way. The majority of black candidates still have difficulty in winning elections because of racially polarized voting. MEMPHIS AS A CASE STUDY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS Race, Power and Political Emergence in Memphis examines black political behavior and empowerment strategies in the city of Memphis. Each chapter of the text focuses on three themes—mobilization, emergence, and incorporation. From the late 1800s to the 1990s, blacks in Memphis used various strategies to mobilize the black electorate and elect representatives. During the Reconstruction years, the Jim Crow system of legalized segregation inhibited black political development. From the early 1900s to the mid 1950s, E.H. Crump used the large black voting bloc to elect his machine’s candidates, but refused to allow the black community to elect black candidates. In the Southern cities of Atlanta, Baltimore, and New Orleans, the traditional mobilization tactic involved organizing blacks and liberal whites in coalitions to elect black representatives during the 1960s. Blacks in Memphis, however, were unable to transform the interracial groups that supported and negotiated the desegregation agreements of the 1960s into coalitions to elect black representatives. With few exceptions, most of the black elected officials in local races received less than 10 percent of the white vote and at least 80 percent of the black vote. After black candidates won an increasing number of political offices during the 1980s and 1990s, the black community experienced political emergence. In the early 1990s, the local political scene experienced a transition from a white-dominated to a black-dominated governing coalition. The experience of cities like Detroit, Gary, Newark, and others, however, shows that electing black officials is not enough. Blacks who control the political base are not able to aid the underclass if their cities lack overall economic development. Without additional economic resources, very little change will take place. Good working relationships with the business community are essential for economic development. If this does not happen, despite their political emergence, blacks will lack strong political incorporation.

4


Black political development in Memphis has undergone four periods— the eras of access, machine rule, civil rights struggle, and racial politics. Racism was one of the primary obstacles to black political development during each of these periods. Chapter 2 shows that African Americans gained rights of citizenship and suffrage and thus mobilized their communities for participation in the political system for the first time during the era of access. Within four decades, blacks advanced their status from that of slaves in the 1860s to black elected officials in the 1870s and 1880s to less than half of the electorate by 1900. Chapter 3 discusses the Crump machine and its relationship with the black community. For approximately fifty years, E.H.Crump used both the black and white vote to power his political machine. Despite the machine’s domination, black businessmen and political organizations sought political emergence by endorsing nonmachine candidates, forming political organizations, and opening businesses on Beale Street. The Crump machine taught the black community a valuable lesson—the importance of bloc voting and mobilization. After Crump’s death, a unified black voting bloc would support black and white liberals rather than machine candidates. Chapter 4 examines activities during the era of civil rights struggle. In the 1960s, individual plaintiffs and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.) filed federal and state lawsuits and the sit-in movement began. Interracial groups negotiated voluntary desegregation of public facilities before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because of desegregation, African Americans gained a sense of confidence that they could elect black representatives. As a result, the first black elected officials since Reconstruction won political offices. Racial polarization worsened after the 1968 Sanitation Strike, 1969 Black Monday protests, and 1971 Elton Hayes riot. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the role race played in local political elections during the era of racial politics. Chapter 5 discusses the role of the Ford brothers in Memphis politics and the black community’s unsuccessful efforts to elect a black mayor in the city’s nonpartisan elections and atlarge Memphis City Council members. In Chapter 6, I examine the main components of W.W.Herenton’s successful mayoral campaign. In Chapter 7, the challenges Herenton faced during his first term as he attempted to govern a racially polarized city and faced opposition from both black and white Council members are discussed. The final chapter analyzes the future of black politics in Memphis. Black citizens will remain concerned about crime, economic development, poverty, the quality of public schools, and racial polarization. Other issues


5

such as criminal disfranchisement may affect the ability of black political figures to win elections. Moreover, a new generation of black political leaders is emerging in Memphis politics. In 1996, Harold E.Ford Sr., who retired after twenty-two years in Congress, was succeeded by his son Harold E.Ford Jr. The Harold Jr. election raised the issue of whether Harold Sr. had transferred his “mini-Crump machine” to his son. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MEMPHIS CASE STUDY FOR NATIONAL POLITICS AND RACE By analyzing the effects of race on black political emergence in Memphis, scholars will be able to examine broader questions about its effects in other cities. How do political machines use substantial black electorates to their advantage? What forms of protest do black communities conduct to rebel against machine rule? What primary mobilization tactics have black citizens used during the different periods of their political development? Why do blacks mobilize more quickly in some cities? In cities with large and predominantly black populations, what elements prevent black candidates from winning citywide races? What constraints do newly elected black mayors face? What benefits do black citizens gain from their representation? After a predominantly black governing coalition is elected, what obstacles remain? Can black citizens translate proportional representation into strong political incorporation? How much power can African Americans realistically expect to gain in cities? The Memphis case study shows that white racism is not the only obstacle to black political development. Black citizens can have population majorities, but lose elections for other reasons. Their ability to win elections and gain full incorporation depends heavily on whether they minimize internal conflict, establish coalitions with middle-class citizens, and with the business establishment. NOTES 1 Rufus P.Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb, eds.,“Can Blacks and Latins Achieve Power in City Government? The Setting and the Issues,” Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition (New York: Longman, 1990), 9. 2 William J.Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit: Black Politics and the Chicago Machine, 1931–1991 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 91–114. 3 Edward T.Clayton, The Negro Politician (Chicago: Johnson Publishing Co., 1964), 73.

6


4 Bernard Grofman, “Throwing Darts at Double Regression—and Missing the Target,” Social Science Quarterly 74, 3(September 1993):480–487. 5 Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard G.Niemi, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 73. 6 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 7 Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley and Richard G.Niemi, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67. 8 Katherine L.Tate, “The Politics of Race in American Cities” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Tampa, Florida, November 1–4, 1995), 4. 9 Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 57; Richard A.Keiser, “The Rise of a Biracial Coalition in Philadelphia,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds., Rufus P.Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 49–76. 10 John H.Millenkopf, “New York: The Great Anomaly,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: Second Edition, eds., Rufus P.Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1997), 110–113.

CHAPTER 2

Black Politics and Race Relations in Memphis During Reconstruction

INTRODUCTION The era of access during the Reconstruction years is the focus in Chapter 2. During this period, three factors led to the black political emergence that occurred during the 1990s–black suffrage, the 1866 race riots, and the yellow fever epidemics. After 1867, black voters participated in the political system for the first time by electing local and state representatives. Despite the passage of laws which denied most Southern blacks the right of suffrage, blacks in Tennessee continued to vote. In other Southern states, blacks were disfranchised because of grandfather clauses, literacy tests, and white primaries. Blacks in the city of Memphis continued to cast bloc votes for candidates, form political groups, and mobilize voters after the end of federal Reconstruction. During the spring of 1866, three days of rioting resulted in over $100,000 worth of property damage and forty-eight deaths. These riots were not the first racial uprisings in Memphis, but revealed the tension that existed in the post-Civil War years. The 1866 riots and subsequent racial conflicts resulted in a racially polarized political and social environment that continues to exist in Memphis. As a result of the yellow fever epidemics in the 1870s, Memphis gained a 50 percent black population. Middle-class whites, mostly of German descent, left the city and a disproportionate number of poor whites died during the epidemics. Thus by the turn of the century, Memphis was one of few Southern cities with a large population of enfranchised blacks.

7

8


BLACK MANUMISSION, CITIZENSHIP, AND SUFFRAGE The city of Memphis was incorporated on December 19, 1826 with the intent to keep black citizens in a permanent and inferior position. By 1856, 30 years later, the city’s population had grown from 663 to 22, 643 residents, and blacks made up 60 percent of the West Tennessee population. By 1860, approximately one-fourth of Tennessee’s total population was slave and only 7,300 black residents were free.1 Both the emancipated and enslaved black residents faced restrictions. They were constantly under watch, denied an education, restricted by a night curfew and forbidden from holding night meetings unless such were approved by the mayor and witnessed by the police.2 The analysis of slavery in this section shows how far the black community has come. During the city’s earliest years, blacks were once considered to be less than human. Now, black politicians dominate the local political arena and the city has a large black middle-class sector. The first slaves were transported to Memphis in 1795. At first, their labor was used to build a Spanish fort; yet in later years, slave labor maintained the cotton industry in Memphis3 The names of four streets in downtown Memphis indicated their primary functions in the slave trade—Auction, Court, Exchange, and Market.4 During the early and mid-1800s, the Tennessee legislature drafted measures which both maintained the institution of slavery and prevented the migration of free blacks into the state. For example, it passed a law in 1831 which prohibited granting freedom to slaves unless provisions were made for their removal from the state.5 In 1834, members of the Tennessee constitutional convention upheld the institution of slavery because of its importance and inevitability in the state. A committee issued a report asserting that since blacks were “doomed to dwell in the suburbs of society, [any] premature attempt on the part of the benevolent to get rid of the evils of slavery” was ill-advised.6 The convention also forbade the passage of laws which freed slaves without the consent of their owners and withdrew suffrage rights from free blacks.7 During Reconstruction, Tennessee’s former slaves finally received their civil rights. In January 1865, the state constitutional convention abolished slavery when it forbade the legislature from drafting laws upholding “the right of property in man.”8 On July 20, 1866, blacks received the right of citizenship when the Tennessee legislature ratified the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. On February 27, 1867, the state legislature passed a law entitled an Act to Alter and

Black Politics and Race Relations

9

Amend the Act Passed May 3, 1866 which granted the right of suffrage to black men.9 By 1867, approximately 40,000 black men had the right of suffrage in Tennessee. Recognizing the power of their votes, Radical Republicans created Union Leagues which encouraged these former slaves to support the Republican party and taught them the principles of loyalty, freedom, and good citizenship.10 During the late 1860s, Radical Republicans ensured that their candidates would win elections by denying suffrage rights to exConfederates while at the same time attracting substantial percentages of the black vote.11 Many black citizens believed that the Republican party, the party of Lincoln, had freed them from slavery and that they had to vote for Republican candidates in order to remain free.12 In the August 1867 election, Governor William G.Brownlow, a Republican, defeated his opponent by approximately 50,000 votes partly because of overwhelming support from black voters.13 Although black Tennesseans were enfranchised, they still faced obstacles in exercising their right to vote. The Ku Klux Klan formed in 1866 in Pulaski, Tennessee. The group practiced racial intimidation by vandalizing property and harassing individuals throughout the state. Its major objective was to “wrest control of the state government from the radicals by terrorizing and sometimes killing union men and Negroes and preventing the latter especially from exercising the right to vote.”14 Many Tennesseans viewed the Klan as a “necessary, political expedient justified by the Radical disfranchisement policy, the high taxes of Brownlow’s administration and the threat black voting posed to white supremacy.”15 In addition to fears of Klan terrorism, black citizens faced the possibility of a loss of employment and other punishments for their political activity. Whites often refused to employ them unless they voted for certain candidates.16 In addition, members of the Union Leagues and other political organizations were assaulted.17 Despite these obstacles, black Tennesseans voted in large numbers and elect a few black representatives during the late 1800s. THE FIRST BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS IN TENNESSEE Since black men in Tennessee had been granted the rights of citizenship and suffrage, their next task was to gain the right to hold political office. Although the 1867 law, An Act to Alter and Amend the Act Passed May 3, 1866, enfranchised black citizens, section 16 withheld their right to hold office and serve on juries18 At Governor Brownlow’s

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request, the Tennessee legislature enacted “An Act to Remove All Disabilities for Holding Office and Sitting on Juries on Account of Race or Color.”19 As a result of this Act, black male candidates were both appointed and elected to political offices beginning in January 1868. In Nashville, Randall Brown, a former slave, served on the Nashville City Council from 1868 to 1869 and James C.Napier was appointed as county claims commissioner from 1868 to 1870.20 In Knoxville, Alderman David Brown served from 1869 to 1870 and Alderman W.F.Yardley served from 1872 to 1873.21 In January 1872, Dr. J.B.Young became the first black mayoral candidate in Knoxville, but failed to receive any votes.22 Also, the 1872 election of Sampson W.Keeble of Nashville made him the first black state representative.23 In the city of Chattanooga, five black aldermen were elected—George Sewall (1871–72), Robert Marsh (1873–74), D.Medlow (1875–76), W.C.Hodge (1878–79) and W.B. Kennedy (1878–79).24 Beginning in the mid-1870s, the first black elected officials won offices in Memphis. Joseph Clouston, a successful businessman, was elected to the Memphis City Council in 1874. J.A.Thompson and H.C. Clowens were elected as magistrates in 1876 and 1878 respectively.25 From 1879 to 1880, Green E.Evans served on the City Council. Edward Shaw, who moved to Memphis from Kentucky in 1852, became one of the city’s most controversial black political figures during the postslavery era. His political career showed the ability of black candidates to win local political offices and to challenge the white establishment during this time. The end of his political career in the mid 1880s, however, proved that whites could easily get rid of outspoken black politicians when they grew tired of them. In 1870, he ran unsuccessfully for Congress.26 Four years later, Shaw became the first black elected official in West Tennessee. He also briefly served on the Shelby County Commission. Shaw’s advocacy of integration and promotion of civil rights legislation were viewed as both militant and outrageous by whites in Memphis. He was critical of both Democrats and Republicans for their paternalistic and prejudiced views toward black citizens. During the Civil War, he refused to join the Union army because of the exploitation of black soldiers who served as laborers, but could not become officers.27 Shaw also refused to praise Abraham Lincoln for emancipating the slaves. Because of his views and activities, the Memphis press referred to Shaw as “an avowed communist, repudiator and general disruptionist” and “a mean and


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despicable individual.”28 After Democratic Senator Isham G.Harris nominated Shaw to head the federal customs office in July 1885, the Chattanooga Times wrote editorials which referred to Shaw as a “brutal deformity of the human race…an “ignorant and dishonest scoundrel [who would incite blacks to burn] Southern homes [and who often spoke] disrespectfully of the white women of the South.”29 Eventually Harris withdrew the nomination. Because of this type of opposition, Ed Shaw left the political arena in the mid-1880s and practiced law until his death in 1891.30 By 1880, black Republican voters in Tennessee numbered approximately 80,000.31 Since this was a substantial voting bloc at the time, both Republican and Democratic candidates catered to the black vote. Briefly in the 1880s, black citizens participated in Republican party politics at all levels of state and local government. Although Tennessee did not elect a black congressman during Reconstruction, twelve state representatives were elected during the 1880s including black Memphians Benjamin Payne, Leonard Howard, Green E.Evans, and W.A.Fields. 32 Few of their bills were enacted as laws, but these assemblymen symbolically protested racism by proposing legislation against lynchings and discrimination in the criminal justice system, employment arena, schools, and electoral process. Black state representatives also asked for the desegregation of public accommodations, facilities, and transportation, as well as a repeal of the ban on interracial marriages.33 A few black Tennesseans joined the Democratic party during the 1880s because of their belief that the Republicans took their votes for granted. During this time, most white Republicans would neither vote for black candidates nor allow their full participation in party affairs. In addition, the party refused to endorse black candidates for elective offices. For example, only two black candidates were listed on the 1886 Republican ticket: Isaac F.Norris for county court clerk and Louis H.Fields for county register.34 In the August 1886 elections, a large number of black voters in Memphis followed Ed Shaw’s suggestion that they “shake off the yoke of Republicanism and stand shoulder to shoulder with their best friends, the Democrats of the country.”35 Mainly as a result of the black vote, local Democrats defeated the Republican ticket. Later in November 1886, the black vote contributed to a landslide victory for Democratic gubernatorial candidate Robert L.Taylor.36 Thus in 1886, the black community proved to the Republican party that it would have greater difficulty in winning local and statewide offices without the black vote.

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SOUTHERN DISFRANCHISEMENT AND THE END OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDING During the late 1880s, many whites across the South feared that blacks would use their voting blocs to challenge white supremacy. In Tennessee, a group of Republicans in the late 1880s suggested a “lily-white” Republican party because of their belief that white Democrats would switch parties if the Republicans excluded black members.37 Despite this movement and the dissatisfaction many blacks had with the Republican party, most black Tennesseans remained loyal members of the Republican party. Beginning in the late 1880s, however, Southern legislatures introduced suffrage requirements which greatly reduced black political participation and led to a sharp decline in the number of black office-holders. The states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia held conventions to amend their suffrage laws during the late 1880s and early 1890s. Southern states with the largest black populations usually implemented harsher requirements than others. Blacks constituted the majority of South Carolina’s population, outnumbered whites in several of Mississippi’s counties, and made up a larger percentage of registered voters than whites in Louisiana.38 For these reasons, each of these states required potential voters to pass literacy tests in which they had to “understand” and provide a “reasonable interpretation” of the state constitution. 39 By using such vague terminology, Southern states ensured that even the most educated blacks failed these tests, but not illiterate whites. The state constitutions in Alabama and Georgia stipulated that persons who failed literacy tests could still vote if they owned a certain amount of property (usually 40 acres or more) or if they were of “good character.”40 Many southern states continued to administer literacy tests until passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The state of Mississippi was the first to enact a grandfather clause in 1890. In later years, the states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia included these clauses which exempted white males from literacy and property-owning requirements if their fathers or grandfathers had been eligible to vote before 1867.41 The enforcement of these clauses disfranchised the majority of black men whose ancestors had been slaves at the time. In 1915, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that grandfather clauses were unconstitutional in Guinn v. United States.42


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During the later years of the “solid [one-party] South,” white primaries prohibited black citizens from joining the Democratic party in all Southern states except for Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee.43 State legislatures drafted laws which only allowed members of the Democratic party to vote in their primary elections. Because the Democrats usually won Southern elections, the winners of these primaries were almost assured of victory in subsequent general elections. This practice ended in 1944 after the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusion of black voters from party primary elections was a “state action” that violated the Fifteenth Amendment.44 The suffrage requirements in Tennessee and Florida were less egregious than those in the rest of the South during Reconstruction. Neither state required that voters pass literacy tests, but poll taxes required the payment of a $1.00 of $2.00 fee to provide funds for public schools.45 Other suffrage restrictions in Tennessee included the Myers bill by Tennessee Senator John C.Myers, which allowed the governor to appoint voting officials, required prospective voters to register at least twenty days before the date of the election, and stipulated that voters present registration certificates at the polls before being allowed to vote.46 Senator Joseph H.Dortch sponsored a law which only applied to Chattanooga, Knoxville, Memphis, and Nashville—areas with strong black participation rates. A provision in the Dortch bill prohibited assistance to illiterate voters in marking their ballots. This provision had a detrimental impact on black voters because approximately 54.2 percent of the state black population over ten years of age was illiterate compared to 17.8 percent of whites.47 In 1890, the Dortch bill was revised to allow the listing of candidate names in alphabetical order without indicating their party identification. This change made it even more difficult for illiterate black voters who were accustomed to voting for Republican candidates based on party symbols listed next to their names. After both the Myers and Dortch bills became law, Senator Benjamin J.Lea drafted legislation which required that separate booths be used when voting for national and state offices. This bill, which resulted in the end of the federal supervision of local elections, also passed in both houses of the legislature.48 Because of the Myers, Dortch, and Lea bills, and poll tax requirement, the percentages of black registered voters decreased substantially in the August 1890 elections. In addition, only seventeen black Tennesseans held political office from 1885 to 1900 and the state legislature completely lacked black representation by the turn of the century.49 Harry Holloway’s assessment of Southern politics during the 1890s also described the political scene in Memphis:

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Race, Power, and Political Emergence in Memphis With the full application of the doctrines of white supremacy in the 1890s in the creation of the traditional system, the Negro community became a truncated offshoot of the white community and was heavily dependent upon it. Most of the business, professional, political, and social activities common to organized social life took place in the white community and little or none among Negroes. Negro political life was almost nonexistent; what little did exist was controlled by whites…. The professional and middle class elements in the Negro community were largely nullified as a source of leadership.50

Thus, despite the fact that blacks in most of Tennessee’s counties remained enfranchised after the end of federal Reconstruction, their political development was nonexistent in a white supremacist society. RACE RELATIONS DURING THE ERA OF ACCESS During the Reconstruction years, federal troops were supposed to protect former slaves by distributing food and clothing, monitoring elections, organizing schools, and policing the streets. Conflicts soon developed among military officers and local residents. Former Confederates resented military occupation and the arrogance of the Yankee soldiers. White southerners objected to seeing black soldiers in uniforms. Also, fights took place because white soldiers refused to acknowledge blacks as their equals. At other times, black citizens were ordered to remain on their plantations, abused, and jailed indiscriminately.51 In this tense racial climate, mass violence was inevitable. In May 1866, four days of rioting in Memphis resulted in approximately $130,000 in property damage, the deaths of 46 blacks and 2 whites, 75 other injuries, 5 rapes, 10 assaults, 100 robberies, 91 incidents of arson, and the destruction of 4 churches and 12 schools.52 Although local papers described the incident as nothing more than a “nigger riot,” a congressional committee found that black Memphians retaliated only after being attacked: The whole evidence discloses the killing of men, women, and children—the innocent, unarmed, and defenceless pleading for their lives and crying for money; the wounding, beating, and maltreating of a still greater number; burning, pillaging, and robbing; the consuming of dead bodies in the flames, the burning of dwellings, the attempts to burn up whole families in their houses, and the brutal and revolting ravishings of defenceless and terror-stricken women.53


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The racial conflicts that existed during the era of access resembled those that later occurred during the eras of civil rights struggle and racial politics. During each of these periods, Southern whites resented efforts to change their society and the black community had strained relations with the local police force. In 1866, blacks often complained about the abuse they suffered from a mostly Irish police force. Of the 180 police officers in Memphis, 163 were Irish.54 Irish immigrants resented having to compete with former slaves for jobs. They and other whites also feared the power that black Memphians would gain from their large population and male suffrage. By 1866, a number of black soldiers and their families had settled near Fort Picketing in South Memphis. The Third Regiment of the U.S. Colored Artillery had been organized by the Union army and stationed in Memphis. Several confrontations took place among the artillerymen and the police. Irish policemen resented the fact that black soldiers were allowed to arrest whites and patrol the city in the interest of maintaining order. While local residents accused the black soldiers of loitering, using obscene language, and public drunkenness, the soldiers complained of arrests and severe beatings without cause.55 During the spring of 1865, an Irish officer was not tried after shooting a black soldier four times in front of the Commercial Hotel. In April 1866, five officers assaulted and dragged a black soldier down a crowded street for using loud language.56 On Monday afternoon, April 30, a group of black men celebrated after gaining official discharges from the army. As they were leaving a saloon, four white policemen asked them to step off of the sidewalk so that they could pass. When one of the soldiers tripped and stumbled, a policeman fell over him and a minor scuffle took place.57 On Tuesday, May 1, the men continued to celebrate in saloons, another fight occurred among black soldiers and white police officers. After a rumor surfaced that a white officer had been wounded, the police and a group of white citizens returned to South Memphis. During the next two days, a wild mob attacked both black and white citizens in black neighborhoods; burned and vandalized churches and schools; raped women; and severely assaulted others. Reports indicated that many persons were burned alive. The mob also set houses afire and shot at occupants as they attempted to escape.58 Although General Ulysses S.Grant suggested that the federal government sue the city so that victims could recover damages, U.S. Attorney General James Speed disagreed. He believed that the riot was a local issue which did not warrant federal intervention. Since civilian courts

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were open in Memphis and no federal laws had been violated, the victims had to appeal to local authorities for monetary relief.59 Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 could not be invoked since it required federal protection of black citizens and their property, but did not require compensation if local authorities failed to provide safety.60 In the years following the 1866 riots, race relations worsened in Memphis. Black unemployment remained at enormously high levels. Random killings and assaults went without punishment. During the era of slavery, state laws had protected the slaves’ welfare because they were considered property. After they were freed, however, local authorities refused to protect them from intimidation and violence. Citing state sovereignty, federal officials refused to intervene in local affairs. Thus, despite emancipation and the passage of federal legislation, the status of black Americans remained unchanged. State and local authorities refused both to enforce civil rights laws and to protect the safety and welfare of black citizens. Lynchings emerged as a “new Negro crime” during the post-Civil War era. The Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups openly practiced this crime. The most common justification for lynchings was the rape of white women, but blacks were killed for all kinds of offenses.61 Often, the most prominent members of black communities were lynched when attempting to establish businesses or gain civil rights. This was the case when Thomas Moss, Calvin McDowell, and Henry Stewart were lynched on March 8, 1892.62 The white community in South Memphis resented the fact that Moss, McDowell, and Stewart opened the People’s Grocery Store at the curve of Walker Avenue and Mississippi Boulevard. Many black residents of the area patronized the new black-owned business rather than the white market that was located directly across the street. On one occasion, the store’s owner, W.H.Barrett, threatened Calvin McDowell with a pistol and promised to “clean them out.”63 He later filed a complaint alleging that the People’s Grocery Store was a public nuisance and thus should be closed down. Black neighborhood residents then held a town meeting in which speakers promised to retaliate against any such action. Eventually, the store’s owners armed themselves after a rumor of a white mob surfaced. When twelve white deputies dressed in plain clothes arrived to serve a warrant to the owners for “conspiring against whites,” they were fired upon and three were wounded.64 Within hours, reports of a black riot circulated throughout the city. The store’s owner, manager, and clerk were arrested along with approximately


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thirty-one others who lived in the area, but were not involved in the shootings. Shelby County Criminal Court Judge Julius J.DuBose then issued an order to confiscate weapons from black neighborhoods and the black-owned Tennessee Rifles Company.65 Eventually, deputy sheriffs allowed a group of men to abduct Moss, McDowell, and Stewart from their cells. Soon after the murders, whites vandalized and closed down their grocery store. In 1892, 255 lynchings were reported throughout the United States. Except on rare occasions, they were not investigated. Memphis’ black community refused, however, to ignore the murders of Moss, McDowell, and Stewart. Journalist and former schoolteacher Ida B.Wells, one of Thomas Moss’ close friends, wrote a series of angry editorials for Memphis’ black newspaper, the Free Speech.66 The 1892 lynchings and the 1866 riots were similar to the conflicts that developed between the police and black community during the 1968 Sanitation Strike, 1969 Black Monday protests, 1971 Elton Hayes riots, 1983 Shannon Street raid, and 1994 Elmer Bogard murder. In all of these, blacks believed that the police either failed to protect them or purposely assaulted them and that whites were jealous of their efforts for economic and political gains. On the other hand, whites saw the police’s action as legitimate and believed that blacks provoked these conflicts. The polarization that existed during the era of access continued to exist in subsequent years. THE YELLOW FEVER EPIDEMICS OF 1873 AND 1878 By 1860, the city of Memphis had a prosperous economy due to the cotton industry. With a population of approximately 30,000, it was the sixth largest southern city. At least one-third of its citizens were of Irish and German descent. By 1866, the city had grown to almost 50,000 residents. Its stable economy would soon collapse after the yellow fever epidemics of the 1870s. This section examines the origin of the epidemics, their effect on the city’s population, racial makeup, and financial condition. In the decades since the yellow fever epidemics, scholars have debated their place of origin. As shown in Table 2-1, a relatively mild outbreak of yellow fever occurred in 1828. The disease had already existed in Asia, Africa, South America, and the West Indies before mosquitoes carried it to the United States.67 The epidemics of the late 1800s had a devastating impact on Memphians because of the city’s location along the Mississippi riverbank. Ships and steamboats traveled from New Orleans to St. Louis and docked in Memphis.68

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Table 2-1 Epidemics in Memphis Before 1880

Source: Reprinted in Gerald M.Capers. 1970. Yellow Fever in Memphis in the 1870s. The City in American Life, A Historical Anthology. Edited by Paul Kramer and Frederick L.Holborn. New York: G.P.Putnam’s Sons, 176.

In addition, the city of Memphis had inadequate sewer systems and contaminated milk and water. Its unpaved streets were filled with garbage, human waste, and dead animals during the 1870s. These conditions allowed the disease to spread from Happy Hollow and the Pinch, two small Irish Catholic communities near the river, to all parts of the city.69 An 1873 board of health report described local conditions: [Memphis] is under the Chickasaw Bluffs, so sunken that during high water it is largely submerged, and after the tide has fallen is left


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partially covered with stagnant ponds and slimy ooze, whose exhalations are noisome and offensive. Its soil is alluvial, and upon this garbage has been continuously thrown, until it has become extremely filthy. It is the natural drain for the gutters of the overhanging bluffs, through which the sewage steadily trickles. It is in addition the home of a low class of Irish, and the favorite landingplace of flats and rafts, whose occupants are proverbial for their carelessness and uncleanliness. During the hot summer months this accumulated mass of filth has been festering and rotting in the sun, exhaling mephitic gases, which in themselves are potent enough to induce infection, only needing the germ of yellow fever to be sown to yield all the fearful fruits of this great epidemic.70

Persons afflicted with yellow fever first had chills followed by headaches, back pain, burning skin, a rapid pulse, and watery eyes.71 Physicians determined the severity of the disease by looking at the person’s tongue. In mild cases, it was thin and elongated with a whitish or yellowish film. In more severe cases, the tongue was thick, flat, and covered with a white “cottony” coat.72 In fatal cases, victims were unable to urinate and threw up black vomit.73 As a result of panic in the city, the crime rate increased. Many policemen died. Others were afraid to patrol the city for fear of catching the fever from quarantined persons. It would later be found that the disease was not contagious, yet families were quarantined in their homes during the late 1800s. Moreover, neighboring cities and towns refused entrance to trains and ships and the importation of goods from Memphis74 Survivors recounted gruesome yet often fictional tales about bodies covered with black vomit and rats, dead animals, and stillborn babies.75 By the late 1870s, the city of Memphis was devastated by death, a population declines, and poverty. In 1867, 550 of the 2,500 persons afflicted with yellow fever died. In 1873, the number of deaths rose to 2,000 out of 5,000 cases. One year later 5,150 of the 17,600 victims died. In the summer of 1879, 600 of the 2,000 afflicted died of yellow fever. According to Table 2-2, the German population decreased from 2,144 in 1870 to 1,671 in 1900. In 1870, 3,371 Irish citizens lived in Memphis. By 1900, only 49 remained. The yellow fever epidemics did not have as devastating an impact on black Memphians. Only 7 percent, compared to 75 percent of whites, died for reasons which remain unknown.76 After the epidemics, black residents made up almost 50 percent of the Memphis population.

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Table 2.2 Racial and Ethnic Populations in Memphis During the Late 1800s

*The Census Office did not provide information on ethnicity until 1870. **This number includes both free and enslaved blacks. Sources: Department of Interior Census Office. 1872. Populations by Race of Cities, Towns, Etc. 1870 and 1860. The Statistics of the Population of the U.S. Embracing the Tables of Race, Nationality, Sex, Selected Ages and Occupations. Compiled from the Original Returns of the Ninth Census (June 1, 1870). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office; Department of Interior Census Office. 1883. Population of Cities and Towns, Etc.: 1880 and 1870. Statistics of the Population of the U.S. at the Tenth Census (June 1, 1880). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.; Department of Interior Census Office. 1895. Population by Sex, General Nativity and Color of Places Having 2,500 Inhabitants or More: 1890–Continued. Report on Population of the U.S. at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office; and Department of Interior Census Office. 1895. Population by Sex, General Nativity, and Color for Places Having 2,500 Inhabitants or More: 1900– Continued. Report on Population of the U.S. at the Eleventh Census: 1890. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

By 1880, the city of Memphis lay on the verge of bankruptey. At the end of the decade, the city’s debts totaled approximately $3.5 million, as a result of middle class flight and its high poverty rate. Under these conditions, the city of Memphis began its recovery process. On January 31, 1879, Governor Albert S.Marks signed a law which required the city to forfeit its charter and become a taxing district.77 Memphis would now be governed by a fire and police, public works, and health commission. The governor appointed the president of the taxing district who also served as mayor. In January 1880, the city built a new sewer system and cleaned its streets. Also, Robert R.Church Sr., the South’s first black millionaire,


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was the first businessman to purchase a $1,000 bond which eventually helped the city to pay its debts.78 By 1900, the city of Memphis had regained its charter as well as the powers of local taxation and spending. Yet, the city remained dirty and indebted. Also by the turn of the century, many Irish immigrants had died from yellow fever. Most German immigrants had left Memphis and most blacks had survived the epidemics. After poor Southern blacks and whites moved to Memphis from other towns, the city consisted of a more unified group of Southern whites who identified themselves as white rather than German, Irish, or Italian and a large community of poor, uneducated blacks who needed to be mobilized politically. CONCLUSION The first black political figures in Tennessee had a mostly symbolic presence in their respective offices. Since black assemblymen failed to gain support for their proposed legislation, they could not address racial injustices both in Memphis and throughout the state. After the 1890s, black elected officials were virtually nonexistent at all levels in Tennessee. Despite a lack of representation, black citizens experienced a number of successes. They continued to vote in local, state, and national elections. Most importantly, black Memphians survived racial violence, the yellow fever epidemics, and the city’s dismal financial condition with hopes that their situation would improve after the turn of the century. NOTES 1 Joseph H.Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow. Tennessee’s Race Relations in the 1880s (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 212; Chase C.Mooney, Slavery in Tennessee (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 63. 2 Lester C.Lamon, Blacks in Tennessee, 1791–1970 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 19–20; Sandra C.Vaughn, “Memphis: Heart of the MidSouth” in In Search of the New South: The Black urban Experience in the 1970s and 1980s, ed. Robert D.Bullard (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989), 99. 3 Carole M.Ornelas-Struve and Frederick Lee Coulter, Memphis, 1800–1900 (New York: Nancy Powers, 1982), 60; Sandra C.Vaughn, “Memphis: Heart of the Mid-South” in In Search of the New South The Black Urban Experience in the 1970s and 1980s, ed. Robert D.Bullard (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989), 98.

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4 Sandra C.Vaughn, “Memphis Heart of the Mid South” in In Search of the New South The Black Urban Experience in the 1970s and 1980s, ed. Robert D. Bullard (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989), 98. 5 Caleb Perry Patterson, The Negro in Tennessee: 1790–1865 (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 155. 6 Chase C.Mooney, Slavery in Tennessee (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 80. 7 Lester C.Lamon, Blacks in Tennessee, 1791–1970 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 14. 8 Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental Affairs (Nashville: Rich Printing Company, 1964), 4. 9 Acts of Tennessee of 1866–67. 10 Ernest W.Hopper, Memphis, Tennessee.: Federal Occupation and Reconstruction (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1957), 206. 11 Ibid., 234. 12 Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental Affairs (Nashville: Rich Printing Company, 1964), 18. 13 Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, The Negro in Tennessee: 1865–1880 (Washington, D.C.: The Associated Publishers Inc., 1941), 55. 14 Ibid., 61. 15 Joseph H.Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow: Tennessee’s Race Relations in the 1880s (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 212; Chase C.Mooney, Slavery in Tennessee (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 13. 16 Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental Affairs (Nashville: Rich Printing Company, 1964), 20. 17 Ibid., 21. 18 Acts of Tennessee of 1866–67. 19 Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, The Negro in Tennessee, 1865–1880 (Washington, D.C.: The Associated Publishers Inc., 1941), 57. 20 Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental Affairs (Nashville: Rich Printing Company, 1964), 30. 21 Ibid., 30. 22 Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, The Negro in Tennessee, 1865–1880 (Washington, D.C.: The Associated Publishers Inc., 1941), 248. 23 Ibid., 297. 24 Ibid., 248. 25 Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental Affairs (Nashville: Rich Printing Company, 1964), 44.


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26 Lester C.Lamon, Blacks in Tennessee, 1791–1970 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 27; David M.Tucker, “Black Politics in Memphis, 1865– 1875,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 28 (1972):14–15. 27 Lester C.Lamon, Blacks in Tennessee, 1791–1970 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 26. 28 Joseph H.Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow. Tennessee’s Race Relations in the 1880s (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 49. 29 Ibid., 49. 30 David M.Tucker, “Black Politics in Memphis, 1865–1875,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 28 (1972):16. 31 Joseph H.Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow. Tennessee’s Race Relations in the 1880s (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 63. 32 Ibid., 48. 33 Joseph H.Cartwright, “Black Legislators in Tennessee in the 1800s: “A Case Study in Black Political Leadership,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 32 (1973):266. 34 Joseph H.Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow: Tennessee’s Race Relations in the 1880s (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 88. 35 Ibid., 54. 36 Joseph H.Cartwright, “Black Legislators in Tennessee in the 1800s: “A Case Study in Black Political Leadership,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 32 (1973):88. 37 Ibid., 94. 38 John Samuel Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 175–180. 39 V.O.Key, Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 558. 40 Ibid., 556–559. 41 John Samuel Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 182–183. 42 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340 (1915). 43 John Samuel Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 184. 44 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944). 45 The Voting Rights Act prohibited poll tax requirements as a condition for voter registration and the U.S. Supreme Court found them to be unconstitutional in 1966. 46 Joseph H.Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow. Tennessee’s Race Relations in the 1880s (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 223. 47 Ibid., 225. 48 Ibid., 227.

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49 Joseph H.Cartwright, “Black Legislators in Tennessee in the 1800s: A Case Study in Black Political Leadership,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 32 (1973):267; Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental Affairs (Nashville: Rich Printing Company, 1964), 59. 50 Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City Organization (New York: Random House, 1969), 21. 51 Ibid., 71. 52 Ibid., 36. 53 U.S. Congress. House Select Committee on the Memphis Riots. 39th Congress, 1st Session. House of Representatives 101. July 25, 1866. (Reprint. Memphis Riots and Massacres. 1866. Miami: Mnemosyne, 1969), 5. 54 James Gilbert Ryan, “The Memphis Riots of 1866,” Journal of Negro History 62 (1977):244. 55 Mary Frances Berry, Black Resistance, White Law (New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1994), 73; James Gilbert Ryan, “The Memphis Riots of 1866,” Journal of Negro History 62 (1977):245. 56 James Gilbert Ryan, “The Memphis Riots of 1866,” Journal of Negro History 62 (1977):245–246. 57 U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on the Memphis Riots. 39th Congress, 1st Session. House of Representatives 101. (July 25, 1866). (Reprint. Memphis Riots and Massacres. 1866. Miami: Mnemosyne, 1969), 6. 58 Ibid., 385. 59 Mary Frances Berry, Black Resistance, White Law (New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1994), 74. 60 U.S. Congress, Opinions of the Attorney General. 39th Congress, 1st Session. House of Representatives 101. (July 25, 1866). (Reprint. Memphis Riots and Massacres. 1866. Miami: Mnemosyne, 1969), 531–532. 61 N.A.A.C.P, Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889–1918 (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969), 10–28; Ida B. Wells, A Red Record (Chicago: Donohue and Henneberry, 1895), 142–146. 62 According to reports, Moss begged for his life for the sake of his pregnant wife. McDowell’s body had been tortured either before or after his death. He was missing the fingers of his right hand and his eyes had been gouged out. It was even rumored that a criminal court judge may have been one of the lynchers. 63 Ida B.Wells, On Lynchings (Reprint: New York: Arno Press, 1969), 35. 64 David M.Tucker, Memphis Since Crump (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 7; Ida B.Wells, On Lynchings (Reprint: New York: Arno Press, 1969), 35. 65 David M.Tucker, Memphis Since Crump (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 8.


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66 According to Paula Giddings in When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America, Ida B.Wells and others suggested that black citizens leave Memphis because of its racism. Thomas Moss’ last words before his death were, “Tell my people to go west. There is no justice for them here.” 6,000 black Memphians migrated westward to Kansas and Oklahoma as well as to northern cities. Ida Wells also participated in a boycott of the city’s railway system. White businesses on the verge of bankruptcy panicked from the loss of income. Yet, local political figures made few efforts to address discrimination and racism toward black citizens. 67 Gerald M.Capers Jr., The Biography of a River Town (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 175–177. 68 On August 11, 1873, the first indication of yellow fever surfaced after the death of deck hand William Davis on a New Orleans steamboat en route to St. Louis. The first positive identification of the disease was reported on September 2. 69 Gerald M.Capers Jr., The Biography of a River Town (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 179; Armistead L.Robinson, “Plans Dat Corned From God,” in Toward a New South, eds. Orville Vernon Burton and Robert C.McMath Jr. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 79. 70 John H.Erskine, “A Report on Yellow Fever as it Appeared in Memphis, Tennessee in 1873,” Public Health Papers and Reports (Memphis: American Public Health Association, 1873), 385–386. 71 Gerald M.Capers Jr., The Biography of a River Town (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 177; John P.Dromgoole, Yellow Fever Heroes, Heroines and Horrors of 1878 (Louisville: J.P.Morton and Company, 1879), 16. 72 John H.Erskine, “A Report on Yellow Fever as it Appeared in Memphis, Tennessee in 1873,” Public Health Papers and Reports (Memphis: American Public Health Association, 1873), 386. 73 Ibid., 388. 74 Gerald M.Capers Jr., The Biography of a River Town (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 178; Reverend D.A.Quinn, Heroes and Heroines of Memphis (Providence: E.L.Freeman and Sons, 1887), 231–234. 75 Gerald M.Capers Jr., The Biography of a River Town (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 183; John P.Dromgoole, Yellow Fever Heroes, Heroines and Horrors of 1878 (Louisville: J.P.Morton and Company, 1879), 61–68. 76 Gloria Brown-Melton, A History of Blacks in Memphis, 1920–1955 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington State University, 1982), 4. 77 On January 31, 1879, the Memphis Board of Alderman voted 6–3 to surrender the city charter. By allowing the legislature to repeal the charter and create a

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taxing district on January 29, the city of Memphis avoided bankruptcy. In addition, the decision prevented black control of local governmental affairs. Black voters could have used their sizable population to elect representation. See Joseph H.Cartwright, The Triumph of Jim Crow (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 138–139; Charles Clotfelter, 1973, “Memphis Business Leadership and the Politics of the Fiscal Crisis,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 27 (1973):49. 78 Fred L.Hutchins, What Happened in Memphis (Kingsport, Tennessee: Kingsport Press, 1965), 101.

CHAPTER 3

The Crump Machine and Black Memphis

INTRODUCTION By the turn of the century, the city of Memphis showed signs of recovery from the yellow fever epidemics of the 1870s. The city had regained its charter and thus the right to self-governance; built new sewer and water systems; immunized residents against diseases; and cleaned its streets. In addition, Memphis became the cotton capital of the nation and its population continued to increase as a result of continued migration. Nevertheless, problems remained. Crime and corruption plagued the city. A substantial number of black Memphians were illiterate and unemployed. Many of the churches and schools that were destroyed during the 1866 riots were never rebuilt. Local tax rates remained high. Streets were unpaved and dirty. In addition, the police and fire departments were unreliable. By the turn of the century, the city of Memphis had one of the highest per-capita murder rates in the country. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the dynamics of the Crump machine— its origin and control of both the black and white vote. In addition, black protest efforts during and after the Crump years will be discussed. These included the formation of civil rights and political organizations, the emergence of new community and political leaders, the filing of lawsuits, and other political activities. The machine era was crucial in black political development because the black community realized the power of its substantial voting bloc. The majority of candidates had little chance for victory unless they received a large percentage of the black vote. During and after the Crump years, 27

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black citizens attempted to mobilize their vote while also addressing the issue of civil rights. The 1959 Volunteer Ticket effort would be one of the first in which the majority of black voters supported black candidates. All were defeated and civil rights lawsuits ended unsuccessfully. Yet by the end of the decade, citizens learned from their experiences and thought of new empowerment strategies for the future. POLITICAL MACHINES AND BLACK VOTERS Edward C.Banfield and James Q.Wilson defined a political machine as: A party organization that depends crucially upon inducements that are both specific and material…. A machine like any other organization offers a mixture of material and nonmaterial inducements in order to get people to do what it wants them to do.1

Ross, Levine, and Stedman associated political machines with an exchange process, spoils system, and a brokerage system. The machine exchanged material and non material benefits for the votes necessary to maintain and reinforce its power. It denied these same benefits to those persons and groups who refused to provide support.2 Primarily because of racial discrimination, black citizens have been among the most exploited groups by political machines in the cities of Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Memphis, New York, Philadelphia, and others. White and ethnic voters, however, have also aided political machines in sustaining their power. In an analysis of the Richard J.Daley machine, William J.Grimshaw pointed out that poor and predominantly white wards were more likely than blacks to vote for machine candidates from 1931 to 1952.3 The majority of black wards supported machine candidates after Mayor Daley’s election in 1955. Political machines had some positive benefits for whites and immigrants. Judd and Swanstrom pointed out two main reasons for their rise after the turn of the century: the emergence of a mass electorate and the beginning of the industrialization age.4 Millions of immigrants moved to the United States, became citizens and gained the right to vote during the early 1900s. Since many of the new voters were poor and politically inexperienced, machine bosses found ways to mobilize them by providing incentives.5 During the industrialization age, employment was the main incentive because many businesses refused to hire immigrants.


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In addition, machines helped these persons to assimilate into American life and served as vehicles of upward mobility.6 Since many were Irish machines, Irish citizens won elective office or were appointed as lieutenants within the organization.7 Although whites and immigrants often benefited from political machines, black citizens gained very little. Their exclusion from principles of citizenship hampered their assimilation into American life. In Baltimore, Chicago, and New York City, machine bosses used black lieutenants Clarence “Du” Burns, William “Boss” Dawson, and Ferdinand Q.Morton to mobilize the black vote in favor of machine candidates, but these men were not allowed to use their positions as vehicles of upward mobility. They could neither hold high ranking positions within the machine nor participate in decision-making. Put simply, black lieutenants secured the black vote for the machine ticket, but were usually disposed of when no longer useful. James Q.Wilson found that poor black citizens in urban areas supported machine rule because of their overwhelming needs. Machine bosses delivered some incentives to black citizens who usually ranked at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.8 Poor blacks voted for machine candidates out of desperation. Yet, Harold Gosnell found that middleclass blacks often provided even greater levels of support.9 The next section analyzes the relationship between the Crump machine and the black community of Memphis. Unlike Chicago, the majority of black and white voters from all socioeconomic classes supported the machine’s candidates on election day. No evidence supported the position that middle-class blacks were more supportive of the Crump machine than poor blacks. The situation was similar to that in Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati, Kansas City, New York City, and Philadelphia because of its exchange of incentives for votes, use of corruption to build and maintain a power base, and paternalism toward black citizens. Crump almost singlehandedly controlled his machine and chose not to create a black submachine in Memphis. Machine politics in Memphis differed from that in Baltimore because Crump’s machine controlled wards and precincts throughout the entire city, while Baltimore’s machine never had citywide control. Democratic political organizations or clubs distributed slates which endorsed candidates for various offices in each of the city’s precincts.10 Also except for allegations of a Ford machine, machine politics ended in Memphis in the years after Crump’s death, but machine politics remains very much alive in Baltimore, Chicago, New York City, and Philadelphia.

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MR. CRUMP WON’T ’LOW NO EASY RIDERS HERE According to folklore, E.H.Crump moved to Memphis in 1874 with twentyfive cents in his pocket.11 A few years after he moved to Memphis, Crump married Bessie Byrd McLean, the daughter of a wealthy businessman. In 1906, he purchased the Woods-Chickasaw Manufacturing Company, a business which had once employed him as its secretary and treasurer, and changed its name to the E.H.Crump Buggy Company.12 Thus before beginning his political career, Crump was a successful businessman and subsequently a millionaire. In 1909, E.H.Crump was elected mayor under the new mayorcommission form of government. He defeated incumbent J.J.Williams and businessman Walter W.Talbert by approximately seventy-nine votes.13 Crump had campaigned as a reformer who along with five commissioners would solve the city’s remaining problems and end corruption. From 1907 to 1909, while serving as the commissioner of the fire and police departments, he raided several of the city’s gambling halls.14 During the 1909 mayoral campaign, W.C.Handy, “the father of the Blues,” performed a song at a political rally in response to Crump’s reform candidacy: Mr. Crump won’t ’low no easy riders here Mr. Crump won’t ’low no easy riders here We don’t care what Mr. Crump don’t ‘low We gon’ to barrel-house anyhow— Mr. Crump can go and catch hisself some air!15 Despite his promise to reform Memphis, E.H.Crump soon created a machine which sustained itself on corruption. During the age of Prohibition, his administration accepted bribes from brothel, gambling houses, and saloon owners. In 1915, the legislature forced Mayor Crump to resign because of his failure to enforce Tennessee’s gambling, prohibition, and prostitution laws.16 In 1916, he resigned as mayor shortly after being sworn in for a third term, but continued to serve as county trustee during the same year.17 The ouster did not destroy his influence. After devoting his energies to the Crump and Trezevant Insurance Company and the Coca-Cola franchise which he had owned for over a decade, Crump reentered the political arena, but did not run for office. In 1927, the Crump ticket, led by mayoral candidate Watkins Overton, swept the elections. According to scholars,


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Crump’s complete control of local elections began at this time. During the 1930s, Crump was at the height of his power. He served in Congress from 1931–34 and engineered U.S. Representative Walter Chandler’s mayoral victory in 1939. The majority of white citizens loved the eccentric Crump whose red hair turned snow white in later years. He often wore white suits, hornrimmed glasses, a hat, and spoke with a distinctive Southern drawl. Memphians were grateful to Crump for efficient governmental service, law and order, and lower taxes. Citizens were especially pleased with his emphasis on a clean and beautiful city. In 1930, Crump asked a group of housewives to serve on the City Beautiful Commission.18 They found and publicly humiliated owners who neglected their property. In addition, flowers and trees were planted in areas throughout the city. Because of its admiration for Crump, the city honored him by naming events and sites for him both before and after his death—E.H.Crump Boulevard, E.H.Crump day at the annual fair, E.H.Crump stadium, and the Crump statue in Overton Park. The primary method Crump used to sway election outcomes was through the payment of poll taxes. His organization paid the $2.00 fee for thousands of indigent citizens. Crump was determined to use the substantial black population of approximately 40 percent to his advantage (see Table 3-1). His lieutenants paid fees and distributed registration receipts on election day.19 Crump’s officials “herded” or drove busloads of black voters from Memphis, Mississippi, and Arkansas to the polls and told them to support the Crump ticket.20 As a precaution to ensure that his candidates would win by comfortable margins, the Crump machine also transported Mississippi and Arkansas voters to the polls in Memphis. These practices became so outrageous that in July 1928, Charles Patrick Joseph Mooney, the editor of the Memphis Commercial Appeal, printed a cartoon depicting a white man telling black citizens how to vote with the caption reading, This Must Not Happen Again in Memphis.” At other times, Memphians “were voted” without their knowledge. The Crump machine cast votes for thousands of citizens who were registered, but failed to turn out on election day.21 It also relied on “repeaters,” Crump supporters who voted in different precincts on election day.22 The organization had a stereotypical belief that blacks would vote for Crump’s candidates if they received barbecue, milk, whiskey, and watermelons as incentives. Black ministers such as A.D.Bell, A.E.Campbell, J.L.Campbell, T.O.Fuller and Blair T.Hunt

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Figure 3.1. Photo of Edward Hull Crump, 1930. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis) informed Crump of the black community’s needs and persuaded their congregations to vote for his candidates. The Reverend A.D.Bell of Mount Moriah Baptist Church was in charge of giving watermelons to black citizens.23 The majority of black ministers, however, were not actively involved in local political affairs because of their dissatisfaction with Crump and his machine’s paternalism. Many rebelled against the machine by refusing to vote rather than supporting its candidates.24


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E.H.Crump had a paternalistic attitude toward black Memphians, but met a few of their needs. He regarded black citizens as inferior to whites believing that white men were equal citizens, but black men had their “proper place.”25 Since Crump believed that black Memphians were entitled to some “governmental care and service,” he addressed some of their needs such as building Douglass Park, appointing black medical inspectors in black schools; giving milk to young mothers, and making efforts to end the harassment of black citizens by local officials.26 Crump also honored prominent black citizens such as the Reverend T.O.Fuller, attorney Will Foote, and Tom Lee who rescued thirty-one people from the Mississippi River after the capsize of a steamer in 1925.27 In addition to his local paternalism, Crump generally had racist views toward black Americans. He allowed police brutality against black citizens to go unchecked. During the 1920s, Ku Klux Klan member Clifford Davis served as police commissioner and almost 70 percent of the force were Klan members.28 The first black officers were not appointed until 1948 when nine black policemen were hired, but were only allowed to patrol black neighborhoods.29 As random acts of violence against black citizens occurred constantly, few efforts were made by local or federal authorities to address the problem. On several occasions, citizens appealed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) Director J.Edgar Hoover and to the U.S. Attorneys General in Memphis for help to no avail. During the 1940s, his police commissioner “Holy Joe” Boyle targeted citizens who “[fanned] racial hatred.”30 These were persons who either challenged or criticized Crump’s bossism. For example, Dr. J.B. Martin, a local pharmacist, was forced to leave Memphis after he publicly campaigned for Republican presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie in 1940. In October 1940, Crump ordered the cancellation of all black Republican rallies in Memphis. After Dr. Martin refused to cancel a rally on October 28th at Salem Baptist Church, Crump sent police officers to his pharmacy for several weeks to search customers for narcotics including twenty children from a local kindergarten who bought ice cream there.31 Black Republican Elmer Atkinson also had to leave Memphis after police harassed patrons at his Beale Street restaurant including a Catholic priest, Father Bertrand Koch.32 It was commonly believed that black Memphians accepted incentives from Crump, but seldom challenged his machine. As previously stated, Crump cooperated with various black community leaders to secure support; however, others made independent efforts during the Crump years.

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Table 3.1 The Black and White Populations in Memphis, 1900–60

Source: Department of Interior Census Office. 1960. The Statistics of the Population of the U.S. Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office.

EFFORTS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE DURING THE CRUMP YEARS After the turn of the century, a small but significant group of black entrepreneurs opened businesses on Beale Street as a way to gain economic independence during the Crump years. The street was known for its gambling houses, music, restaurants, saloons, and other places of entertainment. Lieutenant George W.Lee, a former Army officer and one of the city’s most influential black political leaders during the machine era, described Beale Street as: …A main street of Negro America where its pulse beat highest, where richly red, dark brown women, hang-jawed country rubes mixed with spruce urban Negroes in an atmosphere pungent with barbecued pig, alive with the music of those who sit around in the cafes trying to ease their souls with ready-made song…. On Saturday they came from Arkansas, North Mississippi, East Alabama, and West Tennessee. They arrived in the early morning in their wagons, in Fords, on horseback. They bargained for clothes in the pawnshops, bought groceries in Piggly Wigglys, barbecued pig at hognosed restaurants and chitterling cafes, then gathered at a vacant spot called the Wagon Tongue on Beale and Second, and entertained the crowds with their banjos and harmonicas, their jug bands….33


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Black-owned banks, funeral homes, insurance and real estate companies, newspapers, Robert R.Church Auditorium, Church Park, and the First Baptist Church of Beale Street were also located on this historic street.34 In 1906, Robert R.Church Jr. established the Solvent Savings Bank and Trust Company. By 1920, it became the fourth most prosperous black bank in the U.S. with assets of one million dollars.35 In 1910, Wayman Wilkerson and J.Jay Scott opened the Fraternal Savings Bank and Trust on Beale. By 1920, its deposits totaled $500,000.36 In 1919, Bert N.Roddy established the Citizens’ Cooperative Stores, a chain of grocery markets in black neighborhoods.37 Also during the early 1920s, Dr. Joseph Edison Walker relocated the Mississippi Life Insurance Company from Indianola, Mississippi to Memphis.38 After his resignation, Walker along with Archie W.Willis and Mark William Bonner established the Universal Life Insurance Company.39 Although most of these businesses closed during the Depression years, Beale Street was at one time known as the “Harlem of the Lower South.”40 Despite black business efforts, the primary concern was gaining political power during the Crump years by establishing political and civil rights groups and by participating in local elections. Before the 1930s, the majority of black Americans were Republicans. In Memphis, Robert R.Church Jr. became one of the most influential black Republicans in the nation. It was rumored that Church was one of Crump’s black supporters, but the two did not have a cooperative relationship. Church began his political career by serving as a delegate from the Tenth Congressional District at both the 1912 and 1916 Republican National Conventions.41 In later years, he served as delegate in eight conventions. During the administrations of Republican Presidents Warren G.Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover, Robert Church Jr. controlled federal patronage in the Tenth Congressional District. During the 1920s, he was at the height of his influence. Although Church was not allowed to appoint blacks to public offices, he chose whites who were willing to serve black interests. Thus, during his political career, Church helped select white federal judges, a U.S. Attorney General for West Tennessee, and a number of postmasters. He also helped black Memphians to gain federal employment at post offices. Church along with Waymon Wilkerson, Leroy McCoy, Josiah T. Settle, and Bert M.Roddy, established one of the first black political organizations in Memphis in 1916. The Lincoln League conducted voter registration drives in black neighborhoods and schools to educate citizens of the

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importance of political participation.42 The League, named in honor of Abraham Lincoln, also endorsed candidates, mobilized voters, and paid poll taxes before the organization ended in the 1920s.43 It was founded because the Shelby County Republican Organization excluded black members. In November 1916, the “Lincoln League Ticket” endorsed several black candidates who were running for Congress, the State Senate, and the State House of Representatives.44 In June 1917, Robert Church Jr. was one of the founding members of the first Memphis Chapter of the N.A.A.C.P. Its first officers were: Bert M.Roddy, President; the Reverend J.W.Ribbins, Vice President; W.H.Bentley, Secretary; and Wayman Wilkerson, Treasurer. Church also served on the N.A.A.C.P.’s National Board of Directors. The Chapter was founded after the lynching of seventeen year-old Ell Persons who was charged with the rape and murder of a sixteen year-old white girl. Although no evidence linked Persons to the crime, he was arrested and charged. Approximately one week before his trial, a mob murdered him, set his body afire, and left it on Beale Street.45 During the 1920s, the black vote determined the outcome of two city mayoral elections. In 1923, a slate of Ku Klux Klan (K.K.K.) candidates were defeated largely because of the black vote. In both Memphis and Atlanta, the Klan experienced a sharp increase in membership in the 1920s because of the resentment whites felt from the growing number of predominantly black neighborhoods. In Memphis, the Klan was most powerful in three areas—South Memphis between McLemore Avenue and South Parkway East, West of the Memphis Fairgrounds to Barksdale Street, and the Binghampton area in Northeastern Memphis.46 Predominantly black neighborhoods were located in proximity to these areas. The Klan attempted to place its members in local governmental offices and the police department.47 In 1923, Mayor Rowlett Paine fired his secretary, Clifford Davis, because of his Klan membership. Davis had also spoken at several Klan rallies. Later in the year, Davis ran for city judge as part of the Klan ticket and was their only successful candidate.48 Although the K.K.K. sought the black vote by suggesting that black Memphians and Klan members had common interests as native-born Protestants, the majority of black citizens favored the Paine ticket in 1923.49 E.H.Crump endorsed Paine’s candidacy in the final days of the election after initially backing the ticket headed by Lewis T.Fitzhugh.50 The Crump endorsement probably contributed heavily to Paine’s 4,000-vote win, but the black community had supported him long before Crump’s involvement.51 Paine had promised a group of black businessmen and


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political leaders that his administration would provide street lights, pave streets, and build a new black high school in black neighborhoods, as well as appoint black firemen and police officers.52 In the 1927 mayoral election, black voters rejected Rowlett Paine’s reelection bid after he reneged on campaign promises. Robert Church Jr., along with Wayman Wilkerson, George W.Lee, and Dr. J.B.Martin, established the West Tennessee Civic and Political League of 1927. The organization’s main goal was to find an alternative mayoral candidate and to thwart the machine’s influence. The League desired “clean government” and an end to the “herding” of voters.53 On election day, 80 percent of black voters supported Watkins Overton for mayor.54 He defeated Rowlett Paine because of support from both the League and from E.H.Crump. After Franklin D.Roosevelt was elected in 1932 and black voters later shifted parties, the forty year political career of Robert Church Jr. ended. During the course of his career, Church had always received racially motivated threats. In the 1920s, a rope in the shape of a noose was mailed to his home as a threat of lynching.55 At another time, someone fired a shot into his bedroom window and a bomb exploded while Church spoke at a political rally in 1927.56 These threats, however, did not deter him from his work or affect his level of influence. By 1940, the complete black Democratic shift had occurred. During that same year, the city levied extremely high taxes on Church’s home and other properties. In addition, city inspectors found a number of code violations in his buildings. In November 1940, Church was forced to leave Memphis after the city confiscated his properties for failure to pay taxes. He then continued his involvement in Republican politics in Washington, D.C. and also lived with his daughter Roberta in Chicago for a brief time. Church Park and Auditorium were renamed the Beale Avenue Park and Auditorium. Moreover, the city fire department set Church’s mansion on Lauderdale Street afire allegedly to test its new fire extinguishing equipment.57 Despite the fact that he never held elective office, Robert Church Jr. was the city’s most influential black political figure during the machine era. During the era of independent politics, black candidates ran for a number of major elective offices, but did not again win these elections until the mid- and late 1960s. THE BEGINNING OF INDEPENDENT POLITICS In the 1948 Democratic primary elections, U.S. Representative Estes Kefauver and former Tennessee Governor Gordon Browning led the slate

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of candidates who defeated the Crump ticket in both the Democratic primary and the November general election. The U.S. Senate race between Kefauver, incumbent Thomas Stewart, and Circuit Court Judge John Mitchell received the most attention from the local media. Kefauver primarily courted votes from blacks, businessmen, labor groups, women, and younger voters. If elected, he promised to give additional benefits to veterans, end the poll tax, expand the Tennessee Valley Authority, and promote then President Harry S.Truman’s civil rights platform.58 Because of these views, Crump and his candidate John Mitchell accused Kefauver of being pro-Communist. The black and labor union votes primarily led to the defeat of the Crump ticket in the 1948 elections. In 1947, Crump had shown his commitment to racial segregation and white Southern values by refusing to allow the American Heritage Foundation’s Freedom Train to stop in Memphis. The train, which carried original copies of the Declaration of Independence and other historic documents to various cities, required segregated viewings.59 Also, a few months before the August 1948 elections, Crump endorsed U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond’s Dixiecrat Party platform which advocated segregation and state’s rights rather than federal civil rights.60 In contrast, labor groups favored Kefauver because of Crump’s previous opposition to the formation of unions in Memphis. The 1948 defeat did not completely destroy the machine because E.H.Crump still maintained considerable influence in local and state politics. In 1950, Crump’s Democratic candidates won all of the 31 local elections in which they competed. Two years later, Crump backed Frank Clement who defeated Gordon Browning in the 1952 gubernatorial race.61 Nevertheless, the 1948 elections showed the power of the black vote in Memphis. Crump realized that he could not adamantly oppose civil rights and still win the black vote. Without it, Crump’s candidates had little chances of winning future elective offices. In 1951, the first serious black effort for a political office in forty-five years occurred when Dr. Joseph Edison (J.E.) Walker sought membership on the Memphis Board of Education.62 Although originally a Republican, Walker ran as a Democrat in the 1951 election. On November 8, 1951, J.E.Walker was defeated. Despite the increase in black voter registration from approximately 7,000 in 1949 to approximately 20,000 in 1951, Walker only received approximately 7,000 votes out of about 93,000 cast.63 Although J.E.Walker lost the school board race, the N.A.A.C.P. and local political organizations conducted successful voter registration drives in black precincts.


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During the early 1950s, black political leaders failed to win elections, but had other forms of influence. During the 1952 Republican National Convention in Chicago, Lieutenant George W.Lee led the convention in the Pledge of Allegiance and endorsed nominee Robert A.Taft as the man who would “lead the way to building America as a community of fellowship for the oppressed people of all races.”64 After Dwight D.Eisenhower was selected over Taft, Lieutenant Lee encouraged black voters to support Eisenhower rather than Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson. Yet by the early 1950s, the majority of black citizens had made a solid transition to the Democratic party. In 1952, 73 percent of the national black vote went to Adlai Stevenson.65 Stevenson also captured the majority of votes in all of Memphis’ black precincts. Eisenhower won the election, however, because of his enormous popularity among whites. On April 18, 1952, Robert Church Jr. died of a heart attack shortly after he returned to Memphis while on the verge of making a political comeback. Church had hoped that General Dwight D.Eisenhower, a Republican, would win the presidential election. To Church, an Eisenhower victory would allow him once again to wield the formidable influence he once did in local and national politics. In the months before his death, Church attempted unsuccessfully to become a delegate at the state convention in Nashville, but lost to Lieutenant Lee. After this defeat, Church’s next plan was to become a delegate to the national Republican convention in Chicago in July 1952. He had been a delegate to every Republican convention from 1912 to 1940. Black Republicans had influenced a number of citizens to sign a petition recommending Church’s appointment. At the time of his death, Church was talking to Matthew Thornton, the “Mayor of Beale Street,” about mobilizing black voters in support of the Eisenhower campaign in the event he won the Republican nomination.66 After Robert Church Jr.’s death, his daughter Sarah Roberta ran in her father’s place. In August 1952, Ms. Church became the first black woman to gain election on the Tennessee Republican Executive Committee. This made her the first black woman to both run for and to win an elective office in Tennessee. Two years later in 1954, the machine era ended after E.H.Crump’s death. Evidently Crump had little desire for his machine to continue after his death because he refused to delegate any substantial authority to his lieutenants during the machine’s ascendancy and left no successor to head it after his death. Because they were no longer inhibited by the

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FIGURE 3.2. Lieutenant George W.Lee and Robert R.Church Jr. in 1952 (Photo by Ernest Withers, Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis Crump machine, the black community began to practice an electoral strategy in 1954 that they would continue to use in the eras of civil rights struggle and racial politics. During the 1954 elections, they selected three black Democrats—William C.Weathers, Benjamin Hooks, and T.L.Spencer—to run for the state legislature. In an examination of Memphis politics, Hairy Holloway discussed the main reason that blacks in Memphis drafted candidates to run for office: There was always a chance the Negro candidate might win; more important, he stimulated political interest among ordinary Negroes…. These candidates [who ran for office] were all men whose political or legal activities had won them a position in the forefront of Memphis’ civil rights struggle.67

Even though Weathers, Hooks, and Spencer lost their respective elections, the black voter registration and turnout percentages increased.68 The efforts


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of Weathers, Hooks, and Spencer in seeking office were part of a larger strategy in which black Memphians established the habit of voting for black candidates on election day. During the 1955 municipal election, white candidate Edmund Orgill was elected mayor of Memphis and a new era of independent politics began. The influential black vote of approximately 35,000, led to Orgill’s win as well as victories for white candidates Henry Loeb and Stanley Dillard for the City Commission and Mrs. Frances Coe for the school board. 69 Despite the hope he characterized for the black community, Mayor Edmund Orgill had a poor civil rights record. After suggesting the appointment of Dr. J.E.Walker to the board of the John Gaston Hospital, Orgill received an angry response. His neighbors reported false fire alarms at his house in the middle of the night so that he would be awakened by police and fire trucks. At other times, citizens sent a number of telegrams and letters expressing their opposition. Subsequently, the idea of Walker’s appointment was totally rejected by City Commissioners.70 Because of these reactions, Orgill withdrew Walker’s nomination and thereafter remained silent on the issue of civil rights. In 1955, black citizens and their leaders failed to take full advantage of the “single-shotting” voting technique to favor the school board bid of Reverend Roy Love, a Baptist minister. On election day in 1955, black voters primarily supported both Love and Mrs. Frances Coe in the race to elect four school board members in a sixteen-candidate race. As a result of split black votes, Mrs. Coe finished third and thus won a seat on the board while Love fell approximately 6,000 votes short of victory. Election analyses reveal that if black voters had cast their support for Love alone, he would have been elected. The positive aspect of Rev. Love’s bid was that despite his loss, the school board campaign of 1955 was the strongest and thus most threatening political effort of the black community since Reconstruction. By 1955, the Crump machine had only a waning level of influence in Memphis politics and the black community had established an organized political base. Harry Holloway found that: Crump’s death left a political vacuum among Negroes, for it broke their main tie with the white community and in this their experience differed from that of Houston and Atlanta, where at this time Negroes were either part of a coalition or in the early stages of developing one”.71

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Whereas blacks in Houston and Atlanta participated in coalition politics, blacks in Memphis emphasized “independent power politics” after E.H.Crump’s death.72 They had business and political leaders who could wage effective campaigns, both Democratic and Republican political organizations, efficient ward and precinct clubs in predominantly black areas, and a substantial black voter registration rate. For the first time since Reconstruction, the black electorate mobilized its vote for black candidates rather than the machine’s white candidates. THE N.A.A.C.P. ATTACKS SEGREGATION As black Memphians continued their political efforts in the new era of independent politics, the N.A.A.C.P. attacked institutional racism in Memphis during the protest era. Members of the local Chapter believed that the mid-1950s and late 1950s was an opportune time to challenge de jure segregation. By this time, the machine era had ended and the U.S. Supreme Court had handed down landmark decisions striking down various forms of segregation. Thus in Memphis, the fight for desegregation turned into a battle between blacks and whites. While the black community sought political representation and the desegregation of public facilities, institutions, and means of transportation, the white community adamantly resisted their efforts. Most whites had no desire to live in the same neighborhood with blacks, to associate with them, and certainly not to vote for them. Realizing the battle that lay ahead, the N.A.A.C.P. targeted one area at a time to integrate during the mid- and late 1950s–Memphis State College (which later became the University of Memphis), parks, buses, libraries, and so on.73 The organization also held rallies to change the mind-set of many black Memphians who doubted that they could desegregate the city. Later during the early 1960s, N.A.A.C.P. members, college students, and others participated in protests and boycotts. In October 1955, attorneys J.F.Estes, A.W.Willis Jr., H.T.Lockard, Benjamin L.Hooks, Alexander Looby, and Robert Carter filed a suit in federal court on behalf of eight black students who had applied for admission to Memphis State.74 This litigation was the beginning of a fouryear court battle to integrate the college.75 As the fight to integrate Memphis State College continued, other black citizens and groups targeted segregated parks, buses, and libraries. By the mid-1950s, the city had increased the number of black playgrounds from fourteen to seventeen, provided three municipal swimming pools and one nine-hole golf course. Yet black and white recreational facilities


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largely remained separate and unequal. The Memphis Park Commission found only three black playgrounds comparable to those in white neighborhoods. Most of the black playgrounds lacked lights, toilet facilities, water fountains, and usable equipment. Also, the slides, swings, tables, and softball diamonds in most black playgrounds were in poor condition and oftentimes unsafe.76 During the mid-1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court held that segregated buses, golf courses, playgrounds, public parks, schools, and swimming pools were unconstitutional. Mayor Walter Chandler and the Memphis City Commission, however, refused to desegregate. As the N.A.A.C.P. continued to file class-action suits on behalf of the black community, many citizens realized the inevitability of court-ordered desegregation in Memphis. Thus, interracial groups organized to peacefully implement voluntary desegregation as some whites became more conservative. (This point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.) In March 1956, the Interdenominational Ministers Alliance, a black ministerial organization suggested a black-white coalition for improved race relations in Memphis. At its initial formation, the group was chaired by white attorney George Grider. Its major objectives were to implement Supreme Court decisions dealing with desegregation without incident, address problems in black communities, and send its representatives to public hearings on race relations.77 Later in 1956, the interracial Greater Memphis Race Relations Committee (G.M.R.R.C.) was formed to address the black community’s concerns and problems. Both external and internal divisions led to this group’s demise. Externally, whites opposed interracial civil rights groups and thus the G.M.R.R.C. received little support from either white citizens or leaders. Internally, many whites refused to meet with black members. Thus two subcommittees, one white and one black, were created. As a result of these types of divisions, the G.M.R.R.C. was short-lived. In response and in objection to interracial groups, a number of white citizens organized the Pro-Southerners, an outspoken segregationist group which capitalized upon the McCarthyist mood of the 1950s by accusing those who favored integration of being Communists. The group also objected to “racial mixing” believing that segregation was ordained by God. Rev. Henry W.Fancher Sr., a Pro-Southerner, stated their view that, “God Almighty enacted the law of segregation and He was the only practitioner of segregation. He made men black because He wanted them to stay that way. Segregation will bring about conditions that most likely will lead a lost soul to God.”78

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Harry William Pyle, a Ku Klux Klan member, was leader of the ProSoutherners until his resignation in March 1956. Pyle and the ProSoutherners viewed each Supreme Court decision dismantling segregation as a threat to the constitutional rights and liberties of whites.79 The group also vehemently opposed the N.A.A.C.P. At a group-sponsored rally, James D.Johnson, leader of the Arkansas White Citizens Council, called the civil rights organization “the worst organization to come along since the one that crucified Christ….”80 The Pro-Southerners group ended in 1956 shortly after Pyle’s resignation. Besides the Pro-Southerners, other white supremacist groups formed during the mid-1950s, such as the Citizens for Progress, which adopted the motto “Keep Memphis Down in Dixie.”81 This organization ended shortly after the 1958 elections when none of their candidates were successful. The Association of Citizen’s Councils also established a branch in Memphis. Other groups included We The People and the Tennessee Federation for Constitutional Government. Despite white resistance, Memphians continued to form interracial groups. In 1957, the Ministers and Citizens League shifted its focus to ending police brutality, desegregating public institutions and buses, creating equal housing opportunities, and implementing recent Supreme Court decisions.82 When originally formed by Lt. George Lee and Dr. J.E.Walker, the group concentrated on increasing black voter registration during the Roy Love school board campaign. Also in 1957, the Twenty-Sixth Ward Civic Club concentrated on desegregating public libraries, Ellis Auditorium, and buses. In June 1957, Jesse H.Turner filed yet another lawsuit attacking segregated libraries. Turner applied for permission to borrow books from the main branch of the Memphis Public Library. During this time, the Vance Avenue branch was the only one open to black patrons. After Librarian Jesse Cunningham denied his request, Turner appealed to the chairman of the Memphis Public Library Board in July 1957. One year later in July 1958, the library board offered a compromise to the black community. It announced that segregation would continue in public libraries, but end in the reference section of the Cossitt branch within a year. This change was in response to Jesse Turner’s allegation that he needed access to reference sections because of the inadequacies of the Vance Avenue periodicals. Turner also wanted his children to have access to the children’s department at the main public library.83 Immediately after this announcement, Turner and Lockard were greeted with opposition from four members of the City Commission on the issue of library desegregation. Two of the more vocal opponents, Stanley Dillard and Henry


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Loeb, had been elected with black support. On August 15, 1958, Jesse Turner filed a federal challenge to segregated libraries. During the 1958 election, black political organizations endorsed black attorney Shep A.Wilbun Sr. for state representative, as well as white candidates Edmund Orgill for governor, Albert Gore for the U.S. Senate, and Robert A.Hoffman for Chancellor of Chancery Court. During the Wilbun campaign, several black lawyers and businessmen formed the Shelby County Democratic Club, with Dr. J.E.Walker as general chairman and Russell Sugarmon Jr. as executive director. This group was designed to organize voters in predominantly black wards and precincts. Its major goal was to establish one of its local branches in every precinct in which there were at least fifty black voters.84 Although Shep Wilbun lost the election, black Democrats were on the verge of replacing black Republicans as the black community’s most influential political leaders. By 1960, A. Maceo Walker had succeeded his father Dr. J.E.Walker. In addition, the Shelby County Democratic Club had established thirty branches with approximately 400 members.85 The irony associated with the Wilbun campaign was that the local media failed to view him as a serious candidate and seldom mentioned his campaign. Despite his loss, Wilbun received between five thousand to ten thousand votes from whites who may not have known that he was black.86 THE VOLUNTEER TICKET CAMPAIGN OF 1959 Black Memphians made their most ambitious political effort during the municipal elections of 1959. In August, Russell Sugarmon Jr., Benjamin Hooks, A.W.Willis Jr., Rev. Henry Clay Bunton, and Rev. Roy Love entered as candidates on an all-black Volunteer Ticket. The black community had grown tired of unfulfilled promises from white politicians who appealed to the black vote to gain office, but did nothing for them once elected. White politicians faced a dilemma after entering office. They could not meet black needs to any great extent because of fears of white backlash, but they could not completely ignore black interests because of the increasing voting power of the black community in Memphis. In addition to Volunteer Ticket members, other black citizens had already announced their entrances as independent candidates in the 1959 election. Elihue Stanback ran for tax assessor and O.Z.Evers for an unspecified City Commission post. Both Stanback and Evers, leaders in the Binghampton Civic League, opened their headquarters in the predominantly black Binghampton section of Memphis. Because

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Figure 3.3. Left to right: Henry C.Bunton, Benjamin L.Hooks, and Russell B.Sugarmon Jr. during the Volunteer Ticket Campaign of 1959. (Not Shown Rev. Roy Love) (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis) of their disagreements with black leadership on questions of political strategy, Stanback and Evers refused invitations to join the Volunteer Ticket. Although Evers later failed to qualify for candidate status, black political organizations backed the almost nonexistent Stanback campaign.87 The most promising Volunteer Ticket campaign was that of public works commissioner. After Henry Loeb vacated his seat on May 21 to run for mayor, Russell Sugarmon Jr., a thirty year-old Harvard law school graduate, entered the race on June 5 as an independent. Eventually, Sugarmon was the only black candidate facing six whites— W.C.Anderson, John Ford Canale, Sam Chambers, Sam Clark, William Farris, and Will Fowler. He entered politics in 1958 at the age of twenty-nine by serving as S.A.Wilbun’s campaign manager. A Sugarmon win in the 1959 election would have resulted in the first black elected victory in Memphis since the 1879 election of Green E.Evans to the City Council.88


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Because of the power a Sugarmon victory would give to blacks in Memphis, many white political figures wanted to make sure the white community knew that Sugarmon was black and to make them aware of the implications of having a black public works commissioner. Therefore, they embarked on a campaign to “Keep Memphis City Government White.” In order to encourage a large white turnout and prevent Sugarmon from winning, the Tennessee legislature passed a state law to prevent singleshot voting. Extensive, and oftentimes biased, newspaper coverage revealed the level of apprehension whites had of the possibility of black elected officials. Moreover, runoff elections and other measures were suggested so that the field of white candidates would be narrowed. On the other end, the Sugarmon campaign with the theme “This Is A Crusade for Freedom” held rallies to increase black voter registration and raised funds. Simultaneously, black political organizations and civic clubs gave suggestions on campaign strategies and mobilized a high black turnout rate on election day. Realizing they would receive little support from whites, the Volunteer Ticket concentrated on soliciting funds and black mobilization. Black Memphians had to be shown that they could force change through the electoral process, but only if they contributed both money and time to the Volunteer Ticket. A number were willing to serve as campaign workers on behalf of their cause, numbering some 1,200 on election day. Yet, since most black residents were locked in low-paying, unskilled jobs, they devoted their small wages to supporting their families because little was left to contribute to the campaigns which needed approximately $12,000 to meet expenses.89 It was obvious to political strategists that one institution existed in every black area where they could both arouse black citizens and solicit money—the church. A finance committee consisting of fifty men divided into three subcommittees. The first planned a mass Freedom Rally. A second organized a fundraising dinner. The third concentrated on individual contributions.90 The first committee had two freedom rallies complete with prominent speakers and gospel music in order to reinforce the idea that the Volunteer Ticket was not merely a campaign, but a “crusade” for freedom in a racist and segregated city. During the first rally on July 30, 1959, Lt. George Lee and each of the candidates addressed 5,000 citizens at Mason Temple asking them to contribute one dollar each to the campaign. Popular gospel singer Mahalia Jackson accompanied by a 1,000 member choir from local churches added to the mood. The highlight of the evening was a rousing speech by Dr. Martin Luther

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King Jr. who stressed the importance of voting for the Volunteer Ticket ironically in the same city where he would be assassinated less than a decade later. The second rally was a fund raising dinner held on August 14, days before the election. Approximately 400 citizens paid $10.00 to hear the candidates as well as Mrs. Daisy Bates, president of the Little Rock, Arkansas Chapter of the N.A.A.C.P. and mentor to the “Little Rock Nine” who integrated previously all-white Central High School in 1957.91 Besides seeking individual contributions in black churches, the third finance subcommittee held several “Coca Cola parties”—informal fundraisers for the Volunteer Ticket candidates at the homes of their supporters. As black Memphians continued to gain a sense of pride from the Volunteer Ticket campaign, whites continued their efforts to prevent black victories of any kind. During the 1959 session, the Tennessee General Assembly passed a law to end the practice of single-shot voting. Before this time, the candidates with the highest plurality of votes were elected to the four City Commissions posts—public works, fire and police, finances and institutions, and public service. As a result of the new legislation, candidates had to run for specific posts. Also prior to 1959, voters had the choice of either casting one vote for each of the four candidates or up to four for one contender. The intent of the legislation was to prevent black citizens from contributing all four of their votes in favor of Sugarmon. Since the intent of the law backfired when whites split their votes, other measures were suggested to prevent Sugarmon’s election. As city newspapers provided daily and weekly reports of black and white campaign strategy and hinted other ways of beating Sugarmon, white leaders proposed requiring runoff elections so that the winners would be elected by a true majority. The belief of most whites was that a black candidate could not possibly be the preference of the 70 percent white voting majority. In June 1959, Governor Buford Ellington refused Commissioner Henry Loeb Jr.’s request to call a special session of the legislature which would not convene again until January 1961. Henry Loeb requested that the legislature debate the need for a runoff law in the Memphis election.92 White political leaders then suggested holding a voluntary preferential primary or “pre-primary” race before August. In this special election, only the two candidates with the highest number of votes would be listed on the August ballot. Like the runoff option, this suggestion was abandoned when City Attorney Frank Gianotti stated that approximately $40,000 in city funds could not legally be allotted toward an election of this nature.93


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Russell Sugarmon Jr. and the other candidates also were threatened with obscene phone calls and death threats. In addition cabs, fire trucks, and police cars were sent to their homes on a regular basis.94 On another occasion, Sugarmon, A.W.Willis Jr., Benjamin Hooks, and Rev. Jim Lawson were fired at while driving home.95 The most successful effort taken by white political leaders was to actively back one of the white candidates. City Personnel Director William Farris eventually emerged as the favorite mostly because of the efficiency of his campaign staff. His “blitz committee” was a small group of workers who campaigned in the neighborhoods where business and political leaders lived hoping to attract support. Eventually Farris and John Ford Canale emerged as the top two contenders.96 Farris’ popularity widened after Will Fowler withdrew his candidacy. The well-known Fowler had served as City Engineer in the Public Works Department for forty years. Newspaper polls showed that despite his advanced age of seventy-two and lack of political experience, he was one the leading candidates.97 Shortly before election day, Fowler dropped out of the public works race announcing, “I have no desire to be a hero but simply to follow the dictates of my own conscience. I have a deep affection and respect for the good old Southern Negro and I do not wish to see the harmonious relation disturbed.”98 After Fowler’s departure, newspaper polls indicated that Farris was the leading candidate. On August 20, election day, Sugarmon placed second with 35,000 votes. The other Volunteer Ticket candidates were also defeated. Despite these losses, the campaign showed the beginning of black independent power politics after Crump’s death. The black community drafted candidates and organized a mass mobilization effort on their behalf. Unlike in Houston and Atlanta, blacks in Memphis refused to accept a subordinate role in a white-dominated coalition, but instead wanted to use their voting bloc to elect black candidates. The Volunteer ticket campaign led to a new level of self-confidence for black Memphis, especially for its youth. This new vigor would next been seen during the sit-in movement of the early 1960s. CONCLUSION During the Crump years, the black community continued to grow and develop. Although black citizens constituted approximately half of the Memphis population, they were unable to elect representation. The Crump machine dominated the local political scene by providing efficient

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governmental service, exchanging incentives for votes, and suppressing its critics. As a result, black Memphians had to create a mobilization strategy during the Crump years for political and economic empowerment. Black businessmen protested machine rule by seeking economic gain on Beale Street. Black Republicans distributed patronage and supported their party’s candidates in a city dominated by a Democratic political machine. In addition, black citizens organized the N.A.A.C.P., Lincoln League, and other empowerment groups to protest Jim Crow. Despite the defeat of the Volunteer ticket, the strongest black mobilization effort since Reconstruction, black Memphians knew that their preferred candidates would eventually win and that racial segregation would end. NOTES 1 Edward C.Banfield and James Q.Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 115. 2 Bernard H.Ross, Myron A.Levine and Murray S.Stedman, Urban Politics (Itasca, Illinois: F.E.Peacock Publishers, 1991). 3 William J.Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 61. 4 Dennis Judd and Todd Swanstrom, City Politics (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1994), 54. 5 Edward C.Banfield and James Q.Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 117. 6 Dennis Judd and Todd Swanstrom, City Politics (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1994), 60. 7 Ibid., 64. 8 James Q.Wilson, Negro Politics (New York: Free Press, 1960), 54. 9 Harold F.Gosnell, Negro Politicians (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), 34–35. 10 Marion E.Orr, “The Struggle for Black Empowerment in Baltimore: Electoral Control and Governing Coalitions” in Racial Politics in American Cities: Second Edition, eds., Rufus P.Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb, (New York: Longman, 1997), 204. 11 Roger Biles, Memphis During the Great Depression (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 32. 12 William D.Miller, Mr. Crump of Memphis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 41. 13 Virginia Emerson Lewis, Fifty Years of Politics in Memphis (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1955), 76.


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14 Lamar Whitlow Bridges, “Editor Mooney Versus Boss Crump,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 20 (1966):77. 15 Arna Bontemps, William C.Handy (New York: Macmillan Company, 1941), 93. 16 Virginia Emerson Lewis, Fifty Years of Politics in Memphis (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1955), 102. 17 Michael K.Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights (UrbanaChampaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 45. 18 David M.Tucker, Memphis Since Crump (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 27. 19 Roger Biles, Memphis During the Great Depression (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 41. 20 Walter P.Adkins, Beale Street Goes to the Polls (M.A. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1935), 24. 21 Roger Biles, Memphis During the Great Depression (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 44. 22 Walter P.Adkins, Beale Street Goes to the Polls (M.A. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1935), 24. 23 Randolph Meade Walker, “The Role of the Black Clergy in Memphis During the Crump Era,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 33 (1979):44. 24 Ibid., 45. 25 William C.Havard, The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 183. 26 William D.Miller, Mr Crump of Memphis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 104. 27 Ibid., 204. 28 Michael K.Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights (UrbanaChampaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 49. 29 George Washington Lee, Beale Street (New York: Robert O.Balloiu, 1969), 240–241. 30 David M.Tucker, Memphis Since Crump (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 19. 31 Annette Church and Sara Roberta Church, The Robert R.Churches of Memphis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, 1974), 182. 32 Ibid., 182–183. 33 George Washington Lee, “Poetic Memories of Beale Street,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 28 (1969):65–66. 34 Annette Church and Sara Roberta Church, The Robert R.Churches of Memphis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, 1974), 21–24; Fred L. Hutchins, “Beale Street As It Was,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 28 (1974):57.

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35 Lester C.Lamon, Blacks in Tennessee, 1791–1970 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981), 186–190. 36 Ibid., 189–190. 37 Ibid., 74. 38 Gloria Brown-Melton, A History of Blacks in Memphis, 1920–1955 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington State University, 1982), 76. 39 Ibid., 76–81. 40 Walter P.Adkins, Beale Street Goes to the Polls (M.A. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1935), 9. 41 James B.Jalenak, Beale Street Politics (Senior Thesis, Yale University, 1961), 19–20. 42 Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental Affairs, 1865–1965 (Nashville: Rich Printing Company, 1964), 90. 43 Annette Church and Sara Roberta Church, The Robert R.Churches of Memphis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, 1974), 87. 44 Clarence L.Kelly, Robert R.Church (M.A. Thesis, Tennessee State University, 1954), 27. 45 Gloria Brown-Melton, A History of Blacks in Memphis, 1920–1955 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington State University, 1982), 47. 46 Kenneth T.Jackson, The KKK in the City, 1915–1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 48–49. 47 Clarence Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989), 11. 48 Kenneth T.Jackson, The KKK in the City, 1915–1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 50–51. 49 Gloria Brown-Melton, A History of Blacks in Memphis, 1920–1955 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington State University, 1982), 98. 50 Kenneth T.Jackson, The KKK in the City, 1915–1930 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 51. 51 Michael K.Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights (UrbanaChampaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 45. 52 Gloria Brown-Melton, A History of Blacks in Memphis, 1920–1955 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington State University, 1982), 98. 53 Ibid., 101. 54 Michael K.Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights (UrbanaChampaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 45. 55 Gloria Brown-Melton, A History of Blacks in Memphis, 1920–1955 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington State University, 1982), 97. 56 Annette Church and Sara Roberta Church, The Robert R.Churches of Memphis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, 1974), 172.

The Crump Machine and Black Memphis 57

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Ibid., 184–185. Allen H.Kitchens, “Ouster of Mayor Edward H.Crump,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 19 (1965):120. 59 Michael K.Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights (UrbanaChampaign: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 246. 60 Ibid., 246. 61 Allen H.Kitchens, “Ouster of Mayor Edward H.Crump,” West Tennessee Historical Society Papers 19 (1965):120. 62 On March 31, 1880, Walker was born in poverty near Tillman, Mississippi. He later worked his way through Alcorn College in Mississippi and Meharry Medical College in Nashville. After practicing medicine for thirteen years and presiding as president of Mississippi Life Insurance Company, Walker moved to Memphis and founded the Universal Life Insurance Company. During the 1930s, Walker was listed as one of the Ten Most Influential Negroes in America because of his business and civic involvement. In December 1946, he was one of the organizers of the Tri-State Bank in Memphis. 63 Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental Affairs, 1865–1965 (Nashville: Rich Printing Company, 1964), 118. 64 David M.Tucker, Lieutenant Lee of Beale Street (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971), 159. 65 Steven F.Lawson, Running for Freedom (Temple University Press, 1991), 40. 66 Gloria Brown-Melton, A History of Blacks in Memphis, 1920–1955 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington State University, 1982), 322. 67 Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City Organization (New York: Random House, 1969), 292. 68 Dr. Benjamin L.Hooks, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, June 15,1995. 69 William E.Wright, Memphis Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 6. 70 Stephen M.Findlay, “The Role of Biracial Organizations in the Integration of Public Facilities in Memphis, Tennessee” (Unpublished Document, 1975), 8. 71 Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City Organization (New York: Random House, 1969), 280. 72 Ibid., 272. 73 Rev. Samuel B.Kyles, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, November 13, 1995. 74 The students were Sammie Burnett, Ralph Prater, Luther McClellan, Eleanor Gandy, Bertha Mae Rogers, John Simpson, Rosie Merrian Blakney, and Laverne Kneeland. 75 After a federal court ordered Memphis State College to admit the students, they entered during the fall 1959 term. They had to sit in a separate section of the library and Crump stadium at football games, could not take physical education 58

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or Air Force ROTC courses, had separate bathrooms and lounges, and had to leave campus immediately after their classes ended. 76 Ellis Moore, “Negroes Worried About Youth, Present a Nine-Point Program,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, December 9, 1955. 77 Anne Trotter, “The Memphis Business Community and Integration,” in Southern Businessmen and Desegregation, eds. Elizabeth Jacoway and David R. Colburn (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University press, 1978), 286. 78 Paul Vanderwood, “Pro-Southerners for Interposition,” Memphis PressScimitar, March 5, 1956. 79 Ibid. 80 Paul Molloy, “Pro-Southerners Lash Moderates,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, March 5, 1956. 81 William E.Wright, Memphis Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 8. 82 Stephen M.Findlay, “The Role of Biracial Organizations in the Integration of Public Facilities in Memphis, Tennessee” (Unpublished Document, 1975), 16. 83 John Spence, “Negro Asks to Borrow Books from Library,” Memphis PressScimitar, June 28, 1957. 84 Russell B.Sugarmon Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 22, 1993. 85 William E.Wright, Memphis Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 7. 86 Ibid., 6. 87 Ibid., 9. 88 Mingo Scott, The Negro in Tennessee Politics and Governmental Affairs, 1865–1965 (Nashville: Rich Printing Company, 1964), 144. 89 William E.Wright, Memphis Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 25. 90 Ibid., 24. 91 Ibid., 25. 92 Ibid., 14. 93 Ibid., 14. 94 Russell B.Sugarmon Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 22, 1993. 95 Ibid. 96 William E.Wright, Memphis Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), 16. 97 Ibid., 13. 98 Anthony Cooke, “Inaugural Bid: To End Racial Bloc Vote,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, September 20, 1987

CHAPTER 4

The Civil Rights Movement in Memphis

INTRODUCTION Chapter 4 analyzes the civil rights movement in Memphis in the context of national efforts. In cities like Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, nonviolent marchers and protesters were met with massive resistance and violence. Citizens conducted direct action protests such as boycotts, marches, and sit-ins while also filing federal and state lawsuits to protest their disfranchisement in a segregated society. Most received redress after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. After these two crucial pieces of federal legislation were ratified, the civil rights movement changed its focus. Rather than addressing southern disfranchisement and segregation, civil rights activists tackled the issues of employment discrimination, police brutality, poverty, substandard living conditions, and the Vietnam War. Also during the mid-1960s and late 1960s, black youths organized new groups and race riots occurred in a number of cities. Many of the new organizations advocated the use of violence as a form of self defense rather than nonviolent protests. In his study of Birmingham, Huey L.Perry found that “whites’ resistance to blacks’ demands for political rights was more severe in Birmingham than in any southern city of comparable size.”1 In Memphis, however, relatively peaceful and voluntary rather than court-ordered desegregation occurred before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, while black citizens maintained their powerful voting bloc. Nevertheless, Memphis remained a “decaying river town.” Despite continued protests from the 55

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N.A.A.C.R, a number of whites ignored the desegregation orders of the early 1960s. Local newspapers printed daily anecdotes from “Hambone,” a caricature of a lazy, uneducated black man, and Cotton Carnival parades sometimes had floats of the black “Sambo.” During the early 1960s, citizens began public demonstrations in Memphis, while the N.A.A.C.R continued to wage a legal battle against segregation. In the late 1960s, black citizens used the traditional forms of protest, yet black youths had grown impatient with boycotts, lawsuits, and marches. As a result, violence occurred during the 1968 sanitation strike marches. Also, the first major race riot since 1866 occurred in 1971 after a group of policemen murdered seventeen year-old Elton Hayes. During this era of civil rights struggle, blacks in Memphis experienced another period of transition in their search for political emergence. In the local political scene, the first black elected officials since Reconstruction won local and state offices and A.W.Willis ran for mayor. The Sanitation Strike, the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the Black Monday protests, and the Elton Hayes riot showed conflicts of black rebellion and white resistance. After these incidents, a different kind of racial polarization was evident. Because many whites moved out of the city, the black population increased substantially after neighborhoods experienced transitions from white to black. Moreover, the percentage of black students in public schools increased and disparities remained among blacks and whites. NONVIOLENT PROTESTS BEGIN IN MEMPHIS Despite efforts for political and civil rights advancement, Memphis remained a segregated city in 1960. Black citizens could only visit the zoo, Brooks Memorial Art Gallery, and main branch of the Memphis Public Library and Information Center on “black Thursday”.2 They could only attend the fairgrounds during the one-day Negro Tri-State Fair held during the summer.3 Public schools and colleges remained “separate and unequal” four years after the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision. Visible “Colored Only” signs designated black seating on buses, in theaters, at lunch counters, and at water fountains. In addition, police brutality remained unchecked with officers justifying the abuse of black citizens on charges of disorderly conduct. This term applied to “disrespectful” persons who either used an offensive tone of voice or did not address officers with the title “sir.”4


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Segregated housing also proved problematic not only because of often dangerous and unsanitary conditions, but also due to overcrowding. Black families were only allowed to live in the city’s predominantly black areas— many of which had massive housing shortages. Blacks who moved into white areas lacked the power to end the harassment and threats they received from their neighbors. The message was clear that they were not welcome and their lives were threatened. In 1958, Rev. C.H.Mason, son of the founder of the Church of God in Christ, moved into the Glenview area, a middle-class white neighborhood. In February, a cross was burned in front of his home and his church was destroyed by a fire. Later, his home was vandalized and set afire.5 Because of the racist conditions black citizens endured daily and the improbability that interracial groups would bring about change, local college students began a sit-in movement in March 1960. Influenced by students in cities such as Greensboro, North Carolina and Nashville, Tennessee, eight black students held their first sit-in protest on March 19, 1960 at the Cossitt branch of the Memphis Public Library. The students were using the catalog file and quietly sitting at tables in a library in which they could only use the reference section. After approximately thirty minutes, they were arrested, charged with vagrancy, loitering, and fined $51. On the same day, seven others held a demonstration at a white lunch counter in McLellan’s department store. After their arrests, the students received overwhelming praise for their efforts. To show their support, 4,500 black citizens gathered at Mt. Olive C.M.E. Church to listen to speakers who advocated nonviolent resistance to segregation. Those in attendance contributed to a freedom fund for filing litigation in courts and providing bail for protesters. The group also planned a massive drive to increase the black voter registration level to 100,000.6 As the sit-ins continued, members of the Memphis Committee on Community Relations (M.C.C.R.), an interracial group of attorneys, clergymen, doctors, and educators, held meetings with the City Commission and Mayor Henry Loeb Jr. to end segregation in public libraries, the city zoo, Brooks Memorial Art Gallery, the Pink Palace Museum, and Ellis Auditorium.7 On March 23, 1960, N.A.A.C.P. attorneys J.F.Estes, Benjamin Hooks, C.D.Norton, B.F.Jones, Russell Sugarmon Jr., I.H. Murphy, S.A.Wilbun and A.W.Willis Jr. asked the students to stop their protests for two weeks while these negotiations took place. When the Memphis City Commission refused to desegregate public facilities in Memphis on March 28, 1960, the students ended their two-week truce and continued their protests.

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Figure 4.1. Members of the Memphis Committee on Community Relations after a meeting to negotiate desegregation. From left: Edward J.Meeman, Reverend John C.Mickel, Russell B.Sugarmon Jr., Hollis F.Price, A. Maceo Walker, Edmund Orgill, Commissioner James W.Moore, Arthur McCain, Mayor Henry Loeb, Commissioner William Farris, A.I.Davies, John T.Dwyer, Frank Ahlgren, Jesse H.Turner, Dr. Paul Tudor Jones (chairman), Rabbi James Wax, Commissioner Claude Armour, Reverend S.A.Owen, and Lieutenant George W.Lee. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis) In addition to sit-in protests, the black community boycotted businesses in the fight for desegregation. They were asked to not shop in stores with discriminatory hiring practices during the Easter shopping season, but instead to devote their money to the freedom fund. Rev. David W.Browning of Mt. Pisgah C.M.E. Church asked that members of his church “put their Easter bonnets on the altar.”8 This request proved to be quite a sacrifice to black families who saved money all year for new Easter outfits, but the boycott was successful. Beginning in the fall of 1960, the City Commission, seeing no end to protests and the inevitability of court-ordered desegregation, agreed to ban the practice of segregation in buses, libraries, restaurants, parks, and the city zoo. In September 1960, the Memphis Transit Co. announced a new policy ending racial segregation on buses. On October 14, 1960, the Commission agreed to end the racial segregation of patrons at public libraries less than one month before adjudication of Jesse Turner’s


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classaction suit. On November 14, 1961, the N.A.A.C.P. issued a statement that all protests would end because of “favorable negotiations with downtown merchants.”9 In 1962, even more segregated practices ended. On February 6, 1962, Memphis department stores desegregated their lunch counters. On March 26, 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered immediate desegregation of all restaurants at interstate and intrastate transportation facilities.10 This decision applied to restaurants in airports and bus stations. On Monday, May 27, 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Park Commission had to desegregate all recreational facilities immediately.11 Two years earlier, a federal judge had approved a plan of gradual integration of golf courses, tennis courts, playgrounds, parks, and the Pink Palace Museum enacted by Memphis City and Park Commissioners. On May 31, 1963, the Park Commission declared that public recreational facilities would no longer be segregated. Despite the official end of legalized segregation in 1963, black candidates lost major elective offices in Memphis because of their refusal or inability to convert the coalitions that negotiated desegregation into electoral coalitions. As mentioned in Chapter 3, blacks in Memphis (unlike blacks in Atlanta and Birmingham) preferred independent politics over coalition politics after E.H.Crump’s death. In Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988, Clarence Stone pointed out that former Atlanta Mayor William B.Hartsfield created a governing coalition which promoted economic growth and racial moderation during the 1950s. A “goalong-toget-along system” was created in which black businesses, churches, and colleges received financial benefits, but citizens had little power.12 The members of this coalition later elected Maynard Jackson as the city’s first black mayor in 1973. A similar coalition existed in Birmingham during the early 1960s. White businessmen saw the harmful effect of violent civil rights protests on the city’s image. In 1963, blacks, members of the business community, and moderate whites voted to change the city’s form of government so that Bull Connor could be ousted from office.13 After doing so, the coalition elected Birmingham’s first moderate mayor, George Seibels, in 1967; its first liberal mayor, David Vann, in 1975 and its first black mayor, Richard Arrington, in 1979.14 In cities such as Atlanta and Birmingham, interracial groups that negotiated civil rights issues later focused on electoral mobilization thus choosing the first black mayors and other political figures in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead of forming electoral coalitions to select a black mayor and other city wide representatives, the black community in

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Memphis took a different approach. They waited until their voting agepopulation and turnout levels surpassed those of whites. THE 1967 MUNICIPAL ELECTION: A.W.WILLIS JR. RUNS FOR MAYOR During the 1960s, reform movements in Southern cities, such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, and Little Rock, replaced mayor-commission governments with strong mayor-weak Council governments. After these changes, voters elected new political officials to replace commissioners who inhibited the city’s progress in race relations.15 In Memphis, the mayorcommission government had been in effect for over fifty years. Both during and after E.H.Crump’s mayoral terms, his political machine handpicked the mayors and city commissioners so that the machine could control the local political structure. To put an end to this kind of control, voters in Memphis approved a referendum which changed the form of city government on November 8, 1966. Instead of a mayor and five commissioners, the city would now be run by a mayor and thirteen City Council members who would serve four year terms. Six Council members held at-large positions while the other seven represented districts. This new form of government would be effective on January 1, 1968. The black community approved of the combination of at-large and district seats in 1967, because this plan guaranteed that at least three black City Council members would be elected. Three other Council seats represented districts with large black populations. Thus, voters had a chance to elect six blacks on the City Council. A.W.Willis Jr. was the first black candidate to run for mayor under the new mayor-Council form of government. His platform advocated the creation of a civilian review board, open housing laws, a new civil and human rights group to replace the M.C.C.R., and racially-neutral testing procedures to insure that blacks were not excluded from municipal positions.16 Members of the Shelby County Democratic Club asked Willis to run for mayor. The organization believed that if Willis entered the mayor’s race, black City Council candidates would have a stronger chance of winning because of the higher black turnout rate.17 In 1967, Willis ran against six white candidates, including former mayor Henry Loeb and incumbent William B.Ingram, both of whom proceeded to a runoff election. Backed by a solid white vote (90 percent of the total vote), Loeb eventually became mayor.


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Figure 4.2. A.W.Willis Jr. on the campaign trail on August 17, 1967. The members of black political organizations asked Willis to run for mayor as a way to encourage black voters to vote for black rather than white candidates. He managed the campaigns of several other black camdidates before his death in 1983. (Photo by Jim McKnight. Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis In 1967, black leaders refused to enter a coalition with white members of the M.C.C.R. in favor of white City Commissioner Hunter Lane Jr. who was running for mayor in 1967. The black community was frustrated with the M.C.C.R.’s failure to address the massive unemployment rate among black workers. Although some gains had been made in the desegregation of restrooms, water fountains, and eating areas, the majority of employers had hired token black employees in order to avoid the harsh penalties imposed

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by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Black citizens were also excluded from higher-ranking public school and municipal positions.18 The M.C.C.R. also ignored incidents of police brutality. In 1966, the M.C.C.R. created a new committee to analyze police misconduct and advocated integrated police squad cars, promotion of black officers, and discontinuance of the term “nigger” on police radios.19 Black M.C.C.R. members, however, were not satisfied with these actions because evidence remained of the presence of “excessive force [and] prejudicial behavior.”20 While some black leaders believed that Willis’ decision to run for mayor was ill-timed, others felt that Memphis would never be ready for a black mayor. In 1967, black voters had no legal obstacles to voting, but simply refused to support Willis mostly because they lacked the levels of confidence and momentum that led to the election of black mayors in Cleveland, Ohio and Gary, Indiana during that same year. The Cleveland and Gary experiences proved that the election of a black mayor was possible only if the overwhelming majority of the black community was mobilized in support of his candidacy. It was obvious that black candidates would probably not receive economic support from either the white business community or white citizens in the form of contributions. The Willis campaign proved the validity of this assertion by receiving little if any financial support from either constituency. Although white Memphians would not vote for a black candidate, black voters in 1967 provided substantial crossover support for white candidate William B.Ingram’s reelection bid. Ingram, a judge, was one of the first white candidates to address a black church congregation. Although he had a patronizing attitude toward blacks, many felt that he was courteous and respectful toward blacks who appeared in his court.21 Black citizens and the influential black clergy believed Ingram’s claim that substantial gains had been made in black employment during his first term. In reality, a disproportionate number (37 percent) of black municipal workers were garbage collectors.22 Also, according to the local Chapter of the N.A.A.C.P., black workers held less than 8 percent of the white-collar positions.23 Nevertheless, he received twice as many votes as Willis in many black precincts. On average, he received at least 60 percent of the vote in predominantly black precincts as compared to an average of 39 percent for Willis. One major reason for black indifference to the Willis campaign was their lack of confidence that he could win. Black Memphis believed that the Willis bid for mayor was ill-advised. If black voters had supported the Willis mayoral bid with the same bloc vote as that cast during his 1964


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state legislative race, he could have emerged as one of the leaders in the general election. Willis realized during the course of his campaign that black Memphians wanted a black state legislator, but not a black mayor. He pointed out that: This campaign is raising for the first time the real problems of racial inferiority. The Negro has been taught to be inferior…. When I step out and say I want to be mayor of the town, that’s way ahead of most Negro’s thinking. They’ve first got to believe in themselves. They’ve got to believe that a Negro is capable of running the city.24

This was a correct statement. The majority of black Memphians felt that victory was inconceivable due to the fact that the black electorate was only 37 percent in 1967. Also, because of the atmosphere of racism, racial polarization, and white paternalism in the city, black candidates did not benefit from biracial coalitions. Another reason for black apathy in 1967 was the candidacy of former mayor Henry Loeb Jr. who sought reelection to the mayor’s office. Loeb had served as public works commissioner for four years and resigned from the mayoral office shortly before the end of a full four year term (1960–63) to devote time to his family’s laundry business. Black Memphians feared the possibility of another Loeb administration to such degree that many believed rumors before the election that Loeb had paid A.W.Willis Jr. $35,000 to enter the campaign and split the black vote which would assure Loeb’s win.25 In the 1967 mayoral election, 235, 303, or 60 percent of registered voters, turned out on election day. White candidate Loeb received approximately 47,000 votes (33 percent of the total vote). White candidate Ingram placed second with 36,000 votes (24.9 percent). White candidate William N.Morris placed third with 30,979 votes (21.3 percent). Hunter Lane and other white candidates received approximately 12,000 votes (8.5 percent). Finally, A.W.Willis Jr. only garnered approximately 18,000 votes which totaled 12.3 percent of the total vote. He commented in anger that “the disgust [of the defeat] is [that the] people who could most benefit, the Negro people, could not grasp the problems”.26 The Willis campaign and subsequent failed campaigns by black mayoral candidates led to the belief that black voters in Memphis lacked the determination to elect a black mayor. The Willis effort showed black apathy by both refusing to vote and by devoting most of their vote to William Ingram. Yet, three black citizens were elected to represent

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Figure 4.3. Singer Rufus Thomas (fourth from right). A.W.Willis Jr. (third from right), and Businessman A.Maceo Walker (second from right) at a campaign appearance in 1967. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis) predominantly black districts on the Memphis City Council—Fred Davis, James L.Netters, and J.O.Patterson Jr. Although three other black candidates had competed for at-large positions four and five, none garnered the percentages necessary to compete in runoffs. One year later, black candidates A.W.Willis Jr. and Russell Sugarmon Jr. were defeated by black candidates John Taylor and Alvin


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Figure 4.4. Henry Loeb Jr. greets his supporters during the 1967 mayoral campaign. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

King respectively in the state legislature. Although A.W.Willis Jr. ended his political career, he remained active in Memphis politics until his death in 1983. Willis would later serve as an adviser to black mayoral candidates Otis Higgs Jr. and J.O.Patterson Jr. and he endorsed Dick Hackett’s 1983 mayoral campaign.27 Despite his loss in 1967, it is difficult to call his 1967 mayoral bid a failure because A.W.Willis Jr. worked behind the scenes on many subsequent mayoral campaigns and also paved the way for other black candidates. TWO MEMPHISES: THE SANITATION STRIKE, BLACK MONDAYS AND THE ELTON HAYES RIOT By the late 1960s, the city of Memphis had desegregated and elected three blacks to a nine-member City Council and two black representatives to the ninety-nine-member Tennessee House of Representatives. Yet despite the optimism associated with civil rights measures, desegregation, and

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the election of black representatives, significant employment and income disparities remained among black and white citizens. Nevertheless, it appeared that Memphis had more progressive race relations than other cities in the deep South. The city had not experienced a race riot since 1866 and had passed through the height of its civil rights movement with few incidents of violence. This perception changed during the late 1960s. In 1968, the Sanitation Strike lasted sixty-five days and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated while assisting the strikers in Memphis. In 1969, black teachers and students protested conditions in public schools and in 1971 black citizens rioted after a group of white policemen murdered a black teenager. During each of these protests, blacks accused local officials of racism, but whites overwhelmingly supported these elected officials. This climate would continue to characterize local race relations and the electoral arena during the era of racial politics. Even before the 1960s, two Memphises had always existed—one black disproportionately low-income sector and one white disproportionately middle-income sector—with diverging interests and needs. Nevertheless, blacks had been optimistic that once the city desegregated, they would establish cooperative relationships with whites. They would work together, live in the same neighborhoods, and send their children to the same schools. As in other cities, however, racial polarization in Memphis worsened after the protests of the late 1960s. Andrew Hacker found that by the late 1960s, America had become “two nations: black and white, separate, hostile, unequal.”28 In Chicago, Detroit, Newark, and many other cities, blacks and whites refused to vote for candidates from the other’s racial group. Because of the increasing crime rate, whites believed that they would not be safe if blacks lived in their neighborhoods. Thus, residential segregation worsened after whites moved out of areas when black families moved in. Also, the public school systems became predominantly black after whites transferred their children to county, private, and suburban schools. Although the sanitation workers went on strike during the winter of 1968, events had been building for years. Major disparities existed in the hiring, promotion, and pay scales of black and white Sanitation Department employees. While all of the blacks were unskilled workers, most whites held supervisory positions. Black employees faced no real prospects of promotion, lacked adequate health benefits, lacked bathroom facilities, were not allowed to take vacations, and were only paid between $1.10 and $2.10 an hour depending on their status as crew members, crew chiefs or truck drivers.29 They could also be denied pay or fired without


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justification by often abusive white supervisors. In addition, black sanitation workers usually had to work overtime without receiving additional pay. The city also refused to recognize the local 1733 Chapter of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (A.F.S.C.M.E.), the union to which many black sanitation workers belonged. Besides receiving low wages, the men had to endure horrible and dangerous working conditions. In addition to unbearably hot Memphis summers and the stench of decaying garbage, black workers often ended their work days as maggot-infested and beaten men. According to Leroy Bonner, a retired sanitation worker: I would get home to take a bath…. [On one occasion, I can recall] two maggots right around my navel. I took a bath and they stretched out and they fell off in the tub. And my wife…came in and washed my hair and everything and was pulling them out of my head.30

The workers had no alternative but to endure the conditions. Many had migrated to Memphis from rural areas in Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas. Unfortunately, the wages and working conditions of sanitation workers were exploitative, but constituted an improvement over those of rural sharecroppers who were often treated like slaves on plantations. After years of enduring these indignities, the sanitation strike began during the winter of 1968. On January 30, twenty-one black sewage and drain workers were sent home with $11.00 deducted from their pay because they were not allowed to work in the rain.31 The next day, Thomas Oliver (T.O.) Jones, President of the Local 1733 of the A.F.S.C.M.E. asked the men to stay home until given their deserved pay. They later went back to work after the newly elected Commissioner of Sanitation, Charles Blackburn, promised Jones that the practice of depriving workers of pay when they were not needed would end. Jones wrongly assumed that the 21 men would receive pay in their next check. In the meantime, T.O.Jones and P.J.Ciampa, an international field director of the national Chapter of the A.F.S.C.M.E. negotiated union demands with Blackburn. They wanted official recognition of the A.F.S.C.M.E. union, a grievance procedure, additional pay so that they could pay dues (a checkoff), and an hourly pay raise from $1.60 to $2.35.32 As the negotiations were taking place on February 1, two black sanitation workers—Echol Cole, 25, and Robert Walker, 29–were accidentally crushed to death after being pulled into a garbage compressor.33 Because

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the men lacked benefits and insurance, their families bore the burden of paying funeral expenses. Although Mayor Loeb and the City Council contributed a total of $500.00 toward their funeral expenses, black workers remained bitter after these deaths. They realized that any of them could be the next victims. On February 11, union representatives officially declared a strike after leaders of the Public Works Department refused their demands. The next day, less than one hundred of the city’s 1,100 black sanitation workers went to work. During the course of the strike, Mayor Henry Loeb took a stubborn and unyielding position. Whereas blacks believed that Loeb’s actions were mean-spirited and unfair, whites respected and admired him for maintaining law and order during a time of “long hot summers”—race riots in Cleveland, Detroit, Harlem, Jersey City, Newark, Watts, and almost three hundred other cities.34 As long as Loeb maintained order and the streets remained clean, whites in Memphis had few complaints. When he first addressed strikers and their union representatives, he branded the strike as being illegal. Instead of negotiating with the men, Loeb had a patronizing attitude and refused to bargain, but agreed to provide food stamps to the strikers’ families. By Thursday, February 15, Loeb had hired 154 black and white sanitation workers to replace the strikers. According to estimates, 10,000 tons of garbage now lay on Memphis streets.35 Since the beginning of the strike, garbage had been collected in some areas of the city, but not in others and garbage cans were being sold at exorbitantly high prices.36 The workers held their first nonviolent march in downtown Memphis on February 22. Approximately 130 people participated in the peaceful two-hour march in downtown Memphis. On the same evening, seven hundred strikers and their supporters crammed into a special session of the public works committee at City Hall. They again expressed their demands—recognition of their union, an official grievance procedure, higher wages, payroll deductions of union dues, a fair promotion policy, adequate hospital and life insurance, a pension program, sick leave, vacation pay, overtime pay, and written contracts. After many debates and arguments, the strikers refused to leave when asked to by fire marshals. After the meeting ended hopelessly, the strikers held a sit-in protest in the brand new city hall building. They felt that as citizens, they had the right to remain in the building until their demands were met. While black citizens saw the protest as a legitimate sign of defiance, whites viewed it as a “picnic” in their beautiful rosewood-paneled and red-carpeted City


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Hall.37 The strikers left peacefully after the committee agreed to recommend to the City Council that their union be recognized and that a dues checkoff system be implemented.38 On February 23, violence erupted after another meeting in Ellis Auditorium. The City Council announced that they had voted 9 to 4 to reject the strikers’ demands.39 As the men and the leaders marched toward their downtown headquarters in a nonviolent protest, the police attacked them with nightsticks and sprayed mace.40 This incident was important for two reasons: It led to an economic boycott of the Memphis Commercial Appeal and Memphis Press-Scimitar newspapers and of downtown stores. In addition, the incident brought national attention to the strike and angered black youths who viewed nonviolent protests as being ineffective. Realizing the futility of their strike efforts, black ministers and strike representatives invited prominent civil rights activists to Memphis in March 1968. Mayor Loeb had secured an injunction prohibiting union leaders from engaging in or encouraging strike activities on February 24. On March 5, 117 sanitation workers and their supporters met with Council members. After the meeting ended hastily, the 117 men refused to leave and were arrested. On March 14, national N.A.A.C.P. official Roy Wilkins and Bayard Rustin of the A.Philip Randolph Institute praised the strikers’ determination before a crowd of 13,000. The highlight of the strike was the involvement of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. who visited Memphis at the request of black clergymen. King was planning his Poor People’s March in Washington, D.C. scheduled for April 1968. In the Poor People’s Campaign, King and others planned a massive march to Washington to highlight poverty. Because of King’s involvement and the negative national publicity that now focused on both the strike and the city of Memphis, Mayor Loeb took an even tougher stance by refusing to recognize the union, refusing to institute a dues checkoff system, and ending the food stamp program. Due to a winter snowstorm, the March 23 march was canceled, but King returned to Memphis on March 28. At 11:00 A.M., 20,000 people walked from Clayborn Temple to downtown Memphis. Many carried signs proclaiming, “I AM A MAN” as a statement of the strike’s true meaning—human dignity and pride. Yet during the course of the march, violent confrontations took place. It was later discovered that many of the members of the disruptive element were “Invaders,” a new empowerment group which consisted mostly of black high school and college students, who began the mayhem by smashing windows and

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looting stores.41 As some policemen sprayed tear gas and mace, others beat the marchers with sticks. Approximately fifty people suffered minor injuries and 120 others were arrested. Sadly, the planned nonviolent march resulted in one death—sixteen year-old black high school student Larry Payne. According to a police report, the youth had been shot while looting and after having lunged at an officer with a butcher knife.42 Mayor Henry Loeb Jr. and others used the violent confrontation as a way to damage King’s credibility. Loeb bragged that he asked Governor Buford Ellington to send 4,000 National Guardsmen to Memphis “two minutes after the first window was broken on Beale Street.”43 Moreover, erroneous rumors circulated that rooftop snipers, arson and gunfire erupted throughout the city. After the local media blamed King for the violence, he left Memphis, but vowed to return. Because the Poor People’s Campaign was only three weeks away, many feared that violence would erupt again. After Dr. King’s death on April 4, 1968, Mayor Loeb offered his sympathies to King’s widow, Coretta, but refused to alter his position on the strike. On the next day, King’s wake was held at R.S.Lewis Funeral Home. In order to influence Loeb to surrender, three hundred black and white ministers signed a statement asking the mayor to end the strike, recognize the union and approve the dues checkoff. On April 6, President Johnson order Secretary of Labor James Reynolds to negotiate with the union. On April 7, approximately seven thousand people participated in “Memphis Cares,” a rally to praise King, to call for unity, and to end the strike. On April 8, approximately twenty-thousand marchers walked from Clayborn Temple to City Hall where Coretta Scott King was one of the speakers.44 The strike finally came to an end on April 16, 1968. The Memphis City Council, by a vote of 12 to 1, agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding with the A.F.S.C.M.E., Local 1733. They also agreed to provide a grievance procedure, to pay higher wages, and to provide incentives for the hiring and promotion of black sanitation workers. After the strike ended in April 1968, the strikers returned to work. Since 1968, many sanitation workers have stated that their conditions and pay have not improved as expected. As a result of a ten-cent-anhour pay raise and another five-cent increase four months after the strike ended, crew members received $1.95 an hour and crew chiefs earned $2.25 by late 1968. The federal minimum wage was $1.60 an hour. Moreover, the A.F.S.C.M.E. union received official recognition to


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Figure 4.5. Whereas Mayor Loeb had immense popularity with whites, the majority of black Memphians believed that he was a racist. Here, he addresses a group of black students who protested one of his appearances at the University of Memphis a few days before Dr. King’s death. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

negotiate the demands and grievances of strikers, but this did not always translate into better opportunities for its members. A disproportionate number of black sanitation employees continued to hold unskilled positions.

The experience of T.O.Jones, head of the local A.F.S.C.M.E. Chapter in 1968, showed that the strike failed to improve the lives of some sanitation workers. Jones worked for the A.F.S.C.M.E. international staff from 1968 to 1970. He then worked for another union until his retirement in the late 1970s. In the years before his death on April 12, 1989, Jones lived in poverty and relied on food and monetary donations from friends.45 One year after the end of the Sanitation Strike, black citizens continued their search for economic power and political representation. When a labor dispute occurred between the black members of the A.F.S.C.M.E. and St. Joseph’s Hospital, the N.A.A.C.P. demanded that the Memphis Board of Education hire black teachers and principals in city schools. In

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Figure 4.6. Mayor Loeb mobilized local policemen and national guardsmen after a violent confrontation between sanitation strikers and policeman on March 23, 1968. Loeb later bragged that 4,000 national guardsmen were on the street “two minutes after the first window was broken on Beale Street.” (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

1969, black student enrollment in public schools was approximately 54.3 percent; yet, the majority of teachers in predominantly black schools were white. Few blacks served as principals and administrators and none had been elected to serve on the Memphis School Board.46 In early October 1969, the Memphis branch of the N.A.A.C.P. presented fifteen demands to the school board. The organization desired: the creation of racially mixed districts so that black school board members could be elected, the integration of public schools, the resignations of two white school board members who opposed integration and the hiring of black school employees, changes in the personnel department, the hiring of black teachers, principals, and administrators, the use of multicultural books and courses, free lunches to poor children, and televised school board meetings.47 Not surprisingly, school board members disagreed with most


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of these requests. The school board agreed to make efforts to create racially mixed districts, integrate schools, and hire black teachers and staff members, but adamantly refused the request for the resignations of white school board members, multicultural books, and televised meetings. As a result, the first Black Monday protest began on October 13. About 63,000 of 134,000 students boycotted classes while police banned approximately 500 black teachers from entrance to the Board of Education office. In addition to the school boycotts, the N.A.A.C.P. led economic boycotts and formed a coalition with other black organizations— A.F.S.C.M.E., Committee on the Move for Equality, Shelby County Democratic Club, Bluff City Council of Civic Clubs, Concerned Teachers, Welfare Rights Organization, Memphis Mobilizers, and ministerial groups. This broad-based alliance would address various forms of racism— education, police, employment, housing, and so on. The first coalitionsponsored march occurred on October 18. During the second Black Monday on October 20, when 65,000 black students and 674 teachers missed classes, coalition members staged a march through downtown Memphis. The boycotts of stores continued. Approximately 650 supporters marched from Clayborn Temple to City Hall. Their representatives aired grievances about the schools, police abuse, and St. Joseph Hospital before a joint meeting of the City Council and the County Court. The majority of City Council members refused, however, to hear the claims of group spokespersons. In order to prevent another march from taking place, Mayor Loeb told police officers to form a line on Hernando Street and arrest all marchers who broke through the barricade for obstructing traffic. On October 20 at approximately 5:30 P.M., fifty-three of the two thousand marchers passed through the police line. Although the fifty-three were arrested, other marchers threw rocks, bottles, and bricks at the officers. At this time, police used a machine known as the “Pepper Fog” to spray tear gas. No major injuries were reported, but bombings and break-ins occurred in other parts of the city.48 Fire and Police Director Frank C. Holloman issued a ban preventing marches after 3:30 P.M. to prevent traffic problems. He had also unsuccessfully sought a temporary restraining order from U.S. District Court Judge Robert M.McRae Jr.49 Less than one year after the Memphis Sanitation Strike, the city of Memphis was experiencing another divisive racial conflict. City leaders and Mayor Loeb wanted to end this confrontation quickly without attracting national attention, but they were not willing to meet the protesters’ demands. Loeb threatened the possibility of reduced pay or suspension of city

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workers, longer school terms to address student absenteeism, and threatened to sue protest and union leaders for damages if the protests did not end. Nevertheless, forty-six thousand students participated in the third Black Monday protest and downtown march on October 27. During the fourth Black Monday, the coalition of black labor, civil rights, and political groups asked black citizens to miss work and close businesses in black neighborhoods.50 Black Monday organizers asked for these additional requests because more forceful tactics were necessary to bring about the desired changes. The fourth Black Monday protest was just as successful as the first three because sixty-eight thousand students were absent from their classes, and five thousand citizens participated in a rally at City Hall. The Black Monday protests came to an end in mid-November 1969. after the majority of school board members agreed to institute the N.A.A.C.R’s five recommendations. The committee consisting of five whites and four blacks included: Jesse Turner, Mrs. Maxine Smith, and Mrs. Lorene Osborne of the N.A.A.C.P.; E.C.Stimbert, Edgar Bailey, and Dr. John Crothers of the school board; and Criminal Court Judge Odell Horton, Allen Morgan, and Walter Barret representing the public.51 Their recommendations were: for the board to encourage the passage of legislation in the 1970 session of the Tennessee General Assembly so that black members could be elected; increase its commitment to hiring teachers, administrators and staff on the basis of merit; appoint a black assistant superintendent and black coordinator to study the administrative structure of the school system; to recruit qualified black and white teachers, principals, and administrators; and to provide quality education for every student.52 As a result of the acceptance of these recommendations, the United Black Coalition and N.A.A.C.P. called for an end to the school boycotts. The school board also assured them that teacher and student protesters would not be punished.53 The black community was pleased with the success of the 1969 Black Monday protests. The school board implemented most of their demands and no violence occurred. Two years later, however, the most violent race riot in the city since the 1866 race riots occurred and resulted in even more strained race relations. The Elton Hayes conflict began on October 15, 1971. At approximately 2:00 A.M., George Barnes, fifteen, was driving his two friends Calvin McKissack, fourteen, and Hayes, seventeen, on a South Memphis street. Hayes was seated in the middle of the pickup truck. After a police car spotted the youngsters, a high speed chase ensued. The pursuit ended when Barnes’


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truck ran into a ditch in the Capleville section of Shelby County, a few miles outside of the Memphis city limits. By this time, approximately twenty-three policemen had gathered at the scene. While some watched, several officers severely attacked the three youths with nightsticks. Barnes and McKissack were later arrested and charged with speeding, driving without a license and assault with intent to murder. At 10:00 A.M., Elton Hayes was pronounced dead at John Gaston Hospital. Conflicting accounts were given by Barnes and McKissack on one hand and the officers on the other as to why policemen began following the youths, why Barnes failed to stop, and whether the beatings were justified. When questioned separately, Barnes and McKissack provided similar details. Barnes stated: They [the police] were chasing us and when I turned on Stephenson road, I could see the roadblock ahead so I stopped and pulled to the side of the road. Almost as soon as I stopped, the police and sheriff’s men jerked me from the truck and stated hitting me with sticks. They pulled him [Hayes] from the other side of the car and started hitting him and Calvin and I heard Elton scream. When we pulled up on South Parkway, I spun the wheels and the police started after us. But they hit the curb because they were going too fast, not because we hit them. How could we have hit them when they were behind us all the way?54

McKissack remembered that the three had been drinking beer before the chase began, but later cooperated with police. His account was that: The police yelled halt and we got out of the car together with our hands over our heads. As soon as my feet hit the ground, someone kicked me to the ground and started hitting me with sticks. I covered my head and eyes. I didn’t see anyone. I couldn’t see who was hitting him [Hayes]. Elton screamed once “I didn’t do it. George did it. The other boy did it,” then I didn’t hear anything else.55

Shortly after Hayes’ death, the police officers filed their first report. They claimed Hayes was thrown from the truck and injured after it overturned. Two officers, E.L.Mullins and J.B.Dyer, stated that the chase began after Barnes made an illegal turn and later tried to force them off the road. A sheriff’s car, occupied by E.B.Bonham and J.L.Roberts, was also forced off the road. Other officers witnessed the pursuit and joined the chase.

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Two deputies, D.T.Wade and W.R.Lee, set up a road block at Capleville. When swerving to avoid the road block at approximately sixty miles per hour, the truck landed on its side. Hayes was injured after he was thrown out of a side window. On October 16, the officers filed a second report alleging that the truck had not overturned but had run into a ditch. On the same day, an autopsy revealed that Hayes died as the result of a “blow or blows to the head.”56 In other words, the young man’s skull was almost completely crushed. No evidence showed that Hayes was thrown from the truck as police had indicated in their first report nor did his injuries result from striking anything inside the truck’s interior.57 Black Memphians believed that Elton Hayes was yet another black male murdered by police. To no avail, civil rights groups had complained about police abuse for years prior to this incident. After the autopsy report became public, investigations were launched by Attorney General Phil Canale and the N.A.A.C.R Also, Police Chief Henry Lux suspended twenty-three officers during the course of investigations. In order to calm racial tensions, black politicians held meetings with Mayor Loeb, the City Council and with black residents.58 Nevertheless, incidents of violent rebellion occurred in the days after Hayes’ death. On October 19, the night of his funeral, firebombings, shootings and other uprising began at approximately 8:37 P.M. in midtown Memphis. Firemen attempting to extinguish a fire started by an arsonist at the Speedy Foods store were shot at twice. Later during the evening, a police helicopter was reported damaged by gunfire. These incidents spread to other parts of the city and continued for the next four days. Most of the rioting took place in predominantly black neighborhoods, especially in Orange Mound where Hayes had lived. On the second day of unrest, October 20, five predominantly black schools closed early because of disturbances. Outsiders threw rocks at schools, made bomb threats and one trash fire was reported. Also, parents withdrew students from school for fear of violence. As a result of these incidents, Mayor Loeb called for a curfew from 7 P.M. to 5 A.M. He withdrew the order at approximately 6 P.M. because of objections from both leaders and citizens. Two days after Elton Hayes’ death on October 21, the riots resulted in the first death. At approximately 8:44 P.M., three-year-old Robert Reed Jr. was struck by an unmarked police car. Reed ran into the street in front of his home and was pronounced dead hours later. Earlier on the same day, approximately 250 high school students marched from North


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Figure 4.7. Trash and debris lay on Dunlap near Poplar Boulevard after the Elton Hayes riots. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

side High School to City Hall in downtown Memphis. The youths carried signs calling for justice and “death to the pigs” in their demonstration. On October 22, the violence declined as the City Council continued meetings with black residents on police brutality. Council Chairman Jerred Blanchard pledged passage of a resolution to create a community

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Figure 4.8. A police officer arrests a protester at a housing project near Crump Boulevard during the riots. (Photo by Jack E.Cantrell. Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

police committee of twenty black citizens and twenty policemen. On the next day as the city remained calm, Mayor Loeb named Police Chief Inspector Jack Wallace acting chief of police, to replace Chief Henry Lux who had resigned before the end of his term. On December 9, 1971, nine officers were charged with various offenses in connection with the death of Elton Hayes. Four officers were found guilty of first-degree murder; four others of assault-to-murder in the first degree. Another officer was charged with neglect of duty. All but one of the nine officers were white. Black sheriff’s lieutenant, Theodore Wilks, was among those charged with first-degree murder.59 CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN MEMPHIS During the civil rights movement in Memphis, several factors led to the black political developments of the early 1990s. First, interracial groups negotiated voluntary desegregation before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is questionable, however,


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Figure 4.9. Four of the nine officers who were charged with the death of black teenager Elton Hayes enter Judge Otis Higgs Jr.’s courtroom on January 21,1972. Higgs’ role in the trial would later become an issue when he ran for mayor in 1975. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

whether the desegregation of public facilities was “voluntary” considering the many lawsuits and protests which took place. Voluntary desegregation actually was token desegregation. Whites moved out of neighborhoods. The local school board made few efforts to integrate the schools. Moreover, businesses did not remove hiring barriers and excessive police force remained unchecked. Nevertheless, the city of Memphis did not experience the same level of violence that occurred during the civil rights protests in other Southern cities. Also, since blacks in Tennessee had not been completely disfranchised, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did not target counties in the state. Second, because of desegregation, African Americans gained a sense of confidence that they could elect black representation during the civil rights era. In 1964, A.W.Willis Jr. was elected to serve in the state legislature. In 1967, three black City Council members were elected and Willis became the first black mayoral candidate in Memphis. He lost because the majority of black voters favored mayoral incumbent William B.Ingram and Willis received few white crossover votes.

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Third, the institutional changes of the 1960s would have long-term political consequences. In 1966, voters approved a majority vote requirement which called for runoff elections if the candidate with the plurality of votes failed to received a majority of at least 50 percent. Also, a strong mayor-weak Council form of government replaced the mayorcommission government. Although three of the City Council districts had majority black populations, a black candidate would not win an at-large Council seat until 1983. Nevertheless, black citizens believed that the mayor-Council government would provide fairer representation and eliminate the possibility of machine politics. The runoff law required candidates to have a majority rather than a plurality of votes. On a positive end, the mayor and at-large Council members could not win without black support. On a negative end, black candidates would be defeated when running for these offices in future years because of racially polarized voting in a predominantly white city. Fourth, black leadership filed federal lawsuits to challenge the discriminatory measures which hampered their political development. In 1991, months before the October mayoral election, a federal lawsuit would change the structure of Memphis elections by eliminating the majority vote requirement as well as challenge the constitutionality of at-large elections and the city’s annexation policy. Thereafter, black candidates had more viable chances of winning city wide elections while whites lost their voting-age population majority in the city. Finally, racial polarization worsened after each of the civil rights protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this time, the black community continued to seek political and economic empowerment by supporting black candidates and conducting protests. Although electoral victories resulted, the protests in the subsequent years became more violent as citizens grew frustrated with discriminatory conditions. Black Memphians elected representatives to the City Council, county commission and state legislature, but refused to provide widespread support to the A.W.Willis Jr. mayoral bid. Some believed that Memphis was not ready for a black mayor due to its racial climate. Others were more concerned with preventing former mayor Henry Loeb Jr.’s reelection. The Loeb mayoral victory in 1967 proved that black voters both in Memphis and in the nation had the power to elect representatives during the late 1960s, but their political influence could be nullified by white voters who often elected their enemies as mayors. During the Sanitation Strike, Mayor Loeb and a majority white City Council showed the limits of black political power in Memphis because black and moderate white


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Council members were constrained by white conservative Council members and an ultraconservative white mayor. This would characterize the Memphis City Council for the next twenty-seven years. Before the Sanitation Strike, the Black Monday protests, and the Elton Hayes riot, black voters saw little need for a black mayor. These three incidents showed that the black community had to elect more than token representation to achieve gains in the work force, educational system and in the area of police-community relations. Since Memphis had a strong mayor-weak Council government, blacks needed to elect a black mayor and/or a larger number of Council members to have a legitimate amount of political influence. During the next two decades, black Memphians would unsuccessfully attempt to elect a black mayor and at-large City Council members because black candidates were disadvantaged by racial polarization, lower black voter turnout levels, and discriminatory suffrage laws during the era of racial politics. NOTES 1 Huey L.Perry, “The Evolution and Impact of Biracial Coalitions and Black Mayors in Birmingham and New Orleans,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: Second Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1997), 180. 2 Benjamin Muse, Memphis (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1964), 8. 3 Ibid., 7. 4 Stephen M.Findlay, “The Role of Biracial Organizations in the Integration of Public Facilities in Memphis, Tennessee” (Unpublished Document, 1975), 5. 5 Ibid., 18. 6 Ibid., 5. 7 Harry Holloway, The Politics of the Southern Negro: From Exclusion to Big City Organization. (New York: Random House, 1969), 286. 8 Joseph A.Sweat, “2,000 Negroes Gather at Church as Trial Goes On,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, March 21, 1960. 9 Benjamin Muse, Memphis (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1964), 8. 10 Paul Vanderwood, “Court Rules on Airport Facility,” Memphis PressScimitar, March 26, 1962. 11 The commission later closed the city’s swimming and wading pools for an indefinite period. They also passed a rule that children on competitive sports teams had to join those at parks in their neighborhoods. This meant that despite the declaration of desegregated parks, black and white children continued to play on segregated teams in separate parks. Although resistance of this nature continued,

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desegregated city parks and pools opened in June 1963 with no incidents of violence. As a precaution, police cars were called in to serve as a deterrent to possible disruptive forces. Also, members of the Shelby County White Citizens Councils and other segregationist groups picketed many sites. 12 Clarence N.Stone, “Race and Regime in Atlanta,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus P.Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb, (New York: Longman, 1990), 131. 13 Steven F.Lawson, Running for Freedom: Black Politics and Civil Rights Since 1941 (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1991), 92. 14 Huey L.Perry, “The Evolution and Impact of Biracial Coalitions and Black Mayors in Birmingham and New Orleans,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: Second Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 142. 15 Edward S.LaMonte, Politics and Welfare in Birmingham, 1900–1975. (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1995). 16 David M.Tucker, Memphis Since Crump (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 141. 17 Russell B.Sugarmon Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 22, 1993. 18 David M.Tucker, Memphis Since Crump (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 138. 19 Ibid., 140. 20 Ibid., 140. 21 Dr. Miriam DeCosta-Willis, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, June 20, 1995. 22 Lester C.Lamon, Blacks in Tennessee, 1791–1970 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 112. 23 David M.Tucker, Memphis Since Crump (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 141. 24 Walter Rugaber, “Negro Mayoral Bid in Memphis Tests Negro Vote,” New York Times, September 29, 1967. 25 Ibid. 26 William Street, “Ingram, Loeb Move Into Runoff,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 6, 1967. 27 Dr. Miriam DeCosta-Willis, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, June 20, 1995. 28 Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1992). 29 According to City Personnel Director Richard Barnes, Memphis workers received higher than average pay than employees in other cities. Black sanitation workers in St. Louis received wages of $2.20 an hour, followed by Dallas with


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$1.83, and Atlanta with $1.80. Those in Jackson, Mississippi, New Orleans, and Little Rock were among the lowest paid, with an hourly wage of approximately $1.40. 30 Cornell Christion, “Blood and Strife Brought Dignity for City Workers,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, February 28, 1993. 31 Anne Trotter, “The Memphis Business Community and Integration,” in Southern Businessmen and Desegregation, eds. Elizabeth Jacoway and David R. Colburn (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press), 290. 32 Ibid, 290. 33 Cornell Christion, “Blood and Strife Brought Dignity for City Workers,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, February 28, 1993. 34 Steven F.Lawson, Running for Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in America Since 1941 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 127–128. 35 Charles A.Brown and Clark Porteous, “Hiring Garbage Men Goes Slowly,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, February 15, 1968. 36 Joan T.Beifuss, At The River I Stand: Memphis, the 1968 Strike, and Martin Luther King (Memphis: B and W Books, 1985), 71. 37 Anne Trotter, “The Memphis Business Community and Integration,” in Southern Businessmen and Desegregation, eds. Elizabeth Jacoway and David R. Colburn (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press), 293. 38 Joseph A.Sweat, “Union Vows Strike Will Hold Despite City Hiring New Men” Memphis Commercial Appeal, February 16, 1968. 39 The three blacks and white attorney Jerred Blanchard were the only City Council members who wanted to end the strike. 40 Cornell Christion, “Blood and Strife Brought Dignity for City Workers,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, February 28, 1993; Anne Trotter, “The Memphis Business Community and Integration,” in Southern Businessmen and Desegregation, eds. Elizabeth Jacoway and David R.Colburn (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press), 293. 41 Earlier in the morning at Hamilton High School, a group of black students known as the Invaders referred to Martin Luther King Jr. and other civil rights leaders as “Uncle Toms” and practiced making a Molotov cocktail bomb. A student suffered minor injuries at the school, but erroneous rumors later circulated that she had died. 42 Walter Rugaber, “Negro Mayoral Bid in Memphis Tests Negro Vote,” New York Times, September 29, 1967. 43 Ibid. 44 Cornell Christion, “Blood and Strife Brought Dignity for City Workers,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, February 28, 1993. 45 Ibid.

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Race, Power, and Political Emergence in Memphis 46

Sara Lewis, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, June 22, 1995. Dr. Benjamin L.Hooks, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, June 15, 1995. 48 Wayne Trotter, “Tear Gas Follows Rocks as Police Stand Firm,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 11, 1969. 49 Ibid. 50 Calvin Taylor Jr., “600 Teachers Vow to Skip School to Push NAACP’s Black Monday,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 20, 1969. 51 Anonymous, “School Board Gives OK to Proposals Outlined by Mediation Committee, Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 17, 1969. 52 Sara Lewis, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, June 22, 1995. 53 On November 22, the Memphis Board of Education filed a $10 million lawsuit against nineteen of the Black Monday activists who were accused of violating a Tennessee law which stated, “It is a misdemeanor for any person to urge incite or assist any child of the age of eighteen or under who is registered at any public or private school to leave the child’s school while the school is in session or to not attend the school when the school is in session, for the purpose of participating in a public protest demonstration or breach of the peace.” In June 1972, however, Assistant Attorney General Don Strother dropped all charges. 54 William Bayne, Beth J.Tamke, and Charles Thornton, “Beating Hinted in ‘Crash’ Death,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 20, 1971. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Walter Bailey, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, June 2, 1994. 59 Jefferson Riker, “Nine Law Officers Are Indicted,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, December 10, 1971. 47

CHAPTER 5

Racial Polarization and Electoral Behavior, 1975–1987

INTRODUCTION Chapter 5 examines the transition from the eras of civil rights struggle to that of racial politics. As mentioned in chapter four, blacks in the nation made the transition “from protest to politics” during the era of the civil rights struggle. By using mobilization strategies that depended heavily on black unity and biracial coalitions, black candidates won citywide, district, national, and state elections. Black mayoral and at-large candidates were defeated in Memphis, however, because of a lack of confidence that they could elect a black mayor, an inability to form coalitions in a conservative Southern city, and institutional factors which diluted the black vote. During the era of racial politics, the issue of race dominated most citywide Memphis elections. From 1975 to 1987, blacks and whites engaged in a power struggle. As the black population increased, a growing number of “serious” contenders ran for office. Black politicians made the initial steps in changing their role in the political structure from subordinate to dominant. Black elected officials represented predominantly black districts on the City Council and in the state legislature when Harold Ford became the state’s first black congressman. Yet, white conservatives continued to dominate the local political scene because of the city’s white voting-age population majority and racial polarization. With the exception of Minerva Johnican’s victory in 1983, black candidates were defeated in at-large City Council races resulting in a predominantly white Council.

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An examination of the three themes of this book—mobilization, emergence, and incorporation—finds that major changes occurred in black mobilization as the political community sought emergence and incorporation. First, Harold Ford became the most powerful politician in Memphis. A black political figure had not possessed such a level of influence since the days of Robert Church Jr. and Lieutenant George Lee. During his congressional career, Ford gained prominence because of his ability to mobilize black voters both before and on election day, his ability to deliver constituent services, and his influential endorsements. As Ford’s power base grew, both black and white candidates sought endorsements from him rather than from black political organizations in order to mobilize the black vote. Ford’s critics called him a machine boss because of his ability to deliver the black vote. Because of his outspokenness, many whites viewed him as being racist and corrupt, but blacks almost wholeheartedly supported the Ford brothers during scandals. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, a substantial number of blacks believed that Harold Ford’s three federal trials for mail and bank fraud along with local media coverage of his political activities were a form of racist harassment of a prominent black elected official. A second change in mobilization occurred in mayoral elections. During the era of racial politics, the primary mobilization tactic involved drafting a candidate and mobilizing the black vote on his behalf. Black candidates used this tactic in the 1975, 1979, and 1982 mayoral races and in most at-large Council elections. In the 1983 and 1987 mayoral elections, however, ideological differences were apparent as new kinds of black politicians ran for office. Minerva Johnican became the first black woman to make a serious mayoral bid. Some candidates were employed as hairdressers, postal workers, and singer/songwriters. Others had more traditional occupations—lawyers, ministers, and politicians. Many of these nontraditional candidates faced little chances for victory, but represented members of the underclass who disapproved of middle-class black politicians. From 1975–87, black mayoral candidates won elections in other cities, but those in Memphis were defeated largely because of an inability to mobilize the black vote. This chapter provides an overview of the Ford organization and explanations for black candidate losses in the five mayoral elections which occurred from 1975 to 1987. It also examines the inability of black candidates to win at-large Council elections. From 1967–87, three black candidates usually represented predominantly black districts on the City Council. In 1983,


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Minerva Johnican became the first black candidate to win an at-large seat. As will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8, an increased number of black candidates won at-large seats after a federal judge found in 1991 that these elections were discriminatory. If this ruling had not occurred, whites would probably still hold a majority on the Council. THE FORD POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF MEMPHIS As was noted in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, black citizens focused on strengthening their political organizations before the 1970s. These groups were heavily involved in mobilizing campaigns and civil rights protests. In addition, black politicians rose to prominence in Birmingham, Chicago, Memphis, and New Orleans through political organizations which usually drafted candidates thus giving black citizens a voice in the political process.1 The Ford organization was the dominant black political group in Memphis from the 1970s. Since 1970, six members of the Ford family have held local, state, and national elective offices: Emmitt, Harold Sr., Harold Jr., James, Joe, and John Ford (see Table 5-1). Currently, Harold E.Ford Jr. represents the Ninth Congressional District of West Tennessee. John Ford is a state senator. James Ford is a Shelby County Commissioner and Joe Ford is a City Council member. Harold Ford Sr. began his political career in 1970 after winning election to the Tennessee legislature. By 1974, Harold and John Ford had proven themselves in the local political arena. In addition to Harold’s four years in the Tennessee legislature, John Ford had held a position on the Memphis City Council since 1971. In 1974, twenty-nineyear-old Harold Ford challenged four-term incumbent Dan Kuykendall and an independent black candidate, Louis L.Porter, for the Eighth Congressional District seat. Emmitt Ford was seeking a seat in the Tennessee legislature. After each of the Ford brothers won their respective races, they began referring to themselves as the Ford organization. After Harold Ford established and expanded his power base, black candidates became more concerned with gaining his support rather than that of black political organizations. During his twenty-two years in Congress, black contenders, especially those who lacked name-recognition, believed that it was much easier to win with Harold Ford’s endorsement. Some blamed Ford for their losses, especially in mayoral races. In order to fully understand black politics in Memphis, one must understand the dynamics of the Ford organization as well as the reasons that Harold Ford gained, maintained, and eventually transferred his power base.

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Table 5.1 Elective Offices Held by Members of the Ford Family

Source: Tennessee Blue Book. Nashville: Secretary of State, 1971, 1975, 1981, 1997. * The 8th district became the 9th district after redistricting in the 1970s.

The John and Emmitt Ford wins were substantial in 1974. Both garnered approximately 60 percent of the black vote and had total vote percentages which almost doubled those of the second highest contenders.2 Harold Ford defeated U.S. Representative Dan Kuykendall by a very small margin. Harold Ford realized that Kuykendall had defeated J.O. Patterson Jr. in 1972 because of Patterson’s absenteeism on the City Council, limited number of public appearances, and lack of endorsements. These factors made voters believe that Patterson was not a serious contender. In outlining his campaign, Ford planned to attract most of the black vote and a small percentage from whites in a coalition-based campaign. He believed that 1974 was an opportune time to run for Congress because of a slumping economy and continuing anti-Republican mood in the country in the aftermath of Watergate. He was also encouraged by the redrawing of district lines due to population shifts in April 1972. By 1974, the Eighth District was 47.5 percent black.3


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Figure 5.1. Left to right: State Representative Emmitt Ford, State Senator John Ford, and Congressman Harold Ford in 1974. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection. University of Memphis)

Ford’s campaign theme was “Harold Ford: A Democrat for All the People.” To reinforce his credibility, he received strong endorsements from Mayors Tom Bradley of Los Angeles, Jay Cooper of Pritchard, Alabama, and David Hume of Hayti Heights, Missouri. Ford also received the support of the local and national chapters of the Democratic Party, Shelby County Democratic Party Chairman James White, County Court Squire William Farris, former gubernatorial candidate John Jay Hooker, Senate Majority Whip from West Virginia Robert Byrd, and National Democratic Party Chairman Robert Strauss.4 In his congressional campaign, Harold Ford was an underdog facing a well-known white Republican. Yet, Dan Kuykendall realized he could not ignore his candidacy. At the time, the Ford brothers were greatly admired by black citizens and respected by many whites as well. To offset their popularity, Kuykendall’s campaign slogan addressed the “Two I’s— Inflation and Integrity Versus the Ford Machine.” To Kuykendall’s disadvantage, voters in 1974 sought change in politics. On early Wednesday morning, November 6, 1974, Harold Ford was declared the winner. His margin of victory was later cited as 744 votes.

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Ford received over 97 percent of the black vote and approximately 15 percent of the white vote. This victory made him the first black Tennessean to be elected to Congress. The November 5 election night was filled with controversy. After the polls closed, major radio and television stations reported a Kuykendall reelection by approximately 5,000 votes. In disbelief, a frustrated Harold Ford went to the Shelby County Election Commission office and waited for final results. At approximately 10:30 P.M., commission workers discovered that uncounted tally sheets from six precincts had been left in metal boxes. Ford believed that this was an attempt to prevent his win. On live television, he alleged that the tally sheets had been “buried in a garbage can to be shipped out.”5 After television stations changed their story and declared Ford the winner, Kuykendall was told of his loss while still on camera. He had been informed that his 5,000 vote win was official. Ford’s narrow victory was confirmed days later. After Kuykendall’s loss, he predicted that the Eighth District would become a “yo-yo seat” where no one could expect to serve more than one term.6 Yet, Harold Ford’s congressional seat was not threatened by a serious contender from his 1974 win until his retirement in 1996 (see Table 5-2). Because of the strength of their organization, the Fords were often accused of developing a “mini-Crump machine” in Memphis. The most effective tactic of the Ford organization has always been their mobilization of the black community. Before election day, the Fords and their supporters engaged in vigorous grassroots campaigns by making speeches, walking through neighborhoods, displaying yard signs, distributing ballots, etc. The Ford ballot listed instructions informing citizens on voting procedures and the names of persons favored by the Fords. These candidates paid fees in order to have their names listed on the Ford ballot. The price was determined by the level of office being sought and the candidates’ amount of campaign funds. Major candidates in statewide and city wide races were charged higher fees than those running for local offices. Because the Fords often disagreed about whom they should endorse, John Ford created “the “John Ford Ballot.” For example, when Harold Ford endorsed Otis Higgs for mayor in 1979, John Ford was contemplating entry into the race. Harold also endorsed and campaigned for the senator’s opponent, Jack Sammons, in the 1994 Shelby County mayoral election. After Harold Ford’s retirement, Harold Jr. created the “Harold Ford Jr. Ballot.”


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Table 5-2 Harold E.Ford Sr.’s Total Vote Percentages, 1974–94

Source: Shelby County Board of Election Commission

After Harold Ford gained more influence, candidates sought his endorsement more so than that of political organizations to gain larger percentages of the black vote. During the eras of access, machine rule, and civil rights struggle, political organizations such as the Colored Citizens Association, West Tennessee Civic and Political League, Lincoln League, and Shelby County Democratic Club educated the black community about the importance of voting, endorsed candidates, and encouraged bloc voting, registration and turnout. During the era of racial politics, however, black political organizations lost much of their influence. For many years some candidates believed that it was easier to win elections with Harold Ford’s backing because he “controlled” the black vote. According to former Memphis Mayor Wyeth Chandler, “At one time, you couldn’t get anything done in the black community without Harold Ford.”7 During the 1979 city elections, accusations continued that the Ford organization had developed a political machine in the black community. Groups consisting of black ministers and elected officials opposed the alleged practice of machine politics in a newspaper ad criticizing Ford campaign tactics on behalf of Dr. James Ford’s City Council bid. According to an unidentified source, James Ford “campaigned almost exclusively on

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Figure 5.2. Twenty-nine-year-old Harold Ford flashed a victory sign at the Rivermont Hotel after defeating Dan Kuykendall for Congress on November 5, 1974. (Photo by Glenn Peterson. Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection. University of Memphis)

continuing the kind of service he said people had come to expect from a Ford” after his last-minute entry in the race.8 The Ford family aggressively campaigned on James Ford’s behalf by appearing at or sending representatives to churches and door-to-door throughout the district. Moreover, Ford yard signs and posters dominated neighborhood yards and utility poles. On election day, the Fords visited fourteen polling places to campaign for James Ford in his first political race. James Ford received 51.3 percent of the vote and defeated seven candidates for the District Six Memphis City Council seat which had once been held by John Ford. One competitor for the City Council seat, Kathryn I.Bowers, felt that she “did not lose a race to James Ford, but instead lost to Harold Ford…. There are people in the city that worship Congressman


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Ford as people worship a god…. It could lead down the road to destruction.”9 Minerva Johnican has had public battles with the Fords. In 1980, she challenged Harold Ford for his congressional seat and was defeated by a wide margin of approximately 40,700 to 11,300. Two years later, Ford strongly endorsed political novice Julian Bolton for Johnican’s county commission seat in an alleged retaliatory action. Bolton narrowly defeated Johnican by 398 votes. A few months after her loss to Bolton, Johnican stated: He [Harold Ford] does run a machine of fear…. I know that if I run for any elective office, he is going to put a lot of money on my opponent to defeat me. He will try to keep me out of politics because I am one of the few people in the community who knows him well, isn’t afraid of him, and doesn’t mind speaking out against him.10

Although political analysts have predicted that Congressman Ford would run for mayor, he has declined to do so for various reasons. His endorsements and other activities, however, played significant roles in local elections.11 Harold Ford’s career has major implications for black politics. By the 1970s, the most powerful politicians in many cities were African American. Individuals like Ford, Marion Barry, Thomas Bradley, Willie Brown, William Clay, Maynard Jackson, Coleman Young, and others were more than just elected officials. Their influence transcended the boundaries of their districts or cities because they brought substantive benefits to their cities such as federal funds and jobs. Both black and white candidates sought their support because of their ability to “deliver” the black vote. THE QUEST TO ELECT THE FIRST BLACK MAYOR OF MEMPHIS, 1975–1987: REASONS FOR UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDACIES After A.W.Willis’ 1967 mayoral campaign, blacks in Memphis failed to elect a black mayor for almost twenty-five years. During the era of racial politics, the black community was mostly concerned with electing a black mayor and increasing the number of black City Council members. As the black population increased and African American mayors won in other cities, blacks in Memphis became more determined to elect a black mayor. In other cities, black mayors used a number of

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campaign strategies. While some focused primarily on black mobilization, other placed less of an emphasis on race and attempted to build coalitions with whites and other minorities. (These strategies will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.) Georgia Persons identified five different periods in the elections of black mayors from 1967 to 1989. During the first, Walter E.Washington became the first black chief executive of a major American city (populations of 150,000 and above) after President Lyndon B.Johnson appointed him as Commissioner of the District of Columbia in 1967. Also in that year, Carl Stokes of Cleveland and Richard Hatcher of Gary became the first elected black mayors of major American cities. In 1970, Kenneth Gibson became mayor of Newark, New Jersey. During the second period, black mayors were elected in Atlanta, Detroit, and Los Angeles in 1973, and in Washington, D.C. in 1974. The third period occurred during the late 1970s with elections in New Orleans and Oakland in 1977, followed by Birmingham in 1979. During the fourth period, the cities of Charlotte, Chicago, and Philadelphia elected black mayors in 1983 and Baltimore in 1987. The fifth occurred in November 1989 when black mayors were elected in Durham, New Haven, New York City, and Seattle.12 As black mayoral candidates won local elections in other cities during these five periods, those in Memphis were defeated. During the 1970s, candidates Thomas Bradley of Los Angeles, Coleman Young of Detroit, Maynard Jackson of Atlanta, Marion Barry of the District of Columbia, Richard Arrington of Birmingham, Ernest “Dutch” Morial of New Orleans, Lionel Wilson of Oakland, and others were elected as mayors of their respective cities. Yet, Otis Higgs lost racially polarized Memphis mayoral elections in 1975 and 1979. Although a minority in terms of voter registration, blacks voted in a more cohesive bloc than whites during the two elections. In 1975, the substantial black vote in Higgs’ favor was sufficient for his second place finish in the general election. In the runoff, the vote split heavily along racial lines. Four years later, Mayor Wyeth Chandler again defeated Higgs in a polarized runoff election. During the 1980s, black candidates lost mayoral races even after Memphis had a predominantly black population. In a 1982 special election, J.O.Patterson Jr. received a plurality of votes in the general election. Yet, Dick Hackett later won a runoff election. Other black mayoral campaigns of the 1980s were unsuccessful because of divisions among black Memphians which resulted in a split black vote. Both in


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1983 and 1987, Dick Hackett won general elections as a result of fragmented black votes. In 1983, seven black candidates ran for mayor. In 1987, three black contenders entered the race. A statement made by Nelson and Meranto characterized the state of black politics in Memphis during this time: In order for a group to wield political power, it is not enough that it be concentrated in large numbers in a limited geopolitical area. Political power [the ability to influence the allocation of governmental resources] in so far as it flows from electoral action, is achieved only if numbers are augmented by group cohesion, leadership, political consciousness and organization.13

Before 1991, the mayoral elections in Memphis showed that the black community failed to take advantage of a crucial resource—a substantial population. In other cities, black mayors won elections through the use of effective mobilization strategies and unity among leaders. The Memphis case proved that black mayoral candidates had to receive the majority of black votes, attract respectable levels of white crossover support, and encourage larger black turnout levels in order to win. The next sections discuss the dynamics of each of the five city mayoral elections which occurred from 1975 to 1987 and provide reasons for black candidate losses. THE 1975 MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTION In 1975, six candidates competed for the mayoral office: white incumbent Wyeth Chandler, white businessman Joe M.Burnett, black former criminal court judge Otis Higgs, black schoolteacher Willie C.Jacox, white businessman William Bryan Thompson, and 1971 white mayoral candidate Kenneth Turner. Higgs and Turner were Chandler’s two major opponents. Early in the race, it was obvious that there would be a battle for black votes between the two main challengers. Predictably, Higgs would be the front runner among black voters because of endorsements from black leaders, organizations, and churches. Yet, Turner had received the majority of the black vote in the 1971 mayoral race because of his extensive campaigning in black communities and endorsements from black civic and political leaders. In 1971, Turner had capitalized on issues such as the 1968 Sanitation Strike, the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and the Elton Hayes

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Figure 5.3. The candidates for mayor in 1975: Wyeth Chandler, Kenneth Turner, William B.Thompson, Joe Burnett, and Otis Higgs. Not shown: Willie C.Jacox, and William Bryan Thompson. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

murder. In order to gain black support in the 1971 runoff, the Turner campaign circulated signs which pictured three black men—Elton Hayes, Martin Luther King Jr., and an anonymous person. Underneath the pictures, a slogan read, “If Chandler is elected, this could be your son”.14 The implication was clear that Chandler, who was endorsed by Mayor Henry Loeb Jr., was hostile to the interests of the black community. As a result of these kind of political ads and other factors, Kenneth Turner did extremely well in predominantly black precincts (98 percent of the black vote) and received enough white votes to compete in the runoff. Yet, Wyeth Chandler swept virtually all of the white precincts of the city and won by less than 2,000 votes. In 1975, Turner wanted to keep his broad base of black support and to attract the votes of whites who were frustrated with the Chandler


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administration. Higgs’ entrance into the race meant that Turner would lose a substantial number of black votes. Out of frustration, Turner alleged that Higgs had been paid to enter the race shortly before the filing deadline in order to split the black vote. Days later, leaflets surfaced in black neighborhoods which hinted that Higgs had no chance of winning because white Memphians would not support a black candidate. Therefore, black Memphians should vote for Turner. Other leaflets questioned former Judge Higgs’ role in the trial of the white policemen accused of murdering black teenager Elton Hayes.15 Otis Higgs denied these accusations and focused on attracting black support and white crossover votes in a city where white voters outnumbered black by approximately 7 percent. The 1975 Higgs campaign used a “dual campaign strategy” which emphasized different issues in black and white communities.16 When addressing whites, he focused on the issues of decreasing property taxes, improving the quality of public schools, reducing crime, and providing leadership at city hall. When addressing blacks, he emphasized that blacks could show black pride and unity by voting for him. Since local newspaper polls indicated that Mayor Chandler had a sizable lead, he expected a general election victory. During his campaign, Chandler contrasted his first term from that of Mayor Henry Loeb. He claimed that there was less friction among blacks and whites and among labor groups— two of the most alienated groups under the Loeb administration. Also, Chandler pointed out some of his major accomplishments as mayor including new recreation facilities and community centers, improved city services, economic growth, and no increase in city taxes.17 In the 1975 general election, both Chandler and Higgs received the majority of votes in predominantly white and black precincts, respectively. As shown in Table 5-3, Higgs received approximately 80 percent of the black vote and 10 percent of the white vote. Chandler received 70 percent of the white vote and 3 percent of the black vote. Wyeth Chandler’s total vote of 46.5 percent was approximately four percent shy of the 50 percent needed to win the general election and avoid a runoff.18 Higgs placed second with 35.1 percent of the total vote followed by Kenneth Turner with 16.4 percent. In 1975, Mayor Chandler predicted that he would defeat Otis Higgs by a landslide in the runoff. Both candidates pledged to avoid the use of racially divisive tactics. Indeed, racist appeals were lacking from their runoff campaigns. During the month before the November runoff election, neither candidate made personal attacks. Higgs focused on the issues

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Table 5.3 Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1975 Memphis Mayoral Elections


surrounding an increase in property taxes during the Chandler administration. He accused Chandler of “deceit” in his telling voters that an increase in property taxes had not transpired during his administration and by alleging that Memphis had lower taxes than other cities of its size. Higgs also spoke of his pledge to improve the quality of public schools, reduce crime, and provide leadership at City Hall.19 Chandler questioned Higgs’ qualifications for the mayoralty without appealing to racism. He believed that Higgs would have been more qualified to serve as mayor if he had had political experience and continued to highlight the major accomplishments of his administration.20 In November 1975, Wyeth Chandler, an attorney and former City Councilman, became the first mayor to be elected to a second consecutive term in Memphis since the 1943 reelection of his father Walter Chandler. He defeated Higgs by approximately 31,055 votes—a margin of 58 percent to 42 percent of the total vote. A substantial number of both black and white Memphians voted on the basis of race. Chandler, by receiving 89.9 percent of the white vote and 3.2 percent of the black vote, defeated Higgs by a wide margin. Higgs received approximately 14,800 white votes (10.1 percent) and 68,400 black votes (96.8 percent). THE 1979 MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTION In the 1979 general election, Wyeth Chandler sought a third mayoral term. Otis Higgs, white Memphis City Councilman Pat Halloran, LebaneseAmerican businessman Robert “Prince Mongo” Hodges, and black


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Figure 5.4. Otis Higgs concedes his loss for mayor in November 1975. W.W.Herenton is in the background. The race of the Higgs and Chandler supporters showed the extent of racial polarization in the city. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

Executive Director of the Memphis-West Tennessee Congress of Racial Equality Dr. Isaac Richmond were his challengers. The most credible opponents were Higgs and Halloran. In 1979, Wyeth Chandler again focused on his accomplishments during his eight years as mayor. In the area of economic growth, an increase in jobs resulted from new and expanding Memphis businesses. Chandler also cited evidence of less employment discrimination, a thriving tourist industry, and a downtown development plan which included the MidAmerica Mall, Cook Convention Center, Volunteer Park, Mud Island Project, and other restaurants and attractions.21 The issue of race was dominant in the 1979 election. A major dilemma for Higgs was his lack of a strong campaign platform. His “Yes We Can” theme stressed racial love, equality, crime, public education, and economic growth.22 Higgs implied that a vote in his favor would be a vote against racism and accused Chandler of heightening the issue of

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Figure 5.5. Wyeth and Linda Chandler appear at a victory celebration after defeating Otis Higgs in the November 1975 runoff election. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

race. He neither detailed his abilities nor convinced voters that he had greater leadership qualities than a two-term incumbent with a relatively successful record. In October 1979, Higgs received enough votes to face Chandler in another runoff election after the elimination of candidates Pat Halloran, Robert Hodges, and Isaac Richmond. The Halloran bid with only 9,000 votes partially resulted in a split white vote and thus contributed to Chandler’s narrow victory. After holding a sizable lead during early election reports (above 50 percent), Chandler eventually received a 46.7 total vote percentage in comparison to 45.3 percent for Higgs. Probably because of close vote percentages in the general election, Otis Higgs received more overt racial animosity from whites in the runoff. Days before the runoff election, an unknown person burned a cross in front of Higgs’ home. Moreover, a twenty-one-year-old man publicly claimed that he was Higgs’ illegitimate son. In a few days, a burning cross was thrown inside the young man’s home.23


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Table 5-4 Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1979 Memphis Mayoral Elections


During the runoff, the Higgs campaign continued to focus on Chandler’s problems during his second administration which included budget deficits; strikes by firemen, policemen, and teachers; increases in fees for city services; an inability to expand the city’s tax base; and a federal investigation of public works division operations in city government.24 Wyeth Chandler had also faced a bitter divorce, had been arrested for fighting in a public facility, and had angered many women by judging a wet t-shirt contest at a local nightclub. Shortly before election day, Chandler requested a listing of registered white voters who failed to participate in the general election from the Shelby County Election Commission. He planned to make a strong effort to persuade these citizens to vote for him in the runoff. This was the first time such a request had been made for the names of members of a specific race who failed to vote. Since Higgs and others felt that this was a racist campaign tactic, charges of racism were made by both candidates. In response to the accusations, Chandler stated that his plan was not to target white voters while alienating blacks, but was “to get out every vote that [he thought would] vote for Wyeth Chandler.”25 At a press conference, Higgs addressed the issue of racial polarization in the runoff, “My opponent is the same man that stood at a bus burying with a two-by-four in his hand. My opponent is the same man that called the Civil Rights Commission ‘a bunch of weirdoes….’.”26 Chandler responded by reading an excerpt from a black newspaper article in which Higgs allegedly called black Chandler supporters “traitor[s].”27 He later with drew his request for the names of

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white voters, but continued to justify it as being racially neutral. As shown in Table 5-4, Chandler defeated Higgs in the 1979 runoff by a margin of 52.9 percent (approximately 120,207 votes) to 47.1 percent (approximately 107,252 votes). This victory made him the first mayor in over forty years to be elected to a third consecutive term. AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1975 AND 1979 RUNOFF ELECTIONS In 1975 and 1979, Wyeth Chandler defeated Otis Higgs in racially polarized mayoral elections. Higgs made more of an effort to attract white crossover votes in his 1979 mayoral campaign which was described as one of “the most colorless [campaigns in Memphis history].”28 This included numerous appearances before church, civic, and political groups in both black and white communities. Election results indicated that race was the dominant factor for vote choice in both elections. Overall turnout levels were respectable, but white turnout percentages were higher than black. In other words, Otis Higgs failed to attract enough white crossover support in racially polarized elections. Because of his lack of political experience and Chandler’s incumbency advantages, white voters had no real reason to support him. Another obstacle for Higgs and other black candidates seeking to gain white crossover votes was the refusal of many whites to open their doors to black campaign workers.29 In addition, some predominantly white organizations would not allow black candidates to appear before their members.30 The racially polarized voting behavior in the 1975 and 1979 may-oral elections found that black mobilization for Otis Higgs spurred white mobilization for Wyeth Chandler. Both Chandler and Higgs wanted crossover support, but also to maintain high voter percentages from blacks and whites respectively. The majority of black leaders and organizations endorsed the Higgs candidacy. Also, black churches and volunteers offered transportation to the polls. Higgs delivered speeches before black audiences in which he told them of their obligation to elect a black mayor. These tactics motivated black Memphians; yet according to local newspaper reports, whites felt excluded, threatened, and uncertain with the prospect of a “black city hall.” In both the 1975 and 1979 runoff elections, Otis Higgs, the only black candidate, attracted only small percentages of white votes, but a majority of black votes. He could not blame his losses, however, solely on racial


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polarization. In both mayoral races, Higgs failed to encourage black Memphians to vote on election day at a rate higher than whites. Several reasons can explain why black voters supported Otis Higgs in 1975 and 1979, but refused to vote for A.W.Willis Jr. for mayor in 1967. One reason is because of the context surrounding the two white challengers, Henry Loeb and Wyeth Chandler. Both men were conservatives, but black citizens believed that the only way to prevent Loeb from winning was to vote for a white moderate in 1967. In 1975 and 1979, they believed that Higgs could defeat Chandler because of the large increase in the number of black registered voters. Despite a substantial black voting bloc, Otis Higgs lost the 1975 and 1979 runoffs because whites had a higher white turnout rate, but most refused to vote for him. THE 1982 SPECIAL MAYORAL ELECTION In 1982, Mayor Wyeth Chandler unexpectedly resigned and became a Circuit Court judge.31 J.O.Patterson Jr. was appointed as interim mayor. A special election was then ordered so that a successor could serve the remaining twelve months of Chandler’s term. Patterson was the only serious black contender facing three strong white candidates: County Clerk Dick Hackett, Attorney Mike Cody, and City Council member Pat Vander Schaaf. It was predicted that Hackett would win because of his seven years as director of the Mayor’s Action Center and four years as county clerk. The other five candidates had little or no political experience or name-recognition.32 Because of Pat Vander Schaaf’s ability to attract votes from white women, Hackett’s Republican supporters and Mike Cody’s “middle” candidacy, a split white vote was expected.33 Cody was a white liberal competing against two strong candidates—one black and one white—in a racially polarized election. As a result, he was not expected to attract substantial vote percentages from either blacks or whites despite his abundant campaign fund. Patterson’s strategy in the general election was to benefit from the split white vote and attract a large enough turnout among black voters so that he could avoid a runoff. Most of his $30,000 campaign fund was used for print and radio ads. Patterson also addressed voters through speeches before political and civic groups, ballots, and door-to-door visits. Because J.O.Patterson Jr. received little help from Congressman Harold Ford, he forged a coalition with other black political figures, many of whom were Ford’s adversaries to ensure a large black voter turnout. Minerva

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Table 5-5 Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1982 Memphis Mayoral Elections


Johnican who saw a Patterson win as a way to “end the total control exerted by the Ford machine” arranged a Women for Patterson fund raising and mobilization drive.34 Rev. James E. Smith, head of the A.F.S.C.M.E. conducted Operation Big Vote to carry voters and campaign workers to the polls and to distribute campaign flyers. On election day, J.O.Patterson Jr. received the majority of votes in the general election. As shown in Table 5-5, his total vote percentage of 40.7 outnumbered the 29.8 percent received by Dick Hackett, leaving the two in a November 30 runoff race. If it had not become for the majority vote requirement, J.O.Patterson Jr. would have been the first black elected mayor of Memphis. In the runoff campaign, J.O.Patterson Jr. realized that a victory was possible. His strong showing in the general election was proof that a win was possible only if he could do two things: attract a large amount of white crossover support and a maintain a high black voter turnout rate. Initially, J.O.Patterson Jr. and Dick Hackett agreed to a “love-in” in which both would avoid making personal attacks and instead focus on issues such as decreasing property and payroll taxes, increasing the number of police patrols, improving schools, and furthering economic development would be emphasized. Both candidates had much to gain through use of a deracialized campaign. Hackett would benefit from a friendly or even boring campaign, because this would not motivate black Memphians to turn out at the polls. In 1982, the percentage of white registered voters continued to outnumber that of blacks. Also, Hackett had little to gain by appealing across racial lines because 94 percent of black voters supported Patterson’s general election bid.


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Patterson did not want to heighten racial issues in the runoff election primarily because the campaigns of previous black mayoral candidates had proven that doing so would only alienate white liberals whose support he greatly needed to win the election.35 He wanted to win the support of the approximately 25 percent of white voters who had voted for Mike Cody in the general election. Patterson believed that if he received financial contributions, endorsements, and votes from this segment of the white community and the overwhelming majority of black votes, he could win the election. In the general election, J.O.Patterson Jr. had primarily targeted the black vote. With the exception of a few television advertisements and speeches, he made few efforts to garner white votes out of the belief that a massive black voter turnout would lead to his election. In the runoff, Patterson, however, knew that he had to receive a larger percentage of white votes in an election that would almost assuredly be split along racial lines. Approximately two weeks before the runoff, Patterson abandoned his deracialized “love-in” campaign strategy. At the Annual Convocation of the Church of God in Christ, his father J.O.Patterson Sr. urged approximately 40,000 members of the church to “cooperate with God, think less of material wealth—and lend a hand to [Patterson Jr.’s] campaign…. Both men [Patterson Jr. and Hackett] are qualified, [but] the conscience of Memphis should honor a black man with the office of mayor.”36 One week before the runoff, J.O.Patterson Jr. publicly announced the end of the “love-in” out of the realization that he probably would not garner the amount of votes from whites that he needed to win the election. The only result of the “love-in” was that black voters were losing interest in his campaign. Moreover, if Patterson had continued the “love-in” campaign strategy, large numbers of black voters would have lacked the motivation to vote on election day because their turnout rates have usually been higher during controversial and racially charged elections. For example, Nelson and Meranto presented evidence that the 1967 victory of black candidate Carl Stokes was partly attributable to the belief that a black mayor could more effectively calm Cleveland’s racial tensions during the mid1960s.37 Starks and Preston found that the racist tone of the 1983 Chicago mayoral runoff between Harold Washington and Jewish candidate Bernard Epton both angered and motivated black Chicagoans into registering and turning out at the polls.38 After the end of the “love-in”, Patterson attacked Hackett’s inadequacies such as his political inexperience and relatively low

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educational level. Moreover according to Patterson, Hackett also referred to the A.F.S.C.M.E. as a black union, and had once called one of his black employees a “Mau Mau”.39 On the issue of race relations, Patterson believed that Dick Hackett would worsen both “racial polarization and… racial confrontations instead of providing stabilizing and progressive leadership for the city.”40 Beginning what would become his usual strategy when running against black candidates, Dick Hackett refused to respond to Patterson’s allegations. He realized that Patterson was alienating his white liberal supporters. Also, Hackett did not want to risk alienating black voters with divisive racial appeals as had other white candidates when faced with the threat of a credible black contender.41 Hackett’s only efforts to attract black votes included radio and newspaper appeals through the black media. In addition, Hackett canceled his joint appearances with J.O.Patterson Jr. allegedly in an effort to prevent the mayoral campaign from polarizing the city. In the 1982 runoff, J.O.Patterson was not able to increase his levels of white support. Black voter turnout increased by five percentage points. In the runoff, 60 percent of black citizens voted compared to 68 percent of whites. These were substantial turnout levels for a local election. Dick Hackett was elected mayor after receiving approximately 54 percent of the total vote while Patterson received 45.6 percent. The black turnout rate was substantial despite the lack of involvement by black leadership. Although Harold Ford endorsed J.O.Patterson in the general election, he remained neutral during the month-long period before the runoff and hinted that he would run for mayor in 1983. While running for Congress in 1982, Ford mailed an endorsement ballot to black voters urging them to vote for him and other Democratic candidates in various races, but omitted Patterson’s name. After receiving harsh criticism from the black community, Ford publicly endorsed Patterson for mayor. His reluctance to support Patterson in part resulted from Patterson’s refusal to vote for James Ford for City Council chairman. Patterson instead voted for Republican Barbara Sonnenburg. After this incident, Ford stated that he would “never support J.O.Patterson again.”42 Patterson also had a tense relationship with the Fords because John Ford competed against Patterson and other candidates in the 1978 Shelby County mayor’s race, but withdrew shortly before election day. On the day of Hackett’s swearing-in ceremony, Patterson blamed his defeat on a lack of support from the Ford organization by stating:


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Dick Hackett is being sworn in today instead of J.O.Patterson Jr. because of the lack of support given me by the Fords…. It is the Fords who are the disgrace, who have sold out the black community…. They didn’t want to see any black man but a Ford serve as mayor.43

Despite his belief, Patterson could not completely blame his defeat on the Ford organization. It resulted mostly from the discriminatory nature of Memphis runoff elections. Many studies have analyzed black candidate success in runoff elections. The “minority-disadvantage myth” stated that minority candidates are at a disadvantage in runoff elections even when they received the majority of votes in the general election.44 Because of the entry of more than one white candidate, black contenders often received the majority of votes in the first election, but were later defeated. During the runoff, whites had a higher turnout rate and a more cohesive voting bloc.45 In an analysis of Georgia runoff elections from 1970 to 1984, Bullock and Smith found little support for the “minority-disadvantage myth.” Since 1977, black candidates who received a plurality of votes in the general election had as much of a chance of winning runoffs as whites.46 They were more likely to lose runoffs when they competed against other black contenders and when they placed second to white candidates in the general election.47 Despite these findings, the majority vote requirement had a very detrimental effect on J.O.Patterson Jr.’s mayoral campaign. Out of the nine candidates in the general election, J.O.Patterson Jr. received a 40.7 percent total vote percentage while Dick Hackett garnered 30 percent. Yet in the runoff, Patterson was defeated by a 54 percent to 45.6 percent majority in favor of Hackett. If there had not been a runoff election, J.O. Patterson Jr. would have become the first black elected mayor of Memphis in 1982. THE 1983 MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTION In the 1983 mayoral race, black leaders encouraged the idea of one consensus candidate to represent the black community. The black and white populations were approximately 50 percent and the percentage of white registered voters outnumbered those of blacks by approximately 30,000 voters. During this time, black Memphians needed a candidate with broad appeal in both the black and white communities. Neither

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D’Army Bailey, John Ford, nor Otis Higgs, the most serious black contenders, possessed this quality.48 By 1983, Higgs had conducted two failed may-oral bids. John Ford lacked widespread appeal outside of the black community. Attorney D’Army Bailey was making his first run for a political office in Memphis. Although the black candidates agreed that only one of them should run, each believed that he should be the consensus candidate and thus refused to withdraw from the race. Also, the candidates and black citizens were angered by the tactics of the Ford organization to force other black candidates out of the race and leave John Ford as the consensus candidate. Primarily because of Harold Ford’s influence in the black community, John Ford as the consensus candidate would probably have had the highest probability effacing Hackett in a runoff election. Besides receiving an endorsement from Chicago Mayor Harold Washington, Ford’s campaign was also both positively and negatively affected by the efforts of campaign manager Harold Ford. On the positive end, an active role by Harold Ford should have led to a larger than usual black turnout.49 On the negative end, John Ford could not win by depending solely on the Ford name. Put simply, the Congressman could not transfer his charisma and appeal to his younger brother. To a large degree, Dick Hackett’s 1983 mayoral win resulted from blatant racial polarization. He continued his effective strategy of not responding to allegations made by black candidates. Realizing that he had high levels of support in the white community and that any statement could be interpreted as racist, Hackett remained silent while black candidates directed harsh accusations both at him and at each other. The local media mostly blamed Harold Ford for perpetuating racial polarization. He announced early in the campaign that race would be a significant issue, but would not be exploited. The Ford organization made its harshest charges against the Higgs campaign because it was most threatening to that of John Ford. According to Harold Ford, Higgs accepted “white money” or bribes from the white community to remain in the race, split the black vote, and prevent John Ford from winning.50 Ford stated, ‘The white community is giving Higgs money, we understand, in an effort to keep Higgs in the campaign and to ensure that a black can’t be elected mayor. It is a try to overthrow the top black contender, John Ford.”51 Ford then asked Higgs to “disclose where he [was] getting his money to finance his campaign.”52 To Hackett’s benefit, he had no difficulty in gaining reelection in the October general election. Since he received 57.2 percent of the total


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vote, he did not have to compete in a runoff election against any of the black candidates. In terms of total votes: Ford received 22.1 percent; Higgs 16 percent; Bailey 3.1 percent; and other candidates 1.6 percent. In terms of racial polarization, Hackett received approximately 4 percent of the black vote, while the black candidates split approximately 4 percent of the white vote. As shown in Table 5-6, Dick Hackett’s 1983 victory resulted mostly from a split black vote and low black voter turnout in a racially polarized election. Many charges and accusations were thrust by the black candidates both at each other and at the incumbent. Also, all of the candidates made appeals in their respective communities to maintain voting blocs with few efforts to garner crossover support. These types of divisions resulted in Hackett’s substantial margin of victory in the general election without the need for a runoff. Thus in 1983, black voters knew that victory was impossible because of the lack of unity shown by their leadership. This apathy resulted in a black voter turnout of approximately 48 percent. The white turnout rate was approximately 65 percent. THE 1987 MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTION Before W.W.Herenton’s 1991 victory, the 1987 election was the most promising for the election of a black mayor. During the 1980s, the black population steadily increased by 7.2 percent from 307,702 to 334,737, while the white population decreased by 6.4 percent from 333,789 to 268,600 (see Table 5-7). According to the Shelby County Election Commission, the city’s black population suipassed the white population for the first time in 1986. Since Memphis now had a slight black majority, black candidates should not have had to garner sizable crossover vote percentages from whites if they could obtain a large turnout among black voters. If one of the candidates had run a successful campaign in 1987, a victory would probably have resulted. The divisions among black candidates prevented his from occurring. Three virtually unknown black contenders and perennial candidate Robert “Prince Mongo” Hodges competed in the 1987 election. The black candidates were City Council member Minerva Johnican, former state representative Dedrick “Teddy” Withers, and postal worker Walter Franklin. As a result of their entrance into the race, the black vote was split heavily. The total votes received were as follows: Franklin garnered 0.62

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Figure 5.6. Left to right: John Ford, Harold Ford, and the congressman’s wife Dorothy Ford after the senator’s loss in the October 1983 mayoral campaign. (Photo by Ken Ross. Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

percent of the vote; Hodges 0.93 percent; Johnican 22.65 percent; and Withers 1.62 percent. Dick Hackett easily won the general election by receiving 58.56 percent of the overall vote. These percentages were disappointing because the white vote also split in 1987. City Council member Bill Gibbons tried to organize a coalition of black voters and Republicans. Because State Senator John Ford and his brother City Councilman James Ford endorsed the Gibbons campaign, he hoped that he would receive enough votes to compete in a runoff election. Although Gibbons received 25 percent of the black vote, Table 5-8 shows that he only garnered approximately 8 percent of the white vote. Gibbons’ dismal performance mostly resulted from a lack of issues to rally around. The two Hackett administrations had achieved a number of economic successes especially in the year prior to the election. For example, the major corporations such as International Paper, Litton Microwave, Great Western Financial, and the Defense Department’s U.S. Large Cavitation Channel Project all opened offices in Memphis during Hackett’s


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Table 5-6 Regression Estimates of Racial Voting Behavior in the 1983 Memphis Mayoral Election

Source: Shelby County Board of Election Commission Table 5-7 Black and White Populations of Memphis, 1960–90

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1990. Census of Population and Housing. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office



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two terms as mayor. Other existing Memphis businesses such as Rachels Industries and St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital expanded and created additional jobs. Hackett also cited as achievements recent tourist attractions in the city such as the Ramesses the Great Exhibition and a panda on loan at the Memphis Zoo. Gibbons thought about dropping out of the mayor’s race shortly before the August 13 deadline, but decided to remain in the race in order to emphasize the issues of reducing crime and improving the quality of public schools. He focused on the escalating crime rate in the city and once stated that 1 out of every 10 Memphis residents had been victimized by serious crimes since Mayor Dick Hackett’s election in 1982.53 He also mentioned the status of the Memphis city school system with its deteriorating school buildings and lack of funds. Approximately two weeks before the election, Gibbons became optimistic that the issues surrounding the September 24 shooting death of Joseph Robinson could revitalize his campaign. Robinson, a mentally disturbed black man, died instantly after he was shot nine times by white police officers. They alleged that a disoriented Robinson was stabbing himself with a knife and lunging at them even after being shot many times.54 Eyewitnesses in the Memphis public housing development where the shooting occurred, however, reported that Robinson was only a threat to himself and not to the officers. Many also stated that the officers continued their gunfire after Robinson had fallen to the ground. Gibbons compared this incident of alleged police misconduct to a 1983 Shannon Avenue incident in which police killed seven black men who had held a white police officer hostage, then tortured, and killed him. To Bill Gibbons’ dismay, Dick Hackett quickly handled what could have been a damaging issue to his campaign after black citizens threatened to hold protests throughout the city. After visiting Robinson’s mother, Hackett demanded that the Memphis chapter of the F.B.I. fully investigate the shooting. He also promised to create local agency to aid the mentally disturbed. Thus, this last minute effort to save Gibbons’ campaign failed to prevent Hackett’s victory. Despite the fact that white candidates Bill Gibbons and Dick Hackett received respectable percentages of the black vote, racial polarization remained evident in the 1987 election. Black candidates accused each other of “selling out,” being “Uncle Toms,” and practicing “black racism.” Minerva Johnican once stated that white voters would be more willing to elect a black woman as mayor. She called herself “The Oprah Winfrey of Memphis,” and pointed out that she was the first black


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citizen to win a city wide office.55 In 1983, she defeated Democrat David Hill for an at-large City Council seat by garnering 30 percent of the white vote. She cited this election as proof that white Memphians would vote for black candidates. In reality, however, Ms. Johnican’s victory and receipt of the white vote also resulted from her relationship with white state representative Karen Williams. Williams endorsed Johnican because she had helped Williams win election to the state legislature.56 Also, Harold Ford endorsed Johnican’s opponent, white Republican David Hill. Johnican benefited from the Congressman’s disfavor with white voters because of his indictment on federal charges of conspiracy, bank, and mail fraud. Black voters supported Johnican rather than Hill because of the partisan and racial factors, but also because many felt that Ford had treated her unfairly during the 1982 Shelby County Commission election.57 In order to attract substantial levels of support from the black community, Johnican needed help from black leaders. In 1987, however, ill feelings remained between Johnican and the Ford brothers. Although Harold Ford did not get involved in the 1987 election, his brothers John and James both endorsed Bill Gibbons.58 Also former candidates A.W. Willis Jr. and D’Army Bailey endorsed Dick Hackett.59 Out of frustration at losing crucial endorsements from black leaders in favor of white candidates, Johnican called them “Uncle Toms…selfish blacks [who are] selling out our people.”60 Candidate Dedrick “Teddy” Withers accused Senator John Ford of being paid by the Bill Gibbons campaign for his support.61 In response, John Ford accused both Johnican and Withers of practicing “black racism”—blacks unfairly criticizing a black politician.62 In 1987, the city of Memphis was approximately 52 percent black. As was the case in previous mayoral elections, black contenders lost as a result of a split black vote, racially polarized voting patterns, or a lack of crossover support, and lower black voter turnout percentages. As in 1983, the 1987 election showed the failure of the black community to unify when competing against a shrewd white incumbent who ran a relaxed campaign and refused to reply to his critic’s charges for fear of being viewed as racist. The only positive result of the 1987 mayoral campaign was that the voting patterns were not as polarized as they had been in previous elections. White candidates received higher percentages of the black crossover vote in the 1987 election than previous white mayoral candidates in the past twenty years. The majority of whites continued to vote on the basis of

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race. Hackett received approximately 90 percent of the white vote; Gibbons 8 percent; and Johnican 1 percent. One can easily question why a more credible and well-known black candidate did not run for mayor in 1987. By 1987, Otis Higgs had conducted three failed mayoral bids. Candidates A.W.Willis Jr., J.O.Patterson Jr., and D’Army Bailey ended their political careers with their failed mayoral bids in 1967, 1982, and 1983. Also, the Ford brothers declined to run for office in 1987 mainly because they were preoccupied with Harold Ford’s second federal trial on mail and bank fraud charges. W.W. Herenton had no political aspirations in 1987 because of his then relatively uncontroversial reign as the superintendent of the public school system. One could only speculate about the reasons for the black community’s failure to choose a consensus candidate, the fact that many relatively unknown black contenders ran for mayor, and the split black vote in the 1987 election. Also, some black leaders made no endorsements while others supported white candidates. In essence, black voters had little interest in the candidates or in the issues that they focused on in 1987. THE TURNOUT FACTOR, 1975–87 A number of studies have examined decreasing turnout levels among voters. As the years have passed, the American electorate has become less interested in voting on election day.63 In analyzing the turnout rates in the mayoral elections from 1975 to 1987, the following conclusions are evident. First, turnout was high in some predominantly black areas, but low in others. Blacks who lived in middle-income and high-income precincts had more substantial turnout levels than those in low income areas. Second, Table 5-9 shows that both black and white turnout increased in elections with strong and competitive black contenders. For example, the highest turnout levels occurred in the 1982 special mayoral election. Black candidate J.O.Patterson Jr. had an organized campaign, more political experience than his opponent, and name-recognition. Black voters had a record turnout during the runoff election, but Patterson lost because whites turned out as well. Black turnout levels decreased, but remained average in the 1983 and 1987 mayoral elections. Voters had less of an interest in electing a black mayor due to both the number and quality of the candidates as well as the nature of their campaigns. Finally, the role of political organizations and parties affected voter turnout. As stated in Chapter 1, Memphis’ mayoral elections are nonpar


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Table 5.9 Regression Estimates of Racial Turnout in General and Runoff Memphis Mayoral Elections, 1975–87


tisan. The majority of black registered voters and all of the black candidates who ran for mayor were Democrats. The Democratic party, however, neither endorsed these contenders nor conducted other efforts on their behalf; moreover, because of the few remaining black political organizations, black candidates had to largely rely on churches to mobilize their supporters and to raise funds, or on endorsements from Harold Ford and other black political figures. THE EFFECT OF THE MAJORITY VOTE REQUIREMENT IN AT-LARGE COUNCIL ELECTIONS African Americans tend to have less representation on City Councils primarily due to the use of majority vote requirements. Underrepresentation is evident when the percentage of a Council’s black members is substantially lower than the percentage of the city’s black population. Previous Memphis City Council elections revealed that the majority of candidates lost at-large elections before 1991, but won at least three of the six district seats since the 1967 election. In an October 1967 general election, the first year City Council elections were held under the city’s new mayor-Council governmental system, three African Americans were elected to represent predominantly black districts—Fred L.Davis, James L.Netters, and J.O.Patterson Jr. Although three black candidates competed for at-large, positions four and five, none

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received the vote percentages necessary to compete in runoffs. In October 1971, three black Council members—Fred L.Davis, John Ford, and J.O.Patterson Jr.—again represented predominantly black districts. Black candidates seeking at-large seats, however, again failed to garner voting percentages necessary to compete in runoffs. In 1975, Davis, Ford, and Patterson were reelected and Roscoe Dixon became the first African American to compete in a runoff election for an at-large City Council seat. His opponent, Pat Vander Schaaf, was appointed in April 1975 to replace retiring member Gwen Awsumb. Race was an issue in the runoff and precinct returns revealed that voters cast support to a large degree on the basis of racial identity. Vander Schaaf often claimed that Dixon made appeals for racial solidarity in predominantly black areas and encouraged racially polarized voting. Table 5-10 shows that Vander Schaaf defeated Dixon by a margin of 66.9 percent to 33.1 percent in the runoff. In 1983, Minerva Johnican and Myron Lowery also competed against white candidates in at-large City Council runoff races. Although Lowery lost the at-large, position two race to white candidate Bill Gibbons by a margin of 45.4 percent to 54.6 percent, Johnican became the first black candidate to be elected to an at-large position on the Council. She defeated white Republican David Hill by a margin of 53.2 percent to 46.8 percent because she received 30 percent of the white vote and 80 percent of the black vote. Lowery on the other hand was defeated in a racially polarized election and received few votes from whites. The 1987 election would indicate whether Johnican’s at-large victory was a fluke. In 1983, Johnican received 30 percent of the white vote, an incredibly high crossover percentage for a black candidate in a local election. Johnican’s 1983 victory did not lead to electoral success for other black candidates in at-large Council races. In 1990, attorney Earnestine Hunt became the second black candidate to win an at-large position after her election to the city court.64 Because of Minerva Johnican’s successful alliance with white Republicans in 1983, one can question why other black candidates failed to do the same when seeking citywide offices. The main reason is because of “racial reflexivity” in Memphis.65 If black candidates made strong appeals for white crossover votes, they risked alienating black voters. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, few well-known white politicians and civic leaders publicly endorsed black mayoral candidates because of the extent of racial polarization in the city. They sometimes supported black candidates behind the scenes. Even when black candidates received


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Table 5.10 City wide Results of At-Large Council Elections

Source: Shelby County Election Commission

endorsements, they usually did not receive large percentages of the white vote. For example, in his first mayoral bid, Otis Higgs was supported by white attorneys Bill Bruce and John Dice, pollster Berje Yacoubian, City Council member Jerred Blanchard, and state representative Pam Gaia.66 Yet, Higgs received approximately 10 percent of the white vote in the general and runoff elections. In 1982, the Memphis Commercial Appeal endorsed J.O.Patterson for mayor, but he only received 1 percent of the white vote in the general and 6 percent in the runoff. In 1987, Minerva Johnican resigned from the City Council to run for mayor and James Ford, Rickey Peete, and Michael Hooks were elected to represent predominantly black districts. White candidate Tom Marshall and black attorney Herman Morris Jr. competed in a runoff for Johnican’s

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at-large, position six Council seat. Marshall, with a 56.6 vote percentage, defeated Morris who received 43.4 percent. The absence of a majority vote requirement in 1991 affected the outcome of two at-large City Council races. During this election year, the number of black City Council members doubled from three to six. Janet Hooks, James Ford, Shep Wilbun Jr., and Jerome Rubin were elected to represent districts. In addition, Kenneth Whalum and Myron Lowery defeated white candidates Oscar Edmonds and A.D.Alissandratos in atlarge elections. Whalum received 48.3 percent of the vote to defeat Edmonds with 41.8 percent and Lowery received 54.7 percent. If the majority vote requirement had not been eliminated, Whalum and Edmonds would have had to compete in a runoff election and Whalum would probably have been defeated. CONCLUSION This chapter analyzed the unsuccessful mayoral bids of black candidates from 1975 to 1987. It mostly examined their major strategies, mobilization efforts, crossover appeals, and results. During this time, black candidates were defeated because of a lack of white crossover votes in racially polarized elections, disappointing turnout levels, and split black votes. In terms of campaign strategies, Otis Higgs lacked political experience and faced a popular incumbent in 1975 and 1979. He spoke of racial harmony and addressed relevant issues, but received a small amount of white support. Although Higgs received the majority of the black vote, whites had a higher turnout. In 1982, J.O.Patterson Jr. could have won a special mayoral election if he had not been required to compete in a runoff election. In the general election, black voters had a high turnout. Also, Patterson, a former City Council member and state senator, had more political experience than Dick Hackett, the city court clerk. Patterson lost, however, because of the “minority-disadvantage” in runoff elections. He received a plurality of votes in the general election due to a split white vote and substantial black turnout, but lost the runoff. A cohesive white voting bloc for Hackett outnumbered the cohesive black voting bloc for Patterson. Also, the presence of a strong black contender led to a substantial turnout among blacks and whites. After Patterson’s defeat in 1982, black Memphians lost the momentum to elect a black mayor. During the 1980s, the black population equaled and later surpassed that of whites. In the 1983 and 1987 mayoral elections,


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Mayor Dick Hackett won easily because a number of black candidates ran for mayor. None of them possessed the appeal necessary to attract white crossover support or to mobilize a high black turnout rate. During the 1987 campaign, black voters had unacceptable candidates who devoted most of their time to attacking each other in ludicrous campaigns. As a result, black turnout levels decreased substantially during the 1983 and 1987 campaign. In 1991, black Memphians were determined not to repeat the mistakes of the 1980s. This time there would be unity. NOTES 1 Huey L.Perry, Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1997), 180. 2 Since 1974, the Ford brothers (Harold, John, James, and Joe) usually have averaged at least 80 percent of the black vote in their respective elections. 3 Dan Kuykendall defeated J.O.Patterson Jr. by approximately 18,500 votes in 1972. The district’s makeup was 42 percent black and 58 percent white. 4 Art Gilliam, “Ford’s Win Verifies New Day in Local Politics,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 18, 1974. 5 Mary Ann Lee, “Kuykendall’s Loss Told as Cameras Whirr,” Memphis PressScimitar, November 6, 1974. 6 Joseph Weiler, “Vote Count Proved an Upset,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 7, 1974. 7 Wyeth Chandler, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, May 26, 1994. 8 Leroy Williams Jr., “Family’s Weight Helped Lift James Ford to City Council Seat,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 6, 1979. 9 Ibid. 10 Anonymous, “Power Play,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, August 10, 1983. 11 Sharon D.Wright, “The Power of Ford Endorsement in Memphis Mayoral Elections,” National Political Science Review (Forthcoming). 12 Georgia. A.Persons, “Black Mayoralties and the New Black Politics: From Insurgency to Racial Reconciliation,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993). 13 William E.Nelson Jr. and Philip J.Meranto, Electing Black Mayors, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 322. 14 Wyeth Chandler, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, May 26, 1994. 15 W.Otis Higgs Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 28, 1993. 16 Saundra C.Ardrey, “Cleveland and the Politics of Resurgence,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993).

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W.Otis Higgs Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 28, 1993. At this time in Memphis, a majority vote requirement stipulated that the two candidates with the highest total vote percentages had to compete in a runoff election if neither received a majority vote of 50 percent or above in the general election. 19 W.Otis Higgs Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 28, 1993. 20 Wyeth Chandler, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, May 26, 1994. 21 Ibid. 22 W.Otis Higgs Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 28, 1993. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Terry Keeter, “Board OK’s Giving Chandler Printout of White Nonvoters,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 16, 1979. 26 Terry, Keeter, “Chandler, Higgs Swap Blasts on TV Debate,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 4, 1979. 27 Ibid. 28 Terry Keeter, “Colorless Campaign Should Have Been the Reason Higgs Lost,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 17, 1979. 29 W.Otis Higgs Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 28, 1993. 30 Ibid. 31 In 1982, Chandler, who held a law degree from the University of Tennessee, was appointed judge of Division I Circuit Court by Governor Lamar Alexander. 32 The other mayoral candidates were homemaker Gladys Adams, nursery owner Richard Stringer, sales representative John J.Baker III, unemployed painter W.A. “Bill” Smith, and former city court clerk Joyce Bousson. 33 Jim Balentine, “Low Black Turnout Adds to Patterson Defeat,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, December 1, 1982. 34 Kay Pittman Black, “Patterson May Sidetrack Ford Machine,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 19, 1982. 35 Saundra C.Ardrey, Cleveland and the Politics of Resurgence,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993); Richard Keiser, “The Rise of a Biracial Coalition in Philadelphia,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb (New York: Longman 1990); Steven F. Lawson, Running for Freedom (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); William E.Nelson Jr. and Philip J.Meranto, Electing Black Mayors (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977); Raphael J.Sonenshein, “Biracial Coalition Politics in Los Angeles,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990). 18


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36 Barbara Burch, “Patterson Campaign Gets Push in Father’s Sermon,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 15, 1982. 37 William E.Nelson Jr. and Philip J.Meranto, Electing Black Mayors (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977). 38 Robert Starks and Michael B.Preston, “Harold Washington and the Politics of Reform in Chicago: 1983–1987,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 88–107. 39 Barbara Burch, “Patterson Campaign Gets Push in Father’s Sermon,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 15, 1982. 40 Ibid. 41 Harlan Hahn, David Klingman, and Harry Pachon, “Cleavages, Coalitions and the Black Candidate,” Western Political Quarterly 29 (December):507–520; Steven F.Lawson, Running for Freedom (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Paul Kleppner, Chicago Divided (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985); Zaphon Wilson, “Gantt Versus Helms,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993), 176–193. 42 Jim Balentine, “Low Black Turnout Adds to Patterson Defeat,” Memphis Press-Scimitar, December 1, 1982. 43 Ibid. 44 Arthur Fleischman and Lana Stein, “Minority and Female Success in Municipal Runoff Elections,” Social Science Quarterly 68 (June):379. 45 Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1989), 380. 46 Charles S. Bullock III and A.Brock Smith, “Black Success in Local Runoff Elections” Journal of Politics 52 (November):1205. 47 Ibid., 1218. 48 Singer/songwriter Timothy “El Espada” Matthews, hair stylist Peggy Robinson, salvage company owner Lilliard Anthony (L.A.) “Tony” Watts and grocer Lugene Williams were other black candidates who ran for mayor in 1983. 49 Sharon D.Wright, “The Power of Ford Endorsement in Memphis May-oral Elections,” National Political Science Review (Forthcoming). 50 Thomas Jordan, “Harsh Ford Tactics Leave Political Scars,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, August 12, 1983. 51 Kay Pittman Black, “Whites Financing Higgs, Ford Says,” Memphis PressScimitar, August 10, 1983. 52 Ibid. 53 Terry Keeter, “Mayor Avoids Runoff,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 9, 1987.

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54 John Beifuss, “Questions Unresolved in Body Report,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, September 27, 1987. 55 Minerva Johnican, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, May 25, 1994. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Anthony Cooke and Terry Keeter, “Johnican, Withers Rip ‘Uncle Toms’,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 18, 1987. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Sidney Verba and Norman H.Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A.Cloward, Why Americans Don’t Vote (New York: Pantheon Publishers, 1989); Ruy Texeira, The Disappearing American Voters (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1992). 64 Marcus D.Pohlmann and Michael Kirby, Racial Politics at the Crossroads: Memphis Elects Dr. W.W.Herenton (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 175. 65 Ibid, xxi. 66 Ibid., 23.

CHAPTER 6

The 1991 Memphis Mayoral Election: W.W.Herenton Targets Black Mobilization

INTRODUCTION The date October 4, 1991 was a milestone in Memphis politics. The black community gained a dominant role in the local governing structure because voters elected a black mayor twenty-four years after the candidacy of the first black contender and six black City Council members. Black candidates also won at-large positions on the City Court and the Memphis School Board. Various developments during the eras of access, machine rule, and civil rights struggle resulted in black political ascendancy. For example, a substantial black electorate began to participate in local, national, and state elections during the eras of access. During the eras of machine rule and civil rights struggle, the black community found ways to mobilize its bloc vote in a racially polarized environment. The 1991 Memphis mayoral election was among the most polarized in the city’s history. In 1967 and 1987, a large percentage of black voters supported white candidates. In 1991, however, neither blacks nor whites provided significant crossover votes. Dr. Herenton once stated “[that he did not want] to get elected because he [was] black, but rather because [he was] eminently qualified and also [happened] to be black.”1 His entire campaign, however, ranging from the conventions for his selection as a consensus candidate to the final get-out-the-vote campaign was mostly directed toward black voters. Herenton realized that the deracialized and dual campaign strategies used by black mayoral candidates in other cities had failed for Otis Higgs and J.O.Patterson Jr. in Memphis. Despite campaigns which downplayed racial issues, the majority of white voters refused to support black candidates. 123

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Chapter 6 mainly analyzes the black mobilization strategy that led to the Herenton victory as well as the issues of racism and reverse racism. Herenton’s five-month campaign included the choice of a consensus candidate, massive voter registration drives, the encouragement of black voter turnout, and limited attempts to attract crossover votes. A federal ruling that led to changes in the city’s annexation policy and banned runoffs in citywide elections also led to the Herenton victory. Previous experiences of black candidates had proven that a less organized campaign lacking one or more of these elements would probably have resulted in defeat. DOMINANT CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES FOR BLACK MAYORAL CANDIDATES Since 1967, black mayoral candidates have used a variety of campaign strategies. The earliest research found that most black mayors were elected in either largely or predominantly black cities. Insurgency was their dominant campaign strategy. Georgia A.Persons defined it as “challenges to the prevailing political order, embrace of a social reform agenda and utilization of a pattern of racial appeals to mobilize a primary support groups of black voters.”2 Black mayoral contenders focused heavily on black neighborhood mobilization while seeking as many white votes as possible. As a result, they usually received the majority of black votes and a small percentage of white crossover support (20 percent or less) in racially polarized elections. 3 The majority of black mayoral candidates in predominantly black cities continue to use the insurgent strategy. Other contenders used a dual strategy. They made entirely different appeals to black and white communities. These candidates stressed the symbolic benefits of having a black mayor to black voters. When campaigning before whites, black contenders provided assurances that they would govern the city both effectively and objectively.4 In subsequent years, black contenders used the political strategy of deracialization to win elections in predominantly white cities. Charles V. Hamilton defined a deracialized campaign as one which placed little emphasis on racial issues in favor of those of concern to all voters.5 This tactic had three major components: projecting a “nonthreatening” image, avoiding the use of overt racial appeals when mobilizing the electorate, and emphasizing neutral and nonracial issues.6 The 1973 mayoral candidacy of former City Councilman Thomas Bradley in Los Angeles was one of the earliest and most successful uses

The 1991 Memphis Mayoral Election

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of the deracialization strategy. Bradley received approximately 46 percent of the white vote and 51 percent of the Latino vote to defeat incumbent Sam Massell.7 At this time, the black population was only 17 percent. Bradley later served five terms as Los Angeles mayor as the result of a strong black, Jewish, and Latino coalition.8 Although other black candidates would benefit from these kind of coalitions in later years, the Bradley mayoral victory was somewhat unique in the early 1970s. Other newly elected black mayors of this era—Maynard Jackson of Atlanta, Coleman Young of Detroit, Marion Barry of Washington, D.C, Ernest “Dutch” Morial of New Orleans, Lionel Wilson of Oakland, and Richard Arrington of Birmingham—benefited from coalitions, but mostly used insurgent strategies in cities with large black electorates. During the 1980s, a few contenders were successful in northern cities once dominated by political machines—Baltimore, Chicago, New York City, and Philadelphia. In these cities, the Kurt Schmoke, Harold Washington, David Dinkins, and Wilson Goode campaigns built coalitions by portraying themselves as reformers who would end corruption and provide economic growth.9 Although an increased number of black mayoral candidates conducted deracialized campaigns and thus won larger percentages of the white vote, evidence of racial strife remained. The 1983 Chicago mayoral election has been the focus of numerous studies because of its bitter tone.10 Although the race of the candidates had been a critical issue in the 1983 primary, it became more significant after a split white vote resulted in a Harold Washington versus Bernard Epton general election campaign. On March 27, 1983, Epton supporters shouted racial and other epithets at Washington and former Vice President Walter Mondale as they sought entry into a Catholic church in northwest Chicago. In addition, the words “Nigger, Nigger Die!” were spray-painted onto the doors of the church.11 Washington, on the other hand, continued his effective “crusade” campaign in black neighborhoods for increasing their registration and turnout. Black mobilization was the key element to his victory. Washington received approximately 98 percent of the black vote, 50 percent of the Latino vote and 20 percent from white “lakefront liberals.”12 The coalition-based campaigns which elected black mayors in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York were short-lived for various reasons. White candidates have either defeated or succeeded black mayors in these cities. Scholars are now analyzing whether biracial coalitions remain possible in cities due to conflicting interests among ethnic groups.13

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On November 7, 1989–Black Tuesday—a number of black mayoral candidates were elected by using deracialized campaigns in predominantly white cities—Cleveland, Durham, New Haven, New York City, and Seattle. In addition, Virginia’s L.Douglas Wilder became the nation’s first elected black governor.14 All of these candidates received at least 40 percent of the white vote in their respective elections.15 As the new decade approached, black mayoral candidates ran for office in a growing number of predominantly black cities after massive black population increases in many areas during the 1980s. By 1991, 316 black mayors had been elected in the United States. The majority governed small and predominantly black cities in the South.16 In addition, black majorities almost guaranteed “black mayoral succession” or the continued elections of black mayors in Atlanta, Birmingham, Detroit, New Orleans, Newark, Washington, D.C., and other cities.17 In cities with large black populations, four outcomes were possible. The 1983 and 1987 Memphis elections showed that white candidates sometimes won elections as a result of split black votes. In the 1986 New Orleans mayoral race and others, class divisions affected the preferences of middle-income and lower-income black citizens. After the first black mayor Ernest “Dutch” Morial was prohibited from seeking a third term, two black candidates (State Senator William Jefferson and former City Council member Sidney Barthelemy and one white contender (attorney Sam LeBlanc) competed for the mayoral office. At the time, the black population was approximately 51 percent. In the runoff, Barthelemy’s total vote (58 percent) outnumbered Jefferson’s (42 percent) because of the support he received from whites (85 percent) and middle class blacks (30 percent) (19). Jefferson received overwhelming support from lower class black citizens (70 percent), but few votes from whites (15 percent) (20).18 Thus, a white voting bloc determined the outcome of an election in which black voters were divided along class lines. The 1997 St. Louis democratic primary election provided evidence of a third outcome in city mayoral races. A white voting bloc has determined the winner of many races. Incumbent black mayor Freeman Bosley Jr. received over 80 percent of the black vote. His black opponent Clarence Harmon won the election because he received over 80 percent of the white vote. Finally, voting remained polarized in some cities because the majority of blacks and whites only supported candidates from their racial group. The 1994 New Orleans mayor’s race proved that racially polarized voting can occur after several years of black mayoral governance. During that election, 90


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percent of black voters supported black candidate Marc Morial while 93 percent of white voters supported his white opponent Donald Mintz.19 The Herenton campaign in Memphis closely resembled the Chicago campaign and governance model which included the following factors: motivation, political mobilization, goals and candidate identification, an agenda, policy formation, and outcomes and evaluation.20 Black citizens in Memphis and Chicago had never been completely excluded from the political process despite significant barriers and the black vote had been controlled by political machines for many years.21 Yet, the primary motivation for black citizens to elect a black mayor resulted from their frustration with being excluded from white mayoral administrations. In order to mobilize black voters, the Harold Washington and W.W.Herenton campaigns mainly focused on black unity. The black community not only had a mission, but a “crusade” to elect a black mayor who would not ignore their interests. Therefore, they chose one candidate to run for mayor and drafted a list of goals that they wanted him to fulfill after his election. Influenced by the 1983 Chicago model, the black community in Memphis chose W.W.Herenton as their consensus candidate—the one black candidate who would run against Dick Hackett in 1991. Robert “Prince Mongo” Hodges was the third mayoral candidate. THE CANDIDATES: DICK HACKETT, W.W.HERENTON, AND ROBERT HODGES As mentioned in Chapter 5, Dick Hackett made his first mayoral bid in a 1982 special election.22 In the general election, City Council member Mike Cody was eliminated leaving Hackett and J.O.Patterson Jr. in a runoff. Hackett later defeated Patterson in the November runoff and began his first mayoral term on December 8, 1982. He won reelection campaigns in 1983 and 1987. Many black voters felt that if Hackett had not been white, he would never have been elected mayor. W.W.Herenton once described him as a “clerk and college dropout with a lack of vision.”23 He was an average student at Hillcrest High School and at Memphis State University where he dropped out of college during his senior year without receiving a degree. All of Hackett’s serious black mayoral opponents were more educated. D’Army Bailey, Otis Higgs, and J.O.Patterson were attorneys while John Ford and Minerva Johnican had master’s degrees. Although Dick Hackett described himself as a moderate, most voters associated him with conservative former mayor Wyeth Chandler. Hackett

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had worked in Chandler’s 1971 campaign and was appointed as the first director of his Mayor’s Action Center which handled citizen’s complaints. He also appointed more black directors than any other mayor, especially during his third term. Nevertheless, many black citizens believed that he mostly furthered the interests of whites because of his administration’s heavy focus on downtown rather than neighborhood development. During the 1991 campaign, Herenton criticized the Hackett administration’s emphasis on tourism and downtown development as a way to stabilize the economy and create jobs, but found that he had to do the same as mayor. During the Hackett years, the historic Beale Street was renovated and a trolley system begun on Main Street. Also, the Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza Convention Center and Hotel, A.W.Willis Jr. bridge to Mud Island theme park, and the National Civil Rights Museum opened in or near the downtown area.24 As a way to attract a National Football League (N.F.L.) team, the Hackett administration expanded the Liberty Bowl stadium. Like most city mayors, Dick Hackett faced a number of problems during his third term, but the black community believed that whites would continue to support him in 1991. Few new businesses moved to Memphis during the late 1980s and early 1990s and the Holiday Inn Corporation moved its headquarters from Memphis to Atlanta.25 Nevertheless, the only property tax increase occurred in 1985 and the city had a high bond rating which indicated financial stability. Dick Hackett’s most embarrassing problem occurred in 1989. City officials decided to build a new arena in downtown Memphis rather than to upgrade the Mid-South Coliseum. Sidney Shlenker, a millionaire owner of the Denver Nuggets basketball team, agreed to pay $1.5 million annually to the city and county to help repay the bonds used for construction of the Pyramid if he could control the building’s construction. His plan included a rock and roll museum, a Hard Rock Cafe restaurant, a College Football Hall of Fame museum, and a number of other shops. After the Memphis Pyramid was completed, Shlenker planned to renovate Mud Island. At one time, it appeared that the arena would not be completed. After Shlenker filed for bankruptcy, the city had to pay the additional $20 million in expenses that he incurred. The arena’s construction was supposed to cost $30 million, but ended up costing $56 million.26 Although the Pyramid’s appearance was impressive, it did not include museums, restaurants, or shops that Shlenker had promised to include in it. As a result of the controversy surrounding the erection of the Memphis Pyramid, Dick Hackett was in an extremely vulnerable position as he sought


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his third reelection in 1991. W.W.Herenton served as a formidable opponent for the incumbent. Willie Wilbert Herenton, the son of a laundry worker and a drug store delivery man, became a fifth-grade teacher in 1963. In 1972, he earned a doctorate in educational administration. On January 1, 1979, Herenton became Memphis’ first black school superintendent. His tenure as superintendent was relatively successful until schoolteacher Mahnaz Bahrmand-Vincent filed a sexual harassment lawsuit in 1989. She sued Herenton for $3 million on the grounds of “breach of promise to marry, fraud, outrageous conduct, and civil rights violations.”27 BahrmandVincent alleged that Herenton initiated an affair which lasted for two years and which included a broken marriage promise, two abortions, a miscarriage, and physical abuse. After Herenton ended the relationship, Bahrmand-Vincent claimed he denied her a promotion and tried to force her to move out of the city. This lawsuit prompted an investigation of Herenton’s personal and administrative affairs as superintendent. Herenton eventually resigned and later reached an out-of-court settlement with Bahrmand-Vincent. During the election, it appeared that W.W.Herenton benefited from the sexual harassment scandal in the black community. Many black voters supported him because they believed that whites had treated him unfairly. To many of them, Herenton’s personal life had nothing to do with his work as superintendent. Even if the sexual harassment allegations were true, Herenton’s indiscretions were tame compared to those of white mayors such as Wyeth Chandler. Thus, the black community viewed the investigation and Herenton’s subsequent resignation as part of a racist conspiracy to destroy the city’s first black superintendent. Even if W.W.Herenton had not been accused of sexual harassment in 1989, most whites probably would not have voted for him or any other black mayoral candidate in 1991. Mahnaz Bahrmand-Vincent’s lawsuit gave whites a reason to reject his candidacy. To many of them, Herenton was a politically inexperienced sexual harasser who lacked the credentials to serve as mayor. Robert “Prince Mongo” Hodges, the third mayoral candidate, had once attended prestigious Columbia University and owned Prince Mongo’s Planet, a successful downtown restaurant in 1991. Before placing third in the 1978 race for Shelby County mayor, his first bid for political office, he had received attention from the local media, his neighbors, and the local police because of his “outdoor art collection” in front of his home in a middle-class area of Midtown Memphis.28 The collection included old cars, furniture, a coffin, boulders, bathtubs, and commodes, beer cans,

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litter, weeds, and other forms of trash. Although Hodges was of Lebanese descent, he claimed that he was not a human, but a “free spirit” who commuted daily to and from his native planet Zambodia by hot air balloon.29 When he appeared in public, he usually wore a headdress, bones and fur on his clothes, and a grass skirt to show his concern for people and his effort to “crush the machine that got hold of everybody’s life.”30 Hodges, a native of Virginia Beach, Virginia, served fifteen months of a four-year sentence in 1968 for the “abduction and malicious wounding of his lawyer.”31 Before 1991, his mayoral campaigns were not taken seriously. If elected, he promised to abolish city taxes, hold public hangings, and “restrict the duties of the ignorant City Councilmen according to the mentalities”.32 Hodges, who described the city of Memphis as “a racist town whose leaders permit crime, neglect education, and murder, rob and rape the people,” had strong views on both Hackett and Herenton’s character. He stated that Hackett as mayor “tripled [city] taxes and [left] the city falling apart…. When you go to bed with skunks, you smell like skunks”.33 In reference to Herenton, Hodges asked, “Do you want him leading you…when the school system is falling apart”?34 THE MEMPHIS MODEL FOR ELECTING ITS FIRST BLACK MAYOR In 1983, Chicago’s black political community focused on: motivation, political mobilization, and goals and candidate identification in order to elect Harold Washington as the city’s first black mayor. After his victory, the Washington administration created an agenda and policies to enhance the city’s economic development while at the same time meeting the needs of the underclass. At the end of his first term, Washington evaluated the both positive and negative outcomes of his agenda and policies.35 The Memphis model to elect its first black mayor also included the elements of motivation, political mobilization, and goals and candidate identification. Chapter 7 discusses the fact that Harold Washington and other first black mayors who used this strategy had a clear agenda of what they wanted to accomplish and then created policies to further the agenda. During the second term, they evaluated their performance and determined whether they had accomplished their agenda. However, W.W.Herenton lacked an agenda during the first year of his term and faced difficulty when trying to implement his policies because of resistance from City Council members and other problems.


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While W.W.Herenton tried to assure whites that he would be fair to them, black activists and political figures demanded that he adhere to the African American People’s Convention platform (discussed in the next section). By the end of his first term, the Herenton administration had adequately addressed these dilemmas. Voters gave him a favorable evaluation in October 1995 by reelecting him by a large margin. The major components of the 1991 Herenton mayoral campaign included: his selection as consensus candidate, a focus on increasing black voter registration, and turnout levels higher than those for white voters, minimal appeals for white crossover votes, and a ban on runoffs in city wide elections. THE CHOICE OF A CONSENSUS CANDIDATE Usually black mayoral candidates have a greater likelihood of victory when only one black contender runs for office and is supported by the entire community. In addition, studies have shown that black voter registration and turnout rates are higher when one black candidate runs for mayor.36 Realizing that only one of the major dilemmas for previous black mayoral contenders had been the splitting of the black vote, Memphis’ black leadership decided to select a consensus candidate to run for mayor in 1991. The main objective for black Memphians, as it had been in previous elections, was to choose the right candidate. In 1991, rumors surfaced that a number of persons planned to run for mayor: the executive director of the N.A.A.C.P. Benjamin L.Hooks, Shelby County Tax Assessor Michael Hooks, Otis Higgs, Herenton, Senator John Ford, Minerva Johnican, City Council members Shep Wilbun Jr. and Kenneth T. Whalum, and Dr. TalibKarim Muhammad. Because of the fear of a split black vote, black leaders decided to allow citizens to select a consensus candidate so that they would defeat Dick Hackett. Black Memphis not only had difficulty in deciding who the consensus candidate would be, but debated the methods for choosing him. Harold Ford wanted to hold neighborhood community meetings. Eventually 148 civic, political, and religious leaders would hold a black leadership summit, organize a massive voter registration drive, and later select the candidate. On the other hand, City Council member Shep Wilbun Jr. believed that citizens would have more motivation to vote if they had some choice in the selection process. He believed that since the people would be voting, they should be allowed to choose

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their candidate at an African American People’s Summit.37 Potential candidates would only be allowed to participate if they agreed to support the consensus candidate and to promote an agreed-upon platform which addressed crime, conditions in public schools, jobs, poverty, and police-community relations after their election.38 In April 1991, between 3,000 to 4,000 citizens attended the African American People’s Convention and selected W.W.Herenton as the consensus candidate. Some black political figures disagreed with this idea. After the convention selected Herenton, Otis Higgs refused to withdraw his candidacy for mayor because he believed that the selection process was “flawed and stacked in Herenton’s favor”.39 At the convention, W.W. Herenton’s supporters packed the Mid-South Coliseum immediately after its doors were unlocked and demanded that he serve as consensus candidate.40 Higgs also felt that Ford’s Leadership Summit was “little more than a mini-People’s Convention” and vowed to stay in the race.41 Although no vote was taken at the summit, it was clear that Herenton was the community’s choice. On black radio talk shows and in the Tri-State Defender newspaper, black citizens threatened to punish Higgs or any other black candidate who ran for mayor. Two days after the summit, Higgs withdrew his candidacy leaving a battle between W.W.Herenton, Dick Hackett, and Robert Hodges. 1987 mayoral candidate Minerva Johnican and state representative Alvin King believed that the idea of a consensus candidate worsened racial polarization in Memphis. Johnican stated in an interview with the Memphis Commercial Appeal that, “Some blacks are reluctant to come out against a consensus candidate, while some whites who might have supported a black candidate were turned off by the ‘angry and exclusive tone’ of the unity process.”42 King was one of few black elected officials who refused to support the Herenton campaign because: All [Herenton’s] running on is that he’s black…[Otis Higgs] was forced out of the race just because he’s black and some people are saying ‘we already have a black in the race’… Those days are over— white people will vote for blacks and black people will vote for whites—as long as race isn’t the only issue.”43

Allegations of reverse discrimination were made because both whites and the Memphis media were allegedly excluded from both Wilbun’s convention and Ford’s summit. The organizers preferred a black


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convention and summit because of the belief that the presence of whites would make it more difficult to mobilize black voters.44 The Memphis media was not invited to either meeting because of their racially biased coverage of black political figures. The Memphis Commercial Appeal had given front-page coverage to Herenton’s sexual harassment scandal and alleged that he mismanaged funds as school superintendent. It has also printed editorials and cartoons which criticized and to some extent belittled black leaders in the city. Despite the objections, W.W.Herenton was probably the best choice for the consensus candidate. He had served as school superintendent for over twelve years before retiring in June 1990. Because of his accomplishments as school superintendent, he received praise from both blacks and whites in Memphis. Also, he was probably one of few black leaders who could motivate black voters to turn out at the polls in sizable numbers. Another advantage with the choice of Herenton as consensus candidate was his expertise in handling the media. As a result of events associated with the 1989 sexual harassment scandal, he knew how to maintain his composure before the media. Also, Herenton avoided open confrontations with Hackett. In past mayoral campaigns, black candidates had been blamed more so than whites for racial polarization. Since white incumbents who ran against black contenders had advantages because of their race, incumbency, and a majority white electorate, they refused to openly criticize their black opponents for fear of being viewed as racist.45 The crucial element in electing a black mayor besides mobilization was the time factor. In 1991, a black mayoral candidate would have had to forge a well-organized and well-financed campaign in order to defeat a nine-year incumbent. The small black voting majority had to be mobilized through a viable grassroots campaign. Leaders realized that the business community would provide funds for the Hackett campaign. Because of the time limitation, the fear was that no black candidate would be able to raise enough funds to defeat the wellfinanced Hackett campaign. After the black community chose W.W.Herenton as their candidate and other black contenders withdrew from the race, the white community faced a dilemma. A united black community pledged to support one candidate for mayor. Also, the black voter registration rate and voting-age population slightly outnumbered those of whites. If the white vote split, Herenton was almost assured of victory. On August 1, 1991, the filing deadline, four whites were still planning to run for mayor—State Senator Steve

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Cohen, Attorney James D.Causey, James H.Leonard, and Elaine Coupe. Although these white candidates and others contemplated mayoral bids, none filed as candidates. If they had entered the mayor’s race, the white community would have blamed them for splitting the white vote and disadvantaging the Hackett campaign. VOTER REGISTRATION DRIVES AND TURNOUT RATES Herenton campaign organizers began a heavy voter registration effort. They realized that previous black candidates were defeated because whites had a greater turnout rate. Because of racial bloc voting, white majorities were able to elect their preferred candidates. Herenton wanted to show black Memphians that 1991 was their year to elect a black mayor because of their population and registration voter majorities. He emphasized that “Help Is On The Way,” but only if they registered and turned out at the polls.46 In previous mayoral elections, black voters lacked motivation because of dissatisfaction with the candidates who ran, the conduct of the elections and a lack of unity among black leadership. In 1991, the first two problems had already been solved. Black citizens had selected Herenton as their representative. The remaining challenges for him was to motivate black voters into turning out at the polls on election day. Despite a lack of funds, Herenton conducted an aggressive grassroots campaign. He realized that most of the business community and white voters were supporting the Hackett campaign. Therefore, he conducted the type of open and public campaign throughout the city which would easily attract media coverage and which has typically proven beneficial to black mayoral candidates for ensuring a large black turnout. 47 It included visiting churches, neighborhoods, restaurants, stores, and other public places in the months before the campaign, giving speeches, leading marches, distributing literature, and driving through the city appealing to voters with a bullhorn. In the final ten days before the 1991 election, Herenton held a getoutthe-vote campaign. During this time, he increased efforts to encourage a large turnout. Martin Luther King III and Jesse Jackson visited Memphis in the final days of the campaign. On the night before election day, Jackson referred to the Herenton campaign as a “religious pilgrimage.” At one of the campaign’s last rallies, he stated, “[Martin Luther] King


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[Jr.’s] death had been a crucifixion. Herenton’s election would be the resurrection…. Let Dr. King and those who paid the supreme price rejoice that the work done in Memphis was not done in vain”.48 Also during the final days of the Herenton campaign, Harold Ford conducted several efforts to ensure a large black turnout such as giving speeches, mobilizing volunteers, making phone calls, and so on After the polls closed on election day, Ford led a group of citizens to the Shelby County Election Commission to investigate a computer error in counting absentee votes. The Memphis Commercial Appeal reported, “Ford… and Shelby County Election Commission Chairman O.C.Pleasant Jr. went jaw-to-jaw as the congressman demanded to see the ballots and a list of the people counting them.”49 Pleasant, who is black, claimed that workers could not read a damaged computer disc. As commission employees reentered absentee vote totals on another computer disc, Herenton supporters suspected foul play. As mentioned in Chapter 5, ballots from mostly black precincts had accidentally been left in metal boxes during Ford’s 1974 congressional bid. The Congressman and Herenton’s campaign volunteers believed that this was an attempt to sway the election in Hackett’s favor. Before this time, Herenton had refused to accept the Congressman’s help because he wanted to win the election on his own.50 Because of Harold Ford’s ability to win elections and mobilize the electorate, Herenton knew that it would appear as if Ford won the election for him. He also knew that Ford and many other black leaders had not supported his campaign at first. Many did not want him to serve as consensus candidate or believe that he could win the election. Otis Higgs, Alvin King, and Minerva Johnican were among the few black political figures who publicly admitted it. Thus, during the course of the campaign, Herenton refused to accept both their advice and their money because he did not want to enter office with the feeling that he owed them anything.51 At 2:00 A.M. on October 4, 1991, absentee ballot totals—numbering 5,509 for Dick Hackett, 2,621 for W.W.Herenton and 56 for Robert Hodges—confirmed a Herenton victory by 172 votes. W.W.Herenton’s “insurgent” campaign strategy successfully translated black mobilization into victory. Georgia A.Persons has found that insurgency usually results in white resistance of black mobilization efforts and subsequent mayoral rule.52 Levels of racial polarization have become more extreme after the initial election of black mayors.53 Such was the case in Memphis, after many white citizens demanded a recount. The Hackett campaign threatened a legal challenge to the outcome. Campaign

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Table 6-1 1991 Memphis Mayoral Election Results

Source: Shelby County Election Commission

Manager William Boyd announced that an audit was neces sary to determine the validity of the outcome. If Hackett had chosen to contest the race, a new election could have been ordered or illegal votes would have been subtracted from the candidates’ vote totals. Days after the election, however, an audit confirmed that W.W.Herenton had won the mayoral election by 142 votes (see Table 6-1). CROSSOVER VOTES Studies of voting behavior have found that both blacks and whites usually vote along racial lines with few casting crossover votes.54 The city of Memphis was similar to other large urban areas where black and white voting patterns tended to be racially polarized. For this reason, both candidates Herenton and Hackett primarily targeted voters in black and white communities respectively while making limited attempts to attract crossover support. These efforts included a desire to gain public endorsements from leaders and to attract funds and votes. It was difficult to attract either because citizens resented leaders who provided public crossover support in racially polarized elections. For example, Alvin King campaigned for Hackett, but faced hostility from the black community. Before Herenton’s victory, his supporters carried signs at rallies which read “Remember Alvin King” and “Bye Bye Alvin, We Can’t Hackett.”55 After Herenton and Harold Ford endorsed activist Henri Brooks in 1992, King lost his state legislative seat after twenty-two years in office and after serving as chairman of the Shelby County legislative delegation. The black community also boycotted four McDonald’s restaurants owned by black businessman George Jones, a cochairman of the Hackett campaign.56


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Figure 6.1. Mayor W.W.Herenton promised his mostly black supporters that “Help Is on the Way” during his victory speech in the early hours of October 4, 1991. (Courtesy of the Mississippi Valley Collection, University of Memphis)

Despite the backlash faced by those who provided crossover support, Dick Hackett received a few endorsements from prominent black Memphians such as the presiding bishop of the Church of God in Christ, L.H.Ford and James E.Smith, head of the A.F.S.C.M.E., Local 1733.57 The Independent Political Action Council (I.P.A.C.), a newly formed organization of black pastors, also opened a campaign office for Hackett in a predominantly black shopping area, ran a phone bank, and distributed fliers on election day.58 The Herenton campaign was unable to garner public support from either white leaders or from predominantly white institutions. Perceiving it as a waste of time, Herenton made few efforts to attract the white vote. The experiences of previous black mayoral candidates had proven that the majority of white Memphians would not vote for black contenders. Herenton’s only major action for garnering white support was to distribute a publication to white neighborhoods detailing his stance on five issues—housing, economic development, education, quality neighborhoods, and crime—and speaking at functions in white communities when invited.59

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Hackett conducted more campaign efforts in black areas in 1991 than during previous elections. In earlier elections, his campaign used paid television and radio advertisements and he avoided debates with black candidates. In 1991, the incumbent did not need financial support from black citizens, but was in dire need of their votes. Therefore, he appeared at shopping areas in black neighborhoods and distributed campaign leaflets. Hackett also held backyard receptions before small racially mixed groups. Dick Hackett avoided public appearances with W.W.Herenton because of the complex racial conflicts that had plagued previous Memphis mayoral elections. He and Herenton had one debate at the Rotary Club in the days before the election. Both avoided racial issues. A number of white candidates in cities with large minority populations have used similar racially neutral tactics. For example, in 1983, Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo’s campaign against black candidate W.Wilson Goode avoided the issue of race. Four years earlier, Rizzo had been elected after asking Philadelphians to “vote white.”60 In 1983, however, the city had an approximately 40 percent black population. Overt, racially divisive appeals often result in a higher turnout among blacks and liberal white voters. Hackett and Herenton received almost equal percentages of crossover votes from black and white voters. In fifty-nine predominantly black precincts, Herenton received approximately 95 percent of the vote, Hackett less than 5 percent and Hodges less than 1 percent. In thirty-one predominantly white precincts, Hackett received approximately 95 percent of the vote, Herenton less than 5 percent, and Hodges less than 1 percent (see Table 6-2). AN END TO RUNOFFS IN AT-LARGE ELECTIONS Since its enactment in 1965, the Voting Rights Act had been applied to alter at-large systems which worked to the detriment of black voters. In many cities, majority vote requirements in at-large elections have usually resulted in black majorities being unable to elect black candidates, especially when voters cast ballots on the basis of race.61 Various scholars have analyzed the negative effects runoff requirements have had on black candidates. Some have found that black contenders were not at a disadvantage in runoff elections.62 Others found that the lower black participation rate was detrimental to the candidacies of black contenders.63


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In Memphis, the most recent discriminatory voting litigation began after Dr. Talib-Karim Muhammad filed a class-action lawsuit in November 1988. Muhammad challenged at-large elections for mayor and the City Council under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well as under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments. The Memphis and Shelby County metropolitan area has approximately one million residents. Its population growth has resulted from the continuous migration of blacks into the city and annexation of the suburbs. During the era of racial polarization, an increasing number of blacks moved into the city while many whites left, but whites had a voting-age population majority due to the annexation of predominantly white suburbs. Annexation has had both positive and negative consequences in cities. On a positive end, the annexation of predominantly white, middleclass suburbs resulted in a more stable tax base in the city. On a negative end, the increased number of white citizens prevented the black community from gaining a voting-age population majority. Before 1991, the white voting majority prevented black candidates from winning mayoral and other citywide elections. If the city had been allowed to annex the predominantly white Hickory Hills area, approximately 14,259 additional whites would have participated in the 1991 race and W.W.Herenton’s insurgent strategy would probably have been unsuccessful.64 Dr. Muhammad argued that at-large elections diluted the black vote by giving African Americans less of an opportunity than white citizens to participate in the political process by electing their desired candidates. The lawsuit pointed out that a history of discrimination in Memphis and in Tennessee resulted in racially polarized voting patterns. In the past, black candidates who competed against whites either lost general or runoff elections. Black contenders were defeated in runoffs primarily because of white bloc voting and higher levels of turnout.

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In February 1991, the U.S. Justice Department filed a lawsuit against the city of Memphis alleging that at-large election systems discriminated against black voters. The Justice Department lawsuit was later consolidated with Muhammad’s earlier class-action suit. It specifically targeted runoff elections, at-large elections and the city’s annexation policy. In July 1991, U.S. District Judge Jerome Turner banned runoffs in city elections. He found that a majority vote requirement was designed to dilute black voting so that whites would win elections.65 Evidence presented in a preliminary hearing proved that the purpose of the runoff requirement was to ensure that white voters had more of an ability to elect their favored candidates. In addition, Judge Turner concluded that the runoff provision in question was designed to dilute the votes of black citizens because atlarge elections usually had racially polarized results. Moreover because the black voter turnout rate was usually lower than the white turnout rate, it had been impossible for black candidates to defeat whites in at-large and runoff elections in which one black and white contender competed. As a result of this ruling, Herenton with a 49.4 percent majority did not have to face Hackett in a runoff election. Because black voter turnout in past runoffs has been substantially lower than in general elections, a high probability existed that Herenton would have lost the runoff election, mainly because of a higher white voter turnout rate and racially polarized voting. MEMPHIS, BALTIMORE, AND ST. LOUIS: WHY DID IT TAKE SO LONG TO ELECT A BLACK MAYOR? During the era of racial politics, the black community of Memphis elected its first black mayor as well as four district and two at-large black City Council members. Black candidates also won at-large seats on the City Court and the Memphis School Board. The dilemmas that black Memphians experienced when trying to successfully mobilize their bloc vote in a racially polarized environment were not unique. Voters in other cities with large black populations also have had problems when trying to elect representatives. The cities of Baltimore, Memphis, and St. Louis have several similarities. African Americans were not disfranchised after the Reconstruction years. Although political machines controlled local government for many years. Also despite large black populations, divisions among black leaders hampered the ability of black candidates to win mayoral elections. By 1987, Baltimore, Memphis, and St. Louis were the only cities with black populations of at least 40 percent that had not elected


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black mayors.66 Also in Baltimore and Memphis, black majorities were not elected on City Councils until 1995.67 In Baltimore, the continuing effects of machine politics and divisions within the black community inhibited mobilization efforts. In an examination of black politics in Baltimore, Marion E.Orr pointed out that black machine-style politicians and black civil rights movement leaders had ideological divisions which prevented the election of a black mayor in 1971.68 From 1971 to 87, white candidate William Donald Schaefer was able to win reelection as mayor because of his positive relationship with the black community and successful downtown redevelopment projects.69 After Schaefer was elected governor in late 1986, the city of Baltimore later chose Kurt Schmoke as its first elected black mayor in December 1987 in a race that lacked racial polarization.70 As in Baltimore, Lana Stein and Carol W.Kohfeld found that the history of machine politics in St. Louis prevented black candidates from winning mayoral and city wide offices. Before the 1993 mayoral victory of Freeman Bosley Jr., the black community lacked a candidate with widespread appeal and an issue on which to mobilize the black electorate.71 In addition, racial polarization and the small black voting-age population resulted in unsuccessful elective bids.72 After the 1950s, machine politics did not have a detrimental effect on black mobilization in Memphis. The mayoral elections from 1975 to 1987 showed that blacks failed to mobilize successfully because of disagreements among leaders, the number of black candidates who ran for mayor, the lack of candidates with crossover appeal, the racially polarized electorate, and institutional factors such as the city’s annexation policy and majority vote requirement. Also before the 1970s, black political organizations had an active role in mobilizing voters, but eventually these groups experienced a decline in influence and disappeared. In Baltimore and St. Louis, black political groups still have a major role in the local political scene. In Memphis, however, the politics of personality has prevailed during the era of racial politics. Most black elected officials have attracted supporters to a large degree because of their charismatic personalities rather than through the use of political organizations. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM W.W.HERENTON’S VICTORY? In 1991, W.W.Herenton was elected the first black mayor of Memphis for several reasons. First, black citizens felt “our time has come.” The city

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had a 55 percent black population and the percentage of black registered voters slightly outnumbered white. After the 1987 Kurt Schmoke win in Baltimore, Memphis was the only major city in the nation with a predominantly black population that had not elected a black mayor and St. Louis was the only city with a black population of at least 40 percent that had not elected one. Second, Herenton’s insurgent campaign strategy was successful because of its focus on black mobilization. On election day, black voters had a higher turnout rate than whites in a racially polarized election. Whites also had a substantial turnout level and cohesive bloc vote. Some whites refused to vote for Herenton because of their fears of a black administration. Others either disapproved of Herenton because of his lack of political experience and the sexual harassment allegation or were turned off by his black mobilization strategy—the African American People’s Convention, Black Leadership Summit, “religious crusade” theme, and so on. A third reason for the Herenton victory was that Dick Hackett may have been ready to leave the mayor’s office after serving as mayor for nine years. He knew that a black mayoral candidate would eventually win in Memphis. Also, some citizens believed that he had never been qualified to serve as mayor, but won because white voters lacked another strong white candidate in 1982, 1983, and 1987. For unknown reasons, the Hackett campaign did not use a significant amount of its abundant campaign funds in 1991. During the final days before the election, Herenton and others attempted to motivate black voters into turning out at the polls. Other than running radio and television advertisements and making appearances, however, Hackett did very little. The Memphis experience shows that black mayoral candidates who are unable to form coalitions in cities must conduct well-organized grassroots campaigns to motivate black voters and find a way to lessen the divisions that result in a split black vote. It is unlikely that W.W.Herenton could have won with a deracialized or dual strategy in 1991. The Otis Higgs and J.O.Patterson Jr. experiences proved that he probably would not have received more than 10 percent of the white vote. In addition, Herenton would have risked alienating black voters if he had focused heavily on forming coalitions with whites. If the black community had not selected a consensus candidate, a split black vote may have occurred because of the number of black candidates who had planned to run for mayor in 1991. If Herenton and Hackett had competed in a runoff election, either may have won. Both the Herenton and Hackett campaigns would have


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encouraged high turnout rates among blacks and whites. Although the Hackett campaign had more funds, blacks voters were on a “crusade” to elect the city’s first black mayor. The approximately three thousand votes for Robert Hodges could have aided either Hackett or Herenton depending on the race of his supporters. On the other hand, these voters may have chosen not to participate in the election. The turnout factor would then have decided the election’s outcome. Shortly after taking office, Herenton realized that a race-based strategy alone would not be sufficient to either govern the city or secure his reelection. Although black Memphians increased their political representation, the business establishment, Shelby County government, and state legislature remained dominated by whites. W.W.Herenton’s dilemma was to create a leadership style so that he could govern the entire city. NOTES 1 Anonymous, “Mayoral Candidates and the Issues,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 16, 1991. 2 Georgia A. Persons, “Black Mayoralties and the New Black Politics,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993), 40. 3 Charles S.Bullock III, “Racial Crossover Voting and the Election of Black Officials,” Journal of Politics 46 (February, 1984); William E.Nelson Jr. and Philip J.Meranto, Electing Black Mayors (Columbus: Ohio State University Press), 1977. 4 Saundra C.Ardrey, “Cleveland and the Politics of Resurgence,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993), 112. 5 Charles V.Hamilton, “Deracialization,” First World 1 (1977):3–5. 6 John M.McCormick II and Charles E.Jones, “The Conceptualization of Deracialization,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1993), 76–77. 7 Harlan H.Hahn, David Klingman, and Harry Pachon, “Cleavages, Coalitions and the Black Candidate, Western Political Quarterly 29 (1976):513. 8 Raphael J.Sonenshein, “Biracial Coalition Politics in Los Angeles,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 46–47. 9 William J.Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 159–164; Richard A.Keiser, “The Rise of a Biracial Coalition in

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Philadelphia,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, ed. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 60; John H.Mollenkopf, “New York,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, ed. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 86. In Baltimore, incumbent William Donald Shaefer won a Maryland gubernatorial election. 10 William J.Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Melvin G.Holli and Paul M.Green, eds. The Making of the Mayor (Grand Rapids: William B.Eerdmans, 1984); Paul Kleppner, Chicago Divided (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985); Dianne Pinderhughes, Race and Ethnicity in Chicago Politics (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1987); Michael B.Preston, “The Election of Harold Washington,” in The New Black Politics, eds. Michael B.Preston, Lenneal Henderson Jr. and Paul Puryear (New York: Longman, 1987), 139–171; Robert T.Starks and Michael B.Preston, “Harold Washington and the Politics of Reform in Chicago,” in Racial Politics in American Cities, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 88–107. 11 Robert T.Starks and Michael B. Preston, “Harold Washington and the Politics of Reform in Chicago,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 97. 12 Ibid., 97–98. 13 John A.Garcia, Forming Coalitions Between the Latino and African American Communities (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1993); Raphael J. Sonenshein, Politics in Black and White (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 14 John M.McCormick II and Charles E.Jones, “The Conceptualization of Deracialization,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993), 66. 15 Ibid., 68. 16 Roger Biles, “Black Mayors,” Journal of Negro History 77 (Summer 1992):115. 17 Georgia A.Persons, “Black Mayoralties and The New Black Politics” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1993), 50. 18 Huey L.Perry and Alfred Stokes, “Politics and Power in the Sunbelt,” in The New Black Politics, eds. Michael B.Preston, Lenneal Henderson Jr., and Paul Puryear (New York: Longman, 1987), 222–255 19 Richard L.Engstrom and Willie D.Kirkland, “The 1993 New Orleans Mayoral Election: Racial Divisions Continue,” Urban News 9, 1 (Spring 1995): 6–9.


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20 Robert T.Starks and Michael B.Preston, “Harold Washington and the Politics of Reform in Chicago,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 90. 21 William J.Grimshaw, Bitter Fruit (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); William D.Miller, Mr. Crump of Memphis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964); David M.Tucker, Memphis Since Crump (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1980). 22 In 1982, Mayor Wyeth Chandler resigned and accepted an appointment as a circuit court judge. 23 Jerry Markon, “Herenton Steps Up Campaign for Mayor, Attacks Hackett,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, September 9, 1991. 24 Marcus D.Pohlmann and Michael Kirby, Racial Politics at the Crossroads: Memphis Elects Dr. W.W.Herenton (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 45. 25 Ibid., 42. 26 Ibid., 46. 27 During the months before the election, Bahrmand-Vincent moved into the Memphis apartment complex where Herenton lived. After he moved out, she claimed that she did not know he lived there. See Lawrence Buser, “Teacher Sues Superintendent,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 2, 1989. 28 Mike Mansur, “Mayoral Hopefuls Vow ‘Clean’ Race: City Crews Clean Up Mongo ‘Art,’” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 13, 1982. 29 Jefferson Riker, “Mayoral Long Shots Support ‘Little Man,’” Memphis Commercial Appeal, September 23, 1979. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Jeffrey Markon, “Mongo: Future Bleak, Students!,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, September 27, 1991. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Robert T.Starks and Michael B.Preston, “Harold Washington and the Politics of Reform in Chicago,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 88–107. 36 Saundra C.Ardrey, “Cleveland and the Politics of Resurgence,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993), 109–127; W.Avon Drake and Robert D.Holsworth, “Richmond and the Politics of Calculated Cooperation,” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993), 87–108;

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Richard A.Keiser, “The Rise of a Biracial Coalition in Philadelphia “in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 49–76; Steven F. Lawson, Running for Freedom, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Huey L.Perry and Alfred Stokes, “Politics and Power in the Sunbelt,” in The New Black Politics, eds. Michael B.Preston, Lenneal Henderson Jr., and Paul Puryear (New York: Longman, 1987), 222–255; Michael B.Preston, “The Election of Harold Washington,” in The New Black Politics, eds. Michael B.Preston, Lenneal Henderson Jr., and Paul Puryear (New York: Longman, 1987), 139–171. 37 Shep Wilbun Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, March 28, 1995. 38 Ibid. 39 Charles Bernsen, “Hackett and Herenton Seek Broader Support,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, September 19, 1991. 40 Reginald French, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 21, 1993. 41 Charles Bernsen, “Hackett and Herenton Seek Broader Support,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, September 19, 1991. 42 Charles Bernsen, “Hackett and Herenton Seek Broader Support,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, September 19, 1991. 43 Paula Wade, “Outspoken Stance on Herenton is Typical of Alvin King,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 11, 1991. 44 Charles Carpenter, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, July 20, 1992; Shep Wilbun Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, March 28, 1995. 45 Also, the local media oftentimes reported the comments and activities of black mayoral candidates in a biased way. As a result, it appeared that black rather than white candidates were responsible for racial polarization. 46 Jerry Huston and Cornell Christion, “Mayoral Candidates on the Go Right Up to the Election,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 3, 1991. 47 William E.Nelson Jr. and Philip J.Meranto, Electing Black Mayors (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977). 48 Michael Kelley, “Herenton’s ‘Crusade’: Late Kick Wins Race,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 4, 1991. 49 Terry Keeter, “Absentee Votes Settled, but Raw Feelings Remain,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 5, 1991. 50 Marcus D.Pohlmann and Michael Kirby, Racial Politics at the Crossroads: Memphis Elects Dr. W.W.Herenton (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 152. 51 Ibid. 52 Georgia A.Persons, “Black Mayoralties and The New Black Politics” in Dilemmas of Black Politics, ed. Georgia A.Persons (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1993), 45.


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53 Charles H.Levine, Racial Polarization and the American Mayor (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974). 54 Charles S.Bullock III, “Racial Crossover Voting and the Election of Black Officials,” Journal of Politics 46 (February, 1984):238–251; Charles S. Henry, “Racial Factors in the 1983 California Gubernatorial Campaign,” in The New Black Politics, eds., Michael B. Preston, Lenneal Henderson Jr., and Paul Puryear (New York: Longman, 1987), 76–94; Richard Murray and Arnold Vedlitz, “Racial Voting Patterns in the South,” Annals (Spring 1978):29–39; Thomas F.Pettigrew, “When A Black Candidate Runs for Mayor,” People and Politics in Urban Society. Urban Affairs Annual Review (Beverly Hill, California: Sage Publications, 1972), 95–118. 55 Paula Wade, “Chill Wind Blows for King from Inner City,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 11, 1991. 56 Gregory Duckett, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, November 14, 1995. 57 Charles Bernsen, “Hackett and Herenton Seek Broader Support,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, September 19, 1991. 58 Ibid. 59 Charles Carpenter, chairman of 1991 W.W.Herenton mayoral campaign, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, July 20, 1992. 60 Richard A.Keiser, “The Rise of a Biracial Coalition in Philadelphia,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, edited by Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb. (New York: Longman, 1990), 49–76. 61 Steven F.Lawson, Running for Freedom (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 45. 62 Charles S.Bullock III and Loch K.Johnson, Runoffs in the United States (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Charles S.Bullock III and Loch K.Johnson, “Runoff Elections in Georgia,” Journal of Politics 47 (August, 1985):937–946. 63 Lorn Foster, Prepared Statement in Voting Rights Act: Runoff Primaries and Registration Barriers. Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Congress, Second Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985); Jesse Jackson, “Runoffs and Voting Rights,” Washington Post, April 9, 1984; Stephen G.Wright, “Voter Turnout in Runoff Elections,” Journal of Politics 51 (May, 1989):385–396. 64 Marcus D.Pohlmann and Michael Kirby, Racial Politics at the Crossroads: Memphis Elects Dr. W.W.Herenton (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 178. 65 Chris Conley, “U.S. Judge Bans Runoffs in At-Large Contests,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, July 27, 1991.

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66 Baltimore has had a majority black population since the mid-1970s and Memphis since the mid-1980s. In 1990, the St. Louis population was approximately 50 percent black, yet whites constituted the majority of the voting-age population. 67 Both cites have strong mayor-weak Council governments. 68 Marion Orr, “The Struggle for Black Empowerment in Baltimore: Electoral Control and Governing Coalitions” in Racial Politics in American Cities: Second Edition, eds. Rufus P.Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb (New York: Longman, 1997), 207. 69 Ibid., 209. 70. In January 1987, black City Council President Clarence “Du” Burns was sworn in to serve as mayor until a special election was held to elect former mayor Schaefer’s successor. In December 1987, Kurt Schmoke received 65 percent of the white vote and 90 percent of the black vote. 71 Lana Stein and Carol W.Kohfeld, “St. Louis’s Black-White Elections: Products of Machine Factionalism and Polarization,” Urban Affairs Quarterly 27, 2 (December 1991):230. 72 Ibid., 227–248.

CHAPTER 7

The Limits of Mayoral Power and the Ethnoracial Transition in Memphis

INTRODUCTION Professors Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb found that minority groups pursue political objectives in two ways: they petition government from the outside (interest-group strategy) or they achieve representation and a position of influence from the inside (electoral strategy). The electoral strategy includes group mobilization that leads to electoral activity, group representation, and incorporation.1 The ultimate goal of the electoral strategy is to achieve governmental responsiveness. In other words, blacks and other minority groups must organize themselves by registering to vote, pursuing political offices, electing their desired candidates, ensuring that their representatives serve their interests, and reaping the benefits from a responsive government. During his 1991 campaign, W.W.Herenton promised that his administration would allow both blacks and whites to have a role in governing the city and that a greater level of racial harmony would be achieved. During the first two years of his term, however, the new mayor discovered that his power to address the city’s problems was limited by its racially polarized citizenry and City Council members, its deficits, and its power struggles among black political figures. After his victory, Herenton received a number of racially motivated death threats and wore bulletproof vests when appearing in public. Also, few whites attended the January 1992 inaugural ceremony. This chapter analyzes W.W.Herenton’s first term as mayor. One major issue is whether black citizens have come closer to achieving political 149

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incorporation defined as “an equal or leading role in a dominant coalition that is strongly committed to minority interests.”2 Although black Memphians have elected a number of representatives including a black mayor, this chapter analyzes whether they have gained substantive or symbolic representation in terms of appointments on boards and commissions, incentives to decrease crime and poverty levels, and measures for neighborhood development. In addition the chapter examines the way in which the mayor was able to translate a narrow win, a racially divided city, and skeptical business community in 1991 into a high approval rating and an overwhelming reelection victory in 1995. The next section examines the major dilemmas, constraints, and successes of the Herenton administration during its first term. The second analyzes the mayor’s difficult relationship with the City Council. Levels of racial polarization among the seven white and six black Council members are examined as well as Herenton’s disagreements with black Council members on the issues of city-county consolidation and police brutality. The third focuses on the conflicts among Mayor Herenton and Congressman Ford during both the latter’s 1993 trial and the 1994 Shelby County mayoral election. Chapter 7 ends with an analysis of the results of the 1995 mayor’s race. REVISITING THE HOLLOW PRIZE THESIS: CHALLENGES FOR MAJORITY-BLACK GOVERNING COALITIONS After W.W.Herenton’s 1991 win, the city of Memphis experienced an “ethnoracial transition.” Peter K.Eisinger defined this term as “the acquisition of formal executive office in a political jurisdiction by a member of a previously subordinate ethnic group that is now backed politically by a new, potentially durable working majority composed largely of or dominated by members of that group.”3 In other words, the city experienced a transition from a majority white to a majority black governing coalition. After the elections of the nation’s first black mayors, scholars began to research whether they could deliver economic resources to black communities. The majority of these studies found that predominantly black political establishments were severely constrained by predominantly white economic communities.4 Peter K.Eisinger, Richard C.Hill, and Wilbur C.Rich’s research focused on the efforts of black mayors to achieve economic growth in their cities.5 Adolph A.Reed Jr. found that the majority

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of black mayors pursued corporate-centered strategies in which they tried to attract new businesses and expand upon existing ones with the hope that jobs and other benefits would trickle down to the black community.6 Although the black middle-class often attained economic gains, the status of the poor remained unchanged.7 After his election, the politically inexperienced W.W.Herenton faced the same high expectations and limited resources as black mayors of many other American cities. H.Paul Friesema found that newly elected black mayors often inherited a “hollow prize” because of the many socioeconomic ills in their cities.8 At one end, a number of white residents left the cities after the elections of black mayors. Besides the economic implications, massive white flight resulted in polarized and often hostile relationships between black cities and white suburbs. At another end, black citizens expected black mayors to place a priority on black interests and provide overnight solutions to the city’s long-term problems.9 Mayors who catered to the business establishment were often accused of “selling out” the black agenda.10 Shortly after the Herenton election, disagreements, power struggles, and rivalries plagued Memphis’ black leadership. In 1993, a number of community leaders and citizens threatened to boycott the city’s twentyfive-year effort to land a National Football League team if Harold Ford was found guilty of mail and bank fraud. In 1994 and 1996, Ford and Herenton clashed again during the Shelby County mayor’s race and the Harold Ford Jr. congressional campaign. These divisions supported Jennings’ finding that “the black electorate is becoming differentiated on the basis of ideological and philosophical issues”.11 In other words, black voters and political figures are not monolithic, but disagree on the agenda that should be furthered in cities oftentimes along class and ideological lines. BUILDING AN URBAN REGIME: A LEARNING GROUND FOR THE NEW MAYOR Currently in Memphis and many other cities, black residents are the majority electorate, but have limited economic resources. Black mayors in cities such as Atlanta, Cleveland, and Denver have formed coalitions with the business community in order to govern effectively. Clarence Stone defined this arrangement as an urban regime or “the informal partnership between city hall and the downtown business elite”.12 He believed that black mayors needed to build stable urban regimes because:

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Race, Power, and Political Emergence in Memphis African Americans have numbers and substantial voting power but limited economic resources. The business elite control enormous economic resources but lack numbers. That African Americans could supply needed numbers paved their way into incorporation initially and as those numbers reached an electoral majority, they took on added weight.13

Despite the electoral victories of black candidates in 1991, Memphis’ black community still lacked full incorporation because of a lack of support from a mostly white business community and the gap between haves and have-nots. During his first term, W.W.Herenton attempted to build an urban regime by forming coalitions between the mayor’s office and the business community and between city and county governments. By pursuing a corporate-centered strategy for economic development, he hoped that the black community would be fully incorporated into both the political and business establishments. Also, Herenton realized that his prospects for reelection would be stronger if voters perceived him as having “moved the city forward” or having implemented innovative policies to both maintain and enhance the city’s economic base. After W.W.Herenton’s election, he was confronted with the problems of meeting black expectations while assuring whites that he would have a color-blind administration.14 Black voters expected him to fulfill his 1991 “Help Is On The Way” promise by focusing on an urban agenda in addition to economic development. Since a number of black Memphians believed that previous mayors had little interest in their needs, they hoped that a black administration would be more responsive. With Herenton’s 1991 victory, he joined a group which William E. Nelson Jr. defined as “new breed” politicians.15 These individuals were elected mostly by black voters and as a result were expected to focus on black needs once in office. They often governed cities in which large gaps existed along class lines. As shown in Table 7-1 and Table 7-2, the majority of black mayors serve in cities with either large or predominantly black populations. By the time the black electorate was both mobilized and numerous enough to elect a black mayor, their cities had suffered from years of neglect by previous administrations, flight of the middle-class, and decreasing levels of federal aid. Constraints such as the flight of the middle-class, shrinking tax bases, decreasing levels of federal aid, and attacks on affirmative action hampered the ability of black mayors to serve those who were most in need. Thus, despite the presence of a black mayor, the agenda and priorities of city


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Table 7.1 Socioeconomic Index of Cities Governed by Black Mayors in 1993

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Table 7.1 Socioeconomic Index of Cities Governed by Black Mayors in 1993 Continued

Source: Black Mayors of Cities with Populations Over 50,000, January 1993. Statistical Record of Black America, Third Edition. Edited by Jessie Carney Smith and Robert L.Johns. Detroit: Gale Research; Department of Interior Census Office. 1990. 7990 Census of the Population: Social and Economic Characteristics. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

government remained largely unchanged in most cities.16 Despite campaign promises, poor and working-class black citizens mostly gained symbolic rather than substantive representation from black mayors. This was known as “feel-good politics” because citizens gained a sense of pride after electing a black mayor, but few other benefits. Clarence Stone, Marion E.Orr, and David Imbroscio, in “The Reshaping of Urban Leadership in U.S. Cities,” found that black mayors pursued economic growth strategies because of the difficulty in attracting the resources to support an urban agenda.17 The belief was that corporations would rarely invest in inner-city revitalization efforts. As a result, black political figures were constrained by a “white power structure.” Alkalimat and Gills defined this dilemma: The corporate control of the economy is managed by and serves the interest of a predominantly white ruling class. There are few blacks on


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Table 7-2 Cities with the Highest Poverty Rates, 1989

Source: Bureau of the Census. 1993. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 472.

corporate boards and in top administrative slots [and]…disproportionate white control of political parties, elected and appointed offices, and government employment. Further, while blacks are extremely over represented at the lowest levels in government, the reverse—under representation—is pervasive at the higher levels.18

Tables 7-3 and 7-4 provide data which showed socioeconomic characteristics of all families in Memphis and the disparities in the incomes, poverty levels, and occupations of black and white families in 1990. The median income for white households ($37,228) was almost double that for blacks ($18,632). Moreover, approximately 31.3 percent of black families earned annual incomes which are below the poverty level ($5,000 or less). The figure for whites in poverty was 4.8 percent. Whites were three times more likely to hold professional occupations while black Memphians were twice as likely to hold service occupations. The U.S. Census defined managerial and professional occupations as those dealing with administration, management, engineering, health sciences, teaching, library science, and counseling. Examples of service occupa tions were

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Table 7-3 Socioeconomic Characteristics of All Families in Memphis, 1990

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. 1994. City and County Data Book. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

those in private households, police, firelighters, food services, cleaning, and building service occupations. As a way to address these disparities and other problems, W.W.Herenton became a consensus builder who pursued strategies for both downtown development and urban renewal. Kotter and Lawrence identified mayoral leadership styles which included the power broker, public entrepreneur and consensus builder.19 Since his successes as mayor depended largely on his leadership style, Herenton prioritized forming cooperative relationships with the business community and the middle-class. According to Huey L.Perry, the experiences of Mayors Richard Arrington of Birmingham and Ernest “Dutch” Morial of New Orleans provided evidence that consensus builders were usually more successful in governing cities than mayors with confrontational styles. Both men were elected as the first black mayors in their respective cities. Whereas Arrington was a consensus builder, Moral had a confrontational style. As a result of their leadership styles, Arrington established cooperative relations with the business community and the City Council, but Morial’s policies and initiatives were usually opposed by the majority of New Orleans’ City Council members.20 W.W.Herenton’s urban agenda included efforts to reduce the crime rate, increase the availability of low-income housing, create a down payment assistance program for first-time homeowners, renovate public school buildings, and build new schools. Concerning downtown development, Herenton created the Downtown Leadership Council in 1994. In this organization, he and thirty of Memphis’ most influential business eaders planned innovative and profitable economic development pro jects in


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Table 7-4 Socioeconomic Characteristics of Black and White Families in Memphis, 1990

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1990. Occupations of Employed Persons by Race and Hispanic Origin; U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1990. Income in 1989 of Households, Families and Persons by Race and Hispanic Origin; U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1990. Poverty Status in 1989 of Families and Persons by Race and Hispanic Origin. * Incomes between $25,000 and $50,000. ** Incomes of $50,000 and above. *** Ages 16 and Over.

downtown Memphis. As a result of their efforts, Auto Zone Inc. relocated its main headquarters to the downtown area; renovations began on Peabody Place, Tom Lee Park, and Central Station; and a triple-A baseball park opened in the downtown area.21 Also, the mayor proposed an $11 million riverfront development plan and began negotiations to open a Grammy Hall of Fame Museum in the Memphis Pyramid. Nevertheless, Herenton’s critics accused him of using the same corporate-centered strategies as previous mayoral administrations and pursuing the path of economic development at the expense of the poor. Out of necessity, the mayor emphasized downtown development because of his belief that black Memphians would benefit from general prosperity in the city of Memphis. Although his critics viewed this agenda as being detrimental to the black community, Herenton realized that black mayors needed to create innovative policies rather than relying on taxes and federal aid.22 Many of Herenton’s black critics agreed with his emphasis on downtown development, but believed that he abandoned the agenda of the 1991 African American People’s Convention, which called for housing and

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neighborhood development, improving the quality of public education, decreasing the poverty rate, efficient fire and police service, and economic growth. For example, Mayor Herenton opposed the civilian review board proposed by City Councilman Shep Wilbun Jr. He also distanced himself from Harold Ford especially during his 1993 trial and the 1994 Shelby County Mayoral Election. Also, six of the first eleven appointments to the Herenton administration, including his chief administrative office were white. HERENTON’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CITY COUNCIL One of W.W.Herenton’s early dilemmas was a lack of support from a racially divided City Council. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb pointed out the importance of a good mayor-council relationship. In Racial Politics in American Cities, they stated: Blacks and Latinos, if they are to achieve their political goals in any city, have to secure the support of a majority of the City Council over a period of years. Thus the key to control of city government in favor of minority interests has to be a dominant coalition—that is, minority participation in a coalition that is able to dominate City Councils and secure repeated reelection. Such a dominant coalition does not have to consist entirely of blacks and Latinos, but it does have to have a strong commitment to their interests if they are to obtain the changes in city government policies that they want.23

During his first two years, the Herenton administration faced difficulty in promoting its agenda because of resistance from the City Council. During his first term, Council members clashed on a number of issues. These ranged from budget proposals and property tax increases to police abuse. Voting often fell along racial lines with the six black members favoring and the seven whites opposing Herenton’s proposals. At other times, black City Council members opposed the mayor. During his first year, Herenton realized that the majority of the Council did not support many of his proposals. The seven whites rejected his 1992 operating budget, while the six black members favored it. One year later, the majority sharply reduced Herenton’s $30.5 million plan to build and upgrade housing in deteriorating neighborhoods and provide small business loans in ten inner-city areas.24


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It appeared that many of the divisions were racially motivated. Many thought that this problem would be solved after an almost inevitable black majority was elected. After serving for less than a year, Herenton joked that voters should “elect a seventh councilman who looks like me,” because of his belief that a predominantly black City Council would be more supportive of his proposals.25 Herenton faced opposition from black elected officials as well during his first mayoral term, however, mostly because of his views on the issues of the consolidation of city and county governments and a civilian review board to monitor police brutality. Herenton angered a number of his constituents in August 1993 when he suggested the possibility of consolidating the city and county governments and later running for mayor of the new consolidated government in 1994. If both city and county voters had approved the merger and he had run, the city of Memphis would have lost its charter and Shelby County would have assumed full responsibility for public education, law enforcement, as well as other city services.26 In making this suggestion, Herenton thought of the implications of having a poor city surrounded by affluent suburban areas. He also wanted to establish a cooperative relationship among the city and county governments and realized that property and sales tax revenues alone would not sufficiently meet the city’s needs without some other form of economic growth.27 In 1992 and 1993, Mayor Herenton had suggested property tax increases because he predicted a $50 million deficit by the mid-1990s. In November 1993, his administration enacted a hiring freeze on governmental positions because of a “bleak” financial situation. At one time, current revenues were insufficient for maintaining city services, funding the public school system and addressing housing problems. Many of Herenton’s black supporters were surprised and outraged at the consolidation idea despite the fact that the mayor had mentioned its benefits during the 1991 campaign. Nevertheless, the consolidation of city and county governments in 1993 would have diluted black voting power and essentially destroyed the black political base in Memphis. Because of the increasing black population, black political figures continued to be elected in Memphis. Shelby County, on the other hand, had both a majority white population and registered voter percentage. As of 1990, white registered voters outnumbered blacks in the county by approximately 70,000. Consolidation probably would be a more feasible option for the future because the entire Memphis and Shelby County metropolitan area will have a majority black population by the year 2000. In addition, The 1996 Memphis Poll indicated that

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blacks had grown more supportive of consolidation and annexation since 1993.28 In 1993, City Council members were some of the most avid opponents to consolidation. Many felt that Herenton’s prediction of a $50 million deficit was an exaggeration of the city’s financial condition. Others pointed out that since the added resources and wealth resulting from consolidation would not be allocated toward an urban agenda, the underclass would not benefit. Rather than trying to consolidate city and county governments, Council members suggested that the Herenton administration create incentives to allow low-income groups to contribute to the tax base. Another issue that showed racial divisions on the Memphis City Council was that of police brutality. In 1994, W.W.Herenton allegedly fired the Director of Police Services Melvin T.Burgess, an African American, because of numerous complaints about police brutality and the failure of the local police force to crack down on drug trafficking. A few months prior to the firing on April 8, 1994, the “pepper gas” incident had occurred. During a high-speed chase, two black undercover officers were stopped and questioned. During a physical confrontation, one of the white officers used pepper gas to subdue one of the black policemen. The white officer was suspended with pay and later terminated after an investigation. Although Mayor Herenton had appointed seven citizens to a civilian oversight committee in 1992, they did not review any allegations of misconduct during the first year and sided with the police in four cases in 1993. As a result of increasing complaints, Councilman Shep Wilbun Jr. proposed a seven-member Citizens’ Law Enforcement Review Board in the fall of 1994. Unlike Herenton’s oversight committee, the board would have the power to investigate the complaints, subpoena witnesses and review the records of both the County Sheriff’s and Memphis Police Departments.29 On October 18, 1994, Wilbun’s ordinance was defeated by a vote of 4 to 7. All seven of the white City Council members opposed the measure. Mayor Herenton, Police Director Walter Winfrey and Memphis Police Association President Bryant Jennings also felt that the review board was unnecessary.30 On October 19, 1994, the death of a sixty-eight-year-old black man provided an even stronger indication of the need for a civilian review board. Officers shot Jessie Bogard as he chased youths who threw rocks at his Orange Mound home. Since Bogard was carrying a pistol, the officers claimed the shooting was justified, but witnesses stated otherwise. As a


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result of public outcry, Councilman Wilbun’s amended ordinance was approved by a vote of 10 to 2. THE INITIAL BREAKDOWN OF BLACK UNITY In order for black citizens to gain substantive rather than merely symbolic representation, James B.Jennings and William E.Nelson Jr. have found that they must create a “cohesive political power base” to secure elections and develop support for the mayor’s agenda.31 This includes creating independent political organizations to mobilize the black community and serving strong leadership roles in parties. Unlike the situation in Boston, Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee, black independent groups and leaders have not emerged to the forefront in Memphis politics. In Memphis, the majority of black voters and elected officials are Democrats. Although some new political personalities and organizations have emerged over the years, most had ties to the Democratic party. The political base that led to the Herenton win collapsed after his inauguration. In 1991, a united black leadership strongly backed the Herenton candidacy in its final days. After taking office, however, the mayor was not able to garner support for his agenda. In addition to dealing with a racially divided electorate and City Council, black leaders accused the mayor of “selling out” their constituents’ interests in favor of a corporate agenda and of concentrating too heavily on developing ties with the business community that ignored him during his 1991 campaign. In March and April 1993, W.W.Herenton had to deal with “black political radicalization” in Memphis. Jennings defined this as “a period of increasingly militant black activism” in which mostly lower- class and working-class individuals have led aggressive protests in order to both focus attention on their problems and challenge the status quo.32 During Harold Ford’s third trial for mail and bank fraud, the mayor faced the dilemma of supporting Memphis’ most powerful black politician, while at the same time protecting the city’s welfare. Ford’s first two trials, held in Memphis, ended in hung juries split along racial lines. In 1993, a federal judge moved the jury of eleven whites and one black from Memphis to Jackson, Tennessee where black citizens only composed 30 percent of the population. Because black Memphians vehemently objected to both the jury selection and the change of venue before the Ford trial, local leaders including Council members Shep Wilbun Jr. and Myron Lowery, planned to organize a boycott of the city’s twenty-five-year effort to land a franchise

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team from the N.F.L. As part of the protest, they announced a petition drive to inform N.F.L. officials of racism in Memphis. On local talk-radio shows, angry citizens threatened rioting and other forms of violence if Ford were found guilty. In their view, the Congressman’s ten years of federal trials was another case of harassment of a prominent black elected official. Others believed that Mayor Herenton should have attended the trial and supported Ford despite their long-standing rivalry. As a way to address the situation, Herenton held a press conference announcing that the planned boycott would hamper economic growth in the city. He also indicated a willingness to severely punish those who engaged in violence. As an additional precaution, an increased number of police officers patrolled the streets on the day of the verdict. Although Ford was later acquitted, a number of black citizens believed that Mayor Herenton should have shown more compassion toward the Congressman. In August 1994, black divisions became more obvious after four black candidates entered the Shelby County mayoral race. The City of Memphis witnessed a well-publicized confrontation between Herenton and Ford during the final weeks before the August 4 election. Both received enormous media coverage for their role in a race neither had entered as candidates. Although Herenton had suggested a run for county mayor and consolidation of city and county governments in August 1993, he later changed his mind and refused to endorse any of the county mayoral candidates. During this time, Harold Ford was seeking a tenth term in Congress. Voters in Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee elected Republican and former County Commissioner Jim Rout as mayor by an overwhelming margin. Rout replaced sixteen-year incumbent William Morris who was running for governor. A field of approximately nine candidates, four of whom were black, competed for the county mayoral office. As of 1990, the black population in Shelby County was 42 percent while 55 percent in Memphis. Because of the number of black candidates in the race, the black vote was split. In addition, the Shelby County mayor’s race turned out to be a power struggle among W.W.Herenton and Harold Ford. Analysts predicted that the same divisions would again surface during the 1995 city mayoral election. Approximately one week before the Shelby County mayor’s race, Ford urged voters to support white independent Jack Sammons for mayor. In making the endorsement, Ford referred to him as a “coalition candidate” capable of garnering support from both black and white voters. Since four


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Figure 7.1. Harold Ford gave an emotional speech to supporters at the Holiday Inn Crowne Plaza hotel after his acquittal. Harold Ford Jr. is in the background. (Courtesy of the Memphis Commercial Appeal)

black contenders, including Ford’s brother Senator John Ford, had entered the race, the Congressman believed that the black candidates would lose based on a split black vote, racially polarized voting and a majority white voting-age population. Since Ford did not want white Republican Jim Rout to win the election, he actively campaigned for Sammons rather than John Ford and the other black candidates. The black leadership of Memphis, especially those who had entered the race, vehemently criticized the Congressman for his stance. Senator John Ford expressed that he was “saddened, hurt and puzzled” by the endorsement.33 He later hinted the possibility of “a back room [deal] being made” after Harold Ford and seventy-five black ministers praised Sammons before an audience that included the Senator and the other black candidates.34 One reason for this criticism centered around the unwillingness and/or inability of black candidates to form biracial coalitions in local elections. As mentioned in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, these alliances had not previously existed in Memphis and Shelby County. Voting in the majority of elections has remained polarized along racial lines.35 As a result, black mayoral candidates have mostly focused on mobilization of the black electorate combined with limited appeals to white communities.36

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THE 1995 MEMPHIS MAYORAL ELECTION A “second wave” of black mayors have been elected during the 1980s and 1990s. In cities such as Chandler, Arizona; Denver, Colorado; Rockford, Illinois; and Seattle, Washington, large percentages of white voters have supported black mayoral bids, oftentimes providing decisive swing votes. At other times, whites have backed the reelection efforts of black mayors after an initial resistance to their rule.37 More recently, black mayors have either been replaced or succeeded by white mayors in cities such as Gary, Los Angeles, New York City, and Philadelphia. In 1995, it was expected that white voters would oppose Mayor Herenton’s reelection bid in Memphis. Previous chapters covered the extent of racial polarization in the city. Before 1995, candidates did not receive substantial levels of white support in the majority of mayoral and other citywide races. Yet in October 1995, W.W.Herenton was reelected with large percentages from both black and white voters. In this section, the results of the 1995 mayoral election will be compared to the 1991 race in terms of the issues addressed, level of racial polarization, and turnout rates. In “The Second Time Around: A Profile of Black Mayoral Reelection Campaigns,” Sharon M.Watson analyzed the reelection campaigns of black mayors in Atlanta, Cleveland, Detroit, Gary, Los Angeles, Newark, New Orleans, and Oakland. She found that they shared several characteristics. These included a decline in the turnout of both blacks and whites, larger margins of victory, a continued reliance on black mobilization, fewer challenges from “serious” candidates, and incumbency advantages based mostly on name recognition.38 An application of Watson’s findings to the 1995 Memphis mayoral election reveals a sharp decrease in the turnout of both black and white voters. The 1991 race had one of the largest turnout rates for a local mayoral election (65.2 percent). Yet four years later, approximately half of the electorate (35.1 percent) cast votes. While black turnout decreased from 64.6 to 42 percent, the level among whites dropped from 67 to 29.6 percent. These rates fell below the average for Memphis mayoral elections. Consequently, black registrants outnumbered white registrants by approximately thirty thousand voters. The city of Memphis had a higher average turnout rate (47.1 percent) than did other large southern cities in the mayoral races from 1969 to 1991 because of the city’s political history (see Table 7-5). E.H.Crump and black political organizations in later years encouraged a large black turnout. Since the 1970s, Harold Ford has been very adept at mobilizing blacks to turn out at the polls on election day;


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Table 7-5 Regression Estimates of Average Turnout in Mayoral Elections of Southern Cities, 1969–91

Source: Reprinted in Anthony Desales Affigne. Race and Turnout in Memphis: The Persistence of Racial Differentials in Participation. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 14–16, 1994

well-known black candidates have run for office; and issues of concern to the black community have dominated local elections. Despite the apparent lack of interest in the 1995 mayor’s race, W.W. Herenton won by a higher margin of victory. According to Table 7-6, he received three times as many votes (74.2 percent) as the second-place candidate John Baker (24.2 percent). A racial breakdown of the Memphis electorate reveals that Herenton received approximately 40 percent of the vote from whites and 97 percent from blacks. In the 1991 mayoral election, he defeated Dick Hackett by less than two hundred votes. Both candidates had a total vote percentage of 49.44–one point less than a clear majority. Although Herenton continued to rely heavily on black mobilization and bloc voting, the issue of race was less of a factor in 1995. Most of his support again came from black citizens. The mayor abandoned the “religious crusade” theme from 1991. however, and instead highlighted the major accomplishments of his first term.39 In a subtle manner, Republican John Baker focused on racial issues when he accused Herenton and black Police Director Walter Winfrey of reverse racism. Baker alleged that white officers were either demoted,

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Table 7.6 Regression Estimates of Results in the 1991 and 1995 Mayoral Elections


fired or suspended for their actions while black officers escaped punishment. As an example, he cited Winfrey’s decision to transfer three white officers who attended the Good Ol’ Boys Roundup in East Tennessee—an annual meeting of law enforcement officers which received national coverage for its racist slogans—without any evidence of wrongdoing. Baker, a salesman, said that he entered the mayor’s race in order to give voters an alternative to the Herenton campaign. He attempted to use the same strategy as many other white candidates who ran against black incumbents. Like these candidates, Baker focused on issues such as improving the quality of public schools, reducing sales and property taxes, and making the Memphis Police, Fire Departments, and Housing Authority more efficient.40 He referred


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to his platform as the “Contract with Memphians” which resembled the Republican “Contract with America.” Herenton ignored Baker’s campaign and refused to debate him and the other contenders—Robert “Prince Mongo” Hodges and Ernie Lunati. Perennial candidate Hodges was making his eighth mayoral bid, while Ernie Lunati had been convicted of prostitution and obscenity charges in 1982.41 None of these candidates had a realistic chance of winning the election because of their lack of campaign funds and endorsements. In 1995, W.W.Herenton was not challenged by a black contender because of his name recognition, popularity, substantial campaign fund of approximately $500,000, and endorsements from Tennessee Governor Donald Sundquist, Shelby County Mayor Jim Rout, Shelby County Republican Chairman Dr. Philip Langdon, Bartlett Mayor Bobby Flaherty, Birmingham Mayor Richard Arrington, Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke, Atlanta Mayor Bill Campbell, and other political figures. Thus, the 1995 Memphis mayoral race dramatically differed from the 1991 election in which W.W.Herenton experienced a narrow victory in a racially polarized election. In 1991, most whites did not want to elect a black mayor in Memphis, but the majority of black voters were determined to elect the city’s first. As a result, the 1991 mayoral race had one of the highest turnout rates for a local election. During Mayor Herenton’s first term, he focused on furthering economic development, establishing a working relationship with the business community, and broadening his political base. In 1995, Herenton had a high approval rating and received four times as many votes from whites (see Table 7-7). Nevertheless, one should not be overly optimistic about the results of the 1995 mayoral election. Although Mayor Herenton received an impressive 40 percent of the white vote, candidate John Baker garnered almost 60 percent. Thus, racially polarized voting remained evident because the majority of whites supported Baker while 97 percent of black voters favored Herenton. In addition, the decreases in black, white, and overall turnout rates indicated that voters had little interest in the 1995 mayoral election. The turnout rates in the 1995 mayoral election were among the lowest in the city’s history primarily because the level of enthusiasm associated with the election of the city’s first black mayor had subsided. Approximately half of the voters who participated in the 1991 mayoral election turned out at the polls in 1995 and whites showed less of an interest than blacks. The decrease in the white voter registration and turnout rates provided evidence that many have either moved out of the city or lost the desire to participate in city mayoral elections.

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Table 7-7 Memphis Commercial Appeal Poll, 1995

Source: The Memphis Commercial Appeal Poll, September 17–20, 1995. The margin of error is +/-4 points with a confidence level of 95 percent.

CONCLUSION During the early years of Mayor W.W.Herenton’s first term, no one could have predicted that he would win by a landslide in 1995. Yet, the mayor’s emphasis on economic growth and on creating a coalition among businessmen, other politicians, and both black and white citizens, led to his reelection by a large margin. Although Mayor Herenton’s critics accused him of catering too heavily to the business establishment and neglecting the interests of the poor and of the black community, he received the overwhelming majority of the black vote and a large number of white voters in 1995. Regardless of class status, the majority of black Memphians supported the mayor’s reelection bid due to both the substantive and symbolic benefits they received. The city of Memphis now has a majority black governing coalition. Besides the reelection of W.W.Herenton, the first majority black City


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Council was chosen in 1995 after a temporary redistricting plan was implemented. Before 1995, the Memphis City Council consisted on seven district and six at-large seats. The Council created this plan in order to settle the federal voting rights lawsuit against the city discussed in Chapter 6. The new plan kept the seven district Council seats, but replaced the six at-large seats with two “super districts.” Each super district elected three representatives; one district had a predominantly black population, the other a white majority. The runoff elections that disadvantaged black mayoral and at-large City Council candidates were not completely eliminated. They are not required in super district elections, but still are in district races if neither candidate wins by least 50 percent of the total vote. Incidentally, Dr. Talib-Karim Muhammad, who filed the original voting rights lawsuit in 1988, was elected to represent one of the super district seats in 1995. In the future, black Memphians will probably continue to elect a number of black representatives as the population increases in the Memphis-Shelby County metropolitan area. Yet, full incorporation has been constrained by a number of factors. The city is still experiencing overwhelming social problems such as crime, poverty and homelessness. Wide disparities exist among the haves and have-nots. During his second term, the Herenton administration must ensure that neighborhoods are not neglected, stem middle-class flight, and pursue economic development. In addition, W.W.Herenton must establish a workable relationship with the City Council without assuming that a predominantly black Council will be more responsive than a predominantly white one. Despite the remaining dilemmas, Mayor W.W.Herenton of Memphis has been relatively successful in governing a racially polarized city, pursuing economic development and managing conflict during his first term. NOTES 1 Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb, eds. “Can Blacks and Latinos Achieve Power in City Government? The Setting and the Issues,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition (New York: Longman, 1990), 10. 2 Ibid., 9. 3 Peter K.Eisinger, The Politics of Displacement (New York: Academic Press, 1980). 4 Peter K.Eisinger, The Politics of Displacement (New York: Academic Press, 1980); Mack H.Jones, “Black Political Empowerment in Atlanta,”

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Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 439 (September 1978):90–117; Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb, Protest Is Not Enough (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). 5 Peter K.Eisinger, The Politics of Displacement (New York: Academic Press, 1980); Richard Child Hill, “Crisis in the Motor City,” in Restructuring the City, ed. Susan Fainstein et. al. (New York: Longman, 1983); Wilbur C.Rich, Coleman Young and Detroit Politics (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989). 6 Adolph Reed Jr., “The Black Urban Regime: Structural Origins and Constraints,” in Power, Community and the City: Comparative Urban and Community Research, ed. Michael Peter Smith (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988), 138–189. 7 Huey L.Perry, “The Evolution and Impact of Biracial Coalitions and Black Mayors in Birmingham and New Orleans, in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 140–152. 8 H.Paul Friesema, “Black Control of Central Cities,” American Institute of Planners Journal 35 (March 1969):75–79. 9 Michael B.Preston, “Big-City Black Mayors,” National Political Science Review 2 (1990):l31. 10 Peter K.Eisinger, The Politics of Displacement (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 258. 11 James Jennings, The Politics of Black Empowerment (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992), 181. 12 Clarence Stone, Regime Politics (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1989), 3. 13 Clarence N.Stone, “Race and Regime in Atlanta,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: Second Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb (New York: Longman, 1997), 166. 14 Michael B.Preston, “Big-City Black Mayors,” National Political Science Review 2 (1990):131–137. 15 William E.Nelson, “Cleveland: The Evolution of Black Political Power,” in The New Black Polities: The Search for Political Power. Second Edition, eds. Michael B.Preston, Lenneal Henderson Jr., and Paul Puryear. Second edition. (New York: Longman, 1987), 172–199. 16 Adolph Reed Jr., “The Black Urban Regime: Structural Origins and Constraints,” in Power, Community and the City: Comparative Urban and Community Research., ed. Michael Peter Smith (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988),138–189.


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17 Clarence Stone, Marion E.Orr, and David Imbroscio, “The Reshaping of Urban Leadership in U.S. Cities,” in Urban Life in Transition. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, eds. M.Gottdiener and Chris G.Pickvance (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1991). 18 Abdul Alkalimat and Doug Gills, “Chicago: Black Power vs. Racism,” in The New Black Vote, ed. Rod Bush (San Francisco, California: Synthesis Publications, 1984). 19 John P.Kotter and Paul R.Lawrence, Mayors in Action (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), 18–32. 20 Huey L.Perry, “The Evolution and Impact of Biracial Coalitions and Black Mayors in Birmingham and New Orleans, in Racial Politics in American Cities: Second Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1997), 183–186. 21 Reginald French, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, December 21, 1993; Gregory Duckett, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, November 14, 1995. 22 Clarence Stone, Marion E.Orr, and David Imbroscio, “The Reshaping of Urban Leadership in U.S. Cities,” in Urban Life in Transition. Urban Affairs Annual Review, eds. M.Gottdiener and Chris G.Pickvance (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1991). 23 Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb, “Can Blacks and Latinos Achieve Power in City Government?” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb (New York” Longman 1990), 9. 24 Roland Klose, “Mayor Seeks $6 Million for Housing, Business Aid,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 12, 1993. 25 Susan Adler-Thorpe, “Key Quality for City Council?,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, August 2, 1992. 26 Minerva Johnican, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, May 25, 1994. 27 Bob Patterson, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, August 11, 1994. 28 Michael Kirby, The 1996 Memphis Poll. Unpublished Document, 1996. 29 Shep Wilbun Jr., interview, Memphis, Tennessee, March 28, 1995. 30 Roland Klose, “Council OK’s Police Review Board,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, October 26, 1994. 31 James B.Jennings, The Politics of Black Empowerment (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992); William E.Nelson Jr., “Cleveland: The Evolution of Black Political Power,” in The New Black Polities: The Search for Political Power. Second Edition, eds. Michael B.Preston, Lenneal Henderson Jr. and Paul Puryear (New York: Longman, 1987), 172–199. 32 James B.Jennings, The Politics of Black Empowerment (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992), 178; James B.Jennings and Mel King, From

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Access to Power (Cambridge: Schenkman Books, 1986); James B.Jennings, “Boston,” in The New Black Vote, ed. Rod Bush (San Francisco, California: Synthesis Publications, 1984). 33 Terry Keeter, “Ford Draws Fire for Mayoral Stand,” Memphis Commercial Appeal, July 26, 1994. 34 Ibid. 35 Sharon D.Wright, Aftermath of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Racial Voting Patterns in Memphis Mayoral Elections (Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Tennessee at Knoxville, 1993). 36 William E.Nelson Jr. and Philip J.Meranto, Electing Black Mayors (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977); Sharon D.Wright, “The Failure of the Deracialization Strategy for Black Candidates in Memphis Mayoral Elections,” in Race, Politics and Governance in the U.S., ed. Huey L.Perry. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, Forthcoming). 37 Robert T.Starks and Michael B.Preston, “Harold Washington and the Politics of Reform in Chicago,” in Racial Politics in American Cities: First Edition, eds. Rufus P.Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H.Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), pp. 88–107. 38 Sharon M.Watson, “The Second Time Around,” Phylon 45 (Fall 1984): 165–184. 39 Gregory Duckett, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, November 14, 1995; Wyeth Chandler, interview, Memphis, Tennessee, May 26, 1994. 40 Nate Hobbs, “Herenton Runs on Record: Key Rival Offers ‘Contract,’=” Memphis Commercial Appeal, August 19, 1995. 41 Ibid.

CHAPTER 8

The Continuing Search for Full Incorporation in Memphis

A statement by former Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young was an accurate characterization of black political development in the South: It used to be Southern politics was just “nigger” politics, who could “outnigger” the other—then you registered 10 to 15 percent in the community and folk would start saying “Nigra,” and then you get 35 to 40 percent registered and its amazing how quick they learned how to say “Nee-grow,” and now that we’ve got 50, 60, 70 percent of the black votes registered in the South, everybody’s proud to be associated with their black brothers and sisters.1

As the number of black voters increased in the South, white candidates had to ask for their support. Blacks were no longer outsiders who were excluded from political participation and office holding, but became insiders who could demand that their elected officials address their interests. During the eras of access, machine rule, civil rights struggle, and racial politics, blacks in Memphis sought and achieved political emergence. During the era of racial politics, they elected a black mayor, a father and son to Congress, a majority black City Council and school board, and black County Commissioners. Also, most of the Democratic state legislators from the Shelby County area were African American as were the heads of the fire and police departments and public school system. With this black political ascendancy, the city of Memphis represented the ultimate case study that showed ways in which blacks in a traditional Southern city later dominated the local political structure. This chapter summarizes the black 173

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political experience in Memphis in the context of larger issues in race and local electoral politics and address the issue of what else is left to be achieved. Chapter 1 outlined a number of questions on race, power, and political emergence. For example, how do political machines use substantial black electorates to their advantage? The machine headed by E.H. Crump for approximately fifty years used the black vote in order to maintain its power base through election fraud, incentives and intimidation. Its incentives to black voters included neighborhood improvements and gifts of no financial consequence such as barbecue, watermelons, and whiskey. In terms of election fraud, a number of citizens registered, but never actually voted. Both blacks and whites “were voted.” Crump officials paid poll taxes and collected registration receipts in order to sway close elections. Also, in order to completely dominate the local political scene, Crump destroyed any potential critics. Because he almost single-handedly controlled his machine, it collapsed in the years after his death. Since the 1970s, it has been alleged that Harold Ford has run a political machine in the black community of Memphis. In analyzing this issue, one can question whether it is possible for a black man to gain the power to create a political machine. Hanes Walton pointed out that traditionally black citizens were “of,” not “in,” political machines. They voted for the machine ticket on election day, but were not appointed to influential positions nor given the authority to make crucial decisions.2 In Memphis, the Ford organization has a considerable amount of influence in the local, state, and national political arena, but cannot be defined as a political machine. Family members have the ability to win elections by large margins and the Harold Ford ballot has always been a powerful endorsement tool. Since 1974, Emmitt, Harold Jr., Harold Sr., James, John, and Joe Ford have held been elected as members of Congress, the Memphis City Council, Shelby County Commission, state House of Representatives, state Senate and as General Sessions Court Clerk. It is rumored that Harold Ford Sr. resigned in March 1996 and transferred his power base to his son so that he could run for mayor in 1999. A political machine provides incentives, influences vote choices, and wins elections. Concerning incentives, Harold Ford Sr. has not provided the kinds of benefits to his constituents as have machine bosses. Although he assisted his constituents with rent payments, employment, and other needs, he did not have the ability to provide other incentives. Moreover, because of the Ford organization’s size, it cannot conduct a city wide


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ward and precinct operation as did the Crump machine in order to control the electorate in the entire city. Despite their election wins and popularity, the Fords have experienced losses in recent years. In 1992, Harold Ford Sr. and Mayor W.W. Herenton strongly endorsed Michael Hooks for Shelby County Property Assessor in a disappointing “Dream Team” campaign. In 1994, Ford faced one of his greatest defeats after he endorsed Jack Sammons for Shelby County mayor. In addition, Senator John Ford lost a race for General Sessions Court Clerk in 1996 partly because of his domestic troubles and allegations of sexual harassment. Thus whereas E.H.Crump and other political bosses used the black vote to maintain their power bases by use of fraud, incentives and intimidation, Harold Ford relied mostly on his delivery of constituent services and his popularity with black voters. Another question considered in Chapter 1 was: What forms of protest do black communities conduct to rebel against machine rule and which primary mobilization tactics have they used? During the height of E.H.Crump’s power, he had few vocal critics. Citizens were aware of the harsh punishments they would face if they challenged the machine; yet, black citizens opened businesses on Beale Street as a way to gain economic independence, voted on election day in order to show the strength of their voting bloc, and organized new political groups. After the end of the Crump machine ended and the beginning of an era of independent politics, black political organizations mobilized the black vote in favor of both black and white candidates. As discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the black community’s primary electoral strategy during the late 1950s and early 1960s focused on drafting and supporting one consensus candidate to run for an office rather than forming coalitions with whites. In 1959, the strategy almost worked. In 1964, A.W.Willis Jr. was elected as the first state representative in Tennessee since Reconstruction. In 1975, 1979, and 1982, however, the strategy failed for black mayoral candidates. Finally, in 1991, the focus on a consensus candidate and black mobilization led to W.W.Herenton’s election as the first black mayor of Memphis. The November 1996 congressional election may provide evidence of a future trend with implications for black mobilization. In the August Democratic primary, Harold Ford Jr. defeated white state senator Steve Cohen and black state representative Rufus Jones, W.W.Herenton’s former brother-in-law. In November, Ford Jr. defeated Republican Rod DeBerry, a conservative black Republican. During the 1990s, the Republican party has attempted to attract black members in Memphis because black citizens

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will probably hold population majorities in both the city and county after the year 2000. In the future, black Democrats will continue to compete against other black Democrats and against black Republicans in citywide elections. When the major candidates are black, campaign and mobilization strategies differ remarkably from those used against white candidates. Chapter 1 also posed the following question: In cities with large and predominantly black populations, which elements prevent black candidates from winning mayoral races? As pointed out in Chapter 5, black mayoral contenders were defeated from 1975 to 1987 because of a lack white crossover votes, lower black turnout, majority vote requirement, and split black votes. The experience of black candidates in Memphis from 1975 to 1991 indicated that the black electorate had to use the same strategy as that in 1959–the selection of a consensus candidate—in order to win. During these years, the high levels of racial polarization among the local electorate prevented black candidates from winning when they used the mobilization tactics used by black contenders in other cities. The 1995 mayoral election disproved the belief that white voters would not support a black candidate in a local citywide race because W.W.Herenton received approximately 40 percent of the white vote. Yet, white voter turnout decreased from over 60 percent in 1991 to less than 30 percent in 1995. These figures indicate that whites have lost their interest in the local political scene. Based on the city’s history of racial polarization and white resistance to black mayoral candidates, the white turnout rate probably would have been higher and racially polarized voting more evident if a more credible white candidate would have run against W.W.Herenton in 1995. It has been questionable whether black citizens are better off after black majorities are elected. One debate in black politics concerns what else is left to be achieved after majority-black governing coalitions are elected. In other words, is it possible for blacks to achieve full incorporation—a dominant role in a governing coalition that is committed to minority interests—rather than mere political representation? It usually takes several years for predominantly black governing coalitions to address the needs of poor blacks. In addition, black political figures usually face economic constraints which inhibit their effectiveness. They must balance the interests of disproportionately poor, black residents of the city with those of the middle class. Thus, despite their campaign promises, black political figures must place more emphasis on efforts for economic development and tourism rather than the issues of crime, low income housing, neighborhood development, and police abuse.


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The current political scene in Memphis provides an example of the difficulties that black communities face when attempting to translate their proportional representation into full incorporation. Clarence N. Stone’s finding that “electoral control of city government…falls far short of full incorporation” applies to the Memphis case because blacks lack full incorporation despite their dominant role in city government.3 Mayor W.W.Herenton made efforts to achieve full incorporation during his first term by forming coalitions with the business community, county government, and white voters. Before the Herenton first term and reelection, most black candidates in mayoral and at-large City Council races found attempts to form coalitions a waste of time because of “racial reflexivity” or extreme racial polarization in Memphis. The Memphis case shows that biracial coalitions are not always necessary to win elections, but are necessary for effective governance. Despite his relatively successful first term, Mayor Herenton must modify his trickle-down economic development strategy. Blacks will only achieve full incorporation in Memphis if the Herenton administration bridges the disparities between the two Memphises. Before the era of racial politics, the two Memphises consisted of white haves and black have-nots. Since the 1970s, the two Memphises have consisted of black and white middleclass haves and black low-income have-nots. Few low-income whites lived in the poor, inner-city areas of Memphis. Most lived in the neighboring states of Arkansas and Mississippi, or in rural West Tennessee, but worked in Memphis. Although Mayor Herenton and the City Council have addressed issues that previous mayoral administrations had neglected, their primary focus has been on maintaining financial stability by attracting additional revenues into the city. During W.W.Herenton’s first term, the Council often split along racial lines; while black members supported the mayor’s proposals, whites rejected them. The same racial divisions surfaced during attempts to end the federal voting rights lawsuit.4 It remains to be seen whether W.W.Herenton will have more success in furthering his agenda with the predominantly black City Council elected in 1995 The mayor should not assume that a black majority will be more supportive than a white one. In their research, Whelan and Young discovered that the city of New Orleans’ first black mayor, Ernest “Dutch” Morial, often faced his strongest opposition from City Council president and later mayor Sidney Barthelemy.5 Oftentimes black City Council members challenge the initiatives and proposals of black mayors because they plan to run against them in future elections.

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Another compelling issue for both the city of Memphis and the nation is criminal disfranchisement. The state of Tennessee and others revoke the right of suffrage from those with criminal records. Less than half of black males in the city between the ages of eighteen and thirty have lost their right to vote due to prior criminal records.6 Analysts now seek to determine whether criminal disfranchisement results in “legal castration.”7 Many of these persons have lost their right to vote because of crimes that were committed during their teens and early twenties. After these persons have been classified as “ex-felons” or “exoffenders,” it is almost impossible for them to regain the right of suffrage. Even more troubling is the fact that they lose their desire to participate politically. Attorney A.C.Wharton stated, “They form the negative habit of not voting, become comfortable, apathetic and have an excuse to not vote. Once hope is killed, it’s difficult to rekindle it”.8 In Memphis, a movement is underway to restore voting rights for ex-offenders soon after they are released from prison.9 Although the black population will continue to rise in the Memphis-Shelby County metropolitan area and nationally, the criminal disfranchisement of a large number of black males may have a devastating impact on future black political development. In the past, black Memphians have overcome far greater obstacles which hampered their ability to elect representatives. It remains to be seen, however, whether blacks in Memphis and in other predominantly black cities will translate their representation into an enduring political and economic power base. NOTES 1 Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945. (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 47. 2 Hanes Walton, Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis (Philadelphia: J.B.Lippincott, 1972). 3 Clarence N.Stone, “Race and Regime in Atlanta,” in Racial Politics in American Cities. Second Edition, eds. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David Tabb (New York: Longman, 1997), 170. 4 During the 1996–98 term, members were to reconsider the redistricting plan. At present, they represent seven districts and two superdistricts. Voters select three Council members in each superdistrict. One has a black majority while the other has a white majority. The majority vote requirement for runoffs only applies in the seven district elections. They have been eliminated in the superdistricts. The current plan was a compromise after the previous Council split along racial


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lines. During the 1994–1996 term, the six black members favored replacing the old system of seven district and six at-large seats with an all-district plan. At-large or citywide seats would have been completely eliminated. Supporters of at-large seats believed that they would benefit black citizens in future elections as the black population increased. Critics pointed out, however, that black candidates faced more difficulty in winning citywide elections due to the additional campaign costs and racial polarization. Regardless of whether the predominantly black Council approves an all-district plan or their current one, the Memphis City Council will probably retain its black majority in future elections. 5 Robert K.Whelan and Alma H.Young, “New Orleans: The Ambivalent City,” in Big City Politics in Transition. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, eds. H.V. Savitch and John Clayton Thomas (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1991), 132–148. 6 Criminal disfranchisement is the most recent obstacle to both black suffrage and the election of black political figures. Since the early 1990s, the percentage of black inmates has outnumbered the percentage of white inmates. In 1994, black inmates made up 43.9 percent of the national prison population, ,while the number for whites was 39.1 percent. 7 Attorney A.C.Wharton, Voting Rights Symposium, National Civil Rights Museum, April 1, 1995. 8 Ibid. 9 Minerva Johnican, Voting Rights Symposium, National Civil Rights Museum, April 1, 1995.

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CASES Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340 (1915). Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966). Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944). Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

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INTERVIEWS Walter Bailey, June 2, 1994. Charles Carpenter, July 20, 1992 and September 3, 1992. Wyeth Chandler, May 26, 1994. Sara Roberta Church, May 24, 1994. Charles Crawford, March 29, 1995. Representative Lois DeBerry, August, 9, 1994. Gregory Duckett, November 14, 1995. Senator John Ford, September 2, 1992 and May 24, 1994. Reginald French, December 21, 1993. John Gnuschke, March 27, 1995. Dr. Kenneth Goings, March 29, 1995. W.Otis Higgs Jr., December 28, 1993. Dr. Benjamin L.Hooks, June 15, 1995. James B.Jalenak, August 6, 1996. Minerva Johnican, May 25, 1994. The Reverend Samuel B.Kyles, November 13, 1995. Sara Lewis, June 22, 1995 Thomas B.Long, December 30, 1994 The Reverend James L.Netters Jr., May 27, 1994. Bob Paterson, August 11, 1994. Benjamin Sissman, December 27, 1994. Russell B.Sugarmon Jr., September 1, 1992 and December 22, 1993. Randolph Meade Walker, March 30, 1995. Ronald A.Walter, July 30, 1996. The Reverend Kenneth Whalum Sr., December 28, 1994. Shep Wilbun Jr., March 28, 1995. Dr. Miriam DeCosta-Willis, June 20, 1995

DISSERTATIONS, THESES, AND UNPUBLISHED PAPERS Adkins, Walter P. 1935. Beale Street Goes to the Polls. M.A.thesis. Ohio State University. Brown-Melton, Gloria. 1982. A History of Blacks in Memphis, 1920–1955. Ph.D. dissertation. Washington State University. Findlay, Stephen M. 1975. The Role of Biracial Organizations in the Integration of Public Facilities in Memphis, Tennessee, 1954–1964. Unpublished document. December 3. Foster, Lorn. 1985. Prepared Statement in Voting Rights Act: Runoff Primaries and Registration Barriers. Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional

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Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary; U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Garcia, John A. 1993. Forming Coalitions Between the Latino and African American Communities: Delineating Common Strands. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1–4. Hopper, Ernest W. 1957. Memphis, Tennessee: Federal Occupation and Reconstruction, 1862–1870. Ph.D. dissertation. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Jalenak, James B. 1961. Beale Street Politics: A Study of Negro Political Activity in Memphis, Tennessee. Senior thesis. Yale University. Keiser, Richard A. 1997. Analyzing Urban Regime Change: White Backlash, Black Power and Shades of Gray. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 4–6. Kelly, Clarence L. 1954. Robert R.Church, A Negro Tennessean in Republican State and National Politics from 1912–1932. M.A. thesis. Tennessee State University. Kirby, Michael. 1996. The 1996 Memphis Poll. Unpublished document. Lewis, Virginia Emerson. 1955. Fifty Years of Politics in Memphis, 1900–1950. Ph.D. dissertation. New York University. Peck, Jim, ed. 1960. Sit-Ins: The Students Report. New York: Congress of Racial Equality. Tate, Katherine L. 1995. The Politics of Race in American Cities. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Tampa, Florida, November 1–4. Wright, Sharon D. 1993. Aftermath of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Racial Voting Patterns in Memphis Mayoral Elections, 1967–1991. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Tennessee at Knoxville.

SYMPOSIUMS Minerva Johnican, Voting Rights Symposium, National Civil Rights Museum, April 1, 1995. A.C.Wharton, Voting Rights Symposium, National Civil Rights Museum, April 1, 1995.

About the Author

Sharon D.Wright, a Memphis native, earned a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville in 1993. She currently is an assistant professor in the department of political science and the Black Studies program at the University of Missouri at Columbia.

197

Index

A.Philip Randolph Institute, 69 Adams, Gladys (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 120 Affirmative action, 151 Africa, 17 African-American People’s Convention, 131–132, 142, 157 Alabama, 12, 34 Alissandratos, A.D. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 117, 118 Alkalimat, Abdul, 154 American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 67, 70–71, 73, 104, 106, 137 Anderson, W.C. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices),46 Annexation, 80, 124, 140, 141 Arkansas, 12, 34, 48, 67, 177 Arrington, Richard (see also Black mayors, Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 59, 94, 125, 156, 167 Asia, 17 Association of Citizen’s Councils

(see also Whites: opposition to black civil rights, White Citizens Councils), 44 At-large elections (see also Memphis City Council: at-large elections for), 1, 4, 60, 85, 86–87, 113, 115–118, 123, 138–140, 177 Atkinson, Elmer, 33 Atlanta, Georgia, 3, 42, 49, 59, 60, 83, 94, 125, 126, 151, 153, 155, 164, 165, 167, 173 Auto Zone Inc., 157 Awsumb, Gwen, 116 Bahrmand-Vincent, Mahnaz (see also W.W.Herenton: relationship with Mahnaz Bahrmand-Vincent), 129, 145 Bailey, D’Army (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 107–108, 109, 111, 113, 114, 127 Bailey, Edgar, 74 Baker, John (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 120, 165–169 Baltimore, Maryland, 1, 3, 28, 29, 60, 199

200 94, 125, 140–141, 142, 148, 153, 165, 167 Banfield, Edward C., 28 Barnes, George (see also Riots, Memphis: race riots in), 74–75 Barnes, Richard, 82 Barnes, Thomas (see also Black mayors; Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 153 Barret, Walter, 74 Barrett,W.H., 16 Barry, Marion (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 93, 94, 125 Barthelemy, Sidney (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 126, 177 Bartlett, Tennessee, 167 Bates, Daisy, 48 Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 155 Beale Avenue Auditorium, 37 Beale Avenue Park, 37 Beale Street, 4, 33, 34–37, 50, 70, 128, 175 Bell, A.D., 31, 32 Bentley,W.H., 36 Binghampton Civic League (see also Political organizations), 45 Birmingham, Alabama, 55, 59, 60, 87, 125, 126, 153, 156, 165, 167 Black Leadership Summit (see also Ford, Harold E., Sr.: role in 1991 Memphis mayoral election), 131–132, 142 Black mayors (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices): efforts to elect, 4–5, 60–65, 81, 85–87, 93–119, 123–143 the governance of, 5, 124, 126, 149–158, 176–178 Black Monday protests (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in), 4, 17, 56, 65, 66, 71–74, 81, 84

Index Black political radicalization (see also Blacks: political mobilization efforts of; Jennings, James B.), 161 Blackburn, Charles, 67 Blacks: and labor unions, 38, 66–70, 106 and the yellow fever epidemics, 19 as candidates for elective offices, 1, 4, 5, 9–11, 13–14, 15, 39–42, 45–50, 62–65, 164, 173–178 civil rights efforts of, 4, 42, 45, 55–81 clergy, 31–32, 43, 57–58, 62, 69, 91, 95, 102, 115, 137 disfranchisement of, 1, 7, 173 economic development of, 3, 16, 34–35, 50 internal divisions among, 5, 103–104, 106–114, 118–119, 126, 140–141, 151, 158–163 intimidation of, 1, 9, 14–17, 33, 48–49, 57 (see also Racism, Voting: suffrage discrimination, Whites: opposition to black civil rights) membership in coalitions, 3, 43 political mobilization efforts of, 3–5, 27–28, 38–42, 45–50, 60–65, 85, 86, 93–95, 104, 123–143, 149, 165, 173–178 (see also political organizations) political women, 39, 85, 86, 112–113, 116 relationship with local politicians, 30–33, 34–42, 45, 48, 52 63, 71, 103, 135–138, 164, 173 (see also Crump, Edward Hull: relationship with blacks; Loeb, Henry Jr.: relationship with blacks) relationship with whites, 21, 56

Index (see also Racial polarization: in social relations among blacks and whites) socioeconomic status of, 56 (see also Memphis: poverty in) voting behavior of, 1, 4, 9–11, 63–64, 96–98, 101, 104, 109, 111, 115, 168 (see also Racial polarization: effect on voting in Memphis) voter turnout of, 2, 40, 62–63, 95, 102, 103–104, 109, 113, 114–115, 118–119, 124, 131, 134–136, 138, 140, 142, 164–168, 176 Blackwood, Ronald, 154 Blakney, Rosie Merrian (see also Memphis State College; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 53 Blanchard, Jerred (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 77, 83, 117 Bloc voting (see also Blacks: voting behavior of; Whites: voting behavior of), 4, 60, 62, 94, 97–98, 101–102, 103, 104, 107, 111, 118, 123, 126, 142, 155, 165, 175 Bluff City Council of Civic Clubs (see also Black Monday protests), 73 Bogard, Elmer, 17 Bogard, Jesse (see also Memphis: police brutality in), 160 Bolton, Julian, 93 Bonham, E.B., 75 Bonner, Mark William, 35, 67 Bosley, Freeman Jr. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices, Black mayors), 126, 141 Bousson, Joyce (see also Whites: as

201 candidates for elective offices), 120 Bowers, Kathryn (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), I. 92 Box, Charles (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 153 Boyd, William, 135 Boyle, Joe, 33 Bradley, Thomas (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 89, 93, 94, 124–125, 153 Brooks, Henri (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 136 Brooks Memorial Art Gallery, 56, 57 Brown, David (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: election of black politicians during), 10 Brown, Randall (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: election of black politicians during), 10 Brown v. Board of Education, 56 Brown, Willie (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 93 Browning, David W. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: election of black politicians during), 58 Browning, Gordon (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 37, 38 Browning, Rufus, 149 Brownlow, William G. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 9, 10 Bruce, Bill, 117

202 Bunton, Henry Clay (see also Volunteer Ticket of 1959; Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 45 Burgess, Melvin Jr., 160 Burnett, Joe M. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 95, 96 Burnett, Sammie (see also Memphis State College; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 53 Burns, Clarence “Du” (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 29, 148 Byrd, Robert, 89 Cambridge, Massachusetts, 153 Camden, New Jersey, 154 Campaign strategies, 2–3, 45–50, 60–65, 93–114, 118–119, 123–127, 128, 130–138, 143 Campbell, A.E. (see also Blacks: clergy), 31 Campbell, Bill (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 167 Campbell, J.L. (see also Blacks: clergy), 31 Canale, John Ford (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 46, 49 Canale, Phil, 76 Capleville, 75, 76 Causey, James D., 134 Central High School, 48 Central Station, 157 Chambers, Sam (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 46 Chandler, Arizona, 153, 164 Chandler, Walter (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 31, 43, 98

Index Chandler, Wyeth (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 91, 94, 127, 129 Charlotte, North Carolina, 94, 95, 103, 165 Chattanooga, Tennessee, 10, 13 Chicago, Illinois, 1, 2, 28, 29, 39, 66, 87, 94, 105, 108, 125, 127, 155, 161 Chickasaw Bluffs, 18 Church of God in Christ (see also Blacks: clergy), 57, 105 Church Park, 35 Church, Robert R. Sr., 20–21 Church, Robert R. Jr.: death of, 39 as entrepreneur, 35 federal appointments of, 35 harassment of, 37 role in local politics, 35, 86 role in the NAACP, 36 role in the Republican party, 35 Church, Roberta (see also Blacks: political women), 37, 39 Ciampa, P.J. (see also Memphis Sanitation Strike of 1968), 67 Citizens Cooperative Stores, 35 Citizens for Progress (see also Whites: opposition to black civil rights), 44 Cincinnati, Ohio, 28, 29, 153 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 16 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4, 55, 61, 78 Civil Rights Commission, 101 Civil War, 10 Clark, Sam (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 46 Clay, William (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 93 Clayborn Temple, 69, 73

Index Cleaver, Emmanuel (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices;Black mayors), 153 Clement, Frank, 38 Cleveland, Ohio, 62, 68, 94, 105, 126, 151, 153, 155, 164 Clouston, Joseph (see also Blacks as candidates for elective offices; Memphis City Council: Blacks elected to; Reconstruction: election of black politicians during), 10 Clowens, H.C. (see also Blacks as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: election of black politicians during), 10 Coalitions (see also Campaign strategies; Memphis: civil rights movement in), 3, 5, 42–44, 57–58, 59–63, 73–74, 78–79, 103, 125, 142, 150, 151, 152, 157, 162–163, 167, 168, 175, 176 Cody, Mike (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 103, 104, 105, 127 Coe, Frances (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 41 Cohen, Steve (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 134, 175 Cole, Echol (see also Memphis Sanitation Strike of 1968), 67 Colored Citizens Association (see also Political organizations), 91 Columbia University, 129 Committee on the Move for Equality (see also Black Monday protests), 73 Communism, 10, 38, 43 Compton, California, 153 Concerned Teachers (see also Black Monday protests, 73

203 Contract With America, 167 Contract With Memphis, 166–167 Cook Convention Center, 99 Connor, Theophilus “Bull,” 59 Consensus candidate (see also Blacks; political mobilization efforts of), 107–108,114,123,124, 127, 131–134, 143, 175, 176 Consolidation of city and county governments, 150, 159–160, 162 Coolidge, Calvin, 35 Cooper, Cardell (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 153 Cooper, Jay, 89 Cotton industry, 8, 17, 27 Coupe, Elaine (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 134 Criminal disfranchisement (see also Memphis: crime in), 5, 178, 179 Crossover voting (see also Blacks: voting behavior of; Whites: voting behavior of), 95, 97, 102, 109, 113, 123, 124, 131, 136–138, 164, 176 Crothers, John, 74 Crump, Edward Hull (see also Memphis: machine politics in; Political machines; Whites: as candidates for elective offices): as congressman, 31 as county trustee, 30 as mayor, 4, 30 as machine boss, 27–28, 30–33, 35, 37, 60, 175 death of, 39, 42, 49, 59 ouster of, 80 political career of, 30–34 relationship with blacks, 3, 30–33, 34–42, 164, 173 Cunningham, Jesse, 44

204 Daley, Richard J. (see also Political machines), 28 Dallas, Texas, 83 Daniels, Ron (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 153 Davis, Clifford, 33, 36 Davis, Fred L. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Memphis City Council: blacks elected to) 115, 116 Davis, William, 25 Dawson, William (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Political machines), 2, 29 Dayton, Ohio, 153 DeBerry, Rod (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Republican party: relationship with black voters), 176 Defense Department’s U.S. Large Cavitation Channel Project, 110 Democratic Party: relationship with black voters, 11, 13, 37, 114–115, 161, 173, 176 Denver, Colorado, 151, 153, 164 Denver Nuggets, 128 Deracialization (see also Blacks: political mobilization efforts of; Campaign strategies), 97–98, 102, 104–106, 123, 124–125 Detroit, Michigan, 3, 66, 68, 94, 126, 153, 155, 161, 164 Dice, John, 117 Dillard, Stanley, 41, 44 Dinkins, David (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 125, 153 District of Columbia, 94 District elections, 35, 60, 64, 80, 86, 116, 118, 169 Dixon, Richard C., 153 Dixon, Roscoe (see also Blacks: as

Index candidates for elective offices; Tennessee General Assembly: blacks in), 116, 117 Dortch, Joseph H., 13 Douglass Park, 33 Downtown Leadership Council, 156 Dream team campaign (see also Coalitions; Ford, Harold E., Sr.: endorsements of) 175 DuBose, Julius J., 17 Durham, North Carolina, 44, 126 Dyer, J.B., 75 East Orange, New Jersey, 154 Economic development: in Memphis, 5, 151–152, 156–158, 167, 169 of blacks, 130, 150–151, 154–155, 177 Edmonds, Oscar (see also Memphis City Council: racial divisions among members; Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 117, 118 E.H.Crump Buggy Company, 30 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 39 Eisinger, Peter K. (see also Ethnoracial transition), 150 Ellington, Buford (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 48, 70 Ellis Auditorium, 44, 57, 69 El Paso, Texas, 155 Epton, Bernard (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 105, 125 Estes, J.F. (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in; NAACP; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 57 Ethnoracial transition (see also Eisinger, Peter K.), 150 Evans, Green E. (see also Blacks: as

Index candidates for elective offices; Memphis City Council: blacks elected to; Reconstruction: election of black politicians during; Tennessee General Assembly: blacks in), 10, 11, 46 Evanston Township, Illinois, 154 Evers, O.Z. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 45–46 Fancher, Henry W., Sr. (see also Pro-Southerners; Whites: opposition to black civil rights), 43 Farris, William (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 46, 49, 89 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 33, 112 Fields, Louis H. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: election of black politicians during; Tennessee General Assembly: blacks in), 11 Fields, W.A. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: election of black politicians during; Tennessee General Assembly: blacks in), 11 Fifteenth Amendment, 1, 13 First Baptist Church of Beale Street (see also Blacks: clergy), 35 Fitzhugh, Lewis T., 36 Flaherty, Bobby, 167 Flint, Michigan, 153 Florida, 12, 13 Foote,Will, 33 Ford, Emmitt (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Ford political organization; Tennessee General Assembly: blacks elected to), 87, 88, 89, 174

205 Ford, Harold E., Jr. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Ford political organization), 5, 87, 88, 90, 151, 174, 175–176 Ford, Harold E., Sr. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Ford political organization; Tennessee General Assembly: blacks in): alleged machine politics of, 91–93, 104, 174–175 as Congressman, 29, 85, 86, 87–93, 110, 164–165 endorsements of, 87, 91–93, 103, 106, 107, 108, 113, 120, 162–163, 174–175 federal trials of, 86, 114, 151, 157, 161–162 political influence of, 5 relationship with W.W.Herenton, 150, 151, 162 retirement of, 5, 174 role in 1991 mayoral campaign, 131–132, 135 Ford, James (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Ford political organization; Memphis City Council: blacks elected to), 87, 88, 91–92, 108, 110, 117, 118, 174 Ford, Joe (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Ford political organization; Memphis City Council: blacks elected to), 87, 88, 174 Ford, John (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Ford political organization; Tennessee General Assembly: blacks in), 87, 88, 90, 92, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 116, 131, 163, 174, 175

206 Ford, L.H. (see also Blacks: clergy), 137 Fort Pickering, 15 Fourteenth Amendment, 8 Fowler, Will (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 46, 49 Franklin, Walter (see also Blacks: ascandidates for elective offices), 109 Fraternal Savings Bank and Trust, 35 Friesema, H.Paul (see also Hollow prize thesis), 151 Fuller, T.O. (see also Blacks: clergy), 33 Gaia, Pam (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 117 Gandy, Eleanor (see also Memphis State College; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 53 Gary, Indiana, 3, 62, 94, 153, 164 Gaston, John, 75 Georgia, 12, 107 Gerrymanders (see also Voting: suffrage discrimination), 2 Gianotti, Frank, 48 Gibbons, Bill (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 110–111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117 Gibson, Kenneth (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 94 Giddings, Paula, 25 Gills, Doug, 154 Goode, W.Wilson (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 125 Gore, Albert Sr. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 45 Gosnell, Harold, 29

Index Grammy Hall of Fame, 157 Grandfather clauses (see also Blacks: disfranchisement of; Voting: suffrage discrimination), 7 Grant, Ulysses S., 15 Great Western Financial, 110 Greater Memphis Race Relations Committee (see also Coalitions), 43 Greensboro, North Carolina, 57 Grider, George (see also Coalitions), 43 Grimshaw, William J., 28 Guinn v. United States (see also Grandfather clauses; Voting: suffrage discrimination), 12 Hacker, Andrew, 66 Hackett, Richard C. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices): as mayor, 127–129, 136, 142 mayoral campaigns of, 94–95, 103–114, 118–119, 127–129, 132, 135, 136, 137–138, 140, 143, 165 Halloran, Pat (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 98, 100 Hamilton, Charles V., 124 Hamilton High School, 83 Handy, W.C., 30 Happy Hollow, 18 Hard Rock Cafe, 128 Harlem, New York, 68 Harmon, Clarence (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices;Black mayors), 126 Harold Ford ballot, 90 Harold Ford, Jr., ballot, 90 Harris, Elihu (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 153

Index Harris, Isham, 11 Hartford, Connecticut, 153 Hartsfield, William B. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 59 Hatcher, Richard (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 94 Hayes, Elton (see also Memphis: race riots in; Riots), 4, 17, 56, 65, 74–81, 95–96, 97 Hayti Heights, Missouri, 89 Herenton, W.W. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors): as may or, 4, 130, 131 as school superintendent, 114, 133 mayoral campaigns of, 4, 123–124, 127, 131–138, 142–143, 145, 175 relationship with Memphis City Council, 149–150, 158–161, 177–178 relationship with Mahnaz Bahrmand-Vincent, 129 relationship with white voters, 131, 149, 152, 156, 165–168, 176– 177 Higgs, W.Otis Jr. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 65, 79, 94, 95–102, 108, 109, 111, 114, 117, 118, 123, 127, 131, 132, 135, 142 Hill, David (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 113, 116, 117 Hill, Richard C, 150 Hodge, W.C. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: blacks elected during), 10 Hodges, Robert “Prince Mongo” (see

207 also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 98, 100, 109, 127, 129–130, 132, 135, 136, 138, 139, 143, 167–168 Hoffman, Robert A., 45 Holland, Wallace (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 154 Holloway, Harry, 13, 40, 41 Hollow prize thesis (see also Friesema, H.Paul), 151 Hooker, John Jay (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 89 Hooks, Benjamin (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Memphis: civil rights movementin; Volunteer Ticket of 1959), 40–41, 45, 49, 57, 131 Hooks, Janet (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Blacks: political women; Memphis City Council: blacks elected to), 118 Hooks, Michael (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 117, 131, 175 Hoover, Herbert, 35 Hoover, J.Edgar (see also Federal Bureau of Investigation), 33 Horton, Odell, 74 Houston, Texas, 42, 49, 165 Howard, Leonard (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: blacks elected during; Tennessee General Assembly: blacks in), 11 Hume, David, 89 Hunt, Blair T. (see also Blacks: clergy), 32 Hunt, Earnestine (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Blacks: political women), 16

208 Imbroscio, David, 154 Immigration, 15, 28–29 Independent Political Action Council (see also Blacks: clergy; crossover voting), 137 Indianola, Mississippi, 35 Inglewood, California, 153 Ingram, William B. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 60, 62, 63, 79 Insurgency (see also Blacks: political mobilization efforts of; Campaign strategies), 124, 125, 135, 142 Interdenominational Ministers Alliance (see also Coalitions), 43 Interest groups, 149 International Paper, 110 Invaders (see also Memphis Sanitation Strike of 1968), 69–70, 83 Irvington, New Jersey, 154 Jackson, Jesse, 134–135 Jackson, Mahalia, 47 Jackson, Maynard (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices;Black mayors), 59, 93, 94, 125, 153 Jackson, Mississippi, 83 Jacox, Willie C. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 75 James, Sharpe (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 153 Jefferson, William (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 126 Jennings, Bryant, 160 Jennings, James (see also Black political radicalization), 151, 160 Jersey City, New Jersey, 68 Jewish Americans, 125

Index Jim Crow (see also Segregation: legalized), 3 John Ford ballot, 90 Johnican, Minerva (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices;Blacks: political women; Memphis City Council: blacks elected to), 83, 85, 86, 109, 110, 111, 112–113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 131, 132, 135 Johnson, Lyndon B., 94 Jones, B.F. (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in;Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 57 Jones, George, 136 Jones, Rufus (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Tennessee General Assembly: blacks in), 175 Jones, Thomas Oliver (see also Blacks: and labor unions; Memphis Sanitation Strike of 1968), 67, 71 Judd, Dennis, 28 Kansas, 25 Kansas City, Missouri, 28, 29, 153 Keeble, Sampson W. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: blacks elected during), 10 Kefauver, Estes (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 37, 38 Kennedy, W.B. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: blacks elected during), 10 Kenney, Walter (see also Black mayors), 153 King, Alvin, 132, 135, 136 King, Coretta Scott, 70

Index King, Martin Luther Jr. (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in): assassination of, 56, 66, 95, 134–135 civil rights efforts of, 47, 96 role in 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike, 69–70, 83 King, Martin Luther III, 134 Kneeland, Laverne (see also Memphis State College; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 53 Knoxville, Tennessee, 10, 13 Koch, Bertrand, 33 Koch, Ed (see also whites: as candidates for elective offices), 33 Kohfeld, Carol W., 141 Kotter, John P., 156 Ku Klux Klan (see also Blacks: disfranchisement of; Blacks: intimidation of; Whites: opposition to black civil rights), 9, 16, 33, 36 Kuykendall, Dan (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 87, 88, 89–90 Lane, Hunter Jr. (see also Whites: as candidates f or elective offices), 61 Langdon, Philip, 167 Latinos, 125 Lawrence, Paul R., 156 Lawson, Jim (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in), 49 Lea, Benjamin J., 13 LeBlanc, Sam, (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 125 Lee, George W. (see also Blacks: political mobilization efforts of;

209 Republican party: relationship with black voters), 34, 39, 44, 47, 86 Lee, Tom, 33 Lee,W.R., 76 Leonard, James H. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 134 Levine, Myron A., 28 Liberty Bowl stadium, 128 Lincoln, Abraham, 9, 10, 36 Lincoln League (see also Blacks: political mobilization efforts of; Political organizations), 35–36, 50, 91 Little Rock, Arkansas, 9, 48, 60, 83 Litton Microwave, 110 Livingston, George, 154 Lockard, H.T. (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in), 44 Loeb, Henry, Jr. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices; Memphis Sanitation Strike of 1968): as mayor, 46, 57–58, 78, 80–81, 97 relationship with blacks, 41, 45, 48, 63, 71, 103 relationship with whites, 65, 96 role in Black Monday protests, 73–74 role in Memphis Sanitation Strike of 1968, 68–70, 72 Looby, Alexander (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in), 42 Los Angeles, California, 89, 94, 124, 125, 153, 164 Louisiana, 12 Love, Roy (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Blacks: clergy; Volunteer Ticket Campaign of 1959), 41, 44 Lowery, Myron (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices;

210 Memphis City Council: blacks melected to), 116, 117, 118, 161 Lunati, Ernie (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 167, 168 Lux, Henry, 76, 78 Lynchings (see also Blacks: intimidation of), 16–17, 36, 37 Majority vote requirement (see also Runoff elections; Voting: suffrage discrimination), 2, 80, 138–140, 141, 176 Marks, Albert S., 20 Marsh, Robert (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: blacks elected during), 10 Marshall, Dale Rogers, 149 Marshall, Tom, 117, 118 Martin, J.B., 33 Mason, C.H., (see also Blacks: clergy; Blacks: intimidation of; Church of God in Christ; Racial polarization: in housing patterns), 57 Mason Temple, 47 Massell, Sam (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices) Matthews, Timothy “El Espada” (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 122 Mayor-commission government, 60, 80 Mayor-council government, 60, 80, 81, 115 Mayor’s Action Center, 128 McClellan, Luther (see also Memphis State College; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 53 McCoy, Leroy, 35 McDonald’s, 136 McDowell, Calvin (see also Blacks:

Index intimidation of; Lynchings), 16–17, 24 McKissack, Calvin (see also Memphis: race riots in;Riots), 74–75 McLean, Bessie Byrd, 30 McRae, Robert M. Jr., 73 Medlow, D. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: blacks elected during), 10 Meharry Medical College, 53 Memphis: civil rights movement in, 4, 17, 55–81 (see also Blacks: civil rights efforts of) crime in, 5, 19, 27, 112, 137, 169, 178 economic development in, 20–21, 26, 137 incorporation of, 8 machine politics in, 27–50, 141 (see also Crump, Edward Hull; Ford, Harold E. Sr.; Political machines) police brutality in, 15–17, 33, 62, 56, 62, 74–78, 79, 112, 132, 150, 157, 159, 160–161, 177 politic in, 1, 13 poverty in, 5, 17, 20, 169 public school system of, 5, 112, 130, 137 Shannon Street incident, 132, 166, 173 slavery in, 4, 8–9, 16 unemployment in, 16, 27, 62, 132 Memphis Board of Education, 38, 71, 73, 84 Memphis City Beautiful Commission, 31 Memphis City Commission, 30, 41, 43, 44, 48, 57, 58, 59, 81 Memphis City Council:

Index at-large elections for, 4, 80, 81, 85, 86–87, 113, 115–118, 177 blacks elected to, 10, 46, 60, 63–65, 79, 80, 93, 115–118, 123, 138–140, 141, 168–169, 174 and the Memphis Sanitation Strike, 67–70 and the Elton Hayes riots, 76–77 racial divisions among members, 4, 80–81, 83, 150, 158–161, 168–169, 177–178, 179 relationship with W.W.Herenton, 149–150, 158–161 (see also W.W.Herenton: relationship with Memphis City Council) Memphis City Court, 140 Memphis City Hall, 68, 73, 74, 77, 98, 102 Memphis Commercial Appeal, 69, 117, 132, 133, 135 Memphis Committee on Community Relations, 57–58, 60–62 Memphis County Court, 73 Memphis Mobilizers (see also Black Monday protests), 73 Memphis Park Commission, 43, 59 Memphis Press Scimitar, 69 Memphis Public Library and Information Center, 44, 56, 57, 58 Memphis race riots of 1866 (see also Memphis: race riots in; Riots), 7, 14–17 Memphis Sanitation Strike of 1968 (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in), 4, 17, 56, 65–71, 73, 81, 82–82, 95 Memphis State College (see also The University of Memphis), 42, 53 Memphis Transit Company, 58 Memphis Zoo, 112 Meranto, Philip J., 95, 105 Mid-America Mall, 99

211 Mid-South Coliseum, 128, 132 Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 155, 161 Ministers and Citizens Leagues (see also Coalitions), 44 Mintz, Donald (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 127 Mississippi, 12, 17, 34, 67, 83 Mississippi Life Insurance Company, 35, 53 Mississippi River, 33 Mitchell, John (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 38 Mondale, Walter (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 125 Mooney, Charles Patrick Joseph, 51 Morgan, Allen, 74 Morial, Ernest “Dutch” (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 94, 125, 126, 156, 178 Morial, Marc (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 127 Morris, Herman Jr. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 117, 118 Morris, William (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 162 Morton, Ferdinand Q., 29 Moss, Thomas (see also Blacks: intimidation of; Lynchings), 16–17, 24–25 Mt. Morial Baptist Church (see also Blacks: clergy), 32 Mt. Olive C.M.E. Church (see also Blacks: clergy), 57 Mt. Pisgah C.M.E. Church (see also Blacks: clergy), 58 Mt. Vernon, New York, 154

212

Index

Mud Island, 99, 128 Muhammad, Talib-Karim (see also Annexation; At-large elections; Majority vote requirement; Runoff elections), 131, 139–140, 169 Mullins, E.L., 75 Murphy, I.H. (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in; NAACP, Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 57 Myers, John C. (see also Tennessee General Assembly), 13

New York, New York, 28, 29, 94, 125, 126, 153, 164 Nickelberry, Henry (see also Black mayors), 154 Norris, Isaac F. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 11 North Carolina, 12 Norton, C.D. (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in; N.A.A.C.P.; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 57

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in), 4, 38, 42–45, 50, 56–57, 59, 62, 69, 71–74, 76, 121 National Civil Rights Museum, 128 Napier, James C. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: blacks elected during), 10 Nashville, Tennessee, 10, 13, 39, 53, 57 National Football League, 128, 151, 161 Negro Tri-State Fair (see also Segregation: legalized), 56 Nelson, William E. Jr., 95, 105, 152, 160 Netters, James L. (see also Blacks: clergy;Memphis City Council: blacks elected to), 115 New Haven, Connecticut, 94, 126, 153 Newark, New Jersey, 3, 66, 68, 94, 126, 153, 164 New Orleans, Louisiana, 3, 17, 24, 83, 87, 94, 125, 126, 153, 155, 156, 164, 165, 178

Oakland, California, 94, 125, 153, 164 Oklahoma, 12, 25 Operation Big Vote (see also Blacks: political mobilization efforts of), 104 Orange Mound, 76 Orgill, Edmund (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 41, 45 Orr, Marion, 141, 154 Osborne, Lorene (see also Black Monday protests), 74 Overton, Watkins (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 30, 37 Paine, Rowlett (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 36, 37 Palmer, Douglas (see also Black mayors), 154 Patterson, J.O. Jr. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Blacks: clergy), 63, 88, 94, 103–107, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 123, 127, 142 Patterson, J.O. Sr. (see also Blacks: clergy; Church of God in Christ), 105

Index Payne, Benjamin (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: blacks elected during;Tennessee General Assembly: blacks in), 11 Payne, Betty (see also Black mayors; Blacks: political women), 154 Payne, Coy (see also Black mayors), 153 Payne, Larry, 70 Peabody Place, 157 Peete, Rickey (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 117 Perry, Huey L., 55, 156 Persons, Ell (see also Lynchings), 36 Persons, Georgia, 94, 124, 135 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 28, 29, 94, 125, 138, 164 Pink Palace Museum, 57, 59 Pleasant, O.C. Jr., 135 Political incorporation, 1, 3, 5, 86, 149–150, 152, 169, 173–178 Political machines (see also Crump, Edward Hull; Memphis: machine politics in), 1–2, 4–5, 27–29, 125, 141, 173–175 Political organizations, 9, 35–36, 37, 42, 44–50, 87, 91, 114, 115, 141, 160, 164, 175 Poll taxes (see also Blacks: disfranchisement of; Voting: suffrage discrimination), 13, 23, 31, 38, 174 Pontiac, Michigan, 154 Poor People’s March, 69, 70 Porter, Louis L. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 87 Prater, Ralph (see also Memphis State College; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 53

213 Pratt-Kelly, Sharon (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 153 Prince Mongo’s Planet, 129 Pritchard, Alabama, 89 Pro-Southerners (see also Whites: opposition to black civil rights), 43–44 Proportional representation, 5 Pulaski, Tennessee, 9 Pyle, Harry William (see also Pro-Southerners; Whites: opposition to black civil rights), 44 Pyramid Arena, 128, 129, 157 Quotas, 3 Race: and machine politics in Memphis, 3–4 (see also Crump, Edward Hull: relationship with blacks; Political machines) as a factor in Southern politics, 11, 173 as an issue in local political campaigns, 96, 99, 100–102, 104–106, 108, 112–113, 116, 125–127, 132 Racial appeals (see also Campaign strategies; Race: as a factor in Southern politics), 2–3, 56–57, 66, 79 Racial polarization: effect on voting in Memphis, 2, 48, 56, 63, 85–119, 123, 135, 163, 167–168, 176, 177 (see also Blacks: voting behavior of; Voting: racially polarized; Voting: suffrage discrimination; Whites: voting behavior of) in housing patterns, 56–57, 66, 79 in social relations among blacks

214 and whites, 4, 7, 17, 21, 56–60, 66, 80, 149–152, 161 Rachels Industries, 112 Racism (see also Segregation: legalized; Whites: opposition to black civil rights), 4, 5, 56, 112, 113, 124, 125, 129, 130, 132–133, 138, 149, 166 Raleigh, North Carolina, 165 Ramesses the Great Exhibit, 112 Reconstruction, 3, 4, 7 black political efforts during, 7, 13–14, 140 disfranchisement of blacks during, 12–14 election of black politicians during, 8–11 emancipation of slaves during, 8–9 (see also Memphis: slavery in) riots during, 7, 14–17 (see also Memphis: race riots of 1866) Redistricting, 88, 89, 179 Reed, Adolph Jr., 150–151 Reed, Robert Jr., 76 Reeves, Kenneth (see also Black mayors), 153 Republican party: and black voters, 9, 10, 35, 39, 176 and the “lily-white” movement, 12 radical Republicans in, 9 Reynolds, James, 70 Ribbins, J.W., 36 Rice, Norman (see also Black mayors), 153 Rich, Wilbur C., 150 Richmond, California, 153 Richmond, Isaac, 99, 100 Richmond, Virginia, 154 Riots (see also Elton Hayes, Memphis: race riots in; Memphis Sanitation Strike of 1968; Reconstruction: riots during), 4,

Index 7, 14–17, 27, 68, 74–78 Rizzo, Frank, 3, 138 Roanoke, Virginia, 153 Robert R.Church Auditorium, 35 Roberts, J.L., 75 Robinson, Joseph, 112 Robinson, Peggy, 122 Rockford, Illinois, 153, 164 Roddy, Bert N., 35, 36 Rogers, Bertha Mae (see also Memphis State College; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 53 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 37 Ross, Bernard H., 28 Rotary Club, 138 Rout, Jim, 162, 163, 167 Rubin, Jerome (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Memphis City Council: blacks elected to), 118 Runoff elections (see also Majority vote requirement; Voting: suffrage discrimination), 47, 48, 60, 80, 94, 97–98, 100–103, 104–107, 108, 109, 115–118, 120, 124, 138–140, 143 Rustin, Bayard, 69 Saginaw, Michigan, 154 St. Joseph’s Hospital, 71, 73 St. Louis, Missouri, 17, 24, 83, 140–141, 142, 148, 155 St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, 112 Salem Baptist Church (see also Blacks: clergy), 33 San Antonio, Texas, 155 Sammons, Jack (see also Coalitions; Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 90, 162, 163, 175 Saxon-Perry, Carrie (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 153

Index Schaefer, William Donald (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 141, 148 Schmoke, Kurt (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 125, 141, 142, 148, 153, 167 Scott, J.Jay (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 35 Seattle, Washington, 94, 126, 153, 164 Segregation: end of, 3, 4, 53, 78–79 efforts to dismantle, 55–60 legalized, 3, 56–57, 81–82 (see also Racism) supporters of, 43–44 (see also Whites: opposition to black civil rights) Seibels, George, 55 Selma, Alabama, 55 Settle, Josiah T. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 35 Sewall, George (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Reconstruction: blacks elected during), 10 Shaw, Edward (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 10–11 Shelby County Commission, 10, 113, 173, 174 Shelby County Democratic Club (see also Black Monday protests; Democratic party;Political organizations), 60, 73, 91 Shelby County Election Commission, 89, 91, 98, 101, 104, 109, 111, 115, 117, 135 Shelby County Republican Organization (see also

215 Republican party; Political organizations), 36, 45, 51 Shlenker, Sidney, 128 Sills, James Jr. (see also Black mayors), 154 Simpson, John (see also Memphis State College; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 53 Sit-in movement (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 4, 49, 57–59, 68 Single-shot voting (see also Campaign strategies; Volunteer Ticket of 1959), 48 Smith, James E., 104, 137 Smith, Maxine 74 Smith, W.A. “Bill” (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 120 Solvent Savings Bank and Trust Company, 35 Sonnenburg, Barbara (see also Whites: as candidate for elective offices), 106 South America, 17 South Carolina, 12 Speed, James, 15 Spencer, T.L. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 40–41 Split black vote (see also Blacks: internal divisions among, Blacks: voting behavior of), 62, 63, 79, 94, 109, 111, 113, 114, 118–119, 131, 141, 163, 176 Stanback, Elihue (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 45–46 Stedman, Murray S., 28 Steele, Michael (see also Black mayors), 154 Stein, Lana, 141

216 Stevenson, Adlai (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 39 Stewart, Henry (see also Blacks: intimidation of; Lynchings), 16–17 Stewart, Thomas (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 38 Stimbert, E.C. (see also Black Monday protests), 74 Stokes, Carl (see also Black mayors), 94, 105 Stone, Clarence, 59, 151, 154, 177 Strauss, Robert, 89 Stringer, Richard (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 120 Strother, Don, 84 Sugarmon, Russell Jr. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Memphis: civil rights movement in; Segregation: efforts to dismantle; Volunteer Ticket of 1959), 45–49, 57, 64 Sundquist, Donald (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 167 Swanstrom, Todd, 28 Tabb, David, 149 Talbert, Walter W. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 30 Tate, KatherineL., 2 Taylor, Noel (see also Black mayors), 153 Taylor, Robert L. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 11 Tennessee, 12, 13, 34, 67, 166, 175, 177, 178 Tennessee Federation for Constitutional Government (see also Whites: opposition to black civil rights), 44 Tennessee General Assembly, 8, 47, 48 blacks in, 11, 13, 64–65, 174

Index Tennessee Rifles Company, 17 Tennessee Valley Authority, 38 Third Regiment of the U.C. Colored Artillery, 15 The Pinch, 18 Thompson, Aaron (see also Black mayors), 154 Thompson, J.A. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 10 Thompson, William Bryan (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 95, 96 Thornburg v. Gingles, 2 Thornton, Matthew, 39 Thurmond, Strom (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 38 Tillery, Dwight (see also Black mayors), 153 Tillman, Mississippi, 53 Tom Lee Park, 157 Trenton, New Jersey, 154 Tri-State Bank, 53 Tri-State Defender, 132 Truman, Harry S., 38 Turner, Jerome, 140 Turner, Jesse H. (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in; NAACP; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 44, 45 Turner, Kenneth (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 95–97 Twenty-sixth Ward Civic Club (see also Political organizations), 44 Union League (see also Political organizations), 9 United Black Coalition (see also Black Monday protests), 74 U.S. Justice Department, 140 U.S. Supreme Court, 42, 43, 59 Universal Life Insurance Company, 35, 53 University of Memphis (see also

Index Memphis State College), 42 Vander Schaaf, Pat (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 103, 116, 117 Vann, David (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 59 Vietnam War, 55 Vincent, Edward (see also Black mayors), 153 Virginia, 12, 126 Virginia Beach, Virginia, 130 Volunteer Park, 99 Volunteer Ticket of 1959 (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 28, 45–50 Voting (see also Blacks: voting behavior of; Whites: voting behavior of): suffrage discrimination, 1–3, 7, 12, 28–29, 138–140, 174–175 (see also Blacks: disfranchisement of) Voting Rights Act of 1965 (see also At-large elections; Grandfather clauses; Literacy tests; Majority vote requirement; Poll taxes;Voting), 2, 4, 12, 23, 55 79, 138 Wade, D.T., 76 Wallace, George (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 3 Wallace, Jack, 78 Walker, A.Maceo, 45 Walker, Joseph Edison (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 35, 38, 41, 44, 45 Walker, Robert, 67 Washington, D.C., 69, 94, 105, 125, 126, 153, 165 Washington, Harold (see also Black mayors), 108, 125, 127, 130 Washington, Walter, 94

217 Watergate, 88 Watson, Sharon M., 164 Watts, California, 68 Watts, Lilliard Anthony (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 122 We the People (see also Whites: opposition to black civil rights), 44 Weathers, William C., 40–41 Webb, Wellington (see also Black mayors), 153 Welfare, 3 Welfare Rights Organization (see also Black Monday protests), 73 Wells, Ida B. (see also Lynchings), 17, 24, 25 West Indies, 17 West Tennessee Civil and Political League (see also Political organizations), 37, 91 Whalum, Kenneth (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Blacks: clergy;Memphis City Council: blacks elected to), 117, 118, 131 Wharton, A.C., 178 Whelan, Robert, 177 White Citizens Councils (see also Whites: opposition to black civil rights), 82 White, James, 89 White, Michael R. (see also Black mayors), 153 Whites: as candidates for elective offices, 10, 46, 49, 125, 126, 134, 164 membership in coalitions (see also Coalitions; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 3, 125, 137 middle-class flight of, 20, 56, 151, 152, 169 opposition to black civil rights, 1, 2, 5, 15–17, 20, 42–44, 47–49,

218 55–60 (see also Racism; Segregation: supporters of) views on slavery (see also Memphis: slavery in), 8–9 voting behavior of, 2, 60, 63, 96–98, 101, 104, 109, 111 113–114, 115, 164–168 voter turnout of, 2, 103, 107, 109, 114–115, 118, 134, 142, 164–167 176 and the yellow fever epidemics, 7, 19 White primaries (see also Voting: suffrage discrimination), 7 Wilbun, S.A. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Memphis: civil rights movement in; NAACP; Segregation: efforts to dismantle), 45, 57 Wilbun, Shep, Jr. (see also African-American People’s Convention; Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Memphis City Council: blacks elected to), 118, 131–132, 158, 160–161 Wilder, L.Douglas (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 126 Wilkerson, Wayman, 35, 36, 37 Wilkie, Wendell (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 33 Wilkins, Roy, 69 Wilks, Theodore, 78 Williams, J.J. (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 30 Williams, Karen (see also Whites: as candidates for elective offices), 113 Williams, Lugene (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 122 Willis, Archie W Jr.: as candidate for elective office, 45,

Index 49, 56, 60–65, 79, 80, 103, 114, 175 (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices) as civil rights activist, 57, 113, 128 (see also Memphis: civil rights movement in; Segregation: efforts to dismantle) as state legislator, 63, 79, 93 Willis, Archie W. Sr., 35 Wilmington, Delaware, 154 Wilson, James Q., 28, 29 Wilson, Lionel (see also Black mayors), 94, 125 Winfrey, Oprah, 112 Winfrey, Walter, 165–166 Withers, Dedrick “Teddy” (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 109, 110, 113 Wood, Bernice (see also Black mayors), 153 Woodrow, Stanley (see also Black mayors), 153 Woods-Chickasaw Manufacturing Company, 30 Yacoubian, Berje, 117 Yardley, W F. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 10 Yellow fever epidemics (see also Memphis: yellow fever epidemics in; Whites: and the yellow fever epidemics), 7, 17–21 Young, Alma, 177 Young, Andrew (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 173 Young, Coleman (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices; Black mayors), 93, 125, 153 Young, J.B. (see also Blacks: as candidates for elective offices), 10 Zambodia, 130

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