Problems Of Ethics

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PROBLEMS OF ETHICS

PRENTICE-HAL4 PHILOSOPHY SERIES ARTHUR

E. Mu\ftHY, PH. D.,

EDITOR

PERCEPTION AND AESTHETIC VALUE, by Harold Newton Lee

FORMAL LOGIC, by

Albert A. Bennett and Charles A. Bayhs

PROBLEMS OF ETHICS, by Moritz

Schlick.

Translated by David Rynin

PROBLEMS OF ETHICS BY

MORITZ SCHLICK AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION BY

DAVID RYNIN,

PH.D

NEW YORK: 1939 PRENTICE-HALL, INC.

COPYRIGHT, 1939,

BJ;

PRENTICE-HALL, 70 Fifth Avenue,

New

York

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NO PART OF THIS BOOK MAY BE REPRODUCED IN ANY FORM, BY MIMEOGRAPH OR

ANY OTHER MEANS, WITHOUT PERMISSION IN WRITING

FROM THE PUBLISHERS.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Foreword appearance, in English translation, of Professor Moritz Schlick's Fragen dcr JLthi\ is timely and welcome.- Professor Schlick was the leader of the

THE

vigorous and influential "Vienna Circle," a group of scientists, logicians, and philosophers who attacked in the persistent problem as to what the nature and the significant function of philosophical

a fresh

way

reflection really

on the

is.

These thinkers, in general, carry and positivism, which

traditions of empiricism

they have reformulated in the light of certain views a logical analysis of language and symarising from bols.

Accordingly, the position which these writers sometimes goes by the name of "logical

represent

positivism."

The

application

of the

methods and

re-

type of analysis to some of the traditional problems of ethics supplies the substance of this book. It will bring home to the mind of the thoughtful sults of this

reader the pressing question as to the real nature of indeed of all those problems which ethical

problems have to do with the appraisal of

human

values.

These

problems are crucial for us now, both in theory and in To have so unambiguous and clear a state-

practice.

FOREWORD

vi

ment

of these problems as they appear within the permuch worth spective of modern positivism is very while.

GEORGE The

University of California

P.

ADAMS

Translator's

this

Schlick's ALTHOUGH

Note

authorized translation of Moritz

Fragen der Ethi\ was read and ap-

proved, and in part revised, by the author before his responsibility accept untimely and tragic death, for whatever shortcomings may yet characterize it. I wish to thank my friends for their assistance in renderI

ing the more

difficult

full

readable English, passages into

DAVID RYNIN

Vll

Contents PAGE

FOREWORD, BY GEORGE P. ADAMS

v

NOTE

TRANSLATOR'S

vii

PREFACE

xin

CHAPTER

L

WHAT

Is

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

1.

Ethics Seeks

2.

The

3.

On

4.

Is

Subject-matter of Ethics the Definition of Good

the

Good

5.

The Formal

Material Characteristics

&

9.

.... ....

Indefinable?

6. 7.

....

Nothing But Knowledge

Characteristic of the

Good

Moral Norms and Moral Principles Ethics as a "Normative Science"

.

14

17 20

.

.

Ethics Seeks Causal Explanation

11.

Formulation of the Fundamental Ques-

12.

The Method

22 26

of Ethics Is Psychological *

THE MOTIVES OF

HUMAN

.

28

i

CON-

DUCT?

2.

10

.

10.

1.

5 8

.

Ethics as Factual Science

WHAT ARE

i

2

II

tion

II.

i

31

Activity and Conduct The Nature of the Act of Will ix

...

31

33

CONTENTS HAPTER II.

PAGE

WHAT ARE

THE MOTIVES OF

HUMAN

CON-

DUCT? (Continued} 4.

The Concept of Will The Law of Motivation

5.

In Proof of the

6.

The Law

7.

The Law

3.

Law

35

36

of Motivation

.

.

Sacrifice

42 of Motivation in the Case of

Heroism 8.

45

Rebuttal of False Objections and Explanations of Motivation Is

9.

The Law

10.

The Law

47

Not Tauto-

logous

51 Expresses Significant

Knowl-

edge III.

WHAT

Is

53

EGOISM?

56

..*.... ...

4.

Egoism Is "Immoral" Egoism and "Personal Welfare" The Nature of Impulse Is Egoism an Impulse?

5.

The

1.

2.

3.

Possibility of

65

Not

the Will to Pleasure

Egoism

7.

Egoism and the Impulse

.

.

IV.

....

Egoism as Inconsiderateness Moral Condemnation of Egoism

WHAT Is THE MEANING OF i.

The

Morality of

rality of

Desire

69

of Self-Preser-

vation

9.

57

Imagining "Personal

6.

Is

56

59 62

States"

8.

41

of Motivation in the Case of

.

.

"MORAL?" Demand and the Mo.

.

72 73 76

79 79

CONTENTS

xi

HAPTER

IV.

PAGE

WHAT Is THE MEANING OF "MORAL ? "

( Con-

tinued) Moral Demands as Expressions of the

2.

3.

Desires of Society Critique of Utilitarianism

4.

The Good Appears

5.

The Formulation

to

84

87

Society

as

the

Useful

Place

90 of

According

Moral Laws Takes to

the

Utilitarian

Principle 6.

V.

93

Conclusions

96

ARE THERE ABSOLUTE VALUES? 1. The Theory of Objective Values .

2.

.

.

.

100

.

.

100

Pleasure as the Criterion of Objective

Value

102

Value?

3.

Objective Criteria of

4.

Subjective Criteria of Value

5.

Do

.... ....

Value Judgments Have the Validity

of Logico-Mathematical Propositions? 6. 7.

The "Absolute Ought" The Emptiness of the

ARE THERE WORTHLESS

Hypothesis of

115

JOYS AND VALU-

ABLE SORROWS? 1.

2.

The The

120

Relativity of Values

120 Pleasure

.

.

.

.

.

4.

Prejudice Against Happiness and Sorrow as Mixed States Associative Pleasure in Sorrow

5.

Is

3.

122 127

132

Sorrow a Necessary Condition of Pleasure?

6.

107

no

Absolute Values

VI.

103 105

The

Bliss of Suffering

134 136

CONTENTS

xii

CHAPTER

VII.

PAGE

WHEN

Is

A

MAN

...

RESPONSIBLE?

1.

The Pseudo-Problem

2.

Two

of

Freedom

Will

143

3.

Meanings of the Word "Law" Compulsion and Necessity

4.

Freedom and Indeterminism

5.

6. 7.

.

.... .... ....

The Nature of Responsibility The Consciousness of Responsibility

.

2. 3.

4. 5.

PATHS LEAD TO VALUE? .... What Are the "Natural" Impulses? .

New

Formulation of the Question Moral Suggestion

.

.

154

159 162 165

173

to^

177

6.

The Foundation

7.

Happiness and the Capacity for Hap-

8.

The Happiness Value

9.

Virtue and Happiness

Hedonism

of

.

.

.

179 182

piness

The Moral

Principle:

of Social Impulses

Be Ready

185 191

for

Hap-

piness

INDEX

149 151

169

Motive Feelings and Realization Feelings The Assimilation of Motive Feelings Realization Feelings

10.

148

156

WHAT 1.

146

Causality as the Presupposition of Responsibility

VIIL

143

of the

195

11.

Morality Without Renunciation

12.

Personality

13.

Ethics of

.

.

.

and Kindness

Duty and

Ethics of Kindness

199

202 205 211

Preface is

1

generally considered to be a part of philos-

ETHICS ophy.

But according to the view here represented,

philosophy

is

not a science, that

is,

it is

not a system

of propositions. Its task consists in making clear the content of scientific propositions, that is, in determining or discovering their meaning. The final determi-

nation of the meaning of propositions cannot made by means of assertions, cannot thus

be

form a

science, because in that case

ask ever

anew

itself

itself

we would have

to

of the explanatory

for the

meaning and thus would arrive proposition,

at

an

infinite re-

gress. Every statement of a meaning (called "definition") must, generally through a series of sub-definitions, finally lead to a direct exhibition of what is

This exhibition can only be the result of an

meant.

actual operation, a physical or psychic act. Thus the determination of the ultimate meaning is always the result of an activity. This activity constitutes the es-

sence of philosophy; there are sitions,

but only philosophical

1

[The omitted.]

irrelevant

first

no

philosophical propo-

acts.

paragraph

of

the

original

is

PREFACE

xiv

a philosophical book possible at all, since one cannot put activities into the pages of a book?

How,

What

is

then,

can a

treatise

on

ethics contain?

For

if

ethics

were philosophy it could consist only of those by means of which the meaning of moral judg-

really acts

ments would be discovered and explained. Concerning this, two things are to be said. First, in so far as this treatise is "philosophical" it

would

like

actually to

make such

(and

a claim),

its

sentences function not as actual propositions which communicate definite facts or laws, but as stimuli for

the reader to carry out those acts by virtue of which certain propositions obtain a clear meaning. (That

much more important than any can be disputed by no one who bejudgments

such stimuli can be correct

lieves in the

power of philosophy.)

tions are such as occur in daily life

"This

man

is

well-intentioned"; "That

Those proposi(for example,

man was com-

they will not be but constitute the subject-

pletely responsible for his act.");

formulated in

this treatise,

matter for consideration.

In the second place, however, the book would like to claim for certain of its sentences that they are real propositions.

pages

I

Thus

I

believe that in the following

communicate some truths

unimportant ones. may also be called

If this is

opinion not not an illusion, the book in

my

according to what was said previously, true judgments may be systematized; they constitute a part of science. Since those scientific, for,

PREFACE

xv

propositions concern the behavior of men, the scientific field to which they belong is psychology. I

hope, then, to have contributed,

sophical

activity

and,

secondly,

to

first,

to

philo-

psychological

knowledge by the answers which the book gives to fundamental ethical problems, and by the observations leading to these answers. This contribution points to a very different orientation from that which now prevails in the literature of

and seems to

me

German moral

for this reason

all

philosophy more im-

the

portant.

MORITZ SCHLICK Vienna, September 1930.

CHAPTER What z.

Is

the

Aim

I

of Ethics?

Ethics Seel(s Nothing But

Knowledge

questions which have meaning, are therefore capable of being answered, then ethics is a science. For the correct answers to its quesIf there are ethical

and

tions will constitute a system of true propositions,

and

a system of true propositions concerning an object is the "science" of that object. Thus ethics is a system of

knowledge, and nothing Every science to understand;

is,

else; its

only goal

is

the truth*

as such, purely theoretical;

hence the questions of

it

seeks

ethics, too, are

As philosophers we try to find their correct solutions, but their practical ap-

purely theoretical problems. plication, if such

is

possible, does

not

fall

within the

sphere of ethics. If anyone studies these questions in order to apply the results to life and action, his dealing with ethics has, it is true, a practical end; but ethics itself

never has any other goal than the truth. as the philosopher is concerned with his

So long

purely theoretical questions, he must forget that he has a human interest as well as a cognitive interest in the him there is no greater object of his investigation. For

WHAT

2

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

danger than to change from a philosopher into a moralDesire for ist, from an investigator into a preacher. the truth

the only appropriate inspiration for the thinker when he philosophizes; otherwise his thoughts is

run the danger of being led astray by his feelings. His wishes, hopes, and fears threaten to encroach upon that objectivity

which

the necessary presupposition Of course, the prophet and the is

honest inquiry. investigator can be one and the same person; but one cannot at the same moment serve both interests, for

of

all

whoever mixes the two problems

will solve neither.

A glance at the great ethical systems

will

show how

hardly one in which we do not occasionally find an appeal to the feeling or the morality of the reader where a scientific

necessary these remarks are.

There

is

would have been appropriate. Nevertheless, I do not point out the purely theoretical character of ethics merely to warn my reader, and myself. I do it also because it will help us to define the problems with which ethics is concerned and which analysis

we

shall

try

2.

To what

to solve.

The

object,

Subject-matter of Ethics or realm of objects, do the questions

many names, and we use them so often in daily life that one might think we should know exactly what we mean by them. The

of ethics relate ?

This object has

ethical questions concern "morality/* or ally "valuable,"

what

what

serves as a "standard" or

is

mor-

"norm"

WHAT

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

3

human conduct, what is "demanded" of us; or, to name it by the oldest, simplest word, ethical finally, of

questions concern the "good." And what does ethics do with this object ? have this answered ethics seeks underto question: already

We

it, to gain knowledge of it, and would and can under no circumstances do anything else with it. Since

stand

is, in essence, theory or knowledge, its task cannot be to produce morality, or to establish it, or call it to life. It does not have the task of producing the good neither in the sense that its business is to invest

ethics

the good with reality in human affairs, nor in the sense that it has to stipulate or decree what the word "good" It creates neither the signify. concept nor the objects which fall under the concept, nor does it provide the opportunity of applying the concept to the All this it finds, as every science finds the objects.

ought to

materials

it

works with, in experience.

It is

obvious

any other beginning. The view (introduced by the "Neo-Kantians") misleading according to which objects of a science are not simply that

no

science can have

"given" to it but are themselves always "given as problems" will not lead anyone to deny that whoever wishes to understand anything wishes to understand.

Where and how,

We

must

first

know what

it is

he

"the good" of ethics given? must from the outset be clear on the point that is

same that lies beonly one possibility, the other sciences. Wherever an instance of the

here 'there fore all

then,

is

be object to

known

occurs, there

must be exhibited a

WHAT

4

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

mark

(or group of marks) which characterizes the thing or event as one of a certain definite kind, thus distinguishing it from all others in a special way. If certain

this

were not so

we would have no

no motive to call which is used in

it

opportunity and a name. special by Every name

discourse for

communication must

have a meaning capable of being indicated. This is indeed self-evident, and it would not be doubted of the object of any other science

only in ethics has

sometimes been forgotten. Let us consider some examples outside the ethics.

limited

it

field of

Biology, the science of life, finds its sphere by a group of characteristics (a special kind of

motion, regeneration, growth, and so forth) which belong to all living things, and stand out so clearly for every-day observation that apart from certain critical instances the difference between the animate and in-

animate

very sharply distinguished, without the use of any scientific analysis. It is only because of this that the concept of life could have first been formed, and

obtained

is

its

special

name.

If

the biologist succeeds,

with progressive knowledge, in establishing

new and

sharper definitions of life, in order better to bring the events of life under general laws, this means only more

and perhaps extension of, the concept, without however altering its original meaning. Similarly the word "light" had a definite meaning

precision in,

before there was a science of light, that is, optics, and this meaning determined the subject-matter of optics.

The

distinguishing

mark was

in this case that immedi-

WHAT ate experience

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

which we

call "light-sensation," that

datum

a not-further-definable

5

of consciousness,

is,

known

only to the perceiver, the occurrence of which again apart from critical instances indicates the presence of those events which constitute the subject-matter of opThe fact that optics in its modern developed tics.

form

the science of Roentgen rays and radio-telegraphic waves as well (because their laws are identical with the laws of light) enlarges the meaning of the is

word "optics" without changing its basis. As certainly, then, as the expression "moral good" makes good sense, just as certainly rhust we be able to discover

it

But

way analogous to that by which one meaning of the word "life" or "light."

in a

discovers the

many philosophers

ethics,

indeed the

see in this a serious difficulty of

difficulty,

that the sole task of ethics

and they are of the opinion is

the discovery of the defi-

nition of "good."

3.

On

the Definition of

Good

This view can be interpreted in two ways. In the the task of the philosofirst place, it could mean that in exhausted describing exactly the sense in pher is

which the word "good" or ban or gut or buono or dya$6v in its moral signification is actually used.

would concern itself merely with making clear the a strict formulation already well-known meaning, by of it in other words (were it not already well known It

one would not

know

that, for

example, "good"

is

the

WHAT

6

of

translation

ethics?

The

definitions

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS? Is

bonum).

this

really

the goal of of words by

statement of the meaning (as G. E. Moore in his Principia Ethica

is

has pointed out in a similar connection) the business of the science of language. Ought we really to believe that ethics is a branch of linguistics? Perhaps a

branch that has

off

split

from

because the definition

it

of "good" harbors special difficulties we meet in other word? very peculiar case, that a whole

A

no sci-

ence should be necessary to find merely the definition of a concept!

mere

And

definitions ?

an end; they stand nitive task.

in

any

They

are, after all,

at the

If ethics

who

case,

is

interested in

only means to

beginning of the real cog-

ended with a definition

it

would

science, and the phiinterest himself would losopher only in what comes after it. No, the real problems of ethics are certainly of a very different sort. Even though the task of

be

at

most the introduction to a

ethics could be formulated as that of stating

good

"really is," this

the sisting in

what the

could not be understood as con-

mere determination of the meaning of a

concept (as also, in our example, optics does not strive for a mere definition of "light"). Rather it would

have to be understood as the task of explanation, of complete cognition of the good that the

then

meaning of the concept

relates

it

is

which presupposes already known and

more gendoes with light, which

to something else, orders

eral connections (just as optics

it

in

us what light "really is" by pointing out the place in the sphere of natural events to which the well-

tells

WHAT

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

known phenomenon

7

belongs, by describing to the last

and by recognizing their identity with the laws of certain electrical events). Secondly, the view according to which the goal of

detail its laws,

ethics consists of a correct determination of the

concept

"good" could be interpreted as not being concerned with the formulation of the content of the concept, but rather with giving it a content. This would, however, be exactly that view which we have from the start

recognized to be quite senseless. It would mean made, or created, the concept of

that the philosopher

the good, while without

word "good."

him

He would

there existed merely the

of course have to invent

it

(But inasmuch as in formulating his he could not act completely arbitrarily, since

quite arbitrarily. definition

he would be bound by some norm, some guiding prinof the good would already be deterciple, the concept

The

philosopher would have merely to find a formulation of it, and we should have before us the previously considered case.) However, it

mined by

these norms.

would be quite absurd to demand of ethics nothing but the arbitrary establishment of the meaning of a word. That would be no achievement at all. Even the prophet, the creator of a new morality, never forms a new concept of morality, but presupposes one, and asserts only that other modes of behavior are subsumed

than those which people have believed up to that time. In logical terms, the prophet holds that the

under

it

acknowledged content of the concept has a different range from that supposed. This alone can be the

8

WHAT

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

IS

meaning when he declares: "Not that is 'good* which you have held as such, but something else!" Thus we see the view confirmed that in no way is the formulation of the concept of the moral good to be considered as the final task of ethics; it cannot be re-

garded as anything but a mere preparation. To be sure, this preparation is not to be neglected; ethics ought not to spare itself the task of determining the meaning of its concept, even though, as we have said, the meaning of the word "good" may in one sense

be assumed as known.

4.

&

the

Good

Indefinable?

It is very dangerous to withdraw from this task under the pretext that the word "good" is one of those whose meaning is simple and unanalyzatye, of which

therefore a definition, a statement of the connotation,

is

impossible. What is demanded here need -not be a definition in the strictest sense of the word. It is sufficient to indicate

concept; to state

acquainted with

how we

can get the content of the

what must be done in order its

content.

It

also impossible to define what the but we can nevertheless fix its ously, for example,

by saying

is,

strictly

to

become

speaking,

word "green" means meaning unambigu-

it is

the color of a sum-

mer meadow,

We

or by pointing to the foliage of a tree. mentioned above that a "light-sensation" which

furnishes us with the fundamental concept of optics

not definable; however,

we know exactly what

is

is

meant

WHAT

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

9

by it, because we can give the exact conditions under which we have a light-sensation. In the same way, in ethics we must be able to give the exact conditions under which the word "good" is applied, even though its fundamental concept be indefinable. In this man-

must be possible to give the meaning of any for otherwise it would have no meaning at all. word,

ner

It

it

must even be capable of being given

easily;

profound

philosophical analysis cannot be necessary for this, for the matter concerns merely a question of fact, namely, a description of those conditions under which the word

equivalent in other languages, or its conis trary, "evil") actually used. It is difficult for many philosophers to stick to the

"good" (or

realm of

its

even temporarily, without immediately a inventing theory to describe the facts. And thus the theory has been frequently propounded that the fundafacts

mental concept of ethics

is

given as

is

the fundamental

concept of optics. Just as we possess a special sense, namely the sense of sight, for the perception of light, so it is

supposed that a special "moral sense" indicates the

Accordingly, good and evil would be objective characters, to be determined and investigated as are the physical events which optics in-

presence of good or

vestigates,

evil.

and which

it

considers to be the causes of

light-sensations.

This theory is of course wholly hypothetical. The moral sense is merely assumed; its organs cannot be pointed out as can the human eye. But the hypothesis is

also false;

it

fails

to account for the variations in

WHAT

io

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

IS

moral judgment among men, since the further assumption that the moral sense is poorly developed in many persons, or completely absent, does not suffice to explain these variations.

No,

it is

not the distinguishing characteristic of the

subject-matter of ethics that

kind of perception.

it is

the object of a special

Its characteristics

must be capable

of exhibition by simply pointing to certain

known

This can happen in differfacts, ent ways. Two ways are here distinguished: first, one can seek for an external, formal characteristic of good without any

and

and, second, one can search for a material

evil;

characteristic,

5.

artifice.

one of content.

The Formal

The formal

characteristic,

whole weight of

his

made prominent by good always appears

commanded; conduct as

it

Characteristic of the

the

on which Kant placed the

moral philosophy, and which he his greatest eloquence, is this: the as something that is demanded, or

evil, as

such as

Good

something forbidden.

demanded

Good

or desired of us.

Or, has generally been expressed since Kant: those is

actions are

is

good which we ought

to do.

Now,

to

a demand, a claim, or a desire there belongs someone claims, or desires. This author of the

who demands,

moral law must also be given in order that the characterization

by means of the formal property of the com-

mand be unambiguous. Here opinions

differ.

In

theological

ethics this au-

WHAT thor

good

is

is

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

God, and according

good because God

to

it

one interpretation the

desires it; in this case the

formal characteristic (to be a

command

express the very essence of the good.

of

God) would

According to an-

other, perhaps profounder, interpretation, God desires the good because it is good. In this case its essence

must be given by certain material characters previously to and independently of those formal determinations. In traditional philosophical ethics the opinion prevails that the author is, for example, human society (utilitarianism) or the active

self

(eudaimonism) or even no

one (the categorical imperative).

From

this last

proceeds Kant's doctrine of the "absolute ought," that is, a demand without a demander. One of the worst errors of ethical thought lies in his belief that the con-

cept of the moral good is completely exhausted by the statement of its purely formal property, that it has no

content except to be what

is

demanded, "what should

be."

6.

Material Characteristics

In opposition to this, it is clear that the discovery of the formal characters of the good constitutes only a preliminary step in the determination of the content of the good, in the statement of material characteristics. If we know that the good is what is demanded, we

must

still

manded?

ask:

What

is

it

then that

In answer to this question

the author of the

command and

is

actually deturn to

we must

investigate his will

WHAT

12

and

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

desire, for the content of his desire is that

which

he wishes to happen. When I recommend an action to someone as being "good," I express the fact that I desire

it.

So long as the lawgiver is not known with certainty, we must stick to the laws as they are generally observed, to the formulations of moral rules as we find

them among men.

We must

discover

which ways of

acting (or dispositions, or whatever be the term used) are called "good" by different people, at different

men or religious writers. Only in this way do we come to know the content of this concept. From the content it may then be possible to times,

by

different wise

infer the lawgiving authority,

if

it

cannot be ascer-

tained otherwise.

In grouping together the individual cases in which

something is designated as morally good* we must search for the common elements, the characters in

which these examples agree or show similarities. These similar elements are the characters of the concept "good"; they constitute its content, them must lie the reason why one and the

"good,"

To

is

be

and within

same word,

used for the several cases.

sure,

one will

which nothing common

once come upon cases in can be found, in which there at

seems to be a complete incompatibility; one and the same thing for example, polygamy will be considered moral in one community, and in another a crime. In such a situation there are two possibilities. First, there could be several irreducibly different concepts of

WHAT

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

13

"good" (which agree in the purely formal property of being somehow "demanded") ; if this were so there would not be a single morality, but many. Or, secit could be that the divergence in moral judgments was only apparent and not final; that, namely, in the end one and the same goal was approved, but that a

ond,

difference of opinion prevailed as to which way leads to it, which actions should therefore be demanded.

(For instance, polygamy and monogamy are not in themselves judged morally. The real object of valuation is perhaps the peace of family life, or the least

troublesome order of sexual relationships. One person believes that this end can be attained only through

monogamous

marriage, and considers

it,

therefore, to

be morally good; another believes the same of polygamy. One may be right, the other wrong; they difnot by their final valuations, but only by virtue of their insight, capacity of judgment, or experience.)

fer,

there is actually among men a multiplicof moralities incompatible with one another, or ity whether the differences in the moral world are only

Whether

specious,

would find everyand masks of moral-

so that the philosopher

where, under the

many

disguises

one and the same face of the one Good, we canity, not now decide. In any case, there are wide regions

which the unanimity and security of moral judgments is substantiated. The modes of behavior which we group together under the names reliability, helpin

everywhere judged to be "good," while, for example, thievery, murder, quarrelsomeness

fulness, sociability are

WHAT

14

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

pass for "evil" so unanimously that here the question of the common property can be answered with pracuniversal validity. If such characters are found for a large group of actions, then one can apply himtically

self to the "exceptions"

and

irregularities,

that

is,

to

those cases in which the same behavior evokes diver-

gent moral judgments in different times,

among

dif-

ferent peoples. Here one finds either that there is different ground for the judgment from that in

no all

ordinary cases, but that it is merely more remote, hidden, or applied under altered circumstances; or one

must simply note the

fact as indicating a

biguous meaning of the word "good."

new

or am-

And

finally,

happens, of course, that certain individuals hold different opinions regarding good and evil from those it

held by people of their time and community.

In these

quite as important to make out*the content and causes of their opinions as in any other more regular cases, if the persons in question are important as

cases

it is

prophets, moral writers, or morally creative men; or if their teachings disclose hidden currents or impress their

moral judgments on humanity and the future.

7.

Moral Norms and Moral Principles

The common characteristics which

a group of "good" acts or dispositions exhibits can be combined in a rule mode of action must have such and of the form:

A

such properties in order to be called "good" (or "evil"). Such a rule can also be called a "norm." Let it be

WHAT

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

15

at once, however, that such a "norm" is a mere expression of fact; it gives us only but nothing the conditions under which an act or disposition or

understood

character

is

moral value.

actually called "good," that is, is given a The setting up of norms is nothing but

the determination of the concept of the good, which ethics undertakes to understand.

This determination would proceed by seeking ever groups of acts that are recognized to be good, and

new

showing for each of them the

rule or

norm which

all

members satisfy. The different norms, so obtained, would then be compared, and one would order them into new classes such that the individual norms of each class had something in common, and thus would all be subsumed under a higher, that is, a more general, norm. With this higher norm the same procedure would be repeated, and so on, until, in a perfect case, one would at last reach a highest, most general rule that included all others as special cases, and would of their

be applicable to every instance of human conduct. This highest norm would be the definition of "the

good" and would express its universal essence; it would be what the philosopher calls a "moral principle."

Of course, one cannot know beforehand whether one will actually arrive at a single moral principle. It well be that the highest series of rules to which

might

the described characte'r,

norms

way

leads simply

shows no

common

that one has, therefore, to stop with several

highest rules, because despite all attempts none higher can be found to which these could be reas

WHAT

16

duced.

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

There would then be

several

mutually inde-

pendent meanings of the expression "moral good/' sevmutually independent moral principles which only in their totality would determine the concept of moralor perhaps several different concepts of the moral, ity, depending upon the time and the people. It is signifieral

cant

how little

these possibilities have, in general, been

considered by philosophers; almost all have at once sought a single moral principle. Quite the contrary is true of the practical moral systems, which ordinarily do not attempt to establish an all-inclusive principle; as in

the case of the catechism, which stops at the ten com-

mandments. For those

who

believe that the sole task of ethics

consists in the determination of the concept of the good, that is, in the establishment of one or several

moral

the completion of the described proexhaust the theme of ethics. It would

principles,

cedure would

be a pure "normative science"; for its end would lie in the discovery of a hierarchy of norms or rules which culminated in one or several points, the moral prinand in which the lower levels would be exciples, plained or "justified" by the higher. To the question, "Why is this act moral?" the explanation can be given,

"Because

it falls

asks further, rule

moral?"

under these

"Why this

definite rules";

are all the acts falling

would be explained by

and

if

one

under

this

saying, "Be-

under that next higher rule." And cause they the moral principle only with the highest norm with all fall

or moral principles

is

the

knowledge of the validating

WHAT

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

IS

17

grounds, a justification, no longer possible in this way. There ethics is at an end for him who sees it as a mere

normative science. Ethics as a "Normative Science"

8.

We now

what meaning the phrase "normative science" can have, and in what sense alone ethics can "justify" an act or its valuation. In modern see clearly

philosophy since Kant, the idea repeatedly appears that ethics as a normative science is something completely different

"When

from the

"factual sciences."

It

does not ask,

a person judged to be good?" or, "Why is he judged to be good ?" These questions concern mere But it does ask, "With facts and their explanation. is

what right

is

not trouble

itself

"What

is

that person judged to be

with what

valuable?

is

What

here obviously the question

good?"

It

but asks: actually valued,

should be valued?" is

does

And

quite different.

But this manner of opposing normative and factual sciences is fundamentally false. For if ethics furnishes a justification

does so only in the sense just explained, namely, in a relative-hypothetical way, not absolutely. It a certain judgment only to the extent that "justifies" it

it

shows that the judgment corresponds to a certain

norm;

that this

norm

itself is

can neither show nor, by

"right," or justified,

itself,

determine.

it

Ethics

must simply recognize this as a fact of human nature. Even as a normative science, a science can do no more than explain;

it

can never

set

up or

establish a

norm

WHAT

i8

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

(which alone would be equivalent to an absolute It is never able to do more than to tification).

jusdis-

them from the norms always lies outside and knowledge. This means that

cover the rules of the judgment, to read facts before it; the origin of

and before science

their origin can only be

and does not

lie

within

it.

apprehended by the science, In other words: if, or in so

far as, the philosopher answers the question "What is good?" by an exhibition of norms, this means only that

he

tells

us

what "good"

actually

means; he can never

us what good must or should mean. The question regarding the validity of a valuation amounts to asking tell

for a higher acknowledged norm under which the value falls, and this is a question of fact. The question of the justification of the highest norms or the

ultimate values

higher to ern

ethics, as

must be

senseless,

because there referred.

is

nothing

Since

mod-

we

lute justification it

is

which these could be

remarked, often speaks of *this absoas the fundamental problem of ethics, formulation of

said, unfortunately, that the

the question from which

it

proceeds

is

simply mean-

ingless.

The perversity of such a formulation will be exhibited by a famous example.

of the question John Stuart

Mill has often been justly criticized because he thought

himself able to deduce from the fact that a thing was desired that it was in itself desirable. The double

meaning of the word desirable ("capable of being desired" and "worth desiring") misled him. But his critics

were

also

wrong, for they rested their criticism

WHAT upon the same

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

19

presupposition (expressly formuby neither), namely, that the phrase "in itself desirable" had a definite meaning (by "in itself" I mean false

lated

"for

its

own

sake," not merely as a

means

to

an end)

;

but in fact they could give it no meaning. If I say of a thing that it is desirable, and mean that one must desire

it

as a

means

if

one

desires a certain end,

everything is perfectly clear. a thing is desirable simply in

mean by

this statement;

fore meaningless.

it is

If,

however,

itself, I

I assert

then that

cannot say what

not verifiable and

is

I

there-

A thing can be desirable

only with Mill believed

something else, not in itself. himself able to deduce what is in itself desirable from respect

what

to

actually

had nothing neither side

is

to

desired; his opponents held that these

do with one another.

knew what

it

said,

But ultimately for both failed to give

an absolute meaning to the word "desirable." The question whether something is desirable for its own sake

is

no question

at all,

but mere empty words.

On

the other hand, the question of what actually is desired for its own sake is of course quite sensible, and ethics is

concerned only with answering this quesMill succeeded in arriving at this real question,

actually

tion.

in the passage criticized, senseless

form of the

and thus freed himself

be sure, less question, to

of the

by

his

argument than by his healthy instinct, while his opponents remained tied to it and continued to search

false

for an absolute justification of desire.

WHAT

20

9.

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

IS

Ethics as Factual Science

Such norms as are recognized as the ultimate norms, or highest values, must be derived from human nature and life as facts. Therefore, no result of ethics can stand in contradiction to

life; ethics

cannot declare as

which lie at the foundation norms cannot demand or command anything a real opposition to those final norms recog-

evil or false those values

of

life; its

that

is

in

nized by

Where

such opposition occurs it is a sure sign that the philosopher has misunderstood his problem, and has failed to solve it; that he has unlife.

wittingly become a moralist, that he feels uncomfortable in the role of a knower and would prefer to be a

The demands and

creator of moral values.

claims of

a morally creative person are merely subjects for inmere objects for cognivestigation for the philosopher, tive consideration;

and

chance, at other times,

We

just

this

be

holds also

this creative

said that there could be

if

he should by

man himself.

no

real

opposition

between the meaning of the word "good" that is and the meaning found by actually accepted in life, the philosopher. An apparent difference can of course occur, for language and thought are very imperfect in not daily life. Often the speaker and valuer is himself clear as to rest

on a

what he

expresses,

and often

false interpretation of the facts,

his valuations

and would

at

once change with a correction of the mistake. The philosopher would have the task of discovering such

WHAT errors

IS

and faulty

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

expressions,

21

and would have

to rec-

ognize the true norms that

lie at the root of moral and them in judgments, place opposition to the apparent ones which the agent, or valuer, believes himself

And

in so doing he would, perhaps, find it necessary to delve deep into the human soul. Always, to follow.

however,

it

would be an

actual, already

norm that he would find there. The ultimate valuations are facts

fundamental

existing in

human

consciousness, and even if ethics were a normative science it would not cease because of this to be a science

Ethics has to do entirely with the actual; this seems to me to be the most important of the propo-

of facts.

sitions

which determine

its

task.

Foreign to us is the hold the questions of

pride of those philosophers who ethics to be the most noble and elevated of questions because they do not refer to the common is but just

concern the pure ought. Of course, after one is in the possession of such a system of norms, of a system of applications of the concepts good and evil, one can consider the connec-

members of the hierarchy, the order of the individual rules, quite independently of any relation to the inner strucactuality; one can investigate merely

tions of the

ture of the system. And this holds even if the norms are not the really valid ones, but are falsely considered such, or are freely imagined and arbitrarily established. The last case would indeed possess only the interest

of a

game and would make no claim

"ethics."

to the

name

Ethics as a normative science would,

of

how-

WHAT

22

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

ever, furnish a hierarchical order of rules, in acts

and

attitudes

and

characters

would

which

possess a defi-

place with respect to their moral value. course this would be true not only of existing

nite

attitudes, but also of is to be of any value

And acts

of

and

the system must beforehand supply a place

all it

all

possible ones; for

if

for every possibility of human behavior. After becoming acquainted with the highest norms, one can consider the

whole system without any reference to actual

by merely considering the possible. Thus Kant emphasized that for his moral philosophy it was indifferent whether or not any moral will actually

behavior,

existed.

Hence

ethics conceived as a theory of

norms

would exhibit the characteristics of an "ideal science"; it would have to do with a system of ideal rules, which be of could, course, applied to actuality, and would only thereby possess any interest, but the rules would have meaning quite independently of this*application, and could be investigated in their relations to one another.

Thus someone might have invented

the rules

of chess, and might have considered their application to the individual matches even if the game had never

been played, except in his mind, between imaginary opponents. 10.

Ethics Seefa Causal Explanation

To recapitulate: asked,

first,

We

began with the position that the to "explain the moral good," and we what sort of thing this "good" is which we

task of ethics

is

WHAT want

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

23

We found that this subject-matter of

to explain.

ethics is not given to us as simply as, say, the subjectmatter of optics, light, that is, by a mere sensation; but that for its determination the discovery of a "moral

principle" or a necessary.

If

whole system of principles or

we

call a

rules

is

discipline that concerns itself

with such a system a "normative science,"

we

see that

theory of norms affords nothing more than the discovery of the meaning of the concept "good." In this it exhausts itself. There is no question in it of a

this

real explanation of the good.

It offers ethics

only the

which is to be explained. Therefore we have the outset rejected the view of those philosophers from who consider ethics to be merely a normative science. object

No, only where the theory of norms ends does

The former

ethical

completely to see explanation begin. the important, exciting questions of ethics, or, worse, turns them aside as foreign in essence to ethics; in truth

the

it

fails

except through mistakes, to get beyond the meanings linguistic result of determining

fails,

mere

of the words "good" and "evil." It does of course also give us a kind of pseudocall we that which justification. explanation, namely, Explanation always consists of the reduction of what is to be explained to something else, to something more and actually the norms are thus referred back

general; to one another, until the highest are reached. These, the moral principles (or the moral principle), accord-

ing to definition, cannot be referred to other ethical norms, and cannot therefore be morally justified.

WHAT

24

But

IS

this does

not

must be impossible. could be

shown

THE AIM OF ETHICS? mean It

that all further reduction

might be that the moral good

to be a special case of a

more general

Actually the word "good" is used in an extra-moral sense (one speaks not only of good men, but also of good riders, good mathematicians, of a good

kind of good.

good machine, and so forth); it is therefore probable that the ethical and the extra-ethical meanings

catch, a

of the

word

good can in

are this

somehow connected. If the moral manner be subsumed under a wider

concept of the good, then the question, "Why is moral behavior good?" could be answered by, "Because it is

good in a more general sense of the word." The highmeans of an extraest moral norm would be justified by moral norm; the moral principle to a higher principle of life. Possibly the reduction could

would be referred back

go on a few more

steps,

but the final norm, the highest principle, can In no way be justified, for the very reason that it is the last. It

would be

senseless to ask for a further justification, a

further explanation. It is not the norms, principles, or values themselves that stand in need of and are capable of explanation, but rather the actual facts from which the acts of giving they are abstracted. These facts are rules, of valuation, of approbation in human consciousness; they are thus real events in the life of the souL "Value," "the good," are mere abstractions, but valuation, approbation, are actual psychic occurrences,

and

this sort are quite capable of explanation, separate acts of

that

is,

can be reduced to one another,

WHAT And

here

lies

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

the proper task of ethics.

25

Here

are

the remarkable facts which excite philosophic wonder, and whose explanation has always been the final goal

That

of ethical inquiry. certain

actions,

declares

man

actually approves

certain

dispositions

to

of

be

"good," appears not at all self-explanatory to the philosopher, but often very astonishing, and he therefore asks his

"Why?" Now,

in all of the natural sciences every

explanation can be conceived as a causal explanation, a truth which we need not prove here; therefore the

"why" has

the sense of a question concerning the cause of that psychical process in which man makes a valuation, establishes a moral claim.

(We must make

when we we mean by

speak of the discovery of the the term "cause" only a popular "cause," abbreviation for the statement of the complete laws clear that

governing the event to be known.) In other words, the determination of the contents of the concepts of good and evil is made by the use of moral principles and a system of norms, and affords a of the lower moral rules by the the other higher; scientific \nowledge of the good, on to the cause, hand, does not concern norms, but refers relative

justification

concerns not the justification but the explanation of moral judgments. The theory of norms asks, ''What does actually serve as the standard of conduct?" Exserve as planatory ethics, however, asks "Why does it the standard of conduct?"

WHAT

26

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

ii.

Formulation of the Fundamental Question

It is

clear that in essence the first question is a dry, little interest from man

formal matter that could win

not have such importance for practice, and if the to its answer did not offer so path many opportunities for profound insight into human nature. The second did

it

question, however, leads directly to these profundities. It concerns the real grounds, the actual causes and

motives that drive one to distinguish between good

and

evil,

and

call forth the acts

of moral judgment.

Not only judgments, but also conduct, for this follows upon judgment. The explanation of moral judgment cannot be separated from the explanation of conduct.

To

be sure, one should not believe, without further

reason, that everyone arranges his conduct according to his moral judgments. Obviously, that would be a false

assumption.

The

connection, although indissol-

more complicated. What a man values, apuble, proves, and desires is finally inferred from his actions better from these than from his assertions, though these, too, are kinds of action. What kind of demands one makes of himself and others can only be known from one's conduct. A man's valuations must someis

how appear among the motives of his acts;

they cannot,

in any case, be discovered anywhere else. He traces the causes of conduct far enough must

upon the

causes of all approbation.

the causes of conduct

is,

therefore,

The

who come

question of

more general than

WHAT

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

that of the grounds of moral judgments;

its

27

answer

would give more comprehensive knowledge, and would be methodologically profitable to start with

it

it

even if it were not necessary to begin with the study of conduct as the only thing observable. Therefore, we may and should replace the question raised above, "What motives cause us to establish moral

norms?" by the other question, "What

are the motives

of conduct in general?" (We formulate the question in this general way and do not at once restrict it to

moral actions because, according to what has been said, it might be possible to deduce valuations and their not better, from immoral or are the more warranted in relating

motives just as well, neutral acts.)

We

if

once to conduct, since man interests himself in valuations only because conduct depends upon them. If moral approbation were something that

our question

at

remained enclosed in the depths of the heart, if it could never appear in any way and could not exert the least

on the life, happiness and unhappiness of man, no one would bother himself with it, and the philosopher would become acquainted with this uninfluence

important phenomenon only by an act of introspecThat wonder concerning the moral judgments

tion.

of

man, which we have described

as the earliest

leading to the formulation of ethical questions, all wonder at his own actual moral behavior.

we

impulse above

is

inquire into the causes, that is, the of all human actions, with the regularity and order, aim of discovering the motives of moral actions. And

Therefore,

WHAT

28

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

IS

in so doing because we can postpone the the essence of morality, the moral question regarding until we solve the problem of the natural principle,

we

profit

law governing behavior in general.

we come be

tainly actions

When, however, know about action in general, it will cermuch easier to learn what is peculiar to moral to

and

without

to define the content of the

difficulty.

Perhaps

it

concept "good"

will turn out that

we no

longer feel the necessity of determining a sharp boundary for it (just as, after the physical explanation of of how and whether the concept of light, the question "light" is to be distinguished from that of heat radiation or ultra-violet radiation loses all interest).

12.

The Method

of Ethics Is Psychological *

Thus the

central

problem of

ethics

concerns the

causal explanation of moral behavior; all others in relation to it sink to the level of or subor-

preliminary

The moral problem was most clearly way by Schopenhauer, whose sound sense of reality led him to the correct path here (if not in the solution) and guarded him from the Kantian

dinate questions. formulated in this

formulation of the problem and from the post-Kantian

philosophy of value.

The problem which we must put

at the center of

a purely psychological one. For, without doubt, the discovery of the motives or laws of any kind

ethics

is

of behavior, and therefore of moral behavior,

is

a purely

WHAT

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

29

psychological affair. Only the empirical science of the laws which describe the life of the soul can solve this

One might wish

problem.

posedly profound and

to derive

from

this a sup-

destructive objection to our for-

mulation of the problem. For, one might say, "In such case there would be no ethics at all; what is called

would be nothing but a

ethics I

answer,

ogy?"

"Why

part of psychology!" shouldn't ethics be a part of psychol-

Perhaps in order that the philosopher have his

science for himself

and govern autonomously

in this

He

would, indeed, thereby be freed of many burdensome protests of psychology. If he laid down a sphere ?

command,

Thus

shall

man

act,"

he would not have

pay attention to the psychologist who said to him, "But man cannot act so, because it contradicts psychoto

logical

laws!"

fear greatly that here

I

and there

this

motive, though hidden, is at work. However, if one that "there is no ethics," because it is not says candidly necessary to label a part of psychology by a special name, then the question is merely terminological.

a poor recommendation of the philosophical of our age that we so often attempt to draw strict

It is

spirit

lines of division

new

between the

disciplines,

and

sciences, to separate ever

to prove their autonomy.

The

true philosopher goes in the opposite direction; he does not wish to make the single sciences self-sufficient and to unify and bring independent, but, on the contrary, that is common to show what he wishes them together; to

them

is

what

is

most

essential,

and that what

is

3o

WHAT

IS

THE AIM OF ETHICS?

accidental

and

different

is

practical

methodology.

to be

Sub

viewed

as

belonging to

specie aeternitatis there

for him only one reality and one science. Therefore, if we decide that the fundamental tion of ethics,

"Why

does

man

act

is

ques-

morally?" can be

answered only by psychology, we see in this no degradation of, nor injury to, science, but a happy simplification of the world-picture. In ethics but only the truth.

independence,

we do

not seek

CHAPTER What Are

II

the Motives of

Human

Conduct? i.

Activity

and Conduct

experience, not every human action allows of moral judgment; the greater part of our lives is filled with activities which, considered in them-

As we

learn

selves, are ties,

from

beyond good and

work and

evil.

All our daily activi-

play, necessities as well as

amusements,

formed of a vast number of complicated movements which may be executed well or poorly, but are

called "good" or "evil." How we our feet when place walking, hold a pen when writing, or move our fingers in piano-playing is, from the

which cannot be

ethical point of view, perfectly indifferent. The exceptions in which activities of this sort are subjected to

moral judgment are

shown

to be merely apparent. If, for example, a pianist pains his audience because of clumsy finger movements, his errors are, under certain conditions, morally disapproved; but closer examination

easily

shows that the judgment

refers not

to the activity of the hands themselves, but only to the prior resolution to appear before the public with insufficient technique. 31

WHAT ARE THE MOTIVES

32

This holds in general. "resolutions."

do only with which the stream against

Ethics has to

Certain acts

of activity breaks stand out in the regular flow of acthat fills our existence (and is morally irrelevant). tivity

These

represent the decisions of life; they alone deserve the name of "conduct"; all else is mere "activacts

ty"

How To

conduct distinguished from mere activity?

is

begin with, the personality

cated in conduct; activity

come

is

external,

is

must be more sharply drawn. means of doing this, since it duct the significant

no

impli-

rises

to the light of consciousness.

activity

much more

from greater depths, while more superficial, and often fails to

it

title

But the difference

Psychology offers us a

applies to genuine conof "acts of will." In mere

act of will or decision occurs.

Such

activity

occurs as immediate, although not necessarily unconIn playing the scious, reactions to definite stimuli.

piano the perception of written notes calls forth the corresponding finger movement without any interven-

The player does not continuously decide, "Now I shall move this finger, now that, and now my arm," and so forth. The action proceeds ing act of will.

according to the "ideo-motor" pattern, that or a perception or some sensation functions

a stimulus;

or,

is,

an idea

directly

as

speaking psychologically, a stimulus of

the sensory centers of the nervous system flows directly into the motor centers and brings forth the correspond-

ing movement without delay.

OF HUMAN CONDUCT? The Nature

2.

This

is

of the

the normal course of

on

mere

in

activity,

Act of Will

all

our

acts.

It

would

would run colorand there would be no acts

never be disturbed, our whole lessly

33

life

any time only one stimulus were at work. In such a case we would never have formed the con-

of will,

if at

cept of "will," possibility of,

we would have had no occasion for, or doing so. What we call an act of will

occurs only where several stimuli are at taneously, to

time,

which one cannot respond

because

they

lead

to

work at the

incompatible

simul-

same

activities.

What happens

in such a case of ?" "conflicting motives In general, the following: there occurs a peculiar oscillation of events of consciousness, a more or less

namely,

rapid shift of ideas, as

appear, confused.

which

alternately appear and disclearer and more

weaker and stronger,

They

are the imaginative pictures of the by the stimuli,

results of the different activities aroused

this manner attempt, so to speak, to triumph over one another, dispute the possession of the field of

which in

and mutually inhibit one another. Let us consider a very simple case. I decide to leave the room. I go to the door and press the latch. All attention,

automatically; the walking, the

movement

arm and hand, proceed without any

act of will

this occurs

of

my

being necessary. Now I press the latch and pull on the door but it does not open! The usual course of events is disturbed. While hitherto, perhaps, I have


34

been thinking of very different matters, now my attention is centered upon the door. I shake it vigorously, sense the tightening of muscles, and experience exertion against what opposes me. The idea of openbefore me as an ing the door stands firmly and

my

clearly

image of

"will" to open the door. believe that the of "willing" in specific experience

I

my

I

goal.

the whole affair

is

nothing but the "feeling of exertion"

(whether this is simply a feeling of tenseness in the muscles or some special "innervation-sensation" does not concern us here). If the door offers opposition for a long time, the question occurs to me, shall I not desist, and wait until the perhaps inadvertently closed

opened, or shall I rather seek another exit from the room? In this way the outer inhibition leads to

door

is

an inner one; the

conflict

between the end-in-view and

the perceived state of affairs turns into a conflict between ideas, between that of exit by forte, and that of

remaining, or of leaving by the window. These ideas oppose each other; one will triumph, and this triumph is obviously a "decision," an "act of will." In any act of will we find a struggle against an inner or outer check, which ends with triumph or surrender.

For

ethics,

only the case of inner checks

of any imrestrict ourselves to the investiis

portance; therefore we gation of those acts of will in which a definite idea (motive, or end-in-view) several, is,

and which

is

finally

in conflict with another or

dominates

actually leads to overt activity.

it

or them, that

HUMAN CONDUCT?

OF

3.

The Concept

35

of Will

We

are accustomed, under the circumstances just described, to speak of an "act of choice," and to say that the person has chosen between different possibilities, that he has come to a definite decision; and a

primitive psychology under the influence of the idea of substance treats the matter as if the choice or decision in the conflict of motives were

made by

a special

power, the "will," which, watching the struggle from without, intervenes and bestows the prize of victory upon one or the other of the contestants. But we have nothing to do with such uncritical thinking. Experience fails to disclose any such substratum which stands

behind the appearances, and

its

hypothetical assumption contributes nothing at all to the comprehension of the matter. It leads rather, among other things, to an irresolvable circle; for, on the one hand, we say that

the "will" decides between the motives, and, on the

other hand,

"What

we

can give no answer to the question,

determines the will in

its

decision?" except,

"the motives themselves." present no "act of will" that, added to oscillation of the ends-in-view, and the final

No, there the

is

triumph of one of them, decides which shall triumph; but the whole process that we have described is itself the act of will. ture that

what

experience

may

To

we add

the conjecand striking in the whole is specific innervation lie in a particular kind of

which, again,


36

or sensation of tenseness in the muscles.

known

that the latter

present also

is

1

It

when

is

well

the agent

has to overcome a purely inner check or restraint, such as the rejection of

certain ends-in-view.

The body

musculature strains (the hands clench, the face takes

on a "determined expression") and the feeling of exertion, of overcoming,

The Law

4.

Be

present.

of Motivation

may, the question which here concerns philosophers is, "What determines whether a

that as

us as

is

characteristic

it

certain idea triumphs or

motives?

What

motive?"

Or,

succumbs in the

conflict of

properties distinguish the prevailing in a more appropriate formulation,

"Under what conditions does a definite idea gain the upper hand ?" The answer to this question tells us why a man does this rather than that, why In general he prefers something, "wills" something. It is the answer to the question, "What are the motives of human

conduct?" 1

For

this

assumption the following surprising experiment If one stands sideways with his

furnishes clear evidence.

shoulder against a wall, his his body,

wall with

arm hanging

vertically alongside

presses for some time very strongly against the his arm, as if he were trying to lift it to the horizon-

and

tal position,

which the wall prevents, and then suddenly

away from the

wall, his

arm

rises at

once as

if

"of

its

own

steps self"

into the horizontal position, without any decision of the will. The cause of this is that the effort of raising the arm is now so

small in comparison with the immediately preceding effort that it fails to register in consciousness.

OF

HUMAN CONDUCT?

In many, indeed most, situations of is

easy to find;

it lies

so clearly at

life

hand

37

the answer

that

it

can be

correctly given without further trouble by any unprejudiced judge, that is, by any man not led astray by philosophizing and moralizing. Such a person will

us that, at least in general, in a conflict of several ends-in-view, a man will act in the direction of the most

tell

pleasant.

What

does this statement

Every

idea, every content of

mean? our consciousness, as

we

a certain tone. And possesses this has the consequence that the content in question is not something completely neutral, or indifferent, but learn

is

from experience,

somehow

characterized as agreeable or disagreeable,

attractive or repellent, joyful or painful, pleasant or

unpleasant.

and

We adopt the last mentioned terminology

every experience has an emotional tone that is pleasant or unpleasant, or, in the substantival language of psychology, in every experience there is a feeling of say,

pleasure or of pain. course indescribable

The

essence of these feelings

is

of

every simple experience is beyond and one can only make clear what is description meant by appropriate indications. Here we should note all

we

use the words "pleasant" and "unpleasant" in the widest possible sense. All further questions, such

that

as

whether there are different kinds of pleasantness and

unpleasantness, or only different grades, we put aside; most of them, like the one just mentioned, seem to me to be improperly formulated. different experiences

when

I

Of

course, I have very

stroke soft silk,

when

I


38

attend a performance of when I admire an heroic

beloved person makes spect there

Midsummer Night's Dream, act, when the proximity of a

me

happy; but in a certain reundoubtedly a similarity in the mental

is

dispositions in all these cases,

and we express

this

when

we

say that all of them have pleasant emotional tones, or that all of them are joyful. On the other hand,

however

different

when

my

feelings

may

be

when

I

cut

my

hear a violinist play a false note, when I finger, think of the injustice of the world, when I stand at the I

bier of a friend, there

these cases all as

which

still

is

some kind of

justifies

me

belonging to a single class,

similarity

in considering

in

all

them

and in saying they are

unpleasant feelings.

The enumeration

of these examples should not be In exceptional cases it may very well

misunderstood.

be that the

last

mentioned

those mentioned

situations are pleasant,

and

unpleasant. Sensations of bodily pain can be pleasant (perversion), false violin tones can amuse and please me (as in the case of intended first

comedy), indeed, a pessimistic philosopher can even be pleased with the injustice of the world, viewing it triumphantly as a confirmation of his views: "I told you so!" No definite emotional tone belongs to a it depends upon the whole white object can appear in any color,

as such; specific experience situation, just as a

depending upon the lighting. After these explanations

we

can

state that the deci-

sion of the will proceeds in the direction of the most in the following manner: of the pleasant end-in-view,

OF HUMAN CONDUCT? which function

39

one gains the the finally possesses highest degree of pleasant emotional tone, or the least unpleasant tone, and thus the act in question is unambiguously de-

ideas

as motives, that

upper hand which

termined.

Two

remarks must be introduced here.

First,

the

decision occurs only after the difference in emotional tone reaches a certain point, because without this

assumption it is obvious that no oscillation in "choice" could ever occur. The second remark is that when I describe the conflict of motives as an opposition of ideas, this is to be considered as a way of speaking only,

and not

anything binding or compromising. Perhaps other psychic acts are involved, but this question can remain undecided for our purposes. as

we discuss the validity of the above proposiwe must devote a moment to the difficulties which

Before tion, lie

hidden in the notion of "most pleasant," or

"least

The

use of these phrases obviously preunpleasant." supposes that one can compare the different pleasant and unpleasant situations, and can speak of more or less

with respect to

feelings.

However,

this

seems to

be impossible, because the intensity of feelings (or any other psychical state) certainly cannot actually be measured, cannot be determined quantitatively.

This

doubtless true; a calculus of pleasure and pain with sums and differences of feelings would be meaningless.

is

we

can carry through the comparison of ideas with respect to their "pleasure value" or their "motiva-

Still,

tive

power/'

which

is

necessary

for the

understanding


40

of acts of will.

This follows from the fact that in

we

constantly say with sense and under"I standing, prefer this to that, but not as much as I It seems to me that the like the other," and so forth.

every-day

life

matter sums up as follows: When two ends-in-view, a and b, appear alternately before one, they are not directly balanced one against the other; but we find

example, the transition from a to b is an unpleasant experience, while the transition from b to a is

that, for

we are able to say, by way of definipleasant. Thus is the more a with that tion, pleasant or the respect to b less unpleasant idea. In general, we must not consider the genesis of acts of will as a static balancing, but rather as a dynamic process, a flux, in which the wax-

ing and waning and shifting of the images is at least as much tinged with feeling as are the images themselves. Thus we see how one can speak sensibly of

more or

less

with respect to pleasure and pain, without

We

differences. reactually presupposing quantitative the than more of opposition pleasure quire nothing and pain in the transition from one idea to another.

number

of motives present the most attractive or least unattractive end-in-view is distinguished the fact that every departure from it to any one of

Among

a

by

joined with an inhibiting pain. Thus it such in the center of represents a summit, appears as

the others

is

consciousness,

and draws conduct toward

itself.

OF HUMAN CONDUCT?

5.

Law

In Proof of the

Having thus become

41

of Motivation

regarding the meaning of the law, that in the conflict of motives the decision goes to the most pleasant or least unpleasant, we turn now to the question of I

its

clear

validity.

have already remarked

cases of

table

When a child reaches for the largest

and obvious.

of several cakes offered

open

that, for the majority of

every-day acts of will, its validity is indispu-

it,

when

I

take a walk in the

going to a faculty meeting, when I whether the destination of a summer's trip shall

air instead of

reflect

be the sea or the mountains,

when one wavers between

the opera or to a concert, between buying black or brown shoes then, normally, in all these a

visit to

cases

and in a thousand similar

shadow of

ones, there

a doubt that the decision

is

is

not the

determined by

the agreeableness or disagreeableness, by the pleasure in the quality of the end-in-view, and that it takes place

described way. But in order to pursue the study of ethics, indeed to understand the mechanism of conduct at all, we are

served by a rule that holds good in the majority of cases only; we need a law, that is, a description of the familiar relationships that fits all cases. little

Now

method always used by verified in

many

cases

science

may

is

to ask

whether a rule

be a law, that is, At any rate, one begins

not

itself

actually hold for all cases. with this assumption and often finds

it

verified, in that


42 all cases

which

at first

sight

seem not to their

fit

the rule are

actual

apparent exceptions only, subsumption under the law being hidden by complicated circumstances.

to our problem, we express the provisional assumption that the rule governing many cases of motivation may itself be a law, that is,

Applying

this

method

we examine whether

or not in every case of an act of

will the decision be not determined in the direction of

the most pleasant, or least unpleasant, motive.

6.

At

The Law

of Motivation in the Case of Sacrifice

sight this seems not to be the case at all. It that a well-bred child chooses the smallest happens cake, even though it obviously would "rather have" the first

and do we not very often find ourselves in the situation of the child and trudge toward a painful,

largest;

unpleasant goal ? Does this not happen whenever we "make a sacrifice?" The fact is, many, if not most, philosophers believe that in such situations the prevailing motive is certainly not the most pleasant, and is often extremely unpleasant. Therefore, they do not consider the law to be universally valid; they deny it represents the law of motivation, and say it is not at all

man

can desire only that the idea of which possesses relatively greater pleasure for him. They hold that he can desire simply anything, and many of true that a

them (including Kant) though

human

conduct

are of the opinion that alis

determined by pleasant or

OF

HUMAN CONDUCT?

43

unpleasant feelings in the described manner in all other cases, this is simply not so in the case of moral acts.

and

The

according to them, form an exception are, indeed, defined and distinguished by this fact.

Hence we

latter,

and importance of our problem, and we cannot be content before learning whether our law of motivation holds only in the limited sphere see the extent

of the trivial acts of every-day life, or whether it is a true law governing every act of will without exception.

Let us not hesitate to analyze more closely the case who has to choose between its several cakes.

of the child If

the child takes the smallest in order to leave the

larger ones for its companions, one may well consider Can its behavior really not this to be a "moral" act. be explained in terms of the law that the most pleasant

end-in-view determines the will?

must admit

that this is

the state of

mind

of the other

who

believe that

very easily done.

For

we

how

is

of this child distinguished from that thoughtlessly takes the largest?

We

said before that even the child

a "sacrifice"

I

who here decides to make

would "rather have" a larger piece of cake But what is the significance of

than a smaller one. this?

Obviously, that under otherwise similar con-

ditions the idea of the larger cake

is

more

pleasant (in the sense previously defined) than is that of the smaller. But conditions here are not the same, since in the mind

of the child

who

renounces, because of his education

or natural propensities, certain events are happening which are absent in the other child; and these act so that the original emotional tone of the conflicting ends-


44

in-view tion

is

entirely

by means

altered.

They

are events of associa-

of which there enter,

more or

less

clearly,

into consciousness ideas of pleased or displeased parents, their words of praise or censure, or the ideas of

happy or disappointed companions.

The

strong emo-

tional tones that belong to all these ideas are transmitted to the motive with which they are associated,

and completely modify its initial pleasure value. The image of a larger piece of cake is indeed more pleasant than that of a smaller one

both stand side by side unaccompanied by other ideas, but here each is joined by a complex of other ideas together with their feelings, if

and these

feelings are transferred, as experience shows, to those images, even when the ideas to which they originally belonged no longer appear in consciousness.

By this process the idea of the become more pleasant than that

good can easily of the greater, and the lesser

apparently paradoxical decision occurs in complete conformity with our law of motivation. Every one

admits that the act of will could take place as it did only because of certain external influences, for no one believes that a child can choose the smaller cake merely

because

it

likes the larger

one more.

And pedagogical

experience teaches us that these influences are of the sort described. Since this suffices to explain the fact

our completely, we need no further hypothesis. Thus law of motivation has here been entirely verified; and it is

verified in all other cases

sider.

choose to con-

dealt with a very simple example, we to turn our attention to those acts of will

Having

do well now

we may

OF HUMAN CONDUCT? in

which the very highest matters are

which have from olden times been drawn ground of

ethical inquiries.

The Law

at stake,

and

into the fore-

Such are the

seemingly-greatest renunciation, or

7.

45

cases of

self-sacrifice.

of Motivation in the Case

of

Heroism

The idea

of personal destruction is, in general, one of the most terrifying; not the most terrifying, for there are enough miseries in comparison with which death is felt

as a

soothing

relief.

whose

history, acts of will

Yet

we

fatal

observe, in life

and

and miserable conse-

quences are not only inevitable for the performer, but are clearly seen by him to be involved as the goal of his

The martyr accepts pain and death for the sake of an idea, a friend gives his life or "happiness" for his friend. Can any one in earnest say of such action.

persons that their decisions are determined by the motives which possess the most pleasant or the least unpleasant emotional tones?

According to anything

else if

firm conviction, one cannot say one would tell the truth, for such are

my

Let us then try to analyze and understand the motive of heroism. The hero acts "for the sake of the facts.

a cause"; he desires to carry out an idea or realize a definite goal. It is clear that the thought of this goal or that idea dominates his consciousness to such an

extent that there

thoughts.

At

hardly room for any other this holds in the case of inspiration,

is

least

in

it


46

from which alone an heroic that the idea of his

own

act

can

arise.

It is

painful destruction

is

true

present,

however burdened with pain it may be in itself, it is inhibited and repressed by the predominant end-inin an "act of will," in an which view, finally triumphs

but,

effort

which becomes stronger and sharper the longer

and more

the thought of the unavoidable catastrophe confronts him. What is the source of the astonishing force of the decisive end-in-view ? Whence the

clearly

power of

to emotion.

can

fall to

Inspiration

is

this

is

due

the greatest pleasure that

To be inspired by someovercome by the greatest joy in the The man who, under the stress of in-

the lot of man.

thing means

thought of

Without doubt

this affect?

to be

it.

spiration, decides to help a friend or save another crea-

ture

from pain and

destruction, whatever the cost, finds

the thought of this act so profoundly jojtful, so overwhelmingly pleasant that, at the moment, the idea of

the preservation of his

own

life

and the avoidance of

pain cannot compare with it. And he who fights for a cause with such inspiration that he accepts all persecution and insult realizes his idea with such elevated

pure joy that neither the thought of his miseries nor their actual pain can prevail aught against it. The notion of giving up his purpose because of pain is, for him, more unpleasant than the pain itself. Thus the correctness of our law of the will is shown in even the most extreme case,

and quite

without any auxiliary hypothesis.

It

the will follows the versally true that

is,

naturally, in fact, uni-

motive which has

OF HUMAN CONDUCT?

47

the greatest degree of pleasant feeling connected with it.

Rebuttal of False Objections and Explanations

8.

was, of course, a gross error to

It

try,

as

men

did on

the basis of a naive psychology, to explain the action of the martyr by saying that his behavior is determined

by a hope of reward in another world, beyond; in this fashion apparently subsuming it under our law of the This explanation may often fit, but certainly not always, for there have been unbelieving martyrs, con-

will.

cerned only with this world. Indeed, it does not hold even in the majority of cases, even though Schiller has the

Maid

of Orleans die with the words,

brief, the joy

und ewig

ist

is

everlasting."

die

["Kurz

ist

"The pain

is

der Schmerz,

Freude"]

not at

necessary that the prevailing pleasant idea be of one's personal condition. should this be assumed ? Perhaps because one believes

No,

it

is

all

Why

that, in general,

be pleasant,

only ideas of one's

own

condition can

only such ideas can be This would be a gross misunder-

or, at least, that

intensely pleasant? standing of the psychological fact, for the

commonest

experiences teach us the opposite. They also teach that a man is not nearly so much concerned with his own future good and evil as many older ethical systems

would have us see this in the

moderate.

believe.

way

When

For example, one can

man harms

easily

himself by being imhe squanders his future happiness a


48

for a mess of pottage, why should he not risk it for the sake of the joy given him in saving some unfortunate ?

we

are not clear in this,

we run

the danger of establishing our law of motivation in an erroneous manner, and hence missing its truth. In fact, such If

mistaken notions that

many

at this

point are to blame for the fact

hold our law to be

false.

They suppose

to be absurd to say that the martyr suffers

and

it

dies

because of "pleasure," since in this way one seems to wipe out, either in fact or at least terminologically, all difference between the pleasant and the unpleasant. When it comes to the confusion of the facts I believe

that our representation has avoided just that to which our opponents have fallen victim. It is not a confusion, if we emphasize an ordinarily painful experience can, under special conditions, become pleasant, and vice ver$a. It is this

but on the contrary a finer distinction, that

overlooked by the opponents of our view when they say that a man can act in the direction of any end-in-view, and not only toward a pleasant one. To fact that

is

be sure, any end can be desired, but this does not mean that it has nothing to do with the pleasure tone of the end-in-view, but only that any end can become pleasant. It is as if one said, "Whoever is not blind can see any

Of course, but only if it be illuminated! can no more direct itself toward an end, the

visible thing."

The will

simply unpleasant and has absolutely nothing attractive, alluring, or noble in it, than the eye can see an object clothed in utter darkness. In ethical idea of which

is

considerations

we

often

come upon

the assertion that

OF HUMAN CONDUCT? man

can desire that which

and unenjoyable

is

to him; but

49

in every respect painful all examples that can be

show upon analysis that the end is imagined as in some way still something noble, great, necessary, propitiative, or valued, no matter how much woe may be connected with it. As soon as one offered of such a desire

succeeds (which

is

not so easy) in imagining an end

that appears to be completely unpleasant, repulsive, disgusting, bringing suffering, and hateful without

compensation, without any possibility of transfiguration, exhaltation or admiration, then one sees at once

with complete certainty that such an end cannot be desired.

It is

an inescapable law that the absolutely

and unpleasant

is not a possible object of are of course often fanatics, and a Martyrs fanatic often inclines toward perversion; hence bodily

repulsive desire.

pain can then be pleasant for him.

But

this case is

very rare, although frequently happens that the idea of an ordinarily painful state is a joyful one for him. With this we arrive at a second factual distinction, it

which

is

frequently neglected by those who deny our It is the distinction between the will.

law of the

pleasant idea of a state and the idea of a pleasant state. That is, one can imagine only a thing, a state, or an event, but not the pleasure connected with the things;

whether the idea all

itself is

joyful or painful does not at

depend on whether the imagined

things,

when

they

are actually present, have pleasant or unpleasant consequences. As is well known, Dante thought that

there

was no greater pain than

that connected with

WHAT AKE THE

50

the idea of a pleasant state

Nessun maggior dolore . . only with whether an idea whether

MOTlVJiS

if .

is

this

lay

Our law pleasant,

in the past, is

concerned

and not with

the idea of something pleasant. Regarding the objection, often raised, that the law of motivation can be maintained only by a trick of it is

terminology, since one extends the concept of pleasure too widely and designates very different things by the one word, we must say that the real reason for our usage, in grouping together everything which is pleasant or satisfying, lies in the facts. The usage is perfectly natural,

and

is

subsequently justified because

it

leads to a simple formulation of a fundamental law. And how else would one define the concept of

pleasure? The objection raised above cannot be considered a serious one. Of course, we could agree to call only the satisfaction of hunger, thirst, and the sexual

impulse "pleasure" which, perhaps, certain moralists would prefer but in so doing we should merely satisfy certain prejudices, and it would be necessary to give

up the adequate formulation

of the

law of motivation.

No serious

danger, then, threatens our law from this actually finds the conviction of its

quarter; and one validity very

who

widespread.

explicitly

validity.

The

oppose

it,

Even many philosophers implicitly

institutions of

human

presuppose society all

its

show

the universal belief in the validity of the law. For no religion, no system of education, no public institution knows any other means of influencing human action

HUMAN CONDUCT?

OF than to

51

make the idea of the end whose

strive to

realiza-

desired as pleasant as possible, and the idea of the undesired unpleasant. The clumsiest means of doing this is the promise of reward and the threat of tion

is

punishment, but there are also more refined, indirect means.

The Law

9.

Such being the

of Motivation Is

case,

it is

Not Tautologous

unnecessary to defend the

truth of the law of motivation any further; find it considered almost self-evident. But

we even we must

again be careful not to consider it too self-evident, which is indeed often done. Some think the law says

nothing whatever, others that for

no first

significance.

opinion. often hear

We

We it

shall

said that

ethics, at least,

it

has

begin by examining the if

a

man

decides in favor

of something it is clear that he "prefers" it to something else, that he considers it in some sense better.

But this holds only because "to prefer" and "to consider better" are different expressions of the same fact.

Our "law" has it is

merely an

therefore

(it is

said)

no

factual content;

a tautology, analytical proposition,

and

no knowledge. argument is false. It rests upon a confusion of "to desire" and "to will." The expressions "to consider better," "to find more satisfying," "to imagine with pleasure," and similar ones, may be treated as synonyms of "to desire." John Stuart Mill saw this

affords us

But

this


52 clearly

and the

when he wrote

to desire

same

it

fact.

is

volition

is

something pleasing

are only different ways of expressing But "to will" is something else, some-

No reaction need follow mere

thing more. volition

that to find

desire,

but

inseparably joined to action and conduct; identical with the primary, inner stage of

conduct, the exertion, the innervation.

(Whether

this

actually leads to bodily motion and to further external depends upon external circumstances and can

effects

no longer be

attributed to

him who

That something imagined with the of pleasure

actually willed, that

is

wills, to the self.)

maximum amount

is,

leads to innerva-

anything but self-evident; it is simply a fact of experience. We are so accustomed to this fact that we tion, is

it is part of the very concept of be also something desired. Howsee that here we are concerned with an em-

are inclined to believe

the willed that ever,

we

pirical

because

fact,

it

with a law established &y experience; can very well imagine a different state of

we The

child with the piece of cake could, for example, very well observe the larger piece with much greater pleasure and still make the discovery that whenaffairs.

ever a smaller or less tasty piece was offered its hand always reached for the latter. And it could be so universally:

whenever

several

ends-in-view of different

pleasure values compete with one another the reaction might unhesitatingly proceed in the direction of the least

pleasant.

always

wills

law of the

This

is

what he

will.

Of

That man would be a possible

quite conceivable.

least desires

course,

under such circumstances,

HUMAN CONDUCT?

OF if

the world remained as

it

now is,

53

an individual subject

law would be destroyed in a very short time. Our actual law of motivation would appear to be a

to this

one defined

as the most pleasant idea that to leads but this is conduct; actually certainly not relevant, since we have assumed from the

tautology

if

which

beginning

that

by pleasure

known

diately

Only

is

to

meant an indefinable quality immeeveryone and different from pain.

observation can determine that those ideas are

endowed

the deciding motives which are most richly with this quality; it is not self-evident.

The Law

10.

Expresses Significant

Knowledge

A

word now concerning the attempt, mentioned above, to show our law of the will to be insignificant. It

may

be admitted, one

what appears of that ?

and

will

in

The do

it,

says,

some way

noble

man

that

man

attractive to

can will only But what

him.

will find the

good

while the scoundrel will prefer

pleasing, evil,

both

we

shall

according to the same law; and consequently

learn nothing regarding the difference between good and evil, concerning the distinction between moral and

This distinction and everything that interested in could remain the same even if

other conduct. ethics

is

some other law of the will were true; knowledge of the law leaves us no wiser than we were before concerning ethical matters.

We

answer that of course we learn nothing positive concerning what is unique in moral volition, but we


54

learn at least something negative, namely, that the peculiarity of good conduct does not consist in the fact that the pleasure and pain of the agent have nothing to do with his motivation. And, since this has often

been maintained, and indeed from it has been derived the opinion that moral behavior proceeds in the direction opposite to the most pleasant motive (William James says that moral conduct is conduct in the line of greatest resistance),

we must

consider

it

an important

law holds for every

insight to note that our

volition

without exception, and therefore for moral volition. But more than this is gained. When one asks, why

A

behave morally and B the opposite? we can answer: because the idea of a certain end is joined

does

now

with pleasure for A, but with its opposite for B (both, of course, taken relative to the pleasure-value of the contrary ways of acting). tion

But, one will say, the ques-

given no final answer in this way; it is only put For now one must ask: why, then, is the same

is

off.

idea pleasant for the one

Exactly! a point at

The

question

is

and not for the other?

only put

off,

but perhaps to

which one can hope to answer it now know where we have to search. It

to

make

easily!

We

is necessary out the laws of feelings, the rules that govern

growth and decline, according to which they work together and against each other, but above all to

their

understand the process whereby they are joined to ideas.

Perhaps psychology already knows these laws. as we are in possession of them we shall be

As soon

able to refer to their ultimate causes the predispositions

OF men

HUMAN CONDUCT?

55

of acting; we shall be in position to understand their differences and their origin,

of

and,

to a certain

finally,

way

to give the

ment can be acquired just

means whereby

influenced. that

We

shall,

knowledge which

their develop-

with

this,

ethics seeks.

have

CHAPTER What i.

Is

Egoism

III

Egoism? Is

"Immoral"

philosophers have thought that a will determined in the described manner, by the maximum

Many

pleasure, to be

must be

called egoistic; because

it is

supposed

or selfish, to "seek one's own egoistic, pleasure." this holds even of those thinkers, like Spinoza,

And who had

a presentiment of the validity of our law, as well as of those, such as Kant, who denied it. The

former merely desired to express a fact, but in so doing gave to the word "egoism" so broad a meaning that it

became quite useless; the latter desired to discredit the law of the will. They used the word "egoism" with the uncomplimentary meaning which

it has in everyday but they did not realize that in this sense conduct is certainly not at all egoistic when it occurs in accordance with our law of motivation. For no unbiassed

life;

person will call an act egoistic which, for example, arises out of joy in the satisfactions of another person. There is no doubt that in everyday speech this word is used with the intention of blaming; that is, when someone calls certain conduct egoistic he desires to call 56

WHAT

IS

EGOISM?

57

up an unpleasant idea of this conduct. Also there is no doubt that such condemnation is intended as moral condemnation: the word "egoistic" signifies a concept subsumed under the concept of the "immoral." Thus a subspecies of immorality.

is

By learning what is meant by egoism we learn in part what is meant by "immorality," and this gives us a clue to the

egoism

meaning of "morality," its opposite. If those philosophers were right who hope to derive all immorality from "egoism," and who see in it the source of all evil, then with the discovery of the meaning of the word the whole question of the nature of the moral would practically be answered; for it would only be necessary to separate what is indifferent (if anything of the sort exists)

from what

is

not egoistic to find the moral in

the remainder. But, however this

any case the inquiry concerning the nature of egoism can only consist in determining the sense in which the word is actually used.

havior

It is

may

be, in

cannot determine that a certain kind of be"really" egoism,

and that nothing

else

can

bear this name.

2.

Egoism and "Personal Welfare"

The most convenient, easiest assertion that a philosopher can make about egoism is that it is an "impulse." Thus we find Schopenhauer saying that all human conduct can be explained by the existence of three "main-springs" of conduct, namely, egoism, malice,

WHAT

58

EGOISM?

IS

and sympathy. This would be an extremely simple mechanism, and further explanation of the three impulses does appear at first very simple. Egoism (according to Schopenhauer and many others) aims at

own

welfare"; sympathy aims at "another's welfare" and corresponds to altruism; and malice aims

"one's

at

"harm

own

one's

Thus, according to

to others."

welfare and the welfare or

this teaching,

harm

of others

constitute the three situations possessing human interThe "satisfaction" of an impulse would consist in est.

the realization of

its

corresponding situation.

significant that in this

toward "one's

list

there

is

no impulse

Is it

not

directed

own harm?"

easy to see that in this manner it is impossible to a definition of egoism, or even to understand the get nature of an impulse in general. For one must know It is

first

what

one's

"own

in the fact that one's

Does,it not consist desires are fulfilled, that is,

welfare"

own

is.

Consequently, if one is sympathetic, the other's welfare means at the same time the realization of one's own desires; if a man is that one's impulses are satisfied

malicious he

is

satisfied in

?

knowing the other

to suffer,

and thereby his own welfare is increased. In other words, an act springing out of malice or sympathy would be just as egoistic as conduct motivated by egoism.

We cannot

learn

from

mean

this

paradox that by "welfare" one

the realization of

satisfaction of all of one's

up

all

personal desires, the

own impulses,

without giving

the definition of egoism as the impulse aiming at

WHAT "personal welfare."

IS

One

EGOISM?

of the

two

59 at least

must be

both must be abandoned in order to

In

fact, given up. obtain a clear idea that will do justice to the actual use

of the word.

For

if

one

tries to

improve Schopen-

hauer's thought, retaining his way of looking at the matter, by saying that "welfare" means the realization

with the exception of those arising from malice or sympathy, then we must ask: with what right

of

all desires

are

such different

activities

as

striving

for

power,

knowledge, sexual pleasure, enjoyment of art considered to be expressions of one impulse, namely "egoism?" This cannot be justified by linguistic usage, for the desires directed, for example, toward knowledge or aesthetic enjoyment are not usually called egoistic;

nor can

it

be grounded in the

facts, for

evidently

we

have here a large variety of different "impulses," and the word "egoism" would only be a collective name for them. pulses, but

It

would not be coordinated with the im-

would

stand, as

it

were, behind or over

an impulse of a higher order. Such an them, impulse, which aimed at the satisfaction of impulses, would of course be a meaningless notion; and thus we as

discover the extreme carelessness of the usual formulation of the concept, carelessness that makes it impossible to talk clearly and sensibly concerning this matter.

3.

The Nature

of Impulse

Therefore, before carrying our considerations any further, we must ask what it is we wish to designate

WHAT

60

IS

EGOISM?

by the term "impulse." Linguistically the word obviously means something that pushes, impels, or thrusts; and so one generally thinks of a force (a "spring")

which in turn

imagined as analogous to muscular exertion or work. If, however, one is to make the nature of an impulse clear, one does well to replace is

such images by an abstract formulation. And this must obviously be: an impulse is a human disposition by means of which man's desires and volitions are directed toward a definite goal.

which,

This formulation,

like every statement about "dispositions," "pro-

pensities," or "faculties," says

but

little,

obtains a con-

we remember that we already know, preceding chapter, how a definite goal comes

crete content if

from the

to be desired.

This desire consists in the fact that the l

idea of the goal

impulse

exists

is

pleasant;

thus

we may

say that an

whenever an idea (or perception)

is

accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. The disposition which constitutes the essence of impulse is, then, the inherited or acquired propensity to react to certain stimuli with feelings. These can of course be un-

pleasant feelings, for an impulse can be negative in nature; an unpleasant idea has the tendency to lead to

a

movement 1

If

1

of avoidance or flight.

do not think

that this definition of desire

not desire the moon,"

we

is

too broad.

pleasant, but we do do desire the should answer:

one objects: "The sight of the

moon

is

"We

sight of the moon." And again we must warn against a confusion of desire with volition. What is desired is willed only if

no other stronger

desires are present.

WHAT We

sec at once that

IS

EGOISM?

61

an impulse need not be an

enduring, fixed orientation of the

soul;

it

can be

temporary and changeable. Because of a passing disposition an idea can come to possess a certain emotional tone even though in general ent one, or none at all.

An impulse is, like a force, direction

and a

it

possesses quite a differ-

characterized by a certain

certain magnitude.

The former

is

given by the particular idea (or class of ideas) to which the pleasant or unpleasant feelings are joined, the intensity of the feeling, by which is meant relative strength in relation to the emotional tones

latter its

by the

(One should bear in mind previous chapter on the compari-

of other alternative ideas.

what was

said in the

son of feelings of pleasure.) Impulses, then, are not to be compared to actual tensions or potential energy. The nervous energy that spent in every act has its seat, so to speak, in the whole organism, not in an individual impulse; the latter merely determines the path it takes. The

is

"strength" of an impulse only conditions its preponderance over other impulses; the intensity of the act,

the power with which the total energy which

word

it is

carried out, depends

upon

available to the agent. The "inclination," which Kant always used in place is

of "impulse," offers less occasion for the confusion of and expanding force, and therefore is the

impulse

better expression. For an impulse does not actually a tendency. "impel," but "inclines" or directs

When

we

attribute to

anyone an inclination toward certain

WHAT

62

EGOISM?

IS

things, conditions, or activities, this is only another way of expressing the fact that the idea of those things or

pleasant for him. And since there is hardly any idea, or perception, or any psychic event to which a feeling is not joined, we can say that in every moment activities is

of our conscious

whole basis

life is

a

life

some

inclination

is

active:

our

of impulse. This is the empirical rests the notion of many philosophers

life

upon which

that the essence of

the "will."

(According to the essence of the whole universe.) life is

Schopenhauer, it is If we connect what

is

said above

on the nature

of

"impulse" with the law of the will enunciated in the preceding chapters, we realize the important truth that, no matter what one's conduct is, one always follows

some

inclination.

One can do and

will only

what one

has an impulse to will and do. For the law of the will asserts that one can act only toward tl^at end whose idea

is

most pleasant for one, and

direction of the strongest impulse.

means in the Thus Kant's cate-

this

which demands that one act wholly gorical imperative, independently of one's inclinations, demands what is impossible. It goes contrary to the facts of psychology and therefore has no interest for us. Moral conduct is either impossible or

it

is

derived from natural in-

clinations.

4.

Is

Egoism an Impulse?

After making clear the meaning of the term "imthe question whether egoism is an impulse pulse,"

WHAT

IS

EGOISM?

63

obtains a clear meaning, and we can now answer it. If egoism or selfishness were one inclination among others, this

would mean

that certain definite ideas

were

pleasant to the egoist which for other men would be unpleasant or without any emotional tone whatever.

Which

ideas could these be?

Here we must consider the concept welfare," already touched upon.

of "personal Is there an idea of

"personal welfare?" Obviously there is not, for an idea is always an intuited, given content of conscious-

on the

ness, while "welfare,"

contrary, is something extremely abstract; hence there is no idea of "welfare" in general. If we assign someone the task of imagin-

ing his

own

welfare he cannot carry

picture definite situations in

he

it

out; he can only that

which he would say

is satisfied.

Can we deduce from

this that

only those inclinations

are possible which are directed upon particular imaginable situations or things, that there can be no impulse directed toward the

abstraction "personal

welfare,"

and that therefore egoism must be something else? Such a conclusion would be premature, for there are undoubtedly such impulses as the will to power, the will to wealth, and yet power and wealth are wholly abstract, and not directly imaginable. Shall

we

such as "power" say that a general concept

can also be emotionally colored, like an actual idea, and This thereby constitute the nucleus of an impulse?

would be a psychological

error that

the rationalization of ethics, guilty of

would make us from which

all

WHAT

64

IS

EGOISM?

systems in the history of philosophy have suffered; in. stead of investigating the individual cases of actual psychic processes connected with moral feeling they deal at once with abstractions and generalizations which, just because they originate in the thought *

of everyday

life,

are to be tested doubly carefully.

"Power" in general cannot be pictured by anyone, but only the activities in which it manifests itself. The

man who

longs for power sees himself carry admiring multitudes before him in a fiery speech, sees how he

gives commands to cringing subordinates, how he stands majestically before humbled opponents, and so

He who

strives for wealth cannot imagine this the individual but things which condirectly, pictures stitute, represent, or symbolize it: a castle, a park, a

forth.

steam-yacht, a dollar and similar things.

bill,

a table loaded with delicacies,

The

sight

and thpught of such

as is characteristic things are saturated with feelings, for the process of desire. greatly powerful desire and concreteness of liveliness the is dependent upon

How

the exciting idea or perception is known to all poets (indefinite "yearning" is a very different thing from desire); philosophers should also learn this in order that they artificial

might not replace the actual human soul by constructions having nothing to do with real

life.

That, despite the psychological facts described, we still may speak of "the" will to wealth, and must do this (for its resolution into

notes, another

an inclination toward bank

toward automobiles, and so forth, would

WHAT be absurd)

mon

IS

upon the

rests

EGOISM? fact that

to all these desired things;

money-value, and this

65

something

is

com-

namely, their high all

that, conversely, things possessing property are desired by the same individThis indicates that in all these cases, somehow, a

common

ual.

common

cause can be made responsible for the fact that just those objects which belong to the class defined by the common property arouse desire when imagined or perceived by a certain individual. this common element, or this cause,

The is

presence of

now

expressed

an "impulse," and for this reason the referring of the conduct to impulse signifies a kind of as the presence of

explanation or knowledge, for knowledge consists in discovering what

The

5.

We

are

is

common

Possibility of

now

to different entities.

Imagining "Personal States"

prepared to answer the question, "Is

there an impulse

that

is

directed toward 'personal

welfare/ and which therefore may be called egoism?" The question must be answered in the affirmative if there

mon

a special class of objects of desire whose comcharacteristic consists of the fact that all of them is

are states of personal welfare; otherwise

it

must be

denied.

In fact

we do

not succeed in delimiting a

states in the desired this, is

the

first

manner.

attempt

by a

Try

it!

state of

If

class of

one meant

welfare simply

any pleasant state, the following would result: we should have to separate out all of the acts of will of an

WHAT

66

IS

EGOISM?

which the prevailing (and therefore pleasant) idea was the idea of a state of the

individual in relatively

agent himself.

From

these acts

we

should have to

again those (for they would not be all) in which the imagined personal state was pleasant; then we select

should have to say that these

last, finally

selected acts

proceeded from the egoism of the individual. Both selections meet with insuperable difficulties.

The

first,

which would

select the cases in

which the

idea of a personal state functions as motive, faces the epistemological difficulty of clearly distinguishing the

ego from the environment the difficulty, namely, of deciding whether an idea is really only of a state of

whether

includes something else, say, the external conditions of the internal state. For example: oneself, or

it

suppose someone would like to hear the "Eroica" and decides to attend a certain concert. In general, the events proceed so that, as a result perhaps of an announcement of the concert in a newspaper, the person imagines certain sounds and melodies of Beethoven; in addition he imagines the orchestra playing, pictures the conductor, the lighted hall, perhaps musical notes, and so forth; all these ideas or images are very pleasing and in the end lead to action (the purchase of tickets,

and

so forth).

that the

And now

suppose someone asserting

whole process might take place

differently,

so

that the person does not think of the concert hall nor the orchestra nor the conductor nor the tones of the pictures his own state of musical In the first case the impulse to which the

symphony, but only enjoyment.

WHAT

IS

EGOISM?

67

would be the requirement of or it would be egoism! Such an opposition of the two cases is untenable, for

action corresponds

desire for music; in the second

the following reasons: First (and this is the most fundamental), it is doubtful whether a case of the second sort

is

at all

possible.

I

do not

believe that

it is.

I fail

how anyone

can imagine himself in a state of musical enjoyment without somehow also imagin-

to discover

ing the conditions and the object (the composition) of his enjoyment. It seems to me that the process must

always take place in the manner first described, or because the state of the self cannot be isolated similarly,

from the "impressions" which

call it forth; for in fact

these impressions belong to the state. Every idea presupposes a perception to which it is related as a copy or

no perception of the personal state (but only the state itself, which can also be a perception), it follows that there is no idea of

secondary experience.

it.

case

One

Since there

is

could at best attempt to distinguish the second

from the

and consider

it

exceptional, by cases the process is essentially that both in admitting the same, but that in the second is added the thought, first,

"All these events of the musical performance come to

my

and only in so far as they condition in me." But what of it?

attention as a result of

produce a special This accompanying thought would be a noteworthy additional fact, a peculiarity of the individual, but

no

new "impulse" would be given with it; nothing would be altered in the act of the will. One cannot man would not have gone to the concert say, "The

special

WHAT

68

unless

IS

EGOISM?

he had that thought, and therefore the impulse

according to the presupposition, the musical impulse is already present (because otherwise lay in

it,"

for,

would

the concert

fail to produce a pleasant state in the him) ; impulse is present and there are no hindrances, the action must follow even without the

and

if

accessory thought, the motivation.

and therefore

this

plays

no

part in

In the second place, suppose that a pure idea of nothing but one's personal state were possible, and occurred sometimes as a motive: this would be a very special orientation of consciousness, it would be an extraordinary case, and therefore cannot constitute the case of "egoism"; for egoism is not at all rare, but an

There

everyday matter. of one's

own

states is

is

no doubt

and could occur only men. And it is just as

exceptional,

in hyperacute, sophisticated clear that a natural

that the thought

man who thinks

very

little

can be a

robust egoist; and therefore that thought cannot be the characteristic property of the egoist. One realizes this

most

clearly

by picturing the disposition of an

egotisti-

Suppose that such a person robs his companions of something, and appropriates it all without thinking of the others. Does he not act selfishly in all

cal person.

when he

continuously

his violent or pictures to himself, during cedure, how pleased he will be when

cunning prohe gets the

such

cases, or is

he

selfish

only

object?

We

have

restricted

our observations to certain ex-

amples, but the result holds generally.

However hard

WHAT one

tries,

state;

at

one

EGOISM?

IS

69

find a pure idea of a personal this does seem to occur one sees

fails to

and whenever

once that there

is

nothing

new

in the situation as a

whole, but only a special thought is added. Our thoughts seem above all to be directed upon ourselves

when we imagine our course

future bodily state. But this of idea of the "self" at all, but of

would not be an

something external. Still, apart from this, egoism could not be so defined; the concept would have, in comparison with scope.

He who

common usage, a far too restricted interested himself in nothing but his

meals would certainly be called an egoist, but he need never think of his "self"; his soul (if this word is appropriate to such a man) would be concerned with nothing but ideas of his favorite food and drink. The object,

not

the

subjective

which

its

in

similar cases.

condition

of

satisfaction

possession produces, is alone desired. Something analogous holds in the case of a believer in after life, who imagines a state of personal blessedness, and all

6.

Egoism

Is

Not

the Will to Pleasure

Thus we have determined that we cannot discover any conduct whose motivating idea is the idea of a agent himself; and since this characteristic found in no actions, it cannot be present in the case

state of the is

of "egoistic" actions. If our investigation had not led to this negative result we should now have to inquire behavior is classified with that in whether egoistic

WHAT

70

which the motive state.

But we

IS

EGOISM?

the idea of a pleasant personal now ignore this question; neither

is

may

a pleasant nor unpleasant state of the

self is

ever actu-

imagined. This attempt to analyze and conceive egoism as an

ally

A

similar attempt, impulse is no longer relevant. undertaken by many philosophers, which proceeds from the formula that those acts are egoistic which are

directed

upon personal

pleasure as the final goal, fares

even worse. in the previous chapter, what at role pleasure really plays in volition, we recognize once the mistake of this formulation; however, we are

Having determined,

now by

in position to form a final judgment regarding it means of the considerations just presented. While,

according to the view criticized, a volition egoistic

when

is

called

the idea of a pleasant personal state funcneW formula the

tions as motive, according to the

motive must be an idea of pleasure itself. This idea of pleasure must itself be pleasant, and egoism would thus be the impulse which

Do we

really

mean

this

is

directed toward pleasure. word "egoism" ? In-

by the

there any such thing? Is such a thing conceivable? If it is probable that in general no given personal state is in itself imaginable, this certainly also

deed,

is

holds of pleasure. For pleasure and pain as emotional tones are most intimately connected with the self, with the states of the

self.

Psychologists usually define the

the consciousness of "states," in feelings as contents of for example, to as the contents opposition,

perceptions

WHAT

IS

EGOISM?

of the consciousness of "objects." all agreed that there is no such

71

And

they are almost thing as the "idea of a

Thus I can only feel pleasure and pain, I cannot think or imagine them. It is impossible to realize the pleasure that one has, for instance, in the

feeling."

of a beloved face, except by imagining this face then one feels itself; pleasure (generally less than in

sight

the presence of the corresponding perception) is itself

it

is

;

a feel-

lived through, actually had,

ing present, not merely imagined. Moreover, one cannot imagine an idea, but can only have it. It appears to me to be certain that in the strict sense pleasure and pain are

unimaginable; in order to intuit them one must each time provide them in the original. Similarly, of wrath, fury, love, possible.

ena must

and other

affections, there are really

no

ideas

The

experiences of accompanying phenomserve as substitutes: the outer manner of

reaction, the characteristic sensations of strain,

forth; in short, all that

which

nected with the affection.

is

perceptual,

and so

and con-

For every idea presupposes

some perception as its pattern. If there is no idea of pleasure, then as a motive; in other words, there

is

it

cannot appear

no impulse toward

hence egoism cannot be such. Pleasure pleasure, and is never desired, but only that which is imagined with impossible to assert that egoism is the impulse directed toward one's personal welfare and that "personal welfare" can be identified with pleasure.

pleasure.

Therefore,

it is

WHAT

72

IS

EGOISM?

Egoism and the Impulse

7.

We

of Self-Preservation

need mention only one other attempt to treat an impulse. It is its identification with

selfishness as

the so-called "impulse of self-preservation," an idea that one may find, for example, in Spinoza. First,

concerning

this,

we

should note that the language of

everyday use does not justify the equivalence; for we try to distinguish clearly between egoism and the effort of self-preservation.

To

begin with, not every act considered "egoistic," for ex-

of self-preservation is ample, the normal care of one's health, the avoidance of unnecessary danger, defense of one's life against robbers; and, in the second place, not all "egoistic" condirected toward self-preservation. The egoist thinks much more of enjoyment than of life, and can,

duct

is

through inconsiderate pursuit of the former, very well put the latter in jeopardy; indeed, one can think of suicide proceeding from egoism, for example, in the cases in which a life, whose preservation is of the greatest

importance for others,

is

wilfully

ended because of

ennui.

These

make

impossible to conceive egoism as an impulse of self-preservation. But even if a close connection existed between the two notions, egoism facts

it

would not thereby become an "impulse"; for one cannot speak of an effort of self-preservation as an impulse in our sense. This would only be possible if there were an intuitive idea of "self-preservation," which because

WHAT of

its

pleasure tone

duct.

EGOISM?

IS

would

73

kinds of con-

incite certain

But obviously "self-preservation"

is

such an ab-

concept that there is certainly no intuitive emotional idea of it. Actually, the modes of behavior which are considered typical expressions of the effort of self-preservation are to be considered manifestations stract

rather of a fear of death or destruction, is

a

and

this too

not a simple impulse (because "destruction" also is too general concept), but a collective name for

much

a class of dispositions to react with powerful unpleasant feelings in certain dangerous situations.

8.

Egoism

is

not an

we

arrive at the conclusion that egoimpulse, and that to this word corre-

Inevitably, then,

ism

as Inconsiderateness

sponds a complicated meaning. great importance for ethics, it

This meaning

is

of

and we must inquire into

further.

Following the preceding considerations,

we need no

longer pursue the possibility that "egoism," although not a single impulse, might mean a common property of a series of different impulses. For these considera-

showed us that the mere striving for something, the fact that some idea awakens feelings of pleasure is tions

not

itself

enough

to constitute "selfishness."

We

can-

not, for example, separate out a group of "sensual imhas often been pulses" and call these egoistic. (This

in sense-pleasapparently in the hope of finding ure the readiest substitute for the difficult concept of tried,

WHAT

74

IS

EGOISM?

"personal welfare.") In this connection one always thinks of hunger, thirst, and the sexual impulse. And in fact one cannot extend the concept of sensual desire much further without obtaining wholly indeterminate

boundaries, since the senses play an important role in the other impulses, too, as in the aesthetic ones; and

the distinction between "interested" and "disinterested" pleasure, as Kant wished to formulate it is, capable of being completely carried out.

I

think, in-

Every

man

has these so-called sensual inclinations, and could not exist without them; but they do not make an egoist

moments when they determine In eating, drinking and procreating a man far from conducting himself egoistically.

of him, not even in the his action. is

Something altogether different is needed in addition. Selfishness is neither an impulse nor a collective name for a group of impulses. The satisfaction of an impulse is never in itself egoistic; but only the manner in

which

this occurs,

only the circumstances in which

it

takes place can give rise to that fact which we wish to characterize by the disparaging word "egoism."

And first

the

thus

we

attain the important insight (perhaps

expressed in the ethics of Bishop Butler) that by "selfishness" a fairly complex fact is desig-

word

nated, namely, the existence of a certain relative strength between the inclinations. For when we charge some-

one with egoism we do not blame him for the presence

when we accuse him of envy or but we condemn him because under the given cruelty, conditions just this impulse led to action; we would of a certain impulse, as

WHAT

EGOISM?

IS

have demanded the omission of sion of another.

75

this act, or the

commis-

However, he would have been able

to act otherwise only if some other inclination had been present to repress the original impulse and direct voli-

tion toward another goal; but such opposing inclinations were absent or too weak with respect to the first.

Which

are these impulses

lead to selfish conduct? cial

impulses."

whose absence or weakness

They

are obviously the "so-

These are the impulses whose essence

consists in the fact that the perception or imagination

of

modes

of behavior or states of fellow

men leads One may

directly to feelings of pleasure or pain. well describe them as the altruistic impulses, but this

will entail

an asymmetry in the use of the words "ego-

ism" and "altruism."

A man

inclinations are absent has

the weal and

woe

in

whom

the altruistic

no immediate

interest in

of other creatures; their joys

and

sorrows, even their existence, are indifferent to him so long as he is not required indirectly (that is, by the ex-

citement of his other impulses) to take them into consideration. And this is in fact the peculiar characterof the egoist inconsiderateness. It is not the fact that he follows his special impulses that makes him

istic

and blamable, but that he does so quite untroubled by the desires and needs of others. When he

hateful

pursues his ends with such inconsiderateness that he and sorrows of his neighbors (in coldly ignores the joys so for as he sees

no connection with his own aims), when

he remains deaf and blind and cold to the happiness and misfortune of his neighbor, then we consider him

WHAT

76 to be

an

egoist,

IS

EGOISM?

and frequently

we do not in the

least

condemn

so even

when

otherwise

his aims.

we discover the nature of that tendby the reproachful name of selfish-

Thus, in principle,

we

ency which ness;

it

call

constituted

is

by inconsiderateness, which

is

based upon the fact that among the existing inclinations the altruistic ones are relatively underdeveloped. It would, obviously, be vain labor to try to determine separately

and exactly the

relationship of impulses that

to designate a man as egoistic, or a definite degree of this quality. Here cannot distinguish strictly or discriminate exactly,

must hold in order to ascribe to

we

him

not to speak of measuring, for we have to do throughout with vague concepts. In ethical statements we never get beyond

relative,

vague, qualitative compar-

keep this in mind so that we necessary may not hunt for an apparent exactness at the wrong can lead to nothing but delusion. place, which isons.

to

It is

9.

Moral Condemnation of Egoism

much with determining the meaning of the concept of egoism? Because we have here a suitable starting point from which we can

Why

have

we

troubled so

ascertain the true

meaning

of moral predicates in gen-

eral.

Egoistic volition is for us the example of immoral volition, volition that is condemned. To condemn an act

means always

to desire that

it

should not occur.

And the desire that something should not happen means

WHAT

IS

EGOISM?

77

(according to our earlier explanation of desire) that the idea of its happening is unpleasant. Thus, when we ask, "Why do I condemn egoistic behavior?" the question is identical in meaning with, idea of such behavior cause me pain?"

"Why To

does the

find an an-

swer to

this is very easy. It is, "Because the selfishness of another actually causes me pain directly." For its essence is just inconsiderateness with respect to the in-

fellow men, the pursuit of personal ends at the cost of those of others. But since I belong among

terests of

these others,

of

my joys

I

am

and an

in danger of suffering a restriction sorrows at the hands increase of

my

of the egoist, at least in so far as his conduct enters into my sphere of life. Where this is not the case it affects at least the feelings

and

lives of

our fellow men, and

share in these by virtue of my social impulses; because of them I feel as my own pain the damage done to I

others

by the

egoist.

His conduct means in every

in-

stance, either directly or indirectly, the increase of feelings of pain; no wonder, then, that the idea of his

my

behavior possesses that emotional tone which expresses Each member of itself in condemnation and censure.

human society will, on an

average, react to egoism with the same feelings for the same reasons. The blame and

condemnation with which they oppose it is nothing but moral censure, moral condemnation. Thus the moral

made

of selfishness appears to be the natural emotional reaction of society to the influence it is ex-

valuation

posed to by egoistic persons. In any case this is the simplest explanation, and

if it

WHAT

78

accounts for retain

it,

all

IS

EGOISM?

relevant facts

we

shall not only

but also we shall have to try to extend

explanation to all other

have to

this

same

moral valuations.

We

have just expressed the view that the explanation of the moral appraisement of egoism can be carried through in an analogous manner for all moral valuations.

we

opinion proves to be universally valid be able to express the following law as a fun-

If this

shall

damental

ethical insight: the

of behavior

and

moral valuations of modes

characters are nothing but the

emo-

tional reactions with which human society responds to the pleasant and sorrowful consequences that, according to the average experience, proceed from those modes

of behavior and characters. consider this proposition to be correct. lowing observations are devoted to its proof. I

The

fol-

CHAPTER What i.

The

Is

IV

the Meaning of "Moral?"

Morality of

Demand and

the Morality

of Desire

The single example of a moral value-judgment which has thus far concerned us was the moral condemnation of egoism. We have taken this concept in the sense in which it implies moral disapprobation, and have determined its meaning more exactly. Our

was begun

point purposely, because for our currently prevailing morality the criticism of discussion

at this

selfishness It is

is typical. characteristic of this morality that all of its

most

important demands end in the repression of personal desires in favor of the desires of fellow men. These

demands

require considerateness, reject egoism, and to appear range themselves against the self, in favor of the other person. (According to Fichte all immoralhas its basis in "selfishness.") Our morality is esity

of renunciation. sentially a morality

Among religions whose Christianity and Buddhism in particular moral precepts are of this character. In the Mosaic it

is

self decalogue, likewise, curbing of the

79

is

the chief

WHAT

8o

IS

THE MEANING OF "MORAL?"

and this finds its external expression in the negative form of most of the commandments: "Thou shalt not," "thou shalt not." The positive commandments (the third and fourth) demand considpostulate,

eration for the desires of

on

positive altruistic behavior, as

"Thou shalt love The constant theme

ness:

of others; in ciety tell

its

It

parents.

is

a

In Christianity the emphasis

morality of obedience. is

God and

opposed to

selfish-

thy neighbor." of this morality

is

consideration

precepts, too, our fellow men and sotheir desires and needs; they

speak and express

us

how it

is

desired that

we

should

act.

Hence the

demand

character of this system, which Kant held to be the essence of morality. The morality of ancient classical times, the Socratic, Stoic, and Epicurean, is different.

quite

"What

is

demanded

be happy?"

It

fundamental

Its

has

me ?"

of

its

question

but, "Hovij

must

is

not,

I live

to

source in the desires of the indi-

vidual, of the agent himself, and thus bears the characcould ascribe ter not of demand but of desire.

We

autonomy

to

morality of

it,

in opposition to the

demand,

if

heteronomy of the

another meaning did not usu-

claim to this expression. The ancient classical ally lay ethics is not an ethics of self-limitation, but of selfrealization, not

The of

it

of renunciation, but of affirmation.

subjugation of selfishness

is

so

that, subsequently, objections

little

characteristic

were often made

But these objections are and consideration unjust, for condemnation of egoism for others and society (for example, the state) are presagainst

its

egoistic

tendencies.

WHAT cnt in

IS

with


81

desirable distinctness, although usunot in the form of an original, ultimate obligation, ally but as a derivative demand. it

In general

all

should be noted that judgments of parin different moral systems deviate very each other. Base acts (at least within one's it

ticular acts little

from

own

society) are

ity

everywhere detested, and magnanim-

everywhere praised; only the

spirit

or state of

from which the valuation proceeds seems that

is,

mind

different,

the valuation appears to be justified differently. search which we begin here for the meaning of

The the word "moral" would

constitute, according to the

considerations of Chapter I, a general preparatory task of ethics; and the systematic arrangements of all the cases of

its

use, in different times

among

different peo-

and circumstances, would lead to a system ple, circles, of norms (or to several) upon which the causal explanation of ethics would have to base

But

itself.

we

renounce from the outset any attempt to develop such a system; we have passed at once to its peak, where the most general formulation of the concept of "moral do this because we desire good" is to be found.

We

to deal with the

most general

to concern ourselves with

ethical problems, special

and not

moral valuations.

This shortened procedure is possible because the transition from the lower to the higher levels of the system in practice, always necessary and constantly made; so that we may presuppose the greater part of the task is,

to be done, even

though the

us carefully formulated.

results

Thus we

do not see

how

lie

before

little

the

WHAT

82

IS

THE MEANING OF

"

theory of norms, to which this formulation belongs, contributes to actual ethical knowledge. essential difference between the morality of de-

An

mand and

the morality of desire, between the ethics of self-limitation and that of self-assertion, is not hard to find: at

bottom there

lies

a different concept of the

good. With Socrates the word "good" appears to have a unified meaning; in the Platonic dialogues there is talk of

good

shoes, a

good

cobbler, a

so forth, without any difference in

parent.

In Chapter

word "good"

is

I

we

good

citizen,

and

meaning being

ap-

considered the fact that the

also used in

suggested that moral

good

is

an extra-moral

sense,

and

a species of the universal

genus "good," being distinguished from this latter by certain specific differences, but having the most important properties in common with it. Socrates and most of the ancients never doubted this, and considered the

common

element so exclusively that they failed

al-

together to inquire into the specific properties of the "moral" good. Aristotle did so and determined the

very nicely when he said, When we a anyone good cobbler or a good pilot or a good architect, we use the word in an extra-moral sense; but specific

difference

call

when we

call

him

a good

man, then we use the word

moral meaning. However, the Aristotelian formulation is no more than a hint for us, which we improve and perfect by

with

its

proposing the following, in order to express the actual

meaning of the word: The word "good" has a moral

sense

when

(i)

it

WHAT

IS


human decisions, and by human society.

refers to

bation

83

(2) expresses an appro-

In order to explain the words "approve" and "society"

we add that when we

say: the decision of

means:

an individual

desired by a large majority of those persons with whom the individual comes into contact through word or deed. It society," this

is

"approved by

is

essential to these statements that

For the Greeks, but what

is

originally,

desired, that

is,

is

they be vague.

"good" meant nothing

in our language,

what

is

imagined with pleasure (fjficovri); therefore ancient ethics is for the most part a theory of pleasure, hedonism. Even today "good" means, in the most general sense, the same thing: a thing is good if it is as one desires

it.

But from

this,

under the influence of our

morality of renunciation, the narrower meaning of the morally good has arisen. Good in this sense means is desired by human society, something which confronts the individual as an alien desire, which

merely what

may

or

may

not coincide with personal desires.

The

demands which they make of Hence an ethics which concerns the good

desires of others are the

individuals.

in this sense alone

what

not a theory of pleasure, but of

obligatory; it is "deontology." ethical theory of the Greeks was based

is

The sires

is

on de-

and not upon demands, for the Greek could not

imagine otherwise than that the individual himself must be his own moral lawgiver; moral norms were of course, then, as in every community, also formulated as commands. Because of the fact that modern ethics

84

WHAT

makes

IS


central the facts of

demand and

renunciation,

it

runs the risk of putting senseless questions and going wholly astray; on the other hand, its path leads nearer to certain fundamental insights of great importance for the understanding of ethical matters. For, in fact, in

the concept of renunciation or in the emphasis upon altruism lies a hint leading toward the most essential point of morality.

2.

For us

Moral Demands

as Expressions of the Desires of Society

it is

must be no insuperable as theory of pleasure and

clear that there

opposition between an ethics as theory of moral obligation; or, as we may put it, between the theory of goods or pleasures and the theory of duty; but the latter will be grounded by and de-

duced from the former. tion, the

moral demands

For, according to our concepor duties go back in the last

the feelings of pleasure and pain of individanalysis to are nothing but the average, prevailing uals, since

they

of course, comprehensible that in practice the morality of self-realization should arrive also at demands of renunciation, which appear to desires of society.

It is,

be necessary means to the end of happiness.

Thus the

man and

the saint approach one another; performance of duty appears as the condition of

ideals of the wise

self-realization.

on the other hand, the precepts of renunciation were something final and absolute, as their exponents If,

WHAT

IS


85

would have us believe, and not derivable from any desires, there would be no bridge between happiness and would be enmity or complete indifference. If a virtuous person should ever be happy this would be the merest accident, and if he were always happy

virtue, there

A

this would be an incomprehensible miracle. connection between the performance of duty and happiness exists, a reconciliation of the ethics of renunciation

with the ethics of joy

possible, the

is

agreement of their

valuations in individual practical cases if

moral commands themselves

only needs and desires.

We

rise

is

explicable,

human

out of

affirmed that this

is

actually

the case (p. 78) when we formulated the hypothesis that the moral precepts are nothing but the expressions of the desires of human society; in the moral valuation of definite acts or dispositions as good or bad is mirrored only the measure of joy or sorrow that society expects to receive from those acts or dispositions.

Thus we

see

how

made

very important is the validity of the end of the preceding chapter;

at the

proposition let us now devote ourselves to

its

proof.

In the thesis with whose proof there are, strictly,

two

we

are concerned

different assertions to be distin-

that, in fact, whatever

is guished: first, morally apthe does to of human soincrease proved promise joys

ciety;

and second, that

this effect expected

by

society

reason why it is approved. It is clear really the only that these assertions are to be distinguished carefully.

is

could be that everything called "morally good" by to benefit society, and vice society did in fact serve It

WHAT

86

IS


versa, but that the reason for calling

it

good and apwhich we con-

proving it lay elsewhere. The vinced ourselves in the discussion of egoism) is as follows: the determination of the complete extensional case (of

equality of the concepts "morally good" and "what advances the pleasure of society" leads any unbiased per-

son to believe also in their intensional equality; and special opposing reasons would be necessary to make this belief

appear to be unjustified.

Without such op-

posing reasons the inference to the identity of both concepts is simply obvious in terms of the method of empirical

knowledge.

If,

in addition,

we

should succeed

in deducing from psychological laws that behavior which is favorable to the genesis of pleasure in the

human community must

be approved by

it,

while what

increases sorrow necessarily is subjected to its disapproval (as we have seen in the case of egoism), then

no one

will be able to upset our conviction that this

approbation and disapprobation

is

nothing but "moral"

approbation and disapprobation. Accordingly, the proof of our thesis would involve steps: (i) to show that in fact the moral predicate

two

"good"

is

bestowed only upon such behavior as prom-

the social group an increase in pleasure, and (2) to refute the reasons which lead many philosophers to ises

believe that, despite the foregoing fact, the predicate "good" means something different from promising an

increase of happiness or a decrease of sorrow for soFor if these reasons do not hold good the validciety. ity

of the second assertion

is

self-evident.

WHAT

IS

3.

The


87

Critique of Utilitarianism

which we have "good" is what tends

first thesis

to defend

and which

to further the happiness of society bears a special name in ethics; it is the moral principle of "Utilitarianism." It has this name asserts that

because

it

says,

human

"Good is what The formulation

roughly,

is

useful (utile)

of our thesis

is

perhaps not unessentially different from that which

it

to

received

society."

in the

classical

systems

of

Utilitarianism.

These systems say (at least according to their sense) "The good is what brings the greatest possible happi:

We

ness to society." human society, that

is

express it more carefully: "In called good which is believed to

bring the greatest happiness." necessary to point out the difference between these formulae? In the first it might seem (and this Is it

was

the opinion of certain champions of the utilitarian principle) that it contains the absolute deactually

mand

that everyone

must

set as

the final goal of his ac-

tion the happiness of the greatest number; while the second merely wishes to express, as a fact, the demands

which

society actually

Whoever

makes of

its

members.

demand must make its content Hence the Utilitarian who seeks

advocates a

as precise as possible.

a moral principle cannot be satisfied with the vague statement that good is what furthers the "happiness of human society," but must seek to make this latter concept

more

exact.

The

inevitable attempt to attain a

88

WHAT

more

IS

THE MEANING OF "MORAL?" Bentham

exact determination led

Utilitarian

formula that those

acts are

to the

morally good

which under given circumstances have the happiness of the greatest

number

of

famous

"greatest

human

beings"

(or living creatures in general?) as their consequences. few words can show the utter inapplicability of this formula. In the first place, the results of every act are

A

simply incalculable, for they stretch on into time indefinitely; and even the resultant events of the near future cannot be predicted, for they depend more or less upon "chance," that is, slightly differing acts can

have extraordinarily different

effects.

In the second

"the greatest happiness of the greatest number" place, is a senseless conjunction of words, which can indeed

be given a meaning by means of certain conventions, but such a conventional meaning, because of its arbitrariness, will

mula would

not express the thought which the for-

like to express.

Furthermore, Utilitarian-

ism did not attempt to find a meaningful convention, but believed that these words had a clear meaning, presupposing that one can speak of the pleasure of

differ-

ent persons as of something comparable in magnitude. And this is the fundamental mistake. If it has been

shown

even the individual feelings of pleasure are not amenable to quantitative comparison, then that (p. 40)

this holds

which

even more of the vague concept of happiness,

is difficult

ure.

The

any way except as a "summation" of feelings of pleas-

to construct in

sort of conjunction or

Utilitarian

would find himself confronted

by such questions as these;

"How

should

I act

when

WHAT

IS


the circumstances are such that

my

89

conduct can lead

amount of happiness in each of four persons, or double that amount for each of two?" The absurdity of such a question is apparent; but the Utilitarian cannot avoid them; his formula

either to a certain definite

makes to say,

sense only if he can tell us exactly what it means is three-and-a-half times as happy as B."

"A

We are in

a better situation with respect to this mat-

than are the followers of Bentham; for we do not wish, as they do, to establish a formula or a command.

ter

We

do not

desire to construct a concept of the "good" we should have to define exactly but we

which want only a simple determination of what, in human Thus we are not required society, is held to be good. to state of what the highest good consists, and which

modes

of behavior lead to

it;

we

men believe, on the average, and

determine only that

are in

wide agreement,

modes

of behavior lead to the greatest common good. The reasons for this belief do not at present interest us, and whether they are good reasons,

that certain

whether they are

valid,

we

are not required to

know

by our formulation of the question.

One

other important observation is here included: every philosopher, including the Utilitarian, knows of course that no one can predict the results of conduct

with complete assurance, that effect of chance.

If,

this

is

always in part an

or despite this, Utilitarianism

other, ethical theory apparently judges the

any moral value

of a decision by its results, this can only be the average been evident that the It has or result.

probable

always

WHAT

90

IS


decisions (the "intentions") alone are the objects of moral judgment. Therefore it is incorrect to distinguish, as

and an

is

often done, between an "ethics of intention"

"ethics of result."

There has never been an

"ethics of result."

The Good Appears

4.

to Society as the Useful

In order to show that that

good" which, according

is

considered "morally

to the opinion of society,

we must

its

is

to

establish

advantage (pleasure increasing) that moral valuations of modes of behavior change when the structure of human society changes, and that

change takes place in a manner which is inevitable the opinion entertained regarding the conditions of the welfare of society is determinative of that valuathis

if

For

tion.

if

it

appears that the actual alteration of

moral valuations corresponds to changes of certain states of, and opinions in, the community, then we may with certainty assume that these sent the basis

upon which the

states

and views

valuations

repre-

rest.

actually the case. Ethnography and history agree in teaching that the diversities in moral precepts, which change from people to people and epoch to

This

is

epoch, always correspond to diversities in what, under the prevailing circumstances, is favorable to the welfare of the society; or rather to what is so considered.

We

here point to a single

alteration

change

in

shows

itself

set

of facts in

which

this

the especially clearly, namely,

moral views correlated with the increase in

WHAT

IS


91

community in which they prevail. In such times and places in which the community of persons

size of the

(determined by their instinctive drawing together in the

common

struggle for existence) extends over only tribe, a clan, or a family, the moral rules that recognized demand consideration only for the

a small are

of the group itself; with respect to those who stand outside it there is no ethical obligation. Often,

members

indeed, everyone who does not belong to the group is eo Ifso considered an enemy, an outlaw. It is well

known

that in primitive tribes under certain circumstances the murder of a member of a neighboring tribe

considered to be as great a moral service as the murder of a member of one's own tribe would be a crime. is

And

these valuations are not merely proclaimed externally and recognized by the individual because of

the application of sanctions, but appear to him as the voice of his own conscience, which commands him

with incontrovertible authority and

terrible

emotional

force (for, obviously, the conscience is formed by external suggestion, whose whisperings resound in the

mind

as

through a powerful trumpet).

We

find a

famous example of

this in the writings of Darwin, conscience suffered dreadful of of the who pangs by an African savage who had neglected to take retells

venge on a neighboring

some

him

sort of

that

magic.

it is

tribe for injury

done him by

A missionary had impressed upon

a great sin to

murder a man, and the

age did not dare to carry out the act of vengeance.

sav-

But

the consciousness of his neglected "duty" oppressed

WHAT

92

him

so

IS

much

THE MEANING OF "MORAL?" went about disturbed and

that he

upset,

food and drink, and could enjoy nothing. rejected short,

he showed

all

In

the signs of an "evil conscience."

Finally he could bear

it

no

longer, stole

away secretly, and returned light of

slew a

member

heart:

he had performed his duty and pacified his conby means of the murder. Would anyone wish

of the other clan

science to

deny that the

feelings of the savage are "real"

pangs

of conscience, as these are felt by a moral civilized man? If so, we can only attribute this to prejudice, for one will search in vain for the difference.

Of

course, in general, the European feels scruples of conscience under different circumstances, namely, after

committing murder, and not when the deed has been omitted; but even this does not hold without exceptions.

For in war the great majority of

men

consider

benot only not forbut a moral bidden, obligation. actually The difference between the moral views of the Afrithe destruction of their enemies to

can and a modern European in

this respect is explained the fact that the group which furnishes the standard by for the formation of those views is for the savage the tribe or clan, but for the civilized man is extended to

include a whole nation or state; and further fact that the state of

and

enmity

the other. transitory for

is

upon the

enduring for the one,

And

if

to a philosopher

war between two nations appears quite as immoral as a conflict between two armed bands of a single nation, this is

because for

him

the

human

society

which makes

WHAT

IS


93

the moral laws has extended over the whole world: in his conscience re-echoes the voice of all humanity.

What sally.

appears here in a single example holds univerThe content of the moral precepts that hold in

a community, and that are taken over completely into the moral consciousness of its members, depends entirely

its

upon its

strength,

civilization,

living conditions,

upon

its

size

and

relation to the surrounding world,

customs, and

religious ideas.

I

its

forego the

introduction of further evidence, and refer to Wester-

marck's Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, and to Spencer's Data of Ethics, which contain rich mate-

We

rial.

upon the

see in the states of

dependence of moral valuations

human

the content of morality ciety.

It also

ing

whom

We

shall

quires

5.

a

society a sure indication that

is

actually

determined by

so-

seems to be the moral lawgiver concern-

(according to Chapter I) ethics must inquire. soon see whether this result is final or re-

more thorough

The Formulation

proof.

of

According to the

Moral Laws Ta\es Place

Utilitarian Principle

Closer examination of the content of moral precepts shows that the community anticipates a furtherance of its

welfare from their observance.

It is

not necessary

to prove this in particular cases, since it is generally not disputed. For whatever be one's opinion

regarding

the nature and origin of moral rules,

it is

generally be-

94

WHAT

IS


licved that society 1

is

benefited

if all

of

its

members obey

this we point out that the laws the state (which everywhere promulgated by are not, indeed, identical with moral laws, but which

them.

For the confirmation of

should represent their essential minimum) are thought out with no other purpose in mind than to advance the general welfare. It is inconceivable that still

any modern lawmaker could give any other justification for the proposal of a law than this utilitarian one (the

lawmaker always appears

as a utilitarian because

he says in justification of his proposals, "They are useful to society," not, "Society considers them to be use-

Whenever legislatures or parliaments discuss a law or precept the discussion centers solely on the be most useful to soquestion, "Which decision will

ful").

ciety ?"

No

one

asks,

"Which

decision

is

moral or has

the greatest moral value?" It may happen that in debate mention is made of the "honor" of the community

or the "holiness" of an institution

is

stressed,

but such

arguments are never directed against the increase of happiness, but are introduced only when it is silently

assumed that the observance of them does not stand in opposition to society's striving for happiness. The lawmakers have thus the unenviable task of deciding what

most advantageous to the welfare of the or humanity. And they do not despair of the

in fact will be state

solution of this task only because they can, generally,

1 An exception is found in Mandeville's famous the Bees or Private Vices Public Benefits.

The Fable

of

WHAT replace

it

IS


by an

easier one,

95

namely: to hinder what

directly injure society. In so doing they make the (not self-evident) assumption that the avoidance of immediate injury is likewise the path to the greatest

would

general welfare. What holds of the formulated laws, of legality, also holds for the moral views of society, for the moral code: the conviction prevails that moral behavior furthers the general happiness, indeed that it is the necessary if not the sufficient condition of that happiness. The opposing view has been held occasionally by a few individ-

but that need not surprise

us, for there is hardly matters of human imany possible opinion regarding portance which has not been expressed by someone.

uals,

philosophers proclaim with great feeling that morality is independent of welfare, by saying that one

If

many

must always do what

is

the greatest clearly that

"right," even

harm

though one

sees

will result, then such a

standpoint of "fiat justitia, pcreat mundus" does indeed partake of the sublime, which is always the attribute of the unconditioned; but

no wise guide

of a nation's

destiny would

of actactually assume the responsibility ing according to that prescription. And to the blame he would thus receive from the absolutist philosopher

would be opposed the praise that a grateful society would bestow upon him for not having sacrificed its abstract principle. Society well-being in favor of an would unquestionably consider morally good.

Of

his

behavior to be

course the divergent attitude of the

philosopher must also be

made

intelligible;

we must

96

WHAT

understand


IS

how he

We

approbations.

arrives at his approbations shall deal

with

this

and

dis-

question in a

moment. 6.

By means rive at the

we

ar-

(that

is,

of considerations like the foregoing

following results:

The meaning

(1)

Conclusions

of the

word "good"

what is considered as moral) is determined by the opinion of society, which is the lawgiver formulating moral demands.

Since, with respect to a social group, there

can only be an average or prevailing opinion, one cannot raise an objection to this view based upon the fact that there are deviations from some of the usual norms.

The

(2)

mined modes ciety

content of the concept "good"

is

deter-

and only those way by of behavior are subsumed under it which so-

in such a

society thati all

welfare and presindeed the presupposition of its wel-

believes are advantageous to

ervation (which

is

its

fare).

Considering propositions (i) and (2) together we deduce from them, or consider the assertion justified, that:

The moral demands

(3)

are established

by

society

only because the fulfillment of these demands appears to be useful to

We

it.

can also formulate proposition (3) by saying,

"The good ciety to

good only because it is considered by sobe useful"; and in the last analysis this means: is

WHAT

IS


97

considered to be conducive to pleasure. Or also thus: the material meaning of the word "moral" exhausts in denoting what, according to the prevailing opinion in society, is advantageous (its formal meaning itself

being demanded by society). clear that a logical connection must

consists in It is

exist be-

tween (i) and (2); for the reason that moral behavior is demanded must somehow or other lie in the nature of morality, and

if this

nature

is

completely given by the must contain proposition (2) grounds of (i). But this connection need not be as direct and simple it

as

proposition (3)

would make

out.

It

might be that

even though morality were undoubtedly advantageous to the general welfare it would be approved upon other grounds. In other words, it might be that the idea of moral behavior did not owe its pleasure-tone to belief in the usefulness of such behavior to society, but that this joy had some other origin, for example, in a "con-

whose presence expressed itself in certain speof feelings and ideas (or actually was composed them) and whose origin constituted a special problem. science," cial

We

mention for example the metaphysical hypothesis

that divine insight furnished man with a conscience in order to implant in him a motive of moral behavior,

such behavior as would be (again according to the divine insight) in the last analysis most useful to him.

We require no such hypotheses, however, for what they would explain ical

is

explained for us by

As

soon, that

relationships. to be a member of society

and

is,

known

as

one

feels his

psychologhimself

feels

own good and

98

WHAT

evil to

IS


be bound up with that of others, the idea of a

happy community must become a pleasant this

emotional tone extends

laws to

all

modes

of behavior

itself

idea;

according to

which he supposes

and

known are ad-

vantageous to the welfare of society. In other words: a social man desires that his environment be happy and

unendangered, desires all modes of behavior which are conducive to this, values, approves and commends

them, and condemns and persecutes contrary conduct. All these are only different ways of saying the same thing.

Of course the processes whereby the general welfare becomes a pleasant goal are complicated; and one must not, above

all,

attribute too great a role to rational in-

if men thought much more and more than accurately they usually do about the consequences of action, such considerations would have but little

sight.

For even

influence in the realm of feelings. And these processes take place chiefly in this realm, in the absence of subtle

But here

we

can appeal to a general principle which has otherwise proved to be valid in psy-

thinking.

chology and biology, namely, that the result of organic, unconscious, or instinctive processes is the same as would have resulted from a rational calculation. This principle

is

closely

connected with that general "pur-

posiveness" of the organic world

which

is

usually called

one would trace the development of "teleology." these psychic processes, one must keep specially in mind If

that they have their origin in concrete situations, and that such abstract concepts as the "general welfare" are

WHAT

IS


99

quite useless in the formation of powerful centers of In what follows we shall have occasion to feeling. offer contributions to the

psychology of moral valua-

we are satisfied which the human spirit

tion, but at present

to see at least the

path along

necessarily arrives

praise and approbation of "moral" behavior. With this we have not of course strictly shown that the valuation of morality, which we have deduced, is actually moral valuation (that it does not merely conat the

the basis of a certain type of value of the moral a "utility value," but constitutes the whole of moral

stitute life,

valuation); but we shall, according to our program, consider it certain and thus hold our proposition (3) (p. 97) to

be true

if

we

also succeed in

showing that

the most important attempt in ethics to conceive the nature of moral valuation differently cannot be carried out. all

Our

only reasons for considering this attempt at from them, considered factuwhat has been adduced appears to us to con-

are historical; apart

ally,

tain a sufficient foundation of our thesis,

however

in-

But since, especially at present, writers represent a very different many philosophical point of view, we turn to the critical considerations, which we proposed as the second stage in the proof of exhaustive

it

may

our thesis (p. 86).

be.

CHAPTER V Are There Absolute Values? i.

The

The Theory

opinion

we have

of Objective Values

to

examine may best be ex-

pressed negatively in the assertion that the moral value of a disposition cannot in any way be grounded in feelings of pleasure. Value is something wholly independent of our feelings, something pertaining to valu-

able objects, in a definite amount independently of the way in which ally to them, value or not.

and

and degree, quite

we

react emotion-

whether anyone acknowledges the Pleasure, to be sure, is a value, but only to

one among many, and obviously not the highest. Often it is admitted that the valuable produces feelings of pleasure in the observer, but this fact is supposed to have nothing to do with the essence of the value,

but

is,

in a sense, accidental.

many who

hold

this

I

say "in a sense," for I believe, to

view do not wish,

deny that perhaps the generation of feelings of pleasure in the presence of something valuable is a natural law, and that a causal connection exists between the two. But they say that this is quite unessential, that if it were not so

it

would make no

difference to the value of the

ARE THERE ABSOLUTE VALUES?

101

valuable thing; this value would exist even if the law of nature read: "The idea of the valuable thing is quite

men," or "extremely annoying" or

indifferent to all

"horrible."

The

role played in ethics

by

this

theory of the ob-

known

to require one to the existence of a system proclaims of values, which, like the Platonic ideas, constitutes a

jectivity

of value

dwell upon

it.

is

too well

It

realm independent of actuality, and in which is exhibited an essential order of such a nature that the values

compose a hierarchy arranged according

to higher

and

And its relation to reality is only established the moral command, which runs, approximately, by "Act so that the events or things produced by your actions are as valuable as possible." lower.

The

criticism

tremely simple.

which we make of Its

main

philosophical method.

this

view

is

ex-

prescribed by our first, "What does the

lines are

We

ask

word value mean ?" or, which comes to the same thing, "What is the meaning of an assertion which ascribes a certain value to any object?"

This question can be an-

swered only by stating the method of determining the truth of a value judgment; that is, one must state ex-

under what empirical conditions the proposition "This object is valuable" is true, and under what conactly

ditions

it is false.

If

then the proposition words.

Thus we ask

one cannot is

state these conditions,

a meaningless combination of

the philosopher, nize the value of an object?"

"How do you And since no

recog-

one

is


102

here to answer (the author writes these lines in deep seclusion on the rocky coast of the Adriatic Sea) we shall search for the usual

2.

and

possible answers together.

Pleasure as the Criterion of Objective Value

In case anyone (I do not know whether there is any such person) should answer that values are in fact to be recognized only in feelings of pleasure which (a.)

valuable things awaken in us, and that also the rank of the value is disclosed to us only by means of the intenof the corresponding feeling, and that in addition sity there

no other

is

criterion of the existence

and rank

of the value, yet that nevertheless the value does not of producing pleasure, but is someactivity

consist in the

thing

we must accuse him of logical nonHowever, we do it very unwillingly, for factu-

else,

sense.

then

we do

not find anything to dispute regarding the consequences of his theory. The nonsense consists in ally

the fact that with respect to all verifiable consequences his view is in complete agreement with our own (that

"value"

is

nothing but a

name for

dormant pleasure but despite this he

the

of the valuable object), they are different. The proposition that "to be valuable" means something quite different from possibilities

asserts that

"to bring pleasure" presupposes that there is some propto the valuable, and not to the erty which belongs only pleasure-bringing: the assertion becomes senseless if pleasure-producing is the only characteristic of the valuable.

If

we

should peacefully grant the existence of


103

"objective" value, this would be nothing but a contentless addition. Everything would remain as if it were essentially subjective,

assertion about

quences,

as

it

for

we would

only because of

be able to its

also the case according to

is

make an

pleasure conseour own view.

add that from the

criticized standpoint every feelbe of must pleasure interpreted as the sign of an ing I

objective value. If this held only in certain cases, but not in others, we should have to be able to say how the this would require a new criterion of the original one, which was rejection simply advocate of The values objective requires, pleasure. then, an empirical criterion of value which cannot be

cases differed,

and

and the

identical with pleasure.

3.

Objective Criteria of Value?

want to give an objective crias we values terion for objective just recognize that an animal is a camel by the fact that it has two humps, (b.)

It is

natural to

concerning whose existence one can convince himself Sense-perception, whose value as a criterion for objectivity has often been disputed in

by sense-perception.

epistemological considerations, may be unhesitatingly accepted as the judge in our problem, as in all questions of daily life. Hence if value could be seen or

touched as can a camel's hump, ethics would have no occasion to discuss its nature. But since this is not so,

one seeks some objective fact which shall serve as the of values; and thus one asserts, for example, sign


104

"Whatever furthers the progress of evolution is valuable," or, "Whatever contributes to the creation of spiritual possessions, for example, works of art, and science, valuable," or similar statements.

is

taken, itual

Wilhelm Wundt

products

We Even

not mis-

once what

is

attempt.

wrong

in such attempts.

one should succeed in finding a formula which everything generally considered to be valuable,

if

fitted

seems to me, would always appear to Since, for example, what a "spiritual pos-

such a formula,

be

am

in his ethics of objective spir-

made such an

feel at

If I

circular.

session"

is,

it

what

shall pass for

an "upward evolution"

downward) can only be determined by comparison with some standard. It cannot itself deter(as opposed to

mine the standard. circle,

one

arbitrarily

And

if,

in order to escape the

establishes

what should be under-

stood by spiritual possessions, and things of the sort, this determination would be arbitrary; at best one

would have produced the definition of a concept, based upon opinion, which one decides to call "value"; but this would not offer a criterion for that which we all mean when we use the word "value." A fundamental error lies at the basis of the whole attempt:

it

consists in seeking value distinctions in the

reference to the objective facts themselves, without acts of preference and selection, through which alone

value comes into the world.


4.

(c.)

Thus

Subjective Criteria of Value

there remains

no

the characteristic of value once

datum and

105

alternative to

more

in

locating

an immediate

to finding the verification of a proposition

concerning value in the occurrence of a definite experience.

Our own

criterion

sponding experience with which we dealt

is

of this sort: the corre-

simply the feeling of pleasure, at length in Chapter II. Accordis

ing to our opinion the essence of value is completely exhausted by it. The opposing theory of absolute value cannot, as was shown in (0.), use pleasure as the characteristic of value;

it

must therefore

assert the

occurrence of a wholly different experience which indicates the existence of a value. This is, in fact, if I un-

derstand them rightly, the opinion of the noteworthy representatives of that theory (of Brentano, and the schools following him). According to them we posthe existence of a value sess the capacity of determining

much

the same

we

are acquainted with the presence of a material object by means of perception. The role here played by sensation is there taken over by

in

way

as

a specific experience, which one may call the feeling or experience of value, insight, or what not; without of course contributing anything to a closer description by

In any

always something ultimate, unanalyzable, which must appear when a value is verified, and which one either has or does this

naming.

judgment

case,

it is


106

not have, concerning which therefore there can be no further discussion.

What far as

should

it

we

say regarding this theory?

asserts the existence of a

special

In so

datum

of

consciousness, a "value-experience,"

would be

any disagreement each person alone can know One could simply accept or re-

senseless, for

what he

experiences. the ject theory without any proof. (I personally could not accept it, because I do not succeed in distinguish-

ing between the feeling of pleasure that I have when I hear "Don Juan" or see a noble face or read about the personality of

Abraham

Lincoln, and an elementary

value-experience which, according to that view, must first assure me that what gives me joy is also a value.) But the theory asserts not only the existence or oc-

currence of a certain

datum

further that this informs

of consciousness, but asserts

me

of something objective,

independent of me, that it guarantees for me the existence of an absolute value. Does this assertion also not require verification?

That the

criterion

found in a datum of consciousness, that

is,

is

finally

in the realm

of the "subjective," would not in itself be suspicious; for this cannot be avoided, and the example of perception teaches us that "subjective" sensations can lead us to objects whose independence of us, and objectivity, leave for all practical purposes nothing to be desired.

And

we

are concerned with practical knowledge in the significant sense. But the sensations are out that performance only because they able to carry

in ethics

ARE THERE ABSOLUTE VALUES? The

obey very definite laws. ever colorful

which

is

it

107

play of perceptions, how-

be, exhibits a very definite regularity,

expressed by the fact that we are able to make concerning the occurrence of sensa-

verifiable predictions

(Regularity does not indicate something objecIf tive, but is itself objectivity.) something of the sort

tions.

held of the hypothetical value-feelings, as holds for sensations; if value propositions cohered in a consistent sys-

tem, as do the propositions about perceptions, then valuefeelings could guarantee objective values. But that is

The

not the case. there

is

thetics,

chaos of valuations

is

proverbial,

and

no hope of putting value theory, ethics and aeson a level with physics, which would otherwise

be easy.

Thus

no

of passing from elementary value-experiences to the justification of objective absolute values. But if one says that the justification there

is

possibility

itself I can already contained within the experience only answer that I cannot imagine how such an asser-

lies

tion

would be

know what 5.

Do

(d.)

it

verified,

and that therefore

I

do not

means.

Value Judgments Have the Validity of LogicoMathematical Propositions?

Perhaps

many hold

lute values to objective

the comparison of absomaterial bodies to be improper,

because the realm of values seems incomparable to gross physical reality.

At

least

we

hardly ever find

io8

ARE THERE ABSOLUTE VALUES? 1

the analogy to perception drawn. Instead of it, the more often, another, that is, the value-propositions are

compared to the propositions of logic or mathematics, and explained by means of them. Neither deals with "actual" objects, and the validity of both is of the same sort. In the example of logic or mathematics we see best, it is

jectivity is

supposed,

how

it is

possible, despite the sub-

of our experience of evidence, to arrive at

intrinsically valid, absolute,

what

and

existing independof assent of or act ently any thought or feeling. any The law of contradiction, and the proposition "Two times two equals four" hold simply, whether anyone

thinks and understands

them or

not.

As

here with

absolute truth, so there with absolute value. tion of the of value objectivity

is

in this

see

way

(for

example,

made

usually Nicolai

The

no-

plausible

Hartmann,

and generally it remains the only way. But, however misleading the argument is, our comparison with perception and its objects is a thousand Ethics),

times better, even from the standpoint of the absolutist comparison of any propositions with those theory.

A

of logic (which in this context also include the mathematical) always leads to nonsense; for logic

not comparable to anything (I hope

I

may

is

simply be forgiven

somewhat paradoxical statement, but the way in which even today the essence of logic is misunderstood

this

1

Nevertheless the advocates of absolute values often say that these are intuitively known, and their whole outlook is thus called "intuitionism," a term in use in particular among English writers. But intuition signifies something similar to perception.

ARE THERE ABSOLUTE VALUES? demands

109

This is not the place note briefly only that the and the so-called propositions of propositions of logic are mathematics tautologies, or tautology-like forms, forthright criticism).

me to expand this point;

for

I

they express nothing whatever (they are merely for the transformation of propositions). It is to rules

that

is,

this alone that they

owe

their absolute (independent

of every experience) truth, which is really only a ingless limiting case of truth. Thus in logic it

meanis

not

according to the hopes or statements of the absolutists, it should be in value theory: namely, that here,

as,

in

some

sense, there is a

realm of non-actual essences,

independent of us, but ready to be recognized by us at any time, or, perhaps, in the case of values, to be realLogical propositions furnish us with no knowledge whatever, they express no facts, and teach us nothing about what exists in the world, or how any-

ized.

thing does or should behave in the world.

Thus

if

the

value-propositions were similar to them it would only follow that they too were mere tautologies, in all strict-

ness saying nothing; a consequence that would ceras tainly cause us to wish value-propositions to have as possible to those of logic. Judglittle similarity

ments about value ought to

tell

us just what

is

most

important. Tautological propositions can be formed about anything, and of course, about values. When, for example,

A

is write the proposition: "If the value greater than the value Bf then the value B is smaller than the value

I

A/ I 9

have clearly said in

this true

proposition nothing


no at all

about values, but have merely shown the equivatwo different modes of expression. Indeed the

lence of

proposition is not a proposition of value theory, but belongs to logic. And so it is always: whenever I come upon a proposition that is true of

independently every experience, I am in the realm of logic. Only the propositions of logic, and all of them, have this character.

In this

lies their

peculiarity,

which

I

spoke of

before.

Thus tics

we

also in a fail

comparison with logic and mathema-

to find a verifiable

meaning

in propositions

about absolute values.

The "Absolute Ought"

6.

(e.)

Here

attention

it

upon

necessary to bestow a moment's Kant's ethics. His concept of ought

represents exactly

is

what we have hitherto

called "value-

experience." There was undoubtedly at work in him a motive which presumably also plays a role in the genesis of modern absolutist theories: the desire to elevate ethics entirely above the empirical level. Kant

showed

moral precepts have the that each appears to us as could not bring himself to leave

correctly that the

character of demands,

an "ought." its is

But he

and

empirical meaning to this word, in which alone it knows this meaning: "I actually used. Everyone

ought to do something" never means anything but "Someone wants me to do it." And in fact the desire of another, directed

upon me,

is

described as an ought

ARE THERE ABSOLUTE VALUES? only

when

in

that person is able to add pressure to his to reward fulfillment and to punish

and thus

desire

neglect, or at least to point out the natural consequences

of observance or neglect. This is the meaning the word has in daily life; nor does it occur there with any

other meaning. (imperative)

;

We

call

therefore

such a desire a

it is

command

of the essence of the im-

perative to be hypothetical, that sanction, a promise or a threat.

is,

to presuppose

some

According to our own view, developed in the previous chapter, the lawgiver who sanctions the moral commands is human society, which is furnished with

command. Thus we may morality makes demands on men, that

the necessary power to

rightly say that they ought to behave in certain ways; because we use the word "ought" here in exactly the determined empirical sense.

with

But, as

No

this.

we

matter

whom

Kant cannot be

satisfied

he might find to be the it would always be

command

source of the ethical

upon

hypothetical, dependent this being, ceasing

said,

upon

the

power and

his absence or

desire of

with a change

Since Kant, in order to avoid the hypothetical, did not wish to make even God responsible

of his desires.

for the moral rules, there remained for

but a leap into the void.

He

proceeded from no "other"; the ethical

command

is

him nothing

explained that the ought

it is

an absolute ought, and

a categorical, not a conditional,

imperative.

But

we have seen that a relationship to a power which

expresses

its

desires

is

essential to the concept of the


ii2

ought, just as essential as the relationship to some conditions (sanctions) is for the concept of the imperative.

These

belong to the definition of both know them. Thus, for example, the

characteristics

concepts as we concept "uncle"

defined relative to nephews and nieces; an "absolute uncle" would be nonsense. Since is

Kant, for his concepts of the ought and of the imperative, expressly repudiates the relation to one who com-

mands, and to sanctions, both terms must have for him a wholly different meaning from that explained by us. It is, of course, the use author of to privilege every words as he pleases, and to give the terms he finds in a

life

daily

new meaning,

ing exactly and retains

new

him

character.

it.

only he defines this meanBut Kant does not give a

He

speaks as if the word "ought" is in the usual sense, minus only its relative

definition.

used by

if

However,

this is a contradiction, for rela-

the relation to another desiring person, is constitutive of the ought in its usual sense. It is just as if tivity,

Kant had

wish to use the phrase walk' with such a meaning that I can say said, "I

being taken' without anyone there

ought without someone uncle

who

is

who

who

gives

take a

'to 'a

takes

walk

commands

such, not relatively to some

is

An

it." is

nephew

an or

niece, but simply in himself.

In order to rid the Kantian ethics of this nonsense

we must

use the

word "ought" with

a

meaning which

has nothing in common with its original meaning; and therefore the same word should not be used. The role which it plays, apart from that unfortunate ex-


113

planation in Kant's ethics, is, as has been suggested, that which fell to the "value-experience" in the views

considered earlier, with the here unessential difference that

it

exclusively represents the

"moral law in me."

moral values:

(By the "in

me"

there

it is

is

the

appar-

ently given to Kant another opportunity to introduce a lawgiver of the ought, namely the itself. How-

ego

ego otherwise the ought would simply be the expression of its will but the superempirical "practical reason" of the ego, which makes ever, not the empirical

it

"autonomous."

And

worldly rewards.)

"The

down

the moral law

or

reveals itself in

it

is,

metaphysics Kant

in his

also adds the sanctions ally

in

form of

the

practical reason"

however, either

some

verifiable

fin-

other-

which

lays

an empty word experience.

It

could be defined only in terms of such. Accordingly, for Kant the ought is to be defined as the consciousness of moral value.

But with

this

we

arrive at the

problem of section (*/.), and we may consider the unto be established. tenability of this view Still, it

may

be asked, might there not perhaps be

at least some hint regardthe asserted the kind of ing psychological properties that we might know "feeling of value" would have, so where to seek for such a subtle experience, alleged to

given with the word "ought"

be so different from every feeling of pleasure ? Is there not, perhaps, in consciousness a demonstrable experience of the "ought" tion"?

We

must answer

complementary to that of that

volition

itself

is

"voli-

not

an


ii4

elementary experience, but

is

resolvable into a series of

and therefore one cannot

processes (cf. Chapter II), well speak of an elementary experience opposed to it. When the command of another person confronts me

under the conditions described on page no, then definite conscious processes take place in me, which represent just that experience which in everyday life we call It is

"ought."

complex, yet not so

difficult to

analyze. the consciousness, of "compulsion," which consists of the fact that a persistent idea is estab-

The decisive thing is

by the one who commands, and is equipped by means of his sanctions with feeling tones so strong that

lished

they affect adversely the pleasure components of all other ideas, and (in the case of obedience) suppress

them.

The ought

stands in opposition to something desired, but not to volition; the ought is rather a part

of the motivation process, and as such itself belongs to volition, and does not stand in opposition to it.

We

seek in vain for another immediate experience of the

ought.

One more order that

it

point.

The

ought, before

may, occur must

make

it

can,

be willed.

also 2

and in

Kant

how

the ought, which with him had the extremely abstract character of a moral "law," could be taken up into volition; and strove in vain to

this

difficulty

seems to

conceivable

me

to exist for every absolutist

Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. "How a law can be immediately and in itself the determining ground of volition 2

(which

is

the essence of

insoluble problem."

all

morality)

is

for

human

reason an


115

the valuable be theory. In order that actually sought and realized it must arouse our feelings. then

Why

does anyone oppose the recognition of the essence of value in this excitation of feeling? For one cannot

make values comprehensible here below after they have 8 The asserbeen removed into a foteeovQcivtog tojtog. tion that moral values in particular have nothing to do with pleasure and pain is certainly false, for no one can

deny that a feeling of joy is bound up with the act of moral approbation, and that one always expresses moral blame unwillingly, with pain or anger. Otherwise there is no real disapprobation, but it is only pretended. 7.

The Emptiness

of the Hypothesis of Absolute Values

Thus we come tive values,

to the second

argument against objecand which frees conclusive, quite raises us above the hair-splitting that we,

which

us from and

is

perhaps, began to feel in the line of thought of the

argument.

This (beginning on

p.

first

102) simply asked

meaning of so-called absolute value judgments, concluded that none could be shown, however one

for the

and

tried.

But

now

let

us assume that the desired meaning has

been found, so that

we

are able to determine in

some

way that there is a hierarchy of objective values wholly now consider "value" independent of our feelings.

We

[Place above the heavens.]


ii6

to be a property of objects, qualifying

them

in various

forms (for example, beautiful, good, sublime, and so forth) and in different degrees. All these possible properties together

form a system, and

in each case

is

unambiguously determined which of these properties a specific object has, and to what degree; thereby assigning to it a definite position in the system of the value hierarchy.

Good, we say, let it be have we to do with that ?

so!

What

follows?

How docs it concern

What us?

The

only interest we could take in this realm of values would be a purely scientific interest; that is, it

an investigator that the things in the world, in addition to other properties, also have these, and by means of them can be ordered in a cer-

might be of

interest to

way; and he might devote much labor to the description of this system. But for life and conduct tain

this

arrangement would be no more important than,

say, the

arrangement of the

stars in the

order of their

magnitudes, or the serial arrangement of objects according to the alphabetical order of their names in the Swahili language.

no exaggeration or misrepresentation, but is the case. To my question, "What do these actually objective values mean to me?" the absolutist answers, This

is

constitute the guiding lines of your conduct! In setting up your goals of action you should prefer the higher to the lower." If I then ask, "Why?" the abso-

"They


117

simply cannot give any answer. This is the decisive point, that because of his thesis of the inde-

lutist

pendence of

from

all

values, the absolutist has cut himself off

possibility

of giving any other answer to my if I don't do it?" than "Then

"What happens

question, you don't that case

do you

it,

that

note that this answer action only

is

if I desire,

"good man," that

is,

Should he answer, "In good man," then we should relevant and can influence my

is all!"

are not a

or have reason to desire, to be a

only

if it is

presupposed that cer-

And

tain feelings are connected with that concept.

such a presupposition may not be made by the absolutist; he may not say, "You will be more highly respected as a good man, you will lead a happier life, just

you

will have a better conscience,

you will be more

at

peace with yourself," and so forth; for in doing so he appeals to my feelings, as though the value were really

binding upon

me

only because

it

brought

this doctrine is expressly repudiated.

every

and

way

if I

it

were pleasant to

had the

is

joy;

and

Even though

in

to be a scoundrel,

cordial respect of others, genuine peace

my soul, and pure inner joy in a lively manner, though it in

cause the fact

me

me

otherwise),

if,

as a result is difficult

thus,

my

(imagine

this

do

be-

to

life

so,

were more

of my failure agreeable, exalted and happier because would have to the absolutist still the moral laws, obey

"Yet you must obey them, even though you become extremely unhappy." Whether happy or un-

to

say,

happy, pleasant or unpleasant, tuitionist, absolutely

all this has,

for the in-

nothing to do with moral value

ii8


which has been emphasized by no one more sharply than by Kant. But in these philosophers we still always find a hidden appeal to the feelings, even though it consist only in the use of certain honorific terms, like "honorable"

itself.

Perhaps the philosopher not answer the question,

mean

is

even proud that he can-

"What do

absolute values

me ? What

happens if I pay no attention to he even Perhaps despises our question. If so, we answer his proud silence with the statement that in to

them?"

all seriousness

values, to

we

which

it

simply have no concern with such

makes no

difference whether

we

are

concerned with them or not, whose existence has no influence upon our peace of mind, our joy or sorrow,

upon

all

those things that interest us in

life.

Indeed

we

cannot be concerned with such "values," for (see Chapter II) only those objects can arouse our volition

which in some way or other arouse feelings of pleasure or pain in us. They would not be values for us.

Thus we conclude:

if

there were values

"absolute" in the sense that they

which were

had absolutely nothing

do with our

constitute an indefeelings, they would pendent realm which would enter into the world of our volition and action at no point; for it would be as if an impenetrable wall shut them off from us. Life would proceed as if they did not exist; and for ethics

to

they would not exist. But if the values, in addition to and without injuring their absolute existence, also had the property or power of influencing our feelings, then they would enter into our world; but only in so far


119

they thus affected us. Hence values also exist for ethics only to the extent that they make themselves felt, as

are relative to us.

And

a philosopher says, "Of course, but they also have an absolute existence," then we know that these words add nothing new to

that

is,

if

the verifiable facts, that therefore they are empty, and their assertion

meaningless.

CHAPTER

VI

Are There Worthless Joys and Valuable Sorrows? i.

The

Relativity of Values

After having answered in the negative the question of the existence of absolute values, we feel

finally

assured of the assertion that the sense of every proposition concerning the value of an consists in the object fact that this object, or the idea of

produces a feeling of pleasure or pain in some value feeling subject. exists with to a it is relative. If only respect subject, it,

A

no pleasure and pain in* the world there would be no values. Everything would be indifferent.

there were

It is

well to note in what sense

every value:

its

relativity

existence depends

upon

characterizes

the being and

the

feeling of a subject, but this subjectivity is not caprice, it does not mean that the subject can at will declare the object to be valuable or valueless. So

long

as toothaches are

painful they have no value for the sufferer, and he cannot alter this; otherwise he would certainly relation

do is

momentary is fixed,

When

a specific object in a specific presented to a specific subject, and the constitution and disposition of the subject so.

then the feeling with which the subject reacts 120

ARE THERE VALUABLE SORROWS? to the constitution of the object is, it has at that moment an disvalue.

This fact

is

is

121

also determined, that

unambiguous value or

wholly objective; neither the

subject nor the disinterested observer can explain it away in the least; the fact is just as "objective" as would be the existence of an "absolute" value. The relativity

of values does not therefore

mean

a meta-

physical relativity, so to speak, as if value were longer tangible or definite. This seems so clear to that I

would not waste a word on

it if

no

me

misunderstand-

point did not occur (as in Nicolai ings regarding Hartmann's Ethics). The pleasure or pain which the this

is certainly something subject experiences in valuing absolute, for if the word "absolute" is permissible any-

where, then

datum

certainly so in reference to such a final of consciousness. In order that an object be it is

valuable to a subject, the object and the subject must be of a definite nature, and there must be a definite relation

between them.

If

all

this

exists,

then the

and unambiguously has a

object necessarily value for the subject.

This doctrine of the

relativity

of values,

definite

in

my

opinion, does full justice in every way to their true nature. It is so natural and obvious that even in

ancient times

it

was widely

Socratic theory;

it

was

I believe that one from pleasure in the

held.

can trace the derivation of values

expressly formulated in the by Aristippus, a follower of

Cyrenaic school founded Socrates, and since that time has remained in the history of ethics. In addition, the theory is in such complete

ARE THERE WORTHLESS JOYS

122

agreement with experience

man

as

it

expresses itself in hu-

not met with strong institutions, that, emotional opposition, no other view could have arisen. But propositions of the theory are of such a sort that

had

the thoughts connected with

it

them can

easily give

rise

to unpleasant feelings, while the absolute value theory meets certain human needs, that is, its thoughts are

received with pleasure. And since these emotional reactions occur in the course of ethical considerations the

disapprobation of one theory and the approbation of the other itself easily takes on the character of a moral valuation;

and there

arises that situation of a peculiar

confusion of insight and valuation that makes ethical discussions so difficult,

and makes observations

like

those of the preceding chapter necessary.

2.

The

Prejudice Against pleasure

A definite prejudice

is

to

blame for the

fact that the

proposition asserting the relativity of value, and its dependence upon the pleasure of the evaluator, arouses

unpleasant thoughts, and thus calls forth a disapprobation which appears as moral disapprobation itself.

We meet this prejudice in this context again and again, of moral typical prejudice the philosophers: prejudice against "pleasure." have touched upon it lightly in earlier chapters, but it

and

it

may be considered the

We

is

well to examine

again systematically, for in so certain more fundashall be able to clarify

doing we mental problems.

it

AND VALUABLE SORROWS?

123

Hence we seek

the psychological cause of this prejudice; and, according to the principle that an error is first

overcome when

also its origin

the

main

is

not only refuted but

it is

explained,

errors of ethics

when

we shall only be safe from when we have found that

cause.

Our

does one rebel against the recognition of pleasure as the final measure of all value, including moral value ? It will be answered when we question

is:

Why

word "pleasure" or has the tendency to be must, conversely, also seek the reason

explain psychologically

why

the

words having similar meaning unpleasant.

We

why suffering and to be

grief,

and

similar states,

which seem

genuinely unpleasant, are yet not considered

alto-

many gether valueless. It is from just infer that the true standard of value, according to which not every pain is valueless, and not every pleasure this fact that

valuable,

must be other than

pleasure.

We

consider these points in turn: (i) The cause of the evil repute of the word "pleasure," or related terms, lies, in my opinion, only in those

mutual

human

influences

which can in the widest

sense be called "education."

All education concerns the transformation of man, the alteration of his dispositions; it consists in the the strengthening or forming of certain impulses, and

weakening or removal of

others.

That

is

(cf.

the

definition of impulse in Chapter III), education attempts to equip certain ideas with a greater pleasure-

tone and to

make

others,

on the

contrary, have as

little


124

or even to

make them

very unpleasant. In takes place (and I speak not actually only of the education of children, but of every moral influence exerted by men upon one another) the as

possible,

education as

it

second, negative, method which tries to repress and dam up the existing impulses is used preponderantly. It

has indeed long been a reasonable

demand

of peda-

prefer the positive method, to strengthen and develop the desirable impulses, instead of spending all energy upon overcoming the undesirable; but this to

gogy

method is much easier, and it is also usually considered more urgent first to protect society from injuries latter

that can

come

to

members; the carried on only

it

from the unbridled impulses of

cultivation

secondarily.

of

useful

Therefore

its

dispositions is happens that

it

education for the most part works by means of restrictions and prohibitions; the state, for fxample, sanctions

laws by means of punishments for transgression alone, not by means of rewards for obedience. And

its

we

explain the fact, to which attention was called in the beginning of Chapter IV, that our whole moral-

thus

exhibits in such high degree a prohibitory character. The essence of prohibition consists in the fact that

ity

we

are told,

do." ant,

is

"You must not do what you would

like to

Something, the idea of which is originally pleasdeclared to be bad by the moral precept; and the

impression arises that in general what brings pleasure is always bad. The fact that for the most part I come in contact with moral rules

only

when someone

and educative measures

wishes to change something in

me


125

(otherwise they would not be required) has the con-

sequence that what is commanded by morality always appears to be what one would not do of one's own self, I

naturally.

am

firmly convinced that this

is

the

correct, startlingly simple explanation of the fact that

nature and morality appear to

many

philosophers as

opposites, that Kant believes it necessary to distinguish between man as a natural creature and man as morally

nothing but the "overcoming of outer and inner nature," that James defines moral conduct as that which proceeds in the line of rational, that for Fichte virtue

is

greatest resistance (while conversely, nature follows the principle of least resistance). According to these theories the

moral

is

never the natural, and morality

is

never self-evident.

How

clearly

we now

see

through the psychology of

those philosophers who reject pleasure as the standard of value! Morality, in order to attain its ends,

all

must remove the pleasure-tone from

away light,

easily

their seductive

finery,

certain ideas, tear

put desired goals in a bad

alluring ones appear suspicious. How can happen that in this process of exerting

make it

moral influence the peculiar purpose and meaning of instrumorality is seen, even though it is really only mental. to ity sarily

Although

at first

it

never occurred to moral-

abhor pleasure as such, must it not almost necescome, habitually, to treat pleasure as something

better avoided, as

something dangerous, low, and com-

mon ?

the only value, indeed morality could not possibly

But

valuable

at

if

pleasure

all,

is

if it is

warn


126

all

against

possible satisfactions; hence pleasure

must

was not something disreputable. However, noticed that originally no moral precept ever warned be

it

against pleasure as such, but always only against definite activities or objects which were pleasant. Yet if a child

is

constantly

rooms, must

it

warned against poisonous mushall mushrooms and

not in the end fear

hold them always in suspicion; even though the warning ultimately did not concern mushrooms, but only poison ?

Not

that moral teachers have never

distinction

between valuable and

evil

made

a clear

pleasures,

be-

tween permissible and unpermissible joys. For they have used the principle of reward also, and the pleasure that serves as the reward

But

must of course be "good."

again, very characteristic that especially in religions the tendency, at least, e^sted to banish as many as possible of the natural feelings of pleasure to it

is,

the realm of prohibited things; so that this realm in the case of the extremists, the ascetics, finally included all

natural pleasure.

Thus

"earthly" and "heavenly"

the opposition of the former are all

arises

joys;

worthless, only the other-worldly joys are good. It would be the task of a sensible education to return the

heavenly joys to earth again.

Who

knows whether moral sermons, by means of

suggestion, have not given the impulse to many a pessimism, which in turn easily found further reasons

for the worthlessness of pleasure, for example, that every joy contains within itself the germ of future


127

sorrow, just because, perhaps, every pleasure must end,

and

this is

always painful.

The modern

philosopher of value does not go so far and pleasure as opposites, but he

as to consider value

supports the suggestion of the moralist in so far as he grants to pleasure no moral value, and therefore rejects it entirely as a standard of value. I repeat that this view is explained in a very large part simply by the

method

of moral education,

which must declare so

pleasant things to be reprehensible, brings pleasure as such into disrepute.

many

3.

and thereby

Happiness and Sorrow as Mixed States

The

consideration of the second explanatory ground of that view leads us to more weighty matters. This second reason lies, we noted, in the fact that in (2)

our judgments on the value of a

life

rate the unpleasant experiences, pain

We

we do

not at

all

and sorrow, only

on the contrary

that they can negatively. at least serve to give to life that richness which is prethe supposed by highest value. For what kind of life

do we

we

call

believe

the most valuable?

ascribe nobility

Is it

and greatness?

not that to which

And do

not these

words mean something altogether different from a maximum of pleasure ? Again and again we hear that if

one

"The

greatness he must renounce happiness. fate of the great men of history has not been strives for

happy," says Hegel. If it is true that the highest in life cannot exist without sorrow and pain, then, so it


128

not simply the valuable, but must rank as the standard of value to something

seems, pleasure give

its

up

is

altogether different.

stands

that behind such objections there kind of serious and significant truth, and feels

Everyone

some

that superficial arguments will be of

no

avail against

Such would be an argument which said that a life of and greatness is in fact valuable only for nobility

it.

others

who profit by the deeds

of the genius; those

and

enjoy his achievements value for himself

it

has actually

sive desire for

little

praise

is

who But

life.

value; unless an exces-

power and ambition

him, whereby compensation he took upon himself.

his

is

thus satisfied in

made

for the burdens

This argument is invalid: in the first place because the nobility and moral greatness of a human life is not always measured by successful deec^, that is, according to its social utility; and, in the second place, because the great

man

and fame, can

himself, even without desire for feel the value of

despite his change with no one to

that

strongly

power

an heroic existence so

"unhappiness" he would

whom

life's

joys

came

in a less

adulterated form. considerations to requires more penetrating see whether the situations described do not require us to revise our view of the nature of value. What we

Thus

it

have to do actual

again, only this, meaning of the words is,

to ask: like

"What

is

'happiness'

the

and

borrow' in those cases where a 'higher' but sorrowful

AND VALUABLE SORROWS? life is

contrasted with a lower' but

praised as the

The word meaning

129

happy one, and

more valuable?"

"happiness" has in any case such a vague

that in different contexts

are meant.

The

very different things same holds, moreover, of the Greek

term

ei)8ai|jiovia, while, for example, the Latin bcatitudo has a more definite coloring, corresponding to the German Seligkfit. In the polemic against the

eudaemonistic "happiness"

is

way of thinking, the vague expression commonly understood as if it meant

something like enjoyment, comfort, gratification. These words also, of course, having little of the exactness of scientific terms.

The

cited

aphorism from

Hegel, on the happiness of the great men of history, continues, "They never attain peaceful enjoyment!" Is

the assertion that a noble

life is

more valuable than

a happy one to say only that greatness

is

incompatible with "peaceful enjoyment"? This would gladly be granted, even by him who holds that greatness and

happiness are not mutually exclusive, and who is of the opinion that all nobility finally depends upon some he need only deny the identificafeelings of pleasure; tion of happiness with peaceful enjoyment, and remember that the strongest feelings of pleasure are

connected with other

states

than "peaceful enjoyment."

And

he would certainly be right! But in this way only a very crude

overcome. far

from

The settled.

difficulty

would be

us would still be question troubling Granted human nature and condi-


130

tions of life to

that a

human Thus

sorrow.

be what they are, it must be admitted life can become more valuable through suffering

must be valuable

either di-

rectly or indirectly, that is, either contain pleasure itself or constitute the necessary condition of it. Otherwise

the statement cannot be validly maintained that value is

determined by pleasure alone.

Is

anything like

this

possible? It

seems to be impossible only so long as we forget and sorrow are terms of very indefinite

that happiness

meaning, and therefore need not

at all coincide

with

the pair of concepts pleasure, pain, which we assume as defined psychologically, and use with a constrictly

meaning. Dostoevsky, who certainly did not reflect less than other men on the value of life, puts into the mouth of one of his heroes the question (in

stant

Letters

from the Underworld}, "WJiat

And

happiness or noble sorrow?"

is

better,

cheap he considers the

answer to be so self-evident that he neglects to give it, but has the hero repeat, "Well, which is better?" Here, there is added to the words "sorrow" and "happiness" an adjective that would result in a contradiction in terms if by happiness were meant something wholly pleasant,

and by sorrow pure

disparaging description here: must show some speck of pain

pain.

what

on

its

For "cheap" is

is

a

thus described

otherwise brilliant

garb; and conversely, so long as a sorrow can still be "noble" it is not a pure pain, but still bears some bright star

on

its

dark raiment.

On

the other hand, Dos-


131

pure meaning of beatitude \ in The Brothers Karamazov he has the old man, Zosima, say, "For men are

made

for happiness. Whoever is completely happy is to to himself: I have fulfilled God's will on worthy say

All teachers,

this earth.

all saints, all saintly

have been happy." Thus it extreme complexity of life

words

like

"happiness,"

"sorrow" are used in

life

is

clear

really

martyrs

(and with the

self-evident)

"unhappiness,"

that

"pleasure,"

and poetry for complex

states

having mixed components of feeling. The psycholowho by his analysis must expose those pure tones gist, which he calls "pleasure" and "pain," deals with abstractions

and

arrives

appear paradoxical.

at

formulations which

(The law

must

of motivation enunci-

ated in Chapter II, and the reduction of all value to pleasure are such formulations.) When even such an

elementary sensation as pain can, according to the circumstances, possess pleasant as well as unpleasant

components

it

is

no wonder

structure psychic states have a

more complicated even more difficult to

that

discover.

From

considerations such as these

we form

the con-

when it is valued positively jecture that "suffering," and viewed as a desirable constituent of life, designates without exception a compounded

state

(or

better,

for in the true sense nothing structurally complicated, in which the psychologist is

psychic

"compounded"),

can- point out the feeling components that are to be made responsible for the "value."


i 32

4.

Associative Pleasure in

Sorrow

We speak first of the simple, almost trivial case, that a

state

tions,

which "in

and without

things) because

is it

itself"

(that

is,

under usual condi-

special relation to past

and future

unpleasant obtains a pleasure component is associated with ideas which are strongly

colored by pleasure. They have this coloring either because they relate to previously had joyful experiences, or because they relate to future states which are pictured as exjoyful. Everyone can easily find hundreds of

own experience for each of these cases. To the first sort belong all those in which an ugly object amples in his

cherished because cheerful memories are joined to it, or where for the same reason various unpleasant sensa-

is

tions lose their unpleasantness;

sometimes valued.

I

even bad odors are

once heard of a worker

who was

in the habit of opening a gas-cock to enjoy the odor; he had been employed in a gas-plant and had evidently

had a pleasant time

there.

We have cases of the second sort wherever one undertakes a painful performance for the sake of its effects; the idea of these makes the activity pleasant. To very

many persons

all

"labor" seems to be of this sort.

Con-

of difficulty easily comes to versely, every overcoming be considered unpleasant, as a mere means to an end,

which

need not in the

be (this observation is important for the valuation of an "heroic" life). But above all we should think of what in the widest it

least


133

sense can be called a promise or a threat, reward or punishment. Every pleasure can be called a reward if it

characterizes a state

which

is

the effect of definite

behavior, and has the consequence that the idea of this result, and thereby the behavior leading to it, itself becomes pleasant. The representation of that future

then called "hope," and there are doubtless but

state is

pleasure in human life to which of not somehow contribute. Perhaps do hope feelings in general, hope (longing is related to it) is the source of the happiest feelings. If we should destroy them, so

few

states of intensive

that of every pleasure only the momentary present component remained, so to speak, this would at least

be a pretty wretched remainder. This fact alone appears to render unjustified the attitude of those moralists and philosophers who look disdainfully upon the principle of reward or compensation, who see but a very crude method in its application, and who reject entirely

the fact that

it is

used in ethics to locate the

value of suffering, also only in part, in the reward for suffering. This is, on the contrary, a correct explana-

That

tion.

ing

it

so simple does not justify us in rejectas a superficial eudaemonistic construction.

That

it is

eudaemonistic

superficial,

are

considered

even immoral, can be understood from the

part of this chapter. For the reason one seeks to defend the religions, especially

considerations of the

same

explanations

first

eudaeChristianity, against the charge of exhibiting monistic tendencies in arousing other-worldly hope.

But

this

seems to

me to be

altogether useless

and super-

134


fluous.

It is

not true that reference to compensation

by future happiness for suffering is incompatible with true magnanimity, or indicates an appeal to "egoism" (cf.

Chapter

III); consolation

and reward are much

rather the expression of kindness. And kindness too is noble. Some of the most beautiful passages of the

owe

their beauty to the subjoined promises: "Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."

Gospels

Often

it is

the references to future joys alone that give

even the formulations of moral precepts their grandeur, by placing men in relationships affording wide perspectives in

which things assume

The "Judge not!"

obtains

its

their proper value.

force only

from the added

phrase, "That ye be not judged."

5.

Is

Sorrow a Necessary Condition of Pleasure?

Hitherto

we have

dealt only with the simple (but

nevertheless important) idea that suffering is valuable whenever it represents the path to joy; the valuation of the end being carried over to the means, according to

well-known laws.

We might now attempt to general-

thought to the more important observation that the path to joy always leads through suffering, that they are connected by a law of nature. ize this

This law could only be the law of contrast, and

would

it

in this case say that never-ending states of pleas-

ure could not be

felt as

such (thus really would not be

such) unless they were interrupted by pain:

as,

for ex-


135

ample, the Pythagoreans supposed that we did not hear the music of the spheres, solely because they sounded a continuous monotone.

Pleasure

would only be

possi-

ble after antecedent pain. This inference is erroneous, even

contrast holds.

To

the value of health

be sure, if

there were

spring would not be sung

and

though the law of we would never speak of

if it

no

illness; praises of

did not follow winter,

the whole year rounded out equably; but from this it only follows that some change is necessary if are to occur. Just as winter is not merely lively feelings if

a miserable season but has

its

ferent from those of summer,

own

so

it

joys,

would

though

dif-

suffice if dif-

ferent qualities of pleasure alternated with each other, or if states of highest joy followed indifferent or mildly

pleasant ones; the former would stand out from the latthe necessity of pain as ter quite well enough. Thus

the pre-condition of pleasure cannot be deduced in this manner. At most one could say that the transition

from a

state joyful to a less joyful

is

under

all

tions painful; but then the observation again trivial and does not solve our real problem.

condi-

becomes

Hence, even though here we cannot offer a proof, it seems to be a fact of experience (I am of course not

still

that the most profound joys of altogether sure of it) not life are possible unless, previously, grave actually been experienced. It seems that have of feelings pain them in order to become receptive of the soul requires

the sublimest pleasures. plorable fact,

This would indeed be a de-

and not one we would want

to palliate


136

by saying that it

a

it is

really exists,

human

not in the

then

we

can attain

least

deplorable.

But,

should understand better

if

why

highest value only by passthe extremes. life such as the modest ing through life

its

A

poet Morike prayed for: Wollest mit Freuden

Und Mich

wollest mit Leiden

nicht uberschuttenl

dock in der Mitten Liegt holdes Bescheiden.

.

.

.*

could not be truly great, not because it lacked the deepbecause of the absence of the greatest est suffering, but joys,

which seems indeed to lead only

the path to

through pain. 6.

The

The

Bliss of Suffering

value which, thus far,

we have been

sign to "suffering" was not inherent in to it only to the extent to which it was a

but accrued

means

to pleasIs this the only kind of value that is to be

ant ends.

found in

it,

able to as-

it?

Does

it

explain adequately the feeling,

reflection one can hardly resist, that has the important function in life of protectsuffering ing it from "shallowness," where shallowness is the op-

which upon deeper

posite

of "depth," a

to designate 1

[Let

me

what

word by which one

is

most

certainly wishes valuable in life ? It seems to

not be overwhelmed with joys and with sorrows,

for gentle moderation lies in the

mean.

,

.

.]


137

me that what we have hitherto discovered is insufficient to

do

justice to these matters.

Consequently

we

are

faced by the question of whether there is not either a value wholly independent of pleasure, or whether in the states called "sorrowful" there are not

still

to be

found some pleasure components, which belong there by their very nature, as it were, and are not introduced by a comparatively external I shall say at once that in fer," in its

mixed

association.

opinion the word "sufsignificant sense, is always used only for

states,

my

for complicated experiences

whose feeling We remarked

tones are never wholly and purely pain. earlier that emotions of wholly unmixed pain are rare, and occur only in the cases of unmitigated aversion and

disgust. It is only an end with such accompanying affects that can never be willed; and this with the neces-

Chapter II). Most forms of disagreeable things tend to have a hidden pleasure component, as it were, and this holds even of anger, sity

of a natural

law

(cf.

and of mourning. Even the profound grief with which we stand at the deathbed of a loved one is permeated by the peculiar remote sweetness from

fear, care,

which the thought of death is seldom free, and upon which perhaps rests the feeling of its sublimity. Such involved

states,

by virtue of

their richer struc-

ture, naturally constitute the field of poetry.

There

the bliss of sorrow is praised again and again, and if the poet longs for bitterness (Heine) it is the sweetness of bitterness which makes it an object of ardent desire.

Where

this

problem becomes most

clearly

visible is in


138

Since Aristotle, ever new attempts have been explain the pleasure in tragedy, and the explanations remain unsatisfying so long as they (as did tragedy.

made

to

that of Aristotle) refer the joy in the tragic to subsequent associations. The pleasure lies rather in part in

"suffering"

and

itself,

and for

this

whose

reconciliation,

component the

role in tragedy

catharsis

may

other-

wise be great enough, is no longer necessary. Thus Gerhart Hauptmann in Michael Kramer says, "Even

what

serves to

humble us

is

at

once glorious and

ter-

rible." It has in general not escaped the notice of the poets that experiences of "suffering" are not wholly disagreeable, not altogether painful; and they have often in their

manner expressed

saying that joy and sorrow are In Anatole France we read (La Vie

this,

in essence related.

en Fleur, the end),

"On aime

aussija vie, la douloureuse vie, parcequ'on aime la douleur. Et comment ne I'aimerait on pas? Elle ressemble a la joie, et parjois se

2

confond avec elle." We have now to formulate that

fact or to discover

that general truth which lies at the base of such stateas the one just cited. What lies behind the "similarity" of pleasure and sorrow, here affirmed?

ments

According to the established method of psychology, we shall consider for the solution of our problem the external 2

[One

row. is

mode

of appearance of the effect, the behavior

loves life also, sorrowful life, because one loves sorshouldn't one love it? It resembles joy, and

And why

sometimes confused with

it.]


139

exhibited by a joyful and a suffering person. And at it strikes us that in addition to differences there

once

are very remarkable agreements to be observed. It is very significant that suffering and great joy have in common in their expression such a pronounced

nomenon

"Les haul

as tears.

plaisirs sont

pheceux qui

3

(Guyau, Vers d'un Philosophe, weeps when he suffers, and tears

font prcsque pleurcr"

A man

139).

p.

come

when he

experiences great joy, even for (and us) in the presence of a noble important deed, or when he hears of a generous reconciliation; in to his eyes

this

is

whenever he has elevated

short,

"ethical"

Pure pain (the feeling of something brings no

ply offensive) scream or groan

What

when

tears;

repulsive, or sim-

we do

not weep, but

in great pain (Laokpon).

common to the which men weep ? is

feelings.

joyful

and sorrowful

situa-

tions in Evidently a powerful convulsion of man's whole nature, in which, however, the

not the decisive thing, but rather the fact that is affected to a depth which very few impressions can reach. These are of course only fig-

force

is

the whole person

Translated into the language of psychology, they state that in such powerful experiences we have to do with certain functions of the soul (one urative expressions.

can also say "physiological functions" without altering the sense) which can be aroused in the most diverse

and which ways, but which are very difficult to arouse, life have a fundamental significance;

for the volitional

so that 8

[The

its

character has an essential dependence

great pleasures are those that nearly

make

upon

us weep.]


i 4o

them.

They

are

made

active

by pleasant

pleasant powerful stimuli; but

ways

pleasant.

this

as well as

activity

un-

itself is al-

These functions constitute something

elevated and great in men in the double sense that their power in the psychic life is enormous, and that they are

the source of very intense joys. Moments in which one becomes aware of their activity are moments of exalted feeling. Apart from certain exceptions, every vehement psychic process, every deployment of power, and lively activity is pleasant. If, however, the process penetrates to the depths of the soul one has feelings of sublimity ranging from a transitory "touching" emotion to the highest unwavering inspiration, observable

in world-shaking deeds. Perhaps, for obscure reasons, suffering rather than joy has the power of moving the soul to its inmost

depths

pain stirring

it

as a sharp

plow turns the

soil.

(The word "pathos," which we use approximately with the meaning of "inspiration," actually means "sufIf this were true, we should better underfering.") so eloquently praised as something great and holy, and why the poet believed that powers reveal themselves in it:

stand

why

suffering

is

heavenly

Wer

Trdnen ass, fammervollen Ndchte auf seinem Bette weinend sass, der \ennt euch nicht, ihr himmlischen Mdchtel

wer

nie sein Brot mit

nie die

*

(Goethe) 4

has not eaten his bread in tears, nor sat weeping on his bed through nights of misery, knows ye not, ye heavenly

[Who

powers!]

AND VALUABLE SORROWS? But

I

believe that one could with the

141

same

justifica-

tion say (and Goethe also would willingly have said) that who does not know the heavenly powers has never

experienced the ecstasies of pure joy.

Nietzsche was

probably right in his aphorism that pleasure is profounder than affliction. Indeed there is no essential

and our considerations led to none, why intense alone should not suffice for us to rise to true greatjoys ness, to reach the ultimate depths of our nature, and to reason,

That suffering life. in succeeds the into great consoul easily stirring for the vulsion, making it ready highest joys, is probthe connected fact that in general the most with ably attain all of the sublimities of

more

intense pains yield the strongest impulses. state

obviously presses

escaping a danger, more to reach a goal. Then

easily,

we

however,

when

enjoy the effort

striving

itself

and

Thus it happens that great art defrom sorrow than from pleasure,

more readily that almost all the great rives

painful

violently toward a change We run most rapidly when

than does a pleasant one.

are not in a hurry.

A

more

artists

have also suffered

greatly.

Der Lorbeerfyanz ist, wo er dir erscheint, Ein Zeichen mehr des Leidens als des Gluc\$? (Goethe, Tasso)

The

sufferer calls

need of the work of

more force into play, he is more in art, which liberates him and brings

salvation. 5

[The laurel-wreath ...

of happiness.]

is

a symbol more of sorrow than

ARE THERE WORTHLESS JOYS?

142

If in this

manner pain releases the strongest psychic no law of nature that intense joy could

still it is

powers, not do the same; and experience teaches that this ac-

We

tually happens, though examples of it are rarer. must in any case desire that they become more fre-

quent; nor

why, with advancing not take place along should civilization, development this line. Indeed, perhaps true progress in civilization is

there visible reason

consists in just this, that suffering

more unnecessary more by

for the release of powerful pleasure-

forces, this role

bringing

become more and

being taken over more and

joyful inspiration, as

we

observe

it

occasionally

in especially favored men.

we have

reached the following results: the opinion that pleasure is often not, or not at all, valuable rests upon a certain prejudice whose origin In this chapter

has been disclosed and which has thus been rendered

The opinion that "suffering" is valuable is but correct, only because the generally very complex

harmless.

state designated by this word is always shot through with certain feelings of pleasure to which the value can be referred. What holds of sorrow holds a fortiori of all

other things, that

they promise, which

is,

is

they owe their value to the joy the only measure of their value.

CHAPTER When

Is

a

Man

The Pseudo-Problem

i.

With

hesitation

of

VII

Responsible?

Freedom

and reluctance

I

of the Will

prepare to add this

chapter to the discussion of ethical problems. it I

must speak of a matter which, even

thought to be a

which got into

fundamental

ethics

ethical

at

For in

present,

is

question, but

and has become a much discussed

problem only because of a misunderstanding. This is the so-called problem of the freedom of the will. Moreover, this pseudo-problem has long since been settled

above

by the all,

efforts of certain sensible persons; and, the state of affairs just described has been

with exceptional clarity by Hume. of the greatest scandals of phireally one

often disclosed

Hence

it is

losophy that again and again so much paper and printer's ink is devoted to this matter, to say nothing of the expenditure of thought, which could have been ap-

more important problems (assuming that it would have sufficed for these). Thus I should truly be ashamed to write a chapter on "freedom." In the chapter heading, the word "responsible" indicates what

plied to

concerns ethics, and designates the point at which mis143

i 44

WHEN

understanding

IS

A

MAN

arises.

RESPONSIBLE?

Therefore the concept of

our theme, and

re-

in the process of its clarification I also must speak of the concept of freedom I shall, of course, say only what others have sponsibility constitutes

if

already said better; consoling myself with the thought that in this way alone can anything be done to put an

end

at last to that scandal.

The main selves in

task of ethics (of

Chapter

I)

is

which we convinced our-

to explain

moral behavior.

To

explain means to refer back to laws: every science, including psychology, is possible only in so far as there are such laws to

which the events can be

referred.

Since the assumption that all events are subject to universal laws is called the principle of causality, one can

"Every science presupposes the principle of causality." Therefore every explanation of human bealso say,

havior must also assume the validity of causal laws; in this case the existence of psychological laws. (If for

example our law of motivation of Chapter II were incorrect, then human conduct would be quite unexplained.) All of our experience strengthens us in the belief that this presupposition is realized, at least to the extent required for all purposes of practical life in in-

tercourse with nature

and human

beings,

and

also for

the most precise demands of technique. Whether, indeed, the principle of causality holds universally,

whether, that is, determinism is true, we do not know; no one knows. But we do know that it is impossible to settle the dispute

minism by mere

between determinism and indeter-

reflection

and

speculation,

by the con-

WHEN sideration of so

IS

A

many

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

reasons for and so

many

145

reasons

against (which collectively and individually are but pseudo-reasons). Such an attempt becomes especially ridiculous

when one

considers with

penditure of experimental

and

what enormous

logical

skill

ex-

contempo-

approaches the question of whether causality can be maintained for the most minute intra-atomic events.

rary

physics

carefully

But the dispute concerning "freedom of the will" generally proceeds in such fashion that

tempt

to refute,

and

its

its

advocates

at-

opponents to prove, the validity

of the causal principle, both using hackneyed arguments, and neither in the least abashed by the magni-

tude of the undertaking. (I can exclude only Bergson from this criticism, with whom, however, this whole not an ethical but a metaphysical problem. ideas, which in my opinion will not stand epistemoare of no significance for us.) Others logical analysis, question

is

His

distinguish

two realms,

in one of

which determinism

holds, but not in the other. This line of thought (which was unfortunately taken by Kant) is, however, conquite the most worthless (though Schopenhauer

most profound idea). not necessary to lay claim to a final Fortunately, solution of the causal problem in order to say what is

sidered

it

to be Kant's it is

there is necessary in ethics concerning responsibility; the careful derequired only an analysis of the concept, in fact is which of the termination joined to the meaning

words "responsibility" and "freedom" as these are acIf men had made clear to themselves the tually used.

WHEN

146

IS

A

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

sense of those propositions, which we use in everyday life, that pseudo-argument which lies at the root of the

pseudo-problem, and which recurs thousands of times within and outside of philosophical books, would never

have

arisen.

The argument true,

my

that

if,

will too

acter

and

sary,

not

my

is

events obey immutable laws, then always determined, by my innate char-

is

my

motives.

But

free.

acts, for

runs as follows: "If determinism

is, all

I

Hence

if so,

then

my decisions are necesI am not responsible for

would be accountable

for

them only

if I

could do something about the way my decisions went; I can do nothing about it, since they proceed with

but

necessity

from

my

character

and the motives.

And

I

have made neither, and have no power over them: the motives come from without, and my character is the necessary product of the innate tendencies and the external influences which have been effective during my lifetime.

Thus determinism and moral

responsibility

Moral

are

incompatible. responsibility presupposes freedom, that is, exemption from causality." This process of reasoning rests upon a whole series of confusions, just as the links of a chain hang together. must show these confusions to be such, and thus

We

destroy them.

2.

Two Meanings of the Word "Law"

begins with an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of "law." In practice this is understood as a It all

WHEN rule

IS

A

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

147

by which the state prescribes certain behavior to These rules often contradict the natural

its citizens.

desires of the citizens (for if they did not do so, there be no reason for would them), and are in fact

making

not followed by

them; while others obey, but many under compulsion. The state does in fact compel its of

certain sanctions (punishments) which serve to bring their desires into harmony with the prescribed laws.

citizens

by imposing

In natural science, on the other hand, the word "law" quite different. The natural law is not a prescription as to how something should behave, but a formula, a Ascription of how something does in

means something

The two forms of "laws" have only this common: both tend to be expressed in formulae.

fact behave.

in

Otherwise they have absolutely nothing to do with one very blameworthy that the same word has been used for two such different things; but even another, and

more

it is

so that philosophers have allowed themselves to

be led into serious errors by this usage. Since natural laws are only descriptions of what happens, there can be in regard to them no talk of "compulsion." The laws of celestial mechanics do not prescribe to the planets

how

they have to move, as though the planets

and are actually like to move quite otherwise, of Kepler to burdensome laws forced these by only move in orderly paths; no, these laws do not in any

would

way "compel"

the planets, but express only

fact planets actually do. If we this to volition,

apply

we

what in

are enlightened at

WHEN

148

IS

A

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

once, even before the other confusions are discovered.

When we

say that a man's will "obeys psychological

which compel him to or dictate desires to him, which

laws," these are not civic laws,

make

certain decisions,

he would in

fact prefer not to have.

nature, merely expressing

which

They

desires

are laws of

he actually has

under given conditions; they describe the nature of the will in the same manner as the astronomical laws describe

the nature of planets.

where

man

sires.

How

"Compulsion" occurs

prevented from realizing his natural decould the rule according to which these

is

natural desires arise

itself

be considered as "compul-

sion"?

3.

But

Compulsion and Necessity

this is the

second confusion fo which the

first

leads almost inevitably: after conceiving the laws of nature, anthropomorphically, as order imposed nolens volens upon the events, one adds to them the concept

of "necessity." This word, derived from "need," also comes to us from practice, and is used there in the sense of inescapable compulsion. with this meaning to natural laws

To is

apply the word

of course senseless,

for the presupposition of an opposing desire

and

it is

ferent,

That

which

is,

is

lacking;

then confused with something altogether is

actually

universality.

an

It is

dif-

attribute of natural laws.

of the essence of natural

laws to be universally valid, for only when we have found a rule which holds of events without exception

WHEN do we

IS

call the rule

A

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

a law of nature.

149

Thus when we

say "a natural law holds necessarily" this has but one legitimate meaning: "It holds in all cases where it is It is again very deplorable that the word has been "necessary" applied to natural laws (or, what amounts to the same thing, with reference to causal-

applicable."

quite superfluous, since the expression "universally valid" is available. Universal validity is ity),

for

it

is

something altogether different from "compulsion"; these concepts belong to spheres so remote from each other that once insight into the error has been gained one can no longer conceive the possibility of a confusion.

The confusion of two concepts always carries with it the confusion of their contradictory opposites. The opposite of the universal validity of a formula, of the existence of a law,

is

the nonexistence of a law, inde-

terminism, acausality; while the opposite of compulsion is what in practice everyone calls "freedom." Here

emerges the nonsense, trailing through centuries, that freedom means "exemption from the causal principle," or "not subject to the laws of nature." Hence it is believed necessary to vindicate indeterminism in order to save human freedom.

4.

Freedom and Indeterminism

no quite mistaken. Ethics has, so to speak, moral interest in the purely theoretical question of "determinism or indeterminism?," but only a theoretical This

is

WHEN

150

IS

A

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

namely: in so far as it seeks the laws of conduct, and can find them only to the extent that causalholds. But the question of whether man is morally ity

interest,

free (that

is,

has that freedom which, as

we

shall

show,

the presupposition of moral responsibility) is altogether different from the problem of determinism. is

Hume

was

especially clear

on

this

He

point.

indi-

cated the inadmissible confusion of the concepts of

"indeterminism" and "freedom"; but he retained, inappropriately, the word "freedom" for both, calling the

one freedom of "the

will," the other,

He showed

"freedom of conduct."

genuine kind,

that morality

interested only in the latter, and general, is unquestionably to be attributed to

is

that such freedom, in

And this is quite of compulsion; a

correct.

man

is

mankind.

Freedom means the free

if

he does not

opposite

act

under

compulsion, and he is compelled or lyifree when he is hindered from without in the realization of his natural

Hence he

desires.

chained, or

gun

to

do what

when he is him at

locked up, or the point of a otherwise he would not do. This is is

unfree

when someone

forces

quite clear, and everyone will admit that the everyday or legal notion of the lack of freedom is thus correctly

be considered quite interpreted, and that a man will free and responsible if no such external compulsion is exerted upon him. There are certain cases which lie

between these

someone cotic.

or

acts

clearly

described ones,

as,

say,

when

under the influence of alcohol or a nar-

In such cases

less unfree,

we

consider the

and hold him

less

man

to be

more

accountable, because

WHEN we

rightly

MAN

A

IS

RESPONSIBLE?

151

view the influence of the drug as "external," it is found within the body; it prevents

even though

him from making his nature.

decisions in the

manner

peculiar to

own will, we

he takes the narcotic of his

If

make him

completely responsible for this act and transfer a part of the responsibility to the consequences, were, an average or mean condemnation of the whole. In the case also of a person who is menas

making,

tally

ill

it

we do

not consider

him

free with respect to

those acts in which the disease expresses itself, because we view the illness as a disturbing factor which hinders

the normal functioning of his natural tendencies. make not him but his disease responsible.

5.

The Nature

But what does

We

of Responsibility

this really signify?

What do we

mean by

this concept of responsibility which goes along that of "freedom," and which plays such an imwith It is role in morality ? easy to attain complete

portant clarity

in this matter;

mine the manner

in

we need

only carefully deter-

which the concept

is

used.

What

the case in practice when we impute "responsibility" to a person? What is our aim in doing this? The has to discover who is responsible for a given act

is

judge

punish him. We are inclined to concerned with the inquiry as to who deserves

in order that he

be

less

reward for an

may

act,

and we have no

for special officials

but of course the principle would be the same. But let us stick to punishment in order to make the

this;

WHEN

152

idea clear. still

IS

What

A is

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

punishment, actually?

often expressed, that

it is

The view

a natural retaliation for

past wrong, ought no longer to be defended in cultivated for the opinion that an increase in sorrow can be "made good again" by further sorrow is altogether barbarous. Certainly the origin of punishment may society;

lie is

an impulse of retaliation or vengeance; but what such an impulse except the instinctive desire to dein

stroy the cause of the deed to be avenged, by the destruction of or injury to the malefactor? Punishment is

concerned only with the institution of causes, of moand this alone is its meaning. Punish-

tives of conduct,

ment

an educative measure, and as such is a means to the formation of motives, which are in part to preis

vent the wrongdoer from repeating the act (reformation) and in part to prevent others from committing a similar act (intimidation).

of reward

we

Analogously, in the case

are concerned with

Hence the question regarding

an

incentive.

responsibility

is

the

to be punished? question: Who, in a given case, is is to be considered the true wrongdoer? This

Who

problem

is

not identical with that regarding the orig-

inal instigator of the act; for the great-grandparents of

man, from whom he inherited his character, might in the end be the cause, or the statesmen who are rethe

and so forth. But the sponsible for his social milieu, "doer" is the one upon whom the motive must have acted in order, with certainty, to have prevented the act (or called it forth, as the case be). Considera-

may

WHEN

IS

MAN

A

tion of remote causes

is

of

RESPONSIBLE?

no help

153

here, for in the

first

place their actual contribution cannot be determined, and in the second place they are generally out of reach. Rather, we must find the person in whom the decisive

junction of causes lies. The question of who is responsible is the question concerning the correct point of application of the motive. And the important thing is that in this its meaning is completely exhausted; be-

hind

no mysterious connection between and requital, which is merely indicated

there lurks

it

transgression by the described state of affairs.

It is a matter only of be punished or rewarded, in order that punishment and reward function as such be able

knowing who

is

to

to achieve their goal.

Thus,

all

the facts connected with the concepts of

and imputation are at once made intellido not charge an insane person with re-

responsibility gible.

We

for the very reason that he offers no unified point for the application of a motive. It would be pointless to try to affect him by means of promises or threats, when his confused soul fails to respond to sponsibility,

such influence because order.

heal

We

him

sponsible,

do not

its

normal mechanism

(metaphorically,

and

try

is

out of

him motives, but try to we make his sickness re-

to give try

to

remove

its

causes).

When

a

man

forced by threats to commit certain acts we do not blame him, but the one who held the pistol at his

is

breast.

The

reason

is

had we been prevented

clear: the act

would have been

able to restrain the person

who

WHEN

154

IS

A

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

threatened him; and this person is the one whom we must influence in order to prevent similar acts in the future.

The Consciousness

6.

of Responsibility

much more important than the question of when a man is said to be responsible is that of when he himself feels responsible. Our whole treatment would But

if it gave no explanation of this. It is, welcome confirmation of the view here dea then,

be untenable

veloped that the subjective feeling of responsibility coincides with the objective judgment. It is a fact of experience that, in general, the person blamed or con-

demned

is

conscious of the fact that he

taken to account

was "rightly"

of course, under the supposition that that the assujped state of affairs

no error has been made,

actually occurred. What is this consciousness of having been the true doer of the act, the actual instigator? Evidently not merely that it was he who took the steps

required for its performance; but there must be added the awareness that he did it "independently," "of his own initiative," or however it be expressed. This feel-

ing

is

simply the consciousness of freedom, which

merely the knowledge of having acted of one's sires.

And

"one's

own

desires" are those

own

is

de-

which have

their origin in the regularity of one's character in the and are not imposed by an external given situation,

power, as explained above.

power

The

expresses itself in the

absence of the external

well-known feeling (usu-

WHEN ally

A

IS

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

155

considered characteristic of the consciousness of

freedom) that one could

How

this indubitable

also

have acted otherwise.

experience ever

in favor of indeterminism

argument me.

sible to

It is

came is

of course obvious that

to be

an

incomprehenshould have

I

had I willed something else; but the never that I could also have willed somefeeling says thing else, even though this is true, if, that is, other moacted differently

tives

had been present.

And it says even less that under

exactly the same inner and outer conditions I could also have willed something else. could such a feel-

How

ing inform retical

me

of anything regarding the purely theoquestion of whether the principle of causality

holds or not ?

Of

course, after

what has been

said

on

the subject, I do not undertake to demonstrate the prinI do ciple, but deny that from any such fact of consciousness the least follows regarding the principle's This feeling is not the consciousness of the validity.

absence of a cause, but of something altogether different, namely, of freedom, which consists in the fact that I

can act as

Thus

I desire.

the feeling of responsibility assumes that

I

acted freely, that my own desires impelled me; and if because of this feeling I willingly suffer blame for my behavior or reproach myself, and thereby admit that I have acted otherwise, this means that other be-

might

havior was compatible with the laws of volition of course, granted other motives. And I myself desire the existence of such motives and bear the pain (regret and

sorrow) caused

me by my behavior so that its repetition

WHEN

156

IS

A

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

To blame

will be prevented.

oneself

means

apply motives of improvement to oneself, which the task of the educator.

ally

But

if,

just is

to

usu-

for example, one

does something under the influence of torture, feelings of guilt and regret are absent, for one knows that ac-

cording to the laws of volition no other behavior was possible no matter what ideas, because of their feeling tones,

might have functioned

as motives.

The impor-

tant thing, always, is that the feeling of responsibility means the realization that one's self, one's own psychic processes constitute the point at which motives must be applied in order to govern the acts of one's body.

Causality as the Presupposition of Responsibility

7.

We can speak of motives only in a causal context; thus it

becomes

sibility

clear

rests

how

upon

very

much

the concept of responis, upon the

that of causation, that

In fact if we should regularity of volitional decisions. conceive of a decision as utterly without any cause (tins

would

in all strictness be the indeterministic presupposition) then the act would be entirely a matter of chance,

for chance

is

identical with the absence of a cause; there

opposite of causality. Could we under such conditions make the agent responsible? Certainly not. Imagine a man, always calm, peaceful and blameless,

is

no other

who

He

suddenly falls upon and begins to beat a stranger. is held and questioned regarding the motive of his

which he answers, in his opinion truthfully, we assume: "There was no motive for my behavior.

action, to

as

WHEN

IS

A MAN RESPONSIBLE?

Try as I may I can discover no without any cause else to

ply nothing

our heads and

call

lieve that there

I

do

be said about

him

was a

My volition was

reason.

desired to

so,

it."

and there

is

sim-

We should shake

insane, because

cause,

157

we have

to be-

and lacking any other we

must assume some mental disturbance

as the only cause

remaining; but certainly no one would hold

him

to be

responsible. If decisions were causeless there would be no sense in trying to influence men; and we see at once

that this is the reason why we could not bring such a man to account, but would always have only a shrug of

One can easily make an agent the more we can find for his con-

the shoulders in answer to his behavior.

determine that in practice we responsible the more motives If a

duct.

man

his victim, if

was an enemy of previously he had shown violent tendenguilty of an atrocity

angered him, then we impose severe punishment upon him; while the fewer the reasons to be found for an offense the less do we con-

some

cies, if

special circumstance

demn the agent, but make "unlucky chance," or tary aberration,

something of the

a

momen-

sort, responsible.

We do not find the causes of misconduct in his character,

and therefore we do not

better: this

that

we do

he too stand

and only

try

to influence

it

for the

this is the significance of the fact

not put the responsibility upon him. And be so, and says, "I cannot under-

feels this to

how

such a thing could have happened to me."

In general we know very well how

to discover the

causes of conduct in the characters of our fellow

men;

and how to use this knowledge in the prediction of their

158

WHEN

IS

A

MAN

RESPONSIBLE?

future behavior, often with as

much

know that a lion and

with which we

certainty as that a rabbit will behave

quite differently in the same situation. From all this it is evident that in practice no one thinks of questioning the principle of causality, that, thus, the attitude of

the practical man offers no excuse to the metaphysician for confusing freedom from compulsion with the ab-

sence of a cause.

If

one makes clear to himself that a

with a chance happening, and that, consequently, an indetermined will would destroy all responsibility, then every desire will cease causeless

happening

is

identical

which might be father to an indeterministic thought. No one can prove determinism, but it is certain that we assume its validity in all of our practical life, and that in particular we can apply the concept of responsibility to

human

conduct only in so far as the causal principle

holds of volitional processes. For a final clarification I bring together again a list of those concepts which tend, in the traditional treat-

ment

of the "problem of freedom," to be confused.

In

the place of the concepts on the left are put, mistakenly, those of the right, and those in the vertical order form

a chain, so that sometimes the previous confusion cause of that which follows:

is

the

Natural Law.

Law of State.

Determinism (Causality).

Compulsion.

(Universal Validity) .

(Necessity) .

Indeterminism (Chance).

Freedom.

(No Cause)

(No Compulsion)

.

.

CHAPTER What

VIII

Paths Lead to Value?

Prepared by the questions already asked, and, let us hope, by the answers given, we turn now to consider the

main

tions of

"Why But

Chapter

does

this

man

comes

I,

two

we

no other form than, (or, "Why is he moral ?" the same thing, for in the end his could give

act morally

to

character can be Since, in

Following the considera-

ethical problem.

known

only through his conduct).

earlier chapters,

"What duct?" and "What

the questions

it

?

we

attempted to answer human con-

are the motives of

meaning of moral?" it appears that we need only unite the results there found to have the solution of our problem at hand. This it

shall, in fact,

out

we

is

the

be our procedure. But in carrywe touch on all of the points

see that

ing which, in discussions of moral matters, constitute the most important topics of dispute. In order to be able to

decide this dispute

we

have, in the remaining

answers chapters, analyzed certain questions whose consideraare presupposed by many of the following tions.

which tions,

we come upon questions most important human ques-

In such considerations

are not only the but which are the only important questions.

For only those things are important which 159

relate to

WHAT PATHS LEAD TO VALUE?

160

values,

that

and

in the nature of the problems of value without exception are affected in some way

all

it lies

by the main problem of ethics. Of course this is not the place in which to decide practical moral problems,

we

have to establish general principles with whose help such decisions may be facilitated, wherever it is possible. but

shall at least

The answer the motive of

to the question of

human

what

in general

is

conduct ran: in the case of con-

scious volitional conduct (ethics

is

not interested in

other activities) men are always determined by feelings, and in such a manner that they always strive for that goal,

among

those considered, the idea of which

is characterized, at the time of choice, by the least pain or the greatest pleasure (the nature of this comparison of magnitudes has been carefully elucidated).

And

the answer to the question,," What

the

is

mean-

ing of moral ?" was, "That conduct which society believes will best further its own welfare." If

we

put the two results together

we

see that the

main problem, "Why do men act morally?" will be solved as soon as we can show how the idea of the things which appear useful to society can also be pleasant for the individual agent himself.

explanation must

make

clear

for there are also cases of First,

we must

why

this

Moreover, the is not always so,

immoral conduct.

take care to understand what

is

meant

by "explanation" in this context. In many cases it is a psychological excertainly quite impossible to give planation of

why

a definite experience

is

pleasant.

WHAT PATHS LEAD TO Thus it is an ultimate,

VALUE?

161

irreducible fact that a sweet taste-

generally pleasant, while, on the contrary, a very bitter or sour one is unpleasant; and the same holds of the feeling components of every sensuous

sensation

is

There are

best but physiological or biological explanations for the joy we experience in a

experience.

at

saturated color, in the sexual act, in the satisfaction of thirst,

and so

forth;

These

philosopher.

and these do not

facts

interest

the

have never been considered

problematic. The philosophers have never asked, "Why does it please men to eat, to dance, to rest?"

as

They asked

only,

"How

can

it

please

men

to

do what

pleases othersi" Therefore there are two classes of joys: those which we take as natural, elementary, not in need of any

explanation; and those which do not seem to be evident, but excite philosophic wonder. class aesthetics

and

ethics

owe

To

self-

this latter

their existence.

Their

is to explain why feelings of pleasure (or pain) occur also where, at first, we do not expect them (with what reason, though?). The joys of the second sort

task

can, evidently, be explained only because they can be referred to those of the first kind. Knowledge always consists in such a reduction of what is to be ex-

only

plained to something not requiring explanation.

Thus

how the aesthetic and ethical joys it and valuations are derived from or compounded of must be shown

We

shall "natural" or "primitive" feelings of pleasure. speak later of the psychological laws which govern the

"combination" of feelings.

At

present the following


162

problem faces us: what are the primitive feeling reactions which may be considered so natural that an the remaining ones, which refer to them, will satisfy us as a complete explanation?

explanation of

i.

all

What Are

the "Natural" Impulses?

Most philosophers have been altogether too naive in their assumptions regarding what they considered to be primitive human nature. They are most to blame if

they failed to see the problem, and thus failed to

indicate

by what means they actually wished to make proceeding as they did from some

their explanation

confused idea of

How

man

as a naturally egoistic creature.

confused such an idea

is

was shown

in Chapter

The for

the most part obscurely expressed fundamental idea was, perhaps, that tjie natural impulses III.

are absolutely necessary for mere biological existence, hence those directed upon ingestion, warmth, and reproduction. Thus other men are con-

are those

which

sidered only as so many obstacles to the satisfaction of one's own impulses; for other men, too, claim the things needed for existence. And because men quar-

mutually over these things there

rel

arises the

"war

against all," which Hobbes assumed to be the primitive state, since he, in fact, began with the de-

of

all

and

interesting that,

tions,

Now

undoubtedly true beginning with these assump-

scribed presuppositions.

it

is

one can deduce the necessity of ending the

lum omnium

contra

omnes

by, as

it

bel-

were, a peace, and


163

reaching a modus vivendi in which each leaves to the others a part of the world's goods, in order thus to enjoy his own share in safety. As we see, in this manner one easily gains the insight that for a human being of such nature

would be

(and indeed the best thing for the preservation of his life) if each one observed such rules of conduct, approximately, as are it

best

by the legislation of a state. But the question of what would be the best for a man is to be sharply distinguished from the other actually established

question, of why he actually does what is best. In order to answer it, following this line of thought, we must now make an assumption regarding the individual's intelligence.

If

everyone possessed the keen knew how to use it in

understanding of Hobbes, and

making

his decisions, then

sufficiently strong

under certain conditions a

motive could be formed for the

dis-

covery of and obedience to such a rule of behavior: the idea of the personal joy to be obtained by obeying the

law would

constitute such a motive, because of a trans-

ference of

its

pleasure-tone to the idea of the

means

leading to this end. But since in fact the intellectual since mere intellectual capacities are not so great, and little influence on the have feelings, very operations

the motive of proper conduct is not the result of such a calculation. Additional motives must be supplied,

and

that society introduces sanctions,

is,

threatens trans-

with artificial punishment. And gression of the rules now the motive does not consist in the joy of the foreof the act, but in the fear seen natural consequences

164


of the consequences of wrong conduct, that is, fear of pain. In this fear lies the beginning of what is called conscience; of

further development, whereby it becomes relatively independent of external sanctions, one can, to a certain extent, also give a psychological exits

planation.

But

this

whole chain of reasoning has

little

value, be-

begins with a fictional human nature which quite definitely does not correspond to reality. The

cause

it

most important ties that naturally bind men to their environment are here left out of account. Just as one cannot think of man's nature apart from his breathing, which joins him with the external world, so we cannot consider his nature independently of the

human

atmosphere in which he lives from his birth on. In other words: the social impulses, by virtue of which the behavior of others constitutes

aji

immediate source

of pleasure and pain for him, are just as "natural" as the most primitive bodily needs; and are not derived

from them

some roundabout way. If such genesis impulses must be assumed anywhere, it

in

of the social

has long since been completed on

prehuman evolupresent in some form

tionary levels; these impulses are or other in all higher animals. The need for

companthe herd in found instinct, ionship very widespread aid instincts which in the those and the same holds of examrearing of the young; and hundreds of similar is

known. Ought the philosopher to ples are generally search for their genesis, and meddle in biology? He will certainly not desire to undertake this task: his

WHAT PATHS LEAD TO VALUE? interests lie in

165

another direction, and he must formuthey may be answered by

late his questions so that

an investigation of the human soul alone. 2.

New

Formulation of the Question

not acceptable, what other point of departure shall we accept? What then are the "natural" human dispositions? Which of man's But,

if

Hobbes'

fiction

is

possible ends-in-view can

we assume

to be naturally

pleasant, and not surprising and in need of explanation? Shall we add to hunger, thirst, and the sexual

impulse, say, the mother instinct, and the impulse toward companionship, and four or five other inclinations,

and then on

this

new

basis begin

Hobbes' whole

In this manner the philosopher would win himself no great merit. Of course, with deduction anew?

the help of the social impulses it would be easier for him to explain the observance of laws, and the moral

behavior proceeding from this, than it would be upon the basis of the Hobbesian presuppositions. He would be able to ascribe to the altruistic inclinations a part in the stirrings of "conscience," and

would

the facts in his considerations.

But

would never be

able to

do

stay closer to his explanation

full justice to the facts, for

the selection of impulses which he assumes to be "natural" would always remain arbitrary. It would

always be a matter for doubt whether other equally primitive dispositions were not to be added, or whether,

on the

contrary, the

number assumed could not be


166

But as long

reduced.

as this

is

the case, the whole

its peculiar interest: if one may suppose the most diverse social inclinations to be proper to

deduction loses

human

nature, then moral conduct in general ceases

to be surprising. One is convinced in principle that morality is in complete conformity with human nature,

and

becomes a question of secondary importance as to which impulses in particular must be adduced to it

give an account of demands of them.

why men

actually

do what

society

This whole explanatory procedure is unsatisfying because it fails to emphasize what, at bottom, most interests the philosopher, namely, the differences in hu-

man

behavior.

therefore

He

desires to explain morality,

must assume men

to be creatures

and

endowed

with definite dispositions. The interest not only of the moralists, but also of the psycl^logists, is centered, does this man have primarily, upon the question: feelings in conformity with moral laws, while that

Why

man does not ? Why is one man good, the other bad ? What does the one have which the other lacks ? And to this is joined the practical problem of how he can be supplied with what he lacks. In these questions we are not at

all

helped by the

between natural and derived impulses. We not wish to asume that the "bad" man is natural,

distinction shall

that the "good" man has, in addition to the primitive dispositions, certain others developed from them;

and

we

every inclination which we as belonging to human nature, exclud-

shall, rather, accept

find in

men


167

ing only those which are notoriously morbid, and generally recognized as such (in which we need not draw the boundaries too sharply, and in any case we shall include the characteristic of rarity in the criterion of

And now

morbidity).

our task would be to explain

moral and immoral decisions in particular cases, or rather in typical cases, by indicating which of the available stock of impulses have actually been functioning as motives.

The

solution of the

be extremely

problem thus formulated would It would require an under-

difficult.

standing of the realm of impulses and their nuances and demand an insight into the laws of emotional life

which we do not such knowledge greatest

difficulties

Therefore

it

is

further, so that

And

possess. its

application

because of

if

we

did possess

would meet with the

its

extreme complexity.

simplify the problem ignore the concrete obstacles

necessary

we may

even

to

and speak only of those general

principles necessary for

the solution of the problem. To this end we turn our attention to a further

cir-

cumstance, which our considerations have neglected hitherto.

We

have viewed man's inclinations

constituents of his nature or character, but

as fixed

it is

their

property to be, to a considerable degree, changeable. The impulses do not form a solid frameessential

work

of the soul, but constitute rather a plastic mass, which, under the influence of the environment, is

has a much constantly changing. The philosopher interest in these changes than in individual greater


i68

differences of conduct

and

character.

of their origin and disappearance than that of their differences, and

is

The

question

more important

by the transforma-

tion of these inclinations those differences can be cre-

ated or destroyed; or, to put can be made of a bad one. are of

many forms and

plicated, there

is,

crudely, a better man Although the impulses

it

their connections

very com-

following from their nature, a simple

law governing their changes, to which all of them are Hence, what is most important in them for subject.

open to knowledge; without its being necessary for one to fall into the difficulties which, because of us

is

the complexity of the psychic life, explanation of human decisions.

we pay

grow out If,

of a strict

in this manner,

attention to the dispositions themselves than to the laws governing their changes, we introduce less

a differential calculus, as it were, instead of the usual one; and the form of the question must be altered. Therefore we renounce the attempt to give an explicit

answer to the question of why men are moral. And we do this with no regret, because everything important concerning

it is

question which dispositions

the reply to the implicitly answered by we now ask: by what means are human

toward moral behavior increased or de-

creased?

This form of the question will forthwith undergo a further change, and then take, approximately, the form

which we have already given it in the chapter heading. For the present we see, at least, why the main question to the con(the answer to which constitutes, according


169

siderations of Chapter

I, the ultimate goal of all ethical not inquiry) could appear in the present chapter head-

ing.

Moral Suggestion

3.

The

influences

which

affect a

man's inclinations for

a change, favorably or unfavorably, can be grouped, roughly, into those which influence him from without, and those which result from his own conduct. The

not precise, for the external world is usually more or less involved in influences of the second sort; division

but

it

We

is

serves our present purpose. need devote only a brief discussion to the factors

of the

being less important to ethics. In exclude purely physical or physiological

first sort, as

doing so

we

factors, because they do not enter into this context (even though the opinion has been expressed that future

human

character merely by the infusion of certain hormones), and restrict ourselves to science will control

Here we come upon suggestion, which plays a role from childhood up in the formation of desires and inclinations, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated. A thing can become the

those of psychology.

without giving any reasons, it is but is constantly praised. If we always hear that a thing good, even though it is not stated why or for what it is goal of desire

if,

good, the idea of that thing becomes pleasant; sire to

see

make

many

its

acquaintance or to possess

desiring

the

same

thing,

if,

say,

it.

we

we

de-

If

we

observe


170

how an

irresistible

current draws individuals and na-

tions to the south or the west a similar desire

awakens

The best-known example

of the process of making the idea of an object pleasant by means of suggestion, and thus making the object itself into a goal of in us.

desire, is the advertisement.

In order to achieve

its

needs, often, only to associate the astonishing name of the object with an attractive picture; the pleasure in the picture alone has the consequence that effect

it

the beholder likes to think of the object; it becomes valuable to him. Of course, if, in addition, it does

not possess some

and

utility,

the purchaser will be deceived,

will reject the advertisement as misleading.

because of the

difficulty, frequently,

But

of determining

its

remains the only source utility value, suggestion often of the pleasure which the object is able to produce.

What

the case with morality? Its precepts, too, can be made valuable by praise; for the method of is

suggestion is, in principle, applicable to every object. And in fact this means is used to create motives for

moral conduct; the educator presents moral behavior to the child as the most excellent of all goals, he takes every opportunity of extolling the grandeur of noble deeds, of recommending noble persons as patterns that cannot be lauded too highly. Certainly in such a man-

aroused in good deeds and in good men, and the desire is created of emulating them. Here there

ner joy

is,

is

of course, at once added a second motive, difficult

to separate

universally

from the first: if good deeds are really and the doer of them enjoys the praised


171

respect of his fellow men, then the obedient pupil will share in this welcome consequence of good behavior;

and thus new motives ence can teach

him

To

be sure, experilater that noble conduct is often are added.

and earns him persecution instead of honor and recognition. And this would work against misinterpreted,

the pleasure induced by suggestion, as in the case of a cheap article greatly praised in advertisement, if the suggestion this

is

not so formulated as to run no risk from

As a matter

quarter.

of fact the

good educator

does not speak of external results; he lauds decisions which are made independently of another person's

knowledge, and says that the good which cretly

is

especially praiseworthy.

is

done

se-

In this manner the

emphasis upon the pleasure produced by suggestion is separated from other motives. Of course an unpleasant motive can be created in the same way: the expression of universal disgust for a definite mode of behavior it unpleasant also, even though no reason for the disgust be given. This process of forming motives by suggestion is

makes the idea of

and there are no objections to it. Or might it be condemned "from the moral standpoint" ? thoroughly

effective,

Clearly only if the value of a thing lay entirely in the fact that it was universally praised; in which case it would not seem to us to be genuine, but only, as it

were, a soap bubble, which would collapse at the first impact. It would be a piece of worthless paper which passed from

hand

acknowledged

as

to

hand

in a closed envelope

and was

payment by everyone because each


172

believed that a check lay within until someone opened the envelope and cried "Fraud!"

One renders no great service to morality by wishing to brand the opening of the envelope itself as immoral conduct, that is, to ban the question, "Why in the world should morality be praised?" (which Kant and the champions of absolute value theories are inclined to do). Thus Nietzsche might come along and say: behold,

I

have been the

and what did

I

to unveil so-called morality, Merely that the traditional

first

find?

precepts have indeed a real value, but only for those who impose them upon others and who do not themselves obey; for these others the precepts

have only the

value induced by suggestion, by which the masters

delude them, and otherwise none at all. Still, it might be possible that society, which, as we saw, is the originator of moral ^precepts, resembles a dishonest merchant

who praises worthless goods for

own

were

ends.

If this

so,

then of course

my

his

moral

behavior would bring joy to others (the society which commands is always composed of the others. I cannot

count myself of their number), but for me my behavior would have only an apparent value which the others were clever enough to suggest to me. But such is not in the least the case.

And

should an individual once

untroubled by moral commands, give free rein to his impulses, society would at once react

doubt

this and,

with the imposition of sanctions, and would, by punishment, show

him

a true value of morality, consisting simply in avoiding these sanctions.

WHAT PATHS LEAD TO And

thus

we would

VALUE?

173

arrive at the other external fac-

which, in addition to suggestion, influence human inclinations: namely, punishment and reward, which

tors

that in fact feelings of pleasure are the result of following desired modes of conduct, and that pain is the consequence of forbidden conduct. The ideas see to

it

of such results are then stressed correspondingly function as motives.

and

But these matters have already been touched upon several times, and are familiar to every child. Consideration of these external factors in the formation

and

repression of dispositions leads only to insight into relamakes intelligible only tively external processes, and

the roughest outlines of conduct, as we noticed previously. Suggestion and reference to social sanctions are of course only the most primitive means of the production of motive feelings; the subtle influences which most interest the philosopher are not to be attained by

We

already know that the social impulses themselves contribute stronger and more permanent their help.

motives.

Hence

time to turn to those character-forming influences which come from within and are established

by one's 4.

it is

own

acts.

Motive Feelings and Realization Feelings

All volitional conduct comes to pass in this manner: one of several different conflicting ends-in-view finally gains the foreground of consciousness and represses


174

the others; this, of course, occurs as soon as the positive between its feeling-tone and those of the

difference

certain point, so that the most or least painful idea emerges victoriously.

others passes pleasant

beyond a

The

feeling connected with the idea (that is, with the so-called end-in-view), in particular the feeling joined to the victorious idea, we called the motive feeling.

And

it

was one of our most important observations

that the feeling which the idea of a definite state awakens in us need not be at all similar to the feeling which belongs to the state itself when it is realized.

We shall call the latter the realization feeling. A realization pleasure as well as a realization pain can thus correspond to a motive pleasure, and vice versa. must, as we stated earlier, distinguish sharply between

We

the idea of a pleasant state and the pleasant idea of a state.

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