Practical Drug Enforcement, Third Edition (Practical Aspects of Criminal and Forensic Investigations)

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Practical Drug Enforcement Third Edition

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CRC SERIES IN PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL AND FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS VERNON J. GEBERTH, BBA, MPS, FBINA Series Editor Practical Homicide Investigation: Tactics, Procedures, and Forensic Techniques, Fourth Edition Vernon J. Geberth The Counterterrorism Handbook: Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques, Third Edition Frank Bolz, Jr., Kenneth J. Dudonis, and David P. Schulz Forensic Pathology, Second Edition Dominick J. Di Maio and Vincent J. M. Di Maio Interpretation of Bloodstain Evidence at Crime Scenes, Second Edition William G. Eckert and Stuart H. James Tire Imprint Evidence Peter McDonald Practical Drug Enforcement, Third Edition Michael D. Lyman Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Third Edition Robert R. Hazelwood and Ann Wolbert Burgess The Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Practical Guide to Assessment, Investigation, and Intervention, Second Edition Seth L. Goldstein Gunshot Wounds: Practical Aspects of Firearms, Ballistics, and Forensic Techniques, Second Edition Vincent J. M. Di Maio Friction Ridge Skin: Comparison and Identification of Fingerprints James F. Cowger Footwear Impression Evidence, Second Edition William J. Bodziak Principles of Kinesic Interview and Interrogation, Second Edition Stan Walters Practical Fire and Arson Investigation, Second Edition David R. Redsicker and John J. O’Connor The Practical Methodology of Forensic Photography, Second Edition David R. Redsicker Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation, Second Edition David E. Zulawski and Douglas E. Wicklander

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Investigating Computer Crime Franklin Clark and Ken Diliberto Practical Homicide Investigation Checklist and Field Guide Vernon J. Geberth Bloodstain Pattern Analysis: With an Introduction to Crime Scene Reconstruction, Second Edition Tom Bevel and Ross M. Gardner Practical Aspects of Munchausen by Proxy and Munchausen Syndrome Investigation Kathryn Artingstall Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology David R. Ashbaugh Practical Criminal Investigations in Correctional Facilities William R. Bell Officer-Involved Shootings and Use of Force: Practical Investigative Techniques David E. Hatch Sex-Related Homicide and Death Investigation: Practical and Clinical Perspectives Vernon J. Geberth Global Drug Enforcement: Practical Investigative Techniques Gregory D. Lee Practical Investigation of Sex Crimes: A Strategic and Operational Approach Thomas P. Carney Principles of Bloodstain Pattern Analysis: Theory and Practice Stuart James, Paul Kish, and T. Paulette Sutton Cold Case Homicides: Practical Investigative Techniques Richard H. Walton Practical Crime Scene Processing and Investigation Ross M. Gardner Practical Bomb Scene Investigation James T. Thurman Practical Analysis and Reconstruction of Shooting Incidents Edward E. Hueske

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Practical Drug Enforcement Third Edition Michael D. Lyman

Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group 6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300 Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742 © 2007 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business No claim to original U.S. Government works Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 International Standard Book Number-10: 0-8493-9808-8 (Hardcover) International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-8493-9808-7 (Hardcover) This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reprinted material is quoted with permission, and sources are indicated. A wide variety of references are listed. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and the publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or for the consequences of their use. No part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access www. copyright.com (http://www.copyright.com/) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC) 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lyman, Michael D. Practical drug enforcement / Michael D. Lyman. -- 3rd ed. p. cm. -- (CRC series in practical aspects of criminal and forensic investigations) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8493-9808-7 (alk. paper) 1. Drug traffic--Investigation--United States. 2. Criminal investigation-United States. 3. Undercover operations--United States. 4. Drug enforcement agents--United States. I. Title. HV8079.N3L96 2006 363.450973--dc22 Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com and the CRC Press Web site at http://www.crcpress.com

2006018616

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Foreword

For literally hundreds of years, societies around the globe have dealt in one way or another with the problems caused by drug abuse and addiction. Drugs saturate all levels of society, and stories involving drug abuse, drug raids, and arrests continue to be told in both electronic and print media. No social group has escaped the effects, either directly or indirectly, of drug abuse and drug trafficking. It is well known that drug trafficking is a lucrative criminal activity. It is worth an estimated $30 billion annually when costs such as law enforcement, drug treatment, prevention, corrections, drug-related crimes, loss of productivity on the job, and accidents are considered. Illicit drug consumption is now so widespread that it touches most families, neighborhoods, businesses, and many other corners of society. Crimes committed by professional criminals also reflect the severity of the problem. For instance, the National Institute of Justice reports that two out of three inmates serving time in state correctional institutions admit that they were under the influence of drugs when they committed the crimes for which they were later convicted. Adding to the frustration is the fact that drug-related homicides are a perennial problem in our major cities. Police officers and innocent citizens across the country are targeted for murder every year by drug dealers who are becoming increasingly willing to use deadly weapons. Many drug-dealing organizations are superbly organized and many have hundreds of thousands of dollars at their disposal for sophisticated equipment, high-priced attorneys, bribes for corrupt judges and police, and bail to keep them out of prison and on the streets. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that entry into the market is relatively easy, thereby making the drug trade an equal opportunity employer. Members of the law enforcement community are constantly faced with the challenge of change within their own arena. Recurrent problems such as rising officer attrition rates, ongoing training needs, and inadequate funding for drug enforcement projects and equipment continue to haunt most government agencies. Other problems perpetuated by influences outside the law enforcement area include the overabundance of drug cases burdening our state and federal court systems and the placement of convicted offenders within an already grossly overcrowded penal system. vii

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Practical Drug Enforcement

Despite this, however, federal and local governments have realized that their first responsibility is the identification, apprehension, and prosecution of those responsible for the manufacturing and distribution of illicit substances. Drug enforcement policies continue to be shaped by certain beliefs. First, is that the control of those drugs that pose the greatest danger to the public should receive the most attention from drug enforcement personnel. Second, is that drug abuse by even casual users contributes to the demand for drugs and constitutes a significant role in the criminal drug scene. Therefore, in an effort to break the supply and demand cycle, drug enforcement officers must eliminate the demand for drugs by the apprehension and prosecution of all known drug offenders and maintain concurrent initiatives against sources of supply on both local and national levels. Practical Drug Enforcement, Third Edition is designed as an investigative resource, discussing investigative techniques for law enforcement. The drug enforcement initiative is only one segment of the overall solution, which also includes programs aimed at public education, prevention, and treatment. Although it is unlikely that drug enforcement efforts alone will ever abolish the existing drug abuse and trafficking problem in the United States, it is clear that ongoing knowledge of sound drug enforcement practices is essential.

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Preface

Police work deals with human nature, which is always changing and, therefore, constantly poses new challenges for law enforcement officers. The skills learned in basic police training are just that — basic. Officers must seek continual training to keep up with their criminal counterparts, not just to secure a conviction in court but to remain safe and to protect the civil rights of those they investigate. The investigation of crimes such as burglary, homicide, and rape has undergone changes over the years, but not to the extent that drug enforcement has. Enforcing drug violations is proactive and can require the use of undercover operatives, making it unique and casting this mode of investigation into a class of its own. Drug enforcement therefore requires extensive and ongoing training. When I first began my career in drug enforcement, all I had to base my decision on was the portrayal of undercover police agents in the movies and on television. I realized quickly that the actual duties of a drug enforcement agent are much different from those portrayed by Hollywood and the entertainment industry. My initial learning process was somewhat slow, mainly because the only actual investigative training I received was by accompanying more experienced agents on drug buys, surveillances, and raids. Investigative skills were learned through trial and error. In those early days, many drug buy techniques were untried and untested, and were often attempted by drug agents working alone. One does not have to be a narcotics agent to realize the impact of drug use and trafficking on society. Law enforcement officers working in all aspects of police work witness, on a daily basis, an array of crimes directly associated with the illicit use of dangerous drugs. Many lose their lives. A basic understanding is therefore necessary in combating the drug problem, which involves all law enforcement officers in all jurisdictions. It has been no easy task preparing a text that would be of wide interest to law enforcement officers operating in many different jurisdictions. For example, while researching this book, I spoke with a narcotics agent in Florida who advised me that the only cocaine cases his agency would authorize him to work on were those involving quantities of 10 kilograms or more. I later ix

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spoke with a narcotics agent in Kansas who said that a 1-ounce cocaine dealer in his jurisdiction is considered a significant violator. No text can provide every investigator with all the answers regarding problems encountered in drug enforcement. Any text addressing this subject, however, should offer law enforcement officers from all jurisdictions a suitable guide for the general management of drug investigations and of drug enforcement units as a whole. Practical Drug Enforcement, Third Edition is such a text. It addresses contemporary aspects of covert criminal investigation and provides the reader with a look at the management of the drug enforcement unit itself. The goal of this text is to promote thought toward different methods of detecting and capturing drug traffickers while identifying those methods commonly used to avoid detection. This book is offered as a guide to law enforcement officers in their criminal investigations.

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The Author

Michael D. Lyman, Ph.D., is a Professor of Criminal Justice at Columbia College of Missouri located in Columbia, Missouri. Formerly employed as a certified police trainer, Lyman accumulated 11 years of practical experience as a drug enforcement agent, working with both the Kansas Bureau of Investigation and the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control. In his duties as a drug enforcement agent, Lyman was personally involved in the investigation of hundreds of illicit drug cases. He has also trained hundreds of law enforcement officers in methods and techniques of criminal investigation. He served as an undercover and intelligence agent, working in the intelligence, air smuggling, and street enforcement units. Today, Dr. Lyman is nationally recognized as an expert in drug enforcement operations and investigative practices and has provided consultation to private attorneys, prosecutors, and judges as well as expert testimony in federal courts across the nation. Dr. Lyman’s academic background includes a Bachelor of Science degree and a Master of Science degree in Administration of Justice from Wichita State University, as well as a Ph.D. from the University of Missouri–Columbia. He has been published in the area of drug enforcement and criminal investigation for 20 years and has authored seven textbooks and numerous articles dealing with drug enforcement and criminal investigation.

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Acknowledgments

It would be impossible to attempt a project of this nature without the collective expertise of many qualified and dedicated law enforcement professionals. This text is therefore a tribute to all who helped in its preparation, and proper recognition is in order for the following law enforcement agencies who provided assistance in its final preparation: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration U.S. Marshal Service Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Institute of Drug Abuse International Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association National Institute of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control Arkansas State Police Kansas Bureau of Investigation Missouri Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Missouri Highway Patrol Missouri Task Force on the Abuse, Misuse and Diversion of Prescription Drugs Florida Department of Law Enforcement Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department Columbia, Missouri, Police Department New York City Police Department Dallas Police Department Oklahoma County District Attorney’s Office

In addition to information provided by the above law enforcement organizations, numerous law enforcement officers also contributed to the making of this book. Many of those asked that their names be withheld, but a debt of gratitude for their contributions is well deserved. I also extend a special thanks to Series Editor Vernon Geberth for his support and assistance in making this text a part of the CRC Series in Practical Aspects of Criminal and Forensic Investigations. xiii

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Table of Contents

Introduction

1

xxv

Initiation of Drug Investigations: Sources of Information

1

Case Initiation Target Selection Receiving Information Verifying Information Case Preparation Budgeting Resources Other Information Sources Outside Law Enforcement Agencies The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Department of Homeland Security The U.S. Marshal Service Other Criminal Justice Agencies Probation and Parole Offices Court Records Prosecutor’s Records Public Service Agencies State Departments of Motor Vehicles Social Service Agencies Medical Examiner’s Office City or State Licensing Departments Tax Departments Departments of Highways or Roads Health Departments Sanitation Departments Boards of Education

1 2 3 3 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9

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2

Private Sector Sources Telephone/Cellular Phone Companies Public Utility Companies Banks Credit Agencies Telegraph Companies Other Sources Undercover Intelligence Trashing Summary Suggested Reading

9 9 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 12

Undercover Operations

13

Preparing for Undercover Assignments Personnel The Roles of Officers Equipment Standard-Issue Police Equipment Special Equipment Vehicles Radios Recording Devices Undercover Identification Weapons Working Undercover The Cover Story Protecting the Undercover Officer’s Cover Infiltration Drug Buy Operations Preparations Hazards The Buy–Walk Procedure The Buy–Bust Procedure Location of the Buy Outdoor Locations Indoor Locations Precautions Planning the Drug Buy Prebuy Planning Postbuy Planning The Flash-Roll Conspiracy Investigations

14 14 15 15 15 16 17 18 18 19 20 21 21 22 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 32 33 34 34 35 35 38

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3

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Element One: The Agreement Element Two: The Overt Act Types of Conspiracies The Chain Conspiracy The Wheel Conspiracy The Enterprise Conspiracy Forfeiture Sanctions Sharing Provisions of Federal Forfeiture Laws The Vehicle Indemnity Form Summary Suggested Reading

38 39 39 40 40 40 41 42 44 44 46

Identification of Drug Evidence

47

Narcotics Narcotics of Natural Origin Opium Morphine Codeine Semisynthetic Narcotics Heroin Hydromorphone Oxycodone Hydrocodone Synthetic Narcotics OxyContin Meperidine Dextropropoxyphene Fentanyl Narcotic Treatment Drugs Methadone LAAM Stimulants Cocaine Street Terms: Cocaine Amphetamines Methamphetamine Khat Depressants Barbiturates Benzodiazepines Rohypnol Rohypnol and Drug-Facilitated Rape

47 49 50 50 50 51 51 53 53 54 55 55 56 56 56 57 57 58 58 59 60 62 63 65 65 67 67 69 70

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4

Gamma Hydroxybutyrate (GHB) GHB and Drug-Facilitated Rape Chloral Hydrate Cannabis Marijuana Bongs Hashish Hashish Oil Hallucinogens LSD Peyote and Mescaline New Hallucinogens MDMA (Ecstasy) and other Phenethylamines Raves Phencyclidine and Related Drugs Ketamine Suggested Reading

70 72 72 72 73 74 75 75 76 77 79 80 80 81 82 83 84

Informant Management

85

Who Becomes an Informant? Types of Informants Psychological Motivations of Informants The Fear Motivation The Revenge Motivation The Perverse Motivation The Mercenary Motivation The Repentance Motivation The Egotistical Motivation The Unwitting Informant Informant Interviews Contracting an Informant Method of Payment Expenditures of Official Drug Funds Criminal Activity by the Informant The Cooperating Individual Agreement Informant Payments Use of Female Informants by Male Officers Statement of Officer–Informant Relationship Informant Statements Procedures for Drug Purchases Inside Drug Buys Multiple Drug Buys

87 89 90 90 90 91 91 91 91 91 92 93 93 93 94 94 96 96 96 96 97 97 97

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Table of Contents

Controlled Drug Buys (Informant Drug Buys) Mutual Agreements and Understandings The Cover Story Method of Introduction Negotiating Amounts Time of Day Manipulation of Funds Protection of Informant Identity Wilson v. United States Special Informant Problems The Informant with “Cold Feet” The Informant and the Target’s Right to Counsel Other Problems with Informants Officer–Informant Relationships Informants of the Opposite Sex Crimes Committed by the Informant Officers Who “Own” Their Informants The Informant in the Courtroom The Controlled Drug Purchase Summary Suggested Reading

5

Surveillance Operations Preparing for the Surveillance Foot Surveillance One-Man Surveillance Two-Man Surveillance ABC Method Progressive or “Leapfrog” Method Difficulties in Surveillance Operations Vehicle Surveillance Fixed Surveillance Electronic Surveillance Audio Surveillance Bumper Beepers Wiretaps Passive Monitoring Video and Photo Surveillance Undercover Apartments Surveillance of Undercover Personnel Stakeouts Preparation

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97 97 97 97 98 98 98 98 100 100 100 101 101 101 101 102 102 102 103 106 107

109 111 112 112 112 112 113 114 115 117 118 118 119 119 120 120 122 123 124 124

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Personnel Selection Equipment Briefings Assignment of Duties Team Planning Training Communications Deployment Stakeout Postevent Procedures Foot Pursuits Satellite-Assisted Surveillance Thermal Imaging The Mechanics of Thermal Imaging Thermal Imaging Applications Structure Profiles Disturbed Services/Hidden Compartments Legal Limitations of Thermal Imaging Summary Suggested Reading

6

Serving High-Risk Warrants Classifying High-Risk Warrants Step One: Planning Step Two: Briefing Step Three: Execution Step Four: Critique Booby Traps Exterior Booby Traps Safety Precautions Types of Traps The Punji Pit The Foot Breaker The Trot Line The Mousetrap Interior Booby Traps Safety Precautions Types of Traps Magazine Bomb Hot Light Armstrong’s Mixture Other Weapons

124 125 126 126 126 127 127 128 131 131 132 134 135 136 136 136 137 138 138

139 140 140 143 145 146 147 148 149 149 149 150 152 153 153 153 154 154 155 155 155

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Table of Contents

Drug Raid Procedures Checklist for Raid Preparation The Raid Leader Tactical Considerations External Control Methods Immediate Reaction Maneuver L-Shaped Clearance Maneuver L-Shaped Sweep Maneuver Internal Control Methods The Wraparound Entry Method The Crisscross Entry Method The High-Risk Entry Method The Final Raid Report Summary

7

Drug Enforcement and the Patrol Officer Patrol Enforcement of Drug Violations Intelligence Gathering Street Observations Unrelated Arrests Open-Air Drug Markets and Police Patrol Open-Air Drug Markets Drug Dealer Profiles The Jamaican Drug Operation Case Study Patrol Response to Open-Air Markets The Coordinated Response Conducting Area and Vehicle Searches Interdicting Drugs in Transit Major Transportation Routes Identifying Drug Couriers Observing the Behavior of Drug Couriers Investigative Stops Using Drug Courier Profiles Profiling: The Legal Environment Suggested Reading

8

Clandestine Laboratories Safety Considerations Identifying Laboratory Operations Investigation Techniques Seizure and Forfeiture Health and Safety Regulations

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155 156 157 158 159 159 160 161 162 163 164 164 165 166

169 169 170 171 172 173 175 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 181 183 185 185 192

193 195 196 198 200 202

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Chemicals Found in Laboratories Hazardous Chemicals Conducting a Laboratory Raid Contamination Prevention and Decontamination Controlling Precursor Chemicals Suggested Reading

9

Pharmaceutical Diversion Drug Control Legislation Drug Types and Regulations Diversion Tactics Physician Investigations Doctors Who Divert Drugs Nurses Who Divert Drugs Drug Theft Substituting Drugs Undercover “Patients” Medical License Control Prescription Clinics Stress and Pain Clinics Pharmacy Investigations Prescription Forgeries Punishment of Violators Professional Patients (the “Scammer”) The Fat Lady Scam The Breast Cancer Scam The Toothache Scam The Altered Scrip Scam The Phantom Refill Scam The Drug Audit Problems in Diversion Investigations

10

Special Enforcement Operations Marijuana Cultivation Growing Marijuana Commercial Grade Sinsemilla Indoor Growing Operations Cloning Hydroponics Evidence of Marijuana Cultivation

203 203 203 205 206 209

211 212 213 216 218 218 220 221 221 222 223 224 225 226 228 229 230 230 231 231 231 231 232 232

235 235 236 236 237 237 238 238 238

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Table of Contents

Domestic Eradication Smuggling Investigations Air Smuggling Aircraft for Smuggling Aircraft Data Plates Search of a Typical Light Plane Search of Commercial Aircraft The Pilots Ground Smuggling Search of a Typical Automobile Reverse Sting Operations Planning the Reverse Sting Manpower Considerations Conducting the Sting Summary Suggested Reading

11

Legal Considerations in Drug Enforcement Operations Surreptitious Monitoring of Suspects’ Conversations Types of Surreptitiously Monitored Statements Fourth Amendment Challenges Fifth Amendment Challenges Sixth Amendment Challenges Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Police Car and in Interrogation Room Monitoring Scenarios Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Jail Monitoring Scenarios Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and the “Unrelated Charge” Monitoring of Suspects in Sixth Amendment Situations: “Elicitation” vs. “Listening Post” Summary of Sixth Amendment Monitoring under Federal and State Statutes Federal Law: The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act State Law Entrapment Sorrels v. United States Sherman v. United States Confusion

xxiii

239 240 241 242 244 244 246 246 246 247 248 248 248 250 253 253

255 255 256 257 258 259 260 260 260 261 261 261 261 262 262 263 265 266

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United States v. Russell Hampton v. United States Jacobson v. United States Predisposition Definition of “Predisposition” Factors in Predisposition Possession with Intent to Distribute Drugs Possession Actual Possession Constructive Possession Joint Possession Lookouts, Brokers, and Other Participants Possession with Intent to Distribute Quantity Quality Packaging Location Large Amounts of Cash Weapons Addiction of the Possessor Presence of Paraphernalia Traffic Association with Known Dealers, Gang Membership Summary Suggested Reading

12

Searching and Seizing Drug Evidence Searching the Suspect’s Premises Searching the Suspect’s Vehicle The Front-End The Interior The Rear Area The Underside Searching Pickup Trucks and Work Vehicles Other Vehicles Consent Searches Dwelling Searches Handling Drug Evidence Counting and Weighing Evidence Sealing and Labeling Evidence Suggested Reading

267 268 269 269 270 271 273 274 274 274 275 276 276 277 277 278 278 278 278 278 279 280 281 281 281

283 283 285 286 286 288 288 289 290 290 291 294 295 297 298

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Table of Contents

xxv

Appendix I: Drug Scheduling

299

Appendix II

311

Appendix III: Code of Federal Regulations: Section 1310.02 — Substances Covered

315

Index

319

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Introduction

The negative consequences of drug abuse affect not only individuals who abuse drugs but also their families and friends, various businesses, and government resources. Although many of these effects cannot be quantified, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) reported that, in 2004, the economic cost of drug abuse to the United States was $180.9 billion. The most obvious effects of drug abuse — which are manifested in the individuals who abuse drugs — include ill health, sickness, and ultimately death. Particularly devastating to an abuser’s health is the contraction of needle-borne illnesses, including hepatitis and HIV/AIDS through injection drug use. The statistics are shocking. For example, National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) data indicate that, in 2004, over 3.5 million individuals aged 18 and older admitted to having injected an illicit drug during their lifetime. Of these individuals, 14% (498,000) were under the age of 25. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports that 123,235 adults living with AIDS in the United States in 2003 contracted the disease from injection drug use, and the survival rate for those individuals is less than that for those who contract AIDS from any other mode of transmission. CDC further reports that more than 25,000 people died in 2003 from drug-induced effects. Children of individuals who abuse drugs often are abused or neglected as a result of the individual’s preoccupation with drugs. National-level studies have shown that parents who abuse drugs often put their needs to obtain and abuse drugs before the health and welfare of their children. NSDUH data collected in 2003 indicate that 4.3% of pregnant women aged 15 to 44 report having used illicit drugs in the past month. Moreover, those same data show that 8.5% of new mothers report having used illicit drugs in the past month. Children whose parents and other family members abuse drugs often are physically or emotionally abused and often lack proper immunizations, medical care, dental care, and necessities such as food, water, and shelter. The risk to children is even greater when their parents or guardians manufacture illicit drugs such as methamphetamine. Methamphetamine abusers often produce the drug in their own homes and apartments, using hazardous chemicals such as hydrochloric acid, iodine, and anhydrous ammonia. Children xxvii

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who inhabit such homes often inhale dangerous chemical fumes and gases or ingest toxic chemicals or illicit drugs. These children commonly test positive for methamphetamine and suffer from both short- and long-term health consequences. Moreover, because many methamphetamine producers also abuse the drug, children commonly suffer from neglect, often leading to psychological and developmental problems. National Clandestine Laboratory Seizure Statistics (NCLSS) data show that United States law enforcement agencies report having seized 9895 illicit methamphetamine laboratories in 2004. These agencies report that 2474 children were affected by these laboratories (that is, they were exposed to chemicals, they resided at laboratory sites, or they were displaced from their homes), whereas 12 children were injured and 3 children were killed. The economic impact of drug abuse on businesses whose employees abuse drugs can be significant. Although many drug abusers are unable to attain or hold full-time employment, those who do work put others at risk, particularly when employed in positions where even a minor degree of impairment could be catastrophic; airline pilots, air traffic controllers, train operators, and bus drivers are just a few examples. Quest Diagnostics, a nationwide firm that conducts employee drug tests for employers, reports that 5.7% of the drug tests that they conducted on individuals involved in an employment-related accident in 2004 were positive. Economically, businesses often are affected because employees who abuse drugs sometimes steal cash or supplies, equipment, and products that can be sold to get money to buy drugs. Moreover, absenteeism, lost productivity, and increased use of medical and insurance benefits by employees who abuse drugs affect a business financially. The economic consequences of drug abuse severely burden federal, state, and local government resources and, ultimately, the taxpayer. This effect is most evident with methamphetamine. Clandestine methamphetamine laboratories jeopardize the safety of citizens and adversely affect the environment. Children, law enforcement personnel, emergency responders, and those who live at or near methamphetamine production sites have been seriously injured or killed as a result of methamphetamine production. Methamphetamine users often require extensive medical treatment; some abuse, neglect, and abandon their children, adding to social services costs; some also commit a host of other crimes, including domestic violence, assault, burglary, and identity theft. Methamphetamine producers tax strained law enforcement resources and budgets as a result of the staggering costs associated with the remediation of laboratory sites. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the average cost to clean up a methamphetamine production laboratory is $1900. Given that an average of 9777 methamphetamine laboratory seizures were reported to NCLSS each year between 2002 and 2004, the economic impact is obvious. DEA absorbs

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Introduction

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a significant portion of such costs through a Hazardous Waste Cleanup Program and in 2004 administered more than 10,061 state and local clandestine laboratory cleanups and dumpsites at a cost of more than $18.6 million. Nonetheless, resources of state and local agencies also are significantly affected. For example, 69% of the county officials responding to a 2005 survey by the National Association of Counties report that they had to develop additional training and special protocols for county welfare workers who work with children exposed to methamphetamine. Moreover, the time and manpower involved in investigating and cleaning up clandestine laboratories increase the workload of an already overburdened law enforcement system.

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A common problem encountered in criminal investigation is being able to recall not just a particular technique for investigation, but also different investigative techniques. All police officers undergo training in many areas of law enforcement and in time learn to adapt certain techniques to their particular personalities, abilities, and so forth. However, investigations are sometimes not successful, not because an officer was unable to apply learned techniques, but because he or she was unable to remember the right one at the right time. The training process must be continuous, and all officers must update their training with new techniques as well as periodically refresh their memories in already learned techniques.

Case Initiation Much of the literature regarding drug investigations labels drug dealing as a “victimless crime.” Although it cannot be generalized that all crimes have victims, drug manufacturing and trafficking do in fact have many victims. We must remember that the victims of narcotics transactions are frequently removed from the act itself. This can be illustrated by the following examples of active and passive victims: 1. People who experience drug overdoses or contaminants in impure drugs or diseases related to drug use. 2. Victims of crimes against persons (such as assault, robbery, rape, and murder) or crimes against property (such as burglary and auto theft). 1



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3. Taxpayers who must foot the bill for the increased police protection, court costs, and penitentiary facilities necessitated by increased drugrelated crimes. 4. Citizens whose insurance rates rise because of drug-related crimes (auto theft, burglary, larceny, robbery, insurance fraud) and drug-related medical costs (accidents, illnesses, long-term disabilities). 5. Employers who must deal with on-the-job, drug-related accidents, their effects on consumer and employee safety, and their overall effects on costs and productivity. In proactive investigations (such as drug trafficking and other vice crimes) the actual crime has not yet been committed, so there is usually no victim or complainant identified. At times, cases are seemingly handed over to agents on the proverbial “silver platter” because of reliable informant information or timely investigative leads provided by other law enforcement agencies. Frequently, however, drug enforcement agents must initiate their own cases with few initial leads. Investigators must therefore be creative when focusing on a particular suspect or criminal organization.

Target Selection Because of the immensity of the drug abuse problem, it is logical to assume that just about anybody can be suspected to be a drug user or dealer in any given community. Moreover, restrictions in manpower and money make it impossible for law enforcement agencies to investigate all suspected drug dealers in a particular area. It is therefore the responsibility of the investigating officer to make a determination as to the specific type of investigation. It should be emphasized that the target, regardless of what or who it is, should be a specific one. Such a determination is based on several factors, including (1) the size of the drug enforcement unit, (2) the availability of equipment and money, (3) agency jurisdiction, and (4) target input from the community (public pressure, informants, anonymous tips, and so forth). Priorities for target selection should also include the type of drug being trafficked, the weight of drugs (grams, ounces, or kilos), and the level of violator (street dealer, wholesaler, and so forth). The initiation phase of the drug investigation involves locating and identifying leads that the investigator can follow up. The key word is information. Information about people, places, and organizations provides leads that help identify patterns of illicit drug activity. The making of a drug case involves several distinct steps within the initiation phase, each of which might supply the investigator with dependable investigative leads. These



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steps include interviewing informants, conducting covert surveillance, and collecting intelligence on criminals. In addition to these, investigators should consider other methods of case initiation, as discussed next.

Receiving Information Many sources can provide information to the investigator about illegal drug activity. One of the most useful is the confidential informant (CI). An informant may be a person facing criminal charges who wishes to provide information in exchange for a lesser sentence or a reduction in criminal charges or a concerned citizen who offers information to the police out of a sense of civic duty. Additional valuable sources of information include leads from other law enforcement officers and agencies. These sources include officers in the investigator’s own department and in other jurisdictions who have knowledge about criminal activity in a given area. It is the investigator’s responsibility to evaluate the usefulness of any information received. The investigator must be able to judge the probable truthfulness and reliability of the information because it may be based on guesswork or exaggeration. Moreover, the investigator must always remain cognizant of the motives of those who furnish information.

Verifying Information Once information is received and its source is evaluated, the verification phase begins. Independent verification of information must be conducted separately from the source itself to ensure its accuracy. Three investigative methods are usually considered for this task: 1. Surveillance: Monitoring narcotics suspects through observation can be an effective verification tool. When actual criminal acts are not likely to be observed through surveillance, any corroboration of existing data may help substantiate suspected criminal activity. 2. Use of informants: Even though the officer’s initial information might have been received from an informant, the use of a second informant can be beneficial in verification if the second informant is in a position to acquire information where undercover officers cannot be utilized. 3. Other sources: Internal departmental sources may provide muchneeded information for investigators. These include arrest records, intelligence files, drug-buy reports, and other reports and files within the investigator’s department.



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Case Preparation Because of the complexity of criminal organizations, the wide variety of suspects, and conflicting jurisdictional considerations that arise in drug cases, a thoroughly prepared case is imperative for successful prosecution. Drug investigations are commonly distinguished by the unconventional (but effective) practice of police undercover work, as well as other specialized techniques that have been adapted by investigators. Despite the unusual methodology sometimes practiced by drug investigators, a protocol must be developed to eliminate “trial and error” investigative tactics. For the most part, drug investigations focus on targets. Targets can be individuals, establishments, or organizations with suspected links to illicit drug activity. Different targets will need different investigative measures. For example, if the target of an investigation is a nightclub, the investigator should ask him- or herself the following questions: What drugs are allegedly sold at the establishment? Who are the owners, and do they have a criminal history that might support suspicions of drug trafficking? Can the establishment be penetrated by informants or undercover officers for gathering intelligence and making criminal contacts? Answers to these questions may give the investigator ideas on how best to approach the investigation. If, on the other hand, the target is a suspected drug dealer, other questions should be asked: Is the suspect a dealer or user? If the suspect is a dealer, on what level does he or she operate (that is, street level, midlevel, or higher)? Is the suspect considered dangerous, and if so, why? Might the suspect be willing to become an informer? Again, answers to these questions will give the investigator an indication as to how to approach the investigation in terms of equipment, manpower, and funds for drug purchases.

Budgeting Resources At this stage in case preparation, a determination must be made as to whether a drug purchase from a suspect would result in an immediate arrest (buy–bust). This will dictate whether surveillance officers, uniformed officers, or special tactics will be necessary. When budgeting is available for resources for the drug case, it is a good idea to create a checklist of resources to consider. The checklist should include: 1. Financial resources: Drug investigations are expensive. Agent and staff salaries, office administration (i.e., typing and filing), and the purchase of investigative equipment are necessary costs. Unit managers will concern themselves with most of this; however, the case officer should consider other possible expenses (cash for drug purchases or informant



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payments, rent for a house or apartment used for observation, use of a specialty vehicle, or the need for a “flash-roll”). 2. Manpower: For cases involving extensive surveillance, it should be acknowledged from the beginning that additional manpower will be required. Much valuable time can be wasted on ineffective investigations, and agents brought in to assist in unproductive surveillances may be forced to “back-bum” their own case loads. In addition, adequate manpower should be accounted for in the event that an informer or undercover agent makes an undercover contact. A minimum of three cover or surveillance agents should be deployed to assist in every undercover contact. 3. Investigative equipment: Unit managers should have responsibility for acquiring equipment to be used in the investigation. During the case preparation phase, however, case officers should make an assessment of the unit’s available equipment and determine whether other specialized equipment should also be considered (for example, body transmitters, receivers, tape recorders, video recorders, body armor, weapons, listening devices). If a conspiracy investigation is anticipated, binoculars, night viewing devices, pin registers, cameras, and radio scramblers might also be considered.

Other Information Sources Traditionally, local police agencies possess more valuable criminal intelligence than any other outside law enforcement agency. This information, however, is generated from a variety of sources that may or may not be reliable. During the early phase of an investigation, the drug unit’s own department is the most likely starting point for the collection of a criminal intelligence base. The following sources of information should be queried when starting an investigation: 1. Police intelligence reports: These reports might be indexed by several methods: suspect’s name, address, geographical location, or type of suspected criminal activity. 2. Incident reports: These are case reports containing records of offenses and minor incidents, most likely filed in a general records section. 3. National Crime Information Center (NCIC) records: This source should not be overlooked. It contains valuable information on an individual’s criminal history: types of offenses for which he or she has been arrested, convictions, locations of arrests and/or convictions, aliases, and other special information.



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4. Field interview (Fl) cards: These cards are commonly filled out by patrol officers while investigating suspect activity in their districts. If filed and indexed properly, this information may prove beneficial in future investigations. 5. Traffic citations: The traffic ticket, although a record of a minor offense, may be helpful when attempting to locate identifiers of a particular suspect. It provides not only the suspect’s name, address, and date of birth, but it also gives the suspect’s physical description, vehicle description, and the location and time of the citation. 6. Fingerprint files: These files should contain physical descriptions and the criminal histories of previously arrested suspects. 7. Arrest records: These records contain valuable personal information on previously arrested suspects, specifically, name, address, associates, employers, relatives, and former addresses. 8. Warrant file: This file will help investigators locate specific identifiers of a suspected offender. Because specific information is required for the issuance of arrest warrants, the warrant file is a valuable resource for investigators. Outside Law Enforcement Agencies After police records are examined within the investigator’s own department, other police agencies should also be queried. In this process, investigators should not only check agencies within their own jurisdictions but identify outside police jurisdictions where the suspect may have lived or worked. If the suspect has ever been processed by law enforcement in these areas, those agencies could provide valuable arrest and conviction information (criminal history). To aid in locating these jurisdictions, an investigator can examine the suspect’s former arrest records, relatives’ names and addresses, military service duty stations, and so on. Federal agencies should also be contacted in this phase of the investigation. There are 32 federal agencies involved in drug enforcement. The five agencies listed below, however, are the most likely to have local criminal information. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) The DEA is the primary federal drug enforcement agency in the United States. With 227 district offices across the country and 86 offices abroad, the DEA possesses criminal and intelligence information on thousands of convicted and suspected drug traffickers. Especially helpful are the DEA’s massive computer systems. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), for example, furnishes information on smuggling, drug production, and trafficking trends. Additional information is compiled about top-level traffickers and organizations operating in the United States and abroad. EPIC is accessible 24 hours a day and is



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staffed by agents from the DEA; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Internal Revenue Service (IRS); U.S. Marshal Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and the U.S. Customs Service. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) In January 1982, the FBI was granted concurrent jurisdiction with the DEA to conduct drug investigations. The FBI offers expertise in the investigation of organized crime organizations, financial investigations, and white-collar crime, all useful in the investigation of drug offenses. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) The IRS is part of the Department of the Treasury. The IRS Investigative Task Force targets large-scale drug traffickers and money-laundering activities, focusing on reports of financial transactions filed by banks and other institutions. Department of Homeland Security In aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, in 2002 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created. This organization essentially includes the housing of federal law enforcement agencies, which include: U.S. Customs and Border Inspection; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Secret Service; U.S. Coast Guard, and the Transportation and Security Administration. The reorganization is designed to provide improved and more effective use of federal resources to fight any threat to the United States. As such, the DHS is an excellent source of information for drug investigations. The U.S. Marshal Service The U.S. Marshal Service, operating under the Department of Justice, conducts full criminal investigations and is heavily involved in the investigation of outlaw motorcycle gangs and forfeiture of property. Other Criminal Justice Agencies There are other sources of information within the criminal justice system besides law enforcement agencies. These agencies are detailed below. Probation and Parole Offices Because the corrections function of probation and parole requires strict supervision of convicted suspects’ activities, it is also an excellent source for current information regarding the associates, residences, and employment of suspected offenders.


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Court Records Criminal proceedings are a matter of public record, and examining these can provide new information to the investigator. Court records include criminal, civil, and juvenile proceedings with which the suspect may have been involved, as well as records pertaining to real estate deeds, grants, mortgages, or powers of attorney. Information can also be obtained from certificates of marriage (which include names of bride and groom), divorce decrees (which include the names of the plaintiff and the defendant, the date of separation, and the names of children), wills, births and deaths, bankruptcy papers, and so forth. Prosecutor’s Records At times, these records may be of value because they provide a compilation of a suspect’s encounters with local police and provide the names of law enforcement agencies that have dealt with the suspect in the past. Public Service Agencies Once criminal justice agencies have been checked by the investigator, an examination of other government agencies may be advantageous. These agencies may also give information about the suspect’s previous whereabouts and background. State Departments of Motor Vehicles The name of this agency varies from state to state, but it can provide extremely valuable information. Again, specific information regarding the type of vehicle registered, number of vehicles, and their descriptions should be available. Social Service Agencies Social service agencies are good sources of information about a suspect’s current residence and employer. Obtaining information may require a court order, depending on the individual regulations of each agency. Medical Examiner’s Office The medical examiner’s office records will give next-of-kin information for deceased individuals. Although not a common source of information, this could prove beneficial in some circumstances. City or State Licensing Departments If the suspect is employed at a liquor-serving establishment, city or state regulations may require him or her to be on record as possessing a license to operate a liquor-serving establishment or to serve liquor. Other types of licenses may be obtained for a variety of purposes.



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Tax Departments Tax departments will have the names of payers of property taxes, legal descriptions of property, and the names of former owners of property. Departments of Highways or Roads Maps of cities showing correct street numbers, alleys, rights of way, locations of drains, sewers, or utility conduits are useful for investigations. Health Departments Local health departments will have birth certificates, records of communicable diseases, and immunization records. Sanitation Departments The sanitation department should have landlords’ names or subscribers to service. Boards of Education Board of education records will contain teachers’ biographies, personal background information, and education (location), as well as students’ records. Private Sector Sources Finally, the private business sector of the community can provide many sources of information that can offer the investigator countless leads. Their cooperation is strictly voluntary; therefore, the professional manner in which the officer conducts the investigation may have a direct bearing on the degree of cooperation received. Frequently, a particular officer within the unit or department will, over time, develop a close working relationship with employees in certain companies, such as the telephone or electric company. This relationship should be taken advantage of, because many of these companies will not provide information without a subpoena or court order. Although the acquisition of these legal instruments is not a difficult task, not being able to access these could bog down the overall progress of an investigation. Some of the most helpful private organizations are discussed below. Telephone/Cellular Phone Companies If the suspect’s phone number is acquired, subscriber information may be obtained to help determine to whom the phone is registered. Conversely, a suspect’s phone number can also be found if only a name is known, thereby revealing an associated address. Additional leads may develop from a suspect’s phone tolls (a list of outgoing long-distance phone calls). Acquiring this list usually requires a subpoena, which can enable investigators to order past


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long-distance phone tolls, revealing numbers called, dates that they were placed, cities called, and time and length of each call. In addition to acquiring a suspect’s long-distance toll calls, local numbers called can also be documented with the use of a device called a pen register. This looks much like an office adding machine and is affixed to the suspect’s telephone line. The pen register records (on a tape readout) the date and time of outgoing calls, the number called, the length of call, the times of incoming calls, and off-hook times. The use of a pen register will probably require a court order, which should include a clause requesting “technical assistance” from the phone company to show the officers how to set up the machine properly. This process involves identifying color-coded wires (binders and pairs) within the phone system and ascertaining where both the suspect’s phone lines and the lines of the investigating agency are located (the appearance) so that a bridge can be made. The pen register may sometimes be located in an undercover apartment or even in the police department. This device requires little supervision or maintenance on the part of investigators and only has to be occasionally monitored to retrieve the tape readout, which shows each day’s telephone activity. Some expense is required to lease a line from the telephone company for the period that the investigation is under way. Public Utility Companies Public utility companies are beneficial sources for identifying suspected offenders whose residences are known. Information from the public utility company will show who is on record as responsible for paying the bill. It is common for a suspect to live at a certain location, but the utility bills are registered to a different party (perhaps an associate or live-in girl- or boyfriend). It is also possible for the water, gas, and electric bills to be registered to several different people at the same residence, thereby identifying numerous possible associates. Banks It may be difficult to identify a particular bank used by the offender. Once identified, however, much useful information can be acquired: checking accounts, savings accounts, auto loans, personal loans, IRAs, or certificates of deposit. A subpoena is usually required. Credit Agencies Many people make purchases with credit cards. A check of the major credit card companies should be undertaken to establish a suspect’s credit holdings. Personal information such as address, employer, relatives, and personal



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references can be obtained as well as a list of items purchased and from where. In addition, a credit bureau will be aware of many of the suspects’ sources of credit. Again, this will require a court order or subpoena, but it is well worth the time. Telegraph Companies It is common for drug dealers to use wire services to transport funds and messages to associates. If the use of wire services can be identified through informants or surveillance, the telegraph company might have information needed by the investigator regarding times and amounts of transactions. Other Sources Other techniques can be used to find information regarding suspected drugtrafficking activity; they are limited only by the agency’s legal restraints and the officer’s imagination. Examples are detailed below. Undercover Intelligence Officers may choose to develop investigative leads by working undercover. If the drug enforcement section has an intelligence unit, this function could be performed by them; however, any undercover officer can accomplish the task. The objective is to collect intelligence covertly without effecting any arrests or in any other way becoming identified. Trashing In the case-initiation phase, the suspect’s discarded trash may produce possible investigative leads. Although this can be a tedious undertaking, trashing can produce evidence of crimes (through discarded materials such as glassware and chemicals) or information about associates (through discarded phone bills or mail). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that trashing is a lawful technique, provided that no laws are broken to acquire the trash. The courts have held that a suspect has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her trash (abandoned property); therefore, no warrant is required. Officers are also protected under the Open Fields Doctrine (Oliver v. United States, 1984).

Summary The case initiation phase of an investigation plays a significant role in determining the manner in which the investigation will proceed. There are numerous sources of information on suspects who have criminal records (as well as those who do not), ranging from law enforcement agencies to


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public utility services. With proper identification of various information sources, drug violations can be documented without the use of undercover techniques or informants. A suspect’s close association with other convicted drug dealers, traffic to and from his residence (including descriptions of persons and vehicles), or other factors will give probable indication of a suspect’s involvement in the illicit drug trade. It must be determined at the onset of every investigation whether sufficient funding and other necessary resources will be available to support a lengthy undercover investigation and whether prompt arrests in the investigation are to be expected. Other considerations are whether informants will be used and to what extent. Investigators must also be cognizant of information sources that will provide continuing information on the locations of suspects as well as personal background and criminal history. Officer safety should be kept in mind through all phases of case initiation since covert duty is sometimes required. Undercover contacts with suspects should only be attempted after every target suspect has been identified and thoroughly investigated. Often these goals can be achieved through the examination of records and through personal contacts with other law enforcement agencies that might have independent knowledge of the suspect.

Suggested Reading Dintino, J.J., Police Intelligence Systems in Crime Control, Charles C Thomas, Springfield, IL, 1983. Lyman, M. and Potter, G., Drugs in Society: Causes, Concepts and Control, 4th ed., Anderson Publishing, Cincinnati, OH, 2004. Schultz, D.O., Police Operational Intelligence, 3rd ed., Charles C Thomas, Springfield, IL, 1973.

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Selling controlled substances without a license is a criminal violation in all 50 states. Other laws govern the distribution, transfer, possession, and possession with intent to distribute or by any other means conduct business involving illegal or controlled drugs. These laws have been passed in an effort to reduce drug consumption and thereby reduce drug-related crimes. As with other crimes, the investigation of illicit drug offenses may be conducted by techniques that range from the traditional to the unconventional. The technique of using undercover agents to infiltrate criminal groups has been an investigative staple for many years and is one of the most effective methods of obtaining credible, firsthand criminal intelligence. However, even in the law enforcement community, the duties of undercover personnel are probably the least understood of any criminal investigation procedure. The use of undercover agents poses critical problems for police agencies, police managers, and prosecutors with regard to manpower, training, funding, specialized equipment, and other resources. In some agencies, procedures for undercover work are clearly and explicitly documented; in others, procedures may be unique to each case, creative, and untried. In either case, undercover investigations must be carried out in strict compliance with agency policy and with local legal restrictions. In this chapter we consider the undercover assignment and what is required and expected of both the drug enforcement unit as a whole and individual unit agents. It is impossible to recommend one procedure that would be appropriate for all units and jurisdictions. In drug enforcement, there are vast differences in the procedures, restrictions, and requirements that govern federal, state, county, and municipal agencies. In addition, drastic operational differences exist between large and small agencies. Because of these disparities, it is only possible to present a general outline for the use and management of undercover personnel. The systems and procedures discussed 13


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here should be modified to meet the individual needs of each law enforcement agency or unit.

Preparing for Undercover Assignments Undercover work can be defined as assuming a fictitious identity and associating with known or suspected criminals for the purpose of collecting information about or evidence of criminal activity. Make no mistake, all undercover work is dangerous! Officers are required to establish a cover story (which may or may not be “blown” at any time during the investigation) and must associate closely with individuals who may be armed, unpredictable, under the influence of drugs, or mentally unstable. Personnel Given the inherent dangers of undercover work, the selection and training of personnel must be meticulous. Consideration must be given to the particular goals (and resources) of the unit, the officers’ personalities, their professional backgrounds, and their physical and mental conditions. In addition, an officer’s proficiency with firearms, good reporting skills, and ability to keep a cool head and use common sense under stressful conditions must be carefully weighed. Because of concern for officer safety and the increasing potential for agency liability, the days of undercover officers working the streets “deep cover” and under minimal supervision are over. Those being considered for undercover assignments should be disabused of television and movie stereotypes. Undercover work is not a glamorous job providing the agent with endless expensive meals, luxurious sports cars, and unheard-of electronic gadgetry. Conversely, it is also not a duty that requires the officer to isolate him- or herself from family and friends and become a drug-using martyr. Most undercover work consists of a brief meeting between the agent and a suspect, an exchange of dialogue, and a transaction — usually a drug purchase. “Deep-cover assignments” — assignments that require agents to operate with minimal protection over much longer periods of time — are not as widely used and require specialized training. Although required to work one-on-one with a suspected drug dealer, undercover officers must also realize that both their safety and the overall success of the investigation require equal participation by all unit members. All unit personnel involved (undercover contact, surveillance, raid, and arrest) are of equal importance. Although every officer within the unit must maintain his or her own caseload, each officer should regard the overall mission of the unit as the effort of a team rather than one individual.



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The Roles of Officers There are two general roles for officers to perform within a drug enforcement unit. The undercover officer contacts individuals or infiltrates establishments or organizations suspected of illicit drug trafficking or other criminal activities. Usually, such contacts are possible because the officer’s appearance, mannerisms, dress, and overall demeanor are similar to those of the suspect. Much time and money are spent in carefully cultivating the officer’s ability to function effectively in this capacity; the true identity of the undercover officer should be protected at all times. The support officer (sometimes called an intelligence, cover, or tactical officer) is a plainclothed officer who works with the drug unit, but not in an undercover capacity. Support officers assist undercover officers by observing drug transactions in which they (or informers) are involved. Support officers also participate in drug raids at the culmination of an investigation, interview arrestees, and perform other functions within the unit that would otherwise jeopardize or expose the identity of the undercover agent. Drug enforcement organizations differ in their resources, methods, procedures, and philosophies. The operational distinctions between undercover and support officers may not be feasible in some agencies. In such circumstances, officers may be required at different times to perform both functions. Equipment To approach any covert investigation effectively, the first order of business is to determine what equipment is necessary and issue it to each agent as soon as he or she is assigned to the unit. The choice of equipment will, of course, vary according to the agency’s financial resources, the size of the unit, and the type of assignment. However, before equipment is purchased, careful thought should be given to its purpose and user, its usefulness, and its durability. Undercover investigators require equipment different from that given to support officers. Also, equipment assigned to an agent might be regularly carried with him or her in an assigned vehicle. Therefore, it may experience much wear and tear from being bounced around in the trunk of a car or in the back of a van, or it may suffer from drastic changes in weather conditions (especially in older vehicles, which may leak). Standard-Issue Police Equipment The issuance of basic police equipment is also necessary for arrest, raid, and tactical situations. Basic equipment should include: • •

Body armor (lightweight and heavy-duty) Raid jackets and hats (marked with the word “POLICE”)



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• • • • • •

Sam Brown belt with holster, speed loaders, and handcuff case Flashlight with autocharger Handcuffs (both metal and plastic flex cuffs) First aid kit City and state maps Binoculars

Special Equipment Some specialized equipment is also necessary for special circumstances. Because much of this equipment is rare and may be extremely expensive, it may not actually be issued to each support officer but may instead be available through an equipment checkout procedure. If the latter is adopted by the drug unit, a log should be maintained showing dates, times of equipment use, the names of officers using the equipment, and the maintenance schedule (dates and types of service performed). Depending on the assignment, other types of equipment are commonly used to ensure an agent’s cover. This equipment includes: • • • • • • • • • •

A digital camera with appropriate resolution (recommended minimum 4 megapixels) and sufficient storage media Night viewing devices Digital video cameras with attachments Concealed body transmitter with receivers (plus extra batteries if required) Hard-line room transmitters (“spike mikes”) Vehicle tracking devices (“bumper beepers”) Breaching device (for tactical units) Bolt cutters Teargas guns (for tactical units) A bullhorn

Other equipment to be kept in the support officer’s vehicle should include: • • •

•

Evidence bags Evidence tape, duct tape, or masking tape Drug field test kit (Note: evidence bags, tape, and testers should also be kept in undercover officers’ vehicles in a bolted, locked strongbox to prevent tampering or theft) Blank forms: consent to search, informant statement, Miranda warning cards (rights waiver), suspect statement, evidence submittal forms, prisoner personal history form



• • •

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Extra undercover license plates (in and out of state) Portable scales for weighing small quantities of drugs A 3-day change of clothes

Vehicles Generally, each vehicle owned by the agency should be assigned a separate number; a maintenance and repair file should be kept on each vehicle. The kinds of vehicles that the agency should own and the equipment that the vehicles should contain depend on how they are used. Support Officer Vehicles. Unit vehicles for support officers should be generally nondescript: two-door sedans in plain colors such as tan, white, gray, or dark blue. (Exotic or expensive sports cars might be advantageous in short-term undercover assignments, but they will also be easily remembered or “burned” by nervous or attentive suspects during any moving surveillance.) Unit commanders should consider using vehicles other than standard passenger cars: foreign cars, pickup trucks, vans, campers, or older cars. Vehicles should also be assigned to match the driver. For example, a more expensive car should be assigned to an appropriately dressed agent; a sports car should be assigned to an agent who fits the role of someone who would typically drive one. If local laws permit it, seized vehicles (if in good condition) are a great asset and can provide a constant source of plausible vehicles for the unit. Undercover personnel should not use vehicles assigned to support officers. Support officers’ vehicles need to be outfitted differently than those assigned to undercover officers. These vehicles should have more standard “police-type” gadgetry, which benefits them — but which would “burn” an undercover agent. All support officer vehicles should be equipped with a set of “kill-switches.” These are standard toggle switches (usually mounted in the glove box) that are wired so that a single headlight, the tail lights, or brake lights can be turned off. This is beneficial in night-time surveillances to change the appearance of a vehicle when suspects view it through the rear-view mirror. Undercover Officer Vehicles. Vehicles used by undercover agents should not contain the same kinds of equipment used by support officers. Undercover vehicles must be kept “clean.” Drug dealers will frequently be inside the vehicle while negotiating with the undercover officer. It is common for a suspect to examine the agent’s vehicle for possible radio wires or hidden microphones, to check the vehicle registration, or to search for personal effects. Anything the suspect finds in the vehicle should be placed there purposely (for example, a checkbook, mail) to support the officer’s cover story. Again, many agencies use seized vehicles — especially for undercover work. Others purchase or rent cars for undercover agents. The obvious benefit


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of a borrowed or rented vehicle is that it can be returned to the lender after the investigation is over, thus enabling officers to have different vehicles for each assignment. Radios A police radio, if installed in a vehicle, should be hidden from view. Many agencies place the radio in the trunk and the radio head where it can be concealed from inquisitive suspects (for example, in the glove box). The radio antenna should also be nondescript. Antennas resembling those for standard AM–FM radios (“Dick Tracy antennas”) should be considered. A portable two-way radio, which can be plugged into a cigarette lighter, can also be used. Even cellular phones have distinct advantages. They permit an officer to possess communication that is readily acceptable to drug dealers because they use them as well. Hand-held radios are another essential piece of equipment for the support officer. They are useful during surveillances conducted away from the car and during raids and arrests. However, they are also expensive and may not be available to every agent. If it is necessary to check walkie-talkies in and out or to assign them to particular agents, procedures should be established to ensure that they will be returned, serviced, and available whenever needed. Regardless of what radio system is used, a frequency scrambler (encoder) should be installed on every radio. This device literally scrambles the transmitted voice of the officer, and only other radios with scramblers (and the correct scrambler code) can decipher the transmission. This is important because of the increasing number of drug traffickers who use programmable police scanners to monitor law enforcement activities. Recording Devices The use of tape recorders, digital recorders, and so forth is essential for most covert operations. A recorder can be used to document field notes, undercover contacts, or telephone conversations. Ideally, the tape recorder should be small and equipped with a remote control or an extended microphone lead. These features can be found in many midsized recorders. Be sure, however, that the recorder selected does not have a “warning beep” to indicate the end of a tape. Because many drug traffickers use RF (radio frequency) detectors to identify hidden tape recorders used by undercover officers, the drug unit should consider removing the erase head (which emits an RF signal) from the recorder. Even though tapes cannot be re-recorded after the head is removed, its removal greatly reduces the chance of detection. The cost of this procedure is usually less than $100 per recorder and is money well spent.



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Before tape recorders are purchased, unit managers should note the kind of transcription machines the unit’s secretarial staff has. The advantages of using compatible equipment (that is, tape recorders and transcription machines that use the same size tape) are obvious, and this is easily guaranteed if all unit equipment is purchased at the same time. All drug enforcement units should require that every taped undercover and telephone contact be transcribed for later use in court proceedings. Undercover Identification Another essential piece of “equipment” is adequate undercover identification. The undercover name chosen by the officer should be one he or she will respond to instinctively. To avoid confusion under stressful conditions, it is often a good idea for an undercover agent to use his or her given first name with a fictitious last name. The first piece of identification to obtain is a driver’s license. This is usually acquired through the state department of motor vehicles; most often it requires a letter from the agency’s chief executive officer addressed to the head of the department of motor vehicles. Second, gasoline credit cards should be issued to the undercover agent in the same name as is on the driver’s license. If this is not feasible, the credit cards should bear the name of a fictitious company. (Note: If a company name is used, it should be worked into the agent’s cover story.) Some agency supervisors may require agents to purchase gasoline at a particular gas or service station to avoid accounting nightmares or other unforeseen complications later. Third, it is imperative that unit managers obtain fictitious social security numbers for all undercover personnel in case agents seek undercover employment. The process may take 2 or 3 weeks, so unit commanders should plan ahead. The application criteria for state and local agencies is as follows: 1. The Social Security Administration (SSA) can only provide fictitious (cover) social security numbers when there is specific legal authority (for example, state law, a standing court decision, agency regulations) permitting the agency to engage in undercover law enforcement activities and to use false identification in furtherance of their lawful functions. 2. All requests from an agency for cover identity social security numbers should be channeled through a designated agency liaison office for approval and control. 3. Social security numbers issued under these arrangements must only be used in connection with the undercover officer’s official duties and only to the extent necessary to carry out the agency’s lawful functions.


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4. Any social security cards issued for undercover law enforcement activity must be returned to the Office of Assessment at the end of the undercover assignment. A cover letter explaining whether the social security number was used in an employment situation should accompany the returned card. If the card was so used, the cover letter should contain sufficient detail about the employment (name, address, gross salary, period of employment) so that the SSA may adjust its records. 5. Although earnings may be reported for the undercover agent during the operation, these earnings would generally not be covered for social security purposes as a valid employer–employee relationship would not exist in most cases. When the operation is completed, the SSA will delete any existing records. Weapons The type of personal handgun carried by an agent is usually an individual choice. Most law enforcement agencies, however, require officers who carry weapons in addition to those issued by the department to qualify with the weapons individually before being permitted to carry them in service. Both revolvers and semiautomatic handguns have distinct advantages, which should be weighed by each agent. The usual considerations are those of concealability, comfort, and topping power. In the event that an investigation results in a shooting, unit officers should request the assistance of tactical officers who are trained in SWAT-type maneuvers. This option may not be available to officers in emergency situations, and in some jurisdictions such assistance may not be available. Depending on the structure of the department, a tactical assault team should also be used when a raid or other tactical situation is anticipated. Use of such a unit, trained in the use of assault weaponry, may reduce the likelihood of an agency’s liability in the event of a shooting. If a department does not have a tactical unit, each officer must be adequately trained in the use of both handguns and long guns. Two long guns in particular should be considered for use by support officers in the unit: a 12-gauge shotgun and a rifle (30-30, .223 caliber, etc.). Depending on the circumstances in which support officers find themselves, they may need to be experienced with both types of weapons. In the case of raids on residences or buildings, shotguns might offer maximum protection. In raids on marijuana fields, clandestine laboratories, or other rural operations, however, rifles might be necessary in the event of an ambush. These two weapons may be carried in the support officer’s assigned vehicle on an as-needed basis. Fully automatic weapons, concussion grenades, tear gas, and other weaponry might also be necessary in different circumstances; each requires specialized training.



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Officers must be properly qualified for the use of each weapon issued. Such qualification should take place throughout the year on a regularly scheduled, “in-service” training basis. Weapons training should prepare the agent for all street circumstances, including day and night shooting, strong/weak hand shooting, shoot-don’t-shoot techniques, and barricade and prone qualifications from 5 to 25 yards. It is also recommended that agencies train officers regularly in “red-handle” shooting exercises. This is a practical and realistic type of training in which special training weapons are loaded with special ammunition that shoots cotton projectiles.

Working Undercover Working undercover has unique benefits as well as a serious downside. It is the one investigative method by which the officer can see firsthand the inner workings of criminal organizations. Officers can also converse and strategize with their criminal targets and learn the ways criminal minds operate. On the downside, the close interaction may place the officer in jeopardy, as he or she might reveal something inconsistent with his or her cover story. Furthermore, exposure to criminal elements in a close, undercover capacity for extended periods of time might cause the undercover agent to act and speak in a manner counter to their nature — even when off duty, reflecting poorly on the officer’s credibility. The Cover Story A prerequisite for assuming an undercover role is the cover story. Simply defined, the cover story is a fictitious story that the agent will convey to suspects concerning his or her background: name, address, hometown (or area), and employment. Other details may be included, but it is a good idea to keep the cover story simple in case the agent must deal with inquisitive drug dealers. The cover story should fit with the area and people involved with the investigation. When an officer chooses to associate him- or herself with a particular town or area, it should be one with which the officer is already familiar in case he or she later meets someone from that area. Officers should remember: a partial truth makes the best lie. When claiming a place of employment, the officer should choose one that cannot be easily checked out by suspects. This is more of a problem in rural areas because people are more likely to know each other in small communities. It may be desirable to choose an out-of-town place of employment that requires a lot of travel or to present a fictitious job in which the officer is self-employed (and therefore more difficult to verify). Whatever story is chosen, the officer should be provided with business cards, customized stationery, credit cards,


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checking and savings account books, and other supporting credentials to corroborate the story. Moreover, the officer should be familiar with the profession chosen for the cover story for the same reasons he or she should be familiar with a purported hometown. The officer’s appearance and mannerisms should also fit the cover story. If the officer claims to be an oil-field worker, it might be out of character for the officer to be seen after hours in an expensive business suit. Conversely, if the officer’s cover story is that of a financier for a big-money drug deal, then expensive clothing would be more appropriate. It might also be necessary for an undercover officer to wear expensive jewelry to help convince sellers of the cover story. (Jewelry can sometimes be borrowed from local stores for short periods; however, the safety and security of the jewelry are the responsibility of the undercover officer.) Protecting the Undercover Officer’s Cover Once the cover story has been established, the undercover officer is committed to it. At least the basics — name, hometown, and vocation — cannot easily be changed without jeopardizing the officer’s safety and the integrity of the investigation. Even if changes are not necessary, however, the undercover officer must be able to detect and withstand attempts by suspects or their associates to test and invalidate the officer’s cover story. Typically, suspects will barrage the officer with questions in an attempt to catch a lie or inconsistency in the cover story. If they are successful (or think they are), suspects will usually attempt to frighten or intimidate the officer into admitting he or she is an undercover agent or into abandoning the investigation out of fear for personal safety — sometimes banding together to do so. Panic is the undercover officer’s worst enemy. Officers must realize two important things: (1) paranoia is common among drug dealers, and (2) no matter what suspects say they know about the agent, many times they are just attempting to bluff the officer into an admission for which they have no proof. If the officer keeps the cover story general, most questioning and suspicion should be easily overcome. Moreover, if the officer has been properly trained and responds to the suspects according to his or her training, a bond of trust may develop between the officer and suspects, which can pave the way to a successful investigation. Drug traffickers use a variety of methods to expose undercover police agents. Even though good field training should prepare undercover personnel for most of them, not every confrontation can be anticipated. Undercover personnel should remember that most questions about the cover story are bluffs, and they should remain calm and confident, discounting the challenges presented without appearing scared, intimidated, or timid.



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Case History A state narcotics agent was assigned to investigate drugs in a small military town. The first night he worked undercover, he decided to go play pool at a local night spot where Detective Clark, the agent’s contact on the local police department, told him there was a lot of drug activity and where the agent could probably make some drug contacts. The agent arrived at the club and immediately walked toward the pool table area of the tavern. While waiting his turn at the pool table, a young black GI sat next to the agent and said, “Hey man, I need to talk to ya about your assignment. I know you don’t know me but there’s a problem, Clark sent me.” The agent, not knowing the man, denied knowing anything about an assignment or anyone named Clark. The GI persisted in trying to convince the agent that the detective sent him to deliver an important message, but the agent did not give in. Finally, the man said, “Sorry man, I was just checking you out to see if you were cool. I’ve got some dynamite coke for sale if you’re interested.” Officers should also be aware that traffickers can be quite tricky and cunning when trying to expose possible police infiltration. They may, for example: •

•

•

• • •

• •

•

Attempt to intoxicate the officer in the hope that he or she will say something inconsistent with the cover story while under the influence of alcohol. Use prostitutes, girlfriends or boyfriends, or associates to attempt to seduce the officer; in so doing, the upper torso will be felt for body mikes, the waist area for weapons, and pockets for police credentials or anything else indicating an association with police work. Ask the officer questions about the cover story when the suspects already know the answers; the suspects hope to observe nervousness on the part of the officer. Ask the officer to furnish drugs to a friend or associate. Ask the officer to consume drugs furnished by the suspect. Attempt to learn information about the officer’s family (spouse, children, other relatives, friends) so that the officer’s story can be more easily verified. Ask the officers to perform various illegal acts. Attempt to rummage through the officer’s car or personal belongings in order to locate police-related material or information showing that the officer was lying about the cover story. Ask the undercover officer excessive questions to see how many he or she is willing to answer before becoming suspicious.



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Infiltration Once a cover story is established, a methodical process of infiltration must take place. During infiltration, a relationship is established between the officer and the suspect. Frequently, an officer finds it difficult to meet or establish any rapport with the suspect without the help of an informant. In some cases, however, informants may cause more trouble for the officer and the investigation than they are worth; therefore, their use should be carefully considered. Infiltration requires inventiveness and originality on the agent’s part because he or she might have to create his or her own opportunity to speak with the suspect. The following case history provides an example of this. Case History A suspected drug dealer was living alone in a trailer court. Surveillance showed that he was somewhat of a recluse and did not go out to taverns at night where agents could possibly meet him. In the front of his trailer, however, there was a vintage 1963 Chevrolet Corvair with a for-sale sign. A quick-thinking undercover officer noticed the vehicle and did some homework on the value and history of the Corvair, knowing that it was a collector’s item. The agent then approached the suspect in his home under the pretense of purchasing the vehicle. This was a good lead-in to meet the suspect: it created an environment of social interaction and an acquaintanceship was formed. After a half hour of car talk, the agent was invited inside the suspect’s house to inspect some additional paperwork on the vehicle. Once inside, the agent observed scales and a water pipe on the coffee table. The conversation then turned to drugs, and a subsequent purchase was made. Once contact is made between the officer and the suspect, the suspect’s confidence must be gained as soon as possible. An officer can best accomplish this by learning of an interest of the suspect’s that the officer can then discuss: jobs, the opposite sex, local bars, motorcycles, cars, drugs, and so on. Contacts must be regularly attempted throughout the investigation to maintain a rapport with the suspect. When working without an informant, it might be necessary to canvas a target area. The undercover officer can expedite the investigation by reviewing intelligence on targeted suspects and locations; concentrating on areas with high incidences of drug traffic might provide investigative leads. Typical starting places might be bars, nightclubs, or taverns, which can be excellent sources of intelligence for undercover officers. Much can be learned by just being present; generally people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when “openly” conversing in public places



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such as a bar. The undercover agent can simply overhear otherwise private or guarded information about suspects: their names, types of criminal activity, places of employment, and their vehicles. Once the officer learns such information and if it appears that the information might be useful in showing criminal activity, it should be promptly documented in intelligence reports. The lack of such properly generated intelligence reports accounts for the loss of much valuable criminal information to the unit. It should be noted that although bars, nightclubs, and taverns can be lucrative sources of information, officer safety is greatly reduced in these settings. If two undercover officers are available, it is a good idea to assign both of them to a particular tavern, working independently of each other. This accomplishes two things: it gives both officers additional backup, and it provides each officer the chance to identify different suspects and criminal groups operating in the tavern. If a tavern is to be infiltrated, the undercover officer has several potentially good targets to consider. The initial people contacted may not be offenders but might know those who are. Without being too aggressive, the undercover officer might consider befriending one of the following people in the bar: •

• •

Bartenders: Bartenders may or may not be involved in criminal activity, but they will most likely know of any criminal activity occurring and who is responsible. Waitresses: Waitresses, too, are frequently aware of dealers and users operating in the bar. Bar regulars: Regular customers in a tavern might be good players to befriend; they, too, often know who might be involved in criminal activity.

Sometimes an informant will arrange a drug transaction and a “first-time” meeting between a dealer and the undercover officer. In this case, the seller will have some degree of suspicion about the officer, and some initial questioning should be anticipated. At this point in the investigation, the officer should remember a few significant guidelines. First, the officer should not let the suspect question him any more than if the roles were reversed. Some questioning is understandable, but it can become excessive. If this occurs, the officer should deal with it the best way possible, perhaps by acting angry and advising the seller that he’s asking too many questions — that the deal is either on or it is not. This should help convince the seller that the officer is aware of what the suspect is attempting and is not willing to be manipulated. Undercover officers will find that subsequent transactions are usually much easier because the dealer feels confident in that he has not been arrested as a result of dealing with the officer.


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Second, while working a bar, an officer might purchase drinks or pay for pool or video games in order to start a conversation with a suspect. However, officers must carefully abide by established policy regarding the consumption of alcoholic beverages while on duty. Most law enforcement agencies permit officers to consume liquor while working undercover; however, because an officer’s judgment may be impaired and because he or she might become less likely to remember necessary facts, this must be done with discretion. In addition, the officer should drink as little as possible to avoid attacks on the officer’s credibility by defense attorneys. Third, if the undercover assignment takes the officer to the suspect’s house, in addition to taking additional safety precautions, officers must recognize that this is a good opportunity to learn new information about the suspect. The officer should mentally map out all entrances, exits, and windows, which the suspect may use for escape during a raid. The officer should mentally note the number on the telephone, which might furnish a lead to the name of a new associate later. Discretely observing mail laying out in the open may also reveal the names of associates. Last, noting the presence of controlled substances and their hiding places may be useful later when obtaining a search warrant or conducting a raid. Fourth, officers should remember that the practice of lying and deceiving is common for drug dealers. If the officer gets caught in a lie, he or she should never become prematurely paranoid and fearful that his or her cover has been blown. The officer should react with disinterest, or perhaps even laugh it off for the suspect’s benefit. It is best to try to justify the lie by claiming that he or she doesn’t “want too many people knowing too much about my personal business.” The suspect will most likely identify with and respect such an explanation.

Drug Buy Operations Although there are many methods of accumulating evidence on drug traffickers, the drug buy is one of the most reliable. Because drug enforcement is proactive rather than reactive and because the undercover officer is personally involved with the suspect, opportunities to purchase drugs as evidence frequently present themselves in undercover investigations. The purchase of drugs by the law enforcement officer is unique because the officer actually participates in the crime. Such participation in criminal acts is lawful, provided that prosecutors can show that the suspect was predetermined to commit the act without the participation of the officer. Documenting a suspect’s “criminal intent” through recorded conversations and the actions of the suspect can accomplish this.



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Preparations For all drug purchases, the unit should have an established policy requiring officers to completely identify the suspect before the buy operation. If the officer fails to do this, subsequent meetings between the officer and suspect may never take place, resulting in an open case showing an expenditure of funds with no leads to make an arrest. Suspect identification should include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Full legal name Identifiers (date and place of birth, Social Security number) Address Criminal history Known associates (including friends, partners, ex-wives, and girlfriends) Full vehicle description

The drug buy should be strategically planned to serve a particular purpose in the investigation. For example, an investigator may first wish to learn more about the seller’s supplier, and additional purchases may be required to accomplish this. Conspiracy investigations necessitate multiple purchases. In other circumstances, however, a straightforward “buy–bust” operation may be best. Multiple purchases from suspects without a specific need will only lengthen the investigation, waste agency funds, and expose officers to unnecessary risks. Moreover, if the suspect is later convicted, the sentences incurred from several different purchases may end up being served concurrently rather than consecutively. The narcotics buy operation involves an “agent” — either an undercover police officer or an informant — who makes the buy or purchase from the dealer. Alhough this may sound quite basic or simple, it is not. The narcotics buy operation is potentially the most dangerous, “tricky,” and unpredictable of any police investigative technique. Many variables are involved, any one of which might create a new complication during the delicate and dangerous interplay between police agent and dealer: 1. The behavior and personalities of both the agent and dealer are unpredictable. 2. The conditions of the “set” (the location where the sales are taking place) are unpredictable. 3. The required movements of the police backup team trying to maintain surveillance and react to actions of the dealer and/or the undercover agent cannot be planned. 4. Vehicular and pedestrian traffic can affect both observation and movement of the backup team. 5. Weather conditions can affect observation and movement.



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6. The conditions given by the dealer to the undercover agent under which he or she will complete the deal are never fully controllable (although they are somewhat negotiable). The undercover agent must have options available and these options must be realistic. 7. There may be mechanical breakdowns or equipment failures: backup autos may break down, transmitting difficulties may occur, or batteries may go dead. In addition, certain areas are “radio dead zones,” where transmission is impossible. 8. Erratic actions by the dealer and/or evasive methods taken by the suspect to avoid surveillance may make the “tail” or effective observation impossible. 9. Third-party situations may arise unpredictably: (a) The dealer’s connection or supply runs out. (b) Someone fouls up on the proposed meeting time. (c) An unexpected police action by other police officers unaware of the “buy” operation can occur against the suspect, the undercover officer, or both. 10. The dealer or his people may rob the undercover officer (the “rip-off”). This is the most dangerous situation that can occur during a drug buy operation, and only the undercover officer can decide how to handle it. Even with a predetermined trouble signal, the first few seconds of the crisis fall upon the undercover agent. Another situation under this category, although not as dangerous, is the “beat” package, whereby the undercover is sold a phony or “dummy” bag. Short of examining the contents, which is nearly impossible to do effectively in front of the suspect, there is little the undercover officer can do. However, immediately after discovering the “beat,” the undercover officer (with a backup team) should make it his or her business to get back to the dealer and make his “beef ”; the same goes for a “short” package (one that weighs less than the agreed-upon amount). This is what a dope dealer would do, and the undercover agent should do the same. Hazards Dangerous circumstances may arise at any time during drug buy operations. Many of these circumstances can be avoided; many are unforeseeable. A strict time limit must be given to each arranged drug deal. This way, support officers will know when to check on the safety of the undercover officer. If this is necessary, support officers may have to use inventive ways to check on the status of a drug deal without actually identifying themselves (prior planning is necessary for this tactic). However, on those occasions when the officer is not out of the residence within the predetermined time, it might be necessary for backup officers to storm the residence and make any necessary arrests.



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The Buy–Walk Procedure The buy–walk is a drug purchase for which an immediate arrest is not planned and the suspect keeps the money. There are good reasons why this is considered both a productive and a nonproductive investigative practice. An agency conducting a lengthy undercover investigation will soon find that if an arrest is made immediately after each drug purchase, the undercover officer’s identity will rapidly become known. To protect the cover of the officer and enable the investigation to net numerous suspects at its culmination, the buy–walk method can be used. The agency then sets a specific date to conduct a coordinated raid during which suspects can be arrested through the use of “buy–busts.” At the same time, arrest warrants are served on other suspects who have been identified earlier in the investigation, and search warrants are served on residences containing known stashes of drugs. The chief advantage of the buy–walk practice is that many investigative leads can be developed when buying drugs from suspects: places of residence and employment may be observed, associates may be identified and observed, and the existence of organizations can be documented by investigators. Other benefits of the buy–walk method are that small drug purchases enable investigators to have the drugs analyzed for purity, and, with each drug purchase, larger quantities can be negotiated to help identify suppliers further up the distribution ladder. The biggest drawback to the buy–walk investigation method is that it is expensive. The cost of continuous drug purchases may become quite substantial over an extended period of time. Additional investigative expenses include the officers’ salaries (including overtime) and incidental expenses, such as expenses for working the street and taverns (food, drinks, bar cover charges), gasoline, and vehicle expenses. To help defray these expenses, many agencies pursue restitution from the defendant to recover the expenditures made during the investigation (drug buy money, laboratory fees, overtime, and so forth). Another major problem associated with a buy–walk investigation is the suspects’ transience. Over a period of time, suspects may relocate several times and be difficult to find at the end of the investigation. In a buy–walk investigation, one of the support officer’s duties is to keep track of suspects as they may move from place to place so that they can be quickly located when the investigation is concluded and warrants are finally issued. The record-keeping in buy–walk investigations may be time consuming and tedious and can be almost overwhelming in investigations involving several suspects. This is why the length of a buy–walk investigation should be carefully considered; it may even be determined by a support officer’s ability to keep track of the suspects during the investigation.



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The Buy–Bust Procedure The buy–bust procedure is a purchase of drugs from a suspect and immediately place him or her under arrest. Because of the necessary physical proximity between the suspect and officer, this is considered one of the most hazardous duties performed by drug enforcement officers. It is because of this imminent danger that all “busts” must be meticulously planned and arrangements should be made in anticipation of any possible problems. It is not uncommon in buy–bust situations for a suspect to be armed and attempt to kill the undercover agent at the time of the arrest. When the suspect resorts to violence in a drug arrest situation, he or she will sometimes claim the action was self-defense — that he or she was not aware that the agent was a police officer and that the killing was an attempt to protect his or her own life. This is why undercover and support officers should be prepared to properly document every buy–bust operation to show that the arrest was properly conducted and that the officer did, in fact, properly identify him- or herself. In buy–bust operations, it is also necessary for the undercover officer to make early arrangements with backup officers regarding when the arrest will take place. In most drug buys, an actual delivery of the drugs might be required to successfully prosecute the suspect; therefore, backup officers might need to time their arrival on the scene just after the undercover officer gives the signal. This will give the undercover officer time to follow through with the needed elements of the transaction. Once the transaction is complete, the signal is given. This can either be a visual signal (such as taking off of the hat) or an audio signal (such as using a specific word in conversation). With this system, the length of time between the backup officer’s arrival on the scene and the time that the signal is given can be predetermined. Case History On the evening of a drug raid, a narcotics agent arrested an individual, who then agreed to become an informant and introduce the agent to his cocaine supplier. After a series of telephone calls, a cocaine deal was arranged: 4 ounces for $8000. The supplier agreed to come to the informant’s house to meet with the undercover agent. The supplier soon arrived at the informant’s house and said he would have to go to a second location and get the cocaine. The agent argued with the supplier and was able to convince the supplier to let the agent ride along with him to meet the individuals who were furnishing the cocaine. The agent was thinking that he could arrest all of the players at the same time (and seize numerous



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vehicles), all from one transaction. The agent asked the supplier the location of where they were going, but the supplier would not say. The agent felt confident, however, that the four surveillance vehicles observing and monitoring him would have no trouble following him in the supplier’s car. The informant, the agent, and the supplier all left in the supplier’s vehicle. Unbeknownst to the agent, the surveillance vehicles lost sight of him and, because of a recent snowfall, were unable to track the vehicle. The backup team could hear the conversations of the agent through the body mike that the agent was wearing, but they could not visually locate him. After about 15 minutes, the backup team could hear the agent meeting with the dealers inside a residence. The agent, still believing that the backup team was just outside the door, drew his weapon and placed the suspects under arrest. A scuffle then ensued between the agent and his four arrestees, and the agent was knocked to the floor. The surveillance officers, by luck, recognized the supplier’s vehicle parked on a side street. By observing the footprints in the snow from the vehicle to a house, the officers stormed the house and probably saved the agent from being killed. Lesson: Don’t change locations in the middle of the deal! The buy–bust is also considered an extremely useful tool for investigators because it is much more cost effective for departments operating on modest budgets. Actually, the undercover officer needs only to display cash to the suspected drug dealer and receive drugs from him to complete the commission of the crime. Location of the Buy There is no ideal location for all undercover drug transactions because every drug deal is different and all drug deals are dangerous. Many factors may affect the outcome of the transaction. For each drug buy operation, however, basic questions should be asked: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Can surveillance adequately cover the undercover officer? Does the location offer the officer maximum safety? Was the location chosen by the officer, the informant, or the suspect? In case of a violent altercation, is it likely that innocent bystanders will be hurt? 5. In case of trouble, how soon can support officers arrive on the scene?


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The first priority in any undercover drug transaction is officer safety. This variable will often be the determining factor in deciding the location of the transaction. Another important consideration is whether the transaction is a buy–walk or a buy–bust, since both have unique considerations when determining the location of the drug deal. Here, we will examine the different types of locations for the drug transaction. Outdoor Locations If the purchase is a buy–walk, the degree of danger associated with it is greatly minimized. This is especially true if it is the second or third buy: the suspect will feel more comfortable dealing with the officer. Good outdoor locations are shopping center parking lots or crowded city parks. In these locations, surveillance officers can get closer to the officer and blend in with the surroundings. An officer should never agree to meet at a location suggested by the suspect: the suspect may employ countersurveillance to look for police or the suspect may be planning a rip-off. In contrast, a poor outdoor location might be a shopping center parking lot in the middle of the night: surveillance officers would have a difficult time staying near the agent because the stores are not open and little public activity is taking place. When an immediate arrest is the planned result of the drug purchase (buy–bust), officers should consider some crucial factors. Unlike a buy–walk operation, a public place is not a good idea. There will be armed officers (and perhaps armed suspects), and the possibility of gunplay should be considered. A busy parking lot would increase the likelihood of an innocent bystander getting shot during the arrest. An isolated location, however, is not the best solution either because it will be difficult for surveillance officers to get near enough to cover the undercover officer. A good compromise might be a location adjacent to a shopping center parking lot where there is minimal traffic. The location should have good visibility and access from the street to allow backup officers easy access. Indoor Locations Indoor locations pose different problems. Once an officer enters the residence of a suspect, the officer’s level of protection is considerably reduced. Suspects feel more at ease on their own turf, and they will be more inclined to ask the undercover officer more questions. In addition, suspects might require agents to consume some quantity of drugs before the transaction can be completed. The officer must bluff his or her way out of this predicament: such behavior is usually against policy and will reflect poorly on the case, the officer, and the agency. Exceptions would be, of course, situations in which the officer is facing immediate danger to his or her life by not taking



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the drugs. Proper field training is the key to best dealing with these circumstances. Below is an example of how indoor and outdoor transactions can interface with one another. Case History A rookie narcotics agent was assigned to investigate drug dealing by juveniles at a local video arcade. After a week or so, the agent began purchasing small quantities of heroin from a 15-year-old dealer. A surveillance team was observing one particular transaction with the boy when an older white male entered the arcade and appeared to deliver something to the boy. Surveillance then followed the visitor to an apartment complex, which, as it turned out, he managed. After subsequent investigation into the man’s background, it was learned that the man was the boy’s father. A major conspiracy case was then developed, resulting in the seizure of a large quantity of heroin and a huge cache of stolen property. Another problem associated with an officer conducting a transaction in the suspect’s residence is that the suspect may have others present to check out the officer or possibly assist in a rip-off. However, an advantage to the deal occurring at the suspect’s residence is that probable cause for a search warrant can usually be obtained. In addition, the officer will have an opportunity to observe locations of drugs and entrances and exits within the residence. Basically, the indoor buy–walk is a good method for criminal intelligence but risky for the undercover officer. Indoor buy–busts are extremely dangerous. Being in the suspect’s residence and away from visual contact with surveillance officers minimizes the safety level of the undercover officer. Undercover agents should, in most circumstances, attempt to draw the suspect out into the open so that surveillance officers can better observe the actions of the undercover officer. Precautions Although drug transactions will differ according to their locations, the amount of drugs and money involved, and the suspects, certain general precautions should be observed in all circumstances. It is easy for undercover officers to get “caught up in the moment” when negotiating for a major deal and forget safety considerations. However, every undercover officer should expect the unexpected and observe the following precautions: •

Never let the suspect establish the location of the transaction: it could be a setup for a rip-off.



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• •

•

•

• •

Never let an informant establish the location of the transaction without the prior knowledge and approval of the informer’s control officer. Never change locations for a drug transaction during a drug deal. If a change of location is necessary, the undercover officer should call off the transaction and arrange for a later time after support officers have been informed. Beware of drug transactions at the suspect’s residence. In case of an altercation, support officers may have a difficult time entering the residence to assist the undercover officer. Never agree to conduct a transaction where more suspects than undercover officers are present. If this occurs, the deal should be called off and arranged at a later time. Always be aware of innocent bystanders. In case of an altercation with the suspect, have a plan! Always be cautious during big-money drug transactions.

Planning the Drug Buy Finally, when planning the drug purchase, it should be remembered that many criminals operate in an organized and regimented fashion in much the same manner as the police. This is evident in cases where there are multiple suspects, each with a specific duty during the transaction (that is, countersurveillance, guarding the suspect’s residence, and so forth). To counter these situations, officers should consider prebuy and postbuy planning. Prebuy Planning Much preparation should be undertaken in the planning phase of the drug transaction. Initially, when the buy is being arranged, all conversations between the undercover officers or informers and drug suspects must be recorded. Frequently, a drug deal might be arranged in the early conversations between players; however, when the deal finally transpires, the seller might make little conversation. Practicing the “record-when-you-can” philosophy will aid the investigator in properly documenting all pertinent conversations. On the day of the transaction, the operative should make a “pretext” telephone call to the suspect for three purposes: 1. To record the voice of the suspect outlining the specifics of the drug transaction: the price of the drugs, what quantity is being sold, and what quality (purity) is being sold. 2. To verify that the drugs are still available at the designated time. 3. To determine (if possible) whether the supplier is expected to meet with the dealer before the deal.



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It is always a good idea for officers to set up surveillance around the location of the arranged drug buy because frequently the dealer will say that he has possession of the drugs when he is actually expecting an associate to deliver them just before the deal. If the dealer does not have possession of the drugs at the time of the negotiations, the supplier will likely give (“front”) the drugs to the dealer just before the transaction (and remain close by). If officers are watching, they can document the delivery of the drugs to the dealer and then follow the supplier to other locations, such as a residence or place of employment. Another important element in prebuy planning is the location and documentation of possible countersurveillance (by associates) on the part of the dealer. Countersurveillance is covert observation by criminals to locate police observers in the area of the drug buy or to assist suspects in a related criminal activity (a rip-off or getaway). Postbuy Planning Just as the supplier may deliver drugs to the dealer before the transaction, he may also return after the transaction to pick up his share of the profits. In another circumstance, the dealer may leave his residence shortly after the transaction to meet with the supplier and deliver the money owed. Either of these circumstances will make it worthwhile to continue surveillance on the location of the transaction to document new associates. The tactical plan is only a tool or guide to be used in the planning process. It should not become a biblical or administrative panacea for the “paper tiger”-type commanders who are neither “streetwise” nor adaptable to split-second changes and are usually more concerned with “form” and “control” of personnel than with the specific objectives of the investigation. This type of supervisor has been known to use such forms as “cover” in the event that something goes wrong during the investigation and should not be assigned to “operational-type” commands. A more realistic approach should be to appreciate the different variables available to the supervisor, choose among alternative actions, develop a “game plan,” and then remember that the only thing that you can be sure of in a narcotics buy is that you cannot be sure about anything. The Flash-Roll A primary goal of the drug enforcement unit is to identify the largest traffickers within a community. Therefore, it is common for undercover agents to work their way up the trafficking ladder to the point where a big-money transaction is necessary to identify a top supplier. In this case, the investigating law enforcement agency must acquire a “flash-roll” to demonstrate to the traffickers that


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they can afford the drugs. The flash-roll is simply a large sum of money used in undercover drug transactions to show to the dealers (flash) without permitting them to actually take possession of the money. The size of the flash-roll may range anywhere from $5000 to $100,000; it therefore creates a potentially violent atmosphere because some suspects might consider robbing the agent of the currency. The sources of flash-rolls will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but if the investigating agency has no specific fund designated for a flash-roll, funds may be borrowed from the city or state treasury or from local financial institutions willing to loan the money, interest free, on the signature of police officers; sometimes more than one source is pooled to generate enough money for a flash-roll. The law enforcement agency having possession of the roll is totally accountable and responsible for its protection. Large money transactions may result in violence; undercover agents have been murdered for a flash-roll. The following is a checklist of considerations essential before undertaking any transaction using a flash-roll: 1. Complete identifiers and criminal history information should be obtained on all known suspects involved in the transaction. 2. Note whether the suspect has previously been observed with a weapon. 3. If the suspect is claiming to deliver large quantities of a drug that is relatively scarce in the area, a rip-off might be planned. 4. Officers must choose the location for the transaction and conduct it on their “turf.” 5. Notice any other conditions that might be conducive to a rip-off (including the officer’s “gut” feelings about the deal). At some time during the transaction, the officers will be required to show the flash-roll to the suspects. This is necessary to convince the suspects that the officers can afford the drugs. This is the point in the transaction where the situation could become violent, and the officers should have a contingency plan. The location for the transaction is one of the most significant considerations and should focus on the following areas of concern: 1. Support officers should have easy access to the undercover agent in the event that a rip-off occurs. 2. Support officers should be located so that they have a good vantage point to observe suspects entering and exiting the area or observe suspects conducting countersurveillance on the transaction. 3. The area should have adequate lighting. 4. In the event of an altercation, exit points should be easily blocked by the support officers.



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5. If a motel room is used as a neutral ground for the transaction, the officers (rather than the suspects) should choose the room, and it should have an adjoining room with a common door for easy access by support officers. 6. All currency in the flash-roll should have its serial numbers recorded before the transaction in the event the roll is stolen. 7. In all cases, the undercover officer in possession of the flash-roll should be equipped with a concealed body mike or any device that enables surveillance officers to listen to the transaction (e.g., hard wire, RF room monitor, etc.) so that the surveillance team officers can monitor the progress of the transaction. Sometimes, it is advisable to show the flash-roll to one of the main suspects without advance notice. This will catch the suspect off guard and give the agent the edge because (1) the flash can be conducted at a protected location of the agent’s choosing, (2) the agent can have sufficient backup at his disposal, and (3) the suspects should not need to see the money a second time before the transaction; once is enough. In this case, the officer has upheld his or her end of the deal by demonstrating the ability to produce the money. It is then up to the suspects to produce the drugs. Another method of showing the money is to advise the suspect that the buyer will telephone him when the money is available to show. This will require the suspect to stay home and wait for the agent’s telephone call. Officers can then establish surveillance on the suspect’s residence and watch for associates coming and going. When the call is made by the undercover agent, the suspect is advised that he will be picked up in 10 minutes or so. This short notice will reduce the suspect’s time to arrange a rip-off. A second undercover officer then arrives at the suspect’s residence (without the flash-roll) and picks up only the suspect. The suspect is then driven to a predetermined location, unknown to the suspect, where agents have established stationary surveillance. The agent driving the vehicle should always be careful to observe mobile countersurveillance. When the suspect arrives, he or she is shown the money and is permitted to count it. In the event that the suspect insists that his or her supplier would also have to see the money, a Polaroid® picture should be taken with the current day’s newspaper in the picture showing the date. The photo can then be taken by the suspect to the supplier. In any transaction where the officers suspect anything indicating a possible rip-off, the transaction should be called off. The momentum of the case in this phase may create an “ostrich” effect on the part of the undercover agents, causing them to become overly anxious for the buy and possibly causing careless mistakes.


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Conspiracy Investigations The undercover drug purchase is an excellent investigative technique allowing an undercover officer the opportunity to observe the violation as it occurs. In such a case, the officer’s testimony is generally considered the best evidence in the prosecution of the case (especially when backed up with surveillance photos, videotapes of meetings, and phone records). High-level offenders and leaders of criminal organizations, however, are usually not receptive to meeting new people (which would allow informers or undercover officers access to them). In these cases, drug enforcement units should consider undertaking a conspiracy investigation. A conspiracy is when two or more individuals enter into an agreement to violate the law and there is a commission of one or more overt acts in furtherance of the agreement. Conspiracy investigations enable law enforcement agencies the means to get to the leaders of criminal organizations who no longer personally handle drug transactions and would otherwise be too well insulated by associates operating on the lower levels of their organization. The law of conspiracy makes each conspirator liable for the actions of others, thus permitting the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of “kingpins” for drug sales that they did not personally conduct. Investigation of these individuals through conventional investigative channels may prove to be a waste of time, thereby creating the need for a conspiracy investigation. An enormous amount of overtime and manpower must be invested in a conspiracy investigation. Evidence and documentation must be obtained to link each member. It is not necessary to show that all conspirators are personally acquainted with each other, but investigators must establish some form of direct or indirect cooperation between suspects. Investigators may, for example, document noncriminal associations between suspects who are also involved with a criminal conspiracy. This noncriminal association can be used to show an acquaintanceship that will aid in proving the overall conspiracy. The irony of conspiracy prosecutions is that a criminal act does not have to be completed. Additionally, drug trafficking conspiracies might take months to put together because most drug traffickers have more than one customer, thus requiring investigators to take long periods of time to properly document all essential players in the conspiracy. Element One: The Agreement The first element of a conspiracy investigation is that the agreement between the suspects must be shown. The agreement may occur in different forms; for example, it could be in writing (not common), through telephone conversations, or through verbal agreements made in person. More commonly, the agreement is inferred from evidence showing that the conspirators acted



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in concert toward an unlawful purpose or is confirmed through the testimony of a cooperating coconspirator. The initial agreement is usually made between two individuals. Others, however, may later join the conspiracy as it progresses. In most cases, newcomers to the conspiracy need not know all of the details of the original agreement, only their particular roles. An example would be a smuggling operation, which is planned by two parties. One of the parties later decides to hire a pilot to fly to Mexico, pick up drugs, and return to the United States. In this case, the pilot has knowledge of a criminal plan but only has personal knowledge of a portion of it. The pilot in this case is still liable as a coconspirator because he or she voluntarily joined the original agreement. Element Two: The Overt Act The second step in a conspiracy investigation is to document an overt act on the part of one or more of the conspirators. In the absence of an overt act, even though the agreement to commit the crime has been established, the suspects still have a chance to back out of it. Once an overt act has been completed, however, the offense (the conspiracy) is complete. The overt act must be something done by at least one of the coconspirators to help achieve the objective of the conspiracy. It may be making a telephone call, purchasing a weapon, or driving to another conspirator’s residence; it could also be an actual criminal act. Basically, the overt act depends to a great extent on the agreement and the type of crime being planned. Once a conspiracy investigation is under way, many smaller conspiracies may develop. These will frequently be interrelated, but officers must differentiate between each coconspirator and the specific conspiracy to which he or she is associated. The following general guidelines should help illustrate how to link conspirators: • • • •

When large-scale distributors sell drugs to middlemen, knowing that they are middlemen, all may then become members of a conspiracy. A single sale of drugs does not constitute grounds for a conspiracy between the buyer and seller. For a drug buyer to become a conspirator, he or she must know the conditions of the agreement and be a part of the original agreement. For a vendor of supplies or equipment to be considered a conspirator, he or she must have knowledge of the unlawful objective of the conspiracy; however, it is not necessary for his or her act to be unlawful.

Types of Conspiracies A conspiracy may be shown in three different ways, each with its own peculiarities. The following is a hypothetical case history that illustrates this.



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Case History At 3:00 PM, John contacts Steve and advises that he has 1 ounce of cocaine for sale for $1800. Steve says he wants to purchase it, but first he needs to go to the bank to get the money. If the investigators can document this agreement, the first step in proving the conspiracy has been accomplished. If Steve then goes to the bank, this action will suffice as the overt act in furtherance of the agreement. In this case, Steve and John can both be arrested and charged with conspiracy. (Note: A charge of conspiracy cannot be alleged or substantiated if an undercover agent [or informer] is one of two parties making the agreement.) The Chain Conspiracy When substantiating a chain conspiracy, the investigator must show that the goal of the suspected individuals is dependent on the successful participation of each member. In addition, each member of the conspiracy must realize that the success of the scheme is dependent on every other member of the conspiracy. Generally speaking, the chain conspiracy is relatively easy to prosecute, provided investigators can show that the members of the scheme have one common goal (for example, drug trafficking). Difficulties arise when the members are engaged in a variety of criminal endeavors and when it becomes difficult to show each member’s participation in one common goal. The Wheel Conspiracy A wheel conspiracy is one in which the primary conspirator, called the “hub,” makes an agreement with others, called the “spokes.” In substantiating this type of conspiracy, each of the spokes must be shown to be aware of each other and to know of the others’ roles in the scheme. The “rim” of the wheel is the agreement that ties each member to the scheme and must be demonstrated by the prosecutor. As one can see, this is a difficult method of investigation because a common agreement among all members is difficult to prove. The typical result of a wheel conspiracy prosecution is that the hub is charged with the crimes of the organization based on his individual association with each spoke, and each spoke escapes responsibility for the criminal actions of the other spokes. The Enterprise Conspiracy Under federal statutes, an enterprise conspiracy is considered a separate offense, thereby making it a separate crime to agree to participate in an enterprise by engaging in a “pattern of racketeering activity.” The enterprise may have numerous criminal activities, thus showing a chain is not necessary. The members of an enterprise may not be aware of each other’s role in the



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schemes, and all that needs to be shown is each member’s agreement to participate in the organization (enterprise). In this type of conspiracy, at least two acts of racketeering need to be shown. Federal law defines the term racketeering as any of the following activities: • • • • • • • • • • •

Drug violations Hobbs Act violations (Federal Racketeering Statute) Loan-sharking Mail fraud Bankruptcy fraud Mann Act violations (white slavery) Bribery Counterfeiting Embezzlement of union funds Obstruction of justice Wire fraud

Prosecution of an enterprise conspiracy can result in massive trials in which everyone charged in the case is present for one criminal proceeding. Juries sometimes have difficulty isolating each defendant and his or her particular charges from the others on trial because an atmosphere of “guilt by association” prevails. As a consequence, convictions obtained at these trials run the risk of being overturned on appeal because of the inability of the prosecution to distinguish between one large conspiracy and numerous smaller ones.

Forfeiture Sanctions Because drug dealing has created enormous profits for drug dealers, many have accepted the risk of arrest and a long prison term as merely “a cost of doing business.” Only by stripping the perpetrator of his or her profits can law enforcement pose a significant deterrent for drug trafficking. In recent years, laws enabling law enforcement officers to seize personal property of suspected drug traffickers has accounted for much of the overall success in drug suppression. The 1984 Federal Comprehensive Forfeiture Act has provided increased authority to seize a suspect’s property based on the presumption that … any property of a person convicted of a drug felony is subject to forfeiture if the government establishes probable cause that the defendant acquired the property during the period of violation, or within a reasonably short period thereafter, and there was no likely source for the property other than the violation. (Note: The



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Federal Forfeiture Law was updated in 2000 with the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act.) The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (and similar state laws) enables officers to seize automobiles, aircraft, bank accounts, securities, real estate holdings, and privately owned businesses. Moreover, it enhanced the penalties of the 1970 Controlled Substances Act (CSA), specifically providing for a 20-year prison term and fines up to $250,000. The CSA contains many valuable provisions for seizing a violator’s property. The types of property subject to seizure under the CSA include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

All controlled substances. Raw materials and equipment. Any property used as a container for controlled substances. Any vehicles, boats, and aircraft used to transport controlled substances. Business records, books, computers, and other materials used in violation of the CSA. 6. All money or negotiable instruments used for exchange for controlled substances. 7. Real property or improvements used to facilitate the commission of violations of the CSA. Under the CSA, for example, if a drug dealer uses his automobile to drive to a location where he is to sell drugs, his car then becomes the conveyance used to facilitate the crime. Therefore, the car is seizable under the law. Additionally, if investigators can show that a suspect purchased an automobile with illegal drug revenues, then the vehicle is subject to seizure. The process of property seizures under federal and most state laws is a civil process rather than a criminal proceeding. In many instances, it is possible for a defendant to be acquitted on a felony drug charge and still lose his property. Sharing Provisions of Federal Forfeiture Laws Since the passing of the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, the U.S. Attorney General was given authority to make an “equitable” transfer of the forfeited property. Basically, this divides any property seized in a joint federal and local operation and allows both parties to benefit from seizures. After seizure of the property, a determination is made assessing the percentage of involvement of each participating agency, and a proportionate distribution of the assets is then made between the agencies. Listed below are two ways that state or local law enforcement agencies may participate in seizure and subsequent forfeiture of property:



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1. The state or local agency can join forces with a U.S. Department of Justice agency (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS], and so on) in a federal investigation and share any property forfeited as a result of its participation. 2. The state or local agency can request that one of the federal investigative bureaus adopt a seizure that it has made and request an equitable share of that property once it is forfeited. This is beneficial when a state forfeiture is not feasible or when a federal seizure would be more advantageous. Case History A city narcotics agent and two agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration proceeded to the $750,000 home of a prominent doctor for the purpose of seizing his 2004 Ferrari automobile, from which he had been selling cocaine. At the time of the seizure, the physician had already been indicted on drug charges and was out on bail. The agents served the proper paperwork on the doctor, and, as they were backing the Ferrari out of the driveway, the unthinking but enraged physician screamed, “You have no right to do this to me. Hell, if you can take my car from me just because I sold dope out of it then why don’t you just take my whole goddamn house, too? That’s where I had my coke parties.” The agents thought about it and based on the doctor’s statement … they did! The FBI and DEA apply two general conditions in the acceptance of a seizure for adoption: 1. There must be a valid prosecutorial purpose in requesting the adoption. Officers should remember that, although many state laws require proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” in seizure cases, federal forfeiture laws require only “probable cause.” 2. Property referred for adoption must meet the following minimum monetary requirements: •

•

Conveyances: • Vehicles: • Aircraft: • Vessels: Nonconveyances: • Real property: • All other property:

$2500 $5000 $5000 $10,000 $1000


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The Vehicle Indemnity Form A frequent problem encountered in seizing a suspect’s vehicle is when the seized vehicle is registered to someone other than the suspect. In some cases, it might be registered to a friend or relative who may not realize that the vehicle was used for the purpose of dealing drugs. In this case, the vehicle must be returned to the lawful owner unless the police can show that the lawful owner had knowledge of the unlawful use of the vehicle. The same applies when a bank, credit union, or other financial institution is financing the vehicle. Once seized, it must be turned back to the institution (or the seizing agency must pay off the existing loan to lawfully keep the vehicle). To combat this problem, it is a good practice for investigating officers to use a vehicle indemnity form when returning seized vehicles to the lawful owners, banks, or other financial institutions. The vehicle indemnity form is used to notify the owner that the vehicle was seized during a narcotics investigation and that it is being returned. It also advises the owner that, if the same vehicle is loaned out again to the same individual who used it for trafficking drugs, it will be seized and forfeited if the individual is caught a second time. Once advised in this fashion, vehicle owners, especially banking institutions, will seldom return the seized vehicle to the lien holder. Similarly, with the widespread use of residential property by drug traffickers, a real estate indemnity form should be considered. This form is structured basically like the vehicle indemnity form but addresses the use of property for drug trafficking. The model vehicle indemnity form in Figure 2.1 can be modified to meet the needs of each jurisdiction.

Summary Working undercover is a valuable investigative tool, but it should be approached with caution. Undercover work is costly, time consuming, and dangerous. The deeper undercover, the less safety the agent is afforded. Consequently, many precautions must be observed. To accomplish undercover work most effectively, the proper investigative equipment is required. This includes equipment to assist the officer in observing and documenting his case as well as equipment to help protect the officer while dealing with criminals. The list of investigative equipment for undercover agents should include properly equipped vehicles, appropriate weaponry, undercover identification, and recording equipment such as cameras, videotape recorders, and cassette recorders. When working undercover, officers must decide what type of investigation is best suited for the department and the community. A lengthy investigation will be more expensive because in buy–walk situations money spent for drugs



45 CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT VEHICLE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT

This agreement is made between _______________________________________________________________ (Name) (Title) _____________________________________________________________________________________________ (Firm Name) (Address) and the City Police Department. The agreement is made in consideration of the return of a _________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________ (Description of Property) registered to _________________________________________________________________________________ (Name and Address) used in violation of the Controlled Substances Act, and for the consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged: ____________________________________ being the ________________________________________________ (Firm or Person Involved) (Type of Interest) Of the property as evidenced by a: _______________________________________________ dated _______________________ (Title, Registration, Contract, Note, etc.) It is hereby agreed to unconditionally release and hold harmless the City Police Department, its officers, employees and agents from any and all claims, demands, damages, causes of actions or suits, of whatever kind and description, and wheresoever situated, that might now exist or hereafter exist by reason of or growing out of or affecting, directly or indirectly, the seizure of the return of the above described property. It is further incumbent upon the individual and/or firm to whom the above described property is being released to be aware of the provisions of state law (statute no.). This section of the state law provides that a claimant of any right of a seized vehicle may be called upon to prove that such “right, title, or interest was created without any knowledge or reason to believe that the vehicle, airplane, or vessel was being, or was to be, used for the purpose charged.” In the event you and/or firm choose to authorize the future control of the above described property or any other vehicle, airplane, or vessel to the individual or individuals causing the seizure addressed in this agreement, such vehicle, airplane, or vessel may be subject to forfeiture to any violation under state law regardless of your and/or your firm’s right, title, or interest. Executed in triplicate this _______ day of _____________________ 20____ . _________________________ (Police Case Number)

__________________________________________________ (Signature & Date of Person Executing) __________________________________________________ (Signature & Date of Police Dept. Employee) __________________________________________________ (Title of Police Dept. Employee)

IN WITNESS HEREOF, the above signed parties have read and understand fully the terms of this VEHICLE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT and so state by subscribing their names thereto. Subscribed and sworn before me this _______day of ____________________, 20____ . __________________________________________________ Notary Public My commission expires: _______________________________

Figure 2.1

Vehicle Indemnity Agreement form.


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is usually not recovered. If a lengthy investigation is not feasible, then conducting buy–busts might be considered. This is an inexpensive way to arrest violators, but the undercover agent’s identity is revealed and officers will not be able to work up the drug trafficking ladder much higher than the street level. Regardless of which method of investigation is pursued, critical attention should be given toward planning the location of the buy. Determining whether the buy is to take place at an indoor or outdoor location may have a direct bearing on the degree of safety available to the undercover officer. Additionally, the status of the drug deal as a small-money or big-money deal may also be an indicator of the degree of danger facing undercover personnel. Those who operate in an undercover capacity may find that they are limited as to how far up the trafficking ladder they can maneuver. If progress is limited in the undercover investigation, other more inventive ways of collecting evidence might be considered. One such method is the use of the conspiracy investigation, which enables investigators to target leaders of an organization who would otherwise use associates to insulate them from law enforcement intervention. Another investigative technique that should be considered in all drug investigations is the effective use of federal (and state) forfeiture laws. These laws make it possible for law enforcement officers to seize any currency or property that might have been acquired either through the illicit dealing of drugs or from profits made from drug trafficking.

Suggested Reading Fitzgerald, D.G., Informants and Undercover Investigations: A Practical Guide for Law, Policy and Procedure, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, in press. Harney, M.L. and Cross, J.C., The Narcotic Officer’s Notebook, 2nd ed., Charles C Thomas, Springfield, IL, 1975. Hicks, R.D., Undercover Operations and Persuasion II, Charles C Thomas, Springfield, IL, 1973. Lee, G.D., Global Drug Enforcement: Practical Investigative Techniques, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2003. Macdonald, J.M., Criminal Investigation of Drug Offenses, Charles C Thomas, Springfield, IL, 1983.

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Drug investigators must understand the effects of drugs. Such knowledge helps them understand not only the drugs that they will be purchasing and seizing but also the drug abusers with whom they come into contact. The literature on drug identification and pharmacology is rich with research findings, which suggest that different drugs affect different people in different ways. For example, drugs such as alcohol and cocaine often have varying effects on users. Not only do the user’s moods differ from one drug to another, but also the development of tolerance and addiction differ from one user to the next. In this chapter we examine drugs that are currently popular and potentially hazardous in today’s society. We also study legal distinctions and categories of drugs and the effects that these drugs have on those who use them. Note that, because of space limitations, only the drugs of abuse most commonly encountered by drug enforcement investigators will be discussed in this chapter.

Narcotics The term “narcotic,” derived from the Greek word for stupor, originally referred to a variety of substances that dulled the senses and relieved pain. Today, the term is used in a number of ways. Some individuals define narcotics as those substances that bind at opiate receptors (cellular membrane proteins activated by substances like heroin or morphine), whereas others refer to any illicit substance as a narcotic. In a legal context, narcotic refers to opium, opium derivatives, and their semisynthetic substitutes. Cocaine and coca leaves, which are also classified as “narcotics” in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), neither bind at opiate receptors nor produce morphine-like effects and are 47


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discussed in the section on stimulants. For the purposes of this discussion, the term narcotic refers to drugs that produce morphine-like effects. Narcotics are used therapeutically to treat pain, suppress cough, alleviate diarrhea, and induce anesthesia. Narcotics are administered in a variety of ways: orally, transdermally (skin patches), intranasally, or by injection. They are also available in suppositories and more recently in “troches,” a form of narcotics that can be sucked like candy. As drugs of abuse, they are often smoked, sniffed, or injected. Drug effects depend heavily on the dose, route of administration, and previous exposure to the drug. Aside from their medical use, narcotics produce a general sense of well-being by reducing tension, anxiety, and aggression. These effects are helpful in a therapeutic setting but contribute to their abuse. Narcotic use is associated with a variety of unwanted effects, including drowsiness, inability to concentrate, apathy, lessened physical activity, constriction of the pupils, dilation of the subcutaneous blood vessels causing flushing of the face and neck, constipation, nausea, vomiting, and, most significantly, respiratory depression. As the dose is increased, the subjective, analgesic (pain relief), and toxic effects become more pronounced. Except in cases of acute intoxication, there is no loss of motor coordination or slurred speech as occurs with many depressants. Among the hazards of illicit drug use is the ever-increasing risk of infection, disease, and overdose. Medical complications common among narcotic abusers arise primarily from adulterants found in street drugs and in the nonsterile practices of injecting. Skin, lung, and brain abscesses, endocarditis (inflammation of the lining of the heart), hepatitis, and AIDS are commonly found among narcotic abusers. Although pharmaceutical products have a known concentration and purity, clandestinely produced street drugs have unknown compositions. Because there is no simple way to determine the purity of a drug that is sold on the street, the effects of illicit narcotic use are unpredictable and can be fatal. Physical signs of narcotic overdose include constricted (pinpoint) pupils, cold clammy skin, confusion, convulsions, severe drowsiness, and respiratory depression (slow or troubled breathing). Most narcotic deaths are from respiratory depression. With repeated use of narcotics, tolerance and dependence develop. The development of tolerance is characterized by a shortened duration and a decreased intensity of analgesia, euphoria, and sedation, which creates the need to consume progressively larger doses to attain the desired effect. Tolerant users can consume doses far in excess of the dose that they initially started with. Chronic narcotic use is associated with physical dependence and a withdrawal or abstinence syndrome when drug use is discontinued. In general, shorter acting narcotics tend to produce shorter, more intense withdrawal symptoms, whereas longer acting narcotics produce a withdrawal syndrome



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that is protracted but less severe. Although unpleasant, withdrawal from narcotics is rarely life threatening. The withdrawal symptoms associated with heroin/morphine addiction are usually experienced shortly before the time of the next scheduled dose. Early symptoms include watery eyes, runny nose, yawning, and sweating. Restlessness, irritability, loss of appetite, nausea, tremors, and drug cravings appear as the syndrome progresses. Severe depression and vomiting are common. Heart rate and blood pressure are elevated. Chills, alternating with flushing and excessive sweating, are also characteristic symptoms. Pains in the bones and muscles of the back and extremities occur, as do muscle spasms. At any point during this process, a suitable narcotic can be administered to dramatically reverse the withdrawal symptoms. Without intervention, the syndrome will run its course, and most of the overt physical symptoms will disappear within 7 to 10 days. The psychological dependence associated with narcotic addiction is complex and protracted. Long after the physical need for the drug has passed, the addict may continue to think and talk about the use of drugs and feel strange or overwhelmed coping with daily activities without being under the influence of drugs. There is a high probability that relapse will occur after narcotic withdrawal when neither the physical environment nor the behavioral motivators that contributed to the abuse have been altered. There are two major patterns of narcotic abuse or dependence seen in the United States. One involves individuals whose drug use was initiated within the context of medical treatment and escalate their dose by obtaining the drug through fraudulent prescriptions and “doctor shopping” or branching out to illicit drugs. The other pattern of abuse is initiated outside the therapeutic setting with experimental or recreational use of narcotics. The majority of individuals in this category may abuse narcotics sporadically for months or even years. Although they may not become addicts, the social, medical, and legal consequences of their behavior are very serious. Some experimental users will escalate their narcotic use and will eventually become dependent, both physically and psychologically. The younger an individual is when drug use is initiated, the more likely the drug use will progress to dependence and addiction.

Narcotics of Natural Origin The poppy plant Papaver somniferum is the source for nonsynthetic narcotics. It was grown in the Mediterranean region as early as 5000 B.C. and has since been cultivated in a number of countries throughout the world. The milky fluid that seeps from incisions in the unripe seed pod of this poppy has, since ancient times, been scraped by hand and air-dried to produce what is known as opium. A more modern method of harvesting is by the industrial poppy


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straw process of extracting alkaloids from the mature dried plant. The extract may be in liquid, solid, or powder form, although most poppy straw concentrate available commercially is a fine brownish powder. More than 500 tons of opium or equivalents in poppy straw concentrate are legally imported into the United States annually for legitimate medical use. Opium There were no legal restrictions on the importation or use of opium until the early 1900s. In the United States, the unrestricted availability of opium, the influx of opium-smoking immigrants from East Asia, and the invention of the hypodermic needle contributed to the more severe variety of compulsive drug abuse seen at the turn of the 20th century. In those days, medicines often contained opium without any warning label. Today, there are state, federal, and international laws governing the production and distribution of narcotic substances. Morphine Morphine is the principal constituent of opium and ranges in concentration from 4 to 21%. Commercial opium is standardized to contain 10% morphine. In the United States, a small percentage of the morphine obtained from opium is used directly (about 20 tons); the remaining is converted to codeine and other derivatives (about 110 tons). Morphine is one of the most effective drugs known for the relief of severe pain and remains the standard against which new analgesics are measured. Like most narcotics, the use of morphine has increased significantly in recent years. Since 1998, there has been about a two-fold increase in the use of morphine products in the United States. Morphine is marketed under generic and brand name products, including MS-Contin®, Oramorph SR®, MSIR®, Roxanol®, Kadian®, and RMS®. Morphine is used parenterally (by injection) for preoperative sedation, as a supplement to anesthesia, and for analgesia. It is the drug of choice for relieving the pain of myocardial infarction and for its cardiovascular effects in the treatment of acute pulmonary edema. Traditionally, morphine was almost exclusively used by injection. Today, morphine is marketed in a variety of forms, including oral solutions, immediate- and sustained-release tablets and capsules, suppositories, and injectable preparations. Codeine Codeine is the most widely used, naturally occurring narcotic in medical treatment in the world. This alkaloid is found in opium in concentrations ranging from 0.7 to 2.5%. However, most codeine used in the United States is produced from morphine. Codeine is also the starting material for the production of two



51

Figure 3.1 Opiate-based syrups were once popular for treating children with teething and dysentery. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

other narcotics: dihydrocodeine and hydrocodone. Codeine is medically prescribed for the relief of moderate pain and cough suppression. Compared to morphine, codeine produces less analgesia, sedation, and respiratory depression and is usually taken orally. It is made into tablets either alone (Schedule II) or in combination with aspirin or acetaminophen (i.e., Tylenol with Codeine®; Schedule III). As a cough suppressant, codeine is found in a number of liquid preparations (these products are in Schedule V). Codeine is also used to a lesser extent as an injectable solution for the treatment of pain. Codeine products are diverted from legitimate sources and are encountered on the illicit market (Figure 3.1).

Semisynthetic Narcotics The following narcotics are among the more significant substances that have been derived from morphine, codeine, or thebaine contained in opium. Heroin First synthesized from morphine in 1874, heroin was not extensively used in medicine until the early 1900s. Commercial production of the new pain remedy was first started in 1898. It initially received widespread acceptance from the medical profession, and physicians remained unaware of its addiction potential for years. The first comprehensive control of heroin occurred



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Table 3.1 Street Terms for Heroin Al Capone Antifreeze Ballot Bart Simpson Big bag Big H Brown sugar Capital H Cheese Chip Crank Dead on arrival Dirt Dr. Feelgood Ferry dust George smack Golden girl Good horse Hard candy Hazel Hero Hombre Horse HRN

Isda Jee gee Joy Junk Lemonade Mexican brown Nice and easy Noise Ogoy Old Steve Orange line P-dope Pangonadalot Peg Perfect high Poison Pure Rawhide Ready rock Salt Sweet dreams Train White boy Zoquete

with the Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914. Today, heroin is an illicit substance having no medical utility in the United States. It is in Schedule I of the CSA (Table 3.1). Four foreign source areas produce the heroin available in the United States: South America (Colombia), Mexico, Southeast Asia (principally Burma), and Southwest Asia (principally Afghanistan). However, South America and Mexico supply most of the illicit heroin marketed in the United States. South American heroin is a high-purity powder primarily distributed to metropolitan areas on the East Coast. Heroin powder may vary in color from white to dark brown because of impurities left from the manufacturing process or the presence of additives. Mexican heroin, known as “black tar,” is primarily available in the western United States. The color and consistency of black tar heroin result from the crude processing methods used to illicitly manufacture heroin in Mexico. Black tar heroin may be sticky like roofing tar or hard like coal, and its color may vary from dark brown to black. Pure heroin is rarely sold on the street. A “bag” (slang for a small unit of heroin sold on the street) currently contains about 30 to 50 milligrams of powder, only a portion of which is heroin. The remainder could be sugar, starch, acetaminophen, procaine, benzocaine, quinine, or any of the numerous



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cutting agents for heroin. Traditionally, the purity of heroin in a bag ranged from 1% to 10%. More recently, heroin purity has ranged from about 10% to 70%. Black tar heroin is often sold in chunks weighing about 1 ounce. Its purity is generally less than South American heroin, and it is most frequently smoked or dissolved, diluted, and injected. In the past, heroin in the United States was almost always injected because this is the most practical and efficient way to administer low-purity heroin. However, the recent availability of higher purity heroin at relatively low cost has meant that a larger percentage of today’s users are either snorting or smoking heroin, instead of injecting it. This trend was first captured in the 1999 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, which revealed that 60% to 70% of people who used heroin for the first time from 1996 to 1998 never injected it. This trend has continued. Snorting or smoking heroin is more appealing to new users because it eliminates both the fear of acquiring syringe-borne diseases, such as HIV and hepatitis, and the social stigma attached to intravenous heroin use. Many new users of heroin mistakenly believe that smoking or snorting heroin is a safe technique for avoiding addiction. However, both the smoking and the snorting of heroin are directly linked to the high incidences of dependence and addiction. Hydromorphone Hydromorphone (Dilaudid®) is marketed in tablets (2, 4, and 8 mg), suppositories, oral solutions, and injectable formulations. All products are in Schedule II of the CSA. Its analgesic potency is from two to eight times that of morphine, but it is shorter acting and produces more sedation than morphine. Much sought after by narcotic addicts, hydromorphone is usually obtained by the abuser through fraudulent prescriptions or theft. The tablets are often dissolved and injected as a substitute for heroin. In September 2004, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of Palladone® (hydromorphone hydrochloride) for the management of persistent pain. This extended-release formulation could have the same risk of abuse as OxyContin ®. Oxycodone Oxycodone (Figure 3.2) is synthesized from thebaine. Like morphine and hydromorphone, oxycodone is used as an analgesic. It is effective orally and is marketed alone in 10-, 20-, 40-, 80-, and 160-mg controlled-release tablets (OxyContin) or 5-mg immediate-release capsules (OxyIR®) or in combination products with aspirin (Percodan®) or acetaminophen (Percocet®) for the relief of pain. All oxycodone products are in Schedule II. Oxycodone is abused orally, or the tablets are crushed and sniffed or dissolved in water and injected. The use of oxycodone has increased significantly. In 1993, about 3.5 tons of


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Figure 3.2 Oxycodone is a powerful narcotics commonly used for pain control and often taken by drug abusers. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

oxycodone were manufactured for sale in the United States. In 2003, about 41 tons were manufactured. Historically, oxycodone products have been popular drugs of abuse among the narcotic-abusing population. In recent years, concern has grown among federal, state, and local officials about the dramatic increase in the illicit availability and abuse of OxyContin products. These products contain large amounts of oxycodone (10 to 160 mg) in a formulation intended for slow release over about a 12-hour period. Abusers have learned that this slow-release mechanism can be easily circumvented by crushing the tablet and swallowing, snorting, or injecting the drug product for a more rapid and intense high. The criminal activities associated with illicitly obtaining and distributing this drug, as well as the serious consequences of illicit use, including addiction and fatal overdose deaths, are of epidemic proportions in some areas of the United States. Hydrocodone Hydrocodone is structurally related to codeine but more closely related to morphine in its pharmacological profile. As a drug of abuse, it is equivalent to morphine with respect to subjective effects, opiate signs and symptoms, and “liking” scores. Hydrocodone is an effective cough suppressant and analgesic. It is most frequently prescribed in combination with acetaminophen (i.e., Vicoden®, Lortab®) but is also marketed in products with aspirin (Lortab ASA®), ibuprofen (Vicoprofen®), and antihistamines (Hycomine®). All products currently marketed in the United States are either Schedule III combination products primarily intended for pain management or Schedule V antitussive medications often marketed in liquid formulations. The Schedule III products are currently under review at the federal level to determine whether an increase in regulatory control is warranted.



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Hydrocodone products are the most frequently prescribed pharmaceutical opiates in the United States, with more than 111 million prescriptions dispensed in 2003. Despite their obvious utility in medical practice, hydrocodone products are among the most popular pharmaceutical drugs associated with drug diversion, trafficking, abuse, and addiction. In every geographical area in the country, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has listed this drug as one of the most commonly diverted. Hydrocodone is the most frequently encountered opiate pharmaceutical in submissions of drug evidence to federal, state, and local forensic laboratories. Law enforcement has documented the diversion of millions of dosage units of hydrocodone by theft, doctor shopping, fraudulent prescriptions, bogus “call-in” prescriptions, and diversion by registrants and Internet fraud.

Synthetic Narcotics In contrast to the pharmaceutical products derived from opium, synthetic narcotics are produced entirely within the laboratory. The continuing search for products that retain the analgesic properties of morphine without the consequent dangers of tolerance and dependence has yet to yield a product that is not susceptible to abuse. A number of clandestinely produced drugs, as well as drugs that have accepted medical uses, fall within this category. OxyContin OxyContin is a prescription painkiller used for moderate to high pain relief associated with injuries, bursitis, dislocation, fractures, neuralgia, arthritis, lower back pain, and pain associated with cancer. OxyContin contains oxycodone, the medication’s active ingredient, in a timed-release tablet. Oxycodone products have been illicitly abused for the past 30 years. OxyContin produces opiate-like effects and is sometimes used as a substitute for heroin. Illicit uses of OxyContin include crushing the tablet and ingesting or snorting it. Most individuals who abuse this drug do so to gain euphoric effects, to relieve pain, and to avoid withdrawal symptoms. Those who take the drug repeatedly can develop a tolerance or resistance to the drug’s effects. Most individuals who are prescribed OxyContin will not become addicted, although they may become dependent on the drug and will experience withdrawal symptoms when use is stopped. Oxycodone is a Schedule II drug under the Controlled Substances Act. Schedule II substances have a high potential for abuse, a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States with severe restrictions, and may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence (Table 3.2).



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Table 3.2 Street Terms Associated with OxyContin Term

Definition

Term

Definition

40 80 Blue Doctor shopping

OxyContin OxyContin OxyContin Obtaining pharmaceutical prescriptions from various doctors OxyContin

Kicker Oxy Oxycotton Pill ladies

OxyContin OxyContin OxyContin Female senior citizens who sell OxyContin

Pharming

Consuming a mix of prescription drugs

Hillbilly heroin

Meperidine Introduced as an analgesic in the 1930s, meperidine produces effects that are similar, but not identical, to morphine (shorter duration of action and reduced antitussive and antidiarrheal actions). Currently, it is used for preanesthesia and the relief of moderate to severe pain, particularly in obstetrics and postoperative situations. Meperidine is available in tablets, syrups, and injectable forms under generic and brand name (e.g., Demerol ®, Mepergan®) Schedule II preparations. Several analogues of meperidine have been clandestinely produced. During the clandestine synthesis of the analogue MPPP, a neurotoxic by-product (MPTP) was produced. A number of individuals who consumed the MPPP–MPTP preparation developed an irreversible Parkinsonian-like syndrome. It was later found that MPTP destroys the same neurons as those damaged in Parkinson’s disease. Dextropropoxyphene A close relative of methadone, dextropropoxyphene was first marketed in 1957 under the trade name of Darvon®. Oral analgesic potency is one-half to onethird that of codeine, with 65 mg approximately equivalent to about 600 mg of aspirin. Dextropropoxyphene is prescribed for relief of mild to moderate pain. Bulk dextropropoxyphene is in Schedule II, whereas preparations containing it are in Schedule IV. More than 150 tons of dextropropoxyphene are produced in the United States annually, and more than 25 million prescriptions are written for the products. This narcotic is associated with a number of toxic side effects and is among the top 10 drugs reported by medical examiners in drug abuse deaths. Fentanyl First synthesized in Belgium in the late 1950s, fentanyl (Figure 3.3), with an analgesic potency of about 80 times that of morphine, was introduced into medical practice in the 1960s as an intravenous anesthetic under the trade



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Figure 3.3 Fentanyl 600 micrograms. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

name of Sublimaze®. Thereafter, two other fentanyl analogues were introduced: alfentanil (Alfenta®), an ultrashort (5 to 10 minutes)-acting analgesic, and sufentanil (Sufenta®), an exceptionally potent analgesic (5 to 10 times more potent than fentanyl) for use in heart surgery. Today, fentanyls are extensively used for anesthesia and analgesia. Duragesic®, for example, is a fentanyl transdermal patch used in chronic pain management, and Actiq ® is a solid formulation of fentanyl citrate on a stick that dissolves slowly in the mouth for transmucosal absorption. Actiq is intended for opiate-tolerant individuals and is effective in treating breakthrough pain in cancer patients. Carfentanil (Wildnil®) is an analogue of fentanyl with an analgesic potency 10,000 times that of morphine and is used in veterinary practice to immobilize certain large animals. Illicit use of pharmaceutical fentanyls first appeared in the mid-1970s in the medical community and continues to be a problem in the United States. To date, more than 12 different analogues of fentanyl have been produced clandestinely and identified in U.S. drug traffic. The biological effects of the fentanyls are indistinguishable from those of heroin, with the exception that the fentanyls may be hundreds of times more potent. Fentanyls are most commonly used by intravenous administration; however, like heroin, they may also be smoked or snorted.

Narcotic Treatment Drugs Methadone German scientists synthesized methadone during World War II because of a shortage of morphine. Although chemically unlike morphine or heroin, methadone produces many of the same effects. It was introduced into the


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United States in 1947 as an analgesic (Dolophine®). Today, methadone is primarily used for the treatment of narcotic addiction, although a growing number of prescriptions are being written for chronic pain management. It is available in oral solutions, tablets, and injectable Schedule II formulations. Methadone’s effects can last up to 24 hours, thereby permitting once-a-day oral administration in heroin detoxification and maintenance programs. High-dose methadone can block the effects of heroin, thereby discouraging the continued use of heroin by addicts in treatment. Chronic administration of methadone results in the development of tolerance and dependence. The withdrawal syndrome develops more slowly and is less severe but more prolonged than that associated with heroin withdrawal. Ironically, methadone used to control narcotic addiction is encountered on the illicit market. Recent increases in the use of methadone for pain management have been associated with increasing numbers of overdose deaths. LAAM Closely related to methadone, the synthetic compound levo alphacetylmethadol, or LAAM (ORLMM®), has an even longer duration of action (from 48 to 72 hours) than methadone, permitting a reduction in frequency of use. In 1994, it was approved as a Schedule II treatment drug for narcotic addiction. Both methadone and LAAM have high abuse potential. Their acceptability as narcotic treatment drugs is predicated upon their ability to substitute for heroin, the long duration of action, and their mode of oral administration. Recent data regarding cardiovascular toxicity of LAAM have limited the use of this drug as a first-line therapy for addiction treatment.

Stimulants Stimulants, sometimes referred to as “uppers,” reverse the effects of fatigue on both mental and physical tasks. Two commonly used stimulants are nicotine, which is found in tobacco products, and caffeine, an active ingredient in coffee, tea, some soft drinks, and many nonprescription medicines. Used in moderation, these substances tend to relieve malaise and increase alertness. Although the use of these products has been an accepted part of the culture in the United States, the recognition of their adverse effects has resulted in a proliferation of caffeine-free products and efforts to discourage cigarette smoking. A number of stimulants, however, are under the regulatory control of the CSA. Some of these controlled substances are available by prescription for legitimate medical use in the treatment of obesity, narcolepsy, and attention deficit disorders. As drugs of abuse, stimulants are frequently taken to



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produce a sense of exhilaration, enhance self esteem, improve mental and physical performance, increase activity, reduce appetite, produce prolonged wakefulness, and to “get high.” They are among the most potent agents of reward and reinforcement that underlie the problem of dependence. Stimulants are diverted from legitimate channels and clandestinely manufactured exclusively for the illicit market. They are taken orally, sniffed, smoked, and injected. Smoking, snorting, or injecting stimulants produce a sudden sensation known as a “rush” or a “flash.” Abuse is often associated with a pattern of binge use — sporadically consuming large doses of stimulants over a short period of time. Heavy users may inject themselves every few hours, continuing until they have depleted their drug supply or reached a point of delirium, psychosis, and physical exhaustion. During this period of heavy use, all other interests become secondary to recreating the initial euphoric rush. Tolerance can develop rapidly, and both physical and psychological dependence occur. Abrupt cessation, even after a brief 2- or 3-day binge, is commonly followed by depression, anxiety, drug craving, and extreme fatigue known as a “crash.” Therapeutic levels of stimulants can produce exhilaration, extended wakefulness, and loss of appetite. These effects are greatly intensified when large doses of stimulants are taken. Physical side effects, including dizziness, tremor, headache, flushed skin, chest pain with palpitations, excessive sweating, vomiting, and abdominal cramps, may occur as a result of taking too large a dose at one time or taking large doses over an extended period of time. Psychological effects include agitation, hostility, panic, aggression, and suicidal or homicidal tendencies. Paranoia, sometimes accompanied by both auditory and visual hallucinations, may also occur. Overdose is often associated with high fever, convulsions, and cardiovascular collapse. Because accidental death is partially due to the effects of stimulants on the body’s cardiovascular and temperature-regulating systems, physical exertion increases the hazards of stimulant use. Cocaine Cocaine, the most potent stimulant of natural origin, is extracted from the leaves of the coca plant (Erythroxylum coca), which is indigenous to the Andean highlands of South America. Natives in this region chew or brew coca leaves into a tea for refreshment and to relieve fatigue, similar to the customs of chewing tobacco and drinking tea or coffee. Pure cocaine was first isolated in the 1880s and used as a local anesthetic in eye surgery. It was particularly useful in surgery of the nose and throat because of its ability to provide anesthesia, as well as to constrict blood vessels and limit bleeding. Many of its therapeutic applications are now obsolete because of the development of safer drugs.



60 Table 3.3 Street Terms for Cocaine All American drug Aspirin (powder cocaine) Barbs Basa (crack cocaine) Base (crack cocaine) Bernie Big C Black rock (crack cocaine) CDs (crack cocaine) Candy sugar (powder cocaine) Coca Crack Double bubble Electric Kool-Aid (crack cocaine) Flave (powder cocaine) Florida snow Foo foo Gin Gold dust Happy dust

Icing Jelly Lady Mama coca Mojo Nose stuff Oyster stew Paradise Pariba (powder cocaine) Pearl Real tops (crack cocaine) Rocks (crack cocaine) Roxanne (crack cocaine) Scorpion Sevenup Snow white Sugar boogers (powder cocaine) Twinkie (crack cocaine) Yam (crack cocaine) Zip

Illicit cocaine is usually distributed as a white crystalline powder or as an off-white chunky material (Table 3.3). The powder, usually cocaine hydrochloride, is often diluted with a variety of substances, the most common being sugars such as lactose, inositol, and mannitol and local anesthetics such as lidocaine. The adulteration increases the volume and thus multiplies profits. Cocaine hydrochloride is generally snorted or dissolved in water and injected. It is rarely smoked because it is heat labile (destroyed by high temperatures). Street Terms: Cocaine “Crack,” the chunk or “rock” form of cocaine, is a ready-to-use freebase (Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5; Table 3.4). On the illicit market, it is sold in small, inexpensive dosage units that are smoked. Smoking delivers large quantities of cocaine to the lungs, producing effects comparable to intravenous injection. Drug effects are felt almost immediately, are very intense, and are quickly over. Once introduced in the mid-1980s, crack abuse spread rapidly and made the cocaine experience available to anyone with $10 and access to a dealer. In addition to other toxicities associated with cocaine abuse, cocaine smokers suffer from acute respiratory problems including cough, shortness of breath, and severe chest pains with lung trauma and bleeding. It is noteworthy that the emergence of crack was accompanied by a dramatic increase in drug abuse problems and drug-related violence. The intensity of the psychological effects of cocaine, as with most psychoactive drugs, depends on the dose and rate of entry to the brain. Cocaine reaches



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Figure 3.4 Paraphernalia used for smoking crack cocaine. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

Figure 3.5 Crack cocaine. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.) Table 3.4 Common and Street Terms Associated with Crack Term

Definition

Term

Definition

Bingers Geeker Jelly beans Moonrock

Crack addicts Crack user Crack Crack mixed with heroin

Oolies Rooster Tornado Wicky stick

Marijuana laced with crack Crack Crack PCP, marijuana, and crack

the brain through the snorting method in 3 to 5 minutes. Intravenous injection of cocaine produces a rush in 15 to 30 seconds, and smoking produces an almost immediate intense experience. The euphoric effects of cocaine are almost indistinguishable from those of amphetamine, although they do not last as long. These intense effects can be followed by a dysphoric crash.


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To avoid the fatigue and the depression of coming down, frequent repeated doses are taken. Excessive doses of cocaine may lead to seizures and death from respiratory failure, stroke, or heart failure. There is no specific antidote for cocaine overdose. Cocaine is the second most commonly used illicit drug (following marijuana) in the United States. Amphetamines Amphetamine, dextroamphetamine, methamphetamine, and their various salts are collectively referred to as amphetamines. In fact, their chemical properties and actions are so similar that even experienced users have difficulty knowing which drug they have taken. Amphetamine was first marketed in the 1930s as Benzedrine ® in an overthe-counter inhaler to treat nasal congestion. By 1937, amphetamine was available by prescription in tablet form and was used in the treatment of the sleeping disorder narcolepsy, and the behavioral syndrome called minimal brain dysfunction, which today is called attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). During World War II, amphetamine was widely used to keep the fighting men going, and both dextroamphetamine (Dexedrine ®) and methamphetamine (Methedrine®) were readily available. As use of amphetamines spread, so did their abuse. In the 1960s, amphetamines became a perceived remedy for helping truckers to complete their long routes without falling asleep, for weight control, for helping athletes to perform better and train longer, and for treating mild depression. Intravenous amphetamines, primarily methamphetamine, were abused by a subculture known as “speed freaks.” With experience, it became evident that the dangers of abuse of these drugs outweighed most of their therapeutic uses. Increased control measures were initiated in 1965 with amendments to the federal food and drug laws to curb the black market in amphetamines. Many pharmaceutical amphetamine products were removed from the market, including all injectable formulations, and doctors prescribed those that remained less freely. Recent increases in medical use of these drugs can be attributed to their use in the treatment of ADHD. Amphetamine products presently marketed include generic and brand name amphetamine (Adderall ®, Dexedrine, Dextrostat®) and brand name methamphetamine (Desoxyn®). Amphetamines are all controlled in Schedule II of the CSA. To meet the ever-increasing black market demand for amphetamines, clandestine laboratory production has mushroomed. Today, most amphetamines distributed to the black market are produced in clandestine laboratories. Amphetamines are generally taken orally or injected. However, the addition of “ice, ” the slang name for crystallized methamphetamine hydrochloride, has promoted smoking as another mode of administration. Just as crack is



1998

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2002

Figure 3.6 Before and after chronic abuse of methamphetamine. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.) Table 3.5 Street Terms for Methamphetamine Blue meth Chicken feed Cinnamon Crink Crystal meth Desocsins Geep Granulated orange Hot ice Ice Kaksonjae L.A. glass Lemon drop

Meth OZs Peanut butter Sketch Spoosh Stove top Super ice Tick tick Trash Wash Working man’s cocaine Yellow barn Yellow powder

smokeable cocaine, ice is smokable methamphetamine. Methamphetamine, in all its forms, is highly addictive and toxic. Methamphetamine Methamphetamine, a derivative of amphetamine, is a powerful stimulant that affects the central nervous system (Figure 3.6). Amphetamines were originally intended for use in nasal decongestants and bronchial inhalers and have limited medical applications, which include the treatment of narcolepsy, weight control, and attention deficit disorder. Methamphetamine can be smoked, snorted, orally ingested, and injected. It is accessible in many different forms and may be identified by color, which ranges from white to yellow to darker colors such as red and brown. Methamphetamine comes in a powder form that resembles granulated crystals and in a rock form known as ice, which is the smokeable version of methamphetamine that came into use during the 1980s (Table 3.5).


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Methamphetamine use increases energy and alertness and decreases appetite. An intense rush is felt, almost instantaneously, when a user smokes or injects methamphetamine. Snorting methamphetamine affects the user in approximately 5 minutes, whereas oral ingestion takes about 20 minutes for the user to feel the effects. The intense rush and high felt from methamphetamine result from the release of high levels of dopamine into the section of the brain that controls the feeling of pleasure. The effects of methamphetamine can last up to 12 hours. Side effects include convulsions, dangerously high body temperature, stroke, cardiac arrhythmia, stomach cramps, and shaking. Chronic use of methamphetamine can result in a tolerance for the drug. Consequently, users may try to intensify the desired effects by taking higher doses of the drug, taking it more frequently, or changing their method of ingestion. Some abusers, while refraining from eating and sleeping, will binge, also known as “run,” on methamphetamine. During these binges, users will inject as much as a gram of methamphetamine every 2 to 3 hours over several days until they run out of the drug or are too dazed to continue use. Chronic methamphetamine abuse can lead to psychotic behavior, including intense paranoia, visual and auditory hallucinations, and out-of-control rages that can result in violent episodes. Chronic users at times develop sores on their bodies from scratching at “crank bugs,” which describes the common delusion that bugs are crawling under the skin. Long-term use of methamphetamine may result in anxiety, insomnia, and addiction. After methamphetamine use is stopped, several withdrawal symptoms can occur, including depression, anxiety, fatigue, paranoia, aggression, and an intense craving for the drug. Psychotic symptoms can sometimes persist for months or years after use has ceased. Methamphetamine laboratories are, by far, the most frequently encountered clandestine laboratories in the United States. The ease of clandestine synthesis, combined with tremendous profits, has resulted in significant availability of illicit methamphetamine, especially on the West Coast, where abuse of this drug has increased dramatically in recent years. Large amounts of methamphetamine are also illicitly smuggled into the United States from Mexico. The effects of amphetamines, especially methamphetamine, are similar to cocaine, but their onset is slower and their duration is longer. In contrast to cocaine, which is quickly removed from the brain and is almost completely metabolized, methamphetamine remains in the central nervous system longer, and a larger percentage of the drug remains unchanged in the body, producing prolonged stimulant effects. Chronic abuse produces a psychosis that resembles schizophrenia and is characterized by paranoia, picking at the skin, preoccupation with one’s own thoughts, and auditory and visual



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Figure 3.7 Harvested Khat plants. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

hallucinations. These psychotic symptoms can persist for months and even years after use of these drugs has ceased and may be related to their neurotoxic effects. Violent and erratic behavior is frequently seen among chronic abusers of amphetamines, especially methamphetamine. Khat For centuries, khat, the fresh young leaves of the Catha edulis shrub, has been consumed where the plant is cultivated, primarily East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (Figure 3.7). There, chewing khat predates the use of coffee and is used in a similar social context. Chewed in moderation, khat alleviates fatigue and reduces appetite. Compulsive use may result in manic behavior with grandiose delusions or in a paranoid type of illness, sometimes accompanied by hallucinations. Khat has been smuggled into the United States and other countries from the source countries for use by emigrants. It contains a number of chemicals, among which are two controlled substances, cathinone (Schedule I) and cathine (Schedule IV). As the leaves mature or dry, cathinone is converted to cathine, which significantly reduces its stimulatory properties.

Depressants Historically, people of almost every culture have used chemical agents to induce sleep, relieve stress, and allay anxiety. Although alcohol is one of the oldest and most universal agents used for these purposes, hundreds of substances have


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been developed that produce central nervous system depression. These drugs have been referred to as downers, sedatives, hypnotics, minor tranquilizers, anxiolytics, and antianxiety medications. Unlike most other classes of drugs of abuse, depressants are rarely produced in clandestine laboratories. Generally, legitimate pharmaceutical products are diverted to the illicit market. A notable exception to this is a relatively recent drug of abuse, gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB). Chloral hydrate and paraldehyde are two of the oldest pharmaceutical depressants still in use today. Other depressants, including glutethimide, methaqualone, and meprobamate, have been important players in the milieu of depressant use and abuse. However, two major groups of depressants have dominated the licit and illicit market for nearly a century, first barbiturates and now benzodiazepines. Barbiturates were very popular in the first half of the 20th century. In moderate amounts, these drugs produce a state of intoxication that is remarkably similar to alcohol intoxication. Symptoms include slurred speech, loss of motor coordination, and impaired judgment. Depending on the dose, frequency, and duration of use, one can rapidly develop tolerance and physical and psychological dependence on barbiturates. With the development of tolerance, the margin of safety between the effective dose and the lethal dose becomes very narrow. That is, to obtain the same level of intoxication, the tolerant abuser may raise his or her dose to a level that may result in coma or death. Although many individuals have taken barbiturates therapeutically without harm, concern about the addiction potential of barbiturates and the ever-increasing number of fatalities associated with them led to the development of alternative medications. Today, less than 10% of all depressant prescriptions in the United States are for barbiturates. Benzodiazepines were first marketed in the 1960s. Touted as much safer depressants with far less addiction potential than barbiturates, today these drugs account for about one out of every five prescriptions for controlled substances. Although benzodiazepines produce significantly less respiratory depression than barbiturates, it is now recognized that benzodiazepines share many of the undesirable side effects of the barbiturates. A number of toxic central nervous system effects are seen with chronic high-dose benzodiazepine therapy, including headaches, irritability, confusion, memory impairment, and depression. The risk of developing oversedation, dizziness, and confusion increases substantially with higher doses of benzodiazepines. Prolonged use can lead to physical dependence even at doses recommended for medical treatment. Unlike barbiturates, large doses of benzodiazepines are rarely fatal unless combined with other drugs or alcohol. Although primary abuse of benzodiazepines is well documented, abuse of these drugs usually occurs as part



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of a pattern of multiple drug abuse. For example, heroin or cocaine abusers will use benzodiazepines and other depressants to augment their “high” or alter the side effects associated with overstimulation or narcotic withdrawal. There are marked similarities among the withdrawal symptoms seen with most drugs classified as depressants. In the mildest form, the withdrawal syndrome may produce insomnia and anxiety, usually the same symptoms that initiated the drug use. With a greater level of dependence, tremors and weakness are also present; in its most severe form, the withdrawal syndrome can cause seizures and delirium. Unlike the withdrawal syndrome seen with most other drugs of abuse, withdrawal from depressants can be life threatening. Barbiturates Barbiturates were first introduced for medical use in the early 1900s. More than 2500 barbiturates have been synthesized, and, at the height of their popularity, about 50 were marketed for human use. Today, about a dozen are in medical use. Barbiturates produce a wide spectrum of central nervous system depression, from mild sedation to coma, and have been used as sedatives, hypnotics, anesthetics, and anticonvulsants. The primary differences among many of these products are how fast they produce an effect and how long those effects last. Barbiturates are classified as ultrashort, short, intermediate, and long-acting. The ultrashort-acting barbiturates produce anesthesia within about 1 minute after intravenous administration. Those in current medical use are the Schedule IV drug methohexital (Brevital®) and the Schedule III drugs thiamyl (Surital®) and thiopental (Pentothal®). Barbiturate abusers prefer the Schedule II short-acting and intermediate-acting barbiturates, which include amobarbital (Amytal®), pentobarbital (Nembutal®), secobarbital (Seconal®), and Tuinal (an amobarbital/secobarbital combination product). Other short- and intermediate-acting barbiturates are in Schedule III and include butalbital (Fiorina®), butabarbital (Butisol®), talbutal (Lotusate®), and aprobarbital (Alurate®). After oral administration, the onset of action is from 15 to 40 minutes, and the effects last up to 6 hours. These drugs are primarily used for insomnia and preoperative sedation. Veterinarians use pentobarbital for anesthesia and euthanasia. Long-acting barbiturates include phenobarbital (Luminal®) and mephobarbital (Mebaral®), both of which are in Schedule IV. Effects of these drugs are realized in about 1 hour and last for about 12 hours and are used primarily for daytime sedation and the treatment of seizure disorders. Benzodiazepines The benzodiazepine family of depressants is used therapeutically to produce sedation, induce sleep, relieve anxiety and muscle spasms, and prevent seizures.


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Figure 3.8 Klonopin. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

In general, benzodiazepines act as hypnotics in high doses, anxiolytics in moderate doses, and sedatives in low doses. Of the drugs marketed in the United States that affect central nervous system function, benzodiazepines are among the most widely prescribed. Fifteen members of this group are presently marketed in the United States, and about 20 additional benzodiazepines are marketed in other countries. Benzodiazepines are controlled in Schedule IV of the CSA. Short-acting benzodiazepines are generally used for patients with sleeponset insomnia (difficulty falling asleep) without daytime anxiety. Shorteracting benzodiazepines used to manage insomnia include estazolam (ProSom®), flurazepam (Dalmane®), temazepam (Restoril®), and triazolam (Halcion®). Midazolam (Versed®), a short-acting benzodiazepine, is utilized for sedation or for treating anxiety and amnesia in critical care settings and before anesthesia. It is available in the United States as an injectable preparation and as a syrup (primarily for pediatric patients). Benzodiazepines with a longer duration of action are utilized to treat insomnia in patients with daytime anxiety. These benzodiazepines include alprazolam (Xanax®), chlordiazepoxide (Librium®), clorazepate (Tranxene®), diazepam (Valium®), halazepam (Paxipam®), lorzepam (Ativan®), oxazepam (Serax®), prazepam (Centrax®), and quazepam (Doral®). Clonazepam (Klonopin®) (Figure 3.8), diazepam, and clorazepate are also used as anticonvulsants. Benzodiazepines are classified in the CSA as depressants. Repeated use of large doses or, in some cases, daily use of therapeutic doses of benzodiazepines is associated with amnesia, hostility, irritability, and vivid or disturbing dreams, as well as tolerance and physical dependence. The withdrawal syndrome is similar to that of alcohol and may require hospitalization. Abrupt cessation of benzodiazepines is not recommended and tapering-down the dose eliminates many of the unpleasant symptoms. Given the millions of prescriptions written for benzodiazepines, relatively few individuals increase their dose on their own initiative or engage in drugseeking behavior. Those individuals who do abuse benzodiazepines often maintain their drug supply by getting prescriptions from several doctors,



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Table 3.6 Street Terms for Rohypnol Circles Forget me drug Forget me pill Getting roached La Rocha Lunch money drug Mexican valium

Pingus R-2 Reynolds Rib Roach-2 Roapies Robutal

Roofies Rope Rophies Row-shay Ruffles Wolfies

forging prescriptions, or buying diverted pharmaceutical products on the illicit market. Abuse is frequently associated with adolescents and young adults who take benzodiazepines to obtain a “high.” This intoxicated state results in reduced inhibition and impaired judgment. Concurrent use of alcohol or other depressants with benzodiazepines can be life threatening. Abuse of benzodiazepines is particularly high among heroin and cocaine abusers. A large percentage of people entering treatment for narcotic or cocaine addiction also report abusing benzodiazepines. Alprazolam and diazepam are the two most frequently encountered benzodiazepines on the illicit market.* Rohypnol® Rohypnol is the trade name for the drug flunitrazepam, a benzodiazepine (central nervous system depressant) like Valium, yet 10 times more potent. Outside the United States, Rohypnol is legally manufactured by HoffmanLaRoche, Inc., and is available by prescription for the short-term treatment of severe sleep disorders. It is widely available in Europe, Mexico, and Colombia but is neither manufactured nor approved for sale in the United States. Illicit use of Rohypnol began in the 1970s in Europe and appeared in the United States in the early 1990s. Much of the concern surrounding Rohypnol is its abuse as a “date rape” drug (Table 3.6). Rohypnol is tasteless and odorless and, until recent efforts by manufacturers, dissolved clear in liquid, which masked its presence. Rohypnol comes in pill form and is usually sold in the manufacturer’s bubble packaging, which can mislead users in the United States into believing the drug is safe and legal. Since February 1999, reformulated Rohypnol tablets, which turn blue in a drink to increase visibility, have been approved and marketed in 20 countries. The old noncolored tablets are still available, however. In response to the reformulated blue tablets, people who intend to commit a sexual assault facilitated by Rohypnol are now serving blue tropical drinks and punches in which the blue dye can be disguised. Rohypnol can be ingested orally, snorted, or injected. It is often combined with alcohol or used as a remedy for the depression that follows a stimulant * Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): www.dea.gov (2006).


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high. The effects of Rohypnol begin within 15 to 20 minutes of administration and, depending on the amount ingested, may persist for more than 12 hours. The drug’s metabolic properties are detectable in urine for up to 72 hours after ingestion. Under Rohypnol, individuals may experience a slowing of psychomotor performance, muscle relaxation, decreased blood pressure, sleepiness, and/or amnesia. Some of the adverse side effects associated with the drug’s use are drowsiness, headaches, memory impairment, dizziness, nightmares, confusion, and tremors. Although classified as a depressant, Rohypnol can induce aggression and excitability. Rohypnol and Drug-Facilitated Rape Drug-facilitated rape can be defined as sexual assault made easier by the offender’s use of an “anesthesia”-type drug that can render the victim physically incapacitated or helpless and unable to give consent to sexual activity. Whether the victim is unwittingly administered the drug or willingly ingests it for recreational use is irrelevant. The person is victimized because of an inability to consciously consent to sexual acts. Rohypnol is one of the drugs most commonly implicated in drug-facilitated rape (see the next section on GHB). It can mentally and physically paralyze an individual. Effects of the drug are of particular concern in combination with alcohol and can lead to anterograde amnesia, where events that occurred during the time the drug was in effect are forgotten. During 2000, some 261,000 rapes and sexual assaults occurred, but it is unknown how many were drug facilitated. Many factors contribute to this lack of data, including the short period of time that the drug can be detected in the victim’s system. Also, victims may not seek help until days after the assault, partly because the drug impairs their memory and partly because of their inability to recognize signs of sexual assault. As with any sexual assault, survivors need help regaining a sense of control and security. Many victims rely on a support system to help them deal with the flood of emotions in the aftermath of the assault. Gamma Hydroxybutyrate (GHB) GHB is a powerful, rapidly acting central nervous system depressant. It was first synthesized in the 1920s and was under development as an anesthetic agent in the 1960s. GHB is produced naturally by the body in small amounts, but its physiological function is unclear. GHB was sold in health food stores as a performance-enhancing additive in body-building formulas until the FDA banned it in 1990. It is currently marketed in some European countries as an adjunct to anesthesia. GHB is abused for its ability to produce euphoric and hallucinogenic states and for its alleged function



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Table 3.7 Street Terms for GHB Cherry Meth Fantasy GBH Georgia home boy Great hormones at bedtime Grievous bodily harm Liquid E Liquid Ecstasy

Liquid X Organic quaalude Salty water Scoop Sleep-500 Soap Somatomaz Vita-G

as a growth hormone that releases agents to stimulate muscle growth. GHB became a Schedule I controlled substance in March 2000 (Table 3.7). In the United States, GHB is produced in clandestine laboratories with no guarantee of quality or purity, making its effects less predictable and more difficult to diagnose. GHB can be manufactured with inexpensive ingredients and using recipes on the Internet. Gamma butyrolactone (GBL) and 1,4butanediol are analogues of GHB that can be substituted for it. Once ingested, these analogues convert to GHB and produce identical effects. GBL, an industrial solvent, is used as an immediate precursor in the clandestine production of GHB. The FDA has issued warnings for both GBL and 1,4-butanediol, stating that the drugs have a potential for abuse and are a public health danger. GHB is usually taken orally. It is sold as a light-colored powder that easily dissolves in liquids or as a pure liquid packaged in vials or small bottles. In liquid form, it is clear, odorless, tasteless, and almost undetectable when mixed in a drink. GHB is typically consumed by the capful or teaspoonful at a cost of $5 to $10 per dose. The average dose is 1 to 5 grams and takes effect in 15 to 30 minutes, depending on the dosage and purity of the drug. Its effects last from 3 to 6 hours. Consumption of less than 1 gram of GHB acts as a relaxant, causing a loss of muscle tone and reduced inhibitions. Consumption of 1 to 2 grams causes a strong feeling of relaxation and slows the heart rate and respiration. At this dosage level, GHB also interferes with blood circulation, motor coordination, and balance. In stronger doses, 2 to 4 grams, pronounced interference with motor and speech control occurs. A coma-like sleep may be induced, requiring intubation to wake the user. When mixed with alcohol, the depressant effects of GHB are enhanced. This can lead to respiratory depression, unconsciousness, coma, and overdose. Side effects associated with GHB may include nausea, vomiting, delusions, depression, vertigo, hallucinations and seizures, respiratory distress, loss of consciousness, slowed heart rate, lowered blood pressure, amnesia, and coma. GHB can become addictive with sustained use. Patients with a history of around-the-clock use of GHB (every 2 to 4 hours) exhibit withdrawal symptoms that include anxiety, insomnia, tremors, and


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episodes of tachycardia (abnormally fast heart rates); symptoms may progress to delirium and agitation. Because GHB has a short duration of action and quickly leaves the user’s system, withdrawal symptoms may occur within 1 to 6 hours of the last dose. These symptoms may last for many months. GHB and Drug-Facilitated Rape According to National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), GHB has surpassed Rohypnol (flunitrazepam) as the most common substance used in drug-facilitated sexual assaults. GHB can mentally and physically paralyze an individual, and these effects are intensified when the drug is combined with alcohol. To date, the DEA has documented 15 sexual assaults involving 30 victims who were under the influence of GHB. Of the 711 drug-positive urinalysis samples submitted from victims of alleged sexual assault, 48 tested positive for GHB. It is difficult to estimate the incidence of drug-facilitated rape involving GHB. Victims may not seek help until days after the assault, in part because the drug impairs their memory and in part because they may not identify signs of sexual assault. GHB is only detectable in a person’s system for a limited amount of time, and, if the victim does not seek immediate help, the opportunity to detect the drug can quickly pass. Also, law enforcement agencies may not be trained to gather necessary evidence and may not be using equipment that is sensitive enough to test for the drug. Chloral Hydrate The oldest of the hypnotic (sleep-inducing) depressants is chloral hydrate, first synthesized in 1832. Marketed as syrups or soft gelatin capsules, chloral hydrate takes effect in a relatively short time (30 minutes) and will induce sleep in about 1 hour. A solution of chloral hydrate and alcohol constituted the infamous “knockout drops” or “Mickey Finn.” At therapeutic doses, chloral hydrate has little effect on respiration and blood pressure; however, a toxic dose produces severe respiratory depression and very low blood pressure. Chronic use is associated with liver damage and a severe withdrawal syndrome. Although some physicians consider chloral hydrate to be the drug of choice for sedation of children before diagnostic, dental, or medical procedures, its general use as a hypnotic has declined. Chloral hydrate, Noctec®, and other compounds, preparations, or mixtures containing choral hydrate are in Schedule IV of the CSA.

Cannabis Cannabis sativa L., the cannabis plant, grows wild throughout most of the tropic and temperate regions of the world. Before the advent of synthetic



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fibers, the cannabis plant was cultivated for the tough fiber of its stem. In the United States, cannabis is legitimately grown only for scientific research. Cannabis contains chemicals called cannabinoids that are unique to the cannabis plant. Among the cannabinoids synthesized by the plant are cannabinol, cannabidiol, cannabinolidic acids, cannabigerol, cannabichromene, and several isomers of tetrahydrocannabinol. One of these, delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) is believed to be responsible for most of the characteristic psychoactive effects of cannabis. Research has resulted in development and marketing of the dronabinol (synthetic THC) product Marinol® for the control of nausea and vomiting caused by chemotheraputic agents used in the treatment of cancer and to stimulate appetite in AIDS patients. Marinol was rescheduled in 1999 and placed in Schedule III of the CSA. Cannabis products are usually smoked. Their effects are felt within minutes, reach their peak in 10 to 30 minutes, and may linger for 2 or 3 hours. The effects experienced often depend on the experience and expectations of the individual user, as well as the activity of the drug itself. Low doses tend to induce a sense of well-being and a dreamy state of relaxation, which may be accompanied by a more vivid sense of sight, smell, taste, and hearing, as well as by subtle alterations in thought formation and expression. This state of intoxication may not be noticeable to an observer. However, driving, occupational, or household accidents may result from a distortion of time and space relationships and impaired motor coordination. Stronger doses intensify reactions. The individual may experience shifting sensory imagery, rapidly fluctuating emotions, fragmentary thoughts with disturbing associations, an altered sense of self-identity, impaired memory, and a dulling of attention despite an illusion of heightened insight. High doses may result in image distortion, a loss of personal identity, fantasies, and hallucinations. Three drugs that come from cannabis — marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil — are distributed on the U.S. illicit market. Having no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, they remain under Schedule I of the CSA. Today, cannabis is illicitly cultivated, both indoors and out, to maximize its THC content, thereby producing the greatest possible psychoactive effect. Marijuana Marijuana is the most frequently encountered illicit drug worldwide. In the United States, according to the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study, 57% of adults aged 19 to 28 reported having used marijuana in their lifetime. Among younger Americans, 17.5% of 8th graders and 46.1% of 12th graders had used marijuana in their lifetime. The term “marijuana,” as commonly used, refers to the leaves and flowering tops of the cannabis plant that are dried to



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Table 3.8 Street Terms Associated with Marijuana Term

Term

Definition

Homegrown Hydro

Bud

Marijuana use High-grade marijuana from Canada Marijuana

Chronic Dope Ganja Herb

Marijuana Marijuana Marijuana; term from Jamaica Marijuana

Kind bud Mary Jane Shake Sinsemilla

Marijuana Marijuana grown in water (hydroponic) Marijuana term from Northern CA High quality marijuana Marijuana Marijuana Potent marijuana

420 BC bud

Definition

Indo

produce a tobacco-like substance. Marijuana varies significantly in its potency, depending on the source and selection of plant materials used. The form of marijuana known as sinsemilla (Spanish, sin semilla: without seed), derived from the unpollinated female cannabis plant, is preferred for its high THC content. Marijuana is usually smoked in the form of loosely rolled cigarettes called joints, bongs, or hollowed-out commercial cigars called blunts (Figure 3.9). Joints and blunts may be laced with a number of adulterants including phencyclidine (PCP), substantially altering the effects and toxicity of these products. Street names for marijuana include pot, grass, weed, Mary Jane, and reefer (Table 3.8). Although marijuana grown in the United States was once considered inferior because of a low concentration of THC, advancements in plant selection and cultivation have resulted in higher THC-containing domestic marijuana. In 1974, the average THC content of illicit marijuana was less than 1%. Today most commercial grade marijuana from Mexico and Colombia and domestic outdoor cultivated marijuana has an average THC content of about 4% to 6%. Between 1998 and 2002, NIDA-sponsored Marijuana Potency Monitoring System (MPMP) analyzed 4603 domestic samples. Of those samples, 379 tested over 15% THC, 69 samples tested between 20% and 25% THC, and four samples tested over 25% THC. Bongs Marijuana contains known toxins and cancer-causing chemicals. Marijuana users experience the same health problems as tobacco smokers, such as bronchitis, emphysema, and bronchial asthma. Some of the effects of marijuana use also include increased heart rate, dryness of the mouth, reddening of the eyes, impaired motor skills and concentration, and hunger with an increased desire for sweets. Extended use increases risk to the lungs and reproductive system, as well as suppression of the immune system. Occasionally, hallucinations, fantasies, and paranoia are reported. Long-term chronic marijuana



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Figure 3.9 “Bong” used for smoking marijuana. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

use is associated with an Amotivational Syndrome, characterized by apathy; impairment of judgment, memory, and concentration; and loss of interest in personal appearance and pursuit of goals. Hashish Hashish consists of the THC-rich resinous material of the cannabis plant, which is collected, dried, and then compressed into a variety of forms, such as balls, cakes, or cookie-like sheets. Pieces are then broken off, placed in pipes, and smoked. The Middle East, North Africa, and Pakistan and Afghanistan are the main sources of hashish. The THC content of hashish that reached the United States, where demand is limited, averaged about 5% in the 1990s. Hashish Oil The term “hash oil” is used by illicit drug users and dealers but is a misnomer in suggesting any resemblance to hashish. Hash oil is produced by extracting



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Table 3.9 Street Terms Associated with LSD and Other Hallucinogenics Term

Definition

Term

Definition

Acid Blotter Dots Mellow yellow Shrooms Window pane

LSD LSD LSD LSD Psilocybin LSD

Angel dust Boat Magic mushrooms Musk Tic tac Zoom

PCP PCP Psilocybin Psilocybin PCP PCP

the cannabinoids from plant material with a solvent. The color and odor of the resulting extract will vary, depending on the type of solvent used. Current samples of hash oil, a viscous liquid ranging from amber to dark brown in color, average about 15% THC. In terms of its psychoactive effect, a drop or two of this liquid on a cigarette is equal to a single “joint” of marijuana.

Hallucinogens Hallucinogens are among the oldest known group of drugs used for their ability to alter human perception and mood. For centuries, many of the naturally occurring hallucinogens found in plants and fungi have been used for a variety of shamanistic practices. In more recent years, a number of synthetic hallucinogens have been produced, some of which are much more potent than their naturally occurring counterparts (Table 3.9). The biochemical, pharmacological, and physiological bases for hallucinogenic activity are not well understood. Even the name for this class of drugs is not ideal, since hallucinogens do not always produce hallucinations. However, taken in nontoxic dosages, these substances produce changes in perception, thought, and mood (Figure 3.10). Physiological effects include elevated heart rate, increased blood pressure, and dilated pupils. Sensory effects include perceptual distortions that vary with dose, setting, and mood. Psychic effects include disorders of thought associated with time and space. Time may appear to stand still and forms and colors seem to change and take on new significance. This experience may be either pleasurable or extremely frightening. It needs to be stressed that the effects of hallucinogens are unpredictable each time they are used. Weeks or even months after some hallucinogens have been taken, the user may experience flashbacks — fragmentary recurrences of certain aspects of the drug experience in the absence of actually taking the drug. The occurrence of a flashback is unpredictable but is more likely to occur during times of stress and seem to occur more frequently in younger individuals. With time, these episodes diminish and become less intense.



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Figure 3.10 Rave poster. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

The abuse of hallucinogens in the United States received much public attention in the 1960s and 1970s. A subsequent decline in their use in the 1980s may be attributed to real or perceived hazards associated with taking these drugs. However, a resurgence of the use of hallucinogens is cause for concern. According to the 2003 Monitoring the Future Study, 10.6% of 12th graders reported hallucinogenic use in their lifetime. According to the 2003 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, approximately 1 million Americans were current hallucinogen users. Hallucinogenic mushrooms, LSD, and MDMA are popular among junior and senior high school students who use hallucinogens. There is a considerable body of literature that links the use of some of the hallucinogenic substances to neuronal damage in animals, and recent data support that some hallucinogens are neurotoxic to humans. However, the most common danger of hallucinogen use is impaired judgment that often leads to rash decisions and accidents. LSD Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is the most potent hallucinogen known to science, as well as the most highly studied (Figure 3.11). LSD was originally synthesized in 1938 by Dr. Albert Hoffman. However, its hallucinogenic effects were unknown until 1943 when Hoffman accidentally consumed some LSD. It was later found that an oral dose of as little as 0.000025 grams (or 25 micrograms, equal in weight to a few grains of salt) is capable of


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Figure 3.11 Blotter acid (LSD). (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

producing rich and vivid hallucinations. LSD was popularized in the 1960s by individuals like Timothy Leary who, encouraged American students to “turn on, tune in, and drop out.” LSD use has varied over the years, but it still remains a significant drug of abuse. In 1999, more than 12% of high school seniors and college students reported that they had used LSD at least once in their lifetime. Because of its structural similarity to a chemical present in the brain and its similarity in effects to certain aspects of psychosis, LSD was used as a research tool to study mental illness. The average effective oral dose is from 20 to 80 micrograms, with the effects of higher doses lasting for 10 to 12 hours. LSD is usually sold in the form of impregnated paper (blotter acid), typically imprinted with colorful graphic designs. It has also been encountered in tablets (microdots), thin squares of gelatin (window panes), in sugar cubes, and, rarely, in liquid form. Physical reactions may include dilated pupils, lowered body temperature, nausea, “goose bumps,” profuse perspiration, increased blood sugar, and rapid heart rate. During the first hour after ingestion, the user may experience visual changes with extreme changes in mood. In the hallucinatory state, the user may suffer impaired depth and time perception, accompanied by



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distorted perception of the size and shape of objects, movements, color; sound, touch, and the users own body image. During this period, the user’s ability to perceive objects through the senses is distorted: they may describe “hearing colors” and “seeing sounds.” The ability to make sensible judgments and see common dangers is impaired, making the user susceptible to personal injury. After an LSD “trip,” the user may suffer acute anxiety or depression for a variable period of time. Flashbacks have been reported days or even months after taking the last dose. Trafficking LSD remains available in retail quantities in virtually every state. LSD production reportedly is centered on the West Coast, particularly in San Francisco, northern California, the Pacific Northwest, and recently the Midwest. Since the 1960s, LSD has been manufactured illegally within the United States. LSD production is a time-consuming and complex procedure. Several chemical recipes for synthesizing LSD are on the Internet, but clandestine production requires a high degree of chemical expertise. Chemists maintain tight control at the production level but do not necessarily participate in the distribution of the drug. These chemists usually sell the crystal LSD product to one or two trusted associates, insulating themselves from the wholesale distributors. Few LSD laboratories have ever been seized in the United States because of infrequent and irregular production cycles. In 2000, the DEA seized one LSD laboratory that was located in a converted missile silo in Kansas. LSD is produced in crystal form, which is converted to liquid and then distributed primarily in squares of blotter paper saturated with the liquid. To a lesser extent, LSD is sold as a liquid contained in breath mint bottles and vials; in gelatin tab form (window panes) of varying colors; and in pill form known as “microdots.” Distribution of LSD is unique within the drug culture. A proliferation of mail-order sales has created a marketplace where the sellers are virtually unknown to the buyers, giving the highest-level traffickers considerable insulation from drug law enforcement operations. The vast majority of users are middle-class adolescents and young adults attracted by its low prices. Rock concerts continue to be favorite distribution sites for LSD traffickers; however, distribution at raves throughout the United States is becoming more popular (Figure 3.11). Contacts made at raves and concerts are used to establish future transactions and shipments of larger quantities of LSD. Peyote and Mescaline Peyote is a small, spineless cactus, Lophophora williamsii, whose principal active ingredient is the hallucinogen mescaline (3,4,5-trimethoxyphenethylamine). From earliest recorded time, peyote has been used by natives in northern Mexico and the southwestern United States as a part of their religious rites.


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The top of the cactus above ground — also referred to as the crown — consists of disc-shaped buttons that are cut from the roots and dried. These buttons are generally chewed or soaked in water to produce an intoxicating liquid. The hallucinogenic dose of mescaline is about 0.3 to 0.5 grams and lasts about 12 hours. Although peyote produces rich visual hallucinations important to the native peyote cults, the full spectrum of effects has served as a chemically induced model of mental illness. Mescaline can be extracted from peyote or produced synthetically. Both peyote and mescaline are listed in the CSA as Schedule I hallucinogens.

New Hallucinogens A number of phenethylamine and tryptamine analogues have been encountered on the illicit market. Those recently placed under federal control include 2C-T-7 (dimethoxy-4-[n]-propylthiophenethylamine), permanently placed in Schedule I in March 2004, and 5-MeO-DIPT (5-methoxy-diisopropyltryptamine) and AMT (alpha-methyltryptamine), which were placed in Schedule I on an emergency basis in April 2003. In addition, a number of other analogues are being encountered. These include DIPT (N,N-diisopropyltryptamine), DPT (N,N-dipropyltryptamine), 5-MeO-AMT (5-methoxyalpha-methyltryptamine), MIPT (N,N-methylisopropyltryptamine), and 5-MeO-MIPT (5-methoxy, N,N-methylisopropyltryptamine) to name a few. Although these drugs are not specifically listed under the CSA, individuals trafficking in these substances can be prosecuted under the Analogue Statute of the CSA. The ever-increasing number of these types of hallucinogens being encountered by law enforcement is a testament to the efforts of individuals to engage in profitable drug enterprises while trying to avoid criminal prosecution. MDMA (Ecstasy) and Other Phenethylamines The drug 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, Ecstasy) was first synthesized in 1912 but remained in relative obscurity for many years. In the 1980s, MDMA gained popularity as a drug of abuse, resulting in its final placement in Schedule I of the CSA. Today, MDMA is extremely popular (Table 3.10). In 2000, it was estimated that two million tablets were smuggled into the United States every week. MDMA produces both amphetamine-like stimulation and mild mescalinelike hallucinations. It is touted as a “feel good” drug with an undeserved reputation of safety. MDMA produces euphoria, increased energy, increased sensual arousal, and enhanced tactile sensations. However, it also produces nerve cell damage that can result in psychiatric disturbances and long-term cognitive impairments. The user will often experience increased muscle tension,



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Table 3.10 Street Terms for MDMA Adam B-bombs Bens Clarity Cristal Decadence Dex Disco biscuit

Ecstasy E Essence Eve Go Hug drug Iboga Love drug

Morning shot Pollutants Scooby snacks Speed for lovers Sweeties Wheels X XTC

tremors, blurred vision, and hyperthermia. The increased body temperature can result in organ failure and death. MDMA is usually distributed in tablet form and taken orally at doses ranging from 50 to 200 mg. Individual tablets are often imprinted with graphic designs or commercial logos and typically contain 80 to 100 mg of MDMA. After oral administration, effects are felt within 30 to 45 minutes, peak at 60 to 90 minutes, and last for 4 to 6 hours. Analysis of seized MDMA tablets indicates that about 80% of all samples actually contain MDMA. About 10% of the MDMA-positive samples also contain MDA (3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine) and MDEA (3,4-methylenedioxyethylamphetamine), whereas another 10% contain amphetamine, methamphetamine, or both. Fraudulent MDMA tablets frequently contain combinations of ephedrine, dextromethorphan, and caffeine or newer piperazine compounds. Hundreds of compounds can be produced by making slight modifications to the phenethylamine molecule. Some of these analogues are pharmacologically active and differ from one another in potency, speed of onset, duration of action, and capacity to modify mood, with or without producing overt hallucinations. The drugs are usually taken orally, sometimes snorted, and rarely injected. Because they are produced in clandestine laboratories, they are seldom pure, and the amount in a capsule or tablet is likely to vary considerably. Raves MDMA is often found at nightclubs and raves. Raves first appeared in the United States in the late 1980s in cities such as San Francisco and Los Angeles. By the early 1990s, rave parties and clubs were present in most American metropolitan areas. Raves are characterized by high entrance fees, extensive drug use, and overcrowded dance floors. Club owners often seem to promote the use of MDMA at their clubs. They sell overpriced bottled water and sports drinks to try to manage the hyperthermia and dehydration effects of MDMA use, pacifiers to prevent involuntary teeth clenching, and menthol nasal inhalers and neon glow sticks to enhance some of the other effects of MDMA.


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Raves often are promoted as alcohol-free events, which gives parents a false sense of security that their children will be safe attending these parties. In reality, raves may be havens for the illicit sale and abuse of club drugs. Cities and communities throughout the United States have attempted to reduce the number of raves in their areas and to curb the use of club drugs in these raves. Several cities have passed new ordinances designed to regulate rave activity. Other cities have reduced rave activity through enforcement of juvenile curfews, fire codes, health and safety ordinances, liquor laws, and licensing requirements for large public gatherings. The synthetic drug MDMA is commonly found at rave parties, nightclubs, and, more recently, other settings such as schools, malls, and private homes that are frequented by youth and young adults. The damaging effects of the drug can be long lasting and are possible after only a small number of uses. Phencyclidine and Related Drugs In the 1950s, phencyclidine (PCP) was investigated as an anesthetic, but, because of the side effects of confusion and delirium, its development for human use was discontinued. It became commercially available for use as a veterinary anesthetic in the 1960s under the trade name of Sernylan ® and was placed in Schedule III of the CSA. In 1978, because of considerable abuse, phencyclidine was transferred to Schedule II of the CSA and manufacturing of Sernylan was discontinued. Today, virtually all of the phencyclidine encountered on the illicit market in the United States is produced in clandestine laboratories. PCP is illicitly marketed under a number of other names, including Angel Dust, Supergrass, Killer Weed, Embalming Fluid, and Rocket Fuel, reflecting the range of its bizarre and volatile effects. In its pure form, it is a white crystalline powder that readily dissolves in water. However, most PCP on the illicit market contains a number of contaminants as a result of makeshift manufacturing, causing the color to range from tan to brown and the consistency to range from powder to a gummy mass. Although sold in tablets and capsules, as well as in powder and liquid form, it is commonly applied to a leafy material, such as parsley, mint, oregano, or marijuana, and smoked. The drug’s effects are as varied as its appearance. A moderate amount of PCP often causes users to feel detached, distant, and estranged from their surroundings. Numbness, slurred speech, and loss of coordination may be accompanied by a sense of strength and invulnerability. A blank stare, rapid and involuntary eye movements, and an exaggerated gait are among the more observable effects. Auditory hallucinations, image distortion, severe mood disorders, and amnesia may also occur. In some users, PCP may cause acute anxiety and a feeling of impending doom; in others, paranoia and violent



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Figure 3.12 Ketamine. (Courtesy DEA, 2006.)

hostility are shown; and in some, it may produce a psychosis indistinguishable from schizophrenia. PCP use is associated with a number of risks, and many believe it to be one of the most dangerous drugs of abuse. Ketamine Ketamine is a rapidly acting general anesthetic (Figure 3.12). Its pharmacological profile is essentially the same as PCP. Like PCP, ketamine is referred to as a dissociative anesthetic because patients feel detached or disconnected from their pain and environment when anesthetized with this drug. Unlike most anesthetics, ketamine produces only mild respiratory depression and appears to stimulate, not depress, the cardiovascular system. In addition, ketamine has both analgesic and amnesic properties and is associated with less confusion, irrationality, and violent behavior than PCP. Use of ketamine as a general anesthetic for humans has been limited because of adverse effects, including delirium and hallucinations. Today, it is primarily used in veterinary medicine but has some utility for emergency surgery in humans. Although ketamine has been marketed in the United States for many years, it was only recently associated with significant diversion and abuse and placed in Schedule III of the CSA in 1999. Known in the drug culture as “Special K” or “Super K,” ketamine has become a staple at raves. Ketamine is supplied to the illicit market by the diversion of legitimate pharmaceuticals (Ketaset®, Ketalar®). It is usually distributed as a powder obtained by removing the liquid from the pharmaceutical products. As a drug of abuse, ketamine can be administered orally, snorted, or injected. It is also sprinkled on marijuana or tobacco and smoked. After oral or intranasal administration, effects are evident in about 10 to 15 minutes and are over in about 1 hour.


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After intravenous use, effects begin almost immediately and reach peak effects within minutes. Ketamine can act as a depressant or a psychedelic. Low doses produce vertigo, ataxia, slurred speech, slow reaction time, and euphoria. Intermediate doses produce disorganized thinking, altered body image, and a feeling of unreality with vivid visual hallucinations. High doses produce analgesia, amnesia, and coma.

Suggested Reading Karch, S.B., A Brief History of Cocaine, 2nd ed., CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2005. Miller, G.J., Drugs and the Law — Detection, Recognition and Investigation, 3rd ed., Anderson Publishing/Lexis-Nexus, Cincinnati, OH, 2005 Palacios, W.R., Cocktails and Dreams: Perspectives on Drug and Alcohol Use, Prentice Hall Publications, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2005. Yudko, E., Methamphetamine Use: Clinical and Forensic Aspects, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2003.


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Of the many tools afforded the drug investigator, the informant is probably one of the most important. Informants are people who know the dealers and the users. They can save the investigator an immense amount of time and effort in locating targets and documenting the extent to which those targets are involved in illegal activity. In 1992, Gambino family mob boss John Gotti was sentenced to life in prison by a federal court in New York City. Probably the most important tool used by the prosecution was testimony from underboss-turned-snitch Salvatore (“Sammy the Bull”) Gravano. Gravano, who himself pled guilty to 19 murders, is a good example of the role that informants can play in the prosecution of high-level people in organized crime cases. Gravano was originally supposed to stand trial along with Gotti, but he struck a deal with prosecutors. In return for a 20-year sentence, which he is currently serving in a high-security cellblock, Gravano agreed to testify in Gotti’s trial (and almost 10 others since). Thus he became one of the highest-ranking Mafiosi ever to turn state’s evidence since mob soldier Joe Valachi turned on his Genovese family boss in 1963. The concept of informants in society is nothing new. In fact, both police and civilians from time to time encourage public participation in solving crimes. For example, the well-known program Crimestoppers encourages citizens to “anonymously” inform police to assist them in developing suspects in crimes or to catch criminals in the act of committing them. Although some people complain that Crimestoppers makes “snitches” out of law-abiding citizens, others argue that it is simply a system of public responsibility similar to the old days when all citizens assumed responsibility for public order. In addition to allowing tipsters to call the police anonymously, cash rewards are sometimes offered for their cooperation. The amount of the 85


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reward depends on the “quality of information” provided by the citizen; that is, information that results in an arrest. All communication between the police and the citizen is accomplished by the assignment of a number to the caller. That number is used in lieu of a name for the remainder of the citizen–police relationship, negating the need for the police ever to know the true name of the tipster. Along similar lines to Crimestoppers are efforts by victims of crimes to convince the community to become more involved with identifying known criminals and reporting violators to police. One example of this is the wellknown television show America’s Most Wanted. This show has helped track down more than 500 fugitives and 20 missing children. In one case, the show spotlighted fugitives who shot and killed two Newark, New Jersey, law enforcement officers. Both men were caught within 1 week of the segments as a result of tips generated from people who watched the show. In recent years, the FBI has issued a public statement commending the show for putting a “human face on crime” and depicting the dangers to law enforcement. Another public forum for locating criminals has been around longer than the television shows discussed above: the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Top Ten Most Wanted list. The FBI has maintained this list since 1950, and, although it was once a mainstay in crime fighting, it has lost some of its appeal in today’s high-tech age of television, computers, and the Internet. Still, it is designed to encourage citizen participation in sharing information with the police about crime and criminals who are wanted. The Most Wanted list was invented by a wire service reporter and later adopted by the publicitydriven director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover. As of 1997, 422 of the 449 fugitives who appeared on the list had been captured, a 94% success rate. Informants are also sought by private citizens. During August 1997, the parents of murder victim JonBenet Ramsey ran their fourth advertisement in a local newspaper appealing for help from the public. The ad included handwriting samples from the ransom note and commented that “the killer appears to be obsessed with techno-crime movies and phrases from them.” In addition, the ad includes quotes from the movies Dirty Harry and Speed that the family claimed were similar to the statements used in the ransom note. In any case, whether it is a paid police informant or an anonymous tip, police rely heavily on information from the public to solve crimes. Experience has shown that a primary component of crime control is proactive law enforcement. Proactive investigations typically include cases such as drug trafficking, prostitution, and gambling, in which investigators actually seek out potential crimes and intervene before a crime is committed. Accordingly, the use of informants as sources of criminal information in such crimes has proved to be invaluable. Consequently, law enforcement officers are insistent



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on protecting the identities of their sources so that the well-being of the informants will not be jeopardized and so that they will continue to be of use to the officer in future criminal investigations. (Note: informants are also commonly called informers, confidential informers, and CIs, or cooperating individuals. In this book, they are usually referred to as informants.) However, despite the usefulness of informants, many misconceptions still exist about the value and utility of the criminal informant. Some people may think that police officers who are using an informant will be tolerant of that person’s criminal lifestyle and might be less willing to report criminal wrongdoing on the part of the informant. Although through the years some improprieties have been documented regarding the use of informants, the value of such people has proved immense in the prosecution of many high-level crime figures and in aiding law enforcement in understanding the inner workings of sophisticated criminal organizations. In addition, some people believe that in dealing closely with informants, police officers may themselves become tainted and their positions compromised. In this chapter we consider the role of informants in criminal investigations and how best to manage the information provided by them. Few investigative tools offer as much value to the criminal investigator as the informant. Historically, it is the hard-to-get information rendered by these civilians that has resulted in the successful conclusion of many major cases. Although there are many types of informants, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) offers the following definition: Any nonlaw enforcement person who, by reason of his familiarity or close association with criminals, supplies regular or consistent information about criminal activities to a police officer. Anyone is a potential candidate to be a police informer. A high percentage of law violators, however, are likely candidates because of their close proximity to crime. Consequently, with proper handling — which must include accurately identifying their motives — quality criminal cases can frequently be made from informant information. This chapter will address the handling of informants by officers, how to identify informant motives, and how to properly manage various informant–officer relationships.

Who Becomes an Informant? The word informant has many negative synonyms, such as snitch and stoolie, and there are exclusions to the definition above, such as victims of crime


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who have reported specific criminal activity to law enforcement. These people can be categorized as complainants. The informant is most typically used in cases in which there is no complainant, such as drug trafficking cases. Because informants can be virtually anyone in the community, the drug investigator should consider anybody with whom he or she comes in contact as a potential source of criminal information. That is, the premise of locating a knowledgeable informant is to realize that someone somewhere is aware of the commission of various crimes. It is therefore the investigator’s responsibility to locate and develop relationships with such people. Generally, people who become informants can be classified into four general groups. 1. Average citizens: Although not necessarily criminal sources, people falling into this group may still be excellent sources of information. Most good investigators have several informants of this type who are contacted periodically for leads. Examples of these informants are waitresses, bartenders, dancers, and private investigators. 2. Fellow law enforcement officers: On an average day, investigators will exchange valuable information with other investigators many times. Although much of this information is between “friends” who are investigators, a considerable amount is also exchanged by officers working in other units within the department. In addition, investigators who befriend officers with other local, state, or federal agencies can also benefit from useful information about criminals and criminal activity. 3. Mentally ill people: A certain percentage of informants fall into the category of the mentally ill or deranged. The experienced investigator can detect when such individuals are simply fabricating information or passing on news stories or gossip. One should consider that, although an informant may be deranged, his or her information might still have some validity. 4. Criminals or their associates: Without question, the criminal informant has proved to be most valued in many police investigations. This is a person who is currently, or has been, associated with a particular criminal element and is therefore in an excellent position to supply firsthand information about criminal activity. Informants come from diverse backgrounds and frequently view their role in different ways. For example, one may give information with no reservations about his or her identity becoming known. Conversely, another may have valuable information to render but may do so only with the understanding that his or her identity remain concealed. Those falling into the latter category typically want their identities to be kept secret for two reasons: (1) for their own protection, or



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(2) because if their true identities become known, their function as informants would be ended.

Types of Informants Three general classifications of informants should be recognized for better understanding of informant management. They are: 1. Occasional informants: This informant is one who is used by officers over long periods of time, and who offers information sporadically. This individual participates only when he or she wants to and will not testify in cases. Occasional informants are often cultivated as a result of becoming acquainted with an officer through a variety of situations. The reliability of this individual may be questionable, and information rendered will usually have to be verified by investigators. 2. Regular informants: Generally considered a productive informant type, the regular informant works frequently with officers over a period of time. This individual is usually a reliable source who has provided past information resulting in arrests and convictions. The regular informants’ motives vary, but because of the long-established relationship with the law enforcement officer, his or her information is usually reliable. 3. Arrested informants: The arrested or “hammered” informant cooperates with police to escape prosecution for crimes for which he or she has been charged. This individual is typically available for one particular investigation and seldom offers subsequent information after his or her initial relationship with the police has ended. It is common for the arrested informant to testify against others in exchange for a dismissal or reduction of criminal charges. Informants can be extremely helpful during an investigation, and their usefulness may outweigh any distaste the officer may experience when working with them. The principal purposes for using informants are: •

• • •

To gain firsthand knowledge of the prices and types of drugs on the street, who is dealing them, and locations where the drug dealing is taking place. To furnish information from sources not readily available to the officer. To make covert observations in localities where strangers would be suspected. To conduct undercover negotiations with suspects.


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Before the prospective informant is interviewed, his or her motives for involvement should be identified. Without question, this is the first responsibility of the investigator because an informant’s motives could weigh heavily against the officer’s safety or the credibility of the investigation. Reasons for individuals becoming involved with police as informers are offset by their reasons for not wishing to associate with law enforcement. These include dislike of the police, loss of respect from criminal associates, fear of retribution from other suspects, loss of self-respect, or feeling that involvement is not worthwhile.

Psychological Motivations of Informants The reasons people desire to deal with law enforcement may vary; however, to avoid problems during an investigation, the informant’s psychological motives should be identified. These include, but are not limited to, the following. The Fear Motivation Because the risks are so great and trust is so scarce in the drug trade, potential informers will sometimes assist in an investigation out of fear. This may manifest itself in many different ways. An arrested informant may participate because of his or her fear of punishment for crime. This is generally considered a good “control” motivation for an informant because if he or she fails to perform properly for the officer, the original charges can be filed and the reluctant informant can be prosecuted. Fear may also stem from a fear of retribution from associates who might be at odds with the informer. In this case, an informant’s desire to protect his or her own well-being and that of family or friends would also be a strong motivator and could produce good-quality information. The Revenge Motivation Although a questionable motive, the informant who seeks revenge may prove to be well worth the agent’s time and effort. The revenge motive may stem from a sour drug deal, anger toward associates who have reneged on drug transactions, profit-sharing disagreements, or other events. Sometimes, noncriminal acts will motivate the informer: jealousy of associates or disputes involving girlfriends, boyfriends, or spouses. Officers must identify this motive early on in the investigation. The informant might resort to entrapment (discussed later) to achieve his or her goal or perhaps heal the breach with the target of the investigation later on and then refuse to continue working with the officer.



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The Perverse Motivation Perverse is defined as “to turn away from that which is right.” An informant with a perverse motivation has an underlying motive other than what has been acknowledged to the officer. For example, the informer may approach the police with seemingly good information, when he or she is actually trying to observe other undercover officers working in the unit. This is a dangerous motive because this informant is not trustworthy, and his or her true motivation must be discovered by officers as soon as possible. The Mercenary Motivation The mercenary informant is one who works for the police for financial gain. This individual is not facing criminal charges and may or may not be considered a criminal, but, because of his or her personal lifestyle, the informant is in a good position to be acquainted with violators. The informant may be extremely effective, but he or she may also become a source of aggravation for the control officer. It is common for the mercenary informant to always want more than what he or she is getting. It is also common for the mercenary informant to have another motive (such as revenge or fear) while working with the police. The Repentance Motivation This informant desires to repay society for personal wrongs he or she has committed in the past. Considered a fairly rare motive, when it presents itself it can be a productive one. However, informers in this class have a tendency to return to criminal behavior after becoming involved as informants in investigation. The Egotistical Motivation An egotistical informer is one who enjoys associating with the police and is intrigued by police work. As in the case of the mercenary informer, he or she may not be personally involved in criminal activity but may attempt to infiltrate the criminal element on behalf of the police. Sometimes this individual can be very productive and ask little of control officers, thereby making this motivation a good one for investigators. Caution should be observed, however, because the egotistical informant is not “hammered,” and therefore control may be minimal. The Unwitting Informant The unwitting informant is probably the most useful and productive of all. Basically, the unwitting informant is an individual whom the undercover agent befriends during the course of an investigation. The informant, of



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course, does not realize that the undercover officer is a law enforcement officer; therefore, he or she is willing to provide information and make introductions to other criminal suspects. Great care must be practiced when working with an unwitting informant. Because he or she is usually in the presence of undercover officers regularly, suspicions may eventually be aroused if the informant notices that the officer never engages in criminal activity. This can sometimes be remedied by staging a fake drug deal between two undercover officers for the informant’s benefit.

Informant Interviews The initial interview of the potential informant is critical. It will identify the informant’s motives and help the officer determine whether the individual is suitable for a professional working relationship. When dealing with informants, the keyword is “control,” since many possess strong personalities and may attempt to dominate the initial conversation (and the investigation, for that matter). Once it is determined that a subject should be interviewed, investigators should follow these basic guidelines: • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Do not rush the interview, but try to keep the conversation from wandering; be subtle when pressing for details. Sympathize with the informant about any problems he or she may be experiencing; try to build rapport. Show appreciation for any information rendered, particularly for information that is of value. Never belittle seemingly worthless information. Do not try to show the informant how his or her information differs from that of other sources. Take notes or document the conversation as soon as possible. To verify the informant’s information or truthfulness, ask about information you already know. Constantly attempt to identify any motives that are causing the informant to render information. Avoid questions that might embarrass the informant. Avoid unnecessary prying into the informant’s private affairs. Avoid arguments with the informant. Always maintain control of the interview. If two officers are involved in the interview, one should do the talking and the other takes notes.

When working with informants, officers should be careful not to give out too much personal information, as this could reduce the effectiveness of



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the officer’s control over the informant or even compromise the safety of the officer in the investigation. In addition, officers should be certain that the informant understands that any criminal activity, including any violations of criminal law and lesser infractions, such as traffic violations and public intoxication, will not be tolerated and may result in prosecution. Many informants are deeply involved in a criminal lifestyle, and this will be reflected in their personal ethics. Control officers must be conscious of this and take care not to adopt a similar lifestyle for the sake of maintaining cover. For example, many informants are prostitutes who may also be topless dancers in nightclubs. To these individuals, sexuality is business and they may attempt to seduce a male officer to exert more control over him during the course of the investigation. This predicament will not only jeopardize the integrity of the officer in the investigation but will also affect the reputation of the agency.

Contracting an Informant After an officer has decided to use an informant, basic understandings must be discussed regarding the informant’s roles and actions while working with the officer. Method of Payment No payments are to be made to an informant unless he or she has been fingerprinted, photographed, and otherwise properly documented. Payments can be made only on a per diem basis and only if the informant is providing reliable information or services to the department. The specific amount of per diem should be established by the officer’s supervisor at the onset of the relationship, so that any future misunderstandings can be avoided. Any money for relocation of the informant after the investigation is over should first be authorized by the officer’s supervisor. Expenditures of Official Drug Funds Informants should be advised of the consequences of absconding with money issued to them for drug purchases. Drug purchase money or “buy money” should only be used for the purchase of drugs, unless otherwise authorized. When issued drug purchase money, the informant should sign a receipt for the money. This receipt will set forth the responsibility of the informant while in possession of the money. In particular, if the informant steals the money, he or she can be prosecuted for theft. If this happens, the informant should be declared unreliable, and he or she should be permanently removed from the files as a cooperating individual.



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Criminal Activity by the Informant There must be no misunderstanding regarding the expected behavior of the informant. It must be made clear that informants are not permitted to engage in any type of illegal activity, either in the presence of the control officer or not. If the informant is arrested for a criminal offense, he or she must understand that working with the police will not provide an escape. Sometimes an informant will tell arresting officers that he or she was committing a crime to maintain cover. Officers who permit this are risking disciplinary action or termination. The Cooperating Individual Agreement The cooperating individual (CI) agreement is a necessary ingredient for management of informants and should be taken seriously by all drug enforcement personnel (see Figure 4.1). Basically, it works like a big league contract: no play, no pay! Good-faith efforts do not count in the world of working informants. The only way law enforcement officers can justify to the public giving an arrested person a break is to trade charges against him or her for charges against a larger violator. Therefore, the agreement spells out the expectations of the CI, which include: • • •

The objectives (people to be investigated, type of drugs to be purchased, etc.). The methods to be used (control buys, tape-recorded telephone calls, CI testimony, etc.). Other agreements, which release the law enforcement agency from liability in the event the informant is hurt on duty or tries to claim Worker’s Compensation or unemployment benefits.

The CI should be told exactly what he or she will receive if the terms of the agreement are fulfilled and a prosecutable case results. Compensation can include a letter to the sentencing judge, reduction of charges, relocation of the CI, and so forth. Cooperating conditions may include the following: • • •

The defendant understands that only results will help him or her and not simply good-faith efforts. The defendant must be truthful and submit to a polygraph examination or urine analysis upon demand. The defendant may be released from his or her obligations at any time. In this case, the government will not be bound to its part of the agreement and there will be no retribution against the CI unless he or she jeopardizes the subsequent investigation.



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CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT COOPERATING INDIVIDUAL AGREEMENT I, ____________________________________, the undersigned, state that it is my intent to associate myself, of my own free will and without any coercion or duress, with the City Police Department as a cooperating individual. As a cooperating individual, I understand and agree that I have no police powers under the laws of the State of ( ______ ) and have no authority to carry a weapon while performing my activity as a cooperating individual. Further, I understand and agree that my only association with the City of ( __________ ) is as a cooperating individual on a case-by-case or time-to-time basis as an independent contractor, and not as an employee of the police department. Any payment I receive from the City Police Department will not be subject to federal or state income tax withholding or social security. I understand that it is my responsibility to report any income and also that I am not entitled to either workmen’s compensation or unemployment insurance payments for anything I do as a cooperating individual. In consideration for being allowed to associate with the City Police Department as a cooperating individual, and in consideration for any payment I may receive, I agree to be bound by the following terms and conditions and procedures while so associated. 1. I agree that under no circumstances will I purchase or possess any controlled substances or suspected controlled substances without the direction and control of a police officer and then will make a purchase only with monies supplied by him. 2. I agree not to use or sell, dispense, or transfer any controlled substance except that I may use any controlled substance prescribed to be by a licensed physician. 3. I agree to maintain a strict accounting of all funds provided to me by the City Police Department and I understand that misuse of city funds could be grounds for criminal prosecution against me. 4. I agree not to divulge to any person, except the officer with whom I am associated, my status as a cooperating individual for the City Police Department unless required to do so in court, and shall not represent myself to others as an employee or representative of the City Police Department nor use the department or any of its officers as personal references or as credit or employment references. 5. I understand that any violation of the above listed provisions may be grounds for my immediate removal as a cooperating individual and that any violation of law may result in my arrest and prosecution. I understand that association with the City Police Department as a cooperating individual may involve strenuous physical activity and may become hazardous to my physical well-being and safety. Nevertheless, it is my desire to associate myself with the department, on an independent contractor basis, as a cooperating individual. I am associating myself with the department in this status freely and without any coercion or duress. In consideration of being accepted as a cooperating individual, I release and discharge the City of ( __________ ), the City Police Department and its elected officials, officers, employees, and agents from all claims, demands, actions, judgements, and executions which I may have or acquire and subsequently claim to have against the city for personal injuries and property damage I sustain which arises out of or in connection with my association with the city. I make this release for myself, my heirs, executors, and administrators. Also, I agree not to maintain any action against the City of ( __________ ), the City Police Department, or its elected officials, officers, employees, or agents for personal injuries and property damage I sustain which arise out of or in connection with my association with the City Police Department. ________________________________________________ Cooperating Individual ________________________________________________ Date WITNESSES: ______________________________________ Officer ______________________________________ Officer

Figure 4.1 A Cooperating Individual Agreement should always be signed by the informant to avoid the problem of informants claiming unemployment or Worker’s Compensation benefits.


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Informant Payments From the outset of the relationship, it should be determined how the informant will receive compensation, if any, and what is required to receive it. It is better to pay informants on a per diem basis rather than case-by-case to avoid possible subsequent allegations of entrapment. Informants also tend to request additional funds for extras, such as the telephone bill, car repairs, or groceries in addition to the agreed-upon payments for services rendered. The control officer should discuss these contingencies ahead of time with the informant. Use of Female Informants by Male Officers Policy should be established regarding the treatment of female informants by male officers. When male officers are involved, interviews of female informants should be conducted when at least two officers are present. This will minimize any spurious complaints that could possibly be lodged later against the officers. Female informants should be searched by female officers to ensure that they are not armed or are not holding any illegal drugs. A female informant may prove to be as dangerous to the officer as a male informant; their aggressiveness and street smarts should not be underestimated. Statement of Officer–Informant Relationship An officer must always remain in control of the officer–informant relationship. For this reason, the officer must refrain from being too friendly; inadvertently revealing personal information about spouse or children may later reduce the officer’s effectiveness or control. Moreover, such information could be revealed during the suspect’s trial and be a source of embarrassment for the officer and his or her agency. Informant Statements Once an informant has been approved for use, a CI agreement should be signed and kept on file. This agreement states the conditions under which the informant will continue working with the police. There have been cases in which informants have sued law enforcement agencies for Worker’s Compensation claims because they considered themselves employees of the city, county, or state. The CI agreement, if properly worded, will eliminate such claims. After each undercover contact, the informant should provide the officer with a written statement of what occurred, what was said, and what was observed. The informant should sign only the original copy of the statement, which should then be placed in the informant’s file; unsigned copies should be placed in the file for later use in court. In the event that the informant is compelled to testify, original statements will be used as evidence along with his or her testimony.



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Procedures for Drug Purchases Because there are so many different types of drug purchases and the circumstances surrounding them are so variable, a standard policy should be established and understood regarding the informant’s role. Inside Drug Buys Drug buys are generally safer if conducted on the street or in a suitably wired undercover apartment. If circumstances require that the drug buy take place in the suspect’s residence, an officer should be present to corroborate any activity or statements made by criminal suspects. When informants participate in undercover drug transactions, they should always be equipped with concealed transmitters so that officers can monitor and record the conversation for evidence. Multiple Drug Buys It is a good practice to make more than one drug purchase from a single suspect. Multiple buys help demonstrate that the dealer was in business and that criminal intent existed for the transaction. This should protect the officer against the suspect’s use of the entrapment defense. Multiple buys also help officers identify the dealer’s source of supply through repeated contacts. Controlled Drug Buys (Informant Drug Buys) Although useful in some circumstances, the controlled buy should be avoided whenever possible. In this type of buy, informants usually make direct contact with the dealer, and the informant’s testimony is subsequently required. Problems also arise if the informant later decides he or she does not want to testify, and the case is therefore lost (see the section on the controlled drug purchase later in this chapter). Mutual Agreements and Understandings All details of the undercover context must be worked out before the informant is placed into service. The Cover Story A cover story is crucial to the success of the undercover investigation. An informant may be allowed to suggest a cover story, but the officer should ultimately decide on the details. Both the informant and the undercover officer should be comfortable with the cover story. Method of Introduction The manner in which the informant introduces the agent to the suspect should be discussed in detail and in advance before the undercover contact.


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In some cases, the informant may wish to converse with the suspect a few moments before the introduction;. this should be decided before contact to avoid confusion and misunderstanding. Negotiating Amounts It is a good practice for the informant not to be told too far in advance what he or she is supposed to buy or how much. Again, entrapment precipitated by the informant must be avoided at all costs since he or she may be out to “set up” a rival dealer or some other enemy. Which drugs to buy and when to buy them should only be established just before the actual transaction. If an earlier meeting is required, officers should record the contact for verification of its legitimacy. Before each drug buy, the informer should be required to phone the suspect (if a phone is available) to reconfirm the drugs to be purchased, the amount, and the quality. Time of Day Daylight hours are usually the best time to attempt to purchase drugs. Surveillance officers are better able to notice license tags, addresses, and physical descriptions of associates. In addition, surveillance officers can more easily be hidden in traffic to better cover the informant or undercover officer. Manipulation of Funds An informant might advise the officer that a particular drug sells for a specific price, when in reality it sells for less. In this case, the informant is attempting to “skim” the extra money without the officer’s knowledge. If this occurs, an ethical (honesty) infraction has occurred and the informant should be declared unreliable and should not be considered for any future use. Moreover, if there is sufficient evidence, the informant should be charged with theft, embezzlement, or any other appropriate criminal charge.

Protection of Informant Identity Experience has shown that defendants may attempt to injure, intimidate, or even murder people working with the police. Accordingly, the investigator bears an ethical and professional responsibility to safeguard the identity of informants and their families to the best of his or her ability. During initial interviews, investigators should advise potential informants that it is impossible to absolutely guarantee the confidentiality of their identity but that all efforts will be made to do so. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the identity of informants may be kept secret if sources have been explicitly assured of confidentiality by investigating officers or if a reasonably implied assurance



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of confidentiality has been made. Measures to protect an informant’s identity include the following: 1. Direct contact with the informant should be limited to one investigator or the “control” agent (unless the informant is of the opposite sex, in which case two investigators should be present). Meetings should be brief and held where neither party will be recognized. 2. Telephone conversations between control agents and informants should be kept to a minimum in case someone is listening. 3. When officers do telephone their informants, they should use a nontraceable telephone since the informant’s telephone may have caller ID that others living with them can observe. 4. Meeting places between investigators and informants should be selected by the investigator and should be in a different location each time. 5. Informants should be warned about discussing their association with the police with anyone, including family and friends. An informant’s identity should not be disclosed unless absolutely necessary, and then only to the proper parties. Generally speaking, an informant’s identity should not be disclosed if it would create an immediate danger to the informer or cut off a reliable source of information. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of protection of the informant’s identity in court. In U.S. Department of Justice v. Landano (1993), the court required that an informant’s identity be revealed through a request made under the federal Freedom of Information Act. In that case, the FBI had not specifically assured the informant of confidentiality, and the court ruled, “The government is not entitled to a presumption that all sources supplying information to the FBI in the course of a criminal investigation are confidential sources.” It is the right and the duty of every citizen of the United States to communicate all the information he or she has on the commission of an offense against the laws of the United States to officers of government charged with the duty of enforcing the laws. Such information is privileged as a confidential communication which the courts will not compel or permit to be disclosed without the consent of government. Such evidence is excluded, not for the protection of the witness before the policy of law … however, a trial court must dispose of the case before it. If what is asked is essential evidence to vindicate the innocence of the accused or lessen the risk of false testimony, or it is essential to the proper disposition of the case, disclosure will be compelled.



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Wilson v. United States Generally, there are three possible consequences for an officer’s refusal to disclose an informant’s identity: the court may uphold the officer’s refusal if there is no harm to the defendant, the court may dismiss the charge against the defendant, or the court may find the officer in contempt of court and have him arrested. The following general guidelines should be observed by all agents to ensure effective management of informants and to ensure officer safety: • • • • • •

Every attempt should be made to keep track of the informant’s independent activities. All informant contacts should be made with consideration for optimum officer safety. An informant should not be paid until the information has been evaluated. All informant information should be verified when possible. Before undercover contact, the name of the informant and the location of the contact should be relayed to the police supervisor. A receipt for informant payments should be acquired when all payments are made.

Special Informant Problems Working with informants is an endeavor in human behavior. As such, it is all but impossible to establish a set operational procedure that will apply to all informants all of the time. Flexibility is the key for the drug investigator. Here are a few of the most common problems that can present themselves throughout the course of a drug investigation. The Informant with “Cold Feet” Sometimes an officer will develop an informant, and shortly thereafter the informant will have second thoughts about the arrangement, usually because of fear of retribution from fellow drug dealers. In such cases, it is best to release the informant (after explaining that the original “deal” is now off). There are three good reasons for officers not to work with informants with cold feet: 1. Frightened informers are seldom productive. 2. Frightened informers may place the undercover agent in dangerous circumstances by acting nervous or by panicking during drug transactions. 3. Informants may be fearful of participation because of the danger involved, and rightfully so. Therefore, they should have the option not to work.



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The Informant and the Target’s Right to Counsel There are occasions when the police may use an informant to learn more about a particular prisoner, or after arresting several individuals, place a wire on one of them to learn the defense strategies another might use. It should be remembered that any time the suspect is in custody or has a case pending against him, his right to counsel might become an issue. The rules vary from state to state, but the following points generally should be considered: 1. Generally, once a suspect has asked for an attorney, officers cannot use an informant to try to gain information. The informant would be acting on the part of the police and thus would be a “police agent.” Once the suspect has been read the Miranda warning and has signed a statement of rights and waiver, however, he or she is fair game for a police informant. 2. The above does not apply, however, in cases of inmates who approach the informant with information. 3. Once a defendant has been indicted or charged, the right to counsel is “attached.” Basically, this means that the police cannot attempt to gain information (on the case in which he or she is charged) through an informant. This applies even in a case in which the informant is a codefendant. These requirements do not necessarily prevent police officers from using an informant to obtain information from the suspect on other crimes. If the suspect is planning to murder a witness, the informant has a free hand in attempting to obtain as much information as possible. Other Problems with Informants In addition to concerns of entrapment and ethical, moral, and criminal activity on the part of the informant, there are several other areas of concern. Officer–Informant Relationships Because investigators and their informants work closely together, it is possible that an officer can become caught up in an informant’s personal life and problems. Certainly, the investigator should lend a sympathetic ear when possible, but becoming too close to an informant could jeopardize the investigator’s level of control. Informants of the Opposite Sex Many investigators have fallen victim to allegations of sexual misconduct with informants of the opposite sex. Although some have proven truthful,



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many have had no basis in fact but still resulted in disciplinary action against the officer and termination of the investigation. To avoid such allegations, a second officer should always accompany the investigator. The locations of meeting spots with informants should also be considered very carefully, particularly if it is not possible for a second officer to be present. Crimes Committed by the Informant During the initial meetings between the investigator and a potential informant, the officer should stress that any criminal activity on the part of the informant will not be tolerated. History has shown that after being arrested for a crime, informants will sometimes mention the name of their control officer at the time of their arrest in hopes of being released or receiving special treatment. Officers Who “Own” Their Informants Over the years, some unscrupulous officers have claimed that meetings between themselves and criminals were in fact meetings with informants. Informants should be considered the property of the entire department and should be sufficiently documented. This will avoid any allegations of misconduct on the part of investigators if seen with known criminals.

The Informant in the Courtroom Investigators should know in advance whether the informant’s role in the investigation will necessitate his or her testimony should the case go to trial. The best time to plan for this is while the case is being prepared, not after the arrest has been made. To reduce the likelihood of testimony being required of the informant the following should be observed: 1. Officers should corroborate as much of the informant’s testimony as possible with the use of tape recordings, surveillance, and other physical evidence. 2. After each contact with the suspect, a statement should be taken from the informant either in longhand or by tape recording for later transcription. Informants, like police officers, must have a means to refresh their memories in the event the case ends up in court. It is usually not satisfactory for the informant to rely on the officer’s report because it could be charged that he is merely memorizing details from the officer’s report. In addition, an informant’s report will lock him into testimony if he later chooses not to cooperate in the case or to lie on the witness stand.



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3. All money paid to the informant should be carefully documented. Defense attorneys may attempt to show that the informant was paid an enormous amount of money to “entrap” the defendant. Adequate records and a proper payment method will invalidate this defense.

The Controlled Drug Purchase Frequently, undercover officers are unsuccessful in infiltrating trafficking organizations and must consider other means of penetration. In such cases, police should consider using informants who are already accepted and known by the suspects. It is always better for an informant to introduce an undercover agent to the suspect as a trusted friend than to risk sending the informant alone — there is greater informant control and the case will be strengthened by the officer’s firsthand testimony. This, however, is not always possible. If an informant is the only one who can meet and negotiate a drug transaction with a suspect, the informant’s services can be used in two ways: (1) by making undercover purchases for the purpose of later charging the dealer with drug dealing, or (2) by making undercover drug purchases for the purpose of obtaining probable cause for a search warrant of the suspect’s residence. Both strategies have distinct advantages and disadvantages. If the drug purchase results in the later arrest of the suspect, the informant will probably have to testify (along with the informant’s control officer and any surveillance officers). The defense strategy in this scenario is to attack the credibility of the informant: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Is the informant’s testimony truthful? Does the informant have a motive that would cause him or her to lie? Does the informant have a history of criminal involvement? Does the informant now or has he or she ever used illegal drugs? Has the informant ever been convicted of a criminal offense involving drugs or honesty?

If the answer is yes to any of these questions, the defense counsel may have an improved basis for defense. Because the defense attorney may crossexamine any prosecution witness, some of the above information may be revealed for the purpose of discrediting and impeaching the testimony of the informant. The defense counsel’s ultimate goal is to establish a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors and, therefore, seek an acquittal. If the informant is proven, reliable, and comfortable on the witness stand, he or she might be successfully used for multiple drug buys. If the informant’s reliability is untested, a controlled informant purchase for obtaining probable


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cause will be more appropriate. In either case, however, a strict protocol for handling the informant must be observed. Following this protocol will ensure that the informant’s involvement with the suspect was monitored by case officers, minimizing possible wrongdoing by the informant. Outlined below is a step-by-step process for conducting a controlled drug purchase. 1. Only use informants who have been established as reliable, that is, either utilized for previous drug purchase operations or by verification of any information rendered. 2. Conduct an in-depth interview of the informant; determine his or her knowledge of various drugs in the community, drug prices, drug packaging, and information on drug dealers. Determine whether the informant is using drugs, and, if so, what types. 3. A separate statement should be taken from the informant regarding his or her personal knowledge in dealings with the suspect. • What types of drugs is the suspect dealing? • In what quantities does the suspect deal? • Is the suspect considered dangerous? (If so, why?) • Does the suspect carry a weapon? (If so, what type?) • Who are the suspect’s associates? • Does the suspect live alone or with others? (If so, who?) • If employed, where does the suspect work? • What vehicles are involved? (Get descriptions.) 4. Verify the informant’s information. A comprehensive utility check should be conducted by the informant’s control officer to determine whether other people are living at the residence. A complete criminal history should be acquired on each suspect. This should include teletypes to other jurisdictions for local criminal history inquiries. State driver’s license information should also be acquired. Attention must be given to arrests as well as to convictions to help profile the suspect. 5. Record the serial numbers of money used for official drug purchases. Serial numbers must be incorporated into the case report and used as evidence in the case. Official funds might later be seized at the suspect’s residence as a result of a search warrant. In this event, seized funds are to be used as evidence in the case. 6. Strip search the informant. This must be conducted just before the drug buy and should be thorough enough that the officer can later testify that the informant had no illicit drugs concealed on his or her person before the meeting with the suspect. If a body cavity search is required, trained medical personnel should be used, not officers. Furthermore, medical personnel (for cavity searches) or officers (for pat-down searches) of the same sex must be used to conduct searches.



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7. Equip the informant with a recording device. A concealed transmitter should be placed on the informant to allow surveillance officers to monitor conversations between the informant and the suspect and to record the conversations for evidence. If a transmitter is unavailable, a small tape recorder should be considered. This is a less satisfactory method because officers cannot monitor the conversation; however, a recorded tape of the contact will be available as evidence. 8. Search the informant’s vehicle. The vehicle used by the informant should be searched by officers for drugs or money. Once the informant and/or the vehicle is searched, neither should be left unattended until after the drug deal is over. This will ensure that both are “clean.” 9. Conduct drug buys in populated and open areas where surveillance teams can easily be positioned and which are familiar to them (for example, a shopping center parking lot, a bus station, a city park). Motel locations should be preselected by officers for accessibility and safety. Do not allow the informant or the suspect to select the location for the drug transaction. If a location is suggested by the suspect, a second or third preselected counterlocation should be suggested. Never conduct the deal on the suspect’s own “turf.” 10. Conduct close surveillance of the informant. The informant must be constantly observed from the time of the strip search to the time he or she meets with the suspect. The informant must be instructed to drive slowly, use proper turn indicators, and go directly to a predetermined location. If the location changes during the deal, the informant should call off the transaction. 11. A set period of time must be given to the informant for the transaction. If the transaction is not completed within the given time, the informant must be advised that the officers will assume the informant is in trouble and storm the location. Officers must carefully log all activities of the informant: times, direction of travel, and any pertinent conversation with the suspect. 12. Informants should be instructed to volunteer as little information as possible. They should instead ask the suspect questions about the transaction (price, quality and purity of drugs, and future drug transactions). If possible, the actual exchange of drugs for money should be observed and photographed by surveillance officers. The informant should be instructed to proceed to a prearranged location after the purchase while officers maintain visual contact. The location should not be the police department in case the informant is followed by the suspects. The drug evidence should be taken from the informant, initialed by both the officer and the informant, and packaged and preserved according to accepted practices of evidence custody.


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13. All drug evidence should be promptly transported to the laboratory to protect the chain of custody and for chemical analysis. A second strip search should then be conducted for money and drugs retained by the informant. A statement should be taken from the informant. The statement should include any conversation with the suspect, as well as locations where additional drugs may have been observed. 14. If a search warrant is to be obtained, it should be acquired as soon as possible after the last drug purchase. It will be necessary for the police laboratory to expedite the testing of the drugs. Special arrangements might have to be made. If this is not realistic, the drugs will have to be field tested by officers in order to establish probable cause. 15. Surveillance should be maintained at the location of the intended search in order to identify associates or customers entering or leaving the location. During the search, drugs, paraphernalia, records, weapons, and money should be seized if it can be shown that they pertain to the case. Vehicles should be seized if they were used to facilitate any drug trafficking activity or if they were acquired by illegally obtained drug money.

Summary The informant is a potentially valuable investigative resource for the drug enforcement officer. The use of informants in drug investigations must be preceded by a thorough understanding of the motivations that underlie their involvement. These motivations may either benefit or hinder investigators in their endeavors. All investigative personnel must understand procedures for the cultivation and placement of informants. Proper control and management of the informant must be established at the onset of the investigation, and the informant’s role should be well defined. If a task can be accomplished by an undercover officer without the aid of an informant, that should be considered; an uncooperative or unreliable informant may hinder the progress of the case. In many circumstances, however, informants can provide valuable information on people, places, and organizations operating within the drug trade. Police personnel should take care to use informants in a proper and lawful manner. If they have done so, then the information and evidence obtained through informants can be a significant aid in the successful prosecution of drug traffickers.



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Suggested Reading Fitzgerald, D.G., Informants and Undercover Investigations: A Practical Guide for Law, Policy and Procedure, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2007. Lyman, M., Criminal Investigation: The Art and the Science, 5th ed., Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2007. Madinger, J., Confidential Informant: Law Enforcement’s Most Valuable Tool, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 1999. McWilliams, J.C., The Protectors: Harry Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Associated University Press, Canbury, NJ, 1990.



5

Surveillance Operations

Any investigator will tell you that one way to learn a considerable amount of information about someone is to simply follow them. Doing so can reveal where suspects live, work, hang out, bank, and with whom they associate. Surveillance entails more than just physically following suspects and is a primary duty of the drug enforcement investigator. Surveillance can be conducted in a number of ways. These include on foot, in a vehicle, or through electronic monitoring or wiretaps. Police surveillance serves many purposes in ongoing criminal investigations. It is clear, however, that within a covert unit this is an essential function. Specifically defined, surveillance is the surreptitious observation of persons, places, objects, or conveyances for the purpose of determining criminal involvement. The three types of surveillance effectively used by law enforcement agencies are moving, stationary, and electronic. Surveillance is usually undertaken with certain objectives: to obtain specific details of persons and places suspected of drug trafficking, to verify information, to collect evidence of crimes, to obtain probable cause for search warrants, to apprehend suspects in the commission of crimes, to prevent the commission of crimes, and to locate persons wanted for crimes. Surveillance is also probably the most time-consuming and tedious task in law enforcement. One key to a successful surveillance operation is reliable intelligence. In addition, the surveillance function can provide invaluable intelligence that might be unobtainable through other sources. Surveillants (officers assigned to make observations) must be creative in their efforts to observe criminal suspects and activity covertly. Ideally, the surveillant’s appearance and mannerisms should blend in with the surroundings to

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remain inconspicuous. He or she must also remain alert to details and be resourceful and patient throughout the operation. To best prepare for surveillance, officers must first study police files for any information pertaining to the case: the suspect’s physical description; names, addresses, and physical descriptions of associates; vehicle descriptions; residence and business addresses; and any other known areas the suspect frequents. Appropriate equipment should be made available to each team: digital cameras with zoom lenses, binoculars, tape recorders for surveillance notes, night viewing devices, and basic items (such as pens, pencils, note paper for the surveillance log, and change or phone cards for pay phones). After basic information is gathered, the target area should be reconnoitered to determine the appropriate vehicles and dress. The team should also note surveillance vantage points (where officers can best observe the area), street names, one-way streets, dead-end streets, and traffic conditions in order to avoid problems during the operation. Surveillance should not be assigned to an officer working alone: two sets of eyes and ears are better than one, and teams better avoid the problem of tedium. A team leader or supervisor should also be present during the surveillance to add cohesiveness and direction to the operation. If the surveillance becomes mobile, a communication system must be established to reduce confusion and avoid excessive radio traffic. Because surveillances are often lengthy, relief officers are necessary. The supervisor must establish procedures to guarantee that each new shift is apprised of any advancements or changes in the case. The briefing should include identification of new suspects, vehicles, residences, and locations. Depending on the case, different methods can be used to document the actions of criminal suspects. A surveillance operation may be directed toward a person, a vehicle, or a location for the purpose of bringing an investigation into sharp focus. By identifying individuals in obtaining detailed information about their activities, the criminal investigator can accomplish the following: • • • • • • • •

Obtain evidence of a crime Prevent the commission of an act or apprehend a suspect in the commission of an act Locate individuals or watch their hangouts and associates Obtain probable cause for obtaining search warrants Gather information for later use in an interrogation Develop leads and information received from other sources Obtain admissible legal evidence for use in court Protect undercover officers or corroborate their testimony



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Preparing for the Surveillance Before initiation of the surveillance, a study should be made of all files relating to the suspects, their activities in crimes, their working and neighborhood environments, and the vehicles involved in the case. In studying information relating to the suspects, the officer should focus on names and aliases used by suspects and detailed physical descriptions, including photographs when available. When possible, the suspect should be pointed out to the surveillance officers. Identifying characteristics and mannerisms of the suspect should also be studied by the officers. The habits and normal routines of the suspects should be examined, as well as their probable suspicion of, and ability to elude, the surveillance operation. The identities and descriptions of known or suspected contacts or associates should be known, and the officers should be knowledgeable about the scope and extent of crimes and activities in which the suspects are involved. Officers must also familiarize themselves with the type of neighborhood in which the operation will take place, concentrating on such aspects as the type of inhabitants, their dress, and their use of language. This information will assist the officers to blend in with the neighborhood. The equipment used by surveillance officers is only limited by their improvisational abilities. For example, on a short-term surveillance of a building, the surveillance officers may use utility belts with tools and hard hats to adopt the appearance of public utility employees or utilize some other type of “cover” equipment. A physical reconnaissance should be made to study the areas where the surveillance will take place and to identify suitable vantage points for the officers. Similarly, traffic conditions can be observed, and the officers can become familiar with the names and locations of streets in the area, including locations of dead-end streets that may be used by the suspect to spot surveillance officers. The reconnaissance should also gather information on the neighborhood and its inhabitants that would not be in the police files. The officer must mentally and physically prepare himself for surveillance operations and realize that he or she must be patient and possess endurance. Perseverance is needed while waiting for the suspect to appear or to doggedly follow a suspect through the same routine day after day. Regardless of careful planning, there are always many unanticipated occurrences in surveillance work; therefore, officers must be alert and resourceful. Keen powers of observation and memory are also needed as officers often cannot write down all events, descriptions of contacts, or times as they occur. Furthermore, officers must prepare a logical explanation for


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being in a particular place at a particular time if they are approached by the subject and accused of following him or her. The officer must address and adopt the demeanor of local inhabitants in order to blend into the setting. The type of clothing to be worn will determine whether concealment of weapons or use of personal radios jeopardizes the operation. Ideally, the officer should have an ordinary appearance and must be able to act naturally under all circumstances, to avoid attracting the suspect’s attention and to blend in to the target’s environment. Officers should also have such items as caps, jackets, and glasses available to quickly change appearance if needed. Flexibility and versatility are the keys to any surveillance. The change of clothing may suffice for one individual; another may use clothing to suggest a trade or service. The clothing and behavior should be coordinated to communicate some cover or excuse for being in a neighborhood.

Foot Surveillance Generally, the foot surveillance technique is used only over relatively short distances or to maintain contact with a suspect after he has left a vehicle. There are four principal methods for conducting a moving surveillance on foot: oneman surveillance, two-man surveillance, ABC, and progressive or “leapfrog.” One-Man Surveillance The single-officer technique is extremely difficult to conduct because the suspect must be kept in view at all times and close contact is required to enable the officer to immediately observe the suspect if he enters a building, turns a corner, or makes other sudden moves. Two-Man Surveillance This method affords greater security against detection and reduces the risk of losing the suspect. On streets that are crowded with pedestrian or vehicular traffic, both officers should normally remain on the same side of the street as the suspect. The first officer trails the suspect fairly closely. The second officer remains some distance behind the first. On a less crowded street, one officer should walk on the opposite side of the street nearly abreast of the suspect. In order to avoid detection, the two officers should make periodic changes in their positions relative to the suspect. ABC Method By utilizing a three-man surveillance team in this technique, the risk of losing the suspect is further reduced. Under most conditions, this method provides



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greater security against detection. The ABC method also permits a greater variation in the position of the officers and also allows an officer who suspects he has been spotted by the suspect to drop out of close contact. Under normal traffic conditions, officer “A” keeps a reasonable distance behind the suspect. Officer “B” follows “A” and concentrates on keeping “A” in view. He also checks whether an associate of the subject is being used to detect the surveillance (countersurveillance). Officer “C” walks on the opposite side of the street slightly behind the suspect. On streets with little or no traffic, officers “B” and “C” may be on the opposite side of the street or officer “C” may be in front of the suspect. On crowded streets, however, all three officers should generally be on the same side of the street. The lead officer should follow closely to observe the suspect at intersections or if he enters a building. As with the two-man method, the officers should frequently alter their positions relative to the suspect to avoid detection. When the suspect approaches an intersection and there is a probability that he might turn, officer “C” across the street should reach the intersection first. By pausing at the corner, officer “C” can watch the suspect and signal his actions to officers “A” and “B.” If “C” signals that the suspect has turned the corner and stopped, both “A” and “B” may have to cross the intersection and proceed to a point out of the suspect’s view and rely on “C” to signal them when the suspect continues on his way. Whether or not the suspect stops, turning the corner provides an opportunity to rotate the positions of the officers. To communicate with each other, surveillance officers must agree on some basic hand signals. These hand signals must be simple and given in such a manner as not to attract attention. When possible, small, easily concealed personal radios can be used by the team. Progressive or “Leapfrog” Method In the progressive or “leapfrog” method of surveillance, the suspect is observed intermittently as he moves along a certain habitual route. The surveillance officer stations himself at a fixed point until the suspect disappears from view. If a suspect follows the same route each day, his destination may be determined without constant surveillance. The officer should station himself each day where the suspect disappeared from view the previous day. More than one officer can be used to extend the period of observation. This method may be of value in locating hideouts or meeting places when the risk of trailing a suspect is too great. This method is not common because of the time involved and the probability of obtaining poor results. There is no assurance that the suspect will either go to the same destination or take the same route each day. However,


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a modified version may be useful when a suspect’s rounds are routine or when his contacts are known but his source or base of operations is unknown. The suspect can be followed until the risk of detection is too great. The surveillance can then be canceled for that day and reinstituted the next day at the location where the previous day’s surveillance was called off. Difficulties in Surveillance Operations Problems that may be encountered when conducting a foot surveillance are infinite, but there are certain common difficulties that preplanning may help to resolve. For example, if the suspect enters a building, at least one officer should follow the suspect inside, unless the building is a private home or small shop or if entry would expose the officer. For large public buildings with many exits, all officers should follow the suspect into the building. It is prudent for one officer to remain in the lobby or at the door to spot the suspect if he leaves the building. In instances where a suspect enters a restaurant, at least one officer should enter behind the suspect to note any contacts made inside. If possible, the officer should pay his check before the suspect so that he can be prepared to leave with him. In some cases, it is desirable for the officer to leave shortly before the suspect and wait for him outside. Should the suspect register in a hotel, the room number and length of anticipated stay may be obtained from a manager or desk clerk. However, these employees should not be asked for information until it is determined that they can be trusted. If the hotel management is cooperative, it may be possible to obtain a room near the suspect, which can be used as a surveillance base. All outgoing telephone calls placed by the suspect are normally recorded by the hotel switchboard operator. These records should be examined for leads. Trash from the suspect room should not be overlooked, although trespassing to retrieve this or any other possible evidence without a search warrant is not permitted. A clever suspect, discovering that he is under surveillance, may not reveal this knowledge but may attempt to lose his followers by means of false contacts or decoys. For example, for a surveillance on a suspected illicit drug exchange, the suspect may leave a package full of worthless papers or materials with the contact, thereby causing unwary officers to redirect or discontinue their surveillance, leaving the suspect free to make the real contacts unobserved. Similarly, the suspect may attempt to lead the officer into a trap. A thorough knowledge of the locality, tempered with good judgment and alertness to realize when trailing becomes too easy, is a good defense against such traps. If a suspect resorts to trickery, it is good policy to change surveillance officers. Some common methods that a suspect may use to detect foot surveillance are:



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1. Stopping to tie a shoelace, meanwhile looking for followers. 2. Stopping abruptly and looking at people to the rear or reversing course and retracing steps. 3. Stopping abruptly after turning the corner or walking slowly and rapidly. 4. Arranging with a friend in the shop or other place to watch for surveillants behind him. 5. Riding short distances on buses and taxis or circling a block in a taxi. 6. Entering a building and leaving immediately via another exit. 7. Watching in mirrors of hotel lobbies and restaurants to see who is coming and going. 8. Starting to leave a location quickly and then suddenly turning around to see whether anyone also suddenly rises. 9. Opening and closing his hotel door to indicate that he has left the room and then waiting inside the room with the door slightly ajar to see whether anyone leaves an adjacent room.

Vehicle Surveillance As with foot surveillance, there are four types of vehicular surveillance (or mobile surveillance): the one-, two-, and three-car surveillance and the leapfrog method. If only one car is available for surveillance, its position should be behind the suspect’s car, the distance varying with the amount of traffic in the area. In city traffic, not more than two vehicles should be permitted between the suspect’s car and the surveillance vehicle. In rural areas, it is advisable to give the suspect a good lead. If intersections and road forks are far between, the lead can be extended to a point where the suspect’s car may be even temporarily lost from view over hills or around curves. When possible, there should be another car between the surveillance vehicle and the suspect’s car. At night, the surveillant’s car should not have its headlights on high beam unless absolutely necessary to maintain contact. Similarly, all other unnecessary lights on the car should be extinguished. Whenever possible, the surveillant’s car should be occupied by two officers — one driver and one observer to take notes. The second officer can also take over surveillance on foot if necessary. Seating arrangements and appearance of these two officers should be changed periodically to avoid recognition by suspects. The officers should prepare for emergencies by carrying food, raincoats, tire chains, and any other items appropriate for the circumstances of the surveillance. Many agencies have installed switches (kill-switches) on surveillance cars to enable the officers to darken lights, shut off running lights, or to shut off individual lights needed to change the vehicle’s appearance.


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Figure 5.1

When conducting a two-car surveillance in city areas during daylight hours, both cars should be behind the suspect’s car. Occasionally, one car may operate on a parallel route, timing itself to arrive at intersections just before the suspect in order to observe his route at the intersection. This method is also highly suitable for use at night in suburban areas. In a three-car surveillance, parallel routes can be more readily utilized, and the positions of the cars can be changed frequently enough to prevent discovery of the surveillance. One car may be used to lead the suspect while the suspect’s vehicle is observed through the rearview mirror. The leapfrog surveillance with cars is very similar to leapfrog surveillance on foot. In this type of surveillance, for example, the suspect’s vehicle may be observed intermittently as it proceeds along its suspected route. From a fixed



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position, the officers watch the suspect’s vehicle disappear from view. After a number of such surveillances, the suspect’s final destination is determined. This particular approach of the leapfrog surveillance is often impractical because of the greater distances that can be covered by car. For this reason, it would be more beneficial if the surveillance officers followed the suspect’s car until the risk of detection is too great, whereupon the surveillance is called off for that day. The next time the suspect makes his scheduled trip, the officers can initiate their surveillance at the geographical point that the previous surveillance was ended. As in the case of foot surveillance, the suspect who believes he may be followed can resort to various techniques to detect the surveillance automobile. Some of the most common techniques include: • • •

Alternate fast and slow driving or frequent parking Stopping suddenly around curves or corners or speeding up a hill and then coasting slowly downhill Driving into dead-end streets or pulling into driveways

Once a suspect has confirmed his suspicion, he can use a variety of techniques to elude automobile surveillance. Some examples are: • • • • •

Committing flagrant traffic violations, such as making U turns, driving against traffic on one-way streets, and running through red lights Using double entrances to driveways — in one entrance and out the other Cutting through parking lots Driving through congested areas Deserting the vehicle beyond the blind curve or corner

Fixed Surveillance When a fixed surveillance (stationary surveillance) is utilized, officers watch from a stationary vantage point, such as a room, house, or camouflaged outdoor fixture located near the premises being observed. Typically, a fixed surveillance, or stakeout, is conducted for one of the following reasons: • • • •

To detect illicit activities in the targeted area To identify persons who frequent the dwelling or establishment and to determine their roles in the illicit activity To provide the probable cause for a search warrant of the target area To determine the habits of the individuals who frequent the locale under observation


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Before the fixed surveillance is initiated, the surrounding area should be carefully studied. The officers should note the residents and transients and the general character of the neighborhood. Only after such a survey is conducted should the observation point be selected. This observation point should afford maximum observation of all entrances and exits to the location under observation and should have an exit to permit officers to enter and leave without being observed from the suspect’s premises. Panel trucks and campers have been converted to fixed observation points using peepholes or curtained windows for viewing. Rooftops are excellent for long-range surveillance, whereas stores and hallways are suitable sites for short-range viewing. Another possibility is a camouflaged outdoor fixture such as a vendor’s stand. Sometimes it is possible to use the same observation point over an extended time period; in other instances, it is necessary to move frequently to avoid notice. For fixed surveillance to be effective in scrutinizing the suspect’s activities, the presence of the observing officer must not be detected. For this reason, a fixed observation post in a building is preferable because the officers are not only concealed, but, through a rental arrangement, they have the rights of a resident or tenant. The location should also not attract the attention of the other occupants of the building.

Electronic Surveillance Electronic surveillance is the documentation of individuals, vehicles, or locations by electronic means; electronic devices are frequently used in conjunction with foot or vehicle surveillance. To secure a conviction in a drug case, most prosecutors now require not only the testimony of officers and police chemists but also supportive evidence such as photographs of the defendant, a recorded tape of the defendant’s voice, or a videotape showing the defendant’s criminal involvement. Many devices are available, and their quality and expense will vary from manufacturer to manufacturer. Basically, electronic surveillance devices fall into two categories: audio and visual. Audio Surveillance The ability to record the suspect’s voice before, during, and after a criminal transaction is an asset to any case. Even during the initial negotiations — long before any transactions have taken place — recorded conversations can provide valuable evidence of a suspect’s “criminal intent.” Typically, undercover operatives wear concealed transmitters, so-called body-mikes, when personal contacts are made. Officers should always test the unit before it is used because a body transmitter may occasionally transmit



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over cable channels inside a suspect’s residence. Body transmitters are usually expensive; a small tape recorder may serve as a substitute. Another way to record conversations with a suspect is to have an undercover agent or informant phone the suspect and record the call with “induction coil pickup.” An induction coil pickup is relatively inexpensive and is readily available at most electronic stores. It is also easy to use: simply attach the pickup to a telephone receiver and insert the plug into a standard tape recorder microphone jack. This procedure is not considered an illegal wiretap because one party of the conversation (the undercover officer) has given permission for the recording. Another method of recording criminal conversations is the use of the “spike mike.” When a suspect is located in a particular location (for example, an apartment or motel room), the spike mike can be placed against an adjacent wall and conversations can be monitored. Here, however, the suspect’s constitutional rights must be protected. If no agency personnel is participating in the conversation, use of a spike mike must first be authorized by the local prosecuting attorney (also see Chapter 11). Bumper Beepers For a moving surveillance, a vehicle-tracking device (or so-called bumper beeper) might be considered. A bumper beeper is an electronic transmitting device, usually attached to the underside of the suspect’s vehicle, which emits a signal that is picked up by special receiver. The receiver indicates which direction the suspect is traveling by emitting a series of “beeps”; the beeps are rapid when the suspect is close, and spaced out when the suspect is further away. A bumper beeper makes it easier to maintain a “loose tail” on a suspect. A bumper beeper, however, can be installed on a vehicle only pursuant to a court order. Bumper beepers can be somewhat problematic. Ideally, they are connected to the car’s battery (12 volt), but the hookup could be discovered by the suspect. Failing this, one can rely on the beeper’s internal 9-volt batteries. However, these are only good for short periods of time, thus making it necessary to retrieve the unit periodically and replace the batteries. Finally, the suspect may discover the beeper, thus jeopardizing the investigation and losing the unit (usually incurring a financial loss and perhaps embarrassing the department). Wiretaps The wiretap is the most commonly discussed form of electronic surveillance. The wiretap is a sensitive technical method of electronic surveillance. Although it may be legally authorized under federal law (and most state laws), a few states still have legislation that forbids wiretapping or eavesdropping.


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Even in states where a wiretap may be legally used, it still must be the last resort in the investigation process: officers must show that all other avenues of investigation have been tried and have failed, or they must show that those not tried are too dangerous to attempt. Furthermore, all details of the previous investigation attempts (and the reasons why other techniques should not be tried) must be specifically documented in the application (affidavit) for the court order authorizing the wiretap. Moreover, the courts have ruled that, to conduct electronic eavesdropping lawfully, officers must do everything reasonably possible to respect the suspect’s right to privacy. This means that should a wiretap be authorized, officers can only listen to criminal conversations and therefore must “minimize” intrusions into conversations not relating to criminal conduct. In addition to being legally complicated, wiretap investigations are also expensive and time consuming. In addition to carefully planning a wiretap investigation, it should be remembered that a wiretap merely facilitates a conspiracy investigation. It is a means of documenting an agreement between two suspects to commit a particular criminal act. Because an overt act is necessary to prove a conspiracy, surveillance officers must be on 24-hour standby to properly observe and document the subsequent overt act. This represents a considerable commitment of time and manpower; many departments often cannot justify its use. If a wiretap is employed, however, it can prove to be a good investigative tool. It permits law enforcement officers to record criminal conversations, and the recordings provide excellent evidence for the prosecution of conspirators. Passive Monitoring Passive monitoring (that is, without electronic equipment) of suspect conversations is permitted under certain circumstances. The same considerations with regard to the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy, however, still pertain. An example of permissible passive monitoring would be when two suspects are discussing a drug deal while standing at a pool table in a public tavern. If an undercover agent was legally present in the tavern (posing as a customer) and close enough to overhear the conversation, the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy would not have been violated. Any conversation overheard regarding criminal activity could then be used against the suspect in court. Video and Photo Surveillance Whenever possible, visual surveillance equipment should be used to corroborate audiotape recordings or testimony of prosecution witnesses. The most typical (and underrated) means of visual recording is the camera. Whether



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digital cameras can provide a reproduction of all or parts of the crime for prosecution. If budgets are not too restricted, higher resolution cameras (for example, 6 megapixels) will give officers clear and detailed photographs. Most cameras automatically date each print at the time it is taken. The use of video cameras is also generally accepted in sophisticated criminal surveillance operations. Generally, videotaped evidence provides a more comprehensive reproduction of a crime than a still photograph (although still photographs often afford greater detail and clarity). Unit managers, especially, should be aware that video technology is constantly changing, and they should try to stay current with what is available. The newer smaller cameras, for example, are more easily concealed and may be worth the additional expenditure. Because many covert operations involve nighttime maneuvers, methods should be developed to use cameras and video equipment at night. The starlight scope, for example, will illuminate an otherwise almost totally dark area and may be used with or without a camera. The starlight scope produces a greenish, somewhat grainy image, but it permits acceptablequality photos of nighttime meetings between suspects and police agents. In the case of total darkness, the starlight scope will, however, require some light source to provide an image. The source cannot be too great, such as a nearby streetlight, but a mild source of light (starlight, mild moonlight) will create sufficient illumination to an otherwise dark area, permitting suspect identification, the reading of automobile license tags, and tracking of undercover agents. Another solution to the problem of nighttime surveillance is the use of a 35-mm camera with an infrared lens. An infrared lens allows excellentquality photos under minimal lighting conditions. One source, which provides more than sufficient lighting, is a Cyalume ® infrared light stick. The Cyalume light stick is an inexpensive light source that, when broken in half, emits ample light for infrared photography while the light source itself remains literally invisible to the naked eye. Suspects will be unable to detect anything unusual unless they, too, are using infrared equipment for countersurveillance. Infrared light sticks have other benefits. An infrared light stick can be placed in an undercover agent’s jacket pocket, thus allowing surveillants using infrared equipment to more easily distinguish the agent from suspects during the nighttime contact. In office buildings, when it is not feasible to turn on the indoor office lights, light sticks placed in a ceiling vent will emit enough light for infrared photography or visual surveillance. Even in a room that appears totally dark to the naked eye, infrared lighting will illuminate the room so that a positive identification of suspects is possible through an infrared camera system.


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Undercover Apartments A highly recommended surveillance tactic is the use of a specially equipped undercover apartment as a meeting place between undercover officers and suspects. The apartment should be selected for its strategic location and for ease in incorporating surveillance equipment. Ideally, the undercover apartment should be a two-bedroom dwelling in which a bedroom and the living room share a common wall; such a layout enables support officers to more closely monitor meetings between undercover officers and suspects. When locating an appropriate apartment, however, a background check of all neighbors should be performed to ensure that known felons are not living nearby. In the undercover apartment there should be a specific item — such as a sofa or chair — in the main surveillance room upon which video cameras, microphones, and special lighting will be targeted. This is where the undercover officer tries to have the suspect sit so that the suspect’s image and words can be clearly recorded. The officer should be trained to be able to lead the conversation to what the officer wants to discuss. The undercover officer must have the ability to read the suspect’s body language in order to detect nervousness. The undercover officer must also feel comfortable in front of the camera. It is important that he or she does not talk too much, act nervous, or otherwise fail to think clearly during the undercover contact. To prepare officers for the videotaped encounter, it might be advisable not to tape the first transaction in an investigation. When subsequent transactions are made, the officer should be more comfortable with both the camera and the suspect. If the subsequent videotaped drug buy goes smoothly, the officer may choose not to file charges on the unrecorded initial purchase. The proper placement of low-light video cameras is crucial to the proper documentation of meetings between undercover officers and suspected drug violators. The cameras may be placed in almost any location within the room where both the officer and suspect can be filmed, but to avoid detection, they should never be placed at the suspect’s eye level. People have a tendency to look around at eye level more often than they do above or below it. Good locations for camera placement include ventilation vents, stereo speakers, flowerpots, and behind posters and pictures. Two-way mirrors, although still used, are no longer recommended. Their use is somewhat dated, and suspects may expect that cameras are concealed behind them. If mirrors are used, however, a black cloth should be positioned behind the mirror so that surveillance cameras cannot be detected. In addition, if concealed cameras are employed, steps must be taken both to shield the cameras from view and to position the cameras so that light reflections from the lenses do not give away their hiding places.



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When placing a video camera in an undercover apartment, officers must take care to position it where images can clearly be recorded. Preferably, a wide-angle lens should be used, as the field of view will most likely take in the entire room. When placing the camera, a rule of thumb is to manipulate the suspect to an area of the room where the image of his head appears on the video monitor just slightly larger than a thumb when placed on the monitor screen over the image. If a clear image is unobtainable on the videotape, subsequent identification of the suspect may be difficult in court proceedings, thereby jeopardizing the case. Other technical modifications can be made to not only conceal surveillance cameras but also to more easily cloak the surveillance process. Such modifications include installation of silent plastic gears in camera autowinders, appropriate interior lighting in undercover apartments, and the placement of specially designed concealed power microphones, which can clearly transmit voices within a particular room.

Surveillance of Undercover Personnel When surveillance of undercover personnel is anticipated, surveillants must consider several important factors. First, it should be understood that, once the undercover officer assumes his or her role in a contact, the officer’s ability to control the overall safety of the meeting is diminished. Even if the undercover officer is the case agent, he or she will not be able to observe the “big picture.” Basically, this means that the undercover officer cannot observe countersurveillance by suspects or new and unforeseen circumstances. These are the provinces of the support officers conducting the surveillance. Second, it should be remembered that the surveillance officer has several basic functions while assisting the undercover officer. All of these functions are important and should be remembered at all times. These include the following: • • •

To protect the undercover officer by monitoring his contacts with suspects. To locate any possible countersurveillance suspects in the area. To accurately log any activity associated with the undercover contact, for example, people coming and going, vehicle descriptions, etc.

Observation of an undercover officer may pose other surveillance problems: •

Neon signs and large buildings tend to reduce the transmitting range of the body transmitter (radio frequency [RF] transmitter).



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•

Officers conducting surveillance in parking lots where transactions are scheduled may be observed by employees of businesses in the area. The local police may be called in this circumstance because of the employees’ belief that the officers are would-be burglars or armed robbers.

Stakeouts Experienced investigators will commonly state that a stakeout is one of the most tedious yet potentially productive assignments in drug enforcement. Essentially, a stakeout is a stationary surveillance focusing on a specific location. Stakeouts are typically used in drug enforcement to observe people who come and go from a specific location as well as other types of investigations, such as robbery, in anticipation of a crime being committed. The anticipated perpetrators may be known individuals or may be suspects known only by their mode of operation (MO). Often, the purpose of the stakeout is to arrest the suspect(s) during the attempted or actual commission of a crime — such as taking down a methamphetamine lab after it has begun production of the drug. Stakeouts can involve enforcement actions against armed criminal suspects. Therefore, the safety of officers and bystanders should always be of primary concern. The objectives of criminal arrest should never supersede the need to protect officers and civilians against unreasonable risks. Preparation Before conducting a stakeout, officers and supervisors should review individual department policies affecting the operation. Officers must be acutely aware that the use of deadly force is a distinct possibility. If an officer has difficulty in accepting that fact, he or she should not be assigned to the stakeout. Department policy concerning such assignments must be clear and complete, and all officers should review these policies and procedures with their supervisors. Personnel Selection The selection of officers to staff stakeouts is of considerable importance. Only those officers who are mentally and physically fit and who have continually demonstrated good judgment in high-stress situations should be considered. This is not an assignment for inexperienced investigators, and stakeouts should not be the testing ground for an officer to demonstrate his or her skills and ability. Rather, stakeouts should be staffed with the most competent investigators in their organization.



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Investigators assigned to the stakeout should be subject to close evaluation. Their actions and reactions in a stakeout environment must be predictable and cannot be left to chance. Maturity coupled with experience, dedication, and loyalty are desirable traits of a stakeout officer. Because of the strenuous nature of these assignments, the physical condition of officers should not be overlooked. For example, an officer who is out of shape will tire easily, and this will adversely affect his ability to react quickly when needed most. As with many aspects of drug enforcement, stakeouts involve hours and hours of tedious waiting punctuated by moments of extreme physical demands — an environment in which only the most experienced and trained officers are suitable. Equipment The equipment required for stakeouts is relatively straightforward; however, the decision about what to bring should not be a subject of individual officer choice. For example: • •

Soft body armor is a necessity for all officers. Running shoes are preferable if they are appropriate dress for the stakeout environment and prevailing weather conditions.

In all probability, officers will not be able to take breaks or have a mealtime, so food and drink will need to be carried to the stakeout. If the stakeout is in a restricted area, particular arrangements must be made for relief. Provisions must also be made for restroom facilities, although these will frequently fall short of normally accepted standards. The officer’s primary weapon, back-up weapon, and any additional weapons such as shotguns should be inspected to ensure proper operation. If an officer is assigned a shotgun, he or she should be well trained in its use under all conditions. In some cases, it may not be feasible for an inside team to deploy a shotgun or other shoulder weapon. In most cases, the inside team is not the arrest or “takedown” team, so officers will normally only require handguns. In the event that investigators of an inside team are not concealed, such as when acting as employees in a work area, they may not be able to conceal weapons on their person. If a weapon is to be hidden in a desk drawer or other location, the officer must be in immediate proximity to the weapon. “Takedown” officers, assigned arrest responsibility, must be armed at all times. Special weapons that are authorized only under unusual circumstances are not recommended unless officers train regularly with these weapons and have achieved an above-average level of proficiency. Standard-issue sidearms and shotguns remain the preferred choice since officers are usually most familiar with these weapons.


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Briefings The briefings or roll calls preceding deployment of a stakeout should be of two types. The first type is the dissemination of information by investigative personnel. The investigators in charge of the case should provide all officers with information concerning the suspect(s) and their MO. This should include, when available, photos or composites, suspect armament, and the suspect’s potential for violence based on previous crimes. Is the suspect armed? Has the suspect used his weapon? Has the suspect used drugs and, if so, what kind? What is the possibility of outside accomplices or countersurveillance? As these and related issues are discussed, one can begin to formulate the tactical actions that officers must take. The second type of the briefing is provided by those officers who surveyed, or “advanced,” the assigned location. An advance consists of assessing a potential stakeout location and developing an initial tactical plan. The advance should be the responsibility of the stakeout supervisor or senior officers with stakeout experience. Organization, manpower deployment, and related concerns should be the responsibility of supervisors with tactical knowledge. Assignment of Duties After the briefing, officers should be assigned their responsibilities, with a minimum of four officers assigned to each inside location if an arrest is anticipated. Stakeouts conducted for intelligence purposes and not arrest may utilize as few as two investigators. If resources preclude this minimum assignment, the stakeout should not be conducted. The safety of officers and bystanders is not a factor that can be compromised. Whereas four officers is the minimum for most inside stakeouts, manpower requirements increase if more than two suspects are involved. As a general rule, two officers should be used for every suspect. The suspects’ weapons should also be considered when determining the number of officers needed, as well as the suspects’ history of violence. Team Planning After personnel assignments are made, individual team meetings should be conducted for the purpose of contingency planning. These meetings should never be conducted at the stakeout location or other public places that could compromise the operation. Officers should be reminded that all material relative to the stakeout is confidential and that such material should be controlled. Depending on the sensitivity of the detail, this material may be collected at the end of the watch, at the conclusion of the detail, or sequentially numbered and signed for by each officer.



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A senior officer selected by the detail supervisor should conduct the team meeting. This officer is responsible for a single stakeout location and the officers assigned to that location, as well as for the specific tactical plan for the team. In planning a stakeout, one must be prepared for the most serious situation that may occur and proceed with that mindset. For example, the team leader and supervisor must anticipate the possibility that an officer may be involved in a shooting, together with the potential circumstances and the tactical response. With this in mind, one would also need to know the location and shortest distance to the nearest emergency medical facility. Contingency plans should also address appropriate actions to take should the suspects use side or rear entrances for entry or exit, force employees into a storeroom or other location, threaten the use of explosives, take hostages, create a barricade situation if confronted, or take other unpredicted steps. Contingency planning is the key to conducting a successful stakeout. The overall plan must be flexible and capable of dealing with communications failures, vehicle problems, or any of a number of other matters that could potentially disrupt or curtail the operation. Training Stakeouts are among the most demanding of law enforcement tactical operations. As a consequence, officers deployed in such operations must be professionally trained in the specialized skills necessary to ensure effectiveness and safety. Basic annual or semiannual qualification with standard issue firearms, for example, does not adequately prepare an officer for the potential circumstances in which firearms may be used in actual stakeout conditions. For example, engaging an armed felon who is moving in and out of acceptable background conditions or properly using a 12-gauge shotgun with magnum rounds from a prone position are skills that must be learned and practiced repeatedly well before an officer is assigned to a stakeout operation. Police agencies that do not have in-house access to this type of specialized training should seek outside sources of training assistance before conducting a stakeout. Communications Communications are totally dependent on the resources of an individual agency. Whenever possible, however, a single frequency should be assigned to a stakeout detail. This tactical frequency should be reserved and given appropriate priority; however, if this is not possible, the assigned frequency should be available at a moment’s notice. Officers at a stakeout location should have the authority to dedicate the frequency to their operation if the need arises.


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If individual headsets are not available, most police radios will accommodate ear plugs that are commercially available. It is vitally important that officers have closed communications inside locations so that radio transmissions do not reveal their position. Extra batteries for hand-held radios are essential. Radio checks should be made every one-half to one hour, depending on the number of locations and the capability of that agency’s communication system. Deployment Generally, a stakeout consists of an inside team and an outside team of two officers each. The outside team is normally designated as the arrest team. Enforcement action should not be taken by the inside team unless a lifethreatening situation develops. Once the subjects have exited the stakeout location, the inside team is also responsible for securing the location to ensure that the suspects do not reenter and possibly create a barricade or hostage situation. Assigning the arrest is ultimately based on factors associated with the specific stakeout location. For example, normally crowded public stores are not generally the best location for an arrest confrontation. On the other hand, less trafficked locations, such as exclusive jewelry stores that use controlled public access, would be preferable over a busy public street. These and related factors concerning the stakeout location should be addressed during the stakeout advance, and team responsibilities should be decided by the detail supervisor. The inside team is responsible for briefing employees concerning their actions if a crime occurs. They should ensure that employees do not initiate any independent action and should remove any privately owned weapons. Employees should understand that they should not inform anyone that police are present, nor should they seek assistance from the stakeout team for crimes such as shoplifting. If necessary, uniformed officers may respond as usual to handle these offenses. Such incidents should be handled as quickly as possible, and uniformed officers should leave the area once the call for service has been handled. Employees should be reminded to conduct themselves in a normal and inconspicuous manner at all times. They should also be cautioned to lie prone on the floor should gunfire develop. If the inside team is not going to observe from a concealed position, officers must be inconspicuous in their particular setting. If employees wear a distinctive attire, then so must the inside team. There is always a possibility that the suspects may inspect a location before committing the crime, so stakeout officers must appear to be a part of the local operation. All police equipment must be concealed, and radios must be turned off. Any private security should be dismissed and should leave the area. If the absence of private security would



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be obvious, security personnel may be permitted to stay, but they should not be armed and should be thoroughly briefed as to their role. Employees should be informed that no police action will be taken inside, with the exception of actions necessary to save lives, so as to relieve any unnecessary anxiety on the part of employees. Officers should also ensure that there is nothing on the premises, such as a scanner, that would reveal the stakeout operation. If any employee displays obvious signs of stress, serious consideration should be given to removing that employee with the cooperation of the location’s management personnel. If there is any suspicion that an employee may be involved with the suspects, an inside team should not be deployed, and no one outside the police agency should be notified of the stakeout operation. In such instances, assigned officers should conduct the stakeout from a covert observation post outside the location. Concealment of the outside team is a concern that officers sometimes overlook. Just as suspects survey prospective target locations from inside, they also frequently survey the surrounding area. Stakeouts that do not adhere to good concealment practices risk detection. There is simply no way, for example, that two officers can sit in a vehicle or use the same disguise for an extended period of time without being conspicuous. A sedan is frequently used but may not be the best available option for the outside team. If a sedan is preferred, however, one officer should sit in the front seat and one in the right rear seat. The officer in the rear seat should position himself so he has a clear view of activities to the rear of the vehicle. This positioning is necessary, since there are cases in which officers have been fatally wounded while seated together in the front of their vehicle and unable to see suspects approaching from the rear. Underground parking, carports, and residential driveways also provide concealment and allow officers some freedom of movement. Vans and other businesses or residences are also frequently used. Whatever the location, the observation post should be selected with the understanding that it could be in place for an extended period of time. Response of the outside team to the stakeout location should be tested, taking into account changing traffic patterns at different times of the day. Thirty seconds should be considered the maximum allowable response time for the outside team to get to the stakeout. To reduce response time, outside teams should not situate themselves on the opposite side of major thoroughfares and either minimize the number of intersections that must be crossed or eliminate them altogether. Entry and exit of the inside team to the stakeout location are extremely important. All equipment, particularly weapons, must be concealed, and officers should not arrive at the location at the same time. Once inside, the


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first officer should contact the designated manager or person in charge. Officers should seek a private area to brief the manager on stakeout procedures and then reevaluate the situation for safety. If circumstances have changed sufficiently since the advance was conducted to affect safety, officers should contact a supervisor immediately and, if necessary, redeploy until the problems can be resolved. The physical environment of a stakeout is one of the most troublesome issues should the use of firearms be necessary. Regardless of whether an officer is deployed inside or outside the location, all officers must visually inspect the entire location with background in mind. For example, plate glass windows from floor to ceiling or plasterboard walls are unacceptable background materials should the use of firearms become necessary by the inside team. Officers should be positioned to minimize inferior backgrounds. A standard procedure in this regard is to station one officer undercover, at a point in the facility well above eye level. This positioning provides several advantages. If the use of firearms is required, this officer will be firing downward, thus minimizing or eliminating background problems. It also provides for greater visibility and strategic advantage. With one officer in this position providing cover, the second inside officer can be used to collect the suspect’s weapons and frisk and handcuff the subject if an arrest must be made inside the stakeout location. The inside team should alert the arrest team as soon as anything unusual is suspected. Radio contact with the arrest team should be maintained for as long as possible to describe the suspects and the types of weapons being carried, anticipated exit route, and other pertinent information that would assist the arrest team and promote their safety. Weapon readiness is also an important consideration. When shotguns are used, a round should be chambered with the safety on. Shotguns should never be leaned against a wall, table, or other object but laid flat when not being held. Semiautomatic handguns should also be in a ready condition with the safety on. There is no time to chamber a round when needed instantly in a tactical situation. In addition, when disengaging the safety in such instances, it should be done as quietly as possible. Placing a finger on each side of the safety release when disengaging is a good way to ensure silence. Exiting a location is as critical as entry. Officers should exercise the same caution in leaving the location as they did when entering. As a stakeout continues, fatigue may become a factor. Officers and supervisors should be alert to signs of fatigue, and personnel should be rotated as necessary, especially for inside team officers whose level of preparedness and stress is greatest. Rotation can help to alleviate this constant tension as well as allow other officers to become knowledgeable about other duties of the stakeout operation.



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Stakeout Postevent Procedures The potential for the use of deadly force is a part of nearly all stakeouts. However, this potentiality does not constitute grounds for an exception to existing policies and procedures that govern the use of deadly force in individual agencies. The safety of officers and citizens alike and overall reverence for human life remain important issues. As in other circumstances, officers should use deadly force only as a last resort after all other reasonable alternatives are exhausted. Should a suspect be shot, he should be disarmed and handcuffed immediately. Officers should not diagnose the condition of the suspect to determine whether handcuffs are required. Instances exist in which presumably dead or incapacitated suspects have inflicted serious injuries on unsuspecting officers. The suspect’s weapon should also be secured. If the officer is not familiar with the weapon, he should handle it only to the degree necessary until it can be rendered safe. After the arrest, the surrounding area should be checked for accomplices and getaway cars, and the immediate area should be secured as a crime scene as soon as possible. In addition to ambulances, a call should be made for assistance from uniform support personnel. These calls should be made by telephone because police radio communications are frequently monitored by the news media and the public. All plainclothes officers should display proper identification and be easily identified as police officers because responding officers may not be aware that the location was a stakeout. Raid jackets are relatively inexpensive, easily obtainable, and easily recognized. Once the location is secured, standard procedures for handling a crime scene should be employed. The area should be roped off or isolated, evidence should be preserved, and witnesses should be located and identified. Information to be released should be channeled only to assigned press relations officers. Officers involved in the incident should not be subjected to press interviews and should not make public statements. Foot Pursuits If a suspect is able to elude the arrest team, a foot pursuit may ensue. The need for running shoes and loose-fitting clothing in these cases is apparent. Sound tactics for conducting foot pursuits enhance officer safety and increase the chances of capturing the fleeing suspect. Officers should not split up but remain as a team. If there are multiple suspects, the “main player” should already have been identified, and pursuing officers should concentrate on that individual.


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One should not forget that if the suspect discards one weapon he may be carrying a back-up weapon. Officers should not run blindly around the corners of buildings but, rather, should make wide turns to avoid being confronted at the corner by a waiting suspect. Officers should decide during stakeout planning whether one officer will carry a shotgun should a foot pursuit be necessary. Shotguns are valuable in these circumstances but are also heavy and limit one’s flexibility when the suspect is overtaken. Knowing the area surrounding the stakeout location is an advantage, and stakeout teams should study maps of their assigned areas before deployment. Both officers should carry portable radios during a foot pursuit. Although it is rather difficult to broadcast during a foot pursuit, the radios are necessary for coordinating responding units to establish a perimeter, as well as for personal safety.

Satellite-Assisted Surveillance Shortly after Laci Peterson disappeared in Modesto, California, on Christmas Eve 2002, her husband, Scott, assured police that he had nothing to do with it. The police were suspicious. Without Peterson’s knowledge, they received court permission to attach global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices to the undersides of three vehicles he was known to drive. The devices, which use cell phone networks and signals from orbiting satellites to pinpoint land locations, indicated that, twice in January 2003, Peterson drove to a San Francisco Bay Marina near where the bodies of his wife and unborn son washed ashore 3 months later. Scott Peterson was subsequently arrested and charged with the murder of his wife and unborn child. Prosecutors in the case used data gathered by the GPS devices as part of a body of evidence suggesting that Peterson was guilty. The use of GPS in the Peterson case reflects how police across the nation are turning to such devices for surveillance, eavesdropping, and other tasks that traditionally have been performed by uniformed officers and detectives. Recent improvements in cell phone technology and in the quality of satellite signals allow investigators to track and record a vehicle’s movements in realtime and display the information on a map on a laptop computer. A typical GPS tracking device is about the size of a paperback book and can be affixed to a car’s undercarriage with a magnet. The cost for such a device is minimal at about $1000. As of the writing of this text, questions over whether police need a court’s permission (a court order) to use GPS devices in investigations have become the subject of concern in state and federal courts across the nation.



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Wiretaps and property searches ordinarily must be authorized by a state or federal judge, who determines whether such tactics are needed to investigate a crime. The surveillance on public roads ordinarily does not require such court orders. Because GPS devices are a substitute for ordinary visual surveillance, many police departments believe it can be used without a court order. Civil rights advocates are concerned that the technology has advanced to where police can track thousands of people anywhere and anytime, and police do not have to give a reason. As of the preparation of this text, there are no records of how often GPS is being used nationally in criminal investigations. However, an examination of recent criminal investigations has revealed that its use is somewhat common. For example: 1. In May 2004, a Honolulu police unit that locates stolen automobiles parked a car with a GPS tracker in a high-crime area. The “bait” car was stolen and located quickly. Police arrested the driver. 2. In 2002, criminal investigators in Nassau County, New York, used two GPS devices to track a car driven by burglary suspect Richard Lacey. Prosecutors planned to use GPS records to show that the car was in the vicinity of several homes at the time they were burglarized. 3. In 2000, the FBI in Las Vegas used two GPS devices that had been built into a car to eavesdrop on the targets of an investigation into organized crime. The device, offered as a safety accessory by some carmakers, allows lost or endangered drivers to be located quickly if they call for help. 4. In 1999, in Spokane, Washington, GPS devices on the Ford pickup and the Honda Accord driven by murder suspect William Bradley Jackson led police to the grave of his missing 9-year-old daughter Valiree. The GPS data indicated that Jackson made two trips to the site in the 3 weeks after he reported the girl missing. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to 56 years in prison. The first GPS devices were developed by the military in the 1980s and read signals transmitted by a network of 24 satellites. The device calculates its location based on its distance from each satellite. A built-in modem and antenna transmit information similar to a cell phone call. Experience shows that the system can be accurate, down to a nanosecond and within 20 feet. Criminal investigators claim GPS devices have distinct advantages over human trackers in that they can operate around the clock without a break, and they are less likely to lose track of the targets or to be noticed. Courts are just beginning to address issues raised by GPS use in criminal investigations. In the Jackson case in Washington State, police argued that


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the devices do not require a court order because they provide the same information as a visual search. The state’s Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the GPS devices used to track Jackson were “merely sense augmenting” and revealed information open to “public view” as Jackson traveled county roads. However, the State Supreme Court disagreed, stating that under Washington’s State Constitution, GPS surveillance requires a court order because it amounts to a search. In September 2003, in an opinion joined by all nine of the court’s justices, Justice Barbara Madsen wrote “the intrusion into private affairs made possible with the GPS devices is quite extensive …. Vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of places; they can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal habits and foibles.” She continued to say that “GPS can provide a detailed picture of one’s life.” However, the murder conviction in the Jackson case was upheld because Spokane County investigators took the precaution of getting a court order, even as they argued that it was not needed. It is possible that federal courts could reach a different conclusion because the Supreme Court, for over 20 years, has authorized law enforcement to plant electronic transmitters on vehicles without a warrant and to track them, as long as the vehicles do not enter private property. In addition to tracking criminal suspects, some law enforcement agencies are also using GPS devices to check on the activities of their own employees. For example, between 1999 and 2003, law enforcement agencies in Des Moines, Iowa; Omaha, Nebraska; Orlando, Florida; and other cities have used GPS devices on police cars to track cars’ whereabouts during duty hours. In one case, in Clinton Township, New Jersey, in 2001, five officers were let go after their handwritten activity logs conflicted with information collected by GPS devices. In this case, one night shift officer reported that he had spent about 2 hours checking the security of a residence and several local businesses. The global positioning data indicated that his cruiser had been parked at a McDonald’s restaurant the entire time.

Thermal Imaging Whether searching for a lost child or an armed suspect, darkness can be the greatest obstacle for a criminal investigator. Technology that was once dedicated to military applications is now being employed by law enforcement to make the job easier and more effective in a variety of ways. The technology is referred to as thermal imaging. Thermal imaging is proving to be a valuable tool in the police arsenal, not only in drug enforcement but in a variety of crime prevention, public safety, and related capacities. Thermal imaging devices allow officers to effectively



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“see in the dark” without being seen by others. These devices can also, for example, allow officers to locate and track suspects and their vehicles, discern the growth of marijuana indoors from a distance, and easily spot discarded evidence such as drugs, drug paraphernalia, or weapons thrown by fleeing suspects. Additional uses continue to unfold as officers experiment with these devices in their daily job requirements. Thermal imaging equipment was developed for use by the military years ago. All federal officers and law enforcement agencies have used the devices for some years; until recently, however, they were prohibitively expensive for local law enforcement agencies. As such, most local police agencies have had little or no exposure to the use of thermal imagers. Because of this and to provide further information on the use of thermal imaging devices in the local law enforcement environment, the National Institute of Justice in cooperation with local law enforcement agencies in the Dallas, Texas area conducted an assessment program of thermal imaging. The author’s agency and 12 other police agencies in the Dallas area employed more than 50 NightSight infrared thermal imaging systems, a combination of both the 200 series vehiclemounted system and PalmIR 250 hand-held units. The Mechanics of Thermal Imaging Although an infrared thermal imager can be used with little formal training, such training is preferred to maximize the benefits and improve the use of this equipment. Formal classroom training and practical exercises with the equipment are important to enhance an officer’s ability to get immediate useful results from these devices. To that end, the Law Enforcement Thermographers Association was used with this field assessment to provided officers with basic thermography certification. The training not only provide officers with an understanding of how to use the equipment but also informed users on how thermal imaging works and how it can be used in the law enforcement environment. Infrared thermal imaging cameras equipped police officers with a new way of looking at the world. Thermal imagers or “forward-looking infrared” (FLIR) systems rely on thermal contrasts to generate a video image. Thermal imaging devices create pictures based on heat energy emitted by the viewed scene rather than the light reflected off of it. In its simplest terms, thermal imagers operate like the human eye but are much more powerful. Energy from the environment passes through a lens and is registered on a detector. In the case of the thermal imager, that energy is in the form of heat. By measuring very small relative temperature differences, invisible heat patterns are converted by the thermal imager into clear, visible images that can be viewed by the operator through a viewfinder


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or monitor. Thermal imagers are usually very sensitive and can detect temperature variations smaller then 0.1°C. Thermal imagers “see” nothing more than the heat emitted by all objects in the camera’s field of view. They do not see visible light nor do they emit rays or beams of energy. Thermal imagers are completely passive and nonintrusive. Because these devices see heat and not light, they can be used for both daytime and nighttime operations. Thermal imagers can be compared to image intensifiers, which are another type of night vision technology and one that has been used by law enforcement and the military for some years. In contrast to image intensifiers, thermal imagers are unaffected by the amount of light in a scene and will “bloom” or shut down indirect light. Unlike image intensifiers, thermal imagers can operate in dust, smoke, light fog, clouds, haze, and light rain because infrared wavelengths are longer than visible wavelengths of light.

Thermal Imaging Applications Law enforcement has numerous applications for thermal imaging technology. In addition to those related to drug enforcement, search and rescue, fugitive searches, vehicle pursuits, flight safety, perimeter surveillance, structure profiles, and hidden compartments in vehicles are other uses for thermal imaging. Structure Profiles The use of thermal imaging, particularly for drug enforcement, typically relates to structure profiles. One of the earliest uses of thermal imaging and law enforcement involved structure profiles during indoor marijuana cultivation investigations. Excess heat produced by growing lamps must exit through exhaust fans, attic fans, and exterior walls so that an acceptable growing environment is maintained. Thermal imagers can detect this abnormal heat release. This information can provide additional elements of probable cause to secure a warrant. Thermal imagers can also detect false walls and hidden compartments and evaluate differences in building materials in a structure. Disturbed Services/Hidden Compartments Whenever a service is disturbed or altered, the thermal characteristics of the service are also altered. In other words, the thermal profile of the disturbed service looks “disturbed,” even if it does not appear changed to the unaided eye. This principle can be applied as a nondestructive method to survey walls and floors for hidden compartments or even people. Earth that has been



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turned by a shovel or other implement radiates differently from compacted soil that has not been disrupted. This fact can be helpful in locating items such as drugs, money, weapons, bodies, and other instruments or evidence of drug violations. In vehicles, the device can be used to detect repaired sheet metal or bonded areas that may contain contraband and false walls, panels, or bulkheads that might be used for the same purpose. Legal Limitations of Thermal Imaging In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of electronic surveillance through thermal imaging in Kyllo v. United States. In Kyllo, officers who suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana in his home used a thermal imaging device to examine the heat radiating from his house. The thermal imaging device was used from across the street and took only a few minutes. The scan showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall of Kyllo’s house were relatively hot compared to the rest of the house and substantially hotter than neighboring homes. Based on this information, utility bills, and tips from informants, officers obtained a search warrant for Kyllo’s home. The search resulted in the seizure of more than 100 marijuana plants. This case brought up the question, “Is the use of the thermal imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?” The Supreme Court’s answer was “yes.” This case addresses the use of thermal imaging devices and law enforcement; there are several issues of concern because of technological advances. The court described what thermal imagers do as follows: “Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye. The imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth – black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; in that respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.” The government argued that imaging does not constitute a search because (1) it detects “only heat radiating from the external surface of the house” and therefore there is no entry, and (2) it did not “detect private activities occurring in private areas” because everything that was detected was on the outside. The court disagreed, concluding that the Fourth Amendment draws a “firm line at the entrance of the house.” The court conceded that, although no significant compromise of the homeowner’s privacy occurred in this case,


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“we must take a long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.” Acknowledging that “it would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” it nonetheless concluded that “the Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner that will conserve public interest as well as the interest and rights of individual citizens.” In summary, there is a limit to electronic surveillance even if it does not directly intrude into individual privacy. The limit here was drawn “when the government uses a device that was not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”

Summary The effective use of covert surveillance in drug investigations cannot be overemphasized. It is through this process that much is learned about the activities of suspected traffickers. Surveillance agents to monitor contacts with traffickers are necessary in drug enforcement by protecting undercover officers and successfully documenting actions, conversations, and other evidence that will later benefit the prosecution of the case. Proper surveillance can be accomplished by vehicle, foot, and electronic methods; all are designed to permit the officer to observe without being observed. Investigative personnel must be cognizant of the suspect’s right to privacy and the need to gain the proper authority to observe the suspect in various circumstances. In addition to the techniques of observation in surveillance, it is often necessary for the officer to be trained in the use of sophisticated electronic devices, which enhance the officer’s ability to conduct surveillance duties. These devices enhance images of suspects so that identification can be made in court proceedings. Such devices also increase the degree of safety afforded to the undercover officer during contacts with suspects.

Suggested Reading Lyman, M., Criminal Investigation: The Art and the Science, 4th ed., Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2007. Levine, M., Deep Cover, Delacorte Press, New York, 1990.

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6

Serving High-Risk Warrants

Whereas working undercover and making arrests are two very hazardous duties of undercover officers, it is the drug raid that poses imminent danger. Drug investigators have been shot and killed during drug raids where planning was insufficient. Tactical precision, timing, and accurate intelligence information all come into play at the time of the drug raid — this is the time when the stakes are highest! Some departments assign the task of executing high-risk warrants to their Special Weapons and Tactics team (SWAT), whereas other departments, because of lack of personnel or other reasons, may utilize detectives or other uniformed personnel. However, neither of these approaches may be suitable if care is not taken in analyzing the circumstances surrounding the offense and the suspects, the location at which the warrant will be served, and in planning the appropriate response. There are specific steps that must be taken in these and related matters if warrants are to be effectively and efficiently executed with a minimum amount of risk to officers, innocent civilians, and suspects alike. This chapter examines these steps, a four-stage process involving planning, briefing, execution, and critique. This chapter is intended primarily for organizing, planning, and structuring a tactical operation for service or execution of a warrant. There are an extensive array of tactical considerations that come into play in these operations, such as the selection of appropriate firearms in relationship to the location in question, proper procedures for the use of tactical equipment such as flash/sound diversionary devices, tear gas, breaching and entry devices, and an array of other potential concerns. These hands-on tactical considerations are outside the scope of this chapter. Officers who anticipate becoming involved in warrant service should receive the proper training and handling of these and other tactical devices as 139



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well as in dynamic entry tactics and techniques. Many of the skills are provided in SWAT training programs. Although not all warrant service personnel must be SWAT trained, those that assist in these operations should at least be familiar with the basic procedures and tactics common to these assignments. Police agencies that have limited personnel should rely on interjurisdictional arrangements to assist or conduct these assignments. They should never be conducted without adequate resources or training for the sake of expediency.

Classifying High-Risk Warrants All departments should establish criteria for classifying search warrants. Obviously, not all warrants are “high risk” and will not require the type of planning, resources, or equipment outlined in this chapter for their execution. Development of criteria for identification of high-risk warrants will reduce some of the guesswork involved in this process. Several factors dictate when special steps should be taken in the execution of a search warrant. These include: • • • • • •

The presence of a fortified location, such as are often found when confronting drug traffickers Gang members Known shooters Anyone who has a history of armed violence The presence of automatic weapons or other military-style armament Any other situation where violence may be encountered

These and related factors are generally known to officers and investigators before their application for a search warrant. If there are questions, however, about the potential for violence or the difficulty in gaining access to the location to be searched, additional investigation of these factors is necessary. All warrants that are classified as high risk should be executed using the four-step process (planning, briefing, execution, and critique).

Step One: Planning The planning stage of the operation is designed to gather as much information about the location, its surroundings, and the individuals involved as possible. The information will be used to determine the type of entry that will be made, the number of officers required, and the types of armament and equipment necessary.



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If possible, interior diagrams of the location should be obtained or developed. Those who have had access to the location in the past (such as undercover officers or their informants) should be contacted for assistance. In the case of tract homes or other commonly styled facilities, floor plans may also be obtained by examination of proximate locations or perhaps through contact with a cooperative and trustworthy realtor. Consideration should also be given to the type of area that surrounds the location. If it is a detached home, for example, one should note the proximity of homes that adjoin the location and attempt to determine who occupies these locations. The same type of information should be established for multifamily locations, with added emphasis on safety should the use of firearms be necessary. The pedestrian and vehicular traffic in the immediate area at the time of day in which the warrant will be executed should also be determined. This information will have obvious safety implications for the operation, dictate whether special consideration should be given to traffic control, and will also help to establish whether there is a need to deal with lookouts or other accomplices that may be operating in the area. Whenever possible, a photograph should be taken of the location and the immediate surroundings. If available, a helicopter is ideal for taking photographs because they can identify a safe approach route and provide views of areas that might be obstructed by vegetation, fencing, or walls. Other useful photographs can easily be obtained from the surveillance location or stationary or moving vehicles. If neighbors or others who occupy locations in the immediate area are cooperative and trustworthy, they may allow officers to utilize their locations briefly for surveillance purposes (see Chapter 5 on surveillance methods). Video cameras are also very useful in this regard because they can cover more area in a shorter time frame and with greater continuity. When conducting the surveillance, one should pay particular attention to the following: •

•

•

Fences or walls: If the structures must be scaled to gain access to the location, the need for ladders or other means to scale these obstructions must be considered. Windows: Windows can be excellent entry points, particularly when considering that most suspects expect police to enter by doors. As entry points, however, windows may be restricted because of their limited size and distance from the ground. If windows are to be used, officers should be trained in “raking,” breaking, and entering techniques. It should be noted that, in some fortified locations, suspects have been known to replace glass windows with Plexiglas®. Doors: Access to doors should be assessed for their locations and accessibility, their composition, locking or other security mechanisms,



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•

•

•

and the direction in which they open. Doors are better suited for entry; however, because they are more predictable entry points, they are consequently more dangerous. The front door is normally the strongest in the dwelling and may be more difficult to breach than other exterior doors. Occupants: In addition to profiling the suspects, one should determine whether there are others in the facility that may require special consideration during the entry process. This may include children or disabled persons who may not be directly involved as suspects. In addition, one should determine whether there are animals on the premises. Dogs may pose particular problems but can generally be controlled or subdued without injury by being sprayed with a chemical fire extinguisher. Route to location: Surveillance officers should identify the best route for approaching the location, keeping in mind the need for a low-profile approach and the need to deploy personnel systematically at the site. All drivers should drive the preplanned route in advance to ensure that they arrive at the proper location. Fortifications and armament: Also important is the need to gather as much information as possible about door and window fortification. One should determine, for example, whether windows have decorative bars or metal mesh, the types and number of locks employed, whether doors or windows are reinforced from within, and whether there are other fortifications or booby traps on the premises. This information is often difficult to establish without the assistance of reliable informants. The same may be true of armament, although the nature of the offenses in question may provide specific information on the types and caliber of weapons available to the suspects.

Once the above types of information are available, specific decisions can be made concerning the methods of entry that will be used. A portion of that decision will be based on the types of equipment available to the entry team and their training in its use. One of the least destructive and effective devices for use in entry operations is the flash/sound diversionary device. There are several varieties of this device, but all generate detonation and blinding light, which can confuse suspects within a location. Normally flash/sound devices are used in hostage situations where the element of surprise is available to the police, but they can also effectively be employed as a tactical diversion when serving some high-risk warrants. Training is essential in their use, as they are capable of causing injury and fire if not properly deployed. Several of the more useful pieces of equipment available for this purpose include hooks for pulling bars and mesh away from windows; locking hooks



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can be used for bars without mesh backing and larger hooks are best for removing bars and mesh together. The hooks are attached and connected to a steel ring and cable, which are connected to the pulling vehicle by a nylon rope at least 1.25 inches in diameter. As with other types of equipment, officers should practice with these devices to ensure safety as well as an effective operation. Officers should stay clear of the pulling operation because of the possibility of serious injury or death. One can normally breach fortified, standard composition exterior doors by using the currently available battering devices. These current devices, designed for use by a single officer, are specially balanced and weighted. They also allow officers to position themselves so that they will not be directly in front of the door, thus reducing exposure to possible gunfire from within. For reinforced or fortified exterior doors, explosives are an excellent means of gaining entrance. The use of an experienced ordnance, explosive, and demolition officer is essential in these situations. The risks of injury to officers or others in the location are such that this alternative should be used only as a last resort and where the type of suspects in the location provide firm justification. When warranted, however, the use of explosives can provide rapid entry and generate some confusion among suspects in the location by virtue of the noise and concussion involved. Once inside the location, it is not uncommon to find interior doors fortified with bars or other devices. In such cases, officers have sufficient time to utilize alternative entry devices. Typically, a cutting torch is used for cutting heavy metal bars. Use of a cutting torch requires the officer to be trained and to have a heavy-duty protective vest and helmet, flameproof uniform and gloves, eye protection, and access to a fire extinguisher. Because of the extra time required to gain access by this means, it is not well suited for gaining primary entry into a location.

Step Two: Briefing Once an operational plan has been developed, it is necessary to draw the operational team together, make assignments, and review the plan. All officers involved should be informed of the type of warrant being served and the exact location of the residence or facility in question. In this type of case, photographs taken of the location are very useful and should be presented to all officers. The location should be described in detail from both exterior and interior perspectives together with any information on fortifications. Information on neighbors and exterior surroundings of the location should be provided, as it may affect the operation. The suspects should be described in detail, including scars, tattoos, clothing, criminal background, and gang affiliations. Photographs should be provided if available. Detailed


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Figure 6.1 Document assignment plan.

information should also be provided on the weapons possessed by the suspect and his or her propensity for violence when confronted with arrest. Finally, the operational plan should be presented to the officers in detail. It is essential that the plan be fully explained and that each officer has an exact understanding of his or her responsibilities in relationship to those of all other team members. For this reason, written assignments must be developed around the plan and given to each officer. Figure 6.1 shows an example of such a document assignment plan. This type of written schematic allows officers to visualize the precise assignment in relationship to all others and specifies the officers’ basic responsibilities, specialized equipment or assignment, and vehicle. In addition to its operational usefulness, this document is helpful for debriefing purposes and for use as a record of the operation. In Figure 6.1, all sides of a location in question are numbered (in parentheses) consecutively, beginning at the front of the house and moving clockwise. All officers have been assigned to one of two entry teams, either the primary (red) team or the secondary (blue) team. The blue team is used to gain entry only if the primary team is thwarted in its attempts and the blue team is called to assist. In this particular scenario, the officers do not have an interior floor plan. Their initial entry point is the front door with a rear door as a secondary



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option. Officers 1, 2, and 3 are the primary entry team being used to breach the front door. Officers 4 and 5 are being used primarily to cover the entry. They will break and rake window S-22 simultaneously with the breaching of the front door and join the entry team inside the residence. A flash/sound diversionary device will also be deployed within the residence at the time of entry. Officers 8 and 9 are primarily used for containment of sides (3) and (4) to ensure that no suspect is able to escape from windows or doors on the sides. Officers 6 and 7 are designated as the secondary entry team assigned to breach the rear door and to freeze and cover anyone inside. Officer 10 is the supervisor in control of the overall operation. The supervisor will notify those inside the location by bullhorn or telephone that the officers have an arrest or search warrant and instruct them to exit the premises. If those inside do not comply within a reasonable amount of time, the forced entry operational plan will be called into effect. In the case of a warrant involving narcotics, time is of the essence so that contraband will not be destroyed. In such cases, all members of the warrant team will normally enter the premises at the same time. In a fugitive warrant situation, however, entry will normally involve a stealth approach similar to that used with a barricaded suspect. The operational plan in Figure 6.1 requires a minimum of nine officers and one supervisor. The actual number of officers required on any given operation, however, will vary substantially depending on the findings of the planning stages of the operation. Under certain circumstances at the same location, for example, the deployment of one or two officers on every window or door may be needed. An operation is successful when there is no need to resort to deadly force. One of the best ways to obtain this objective is to provide the police with overwhelming tactical capabilities and advantages. In some instances, the use of force cannot be avoided. However, with adequate planning and the application of sufficient police resources, one can reduce the risks of engaging in a deadly force confrontation.

Step Three: Execution Once the operational plan has been developed and involved officers briefed on their assignments and the overall operational plan, the team is ready to execute the warrant. The objective of the tactical team is to secure the location and suspects within. Normally, in the case of the search warrant, the location is turned over to other police investigators for the actual search operation. All weapons that will be used in the operation should be inspected and an inventory taken. Transporting vehicles should be lined up in the sequence in which they will arrive at the location, and officers should position themselves


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in the vehicles in the order that they will assume at the location. It is very important that a supervised rehearsal be conducted to ensure that all officers are familiar with their responsibilities and the equipment that they will utilize. Officers who are assigned to carry ladders or other specialized equipment need to ensure that they can easily exit vehicles without encumbering or obstructing the movement of other officers. As a precaution against possible sniping, the first officer outside the vehicle should be assigned the responsibility of covering all other members of the warrant team. Executing officers should be reminded that warrants must be executed within a reasonable amount of time or, in the case of searches, the warrant may be invalidated and the evidence gathered held inadmissible. Some statutes require that a warrant be executed in a specified period of time following its issuance. Normally, the search should be conducted during daylight hours, particularly where residences are involved and where serious safety issues come into play; however, a nighttime search may be necessary in some high-risk warrant situations. If a nighttime search is necessary, justification for doing so must be articulated in the affidavit. Depending on the law of the jurisdiction, it may also be necessary for the warrant to include that nighttime entry is authorized. Normally, executing officers should enter into the premises only after they have announced their presence and request admission. “No-knock” entries should be conducted only when they are clearly justified by the circumstances. In some jurisdictions, it may be necessary for the warrant to specify that a no-knock entry is authorized. Officers should remember that, after the operation, efforts must be taken to secure the facility if the entry caused any damage to doors or windows or in any way exposed the location to damage. Failure to do so may result in civil recourse against the officers.

Step Four: Critique Immediately after the operation, it is important that the executing team assemble to formally critique the operation. Critiques can be valuable learning exercises if the necessary time is taken to identify areas that can be improved. Members of the team should begin with an examination of the overall operational plan and compare the anticipated or perceived operation with the actual way in which it unfolded. Any deficiencies in intelligence concerning the plan’s development should be identified and a means considered to rectify these problems should they be encountered in future operations. It is also important to identify any training or equipment needs that were deficient in the operation and explore ways of filling these voids.



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Booby Traps Complicating enforcement efforts in marijuana eradication operations, raids on clandestine laboratories, and numerous other drug enforcement operations is the risk of encountering deadly booby traps. Indeed, booby traps are becoming an ever-increasing hazard for drug agents. Like technology in drug manufacturing, knowledge of how to manufacture new and ingenious traps is also spreading among traffickers. Much of this knowledge was originally acquired in Vietnam, where traps of this nature were common. Traffickers plant booby traps in and around their operations because (1) the parts for the traps cost virtually nothing and (2) the effectiveness of the devices is substantial. Traffickers use booby traps for three basic reasons: 1. To warn suspects of intruders (by the sound of explosions or by floodlights). 2. To deny intruders (police) access to the inhabited area by injuring or killing them. 3. To slow down police pursuit during a raid by injuring or killing officers. When considering a laboratory raid, officers must realize that, in the event that even one officer is injured, a minimum of one additional officer will most likely be needed to render assistance. If there is already a shortage of officers in the assault, the raid team will be even more undermanned and that much more vulnerable to attack. Therefore, just as a police chemist is recommended for the raid of a clandestine laboratory, officers who suspect booby traps should be accompanied by a qualified emergency ordnance disposal (EOD) specialist to help identify traps or bombs and otherwise assist the officers in the drug raid. In the absence of an EOD expert, however, officers should be aware of the clues that might indicate that booby traps have been used: 1. Handbooks in the residence that give instructions on how to assemble traps: The Anarchist’s Cookbook, by William Powell; The Poor Man’s James Bond, by Kurt Saxon; The OSS Special Weapons Devices and Equipment, published by Paladin Press. These publications are manuals for bomb and booby-trap assembly; if the books are present, officers should assume that booby traps will also be present. 2. If the profile of any suspect includes either a criminal history involving prosecution for weapons offenses or past military services in Vietnam, booby traps should be expected. Most booby traps fall into two categories: explosive and impaling. They can be activated by remote control, by manual control, or by the victim



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(usually via trip wire). They may be located either outside or inside a structure. Traps may be used to scare the intruder or to injure or kill. In all cases, however, they are to be considered extremely hazardous to investigating officers. Officers who are not trained in dismantling or disarming bombs or booby traps should not attempt to disarm the devices. They should, however, be capable of identifying them. Normally, the trap will be located along an entrance to a location (a doorway, entry path, or stairway). It would therefore be advisable for officers to approach the target area off the main path, with a lead man looking for hard-to-spot signs of traps (such as trip wires) by using a probing rod or a belt or strip of cloth dangling from a stick. The types of traps that officers may encounter will depend on only the perpetrators’ imagination and cunning. Officers should always remember the cardinal rule: “Notice the unobvious and expect the unexpected.”

Exterior Booby Traps Regardless of the specific rank or assigned duties of each officer on the raid team, all officers should look out for the obvious or telltale signs of booby traps in the area and be aware that they could be installed anywhere. This is a difficult task, as traffickers usually succeed in hiding traps. Investigators should be alert for seemingly insignificant signs that might indicate the existence of a trap. Officers should look for booby traps in the following areas: 1. Any cleared trail or pathway. 2. Near any object that arouses curiosity (e.g., a dead animal used as a decoy for intruder observation). 3. Along escape routes. 4. Affixed to any innocent-looking, movable objects, such as doors, windows, and gates. The following signs may indicate the presence of traps: 1. Any disturbance in the terrain that looks unusual (like a cover-up). 2. Dead leaves in one area, surrounded by green leaves or any vegetation in a pile, that does not fit the area (possibly a punji-pit cover). 3. Any depressions in the soil caused by settling of the earth (possibly covering up a pit). 4. Any wires strung across walkways (possibly linked to explosive devices). 5. Items such as ropes, nails, or other fasteners that serve no obvious purpose (possibly used to activate explosive devices or anchor trip wires).



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When a booby trap is encountered, officers should immediately notify fellow officers either vocally or via radio and then identify it with a noticeable marker (for example, an orange ribbon) to alert other officers entering or leaving the area. Again, nonspecialist officers should refrain from attempting to disarm booby traps and should simply bypass the area. Safety Precautions An explosives expert is recommended for each raid where traps are anticipated, and certain precautions should be practiced: 1. Only one officer should approach a trap. Other officers should be in nearby covered positions. 2. When a trip wire is located, both ends of the wire should be checked. 3. All devices should be checked for more than one trip wire. 4. Trip wires should be cut only after any safeties are replaced. 5. Electric-looking wires should not be cut. 6. If twisted-type wires are present, only one wire at a time should be cut. 7. A mercury fuse may also be present in a device that has an obvious means of detonation (e.g., conspicuous fuse). 8. Before wires are traced, all suspect devices should be checked for a human operator, who might attempt to detonate the device from a hand-held controller. 9. If a suspect is apprehended in a raid, he or she should then be required to lead the search team through the site. 10. All officers in the raid team should move in pairs. In addition to having two sets of eyes on the alert, it also enables each officer to have first aid nearby in case of a casualty. 11. If one team member is injured as the result of a trap, remaining officers must approach the injured officer with caution so that no additional injuries will result. Types of Traps The Punji Pit A standard in guerilla warfare, the punji pit was widely used in World War II and in Vietnam. The punji pit is a large, deep hole in the ground containing many bamboo spikes or rusty nails, which are commonly coated with feces, urine, antifreeze, and other substances designed to promote infection and cause discomfort for the victim. (See Figure 6.2.) The punji pit is difficult to spot because it is covered with leaves and small tree branches. The intruder steps on the covering, and his or her body weight breaks the branches, dumping the victim into the pit. Investigators


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Figure 6.2

should look for leaves and branches that are obviously not part of the surrounding greenery or for anything in the road that does not seem to fit in the environment. Sometimes, dead animals are nailed to or hung from trees to distract the intruder or to lure him or her to the trap. The Foot Breaker This device can be manufactured by the perpetrator or purchased through mail order survivalist-type magazines. It consists of a metal pipe that houses



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Figure 6.3

a .22- or .25-caliber bullet. The bullet is placed inside with a spring-loaded firing pin at the base of the pipe. The pipe is then anchored in the ground. When it is stepped on, the weight of the victim activates the firing pin and shoots the bullet into the victim’s foot. Although this device is not designed to kill the intruder, it will wound sufficiently to remove the officer from the assault team. Officers who wear boots with steel-shank soles may find these are sufficient to stop the bullet. This trap is difficult to detect, and it will most likely be located on the entry path to the target area. (See Figure 6.3.)


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Figure 6.4

The Trot Line This trap is inexpensive, easy to manufacture, and extremely effective. The trap consists of a monofilament fishing line strung between two trees at eye level. Anchored on the line are numerous fishing hooks, which injure the intruder. This trap is almost impossible to see, even under the best of lighting conditions. As with many of the other types of traps, it is not designed to kill, only to maim. (See Figure 6.4.)



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The Mousetrap The mousetrap is designed to kill and maim. It consists of a standard mousetrap, which is used as a firing pin for a shotgun shell that is attached to the trap. A trip wire activates the catch on the mousetrap, thereby detonating the shotgun shell. These traps are commonly attached to trees at both knee and head levels. Although the trap is usually fatal, sometimes it is used merely to warn suspects of intruders.

Interior Booby Traps Once the outer perimeter has been cleared, the danger of encountering a trap is not yet over. Interior traps may be even more dangerous because they are usually contained in or wired to an object that appears to be perfectly normal — a lamp, a book, a door. All raid team members must practice caution at all times. Trip wires, electrical switches, or remote control can activate indoor traps. Typical indoor locations for traps are doors and windows, stairs and floorboards (pressure-type devices), gates, books or X-rated magazines (spring-release devices), refrigerators, drawers, packages, or furniture (pressure-type devices). Safety Precautions As with outdoor traps, an explosives expert should be present. Other officers should observe the following precautions: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Do not attempt to open books or magazines. No containers should be opened without thorough examination. Furniture should be closely examined. Electrical switches should not be used if possible. Officers should not consume food or beverages while at the raid site. Anything that appears unusual should be regarded as suspect, and treated as such. 7. Booby traps that are located should be treated the same as outdoor traps: marked and avoided. No single strategy can completely safeguard law enforcement officers in all raids in which booby traps are in place. Each raid is different and should be evaluated on an individual basis, with consideration given to the type of case, the number of possible suspects (and their backgrounds), and the location of the raid.


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Figure 6.5 The flash fire bomb is relatively easy to construct and requires little knowledge or explosives.

Types of Traps Magazine Bomb This device is a magazine that has had a portion of the inner pages removed so that a mousetrap will fit inside unobtrusively. The mousetrap is affixed to a blasting cap, which will detonate when the magazine is opened. X-rated magazines are normally used to lure the victim. Magazine bombs can cause injury to the face, loss of fingers, or even death.



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Hot Light This is an incendiary device consisting of a standard light bulb that has been filled with a combustible liquid such as ether, kerosene, or gasoline. When the light switch is turned on the device detonates, creating an explosion, and possibly igniting the victim’s clothing. Variations of this trap include trap hand grenades that have been affixed to light sockets in place of light bulbs. Armstrong’s Mixture Armstrong’s mixture is a fairly new device, usually found in methamphetamine laboratories operated by outlaw motorcycle gangs. The device is made from a mixture of red phosphorous and potassium chlorate. After the chemicals are mixed together and rolled up in an aluminum foil ball, they are immersed in alcohol to render the material harmless. When the alcohol dries, the chemicals become volatile. The devices are designed to look like packages of drugs wrapped in foil. When an officer attempts to open the package to check its contents, the tin foil activates the chemicals by rubbing against them, thereby triggering an explosion. The balls usually come in three sizes, and the extent of the injury will depend on the size of the ball: marble-sized balls cause loss of fingers or eyesight and facial damage; egg-sized balls cause loss of a hand or part of an arm, loss of eyesight, and facial damage and are possibly fatal; baseball-sized balls are always fatal.

Other Weapons Whether engaged in the search of a car or residence, the investigators should be aware of weapons other than traditional firearms (handguns, shotguns, rifles) that are commonly used by drug traffickers and may be cleverly hidden or otherwise unnoticed. One such weapon is the “bolt gun.” This device appears to be an ordinary bolt and might even be used as an ordinary bolt in a motorcycle, car, or truck. The weapon is made from a standard L" diameter (4H" long) machine bolt that is hollowed out to fire a .22-caliber long rifle or standard cartridge. To discharge the weapon, the hexagonal head is pulled back, and a spring-loaded firing pin comes into contact with the cartridge. Knives can also be concealed in belts, gas tank caps, pens, and rulers. The officer should always remain cognizant of such devices when approaching suspects or their residences.

Drug Raid Procedures Raids are some of the most life-threatening situations encountered by law enforcement officers. Because they are used so frequently in drug enforcement,



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it is essential that all drug enforcement personnel be aware of the procedures for planning and conducting a raid in order to minimize casualties and confusion. It is impossible to discuss every possible raid situation and how properly to plan for all unexpected predicaments. All raids hold surprises. But to best avoid unforeseen dangers, the drug agents’ best weapon is quality intelligence. Good intelligence can reveal much-needed information about the circumstances officers will encounter: weapons or booby traps inside the residence; associates who might be present at the time of the raid; fortification of the residence; whether stolen goods are expected to be at the raid location. Raid planners must always prepare for the worst. When considering a drug raid, “Murphy’s Law” should be remembered: “If anything can go wrong, it will!” It is important to know the type and amount of drugs being sought in the raid. This could make a difference in how the house is entered. If there is a suspected 100 pounds of marijuana in the residence, it is unlikely that suspects will be able to dispose of if before entry by officers. If, however, there is 1 pound of cocaine suspected in the residence, then it is likely that it could be flushed or otherwise destroyed before entry; in this case, a “no-knock” warrant should be obtained. In addition to the risk of encountering armed suspects during a raid, there is also the danger that officers may accidentally shoot each other in a crossfire situation or through mistaken identity. This has happened on numerous occasions, and the possibility increases when all members of the raid team are not thoroughly acquainted with each other and with the raid plan. When casualties occur in raids, it is usually not as a result of poor planning but overplanning. Raid plans should not be so complex as to create confusion and misunderstanding among officers. As most experienced officers will attest, there are enough unforeseen surprises in each raid without having an overly complex plan. The key to success with raids is simplicity. Checklist for Raid Preparation Although there are many considerations for the planning of a raid, basic planning should include the following steps: 1. Collect all intelligence regarding the suspects, associates, the structure to be raided, and the neighborhood (area) to be raided. 2. Conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the area to identify all entrance and exit routes as well as any one-way or dead-end streets. 3. Provide a sketch, drawing, or map to show team members where they are expected to be. 4. Evaluate the organization of the raid team, including the number of personnel and type of equipment needed.



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5. Remember that communications are essential during a raid, particularly when multiple agencies are participating. Because most law enforcement agencies use different frequencies, a team leader from the host agency should be assigned to each team with reliable communications for unit to unit and unit to base. 6. Make arrangements for emergency response personnel, including SWAT officers and fire and ambulance personnel. 7. If needed, have a police chemist available to assist in the search and dismantling of any chemical laboratories. 8. Establish the time of raid execution. In addition, establish a briefing at least 1 hour before the designated time of the raid. 9. Establish a chain of command that is understood by all members. The Raid Leader The team leader is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the raid and should have sufficient authority within the unit to make field command decisions when necessary. Initially, all plans for manpower, equipment, and communications must be understood; the time to recognize deficiencies in planning is before the raid, not during it. Additional considerations such as food, water, and first aid must also be accounted for in the event of an extended operation, as should plans for the proper evacuation of neighbors in the area in the event of a possible shooting situation or explosive laboratory. The team leader has the responsibility of selecting team members for various tasks during the raid. These members must possess the necessary physical abilities, skills, and knowledge to conduct such an operation, and all team members must be properly outfitted with equipment (raid jackets, body armor, radios, shotguns/rifles, etc.) and have sufficient knowledge of the investigation, including information on suspects, weapons, vehicles, and so forth. Because multiple law enforcement agencies usually participate in drug raids, the team leader must be sure every officer is familiar with the other officers involved in the raid (especially when undercover people are used). This is usually accomplished during the briefing where all parties are present. Second, raid/search teams must be established if there is more than one residence to raid. The teams will usually consist of five to seven officers. Again, the team leader for each team should be a member of the host agency for the raid and should possess communications between other team members. To properly prepare a team for the raid, the following checklist should be considered: 1. Communications a. Electronic: radios (encoded), battery-powered headsets, flashlights b. Other: flares, whistles, vocal or hand signals



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2. Equipment a. Weapons b. Uniforms (i.e., raid jackets) c. Camouflage d. Specialized equipment: night vision devices, bolt cutters, etc. e. Food and water f. Contingency plan for a shooting situation g. Prisoner transportation plan h. Transportation for team members 3. Investigative considerations a. Searching techniques b. Search warrant execution c. Arrangements for prisoner interviews d. Processing crime scene and prisoners: sketches and photographs e. Arrangements for proper press release 4. Search team members a. Recording officer (the search unit) b. Evidence-seizing officer (the search unit) c. Prisoner control officer (optional) Tactical Considerations Because many raid situations do not offer the luxury of a trained SWAT (special weapons and tactics) team, raid team members must be knowledgeable about basic assault tactics. The tactics discussed here are general and should be considered for each raid situation on an individual basis. Raids will be conducted in both urban and rural environments, so the individual raid plan will vary in each case. For example, a raid in a rural area, such as a cultivated marijuana patch or illegal laboratory, may present different dangers than if it were conducted in the city. This is true because of the lack of sufficient cover for officers involved in the initial assault, as well as the possibility of hidden booby traps and snipers located in wooded areas of the property. For this reason, a raid conducted on a structure suspected of containing booby traps should be conducted in three phases: (1) the securing of suspects, (2) a sweep by an EOD expert for hidden booby traps to remove hazards, and (3) the search of the residence for contraband (if authorized by a search warrant). All suspects must be controlled immediately upon the assault of the structure. Once under control, all suspects (whether under arrest or not) should initially be detained and turned over to the prisoner control officer for monitoring. It can later be determined who should be placed under arrest after the search of the residence is conducted and evidence is located. In this



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phase, the team leader must maintain control of his or her team members. Prior intelligence of the structure and area should assist officers in knowing which strategy of entry to use. The initial assault of the raid location usually requires four unit functions: 1. Perimeter unit: This is the unit that seals off the raid site from intruders (curious bystanders) and may aid in apprehending individuals attempting to escape from the structure. The perimeter unit can also be used if neighbors need to be evacuated from the raid site before assault of the premises. 2. Assault unit: This is the initial entry unit whose primary responsibility is to control all suspects within the structure, thereby making it possible to safely conduct a search. 3. Cover unit: This unit supports the assault unit in case of an altercation or confrontation by suspects and usually enters the structure immediately after the assault unit. 4. Search unit: This unit is assigned to conduct a thorough search of the structure once the suspects are accounted for and secured. There are several assault and control maneuvers that should be considered and discussed with team members during the raid briefing. These tactics cover the approach to the structure as well as entry methods and should remain flexible to adapt to any raid situation.

External Control Methods If the suspect inhabiting a raid structure detects an approaching officer, he or she will be forewarned to either destroy any evidence, acquire weapons with which to attack officers, or escape. Organized methods of approach are essential in ensuring the officers’ greatest assistance in any raid: the element of surprise. Immediate Reaction Maneuver This is an assault maneuver conducted primarily in rural areas while approaching marijuana patches or clandestine laboratories. A point person must lead the raid team and act as an initial scout for suspects, guard dogs, or booby traps. If the suspect is sighted, the point person should immediately move off the path quietly toward the area with the most cover. The rest of the team moves off the path in the same direction, thus eliminating a crossfire situation. (See Figure 6.6.)


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Figure 6.6

L-Shaped Clearance Maneuver In the event that there are several structures on the property of a raid site, the use of the L-shaped clearance maneuver should be considered. This will help to prevent a possible crossfire situation and most effectively contain any suspects. In this scenario, team “B” must be in place before team “A” arrives. This plan also allows team “B” to converge on the outbuildings before they move in on the suspect’s residence. (See Figure 6.7.)



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Figure 6.7

L-Shaped Sweep Maneuver This is a maneuver most appropriate for marijuana operations, since it automatically flanks any opposing targets that are encountered and concurrently eliminates the possibility for escape. In this sequence, the team leader is positioned at the corner of the L formation so that he or she can better direct all team members. If the suspect confronts either flank with gunfire, the flank fired upon immediately halts and lays down the first base of fire. The remaining team then changes position and returns fire. Containment and control are the ultimate results of this paramilitary maneuver. (See Figure 6.8.) It should be noted that, in many cases, the use of hand-held radios may give away the location of agents seeking cover; the raid team should develop hand signals (in advance) to use when radios must be turned off and silence is necessary for either a discreet approach or officer safety.


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Figure 6.8

Internal Control Methods One of the most dangerous duties in drug enforcement is when officers enter the residence during a raid. Most of the officers injured or killed make the same mistakes, usually while passing through the doorway into the residence. The most common mistake is that, when the door is first opened, the first officer through the door will usually stand in the doorway and scout the



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Figure 6.9

layout of the room. The danger is that, no matter where the suspects are located in the room, their chance of hitting a target standing in the doorway (the “fatal funnel”) is almost 100%. Given that there are only so many ways to enter a doorway in a raid situation, officers should practice accepted entry methods and remain in the doorway only long enough to enter the room: never linger in the doorway! There are three methods of entry during a raid; these can eliminate complications and maximize the control of suspects. The Wraparound Entry Method Although dangers may exist within the residence, officers are at much less risk when this approach is used. Two officers should be used when possible, thus enabling each officer to survey one-half of the room for possible suspects. As these officers maintain their posts, other officers enter the structure and practice the same method for each additional room. (See Figure 6.9.)


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Figure 6.10

The Crisscross Entry Method This method of internal structure control is effective because it allows two officers to enter the structure and immediately position themselves inside the structure, providing mutual coverage of the control area. Once in position, the entry officers can maintain control of the room and permit support officers to enter and perform the same maneuver for each room within the structure until all occupants are accounted for and controlled. (See Figure 6.10.) The High-Risk Entry Method When entry must be made into a structure where risk factors are high, the high-risk entry method should be considered. This method should be used whenever a drug raid is planned or a search warrant is being served. It addresses one of the most important considerations in drug enforcement — officer safety. (See Figure 6.11.)



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Figure 6.11

The Final Raid Report At the conclusion of each raid, the case agent should prepare a report summarizing all significant aspects of the raid. It is advisable for the case agent to prepare this report because the agent is most familiar with the suspects, addresses, and other aspects of the case. The final raid report may be prepared at the office, but notes for the report should be taken at the scene of the raid to ensure accuracy of times, locations, suspects’ names, officers present, and other details. Certain fundamentals must be included in the report: 1. Information on the raid team a. Size of the team b. Names of each team member (plus each jurisdiction, if applicable) c. The specific task of the team d. Times of arrival and departure



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2. Information on the raided structure a. Entry and exit routes b. Environmental information (rain, snow, night, dawn, etc.) c. Terrain information, including sketches, photographs, and diagrams to depict the approach methods and the location of any important pieces of evidence d. Other locations of evidence inside the structure e. Locations of weapons 3. Information on suspects a. Suspect information b. Confrontations with suspects 4. Other information a. Officer injuries b. Any other information that may later be important

Summary Much is to be considered when addressing the many different situations encountered in drug enforcement. A technique that is effective in one investigation may not be successful in another. The investigator must be flexible in his or her approach in dealing with all types of investigations. The marijuana cultivation operation is a drug enforcement problem that poses many unique hazards and investigative challenges. The recognition of such an operation is the first step in the investigation, which can be best accomplished by the receipt of credible informant information; in some cases, this may be difficult to obtain. Locating cultivators may also require investigators to profile the violators themselves by observing their actions, growing equipment or supplies, and the type of land most commonly chosen for such an endeavor. Like the marijuana cultivation operation, the clandestine laboratory operation is also largely a rural phenomenon, which makes detection both tedious and difficult. The operator will set up his or her laboratory after first accumulating chemicals and hardware from numerous sources. Investigators who identify such a violator should conduct extensive surveillance to determine the sources of supply for necessary equipment and precursors. Observing the suspect in possession of special equipment and chemicals may be sufficient probable cause for acquiring search warrants for those locations associated with the suspect. Laboratory operators commonly choose a rural environment because of the distinctive odor emitted from the lab while it is in operation. This odor would be easily noticed if it were in a more populated environment. Again, the odor alone may be sufficient probable cause for a search warrant if detected and properly documented.



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Compounding problems in cultivation and laboratory operations are deadly booby traps. When approaching a location suspected of being booby trapped, a qualified EOD expert should be present to help identify possible traps. If an EOD expert is not available, officers should be knowledgeable in how to recognize a trap. When raids are considered, precautions should be taken in the handling of prisoners, collection of evidence, and coordination of the raid while multiple jurisdictions are present. If the raid is kept simple, confusion and casualties will be minimized.



Drug Enforcement and the Patrol Officer

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In many parts of the nation, the uniformed patrol officer has not been used to the greatest extent possible in drug control. When properly trained and motivated, a patrol officer is in an excellent position to make drug seizures and the associated arrests simply because drugs travel the streets and highways every day. During a tour of duty, a patrol officer logically can expect to encounter someone who is transporting illegal drugs or in possession of small amounts of drugs. The officer, however, must be trained to recognize the signs that may indicate illegal activity, know where to look for concealed drugs, and understand the legal requirements for a proper search, seizure, and arrest.

Patrol Enforcement of Drug Violations Although the number of users is generally an accepted indicator of the magnitude of the drug abuse problem, other factors should be considered in determining drug abuse severity in the community. The severity of the drug problem can be related to the particular drug being used. Various drugs pose different threats to the behavior and condition of users and therefore the community in general. In addition, evaluation of the drug abuse problem must consider the frequency and quantity of consumption, which establish the pattern of use. For example, the probability of advancing from recreational to chronic levels of consumption differs according to the type of drug being used. Users of dependence-producing drugs such as heroin are more likely to advance to higher levels of use patterns than are users of nondependenceproducing drugs such as marijuana. These use factors are more revealing than the number of users and must not be overlooked when determining the scale of the drug abuse problem. The social costs of use of a particular drug can be estimated on the basis of these conditions: 169



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• •

•

The likelihood that a user will become drug dependent with either physical or psychological dependence on the drug or both. The severity of the adverse consequences of use, both to the individual and to society, in terms of criminal behavior, health, or economic dependence. The number of compulsive users who are currently suffering adverse consequences from drug abuse.

Intelligence Gathering Patrol officers are the frontline of the police force. As such, every police officer can contribute information to the drug intelligence process by reporting indications of drug activity. However, officers are often uncertain about the type of information that would be of value to the drug enforcement unit. A general guideline is for police officers to report all information that might possibly help the unit to carry out its mission. The unit can then evaluate the suspected drug activity information for possible action. Police officers either obtain information from individuals that they contact or observe events worthy of reporting. Each source of information must be evaluated and reported by the officer. Of extreme importance is the officer’s reported evaluation of the reliability of the information. An individual providing the police officer with information may be a criminal who assists the police officer for various motives, the “good citizen” who responds helpfully to questioning, or the victim of a crime who provides information for investigative leads. By utilizing to the fullest any information provided by cooperative individuals, the police officer must consider what motivates such assistance. In most cases, the cooperative noncriminal merely wants to do his or her part to live in a crime-free community. In evaluating information from this source, however, the police officer should remain sensitive to the possibility of misinformation in the form of exaggeration, embellishment, or speculation. At the other end of the spectrum is the criminally involved informant. The motivations of criminal informants vary and may be based on the desire to obtain revenge for perceived wrong or for the purpose of eliminating competition. Regardless of the source, the information received and reported to the drug unit must be evaluated relative to its source and the circumstances of its receipt. The officer’s own observations can be of tremendous value. Street observations can include probable locations of drug-dealing sites, “shooting galleries,” and contact with drug abusers.



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Street Observations Police officers should remain alert for conditions that indicate the existence of drug activity. Typically, drug dealers operate out of a dwelling, usually their residences. A dwelling provides the greatest degree of protection of the dealer’s money and drugs during illicit transactions. The level of pedestrian and vehicular traffic near the dealer’s location is usually high and serves as an indicator of drug activities. In fact, traffic often becomes so busy that neighbors quickly notice that something is wrong. If the police officer knows the citizenry on his beat and maintains personal contact with them, they probably will report such unusual activity to him. The pattern of traffic can usually be identified with ease. Customers will enter the apartment or house, stay a few minutes, and then leave. Upon approach and entrance into the building, customers typically look around, yet try to act casually. Their exit is more rushed, since customers at this point are “holding” some form of contraband. When customers arrive in vehicles, they may drive by first to determine whether everything is “all right” before going in. The officer may also learn of so-called shooting galleries, where heroin addicts either buy and immediately use the drug or just “shoot up” (administer the heroin). Sometimes dealers insist that customers use the drug in their presence to preclude controlled informant or undercover officer buys. In most cases, addicts will purchase and use heroin in different places. Often, there is a “fee” of a few dollars to use the shooting gallery for taking the drug and staying through the “nodding” period. Shooting galleries exist because addicts need a safe place to take the narcotics and wait out the aftereffects. The existence of a shooting gallery usually comes to police attention by one of two means. First, upset or curious neighbors may call the police, complaining about the activity in the area of the gallery. Second, the police officer may observe an unusual amount of traffic around the location, or he may see known addicts in or near the building. Drug activity, especially involving younger people, may take place on the street and is often undetectable to the alert officer. Usually one individual, the drug dealer himself, is the focus of the attention. He may be approached by individual customers or small groups, depending on the nature of the purchase. The furtive glances of these buyers, their dispersion when an officer or police vehicle approaches, and their attempt to drop objects upon contact with an officer are typical indicators that a street-level drug dealer is operating nearby. An officer may even observe an individual using drugs. The paraphernalia of the drug user differs according to the type of drug being used. For example,



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heroin addicts typically use a “kit” consisting of a piece of rope or rubber for tying around the arm and causing the vein to stand out, a hypodermic needle with a rubber ball or syringe for injection, and a spoon or other convenient means for “cooking” the drug. When cooking a drug, the user is converting the solid drug into an injectable solution. A small ball of cotton for “filtering” out any undissolved material in the drug mixture is also part of the kit.

Unrelated Arrests During an arrest for an unrelated offense, an officer may find drugs or evidence of drug use. When this occurs, information should be sought to build a successful case for illegal possession. Certain questions need to be answered: Does the suspect have drugs in his possession? • • •

If so, what are the drugs and where did they come from? Is the possession legal? Is the suspect currently under the influence of drugs?

Although these types of questions may appear basic, a police officer should remember that, of the thousands of drugs on the market, most do not require a physician’s prescription. These nonprescription items can be bought from supermarkets, grocery stores, and drug stores. The officer’s questioning should be designed to dig out the greatest amount of helpful evidence and to produce evidence that is admissible in court. When questioning an arrested person who has what appears to be prescribed drugs, and after reading the suspect the Miranda warnings, the officer should ask the following types of questions to determine whether the drugs are legally in his possession: • • • • • • • • • • •

Are you sick now or have you been ill? Is this medicine yours? Do you know what it is? What is the medication taken for? How long have you been taking the medicine? When did you last take the medicine? Did you receive a legal prescription from a medical doctor? If so, where is the prescription filled? Are you under the care of the doctor? If so, do you take medicine according to doctor’s orders? Who is your doctor?



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With this type of questioning, the police officer can determine whether the suspect is actually ill and in legal possession of a prescribed medication. Any information obtained from the arrested suspect should be verified. For instance, if the suspect has a prescription bottle, the officer can call the doctor whose name appears on the prescription label for verification. The officer can also contact the pharmacist and request that he or she check the records to determine whether the prescription number, date on the label, the medicine, and the quantity matches what is allegedly prescribed. The patrol officer must exercise special care when seizing drugs from the arrested suspect. In particular, the officer must ensure that the drug is not one that has been prescribed and is not vital to the suspect’s health. If medication is essential to the arrested person’s health, arrangements should be made to continue the medication. The assistance of a physician should be obtained if the officer has any doubt about the suspect’s need for medication.

Open-Air Drug Markets and Police Patrol The “open-air drug market” has greatly changed law enforcement in jurisdictions nationwide on levels of drug enforcement. To a great extent, this evolution was brought about by a change in the “drugs of choice.” As of the preparation of this text, those drugs are “crack” cocaine and methamphetamine. Earlier, the drugs of choice were heroin, marijuana, cocaine hydrochloride, and to a lesser extent barbiturates, amphetamines, and hallucinogens. These drugs and their effects on society were generally unknown to the general public. As a rule, sales were generally transacted on a friend-to-friend, user-to-user, or dealer-to-regular customer basis. To acquire drugs, one had to know the supplier and the supplier needed to know the customer. As a result of these buyer–customer relationships, drug transactions could be conducted in total privacy, safely, and with great success. Traditional drug enforcement techniques were tailor-made to deal with these illegal activities. A small unit of undercover officers was generally established to infiltrate these close-knit groups. They would then attempt to steadily move up the ladder from user, to dealer, to supplier, to importer. Such investigations, known as bilateral investigations, were expensive, dangerous, time-consuming, and almost always aimed at major drug traffickers. When the drug of choice moved to phencyclidine (PCP) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, police started to see a change in drug transactions on the street. This came about in part because users became sharers — a buyer who had a supplier would make a purchase for himself and his friends who would then smoke the drug together. Police also began to see a change in the effect



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of drug use as users frequently became extremely violent. This led to a direct correlation in the steady increase in crime and calls for service most departments experienced since the 1980s. PCP trafficking also led to the birth of many so-called open-air drug markets. Low-level dealers had regular customers who came to their apartments or homes to buy PCP, and as more people began using it, the clientele grew considerably. Drug businesses grew to such proportions that dealers moved their businesses outside and began selling to regular customers and strangers alike. As business grew, dealers began hiring others to conduct the street sales; thus the birth of the open-air drug markets. Open-air drug markets were also reinforced by the lowcost drugs being sold. Small amounts of PCP partially treated with marijuana, for example, could be purchased for as little as $10, which made it affordable for all socioeconomic groups. These dynamics were again bolstered by the street sales of crack cocaine and methamphetamine. Cocaine hydrochloride, or powdered cocaine, was once thought to be the drug of choice of the rich and famous. A number of factors contributed to this perception. It was an expensive drug, primarily because it had to be sold in quantity to make a profit. Cocaine was also considered a social drug. Used primarily at parties or other such gatherings, it was purchased in quantity. Cocaine powder was, and is, mostly ingested by snorting or inhaling it through the nose. It is then absorbed into the blood vessels where it is routed through the body organs and finally to the brain. It takes longer to feel the effects of cocaine powder (as opposed to crack), but a person can stay high for 1 to 2 hours as opposed to the crack high of 10 to 30 minutes. On the other hand, cocaine base is totally different. It is made from cocaine hydrochloride or cocaine powder. One part cocaine powder is mixed with two parts baking soda. This mixture is then boiled at 176°F where many of the impurities and original cutting agents are cooked from the mixture. The solution makes a crackling or popping sound during the process, and a gummy substance is formed. This substance is extracted from the solution and cooled. As it cools, it forms a hard, rock-like substance that must be cut, broken, or chipped to desired sizes. The most popular names for the resulting product are cocaine base, crack, and rock. Crack can be purchased in whatever size or amount desired. All prices are negotiable based on quantities desired and buyer–seller relationships. Crack is the drug of choice nationwide for five main reasons: • • • • •

The effect of the drug on the user The cost to the user The availability of the drug The profit for the distributors The method of ingestion



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If any one of these interrelated factors could be eliminated, crack would not be the public menace it has been for the last 20 years. Interviews with hundreds of crack users conducted by police and public health and other officials revealed the same facts. When crack is ingested, the abuser feels the full effect of the drug in 3 to 7 seconds. Unlike cocaine powder, crack goes from the lungs directly into the bloodstream, which carries it straight to the brain. There are no body organs in its path to filter any of the potency. The only complaint by abusers is that the effect is short-lived, usually lasting only 10 to 30 minutes. The effect is substantially more powerful than that of snorted cocaine powder and the drug is much more addictive. The availability of or access to crack is nearly limitless in communities where open-air drug markets operate.

Open-Air Drug Markets Open-air drug markets are most often found in apartment complexes with tenants of middle to low income. They can also be found at or near shopping malls and even in isolated residential areas. They all have several things in common: • • • •

Their accessibility to vehicular traffic with adequate parking for customers. A large volume of nondrug abuser traffic, both pedestrian and vehicular, which allows dealers and buyers to be inconspicuous. Numerous escape routes for buyers and dealers to escape the police as well as flee street robbers and other dealers. General knowledge that crack can be bought or sold at that specific location.

Drug Dealer Profiles The average drug dealer in these markets is male, 16 to 25 years old. There are two different types of dealers, the first of which is the addict who sells enough crack to supply his own habit. This type of dealer is generally unkempt, unreasonable, and unsafe. He is often under the influence of crack and is potentially dangerous in arrest situations. The other type is the dealer who wants to make a profit. He is dressed in the most expensive up-to-date street wear on the market. Typically, clothing is clean and of a designer brand. This dealer is often vain, semieducated, and proud. He is most often sober and may have never used crack. He will also attempt to avoid apprehension but once arrested is more likely to submit


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without further incident. Because there is always a demand for crack, street dealers set their own hours. They work when and as long as they want. If they arrive at a market and find other dealers already working, more often than not, they move a distance away or go to another known market where there is no competition and set up shop. Profits vary by day of the week. White customers often report that they purchase drugs as the weekend nears because of anticipated days off from work and because payday has arrived and appear to often pay higher prices per unit than black customers. Overall, sales are the greatest the first 3 days of every month, which coincides with the arrival of public assistance (Welfare checks, Assistance to Dependent Children checks, and so forth), paydays, and other income.

The Jamaican Drug Operation Case Study The threat of Jamaican-run drug operations has all but disappeared in the United States in recent years. It is instructive to remember and study their base of operation, which proved to be one of the most successful and aggressive open-air drug trafficking operations ever seen in this nation. Beginning in the late 1980s, Jamaican Posses operating in the United States demonstrated that they were real profit makers and were rarely involved in hand-to-hand street sales. Because of arrests, threat of deportation, and fear of robbery or violence from other street dealers, the Jamaicans were rarely seen on the streets at these markets. They ran their operations through what they called “gates,” generally an apartment in the immediate area of the market. They rarely, if ever, leased the apartment themselves. Rather, they paid the tenant for its use, took it over by force or threat of violence, sublet the unit, or took over a vacant unit. They typically fortified the entrances if they expected prolonged usage of a particular apartment unit. Gates were occupied only during certain periods when Jamaican workers or “runners” were selling crack at the markets. The Jamaicans rarely kept more crack in the gate than they intended to sell during the anticipated period of sales. Workers or “runners” worked on a commission basis and usually were given a small amount of crack to sell. When they sold out, the workers returned to the gate and gave the Jamaicans their share of the profit. They received another supply or “re-up” and went back to work, thus the terms runners and workers. The Jamaican utilizing this method of operation insulated himself from arrest by police, from robbers, from customers, and from other criminals and violence from other dealers. The workers and runners typically operated as teams. The more team members, the less profit per team member, but there was more profit in the long run since more sales could be safely completed under these conditions. The tasks all teams had to perform included:



• • • • • •

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Flagging: Getting the attention of customers and making the initial contact. Working: Making the actual hand-to-hand transaction. Holding: Maintaining or keeping custody of the crack. Lookout: Watching for such dangers as police, robbers, and other dealers. Enforcer: Protecting the team against robbery. Banking: Keeping track of sales and holding cash from sales.

Teams rarely have six players, with each performing only one of these functions. More often than not, one worker performs two or more of these tasks. If a worker was alone, he was required to perform them all, but his risk of robbery, violence, or arrest was much higher. Alternative assignment of individual tasks typically takes the following patterns. In a two-man team, the first individual often serves as lookout and flagger, whereas his partner works, holds, and banks. In a three-man team, one member acts as a lookout and flagger, the second member as a worker, and the third member holds the drugs and banks. In a four-man configuration, the first team member also typically acts as a lookout and flagger, another member works, a third member holds, and the final participant serves as a banker. In some open-air drug markets such as Jamaican Posse operations, it is not uncommon to find several dealers who appear to be working as teams but who are really not. This often results when several individuals combine their money, purchase a quantity of crack, and sell it as a joint venture. Under these circumstances, each member serves as flagger, worker, holder, and banker, and many individuals may approach the same potential buyer at the same time in an effort to sell drugs. These are the least sophisticated drug operations, generally involving youths between 14 and 18 years of age, who are less experienced in selling drugs, less organized, less cautious, generally unarmed, and more cooperative once arrested. As such, they are the easiest of open-air drug marketers to apprehend. When police arrive on the scene, these individuals generally flee immediately into adjoining apartment buildings and residences where they live or are known. These young suspects are typically more inclined to be drug users and are often quite successful in keeping knowledge of their illegal activities from their families.

Patrol Response to Open-Air Markets Uniformed police officers are a common sight in neighborhoods where openair drug markets operate as they respond to complaints concerning dangerous substances as well as other matters. When in the area of a suspected open-air


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drug market, it is best for the officer to assume a routine approach and enter the area at a moderate speed. If possible, the officer should observe the area without being seen stopping to talk to uninvolved persons and should mentally note the descriptions and operations of suspected dealers. Potential escape routes should be identified and any anticipated approaches should be planned, using safety as a guiding principle. If a decision is made to approach a suspect, it should be determined whether reasonable suspicion exists to conduct a Terry search of the suspect’s outer clothing. Reasonable suspicion can also be developed by asking the individual a few simple questions such as his name, where he lives, why he is there and what he is doing, where he works, and whether he has any identification. The officer should record the individual’s name, date of birth, and Social Security number before requesting a record check. Most individuals who are dealing drugs will not have any valid identification. In such instances, the individual should be asked for this information and then asked to repeat it for verification purposes. It is important to be observant of the immediate area. If it can be performed safely, officers should check for a “stash” of drugs that may be close at hand. This is accomplished by examining all types of containers and apparent trash, such as soda cups, fast food bags, and the like. If probable cause for a search is developed, a complete search should be performed. If an inordinate amount of cash is found, question the suspect about where and how he acquired it. It may be established during the course of the investigation that the cash and other valuables are subject to forfeiture. If the suspect has car keys, ask him where the car is located and who owns it and ask to see the registration. Also ask for consent to search the vehicle. Many street dealers believe that they can outsmart police officers. This belief combined with an arrogant attitude often prompts them to freely consent to a search of their vehicle and their person under the assumption that they have hidden their drugs too well to be found.

The Coordinated Response On those occasions where time and manpower permit, it is preferable to initiate a coordinated response to complaints of open-air drug sales. Such responses are advisable from both the safety and effectiveness perspective, considering the organization of most street drug sales. Dealers will go to great lengths to protect their merchandise and themselves, including resorting to the use of force. Lookouts, standing by with cellular phones, notify dealers when police approach as well as provide the direction that the officers are traveling while approaching. Almost every gate has a police scanner used to monitor local police radio frequencies. Lookouts are frequently found on



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bicycles and skateboards and conspicuously patrolling these markets much like police officers on surveillance assignments. Under such circumstances, the coordinated patrol officer response is advisable. A coordinated operation should be under the control of one supervisor, and all communication should be channeled through that individual. Before initiating the operation, all members of the response team should be thoroughly briefed on the assignment and their particular role in relationship to others. It is important that all officers be familiar with the location in question. The area should be sketched with the following items indicated: escape routes, known or suspected crack houses, locations in the vicinity where warrants have previously been executed, areas where weapons have been encountered, and places where cover or concealment can be provided. The identities of individual suspects (if known) and their potential for violence and the potential for police crossfire situations should also be communicated. A plan of approach should be discussed thoroughly so that each officer is certain of his or her assignment and how it fits into the plan. It should be emphasized that officers must not deviate from the plan. Rules must be established and strictly adhered to. For example, officers should not be permitted to chase a fleeing suspect beyond a predetermined perimeter of the takedown area no matter how compelling the chase. To avoid confusion, the plan should be made as simple as possible, with each officer clearly understanding his or her responsibilities. The number of officers utilized should be dictated by the size of the drug operation and the number of suspects involved. Operation should be limited to the number of officers necessary, but officers should always outnumber the suspects specifically targeted. Officers should be equipped with or have access to radios equipped with earphones, flashlights that are operational, evidence bags and tags, gloves for suspect searches, and soft body armor, in addition to other standard issue items.

Conducting Area and Vehicle Searches Drugs in general, and crack in particular, can be hidden in many odd containers and in places where some officers may not consider checking. Therefore, when conducting an area or motor vehicle search, one should pay particular attention to innovative hiding areas and be imaginative in the search process. In an area search, a variety of fixed objects can serve as containers. For example, one should consider drain pipes, signposts, mailboxes, fence railings, banisters, light fixtures, and fire extinguishers as examples of potential hiding places in this category. Also explore above-ground locations such as windowsills, awnings, the crotch of trees, exit signs, address signs, and door jambs.


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Trash-like containers are also frequently utilized in the form of balled-up paper napkins, towels, or bags; paperclips; and a variety of soda, beer, or other cans. Areas on the ground in the immediate vicinity should not be overlooked, including under rocks or mulch, inside bushes and shrubbery, under drain splash pans, as well as under and around porches and landings. It is also important to be aware of the unusual. For example, if it has been raining, a dry area may draw one’s attention; a tennis ball that has been cut open may contain crack, as may a cigarette lighter that does not light. Once probable cause has been established or permission granted to search a motor vehicle, the same type of imaginative search should be undertaken. For example, in the interior of the vehicle one should examine under the headrest, under the dashboard, heater and air-conditioning vents, large control knobs, steering wheel pads, the steering column, under floor mats, armrests, on the transmission hump under the seat, the padding and spring area under the seat, and any ornaments on the rear deck and door panels and sun visor coverings. In the trunk area, examine all containers, including aerosol cans for removable tops or false bottoms, toolboxes and tools, the spare tire to determine whether it is inflated or accessible for holding drugs, and all areas around the wheel well. In the engine compartment, include the search of the antifreeze overflow tank, the windshield washer fluid tank, the air filter housing, and light and grill areas. Examine the hubcaps and the inside of bumpers and trailer hitches. Also check for straps or heavy tape around the frame or undercarriage. Once an arrest has been made for possession or distribution of drugs, the suspect should be searched thoroughly on the scene to ensure the safety of officers and prevent the suspect from destroying any additional evidence.

Interdicting Drugs in Transit For the past decade, many large seizures of drugs have been made by uniformed officers on patrol. Although some of these drug shipments were discovered accidentally as the officers focused on traffic offenses, others resulted because officers were trained to watch for suspects who fit a “profile” for interstate drug traffickers. The Missouri State Highway Patrol, for example, has made a number of seizures of large drug shipments on its state highways after training troopers to detect drugs concealed in vehicles. Missouri calls this program “Looking Beyond the Initial Stop.” In other states, officers who have been trained to detect drug couriers on the highways have been equally successful. For example, in La Salle, Illinois, troopers with the Illinois State Police became suspicious after stopping a speeding U-Haul truck and talking with the driver and passengers. The troopers asked permission to search the truck. Hidden under some mattresses



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were eight cardboard boxes containing 407 individually wrapped packages of cocaine, totaling 944 pounds. In another case, three New York City officers on routine patrol spotted a pickup truck erratically entering the street from a driveway. They pulled the truck over and found 60 kilos of cocaine (about 132 pounds), guns, and two fake police badges. The truck was weaving because the two men in it had just stolen it from a drug trafficker and did not know how to drive it properly. As these cases illustrate, “routine” traffic stops can become very nonroutine when officers are trained to look beyond the initial violation for unusual behavior and signs. However, even when patrol officers are alert and well trained to look for signs of drug trafficking, interdicting drugs on the nation’s streets can be difficult and frustrating because, for every drug courier who gets caught, hundreds get away, particularly on the interstate highways.

Major Transportation Routes Although the interstate highway system is the primary “hunting ground” for large shipments of illegal drugs, patrol officers should remember that interstate drug couriers must leave the highway while en route for gas, food, and occasional lodging (although many couriers avoid making overnight stops). Thus, officers may encounter the drug couriers and their vehicles on state highways and secondary roads and at truck stops and gas stations near the interstates. The same couriers eventually enter the cities to deliver their shipments. It is in the cities that they may arouse the most suspicion provided that officers are alert and know what to look for. Once a large shipment arrives in its destination city, the importer breaks it down into smaller amounts for transport to regional or wholesale distributors. In turn, the regional distributors repackage the drugs into even smaller bundles for resale to street distribution organizations. They also repackage the drugs for sale to the street dealers who make the actual sales to the consumers. At any of these redistribution points, the drugs are in transit on the streets and available to be seized by alert patrol officers.

Identifying Drug Couriers The term “courier” typically refers to those who transport drugs from one area to another — from Tucson to Chicago, for example. Couriers work for wholesale importers and distributors. The wholesale importers smuggle large quantities of drugs into the United States from another country or smuggle large amounts of drugs from one area of the country to another (for example,


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an east coast drug “kingpin” may purchase a truckload of marijuana from Texas). The wholesale importer uses a variety of methods to bring the drugs into or across the country, including commercial and private aircraft of all sizes, cruise ships, freighters, trains, fishing and recreational boats, buses, tractor trailers, cargo containers, recreational vehicles (RVs) and motor homes, automobiles, pickup trucks, humans who swallow drug-filled balloons or pack drugs on their body (known as “mules”), miniature submarines, and pack animals in desert areas. Drugs can be transported by literally anyone. Therefore, the first rule that patrol officers should remember is that there really is no typical drug courier. Some officers have learned this the hard way and paid for their “trust” with their lives. However, officers should not become so distrustful that they begin to view every citizen they encounter during a traffic stop as a drug courier. Despite the fact that anyone can be employed as a drug courier, there are certain characteristics common to many drug couriers and dealers that make it possible for law enforcement agencies to develop “profiles” of them. Patrol officers should study the profiles and learn to take a closer look at both the person and the vehicle. Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) developed a training and interdiction program called Operation Pipeline, which teaches state police officers how to identify vehicles hauling drugs. The Ohio State Patrol, for example, has five teams of troopers and narcotics detector dogs participating in the program. The DEA trains the troopers to identify certain types of vehicles and teaches them how to engage the drivers in conversation to obtain consent searches. The troopers are also taught to spot visual clues and to detect inconsistencies in stories from drivers and passengers. As a result of this program, state police are interdicting large shipments of drugs throughout the nation. DEA Airport Profiles For airport profiles, factors included will vary, depending, among other things, on the geographical area and on what sort of operation is targeted. Profiles designed for use in apprehending couriers passing through airports will differ from profiles designed to detect couriers transporting drugs by motor vehicles on highways. One DEA airport profile consists of seven “primary” characteristics and four “secondary” characteristics. Primary Characteristics 1. Arrival or departure from an identified source city. 2. Traveling by an unusual itinerary.



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3. 4. 5. 6.

Carrying little or no luggage. Use of an alias. Carrying an unusually large amount of currency. Buying airline tickets with a large amount of small-denomination currency. 7. Unusual nervousness. Secondary Characteristics 1. 2. 3. 4.

The almost immediate use of public transportation. Immediately making a telephone call after deplaning. Leaving a false callback number with the airline. Excessive travel to source or distribution cities.

Patrol officers come into contact with couriers of large drug shipments, as well as with sellers who are carrying smaller quantities of drugs. Typically, the contact results from a traffic stop, an accident, or something wrong with the vehicle that draws the officer’s attention (for example, a broken taillight, license plate covered with mud, breakdown, low-riding rear or trunk of vehicle). In addition, confidential informants can provide information to patrol officers to tip them off that someone is transporting drugs and where the vehicle can be located. By stopping the vehicle on probable cause (for example, exceeding the speed limit, broken taillight, expired license tag), the officer might be able to make a warrantless search of the vehicle.

Observing the Behavior of Drug Couriers Certain behaviors should alert the officer that the driver or passenger of the vehicle might be a drug courier. For example, when the vehicle is stopped, the driver may get out and rush back to the patrol car in attempt to keep the officer away from the vehicle because some illegal item is in plain view. If the driver or passenger(s) seems unreasonably nervous, then the officer should suspect possible illegal activity. Suspects show that they are nervous by unusual body movements or an inability to stand still while talking to the officer. The person may have an excessively dry mouth indicated by constantly licking his lips or may perspire heavily. However, many average, innocent citizens also become nervous when stopped by an officer for a traffic offense. Therefore, a suspicion of illegal activity should be pursued only when the person’s reaction clearly goes beyond normal nervousness. If the driver or passenger exhibits signs of drug abuse, then the officer should suspect that the vehicle may contain drugs or other contraband. Constant sniffing and remnants of white powder or redness around the nose



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may indicate cocaine abuse. If the occupants of the vehicle are using drugs, then they are probably not couriers, and any drugs found in the vehicle most likely will be in small amounts. People who are acting as drug couriers may not respond to questions appropriately. This is especially true of novice couriers on their first drug run. For example, elderly vacationers hired to transport a load of drugs home are unlikely to be targeted by police for closer inspections. Other clues that people in the vehicle may be transporting illegal drugs include: • •

•

•

•

Excessive stuttering, which can indicate that the person is under great stress or experiencing fear of discovery. Pausing for an unusually long time before answering questions (this can signal that the person is carefully considering the contents of an untruthful answer or trying to remember how a similar question already was answered with a lie). Statements that begin with phrases like “God is my witness,” “Honestly, officer,” or “I swear on my mother’s grave” may indicate deception in responding to questions. Answering questions with another question or constantly repeating the question asked by the officer (this may indicate the person is stalling for time while considering an untruthful response). Obviously, evasive answers should alert the officer to the possibility of illegal activity.

Possible drug trafficking should be suspected when the vehicle and driver did not seem to belong together. For example: •

• •

•

•

A car rented in Florida by a person from Tennessee who is not present at the time the officer confronts the driver warrants a closer look — the driver may be a hired drug courier. Credit card receipts or car rental agreements can provide the officer with valuable information. If the driver carried a credit card with a name other than his own, particularly if it has been used for food or fuel expenses on the trip, then possible illegal activity should be suspected. Conversely, if a long-distance traveler is not carrying any credit cards at all, but instead has a large wad of cash, the officer’s suspicion should be aroused. Because they fear robbers and thieves, authentic tourists usually carry credit cards and traveler’s checks, not large amounts of cash. If the vehicle is sitting very low in the rear, a large, heavy quantity of contraband may be in the trunk.



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If luggage or spare tire and jack are sitting on the back seat, back floor, or front passenger seat this might be a sign that the trunk contains illegal drugs that take up a lot of space, such as packages of marijuana, boxes containing methamphetamines, and so forth. The officer should check for a trunk key on the vehicle’s key ring. If the driver does not have a trunk key, then the officer should inquire why. Perhaps, the courier, who does not own the drugs in the trunk, may not be trusted by the drug wholesaler; the drug wholesaler may have taken possession of the key to guarantee the load’s safe arrival.

Investigative Stops Using Drug Courier Profiles Federal and state courts have varied widely in their positions as to the legality of using drug courier profiles as the basis for action against suspected drug carriers. Even panels of the same appellate court have at times reached different conclusions about profiles and the propriety of their use. The result has been confusion and frustration for law enforcement officers attempting to combat drug traffickers. At this point in time, however, state and federal decisions, coupled with recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, have made it possible to state certain legal principles that apply to the use of drug courier profiles by law enforcement officers. An understanding of these basic principles is an absolute prerequisite to the effective and lawful use of drug courier profiles.

Profiling: The Legal Environment Most of the cases to date have involved federal or state officers stopping suspected drug couriers passing through airports; as a result, most of the decisions have come from federal courts. However, profiles have also been used by state and local police officers to stop motor vehicles on the highways. State court decisions involving the use of profiles to justify motor vehicle stops have typically cited the federal airport stopped cases as precedents for the state decisions, and it is these federal cases that are discussed below. Individual states may impose restrictions on the use of drug courier profiles that are in addition to the limitations imposed by the U.S. Constitution and the federal courts. Therefore, state and local law enforcement officers should consult cases and statutes of their own jurisdictions to determine the current status of drug courier profiles under local law. The first principle that the law enforcement officer must understand is that the law governing “investigative stops” is critical to the use of drug courier profiles, because:


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1. The profile can never in itself justify an arrest; at most, it can only be used to justify further investigation, which, in the typical field situation, will usually involve an investigative stop. 2. Only if the investigative stop is valid will any subsequent arrest, search, or seizure be upheld by the courts. 3. The validity of the investigative stop will be judged by the standards set forth in the case of Terry v. Ohio* and subsequent decisions. Not surprisingly, most of the litigation that has arisen over the use of drug courier profiles has involved the question of whether the officers’ use of a drug courier profile in and of itself justified an investigative stop. Because of the close relationship between the drug courier profile and the investigative stop, officers should be particularly familiar with two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, Terry v. Ohio and United States v. Sokolow.** Terry v. Ohio,*** decided in 1968, was the landmark case that set forth the Supreme Court’s guidelines for investigative stops. This decision established the following legal guidelines, which are applicable to all “stop and frisk” situations but which must be understood if stops, arrests, and seizures based on drug courier profiles are to be successful. Under Terry, a police officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes only if the officer has “reasonable suspicion,” supported by articulatable facts, that a criminal activity may be afoot.**** Note that the stop must be brief and the reasons therefore must be “articulable” — expressly explainable by the officer.***** “Reasonable suspicion” means less than probable cause****** but more than a general unparticularized suspicion, or “hunch.”******* The courts concede that the concept of reasonable suspicion, like that of probable cause, is difficult to define and cannot be “reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” ******** *

392.U.S. 1 (1968). No. 87-1295, 45 CrL 3001 (1989). *** 392.U.S. 1 (1968). **** 392 U.S. at 30. ***** An officer may approach a person in a public place before the formation of “reasonable suspicion, closing as long as the approach does not amount to a detention or ‘seizure’ of the person.” See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 US 1 (1984). However, the actual detention or “stop” may occur only after reasonable suspicion has been formed. Note: the officer should be discreet and approach first in a public place before the formation of reasonable suspicion. If the approach reasonably appears to be an attempt to contain the person, the courts may regard the approach itself as a “seizure.” ****** Probable cause has been defined as saying “a fair probability that contraband were evidence of a crime will be found.” United States v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). ******* The level of suspicion required for a Terry Stop is less demanding and required for a showing of probable cause. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez , 473 US 531 (1985). However, there must be something more than just the officers “viewing” and there is something wrong; the officer must have, and be able to explain, specific reasons for stopping the suspect. ******** United States v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). **



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Therefore, in evaluating the validity of an investigative stop, neither judges nor law enforcement officers are required to apply a mechanistic set of “rules.” Instead, they should look at the “totality of the circumstances.” This means, basically, that the officer, the courts, and — ultimately — the jury should evaluate the situation in the light of common sense. As one court noted: The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as fact finders are permitted to do the same — and so are law enforcement officers. Therefore, if this commonsense evaluation of the situation gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Terry is satisfied, and the investigative stop is valid. On April 3, 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in United States v. Sokolow. This case presented to the Court the issue of whether or not the fact that a suspect fits a drug courier profile in itself justifies an investigative stop. This case is extremely important not only because it sets forth the view of the Supreme Court regarding the use of drug courier profiles, but also illustrates the type of careful police procedure that withstands constitutional challenges in court and makes it possible for judges to uphold the stop, arrest, and search of a suspected drug courier and seizure of the narcotics that the drug courier is carrying. On a Sunday in July 1984, the defendant appeared at the United Airlines ticket counter at Honolulu Airport and purchased two round-trip tickets for Miami on a flight departing Honolulu later in the day. The tickets were obtained in the names of “Andrew Kray” and “Janet Norian,” and the defendant gave the ticket agent his home telephone number. The tickets cost $2100, and the defendant paid for them in cash from a large roll of $20 bills, which was estimated to contain about $4000. The defendant, approximately 25 years old, was dressed in a black jumpsuit, wore gold jewelry, and “seemed nervous.” He was accompanied by a woman who was later identified as Janet Norian. Neither person checked any luggage, but they carried four bags onto the airplane. Alerted by the cash purchase, the ticket agent notified the Honolulu police of the incident. Police officers determined that the telephone number given by the defendant was not listed to “Andrew Kray,” and no such person was listed in Hawaii. They also discovered that “Kray” and Norian were scheduled to return to Miami 3 days later on July 25, with stopovers in Denver and Los Angeles.


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DEA agents were notified. Concluding that the defendant’s behavior pattern fit one of DEA’s courier profiles, the agents were on hand when the defendant and Norian arrived back at the Honolulu Airport on July 25. The pair were stopped by the agents and taken to the DEA office at the airport, where their luggage was subjected to examination by a narcotics detector dog. The dog “alerted” to the defendant’s shoulder bag. The defendant was thereupon arrested. The DEA agents then obtained a warrant to search the shoulder bag but found no drugs. However, the bag did contain several documents that indicated that the defendant was involved in drug trafficking. The agents then had the dog examine the luggage, and the dog alerted to another of the bags. According to the Supreme Court’s account of the case, because it was then too late in the evening to obtain a search warrant for the second bag, the defendant was allowed to leave the airport while the agents kept the luggage. The following morning, another dog was called in; this dog also alerted to the second bag. The agents obtained a warrant for a search of the second bag and found 21,063 grams of cocaine inside. The Federal District Court rejected the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, but the defendant’s subsequent conviction was reversed by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court found that the agents’ stop of the defendant at the airport was not based on “reasonable suspicion,” as required under Terry and, as such, was improper. Consequently the court held that the resulting arrest, search, and seizure were also invalid. * Basic Principles of Drug Courier Profile Use 1. Drug courier profiles may be used only as a basis for further investigation. Such profiles do not, standing alone, justify an arrest. This principle has been made crystal clear by the courts. Any attempt to arrest a drug courier based solely on the use of the courier profile will almost certainly result in all evidence being suppressed and the criminal charge being dismissed. In addition, the officers and agencies involved may face a very real threat of civil liability as a result of their actions.**

*

United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987). Referring to the agents in the case: [T]he court consistently has required that officers’ suspicion be supported by evidence of ongoing criminal activity … such behavior cannot be intuited from a hodgepodge assembly of ‘factors’ about an individual character rather than criminal acts. It must demonstrate the ongoing commission of a crime.” 831 F.2d 1413. ** In view of the existing case law, it is unlikely that any court would uphold such an arrest, or rule that an officer attempting such an arrest would be entitled to qualified immunity under the so-called “good-faith defense.”



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2. The factors that make up the elements of a drug courier profile may, however, under certain circumstances justify an “investigative stop.” United States v. Sokolow and other court decisions have held that it is not the drug courier profile in itself, but the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time they decide to make an investigative stop that determine whether the stop was valid. If, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers’ suspicion was reasonable, the stop is valid. The fact that the behavior of the suspect that aroused the officers’ suspicion happened to appear on a “profile” is irrelevant. It is the circumstances that determine a reasonable suspicion, not the existence or absence of a formal “profile.” Therefore, the profiles must be used only as a starting point; all of the circumstances of the case must be considered, not just the items appearing in the profile. Although the profiles may certainly be used, they must not be applied in a mechanical, unthinking manner. The officer must consider the profile items in connection with the particular circumstances existing at the time and place. However, the officer may evaluate the circumstances in light of his or her own experience. Conduct seemingly innocent may, when viewed as a whole, reasonably appear suspicious to an officer who is familiar with the practices of drug smugglers and the methods used by them to avoid detection.* 3. The officer must be able to articulate the factors that led him or her to form a reasonable suspicion of the person stopped. Unless the involved officer can successfully explain to the court the factors that justified the stop, the stop will be held invalid and any subsequent arrest, search, or seizure will likely be invalidated. It does not do any good to say to the court “I just had a feeling that something was wrong.” The officer must be able to list and explain the specific and particular observations that led him or her to conclude that the person in question might be a drug courier. * Law enforcement officers utilize a number of different profiles. For example, see Florida v. Royer, 460 US for anyone (1983); and United States v. Mendenhall , 446 US 544 (1980); and United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982); State v. Cohen, 103 N.M. 558, 7-11 P.2d three (1985), cert. denied 106 S. Ct. 2276 (1986).


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The ability of the officer to state and explain his or her decision in clear, concrete terms can, and often does, make the difference between winning and losing a case of this type. Therefore: 4. Know not only what factors are included in the profile but also why they are included. Because the unthinking, mechanical employment of a profile has been disapproved by the courts, the officer must be able to demonstrate to the court that the use of the profile was made intelligently and with an understanding of the meaning of the profile factors.* 5. Where possible, try to identify for the court factors in addition to those listed in the profile that contributed to the overall decision to detain the suspect. This will help demonstrate to the court that the use of the profile was not mechanical and unthinking. 6. Limit detention of the suspect to the minimum necessary to obtain further information. Even if the initial detention is valid, if you hold the suspect for too long, or otherwise exceed the balance of “reasonable” detention, the case may be thrown out by the courts. If the initial detention produces additional grounds for suspicion, the detention may be extended; however, after a reasonable time, the officers must make the decision to arrest or release the suspect. This is particularly sensitive when the suspect has been removed to a private room for questioning. 7. If the suspect has not yet been arrested, obtain either a valid consent or a search warrant before searching the suspect’s luggage or automobile. Because of the limitations imposed by Terry v. Ohio, agencies should not permit a complete search of person, luggage, or automobile of * Defendant was to some extent supported in this contention by the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980), reversing the conviction of the drug courier defendant, for lack of the reasonable suspicion in the initial stop, despite the fact that the defendant was arriving from Florida City (Fort Lauderdale), and had not checked his luggage, and displayed other behavior traits regarded by the officers as characteristic of a drug courier. The majority in that case held that the behavior involved was sufficient to justify the stop because such behavior would also be displayed by “a very large category of presumably innocent travelers.” 48 US at 441.



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the detained suspect unless an arrest has been made or probable cause for such a search has arisen. It will be necessary to have either the suspect’s consent or a warrant before anything more than the Terry “frisk” can be conducted. Therefore, if the valid consent to search the suspect’s luggage or automobile cannot be obtained and there is not yet probable cause for an arrest and a complete search, get a search warrant before searching luggage or vehicles. If the foregoing principles are observed, the use of drug courier profiles will be both proper and effective. When the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendant contended that the evidence should have been suppressed because the agents did not have the “reasonable suspicion” necessary for the initial stop. The defendant argued that the agents lacked “reasonable suspicion” because they were relying on the use of their DEA drug courier profile to identify the defendant as a suspect, although aspects of the defendant’s behavior that the agents concluded from the profile could have been the actions of a totally innocent person. * However, the Supreme Court rejected Sokolow’s arguments, ruled that the stop was valid, and upheld the conviction. Noting the various factors described above, which led the DEA agents to conclude that the defendant fit the profile, Chief Justice Rehnquist said: Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion. The Court observed that: Terry itself involved “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent” if viewed separately, “but which taken together warranted further investigation.” The Court then addressed the specific question of the DEA agents’ use of the drug courier profile. We do not agree with [defendant] that our analysis is somehow changed by the agent’s belief that his behavior was consistent with one of DEA’s “drug courier profiles” … a court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must require the agent to *

The factors specifically mentioned in the opinion as establishing reasonable suspicion were: (1) paying $2100 and cash for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20 bills containing nearly twice that amount; (2) traveling under an alias; (3) in traveling from Honolulu to Miami in July (20 hour trip) and remaining only 48 hours before returning.



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articulate the factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a “profile” does not … detract from their evidentiary significance … we hold that the agents had a reasonable basis to suspect that respondent was transporting illegal drugs on these facts. In applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Sokolow, it is important to note that the Court did not state that the drug courier profile in itself provided a sufficient basis for the investigative stop of Sokolow at the Honolulu Airport. The Court held only that the factors that were known to the DEA agents and that led them to believe that Sokolow fit the profile, which they happened to be using, were in themselves sufficient to constitute “reasonable suspicion” and to justify the temporary detention of Sokolow for further investigation. * The majority of the Court seemed to regard the fact that the agents were using a profile as irrelevant; to the justices who voted to uphold the conviction, it was apparently the circumstances themselves, not the existence or use of a prepared profile, that constituted “reasonable suspicion.” Presumably, the result of the case would have been the same even if the profile had not been involved.** It is therefore important that officers do not regard this case as authorizing investigative stops merely because a person fits a previously prepared “profile.” In determining whether there were sufficient grounds for an investigative stop, the test is whether the facts and circumstances that were known to the officers at the time they made the decision to detain the suspect created the necessary “reasonable suspicion.” The fact that a profile was or was not involved appears to be irrelevant.*** Nevertheless, from Terry v. Ohio and United States v. Sokolow and other cases, we can draw certain conclusions that can be stated in the form of basic principles, which at this time appear to govern the use of drug courier profiles by law enforcement officers.

Suggested Reading Adams, T.F., Police Field Operations, 7/E, Prentice Hall Publications, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2007. Steffen, G.S., Drug Interdiction: Partnerships, Legal Principles, and Investigative Methodologies for Law Enforcement, Prentice Hall Publications, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2002. *

By contrast, the dissenting minority appeared to regard the mere fact that a profile was used a sufficient reason to invalidate the stop and suppress the evidence. ** This view has been expressed by some of the courts, circuits, and state courts. *** See Brown v. Texas, 443 US 47 (1979).


8

Clandestine Laboratories

Over the past 30 years, law enforcement officers have seized thousands of clandestine laboratories located in such diverse places as farmhouses, log cabins, city apartment buildings, and urban commercial properties. Clandestine operations have included both makeshift and sophisticated technology and equipment, and operators have varied from inexperienced novices to qualified organic chemists. For the most part, drugs produced in clandestine laboratories have been amphetamines, methamphetamines, or hallucinogens. The proliferation of illicit drug laboratories remains a public concern and a top priority of law enforcement. The magnitude of the problem is illustrated by 2006 statistics from the Office of National Drug Control Policy which stated that, from 1975 to 2001, the federal government seized 16,054 illegal drug laboratories, of which 13,931 were used to produce methamphetamine. More than 3 million 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) (discussed later in this chapter) tablets were seized during 2000, compared with 196 tablets in 1993. These statistics show a disturbing pattern of criminal involvement and growing interest in the illicit manufacture of drugs (see Figure 8.1). As with other types of drug enforcement investigations, the investigation of an illicit drug laboratory begins with obtaining and verifying information about the location, its operators, and the drug being produced. Information can be developed by establishing a liaison with chemical and equipment suppliers, as well as with manufacturers and distributors of machinery. Inquiries about unusual purchases of supplies and equipment may uncover a clandestine laboratory. Many clandestine lab operators often go further than just producing a powder or liquid form of the drug. Many actually possess it to its final retail form. Indications that a clandestine laboratory is operating in a particular area include a low selling price and a large-scale availability of the drug. If the presence of a clandestine laboratory is suspected, several investigative steps should be undertaken: 193



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Total of All Meth Clandestine Laboratroy Incidents Including Labs, Dumpsites, Chem/Glass/Equipment

Calendar Year 2004 947 472

65 21 72

228

122

120

764

66 AK 20 HI GUAM 1

168

78 48 295 1335 205 106 1058 1074 286 584 165 2788 571 75 659 800 1327 318 170 267 385 261 452 123 276

31

42 79

234

Source: National Clandestine Laboratory Database Total: 17,170

DE MA MD ME VT DC NH

3 1 1 3 1 1 2

map last updated on August 18, 2005

Figure 8.1 This map illustrates the numerous “meth” laboratories discovered in 2004 and makes clear the importance of aggressive drug enforcement measures.

• • • • •

Identify new residents and determine whether they have any prior drug arrests. Look for the presence of window fans or other exhaust equipment, particularly those operating in cold weather. Watch for unusual deliveries by the mailman or express companies. Observe trash for waste materials and discarded containers that are used in drug processing. Pay attention to unusual odors in suspected areas.

To continue the investigation, chemical supply houses should be contacted for information on new customers who may: • • • • • •

Phone in orders by representing themselves as agents for firms. Order by mail with letterhead stationery of unknown corporations. Submit cash-and-carry orders. Request that shipments be sent to a residential address or to a post office box. Change order procedures frequently. For legitimate chemical manufacturers or commercial laboratories, order unusual items.

Probable cause for obtaining a search warrant for a suspect clandestine laboratory may be derived from such factors as information obtained from chemical suppliers, observed activities, chemical odors emanating from the suspected building or structure, or statements obtained from informants.



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Timing the seizure of a clandestine laboratory is critical and can be a major problem for investigators. In a new manufacturing operation, if the production process has not reached the final stage, a premature seizure may yield little more than the component chemicals. This, of course, provides no illegal drug as evidence. Usually, the only course of action when chemical synthesis of the drug has not yet taken place is to charge the suspects with conspiracy to manufacture drugs. The main objective is to seize the laboratory while the illegal drugs are being produced or to find evidence that illegal drugs have been produced at an earlier time by locating traces of those drugs. Once this is accomplished, the illegal manufacturer can then be charged.

Safety Considerations Clandestine laboratories present a special safety hazard to the criminal investigator because of the possibility of fire or explosion; many of the chemicals used in clandestine drug operation are unstable and highly flammable. Moreover, there is a possibility of drugs being ingested by officers who breathe laboratory fumes or absorb drugs through skin contact. It is recommended, therefore, that local officers who encounter a clandestine laboratory obtain the immediate assistance of a qualified chemist before conducting a thorough search of the premises. Chemists can assist by helping to prevent fire or explosion and detecting and initially identifying drugs being produced. Once a laboratory has been secured, the chemists can provide assistance with selecting, identifying, collecting, and preserving the evidence. As a safety precaution, the local fire department should be notified when police officers discover a clandestine laboratory or when a raid is initiated by the police. If the police find themselves in a clandestine laboratory without a chemist, they should observe the following: •

• • •

• •

Keep the laboratory operator present when shutting down the laboratory; his advice on the procedures being used may save his life and those of the officers. Do not allow smoking in or near the site. Do not use cameras with flash; use strobe lights instead. If fumes within the laboratory are strong, shut off all electrical equipment, except those being used to stir materials or are otherwise part of the chemical process. Once the site is under control, evacuate nearby people. Be alert for any container labeled lithium hydride, which is an explosive substance when mixed with water.


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Table 8.1 Types of Laboratories 1. Extraction laboratories produce illicit substances by removing certain elements from one substance and creating another. Examples are: a. Hashish: This is an extraction of the marijuana plant made by boiling marijuana in a solvent and alcohol solution. The precipitant is then filtered through a strainer, and the resulting material is allowed to dry. b. Methamphetamine: One somewhat primitive method of making a crude brand of methamphetamine is by collecting a large number of Benzedrine inhalers and removing the cotton parts of the inhalers. This material is then placed in a vat filled with muriatic acid and heated until a film forms on the top of the solution. 2. Conversion laboratories convert existing controlled substances into different forms for street sales. A typical example: a. Crack: This free-base form of cocaine is made by mixing powdered cocaine with baking soda, ammonia, and water and heating the solution until a residue is formed, which is then dried. 3. Synthesis laboratories convert one chemical to another. Phencyclidine (PCP) and methamphetamine laboratories are typical examples. Such labs use controlled chemicals such as “P2P” to create yet a different product.

Identifying Laboratory Operations Although many different types of drugs are produced by clandestine laboratories, there are three basic types of lab operations; these are described in Table 8.1. In some instances, fire departments, responding to the scene of a fire or explosion, will discover evidence of laboratory operations. Such determinations, however, depend on the ability of those personnel to recognize the type of substances and equipment typically used in such operations. Therefore, it is important that emergency service personnel be trained in identification of clandestine laboratory operations. Because the fire department should be called during drug lab raids, it is important that responsible personnel from both agencies develop a working relationship in dealing with the potential problems that may arise from these types of operations. Evidence of drug laboratory operations is often generated through informants. Laboratory operators who are attempting to establish operations in a new community often need to determine sources for the purchase of specific chemicals. Plans for development of a laboratory and related involvement of suppliers or distributors frequently are revealed by confidential informants and intelligence gathered from arrestees. The community at large may also provide valuable tips on laboratory operations based on the observations of unusual activities or circumstances. Many drug laboratories operate in urban or suburban residential communities; citizens, who become aware of the common signs of laboratory operations, can provide valuable information to the police. These indicators include:



•

• • • • •

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A residence where one or more individuals visit but where no one lives. Laboratory operators are generally cautious about the risks of fire, explosion, or contamination and attempt to limit their exposure and risk. Residences or other buildings that have sealed doors and windows but are not abandoned. The presence of ventilating fans that operate irrespective of weather conditions. Strong ammonia or related odors. An unfurnished “residence.” A “resident” who frequently goes outside for a cigarette break or to get some air.

Although, in and of themselves, these circumstances do not prove the existence of an illegal drug manufacturing operation, several such factors together may be suggestive enough to warrant establishment of low-profile police surveillance. Perhaps the single most important source of information on clandestine drug laboratory operations is a cooperative chemical supplier. Chemical company sales records and inquiry files can often identify laboratory operators even before manufacturing and distribution begin. Chemical distributors should be provided with information on the types of chemicals that are being targeted by drug enforcement agencies and which chemicals are most likely used in the manufacture of popular illegal drugs and controlled substances. The intended use of some chemical purchases may be obvious, as some chemicals in combination will produce no other product than a controlled substance. For example, piperidine, cyclohexanone, and phenylmagnesium bromide will, in combination, produce only phencyclidine, although other chemicals are required to complete the process. A list of chemicals that are potentially used in the manufacture of controlled substances is presented in Appendix III. All of these will certainly not be used in all cases for illegal drug manufacturing; however, an alert chemical distributor may be able to provide police investigators with leads sufficient to warrant further investigation. Chemical suppliers should also be aware of suspicious circumstances regarding how these and other chemicals are purchased. Many experienced laboratory operators are aware of the potential problems related to the purchase of certain chemicals and how their actions can become suspicious. In some cases, to avoid suspicion, operators will insist on paying for their purchases with cash and have the chemicals picked up directly from the supplier rather than delivered. Chemical suppliers should be made aware of other suspicious actions of chemical purchasers, such as the use of an incorrect name, address, or telephone number, a nonexistent


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Table 8.2 Clandestine Laboratory Indicators • A large amount of cold tablet containers that list Ephedrine or Pseudoephedrine as ingredients • Jars containing clear liquid with a white or red solid on the bottom • Jars labeled as containing iodine or dark, shiny, metallic purple crystals inside of jars • Jars labeled as containing red phosphorus or a fine dark red or purple powder • Coffee filters containing a white pasty substance, a dark red sludge, or small amounts of shiny white crystals • Bottles labeled as containing sulfuric, muriatic, or hydrochloric acid • Bottles or jars with rubber tubing attached • Glass cookware or frying pans containing a powdery residue • An unusually large number of cans of camp fuel, paint thinner, acetone, starting fluid, lye, and drain cleaners containing sulfuric acid or bottles containing muriatic acid • Large amounts of lithium batteries, especially ones that have been stripped • Soft silver or gray metallic ribbon (in chunk form) stored in oil or kerosene • Propane tanks with fittings that have turned blue • Occupants of residence going outside to smoke • Strong smell of urine or unusual chemical smells like ether, ammonia, or acetone Source: U.S. Department of Drug Enforcement, 2006

company, or other deception. A suspect may also present unreasonable explanations for the use of certain chemicals. For example, the individual may state that he is purchasing large quantities of phenylmagnesium bromide, an essential component of PCP manufacturing, to clean carburetors. The sales records and information pertaining to the identity of the purchaser, which can be obtained from a cooperative chemical supplier, are essential for investigating a targeted suspect and can be used to identify lab operators and/or the location of the laboratory. For example, when a suspect places an order, the supplier can inform the suspect that the item is not in supply and that it will have to be ordered. With the order, it may be then possible to successfully procure a suspect’s name, address, and telephone number on the presumption that he or she will be notified when the item arrives.

Investigation Techniques Investigating a clandestine laboratory is especially dangerous for police because of the explosive, corrosive, and hazardous materials usually associated with the drug manufacturing process and because many laboratories are fortified with deadly booby traps. In many cases, even a slight spark can create a chain reaction, resulting in a massive explosion. Agents have fainted from fumes emitted from the laboratories. Because of this, investigators who raid the labs now wear protective plastic jumpsuits, rubber gloves, respirators, and air tanks. Portable showers in vans are sometimes used to allow agents to wash off contaminants. Indicators of clandestine laboratories are summarized in Table 8.2.



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Not only do criminal drug laboratory operators mix deadly toxic chemicals, but they also have been found to dump toxic waste down bathroom drains or in holes dug in the ground. These actions make some laboratory locations akin to hazardous waste sites. Clandestine laboratories are often operated by nonprofessional individuals with limited knowledge of chemistry. Some labs are run by people who have learned various processing techniques through their peers in the criminal underworld. The methamphetamine market, for example, was dominated for many years by the Pagans motorcycle club. The skills utilized in drug processing and the safety procedures used by a group like the Pagans are highly suspect. The strongest weapon in fighting illicit laboratories is sound criminal intelligence. This can be acquired from other law enforcement agencies, informants, or surveillance activities. Before moving against a laboratory, investigating officers should learn: 1. Number of inhabitants at the laboratory 2. Identities of inhabitants a. Names and other personal identifiers b. Criminal histories 3. Any weapons located in the residence 4. Information on guard dogs, booby traps, and any exterior fortification 5. The progression of the cooking process (is there any finished product available for seizure?) Additional intelligence can sometimes be acquired through a close working relationship with the chemical and laboratory equipment suppliers. Although some of these manufacturers may be involved with criminals, those who are not can be valuable sources of intelligence. As mentioned above, employees of these companies should watch for customers who: • • • • •

Use names of unknown companies for orders Pay cash for items purchased Order unusually large amounts of chemicals commonly used in laboratory operations Request shipments of chemicals or equipment sent to residences or post office box numbers Phone-in orders representing themselves as employees of companies

In some cases, law enforcement agencies have attempted to establish chemical “store-fronts,” which are “sting”-type operations consisting of undercover agents operating a contrived chemical distribution company. Officers



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provide needed chemicals to suspected laboratory operators and follow the suspects to their destination. Subsequent surveillance results in acquiring search warrants and raiding the location of the suspected laboratory. Although generally considered a successful strategy, problems are created when officers fail to maintain surveillance and thereby lose track of the perpetrators, who have possession of valuable chemicals. The presence of illicit laboratories may be detected by an abundance of methamphetamine or PCP in the area at an unusually low price, indicating a fresh “cook-off.” If a laboratory is suspected in an area, the following points should be considered: 1. A check with local utility companies may show an excessive use of electricity or water. 2. Postal officials may render information regarding residents’ receiving mail at the suspected address, including any large deliveries. 3. Once identified, all of the residents’ criminal backgrounds must be checked to determine previous involvement in drug violations. This information can be used later to establish probable cause for a search warrant. 4. When the suspected residence is under surveillance, officers should look for ventilation systems such as window fans. 5. Investigators should be aware of any unusual odors in the area that might indicate the presence of an operating laboratory. 6. A trashing of the suspects’ residence should be considered if the location provides an opportunity (see Chapter 1). 7. A list of the suspects’ long-distance telephone calls (a subpoena will be required) will provide a readout of all direct-dial long-distance calls made from the residence, thereby identifying possible associates or chemical supply companies used.

Seizure and Forfeiture There are a wide variety of circumstances under which laboratory operators may be arrested; only the most typical are discussed here. Most laboratory operations that have been closed are the result of intensive investigative work, culminating in raids. These raid operations are discussed later in this chapter, primarily as they relate to safety procedures and requirements. On occasion, police officers will inadvertently discover clandestine laboratory operations after responding to a public safety situation. It is essential that officers take only those steps necessary to protect their lives or the lives of bystanders and to make arrests only if entry in the laboratory is not



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required. If the officers’ presence has not been detected, findings can be relayed to supervisory personnel and other appropriate personnel within the department who have received specialized training in handling clandestine laboratories. Once the scene is secure, it may be possible to interview neighbors to gather information on occupancy. Officers should also take note of vehicles parked in the immediate area of the laboratory. Another means of interdiction involves the civil forfeiture of illicit chemicals and drug manufacturing paraphernalia. This procedure, which pertains to individual laboratory operators as well as to chemical suppliers under federal law 21 USC 881, allows federal agencies to seize anything used or intended for use in the manufacturing, delivery, or importing of illegal drugs. Most states have similar prohibitions, and officers should be familiar with the provisions and limitations of these laws. Use of these forfeiture statutes may be a reasonable alternative to attempts to establish a criminal case, particularly where manpower constraints limit surveillance and other operations, when suspects’ discovery of surveillance may necessitate terminating the investigation, or when it is feared that the laboratory operation is preparing to relocate quickly. Often, the circumstances that justify a civil seizure will lead to successful prosecution under criminal statutes relating to conspiracy or the attempt to manufacture controlled substances. When making a decision concerning civil seizure of illegal drugs and manufacturing materials, officers should contact the local prosecuting attorney for advice. Although evidence may not support criminal prosecution, it may be adequate for a civil seizure. Normally, successful seizure requires that officers demonstrate the suspect’s probable intent to manufacture a controlled substance. This can be accomplished by considering the type and combination of chemicals and paraphernalia present, furtive activity, use of subterfuge, or other questionable practices. Chemical companies or supply houses that knowingly supply chemicals or other supplies to laboratory operators without reporting those sales to the police, disguise sales, assist buyers in using the chemicals, or otherwise assist in the preparation or merchandising process are also subject to civil and criminal penalties under federal laws 21 USC 881, 841, and 846, as well as many state laws. It is normally possible to apply seizure and forfeiture actions to such merchants if the investigation can establish any factor that shows the supplier’s “guilty knowledge” of the illegal uses of their merchandise. Undercover purchase of chemicals from suppliers is the most typical means of developing criminal cases against them. In addition, chemicals seized from drug laboratories may display manufacturer’s labels, including lot numbers, and equipment may have manufacturer’s plates and serial numbers, which may be used to trace their sales or transfers.


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Under proper circumstances, therefore, civil seizure may be an acceptable, if not the preferred, approach to termination of illegal drug manufacturing operations. Additionally, once such actions are taken, perpetrators will often cooperate with the police and provide intelligence that will assist in additional enforcement operations.

Health and Safety Regulations The responsibility for safety placed on police agencies in dismantling clandestine laboratories is immense. The knowledge, skills, training, and equipment necessary to safely raid and dismantle a laboratory can present a nearly insurmountable burden to small- and medium-sized police departments. For this reason, police agencies should never attempt to conduct a laboratory raid without first consulting an expert in the field. Specially trained and equipped personnel may be found in state and major metropolitan police and fire departments and through field offices of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). For decades, police agencies have handled, stored, and disposed of a wide variety of chemical substances that have been seized in drug raids. Many of these, either individually or in combination, are toxic and carcinogenic. Experience has clearly demonstrated the danger of exposure to the substances. As a result, federal and state regulatory agencies have instituted regulations for the controlled handling, transportation, storage, and disposal of such materials. At the federal level, regulations are promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Department of Transportation, and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). As a result of these regulations, the DEA requires all their agents, chemists, and task force officers who deal with clandestine labs to be certified by a special safety school. OSHA regulates employee working conditions. The processing of clandestine laboratories, from an employee health and safety standpoint, is controlled by provisions of OSHA standards 29 CFR 1910.1200. Included in these provisions are requirements that employees be trained to recognize chemical health hazards and to be skilled in safe chemical handling techniques and first aid. OSHA has also set standards for clothing and equipment for clandestine laboratory dismantling operations. The Department of Transportation, under CFR 49, regulates the transport of hazardous materials, whereas the EPA, pursuant to CFR Title 40, controls the handling of hazardous wastes. In accordance with their standards, police agencies must obtain an EPA number so that chemical wastes can be taken to an approved EPA facility for storage and destruction.



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Chemicals Found in Laboratories Officers need to be aware of three distinct categories of chemicals found in illicit laboratories: precursors, reagents, and solvents. •

• •

Precursors: Precursors are raw materials used for manufacturing a controlled substance, which later become part of the finished product. The law requires that these chemicals be reported when anyone sells, transfers, or furnishes them. Reagents: Reagents chemically react with one or more precursors but are not part of the finished product. Solvents: Solvents do not react chemically with precursors or reagents but become part of the finished product. These are used to dissolve solid precursors or reagents and to purify other chemicals. Solvents are explosive and should be considered extremely volatile and dangerous.

Hazardous Chemicals Most laboratories will contain extremely volatile chemicals. Officers should be familiar with hazardous compounds. •

•

•

•

Ether: Ether is a common ingredient used by lab operators. It is an extremely flammable liquid that tends to form explosive peroxides when evaporated to dryness. Empty or near-empty cans of ether should be handled with extreme care. Mercuric chloride (bromide): Mercuric halogen compounds are extremely violent poisons. Officers should avoid breathing the dust from these chemicals. Lithium aluminum hydride: Lithium aluminum hydride (LAH) is commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine and amphetamine. It is a highly unstable compound that reacts violently to moisture or heat. Keep moisture away from this reagent! A chemical called Vitride has, in some instances, replaced LAH, and it should be handled with the same precautions. Sodium or potassium cyanide: Sodium is a soft, shiny metal that becomes dull gray when exposed to air. Sodium also reacts explosively with water. It should be stored in liquids containing no oxygen, such as kerosene.

Conducting a Laboratory Raid Chapter 6 addressed the serving of high-risk warrants; however, because of the specialized nature of a clandestine laboratory raid, certain related precautions will be identified and discussed here.


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Figure 8.2 DEA agents raiding an illegal methamphetamine laboratory. Protective gear is required to safeguard against toxic fumes and materials commonly encountered in such a raid.

Conducting a raid on an occupied laboratory requires preplanning. Normally, a planning meeting involves the police tactical unit, bomb squad, hazardous material or chemical waste disposal personnel, chemist, and department representatives — all of whom are specially trained. The nature of the operation from initial injury to dismantling should be reviewed, with particular attention to the types of chemicals most likely to be used, the nature of the suspects involved, and contingency plans for emergency services should a fire, explosion, or toxic reaction occur (see Figure 8.2). Initial entry personnel should be outfitted with protective clothing, body armor, and goggles. “Nomex” will provide short-term protection from fire, and goggles will protect eyes from airborne fumes and thrown chemicals. The tactical unit is for securing the suspects and should exit the laboratory as quickly as possible and with the minimum amount of force. Tactical team members should wear the minimum amount of protective clothing necessary so as not to unduly restrict their movements. It is also important that the team’s exposure to the laboratory environment be extremely limited. The team should make a mental note of the laboratory environment and report its findings to the assessment team members that will follow. Laboratory operators, in anticipation of possible raids, sometimes booby trap the facility to destroy evidence. The ability to recognize these and other potential hazards are dependent on the training and experience of team members, a factor that underscores the importance of special training for such operations. After leaving the facility, the tactical team should undergo decontamination (discussed next). After the site is secured, the assessment team may enter. Team members should wear special protective clothing covered with disposable protective suits, as well as chemical-resistant gloves and boots covered with disposable



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gloves and boots. All seams of the suits should be taped with nonporous adhesive tape, and each member should be equipped with a self-contained breathing apparatus. The team should be outfitted with two air-monitoring devices — a combustible gas indicator and indicator tubes. The combustible gas indicator is an essential air-monitoring device that tests for oxygen levels, airborne gas particle levels, and the combustibility of the environment. The indicator tubes test for the presence and quality of specific types of chemical vapors. A pump is used to force air through the individual tubes. Assessment team members should test the laboratory environment at several locations and make notes of instrument readings. They should also make a diagram of the interior, noting any dangers or problems that may be encountered. When completed, the assessment team should leave the facility, decontaminate, and give their report to the dismantling team. The dismantling team should wear the same type of protective clothing as the assessment team. Even though dangerous substances may not have been found, there is always the possibility of spills and damage during dismantling that could create a hazardous situation. As stated earlier, a chemist, trained in laboratory dismantling, should be on hand to take samples of chemicals present and products being manufactured so that informed judgments can be made on safely packing, transporting, storing, disposing, and handling evidence samples. Crime scene personnel, under the close supervision of the dismantling team supervisor, should conduct standard crime scene processing procedures, including photographing the crime scene and searching for latent fingerprints. The recording of laboratory operations is also helpful for evidentiary purposes and for courtroom presentation. The chemist can direct the proper packaging of chemical substances. Care must be taken so that only compatible chemicals are packaged together. Typically, chemicals are placed in drums filled with vermiculite or a similar absorbent, nonflammable substance. An EPA-approved waste disposal company can be of great value in the packaging process. Chemicals that will not be used in court because of potential hazards, together with decontaminated clothing and equipment, must be packaged, transported, and stored or disposed of according to EPA guidelines.

Contamination Prevention and Decontamination In dealing with clandestine laboratories, trained personnel should recognize that safety must be a top priority. In addition to the potential physical effects of chemical exposure, there are the additional threats of fire, explosions, and contact with caustic or corrosive substances and the dangers associated with


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compressed gas. As such, teamwork and constant communication are essential. Team members must work slowly and methodically as a matter of caution but also because of the fatigue and stress associated with the operation. The protective clothing can cause overheating and fatigue, as well as reduced dexterity, field of vision, and effective communication, all of which add to the potential for human error and accidents. Added precautions to avoid contamination include a thorough washing of any exposed body parts after processing the laboratory. Officers should never smoke, drink, or eat around the lab site. Care should be taken not to sit, rub, or lean against potentially contaminated surfaces. A special decontamination area should be designated to prevent the transfer of contaminants in the laboratory to the outside environment. The laboratory setting and the level of contamination will normally determine the type of decontamination area to be used. In an urban environment, for example, it may be best to employ the services of an EPA-approved chemical waste disposal company. These companies can be expensive but are fully equipped to handle decontamination on the scene by using portable equipment. The expense associated with these firms is generally inconsequential when considering the risks to lives and potential liability associated with a mismanaged laboratory dismantling operation, particularly when located in an urban area. In a rural or suburban setting, it may be possible to set up the decontamination area on-site. Such an area should be located upwind from the laboratory site. An operational area should be roped off, the ground within covered by a plastic sheet, and the area divided clearly into a “hot” or unclean area and a clean area. The site should be equipped with plastic garbage bags for disposal of outer disposable clothing; water, detergent, and a bristle brush for cleaning reusable clothing and equipment; a large container such as a plastic pool for “dirty” water; and a chair or stool. Workers leaving the laboratory should enter the decontamination area on the dirty side and remove the tape from their clothing and the disposable booties. A properly outfitted decontamination assistant should help scrub the boots; once accomplished, the worker should move into the clean area. There, the officer should remove the breathing apparatus and disposable suit and gloves, wash hands and any other exposed skin surfaces, and then exit the area. All contaminated clothing and wastewater must be included with the contaminated waste products (which are removed to the waste disposal site).

Controlling Precursor Chemicals The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is the principal federal law directed at combating the illicit manufacture and distribution of controlled drugs in



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the United States. Since its passage in 1970, the CSA has been amended on a number of occasions. The most recent change in the scope of the CSA is the implementation of amendments and regulations regarding chemicals and equipment used in the illicit production of controlled substances. The clandestine production of drugs is dependent on the availability of chemicals necessary to accomplish the illicit activity. Most of the drugs in the illicit drug trafficking business, with the exception of marijuana, require chemical production. For example, although cocaine is produced naturally in the coca plant, large amounts of chemicals are needed to successfully extract the drug and process it for the illicit market. The controls placed on chemicals are substantially less than those imposed on controlled drugs because most of the chemicals have legitimate industrial applications. For this reason, the term “regulated” more appropriately describes chemicals covered under the CSA vs. the term “controlled,” which is used for drugs. Several items that are regulated as chemicals under the CSA are also noncontrolled ingredients in drug products lawfully marketed under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; these substances are, therefore, widely available to the general public. Examples of these products include over-thecounter (OTC) medications containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. DEA chemical control was initiated in the United States with the passage of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 (CDTA), which became effective on August 1, 1989. The initial legislation was drafted in 1985. The CDTA regulated 12 precursor chemicals, 8 essential chemicals, tableting machines, and encapsulating machines by imposing record keeping and import/export reporting requirements on transactions involving these materials. United States companies were the main source of tons of chemicals used in the production of cocaine in the Andean countries of South America before 1985. The principal chemicals used in the production of cocaine at that time included acetone, methylethyl ketone, methylisobutyl ketone, ethyl ether, potassium permanganate, hydrochloric acid, and sulfuric acid. Soon after the CDTA became effective, the quantity of many of these chemicals exported from the United States declined significantly. Cocaine traffickers reacted to the reduction in the availability of chemicals from the United States for illicit production by developing new sources of supply in other parts of the world. The international community responded by incorporating Article 12 into the United Nation’s Convention against Illicit Drug Traffic of 1988. Article 12 established chemical controls on a list of 22 chemicals used in the production of heroin, cocaine, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), PCP, amphetamine, methamphetamine, MDMA and related drugs, and numerous other clandestinely produced drugs. The CDTA also had an initial impact on the number of clandestine methamphetamine laboratories in the United States. In the first 3 years after the law was passed, the number of clandestine laboratories seized declined by 61%.


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The provisions of the CDTA regarding bulk ephedrine and pseudoephedrine caused methamphetamine traffickers to look for other sources of the precursors. The traffickers noted that the CDTA contained an exemption for OTC products that contained regulated chemicals. They took advantage of this loophole by turning to single-entity OTC ephedrine tablets and capsules whose single active ingredient was ephedrine as a source of precursor material for the illicit production of methamphetamine. Federal legislation was passed in 1993 in response to the methamphetamine traffickers’ switch to OTC ephedrine products. The legislation was the Domestic Chemical Diversion and Control Act of 1993 (DCDCA), which became effective on April 16, 1994. The DCDCA eliminated the CDTA terminology of “precursors” and “essential” for chemicals regulated under that act and replaced them with the terms “List I” and “List II” chemicals. The DCDCA also removed the exemption for OTC single-entity ephedrine tablets, thus closing the loophole left by the CDTA. In addition, it gave the DEA the authority to remove the exemption for any other drugs containing listed chemicals if it was shown that they were being diverted for the illicit production of controlled substances. The DCDCA required that all manufacturers, distributors, importers, and exporters of List I chemicals be registered with the DEA and that bulk manufacturers of List I and List II chemicals report on the total quantity of listed chemicals produced during the year. Record-keeping and reporting requirements for transactions in single-entity ephedrine products were also imposed by the DCDCA. Methamphetamine traffickers quickly reacted to the provisions of the DCDCA by switching to single-entity pseudoephedrine products and combination products of ephedrine. The Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996 (MCA) was then passed to counter the traffickers’ response to the DCDCA. The MCA expanded regulatory controls on all lawfully marketed drug products containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine, and it increased penalties for the trafficking and manufacturing of methamphetamine and listed chemicals. The MCA also made it unlawful for any person to distribute a “laboratory supply” to a person who uses, or attempts to use, that laboratory supply to manufacture a controlled drug or listed chemicals with reckless disregard for the illegal uses to which such laboratory supply will be put. The Special Surveillance List was published by the Attorney General and consisted of all listed chemicals, all mixtures, and all OTC products and dietary supplements that contained listed chemicals, 28 other chemicals frequently used in the clandestine production of controlled drugs, or listed chemicals and four pieces of laboratory equipment commonly found at clandestine drug laboratories. Individuals who violate the laboratory supply provision of the MCA



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are subject to a maximum civil fine of $25,000. Businesses that violate the provision are subject to a maximum civil fine of $250,000. Ready access to chemical supplies is critical for drug traffickers, who continuously look for loopholes in legislation and new methods of clandestine production routes to continue their illegal activity. Currently, List I and List II of the CSA contain 38 chemicals.

Suggested Reading Christian, D.R., Forensic Investigation of Clandestine Laboratories, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2003. Christian, D.R., Field Guide to Clandestine Laboratory Identification and Investigation, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2004.



9

Pharmaceutical Diversion

Legally manufactured pharmaceuticals that are diverted onto the streets account for more than twice as many drug-related injuries and deaths each year than contraband products such as heroin or cocaine. Statistics based on emergency room and medical examiner reports made to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) over a 32-month period enumerated 350,000 drug-related injuries and deaths caused by abuse of pharmaceuticals. During the same period, the number of injuries and deaths attributed to the use of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and other illicit drugs amounted to 150,000. If drug abuse is a public health problem, as defined by the number of people who are treated at hospitals each year for drug-related injuries or illnesses, it becomes clear that legitimate drugs diverted into illegal channels account for a significant portion of the nation’s drug abuse problem. Furthermore, DEA investigators estimate that 95% of these diverted pharmaceuticals are supplied by physicians and pharmacists who knowingly prescribed or dispensed controlled substances to individuals who should not receive them or received them through theft or fraud. Currently, it appears that approximately 13,000 physicians and pharmacists (2% of the registered population) are involved in some type of illicit practice. The successful detection and elimination of this broad-based source of illegal drugs depends almost entirely on the active participation of uniformed patrol officers and local investigators. Although the DEA will bring criminal charges against doctors involved in drug diversion, they only investigate and prosecute the most flagrant, high-volume dealers. As a matter of policy, the DEA concentrates its investigations on physicians documented to be diverting at least 50,000 doses per month. In a typical year, criminal cases are brought against approximately 125 doctors or pharmacies who distribute over one million illegal doses of controlled substances. 211


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The concentration of DEA resources on arrest and conviction of highvolume traffickers calls public attention to the diversion problem and offers support to those who seek to control pharmaceuticals. The greater part of the detection and enforcement problem, however, falls into the hands of state and local law enforcement officers. Because of certain inherent difficulties that confront federal investigators — such as uneven state medical licensing and review procedures, a growing sophistication among addicts and drug sellers, complex defenses constructed by organized crime outlets, and the essentially local and immediate nature of prescription fraud and forgery cases — the key figure in any effort to reduce drug diversion as a public health problem must be the local police investigator and the uniformed patrol officer.

Drug Control Legislation Diversion of legally manufactured drugs into illegal channels may occur at several possible points in the distribution process. Varying degrees of control are dictated by federal law for all participants in the drug distribution system, which flows from the manufacturer, to the wholesaler, to a local hospital, and then to a neighborhood pharmacy or to the office of the prescribing doctor, dentist, or veterinarian. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA) is the federal legislation upon which the DEA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) drug enforcement activities are based. Its purpose is to create a “closed system” of distribution, within which the drug products must be accounted for and reported at each transfer of possession. Ideally, the drug may then be traced forward or backward in the system through a trail of required paperwork. The CSA is a comprehensive piece of legislation that consolidated more than 50 separate pieces of drug legislation that had been enacted during the previous five decades. The much amended Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914 had long served as the nation’s primary drug control legislation until the passage of the CSA. Although a strong law, the CSA is nonetheless dated. For example, at the time of its passage, much of the nation’s drug abuse problems were perceived to be controllable at the manufacturer/wholesaler level of the operation. In the aftermath of the highly publicized “hippie” subculture, the greatest danger to public health was thought to be generated by clandestine laboratories or by theft or fraudulent diversion of large quantities of drugs from manufacturers or shippers. As a result, very strong federal controls and related penalties were legislated for manufacturers and shippers of controlled substances. Licenses to participate in the drug distribution business were subject to compliance with



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regulation, and such licenses could be withdrawn by the DEA for reasons of noncompliance. Enforcement of these controls has effectively closed the upper level of the distribution system to widespread diversion. In a typical pharmaceutical manufacturing facility, for example, the preparation of brand-name products now takes place behind fortress-like defenses characterized by armed guards, vaults, and several alarm systems. White-smocked workers make ingredients, fill capsules, and place them in bottles under close supervision and observation. Each dose is accounted for throughout the manufacturing process, and a shortage of a substance is enough to trigger an investigation. Drugs are stored in warehouses with carefully specified security defenses, and shipments are made under guarded conditions of the utmost secrecy. Very few diversion incidents now take place at the manufacturer/distributor level. Instead, the most unsecured section of the drug control system is now located at the local level, mainly at the level of the corrupt doctor or pharmacist or as a result of prescription frauds and forgeries.

Drug Types and Regulations Federal record-keeping and reporting procedures are, of course, required of physicians and pharmacists who receive and dispense drugs. The CSA divides drugs and other substances into five schedules, defined in terms of the substance’s potential for abuse. Regulations affecting manufacturers, doctors, pharmacists, and others are identified relative to the particular products’ placement on a schedule. The controlled substances and their derivatives listed under the CSA can be found in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 21, under “Part 1308, Schedules of Controlled Substances.” Controlled substances in Schedules II to V have an accepted medical use in the United States, and Schedule I substances do not. The characteristics and some examples of the drugs in each schedule are outlined in Table 9.1. For example, Schedule I drugs are those having the highest potential for abuse. There is no legitimate medical application for Schedule I drugs in this country. Examples of Schedule I drugs include heroin, marijuana, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and mescaline. These drugs may be administered only by an authorized person who is conducting controlled research. Because there are no legitimate medical applications for Schedule I drugs, a criminal case for possession can generally be made against anyone who is found with them. Schedule II drugs also have a very high potential for abuse, but these drugs do have some legitimate medical applications. A doctor’s prescription



214 Table 9.1

Schedules of Controlled Substances Schedule I Substances

The substances in this schedule have a high abuse potential and no accepted medical use in the United States. This is the only schedule that includes drugs that are not available for prescribing, dispensing, or administering. The DEA does allow for research involving Schedule I substances. This requires a separate registration as a researcher. Examples of substances classified as Schedule I narcotics include heroin, certain clandestinely made fentanyl analogs, and propiram. Some hallucinogenic substances found in Schedule I include LSD, marijuana, and 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA [Ecstasy]). Other examples of Schedule I substances are the depressants methaqualone and gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB) and the stimulant methcathinone. Schedule II Substances Substances in Schedule II have a high abuse potential with severe psychological or physical dependence liability, have an accepted medical use in the United States, and are available for practitioners to prescribe, dispense, and administer. Some examples of single-entity Schedule II narcotics include morphine, codeine, hydrocodone, and opium. Other Schedule II narcotic substances and their common name brand products include hydromorphone (Dilaudid®), methadone (Dolophine®), meperidine (Demerol®), oxycodone (Percodan®), and fentanyl (Sublimaze®). Some examples of Schedule II stimulants include amphetamine (Dexedrine®), (Adderall®), methamphetamine (Desoxyn®), and methylphenidate (Ritalin®). Other Schedule II substances include cocaine, amobarbital, glutethimide, pentobarbital, and secobarbital. Schedule III Substances The substances in this schedule have an abuse potential that is less than those in Schedule II but more than Schedule IV substances. Some examples of Schedule III narcotics include products containing less than 15 milligrams of hydrocodone per dosage unit (i.e., Vicodin®, Lorcet®, Tussionex®) and products containing not more than 90 milligrams of codeine per dosage unit (i.e., codeine with acetaminophen, aspirin, or ibuprofen). Other Schedule III substances include the anabolic steroids benzphetamine (Didrex®), phendimetrazine, and buprenorphine (Buprenex®) and any compound, mixture, preparation, or suppository dosage form containing amobarbital, secobarbital, pentobarbital, dronabinol (Marinol®), or ketamine. Schedule IV Substances The substances in this schedule have an abuse potential less than those listed in Schedule III and more than substances in Schedule V. Some examples of Schedule IV narcotics include propoxyphene (Darvon®), butorphanol (Stadol®), and pentazocine (Talwin-NX®). The following benzodiazepine substances are also found in Schedule IV. They include alprazolam (Xanax®), clonazepam (Klonopin®), clorazepate (Tranxene®), diazepam (Valium®), flurazepam (Dalmane®), halazepam (Paxipam®), lorazepam (Ativan®), midazolam (Versed®), orazepam (Serax®), prazepam (Verstran®), temazepam (Restoril®), triazolam (Halcion®), and quazepam (Doral®).


Pharmaceutical Diversion Table 9.1 (continued)

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Schedules of Controlled Substances

Other Schedule IV substances include barbital, phenobarbital, chloral hydrate, ethchlorvynol (Placidyl®), chlordiazepoxide (Librium®), ethinamate, meprobamate, paraldehyde, methohexital, phentermine, diethylpropion, pemoline (Cylert®), mazindol (Sanorex®), and sibutramine (Meridia®). Schedule V Substances The substances in this schedule have an abuse potential less than those listed in Schedule IV and consist primarily of preparations containing limited quantities of certain narcotic and stimulant drugs generally for antitussive, antidiarrheal, and analgesic purposes. Some examples are cough preparations containing not more than 200 milligrams of codeine per 100 milliliters or per 100 grams (Robitussin AC®, Phenergan with codeine®). Source: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2006.

is required to obtain any Schedule II drug, and the prescription may not be refilled. Examples of Schedule II drugs include opium, morphine, codeine, Dilaudid, Percodan, cocaine, amphetamine, Benzedrine, Dexedrine, methaqualone, Nembutal, and Seconal. Because there are legitimate medical uses for Schedule II drugs, possession of the drug is not in itself a crime. A case must be made for either an illegal possession or possession for sale. An arresting officer who finds a suspect in possession of Schedule II drugs may have no case against the individual, but that officer may have a case against an unscrupulous doctor or pharmacist who might have supplied the drugs. A doctor’s prescription is also required for Schedule III and Schedule IV drugs. Schedule III drugs have less potential for abuse, but they may lead to moderate physical or psychological dependency. Examples include Doriden ®, Nodular®, and other mixtures of narcotic and nonnarcotic drugs. Schedule IV drugs have even less potential for abuse, although these may lead to limited dependency. Examples include barbiturates and tranquilizers such as phenobarbital and Valium. Schedule V drugs require a doctor’s prescription in some states but not all. Schedule V drugs have a lower potential for abuse but could lead to psychological dependence. Examples include over-the-counter drugs that can contain limited quantities of narcotic drugs, such as cough remedies with codeine. Because Schedule II drugs have the highest potential for abuse among legitimately manufactured products, these drugs are frequently the objects of diversion schemes. Therefore, the “paper trail” for Schedule II drugs is particularly formidable. Sales of all Schedule II drugs from wholesalers and manufacturers must be reported to the DEA. A federally issued order form, preprinted with the



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name and address of the ordering physician or pharmacist, must be used to transfer any of the Schedule II drugs. The pharmacist is required to keep prescriptions on file for 2 years. Most states have laws that permit police officers and other authorized investigators to inspect prescriptions, orders, and records of controlled substance inventories. These laws may be in the civil statutes rather than in the criminal statutes; the investigating officer should be aware of their authority and should be prepared to provide the proper legal citation.

Diversion Tactics Since passage of the CSA, both legitimate and illegal drug markets have become more sophisticated. Advancement in cancer treatment research has produced powerful painkillers that addicts have learned can substitute for heroin. Legitimate manufacturers now market popular “mood enhancement” drugs that have potential for abuse. Today’s drug buyer has learned that it is safer to obtain brand-name drugs that have been diverted onto the street than it is to deal with the drug peddler who is dealing an unknown product from a clandestine laboratory. For drugs purchased from a clandestine laboratory, the buyer does not know for certain what kind of poison or toxic ingredients are contained within it whether he or she will be ripped off with a no-impact placebo. On the other hand, when purchasing diverted drugs, the buyer is certain: these clearly identifiable, marked products are coded by manufacturers who prepared the dose under rigid guidelines enforced by U.S. Government inspectors. The availability of diverted drugs also contributes to their increased usage. Unlike substances such as heroin and cocaine, diverted pharmaceuticals are produced within the United States and are not subject to the periodic shortages that affect smuggled products. The product is available at virtually every street-corner pharmacy in the country. The problem of the addict or the drug seller is reduced to how to divert the drug onto the street. Drug diversion tactics may be classified under five general headings: wholesale-level diversions, illegal sales by medical practitioners, theft, fraud, and forgeries. 1. Wholesale diversion, such as large-scale theft or fraud from the manufacturer or distributor, is minimal at the present time because of strict, enforceable controls that have been legislated for this level of the drug distribution system. The DEA reports few diversion incidents at this level, but a simple comparison of the number of incidents may be somewhat misleading, since one diversion incident at the wholesale



2.

3.

4.

5.

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level — such as a hijacking of a major drug shipment — can place thousands of illegal doses on the streets. Nonetheless, wholesale-level distribution is believed to be adequately controlled by existing laws and investigative techniques. Illegal sale by medical practitioners accounts for the largest current volume of diverted drugs. Illegal sales may originate with doctors, pharmacists, or employees at hospitals. The person responsible for the diversion may attempt to cover his tracks with a fraudulent paper trail of some kind or may seek to confuse investigators by destroying part of the legitimate paper trail. The existence of required reports and records, however, constitutes an important part of any investigation of the medical practitioner. Theft as a diversion tactic is reported to be on the increase. This category includes burglary of storage facilities, armed robbery of pharmacies and doctors’ offices, and pilferage and employee theft at both hospitals and pharmacies. According to DEA statistics, theft of pharmaceuticals accounts for nearly 300 million in illegal doses reaching the streets per year. It should be noted that reports of theft or burglary are also used by doctors and pharmacists to account for inventory shortages or to explain missing reports and drugs that were dispensed illegally. Fraudulent schemes to fool a doctor or pharmacist into prescribing drugs produce an unknown, although presumed to be large, quantity of diverted drugs. Frauds are perpetrated by individuals who obtain drugs for their own use and individuals who either sell the prescribed drugs or turn them over to a criminal employer who sells them elsewhere. The scale of such frauds varies from individual addicts who supply themselves to well-organized activities that utilize paid “patients” to obtain prescriptions and paid “runners” to fill prescriptions at various pharmacies throughout a city. Prescription forgery as a classification includes consideration of counterfeit prescriptions and altered prescriptions as well as true forgeries. Many forgeries are carried out with the knowledge of either a physician or the dispensing pharmacist, although some forgeries have been shown to originate with the pharmacist to disguise the loss of drugs that were illegally sold. The exact volume of drugs diverted by prescription forgery is unknown but is presumed to be significant. Drugs obtained with forged prescriptions can be sold on the street at inflated prices. For example, the painkiller Dilaudid, prescribed frequently for cancer patients, is known on the street as “drug store heroin.” The pharmacist pays about $.30 per tablet for the substance and may market at three times the price for prescription sales to



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legitimate customers. A tablet of Dilaudid can be sold on the street to heroin addicts for $50, which explains the incentive for prescription forgery.

Physician Investigations It is somewhat shocking to realize that doctors can be as corrupt as anyone else. They prescribe illegally for many reasons. They may want money, sex, security, or escape, just like anybody else. The doctor may be an addict or an alcoholic. His practice may be slipping as he grows old or senile. He may have become hardened and bitter because of personal failures. Doctors are people, and the DEA estimates that approximately 2% of them are engaged in illegal drug traffic. So-called script doctors write prescriptions for controlled substances for a fee without properly examining or diagnosing the patient. Over the past decade, several investigative programs conducted by the DEA have confirmed that medical practitioners (doctors and pharmacists) are the major sources of diverted drugs. Doctors Who Divert Drugs Generally, four types of doctors are involved in the diversion of pharmaceutical drugs (see Table 9.2 for examples of diversionary methods). 1. Dishonest: A dishonest doctor makes a profit from the illegal sale of pharmaceutical drugs or may be involved in cases where prescriptions are given to suspects for the purpose of unlawfully distributing illicit drugs. 2. Impaired: Some physicians use drugs both on and off the job. Drug dependency may develop for a number of reasons: marital problems, stress on the job, and recreational use. The recidivism rate, however, is generally low for those who are treated properly and on a timely basis. 3. Dated: A doctor who has been in practice for a number of years may be willing to indiscriminately hand out drugs to anyone who has an apparent legitimate need for medication. Doctors who fall into this category are not necessarily criminals but more likely are set in their ways and unwilling to conform to new rules and regulations. 4. Gullible: This physician is not cautious enough to recognize a scam. Although possibly an otherwise competent doctor, he or she will easily fall victim to professional patients.



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Table 9.2 Examples of Drug Diversion by Doctors: 1. A physician writes a prescription in a patient’s name, picks up the drugs personally, and tells the pharmacist he or she will take it to the patient. 2. A physician sends a patient to the pharmacy to have a prescription filled but requires the patient to bring the drugs back to his or her office. Only part of the drug is administered, and the physician keeps the rest. 3. A physician writes a prescription in the name of a family member and then picks up and uses the drugs. 4. A physician writes a prescription in his or her own name at various pharmacies at the same time. 5. A physician self-administers injectable drugs taken from nurses’ stations, hospital emergency rooms, or hospital pharmacies. 6. A physician orders drugs from several pharmacies at the same time, using DEA official order forms, and at the same time orders the same drug from a mail-order drug company. 7. A physician obtains drug samples and self-administers them.

A number of investigative responses have emerged over the years to deal with the diversion problem. The most effective response combines the strength of each investigative approach. Statistical data collected and analyzed by the DEA identify pharmacies and doctors who are prescribing or dispensing abnormally large quantities of drugs. DEA or other narcotic specialists in the state may provide guidance with respect to elements of proof required to convict under specific laws. Ultimately, however, the classic “doctor bust” is the result of one or more undercover drug buys, usually by a police officer who obtains controlled drugs. For example, it became known (from a report made by a uniformed patrol officer) that a doctor who resided in an old hotel was prescribing drugs for a fee. An investigator visited the doctor and explained that he was a truck driver and wanted 100 Ritalin tablets, a stimulant that is sometimes prescribed for weight reduction. The prescription was written without a physical examination, although the detective was not overweight. Another investigator called on the doctor, again describing himself as a trucker, and received 200 Preludin ® tablets, also stimulants that are prescribed for the treatment of obesity. The investigator, who was in excellent physical condition, asked the physician whether an examination was necessary. The doctor replied, “No. You look okay to me.” The doctor was an alcoholic with a failed practice who supported himself by writing prescriptions for anyone who would pay the fee. Doctors also provide drugs for sex. For example, a woman who wanted help kicking her addiction told police officers about a doctor who had been supplying her with drugs in return for sex. In this investigation, the officers decided to obtain evidence against the doctor by having the complainant record the transaction. The woman went to the doctor’s office with a recording device. After a preliminary conversation about nonexistent medical


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symptoms, the woman offered to perform oral sex in return for 30 Preludin pills. The doctor agreed. The difficult problem with this technique is a claim of entrapment as a legal defense (see Chapter 11). This type of investigation must be carefully constructed. The doctor who provides drugs for sex may take elaborate precautions, perhaps because he perceives discovery in this relationship more threatening to his family life than if he had taken money as payment. In an investigation similar to the one described above, involving a woman who would have been supplied drug prescriptions in return for sex, the following precautions were uncovered. Acting as an informant for the police, the woman had to fill out a medical complaint form in the doctor’s waiting room so that she could see him in the examination room. As soon as the woman was alone with the doctor, she offered to have sex with him in return for a prescription for drugs that she had intended to sell. The doctor refused her request. As a result, the doctor made a notation on the woman’s medical form, which was filed by his nurse. It read, “Patient has no illness. She offered to pay $50 for speed. Told her that it was impossible and discouraged her from returning to this office.” Actually, the doctor had told the woman to return to his office on the next day, when his nurse would not be working. The woman returned, had sex with the doctor, and received her prescription. The doctor who prescribed drugs may be an elderly practitioner who was losing his practice to younger competition. Responding to reports that one elderly doctor was providing drug prescriptions irresponsibly, an investigator visited the doctor’s office, which was located in his home. During a preliminary conversation that remained largely social, the doctor appeared to be mentally confused, perhaps senile. The prescription for the requested drugs was then written by the doctor’s wife without the benefit of physical examination or direction from the doctor. It is not uncommon for a medical practice (at least for the prescriptionwriting function) to be taken over by a family member, a nurse, or a paid assistant when the doctor becomes incompetent because of age or illness. Abuse of the prescription-writing power sometimes follows. Nurses Who Divert Drugs Diversion problems also involve nurses. A distinction needs to be made between diversion drugs for resale and diversion because of personal addiction (see Table 9.3). Both present unique problems and may require different solutions. Studies have shown that, of those nurses who are diverting drugs, more are physically addicted than are selling drugs for profit. This distinction may affect the manner in which an investigation is approached and how the suspect is dealt with.



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Table 9.3 Recognizing the Drug-Impaired Health Care Worker Drug abusers often exhibit aberrant behavior. Certain signs and symptoms may indicate a drug addiction problem in a health care professional. Tell-tale signs include: • Work absenteeism — absences without notification and an excessive number of sick days used. • Frequent disappearances from the work site, having long, unexplained absences, making improbable excuses, and taking frequent or long trips to the bathroom or to the stockroom where drugs are kept. • Excessive amounts of time spent near a drug supply. They volunteer for overtime and are at work when not scheduled to be there. • Unreliability in keeping appointments and meeting deadlines. • Work performance that alternates between periods of high and low productivity, which may suffer from mistakes because of inattention, poor judgment, and bad decisions. • Confusion, memory loss, and difficulty concentrating or recalling details and instructions. Ordinary tasks require greater effort and consume more time. • Interpersonal relations with colleagues, staff, and patients suffer. Rarely admits errors or accepts blame for errors or oversights. • Heavy “wastage” of drugs. • Sloppy record-keeping, suspect ledger entries, and drug shortages. • Inappropriate prescriptions for large narcotic doses. • Insistence on personal administration of injected narcotics to patients. • Progressive deterioration in personal appearance and hygiene. • Uncharacteristic deterioration of handwriting and charting. • Wearing long sleeves when inappropriate. • Personality change — mood swings, anxiety, depression, lack of impulse control, suicidal thoughts or gestures. • Patient and staff complaints about health care provider’s changing attitude and behavior. • Increasing personal and professional isolation.

Drug Theft Most health care institutions experience some degree of diversion, and generally the employees are the culprits. Those employees who are most likely involved with drugs are those who have access — physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and other employees. The most commonly diverted drugs are Valium, morphine, Demerol, Tylenol III with codeine, Percodan, Percocet, and Ritalin. The type of user and the opportunities available will have a bearing on whether tablets, capsules, or injectable substances are preferred. Diversion may occur in many different areas of the health care facility, but it will most commonly take place at the hospital pharmacy, the nursing station, or the recovery floor. Substituting Drugs If outright theft is not considered safe by the violator, he or she may substitute a noncontrolled drug for a controlled drug. Drug substitution may be accomplished, for instance, by appearing to inject a patient with a prescribed


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medication while in fact a worthless substance may be used in its place. This may cause the patient to suffer and could result in medical setbacks. Substitutions are commonly carried out through “charting” (backdating patients’ charts to show that drugs were administered, but which were in fact stolen) or forging other nurses’ names. To avoid the possibility of substitution, two nurses should be required to obtain drugs needed on the floor. This would add a check and balance to prevent one of them diverting the drugs.

Undercover “Patients” All of the examples thus far cited of doctor abuse of prescription-writing authority are cases that were handled by some variation of undercover buy (see Chapter 2). The investigator who poses as a patient in order to receive the prescription for drugs should keep certain principles in mind to produce hard evidence that will hold up in court. If possible, the prescription should be obtained without claiming some illness. When the case comes to court, the doctor will attempt to show that a legitimate doctor–patient relationship existed. He will attempt to prove that the drug was prescribed — perhaps mistakenly — for a legitimate medical reason. The investigator on the other hand must show that no legitimate medical reason existed for providing the prescription, that a physical examination either did not take place or was obviously inadequate. Ideally, the investigator should not pretend to be a patient at all once in the presence of the doctor. The investigator should clearly state that he wants the pills to sell them or for some other illegitimate reason. If asked leading questions by the doctor about imaginary complaints, the investigator plays down: “I told you I feel fine. I need two pills for my girls.” The doctor, however, may insist on a physical examination and avoid any direct conversation about the prescription in order to protect himself. If an examination is required, the “patient” repeats that he does not feel ill in any way and sees no point to the examination. The investigator should record all details about the examination that point out its artificiality, such as being weighed while wearing boots and overcoat or having a stethoscope passed over his chest while the instrument is around the doctor’s neck instead of in his ears. Sometimes a doctor will provide a prescription for drugs only if the patient “plays the game.” Some talk about medical complaints and some form of examination will be required before the doctor provides the drugs. Under these conditions the investigator may specifically request Percodan or Dilaudid, both potent Schedule II drugs that can be used as substitutes for heroin. The investigator complains of lower back pain. The doctor should take a medical history and perform a physical examination before prescribing these drugs. If he does not, the investigator may have the beginnings of a case.



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The undercover “patient” may request narcotics for treatment of his drug addiction. The doctor is required to refer such patients to drug treatment centers rather than to prescribe narcotics. If the doctor complies, there is a case. The undercover officer may also ask the doctor to write prescriptions for a fictitious third person. The agent submits a list of names and asks for prescriptions for each person. If the doctor complies, it is a clear indication that he is pushing drugs instead of prescribing medicine. In any successful doctor diversion case, repetition is important. One incident of poor medical practice can be explained away, even if the incident is a serious one that deals with potent Schedule II drugs. Several incidents, involving repeated buys by the same person or similar buys by other undercover agents, would be more difficult for the doctor to defend. Investigators must keep in mind that prosecutors generally do not like doctor cases. A case involving street sales of narcotics is frequently an openand-shut affair. On the other hand, a case against a professional medical practitioner will be difficult to prosecute. Substantial evidence of wrongdoing must be at hand before the case will be taken to court.

Medical License Control Part of the difficulty in gaining control of drug diversion that originates with medical practitioners is the lack of control over medical practice licensing. The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 granted the DEA the power to recall licensing of manufacturers and distributors of drugs if they fail to comply with regulations or act irresponsibly. Licensing a medical practitioner who dispenses drugs at the local level was left to the states and their respective medical boards. By law, a DEA registration number — a license to prescribe narcotics and controlled substances — is granted automatically to a practitioner who is properly licensed by a state medical authority. This registration may not be withdrawn, however, unless some very special conditions are met: (1) if the application for registration was falsified; (2) if the practitioner has been convicted of a drug-related felony; (3) if the practitioner’s state license has been suspended, revoked, or denied. For a variety of reasons many states do not have the capability to take effective action against practitioners who violate their authority. Although some states have developed tough-minded review boards with the power to suspend or revoke medical licenses if a practitioner fails to live up to standards, many state medical boards rarely take administrative action against practitioners. Some boards continue to take the position that they are certification boards, and not a review board, that checks the qualifications of those who seek licenses to enforce professional standards. The bottom line is


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that often in many states the only effective way to deny a medical practitioner a license is to prove a felony case against the practitioner.

Prescription Clinics This loophole in the control system — the inability to withdraw prescribing authority from the medical practitioner who fails to meet standards but who has not been convicted of a felony — is exploited by organized crime interests, who recruit failed and corrupt doctors to write prescriptions. The instrument for diverting prescribed drugs onto the streets is the legal storefront medical clinic, usually located in rundown neighborhoods. More than one clinic may be operated by the same syndicate, so that prescribing doctors can be moved from one location to another. The illegal clinic is funded by nonmedical financiers, many of whom have organized crime connections. Failed or corrupt doctors are hired on a salary basis to write prescriptions 3 hours per day at one or more locations. Runners are employed to visit these doctors, obtain prescriptions, and get them filled in various pharmacies. The drugs are then turned over to syndicate organizers who sell them on the street for inflated prices. The criminal medical clinic has proven to be a very difficult obstacle for effective drug enforcement. Many of its characteristics tend to place it outside the range of customary methods used to monitor and control diversion traffic. For example, because no drugs are stored on the clinic premises, no DEA license may be required for the clinic. With no reports required to document drug transfer, the location of the prescription clinic may bypass much of the DEA’s routine statistical review of drug activity. For example, DEA statistics may reveal a very high amphetamine prescription activity taking place in a particular state. This can be further refined to identify what percentage of that activity is taking place within zip code regions within a particular jurisdiction. Further analysis can reveal whether a high percentage of activity is taking place at certain pharmacies. The local investigators are thus provided an invaluable lead for control of diverted drugs. However, under normal monitoring conditions, the dispensing pharmacies can show up on a DEA report, but the criminal medical clinics will not. The criminal medical clinic also defies elimination by the traditional “doctor bust” method of investigation. Because several doctors may be involved in the operation at several locations, arrest of one doctor will not have the desired effect of closing down the criminal operation. Organizers will have another doctor at that location within a matter of hours to continue business. A complete case for conspiracy, criminal intent, and so forth, will have to be brought against the organizers and managers of the facility before



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the clinic can be closed down. This is made even more difficult by the relatively mobile nature of the clinic. As soon as organizers fear that law enforcement investigators are getting too close, the clinic will be closed, possibly to reopen elsewhere in the same city under another name. Under these conditions, it is clear that the only person who is in a position to effectively identify, preserve, report, and initiate an investigation of the facility is the patrol officer on whose beat the clinic is located. Although specialized narcotic investigators and organized crime specialists may become involved to complete the investigation, the patrol officer remains the key figure to identify the target. For the most part, criminally organized prescription clinics have the following characteristics. The prescription clinic is a storefront location in a poor neighborhood. Lines of patients, many of whom are paid runners, are frequently seen waiting outside the clinic. No medical equipment is visible at the facility, and patients who receive prescriptions for drugs will probably not receive physical examinations by prescribing doctors. Names of physicians who work at the clinic will probably not be included on the sign that identifies the facility. At most legitimate medical clinics, the names of consulting physicians are prominently displayed. The patrol officer who identifies a facility that is suspected of being a criminal prescription clinic should report the location of the clinic to narcotics investigators. The officer should remain alert to observe details about the clinic’s operations.

Stress and Pain Clinics A further sophistication of the illegal prescription clinic is the stress or pain clinic. Illegal stress or pain clinics are a growing phenomenon that is very difficult to control. Like the basic criminal medical clinic, the illegal stress or pain clinic is funded by organized crime backers and staffed by corrupt medical practitioners who maintain the authority to write illegal prescriptions for drugs. The operations of the illegal stress or pain clinic, however, are less blatant. Less emphasis is placed on speed and quantity of activity and more emphasis is placed on acting out certain defensive tactics designed to thwart prosecution. For example, all visitors to the stress or pain clinic talk to a doctor about their symptoms. All visitors are required to take a psychological test, and all visitors walk through a perfunctory physical examination before they are given a prescription for drugs. However, all patients receive prescriptions for the controlled drug regardless of medical condition. Undoubtedly, the illegal stress clinic will attract a number of legitimate patients seeking relief from


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symptoms of stress through legitimate medical treatment. Unfortunately in many cases, an illegal stress clinic also serves as an outlet for massive drug diversion, which is extremely difficult to document. Visits to illegal facilities by undercover investigators posing as patients reveal that much of the medical testing and diagnosis are artificial. Test questions include, Are you having difficulty at work? Are you having any difficulty with your family life? Are you having any personal problems with anyone? Are you experiencing lower back pain? Virtually everyone who visits the clinic will be found to be suffering from stress for one reason or another. Like the less sophisticated storefront medical clinic, stress clinic patients are often paid runners who fill prescriptions at various pharmacies and then turn over the drugs to their employers who sell the drugs at much higher prices. In one case, an illegal stress clinic was successfully prosecuted when police investigators recruited several cooperating physicians to visit the facility undercover as potential physician employees. The prescribing doctor’s defense — that he tested and diagnosed all patients before making a medical judgment about treatment — was thus challenged by equally competent medical testimony, which described the diagnosis process at the stress clinic as absurd. This type of medical testimony, plus statistical tabulations demonstrating abnormally high percentages of stress clinic patients receiving similar prescriptions, seem to be effective investigative tools for challenging the criminal operations at these facilities. The traditional “buy–bust” technique, however, will not be effective if directed against only one prescribing doctor. As with the medical clinic, putting one doctor out of business does not put the clinic out of business. Evidence must be gathered against several participants, so that organizers and financiers are included, for the investigation to begin with lasting success.

Pharmacy Investigations So-called script doctors that write prescriptions for a fee may instruct patients to have prescriptions filled at a particular location where there is a pharmacist who will not question the transaction. Conversely, whether they are directly involved in any illegality or not, the pharmacist can identify physicians who write an unusual number of prescriptions for controlled substances. Some physicians also write prescriptions to obtain drugs themselves, either for personal use or to sell the drugs for higher prices. In these cases, the pharmacist can be a key source of information for the investigator. The physician may visit the pharmacy personally with prescriptions that he claims are for patients who are confined because of serious illness. He claims that it is his intention to deliver the medicine during a house call. Similarly,



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the physician may write a prescription in the name of some member of his own immediate family, claiming that the family member is ill and requires the medication. A physician may also write a prescription for himself, claiming that a large quantity of a controlled substance is needed to carry out some research project. He confirms that the drugs will be used for research purposes using his authority as a licensed medical practitioner. Because the physician–pharmacist relationship is often a social as well as a professional one, the pharmacist rarely denies these products to a licensed physician. A responsible pharmacist, however, will report the transaction appropriately and will maintain required records of the transfer of drugs. The records of prescription sales maintained at the pharmacy invariably form an important part of any pharmacy investigation, whether it centers on a prescribing physician or on the pharmacist himself. Because of the existence of these required records, making a diversion case against a pharmacist is somewhat easier than making a case against the physician. The pharmacist must be able to account for all substances that have come under his control, either as inventory or accountable prescriptions. The sheer volume of paperwork, however, makes any pharmacy investigation difficult, and an imaginative pharmacist can employ a variety of subterfuge to cover illegal tracks. For example, during a periodic check on one pharmacy, investigators with a specially trained diversion investigation team asked to see the five bottles of cocaine that were reported as part of the pharmacist s inventory. The pharmacist pointed to five bottles on the upper shelf of the storeroom. Other inspectors had been satisfied with this visual check, but one officer insisted on testing a sample. The agent found one of the bottles contained not cocaine but aspirin powder. The pharmacist had been selling the cocaine without prescriptions while maintaining the aspirin substitute as part of his inventory. A common ruse used to destroy an incriminating paperwork trail is the staged burglary. The pharmacist claims the drugs, money, and records were stolen during a burglary that he actually carried out himself. One pharmacist even hired an arsonist to set fire to his store to destroy incriminating records. In such cases, the officer who investigates the burglary or arson should be alert to the possibilities of a drug diversion cover-up as a potential motive. Suspicions about conflicting evidence at the scene should be shared with drug investigators. Pharmacy files, even when maintained properly, may be prepared with forged prescriptions that were created by the pharmacist himself. For example, some frauds are prescriptions that are made out to deceased persons or to addresses of vacant lots or public buildings. Others may appear to be legitimate at first glance and will require careful analysis before they can be identified.


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Prescription Forgeries Recognizing forged prescriptions maintained on file in a pharmacy is not an easy task but given sufficient time and resources such investigations can be successfully accomplished. Although an investigating officer has the authority to photocopy prescriptions, it may be necessary to obtain a subpoena to obtain original prescriptions. Most state laws on the subject include confidentiality requirements. Essentially this means that the investigator may not divulge any information gained from the study of these records except in connection with the prosecution or other official proceedings related to the investigation. Valuable records include all original prescriptions for scheduled drugs and the pharmacist’s records of refills for Schedule III and Schedule IV substances. Refills are limited to five refills during 6 months. Drugs in these categories are normally prescribed by doctors in monthly doses and left to the user to refill as needed during a 6-month period. Abuse (and the high profit from diversion) is a greater danger with nonrefillable prescriptions written for Schedule II drugs. Prescription forgery includes counterfeit prescriptions and altered prescriptions, as well as true forgeries. A true forgery, for example, might be written on a stolen medical prescription pad that was taken from a doctor’s office. Someone who is familiar with prescription drug terms and the method for filling out prescription forms simply writes the quantity of the desired substance on the form and signs it with a doctor’s name. Although some attempt to imitate the doctor’s handwriting, more often there is no effort made other than to fill out the blank form in a professional manner. The prescription is then taken to a pharmacy where it is filled. Altered prescriptions frequently occur as the by-product of an attempt to obtain drugs from the physician by some type of fraud. An individual represents himself at a doctor’s office, for example, claiming to be suffering from intense lower back pain. The patient claims to be visiting the area on vacation and has left home without his prescription drugs. He may specifically request a drug by brand name as a medicine that has provided relief in the past. Will the doctor prescribe just enough medicine to get him back home? The doctor may be duped into providing a small quantity of the medicine, perhaps 10 tablets. After leaving the doctor’s office, the patient alters the quantity from 10 to 40 or even 100 tablets. Thus, the scheme diverts a relatively large volume of drugs onto the streets. Counterfeit prescription forms are also produced by persons engaged in high-volume drug diversion activities. A common practice is to print a form with a fictitious doctor’s name and DEA registration number. A telephone number for the doctor’s “office” is actually the number of a cellular phone or some other safe location. Runners are sent to several pharmacies throughout



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the city to fill prescriptions for drugs. If a pharmacist calls the phone number to check on the validity of the prescription, he is told by an accomplice that the prescription is valid. Forged prescriptions on valid prescription forms may include a variation of this telephone confirmation defense. An employee in the doctor’s office, such as a nurse or receptionist, may be part of the conspiracy. When the pharmacist telephones to confirm the prescription, the employee reports that it was indeed written by the doctor. Prescription forgeries of all types divert an unknown quantity of pharmaceuticals into illegal channels, but DEA investigators estimate that the volume is large. Vigorous enforcement of the law with respect to prescription forgery, furthermore, offers one of the more promising avenues of approach to the large problem of controlling and investigating large-scale drug diversion. Diversion of pharmaceutical drugs is considered an expanding problem within the drug enforcement community. More and more criminal investigations are revealing the widespread involvement of health care professionals in the diversion of controlled substances from hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, and doctors’ offices. The involvement of street criminals (or “professional patients”) in this lucrative business is also on the increase and will be discussed later in this chapter. It is estimated that diverted pharmaceutical drugs account for an estimated 32% of the illegitimately consumed drugs in the United States. The DEA estimates that 2% or 13,000 practicing physicians and pharmacists are involved in some form of illegal diversion activities. Punishment of Violators The problem of diversion is growing because many facilities fail to address the problem and also because the violators have methods of avoiding punishment. Suspected users often quit and join other hospitals. Other employees might suspect an on-the-job user, and, to avoid being confronted with a diversion charge, the subject simply changes jobs. When the new hospital calls for a reference, information regarding any possible involvement in drug use or diversion is not shared. The user is therefore allowed to continue the unlawful activities. Employees who have been caught are often simply transferred. It is evident that some hospitals are more willing to transfer employees caught in diversion activities to different units within the hospital rather than to terminate their employment or seek prosecution. Medical care professionals are somewhat clannish and reluctant to “snitch” on fellow workers. Transferring suspected employees eliminates stigmatization by coworkers and embarrassing publicity for the institution. Unfortunately, this practice offers no incentive for violators to discontinue their involvement in diversion activity.


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Finally, there is the problem of outright denial. One mistake investigators frequently make is to approach a suspect before any concrete evidence has been documented. If the suspect denies his or her involvement in the diversion, the investigator’s bluff is called and the investigator has no immediate recourse. Having a sound case prepared when approaching a suspected violator also maximizes the deterrent effects of diversion investigations within the medical facility.

Professional Patients (the “Scammer”) To understand the problem of drug diversion, investigators should also look at the various scams used by street criminals to obtain pharmaceutical drugs. The word “scam” is defined by Webster’s as “to cheat or swindle, as in a confidence game.” This is precisely what is happening within the medical care community. Street criminals are acquiring drugs through deceit and selling those drugs on the street for profit. The most likely target of the scammer is the physician. Once the scammer is successful in conning a prescription out of a physician, he or she will usually experience little trouble in having it filled by a pharmacist. Pharmacists are the second-most likely targets of the scammer, especially one who is trying to pass forged or altered prescriptions. In addition to forgery and alterations of prescriptions, a pharmacist can be an unwitting partner in a scam when he or she (a) fills prescriptions for the same patient from different physicians; (b) fills prescriptions for the same patient too frequently, or (c) accepts refill orders for prescriptions when the scammer calls in the prescription and pretends to be a physician. Investigators have uncovered hundreds of diversion schemes over the years. Some of the more common scams experienced by many different jurisdictions are offered in brief below. The Fat Lady Scam This is a common deception, usually perpetrated by several women who are severely overweight. The women move into a new community and develop a schedule in which each member visits a maximum number of physicians each day for a week or so. Each woman tells each physician that she visits that she is chronically unhappy with her life because of being overweight. She tells the doctor her husband is going to leave her and fight for custody of the children, and she is considering having her stomach stapled. At this point the “patient” begins hinting about a particular drug (e.g., Preludin, amphetamines, or another Schedule II drug). The physician will usually refuse to prescribe Schedule II drugs for weight reduction but might



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be willing to prescribe Didrex®. After the patient is issued a prescription for Didrex, she might then request a prescription for Valium to keep from “getting too edgy.” The Breast Cancer Scam This scam involves individuals who are actually experiencing legitimate medical problems. The scam was documented in the St. Louis area, and it involved a woman who had a form of breast cancer. She would simply show up at a physician’s office and present her case for treatment. In this case, Dilaudid was the only drug that gave her relief, and the physicians would usually give her a prescription. The woman was seeing seven doctors on a regular basis in different surrounding towns. Physicians should be cautious about treating patients who are unknown to them, who have insufficient identification, or who otherwise behave suspiciously. The Toothache Scam This scam is popular among narcotics addicts who are also experiencing a tooth-decay problem. The addicts will try to obtain Schedule II narcotics from dentists and physicians at the same time. Addicts have attempted to obtain telephone prescriptions for the desired drug without even seeing a dentist. If the addict chooses to see the dentist, he or she will present a legitimate “reason” for having to be somewhere else so that the dentist will issue a prescription for a drug such as Demerol or Dilaudid. Dentists, in cases like this, should be suspicious of numerous new patients showing up during a brief period of time. This might indicate the existence of an organized diversion ring operating in the area. The Altered Scrip Scam Prescribers who short-cut proper prescription-writing practices — especially those who use Arabic numerals for the dose amounts and do not write out the numbers — are easy targets for professional patients. By simply matching the ink color of the prescriber’s pen, a 10 can be altered to a 40, 5 can become 25, and so on. A reasonable prescription becomes excessive, and certainly more profitable to the professional patient. The Phantom Refill Scam Investigations are revealing an increasing number of prescriptions with refill numbers that have been altered by the patient without the knowledge of the physician or dentist. Professional patients — especially those who are addicted to or selling codeine-containing drugs, Schedule II drugs, Schedule IV


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tranquilizers, or sleep medications — commonly add refills to prescriptions that are not authorized by the physician or dentist. Drugs obtained in this fashion provide the violator with a considerable profit margin, which in turn acts as an incentive for the commission of the act. For example, one Dilaudid tablet may bring as much as $50 to $60 on the street. A 10-mg Valium tablet (diazepam) may sell for $5 to $20. Some of the most popular drugs obtained by these scams are Dilaudid, Dolophine, Ritalin, Tuinal, Talwin, Preludin, Percodan, Valium, Seconal, Tylenols III and IV, and amphetamines. Officials in many cities are now reporting increased demands for Ritalin and Talwin tablets, which are usually ground up, dissolved in water, and injected by the user. The Ritalin–Talwin combination is cheaper than the traditional speedball, which is a combination of heroin and methamphetamine (or cocaine) powder. Many other scams are facilitated by con artists who are elderly, handicapped, or simply clever or brazen enough to attempt such frauds. All professionals within the medical community are duty bound to report attempts to illegally obtain drugs as soon as they are detected. Table 9.4 summarizes common characteristics of the drug abuser vs. a legitimate patient.

The Drug Audit In addition to the nine control mechanisms in the 1970 Controlled Substances Act (see Appendix I), all registrants must keep full records of every controlled substance that they manufacture, purchase, sell, or keep in inventory, regardless of which Schedule the drugs fall under. (Limited exceptions to this requirement are only available to researchers and physicians.) Audits can be performed from these records to trace the flow of any drug from the time of manufacture, through the wholesale level, on to its destination at a pharmacy, hospital, or physician’s office and then on to the patient. The mere existence of this requirement is often enough to discourage many types of diversion. One record-keeping distinction is made. All records for all Schedule I and II drugs must be maintained separately from all other records of the registrant. The purpose for this requirement is to allow investigators the ability to audit the most abused drugs more expeditiously.

Problems in Diversion Investigations Even though pharmacists are required by law to account for every dose of dangerous drugs that they order, suspicious fires, robberies, and break-ins can destroy prescription files and cover shortages of pills. For these and many other reasons, evidence of diversion is difficult to acquire. For example,


Pharmaceutical Diversion Table 9.4

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Recognizing the Drug Abuser

Telling the difference between a legitimate patient and a drug abuser is not easy. The drugseeking individual may be unfamiliar to you. They could be a person who claims to be from out of town and has lost or forgotten a prescription of medication. Or the drug seeker may actually be familiar to you, such as another practitioner, coworker, friend, or relative. Drug abusers or “doctor-shoppers” often possess similar traits and modus operandi. Recognizing these characteristics and modus operandi is the first step to identifying the drug-seeking patient who may be attempting to manipulate you to obtain desired medications. Common Characteristics of the Drug Abuser • • • • • • • • • •

Unusual behavior in the waiting room. Assertive personality, often demanding immediate action. Unusual appearance — extremes of either slovenliness or being overdressed. May show unusual knowledge of controlled substances or gives medical history with textbook symptoms OR gives evasive or vague answers to questions regarding medical history. Reluctant or unwilling to provide reference information. Usually has no regular doctor and often no health insurance. Will often request a specific controlled drug and is reluctant to try a different drug. Generally has no interest in diagnosis — fails to keep appointments for further diagnostic tests or refuses to see another practitioner for consultation. May exaggerate medical problems or simulate symptoms. May exhibit mood disturbances, suicidal thoughts, lack of impulse control, thought disorders, or sexual dysfunction. Cutaneous signs of drug abuse — skin tracks and related scars on the neck, axilla, forearm, wrist, foot, and ankle. Such marks are usually multiple, hyperpigmented, and linear. New lesions may be inflamed. Shows signs of “pop” scars from subcutaneous injections. Modus Operandi Often Used by the Drug-Seeking Patient Include

• • • • • • • • • • • •

Must be seen right away. Wants an appointment toward end of office hours. Calls or comes in after regular hours. States he/she is traveling through town, visiting friends or relatives (not a permanent resident). Feigns physical problems, such as abdominal or back pain, kidney stone, or migraine headache in an effort to obtain narcotic drugs. Feigns psychological problems, such as anxiety, insomnia, fatigue, or depression in an effort to obtain stimulants or depressants. States that specific nonnarcotic analgesics do not work or that he or she is allergic to them. Contends to be a patient of a practitioner who is currently unavailable or will not give the name of a primary or reference physician. States that a prescription has been lost or stolen and needs replacing. Deceives the practitioner, such as requesting refills more often than originally prescribed. Pressures the practitioner by eliciting sympathy or guilt or by direct threats. Utilizes a child or an elderly person when seeking methylphenidate or pain medication.

What a Physician or Pharmacist Should Do When Confronted by a Suspected Drug Abuser DO • Perform a thorough examination appropriate to the condition. • Document examination results and questions you asked the patient.

continued



234 Table 9.4 (continued)

Recognizing the Drug Abuser

• Request picture ID, or other ID and Social Security number. Photocopy these documents and include these in the patient’s record. • Call a previous practitioner, pharmacist, or hospital to confirm patient’s story. • Confirm a telephone number, if provided by the patient. • Confirm the current address at each visit. • Write prescriptions for limited quantities. DO NOT • Take their word for it when you are suspicious. • Dispense drugs just to get rid of drug-seeking patients. • Prescribe, dispense, or administer controlled substances outside the scope of your professional practice or in the absence of a formal practitioner–patient relationship. Source: U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 2006

undercover agents investigating this type of criminal behavior may find that the suspect doctors claim that they were just “practicing medicine” and attempting to cure a patient by prescribing drugs for an illness. Other violations are more blatant, such as when physicians sell drugs to friends and associates or barter prescriptions for merchandise. Other problems arise in the prosecution of diversion cases. Prosecutors are usually eager to file charges against drug dealers from the street, but when a drug dealer happens to be a physician in the community, charges are sometimes difficult to bring, and prosecutors are often reluctant to try “respectable” citizens who have the resources to mount an active defense against the charges. In addition, there are other pressures on prosecutors. They may have a social or political relationship with the registrant. If they are in a rural county that has few doctors’ offices, they know that any doctor forced out of business could leave some families without easy access to medical care. Furthermore, inconvenienced voters often have good memories when the prosecutor has to stand for reelection, creating a situation in which the prosecutor may actually be punished by the very public he or she serves for attempting to apply diversion laws to physicians. Even when charges are brought against physicians, prosecutors may have a difficult time convincing juries of the seriousness of the violation, or it may be difficult to explain the complexities of the diversion case to the jury. Because of these considerations, a conviction may not be forthcoming.


Special Enforcement Operations

10

Because of the pervasiveness of drug trafficking, law enforcement agencies will commonly involve themselves in both street and high-level investigations. It is therefore essential that officers be adequately trained in both technical and tactical methods of investigation, which sometimes present unique challenges. These investigations will frequently focus on cultivated marijuana fields, illicit laboratories, smuggling operations, reverse drug sting operations, and pharmaceutical diversion investigations. Each represents a significant contribution to the country’s illicit drug supply, which is why investigations into these areas should be undertaken regularly. This chapter examines each of these areas of criminal investigation and identifies problems and investigative methods used in each.

Marijuana Cultivation Marijuana has consistently remained one of the economic staples in the illegal drug business. Because marijuana grows in almost all 50 states, domestic cultivation also contributes greatly to the nation’s overall drug problem. Marijuana cultivation has proven to be a relatively easy-entry illicit market. All that is required for a simple growing operation is seeds, a water source, land, and a willingness to enter into a criminal enterprise, which in some states can result in a prison term as long as 25 years. It is difficult to estimate the amount of marijuana actually produced in the United States. No single criminal organization is thought to control domestic marijuana production and trafficking, probably because of the easy-entry nature of the business and the difficulty that criminal organizations would experience if they attempt to monopolize it. Consequently, the domestic marijuana market has spawned the development of rural criminals who live 235


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and operate in scarcely populated agrarian areas. In addition to the protective rural environment, law enforcement in these areas is often diffuse. Growers can operate with impunity while their operations are cloaked by thick forests, lush vegetation, or inaccessible mountain slopes. These factors also help conceal marijuana-growing operations from rival growers or “pot poachers.” Major outdoor cannabis cultivation takes place in Hawaii, Kentucky, Tennessee, California, and New York. Perhaps spurred on by successful efforts to curb outdoor cultivation, indoor cultivation flourishes, particularly in California, Florida, Oregon, Washington, and Kentucky. To help hide their plants, outdoor growers frequently disperse them among corn and tomato plants or along riverbeds and creeks. Over the years, police agents have discovered deadly booby traps in and around marijuana patches. Other safeguards have included hidden steel-jaw traps, guard dogs, and armed guards. These devices are designed not only to serve as a deterrent for police and poachers but also as a signal to nearby growers, who may be heavily armed and potentially violent. Growers have even resorted to indoor growing operations, not only to conceal their operations but to provide year-long harvesting opportunities. Marijuana growers are a somewhat fragmented group of traffickers who rely on kinship or local (“good-old-boy”) networks. Operations are typically financed by either previous transactions or by “jobbers,” furnishing special lighting, fertilizer, or other equipment in exchange for a percentage of the harvest. Police have documented cases, however, in which large-scale cultivation operations were financed by business executives looking for alternate ways to invest their money. The packaging of marijuana remains universal. After harvest, it is usually placed in large trash bags for transportation. For smaller retail sales of 0.25 pound or less, smaller zipper-closing plastic bags are usually used. Marijuana growers have learned that many police raids are products of so-called “search-and-destroy” missions based on information from informants. Therefore, many growing operations are now automated, allowing the grower to be absent in case of a police raid. This explains why search-anddestroy operations are often expensive and unproductive and rarely have a top enforcement priority for police. Growing Marijuana Three types of marijuana are commonly found in the United States: Indian hemp, commercial grade, and sinsemilla. The two cultivated grades are commercial and sinsemilla, which have significant growing differences. Commercial Grade Commercial-grade marijuana is produced from cannabis plants that are cultivated in plots in which the male and female plants are allowed to grow



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together and the female plants are fertilized. The whole plant is harvested, stripped of its stems, and marketed. At maturity, the plant will range from 7 to 15 feet high. Most of the leaves have 7 to 11 leaflets (almost always an odd number), with the center leaflet the longest. Sinsemilla The increased cultivation of sinsemilla reflects a growing trend to develop higher potency marijuana plants that result in greater profits. Many of these growers are horticulture specialists, and they crossbreed different strains of marijuana to produce the highest potency plants possible. Some growers select high-potency seeds from areas such as Mexico, Afghanistan, and Thailand; others attempt to produce their own high-quality seeds. In the latter case, a grower selects the largest female plant, impregnates a cotton swab with pollen, and places it on the largest bud of the plant. The cotton swab and bud are then covered with a plastic bag to protect the rest of the buds from the pollen. These fertilized buds will then produce seeds for the next growing season. In 1996, the U.S. government estimated that 37% of the domestic marijuana crop was sinsemilla. Sinsemilla is produced from unfertilized female plants, which are grown in plots from which all male cannabis plants have been removed before pollination. When grown in this fashion, the female plants flower more readily and produce more resin in an attempt to attract the male pollen. The resin contains THC (delta-9-tetrahydracannabinol), which is the active agent in marijuana. The THC content in sinsemilla plants may be twice that of the commercial-grade plants. On average, a cultivated marijuana plant will produce 1 pound of marketable product. A plant that has had its flower tops removed, however, may be harvested two or three times in a growing season, thereby producing 2 to 3 pounds of marketable product. Prices of cultivated marijuana vary greatly from region to region but range from $800 to $2000 per pound and up to $200 per ounce for the higher grades. Most cultivated marijuana plots are discovered as a result of search-anddestroy missions by police officers. Such activities have proven fruitful, but they frequently require four-wheel-drive vehicles, spotter aircraft, and substantial training in guerrilla warfare-type tactics in order to combat the snipers, guard dogs, and booby traps commonly associated with these operations. Indoor Growing Operations Many criminals are resorting to indoor growing methods, which (a) make police detection more difficult and (b) enable growers to produce marijuana year round. Growing structures such as greenhouses, converted residences, barns, basements, and chicken houses have been uncovered by drug enforcement officials. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement



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Administration (DEA), two methods are commonly used for indoor cultivation: cloning and hydroponics. Cloning Cloning originated on the West Coast. Hybrid marijuana is cultivated, and superior plants are selected for new cultivation. A cutting from a plant is obtained underwater, which prevents air from affecting the exposed ends. The cutting is wrapped in a paper towel that has been soaked in a root stimulant and then placed in a pot to grow. The cutting then develops roots. Growth is sometimes accelerated by the use of halide lights. Cloning permits a grower to produce hundreds of plants from a select few and avoids the time-consuming process of waiting for the seeds to germinate. Hydroponics This popular cultivation process was originally perfected for plants such as tomatoes and cucumbers. Plants are grown in a soil-free, mineral-rich solution. Marijuana seedlings are taken to the hydroponic greenhouse and placed in 4-inch pipes, which contain the solution. In this environment, a sinsemilla plant measuring 8 to 10 feet high can be grown in 4 to 6 weeks. Cultivated marijuana plants grown hydroponically will contain up to twice the THC content found in even the highest commercial grades. One benefit of producing plants in this fashion is that greenhouses may be as small as 400 square feet: only 1 square foot is required to grow a mature plant. Such operations may operate year round, and one such operation can possibly produce up to $5 million worth of marijuana annually. One way to investigate a possible greenhouse operation is to compare the suspect’s utility bills with those of neighboring residences to check for excessive use of electricity and water. Evidence of Marijuana Cultivation Once cultivated, the packaged marijuana is transported by pickup trucks with camper shells, vans, rental trailers, passenger vehicles, and (in some cases) general aviation aircraft. Commercial airlines are used more frequently to transport smaller quantities of drugs to various destinations within the United States. In addition, common carriers — even the U.S. Postal Service — have been discreetly used by traffickers to ship small quantities of marijuana. Because cultivation is mostly a rural operation, a lot of activities take place undetected by police or inquisitive neighbors. Certain types of behavior, however, might indicate the existence of a cultivation operation: 1. Individuals who purchase wooded lands, erecting high fences with heavy chains and locks on gates, and displaying “Keep Out” signs.



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2. Individuals who buy land that could be used for farming or ranching and then do not use it for those purposes. 3. Out-of-state individuals who make large cash payments for tracts of land or pay for the land in cash. 4. Buyers who purchase property through third parties and do not want to leave their addresses or telephone numbers with the seller. 5. People with no knowledge of ranching or farming who buy farms or ranch lands and then show no visible means of support. 6. An unusual amount of vehicular traffic by which unknown individuals are transported on and off the property, with entrance gates always locked after each entry or exit. 7. The erection of large greenhouses or tin buildings on the property where these structures would not normally be utilized (for example, on very heavily wooded land where there are no animals to feed). 8. The use of guard dogs, alarms, and surveillance systems on property in the country (for example, dogs around a tin barn in an isolated area of the property). 9. A house in the country where men are constantly coming and going, but women and children are seldom seen. 10. Large purchases of fertilizer, garden hose, plastic PVC pipe, chicken wire, long 2-foot × 2-foot lumber, different sizes of pots, machetes, camouflage netting, camouflage clothing, or many sizes of stepladders. 11. The erection of tents or the use of camper trailers or other recreational vehicles on wooded property with no evidence of recreational activities. 12. An unusual pattern of vehicular traffic or appearance of a particular vehicle in the same isolated area. 13. Large purchases of green plastic sheet material, green spray paint, large trash bags, lanterns, portable heaters (e.g., large kerosene heaters), extension cords, heat lamps, and fans. 14. New owners of property who refuse to talk to neighboring property owners about how they use their property. 15. The purchase of large amounts of heavy plastic materials, with buyer being evasive about their use. 16. Unexplained and unreasonably high utility bills. 17. The purchase of properties formerly used as chicken or turkey farms by buyers whose use of the property would be suspicious.

Domestic Eradication Domestically cultivated marijuana constituted approximately 19% of the total U.S. supply in 1985 and 18% in 1986. It is thought that these figures, which have increased since 1984, are a result of not only domestic interdiction


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programs but also eradication efforts in foreign source countries. In 1987, the DEA reported that more than one-third of the cultivated cannabis plants eradicated in 1985 and 1986 were sinsemilla, which is preferred over the commercial grades for its high THC content. Marijuana eradication involves locating and seizing both cultivated plots and wild-growing patches. This is a difficult and expensive undertaking for law enforcement agencies and usually requires a joint effort on the part of several agencies. The DEA first provided financial aid for marijuana eradication in Hawaii in 1979. Since then, this federal program, which offers funding and investigative and aircraft resources, has been expanded to all 50 states. The program is considered successful: in 1984, for example, an estimated 3.8 million marijuana plants were seized in 48 states. In most states, a National Guard unit assists local drug enforcement officers in eradication maneuvers. This means that equipment such as trucks, helicopters, and additional manpower can be placed at the disposal of the local law enforcement agencies, thereby making such operations easier to complete. Even with federal assistance, however, marijuana eradication is one of the most tedious and exhausting tasks in drug enforcement. Officers must be prepared to encounter cultivators who have military experience, police criminal records, and weapons. In addition, officers must also face long, hot days, with the risks of heat exhaustion, hornet and wasp stings, snakebites, poison ivy, sunstroke, and spider bites. The enforcement unit should properly document each eradication effort. All pertinent information should be catalogued and indexed: type of field (cultivated or wild growing), the names and identifiers of suspects, the items seized (weapons, vehicles, cultivation equipment, etc.), and other information (booby traps, type of marijuana, number of plants, etc.). Such documentation may be required under local or state law. In many cases, a state investigative police agency may collect the data from local law enforcement agencies throughout the state and maintain a master file of all plots and violators.

Smuggling Investigations Typically, smuggling calls to mind national and international organizations, with far-reaching implications. We are aware, for example, that a considerable amount of heroin originates in Mexico and Southeast and Southwest Asia. Cocaine, for the most part, originates in South American countries such as Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Marijuana, aside from its domestic sources, is smuggled in from Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Jamaica. It should be obvious that, once drugs arrive in the United States, there must be a domestic smuggling network, which then transports the drugs to



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places of distribution throughout the country. This is where local law enforcement must have sufficient expertise to deal with the problem of interstate and intrastate smuggling. This text will not address the task of international drug interdiction but will focus on the role of domestic law enforcement in detection and investigation of the various modes of domestic smuggling.

Air Smuggling Traditionally, the investigation of air smuggling had been the province of the federal government. During the past 10 years or so, however, it is increasingly common for state and local law enforcement agencies to conduct full-scale investigations into drug trafficking by air. Moreover, the recent federal task force concentrations in coastal cities and traditional ports of entry have caused many smugglers to transport their payloads further inland to areas considered safer by traffickers. The U.S. Customs Service estimates that there are between 3 and 10 successful smuggling flights each day in the United States. Evidence of this is found in the number of aircraft (large and small) seized by authorities during the off-loading process. Moreover, some planes are occasionally discovered abandoned — full of drugs and out of fuel. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires all flights by private aircraft originating in other countries to file flight plans 24 hours in advance and to land at airports nearest to their points of entry that have customs offices. By coordinating flight plan information with radar surveillance, any aircraft crossing a U.S. southern border without a flight plan can be identified as suspicious. Unfortunately, many areas of the border do not have low-altitude radar coverage, allowing many small aircraft to go undetected. Air smuggling investigations are tedious and difficult to conduct, since pilots often change their destinations, making detection difficult. To help combat this problem, law enforcement officers may “wire” a suspected aircraft to track it. A law enforcement transponder is placed in the suspect aircraft, which emits a signal that can be received by FAA control towers. These transponders look exactly like standard aircraft transponders, thus leaving little clue as to their true function. These devices must be surreptitiously installed by investigators and pursuant to a lawful court order. In investigations requiring the installation of a transponder, the Customs Service is usually contacted — which typically gives assistance in preparing the court order and technical assistance in installing the transponder. Another way of detecting air smuggling is by locating and conducting surveillance on a suspected “ground crew.” The ground crew consists of individuals employed by smugglers to meet the aircraft at a designated time and location and to off-load the drugs for transport to various distribution


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Figure 10.1 A small general aviation aircraft seized in rural Oklahoma after it ran out of fuel and was forced to make an emergency landing. It contained a payload of illicit drugs. (Photo courtesy of the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Control.)

points. These players may be hired to conduct only this particular task, or they may be involved in the overall planning of the operation. The ground crew usually employs vans or pickup trucks with camper shells (which are sometimes rented for the operation). The ground crew is usually equipped with two-way, ground-to-air radios to communicate with the pilot as he or she approaches the landing site. The landing site will vary in each air smuggling operation; typical sites include small, out-of-the-way airports, or even sections of highways that are seldom traveled. The capture of a smuggling aircraft should be accomplished with caution: pilots and ground crew are often heavily armed to prevent possible ambushes by poachers. In addition, state and local agencies should always contact the U.S. Customs Air Branch, which will offer support and expertise in the pursuit and capture of suspect aircraft. The Customs Service currently has planes equipped with forward-looking infrared sensors for tracking smugglers at night without making visual contact. Dealing with an air operation can be complicated and requires interagency cooperation (see Figure 10.1). Aircraft for Smuggling To properly investigate a suspected air smuggling operation, officers should have a basic knowledge of the various types of aircraft that smugglers use and which planes are best suited for different smuggling operations. Marijuana is usually packed in bails (50 or 100 pounds each), and smuggling normally



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requires larger aircraft, such as a C-132 or DC-3. Many other types of aircraft are commonly used, but, regardless of type, most traffickers prefer older aircraft, which can be abandoned (ditched) if necessary; older aircraft represent less potential financial loss than newer, more expensive planes. Cocaine, however, is usually brought in on smaller planes. The payload is smaller, and smaller aircraft normally fly much faster than larger planes. Popular planes for cocaine smuggling are single- and twin-engine aircraft such as the Cessna 400 series; other preferred models are the Aerocommander 680 and 690, Piper Aztec, and Piper Navajo twin-engine models. One of these planes can generally transport about 1 ton of cocaine over a range of about 1800 miles and can stay airborne for about 11 hours with a standard fuel system — even longer with a bladder tank. To maximize range and capability, smuggling aircraft are frequently “plumbed” or outfitted with auxiliary fuel systems. These systems, called “bladder tanks,” are sometimes installed on the outside of the aircraft or on a wing. Some smugglers prefer to conceal the bladder by using a collapsible tank inside the aircraft; this may consist of nothing more than a waterbed, which is used for a one-way trip and thrown away after the flight. The space formerly occupied by the bladder can be used for storing cocaine on the return journey. Air smuggling via general aviation aircraft is the most common method of importing cocaine from South America. Nearly two-thirds of the cocaine smuggled into the United States is transported in this fashion, although some use of commercial aircraft is also fairly common. (An estimated 64% of the marijuana consumed by American users is smuggled from foreign sources.) Planes that do not contain bladder tanks must refuel at predetermined transshipment points between the country of origin and the United States. These points are critical in the smuggling phase and can be found throughout South America, Cuba, the Bahamas, and Puerto Rico. Transshipment stations may simply be refueling stops, or they may be areas where the drugs are off-loaded and repackaged. Smugglers land at airports of every size and in large and small cities throughout the country. Although the planes may appear entirely “normal,” there are telltale signs for profiling aircraft used in smuggling. These signs are not only possible indicators of smuggling activity, but they could give investigators other leads to follow up and verify. Some physical characteristics of smuggling aircraft are: 1. Passenger seats missing from the aircraft. 2. Strong, unusual odors, such as perfume (used to cover the scent of marijuana). 3. Numerous cardboard boxes, duffel bags, plastic bags, or other containers inside the aircraft.



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4. Altered or otherwise falsified aircraft registration numbers. 5. Landings in which aircraft meet ground vehicles and depart after only a brief period on the ground. 6. Aircraft flying or landing after dark without lights. 7. Trucks, campers, or vans waiting at or near areas suitable for aircraft landings; these are often equipped with radios for use in communications with aircraft. 8. Pilots or passengers displaying large amounts of cash and making cash payments for fuel and services. 9. Windows of aircraft are covered by curtains or temporarily taped over. 10. Pilots or passengers reluctant to leave the aircraft unattended during ground servicing. 11. Aircraft parked a long distance from the line shack or at the far end of a ramp. Aircraft Data Plates When investigating suspect aircraft, it is often necessary to check the data plate of the aircraft to verify the authenticity of its externally displayed registration and to determine the true ownership. Occasionally, a plane’s external registration will also show signs of being altered, or the aircraft may be devoid of any registration markings. The latter is usually true when a plane crashes and burns. Search of a Typical Light Plane In the event that a suspected smuggler aircraft can be documented entering the country, U.S. Customs officers may search the aircraft without a warrant (a customs search). Absent any exigent circumstances, a search warrant or consent must be obtained. Searching an airplane is quite different from searching an automobile or marine vessel. Certain tools should be kept on hand for the task: a flashlight, an aircraft reference book, an inspection mirror, and a screwdriver (used as a probe). In addition, it may be necessary for officers to seek assistance of a certified mechanic to ensure the future airworthiness of the aircraft. Listed below are the main areas to search when concealed contraband is suspected: 1. Engine compartment: Have the pilot open the engine cowling on both sides. With the aid of a flashlight and inspection mirror, check for small packages that might be attached to the engine mount structure and other parts of the power plant. 2. Wheel wells: With the aid of a floor creeper, inspection mirror, and flashlight, check the surrounding structure for small concealed packages.



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Figure 10.2 Areas searched in light aircraft.

3.

4.

5.

6.

In most light planes, a large area of the internal wing structure may be viewed from the main landing gear wheel wells because of access holes. Cabin area: With the aid of an inspection mirror and flashlight, check under and behind the instrument panel, in the glove compartment, under seat cushions, in seat pockets, in the headliner if it has a zipper for inspection access, in ashtrays, in any open compartments, under the floor and above ceiling panes, and inside ventilation ducts, baggage, map cases, and flight kits. The baggage compartment behind the rear bulkhead cover: In most light planes, the rear bulkhead cover is a canvas or plastic sheet that is easily removed (it is usually held in place by snap fasteners, thumb disconnects, or Velcro® tape). With the aid of an inspection mirror and flashlight, examine the aft portion of the fuselage. The baggage compartment: Examine all baggage and the interior of the compartment. Do not place baggage on top of the wing. The wing skin is light and may be easily damaged. Most light twin-engine aircraft also have baggage compartments in the noses of the plane. The exterior of the plane: Examine the following areas for improper condition or operation, which may indicate the concealment of contraband: the nose cone, the prop spinner, light assemblies and bulbs, exhaust pipes, recessed areas in the landing gear, fuel cells, wing flaps, aileron tab, elevators, wheels and hubs, luggage compartments, wing-tip fuel tanks, and filler caps (see Figure 10.2).


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Search of Commercial Aircraft Commercial aircraft are frequently used to hide and transport drugs. A search of a commercial aircraft should include the baggage and storage compartments, the restrooms, life-raft compartments, trash containers, wheel wells, liquor locker, and area under the floor of the cockpit. The Pilots It is somewhat difficult to profile a smuggler pilot: they do not seem to fit stereotypes. Pilots may be of any nationality, age, or sex. In addition, they may be licensed commercial pilots, unlicensed pilots, or even former military flight personnel. Because the drug business is so lucrative, most smuggler pilots usually operate with extremely sophisticated equipment. In many instances, this equipment is more sophisticated than that used by police agencies and may include 1. Sophisticated electronic equipment to maintain communications within their organization: air-to-air radios, ground-to-air radios, and advanced radar. 2. Equipment to monitor law enforcement radio transmissions. 3. State-of-the-art communication scramblers; these are used to “garble” ordinary transmissions to anyone listening without a receiver having a scrambler with the same code. 4. Pocket pagers. 5. Digital encryption devices; these are used to send messages in code, and they can be accessed only after a security code is entered directly into the device. 6. Radar altimeters. 7. Beacon-interrogating digital radar. 8. Position-tracking equipment. 9. Long-range navigational instruments. 10. Night-vision goggles; these are used to intensify any available light by a factor of 50,000, thereby reducing the smuggler’s risk of detection by being able to fly “dark,” or without lights.

Ground Smuggling Authorities are discovering an upsurge in ground smuggling operations. Vehicles are used to transport drugs from aircraft and vessels to destinations within the United States and to transport drugs directly across the borders of the United States. The Border Patrol now uses a variety of sophisticated equipment to detect illegal intrusions: buried ground sensors, infrared heat sensors, night-vision goggles, and pocket-sized starlight scopes.



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Figure 10.3 Areas searched in typical automobile.

Search of a Typical Automobile The legality for searching an automobile is discussed in Chapter 6 and should be considered before any search is conducted. Given legal grounds for a search, it should be determined whether the case involves smuggling or whether the vehicle was used as a temporary hiding place for drugs. Normally, a smuggling operation will reveal a more extensive effort on the part of the driver to conceal drugs, thus making the drugs more difficult to locate. In either case, the search must be conducted thoroughly, with officers knowing specifically what areas to search. Officers should begin at one end of the vehicle and slowly work toward the other. It is a good idea for more than one officer to be present for the search; both officers should search the vehicle, so that evidence will not be overlooked. In most cases, drugs will usually be concealed in a few standard areas (see Figure 10.3): 1. Radiator, grill, and bumpers: Drug packages may be attached with duct tape to the rear of a license plate or inside a locking gas cap. 2. Fenders and front wheels: Look inside hubcaps and behind headlights. 3. Power plant area: Search inside the air filter, and look for packages affixed to electrical wiring, hoses, or under the hood. 4. Dashboard area: The driver may have installed removable panels, and these should be checked by operating all knobs. Search for packages affixed behind the foot pedals or in ventilation ducts. 5. Header area: It is common to discover concealed drugs within the cloth area of the headboard lining or within the sun visors.



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6. Front and back seat areas: Drugs may be concealed between the seats, within the seats and spring assemblies, or within hidden compartments in the seat. 7. Door panels: Door panels are removable and offer the smuggler areas to hide drugs, which might go undetected by unobservant police officers. 8. Trunk area: Look within the trunk lid frame and beneath the insulation. Drugs are also commonly hidden within hollow tools, inside the spare tire assembly, under carpeting, or within clothing in the trunk.

Reverse Sting Operations The “reverse sting” narcotic sale is one in which undercover investigators, posing as dealers, sell large quantities of narcotics to known traffickers (also see Chapter 2 on undercover operations). These types of operations have proven successful in penetrating otherwise untouchable drug markets. The same “reverse sting” techniques can also be used against drug consumers on the street. Street-level reverse sting operations can be used whenever any type of controlled substance is being sold in a high-traffic environment. However, police agencies have found it particularly effective in dealing with “rock” cocaine sales. Rock cocaine or “crack” has become the drug of choice and has led to a serious crime problem on the streets of many American towns and cities. Planning the Reverse Sting The “rock reverse” is almost always set up on the street in an area generally occupied by large numbers of street dealers or directly in front of a known crack house. The operation is dangerous for undercover officers and takedown officers; therefore, it is important that personnel be selected carefully for this assignment. All weapons that may be used in the operation should be thoroughly inspected, and officers assigned should wear soft body armor, as they should during all assignments. Reverse sting operations are manpower intensive. The reverse sting operation discussed here requires between 20 and 25 officers in order to be conducted safely and efficiently. Although this is a considerable expenditure in personnel, the operation can be justified based on the large number of arrests that can be made and the positive impact that this could have on the community. Additionally, considerable amounts of property and assets may be forfeited to the jurisdiction as a result of these operations. Manpower Considerations Three undercover investigators should be designated to perform the principal street sales assignments. Each officer should be dressed in a manner



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Figure 10.4 Anatomy of a crack house.

characteristic of the local dealers. The primary undercover officer (A) is responsible for making the drug sale, whereas undercover officers (B) and (C) position themselves within 200 feet of officer (A) on each side. Vehicle assignments are as follows (see Figure 10.4): •

•

•

Vehicle 1 is the principal vehicle used to accommodate officers making the arrest. Ideally this vehicle should be an inconspicuous panel van or step van without rear or side windows and with double folding side doors. Five officers should be assigned to this vehicle, three of whom should be uniformed and the remaining two wearing reflective raid jackets. Three of these officers should be designated to employ weapons during the arrest, whereas the other two should be assigned to search and handcuff the arrestees. Vehicles 2 and 3 are designated as blockade cars. These should be unmarked, inconspicuous sedans or other vehicles with two undercover officers assigned to each. These vehicles should park about 100 feet on each side of the van and should be ready to pull into a position to block the suspect’s vehicle at the time of the arrest or “takedown.” Vehicle 4 should be a surveillance van with audio/video and night vision capabilities. The surveillance van is stationary and is placed undercover within 100 feet of the primary undercover officer. Vehicles 5 and 6 are



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Figure 10.5 Anatomy of a sting operation.

marked units with two uniformed officers in each. These vehicles are assigned locations just outside the takedown area and are meant to provide additional coverage should suspects flee the area. In addition to these assignments, a prisoner-transportation van should be stationed just outside the operations area to ensure expeditious handling of arrestees. (See Figure 10.5.)

Conducting the Sting The primary takedown vehicle must be in close proximity to the primary undercover officer, as rapid response is essential in making the arrest. There must also be an appropriate place to locate the surveillance van so that it will



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be inconspicuous and provide for good audio/visual coverage. In some cases, officers may choose to conduct surveillance from a building location directly opposite the takedown area rather than use a van. Once the operational area has been identified, diagrams of the neighborhood should be developed. These diagrams should include all relevant buildings and features and identify the position of all police vehicles and personnel to be deployed in the operational area. The diagram should be used during the personnel briefings to “walk-through” the entire operation. If feasible, it is preferred that the entire operation be practiced in a nonpublic area just before being employed in the target area. The reverse sting requires that a quantity of crack cocaine be packaged for sale. A court order may be required for use of this or other contraband from police property control. Preferably, the crack that is used in the sale should be laboratory tested. Each cocaine rock should be sealed in clear plastic tape, a plastic bag, balloon, or other means. The method for sealing the rock should correspond with the method popularly used in a given area. The plastic bag or other method also allows the cocaine to be marked and discourages suspects from attempting to swallow the evidence. Before the crack package is sealed, a piece may also be broken off from each rock and stored in evidence, a measure that helps in prosecuting buyers who manage to swallow or otherwise dispose of the evidence during their arrest. It should be noted that, if the suspect swallows the cocaine, he should be immediately transported to an emergency medical facility. A potentially lethal overdose can thus be avoided. Approximately 20 minutes before the operation, marked police vehicles with uniformed officers should be sent into the target area to disperse any actual drug dealers. While in the area, these officers should also make contact with the citizens and request that they and their children stay out of the operational area. Most citizens will comply, particularly in view of the fact that their neighborhood may have been overrun by the drug dealers for some time. The primary undercover officer is responsible for selling the rocks while the two other undercover officers direct potential customers to him and provide backup protection. If the operation lasts for an extended period of time, these three officers should rotate assignments. The primary undercover officer should be positioned directly opposite the takedown van so that takedown officers will be in position almost immediately after exiting the vehicles. The primary undercover officer should be wired with a body transmitter so that the transaction can be recorded verbatim. The transmitter also serves as a backup safety device so problems that may develop can be overheard by the officer in the surveillance van.


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The undercover officer who is responsible for the sale has the major responsibility for ensuring that an “entrapment” situation is not created by what he or she says or does. The guidelines for the operation developed with the local prosecutor must be specific in terms of the types of language and actions that can be used to establish contact and a dialogue with potential buyers. “Typical” guidelines for reverse sting operations instruct undercover officers to stand alongside the street in the target area and act in a manner generally characteristic of local street dealers. Officers are told to ask (after first being approached by a suspect) general questions such as “What do you want?” Or “What are you looking for?” After the customer states that he is looking for crack, the officer is free to negotiate a price and conclude the sale. Through the careful development of an acceptable dialogue between the undercover officer and customer, the danger of entrapment is virtually eliminated. Predisposition of the suspect to commit the crime can easily be shown through audio and video recordings of the incident. The suspect can be seen on a videotape slowly driving into an area frequented by “crack” cocaine dealers. The suspect can be heard asking the undercover detective for cocaine. Predisposition can also generally be established by prior arrest records for drug offenses or by the presence of drug paraphernalia that may be found in the suspect’s vehicle. It should also be noted that, in most cases, it is necessary that the suspect actually takes possession of the cocaine before he can be arrested and charged with possession. Examining the cocaine “rock” before purchase does not normally constitute possession. Some agencies use prearranged signals between the undercover officer and the takedown team to initiate the arrest when the transaction is complete. A discrete signal, such as scratching one’s face or another movement, is most useful if a body transmitter is used by the undercover officer. If the transmitter is used in conjunction with visual surveillance, however, the officer conducting the surveillance should order the takedown. This latter approach is preferable for two reasons: 1. Police officers involved in undercover drug sales have been robbed of their drugs at gunpoint. 2. Some drug buyers, particularly those who have been arrested in stings on prior occasions, can readily detect commonly used police signals. Once the takedown command is given, the officers from the van should exit the vehicle, announce that they are police, and establish a good field of fire that will not jeopardize the undercover officer or other police personnel. Speed in making the takedown is essential. It is far more likely that control



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and compliance of suspects can be established if officers deploy rapidly and thwart any attempts of the suspect to flee or otherwise react. As officers exit the van for the takedown, the blocking vehicles should move into positions that will reduce the likelihood of an attempted escape. Officers in the blocking vehicles can also serve as backup to those in the van. Once all suspects are in custody, a prisoner van can be summoned and other personnel can drive the suspect’s vehicle to the impoundment area.

Summary This chapter deals with drug enforcement problems requiring special operations. While no investigator can be completely prepared for all the circumstances that he or she will encounter on the street, it helps to have some basic exposure to many of the most common problems. First, we discussed marijuana cultivation indoor and outdoor. Investigators must have a good grasp of the various hazards and types of evidence involved with this complex type of investigation. Next, smuggling operations are discussed. Drug smugglers know no boundaries and may be operating in your jurisdiction. This section informs you what to look for. Domestic marijuana eradication and smuggling operations are also discussed. These problems represent sources of illicit drugs that account for much of the nation’s supply. As such, the special operations discussed in this chapter provide a solution for investigators. Finally, the reverse sting operation is examined and procedures on how to establish a workable operation are discussed. Specific steps for conducting the sting are featured.

Suggested Reading Inciardi, J.A., Lockwood, D., and Pottinger, A.E., Women and Crack Cocaine, McMillan Publishers, New York, 1993. Gugliotta, G. and Leen, J., Kings of Cocaine, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989. Shannon, E., Desperados, Viking Press, New York, 1988.



Legal Considerations in Drug Enforcement Operations

11

Law enforcement officers are professionally, ethically, and legally bound to work within the legal environment. Doing so ensures a fair investigation and safeguards against the case being thrown out of court because evidence was illegally obtained. Because drug investigations are proactive and often utilize undercover operatives and informants, three issues are of particular concern to the investigator: the covert monitoring of suspects, entrapment, and possession with intent to distribute drugs. Understanding the legal implications of these issues will keep investigations fair, legal, and sufficiently strong for a conviction of the suspect in a court of law.

Surreptitious Monitoring of Suspects’ Conversations One of the more valuable investigatory tools made available to police officers by the courts in recent years is the surreptitious monitoring of conversations involving persons suspected of criminal acts. Surreptitious monitoring of such conversations may produce evidence that is extremely damaging to those concerned. If the monitoring is conducted under the proper circumstances, this evidence may be admissible in a court of law. Many law enforcement officers are under the impression that this type of monitoring is improper or illegal and that results are inadmissible unless the monitoring is conducted pursuant to a warrant. Therefore, many of the same agencies, by custom or because of formal policies, prohibit or discourage the use of this investigative technique, unnecessarily restricting officers. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that, if certain guidelines are observed, evidence produced by warrantless monitoring is perfectly acceptable. 255


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Types of Surreptitiously Monitored Statements Although possible factual situations are almost unlimited, the cases dealing with surreptitious monitoring or recording of suspects’ conversations usually involve one of three typical scenarios: 1. Conversations between suspects seated in a police vehicle. In this situation, two or more suspects who have been arrested or otherwise detained are placed in a police vehicle. Officers then move away from the vehicle, ostensibly to continue the investigation of the matter for which the suspects are being held, but a tape recorder or other monitoring device is left in the vehicle. The suspects then engage in a conversation during which incriminating statements are made; the statements are overheard or recorded for later use as evidence against them. 2. Conversations in an interrogation room in a police station. Here, the suspect is typically left alone in an interrogation room with a relative, friend, or suspected accomplice. Thinking that the conversation is not being overheard, the suspect makes statements regarding the offense. 3. Conversations in a jail cell with individuals who are, or who are believed by the suspect to be, fellow prisoners. Jail inmates can become quite talkative when they think that the statements are being made only to fellow inmates. Two such scenarios are given below: 1. The police place an undercover agent or informant in the cell to overhear statements made by the suspect. 2. A listening device is concealed in or near the cells so that conversations can be monitored by nearby police.* In each of the scenarios the evidence obtained has been held admissible by the courts. For example, in Stanley v. Wainwright,** two robbery suspects were arrested and placed in the backseat of a police vehicle. Officers then moved away from the vehicle; however, one of the officers left a tape recorder operating on the front seat while the arrestees were left unattended. Thinking they were safe from being overheard, the suspects discussed the situation between themselves, making statements that incriminated them. The recorded statements were held to be admissible as evidence against the suspects. In Ahmad A. v. Superior Court,*** a juvenile was arrested for murder. At the police station, the defendant was, at his request, permitted to talk with *

Often, of course, these occur together, as where electronic monitoring is used while the undercover agent or informant is in the cell. ** 604 in. T. D. 379 (5th Circuit 1979). *** 263 Ca. Rptr. 747 (Cal. Appl 1989), cert. denied, 11 S. Ct. 102 (1991).



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his mother in an interrogation room with no officers present. During his conversation, the suspect made incriminating statements. These comments were recorded and used as evidence against the defendant. The California court upheld the admissibility of the evidence. In Illinois v. Perkins,* a murder suspect was being held in jail on an unrelated charge. An undercover officer was placed in the cell, and, during a conversation, the undercover officer asked the suspect whether he ever killed anyone. The suspect responded with an admission of the murder for which he was under investigation. Evidence of the statement was held to be admissible. When surreptitiously monitored or recorded statements are offered in court, the defense may challenge the admissibility of the evidence on several grounds. Only if the prosecution can overcome each of these challenges will the evidence be admissible.** Fourth Amendment Challenges The defendant may contend that the statement was monitored in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. For example, the contention may be that the monitoring or recording constituted a “seizure” in violation of the defendant’s right of privacy. For this defense to succeed, the defendant has to show that the “seized” conversation took place in a location where there was a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” In a number of court decisions dating back to Katz v. United States,*** the 1967 case involving electronic surveillance of a telephone booth, the Supreme Court has held that such conversations are protected if, at the time of the conversation, the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that was both subjectively and objectively reasonable. As such, the monitored conversation is admissible unless the evidence shows not only that the defendant personally believed that the conversation was private but also that this expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable. When the conversation occurs in an area under police control, such as in a patrol car, in an interrogation room of a police station, or in a jail cell, the courts have held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such locations.**** The emphasis here is on the term reasonable expectation. Although the defendant may have subjectively believed (or may have contended that he or she believed) that the conversation was private and would *

110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990). See also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). *** 389 US 347 (1967). **** See, e.g., Stanley v. Wainwright, 604 in. T.D. 379 (5th Circuit 1979) (police car); and United States v. McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525 (11th Cir. 1993) (police car); Ahmad A. v. Superior Court, 263 Ca. Rptr. 747 (Cal. Appl 1989) (interrogation room); United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1985) (jail). **


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not be overheard, if that belief is not objectively reasonable, the evidence is admissible. As with any type of search or seizure, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to police activities in areas where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.* Even in conversations that were monitored in a police car or police station, some defendants have contended a reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations that had occurred prior to the time that they were actually placed under arrest. Under this argument, monitoring would be permissible in a police car or a police station only after the targeted individuals had been formally arrested. However, courts have generally rejected this contention, finding no distinction between arrestees and individuals who are not yet placed under arrest. Neither are considered to have any reasonable expectation of privacy in police vehicles or interrogation rooms. ** It should be noted, however, that, although individuals should normally have no reasonable expectation of privacy in police vehicles or police stations, this may be altered if the police give the suspect some reason to believe that the conversations will be private and unmonitored. As such, if any monitoring is contemplated in any location, whether in a patrol car, an interrogation room, a jail cell, or anywhere else, police must scrupulously avoid making any representation to the suspects that the location is private or that their conversations will be unmonitored. If any form of direct or indirect assurance of privacy is given, the suspect’s subsequent belief that the conversation is private will be conclusively presumed by the courts to be objectively reasonable, and any monitoring performed contrary to the explanation will be a violation of the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. Fifth Amendment Challenges Perhaps more common than Fourth Amendment challenges are claims that overheard conversations are unlawful custodial interrogations and that the monitoring is therefore a violation of the Fifth Amendment and the Miranda rule. Of the various types of challenges discussed in this chapter, the Fifth Amendment defense is perhaps the easiest for the prosecution to refute, for the courts have typically rejected such contentions. These courts have pointed out that the Miranda rule was formulated to protect individuals who might feel compelled to make statements because of pressures during custodial *

When making a Fourth Amendment challenge to monitored evidence, the defendant will, of course, contend that he or she subjectively believed that the conversation was private. Even if the court believes such contention, this is insufficient cause to suppress the evidence if the belief was an unreasonable one. See, e.g., United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1985) (expectation of privacy during jail visits unreasonable). ** See United States v. McKinnon , 985 F.2d 525 (11th Cir. 1993).



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interrogation. Police officers should be aware, however, that the Miranda rule does not apply to interviews conducted in noncustodial situations, nor does it apply when police conduct does not constitute an interrogation. Without “official compulsion,” there is no compulsory self-incrimination and no need for, or applicability of, the Miranda rule. Following this line of reasoning, the courts that have considered the question of surreptitious monitoring have concluded that, as long as the suspects are not aware that police officers are present or within hearing distance, there is no “custodial interrogation,” and the Miranda rule therefore does not apply in these situations. For example, in all the scenarios described earlier, the suspects were not aware that any police officer or informant was listening. Because the suspects were not aware of any police presence, there was no official compulsion to speak. Therefore, no Miranda warnings were required, and the statements uttered were considered to be voluntary. Consequently, the monitoring that produces evidence of the statements does not violate the Fifth Amendment or the Miranda rule.* Sixth Amendment Challenges The most complex challenge to evidence obtained by surreptitious monitoring is the contention that such monitoring violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This right, which is sometimes less familiar to police officers than the Fifth Amendment (Miranda) right to counsel, can be explained as follows: Sixth Amendment right to counsel vs. Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches to any person subjected to “custodial interrogation.” By contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when the case against the suspect has reached a so-called critical stage.** This critical stage is reached when formal charges have been filed or when “adversarial judicial proceedings” have begun.*** However, *

See Illinois the Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990); Stanley v. Wainwright, F. 2d. 379 (5th Circuit 1979). This result may be altered if, before the monitoring, the suspect has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent or the Miranda right to counsel. Officers conducting monitoring of conversations following an assertion of either of the Miranda rights by the suspect may expect the suspect to contend that his previous assertion of the Miranda rights made the monitoring improper. In Illinois v. Perkins, referred to above; there was no claim that the defendant had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel or to remain silent; whether any such invocation of rights would have affected the outcome of that case is unclear. ** See Messiah v. United States , 377 U.S. 201 (1964). *** Messiah v. United States , 377 U.S. 201 (1964).



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until a “critical stage” has been reached, there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and surreptitious monitoring of a suspect’s conversations before this point will not violate that right. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Police Car and in Interrogation Room Monitoring Scenarios Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only attaches when formal judicial proceedings have begun against a defendant, Sixth Amendment issues will normally not arise in situations in which a person is still only a suspect and has not formally been charged with the crime. As such, for example, for suspects placed in a police car pending further investigation or placed in an interrogation room at the police station, there is usually no Sixth Amendment right to counsel and thus no Sixth Amendment objection to monitoring. Although the situations are “custodial” for Fifth Amendment Miranda purposes, they usually do not involve the Sixth Amendment because normally such suspects have not yet been formally charged. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Jail Monitoring Scenarios The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is more likely to come into play in surreptitiously monitored cases where the monitoring occurs in a jail cell or police lockup. For incarcerated individuals, formal charges have most probably been filed; therefore, care must be taken that jail cell or lockup monitoring does not violate the target Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and the “Unrelated Charge” The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “charge specific,” meaning that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel only as to the specific crime or crimes for which he has been formally charged. Thus, a suspect may have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in respect to one criminal matter but have no such right with regard to another crime. This may be of great significance in “cell monitoring” situations. Although the target may have been charged with one crime, this does not preclude monitoring of conversations regarding another suspected, unrelated crime that is under investigation but for which the suspect has not yet been formally charged.* For example, the defendant might be in jail on a charge of robbery and may also be involved in drug trafficking unrelated to the robbery charge. In that situation, the Sixth Amendment would not bar monitoring of conversations regarding the unrelated drug trafficking activity until formal proceedings on the drug trafficking charges have been instituted.

*

Hoffa v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).



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Monitoring of Suspects in Sixth Amendment Situations: “Elicitation” vs. “Listening Post” Even if the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached to the suspect as to the same crime that is the focus of the monitored conversation, the Sixth Amendment does not violate it as long as the monitoring is merely a passive listening in on statements not elicited from the suspect by police action. However, if an informant or undercover officer is placed in a cell, actively eliciting statements from the suspect about a charge to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, this is a violation, and the evidence obtained is inadmissible.* If the informant or undercover agent is not actively eliciting incriminating statements from the suspect, but merely listening to whatever the suspect chooses to say, these unsolicited statements to an informant or officer are admissible. Under this rationale, electronic monitoring of the suspect’s jail cell conversations would not violate the Sixth Amendment, even though the evidence obtained relates to a charge to which the suspect Sixth Amendment rights have otherwise attached. To suppress such evidence, the defendant would have to “demonstrate that the police … took some action, beyond mere listening, that was designed deliberately to the elicited incriminating remarks” [Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986)]. Summary of Sixth Amendment In short, police may monitor a suspect’s conversations without violating the Sixth Amendment if • •

No formal charges have been filed regarding the crime that is the object of the monitoring. Police activity is limited to passive listening, with no active solicitation by a police informant or undercover agent.

Monitoring under Federal and State Statutes A defendant may challenge evidence obtained by surreptitious monitoring on the grounds that the monitoring or recording violated one or more state or federal statutes. Federal Law: The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act ** governs the interception of oral conversations by electronic or mechanical means. *

See United States v. Henry, 477 US 264 (1980). Also see Main v. Moulton, 474 US 159 (1985). 18 U.S.C. §§2510 et seq.

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Protected communications may be intercepted only after the issuance of a warrant. However, the statute protects only conversations in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, the determination made for the Fourth Amendment analysis discussed earlier. Because, as noted earlier, courts have generally found no such reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations conducted in police vehicles, police stations, or jail cells, monitoring of these types of conversation do not normally violate Title III. * State Law The laws of individual states may differ from the provisions of Title III. In some states, monitoring permissible under both federal constitutional decisions and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act may be prohibited by state statutes, as determined by a state constitution or state appellate court decision. Therefore, before any law enforcement agency undertakes electronic or mechanical monitoring of suspects’ conversations, the department concerned should consult with local legal advisers to determine whether the proposed monitoring will violate the state constitution or the statutes or ordinances of that jurisdiction.

Entrapment Drug enforcement investigators, by virtue of working in a proactive capacity (investigating crimes before they are committed), are faced with some unique legal concerns. As a rule, the issue of entrapment is of the gravest legal concern to both investigators and prosecutors. At times, information provided by informants is of such value that informants are paid for the information that they supply. The investigator should be careful not to pay for information that has not been verified or that is not considered useful in the investigation. Payments should be sufficiently modest to avoid accusations by the defense of entrapment. When this occurs, the defense will maintain that the investigator’s *

In addition, Title III is generally applicable to situations in which the monitoring or recording of the conversation is conducted with the consent of one of the conversants. See, e.g., Laetividal-Gonzalez, 939 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). This principle may defeat a Title III statutory challenge in monitoring situations in which a police informant or undercover officer has been a party to the monitored conversation. (Note: this exception may not be recognized by state law. Consult local legal advisers.) In addition, when conversants are made aware that they may be monitored, those making statements subsequent to the giving of the notice may be held to have consented to the monitoring. See, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1988) (jail inmates’ use of jail telephones known to be monitored constituted consent to have such conversations monitored).



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payment to the informant was so high that the informant was enticed into “setting up” the suspect solely for the large monetary reward. Law enforcement organizations have been criticized for going too far in attempting to “fool” suspected criminals. While working undercover or while supervising an informant in that capacity, police officers must be careful that they do not inadvertently coerce someone into committing a criminal act. The defendant may be excused from criminal liability through the use of the entrapment defense if it is demonstrated successfully in court. As summarized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sherman v. United States (1958), discussed later in this chapter, entrapment is the procurement of a person to commit a crime that he or she did not contemplate or would not have committed, for the sole purpose of prosecuting him or her. With the proliferation of undercover operations by government agents, increased attention has been given to the legal issues surrounding entrapment. The history of the entrapment defense shows the development of a unique concept in our criminal process. This concept allows a defendant to admit the crime and places the blame on the government. In most jurisdictions, entrapment is an affirmative, positive defense. Most courts require the entrapment defense to be specifically pleaded by the defendant. It is usually held to be an exclusive defense; that is, the defendant cannot plead that he did not commit the offense but that he was trapped into committing it. The defense of entrapment is not usually allowed when the defense pleads innocence, since the reason of the defense necessarily admits the commission of the crime charged. When entrapment is pleaded, the court will usually determine whether the essence of the plea is a matter of law or a matter of fact. If the events indicate that entrapment is a matter of law, the court will issue a judgment. More often, however, the issue is a matter of fact. If it is a jury trial and the facts are in dispute, the case must be submitted to the jury for a test of predisposition or credibility. In an entrapment defense, the accused alleges that the government, not the defendant, is responsible for the commission of the offense. It alleges the seduction of an otherwise innocent person into some criminal activity. The entrapment defense is based on the assumption that the defendant has committed a crime in the technical sense but that the government should in effect be halted from prosecuting him. Sorrels v. United States Entrapment was first defined in 1932 when the U.S. Supreme Court approved the first entrapment defense in Sorrels v. United States [287 US 435 (1932)]. In this first of only four entrapment cases heard by the Supreme Court, entrapment was defined as the “conception and planning of an offense by an


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officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer.” The Court reversed the District Court’s finding that there was no entrapment and held that the issue was a jury decision. It rejected the argument that entrapment should never be a defense to unintentional crime. Sorrels was a prohibition case and involved a government agent posing as a tourist who wanted to buy some moonshine from the defendant. The agent asked Sorrels to get him some moonshine. Sorrels initially refused. The agent then told the defendant that they had served together in the same military division during World War I; after the agent shared war stories with him, the agent induced the sale. Sorrels left and returned with 0.5 gallon of the illegal liquor and was paid by the agent. Evidence at the trial indicated that the agent initiated the sale and that, because of the agent’s persistence and reliance on his friendship with Sorrels, the defendant at last gave in and obtained and sold the liquor. Leaving no doubt as to how the court felt about the agent’s actions, the Court stated It is not the (duty of the police) to incite and create crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it … (it) is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the established law of the land to punish a man for the commission of an offense … which he … never would have been guilty of if the officers of the land had not inspired, incited, persuaded and lured him to attempt to commit it. The Court did allow that the government can appropriately provide “opportunities” and “facilities” for the commission of an offense, to distinguish between the government’s creation of opportunities to expose criminal design and creation of the design by the government: The appropriate object of this permitted activity (creating “opportunities” for a crime), frequently essential to the enforcement of law, is to reveal criminal design; a different question is presented when the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind of the innocent person a disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission for the purpose of prosecution. The Court then stated that, in light of this first attempt to define entrapment, the defendant could not complain regarding any “searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon (the) issue” of whether he was “a person otherwise innocent whom the government is seeking to punish for a criminal offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials.” In essence, the Court here stated that entrapment



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is a two-sided coin, with the conduct of the government on one side and the conduct of the accused on the other. The Supreme Court ruled that, in this case, the issue of entrapment was a matter of disputed facts and that these facts could have been submitted to the jury. Sherman v. United States It was 26 years later that the Supreme Court heard another entrapment case. In Sherman v. United States [356 US 369 (1958)], the issue was entrapment as a matter of law. There is no conflicting testimony, and the Court held that, from the undisputed testimony offered by the prosecution’s witness, entrapment had been established. Sherman was attempting to cure his heroin habit at a drug center when he met a government-employed informant who was also supposedly undergoing treatment for drug addiction. After meeting several times at the center and the pharmacy, Sherman and the informant became friends as they related common drug experiences and the associated problems of drug addiction. The informant appealed to Sherman’s sympathy, begging the defendant to locate some heroin because he was not responding to treatment and suffering withdrawal symptoms. At first, Sherman refused; however, after repeated pleadings from the informant, he sold narcotics to the informant on three occasions. The buys were observed by government drug agents. The undisputed evidence in Sherman showed that the criminal design spoken of in Sorrels had originated with the government informant and that the defendant had not been predisposed to commit the crime. In fact, the crime would not have been committed in the absence of the informant’s participation. The defense based its argument on the following facts: • • • • • •

The defendant was contacted in a medical care environment, not on the street. The defendant was taking “the cure” and attempting to rid himself of the heroin habit. The defendant obtained the heroin only after repeated pleadings. The defendant sold the heroin at the price he paid for it and made no profit. The defendant was induced to provide the narcotic for an informant who claimed his “cure” was ineffective and who had feigned sickness. The defendant shared his supply with the informant, injecting the narcotic himself.

The Sherman case shocked the Court because the defendant was prodded into a situation where he abandoned his treatment and readdicted himself.



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The Court therefore had little difficulty in placing Sherman within the purview of Sorrels. As the defendant pleaded his entrapment defense, he simply alleged that “an agent of the federal government induced him to take part in illegal transactions when otherwise he would not have done so.” Confusion Sherman far from settled the issue of entrapment as a defense. The lower courts were left without any criteria concerning allowable inducement by government agents or any method for establishing the predisposition of the accused. As Justice Frankfurter in concurrence stated, (Sherman) failed to give the doctrine of entrapment the solid foundations that the decisions of the lower courts and the criticism of learned writers (had) clearly shown (was) needed. Instead it accept(ed) without re-examination of the theory espoused in Sorrels. What Justice Frankfurter alluded to was the subjective–objective controversy raging in the lower courts. The subjective test concerns itself with whether the accused was otherwise innocent. The objective test ignored any evidence of predisposition. The adoption of such extremes has been seen in cases such as United States v. Anglada [524 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1975)]. In this case, the Second Circuit held that, even when the most modern showing of predisposition is made, such a showing precludes the instruction of a jury on entrapment. Other courts, as in People v. Turner [390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W. 2d 336 (1973)], have looked only at the government’s conduct, holding that the degree of the government’s participation is only a matter for consideration and that predisposition is irrelevant. In Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion, he outlined the question in Sherman in terms of public policy toward police conduct, further developing the objective theory of the entrapment defense. Criticizing the majority opinion as a distorted analysis of entrapment, Frankfurter stated the statute is wholly directed to defining and prohibiting the substance of offense concerned and expresses no purpose, either permissive or probative, regarding the police conduct that will be tolerated in the detection of crime … to look to statute for guidance in the application of policy not remotely within the contemplation of Congress at the time of its enactment is to distorted analysis …. Furthermore, a test that looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense entrapment.



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United States v. Russell In United States v. Russell [411 U.S. 423 (1973)], the Court affirmed the predisposition approach used in the Sorrels and Sherman cases, effectively going back to the “traditional notion of entrapment.” The Court held that a jury finding of predisposition was the death knell to a defendant’s claim of entrapment. In Russell, a government agent, after being instructed to locate a laboratory suspected of manufacturing methamphetamine, impersonated a representative of an organization that wanted to control the distribution of “speed.” The agent offered to supply the defendants with a basic chemical (phenyl-2-propane) required for the manufacture of the drug if the defendants would give him half the finished product and a tour of their drug manufacturing plant, which was already in operation. Because the laboratory was already in operation, there were sources of propane already available to the defendants. The agent supplied the propane on one occasion and purchased part of the finished product, the methamphetamine. Three days after the purchase of the drug, the agent obtained a search warrant and performed a search of the laboratory. At trial, the defendant and two codefendants were convicted of the manufacture and sale of methamphetamine. Standard entrapment instructions had been read to the jury. Russell appealed to the Ninth Circuit, conceding predisposition but arguing entrapment as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction, holding the establishment of entrapment as a matter of law. In endorsing the objective theory, the court had made the entrapment defense available to the defendant regardless of his acknowledged predisposition to commit the offense. The court decided that the chemical would not have been otherwise available to the defendant and stated that there had been an “intolerable degree of government participation in the criminal enterprise.” The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling in an application of the Sorrels test of entrapment, finding that Russell had gone far beyond the scope of full Sorrels and Sherman. In doing so, the Court failed to deal with the issues of police involvement and the amount of inducement that is permissible. The Court explained, we are content to leave the matter where it was left by the Court in Sorrels and Sherman. Entrapment is present when the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and the implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.



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Russell requested that the majority disposition view be reevaluated, but the Court rejected his appeal, stating that the respondent would “have had the Court require that any prosecution be barred absolutely because of the police involvement in criminal activity.” The Court concluded that, because the manufacture of drugs had gone on before the agent’s involvement, the agent had obviously not instigated the crime but only provided a means for commission of the crime. Such involvement did not constitute excessive involvement by the government. This is probably the only hint from the Court as to what was allowable with regard to police involvement. The Supreme Court made the following ruling: • • •

Entrapment, as a defense, does not rise to a constitutionally protected right. The law enforcement conduct was not unfair or shocking. A predisposition to commit the crime precludes the defense of entrapment.

The Court, in affirming Russell’s original conviction, pointed out the extent of participation that is necessary to prosecute certain crimes. Hampton v. United States In the Supreme Court decision, Hampton v. United States [425 US 484], two sales of heroin were made to agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The government alleged that a government informant met defendant Hampton in a pool hall. Hampton noticed needle marks on the informant’s arm and told him that he had heroin to sell if the informant could find a buyer for the drug. The informant related this information to DEA agents, who arranged two purchases from the defendant. Hampton, however, claimed that the informant told him he knew of a pharmacist who manufactured a nonnarcotic counterfeit drug to sell to gullible buyers. The defendant alleged that a narcotic sale was made in which all of the drugs sold were in fact obtained from the informant. Hampton claimed that he had no intention to sell an illegal drug and had no knowledge that the substance sold was actually the illegal drug, heroin. This allegation was an effort on the part of the defendant at trial to bypass a finding of knowing an intentional statutory violation. Hampton, having conceded predisposition, argued that due process rather than entrapment should guide his case. The defendant asked for entrapment instructions that “the due process clause of Fifth Amendment forbids the conviction of an accused for selling contraband, if the contraband sold was supplied to the accused by the government.” The trial court rejected the requested instructions, and standard entrapment instructions were read



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to the jury. Hampton was convicted of distributing heroin. The U.S. Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, relying on Russell, affirmed the decision. Although the Justices of the Supreme Court did not agree on opinion, the majority could not find a due process violation, determining that the defendant was predisposed to violate the narcotic laws, thus denying a general entrapment defense or a due process claim. Jacobson v. United States In 1992, the issue of entrapment was addressed in Jacobson v. United States. Although not a drug case, Jacobson addresses the extent to which undercover police should aggressively pursue any target. This relates directly to the use of informants, because informants often operate outside the direct supervision of the police agent and can behave in a manner that can, if left unchecked, legally jeopardize the case. In Jacobson, 56-year-old Keith Jacobson was indicted for violating the Child Protection Act. The law made it illegal to knowingly receive through the mail visual depictions of a minor child engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Jacobson claimed that he was entrapped because on numerous occasions agents of the U.S. Postal Service sent him sexually explicit materials through the mail in hopes of getting him to subscribe to one of the publications. Finally, after 26 months of receiving material, Jacobson subscribed to two of the publications. The publications, titled Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II, contained explicit photos of nude boys in their teens and preteens. Upon review, the Court acknowledged the wrongs of child pornography and upheld the appropriateness of police to employ the use of undercover agents, but the Court declared that officers may not originate a criminal design or implant in a person’s mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, as happened in this case. The Court further held that the government must show that the predisposition to commit the criminal act existed prior to approach by government agents. Therefore, in this case, because the defendant had been contacted many times over a 2-year period, no such predisposition had been shown.

Predisposition Although some jurisdictions follow the so-called “objective view of entrapment” (meaning that the sole inquiry is whether or not police induced the crime), the federal courts and a majority of states take the position that, although the defense has established that the police induced the defendant to commit the crime, there is still no entrapment if the defendant was “predisposed” to commit the crime. The evidence must establish that



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The defendant is of a frame of mind such that once his attention is called to the criminal opportunity, his decision to commit the crime is the product of his own preference and not the product of government persuasion. This goes back to the contention of the courts that it is against public policy to permit the police to induce the commission of the crime by a person who otherwise would not have committed the criminal act. This is the attitude that leads to judicial statements such as the one quoted earlier that the police “may not play on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguile him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted.” * Therefore, in many if not most entrapment cases, the entrapment issue turns on the question of whether the defendant was “predisposed” to commit the crime. Definition of “Predisposition” The defendant is “predisposed” to commit a crime if the defendant’s state of mind is such that the defendant is not only willing to commit the crime but he probably would commit the crime sooner or later under similar circumstances. Or, as one court put it, “Predisposition” is usually understood to mean that the defendant was ready and willing to commit the crime that the government has set up before the government set it up. However, mere “willingness” is not enough: The Supreme Court’s formulation of the [entrapment] doctrine … — that bars the punishment of one, who if left to his own devices, probably would never have run afoul of the law — shows that willingness, the pure mental state, is not enough; there must also be readiness, in the sense that the defendant was poised, was likely, to engage in criminal activity.”** Under this definition, merely wanting to commit the act is not sufficient; the defendant must be ready to commit the act, because: [a] person who had dreams of criminality … but no means of living them would be harmless and must be left alone. *

United States v. Hollingsworth, No 92-2299 (7th Cir. 1993). United States v. Hollingsworth, No 92-2299 (7th Cir. 1993).

**



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Predisposition, or the lack of it, depends on the defendant’s mental state at the time that the defendant is first approached by the police. If the defendant by agency efforts have, over a period of time, created that state of mind in the defendant where it did not previously exist, then there is no “predisposition” at the time of the first contact, and the defendant has been entrapped. The predisposition must be “independent and not the product of the attention that the [officers] had directed at petitioner ….” The government is not required to prove that it had a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before conducting an undercover investigation. Therefore, whether the police were aware of the defendant’s predisposition at the time that they began the operation against the defendant is irrelevant. The question is whether the predisposition in fact existed at the time of the initial contact. For obvious reasons, whether the defendant displayed eagerness or reluctance to comply with an invitation to engage in criminal activity will affect the outcome of the case. Evidence that the defendant resisted such suggestions may result in a finding of no predisposition. However, mere reluctance or hesitation will not alone preclude a finding of predisposition. If the defendant willingly commits a crime, the fact that he had some initial hesitation about it is insufficient to defeat the prosecution’s predisposition claim. Factors in Predisposition Whether a defendant was predisposed to commit a crime will be judged on a number of factors. Although different courts articulate these factors differently, the following considerations are known to play a role in judicial decisions on entrapment: 1. Has the defendant previously engaged in criminal acts, especially criminal acts of the same type? The defendant who claims that he or she was entrapped will have a difficult time establishing entrapment if the defendant is known to have previously committed the very same offense, and evidence of such prior offenses is admissible on behalf of the prosecution to rebut the claim of entrapment. Although prior commission of the same type of crime is probably the strongest evidence of predisposition, the earlier criminal activities do not necessarily have to be of the same type. Evidence of other crimes may be enough to establish a predisposition toward criminal activity generally, which may be sufficient to defeat the entrapment defense. Although evidence of previous criminal acts will often establish predisposition, the absence of such activity in the past does not necessarily defeat the prosecution’s case. A lack of prior criminal activity does not preclude a


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finding of predisposition; it merely makes predisposition more difficult to prove. Under the right circumstances, even a person who has no previous criminal involvement may be found to have been predisposed to commit the crime with which he is currently charged. Some criminal acts may, in and of themselves, manifest predisposition, regardless of the lack of previous criminal activity. In one money-laundering case, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, after finding that the prosecution had failed to establish predisposition, stated: Our decision has no implications at all for the garden-variety drug cases in which the defense of entrapment is most frequently, but futilely, raised. One who sells drugs or buys drugs from a government informant or undercover agent has by that very act demonstrated his ability to commit the crime. 2. Was it the police or defendant who first suggested the criminal act? This factor illustrates the close relationship between “inducement” and “predisposition.” Obviously, one who volunteers to commit the criminal act without being asked to do so is more “predisposed” than a person who has been persuaded to commit the crime by officers who have made the first suggestion themselves. Although standing alone, this factor is not determinative; rather, it contributes to the overall picture. 3. Did the defendant demonstrate reluctance to engage in the criminal activity, or did he or she respond enthusiastically to the first suggestion? Again, the link between inducement and predisposition is obvious. The more “induced one” it takes, the more it appears that the defendant was not “predisposed.” The defendant who demonstrates great reluctance to commit the crime and, for some substantial period of time, who resists the suggestion of the undercover officer or informant that the crime must be committed has a much better chance of establishing entrapment defense than the defendant who leaps to comply with the first suggestion of criminal activity. 4. Did the defendant engage in the activity for profit? A person who seeks to profit monetarily from the activity may be considered more “predisposed” than one who engages in the activity for other reasons, e.g., for personal pleasure or to help someone else. 5. Did the defendant display knowledge of the type of offense concerned? One who has close acquaintance of the terminology, technology, procedures, or other aspects of the particular offense is more likely to be considered “predisposed” than one who is ignorant of such matters. For example, in one federal case, the defendant was fluent



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in drug terminology and displayed an extensive knowledge of the prices of drugs in various areas. This was considered to be evidence of “predisposition” to commit a drug-related offense. 6. Does the defendant have a history of association with others engaged in this type of criminal activity? Such associations are regarded by many courts as evidence of predisposition. For example, if the defendant who is charged with a drug offense claims a lack of predisposition, the fact that the defendant is known to have associated with drug dealers in the past may be considered highly relevant by the court.

Possession with Intent to Distribute Drugs Two generic types of offenses are considered here: possession of controlled substances and possession of such substances with the intent to distribute. The elements of these offenses may vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction because there is no “common law” crime of possession or distribution of drugs. All such prosecutions must be conducted under a state or federal statute or local ordinance, and the statutes may vary in their language from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, there is sufficient similarity to allow their essential elements to be discussed, as well as the evidence that officers should note, collect, preserve, report, and (if requested to do so by the prosecutor) introduce at trial. In drug cases, as in any type of criminal case, the burden is on the police and the prosecution to establish all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The failure to carry this burden of proof by competent evidence at the trial will result in a dismissal or not guilty verdict. It is essential that all officers understand the elements of drug offenses and what offenses are admissible in court to establish those elements. In other words, officers must know what is approved and how to prove it. Thus, it is the duty of each officer investigating drug cases to know: • • • •

The elements of each drug-related offense. The types of evidence that are admissible to establish these elements. The possible significance of each circumstance or item of physical evidence encountered during an arrest or search in a drug investigation. The correct methods of collecting and preserving such evidence for use in a subsequent prosecution.

The lack of any of these items of knowledge will severely handicap the officer’s investigation of any drug case and will probably result in a loss of the case in court.



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Possession To obtain a conviction for either possession of drugs or possession with intent to distribute drugs, officers must first establish that the defendant had either “actual” or “constructive” possession of the drugs in question. Unless the legal elements of possession — actual or constructive — can be shown by evidence that is admissible in court, no conviction of either offense is possible. Possession may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. Actual Possession There is no firm dividing line between actual and constructive possession. However, it may be said that a defendant is in actual rather than constructive possession of drugs if the drugs are found on the person or within his or her grasp. Actual possession is usually proven by direct evidence, such as the eyewitness testimony of the arresting officers. However, circumstantial evidence may also be employed. The defendant may be said to be in actual possession of the drugs if the drugs are discovered: • • • • •

In the defendant’s hand. In a bag, box, briefcase, or other similar item carried by the defendant. In the defendant’s pockets or elsewhere in the defendant’s clothing. Concealed in the defendant’s clothing, for example, when taped or otherwise attached to the defendant’s body. In the body orifices or digestive tract of the defendant.

Constructive Possession Even if the drugs are not found in the defendant’s actual possession, a conviction may be obtained if the defendant had “constructive” possession of the contraband. The defendant has constructive possession if the defendant has “ownership, dominion or control over the contraband itself, or dominion or control over the premises or vehicle in which the contraband was concealed.” The issue is access to and control over the drugs. Even if the defendant does not currently have actual possession of the drugs, constructive possession may be found if the defendant can readily gain actual possession over them. As one court put it, “constructive possession is the ability to reduce an object to actual possession” [United States v. Martinez, 588 F. 2d. 495, 498 (5th Cir., 1979)]. Therefore, if the defendant, although not in actual possession, has the right, power, or ability to gain actual possession over the contraband at will, or to produce or dispose of it, the contraband is in the defendant’s constructive possession. Constructive possession is typically established in part by direct evidence, such as by finding drugs in certain locations, and in part by circumstantial evidence, that is, by evidence of circumstances that persuade a court and jury that there was in fact constructive possession.



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Mere physical proximity of the defendant to the drugs or the mere presence of the defendant on the premises or in the area where drugs are located is not normally enough to establish constructive possession. For example, the mere fact that the defendant was a visitor at a residence where drugs were concealed would not alone establish constructive possession of those drugs by the defendant. For the same reason, association of the defendant with other individuals who are in possession of drugs, or the fact that the defendant was found in the same area as these individuals, is not enough to support a conviction by itself. However, proximity to the drugs, together with other circumstances, may be sufficient to establish constructive possession. This is especially true if the proximity results in some degree of control over the drugs. For example, one case showed* that, if the evidence shows that the defendant was “knowingly in a position to exercise dominion or control over the drugs,” this may be sufficient. Proximity to the drugs, although not decisive in itself, is therefore one of the factors that the law will consider in determining whether there was constructive possession. The following situations, among many others, have been found to constitute constructive possession in and of themselves or in combination with other circumstances: • •

• • • •

Drugs are found in the defendant’s residence. Defendant has possession of the key to premises where drugs are located (this might be a residence, a motel or hotel room, an office, a storage shed, a locker, or any other location). The defendant is the owner, operator, or (in some instances) an occupant of the vehicle containing the drugs. Defendant is in possession of the keys to the vehicle that contains drugs. Defendant is driving one vehicle of several vehicles traveling together, even though the drugs were actually located in one of the other vehicles. Defendant orders assistance or accomplices to produce the drugs for inspection or sale.

Joint Possession More than one person may have constructive possession of the same drugs at the same time. For example, joint occupants of the premises may all be found to be in constructive possession of drugs located in a part of the premises to which all had access. Similarly, the defendant who engages in a conspiracy or “joint venture” with others to obtain drugs may be held to be in constructive possession of the drugs, even though the contraband is in the *

United States v. James, 764 F. 2d. 885, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1985).


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actual possession of another person. All that is required is that the defendant must have “some appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the drug.”

Lookouts, Brokers, and Other Participants The mere fact that one has acted as a “lookout” in connection with the possession, use, or sale of drugs may not, standing alone, be sufficient to charge the lookout with possession or possession with intent to sell. At a minimum, it must be shown that the lookout knew of the existence of the drug, and even this will probably be not enough to constitute constructive possession in the absence of any degree of “dominion or control” over the drugs. A broker, finder, or go-between for a drug deal does not, by that fact alone, have constructive possession. Such persons may not be charged with possession or possession with intent to distribute merely because they have brought the buyer and seller together. Only if the defendant has access to and control of the drugs (either individually or jointly with others, as previously discussed) can the defendant be charged with constructive possession. However, in one case a defendant’s ability to assure delivery of the drug by the persons with whom the defendant was associated was held to constitute constructive possession.* The fact that a person is apprehended while leaving a location where drugs are present does not by itself establish constructive possession. The prosecution might show the “dominion and control” over the drugs, which is essential to all cases of this type. Officers should be aware of any circumstances that can show that a suspect (a) was in fact in an area where drugs were present, (b) knew of the presence of the drugs, and (c) had “dominion and control” over the drugs, jointly or with others, as described above. In general, knowledge by the defendant that the drugs are present is essential for conviction for possession. The courts reason that one who does not know that the drugs are present cannot be found to have any “dominion or control” over such drugs. Therefore, it is not surprising that a common line of defense is for defendants to claim that they did not know that the drugs were there. The prosecution must be prepared to show this knowledge, and the arresting officers must take note of all circumstances surrounding the arrest so that showing that this knowledge existed can be logically presented.

Possession with Intent to Distribute As noted earlier, all drug offenses are statutory. Therefore, to obtain a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the police and the prosecution *

United States v. Weisser, 737 F. 2d. 729 (8th Cir. 1984).



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must establish the elements of the offense as set forth in the applicable statute. Because the statutes may vary from state to state, each department must determine the precise elements of the offense set forth in the statute law of the department’s own jurisdiction. Generally, however, there will be two main elements to be established — possession, as discussed above, and intent. Intent, like any subjective state of mind, is difficult to prove directly. Very rarely will a defendant admits that he or she intended to distribute. In some cases, the witness may be able to testify to statements made by a defendant regarding such intent, which may be considered a form of direct evidence. However, intent is seldom established solely by direct evidence; in almost every instance, it must be shown by some amount of circumstantial evidence. Intent may be inferred from one or more circumstances, as outlined below. Quantity The quantity possessed is probably the most important circumstantial indicator of the intent to distribute. In some cases, statutes may state the quantity that is needed to be found to create a presumption of intent to distribute. If a statute does not set forth the presumptive amount, courts nevertheless may be willing to infer the intent from the quantity found. The reverse is also true: if only a small quantity is found, this may negate the existence of intent to distribute and may even be held to raise an inference that the drug was possessed for personal use only. Note that quantity is perhaps the only factor that, standing alone, is sufficient to support a finding of intent; the other factors discussed below are generally sufficient only when more than one such factor or circumstance is present in a given case. Except when the necessary quantity is stated in a statute, cases vary widely as to what quantity is sufficient to justify a finding of intent. However, in the absence of a statute fixing the amount in a department’s jurisdiction, officers should be aware of the following general rules: the greater the quantity, the more likely it is that a court will decide that the quantity alone is sufficient to establish intent to distribute; the smaller the quantity, the more likely it is that the court will demand that the prosecution show additional evidence of intent. Quality The quality or purity of the drugs possessed is a factor that courts will consider in finding intent. Purity is normally not enough by itself to establish intent, but it is a relevant factor, especially when weighed in conjunction with


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other circumstances. Again, the rule of thumb is the higher the degree of purity, the more persuasive this factor will be. Packaging The manner in which any drugs found at the scene are packaged may be significant. For example, if numerous packages are found and the packaging is the same as the packaging supplies found at the same location, this suggests distribution rather than personal use. Therefore, both the number of packages and the type of packaging should be noted and reported. Location The location where the drugs are found may affect the weight given to quantity and quality. For example, the finding of a given quantity of drugs in a jail or prison might be considered more significant than the finding of the same amount in a less rigidly controlled environment. Large Amounts of Cash The presence of large amounts of cash in the location where the drugs are found may be regarded by courts as relevant to the issue of intent because distribution operations tend to generate large amounts of cash. However, this will be considered decisive only if the presence of the money is unexplained. The defendants can be expected to offer any number of possible explanations in court, and some of these may be persuasive, with the prosecution not prepared to negate them. Weapons If firearms or other weapons are present, this may also be considered. It is commonly known that drug dealers tend to possess weapons, and such evidence is therefore regarded as relevant. The number and type of weapons may be important; large quantities of weapons, especially assault rifles, submachine guns, or other heavy or “exotic” weaponry strongly support the inference of drug dealing. Addiction of the Possessor If the person possessing the drugs is addicted to a drug other than the one found, this suggests that the drug found was for distribution rather than for personal use. On the other hand, if the person possessing the drug is addicted to the same drug, this supports the inference that the substance, even though present in large quantity, may have been kept for personal use.



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Presence of Paraphernalia Whether or not the presence of drug paraphernalia at the scene will be admitted as evidence of intent to distribute depends on the type and amount of paraphernalia present and the amount of drug found. The presence of certain types of paraphernalia suggests personal use — for example, a marijuana pipe, a syringe, or a supply of straws and razor blades. The absence of such personal-use paraphernalia may suggest that the drugs are intended for use by others. In some cases, the presence of large quantities of paraphernalia may indicate that they are not for personal use. Where paraphernalia are present, personal use is indicated only if the paraphernalia found are consistent with the use of that particular drug. For example, the presence of a marijuana pipe would not suggest personal use if the drug found was cocaine. Certain types of paraphernalia strongly indicate manufacture and intent to distribute. These would include • • • • •

• •

Cutting agents such as baking soda. Packaging materials such as baggies, bag ties, glass vials, etc. Weighing scales. Spoons, sifters, or other implements used in processing drugs for distribution. Debris or evidence suggesting manufacture or distribution, such as “cut corners” from plastic or foil packages, especially found in large quantities. Chemicals or equipment used in the manufacture of drugs. Other items commonly used by dealers in that area.

The greater the quantity of equipment or supplies found, the stronger the inference of distribution. Note that finding these items, even if they are present in large quantities, will support an inference of distribution only if the items are commonly used to distribute the particular drug found. For example, the presence of large quantities of baking soda would not give rise to an inference of distribution if the only drug found was marijuana. For these reasons, the amount and type of paraphernalia present should always be carefully observed. Again, note that the absence of paraphernalia may be as significant as its presence; for example, officers should be aware of the presence or absence of the following: 1. Cell phones, beepers, and other communication equipment. The presence of beepers, cell phones, or unusual amounts of communication equipment (for example, multiple cell phones) may be indicative of a distribution operation.



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2. Documents. The presence of documents usually associated with drug distribution should be noted by the officers conducting the search or making the arrest. Items that a relevant include: • Notebooks and tally sheets. Even when the investigator is fortunate enough to find them, the presence of notebooks or tally sheets listing customers or recorded sales will seldom if ever be sufficient by itself. However, when found at the scene, such items should be seized as evidence and their presence duly reported because they are, if not conclusive, at least relevant to the issue of distribution. • Cell phone, telephone, and beeper records. Telephone records such as bills and logs may be relevant and therefore admissible as evidence. Such records should therefore be noted carefully and, where appropriate, seized and reported. Records of beeper use may be significant for the same reasons. • Correspondence. Correspondence, by its volume or content, suggesting distribution should be noted and, where appropriate, seized for use as evidence. 3. Surveillance and security equipment. The presence of audio or visual surveillance equipment, alarms, or other security devices should be noted. For example, video cameras, two-way radios, and similar items may be highly indicative of an ongoing distribution operation. The presence of high fencing, infrared motion detectors, and so forth may also be significant. 4. Security and secure storage. Evidence of unusual security measures, such as locked vials, cabinets, closets, or other containers or spaces may be important. Although such measures are not necessarily indicative of criminal activity, they may contribute to an overall picture suggestive of drug use or distribution. The presence on the person(s) being arrested or on the premises being searched of keys that do not fit doors or cabinets located on the premises may be significant. Thus, for example, the presence of one or more keys to public depositories such as a station locker, may, in addition to being an excellent investigative lead, be relevant as evidence to show intent to distribute any drugs found. Traffic Patterns of traffic to and from the premises in question may be significant. Traffic patterns to, from, or near the location may be relevant to the issue of distribution. Numbers, types, times, duration of stay, and other pertinent details should also be noted.



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Association with Known Dealers, Gang Membership Evidence that a defendant is associated with drug dealers may be admissible as evidence of intent to distribute. Although the courts do not favor “guilt by association,” in certain situations such relationships may be relevant and admissible. In particular, evidence that the defendant is a member of the gang known to engage in drug dealing may be significant. For example, in two recent federal cases, that the alleged drug conspirators were members of the “Crips” was held admissible to show the existence of a drug-dealing conspiracy. Two of the most common defenses for possession with intent to distribute are (1) that the drugs were for personal use, not for distribution, and (2) that the defendant did not know the drugs were present and that somebody else must have put them there. Therefore, any evidence that the investigator can produce that would tend to negate these two claims would be extremely valuable to the prosecution of intent to distribute cases.

Summary In drug cases, as in any type of criminal case, it is essential that the officers concerned know what must be proven and how to prove it. Here, we have discussed the various types of evidence that may be admissible in drug cases to establish possession or intent to distribute. In particular, in “possession with intent to distribute” cases, officers must understand the factors that may be considered by a judge or jury as circumstantial evidence in cases where the defendant is charged with intent to distribute. However, officers should remember that, with the possible exception of quantity, no single factor standing alone will normally be sufficient to support such a conviction. Officers must therefore be prepared to observe and report any and all of the circumstances discussed above so that cumulative presence could constitute persuasive circumstantial proof of intent to distribute drugs.

Suggested Reading Lee, G.D., Conspiracy Investigations: Terrorism, Drugs and Gangs, Prentice Hall Publications, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2003. Peoples, E.E., Basic Criminal Procedures, 3rd ed., Prentice Hall Publications, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2007.



Searching and Seizing Drug Evidence

12

The execution of a thorough search of vehicles or premises usually requires a search warrant issued by a judge or magistrate. Although a suspect may waive rights and freely consent to a search, in the context of a detailed search for illicit drugs, such consent is rarely desirable. In addition, there are legal third-party consents under certain circumstances, such as where joint control exists (parent–child, husband–wife, cotenants); however, these cases are also considered exceptional in a detailed search for drugs. Through the authority of a search warrant, a detailed search of a home or vehicle for drugs will primarily be conducted.

Searching the Suspect’s Premises If an arrest and search are planned to take place at the suspect’s home, place of employment, or other premises, a search warrant should be obtained first. Premises cannot be searched thoroughly incidental to an arrest without a search warrant. Even though plain-view observations are not considered searches and evidence can be seized during an arrest, evidence observed from plain view cannot be seized and used as legal evidence. It should be noted that the plain-view doctrine applies only when the discovery of the items to be seized was inadvertent. It is unlikely that a court would uphold the validity of the plain-view seizure where it occurred incidental to a “time” or pretext arrest. For example, if officers arrest a suspect and then accompany him to his residence, suggesting that he go to the bedroom and change clothes before going to jail, drugs seized in the bedroom probably would be excluded as evidence. Thus, a valid search warrant is necessary to ensure a detailed search of the premises. 283



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If an arrest is made in the building without a search warrant, the officer should adhere to the following guidelines: • •

•

•

•

•

•

•

The officer should search the person arrested for weapons and evidence. The officer should search the immediate area around the suspect to prevent his grabbing a weapon or destroying evidence; this area is generally confined to the reaching distance of the suspect. Once the prisoner is restrained, the officer can no longer search beyond his person or the immediate area within which he could lunge and obtain a weapon. The officer may check other rooms and closets or other persons wanted in connection with the crime, to protect himself from attack, if possible violence is reasonably suspected. The officer can seize evidentiary items, inadvertently discovered, that are in plain view in the room of the arrest or in other rooms when searching for the suspect or accomplices at large. The officer may not search other rooms and closets for evidence. He may not rummage through drawers, suitcases, file cabinets, and boxes. The officer may not enter a backyard garage or the suspect’s car parked outside. The officer should be aware that the compost is in the dwelling. Although the threatened distraction of evidence by the compost will enable the police officer to enlarge the scope of the search incident to an arrest in such a manner or to permit an “evidence we,” where it is apparent that evidence is actually in the process of distraction or about to be removed from the jurisdiction, the court has implied that such a search can be maintained whether or not it was considered incident to a valid arrest. The officer may still obtain a valid consent to search other rooms, the basement or garage, automobile, and other places; however, it is better to obtain a search warrant. If the suspect is arrested outside of his or her house, the officer may not go inside the premises for the sole purpose of searching the home.

In the search of a premises with a warrant, the assisting officer should look for the items generally described in the warrant. Warrants prepared to discover illicit drugs frequently use the terms narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia. The following types of items may be seized during the search: •

Contraband — An article the possession of which is the crime itself. The drugs themselves are contraband.



• • •

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Fruits of the crime — Items seized by the criminal. The money involved in narcotic deals can be the fruits of a crime. Instruments of the crime — Items used to commit the crime. In the case of clandestine laboratories, the equipment itself. Evidence — Items that tend to prove that the suspect committed a crime. Items such as diluents and adulterants, food coloring, balloons, or similar items can be collected as evidence.

Searching the Suspect’s Vehicle People who transport drugs most often use standard automobiles and vans, ranging from large rental vehicles to beat-up wrecks. Searching automobiles successfully requires an organized search plan. A plan helps ensure that the officer examines all reasonable and unreasonable places for concealing drugs. Methods used in a vehicle search are similar to those used during a standard crime scene search. Dividing the vehicle into zones and then searching each zone thoroughly increases the chances of finding the contraband. The use of a two-officer search team is preferable, with each officer searching one side of the vehicle and then switching sides and searching the same areas over again. Before the search begins, all precautions must be taken to make certain that the suspects are immobilized and do not have access to weapons. Patrol officers should carry some basic tools that are needed to search a vehicle thoroughly: screwdriver, pliers, flashlight, mirror, and special screwdrivers used to loosen the fasteners found on modern vehicles. A trained narcotics detector dog should be used in the search if available. The heightened senses of the dog can make the search of concealed spaces within the vehicle possible while illuminating the need to disassemble parts of the vehicle, such as door panels and seats. Before beginning the search, the officer must have the vehicle driver’s consent or have probable cause to believe that the cars are being used to transport drugs. Some of the legal issues concerning what constitutes probable cause and what is involved in informed consent are complex, and officers should review the policies and procedures of their agency before conducting a proper search of a motor vehicle. An officer’s knowledge and skill in detecting and locating drugs in transport are useless if the officer does not understand the legal issues related to proper vehicle searches. Once the officer is certain that it is legally proper to conduct a search of the vehicle, the first step is to thoroughly examine the exterior of the vehicle. Look for unusual or irregular places on the exterior sheet metal that indicate work may have been done on the car. Obvious areas where bondo has been


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used or areas where the vehicle’s paint is fresh or imperfectly matched may indicate that concealed compartments have been installed. For example, sheet metal work in front of the windshield may indicate an opening was made to allow access to the heating and cooling ducts. After the drugs are placed into the concealed area, the bodywork — often of poor quality — is performed to hide the access hole. Other areas to check for such bodywork include the wheel wells, fenders, and inside walls of the trunk. The Front-End Drugs may be concealed inside the front bumper by attaching containers with tape or magnets. Drugs carried in this manner usually will be wrapped in some type of waterproof material, such as plastic or duct tape, for protection from the elements. Inside the front fender, contraband may be concealed by using similar methods. Tape and magnets work well to attach items out of sight above the front tires. Contraband also may be concealed inside hubcaps or wheel covers. Some headlight and parking light assemblies contain space to hide drugs. The engine compartment contains several locations that may be used by drug traffickers. For example, containers may be attached to the radiator hoses or electrical wiring with tape. Drugs may be hidden inside or under the air cleaner housing, and small quantities may be placed inside the distributor cap. Ventilation ducts that run from the engine compartment to the passenger area can be loosened, and packages containing the contraband can be placed inside. Drugs and watertight packaging can be hidden in the windshield washer fluid reservoir. If the drug is not affected by heat, a waterproof container can be suspended by a wire inside the radiator. In addition, containers can be attached to the motor block, inside the fan blade guard, or to the steering column. The insulation under the hood can be loosened, so flat packages containing drugs can then be concealed between the insulation in the sheet metal of the hood. The area around the battery should be examined closely, since this is a common area for hiding weapons. Drug dealers frequently will try to avoid carrying a weapon inside the car where it might be seen by the law enforcement officers. However, because a courier is responsible for providing security for the drugs, the officer should always assume that the person is either armed or has easy access to a weapon. The Interior The inside compartment includes many potential hiding places for contraband. Automobile dashboards contain several areas that frequently are converted into hidden compartments for drugs, money, or weapons. When searching a car



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for drugs, the officer should operate all knobs and switches on the dashboard, as any one of them might open a door to a hidden compartment. The officer should examine all ventilation, heating, and air conditioning ducts. It is possible to remove the regulators that control the direction and volume of air coming out of the system, providing a significant amount of space within the ducts to hide drugs. Examine the floor areas carefully. Some drug couriers have concealed compartments in the floor itself under floor mats and factory-installed carpeting. A factory-installed floor covering can be loosened around the edges to allow access to hidden compartments. After the drugs are placed in the compartment, the carpet or mats are reinstalled in the original condition. This type of hiding place sometimes can be detected when examining the underside of the vehicle. Radios and glove compartments mounted in the dashboard sometimes provide surfaces and areas to hide drugs. By reaching up under the dashboard, the courier can tape contraband to the outside of the radio or glove compartment. The wiring underneath the dashboard provides additional opportunities for concealing items. For example, drug packages can be secured to the wiring with tape, string, or wire. The steering column, between the firewall and dashboard, offers similar opportunities for the courier to attach packages of contraband. Another place to hide drugs is the headliner of the passenger compartment, which can be removed. Once it is out of the car, flat packages of drugs can be taped to the inside of the roof. When the headliner is replaced, the drugs are concealed by the fabric. Similarly, the fabric can be removed from sun visors. When the padding is removed, it can be replaced with appropriately sized and shaped packages of drugs. After the fabric is replaced, and the sun visors are reinstalled, the contents are difficult to detect by casual observation. In the front seat area, officers should examine the crevices between the seat back and the seat. Under the seat, the springs provide places to secure packages of drugs off the floor and out of sight. The upholstery can be removed from part of the seat and replaced with appropriately shaped packages of contraband. Any switches associated with the seat, such as those that control the power seat positions, should be operated since the switches can be modified to operate hidden compartments within the seat. Headrests also need examining. The doors contain relatively large empty spaces that can be used to conceal contraband. Access to these areas is gained by removing the entire door panel or perhaps by removing a portion of the inside, such as the armrest. If spaces inside the door are filled with drug packages, the windows may not move up and down freely. The window regulators, which control the position of the window glass, may be obstructed by the concealed packages.


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The Rear Area Because most backseats of automobiles can be removed, officers should carefully examine the area under the rear seat. The rear floor mats, like those of the front, should be examined for concealed compartments. The rear deck area should be probed for any access to hidden areas below the deck. For example, rear deck-mounted stereo speakers may be access hatches to hidden compartments. Many of the same places searched in the front-end of the car must be examined in the rear area, especially the wheel wells. Taillight assemblies may also provide concealed spaces useful to the drug courier. The trunk offers several commonly used hiding places. There is usually a void between the trunk lid sheet metal and the supporting steel members inside the lid. If this area is accessible, it provides a significant amount of space for hiding contraband. The officer’s first indication that the space has been packed with drugs is the trunk lid will not stay in the open position, since the weight of the drugs concealed within may be too great for the mechanism that was designed only to hold open the trunk lid. Examine all containers within the trunk, such as toolboxes, gasoline cans, water jugs, and luggage. The spare tire may contain drugs; it can be taken off its rim, filled with drugs, and then remounted. The tires are then inflated to a proper pressure so as not to appear flat. If the spare tire has been filled with drug packages, it may appear to be heavier than a normal tire and rim assembly. Officers may notice this weight difference when the tire is removed from the trunk during a search. If officers suspect that the spare tire contains drugs, a small amount of air can be released through the tire’s air valve and that air sniffed for any telltale odors released by concealed drugs. However, officers should be aware that drug couriers might place the contraband in the tire, which may also be inflated. This procedure serves two purposes: first, the drugs are held firmly in place by the air pressure, and second, any air that is released will not carry the odor of the concealed drugs. If the vehicle has a spare tire well, the inside of that well, including the walls and the bottom, must be examined. False sidewalls in the tire well, or a false bottom, may be used to conceal contraband. Many vehicles have concealed storage areas for the jack; these locations must not be overlooked during a vehicle search. In some vehicles, such as minivans, there may be compartments for the jack located in the concealed areas above the wheel wells. The Underside Drugs may be attached to the underside of the car frame or body in a variety of ways. Parcels may be taped to the frame after being wrapped in waterresistant packaging or containers may be fastened to the frame or the underside of the vehicle’s floor using magnets or wire. Hidden compartments can be



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attached under the floor or to the frame. These compartment can be difficult for the casual observer to spot. If the containers are built with the right dimensions, and if the car’s frame is properly configured, the hidden compartments will not be visible when the officer simply looks under the vehicle from the side. When the right material is coated with vehicle undercoating compounds, the container may look like part of the understructure of the car. A close examination from beneath the car may be necessary.

Searching Pickup Trucks and Work Vehicles The standard automobile will be the most common vehicle encountered by officers during searches of vehicles suspected of transporting drugs. However, drug couriers may also use pickup trucks and work vehicles to divert suspicion. In vehicles with multiple gas tanks, such as large pickups and motor homes, it is possible to disconnect one tank from the fuel system and remove it from the vehicle. The tank is then cleaned thoroughly, and access hatches are installed at the top of the tank. When the tank is filled with packages of drugs, it is reinstalled under the vehicle, and all fuel and system lines are reattached. This type of hiding place is difficult to detect, although tapping on the tank may produce a sound different from one filled with liquid. If appropriate fuel lines are not properly connected, the officer should immediately suspect that the tank has been modified for illegal purposes. Also, fresh tool marks on the bolts that hold the fuel tank suspension straps in place, or fresh marks and scratches on the tank’s filler neck, may indicate that the tank has been removed and replaced more often than normal. Many pickups have various types of toolboxes mounted in the trunk bed, which offer possibilities for concealing contraband. The box itself may have a false bottom installed to provide significant hidden space, or the box may be mounted on the trunk bed in a manner designed to conceal a false front added to the bed itself. Careful observation and precise measurements, if needed, may reveal that the toolboxes are too shallow when compared to the outside dimensions. Some pickups have a hollow roll bar installed on the forward portion of the truck bed. The inside of the bars provides space for concealing drugs. Officers should closely examine these roll bars to identify any point where it is possible to take the bars apart. Drug couriers sometimes modify pickup trucks to accommodate false bottoms of the truck bed. This involves installing a new bottom that reduces the depth of the truck body. Sometimes examining the pickup bed through the rear wheel wells will reveal that the bed depth does not match the apparent outside dimensions. Camper shells that are installed on pickup trucks also offer spaces for concealment. Roof liners on such shells sometimes can be


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removed and modified to create open areas between the inner liner and the outer metal of the roof. Careful observations usually will make this modification obvious. Custom-built work truck bodies offer many opportunities to design and build concealed compartments. Officers must use their ingenuity when examining such trucks. Concealed spaces on the floor of the body and false bottoms in cabinets mounted on the body should be considered. Some work trucks carry ancillary tanks, sometimes containing diesel fuel or other liquids, that offer opportunities to conceal drugs. For example, a diesel tank may have a smaller tank built inside serving as a place of concealment. Diesel fuel will surround this inner tank; an officer may be able to pump out some of this fuel to reveal the smaller tank hidden inside. If the tank is tapped, it will sound like a normal tank partially filled with liquid. Close examination of such tanks by illuminating the interior of the tank is often necessary to detect this method of transporting contraband. When officers are dealing with work trucks, it is important to remember that the drug courier may deliberately make access to the places of concealment dirty and oily. This action is designed to make officers reluctant to examine these areas closely. Other Vehicles In addition to passenger cars and small trucks, motor homes, rental trailers, tractor-trailer units, and buses may be used in the illegal drug trade. Drugs are also concealed in boats being towed on trailers and motorcycle saddlebags and storage containers, as well as in horse trailers. If an officer has probable cause to believe that drugs are being transported in one of these vehicles and a search is appropriate, the search team members must use their knowledge and imaginations to the fullest extent to locate cleverly designed hiding places. Many of the search techniques for automobiles and small trucks apply here, such as probing wheel wells, dashboards, and so forth; however, these vehicles also present several unique hiding places too numerous to provide an all-inclusive list. State Highway Patrol narcotics officers, as well as resident U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents should be able to provide municipal and county law enforcement officers with lists of common hiding places in these vehicles and trailers.

Consent Searches In the consent search, the search does not have to be connected with the arrest or based on the probable cause needed to secure a warrant. Even the property itself does not have to be “particularly described,” as it does when obtaining a



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search warrant. The temporal duration and spatial scope of the consent search may be limited by the individual furnishing the consent, and the police officer may not search areas where consent to search has been withheld. The nature or object of the consent searches is not limited, however, and the officer does not need to look for any particular kind of item, such as drugs only. A consent search may be valid regardless of whether the subject giving consent had a right to refuse consent. The Supreme Court has noted that “while knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” A consent to search will be valid only where it was voluntarily given, and the courts will refer to the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the consent was voluntary. If the court could find that the consent was “the product of coercion, express or implied,” it is likely that the search will be invalidated and its fruits suppressed. Many courts have indicated that the state must satisfy a more rigorous burden in demonstrating voluntariness or lack of coercion where the individual furnishing his consent is in custody or in such situation where arrest is imminent. Factors such as these, along with others such as whether probable cause for the search existed initially, are often considered by the courts as elements of the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether consent to search was voluntarily furnished, although alone they are not ordinarily determinative. Other circumstances that could rule against a finding that consent had been voluntarily given might include: • • • • • • •

•

The presence of the arrestee’s family, friends, or employer (implied psychological coercion). The display of weapons or the use of restraints. The time of night. The number of officers present. The aggressiveness of the officer. Trickery or misrepresentation used in obtaining consent. Interrogation, when aimed at obtaining consent and conducted without giving the suspect Miranda warnings or when the questioning following the advice of Miranda rights is so intensive as to compulsively induce the consent. Threats to obtain the search warrant or to impound his vehicle.

Dwelling Searches Assignment of sufficient personnel is a crucial step in conducting a thorough search of the dwelling for drugs. Some officers should be assigned to the


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exterior of the premises to prevent escape attempts or attempts to discard evidence from the premises. If evidence is thrown out of the window or door, the officer assigned the role of observer has two functions, to identify the individual discarding the evidence and to secure that evidence. The officer will have to show where the evidence landed and the window or door from which it was thrown. The recording officer has an extremely important function during a detailed search for narcotics. His or her main job is to record where and by whom each piece of evidence is found. Consequently, when he first enters the area to be searched, he or she should draw a detailed diagram of the premises. The officer should also ensure that all contraband is initialed as evidence. The evidence should be kept by the recording officer and preserved according to departmental regulations and procedures until it is turned over to the laboratory for analysis or introduced as evidence in court. Because of these functions, the recording officer should be selected on the basis of his or her ability to testify effectively, since this officer will testify extensively during the trial. Once inside the area to be searched, all individuals found on the premises should be brought into one room so that the recording officer can take down information from each person. Each individual should be listed according to the room in which he was found, since evidence may later be found in those rooms and various individuals may then be charged with possession. Officers should observe individuals for symptoms of drug abuse. Indications that the individual is presently under the influence of narcotics may provide probable cause for a personal search. If enough officers are available, officers should be paired to search each room. The room should be divided equally between the officers. When the officers have completed their assigned area, they should switch so that each area is searched twice, each time by a different officer. Even when only one officer is assigned to a room, he should switch with another officer in another room. Although the officers may use the same pattern of search, the second search may reveal something previously overlooked. To conduct the search, the officer should begin at one wall and search everything that rests against or is hung on that wall and then proceed around the room. Lights and outlets should be examined carefully. If paint on the screws or around the plate is broken, the plate should be removed and the inside area searched. The border around the door should be studied for signs of stress since it may be shielding a hollow portion behind. The top of the door and door frames should be checked for indentations. A plug in the top of the door may hide a secret compartment, as do many door hinges. Plaster walls should be felt for raised areas indicating that they have been plastered over numerous times.



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Wall pictures should be taken down and searched thoroughly since contraband can be hidden between the layers of glass, and the picture itself, or in the frame and paper backing. Similarly, the backs of stereo equipment and other electronic equipment should be removed and the interior examined. The top and bottom of venetian blinds should be removed and checked. Curtains should be felt from top to bottom, including seams, hems, and linings. After the officer has searched the walls and related items, he should move to the center of the room and begin with furniture. Upholstered couches or chairs should be turned upside down and the bottom examined to ensure that the staples are intact and the material protecting the bottom of the couches are the same throughout. A flashlight held close to the material will allow the officer to see whether anything is taped to the springs. Zippered cushions should be taken apart and felt by hand. Telephones should be examined thoroughly, both inside and out. Light shades and bulbs should be removed from their sockets and examined. Rugs should be carefully rolled up. Planters and flower pots should also be examined. The outside of windows should be checked for hanging items. The search team should be especially thorough in searching bathrooms, seemingly a popular room in which to hide drugs. In searching a bathroom, the officer should look for false bottoms on laundry baskets and under sinks and for watertight containers inside flush tanks. Prescription medicine bottles should be carefully examined; their true content should never be taken for granted. If the searching officer believes that there is something amiss with the prescription bottles, such as a great number of bottles or labels made out to people not living in the premises, he should seize all the prescription bottles and mark them as evidence. However, he should ask the suspect what prescription medicines are needed and at what time he or she will need the next dose. The officer should contact the doctor or pharmacist whose name appears on the label to verify the prescription. Moreover, all pills and tablets should be compared with a Physician’s Desk Reference or similar source to ensure that the found drugs correspond to the prescription. When an officer finds evidence, he should temporarily halt his search, call the recording officer, initial the evidence, turn it over to the recording officer, and then continue to search. In this manner, there are at least two officers witnessing the recovery of the drugs, and most likely only the recording officer will need to testify in court about the discovery. Officers must avoid the tendency to stop searching as soon as they find some contraband; people involved in drugs frequently hide the contraband in several different locations. It is the officer’s function to find all of these hiding places. All valuables found on the premises should be safeguarded if necessary, and a receipt should be given to the owner for all items removed from the location. Generally, a list of items taken is written on the suspect’s copy of


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the search warrant and serves as a receipt. Because it may be necessary to remove molding, baseboards, panels, and other fixtures of a home, all damage done to personal property should be listed and photographed. Before ripping up floorboards or breaking into walls, the officer must establish good reasons for his actions. Ideally, the witness or informant will provide positive information regarding evidence hidden in these areas. Other signs would be indentations, marks, or scratches that make it apparent that the section had been previously removed. If large sums of money are found, this fact should be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) so that an investigation can be conducted as to its source. Such an investigation may lead to tax evasion charges and in addition facilitate the narcotics investigation. IRS investigations follow the trail of money that narcotics trafficking invariably leaves behind. Financial evidence of drug dealing enhances the chance for successful criminal prosecution. As part of the search operation of a dwelling, officers should be alert for any intelligence information, such as telephone and address books, if they can be seized as evidence. This information should be jotted down in a manner that will not be noticed by suspects. Otherwise, the value of this intelligence information might be compromised at a later time. If suspects have automobiles in the vicinity of the search scene, probable cause developed from questioning may be sufficient to obtain a search warrant for these vehicles. An officer can stay with the suspect’s vehicle to prevent its removal while a search warrant is obtained. One of the functions of the recording officer is to obtain information from individuals present at the scene; however, if the recording officer becomes too involved in recording discovered evidence, additional officers should be assigned the task of obtaining information from the individuals. Regardless of quantity or variety, however, the actual custody of all evidence remains the responsibility of the recording officer.

Handling Drug Evidence The admissibility of evidence in court depends partly on the manner in which it is collected and the safeguards that are followed to ensure its integrity. For this reason, the police officer must not only be skilled in the collection of physical evidence, he or she must also properly handle and care for it between the time of its collection and its presentation in court. Questions regarding an object’s potential evidentiary value should be resolved by evaluating the object under the circumstances of the crime scene. This evaluation should be based on the exercise of sound judgment, past experience, and common sense. If a doubt exists, secure the object and



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possess it as evidence. The real worth of such evidence can be reevaluated at a later time. The testimony that accompanies the evidence must show that it was found in possession or control of the suspect or, in the case of a drug sale, that the drugs were distributed by the suspect. Additionally, the officer must demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction that the evidence has not been altered and they can positively distinguish it from all other items that may have a similar appearance. The total accounting for evidence is what we know as “chain of custody,” or “chain of possession.” The chain consists of all individuals who have had custody of the evidence since it was confiscated or collected by the police agency. Each of these individuals is responsible for the care, safekeeping, and preservation of the evidence while it is in his or her control. As soon as the evidence is collected, it should be properly marked for identification. As a general rule, solid objects that have a volume of approximately 1 inch or more should be marked with the initials of the officer. Where applicable, the identifying mark should be placed on the evidence container or wrapper rather than directly on the drugs themselves. Objects that are smaller than 1 cubic inch should be placed in a safe container, such as a glass bottle. Liquids, if possible, should be retained in their original container, sealed securely, and marked for identification.

Counting and Weighing Evidence Perhaps the most positive method for providing a future means of knowing the amount of drug evidence seized is to weigh it immediately. Certain types of evidence such as capsules and pills should be weighed and counted. Remember that counting should be performed in addition to, not instead of, weighing. The loss of small amounts of an encapsulated powdery substance may escape detection and only the capsules are counted; however, good scales can detect a weight loss immediately. The scales used by an officer should be calibrated to ensure accuracy. The seizing officer should identify the weight of the evidence in gross proportions. The gross weight includes the container or other packaging material used to enclose or hold the evidence, i.e., box, balloon, bottle, or similar item. The item is weighed, and the gross weights should be noted on the inventory and chain of custody forms or evidence vouchers. If the evidence is a quantity or configuration that prevents officers from weighing it as an entity, then it should be broken out and weighed by lots. Some drug evidence is popularly referred to as “expensive” evidence. A loss of 3 or 4 grams from an overall total of 2 kilograms of heroin assumes


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far greater significance than the loss of 1 or 2 pounds from 1 ton of marijuana. Placed on the scales, expensive evidence, if broken up for purposes of weighing, must be subjected to precise readings. Altogether, a check of the evidence weight at various points along the processing sequence provides the best indication of the effectiveness of evidential security measures. In computing the net weight of a large number of containers of powdertype evidence, the entire exhibit is weighed to obtain the gross weight. Containers similar to the ones that are used should be weighed and the average weight of the containers should be determined. This weight should then be multiplied by the number of containers and the exhibit. This total should be subtracted from the total gross weight of the exhibit and the result is the net weight. In determining the total number of tablets, the actual count should be given when the number is 100 or less. When the number of tablets is large, 100 tablets may be weighed and that weight can then be divided into the total net weight. The resulting number is then multiplied by 100 and this result is the approximate number of tablets. In this case, both the weight and quantity of the tablets should be reported as being approximate. In cases where the illicit drug is in powder form but is contained in capsules, the amount should be reported by gross weight in number. In cases that involve drugs of legitimate pharmaceutical origin, the amount should be reported by total number only. Liquid volume should be estimated in metric units. If the container in which it was found has no stopper or method of sealing itself, the liquid should be transferred to a clean, glass-stoppered bottle and sealed with adhesive tape. Marijuana in brick form should be reported in the gross weight of the entire exhibit. Marijuana in bulk form should be given in gross weight and in metric units. When a small number of growing plants are found, they should be counted. If they are numerous and in a large area, they should be photographed as well. Also, if necessary, the area should be measured as accurately as possible. If no criminal violation is involved, the plant should be reported and either destroyed or submitted to the lab for destruction. Extremely large quantities (for example, a ton of marijuana) may be weighed on warehouse scales, not necessarily to gain an accurate weight, but to obtain a general idea of the amount involved. A one- or two-pound variance in 1 ton of marijuana makes little difference to account insofar as criminal charges in sentencing are concerned. Accountability for drug evidence in the police officer’s control is extremely important because of the possibility of theft or pilferage of this type of evidence. It is for this reason that additional security measures must be instituted when substantial narcotics and dangerous drugs are seized. It is



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also for this reason that extra effort should be directed toward obtaining permission to present photographs of evidence instead of physical evidence during court proceedings.

Sealing and Labeling Evidence Once the narcotics evidence has been counted and weighed, it must be properly preserved, sealed, and labeled. All exhibits should be packed in such a way as to minimize breakage and loss in transit. When laboratories have broken tablets and capsules that have been shipped loosely, recovery for analysis is difficult. Therefore, cotton or other kind of soft, noncontaminating material should be placed in all containers to immobilize tablets and capsules. Furthermore, tablets, capsules, or other small items should never be put in contact with pressure-sensitive tape. For tablets, the surface in contact with the tape is destroyed for forensic purposes. Also, an interaction may occur between the samples of the solvents and plasticizers in the pressure-sensitive coating on the tape. Powder, pills, and capsules should not be placed within an evidence container such as an envelope unless they have first been provided with some form of immediate primary protection, known as an “interior” container. This would be, for example, a polyester bag, bottle, or pill box. Plastic vials, used as containers for small items, must also be protected against damage. They are brittle and frequently broken, thus damaging the evidence. All containers should be secured so that they do not work loose in transit. The fit and suitability of the closure should also be considered. Sticky materials such as opium and hashish should not be put in contact with material such as unglazed paper. Contamination of the sample can occur, and then the entire sample is seldom recovered. Wet material such as plant material should be dried before packaging; if shipped before drying, such material will often decompose before it can be examined. This destroys the microscopic features that are necessary for identification. Also, the decomposition and the mold growth produce volatile amines and other substances that make accurate analysis difficult. The sealing of evidence is important for proper preservation. It ensures the court that the evidence container has not been opened and the evidence tampered with. Sealing can be accomplished by use of heat-sealed envelopes or evidence-sealing tape. Each type of evidence should be placed in a separate container. The investigator should seal pill boxes, envelopes, test tubes, jars, bottles, and cartons containing evidence in such a manner that they cannot be opened without breaking the seal. If an officer breaks the seal affixed to the container, he should write his name or number across the sealed flap of the evidence envelope.


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After the physical evidence is marked, counted, weighed, and made secure within a sealed container, a label is affixed that presents identifying information. The following details should be listed on the label: case number, exhibit number (when a number of items are seized), date and time when the evidence was found, description of the articles, location at time of discovery, signature or initials of the officer who made the discovery, and the names or initials of witnesses to the discovery. When the exhibit is a small item, only allow the case number, exhibit number, date and time, and the initials of the police officer. If needed, all other information should be included in the evidence report submitted by the patrol officer.

Suggested Reading Kiely, T.F., Forensic Evidence: Science and the Criminal Law, 2nd ed., CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2005.

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This is a general reference and not a comprehensive list. This list describes the basic or parent chemical and does not describe the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, esters, ethers, and derivatives, which may also be controlled substances.

Substance 1-(1-Phenylcyclohexyl)pyrrolidine 1-(2-Phenylethyl)-4-phenyl-4acetoxypiperidine 1-[1-(2-Thienyl)cyclohexyl]piperidine 1-[1-(2-Thienyl)cyclohexyl] pyrrolidine 1-Methyl-4-phenyl-4propionoxypiperidine 2,5-Dimethoxy-4-ethylamphetamine 2,5-Dimethoxyamphetamine 3,4,5-Trimethoxyamphetamine 3,4-Methylenedioxyamphetamine 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine 3,4-Methylenedioxy-Nethylamphetamine 3-Methylfentanyl 3-Methylthiofentanyl 4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine 4-Bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine

4-Methoxyamphetamine 4-Methyl-2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine 4-Methylaminorex (cis-isomer) 5-Methoxy-3,4methylenedioxyamphetamine Acetorphine Acetyl-alpha-methylfentanyl Acetyldihydrocodeine

Schedule I DEA Number Nonnarcotic

Other Names

7458 9663

N

PCPy, PHP, rolicyclidine PEPAP, synthetic heroin

7470 7473 9661

N N

TCP, tenocyclidine TCPy MPPP, synthetic heroin

7399 7396 7390 7400 7405 7404

N N N N N N

9813 9833 7391 7392

N N

7411 7395 1590 7401

N N N N

DOET DMA, 2,5-DMA TMA MDA, Love Drug MDMA, Ecstasy, XTC N-ethyl MDA, MDE, MDEA China White, fentanyl Chine White, fentanyl DOB, 4-bromo-DMA Nexus, 2-CB, has been sold as Ecstasy, i.e., MDMA PMA DOM, STP U4Euh, McN-422 MMDA

9319 9815 9051

299

Acetylcodone



300

Substance

DEA Number Nonnarcotic

Acetylmethadol Allylprodine Alphacetylmethadol except levo-alphacetylmethadol Alpha-Ethyltryptamine Alphameprodine Alphamethadol Alpha-Methylfentanyl Alpha-Methylthiofentanyl Aminorex

9601 9602 9603

Benzethidine Benzylmorphine Betacetylmethadol Beta-Hydroxy-3-methylfentanyl Beta-Hydroxyfentanyl Betameprodine Betamethadol Betaprodine Bufotenine

9606 9052 9607 9831 9830 9608 9609 9611 7433

N

Cathinone

1235

N

Clonitazene Codeine methylbromide Codeine-N-oxide Cyprenorphine Desomorphine Dextromoramide Diampromide Diethylthiambutene Diethyltryptamine Difenoxin Dihydromorphine Dimenoxadol Dimepheptanol Dimethylthiambutene Dimethyltryptamine Dioxaphetyl butyrate Dipipanone

9612 9070 9053 9054 9055 9613 9615 9616 7434 9168 9145 9617 9618 9619 7435 9621 9622

Drotebanol

9335

Ethylmethylthiambutene Etonitazene Etorphine (except HCl) Etoxeridine

9623 9624 9056 9625

7249 9604 9605 9814 9832 1585

Other Names Methadyl acetate

N

N

ET, Trip

China White, fentanyl China White, fentanyl Has been sold as methamphetamine

China White, fentanyl China White, fentanyl

Mappine, N,Ndimethylserotonin Constituent of “Khat” plant

Palfium, Jetrium, Narcolo

N

DET Lyspafen

N

DMT Dipipan, phenylpiperone HCl, Diconal, Wellconal Metebanyl, oxymethebanol



Substance

301 DEA Number Nonnarcotic

Other Names

Fenethylline

1503

N

Captagon, amfetyline, ethyltheophylline amphetamine

Furethidine Gama hydroxybutyric acid (GHB)

9626 2010

N

Heroin

9200

GHB, gama hydroxybutyrate, sodium oxybate Diacetylmorphine, diamorphine

Hydromorphinol Hydroxypethidine Ibogaine

9301 9627 7260

N

Ketobemidone Levomoramide Levophenacylmorphan Lysergic acid diethylamide Marijuana Mecloqualone Mescaline

9628 9629 9631 7315 7360 2572 7381

Constituent of “Tabernanthe iboga” plant Cliradon

N N N N

Methaqualone

2565

N

Methcathinone Methyldesorphine Methyldihydromorphine Morpheridine Morphine methylbromide Morphine methylsulfonate Morphine-N-oxide Myrophine N,N-Dimethylamphetamine N-Ethyl-1-phenylcyclohexylamine N-Ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate N-Ethylamphetamine N-Hydroxy-3,4methylenedioxyamphetamine Nicocodeine Nicomorphine N-Methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate Noracymethadol Norlevorphanol Normethadone Normorphine Norpipanone

1237 9302 9304 9632 9305 9306 9307 9308 1480 7455 7482 1475 7402

N

LSD, lysergide Cannabis, marijuana Nubarene Constituent of “Peyote” cacti Quaalude, Parest, Somnafac, Opitimil, Mandrax N-Methylcathinone, “cat”

N N N N N

PCE JB 323 NEA N-Hydroxy MDA

N

Vilan JB 336

9309 9312 7484 9633 9634 9635 9313 9636

Phenyldimazone



302

Substance


Other Names

Para-Fluorofentanyl Parahexyl Peyote

9812 7374 7415

Phenadoxone Phenampromide Phenomorphan Phenoperidine Pholcodine

9637 9638 9647 9641 9314

Piritramide Proheptazine Properidine Propiram Psilocybin

9642 9643 9644 9649 7437

N

Psilocyn

7438

N

Racemoramide Tetrahydrocannabinols

9645 7370

N

Thebacon

9315

Thiofentanyl Tilidine

9835 9750

Trimeperidine

9646

THC, Delta-8 THC, Delta-9 THC, and others Acetylhydrocodone, Acedicon, Thebacetyl Chine White, fentanyl Tilidate, Valoron, Kitadol, Lak, Tilsa Promedolum

N N

Precusor of PCP PCC, precusor of PCP Alfenta Nisentil Amytal, Tuinal Dexedrine, Biphetamine Leritine Cocaine metabolite Burgodin Wildnil

N N

China White, fentanyl Synhexyl Cactus that contains mescaline

Operidine, Lealgin Copholco, Adaphol, Codisol, Lantuss, Pholcolin Piridolan

Algeril Constituent of “Magic mushrooms” Psilocin, constituent of “Magic mushrooms”

Schedule II 1-Phenylcyclohexylamine 1-Piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile Alfentanil Alphaprodine Amobarbital Amphetamine Anileridine Benzoylecgonine Bezitramide Carfentanil Coca leaves Cocaine

7460 8603 9737 9010 2125 1100 9020 9180 9800 9743 9040 9041

Codeine

9050

Dextropropoxyphene, bulk (nondosage forms)

9273

N N

Methyl benzoylecgonine, Crack Morphine methyl ester, methyl morphine Propoxyphene



Substance


Other Names

Dihydrocodeine Diphenoxylate Diprenorphine Ecgonine

9120 9170 9058 9180

Didrate, Parzone

Ethylmorphine Etorphine HCl Fentanyl

9190 9059 9801

Glutethimide Hydrocodone Hydromorphone

2550 9193 9150

Isomethadone Levo-alphacetylmethadol

9226 9648

Levomethorphan Levorphanol Meperidine

9210 9220 9230

Meperidine intermediate-A Meperidine intermediate-B Meperidine intermediate-C Metazocine Methadone

9232 9233 9234 9240 9250

Methadone intermediate Methamphetamine

9254 1105

Methylphenidate Metopon Moramide-intermediate Morphine

1724 9260 9802 9300

N

Dolophine, Methadose, Amidone Methadone precursor Desoxyn, D-desoxyephedrine, ICE, Crank, Speed Ritalin

Nabilone Opium extracts Opium fluid extract Opium poppy Opium tincture Opium, granulated Opium, powdered Opium, raw Oxycodone

7379 9610 9620 9650 9630 9640 9639 9600 9143

N

MS Contin, Roxanol, Duramorph, RMS, MSIR Cesamet

N

M50-50 Cocaine precursor, in Coca leaves Dionin M 99 Innovar, Sublimaze, Duragesic Doriden, Dorimide Dihydrocodeinone Dilaudid, dihydromorphinone Isoamidone LAAM, long-acting methadone, levomethadyl acetate Levo-Dromoran Demerol, Mepergan, pethidine Meperidine precursor Meperidine precursor Meperidine precursor

N

Papaver somniferum Laudanum Granulated opium Powdered opium Raw opium, gum opium OxyContin, Percocet, Tylox, Roxicodone, Roxicet



304

Substance


Oxymorphone Pentobarbital Phenazocine Phencyclidine Phenmetrazine Phenylacetone

9652 2270 9715 7471 1631 8501

Piminodine Poppy straw

9730 9650

Poppy straw concentrate

9670

Racemethorphan Racemorphan Remifentanil Secobarbital Sufentanil Thebaine

9732 9733 9739 2315 9740 9333

N N N N

Other Names Numorphan Nembutal Narphen, Prinadol PCP, Sernylan Preludin P2P, phenyl-2-propanone, benzyl methyl ketone Opium poppy capsules, poppy heads Concentrate of poppy straw, CPS

N

Dromoran Ultiva Seconal, Tuinal Sufenta Precursor of many narcotics

Schedule III Amobarbital and noncontrolled active ingredient Amobarbital suppository dosage form Anabolic steroids Aprobarbital Barbituric acid derivative

2126

N

2126 4000 2100 2100

N N N N

Benzphetamine Boldenone

1228 4000

N N

Buprenorphine Butabarbital Butalbital

9064 2100 2100

N N

Chlorhexadol

2510

N

Chlorotestosterone (same as clostebol)

4000

N

Chlorphentermine

1645

N

Clortermine Clostebol

1647 4000

N N

Amobarbital/ephedrine capsules “Body-building” drugs Alurate Barbiturates not specifically listed Didrex, Inapetyl Equipoise, Parenabol, Vebonol, dehydrotestosterone Buprenex, Temgesic Butisol, Butibel Fiorinal, Butalbital with aspirin Mechloral, Mecoral, Medodorm, Chloralodol If 4-chlorotestosterone, then clostebol Pre-Sate, Lucofen, Apsedon, Desopimon Voranil Alfa-Trofodermin, Clostene, 4-chlorotestosterone



Substance


Codeine and isoquinoline alkaloid 90 mg/du Codeine combination product 90 mg/du

9803

Dehydrochlormethyltestosterone Dihydrocodeine combination product 90 mg/du Dihydrotestosterone (same as stanolone) Dronabinol in sesame oil in soft gelatin capsule Drostanolone

4000 9807

N

4000 7369

N N

4000

N

Ethylestrenol

4000

N

Ethylmorphine combination product 15 mg/du Fluoxymesterone

9808 4000

N

Formebolone (incorrect spelling in law) Hydrocodone and isoquinoline alkaloid 15 mg/du Hydrocodone combination product 15 mg/du

4000 9805

N

Ketamine

7285

N

Lysergic acid Lysergic acid amide Mesterolone Methandienone (see Methandrostenolone) Methandranone Methandriol

7300 7310 4000 4000

N N N N

4000 4000

N N

Methandrostenolone

4000

N

Methenolone

4000

N

Methyltestosterone

4000

N

Methyprylon Mibolerone Morphine combination product/ 50 mg/100 ml or gram Nalorphine

2575 4000 9810

N N

9804

9806

9400

Other Names Codeine with papaverine or noscapine Empirin, Fiorinal, Tylenol, ASA or APAP w/codeine Oral Turinabol Synalgos-DC, Compal See Stanolone Marinol, synthetic THC in sesame oil/soft gelatin Drolban, Masterid, Permastril Maxibolin, Orabolin, Durabolin-O, Duraboral

Anadroid-F, Halotestin, Ora-Testryl Esiclene, Hubernol Dihydrocodeinone+ papaverine or noscapine Tussionex, Tussend, Lortab, Vicodin, Hycodan, Anexsia Ketaset, Ketalar, Special K, K LSD precursor LSD precursor Proviron

Methandienone Sinesex, Stenediol, Troformone Dianabol, Metabolina, Nerobol, Perbolin Primobolan, Primobolan Depot, Primobolan S Android, Oreton, Testred, Virilon Noludar Cheque

Nalline



306

Substance


Nandrolone

4000

N

Norethandrolone Opium combination product 25 mg/du

4000 9809

N

Oxandrolone

4000

N

Oxymesterone

4000

N

Oxymetholone

4000

N

Pentobarbital and noncontrolled active ingredient Pentobarbital suppository dosage form Phendimetrazine

2271

N

2271 1615

N N

Secobarbital and noncontrolled active ingredient Secobarbital suppository dosage form Stanolone

2316

N

2316 4000

N N

Stanozolol Stimulant compounds previously excepted Sulfondiethylmethane Sulfonethylmethane Sulfonmethane Talbutal Testolactone Testosterone

4000 1405

N N

2600 2605 2610 2100 4000 4000

N N N N N N

Thiamylal Thiopental Tiletamine and zolazepam combination product Trenbolone

2100 2100 7295

N N N

4000

N

Vinbarbital

2100

N

Other Names Deca-Durabolin, Durabolin, Durabolin-50 Nilevar, Solevar Paregoric, other combination products Anavar, Lonavar, Provitar, Vasorome Anamidol, Balnimax, Oranabol, Oranabol 10 Anadrol-50, Adroyd, Anapolon, Anasteron, Pardroyd FP-3 WANS Plegine, Prelu-2, Bontril, Melfiat, Statobex Various Various Anabolex, Andractim, Pesomax, dihydrotestosterone Winstrol, Winstrol-V Mediatric

Lotusate Teslac Android-T, Androlan, Depotest, Delatestryl Surital Pentothal Telazol Finaplix-S, Finajet, Parabolan Delvinal, vinbarbitone

Schedule IV Alprazolam Barbital

2882 2145

N N

Bromazepam

2748

N

Xanax Veronal, Plexonal, barbitone Lexotan, Lexatin, Lexotanil



Substance


Butorphanol

9720

N

Camazepam Cathine

2749 1230

N N

Chloral betaine Chloral hydrate Chlordiazepoxide

2460 2465 2744

N N N

Clobazam Clonazepam Clorazepate Clotiazepam Cloxazolam Delorazepam Dexfenfluramine Dextropropoxyphene dosage forms

2751 2737 2768 2752 2753 2754 1670 9278

N N N N N N N

Diazepam Dichloralphenazone Diethylpropion Difenoxin 1 mg/25 μg AtSO4/du Estazolam

2765 2467 1610 9167 2756

N N N

Ethchlorvynol Ethinamate Ethyl loflazepate Fencamfamin Fenfluramine Fenproporex Fludiazepam Flunitrazepam

2540 2545 2758 1760 1670 1575 2759 2763

N N N N N N N N

Flurazepam Halazepam Haloxazolam Ketazolam

2767 2762 2771 2772

N N N N

Loprazolam Lorazepam Lormetazepam Mazindol Mebutamate Medazepam Mefenorex

2773 2885 2774 1605 2800 2836 1580

N N N N N N N

N

Other Names Stadol, Stadol NS, Torbugesic, Torbutrol Albego, Limpidon, Paxor Constituent of “Khat” plant Beta Chlor Noctec Librium, Libritabs, Limbitrol, SK-Lygen Urbadan, Urbanyl Klonopin, Clonopin Tranxene Trecalmo, Rize Enadel, Sepazon, Tolestan Redux Darvon, propoxyphene, Darvocet, Dolene, Propacet Valium, Valrelease Midrin, dichloralantipyrine Tenuate, Tepanil Motofen ProSom, Domnamid, Eurodin, Nuctalon Placidyl Valmid, Valamin Reactivan Pondimin, Ponderal Gacilin, Solvolip Rohypnol, Narcozep, Darkene, Roipnol Dalmane Paxipam Anxon, Loftran, Solatran, Contamex Ativan Noctamid Sanorex, Mazanor Capla Nobrium Anorexic, Amexate, Doracil, Pondinil



308

Substance


Meprobamate

2820

N

Methohexital Methylphenobarbital (mephobarbital) Midazolam Modafinil Nimetazepam Nitrazepam Nordiazepam

2264 2250 2884 1680 2837 2834 2838

N N N N N N N

Oxazepam Oxazolam Paraldehyde Pemoline Pentazocine

2835 2839 2585 1530 9709

N N N N N

Petrichloral

2591

N

Phenobarbital

2285

N

Phentermine

1640

N

Pinazepam Pipradrol Prazepam Quazepam Sibutramine SPA

2883 1750 2764 2881 1675 1635

N N N N N N

Temazepam Tetrazepam Triazolam Zaleplon Zolpidem

2925 2886 2887 2781 2783

N N N N N

Other Names Miltown, Equanil, Deprol, Equagesic, Meprospan Brevital Mebaral, mephobarbital Versed Provigil Erimin Mogadon Nordazepam, Demadar, Madar Serax, Serenid-D Serenal, Convertal Paral Cylert Talwin, Talwin NX, Talacen, Talwin compound Pentaerythritol chloral, Periclor Luminal, Donnatal, Bellergal-S Ionamin, Fastin, Adipex-P, Obe-Nix, Zantryl Domar Detaril, Stimolag Fortis Centrax Doral, Dormalin Meridia 1-Dimethylamino-1,2diphenylethane, Lefetamine Restoril Halcion Sonata Ambien, Stilnoct, Ivadal

Schedule V Codeine preparations: 200 mg/100 ml or 100 g Difenoxin preparations: 0.5 mg/25 μg AtSO4/du Dihydrocodeine preparations: 10 mg/100 ml or 100 g Diphenoxylate preparations: 2.5 mg/25 μg AtSO4

Cosanyl, Robitussin A-C, Cheracol, Cerose, Pediacof Motofen Cophene-S, various others Lomotil, Logen



Substance


Ethylmorphine preparations: 100 mg/100 ml or 100 g Opium preparations: 100 mg/100 ml or g Pyrovalerone

1485

N

Other Names

Parepectolin, Kapectolin PG, Kaolin Pectin P.G. Centroton, Thymergix


9808_A002.fm Page 311 Monday, September 11, 2006 2:09 PM

Appendix II

311

40- to 399-gram mixture 10- to 99-gram mixture 100- to 999-gram mixture 1- to 9-gram mixture 5 to 49 grams pure or 50- to 499-gram mixture 10 to 99 grams pure or 100- to 999-gram mixture

Cocaine base (Schedule II)

Fentanyl (Schedule II)

Fentanyl analogue (Schedule I)

Heroin (Schedule I)

LSD (Schedule I)

Methamphetamine (Schedule II)

PCP (Schedule II)

Quantity 500- to 4999-gram mixture 5- to 49-gram mixture

Cocaine (Schedule II)

Drug/Schedule

Table A.II.1 Federal Drug Trafficking Penalties

First Offense: Not less than 5 years and not more than 40 years. If death or serious injury, not less than 20 or more than life. Fine of not more than $2 million if an individual, $5 million if not an individual Second Offense: Not less than 10 years and not more than life. If death or serious injury, life imprisonment. Fine of not more than $4 million if an individual, $10 million if not an individual

Penalties

Penalties First Offense: Not less than 10 years and not more than life. If death or serious injury, not less than 20 or more than life. Fine of not more than $4 million if an individual, $10 million if not an individual Second Offense: Not less than 20 years, and not more than life. If death or serious injury, life imprisonment. Fine of not more than $8 million if an individual, $20 million if not an individual 2 or more prior offenses: Life imprisonment

Quantity 5 kilograms or more mixture 50 grams or more mixture 400 grams or more mixture 100 grams or more mixture 1 kilogram or more mixture 10 grams or more mixture 50 grams or more pure or 500 grams or more mixture 100 grams or more pure or 1 kilogram or more mixture


312 Practical Drug Enforcement

Any amount 30 to 999 milligrams Any amount Less than 30 milligrams

Any amount

Flunitrazepam (Schedule IV)

All other Schedule IV drugs Flunitrazepam (Schedule IV)

All Schedule V drugs

1 gram or more

Any amount

Other Schedule I and II drugs (and any drug product containing gamma-hydroxybutyric acid) Flunitrazepam (Schedule IV) Other Schedule III drugs

Penalties First Offense: Not more than 20 years. If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years or more than life. Fine of $1 million if an individual, $5 million if not an individual Second Offense: Not more than 30 years. If death or serious injury, not less than life. Fine of $2 million if an individual, $10 million if not an individual First Offense: Not more than 5 years. Fine of not more than $250,000 if an individual, $1 million if not an individual Second Offense: Not more than 10 years. Fine of not more than $500,000 if an individual, $2 million if not an individual First Offense: Not more than 3 years. Fine of not more than $250,000 if an individual, $1 million if not an individual Second Offense: Not more than 6 years. Fine of not more than $500,000 if an individual, $2 million if not an individual First Offense: Not more than 1 year. Fine of not more than $100,000 if an individual, $250,000 if not an individual Second Offense: Not more than 2 years. Fine of not more than $200,000 if an individual, $500,000 if not an individual


Appendix II 313

100 to 999 kilograms mixture; or 100 to 999 plants

More than 10 kilograms hashish; 50- to 99-kilogram mixture More than 1 kilogram of hashish oil; 50 to 99 plants

1 to 49 plants; less than 50 kilogram mixture 10 kilograms or less 1 kilogram or less

Marijuana

Marijuana

Marijuana

Not less than 20 years, not more than life If death or serious injury, mandatory life Fine not more than $8 million if an individual, $20 million if other than an individual Not less than 10 years, not more than life If death or serious injury, mandatory life Fine not more than $4 million if an individual, $10 million if other than an individual Not more than 30 years If death or serious injury, mandatory life Fine $2 million if an individual, $10 million if other than individual

Not less than 10 years, not more than life If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years and not more than life Fine of not more than $4 million if an individual, $10 million if other than an individual Not less than 5 years, not more than 40 years If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years and not more than life Fine of not more than $2 million if an individual, $5 million if other than an individual Not more than 20 years If death or serious injury, not less than 20 years and not more than life Fine of $1 million if an individual, $5 million if other than an individual Not more than 5 years Fine of not more than $250,000, $1 million if other than individual

Not more than 10 years Fine $500,000 if an individual, $2 million if other than individual

Second Offense

First Offense

314

Hashish Hashish oil

1000 kilograms or more mixture; or 1000 or more plants

Quantity

Marijuana

Drug

Table A.II.2 Federal Trafficking Penalties for Marijuana




Appendix III: Code of Federal Regulations: Section 1310.02 — Substances Covered

The following chemicals have been specifically designated by the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as the listed chemicals subject to the provisions of this section and Sections 1309 and 1313. Each chemical has been assigned a DEA Chemical Code Number, which is presented in the right column. Table A.III.1 1310.02(a) — List I Chemicals (1) Anthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts (2) Benzyl cyanide (3) Ephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers (4) Ergonovine and its salts (5) Ergotamine and its salts (6) N-Acetylanthranilic acid, its esters, and its salts (7) Norpseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers (8) Phenylacetic acid, its esters, and its salts (9) Phenylpropanolamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers (10) Piperidine and its salts (11) Pseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers (12) 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone (13) Methylamine and its salts (14) Ethylamine and its salts (15) Propionic anhydride (16) Isosafrole (17) Safrole (18) Piperonal (19) N-Methylephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers (N-methylephedrine) (20) N-Methylpseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers (21) Hydriodic acid (22) Benzaldehyde (23) Nitroethane (24) Gamma-Butyrolactone (other names include GBL; dihydro-2 (3H)-furanone; 1,2-butanolide; 1,4-butanolide; 4-hydroxybutanoic acid lactone; gammahydroxybutyric acid lactone)

315

8530 8735 8113 8675 8676 8522 8317 8791 1225 2704 8112 8502 8520 8678 8328 8704 8323 8750 8115 8119 6695 8256 6724 2011



316

Table A.III.1 (continued) 1310.02(a) — List I Chemicals (25) Red phosphorus (26) White phosphorus (other names: yellow phosphorus) (27) Hypophosphorous acid and its salts (including ammonium hypophosphite, calcium hypophosphite, iron hypophosphite, potassium hypophosphite, manganese hypophosphite, magnesium hypophosphite, and sodium hypophosphite)

6795 6796 6797

Table A.III.2 1310.02(b) — List II Chemicals (1) Acetic anhydride (2) Acetone (3) Benzyl chloride (4) Ethyl ether (5) Potassium permanganate (6) 2-Butanone (or methyl ethyl ketone or MEK) (7) Toluene (8) Hydrochloric acid (including anhydrous hydrogen chloride) (9) Sulfuric acid (10) Methyl isobutyl ketone (MIBK) (11) Iodine

8519 6532 8570 6584 6579 6714 6594 6545 6552 6715 6699

Per 1310.02(c), the Administrator may add or delete a substance as a listed chemical by publishing a final rule in the Federal Register following a proposal, which shall be published at least 30 days before the final rule. Per 1310.02(d), any person may petition the Administrator to have any substance added or deleted from 1310.02(a) or 1310.02(b). Per 1310.02(e), any petition under this section shall contain the following information: (1) The name and address of the petitioner (2) The name of the chemical to which the petition pertains (3) The name and address of the manufacturer(s) of the chemical (if known) (4) A complete statement of the facts which the petitioner believes justifies the addition or deletion of the substance from 1310.02(a) or 1310.02(b) (5) The date of the petition Per 1310.02(f), the Administrator may require the petitioner to submit such documents or written statements of fact relevant to the petition as he deems necessary in making a determination.


Appendix III: Code of Federal Regulations: Section 1310.02

317

Per 1310.02(g), within a reasonable period of time after the receipt of the petition, the Administrator shall notify the petitioner of his decision and the reason thereof. The Administrator need not accept a petition if any of the requirements prescribed in 1310.02(e) or requested pursuant to 1310.02(f) of this section are lacking or are not clearly set forth as to be readily understood. If the petitioner desires, he may amend and resubmit the petition to meet the requirements of 1310.02(e) and 1310.02(f) of this section. Per 1310.02(h), if a petition is granted or if the Administrator, upon his own motion, proposes to add or delete substances as listed chemicals in 1310.02(c) of this section, he shall issue and publish in the Federal Register a proposal to add or delete a substance as a listed chemical. The Administrator shall permit any interested person to file written comments regarding the proposal within 30 days of the date of publication of his order in the Federal Register. The Administrator will consider any comments filed by interested persons and publish a final rule in accordance with his decision in the matter. Sources: 54 FR 31665, Aug. 1, 1989, as amended at 56 FR 48733, Sept. 26, 1991; 57 FR 43615, Sept. 22, 1992; 60 FR 19510, Apr. 19, 1995; 60 FR 32460, June 22, 1995; 62 FR 5917, Feb. 10, 1997; 65 FR 21647, Apr. 24, 2000; 65 FR 47316, Aug. 2, 2000; 66 FR 52675, Oct. 17, 2001.


9808_Index.fm Page 319 Friday, October 13, 2006 2:16 PM

Index

A ABC surveillance method, 112–113 Acetaminophen, 53–54 Actiq, 57 Actual possession, 274–275 Adderall, 62 Addiction as evidence of intent to distribute, 278 observing in drug couriers, 183–184 observing in nurses, 220–221 physicians/pharmacists recognizing, 233–234 ADHD, see Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder Ahmad A. v. Superior Court, 256–257 Aircraft data plates, 244 Air smuggling, 241–246 aircraft data plates and, 244 detecting, 241–242 overview of, 241 by pilots, 246 profiling aircraft used in, 242–244 searching commercial aircraft, 246 searching typical light planes, 244–246 Alfenta, 57 Alftentanil, 57 Alprazolam, 68 Altered script scam, 231 Alurate, 67 America’s Most Wanted, 86 Amphetamines, 62–63, 80 Amytal, 67 The Anarchist’s Cookbook (Powell), 147 Anesthesia, 48, 59 Angel Dust, 82 Anglada v. United States, 266 Antennas, undercover police radios, 18

Anthistamines, 54 Apartments, undercover, 122–123 Armstrong’s mixture, 155 Arrest records, 3, 6 Arrested informants, 89 Arrests, finding drugs in unrelated, 172–173 Aspirin, 53–54 Assault unit, in raids, 159 Ativan, 68 Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 62 Audio surveillance, 118–119 Audits, drug, 232 Auxiliary fuel systems, on smuggling aircraft, 243

B Backup officers, 30, 31 Bag of heroin, 52–53 Banks, as information source, 10 Barbiturates, 66, 67 Battering devices, 143 Benzedrine, 62 Benzodiazepines, 66–69 Bilateral investigations, 173 Black tar heroine, 52–53 Bladder tanks, on aircraft, 243 Board of education records, 9 Body-mikes, 118–119 Body transmitters, 118–119, 123 Bolt guns, 155 Bongs, 74–75 Booby traps conducting raids and, 158 exterior, 148–153 hazards of, 147–148

319


320 interior, 153–155 marijuana patches with, 236 Breast cancer scam, 231 Brevital, 67 Briefing serving high-risk warrants, 143–145 stakeout, 126 Brokers, 276 Budgeting resources, 4–5 Bumper beepers, 119 Butabarbital, 67 Butalbital, 67 Butisol, 67 Buy–bust procedure, 30–31, 33 Buy money, in informant contracts, 93 Buy–walk procedure, 29

C Caffeine, 58 Cameras, surveillance, 122–123 Camper shells, concealing drugs in, 289–290 Cannabinoids, 73 Cannabis bongs, 74–75 hashish, 75 hashish oil, 75–76 marijuana, 73–74 overview of, 72–74 Cannabis sativa L., 72 Case initiation, 1–2 Case preparation, 4 Cash, as evidence of intent, 278 Catha edulis shrub, 65 Cathine, 65 Cathinone, 65 CDTA, see Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act Cellular phone companies, 9–10 Centrax, 68 Chain conspiracies, 40 Chain of custody, 295 Chain of possession, 295 Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act (CDTA), 207–209 Chemicals Code of Federal Regulations for, 315–317 conducting laboratory raid, 203–205 controlling precursor, 206–209 finding in laboratories, 203

Practical Drug Enforcement identifying laboratories through suppliers of, 196–198 seizure/forfeiture actions to merchants of, 201 Chloral hydrate, 66, 72 Chlordiazepoxide, 68 CI, see Confidential information CIs, see Cooperating individuals Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 42 Clandestine laboratories, 193–209 chemicals found in, 203 conducting raid, 203–205 contamination prevention/ decontamination, 205–206 controlling precursor chemicals, 206–209 health/safety regulations, 202 identifying operations, 196–198 investigation techniques, 198–200 overview of, 193–195 safety considerations, 195–196 seizure and forfeiture, 200–202 suggested reading, 209 Classifying, warrants, 140 Clonazepam, 68 Cloning, marijuana, 238 Clorazepate, 68 Clothing, 112, 204–205 Coca leaves, 47–48, 59 Cocaine, 59–62 amphetamines vs., 64 as crack, see Crack federal drug trafficking penalties for, 312 history of, 59 illicit use of, 60 ingestion of, 174 smuggling by air, 243 as stimulant, 47–48 street terms for, 60 Codeine, 50–51, 54–55 Cold feet, informants with, 100 Commercial aircraft, for smuggling, 246 Commercial grade marijuana, 236–237 Communications raid planning and, 157 stakeouts and, 127–128 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 41–42 Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act (MCA), 208 Confidential information (CI), 3 Confusion, entrapment and, 266


Index Consent searches, 290–291 Conspiracy investigations, 38–41 Constructive possession, 274–275 Contamination prevention, illicit laboratories, 205–206 Contingency planning, for stakeouts, 127 Contraband, 284 Contracts, informant, 93–96 Controlled drug buys, 97 Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 41–42 combating illicit manufacture of controlled drugs, 206–209 drug audits and, 232 drug types/regulations and, 213–216 medical license control and, 223 pharmaceutical diversion and, 212 Conversion laboratories, 196 Cooperating individuals (CIs) defined, 87 informant contract for, 94–95 informant statements, 96 Costs buy–walk investigations, 29 procedures for drug purchases, 97 Counterfeit prescription forms, 228–229 Countersurveillance, 35 Court orders GPS tracking device controversy, 132–134 private sector sources requiring, 9–11 Court records, 8 Courtrooms, informants in, 102–103 Cover officers, 15 Cover story, 21–22, 97 Cover unit, in raids, 159 Crack cocaine as, 60–62 in conversion laboratories, 196 drug dealer profiles, 175–176 as drug of choice nationwide, 174–175 Jamaican Posse operations and, 176–177 reverse sting operations against, 248–253 reverse sting operations on, 248–253 Credit agencies, 10–11 Credit cards, undercover identification, 19 Crimes committed by informants, 94, 102 increasing since PCP trafficking, 174 judging predisposition to, 271 Crimestoppers, 85–86

321 Criminals informant interviews with, 93 as informants, 88–89 informants doing activity of, 94 Crisscross entry method, 164 Crossfire, 156 CSA, see Controlled Substances Act Custodial interrogations, 258–259 Cutting torches, 143 Cyalume infrared light sticks, 121

D Dalmane, 68 Darvon, 56 Date rape drug, 69 DCDA, see Domestic Chemical Diversion and Control Act DEA, see Drug Enforcement Administration Decontamination, and clandestine laboratories, 205–206 Deep-cover assignments, 14 Demerol, 56 Demolition officers, 143 Dentists, 231 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 7 Department of Transportation, 9, 202 Depressants, 65–72 barbiturates, 66–67 benzodiazepines, 66–69 chloral hydrate, 72 GHB, 70–72 overview of, 65–66 Rohypnol, 69–70 withdrawal symptoms, 67 Desoxyn, 62 Dexedrine, 62 Dextroamphetamine, 62 Dextropropoxyphene, 56 Dextrostat, 62 DHS, see Department of Homeland Security Diarrhea, narcotics for, 48 Diazepam, 68 Dilaudid breast cancer scam to obtain, 231 defined, 53 sold as drug store heroin, 217–218 Disturbed services, and thermal imaging, 136–137 Diversion tactics, 216–218



322 Doctor busts in illegal prescription clinics, 224–225 in illegal stress and pain clinics, 226 using undercover patients for, 219 Documentation in dwelling searches, 292 as evidence of intent to distribute, 280 Dogs, narcotics detector, 285 Domestic Chemical Diversion and Control Act (DCDCA), 208 Doral, 68 Driver’s license, undercover, 19 Dronabinol, 73 Drug abuse determining severity of, 169–170 of nurses, 220–221 observing in drug couriers, 183–184 physicians/pharmacists recognizing, 233–234 Schedules of Controlled Substances and, 213–216 street observations of, 171–172 in unrelated arrests, 172–173 Drug buy operations, 26–37 buy–bust procedure, 30–31 buy–walk procedure, 29 controlling informant, 103–106 flash-roll, 35–37 hazards, 28 location of buy, 31–33 overview of, 26 planning, 34–35 precautions, 33–34 preparations, 27–28 procedures for informants, 97–98 Drug couriers airport profiles, 182–183 identifying, 181–182 legalities on use of profiles, 185–192 observing behavior of, 183–185 using profiles of, 188–192 Drug dealers detecting in drug transports, 180–181 exposing police infiltration, 23 intent, based on association with, 281 in open-air drug markets, see Open-air drug markets paranoia of, 22 predisposition, based on association with, 273

profiles of, 175–176 Drug diversion tactics, 216–218 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) airport profiles, 182–183 chemical controls, 207 Code of Federal Regulations, substances covered, 315–317 dismantling clandestine laboratories and, 202 pharmaceutical diversion and, 211–212 as primary enforcement agency, 6–7 Drug identification, 40, 47–84 cannabis, 72–76 depressants, see Depressants hallucinogens, 76–80 narcotics, see Narcotics stimulants, see Stimulants suggested reading, 84 Drug investigations, initiation of, see Sources of information Duragesic, 57 Dwelling searches, 283–285, 291–294

E Ecstasy, 80–82 Egotistical motivation, of informants, 91 El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), 6–7 Electronic surveillance operations, 118–121 Elicitation vs. listening post, 261 Embalming Fluid, 82 Emergency ordnance disposal (EOD) specialist, 147 Emergency service personnel, 196 Enforcement operations, special, 235–254 air smuggling, 241–246 domestic eradication of marijuana, 239–240 ground smuggling, 246–248 marijuana cultivation, 235–239 reverse sting operations, 248–253 smuggling investigations, overview of, 240–241 suggested reading, 253 Enterprise conspiracies, 40–41 Entrapment, 262–269 confusion and, 266 doctors providing drugs for sex as case of, 220 Hampton v. United States, 268–269


Index Jacobson v. United States, 269 legal issues surrounding, 262–263 Sherman v. United States, 265–266 Sorrels v. United States, 263–265 United States v. Russell, 267–268 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 202, 206 EOD, see Emergency ordnance disposal specialist EPA, see Environmental Protection Agency Ephedrine, 207, 208 EPIC, see El Paso Intelligence Center Equipment airplane search, 244–246 budgeting for, 5 gaining entrance with, 142–143 raid, 158 stakeout, 125 surveillance, 111 in undercover assignments, 14–21 vehicle search, 285 Equitable transfers, 42 Eradication, of marijuana, 239–240 Estazolam, 68 Ether chemicals, 203 Evidence conspiracy investigations and, 38–39 counting and weighing, 295–297 drug identification and, see Drug identification handling, 294–295 in informant drug purchases, 105–106 seizing and labeling, 297–298 seizing during dwelling searches, 293–294 seizing during search of premises, 285 Expensive evidence, 295–296 Explosives Armstrong’s mixture, 155 booby traps, 147–148 gaining entrance with, 143 hot light booby traps, 155 investigating clandestine laboratories and, 195, 198–200 Exterior booby traps, 148–153 foot breaker, 150–151 punji pit, 149–150 safety precautions, 149 signs of, 148–149 External control methods, high-risk warrants, 159–162

323 Extraction laboratories, 196

F False bottoms, on pickup trucks, 289 Fat lady scam, 230–231 Fatigue, stakeout team, 130 FBI, see Federal Bureau of Investigation Fear informants with cold feet, 100 motivating informants, 90 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 241 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 7, 86 Federal Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 41–42 Federal statutes Code of Federal Regulations, substances covered, 315–317 drug trafficking penalties, 312–314 forfeiture laws, 42–43 monitoring of conversations under, 261–262 Female informants, 96, 101–102 Fentanyl, 56–57, 312 Field interview (FI) cards, 6 Fifth Amendment, 258–260 Files, as information source, 3, 5–6 Final raid report, 165–166 Financial resources, 4–5 Fingerprint files, 6 Fiorina, 67 Fixed (stationary) surveillance, 117–118 Flash-roll operations, 35–37 Flash/sound diversionary devices, 140–142 Flashbacks, hallucinogenic, 76 FLIR (forward-looking infrared) systems, see Thermal imaging Floor mats, of automobiles, 288 Flunitrazepam, 69, 313 Flurazepam, 68 Foot breakers mousetraps, 153 overview of, 150–151 trot lines, 152 Foot pursuits, 131–132 Foot surveillance, 112–115 Forfeiture, 41–45 case history, 43 in clandestine laboratories, 200–202



324 conducting in open-air drug markets, 178 overview of, 41–42 sharing provisions of federal law, 42–43 vehicle indemnity form, 44–45 Forgery, prescription, 217–218 Forward-looking infrared (FLIR) systems, see Thermal imaging Fourth Amendment, 257–258 Fraudulent prescriptions, see also Pharmaceutical diversion hydrocodone and, 55 hydromorphone and, 53 narcotics abuse with, 49 prescription forgery, 217–218, 227–229 Frequency scrambler (encoder), 18 Front-end, of automobiles, 286 Fruits of the crime, 285 Furniture, in dwelling searches, 293

G Gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB) drug-facilitated rape and, 72 federal drug trafficking penalties for, 313 overview of, 70–72 produced in clandestine laboratories, 66 street terms for, 71 Gang membership, 281 Gas tanks, concealing drugs in, 289 Gates, Jamaican-run drug operations, 176 GHB, see Gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB) Global positioning system (GPS), 132–134 Glutethimide, 66 Gotti, John, 85 GPS, see Global positioning system Gravano, Salvatore (Sammy the Bull), 85 Ground smuggling, 246–248

H Halazepam, 68 Halcion, 68 Hallucinogens, 76–84 ketamine, 83–84 LSD, 77–79 MDMA, Ecstasy and other phenethylamines, 80–92 mescaline, 79–80 overview of, 76–77 peyote, 79–80

phencyclidine and related drugs, 82–83 Hampton v. United States, 268–269 Hand-held radios, 18 Handguns, 20 Harrison Narcotic Act, 212 Hashish, 196, 314 Hashish oil, 75–76, 314 Health departments, 9 Health regulations, and clandestine laboratories, 202 Heroin federal drug trafficking penalties for, 312 fentanyls vs., 57 methadone for addiction to, 58 overview of, 51–53 shooting galleries for, 171 street terms for, 52 High-risk entry method, 164–165 Hidden compartments, and thermal imaging, 136–137 High-risk warrants, see Warrants, high-risk Hoffman, Dr. Albert, 77–78 Hooks, 142–143 Hot light, 155 Hotels, surveillance in, 114 Hycomine, 54 Hydrocodone, 54–55 Hydromorphone, 53 Hydromorphone hydrochloride, 53 Hydroponics, for marijuana, 238 Hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 62

I Ibuprofen, 54 Ice, 62–63 Identification, undercover, 19–20 Identity, informant, 98–100 Illinois v. Perkins, 257 Immediate reaction maneuver, 159–160 Impaling booby traps, 147–148 Incident reports, 5 Indoor growing of marijuana, 237–238 Indoor locations, drug buys, 32–33 Infiltration, undercover, 24–26 Informants, 85–107 common problems with, 100–102 contracting, 93–96 controlled drug purchases and, 103–106 in courtrooms, 102–103


Index DEA definition of, 87 drug buys, 97–98 for drug laboratory investigations, 196, 199 importance of, 85–87 interviews with, 92–93 people who become, 87–89 protecting identity of, 98–100 psychological motivations of, 90–92 receiving information from, 3, 170 suggested reading, 107 types of, 89–90 verifying information from, 3 Information, see Sources of information Infrared light sticks, 121 Infrared thermal imagers, see Thermal imaging Inside drug buys, 97 Instruments of crime, 285 Intelligence officers, 15 Intent to distribute, 276–281 Interior booby traps, 153–155 Interior containers, 297 Interior, of automobiles, 286–287 Internal control methods, 162–164 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 7, 294 Interrogation rooms Fourth Amendment challenges, 257–258 monitoring conversations in, 256 Sixth Amendment challenges to, 260 Interviews, informant, 92–93 Investigative stops, legalities of, 185–192 IRS, see Internal Revenue Service

J Jacobson v. United States, 269 Jail cells Fourth Amendment challenges, 257–258 monitoring conversations in, 256 Sixth Amendment challenges to, 260 Jamaican drug operation case study, 176–177 Joint possession, 275–276

K Katz v. United States, 257 Ketalar, 83 Ketamine, 83–84 Ketaset, 83 Khat, 65

325 Killer Weed, 82 Kill-switches, 115 Klonopin, 68 Knives, concealed, 155 Knockout drops, 72 Kyllo v. United States, 137–138

L L-shaped clearance maneuver, 160–161 L-shaped sweep maneuver, 161–162 LAAM (Levo alphcetylmethadol), 58 Labeling evidence, 298 Laboratories, see Clandestine laboratories LAH (Lithium aluminum hydride), 203 Landano v. U.S. Department of Justice (1993), 99 Law enforcement federal agencies, 6–7 getting information from, 5–6 informant contracts, 94–96 officers as informants, 88 receiving information from officers, 3 using GPS devices to check on, 134 Leader, raid, 157–158 Leapfrog surveillance, 113–114, 116–117 Leary, Timothy, 78 Legal issues, 255–281 drug courier profiles, 185–192 entrapment, 262–269 investigative stops, 185–192 lookouts, brokers, and other participants, 276 monitoring conversations, see Monitoring of conversations pharmaceutical diversion, 212–213 possession with intent to distribute, 273–281 predisposition, 269–273 protection of informant identity, 99–100 searching vehicles, 285 suggested reading, 281 thermal imaging, 137–138 Levo alphcetylmethadol, see LAAM Librium, 68 Licensing departments (city or state), 8 Lights, in dwelling searches, 292–293 Listening post vs. elicitation, 261 Lithium aluminum hydride, see LAH Lithium hydride, 195, 203


326 Location, 31–33, 278 conducting area searches for drugs, 179–180 fixed surveillance, 117–118 flash-roll transactions and, 36–37 high-risk warrants and, 140–145 informant identity and, 99 open-air drug markets, 175 prebuy planning and, 35 of stakeout, 126, 129–130 Long guns, 20 Lookouts, legal considerations, 276 Lophophora williamsii, 79 Lortab, 54 Lortab USA, 54 Lorzepam, 68 Lotusate, 67 LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) federal drug trafficking penalties for, 312 overview of, 77–79 Luminal, 67 Lysergic acid diethylamide, see LSD

M Magazine bomb, 154 Manpower budgeting resources for, 5 in conspiracy investigations, 38 in reverse stings, 248–249 Marijuana air smuggling of, 242–243 cultivation of, 235–238 domestic eradication of, 239–240 effects of, 74–75 evidence of cultivation, 238–239 federal drug trafficking penalties for, 314 overview of, 73–74 street terms for, 74 thermal imaging investigations for, 136 weighing evidence, 296 Marijuana Potency Monitoring System (MPMP), 74 Marinol, 73 MCA, see Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act MDA (3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine), 81 MDEA (3,4-methylenedioxyethylamphetamine), 81

Practical Drug Enforcement MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine), or Ecstasy, 80–82, 193 Mebaral, 67 Medical examiner’s office, 8 Medical license control, 223–224 Medications, verifying during arrests, 173 Mentally ill people, as informants, 88 Mepergan, 56 Meperidine, 56 Meprobamate, 66 Mercenary motivation, of informants, 91 Mercuric chloride (bromide), in illicit laboratories, 203 Mescaline, 79–80 Methadone, 57–58 Methamphetamine Armstrong’s mixture in laboratories for, 155 clandestine laboratories for, see Clandestine laboratories federal drug trafficking penalties for, 312 indications of illicit laboratories in area, 200 overview of, 63–65 produced in extraction laboratories, 196 street terms for, 63 Methaqualone, 66 Methedrine, 62 Methohexital, 67 Mickey Finn, 72 Midazolam, 68 Miranda rule Fifth Amendment challenges to, 258–259 informant and target’s right to counsel, 101 unrelated arrests, 172 MO (mode of operation), 124, 126 Mode of operation, see MO Monitoring of conversations, 255–262 under federal and state statutes, 261–262 Fifth Amendment challenges to, 258–259 Fourth Amendment challenges to, 257–258 legalities of, 255 Sixth Amendment challenges to, 259–261 types of surreptiously monitored statements, 256–257 Morphine heroin first synthesized from, 51 hydrocodone vs., 54–55 hydromorphone vs., 53 meperidine vs., 56


Index narcotics having effects like, 48 overview of, 50 Motivations of criminal informants, 170 of informants, 3, 90–92 Mousetrap, 153 MPMP (Marijuana Potency Monitoring System), 74 MPPP, 56 MPTP, 56 Multiple drug buys, 97 Murphy’s Law, 156

N Narcolepsy, 62 Narcotics, 47–58 administering, 48 defining, 47–48 developing tolerance to/dependency on, 48–49 hazardous effects of, 48 of natural origin, 49–51 overview of, 47–49 patterns of abuse in, 49 semisynthetic, 51–55 synthetic, 55–57 as treatment drugs, 57–58 National Crime Information Center (NCIC) records, 5 NCIC, see National Crime Information Center records Neighborhoods, planning surveillance in, 111, 118 Nembutal, 67 Nervousness, in drug couriers, 182–184 Nicotine, 58 Nighttime surveillance, 121 No-knock entries, 146 Noctec, 72 Nurses, diverting drugs, 220–221

O Occasional informants, 89 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 202 Officer–informant relationships, 101 Officers, undercover, see Undercover officers Ohio v. Terry, 186–192

327 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 261–262 One-man surveillance, 112 Open-air drug markets characteristics of, 175 coordinated responses to, 178–179 drug dealer profiles, 175–176 Jamaican Posse operations, 176–177 patrol responses to, 177–178 PCP giving rise to, 173–174 traditional drug trafficking vs., 173 Open Fields Doctrine, 11 Operation Pipeline, 182 Opiate receptors, 47 Opium defining narcotics as, 47 extracting from poppy plants, 49–50 overview of, 50 types of narcotics with, 50–51 ORLMM, 58 OSHA, see Occupational Safety and Health Administration The OSS Special Weapons Devices and Equipment (Paladin Press), 147 OTC (over-the-counter) medications, 207–208 Outdoor locations, drug buys, 32 Outlets, in dwelling searches, 292 Outside law enforcement agencies, 3, 6–7 Over-the-counter, see OTC medications Overt acts, 39 Oxazepam, 68 Oxycodone, 53–55 OxyContin, 53–56

P Packaging, and intent to distribute, 278 Pain hydromorphone for, 53 illegal clinics for, 225–226 narcotics of natural origin for, 49–51 treating with narcotics, 48 Palladone, 53 Panic, in undercover officer, 22 Papaver somniferum (poppy), 49–50 Paper tiger-type commanders, 35 Paraldehyde, 66 Paranoia in chronic amphetamine abuse, 64–65


328 of drug dealers, 22 Paraphernalia as evidence of intent to distribute, 279–280 police observation of drug, 171–172 Parole officers, 7 Passive monitoring, 120 Patrol officers, 169–192 conducting area and vehicle searches, 179–180, 285 coordinated response of, 178–179 drug dealer profiles and, 175–176 enforcing drug violations, 169–170 identifying drug couriers, 181–183 identifying illegal prescription clinics, 225 intelligence gathering of, 170 interdicting drugs in transit, 180–181 investigative stops using drug courier profiles, 185 Jamaican drug operation case study, 176–177 legalities of profiling, 185–192 major transportation routes, 181 observing behavior of drug couriers, 183–185 open-air drug markets and, 173–175 response to open-air markets, 177–178 street observations of, 171–172 unrelated arrests and, 172–173 Paxipam, 68 Payments, to informants, 93, 96 PCP (phencyclidine) federal drug trafficking penalties for, 312 ketamine compared to, 83 open-air drug markets and, 173–174 related drugs, 82–83 synthesizing in laboratories, 196, 200 Pen registers, 10 Pentobarbital, 67 People v. Turner, 266 Percocet, 53–54 Percodan, 53–54 Perimeter unit, in raids, 159 Perkins v. Illinois, 257 Perverse motivation, of informants, 91 Peterson, Laci, 132 Peterson, Scott, 132 Peyote, 79–80 Phantom refill scam, 231–232

Practical Drug Enforcement Pharmaceutical diversion, 211–234 drug audits, 232 drug control legislation, 212–213 drug theft, 221–222 drug types and regulations, 213–216 investigation problems, 232–234 medical license control, 223–224 pharmacy investigations, 226–230 physician investigations, 218–221 prescription clinics, 224–225 professional patients (scammers), 230–232 statistics, 211, 229 stress and pain clinics, 225–226 tactics, 216–218 undercover patients, 222–223 Pharmacists drug diversion tactics of, 211, 217–218 drug types and regulations and, 213–216 investigating, 226–230 prescription frauds/forgeries and, 213 recognizing drug abusers, 233–234 Phencyclidine, see PCP Phenethylamines, 83–84 Photo surveillance, 120–121 Physicians applying diversion laws to, 234 drug types and regulations, 213–216 involved in drug diversion, 211, 217–220 prescription frauds and forgeries, 213 professional patients scamming, 230–232 recognizing drug abusers, 233–234 running illegal prescription clinics, 224–225 Pilots, smuggler, 246 Plain-view doctrine, 283 Planes, see Air smuggling Police intelligence reports, 5–6 The Poor Man’s James Bond (Saxon), 147 Poppies, 49–50 Possession actual vs. constructive, 274–275 joint, 275–276 overview of, 273–274 Possession with intent to distribute, 273–281 addiction of possessor and, 278 association with known dealers, gang membership, 281 large amounts of cash, 278 location, 278


Index lookouts, brokers, and other participants, 276 overview of, 276–277 packaging, 278 patterns of traffic, 280 presence of paraphernalia, 279–280 quality, 277–278 quantity, 277 weapons, 278 Postbuy planning, undercover, 35 Pot poachers, 236 Potassium cyanide, 203 Powder-type evidence, 296 Prazepam, 68 Prebuy planning, undercover, 34–35 Precautions, drug buy operations, 33–34 Precursor chemicals, 203, 206–209 Predisposition defining, 270–271 factors in, 271–273 overview of, 269–270 Prescription clinics, 224–225 Prescription forgery, 217–218, 227–229 Prescription medicine bottles, 293 Preservation of evidence, 297–298 Privacy Fourth Amendment challenges, 257–258 private sector giving out information and, 9–10 trashing and, 11 Private sector sources of information, 9–11, 86, 88 Probable cause, 186 Probation officers, 7 Profiles, drug dealer, 175–176 Progressive method, of surveillance, 113–114 Prosecutor’s records, 8 ProSom, 68 Pseudoephedrine, 207, 208 Psychological motives, of informants, 90–92 Public service agencies, 9 Public utility companies, 10 Punji pit, 149–150

Q Quality, evidence of intent, 277–278 Quantity, evidence of intent, 277 Quazepam, 68

329

R Racketeering, 40–41 Radio frequency (RF) detectors, 18 Radios, police, 18, 132 Raids checklist for, 156–157 dangerousness of, 155–156 external control methods, 159–162 final report on, 165–166 internal control methods, 162–164 laboratory, 203–205 leadership for, 157–158 tactical considerations, 158–159 Rape GHB and, 72 Rohypnol and, 70 Raves, 81–82, 83 Reagent chemicals, 203 Real estate indemnity forms, 44 Rear area, of automobiles, 288 Reasonable suspicion, 186 Reconnaissance, 111 Recording devices, see also Legal issues audio surveillance with, 118–119 corroborating informant testimonies with, 102 in flash-roll transactions, 37 in informant drug purchases, 105 prebuy planning using, 34–35 undercover operations and, 18–19 Records, as information source, 5–6 Red handle shooting exercises, 21 Regular informants, 89 Reliability, of leads, 3 Remote control, booby traps, 147–148 Repentance motivation, of informants, 91 Reports final raid, 165–166 as information source, 5–6 verifying information through, 3 Resources (suggested reading) clandestine laboratories, 209 drug enforcement and patrol officers, 192 identification of drug evidence, 84 informant management, 107 initiation of drug investigation, 12 special enforcement operations, 253 surveillance operations, 138 undercover operations, 46


330 Restaurants, surveillance in, 114 Restoril, 68 Revenge motivation, of informants, 90 Reverse sting operations, 248–253 conducting, 250–253 defined, 248 manpower considerations, 248–250 planning, 248 Rewards, informant, 85–86 RF, see Radio frequency detectors Right to counsel Fifth Amendment, 258–259 and informants, 101 Sixth Amendment challenges to, 259–261 Rip-off, 28, 37 Rock cocaine, see Crack Rocket Fuel, 82 Rooftops, for surveillance, 118 Rohypnol, 69–70 Russell v. United States, 267–268, 269

S Safety clandestine laboratories and, 195–196, 202 contamination prevention/ decontamination, 205–206 Sanitation departments, for information, 9 Satellite-assisted surveillance, 132–134 Scams, pharmaceutical diversion, 230–232 Schedules of Controlled Substances, 299–309 drug types and regulations, 213–216 federal drug trafficking penalties, 312–314 Schedule I, 299–302 Schedule II, 302–304 Schedule III, 304–306 Schedule IV, 306–308 Schedule V, 308–309 Sealing evidence, 297–298 Search units, in raids, 159 Search warrants high-risk, see Warrants, high-risk informant drug purchases using, 106 searching suspect's premises with/without, 283–285 Searches, 283–298 consent, 290–291 counting and weighing evidence, 295–297 dwelling, 291–294 handling evidence, 294–295

Practical Drug Enforcement other vehicles, 290 pickup trucks and work vehicles, 289–290 seizing and labeling evidence, 297–298 suspect’s premises, 283–285 suspect’s vehicle, 285–289 Secobarbital, 67 Seconal, 67 Seizure, clandestine laboratories, 200–202 September 11, 2001, 7 Serax, 68 Serial numbers, money, 37, 104 Sex, doctors providing drugs for, 219–220 Sherman v. United States, 265–266, 267 Shooting galleries, 171 Sinsemilla, 74, 237, 240 Sixth Amendment, 259–261 Smoking cannabis, 73 crack, 60–62 fentanyls, 57 heroin, 53 ice, 62–63 Smuggling investigations, 240–248 by air, 241–246 on ground, 246–248 overview, 240–241 Snorting fentanyls, 57 heroin, 53 Social Security Administration (SSA), 19–20 Social security numbers, 19–20 Social service agencies, 8 Sodium, in illicit laboratories, 203 Sokolow v. United States, 186–192 Solvent chemicals, 203 Sorrels v. United States, 263–265, 267 Sources of information, 1–12 budgeting resources, 4–5 case initiation, 1–2 case preparation, 4 other, 5–6 other criminal justice agencies, 7–8 outside law enforcement agencies, 6–7 private sector sources, 9–11 public service agencies, 8–9 receiving, 3 suggested reading, 12 target selection, 2–3 verifying, 3 Spare tire wells, of automobiles, 288


Index Special K, 83 Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team serving high-risk warrants, 139 undercover operations, 20 Spike mikes, 119 SSA, see Social Security Administration Stakeouts, 124–132 assignment of duties, 126 briefings, 126 communications, 127–128 deployment, 128–130 equipment, 125 fixed surveillance as, 117–118 overview of, 124 personnel selection, 124–125 postevent procedures, 131–132 preparations, 124 team planning, 126–127 training, 127 Standard-issue police equipment, 15–16 Stanley v. Wainwright, 256 State Departments of Motor Vehicles, 8 State statutes, 261–262 Statements, informant, 96, 102 Statements, officer–informant, 96 Stationary surveillance, 117–118 Stimulants amphetamines, 62–63 cocaine, 59–62 defining, 58 effects of, 58–59 khat, 65 methamphetamine, 63–65 Sting-type operations, 199–200, see also Reverse sting operations Street observations, 171–172 Stress clinics, illegal, 225–226 Strip searches, 104 Structure profiles, and thermal imaging, 136 Sublimaze, 57 Subpoena, 9–11 Sufenta, 57 Sufentanil, 57 Super K, 83 Supergrass, 82 Superior Court v. Ahmad A., 256–257 Support officers in flash-roll transactions, 37 radios, 18 role of, 15

331 unit vehicles for, 17 Surreptitious monitoring, see Monitoring of conversations Surveillance, 109–138 budgeting for, 5 of clandestine laboratories, 199 of drug buy location, 31 electronic, 118–121 as evidence of intent to distribute, 280 fixed (stationary), 117–118 on foot, 112–115 for high-risk warrants, 140–142 in informant drug purchases, 102, 105–106 overview of, 109–110 for prebuy planning, 35 preparing for, 111–112 satellite-assisted, 132–134 in stakeouts, see Stakeouts suggested readings, 138 thermal imaging for, 134–138 of undercover apartments, 122–123 of undercover personnel, 123–124 vehicle, 115–117 to verify information, 3 SWAT, see Special Weapons and Tactics Team serving high-risk warrants, 139 undercover operations, 20 Synthesis laboratories, 196

T Tactical officers, 15, 20 Targets case preparation and, 4 of drug investigation, 2–3 Tax departments, 9 Teams high-risk warrant, 143–146 open-air drug market, 177 overall mission accomplished by, 14 raid, 158, 165 stakeout, 126–130 surveillance, 110 Telegraph companies, 11 Telephone companies, 9–10 Telephones, 99, 119 Temazepam, 68 Terrorist attacks, 7 Terry search, 178



332 Terry v. Ohio, 186–192 Tetrahydrocannabinol, see THC THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) cultivation of sinsemilla for, 74, 237 hashish and, 75 overview of, 73 Thebaine, 53–54 Theft, drug as diversion tactic, 217 staged by pharmacists, 227 substituting drugs, 221–222 Thermal imaging applications of, 136–137 legal limitations of, 137–138 mechanics of, 135–136 overview of, 134–135 Thiamyl, 67 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine, see MDA 3,4-methylenedioxyethylamphetamine, see MDEA 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, see MDMA Toolboxes, concealing drugs in, 289 Toothache scam, 231 Top Ten Most Wanted List (FBI), 86 Traffic citations, as information source, 6 as evidence of intent to distribute, 280 Traffickers, see Drug dealers Training stakeout, 127 undercover officer, 22–23 undercover weapons, 20–21 Transcription machines, 18 Transience, 29 Transport of hazardous materials, 202 Tranxene, 68 Trash-like containers, searching, 180 Trashing, for information, 11 Triazolam, 68 Trip wires, 148 Troches, 48 Trot lines, 152 Trunks, of automobiles, 288 Tuinal, 67 Turner v. People, 266 Two-man surveillance, 112

U Undercover apartments, 122–123 Undercover intelligence, 11 Undercover officers busting doctors who divert drugs, 219 cover story, 21–22 drug buy location and, 32–34 protecting cover of, 22–23 purchasing chemicals from suppliers, 201 reverse sting operations, 248–253 role of, 15 for stakeouts, 125–127 surveillance of, 123–124 as undercover patients, 222–223 vehicles for, 17–18 Undercover operations, 13–46 conspiracy investigations, 38–41 cover story, 21–22 drug buys, see Drug buy operations forfeiture sanctions, 41–45 infiltration, 24–26 overview of, 13–14 personnel, 14 protecting undercover officer’s cover, 22–23 radios, 18 recording devices, 18–19 roles of officers, 15 special equipment, 16–17 standard-issue police equipment, 15–16 suggested reading, 46 summary, 44–46 undercover identification, 19–20 vehicles, 17–18 weapons, 20–21 Underside, of automobiles, 288–289 Unit functions, 159 United Nation’s Convention against Illicit Drug Traffic, 207 United States v. Anglada, 266 United States v. Hampton, 268–269 United States v. Jacobson, 269 United States v. Katz, 257 United States v. Kyllo, 137–138 United States v. Russell, 267–268, 269 United States v. Sherman, 265–266, 267 United States v. Sokolow, 186–192 United States v. Sorrels, 263–265 United States v. Russell and, 267


Index United States v. Wilson, 100 Unrelated arrests, 172–173 Unwitting informants, 91–92 Uppers, see Stimulants U.S. Department of Justice v. Landano (1993), 99 U. S. Marshal Service, 7

333

Valachi, Joe, 85 Valium, 68, 69 Vehicles Fourth Amendment challenges, 257–258 for ground smuggling, 246–248 indemnity form for seized, 44–45 monitoring conversations in police, 256, 260 reverse sting operations, 249–253 searching for drugs in, 179–180, 285–290, 294 searching open-air drug market, 178 stakeout team deployment, 129 surveillance with, 115–117 undercover operations and, 17–18 Verification of information, 3 Versed, 68 Vicoden, 54 Vicoprofen, 54 Video surveillance, 120–121 Vietnam, 147

Walls, in dwelling searches, 292 Warrant files, 6 Warrants, high-risk, 139–167 booby traps, exterior, 148–153 booby traps, interior, 153–155 booby traps, overview of, 147–148 classifying, 140 conducting laboratory raid, 203–205 drug raid procedures, 155–159 external control methods, 159–162 final raid report, 165–166 internal control methods, 162–164 other weapons, 15 overview of, 139–140 Step One: planning, 140–143 StepTwo: briefing, 143–145 Step Three: execution, 145–146 Step Four: critique, 146 Weapons booby trap, see Booby traps as evidence of intent to distribute, 278 serving high-risk warrants, 15, 145–146 stakeout, 125, 129–130 undercover operations, 20–21 Weighing, drug evidence, 295–296 Wheel conspiracies, 40 Wholesale diversion, 216–217 Wilson v. United States, 100 Wiretaps, 119–120 Wraparound entry method, 163

W

X

Wainright v. Stanley, 256

Xanax, 68

V


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