Quantifier Scope in German

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Quantifier Scope in German

Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today (LA) provides a platform for original monograph studies into synchronic and diachronic linguistics. Studies in LA confront empirical and theoretical problems as these are currently discussed in syntax, semantics, morphology, phonology, and systematic pragmatics with the aim to establish robust empirical generalizations within a universalistic perspective.

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Volume 84 Quantifier Scope in German by Jürgen Pafel

Quantifier Scope in German

Jürgen Pafel University of Stuttgart

John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia

8

TM

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jürgen Pafel, 1957Quantifier Scope in German / Jürgen Pafel. p. cm. (Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today, issn 0166–0829 ; v. 84) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 1. German language--Quantifiers. 2. Grammar, Comparative and general--Quantifiers. 3. German language--Syntax. I. Title. II. Linguistik aktuell ; Bd. 84. PF3199.P34 2005 435--dc22 isbn 90 272 2808 6 (Hb; alk. paper)

2005054265

© 2005 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa

Table of contents

Abbreviations and symbols Preface Chapter 1 Preliminaries 1.1 Introduction 1 1.1.1 The empirical issues 1 1.1.2 The theoretical issues 11 1.2 German quantifiers 13 1.2.1 Criteria of identification 13 1.2.2 The classes of quantifiers investigated 16 1.3 Syntactic assumptions 25 1.3.1 Noun phrases 26 1.3.2 Verb phrases and sentences 30 1.4 Semantic assumptions 32 1.4.1 Names 32 1.4.2 Quantifiers 44 Chapter 2 Relative scope 2.1 Some basic patterns of Q/Q-interaction 51 2.2 The properties determining relative scope 59 2.2.1 Syntactic constellation 60 2.2.2 Grammatical function 65 2.2.3 Thematic property 70 2.2.4 Distributivity 75 2.2.5 Discourse-binding 79 2.2.6 Definiteness 82 2.2.7 Focus 82 2.2.8 Negation attraction 85

ix xiii

1

51



Quantifier Scope in German

2.3 A linear model of relative scope determination 88 2.3.1 Cumulativity, weights and linear equations 88 2.3.2 The model’s predictions 94 2.3.2.1 Basic Q/Q-interaction 94 2.3.2.2 Negative quantifiers 99 2.3.2.3 Modified DP-quantifiers 101 2.3.2.4 Adverbial quantifiers 102 2.3.2.5 Wh/Q-interaction 103 2.4 Relative scope and the relation between syntactic and semantic structure 107 2.4.1 A comparison between relative scope and word order determination 107 2.4.1.1 The relevant properties and their interaction 107 2.4.1.2 A linear model for word order in the Mittelfeld 111 2.4.2 The correspondence constraints concerning relative scope 114 2.4.2.1 Digression: Quantifier binding 116 2.5 The status of linear models 121 2.5.1 Can linear models be explanatorily adequate? 121 2.5.2 Linear models, optimality and smart heuristics 124 2.6 The scope behavior of further types of quantifiers 125 2.6.1 Coordinative quantifiers 125 2.6.2 Quantifiers with focus particles 128 2.6.3 Relative phrases 132 Chapter 3 Absolute scope 137 3.1 The puzzle of clause-boundedness 137 3.1.1 Absolute scope and (in)coherent infinitival constructions 137 3.1.2 Absolute scope and subordinate finite clauses 142 3.2 A model of absolute and relative scope determination 150 3.3 Scope (and syntax) of wh-phrases in situ 160 3.4 Absolute scope and the relation between syntactic and semantic structure 165 3.4.1 From clause-boundedness to phrase-boundedness 165 3.4.2 Absolute scope and quantifier raising 168 3.4.3 Correspondence constraints concerning absolute scope 170 3.4.4 Scope and quantifier storage 171 3.5 Inverse linking 173

Table of contents 

Chapter 4 Indefinites and quantifiers 179 4.1 Indefinite quantifiers 180 4.2 Types of indefinites 182 4.2.1 Non-specific indefinites 182 4.2.2 Specific indefinites 187 4.2.3 Some consequences concerning (non-)specific indefinites 193 4.2.4 Generic indefinites 197 4.3 The scope of implicit quantifiers triggered by (in)definites 201 4.4 Indefinites in donkey sentences 204 Chapter 5 Interrogative quantifiers 5.1 The pair-list reading as a scope reading 215 5.2 Wh/Q-interaction in German, English and Polish 220 5.3 The semantics of the pair-list reading 224 5.4 Scope and semantics of how many phrases 230 Chapter 6 Alternative scope accounts 6.1 Configurational theories 237 6.2 Semantically and pragmatically based theories 250 6.3 Multi-factor theories 252 Chapter 7 Towards a theory of semantic structure 7.1 The form of semantic structure 261 7.1.1 Semantic features and semantic structures 261 7.1.2 The semantic characterization of lexical items and syntactic phrases 263 7.2 The interpretation of semantic structure 271 7.3 The construction of semantic structures from syntactic structures 276 7.3.1 Semantic specifications and quantifier stores 276 7.3.2 Implicit quantifiers in semantic structure 287

215

237

261

 Quantifier Scope in German

Chapter 8 Concluding remarks

291

References Index

293 311

Abbreviations and symbols

* √

√ ?? ? %

(?) ÷ ≈ ≈> ∃ ∀ ¬ ι → ↔ λ ∧ ∨ ⊕ ≤ *P ♦ ˆ o

> A acc AP a-strong a-weak D

clearly unacceptable sentence or sequence (of sentences) clearly unavailable reading acceptable sentence or sequence available reading more or less unacceptable sentence or sequence neither acceptable nor unacceptable sentence or sequence judgment not shared by all subjects judgment uncertain tends to be gets paraphrased as translates as existential quantifier universal quantifier negation operator iota operator conditional biconditional lambda operator conjunction disjunction summation operator part of plural operator (plus predicate) necessity operator possibility operator cap denotation function rising accent falling accent has scope over adjective accusative adjective phrase strives for widest possible absolute scope strives for smallest possible absolute scope determiner




dat def dis:1 dis:2 DP erg ex-pre gen in-dis in-pre Inst IP l-db LF MF N neg neg-att nom NP P P pl. PP PP pref. pron Q Q QP QR QS que R1, R2, etc. r-strong r-weak S S1, S2, etc. s-adv s-db Sem(...) sg. SP SS st-dis

dative definiteness inherently distributive strongly distributive determiner phrase ergative external precedence genitive inherent distributivity internal precedence instantiation intonation phrase lexical discourse-binding logical form Mittelfeld noun negative negation attraction nominative noun phrase preposition predicate plural predication prepositional phrase preferred pronoun quantifier quantificational operator quantificational-operator phrase, i.e., quantifier quantifier raising quantifier store question marker reading 1, reading 2, etc. strives for widest possible relative scope strives for smallest possible relative scope syntactic category of a sentence step 1, step 2, etc. sentential adverbial syntactic discourse-binding semantic specification of ... singular sentential phrase semantic structure strong distributivity

Abbreviations and symbols

st-pat ∅ t T TP V VP WCO we-pat

strong patient lack of phonetic content trace (i.e., constituent without phonetic content) term operator term verb verb phrase Weak Cross Over weak patient



Preface

This monograph is the revised version of my Habilitationsschrift Skopus und logische Struktur. Studien zum Quantorenskopus im Deutschen (1997), Universität Tübingen. It delivers a quite comprehensive account of quantifier scope in German. The scope behavior both of ordinary quantifiers and negative, adverbial, interrogative, relative and particle quantifiers is investigated. The empirical results are compared to what is known of quantifier scope in other languages. Quantifier scope is a challenge to linguistic theory as it is a phenomenon which is determined by the interplay of different factors. Such interactions have not been studied in depth and the theoretical frameworks are not well prepared to cope with true interactions. More than once, one tried to rely on the tools current frameworks delivered, using c-command relations in syntax, quantifier raising on logical form, reconstruction on diverse levels, and the like in order to cope with quantifier scope – in vain as I fear. Quantifier scope as an outcome of the interaction of diverse syntactic and semantic factors cannot be dismissed as an epiphenomenon. We cannot but develop tools to model such interactions and integrate them into our grammar frameworks. Quantifier scope is basically a semantic phenomenon, it is, however, an interface phenomenon par excellence too, as the interaction of the factors determining quantifier scope is part of the constraints relating syntax and semantics, more precisely, part of the constraints connecting syntactic and semantic structure. Quantifier scope strongly presupposes a level of semantic structure, a level of analysis where the meaning-compositional aspects of the readings of a sentence and its parts are represented. This level is a genuine semantic level of analysis which should neither be identified with a syntactic level of analysis nor with a translation into the language of predicate logic. This, at least, is what I will argue for in this book. In Chapter 1 (Preliminaries), I give an introduction to the empirical and theoretical aspects of quantifier scope and present the syntactic and semantic assumptions that enter into the investigation. I will, as the first step of the in-

 Quantifier Scope in German

vestigation, delimit the domain of inquiry by identifying quantifiers with the help of three criteria: sensitivity to negation, coordination and quantification. In order to find out which factors determine the occurrence of relative scope readings, I vary, in Chapter 2 (Relative scope), systematically several aspects of simple sample sentences and observe how intuitions concerning scope readings change as a consequence. We will see that relative scope is determined by a variety of syntactic and semantic properties. As these properties interact in a weighted and cumulative way, I propose a linear model with linear equations at its center which predicts the observed scope readings and their degree of preference quite accurately. Then the linear model is built into a grammar framework where syntax and semantics are considered to be relatively autonomous, parallel levels connected by an interface of correspondence constraints. I argue that relative scope is configurationally represented on a level of representation which is not a syntactic, but a genuine semantic, level (dubbed “semantic structure”). It is correspondence constraints between the syntactic and the semantic structure which determine the possible relative scope readings and their degree of preference – the linear model mentioned above being part of these correspondence constraints. This approach limits the structural complexity of both syntactic and semantic structure: everything that is needed for scope reasons has an independent justification. Broadening the perspective in Chapter 3 (Absolute scope), I investigate quantifier scope in complex sentences and the phenomenon of clauseboundedness. An integrated model of absolute and relative scope determination is introduced. After generalizing clause-boundedness in a suitable way to phrase-boundedness, I analyze the absolute scope constraints in German as correspondence constraints relating syntactic and semantic structure, i.e., they are analyzed in a similar vain as the relative scope constraints. The phenomenon of inverse linking is taken to be primarily a phenomenon of absolute scope. Indefinite noun phrases are generally regarded as noun phrases with very peculiar scope behavior. In Chapter 4 (Indefinites and quantifiers), different types of indefinite noun phrases are distinguished: quantificational and nonquantificational ones, and, among the non-quantificational ones, non-specific, (weakly and strongly) specific and generic indefinite noun phrases. Quantificational indefinite noun phrases behave, with respect to scope, exactly as the quantifiers investigated in the first three chapters. But non-quantificational indefinite noun phrases, “indefinites” in a narrow sense, have a strikingly different behavior in many respects. These indefinites are uniformly analyzed as names (of a kind), which, in semantic structure, may lead to, or trigger,

Preface

the introduction of a quantifier which ranges over the instances of the kind (the quantifier can be an existential one or some variety of a generic quantifier). Such a quantifier is implicit in the sense that it shows up in semantic structure, but has no counterpart in syntactic structure, and differs from explicit quantifiers (which show up in syntactic and semantic structure) in its scope behavior. Chapter 5 (Interrogative quantifiers) completes the investigation of the major areas of quantifier scope in German. In the previous chapters it turned out that wh-phrases are quantifiers which are subject to the same regularities as non-interrogative quantifiers. The investigation of the so-called pair-list or distributive reading in sentences with interrogative quantifiers (What did everyone buy for Max?) shows a perfect fit between the factors which determine scope interaction between non-interrogative quantifiers and the factors which determine the interaction between interrogative and non-interrogative quantifiers. In Chapter 5, I will, firstly, take up this issue and, secondly, explore the semantic consequences of this insight and propose a particular semantics of wh-phrases and wh-interrogatives. Chapter 6 (Alternative scope accounts) delivers a survey of the different accounts which have been proposed for quantifier scope (configurational theories, semantically and pragmatically based theories as well as multi-factor theories). As I will argue that scope is representend on a geniune semantic level of representation, in Chapter 7 (Towards a theory of semantic structure) the form, construction and interpretation of the level of semantic structure is investigated. I try to show that it is possible to sketch a uniform process of scope determination which encompasses the scope of explicit as well as implicit quantifiers without neglecting their differences, i.e., the differences between explicit and implicit quantifiers in general and the differences among explicit quantifiers and among implicit quantifiers themselves. Chapter 8 (Concluding remarks) delivers a résumé and an outlook. For the quick reader I propose the following road map: §1.1, §1.2, §2.1, §2.2 (browse only), §2.3.1, §2.3.2 (browse only), §2.4.1.1, §2.4.2. This journey will give you a feeling for the facts and the theoretical account proposed. I am extremely grateful to Marga Reis for having had the opportunity to work on scope matters in such a stimulating and pleasant atmosphere at the Sonderforschungsbereich 340 and the German department of the University of Tübingen. I am grateful to the committee who refereed my Habilitationsschrift, encompassing besides Marga, Wolfgang Klein, Uwe Mönnich and Arnim von Stechow. I am indebted to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for



Chapter 1

Preliminaries

. Introduction .. The empirical issues With the Necker cube, the same pattern of two-dimensional lines on a piece of paper can be perceived as two different three-dimensional Gestalten, i.e., as two different cubes. Not at the same time, of course, but one after the other. With a little practice, one can voluntarily skip from one Gestalt to the other.

This example of a Gestalt switch can only be explained by assuming that our visual system can process the two-dimensional pattern in two different ways, which induces the perception of different Gestalten. It is the task of perceptual psychology and neuropsychology to describe the structures and processes which lead to a three-dimensional perception from the basis of twodimensional input. And it is the task of these disciplines to find out why, in certain cases and under certain circumstances, the same input can lead to different three-dimensional perceptions. As for language processing, there are Gestalt switches too; they come under the name of ambiguity. It is a certain kind of linguistic ambiguity and, thus, a certain kind of linguistic Gestalt switch I will be investigating, one displayed in the following sentence: (1.1) Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. one Beethoven-sonata has every piano.player in his repertoire ‘One Beethoven sonata, every piano player has in his repertoire.’




This sentence is ambiguous in two ways as it has the two different readings R1 and R2 (I consider the case where it is the expression eine ‘one’, which bears the main stress in the phrase eine Beethoven-Sonate): (1.2) R1 One Beethoven sonata is such that every piano player has it in his repertoire. R2 Every piano player is such that he has one Beethoven sonata in his repertoire.

The two readings differ in their truth conditions. In the first reading, there must be (at least) one Beethoven sonata, which every piano player has in his repertoire. In the second reading this is not necessarily the case: the sentence becomes true even if the piano players differ with respect to the Beethoven sonatas they have in their repertoire, such that there is no sonata everyone has in his repertoire. (I will, later on and in more detail, discuss the question of whether such a sentence is really ambiguous and why the accent on the quantity expression eine is of importance.) This ambiguity is in some respects similar to the Gestalt ambiguity of the Necker cube. When one reads or hears sentence (1.1) usually one understands the sentence in one of the two readings. If the reading is in accordance with the context, it will not even be noticed that the sentence is ambiguous. But, if the existence of two readings is brought to one’s attention one can voluntarily skip between the two readings. Furthermore, the ambiguity in (1.1) is not based on any ambiguity of its words or phrases. There is instead a common input for both readings, which seems to correspond to the two-dimensional pattern of the Necker cube. How is it possible that there are two different readings while none of the sentence’s constituents is ambiguous? The answer must be that the sentence’s constituents can be combined in two different ways. In order to get a distinct result the constituents must have some property which is responsible for the fact that distinct compositions can lead to different results. Let us look at the following paraphrases of (1.1)’s two readings, which are intentionally very elaborate. (1.3) R1 One Beethoven sonata is such that every piano player is such that he has it in his repertoire. R2 Every piano player is such that one Beethoven sonata is such that he has it in his repertoire.

Looking at these paraphrases, one can say that the first reading corresponds to the words every piano player is such that being embedded by the words one

Chapter 1. Preliminaries

Beethoven sonata is such that and the second reading corresponds to the opposite embedding. The two orders of embedding lead to a difference in what is asserted of the piano players and the sonatas. Quantifiers, i.e., expressions like eine Beethoven-Sonate or jeder Pianist, are related to a certain region, which, in (1.3), is made visible by the that clause following the quantifiers.1 The way one constructs a sentence with two quantifiers like (1.1) determines the regions the quantifiers are related to. The ambiguity of (1.1) demonstrates the fact that one quantifier can be located in the other’s region. What I have introduced as the region a quantifier is related to is generally called its scope. The two readings of (1.1) differ with respect to the quantifiers’ scope, i.e., the sentence exhibits a scope ambiguity, and therefore has two scope readings. Taking the two paraphrases in (1.3) as a starting point and with a little help from predicate logic, the two scope readings can be distinguished as follows: (1.4) a.

(eine Beethoven-Sonate)1 {(jeder Pianist)2 [x2 hat x1 in seinem Repertoire]} b. (jeder Pianist)2 {(eine Beethoven-Sonate)1 [x2 hat x1 in seinem Repertoire]}

In (1.4), the quantifier’s scope – its absolute scope – corresponds to everything which follows the quantifier, i.e., everything which is included in arched or angular brackets. In (a), the scope of jeder Pianist is “x2 hat x1 in seinem Repertoire” and the scope of eine Beethoven-Sonate is “(jeder Pianist)2 [x2 hat x1 in seinem Repertoire]”. That means, that, in (a), jeder Pianist is in the scope of eine Beethoven-Sonate. In (b), it is just the other way round. Thus, we can say that the readings differ with respect to the relative scope of the quantifiers. In (1.4) x1 und x2 are the counterparts of the pronouns sie and er in (1.3). Following predicate logic, I call them bound variables, which means that they are variables bound by a quantifier (in (1.4), they are bound by the quantifier they are coindexed with). In complex sentences, the extension of a quantifier’s absolute scope can be decisive for an interpretation without the presence of a second quantifier. Sentence (1.5), for instance, has the reading that the concert will become a success if everyone is such that he plays well – that means everyone has to play well in order for the concert to become a success. (1.5) Wenn jeder gut spielt, wird das Konzert ein Erfolg. ‘If everyone plays well, the concert will be a success.’

The sentence cannot mean that everyone is capable of making the concert a success by playing well. That would mean that it would be enough that one






musician play well in order for the concert to be a success. The two readings differ with respect to the absolute scope of jeder. In the first reading, the quantifier has scope inside the wenn clause only, i.e., only over “x1 spielt gut” (see (1.6a)). As the wenn clause is the smallest, the minimal clause that contains the quantifier jeder, one can say that, in the first reading, jeder only has scope inside its minimal clause. As for the second, the intuitively impossible reading, jeder has scope over the entire sentence, its scope is greater than its minimal clause (see the region embraced by the arched brackets in (1.6b)). (1.6) a. Wenn (jeder)1 [x1 spielt gut], dann wird das Konzert ein Erfolg b. (jeder)1 {wenn x1 spielt gut, dann wird das Konzert ein Erfolg}

As mentioned, sentence (1.5) does not display this second reading. Apart from a few exceptions, which I will discuss later, the scope of a quantifier is restricted to its minimal clause. This feature is called the clause-boundedness of quantifier scope. Coincidentally, it is the clause-boundedness which makes it possible to distinguish the two readings of Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire with the help of paraphrases like (1.2) and (1.3). I have said that a sentence like (1.1) leads to different readings as it can be constructed in different ways. I can make this proposition now a bit more concrete. That sentence (1.1), i.e., the concrete graphic entity on page 1, has two readings, means that when a competent speaker of German reads it the sentence can evoke the two readings, one at a time. That the sentence has two readings is based on the fact that it can be processed in two different ways, which evoke distinct interpretations. It could be that the processing differs with respect to structures (1.4a) and (1.4b), presupposing that it is these structures that determine interpretation, i.e., determine the occurrence of specific readings. This is quite analogous to the perception of the Necker cube. It is a reasonable suggestion that the ability to see different three-dimensional Gestalten is based on the different ways the information offered to the visual system is processed – with the processing constructing distinct structures (representations, structural descriptions) which determine the different threedimensional Gestalt perceptions (cf. Rock 1985). The Necker cube is something unique in the field of perception as it is not possible to interpret every two-dimensional pattern which can be seen threedimensionally in different ways. To what degree is the scope ambiguity of (1.1) a general phenomenon? Is it generally the case that a sentence with n quantifiers displays n! readings (1!=1, 2!=2·1, 3!=3·2·1, etc.)? Or does the linguistic system systematically impose restrictions on the occurrence of scope readings? The


question of the scope potential of a sentence with several quantifiers is one of the utmost empirical questions I will try to answer. Looking at (1.1) only, the first alternative might be the correct one: although the linguistic and nonlinguistic context of the sentence might strongly favor one reading, the other reading could be evoked by the sentence. Sentence (1.5), however, is evidence for the fact that, at least as far as absolute scope is concerned, a sentence’s scope potential can be restricted. If the second alternative is the correct one, i.e., if the linguistic system is systematically restricting scope readings, then the question arises which specific structures and processes have to be assumed in order to explain these systematic restrictions. The empirical basis of our investigation, i.e., the “observation sentences” the empirical generalizations are based on, is made up of the judgments of more than a dozen native speakers of German – linguists as well as nonlinguists – which have been asked for intuitive judgments on sentences I have construed myself or those I have collected from German newspapers.2 In addition, judgments reported in other research on scope have been considered. Neither psycho- nor neurolinguistic data have been taken into account – as far as German is concerned, I am not aware of the existence of such data. Speaker judgments are of the form “the sentence has only one (/two) readings”, “the sentence is true (/false) in such-and-such a situation”, “this sequence of sentences is coherent (/incoherent)” or – if a sentence has several readings – they are of the form “this reading of the sentence is easy (/hard) to get”. Speaker judgments on sentences from corpora are of the form “given the context, the sentence must (/might) have such-and-such a reading”. Speaker judgments are, of course, introspective, subjective judgments. It must be asked, therefore, whether it is permissible to use them to constitute an empirical basis. Some remarks might be appropriate as speaker judgments play an important role in our investigation.3 As for data acquisition in psychophysics, introspective judgments (“a subject’s report of his own sensations” – Brindley 1960: 144; cited in Teller 1984: 1234) play an important role. For instance, whether a two-dimensional pattern of lines can induce different three-dimensional Gestalt perceptions can be decided on the basis of introspective judgments. To perceive a threedimensional Gestalt is a subjective experience which is introspectively directly available. When we are confronted with the Necker cube for the first time, we are convinced of the existence of the Gestalt switch only if we are successful in perceiving the two three-dimensional Gestalten. Thus, this belief is based on introspection. The way we react in this, and many other cases, shows that we take introspection to be epistemically reliable.4 This by itself, however,






does not mean that introspection is reliable enough for scientific purposes. In psychophysics, there has been an extensive debate on the status of different forms of introspective judgments (see, among others, Brindley 1960; Teller 1984; Hardin 1988). Subjects’ judgments on whether a sensation occurs or not and on whether two stimuli are identical (=experiments of class A) are distinguished from subject’s judgments on the quality and intensity of sensations and the similarity of different sensations (=experiments of class B). In both cases judgments deliver data which are reliable for scientific purposes (Hardin 1988: 40; see also the Brindley-citation in Teller 1984: 1234n). As for linguistics, the situation might not be so different. In psychophysics as well as in linguistics introspective data have to be acquired in a careful manner. What can help is to ‘simplify’ judgments as much as possible. Here, tests can play an important role which present a phenomenon in such a form that relatively simple introspective judgments of the form “the sentence is acceptable (/unacceptable)” or “the sequence is coherent (/incoherent)” are possible (these tests might be comparable with experiments of class A in psychophysics). The search for suitable tests for scope relations is of some importance in investigations concerning scope. In the literature on scope, one very often finds the claim that a sentence has such-and-such scope readings without making any endeavor to supply supporting evidence for this claim.5 With the help of the following tests one can check whether a certain scope reading is possible or not – even if the tests are not always as clear-cut and unequivocal as one would like them to be. One can test (i) the acceptability of certain question-answer pairs, (ii) the possibility of interpreting a pronoun as a bound variable, and one can test (iii) sequences of sentences for contradiction. These tests will be exemplified with the sentence (1.1) Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire ‘One Beethoven sonata, every piano player has in his repertoire’, which was claimed above to be ambiguous. question/answer. The following question-answer pairs are acceptable, even if they are not very natural sequences. (1.7) Von wie vielen Beethoven-Sonaten kann man sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘How many Beethoven sonatas are such that every piano player has them in his repertoire?’ Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire.


(1.8) Kann man von einer Beethoven-Sonate sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘Is one of the Beethoven sonatas such that every piano player has it in his repertoire?’ (Ja,) eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire.

Having a certain scope relation, the question forces the answer to have a corresponding scope relation. In the questions in (1.7) and (1.8), the scope of the universal quantifier jeder Pianist is restricted to its minimal clause, i.e., the embedded clause. Thus it is in the scope of einer Beethoven-Sonate in (1.8) and wie vielen Beethoven-Sonaten in (1.7). As the answers display a corresponding scope relation with jeder Pianist in the scope of eine Beethoven-Sonate, the question-answer pairs are acceptable. This test confirms that (1.1) has a reading with wide scope of the object. If an answer displays a scope relation opposite to the one of the question, it will often violate the conditions for an appropriate answer. This seems to be the case in the following sequences (the asterix indicates that the sequence is unacceptable, the single sentences themselves, however, are acceptable). (1.9) *Von wie vielen Beethoven-Sonaten kann man sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘How many Beethoven sonatas are such that every piano player has them in his repertoire?’ Von jedem Pianisten gilt, dass er eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire hat. ‘Every piano player is such that he has a Beethoven sonata in his repertoire.’ (1.10) *Kann man von einer Beethoven-Sonate sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘Is one of the Beethoven sonatas such that every piano player has it in his repertoire?’ (Ja,) von jedem Pianisten gilt, dass er eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire hat. ‘(Yes), every piano player is such that he has a Beethoven sonata in his repertoire.’

The question-answer test confirms that (1.1) also has a reading with wide scope of the subject:






(1.11) Von wie vielen Pianisten kann man sagen, dass sie eine Beethoven-Sonate in ihrem Repertoire haben? ‘How many piano players are such that they have a Beethoven sonata in their repertoire?’ Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. (1.12) Kann man von jedem Pianisten sagen, dass er eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘Is every piano player such that he has a Beethoven sonata in his repertoire?’ (Ja,) eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire.

Thus this test confirms that (1.1) is indeed ambiguous. quantifier binding. If a sentence has two scope readings, it should be possible to modify the sentence in such a way that the quantifier with wide scope binds a pronoun which is part of the narrow scope quantifier. (Note that this expectation is only justified if there are no independent restrictions which, should the occasion arise, prohibit the interpretation of a pronoun as a bound variable.) Sentence (1.1) confirms this expectation. It can be modified in such a way that one of the quantifiers binds a variable that is part of the other quantifier. The result is that these modified sentences are scope unequivocal: (1.13) Eine Beethoven-Sonate, mit der er1 glänzen kann, hat [jeder Pianist]1 in seinem Repertoire. ‘[Every piano player]1 has a Beethoven sonata in his repertoire with which he1 can shine.’ (1.14) [Eine Beethoven-Sonate]1 hat jeder Pianist, der sie1 spielen kann, in seinem Repertoire. ‘As for [one Beethoven sonata]1 , every piano player who is capable of playing it1 has it in his repertoire.’

This is further evidence for the ambiguity of (1.1). contradiction. The idea of this test is to form a sequence such that the sequence is a contradiction if the sentence to be tested for its scope potential does not exhibit a certain scope relation. By this test, (1.1) is also confirmed as ambiguous: (1.15) Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. Also gibt es eine Beethoven-Sonate, von der gilt, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat. ‘One Beethoven sonata, every piano player has in his repertoire. Thus


there is one Beethoven sonata which is such that every piano player has it in his repertoire.’ (1.16) Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. Aber es gibt keine Beethoven-Sonate, von der gilt, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat. ‘One Beethoven sonata, every piano player has in his repertoire. But there is no Beethoven sonata which is such that every piano player has it in his repertoire.’

On the basis of these tests, we can interpret the speaker judgments as evidence that the sentences to be tested have or do not have certain scope readings. That a sentence has a certain scope reading is not the kind of thing a normal native speaker is cognizant of. The observation that a sentence has a certain scope reading is a highly theory-laden judgment. This feature distinguishes it from introspective judgments of the form “the sentence is acceptable (/unacceptable)” or “the sequence is coherent (/incoherent)”, which a normal native speaker can make and which are much less theory laden. What is the effect on the scope potential if the order of the quantifiers in (1.1) is modified such that the subject precedes the direct object? (1.17) Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. every piano.player has one Beethoven-sonata in his repertoire ‘Every piano player has one Beethoven sonata in his repertoire.’

More or less unanimously (see below), my informants judged sentences of this kind as unambiguous: they have the reading “Every piano player is such that one Beethoven sonata is such that he has it in his repertoire” (the weak reading), but not the reading “One Beethoven sonata is such that every piano player is such that he has it in his repertoire” (the strong reading). These intuitive judgments are confirmed by the outcome of our tests. The acceptability of (1.18a, b), (1.20a) and (1.21a) is evidence for the existence of the weak reading, i.e., the reading with wide scope of the universal quantifier, and the unacceptability of (1.19a, b), (1.20b) and (1.21b) is evidence for the non-existence of the strong reading, i.e., the reading with wide scope of the existential quantifier. √

(1.18) a. Von wie vielen Pianisten kann man sagen, dass sie eine BeethovenSonate in ihrem Repertoire haben? ‘How many piano players are such that they have a Beethoven sonata in their repertoire?’ Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire.

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Quantifier Scope in German √

b. Kann man von jedem Pianisten sagen, dass er eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘Is every piano player such that he has a Beethoven sonata in his repertoire?’ (Ja,) jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. (1.19) a. *Von wie vielen Beethoven-Sonaten kann man sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘How many Beethoven sonatas are such that every piano player has them in his repertoire?’ Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. b. *Kann man von einer Beethoven-Sonate sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘Is one of the Beethoven sonatas such that every piano player has it in his repertoire?’ (Ja,) jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. √

(1.20) a. [Jeder Pianist]1 hat eine Beethoven-Sonate, mit der er1 glänzen kann, in seinem Repertoire. ‘[Every piano player]1 has a Beethoven sonata in his repertoire with which he1 can shine.’ b. *Jeder Pianist, der sie1 spielen kann, hat [eine Beethoven-Sonate]1 in seinem Repertoire. ‘Every piano player who is capable of playing it1 has [one Beethoven sonata]1 in his repertoire.’ √

(1.21) a. Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. Aber von keiner Beethoven-Sonate gilt, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat. ‘Every piano player has one Beethoven sonata in his repertoire. But there is no Beethoven sonata which is such that every piano player has it in his repertoire.’ b. *Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. Also gilt von einer Beethoven-Sonate, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat. ‘Every piano player has one Beethoven sonata in his repertoire. Thus there is one Beethoven sonata which is such that every piano player has it in his repertoire.’

These results are quite clear and it is cross-linguistically not peculiar that a sentence like (1.17) be unambiguous (see below §2.1). But there is one datum which might call this result into question. The following sequence is perfectly acceptable with the first sentence having a certain prosodic structure:


(1.22) Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. Und zwar die Mondscheinsonate. ‘Every piano player has one Beethoven sonata in his repertoire. Namely the Moonlight Sonata.’

The prosody in mind is the one with a heavy accent on eine (presumably a static high tone ↑), an intonation break (#) after eine, and a falling accent on Beethoven. (1.23) Jeder Pianst hat EI↑ne # BEET hoven-Sonate in seinen ReperTOIRE

If, as for this realization, the indefinite noun phrase is a quantifier then sentence (1.17) cannot be claimed to be scope unambiguous. But as we will see below (§4.2.3), one can plausibly argue that, as for sentence (1.22), the indefinite noun phrase is not a quantifier, but a “name”, i.e., a referential expression. We will have to investigate the behavior of several types of indefinite noun phrases which do not follow the pattern of expressions clearly being quantifiers (see Chapter 4). Although I think I have been quite careful in eliciting speaker judgments with respect to the central data of quantifier scope in German, it will be necessary to run tests und perform experiments in a much more methodologically sophisticated way than presented here (cf. Note 5). If the goal is the explanation of native speakers’ intuitions, then a lot of care must be taken to describe them accurately. The main empirical issue is the question of the scope potential of sentences with quantifiers. It has to be found out whether there are systematic restrictions on scope readings and what the nature of these restrictions are – are they purely contextually induced or is there a grammatical mechanism responsible for the restrictions? We have already seen some data which seem to indicate that the restrictions are grammatical in nature. In order to find out which factors determine the occurrence of scope readings, I will vary systematically several aspects of sample sentences and observe how intuitions concerning scope readings change as a consequence. We will see that a sentence’s scope potential is determined by the interplay of different grammatical factors. .. The theoretical issues If there is a grammatical mechanism responsible for the restrictions on scope readings, the question arises which specific structures and processes have to be assumed in order to explain these restrictions. As for generative grammar,

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it is common since Lakoff ([1965] 1970) and McCawley (1968, 1970, 1972) to assume that the linguistic system, the ‘grammar’, encompasses a level of analysis where the meaning-compositional aspects of a sentence’s readings are represented, i.e., where argument-predicate, binding and scope relations are represented. Whereas this assumption is more or less common currency, the very nature of this level of analysis, i.e., the nature of semantic structure, is hotly debated. On the one hand, there is, most prominently, the view of Noam Chomsky and his school: the linguistic system essentially consists of a syntactic mechanism which generates structures that are interpreted phonetically and semantically. This view has aptly been characterized as “syntactocentristic”. At least since 1975, Chomsky assumes that within sentence grammar there is a level specific for semantic interpretation, called logical form (LF), where scope and binding relations are represented. To a large amount, then, a theory of scope takes the form of a syntactic theory of scope; a sentence’s scope potential is explained by the character of the logical forms a sentence has. On the other hand, there is the view that the linguistic system copes with the diverse aspects of linguistic signs (i.e., their phonetic-phonological, prosodic, morphological, syntactic, and semantic aspects) by generating relative autonomous, parallel structural descriptions of these aspects. This means that there are levels of analysis which differ in nature, i.e., have their specific categories and relations, and are not transformationally related. Instead, the relations between structural descriptions at different levels are regulated by correspondence constraints (also known as cross-level rules). These constraints determine which structural descriptions fit with one another.6 As for semantics, this means that semantic structure is a semantic level of analysis which differs in nature from the syntactic level, but is connected to it by correspondence constraints. One fundamental issue discussed in this work is the nature of semantic structure and its relation to syntactic structure. We will see that a non-partisan perspective on scope matters clearly favors the view of relative autonomous levels and disfavors the syntactocentristic one. The most natural way to interpret the empirical results is to assume that the absolute and relative scope restrictions are located in correspondence constraints relating semantic and syntactic structure. Scope is thus one type of semantic phenomenon which forcefully necessitates the assumption of ‘semantic structures’, which should not be mistaken for syntactic structures.7 The specific nature of these correspondence constraints, however, is a challenge to most, if not all, established linguistic frameworks, as we will see.


Another fundamental issue to be discussed is the distinction between referential expressions (i.e., “names”) and quantifiers. There is no unanimity concerning the question of which types of expressions are quantifiers and which are not. The status of definite descriptions is especially so for it is just as controversial as it was at the time of Frege and Russell – with many linguists favoring a referential analysis (see, e.g., Heim/Kratzer 1998: §4.4) and many philosophers favoring a quantificational analysis (see, e.g., Neale 1990). The debate about the status of indefinite noun phrases is not less heated. In identifying quantifiers and distinguishing them from names and (first-order) predicates, I will rely on traditional criteria for ‘quantifierhood’ (namely, sensitivity to negation, coordination and quantification) and we will see that exactly those expressions satisfying these criteria show a homogeneous scope behavior. These results will be supplemented by semantic analyses of several types of names and quantifiers, on the basis of which the distinct behavior of names and quantifiers can be explained. The nature of semantic structure, its relation to syntactic structure and its interpretation are the prominent theoretical issues to be dealt with in this work.

. German quantifiers .. Criteria of identification With our first step, i.e., the delimitation of the domain of inquiry, we already enter a controversial area. There is no unanimity in the literature concerning the question of which expressions are quantifiers and which are not, and thus, no unanimity concerning the question of which readings are scope readings and which are not. Traditionally, one referred to three criteria which help distinguish quantifiers from expressions which aren’t, especially referential expressions like proper names. The criteria are sensitivity to negation, coordination and quantification.8 Firstly, different from names, quantifiers are sensitive to negation, i.e., there are different readings depending on whether negation is inside the scope of the quantifier or whether it applies to the entire sentence containing the quantifier. The sentence Marie ist eingeladen worden ‘Mary has been invited’ can be negated two ways – by negating the grammatical predicate (nicht eingeladen worden ‘not been invited’) or by embedding the entire sentence under es ist nicht der Fall, dass ‘it is not the case that’:

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(1.24) a.

Marie ist nicht eingeladen worden. ‘Mary has not been invited.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Marie eingeladen worden ist. ‘It is not the case that Mary has been invited.’

From a logical point of view, these two ways of negating the sentence are of equal value: the sentences in (1.24) are logically equivalent and contradictory to the sentence Marie ist eingeladen worden. With the universal sentence Damals sind alle, die um eine Einladung nachsuchten, eingeladen worden ‘At that time, all people who asked for an invitation have been invited’, however, the two ways of negating a sentence are not of equal value. (1.25) a.

Damals sind alle, die um eine Einladung nachsuchten, nicht eingeladen worden. ‘At that time, all people who asked for an invitation have not been invited.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass damals alle, die um eine Einladung nachsuchten, eingeladen worden sind. ‘It is not the case that, at that time, all people who asked for an invitation have been invited.’

Sentence (1.25a) has the reading “All people who asked for an invitation are such that they have not been invited.” (1.25a) entails (1.25b), but not the other way round. Thus the sentences are not logically equivalent like the sentences in (1.24). Secondly, quantifiers are sensitive to the distinction between sentence and VP-coordination (with or or and). The following sentence pairs are logically equivalent: (1.26) a.

Johann ist betrunken oder verliebt. ‘John is drunk or in love.’ b. Johann ist betrunken oder Johann ist verliebt. ‘John is drunken or John is in love.’

(1.27) a.

Johann ist betrunken und verliebt. ‘John is drunk and in love.’ b. Johann ist betrunken und Johann ist verliebt. ‘John is drunk and John is in love.’

The following sentence pairs, however, are not logically equivalent: (1.28) a.

Jeder von uns ist betrunken oder verliebt. ‘Every one of us is drunk or in love.’


b. Jeder von uns ist betrunken oder jeder von uns ist verliebt. ‘Every one of us is drunk or every one of us is in love.’ (1.29) a.

Einige von uns sind betrunken und verliebt. ‘Some of us are drunk and in love.’ b. Einige von uns sind betrunken und einige von uns sind verliebt. ‘Some of us are drunk and some of us are in love.’

If (1.28b) is true (1.28a) is true too, but not the other way round: if everyone is drunk or in love it must not be the case that everyone is drunk or everyone is in love. As for (1.29), however, (a) asymmetrically entails (b). Finally, quantifiers are sensitive to the occurrence of a further quantifier. This third criterion can be demonstrated with (1.30). Jeder is sensitive to the adverb einmal ‘once’: jeder can have scope over the adverb or the adverb can have scope over jeder. (1.30)

Einmal hat jeder einen Fehler gemacht. ‘Once, everyone made a mistake.’ R1 Once it was the case that everyone made a mistake. R2 Everyone is such that he has once made a mistake.

If an expression is sensitive in all three respects it is certainly a quantifier. But in many cases the criterion of negation is sufficient to identify something as a quantifier; if an expression is sensitive to negation, it is sensitive to coordination and quantification too. But the criterion of negation is applicable only to expressions that occur in declarative sentences and even here it is nearly impossible to apply it to certain classes of expressions, e.g., polarity items. Where this criterion is not applicable we have to rely on the other two criteria. It is not questioned that the proper names and the quantifiers we have looked at so far have a different behavior with respect to negation, coordination and quantification. And it is also not debated that this is a universal fact: in every language that has proper names and quantifiers, these expressions behave differently. Through my investigations I came to the result that these criteria can be used quite successfully to identify the quantifiers in a natural language. Applying the criteria consequently to expressions of German enables one to delimit a class of expressions, which are homogeneous in their absolute and relative scope behavior, in the sense that these expressions are subject to the same set of restrictions concerning absolute and relative scope. That means we can say: an expression satisfies the criteria for quantifierhood if, and only if, it is subject to this set of scopal restrictions.

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.. The classes of quantifiers investigated If one consequently applies the criteria for quantifierhood to the following classes of expressions, they are shown to be quantifiers. This list is not exhaustive, but it does include the most common types of the German quantifiers. (1.31) Classes of German quantifiers I.

DP-quantifiers a. Simple DP-quantifiers, i.e., noun phrases with initial elements like jed- ‘every’, ein- jed- ‘every’, all- ‘all’, d- ganz- ‘the whole’, d- gesamt‘the entire’, sämtlich- ‘all’, zahllos- ‘countless’, unzählig- ‘innumerable’, d- meist- ‘most’, d- allermeist- ‘very most’, viel- ‘many’, zahlreich‘numerous’, etlich- ‘several’, manch- ‘many a’, mehrer- ‘several’, einig‘some’, ein wenig ‘a little’, ein bißchen ‘a bit’, ein paar ‘a few’, beid- ‘both’, d- selb- ‘the same’, einander- ‘another’, d- ein- ‘one’, d- ander- ‘the other’, etwas ‘some’, irgendein- ‘any’, ein- ‘one’ or another cardinal, as well as the pronouns etwas ‘something’ and jemand- ‘someone’. b. Negative DP-quantifiers, i.e., noun phrases with the initial elements kein- ‘no’, wenig- ‘few’, d- wenigst- ‘the fewest’, d- allerwenigst- ‘the very few’, nicht jed- ‘not every’ (/ein- jed- ‘every’, all- ‘all’, d- ganz- ‘the whole’, d- gesamt- ‘the entire’, sämtlich- ‘all’, viel- ‘many’, beid- ‘both’, ein- ‘one’) as well as the pronouns nichts ‘nothing’ and niemand‘nobody’. c. Modified DP-quantifiers, i.e., simple or negative DP-quantifiers modified by fast ‘almost’, zumindest ‘at least’, mindestens ‘at least’, höchstens ‘at most’, ungefähr ‘about’, genau ‘exactly’, mehr als ‘more than’, weniger als ‘fewer than’, vermutlich ‘presumably’, wohl ‘presumably’. d. Interrogative DP-quantifiers, i.e., wer ‘who’, was ‘what’ and was für ‘what kind of ’ phrases as well as noun phrases with the initial elements welch- ‘which’, wie viel- ‘how many’, wie vielerlei- ‘how many different kinds’, d- wie vielt- ‘how many’ or ‘which’, wie ‘how’ + adjective. e. Relative DP-quantifiers, i.e., der/die/das ‘that’, wer ‘who’, was ‘what’, welch- ‘which’.

II.

Adverbial quantifiers a. Local adverbials: überall ‘everywhere’, vielerorts ‘in many places’, mancherorts ‘at many a place’, wo ‘where’. b. Temporal adverbials: jederzeit ‘everytime’; jede Minute ‘every minute’ (/Stunde ‘hour’, Woche ‘week’, etc.), minütlich ‘every minute’ (stündlich ‘every hour’, wöchentlich ‘every week’, etc.), wann ‘when’.


c.

d. e. f. g. h. i.

j. k. l. m. n. III.

Frequency adverbials: immer ‘always’, meistens ‘mostly’, vielmals ‘frequently’, oft(mals) ‘often’, manchmal ‘sometimes’, mehrmals ‘several times’, einmal ‘once’, selten ‘seldom’, nie(mals) ‘never’, wie oft ‘how many’; jedes (viele, manche, etc.) Mal(e) ‘every time’, ‘many times’, ‘sometimes’. Adverbs of evaluation: glücklicherweise ‘luckily’, erfreulicherweise ‘fortunately’, etc. Adverbs of evidence: offensichtlich ‘obviously’, klarerweise ‘obviously’ etc. Adverbs of intention: absichtlich ‘intentionally’ etc. Causal adverbials: weil ‘because’ clauses, wegen ‘because of ’ + DP, etc. Adverbs of metaphysical modality: notwendigerweise ‘necessarily’, kontingenterweise ‘contingently’. Adverbs of epistemic modality: wahrscheinlich ‘probably’, sicher ‘surely’, vermutlich ‘presumably’, möglicherweise ‘possibly’, vielleicht ‘perhaps’, etc. Non-root modal verbs: dürfen ‘may’, können ‘can’, mögen ‘want’, müssen ‘must’, sollen ‘shall’, wollen ‘want’ Raising verb scheinen ‘seem’ Adverbials of quantity: größtenteils ‘for the most part’, zum größten Teil ‘for the most part’ etc. Reciprocal adverb: gegenseitig ‘one another’ Repetitive adverbials: wieder ‘again’, zum wiederholten Male ‘once again’

Particle quantifiers a. Coordinative phrases of different syntactic type b. Phrases with the focus particles nur ‘only’, nicht ‘not’

I will now look at some of these expressions to justify including them on this list. Simple DP-quantifiers with viel- ‘many’ will be looked at first. Sentence (1.32a), on the one hand, and sentences (1.32b) and (1.32c), on the other, are not logically equivalent. (1.32) a.

Es sind viele von denen, die kommen wollten, nicht gekommen. ‘Many of the people who intended to come didn’t come.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass viele von denen, die kommen wollten, gekommen sind. ‘It is not the case that many of the people who intended to come eventually came.’

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c.

Es sind nicht viele von denen, die kommen wollten, gekommen. ‘Not many of the people who intended to come eventually came.’

This becomes obvious if one takes a situation in which many of the people which intended to come eventually came, but in which also many of the people which intended to come didn’t come. In such a situation, (a) is true, but (b) and (c) are false. The same is true for negative DP-quantifiers with wenig- ‘few’. In the same situation as above, (1.33a) is false, but (1.33b) and (1.33c) are true. (1.33) a.

Es sind wenige von denen, die kommen wollten, nicht gekommen. ‘Few of the people who intended to come didn’t come.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass wenige von denen, die kommen wollten, gekommen sind. ‘It is not the case that few of the people who intended to come eventually came.’ c. Nicht wenige von denen, die kommen wollten, sind gekommen. ‘Not few of the people who intended to come eventually came.’

Noun phrases with beid- ‘both’ as the initial element must be quantifiers too as the following two sentences are also not logically equivalent: (1.34) a.

Es sind beide Philosophen nicht eingeladen worden. ‘Both philosophers weren’t invited.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass beide Philosophen eingeladen worden sind. ‘It is not the case that both philosophers were invited.’

If only one of the philosophers has been invited (a) is false, but (b) true. The sensitivity of beid- to negation is also shown by the fact that the sentence Beide Philosophen sind nicht eingeladen worden ‘Both philosophers haven’t been invited’ is ambiguous: it exhibits both of the readings that each of the sentences in (1.34) has as its unique reading. The coordination criterion is fulfilled too: the sentences in (1.35) are not logically equivalent: (1.35) a.

Beide Philosophen haben getanzt oder gesungen. ‘Both philosophers were dancing or singing.’ b. Entweder haben beide Philosophen getanzt oder (aber) beide Philosophen haben gesungen. ‘Either both philosophers were dancing or both philosophers were singing.’


If only one of them was dancing and only the other was singing, then (1.35a) is true, but (1.35b) is false. Noun phrases with inital beid- are also sensitive to further quantifiers: (1.36) a.

Beide Philosophen haben vielen Gästen die Hand gegeben. ‘Both philosophers shook hands with many guests.’ b. Vielen Gästen haben beide Philosophen die Hand gegeben. ‘With many guests, both philosophers shook hands.’

The two sentences have a different content. Sentence (1.36a) says that both philosophers are such that they shook hands with many guests. Sentence (1.36b) says that many guests are such that both philosophers shook hands with them. The first sentence can be true and the second one false (but not the other way round). In other words, in (a) beide Philosophen has wide scope, in (b) vielen Gästen does. But the noun phrase die beiden Philosophen – with the definite article in front of beiden – does not behave as a quantifier as it is not sensitive to negation (see below §1.4.1). Noun phrases with einig- fulfill the negation as well as the coordination criterion. The sentences in (1.37) are not logically equivalent, but (b) asymmetrically entails (a): (1.37) a.

Einige Menschen sind nicht eitel. ‘Some people aren’t vain.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass einige Menschen eitel sind. ‘It is not the case that some people are vain.’

In (1.38) (a) asymmetrically entails (b): (1.38) a.

Einige Griechen sind nach Troja gezogen und haben der Artemis eine junge Frau geopfert. ‘Some Greeks moved to Troja and sacrificed a young woman to Artemis.’ b. Einige Griechen sind nach Troja gezogen und einige Griechen haben der Artemis eine junge Frau geopfert. ‘Some Greeks moved to Troja and some Greeks sacrificed a young woman to Artemis.’

Noun phrases with d- selb- ‘the same’ and einander- ‘a different’ are quantifiers too. They fulfill the negation criterion: neither the sentences in (1.39) nor the ones in (1.40) are logically equivalent. (1.39) a.

Wir haben nicht die selbe Aufgabe gelöst. ‘We didn’t solve the same problem.’

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b. Wir haben die selbe Aufgabe nicht gelöst. ‘It was the same problem we didn’t solve.’ (1.40) a.

Wir haben keine andere Aufgabe gelöst. ‘We didn’t solve a different problem.’ b. Wir haben eine andere Aufgabe nicht gelöst. ‘It was a different problem we didn’t solve.’

Wh-phrases are one type of expression where the negation criterion cannot be applied as it is only applicable in declarative sentences. The other two criteria are applicable, though, and they reveal the following two sentences to have different content as (a) is an insensible question, but (b) is not. (1.41) a.

Wer ist gegangen und nicht gegangen? ‘Who left and didn’t leave?’ b. Wer ist gegangen und wer ist nicht gegangen? ‘Who left and who didn’t leave?’

As far as sensitivity to other quantifiers is concerned, wh-phrases seem to behave as quantifiers as, in sentences like (1.42), two different readings can be distinguished: (1.42)

Was hat jeder gelesen? ‘What did everyone read?’ R1 What is such that everyone read it? R2 Tell me of everyone: what did he read?

There is a lively controversy about the question of whether the second reading – called the pair-list or distributive reading of wh-interrogatives – really is a scope reading. But, there is ample evidence that wh/Q-interaction, i.e., the interaction between interrogative phrases and ordinary quantifiers, is a case of relative scope interaction (Pafel 1991b, 1999). I will come back to this question later (§2.3.2.5, §5.1). The same can be said of relative pronouns as the negation criterion isn’t applicable, but the other two criteria are. The sentences in (1.43), for example, aren’t logically equivalent – once more, (a) doesn’t make much sense. (1.43) a.

Wer sowohl gewinnt als auch verliert, bekommt ein Glas Sekt. ‘He who wins and loses will get a glass of champagne.’ b. Sowohl, wer gewinnt, als auch, wer verliert, bekommt ein Glas Sekt. ‘He who wins as well as he who loses will get a glass of champagne.’


Analogous to the interrogative sentence in (1.42), the relative clause in (1.44) exhibits two different readings: (1.44)

die Bücher, die jeder gelesen hat ‘the books which everyone read’ R1 the books which are such that everyone read them R2 for everyone: the books that he read

As for the adverbial quantifiers, it does not come as a surprise that notwendigerweise ‘necessarily’ behaves like a quantifier. The following two sentences are not logically equivalent: (1.45) a.

Das Einhorn ist notwendigerweise nicht das Lieblingstier der Semantiker. ‘Necessarily, the unicorn isn’t the semanticists’ favorite beast.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass das Einhorn notwendigerweise das Lieblingstier der Semantiker ist. ‘It is not the case that the unicorn necessarily is the semanticists’ favorite beast.’

As the unicorn is the semanticists’ favorite beast, (a) is false, but (b) is true, as it is probably not necessarily the case that the unicorn is the semanticists’ favorite beast. The first sentence asymmetrically entails the second one and notwendigerweise is also sensitive to coordination: (1.46) a.

Schrödingers Katze ist notwendigerweise lebendig oder tot. ‘Schrödinger’s cat is necessarily alive or dead.’ b. Schrödingers Katze ist notwendigerweise lebendig oder Schrödingers Katze ist notwendigerweise tot. ‘Schrödinger’s cat is necessarily alive or Schrödinger’s cat is necessarily dead.’

The sentences express different statements with (b) asymmetrically entailing (a). But note that the adjective notwendig ‘necessary’ does not behave like a quantifier, as it is not sensitive to negation, coordination or quantification: Es ist nicht der Fall, dass das notwendig ist ‘It is not the case that that is necessary’ ↔ Das ist nicht notwendig ‘That is not necessary’ ↔ Notwendig ist das nicht ‘That is not necessary’; Das oder jenes ist notwendig ‘This or that is necessary’ ↔ Das ist notwendig oder jenes ist notwendig ‘This is necessary or that is necessary’; Es ist nichts davon notwendig ‘Nothing thereof is necessary’ ↔ Notwendig






ist nichts davon ‘Nothing thereof is necessary’. (For differences in the kind of modality expressed by notwendig and notwendigerweise see Pafel 1991a: 116f.). It will also not come as a surprise that epistemic modal adverbs like wahrscheinlich ‘probably’ behave as quantifiers – notice its sensitivity to negation: (1.47) a.

Er ist wahrscheinlich nicht in London anzutreffen. ‘Probably, one cannot meet him in London.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass er wahrscheinlich in London anzutreffen ist. ‘It is not the case that one can probably meet him in London.’

These sentences have different truth values if the probability to meet him in London is 0.5. In this case, (a) is false and (b) is true. We can note again that the adjective wahrscheinlich ‘probable’ does not behave as a quantifier: Es ist nicht der Fall, dass das wahrscheinlich ist ‘It is not the case that that is probable’ ↔ Das ist nicht wahrscheinlich ‘That is not probable’ ↔ Wahrscheinlich ist das nicht ‘That is not probable’; Das oder jenes ist wahrscheinlich ‘This or that is probable’ ↔ Das ist wahrscheinlich oder jenes ist wahrscheinlich ‘This is probable or that is probable’; Es ist nichts davon wahrscheinlich ‘Nothing thereof is probable’ ↔ Wahrscheinlich ist nichts davon ’Nothing thereof is probable’. A bit more interesting is the fact that the type of modal verbs which have been called subjective, epistemic, non-root and propositional modals behave like quantifiers. It may come as a surprise that the so-called raising verb scheinen ‘seem’ – which governs an infinitive – behaves so too. (1.48) a.

Es ist nicht der Fall, dass mir ihm die Drecksarbeit Spaß zu machen scheint. ‘It is not the case that he seems to me to have any fun with this awful work.’ b. Mir scheint ihm die Drecksarbeit keinen Spaß zu machen. ‘He seems to me not to be having any fun with this awful work.’

(1.49) a.

Es ist nicht der Fall, dass ihm die Drecksarbeit Spaß gemacht haben dürfte. ‘It is not the case that he might have had any fun with this awful work.’ b. Die Drecksarbeit dürfte ihm keinen Spaß gemacht haben. ‘He might not have had any fun with this awful work.’

Neither the sentences in (1.48) nor the ones in (1.49) are logically equivalent. This is shown by the fact that (1.48a) can, but (1.48b) cannot feliciously be continued by Ich habe gar nicht gewusst, dass er diese Arbeit tun musste ‘I didn’t know that he had to do this work.’ And by the fact that (1.49a) can, but (1.49b)


cannot be continued by Denn es ist nicht sicher, dass er die Arbeit überhaupt gemacht hat ‘But it is not sure that he did this work at all.’ Non-root modal verbs and scheinen are sensitive to coordination. Neither the sentences in (1.50) nor the ones in (1.51) are logically equivalent. (1.50) a.

Moritz scheint ihr betrunken oder verliebt zu sein. ‘Maurice seems to her to be drunk or in love.’ b. Moritz scheint ihr betrunken zu sein oder er scheint ihr verliebt zu sein. ‘Maurice seems to her to be drunk or he seems to her to be in love.’

(1.51) a.

Moritz soll betrunken oder verliebt sein. ‘Maurice is said to be drunk or in love.’ b. Moritz soll betrunken oder er soll verliebt sein. ‘Maurice is said to be drunk or he is said to be in love.’

The sensitivity to the occurrence of other quantifiers is shown by the de re/de dicto-ambiguity in the following sentences: (1.52) a.

Einer von den Prüflingen scheint geschummelt zu haben. ‘One of the students seems to have been cheating.’ b. Einer von ihnen dürfte gemogelt haben. ‘One of the them might have been cheating.’

The de re-reading is intended if the sentence is continued by nämlich Moritz ‘namely Maurice’; the de dicto-reading if it is continued by Ich muss noch herauskriegen, wer ‘I must still find out who it was.’ Root modal verbs, however, aren’t quantifiers (cf. Pafel 1998: 54ff.). Take, for example, müssen ‘must’ as it is used in Marie muss warten ‘Mary has to wait’. Here is no sensitivity to negation, coordination or quantification on behalf of the modal verb: Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Marie warten muss ‘It is not the case that Mary has to wait’ ↔ Marie muss nicht warten ‘Mary doesn’t have to wait’ ↔ Warten muss Marie nicht ‘Mary doesn’t have to wait’; Moritz oder Marie muss warten ‘Maurice or Mary has to wait’ ↔ Moritz muss warten oder Marie muss warten ‘Maurice has to wait or Mary has to wait’; Niemand muss warten ‘Nobody has to wait’ ↔ Warten muss niemand ‘Nobody has to wait’. Also with wollen ‘want’, meaning “having the intention to”, as in Marie will warten ‘Mary wants to wait’ it isn’t the case: Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Marie warten will ‘It is not the case that Mary wants to wait’ ↔ Marie will nicht warten ‘Mary doesn’t want to wait’ ↔ Warten will Marie nicht ‘Mary doesn’t want to wait’; Moritz oder Marie will warten ‘Maurice or Mary wants to wait’ ↔ Moritz will warten oder Marie will warten ‘Maurice wants to wait or Mary wants to wait’; Niemand will warten ‘Nobody wants to wait’ ↔ Warten will niemand ‘Nobody wants to






wait’. The same can be said for dürfen ‘may’, meaning “being allowed to”, as in Marie darf warten ‘Mary is allowed to wait’: Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Marie warten darf ‘It is not the case that Mary is allowed to wait’ ↔ Marie darf nicht warten ‘Mary is not allowed to wait’ ↔ Warten darf Marie nicht ‘Mary is not allowed to wait’; Moritz oder Marie darf warten ‘Maurice or Mary is allowed to wait’ ↔ Moritz darf warten oder Marie darf warten ‘Maurice is allowed to wait or Mary is allowed to wait’; Niemand darf warten ‘Nobody is allowed to wait’ ↔ Warten darf niemand ‘Nobody is allowed to wait’. Finally, können ‘can’, as in Marie kann schwimmen ‘Mary can swim’, meaning that Mary is capable of swimming, isn’t a quantifier: Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Marie schwimmen kann ‘It is not the case that Mary can swim’ ↔ Marie kann nicht schwimmen ‘Mary cannot swim’; Moritz oder Marie kann schwimmen ‘Maurice or Mary can swim’ ↔ Moritz kann schwimmen oder Marie kann schwimmen ‘Maurice can swim or Mary can swim’; Niemand kann schwimmen ‘Nobody can swim’ ↔ Schwimmen kann niemand ‘Nobody can swim’. Reciprocal pronouns like einander ‘one another’ aren’t quantifiers either. But, the reciprocal adverb gegenseitig behaves like one as it is sensitive to other quantifiers: (1.53) a.

Sie haben sich gegenseitig nur wenige Sachen geschenkt. ‘They gave one another only a few presents.’ b. Sie haben sich nur wenige Sachen gegenseitig geschenkt. ‘Only a few presents did they give to one another.’

It is also sensitive to negation. Only sentences (1.54b) and (c) are compatible with the fact that one of the persons, Mary or John, gave the other one a book as a present: (sentence (1.54a) is, admittedly, an awkward sentence) (1.54) a.

Sie haben sich gegenseitig kein Buch geschenkt. ‘To one another, they didn’t give a book as a present.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass sie sich gegenseitig ein Buch geschenkt haben. c. Sie haben sich nicht gegenseitig ein Buch geschenkt. ‘It is not the case that they gave a book to one another.’

Another interesting case are causal adverbials, which are well-known to be sensitive to negation: (1.55) a.

Er hat sie, weil sie so reich ist, nicht geheiratet. ‘Because she is so rich, he didn’t marry her.’ b. Es ist nicht so, dass er sie, weil sie so reich ist, geheiratet hat. ‘He didn’t marry her because she is so rich.’


(A) entails that he didn’t marry her, but (b) does not. That causal adverbials are sensitive to quantification is shown by the sentences in (1.56): (1.56) a.

Weil sie so reich ist, hat niemand sie geheiratet. ‘Because she is so rich, nobody married her.’ b. Niemand hat sie geheiratet, weil sie so reich ist. ‘Nobody married her, because she is so rich.’

(A) has the reading “Her wealth is the reason that nobody married her”, but (b) has the reading “Nobody is such that he married her for her wealth.” So much for the German adverbial quantifiers. The particle quantifiers will be investigated in detail later in §2.6.

. Syntactic assumptions The syntactic structures I will make use of are, for the most part, quite simple, at least with regard to the complexities which can be found in contemporary syntax. This simplicity is achieved by distinguishing syntactic and semantic structure as two levels of representation distinct in nature (cf. above §1.1.2). As syntactic assumptions form a background which is only relevant for a few scopal considerations, which I will point out in §2.2.1, I will not argue much for the assumptions (but refer to other publications occasionally). The following syntactic categories will be relevant: V, N, A, P, D, S. The first four categories are the classical substantial categories, D(eterminer) and S(entence) are two functional categories. The nature of ‘S’ will be left open. Syntactic units come in two types: words (X) and phrases (XP). Syntactic structures will conform to the following three schemata (precedence is not determined by the schemata): (1.57) a. [XP X – YP*] b. [XP XP – YP] c. [X X – Y]

(complementation schema) (adjunction schema no. 1) (adjunction schema no. 2)

The complementation schema says that a phrase of category X can immediately contain a word of category X and arbitrarily many phrases of any syntactic category Y – with the word (X) being the head of the complement structure. In other words, the word is supplemented to a phrase by an arbitrary number of complements. Here are the relevant instances of the complementation schema:






(1.58) [DP D – NP], [SP S – VP], [VP XP – V], [AP XP – A], [NP N – XP], [PP P – DP]

An instance of the complementation schema will be dubbed “small XP”. Adjunction schema no. 1 says that a phrase of category X can immediately contain a phrase of the same category X (which is the head of the adjunction structure) and a phrase of any syntactic category Y. Adjunction schema no. 2 says that a word of category X can immediately contain a word of the same category X (which is the head of the adjunction structure) and a word of any syntactic category Y. In contrast to complements, a syntactic unit can have only one adjunct. Here are some instances of the adjunction schemata: (1.59) [D D – A], [VP XP – VP], [NP NP – PP], [NP AP – NP]

.. Noun phrases What traditionally are called noun phrases are uniformly analyzed as determiner phrases with the structure [DP D – NP]. Not only noun phrases with an overt article are taken to be DPs, but also noun phrases without an overt article, which are determined to contain an abstract determiner. Quantificational noun phrases come in at least two varieties – with simple D-head or with a complex one. DP

(1.60) D jede alle viele wenige mancher eine (/zwei etc.) welcher

NP ...


(1.61)

DP

D

D ein die ein das ein

NP

A

...

jeder meisten paar selbe anderer

(See Pafel (1994) for arguments concerning the structure (1.61).) The diverse attempts to establish a functional category Q for quantificational elements like jeder ‘every’, alle ‘all’, viele ‘many’ (see, e.g., Giusti 1991) are not convincing to me as I cannot detect strong enough arguments for the creation of a new syntactic category.9 On the contrary, many quantificational elements inflect according to the following pattern, which can be termed the pattern of determiner inflection, as it conforms to the declension of dies- ‘this’, jen- ‘that’ and (with some exceptions) to the declension of the definite and indefinite article (see Karnowski/Pafel 2004: §4.1). (1.62) Determiner inflection in German

nom acc dat gen

masculine -er -en -em -es

singular neuter -es -es -em -es

feminine -e -e -er -er

plural masculine/neuter/feminine -e -e -en -er

To my knowledge this is the best way to cope with the syntactic properties of quantificational noun phrases (cf. Karnowski/Pafel 2004). One must observe that some quantificational elements have a double life as determiner and adjective – namely the cardinals, viel-, wenig- and beid-. (1.63) a. b. c. d.

eines Löwen viel Geld wenig Geld beide Philosophen

a . b . c . d .

des einen Löwen das viele Geld das wenige Geld die beiden Philosophen






In (1.63a –d ) the quantity expression inflects exactly like an adjective and I assume that it is located in the canonical position for attributive adjectives (see below). The quantificational element in (1.63a–c), however, does not have the declension of an adjective (viel- and wenig-, e.g., carry no inflectional suffix throughout the singular).10 In addition, the noun phrases (1.63a –d ) behave like names, in contrast to the noun phrases (1.63a–d), which behave like quantifiers (cf. §1.2.2). Thus this semantic difference corresponds to a syntactic difference – namely whether D contains a quantificational element or not. Noun phrases consisting of all- (/beid-) followed by a definite DP, however, do not conform to the structures (1.60) and (1.61). Here the quantificational element seems to be an adjunct to DP.11 (1.64) a. alle diese Leute ‘all these people’ b. [DP alle [DP diese Leute ]]

Not crucial is the assumption that attributive APs are NP-modifiers, more exactly, left AP-adjuncts to an NP (cf. Haider 1992a: 320; Pafel 1994: 245n16). (1.65) [die [NP neuen [NP konsensfähigen [NP Vorschläge]]]] ‘the new approvable proposals’

The syntactic position of genitive and prepositional attributes is more important. It is a quite common view that NP is left-headed with respect to genitive and prepositional attributes: (1.66) [D (NP [N XP1 ] PP2 )]

But, one can also find the view that NP is, at least partially, right-headed like VP, a view where N-movement is assumed (cf. Valois 1991 for DP in French – where N moves across several intermediate heads, which I have omitted, into a Num-head – and Haider 1992b: §4.1 for German). (1.67) a. [D (αi [XP1 (PP2 [N ti ])])] b. [D (αi [XP1 ([N ti ] PP2 )])]

With our current knowledge, the question of whether NP in German is leftor right-headed with respect to genitive and prepositional attributes cannot be definitively answered. As far as I can see, research hasn’t sufficiently covered this topic yet. Haider (1992b:§4.1) relies on reflexivization data as an argument for a right-headed structure. He argues that, as reflexive binding is only possible by a c-commanding antecedent, the acceptability of Die Wut des Mannes1 auf sich1 ‘the anger of the man at himself ’ reveals the right-headed structure of NP. The argument’s presupposition, however, that reflexive binding relies


on c-command, is anything but sure. Across distinct frameworks, research on reflexivity strongly supports the opposite view, that configurational factors like c-command play no role (see Kuno 1987; Pollard/Sag 1992, 1994: §6; Reinhart/Reuland 1993). For me, the clearest evidence for the left-headed structure (1.66) results from considering the extraction from noun phrases, especially NP and was für Split. Let’s take the DP (1.68a) with the reading according to which Leonardo is the painter, – as in Die Gemälde mit anatomischen Details von Leonardo waren stilbildend – and let’s have a look at the NP Split (1.68b). (1.68) a.

Gemälde mit anatomischen Details von Leonardo paintings with anatomical details of Leonardo b. Gemälde mit anatomischen Details besitzt das Museum viele paintings with anatomical details owns the museum many von Leonardo of Leonardo ‘The museum owns many paintings by Leonardo with anatomical details.’

If the NP in (1.68a) is left-headed, then it has the structure (1.69a), if it is right-headed, it has the structure in (1.69b). (1.69) a. [[Gemälde mit anatomischen Details] von Leonardo]] b. [Gemälde1 [mit anatomischen Details [(t1 ) von Leonardo (t1 )]]]

If one analyzes (1.68b) as a kind of extraction structure, structure (1.69a) is preferable to structure (1.69b) as it contains the string Gemälde mit anatomischen Details as a constituent. NP Split is quite generally a problem for structures like (1.67). A further argument for a left-headed NP-structure comes from was für phrases. Structure (1.70) – with ∅ indicating that the constituent has no phonetic content – seems the most suitable one to explain the diverse properties of these phrases (Pafel 1996, 1995a). (1.70)

DP NP D Æ

PP NP was

für á






If one takes NP to be right-headed and tries to modify (1.70) as little as possible, the result is a structure in which was is no longer a phrase (XP), which contradicts the fact that was can move into the sentence-initial position. DP

(1.71)

XP D Æ

NP X1 was

N1 PP t für á

Admittedly, these arguments for a left-headed structure make use of premisses which are disputable and cannot decide the question conclusively. I am not aware, however, of similarly strong arguments which would support a rightheaded structure. .. Verb phrases and sentences Let’s turn now to the structure of sentences. As you remember, S is the category of sentences; notational choice leaving open the question of the exact syntactic nature of sentences. The basic assumption here is that S has a substantial phrase as complement, namely, a verbal phrase, and not a further functional one (cf. Haider 1993). This scarce structure [SP S – VP] fits to the structure of noun phrases [DP D – NP], but raises many questions which, for the most part, are not relevant to our purposes. The Mittelfeld12 is a binary right-headed VP-structure. To my knowledge, the best argument for the binary right-headedness of the Mittelfeld can be constructed from coordination data (see Höhle 1987). A typical Höhle-sentence like (1.72a) has the geometry indicated in (1.72b), which is supported by the data in (1.73).13 (1.72) a.

Dass Karl den Hund füttern will. that Carl the dog feed wants ‘that Carl wants to feed the dog’ b. Dass [Karl [den Hund [füttern will]]]


(1.73) a. Dass Karl den Hund sowohl [füttern will] als auch [streicheln darf ] b. Dass Karl sowohl [den Hund füttern (will)] als auch [den Kater streicheln will] c. Dass sowohl [Karl den Hund füttern (will)] als auch [Heinz den Kater streicheln will]

Taking into consideration that conjuncts of sowohl...als auch have to be phrases (XPs) (cf. Neijt 1979: 2f.) and that the head of a sentence has a VP as complement (see above), the Mittelfeld and the verbal complex of sentence (1.72a) exhibit the following structure (cf. Frey/Tappe 1991; that füttern is a VP is supported by the possibility of topicalizing it): (1.74) [VP Karl [VP den Hund [VP [VP füttern] [V will]]]]

This is only one of its possible syntactic structures. Another one is indicated by the possibility of topicalizing den Hund füttern. (1.75) Den Hund füttern will Karl nicht. the dog feat wants Carl not

Accounting for this topicalization, the Mittelfeld of (1.76a) can also have the structure (1.76b): (1.76) a. dass Karl nicht den Hund füttern will b. [VP Karl [VP nicht [VP [VP den Hund füttern] [V will]]]]

As is the case in (1.76b), nicht usually seems to adjoin to a small VP in the Mittelfeld: (1.77) [VP nicht [VP XP V]]

As the structures (1.76b) vs. (1.74) make clear, an accusative object is flexible with respect to where it is located. Generally, objects and subjects do not occupy special configurationally defined positions. I will show in Chapter 7 that this creates no problems for semantic interpretation. These are the syntactic premisses which will play a role of some importance in our investigation. But nowhere are they decisive enough that our view of relative or absolute scope essentially depends on them.






. Semantic assumptions The aim of this section is to elucidate on the semantic foundation on the distinction between names and quantifiers that I introduced in §1.2. I will distinguish – on semantic grounds – between four kinds of names and two kinds of quantifiers. For the most part, the semantic analyses will proceed indirectly by translating natural-language expressions into expressions of a logical language. The logical language is a predicate-logical language with λ- and ι-operator, being first-order, in the sense that we will not quantify on predicates. This language is merely a convenient tool, i.e., the translation into this language is not conceived as part of our semantic competence (but we will see in Chapter 7 that many aspects of such a logical language will have counterparts in the semantic structure of natural-language expressions). As for our ontological commitments, the “universe of discourse” encompasses concrete particulars (i.e., particulars in space and time), abstract particulars (i.e., concepts and propositions), pluralities of particulars, and masses. I rely on mereology, that is, I rely on the existence of “pluralities” (“fusions”, “sums”) of individuals. Mereology is ontologically innocent in the sense that it does not postulate additional entities besides the individuals which make up the plurality. If the part-of relation (≤) is taken to be primitive, the fusion of a and b or the plurality consisting of a and b (formally, a⊕b) can be defined as the entity that has all and only the parts of a and b as parts (see, among others, Simons 1987 and Lewis 1991: 72ff. for a presentation of mereology along these lines).14 Concept or Begriff is a general term that encompasses properties, relations, kinds, types of states, processes, events, etc. (cf. Strawson 1974: 16; Pafel 1991a: §2.1).15 With regard to the ontological nature of kinds, I will be committed16 to the view that a kind is not identical to (the mereological sum of) its instances and that its identity is not determined by its instances. Instead, a kind’s identity is determined by the criterion it imposes on its possible instances, i.e., the concept the instances have to satisfy. That means kinds are a species of abstract particulars. The true nature of propositions does not have to be discussed as our analyses do not commit us to a specific view. .. Names In this section, I will take a look into the semantics of definites (noun phrases introduced by a definite article, a possessive or a prenominal genitive), demon-


strative und indexical noun phrases, proper names (noun phrases containing a ‘proper noun’ as head of NP), and indefinites (noun phrases introduced by the overt or abstract indefinite article). Like proper names, definites, indefinites, demonstratives and indexicals do not satisfy the criteria for quantifierhood. Therefore, I call them all names (i.e., referential expressions). Let’s look at definites first. They are not sensitive to negation (cf. Grice 1981: 188 (=1989: 272)). The following sentence pairs are logically equivalent: they do not have different truth conditions (if the definites denote the same thing): (1.78) a.

Unser Hausmeister ist nicht rasiert. ‘Our janitor is not shaved.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass unser Hausmeister rasiert ist. ‘It is not the case that our janitor is shaved.’

(1.79) a.

Die beiden Philosophen sind nicht eingeladen worden. ‘The two philosophers weren’t invited.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass die beiden Philosophen eingeladen worden sind. ‘It is not the case that the two philosophers were invited.’

(1.80) a.

Die Tische dort drüben sind nicht aus Holz. ‘The tables over there are not made of wood.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass die Tische dort drüben aus Holz sind. ‘It is not the case that the tables over there are made of wood.’

As for (1.79), we see that the definite die beiden Philosophen behaves differently from the expression beide Philosophen ‘both philosophers’, which is sensitive to negation (cf. (1.34)). The same is true for the relationship between die vielen Philosophen ‘the many philosophers’ and viele Philosophen, and die wenigen Philosophen ‘the few philosophers’ and wenige Philosophen respectively. The difference between the quantifier beide Philosophen and the name die beiden Philosophen also shows up in right-dislocation and partitive constructions: (1.81) a. Wir haben sie eingeladen, die beiden Philosophen. b. ??Wir haben sie eingeladen, beide Philosophen. ‘We invited them, the two (/?? both) philosophers.’ (1.82) a. b. c. d.

einer der beiden Philosophen *einer beider Philosophen einer von den beiden Philosophen √ ??einer von beiden Philosophen (but: einer von beiden) ‘one of the two (/*both) philosophers’






As for singular definites, they behave like names with respect to coordination and quantification. The following sentence pairs are logically equivalent: (1.83) a. Unser Hausmeister hat getanzt oder (/und) gesungen. b. Unser Hausmeister hat getanzt oder (/und) unser Hausmeister hat gesungen. ‘Our janitor danced and sang.’ (1.84) a. Unser Hausmeister hat vielen Gästen den Weg gezeigt. b. Vielen Gästen hat unser Hausmeister den Weg gezeigt. ‘Our janitor showed many guests the way.’

Interestingly, plural definites can behave like quantifiers with respect to coordination. (1.85) a. Die Tische dort drüben sind ganz aus Holz oder ganz aus Metall. b. Die Tische dort drüben sind ganz aus Holz oder die Tische dort drüben sind ganz aus Metall. ‘The tables over there are completely made of wood or (the tables over there are) completely made of metal.’

Sentence (1.85a) has the reading which makes it possible for some tables to be made of wood and others to be made out of metal. It might be that (1.85b) can have this reading too, but another reading is much more dominant, namely that either all tables are made of wood or all tables are made of metal. But this behavior of plural definites is fully compatible with their status as names, as it can be explained by the occurrences of implicit distributivity operators: in the dominant reading of (1.85b) both sentential conjuncts are interpreted with the help of a distributivity operator (“Every table over there is completely made of wood or every table over there is completely made of metal”). See §1.4.2 for the interpretation, §4.3 for the scope behavior and §7.3.2 for the semantic structure of a distributor. That this seems to be the right view, is strengthened by a closer look at the following two sentences: (1.86) Die Leute, die um eine Einladung nachsuchten, sind (auch) eingeladen worden. ‘The people who asked for an invitation have been invited.’ (1.87) Es ist nicht der Fall, dass die Leute, die um eine Einladung nachsuchten, (auch) eingeladen worden sind. ‘It is not the case that the people who asked for an invitation have been invited.’


The sentences look as if one would be the logical negation of the other – like p and ¬p, but that is not the case. In a situation where some, but not all of the people who asked for an invitation have been invited, both sentences seem to be false. Consequently, they can’t be each other’s negation. This situation is no longer strange if we bring the distributor (§1.4.2) into play and give it scope over the entire sentence in both cases (cf. §4.3). This accounts for the factual semantic relations; a quantificational analysis of definites, however, does not account for them.17 We will, however, find evidence to treat DPs introduced by the possessive (sein ‘his’) as a quantifier in cases where the possessive is bound by a quantifier (§2.4.2.1). As for the interpretation of definites, I will make use of the ι-operator. In our representation language, ιx[φx] is defined as a referential term to denote the entity (particular, plurality, or mass) that is maximal with respect to φ, i.e., that is φ and has all entities that are φ as parts (ι is considered to be a syncategorematic expression). (1.88) Semantics of ι-terms: ιx[φx] denotes an entity x iff x is maximal with respect to φ.

ιx[Brother(x,mary)], for instance, denotes the entity which is maximal with respect to the property of being a brother of Mary. If Mary has exactly one brother, the ι-term denotes him and nothing else; if Mary has several brothers, the ι-term denotes nothing, as the property of being a brother of Mary applies to particulars only and since none of Mary’s brothers is maximal with respect to this property; the term denotes nothing if Mary has no brother. ιx[Water(x)] denotes the total mass of water. ιx[Water(x) ∧ In(x,mediterranean-sea,t)] denotes the maximal mass of water contained in the Mediterranean Sea at time t. ιx[*Brother(x,mary)] denotes the entity which is maximal with respect to the property of being brothers of Mary. What the term denotes depends on the meaning of *Brother. Relying on Link (1983) and many others, I define *P on the basis of P, which applies to particulars only, such that *P applies to the particulars P applies to as well as to the pluralities consisting exclusively of particulars P applies to. (1.89) Definition of the plural operator *:18 If P is an arbitrary predicate which only applies to particulars, then: *P(x) is true iff P(x) ∨ ∃y∃z(x=y⊕z ∧ *P(y) ∧ *P(z))

If Mary has several brothers ιx[*Brother(x,mary)] denotes the plurality consisting of all her brothers. If she has only one, the term denotes her brother and nothing else.






With this definition we can use ιx[φx] representing the meaning of (certain uses of) definites. Hereby, I make use of insights of Sharvy (1980) as well as Link (1983), Heim (1991) and Schwarzschild (1992, 1996), who all define the meaning of definites with the help of maximality. We can formulate the following interpretational rule for certain classes of definites: (1.90) Semantics of definites introduced by the definite article (first version): If α is an occurrence of the form [DP [D d-] [NP β]], then α denotes an entity x iff x is maximal with respect to the concept which β expresses.

It should not be a problem that, according to (1.90), the noun phrase Die Brüder von Marie denotes the one and only brother of Mary, if in fact, Mary has only one brother. The inappropriateness of using the plural noun phrase when there is only one brother can be pragmatically explained. If the plural instead of the singular is used, one may conclude that the singular is inappropriate – in the example, it will be concluded that the speaker assumes that Mary has more than one brother. There seems to be a quantity implicature involved here, a scalar one to be exact. Bruder is semantically stronger than Brüder, as Brüder applies to everything Bruder applies to, but not the other way round. Choosing the weaker element of the scale implicates conversationally the non-applicability of the stronger element. That Brüder is not restricted to proper pluralities is indicated by the complete acceptability of the sequence, Ich weiß, wie viele Brüder Marie hat: nämlich nur einen ‘I know how many brothers Mary has: namely only one’. Here, no choice between singular and plural is possible, so no implicature can arise. In another respect, (1.90) is obviously inadequate: in many uses of an expression of the form [DP [D d-] [NP β]] the NP-complement doesn’t completely express the concept, relative to which, maximality obtains. If I say Der Hund scheint hungrig zu sein ‘The dog seems to be hungry’, this occurrence of der Hund doesn’t denote an entity which would be maximal with respect to the concept of being a dog – there is no such entity, but it would denote one which is maximal with respect to the concept of being a salient dog, i.e., being a dog which is salient in the context of the utterance. (1.90) should also be modified in another way. With der Hund I can refer to certain particular (salient) dogs, but I can also refer to the kind whose instances are particular dogs (as in Der Hund ist der beste Freund des Menschen ‘Dogs are man’s best friends’). (1.91) takes both modifications into consideration. (1.91) Semantics of definites introduced by the definite article (second version):19


If α is an occurrence of the kind [DP [D d-] [NP β]], then α denotes either (i) an entity x iff x is maximal with respect to the concept of (being salient in the context of α and) being β, or (ii) the kind whose instances satisfy the concept of being β.

In contrast to the first version, the definite now always denotes something: if there is no (salient) β, the kind whose instances satisfy the concept β exists nevertheless, as a kind’s identity does not depend on its instances, but on the criterion it imposes (see §4.2.1). It is questionable whether this aspect of (1.91) is fully adequate, but it might help to solve an old problem. As is well-known, Russell claimed that definite descriptions are quantifiers, not names. One case in favor of the quantifier view are cases like (1.92) where there is no particular satisfying the description. (1.92) John believes that the present king of France is bald.

The sentence is fully acceptable although there is no king of France. This does not come as a surprise for a quantificational view, since the scope of the definite the king of France may be restricted to the subordinate clause. It would be a problem for a referential view if definites have a denotation only if there was an appropriate maximal entity. But, as there are quite uncontroversial cases where definites refer to kinds, one might assume a kind-denotation in cases like (1.92) too: the present king of France denotes the kind, every instance of which, is a present king of France. This way of interpreting the definite should come as a last resort, not as an early option, as (1.91) suggests. I will not try to modify (1.91) in this vein. A further case where it looks as if definites are quantifiers are modal contexts. A natural reading of (1.93) is (1.94) – cf. Kripke (1979: 10): (1.93) The number of planets might have been necessarily even. (1.94) ♦ ∃x (there are exactly x planets and (x is even))

The sentence is true in this reading since it is plausible to assume that the number of planets could have been 8 – 8 being necessarily even. It looks as if we could cope with this reading only if we take the definite description a quantifier having intermediate scope – i.e., being in the scope of ♦, but having in its scope. But we can cope with this reading holding on to the referential analysis of definite descriptions, if we take the description’s semantic structure to contain a variable apt to be bound by a quantifier on possible situations (the number of planets existing in w), as the following paraphrase explicitly demonstrates (cf. Heim 1991: 504):






(1.95) There is a possible situation w such that it is necessarily the case that the number of planets existing in w is even.

(The other readings of (1.93), too, can be got in this way – see the examples and analyses in Heim 1991.) The postulation of implicit variables can be independently argued for. For instance, they are necessary in order to adequately represent the intended reading of (1.96). (1.96) Für jeden Wochentag sind fein säuberlich die notwendigen Hausarbeiten notiert. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Nr. 123, 1997, 10) ‘For every day of the week the necessary home work is carefully noted.’ ≈For every day x of the week, the home work which is necessary at x is carefully indicated.

A further element is necessary in order to cope with a prominent reading of (1.97): (1.97) Necessarily, the guy who will tomorrow enter the room first will tomorrow enter the room first.

The sentence can have a reading such that it is true even if nobody enters the room tomorrow. An analysis along the lines of (1.98a) would not be adequate to capture this reading. It is necessary to restrict the possible situations via the existential presupposition of the definite to situations where eventually someone enters the room – see (1.98b): (1.98) a.

In every situation w, the guy who will tomorrow enter the room in w first will tomorrow enter the room first. b. In every situation w, in which there is exactly one person entering the room tomorrow first, the guy who will tomorrow enter the room in w first will tomorrow enter the room first.

Restricting a modal quantifier in such a way is nothing peculiar. Even in sentences with proper names the metaphysically modal quantifier has to be adequately restricted. (1.99a) does not entail – in contrast to (1.99b) – that it is necessarily the case that there are men (cf. Wiggins 1976: 302f.): (1.99) a. Alexander is necessarily a man. b. (Man(alexander))

This fact follows if we analyse (1.99a) in such a way that the quantification is restricted to situations in which Alexander exists (Pafel 1991a: 124 n. 3):


(1.100) In every situation in which Alexander exists, Alexander is a man.

Demonstrative descriptions as this wolf or that wine differ from definites in being always rigid designators. This means that for the evaluation of modal utterances, it is the referent of the demonstrative description in the actual world which counts. The following two sentences show the contrast between definites and demonstratives: (1.101) a.

Necessarily, the guy who will enter the room first tomorrow will tomorrow enter the room first. b. Necessarily, this guy, who will enter the room first tomorrow, will tomorrow enter the room first.

Sentence (1.101a) has a reading which is trivially true (cf. (1.97)). Sentence (1.101b), however, has no such reading, it has no true reading at all, as it is not an essential property of people to enter rooms at certain times. The trivial reading of the first sentence is made possible by evaluating the definite description relative to distinct possible situations (“the guy who enters in situation w ...”). The non-existence of such a reading in the second sentence is because the demonstrative description is evaluated relative to the actual world, specifically, to the surrounding context of utterance. We can account for this trait of demonstratives and its contrast to definites if we represent them as ι-terms, with the predicate φ in ιx[φx] encompassing the property to be salient in the surrounding context of utterance. I refrain from demonstrating that demonstratives do not satisfy the criteria for quantifierhood (for a debate whether demonstratives are, nevertheless, quantificational see King 1999; Dever 2001). Indexicals don’t satisfy them either. Indexicals like I and you can also be represented as ι-terms. Hereby, I can make use of the notion of token reflexivity, which was originally proposed for indexicals by Reichenbach (1947): an occurrence of I denotes that entity that is the producer of this occurrence of I; the same is true for you: an occurrence of you denotes that entity that is the addressee of this occurrence of you (cf. Campbell 1994: §3.3; O’Brien 1995; Perry 1997). Indexicals, thus correspond to ι-terms, with the predicate φ in ιx[φx] denoting a certain token-reflexive property.20 Let’s take a short look at proper names. Along the lines of §1.3.1 above, proper names are DPs with the ‘proper noun’ being the head of the NPcomplement of an abstract or overt D:21






(1.102) a. [DP [D ∅ ] [NP Marie]] b. [DP [D die ] [NP Marie]] c. [DP [D die ] [NP Marie aus München]]

(standard German) (colloquial German) (standard German)

Semantically, there is no difference between these uses of a proper noun (see Karnowski/Pafel 2005; pace Longobardi 1994). Since Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, proper names are seen to be the classical case of a rigid designator. To be precise, occurrences of proper names are rigid designators (cf. Kripke [1972], 2 1980: 7ff.). Neither the expression type John, nor the expression type Ford, or the expression type John Ford, is such that all its occurrences denote one and the same entity. Only occurrences of proper names are rigid designators. On the other hand, proper nouns seem to be predicative expressions like other kinds of nouns (see Burge 1973; Elugardo 2002; cf. Higginbotham 1988): Marie applies to all entities which carry the name Marie. Thus it seems that proper names have a compositional structure similar to definites (as they can have a syntactic structure similiar to definites – see (1.102b)). The rigidity of proper names’ occurrences and the predicative character of proper nouns can be accounted for by treating proper names as a kind of definite: an occurrence of (die) Marie denotes that person which carries the name Marie and is salient in the occurrence’s context (see Karnowski/Pafel 2005). As far as I can see, such an account is immune to Kripke’s critique of the description theory of proper names – especially, since there is no circularity in the proposed account. Also, the picture of a historical, causal chain, which Kripke poses against the description view, can be seen as the first step in explicating the property of carrying a name.22 If these sketches of analyses can be elaborated on successfully, a major part of the noun phrases which behave as “names” are ι-terms. Below, in Chapter 4, we will see that certain kinds of indefinite noun phrases, dubbed indefinites (noun phrases introduced by the overt or abstract indefinite article), behave like names too. They will be analyzed as kind-denoting descriptions. For instance, the indefinite Fragen ‘questions’ in (1.103a) is represented as in (1.103b), which denotes the kind whose instances are pluralities of questions: (1.103) a.

Fragen wurden nicht gestellt. questions were not posed ‘No questions have been posed.’ b. Fragen ≈> κx[*Question(x)]


However, ιx and κx are not sufficient to cope with all kinds of names. Noun phrases encompassing quantifiers, or to be more specific, noun phrases with an inverse-linking reading are a case in point. Consider the subject in (1.104). (1.104) The speakers of all factions agreed on a common declaration.

It has (among others) the reading that the group of people which, for every faction, consists of the speakers of the faction agreed on a common declaration. In this reading, the subject noun phrase cannot have the meaning ιx[∀y[Faction(y)] *Speaker-of(x,y)], which would give us the speakers who are speakers for all factions simultaneously. In a democratic parliament, such speakers generally do not exist, as every faction has its own speakers. In the intended reading, the quantifier all factions must outscope the speakers, but it must not have scope outside the noun phrase, because “For all factions y is it the case that the speakers of y agreed on a common declaration” does not give us the intended reading that the speakers of each faction agreed. In the intended reading, the speakers of all factions denotes the minimal plurality x, such that for every faction y, the speakers of y are part of x. In representing such a description formally, I assume a close relative to the ι-operator and call it µ-operator. µx[φx], too, is a referential term, but it denotes the entity that is minimal with respect to φ (that is φ and is part of all entities that are φ). (1.105) a. the speakers of all factions b. (all factions)1 [the speakers of x1 ] c. µx[∀y[Faction(y)] ιz[*Speaker-of(z,y)] ≤ x]

The µ-operator and the part-of-relation ≤ are extraneous semantic structures not visible in the syntax (I will come back to this in Chapter 7). By the way, the speakers of all factions is indeed a name: it is not sensitive to negation, as the logical equivalence of (1.106) shows. (1.106) a. The speakers of all factions couldn’t agree on a common declaration. b. It is not the case that the speakers of all factions could agree on a common declaration.

A further operator is necessary to cope with the subject noun phrase in (1.107). (1.107) Politicans from all factions agreed on a common declaration.

The subject noun phrase denotes the ‘smallest’ kind such that some x is an instance of it iff, for every faction y, politicans belonging to y are part of x. The sentence is true if some instance of this kind, i.e., a plurality of politicians from all factions, agreed on a common declaration. The new operator is σ:






(1.108) σx[φx] = the kind which is ‘smallest’ with respect to φ.

A kind k is ‘smallest’ with respect to φ iff x is an instance of k iff x is φ and part of the smallest plurality y which is such that every φ has a part of y which is φ as a part. (1.109) a. Politicans from all factions b. (all factions)1 [politicans from x1 ] c. σx[∀y[Faction(y)] ∃z[*Speaker-of(z,y)] z≤x]

Some are of the opinion that proper names have to be type-raised to quantifiers in order to make sense of coordinations of proper names with quantifiers (see, for instance, Partee 1987: 117). According to our analysis of inverse-linking readings, there doesn’t exist such a necessity anymore. In (1.110a), for instance, the quantificational conjunct has scope over the entire noun phrase as indicated in (b).23 (1.110) a. John and most of his colleagues arranged to meet in the café. b. (most of his colleagues)1 [John and x1 ]

Interpreting this structure with the help of the σ-operator, we get a denotation for the DP-coordination that leads to an adequate truth condition of sentence (1.110a): the sentence is true if there is a plurality who arranged the meeting and it consists of John and a plurality encompassing most of his colleagues. (1.111) a. σx[∃y[Most(y,κv[*collegue-of(v,john)])] john⊕y ≤ x] b. ∃x[x Inst @] Arranged-to-meet-in-the-café(x)

(@=(a))

(For this analysis of most see §1.4.2 below.) A similar analysis can be proposed for cases involving the coordination of DP-quantifiers, which seems to support the assumption that branching quantifiers exist in natural language (see also §1.4.2): (1.112) a. Most Israelis and most Palestinians still hate one another. b. More than half of the dots and more than half of the stars are all linked by lines. (Barwise 1979: 61)

If the subject DP in (1.112a) has the semantic structure in (1.113a) and is interpreted with the σ-operator as in (1.113b), then sentence (1.112a) has the truth condition (1.113c). There is, then, no need for branching quantification.


(1.113) a. (most Israelis)1 (most Palestinians)2 [x1 and x2 ] b. σx[∃y[Most(y,κv[*Israeli(v)])] ∃z[Most(z,κw[*Palest.(w)])] y⊕z ≤ x] c. ∃x[x Inst @] Hate-one-another-still(x) (@=(b))

Finally, sentence (1.114a) can be treated in such a way that the universal quantifier does not have scope over the entire sentence (cf. Roberts 1987: 166f.). (1.114) a. (Every professor)1 and one of his1 students wrote a paper together. b. (every professor)1 (one of his1 students)2 [x1 and x2 ] c. σx[∀y[Prof(y)] ∃z[Student-of(z,y)] y⊕z ≤ x]

I propose that there are no names which could not be analyzed sufficiently by one of the four term operators ι, κ, µ, σ. Besides noun phrases, only sentential phrases are candidates for being names (APs, PPs and VPs are predicates). Some kinds of sentences, those that encompass declarative and interrogative argument clauses, are neither sensitive to negation nor to quantification. The following sentence pairs, for instance, are logically equivalent: (1.115) a. Wir glauben nicht, dass Becker und Graf gewinnen werden. b. Dass Becker und Graf gewinnen werden, glauben wir nicht. ‘We do not believe that Becker and Graf will win.’ (1.116) a. Jeder (/zumindest einer) glaubt, dass Becker und Graf gewinnen werden. b. Dass Becker und Graf gewinnen werden, glaubt jeder (/zumindest einer). ‘Everyone (/at least one person) believes that Becker and Graf will win.’ (1.117) a. Wir wissen nicht, wer die Gewinner sein werden. b. Wer die Gewinner sein werden, wissen wir nicht. ‘We don’t know who will win.’ (1.118) a. Jeder (/zumindest einer) weiß, wer die Gewinner sein werden. b. Wer die Gewinner sein werden, weiß jeder (/zumindest einer). ‘Everyone (/at least one person) knows who will win.’

I have tried to show in Pafel (1999) that sentences can be analyzed with the same instrument as noun phrases, i.e., the four term operators ι, κ, µ, σ (see also §5.3 below). Thus I feel confident to claim that, at least for German, these four operators exhaust the semantic possibilites of names.






.. Quantifiers Quantifiers will be analyzed as either having the logical form of a restricted existential or universal quantifier, or having the combined form of a restricted existential and a restricted universal quantifier. In other words, in representing the meaning of quantifiers, I will only make use of the first-order predicate logic quantifiers ∃ and ∀. It might be asked how this is possible as it seems to be that the meaning of sentences like Die meisten F sind G ‘Most F are G’ cannot be represented in first-order logic. It has been proven that in predicate logic there can be no first-order quantifier M such that Mx could be combined with Fx and Gx in such a way that the formula would have the same truth-conditions as Die meisten F sind G. But, this result does not exclude the possibility that there is another way to get a first-order formula with the wanted truth-conditions. If pluralities are considered as values of variables and quantity expressions are seen as relations between pluralities and kinds, the meaning of Die meisten F sind G can be represented in a first-order way as the following paraphrase indicates: “There is a plurality which encompasses most (instances of the kind encompassing all) Fs such that every member of the plurality is a G.” Hereby, I am making use of the restricted existential (∃x[φx]) and the restricted universal quantifier (∀x[φx]). (1.119) a. Die meisten F sind G. b. ∃x[Most(x,κy[Fy])] ∀x’[x’≤x] Gx’ c. There is a plurality which encompasses most Fs such that every member of the plurality is a G.

Most is a relation between pluralities and kinds. It is defined with the help of a function f that assigns to each plurality, relative to a kind, the number (/quantity) of its individuals (that number is relative to concepts is a central result of Frege 1884). (1.120) Most(x,κy[φy]) is true iff f (x,κy[φy]) > 1/2 f (ιz[φz],κy[φy])

(In simplified terms: a plurality x can be called most φ iff the number of x is greater than the half of the total number of φs.) Thus we don’t need generalized quantifiers to cope with most-quantifications. The meaning of die meisten F is represented by the restricted existential quantifier ∃x[Most(x,κy[Fy])] in (1.119). The restricted universal quantifier ∀x’[x’≤x] in (1.119) quantifies over the x’ which are parts (≤) of x, i.e., the value of the variable bound by the existential quantifier. Such a restricted universal quantifier will be called a distributor. It does not belong to the


meaning of die meisten F and it only comes into play if the quantifier is interpreted distributively. However in a sentence like Die meisten haben sich in einer Reihe aufgestellt ‘Most ones lined up’ the quantifier is not interpreted distributively. We will see that it depends partially on the particular quantifiers as to how preferable a distributive interpretation is (see §2.2.4). Writing the distributor as ∀x’[x’≤x] is an oversimplification. It is more appropriate that the distributor should have the form ∀x[Atom(x,y,κz[φz])] with Atom expressing ‘relative atomicity’: x is an atom of y, relative to kind z, iff x is an instance of z and a part of y, and there is no x’, distinct from x, which is φ and a part of x. (1.121) Atom(x,y,κz[φz]) =df x Inst κz[φz] ∧ x≤y ∧ ¬∃x’(x’ Inst κz[φz] ∧ x’≤x ∧ x’=x)

With this view on the semantics of die meisten F, the syntactic structure proposed for it above (§1.3.1) D

(1.122) D

NP

D

A

die

meisten

F

shouldn’t look so odd. Meisten is syntactically an adjective and semantically a quantity predicate – as jeder in ein jeder. This might also suggest that quantificational determiners have their origin as quantity adjectives. Like die meisten F, many ordinary DP-quantifiers can be analyzed as having the form ∃x[φx] with φ as a quantity predication (see Pafel 1991a: §3.5).24 I will only present the semantics of the few quantifiers we will need later. Alle F ‘all F’ as well as jedes F ‘every F’ can be represented as (1.123) ∃x[All(x,κy[φy])]

with (1.124) All(x,k) being true iff f (x,k) = f (ιy[y Inst k],k).

Jedes F has the property of being inherently distributive, which means that it is obligatorily combined with a distributor:






(1.125) ∃x[All(x,κy[φy])] ∀x’[x’≤x]

For reasons of transparency, I will, however, represent jedes F simply as ∀x[φx].25 The logical form of zwei F is taken to be ∃x[Two(x,κy[φy])] with Two(x,κy[φy]) being true iff f (x,κy[φy]) = 2. Sentences like (1.126) have a reading which can be paraphrased by using two existential quantifiers: (1.126) a.

Jakob hat einigen Kindern mehrere Märchen erzählt. ‘John told some children several fairy-tales.’ b. I told three of the stories to many of the men. (Jackendoff 1972)

(A) might be paraphrased as: “There is a set of children and a set of fairy-tales such that John told the set of fairy-tales to the set of children.” With respect to this reading, more than once the issue was raised whether it is a scope reading at all – Higginbotham (1987: 60), for instance, speaks of “scopal independence” and Liu (1990, 1997) considers this reading a case of branching quantification, i.e., a quantification with the quantifiers having no relative scope to one another (besides Liu, Hintikka 1974; Barwise 1979 have argued for the necessity of assuming branching quantification). But, if one views the quantifiers in these sentences as restricted existential quantifiers, the semantics of these sentences do not seem to pose any problem. In (1.126a), the indirect object unequivocally has scope over the direct object (cf. §2.2.3), and if we interpret the indirect object non-distributively, we automatically get our desired reading. We have the same relative scope relations as in a distributive interpretation and there does not seem to be any need for a scope-independent analysis. A further example for branching quantification is reading R2 in the following sentence (cf. May 1989): (1.127)

No man loves no woman. R1 No man is such that he loves no woman. (≈ Every man loves a woman) R2 No man loves a woman.

Reading R2 seems not to be available in all ‘dialects’ of English.26 As for my Sprachgefühl, a corresponding German sentence cannot have reading R2. As there seems to be something special here, one should not demonstrate the general possibility of branching quantification with respect to such examples. As we have already seen, sentences like (1.112) above do not call for a branching interpretation, thus making branching quantification superfluous.


The distributor is the first ‘implicit’ quantifier we meet; by implicit, it is meant that it does not occur in the syntactic structure. To put it precisely: a quantifier is implicit iff it occurs in semantic structure, but doesn’t occur overtly or abstractly in syntactic structure. A quantifier is explicit iff it occurs both in semantic and syntactic structure.

Notes . A quantifier is essentially related to a certain region as a quantifier is not an interpretational unit; it is the structure consisting of the quantifier and the related region which gets a semantic interpretation (see §7.2). In other words, a quantifier is a syncategorematic expression. . As for the non-linguists I have asked for judgments, it was my experience that it was very easy to make them sensitive to the phenomenon (by presenting ambiguous sentences) and elicit judgments. Their judgments did not differ significantly from the linguists’ ones. . As for the state of the art of the debate on the use of intuitive speaker judgments in linguistics see Schütze (1996), as well as the contributions to the Chicago Linguistic Society 32 Parasession. . The introspective account of our mental states is of utmost importance for our thinking and acting. It is argued that, without introspection, we would not be the beings we are (cf., among others, Shoemaker 1996). As for language, it seems to me that linguistic intuitions (both well-formedness and semantic intuitions) are a constitutive part of our linguistic competence, and that, therefore, it is a methodologically sensible strategy to rely on intuitions especially in investigating semantic affairs (see Pafel 2004, 2005). . There is a recent trend in syntax to make use of methods like magnitude estimation and graphic rating, methods which have been successfully applied in psychophysics in order to acquire reliable introspective judgments (see Bard/Robertson/Sorace 1996; Cowart 1997; Keller 2000). Further research will apply these methods to semantic issues as well. . This view has been endorsed in different varieties, among others, by Lamb (1966, 1999), Bresnan (ed.) (1982), Sadock (1991), Shieber/Schabes (1991), Goldsmith (1993), Karttunen (1993), Lakoff (1993), Pollard/Sag (1994), Jackendoff (1997, 2002, 2003), Bresnan (2001). . Discourse representation theory (Kamp/Reyle 1993) and conceptual semantics (Jackendoff 1990, 1997, 2002) are prominent representatives of the autonomy of semantic structures. . As for negation and coordination as criteria for the distinction between quantifiers and referential expressions, see Geach ([1962] 3 1980: §§40–42), Löbner (1990: 17), Pafel (1991a: §3.1). Cf. Heim/Kratzer (1998: §6.1.1). . There are no QPs in syntax – but there are QPs in semantic structure as we will see in Chapter 7. . The case of ein- will be investigated in more detail in Chapter 4.





Quantifier Scope in German . In Pafel (1994: §7) I took alle to be the (complex) D-head of a DP taking a DP as complement. But this cannot be right as the syntactic features of the whole noun phrase are determined by what I took to be the complement DP. (i)

Ihr alle seid (/*sind) eingeladen ‘You are all invited.’

Here alle is right-adjoined to the personal pronoun ihr ’you’, which determines the agreement with the finite verb (2. person). . The “Mittelfeld” is the domain between the finite verb in V1/V2-clauses or the COMPposition in V-end-clauses, on the one hand, and the verbal complex, on the other (cf. Note 3 in Chapter 2). . Höhle assumes a theory of coordination, which is based on the following two premisses: “(i) Es gibt phrasale Koordination von diversen Konstituententypen. (ii) Auf den durch (i) definierten Strukturen können nur (a) Linkstilgung (rechtsperiphere Elision in nicht-letzten Konjunkten, ‘Right Node Raising’) und (b) Gapping (Elision eines unabhängigen Verbs und evtl. weiterer Konstituenten in nicht-ersten Konjunkten) operieren. (Neijt [1979])” (Höhle 1987: 1). . Our analyses, however, are not essentially committed to this view of mereology. They could easily be developed along the lines of a conception (see, e.g., Landman 1989; Schwarzschild 1992) which takes pluralities to be sets of entities – sets in the sense of set theory. I will not make use of Link’s (1983) lattice-theoretic approach to plural semantics for two reasons. First, Link commits himself to the view that entities like novels or critics are atoms which have no parts. But such an atomism is required neither by mereology, nor by plural semantics. Second, the lattice-theoretic approach seems to postulate additional entities beyond the entities which make up a plurality (see Link 1983: 307 and, for the relation between the domain of individuals and the set of atoms, 313f.). Thus, Link’s approach doesn’t seem to be ontologically innocent. I cannot, however, detect an argument from Link which supports the idea that plural semantics should lose its innocence. . This use of the term concept applying to abstract particulars is to be distinguished from the use of concept (see, e.g., Fodor 1998) for concrete mental particulars. . See §4.2.1 below. . If in first-order predicate logic one takes definite descriptions (ιxφx) to be quantifiers then (i) and (ii) are logically equivalent if exactly one thing is φ (see, e.g., Hughes/Cresswell 1996: 325; (ιxφx) is a quantifier binding the x-variable): (ιxφx)¬ψx

[iff ∃x (¬ψx ∧ ∀y (φy ↔ y=x))]

(ii) ¬(ιxφx)ψx

[iff ¬∃x (ψx ∧ ∀y (φy ↔ y=x))]

(i)

Thus it seems that quantifiers can satisfy the negation criterion. Note that the equivalence holds true only if exactly one thing is φ. If there are two things which are φ then (i) and (ii) are no longer logically equivalent. Such a restriction does not hold true for definites. The sentences (iii) and (iv) don’t have different truth conditions albeit there are two authors of “Principia Mathematica” (sentence (iii) should allow negation to be in the scope of the definite description):


(iii) The author of “Principia Mathematica” is not dead. (iv) It is not the case that the author of “Principia Mathematica” is dead. Assuming that definites are quantifiers leads to the false prediction that (iii) is wrong and (iv) is true. . This definition of the plural operator differs from (i) in not presupposing an absolute atomism (*≤ means atomic part of ). (i) *P(x) =df ∀y[y*≤ x] P(y) . This rule of interpretation should be extended such that it encompasses possessive noun phrases, i.e., noun phrases introduced by a possessive or a prenominal genitive. . To be salient (in the context of utterance) is a token-reflexive property too. . By the way, proper nouns are not inherently definite – see: Kennen Sie einen gewissen Gottlob Frege? ‘Do you know a certain Gottlob Frege?’. . By the way, in representing demonstratives, indexicals and proper names as ι-terms, ιx[φx], the φ comes close to the referential feature of Evans (1982: 311ff.). In strict contrast to Evans, however, we analyze definite descriptions as referential ι-terms. . One might object that (1.110b) violates the Coordinate Structure Constraint. The CSC, however, is conceived of as a constraint on syntactic structures. It must be shown that it is operative on semantic structure too. . It might be that the varieties of natural-language quantifiers can represented by (a combination of) the restricted first-order existential quantifier ∃x[φx] and the restricted first-order universal quantifier ∀x[φx]. But I will not argue for it here. . Why should jedes F be analyzed as a combination of existential quantifier and distributor (∃x[All(x,κy[φy])] ∀x’[x’≤x]) instead simply as ∀x[φx]. Firstly, in order to cope with the existential presupposition ordinarily connected with jedes F. Secondly, in order to cope with the occurrence of a modifier like fast ‘nearly’, which can be analyzed as a modifier of the quantity predicate All. It might be, however, that in Jeder Diebstahl wird angezeigt – with no existential presupposition – the subject simply has the logical form of ∀x[φx]. . This observation is due to Paul Schachter (see Liu 1990: 28 n. 4, 1997: 64 n. 2).



Chapter 2

Relative scope

In this chapter I will tackle the question of the scope potential of simple sentences with several quantifiers. We will see that relative scope is determined by a variety of syntactic and semantic properties. As these properties interact in a weighted and cumulative way, I have proposed a linear model with linear equations at its center which predicts the observed scope readings and their degree of preference quite accurately. The relative scope of ordinary quantifiers as well as negative, adverbial and interrogative quantifiers is accounted for. We will see how such a linear model can be built into a grammar architecture with relative autonomous levels. I will present an argument to the conclusion that relative scope is configurationally represented on a level of representation which is not a syntactic, but a semantic, level dubbed “semantic structure”. It is correspondence constraints between the syntactic and the semantic structure which determine the possible relative scope readings and their degree of preference – the linear model mentioned above being part of these correspondence constraints.

. Some basic patterns of Q/Q-interaction In the preliminaries (§1) I discussed the fact that sentence (2.1) [=1.1] is ambiguous, sentence (2.2) [=1.17], however, unambiguous. (2.1) Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. ‘One Beethoven sonata, every piano player has in his repertoire.’ (2.2) Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. ‘Every piano player has one Beethoven sonata in his repertoire.’

This result can be generalized. Sentence (2.1) remains ambiguous if the predicate or the quantifiers’ restriction is modified. Having the action verb spielen ‘play’ or the perception verb anhören ‘hear’ instead of im Repertoire haben does not change the sentences’ scope potential (Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pi-




anist gespielt; Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat sich jeder Pianist angehört). Nor does it change if the existential quantifier quantifies on persons, instead of things (Eine Sopranistin bewundert jeder Pianist ‘One soprano, every piano player admires’), or both quantifiers quantify on things (Eine Wand berührt jeder Stuhl ‘One wall, every chair touches’). It is generally the case that a sentence of the form (2.3) is scope ambiguous in German. (2.3) [DPacc ein- β] – Vfinite – [DPnom jed- α] (– Vnon-finite )

The only alleged counterexamples to this generalization I am aware of are sentences like Eine Goldmedaille hat jede Nation bei den Olympischen Spielen gewonnen, where one reading – here the reading with wide scope of the direct object – describes a situation which is actually impossible. In several other languages sentences are ambiguous too if the subject is a universal quantifier which follows the direct object being an existential quantifier. (2.4) a.

Dutch (according to native speakers) Eén fuga heeft elke pianist in zijn repertoire. one fugue has every piano.player in his repertoire ‘One fugue, every piano player has in his repertoire.’ b. French (according to native speakers)1 Un des livres, chaque étudiant l’a lu. one of.the books every student it.has read ‘One of the books, every student read.’ c. English (according to native speakers) One Beethoven sonata, every piano player has in his repertoire. d. Japanese (Hoji 1985: 65; cf. Kuroda 1970; but see Kuno 1973: 360ff.) daremo-ga aisiteiru. Dareka-o someone-acc everyone-nom loves ‘Someone, everyone loves.’ e. Korean (Joo 1989: 183) Nuku-lul nuku-na saranghanda. someone-acc everyone-nom loves ‘Someone, everyone loves.’ f. Polish (Karnowski 2001: 430) (Przynajmniej) jedna˛ powie´sć Bölla przeczytał ka˙zdy at.least one novel Böll read every germanista. student.of.German ‘(At least) one Böll novel, every student of German has read.’

Chapter 2. Relative scope

Sentence (2.2) Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire remains unambiguous if the predicate or the quantifiers’ restriction is modified. Thus, it is generally the case that sentences of the following form are scope unambiguous: (2.5) [DPnom jed- α] – Vfinite – [DPacc ein- β] (– Vnon-finite )

This state of affairs is not peculiar to German either. Similar sentences in other languages are claimed to be scope unambiguous: (2.6) a.

Italian (Delfitto 1984/85: 220) Ogni studente ammira un professore. ‘Every student admires a professor.’ b. Mandarin (Huang 1982: 112) Meige xuesheng dou mai-le yiben shu. every student all buy-aspect one book ‘Every student bought one book.’ c. Mandarin (Aoun/Li 1989: 141) Meigeren dou xihuan yibe nuren. everyone all love one woman ‘Everyone loves one woman.’ d. Japanese (Hoji 1985: 65) Daremo-ga dareka-o aisiteiru. everyone-nom someone-acc love ‘Everyone loves someone.’ e. Korean (Joo 1989: 183) Nuku-na nuku-lul saranghanda. everyone-nom someone-acc love ‘Everyone loves someone.’ f. Hungarian (Kiss 1994: 61f.) Minden tanár több kérdés-t is meg válaszolt every teacher several questions-acc even preverb answered ‘Every teacher answered several questions.’ g. Polish (Karnowski 2001: 430) Ka˙zdy germanista przeczytał (przynajmniej) jedna˛ every student.of.German read at.least one powie´sć Bölla. novel Böll ‘Every student of German read (at least) one Böll novel.’

Whether the facts are similar in Dutch and French is not clear, as far as the judgments of my informants are concerned. English is the only language where






it has been claimed by some researchers that such sentences are clearly ambiguous – but other researchers disagree (see below for references). Sentences of the form (2.5) remain unambiguous if the quantity expression of the subject is substituted by alle ‘all’, die meisten ‘most’, viele ‘many’, manche/mancher ‘many a’, einige ‘some’ [pl.], mehrere ‘several’ or a numeral. They also remain unambiguous if, instead, the quantity expression of the object is substituted by one of these expressions. If the quantity expressions of subject and object are simultaneously exchanged, the sentences also remain unambiguous. Let us ascertain with some examples whether these substitutions indeed preserve the unambiguity. Sentences (2.7) and (2.8) do not have a reading with wide scope of the object as the question-answer pairs in (2.9) and (2.10) show. (I have opted not to list the other test results; remember that the asterix indicates that the question-answer sequence is not well-formed.) (2.7) Jeder Pianist hat mehrere Fugen in seinem Repertoire. ‘Every piano player has several fugues in his repertoire.’ (2.8) Mehrere Pianisten haben jede Fuge in ihrem Repertoire. ‘Several piano players have every fugue in their repertoire.’ (2.9) a. *Von wie vielen Fugen kann man sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘How many fugues are such that every piano player has them in his repertoire?’ Jeder Pianist hat mehrere Fugen in seinem Repertoire. b. *Kann man von mehreren Fugen sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? ‘Are several fugues such that every piano player has them in his repertoire?’ (Ja,) jeder Pianist hat mehrere Fugen in seinem Repertoire. (2.10) a. *Von wie vielen Fugen kann man sagen, dass mehrere Pianisten sie in ihrem Repertoire haben? ‘How many fugues are such that several piano players have them in their repertoire?’ Mehrere Pianisten haben jede Fuge in ihrem Repertoire. b. *Kann man von jeder Fuge sagen, dass mehrere Pianisten sie in ihrem Repertoire haben? ‘Is every fugue such that several piano players have it in their repertoire?’ (Ja,) mehrere Pianisten haben jede Fuge in ihrem Repertoire.


The same is true for sentences (2.11) and (2.12): (2.11) Mehrere Pianisten haben die meisten Fugen in ihrem Repertoire. ‘Several piano players have most fugues in their repertoire.’ (2.12) Die meisten Pianisten haben mehrere Fugen in ihrem Repertoire. ‘Most piano players have several fugues in their repertoire.’ (2.13) a. *Von wie vielen Fugen kann man sagen, dass mehrere Pianisten sie in ihrem Repertoire haben? ‘How many fugues are such that several piano players have them in their repertoire?’ Mehrere Pianisten haben die meisten Fugen in ihrem Repertoire. b. *Kann man von den meisten Fugen sagen, dass mehrere Pianisten sie in ihrem Repertoire haben? ‘Are most fugues such that several piano players have them in their repertoire?’ (Ja,) mehrere Pianisten haben die meisten Fugen in ihrem Repertoire. (2.14) a. *Von wie vielen Fugen kann man sagen, dass die meisten Pianisten sie in ihrem Repertoire haben? ‘How many fugues are such that most piano players have them in their repertoire?’ Die meisten Pianisten haben mehrere Fugen in ihrem Repertoire. b. *Kann man von mehreren Fugen sagen, dass die meisten Pianisten sie in ihrem Repertoire haben? ‘Are several fugues such that most piano players have them in their repertoire?’ (Ja,) die meisten Pianisten haben mehrere Fugen in ihrem Repertoire.

Sentences with two numerals as quantity expressions behave alike: (2.15) Zwei Pianisten haben drei Fugen in ihrem Repertoire. ‘Two piano players have three fugues in their repertoire.’

This sentence’s most natural reading is the one where each of two piano players is such that he has three fugues in his repertoire. But it cannot have the reading where each of three fugues is such that two piano players have it in their repertoire. This seems to be the outcome of the test for contradiction. The following sequence should not be an obvious contradiction if the reading with wide scope of drei Fugen were possible.






(2.16) *Zwei Pianisten haben drei Fugen in ihrem Repertoire. Aber kein Pianist hat mehr als eine Fuge in seinem Repertoire. ‘Two piano players have three fugues in their repertoire. But no piano player has more than one fugue in his repertoire.’

The situation in several languages is quite similar with respect to active sentences with the subject preceding the direct object. They are unambiguous and the kind of quantity expression – or kind of quantifier – seems to have no perceptible influence on scope (for Italian see Delfitto 1984/1985; Longobardi 1988; for Japanese Kuroda 1970; Kuno 1973; Hoji 1985, 1986; for Mandarin Huang 1981; Huang 1982, 1993; Lee 1986; Aoun/Li 1989; Liu 1990, 1997): (2.17) a.

Italian (Delfitto 1984/1985: 216) Tre poliziotti hanno perquisito tre appartamenti. ‘Three policemen have searched three apartments.’ b. Italian (Longobardi 1988: 681) Molti studenti hanno acquistato due libri. ‘Many students have bought two books.’ c. Japanese (Hoji 1985: 236; cf. Kuroda 1970: 136) (Kono ie-no) dareka-ga (kono heya-no) subete-no this house-gen someone-nom this room-gen all-gen hon-o yonda. book-acc read ‘Someone (in this house) read all the books (in this room).’ d. Japanese (Hoji 1985: 238; cf. Kuno 1973: 360) Yonin-no syoonen-ga sannin-no syoozyo-o syootaisita. four-gen boy-nom three-gen girl-acc invited ‘Four boys invited three girls.’ e. Mandarin (Aoun/Li 1989: 141) Yaoshi liangge ren zhaodao meige xiansuo ... if two men found every clue ‘If two men found every clue, ...’ f. Dutch (according to my informants; cf. Verkuyl 1988; Ruys 1992: 106) Twee pianisten hebben drie fuga’s in hun repertoire. ‘Two piano players have three fugues in their repertoire.’ g. Dutch (Ruys 1992: 105) Op twee na alle mannen versloegen drie vrouwen. ‘All but two men defeated three women.’

English seems to differ significantly according to many researchers who take sentences of this form to be ambiguous (see, among others, Katz/Postal 1964;


McCawley 1970; Kroch 1974; May 1977, 1985, 1989; Huang 1982; Cooper 1983; Haïk 1984; Hornstein 1984; Higginbotham 1985; Williams 1988). But, according to many other researches, at least some kinds of sentences of this form are unambiguous (see, among others, Chomsky 1957; Lakoff 1971; Kuno 1971, 1973; Reinhart 1976, 1979, 1983; Kempson/Cormack 1981; Fodor/Sag 1982; McCawley 1988; Verkuyl 1988; Ruys 1992; Kamp/Reyle 1993; Abusch 1994; Hornstein 1995; Beghelli/Stowell 1997). As far as I can see, a sentence like Two piano players have three fugues in their repertoire is as scope unambiguous as its Dutch and German counterparts. (2.18) *Two piano players have three fugues in their repertoire. But no piano player has more than one fugue in his repertoire.

Comparing wh/Q-interaction in English and German in §5.2, I will come to conjecture that scope relations in English and German seem very similar. If we turn our attention back to German, even sentence (2.19) seems to be unambiguous, no matter what intonation is used. (2.19) Ein Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem Repertoire. ‘One piano player has every fugue in his repertoire.’ (2.20) *Ein Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem Repertoire. Aber kein Pianist hat mehr als eine Fuge in seinem Repertoire. ‘One piano player has every fugue in his repertoire. But no piano player has more than one fugue in his repertoire.’

Let us come back to sentences of the form: (2.3)

[DPacc ein- β] – Vfinite – [DPnom jed- α] (– Vnon-finite )

If one substitutes the quantity expressions in (2.3), the result is not always an ambiguous sentence. The sentences in (2.21) are ambiguous, but in sentence (2.22) wide scope of the subject ein Pianist is for many speakers impossible.2 A few take it as only just possible. (2.21) Eine Fuge haben die meisten (/viele, alle) Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. ‘One fugue, most (/many, all) piano players have in their repertoire.’ (2.22) Jede Fuge hat ein Pianist in seinem Repertoire. ‘Every fugue, one piano player has in his repertoire.’

Thus, (2.22)’s scope potential differs from the scope potential of (2.19) Ein Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem Repertoire. This difference is borne out by the following sequences:






(2.23) a.

Ein oder zwei Fugen haben die meisten (/viele, alle) Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. Aber EIN Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem Repertoire. ‘One fugue, most (/many, all) piano players have in their repertoire. But one piano player has every fugue in his repertoire.’ b. ??Ein oder zwei Fugen haben die meisten (/viele, alle) Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. Aber jede Fuge hat EIN Pianist in seinem Repertoire. ‘One fugue, most (/many, all) piano players have in their repertoire. But every fugue, one piano player has in his repertoire.’

This difference in the readings’ availability or preference must be due to grammatical reasons and not to knowledge about what the world is like, as it is the one and the same reading which is differently preferred. This is a clear piece of evidence that scope determination, including the determination of the readings’ preference value, is, for a great part, a sentence-internal, grammatical process. More on this later. These are some basic patterns of Q/Q-interaction in German, i.e., the scope relations between what I have called simple DP-quantifiers in §1.2.2. When we look now at the determinants of relative scope we will find more patterns. Now, it is tempting to assume that relative scope is directly determined by the syntactic structure, that is, tempting to assume that relative scope can be determined by looking at the c-command relations of the quantifiers and their traces. If a sentence has the form in (2.24a) it is scope unambiguous; if it has the form in (2.24b) it is ambiguous (t is the trace of the co-indexed quantifier): (2.24) a. [Q1 – Vfinite – t1 – Q2 (– Vnon-finite )] b. [Q2 – Vfinite – Q1 – t2 (– Vnon-finite )]

We will see step by step that this cannot be the right explanation (see §6.1 for a summary of the problems of “configurational theories”). The fact that things are not so easy can be seen with sentences like (2.25). (2.25) a.

[Eine von den Aufgaben]1 hat jeder, der sie1 gestellt one of the problems has everyone who she pose bekam, gelöst. got solved ‘One of the problems is such that everyone who had to solve it solved it eventually.’ b. [Welche Aufgabe]1 hat jeder, der sie1 gestellt bekam, gelöst? which problem has everyone who she pose got solved ‘Which problem is such that everyone who had to solve it solved it eventually?’


Assuming a syntactic structure as in (2.24b), one finds that these sentences exhibit a configuration which is called Weak Cross Over (WCO) configuration: (2.26) XP1 ... [... α1 ...] ... t1 ... (α being the pronoun and t the trace of the XP in the Vorfeld)

A typical example for a WCO configuration is (2.27): (2.27) *Who1 does his1 mother love t1

Sentences with a WCO configuration are generally taken to be unacceptable. If, however, the principle which makes (2.27) unacceptable is universal, the sentences in (2.25) cannot have the structure (2.24b) or (2.26). One easy way out is to assume that they have a structure like (2.28). But then we lose the possibility of explaining the relative scope relations via the syntactic configurations as in (2.24). (2.28) [Q2 – Vfinite – t2 – Q1 (– Vnon-fnite )] [XP2 – Vfinite – t2 – [YP ... α2 ...] (– Vnon-finite )]

This is but a first hint that relative scope determination is not so easy as the picture (2.24) suggests. For more on the relation between relative scope and word order see §2.2.1 and §2.4.1. For more on the role of traces for scope see §3.2.

. The properties determining relative scope Relative scope is a multi-factor phenomenon. This was emphasized quite early in the research on relative scope, namely by Kroch (1974), Ioup (1975a, b) and VanLehn (1978), but it has fallen into disregard since then. In the 1990s, however, such a view has found new supporters from different quarters (Alshawi (Ed.) 1992; Kuno 1991; Kuno/Takami/Wu 1999; Kurtzman/MacDonald 1993; Liu 1990, 1997; Pafel 1991b, 1993, 1998; the contributors in Szabolcsi (Ed.) 1997). As far as I can see, one can identify no less than 13 properties that determine relative scope. These properties can be divided into eight groups: (2.29) Relative scope properties – syntactic constellation: – grammatical function:

1. internal precedence (in-pre) 2. external precedence (ex-pre) 3. sentential adverbial (s-adv) 4. subject (subject)






– thematic property: – distributivity: – d(iscourse)-binding: – definiteness: – focus: – negation attraction:

5. strong patient (st-pat) 6. weak patient (we-pat) 7. inherent distributivity (in-dis) 8. strong distributivity (st-dis) 9. lexical d-binding (l-db) 10. syntactic d-binding (s-db) 11. definiteness (def) 12. focusing (focus) 13. negation attraction (neg-att)

I will introduce these properties one by one presenting the evidence why they should be assumed as determinants of relative scope (not in every case is the evidence such that it is unequivocally clear which property is at stake). It will be immediately obvious that these properties’ influence on the scope potential of a sentence is not equal. Some are stronger or have more weight than others. Thus, a model of relative scope determination like the following one suggests itself: (i) relative to each property it satisfies, a quantifier receives a numerical value whose amount depends on the weight of the property; (ii) these values make up the “scope value” of a quantifier; (iii) the scope potential of a sentence is computed through the pairwise comparison of the scope values of the quantifiers of the sentence. This model will be made more precise in §2.3. .. Syntactic constellation The syntactic constellation, i.e., linear precedence or c-command, has a strong influence on the scope potential. The contrast between (2.2) and (2.1) as well as (2.30) and (2.31) is clear evidence of this. The existential quantifier eine Beethoven-Sonate cannot have wide scope if the universal quantifier precedes or c-commands it. But it can have wide scope if it precedes or c-commands the other quantifier. (2.2)

Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. every piano.player has one Beethoven-sonata in his repertoire √ jeder>eine: eine>jeder:

(2.1)

Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. one Beethoven-sonata has every piano.player in his repertoire √ eine>jeder: √ jeder>eine: (slightly preferred)


(2.30) Es hat jeder Pianist eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem it has every piano.player one Beethoven-sonata in his Repertoire. repertoire √ jeder>eine: eine>jeder: (2.31) Es hat eine Beethoven-Sonate jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. √ eine>jeder: (preferred) √ jeder>eine:

The same is shown by the contrast between (2.19) and (2.22) as well as (2.32) and (2.33). (2.19) Ein Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem Repertoire. one piano.player has every fugue in his repertoire √ ein>jede: jede>ein: (2.22) Jede Fuge hat ein Pianist in seinem Repertoire. every fugue has one piano.player in his repertoire √ jede>ein: ein>jede: % (some speakers take it to be possible) (2.32) Doch hat ein Pianist jede Fuge in seinem Repertoire. but has one piano.player every fugue in his repertoire √ ein>jede: jede>ein: (2.33) Doch hat jede Fuge ein Pianist in seinem Repertoire. but has every fugue one piano.player in his repertoire √ jede>ein: ein>jede:

Note that it makes a slight difference for the scope potential whether the preceding or c-commanding quantifier is located in the Vorfeld or in the Mittelfeld:3 in (2.31) the strong reading is the preferred one, in (2.1), however, it is the weak reading which is the preferred one. Thus, it seems that the wide-scope reading of the linear preceding or c-commanding quantifier is more preferred if the quantifier is located in the Mittelfeld than when it occurs in the Vorfeld. This effect is clearer with the sentences in (2.34).






(2.34) a.

Ein Produkt hat jeden Test bestanden. √ ein>jeden: √ jeden>ein: (with a certain intonation) ‘One product passed every test.’ b. Es hat ein Produkt jeden Test bestanden. √ ein>jeden: jeden>ein:

Sentence (a) has a wide-scope reading of the universal quantifier given a certain intonation (especially, a rising accent on ein – see §2.2.7). However, there is no intonation which would make this reading possible in (b). This effect has nothing to do with any special properties of the Vorfeld, as wh/Q-interaction shows. Here, we find a similar pattern as we observed in §2.1, sentences of the form “subject preceding object” being unambiguous, sentences of the form “direct object preceding subject” being ambiguous. (2.35) a.

Welcher Kritiker hat jeden Roman rezensieren müssen? which critic has every novel review must (unambiguous) R1 Which critic is such that he had to review every novel? R2 For every novel: which critic had to review it? b. Welchen Roman hat jeder Kritiker rezensieren müssen? which novel has every critic review must (ambiguous) R1 Which novel is such that every critic had to review it? R2 For every critic: which novel did he have to review?

The pair-list reading (cf. (1.42)) is possible in (b), but not in (a). As for scope, nothing changes if the interrogatives get embedded: (a) is unambiguous, (b) is ambiguous. (2.36) a.

Sie weiß, welcher Kritiker jeden Roman hat rezensieren müssen. ‘She knows which critic had to review every novel.’ b. Sie weiß, welchen Roman jeder Kritiker hat rezensieren müssen. ‘She knows which novel every critic had to review.’

This means that, as far as scope relations are concerned, the Vorfeld and the COMP-position (in embedded clauses) are equal. This result is strengthened by looking at rel/Q-interaction, i.e., scope interaction between relative phrases and ordinary quantifiers. Once more, the same pattern occurs: (a) is unambiguous, (b) ambiguous.


(2.37) a.

die Kritiker, die jeden Roman rezensiert haben ‘the critics which reviewed every novel’ b. die Romane, die jeder Kritiker rezensiert hat ‘the novels which every critic reviewed’

The fact that the wide-scope reading of the linear preceding or c-commanding quantifier is more preferred if the quantifier is located in the Mittelfeld than when it occurs in the Vorfeld can be observed with interrogative quantifiers too. Whereas (2.38a) is clearly ambiguous, (2.38b) is not. (2.38) a.

Wie viele Schüler haben jede Aufgabe gelöst? ‘How many students have solved every problem?’ b. Wann haben wie viele Schüler jede Aufgabe gelöst? ‘When did how many students solve every problem?’

Up to now, I see no possibility to attribute this effect to a (syntactic or nonsyntactic) factor besides syntactic constellation. To elucidate the nature of syntactic constellation, we should try to decide whether precedence or c-command is relevant. The sentences we investigated are not very instructive in this respect, as the sentences have a structure where one cannot decide whether precedence or c-command is crucial. More instructive in this respect are the relations between attributive quantifiers inside a noun phrase, i.e., the scope relations between quantificational PP or genitive attributes in noun phrases. It seems that the preceding quantifier generally has unequivocally wide scope: (2.39) a.

Die Bilder eines jeden Hofmalers von mindestens einem Mitglied der Königsfamilie ‘The pictures of every painter of at least one member of the royal family’ b. Die Bilder eines Hofmalers von jedem Mitglied der Königsfamilie ‘The pictures of one painter of every member of the royal family’

(2.40) a.

Die Angst von jedem von uns vor mindestens einem von euch ‘The fear of every one of us of at least one of you’ b. Die Angst von mindestens einem von uns vor jedem von euch ‘The fear of at least one of us of every one of you’

These data are crucial to our question if these noun phrases have a structure like (2.41) – XP being a genitive noun phrase or a prepositional phrase: (2.41) [D (NP [N XP] PP)]






If syntactic constellation means linear precedence, it is expected that XP can have wide scope. If, on the other hand, syntactic constellation means ccommand (first-branching-type), it is expected that PP (or, the quantifier included in the PP) can have wide scope.4 M-command does not help as there seems to be no way for XP to m-command PP asymmetrically. If a structure like (2.41) is the adequate one, then precedence is the relevant property. If, however, a structure as in (2.42) is adequate – where noun-phraseinternal N-movement is assumed – the scope relations between genitive and PP-attributes are not crucial to our question. (2.42) a. [D (αi [XP (PP [N ti ])])] b. [D (αi [XP ([N ti ] PP)])]

In §1.3.1 I have presented arguments in favour of the structure (2.41). With this background I assume that linear precedence is the relevant property we have been observing at work in this section. Now, we can come back to the fact that the wide-scope reading of the linear preceding quantifier is more preferred if the quantifier is located in the Mittelfeld rather than in the Vorfeld or in the COMP-position. As for the syntactic structure of the German clause, I assumed that a clause is the projection of a functional element (‘S’) which has a substantial phrase (namely, VP) as complement, i.e., does not have a functional phrase as complement (see §1.3.2). With this background, the quantifiers in the Mittelfeld are all contained in the VP-complement of S. In other words, quantifiers in the Mittelfeld have the same “domain” – with an element’s domain being the smallest phrase which the element is properly contained in and which is not the head of a further phrase. See sentence (2.43a) for an illustration: the two quantifiers in the Mittelfeld have the same domain, namely, VPc (VPb is not the domain of einige Fugen as VPb is the head of VPc ). (2.43) a.

dass jeder Pianist einige Fugen spielt ‘that every piano player plays some fugues’ b. [SP dass [VPc [DP jeder Pianist] [VPb [DP einige Fugen] [VPa [V spielt]]]]]

If, however, a quantifier is moved into the Vorfeld its domain is no longer the VP, but the sentential phrase (SP). Therefore, I assume that, as for syntactic constellation, two properties determining relative scope have to be distinguished: external and internal precedence.


Quantifier α has the property of internal precedence (in-pre) relative to quantifier β iff α linearly precedes β and α’s domain is identical with β’s. b. Quantifier α has the property of external precedence (ex-pre) relative to quantifier β iff α linearly precedes β and α’s domain is not identical with β’s.

(2.44) a.

A quantifier in the Vorfeld as well as the COMP-position externally precedes a quantifier in the Mittelfeld as, in both cases, it is not longer part of the VP. Now, we might say that the fact that the wide-scope reading of the linear preceding quantifier is more preferred if the quantifier is located in the Mittelfeld rather than in the Vorfeld or in the COMP-position is due to the fact that the property of internal precedence has more weight than the property of external precedence with respect to relative scope. It is not possible to take the external/internal-distinction as an additional scope factor besides precedence. The reason is that having the same domain is a symmetrical relation. If precedence and the external/internal-distinction are taken apart the relevant effect cannot be explained. If quantifiers are given numerical values adding up to their scope value depending on the properties they have, then the relation between the scope values of two quantifiers, whose relative scope has to be computed, cannot differ with the position of the preceding quantifier: as having the same domain is a symmetrical relation, only precedence counts, but there is no difference with respect to precedence. If syntactic constellation is understood as proposed, then it does not matter whether the syntactic structure is right or left-headed. So it is possible to disprove our view by looking at languages where the arguments of the verb can be right adjuncts to VP, except in German, where they can be left adjuncts to VP. (2.45) a. [VP [VP [VP V ...] XP1 ] XP2 ] b. [VP XP1 [VP XP2 [VP ... V]]]

.. Grammatical function The different scope potential of sentences (2.19) and (2.46) indicates that the quantifiers’ grammatical function has some influence on relative scope: a quantifier has a stronger tendency to wide scope as a subject than as a direct object. (2.19) Ein Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem Repertoire. √ ein>jede: jede>ein:

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


(2.46) Eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. √ eine>jeder: √ jeder>eine:

The syntactic constellation between the existential quantifier and the universal quantifier is identical in both sentences. It cannot be responsible for the difference. But it might be that the different thematic roles of the existential and the universal quantifier make a contribution to the scope difference. Active/passive pairs like the following one should help clarify the relation of grammatical function and thematic roles with respect to scope potential. (2.47) a.

Einen Roman hat jeder Kritiker rezensiert. ‘One novel, every critic reviewed.’ b. Ein Roman wurde von jedem Kritiker rezensiert. ‘One novel was reviewed by every critic.’

It is quite uncontroversial to assume that the thematic role of the subject in (a) is identical to the role of the prepositional object in (b), and the role of the object in (a) identical to the role of the subject in (b). If (surface) grammatical functions had no relevance for scope, there would be no difference in the scope potential of the sentences – the existential quantifier would show the same tendency to wide scope in (a) and (b) with respect to the universal quantifier. However, this is not what we observe. Whereas (a) is clearly ambiguous, the weak reading is very hard, if not impossible, to get in (b). See quantifier binding as evidence. (2.48) a. Einen seiner1 Lieblingsromane hat [jeder Kritiker]1 rezensiert. b. *Einer seiner1 Lieblingsromane wurde von [jedem Kritiker]1 rezensiert. ‘Every critic reviewed one of his favourite novels.’

This shows that the different influence of subject and direct object on scope cannot be reduced to thematic properties. This, however, does not mean that thematic properties have no influence on scope, see §2.2.3. The different scope potential of the sentences (2.19) and (2.46) shows that being the subject is what is relevant for scope potential. From the fact that the two sentences have a different scope potential we can conclude that the values the quantifiers receive from the scope-relevant properties (save the grammatical function properties) cannot be identical. Otherwise, no difference in scope potential would show up, because the scope values of the quantifiers would stand in the same numerical relation when the values from the grammatical function properties were added, and the scope potentials would be the same.


Further we can assume that the values of the existential quantifiers with respect to the scope-relevant properties (save the grammatical function properties) are identical in both sentences. The same goes for the universal quantifiers. Quick reflection shows that we make the right predictions only if we assume that (i) the subject has greater weight than the direct object and that (ii) the value of the existential quantifiers in both sentences is higher than the value of the universal quantifiers with respect to the scope-relevant properties (save the grammatical function properties). In which case, one expects the strong reading in (2.19) to be dominant – the numerical difference between the scope values of the existential and the universal quantifiers increases – and one expects both readings to be possible in (2.46) – the difference in value of the quantifiers decreases or even vanishes. Not all objects behave alike. Indirect objects seem to be scopally ‘stronger’ than direct objects. This is evident in their relation to the subject: in (2.49), the strong reading only is preferred. But it is not the only possible reading. (2.49) Einer von uns hat jedem von euch bei der Prüfung geholfen. ‘One of us helped every one of you at the exam.’

This is also evident in the direct relation between the objects: the weak reading is easy to get in (2.50a) with the direct object in initial position, whereas such a reading is considerably harder to get in (2.50b) with the indirect object in initial position. (2.50) a.

Eines von den Märchen hat Jakob jedem Kind erzählt. ‘One of the fairy tales, John told every child.’ b. Einem der Kinder hat Jakob jedes Märchen erzählt. ‘One of the children, John told every fairy tale.’

This difference in the scope behavior between direct and indirect objects is, once more, nothing which would be peculiar to German (cf. Ioup 1975a, 1975b with respect to English and 13 other languages; Gil 1982: 458f. with respect to Dutch and Hebrew; see also the Japanese and Korean data reported by Hoji 1985; Joo 1989; Kim 1991). I will not assume a property ‘indirect object’, which is relevant for scope, in order to explain these differences. We will see in the next section that there are more differences between distinct kinds of objects which seem to require thematic considerations. If this is done, the contrast we have just observed can be related to these thematic considerations. Looking at further data, we see rather clearly that the behavior of the indirect objects has nothing to do with






their being dative objects, as nearly the same behavior is shown by accusative and prepositional objects: (2.51) a.

Zumindest einer von uns hat jedem von euch geholfen. (ambiguous) ‘At least one of us helped every one of you.’ b. Zumindest einer von uns hat jeden von euch unterstützt. (ambiguous) ‘At least one of us supported every one of you.’

(2.52) a.

Zumindest einer von uns hat jedem von euch geschrieben. at.least one of us has every-dat of you written (ambiguous) b. Zumindest einer von uns hat an jeden von euch at.least one of us has to every-acc of you geschrieben. (ambiguous) written ‘At least one of us wrote to every one of you.’

On the other hand, there are prepositional objects which behave like the accusative direct objects we have looked at so far. The following sentences seem to be unambiguous: (2.53) a.

Zumindest eine der Firmen hat auf jeden der Lieferanten warten müssen. ‘At least one of the firms had to wait for every supplier.’ b. Zumindest einer von uns hat sich in jede von euch verliebt. ‘At least one of us fell in love with every one of you.’ c. Zumindest einer der Holztische hat sich in jedem der Zimmer befunden. ‘At least one of the wood tables was in every one of the rooms.’ d. Zumindest einer von uns hat in jeder dieser Städte gewohnt. ‘At least one of us lived in every one of these cities.’

What about adverbials? First of all, what one might call ‘predicate adverbials’, like the manner adverb schnell ‘fast’, do not behave like quantifiers. See the following equivalences: (2.54)

Sie ist nicht schnell gelaufen. ‘She did not run fast.’ ↔ Schnell ist sie nicht gelaufen. ‘Fast, she did not run.’

(2.55)

Sie ist schnell [geschwommen oder gelaufen] ‘She swam or ran fast.’ ↔ Sie ist schnell geschwommen oder schnell gelaufen. ‘She swam fast or ran fast.’

(2.56)

Niemand ist schnell gelaufen. ‘Nobody ran fast.’ ↔ Schnell ist niemand gelaufen. ‘Fast, nobody ran.’


The same is true for the adverbial non-inflected adjective viel ‘much.’ The following two sentences are logically equivalent: (2.57)

Er hat nicht viel gearbeitet. ‘He did not work much.’ ↔ Viel hat er nicht gearbeitet. ‘Much, he did not work.’

This yields a clear contrast to the case where viel- is part of a DP-quantifier: (2.58) a.

Er hat nicht viele bearbeitet. (unambiguous) ‘He did not work on many ones.’ b. Viele hat er nicht bearbeitet. (ambiguous) ‘Many ones, he did not work on.’

Thus, it seems that predicate adverbials are not quantifiers. However, the wellknown contrast in (2.59) – cf. Lakoff (1972) among others – can be taken as evidence that there is scope interaction between adverb and quantifier. (2.59) a. Sam sliced all the bagels carefully. b. Sam carefully sliced all the bagels.

In (a), the reading which seems to be greatly preferred is the one where every bagel is such that the process by which it was sliced was carried out carefully. In (b), the reading seems to be preferred where the process by which every bagel was sliced was carried out carefully. As manner adverbs are expressions which modify a predicate phrase, the contrast with respect to the preferred reading is the result of distinct predicative phrases being modified: in (b), the quantifier belongs to the predicative phrase which is modified; in (a), it does not (cf. McConnell-Ginet 1982; Huck 1984). One might be tempted to speak of the scope of an adverb and describe the contrast as a difference in scope. I do not bother with this if one clearly distinguishes this kind of scope from quantifier scope. I do not take ‘predicate adverbials’ to be quantifiers. But there are quantifiers among what we are used to calling sentential adverbials (cf. the list in (1.31)). Frequency adverbials seem to be at least as strong as subjects. This is obvious from their behavior with respect to direct objects. In the answer in (2.60), the direct object cannot outscope the adverbial. (2.60) a. *Machte er jeden Fehler zweimal? Ja, zweimal machte er jeden Fehler. ‘Did he make every mistake twice? Yes, twice, he made every mistake.’

The fact that they are even stronger than subjects is indicated by the availability of the weak reading in (2.61a), in contrast to (b); see also (2.62).






(2.61) a.

Es konnte ein Mitarbeiter jedes Mal tun, was er wollte. (ambiguous) ‘One colleague could always do what he wanted.’ b. Es konnte einmal jeder Mitarbeiter tun, was er wollte. (unambiguous) ‘Once, every colleague could do what he wanted.’

(2.62)

Da zumindest einer von uns immer anspielbar ist, ... (ambiguous) ‘As one of us is always in position ...’ (sports)

Other kinds of sentential adverbials behave quite similarly to frequency adverbials. See, for example, locative adverbials, adverbs of metaphysical modality, and adverbs of epistemic modality. (2.63) a.

Überall arbeitet einer von uns. (unambiguous) ‘Everywhere one of us is working.’ b. Einer von uns arbeitet überall. (ambiguous) ‘One of us is working everywhere.’

(2.64) a.

Auf jeder Baustelle arbeitet einer von uns. (unambiguous) ‘On every building site one of us is working.’ b. Einer von uns arbeitet auf jeder Baustelle. (ambiguous) ‘One of us is working on every building site.’

(2.65) a.

Notwendigerweise ist einer von uns schuldig. (unambiguous) ‘Necessarily, one of us is guilty.’ b. Einer von uns ist notwendigerweise schuldig. (ambiguous) ‘One of us is necessarily guilty.’

(2.66) a.

Wahrscheinlich kann einer von uns tun, was er will. (unambiguous) ‘Probably, one of us can do what he wants.’ b. Einer von uns kann wahrscheinlich tun, was er will. (ambiguous) ‘One of us can probably do what he wants.’

Thus, I assume that, besides the grammatical function subject, the grammatical function sentential adverbial (s-adv) has an influence on relative scope, with s-adv having greater weight than subject. .. Thematic property Sentences of the kind (2.67) are scope unambiguous if the main verb belongs to the classes of verbs governing an accusative object in (2.68), these classes not being exhaustive. (2.67) [DPnom ein- β] – Vfinite – [DPacc jed- α] (– Vnon-finite )


(2.68) a.

abmessen ‘measure’, abzählen ‘count’, ansehen ‘look at’, austrinken ‘drain’, backen ‘bake’, beachten ‘observe’, bebauen ‘build on’, bedienen ‘serve’, befreien ‘free’, begehren ‘desire’, begutachten ‘assess’, belügen ‘lie’, berühren ‘touch’, besiegen ‘defeat’, besitzen ‘possess’, besuchen ‘visit’, erlernen ‘acquire’, heiraten ‘marry’, lösen ‘solve’, verstärken ‘strengthen’. b. bekommen ‘get’, bestehen ‘pass’, erhalten ‘receive’, brauchen ‘need’, besitzen ‘own’, finden ‘find’, verlieren ‘lose’, versäumen ‘miss’. c. einsehen ‘realise’, erkennen ‘recognize’, fürchten ‘fear’, glauben ‘believe’, hören ‘hear’, kennen ‘know’, mögen ‘like’, sehen ‘see’, vergessen ‘forget’, verstehen ‘understand’, wissen ‘know’, wollen ‘want’.

However, there is a class of verbs whose accusative objects have a scopal pecularity compared with the direct objects of the verbs in (2.68). They seem to have “stronger” scope, i.e., a greater tendency to wide scope. These verbs are psychological verbs where the experiencer is the object (as in Marie erschreckt Moritz ‘Mary frightens Maurice’), not the subject (as in Moritz fürchtet Marie ‘Maurice is afraid of Mary’). (2.69) ärgern ‘annoy’, beeindrucken ‘impress’, bedrängen ‘besiege’, belustigen ‘amuse’, beunruhigen ‘worry’, ekeln ‘loathe’, entmutigen ‘discourage’, erfreuen ‘please’, erschrecken ‘frighten’, erschüttern ‘bewilder’, freuen ‘rejoice at’, quälen ‘torment’, überraschen ‘surprise’, verärgern ‘annoy’, verblüffen ‘stagger’, verwirren ‘confuse’.

With verbs of this kind, sentences of the form (2.67) are ambiguous or even have only the wide-scope reading of the object (due to quantifier binding as in (d) and (f) below): (2.70) a.

Einer von den Kandidaten hat jeden Prüfer beeindruckt. ‘One of the candidats impressed every examiner.’ b. Eine der Warnungen hat jeden entmutigt. ‘One of the warnings discouraged everyone.’ c. Einer von uns hat jeden von euch entmutigt. ‘One of us discouraged every one of you.’ d. Einer von seinen1 Narren hat [jeden König]1 besonders erfreut. ‘One of his fools amused every king.’ e. Eines der Bilder hat jeden erschüttert. ‘One of the pictures bewildered everyone.’ f. Eine seiner1 Untaten quält [jeden von diesen Mördern]1 besonders. ‘One of his misdeeds torments every one of these murderers in particular.’

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g. Eine der Anschuldigungen hat jeden überrascht. ‘One of the charges surprised everyone.’

That there are two classes of psychological verbs is well-known. In many languages, one can distinguish classes corresponding to (2.68c) and (2.69) which have the same assignment of the experiencer role to subject or object (see, for instance, Croft 1993). The verbs in (2.69) with the experiencer as object have a causative component: they denote processes where one entity makes another entity enter a certain mental state. The verbs in (2.68c), however, mostly denote mental states directly. I will say that the person who is specified by the object in (2.69) is subject to a process. This is similar with respect to dative objects. There is a class of verbs whose dative objects have stronger scope than the dative objects of other verbs. The difference becomes perceptible in sentences of the following form: (2.71) [DPdat ein- β] – Vfinite – [DPnom jed- α] (– Vnon-finite )

With verbs like the ones in (2.72), such sentences are clearly ambiguous: (2.72) a.

absagen ‘cancel’, assistieren ‘assist’, auflauern ‘spy on’, ausweichen ‘evade’, Besuch abstatten ‘pay a visit’, danken ‘thank’, dienen ‘serve’, drohen ‘threaten’, folgen ‘follow’, fluchen ‘curse’, gehorchen ‘obey’, gratulieren ‘congratulate’, helfen ‘help’, nachblicken ‘follow with one’s eyes’, nachfolgen ‘succeed’, zürnen ‘be wrathful’, zuwinken ‘wave to’. b. gebühren ‘deserve’, gehören ‘belong to’, liegen ‘suit’, obliegen ‘come under’, zustehen ‘deserve’. c. ähneln, ähnlich sein ‘resemble’, entsprechen ‘correspond to’, gleichen, gleich sein ‘resemble’.

Some examples of clearly ambiguous sentences: (2.73) a.

Einem von euch hat jeder von uns geholfen. ‘One of you, every one of us helped.’ b. Einem Diplomaten ist jeder Agent gefolgt. ‘One diplomat, every agent followed.’ c. Einem von uns gehört jedes dieser Bücher. ‘One of us, every one of these books belongs to.’ d. Einem griechischem Gott ähnelt jeder römische Gott. ‘One Greek god, every Roman god resembles.’

This differs with the verbs in (2.74). The weak reading of the sentences in (2.75) is hardly possible.


(2.74) a.

geschehen, passieren ‘happen’, unterlaufen ‘make a mistake’, zustoßen ‘happen to someone’. b. entgehen ‘escape’, gelingen, glücken ‘succeed’, misslingen ‘fail’, nützen ‘help’. c. auffallen ‘be conspicuous’, behagen ‘please’, bekommen ‘obtain’, einfallen ‘occur’, gefallen ‘please’, missfallen ‘displease’, schmecken ‘taste’. d. schmilzen ‘melt’, umkippen ‘overturn’, verbrennen ‘burn’, zerreißen ‘rip’, zerbrechen ‘break’.

(2.75) a.

Einem (der) Kandidaten ist jede Lösung eingefallen. ‘One of the candidates, every solution occurred to.’ b. Einem von uns ist jeder der bekannten Anfängerfehler unterlaufen. One of us, every well-known beginner mistake occurred to.’ c. Einem der Mitstreiter ist jede Säule umgekippt. ‘With one of the allies, every pillar overturned.’ d. Einem von uns hat jeder Protest genützt. ‘One of us, every protest helped.’

This is not particular to German. It is reported that in Korean and Japanese (Kim/Larson 1989; Kim 1991), English (Kuno/Takami 1993: 160f.) and Polish (Karnowski/Meyer 2001: §3.5), objects of verbs of a very similar kind, especially psychological ones, show the same peculiar scope behavior. These classes of verbs have especially peculiar crosslinguistic behavior in many respects. Thus, it is not surprising that they also have a peculiar scope behavior. As there are typical unaccusative verbs among the verbs in (2.74), it might be tempting to assume that their peculiar scope behavior can be explained by their subjects being underlying objects. Firstly, however, such an assumption presupposes a configurational account of scope – relative scope determination based on the c-command relations of the quantifiers and their traces, an account which I think is inadequate (see §6.1). Secondly, such a move does not help us understand the peculiar scope behavior of the verbs in (2.69). For this reason, I will look at the semantics to find the property which might be crucial. Semantically, what the objects of the verbs in (2.69) and (2.74) seem to have in common is that the person who is specified by the object has many properties of a Proto-Patient (in the sense of Dowty 1991). He undergoes a change of state, is causally affected, has no control over the process or event. I will say that an object that specifies such an entity is a strong patient. We have seen above in §2.2.2 that there is some evidence that indirect objects usually have stronger scope than direct objects. In (2.49) we have seen that the object of helfen ‘help’ is scopally stronger than a direct object of verbs like

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


the ones in (2.68). The object of helfen, however, does not specify a strong patient – the person does not undergo a change of state, is not causally affected. Nevertheless, it is a patient, a weak patient, as I will say. This view can be generalized to some extent to the other verbs in (2.69). I propose that the thematic properties, strong patient (st-pat) and weak patient (we-pat), have an influence on relative scope with st-pat having greater weight than we-pat. This difference between weak and strong patients can, at least to an interesting degree, be found in theories of lexical semantics, where relative scope of quantifiers is of no concern. For instance, there is a relation to the action tier of the conceptual structures in Jackendoff (1990: Ch. 7). The action tier has the task of representing the affectedness structure of an event or state (Who affects whom?, partly also, How is this done?). Jackendoff assumes the relation AFF (affect) and defines the thematic roles “actor”, “patient” and “beneficiary” on the basis of this relation as follows: actor is the first argument of AFF (it is the one who affects something – intentionally or not), patient and beneficiary are the second argument of AFF with patient being negatively affected and beneficiary positively. To some interesting degree, Jackendoff ’s patient and beneficiary can be mapped onto our strong and weak patient. Jackendoff considers the schema “What happend to X?” as a test for patients. This schema can be applied to our strong patients, i.e., the objects of the verbs in (2.69) and (2.74). The objects of psychological verbs like erschrecken ‘frighten’ are indeed characterized by Jackendoff as patients. What differs from Jackendoff is that one cannot say with respect to all our strong patients that they are “negatively” affected (beeindrucken ‘impress’, erfreuen ‘rejoice’, etc.). To be negatively affected is only an additional feature. The test schema should not be biased in this respect. In German, for instance, Was ist X passiert? will be used in the negative case, but Was ist mit X passiert? is neutral. The object of helfen is characterized by Jackendoff as a beneficiary, and not as a patient. It is indeed strange to answer a question like Was ist (mit) Moritz passiert? ‘What happened to Maurice?’ by saying Marie hat ihm geholfen ‘Mary helped him’. But it is quite natural to answer the question Hat Marie etwas für ihn getan? ‘Did Mary do anything for him?’ by saying Ja, sie hat ihm geholfen ‘Yes, she helped him.’ As I do not hold strong patients generally to be negatively affected, Jackendoff ’s distinction cannot be maintained unchanged for our purposes. In addition, it is not possible to apply the schema “Did she do anything for X?” to all verbs in (2.72). It seems more promising to refer to the degree of affectedness as I have done, speaking of strong and weak patients.


.. Distributivity One can consider the difference between (2.22) and (2.46) as evidence that there is an “inherent” property of the quantifiers which has an influence on the scope potential, a property with respect to which quantifiers with jed- are stronger than quantifier with ein-. (2.22) Jede Fuge hat ein Pianist in seinem Repertoire. √ jede>ein: ein>jede: % (2.46) Eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. √ eine>jeder: √ jeder>eine:

As for quantifiers with jed-, one can say that if a quantifier with the quantity expression α can have wide scope in a sentence, then a quantifier with jed- instead of α can have wide scope too, but not the other way round. It can happen that a quantifier with jed- can have wide scope, but a quantifier with another quantity expression in the position of the universal quantifier cannot. The distinct influence of the different quantity expressions in German can be accounted for by a scale of roughly the following form: (2.76)

(ein-) jed- ‘every’, (ein-) manch- [sg.] ‘many a’ d- meist- ‘most’, beid- ‘both’, viel- ‘many’, all- ‘all’, manch- [pl.] ‘some’ mehrer- ‘several’, einig- ‘some’, cardinals

The higher one moves on this scale, the stronger the tendency for wide scope becomes. The special status of jed- and manch- [sg.] surfaces in sentences like Ein Mann liebt jede Frau ‘One man loves every woman’ and Ein Mann liebt manche Frau ‘One man loves many a woman’, which have a reading with wide scope of the object (although this is not the preferred reading). With no other quantity expression does this seem to be the case, e.g., not with all- (Ein Mann liebt alle Frauen ‘One man loves all women’). Quantifiers with jed- and manch- [sg.] differ from all others in that they are inherently distributive, i.e., they only have a reading where one distributes over a plurality and where a statement on the parts of this plurality is made. They do not have a group reading where a statement on a plurality as a whole is made.

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


In wh/Q-interaction too, it can be observed that inherent distributivity is scope relevant. The sentences in (2.77) are ambiguous, i.e., they have a distributive reading, but the sentences in (2.78) do not display a distributive reading: (2.77) a.

Welches Stück hat jeder bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt? ‘Which piece did everyone play at the final exam?’ b. Wer hat jedem bei der Vorbereitung geholfen? ‘Who helped everyone with the preparations?’

(2.78) a.

Welches Stück haben die meisten (/alle, viele, einige) bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt? ‘Which piece did most (/all, many, some) play at the final exam?’ b. Wer hat den meisten (/allen, vielen, einigen) bei der Vorbereitung geholfen? ‘Who helped most (/all, many, some) people with the preparations?’

Sometimes it is claimed that quantifiers with quantity expressions equivalent to die meisten and viele are inherently distributive (“quantificational”), see Roberts (1987: §3.3) for most and many, and Higginbotham (1987: 43f.) for most (he takes a group reading to be possible with many). As for German, this is not the case. There are non-distributive readings of quantifiers with die meisten and viele: Die meisten Ereignisse lassen sich nahtlos aneinanderfügen ‘Most events can be linked seamlessly’; Sie umfasst viele verschiedene Verwendungsweisen ‘It encompasses many different uses’ (see also 2.83a und 2.84a below). As for English, Kamp/Reyle (1993: §4.4.6) come to a similar conclusion. Let us come back to scale (2.76). It is more subtle to find a difference between the non-inherently distributive quantifiers. The difference seems to manifest itself only in distinct degrees of the scope readings’ preference. In (2.79a) wide scope of the subject is easily possible, not so in (b). (2.79) a.

Eine Fuge haben die meisten (/beide, viele, alle) Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. ‘One fugue, most (/both, many, all) piano players have in their repertoire.’ b. Eine Fuge haben einige (/mehrere, zwei) Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. ‘One fugue, some (/several, two) piano players have in their repertoire.’

As in (2.22) and (2.46), there is a difference in (2.80):


(2.80) a.

Einige Fugen haben die meisten Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. √ einige>die meisten: √ die meisten>einige: b. Die meisten Fugen haben einige Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. √ die meisten>einige: einige>die meisten: hardly possible

Nothing else but the quantity expressions themselves can be responsible for this difference. There is no comparable difference if one considers quantity expressions with the same rank according to (2.76): (2.81) a.

Einige Fugen haben mehrere Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. √ einige>mehrere: mehrere>einige: hardly possible b. Mehrere Fugen haben einige Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. √ mehrere>einige: einige>mehrere: hardly possible

The classes of quantity expressions – d- meist-, beid-, viel-, all-, manch- [pl.], on the one hand, and mehrer-, einig-, the cardinals, on the other – differ in the degree to which they induce a distributive reading of the quantifier they are part of: (2.82) a.

Die meisten (/viele, alle) Kinder haben ein Floß gebaut. ‘Most (/many, all) children built a raft.’ b. Einige (/mehrere, zwei) Kinder haben ein Floß gebaut. ‘Some (/several, two) children built a raft.’

Whereas in (a), the distributive reading is at least as preferred as the nondistributive reading (as for die meisten, the distributive reading seems to be dominant), in (b) the non-distributive reading is dominant. These are subtle, but nevertheless perceptible, differences. With collective predicates a difference can be observed too. The sentences in (2.83a) are not completely acceptable. Without gemeinsam ‘jointly’, however, they would be perfect. The aspect of collectivity introduced by gemeinsam seems not to be fully compatible with the strongly distributive character of die meisten, viele and alle. These sentences support a reading of the kind that there have been several groups of us such that the members of the group spend the evening in the central café (cf. Schütze 1989). Fully acceptable, however, are the sentences in (b).

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(2.83) a. ?Die meisten (/viele, alle) von uns haben den Abend gemeinsam im Zentralcafé verbracht. ‘Most (/many, all) of us spent the evening together in the central café.’ b. Mehrere (/einige, vier) von uns haben den Abend gemeinsam im Zentralcafé verbracht. ‘Several (/some, four) of us spent the evening together in the central café.’

A similar contrast arises with the verb trennen ‘separate’, which enforces strong collectivity on the side of the subject (cf., once more, Schütze 1989). (2.84) a.

Die meisten (/viele, alle) Freunde mussten sich für lange Zeit voneinander trennen. ‘Most (/many, all) friends had to separate from one another for a long time.’ b. Mehrere (/einige, vier) Freunde mussten sich für lange Zeit voneinander trennen. ‘Several (/some, four) friends had to separate from one another for a long time.’

With respect to distributivity, we can, thus, distinguish three different classes of quantifiers: the inherently distributive ones, the strongly distributive ones and the weakly distributive ones. I will consider inherent distributivity (indis) and strong distributivity (st-dis) to be scope-relevant properties. In scale (2.76), the quantity expression eindoes not occur. As we have seen in the contrast between (2.22) and (2.46), quantifiers with jed- and ein- differ inherently. Thus, ein- cannot be inherently distributive. I understand distributivity hereby in such a way that a quantifier can have a distributive reading only if it specifies a proper plurality. Interpreting an expression in a distributive way means that an implicit quantifier, namely the distributor, comes into play. It has the form “every individual with the property φ which is part of y” (cf. §1.4.2), with the distributor requiring that y is a proper plurality, i.e., consists of more than one φ. A sentence like The spectators got to their heads with their hands is interpreted in the distributive reading as “Each (spectator) of the plurality denoted by the spectators got to his head with his hands.” The distributive interpretation of Most spectators got with their hands to their head looks like “There is a plurality x which consists of most spectators such that each (spectator) of the plurality denoted by x got with his hand to his head”. That means that the distributor’s domain of quantification consists of the values of the variable introduced by the explicit quantifier (most spectators). A quantifier with the


quantity expresson ein- cannot induce a distributive interpretation as it does not satisfy the distributor’s requirement for a proper plurality. Distributivity can only be a scope factor if it is independent of scope, i.e., if it is not itself a scope phenomenon. Distributivity and scope are, indeed, conceptually independent: one cannot identify the distributive reading of a sentence with a certain scope relation and the non-distributive reading with another. For instance, the sentence Jakob hat einigen Kindern ein Märchen erzählt ‘John told some children one fairy tale’ has two readings, a dominant group reading (“John told a group of some children one fairy tale”) and a less preferred distributive reading (“Each child of a group of some children was told one fairy tale by John”). Both theoretically-possible scope readings of the sentence have a distributive and a non-distributive reading: the reading “One fairy tale is such that John told it to some children” and the reading “Some children are such that John told them one fairy tale” can be interpreted in both ways. Thus, distributivity is independent of scope. As a matter of fact, the sentence has unambiguous scope. The readings it exhibits are the ones which are possible if the indirect object has scope over the direct object. .. Discourse-binding In the contrast between (2.85) and (2.86) we see that the “structure” of an existential quantifier can be relevant for scope. Whereas (2.85), under certain circumstances, displays a weak reading, (2.86) does not – under any circumstances. (2.85) Ein Produkt hat jeden Test bestanden. ‘One product passed every test.’ √ ein>jeden: (clearly preferred) √ jeden>ein: (2.86) Eines der Produkte hat jeden Test bestanden. √ eines>jeden: jeden>eines: ‘One of the products passed every test.’

A partitive quantifier seems to have a stronger tendency to wide scope than its non-partitive counterpart. This can be observed in wh/Q-interaction too. Whereas the sentences in (2.87) are clearly ambiguous, the non-distributive reading is very dominant in (2.88), perhaps even the only possible reading.

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


(2.87) a. Welches Stück hat jeder bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt? [=2.77a] b. Welche Note hat jeder bekommen? ‘Which grade did everyone get?’ c. Wer hat jedem bei der Vorbereitung geholfen? [=2.77b] (2.88) a.

Welches von den Stücken hat jeder bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt? ‘Which of the pieces did everyone play at the final exam?’ b. Welche von den Noten hat jeder bekommen? ‘Which of the grades did everyone get?’ c. Wer von euch hat jedem bei der Vorbereitung geholfen? ‘Which one of you helped everyone with the preparations?’

The distributive reading seems to become stronger again when the universal quantifier becomes partitive: (2.89) a.

Welche von den Aufgaben hat jeder von euch gelöst? ‘Which of the problems did every one of you solve?’ b. Welches von den Stücken hat jeder von euch bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt? ‘Which of the pieces did every one of you play at the final exam?’

The partitive and non-partitive quantifier differ in how they specify the entities they quantify over. The partitive quantifier explicitly takes the entities from the set of entities already established by the discourse. I will say that quantifiers can differ with respect to syntactic d(iscourse)-binding. A partitive quantifier is syntactically d-bound as, at syntactic structure, it contains an expression which refers to discourse entities. A non-partitive quantifier is not syntactically d-bound, but it can be lexically d-bound if it has the lexical property that it refers to discourse entities at the level of semantic structure. Some quantifiers are inherently d-bound, e.g., each-quantifiers. Each is inherently distributive as jed-, but in contrast to jed-, quantifiers with each cannot be negated and – this is what interests us here – they are inherently dbound: “[The sentence Every dog has a tail] can be construed as a claim about dogs in general, whereas [the sentence Each dog has a tail] must be construed as [a] claim about a particular set of dogs previously mentioned in the discourse” (Beghelli/Stowell 1997: 100). It is clear that jed- behaves like every in this respect. Lexical d-binding might help us understand the fact that different kinds of wh-phrases have different scopal weight. In (2.90), sentence (a) and (b) are unequivocally non-distributive. As for (c), some, but not all informants


get a distributive reading. Practically without exception, (d) is taken to be ambiguous. (2.90) a.

Welche Schüler haben jede Aufgabe gelöst? ‘Which student solved every problem?’ b. Wer hat jede Aufgabe gelöst? ‘Who solved every problem?’ c. Was für Leute haben jede Aufgabe gelöst? ‘What kind of people solved every problem?’ d. Wie viele Leute haben jede Aufgabe gelöst? ‘How many people solved every problem?’

(non-distributive) (non-distributive) (% ambiguous) (ambiguous)

Similar observations apply to (2.91) und (2.92): (2.91) a.

Welche Besucher haben an jeder Tür geklopft? ‘Which visitors knocked at every door?’ b. Wer hat an jeder Tür geklopft? ‘Who knocked at every door?’ c. Was für Leute haben an jeder Tür geklopft? ‘What kind of people knocked at every door?’ d. Wie viele Leute haben an jeder Tür geklopft? ‘How many people knocked at every door?’

(÷non-distributive) (÷non-distributive) (% ambiguous) (ambiguous)

(2.92) a.

Welche Kritiker hat jedes Bild beeindruckt? (÷non-distributive) ‘Which critics did every picture impress?’ b. Wen hat jedes Bild beeindruckt? (÷non-distributive) ‘Whom did every picture impress?’ c. Was für Kritiker hat jedes Bild beeindruckt? (% ambiguous) ‘What kind of critics did every picture impress?’ d. Wie viele Kritiker hat jedes Bild beeindruckt? (ambiguous) ‘How many critics did every picture impress?’

As for which phrases, there is much evidence that they tend to restrict their domain of quantification to entities already established in discourse (see Pesetsky 1987: 107f.; Comorovski 1996: 11ff.). I will say that they are lexically d-bound. This feature distinguishes them from all other wh-phrases. This does not mean that they are obligatorily d-bound, but preferentially. Wer, was, was für and wie viel phrases, however, do not induce d-binding lexically. Thus, as for d-binding, there are two properties relevant for scope: syntactic d-binding (s-db) and lexical d-binding (l-db).

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


.. Definiteness As we have seen in (2.90) to (2.92), wer is scopally stronger than was für and wie viel phrases. I suppose the reason is that wer (and was) are definite, whereas was für and wie viel phrases are indefinite. I have shown in Pafel (1991b) that wer, was and welch phrases behave like definite phrases, whereas was für and wie viel phrases behave like indefinite phrases with regard to word order in the Mittelfeld. We will see later that relative phrases and noun phrases with the possessive behave very similarly to wer and was with regard to relative scope. Therefore, it might indeed be definiteness which is at stake. What might definiteness mean here? It is not syntactic definiteness, as other noun phrases are syntactically marked as [+definit] too, namely, jed-, all-, d- meist- phrases (see Pafel 1994: §6; Karnowski/Pafel 2004: §4.3). It must be a semantic notion of definiteness. I suppose it is definiteness in the sense of maximality, which is inherent in the description operator (see §1.4.1) and the interrogative operator of which and who phrases (see §5.3). The tripartition of interrogative quantifiers – (i) welch phrases, (ii) wer, was, (iii) was für and wie viel phrases – with respect to the tendency to wide scope is explained by the two relative-scope properties l-db and definiteness (def): welch phrases are l-db and def, wer and was are def, but not l-db, and was für and wie viel phrases are neither def nor l-db. Wo (and wann) are not always maximality operators (and thus def), they can be simple existential quantifiers too (see Pafel 1999: §8). .. Focus In wh/Q-interaction, it can be clearly observed that the wide-scope reading of a quantifier vanishes by stressing the quantifier. The sentences in (2.87) are all ambiguous: (2.87) a. Welches Stück hat jeder bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt? b. Welche Note hat jeder bekommen? c. Wer hat jedem bei der Vorbereitung geholfen?

The distributive reading is easy to get when the main accent is on the non-finite verb: (2.93) a. Welches Stück hat jeder bei der Abschlussprüfung geSPIELT? b. Welche Note hat jeder beKOMmen? c. Wer hat jedem bei der Vorbereitung geHOLfen?


But the sentences become unequivocally non-distributive if the universal quantifier is stressed: (2.94) a. Welches Stück hat JEder bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt? b. Welche Note hat JEder bekommen? c. Wer hat JEdem bei der Vorbereitung geholfen?

Note that the sentences remain unequivocally non-distributive if the whelement is stressed additionally: (2.95) a. WELches Stück hat JE der bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt? b. WELche Note hat JE der bekommen? c. WER hat JE dem bei der Vorbereitung geholfen?

The same effect has been observed in Dutch (see Swart 1992: 398), English (see Kuno 1991: 278, Example (46)) and Polish (Karnowski/Meyer 2001: 96). (2.96) a.

Wat voor boeken heeft iedereen gelezen? (ambiguous) what for books has everyone read ‘What books has everyone read?’ b. Wat voor boeken heeft IEDEREEN gelezen? (non-distributive)

(2.97) a. What is giving everyone his biggest headache? (ambiguous) b. What is giving EVERYONE his biggest headache? (non-distributive) (2.98) a.

Kogo pocałowało ka˙zde dziecko? (ambiguous) whom kissed every child ‘Who did every child kiss?’ ˙ b. Kogo pocałowało KAZDE dziecko? (non-distributive)

Now, it seems what happens to the quantifier when it is stressed is that it is narrowly focused, as the accent on the quantifier is a falling accent, which is a focus accent in German (cf. Uhmann 1991; Féry 1993). Thus, it seems that focusing diminishes a quantifier’s tendency to wide scope.5 With Q/Q-interaction, this effect can be observed too. But, here, judgments are more subtle (they are based on my own intuitions only). The sentence Zumindest eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire ‘At least one fugue, every piano player has in his repertoire’ is scope ambiguous. If the main accent is a falling accent on eine it seems to me quite hard to get the strong reading: (2.99) ??Von wie vielen Fugen kann man sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? Zumindest EI ne Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire.

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


A falling accent on jeder, however, makes such a sequence acceptable: (2.100) Von wie vielen Fugen kann man sagen, dass jeder Pianist sie in seinem Repertoire hat? Zumindest EI ne Fuge hat JE der Pianist in seinem Repertoire.

The sentence (2.85) Ein Produkt hat jeden Test bestanden has been claimed to be ambiguous. A rising accent on ein seems to be very helpful in order to get the weak reading: (2.101) Kann man von jedem Test sagen, dass ein Produkt ihn bestanden hat? Ja, EIN Produkt hat jeden Test beSTAN den.

A falling accent on jeden, however, prohibits the weak reading. (2.102)??Kann man von jedem Test sagen, dass ein Produkt ihn bestanden hat? Ja, EIN Produkt hat JE den Test bestanden.

These data can be explained if focusing diminishes a quantifier’s tendency to wide scope. It seems narrow focusing is what is relevant. To some extent, we find something similar in Hungarian: a sentence-initial quantifier can be in the scope of a linearly-following quantifier only if the first quantifier is stressed in a certain way (Kiss 1987: 113ff.). In (2.103), for instance, the narrow-scope reading of valaki(t) ‘somebody’ is possible only with a rising accent on valaki(t): (2.103) a.

Valakit ‘mindenki ‘meg hívott. (Kiss 1987: 114) somebody-acc everybody preverb invited ‘Somebody everybody invited.’ b. Valaki ‘mindenkit figyelmeztetett. (Molnár 1991: 250) somebody everybody-acc warned ‘Somebody warned everybody.’

Assuming that focus is represented in syntactic structure with the help of Ffeatures, we can say that a quantifier’s being marked as narrowly focused on syntactic structure (abbreviated as focus) is the property relevant for relative scope that we have observed in this section. If this view can be maintained, the influence of stress on scope is not a direct one, calling for a direct relation between prosodic and semantic structure, but an indirect one via the occurrence of F-features in syntax. There are two elements I take to be inherently narrowly focused: whphrases and negative quantifiers.6


.. Negation attraction There is something special in the scope relation between positive and negative quantifiers. As expected, the sentences in (2.104) are unequivocal. (2.104) a.

Niemand von uns hat eine von den Aufgaben gelöst. ‘None of us solved one of the problems.’ √ niemand>eine: eine>niemand: b. Niemand von uns hat jede von den Aufgaben lösen können. ‘None of us could solve every problem.’ √ niemand>jede: jede>niemand:

The ambiguity in (2.105) is not very surprising either. But note that wide scope of the negative quantifier is not so easy to obtain. (2.105)

Eine von den Aufgaben hat niemand von uns lösen können. ‘One of the problems, none of us could solve.’ √ eine>niemand: (preferred) √ niemand>eine:

The scope relations in (2.106), however, are unexpected: (2.106)

Jede von den Aufgaben hat niemand von uns lösen können. ‘Every problem, none of us could solve.’ √ jede>niemand: √ niemand>jede:

Given that it is not so easy to get a wide-scope reading of the subject niemand von uns in (2.105), it should be distinctly more difficult to get such a reading in (2.106), as the quantifier in the Vorfeld is an inherently distributive one. But the opposite seems to be the case. The negative quantifier has especially distinct wide scope if the quantity expression jede is stressed – see (2.107a) and compare the quantifier binding in (b): (2.107) a. JEde von den Aufgaben hat niemand von uns LÖ sen können. b. Jede von seinen1 Aufgaben hat [niemand von uns]1 lösen können. ‘Every one of his problems, none of us could solve.’

Thus, comparing (2.105) with (2.106) the opposite is the case to what we would expect. Taking more quantity elements into consideration, it seems that, as far as the constellation “ordinary quantifier in the Vorfeld – negative quantifier in






the Mittelfeld” is concerned, viel-, all- and beid- behave like jed- in allowing wide scope of the negative quantifier: (2.108) Viele (/alle, beide) von den Aufgaben hat niemand von uns lösen können.

Wide scope of niemand is much more difficult, if possible at all, if the quantity element in the Vorfeld is d- meist-, manch-, mehrer- or einig-. (2.109) Die meisten (/manche, mehrere, einige) von den Aufgaben hat niemand von uns lösen können.

The following picture emerges: (2.110) α Aufgabe(n) hat niemand von uns lösen können. √ α = jed-, all-, beid-, viel-, ein- ⇒ niemand>α: α = d- meist-, manch- [sg./pl.], mehrer-, einig- ⇒ niemand>α: hardly possible

This distribution corresponds to the distribution of quantifiers which can, and which cannot, be modified by nicht: (it is not contrastive negation which is at stake here): Nicht jede (/alle, viele, (?) beide, eine) Aufgabe(n) hat er lösen können. ‘Not every (/all, many, both, one) problem(s), he could solve.’ b. *Nicht einige (/mehrere, manche, die meisten) Aufgabe(n) hat er lösen können. ‘Not some (/several, many a, most) problem(s), he could solve.’

(2.111) a.

I will call the property of being negatable, which a quantifier with a certain quantity expression can have, negation attraction. (2.112) +negation attractive: jed-, all-, viel-, beid-, ein–negation attractive: einig-, mehrer-, manch-, d- meist-

Negation attraction (neg-att) is a property relevant for relative scope. This, of course, makes sense only if negation attraction is not a scope phenomenon. It has been argued that nicht is not an operator (like ¬), but an element which marks a syntactic unit as negative and it is this marking which leads to a certain interpretation in semantic structure (cf. Ladusaw 1992: 251f.; Pafel 1991a: 40ff.; 1998: 50ff.; see also §7.2). The distribution of quantity expressions in (2.112) corresponds – except for ein- – to the distribution of quantity expressions which allow the reading N in (2.113) – which is especially easy to obtain with a rising accent on α and a falling accent on nicht (see (2.114)):


(2.113)

α Aufgabe(n) hat er nicht gelöst. N: It is not the case that he has solved α problem(s).

(2.114) a. Jede (/alle, viele, beide) Aufgabe(n) hat er nicht gelöst.7 b. Einige (/manche, mehrere, die meisten) Aufgabe(n) hat er nicht gelöst.

Since Jacobs (1982) reading N (“I-Topikalisierung”) is described as a reading with scope inversion – quantifier and negation have scope opposite to their linear order. Seeing nicht not as an operator, but as a marker suggests a different view: the quantifier in the Vorfeld is being negatively marked by nicht in the Mittelfeld. That there is no scope interaction at stake in (2.114) is also indicated by what we have observed in §2.2.7 above, namely, that focusing a quantifier prevents it from having scope over a quantifier which it can have scope over without focusing: reading N can be made prominent by an intonation pattern where there is a focus accent on nicht. If nicht were an operator, focusing the operator would have just the opposite effect on relative scope than focusing a quantifier (cf. Bott 2001).8 There is some evidence that a quantifier can be negatively marked by a ccommanding negation marker. See the following English sentences and their readings (after Lasnik 1975: 286; Huang 1982: 143): (2.115) a. b. c. d.

Always John didn’t show up. (always>not, not>always) John always didn’t show up. (always>not, not>always) John didn’t always show up. (always>not, not>always) John didn’t show up always. (always>not, not>always)

As for the ambiguous case (d), one usually assumes different underlying syntactic structures: (2.116) a. John [didn’t [show up always]] (always>not, not>always) b. John [[didn’t show up] always] (always>not, not>always)

Whether a quantifier that is c-commanded by a negation marker is negatively marked depends on whether it is negation attractive or not:9 (2.117) a. She didn’t solve all problems. (¬∀;∀¬) b. She didn’t solve some (/several) of the problems. (¬∃; ∃¬) (Lasnik 1972 [1976: 24], 1975: 280; Kroch 1974: 112)

Back to the German examples in (2.114a). If a quantifier can be negatively marked by a c-commanding negation marker then we have to assume (i) that in sentences like (2.114a) nicht c-commands the trace of the quantifier in the Vorfeld and (ii) that the quantifier can be marked negatively by marking its

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trace negatively. As for the first assumption, it is shared by many researchers on this phenomenon (cf. Büring 1997; Jacobs 1997; Molnár/Rosengren 1997), but it is not without problems (see Höhle 1991: 161f.; Pafel 1998: 127). As for the second assumption, compare the conception of traces in §7.3.1.

. A linear model of relative scope determination .. Cumulativity, weights and linear equations After having introduced the following relative scope properties (2.29)

– syntactic constellation: – grammatical function: – thematic property: – distributivity: – d(iscourse)-binding: – definiteness: – focus: – negation attraction:

1. internal precedence (in-pre) 2. external precedence (ex-pre) 3. sentential adverbial (s-adv) 4. subject (subject) 5. strong patient (st-pat) 6. weak patient (we-pat) 7. inherent distributivity (in-dis) 8. strong distributivity (st-dis) 9. lexical d-binding (l-db) 10. syntactic d-binding (s-db) 11. definiteness (def) 12. focusing (focus) 13. negation attraction (neg-att)

I will demonstrate that we can take a sentence’s scope potential as being determined by the interplay of this set of properties. We have already seen that properties belonging to the same group can have different relative weight, as far as a quantifier’s tendency to wide scope is concerned: internal precedence has more weight than external precedence, strong patienthood more than weak patienthood, inherent distributivity more than strong distributivity and so on. What we must find out now is the “absolute” weight of a property, i.e., the weight relative to every other relative scope property. I did not mention it explicitly, but the way I argued makes clear that the interaction of the properties is cumulative. Let us look once more at the already familiar examples:


(2.118) Jeder Pianist hat eine Fuge in seinem Repertoire. √ jeder>eine: eine>jeder: (2.119) Jede Fuge hat ein Pianist in seinem Repertoire. √ jede>ein: ein>jede: %

[=2.22]

(2.120) Ein Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem Repertoire. √ ein>jede: jede>ein:

[=2.19]

(2.121) Eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. eine>jeder: √ √ jeder>eine:

[=2.46]

From the fact that, as in (2.119), a quantifier (ein Pianist) is subject, it does not follow that it can have wide scope. But, if the property in-dis is added, as in (2.121), wide scope (of jeder Pianist) is possible. in-dis in itself, however, does not make wide scope possible – see jede Fuge in (2.120). ex-pre in itself in (2.121) is not sufficient for a quantifier (eine Fuge) to have unequivocally or preferentially wide scope, but in combination with in-dis, a quantifier which is ex-pre has unequivocally or preferentially wide scope – see (2.119). If a quantifier combines ex-pre, subject and in-dis, then it has unequivocally wide scope (as the subject in 2.118), though none of these properties alone has this effect. The examples for cumulativity can be continued ad libitum. The contrast between (2.122) and (2.123) shows that ex-pre must be more strongly weighted than in-dis. If both had the same weight, jede Fuge in (2.122) and eine Fuge in (2.123) would have the same tendency to wide scope. But that is not the case. The facts become transparent if ex-pre has a higher weight. (2.122) EIN Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem ReperTOIRE . ein>jede: √ jede>ein: (2.123) Eine Fuge hat JE der Pianist in seinem Repertoire. √ eine>jeder: √ jeder>eine: (2.122 ) Q1 : ex-pre + subject + focus Q2 : in-dis Q1 >Q2 : possible10 Q2 >Q1 : impossible

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(2.123 ) Q1 : ex-pre Q2 : in-dis + subject + focus Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : possible

ex-pre seems also to be stronger than subject: (2.124) Von JE dem Kritiker wurde ein Roman rezensiert. √ jedem>ein: ein>jedem: (2.125) Einen Roman hat JE der Kritiker rezensiert. √ einen>jeder: √ jeder>einen: (2.124 ) Q1 : ex-pre + in-dis + focus Q2 : subject Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible (2.125 ) Q1 : ex-pre Q2 : subject + in-dis + focus Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : possible

subject and in-dis could have roughly the same weight: (2.124) Von JE dem Kritiker wurde ein Roman rezensiert. √ jedem>ein: ein>jedem: (2.126) EIN Kritiker hat jeden Roman rezensiert. √ ein>jeden: jeden>ein: (2.124 ) Q1 : ex-pre + in-dis + focus Q2 : subject Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible (2.126 ) Q1 : ex-pre + subject + focus Q2 : in-dis Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible

It is not so easy to decide the relative weight of in-dis and we-pat – but they could also have roughly the same weight:


(2.127) Einem Kind hat er jedes Märchen erZÄHLT √ einem>jedes: jedes>einem: (2.128) Jedes Märchen hat er einem Kind erZÄHLT √ jedes>einem: einem>jedes: (?) (2.127 ) Q1 : ex-pre + we-pat Q2 : in-dis Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible (2.128 ) Q1 : ex-pre + in-dis Q2 : we-pat Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible

If that is indeed the case, st-pat must be stronger than in-dis and subject. What might be the weights of lexical d-binding (l-db) and definiteness (def)? Looking at (2.129) and (2.130), we see that they together must be weighted relatively high such that sentence (2.129) becomes ambiguous and (2.130) unequivocally non-distributive: (2.129) Welche Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire? Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + def + focus Q2 : subject+ in-dis Q1 >Q2 : possible (preferred) Q2 >Q1 : possible (2.130) Welche Fuge hat JEder Pianist gespielt? Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + def + focus Q2 : subject+ in-dis + focus Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible

Assuming that wh-phrases are inherently focused with focus having a negative impact on a quantifier’s scope potential, l-db and def together must have quite a high weight such that the interrogative quantifier has unequivocally wide scope in (2.130) and preferably wide scope in (2.129). Assuming a weight of 1 for in-dis, we obtain the following table, which is compatible with the weight relations we have looked at, but contains some decisions which still have to be proven correct by looking at the data.






(2.131) syntactic constellation: grammatical function: thematic property: distributivity: d-binding: definiteness: focus: negation attraction:

in-pre: 3 s-adv: 2 st-pat: 2 in-dis: 1 l-db: 1 def: 1 focus: –1 neg-att: –2

ex-pre: 1.5 subject: 1 we-pat: 1 st-dis: 0.5 s-db: 1

Linear equations are a suitable means to cope with weights and cumulativity. In our case, these equations compute a numerical value, i.e., a quantifier’s scope value, which is a numerical expression for what I have called its tendency to wide scope. The scope value is computed in the following way: (i) relative to each scope-relevant property it satisfies, a quantifier receives a numerical value which is identical to the property’s weight multiplied by 5; (ii) these values are added up to the quantifier’s scope value. Now, we can compute the quantifiers’ scope value in sentences (2.118), (2.119), (2.120) and (2.121). (No quantifier is focused.) (2.118) (2.118 )

(2.119)

(2.119 )

(2.120)

(2.120 )

(2.121)

(2.121 )

Jeder Pianist hat eine Fuge in seinem Repertoire. Q1 : ex-pre + subject + in-dis 1.5x5 + 1x5 + 1x5 = 17.5 Q2 : – 0 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible Jede Fuge hat ein Pianist in seinem Repertoire. Q1 : ex-pre + in-dis 1.5x5 + 1x5 = 12.5 Q2 : subject 1x5 = 5 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible Ein Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem Repertoire. Q1 : ex-pre + subject 1.5x5 + 1x5 = 12.5 Q2 : in-dis 1x5 = 5 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible Eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. Q1 : ex-pre 1.5x5 = 7.5 Q2 : subject + in-dis 1x5 + 1x5 = 10 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : possible (preferred)


The scope relations between two quantifiers in a sentence can be seen as a result of their scope values, more exactly, the difference of their scope values. If the scope value of one quantifier, N1 , is greater than the scope value of the other quantifier, N2 , the difference between N1 and N2 is decisive. If it equals or is greater than 5, the sentence has only readings with wide scope of the quantifier with the scope value N1 . If the difference is smaller than 5, the sentence is ambiguous. The difference in this case shows the degree of preference for the reading with wide scope of the quantifier with the higher scope value. These results can be conveniently expressed by a scope relation’s preference value between 1 and 0. If the scope relation Qi >Qj has the preference value 1 (ω(Qi >Qj )=1), then this reading is possible, but the opposite reading is not (ω(Qj >Qi )=0). If a scope relation has the preference value 0.5, both readings are possible to the same degree. If one has the preference value 0.75 and the other the value 0.25, the first is preferred to the other, which is nevertheless a possible scope relation. The mapping of scope values to preference values is straightforward: (i) If the scope value of Q1 is identical to the scope value of Q2 , ω(Q1 >Q2 )=0.5 and ω(Q2 >Q1 )=0.5. (ii) If the scope value of Q1 is greater than the value of Q2 , then: if the difference is greater than or equals 5, then ω(Q1 >Q2 )=1 and ω(Q2 >Q1 )=0; if the difference is identical to 2.5, ω(Q1 >Q2 )=0.75 and ω(Q2 >Q1 )=0.25. (iii) If the scope value of Q1 is smaller than the value of Q2 , then: if the difference is greater than or equals 5, then ω(Q2 >Q1 )=1 and ω(Q1 >Q2 )=0; if the difference is identical to 2.5, ω(Q2 >Q1 )=0.75 and ω(Q1 >Q2 )=0.25. The preference value for a scope relation with more than two quantifiers – ω(Q1 >Q2 ... Qn ) – is the average of the preference values of the n scope relations Qi >Qj – j>i, n>i≥1, n≥j>1 (cf. Hurum 1988). For example, if ω(Q1 >Q2 )=0.5, ω(Q1 >Q3 )=0.5 and ω(Q2 >Q3 )=1, then ω(Q1 >Q2 >Q3 )=0.66... With this background, let us look once more at the properties’ weights (2.131). Why should the weights of lexical d-binding l-db and definiteness def be as they are? Looking at (2.129) and (2.130), we have seen that l-db and def together must be weighted relatively high. Assuming that wh-phrases are inherently focused and ignoring l-db and def for the moment, we see that the scope values’ relation is 2.5:10 in (2.129). Thus, the weight of l-db and def together must be at least 1 and at most 2. The weight cannot be 1, as in the case of focusing the universal quantifier, as in (2.130), the relation would be 7.5:5, which would not predict that the non-distributive reading becomes the only reading available. The weight must be at least 1.5. If we take the weight of






l-db and def to be each 1, we get a preference for the non-distributive reading, which seems to be appropriate. Thus, we get: (2.129 )

Welche Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire? Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + def + focus 7.5 + 5 + 5 – 5 = 12.5 5 + 5 = 10 Q2 : subject + in-dis Q1 >Q2 : possible (preferred) Q2 >Q1 : possible

(2.130 )

Welche Fuge hat JEder Pianist gespielt? Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + def + focus Q2 : subject + in-dis + focus Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible

7.5 + 5 + 5 – 5 = 12.5 5+5–5=5

.. The model’s predictions ... Basic Q/Q-interaction With these assumptions the real scope relations are predicted quite accurately as we can see in (2.118), (2.119), (2.120) and (2.121). (2.118), with the scope values’ difference being 17.5, is a scope unambiguous sentence. It is not possible to get the other reading by focusing. This is different in (2.119) and (2.120). If the quantifiers are not focused, the scope values’ difference is 7.5 and the sentences are predicted to be unambiguous as they should be. If the quantifier with the higher value is focused, the sentences are predicted to be ambiguous: (2.132)

JE de Fuge hat ein Pianist in seinem Repertoire. 7.5 Q1 : ex-pre + in-dis + focus Q2 : subject 5

(2.133)

EIN Pianist hat jede Fuge in seinem ReperTOIRE . Q1 : ex-pre + subject + focus 7.5 Q2 : in-dis 5

The possibility of wide scope of Q2 is not compatible with our judgments so far. But, I mentioned that there are speakers who seem to get the strong reading in Jede Fuge hat ein Pianist in seinem Repertoire. And there are sentences of the same structure such as (2.133) which are indeed ambiguous: EIN Produkt hat jeden Test beSTAN den (cf. (2.85) and (2.101)). As for (2.121), our model predicts the ambiguity with a preference for the weak reading (see (2.121 )). The sentence remains ambiguous if jeder is nar-


rowly focused (7.5:5). If, however, eine is narrowly focused, the weak reading is the only available reading – which seems to be correct (cf. (2.99)). (2.134)

EI ne Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. Q1 : ex-pre + focus 2.5 10 Q2 : subject + in-dis

We have seen in §2.2.1 that a quantifier has a stronger tendency to wide scope if it precedes the other quantifier in the Mittelfeld (in-pre) than if it is located in the Vorfeld (ex-pre). The weight of in-pre must, therefore, be higher than the one of ex-pre. We obtain good results if we take the weight to be 3, i.e., twice the weight of ex-pre. Sentences (2.118), (2.119) and (2.121) remain unambiguous if the preceding quantifier is moved from the Vorfeld into the Mittelfeld. More interesting is the effect of the same change with respect to (2.120). Without focusing, the sentence is predicted to be unambiguous. With focusing of eine it becomes ambiguous: (2.135)

Es hat EI ne Fuge jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. Q1 : in-pre + focus 10 Q2 : subject + in-dis 10

The contrast to (2.134) is clear. The predictions are also quite good with regard to the scope relations between non-inherently distributive quantifiers: (2.136) a.

Eine Fuge haben die meisten (/beide, viele, alle) Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. (ambiguous) 7.5 Q1 : ex-pre Q2 : subject + st-dis 7.5 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : possible b. Eine Fuge haben einige (/mehrere, zwei) Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. Q1 : ex-pre 7.5 (ambiguous) Q2 : subject 5 Q1 >Q2 : possible (preferred) Q2 >Q1 : possible






(2.137) a.

Einige Fugen haben die meisten Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. √ einige>die meisten: √ die meisten>einige: (slightly preferred) Q1 : ex-pre 7.5 Q2 : subject + st-dis 7.5 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : possible b. Die meisten Fugen haben einige Pianisten in ihrem Repertoire. √ die meisten>einige: einige>die meisten: hardly possible Q1 : ex-pre + st-dis 10 Q2 : subject 5 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible

The predictions remain reliable when we have a look at objects which are weak patients (we-pat) – here syntactic discourse binding (s-db) comes into play for the first time: (2.138)

Einem von euch hat jeder von uns bei der Prüfung geholfen. √ einem>jeder: √ jeder>einem: Q1 : ex-pre + we-pat + s-db 17.5 Q2 : subject + in-dis + s-db 15 Q1 >Q2 : possible (preferred) Q2 >Q1 : possible

(2.139)

Einer von uns hat jedem von euch bei der Prüfung geholfen. √ einer>jedem: (preferred) jedem>einer: √ Q1 : ex-pre + subject + s-db 17.5 Q2 : in-dis + we-pat + s-db 15 Q1 >Q2 : possible (preferred) Q2 >Q1 : possible

The contrast between (2.140) und (2.141), which shows the objects’ distinct strength, is predicted:


(2.140)

Ein Märchen hat Jakob jedem Kind erzählt. √ ein>jedem: √ jedem>ein: Q1 : ex-pre 7.5 Q2 : in-dis + we-pat 10 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : possible (preferred)

(2.141)

Einem Kind hat Jakob jedes Märchen erzählt. √ einem>jedes: (strongly preferred) √ jedes>einem: Q1 : ex-pre + we-pat 12.5 Q2 : in-dis 5 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible

(2.142)

EInem Kind hat Jakob jedes Märchen erZÄHLT Q1 : ex-pre + we-pat + focus 7.5 Q2 : in-dis 5 Q1 >Q2 : possible (preferred) Q2 >Q1 : possible

Let us have a look at st-pat, which has a weight of 2: (2.143)

Ein Kandidat hat jeden Prüfer beeindruckt. (ambiguous) Q1 : ex-pre + subject 12.5 Q2 : in-dis + st-pat 15 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : possible (preferred)

(2.144)

Einem Kandidaten ist jede Lösung eingefallen. (strong reading only) Q1 : ex-pre + st-pat 17.5 Q2 : subject + in-dis 10 Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible

It is predicted that in (2.144) the weak reading becomes possible (not preferred) if the the dative object is focused (12.5:10) – which might be correct. If, however, the dative object is syntactically d-bound as in Einem der Kandidaten ist jede Lösung eingefallen, the sentence remains unambiguous even if focus is brought into play (17.5:10). Let us come back to the distinction between ex-pre and in-pre. I have said in §2.2.1 that, as for (2.34b) Es hat ein Produkt jeden Test bestanden, there






is no possibility of making the sentence ambiguous in contrast to (2.34a) Ein Produkt hat jeden Test bestanden. This contrast is predicted too: (2.145)

Es hat EINProdukt jeden Test beSTAN den. Q1 : in-pre + subject + focus 15 5 Q2 : in-dis Q1 >Q2 : possible Q2 >Q1 : impossible

The model also makes good predictions with respect to types of data we have not looked at so far. Among the following double object constructions, only (d) exibits the possibility of a reading with the linearly-following quantifier outscoping the preceding one (this corresponds to the judgments delivered in Rosengren 1994, examples 75 to 77): (2.146) a.

Jakob hat einem Kind jedes Märchen vorgelesen. ‘One child, John read every fairy tale to.’ b. Jakob hat jedes Märchen einem Kind vorgelesen. ‘Every fairy tale, John read to one child.’ c. Jakob hat jedem Kind ein Märchen vorgelesen. ‘Every child, John read one fairy tale to.’ d. Jakob hat ein Märchen jedem Kind vorgelesen. ‘One fairy tale, John read to every child.’

Without focusing, the scope values’ difference between the preceding and the following quantifier in (a) to (c) is greater than or equals 15. This means that focus cannot make the other reading available. (d), however, differs.11 (2.147) a.

Jakob hat einem Kind jedes Märchen vorgelesen. Q1 : in-pre + we-pat 20 Q2 : in-dis 5 b. Jakob hat jedes Märchen einem Kind vorgelesen. Q1 : in-pre + in-dis 20 Q2 : we-pat 5 c. Jakob hat jedem Kind ein Märchen vorgelesen. Q1 : in-pre + in-dis + we-pat 25 Q2 : – 0 d. Jakob hat EINMärchen jedem Kind vorgelesen. Q1 : in-pre + focus 10 Q2 : in-dis + we-pat 10

As for the interaction of attributive quantifiers as in (2.39), the model makes the right predictions too. As both quantifiers have the NP-complement of D


as their domain, the two quantifiers have internal precedence. As in-pre has a weight of 3, there is no question that in (2.39a) the preceding inherently distributive quantifier has unequivocally wide scope. But even in (b) we have 15:5 as the scope value relation, which leads to unequivocal scope. (2.39)

a.

Die Bilder eines jeden Hofmalers von mindestens einem Mitglied der Königsfamilie ‘The pictures of every painter of at least one member of the royal family’ b. Die Bilder eines Hofmalers von jedem Mitglied der Königsfamilie ‘The pictures of one painter of every member of the royal family’

... Negative quantifiers I assume that (i) the weight of negation attraction (neg-att) is negative, (ii) this property comes into play only if the relative scope relation between a positive and a negative quantifier is at stake, and (iii) negative quantifiers are inherently focused. The scope model’s predictions as to the sentences in (2.104) are correct: (2.104 ) a.

Niemand von uns hat eine von den Aufgaben gelöst. niemand>eine: √ eine>niemand: Q1 : ex-pre + subject + s-db + focus 12.5 Q2 : s-db 5 b. Niemand von uns hat jede von den Aufgaben lösen können. √ niemand>jede: jede>niemand: Q1 : ex-pre + subject + s-db + focus 12.5 Q2 : in-dis + s-db + neg-att 0

More interesting are the results concerning sentence (2.105) and (2.106), which seemed to show that there is something special in the interaction between positive and negative quantifiers. (2.105 )

Eine von den Aufgaben hat niemand von uns lösen können. √ eine>niemand: (preferred) √ niemand>eine: 12.5 Q1 : ex-pre + s-db Q2 : subject + s-db + focus 5



 Quantifier Scope in German

(2.106 )

Jede von den Aufgaben hat niemand von uns lösen können. √ jede>niemand: √ niemand>jede: Q1 : ex-pre + in-dis + s-db + neg-att 7.5 Q2 : subject + s-db + focus 5

Here we see the effect of negation attraction. If we set its weight at –2, sentence (2.106) becomes ambiguous and, with focus on jede, narrow scope of the universal quantifier becomes the preferred reading.12 For (2.105) to become ambiguous in the first place the existential quantifier has to be focused (7.5:5). A sentence with a strongly distributive, but not negation attractive, quantifier in the place of jede in (2.106) makes the sentence unambiguous – at least, this is the prediction (cf. (2.109)). (2.148)

Die meisten von den Aufgaben hat niemand von uns lösen können. √ die meisten>niemand: (preferred) niemand>die meisten: (?) Q1 : ex-pre + st-dis + s-db 15 Q2 : subject + s-db + focus 5

Let us look at some more data. The following sentences are correctly predicted as scope unequivocal if we additionally assume that a quantifier with a scope value equal to or smaller than 0 cannot have scope over another quantifier. (2.149) a.

Niemand hat keine Aufgabe lösen können. ‘Nobody could solve no problem.’ Q1 : ex-pre + subject + focus Q2 : focus b. Keine Aufgabe hat niemand lösen können. ‘No problem, nobody could solve.’ Q1 : ex-pre + focus Q2 : subject + focus

7.5 –5

2.5 0

The predictions for the following sentences are correct too. (2.150) a.

Jeder hat nicht jede Aufgabe lösen können. ‘Everyone could not solve every problem.’ Q1 : ex-pre + subject + in-dis + neg-att Q2 : in-dis + focus b. Nicht jede Aufgabe hat jeder lösen können. ‘Not every problem, everyone could solve.’ Q1 : ex-pre + in-dis + focus Q2 : subject + in-dis + neg-att

7.5 0

7.5 0

Chapter 2. Relative scope 

Here is an example of the possibility of wide scope of a universal quantifier in the Mittelfeld over a negative quantifier in the Vorfeld: (2.151)

Nicht eine von den Aufgaben, der er1 gestellt bekam, hat [jeder von uns]1 lösen können. ‘Not one of the problems he got posed, every one of us could solve.’ Q1 : ex-pre + s-db + focus 7.5 Q2 : subject + in-dis + s-db + neg-att 5

... Modified DP-quantifiers DP-quantifiers modified by höchstens ‘at most’ are similar to negative quantifiers in their scope behavior with respect to universal and existential quantifiers. (2.152) a.

Höchstens EIN Kritiker wird jeden Roman rezensieren. ‘At most one critic will review every novel.’ √ höchstens ein>jeden: jeden>höchstens ein: b. Jeden Roman wird höchstens EIN Kritiker rezensieren. ‘Every novel, at most one critic will review.’ √ jeden>höchstens ein: √ höchstens ein>jeden:

(2.153) a.

Höchstens EIN Kritiker wird einige Romane rezensieren. ‘At most one critic will review some novels.’ √ höchstens ein>einige: einige>höchstens ein: b. Einige Romane wird höchstens EIN Kritiker rezensieren. ‘Some novels, at most one critic will review.’ √ einige>höchstens ein: höchstens ein>einige: (?)

Even in constructions where a positive subject quantifier in the Vorfeld can be outscoped by a direct object, this can no longer happen if the subject quantifier is modified by höchstens: (2.154) *War es bei jedem Test der Fall, dass höchstens ein Produkt ihn bestanden hat? Ja, höchstens ein Produkt hat jeden Test bestanden. ‘Has it been the case with every test that at most one product passed it? Yes, at most one product passed every test.’

Thus, we can cope with the scope behavior of höchstens phrases if we take them to be negative quantifiers.

 Quantifier Scope in German

Quantifiers modified by mindestens and zumindest ‘at least’, however, do not display a significantly different behavior than the corresponding unmodified quantifiers. For instance, sentence (2.155) with or without mindestens is ambiguous: (2.155) Mindestens ein Produkt hat jeden Test bestanden. (ambiguous)

But note that the weak reading is very easy to get here, which might be explained by mindestens focusing ein. Quantifiers with genau ν ‘exactly ν’, mehr als ν ‘more than ν’ and ungefähr ν ‘about ν’ barely differ from the quantifiers with ν alone (ν being a cardinal). Weniger als ν ‘less than ν’ only differs insofar as it is a negative quantifier. Quantifiers with jed- ν-te (like jeder fünfte Mensch ‘every fifth man’) behave more or less like unmodified jed- quantifiers. The same goes for quantifiers modified by epistemic adverbials like vermutlich ‘supposedly’, wohl ‘probably’ (vermutlich alle Musiker verehren Bach ‘Supposedly all musicians adore Bach’, In wohl allen Sprachen gibt es Fragesätze ‘In probably all languages there are interrogative sentences’). ... Adverbial quantifiers I will begin with the behavior of frequency adverbials. The contrast between (2.156a) and (b) is predicted: (2.156) a.

Jedes Mal konnte einer von uns tun, was er wollte. ‘Every time, one of us could do what he wanted.’ √ jedes Mal>einer: einer>jedes Mal: Q1 : ex-pre + s-adv + in-dis Q2 : subject + s-db b. Einer von uns konnte jedes Mal tun, was er wollte. √ einer>jedes Mal: √ jedes Mal>einer: Q1 : ex-pre + subject + s-db Q2 : s-adv + in-dis

22.5 10

17.5 15

The contrast between (2.157a), where the universal quantifier can have wide scope, and (b), where the universal quantifier cannot have wide scope, is predicted too. This contrast indicates that adverbial quantifiers are stronger than subjects (cf. (2.61)).

Chapter 2. Relative scope 

(2.157) a.

Es konnte EIN Mitarbeiter jedes Mal tun, was er wollte. 15 Q1 : in-pre + subject + focus Q2 : s-adv + in-dis 15 b. Es konnte EINmal jeder Mitarbeiter tun, was er wollte. Q1 : in-pre + s-adv + focus 20 Q2 : subject + in-dis 10

The interaction between adverbial and negative quantifier comes out correctly: (2.158) a.

Niemand von uns konnte jedes Mal tun, was er wollte. niemand>jedes Mal: √ jedes Mal>niemand: 12.5 Q1 : ex-pre + subject + s-db + focus Q2 : s-adv + in-dis + neg-att 5 b. Jedes Mal konnte niemand von uns tun, was er wollte. jedes Mal>niemand: √ √ niemand>jedes Mal: Q1 : ex-pre + s-adv + in-dis + neg-att + focus 7.5 Q2 : subject + s-db + focus 5 c. Einige Male konnte niemand von uns tun, was er wollte. √ einige Male>niemand: niemand>einige Male: Q1 : ex-pre + s-adv 17.5 Q2 : subject + s-db + focus 5

The picture does not change much if we take immer ‘always’ or meistens ‘mostly’ as the adverbial quantifier. Things are different if we look at the negative adverbial quantifier nie ‘never’, but this is as expected: (2.159) a.

Nie kann einer von uns tun, was er will. (ambiguous) Q1 : ex-pre + s-adv + focus 12.5 Q2 : subject + s-db 10 b. Einer von uns kann nie tun, was er will. (unequivocal) Q1 : ex-pre + subject + s-db 17.5 Q2 : s-adv + focus 5

... Wh/Q-interaction Wh/Q-interaction is an instance of quantifier interaction: the same properties we looked at in §2.2 are relevant for the availability of the different readings in wh-interrogatives containing (ordinary) quantifiers (Pafel 1991b). Thus, our scope model should make good predictions for wh/Q-interaction too.

 Quantifier Scope in German

The classical asymmetry between (2.160) and (2.161) – cf. (2.35) – is accounted for by the model. In (2.160) the wh-phrase precedes the inherently distributive universal quantifier, is the subject of the sentence, is lexically discourse-bound and – inherently – focused. The crucial change in (2.161) is that the the universal quantifier becomes the subject. This makes all the difference. Now, the pair-list reading is possible, but not preferred in relation the other reading. (2.160)

Welcher Kritiker hat jeden Roman rezensieren müssen? (unambiguous) ‘Which critic had to review every novel?’ R1: Which critic is such that he had to review every novel? R2:For every novel: which critic had to review it? Q1 : ex-pre + subject + l-db + def + focus 17.5 Q2 : in-dis 5

(2.161)

Welchen Roman hat jeder Kritiker rezensieren müssen? (ambiguous) ‘Which novel did every critic have to review?’ R1: Which novel is such that every critic had to review it? R2: For every critic: which novel did he have to review? 12.5 Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + def + focus Q2 : subject + in-dis 10

Sentence (2.161) becomes unambiguous when the universal quantifier is accented heavily: only wide scope of the wh-phrase is possible (cf. §2.2.7). (2.162)

Welchen Roman hat JEder Kritiker rezensieren müssen? ‘Which novel did EVERY critic have to review?’ Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + def + focus 12.5 Q2 : subject + in-dis + focus 5

Changing the quantity expression of the subject in (2.161) also makes the pairlist reading disappear. Whereas jeder is inherently distributive, the quantity expression die meisten ‘most’ is not; it is only strongly distributive, i.e., satisfies the property of strong distributivity (st-dis) (see §2.2.4). (2.163)

Welchen Roman haben die meisten Kritiker rezensieren müssen? (unambiguous) ‘Which novel did most critics have to review?’ Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + def + focus 12.5 Q2 : subject + st-dis 7.5

(I must admit, however, that the model predicts that the sentence becomes ambiguous if die meisten Kritiker is changed into a partitive construction (die meisten von ihnen), which seems a questionable prediction.) Sentence (2.160) is

Chapter 2. Relative scope 

unambiguous, but sentence (2.164) with how many instead of which is ambiguous. The reason is that how many phrases are not lexically discourse-bound. Therefore, their scope value is smaller and the universal quantifier in (2.164) can obtain wide scope. (2.164)

Wie viele Kritiker haben jeden Roman rezensieren müssen? (ambiguous) ‘How many critics had to review every novel?’ Q1 : ex-pre + subject + focus 7.5 Q2 : in-dis 5

Sentence (2.161) is ambiguous, but it becomes unambiguous if the wh-phrase is a partitive phrase as in (2.165). The partitive construction makes a quantifier syntactically discourse-bound (s-db), which increases its tendency to wide scope. (2.165)

Welchen von den Romanen hat jeder Kritiker rezensieren müssen? (unambiguous) ‘Which one of the novels did every critic have to review?’ Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + s-db + def + focus 17.5 Q2 : subject + in-dis 10

Let us have a look at the influence of strong and weak patients in wh/Qinteraction. (2.166)

Wer hat jedem geholfen? ‘Who helped everyone?’ √ wer>jedem: √ jedem>wer: Q1 : ex-pre + subject + def + focus Q2 : in-dis + we-pat

12.5 10

Here we see what weight definiteness should have so that the results come out correctly without modifying the other weights. def should have a weight of 1. With this background it is easy to understand that the question Wer hat jedem geholfen? can become unambiguous by slight modification: by focusing the universal quantifier (12.5:5), by syntactically d-binding the wh-phrase (17.5:10), through substitution of jedem by den meisten (12.5:7.5), or by substituting wer by a which-phrase as in (2.167): (2.167)

Welcher Dirigent hat jedem geholfen? (non-distributive only) ‘Which conductor helped everyone?’ Q1 : ex-pre + subject + l-db + def + focus 17.5 Q2 : in-dis + we-pat 10

 Quantifier Scope in German

Comparing (2.167) with (2.168), we notice the influence of the strong patient property (st-pat): (2.168)

Welcher Fehler ist jedem unterlaufen? (ambiguous) ‘Which mistake happened to everyone?’ 17.5 Q1 : ex-pre + subject + l-db + def + focus Q2 : in-dis + st-pat 15

The contrast between the direct and indirect objects of erzählen and comparable predicates comes out quite nicely, even if the predicted unambiguity of (2.169) might be too strict. (2.169)

Welchem Kind hat Jakob jedes Märchen erzählt? (non-distributive much preferred) ‘Which child did John narrate every fairy tale to?’ 17.5 Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + def + we-pat + focus Q2 : in-dis 5

(2.170)

Welches Märchen hat Jakob jedem Kind erzählt? (ambiguous) 12.5 Q1 : ex-pre + l-db + def + focus Q2 : in-dis + we-pat 10

The unavailability of a distributive reading in (2.171) results from the negative quantifier being inherently focused: (2.171)

Welchen Roman hat nicht jeder Kritiker rezensiert? ‘Which novel did not every critic review?’

Here is one example for the interaction between a wh-phrase and an adverbial quantifier: (2.172)

Wer konnte jedes Mal tun, was er wollte? (ambiguous) 12.5 Q1 : ex-pre + subject + def + focus Q2 : s-adv + in-dis 15

Thus, I can say that the predictions mostly turn out as they should. More on wh/Q-interaction in German in §5.1. We will see in §5.2 that, to a surprising degree, this model could be used to account for the wh/Q-interaction in English and Polish.

Chapter 2. Relative scope 

. Relative scope and the relation between syntactic and semantic structure Now that we have every reason to assume that relative scope is a multi-factor phenomenon with linear models being the adequate means to cope with it, we should ask ourselves what consequences this fact has on the question of scope representation, i.e., the question of how relative scope is treated by the linguistic system. I will argue that relative scope is configurationally represented on a level which is not a syntactic, but a semantic, one, dubbed “semantic structure.” It is correspondence constraints between the syntactic and the semantic structure which determine the possible relative scope readings and their degree of preference. The linear model I presented in §2.3 is part of these correspondence constraints. With this background we can tackle the question whether linear models can be anything more than a descriptively adequate means of predicting scope readings. The argument for semantic structure I present builds on an analogy between relative scope determination and the determination of word order in the German Mittelfeld – these phenomena having significant structural and even substantial similarities. .. A comparison between relative scope and word order determination Relative scope is not the one and only phenomenon in German which can sensibly be seen as a multi-factor phenomenon. Word order in the Mittelfeld is a further case in point, which has already been investigated to a considerable degree (see, among others, Lenerz 1977; Uszkoreit 1986; Reis 1987; Jacobs 1988; Dietrich 1994). If one compares relative scope to word order in the Mittelfeld, as I will do in a moment, many similarities come up. This is explained by the fact that in both cases, at least partly, very similar, balanced properties play a crucial role. From this perspective it does not come as a surprise that models for word order have been proposed which are very similar in design to our relative scope model in §2.3. We will see that relative scope determination and word order determination can be regarded as two variants of one and the same kind of process. This result is the first step in our argument for semantic structure. ... The relevant properties and their interaction Of course, there are substantial differences between relative scope and word order. Scope is basically a semantic phenomenon and not a syntactic one, although syntax has a certain influence on the availability of scope readings.

 Quantifier Scope in German

Word order, on the other hand, is a syntactic, formal phenomenon and not a semantic one, although semantics has a certain influence on the acceptability of successions of words. That they have something in common, however, is indicated by the fact that one can parallel judgments concerning acceptability and degree of “normality” of MF-successions (MF=Mittelfeld) with judgments concerning availability and degree of preference of scope readings. We evaluate scope readings as available or unavailable and distinguish among the available ones between the preferred and the non-preferred readings. In the same way we evaluate successions as acceptable or unacceptable and distinguish among the acceptable ones between the normal and the minor normal successions. (2.173) a.

Evaluation scale for scope readings _

[]

+

b. Evaluation scale for MF-successions _

[]

+

The reason for this similarity is that both phenomena are multi-factor phenomena. Interestingly, the relevant factors or properties are functionally and, at least partially, even substantially simliar. The scope-relevant properties determine a quantifier’s tendency to wide scope while the succession-relevant properties determine a MF-constituent’s tendency to being located ‘leftwards’. This function of the relevant properties is the reason that one can distinguish degrees of availability or unavailability and degrees of acceptability or unacceptability. Grammatical function, thematic property, definiteness and focus are factors which are not only relevant for relative scope, but for word order in the Mittelfeld too. If the factors’ function is to determine the tendency to wide

Chapter 2. Relative scope 

scope or the tendency to the left, the factors determine these tendencies in the same direction. Let us examine grammatical function first. If a quantifier is the subject it has a stronger tendency to wide scope than the object; if a constituent is the subject it has a stronger tendency to the left than the object: (2.174) a.

Da die Marie das Buch NICHT besitzt. as the Mary the book not possesses b. ??Da das Buch die Marie NICHT besitzt. ‘As Mary does not possess the book’.

(2.175) a.

Da der Moritz der Marie NICHT geholfen hat. as the Maurice the Mary not helped has b. ??Da der Marie der Moritz NICHT geholfen hat. ‘As Maurice did not help Mary.’

This subject/object asymmetry cannot be reduced to a thematic distinction. If the corresponding arguments of besitzen ‘possess’ and gehören ‘belong’ have the same thematic properties, the difference in (2.176) cannot be explained by thematic considerations – but it can be explained by the subject/object distinction. (2.176) a.

Da das Buch der Marie NICHT gehört. ‘As the book does not belong to Mary.’ b. ??Da das Buch die Marie NICHT besitzt. ‘As Mary does not possess the book.’

[=2.174b]

Being a sentential adverbial is not only relevant for relative scope, but for word order too. Sentential adverbials have quite a strong tendency to the left. They can even stay left of the subject, but the order “subject>sentential adverbial” is the more normal one (# means acceptable, but less normal than the other sentence). (2.177) a. Da der Mensch notwendigerweise das FALsche wählt. b. # Da notwendigerweise der Mensch das FALsche wählt. (2.178) a. Da der MENSCH notwendigerweise das Falsche WÄHLT. b. ??Da der MENSCH das Falsche notwendigerweise WÄHLT. ‘As man necessarily chooses the wrong thing.’

The second example is thematic property. Firstly, it is well-known that in the Mittelfeld dative objects have a stronger tendency to the left than accusative objects. This is the analogous tendency we have observed with respect to relative scope. Secondly, the objects of certain classes of verbs have a stronger tendency

 Quantifier Scope in German

to the left than objects of other classes. The experiencer-object of psychological verbs is a case in point. (2.179) a. ??Da der Marie der Moritz NICHT geholfen hat. [=2.175b] as the Mary the Maurice not helped has b. Da der Marie die Lösung NICHT eingefallen ist. as the Mary the solution not occurred is ‘As the solution did not occur to Mary.’

This factor is called “Agensbedingung” (agent condition) in the literature. This looks suspiciously similar to our distinction between strong and weak patient. The contrast in (2.179) parallels the scope contrast in (2.180), which was explained by the distinction between strong and weak patient: (2.180) a.

Wem hat jeder geholfen? (ambiguous) ‘Whom did everyone help?’ b. Wem ist jede Lösung eingefallen? (non-distributive only) ‘Who did every solution occur to?’

As a third examle, we have seen that if a quantifier is definite it has a stronger tendency to wide scope than if it is not definite. The influence of definiteness on word order is similar. A constituent has a stronger tendency to the left if it is definite than if it is not definite. (2.181) a. Da Maria die Matraze der Nachbarin geGEben hat. b. ??Da Maria eine Matraze der Nachbarin geGEben hat. ‘As Mary gave the (/a) mattress to her neighbour.’

A fourth and final example is focus. As we have seen, focusing a quantifier’s quantity expression diminishes its tendency to wide scope. The influence of focus on word order in the Mittelfeld is similar. By focusing a constituent, one can reduce its tendency to the left to such an extent that the succession “object to the left of the subject” becomes possible: (2.182) a. ??Da der Marie der Moritz NICHT geholfen hat. [=2.175b] as the Mary the Maurice not helped has b. Da der Marie der MOritz nicht geholfen hat. as the Mary the Maurice not helped has ‘As Maurice did not help Mary.’

As for the influence of focus on word order, it is often assumed that this is a pragmatic phenomenon. We have seen that with respect to scope it is not a pragmatic factor which is at work, but rather narrow focusing of the quantifier,


which is represented in syntactic structure by an F-feature (§2.2.7). Thus, one might wonder whether it really is the same factor which is relevant for scope and word order. However, the view that focus’ influence on word order is a pragmatic phenomenon has effectively been criticized in Reis (1987).13 Reis’s arguments ultimately show that what is relevant for word order is the grammatical feature of carrying a focus accent. Whether it is narrow focus which is relevant to word order – as it is to scope – I must leave open. This comparison indicates that relative scope and word order in the Mittelfeld is determined by a set of more or less similar syntactic-semantic properties. If we draw a parallel between tendency to wide scope and tendency to the left, we note that these properties have the same effect. As we will see in a moment, the properties determining word order in the Mittelfeld are also differently balanced. Thus, a linear model does not only offer itself for word order; only a linear model (or something equivalent) can cope with the gradiency of judgments illustrated in (2.173). Of course, there is still much to do to pin down exactly the factors and properties relevant for word order in the Mittelfeld. Nevertheless, the statement that both phenomena share a set of factors already has some substance. ... A linear model for word order in the Mittelfeld I will present a linear model for MF-successions which makes a rather good prediction concerning the acceptability and preference of MF-successions of non-quantificational arguments, without having all the details worked out.14 Here is the list of properties relevant for word order in the Mittelfeld and their weight: (2.183) Properties and their weight for MF-successions15 pronounhood: grammatical function: thematic property: definiteness: focus:

pron+acc : 3 subject: 2 st-pat: 1.5 def: 1 focus: –1

pron-acc : 2 we-pat: 0.5

agent: 0.5

The “succession value” of an argument results from adding up the values of the properties it exemplifies (the weight is multiplied by 5). The order K1 >K2 (=K1 precedes K2 ) in the Mittelfeld of a sentence S is acceptable iff the succession value of K2 minus the succession value of K1 is smaller than 5. The order K1 >K2 in the Mittelfeld of S is preferred to the order K2 >K1 iff the succession value of K1 is greater than the succession value of K2 .






Some examples. (2.184)

Da wir es ihm gesagt haben. ‘As we said it to him.’ as we it him said have wir: pron + subject + agent + def 10 + 10 + 2.5 + 5 = 27.5 es: pron+acc + def 15 + 5 = 20 ihm: pron + we-pat + def 10 + 2.5 + 5 = 17.5 wir»es; wir»ihm; es>ihm (pref.)16

(2.185)

Da die Marie es ihm gesagt hat. ‘As Mary said it to him.’ as the Mary it him said has die Marie: subject + agent + def 10 + 2.5 + 5 = 17.5 es: pron+acc + def 15 + 5 = 20 ihm: pron + we-pat + def 10 + 2.5 + 5 = 17.5 es>die Marie (pref.); es>ihm (pref.); die Marie>ihm; ihm>die Marie

(2.186)

Da sie es dem Moritz gesagt hat. ‘As she said it to Maurice.’ as she it the Maurice said has sie: pron + subject + agent + def 10 + 10 + 2.5 + 5 = 27.5 es: pron+acc + def 15 + 5 = 20 dem Moritz we-pat + def 2.5 + 5 = 7.5 sie»es; es»dem Moritz; sie»dem Moritz

(2.187)

Da sie ihm das Gerücht gesagt hat. ‘As she told him the rumor.’ as she him the rumor said has sie: pron + subject + agent + def 10 + 10 + 2.5 + 5 = 27.5 ihm: pron + we-pat + def 10 + 2.5 + 5 = 17.5 das Gerücht: def 5 sie»ihm; sie»das Gerücht; ihm»das Gerücht

(2.188)

Da die Marie dem Moritz das Buch geGEben hat. as the Mary the Maurice the book given has ‘As Mary has given the book to Maurice ...’ die Marie: subject + agens + def 10 + 2.5 + 5 = 17.5 dem Moritz: we-pat + def 2.5 + 5 = 7.5 das Buch: def 5 die Marie»dem Moritz; die Marie»das Buch; dem Moritz>das Buch (pref.)

(2.189) a.

Da ihr das Bild geZEIGT worden as her the picture shown was b. Da das Bild ihr geZEIGT worden as the picture her shown was ‘As the picture was shown to her.’

ist. is ist.17 is


ihr: pron + we-pat + def das Bild: subject + def ihr>das Bild (pref.) (2.190) a.

Da as ?? b. Da as sie: ihm:

sie ihm geZEIGT worden she him shown was ihm sie geZEIGT worden him she shown was pron + subject + def pron + we-pat + def

10 + 2.5 + 5 = 17.5 10 + 5 = 15 ist. ‘As she was shown to him.’ is ist. is 10 + 10 + 5 = 25 10 + 2.5 + 5 = 17.5

(2.191) a.

Da den Kritikern das Buch geFALlen hat. as the critics the book pleased has b. Da das Buch den Kritikern geFALlen hat. as the book the critics pleased has ‘As the book pleased the critics.’ das Buch: subject + def 10 + 5 = 15 den Kritikern: st-pat + def 7.5 + 5 = 12.5 das Buch>den Kritikern (pref.)

(2.192) a.

Da es ihm gefallen hat. ‘As it pleased him.’ as it him pleased has b. Da ihm es gefallen hat. as him it pleased has es: pron + subject + def 10 + 10 + 5 = 25 ihm: pron + st-pat + def 10 + 7.5 + 5 = 22.5 es>ihm (pref.)

(2.193) a.

Sie hat der Nachbarin diese MaTRAze geGEben. she has the neighbour this mattress given b. ??Sie hat diese MaTRAze der Nachbarin geGEben. she has this mattress the neighbour given ‘She has given this mattress to the neighbour.’ diese MaTRAze: def + focus 5–5=0 der Nachbarin: we-pat + def 2.5 + 5 = 7.5

(2.194) a.

Sie hat der NACHbarin eine Matraze geSCHENKT. she has the neighbour a mattress donated b. ??Sie hat eine Matraze der NACHbarin geSCHENKT. she has a mattress the neighbour donated ‘She has given a mattress to the neighbour.’ eine Matraze: – 018 der NACHbarin: we-pat + def + focus 2.5 + 5 – 5 = 2.5






We clearly see that the similarities between relative scope and MF-succession can be explained by the fact that very similiar properties (in conjunction with other properties) and a very similiar kind of interaction (cumulativity, weight) determine relative scope and word order in the Mittelfeld. .. The correspondence constraints concerning relative scope The similarities between relative scope and word order determination are not so huge that it would be successful to reduce one process to the other. Word order certainly cannot be taken to be a scope phenomenon. However, one might try to reduce relative scope to word order, i.e., take relative scope as an epiphenomenon of word order regularities. We will see in §6.1, when we are discussing Jacobs (1997), that such a reduction fails. Relative scope cannot be taken to be an epiphenomenon of word order regularities. It is more promising and instructive to explain the similarity between both processes by seeing them as two variants of one and the same kind of process. This perspective is especially instructive for relative scope determination. As far as word order determination in the Mittelfeld is concerned, we already have some insights about its structure. What we have to do, therefore, is model the process of scope determination after the process of word order determination. This will deliver an explanation for the similiarities between the two processes. What is the structure of the determination of MF-succession? A binary right-headed structure corresponds to the Mittelfeld as a topological domain. See for example: (2.195) [VP Karl [VP den Hund [VP [VP füttern] [V will]]]]

With this background the determination of the MF-succession of arguments can be modeled as follows. A set of factors evaluates the hierarchical position, the ‘height’, of the arguments pairwise as possible, preferred or impossible. An argument can only be higher in the structure, i.e., can only c-command another argument, if the difference between its ‘hierarchy value’ and the ‘hierarchy value’ of the other argument is not smaller than a certain number. Distinct relative height in the verbal phrase (being the complement of S) corresponds to distinct relative precedence in the string. That means that what I have called tendency to the left corresponds to high position in the VP. The linear model of MF-succession in §2.4.1.2 can be reinterpreted as a linear model determining the arguments’ phrase-structural position. Its function might be


described as licensing a certain part of the verbal phrase, namely the domain of the left adjuncts. If we try to view relative scope determination in an analogous way the result looks as follows. There is a level of analysis, call it “semantic structure”, where the quantifiers are arranged in a hierarchical way. The scope-relevant properties evaluate the quantifiers’ relative height pairwise. A quantifier can only be higher than another one if the difference between its scope value and the other quantifier’s scope value is not smaller than a certain number. Thus, we can assign the scope model the function to license a certain domain of the semantic structure. The quantifiers’ distinct hierarchical arrangements in semantic structure correspond to distinct scope readings. What I have called tendency to wide scope corresponds to a quantifier’s tendency to a high structural position in semantic structure. In this vain, a sentence like Etwas gefiel jedem ‘Something pleased everyone’, which exhibits two scope readings, has two possible semantic structures: (2.196)

a.

b. etwasx

jedemy

jedemy

etwasx x gefiel y

x gefiel y

“Scope of a quantifier” can now be defined configurationally: (2.197) The scope of a quantifier is the domain which the quantifier commands on semantic structure.

If X and Y are arbitrary semantic phrases not being parts of one another in semantic structure S, then: X commands Y in S =df X is such that, as for S, Y is part of the phrase which immediately encompasses X. This is our argument for the level of semantic structure. It is an argument for a level where quantifier scope is configurationally represented – distinct from the syntactic level. Of course, such an argument is not compulsory; other alternatives are imaginable. But, I do not think that one can demand more from an argument for the existence of a level of analysis. As for its design, it’s a new kind of argument for “logical form”. Up to now, I intentionally refrained from using the term logical form. Now, the time is ripe to compare what I have called semantic structure with some conceptions of logical form. Semantic structure is very similar, indeed nearly identical to the semantic representation or the underlying structure of Lakoff






(1971) and McCawley (1973) as well as the logical form in May (1977), which all deliver an unequivocal configurational representation of scope relations. It is obvious that this representation of quantifier scope is modeled with standard predicate logic in mind. Semantic structure differs from May’s (1985) LF, which is not an unequivocal representation of scope relations. As far as I can see, this modification in May’s theory has not been primarily motivated by scope considerations, but by GB-specific syntactic assumptions, namley the Empty Category Principle. According to this princple, structure (2.196a) is not well-formed as the subject trace is not properly bound. (2.196b), however, obeys the ECP. Thus, the latter structure must carry both scope readings. Such a view only makes sense presupposing that semantic structure is a syntactic level of analysis, which might be transformationally derived by quantifier raising (QR) from s-structure. In my argument for semantic structure I did not make use of QR (or quantifier lowering – the predecessor of QR proposed by the generative semanticists). Nor have I made any assumptions implying that semantic structure should be a syntactic level standing in a transformational relation to other syntactic levels. Thus, it is a serious possibility that semantic structure – as a representation format for a sentence’s compositional semantic structure – is a genuine semantic level of analysis. I will explore this possibility here. Semantic structure is not a logical form in the sense of a translation into a logical language. But, as one of its functions is the representation of scope, semantic structure has a function logical languages are especially useful for. ... Digression: Quantifier binding Further evidence of the usefulness of semantic structure comes from the phenomenon of quantifier binding. Here the following constraint is operative: (2.198) A quantifier can bind a pronoun only if it is in the scope of the quantifier.19

It follows from this condition and our conclusion that relative scope cannot be deduced from the configuration of syntactic structure (s-structure) that the possibility of quantifier binding cannot be deduced from the configuration of syntactic structure. Thus, (2.198) can only be a condition on semantic structure. The relative scope model can be used straightforwardly as a means for predicting possible quantifier bindings. For instance, the scope definition (2.197) and the condition on quantifier binding (2.198) immediately explain that quantifier binding is possible in (2.199a, b) and that these sentences are scope unambiguous: in these sentences we have a configuration of factors such that


the binding quantifier can have scope over the quantifier containing the pronoun to be bound; the reverse reading is excluded because in a suitable semantic structure the quantifier would not command the pronoun it is to bind. (2.199) a.

Eines von seinen1 Bildern hat [jedes Museum]1 ausgeliehen. one of its pictures has every museum lent ‘Every museum loaned one of its pictures.’ b. [Welche Aufgabe]1 hat jeder, der sie1 gestellt bekam, which problem has everyone who she posed got gelöst? [=2.25b] solved ‘Which problem is such that everyone who had to solve it solved it eventually?’

That (2.200a) is unacceptable in contrast to (b) can also be explained: (2.200) a. *Jedes Buch, das er1 besaß, hat irgendjemand1 every book that he owned has someone.or.other b. Irgendjemand1 hat jedes Buch, das er1 besaß, someone.or.other has every book that he owned ‘Someone or other sold every book that he owned.’

verkauft. sold verkauft. sold

In (a) there is a configuration of factors such that the subject irgendjemand cannot have scope over the object containing the pronoun. This sentence exemplifies that quantifier binding cannot be deduced from the configuration of syntactic structure: there is no relevant difference between (2.199a) and (2.200a) in this respect. As for a quantifier binding a possessive, most of the German data discussed in the literature (Frey 1993; Haider 1993: §6.3.3.2; Choi 1995; Berman 2001: §4) can be accounted for by the relative scope model if we take the noun phrases introduced by a possessive to be quantifiers and assume that they are definite (I will discuss the cases where the predictions differ from data in the literature in a moment):20 (2.201) a.

dass jeder1 seine1 Mutter mag ‘that everyone1 likes his1 mother’ Q1 : in-pre + subject + in-dis 25 Q2 : def 5 b. dass jeden1 seine1 Mutter mag ‘that everyone1 , his1 mother likes’ Q1 : in-pre + in-dis 20 Q2 : subject + def 10






c. ??dass seine1 Mutter jeder1 mag ‘that, his1 mother, everyone1 likes’ Q1 : in-pre + def 20 10 Q2 : subject + in-dis d. *dass seine1 Mutter jeden1 mag ‘that his1 mother likes everyone1 ’ Q1 : in-pre + subject + def 25 Q2 : in-dis 5 (2.202) a.

Jeder1 mag seine1 Mutter. ‘Everyone1 likes his1 mother.’ 17.5 Q1 : ex-pre + subject + in-dis Q2 : def 5 b. Jeden1 mag seine1 Mutter. ‘Everyone1 , his1 mother likes’ Q1 : ex-pre + in-dis 12.5 Q2 : subject + def 10 c. Seine1 Mutter mag jeder1 . ‘His1 mother, everyone1 likes.’ Q1 : ex-pre + def 12.5 Q2 : subject + in-dis 10 d. *Seine1 Mutter mag jeden1 . ‘His1 mother likes everyone1 .’ Q1 : ex-pre + subject + def 17,5 Q2 : in-dis 5

(2.203) a.

Wer1 mag seine1 Mutter? ‘Who1 likes his1 mother?’ Q1 : ex-pre + subject + def + focus 12.5 Q2 : def 5 b. Wen1 mag seine1 eigene Mutter nicht? ‘Whom1 does not his1 own mother like?’ Q1 : ex-pre + def + focus 7.5 Q2 : subject + def 10

(2.204) a. *dass Jörg seinem1 Vater jeden1 gezeigt hat ‘that Joe showed everyone1 to his1 father’ Q1 : in-pre + def + we-pat 25 Q2 : in-dis 5 b. *dass Jörg seinen1 Vater jedem1 gezeigt hat ‘that Joe showed his1 father to everyone1 ’ Q1 : in-pre + def 20 Q2 : in-dis + we-pat 10

The one prediction which does not correspond to the judgments in the literature is (2.201c), which is claimed to be acceptable in the indicated binding relation. But I must confess that my intuitions comply with the prediction of my model – I do not perceive this reading to be possible. See the following contrast:


(2.205) a. Zumindest seine1 eigene Arbeit sollte jeder1 schätzen. b. ??Es sollte zumindest seine1 eigene Arbeit jeder1 schätzen. ‘Everyone1 should like his1 own work at least.’

Relating to Choi (1995: 4), Berman (2001: 91) claims that there are sentences of type (2.204b) which are acceptable. But, once more, I do not find the given sentence acceptable (the following sentence corresponds to Berman’s example (20), except that I substituted the generic man ‘one’ by ich ‘I’): (2.206)

*dass ich seine1 Tanzpartnerin jedem1 vorstellte. that I his dancing.partner everyone introduced ‘that I introduced his1 dancing partner to everyone1 .’

Here ends my digression into the regularities of quantifier binding. Let us have a closer look at what I have called the licensing condition, which is based on the linear model for relative scope. The scope model refers to properties which are partly syntactic in nature (precedence, syntactic dbinding, f-marking) and partly semantic (distributivity, patienthood, lexical d-binding, definiteness, negation attraction, and grammatical function, which I construe as “logical” function – see Chapter 7). That means that the condition for relative scope – differing in this respect from the well-formedness condition (2.198) for quantifier binding – must refer to properties in the syntactic as well as in the semantic structure. What I have called licensing condition is better called a correspondence condition, i.e., a condition on the correspondence between semantic and syntactic structure. With such a condition it is possible (as we will see in a moment) to refer simultaneously to the properties of two levels of analysis (without making use of transderivational constraints as in Lakoff 1971). The model for such correspondence conditions is the “two-level rules” of Koskenniemi (see Karttunen 1993; cf. the “cross-level rules” of Goldsmith 1993 as well as the “correlations across levels” of Lakoff 1993). The formal means have been developed in phonology and morphology as alternatives to ordered rewriting rules. We illustrate this with two simple ordered rules (3a) and (3b). Here N stands for an underspecified nasal that is realized as a labial (N:m) or as a dental (N:n) depending on the environment.

(3) a. N → m / ___ p; elsewhere, n b. p → m / m ___



 Quantifier Scope in German

Applying in the order given, these rules convert the lexical string kaNpan to the surface string kamman, with kampan as an intermediate representation. (Karttunen 1993: 177)

What these rewriting rules can do, two two-level rules can do too:21 The idea is that the realization of N as m is licensed and required when it is followed by a p in the lexicon, and the realization of p as m is conditioned by a preceding m on the surface side. In Koskenniemi’s notation, the rules are written as in (5). It is instructive to compare these rules [...] to the rewrite rules in (3) above. (5) a. b.

N:m ⇔ ___ p: p:m ⇔ :m ___

The location of the colon in p: indicates that the p in (5a) is a lexical symbol – with some surface realization that is not relevant for (5a). Because it only refers to the lexical context, (5a) is for all practical purposes equivalent to the rewrite rule in (3a). In (5b), the colon on the left of m in :m indicates that m is a surface symbol here. This makes (5b) different from the rewrite rule in (3b). Because (5a) und (5b) are independent from each other, they can apply simultaneously, whereas the application of (3a) and (3b) must be ordered. (Karttunen 1993: 183)

The correspondence constraints concerning relative scope apply to the relation between semantic structure and syntactic structure – I will assume that correspondences to other levels of analysis are not necessary.22 They can be stated as follows: (2.207) Correspondence constraints concerning relative scope23 C1 Quantifier Q1 commanding quantifier Q2 on semantic structure SEM fits with the syntactic counterpart of Q1 preceding the syntactic counterpart of Q2 on syntactic structure SYN only if preference value(Q1 >Q2 ) = 0 with respect to the properties of Q1 and Q2 in SEM and their counterparts in SYN. C2 Quantifier Q2 commanding quantifier Q1 on semantic structure SEM fits with the syntactic counterpart of Q1 preceding the syntactic counterpart of Q2 on syntactic structure SYN only if preference value(Q2 >Q1 ) = 0 with respect to the properties of Q1 and Q2 in SEM and their counterparts in SYN.

Lakoff ’s (1971) global derivational constraint, Jackendoff ’s (1972) modal projection rule, Reinhart’s (1976, 1983) scope principle, Huang’s (1982) isomorphic principle and Müller’s (1997a) parallel movement can all be seen as a


form of correspondence condition where identity of phrase-structural relations is demanded. I have now determined where the linear model for relative scope has its place in grammar, namely as the basis of correspondence constraints between semantic and syntactic structure. Apart from its empirical virtues, the proposed architecture seems quite satisfying from an aesthetic point of view. Of course, I have to admit that it is not a small thing to assume a new level of analysis – with its own entities, structures, conditions. The proposed view copes with the complexities of relative scope determination without stipulating any additional syntactic machinery or stipulating any new semantic entities. The assumptions for syntactic and semantic structure are rather simple and, if not standard, less complex than standard assumptions. The price for this reduction is the assumption of a genuine semantic level of analysis. We will see more and more evidence that it is a sensible move to postulate such a level. The approach is a rather restrictive one, as only properties on semantic and syntactic structure can be relevant: each scope-relevant property must have an existence independent of scope considerations (which I have tried to show in §2.2) and no properties on other levels of analysis can be relevant – especially no prosodic properties (cf. note 22). I started in this section with the analogy between relative scope and MFsuccessions. It would now be interesting to formulate a correspondence condition based on the linear model for MF-succession. However, I will not do this here.

. The status of linear models .. Can linear models be explanatorily adequate? In linguistics, linear models like the scope model or the model for word order are still a quite exotic creature, to say the least. One hesitates to embrace them as they do not seem to be principle-based, rely on numerical computations and seem impossible to learn. I will try to make clear why I do not think that these points can be convincing arguments against the adoption of linear models. One might criticize linear models because they rely on a multitude of different factors interacting in a specific way (i.e., a scope-specific or a wordorder-specific way). One might propose as an alternative the search for a few principles which make, independently of one another, demands on the



 Quantifier Scope in German

well-formedness of levels of representation and whose interaction can explain the facts. Take May (1977, 1985) as an example. The first element is the scope principle at LF (1977: a quantifier outscopes another one if it c-commands the other; 1985: a quantifier outscopes another one if it stands in a Σ-sequence to the other one). The second essential element of this scope theory is quantifier raising (QR) which determines the mapping from s-structure to LF. The possible scope relations result from the interplay of QR and the scope principle. As far as its design is concerned, this theory is comparable to the theory I have presented. There is a scope definition (the scope of a quantifier is the domain which the quantifier commands on semantic structure) and there are the correspondence constraints based on a linear model. The only one decisive difference with May lies in the fact that assuming a genuine semantic level and correspondence constraints makes scope determination more complex. But this is not an essential structural difference and the additional complexity is well-founded (all serious recent scope theories are more complex than May’s theory). There remains the objection that one should not base the correspondence constraints on a linear model, as the effects of these correspondence constraints might be achieved by the interaction of independent principles responsible for the mapping of syntactic to semantic structure. I will discuss in §6 many such principles which have been proposed in the literature and come to the conclusion that they do not seem to be adequate. In other words, I have found no evidence for the assumption that scope is an epiphenomenon. Of course, this does not mean that there could not be such principles. But, as far as the current state of scope affairs is concerned, there is no rival to a linear model if empirical adequacy is what is at stake. (Something similar is true for the linear word order model and its kin above.). And there is one fact which seems to demand forcefully something like a linear model, namely the gradient character of scope readings. This gradient character cannot be dismissed as a performance effect; it is a trait the grammatical system is responsible for. To account for the gradient character, I see no alternative to linear models or models relying on weights (cf. Abney 1996; we will have a look at optimality theory in a moment). How realistic are linear models? In psychophysics, linear models are quite common, for example, in research on perception of three-dimensional shapes (the Necker cube belongs to this field) and on colour. The visual system uses various cues which are independent from one another in order to discover the three-dimensional shape of objects: binocular vision, motion parallax, texture gradients, outline contours and shading. The interaction of these cues can at

Chapter 2. Relative scope 

least to a certain extent be described by a simple linear model (see Parker et al. 1995). As for biological and computational models of colour perception, there is a class of theories which belong to the ‘linear models framework’ (Maloney 1992). “Actual lights and reflectances are described by representing them as the weighted sums of a small number of illuminant and reflectance basis functions. Colour designators correspond to weighted sums of the reflectance basis functions, and recovering reflectance consists in estimating the weights used to describe a particular reflectance” (Thompson 1995: 91). Thus, in neurosciences, linear models are something quite familiar, which should diminish their exotic character for linguists. Dealing with language, linear models have been proposed in cognitive psychology to cope with categorization and typicality effects (see Hampton 1998), and, in human language processing, mechanisms similar to linear models have been proposed not only for scope processing (see Krutzman/MacDonald 1993), but also for the processing of syntactic ambiguities. Thus, it seems that linear models are a realistic means of coping with our way of producing and understanding language. Let us turn to the objection based on numerical computations. It is uncontroversial that the competent speaker neither explicitly nor implicitly makes numerical computations to find out the reading of a sentence. But concluding from this that linear models are to be dismissed would be like dismissing the law of gravity, which is nothing more than a mathematical formula, because a planet cannot compute its velocity relative to the sun (cf. Feynman 1993: 51). Of course, the question of how the linguistic system implements what a linear model describes remains a sensible one. But, this question seems to be one which can be answered because what a linear model presupposes seems compatible with what we know about neural activity (discharge of action potentials, thresholds for activation, excitatory and inhibitory neural connections, strength of synaptic connections, etc.). Even if the question of implementation is anything but trivial, it is a ‘normal question’ for which an answer can be found. Lastly, I will deal with the objection relating to learnability, which is based on the feeling that one cannot imagine how a linear scope model can be learned. Obviously, this is not an objection, but raises the question of how the linguistic system learns to compute the correct scope relations. This question has many aspects. One aspect of this question is the range of properties the linguistic system picks out as the scope-relevant ones. Probably it is no accident that the two linear models we investigated in some detail rely on similiar properties. Other multi-factor phenomena also seem to rely on similar prop-

 Quantifier Scope in German

erties (see the interpretation of reflexive and personal pronouns, if one follows Kuno 1987). The important question is: what is it that makes these properties so prominent in the linguistic system? Another question is how easy it is for a system to find out the appropriate weights. One must see whether these questions lead to greater problems. .. Linear models, optimality and smart heuristics There are some similarites between linear models and optimality theory (OT). In both cases a structure is evaluated with regard to a set of items (constraints/properties) having a distinct influence (rank/weight). But the dissimilarities might be more important. Above all, OT chooses among the candidates the optimal candidate. All other candidates are regarded as ungrammatical. The linear models we have looked at evaluate a structure as possible/impossible and preferred/not preferred such that there might exist several possible structures with distinct or the same degree of preference. The structures do not compete with one another, but every structure is evaluated independently of the other ones. Finally, linear models are numerical models, but OT is not a numerical model as the constraints are hierarchically arranged without being weighted (cf. Prince/Smolensky 1993: §10.1.2). These differences already hint that it is not so easy to translate the linear scope model into an OT-account. It is arguably even impossible to make such a translation without making substantial changes to OT. The reason is that OT belongs to a type of model where cue weight is noncompensatory (cf. the simple heuristics of Gigerenzer et al. 1999). That means that OT is a model where the violation of a high ranked constraint cannot be compensated by the fulfillment of enough lower ordered constraints. The scope-relevant properties, however, are compensatory, which is just another way of saying that they interact cumulatively or additively. The cumulative character of scope interaction prevents a “simple heuristics” (or an OT-account) from being a viable alternative to a linear model.24 Any approach relying on a non-compensatory scope model has to deny the cumulative character of scope interaction. But, bear in mind that it is the cumulative character which makes it possible to cope with the gradient character of scope readings.


. The scope behavior of further types of quantifiers .. Coordinative quantifiers One can build quantifiers with the help of the coordinating particles und ‘and’, (entweder...)oder ‘(either...)or’, weder...noch ‘neither...nor’, sowohl...als auch ‘both...and.’25 I will illustrate this with DP-coordinations. Let us look at the following sentences (Bertrand Russell was Briton and Willard Van Orman Quine was American): (2.208)

Russell und Quine waren Amerikaner. ‘Russell and Quine were Americans.’

(2.209)

Russell und Quine waren keine Amerikaner. ‘Russell and Quine were not Americans.’

(2.210)

(Entweder) Russell oder Quine war kein Amerikaner. ‘Either Russell or Quine was not American.’

(2.211)

Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Russell und Quine Amerikaner waren. ‘It is not the case that Russell and Quine were Americans.’

As Russell was not American, sentence (2.208) is false. Sentence (2.209) is false as Quine was American. Both sentences stand in a contrary relation to one another. (2.208) is contradictory to (2.210), which factually is a true sentence. (2.210) is asymmetrically entailed by (2.209); (2.210) and (2.211) are logically equivalent. Therefore, (2.209) and (2.211), which are a pair of sentences corresponding to the negation criterion, are not logically equivalent, but stand in asymmetrical entailment. Thus, DP-coordinations seem to be quantifiers.26 This is indirectly confirmed by the following fact. Interestingly, the relations between (2.208), (2.209) and (2.211) correspond to the relations between (2.212), (2.213) and (2.214). (2.212)

Es sind alle von uns da gewesen. ‘All of us have been there.’

(2.213)

Es sind alle von uns nicht da gewesen. ‘All of us haven’t been there.’

(2.214)

Es ist nicht der Fall, dass alle von uns da gewesen sind. ‘It is not the case that all of us have been there.’

Analogously, the sentences in (2.215) behave like the sentences in (2.216): (2.215) a.

Russell oder Quine war ein Amerikaner. ‘Russell or Quine was American.’



 Quantifier Scope in German

b. (Entweder) Russell oder Quine war kein Amerikaner. [=2.210] ‘Either Russell or Quine was not American.’ c. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Russell oder Quine ein Amerikaner war. ‘It is not the case that Russell or Quine was American.’ c . Weder Russell noch Quine war ein Amerikaner. ‘Neither Russell nor Quine was American.’ (2.216) a.

Es sind einige von uns da gewesen. ‘Some of us have been there.’ b. Es sind einige von uns nicht da gewesen. ‘Some of us have not been there.’ c. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass einige von uns da gewesen sind. ‘It is not the case that some of us have been there.’

In both sets of examples, (a) and (b) are compatible (i.e., they can be both true), (a) and (c) are contradictory, (b) is asymmetrically entailed by (c). (2.215c) and (2.215c ) are logically equivalent. The relations between the logical quantifiers ∀ and ∃ and the logical connectives ∧ and ∨ are well-known: under certain circumstances (namely, finite domain, enough individual constants) a universal quantification is identical to a sequence of conjunctions, an existential quantification to a sequence of disjunctions. Coordinations with und or sowohl...als auch behave like universal quantifiers, coordinations with (entweder...)oder behave like existential quantifiers and coordinations with weder...noch behave like negated existential quantifiers. The logical relations between the sentences with DP-coordinations are explained immediately if one assumes that the coordinations are suitable quantifiers. See for instance: (for the meaning of ≤ and ⊕ see §1.4) (2.217)

Russell und Quine waren Amerikaner. Sowohl Russell als auch Quine war Amerikaner. ∀x[x≤r⊕q] American(x) Every x which is (a person and) part of the plurality consisting of Russell and Quine was American.

(2.218)

(Entweder) Russell oder Quine war kein Amerikaner. ∃x[x≤r⊕q] ¬American(x) There is an x which is (a person and) part of the plurality consisting of Russell and Quine and which was not American.

Viewing DP-coordinations as quantifiers allows one to predict the possible readings if another quantifier is around. I will confine myself to the presen-

Chapter 2. Relative scope 

tation of some instructive examples. Let us look first at weder...noch ‘neither...nor’, which is a negative quantifier, and check whether it shows the behavior typical of negative existential quantifiers. (2.219) a.

Weder Moritz noch Marie hat jede Aufgabe lösen können. ‘Neither Maurice nor Mary could solve every problem.’ √ weder...noch>jede: jede>weder...noch: b. Jede Aufgabe hat weder Moritz noch Marie lösen können. ‘Every problem, neither Maurice nor Mary could solve.’ √ jede>weder...noch: (?) √ weder...noch>jede:

(2.220) a.

Weder Moritz noch Marie hat einige Aufgaben lösen können. ‘Neither Maurice nor Mary could solve some problems.’ √ weder...noch>einige: einige>weder...noch: b. Einige Aufgaben hat weder Moritz noch Marie lösen können. √ einige>weder...noch: weder...noch>einige: (?)

In (2.219b) one can observe the effect of negation attraction (in contrast to (2.220b)). Thus, weder...noch phrases behave like negative quantifiers in relative scope interaction. As accusative objects, they also show the expected behavior: (2.221) a.

Jeder hat weder die erste noch die zweite Aufgabe lösen können. ‘Everyone could solve neither the first nor the second problem.’ √ jeder>weder...noch: weder...noch>jeder: b. Weder die erste noch die zweite Aufgabe hat jeder lösen können. ‘Neither the first nor the second problem, everyone could solve.’ √ weder...noch>jeder: √ jeder>weder...noch:

If we observe the interaction of coordinated DP-quantifiers among each other, we find the well-known pattern of possible and impossible readings: (2.222) a.

Sowohl Moritz als auch Marie hat die erste oder die zweite Aufgabe lösen können. ‘Both Maurice and Mary could solve the first or the second problem.’ √ sowohl...als auch>oder: oder>sowohl...als auch:

 Quantifier Scope in German

b. Die erste oder die zweite Aufgabe hat sowohl Moritz als auch Marie lösen können. ‘The first or the second problem, both Maurice and Mary could solve.’ √ oder>sowohl...als auch: √ sowohl...als auch>oder: (2.223) a.

Moritz oder Marie hat sowohl die erste als auch die zweite Aufgabe lösen können. ‘Maurice or Mary could solve the first as well as the second problem.’ √ oder>sowohl...als auch: sowohl...als auch>oder: b. Sowohl die erste als auch die zweite Aufgabe hat Moritz oder Marie lösen können. ‘The first as well as the second problem, Maurice or Mary could solve.’ √ sowohl...als auch>oder: oder>sowohl...als auch: (?)

One final example: the sentence Moritz oder Marie hat jedem dabei geholfen ‘Maurice or Mary helped everyone with it’ has a strong as well as a weak reading like the sentence Einer von den beiden hat jedem dabei geholfen ‘One of the two both helped everyone with it’. By analyzing coordinated noun phrases as DP-quantifiers we obtain, without additional assumptions, the right predictions. With this and the successful use of the negation criterion in mind, there can be no doubt that DPcoordinations are quantifiers (apart from the cases where they are names, of course). .. Quantifiers with focus particles The focus particle nur ‘only’ has several interesting properties: it is (obligatorily) associated with focus and triggers a presupposition. In (2.224), for instance, Moritz ‘Maurice’ is the focus of the particle and the proposition that Maurice was here is presupposed. That this is presupposed is shown by the fact that it is still presupposed if the sentence is negated as in (2.224b) – what is negated is the statement that, except for Maurice, nobody of us was here. (2.224) a.

Von uns war nur MOritz da. ‘No one of us was here except for Maurice.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass von uns nur MOritz da war. ‘It is not the case that, out of all of us, only Maurice was here.’

Chapter 2. Relative scope 

The statement’s truth condition can be formulated adequately if one analyzes the phrase nur MOritz as a negative existential quantifier which contains the PP von uns: (2.225) a.

There is no person which belongs to us, is not identical to Maurice and was here. = No one of us was here except for Maurice. ¬ ∃x[x≤us ∧ x=maurice] Was-here(x) b. It is not the case that there is no person which belongs to us, is not identical to Maurice and was here. = There is a person which belongs to us, is not identical to Maurice and was here. = Besides Maurice, someone else from among us was here. ∃x[x≤us ∧ x=maurice] Was-here (x)

According to the negation criterion, the phrase nur MOritz behaves like a quantifier indeed: the sentences in (2.226) are not logically equivalent with respect to the statement they make, instead, (a) entails asymmetrically (b). (The sentences differ with respect to their presuppositions too.) (2.226) a.

Von uns war nur MOritz nicht da. ‘Out of all of us, only Maurice was not here.’ Statement: Except for Maurice, every one of us was here. ¬ ∃x[x≤us ∧ x=maurice] ¬ Was-here(x) =∀x[x≤us ∧ x=maurice] Was-here(x) Presupposition: Maurice was not here. b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass von uns nur MOritz da war. [=2.224b] Statement: Besides Maurice, someone else of us was here. ∃x[x≤us ∧ x=maurice] Was-here(x) Presupposition: Maurice was here.

That nur is a negative element is indicated by its capacity to license negative polarity elements such as the adverb jemals ‘ever’ or the modal verb brauchen ‘need’: (2.227) a.

Nur einer ist jemals angekommen. ‘Only one person ever arrived.’ b. Niemand ist jemals angekommen. ‘Nobody ever arrived.’ c. *Einer ist jemals angekommen. *‘One person ever arrived.’

 Quantifier Scope in German

(2.228) a.

Es braucht nur einer anzukommen. ‘Only one person needs to arrive.’ b. Es brauchen nicht alle anzukommen. ‘Not everyone needs to arrive.’ c. *Es braucht einer anzukommen. ‘One person needs to arrive.’

There is no unanimity in the literature concerning the question of whether nur MOritz is a noun phrase (Jacobs 1983, especially, disagrees). Many researchers following Geach ([1962]3 1980) take them to be a united quantificational phrase. This view is supported by the considerations above and by observing the scope behavior of nur phrases. Like in Q/Q-interaction, there are different readings according to the order of nur phrases and other quantifiers. Sentence (2.229) has the reading “Only Mary is such that she could solve some problems”. It does not have the reading “There are some problems which only Mary could solve”, which is the reading (b) has as its unique one. (2.229) a.

Nur die Marie hat einige Aufgaben lösen können. ‘Only Mary could solve some problems.’ b. Einige Aufgaben hat nur die Marie lösen können. ‘Some problems, only Mary could solve.’

If one substitutes the quantity expression of the object, as in (2.230) with jede, then the order “nur phrase preceding the universal quantifier” becomes an unambiguous sentence. Sentence (2.230b), however, is ambiguous: besides the wide-scope reading of the universal quantifier which one gets only with some effort, it exhibits the reading with wide scope of the nur phrase. (2.230) a.

Nur die Marie hat jede Aufgabe lösen können. ‘Only Mary could solve every problem.’ b. Jede Aufgabe hat nur die Marie lösen können.27 ‘Every problem, only Mary could solve.’

The fact that the nur phrase can have wide scope in (2.230b), but not in (2.229b) reminds us of the negative quantifiers (cf. (2.104b) vs. (2.106)). We have already analyzed it as a negative quantifier and will see more evidence for it below. Likewise, if the nur phrase is an accusative object, the relative order can decide the possible readings. In (2.231a), for example, the universal quantifier has wide scope, but (b) clearly seems to be ambiguous:


(2.231) a.

Jeder hat nur eine Aufgabe lösen können. ‘Everyone could solve only one problem.’ b. Nur eine Aufgabe hat jeder lösen können. ‘Only one problem, everyone could solve.’

Looking at more examples confirms the impression that we can predict the possible readings of sentences with nur DPs if we take them to be negative existential quantifiers. Taken all together, it seems beyond doubt that nur phrases like ‘nur plus proper name’ are united expressions of the kind ‘negative existential quantifier’. DPs with the focus particles auch and sogar, however, do not display quantificational properties. Neither the two sentences, Auch die Marie ist nicht da gewesen ‘Also Mary wasn’t here’ and Es ist nicht der Fall, dass auch die Marie da gewesen ist ‘It is not the case that also Mary wasn’t here’, nor the two, Sogar die Marie ist nicht da gewesen ‘Even Mary wasn’t here’ and Es ist nicht der Fall, dass sogar die Marie da gewesen ist ‘It is not the case that even Mary wasn’t here’, differ in their truth conditions, although they differ in their presuppositions or implicatures. The focus particle nicht ‘not’ (sometimes called ‘replazives nicht’ in German) has similarities with nur as it is (obligatorily) associated with focus and seems to be a quantificational particle too. Let us try the coordination criterion. (2.232) a.

Nicht die MaRIE hat gesungen und getanzt. ‘It wasn’t Mary that sang and danced.’ b. Nicht die MaRIE hat gesungen und nicht die MaRIE hat getanzt. ‘It wasn’t Mary that sang and Mary that danced.’

In a situation where Mary sang, but did not dance, (a) is true, but (b) is false. But one might doubt whether this is sufficient evidence for the quantifierhood of nicht phrases. The following sentence pair, however, seems to show more clearly that a noun phrase like nicht die MaRIE is indeed a quantifier. In a situation where Mary solves some, but not all problems, the first sentence is false, but the second one true. (2.233) a.

Nicht die MaRIE hat einige Aufgaben gelöst. ‘It wasn’t Mary that solved some problems.’ b. Einige Aufgaben hat nicht die MaRIE gelöst. ‘Some problems, it wasn’t Mary that solved them.’



 Quantifier Scope in German

.. Relative phrases We have seen in §1.2.2 that relative phrases satisfy criteria for quantifierhood. We will see now that the interaction between relative phrases and quantifiers shows every bit of the properties of relative scope interaction as we know it by now. Like the corresponding interrogative sentences (2.77a) and (2.35b), the following relative clauses (or noun phrases) exhibit two readings which one can call distributive and non-distributive readings respectively. (2.234) a.

Die Stücke, die jeder bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt hat ‘The pieces which everyone played at the final exam’ b. Die Romane, die jeder Kritiker rezensiert hat [=2.37a] ‘The novels which every critic reviewed’

(2.77a)

Welches Stück hat jeder bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt? ‘Which piece did everyone play at the final exam?’

(2.35b)

Welchen Roman hat jeder Kritiker rezensieren müssen? ‘Which novel did every critic have to review?’

With (2.234a) one can refer to the pieces which are such that everyone played them at the final exam, or to (all) the pieces which were played at the final exam, notwithstanding whether only one or several musicians played them. Likewise one can refer with (2.234b) to the novels which were so important that every critic reviewed them, or to the novels which were such that at least one critic reviewed them. The first reading is the non-distributive one, the second the distributive. Exactly as in wh/Q-Interaction, focusing the universal quantifier results in the non-distributive reading being the only possible reading. (2.235) a. Die Stücke, die JE der bei der Abschlussprüfung gespielt hat b. Die Romane, die JE der Kritiker rezensiert hat

The grammatical function has an influence on the possible readings too. The following two noun phrases with the relative pronoun being the subject and the universal quantifier being the accusative object are unequivocally nondistributive: (2.236) a.

Die Pianisten, die jede Bachfuge auswendig spielen können ‘The piano players who can play every fugue of Bach by heart’ b. Die Kritiker, die jeden Roman rezensiert haben [=2.37b] ‘The critics who reviewed every novel’


If the object is a dative object, the distributive reading becomes once more possible in certain cases: (2.237) a.

Die Leute, die jedem gratuliert haben ‘The people who congratulated everyone’ b. Die Leute, die jedem bei der Vorbereitung geholfen haben ‘The people who helped everyone with the preparations’

As the following examples show, the relative pronoun die behaves like the interrogative wer, but not like the interrogative welch phrases, which means that the relative pronoun is definite, but not lexically d-bound, which makes sense: (2.77b) Wer hat jedem bei der Vorbereitung geholfen? (ambiguous) (2.167) Welcher Dirigent hat jedem geholfen? (non-distributive only)

The relative pronoun behaves like wer in comparison with wie viel phrases too, as the contrast between (2.238) and (2.90b, d) shows: (2.238) Die Leute, die jede Aufgabe gelöst haben (non-distributive) (2.90b) Wer hat jede Aufgabe gelöst? (non-distributive) (2.90d) Wie viele Leute haben jede Aufgabe gelöst? (ambiguous)

With respect to distributivity the same contrasts show up: (2.239) a. Die Leute, die jedem gratuliert haben (ambiguous) b. Die Leute, die den meisten gratuliert haben (non-distributive only)

As for syntactic constellation, a relative phrase behaves like an interrogative quantifier which introduces an embedded clause or which is located in the Vorfeld, but not like a quantifier located in the Mittelfeld. This does not come as a surprise. How can one interpret these baffling analogies to wh/Q-interaction and thus to quantifier interaction other than by assuming that relative phrases are quantifiers? But, if they are quantifiers, there is a challenge to semantics: how can one account for the distributive reading? For an answer to this question see Pafel (1998: §6.5.3). Trivial, however, is the integration of the interaction of relative phrases and quantifiers into the scope model.



 Quantifier Scope in German

Notes . Quantifier binding provides evidence of the ambiguity of (2.4b): (i)

Un de ses1 livres, chaque étudiant 1 l’a lu. one of his books every student it.has read ‘One of his books, every student has read.’

(ii) [Un des livres]1 , chaque étudiant qui le1 connaît l’a lu. one of.the books every student who it knows it.has read ‘One of the books, every student who knows it has read.’ . Compare the judgments of the author and his informants in Lechner (1998: §3). . The “Vorfeld” is the position in front of the finite verb in V2-clauses. The “Mittelfeld” is the domain between the finite verb in V1/V2-clauses or the COMP-position in V-endclauses, on the one hand, and the verbal complex, on the other (see Reis 1980; Höhle 1986; Abraham 1995 for the topological theory of German sentences). In (2.1), (2.2), (2.19) and (2.22) only one quantifier is located in the Mittelfeld; in (2.30), (2.31), (2.32) and (2.33) both quantifiers are located in the Mittelfeld. . One must presuppose that it is the c-command domain of the PP which is relevant, not the one of the quantificational noun phrase it contains. This is a standard assumption in theories of scope relying on c-command relations (cf. Reinhart 1983: 188). See §3.4.1 for discussion. . At variance with this claim, May (1988: 127) assumes that a quantifier can obtain wide scope by being focused (as focused phrases are adjoined to S’ (CP)). See §5.2 for discussion. . As for wh-phrases, it has been argued for Hungarian, Basque, Aghem, Navajo, Swahili, French, Turkish that they are narrowly focused (see Horvath 1986; Drubig 1994; Engdahl 2001; Ladd 1996; Reich 2003). . Compare All the men didn’t go (Jackendoff 1972: 352ff.). . Büring (1997) bases his derivation of the ¬∀-reading on the assumption that an operator α can have scope over an operator β, if α c-commands β or β can be reconstructed into a position where β is c-commanded by α. If one assumes that the base position of the universal quantifier is c-commanded by nicht, reconstructing the universal quantifier results in the ¬∀-reading. However, relative scope cannot be determined by the c-command relations of the operators and their traces, see §6.1. . For the behavior of indefinite noun phrases introduced by a in English see §4.2.3. . Later, the scope model’s predictions are stated in this format. . Rosengren (1994) thinks that the weak reading is possible in (2.146d) if no quantifier is focused (see her example 75d) as well as if jedem is focused (her examples 77d, f). These judgments are at variance with my own intuitions. . Giving neg-att weight –2 makes the prediction that Doch hat jede Aufgabe niemand von uns lösen können – with both quantifiers in the Mittelfeld – is ambiguous if the universal quantifier is focused (5:5), which seems to be correct. . I do not know why this result shows so few repercussions in the debate on word order.

Chapter 2. Relative scope . The relation of the linear model presented here to those of Jacobs (1988) and Dietrich (1994) is obvious. At least concerning descriptive adequacy, competition, coalition or linear models of MF-successions still are unrivaled (compare the papers in Haftka (Ed.) 1994, which are not based on such models). . pronαacc encompasses personal pronouns and reflexive pronouns. pron is the abbreviation for pron-acc . st-pat means strong patient, we-pat weak patient. If one tried to encompass sentential adverbials too, a weight of 3 for s-adv might be appropriate. . α»β means that only the order α>β is possible. . The acceptability of (2.189b) shows that one must have subject as a property besides agent. . The unacceptability of (2.194b) can be accounted for if one assumes that a constituent with succession value 0 cannot precede a constituent with a positive succession value. Compare the similar assumption for scope with example (2.149b). . This condition is not true in the dynamic semantics of Groenendijk/Stokhof (1991). There, existential quantifiers can bind variables which are not in their scope. This type of semantics is especially motivated by supplying a compositional analysis of donkey sentences. In §4.4, however, we will see that the indefinite noun phrases in donkey sentences are not quantifiers. Thus donkey sentences are not counterevidence to (2.198). . The predictions do not change when the quantifiers are narrowly focused. . “A simple two-level rule contains four pieces of information: a correspondence (cp) that the rule is about, an operator (op), a left context (lc), and a right context (rc); schematically: cp op lc ___ rc. The correspondence part is typically a pair of characters x:y, but it could in principle be a more complex expression. The upper symbol x is part of the lexical representation, the lower symbol y part of the surface form [...] The context expressions are also two-level expressions” (Karttunen 1993: 182). “a:b ⇔ c___p” is to be understood as “a is realized as b in c___p and nowhere else” (ibid.). Two-level rules are very similar to the constraints in the optimality-theoretical correspondence theory (more exactly: McCarthy/Prince 1995: 367f.). . We have seen that it seems tenable to account for the effect of intonation by relying on a syntactic F-feature. . Recall that preference value(Qi >Qj )=0 means that Qi cannot have scope over Qj (see §2.3.1). . Fischer (2001), who translates our linear scope model into OT, has to make substantial changes to the way optimal candidates are computed. For further considerations concerning OT and the linear scope model see Pafel (1998: §5.5). See Heck (2001) for a further OTproposal to cope with quantifier scope in German. . But, of course, coordinations with und ‘and’ can behave like names too: (i)

Russell und Quine haben sich nicht getroffen. ‘Russell and Quine never met each other.’

(ii) Es ist nicht der Fall, dass sich Russell und Quine getroffen haben. ‘It is not the case that Russell and Quine met each other.’



 Quantifier Scope in German

The predicate requires a proper plurality as argument. This fact can be accounted for if one assumes that und coordinations are definite descriptions of pluralities in such cases (e.g., ιx[x=r⊕q]). . The analysis of coordinated noun phrases as quantifiers reaches back at least to the Middle Ages – see Geach (1972: 485f.). . Attested spoken occurrence: Alle Kriterien erfüllt nur Luxemburg. ‘All criteria, only Luxembourg satisfies.’

Chapter 3

Absolute scope

Usually quantifiers are strictly clause-bound. But sometimes they are not. This is the puzzle of clause-boundedness. By investigating the type of structure where they are not clause-bound in some detail, I propose to solve the puzzle by making absolute scope partially dependent on relative scope relations. An integrated model of absolute and relative scope determination will be introduced which has exactly this feature. After generalizing clause-boundedness in a suitable way to phrase-boundedness, the absolute scope constraints in German are analyzed as correspondence constraints relating syntactic and semantic structure. I will sketch the construction of semantic structures on the basis of syntactic structures and take a look at inverse linking, which is not taken to be a relative, but an absolute scope phenomenon.

. The puzzle of clause-boundedness .. Absolute scope and (in)coherent infinitival constructions The verbal parts of the examples we looked at in Chapters 1 and 2 encompassed either (i) a finite verb form only, (ii) a finite form of the temporal auxiliary verb haben or sein plus a participle, or (iii) a finite form of a modal verb and a simple infinitive. It does not come as a surprise that scope interaction between the quantifiers we investigated does not depend on whether a sentence has form (i) or (ii), as no scope factor relies on the difference between (i) and (ii). Thus it is also expected that nothing changes when the verbal parts consist of a finite form of the temporal or aspectual verb werden ‘will’ or the substandard dummy-verb tun ‘do’ plus a simple infinitive. The occurrence of root modal verbs or aspectual verbs (anfangen ‘begin’, aufhören ‘stop’, fortfahren ‘continue’, etc.), however, could have an influence on the thematic properties of the subject. But I have not yet observed such effects (keep in mind that these verbs are not quantifiers in contrast to the non-root modals, see §1.2.2).

 Quantifier Scope in German

Of course, things change when non-root modal verbs and scheinen plus infinitive come into play as they happen to be quantifiers. Here everything depends on the effect the occurrence of the additional quantifier has on scope interaction. If the additional quantifier is located between two DP-quantifiers – as in (3.1), the quantifier behind the verbal quantifier can outscope the preceding DP-quantifier only if it can outscope the verbal quantifier or the verbal quantifier can outscope the preceding DP-quantifier. With respect to the DPquantifiers, (3.1) seems to be as ambiguous as the sentence Eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire is. (3.1) a.

Eine Fuge könnte (/dürfte, müsste, sollte, will) jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire haben. ‘One fugue, every piano player might (/should, will) have in his repertoire.’ b. Eine Fuge scheint jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire zu haben. ‘One fugue, every piano player seems to have in his repertoire.’

The relative scope model predicts that the universal quantifier can easily outscope the existential one if the verbal quantifier outscopes the existential quantifier (this turns out to be the preferred reading): (3.1b )

eine>scheint: scheint>jeder: eine>jeder:

ex-pre vs. s-adv ex-pre+s-adv vs. subject+in-dis ex-pre vs. subject+in-dis

7.5:10 17.5:10 7.5:10

scheint>jeder>eine: 0.83; scheint>eine>jeder: 0.66; eine>scheint>jeder: 0.5

This analysis presupposes that the three quantifiers are contained in the same minimal clause, i.e., that there is no raising out of an embedded clause – see below. There are clear effects on scope interaction in sentences with control verbs like versuchen ‘try’ which can be constructed coherently as well as incoherently. There is a clear contrast between (3.2a) and (b): only (b) exhibits a distributive reading, i.e., pair-list reading (see §2.2.1 and §2.3.2.5 for wh/Q-interaction). (3.2) a.

Wie viele Leute haben versucht, jedes Buch how many people have tried every book b. Wie viele Leute haben jedes Buch zu lesen how many people have every book to read ‘How many people tried to read every book?’

zu lesen? to read versucht? tried

A closer look at (b) shows that one should distinguish two realizations, only one of which exhibits a distributive reading (besides the non-distributive one).

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

In the first one, (3.3a), jedes Buch lesen is an intonation phrase (IP), which is clearly marked as a prosodic unit by intonation breaks.1 In the second realization, (3.3b), jedes Buch zu lesen is not an intonation phrase as there is a perceptible break between the object and the infinitive. (3.3) a. [IP Wie viele Leute HAben] [IP jedes Buch zu LEsen] [IP verSUCHT]? b. [IP Wie viele Leute haben jedes BUCH] [IP zu LEsen versucht]?

Only (b) exhibits the distributive reading. The contrast between (3.2a) and (3.3a), on the one hand, and (3.3b), on the other, seems to show that the distributive reading or wide scope of the infinitive’s object is possible in a coherent, but not an incoherent construction. As for the incoherent construction, one often says that the infinitival phrase is ‘satzwertig’ (sentence-like). It is a further step to assume (as, for example, Stechow/Sternefeld 1988 do) that the infinitival phrase is indeed of the same syntactic category as a finite clause. As this view necessitates empty elements it is controversial. But, making use of this assumption makes it possible to say with respect to the contrast between (3.2a) and (3.3a), on the one hand, and (3.3b), on the other, that the distributive reading is impossible if the whphrase is part of the superordinate clause and the object jedes Buch is part of the embedded clause. In other words: in the following configuration a quantifier cannot outscope the wh-phrase: (S being the syntactic category of a sentence whatever its nature might be) (3.4)

[SP wh-phrase1 ... t1 ... [SP ... quantifier...]...]

The relevant syntactic differences between the sentences above can now be indicated as follows: (3.2a ) [SP Wie viele Leute haben versucht, [SP jedes Buch zu lesen]] (3.3a ) [SP Wie viele Leute haben [SP jedes Buch zu lesen] versucht] (3.3b ) [SP Wie viele Leute haben jedes Buch [VP zu lesen versucht]]

The possibility of the distributive reading seems to depend on the fact that the minimal clause of the universal quantifier contains the wh-phrase as well. A clause σ is the minimal clause of an expression α iff σ properly contains α and there is no clause which is a proper part of σ and properly contains α. As the minimal clause of the wh-phrase is the superordinate clause, the universal quantifier cannot be located in the subordinate clause if a distributive reading is intended. These conditions are fulfilled in (3.3b ) only. What is at stake here is the clause-boundedness of quantifier scope:

 Quantifier Scope in German

(3.5) A quantifier has scope over the minimal clause of the quantifier.

This principle relevant for the universal quantifier and the wh-phrase alike explains why (3.2a ) and (3.3a ) have the reading indicated by (3.6a) only, while (3.3b ) has both readings (3.6b, c). (3.6) a. [(how many people)x . x tried [(every book)y . x read y]] b. [(how many people)x (every book)y . x tried [x read y]] c. [(every book)y (how many people)x . x tried [x read y]]

That structures like (3.6a) and (b) represent distinct readings becomes a bit clearer if we have a negative quantifier instead of the universal one. The following two sentences intuitively mean something different: (3.7) a.

Nicht einen Ball hat Moritz versucht, auf das Tor zu köpfen. ‘Not one ball did Maurice try to head into the goal.’ b. Moritz hat versucht, nicht einen Ball auf das Tor zu köpfen. ‘Maurice tried not to head a ball into the goal.’

For (b) to be true it must be the case that Maurice has the intention not to head a ball into the goal. (a), however, is true even if Maurice does not have such an intention. If a control verb can only be constructed incoherently there is no scope interaction between an argument of the infinitive and an argument of the control verb as long as the infinitive’s argument is contained in the subordinate clause. Bezweifeln ‘doubt’ is one such verb that does not allow coherence (see Stechow/Sternefeld 1988: 408). There is, however, scope interaction in (3.8a, b): the sentences are ambiguous as the object of lösen ‘solve’ has been moved out of the subordinate clause into the superordinate one. (3.8) a.

[SP (welche Aufgabe)1 hat jeder bezweifelt [SP t1 lösen zu which problem has everyone doubted solve to können]] can b. [SP (welche Aufgabe)1 hat jeder [SP t1 lösen zu können] which problem has everyone solve to can bezweifelt] doubted ‘Which problem did everyone doubt that he could solve?’

As expected, (3.9), however, is scopally unequivocal exhibiting no distributive reading, and (3.10) is not really acceptable (# marks an intonation break).

Chapter 3. Absolute scope

(3.9) Wie viele Leute haben [IP jede Aufgabe LÖsen zu können] beZWEIfelt? (3.10) ?Wie viele Leute haben jede Aufgabe # LÖsen zu können # beZWEIfelt?

That means that the object of lösen can be topicalized (cf. Jede Aufgabe hat er lösen zu können bezweifelt), but can hardly be scrambled.2 If one disregards sentence (3.10)’s limited acceptability, it seems to be ambiguous. Sentences with control verbs disallowing coherence behave like one would expect relying on the principle of clause boundedness (3.5). The diverse coherent constructions I listed at the beginning of this section with temporal and aspectual auxiliary verbs or modal verbs obey this principle too if one assumes that there is no sentence-embedding in these constructions. Whether this assumption is justified is controversial. Öhlschläger (1989), for instance, assumes that modal verbs embed an IP (INFL-phrase). This must not necessarily contradict clause-boundedness as we could identify what I have called SP with CP (instead of IP). However, I assumed in §1.3.2 that sentences in German are the projection of a functional category which has a substantial, but no further functional, projection as complement. As for (root and non-root) modals, I do not think that the arguments for sentence-embedding are convincing. But, we do not have to elaborate on this point. Above, we had a look at the coherent construction scheinen+infinitive (see 3.1b). This so-called raising construction is a traditional example for a construction with sentence embedding. With this in mind, (3.1b) could look as follows: (3.11) [SP (Eine Fuge)1 scheint 2 [SP jeder Pianist t1 in seinem Repertoire zu haben] t2 ]

In May (1977: §3.5), the reading of comparable English sentences where the raising verb has scope over the sentence-initial constituent is generated by lowering the sentence-initial constituent into the embedded clause. This move violates the principle of clause-boundedness. However, if there were no sentenceembedding in raising constructions, there would be no violation of clauseboundedness. I think that there is, indeed, no strong evidence for sentenceembedding in scheinen+infinitive-constructions, but much counterevidence (see Pafel 1989a, 1991a). Thus, coherent constructions do not pose any problems for clauseboundedness. The following incoherent construction, however, shows that this principle is not always valid, as (3.12) exhibits a distributive reading although the universal quantifier is part of the embedded clause.



 Quantifier Scope in German

(3.12) [SP (Wie viele Bücher)1 hat er versucht [SP jedem t1 zu zeigen]] ‘How many books did he try to show to everyone?’

Note that this is not a configuration of type (3.4)! As we will see in the next section, the trace of wie viele Bücher plays an important role in making the distributive reading possible. .. Absolute scope and subordinate finite clauses Clause-boundedness is obeyed in many complex sentences embedding finite clauses; see, for instance: (3.13) a.

Irgendjemand glaubt, dass jeder gerne Wein trinkt. ‘Someone or other thinks that everyone likes wine.’ b. Wer hat gesagt, dass ihn jeder mag? ‘Who said that everyone likes him?’

In neither of these two sentences can the subject of the subordinate clause outscope the subject of the superordinate sentence, which – relying on our linear model for relative scope in Chapter 2 – would be possible if the two quantifiers scopally interacted. Clause-boundedness is not only found in argument clauses as in (3.13), but is generally found in adverbial and relative clauses too. (3.14) a.

Wir haben gewonnen, weil jeder sein Bestes getan hat. ‘We won as everyone did his best.’ b. Nachdem jeder sein Bestes getan hat, können wir in Ruhe abwarten. ‘After everyone has done his best, we can sit and wait quietly.’ c. Wenn jeder sein Bestes tut, werden wir gewinnen. ‘If everyone does his best, we will win.’

(3.15) Irgendjemand wird die Note bekanntgeben, die jeder bekommen hat. ‘Someone or other will announce the grade which everyone has got.’

As for the relative clauses, I argued in Pafel (1998: §6.5.3) that the distributive readings they exhibit need not be analyzed in such a way that a quantifier has scope outside the relative clause. In the literature concerning attitude sentences, the view – initiated by analyses of Montague – that there are de re-readings where a quantifier has scope beyond its minimal clause, in contrast to the de dicto-readings of these sentences, dominated for some time. See the two readings of (3.16):

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

(3.16)

Ralph believes that one of us is a spy. R1 Ralph believes that there is someone who belongs to us and is a spy. (de dicto-reading) R2 There is someone who belongs to us such that Ralph believes of him that he is a spy. (de re-reading)

If this were the right kind of analysis, de re-readings would be an example where quantifiers need not be clause-bound. However, it is not obvious that the de re/de dicto-distinction should be analyzed in this way. There are internal problems with such an analysis and alternatives are conceivable (see Pafel 1999: §9). Attitude sentences are, thus, not examples where a quantifier can have scope beyond its minimal clause. However, there are sentences (like (3.12) above) which contradict the principle of clause-boundedness: there are sentences in which a quantifier’s absolute scope is greater than its minimal clause, as well as sentences in which a quantifier’s absolute scope is smaller than its minimal clause. It is certain wh-constructions which are relevant here. Besides ordinary long wh-extraction as in (3.17), I shall, in addition, take into account partial wh-movement (3.18), wh-copying (3.19) and the whimperative (3.20).3 (3.17)

Wo glaubst du, dass die besten Weine wachsen? where believe you that the best wines grow ‘Where do you think that the best wines grow?’

(3.18)

Was glaubst du, wo die besten Weine wachsen? what believe you where the best wines grow ‘Where do you think that the best wines grow?’

(3.19)

Wo glaubst du, wo die besten Weine wachsen? where believe you where the best wines grow ‘Where do you think that the best wines grow?’

(3.20)

Wo schätz mal, dass die besten Weine wachsen! where guess one.time that the best wines grow ‘Guess where the best wines grow!’

Partial wh-movement as in (3.18) has the pronoun was ‘what’ in the initial position of the matrix clause and a wh-phrase of various kinds is possible in the initial position of the embedded clause. The wh-phrase in the embedded clause seems to be the wh-phrase which matters semantically; the was in the initial position seems to be a dummy. Sentence (3.18) is equivalent in meaning to the ordinary long wh-extraction in (3.17). Metaphorically speaking, in partial

 Quantifier Scope in German

wh-movement a wh-phrase has stopped in a resting place on the way to its destination. This leads to a puzzling state of affairs: the embedded clause, i.e., the clause where the true wh-phrase is at rest, looks like an ordinary embedded wh-clause, except that the embedding predicate glauben ‘believe’ normally does not allow a true interrogative clause as its object. If, however, the partial whmovement in (3.18) were to have the same semantic structure as the ordinary long wh-extraction in (3.17) – a structure as indicated in (3.21), for instance, then the attitude predicate would not have an interrogative clause as an object at the level relevant for semantic interpretation. (3.21) wherep [you think [the best wines grow (in) p]]

It is popular to assume such a structure for LF, taking was to be the scope marker of the true wh-phrase, which attracts the wh-phrase or is substituted by it at LF. Wh-copying as in (3.19) is characterized by the existence of an identical copy of the matrix wh-phrase in the initial position of the embedded clause. Not all German speakers accept this kind of construction. And for many speakers it is only fine with pronominal wh-phrases. Sentence (3.19) has the same meaning as (3.17) and (3.18). It seems that the intermediate trace, which we might have in ordinary long wh-extraction, is spelled out as an overt whpronoun. The wh-imperative is an imperative with a wh-phrase at the beginning. Contrary to partial wh-movement, the wh-phrase in (3.20) moved too far. It is interpreted as a part of the embedded clause, giving the sentence the same meaning as (3.22): (3.22) Schätz mal, wo die besten Weine wachsen! ‘Guess where the best wines grow!’

This means that wh-imperatives are a clear example for a quantifier having an absolute scope smaller that its minimal clause. I will first investigate which scope readings are possible when there is an ordinary quantifier in the embedded clause as indicated in (3.23). (3.23) a. b. c. d.

[ wh-phrase... [ t... Q-phrase... ]] [ w-... [ w-... Q-phrase... ]] [ was... [ wh-phrase... Q-phrase... ]] [ wh-phrase... [ t... Q-phrase... ]]

(ordinary long wh-extraction) (wh-copying) (partial wh-movement) (wh-imperative)

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

As for the interaction between the wh-phrase and the ordinary quantifier, the complex sentences in (3.23) have the same relative scope possibilities as the embedded clause in (3.24). See (3.25) and (3.26) for illustration. (3.24)

(Ich frage mich,) [ wh-phrase... Q-phrase... ] I wonder

(3.25)

Ich frage mich, wo jeder gerne sitzen würde. (ambiguous) ‘I wonder where everyone would like to sit.’

(3.26) a.

Wo glaubst du, dass jeder gerne sitzen würde? (ambiguous) ‘Where do you think that everyone would like to sit?’ b. Wo glaubst du, wo jeder gerne sitzen würde? where believe you where everyone readily sit would ‘Where do you think that everyone would like to sit?’ (ambiguous) c. Was glaubst du, wo jeder gerne sitzen würde? what believe you where everyone readily sit would ‘Where do you think that everyone would like to sit?’ (ambiguous) d. Wo schätz mal, dass jeder gerne sitzen würde! where guess one.time that everyone readily sit would ‘Guess where everyone would like to sit!’ (ambiguous)

I have confined myself to presenting ambiguous sentences. The facts are quite clear and they seem similar to the facts in English. Sentences like the ones in (3.27) are judged to be ambiguous by many investigators (see, e.g., May 1985: 45; Cheng 1991: 183; Sloan 1991: 225; Lasnik/Saito 1992: 154; Aoun/Li 1993a: 85). (3.27) a. Who do you think everyone saw at the rally? b. Where does Bobby think every detective will go for vacation?

Relying on the assumption that wh/Q-interaction is a special case of quantifier interaction, the distributive reading of a sentence like (3.26a) looks something like (3.28) – with the universal quantifier having widest scope, i.e., scope beyond its minimal clause: (3.28) everyx wherep [you think [x would like to sit (at) p]]

The distributive readings of sentences like (3.26a–c) are, thus, further examples for quantifiers not being clause-bound.

 Quantifier Scope in German

Let us complete our knowledge concerning scope relations in complex wh-constructions. Let us look at complex wh-sentences with the ordinary quantifier in the matrix clause. Judgments get more difficult here. (3.29) a. b. c. d.

[ wh-phrase... Q-phrase... [ t... ]] [ w-... Q-phrase... [ w-... ]] [ was... Q-phrase... [ wh-phrase... ]] [ wh-phrase... Q-phrase... [ t... ]]

(ordinary long wh-extraction) (wh-copying) (partial wh-movement) (wh-imperative)

These four constructions divide into two groups. Ordinary long wh-extraction and, possibly, wh-copying can be ambiguous, whereas partial wh-movement and wh-imperatives tend to exclusively have the reading with wide scope of the ordinary quantifier. Consider the sentence in (3.30). It is ambiguous, as the contexts in (3.31) and (3.32) show:4 (3.30)

Wo glaubt jeder, dass die besten Weine wachsen? (ambiguous) ‘Where does everyone think that the best wines grow?’

(3.31)

Ich möchte von jedem einzelnen wissen, wo er glaubt, dass die besten Weine wachsen, d.h. ich möchte wissen, wo jeder glaubt, dass die besten Weine wachsen. (jeder>wo) ‘For every single x, I want to know where x thinks that the best wines grow, i.e., I want to know where everyone thinks that the best wines grow.’

(3.32)

Ich möchte nicht von jedem einzelnen wissen, wo er glaubt, dass die besten Weine wachsen. Sondern ich möchte wissen, wo jeder glaubt, dass die besten Weine wachsen. (wo>jeder) ‘It is not the case that, for every single x, I want to know where x thinks that the best wines grow. Instead I want to know where everyone thinks that the best wines grow.’

It is not clear whether the facts hold for English in the identical way. The judgments reported in the literature concerning sentences as in (3.33) vary considerably (ambiguous – Cheng 1991: 183; wide scope of wh only – Sloan 1991: 225ff.; May 1977: 77 n. 8; wide scope of Q only – Haïk 1984: 195f.). (3.33) a. Who does everyone think you saw? b. What did every detective think Bobby will buy?

As for wh-copying in (3.34), it surely has a pair-list reading. Perhaps the whphrase can have wide scope, too – but the facts here are not as clear as in the case of (3.30). I will return to this question.

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

(3.34)

Wo glaubt jeder, wo die besten Weine wachsen? where believe everyone where the best wines grow ‘Where does everyone think that the best wines grow?’

The partial wh-movement and wh-imperative constructions in (3.35) seem to be unambiguous. Wide scope of the universal quantifier seems to be the only option. (3.35) a.

Was meint jeder, wo die besten Weine wachsen? where think everyone where the best wines grow ‘Where does everyone think that the best wines grow?’ b. Wo schätz mal jeder, dass die besten Weine wachsen! where guess one.time everyone that the best wines grow ‘Everyone is up to guess where the best wines grow.’

How can we be sure that sentence (3.35a), for instance, is unambiguous? One occasionally hears the claim that such a sentence is perfectly ambiguous. Now, it does not come as a surprise to me that judgments are disagreeing here. Someone could argue that the claim that in the sentence the universal quantifier has unequivocally wide scope is disproved by the fact that one can answer the question with In Frankreich ‘in France’, which is a felicitous answer to the reading with wide scope of the wh-phrase in (3.30). But this is not a sufficient reason to think that the question (3.35a) indeed has the reading with wide scope of the wh-phrase. The sentence in which the universal quantifier has unequivocally wide scope is perfectly consistent with the possibility of giving an answer also equally appropriate for the sentence with the wide-scope reading of the whphrase. Here is an analogy: even if a sentence has only the reading ∀x∃yφxy, the sentence is true in a situation where ∃y∀xφxy. If there are diverging judgments concerning the availability of a certain reading, one can try to embed the sentence with the critical reading in a small discourse that only makes sense if that reading is available. Let us test the availability of the wide-scope reading of the wh-phrase. The following sequence in (3.36) should only be acceptable if this reading is in fact available: (3.36)

??Ich

möchte nicht von jedem einzelnen wissen, was er glaubt, wo die besten Weine wachsen. Sondern ich möchte wissen, was jeder glaubt, wo die besten Weine wachsen. ‘It is not the case that, for every x, I want to know where x thinks that the best wines grow. Instead I want to know where everyone thinks that the best wines grow.’

 Quantifier Scope in German

The sequence does not seem to be consistent. (It is unclear whether wide scope of the wh-phrase might be possible when there is very heavy stress on jeder.) From these observations, we can draw several related conclusions with regard to partial wh-movement. Firstly, the pronoun was has no influence on the wh/Q-interaction, i.e., no influence in matters of relative scope; it is the embedded, the true, wh-phrase that counts. This is most obvious when there is an ordinary quantifier in the matrix clause and wide scope of wh is impossible. Secondly, partial wh-movement and ordinary long wh-extraction differ with respect to wh/Q-interaction: if there is an ordinary quantifier in the matrix clause, ordinary long wh-extraction displays scope interaction, but partial wh-movement does not. The reason for this difference is that with ordinary long wh-extraction, it is the initial wh-phrase that counts for wh/Q-interaction. Thirdly, these facts indicate that the idea that it is long LF-movement of the true wh-phrase that plays the crucial role in partial wh-movement is too simple: long LF-movement creates an LF-configuration which is identical to the LF-configuration of ordinary long wh-extraction, and in such a situation the two constructions cannot differ in matters of relative scope. If it is indeed correct that only the universal quantifier can have wide scope in (3.35a), then other kinds of quantifier should have wide scope too, e.g., quantifier with d- meist- ‘most’ or viel- ‘many’. That seems indeed to be the case. See §5.1. Now, we get a puzzling situation: quantifiers are strictly clause-bound in one sentences, but are not clause-bound in other sentences. This perplexing state of affairs – the “puzzle of clause-boundedness” – has often been remarked upon, mostly as a problem for May’s (1977, 1985) theory of quantifier raising (see, e.g., Lasnik/Saito 1992). Possibly the puzzle would not arise if distributive readings in interrogative sentences would not be analyzed as a scope reading and if there would be an analysis for wh-imperatives where the wh-phrase would have scope over the superordinate sentence. However, there is overwhelming evidence that wh/Q-interaction is quantifier interaction, and we will see that the puzzle arises even when the distributive reading is not seen as a special scope reading. And, as for wh-imperatives, there is no alternative analysis in sight (see Reis/Rosengren 1992). We have to solve the puzzle of clause-boundedness one way or other. In Chierchia’s functional theory of pair-list readings a quite similar problem arises. See his analysis of (3.37). (3.37)

Who do you think that everyone invited?

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

Whoi is fronted at S-structure. At LF, everyonej is adjoined to the lower IP on the first cycle. At this point it undergoes Absorption, which turns the whquantifier sequence into a complex wh-operator. [Note 31: In the case at hand, Absorption applies to everyone and the intermediate wh-trace, in the manner indicated here:

(i)

[wh ei ] everyonej ⇒ [[wh ei ] everyonej ]

This operator is then moved to the matrix Comp.] On the second cycle, this operator undergoes further LF-movement and is moved to the higher Spec of CP. (Chierchia 1993: 216)

The last step in this analysis is a bit obscure. In order to get from (3.38b), where there is absorption in the embedded clause, to the final LF (3.38c) more is necessary than upwards-movement of the operator formed by absorption. (3.38) a. whoi do you think that [wh ei ] everyonej [ej invited ei j ] b. whoi do you think that [[wh ei ] everyonej ] [ej invited ei j ] c. [[whoi everyonej ] do you think that [ej invited ei j ]] ((c) = (79b) in Chierchia 1993: 216)

Let us assume that this problem can be solved. The decisive point is the possibility to move the operator formed by absorption upwards. When does this possibility arise? Why isn’t this a option for everyone alone, which Chierchia (ibid. 217) takes to be clause-bound? His analysis can be evaluated only when these questions have found their answers. The puzzle of clause-boundedness cannot be solved by relying on a reconstruction account as initially proposed by Frampton (1990):5 neither R1 nor R2 accounts for the pair-list reading R3 of (3.39a, b). (3.39) a. b. R1 R2 R3

Quanti pazienti pensi che ognuno dei medici riesca a visitare in un’ora? (Cinque 1990: 12; cf. Longobardi 1991: 89) How many patients do you think that every doctor can visit in an hour? Which number n is such that there are n-many patients x such that every doctor can visit x in an hour? Which number n is such that every doctor can visit n-many patients in an hour? For every doctor: how many patients do you think that he can visit in an hour?

How can the puzzle of clause-boundedness be solved? In a nutshell, my approach is to try to solve the problem by making absolute scope partially dependent on relative scope relations. I will make use of the observation that in all

 Quantifier Scope in German

sentences in which a quantifier has scope beyond its minimal clause σ there is a quantifier whose scope is greater than σ and which has a trace in σ. As it is the case in (3.26a ): (3.26a )Wo1 glaubst du, dass jeder gerne t1 sitzen würde?

. A model of absolute and relative scope determination Scope determination can be thought of as a procedure that maps syntactic structures (s-structures) onto semantic structures in three steps. The essential part of step 1, i.e., of preliminary scope assignment, is the application of the following principle (Q being either an ordinary quantifier or a wh-phrase), which is nothing else than the principle of clause-boundedness: (3.40) Principle of preliminary scope assignment: A quantifier Q has scope over the predication corresponding to the minimal clause which contains the head of the chain of Q.

Chain is a syntactic notion. A chain is relative to a syntactic structure the maximal sequence of an expression α and the elements co-indexed with it, with the n-th element of the sequence (x1 , x2 ,..., xi ) c-commanding the n+1-th (for n=1,2,...,i-1). The head of a chain is the first element of the sequence. The chain of a quantifier is the chain containing the quantifier. What kind of structure this first step results in depends on what view of scope representation one has. The procedure of scope determination I present is, however, compatible with a variety of scope representations. The second step, which is independent of preliminary scope assignment, is relative scope determination, which has two parts: (i) identification of all the quantifiers whose relative scope has to be computed; (ii) the relative scope computation relying on the linear model for relative scope. The identification part is based on the following criterion. (3.41) Criterion of identification for the relative scope computation: The relative scope of any two quantifiers Q1 and Q2 will be computed iff there is a clause which is, at the level of s-structure, both minimal with respect to an element of the chain of Q1 and minimal with respect to an element of the chain of Q2 .

The structures created by the first step can only be changed if the quantifiers violate certain constraints. These constraints encompass the relative scope pos-


sibilities of the quantifiers of a sentence, which are the outcome of the second step. And there are only two ways of overcoming the violations: one can either raise a quantifier with the effect that it gets scope over a clause higher than the clause it had scope over in the first step, or one can lower the quantifier – raising being the unmarked option. The satisfaction of these constraints leads to well-formed semantic structures (step 3). The system will become more transparent when we observe it at work. Take sentence (3.42), an example for the apparent clause-boundedness of quantifier scoping. As a result of step 1, the wh-phrase gets scope over the whole sentence, while the universal quantifier only gets scope over the embedded clause (because that is the minimal clause which contains the head of the chain of the quantifier, which happens to be the quantifier itself). (3.42)

Wer (/irgendjemand) hat gesagt, dass ihn jeder mag? ‘Who (/someone or other) said that everyone likes him?’ S1 whox [x said [everyy [y likes x]]]

This structure does not violate any constraints, therefore a change is neither necessary nor possible. We already have a well-formed semantic structure. The relative scope component is not activated, because at the level of syntactic structure the minimal clause containing the universal quantifier is the embedded clause, which does not contain the other quantifier or an element of its chain. By the same reasoning, the scope of the wh-phrase in She knows who comes or Does she know who comes? is confined to the embedded sentence. The clauseboundedness of the which phrase in Who believes which agent has been shot? and Do you believe which agent has been shot? is part of the explanation of the sentences’ unacceptability.6 Things are quite different with ordinary long wh-extraction. (3.43)

Wo1 glaubst du, t’1 dass jeder gerne t1 sitzen würde? (ambiguous) [=3.26a,a ] ‘Where do you think that everyone would like to sit?’

In (3.43), the embedded clause is minimal for the universal quantifier as well as for the traces of the wh-phrase. Therefore, the relative scope of the universal quantifier and the wh-phrase has to be determined. As we will see in a moment, the result of the relative scope computation is exactly the same as the result we get for the clause in (3.44):






(3.44)

... [wo jeder gerne sitzen würde] ‘... where everyone would like to sit’ b. Q1 : ex-pre + def + focus 7.5 10 Q2 : subject + in-dis

As for (3.43), the result must be the same: there is the same distribution of scope-relevant properties (the wh-phrase is ex-pre whether it is located in the initial position of the embedded or the superordinate clause as the smallest maximal projection containing the universal quantifier does not contain the wh-phrase). Step 1 leads to a structure where the wh-phrase has scope over the whole sentence and the universal quantifier has scope over the embedded clause only. If we take the first relative scope option in step 2, the structure is well-formed. However, if we take the second relative scope option, the structure has to be changed by raising the universal quantifier. See step 3.7 (3.45)

Wo1 glaubst du, t’1 dass jeder gerne t1 sitzen würde? (ambiguous) ‘Where do you think that everyone would like to sit?’ S1 wherep [you think [everyx [x would like to sit (at) p]]] √ S2 where>every: √ every>where: S3 i. (see S1) ii. everyx wherep [you think [x would like to sit (at) p]]

It is crucial that there is a trace of the wh-phrase in the minimal clause of jeder ‘every’. That’s the reason why there is a relative scope computation with respect to jeder and the wh-phrase (cf. (3.41)). As this computation results in two relative scope options, the structure S1 can be changed. This shows how absolute scope can be dependent on relative scope relations. And it shows that we can explain in a general way the fact that a quantifier is clause-bound in one (reading of a) sentence and non-clause-bound in another (reading of a) sentence. Let us turn to (3.46): (3.46)

Wo glaubt jeder, dass sie gerne leben würde? (ambiguous) ‘Where does everyone think that she would like to live?’ S1 i. wherep everyx [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]] ii. everyx wherep [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]] S2 where>every: √ √ every>where: S3 i. wherep everyx [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]] ii. everyx wherep [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]]


This time the outcome of step 1 yields two structures (alternatively, we could have a structure with unresolved relative scope). There are two relative scope options. Thus, both structures of step 1 are well-formed semantic structures. In order to account for w-...w-constructions we only have to make one specific assumption. In partial wh-movement, the was (being some kind of an expletive) and the true wh-phrase are part of the same wh-chain (cf. McDaniel 1989; Müller 1997b);8 similarly for wh-copying; the initial wh-phrase and its copy are part of one and the same chain. (3.47) a. [wasi ... [wh-phrasei ... ti ... ]] b. [w-i ... [w-i ... ti ... ]]

As for partial wh-movement in (3.48), the wh-phrase wo is assigned scope over the whole sentence by step 1, as the head of its chain is located in the matrix clause. Once more the sentence has two relative scope possibilities. Thus, raising is necessary in order to account for the second relative scope possibility. (3.48)

Was glaubst du, wo jeder gerne sitzen würde? what believe you where everyone readily sit would (ambiguous) S1 wherep [you think [everyx [x would like to sit (at) p]]] √ S2 where>every: √ every>where: S3 i. (see S1) ii. everyx wherep [you think [x would like to sit (at) p]]

Note that it is unnecessary to stipulate that was is a scope marker. It’s a dummy part of a wh-chain – nothing more.9 The scope model does the rest. Besides the was of partial wh-movement, there are two other elements which have been claimed to be scope markers in some of their uses: the English there, which I will discuss in a moment, and the negation marker in Romance languages. Normally, the absolute scope of a quantifier like French personne, Italian nessuno, or Spanish ninguno is restricted to the minimal clause that contains it. But in some dialects of these languages it can get wide scope if there is an occurrence of the negation marker (ne, non, no) in the matrix clause:10 (3.49) a.

non voglio che tu parli con nessuno (Italian) not I.want that you speak with nobody nobodyx [I want [you speak with x]] b. non voglio che venga nessuno (Italian) not I.want that come nobody nobodyx [I want [x comes]]



 Quantifier Scope in German

Assuming that the negation marker forms a chain with the negative quantifier (cf. Aoun 1985: §5.2), the principle of preliminary scope assignment (3.40) provides for the reading. We see, once more, that the concept of a scope marker seems to be completely superfluous. We have seen in §3.1.2 that there is a difference between the relative scope relations in partial wh-movement and ordinary long wh-extraction if there is an ordinary quantifier located in the matrix clause. In both cases, it is the true, content-bearing wh-phrase that counts for relative scope computation. It is, among others, the precedence relation between the true wh-phrase and other quantifiers that is relevant for relative scope. The reason for the difference is that, in partial wh-movement, the true wh-phrase is located in the embedded clause, whereas, in ordinary long wh-extraction, it is located in the matrix clause. As for (3.48), the evaluation of the scope-relevant properties of the whphrase and the universal quantifier yields the same result as the evaluation concerning (3.43) und (3.44): both options exist. This is different in (3.50). Here, the universal quantifier possesses all the scope-relevant properties: it precedes the other quantifier, it is a subject, and it is inherently distributive. In such a case, the relative scope computation allows only the reading with wide scope of the highly valued quantifier. (3.50)

Was glaubt jeder, wo sie gerne leben würde? what believe everyone where she readily live would (only: jeder>wo) S1 i. wherep everyx [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]] ii. everyx wherep [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]] S2 where>every: √ every>where: S3 everyx wherep [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]]

I have been discussing that judgments are not unanimous with regard to (3.50). If there happen to be disagreeing judgments concerning the availability of a certain scope reading, one should look at one’s conception of scope determination and wonder which of its properties make such a reading (im)possible. In our case, the way the relative scope computation is designed makes wide scope of wh impossible. It is not easy to see how, in order to allow wide scope of wh, this component could be changed without a massive amount of wrong predictions as a consequence. Independently, we have seen in §3.1.2 how one can explain the wrong impression that wide scope of wh be possible and we have seen there that wide scope of wh does not show up in critical contexts (as (3.36)).


There are interesting similarities between the sentences in (3.51) and (3.52). (3.51) a. Was glaubt jeder, wo sie gerne leben würde? (unambiguous) b. Wo glaubt jeder, dass sie gerne leben würde? (ambiguous)

[=3.50] [=3.46]

(3.52) a. There is likely to be someone here. (unambiguous) b. Someone is likely to be here. (ambiguous)

It has not only been proposed that was and the true wh-phrase in (3.51a) form a chain, but that the expletive there and someone in (3.52a) do, as well. Was as well as there has been characterized as a scope marker (as for there, see Williams 1984, who has, however, been criticized for doing so by Safir 1987). And, for some time, it was commonly assumed that at LF there is replaced by the quantifier it is coindexed with – the same thing that has been claimed with regard to was and the wh-phrase it is coindexed with. Most interesting, however, is the similarity in relative scope between the pairs (3.51) and (3.52), where it seems obvious that it is the s-structural relation between the quantifiers which is decisive for the relative scope differences. Thus, an analysis analogous to our analysis of (3.51a, b) might also be appropriate for (3.52a, b). Relying on our analysis of (3.50), the decisive reason for the contrast in (3.53)11 is that the wh-phrase can outscope the negative quantifier in (3.53a) leading to a semantic structure which can be felicitously interpreted, whereas the negative quantifier has obligatory scope over the wh-phrase in (3.53b) leading to a semantic structure with a strange interpretation (cf. Pafel 1999: 294). (3.53) a.

Wo wird nicht einer vermuten, dass sie sich versteckt where will not one assume that she herself hidden hält? hold ?? b. Was wird nicht einer vermuten, wo sie sich versteckt what will not one assume where she herself hidden hält? hold ‘Where will nobody assume that she is hiding herself?’

Dayal (1994) favours, against McDaniel (1989), a non-extraction analysis of partial wh-movement, i.e., an “indirect dependency analysis”. Sentences like (3.50) Was glaubt jeder, wo sie gerne leben würde? are interesting in this respect. I claimed that these sentences unequivocally get the pair-list reading and our model relying on a McDaniel-analysis predicts this correctly. Dayal’s theory, however, predicts, as far as I can see, that the sentences unequivocally get the



 Quantifier Scope in German

wide-scope reading of the wh-phrase. In Dayal’s account, sentence (3.50) is interpreted as in (3.54), which amounts to wide scope of the wh-phrase: (3.54) a. λp ∃q [ ∃x [q=ˆlike-to-live-in(she,x) ∧ p=ˆ∀y [believe(y,q)]]] b. {everyone believes that she would like to live in New York, everyone believes that she would like to live in Paris, everyone believes that she would like to live in Berlin,...}

Sentences like (3.54) do not only disfavour this special analysis, they tend to disfavour any analysis of partial wh-movement in German which takes was to be a true argument, for instance, a quantifier on propositions. If it were a true argument, the scope relations should be the same as in Was glaubt jeder? (‘What does everyone believe?’), which is clearly ambiguous.12 It was mentioned above that it is unclear whether a sentence like (3.34) or (3.55) below really has a reading with wide scope of wh. From the perspective of the scope model, the first step is straightforward: the same two structures arise as in (3.46) and (3.50). The second step, or more precisely, the relative scope computation, is the decisive aspect. If only the initial wh-phrase were relevant for relative scope computation, we would get the same result as with ordinary long wh-extraction in (3.46). This presupposes that we can ignore the wh-copy the way we can ignore traces and the expletive was in relative scope computation. Now suppose that we are not allowed to ignore the copy. And assume that (i) a quantifier, in order to get scope over the wh-phrase, must have relative scope over the initial wh-phrase and its copy, and that (ii) the wh-phrase can only outscope another quantifier if the initial wh-phrase and its copy outscope the quantifier. Requirement (i) is fulfilled by (3.55)’s list reading: the universal quantifier can outscope the initial wh-phrase as well as its copy. But requirement (ii) is not fulfilled in (3.55) because the copy cannot outscope the universal quantifier (cf. (3.50)). Thus, the sentence should be unambiguous. (3.55)

Wo glaubt jeder, wo sie gerne leben würde? where believe everyone where she readily live would S1 i. wherep everyx [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]] ii. everyx wherep [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]] S2 where>every: (?) every>where: √ S3 i. ? wherep everyx [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]] ii. everyx wherep [x thinks [she would like to live (in) p]]


Presupposing our analysis concerning the difference between (3.53a) and (3.53b), sentence (3.56) could help in deciding whether the wh-copy is relevant for relative scope computation. Unfortunately, (3.56) does not elicit unanimous intuitions and judgments, as far as my informants are concerned. I myself tend to regard it as unacceptable. %

(3.56)

Wo wird nicht einer vermuten, wo sie sich versteckt where will not one assume where she herself hidden hält? hold ‘Where will nobody assume that she is hiding herself?’

At last, the wh-imperative. Here we have a case of lowering. Step 1 leads to two structures. Both structures are ill-formed because the imperative mood is incompatible with the wide scope of the wh-phrase (compare *Ich möchte, wo jeder schätzt, dass sie gerne leben würde ‘I want where everyone guesses that she would like to live’, which is, I suppose, out for similar reasons). Raising does not help, but lowering of the wh-phrase does. Although we have two relative scope options, only one of them can be realized in a well-formed semantic structure (simultaneously lowering both quantifiers would leave the x-variable unbound). (3.57)

Wo schätz mal jeder, dass sie gerne leben würde! where guess one.time everyone that she readily live would S1 i. wherep everyx [x guess [she would like to live (in) p]] ii. everyx wherep [x guess [she would like to live (in) p]] √ S2 where>every: √ every>where: S3 everyx [x guess [wherep [she would like to live (in) p]]]

Lowering constructions can also be found in Hindi (see (3.58b)) and Japanese (see (3.59)). (3.58) a.

raam-ne puuchaa ki kOn Ram-erg asked who ‘Ram asked who has come.’ b. kOn raam-ne puuchaa ki who Ram-erg asked ‘Ram asked who has come.’

aayaa hE has come aayaa hE has come (Mahajan 1990: 134)



 Quantifier Scope in German

(3.59)

?

dono hon-oi Mary-ga [John-ga toshokan-kara ti which book-acc Mary-nom John-nom library-from karidasita ka] siritagatteiru checked.out que know.want ‘Mary wants to know which book John checked out from the library.’ (Watanabe 1992: 282; cf. Saito 1989)

In German there is at least one more candidat for a construction with quantifier raising,13 where one has the clear feeling that it is a marked construction (like wh-imperatives). In colloquial German, sentences like (3.60) are more or less acceptable with the embedded sentence’s initial wh-phrase unequivocally interpreted as having matrix scope (see d’Avis 1993: 92ff.). (3.60)

Welches Buch meint ihr, wer wann gekauft haben könnte? which book think you who when bought have could which booky whox whenz [you think [x might have bought y (in) z]]

I will come back to this case in §3.3. This model integrating absolute and relative scope determination makes the right prediction with respect to (in)coherent constructions. The incoherent constructions (3.2a ) und (3.3a ) with sentence embedding are correctly predicted as having unequivocally the non-distributive reading: structure (3.61) is the outcome of the scope determination. (3.2a ) [SP Wie viele Leute haben versucht, [SP jedes Buch zu lesen]] (3.3a ) [SP Wie viele Leute haben [SP jedes Buch zu lesen] versucht] (3.61) [(how many people)x . x tried [(every book)y . x read y]]

The coherent construction (3.3b ) without sentence embedding is correctly predicted as ambiguous.14 (3.3b ) [SP Wie viele Leute haben jedes Buch [VP zu lesen versucht]] (3.62) S1 i. [(how many people)x (every book)y . x tried [x read y]] ii. [(every book)y (how many people)x . x tried [x read y]] √ S2 how many>every: √ every>how many: S3 = S1

In (3.12), however, it is the universal quantifier’s raising that leads up to the distributive reading. I omit the details. (3.12) [SP (Wie viele Bücher)1 hat er versucht [SP jedem t1 zu zeigen]]

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

The other types of coherent constructions are accounted for if they exhibit no sentence embedding. Scope beyond its minimal clause is possible for a quantifier only if there is a chain with members in its minimal clause as well as in a superordinate one. This can be the chain of the quantifier itself (as in partial wh-movement) or the chain of another quantifier (as in ordinary long wh-movement). As, in German, such syntactic chain relations are not possible beyond the boundary of adverbial and relative clauses (especially extraction out of these kinds of clauses is impossible in German – see, among others, Lutz 1993), quantifiers contained in these clauses are clause-bound. Thus, it seems that our model integrating absolute and relative scope determination is adequate for the whole range of complex sentences in German. One phenomenon – complex multiple questions – will be investigated in §3.3. I already mentioned that the puzzle of clause-boundedness is unsolved in May (1977, 1985). Lasnik/Saito (1992) and Kitahara (1996) present solutions, but they are making use of scope principles which rely essentially on traces in relative scope computation. Scope principles of this kind seem to be inadequate (see §6.1). As noted above, it cannot be decided whether Chierchia (1993) has a suitable solution. From the perspective of our analysis, it does not make much sense to distinguish types of quantifiers with respect to whether they are clause-bound or not (typologies of this kind have been proposed by Hornstein 1984; Aoun 1985: 165; Aoun/Hornstein 1985). A quantifier like everyone, which is characterized as clause-bound by Hornstein and Aoun, can be clause-bound or not depending on the linguistic context it is embedded. We will see in a moment that the same is true for wh-phrases in situ, which are characterized as non-clause-bound by Hornstein and Aoun. Let us finally have a look at facts which our analysis cannot account for or where it is not at hand how it could account for them. Clause-boundedness seems to be the default case cross-linguistically. One dare say that is a universal. Mechanisms like raising and lowering are also shared by many languages. But there are differences between languages with respect to further possibilities to get scope beyond the minimal clause. For instance, in English certain universal quantifiers seem to have scope over superordinate predications without any chain relation being relevant. (3.63) a.

Someone or other has said that each of the men likes the other. √ each>someone: (cf. Williams 1991: 171)

 Quantifier Scope in German

b. The grade that every student gets will be recorded in the computer. (Engdahl 1986: 257 n. 31, acknowledged to Lauri Karttunen) c. The man who builds each television set also repairs it. (Cooper 1983: 76; acknowledged to Stanley Peters)

I will not make an attempt to integrate these cases into the scope model. The following sentences – with the common feature that there is extraction out of a so-called weak island – do not exhibit a reading with the universal quantifier outscoping the wh-phrase (cf. Cheng 1991: 185ff.). (3.64) a. Which books do you wonder whether every student read? b. Which books don’t you know that every student read? c. Which book didn’t every student think that his teacher wrote?

At first glance, this seems totally unexpected with our analyses so far. The sentences should be as ambiguous as Which book did every student read?. But, much depends on the influence of whether in (a) and the negation marker not in (b) and (c) on the relative scope relations. It has been argued (e.g., in Pafel 1999) that ob resp. whether introduce an implicit interrogative quantifier. If the universal quantifier cannot outscope this implicit quantifier it also cannot outscope the sentence-initial wh-phrase. It is for semantical reasons that the universal quantifier cannot outscope the implicit quantifier (see Pafel 1999: 287). Negative islands, at last. As for (3.64c) and (3.65), we have seen in §2.2.8 that a negation attractive universal quantifier seems obligatorily marked as negative by a c-commanding negation marker. (3.65) Who doesn’t every student like?

Thus, it remains to explain why a negative universal quantifier cannot outscope a wh-phrase. Here too, it can be argued that this is prohibited for semantical reasons (Pafel 1999: §8). But I do not know whether this strategy can be extended to (3.64b) too.

. Scope (and syntax) of wh-phrases in situ So far, I have been silent on the topic of multiple questions. But the integrated scope model has consequences for their analysis too. Take a “Baker-sentence” as in (3.66).


(3.66)

Welcher Agent weiß, wo welches Dokument versteckt ist? which spy knows where which document hidden is R1 which spyx [x knows [wherep which documenty [y is hidden (in) p]]] R2 which spyx [x knows [which documenty wherep [y is hidden (in) p]]] R3 which spyx which documenty [x knows [wherep [y is hidden (in) p]]]

The wh-phrase in situ welches Dokument can be interpreted as having scope over the embedded clause, but also as having scope over the whole sentence. This last one is the critical reading (=the Baker-reading). It is a challenge to the principle of clause-boundedness. According to our scope model, this reading can only be generated if there is an element in the matrix clause which forms a chain together with the wh-in-situ at s-structure. What could this element be? One might think of Baker’s (1970) proposal that wh-phrases are coindexed with an abstract Q-morpheme or, equivalently, with a wh-feature in Comp (for later versions of this proposal, see Aoun/Li 1993b and Ouhalla 1996). So far, I have not made use of such an element, because it did not matter in scope affairs. I am uncertain with regard to the question of whether one can argue for the Qmorpheme on a purely syntactic basis – say clausal typing. As far as semantic interpretation is concerned, this morpheme is not really necessary (see Pafel 1999). Furthermore, we cannot rely on Pesetsky’s (1987) theory of Q-binding of d-linked, non-quantificational wh-phrases since I take d-linked or non-dlinked wh-phrases to be quantifiers, primarily for the reason that they display a very similar relative scope behavior. The scope model in §2.3 has not been designed to capture wh/whinteractions, but it makes clear predictions in this respect. For instance, it is a necessary condition for a wh-phrase in an embedded clause having wide scope that it can, with regard to relative scope, outscope the other quantifiers in the embedded clause whose scope is confined to that clause. In (3.66), for example, welches Dokument must be able to outscope wo – otherwise R3, corresponding to the Baker-reading, would not be a well-formed structure. Such a relative scope option is indeed possible. (3.67)

wo: welches Dokument:

ex-pre + def + focus subject + l-db + def + focus

7.5 10

In (3.68), however, welches Dokument cannot outscope welcher Agent (the scope value relation is 17.5:5 in favor of the subject).



 Quantifier Scope in German

(3.68)

Wer weiß, welcher Agent welches Dokument versteckt hat? who knows which spy which document hidden has R1 whox [x knows [which spyy which documentz [y has hidden z]]] R2 whox which documentz [x knows [which spyy [y has hidden z]]]

Thus, the Baker-reading is predicted to be impossible. That appears to be the right result empirically. An analysis relying on Q-binding seems unable to explain this datum. Hence, I hesitate to introduce a Q-morpheme only to get to grips with the critical reading in Baker-sentences. Theoretically, there is another candidate for an element the wh-phrase in situ might form a chain with: the matrix whphrase. The s-structure corresponding to the two readings of (3.66) could look as in (3.69): (3.69) a. Welcher Agent weiß, wo—1 welches Dokument 1 versteckt ist? b. Welcher Agent—1 weiß, wo welches Dokument 1 versteckt ist?

What kind of binding might this be? One might stipulate an abstract element adjoined to the initial wh-phrase which is the true element binding the whphrase in situ. In that case we would have an s-structure quite similiar in structure to the s-structure of languages (like Bulgarian, see Rudin 1988) where all wh-phrases are moved, apparently forming a wh-complex in sentence-initial position (cf. Brody (1995: 31, 50ff.), who, however, takes the abstract element to be a scope marker). This idea of “wh-in-situ-binding” opens up a surprising perspective. The binding by was in partial wh-movement and the just considered wh-in-situbinding display a perfectly complementary pattern: if a wh-phrase can be bound by was it cannot be bound by an ordinary wh-phrase, and if it can be bound by an ordinary wh-phrase it cannot be bound by was. √

(3.70) a. [ was1 ... *wh-phrase1 ... [ wh-phrase1 ... *wh-phrase1 ... ]] √ √ b. [wh-phrase—1 ... wh-phrase1 ... [*wh-phrase1 ... wh-phrase1 ... ]]

The following sentences illustrate this pattern. (3.71) a. *Was ist welcher Agent erschossen worden? what is which spy shot being ‘Which spy was shot?’ √ b. Wann ist welcher Agent erschossen worden? when is which spy shot being ‘Which spy was shot when?’

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

(3.72) a.

√

Was glaubst du, welcher Agent erschossen worden ist? what believe you which spy shot being was ‘Which spy do you think was shot?’ b. *Wer glaubt, welcher Agent erschossen worden ist? who believes which spy shot being was ‘Who believes which spy was shot?’

(3.73) a. *Was glaubst du, dass welcher Agent erschossen worden ist? what believe you that which spy shot being was ‘Which spy do you think was shot?’ √ b. Wer glaubt, dass welcher Agent erschossen worden ist? who believes that which spy shot being was ‘Who believes which spy was shot?’

For partial wh-movement to be acceptable, was must bind a wh-phrase across a clause boundary, the wh-phrase being located in the initial position of an embedded clause. These conditions are fulfilled neither in (3.71a) – which cannot have the reading “Which spy was shot?”, nor in (3.73a) – which cannot have the same meaning as (3.72a). Wh-in-situ-binding, however, is possible within a single clause (see (3.71b)) as well as across a clause boundary if the wh-phrase to be bound is not located in the initial position of the embedded clause (see (3.72b) versus (3.73b)).15 On the basis of wh-in-situ-binding one can go on and analyze superiority effects as violations of (syntactic, s-structural) constraints concerning the relation between the overt wh-phrase and the adjoined, abstract element. A multi-factor model might be reasonable as superiority violations can be distinctly strong in one language and across languages (cf. Meyer 2004: §4.3.3). I cannot go into this here, but I want to establish that there are superiority effects in German. For instance, (3.74b) is perceptibly more difficult to get than (3.74a), and in (3.75) there is a clear difference in acceptability. (3.74) a. Wer hat wem Recht gegeben? b. § Wem hat wer Recht gegeben? (§ means ‘stylistically marked’) ‘Who gave right to whom?’ (3.75) a. Wer ist was? b. *Was ist wer? ‘Who is what?’

Now I can come back to sentence (3.60), which is an apparent counterexample to the pattern in (3.70) as the embedded sentence’s initial wh-phrase has matrix scope.

 Quantifier Scope in German

(3.60)

Welches Buch meint ihr, wer wann gekauft haben könnte? which book think you who when bought have could which booky whox whenz [you think [x might have bought y (in) z]]

We can derive this reading as follows. Wann is wh-in-situ-bound by the whphrase of the matrix clause. Thus, wann gets matrix scope via the principle of preliminary scope assignment (3.40). But, as far as the relative scope computation is concerned, wann cannot have scope over wer (the difference of the scope values is greater 5). Thus, S1 has to be modified to get a well-formed semantic structure. Raising of wer leads to the well-formed structure S3. (3.76)

Welches Buch— 1 meint ihr, wer wann— 1 gekauft haben könnte? S1 which booky whenz [you think [whox [x might have bought y (in) z]]] √ S2 who>when: when>who: S3 which booky whox whenz [you think [x might have bought y (in) z]]

As we can derive (3.60)’s reading, without being committed to wh-in-situbinding a sentence-initial wh-phrase, (3.60) is no counterexample to the pattern in (3.70). This analysis enables us to solve a problem brought up by Kuno/Robinson (1972). They claimed that Baker-sentences have a reading where all wh-phrases have matrix scope (cf. Feldhaus 1996: §2.2.5 for German). (3.77)

Welcher Agent weiß, wo welches Dokument versteckt ist? which spy knows where which document hidden is which spyx wherep which documenty [x knows [y is hidden (in) p]]

Wo gets matrix scope if welches Dokument is wh-in-situ-bound by the matrix √ subject and the scope option “wo>welches: ” is chosen. Because in that case, wo can be raised. (3.78)

Welcher Agent— 1 weiß, wo welches Dokument— 1 versteckt ist? S1 which spyx which documenty [x knows [wherep [y is hidden (in) p]] √ S2 wo>welches: √ welches>wo: S3 which spyx wherep which documenty [x knows [y is hidden (in) p]]

Thus, in combination with the idea of wh-in-situ-binding, our scope model seems able to cope with the scope options of wh-phrases in multiple questions. That wh/wh-interaction is indeed a kind of scope interaction can be shown by other kinds of evidence too. Take the sentences in (3.79).

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

(3.79) a.

Zum größten Teil wissen wir, welche Kritiker welche Romane rezensieren. ‘For the most part, we know which critics review which novels.’ b. Zum größten Teil wissen wir, welche Romane welche Kritiker rezensieren. ‘For the most part, we know which novels are reviewed by which critics.’

Assume that there are four critics and four novels. Sentence (a) is true only if we know with respect to at least three critics which novels they review. Sentence (b) is true only if we know with respect to three novels which critics review them. This contrast can be explained if the preceding wh-phrase is taken to outscope the other wh-phrase (see Pafel 1999: §6 for details).

. Absolute scope and the relation between syntactic and semantic structure .. From clause-boundedness to phrase-boundedness Clause-boundedness is just one case of a quantifier’s absolute scope being restricted to the semantic domain corresponding to a certain syntactic phrase. We will see in a moment that, besides SP, quantifiers in German seem to be “phrase-bound” with respect to VP, AP and DP, but not with respect to NP and PP. At least in the standard case, the absolute scope of a quantifier contained in a noun phrase is restricted to the noun phrase. This is especially clear when negative quantifiers are contained in DP. The unacceptability of the sentences in (3.80) derives from the fact that the reading, in which the scope of niemandem ‘nobody’ is restricted to the DP, is nonsensical. (3.80) a.

??Ein Bild

von niemandem habe ich gesehen. a picture of nobody have I seen ?? b. Ich habe ein Bild von niemandem gesehen. I have a picture of nobody seen ‘I have seen a picture of nobody.’

The sentence becomes at once acceptable if one enlarges the scope of niemandem by extraction:16

 Quantifier Scope in German

(3.81) a. [Von niemandem]1 habe ich [ein Bild t1 ] gesehen. b. Ich habe [von niemandem]1 [ein Bild t1 ] gesehen.

We have observed this before: a quantifier’s absolute scope can be enlarged by extraction. Analogous to the relationships in sentences, the scope of a wh-phrase in situ contained in DP can be enlarged by being bound by a whphrase.17 (3.82) a.

Wer hat ein Bild von wem gesehen? ‘Who saw a picture of whom?’ b. Wer weiß, wo das Bild von wem liegt? ‘Who knows where the picture of whom is to be found?’

In English there might be some cases where the scope of a DP-internal quantifier is larger than the DP – without extraction entering the scene. Sentence (3.83a) is acceptable – in contrast to (3.80) – and in (3.83b) everyone can outscope someone (see, e.g., Aoun 1985: 167). (3.83) a. I saw a picture of nobody. b. Someone took a picture of everyone.

This case does not exist in German either – see (3.84), where the universal quantifier cannot outscope the indefinite quantifier. (3.84)

Irgendein Mitglied der Regierung hat Abgeordnete aus jeder Oppositionspartei getroffen. ‘Some member or other of the government met deputies from every opposition party.’

As for quantifiers contained in NP (and not only in DP), they are not scopally restricted to the NP. In (3.85), for instance, the universal quantifier has scope over the entire DP despite the fact that it is a complement of N. (3.85)

[DP Das [NP [N Gewicht] eines jeden Paketes]] ‘The weight of every parcel’

This is an example of the inverse-linking reading, which I will investigate in more detail in §3.5. Quantifiers that are the complement of P are not phrase-bound either. A quantifier’s absolute scope is not restricted to the PP in (3.81), (3.82), (3.84) or (3.86). (3.86)

Über einen Roman hat jeder gelacht. ‘About one novel, everyone laughed.’

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

The DP-quantifier can outscope other quantifiers of the sentence. Alternatively, one could assume that a PP can become a quantifier if its complement is a quantifier. For theory-internal reasons, Reinhart (1983) and Frey (1993) had to make such an assumption. I do not see any independent evidence for such a move; in particular, I have no idea what could be semantically meant by “the PP is quantificational”. In VP and AP, however, the absolute scope of quantifiers, being (parts of) complements of V or A, is restricted to VP and AP. At least, the data in (3.87) – from Reinhart (1983: 189) – and (3.88) allow such a view. (3.87) a. Fond of some boy every girl is. b. (... and) break all the plates someone finally did. c. Opposed to all laws though some revolutionaries are, they all support the right of abortion. (3.88) a.

Eine Aufgabe zur vollsten Zufriedenheit gelöst hat jeder, der an dem Test teilgenommen hat. ‘Solve one problem to one’s utmost satisfaction everyone who was tested did.’ b. Jede Platte zertrümmert hatten einige in weniger als fünf Sekunden. ‘Break every plate some people did in less than five seconds.’ c. Doch jedem Gesetz gegenüber ablehnend eingestellt sind nur einige der Revolutionäre, die sich als Anarchisten bezeichnen. ‘Opposed to every law only some of the revolutionaries are who take themselves to be anarchists.’ d. Alle Aufgaben zur vollsten Zufriedenheit gelöst hat nur einer von denen, die an dem Test teilgenommen haben. ‘Solve all problems to one’s utmost satisfaction only one of the participants who was tested did.’ e. Alle denkbaren Fehler unterlaufen sind nur wenigen unerfahrenen Anfängern. ‘Make all possible mistakes only few inexperienced beginners did.’ f. Stolz auf alle Mitarbeiter ist mindestens einer. ‘Proud of all colleagues at least one guy is.’

As Reinhart observes, the sentences in (3.87) only have the reading with wide scope of the subject. The sentences in (3.88) are similarly scopally unequivocal. They are stylistically clearly marked, but they are, nevertheless, acceptable at least to some speakers. Scope relations are inverse to linear precedence. Sentence (3.88a), for example, cannot read that there is one problem which everyone who took the test solved perfectly. And (3.88c) cannot read that every law

 Quantifier Scope in German

is such that only some revolutionaries believing to be anarchists are opposed to it. It seems that scope relations cannot be the outcome of a relative scope determination, i.e., of a direct scope interaction between the quantifiers. Instead, scope relations in these sentences result from the fact that the absolute scope of quantifiers, which are a proper or improper part of a complement of V or A, is restricted to VP and AP.18 We will see in Chapter 7 how quantifiers in the Mittelfeld obtain automatically scope over the quantifiers contained in VP or AP. This will explain the observed readings and the fact that the scope-relevant properties play no role in these sentences. If a quantifier is contained in a VP by being a VP-adjunct, its scope is not restricted to the VP. In (3.89), for example, jeder Pianist’s absolute scope is not restricted to VP*. That means that the absolute scope of quantificational adjuncts is not restricted to the phrase it is immediately contained in. (3.89) a. Eine Beethoven-Sonate hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. b. [SP Eine B-S hat 1 [VP* jeder Pianist [VP in seinem Repertoire t1 ]]]

Only quantifiers included in VP are VP-bound – with XP being included in YP iff XP is a (proper or improper) part of the complement of YP’s head. As for phrase-boundedness we obtain the following result. If there are no superordinate relative scope considerations to be observed, the absolute scope of German quantifiers included in SP, DP, VP and AP is restricted to the semantic domain corresponding to these phrases. Quantifiers included in NP and PP are not restricted in this respect. Taking phrase-boundedness to be the standard case, NP and PP are the exceptions to the rule. .. Absolute scope and quantifier raising Is the process of absolute scope assignment a syntactic one which has the form of a movement operation, as quantifier raising (QR) has in May (1977, 1985)? This does not seem to be the case. The way I have solved the puzzle of clause-boundedness – by making absolute scope partially dependent on relative scope – has no counterpart in movement or extraction. It will become obvious that absolute scope assignment underlies other regularities than a movement process does when we have a closer look at the differences between absolute scope assignment and extraction.19 The following sentences show that an absolute scope interpretation can correspond to the possibility of an (s-structural) extraction; this interpretation can, however, also be more restricted as well as less restricted than extraction.

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

(3.90) a.

Wo glaubst du, dass jeder gerne sitzen würde? ‘Where do you think that everyone would like to sit?’ b. Weißt du, wo welches Buch gekauft wurde? ‘Do you know where which book was bought?’ c. Irgendjemand glaubt, dass ihn jeder mag. (∀∃) ‘Someone or other believes that everyone likes him.’ d. Wer weiß, wo wir welches Buch gekauft haben? ‘Who knows where we bought which book?’

[=3.26a]

In (a), extraction out of the embedded clause as well as wide scope of the universal quantifier is possible; in (b), both is impossible – wh-phrases cannot be extracted from wh-interrogatives (see, for example, d’Avis 1995). Here, scope and extraction are synchronized. In (c), however, wide scope of the universal quantifier is not possible, although extraction from that clauses is possible in German (under favourable circumstances). In this case, scope is more restricted than extraction. Scope can be less restricted than extraction in (d), where wide scope of the wh-phrase in situ is possible despite the fact that nothing can be extracted from wh-interrogatives. From a movement perspective it must look puzzling that the wh-phrase in situ can have wide scope in (d), but not in (b), or that the universal quantifier can have wide scope in (a), but not in (c). It seems obvious that absolute scope assignment obeys other regularities than a movement process does (cf. Lasnik/Saito 1992).20 This result is confirmed looking at the relation between scope and extraction in VP, AP, NP, PP and DP. I confine myself to two very clear cases. Extraction out of DP is possible in German under certain circumstances, but absolute scope is DP-bound as we have seen. Extraction of full noun phrases out of PP is impossible in German, but absolute scope is not PP-bound as we have seen. Multiple wh-interrogatives have often been thought to be a clear example of syntactic LF-movement. Huang (1982) is the locus classicus. This view, however, leads to the well-known problem that LF-movement seems to be less restricted than s-structure movement, as, being contained in a sentence where extraction is impossible for reasons of subjacency, a wh-phrase in situ can have wide scope (see, e.g., 3.90d). If one relies on the notion of wh-in-situ-binding, such a problem does not arise (we have already seen that it is not generally the case that scope is less restricted than extraction). Insofar as there are syntactic constraints on a wh-phrase in situ having wide scope, they are syntactic constraints on wh-in-situ-binding (these constraints are still quite unknown).

 Quantifier Scope in German

I mention in passing that languages differ with respect to the possibilities of wh-in-situ-binding – see Ouhalla (1996). Superiority effects have for some time be taken as evidence for LF as a syntactic level of representation. Such a view is not compelling: alternatives are conceivable. If superiority effects can be handled as the outcome of s-structural constraints, as sketched in §3.3, superiority is no argument for LF as a syntactic level created by QR. Instead, there is every reason to assume that absolute scope is a genuine semantic phenomenon represented on a semantic level of analysis. .. Correspondence constraints concerning absolute scope I came to the conclusion that relative scope constraints are correspondence constraints relating syntactic and semantic structure. As for absolute scope constraints, i.e., phrase-boundedness, it is even more evident to analyze them as correspondence constraints relating syntactic and semantic structure: a quantifier’s absolute scope is restricted to the semantic domain corresponding to the syntactic phrase it is minimally included in. Phrase-boundedness can be divided into two constraints. Firstly, a quantifier included in an XP (X=S,V,A,D) at syntactic structure cannot have scope beyond XP’s counterpart in semantic structure, i.e., raising a quantifier is prohibited. Secondly, a quantifier minimally contained in syntactic phrase XP cannot be part of a semantic domain which corresponds to an element contained in XP, i.e., lowering a quantifier is prohibited. Distinguishing the levels a bit more accurately we obtain: (3.91) Absolute scope constraint no. 1 A quantifier Q cannot command on semantic structure the (semantic) counterpart of a syntactic phrase XP (X=S,V,A,D) if XP includes the head of the chain of Q’s syntactic counterpart. (3.92) Absolute scope constraint no. 2 A quantifier Q cannot be contained in a semantic domain if the domain’s syntactic counterpart is contained in the syntactic phrase which minimally contains the head of the chain of Q’s syntactic counterpart.

These constraints complete the scope constraints I formulated in §2.4.2: (3.93) Relative scope constraint no. 1 Quantifier Q1 commanding quantifier Q2 on semantic structure SEM fits with the syntactic counterpart of Q1 preceding the syntactic coun-


terpart of Q2 on syntactic structure SYN with Q1 and Q2 being chainrelated only if preference value(Q1 >Q2 ) = 0 with respect to the properties of Q1 and Q2 in SEM and their counterparts in SYN. (3.94) Relative scope constraint no. 2 Quantifier Q2 commanding quantifier Q1 on semantic structure SEM fits with the syntactic counterpart of Q1 preceding the syntactic counterpart of Q2 on syntactic structure SYN with Q1 and Q2 being chainrelated only if preference value(Q2 >Q1 ) = 0 with respect to the properties of Q1 and Q2 in SEM and their counterparts in SYN.

Here the condition that the two quantifiers are chain-related is added. This relates to the fact that the relative scope constraints are only sensitive to quantifiers which satisfy what I have called the criterion of identification for relative scope computation. That means that two quantifiers Q1 and Q2 are chainrelated iff there is a clause which is, at the level of s-structure, both minimal with respect to an element of the chain of Q1 and minimal with respect to an element of the chain of Q2 . These are the scope constraints for German. Now the question arises of how to cope with the fact that the absolute scope constraints can be violated under certain circumstances. One might, as in optimality theory, rank these constraints and evaluate sentences with certain semantic structures with respect to their fulfillment of the constraints. I will propose another approach in §7.3. .. Scope and quantifier storage In §3.2 I presented an integrated model of scope determination which in two steps mapped syntactic structures into semantic structures. I have kept the idea that semantic structures are built on the basis of syntactic structures, but I will eschew the two-step procedure. In building up semantic structures, quantifier stores will play an essential role. By constraining the quantifiers’ order in the quantifier store and their point of retrieval from the quantifier store, the absolute and relative scope constraints and their interaction will be implemented. Here I will present the idea only. In §7.3 the procedure will be presented in more detail. Every word or phrase in syntactic structure receives a “semantic specification”, which is built up from the semantic specification of the immediate parts



 Quantifier Scope in German

of the word or phrase. A semantic specification is a pair <SS,QS> consisting of a semantic structure SS and a quantifier store QS which encompasses n ordered quantifiers (n≥0). The semantic structure of a sentence can be read off from the uppermost semantic specification. See the following example. Sentence (3.95a) is supposed to have a syntactic structure as in (b) and a semantic structure as in (c). (3.95) a.

dass jeder Pianist einige Fugen spielt ‘that every piano player plays some fugues’ b. [SP dass [VPc [DP jeder Pianist]1 [VPb [DP einige Fugen]2 [VPa [V spielt]]]]] c. [every piano player1 some fugues2 [x1 x2 plays]]

The syntactic constituents receive the following semantic specifications: (3.96)

V VPa DP2 VPb DP1 VPc SP

: : : : : : :

<x2 , some fugues2 > <x1 , every piano player1 >

A lexical element like spielt ‘plays’ has its semantic characterization, which states that it is a predicate with two arguments, as the first element in the semantic specification and an empty quantifier store as the second element. VPa containing only the verb has the same semantic specification as V. The semantic specification of a quantificational DP has a variable as its first element and the quantifier co-indexed with the variable as its second. The VPb einige Fugen spielt takes the quantifier from DP2 ’s store, puts it in its own and instantiates the second argument of spielt by DP2 ’s variable. In order to build up the quantifier store of the VPc jeder Pianist einige Fugen spielt, the order of the quantifiers in the store has to be determined. Here, the relative scope computation comes into play. At SP the quantifier store has to be emptied and retrieved, i.e., the quantifiers are integrated into the semantic structure of VPc . This is forced by clause-boundedness. This very simple procedure will be elaborated in §7.3.

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

. Inverse linking The inverse-linking reading of noun phrases is characterized by the fact that a quantifier, which is contained in a noun phrase as an attribute of the noun, outscopes the operator introduced by the noun phrase’s head.21 Let us have a look at the following example:22 (3.97)

[Noch nach Monaten graben Eichhörnchen ohne große Orientierungsprobleme die meisten der Futterdepots wieder aus, die sie vor dem Winter angelegt haben.] Biologen vermuten, daß die Tiere sich die Umgebung eines jeden Depots genau merken – etwa wie hoch dort Bäume im Blickfeld stehen. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7.12.1995, 40) ‘[Even several months later squirls dig up most food stores that they put away before winter without serious problems of orientation.] Biologists suppose that the animals remember the environment of every depot – for instance, how high the trees stand there within their field of vision.’

The noun phrase die Umgebung eines jeden Depots ‘the environment of every depot’ is, in the intended meaning, not to be analyzed semantically as: “the region x with the property that every depot y is such that x is the environment of y” In other words, what is being referred to is not a certain region, but, relative to every depot, the environment of the depot – that means that a plurality of regions is being referred to. The inverse-linking reading of die Umgebung eines jeden Depots cannot be analyzed in such a way that the scope of the universal quantifier goes beyond the noun phrase. We have already seen that, in German, the absolute scope of quantifiers included in DP is restricted to the DP (cf. the analysis of (1.104) in Chapter 1). The semantic structure of the inverse-linking reading can be illustrated as follows: (3.98)

[[eines jeden Depots]1 (die Umgebung von x1 )]

The non-intended reading of the noun phrase can be illustrated as such: (3.99)

[die ([eines jeden Depots]1 (Umgebung von x1 ))]

The inverse-linking reading typically occurs with inherently distributive quantifiers (see also: ein Mann pro Bataillon), but not exclusively: die Presse vieler Länder ‘the press of many countries’, die Barrieren in den Köpfen vieler ‘the barriers in the heads of many people’, die Sprecher aller Fraktionen ‘the speakers of

 Quantifier Scope in German

all factions’, eine Antwort auf alle Fragen ‘an answer to all questions’, eine Lösung für alle Probleme ‘a solution to all problems’.23 The inverse-linking reading is possible with existential quantifiers too. (3.100a), for instance, has a reading which can be paraphrased as in (3.100b). (3.100) a. Ich kenne die Bilder von mindestens einem Hofmaler. b. Von mindestens einem Hofmaler kenne ich die Bilder. ‘I know the paintings of at least one royal painter.’

Whenever the inverse-linking reading is possible the non-inverse-linking reading is possible too depending on considerations of plausibility only. Definites and indefinites often exhibit inverse-linking readings, but they seem to be possible with quantificational noun phrases too (see also examples (3.104) and (3.106) below). (3.101)

In Japans Wahlkreisen steht nicht nur ein Bewerber jeder Partei zur Wahl, es treten jeweils mehrere auf. (ZEIT, Nr. 18, 1989, 8) ‘In Japan’s constituencies not only does one candidate of every party run for office, but many of them.’

(3.102)

More recently those still looking for an economic explanation of the crusades have argued that rising populations forced European families to take measures to prevent the break-up of their estates, either through primogeniture or through the practice of allowing only one male of each generation to marry. (The Economist, 23.12.1995, 36)

Inverse-linking readings seem not to be possible if the noun phrase is demonstrative as it is the case in the following example (cf. the impossibility of bound variables as part of demonstrative noun phrases mentioned in §1.3.1): (3.103)

[“Niemand darf seinem gesetzlichen Richter entzogen werden.”] Dieser zentrale Satz jeden Rechtsstaats steht in Deutschland schon seit 1877 geschrieben. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19./20.4.1997, 4) ‘[“No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge.”] This central statement of every constitutional state has stood in writing in Germany since 1877.’

Here is a further example for inverse-linking readings with quantificational noun phrases:24 (3.104)

Jeder Abgeordnete von mindestens einer Partei ist korrupt. ‘Every delegate of at least one party is corrupt.’


This sentence can have the reading that there is at least one party which is such that each of its delegates is corrupt. Ultimately, one must ask oneself here whether inverse-linking readings have anything to do with relative scope determination: the configuration “universal quantifier preceding existential quantifier” always led to unequivocally wide scope of the universal quantifier as, for instance, in: (3.105)

Jeder Abgeordnete ist von mindestens einer Partei umworben worden. ‘Every delegate is sought after by at least one party.’

In contrast to this sentence, the quantifiers of the noun phrase in (3.104) are not syntactically independent from each other, but one is part of the other. The difference between (3.104) and (3.105) follows from the relative scope constraints, as they are defined for quantifiers, which stand in a precedence relation to one another and precedence is incompatible with a part-whole relation of the quantifiers. Thus, it makes sense to take the inverse-linking reading to be primarily a phenomenon of absolute scope, with the scope of the embedded quantifier encompassing the operator of the embedding noun phrase. Looking at cases where a universal quantifier is embedded in a universal quantifier, we see that inverse-linking readings are not a normal relative scope phenomenon: (3.106)

One simple possibility is that every verb in every human language shares some readily accessible property, and children are innately predisposed to look for this property. (Stromswold 1995: 857)

Usually, the relative scope between two universal quantifiers is of no importance for the truth conditions – ∀x∀y (φxy) is equivalent to ∀y∀x (φxy). This is different with restricted universal quantifiers, if one of them contains a variable which is bound by the other quantifier. In this case, only one relative scope relation corresponds to a well-formed formula: ∀x[σx] ∀y[ψyx] (φxy) vs. *∀y[ψyx]∀x[σx] (φxy). If, however, as in (3.106), a universal quantifier is embedded in another universal quantifier, the two scope relations normally lead to different readings: in the inverse-linking reading of (3.106), one refers with every verb in every human language to every verb (of a human language); in the non-inverse-linking reading, one refers to the verbs which occur in every human language – the empty set probably. (For the semantics of inverse-linking and non-inverse-linking readings see §1.4.2.)



 Quantifier Scope in German

Notes . In (3.2a) it is also quite natural to treat jedes Buch lesen as an intonation phrase: (i)

[IP Wie viele Leute haben verSUCHT] [IP jedes Buch zu LEsen]

. Cf. Weil der Oberförster [sich rasiert zu haben] bezweifelte vs. *Weil sich der Oberförster [rasiert zu haben] bezweifelte (examples and evaluation after Stechow/Sternefeld 1988: 408). This difference between possible topicalization and wh-movement, on the one hand, and scrambling that is rather impossible, on the other, shows up with extraction from noun phrases too: e.g., NP split (remnant movement) in the Mittelfeld is possible under very special conditions only. . As for partial wh-movement and wh-copying see Lutz/Müller/Stechow (eds.) (2000), as for wh-imperatives see Reis/Rosengren (1992). . As for (3.32), it seems quite natural to put a heavy accent on jeder in the second sentence; in many cases, accentuation is a suitable means of giving a universal quantifier narrow scope with respect to a wh-phrase, as we have seen in §2.2.7. . Cf. Beck (1995), Cresti (1995) and Rullmann (1995). . These sentences seem to show that raising cannot be induced by violating the selection restrictions of predicates (believe cannot embed interrogative clauses – but see You won’t believe which agent has been shot). . Comparing S1 of (3.45) and (3.42), where I have chosen to interpret the pronoun ihn as a variable bound by the wh-phrase, we see that the identification part of the relative scope determination cannot be based on the output of step 1: in both cases, the embedded structure contains a variable bound by the wh-phrase. . Cheng (1997) argues that, in partial wh-movement, the wh-phrase’s wh-feature undergoes successive cyclic movement and is spelled-out as was. As far as the notion of chain in (3.40) and (3.41) is concerned, it is presumably possible to define the notion of a wh-phrase’s chain in such a way that it is consistent with Cheng’s analysis. . Was is not a scope marker in the sense that it marks (the scope of) a wh-feature, either. Compare Was glaubst du, was Hans meint, wo sie gerne leben würde? (‘Where do you think that Hans believes that she would like to live?’). The intermediate clause does not possess a wh-feature. . See Aoun (1985: 51, 66f., 153ff.), who refers to Kayne (1981), Jaeggli (1982) and Rizzi (1982). . Cf. Höhle (2000: 262), Beck (1995: 122f.). . The kyaa+interrogative-construction in Hindi, which is the primary topic of Dayal, has properties differing from partial wh-movement in German. One difference is that kyaa is a true argument as Dayal shows. For the difference between these two constructions see Pafel (2000: §6). . Sentence (i) is more or less acceptable and seems to have a reading with wide scope of the universal quantifier. It is not easy to decide whether it is raising of the universal quantifier or lowering of the existential quantifier what is at stake.

Chapter 3. Absolute scope 

(i)

Zumindest eine Aufgabe glaube ich, dass jeder lösen kann. ‘At least one problem I think that everyone can solve.’

. The contrast between (i) and (ii) – the universal quantifier can have wide scope only in (ii) – explains itself if one assumes that there is no sentence-embedding in (ii). There is much in favor of such an assumption, as Pollard/Sag (1994: §3) have shown. (i)

Someone expects that everyone will be elected. (unambiguous)

(ii) Someone expects everyone to be elected. (ambiguous) Expect as well as versuchen could thus be coherently constructed. . With this background, the contrast between (i) and (ii) shows that in German there is no wh-movement in non-finite sentences: (i) *Was hat er versucht, welchen Agenten zu erschießen? what has he tried which spy to shoot.down ‘Which spy did he try to shoot down?’ √

(ii) Wer hat versucht, welchen Agenten zu erschießen? who has tried which spy to shoot-down ‘Who tried to shoot down which spy?’ . That extraction of the phrase von niemandem is at stake here is shown indirectly by the following subject/object asymmetry (cf. Pafel 1995a): (i)

[Von niemandem]1 hat er [das Erbe t1 ] verwaltet. of nobody has he the inheritance managed ‘He managed nobody’s inheritance.’

(ii) *[Von niemandem]1 hat [ein Freund t1 ] Wittgensteins Erbe verwaltet. of nobody has a friend Wittgenstein’s inheritance managed ‘A friend of nobody managed the inheritance of Wittgenstein.’ . If ninguno is a quantifier in (i) and (ii), then these are cases of binding by a negation marker analogous to wh-in-situ-binding, presupposing that Aoun (1985: 156ff.) is right in observing that the negative quantifier has scope over the entire sentence. (i)

No vi la foto de ninguno. (Spanish) not I.saw the photo of nobody

(ii) No quiero que la foto de ninguno esté en la mesa. (Spanish) not I.want that the photo of nobody is on the table . I note in passing that I make use of the syntactic assumption that the topicalised VPs in (3.88) can have more than one complement (cf. Pafel 1995b). For instance, the topicalised VP in (3.88d) has the following structure: (i)

[VP [DP alle Aufgaben] [PP zur vollsten Zufriedenheit] [V gelöst]]

. That scope options are independent from syntactic island constraints has already been shown by Farkas (1981) against Rodman (1976) and Cooper (1979).

 Quantifier Scope in German . Raising and lowering, which I used in §3.2, differ from movement operations by not leaving ‘traces’. . Inverse linking was discussed thoroughly for the first time by May (1977). . In this paragraph, I heavily rely on attested occurrences in order to counterbalance the impression that inverse linking is an artificial or rare phenomenon. . Attested occurrences: Ein Mann pro Bataillon ist vorgetreten (spoken occurrence), Dies bescheinigt die Presse vieler Länder Felix Gottlieb, einem der bemerkenswertesten Pianisten und Cembalisten unserer Zeit (brochure of the “Stuttgarter Sommerakademie ‘Johann Sebastian Bach’” (21.8.-4.9.94), last page), Wir haben die Barrieren in den Köpfen vieler wegräumen können (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9./10.12.1995, 8), Sprecher aller Fraktionen hoben die Notwendigkeit hervor, die Rentenprobleme auf dem Konsensweg zu lösen (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3./4.2.1996, 1), Regierungssprecher Hausmann hat noch immer nicht eine Antwort auf alle Fragen (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7.3.1996, 3). . The sentence with an indefinite embedded in a noun phrase has preferably a reading distinct from (3.104): (i)

Jeder Abgeordnete einer staatstragenden Partei ist korrupt. ‘Every delegate of a party representing the state is corrupt.’

Chapter 4

Indefinites and quantifiers

There is a variety of different types of what traditionally are called indefinite noun phrases, which have to be distinguished very carefully: quantificational have to be distinguished from non-quantificational indefinite noun phrases and, among the non-quantificational ones, non-specific, (weakly and strongly) specific and generic indefinite noun phrases have to be distinguished. Quantificational indefinite noun phrases behave, with respect to relative and absolute scope, exactly as the quantifiers we have investigated so far – in fact we have looked at them already in detail in Chapter 2. But there are indefinite noun phrases which have a strikingly different ‘scope’ behavior, firstly, in the sense that they do not obey the absolute and relative scope restrictions we have investigated so far, and, secondly, in the sense that, partially, the criteria for distinguishing names and quantifiers do not always apply neatly to them. I will call these indefinite noun phrases indefinites and analyze them as a special kind of non-quantificational noun phrases. Semantically, indefinites will be uniformly analyzed as names of kinds, generalizing Carlson’s (1977) view on bare plurals to all types of indefinites. Syntactically, indefinites will be uniformly analyzed as determiner phrases whose head exclusively contains an indefinite article, be it overt or abstract. The different sorts of indefinites (nonspecific, specific, generic) differ with respect to (i) whether or not they lead to the introduction of a quantifier into the semantic structure, (ii) what type of quantifier it is that is introduced (existential or generic), and (iii) the quantifier’s scope behavior. The quantifiers are implicit quantifiers as they have no quantificational counterpart in the syntactic structure (the indefinite is a name, not a quantifier). Thus, indefinites differ as to their mapping onto semantic structure: non-specific, (weakly and strongly) specific and generic are descriptive notions for different kinds of mapping. German ein- can either be a determiner or an adjective. As a determiner, it is the head of the noun phrase and is either an indefinite article or a quantificational operator. As an adjective, it is a cardinality predicate located in the canonical position of adjectives inside the noun phrase. The article use can be

 Quantifier Scope in German

distinguished from the two other uses by the fact that the article usually cannot be stressed, but can be reduced phonetically to ’n: Proclitic reduction: (4.1) a. b. c. d.

ein Schiff ein jedes Schiff ein paar Boote ein wenig Zwieback

(4.2) a. eines von uns b. das eine Schiff

a . b . c . d .

’n Schiff ’n jedes Schiff ’n paar Boote ’n wenig Zwieback

‘a ship’ ‘every ship’ ‘some boats’ ‘a bit of rusk’

a . *’nes von uns ‘one of us’ b . *das ’ne Schiff this one ship’

Stress: (4.3) a. *EIN jedes Schiff (vs. ein JEdes Schiff ) b. *’N Schiff

(4.4) a. EInes von uns b. das EIne Schiff

(But there seems to be an emphatic use of the indefinite article, which we will look at in §4.2.3, see example (4.55).) We will see that noun phrases with the indefinite article show a name-like behavior in contrast to noun phrases with quantificational ein-.

. Indefinite quantifiers There are indefinite noun phrases with ein- as initial element, but not an indefinite article, which clearly behave as quantifiers. The partitive noun phrase eine von den Fragen in (4.5), for instance, is sensitive to negation: (4.5) a.

Der Kanzler hat EIne von den Fragen nicht beantwortet. ‘The chancellor did not answer one of the questions.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass der Kanzler EIne von den Fragen beantwortet hat. ‘It is not the case that the chancellor answered one of the questions.’

In certain cases, it is obvious that different scope readings are available: (4.6)

EIne Frage stellt JEder. ‘One question, everyone poses.’ R1 One question is such that everyone poses it. R2 Everyone is such that he poses one question.

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers

(4.7)

EIne Katze landet IMmer auf ihren Füßen. ‘One cat always lands on its feet.’ R1 One cat is such that it always lands on its feet. R2 It is always the case that one cat lands on its feet.

Furthermore, the absolute scope of a quantifier with ein- is restricted to the minimal clause containing the quantifier, as is shown by the unacceptability of the following question-answer pairs (see §1.1.1 for this test): ??Kann man sagen, dass EIne Katze IMmer auf den Rücken gefallen ist, als

(4.8)

sie von der Mauer sprang? ‘Can one say that one cat always fell on its back when it jumped from the wall?’ Ja, es war IMmer so, dass EIne Katze auf den Rücken gefallen ist, als sie von der Mauer sprang. ‘Yes, it was always the case that one cat fell on its back when it jumped from the wall.’ ??Kann

(4.9)

man sagen, dass EIne Katze NICHT auf ihren Füßen landete, als sie von der Mauer sprang? ‘Can one say that one cat did not land on its feet when it jumped from the wall?’ Ja, es war NICHT so, dass EIne Katze auf ihren Füßen landete, als sie von der Mauer sprang. ‘Yes, it was not the case that one cat landed on its feet when it jumped from the wall.’

Noun phrases with stressed kein- can behave like quantifiers too. Firstly, they are sensitive to negation: (4.10) a.

Der Kanzler hat KEIne Frage NICHT beantwortet. ‘There was no question that the chancellor did not answer.’ (i.e., he answered them all.) b. Es ist NICHT der Fall, dass der Kanzler KEIne Frage beantwortet hat. ‘It is not the case that the chancellor didn’t answer any question.’ (i.e., he answered at least one of them.)

It is noteworthy that this is only true for singular noun phrases with kein-. Sentence (4.11), however, cannot mean that the chancellor answered all the questions – the sentence is barely acceptable: (4.11)

*Der Kanzler hat keine Fragen nicht beantwortet. ‘No questions, the chancelor did not answer.’



 Quantifier Scope in German

Let us go back to singular noun phrases with kein-. The following two sentences show that kein-phrases are sensitive to other quantifiers: (4.12) a.

KEIne Aufgabe haben ALle lösen können. (¬∃∀) ‘There was no problem that everyone could solve.’ b. Es haben ALle KEIne Aufgabe lösen können. (∀¬∃) ‘Each one could not solve a problem.’

And, finally, the absolute scope of singular noun phrases with kein- is restricted to its minimal clause: ??Kann

(4.13)

man sagen, dass KEIne Katze IMmer auf den Rücken gefallen ist, als sie von der Mauer sprang? ‘Can one say that no cat always landed on its back when it jumped from the wall?’ Ja, es war IMmer so, dass KEIne Katze auf den Rücken gefallen ist, als sie von der Mauer sprang. ‘Yes, it was always the case that no cat landed on its back when it jumped from the wall.’

So there are clear instances of quantificational indefinite noun phrases with ein- or its negative counterpart kein- as initial element. As ein- and kein- do not have the properties of an indefinite article and are not located in the canonical adjectival position inside the noun phrase, I assume that they are determiners with a quantificational meaning.

. Types of indefinites .. Non-specific indefinites Indefinite noun phrases with the article ein- (being the head of the DP) as well as indefinite noun phrases without an overt article – especially bare plurals – have a different behavior than the quantificational indefinite noun phrases we looked at in the preceding paragraph. The following two sentences are logically equivalent in striking contrast to (4.5); here the noun phrase with proclitic eindoes not behave like a quantifier: (4.14) a.

’ne Frage hat er nicht gestellt. ‘A question, he did not pose.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass er ’ne Frage gestellt hat. ‘It is not the case that he posed a question.’ (i.e., he posed none.)

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

The same is true for the bare plural Fragen ‘questions’, a noun phrase with an abstract indefinite article in the head position of the DP: (4.15) a.

Fragen hat er nicht gestellt. ‘Questions, he did not pose.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass er Fragen gestellt hat. ‘It is not the case that he posed questions.’

In contrast to (4.6), there are no ambiguities in (4.16) which could be interpreted as scopal ambiguities: (4.16) a.

’ne Frage stellte jeder. ‘A question, everyone posed.’ b. Fragen stellte jeder. ‘Questions, everyone posed.’

Applying the coordination test, the relevant sentence pairs are logically equivalent. (4.17) a.

Fragen stellten sowohl Moritz als auch Marie. ‘Questions, Maurice as well as Mary posed.’ b. Moritz stellte Fragen und Marie stellte Fragen. ‘Maurice posed questions and Mary posed questions.’

(4.18) a.

Fragen stellte entweder Moritz oder Marie. ‘Questions, either Maurice or Mary posed.’ b. Moritz stellte Fragen oder Marie stellte Fragen. ‘Maurice posed questions or Mary posed questions.’

(Suitable sentences with ’ne Frage instead of Fragen are logically equivalent too – but 4.17a and 4.18a sound a bit strange with ‘ne Frage in the Vorfeld.) These indefinite noun phrases are non-quantificational; they are indefinites in our terminology. They belong to a type of indefinites I will call non-specific indefinites. An indefinite is non-specific if sentences containing the indefinite have truth-conditions which can be expressed by formulas where the semantical contribution of the indefinite is represented by an existential quantifier which is outscoped by all other operators occurring in the sentences (an indefinite satisfying this condition is de re non-specific – for de dicto non-specific indefinites see below). Formula (4.19), for instance, states the truth-condition of (4.14a, b), and formula (4.20) the truth-condition of (4.16a, b).

 Quantifier Scope in German

(4.19)

¬∃y[Question(y)] Posed(he,y) ≈ It is not the case that there is a y being a question such that he posed y.

(4.20)

∀x[x≤a] ∃y[Question(y)] Posed(x,y) ≈ For every (person) x being part of the (contextually determined) plurality a, there is a y being a question such that x posed y.1

Taking into consideration the negation criterion, there seems to be no alternative to taking non-specific indefinites to be names. But then the question arises of how the existential quantification enters into the truth-condition. One might reject the negation criterion and regard non-specific indefinites as quantifiers with the idiosyncratic property of being in the scope of other quantifiers of the same sentence. Now, one surely would like to know why the above-considered sentences have truth conditions with the existential quantifier having smallest possible scope. As far as I can see, no explanation is within one’s reach if one treats non-specific indefinites as a very peculiar type of quantifier: the idiosyncratic scopal behavior has to be stipulated. However, an explanation seems possible if one takes non-specific indefinites to be names. Of course, they cannot be names of concrete particulars (otherwise we would not get the truth conditions in (4.19) and (4.20)). But non-specific indefinites could be names of kinds of particulars (this is a generalization of what Carlson 1977 proposed for bare plurals only). According to this view, the non-specific eine (/’ne) Frage denotes the kind which is instantiated by every question and by nothing else while the bare plural Fragen accordingly denotes the kind which is instantiated by every plurality of questions and by nothing else. Formally – with κx[φx] being a term denoting the kind such that x is an instance of this kind iff x is φ: (4.21) eine (/’ne) Frage ≈> κx[Question(x)] Fragen ≈> κx[*Question(x)]

As for the ontological nature of kinds, I assumed in §1.4 that a kind is not identical to (the mereological sum of) its instances and that a kind’s identity is not determined by its instances. Instead, a kind’s identity is determined by the criterion it imposes on its possible instances. That means that κx[φx] and κx[ψx] denote the same kind iff the concept φ is identical to the concept ψ. In other words, kinds are a species of abstract entities. Here is one example why I cannot assume that a kind’s identity is determined by its instances. The following sentences obviously differ in meaning: (4.22) Wir suchen einen Beweis für die Entscheidbarkeit der Prädikatenlogik. ‘We are seeking a proof of the decidability of predicate logic.’


(4.23) Wir suchen einen Beweis für die Vollständigkeit der Arithmetik. ‘We are seeking a proof of the completeness of arithmetic.’

Assuming that the referentially opaque objects of the predicate – being de dicto non-specific indefinites – denote kinds, they must denote different kinds (with no instances, necessarily). Otherwise the sentences could not differ in meaning. Thus, a kind’s identity is not determined by its instances, but by the criterion it imposes on its possible instances: being a proof of the decidability of predicate logic is a different criterion from being a proof of the completeness of arithmetic. Let us come back to the question of why sentences with non-specific indefinites can have truth conditions with an existential quantifier with smallest possible scope (representing the indefinite). If, in semantic structure, there is no existential quantifier with peculiar scopal behavior corresponding to the non-specific indefinite, I am urged to assume that the non-specific indefinite can occupy an argument position in semantic structure. Thus, the sentence (4.16a) ’ne Frage stellte jeder ‘Everyone posed a question’ can have a semantic structure like (4.24a) with an interpretation as in (4.24b): (4.24) a. (jeder)1 [x1 stellte (’ne Frage)] b. ∀x[x≤a] Posed(x,κy[Question(y)])

When does a person stand in the relation of posing to the kind ‘question’? He does iff there is an instance of the kind such that the person posed this instance, i.e., a question. (4.25)

Posed(x,κy[Question(y)]) iff ∃y[y Inst κy[Question(y)]] Posed(x,y) ≈ x stands in the relation of posing to the kind ‘question’ iff there is an instance y of the kind ‘question’ such that x posed y.

By switching from the relation to the kind to a relation to instances of the kind, we arrive at the truth condition (4.20) with narrow scope of the existential quantifier, without treating the non-specific indefinite as a quantifier, and without stipulating the scope behavior of the existential quantifier. (4.20) ∀x[x≤a] ∃y[Question(y)] Posed(x,y)

The equivalence in (4.25) can be seen as an instance of a general schema to which there are, nevertheless, systematic exceptions, namely exceptions depending on the meaning of the predicates. Two classes of predicates behave differently: (i) predicates which can be applied to kinds, but not to their instances – compare the subject of spread or extinct and the object of invent or exterminate; (ii) predicates which have a de dicto-reading in which they are ref-



 Quantifier Scope in German

erentially opaque with respect to their kind-argument, as is the case in one reading of verbs like seek: They seek a unicorn does not amount to an existential quantification.2 But note that as a consequence of the proposed account, the distinction between the de re- (=referentially transparent) and de dicto-reading of an object of seek is not represented in semantic structure. Thus, treating non-specific indefinites as names of kinds seems to explain why sentences with non-specific indefinites (can) have truth conditions with an existential quantifier with smallest possible scope – without having to assume that there is an existential quantifier on semantic structure with peculiar scopal properties. However, one might wonder what the theoretical status of equivalences of type (4.25) could be and wonder whether it is a tenable consequence that the two readings of verbs like seek – the de re- and the de dicto-reading – cannot be distinguished in semantic structure.3 We will see below (§4.3) that there might be a reasonable way to assume that for de re-uses of non-specific indefinites, there exists a quantifier in semantic structure. I will close this investigation of non-specific indefinites with an interesting subtype, namely noun phrases with the so-called cohesive use of kein- as in: (4.26) Johanna will sich kein KlaVIER kaufen. ‘Joan does not want to buy a piano.’

First evidence of the kein-phrase not being an existential quantifier comes from the fact that negation is not bound to the indefinite noun phrase, but the whole sentence (or, more exactly, the matrix-VP): firstly, the sentence can be paraphrased as “Joan does not have the intention of buying a piano”; secondly, the negative marker can be separated from the indefinite noun phrase (see (4.27a)); and, thirdly, the cohesive phrase can hardly be moved into the Vorfeld (see (4.27b)): (4.27) a. Ein KlaVIER will sich Johanna NICHT kaufen. b. ??Kein KlaVIER will sich Johanna kaufen.

The difference between the quantificational use of a kein-phrase and its nonquantificational (i.e., cohesive) one is clearly exhibited by the distinct properties of the sentences in (4.28): (4.28) a.

Die Jury will keinen PiaNISten in die engere WAHL ziehen. ‘The jury does not want to place a piano player on the shortlist.’ b. Die Jury will KEInen Pianisten in die engere WAHL ziehen. ‘No piano player, the jury wants to place on the shortlist.’

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

Firstly, the sentences differ prosodically: as for the indefinite noun phrase in (a), the noun is stressed, whereas in (b) keinen is stressed. Secondly, the sentences have a distinct content: as for (a), the jury does not have the intention of considering any piano player – there is no reference to particular piano players, the (non-realized) intention only refers to piano players in general; as for (b), there is no piano player out of the group of piano players participating in the competition who the jury intends to select.4 Thirdly, the negative marker can be separated from the noun phrase in (4.28a), but not in (4.28b): (4.28a) and (4.29a) have the same content, but (4.28b) and (4.29b) do not. (4.29) a. Einen PiaNISten will die Jury NICHT in die engere Wahl ziehen. b. EInen Pianisten will die Jury NICHT in die engere Wahl ziehen.

Finally, the kein-phrase in (4.28b) can felicitously be moved into the Vorfeld (without any semantical modification), which is not true for the kein-phrase in (4.28a): (4.30) a. ??Keinen PiaNISten will die Jury in die engere WAHL ziehen. b. KEInen Pianisten will die Jury in die engere WAHL ziehen.5

.. Specific indefinites There are sentences with indefinite noun phrases with the article ein- (being the head of the DP) and indefinite noun phrases with an abstract indefinite article which seem to be non-quantificational like the non-specific indefinites, but which do not have truth conditions expressed by a formula with the indefinite noun phrase being represented by an existential quantifier with smallest possible scope. Instead, the truth conditions of the sentences can be expressed by formulas where the existential quantifier outscopes some, but not necessarily all operators occurring in the sentences. An indefinite is specific if sentences containing the indefinite have truth-conditions which can be expressed by formulas where the semantical contribution of the indefinite is represented by an existential quantifier which outscopes some, but not necessarily all operators occurring in the sentence. The following sentences exemplify this type of indefinite: (4.31) a.

Wir konnten beobachten, wie eine Katze immer auf den Rücken fiel, wenn sie auf die Erde herabsprang. (∃∀) ‘We could observe how a cat always landed on its back when it jumped to ground.’

 Quantifier Scope in German

b. Wir konnten beobachten, wie eine Katze, als sie von einer Mauer sprang, nicht auf den Füßen, sondern auf dem Rücken landete. (∃¬) ‘We could observe how a cat did not land on its feet, but on its back, when it jumped from a wall.’ (4.32) a.

Wenn eine Katze immer auf den Rücken gefallen ist, wenn sie von einer Mauer gesprungen ist, wurde sie zum Arzt gebracht. (∃∀) ‘When a cat always landed on its back when it jumped from a wall, it was taken to the doctor.’ b. Wenn eine Katze nicht auf ihren Füßen gelandet ist, wenn sie von einer Mauer gesprungen ist, wurde sie zum Arzt gebracht. (∃¬) ‘When a cat did not land on its feet when it jumped from a wall, it was taken to the doctor.’

In (4.31a) and (4.32a) the existential quantifier has scope over the universal quantifier immer ‘always’, and in (4.31b) and (4.32b) the negation is in the scope of the existential quantifier. As for (4.31), one could assume that the indefinite outscopes the universal quantifier and the negation because it is a name denoting a concrete particular, i.e., a certain cat. However, (4.32) shows that, even when an indefinite does not denote a certain particular, it can differ from non-specific indefinites. The existential quantifier representing the specific indefinite can even outscope operators whose minimal clause has the indefinite’s minimal clause as a proper part: (4.33)

Wenn es immer so war, dass eine Katze, wenn sie von einer Mauer gesprungen ist, auf den Rücken gefallen ist, wurde sie zum Arzt gebracht. ‘When it was always the case that a cat landed on its back when it jumped from a wall, it was taken to the doctor.’ ≈ When there was a cat that always landed on its back when it jumped from a wall, it was taken to the doctor.

(4.34)

Wenn es nicht so war, dass eine Katze auf ihren Füßen gelandet ist, wenn sie von einer Mauer gesprungen ist, wurde sie zum Arzt gebracht. ‘When it was not the case that a cat landed on its feet when it jumped from a wall, it was taken to the doctor.’ ≈ When there was a cat that did not land on its feet when it jumped from a wall, it was taken to the doctor.

This is in striking contrast to quantificational indefinite noun phrases with ein-, as we have seen in §4.1 (cf. (4.8) and (4.9)). Placing (4.32b) and (4.34) side by side, it becomes obvious that specific indefinites are not sensitive to nega-

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

tion – this is a second striking difference from quantificational indefinite noun phrases. This insensitivity to negation seems to show that specific indefinites are names, so therefore we are surprised by specific indefinites being sensitive to coordination. The following two sentences are not logically equivalent: (4.35) a.

Wenn eine Katze die Maus nicht fangen kann und wütend schreit, so ist das normal. ‘If a cat cannot catch the mouse and screeches angrily, this is unsurprising.’ b. Wenn eine Katze die Maus nicht fangen kann und eine Katze wütend schreit, so ist das normal. ‘If a cat cannot catch the mouse and a cat screeches angrily, this is unsurprising.’

This is the first case (generic indefinites will be the second one) where an expression is insensitive to negation, but sensitive to coordination. As for the third criterion, i.e., sensitivity to quantification, specific indefinites do not seem to participate in relative scope interaction in the way quantificational indefinite noun phrases do. Whereas (4.36a) shows no scopal ambiguity, (4.36b) exhibits two relative scope readings: (4.36) a.

Eine KATze fiel IMmer auf ihren Rücken. ‘A cat always landed on its back.’ b. EIne Katze fiel IMmer auf ihren Rücken. ‘One cat always landed on its back.’

Specific indefinites are by far the most puzzling case with respect to the name/quantifier distinction. If we assume that they are quantifiers, like quantificational indefinite noun phrases, their behavior would become mysterious – they would differ from all types of quantifiers we have investigated so far (with respect to negation, occurrence of other quantifiers, clause-boundedness). But, assuming that they are names is not satisfactory either: see the truth conditions relying on existential quantification and the sensitivity to coordination. I will propose the following solution to this puzzle: a specific indefinite is a name (of a kind), but, in semantic structure, it leads to, or triggers, the introduction of an existential quantifier which ranges over the instances of the kind. Such a quantifier, which shows up in semantic structure, but has no counterpart in syntactic structure, is an implicit quantifier (in the sense of §1.4.2). Being a name of a kind accounts for the insensitivity to negation and quantification and the relationship between specific and non-specific indefinites. The triggering of the implicit quantifier explains the existential quantification

 Quantifier Scope in German

the truth conditions are based on as well as the absence of the ordinary relative scope behavior: only explicit quantifiers are subject to the correspondence constraints concerning relative scope (3.93) and (3.94), as the constraints only concern quantifiers in semantic structure which have a counterpart in syntactic structure. And the triggering of an implicit quantifier explains the sensitivity to coordination: the two occurrences of the specific indefinite in (4.35b) trigger their own implicit quantifiers, which have scope over one conjunct respectively. Now, what are the absolute and relative scope properties of this implicit existential quantifier? As for its relative scope, it seems that the existential quantifier triggered by a specific indefinite has widest possible scope in its absolute scope domain. As for absolute scope, two classes of specific indefinites can be distinguished: strongly specific indefinites having widest possible absolute scope, and weakly specific indefinites not having widest possible absolute scope (for brevity, I speak of “the scope of specific indefinites” where I should speak of the scope of the existential quantifiers triggered by the specific indefinites). In (4.37) the noun phrase einen unscheinbaren Mann, der auf der Straße Flugblätter verteilte ‘an inconspicuous man who distributed broadsheets on the street’ is a strongly specific indefinite: (4.37)

Wenn wir damals auf einen unscheinbaren Mann, der auf der Straße Flugblätter verteilte, gehört hätten, wäre alles anders gekommen. (=example 139 in Heim 1991: 520) ≈ There is an inconspicuous man who distributed broadsheets on the street such that everything would have been different if we had listened to him.

The indefinites in (4.33) and (4.34), however, are weakly specific as they do not have widest possible absolute scope: (4.33)

Wenn es immer so war, dass eine Katze, wenn sie von einer Mauer gesprungen ist, auf den Rücken gefallen ist, wurde sie zum Arzt gebracht.

(4.34)

Wenn es nicht so war, dass eine Katze auf ihren Füßen gelandet ist, wenn sie von einer Mauer gesprungen ist, wurde sie zum Arzt gebracht.

Indefinites with bestimmt- or gewiss- ‘certain’ are inherently strongly specific. That they are inherently specific and, thus, cannot be non-specific is shown by the fact that (4.38a) is unambiguous and (4.38b) is unacceptable. (4.38) a.

Bestimmte (/gewisse) Fragen hat er nicht beantwortet. ‘Certain questions, he did not answer.’


b. *Er hat keine bestimmten (/gewissen) Fragen beantwortet. *‘He didn’t answer any certain questions.’

In contrast, an indefinite like wichtige Fragen ‘important questions’ can be interpreted specifically as well as non-specifically: (4.39)

Wichtige Fragen hat er nicht beantwortet. ‘Important questions, he did not answer.’ R1 It is not the case that he answered important questions. (i.e., he answered no important questions.) R2 There are important questions he did not answer.

That indefinites with bestimmt- or gewiss- are inherently strongly specific is indicated by the fact that (4.40) has the reading “There is a teammate such that she will immediately stop the game, if he does not keep his mouth shut”, but does not have the reading “If there is a teammate who does not keep his mouth shut, she will immediately stop the game”. (4.40)

Wenn ein bestimmter Mitspieler nicht den Mund hält, dann bricht sie das Spiel sofort ab. ‘If a certain teammate does not keep his mouth shut, she will immediately stop the game.’

The opposite is the case if one omits bestimmter. Now it is the reading with widest possible absolute scope which does not seem to be available. (4.41)

Wenn ein Mitspieler nicht den Mund hält, dann bricht sie das Spiel sofort ab. ‘If a teammate does not keep his mouth shut, she will immediately stop the game.’

Now, it must be noted that the statement that a strongly specific indefinite has widest possible absolute scope has to be made with care (cf. Hintikka 1986; Liu 1990: §2.1.3, 1997:§3.3.3; Enç 1991). For example, in sentence (4.42) reading R1 is preferred: (4.42)

Er sagte, dass sie das Spiel sofort abbricht, wenn eine bestimmte Person den Raum betritt. ‘He said that she will immediately stop the game if a certain person enters the room.’ R1 He said that there is a certain person such that she will immediately stop the game if this person enters the room.



 Quantifier Scope in German

R2 There is a certain person such that he said that she will immediately stop the game if this person enters the room.

See the following sequence, which shows the availability of R1: (4.43)

Er sagte, dass sie das Spiel sofort abbricht, wenn eine bestimmte Person den Raum betritt. Er hat aber nicht gesagt, wen er damit meinte. ‘He said that she will immediately stop the game if a certain person enters the room. But he did not say whom he had in mind.’

(It is unclear to me whether 4.42 really can have reading R2.) The statement that a specific indefinite has widest possible relative scope in its absolute scope domain has also to be made with care. It is not the case that a bestimmt phrase always outscopes all other quantifiers in its absolute scope domain. Sentence (4.44) need not be understood in such a way that there are certain non-logical things which have to be learnt with every type of sport. The intended reading of this utterance seems to be that for every type of sport there are specific non-logical things which have to be learnt. (4.44)

Bei jedem Sport muß man bestimmte unlogische Dinge lernen. ‘For every type of sport, certain non-logical things have to be learnt.’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung Magazin, 28.6.96, 24)

It could be that on some level of analysis the indefinite contains a variable bound by the universal quantifier, this being the reason for the observed relative scope relation. Such a binding is explicitly the case in (4.45): (4.45)

Jeder Professor1 hat jedes Kommissionsmitglied eingeladen, das einen bestimmten Vorschlag von ihm1 unterstützt hat. ‘Every professor1 invited every member of the committee who supported a certain proposal of his1 .’

Jeder Professor has scope over the existential quantifier as the indefinite contains a variable bound by jeder Professor. (4.46)

∀x[professor(x)] ∃y[proposal-of(y,x)] ∀z[Member-of-the-committee(z) ∧ Supported(z,y)] Invited(x,z)

By the way, this reading is a so-called intermediary reading, which plays an important role in the discussion on indefinites (cf. Farkas 1981; Fodor/Sag 1982; Ruys 1992:§§3.4.1, 4.2.4; Abusch 1994; Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997; Geenhoven 1998).

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

If one omits the pronoun in (4.45) the indefinite prefers to have widest relative scope: (4.47)

Jeder Professor hat jedes Kommissionsmitglied eingeladen, das einen bestimmten Vorschlag unterstützt hat. ‘Every professor invited every member of the committee who supported a certain proposal.’

.. Some consequences concerning (non-)specific indefinites The distinction between specific and non-specific indefinites is not a distinction between referential and non-referential uses because both sorts of indefinites denote kinds of things. The specific, in contrast to the non-specific indefinite, triggers an existential quantifier on semantic structure. This means that a sentence with a specific indefinite like Er hat eine wichtige Frage nicht beantwortet ‘An important question, he did not answer’ will be analyzed (more or less) in the traditional logical way as an existential quantification. Thus, the indefinite is not taken to be a name of a particular question. It can be the case that a speaker has something in mind he wants to refer to using a specific indefinite, but this is a pragmatic, not a semantic phenomenon (cf. the distinction between semantic reference and speaker’s reference in Kripke 1979). We already have observed specific indefinites where speaker’s reference is clearly not at stake (see, for example, (4.32)). This view on (specific) indefinites urges one to analyze the pronoun sie in (4.48), which refers back to the indefinite, as an e-type pronoun (Evans 1980), i.e., as a definite description meaning “the important question he did not answer”. (4.48)

[Er hat eine wichtige Frage nicht beantwortet.] Sie lautete folgendermaßen. ‘[An important question, he did not answer.] It had the following content.’

When can an indefinite be interpreted non-specifically, and when specifically? When can it be interpreted strongly specifically, and when weakly specifically? I have not investigated these questions in detail. One might get the impression that an array of (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic) factors is responsible for the different interpretational options. In (4.15a) the indefinite can only be interpreted as non-specific, in (4.39) it can be interpreted specifically as well as non-specifically, in (4.49) only specifically:

 Quantifier Scope in German

(4.15a)

Fragen hat er nicht gestellt. ‘Questions, he did not pose.’

(4.39)

Wichtige Fragen hat er nicht beantwortet. ‘Important questions, he did not answer.’

(4.49)

Er hat eine wichtige Frage nicht beantwortet. ‘An important question, he did not answer.’

As for the weak/strong distinction, we have seen that indefinites with bestimmtor gewiss- ‘certain’ are inherently strongly specific. However, a simple indefinite only encompassing an article and noun (with stress on the noun) cannot be read as a strongly specific indefinite. Compare: (4.41 )

Wenn ein MITspieler nicht den Mund hält, dann bricht sie das Spiel sofort ab.

The addition of attributes will make such an indefinite more prone to a strongly specific interpretation. The situation in English seems to be quite similar. The sentences in (4.50) do not have a reading with the indefinite outscoping negation (see Kroch 1974:129; Hornstein 1988: 104; Payne 1985: 200; Kamp/Reyle 1993: 303), so the indefinite can only be interpreted non-specifically:6 (4.50) a. b. c. d.

Mary doesn’t own a car. John didn’t kiss a woman. I didn’t see an elephant. Bill doesn’t own a car.

Kroch (1974: §3.2.3) observes that (4.51a) and (4.51b) exclusively have the reading with wide scope of the indefinite and that (4.51c) is an example of the quite rare case of an ambiguous sentence of this kind: (4.51) a. John doesn’t love a woman whom his father wants him to marry. b. John didn’t obey a red light (and was killed as a result). c. John didn’t see a cousin of his at the fair.

That means that the indefinites in (a) and (b) are specific ones, and that the indefinite in (c) can be a specific as well as a non-specific one (cf. Kamp/Reyle 1993: 303f.). As for strongly specific indefinites in English, they seem to look similar to their German counterparts.7 I consider not only bare plurals, but all kinds of indefinites to be names of kinds. Carlson (1977) gives several arguments for not treating noun phrases with the indefinite article in the singular as names of kinds, arguing that the

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

properties of bare plurals and noun phrases with the indefinite article in the singular are so divergent that they cannot be taken on par semantically. But, as far as I can see, the differences Carlson mentions only show that bare plurals are harder to interpret specifically than noun phrases with the indefinite article in the singular. For instance, Carlson stated that, in some contexts, bare plurals can only have an opaque (not a transparent) reading. But this is wrong, as Kratzer’s (1980) example Hans wollte Tollkirschen an den Obstsalat tun, weil er sie mit richtigen Kirschen verwechselte ‘John wanted to put belladonnas into the fruit salad because he took them for cherries’ shows (Schubert/Pelletier 1987 supply similar English sentences). Carlson also thought that, different from bare plurals, noun phrases with the indefinite article in the singular interact scopally with quantifiers. We have seen that that is not the case. I consider bare plurals to have no quantificational reading; they are always indefinites. The bare plurals Diesing (1992) identifies as quantifiers are actually not quantifiers. For instance, Diesing takes Briefe aus Europa in (4.52a) to be a quantifier because it precedes the adverb, whereas the same phrase in (4.52b) is not a quantifier. (4.52) a.

Marie liest Briefe aus Europa immer. ‘Mary always reads letters from Europe.’ b. Marie liest immer Briefe aus Europa. ‘Mary always reads letters from Europe.’

However, not only the indefinite noun phrase in (b), but also the one in (a) is insensitive to negation, as the logical equivalence of the following sentences indicates: (4.53) a.

Marie liest Briefe aus Europa nicht immer. ‘Mary does not always read letters from Europe.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Marie Briefe aus Europa immer liest. ‘It is not the case that Mary always reads letters from Europe.’

It is a further consequence of our view on indefinites (and on nicht as a negative marker, see §2.2.8) that the ambiguity of (4.39) is not a scope ambiguity between two operators occurring in syntax. Instead, it is an ambiguity concerning the indefinite’s interpretation – it is non-specific in the first and specific in the second interpretation: (4.39)

Wichtige Fragen hat er nicht beantwortet. ‘Important questions, he did not answer.’

 Quantifier Scope in German

R1 It is not the case that he answered important questions. (i.e., he answered no important questions.) R2 There are important questions he did not answer.

The (most prominent) reading of (4.54), saying that there is a problem which no one could solve, is not the outcome of scope interaction between subject and object as in Eine von den Aufgaben konnte niemand lösen, where the scope computation concerning two explicit quantifiers makes wide scope of the existential quantifier possible. (4.54) Niemand konnte eine bestimmte Aufgabe lösen. ‘No one could solve a certain problem.’

If the indefinite object in (4.54) were an explicit quantifier, the relative scope model would not allow it to outscope the subject. The prominent reading of (4.54) is nevertheless possible because the object is a specific indefinite, which does not scopally interact with the subject, but introduces an implicit existential quantifier with the property of taking widest possible relative and absolute scope. Now is the time to take up a problem mentioned in §1.1.1. The following sequence is perfectly acceptable with a certain intonation of the first sentence: (4.55) Jeder Pianist hat eine Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire. Und zwar die Mondscheinsonate. ‘Every piano player has one Beethoven sonata in his repertoire. Namely the Mondscheinsonate.’

The intonation I have in mind is the one where there is a heavy accent on eine (presumably a static high tone), an intonation break (#) after eine, and a falling accent on Beethoven. (4.56) Jeder Pianst hat EI↑ne # BEET hoven-Sonate in seinen ReperTOIRE

Intuitively, it seems that this utterance has the meaning: “There is a Beethoven sonata which every piano player has in his repertoire.” According to our scope model, analyzing the indefinite noun phrase eine Beethoven-Sonate as an explicit quantifier would not give us the relevant reading as it could not outscope the subject. But analyzing this noun phrase as a special kind of a specific indefinite makes this reading possible.8 We can support this view by the observation that in (4.41), which, pronounced as in (4.41 ), does not have a strongly specific reading of the indefinite,

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

a strongly specific reading seems possible when there is a heavy accent on the article and an intonation break between article and noun as in (4.57). (4.41 ) Wenn ein MITspieler nicht den Mund hält, dann bricht sie das Spiel sofort ab. (4.57) Wenn EIN Mitspieler nicht den Mund hält, dann bricht sie das Spiel sofort ab.

.. Generic indefinites An indefinite is generic if sentences containing the indefinite have truthconditions which can be expressed by formulas where the semantic contribution of the indefinite is represented by an operator of the kind “as for X, it is generally the case that” (X denotes the same kind as the indefinite). Generic indefinites are not sensitive to negation: the sentences in (4.58) and (4.59) are logically equivalent. (4.58) a.

Dinosaurier sind keine Säugetiere. ‘Dinosaurs are not mammals.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Dinosaurier Säugetiere sind. ‘It is not the case that dinosaurs are mammals.’

(4.59) a.

Ein (/’n) Dinosaurier ist kein Säugetier. ‘A dinosaur is not a mammal.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass ein (/’n) Dinosaurier ein Säugetier ist. ‘It is not the case that a dinosaur is a mammal.’

One does not feel any kind of scope interaction between the indefinite and the quantificational adverb in (4.60): (4.60) a.

Katzen landen immer auf ihren Füßen. ‘Cats always land on their feet.’ b. Eine (/’ne) KATze landet immer auf ihren Füßen. ‘A cat always lands on its feet.’

Sentence (4.7) EIne Katze landet IMmer auf ihren Füßen is different: it clearly has two scope readings, but no generic reading. With respect to und coordination, generic indefinites exhibit no scope behavior. Sentences (4.61a) and (b) are logically equivalent. (4.61) a.

Ein Mitglied dieses Clubs trinkt Mineralwasser und spielt Golf. ‘A member of this club drinks mineral water and plays golf.’

 Quantifier Scope in German

b. Ein Mitglied dieses Clubs trinkt Mineralwasser und ein Mitglied dieses Clubs spielt Golf. ‘A member of this club drinks mineral water and a member of this club plays golf.’

But things are different with respect to oder coordination. Sentences (4.62a) and (b) need not be logically equivalent. Sentence (b) can implicate that a member of the club drinks one or the other liquid, but not both – an implicature (a) cannot have. (4.62) a.

Ein Mitglied dieses Clubs trinkt entweder Mineralwasser oder Fruchtsäfte. ‘A member of this club drinks either mineral water or fruit juice.’ b. Entweder trinkt ein Mitglied dieses Clubs Mineralwasser oder ein Mitglied dieses Clubs trinkt Fruchtsäfte. ‘Either a member of this club drinks mineral water or a member of this club drinks fruit juice.’

(Cf. the behavior of plural definites in (1.85) and specific indefinites in (4.35).) That there is something quantificational to generic indefinites becomes more obvious when looking at (4.63a) and (b), which are not contradictory, but contrary – actually, (a) and (b) are false. (4.63) a.

Menschen sind von weißer Hautfarbe. ‘Human beings have white skin.’ b. Menschen sind nicht von weißer Hautfarbe. ‘Human beings do not have white skin.’

We end up with a puzzling situation just as we did with specific indefinites. And we will try to solve the puzzle using the same move. The generic indefinite denotes a kind and can trigger the introduction of a quantifier in semantic structure. There are uses of generic indefinites (“direct kind predication”) where it is uncontroversial that they denote kinds, as for example in Schildkröten sind eine existenzbedrohte Tierart ‘Turtles are an animal species threatened with extinction’. This sentence has the semantic structure of a predication on a kind – the property of being an animal species threatened with extinction is predicated of the kind Testudines. However, there are other sentences with generic indefinites, more exactly, plural generic indefinites, which do not have the semantic structure of a predication on kinds (“characterizing generics”). Here the generic indefinite triggers a generic quantifier, which I tentatively take to be a universal quantifier on typical instances of the kind the indefinite denotes.9

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

(4.64)

∀x[Typical(x,κy[ψy (∧ φy)])] ≈ Every x which is typical with respect to the kind whose instances are ψ (and φ)

In sentences like Schildkröten sind Reptilien ‘Turtles are reptiles’ the additional, implicit property φ does not show up. But in sentences like Schildkröten leben sehr lange ‘Turtles live very long’, this property comes into play: as most of the very young, just hatched turtles die very soon, the sentence, which I would intuitively judge as true, can only mean something like “All typical instances of turtles which do not die in their early youth live very long”. With regard to the logical equivalence of the sentences in (4.65) (cf. (4.58) and (4.59)), we must assume that the generic quantifier has wide absolute scope. (4.65) a.

Schildkröten sind keine Säugetiere. ‘Turtles are not mammals.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Schildkröten Säugetiere sind. ‘It is not the case that turtles are mammals.’ ∀x[Typical(x,κy[*Turtle(y)])] ¬Mammal(x)

(4.66)

Taking the generic quantifier to be a universal quantifier is likely to explain why the sentences in (4.63) are contrary to each other. (4.63) a. Menschen sind von weißer Hautfarbe. b. Menschen sind nicht von weißer Hautfarbe. (4.67) a. ∀x[Typical(x,κy[*Human-beings(y)])] Have-white-skin(x) b. ∀x[Typical(x,κy[*Human-beings(y)])] ¬Have-white-skin(x)

In sentences like Schildkröten leben typischerweise sehr lange ‘Typically, turtles live very long’, there is an explicit generic quantifier. As one would expect, it is sensitive to negation: (4.68) a.

Schildkröten leben typischerweise nicht sehr lange. ‘Typically, turtles do not live very long.’ b. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Schildkröten typischerweise sehr lange leben. ‘It is not the case that turtles typically live very long.’

These sentences are not logically equivalent – in contrast to (4.58), (4.59), and (4.65). This once more makes obvious the difference in scope behavior between explicit and implicit quantifiers. These sentences also show that, in a sentence which is not a kind predication, a generic indefinite does not obligatorily trigger an implicit generic quantifier. It does not if there is a suitable quantifier

 Quantifier Scope in German

which can sensibly take the indefinite as part of its restriction. Such an explicit quantifier can even be a frequency adverbial as sentences like Hochspringer sind meist über 2 Meter groß ‘High jumpers are usually more than 2 meters tall’ seem to show. An analysis like “Most high jumpers are more than 2 meters tall” seems natural here. It has been known for a long time that plural indefinites and singular indefinites differ in their generic uses (see Lawler 1973; Burton-Roberts 1977; Krifka et al. 1995; Cohen 2001; among others): (i) singular indefinites are hardly possible in direct kind predications (*A dinosaur is extinct vs. Dinosaurs are extinct); (ii) singular indefinites cannot be combined with certain predicates to form a generic sentence (*A madrigal is popular vs. Madrigals are popular); (iii) the generic use of a singular indefinite leads to a normative statement (A gentleman opens doors for ladies), whereas the generic use of a plural indefinite leads to a descriptive generalization (Gentlemen open doors for ladies). Krifka et al. (1995: 10) and Cohen (2001: 188) conclude that plural indefinites denote kinds, but singular indefinites do not. This conclusion, however, is not binding. Assume that a singular indefinite in its generic use always triggers an implicit quantifier. This would prohibit a singular indefinite from being used in direct kind predications. And assume furthermore that the implicit quantifier is a universal quantifier not on “typical”, but on “true”, “genuine” instances of the kind the indefinite denotes (the sentence A gentleman opens doors for ladies, for instance, will thus be interpreted as “Every true gentleman opens doors for ladies”). This could explain why generic sentences with singular indefinites have a normative aspect. I will assume this view. Thus, there are two different implicit generic quantifiers: an implicit universal quantifier on typical instances and an implicit universal quantifier on true or genuine instances. Both have wide absolute scope (see (4.58), (4.59) and (4.65)). But, as (4.62b) indicates, it is, to a certain extent, possible that the generic quantifier has scope over one conjunct only, which might be the reason for it having a reading which (4.62a) does not have. (4.62) a.

Ein Mitglied dieses Clubs trinkt entweder Mineralwasser oder Fruchtsäfte. b. Entweder trinkt ein Mitglied dieses Clubs Mineralwasser oder ein Mitglied dieses Clubs trinkt Fruchtsäfte.

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

. The scope of implicit quantifiers triggered by (in)definites We have seen that the implicit quantifiers triggered by indefinites have a scope behavior that is not determined by the same constraints as the explicit quantifiers’ scope behavior. But how does one account for their scope behavior? We can, quite satisfactorily, account for their scope behavior with four features: r-strong (“strives for widest possible relative scope”), r-weak (“strives for smallest possible relative scope”), a-strong (“strives for widest possible absolute scope”), a-weak (“strives for smallest possible absolute scope”). Classifying the strongly specific and generic indefinites as [r-strong,astrong] makes rather good predictions, but we have seen examples where a strongly specific indefinite does not have widest possible absolute scope (see (4.42)).10 The same might be true for generic indefinites, but classifying them as [r-strong,a-strong] predicts correctly the equivalence of (4.65a) Schildkröten sind keine Säugetiere and (4.65b) Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Schildkröten Säugetiere sind. Weakly specific indefinites outscope other quantifiers, can have scope beyond their minimal clause, but do not strive for widest possible absolute scope. Thus, they can be classified as r-strong, but neither as a-strong nor as a-weak. Working with these features, one might wonder whether it could be possible to view de re non-specific indefinites as expressions which trigger an existential quantifier too, namely a quantifier with the feature combination [r-weak,a-weak]. This would account for the fact that sentences with de re non-specific indefinites have truth conditions with the existential quantifier (representing the indefinite) outscoped by all other operators and confined to the indefinite’s minimal clause. If we have to determine the scope properties of the implicit quantifiers of the other kinds of indefinites by hand, it would not matter much if we did this for de re non-specific indefinites too. Even the feature combination [r-weak,a-strong] seems to be instantiated: the distributor looks as if it strives for widest possible absolute scope and for smallest possible relative scope. I will deal with absolute scope first. Sentences (4.69a) and (b) have the same reading, which can be represented as in (c). (4.69) a. The guests didn’t smoke. b. It is not the case that the guests smoked. c. ∀x’[x’≤ ιx[*Guest(x)]] ¬Smoked(x’)

In (b) the distributor has scope over the entire sentence!11 It even seems to be impossible to give it scope over the embedded sentence only. Sentence (b) can-

 Quantifier Scope in German

not have the reading “It is not the case that every one of the guests smoked.”12 As for relative scope, it is clear that the distributor does not have widest scope if it contains a variable bound by another quantifier, as is the case in distributive readings of sentences with most for instance: (4.70) a. Die meisten F sind G. [=1.119] b. ∃x[Most(x,κy[Fy])] ∀x’[x’≤x] Gx’

More interesting are wh-interrogatives. The following sentences differ in their readings: (4.71) a.

Welchen Film hat jeder gestern Nacht ausgeliehen? (ambiguous) ‘Which film did everyone rent last night?’ b. Welchen Film haben die Jungs gestern Nacht ausgeliehen? (unambiguous) ‘Which film did the boys rent last night?’

In (a), a distributive reading is available (“For everyone, which film did he rent?”), but not in (b). If these observations are correct, the distributor cannot have the interrogative quantifier in (b) in its scope. Thus the distributor seems to be [r-weak]. For additional evidence, see the following sentences: (4.72) a.

Meine Studenten haben in der Klausur eine der Aufgaben nicht lösen können. b. Eine der Aufgaben haben meine Studenten in der Klausur nicht lösen können. ‘In the written exam, my students could not solve one of the problems.’

Both sentences seem to have the reading “There is one problem which is such that every one of my students could not solve it”, but not the reading “Every one of my students is such that there is one problem which he could not solve”. If this is indeed the case, then the distributor must have smallest possible relative scope. Furthermore, if a distributor is contained in the restriction of an operator, it seems that the distributor cannot outscope the operator. Sentence (4.73), for instance, can only mean that everyone who solved all three problems can be satisfied. It cannot mean, that each of the three problems is such that everyone who solved it can be satisfied. Thus, the distributor cannot have scope beyond jeder.13 (4.73) Jeder, der diese drei Aufgaben gelöst hat, kann mit sich zufrieden sein. ‘Everyone who solved these three problems can be satisfied.’

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

It should be possible to account for this behavior with an appropriate procedural interpretation of the feature [r-weak]. We arrive at the following typology of implict quantifiers according to their scope behavior: (4.74)

[r-strong,a-strong] [r-strong] [r-weak,a-strong] [r-weak,a-weak]

strongly specific indefinites, generic indefinites weakly specific indefinites distributor de re non-specific indefinites

More on implicit quantifiers and the procedural interpretation of these features in §7.3.2. There we will see that implicit quantifiers adapt in a natural way to the process of constructing semantic structures for sentences with explicit quantifiers. It is possible to sketch a uniform process of scope determination which encompasses the scope of explicit as well as implicit quantifiers without neglecting their differences, i.e., the differences between explicit and implicit quantifiers in general and the differences among explicit quantifiers and among implicit quantifiers themselves. That means that we do not need (much) additional machinery to cope with indefinites. In passing, I want to mention one more candidate for a type of expression triggering implicit quantifiers. Echo-wh-phrases clearly differ from ordinary wh-phrases in that they have widest possible relative and absolute scope. The echo-wh-phrase in (4.75a), for example, seems not to interact with the universal quantifier; a distributive reading seems out of question. And in (4.75b), the echo-wh-phrase has scope beyond its minimal clause. (4.75) a.

Jeder Kritiker hat WAS rezensiert? ‘Every critic reviewed what?’ b. Sie hat behauptet, dass er ihr WAS gegeben hat? ‘She claimed that he gave her what?’

From what we know about the scope behavior of explicit and implicit quantifiers, this can only mean that echo-wh-phrases are not explicit quantifiers. This is compatible with Reis (1992), where it is shown that echo-wh-phrases and ordinary wh-phrases differ considerably – Reis even calls echo-wh-phrases “names” (1992: 242). The relations in (4.75) can be interpreted in such a way that echo-wh-phrases trigger an implicit (interrogative) quantifier of type [rstrong,a-strong].

 Quantifier Scope in German

. Indefinites in donkey sentences Donkey sentences are of interest to me as I analyze indefinites neither as restricted variables as in discourse representation theory nor as explicit quantifiers as Montague or dynamic semanticists do. If it should be the case that the indefinite noun phrases in donkey sentences are indefinites in our sense (and we will see in a moment that this is indeed the case), then the question arises whether our assumptions concerning the semantics of indefinites is compatible with an analysis of donkey sentences. First of all, the question arises how the relation is to be analyzed between the indefinite noun phrases and the pronouns ‘associated’ with them. Donkey sentences are also of interest to us as dynamic semantics claims that donkey sentences show that the binding domain of existential quantifiers, in contrast to universal ones, extend their (syntactic) scope (Groenendijk/Stokhof 1991). However, I assumed in §2.4.2 that quantifier binding is possible within a quantifier’s scope only. At first glance, at least, the indefinite noun phrases in typical donkey sentences seem to be indefinites in our sense: cliticization of ein- is always possible (cliticization being one indicator of the non-quantificational use of indefinite noun phrases; see the outset of Chapter 4): (4.76) a.

Wenn ein Bauer einen Esel besitzt, dann schlägt er ihn. ‘If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.’ b. Wenn ein Bauer einen Esel nicht hasst, dann gibt es auch keinen Grund dafür, dass er ihn schlägt. ‘If a farmer does not hate a donkey, there is no reason for him to beat it.’ c. Wenn ein Bauer jeden Esel hasst, dann sollte er sich keinen Esel anschaffen. ‘If a farmer hates every donkey, he should not buy a donkey.’

(4.77) a.

Jeder Bauer, der einen Esel besitzt, schlägt ihn. ‘Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.’ b. Jeder Bauer, der einen Esel nicht hasst, hat auch keinen Grund, ihn zu schlagen. ‘Every farmer who does not hate a donkey has no reason to beat it.’

The indefinites in these sentences seem to be weakly specific indefinites: the absolute scope of the implicit existential quantifier is restricted to the conditional antecedent or the relative clause, and, within this domain, it strives for

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

wide relative scope – in (4.76b) it has the negation and in (4.76c) the universal quantifier in its scope. There is more and stronger evidence that indefinite donkey noun phrases are not explicit quantifiers: the explicit existential quantifiers we have investigated cannot be associated with a pronoun in donkey-style sentences. (4.78) a. *Wenn [mindestens eine (/manche) Katze]1 auf den Rücken fällt, dann stimmt mit ihr1 was nicht. ‘If at least one (/many a) cat falls on its back, something is wrong with it.’ ?? b. Wenn [ein oder zwei (/manche, einige) Katzen]1 auf den Rücken fallen, dann stimmt mit ihnen1 was nicht. ‘If one or two (/many, several) cats fall on their backs, something is wrong with them.’ c. *Wenn [keine Katze]1 auf den Rücken fällt, dann stimmt mit ihr1 was nicht. ‘If no cat falls on its back, something is wrong with it.’

As far as their binding potential is concerned, these existential quantifiers behave like universal ones (*Wenn [jede Katze]1 auf den Rücken fällt, dann stimmt mit ihr1 was nicht ‘If every cat falls on its back, something is wrong with it’). If, following dynamic semantics, we want to uphold the view that indefinite donkey noun phrases are explicit quantifiers, we are urged to distinguish two kinds of existential quantifiers that have different binding potentials. But, is there any evidence to consider indefinite donkey noun phrases as explicit quantifiers? I cannot detect any (and Groenendijk/Stokhof 1991 do not deliver any). I can only detect counterevidence. Furthermore, I only see counterevidence to the claim that the pronouns associated with indefinite donkey noun phrases behave like variables bound by them (this is a further element of the analysis of Groenendijk/Stokhof). Let us have a look at the following sentence pairs: (4.79) a.

Wenn eine Katze nicht auf ihre Füße fällt, dann stimmt mit ihr was nicht. ‘If a cat does not fall on its feet, something is wrong with it.’ b. Wenn eine Katze nicht auf ihre Füße fällt, dann stimmt mit einer solchen Katze was nicht. ‘If a cat does not fall on its feet, something is wrong with such a cat.’

 Quantifier Scope in German

(4.80) a.

Wenn ein Spieler ein Foul begeht und er auch noch den Schiedsrichter beleidigt, dann tobt das Stadion. ‘If a player commits a foul and, in addition, he offends the referee, the stadium erupts.’ b. Wenn ein Spieler ein Foul begeht und ein solcher Spieler auch noch den Schiedsrichter beleidigt, dann tobt das Stadion. ‘If a player commits a foul and, in addition, such a player offends the referee, the stadium erupts.’

These sentence pairs have more or less the same meaning. This is a remarkable fact. A pronoun which undoubtedly is a bound variable cannot be substituted in the same manner. For instance, the following sentences cannot have the same meaning: (4.81) a.

Wenn ein Bauer glaubt, dass er einen Vorteil erzielen kann, dann wird er ihn mit aller Kraft anstreben. ‘If a farmer thinks that he can achieve an advantage, he will try to get it as hard as he can.’ b. Wenn ein Bauer glaubt, dass ein solcher Bauer einen Vorteil erzielen kann, dann wird er ihn mit aller Kraft anstreben. ‘If a farmer thinks that such a farmer can achieve an advantage, he will try to get it as hard as he can.’

Thus, there is clear counterevidence to the claim that the pronouns associated with indefinite donkey noun phrases are bound variables. That means that two essential presuppositions of dynamic semantics cannot be correct: neither are indefinite donkey noun phrases explicit quantifiers nor are the associated pronouns bound variables. It is worth mentioning that if the associated pronoun is substituted by a simple copy of the indefinite noun phrase the sentence can, up to a certain point, still have the same meaning – but one must invest some cognitive effort to perceive the intended reading (the addition of auch ‘too’ helps): (4.82) a.

Wenn ein Spieler ein Foul begeht, dann bekommt er die gelbe Karte. ‘If a player commits a foul, he gets a yellow card.’ b. Wenn ein Spieler ein Foul begeht, dann bekommt ein Spieler (auch) die gelbe Karte. ‘If a player commits a foul, a player (also) gets a yellow card.’

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

(4.83) a.

Wenn ein Bauer glaubt, dass er einen Vorteil erzielen kann, dann wird er ihn mit aller Kraft anstreben. ‘If a farmer thinks that he can achieve an advantage, he will try to get it as hard as he can.’ b. Wenn ein Bauer glaubt, dass er einen Vorteil erzielen kann, dann wird ein Bauer ihn (auch) mit aller Kraft anstreben. ‘If a farmer thinks that he can achieve an advantage, a farmer will try to get it as hard as he can.’

(4.84) a.

Wenn eine Katze nicht auf ihre Füße fällt, dann stimmt mit ihr was nicht. ‘If a cat does not fall on its feet, something is wrong with it.’ b. Wenn eine Katze nicht auf ihre Füße fällt, dann stimmt mit einer Katze was nicht. ‘If a cat does not fall on its feet, something is wrong with a cat.’

Let us go back to sentences where the pronoun is substituted by a such phrase. The such phrases in (4.79b) and (4.80b) are weakly specific indefinites: cliticization is possible and the implicit existential quantifier can outscope other quantifiers without having widest possible scope. If the such phrase makes up the restriction of an implicit existential quantifier, it is possible to make a first step in the analyses of (4.79b), (4.80b) and (4.87a):14 (4.85) a.

Wenn eine Katze nicht auf ihre Füße fällt, dann stimmt mit einer solchen Katze was nicht. [=4.79b] b. If ∃x[Cat(x)] ¬ Falls(x) then ∃y[Cat(y) ∧ ¬ Falls(y)] Something-is-wrong-with(y)

(4.86) a.

Wenn ein Spieler ein Foul begeht und ein solcher Spieler auch noch den Schiedsrichter beleidigt, dann tobt das Stadion. [=4.80b] b. If ∃x[Pl(x)] Commits-a-foul(x) ∧ ∃y[Pl(y) ∧ Commits-a-foul(y)] Offends(y,the-referee) then Erupts(the-stadium)

(4.87) a.

Wenn ein Spieler ein Foul begeht, dann bekommt ein solcher Spieler die gelbe Karte. b. If ∃x[Pl(x)] Commits-a-foul(x) then ∃y[Pl(y) ∧ Commits-a-foul(y)] Gets(y,a-yellow-card)

Intuitively, sentence (4.87a) is wrong in cases where two players commit a foul, but only one of them gets a yellow card. In order to discuss the question of whether (4.87b) is true or false in such a case, we have to supply a semantics for conditionals. Presupposing that conditionals can be analyzed

 Quantifier Scope in German

as (implicit) quantifications on situations, (4.87b) might obtain the following interpretation: ∀s[∃x[Pl(x)] Commits-a-foul-in(x,s)] ∃y[Pl(y) ∧ Commits-a-foul-in(y,s)] Gets-in(y,a-yellow-card,s) b. ≈ In every situation in which a player commits a foul such a player gets a yellow card.

(4.88) a.

In a case where two players commit a foul, but only one gets a yellow card the analysis proceeds if such a case is not regarded as one situation of the kind “∃x[Pl(x)] Commits-a-foul-in(x,s)”, but as two situations of this kind: in one situation a player commits foul and gets a yellow card, in the other situation a player commits a foul, but does not get a yellow card. Then (4.88a) is wrong, just as intuition demands of (4.87a). One could obtain this result by stipulating that a situation s satisfies a property φ only if s is minimal with respect to φ, i.e., only if there is no s’ which is a proper part of s and which is φ. But I do not think that one should do this because it can depend on pragmatic considerations, which counts as one situation (see below the considerations concerning symmetric and asymmetric readings of donkey sentences). Much depends on what the situations are and how they can be individuated. I tend to view a situation as a plurality of particulars which, for a certain amount of time, are in certain states, stand in certain relations to one another, and undergo certain changes (this is – at least partially – similar to the notion of a situation in situation semantics). I will not go into the problem of individuating situations as it is not specific to our account of donkey sentences – see sentences like (4.88b). We can apply this account of conditionals with such phrases directly to donkey sentences, if we consider a pronoun associated with a donkey noun phrase to have the same semantics, i.e., the same semantic structure as a such phrase. That is, we propose to analyze donkey pronouns as implicit indefinites. This would explain why the sentences in (4.79) and (4.80) have the same meaning, and this would mean that a donkey sentence like (4.79a) has a semantics as sketched in (4.85b) with ihr interpreted as (4.89). (4.79a)

Wenn eine Katze nicht auf ihre Füße fällt, dann stimmt mit ihr was nicht.

(4.89)

ihr ≈> κz[Cat(z) ∧ ¬ Falls(z)]

(4.85b)

If ∃x[Cat(x)] ¬ Falls(x) then ∃y[Cat(y) ∧ ¬ Falls(y)] Something-is-wrong-with(y)

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers 

One could call this a k-type account, thereby implicating that – albeit not being an e-type account – it has some common elements with Evans’s e-type account. The account developed here can immediately cope with the so-called weak (indefinite lazy or existential) reading of donkey sentences (see, among others, Schubert/Pelletier 1989 and Chierchia 1992 for this kind of reading). Sentence (4.90), for example, does not mean that everyone throws every dime which he has into the meter if he has several dimes; it can be only one of them. (4.90) a.

Jeder, der einen Groschen hat, wird es nicht versäumen, ihn in die Parkuhr zu stecken. ‘Everyone who has a dime will not miss to put it into the meter.’ b. ihn ≈> κi[Dime(i) ∧ Has(x,i)] c. ∀x[∃y[Dime(y)] Has(x,y)] ∃z[Dime(z) ∧ Has(x,z)] ¬Will-miss-to-put-into-the-meter(x,z).

In (4.90) the pronoun is an implicit specific indefinite as its existential quantifier has the negation in its scope.15 Were it a non-specific indefinite, the sentence could not have the weak reading.16 Donkey pronouns are not always (implicit) specific indefinites as the following sentence from Dekker (1996: 235) shows: (4.91) If I have a dime in my pocket, I won’t throw it in the meter.

By the way, explicit such phrases substituting a donkey pronoun can also be both specific and non-specific: Jeder, der einen Groschen hat, wird es nicht versäumen, einen solchen Groschen in die Parkuhr zu werfen vs. Auch wenn ich einen Groschen in der Tasche habe, werde ich solch einen Groschen nicht in die Parkuhr werfen. Now, what about donkey sentences with a strong or universal reading? The classics (4.92) can mean that a farmer beats every donkey he owns. In (4.93), the strong reading is the only sensible reading. (4.92) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. (4.93) Every man who owned a slave owned its offspring. (Heim 1990)

I propose to consider the donkey pronoun in the strong reading as an implicit generic indefinite (if there are specific and non-specific implicit indefinites, there should also exist generic ones). Thus, in the semantic structure of a sentence like (4.92) there is a generic quantifier which is responsible for the strong reading:

 Quantifier Scope in German

(4.94) ∀x[Farmer(x) ∧ ∃y[Donkey(y)] Owns(x,y)] ∀z[Typical(z,κv[Donkey(v) ∧ Owns(x,v)])] Beats(x,z) (4.95) ∀x[Man(x) ∧ ∃y[Slave(y)] Owned(x,y)] ∀z[Typical(z,κv[Slave(v) ∧ Owned(x,v)])] Owned(x,ιu[Offspring-of(u,z)])

The fact that (4.92) is not clearly false if one or the other farmer does not beat one of his donkeys supports the proposed account, as the existence of exceptions is compatible with the generic interpretation of the pronoun. But, the possibility of exceptions is not compatible with the standard semantic representation of the sentence which relies on a universal quantifier: ∀x,y (if x is a farmer and y a donkey, x beats y) If this approach is successful, the weak/strong-distinction is reduced to the (non-) specific/generic-interpretation of the donkey pronouns. In sentences (4.96) to (4.99) the relation between the indefinite noun phrase and the pronoun associated with it is reversed. Now, it is the pronoun which is contained in the conditional antecedent or the relative clause (cf. Carlson 1979; Schubert/Pelletier 1989): (4.96) a.

Wenn sie nicht auf ihre Füße fällt, dann stimmt mit einer Katze was nicht. b. Es stimmt mit einer Katze was nicht, wenn sie nicht auf ihre Füße fällt.

(4.97) a. Wenn er ein Foul begeht, dann bekommt ein Spieler die gelbe Karte. b. Ein Spieler bekommt die gelbe Karte, wenn er ein Foul begeht. (4.98) a.

Wenn er glaubt, dass er einen Vorteil erzielen kann, dann wird ein Bauer ihn mit aller Kraft anstreben. b. Ein Bauer wird ihn mit aller Kraft anstreben, wenn er glaubt, dass er einen Vorteil erzielen kann.

(4.99) a. Jedes Foul, das er begeht, wird einem Spieler angerechnet. b. Einem Spieler wird jedes Foul, das er begeht, angerechnet.

The pronoun here is not comparable to a donkey pronoun as it cannot be substituted by a such phrase. The sentences in (4.100), for example, do not mean the same as the sentences in (4.97). (4.100) a.

Wenn ein solcher Spieler ein Foul begeht, dann bekommt ein Spieler die gelbe Karte. b. Ein Spieler bekommt die gelbe Karte, wenn ein solcher Spieler ein Foul begeht.


It is obvious that one cannot describe the meaning of sentences like (4.96) to (4.99) by representing the explicit indefinite by an existential quantifier. For example, the sentences in (4.97) do not mean that there is a player which gets a yellow card if he commits a foul. Instead, they mean that a player committing a foul will normally or usually get a yellow card. These explicit indefinites can be interpreted as generic indefinites and the associated pronouns as variables bound by the indefinite (cf. the possibility of the sloppy reading in Ein Abwehrspieler bekommt die gelbe Karte, wenn er ein Foul begeht, und ein Angriffsspieler auch). Finally, let us have a look at the problem of the symmetric and asymmetric readings of donkey conditionals exemplified by the following two sentences: (4.101) Mostly, if a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it. (4.102) Mostly, if a farmer owns a donkey, he deducts it from his tax.

Intuitively, sentence (4.101) has a reading in which it is true in a situation where there are six farmers with farmer 1 to 5 beating their one and only donkey, but farmer 6 not beating any of his ten donkeys. This is the so-called asymmetric reading. (4.102), however, has a prominent reading in which it is false in an analogous situation (farmer 1 to 5 deducts their one and only donkey from his tax, farmer 6 deducts not one of his ten donkeys). This is an example of the symmetric reading. By analyzing these sentences as quantifications on situations, the difference in their truth value, despite their common structure, results from what counts as one situation in the respective sentences. In (4.101), if the ownership between farmer 6 and his ten donkeys counts as one situation, then there are six relevant situations of ownership (one for every farmer) and five of them have the property of being a situation where the farmer beats his donkeys. Thus, (4.101) proves to be true. (4.102) proves to be false if every single relation between a farmer and a donkey counts as one situation, because then there are 15 situations, but only five have the property of being a situation where a farmer deducts the donkey from his tax. That means that the individuation of situations depends on semantic/pragmatic factors. If this is indeed the case, the problem of symmetric and asymmetric readings is independent of our account of donkey pronouns.



 Quantifier Scope in German

Notes . As for the notions plurality and part see §1.4.1. The quantifiers in (4.19) and (4.20) are restricted quantifiers, i.e., quantifiers whose domain is not the whole domain of universe as is the case with quantifiers in standard first-order predicate logic. The domain is specified by the formula in square brackets following the quantifier and its variable. . See Zimmermann (1993) for arguments stating that referentially opaque noun phrases denote kinds. . This consequence does not appear in the incorporation account proposed in Geenhoven (1998) and Cohen/Erteschik-Shir (2002: §7.2). They assume that most verbs come in two varieties: pose, for example, can denote both a relation between individuals (λyλx[Pose(x,y)]) and a relation between an individual and a property (λPλx[∃y(P(y) ∧ Pose(x,y))]), where an existential quantifier is incorporated into the meaning of the verb (an indefinite object denotes a property which satisfies variable P). Cohen and Erteschik-Shir assume that the verb is type-shifted to provide the existential quantifier. In §4.3 below, I will propose an alternative way how the existential quantifier is introduced into the semantic structure. . The semantical relation between the sentences is illustrated by the following contrast: (i)

Die Jury will KEINEN Pianisten in die engere Wahl ziehen, da sie keinen PIANISTEN in die engere Wahl ziehen will.

(ii) ??Die Jury will keinen PIANISTEN in die engere Wahl ziehen, da sie KEINEN Pianisten in die engere Wahl ziehen will. . Nicht EIN- ‘not one’ has a quantificational use only, i.e., the sentence Die Jury will nicht EINEN Pianisten in die engere WAHL ziehen has the same properties as (4.28b). . Polarity sensitive any phrases seem to be non-specific indefinites too. . Recent research emphasizes the relation between topicality and wide-scope, i.e., specific, indefinites (Portner/Yabushita 2001; Ebert/Endriss 2004). They argue that specific indefinites have wide scope because they are topical. I wonder whether it might just be the other way round. Specific indefinites are topical in certain respects because they have widest possible scope. Thus, indefinites as syntactic/semantic entities come in different varieties, i.e., with different scope properties, and, therefore, have different relations to topicality and focus. Topic and focus, however, seem decisive in distinguishing generic from non-generic indefinites (see, e.g., Cohen/Erteschik-Shir 2002). . Perhaps one can compare this emphatic use of the indefinite article with an emphatic use of the definite article as in: Er spielt DIE Beethoven-Sonate. Nämlich die Mondscheinsonate. The use of the emphatic definite article causes the definite noun phrase to denote the one and only outstanding instance of a Beethoven sonata. . I make this assumption only tentatively as the problem of a generic quantifier’s semantics is well known and unsolved (see above all Krifka et al. 1995: §1.2.6). By the way, the regularities for the determination of φ in (4.64) differ from the regularities for the contextual restriction of explicit quantifiers (Krifka et al. 1995: 45).

Chapter 4. Indefinites and quantifiers  . But, perhaps, it might be possible to claim that the indefinite in (4.42) is only weakly specific. . Cf. Abusch (1994: 121): “distribution is insensitive to quantifier scope islands.” . This makes it once more clear that a definite is not to be identified with a universal quantifier, even if the distributor is taken into account. Note that I do not analyze negation as an operator (see §2.2.8 and §7.2). . Compare sentences with specific indefinites like (i) discussed in Ruys (1992), Reinhart (1997) and Winter (1997). (i)

If three relatives of mine die, I will inherit a house.

Here, too, the distributor cannot escape from the restriction of a covert operator, i.e., the ifclause. The sentence means that there are three relatives of the speaker such that the speaker will inherit a house if all of them die. The sentence does not mean that there are three relatives of the speaker and each of them is such that the speaker will inherit a house if he [=one of the relatives] dies. The same generalization accounts for the unavailability of the inverse-linking reading “There are three cities and each of them is such that some girl living in it is happy” of the sentence Some girl in three cities is happy (cf. Winter 1997: 425f., who attributes the relevant observations to Ruys 1992; Beghelli 1993 and Ben-Shalom 1993). . In (4.85b) ∃x[Cat(x)...] abbreviates ∃x[x Inst κy[Cat(y)...]]. . In (4.90) the existential quantifier must be in the scope of the universal quantifier as it contains a variable bound by the universal quantifier. . Sentence (4.90) raises a technical problem I will not tackle: constructing the semantic structure of the pronoun (see (4.90b)), care has to be taken that it contains an occurrence of the x-variable (which is bound by the universal quantifier) as the first argument of Has.

Chapter 5

Interrogative quantifiers

Wh-phrases seem to be quantifiers: they are sensitive to coordination and quantification (see §1.2.2) and the interaction between wh-phrases and other quantifiers (=wh/Q-interaction) is subject to the same regularities as the interaction between non-interrogative quantifiers (see §2.3.2.5). In this chapter, I will approach the question of whether wh-phrases are quantifiers from a somewhat different angle (§5.1) and I will compare wh/Q-interaction in different languages (§5.2). The evidence that wh-phrases are quantifiers is overwhelming. It remains to be explored what the consequences of this fact are on the semantics of wh-phrases. In order to analyze the pair-list or distributive reading as a reading with wide scope of a wh-phrase, it seems necessary to develop a new semantics of wh-phrases. They are seen as interrogative quantifiers which contain much, if not all, of what is essential for the semantics of interrogatives (§5.3). In the concluding section on scope and semantics of how many phrases (§5.4), I combine this special view on the semantics of wh-phrases with the analysis of indefinites in Chapter 4.

. The pair-list reading as a scope reading It is anything but a trivial affair to take the pair-list or distributive reading as a scope phenomenon. My reason for doing so, after looking at German wh-interrogatives in some detail, is the perfect fit between the factors which determine scope interaction between ordinary, non-interrogative quantifiers and the factors which determine wh/Q-interaction, i.e., the interaction between interrogative and ordinary quantifiers. See the discussion in §2.3.2.5. There, I have presented independent wh-interrogatives only. But there is no change in possible readings when a wh-interrogative is embedded. See, for example, the embedded interrogatives in (5.1): the one in (5.1a) is as unambiguous as (5.2a), and the one in (5.1b) is as ambiguous as (5.2b):

 Quantifier Scope in German

(5.1) a.

Sie weiß, welcher Kritiker jeden Roman hat rezensieren she knows which critic every novel has review müssen. must ‘She knows which critic had to review every novel.’ b. Sie weiß, welchen Roman jeder Kritiker hat rezensieren she knows which novel every critic has review müssen. must ‘She knows which novel every critic had to review.’

(5.2) a.

Welcher Kritiker hat jeden Roman rezensieren which critic has every novel review ‘Which critic had to review every novel?’ b. Welchen Roman hat jeder Kritiker rezensieren which novel has every critic review ‘Which novel did every critic have to review?’

müssen? must müssen? must

That there is no change in scope potential is predicted by the relative scope model, as the preceding quantifier is ex-pre in both cases (and all other properties are distributed in exactly the same way). Szabolcsi (1997b: §2.1; cf. Moltmann/Szabolcsi 1994 and, as for Spanish, Gutiérrez Rexach 1996) claim that in many cases an embedded interrogative has a pair-list reading only when the matrix verb is an extensional verb like know or find out. See the contrast between (5.3a) with the intensional matrix verb wonder and (b) with the extensional matrix verb find out:1 (5.3) a. John wonders which boy more than two dogs bit. (pair-list: ) √ b. John found out which boy more than two dogs bit. (pair-list: )

I could not detect similar contrasts in German: wh/Q-interaction in German does not seem to depend on the embedding predicate. Sentence (5.4), for example, does not seem to have a pair-list reading. This is confirmed by the fact that there is no relevant non-contradictory reading of (5.5). (5.4) Fritz weiß, welchen Jungen mehr als zwei Hunde gebissen haben. ‘Fritz knows which boy more than two dogs bit.’ (5.5) *Fritz kennt zwar keinen Jungen, den mehr als zwei Hunde gebissen haben, aber er weiß, welchen Jungen mehr als zwei Hunde gebissen haben. ‘Fritz knows no boy who was bitten by more than two dogs, but he knows which boy more than two dogs bit.’

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

So there is overwhelming evidence that wh/Q-interaction is nothing but a special case of quantifier interaction. But there is a problem with viewing the distributive reading as a scope reading. In many cases the distributive reading of wh-interrogatives is possible only with quantificational elements like every or each, but not with quantificational elements like most, almost every, or not every. The sentences in (5.6) are unambiguous; they do not exhibit any distributive reading just like their English translations (cf. Liu 1990: 206, 1997: 151). (5.6) a.

Welchen Roman haben die meisten Kritiker rezensieren müssen? [=(2.163)] ‘Which novel did most critics have to review?’ b. Welchen Roman hat nicht jeder Kritiker rezensiert? [=(2.171)] ‘Which novel didn’t every critic review?’

This unambiguity might look surprising if wh/Q-interaction is quantifier interaction, since comparable sentences with ordinary quantifiers are ambiguous: (5.7) Einen der Romane haben die meisten Kritiker rezensieren müssen. ‘One of the novels, most critics had to review.’

But we have already seen in §2.3.2.5 that the relative scope model can account for this pattern of ambiguous and unambiguous sentences. But we should aks ourselves whether the data in (5.6) possibly indicate that for some reason, non-universal quantifiers cannot outscope a wh-phrase.2 We will approach this question by first looking at sentences with universal quantifiers which exclusively have a distributive reading, i.e., interrogatives with quantifiers which do not have a non-distributive reading. Sentence (5.8a) is a case in point. It differs in this respect from (5.8b), which is clearly ambiguous:3 (5.8) a.

Was hat eigentlich jeder für eine Note what has actually everyone for a grade ‘What grade has everyone received?’ b. Was für eine Note hat eigentlich jeder what for a grade has actually everyone ‘What grade has everyone received?’

bekommen? received bekommen? received

(The contrast in (5.8) would remain the same if the sentences were embedded.) Sentence (5.8a) is characterized by the so-called was für split: the whphrase was für eine Note (‘what kind of grade’) shows up as a discontinuous constituent in s-structure (subextraction of was):

 Quantifier Scope in German

(5.9) Was1 hat eigentlich jeder [t1 für eine Note] bekommen? what has actually everyone for a grade received

That (5.8a) does indeed not have a non-distributive reading is shown by the unacceptability of (5.10). The first sentence in this conjunction (Ich möchte nicht von jedem wissen, was er für eine Note bekommen hat ‘I don’t want to know from everybody what grade he received’) is a denial of the second sentence, that contains an embedded version of (5.8a), if the second sentence’s embedded interrogative is interpreted distributively. Thus, this conjunction would be a consistent statement only if the embedded counterpart of (5.8a) had a non-distributive reading. But there is no relevant non-contradictory reading of (5.10).4 (5.10) *Ich möchte nicht von jedem wissen, was er für eine Note bekommen hat, sondern ich möchte wissen, was jeder für eine Note bekommen hat. ‘I don’t want to know from everybody what grade he received, rather I want to know what grade everyone received.’

It is the missing non-distributive reading, and no other cause, which is responsible for the unacceptability of (5.10). This is emphazised by the fact that the conjunction is no longer obviously contradictory if we substitute the unambiguous was jeder für eine Note bekommen hat (≈5.8a) by the ambiguous was für eine Note jeder bekommen hat (≈5.8b). That (5.8a) has only a distributive reading is predicted by the relative scope model if we realize that the interrogative quantifier is located in the Mittelfeld (was only being a part of the quantifier) preceded by the universal quantifier (cf. the structure in (5.9)). Since the was für split construction forces a distributive reading in certain wh-interrogatives with universal quantifiers, it is an apt testing ground for whether wh-interrogatives with non-universal quantifiers can have a distributive reading. Sentence (5.11) is a case where a most quantifier is substituted for the universal quantifier in (5.8a). (5.11) Was haben eigentlich die meisten für eine Note bekommen? what have actually the most for a grade received ‘What grade have most received?’

In a situation as in (5.12), where the range of most consists of six students (s1 to s6 ) and the distribution of the grades is as indicated, a felicitous answer to the question (5.11) is (5.13): (5.12) <s1 ,1(A)>, <s2 ,1(A)>, <s3 ,2(B)>, <s4 ,2(B)>, <s5 ,3(C)>, <s6 ,4(D)>

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

(5.13) Die meisten haben entweder eine Eins oder eine Zwei bekommen. ‘Most have received either an A or an B.’ (most>or)

This answer is consistent with a distributive reading. If we test (5.11) for the existence of a non-distributive reading, the result is the same as in (5.10): the non-distributive reading does not seem to exist. (5.14) *Ich möchte nicht von den meisten wissen, was sie für eine Note bekommen haben, sondern ich möchte wissen, was die meisten für eine Note bekommen haben. ‘I don’t want to know from most students what grade they received, rather I want to know what grade most students received.’

Once more, the conjunction is no longer obviously contradictory if we substitute was die meisten für eine Note bekommen haben (what the most for a grade got have) by was für eine Note die meisten bekommen haben (what for a grade the most got have), which displays a non-distributive reading as well as a distributive reading (the distributive reading is harder to see than in sentences like (5.11)). As is to be expected by now, other quantifiers besides those with every and most can outscope an interrogative quantifier. In (5.15), for example, at least five students has wider scope than the interrogative quantifier. The sentence’s meaning can be paraphrased as “With regard to at least five students I have to know what grade they get”.5 (5.15) Ich muss wissen, was zumindest fünf Studenten für eine Note I must know what at.least five students for a grade bekommen. receive ‘I have to know what grade at least five students get.’

But note that the sentences become questionable when a negative quantifier outscopes the wh-phrase (cf. Swart 1992: 400 for Dutch): (5.16) ??Was hat eigentlich nicht einer (/nicht jeder) für eine Note bekommen? ‘What grade has no one (/not everyone) got?’

Was für constructions are not the only cases where a non-universal quantifier can outscope a wh-phrase. The so-called partial movement construction in (5.17) displays a distributive reading, but not a non-distributive one (cf. §3.1.2).

 Quantifier Scope in German

(5.17) Was glaubt jeder, welche Note er bekommen wird? what believes everyone which grade he receive will ‘What grade does everyone believe that he will receive?’

Thus, considerations analogous to the was für split cases will give us nonuniversal quantifiers outscoping interrogative quantifiers. How many questions are a further case in point. The question Q in (5.18), for example, seems to display a distributive reading too, as the answer A indicates. (5.18) Q: Wie viele Aufgaben haben die meisten gelöst? A: Die meisten haben zwei oder drei Aufgaben gelöst. ‘How many problems have most students solved? Most of them solved two or three problems.’

As for English, Liu (1990: 194ff., 1997: 143ff.) argues that Who did most of the students see?, Who did most of the students think won the prize and Who did most of the students think John chose? do have a reading with most outscoping who. But the distributive reading vanishes when who is replaced by a which phrase (Liu 1990: 206f., 1997: 151f.). This pattern of ambiguous and unambiguous sentences is more or less what we would expect on the basis of the relative scope model (the unacceptability of (5.16) might find a purely semantic explanation; see Pafel 1999: 294).

. Wh/Q-interaction in German, English and Polish In English, there are nearly identical contrasts between subjects and direct objects as in German: (5.19) a. What did everyone buy for Max? (ambiguous) b. Who bought everything for Max? (non-distributive only)

This contrast has presumably been observed by May (1985) for the first time, and it has since then been observed in other languages too.6 Like in German, sentences of the structure “subject wh-phrase preceding a universal quantifier being an object” become ambiguous if the object is a strong patient, as is the case with causative psychological verbs: (5.20) a.

What worried everyone? (ambiguous) (Kim/Larson 1989; Kuno/Takami 1993: 161) b. What gave everyone the will to survive? (ambiguous) (Kuno 1991: 266; Kuno/Takami 1993: 162)

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

We have seen that the distributive reading can vanish if the universal quantifier is focused as in (5.21). (5.21) a.

Was hat jedem Kopfschmerzen bereitet? (ambiguous) ‘What gave everyone a headache?’ b. Was hat JEdem Kopfschmerzen bereitet? (non-distributive only)

The same is true for English (see Kuno 1991: 278, example 46): (5.22) a. What is giving everyone his biggest headache? (ambiguous) b. What is giving EVERYONE his biggest headache? (non-distributive only)

At variance with this claim, May (1988: 127) assumes that a quantifier can get wide scope by being focused (as focused phrases are taken as adjoined to S’ (CP)). With the help of this assumption, May strives to explain that a sentence like Who bought each thing for Max? is ambiguous, contrary to his predictions. He stipulates that each is inherently focused. But these seem to be questionable assumptions und stipulations. Besides English and German, this ‘down-scoping’-effect of focusing has been observed in Dutch and Polish (see §2.2.7). Note that May has to assume that each’s inherent focus can be deleted in a case like Which of you has read each of DICKENS’S books?, which is unequivocally non-distributive. Such a sentence shows rather the wide scope diminishing effect of focusing a quantifier. The special behavior of each might better be explained by its being inherently d-bound (see, above, §2.2.5). Not only sentences with each show that the kind of quantity expression is of importance for scope in English. In the following sentences, for instance, a distributive reading is barely possible or even clearly impossible: (5.23) a.

Which professor do two students admire? (non-distributive; May 1985: 166 n. 8) b. Who do many people like? (÷non-distributive; Berman/Hestvig 1991: 79)

In English, lexical d-binding is a relevant property. In (5.24) the distributive reading is much easier to perceive than in (b), which, according to May (1985: 39), is unequivocally non-distributive, a judgment, which, according to Kuno (1991: 276), many speakers do not share. (5.24) a. Who is serving each of you? (clearly ambiguous) b. Which clerk is now serving each customer? (non-distributive clearly preferred)

 Quantifier Scope in German

This pair of sentences is unfortunately not a minimal pair with respect to the scope-relevant properties, as not only the wh-phrase was modified, but the universal quantifier too. But it is clear that the preferences must change to the non-distributive side if simultaneously the lexically d-bound which phrase is substituting who, which is not lexically d-bound, and the universal quantifier is no longer syntactically d-bound (Kuno assumes that in (a) there is a scope-relevant logophoric effect by the reference to the discourse participants). Villalta (2003: §4.1) presents psycholinguistic evidence that how many phrases and which phrases differ in their tendency to wide scope. In a neutral context, wide scope of the universal quantifier is preferred in sentences like How many movies did everybody see? Wide scope of the wh-phrase, however, is clearly preferred in sentences like Which magazines did everybody read? For German, Pafel (1991b) shows for the first time in detail which factors are relevant for wh/Q-interaction. It is instructive to compare this study with Kuno (1991), who has independently done the same for English (cf. Kuno/Takami 1993; Kuno/Takami/Wu 1999). Both arrive at the conclusion that one has to assume several, differently weighted properties, which are identical to the properties relevant for ordinary quantifier interaction.7 The similarity to the relative scope model in §2.3 will become apparent if we look at the analysis of the following sentences by Kuno. The principle lefthand > righthand corresponds to the factor syntactic constellation, the principle subject > non-subject to the factor grammatical function and the principle more human > less human plays at least a similar role as the factor thematic property. These principles Kuno had already proposed for quantifier interaction and demonstrates their interaction in interrogatives in the following way: (Q means quantifier) (36)

What did everyone buy for Max? a. what > every 1. Lefthand Q > righthand Q b. every > what 1. Subject Q > non-subject Q 2. More human Q > less human Q

(37)

Who bought everything for Max? a. who > every 1. Lefthand Q > righthand Q 2. Subject Q > non-subject Q 3. More human Q > less human Q b. every > who 0.

(38)

What is giving everyone his biggest headache? a. what > every 1. Lefthand Q > righthand Q 2. Subject Q > non-subject Q b. every > what 1. More human Q > less human Q

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

In (36) [...], the every > what interpretation is favored 2 to 1. This prediction is correct, because it is the primary interpretation of the sentence. In contrast, in (37) [...], who > every is favored 3 to 0. Hence, only this interpretation obtains. In (38) [...], on the other hand, what > every is favored 2 to 1, leaving room for the every > what interpretation. (Kuno 1991: 275f.)

The similarites between English and German are overwhelming. With this background, one should expect that the relative scope model of §2.3 can be straightforwardly applied to English (the special behavior of each could be accounted for by taking into account its being lexically d-bound, which has the effect that it is stronger than jeder all other things being equal). And if that is the case, one should expect that the model makes the right predictions for Q/Q-interaction too. I have not checked yet whether these expectations are warranted. Polish is another language where wh/Q-interaction has been investigated in some detail (Karnowski/Meyer 2001). There is the familiar contrast in (5.25): (5.25) a.

Kto pocałował ka˙zde dziecko? (non-distributive only) who kissed every child ‘Who kissed every child?’ b. Kogo pocałowało ka˙zde dziecko? (ambiguous) whom kissed every child ‘Who did every child kiss?’

Karnowski/Meyer (2001) show that many of the factors which Kuno/Takami/Wu (1999) and Pafel (1998) have identified are relevant to Polish too and that a cumulative multifactorial model seems appropriate as a model for the factors’s interaction. According to Gutiérrez Rexach (1996), wh/Q-interaction in Spanish depends on distributivity and discourse binding. The inherently distributive cada ‘each’ makes a distributive reading possible, but todo ‘all’, which is not inherently distributive, does not. Cada has a similar behavior to each, as a distributive reading is even possible in sentences like (5.26c). This behavior can possibly be explained by cada (like each) being lexically d-bound. (5.26) a.

¿Qué han leído todos los estudiantes (/todo estudiante)? (non-distributive only) ‘What did all students read?’ b. ¿Qué ha leído cada estudiante? (ambiguous) ‘What did each student read?’ c. ¿Quién leyó cada libro? (ambiguous) ‘Who read each book?’

 Quantifier Scope in German

I know of no study dedicated to wh/Q-interaction in French, but there are some data presented in the literature which seem to indicate that wh/Q-interaction might work similarly to the languages we have looked at so far. See the familiar contrast between (5.27a) and (b) and the influence of distributivity and/or discourse binding in (c) (Gutiérrez Rexach 1996: 94; cf. Mathieu 1999: §2.3): (5.27) a.

Quel étudiant a lu chaque livre? (non-distributive only) ‘Which student read every book?’ b. Quel livre a lu chaque étudiant? (ambiguous) ‘Which book did every student read?’ c. Quel étudiant a lu chacun des livres? (ambiguous) ‘Which student has read each of the books?’

The experimental results of Villalta (2003: §5.1) show that combien de ‘how many’ phrases differ from quel ‘which’ phrases in their tendency to wide scope in the same way as their English and German counterparts do.

. The semantics of the pair-list reading It is not straightforward to present a semantics which is able to treat the distributive/non-distributive distinction as a true instance of scope interaction. As far as I can see, Pafel (1999) is still the one and only semantic account of pair-list readings which achieves this. There are, of course, other semantics of the pair-list reading, for example, Higginbotham/May (1981) and Groenendijk/Stokhof (1984), but in these approaches, it is not the relative scope of interrogative and ordinary quantifier which is decisive for the distributive/nondistributive distinction (see Pafel 1999: §11). The decisive innovation which makes it possible to treat the distributive reading as a scope reading is the analysis of wh-phrases. In Pafel (1999) they are seen as interrogative quantifiers which contain much, if not all, of what is essential for the semantics of interrogatives. Somewhat surprisingly, wh-phrases are usually denied this essential role und are treated semantically like indefinite noun phrases. I will center on the semantics of which phrases here (for how many phrases see §5.4). Take the following sentence and a situation where there are four critics and four novels and critic a reviews Kundera’s latest novel, critic b reviews Márquez’s latest novel, critic c reviews Rushdie’s latest novel and critic d reviews Updike’s latest novel. (5.28) We know which novel each of the four critics reviews.

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

Sentence (5.28) is true iff we know that critic a reviews Kundera’s latest novel, critic b reviews Márquez’s latest novel, critic c reviews Rushdie’s latest novel and critic d reviews Updike’s latest novel. From this we can conclude that what the interrogative clause denotes are true propositions of the form “x reviews y” with x being one of the four critics and y being a novel, more exactly, it denotes all true propositions of this form and nothing else. In the given situation it denotes the following plurality of propositions (which correspond to the only true answers to the question Which novel does each of the four critics review?): (5.29) [=p1 ] ⊕ [=p2 ] ⊕ [=p3 ] ⊕ [=p4 ]

( denotes a proposition.) Factivity (the denoted propositions are true) and exhaustivity (all propositions of the relevant kind are denoted) have their origin in the semantics of the interrogative quantifier, which has the meaning “there is a maximal plurality such ...” and quantifies on the maximal plurality of novels which eventually makes true propositions out of “x reviews y”. As the universal quantifier outscopes the interrogative quantifier in the distributive reading, for every critic the maximal plurality of novels is given which makes “x reviews y” a true proposition. As in the given situation, every critic reviewed one and only one novel, the interrogative clause denotes the four propositions in (5.29). Interrogatives are analyzed as definite descriptions of pluralities of propositions or kinds of (pluralities) of propositions. This is a further characteristic trait of the approach proposed here. In §1.4.1 I distinguished four different types of names with respect to which kind of term operator they encompass (ιx, κx, µx, σx). As for interrogatives, one encounters exactly the same four operators again. This convergence allows one to reduce many characteristics of interrogatives to semantic properties that are well known in the realm of noun phrases (properties like definiteness, plurality or transparency). See Pafel (1999: §9), where declarative and interrogative clauses are classified along the features [±indefinite] and [±plural]. As for (5.28), the interrogative clause (which novels each of the four critics reviewed) is analyzed as a description of the form “the smallest plurality with the property φ”. (5.30) a. the smallest plurality with the property φ (= µp[φp]) b. µp[Qp] = p1 ⊕p2 ⊕p3 ⊕p4

 Quantifier Scope in German

In representing such a description formally, I put forth a close relative to the ι-operator, the µ-operator (cf. §1.4.1). µx[φx], too, is a referential term, but it denotes the entity that is minimal with respect to φ, i.e., φ and part of all entities that are φ. As for our example (5.28), the question we have to answer is what the property Q in (5.30b) might be such that the plurality consisting of p1 , p2 , p3 and p4 could be the denotation of the interrogative, and we have to answer the question of why we need the µ-operator, i.e., why we cannot hold on to the ι-operator. Before we complete this analysis of the pair-list reading, let us look at the technical details in simpler wh-interrogatives. In a sentence like Which novels have been reviewed the wh-phrase is the element which is responsible for exhaustivity as well as factivity. Its meaning is given in (5.31): there is an x which is maximal with respect to the property of being novels which have been reviewed – I take ∃max x[φx] as an abbreviation for ∃x[φx ∧ ∀y(φy→y≤x)]. (5.31) ∃max x[*Novel(x) ∧ Have-been-reviewed(x)] (ψx) ↓ ↓ exhaustivity factivity

The general form of such a quantifier, whose range consists of at most one plurality – an individual being the smallest possible plurality –, is as follows: (5.32) ∃max x[φx ∧ δx] (ψx)

(Maximality is not an essential property of the meaning of wh-phrases, but factivity is; see Pafel (1999).) Factivity means that in Which ϑ are ∆ the wh-phrase only quantifies on ϑ which are ∆. One can account for this dependence of the wh-phrase’s meaning on the meaning of the sentence it is part of by assuming that, at the level of semantic structure, an interrogative quantifier contains an anaphoric element with the same content as the scope of the interrogative quantifier. See (5.33b) for illustration: the anaphoric element R and the scope of the interrogative quantifier, S, are coindexed. (5.33) a. which novels have been reviewed b. Q1

S2

which

x1 have been reviewed novels

R2

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

The last step of the analysis of (5.33a) is the construction of the description representing the entire interrogative clause. Depending on the features of the interrogative ([–indefinite], [+plural]), the semantic structure where scope relations are represented and the anaphor included in the interrogative quantifier is resolved, i.e., (5.34) is enriched by an element C whose meaning might be represented by λQ[µp[Qp]] and an element F whose meaning might be represented by λT[ ≤ q]. The structure (5.35) is interpreted as indicated in (5.36). (5.34) [Q1 [Q2 ... [Qn [Sx1, x2,...,xn ]]]] (5.35) [C [Q1 [Q2 ... [Qn [Sx1, x2,..., xn - F]]]]] (5.36) µp[Q1 [Q2 ... [Qn [<S> ≤ p]]]]

Now we can combine all elements of the analysis. In the case of (5.33a) Which novels have been reviewed, there is just one quantifier Q, which happens to be [+wh]. Thus, (5.33b) – where the anaphor included in the wh-phrase is resolved – is to be transformed into (5.37), which obtains the interpretation indicated by the outcome of step 12 in (5.38): the smallest plurality p such that there is an x, x being maximal with respect to the property of being novels which have been reviewed, such that the proposition “x have been reviewed” is part of p; or shorter: the smallest plurality that contains the proposition “x have been reviewed”, x being the reviewed novels. (5.37)

U V

C

W Q1 S

F

which novels R x1 have been reviewed

(5.38) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

S ≈> HR(y) [=Have-been-reviewed(y)] F ≈> λT[ ≤ q] W ≈> λT[ ≤ q] (HR(y)) λ-conversion => ≤ q λ-abstraction => λy[ ≤ q] Q1 ≈> λR[∃max x[*Novel(x) ∧ HR(x)] (Rx)] V ≈> λR[∃max x[*Novel(x) ∧ HR(x)] (Rx)] (λy[ ≤ q]) 2x λ-conversion => ∃max x[*Novel(x) ∧ HR(x)] ( ≤ q)

 Quantifier Scope in German

9. λ-abstraction => λq[∃max x[*Novel(x) ∧ HR(x)] ( ≤ q)] 10. C ≈> λQ[µp[Qp]] 11. U ≈> λQ[µp[Qp]] (λq[∃max x[*Novel(x) ∧ HR(x)] ( ≤ q)]) 12. 2x λ-conversion => µp[∃max x[*Novel(x) ∧ HR(x)] ( ≤ p)]

Now we are ready to provide an analysis of the distributive reading of the wh-clause in a sentence like (5.39a). This time, we have two quantifiers with the each quantifier outscoping the interrogative quantifier. Thus, in (5.39c) the universal quantifier outscopes the existential quantifier. The description means: the smallest p such that for each x, x being one of the four critics, there is a y, y being the novel which x reviewed, such that the proposition “x reviews y” is part of p. Or, perhaps more comprehensively: the smallest plurality that, relative to each x, contains a proposition “x reviews y”, x being one of the four critics and y being the novel x reviews. In a situation where critic a reviews Kundera’s latest novel, critic b reviews Márquez’s latest novel, and so on, the description denotes the plurality of propositions in (e). (5.39) a. We know which novel each of the four critics reviews. b. (each of the four critics)1 (which novel R)2 [x1 reviews x2 ] c. µp[∀x[x ≤ a⊕b⊕c⊕d] ∃max y[Novel(y) ∧ Review(x,y)] ≤ p] d. µp[ ≤ p ∧ ≤ p ∧ ≤ p ∧ ≤ p] (cf. (5.30b)) e. = p1 ⊕p2 ⊕p3 ⊕p4

Step by step the description (5.39c) can be constructed as follows: (5.40) [U C (V [Q1 each of the four critics] (W’ [Q2 which novel R] (W [S x1 reviews x2 ] F)))] (5.41) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

S ≈> R(u,v) [=Review(u,v)] F ≈> λT[ ≤ q] W ≈> λT[ ≤ q] (R(u,v)) λ-conversion => ≤ q λ-abstraction => λv[ ≤ q] Q2 ≈> λR[∃max y[Novel(y) ∧ R(u,y)] (Ry)] W’ ≈> λR[∃max y[Novel(y) ∧ R(u,y)] (Ry)] (λv[ ≤ q]) 2x λ-conversion => ∃max y[Novel(y) ∧ R(u,y)] ( ≤ q)

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

9. λ-abstraction => λu[∃max y[Novel(y) ∧ R(u,y)] ( ≤ q)] 10. Q1 ≈> λP[∀x[x ≤ a⊕b⊕c⊕d] (Px)] 11. V ≈> λP[∀x[x ≤ a⊕b⊕c⊕d] (Px)] (λu[∃max y[Novel(y) ∧ R(u,y)] ( ≤ q)]) 12. 2x λ-conversion => ∀x[x ≤ a⊕b⊕c⊕d] ∃max y[Novel(y) ∧ R(x,y)] ( ≤ q) 13. λ-abstraction => λq[∀x[x ≤ a⊕b⊕c⊕d] ∃max y[Novel(y) ∧ R(x,y)] ( ≤ q)] 14. C ≈> λQ [µp[Qp] 15. U ≈> λQ [µp[Qp] (– see step 13 –) 16. 2x λ-conversion => µp[∀x[x ≤ a⊕b⊕c⊕d] ∃max y[Novel(y) ∧ R(x,y)] ≤ p]

With the semantics sketched, the pair-list reading is represented unequivocally as a reading in which the interrogative quantifier is outscoped by a noninterrogative quantifier. It is really quantifier scope which is at stake: the opposite scope relation cannot yield a pair-list reading and the non-interrogative quantifier, since it has wide scope, retains the meaning it has when it is in the scope of an interrogative quantifier. Treating wh/Q-interaction semantically as a true instance of a quantifier scope interaction distinguishes the proposed analysis sharply from analyses like Karttunen/Peters (1980), Higginbotham/May (1981), Belnap (1982), Groenendijk/Stokhof (1984), and Higginbotham (1991, 1996). The proposed analysis is not a variant of the quantifying into questions approach, since the universal quantifier is not quantified into a ‘question’. We did not even make use of any semantic entity which one could call a question (a plurality of propositions is not a candidate for a question since an individual is the limiting case of a plurality). Nor did we use the concept of an answer to a question in our analysis. It is the occurrence of an interrogative quantifier that is the common semantic trait of interrogatives. This is argued for in more detail in Pafel (1999), where a semantic analysis of interrogatives with non-universal quantifiers outscoping the interrogative quantifier is developed and where the fact that yes/no and alternative interrogatives display no pair-list reading is explained.

 Quantifier Scope in German

. Scope and semantics of how many phrases As for how many interrogatives, it is often assumed that they can have a “reconstructed” reading (cf. (3.39) and the reference cited there). Sentence (5.42), for example, is claimed to have three different readings (see Beck 1995: 138): (5.42)

Wie viele Referate hat jeder gehalten? how many presentations has everyone given ‘How many presentations did everyone give?’ R1 Which number n is such that there are n-many presentations which everyone gave? R2 Which number n is such that everybody gave n-many presentations? R3 For everyone, which number n is such that there are n-many presentations and s/he gave them?

R1 is the non-distributive reading, R3 the distributive reading and R2 the reconstructed reading (parts of the how many phrase are moved back into the base position of the how many phrase). Under what circumstances can the reconstructed reading occur? As far as I see, the circumstances are suspiciously similar to the circumstances in which a distributive reading can occur: (5.43) Wie viele Leute haben jede Aufgabe gelöst? ‘How many people solved every problem?’ √ √ reconstructed reading: distributive reading: (5.44) Wie viele Leute haben mehrere Referate gehalten? ‘How many people gave several presentations?’ reconstructed reading: distributive reading: (5.45) Wie viele Referate hat fast jeder gehalten? ‘How many presentations did almost everyone give?’ reconstructed reading: distributive reading: (5.46) Wann hat jeder wie viele Aufgaben gelöst? ‘When did everyone solve how many problems?’ √ √ reconstructed reading: distributive reading: (5.47) Wann haben wie viele jede Aufgabe gelöst? ‘When did how many people solve every problem?’ reconstructed reading: distributive reading:

I am not aware of any clear cases where a reconstructed reading is possible, but a distributive reading is certainly not. Beck (1995: 138) presents (5.48) as a

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

case in point where the reconstructed reading is possible, but the distributive reading is not: (5.48) Wie viele Kinder haben jeden getroffen? ‘How many children met everyone?’

My feeling, however, is that there is a distributive reading in this case. In attitude sentences like (5.49) (=3.39b), however, it becomes clearer that there seem to be reconstructed readings which have to be distinguished from the distributive reading. (5.49)

How many patients do you think that every doctor can visit in an hour? R1 Which number n is such that there are n-many patients x such that every doctor can visit x in an hour? R2 Which number n is such that every doctor can visit n-many patients in an hour? R3 For every doctor: how many patients do you think that he can visit in an hour?

For the reconstructed reading R2 to be true the holder of the belief does not have to have beliefs about doctors in particular (i.e., de re-beliefs). The distributive reading R3 necessitates such beliefs however. But even if this shows that we have to assume a reconstructed reading in contrast to the distributive reading, it still seems the case that a reconstructed reading is possible iff a distributive reading is. The semantic analysis of how many phrases which I will develop now is tightly connected to the analysis of indefinites in §4.2 and §4.3. On the one hand, this might be astonishing as I take indefinites to be names, whereas how many phrases clearly are (explicit) quantifiers. On the other hand, it is just as clear that how many phrases are indefinite noun phrases. As for syntax, we can see that in German wie viel phrases behave like indefinite noun phrases with respect to word order in the Mittelfeld (see Pafel 1991b: §5.3.1). As for semantics, we obtain the same interpretational possibilities with indefinites as with how many phrases. The sentence Ich will fünf Aufgaben lösen ‘I want to solve five problems’, for instance, has a de re- as well as a de dicto-reading (“There are five problems such that I want to solve them” vs. “I want it to be the case that there are five problems I solve”). The same ambiguity can be observed in Wie viele Aufgaben willst du lösen? ‘How many problems do you want to solve?’ I take indefinites to be descriptions of kinds, so I take how many phrases to be quantifiers on kinds whose instances have a certain cardinality. Take a sentence like How many people are you? exhibiting a predicative how many phrase.

 Quantifier Scope in German

The sentence asks for the kind, each instance of which, is a plurality of people whose number is identical to the greatest number which can be truely predicated of the people which make up the denotation of you. The answer We are five people means that the people which make up the denotation of we instantiates the kind, each instance of which, consists of five people. Thus, the question asks for the kind k such that (i) k is a kind that the denotation of you instantiates and (ii) every instance of k, is a plurality of n people with (iii) there being no kind that the denotation of you instantiates and every instance of which, is a plurality of people of a number greater than n. Such a kind k satisfies the predicate Greatest-Number-Kind with respect to the kind of people (κy[People(y)]) and the kind of things (i.e., kinds) which the denotation of you instantiates (κz[Inst(you,z)]). The meaning of the wh-phrase in How many people are you? is illustrated in (5.50), the meaning of the whole sentence in (5.51).8 (5.50) ∃k[Greatest-Number-Kind(k,κx[People(x)],κy[Inst(you,y)])] ≈ there is a kind which is the greatest-number-kind with respect to the kind κx[People(x)] and the kind κy[Inst(you,y)] (5.51) µp[ ∃k[G-N-K(k,κx[People(x)],κy[Inst(you,y)])] ≤ p]

In a sentence like How many problems does Mary want to solve?, the indefinite noun phrase triggers the introduction of an implicit quantifier. The sentence has two interpretations as the indefinite noun phrase can be interpreted as weakly specific or as de re non-specific. In the first case, the implicit quantifier ∃x[Inst(x,k)] has scope over Mary wants to solve x. In the second case, it has only scope over to solve x. The sentence’s two interpretations can be illustrated as follows: (5.52) µp[∃k[G-N-K(k,κx[*Probl.(x)],κy[∃i[Inst(i,y)]Want(mary,<Solve (mary,i)>)])] )> ≤ p] (5.53) µp[∃k[G-N-K(k,κx[*Probl.(x)],κy[Want(mary,)])] <Want(mary,)> ≤ p]

As we will assume in §7.3.2, the introduction of an implicit quantifier is triggered by the fact that a kind-expression is to saturate an argument of a predicate which does not allow this argument to denote a kind. The solution to this problem is the introduction of an implicit quantifier on the instances of the kind. What the introduced quantifier looks like, what its scopal features

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

(r/a-strong, r/a-weak) are depends on the kind of indefinite noun phrase, whether it is generic, strongly or weakly specific or de re non-specific (cf. §4.3). Formally, the implicit quantifier’s introduction is implemented by substituting the semantic specification of the indefinite noun phrase with another one. In How many problems does Mary want to solve?, the indefinite wh-phrase initially has the semantic specification (5.54a), which consists of a kind-variable and a quantifier store with a kind-quantifier co-indexed with the variable (see Chapter 7 for this type of representation). Specification (5.54a) gives way to (5.54b), which consists of a variable and a quantifier store which encompasses the kindquantifier of (a) as well as an existential quantifier on the instances of the kind denoted by the kind-variable (bound by the kind-quantifier). This existential quantifier is the implicit quantifier. (5.54) a. < ki , [QP how many problems]i > b. < x-i , [QP how many problems]i •[QP[α-strong,β-weak] ∃ (x INST ki )]-i >

If it is right to say that the wh-phrase in How many problems does Mary want to solve? can be interpreted as weakly specific and as de re non-specific, the implicit quantifier’s scope features are either [r-strong] or [r-weak,a-weak]. The two quantifiers in the semantic specification in (5.54) have an independent scope behavior apart from the fact that the interrogative quantifier must outscope the other one, in order to bind the kind-variable. The contrast in (5.55) also depends on the type of indefinite noun phrase (for this contrast see Heim 1987; Frampton 1990; Fox 1999). (5.55) a. How many people does Diana think there are t at the party? R1 How many people are such that Diana thinks they are at the party. R2 What is the number n such that Diana thinks that there are n-many people at the party. b. How many people does Diana think t are at the party? R1 How many people are such that Diana thinks they are at the party. R2 What is the number n such that Diana thinks that there are n-many people who are at the party.

In (a), the indefinite noun phrase can only be interpreted as de re non-specific, with the implicit quantifier having scope over the embedded clause only; in (b), however, the indefinite noun phrase can be interpreted as specific or nonspecific. Let us, finally, have a look at distributive and non-distributive readings. In (5.56b) the universal quantifier has wide scope, in (5.56c) and (d) the interrogative quantifier does.

 Quantifier Scope in German

(5.56) a. How many problems did every student solve? b. µp [∀x[Student(x)] ∃k[G-N-K(k,κy[*Problem(y)],κz[∃i[Inst(i,z)]Solve(x,i)])] ≤ p] c. µp [∃k[G-N-K(k,κy[*Problem(y)], κz[∃i[Inst(i,z)] ∀x[Student(x)] Solve(x,i)])] ≤ p] d. µp [∃k[G-N-K(k,κy[*Problem(y)], κz[∀x[Student(x)] ∃i[Inst(i,z)] Solve(x,i)])] ≤ p]

In (c) we treat the interrogative as a weakly specific indefinite, in (d) as a nonspecific one, which gives us the reconstructed reading. That is the way to obtain the reconstructed reading R2 in (5.49) too. As was für phrases are quantifiers on kinds too (as I have argued in Pafel 1996), we should obtain the same interpretational properties as with how many phrases. There is, indeed, a reconstructed reading, as the following sequence shows. (5.57) A: Was für Patienten glaubst du, dass jeder Arzt am liebsten behandelt? ‘What kind of patients do you think that every doctor likes most to treat?’ B: Privatpatienten natürlich. ‘Privat patients, of course.’

The question is interpreted as a question for the kind of patients which is such that every doctor likes most to treat instances of this kind (the indefinite is interpreted as non-specific). At the beginning of this section, we observed that there seems to be a correlation between the occurrence of distributive readings and the occurrence of reconstructed readings. In our analysis of the reconstructed reading, however, the interrogative quantifier outscopes the universal one (cf. 5.56d). At the moment, I could only try to speculate why the indefinite noun phrase can be interpreted as a non-specific indefinite only in cases where a distributive reading is possible. As for scope affairs, the most important consequence of this section is that one can cope with reconstructed readings without having to rely on reconstruction as a scope-assigning mechanism.

Chapter 5. Interrogative quantifiers 

Notes . (5.3b) is identical to (26) and (5.3a) is almost identical to (28) in Szabolcsi (1997b). . Krifka (2001), for instance, bases his theory of pair-list readings on the assumption that this reading is only possible with universal quantifiers. . See Pafel (1991b: 151). This contrast has been independently observed by Swart (1992: 397f.) with regard to very similar Dutch sentences. . The intended reading of von jedem ‘from everybody’ in the first conjunct of (5.10) is the one where it specifies the ‘topic’ of the knowledge, not its ‘source’. The same holds for von den meisten ‘from most’ in (5.14) below. . The interrogative’s reading in (5.15) is a “choice reading” in the sense of Groenendijk/ Stokhof (1984: 451). . The distributive reading in wh-interrogatives is a phenomenon well-known in English since Keenan/Hull (1973). There are, however, languages which seem to exhibit no distributive reading in wh-interrogatives – Hungarian (Szabolcsi 1983; Kiss 1986) and Japanese (Hoji 1986) belong to them. As for Korean, its existence is controversial: Joo (1989: 186, 205) assumes that it exists, but Beck/Kim (1996: 37 n. 16) do not. They agree that only the nondistributive reading is possible if the wh-phrase precedes the universal quantifier, but they disagree in their acceptability judgments with respect to sentences with the reverse order. In Mandarin, the distributive reading seems to exist (Huang 1982; Huang/Li 1996). . Both studies show that May (1985) cannot adequately account for the facts. . Greatest-Number-Kind(k,κx[φx],κy[ψy]) is true iff (1) k instantiates κy[ψy] and (2) there is an n such that every instance of k is a plurality of the kind κx[φx] with the number n such that (3) there is no k’ that instantiates κy[ψy] and every instance of which, is a plurality of the kind κx[φx] with a number greater than n.

Chapter 6

Alternative scope accounts

The various accounts of scope relations can roughly be divided into three classes: the configurational accounts, the purely semantic or pragmatic accounts, and the multi-factor accounts. Quantifier raising and reconstruction are the most popular scope assigning mechanisms to be found among configurational accounts, which we will investigate first.

. Configurational theories Configurational or syntactic theories of scope claim that the scope potential of a sentence can be deduced from the formal configurations, i.e., the c-command relations, on some syntactic level of representation. The theories differ with respect to the exact level they consider to be decisive, the definition of c-command they prefer, and the consideration of traces. In generative grammar, Lakoff ([1965] 1970) and McCawley (1968, 1970, 1972) seem to be the first to propose a level of representation where, besides predicate-argument and anaphor-antecedent relations, quantifier scope is represented. It seems that they can be credited with the fact that in generative grammar a level of representation confined to sentential semantic phenomena was established (cf. Huck/Goldsmith 1995). Lakoff and McCawley thought of this level as strictly distinguished from surface and deep structure in the sense of the Aspects. This level was designed as a rival to Chomsky’s deep structure, but was nevertheless regarded as a labelled tree connected with surface structure via transformations. These assumptions started the debate betweeen the generative semanticists (Lakoff, McCawley, Postal, Ross) and the interpretative semanticists (Chomsky and Jackendoff, above all).1 The first analyses in generative semantics predicted a scope ambiguity in simple sentences with two quantifiers. Lakoff ([1965] 1970)’s rule of “quantifier lowering”, which moved the quantifiers, being predicates in the underlying representation, to the respective noun phrase positions in surface structure,

 Quantifier Scope in German

could be applied without restrictions. Thus, scope ambiguity was the result (cf. Partee 1970; McCawley 1970; Lakoff 1971). Chomsky (1957: 100f.), on the other hand, assumed that the two sentences Everyone in the room knows two languages and Two languages are known by everyone in the room are not logically equivalent, an assumption not shared by Katz/Postal (1964: 72), but by Lakoff (1971), at least with regard to his ‘dialect’. Therefore, Lakoff (1971) proposed, within the framework of generative semantics, a constraint for the transformation of the underlying level into surface structure, a “global derivational constraint” whereby a quantifier which commands another quantifier on the underlying level must command or precede the other quantifier on all the more surface-cy levels. For interpretative semantics, Jackendoff (1972: 293) proposed a very similar rule (Modal Projection Rule). I will come to the empirical judgment of these predictions in a moment. Chomsky has assumed, at least since Chomsky (1975), that in sentence grammar there is a distinguished level confined to semantic interpretation, called Logical Form (LF), differing from deep and surface structure. Exactly as in McCawley and Lakoff, it is this structure where scope and binding relations are represented. The theory of LF has been developed especially by May (1977, 1985, 1989). In LF, quantifiers are moved from their s-structure position to an adjunction position leaving traces in their s-structure position. Quantifiers are adjoined to a phrase (S, NP or VP) which contains the quantifier on s-structure (=quantifier raising, QR) or which does not (=quantifier lowering, QL). Quantifiers are assigned scope by QR and QL. According to May (1977), a sentence like Everyone loves someone has two well-formed logical forms: (6.1) Everyone loves someone. (6.2) a. [everyone1 [someone2 [t1 loves t2 ]]] b. [someone2 [everyone1 [t1 loves t2 ]]]

Every LF represents exactly one of the two possible scope readings of the sentence. LFs are obviously designed with the quantifier&variable notation of predicate logic in mind and do not differ substantially from McCawley’s and Lakoff ’s semantic representations – QR is May’s counterpart to the generative semanticists’ quantifier lowering (which should not be mixed up with May’s QL). Mainly for theory-internal reasons, May (1985: Chapter 2) modified his approach from 1977 such that (6.2b) was the only well-formed LF of sentence (6.1). In this stage of his thinking, this structure represents both scope readings. That means that scope is no longer syntactically disambiguated.

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

Both versions of the theory are such that, with regard to simple sentences with n quantifiers as in (6.1), the prediction is made that n! scope readings are available. Many researchers assume like May that sentences like Everyone loves someone, Many people bought two books or Three examiners marked two scripts are ambiguous (Katz/Postal 1964; McCawley 1970; Kroch 1974; Huang 1982; Cooper 1983; Haïk 1984; Hornstein 1984; Higginbotham 1985; Williams 1988; among others). However, there are some researchers who disagree with these judgments (Chomsky 1957; Lakoff 1971; Kuno 1971, 1973; Reinhart 1976, 1979, 1983; Kempson/Cormack 1981; Fodor/Sag 1982; McCawley 1988; Verkuyl 1988; Kamp/Reyle 1993; Ruys 1992; Abusch 1994; Hornstein 1995; Beghelli/Stowell 1997). This second group considers at least some sentences of this type to be scope unequivocal or considers them to be ambiguous or unequivocal depending on the ‘dialect’ (Lakoff, Kuno). Whatever the right view might be, there are sentences in English for which May’s prediction mentioned above seems clearly to be false: (6.3) Some reporters put tape recorders in every room. (only: some>every; Reinhart 1983: 191) (6.4) I assigned someone every problem. (only: someone>every; Aoun/Li 1989: 147) (6.5) Most of the students read every book. (only: most>every; Liu 1990: 14, 1997: 17)2 (6.6) At least two students read exactly five books. (only: at least two>exactly five; Liu 1990: 16, 1997: 18) (6.7) a.

No student answered every question correctly. (only: no>every; Liu 1990: 13, 1997: 16) b. Every student answered no question correctly. (only: every>no; Liu 1990: 13, 1997: 17)

Similar to German, the reading with the direct object outscoping the subject depends on the lexical properties of the quantifiers involved. See, for example, the following contrast in Liu (1990: 185, 1997: 137): (6.8) a.

Most of the students read every book. [=6.5] (every>most: )

b. Some student read every book. (every>some:

√

)

A further problematic case for May’s theory are sentences with topicalization. See the following contrasts:

 Quantifier Scope in German

(6.9) a.

All of us have read many of these books with great enthusiasm. (ambiguous; Kuno 1991: 279) b. Many of these books, all of us have read with great enthusiasm. (only: many>all; Kuno 1991: 279)

(6.10) a.

Many people come to New York every summer. (ambiguous; Kuno 1991: 279; cf. Reinhart 1983: 192) b. Every summer, many people come to New York. (only: every>many; Kuno 1991: 279; cf. Reinhart 1983: 192)

(6.11) a.

Some reporters put tape recorders in every room. [=6.3] (only: some>every; Reinhart 1983: 191) b. In every room, some reporters have put tape recorders. (ambiguous; Reinhart 1983: 192)

Changing the relative precedence of two quantifiers by topicalization in English has the same effect as topicalization and scrambling in German: the scope value of the preceding quantifier becomes distinctly greater such that the wide scope reading of the quantifiers becomes available or even the only possible reading – depending on how high the scope value is without taking syntactic constellation into account. One can get the impression that Q/Q-interaction in English is a multifactor phenomenon differing from the facts in German only gradually. We have already seen in §5.2 that wh/Q-interaction in English is determined by very similar factors as in German. May’s (1985) configurational theory of wh/Qinteraction cannot account for the facts (see Kuno 1991; Pafel 1991b, c). May’s theory is intended as a universal theory, i.e., the prediction of n! readings with n quantifiers is of universal scope. As this prediction3 is not even valid for English, it is hardly necessary to mention that the facts in German (and, as we have seen partially, the facts in Italian, Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Hungarian and Polish) clearly militate against the prediction and this account of scope. The complex pattern of ambiguous and non-ambiguous sentences in German cannot be explained in such a way. If one wants to stick with QR (and QL) as scope assigning mechanisms, one has to constrain them heavily (see below the discussion of Huang 1982).4 It is not a bold claim that in every language there are simple sentences with n quantifiers which are scope unequivocal. The predictions of Tanja Reinhart’s theory (1976, 1979, 1983) are much more restrictive: a quantifier α can have scope over a quantifier β only if α ccommands β in s-structure.5 This is more or less equivalent to Lakoff ’s global derivational constraint and Jackendoff ’s Modal Projection rule (see above). Reinhart (1983: 194 ff.) is aware of the fact that such an account does not cope

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

with the facts. She herself considers it to be a problem that sentences like Two languages are spoken by everyone are predicted as unambiguous and that it is impossible to derive the inverse-linking reading of noun phrases. She weakens the c-command condition in such a way that the c-command relations supply the unmarked or most accessible reading (cf. Reinhart 1995).6 With reference to Ioup (1975a), she points out that the grammatical function of quantifiers and the nature of the quantity expressions have an influence on relative scope. If one tries to apply this account to German one does not need much time to see that neither the restrictive nor the minor restrictive variant accounts for the facts. According to the restrictive variant, the following clearly ambiguous sentences should not be ambiguous, as only the quantifier in the Vorfeld, but not the one in the Mittelfeld, c-commands the other quantifier: Eine Fuge hat jeder gespielt, Wie viele Fugen hat jeder gespielt?, Irgendeiner wartet immer. The minor restrictive variant is not much better. Above all, it is not the case that, as for the examples just mentioned, the wide scope reading of the quantifier in the Vorfeld is the unmarked or most accessible reading. Eventually, this reading is not more accessible than the other. With regard to the sentences in (6.12), Reinhart argues that c-command, but not linear precedence, determines relative scope. (6.12) a. Fond of some boy every girl is. b. (... and) break all the plates someone finally did. c. Opposed to all laws though some revolutionaries are, they all support the right of abortion.

These sentences have only the reading with wide scope of the subject. If the linear precedence of quantifiers is regarded as decisive for scope determination, the unavailable reading is predicted to be the only possible one. According to Reinhart’s definition of c-command, the subject in these sentences asymmetrically c-commands the quantifier in the preposed AP or VP. (Reinhart 1983: 189 assumes that the AP or VP is immediately dominated by S (as the subject noun phrase is).) Looking at corresponding sentences in German, it becomes obvious that this explanation cannot be correct. The following sentences, which we already had a look at in §3.4.1, are stylistically clearly marked, but acceptable at least to some speakers: (6.13) a.

Eine Aufgabe zur vollsten Zufriedenheit gelöst hat jeder, der an dem Test teilgenommen hat. ‘Solve one problem to one’s utmost satisfaction everyone who was tested did.’

 Quantifier Scope in German

b. Jede Platte zertrümmert hatten einige in weniger als fünf Sekunden. ‘Break every plate some people did in less than five seconds.’ c. Doch jedem Gesetz gegenüber ablehnend eingestellt sind nur einige der Revolutionäre, die sich als Anarchisten bezeichnen. ‘Opposed to every law only some of the revolutionaries are who take themselves to be anarchists.’ d. Alle Aufgaben zur vollsten Zufriedenheit gelöst hat nur einer von denen, die an dem Test teilgenommen haben. ‘Solve all problems to one’s utmost satisfaction only one of the participants who was tested did.’ e. Alle denkbaren Fehler unterlaufen sind nur wenigen unerfahrenen Anfängern. ‘Make all possible mistakes only few inexperienced beginners did.’ f. Stolz auf alle Mitarbeiter ist mindestens einer. ‘Proud of all colleagues at least one guy is.’

These sentences are all scope unequivocal. As in (6.12) the scope relations are inverse to linear precedence. Sentence (6.13a), for example, cannot have the reading that there is one problem which everyone doing the test solved perfectly. And (6.13c) cannot have the reading that every law is such that only some revolutionaries who believe to be anarchists are opposed to it. However, these facts do not favour Reinhart’s c-command condition as, according to standard assumptions concerning sentence structures in German, it is uncontroversial that the subject does not c-command the quantifier in the preposed VP.7 The relations in these sentences are a challenge to scope theory (cf. §3.4.1), but they are of no help with regard to the choice between c-command and linear precedence as a relevant scope factor. Huang (1982) combines Reinhart’s (1976) c-command condition with quantifier raising on LF according to May’s (1977) way. His scope principle demands that the structure which is the outcome of QR be isomorphic to sstructure concerning the c-command relations of the quantifiers: if a quantifier α c-commands another quantifier β on s-structure, then α c-commands β on LF (Huang 1982: 137). The similarity to Lakoff ’s global derivational constraint for scope is obvious. Huang strives to account for the fact that in many cases the Chinese counterparts to ambiguous English sentences are clearly unequivocal (for instance, the counterpart to Everyone loves someone has only the wide scope reading of the universal quantifier in Chinese, i.e., Mandarin). He relates these differences in the scope potential to an independent typological difference between Chinese and English: whereas in Chinese syntactic structures have to be head-final (with one exception only) this is not the case in English. This ty-

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

pological difference matters with respect to the outcome of the optional rule of “restructuring”, which derives s-structures from s-structures and is able to change the c-command relations between quantifiers. The restriction to headfinal structures in Chinese and its absence in English causes there to be more possible s-structures for a given sentence in English than in Chinese, and, thus, more s-structures with distinct c-command relations between the quantifiers. This is the reason why English sentences generally have more scope readings than their counterparts in Chinese. But, in order to cope with the ambiguity of the sentence Someone loves everyone, Huang has to modify his scope principle, as there is no evidence that such a sentence has two distinct s-structures (1982: 148f., 182). He assumes that restructuring is an option for LF too, but only as long as QR has not been applied. He tentatively modifies his scope principle in the following way: α must c-command β after the application of QR if α c-commands β before the application of QR. This modification, however, weakens the isomorphy between s-structure and LF considerably, and must be characterized as an ad hoc solution. Huang’s prediction that in Chinese a quantifier cannot be in the scope of a quantifier which it c-commands asymmetrically has been challenged by Aoun/Li (1989: 142), who point to the following passive sentences: (6.14) a.

Meige ren dou bei yige nuren zhuazon le. (ambiguous) every man all by one woman arrested aspect ‘Every man was arrested by one woman.’ b. Yaoshi liangge xiansuo bei meigeren zhaodao... (ambiguous) if two solutions by everyone found ‘If two solutions were found by everyone,...’

Not only the subject, but also the by phrase can have wide scope. Huang (1993) doubts that (6.14a) is ambiguous: what looks like a wide scope reading of the indefinite really is a referential reading of the indefinite. The counterexample (6.14b), however, cannot be explained away in this way. But Xu/Lee (1989) and Liu (1990: §2.4.1, 1997: §4.2.2.2) support Huang by presenting scope unequivocal passive sentences where the (surface) subject contains the quantity expression liangdao ‘two’ and the object the quantity expression wuge ‘five’ or the subject the quantity expression dabufen ‘most’ and the object the quantity expression sange ‘three’. With regard to such sentences the semantics makes it obvious whether the reading with wide scope of the by phrase is possible. Xu/Lee (1989) even present scope-unequivocal sentences of the kind (6.14b).

 Quantifier Scope in German

Other types of counterexamples to Huang’s theory are scope unambiguous English sentences like (6.3) to (6.7), which are predicted to be ambiguous (keep in mind Huang’s modification of his scope principle). If one adds the German facts, which are similar to the Chinese ones insofar as sentences like Jeder hat manches Buch gelesen are unequivocal, the prima facie attractive proposal of explaining ambiguities in English via typological differences to Chinese becomes dubious. Since about the mid-80’s it became common to give the configurational scope account the following twist: not only the actual position of a quantifier, but also the position of its traces are relevant to scope determination. (See, among others, Haïk 1984; Hoji 1985, 1986; May 1985; Joo 1989; Longobardi 1988; Williams 1988; Aoun/Li 1989, 1993a; Kim/Larson 1989; Höhle 1991; Kim 1991; Frey 1993; Bittner 1994; Hornstein 1995; Kitahara 1996; Jacobs 1997; Krifka 1998; Lechner 1998; Heck 2001.) But these theories differ in many respects, above all as to where scope determination takes place: on logical form, on s-structure or on a reconstructed structure. Hoji (1985, 1986), for instance, explains the contrast in Japanese between the unequivocal (6.15a) and the ambiguous (6.15b) assuming a condition with the effect that a quantifier α can take scope over a quantifier β only if α ccommands β or c-commands a trace of β at s-structure (see 6.16). (6.15) a.

Daremo-ga dareka-o aisiteiru. (unequivocal; Hoji 1985: 65) everyone-nom someone-acc loves ‘Everyone loves someone.’ b. Dareka-o daremo-ga aisiteiru. (ambiguous) someone-acc everyone-nom loves ‘Someone, everyone loves.’ (Hoji 1985: 65; cf. Kuroda 1970; but see Kuno 1973: 360ff.)

(6.16) a.

QP -ga nom b. QP -o1 acc

QP -o V acc QP -ga t1 nom

(unequivocal) V

(ambiguous)

One cannot deny that this approach has some attractive features if one looks at subject/object asymmetries as in (6.15) or (6.17). (6.17) a. What did everyone buy for Max? (ambiguous) b. Who bought everything for Max? (non-distributive only)

A careful look at the data, however, quickly makes clear that the basic idea, i.e., making the scope potential dependent on the c-command relations of the

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

quantifiers and their traces at s-structure, is too simplistic to cope with the facts. Let us first have a look at examples from English. On the one hand, ambiguities like Someone loves everyone, Someone invited each person, Which professor recommends each candidate?, What did you talk about with everyone8 or Many people come to New York every summer [=6.10a] remain unexplained, as the universal quantifier c-commands neither the subject nor a trace of the subject. On the other hand, too many readings are predicted. The following topicalizations are unequivocal, even though the subject c-commands the trace of the topicalized phrase: (6.9b) Many of these books, all of us have read with great enthusiasm. (only: many>all; Kuno 1991: 279) (6.10b) Every summer, many people come to New York. (only: every>many; Kuno 1991: 279; cf. Reinhart 1983: 192)

Depending on the syntactic assumptions, the non-ambiguity of Who did you give everything to? (Kuno 1991: 266) can be a problem. Turning to German, we see that in sentences like (6.18) too many readings are predicted (there are quantifiers which cannot have wide scope despite the fact that, under standard assumptions, they c-command the trace of another quantifier) and in sentences like (6.19) too few readings are predicted: (6.18) a.

Jede Fuge hat irgendjemand gespielt.

(only: jede>irgendjemand) b. Jakob hat jedes der Märchen einem der Kinder erzählt. (only: jedes>einem) c. Welchen Roman haben die meisten Kritiker rezensiert? (only: welchen>die meisten) (6.19) a. b. c. d. e.

Einer von uns hat jedem bei der Prüfung geholfen. (ambiguous) Einem der Kinder hat Jakob jedes der Märchen erzählt. (ambiguous) Ein Produkt hat jeden Test bestanden. (ambiguous) Wie viele Kritiker haben jeden Roman rezensiert? (ambiguous) Wer (/was) hat jedem dabei geholfen? (ambiguous)

On the basis of our investigations the diagnosis is self-evident: in a domain where a set of factors are operating, the approach under discussion assumes that only one factor is decisive. This diagnosis is also true for the more sophisticated versions of the basic idea proposed in the literature, which I will not show in detail here. One can vary the basic idea in many respects, taking QR, Agrprojections or reconstruction into consideration.9 What one will not achieve is obtaining an equivalent for the influence of other factors. You can test this by

 Quantifier Scope in German

taking the English data of this section as well as the data in §5.2 and comparing them with the predictions of the respective theory (if it makes predictions concerning English, of course). There are wrong predictions in every case. Let us take a closer look at theories of relative scope in German which make the scope determination dependent on the c-command relations of quantifiers and their traces (namely Höhle 1991; Frey 1993; Jacobs 1997). According to Höhle (1991), the structure where scope relations are represented is identical to the structure which is the outcome of reconstruction, namely R-structure. In the cases of interest to us, the scope relations are meant to be determined by the c-command relations on R-structure. Thus, it is decisive for scope-relevant expressions whether they become reconstructed into the position of their trace or not. Höhle distinguishes between proper quantifiers (jedes N, keine N, alle N) and indefinite noun phrases (ein N, viele N). Indefinite noun phrases are optionally reconstructed and proper quantifiers are reconstructed only if they bear the rising accent of the intonation pattern called “i-topicalization”.10 However, no independent criterion is given for an expression that is a proper quantifier.11 As far as I can see, the declarative sentences12 in (6.18) and (6.19) are counterexamples to this theory. In (6.18) narrow scope of the universal quantifier should be possible given the intonation pattern of i-topicalization, as the indefinite noun phrase c-commands the universal quantifier’s trace on s-structure (this corresponds to Höhle’s assumptions on base positions). However, these sentences are scope unequivocal notwithstanding the intonation used. On the other hand, the (relevant) sentences in (6.19) are predicted to be scope unequivocal, as the universal quantifier does not c-command the trace of the indefinite noun phrase. Frey (1993) develops a scope theory for “purely quantificational expressions”. Noun phrases like mindestens ein (/mindestens zwei,...) N, viele N, fast alle N and fast jedes N belong to this class of expressions, but noun phrases like ein (/zwei,...) N, alle N and jedes N do not. He does not offer a criterion for a purely quantificational expression. But he offers considerations of why a certain expression is not purely quantificational: if it can be used referentially (1993: 176); if it exhibits a group reading; if it is possible to refer implicitly to a set (1993: 177). Let us have a closer look at these considerations. It is indeed of uttermost importance to be careful with the investigation of indefinite noun phrases, as they can be used referentially. However, that ein N can be used referentially does not mean that such an expression cannot be used quantificationally. And if it is used quantificationally, it must be the object of a theory of quantifier scope (cf. Pafel 1991c as well as §4.1 above). According to Frey, noun phrases like alle N are not purely quantificational, as they

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

can have a group reading as in the example Alle Teilnehmer der Veranstaltung liefen plötzlich auseinander. But why does this prohibit the noun phrase from being purely quantificational? The reason given is that auseinanderlaufen requires a plural subject which denotes a plurality (Frey 1993: 177). But Frey does not explain why the verb demands a referential subject. And I can see no reason why this should be the case: auseinanderlaufen demands a plural argument – this much is uncontested –, but such an argument can be provided either by a referential expression or by a quantifier ranging over pluralities. In other words, there are general sentences with predicates like auseinanderlaufen. See the following analogy: if P is a predicate demanding a plural argument, why should there not be statements of the form ∃xP(x) where the quantifier ranges over pluralities besides statements of the form P(a), where the individual constant denotes a plurality? It is easy to show that there are general sentences with predicates like auseinanderlaufen: the subject in Nicht alle Teilnehmer der Veranstaltung liefen plötzlich auseinander cannot be interpreted as a referential expression. In addition, the criterion of the group reading does not distinguish between the two classes of expressions mentioned above. Group readings are possible with expressions which are judged to be “purely quantificational” : Fast alle (/viele, mindestens fünf ) Leute haben sich danach im Zentralcafé wieder getroffen, Mindestens zwei von uns müssen sich für lange Zeit voneinander trennen, Fast jede Versammlung geht nach einer gewissen Zeit wieder auseinander. The argument that noun phrases with jeder are not “pure” quantifiers because implicit reference to a set is possible is untenable too. It is not clear why this implicit reference to a set should have an influence on the quantifier status of phrases with jeder. Here is an analogy once more: in a predicate logic with restricted universal quantifiers (the expression in square brackets supplies the restriction), ∀x[Rund(x)] Gx is as much a formula with a quantifier as ∀x[x≤a⊕b] Gx is, where we have quantification over entities which are parts (≤) of the plurality a⊕b and thus reference to a set (plurality). As for jeder and fast jeder, we can make explicit the reference to a set by using a partitive von phrase without changing their quantificational status one iota. Finally, Frey mentions as evidence that noun phrases with jeder are not purely quantificational the fact that only (6.20a) has an internal reading, where the colleagues are compared among another (1993: 177). (6.20) a. Jeder Kollege wollte einen anderen Film sehen. b. Viele Kollegen wollten einen anderen Film sehen. c. Fast jeder Kollege wollte einen anderen Film sehen.

 Quantifier Scope in German

Whatever the adequate evaluation of the data might look like, there are sentences with internal readings quickly at hand, where it does not matter whether the subject is jeder or fast jeder. (6.21) a. Jeder hat einen anderen Geruch. b. Fast jeder hat einen anderen Geruch.

The distinction Frey bases his investigation on, namely the distinction between expressions which are “purely quantificational” and expressions which are not, is not tenable. A scope theory cannot but cope with the scope behavior of (unmodified) universal quantifiers as well as with quantificationally-used indefinite noun phrases. The scope theory proposed in Frey (1993) is not only restricted to a subset of quantifiers; it only makes predictions concerning the scope potential of sentences with verum-focus, i.e., sentences where the quantifiers are not accented.13 “Unter dieser Voraussetzung können die von der Syntax auferlegten strukturellen Bedingungen für Skopusoptionen am einfachsten erkannt werden” (1993: 180). The assumption that it makes sense to assume a syntactic scope principle which interacts with other constraints is not discussed, nor is the kind of interaction of these different constraints on scope or the question of whether accentuation makes everything possible (cf. note 13). The proposed scope principle (1993: 185, 190) amounts in many cases to Hoji’s principle (a quantifier α can take scope over a quantifier β only if α c-commands β or c-commands a trace of β at s-structure) and inherits its problems. See the sentences in (6.18) and (6.19), which we have already classified as counterexamples to this variant of a configurational account of scope.14 Before I come to Jacobs (1997), let us have a look at Jacobs (1982), a pioneering work which developed a scope theory for German unrivaled for a long time and which posed many of the empirical and theoretical questions which are still of uttermost concern. Jacobs (1982) assumed that the quantifiers’ linear precedence determines relative scope. In the Mittelfeld, this rule was assumed to be without exception. An exception to this rule is possible only in case a quantifier occupies the Vorfeld and there is a certain intonation pattern – rising accent on the quantifier in the Vorfeld, falling accent on the quantifier in the Mittelfeld. In such a case the quantifier in the Vorfeld enters into the scope of the quantifier in the Mittelfeld. This phenomenon – “scope inversion” through a certain intonation pattern – was called “i-topicalization” by Jacobs. This account is both too restrictive and too liberal. We have seen that scope inversion is possible even in the Mittelfeld (see 2.135, 2.147d, 2.157 or In Sizilien steht zumindest ein Polizist vor jeder Bank). The account is also too restrictive with

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

respect to sentences of the kind Eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist gespielt, where wide scope of the subject is predicted to occur only with the intonation pattern of itopicalization. The general possibility of obtaining scope inversion through the intonation pattern predicts too many readings.15 All sentences with n quantifiers, one of which is occupying the Vorfeld, should have n readings. We have seen, however, that many such sentences are scope unequivocal. The intonation pattern of i-topicalization seems to be neither necessary (Eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist gespielt) nor sufficient (Jedes Buch hat irgendjemand gelesen) for the quantifier in the Vorfeld to be in the scope of a quantifier in the Mittelfeld. Jacobs (1997) assumes, firstly, that in the Mittelfeld relative scope is strictly determined by c-command unless the “i-topicalized constituent” is located in the Mittelfeld. He assumes, secondly, that the scope of a quantifier in the Vorfeld depends on the c-command relations of its trace in the Mittelfeld – the exact position of the trace being the outcome of the regularities for the “optimal ordering” with the quantifier being moved from the Vorfeld into the Mittelfeld. Jacobs assumes, thirdly, that the occurrence of the intonation pattern of i-topicalization is not sufficient for scope inversion (1997: 117f., 130 n. 30). This new account is still too restrictive with respect to the scope possibilities in the Mittelfeld and it still predicts too many readings. I will illustrate this with two examples. Sentence (6.22) is unequivocal (kaum ein>die meisten), although both Mittelfeld orderings in (6.23) are acceptable. (6.22)

Kaum ein Schüler konnte die meisten Aufgaben lösen.

(6.23) a. Da kaum ein Schüler die meisten Aufgaben lösen konnte. b. Da die meisten Aufgaben kaum ein Schüler lösen konnte.

The same is true for (6.24). It is unexpected that the sentence only has the reading with wide scope of the universal quantifier if one connects the scope potential with acceptable Mittelfeld orderings. (6.24)

Jedes Buch hat irgendjemand gelesen. (irgendjemand>jedes: )

(6.25) a. Da jedes Buch irgendjemand gelesen hat. b. Da irgendjemand jedes Buch gelesen hat.

However, Jacobs is aware of the fact that linear precedence and lexical properties of quantifiers have to be taken into account for scope determination (1997: 119f.). But he does not say how these factors interact with scope determination via traces. As long as this interaction is not elucidated, I do not see the relevance of traces to relative scope determination (of simple sentences) if the necessity of other factors is acknowledged. In other words, it is

 Quantifier Scope in German

an open issue whether and how one could combine a configurational with a multi-factor account. It is also not clear whether one can reasonably apply the criterion of the traces’ positions in the Mittelfeld to wh-phrases in the Vorfeld – which sentences should be taken into consideration if the distributive reading of Wie viele Leute haben jeden Roman gelesen? is at stake. And, finally, the scope of quantifiers in the initial position of embedded sentences is not taken into account. Apart from these shortcomings, most configurational theories have the following problem: they cannot give an explanation for the fact that scope readings are more often than not distinctly preferred, a fact which, as we have seen, cannot be reduced to pragmatic or performance aspects.

. Semantically and pragmatically based theories Among the semantically and pragmatically based accounts, there are also ones which are very restrictive with regard to scope readings as well as ones which are very liberal. Montague’s (1973) syntactic-semantic rule of quantifying-in is totally unconstrained; it allows one to generate every scope reading (similarly for Cresswell 1973, as well as Hendriks’s 1988, 1993 Flexible Types approach, which makes heavy use of type-shifting rules). Quantifier storage (Cooper 1983) – a purely semantic alternative to quantifying-in, which, in contrast to quantifying-in, does not assume that scope-ambiguous sentences are syntactically ambiguous – is totally unstrained too. Quantifying-in and quantifier storage must be constrained in some way or other, in order to lead to empirically valid results (cf. Hausser 1976; Rodman 1976; Engdahl 1986; Keller 1988; Gerdemann/Hinrichs 1990; Park 1995; note that they even allow the generation of logically impossible readings – Hobbs/Shieber 1987). As far as Q/Q-interaction is concerned, the mechanism of quantifier storage developed in HPSG (Pollard/Sag 1994: §8; Pollard/Yoo 1995) is also almost totally unconstrained (for instance, quantifiers are not clause-bound). Nearly identical predictions are made such as in May (1977, 1985). In Pollard/Yoo (1995) und Kathol (1996), however, the scope of wh-phrases, which are conceived as quantifiers, is severely constrained – but wh/Q-interaction is not taken into consideration. (For a critical evaluation of these accounts see Feldhaus 1996.) The purely semantic account of Kempson/Cormack (1981, 1982) constrains the scope options in an interesting way. A sentence like Everyone loves someone is judged to be unequivocal as the two readings are not logically independent of one another. (The reading with the wide scope of the existential

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts

quantifier entails the reading with wide scope of the universal quantifier.)16 Not only in the case where readings are logically dependent, but also in cases where they are independent but one is predictable from the other by general semantic principles, one should assume a unique semantic representation which is the input for several interpretations. In the sentence Everyone loves someone, the semantic representation corresponds to the weak reading; the strong reading results from the process of “uniformising” (Kempson/Cormack 1981: 272) – by switching the quantifiers’ relative order. Such an account (assuming a unique semantic representation and deriving the different interpretations on the basis of independently necessary semantic processes) is methodologically attractive. (For conceptual weaknesses of the account of Kempson/Cormack, see Tennant 1981 as well as Poesio 1996: 182 n. 21.) However, the complex pattern of ambiguous and unequivocal sentences in German (and other languages) makes such an account look empirically inadequate. One type of example shall suffice: the difference in scope potential between Jeder Pianist hat eine Fuge gespielt and Eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist gespielt as well as between corresponding sentences, for instance, in Japanese and Korean is fully unexpected in Kempson/Cormack’s account. The same is true for the account of Gawron/Peters (1990), who consider scope determination to be a purely pragmatic phenomenon which is determined by context in a similar fashion like the reference of an indexical pronoun. Concerning the type of example just mentioned, this account predicts that the context should make the reading with wide scope of the existential quantifier available to the same degree in Jeder Pianist hat eine Fuge gespielt as in Eine Fuge hat jeder Pianist gespielt. Appyling the tests for scope relations, we have seen, however, that this is not the case. The scope potential is determined – this is a clear result of our investigation – by a grammatical process (probably, a syntactic-semantic one) on which the context has no influence. What context can influence is the choice among the readings licensed by the scope potential. In Steedman’s (1999, 2000) Combinatory Categorial Grammar, scope is tightly connected to syntactic derivation. Scope ambiguities depend on syntactic ambiguities. Basic sentences with two quantifiers are predicted to be ambiguous, as determiners receive two syntactic descriptions in the lexicon, which makes two derivations possible. Steedman emphasizes how important it is to distinguish quantificational and referential uses of noun phrases (especially with respect to indefinite noun phrases). However, he does not deliver criteria for distinguishing them. Instead he declares quite arbitrarily noun phrases to be non-quantificational. In this way, he makes his scope account im-



 Quantifier Scope in German

mune to counterexamples. Whenever a counterexample arises, a noun phrase is declared to be non-quantificational (see 1999: 302, 306, 2000: 72ff., 80, 82f.). In Barker’s (2002) continuation grammar, quantifier scope is basically a semantic phenomenon which is inherently constrained by ‘integrity’: “if there is a syntactic constituent that contains B and C but not A, then A must take scope over both B and C or neither” (Barker 2001: 101; Barker 2002: 225; as Barker remarks, Park’s (1995) and Steedman’s (2000) scope account in the framework of Combinatory Categorial Grammar obey integrity too). Basic sentences with two quantifiers are generally predicted to be ambiguous; in sentences with more quantifiers integrity comes into play. The same criticism as above is applicable: the complex pattern of ambiguous and unequivocal sentences which we have observed in German makes such an account look empirically inadequate. To mention one special problem only, integrity makes false predictions: sentences like Ein Stück hat jeder mehrmals gespielt ‘One piece, everyone played several times’ are counterexamples, as they can have the reading jeder>ein Stück>mehrmals, which should be ruled out by integrity. As far as computational linguistics is concerned, underspecification is currently a popular approach: in sentences with several quantifiers, a representation is built up where the scope relations are not resolved (see Deemter/Peters (eds.) 1996 as well as Muskens 1995). Everything depends on the factors which the process of resolving the scope readings, i.e., the process of disambiguation, depends on. Underspecification as such cannot be taken to be a kind of scope determination.

. Multi-factor theories Multi-factor accounts assume that a sentence’s scope potential is the outcome of the interaction of several factors with lexical properties of quantifiers which are relevant to scope. Some accounts of this type assume, furthermore, that the factors are weighted and, thus, determine the scope potential to a different degree. Such theories are best suited to explain why scope readings can be available to different degrees, i.e., can be differently preferred. The theory I present in this work is a multi-factor theory. Let us have a look at other theories of this kind. Kroch (1974) is the first encompassing work on scope within the tradition of transformational grammar. He militates against the presumption that the relative scope of operators in English (i.e., quantifiers, negation, modalities) is essentially free. He identifies four factors which determine scope relations

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

(1974: §4.4.1): (i) the ordering of the operators in the surface structure, (ii) “scope readjustment rules”, (iii) lexical scope preferences and constraints, (iv) intonation. These factors interact in the following way. On the basis of surface structure, a “general scope principle” (1974: 85) obligatorily builds up a “scope marker” which assigns scope to the operators corresponding to their surface ordering. Optional scope readjustment rules operate on the scope marker. They reorder the elements in the scope marker in a specific way depending on whether the elements are universal quantifiers, existential quantifiers, modal operators or negation. The outcoming scope markers are checked by “output filters” where lexical scope preferences and constraints become operative. A scope marker which is accepted by these filters represents a possible reading of the sentence (which is possibly characterized as preferred or unpreferred). The surface order of the operators is primary in the sense that the reading which is the outcome of the scope principle is always possible unless it is filtered out by lexical scope order incompatibilities. Other readings, however, are possible only by intervention of scope readjustment rules. The surface order of the operators is also primary in the sense that the corresponding scope ordering is preferred in case it is not excluded (1974: 179). As this system of principles, rules and filters is fine-tuned for the English operators, one can criticize it for being devoid of explanatory force. (See Pafel 1991c for problems which arise when one tries to apply this system to German.) However, one should not neglect the range of systematically investigated scope phenomena (quantifiers, negation, modalities), which is very seldom looked at in such a descriptively and systematically careful way as Kroch does. Ioup (1975a, b) assumes two universal scope factors. In contrast to Kroch, she takes the surface order of quantifiers to be scope irrelevant. According to Ioup, the most important factor is the hierarchy of quantity expressions (6.26), which scales quantity expressions according to their tendency to wide scope. “At the top are the universal quantifiers with distributive properties. Then it seems to depend on the size of the set specified” (Ioup 1975a: 42). Indefinite noun phrases in the singular are excluded from the hierarchy and only unaccented occurrences of the expressions are considered. (6.26) each > every > all > most > many > several > some (+ NPpl ) > a few

The second factor is a hierarchy of grammatical functions (see Ioup 1975a: 57): (6.27) 1. topic. 2. subject which is deep and surface subject. 3. subject which is deep or surface subject, but not both. 4. indirect object. 5. prepositional object. 6. direct object.

 Quantifier Scope in German

Ioup bases her claim that these hierarchies are universally the two decisive scope factors on the judgments of native speakers of English and native speakers of thirteen additional languages. This claim has been refuted with respect to Chinese (Huang 1981) and German (Pafel 1991c: 38ff.). The assumption that linear precedence plays no role seems to be especially untenable. Methodologically, Ioup’s investigation is also problematic: in her interpretation of speaker judgments she assumes a connection between relative scope and distributivity which does not exist in that way (see Pafel 1991c: §3.4.1). Nevertheless, Ioup’s account has attractive features which have guided my work on scope. The scope factors have the form of scales or hierarchies and the scope relations are the outcome of the interaction of such scales. In contrast to Kroch (1974), the influence of grammatical functions is taken into consideration and the influence of quantity expressions is accounted for by a scale which assigns the quantity expression properties (esp. distributivity) which are conceptually independent of scope relations. (Similarly VanLehn 1978; Kroch tried to account for the influence of quantity expressions via “scope features”.) These early multi-factor accounts of Kroch, Ioup and VanLehn did not become very popular. In the eighties, quantifier raising, quantifying-in and quantifier storage occupied the stage. Currently, syntactic and/or semantic reconstruction is the most fashionable scope-assigning mechanism. Around the start of the nineties, several linguists independently of one another discovered the benefits of a multi-factor account (Alshawi (ed.) 1992; Kuno 1991; Kuno/Takami/Wu 1999; Kurtzman/MacDonald 1993; Liu 1990, 1997; McCawley 1988; Pafel 1988, 1991b, 1991c, 1993, 1998; Szabolcsi (ed.) 1997).17 In Alshawi (ed.) (1992) a natural language system is presented whose scope component – simply speaking – enriches the scope algorithm of Hobbs/Shieber (1987) with scope rules and scope preferences (see Pafel 1989b for a linguistic evaluation). Kurtzman/MacDonald (1993) is a psycholinguistic investigation which finds evidence of the preference of scope readings that are determined by the interaction of several principles and finds evidence – as far as scope ambiguities are concerned – of human language processing building up possible readings and ranking them with respect to the degree the principles are obeyed (ranked-parallel models). Liu (1990, 1997) tries to explain the complex pattern of ambiguous and unequivocal sentences in English with certain properties of quantifiers, namely being “non-specific” (can be in the scope of other quantifiers und can hardly take scope over a subject if itself is an object) and “generalized-specific” (cannot be in the scope of other quantifiers and/or can easily have scope over a subject if itself is an object). That means that she does not reduce the scope behavior to properties which are independent of scope –

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

which, however, should be, if possible, the aim of a scope analysis and which seems indeed to be possible. McCawley (1988) only demonstrates the necessity of a multi-factor account. Kuno (1991) as well as Kuno/Takami/Wu (1999) was discussed in §5.2. With the work of Beghelli, Stowell and Szabolcsi in Szabolcsi (ed.) (1997) the insight that the scope behavior of quantifiers can differ depending on their properties and that even in simple sentences logically possible readings are systematically excluded, which differs from the conception of May and others, has apparently reached the generative mainstream. (Beghelli, Stowell and Szabolcsi explicitly refer to the work of Kroch, Ioup and, especially, Liu.) The basic idea of this account is (I refer myself above all to Beghelli/Stowell 1997; Beghelli 1997; Szabolcsi 1997a) that quantifiers can or must occupy distinct positions in LF depending on the quantifier type they belong to. The aim is to predict the scope options from the semantic properties of the quantifiers – scope thus becomes an epiphenomenon, a by-product of feature checking movements, see below. Five quantifier types are distinguished: (i) interrogative quantifiers (WhQPs), (ii) negative quantifiers (NQPs), (iii) distributive-universal quantifiers (DQPs) with every and each, (iv) counting quantifiers (CQPs) with few, fewer than five, at most six, more than five and similar expressions, (v) group-denoting quantifiers (GQPs) with a, some, several, one, two, three, the. Depending on the features the quantifiers exhibit as a consequence of belonging to a certain quantifier type, they can or have to occupy the following LF-positions. A minimalist framework is presupposed, i.e., a quantifier has to be moved into its respective position in order to check its feature (see Beghelli/Stowell 1997: 76, 92; Szabolcsi 1997a: 114.)

 Quantifier Scope in German

(6.28)

RefP CP Spec

AgrS-P Spec

GQP

DistP Spec

WhQP

ShareP Spec

CQP

NegP Spec

DQP

AgrO-P Spec

GQP

VP Spec

NQP

... CQP

AgrS-P and AgrO-P are the well-known minimalist projections for case checking. RefP (=Referential Phrase), DistP (=Distributive Phrase) and ShareP (=Distributed Share Phrase) are new, stipulated projections. (The referential reading of a GQP is distinguished from its reading as specifier of RefP, see Beghelli/Stowell (1997: 74), but we are not informed how the two readings can be distinguished in concrete cases.) Let us have a look at the predictions the theory makes (Beghelli/Stowell 1997: 80f.). The following sentences are considered to be ambiguous (as is the case in May and other work) and predicted to be ambiguous. (6.29) a. Every (/each) student read two books. b. Two students read every (/each) book.

In each sentence we have a GQP (two books, two students) and a DQP with every or each. “A GQP should be scopally ambiguous with respect to a clausemate DQP, depending on whether the GQP moves to Spec of RefP or to Spec of ShareP” (1997: 80). The ambiguity of (6.29a) is assumed without discussion (“a familiar fact”), which is a shortcoming, as they assume that GQPs have a referential reading. The predictions of the theory are obviously more or less at variance with the facts in German (and several other languages). For example, we have seen in §2.1 that sentences of the kind (6.30a) are scope unequivocal in German and other languages, and that there is a clear contrast between such pairs as the ones in (6.30) in several languages.

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

(6.30) a.

Jeder Pianist hat zwei Beethoven-Sonaten in seinem Repertoire. (unequivocal) ‘Every piano player has two Beethoven sonatas in his repertoire.’ b. Zwei Beethoven-Sonaten hat jeder Pianist in seinem Repertoire. (ambiguous) ‘Two Beethoven sonatas, every piano player has in his repertoire.’

According to Beghelli/Stowell, one does not expect any contrast; both sentences (as well as the unequivocal Einer der Pianisten hat jede Beethoven-Sonate in seinem Repertoire) should be equally ambiguous (see also the contrast in 6.11).18 The complex pattern of unequivocal and ambiguous sentences that we have observed in German apparently cannot be captured with such an account. The diagnosis is not hard to give: fixed LF-positions for GQP and DQP cannot do justice either to the factor syntactic constellation or to the scope factors grammatical function, discourse binding and thematic property. This theory is in essence a configurational theory of a new type and has, as its configurational predecessors, great problems. This becomes also clear in the interaction between DQPs (or GQPs) and CQPs. Sentences like Every (/one) student visited more than three girls are predicted as unequivocal, as an object CQP cannot be located higher than in Spec of AgrO-P, whereas a DQP or GQP definitely has a higher position in the tree. This prediction would prove true with corresponding German sentences. However, we have observed many times that a quantifier which cannot take a preceding quantifier into scope has wide scope if it linearly precedes the other quantifier. For instance, the object in Mehr als zwei Aufgaben hat jeder (/ein) Student lösen können can have wide scope (see: [Mehr als zwei Aufgaben]1 hat jeder (/ein) Student, der sie1 gestellt bekam, lösen können). But, topicalization should not have any influence on possible LF-landing sites as long as the quantifier type is not modified. As all quantifier types can be located in the Vorfeld, the Vorfeld does not seem to be the exclusive domain of one quantifier type. (Thus, it cannot be identified with a definite LF-position.) If one would like to assume that by topicalization a CQP is (directly or indirectly) located in Spec of RefP (which, however, would contradict 6.28), the problem arises that the CQP can have narrow scope with respect to a universal subject quantifier. The stipulation of fixed LF-positions does not seem to be appropriate for explaining scope relations. This is confirmed by another prediction of this theory: “A WhQP should always take wide scope with respect to any other QP in their clause, other than GQPs when these are assigned scope in Spec of RefP” (1997: 80). That means that a wh-phrase always takes scope over a distribu-

 Quantifier Scope in German

tive universal quantifier. However, the theory is modified in Beghelli (1997) in such a way that the predictions become much better: he allows for the possibility of reconstructing QPs, especially wh-phrases. With this modification of Beghelli/Stowell’s theory, the basic idea of fixed LF-positions for quantifiers is strictly speaking abandoned.19 But with this modification the influence of scope factors like grammatical function and discourse binding can be simulated. Wh-phrases can be checked in their case positions, i.e., the position where their case feature is checked, as well as in Spec of ShareP, if the wh-phrase is discourse-bound. This leads to the following prediction: “A PL [=pair-list] interpretation is only possible when, by reconstructing the WhQP into its Case position, the wh finds itself in the scope of every” (1997: 391). That means that a distributive reading is possible in the configuration (6.31b) only, but not in (6.31a) (cf. 1997: 391). (6.31) a. [CP [Q-Opi + WhQPi ] [... [AgrXP [every N]k ... ]... ]] b. [CP [Q-Opi + t i ] [... [AgrXP [every N]k/i ... ]... [AgrYP {WhQP}i ... ] ... ]]

Q-Opi is a question operator which, in (b), binds the universal quantifier unselectively. Like the configurational theories we have looked at above, this theory has problems with data like the following: (6.19d) Wie viele Kritiker haben jeden Roman rezensiert? (ambiguous), (6.19e) Wer (/was) hat jedem dabei geholfen? (ambiguous), Was für Kindern hat Jakob jedes Märchen erzählt? (ambiguous), as the case position the wh-phrase is reconstructed into is, in each case, higher than the position of the universal quantifier (LF-case hierarchy according to Beghelli: subject > indirect object > direct object). In addition, contrasts like (2.38a) Wie viele Schüler haben jede Aufgabe gelöst? (ambiguous) versus (2.38b) Wann haben wie viele Schüler jede Aufgabe gelöst? (non-distributive), (5.8b) Was für eine Note hat eigentlich jeder bekommen? (ambiguous) versus (5.8a) Was hat eigentlich jeder für eine Note bekommen? (distributive) or (3.51b) Wo glaubt jeder, dass sie gerne leben würde? (ambiguous) versus (3.51a) Was glaubt jeder, wo sie gerne leben würde? (distributive) are unexpected according to this theory as they show the influence of s-structural properties on the scope relations. I think it is quite clear that stipulating fixed LF-positions for certain quantifier types is not a promising account if one wants to cope with the scope behavior of quantifiers (as noted, by referring to reconstruction, the basic idea of LF-positions is already abandoned). Illuminating independent reasons for fixed LF-positions are not presented by Beghelli/Stowell. (It is clear that their model is the currently fashionable minimalist feature checking.)

Chapter 6. Alternative scope accounts 

This is the end of our stroll through different scope accounts. An alternative to our multi-factor model did not emerge. And we did not come across evidence that scope can be considered an epiphenomenon of independent syntactic or semantic relations. That means that in linguistic theory we cannot but assume a genuine process of scope determination.

Notes . For a reconstruction of this debate see Huck/Goldsmith (1995). . Liu (1990: 14, 1997: 17) assumes an additional reading where no noun phrase is in the scope of the other (“branching quantification”). I do not think that this is a reading to be distinguished from the most>every scope reading: it is a reading where the wide-scope most-DP is interpreted non-distributively (see §1.4.2). . Fox (1995, 2000), who combines QR and QL with economy considerations, makes the similar, albeit a bit more restrictive, prediction that a sentence with n quantifiers has n! readings, if the readings differ in truth-conditions, more exactly, if the quantifiers are scopally commutative (2000: 26). Compare Reinhart (1995) and see Liu (1997: §7.3) for critical comments. . Surprisingly, in May (1985) there is no extensive discussion of Huang (1982), which heavily calls into question May’s scope principle. . “A node A c-commands B iff the first maximal projection dominating A also dominates B” (Reinhart 1983: 25). This definition amounts to the definition of c-command in Aoun/Sportiche (1983: 224) and m-command in Chomsky (1986: 8), although the condition that B may not be dominated by A is missing. . In psycholinguistic work on the resolution of quantifier scope ambiguities, a similiar assumption is made by Tunstall (1997) and Frazier (1999). Tunstall’s principle of scope interpretation states that the preferred interpretation of a sentence corresponds to the logical form that differs minimally from the surface structure. See Villalta (2003) for a critical assessment of this approach from a psycholinguistic point of view. . Similarly, Reinhart’s (1983: 193f.) explanation of the ambiguity of (i) becomes questionable (symmetrical c-command of the quantifiers). The ambiguity of (ii), which should be explained in the same way as the ambiguity of (i), cannot be explained by symmetrical c-command. (i)

Two languages, everybody speaks.

(ii)

Zwei Sprachen spricht jeder.

. Example 8 in Kuno (1991). . See the overview in Lasnik/Uriagereka/Boeckx (2005: §6). They come to the conclusion that it might well be that, if the minimalist “feature attraction program is pursued fully, [...]

 Quantifier Scope in German

there would not only be no evidence, but in fact also no theoretical motivation, for a syntactic active covert component” (216), i.e., for an “LF component proper”. . For a similar account see Lechner (1998), who relies on optional semantic reconstruction of quantifiers with weak determiners. . Left-dislocation, which, according to Höhle, is possible with indefinite noun phrases, but not with proper quantifiers, cannot be considered a criterion for a quantifier being a proper quantifier, as there are more expressions than only proper quantifiers which cannot be left-dislocated. . Höhle (1991) does not deal with the scope of wh-phrases. As he does not offer a criterion for proper quantifiers, it is not possible to decide which predictions his theory makes concerning the interrogative sentences in (6.18) and (6.19). . Frey assumes that, at least in some cases, a quantifier which cannot have wide scope can obtain wide scope by being accented. This is the opposite to what we have observed (see §2.2.7). In the example that is offered of this effect (Viele Männer haben mindestens EINE Frau hofiert (1993: 179f.)), the fact that quantifiers with viele exhibit non-distributive readings is not taken into account (see §2.2.4 as well as Pafel 1991c: 66f.). . The account of wh/Q-interaction in Frey (1993: §10.11) is a step behind the state of the art reached in Pafel (1991b), where one already finds the counterexamples to scope theories which base scope determination on the c-command relations of the quantifiers and their traces. . Similar to Jacobs, Krifka (1998: §2) claims that the rise-fall contour generally makes scope inversion possible. Krifka mentions some exceptions (1998: §8.3), but sentences like JEDer Student hat mindestens EIN en Roman gelesen ‘Every student read at least one novel’ are taken to be scopally ambiguous. . According to the presentation in Poesio (1996), Verkuyl (1992) seems to apply a similar strategy. (This work was not accessible to me.) . See also Kiss (2001), where a mixed configurational-relational account of the scope of German quantifiers is sketched based on two scope factors proposed in Pafel (1993). . It is surprising that neither Beghelli/Stowell nor anyone else in Szabolcsi (ed.) (1997) refers to comparable data in Mandarin, Japanese and Korean, which are well known in the generative literature with the work of Huang, Hoji and Aoun/Li. It is also striking that an analysis of the effect of topicalization on scope in English is missing. . In their approach to quantifier scope in Hungarian, Szabolcsi (1997a: §10) and Brody/ Szabolcsi (2003) weaken the basic idea even further by allowing that the operator series “Referential Phrase–Distributive Phrase–Counting Quantifier Phrase” repeats.

Chapter 7

Towards a theory of semantic structure

Semantic structure is the level of analysis where the meaning-compositional aspects of the readings of a sentence and its parts are represented. In the course of this investigation I came to the conclusion that semantic structure is a genuine semantic level of analysis which should neither be identified with a syntactic level of analysis nor with a translation into the language of predicate logic. On the level of semantic structure, the scope of a quantifier can be defined as the domain the quantifier commands (cf. §2.4.2 above) and the regularities of relative and absolute scope can be implemented as correspondence constraints connecting semantic and syntactic structure. In this chapter, I will investigate the nature of semantic structure. I will have a look at the formal aspects of semantic structure, i.e., the semantic features and semantic structures this level of analysis consists of (§7.1), the interpretation of semantic structures (§7.2), and the construction of semantic structures from syntactic ones (§7.3). I do not pretend to deliver more than a sketch of the questions the nature of semantic structure poses if one seriously conceives it as a truely semantic level of analysis. There are too many difficult fundamental questions to be answered. Nevertheless, I hope that it will become clear that, as far as quantifier scope is concerned, there is a uniform process of scope determination which encompasses not only the scope of explicit quantifiers, but also the scope of implicit quantifiers and which copes with the different behavior of explicit and implicit quantifiers as well as the differences among the diverse explicit quantifiers and implicit quantifiers themselves.

. The form of semantic structure .. Semantic features and semantic structures At the level of semantic structure, a sentence and its (semantically relevant) parts are assigned a semantic type, a semantic category and other semantic fea-

 Quantifier Scope in German

tures. We assume two types of semantic expressions: semantic word (X) and semantic phrase (XP), and three semantic categories: predicative, terminative and quantificational expressions. Semantic structures are built up in accordance with the following three schemata: (in speaking of words and phrases in this chapter, I always mean semantic words and semantic phrases unless indicated otherwise) (7.1) a.

[XP YP* – X ] (complementation) = a word is complemented to a phrase via arbitrarily many phrases b. [X YP – X ] (enlargement) = a word is enlarged by a phrase to a (complex) word c. [XP YP – XP ] (adjunction) = a phrase is adjoined to a phrase yielding a phrase of the same category as the phrase adjoined to

There are three elementary sorts of semantic words: predicates (P), term operators (T) and q-operators (Q). Complex words can be built up by enlarging a word (7.1b). For instance, a predicate can be enlarged by a term (see below) to a (more complex) predicate. (7.2)

[P TP – P ]

There are three sorts of semantic phrases: predications (PP), terms (TP), quantifiers (QP). Quantifiers, terms and simple predications are built up in accordance with the complementation schema (7.1a). Quantifier-adjunction, the only kind of complex predication, is built up in accordance with the adjunction schema (7.1c). (7.3) a. b. c. d.

[PP TP – P ] [TP T – PP ] [QP Q – PP ] [PP QPi – PP[xi ] ]

(simple predication) (term) (quantifier) (quantifier-adjunction)

(The quantifier adjoined to a predication bears the same index as a variable contained in the predication – see below.) Summarising, we have so far: (7.4) Ingredients of semantic structure: types: word, phrase categories: predicative, terminative, quantificational structures: complementation, enlargement, adjunction

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

Inventory of semantic items: elementary words (predicates, term operators, q-operators) complex words phrases (simple and complex predications, terms, quantifiers)

Here are further features which we assume: negative [±neg], inherently distributive [dis:1], strongly distributive [dis:2], negation attractive [±neg-att]. Additionally, we have features denoting the thematic role of a phrase [Θi ] – with [Θ1 ], [Θ2 ] etc. being different thematic roles, whose exact nature we will not discuss. Possibly, the indices and variables we make use of can be thought of as features too. .. The semantic characterization of lexical items and syntactic phrases The semantic properties of a lexical item are given (partially) by its semantic characterization, which complements its phonological and syntactical characterization. Predicates (i.e., the majority of verbs, nouns, adjectives and prepositions) are characterized by the number and nature of elements which are needed to make up a predication. The semantic characterization of one-place predicates like laufen ‘walk’ or husten ‘cough’ looks like the following: (7.5)

PP

TP[Èi]

P

laufen, husten

One term complementing the predicate is sufficient to form a predication (I will not be concerned with temporal and local specifications, which, in many cases, are necessary to form a complete predication). Strictly speaking, by being characterized semantically as in (7.5), a verb is semantically described as a predication consisting of a certain predicate and an unrealized complementing term – and not as a predicate only. This captures what Frege called the unsaturatedness of predicative expressions. Nevertheless, I will continue speaking of verbs, adjectives etc. as predicates, at least, for reasons of simplicity. Alternatively, the semantic characterization of a verb like laufen might consist in characterizing the verb as a predicate with a certain (semantic) valence feature,

 Quantifier Scope in German

i.e., the requirement of being supplemented by a logical subject (for this term, see below). The semantic characterization of two-place predicates like beobachten ‘observe’ or küssen ‘kiss’ looks like the following: (7.6)

PP

TP[Èi]

P

TP[Èj]

P

beobachten, küssen

The thematic roles are specified such that TP[Θi ] is the ‘logical subject’ and TP[Θj ] is the ‘logical object’ of the predicate, that means, that Θi comes to be the agent and Θj the patient role. The logical object TP[Θj ] enlarges the predicate to a more complex predicate which is complemented by the logical subject TP[Θi ] to a predication. I will come back to logical subjects in a moment. The semantic characterization of three-place predicates like geben ‘give’ looks like the following: (7.7)

PP

TP[Èi]

P

TP[Èj]

P

TP[Èk]

P

geben

The thematic roles are specified such that TP[Θi ] is the logical subject and that TP[Θj ] and TP[Θk ] are the logical objects. It does not matter which of the logical objects has which role, i.e., which one is the direct or indirect object.

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

One can give a configurational definition to what I have called logical subject and object: the logical subject of a predicate is the term which complements it to a predication; a logical object of a predicate is a term which enlarges the predicate. The arguments of a predicate are the terms which are necessary to make the predicate into a predication (or, the terms which are assigned a thematic role by the predicate). The unexpanded terms in the structures (7.5) to (7.7) are called open arguments. A one-place predicate like the noun Katze ‘cat’ has one argument, which, however, is not an open argument: (7.8)

PP[x]

TP[Èi]

T

P

Katze

x

I choose x as the head of the term indicating that the argument of Katze is a variable.1 The predication is marked by [x] as containing a variable to be bound. The chosen format of the semantic characterization of predicates allows us to cope with zero-place predicates as well as with one-place predicates without a logical subject in a natural way. I will deal with zero-place predicates first. The semantic characterization of the verb regnen ‘rain’ looks like the following: (7.9)

PP

P

regnen

The verb has the semantic status of a predication whose only element is the predicate regnen. It is an advantage to be able to distinguish predication and predicate in the case of impersonal verbs, for instance, in order to distinguish between predicative and sentential modification.

 Quantifier Scope in German

The verb ekeln ‘be disgusted’ can be construed with a (dative or accusative) object, but without a (nominative) subject, if one intends to express that someone is in a specific kind of psychological state (mich ekelt, mir ekelt). But it is not possible to express the same state of affairs with the help of a subject: *Ich ekele. Our format allows us to represent this use of the verb as an impersonal, i.e., subjectless, predication: (7.10)

PP

P

TP[Èi]

P

ekeln

A verb like frieren ‘be cold’ allows both kinds of uses – an impersonal and a personal one with not much difference in meaning: mich friert vs. ich friere. Quantity expressions like viel- ‘many’ – being adjectives or determiners – are proposed to be, or to contain, a two-place predicate denoting a relation between pluralities (or masses) and kinds (cf. §1.4.2). (7.11)

PP[xi]

TP

P

xi

TP

T PP[xj]

P

viel-

ê

The logical subject of viel- denotes the plurality (or mass) and the logical object the kind, relative to that the plurality (or mass) is characterized as ‘many of this kind’.

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

While there are many predicates (or open predications) among lexical items, there are only a few term operators (or open terms) among them. The definite and indefinite article and other referential determiners belong to them. Their semantic characterization contains an open predication argument – see the definite article. (7.12)

TP

T

PP[x]

der

The quantificational determiners, on the other hand, are semantically characterized as (open) quantifiers. I have represented explicit quantifiers as restricted existential or universal quantifiers – ∃x[φx] and ∀x[φx] – containing quantity predicates on pluralities (cf. 7.11). In its use as a quantificational determiner, the semantic characterization of viel- might look like the following: (7.13)

QP[DIS:2]

Q

$

PP[xi]

TP

P

xi

TP

T PP[xj]

P

viel-

ê

The feature [dis:2] marks the QP as strongly distributive (cf. §2.2.4). The feature [xi ] indicates the variable which is bound by the q-operator. The characterization of the inherently distributive jed- looks like the following (cf. §1.4.2):

 Quantifier Scope in German

(7.14)

QP[DIS:1]

Q

PP[xi]

$

TP

xi

P

TP

T

P

jed-

PP[xj]

k

The semantic structure of noun phrases is now clear. Here are three examples which we will use later: (7.15) a. der Bass ‘the bass’ TP b.

T

der

PP[x]

TP

P

T

Bass

x

c.

abbreviated: [TP der [PP x Bass]]

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

(7.16) a. jeder Pianist ‘every piano player’ b. QP[DIS:1]

Q

$

PP[xi]

TP

P

T

TP

P

xi T

PP[xj]

k

Pianist

jeder

(7.17) a. einige Fugen ‘some fugues’ QP b.

Q

$

PP[x1]

TP

P

T

TP

xi T

P

PP[xj] einige

k Fugen

It is obvious that, in constructing these semantic structures, we mimic the logical representations which we used in §1.4: (7.18) a. ιx[Bass(x)] b. ∃x[All(x,κx[*Piano-player(x)])] c. ∃x[Some(x,κx[*Fugue(x)])]

 Quantifier Scope in German

The semantic structures of verb phrases do not come as a surprise (the fine structure of terms and quantifiers is left out here): (7.19) a. [VP [DP Marie] [VP [DP den Bass] [V spielt]]] PP b. TP[Èi]

P

TP[Èj]

Marie

den Bass

P

spielt

(7.20) a. [VP [DP jeder Pianist]1 [VP [DP einige Fugen]2 [V spielt]]] PP b.

QP1

PP[x1]

jeder Pianist

QP2

PP[x2]

einige Fugen TP[Èi]

T

x1

P

TP[Èj]

T

P

spielt

x2

Here we have made use of quantifier-adjunction (7.3d). According to the scope definition (2.197) “The scope of a quantifier is the domain which the quantifier commands on semantic structure”, jeder Pianist takes unequivocally scope over einige Fugen in (7.20b), which is the only possible scope reading of (7.20a). It is evident that I have constructed the syntax of semantic structures with the syntax of first-order logic in mind. So, it is in most cases very easy to

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

translate into first-order logic with restricted quantifiers. Sentence (7.20), for example, can be translated as (7.21) ∀x[Piano-player(x)] ∃y[Fugue(y)] Play(x,y)

Adverbial quantifiers can be dealt within the same format as DP-quantifiers. Necessarily, e.g., can be analyzed as “in every imaginable situation x, it is the case that the proposition which is identical to PP is true in x”. Then the sentence (dass) es notwendigerweise regnet ‘(that) it rains necessarily’ means that in every imaginable situation it is raining. Like DP-quantifiers, adverbial quantifiers induce a QP. Differing from DP-quantifiers, adverbial quantifiers additionally induce a predication – necessarily, for instance, induces a truein-predication (see also below 7.37). (7.22) a. [VP [DP es] [VP [AdvP notwendigerweise] [VP [V regnet]]]] PP b.

QP1

PP[x1]

ALL IMAGINABLE

TP

P

SITUATIONS T

PP

TP

i

= PP

T

P

P

TRUE-IN

x1

regnet

. The interpretation of semantic structure As the translation of semantic structures into first-order logic is, for the most part, straightforward, we could interpret the proposed semantic structures in the common set-theoretical way used in model-theoretic semantics (for in-

 Quantifier Scope in German

stance, in the way proposed by Heim/Kratzer 1998, to mention one recent textbook only). However, I will not do it that way. The reason is that it seems to me that what predicative expressions denote cannot be identified with sets or functions. Let “concepts” be whatever it is that predicates denote. We are used to saying that predicates denote properties, relations, kinds, actions, events, processes or states, and we know that the semantic behavior of predicates depends much on whether they denote properties, relations, kinds, actions, events, processes or states. Can we identify these varieties of “concepts” with sets or functions? I do not think so. If we let predicates denote the set of entities for which they are true, then two problems arise. Firstly, the differences between properties, relations, kinds, actions, events, processes or states cannot be read off from the sets of entities predicates are true for: different predicates can be true for one and the same entity and it is conceivable that, for example, a process predicate is true for the same entities as a state or property predicate. Secondly, predicates can have a distinct content, even though they are (necessarily) true for the same entities – to be a round square and to be a whole number which is not divisible by one are such predicates.2 Thus I do not take concepts – i.e., properties, relations, kinds, types of actions, events, processes and states – to be set-theoretical entities, but rather a special kind of abstract entity (cf. Strawson 1974: 16). It is a characteristic property of concepts that they can be “realized”: a kind is realized iff there is an entity which exemplifies the kind, an event type is realized iff there is an event of a certain sort etc. Additionally, many concepts can be “satisfied” by objects. The concept ‘run’, for instance, is satisfied by an object iff there is a realization of the concept, i.e., an event of running, and the event is a part, or more specifically, a moment of the object.3 I will treat concepts and propositions as abstract entities in their own right that are not reducible to sets. Thus, the domain of universe D encompasses concrete entities D1 , concepts D2 and propositions D3 . In the spirit of Bealer (1982), I will make use of algebraic functions in interpreting semantic structures. A (non-negative) predication with a logical subject is interpreted with the help of the function of satisfaction:4 (7.23) a.

PP[–NEG]

TP

P

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

b. fsatisfaction (˚TP, ˚P) = ˚PP, D x D2 => D3 , with: ˚PP being the proposition which is true iff ˚TP satisfies ˚P.

For example, Lola is running denotes the proposition which is true iff Lola satisfies the concept ‘run’, i.e., iff there is an event of running which is a moment of Lola (whose ‘agent’ is Lola). The corresponding negative predication is interpreted with the help of the function of non-satisfaction: (7.24) a.

PP[+NEG]

TP

P

b. fnon-satisfaction (˚TP, ˚P) = ˚PP, D x D2 => D3 , with: ˚PP being the proposition which is true iff ˚TP does not satisfy ˚P.

For example, Lola isn’t running denotes the proposition which is true iff the denotation of Lola does not satisfy the concept ‘run’, i.e., iff there is no event of running which is a moment of Lola (whose ‘agent’ is Lola). This semantic analysis of negation fits with our view that a negative element like not is not an operator, but a marker marking a phrase as negative. It is the marking of the predication as negative which has semantic import. An impersonal non-negative predication without a logical subject is interpreted with the help of the function of realization: (7.25) a.

PP[–NEG]

P

b. frealization (˚P) = ˚PP, D2 => D3 , with: ˚PP being the proposition which is true iff ˚P is realized.

For example, It is raining denotes the proposition which is true iff the concept ‘rain’ is realized, i.e., iff there is an event of raining. The corresponding negative predication is interpreted with help of the function of non-realization: (7.26) a.

PP[+NEG]

P

 Quantifier Scope in German

b. fnon-realization (˚P) = ˚PP, D2 => D3 , with: ˚PP being the proposition which is true iff ˚P is not realized.

For example, It isn’t raining denotes the proposition which is true iff the concept ‘rain’ is not realized, i.e., iff there is no event of raining. In §7.1.2 we formally distinguished logical subjects (which complement predicates) from logical objects (which enlarge predicates). Semantically, the denotation of a logical subject is – within a predication – presented as satisfying or as not satisfying a concept. Logical objects differ. The enlargement of a predicate by a term is interpreted with the help of the function of enrichment: (7.27) a.

Pi

TP[È]

Pj

b. fenrichment (˚TP, Θ, ˚Pj ) = ˚Pi , D x D2 x D2 => D2 , with: ˚Pi being the concept which is realized iff there is a realization R of ˚Pj and R stands in the relation Θ to ˚TP.

For example, the VP is kissing Juliet denotes the concept which is realized iff there is an event of kissing which has Juliet as its patient. If a predicate has two objects (give, for instance), the predicate is enlarged in two steps (cf. 7.7). It does not matter which of the objects comes first. Both objects (i.e., their denotations) enrich a concept, they differ with respect to their thematic role. The idea that the arguments of a predicate are ordered, that there is a first, second, third etc. argument plays no role in our view. Logical subjects and objects are distinguished formally and semantically without making use of the idea of order among the arguments, i.e., without making use of n-tupels. Let us move on to terms (TPs). A term with the term operator der ‘the’ is interpreted with the help of the function iota: (7.28) a.

TP

T

PP[x]

der

b. fiota (˚PP[x]) = ˚TP, D3 => D, with: ˚TP is the maximal thing G that makes ˚PP[x] true.

(Df. G makes ˚PP[x] true iff G is such that ˚PP[x] is true with ˚x=G.)

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

Differing from terms, QPs are not interpretational units; it is the whole quantifier-adjunction structure which is interpreted. (For arguments that quantifiers are not second-order predicates see Pafel 1991a: §3.3.) That means that QPs cannot be combined with predicates via complementation or enlargement. And this is the reason why in quantification, a quantifier-variable configuration must be built up (which looks as if quantifiers are ‘raised’ or ‘displaced’ from the position which they have in syntax; more on that in §7.3.1). Existential quantification first: (7.29) a.

PPi

QP1[–NEG]

Q

PPj[x1]

PPk[x1]

$

b. f∃ (˚PPk [x1 ], ˚PPj [x1 ]) = ˚PPi , D3 x D3 => D3 , such that: ˚PPi is the proposition which is true iff there is a G that makes ˚PPk [x1 ] and ˚PPj [x1 ] true.

The same is true for universal quantification. The interpretation of the corresponding predication with a negative existential quantifier might look like the following: (7.30) a.

PPi

QP1[+NEG]

Q

PPj[x1]

PPk[x1]

$

b. f¬∃ (˚PPk [x1 ], ˚PPj [x1 ]) = ˚PPi , D3 x D3 => D3 , such that: ˚PPi is the proposition which is true iff there is no G that makes ˚PPk [x1 ] and ˚PPj [x1 ] true.

 Quantifier Scope in German

A predicate can not only be enlarged by a term, but also by an (open) predication. Enlargement of a predicate by a predication is interpreted with the help of the function of modification: (7.31) a.

Pi

PP[x]

Pj

b. fmodification (˚PP[x], ˚Pj ) = ˚Pi , D3 x D2 => D2 , such that: ˚Pi being the concept which is realized iff there is realization R of ˚Pj and R makes ˚PP[x] true.

For example, is running fast denotes the concept which is realized iff there is an event of running and this event is fast (as an event of running). Summarizing, in interpreting semantic structures we make use (at least) of the following functions: fsatisfaction , fnon-satisfaction , frealization , fnon-realization , fenrichment , fmodification , fiota , f∃ , f¬∃ , f∀ , f¬∀ .

. The construction of semantic structures from syntactic structures .. Semantic specifications and quantifier stores I will now sketch a procedure of how to get to the semantic structure of a sentence on the basis of its syntactic structure. The basic idea is as follows: every node of a syntactic structure is assigned a “semantic specification” which is the outcome of the semantic specifications of the nodes it immediately dominates. A semantic specification is a pair <SS,QS> consisting of a semantic structure SS and a quantifier store QS, which contains n ordered quantifiers QPs (n≥0). If every node of a sentence’s syntactic structure is assigned a semantic specification, the sentence’s semantic structure can be read off from the semantic specification of the sentence’s top node. The syntactic structures which I assume in this investigation (cf. §1.3) conform to the following three schemata (X and Y are variables for the syntactic categories N, V, A, P, D and S, precedence is not determined by the schemata): (7.32) a. [XP X – YP*] b. [XP XP – YP] c. [X X – Y]

(complementation schema) (adjunction schema no. 1) (adjunction schema no. 2)

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

(7.33) a.

[DP D – NP], [SP S – VP], [VP XP – V], [AP XP – A], [NP N – XP], [PP P – DP] b. [D D – A], [VP XP – VP], [NP NP – PP], [NP AP – NP]

The complementation schema says that a phrase of category X can immediately contain a word of category X and arbitrarily many phrases of any syntactic category Y – with the word (X) being the head of the complement structure. In other words, the word is supplemented to a phrase by an arbitrary number of complements. We dub a structure, whose top node is the mother of a local tree matching the complementation schema, a small XP. (The phrases in (7.33a) are small XPs.) Adjunction schema no. 1 says that a phrase of category X can immediately contain a phrase of the same category X (which is the head of the adjunction structure) and a phrase of any syntactic category Y. Adjunction schema no. 2 says that a word of category X can immediately contain a word of the same category X (which is the head of the adjunction structure) and a word of any syntactic category Y. In contrast to complements, a syntactic unit can have only one adjunct. In (7.33b) there are some instances of the adjunction schemata. Let us come back to the semantic specifications of the nodes of a syntactic structure. The semantic specification of nodes which immediately dominate a lexical item generally consists of an empty quantifier store and a semantic structure which is identical to the semantic characterization of the lexical item. For instance, (7.34b) is the (simplified) semantic specification of the V-node in (7.34a), and (7.35b) is the (simplified) semantic specification of (7.35a): (7.34) a.

V

spielt

b. < [PP TP[Θi ] TP[Θj ] spielt], ø > (7.35) a.

D

jeder

b. < [QP[dis:1] ∃[PP x TP jeder]], ø >

The quantificational expressions are the place where the quantifier store of a semantic specification is filled. The DP-node in (7.36a), for instance, has a semantic specification whose first part is a variable and whose quantifier store consists of a QP co-indexed with the variable (and the DP-node).

 Quantifier Scope in German

(7.36) a.

DP1

D

NP

jeder

Pianist

b. < [TP [T x]]1 , [QP[dis:1] ∃[PP x κ(x Pianist) jeder]]1 >

Below we will have a closer look at how the semantic specification of a DP is built up. An adverbial quantifier like notwendigerweise ‘necessarily’ has the semantic specification (7.37), whose first part is a proposition with an open propositional argument (cf. 7.22). (7.37)

ALL IMAGINABLE SITUATIONS

T

PP

TP

P

i

= PP

T

TRUE-IN

x1

If a quantifier store which already contains a quantifier (QP1 ) is to be enriched by a further quantifier (QP2 ), there are two possibilities to order the quantifiers: either QP1 precedes the other quantifier (QP1 •QP2 ) or it follows it (QP2 •QP1 ). These two orderings indirectly represent the two relative scope options, as we will see when we have a look at the operation of integrating a quantifier store into a semantic structure. Which one of the two orderings a quantifier store will contain is mainly determined by the relative scope computation, by the relative scope model. In §2.4.2, we conceived this linear model as the basis of correspondence relations between semantic and syntactic structure (cf. 2.207, 3.93, 3.94).

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

(7.38) Correspondence constraints concerning relative scope5 C1 Quantifier Q1 commanding quantifier Q2 on semantic structure SEM fits with the syntactic counterpart of Q1 preceding the syntactic counterpart of Q2 on syntactic structure SYN only if preference value(Q1 >Q2 ) = 0 with respect to the properties of Q1 and Q2 in SEM and their counterparts in SYN. C2 Quantifier Q2 commanding quantifier Q1 on semantic structure SEM fits with the syntactic counterpart of Q1 preceding the syntactic counterpart of Q2 on syntactic structure SYN only if preference value(Q2 >Q1 ) = 0 with respect to the properties of Q1 and Q2 in SEM and their counterparts in SYN.

These constraints are now reformulated as constraints relating the order of QPs in a quantifier store and the linear precedence of the syntactic counterparts of the QPs: (7.39) Correspondence constraints concerning relative scope Let S be the semantic specification of a syntactic node N. Then: a. The order QPn •QPm in the quantifier store of S fits with αn preceding βm in N, αn and βm not being marked as [empty] only if preference value(QPn >QPm ) = 0 with respect to the properties of QPn and QPm and their syntactic counterparts αn and βm . b. The order QPm •QPn in the quantifier store of S fits with αn preceding βm in N, αn and βm not being marked as [empty] only if preference value(QPm >QPn ) = 0 with respect to the properties of QPn and QPm and their syntactic counterparts αn and βm .

Thus, the linear relative scope model determines the possible orderings of the QPs in the quantifier stores. The restriction on non-empty syntactic items is necessary in all cases where a quantificational expression occurs together with a trace being co-indexed with it in syntactic structure: it is the syntactic position of the overt phrase which is decisive for the relative scope determination with respect to the factor of syntactic constellation, i.e., with respect to the properties of internal and external precedence (in-pre, ex-pre). The subdivision of the scope-relevant properties as syntactic and semantic properties looks like the following. Syntactic constellation belongs, of course, to the syntactic structure. Syntactic d-binding s-db (simplified: do we have a partitive construction or not?) and focus (is the quantificational expression marked as [+f] or not?) are properties of syntactic structure, too. All other scope-relevant properties involve semantic structure. A quantificational ex-

 Quantifier Scope in German

pression is subject iff the variable it induces, i.e., the first part of its semantic specification, saturates the subject argument of a PP (see below and compare the configurational definition of the logical subject in §7.1.2). A quantificational expression is s-adv iff the first part of its semantic specification is an open proposition (cf. 7.37). The property of strong or weak patienthood (stpat, we-pat) follows from the thematic role feature of the variable induced by the quantificational expression. Distributivity (in-dis, st-dis), definiteness (def), lexical d-binding (l-db) and negation attraction (neg-att) follow from the semantic features of the QP. As far as distributivity is concerned, I already put forth the features [dis:1] and [dis:2]. Assuming corresponding features with respect to lexical d-binding, definiteness and negation attraction – features which a quantifier is lexically marked for – is self-evident. In order to construct the semantic specification of complex phrases, we need three specific operations: the combination of two semantic structures, the integration of a quantifier store into a semantic structure and the unification of two quantifier stores. Two semantic structures are combined if one structure saturates an open argument of the other structure. For example, the semantic structure (7.40) and (7.41) are combined in (7.42) by TP Marie saturating the subject argument of the PP (7.41). (7.40)

TP

Marie

(7.41)

PP

TP[Èi]

TP[Èj]

den Bass

P

P

spielt

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

(7.42)

PP

TP[Èi]

Marie

P

TP[Èj]

den Bass

P

spielt

A quantifier store is integrated into a semantic structure if the quantifiers contained in the store are adjoined to the semantic structure in the reverse order to the order in which they occur in the store. For example, the quantifier store QP1 •QP2 is integrated into the semantic structure [PPi ... ] if we arrive at the semantic structure: (7.43) [PP QP1 [PP QP2 [PPi ... ]]]

More exactly, a quantifier store is integrated into a semantic structure iff the quantifiers contained in the store are adjoined to the semantic structure in the reverse order to the order in which they occur in the store, unless the quantifiers have the feature [a-strong] or precede a quantifier with this feature in the quantifier store; in that case adjunction is prohibited. We will deal with this feature later, which I introduced in §4.3 and is purported to achieve widest absolute scope for a quantifier. Two quantifier stores are unified to a quantifier store iff this quantifier store encompasses all and only the quantifiers of the two quantifier stores. The correspondence constraints in (7.39) apply to this new store too, of course. Now, we can treat the construction of the semantic specification of complex syntactic phrases. The semantic specification of a small DP (we ignore here the possibility of quantifiers embedded in the DP) is constructed as follows: If K is the top node of a small DP with index n, its head has the semantic specification and its complement has the semantic specification <SS,ø>, then K has the semantic specification with QS being the result of combining QP and SS. Let us now have a look at the semantic specification of the top node of a small VP, AP, DP and SP. Remember that we came to the conclusion in §3.4.1 that a quantificational expression which is (included in) the complement of V, A, D or S is bound in its absolute scope to the small VP, AP, DP and SP (in contrast to complements of N or P, which are not bound in their absolute

 Quantifier Scope in German

scope to NP or PP). I implement this in the following way: if K is the top node of a small XP (X=N,P), SS of K’s semantic specification <SS,QS> results from (i) the combination of the semantic structures of (the semantic specification of) the head of the XP and the complement and (ii) the integration of the complement’s quantifier store into the result of (i) – QS is empty unless there are QPs which cannot be integrated. Take the small VP einige Fugen spielt ‘plays some fugues’ as an example (Sem(X) gives us the semantic specification of X): (7.44) a. [VP [DP[acc] einige Fugen]2 [V spielt]] b. Sem(DP2 ) = < [TP [T x]]2 , [QP ∃[PP x κ(x Fugen) einige]]2 > Sem(V) = < [PP TP[Θi ] TP[Θj ] spielt], ø>

Only the semantic structure of the verb displays open arguments, which can be saturated in the process of combining two semantic structures. So, if the variable, i.e., the first part of the semantic specification of the DP, saturates the object argument of spielt, we get (7.45): (7.45) [PP TP[Θi ] [TP[Θj ] [T x]]2 spielt]

Integrating the quantifier store of the semantic specification of the DP into (7.45), we get the following (simplified) result: (7.46) [PP [QP einige Fugen]2 [PP TP[Θi ] [TP[Θj ] [T x]]2 spielt]]

Thus, the semantic specification of the VP looks like the following: (7.47) < [PP [QP einige Fugen]2 [PP TP[Θi ] [TP[Θj ] [T x]]2 spielt]] , ø >

One can already anticipate that this causes every quantifier which is adjoined to the VP to outscope necessarily a quantifier contained in the small VP (see below). In combining the variable and the semantic structure of spielt, the variable saturates the object, but not the subject argument of the verb. But why not the other way round? As far as German is concerned, “linking” noun phrases with arguments of verbs suggests that case is of uttermost importance. The function of case can be captured by correspondence constraints between the semantic and the syntactic structure of a sentence of approximately the following sort: if the logical subject of a predicate is a noun phrase, the noun phrase has to be in the nominative case; if the object of a predicate is a noun phrase, the noun phrase has to be in the accusative case (cf. the two-level rules in §2.4.2).

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

(7.48) Correspondence constraints concerning case: a. [PP TPi P] : DPi ⇒ : DPi [case: nom] b. [P TPj P] : DPj ⇒ : DPj [case: acc]

Condition (7.48a) says that if a subject term and a DP share the same index, the DP is in the nominative case; condition (7.48b) says that if a object term and a DP share the same index, the DP has to be in the accusative case. This primitive case theory is sufficient for our needs. In the example above, the accusative DP einige Fugen carries the same index (2) as the corresponding variable and QP. Thus, a semantic structure containing this expression obeys (7.48) only if the variable is a logical object. With such a case theory, the saturation of the object argument of spielt by the variable of einige Fugen is the only option in combining the variable and the semantic structure of the verb. That means that in linking the DP einige Fugen with an argument of the verb, the exact position of the DP in the syntactic structure is of no importance. The DP can be the complement of V or an adjunct of VP. It can follow the subject-DP or precede it. It does not matter. Generally, as for the linking of a syntactic phrase with an argument of a predicate, word order is of no importance in German. (In other words: the constraints on word order are independent of semantic composition.) This trait of our account is at striking variance with the standard view on semantic composition, which relies on the idea that a predicate’s arguments have to come in a fixed order in syntactic structure to get the semantic composition right. From our perspective, linking can be achieved in different ways: by case marking, word order or other means. Back to the semantic specification of complex syntactic phrases. As for NP and PP, the absolute scope of quantifiers which are part of the complement of N or P is not restricted to NP and PP. That means that the quantifier store of the complement will be passed on to the quantifier store of the NP or PP: if K is the top node of a small NP or PP, (i) SS of K’s semantic specification <SS,QS> results from combining the semantic structures of head and complement and (ii) QS of K is identical to the complement’s quantifier store. This guarantees the possibility of the inverse reading in noun phrases with quantificational genitive attributes (die Umgebung eines jeden Depots ‘the environment of every depot’) and of relative scope interaction between quantificational complements of P and, for example, DP-quantifiers in the same sentence. In a local adjunction tree, the mother node’s semantic specification results from combining the semantic structures of its daughters and unifying their quantifier stores. Applying this to

 Quantifier Scope in German

(7.20a)

[VP [DP jeder Pianist]1 [VP [DP einige Fugen]2 [V spielt]]]

we get (7.49) a.

Sem([VP [DP einige Fugen]2 [V spielt]]) = < [PP [QP einige Fugen]2 [PP TP[Θi ] [TP[Θ j] [T x]]2 spielt]], ø > b. Sem(DP1 ) = < [TP [T x]]1 , [QP[dis:1] jeder Pianist]1 > c. Sem([VP [DP jeder Pianist]1 [VP [DP einige Fugen]2 [V spielt]]]) = < (PP [QP einige Fugen]2 (PP [TP[Θ i] [T x]]1 [TP[Θ j] [T x]]2 spielt)) , [QP[dis:1] jeder Pianist]1 >

In case both DPs are VP-adjuncts, the top node has the semantic specification in (7.50b): (7.50) a. [VP [DP jeder Pianist]1 [VP [DP einige Fugen]2 [VP [V spielt]]]] b. < [PP [TP[Θ i] [T x]]1 [TP[Θ j] [T x]]2 spielt] , [QP[dis:1] jeder Pianist]1 •[QP einige Fugen]2 >

The tree (7.20b)

PP

QP1

PP[x1]

jeder Pianist

QP2

PP[x2]

einige Fugen TP[Èi]

T

x1

P

TP[Èj]

T

P

spielt

x2

is the result of integrating the quantifier stores into the semantic structure in (7.49c) or (7.50b). Simplifying the semantics of sentences (SPs), i.e., ignoring that they are kinds of definite descriptions, this structure is the first part of the

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

semantic specification of the sentence [SP dass jeder Pianist einige Fugen spielt], i.e., its semantic structure. In order to get an idea of how quantifiers are handled in complex sentences, how the semantic specification of complex sentences is constructed, we need to know how syntactic chains, i.e., antecedent-trace relations are handled in the construction of semantic structure. I assume that, in syntactic structure, the head of a chain is marked as [+chainhead] and the trace as [–chainhead] as well as [empty]. I further assume (i) that the trace has more or less the same syntactic structure as the head of the chain apart from the fact that the phonetic material is missing and (ii) that the parts of the trace have the same denotation (and thus the same semantic specification) as the corresponding parts of the head of the chain. (In Pafel 1998: §5.6, I argued for such a conception of traces and against the view of traces as bound variables.) See the syntactic structure of the embedded interrogative welche Fuge jeder Pianist spielt ‘which fugue every piano player plays’ for illustration: (7.51) [SP (DP welche Fuge)1 [VP (DP jeder Pianist) [VP (DP [D ∅] [NP [N ∅]])1 [VP (V spielt)]]]]

With this background, the semantic specification of the DP-trace is built up in a regular way. It consists of the same variable and QP as the semantic specification of the antecedent. That means that the construction of semantic specifications proceeds as if there were no trace but the antecedent itself. There is, however, one difference: the QP in the quantifier store of the DP-trace is marked as [a-strong], which prohibits its integration (see above). At the moment when the QP of the DP-trace is unified with the QP of the universal quantifier jeder Pianist (in order to create the quantifier store of the VP jeder Pianist t spielt), the correspondence constraints concerning relative scope (7.39) come into play. The feature [empty] in (7.39) and on the trace ensures that it is the syntactic position of the antecedent, and not that of the (co-indexed) trace, that is relevant for scope determination. This treatment of traces realizes partly what we have called the criterion of identification for the relative scope computation in §3.2. (3.41) Criterion of identification for the relative scope computation: The relative scope of any two quantifiers Q1 and Q2 will be computed iff there is a clause which is, at the level of s-structure, both minimal with

 Quantifier Scope in German

respect to an element of the chain of Q1 and minimal with respect to an element of the chain of Q2 .

The rules for transfer and unification of quantifier stores realize further parts of this criterion. (The criterion thus needs not be stated explicitly as part of a rule or constraint.) An [a-strong]-marked QP cannot be integrated as long as it carries this feature (see above). This makes it possible to violate clause-boundedness and transfer a QP from a subordinate to a superordinate sentence as is the case in the following extraction constructions: (7.52) a.

Wo glaubst du, dass jeder gerne leben würde? ‘Where do you think that everyone would like to live?’ b. Wo glaubt jeder, dass sie sich versteckt halten könnte? ‘Where does everyone think that she could be hiding?’

In (b), the [a-strong]-marked QP is transfered into the quantifier store of the matrix-VP; at some point the QP jeder is added to the quantifier store where the [a-strong]-marked QP is located. This necessitates relative scope computation. We can cope with the raising of the universal quantifier in (7.52a) in the distributive reading of the embedded interrogative (see §3.2 for this kind of raising), as I conceive of integration in such a way that quantifiers are adjoined to a semantic structure unless the quantifiers have the feature [a-strong] or “precede a quantifier with this feature in the quantifier store”. As the quantifier store of the embedded clause in (7.52a) looks like the following in the distributive reading, the universal quantifier is raised, i.e., becomes part of the quantifier store of the matrix-VP: (7.53) [QP jeder]•[QP[a-strong] wo]

At some point, however, the [a-strong]-marked QP must be integrated. For that to happen, the [a-strong] feature must be eliminated. It must be the head of the chain which is responsible for eliminating the feature and the suitable point is where the head of a chain’s QP is to be unified with a quantifier store which encompasses a [a-strong]-marked QP “with the same index”. Both QPs are unified eliminating the [a-strong] feature. This unification accounts for the fact that antecedent and trace semantically count as one element, although they both have their own meaning.6

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

.. Implicit quantifiers in semantic structure Implicit quantifiers come into play if the semantic specification of a syntactic constituent is modified in a peculiar way and the modified semantic specification becomes the syntactic constituent’s semantic specification which is relevant for the construction of semantic structure. Take the distributor. In §4.3 I came to the conclusion that the distributor strives for widest possible absolute scope ([a-st(rong)]) and for smallest possible relative scope ([r-we(ak)]). If we take the simplified version ∀x’[x’≤x] in §1.4.2, its semantic structure looks like the following: (7.54) a.

QP[R-WE,A-ST]

Q

"

PP[x]

TP

T

x

P

TP

P

PART

b. abbreviated: [QP[r-we,a-st] ∀[x TP PART]]

The distributor’s introduction shall be illustrated in the following example. The regular semantic specification of the brothers in (7.55a) is modified into the semantic specification in (7.55b), whose semantic structure is a variable with a negative index which has the same amount as the index of the semantic structure in (a), and whose quantifier store encompasses a quantifier which results from the combination of the distributor with the semantic structure in (a).7 (7.55) a. < [TP ι(x brothers)]n , ø > b. < [TP x]-n , [QP[r-we,a-st] ∀[x [TP ι(x brothers)] PART]]-n >

Here is an example of the distributive interpretation of a quantifier: (7.56) a. < [TP x]n , [QP many sopranos]n > b. < [TP x]-n , [QP many sopranos]n •[QP[r-we,a-st] ∀[x [TP x]n PART]]-n >

The optional rule for the introduction of a distributor looks like the following:

 Quantifier Scope in German

(7.57) If <SS1 ,QS1 > is a semantic specification with SS1 =[TP ...]n , then this specification is substituted by <SS2 ,QS2 > with SS2 =[TP x]-n and QS2 being the unification of QS1 with the combination of SS1 and (i): (i) [QP[r-we,a-st] ∀[x TP PART]]

This rule can only be applied if SS1 denotes a proper plurality or is a variable which is bound by a quantifier on proper pluralities. This rule must be applied in case a QP has the feature [dis:1]. The implicit quantifiers triggered by indefinites are introduced by the same procedure, i.e., by substituting one semantic specification by another one. The introduction is triggered by the fact that a term which denotes a kind should saturate an argument of a predicate which (in one reading at least) does not allow this argument to denote a kind. What the introduced quantifier looks like, what its scope features are, depends on the kind of indefinite, whether it is generic, strongly or weakly specific or de re non-specific. In §4.3 we arrived at the following classification of expressions triggering the introduction of implicit quantifiers: (4.74) [r-strong,a-strong] [r-strong] [r-weak,a-strong] [r-weak,a-weak]

strongly specific indefinites, generic indefinites weakly specific indefinites distributor de re non-specific indefinites

The implicit quantifiers’ scope behavior can be accounted for quite satisfactorily if we give these features the following procedural interpretations: [astrong] is interpreted as a feature which allows a QP’s integration only at the top node, whereas [a-weak] forces a QP’s integration at its minimal clause; [r-weak] is interpreted as a feature which locates a QP behind all other QPs in a quantifier store, whereas a [r-strong]-marked QP is located in front of all other QPs in a quantifier store. Whatever the best interpretation of these features might be, implicit quantifiers adapt in a natural way to the process of constructing semantic structures for sentences with explicit quantifiers. It is possible to sketch a uniform process of scope determination which encompasses the scope of explicit as well as implicit quantifiers without neglecting their differences, i.e., the differences between explicit and implicit quantifiers in general and the differences among explicit quantifiers and among implicit quantifiers themselves. That means that we do not need (much) additional machinery to cope with indefinites: implicit quantifiers are needed anyway (in accounting for distributivity and genericity, for instance) and their scope behavior has to be determined in some way or

Chapter 7. Towards a theory of semantic structure 

other, as it is not captured by the correspondence constraints for relative and absolute scope. This differs from Abusch’s (1994) and Ruys’ (1992) theory, on the one hand, and the diverse proposals (Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997; Kratzer 1998; Matthewson 1999, among others), on the other, which rely on choice functions in the analysis of indefinites. If Geurts is right, “[t]he choice function theory is faced with a number of nontrivial problems, none of which arise if we adopt a movement theory, of one kind or another” (Geurts 2000: 737). The account I proposed is a kind of movement theory, as the implicit quantifier can move up in semantic structure.

Notes . For reasons of transparency, the variable is taken to be a special ‘semantic expression’ x. Alternatively, one could indicate that a term is a variable by giving the term operator a special feature (T[x]). . See Pafel (1991a: §2.1) for details. See also the motivation for the so-called property theories (Bealer 1982; Bealer/Mönnich 1989). . “Moment” is Husserl’s term for the traditional category of accident (see Smith (ed.) 1982; Künne 1983: 72ff.; Mulligan et al. 1983/84). . ˚ is the denotation function ranging over semantic structures. Considering temporal and locational specifications, the function of satisfaction should be complemented by two further arguments. . Recall that preference value(Qi >Qj )=0 means that Qi cannot have scope over Qj (see §2.3.1). . The phenomenon of lowering, which we have observed in §3.2 in wh-imperatives like (i), is excluded by the procedure so far. (i)

Wie viel schätz mal, dass jeder bezahlt hat! ‘Guess how much everyone has paid!’

We could account for it if we allowed as a marked possibility that the unification between the QP introduced by wie viel and the QP introduced by the trace already happens in the embedded clause. . This procedure resembles type raising in categorial grammar. An important difference is that in our account the definite noun phrase does not become a quantifier.

Chapter 8

Concluding remarks

Scope interaction is a multi-factorial phenomenon. This is not a new insight. As I have pointed out in §6.3, it was discovered very early at the beginning of the research on quantifier scope, but has never really been accepted as a true insight. It was ignored for a long time and had to be rediscovered. There is a strong temptation to explain scope interaction in a one-dimensionally way, be it syntactic, semantic or pragmatic. The reason for this temptation is deeply embedded in the structure of contemporary theories of linguistic competence. They provide no theoretical means to cope with interactions of a multitude of different factors like the ones which I have described with linear models. And thus, they provide no means to cope with one basic trait of the data, the gradient character of scope readings, i.e., the fact that scope readings are more often than not distinctly preferred, a fact which cannot be reduced to pragmatic or performance aspects. As it is the linguistic system, i.e., competence, which is responsible for this trait, there seems to be no alternative to integrate linear models or models relying on weights into the grammar, in order to account for the gradient character of the data. I tried to show that linear models have a natural place in a grammar model as part of the syntax/semantics interface, i.e., part of correspondence constraints connecting syntactic and semantic structure, with syntactic and semantic structure being levels of description with their specific categories and relations. I hope that some will see the beauty of this account, its empirical and theoretical advantages: the considerable accuracy of coping with a wide range of data and its simplicity with respect to its syntactic and semantic assumptions. For the most part, I relied on introspective data, i.e., speaker judgments. Significant progress will be achieved when ample corpus, psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic data concerning quantifier scope are available. We will, furthermore, understand the linear model better when quantifier interaction in other languages besides German is studied with the help of linear models. We will understand the scope-relevant properties better when other phenomena where similar properties are at stake (word order, binding of reflexive pronouns, for

instance) are compared and when we have an answer to the question what it is that makes these properties so prominent in the linguistic system. Finally, the value of the scope account presented here depends on how well it can be integrated into a comprehensive view of the syntax/semantics interface, which has been conceived in this work as correspondence constraints connecting syntactic and semantic structure.

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