Power and Influence: The Embeddedness of Nations

Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to ETH Zuerich - PalgraveConnect - 2011-05-12 Power and Inf...

Author: Deborah E. de Lange

207 downloads 2535 Views 2MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to ETH Zuerich - PalgraveConnect - 2011-05-12

Power and Influence

10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange



This page intentionally left blank

The Embeddedness of Nations

DEBORAH E.

DE

LANGE



Power and Influence

POWER AND INFLUENCE

Copyright © Deborah E. de Lange, 2010. All rights reserved.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–10516–4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data De Lange, Deborah E. Power and influence : the embeddedness of nations / Deborah E. De Lange p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–230–10516–4 1. Strategic planning. 2. International relations. 3. Globalization. 4. United Nations. General Assembly. I. Title. HD30.28.D3963 2011 658.49012—dc22

2010019605

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: December 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.



First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

ix

Foreword

xi

Preface

xvii

Acknowledgments

xxi

Introduction

1

Part I

Understanding Embeddedness

1

The Embeddedness View and Network Analysis

2

International Trade Networks

23

3

Military Alliance Networks

35

4

Diplomatic Networks

41

5

International Governmental Organizations

51

Part II

9

Dynamics of International Cooperative Decision Making

6

Previous Research in International Relations

7

Examples of Diplomatic Behavior: Backroom-Bargaining and Negotiations

Part III

97 121

The United Nations Context

8

The United Nations and Its General Assembly (UNGA)

139

9

History of Decision Making in the UNGA

151



Contents

vi

Contents

The Research Study

10

Research Hypotheses

159

11

Data and Methods

175

12

Results

189

Part V 13 14

Implications

Contributions to Political Science and International Relations

201

Contributions to Strategic Management and Organizational Theory

207

Appendix: Additional Analyses

215

Notes

247

Bibliography

251

Index

261



Part IV

2.1 Trade Subnetwork of 12 EU Countries, 1995 2.2 Similar Voting with France by EU Candidate and Experimental Comparison Countries 3.1 Alliance Networks of All UNGA Countries 3.2 UNGA Country Voting Similarity with the United States 4.1 Network Diagram of Diplomatic Visits by UNGA Countries, 1991 5.1 Two-Mode Political-Military IGO Network Diagram for UNGA Countries, 1999


25 26 36 38 42 53


Figures




5.1 8.1 11.1 12.1 12.2 A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4

Calculations to Support IGO Network Analysis Discussion UNGA Vote Topics 1990–2000 Basic Statistics Main Model Table of Results Main Model Table of Results Basic Statistics for Small Sample Analysis Main Model using Small Sample Main Model using Small Sample Small Sample Sensitivity Analysis: Basic Statistics (Results with Deletions) A.5 Small Sample Sensitivity Analysis (Results with Deletions) A.6 Small Sample Sensitivity Analysis (Results with Deletions) A.7 Full Sample Sensitivity Analysis: Basic Statistics (Results with Deletions) A.8 Sensitivity Analysis using Full Sample (Results with Deletions) A.9 Sensitivity Analysis using Full Sample (Results with Deletions)


56 142 184 190 193 218 220 221 228 230 231 234 236 237


Tables




T “ ” that international relations (IR) scholars have traditionally studied is arguably more important than ever before. The unprecedented number and strength of the linkages that tie individuals, organizations, and nation-states in the contemporary world make it more essential than at any past time to understand the forces that shape these relations and how these relations are shaping the world. Consider the natural environment. Human activity, even at the local level, is increasingly causing irreversible changes in the Earth’s biosphere that have no historical precedent in a world where, until very recently, humans lived in small and largely closed subsistence communities. It is no exaggeration to claim that the future, not only of the human species but of a vast number of other living species as well, depends on how we will interact with each other to address environmental impacts. International organizations like the United Nations lie at the core of our contemporary international system. These organizations are the “social technologies” we have devised to shape our interactions and create rules of engagement; they are the modern equivalent of the Sovereign that keeps our world from reverting to a “state of nature” that, given our knowledge of atomic energy and our extensive interdependence, would have devastating impacts for the world. In recent decades, the social sciences have experienced a resurgence of interest in institutions, rightly grasping that even competitive markets rely on property rights and other complex institutions in order to function. International organizations are the closest entities we have, at the international level, to the states that, at the national level, supply the institutions underpinning market exchange and, more generally, social activity. The experience of two horrific world wars and, more recently, of failed and imploding states such as Yugoslavia, Zaire (Congo), or Lebanon should convince any remaining skeptics that international governance is not any less necessary now than the nation-state was in Hobbes’ time. But international organizations and, more generally, the interaction of countries in the international stage, are of broader, if less dramatic, interest. For countries exist in mutual cooperation and competition. While



Foreword

Foreword

acknowledging interdependence, countries also vie for limited stocks of natural resources, financial capital, highly educated workers, or tourist spending, to name just a few of the more obvious sources of international competition. As Nalebuff and Brandenburger’s “co-opetition” paradigm— now fully “institutionalized” in strategic management courses around the world—shows, business firms operate in a setting that is not radically different. They not only compete with each other, but also cooperate to set up strategic alliances, lobby governments, agree on technological standards, and share risks in complex projects, among other possibilities. Hence, the study of international organizations can yield rich insights for students of strategic management, too. In the present book, de Lange sheds much light on these important issues, advancing both scholarship and practical understanding. On the scholarly side, she operationalizes power and influence among nation-states in a novel way not previously done in IR. United Nations voting records provide an unambiguous and rich set of data on the decisions of individual countries across a wide range of issues. These data can therefore be subjected to the statistical analyses that can tease out power and influence from other explanatory factors. By contrast, IR scholars have had to grapple, for instance, with the ambiguities of the definition of armed conflict and the relatively small numbers of instances from which inferences can be made. Another advance made by de Lange on both methodological and empirical grounds is the application of the concepts and tools of network analysis. Although IR as a field has long grappled with the complexities of alliances involving more than two countries, surprisingly little IR research has made use of network analysis, in contrast with work by sociologists, which has led to the development of new tools and their successful application to relations among individuals, firms, and other types of organizations. Network analysis, as it turns out in de Lange’s capable hands, is a potent tool for the study of interactions among nation-states. In particular, it offers a conceptually and empirically clearer measure of power and influence through the analysis of the observed ties among countries. By themselves, these two contributions to IR—providing much-needed clarity in the definition and measurement of both dependent and explanatory variables—would be enough to justify the importance of de Lange’s work. It is our good fortune that there is much more of value in this book. The author’s in-depth exploration of the concept of embeddedness and her empirical insight into the impacts of cultural and ideological affinity deserve particular mention. De Lange makes a persuasive case that embeddedness constitutes a separate, self-contained theoretical perspective that can stand on its own and ought to be regarded as such by social scientists. Just as theories of organizational behavior and international relations have accepted that



xii

xiii

individuals, organizations, and countries depend on their access to external resources and that this dependence powerfully shapes their behavior and relations with other actors, or that the specific set of resources controlled or sought by these actors influences their behavior and the outcomes of their interaction with other actors, it is hard to argue against the equally plausible idea that the commonalities in origin or evolution of these actors, and the structure of their relationships with other actors, also exert a fundamental force on their behavior and on interaction outcomes. In fact, not only is this a plausible theory, but one that can be empirically tested without ambiguity through the application of network analysis, as in fact it has been tested with regard to phenomena as diverse as job searching or the international diffusion of ideas and institutional innovations. Separate from—but strongly complementary to—the concept of embeddedness is the concept of affinity, particularly cultural and ideological affinity. Much of the more recent theorizing in IR deals with new concepts of power based on the ability to influence others’ ideas and perceptions—most famously, Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power.” One way to understand soft power is to regard it as the ability to create cultural or ideological affinities. Thus U.S. influence on former Soviet states such as Georgia, with which it had little in common prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, may stem in part from the attraction of the ideas emanating from the United States for the post-Soviet leaders of these countries, for example as a result of these ideas being regarded as recipes for economic development and political liberation from Russian influence. In fact, the empirical literature on the diffusion of ideas and institutional innovations has shown the concept of affinity to be important, for example by looking at something as simple as the influence of adoption by a neighboring country on the likelihood of a country’s taking up new ideas or institutional innovations. What is new in de Lange’s work about our understanding of affinity is not so much the confirmation of these results, but the fact that her empirical results show affinity to be a more complex and nuanced factor than we understood. As de Lange shows, the relationship between affinity and commonality of behavior turns out to be a quadratic one, where a very high degree of affinity can actually produce divergent behavior. Whether this puzzle is confirmed by other studies, and how we explain it, remain for further research, but de Lange’s research is valuable for identifying it. Beyond these contributions, de Lange’s work also deserves consideration for its successful crossing of disciplinary boundaries. Here we have an international business scholar stepping into what would be considered a traditional IR topic—voting at the United Nations—and yet applying not only concepts from IR but also from sociology to derive important empirical results that turn out to have important implications for strategic



Foreword

Foreword

management. While the interface between IR and international business scholarship has been a fertile one, yielding important results about political risk, it is refreshing to see an entirely novel exploration of the complementarity between these two fields. The task ahead is to further develop the implications of de Lange’s research for international business, perhaps along the lines of the incipient research on international networks of firms, nongovernmental organizations, and governments. In fact, the cross-disciplinary possibilities of de Lange’s research may go beyond the implications for firms. Reading her narrative and analysis of the role of country visits, one is reminded of the anthropological descriptions of the potlatchs among the nations of the Pacific Northwest, which appeared to play a similar role of cementing relationships and building ties that could be leveraged on future occasions. Finally, the implications of the book also deserve to be underscored. De Lange’s book is rich with suggestions for taking her research further or applying it in other contexts traditionally studied by management and IR scholars. Perhaps most obvious is the need for research in management and international business to make the co-opetition paradigm much more central than it has been so far in research in these fields. Although it is well accepted in teaching curricula, it is still relatively marginal in research, and its important implications are not emphasized enough in business school teaching. The work of Professor de Lange shows that collaboration is as important a phenomenon as competition, and it should be placed in such a position in both research agendas and classroom practice. More specifically, just as countries collaborate to develop and sustain international governance structures at the same time as they compete with each other on a variety of dimensions, firms also engage in extensive collaboration. One such type of collaboration that has received a great deal of attention in recent years is the establishment of strategic alliances. But this is by no means the only type of collaboration. For example, political scientists have long been interested in the aggregation of business interests though chambers of commerce and other business associations in order to exert a stronger influence on public policy, but this type of collaboration has received relatively little attention in the literature of management or international business. In this regard, Professor de Lange’s book offers many suggestions for potential sources of affinity and embeddedness among business firms that can foster inter-firm collaboration. Strategic management literature has traditionally emphasized industry as the primary category for the study of strategic interaction among firms; international business literature has supplemented this category with that of the national origin of firms. But these are not the only possibilities. Professor de Lange’s work suggests that managers’



xiv

xv

social ties may play a key role as well, just as “social” ties among countries (country visits) play an important role in international governance. On the empirical side, this book also provides valuable lessons and examples for future scholarship to exploit. The most obvious one is the use of the voting records of international organizations as sources of empirical data. The United Nations may not be the only organization for which voting data is available. Similar data may be obtained for the World Trade Organization; for voting by the boards of directors of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and similar entities; or for a variety of other voluntary and public institutions of an international nature, from the International Postal Union to the International Labor Organization. Analysis of such records may allow not only replication of de Lange’s tests, but also testing of other hypotheses. And of course, there may be other publically available data in the archives of these entities, such as the minutes of meetings of their governing bodies, that yield further valuable data for the empirical researcher. The last implication of the book that should be highlighted is the potential for additional cross-fertilization between the fields of IR and international business. The book offers an extended and valuable discussion of the concepts of power and influence, particularly in IR. Yet the application of these concepts to inter-firm relationships still has much to offer. For example, the concept of influence could help scholars reach a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which firms are imitated by their competitors or even by non-competing firms. It is well known, at least anecdotally, that companies such as General Electric or McKinsey exert a great of influence by dint of the prestige accorded to their professional ranks, which makes them attractive managerial candidates for many firms even if they have no direct relationship with GE or McKinsey. In the opposite direction, IR could benefit from the incorporation of firms, particularly multinational enterprises (MNEs) as independent actors in the contemporary international system. The growing reach and impact of these firms in an increasingly globalized world has turned many of them into important actors in their own right when it comes to international governance and other issues of interest to IR scholars. Take the example of the World Economic Forum at Davos. The Forum is not only supported financially by MNEs, but also offers them a setting in which they can directly interact with heads of state and powerful politicians in order to affect public policies around the world on matters of importance to MNEs, such as exchange rate regimes, regulation of international capital flows, and the like. Or consider the well-documented leading role of Pfizer in the development of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Standards (TRIPS) and their inclusion in the international trade regime under the World Trade Organization’s purview.



Foreword

Foreword

To conclude, Professor de Lange’s book has important messages not just for those interested in the ability of international organizations to address the urgent governance challenges of our contemporary world, but also for anyone seeking to better understand how organizations, whether political or otherwise, interact with other organizations in a variety of settings. Even more broadly, social scientists will find here a valuable instance of crossdisciplinary research and original empirical work. We can only hope that they will be inspired to follow the path blazed by this book. C R Associate Professor of International Business, Sawyer Business School, Suffolk University



xvi

I   , this book examines globalization by studying the effects of external worldwide networks on international policy development in the United Nations. From an academic perspective, these are the effects of the embeddedness of nations in trade, military alliance, diplomatic and intergovernmental organization (IGO) networks on how our world is run. Although the United Nations has no legal authority, it has moral authority, and it has the membership and potential access to resources of almost all countries in the world while sustaining an international policy agenda that is practically boundless in scope. In effect, on many matters such as world security, the United Nations has become the counterbalance to the only superpower left, however friendly, the United States. Instead, from cultural and economic perspectives, we may agree that the world is multipolar over the post–cold war period studied in this book, 1990–2000, such that the European Union and Japan together with the “Asian Tigers” compete with the United States; other “poles,” China, Brazil, Russia, and India are still newly industrializing countries and, while they are carving out their place on the world stage, they are not quite yet counterbalancing powers. However, these countries can combine their efforts within the United Nations. Every vote in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has equal value because of the one vote—one country rule. This embeddedness of nations is a useful context for testing a strategy and organizations theory termed the “embeddedness view.” The main principle of this view is that social structure affects actions. The research underpinning this view uses network analysis to enact this social structure at the organizational level through international networks. Furthermore, rather than examining how networks affect actions, this study uses decisions as outcomes, a closer link in the causal chain to the original effects. This avoids the confusion arising from many potential alternative explanations for the effects on actions, more distant in the chain of causality. Research in strategic management tends to test more remote outcomes, creating greater uncertainty in the research; this happens because



Preface

Preface

measureable performance results in the firm context are reported. They are even more distant than actions, since performance is measured after the actions occur; for example, after the products are manufactured and sold, the reported performance measures are revenues and profits. However, innumerable factors could affect the available information, discussion, decisions, actions, and final performance measurements; also, it is difficult to be assured that the effects of the original phenomenon posited (i.e., embeddedness in this case) are directly responsible for performance. Decision data are not available from firms because decisions are privately made within those firms and may be considered confidential and may not even be recorded. In the international realm of the UNGA, decisions are publically recorded votes, so this is advantageous for testing theory. Further, the international context is more generalizable than is the firm context, even if one were to use multi-national corporations. Consequently, strategic management theory can be tested more advantageously in an international relations setting. In fact, both academic areas have been developing many concepts that are closely analogous, and a review of international relations theory in this book incorporates some further observations along these lines. Both areas can contribute to each other, as is pointed out in this volume. Some concepts discussed and developed include interdependence, dependence, independence, conflict, power, and influence. Other core concepts are developed and uniquely operationalized. Network measures are constructed and explanations are provided for how they operate in the various embeddedness contexts: Trade is economic embeddedness whereas alliances, diplomatic visits, and IGOs build “institutional embeddedness.” Institutional embeddedness is new within embeddedness theory because it has traditionally been defined with respect to economics. Mechanisms of power may underlie reciprocity in trade and alliances, whereas other types of influential forces underlie cooperation in the diplomatic visits and IGO networks that do not support relative power. This is where the “power” and “influence” for which this book is named arise in the study. Hypotheses tie the network variables to the cooperative-dependent variable that is similar voting in the United Nations. Thereafter, a panel data model and extensive additional analyses are used to test the hypotheses and the soundness of the model since the data offer many complicated challenges. Results are discussed and overall, support is found for the embeddedness view in both economic and institutional environments; the fact that embeddedness can stand up to these varying tests suggests that it can stand alone as a theory. It is a theory preferred over most others because it has greater explanatory power and is widely generalizable.



xviii

xix

The progression of this text is as follows. In part I, chapter 1, the strategy and organizations concepts and, more specifically the embeddedness view and network analysis, are introduced. In the same part, chapters 2–5, the trade, military alliance, diplomatic visits, and IGO networks are explored so as to explain and describe relationships amongst countries over the 1990–2000 period: How are they embedded with each other? In part II, the international relations side to the story is provided with a discussion and development of theory in chapter 6 together with illustrations that bring it alive in chapter 7. In Part III, the UNGA research context is described in chapter 8 and historical examples to illustrate this decision making context are discussed in chapter 9. Next, Part IV presents the research study in chapters 10–12. Chapter 10 describes the data and consequent model. Chapter 11 develops the specific hypotheses and chapter 12 reports results and provides some discussion of those results. Additional technical empirical analyses are found in the Appendix. Finally, Part V outlines the implications of this study which includes contributions to two main academic areas, strategic management and international relations. This study also has implications for managers and policy makers. Thus, this research study, while primarily an academic work, also addresses interests and concerns of those affected by globalization.



Preface




A        even if there is only one author. In this case, the most important influence is my deceased father, Jan H. de Lange, who instilled in me the values and confidence to forge ahead despite many barriers from start to completion. Publishing my PhD dissertation as a book is a considerable personal victory, and I would like to thank Professor Prescott C. Ensign for his experiential advice and for his introduction to Laurie Harting, executive editor at Palgrave Macmillan, who, along with Laura Lancaster and other staff, made this book possible. Many thanks also go to the anonymous academic reviewer involved in the publishing decision, whose advice was extremely helpful in turning the dissertation into this book. I would also like to thank those involved with my dissertation: Professor Terry Amburgey and Professor Daniel Trefler. I am additionally thankful to Dan for providing financial support. Moreover, I greatly appreciated the helpfulness of Professors Olav Sorenson, Tina Dacin, Ravi Madhaven, and Uli Menzefricke. I would also like to give credit to three bright and helpful research assistants: Grace Chan, Kasia Trzaski, and David Wright. Later, I contacted Professors Robert Keohane and Carlos Rufin, both of whom I am indebted to for their kind moral support. It has been tremendously motivating as I complete this manuscript over the last couple of months. Thank you so much. Finally, I have to mention that it is a coincidence that I am now publishing this work as a book. I had entered a PhD program with the thought of publishing it in this form because of the influence of an academic mentor who had done the same. But the idea fell by the wayside until almost six years later, after I was in touch with Scott Ensign. Not only does there seem to be a coincidence in the act of publishing a book, but also in the subject matter, the research, and the city in which I now reside as an assistant professor, Cambridge, Massachusetts. In fact, in 2005, as I developed the hypotheses for this study, this same professor and his co-authors published a paper that included ideas I had in my framework. At first, I was taken aback. Of course, I had to leave these ideas, as my own, out of my study. Instead I cited



Acknowledgments

xxii

Acknowledgments


their work and with gratitude received coding of IGOs from them. Thus, I believe I owe Professor Marc L. Busch thanks and recognition. Although not directly involved, he was an early inspiration and must have remained in the back of my subconscious mind. I hope he reads this book one day and takes some pride in his unexpected contribution.


T   to contribute to academic literature in the management and international relations fields by building upon embeddedness theory. It crosses boundaries because it tests strategic management and organizational theory that has its roots in sociology, in an international relations setting. However, in doing so, contributions to previous research in international relations are also made. Moreover, economists within the field of management may take an interest in the parts about trade and the econometric analysis. Thus, it is intended to be a multidisciplinary work that demonstrates the need for these multi-faceted approaches within the field of strategic management. In this introduction, I will outline some important ideas of this work; then, I will get to the research question and study approach. First, some organizational theory calls for recognition of the environment in which firms are embedded, yet more often it is ignored or not detailed enough. To study the firm environment that includes many different types of influences and stakeholders, a multidisciplinary approach is required. Furthermore, the title of this book combines phrases and words that reflect the combination of the areas in this book. For example, the concepts of “power and influence” are often thought of as terms from political science, but they are also prevalent in management work, and are specifically discussed in reference to embeddedness and networks here. The word “embeddedness” first stems from organizational theory, but is also used more informally in international relations literature. Embeddedness, in organizational theory, is the concept that social relations shape economic behavior such that social structure affects economic action (Granovetter, 1985; Sacks & Uzzi, 2000). In international relations, embeddedness has its analogy in complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2001). After explicating on the multidisciplinary discussion that underpins the motivation for this study, I will explain the questions that this work asks and explain its approach for addressing them. Studying the Firm Environment The firm environment that embeddedness theory identifies contains many different types of actors. These include customers, suppliers, other firms 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


Introduction

Power and Influence

that may or may not be in the same industry or related ones, governments, local community members, activists, and media, for a few examples. These actors represent different academic areas and are not easily classifiable into only one realm. For example, customers, suppliers, and firms may be economic entities because they buy and sell things, but they are also comprised of people who interact in social and political ways; this affects their economic activity. Since people are at the individual level of study, they are not only to be studied from sociological and political view points, but also the psychological. Thus, psychology is an additional useful academic area to understand along with sociology and political science. Moreover, local community members and activists have a stake in firms; for example, firms that pollute violate community norms and activists may assemble organized action against this type of problem. These behaviors can be evaluated from multiple points of view, perhaps sociology is dominant; but political science plays a role as activists attempt to gain government representatives’ attention to drive change. Moreover, firms and markets need structure and regulation. They are affected by government decisions and international organizations that develop worldwide consensus and standards, even governing commodity markets. Globalization is very political and requires an understanding of international law as well. Behavior in organizations is believed to be the study area of sociologists and social psychologists, but governments and other related organizations are considered the domain of political science. Also, the media make reports of historical significance that, at a current time, also affect behavior. Is the study of history together with the other areas mentioned relevant then? This high level description of the firm environment demonstrates the requirement for a multidisciplinary perspective and depending on the focus of the study, one or more academic areas may be emphasized. A strength of the embeddedness view is that it is not exclusionary to any one domain because it incorporates the firm environment. Some strategic management literature has emphasized and advocated a multidimensional, multi-theoretic approach as well as identifying the firm environment (Ansoff, 1987; Baum & Dutton, 1996; Garriga & Mele, 2004; Pfeffer, 1987; Shubik, 1958; van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Yet, many scholars remain cloistered in their traditional domains, continuing to produce contrived research to support theories that have little or only very partial explanatory value to the real business world. Without some holistic view, the theory does not make sense. However, once theory has erroneously been socially accepted, the goal becomes one of proving its validity, regardless. Moreover, finding evidence does not prove anything, yet this is the faulty emphasis in empirical work that lacks thoughtfulness in its direction, stemming from narrow theories. I suggest two options: combine theories or choose more realistic multidisciplinary theories. In this study, I choose to



2

3

emphasize the latter approach by strengthening embeddedness theory and I also draw from international relations theory, thus combining theories. Another approach, aside from choosing better theories or combining them, is to address questions at higher levels of analysis beyond the organization. In strategic management literature, the choice is usually the firm or industry level, but most work occurs at the firm level. Also, the industry level is still confined to a set of firms. The embeddedness view considers any relevant constellation of actors; networks specifically identify connections between them. The levels of analyses are between any type of actor, such as inter-unit or interorganizational (and higher levels), for example. Other theories include higher levels of analyses, too. Organizational ecology theory offers the options to use populations and communities of organizations; institutional theory also entails the concepts of communities and fields. Fields comprise a wider set of actors than only firms or the firms in a particular industry. Also, stakeholder theory, often associated with a branch of strategic management that is called sustainability, specifically takes into account a wide set of actors. It demands some multi-disciplinarianism and, whereas the other theories offer the conceptual tools, they are not often enough employed. The Title Is Multidisciplinary The title is representative of the multidisciplinarianism of this work. Power and influence are important concepts in international relations and strategic management. Related concepts developed in this book through an exploration of previous theory in international relations include dependence, interdependence, and independence. Sometimes, the words power and influence are used interchangeably, but power refers to a kind of coercive leverage over another actor such that the victim may do something it would otherwise not do (Keohane & Nye, 2001). In contrast, influence is related to the ability to be persuasive, in this text particularly through information. Particular positions in different types of networks suggest these characteristics. Moreover, power and influence are issues in areas of management literature other than networks; institutional theory discusses coercive isomorphism, and power is a core concept in resource-dependence theory, for some examples (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Theories about status, endorsements, and director interlocks are related to different types of influence, not necessarily related to power of the kind that is leverage (Davis, 1991; Podolny, 1993; Rao, 1994). These are only a few examples, intended to illustrate that strategic management often widely uses the concepts of power and influence; further discussion of these theories is out of the scope of this book.



Introduction

Power and Influence

Also, the terms power and influence summarize concepts from realist and international organization models of post–cold war international relations (Keohane & Nye, 2001). In a realist world, military power is commanding, whereas in an international organization model the structure of world politics is characterized by complex interdependence and leadership may be assumed by different actors or groups of actors in different domains (Keohane and Nye, 2001). Thus, weaker countries may be influential although they are not powerful. Additionally, power entails characterizations such that actors may be dependent, independent, or interdependent. This book discusses issues with these terms in previous literature; it has been controversial, and because they are related terms, they have been difficult to distinguish and disentangle. I suggest that dependence decreases until an actor is independent such that the two constructs may be on the same continuum. Also, whether actors have choice helps to identify the actor’s situation. If the actor chooses to engage with another, it is more likely interdependent or independent. In becoming interdependent, the actor may give up some autonomy and be less powerful, more vulnerable, with respect to its partner, but so is its partner with respect to it. A dependent actor would choose not to be, so it cannot be either of the others. A dependent actor has little to offer another in the same domain. For example, Australia is militarily dependent on the United States; whereas the United States could defend Australia, Australia could not save the United States in the case of attack. The United States is powerful and Australia is not; they are not interdependent in this domain. This does not mean that Australia is not helpful to the United States in monitoring security, for example in the South Pacific, but this is only reciprocity that the United States enjoys in return for its protection; it could compensate in a case where Australia decided not to cooperate. However, Australia does so primarily because it needs United States protection and cannot find a replacement for it.1 The Research Question and Approach The main question this study asks is, “Why do state actors vote cooperatively in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)?” In the literatures of networks and social psychology, external social structural influences on group decision making and cooperation have been of interest (Kameda, Ohtsubo & Takezawa, 1997; Mizruchi & Potts, 1998). However, in management literature there are substantial theoretical and empirical gaps in examination of how embeddedness affects strategic decision making at levels above that of the individual, and this is especially true in international settings (Granovetter, 1985; Pfeffer, 1987). The area of international relations



4

5

that studies strategic voting has not applied embeddedness or network analytic approaches which together can uncover these more difficult-to-observe social structural effects (McCarty & Poole, 1995; Rosenthal & Voeten, 2004; Voeten, 2000, 2001, 2005; Weisberg, 1978). This cross-disciplinary approach of applying organizational theory to an international relations setting is relatively unique at the time of writing this (except for Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2006; Ingram, Robinson, & Busch, 2005), even though international organizations, such as the UNGA, are excellent contexts for organizational theory testing. Consequently, the focus of this work is to contribute to organizational theory and development of the embeddedness view. More specifically, it studies embeddedness effects on cooperative strategic decision making within an organization composed of actors representing governments of states, an interorganizational setting. Scholars suggest that further development of the embeddedness view, a developing theory that considers economic action in the context of social structure, would include investigating the content of ties, the intensity of relationships, and reciprocal embeddedness (Dacin et al., 1999). This study will consider economic and institutional types of reciprocal embeddedness, which involve ties having different contents and different timing between building the tie and acting on it. Economic embeddedness is based on economic exchange. In this study, it is the immediate exchange of goods and services for monetary compensation among trading partners. In contrast, the ties of institutional embeddedness are built on common interests rather than monetary transactions and include international alliance agreements, IGO memberships, and visits by one country to another. These ties have disconnects between the initiation or existence of the tie and action based on having the tie; they are less reliable. In any of these cases, the intensity of the ties may be considered. Moreover, little study has been done of the linkages and cross-level mechanisms of embeddedness, including the presence of multiple mechanisms of embeddedness or a nested view (Dacin et al., 1999). This study can test nested embeddedness because of the political and cultural embeddedness within the international setting that moderates the institutional embeddedness. Two main mechanisms creating reciprocal embeddedness are considered, each relying on different types of tie contents that lead to different relationship dynamics. One is power-oriented, positing that relationships of interdependence and dependence lead to relationships involving reciprocity that occurs outside of these relationships, e.g., issue-linkage (Axelrod, 1997; Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Molm, 1994). This mechanism operates in the case of economic embeddedness. The other is influence-oriented, based on either similarities among actors, referred to as homophylic influence and/or



Introduction

Power and Influence

information-sharing. Actors sharing similarities, such as similar social positions, will share enough commonalities that they will develop similar world views primarily through information-sharing (Winquist & Larson, 1998). So, this latter mechanism is not based on the leverage that one actor has over another; rather, it emphasizes information-sharing that builds common views and leads to similar decisions. This is more often the case for institutional embeddedness. The international setting offers an environment conducive to testing the nested effects of cultural and political embeddedness with institutional embeddedness. The similarity of states on these dimensions is expected to facilitate communication pathways such that they can more easily develop common understandings because they already have a basis for them; it is the effect of homophily, but tested at the interorganizational or intergovernmental level rather than at the oft-examined individual level (Brass, 1984; Burt, 2000; McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Furthermore, because of the smoother relationships, they will tend to interact more, further enhancing and building a shared set of views that result in similar voting (Axelrod, 1997; Borgatti & Foster, 2003). Cultural and political embeddedness facilitate the relational embeddedness of institutional networks through improved communication leading to shared views that ultimately build stronger ties that influence decision making (Hansen, 1999). Also, the decisions of the UNGA are accurately recorded public information in the form of roll call votes, so rather than testing the effects of embeddedness on survival or performance outcomes as is often the case (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Burt, 1992; Galaskiewicz, Hager, & Larson, 2004; Minor, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990; Schilling & Phelps, 2005; Uzzi, 1996), the effects can be tested on the decisions, a closer link in the chain of causality, that is, embeddedness affects the decisions actors make, which lead to actions and, ultimately, performance outcomes. Social structure governs many intervening processes that regulate key performance outcomes (Uzzi, 1996). The context of this research is useful for investigating all of the aspects under study here at a level beyond that of the individual. Since UNGA countries have several types of networks with different bases for their network ties and varying network positions, the four types of embeddedness and their underlying mechanisms are conveniently investigated in this setting.



6

Understanding Embeddedness



Part I




The Embeddedness View and Network Analysis I    , decision-making processes are often not as transparent as we may like them to be; external influences interfere prior to formal meetings in which decisions are made (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). These external influences are related to the embeddedness of organizational actors in networks and this affects the actors’ decisions in the focal forum. This chapter introduces the embeddedness view that is useful for theorizing about this process. Also, it introduces some network concepts that are used later to develop more specific constructs related to embeddedness. Specifically, this study investigates whether and how external international networks influence decisions in the UNGA, the focal forum; these are the effects of embeddedness. The international networks that build the embeddedness include those of trade, military alliances, diplomatic visits, and intergovernmental organizations. The concepts and dynamics are of interest because they generally inform us about power and influence in strategic management and international relations contexts. However, this chapter will tend to discuss the embeddedness view and networks from a management point of view because this has been the more recent context of scholarship. Later chapters will clarify the correspondence of these concepts with international relations theory. In several types of forums such as meetings of boards of directors, union negotiations, government parliaments, and international organizations— this phenomenon affects decision outcomes and, ultimately, the organizations’ policies and actions (Davis, 1991; Davis & Greve, 1997; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). For example, directors of firms are often members of exclusive social clubs where they may have discussions and dealings. They may,



Chapter 1

Power and Influence

in fact, be members of many clubs and through these social networks may gain information they believe is valuable enough to affect their decisions, consciously or subconsciously (McPherson et al., 2001). Thus, the effects of embeddedness are highly consequential to all of our organizations because these organizations have decision makers who also engage in external networks. A series of examples of decision-making cases reported in the press are discussed in later chapters. These examples provide illustrations in the context of unions, boards of directors, governments in diplomatic relations, and international organizations. Often, the hidden dealings among actors are referred to as “backroombargaining,” and part of this can be vote buying, which affects the outcome of decisions (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). Backroom bargaining is taken for granted, but it has been extremely difficult to find evidence of it via academic studies because these dealings are not recorded and not observable. This study uses network methodology to uncover the embeddedness effects on actors who make important strategic decisions. Although many do not consider embeddedness a theory, it is a well-recognized perspective that I will review here. In fact, this study builds on this perspective and provides empirical support to make a strong enough contribution to defend the contention that it is a theory. At the very least, I would suggest that embeddedness will become a theory as more contributions are made to it. Its strength is in its being closer to reality than any other existing management theory. In the following sections, I will begin by describing embeddedness; next, I will add some vigorous debate currently extant in the field. Following this, I will explain how embeddedness and networks create context that affects decision making, and finally I will propose types and mechanisms of embeddedness not previously elucidated. Some of the mechanisms that include concepts of power, dependence, and interdependence tie in with international relations theory discussed in later chapters. The Embeddedness Perspective The embeddedness view originates in management literature and, more specifically, comes from economic sociology; thus, it is discussed in this chapter in the context of the firm, even though this research is in the international context. The transition to the international realm will occur later, after this initial explanation of the basic theory. Embeddedness will also be demonstrated to apply to a more general institutional context that is not necessarily economic, thereby widening its applicability. I will later explain why “institutional embeddedness” strengthens embeddedness as a theory. Embeddedness is the concept that social relations shape economic behavior and as a result social structure affects economic action (Sacks & Uzzi,



10

11

2000; Granovetter, 1985). Note that embeddedness has been defined in terms of economic actions and this study seeks to broaden this definition by avoiding the narrow economic orientation. Considering social relations as shaping actions makes it a contextual view that can illuminate some of the external social structural factors that influence cooperative strategic group decisions which are reflected in voting behavior. This study examines decisions rather than final actions since decisions are intermediate steps toward actions and reflect the effects of embeddedness in a more direct connection. This approach eliminates many possible alternative explanations for given decisions and actions. Embeddedness theory presumes that the environment challenges actors to survive and demonstrate their comparative advantage (Jones, Hesterley, & Borgatti, 1997). The environment includes a variety of actors who are interlinked such that there is little distinction between the environment and organizations. These interlinked actors, of which an organization is one, make up a social network. Within a network, organizations gain benefits from each other—from their interconnectedness—and from their positions in the network with respect to each other; the network is both a conduit and a form of social capital (Burt, 1992; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Because of this characteristic of mutual reliance, embeddedness is much more a theory of interdependence than dependence since networks of actors are the environment. Dependence tends to produce a hierarchy of control of the powerful over the powerless and this is not the emphasis in network governance. Whereas there are many benefits from connectedness, there is also a dark side to embeddedness: Actors can be overly embedded, constraining instrumental action (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). This means that challengers and independent actions may be stifled by social control. When actors are highly interdependent, conflict is reduced because challenging one another could lead to repercussions. It is easier and safer to agree and follow the rules of the game. Whereas cooperation can be productive, if no conflict is allowed and there are no challengers, new ideas are shut out, information is redundant, and a decrease in diversity may lead to decay because the network is not changing according to changing conditions (Uzzi, 1997). In a later chapter this is illustrated by an example of the over-embeddedness of the business elite in France. From this perspective, actions and outcomes in the broader environment are affected by actors’ dyadic relations and by the structure of the overall network of relations that includes trust and information sharing (Jones et al., 1997). Gulati (1995) provides an example when he discusses the antecedents for alliances. He says that trust is a “type of expectation that alleviates the fear that one’s exchange partner will act opportunistically” (Bradach & Eccles, 1989:104); the idea is akin to Simmel’s notion of mutual faithfulness



E mb e d d e d n e s s V i e w & N e t w o r k A n a lys i s

Power and Influence

in social relationships (Simmel, 1978: 379). Gulati (1995) explains that knowledge and deterrent-based trust are built through repeated alliances between firms.1 Alliances may begin as equity ties, but over time, future alliances will not require hostages and administrative governance; moreover, trust offers more flexibility such that alliances are less constrained. However, dyadic trust is not only built through direct experience with a partner; it is also built through knowledge of each others’ reputations in the network. Reputation is one of many important social network mechanisms, and the following paragraphs elaborate on network theory so as to explain that relationships beyond the dyad are important. This theory works at three interrelated levels of analysis: interpersonal, inter-unit, and interorganizational (Brass, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). When behavioral assumptions are inter-relational, individual actors are not the focus; rather, the focus is on relational ties between actors. For example, because firms are connected to each other through supplier, customer, and alliance type relationships, they exchange information and learn from each other. This collective information enhances their decisions. Therefore, firms act in a “collectively rational” way—they value the benefits of being part of a networked collectivity and thus are motivated to reciprocate and build trust through various processes (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998; Gulati, 1995). Also, actors are “expertly rational” because they are connected to others who have information; the network offers them benefits of both information (access, timing, and referrals) and control (tertius gaudens, entrepreneurial, motivation) (Burt, 1992). Position in a network can affect the limits to this rationality, which thus varies and is not a constant. For example, an actor could be part of a dense and tightly connected cluster, a clique, wherein several actors are all connected to each other; one consequence is that they circulate the same information among each other (Burt, 2004). Alternatively, an actor may be a broker, connected to many others in different clusters; in this situation, the actor has access to diverse information (Burt, 2004). The networks literature has investigated brokerage and other related concepts, not discussed here, and extols the advantages of this position as related to higher social capital (Burt, 2004). As mentioned, this view assumes that actors are collectively rational which has consequences for network governance. Actors with a collectively rational perspective work to achieve pareto-improved solutions and to maintain their relationships through reciprocity (Sacks & Uzzi, 2000). Moreover, network forms of governance are a response to exchange conditions of asset specificity, demand uncertainty (generated by seasonality), task complexity, and high frequency of interactions.2 These exchange conditions lead to the structural embeddedness of transactions, a concept to be explained later.



12

13

Accordingly, social mechanisms are incorporated into governance; they are used for coordinating and safeguarding exchanges, and they include: restricted access, macro-culture, collective sanctions, and reputation (Jones et al., 1997). Thus, reputation is the result of a collectively rational decision about the perceived trustworthiness of a network member. Other unique concepts of embeddedness include: (1) structural homophily, which refers to actors that are similar in centrality (a more central actor has more connections to others in the network), and (2) structural differentiation, an emergent systemic property that captures the extent to which actors come to occupy an identifiable set of network positions, each position characterized by a relational profile (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Thus, these concepts identify relationships that are other than dyadic and that may be termed structural properties. Research attempts to understand the significance of them. When firms are embedded in networks, their organizational boundaries are permeable and, in fact, some implications of such permeability are that this theory (1) blurs the boundaries of the firm; (2) recognizes a new constellation of forces as being crucial to economic success, that is, government, higher education, skilled labor pool, and research institutes; and results in (3) the spread of technologically advanced, smaller units of enterprise. Expansion occurs, therefore, through various cooperative interorganizational relationships (Powell, 1990). The connections to the outside world suggest that there are external influences on an organization and this ties in with what is of interest in this research demonstrating that various external types of networks influence decision making. Embeddedness Debates At this point, the embeddedness view has been basically described; further discussion will enhance comprehension of embeddedness. Now follows explication upon some of the issues in management literature. First, the theory’s differences from a competing theory are elucidated and then conceptual arguments within the field are explored. Embeddedness versus Transaction Cost Economics Embeddedness is evolving into a theory that offers an alternative to transaction cost economics (TCE), a main difference being that actors do not act atomistically outside a social context (Granovetter, 1985) and with wideranging implications. TCE takes a restricted view that does not consider any other parties except those involved in the transaction, and makes very delimiting assumptions about their motivations and behavior. The addition




Power and Influence

of social context adds required realism and, thus, the embeddedness view is more explicatory. When a theory improves upon another in this way it is considered to be preferable according to the philosophy of science (Lakatos, 1974). This will be elaborated upon later in this chapter. When theories of governance are discussed, transaction cost economics (TCE) inevitably comes up. Embeddedness either challenges or extends TCE, depending on one’s preference. Due to the linkages among actors in the embeddedness view, as mentioned, pareto-improved solutions are sought such that the TCE assumption of opportunism (Williamson, 1975) becomes inappropriate because this behavior is punished in networks through the ability to sanction members who abuse their network partners (Uzzi, 1997; Jones et al., 1997). Moreover, in the embeddedness approach greater exchange intensity in a close business relationship stimulates expectations of providing better services than what is set out in the contract (Uzzi, 1996), but this is not necessarily so in TCE. In TCE, when a transaction becomes a small-numbers bargaining situation, then the buyer or seller will opportunistically take above-market rents or shirks, based on his or her selfinterest (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). The embeddedness view interposes that reciprocity rather than calculativeness becomes important in the network, not only out of fear of sanctions, but also because of the value of reputation (Sacks & Uzzi, 2000). Generally speaking, in the embeddedness view human intentions are variable rather than constant, as assumed in the TCE approach, so therefore embeddedness allows for a greater range of possibilities and, as a consequence, greater realism. Through the use of embeddedness conceptualization the field of economic sociology has managed to rebuff other theories’ simplifying assumptions, such as those of TCE, that under-socialize economic systems through concepts of the atomistic, self-interested actor who is a born deal-maker working in a selfregulating market that exists within an autonomous economy (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007; Granovetter, 1985; Smith [1776(1979)]). However, in order for the embeddedness view to mature and become a theory, it must be able to define itself without relying solely on explications of how it stands out against other theories, according to a review by Krippner and Alvarez (2007); it is this problem that scholars in the field of embeddedness must solve in order for the field to generate a positive research program. Controversy within the Field As mentioned, there is also conflict within the field and a recent review of embeddedness literature contrasts Granovetter’s (1985) embeddedness view with that of earlier work by Polanyi (1944 [2001]) (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007). This literature suggests the two scholars’ contextualized approaches



14

15

are different in that Granovetter takes an exterior view whereas Polanyi takes an interior view. This will be further discussed in this section (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007). The two views seem difficult to reconcile, according to Krippner and Alvarez (2007), but I suggest a resolution here. The “external” view is one that addresses the relational bases of social action in economic contexts and the “internal” view is one of the integration of the economy into broader social systems (Madhavan, 2008; Krippner & Alvarez, 2007). Although the review recognizes the different levels of analysis at which Granovetter and Polanyi work—Granovetter being micro and meso, whereas Polanyi is macro—this is not the main differentiation that the authors choose to stress and I tend to agree with them on this point (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007). However, while I see that Polanyi’s view may be appropriately called “interior”, I do not think that Granovetter’s is properly labeled “exterior.” Moreover, I disagree with the contention that the two scholars are describing different points of view; I believe these views are reconcilable because I disagree that Granovetter intends to express a view of social relations as shaping economics from the outside (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007). First, I will explain why Granovetter’s view is not “external” and then I will link the Polanyian and Granovetterian views. Granovetter views social relations as intertwined with economic transactions rather than as being external to them, and I will use his own words as solid evidence of this. In a general way, there is evidence all around us of the extent to which business relations are mixed up with social ones. The trade associations deplored by Adam Smith remain of great importance. It is well known that many firms, small and large, are linked by interlocking directorates so that relationships among directors of firms are many and densely knit. That business relations spill over into sociability and vice versa, especially among business elites, is one of the best-documented facts in the sociological study of business. (Granovetter, 1985)

His discussion carries further evidence including mentions of trust, cooperation, antagonism—and the list continues (Granovetter, 1985). These are aspects of relationships that are intertwined in the economic relationships, and are not forces from outside. I would like to take Granovetter’s last comment above a step further and suggest that business relations are a type of social relation simply because humans or human organizations are involved in them. It is impossible to separate from the social world any type of action or systems that humans engage in together. We separate love from friendship relationships and call them different types of ties in networks; similarly, economic relationships are




Power and Influence

just another type of tie. Bringing in network concepts (later to be explained in more detail), it is the tie contents or the type of tie that joins actors and that defines the relationship type (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Burt, 1992). The nodes of these networks are always humans at the individual level or human-created entities at the organizational level. In this study, nation states and IGOs are the nodes; nation states are geographic areas carved up based on political boundaries determined by humans, having governments that are run by humans. IGOs are human organizations. Regardless of whether the nation states are engaging in trade via their firms, such that economic transactions are the ties, or are in military alliances—institutional ties based on promises of future cooperation in security matters—these relationships are sociological because humans must be involved in them. Thereby, I now bring the Granovetterian and Polanyian views together. From a macro view, economics is a human system; thus, as Krippner and Alvarez (2007) describe Polanyi’s view, economics is interior to the social world. However, precisely because economics is a social system, sociology is intertwined in the economic world at the micro and meso levels. So, the two views are part of each other and do not make sense without each other because they are the same, only coming from different directions; one is topdown (macro), the other bottom-up (micro and meso). The “solution” to the “problem” with which economic sociology purportedly is confronted, according to Krippner and Alvarez (2007), stares us in the face. The reason this debate arises—a debate that assumes that somehow one system created by humans may be separated from others and these others need to define themselves; that is, in this case, economics is separated from sociology and needs to define its agenda vis-à-vis economics, according to Krippner and Alvarez (2007)—is because of our need to compartmentalize the world; we break it down into parts so that we may analyze them in feeble attempts to understand the parts and perhaps, the whole. The world is interconnected and, as theorists in the social sciences, we have to remember that our theories will often emphasize one aspect of the human world over others because of our limited ability to understand the world all at once, in its entirety, at any particular time. The view that there is a division between sociology and economics is socially constructed—it is only in our minds and then, because of the macroculture that is created, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that we allow to become institutionalized. The solution is that we simply have to use our minds and make choices to change the lens that we don’t notice exists—after you’ve been wearing glasses for a while, you forget they’re sitting on your nose. Look in the mirror and see that you’re wearing glasses. Don’t like the frames? The lenses are no longer clear enough? Then, get a better pair of glasses; but, of course, you will not likely ever have perfect vision, even with the correction.



16

17

Additionally, some aspect of the human world may be emphasized because powerful elites prefer that we choose a particular focus (Granovetter, 1985; 484). In recent times, and perhaps since Adam Smith, many believe in a taken-forgranted ideology that to act self-interestedly, even opportunistically, is human nature. However, this is a kind of manipulation not new to the field of strategy, whether military or business strategy; to “divide and conquer” is an old tactic— specifically, to place our own needs over all others fragments us. It is convenient for our employers since we work harder because we do it for ourselves, but this ultimately benefits our employers since we are not paid what our labor is worth or else no profit could be made. Moreover, if this behavior is justified as human nature, then it gives license to those who normally, or want to, act badly. These beliefs about human nature have nothing to do with scientific knowledge; it is ideology convenient for those who are powerful and of poor character. This ideology replaces older belief systems that were also formerly not to be questioned. Human history is rife with examples of powerful elites inculcating the masses with various belief systems that facilitated control. Religions are examples and belief in “the market” is no different. To some, I could appear a heretic for expressing such a view, but so were others in past times who challenged the dominant myths and in retrospect were correct; they were speaking about obvious truths of which others lacked awareness or felt suppressed from exposing. Our maintenance of academic freedom and freedom of speech is our recourse in the face of ideology; ideology is not truth and, therefore, has no place in academia; it seeps in, however. The embeddedness view relieves us of these constraints by not making such exaggerated and specific assumptions about human nature. The Networks of Embeddedness Create Context Within strategy literature, many scholars agree that a more contextualized concept of strategy would better reflect the reality of how strategy is devised (Baum & Dutton, 1996; Pfeffer, 1987). Why is embeddedness a contextual view and how does context matter to decision making? The view is supported by the body of knowledge of social networks and can be operationalized using network analysis; networks create context. Embeddedness cannot only be relational, reciprocal, positional, and structural, but it can also be nested. Relational embeddedness refers to the dyadic tie between two actors and can be uni-directional or bi-directional (Jones et al., 1997). Reciprocal embeddedness refers to the idea that actors reshape networks and create new ties (Dacin et al., 1999). This refers to the active process of network building (Gulati, 1998; Dacin et al., 1999). Structural and positional embeddedness have been confused in the literature. Essentially, these are notions of the effects of networks on actors beyond




Power and Influence

the dyad. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) describe positional embeddedness using concepts that describe or compare actors’ positions in the networks, such as equivalence and centrality. The structural equivalence of two actors occurs when they are connected to the same actors; centrality is measured in a few ways, but it essentially means that the most connected actors are most central in the network. In comparison to positional embeddedness, structural embeddedness is used in reference to indirect ties (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Indirect ties impact the network through common third-party effects which lead to concern for reputation and finding opportunities through referrals (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). However, Jones, Hesterley, and Borgatti (1997) discuss structural embeddedness in reference to the network’s overall structure or architecture; it influences behavior through social control and provides the foundation for social mechanisms, such as restricted access (knowing with whom to exchange and whom to avoid), macroculture (the common values, norms and beliefs shared across firms), collective sanctions (condemnation or ostracizing of perpetrators), and reputation (Jones et al., 1997). Furthermore, Zukin and DiMaggio (1990: 18) use the term “structural embeddedness” more loosely, relying on Granovetter’s conceptualization: it is “a contextualization of economic exchange in patterns of ongoing interpersonal relations” (Granovetter, 1985). For the sake of simplicity and to avoid confusion, I am going to call embeddedness that considers network structure beyond the dyad “structural embeddedness” because positions in the network only exist as a result of structure. Finally, nested embeddedness, rather than a network property, is an embeddedness concept that has not been well-defined in the literature since it has not been much explored (Dacin et al., 1999). Dacin et al. (1999) describe nested embeddedness as different types of embeddedness that moderate one another. A more recent effort has suggested the definition is “an individual being in a nested structure of institutional layers” (Kenney & Goe, 2004). However, this definition is very specific to the paper, and Dacin et al.’s is very general. The interpretation found in this book will be the more general one since nestedness does not imply a particular level of analysis— only that one type of embeddedness may create a context affecting another type of embeddedness, thus the concept of a moderating influence in this research is consistent with Dacin et al.’s definition. Context affects decision making because of actors’ ties. Ties are the important linkages ultimately building the network context, so it is important to explain some characteristics of ties. A tie establishes a relation between a pair of actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) and ties may have different strengths. Tie strength is consequential for influencing strategic decisions because they involve highly complex situations in which incomplete information is the rule (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1986). How are weak and strong



18

19

ties differentiated? A weak tie is easily broken without damaging the actors involved, whereas breaking a strong tie has definitive consequences to the parties. However, a weak tie takes less time and resources to build and maintain and has less richness to offer. A strong tie needs attention, but the depth of the relationship has value because of its intensity—trust and understanding make it possible for partners to build greater mutual understanding so they can be more helpful to each other. So, a strong tie is more costly and risky, but offers different and, more often, greater rewards. For example, a trade relationship that is purely transactional and wherein neither party is dependent on the other is a weak tie; if the trade transactions stop, each loses something, but neither is seriously damaged. In comparison, FDI (foreign direct investment), a strong tie, involves a large long term investment by a firm in a foreign country; it is an investment that is not easily retracted if things go wrong; a loss could cause the firm great financial damage. Research tells us that weak ties tend to be valuable for exploration and discovery (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992); they are best used for discovering new information that is not complicated or tacit (Hansen, 1999). In contrast, strong ties tend to be influential in strategic decision making because of the imperative for the transfer of more complex and tacit information (Uzzi, 1996; Hansen, 1999); strong ties enable actors to convey fine-grained information and facilitate joint problem solving (Uzzi, 1996). They also have a greater requirement for reciprocity (Hansen, 1999). Finally, ties that create context affect decision making because they change the type of actor rationality that can be assumed; the context provides information to decision makers. We often think to ourselves, when given limited information to make a decision, that it really “depends.” That is, we need to know the context in which we are to apply the information. When embedded actors make decisions they are collectively and expertly rational rather than boundedly rational (Sacks & Uzzi, 2000; Simon, 1997; Williamson, 1975) or fully rational (Axelrod, 1997). While decision makers use heuristics and, because of their isolated nature, are boundedly rational in information processing theory and transaction cost economics (TCE), they are, on the other hand, expertly rational in the embeddedness view because they have ties that reduce the boundedness through improved information transfer and more even information distribution within the network (March, 1999; Sacks & Uzzi, 2000). This “evenness” means the network experiences some common conditions or has shared understandings such that the conditions are not different for every node in the network. When a board of directors or the UN General Assembly makes a strategic decision, the actors of these organizations cast their votes not only with the information they have heard at the formal meeting, but also with all the information they have derived from their networks of strong ties.




20

Power and Influence

Four types of embeddedness are proposed in this study, whereas in most management writings the theory is defined by one type. Rather than referring to it in the literature as economic embeddedness, it is simply, “embeddedness.” However, the concepts of the theory are not confined to economic contexts and are generalizable to another type of setting based on the type of ties, such that actors may be institutionally embedded. This is based on institutional ties that, particularly in this international work, are built on military alliances, diplomatic visits, and IGO memberships. For example, military allies could build weak or strong ties, depending on how closely they work together. If they share sensitive security information that would be dangerous to either if it leaked, then the tie is strong. If one partner defects from such a close relationship, it could put itself at risk of retaliation by the other partner. On the other hand, if they write an agreement down on a piece of paper and rarely discuss it, then it is a weak tie. Since context is not only built through direct ties, embeddedness can also be cultural and political. These concepts are used to test nested embeddedness and to create necessary controls for the study; they are not, on their own, the focus of the study. Explicit ties create context, but they are not absolutely required for the creation of context. For example, countries that have similar political ideologies could be politically embedded because they share common understandings not communicated necessarily through observable ties. Their peoples may read the same books and be exposed to media that expound the same kinds of perspectives and their absorption and acceptance of this understanding results in their choice of similar types of political systems and approaches, such as democracy or communism, liberalism or conservatism. In international measurements, the continuum is one of democracy to autocracy. Their knowledge that they have similar views may cause them to respect each others’ decisions and reactions such that they influence each other without direct communication or, when they communicate, it is more influential than when they discuss the same matters with others who do not share the same politics; this makes them politically embedded. A similar dynamic could occur when countries know they share the same culture. Economic and institutional embeddedness are more easily observable because of network ties than are the other types of embeddedness just mentioned and may involve mechanisms of differential power or influence through homophily and information sharing, depending on the forms they take. In contrast, political ideological and cultural embeddedness are difficult to observe with certainty and are based on value homophily which tends to lead to influence rather than to differential power. Value homophily



Types and Mechanisms of Embeddedness

21

(McPherson et al., 2001) is the general term for the mechanism underlying political ideological and cultural embeddedness. Value homophily is “based on values, attitudes, and beliefs” and “includes a variety of internal states presumed to shape our orientation toward the future behavior” (McPherson et al., 2001; 419). These relationships of power and influence are elaborated upon here in the context of management literature; in a later chapter, further elaboration will be included in a discussion of previous research in international relations which helps clarify the ideas even more. Both academic areas are helpful to each other. When embeddedness places economic transactions in a social context so that economic transactions can lead to long-term relationships based on reciprocity, trust, and reputation, then actors are said to be economically embedded (Granovetter, 1985). Institutional embeddedness occurs when actors are tied through any type of institution.3 Notice that these types of embeddedness, economic and institutional, have observable ties. Ongoing trading relationships can be traced monetarily. Institutional linkages are recorded or reported in documents. For example, military alliances are formally documented, IGOs have membership lists, and visits between countries are reported by the press (King, 2006). One mechanism that may underlie embeddedness is based on differential power. Tied actors may act independently, dependently, in a mutually dependent fashion, or interdependently. Dependence and mutual dependence imply power imbalances caused by inherent strengths and weaknesses as well as the timing of reciprocity. One actor may have more to gain from the relationship than the other because it is inherently weaker in some manner, that is, in a military alliance in which the weaker actor may have poor combative capabilities or low technology equipment and thus, be dependent. Mutual dependence is a case where actors require each other to perform, but their performance is sequential in that one actor may benefit more than the other; in fact, if one actor completes his obligations to the agreement, the other can defect by not reciprocating. Because of the sequential nature of the actions and derived benefits, this type of relationship is riskier than one of interdependence (Axelrod, 1997; Molm, 1994). Interdependence is less risky because it implies a group-like dynamic. In the case of groups, members must all cooperate in order to reap benefits (Molm, 1994) and, therefore, the actions of groups tend to be simultaneous.4 Interdependence in groups involves more equal levels of reliance and simultaneity in the sense that no benefits go to any actor in the group until all actors have made their expected contributions (Molm, 1994; Axelrod, 1997). In fact, interdependence and the resultant cooperation build social capital; the interdependence maintains the structure of the relationships (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997).




Power and Influence

Other types of embeddedness operate through homophily and information-sharing. Few studies have applied the concept of homophily at the interorganizational level. One study by Li and Berta (2002) found that investment banks conform to the homophily phenomenon by choosing other similarly high status banks to engage in deals together. Political and cultural embeddedness occur when states align based on shared values, or value homophily. In international relations, the idea that homophily creates shared views is put into different terminology. For example, according to Huntington (1996), the post–cold war world may be multipolar based on cultural differences. During the cold war, the world was generally accepted as bipolar based on political differences—there existed a duel between democracy and communism (Russett & Oneal, 2001: 60, 92, 111). The value homophily joins the states like a macroculture and nowhere is it officially recorded that this is the reason for their alignment. Zukin and DiMaggio (1990: 14–22) offer a definition of cultural embeddedness as “the role of shared collective understandings in shaping economic strategies and goals.” Alternatively, this has been more generally defined as, “the ways shared understandings and meanings come to give form to organization activity, structures and process” (Dacin et al., 1999: 328). What has been presented is an overview of the relevant concepts of the embeddedness view, explanations of the different types of embeddedness, and the various mechanisms that may underlie each type of embeddedness. In developing the theory and hypotheses, I will discuss why certain mechanisms accompany the various forms of the different types of embeddedness to explain why they affect decision making. These mechanisms generate differential power and/or influence which explains why the embeddedness has an effect on decision making. Subsequent chapters in Part I provide more information about international contexts by exploring the various types of networks chosen for this study: trade, military alliances, diplomatic visits, and IGOs. It will become apparent from the descriptions and analyses that countries are “embedded” with each other on these bases.



22

International Trade Networks F   of networks are created from the data sets used in the study: trade, alliance, diplomatic visits, and IGO networks. I will discuss each type in the following four chapters; this chapter will be devoted to international trade networks that in recent times have become very dense. To discuss them, it is necessary to examine smaller subsets because in their entirety—and even by region—they are too densely interconnected; network diagrams are not informative when all the countries are shown with all their connections in one picture. However, the statistical model, described in a later chapter, uses all the network-related data available in the data sets for all the UNGA countries each year. Even when using subsets, it is difficult to draw many conclusions about the relationships unless there are obvious outliers or patterns; knowledge of the subject can help to find anticipated patterns, but it is difficult to find unanticipated patterns that are hidden. The statistical model is an improved approach to researching the relationships, but this examination and discussion of the network diagrams helps to familiarize the reader with the data; some relationships may be uncovered and it may help to anticipate or corroborate results of the statistical model. Thus, I will discuss trade networks in terms of how we understand them today—by major trade regions—first, to see whether voting in the UN may be affected by these constellations. Following this, I will examine voting patterns among the industrialized (“North”) and developing (“South”) nations from a World Systems Analytic View (Wallerstein, 1974) and see whether trade linkages, or the lack of such linkages, potentially affect cooperation in these North-South relationships in the UN. Also, I will compare these core-periphery trade-voting patterns with potential trade-voting between industrialized nations and newly industrializing nations, such as those of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and CEE nations (e.g.,



Chapter 2

24

Power and Influence

the Baltic states, states of the former Yugoslavia, and others such as Poland and Hungary). This approach investigates whether there are differences that may relate to the rise of these countries in terms of their wealth and G20 world club status compared to other developing nations.

Major trading regions are examined based on their regional trade agreements so there is coverage of most of the world. The European Union, ASEAN (Asia), Mercosur (South America), NAFTA (North America), and COMESA (Africa) trade linkages and voting patterns will be considered. European Union. See figure 2.1 for a view of a subset of European Union (EU) trade networks—twelve European Union countries represented as both importers and exporters. Trade is directional and in the diagrams arrows point from the exporter to the importer. Notice that most countries reciprocally import and export (e.g., in 1995, Italy exported $6.431 billion to Belgium, while Belgium exported about a third more to Italy, $9.506 billion); consequently, it is not obvious which countries have higher in-degree centrality than others—they are about the same on this measure among themselves. When the entire set of UNGA countries is included, in-degree centralities are more varied. Another attribute of trade networks, already alluded to, is that they are “valued” in terms of millions of dollars; this is the dollar amount of trade being exported from one country to another in the year. European Union countries are used to illustrate trade networks because one of the main goals of the EU is to develop a free-trade zone, an attempt to be a single market that allows free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. Also, the countries used for this illustration are chosen by date— earlier and later members—because I can check whether over the period of this study those countries that were candidates for accession voted in the UNGA in accordance with prominent trading countries already in the EU in order to help themselves—the candidates—gain acceptance. Twelve of the twenty-seven EU countries were chosen: six original members (France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands—represented by yellow circles on the network diagrams in figure 2.1), three members that joined in 1995 (Finland, Sweden, and Austria—represented by blue circles on the network diagrams in figure 2.1), and three members that joined in 2004 (Poland, Malta, and Hungary—represented by pink circles on the network diagram in figure 2.1). Members that joined in 2004 would have been under consideration and thinking about their own candidacy in the 1990s because accession is a long process. European integration requires a state to satisfy economic and political conditions known as the Copenhagen criteria



Regional Trade Networks

10.0 2.0 7.0

3810.0 3.0 FIN

4672.0

453.0

1218.0 12036.0

Correlates of War (COW) country codes are next to the country names listed in the chart below. Also, the countries are listed by the date that they joined the EU.

4406.0

589.0 4092.0

3979.0 229.0

248.0 72.0

Figure 2.1

1248.0

3404.0

39617.0

245.0

34697.0 807.0

1164.0 2482.0

27269.0

267.0

ITA 5359.0

396.0

2305.0 11028.0 23405.0 794.0 736.0

23513.0

4868.0 71.0 LUX

979.0

3257.0 975.0

FRN

2263.0

1148.0

47580.0 1220.0 28670.0 5806.0

16229.0

610.0

1421.0

36964.0

1663.0

737.0

1.0

33.0 30.0

1158.0 1987.0 31503.0

740.0406.0 14.0

344.0

96.0

28885.0 1312.0

15.0

380.0

962.0

549.0

2004 Hungary (HUN) Malta (MLT) Poland (POL)

HUN

1271.0

1227.0

4657.0

799.0 1146.0 1318.0

483.0

137.0

2275.0 1704.0 11403.0

9506.0

14486.0

26687.0 BEL

885.0

57.0 701.0

375.0 37352.0

27553.0

1995 Austria (AUS) Finland (FIN) Sweden (SWD)

352.0

529.0

22.0

1026.0

3628.0

7736.0

6431.0

1957 Belgium (BEL) France (FRN) Germany (GFR) Italy (ITA) Luxembourg (LUX) Netherlands (NTH)

3.0

4829.0 632.0

1550.0

GFR

In the diagram, original EU members, having joined in 1957 are white circles, those that joined in 1995 are black circles, and those that joined in 2004 are grey circles.

76.0 13.0

8680.0

357.0 2967.0

50523.0

8.0 148.0

3.0

180.0 1,0567.0

POL

123.0

2075.0

1097.0 268.0

165.0

4059.0 2818.0 214.0

540.0

1.0

1.0

9004.0

Due to the density of the trade networks, a country subset is used in the analysis. Only 12 of the 27 European Union members are chosen.

MLT MLT

311.0

909.0

16830.0

Trade Subnetwork of 12 EU Countries, 1995.


1111.0

NTH

36.0

1267.0

AUS


SWD 3463.0

26

(a result of the Copenhagen summit of June 1993). These criteria include a secular, democratic government; rule of law; and corresponding institutions and freedoms. A key point is that the EU Treaty dictates that every current member state and also the European parliament must agree to acceptance of a new member. Consequently, countries with membership in this trade club are powerful with respect to candidate countries’ success in attaining EU membership, including trade and other benefits that go with it. Perhaps in the UNGA, these candidate countries vote in accord with prominent EU members in order to appease them. In 1990, trade data show that even prior to accession, EU countries are trading with candidate countries. In 1990, only the yellow-circle countries are EU countries and all others are candidates. Notice that even tiny Malta trades with all the other countries. In 1995 and 1999 Poland, Malta, and Hungary are not yet EU countries. I will perform an illustrative experiment to see whether similar voting and EU membership candidacy (membership in a trading block with prominent trading countries) trend in the same direction. I will examine voting patterns between France, one of the most prominent members of the EU, and the other six EU candidates (See figure 2.2 below). An obvious trend in figure 2.2 is that EU candidate countries vote more similarly to France over time. For comparison, three other countries, Russia,

Country Patterns of Voting with France in the UNGA 100 Poland (POL 290)

90

Italy (ITA 325) 1957 Original Member

Italy (ITA 325) Austria (AUS 305) Hungary (HUN 310) Malta (MLT 338) Finland (FIN 375)

% Similar Voting

80 70

Sweden (SWD 380)

60 50

Russia (RUS 365)

40 30 20 Egypt (EGY 651)

10 0 1990

1995

1999

Year

Figure 2.2 Countries.

Similar Voting with France by EU Candidate and Experimental Comparison



Power and Influence

27

Italy, and Egypt—none vying for EU membership—are included in the chart (Italy is already a member, and is part of the trading block). France is not influential on Russia and Egypt with regard to EU candidacy; notice that correspondingly, their similar voting patterns are lower in comparison with those of the candidate countries and do not rise as dramatically over time. Italy is already in the EU and, while it votes with France, it does not over time show the same pattern of increasing vote similarity. As emphasized earlier, this experiment is only meant to be illustrative, since it presents only correlational information about a limited set of data; many other factors other than France being a prominent country within a trade network may be at play in these countries’ similar voting patterns. Perhaps, for example, a country being in the same geographic region plays a role? This is why the statistical model that can control for various alternative explanations (presented in a later chapter) is an improvement over this data exploration. Asian Region Trade Networks—ASEAN. ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is a Southeast Asian community of ten member countries. The founding nations are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Viet Nam in 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. I can use the data set to examine patterns of membership and trade for the latter four countries which joined in the 1990s. The ASEAN community is more than a trade association; it also encompasses political-security, economic integration, and socio-cultural solidarity. The ASEAN charter does not outline requirements for selection of members and it seems to be based on geographic proximity as well as on an attempt to create some collective economic power in the face of China’s growing regional power. Thus, it is not a group that can bestow great benefits on its members as in the case of the EU. ASEAN is more of an expression of loose, protective solidarity. Consequently, membership is not as difficult to attain as in the case of the EU and it is doubtful that reciprocal voting in the UN would be motivated for the attaining of membership. Data indicates that in the UN, ASEAN members vote similarly 95–100 percent of the time with each other, with Africa, the Middle East, and some other Asian nations. This potentially paints a picture of a divide between the three regions—Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East—and the rest of the world. ASEAN members are not exchanging favors with wealthy nations to obtain trade relationships or other benefits—they are not voting in compliance with them—so, any similar voting is likely a reflection of their common interests as developing nations. South American Trade Networks—Mercosur. South American nations have not appeared in the analysis so far, so it is interesting to investigate their



INTERNATIONAL TRADE NETWORKS

Power and Influence

voting patterns. Mercosur, or the Southern Common Market as of 1991, comprises one large Portuguese-speaking country, Brazil, and the Spanish nations of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Portuguese and Spanish are the official languages of the group, in comparison with the EU and ASEAN, which both choose English even though they are multilingual zones. Not choosing English, generally the language of business today, may be a sign of confidence in a given region. The goal in that case is to be more than a trade pact and more like a community. South America is not a single trade zone since this Southern Common Market does not include countries such as Chile and Peru. Membership is more difficult to attain, as exemplified by Venezuela’s awaiting Paraguay’s acceptance of its membership. Since nations like Brazil and Argentina are making progress, there are benefits of membership in building linkages with these wealthier nations. Under such circumstances, non-members desiring entry may be motivated to reciprocate with members that have the power to keep them out or delay membership. Whether South American countries consider UN votes valuable as part of reciprocation is a question. Issues in South America have not been high on the UN voting agenda, so UN votes may not seem worth trading. Since Mercosur was founded within the time period of the data, I can look into this question. Considering 1993, 1995, and 2000 as a few sample years spanning the data set’s time frame, in 1993 Brazil is using its votes in the UN to support African, some Middle Eastern, and Caribbean nations, and is voting only secondarily with other South American countries. Venezuela, Chile, and Bolivia are countries that may later want entry into Mercosur and at this time they are doing the same as Brazil. These countries are not voting with Western nations and are not particularly favoring each other. In 1995, the same pattern appears except they vote more often with other South American countries and not only with those of Mercosur. In 2000, the same patterns continue. South American countries seem to be supporting poorer nations in the world, including their cousins in the Caribbean, as well as with wealthier Middle East oil-exporting nations. Venezuela and Ecuador are part of OPEC and this could be an influencing factor in regard to ties with the Middle East. In essence, some solidarity is observed, but not necessarily in deference to Mercosur nations. South American nations are either identifying with, or supporting, developing nations in the UN and the motivations for this are not clear except that there may be some empathy. North American Trade Networks—NAFTA. Do NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement) partners, the United States, Canada, and Mexico, vote with each other in the UN? NAFTA was ratified in 1994, so I will compare voting patterns before and after the trade agreement was put



28

29

into place. In 1993, just before NAFTA, Mexico has the highest incidence of voting similarly with other countries: above 90 percent, and specifically with South American and some African countries. In the UN, Mexico is not voting with its wealthy continental neighbours. Canada is voting with Europe, including Eastern Europe, but similarity is in the 80-percent range with only a few cases in the 90-percent range. Canada votes similarly with the United States 73 percent of the time. Mongolia and Israel vote similarly with the United States, as do European nations such as the Netherlands, England, France, and Germany but compliance rates are below 90 percent with only a few cases in the 80 percent range and most others well below. I would infer that Mongolia wants military protection from the United States against potentially threatening neighbours Russia and China. Israel also covets American support in its contentious situation which is very high on the UN agenda in this time period, so reciprocity seems to be working in these special cases. Of the nations examined so far, the United States seems to be one of the countries with the fewest similarly voting allies in the UN. So, prior to NAFTA, member countries do not seem to be reciprocating with each other by using their UN votes. Canada and the United States overlap in regard to their European partners, but each also has different close partners and Mexico is not part of this Western club. By 1995, Mexico is still not voting with Canada and the United States; Canada is only 40 percent compliant with the United States in this year. By 2000, Canada is back up to 71 percent compliance with the United States. Mexico is very much in compliance with some African nations, up to 100 percent, and remains in high compliance with South America but not with its wealthy North American trade partners. Thus, NAFTA is not a binding force among these nations and does not prompt reciprocity in the UN. The Mongolian and Israeli cases suggest that reciprocity with the United States is protection-oriented rather than trade-motivated. African Trade Networks—COMESA. COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) is one of many Regional Economic Communities (REC) on the African continent. Many African nations belong to one or more of these communities which have free trade goals and some other ancillary goals such as defense coordination. As of 2008, RECs such as CEN-SAD, COMESA, ECOWAS, EAC, SADC, and IGAD are coming together under the AEC (African Economic Community) which is very much like an EU in its planned institutions, even including a common currency. COMESA is the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. The founding states in 1994 were Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbawe. COMESA aims to




Power and Influence

integrate its member nations economically with a focus on trade, customs and monetary affairs, transport, communication and information, technology, industry and energy, gender, agriculture, and environment and natural resources (see http://about.comesa.int/lang-fr/overview/vision). Some membership changes have occurred over the years and I will focus on two that fit into the time frame of the data, 1990–2000. Egypt joined in 1999 and Mozambique was a member from 1994–97. Both Mozambique and Lesotho left this REC to focus on building another, called the Southern African Development Community (SADC). SADC aims to work on coordinating development projects among member nations to reduce their reliance on South Africa (see http://www.sadc.int/). Similarly to earlier analyses, I will examine whether membership affects voting in the UN. For example, does Egypt tend to vote with other members in COMESA whereas Mozambique, after leaving the group, does not? Perhaps I’ll find that Mozambique changes its voting patterns in such a way that before leaving, it votes with COMESA members but afterward, does not tend to do so. No particular requirements exist for membership except that a member country agrees to and abides by a set of principles that include non-aggression toward other member states. African nations have a culture of solidarity that may override economic logic (Xinhua, 1999). The nations in COMESA are also overall very poor, thus, voting similarly is expected to be an expression of solidarity rather than of power relations; solidarity is a closer concept to homophily—being under similar difficult economic circumstances and being African. Moreover, since many countries are part of more than one REC, there may be little motivation to vote with particular REC members; in the UNGA, on the other hand, African nations vote as a block. In fact, voting patterns suggest that African nations do not side with those in their REC(s). For example, Zimbabwe and Kenya are both founders and current members of COMESA and over the period Zimbabwe votes at a high rate of similarity to Kenya, in the 70–80 percent range, but at a lower rate with Kenya than do Egypt, Mozambique, or Morocco. Each of the latter countries is a different membership case: Egypt became a member later, Mozambique was a member and left, and Morocco is not in the same African region and would not likely ever join COMESA. Still, these factors do not appear to affect voting in the UNGA since annually they all vote at around a 70–100 percent similarity level. One may expect that in the year that Mozambique left COMESA, or thereafter, it would vote differently, but this is not the case. There is unity among African countries in the UNGA. Perhaps, they cannot confer benefits on each other in a bilateral sense because they are poor. The greatest benefit they can give to each other is to stand together for their interests in a forum that gives them some weight based on numbers due to the one country–one vote principle.



30


31

World Systems Analysis asserts that the world has a capitalist division of labor so that it is divided into a core and periphery. The core is the wealthy North that has the means of production and the periphery is the poor South that supplies the labor (Wallerstein, 1974). Since profit is the result of value taken from those who provide the labor, labor is paid less than it is worth; thus, there is a shift of wealth from the periphery to the core (Wallerstein, 1974). The North is composed of the industrialized or Triad Nations—those of North America, Europe and Japan—whereas the South is Africa, South America, and Asia. Noting the patterns of cooperation of voting in the UN (thus far discovered by examining trade groups), this World Systems pattern emerges. Canada and the United States vote with Europe, whereas South America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Africa tend to vote cooperatively. Similar voting is a sign of solidarity, a kind of reciprocity that is related to being in a similar situation—homophilous relationships—rather than power. It may even be an expression of defiance since the unified voting is much stronger among the South than the North. However, some evidence did surface that unbalanced power relationships are reciprocated through UN voting—Israel and Mongolia vote with the United States, likely for military and political protection against threats in their region. Also, in trade regions where it is difficult to attain membership because all members must agree to new entrants, countries aspiring to membership can be motivated to vote similarly with those members in powerful decision-making positions. Additionally, some nations of the South may not reciprocate because their trade with the rest of the world is so miniscule. For example, Africa’s trade is only 2–3 percent of the world’s trade, so what does it have to reciprocate for with the West (WTO, 1990–99)? Given voting patterns, foreign aid from the West is not a motivating factor for reciprocation and one can only postulate that aid is perceived as being owed so that no recompense is required in return. Southeast Asia’s trade (ASEAN) is 4–6 percent of world trade and South America’s trade (Mercosur) is about 1 percent of world trade (WTO, 1990–99). The poor South has no reason to reciprocate and the next investigation into BRIC nations may help clarify this situation since over the time period of the data they are transitioning away from being part of the poor South and have stronger trade linkages with industrialized nations of the North. Trade Networks—North and BRIC Linkages BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are moving up the ladder of development and part of that process is their involvement in



Trade Networks—North and South Linkages

32

Power and Influence

a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances, linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances. . . . Interdependence . . . refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 229)

Recognizing, though, that Russia and China, transition economies, are on the UN security council and historically have not voted similarly with the other Western nations, it may be more informative to see how India votes; we’ve already looked at Brazil as part of Mercosur and have seen that it does not vote with the North. In 1990, India votes at very high rates with Mexico, the Caribbean, South America, and Africa, over 90 percent, and up to 100 percent in compliance. In 1993, India is voting the same way, with slightly lower levels of compliance—not so often over 90 percent. So, it is spreading out its cooperation, but not extending it to the North. Indian voting in 1995 and up to 2000 has a similar pattern with higher rates of compliance, as in 1990. Notably, Cuba is one of its most similar voters. So, India remains part of the South block of voters even though total trade value with the United States, the largest North market, is growing at a compound annual rate over the period 1990–2000 of 11 percent and by 2000 is valued at approximately $11 billion. Similar results are found for other BRIC nations, except for Russia. China rarely votes similarly with the United States: usually a 0 percent rate; in 1998 it reaches 8 percent, yet its total trade grows at a compound annual rate of 20 percent over the period and in 2000 is valued at $119 billion. Brazil’s similar voting ranges from 0–15 percent, more often in the low teens, and its trade growth rate with the United States is 5 percent, not as high as other nations. Russia is most cooperative and trade with the United States ranges from 5–53 percent, more often in the 30 percent range. Also, its trade grows over the period at a rate of 19 percent, similar to China’s fast rate; but the value of trade in 2000 is much smaller, at about $7.8 billion. It makes sense that Russia may be more cooperative than other nations because it has sought and received American help to make its transformation, both politically and economically. In contrast, other nations have made their changes relatively autonomously, especially Brazil and China, both maintaining their political philosophy differences. Brazil has been a social democracy and China, a oneparty communist system. Brazil’s success has been oriented to growth and development from within, whereas China’s strategy has been to protect its internal markets, keep its currency low, and promote exports.



globalization and world trade. Globalization is increasing globalism; globalism is


33

Overall, in the case of Russia, weak linkages may exist in terms of tradevoting reciprocal behavior. The other BRIC nations, while trading with the North (represented by the large American market in this analysis), do not reciprocate through UN voting.

The Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries include: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro. These countries have become interesting since the fall of the Soviet Union broke its hold on them. The Baltic States—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—have obtained their independence. Several of these nations have joined the EU. In May 2004, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia joined as did Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007. These countries are changing their political and economic systems to be more like and to join with the West. As mentioned earlier in the section about the EU, both Poland and Hungary began to vote similarly in the UN as they desired entry to the EU; not only does the EU have stringent policies for allowing new members, but applicants must be accepted by all current members and this can make for a difficult process. I’ll look into the voting patterns of these CEE nations that joined the EU in 2004 and also of some of the CEE nations that are further from EU member status. Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia are distant and uncertain members of the EU over the period of this study. In 1993, they vote both dissimilarly and similarly with a small set of countries. Croatia votes with Greece, Armenia, Spain, Andorra, and San Marino at 90–100 percent compliance. Bosnia and Herzegovina choose to vote with an odd assortment: Azerbaijan, Turkey, Solomon Islands, and Fiji at about 100 percent compliance. Macedonia, which became a member of the UN in 1993, votes most closely, but only at a 66 percent rate, with South Korea, Singapore, Gambia, Nepal, and Uruguay, countries that are not obviously related. Macedonia does not follow any crowd in 1993. However, in 1995 things change. By then, Croatia and Bosnia are allied in a war against the Serbs, and a world consensus is demonstrated when NATO bombs protect Bosnia. Thus, voting in the UN is reflective of this support such that a vast majority of European nations, Japan, Canada, South Korea, New Zealand, and Russia are voting at 90–100 percent compliance with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Slovakia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria are part of this group. Trade and economic considerations are not likely motivating this cooperation since the war in the region is an obvious driver and would also prevent constructive economic activity in the affected nations. 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


Trade Networks—CEE Linkages

Power and Influence

In 2000, voting patterns change to match the EU accession issue. The nations further away from consideration—Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—are voting together and are not voting as closely with the dominant European powers as are the two countries vying for EU membership, Bulgaria and Slovakia. Clearly, the CEE nations are using their votes from 1995 onward in a cooperative manner to suit their objectives. When times are violent and uncertain, they seek military support and later, when things begin to settle down, they seek community membership, which is largely for economic stability, including free trade with their wealthy European neighbours. Summary—Trade-Voting Behavior This analysis provides some possible insights about cooperative voting. Reciprocity seems to be first motivated by common interests that can be termed homophily; when countries find themselves in a common plight, they use the UN principle of one vote per country to act as a voting block to advance their interests. Thus, the world is very much divided according to World Systems Analysis, where there is a wealthy industrialized core and a poorer Southern periphery that seeks to protect itself. It is not inferred that there is any change as nations begin to dig themselves out of developingnation status and begin to become wealthier, as is the case of most BRIC nations except for Russia. Although China, Brazil, and India have access to American markets and are able to trade, and over time these relationships are increasing in value, they do not change their stance in the UN in regard to their unity with the Southern periphery. However, reciprocity also occurs when there are clear bilateral power relations. When a country is under threat from neighbours or wants to gain some direct benefit, it will vote similarly with its benefactor. This is surmised in the cases of EU accession or when US military or political protection is an imperative, such as in the cases of Israel and Mongolia, and more weakly when Russia sought help from the United States in its transition. Trade, as for example in the case of EU accession, is likely a motivating factor so there is probably a trade-voting relationship. Finally, cooperative voting also occurs in support of UN principles such that behavior does not have to be motivated by homophily, of the kind mentioned, or bilateral power relationships. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1992–95 involved human atrocities, including genocide and other human-rights violations, prompting a near global reaction calling for a stop to it. Thus, voting in the UN reflected this world-wide consensus, perhaps a broader type of value homophily that is represented by UN membership.



34

Military Alliance Networks I   , other reasons were found in addition to trade that are likely to lead to cooperative voting, and security issues are probably a component that induces reciprocal behavior in the UN. See figure 3.1 for alliance networks of 1990 and 2000 that include all UNGA countries. From 1990–2000, only years in which a significant network change occurs are discussed, but for simplicity not all the diagrams are shown. In these networks, an alliance exists as a network tie or it does not, types of alliances are not included, and a tie is non-directional because each agreement is bilateral. So, either there can be bidirectional arrows between countries that are officially allies according to binding agreements or, as can be removed, the arrows is done so the diagrams are cleaner to view. What is interesting about these diagrams are the obvious clusters of allies. Also, some bonds are broken and created over time, sometimes joining or disconnecting clusters. In 1990 there is an African cluster (many West African countries) joined to what I will refer to as a Middle Eastern cluster by Mauritania (MAA), an Islamic country in northwest Africa. In all the years except 1999, Mauritania is the broker between these clusters. In 1999, the clusters are completely separate. Mauritania, a former French colony, became independent in 1960. While under military rule previously, it legalized political parties in 1991, so over most of the period of this study it has a civilian government. Another point about these two clusters is that from 1992 onward they are isolated from other alliance clusters. Previous to 1992, Russia has alliances with two countries in the Islamic cluster, Iraq and Syria. Russia is the broker between the Islamic and European clusters, but from 1992 onward Russia is part of the European cluster. Moreover, there are other smaller groups of countries with whom Russia links prior to 1992, but afterward, they are set adrift in



Chapter 3

36

Power and Influence 1990 Alliance Network of All UNGA Countries

African cluster

European cluster

South American cluster

2000 Alliance Network of All UNGA Countries Former Soviet States and Asian cluster

European cluster

Middle Eastern cluster

South American cluster African cluster

Figure 3.1

Alliance Networks of All UNGA Countries.

dyads, triads, and a quartet—many are sets of African countries, formerly British, French, or Portuguese colonies; also, there is a South Asian group made up of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Prior to 1992, India was connected to Russia. 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


Middle Eastern cluster

37

The European cluster is, predictably, joined to the Latin/South American cluster by Canada and the United States. Also, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and South Korea (beginning in 1992) are individually connected to the United States. These latter connections last until the end of the study period. However, in 1992 South Korea, while connected to the United States, is also connected to North Korea. North Korea’s only other connection is with China which alone is connected to North Korea. By 1994, North Korea has disconnected from South Korea to form a dyad with China. In the 1999 network, China has new connections with some former states of the Soviet Union. In 1994, the world appears polarized, having two major clusters: a “Western” cluster (Europe and the Americas with some notable exceptions such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea) and a tenuous African/Middle Eastern cluster. An Indian triad (India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan) is also significant because of the huge population and political economy it represents. This configuration remains for most of the study period except that in 1995 the new Russia is connected to a cluster made up of many of its former soviet states, now independently recognized in the UN: Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, Belarus, Tajikistan, and so on. Given these observations regarding the alliance networks, some rudimentary analysis was done tying similar voting to the cluster patterns, tie changes, and in-degree centrality. For example, since the United States and Canada tie the European and American clusters together, through many connections on both sides, I presuppose that their high centrality makes them prominent and powerful and as a result other countries tend to vote in accordance with them. However, I will just choose one, the United States. I can sample countries in the “Western” cluster, in the “Afro-Mid East” cluster and countries more isolated in triads or in the quartet. A comparison will be China: Does a country that seems so powerful on the world stage, yet with few official alliances, command a great deal of influence in the UNGA? The results, demonstrated for the United States in figure 3.2, suggest that it is the countries of the West, particularly the Europeans, who tend to vote more similarly with the United States. Denmark and the Netherlands have NATO in common with the United States which may make them closer allies than the South American countries in this exploration, Peru and Brazil. Historical relationships are an obvious possible factor. Other countries tend to vote differently from the United States. A graph is unnecessary to show the voting pattern with China since it is essentially the opposite of what is found for the United States. NATO allies Denmark and the Netherlands rarely vote in accordance with China whereas 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


Military Alliance Net work s

Power and Influence 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Denmark (W-E) 390 Netherlands (W-E) 210

Peru (W-A) 135

Brazil (W-A) 140

Angola (I-Q) 540 Jordan (AM-M) 663

Pakistan (I-I) 770 Nigeria (AM-A) 475

Ghana (AM-A) 452

Kenya (I-D) 501 India (I-I) 750

Syria (AM-M) 652

1990

1992

1994

1999

2000

Year Legend for codes used in the graph (The codes refer to a country’s position in the alliance network, as discussed earlier.) (W–A) Western country in the American cluster (W–E) Western country in the European cluster (AM–A) Afro-Mid East country in the African cluster (AM–M) Afro-Mid East country in the Middle East cluster (I –I) Isolate country – relatively isolated; from the Indian triad (I–Q) Isolate country – relatively isolated; from the quartet (I–T) Isolate country – relatively isolated; from a dyad

Figure 3.2

UNGA Country Voting Similarity with the United States.

the other countries frequently vote similarly with China. It seems that alliance agreements only sometimes predict similar voting in the UNGA. In fact, there is predominantly a negative relationship between having an alliance agreement and similar voting in the UNGA. During the cold war, the United States and Soviet Union were the most powerful nations in terms of military strength and afterward, although the United States is the most militarily powerful in the world, Russia still maintains a sizeable presence (Baker, 2010); however, Russia is so broken down and, consequently, ineffective that other nations are not worried about its continued expansion; instead it is contracting and many former soviet countries gain independence. One reason why nations do not vote with the United States in the UN may be that there no longer is an aggressive Russian security threat, so their voting motivations are instead governed by other concerns that may be culturally, philosophically, or geographically motivated. Homophily of interests was suggested in the previous chapter. Earlier, it was found that Israel and Mongolia were voting with the United States,



% Similar Votes

38

39

and it may also be noted that NATO allies likely vote with the United States. Let’s get a more comprehensive view of which nations are voting with the United States or Russia post–cold war and, when it makes sense, try to correlate these votes with military alliances. When nations vote with either of these powers, it may indicate other types of security threats, ones not related to the cold war. Also, it is interesting to see whether Russia has any allies after the cold war. The voting pattern with the United States or Russia over 1990 to 2000 is telling and the following discussion is of compliance at 80 percent or greater. In 1990, all the usual European allies—Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg—are voting closely with the United States, but, it’s a relatively small group of seven nations. Not even Canada is one of them, although it is perceived that this country relies on the United States for protection. In contrast, a very long list of about 75 countries, including those predominantly in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, are voting similarly with Russia. This does not reflect cold war alliances because, for example, most of Africa is made up of former Western colonies who were American allies. By 1992, the voting pattern has changed dramatically, such that only 12 countries are voting with Russia. These include Canada, the Scandinavian countries, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Australia. Thereafter, for the rest of the decade, only a handful of nations vote the same way and this could be in part a signal of Russia’s waning military and economic power; Russia no longer has any pull on the world stage whereas the United States gains some. The United States gains support over the decade until 2000, when not even the allies are supportive; this is the year Bill Clinton leaves office. George Bush then assumes the presidency in 2001. In 1992, Israel votes cohesively with the United States, but this does not continue and the United States receives support in the decade from Canada and the Scandinavian and Eastern European countries, in addition to the usual seven European friends. Over this decade, the cold war is finished and old alliances are not so consequential. Both the United States and Russia have lost support by the end of the decade. This signals that countries do not need protection from the most militarily powerful because, increasingly, the path to power is not by force vis-à-vis other nations. However, this does not mean internal strife has been eliminated. Problems in the Middle East with respect to Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) dominate the UN agenda. Additionally, countries are unifying on other issues rather than against the threat of war; they are building regional communities, initially based on free trade, but with many other goals, and these are similar to the EU model in many cases as discussed previously.



Military Alliance Net work s




Diplomatic Networks G   , what is dominating the diplomatic agenda over the decade of the 1990s? The cold war is over and the powers-that-were do not have as much power in the UNGA; of course, Russia and the United States maintain their veto power on the UN Security Council, but this is not the forum under examination. Issues of the most heightened importance are discussed there whereas the UNGA offers an arena for greater diversity of issues since the agenda does not have to be as urgent or securityrelated and all countries are involved. The world is more likely split along the traditional North-South lines at this time and protective communities are growing up. Aside from the UN issue agenda that clearly puts activities of the Middle East at the top (see table 8.1 in chapter 8), perhaps examining the diplomatic-visits networks will provide more information about the embeddedness of nations and what drives this embeddedness. I will explain the diagrams, analyze a prominent country in the diagrams to see if voting is related to its position, and then discuss the visits as they relate to major events in each region of the world. See figure 4.1 for an example of the network diagrams of diplomatic visits by all UNGA countries in each year examined from 1990–2000. They are different each year because countries change whom they visit and while each year’s activities will be discussed for brevity not all diagrams are included. These diplomatic-visits networks are directional and nonvalued. The arrows are in the direction of the visited country. Although the networks are different each year, the high-degree centrality countries appear to be the United States and the United Kingdom (UK); arrows are in both directions, so they have both in-degree and out-degree centralities. The cases of other countries vary from year to year. For example, in 1990 and 1991, Iraq seems to have many visitors, but this attention dies down in 1992. Another example is China which is quite active in most years except for 1998. The overall pattern of the network is consistent—it has one large,



Chapter 4

42

Power and Influence PAN PRK BEL CON

ROK

DRC INS

MAL

GUA

CHN

OMA

LEB

FRN

BAH UKG

JPN

DRV SRI

KUW SAU RUS

AUL

JOR

PHI

LIB IRQ

USA IRE MAW

YUG

LAO

LBR

ITA

IRN

ROM

ALB

ISR

POL

IND NAM

UAE

NTH TUR

SIN

EGY

SYR

CZE

NIG DEN

HUN CUB

SWD

CDI GAM

COL

BRA

Figure 4.1

Network Diagram of Diplomatic Visits by UNGA Countries, 1991.

major cluster, not tightly connected, and around it some smaller isolated groupings of countries, groupings that vary from year to year. The statistical model will use in- and out-degree centrality, but for a rough exploration of the data, I investigate whether countries tend to vote with a high-degree centrality country such as the UK. I check to see whether countries, connected to the UK or not, vote in accordance with it in the UNGA. At first, it appears that countries not connected tend to vote with the UK, but a more prevalent (and likely pattern) is that European countries tend to vote with it. No particularly informative patterns are found, so a statistical model is required. Since regional issues may be influencing diplomatic visits, I next make related network observations about diplomatic activity. In each of the regional sections below I discuss the visits made by the countries of that region rather than the visits they receive because, otherwise, there is duplication. European Diplomacy Certain European countries stand out as playing a part in international diplomacy. First, I will review some of the diplomatic activities of these nations each year and then summarize some observations; I will do the same



THI

43

in each of the following regional sections. In 1990, the UK visits Argentina, Bahrain, the United States, and Iraq, and not many other countries are active on the same level. Sweden visits Bulgaria, the Netherlands visits Colombia, Czechoslovakia visits the United States, France visits Vietnam and Libya, Spain visits El Salvador, and Turkey visits Qatar. I classify Turkey as European since it eventually will be part of the EU. In 1991, Turkey visits Ireland, Russia, and Sweden; the Netherlands visits Iraq; Italy visits Jordan; and the UK visits Guatemala and Lebanon. In 1991, the UK is less active. In 1992, France visits Iraq and Vietnam; the Netherlands visits Bahrain; the UK visits China, Australia, Kenya, Mozambique, Mexico, and the United States; and Hungary visits Canada. In 1993, the UK visits Mexico, Argentina, Spain, Croatia, Australia, Cambodia, China, and Mexico. Ireland visits the UK, and the Ukraine visits Israel. The UK is very active in 1993. In 1994, Sweden visits South Africa; Belgium visits Chile; Denmark visits Czechoslovakia; the UK visits Kuwait, Cuba, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia; and Romania visits Iraq. In 1994, the UK seems to focus on the Middle East. In 1995, Hungary visits Spain; the Netherlands visits Bosnia; Norway visits the UAE; the UK visits Pakistan, Jordan, Croatia, Russia, the United States, Bosnia, Turkey, Ukraine, Singapore, Peru, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and the Ivory Coast; Croatia visits Jordan; France visits Japan, Croatia, China, Cuba, and Macedonia. In 1995, the UK is very busy again all over the world, likely both addressing problems related to the Bosnian War and maintaining important links with Middle East countries, possibly for security, among other issues. Also, this year France steps onto the world stage more actively. In 1996, the UK visits Cyprus, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Brazil, Kuwait, Cuba, Bosnia, India, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, the United States, and Vietnam. France visits the UK and Indonesia, Italy visits Tunisia and Poland, Norway visits Poland, Finland visits Morocco, Hungary visits Romania, and Romania visits Bulgaria. The Eastern European nations are taking more initiative—perhaps related to their independence from Russia. In 1997, Italy visits Albania and Argentina; Denmark visits Brazil; Turkey visits Cyprus; France visits Egypt and Mali; Croatia visits Indonesia; the UK visits Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Kuwait, and Argentina. The UK spends more time in Southeast Asia this year. Also, over the years, the South American country that has been of greatest interest seems to be Argentina and Brazil has entered the picture, perhaps part of the transformation that is going on in that region. In 1998, Ireland visits Belgium; the UK visits Turkey, Romania, China, Egypt, Brazil, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria, and Syria; Italy visits Brazil; and Norway visits France. The UK usually makes trips to Saudi Arabia



Diplomatic Net work s

Power and Influence

and/or Kuwait. The UK was highly involved in the defense of Kuwait against Iraq in the 1990–91 Gulf War and took part in the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort (Auerbach, 1991; Rashid, 1991). Although the UK is self-sufficient in petroleum due to North Sea oil, it maintains a close friendship with Saudi Arabia. In 1999, the UK visits the United States, Thailand, Japan, Israel, Russia, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ghana, Spain, Nigeria, Libya, Italy, Turkey, and Macedonia. Belgium visits Albania. In 2000, the UK visits Ukraine, Russia, Australia, India, Nepal, the United States, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone. France visits Poland, Belgium, and Lebanon. The UK is very active almost every year in visiting other nations and it attempts to visit the entire world over this time period; it consistently visits the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. Perhaps its former role as a dominant colonial power has instilled this habit. France is second to the UK in diplomatic visits. The Netherlands seems to make timely visits associated with issues of major concern; in 1991, it visits Iraq, likely related to the Gulf War, and in 1995, it visits Bosnia, likely related to the conflict in Bosnia. Other European nations make occasional visits, but clearly the UK is involved in most of the diplomacy. South American Diplomacy South American diplomacy in this discussion includes Central America and the Caribbean in addition to the continental countries. In 1990, Venezuela visits the UK and Iraq, Belize visits Turkey, Colombia visits the United States, Brazil visits Iraq, El Salvador visits Cuba, and Nicaragua visits Panama. In 1991, Panama visits South Korea, Cuba visits the United States, and Belize visits the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In 1992, Argentina visits France and the United States. In 1993, Brazil visits Colombia, Cuba visits Argentina, Nicaragua visits Japan, and Venezuela visits Ethiopia. In 1994, Chile visits Belize and the United States. In 1995, Uruguay visits Angola, and Colombia visits Cuba. In 1996, Argentina visits Libya. In 1997, no activity is found. In 1998, Venezuela visits Mexico, Brazil visits Turkey and the United States, and Paraguay visits Brazil. In 1999, Paraguay visits Brazil, and Cuba visits Russia. In 2000, Bolivia visits Sweden, and Argentina visits Malaysia. Compared to British activity, South American countries are not as diplomatically active, possibly because they are focused on dealing with internal problems. In 1990, around the time of the Gulf War, both Venezuela and Brazil visit the aggressor, Iraq; otherwise, no South American countries visit Kuwait or the Middle East in this decade. South American nations have access to oil and are probably not concerned about security issues related



44


45

Middle East Diplomacy Overall, Middle Eastern countries are very busy, primarily with each other. In 1990 Syria visits Egypt and Libya; Lebanon visits Syria and Iraq; Kuwait visits Iran and the UAE; Iraq visits Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia visits Jordan; Cyprus visits Kuwait; and the UAE visits Saudi Arabia. In 1991, Oman visits the UAE; Israel visits Egypt and Syria; Syria visits Egypt; Iraq visits Jordan, Iran, and Kuwait; Jordan visits Libya, Syria, and Kuwait; Iran visits Gambia and Turkey; and Bahrain visits Kuwait. In 1992, Oman visits Qatar and Egypt; Kuwait visits Oman and Iran; Iran visits Iraq, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia; Jordan visits Syria and Saudi Arabia; Lebanon visits Syria; Israel visits Jordan and Lebanon; Iraq visits Kuwait; Bahrain visits Kuwait and Iran. In 1993, Israel visits the UAE, Lebanon, Egypt, Norway, and Turkey; Lebanon visits Israel; Iran visits Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia visits Oman; Syria visits Bahrain; Iraq visits Kuwait; Kuwait visits Iraq; Jordan visits the United States and Israel. To this point, it can be noted that apparent enemies are meeting with each other: Iraq and Iran, usually troublesome to each other, make a couple of visits and Kuwait and Iraq are interacting as soon as 1993 just after a terrible war finished in 1991. Also, Israel figures prominently in Middle East diplomacy even though, as a Jewish state, it is a complete outsider and also is viewed as a possible enemy since it is in conflict with the Palestinians, a minority within their state and culturally tied to the rest of the region since they are for the most part Islamic. Israel has even built a nuclear arsenal and this further angers its neighbors. In 1994, Kuwait visits Iraq and vice versa; the UAE visits India; Israel visits Syria and Norway; Jordan visits Egypt; and Qatar visits Iran. In 1995, Qatar visits Indonesia; Israel visits Oman, Egypt, Jordan, Italy, and Syria; Syria visits France and Iran; and Iran visits Croatia and Chile. In 1996, Jordan visits Egypt, Israel, and Russia; Israel visits Nigeria, Jordan, and Egypt; Oman visits Saudi Arabia and the UAE; Iran visits Syria; Syria visits Saudi Arabia; Qatar visits the UAE and Japan. In 1997, Oman visits India; the UAE visits the United States and Egypt; Iran visits Bahrain, Syria, and Russia; Israel visits Jordan and Turkey; Syria visits Kuwait; and Bahrain visits the UAE. In 1998, Saudi Arabia visits Syria, Iran, Kuwait, and the United



to the Middle East—they don’t share cultural ties or have geographical proximity. Venezuela is part of OPEC, though. All four Mercosur countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) visit other countries but on their continent this activity is not exclusive to them or found more often among them. In sum, no pattern of relationships is found, except that the United States and Cuba may receive slightly more attention.

Power and Influence

States; Iran visits Russia; Syria visits Qatar; Qatar visits Kuwait; Kuwait visits Jordan; Israel visits the United States; Jordan visits the United States; Oman visits Kuwait; the UAE visits Kuwait. In 1999, Israel visits Egypt, Syria, and Russia; Jordan visits Israel; Iran visits Saudi Arabia. In 2000, Kuwait visits Bahrain; Saudi Arabia visits Jordan; Oman visits Japan; Iran visits Palau; Israel visits Palau, Sweden, Syria, and Mauritania; Lebanon visits Israel; Cyprus visits Lebanon. The amount of diplomatic activity in the region is stunning and highly interlinked. Egypt, although African, is a wellestablished member of the Mid East clique. Outside nations are sometimes paid attention to and Norway and the United States arise a few times in these networks; the United States is not as prominent as might be expected and Israel is very prominent where that might be unexpected. Since both friends and enemies make visits to each other in this region, perhaps Israel’s centrality is to be expected. African Diplomacy Like South America, Africa is less involved in diplomacy because it is dealing with so many internal problems. However, as discussed in the trade networks section, Africa is attempting to solve problems by working within the continent to build some internal strength. In 1990, Mozambique visits Swaziland, Tanzania visits Italy, Cameroon visits the DRC, and Sudan visits Libya and Egypt. In 1991, the DRC visits the Congo, and Namibia visits the United States. In 1992, Algeria visits France. In 1993, Nigeria visits Niger and Togo, Cameroon visits China and Laos, and Lesotho visits Israel. In 1994, Algeria visits Senegal, South Africa visits Iran and Zambia, Mozambique visits Zimbabwe, and Rwanda visits Tanzania. In 1995, Egypt visits Sudan, Kenya visits Uganda, and Lesotho visits the UK. In 1996, Kenya visits Uganda, Egypt visits Sudan, the DRC visits Kenya, Sudan visits Eritrea, Rwanda visits Zimbabwe, Swaziland visits South Africa, South Africa visits Comoros and Algeria, Burkina Faso visits Algeria, and Liberia visits Morocco. In 1997, the DRC visits Kenya and Gabon, Rwanda visits Gabon, and South Africa visits Gabon and South Korea. In 1998, Ethiopia visits Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Eritrea, and Burundi; Burundi visits Uganda; South Africa visits Uganda, the Netherlands, and Iran; the DRC visits Burkina Faso and Algeria visits Saudi Arabia. In 1999, Liberia visits Italy, Ethiopia visits Algeria, Algeria visits India, Sierra Leone visits Togo, and Togo visits Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast. In 2000, South Africa visits the DRC and Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone visits the Ivory Coast, Algeria visits France, Ghana visits Lebanon, Guinea-Bissau visits Nigeria, and Mali visits Nigeria. Throughout the decade, continental interaction increases, most visits being internal. Algeria and France have a close relationship since Algeria



46


47

was a colony until 1962. Algeria, South Africa, and the DRC are slightly more active than other African nations.

North American diplomacy is led by the United States; Mexico and Canada are not very active. The UK and the United States are the most diplomatically active countries in the world. In 1990, the United States visits Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Philippines, Russia, Kuwait, Japan, Peru, Singapore, and Bolivia; Canada visits Jordan. In 1991, the United States visits Russia, Saudi Arabia, Poland, Singapore, India, Namibia, Albania, Romania, Laos, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Colombia, Malawi, Iraq, the Philippines, and Turkey. In 1992, the United States visits the UAE, Sudan, Senegal, Ecuador, Portugal, Turkey, Belgium, Canada, Japan, North Korea, China, and Israel. In 1993, the United States visits Vietnam, Nicaragua, France, and Israel; Mexico visits the United States; and Canada visits Mexico and Haiti. In 1994, the United States visits China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Guatemala, Angola, Egypt, Haiti, Uganda, Russia, and Burundi; Canada visits the United States. In 1995, the United States visits Vietnam, France, Iran, Brazil, Poland, Spain, Kuwait, Mexico, and Bosnia; Mexico visits Canada and Canada visits Portugal. In 1996, the United States visits Japan, Qatar, Cuba, Liberia, Cameroon, and China. In 1997, the United States visits Bangladesh, Vietnam, Haiti, North Korea, Kuwait, Canada, Israel, Jordan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the DRC; Canada visits the United States, Israel, and Mexico. In 1998, the United States visits Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Poland, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Greece, Liberia, South Korea, Japan, Kuwait, and Canada; Mexico visits the United States; Canada visits India. In 1999, the United States visits Greece, Kuwait, South Korea, North Korea, Colombia, Vietnam, New Zealand, China, and Indonesia. In 2000, the United States visits Jordan, Cyprus, Israel, Sweden, Congo, South Korea, Greece, and China. The Americans dominate diplomatic activity, and other countries may not feel the need to be as active because they are members of international organizations, such as the UN, that offer plenty of opportunity to meet. However, the United States likes to maintain its option to act unilaterally and the individual visits outside of the UN and other forums of which it is a member may be an expression of the ambition to be influential on its own terms. The earlier vote analysis, showed that the UN is not a forum that works best for the United States. It may be no coincidence that the former most powerful country, the UK, and the current-day superpower, the United States, are the most active. However, there is no obvious pattern to American visits and they cover the world’s regions; for example, it is not only



North American Diplomacy

Power and Influence

visiting oil nations, although they figure prominently, or Europe, with its Western friends. It makes regular visits to Vietnam and this could be related to solving problems there after the war it waged in the 1960s against communism and 1970s. An overall impression is that while the United States is protecting its interests, it is also attempting to help solve some of the world’s problems as it visits some very disadvantaged nations and pure self-interest could hardly be the only motivation for some of these calls, for example, Bangladesh and Haiti. Asian Diplomacy Asia is a vast continent with many regions and widely different cultures. Russia, although in both Europe and Asia, is considered part of Asia in this analysis. In 1990, Thailand visits Indonesia; New Zealand visits Turkey; India visits Jordan; Japan visits Iraq, China, and Russia; and the Philippines visits Saudi Arabia. In 1991, North Korea visits South Korea; Japan visits Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey; China visits the UK and France; Indonesia visits China and Malaysia; Sri Lanka visits Russia; Australia visits Turkey; Singapore visits Saudi Arabia; the Philippines visits Jordan and Kuwait; and Russia visits Vietnam and the UK. In 1992, Thailand visits Myanmar; Armenia visits Japan; Australia visits China; Singapore visits China; South Korea visits North Korea and the Solomon Islands; Brunei visits the UK; Japan visits Italy, Hungary, Belize, China, and the UK; Vietnam visits Singapore; and Indonesia visits Singapore. In 1993, North Korea visits India, South Korea visits Japan, Japan visits Italy and Belize, New Zealand visits the United States, Australia visits Cameroon, Singapore visits Cameroon and China, China visits Saudi Arabia and the United States, India visits Oman, and Russia visits Ethiopia. Notice that up until this year, 1993, Russia is visited by others and it makes only a few visits. For once having been a very powerful nation that could send cosmonauts to the moon, it behaves much differently than other powerful nations like the UK and the United States, diplomatically. It could be that Russia is trying to heal its wounds after so much internal strife and, going forward, it is facing independence movements in many of its Eastern European states. In contrast, Japan is an economic power that makes itself visible diplomatically. If making visits is a mark of a powerful nation, then Japan is to Asia what the United States is to North America, and the UK is to Europe, and this fits the “Triad” concept. China is not as outwardly central, but it is making selective, and perhaps strategic visits to wealthy, powerful nations such as the United States, UK, France, and Saudi Arabia. It is visited by many and this could be a signal of its growing international presence which it promotes through its export strategy.



48

49

In 1994, Vietnam visits Australia; Singapore visits Vietnam; Indonesia visits Singapore, Malaysia, Spain, China, and Japan; Malaysia visits Brunei and the Philippines; Bangladesh visits the United States; Brunei visits Kuwait, China, and Iran; Japan visits the United States, the Philippines, Spain, Oman, India, and South Africa; China visits India, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Japan, and Iran; the Philippines visits China and Japan; and India visits Oman and the UK. In 1995, Indonesia visits Qatar, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE; Singapore visits Indonesia; South Korea visits North Korea; Japan visits Pakistan and the United States; Nepal visits Japan, India, and China; Australia visits Italy, Rwanda, Cameroon, China, and Vietnam; and Russia visits Croatia, France, and Iran. In 1996, Malaysia visits Singapore; China visits Singapore, Canada, Uruguay, and the United States; Cambodia visits Vietnam; Australia visits Indonesia and the United States; the Philippines visits Indonesia; Palau visits Jordan and Egypt; and Russia visits the Ukraine. In 1997, India visits Pakistan; China visits Indonesia, the United States, South Africa, Australia, Singapore, and Bangladesh; Vietnam visits China; Australia visits Malaysia; Indonesia visits Croatia; Japan visits Argentina, the UK, Singapore, and Brazil; and Singapore visits the United States. In 1998, Brunei visits Malaysia, Thailand visits Malaysia, Indonesia visits South Korea, South Korea visits the United States, China visits Denmark, and Myanmar visits Singapore. In 1999, Brunei visits Malaysia; Myanmar visits China; China visits Canada, South Africa, Indonesia, and Israel; Australia visits China and Papua New Guinea; Myanmar visits China; Japan visits New Zealand, Thailand, and Australia; Thailand visits China; Russia visits Vietnam, Japan, and Iran. In 2000, Fiji visits Papua New Guinea; Thailand visits Cambodia; Indonesia visits Singapore; Pakistan visits Kuwait and the UK; New Zealand visits the Solomon Islands; India visits Australia and Pakistan; Australia visits the Solomon Islands, Saudi Arabia, and the UK; and Japan visits Saudi Arabia, Finland, and the United States. Many of the Southeast Asian nations are very active and this is indicative of their growing wealth. Indonesia makes many visits and Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Thailand are active—all are members of ASEAN. They visit each other and seem to like the oil-producing nations of the Middle East. Also, wealthy industrialized nations like Australia and New Zealand are quite connected. India is connected too and its activity is less, perhaps reflective of the fact that its growth is not as great as China’s. Russia is not active and, as mentioned, this could be related to its implosion and breakup. Japan is a central nation with respect to its region and the world; it continues to assume a slightly lesser, yet similarly well-connected role as that of the United States and the UK. Overall, most countries of the Asian region are very active which likely reflects the overall economic growth.




Power and Influence

A general pattern found in this data is that the most powerful nations make many visits and so do growing nations. Nations that are wealthy and stable, such as Western European nations and Canada, are only somewhat active whereas countries in troubled regions visit each other, possibly to collaborate and solve problems, for example, South America and Africa. Most countries in trouble do not make many visits. The Middle East oil-producing nations are very central in diplomatic networks; they are visited by others and are highly interconnected among themselves. It should be considered that countries that do not seem very diplomatically active in these networks may instead be working through international organizations. They may be satisfied with the agendas of these organizations and their cooperative orientation whereas countries with particular agendas may be more inclined to make visits.



50

International Governmental Organizations I   (IGO) are political institutions that serve many purposes through cooperative diplomatic relations. An IGO is official when its membership includes at least three members from the state system defined by the Correlates of War,1 it holds regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years, and has a permanent secretariat and headquarters. IGOs operate not only with different agendas, but also on different terms and these terms of reference shape the power relationships and decisions in these forums. For example, the World Bank and IMF operate on the grounds that a country contributing more funds to the institution has more weight in a vote; thus, all countries are not equal in these IGOs which are oriented toward financial aid and development. In contrast, the UNGA gives each country one vote regardless of its financial status or population; a large wealthy country is required to give proportionately more and even though the United States refuses to pay vast obligated sums in a timely manner (such that it cripples the institution purposely), it still is allowed its seat on the Security Council and a vote in the UNGA. Representation in the UN is a major issue, but not one that will change in the near future. Also, even though an IGO may have rules, whether or not it enforces them is another issue of contention and this can lead to dysfunctional behavior and ineffectiveness. For example, even though many members violate human rights, they remain in the UN. China remains a member even though it has its one-child policy and uses capital punishment regularly. However, South Africa was thrown out over apartheid for a number of years and regained membership in 1994. Keeping a member in the IGO ensures continued dialogue which would stop if the member were thrown out and



Chapter 5

Power and Influence

this may be the rationale with China; it is also a nuclear power and a member of the Security Council. South Africa has not had this latter status, so its past isolation was not a danger to the world; its exclusion from the UN and the subsequent increased pressure by the world community to change its domestic policies were effective strategies. In this chapter, I will introduce some IGOs and analyze network relationships. The IGO networks in this study are subdivided into categories according to coding by Ingram et al. (2005) so that there are General, Political-Military, Economic, and Social-Cultural networks. For example, the Political-Military IGO networks include country memberships in IGOs that are oriented to political and/or military issues. The General IGOs are those that do not fit into one of the other three categories. The density of the IGO networks requires that, for network diagrams and preliminary analysis, a subset of the UNGA countries is used (the statistical model in a later chapter uses all the UNGA countries). The same subset of countries used in additional empirical analysis in the Appendix illustrates the two-mode IGO networks here: the Czech Republic (or Czechoslovakia), Bosnia Herzegovina (and Yugoslavia; Bosnia Herzegovina exists after 1994), Djibouti, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan. The reasoning for choosing these countries for additional analysis is explained in the Appendix. In brief, the rationale is that they are outlier countries in regard to their network relationships. They are also interesting to use here in introductory analysis because of their potential uniqueness. Moreover, if some of these countries share common interests, they may reveal them by joining the same IGOs and this could be correlated with similar voting in the UNGA. A rough exploratory analysis will be presented. Additionally, a regional analysis is presented in a similar approach to the diplomatic networks. I may generate new inferences and investigate an inference from the previous chapter: that some countries choose to work diplomatically through international organizations rather than by diplomatic visits and also that these are countries that do not tend to have specific agendas for themselves vis-à-vis the world. EU members and Canada may fit this description as opposed to a country like the United States which has a tendency to choose unilateral approaches to achieve its foreign policy purposes or China, which has an externally oriented growth policy tied to foreign direct investment and exports. Exploratory Analysis of an IGO Network Subset To begin an initial exploratory analysis of IGO membership-voting relationships, see figure 5.1 for an example of a two-mode IGO network. Several of these network diagrams for the same set of countries, for each category



52

53

IGOs JPN

1550

360 800 1390

1230

CZR

2040 3700

1830 2150

TUR

4100 4510

1080

3760 BOS 3850

DJI 220

UAE 10

3450

1990

Figure 5.1 1999.

Two-Mode Political-Military IGO Network Diagram for UNGA Countries,

of IGO and each year, were reviewed, but for brevity are not included here. They are two-mode networks because both countries and IGOs are linked in the same network—countries are depicted as red dots connected to the blue squares, the IGOs to which the countries belong. Countries are not tied directly; instead, they are tied through the IGOs in which they have mutual memberships. This secondary step through which the countries are tied is the “second mode.” No tie direction is indicated on the diagrams because an IGO never belongs to a country; if arrows were to be shown, they would all point from the countries to the IGOs, so they would merely clutter the diagrams. The IGOs are numbered because some of the names are very long and acronyms sometimes do not apply. However, I will also be discussing some of them by name. Networks for each year and classification of IGO (General, PoliticalMilitary, Social-Cultural, and Economic) were examined for changes from year to year (not shown here). Some examples of changes are noted here. In the case of the General IGOs, 1990, 1995, and 2000 are years with



3620

Power and Influence

some changes. Djibouti joins 3100 (International Seabed Authority) and Turkey appears to have left 1730 (European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation: EUROCONTROL) in 1995. By this time, Czechoslovakia (CZE) has become the Czech Republic (CZR). Also, Djibouti joins 4050 (Regional African Satellite Communications Organization) and 50 (African Civil Service Observatory) by the year 2000. Yugoslavia has joined a number of IGOs such as 3100 (International Seabed Authority), and 1440 (Danube Commission) in 2000. Overall, Djibouti, United Arab Emirates, and Japan share more common memberships than other nations in the subset. However, their average similar voting over three years is 47 percent, compared to an average of all the countries in the subset of 52 percent (see table 5.1 for details of the calculations). Also, Japan, the Czech Republic, and Turkey may share common interests, based on their memberships. They do vote together more often than all the other countries in the subset together, on average over three years—65 percent of the time. The set of Political-Military IGO diagrams from 1990 to 1992 show limited changes. Czechoslovakia has left 4460 (Warsaw Treaty Organization) and Yugoslavia has left 1080 (Central European Initiative: CEI), now having no memberships and being isolated from the world military community. Japan also has no IGO memberships of this type in any year due to its WWII aggression; subsequent to WWII, it was disallowed from using force in international disputes. 1993 sees no changes and, in 1994, Bosnia Herzegovina has memberships in 1080 (CEI) and 3850 (Organization of the Islamic Conference). Moreover, the Czech Republic joins 1390 (Council of Europe) and 1550 (Euro Atlantic Partnership Council). In 1999, it adds 3700 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). In 2000, Yugoslavia rejoins 1080 (CEI) and this is its only membership. In these Political-Military IGO memberships, overall, the United Arab Emirates and Djibouti share common interests—this bears out at 91 percent similar voting, on average, over three years (see figure 5.1 for details), and Turkey and the Czech Republic share common interests in Political-Military IGOs; they vote similarly 71 percent of the time. The Economic IGO networks change in the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 2000. Memberships are more volatile in Economic IGOs compared to the others so far. An overall look at the diagrams suggests that the countries are well connected with each other through these IGOs. Japan takes the lead in terms of membership in the most Economic IGOs which contrasts dramatically against its lack of membership in any Political-Military IGOs. This activity suggests Japan would be more active in Political-Military IGOs if it were allowed. Some of the IGOs that are central among all the countries across most years (although not every country is necessarily a member of all of these) are: 3000 (International



54

55

Pepper Community), 2750 (International Finance Corporation), 4420 (United Nations Industrial Development Organization), 1840 (Food and Agricultural Organization), 4570 (World Tourism Organization), and 1160 (Common Fund for Commodities). The similarity of voting by Japan with the other countries is 51 percent (see figure 5.1), close to the 52 percent average of all the countries, so it is hard to say whether the Economic IGO networks are particularly influential for Japan in the UN. Also, Japan, the Czech Republic, and Turkey seem to share many common Economic IGO memberships: 3200 (International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property), 3750 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), 3540 (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), 3940 (Permanent Court of Arbitration), 3210 (International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works), 810 (Bank for International Settlement), 3260 (International Wheat Council), 2680 (International Cotton Advisory Committee), and 580 (Asian Development Bank) are some examples. Will the average of the percentage of similar voting be higher among the latter three compared to all the countries combined? In fact, it is at 65 percent similar voting compared to 52 percent. The Social-Cultural IGO networks have changes in the years 1990, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, and 2000. Memberships are most volatile in these types of IGOs. Once again, Japan is highly connected demonstrating its preference for involvement in the world community. The United Arab Emirates increases its memberships in the late 1990s, rivaling Japan. All the countries in the subset are highly connected to each other and the main IGOs that connect them include: 3170 (International Telecommunications Satellite Organization), 2640 (International Committee of Military Medicine and Pharmacy), 1650 (European Customs Union Study Group), 3530 (Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol), 2930 (International Office of Epizootics), 2500 (International Civil Aviation Organization), 2780 (International Hydrographic Organization), 2290 (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission), 4430 (Universal Postal Union), 4530 (World Meteorological Organization), 4410 (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), 4550 (World Health Organization), 2830 (International Labor Organization), 2760 (International Fund for Agricultural Development), 2780 (International Hydrographic Organization), and 2290 (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission). Do these countries also vote similarly with each other? Since the United Arab Emirates has increased its number of IGO memberships, will its percentage of similar voting with Japan increase over the years because they become more connected with each other through the same IGOs? In answer to these questions, it was mentioned earlier that the countries tend to vote with each other 52 percent of the time. Moreover, the possible



IGOs

Table 5.1

Calculations to Support IGO Network Analysis Discussion

Voting Analysis to Support IGO Network Discussion Country Subset: Czech Republic (or Czechoslovakia), Bosnia Herzegovina (or Yugoslavia), Djibouti, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Japan.

Country Voting Pairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN JPN UAE UAE UAE UAE UAE UAE TUR TUR TUR TUR TUR DJI DJI DJI DJI BOS BOS BOS YUG YUG Average of % Similar Voting for Each Year

UAE TUR DJI BOS YUG CZE CZR TUR DJI BOS YUG CZE CZR DJI BOS YUG CZE CZR BOS YUG CZE CZR YUG CZE CZR CZE CZR

Country Codes 740 740 740 740 740 740 740 696 696 696 696 696 696 640 640 640 640 640 522 522 522 522 346 346 346 345 345

696 640 522 346 345 315 316 640 522 346 345 315 316 522 346 345 315 316 346 345 315 316 345 315 316 315 316

1990 (%)

1995 (%)

2000 (%)

Average Over the Years (%)

5 50 5 N/A 5 60 N/A 30 100 N/A 100 5 N/A 32 N/A 30 55 N/A N/A 100 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 N/A 39

56 76 56 95 N/A N/A 77 54 100 75 N/A N/A 56 52 95 N/A N/A 93 75 N/A N/A 56 N/A N/A 90 N/A N/A 74

18 36 14 43 100 N/A 64 11 73% 0 33 N/A 9 27 86 100 N/A 82 14 33 N/A 14 N/A N/A 86 N/A 100 47

26 54 25 69 53 60 71 32 91 38 67 5 33 37 91 65 55 88 45 67 5 35 N/A N/A 88 5 100 52



%Similar Voting for Each Pair

Continued

General IGOs

DJI, UAE, JPN (%)

JPN, CZR, CZE, TUR (%)

Political-Military IGOs

JPN, CZE, TUR, JPN w/ CZR, UAE, CZR, all others TUR DJI (%) CZE (%) (%) (%)

26

26 54 25 69 53 60 71

54 25

60 71 91

Social-Cultural IGOs

UAE, JPN 1990 (%)

UAE, JPN 1995 (%)

UAE, JPN 2000 (%)

5

56

18

5

56

18

54

60 71

91

55 88

47

Economic IGOs

65

55 88

91

71

55 88

51

65



Table 5.1

Power and Influence

Japan-United Arab Emirates voting trend does not likely exist; while similar voting does increase, it is not a steadily rising trend line to the end of the study period, that is, 5 percent in 1990, up to 56 percent in 1995, and then a drop to 18 percent in 2000. Also, these rates of similar voting are well below the total country similar voting averages, that is, 39 percent in 1990, up to 74 percent in 1995, and down to 47 percent in 2000. In summary, this preliminary exploration familiarizes the reader with the networked IGO data and provides hints that some correlations between voting and networked relationships may exist. The Political-Military, Economic, and General IGO memberships show the most promise of influencing voting based on this analysis. The statistical model in a later chapter, with its dependent variable, independent variables and controls will provide improved insight. Regional IGO Network Analysis Next, an examination of these different types of IGO networks by region may provide additional insights about the world community. I will look into whether some countries have a preference for international organizations as diplomatic channels and notice to which they choose to belong. Other patterns may emerge in this exploration. The IGO memberships are discussed for two points of comparison in time, near the beginning and the end of the data set, 1991 and 1999. In case there are any big changes in patterns, this will capture them. For each region; Europe, North America, South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia I will look at participation in the various categories of IGOs: Political-Military, Social-Cultural, Economic, and General IGOs. Also, I will examine some particular countries’ memberships in relation to the observations of the previous chapter on diplomatic relations, and questions mentioned in this chapter. European Participation in IGOs. In 1991, 33 European countries (including Turkey) in the UN were members of 23 General IGOs and by 1999 this increased to 27 General IGOs across 43 countries. The number of countries increased by ten because Monaco, Andorra, Slovakia, San Marino, Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia (the latter three replacing Yugoslavia), Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan were added to the UN and one, Yugoslavia was removed (until 2000 when it was readmitted to the UN with a different name). These remained members of the same set of organizations and added four: the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies; Group of Schengen; International Seabed Authority; and South and West Asia Postal Union. Europe experienced many political changes over this decade, but memberships in General IGOs did not change that much.



58

59

Almost all the 43 countries in 1999 are members of the: International Telecommunications Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, United Nations, International Criminal Police Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations, and the International Maritime Organization. Only smaller countries are not in at least two of these worldwide organizations. More than a third of the nations are members of: Hague Conference on Private International Law, International Mobile Satellite Organization, World Road Association, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, the International Organization of Legal Metrology, Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, and the International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions. Most of these memberships are in worldwide institutions and only a few are regional which, in general tells us that Europe remains part of the world as it develops its EU institutions. It is not showing evidence of withdrawal or breakdown. It may have been expected that Turkey would be an outlier in its memberships because of its different cultural heritage and location compared to its European counterparts, but it stands out only in two: the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee set up to advise members on international law and the South and West Asia Postal Union. Cyprus has a few different memberships. It is one of two countries that are members of the: AsianAfrican Legal Consultative Committee, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the International Seabed Authority. These organizations, to which Turkey and Cyprus belong, have very low European representation. Cyprus is not a member of the EU at this time, joining in 2004. Turkey is not yet a member, but is expected to be one. The European countries having the most memberships in General IGOs are: France, with 21, Italy, with 20, and Norway, Belgium, Austria, Spain, and the Netherlands, with 19. The UK, the country that is so diplomatically active in terms of visits, as discovered in the last chapter, is a member of 16 General IGOs. The UK differs from the others in not being a member of the: Central Commission Navigation of the Rhine, Group of Schengen, International Commission on Civil Status, and International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions. First, the UK is not near the Rhine so it makes no sense for it to be part of the related IGO. It must currently disagree with the concept of eliminating passport controls within the EU and strengthening EU external border control because the Group of Schengen is behind this idea. Furthermore, the UK was not an original member of the



IGOs

Power and Influence

International Commission on Civil Status because this organization was set up after WWII in order to help people find their official documents in Europe, which would not have been such a problem in the UK; this process on the continent initiated European cooperation that ultimately resulted in the establishment of the EU. The International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions has worldwide scope and is concerned with public-administration law. Today, the entire EU is a member, whereas the UK was not a member in 1999. Overall, this analysis suggests that the UK’s involvement in General IGOs is not sufficiently less or different so as to lead to a conclusion that its use of IGOs for diplomacy is significantly less than other European nations. I address this issue because the UK was by far the most active country in the diplomatic visits networks and the question remains as to whether and how it conducts its diplomatic relations differently from other European countries and from those around the world. At this point, the UK appears to use both types of channels, the collective group approach and the one-on-one approach. In 1991, Europeans are members of nine Political-Military IGOs and by 1999 they are members of 12, a net increase of three, which includes four new ones and one that is dissolved. In 1991, six formerly communist countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia) are members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and in 1999 this is not the case because this IGO dissolved in 1991 with the end of the Soviet Union. The four new memberships are in the: Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, European Union, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion. The Euro Atlantic Partnership Council is a military alliance of NATO and other partner nations and has more members (21) than the European Union (14). The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) replaces the Warsaw Treaty Organization in the sense that it is a community organization for the former Soviet states. It includes security in its mission, but this is not its primary focus and it is not set up in direct opposition to NATO or Europe. The Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion is composed of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the aim of participating in international peacekeeping. These membership changes are reflective of geopolitical changes related to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and building up of the European Union. Along with these four organizations, three of which could be considered wholly or partly of a military orientation, the Europeans are members of the: Council of Europe (38), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (16), Central European Initiative (CEI) (15), ACP-EEC Joint Assembly (14), Western European Union (9), Nordic Council of Ministers (5), and Organization of the Islamic Conference (4). One, the UK, is a member of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and also has the most of these



60

61

types of memberships, at six. Overall, eight out of 12 of these PoliticalMilitary IGOs could be considered military or defense oriented. Countries not on the Council of Europe include Monaco, Bosnia, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This IGO seeks to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe. It is not obviously a military organization, but it intends to eradicate a great deal of criminal behavior and various kinds of violence or threats of violence, so it is perhaps a kind of modern-day defense organization. NATO does not include many of the former Soviet republics, some Scandinavian countries and a few others, such as Ireland and Austria. Note that Switzerland did not join the UN until 2002, thus is not part of this discussion about Europe since it is not in the dataset; also, it is not a member, but is a partner of NATO, due to its preference for neutrality. Notice that other organizations listed earlier are representative of regional parts of Europe: Central European Initiative (CEI), Western European Union (9), and Nordic Council of Ministers (5). The CEI intends to help Central Europe integrate with the rest of Europe and it is not militarily oriented. The Western European Union is made up of the core wealthy nations and has a military purpose, but is not very active. The Nordic Council of Ministers is like an EU for the Scandinavian countries to allow for free movement among the countries. On this list of European memberships only the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly and Organization of the Islamic Conference reach out to other regions of the world. ACP stands for Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific and it is an organization in which Europe attempts to build relationships, essentially with former colonies. The four nations in the Organization of the Islamic Conference are Turkey, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, and Albania, reflecting their different ethnic makeup compared to most of Europe which is not historically Islamic. This IGO is defense-oriented in the sense that it intends to safeguard and protect Muslim interests around the world. Out of the four, only Turkey is a member of NATO and this could represent conflicting military interests within Europe. In 1991, Europe is part of 63 Economic IGOs and by 1999 it has memberships in 67 of them, for a net increase of four, but this includes many changes that will not all be listed. Sixteen IGOs are added and 12 are no longer listed. GATT, the EEC, and ECSC are replaced by the WTO and the EU, for example, so they are not all entirely new memberships. A great majority are in major international organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization which has the greatest membership, 43 out of all 43 countries. This emphasis reflects the capitalist orientation of this region since property rights is an important precept of this philosophy. Other IGOs with high rates of membership include the: International Union for the Protection



IGOs

Power and Influence

of Industrial Property, International Monetary Fund, International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Trade Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Only one of these is oriented specifically to Europe, as its name implies. Others, such as the following, count about a third or more of the countries as members and tend to become more specific in their goals, both regionally and topically, as indicated by their names: European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Bank for International Settlement, World Tourism Organization, International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, European Patent Office, International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, International Cocoa Organization, International Wheat Council, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Common Fund for Commodities, International Jute Organization, International Coffee Organization, International Pepper Community, International Tropical Timber Organization, European Central Bank, International Lead and Zinc Study Group, International Natural Rubber Organization, International Olive Oil Council, Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, European Investment Bank, and European Company for the Financing of Railroad Rolling Stock (EUROFIMA). Wheat, timber, rubber, and olive oil IGOs are explainable for this region, but what is behind memberships in cocoa, coffee, jute, and pepper industry organizations—membership that might otherwise be expected of tropical nations? In many cases, these organizations include both producing and consuming countries; European countries are more often consumers and only occasionally producers of these commodities. South nations are the producers and thus, the picture this paints is very much one of the World Systems View. These organizations are the mediators between the core and the periphery for some of the most highly traded commodities in the world. The International Cocoa Organization is based in London and today espouses a mandate to set prices and promote sustainability in production and to protect farmers. Since most producers sign on to the agreements, this organization is marking the market and setting trade terms for cocoa and it is, thus, not a free market. The International Coffee Organization has a similar function and its base is also in London. The International Pepper Community and International Jute Organization are similar. The International Wheat Council is a very different kind of organization; its mandate is to ensure fair distribution of wheat when there are emergencies. The International Tropical Timber Organization is concerned with sustaining tropical forests while developing



62

63

related industries that can create employment and build international trade. The International Natural Rubber Organization has the intent to stabilize prices, much like a cartel. So, most of these commodity-named organizations, having both producer and consumer national members, with the exception of the Wheat Council, represent their respective industries with a similar mix of interests—usually price setting, sustainability, and international trade, but with different emphases ranging from behaving like a cartel to protecting poor producers or the natural environment. When membership is very low in some Economic IGOs it is often because the organizations are not focused on European concerns and instead relate to other regions of the world. Unexpectedly, it is not the somewhat diverse cultural mix of what are considered European states that results in these outliers. For example, two countries are members of the Islamic Development Bank, Italy and the UK, which are historically core nations of the EU; they do not have Islamic roots, but the UK does have very strong ties with the Middle East, as evidenced in its diplomatic visits enumerated in the previous chapter. Italy does not demonstrate the same activity. Also the only two European members of the Caribbean Development Bank are Spain and Portugal. This is likely for reasons of an Ibero-America connection in that these former colonialists and Caribbean colonies remain involved with each other. Another reason for lower participation in some IGOs is small-region cooperation. The Benelux Economic Union and Benelux Economic and Social Advisory Council have only three close countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Similarly, the Nordic Investment Bank, Nordic Development Fund, and West-Nordic Foundation have as members five Scandinavian countries: Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. Which nations are most active in Economic IGOs based on the number of memberships? France has the most memberships at 43 and others with 40 or more are the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Finland. Also, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and the UK have many, ranging from 38 to 39 memberships. The UK is very active and since it is not one of the countries that falls into a smaller regional grouping, for example Benelux or the Nordic group, its participation rate appears to be that much greater. Its memberships are in more external international IGOs not directly related to its region such as the Islamic Development Bank, Conferencia de Autoridades Cinematogrificas de Iberoamerica, and the African Export Import Bank explain this along with its many memberships in the commodity-related Economic IGOs on this European list. France and the UK have been historical rivals. How does France, the country with the most memberships, differ from the UK? France is a member of the: World Tourism Organization, International Commission



IGOs

Power and Influence

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, International Nickel Study, Group InterAmerican Investment Corporation, Pole Europeen de Developpement, and Indian Ocean Commission, whereas the UK is not a member of any of these. The UK is a member, while France is not, of the Common Fund for Commodities and the Islamic Development Bank. The Pole Europeen de Developpement is for regional cooperation among three French-speaking countries: Belgium, France, and Luxembourg. No particular pattern emerges except that each nation has a slightly different set of preferences, expressed through their membership choices. In 1991, Europe has 76 Social-Cultural IGO memberships whereas in 1999 it has 87, a net increase of 11 and with many changes such that there are too many to list. Twenty four memberships are new in 1999 and thirteen relatively low membership IGOs no longer are on the list in 1999. Most countries are members of the: Universal Postal Union, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, World Meteorological Organization, International Labor Organization, International Office of Epizootics, European Customs Union Study Group, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Global Environment Facility. Once again, most of these organizations are worldwide and not specific to any members’ proclivity. The Global Environment Facility was just established in October 1991 and therefore is one of the IGOs not listed yet in 1991. It represents a new set of strong concerns to protect the global environment and promote sustainability. A large number of Social-Cultural IGOs have only a few European members relative to their numbers. Thirty-nine have nine or fewer members whereas only two have nine members and ten have only one member. They belong to everything from the Latin Union, with eight members (France, Monaco, Spain, Portugal, Italy, San Marino, Moldova, and Romania), to the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization, with four members (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Russia), to the Baltic Council, with three members (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), the Pan-American Health Organization, with two members (Spain and Portugal), and the African School of Architecture and Town Planning, with one member (France); this is just a sample of the variety of divergent interests. The Europeans only appear cohesive within a limited set of international forums, the top eleven Social-Cultural IGOs out of a list of 87. Otherwise, they are quite fractured in their priorities as indicated by their varied memberships. Their memberships also reflect many European regions of separate cultures. The question arises, “What does it mean to be European?” Their commonalities reside in their membership in the EU, their geographic location, much related history, and many, but not all, having a similar past as colonizing countries.



64

65

Which countries are most and least participative? France leads with 63 memberships, and the next group has numbers only in the 40s: Spain (48), the Netherlands (46), Portugal (46), Belgium (45), the UK (43), Italy (43), Denmark (43), and Sweden (42). Small countries like Liechtenstein (4), Andorra (4), and San Marino (7) are the only countries with single-digit memberships. What is France doing that is different? It appears to be using IGOs rather than diplomatic visits to further its diplomatic relations; in the previous chapter, France was not central in the diplomatic network. It is joining almost all the IGOs except those that it does not fit with based on region, for example, it does not join the Baltic council because it is not a Baltic nation. In addition, France more than any other country joins many IGOs related to other parts of the world. For a few examples, it is a member of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization, South Pacific Commission, Agency Safety Aerial Navigation in Africa, Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center, and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. Perhaps, France views IGO memberships as allowing for richer and more enduring relationships than brief visits and are, therefore, potentially more effective and a better investment of time and effort. An earlier analysis examining whether diplomatic visits were necessarily advantageous for the UK in UN voting showed they were not. This basic analysis will look into whether other countries tend to choose to vote with France over the UK and whether France’s approach to diplomacy, using IGOs, could be more influential. In 1999, the UK has 32 countries voting with it at a compliance rate of 80 percent or more whereas 25 countries vote similarly at the same level with France. The comparable numbers in 1991 for the UK were eight and for France were seven. In 1995, the numbers for the UK were two and for France were five. This kind of basic analysis is inconclusive for suggesting which country’s tactics are more persuasive. At least, this is not evidence that France’s approach is a failure, but its approach of having many more IGO memberships is not likely giving it a great advantage either. The UK is finding relative success through its high activity in both visiting and IGO memberships. Summary—Europe. First, General IGO memberships do not change that much and there are some additions to this list of major worldwide institutions that most European nations support. Although Europe undergoes massive changes in this decade with the fall of the Soviet Union and many former Soviet states desire independence and integration with Europe, the maintenance of memberships and increase in activity in all types of IGOs suggests that Europe does not retreat as it changes and develops its EU institutions. Changes in the Political-Military IGOs reflect the geopolitical changes in Europe. These institutions increase in number and reveal some ambitions



IGOs

Power and Influence

of regions within Europe, primarily related to self-improvement or with intent to be constructive. Many in this category have a military or defense orientation and, although this is not currently indicative of future violent divisions, one division signified by a few countries in an Islamic IGO is a potential military divide against a majority of NATO countries in Europe. Europe, having been the epicenter of both world wars and many other conflicts, has been historically a very violent region; today, however, it collectively preaches peace. A long list of Economic IGO memberships and the types that predominate reflect the capitalist orientation of Europe as well as its desire to control commodities markets since Europe is a leading consumer of commodities. Many of these commodities-managing organizations are mediators between the North and South nations, suggesting evidence of the World Systems View in operation, but with inclusion of partial moves to altering the imbalance so as to be more in favor of the South than in the past; sustainable practices are often a theme. Also, the wide varieties of Economic IGOs that have different combinations of members, some with very few, reflect small-region cooperation and, overall, that European nations are not unified in their interests. France has the most Economic IGO memberships of all European nations. The UK also has many and, thus, is both active in diplomatic visits and IGOs and does not seem to choose one diplomatic channel over another. The UK also demonstrates its unique connection to the Middle East through a particular membership as it did in the diplomatic-visits networks. Social-Cultural IGO memberships mirror regional differences in Europe and this set of IGOs is the longest list. France has by far the most memberships of all European nations in 1999 and this was composed of more IGOs associated with world regions outside of Europe. The UK is also quite active in IGOs. Thus, the UK uses a two-channel approach to diplomacy—visits and IGOs—whereas France predominantly uses the IGO channel. However, no pattern of greater voting compliance with the UK over France is found in the UN so no connection to diplomatic strategy is implied. North American Participation in IGOs. The North Americans in 1991 are members of 19 different General IGOs, five Political-Military IGOs, 47 Economic IGOs, and 55 Social-Cultural IGOs, for a total of 126 IGOs. In 1999, they are members of 21 General IGOs, an increase of two. The changes in General IGOs are that both Canada and the United States join the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Mexico joins the International Seabed Authority. The three countries, Mexico, Canada, and the United States, are not all members of the other 19 General IGOs, but in many all three are members or at least two are members. They are all members of 11 General IGOs: the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the International



66

67

Atomic Energy Agency, the International Maritime Organization, the International Mobile Satellite Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, the North American Plant Protection Organization, the Organization of American States, the World Road Association, the United Nations, and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. Within this mixed-bag set of IGOs, these three countries have a lot in common and their memberships are in IGOs that have a worldwide orientation rather than a regional scope including law, energy, communications, and policing. They are still only members of five Political-Military IGOs by 1999. The United States and Mexico are members of the Inter-American Defense Board which promotes collaboration on common defense and security issues facing the Americas. Canada and the United States are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States is a member of the ANZUS Council, organized for defense coordination among the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Canada is a member of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission which looks after graves of dead soldiers from WWI and WWII and has no military intent. Mexico is a member of the Rio Group, a South American defense pact that, in answer to the OAS, which includes South and North American countries, does not include the United States. Each of these latter memberships is distinctly related to differences in each of the three North American countries’ national priorities and orientations. While these memberships signal some common interests in that the United States and Mexico overlap and the United States and Canada overlap, Canada and Mexico do not have any organizations in common. Mexico very much identifies with its Latin American neighbors. North American countries are members of 49 Economic IGOs, an increase of two, but some memberships have also changed compared to 1991. By 1999, they are all new members of the International Copper Study Group, the World Trade Organization, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. The United States joins the African Export Import Bank Trade and Investment Council. Mexico joins the Conferencia de Autoridades Cinematogrificas de IberoAmerica and the Group of Three that is comprised of Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. Mexico, having been a colony of Spain, identifies with IberoAmerica. The North American nations have about a third of their IGO memberships in common; in another third, they share membership with one other North American nation, and in the remaining third they do not share membership with one of the other two countries. Aside from those already mentioned, they share membership in the: Bank for International Settlement, International Finance Corporation, International Monetary Fund, International Union



IGOs

Power and Influence

for Protection of Industrial Property, International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Permanent Court of Arbitration, World Intellectual Property Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Food and Agricultural Organization, and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Canada and the United States have many common memberships in the list of Economic IGOs (in addition to those discussed as changes) where two North American countries are members. However, when only a single country is a member of one of these IGOs, it is more often Mexico; this difference further demonstrates the separation of Mexico in its interests from the other two nations. Both Canada and the United States are members of the: African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, International Wheat Council, International Lead and Zinc Study Group, International Pepper Community, International Commission Northwest, International Tropical Timber Organization, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International North Pacific Fisheries. As wealthy nations, many of these common memberships are related to aiding developing nations and are therefore distantly related to common self-interest. The memberships related to commodities and resources are related to common self-interest. In comparison, Mexico alone is a member of the following Economic IGOs in 1999: Cocoa Producers’ Alliance, Common Fund for Commodities, Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Matters, International Coffee Organization, World Tourism Organization, Group of Fifteen (G-15), Group of Latin American and Caribbean Sugar Exporting Countries, Latin American Integration Association, and the Latin American Economic System (LAES). A South American theme runs through this list. Also, the list does not reflect an orientation toward helping other nations develop so much as helping itself through collective coordination with other countries having similar problems; this is reflective of Mexico’s different status from the other two as a developing nation. For example, the Group of 24 nations is comprised of South American, African, and Asian nations with a stated goal to address common challenges as developing nations. Also, the Group of Fifteen is a group of developing nations formed for similar reasons and started in association with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), countries that did not want to choose sides during the cold war. Mexico differs with Canada and the United States on this historical NAM orientation. By 1999, North American countries are members of 62 Social-Cultural IGOs in combination. This is an overall increase of seven memberships since 1991, with 11 changes. Canada and the United States join the Arctic



68

69

Council and the North Pacific Marine Sciences Organization. The United States alone is a member of the International Coral Reef Initiative. Only Canada is a member of the African and Malagasy Council for Higher Education. Mexico joins quite a few on its own: the Tropical Agriculture Research and Training Center, the Association of Caribbean States, the Fund for Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean, the Latin Union, Partners in Population and Development (A South-South Initiative), and the Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science. Mexico is a frontrunner in the number of memberships it has in this category, as it tends to be overall; additional memberships are tied to its Spanish history and developing-nation status. Twenty-three of the Social-Cultural IGO memberships are shared by all three, including: the International Bureau of Weights and Measures; the International Civil Aviation Organization; the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization; the Postal Union of the Americas, Spain, Portugal (formerly Pan-American Postal Union and the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain); Universal Postal Union; the European Customs Union Study Group; the World Meteorological Organization; the Global Environment Facility; the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol; the Inter-American Children’s Institute; the Inter-American Conference on Social Security; the InterAmerican Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture; the International Center for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property; the International Exhibitions Bureau; the International Fund for Agricultural Development; the International Labor Organization; the International Office of Epizootics; the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the Pan-American Health Organization; the World Health Organization; the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; the International Vine and Wine Office; and the Pan American Institute of Geography and History. Many of these are distinctly New World institutions, having “America” in the name. Except for the Postal Union of the Americas, the joint membership institutions do not tie them with other particular regions of the world. If other parts of the world jointly participate, it is in those institutions that are worldwide in scope, having “International” in the name. From a socialcultural perspective, Canada and the United States do not demonstrate common historical ties through common memberships; for example, they might have been expected to have common ties to some British and European institutions based on common ancestral history, but this is not the case. For most of the other common memberships where there are only two nations, it is Canada and the United States having the same memberships over concerns for ocean resources and energy. Aside from that earlier mentioned in regards to membership changes, they are both members



IGOs

Power and Influence

of the International Hydrographic Organization, North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization, North Pacific Fur Seal Commission, International Council for Exploration of the Sea, International Energy Agency (IEA), International Institute for Refrigeration, and North Pacific Marine Sciences Organization. The IGOs in which one of these countries is the only member from North America tend to reflect their uniquenesses and those not already mentioned as part of the changes in memberships include, for Canada: the Commonwealth Telecomm Board, Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, Commonwealth Science Council, CAB International, Conference des ministres de la jeunesse et des sports des pays, European Space Agency, and Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization. Many of these memberships reflect historical Commonwealth and French ties. Memberships the United States chooses include: Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, European Commission for Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, International Committee of Military Medicine and Pharmacy, Council Tech Coop South/South-East Asia, European Molecular Biology Conference, and the South Pacific Commission. These memberships reflect interests in food safety, health sciences, and the Asian region. They do not show a trend reflecting historical cultural relationships. Finally, Mexico’s memberships include the: Latin American Civil Aviation Commission, Latin American Energy Organization, Latin American Fisheries Development Organization, International Regional Organization against Plant and Animal Diseases, Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture, Latin American Center for Physics, and Latin American Institute of Educational Communication. These memberships emphasize Mexico’s much stronger links with the Latin American/Spanish and Portuguese world. Likely, language differences from its North American (English/ French) neighbors also contribute to the different choices along with the cultural history and developing nation status. While Mexico most emphasizes its historical cultural roots through its memberships, Canada also has this tendency, although not as pronounced whereas the United States does not. The behavior of the two smaller nations, which seek to maintain their cultures, is also perhaps a reaction to being neighbors with the United States, a country that avoids recognition of other cultures aside from what it perceives as its own “American” culture. This culture reflects its consumer-oriented society spread by its multinational corporations, for example, Coca-Cola and MacDonald’s. Summary—North America. Overall, there has been an increase in participation in IGOs by the North American countries and some of these are in the category of General IGOs; the three nations have common membership



70

71

in many of these worldwide institutions that address borderless issues such as international law, mobile communications, and energy. Political-Military IGO membership has not changed and this is reflective of the times in that although military considerations remain important, they are not dominating the international agenda except on a regional basis such as the ongoing troubles between Israel and the Palestinians. The United States joins each of its neighboring countries in an institution—NATO with Canada for example. Otherwise, the three nations do not have much in common in Political-Military IGO memberships. The United States has an interest in the Pacific region whereas Mexico focuses on its home region. The number of Economic IGO memberships has increased and some changes have occurred. The three countries have much in common, such as NAFTA and the WTO. The joint memberships of Canada and the United States in these Economic IGOs tend to be for supporting economic development in less-developed nations. Some common ground is also shared in other forums that pay attention to commodities. Mexico has more Economic IGO memberships and alone identifies with its Ibero-American cousins and other developing nations facing similar challenges. Its connection to the Spanish world is strong. Memberships in Social-Cultural IGOs grow and change the most and are the type with the most memberships. Mexico is involved in most of the increase and changes in memberships in that it is a member of many Latin American IGOs and those that are collectives of developing countries. However, there is considerable overlap in the memberships of all three nations and they, therefore, still have lots in common even though both Canada and Mexico differentiate themselves through culturally oriented memberships that the United States does not take part in. The United States does not seem to join IGOs in connection with cherished historical ties as do the other two countries. Participation in IGOs by the United States is very high, and this examination does not provide information as to how active the country is in given IGOs. However, it cannot be inferred that the United States is choosing diplomatic visits over IGO membership to further its foreign policy relations; it appears to mix the two approaches. In contrast, Canada and Mexico have many IGO memberships whereas neither is very active in the diplomatic-visits networks. Thus, these countries prefer IGO channels. Their actual activity is not observable in this data, but given that they are uniquely involved in certain IGOs relating to their particular interests, and in the case of Mexico it has very many Latin American connections, then it may be inferred that these extra memberships matter or else they would not bother with them. South American Participation in IGOs. The area of South America includes 31 countries along with Central America and the Caribbean.



IGOs

Power and Influence

Highlights of their collective IGO memberships are discussed along with those nations that show notable membership patterns. Together, they are members of 19 General IGOs in 1990 and these memberships increase by two to 21 in 1999. Ten nations leave the Permanent Secretariat of the South American Agreement on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, presumably shutting it down with no replacement organization listed. This IGO was set up to deal with drug abuse, not production. Seventeen nations join the International Seabed Authority. Fourteen nations join the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. Argentina is the only country that joins the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. These nations act collectively in most cases such that memberships of IGOs usually include more than one of them. All the countries are members of the International Criminal Police Organization, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations. Thirty are members of the International Maritime Organization and the International Telecommunications Union; St. Kitts and Nevis is not a member of these two organizations and others, likely because it is so small, the smallest country in fact. Twenty eight are members of the Agency for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (OPANAL). Guyana, St. Kitt’s and Nevis, and Cuba are not members of the anti-nuclear group. Eighteen countries are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Suriname, Honduras, Guyana, Belize, St. Kitt’s and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the Bahamas, and Antigua & Barbuda are not members of the IAEA, likely because in most cases they are small Caribbean islands for which this is not an issue. This agency promotes the peaceful use of nuclear power—as energy rather than as a weapon. Other collective memberships not already mentioned include: the World Road Association, the International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the International Whaling Commission, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, the International Mobile Satellite Organization, the Comite Regional de Sanidad Vegetal del Cono Sur (food safety), the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the International Organization of Legal Metrology, the Multinational Force and Observers, and the International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions. A Commonwealth organization is included in the list reflecting the Caribbean’s English history whereas most of the countries are otherwise Spanish. South American countries are members of few Political-Military IGOs. In 1991, they are members of four and by 1999, they have added one, the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Guyana and Suriname join this one, having a mix of religions such that there is a significant Muslim



72

73

presence; and the intent of this IGO is to safeguard the interests of Muslims. Otherwise, over the decade these countries have been members of the InterAmerican Defense Board (this board sees an increase of South American members from 17 to 21 over 1991–99), the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly (no change in membership of 15), the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (an increase of 2 members to 13), and the Rio Group (one member increase to 11). The Caribbean nations are members of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States whereas they are not part of the Rio Group that has the South American continental countries as members. The ACP-EEC Joint Assembly is a curious mix since in this IGO the Caribbean is not coordinating with the Americas, of which it is really a geographic member and, instead, it links more closely with Europe and Africa. The European Community seeks to build relationships with these other parts of the world that they formerly colonized and to aid in economic development. The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States seeks sustainable development and poverty-alleviation in the regions. The Inter-American Defense Board has a mix of island and continental nations and is the only Political-Military IGO that brings them together for common North and South American defense. The Rio Group is an alternative to the OAS in that it includes South and Central America and excludes the United States; its purpose is to coordinate policy and it is not a militarydefense organization. Thus, South America is involved or concerned with international defense in a limited way, being a member of only one major organization for the Americas. South American countries are much more active in Economic IGOs than in the other types already discussed. In 1991, they have combined representation in 57 IGOs of this type and by 1999, that number has been reduced to 55; many changes are involved in these numbers. For some examples, they are no longer members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Union of Banana Exporting Countries, Central American Energy Commission, International Bauxite Association, Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries, Intergovernmental Council for Copper Exporting Countries, International Jute Organization, International Wool Study Group, International Rubber Study Group, and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Some of these wind down. For example, over the 1994/95 period GATT changes to the WTO. Some new memberships in 1999 that did not exist in 1991 include: the WTO, Conferencia de Autoridades Cinematogrificas de Ibero-America, the Trade and Investment Council, Bank for International Settlement, the Group of Three, the International Copper Study Group, the Asia-Pacific Econ Cooperation (APEC), and the African Export Import Bank. Some very specific memberships associated with



IGOs

Power and Influence

commodities are dropped, for example, wool, jute, bauxite, and rubber, and some IGOs with wider missions are adopted. In 1999, most of these countries are part of the: World Trade Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the International Finance Corporation, International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the World Intellectual Property Organization. These are worldwide institutions that do not signify any obvious special interests; membership indicates that these nations are interested in being part of the world community, collectively and individually. More than half are part of the: Latin American Economic System (LAES), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Inter-American Investment Corporation, International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, Group of Latin American and Caribbean Sugar Exporting Countries, Permanent Court of Arbitration, World Tourism Organization, and International Cocoa Organization. In addition to prior comments, this latter set of memberships reflects their collective South American special interest in developing their own region. About a third or more are members of the: Conferencia de Autoridades Cinematogrificas de Ibero-America (continental nations), Caribbean Community (Caribbean nations), Common Fund for Commodities (a mix of continental and Caribbean nations), Caribbean Development Bank (Caribbean and some others), International Coffee Organization (a mix of nations), International Tropical Timber Organization (a smaller mix of nations), International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (larger nations and Central American nations), and Latin American Integration Association (continental nations). This set, with smaller common membership numbers, is specific to regional interests. Most of the remaining IGOs on the list have more than one South American member; only a few do not and this is different from North America where the countries are much more prone to going their own way. Although South American countries are diverse in many ways, such as religion, and have many different immigrant pools, they have a common Spanish and Portuguese history and language that makes them part of IberoAmerica. This gives them the ability to understand each other on a cultural basis and to linguistically communicate with each other. Additionally, no South American country has industrialized nation status or sits on the G8, so any gaps between rich and poor at the international level are not as great as among North American neighbors. They are quite homophilous along many lines and cohesive.



74

75

In 1991, South Americans are members of 52 Social-Cultural IGOs and by 1999, this is increased by eight to 60 different memberships. In 1999, they are now members of: Association of Caribbean States, Fund for Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean, Caribbean Postal Union, International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Group of Temperate Southern Hemisphere Countries on the Environment, International Coral Reef Initiative, Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, and Partners in Population and Development—a South-South initiative. Since 1991, they have left the Commonwealth Air Transport Council; Convenio Andres Bello de integracion educativa, scientfica y cultural; and Organization for Cooperation of Railways. As in the other types of IGOs, there are only a handful of singular memberships and the same collective behavior is to be found. In 1999, most of these countries are members of: Universal Postal Union, Global Environment Facility, Pan-American Health Organization, World Health Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Inter-American Children’s Institute, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Labor Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, World Meteorological Organization, Inter-American Conference on Social Security, Association of Caribbean States, Latin American Energy Organization, and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission. Many of these are worldwide organizations and membership in them signifies at least an interest in demonstrating cooperation with the world community on social-cultural issues. Some are regional organizations and the high membership levels are reflective of the ability of the countries to coordinate on common concerns. Regional issues include health, children, energy, agriculture, and social security. Other popular IGOs in 1999 are the: Latin American Energy Organization; Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; International Telecommunications Satellite Organization; International Exhibitions Bureau; International Office of Epizootics; Non-Aligned Movement; International Organization for Migration (IOM); Pan American Institute of Geography and History; Postal Union of the Americas, Spain, Portugal (formerly Pan-American Postal Union and the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain); European Customs Union Study Group; Latin American Civil Aviation Commission; Fund for Development of the Indigenous Peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean; Latin Union; Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture; International Center for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property; International Committee of Military Medicine and Pharmacy;



IGOs

Power and Influence

International Rice Commission; International Hydrographic Organization; Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science; Latin American Center for Physics; Latin American Fisheries Development Organization; Caribbean Examination Council; Latin American Institute of Educational Communication; Commonwealth Telecomm Board; Bionet International-Global Network of Biosystematics; and Tropical Agriculture Research and Training Center. What is significant about this list is that it covers a wide variety of issues in which about a third or more of these countries are interested. High membership, 21 countries, in the Non-Aligned Movement sets this area apart from North America and joins it with Africa and Asia on principles of international peace. Not backing the allies of WWII may have damaged them economically because in not providing support they were left out of opportunities that the allies would later offer each other. Although South America has had a lot of internal strife relating to political instability, corruption, and violence in the form of wars of independence and civil wars, the region has not been significantly involved in major world wars. Given their high participation in IGOs, it may at first seem inconsistent that they were not engaged in any major wars; however, their membership in PoliticalMilitary IGOs is very low and only one is related to military cooperation. In fact, their reluctance to engage in large-scale wars, in keeping with UN principles, may make them good members of the world community and this is consistent with their high engagement in worldwide IGOs. Other evidence, found on a regional level, supports the view that South America tends toward positive rather than negative engagement. Although there have been several wars among nations in South America (this does not include wars of independence and civil wars since the latter are internal and the former are with colonial powers.) they have been relatively few given the numbers of nations in this region and have mostly been pre-1900. In the twentieth century, the major combatants were Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, but these were not wars that significantly changed boundaries as did, for example, the wars that shaped Europe. In the twenty-first century, there are virtually no major regional international conflicts. South America is made up of modern civilizations that are younger than Europe, so the boundary disputes can be viewed in light of its development after most countries became independent in the nineteenth century. Like Europe, it has had a developmental period, but this has not resulted in the same level of destruction and change caused by the wars in Europe. Also, on a regional level it is able to bond, as discussed, in regional IGOs. While, admittedly, most Non-Aligned members were aligned through some of their actions that indicated a favorite side, they attempted to display a different set of peaceful principles in a bipolar world that really was



76

77

like a two-sided suction cup; a country was pulled in one way or the other and it was hard not to be drawn into one side because the forces were so strong and because countries of the NAM were much weaker, developing nations. On both worldwide and regional terms, South American countries have tended toward an orientation of positive rather than negative engagement, attempting to avoid wars and to solve problems constructively, not in an absolute sense, but in a relative sense compared to the Triad nations and Russia that have been internationally expansionist and warlike. Tempering this statement is the caveat that many South American countries have not been stable internally. Therefore, an additional or alternative explanation for their reluctance to engage in international wars is that they have been absorbed in their individual problems and unable to look beyond their borders. However, collective membership in many regional and international IGOs is some evidence against this argument; if they were so preoccupied with individual problems, they would not look outward to organize regionally in so many institutions on so many issues. Working together helps them solve the individual problems they have in common and so they make this outward effort in their own self-interests as well as collective interests. They could expend energy on international wars, but they choose not to and it is not likely they will do so, because they cannot. Summary—South America. South America is very active in IGOs and most active in the Social-Cultural type, then Economic and General, and least active in Political-Military IGOs, even recognizing that there are many fewer of them to begin with. South American countries are only active in one military type of IGO. Indicative of their collective orientation, especially within the IberoAmerican world, as discussed, it is consistent that South America does not engage a great deal in diplomatic visits, as found in the previous chapter; one-on-one visits tend to entail motivations to further individual goals or to gain support for unilateral or multilateral action that is not necessarily initially based on a wider consensus. This coincides with an earlier statement that South American nations are focused on solving their own internal problems. Instead, they find that especially the regional IGO forums help them to solve problems they share in common. This could be a more productive way to share information, share approaches to problem-solving, and collectively manage issues that cross borders. Also, their preference for open forums over private formal discussions suggests a greater willingness to be open to scrutiny and discussion that includes more dissent. African Participation in IGOs. In 1991, Africa’s 49 countries participate in 19 General IGOs and in 1999, the membership of 43 African countries has risen to 22 General IGOs, the same set with three additions, the: International Seabed Authority, African Civil Service Observatory,



IGOs

Power and Influence

and Hague Conference on Private International Law. The difference in the country membership in the UN is that the 1991 set includes Sao Tome and Principe, Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, Liberia, Burundi, Somalia, and Lesotho. The 1999 set does not include these eight nations but adds Eritrea and South Africa. South Africa, except for Lesotho, was for many years not recognized in the UN because of its policy of apartheid which ended in 1994. In some years, certain nations may not choose to be active in the UNGA. Even though collective membership numbers are low, in 1999 all countries are members of at least some IGOs with the two most popular being the United Nations and the International Telecommunications Union, both having full membership of the 43 countries. The International Criminal Police Organization has 42 members and, in other IGOs, the membership numbers drop drastically. The other General IGOs of which African nations are members in 1999 are: International Maritime Organization, International Atomic Energy Agency, Ministerial Conference of West and Central African States on Maritime, World Road Association, Commonwealth Secretariat, International Mobile Satellite Organization, International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions, Association of African Tax Administrators, Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa, Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, International Organization of Legal Metrology, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, International Whaling Commission, Commission of the Chad Basin, and Multinational Force and Observers. Most are large, worldwide organizations and only a few reflect African interests more specifically. Only the Port Management Association of Eastern and Southern Africa is regional and it is not dealing with critical issues; it is operational. From this, list it appears that the United Nations and the African Civil Service Observatory are the only IGOs that are forums for expression of, or for, addressing critical African interests, but perhaps there is more specificity to be examined in the other types of IGOs. Countries most active in IGOs are Egypt (15 memberships), Cameroon (15), Tunisia (14), Kenya (14), Senegal (14), and Nigeria (13). The least active are Swaziland (4), Eritrea (4), Chad (6), Rwanda (6), Malawi (6), and Botswana (6). Eritrea chooses to be a member of the top four most popular General IGOs, and Swaziland is in the top three plus the Commonwealth Secretariat. In looking at which countries choose some of the less popular IGOs, Morocco is the only member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Egypt is the only member of the Multinational Force and Observers, the IGO that overlooks the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt—peace in the Sinai.



78

79

African nations are not members of many Political-Military IGOs. In 1991, they are members of the: Organization for African Unity, ACPEEC Joint Assembly, African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, Organization of the Islamic Conference, and League of Arab States. In 1999, they are members of the same set and only South Africa joins the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. All are members of two or more of the five IGOs first listed. The Congo and Morocco are the only nonmembers of the Organization for African Unity. Djibouti and Sudan are members of all five organizations. Only a set of eight countries that identify themselves as Arab are part of the League of Arab States: Comoros, Djibouti, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Liberia, Sudan, and Egypt; and this IGO has the second smallest set of African members. However, the Organization of the Islamic Conference attracts 21 members including all those that are part of the League of Arab States. These latter two organizations are not literally military organizations; the League of Arab States intends part of its mission to be the safeguarding of sovereignty and this includes defense. It is harder to tell with the Organization of the Islamic Conference; it intends to safeguard and protect the common interests of Muslims and commits itself to the peaceful rules of the UN. In understanding their stated missions, I do not believe that any of the purely African non-Arab/Muslim IGOs listed are military organizations. I would suggest that only one IGO within this category is likely military: the League of Arab States. Overall, African and Arab nations are not demonstrating through IGOs warlike intentions or even preparation for defense in case of war. Membership in Economic IGOs is high in 1991, with 79 IGOs, and in 1999 there are 82, but with several changes. The top IGOs in terms of number of African members are: the African Development Bank, International Finance Corporation, International Monetary Fund, Food and Agricultural Organization, United Nations Industrial Development Organization, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Intellectual Property Organization, World Trade Organization, and the World Tourism Organization. A trend in these memberships is that many are developmentoriented. Also, although African nations are generally poor, they are managing to stay engaged internationally through these memberships. As providers of many resources and commodities, they are members of many of these related organizations, as discussed earlier in the European section, regarding Europeans as the consumers. Some of these IGOs are: International Cocoa Organization, African Timber Organization, African Oil Palm Development Association, International Coffee Organization, International Pepper Community, International Tropical Timber Organization, and Cocoa



IGOs

Power and Influence

Producers’ Alliance. All the African countries are members of many Economic IGOs and there are no obvious outlier countries that are members of only a few; thus, no nations are obviously withdrawing from the world community. Egypt (39), Morocco (38), and Algeria (37) show the highest rates of participation. As do other regions studied so far, African nations show a preference for economic development over violent confrontation, as demonstrated by their choices of types of memberships. This is a positive indicator in a continent that has so many troubles. Social-Cultural IGOs are secondary to Economic IGOs in terms of memberships and this is different from North America, South America, and Europe, studied so far, which all choose more Social-Cultural IGOs than Economic IGOs. Perhaps the Economic IGOs are a focus because they aid in required development whereas Social-Cultural types are out of the budget or appear to be frivolous. African nations are members of 57 Social-Cultural IGOs in 1991, and by 1999, they are members of 69 after many changes in membership. Very high participation rates are found in the International Civil Aviation Organization, Universal Postal Union, World Meteorological Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Labor Organization, World Health Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Conference of African Ministers Responsible for Sustainable Development, Non-Aligned Movement, European Customs Union Study Group, Global Environment Facility, and International Office of Epizootics. Like South American countries and unlike the North American and European nations, African countries choose to be part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Issues such as agriculture, health, labor, the environment, and sustainable development are important to them. They are members of some unique IGOs not found in, or otherwise not important to, the other regions already studied (North America, South America and Europe). A few examples are the: International Rice Commission, Regional Council for Adult Education and Literacy in Africa, and International Red Locust Control Service. They represent some unique challenges in Africa such as reliance on rice as a staple food, problems of lack of education and literacy, and problems with locusts. Also, regional representation is somewhat prevalent. Some regional Social-Cultural IGOs in Africa are: the West Africa Rice Development Association, Niger Basin Authority, Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel, Gambia River Basin Development Organization, Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin, West African Examinations Council, Senegal River Development Organization, Group of Temperate Southern Hemisphere Countries on the Environment, Desert Locust Control Organization for



80

81

East Africa, and Gambia River Basin Development Organization. Many are related to river basins and their use for hydroelectric energy or water for agriculture. Drought and deserts are also themes in that Africa is concerned about managing its precious water resources. Additionally, Arab culture is represented through quite a few organizations, thus reflecting one of the unique orientations of this continent. Some of these IGOs include: the Arab Postal Union, Arab Center for Medical Literature, Arab Labor Organization, and Arab Federation for Technical Education. The set, or a subset, of the League of Arab States on this continent: Comoros, Djibouti, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Liberia, Sudan, and Egypt are members of these organizations further demonstrating their Arab cultures. Weaker linkages are demonstrated through these Social-Cultural IGOs to other parts of the world. First, the Latin world is represented by memberships in the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and Latin Union. Three countries of the Latin Union are: Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau, former Portuguese colonies. Angola is added to this list to identify the four members of the Community of PortugueseSpeaking Countries. Also, memberships in the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (Egypt only) and the Inter-American Children’s Institute (Angola, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt) link Africa with the Americas. Asia links with Africa through the Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction Organization (nine countries in Africa). Europe links with Africa through the European Customs Union Study Group. Many of these connections relate to aid and only the Arab and Latin connections are based on common culture with select groups of African countries. Although many European nations exploited African countries as colonizers, only the Latin (Portuguese) connection is substantially represented in a social manner. Summary—Africa. African countries participate most (in order) in Economic, Social-Cultural, General, and lastly, Political-Military IGOs. The Americas and Europe participate in Social-Cultural IGOs more than those classified as Economic, but otherwise, the order is similar. Whereas African nations are members of General IGOs, none take part in many. The reason may match the reason why membership in Economic IGOs trumps Social-Cultural IGOs. These nations have thin resources, both in terms of money and human expertise compared to countries in other regions; thus, they have to strategically allocate scarce resources so those memberships that do not represent priorities, reflected in Economic IGO memberships that support their economic development, are fewer. General IGOs are a mixed bag and Social-Cultural IGOs may not be absolutely necessary under the difficult circumstances that most African nations find themselves. The numbers of General IGO memberships are



IGOs

Power and Influence

in the low 20s, in line with the Americas, but North America only has three countries and South America has more than ten fewer countries than Africa. Wealthier Europe, with about the same number of countries, has 27 memberships. Europe is busy in Social-Cultural IGOs with 87 memberships whereas Africa is in only 69, slightly more than the Americas, with membership in the low 60s, but they have fewer nations and are historically less culturally diverse. North America has been historically run and influenced by those of primarily British ancestry with some Spanish and French influences. South America is strongly Spanish and Portuguese. However, although Africa has had almost every colonial power on its territory, indigenous peoples have regained power in modern times whereas in the Americas this is not the case; the former colonies in North America have dominated and have eliminated most indigenous people. Thus, the mix of powers is more complicated in Africa and this would be expected to be reflected in many Social-Cultural IGOs, catering to and created by all these different peoples, but this is not the case. Political-Military IGOs are few and non-military in nature. One has a mandate of African unity whereas a couple are based on building the Arab and Muslim communities. This latter subgroup of African nations is a strong cultural fixture. Europe also attempts to maintain ties with several regions, including Africa, suggesting a remaining colonial influence on the continent. Overall, the world does not view any African nations as military threats and aggression is not a suggested attribute based on this study of IGOs; none are rogue nations. Many have internal problems, including wars, and this keeps them distracted from ambitions of international expansionism. Instead, they seek unions for collective support. In 1999, Morocco is one of only two nations that is not a member of the African Union (a Political-Military IGO) and it is the only member of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (a General IGO), perhaps reflective of its close ties to Europe through its relationship with France and its capitalistic open economy. Yet, it is also one of a group of Arab states on this continent. It also is one of the most active members in Economic and Social-Cultural IGOs. Thus, it acts like an outlier among these nations; perhaps its relative wealth gives it more leeway. Africa is engaged with the world through IGOs and this is potentially a positive force for improvement; however, outside of the largest types of worldwide IGOs, Africa is not very well connected in specific ways with wealthy regions that could help it. From earlier study, it has been seen that North America and Europe have not demonstrated a strong interest in linking with Africa, either through diplomatic visits or in IGOs specifically geared to African concerns, except where advantageous to them such as in commodity-market governance. This is slightly odd because of Africa’s



82

83

colonial past; some evidence, based on IGO memberships, suggests that Portuguese colonies are more connected to their former colonizers than are others. Egypt does have a strong place in the diplomatic network, primarily connecting it with the Middle East rather than the West; Arab nations of Africa, such as Morocco and Egypt, seem to gain some strength through Muslim unity; they, in general, are among the wealthier African countries. South Africa is the wealthiest nation on the continent, but has not figured prominently in this study of IGO memberships. It does not subscribe to many of them, but is as engaged as any other African nation. Its memberships do not set it apart in any unique way. It is one of the few members of the International Vine and Wine Office and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (both Social-Cultural IGOs). Its wine is famous and its ability to produce an exported and recognized luxury product does set it apart from other African nations. Also, its Economic IGO memberships do not indicate anything remarkable except that it is not as needy a nation, being the only one in 1999 not a member of UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization). It may not be as engaged in helping to solve the continent’s development problems since it is not a member of many organizations geared toward this goal, such as: Association of African Central Banks, African Reinsurance Corporation, Islamic Development Bank, and Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations. This posture may be a result of its anti-social apartheid past and wealthy status as compared to the other countries; however, it is still a developing nation. Middle Eastern Participation in IGOs. In 1991, 13 nations of the Middle East vote in the UN, whereas in 1999 there are 17 countries, a result of independence from the Soviet Union. The original nations are Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Afghanistan. In 1999, Iraq is not part of this list and Iran is on it instead along with former Soviet states, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Iran and Iraq show up in different years’ datasets suggesting they are not consistently voting in the UN. These nations are members of 15 General IGOs in 1991 and in 1999, the number is 18. In 1999, all 17 countries are members of the International Telecommunications Union and the United Nations. Most countries are members of the: International Maritime Organization, International Criminal Police Organization, and International Atomic Energy Agency. By this year, they have added three IGOs: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Seabed Authority, and the South and West Asia Postal Union. Through these memberships, they are linking with Europe and Asia. Legal issues, including private law, are important given that this rather shorter list includes five related organizations including the: International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions, the



IGOs

Power and Influence

Hague Conference on Private International Law, International Organization of Legal Metrology, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, and the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee. Wealthy oil nations, many ruled by family-run dictatorships, may be concerned with laws to protect their wealth and stature. Nothing else is unique about these memberships; they are similar to other regions’ choices in that there are many major worldwide institutions. In 1991, 12 nations are, not surprisingly, members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, with Israel as the odd man out. In total, membership is in only three of these types of IGOs and Israel is not a member of any of them. Ten are members of the League of Arab States and six are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (The GCC includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman). In 1999, 15 are members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, thus the former Middle Eastern Soviet block countries also consider themselves Islamic. Membership is the same in the other two institutions. The four ex-Soviet states are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and three (not Tajikistan) are members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The new nations straddle the line between being both Islamic and European. The CIS is a very loose association, not military in anyway, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is part of NATO. Also, as mentioned earlier, the League of Arab States could be construed as defensive and the GCC is a common market as well as a stated defense organization. Thus, with just a few organizations, these states have a relatively strong military orientation in 1999. In 1991, the Middle Eastern states are members of 47 Economic IGOs and by 1999, are members of 52 Economic IGOs with many changes involved in getting to this net number. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have the most memberships at 26 while Afghanistan has only 11. Saudi Arabia was quite central in the diplomatic-visits network, remaining powerful in the world today, and an important participating nation whereas Afghanistan has antisocial elements such as Taliban terrorists and this is reflected in its fewer memberships. All 17 countries in 1999 are members of the: International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Qatar is the only non-member of the International Finance Corporation and Uzbekistan is the only non-member of the Food and Agricultural Organization. Aid is an obvious emphasis in this set of organizations and these countries are generally wealthy so they must be providers of aid more often than receivers. The bulk, but not all, of the organizations with many members are Arab/ Gulf region/oil/Islamic by name. This is a list of 14 organizations so, like diplomatic visits, these IGO memberships demonstrate that these nations are very cohesive. However, Israel is not a member of any of these clubs



84

85

whereas it was highly active with its regional neighbors in the diplomaticvisits networks. The other countries, generally not members of these organizations, are the former Soviet states. These CIS countries are outside the Gulf region on the eastern side of Iran and are poorer than their neighbors. The Economic IGOs with very few memberships from this region link with other regions of the world; many of them suggest fragmentation of this region alongside cohesion. Much of this is due to the differences Israel has with other countries. Out of 17 organizations with memberships of fewer than two from this region, Israel is a member of six of them. In total, Israel has 20 Economic IGO memberships. These IGOs are: the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association, Inter-American Investment Corporation, International Olive Oil Council, International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Tourism, plants, and olive oil are some of Israel’s economic interests along with linking with the Americas and Europe. In contrast, Lebanon, the CIS states, and most of the Gulf region countries except for Saudi Arabia are usually members of the same IGOs as others in the region. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran have memberships in three of the IGOs with few members. Saudi Arabia is a member of the African Development Bank, Societe Arabe des mines de l’Inchiri, and Bank for International Settlement. Jordan is a member of European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association, and Societe Arabe des mines de l’Inchiri, related to copper mining in West Africa. It shares interests with Saudi Arabia in African copper mining and with Israel in tourism and plants. In contrast, Iran is a member of the Asian Reinsurance Corporation, Asian Clearing Union South Investment, Trade and Technological Data Exchange Center, and Asian Productivity Organization (APO) suggesting that it is making strategic links with Asia. Afghanistan is the only country other than the CIS nations that is a member of the Asian Development Bank. It is one of two members, along with Iran, of the Asian Reinsurance Corporation. Both Iran and Afghanistan are very troubled nations as viewed by Western nations and the UN. In the twenty-first century, their problems have developed to an extent that Afghanistan harbors the Taliban, considered terrorists, and Iran is a rogue nation attempting to develop nuclear armaments. Protection gained from Asian countries in exchange for votes in the UN may be motivation for Iran’s and Afghanistan’s membership and help in these Asian development organizations. Social-Cultural IGOs memberships are 39 in 1991 and 49 in 1999. The year 1999 has the same set of IGOs plus ten additions, many related to the



IGOs

Power and Influence

ex-Soviet states. The new ones are the: Global Environment Facility, Council of Ministers of Health of the Arab States of the Gulf, Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications, International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, Inter-American Children’s Institute, Joint Administration of the Turkic Culture and Arts, International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, Asian-Pacific Postal Union, and European Commission for Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. Israel and Syria have the most memberships at 27. Jordan and Lebanon are next with 26 memberships. All Middle Eastern countries have memberships that number at least in the teens such that none has a very low number of memberships compared to the others. They are all members of the: International Civil Aviation Organization, Universal Postal Union, World Meteorological Organization, International Office of Epizootics, World Health Organization, and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Afghanistan is the only non-member of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, an international environmental treaty to protect the ozone layer, and Kuwait is the only non-member of the International Labor Organization. All nations are members of the Non-Aligned Movement except for Israel and two of the ex-Soviet states, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Israel seeks United States protection against its Arab neighbors. In these memberships, a similar pattern as that found in the Economic IGOs is evident. Iran and Afghanistan are making ties with Asia through Social-Cultural IGOs and in most cases they are the only members from this region or only one of them is a member. This is the case for the following IGOs: Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme, Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development, Council Tech Coop South/South-East Asia, and the Asian-Pacific Postal Union. Due to its eastern location with respect to its Middle Eastern neighbors, Afghanistan may feel Asian, but a South Asian identity is not explained by this yet, some of these IGOs fall into this category. Thus, both Iran and Afghanistan could be seeking protective votes in the UN from Asian nations. This is happening today as Iran is protected by China from sanctions brought about by its nuclear-weapons program to which the United States objects. I will examine the voting data in 1999 to investigate whether Iran and Afghanistan have some of these Asian memberships to build support in the UN. In 1999, countries voting with Iran at compliance rates of 80–100 percent are: St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, Madagascar, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Cuba, Sudan, Chad, Honduras, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Comoros, Colombia, Suriname, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Djibouti, Angola, Zimbabwe, Morocco,



86

87

Algeria, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen Arab Republic, Vietnam, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Myanmar, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Fiji, North Korea, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Malaysia, Brunei, United Arab Emirates, and the Philippines—47 countries. Many African nations (20), some South American nations (5), most of the Middle East (9) and Asian nations (13) are compliant. Based on this analysis Iran’s strategy seems to work. Also in 1999, 33 countries vote with Afghanistan at a 80–100 percent rate: Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen Arab Republic, Turkmenistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, North Korea, Vietnam, Fiji, Rwanda, Djibouti, Comoros, Seychelles, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Ghana, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Honduras. More than a third of these, 12, are Asian, 9 are Middle Eastern, only 1 is South American, and the rest, 11, are African. Afghanistan could also be vote-buying or engaging in reciprocal behavior by engaging with Asian IGOs. Summary—Middle East. Participation in General IGOs reflects an interest in laws and especially private property law which makes sense since the powerful oil nations are controlled by wealthy men who seek to protect their positions and their wealth. Political-Military IGO membership reflects a cohesiveness among most of these nations, with Israel an unwelcome outsider. The new CIS countries are welcome members of the Arab defense organizations and, at the same time, they coordinate with NATO through a European organization. Compared to other regions, this smaller set of countries is well engaged with military concerns through international organizations. Economic IGOs have only slightly more membership than the SocialCultural IGOs, and there are many. In the more specific types, the Arab nations predominate and Israel along with the CIS nations are left out. Israel is an enemy and the CIS nations are poor. Israel and Saudi Arabia are similar opposites. Both are linked to the rest of the world through IGOs. Saudi Arabia is a core member of the Middle East, whereas Israel is an outsider. The former links with the rest of the world more than other members because it is powerful in its region and can be influential outside of it due to its strength, whereas the latter links with regions outside its region to find support in spite of its weakness within its region. With these countries, except for Israel and two CIS countries, the NonAligned Movement is a popular social-cultural IGO. Israel is aligned with the United States for protection from its unfriendly Arab neighbors and some CIS countries may have some loyalty to Russia based on their history while others have chosen to join NATO and the Western alliance even though the cold war is over.



IGOs

Power and Influence

Also, Afghanistan and Iran are likely engaging in reciprocal behavior with Asia. They are members of many Asian Economic and Social-Cultural IGOs that do not relate to their Eastern Middle East region in a direct way; thus, they appear to help the Asian, including the South Asian, region through these IGOs and in return gain supportive UN votes from those countries. A brief analysis supports this possibility. The votes protect them against sanctions and other possible actions opposed to behavior that the West does not support. Asian Participation in IGOs. In 1991, 30 Asian countries are members of 18 General IGOs, whereas by 1999, 29 countries are members of 21 General IGOs. Note that Russia is part of Europe because of its COW country coding that groups it this way. Vanuatu is a very small island country near Australia not in the 1999 data set because it did not vote that year. Like many other regions, the two additional IGOs include the: International Seabed Authority (Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Fiji), and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand). The South and West Asia Postal Union has only one member from this region, Pakistan. Most countries are members of the: International Telecommunications Union, United Nations, International Maritime Organization, and International Criminal Police Organization. ASEAN’s membership has grown from six countries in 1991 to 10 in 1999. These Southeast Asian countries are attempting to build a community to strengthen themselves in the face of growing competition in the region, including that from China. The countries are members of five Political-Military IGOs including the: Organization of the Islamic Conference; African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States; ACP-EEC Joint Assembly; Commonwealth War Graves Commission; and ANZUS Council. These memberships have remained stable and all have low numbers of members, in the single digits. The Organization of the Islamic Conference is a UN-associated IGO working in the interests of Muslims around the world; it has a peaceful orientation and the member countries are: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Maldives, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. The ANZUS Council is the only defenseoriented organization through which the United States coordinates with Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific Rim. Fifteen countries have no memberships in any of these organizations; this is not a militarily organized region in an international sense and if this type of membership is any indicator, the region is the least concerned about defense or the military. This is a unique attribute although other regions, such as Africa and South America, are also not well organized militarily. In 1991, this region has memberships in 57 Economic IGOs and by 1999 it has 54 memberships. Even though 1991 has a longer list of organizations,



88

89

1999 has a few additions including the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Copper Study Group, African Export Import Bank, and Caribbean Development Bank. The WTO has all countries as members except North Korea. The Asian Development Bank does not include Brunei or North Korea. The IMF has all as members except Sri Lanka and North Korea. Also, the FAO has all countries as members except Brunei and Singapore. From the outset, North Korea is an oddity in its memberships with only seven including the: FAO, WIPO, UNIDO, World Tourism Organization, International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, Common Fund for Commodities, Intergovernmental Organization for Marketing Information, and Technical Advisory for Fishery Products in the Asia and Pacific Region; it is an isolated communist country and this is reflected here. Only Brunei and the Solomon Islands have participation as low as that of North Korea, but the patterns are different. Brunei has chosen membership in some of the major IGOs and has not chosen to participate in smaller, more specialized and regional organizations. Similarly, the Solomon Islands is a member of the five top IGOs but has also chosen a couple of smaller ones. Also, overall these countries are not collective in their membership decisions as indicated by 33 IGOS with single-digit membership. They do not share many strong common interests. Indonesia is the only member of OPEC (it withdrew in recent times due to net imports of oil). Many commodity and resource organizations are on this list, for example, the International Cocoa Organization and the International Pepper Community. China is active in 30 Economic IGOs and a member in the most popular 19 organizations. Although communist, it acts very differently from its North Korean neighbor and is not so isolationist. Japan and India have the most memberships, 37 each. While China and India show some interest in African relations through a couple of memberships, Japan appears to have lesser interest in regions of the world outside its own. In 1991, these countries are members of 49 Social-Cultural IGOs and by 1999 they are members of 57. They have only slightly more of these types of memberships in 1999 than in Economic IGOs. This suggests equal priority. Most take an interest in the: Universal Postal Union, World Meteorological Organization, World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, Global Environment Facility, Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, International Fund for Agricultural Development, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity. A number of poorer countries, including North Korea, have fewer memberships than others. Pakistan and India have the most Social-Cultural memberships; they are members of all the most popular IGOs as well as many others; none



IGOs

Power and Influence

particularly stand out as reflecting their unique cultures or priorities, though. Also, although these two countries are not friendly with each other, they do not show animosity through memberships; that is, they share many in common and do not avoid or exclude each other. China is also active in these IGOs without any particular patterns of membership. Moreover, although New Zealand and Australia are culturally connected with the West through their colonial origins, their Social-Cultural memberships do not show a pattern of ties with either Europe or North America. Japan, a powerful nation, is active but no pattern is found in its memberships. It is part of the Asian world and at the same time reaches out internationally through general memberships and the odd one that links them with European or Americans. It does not show an interest in Africa, developing nations, or aid in any particular way. The Non-Aligned Movement is indicative of alliances. It has a substantial membership in this region except that China, South Korea, Japan, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Samoa are not members. Other than China, they are allies of the United States. Summary—Asia. Asian countries represent a wide range of diversity, from India to China, Japan, and Australia. Their membership patterns suggest this diversity is manifested through a lack of strong commonality or cohesiveness. They have no military defense coordination and this is a unique characteristic of the region compared to others. Whereas Africa and South America are also low on military organization, Asia seems least organized militarily, but for very different reasons. Certain countries, such as China, have their own strong military organizations and have been internationally aggressive; the diversity of this region probably contributes to this orientation of national, rather than regional, military strength. In contrast, South America and Africa are quite cohesive and cooperative in their respective regions and attempt to resolve common problems. Military build-up does not tend to be a priority for them and, in general, they have not been as internationally aggressive as have some Asian nations. Thus, the lack of military organization in Asia is not a reflection of peacefulness. An exception in this region is that the United States coordinates militarily with Australia and New Zealand. Also, while many countries are part of the NAM some major players are not. In general, the region has many IGOs and if these countries have anything in common, it is that they tend to focus on their region as a whole and do not have many sub-regional organizations. ASEAN, as a Southeast Asian group is an exception and a group of Muslim countries protect their own interests. Also, they are not especially externally oriented in that they are not deeply connected to other regions of the world except through the major worldwide organizations that all countries tend to join. This behavior contrasts with the diplomatic-visits networks analysis that suggested these



90

91

countries were very active; perhaps because they have such divergent interests they use the one-on-one approach more enthusiastically than the group model because visits allow for specific discussions on subjects of interest. The IGO model works for addressing common interests and this seems to occur on a wider regional level. Conclusion. Examining country IGO membership patterns for individual countries and regions provides many insights. One can find that some nations cooperate more with others or that some regions cooperate more. Even sub-regional groups and cultural divisions may be implied by membership patterns. Preliminary rough analysis suggests that common IGO memberships are correlated with similar voting in the UN and Political-Military, Economic and General IGO memberships seem most promising for this. However, regional analysis implies that there are other patterns with greater scope aside from dyadic relationships. First, to answer one broad question regarding choice of influencechannel, diplomatic visits, or IGOs, those countries that are active in diplomatic-visits networks also tend to use IGOs. However, a country like France, which is only moderately busy visiting, tends to prefer IGO forums, possibly because it likes a collective approach to finding solutions. Also, Japan, a nation fairly busy in the visits network, does use IGOs, but not likely with the same zeal as other powerful nations such as the UK and the United States which are active in both types of channels. One reason appears to be the fragmentation in Asia; Japan does not likely have its agenda addressed in Asian-oriented IGOs, so visits may be more effective. Moreover, some countries, such as Canada, which are not making many diplomatic visits, use IGOs more. Although this study looks at dyadic voting relationships, it becomes clear from this network investigation that countries’ interests in this time frame are highly congruent with regional and, to a lesser extent, worldwide interests. Most countries choose to be a part of regional IGOs as well as with worldwide ones. South American, African, and Middle Eastern countries conform. European nations have this characteristic, but they are also fragmented into sub-regional groups. Asian countries are cooperative on the bigger issues but are fragmented at a more specific level and are not as cooperative as other regions appear to be because they are so different. North American nations are the least cohesive even though there are only three of them; Mexico joins with Ibero-America and developing nations. Except for North America, when two countries are compared in their voting, it is often like comparing the voting patterns of regions, if the countries are good regional representatives. For example, Middle Eastern countries are very cohesive with each other except for Israel, so choosing any one of these countries could be predictive of regional expressions.



IGOs

Power and Influence

This rich dataset suggests three major attributes regarding how the world is organizing post–cold war. Primarily, the world is multi-polar by continental region in the sense that regions are internally coordinating with each other, as evidenced by so much interregional organization. The IGO connections and voting patterns do not at all suggest uni-multipolarity in that the West and other allies of the United States are well connected with the United States (as the uni-pole) against the rest of the world. The lack of cohesion between the United States and its own neighbors is strong evidence and other points supportive of this were made earlier. A second aspect of world configuration is that within most regions, there are prominent dominant or more externally oriented powers that do not necessarily cooperate within their regions. In North America, it is the United States, which is only somewhat cooperative—it does not build cohesion on its continent although it is part of NAFTA which is only a trade agreement and has many problems. In Europe, it is the UK, and this nation, while it likes to stand out in a crowd, has managed to join the EU. In Africa, it is South Africa and this country stands out in contrast with its neighbors due to its vast difference in wealth and former apartheid system; other nations on this continent are trying to help themselves despite South Africa. In the Middle East, it is Saudi Arabia and this nation is very cohesive within its realm. In Asia, it is Japan which is not obviously helpful nor is it a hindrance. It looks out for its own interests. In South America, it is Argentina (not yet Brazil); Argentina is not the obvious behemoth that other nations are in their own regions, but it stands out on the world stage more so than other South American countries and at the same time, is cooperative as a member in its region. The third attribute of the shape of the world is that North-South divisions are evident. Commonalities expressed in UN voting and IGO memberships go beyond continental regions; the situation may be construed as a World Systems scenario that is the North versus the South or core versus periphery. The South votes together and, at the same time, there are numerous commodity and resource IGOs that act as mediators between North consumers and South producers. These IGOs create and control markets that are not free between these regions, thus controlling the balance of resources. Also, in 1995 the World Trade Organization is established to deal with these issues. So, we have continental cohesion that tends to be stronger in South continents than in North ones within a polarizing North-South divide. Moreover, prominent powers on each continent (i.e., the United States and the UK) either seek visibility or receive attention (Saudi Arabia) on the world stage. This is evidence of movement toward globalization and explains that there is a different configuration of loci in the world after the cold war inasmuch



92

93

as they are regionally based, continental and sub-continental. Additional to this are cultural forces that represent transnational and transregional ties that are Islamic and Ibero-American. Moreover, Political-Military IGOs do not, in general, have that strong of a military expression and they are few in number compared to other categories. There is NATO and a couple of other military IGOs to which the United States belongs but most other regions do not have a military orientation comparable to the United States, although they are not in opposition to it such that the uni-multipolar concept is not supported. Most other regions of the world choose the Non-Aligned Movement and this cannot be interpreted as anti-American; they either advocate peace or are disinterested in military adversarialism. However, some individual nations do command individual military strength. A combination of a general lack of interest in expansionist-oriented military power, likely exhausted after the experience of the cold war and the breakup of the Soviet Union, and a stronger interest in solving development and internalpeace issues helps explain the reduction of regional conflict. Countries are finding their common concerns are better dealt with collectively and they see themselves as having a common destiny with their regional partners against other regions rather than versus local neighbors.



IGOs




Dynamics of International Cooperative Decision Making



Part II




Previous Research in International Relations P  in international relations associated with this study is vast and sometimes controversial. Not all of it will be reviewed here, but some important literature will be discussed in the context of this study while linking it with organization theory and the wider body of management research, where applicable; some analogous work in the field of international relations has been done in parallel with management research. Also, I will build on previous research with some of my own insights. First, I will explain what this previous research has in common with this study and then discuss it. As a brief recapitulation, this study examines the effects of international networks on cooperation in a focal forum; underlying this cooperation could be bargaining, reciprocal behavior and compliance, shared information from trusted sources, or homophily—meaning that similar entities gravitate toward each other on the basis of their commonalities; also, they communicate well and, thereby, affect each other. Dealings may be explicit or cooperation may not entail direct communication and could be motivated by international norms, expectations, or indirect influence. Research has had difficulty uncovering what exactly is happening, even to the point of having trouble demonstrating cooperation, in a general way, because the behavior is not often observable from an empirical standpoint. The network approach used here has helped shed light on international relationships. Past work in international relations has defined terms, proposed what could be happening, and attempted some empirical work, but with problematic measures. For example, definitions of international interactions such as interconnectedness and interdependence or dependence have been debated and refined. Related to this is asking what is international power in



Chapter 6

Power and Influence

a new world order in which military power is not necessarily the defining element. How does power play a role in relationships of interdependence and dependence? Also, research has investigated whether interdependence, often measured using international trade, leads to increased or reduced conflict and to more cooperation. Finally, very much aligned with the theme of this book—the difference between power and influence—is the view that changes on the world stage (regime change) may be explained by two models: one is based on power and is called issue structuralism, and the second is an international organization model, one that I will call an influence, rather than a power model (Keohane & Nye 2001). What is Dependence and Interdependence? The title of this book seems simple enough: Power and Influence. In fact, the concepts these words entail and the related concepts of importance in this book—dependence, interdependence, mutual dependence, and independence—have been discussed at length by political scientists and others so as to ensure clear communication among scholars in the field of international relations (Baldwin, 1980). Keohane and Nye (2001) and Baldwin (1980) share some different views. While addressing issues that Baldwin (1980) is concerned with so as to demonstrate how this work deals with or satisfies them, I am also going to interject some concepts from Keohane and Nye (2001). In doing so, the reader will grasp some of the complexity in the multidimensional world of international relations. First, definitions of dependence have produced two distinct meanings and one is preferred primarily because it is consistent with other terms and agrees with normal usage. For a longer explanation see Baldwin (1980). The choice is between sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence and I will discuss how this book approaches this issue from an empirical standpoint. Sensitivity interdependence, according to Baldwin (1980) and quoting Keohane and Nye (2001), is “a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces.” In contrast, vulnerability interdependence in conventional usage is, “a relationship of subordination in which one thing is supported by something else or must rely upon something else for fulfillment of a need.” (Baldwin, 1980) It is much more costly to break the latter type of relationship. If one is only sensitive to another, then the latter is influential but not powerful. The power of one is achieved through another’s vulnerability to it. A stronger sense of reliance is implied by vulnerability that is not in sensitivity. Therefore, dependence is a case of power. Baldwin (1980) likes to illustrate the difference with examples such as being sensitive to alcohol if you are a drinker, but being vulnerable to it if you are an alcoholic. An alcoholic is dependent, whereas a drinker can without difficulty choose not to consume alcohol.



98

99

Keohane and Nye (2001) view the difference between sensitivity and vulnerability differently in the international relations context. “Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework—how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?” (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Sensitivity describes a current state of being whereas vulnerability describes costs to adapt so as not to be as sensitive (Keohane & Nye, 2001). The latter conceptualization creates a useful framework for discussions of international relations so that more specificity of terminology to the area is built in. However, based on rules for meanings of words, Baldwin (1980) prefers to use conceptualizations rooted in commonplace usage and, therefore, does not want to discuss dependence or interdependence in terms of sensitivity; he says the concept of vulnerability is the underlying idea in common practice. Also, interdependence is a concept connected to dependence as in Baldwin’s discussion. For example, he uses vulnerability interdependence to define dependence. Keohane and Nye (2001) distinguish interconnectedness from interdependence and define two types of interdependence, sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence, where “vulnerability is another step further in cost” (Keohane & Nye, 2001). A possible interpretation of interdependence is derived from a counterfactual approach, such that if parties would be better off without their relationship then they are not interdependent. Baldwin (1980) illustrates this with Deutch’s (1954) international relations view of interlocking relationships that grow out of the division of labor among countries because of their specialization. The question of whether to be in an interdependent relationship is clarified by the concept of opportunity costs. If it is less costly to be in the relationship rather than not to an extent that both actors prefer to maintain it, then the actors are interdependent. Additionally, Baldwin (1980) quotes Sir Norman Angell: “the degree of interdependence varies inversely with the effectiveness of force.” All of this suggests that there have been different approaches taken to explain interdependence and consensus has not been reached. The concepts of dependence and interdependence are first illustrated in this book using the trade network concepts constructed in the empirical work. The concepts are also operationalized in military alliance networks. Baldwin (1980) explicates a view of generalizability such that, “It should not be necessary to develop a separate theory to cover each issue-area of international exchange relations.” I agree and strive to build on previous theory in a consistent manner while attempting to clarify and improve upon it. Accompanying the dependence ideas is power. In earlier times, international power was mainly defined according to military might, but the basis for power has changed post–cold war (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Power is “the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would



Research in International Rel ations

Power and Influence

not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor). Power can be conceived as power over outcomes.” (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Having power resources is potential power and a “less dependent actor” is also considered one who is more powerful within a particular dimension (Keohane & Nye, 2001). In the realist world, military power could be translated into power in other spheres through linkage strategies. A country that is strong in trading a particular good, for example, may cooperate with a more militarily powerful actor because of a hierarchy of issues that makes military security the priority (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Whereas power is not as fungible as money, the traditional-issue hierarchy helps establish preferable tradeoffs. When military security declines in importance, as is the case today, linkage strategies may work on other dimensions; the economic power may link with other social-political issues and be successful that way. However, in a world of complex interdependence, the dynamics do not work quite as conveniently as will be discussed later. The relative trade centrality measure used in this empirical work measures relative power in trade based on network centrality of one country relative to another. They are not necessarily connected in trade, so it is potential power. If one country has many inward ties, many countries importing into it, it is more central than others with fewer ties, and this is a continuous variable. Therefore, it does not define one country as more powerful and another as dependent in an absolute sense. The measure is relative because the trade centralities of two countries are subtracted. A larger difference suggests a greater power differential or conversely, greater dependence of one on another. However, what is meant by dependence and interdependence in this case relative to the earlier discussion? At first, the measure I have used could seem to suggest a continuum from dependence to interdependence to independence and, at the same time, from vulnerability interdependence to sensitivity interdependence, but this is not quite right. The latter two constructs could be on a continuum within the construct of dependence or, possibly, a better approach clearly connects all of these ideas. I am going to explore some ideas and advance a preferred possibility. Following this, I will explain why the measure of relative trade centrality, as a continuous variable measure of these concepts, is likely more practical than a dichotomous approach. First, I am going to agree with Baldwin (1980) that vulnerability interdependence, as he defines it in general common usage, is the preferred meaning over sensitivity interdependence for dependence. Dependence does suggest a neediness that is hard to overcome and this state of being is better described with the word “vulnerable” than “sensitivity.” If one has few other options then one is vulnerable or dependent on its only other. To be sensitive suggests that what a partner does affects one’s situation and may even affect



100

101

decisions, but does not necessarily leave one without other decent options. The partner is replaceable, perhaps with some inconvenience. These concepts are really quite close, however, and the difference between them may come to be viewed as contrived. Sensitivity, while it seems to represent a different state of being, is an incremental distance away from vulnerability. This “step away” of one concept from the other mirrors Keohane & Nye’s (2001) view, while at the same time not defining it so specifically such that vulnerability means a difficulty or costliness in policy change. I will turn that stepped difference into a more nuanced graduation with the following argument. The line is blurrier. If a country has only one supplier of an important good, it is vulnerable for a time until it finds an alternative partner. Its vulnerability would be reduced to sensitivity if it found alternative suppliers before it lost the sole supplier. Its state of being would be sensitive, even from Keohane and Nye’s (2001) position. If the sole supplier were to cut off supply today, it would only be a matter of time for the country to find an alternative supplier. However, the time period may be long enough so as to inflict pain. For example, an extreme situation is that a new supplier may not exist until the same technology can be invented. Also, geography could increase the time required to find an alternative supply. Proximity becomes an issue if a region is hard to access and an alternative supplier may have difficulty delivering. Numerous scenarios could affect the time for alternative supply and more time increases vulnerability if the situation is painful. As soon as an alternative is found, it is hoped that the originally vulnerable party will learn from the past error of reliance and develop additional relationships so that it is only sensitive to a loss of a partner and not vulnerable. Sensitivity implies that such an inconvenience is less because it takes no or little time to find an alternative supplier. This is the difference—time over which there is pain. Keohane and Nye’s (2001) graphical depictions show their concepts over time, yet they talk in terms of costs. However, the amount of time before devastation without a particular good is not obvious and lies on a continuum of contingencies. If Saudi Arabia were to stop supplying the United States with oil and gas, the United States would turn to other suppliers, such as Canada, and request that it try to produce more to compensate. The United States would not likely shut down, but gas prices may increase, making a variety of goods more expensive. If one were to argue that because the United States has alternatives this scenario is not one of dependence, it becomes difficult to find a real scenario where a country is wholly dependent on another; although there is specialization in trade, we do not, and could never, have a world where only one supplier existed for many important goods. When a good is important, almost by definition, there are alternative suppliers because the market




Power and Influence

motivates competition, according to demand. If absolute dependence is conceivably impossible, why define it? It is the equivalent of attempting to define a word that has no meaning because it is nonexistent. Of course, this logic has to carry over into all dimensions, not only trade, and I suggest that it does. In the military realm, in which it is conceivably more difficult to find substitutes (allies) than in trade, I would argue that particular conflict situations are so complex that often a country cannot count on an ally to come through when needed, anyway, and others may come to the fore instead; it highly depends on the relationships, leaderships, and bargaining at the time. In WWII, Canada entered the war to protect its European allies, whereas the United States did not enter until after being attacked by Japan. Meanwhile, America’s European allies had been asking for help. It is unexpected that a peaceful nation like Canada would fight first before the Americans and be so effective. Furthermore, in the 1990s, over the time of this study, NATO is a collective alliance and, by definition, this suggests there are substitute allies if it does not act in full accord. So, if through this thought experiment one is satisfied that the United States-Saudi Arabia-Canada scenario is one of solving a problem of dependence, the boundary between sensitivity and vulnerability is blurry. The United States could call upon several other international oil suppliers, not just Canada, to collectively compensate for its loss of Saudi supply. Over time, the reparation could become permanent such that the new suppliers are happy with the increased business and Saudi Arabia loses its leverage. How could this happen? The other suppliers may develop improved technologies to facilitate their increased production effort or the United States may adopt new suppliers, for example, African suppliers. Also, alternative energy may begin to fill in the gap. Time heals all wounds and the difference between vulnerability and sensitivity is solved over time and with political will; urgency demands this. The incremental change, adding suppliers or finding alternative ways to solve a problem (an alternative energy source in the example above) can be solved so as to transform vulnerability to sensitivity before disaster happens. If, because human intervention is successful, no disaster happens will the situation be characterized as one of vulnerability or sensitivity? The “if” is a contingency. Furthermore, time is continuous and the difference between being vulnerable and sensitive is continuous not dichotomous. How much time does it take for Canada to increase oil and gas production to compensate for the Saudi oil and gas loss? Or, how much time does it take the American president’s aides to contact enough foreign suppliers so that collective production is increased? These are unknown contingencies such that the breach could be solved quickly or it could take days or months, but it is unknown and the success of the contingencies affects the time required for a solution. It may make the difference between calling the



102

103

situation one of vulnerability or one of sensitivity and since it is so blurry in any case, it will be argued both ways, on retrospect. While the difference between vulnerability and sensitivity is maintained after this discussion such that vulnerability is more clearly dependence and sensitivity is a lesser case of it, the connection between the two puts them on a continuum of dependence. In sensitivity interdependence, one actor relies on another to a lesser extent than in vulnerability interdependence. Put in terms of drinking alcohol, is there such a clear line between being a heavy drinker and an alcoholic? While the social drinker is obviously not an alcoholic, someone may imbibe to such an extent that it is not clear whether or how much dependence exists. The drinker is even confused about this and whether the drinker is sensitive or vulnerable is an arguable matter. In international relations, the concepts are likely discussed and confused because they are close, but the closeness has not been identified and articulated as is done here. Keohane and Nye (2001) use a definition of dependence that suggests sensitivity rather than vulnerability according to Baldwin (1980), but my later interpretation is that they are in close agreement with my development and include both as dependence. In fact, they suggest that in the context of the politics of raw materials, vulnerability is more important (Keohane & Nye, 2001; 13). When Keohane and Nye (1975) are criticized by Baldwin (1980) for discussing interdependence and dependence as if the concepts do not exist prior to WWII, maybe what is missing is the recognition that in recent times the issue of dependence is more often easily and quickly solved because of various forces of globalization (improved, faster communication systems, travel, language usage, etc.). The time to solution is reduced because contingency options are more abundant and have greater likelihood of success. Thus, in recent times, the boundary between the two concepts of dependence is less clear. Allowance for change of a definition is acceptable to Oppenheim (1975) as long as other criteria are not violated according to Baldwin (1980) and while I would not suggest that times have changed so much as to overturn the definition of dependence in terms of vulnerability, its evolution could be inclusive of a continuum that includes sensitivity. Dependence, in any case, is different from interdependence because dependence is unidirectional; only one of the actors is reliant on the other, whereas interdependence is bidirectional such that actors become mutually reliant by choice; both partners facilitate each other in some way. To measure dependence, a scale would put vulnerability interdependence at one end and sensitivity interdependence in all the space in between up to independence at the other end. A single actor could be highly dependent to the point of vulnerability, it could be dependent to a lesser extent such that it is sensitive, and where the sensitivity decreases to zero, it is independent.




Power and Influence

How does interdependence fit into the schema? The extremes of dependence and independence, along with intermediate positions, seem to fit along a linear scale such that dependence implies a unidirectional tie and, as dependence decreases to zero, independence is reached which implies the tie disappears. This is a scale of dependence. How does a bidirectional concept get built into this? Interdependence needs its own separate scale because it is bidirectional and it is a decision more than a fact of helplessness, as is dependence; the power of each actor allows it to decide whether to be interdependent and determines how much it can offer the relationship. The construct entails a different set of relations; it is not a gradual change from dependence to independence with interdependence in between because interdependence does not transform into independence. As we understand it, interdependence is a choice based on opportunity costs in that one country chooses to be in a relationship with another because it is less costly than autonomy (Baldwin, 1980: Gasiorowski, 1986; Keohane & Nye, 2001). In contrast, the extreme ends of the scale of dependence are not alternative choices; one cannot choose to be independent if in fact one is dependent. For example, being independent with respect to oil consumption could mean that a country is satisfied by its own internal supply; however, if in fact it does need foreign oil, it is dependent; it is one or the other and cannot make a choice to be one or the other at a point in time. Independence implies having the power to choose whether to engage with another and become interdependent; whereas, dependence implies a lack of power to make a choice. The choice in a dependent situation is almost always to not be so. The choice in an independent situation to become interdependent needs thoughtful analysis. When interdependence is chosen, it is because it provides benefits beyond those that independence can offer, but they need not be taken. For example, the United States often makes a choice as to whether to act unilaterally or multilaterally and this is illustrated in the following chapter. The United States was not dependent on the UN to help it when it decided to attack Iraq. It is powerful and independent enough to attack without the UN; however, working with the UN can, but not necessarily, offer compensating benefits for giving up some autonomy such as access to resources and historical legitimacy derived from the moral authority of the UN. In the case of trade, country A may have its own internal source of something like wheat, but by buying wheat from country B, that other country B may offer A another useful product at a reduced price. A cost of this decision is the damage done to country A’s wheat farmers. However, a net benefit of interdependence for both countries is preferred. How does this discussion about interdependence translate in terms of the relative trade-power measure used in this study? When two countries have low trade in-degree centrality, they have low power and little to offer each other on the basis of trade. Therefore, it is difficult for them to become interdependent



104

105

in trade. When two countries each have high trade in-degree centrality, they are both powerful and can confer benefits on each other; thus, they can choose to be highly interdependent. When two countries each have some medium amount of power, they can also become interdependent, but the potential is not as high as between two very powerful countries. Lastly, when two countries are unequal in their power, but each has some power, they can be interdependent because each still may have something to offer the other, but it cannot be as great as if they are both powerful. One country is not, because of its relative lack of power, necessarily dependent on the other. The relative comparison of this last case with two countries that are both lesser powers but more equal is indeterminate. For example, Canada and the United States or the United States and China are both pairs of powerful trading countries that are highly interdependent. China owns a great deal of United States debt, whereas Canada and the United States exchange more across their mutual border than they do with any other nations. On the other hand, Mexico is less powerful in trade vis-à-vis its North American neighbors. The United States is interdependent with Mexico, but not to the same extent as with Canada; Mexico has less to offer. This does not make Mexico dependent, however. An interdependence scale takes into account the different combinations of power levels of the two actors rather than the changing power level of one actor relative to an unchanging relatively powerful actor, as on the dependence scale, which is unidirectional. It is also more of an “opportunity for interdependence scale” because of the choice involved. At one end of the interdependence scale there is no opportunity for interdependence when neither actor can offer the other anything; neither is powerful, but this does not necessarily mean they are dependent. At the other end of the scale, both actors are very powerful and have the opportunity to maximize their interdependence if they so choose. In between, interdependence increases from zero at one end to a maximum at the other end as the country pairs have less or more to contribute based on their power. Next, if interdependence is a choice based on opportunity costs, why is dependence defined in terms of the words vulnerability or sensitivity interdependence (Baldwin, 1980)? The problem is that scholars do not want to define dependence using the same word, dependence, so they choose something else, interdependence. It is different, but inappropriate based on the discussion above since interdependence can only operate when there is choice and dependence implies that there is no choice. Moreover, being vulnerable or sensitive could refer to both situations. Interdependence can make a formerly independent country vulnerable or sensitive for the time being because interdependence inherently suggests some loss in autonomy, but it is not dependence because it is powerful enough so that it has other options; a dependent country can also be vulnerable.




Power and Influence

I suggest that the two constructs, dependence and interdependence, be defined separately without utilizing either word to describe the other. Both can be defined with respect to independence. Dependence is the opposite of independence; in an absolute but unrealistic and solely theoretical sense, dependence suggests no autonomy on a matter and independence suggests full autonomy. Allowing vulnerability to turn into sensitivity gives way to a more realistic continuum of dependence that eventually moves toward independence. In contrast, interdependence is a the result of a choice to lessen or give up some or all independence and that carries with it in the tradeoff benefits and lower opportunity costs. Some autonomy is given up in respect of the other partner’s needs and the compensating benefits it offers, but not because the other partner has power over it that cannot be avoided; both partners have power over each other that they both know they do not have an incentive to exercise. The concept of interdependence dictates that doing harm to your partner can do harm to yourself. In dependence, there is no such reciprocal control; one party can harm the dependent party without concern for substantial or significant retaliation and impacts. Finally, I’d like to add an additional note about a conceptual difference in some international relations literature compared to this study, based on previous research in social psychology and political science. For example, Keohane and Nye (2001) do not differentiate interdependence from mutual dependence. This study finds literature that makes an important conceptual difference that is used here. Mutual dependence is sequential dependence such that before a cooperative project is completed, an actor can defect and reap some benefits (Molm, 1994; Axelrod, 1997). Military alliances, modeled in this study, are relationships of mutual dependence because there is much time between the agreement and action; moreover, actions may vary compared to the original agreement and not be reciprocated; they are highly unpredictable. In an interdependent project, actors must all complete their parts before any of them can obtain benefits (Molm, 1994; Axelrod, 1997). Consequently, a state of interdependence is more cohesive than is mutual dependence. International trade, where the trade is in necessities and not luxuries, is continuous and comparatively instantaneous; so, while it is not exactly a group phenomenon, it still considered interdependence rather than mutual dependence. IGOs produce group phenomena and interdependence when members are active and make costly investments. Social Power’s Relation to Dependence and Interdependence Networks do what social power scholars call for in terms of recognizing the relational aspect of power. Power “has been defined in terms of an actual or



106

107

postulated relationship between two or more actors.” (Baldwin, 1980). This study uses relationships to define power; in the case of power in the trade network, it is not who you are connected to, but how many are connected to you by their imports. Also, in the military-alliance networks, a central actor is powerful because it has more alliances that are bidirectional. More alliances give it more choice in case of trouble. If an alliance partner turns on it, it has other partners to help in its defense. Alliances can also be constraining such that if one partner calls for help, this call could be in regard to threats from another partner and then there is a tradeoff in terms of the decision about which partner to support; however, this is a better scenario than one in which a country is vulnerable to an alliance partner because it is the only partner who will provide protection. In the diplomatic-visits network, power is measured analogously to trade such that inward ties or visitors to it indicate power, but it is really influence because it is information-based and not coercive, still to be explained. In the visits networks, if it is outwardly active, it is attempting to persuade others to accept its views, but this activity is not indicative of its influence. Networks happily satisfy a problem identified in international relations literature: that power relationships are not often well enough defined. They always provide a minimum specification of scope and domain, by definition (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950; Nagel, 1975). Scope requires that those involved in the relationship be identified, and these actors are the nodes of the network. When one country is powerful based on in-degree centrality in the trade network, the actors that make it powerful are identifiable because they are connected via ties to the focal actor. The relative power of two actors is measured by a subtraction of in-degree centralities and, therefore, the actors must be identified. A large number indicates a power differential—one must be more powerful than the other. Also, domain is defined based on the type of network and type of ties that join the actors. The trade network is called this because the ties are created by the importing activities of one country into another. A limitation of networks is that while they satisfy the minimum requirements, they do not give a complete description that would include many more details, such as what actions are desired and demanded by each party, how the actions are to take place, where, when, and so on. (Baldwin, 1980). Networks fill an important research gap; according to Baldwin (1980) a change in scholarly writing to at least providing the minimum description of power relations, scope and domain, would make a profound impact on the clarity and precision of discussions about dependency relations. Adoption of the habit of sketching out networks may address this problem. Networks can also incorporate degree or weight of power in a quantified or relative manner as requested by Baldwin (1980). Often, the thickness of the ties between actors pictorially indicates the weight of the tie. In this study, for example, trade intensity, a control, measures the value of the trade tie between




Power and Influence

two countries based on their net imports and exports. One tie may be more important than another on this basis. Also, values could be assigned to nodes. One node may have a larger market in monetary terms, for example. In this study, trade network power is measured in terms of the number of inward ties. Thus, networks offer some flexibility in measurement. Also, this avoids any dichotomous assignment of countries as being powerful or not powerful, dependent or non-dependent, which is a concern of Baldwin’s (1980) because of any denial of the existence of degrees of differences. A differentiation that is not obvious is found in the comparison between actual and potential power and the issue of which type of power vulnerability implies. Vulnerability suggests that a dependent country is at risk, but it is not determinedly doomed because the country that has power over it has potential power that may or may not be exercised (Baldwin, 1980). Similarly, in this study relative trade in-degree centrality, a measure of relative power, is also potential power since a dyad of countries is not necessarily trading with each other. All pairs of countries in the dataset each year are compared without assuming they are trading partners. Baldwin (1980) makes the point that inequitable bargaining may not always result when power is potential, because the vulnerable party can find ways to offset its disadvantage; this present study very much accommodates this view since in it is posited that reciprocity in other domains, specifically, cooperative voting in the UN, is a way that less-powerful countries find ways to balance power inequity. Longterm reciprocity is one of the most important international norms because it develops a government’s reputation for trustworthiness which is the working capital of politics (Keohane & Nye 2001). Moreover, scholars agree that power is a relative phenomenon and that dependency is a type of power relationship within a domain such that reciprocity is motivated based on actors’ different relative powers in different domains (Baldwin, 1980: 501; Caporaso, 1978; Keohane & Nye, 2001). Furthermore, Baldwin (1980) explains, based on non-fungibility of potential power, why reciprocity is prevalent. Power resources are not monetarily translatable as are economic resources so trade-offs occur across scopes and domains. For example, when one country, A, can help another, B, obtain foreign aid because it has power resources to do so, B can reciprocate or pay back for the help by utilizing its power resources in another area on behalf of A; it could, for example, reciprocate by voting cooperatively with A in the UN. These concepts are fundamental both conceptually and empirically in this study. Whether reciprocal behavior balances out power relationships or leaves them still unbalanced is difficult to determine because it is subjective, depending on whether actors agree that they have conferred equal benefits on each other; thus, this problem of fungibility creates problems in the exchange relationship even after there has been a reciprocal exchange.



108

109

The management literature describes an analogous concept close to these international, multi-domain or scope reciprocal relationships. It is mutual forbearance, which occurs in situations of multi-market contact (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Gimeno & Woo, 1999; Greve, 2008; Haveman & Nonnemaker, 2000). This literature may add understanding to the international relations realm because the firm context has been theorized about and tested empirically quite extensively. The theory explains a kind of tacit collusion among firms. Using a two-firm, two-market example, they both compete in the same markets, but each firm has an advantage over the other in one of those markets. Rather than driving each other out of their respective spheres of influence, the weaker firm in each market forebears in respect of the other, allowing the stronger one to keep greater market share. At the same time, the firm with greater market power does not try to eliminate its competition because it knows that it does better by also being allowed to exist in a second market in which it has less power. Thus, both firms gain by doing business in both markets, while each allows the other to maintain its sphere of influence without challenge at above-market rents. Cooperation is more profitable than competition and the firms tacitly agree to share the pie in these types of domain-tradeoffs that could also be scope tradeoffs. A domain tradeoff would happen in different product or service markets. A scope tradeoff would occur over different customer groups or geographical markets. Domain tradeoffs are most often examined in management literature. Concepts are similar, but semantics are different in the management and international relations literatures. Another difference is that industries can have many more firms than there are countries in the world, but numbers do not necessarily make a difference in theory; also, the focus of industry dynamics is often on its oligopolistic few and fringe players barely matter. In country power-differentials or dependency-relations, competition is not the operative word; likewise, power and dependence are not the operative words in firm literature. However, firms enter into collaborative relationships with each other, for example, alliances and joint ventures that entail power struggles. Moreover countries enter into trade, foreign direct investment, and militaryalliance relationships in the international realm (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 2000). Also, countries fear damage from other more powerful countries and this is analogous to competition that is damaging for a firm because its market share and profits are eroded, possibly leading to bankruptcy or ruin. Another aspect of power is the intent of a powerful actor to exert force. Baldwin (1980) mentions the “rule of anticipated reactions” such that a vulnerable actor may react to perceived power without the powerful other requesting or intending to impose itself on the actor. Again, this study’s empirical work conforms to this consideration since no assumption is made in the measurements of relative power and its effect on the outcome variable,




110

Power and Influence

on similar voting, as to whether either party is aware of the power relationship or what are the intentions of the parties. Reciprocal behavior could be compliance based on implicit international norms of reciprocity or an explicit backroom deal.

Previous research has examined whether trade interdependence dampens international conflict and builds cooperative relations. This study is interested in strategic cooperation as an outcome. However, conflict and cooperation are sometimes viewed on the same continuum, but this has been questioned such that both could be occurring at the same time (Pevehouse 2004). So, separate dependent variables have been used and this study uses a dependent variable that measures cooperation, not conflict. Also, realists and liberals expect different outcomes from trade. Liberals like to believe that trade is correlated with cooperation for a few reasons. First, when countries trade, they benefit economically and this can be more valuable than the economic benefits of war that come from pilfering or taking over lands and that are counterbalanced by the horrible costs of war (Pevehouse, 2004; Rosecrance, 1986). Countries do not trade with each other when they are battling each other, so the choice is one or the other and trade is the preference. Also, there is a concept of binding commercial liberalism that is related to the dependencies created when countries specialize in trade (Pevehouse, 2004; Stein, 1993). They need each other for various supplies and these trade connections would be broken in times of severe turmoil. Thus, trade reduces the likelihood of conflict. Third, Pevehouse (2004) explains a signaling theory advocated by Morrow (1999) and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001). This theory says that when countries trade it is one additional communication signal on a palette of signals that they share between them; they can signal friendly resolve through trade policy or in their markets, and this can avert war (Pevehouse, 2004). This study more closely models the second dependence argument: binding commercial dependence, as above, but along a continuum ranging from trade-dependence, to interdependence and independence through the use of trade network power as measured by prominence in the trade network. It uses a different measure and specifically measures relative positional power in the trade network. So, while it is dyadic, comparing the relative power of two countries, it is also a network measure that considers a broader set of connections, thus modeling context in terms of other connections. A country with more import trade ties to many other nations is more central in the trade network and has more power due to its prominence. It has more choice of trade partners and reduces its dependence on particular suppliers or importers that would otherwise result from specialization in trade. It also 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


Trade Leads to Cooperation, Conflict, or Both?

111

has some attraction because many others want to trade with it and this could be for many reasons such as openness to trade and a lucrative market, but this is not precisely defined; it is a general measure of power that could be an outcome of a combination of factors. It is not to be confused with market power because that would include quantities or monetary amounts of trade such that a country with lots of consumers willing and able to buy merchandise and services would have a lot of market power; this mass purchasing power would be reflected in trade volumes or dollars and this study controls for this using a measure of dyadic trade intensity; it captures the amounts of monetary trade that occur between two countries. Other less prominent nations have fewer partners and are more interdependent, or even dependent, on more powerful others. In contrast, some realist scholars believe that trade interdependence leads to conflict more so than cooperation because of the increased contact that can lead to problems. Peace is not promoted; rather, the opportunity for conflict is created where there was none before because of the interaction that did not exist before (Pevehouse, 2004; Waltz, 1970). Gasiorowski (1986) provides a strong and thorough challenge to past empirical studies that find interdependence leads to cooperation or reduced conflict. He primarily critiques measures of conflict and interdependence with a focus on trade as being representative of it; he also differentiates interdependence from interconnectedness and this is analogous to network concepts of strong and weak ties. Trade that is not terribly important, such as that of luxury goods, is only interconnectedness because it does not involve significant costs (Gasiorowski, 1986; Keohane & Nye, 2001). Strong ties are costly to break whereas weak ties carry little consequence if broken. Since this study uses in-degree centrality and relative potential power rather than any kind of measure that would reflect the intensity or strength of direct ties, except as a control, the measures are not comparable to those that Gasiorowski (1986) struggles with and attempts to improve.1 Aside from this, this study does not in any way attempt to measure conflict and, moreover, it does not measure actual interdependence because the pairs of countries in dyads may not even be involved in any actual interaction. Therefore, this study either could be said to overcome all of the problems in his debate or simply measure different things with an intention to do so. Gasiorowski (1986) correctly qualifies conflict measures in that they include more than violent conflicts, even diplomatic disputes. I have a couple of difficulties with these conflict measures and the logic of the research. One is that the conflict measure is flawed and the second is that as international scholars, we should be concerned about whether interactions lead to violent conflicts, not any kind of conflict, as will be explained. First, the conflict measure is flawed because when there are cooperative relationships, fewer friendly behaviors are reported to the extent that conflicts are over-weighted compared to friendliness. Friendliness cannot be measured 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange



Power and Influence

using the same approach as conflicts are measured. For example, do any conflict measurements record that two countries have been peaceful for a number of years and rate this accordingly? I doubt this is the case, and if it were, how would one measure the intensity of that friendliness or cooperation over time? One could argue that two countries are silent enemies for a long time. If they were, this could neither be friendliness nor conflict. However, silent enemies are not engaged in battle and seem cooperative, while they are not friendly. Conflicts, whatever the type, are salient and therefore more of them will be reported. Negative events more often make the news than do positive ones. Any measure of conflict that attempts to incorporate both negative and positive behavior, regardless of how intensity weights are applied, cannot be well balanced in measurement and will be biased toward conflict. I suggest that a conflict measure should purely measure negative behavior. Second, no matter what kind of relationship, whether international or interprovincial within a nation, there will be disagreements and “conflicts” that are not violent; it is the nature of interaction, but this is not necessarily a bad thing in comparison to no interaction at all. Some kinds of conflict are part of regular behavior. What if there were no disputes? We may worry that they are not being reported and become concerned about the freedom of the press because we expect to hear about them. When we study the effects of international interactions on conflict, we are concerned with whether it is violent because this is destructive. Other types of conflict that peacefully demonstrate anger or disagreement can be constructive such that they express that there is an issue to deal with in the relationship without resorting to violence; it may also act as a social control in the case that one partner is not being fair in an otherwise mutually beneficial relationship. The conflict puts the brakes on bad behavior. Thus, the conflict serves a necessary corrective purpose. This kind of expression can avert violent conflict that might otherwise occur had there not been outlets for the expression and resolution of disgruntlement. Constructive conflict could be interpreted as a positive cooperative outcome of interdependence or connectedness. The constructive conflict is a deterrence to destructive conflict. Therefore, the conflict variables of previous research are commingling two different types of conflict, very different in nature and, additionally, mixing in poor estimates of cooperation. The crux of the matter is that international scholars and the rest of the world want to know whether entanglement, whether considered interdependence or interconnectedness, leads to destructive behavior because of the undesirability of such behavior, or whether it leads to cooperation that could include constructive conflict because this is desirable. Other realist scholars believe there is no relationship between trade and peace because other factors dictate peace and they ascribe mostly military reasons for dictating peace such as nuclear deterrence (Buzan, 1984;



112

113

Pevehouse, 2004). At an anecdotal level, it is hard to imagine that Canada and the United States are friendly because of military power, for example, or that trade has nothing to do with their peaceful relationship. The United States has enough military might, including nuclear weapons, that it could easily take over Canada whether it trades with it or not. I would suggest that interactions on trade, business, and social levels are connections that act as deterrence to war and Pevehouse (2004) makes a similar critique in his discussion of what the average observer of modern international systems sees—trade interaction that may involve disputes does not turn into war. Canada and the United States have historically been each others’ largest trading partners and, at the same time, this has been the most peaceful and least-guarded border in the world. They also have the NAFTA agreement and although there have been many trade disputes, these disputes have never resulted in violent conflict. The only threat of physical conflict seems to come from WTO protesters who do not like free trade. From an organizational theory perspective, this anecdotal evidence, which as Pevehouse (2004) has suggested is generally agreed upon, supports the side of the embeddedness view that is in conflict with transaction cost economics, two competing organizational theories. The embeddedness view favors a more cooperative outcome in small-number bargaining situations because close ties are built on trusting relationships that do not exist without having been tested; whereas the transaction-cost argument suggests a conflictual outcome because of its assumption that an actor will take advantage of a weaker actor’s position if given the chance. Correspondingly, the liberal view expects cooperation when there is interaction, whereas the realist view expects conflict with interactions. While the organizational theory fills the gap in the argument between liberals and realists, as will be explained, international phenomena are, at the same time, evidence for one organizational theory over another. First, the theory fills the gap because it explains why cooperation develops through interactions and not conflict or in transaction-cost theory terms, one actor does not opportunistically take advantage of the more dependent party because of networks and the related social control. In the embeddedness view, linkages motivate pareto-improved solutions partly because any other behavior would be revealed through the network and punished (Uzzi, 1997; Jones et al., 1997). Moreover, greater exchange intensity in close business relationships, in the embeddedness approach, motivates expectations of providing better services than what is set out in the contract (Uzzi, 1996) but, this is not necessarily so in transaction-cost economics (TCE). In TCE, when a transaction becomes a small-numbers bargaining situation, then the buyer or seller opportunistically takes above-market rents or shirks, based on self-interest (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). The parties build trust in the embeddedness view whereas in the transaction-cost view trust is




Power and Influence

violated. In the international arena, TCE could explain the expectation of the realists’ argument. Trade interdependence creates a situation in which parties may not treat each other with respect and this could cause conflict, even war. However, the embeddedness view interjects that reciprocity rather than calculativeness becomes important in the network, not only out of fear of sanctions, but also due to the value of reputation (Sacks & Uzzi, 2000). Thus, at the international level, countries in trading relationships are motivated to treat each other decently, or well, not poorly. So, the realist theory corresponds with TCE and it provides more in-depth explanation. Likewise, the liberal theory corresponds with the embeddedness view and it provides a fuller explanation. Furthermore, the international evidence supports liberal claims, as explained specifically in the Canada-United States case and as is recognized in general international behavior, as mentioned earlier. Since liberal theory corresponds with embeddedness, this external support of the liberal view is also evidence that embeddedness has better explanatory and predictive power than does TCE. By combining work from the literatures of both international relations and organizational theory and then examining international behavior, theory is improved and at the same time, we can choose one theory over another, given the evidence in the international context. While no theory is absolutely proven, over time one theory or another can be revealed as better by explaining more and the other is falsified—although not by a single falsified statement or instance (Lakatos, 1974; Popper, 1963). TCE is falsified in reality and embeddedness is the theory to replace it. Additionally, the embeddedness view recognizes negative outcomes as a result of close ties, but these are not conflictual outcomes. When formerly close partners end their relationship—for example, a supplier goes out of business or moves overseas in a case where a manufacturing partner had relied not only on the supplier’s materials but also on particular designaspects that fit with its manufacturing process—this may leave the manufacturer in a difficult position when it comes to finding a new supplier (Uzzi, 1997). Loss of this specialized partner, analogous to the hazard in tradespecialization, is a risk that comes with interdependence or embeddedness. Looming over-embeddedness is an additional situation in which a network of partners has become so embedded that new partners have not been introduced and the old network becomes ossified; the network is just circulating the same old information, and behaviors are not adjusting to a changing environment (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Uzzi, 1997). Thus, the network can make itself obsolete by being so embedded. This is a collective failure that does not imply conflict, only unawareness. The negative aspects of embeddedness do not align with realist assumptions of conflict. In reality, this seems to hold true. China has been exporting to the United States to the extent that the United States has become dependent and even exasperated with the relationship; China also suppresses 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


114

115

the value of its currency to make its products even cheaper. Moreover, China owns a great deal of United States debt. The combination of these interdependencies has resulted in the somewhat negative term, “Chimerica.” It has been a contentious situation and one of over-embeddedness of the two nations, but no armed conflict has occurred even though they are both militarily powerful countries that are not proximate—that is, they can attack each other from a distance with their technologies and not experience many regional after-effects because they are so distant; for example, if the United States attacked China and caused debilitating harm, it would be challenging for Chinese terrorists to travel to the United States to attack in retaliation; also, the United States can avoid illegal migration of masses of Chinese civilians who would be impacted by such a scenario because the migrants would flow into countries neighboring China. Yet, no one expects any such problems in the future. Thus, even in a highly interdependent relationship between two powerful nations that has also soured in many ways, the realist prediction of armed conflict does not bear out. The “Chimerica” relationship is further illustrated with an article in the next chapter. The embeddedness view is a management theory and therefore never predicts physical harm among interacting parties as does international relations theory. It only predicts that over-embeddedness can be negative because of the inherent risks in parties’ exclusive relationships and lack of attention to other possible partners from whom they could learn and with whom they could exchange. Back to the example: if the United States had diversified its trade partnerships and not bought in to the exceedingly low costs China offered, it would have strengthened other countries by conferring economic-development benefits on them, China would not be so dominant, and the United States would have strengthened its bargaining position because it would have alternate suppliers. Overall, the embedded relationship has been a positive one for both parties; the United States has had cheap access to goods and capital and China has developed economically. However, the relationship has decayed for reasons mentioned earlier. This relationship is unique; most international relationships are not so extremely embedded. Over-embeddedness of networks is not likely to occur often on the international scene because countries have large governmental machineries that can scan their environment for other opportunities and build relationships, while at the same time working closely with current international partners; the resources of countries are more plentiful than are those of small firms. However, the interdependence of countries in trade specialization is analogous to the exclusivity of relationships in the embeddedness view that leaves partners vulnerable. Moreover, there is little evidence supporting the realist view that this leads to violent conflict, but there is a great deal of support for the liberal view that trade interdependence, even when there are problems, averts conflict. As China has developed, it has been watched as a potential 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange



Power and Influence

military threat; however, building interdependence with the United States has been a rationale for reducing such concerns and China’s economic development is expected to come with peaceful behavior as they protect their interests (Fairclough, 2006; Browne & Fairclough, 2009; Pei, 2008). Pevehouse (2004) proposes alternate, combined, and more refined analysis of the trade-conflict or cooperation debate. He asks why both conflict and cooperation could not occur at the same time inasmuch as states trade but also experience some conflict that is not very intense or protracted. He hypothesizes, empirically tests, and finds support for his assertions that in trade, conflict is more likely, but less frequent. Thus, the liberal and realist hypotheses are supported with emphasis on the liberal since trade does lead to cooperation overall with some disputes being part of the cooperative relationship. Other studies supporting liberal theories have not separated conflict from cooperation to see whether they can occur at the same time (Pevehouse, 2004; Polachek, 1997; Reuveny & Kang, 1996). Another study has found that trade may not limit disputes that much when similar country preferences (affinity) are controlled for, measured by similar UN voting (Gartzke, 2000). This is potentially confusing when compared to this present study, which uses, instead, similar voting in the UN as a measure of cooperation, a dependent not an independent variable. If trade—the trade variable is a trade-to-GDP ratio in Gartzke (2000)—and cooperation (affinity) are both independent variables, as in the other study, and disputes are the outcome variable then two cooperative concepts may be commingled where one, trade that is only partly cooperative as suggested by Pevehouse (2004), can actually lead to the other, similar voting, as in this present study. (However, this study uses a unique measure of power in the trade network.) That is, trade interdependence leads to cooperation which can be measured by similar voting (affinity). Similar voting, as cooperation, suggests fewer disputes. Therefore, I would contend that the study by Gartzke (2000) provides support for similar voting being a measure of at least a likelihood to cooperate, termed affinity in their study. I make the assumption that voting-similarity is a proxy for cooperation, not just preferences, and beyond this study by Gartzke (2000) there is evidence of this in the UN since certain blocks of countries purposely vote together (Arifin, 1996; Holden, 1996; The Irish Times, 2000). A solution to the problem in Gartzke (2000), in a panel-data examination, is that state preferences may be controlled for using a fixed-effects approach or country dummies that control for country differences that would include country preferences without recognizing similarities. This would avoid the inclusion of cooperation in the regression as an independent variable. Moreover, Gartzke (2000) uses a logit approach that reduces the richness of information in the outcome variable. The dependent variable, disputes,



116

117

could be a continuous variable if it had not been made binary. It turns a threat or display of force into a military dispute, but these activities are very different from an actual attack which includes the use of force or all-out war. The interpretation of whether a country has threatened or displayed force can also be controversial. For example, are Iran’s nuclear tests a threat or display of force that can be termed conflict or are they merely building an arsenal as a right that other nations also believe they have—including Israel? Some may view this as the right of a nation to build its defense, based on the principle of national sovereignty and this is different from an actual direct military dispute, one country against another. Against whom would this military threat be directed? The United States, Israel (Dreason, 2009)? The West and NATO countries may view Iran’s actions as a military threat against them. It is not clear, however, and if trade leads to military disputes then dyadic trade must correspond with the same dyad’s disputes. Thus, the coding of the dependent variable could be problematic by interpretation of whether conflict is being displayed and against whom, unless actual force is used against a particular country. Therefore, a continuous dependent variable is preferred in order to avoid eliminating the information or the binary variable should only be positive in the case of actual use of force, not the threat or display of force. This study uses percentage of similar voting between countries in a dyadic relationship, a continuous variable, and does not attempt to define cooperation strictly as if it absolutely exists or does not exist as would a binary dependent variable. Perhaps this avoids the absolutism of both the liberal and realist views that trade leads to complete cooperation or to conflict because graduation of cooperation is reflected in a continuous variable. This approach also reflects the doubt expressed in some studies, Pevehouse (2004), for example, that trade leads to purely cooperative behavior. Scholars tend to agree that trade does lead to cooperation, but in a qualified way such that conflict is inherent in interaction. Other management literature recognizes this tension between and combination of cooperation and conflict, usually termed coopetition, in interactions. The firm-alliance literature, much of it also related and part of the embeddedness literature, studies the problems that arise, including competitive behavior, in close cooperative agreements so as to make recommendations on how to achieve alliance success, however that may be defined. Two Models of Regime Change Keohane and Nye (2001) introduce what they call an international organization model as an additional explanation to issue structuralism to explain regime change. A regime is the set of rules of the international bargaining process and issue-structuralism explains that power is used through issue-linkage




Power and Influence

when change is desired by those who are powerful. However, much activity does not conform to this theory and this is evident in other chapters that show voting in the UN is not primarily aligned with the powerful countries. For example, one UN voting pattern falls along the North-South divide; poorer nations of the Southern hemisphere vote together, sometimes in opposition to the wealthier and more powerful industrialized block that tends to be in the Northern hemisphere. The older theory also does not consider a different set of conditions of what Keohane and Nye (2001) call complex interdependence. When the world operates in an interdependent manner rather than in accord with realist rules: 1) societies are connected in multiplex ways, such as through various informal elite diplomatic networks and transnational entities like MNCs; 2) issues are not arranged according to any clear hierarchy, and 3) military force does not play an effective role in intergovernmental relations (Keohane & Nye, 2001). The operable model is termed the international organization model and it is not reliant on the formal organizational form; instead, it is very much like a network model of governance, used in this study and stemming from organizational theory at intergovernmental and transgovernmental levels. “Power over outcomes will be conferred by organizationally dependent capabilities, such as voting power, ability to form coalitions, and control of elite networks: that is, by capabilities that are affected by the norms, networks, and institutions. . . .” (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 48). In other words, power resources do not guarantee outcomes and the interplay of many factors increases complexity for any kind of outcome predictions. The two models resemble the concepts of power and influence that this study tests. Some texts make power and influence equivalent concepts but, like vulnerability and sensitivity concepts, I see them as graduations of each other. Power is, as earlier defined, the ability to make another do something it would not otherwise choose to do. In contrast, influence does not suggest an abrogation of choice for the party being influenced. In the absence of power, the ability to influence is a valuable talent. For example, a project manager may need to coordinate a firm’s cross-functional work, but since this managerial position does not usually carry with it the ability to evaluate performance (because this is usually a responsibility of department heads), the project manager needs to somehow convince and influence, for example, the R&D group to design something that manufacturing can work with. The project manager does not have any formal institutional position power, but may develop some type of informal power that is actually the ability to convince; this suggests that the choice made by R&D could go either way. However, this skill may also be a type of power and this is why I see power and influence as related—one is a step or an increment away from the other. In the international organization model, influence is operable more often than is power; whereas, in the realist model, power rules.



118

119

In this study, trade and military alliance network measures are of power; however, this is not the same as realist power based on military might since the power resource is centrality in these networks, not the size of military or amount of ammunition stockpiled. So, it is a lesser kind of hard power, but nevertheless a more coercive type of social-network power that demands reciprocity. In this study, the influence is found to be in diplomatic and international governmental (IGO) networks. Network centrality—in-degree and out-degree centralities in the diplomatic network—are measured, but these suggest a kind of opinion-leader power (in-degree) and an outward effort to convince (out-degree); thus, countries are not using coercive power and it is different types of influence that are being examined. Keohane and Nye (2001: 223) discuss the social construction of scientific information and how the view of credibility is built among information-takers and information-shapers; shapers must be credible. The directionality in the diplomatic networks suggests that an inwardly directed tie is from a shaper node to a taker node because the shaper wants to visit the taker to influence it, but this is not necessarily conceptually the case; takers may go to shapers because shapers are in possession of information or their opinions have credibility. Empirical work can test this since shapers are expected to be influential on decision making and takers would be less so. Results identify opinionleaders as being influential; thus, those nodes with many inward ties are the shapers, not the takers, and this is consistent with the notion of power in a network; this type of power, though, is influence based on information. In a two-mode IGO network, countries are interconnected by their memberships in IGOs. In IGOs, countries usually vote and as Keohane and Nye (2001) suggest, the international organizational model is not power-oriented but is, instead, influential. Similarly to diplomatic networks, information may be shared, but in a group forum rather than one-on-one. However, IGO membership does not necessarily indicate active information-sharing and may only be symbolic of interest. Keohane and Nye (2001: 294) say, “International organizations are worthwhile only if they can facilitate bargaining among member states that leads to mutually beneficial cooperation. They are not desirable for their own sake.” This assumes that countries are active in IGOs. The IGO network has two modes because it includes connections of two different types of entities in a stepped fashion. Countries are not directly connected; they are connected to IGOs. The network ties are the country memberships in IGOs. Therefore, counts of same IGO memberships of two countries suggest similar interests and if they are active, more interaction on issues of mutual interest. “We need to think of international organizations less as institutions than as clusters of intergovernmental and transgovernmental networks associated with the formal institutions.” (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 209) Moreover, these




Power and Influence

networks do not recognize organizational boundaries, so this conception in its entirety blurs the boundaries. The measure in this study is in accordance with this model. Counts of IGO memberships for a pair of countries recognize the cross-organizational linkages beyond organizational bounds. Also, examination of clusters of countries’ IGO interests, not only from a dyadic standpoint as is done in the empirical model, is discussed at length in the IGO network chapter. Empirical research could address clusters, but this type of research has technical problems associated primarily with the controversial challenge of defining a cluster. This study, like Keohane and Nye (2001), is of the view that both models, the realist one and that of complex interdependence, or more specifically, issue structuralism and the international organization models, are operative. The latter model is quite stable and will be disturbed when countries step outside expected diplomatic behavior and drastically violate network norms; under these circumstances, power resources will be called upon in a realist context to deal with conflict. An illustration in the next chapter suggests that Kofi Annan of the UN agrees. In a world of complex interdependence, leaders do not become apparent until they rise up to the specific occasion because different countries will head up initiatives depending on the issue. Keohane and Nye (2001) explain that multiple leadership, rather than collective leadership, is the applicable terminology since many states will lead but not all will lead at once. Powerful nations will still be influential and informal networks of many nations are supportive. For example, in the network-data examination of earlier chapters, regional congregations of countries are attempting to solve their own problems by creating communities similar in principle to the EU, but these are not often as strong nor do they possess the same complexity. This seems like collective leadership, but it is also evident that each region has a leader or leaders who dominate on the international scene and, through their higher international status, may help their region to gain notice and acquire resources. Over the period 1990–2000, the UK is a leader in Europe and France is the next contender primarily through IGOs. South Africa is an unhelpful leader in a direct sense but it, nevertheless, draws international attention to Africa because of its greater wealth and more hospitable environment for visitors. Most of Africa is organizing itself despite South Africa and this division is a legacy of South Africa’s apartheid past. Saudi Arabia is a strong Middle Eastern leader. Asia seems to have a couple of leaders, Japan and China. South America’s leader is Argentina over this time period; Brazil comes later. North America’s clear leader is the United States and Canada plays a quieter leadership role in IGOs.



120

Examples of Diplomatic Behavior: Backroom-Bargaining and Negotiations B-   on negative connotations because the public feels that it is not transparent, but secretive and may include bribery. However, most negotiations in many fields are not completely visible and, as explained earlier, it would be next to impossible to produce agreements in many cases if the public were allowed to scrutinize every aspect; too many issues are delicate or controversial and cannot be discussed in an open manner due to many types of sensitivities. In this chapter, I am going to provide many example stories in both the international diplomatic realm and other areas. The former types of narratives provide a real-world feel for what is actually going on underneath the theory and empirical work; the latter types of accounts demonstrate the wide applicability of the cooperative theoretical concepts. Analogous bargaining situations and processes arise in management and elsewhere such that this work is highly generalizable. Negotiations on Behalf of Workers Union negotiations are situations where a bargaining unit that represents employees deals with the employer to determine collective agreements that include such things as pay, benefits, and working conditions. Unions often exist when management has poor relations with workers. Employers and employees are interdependent groups, each choosing the other and gaining benefits from each other such that a breakup is also costly. However, imbalances in power, usually on the side of the employer, leave employees



Chapter 7

Power and Influence

individually at a bargaining disadvantage; the existence of many possible employees and fewer employers creates this situation such that an employee is more easily replaceable than is a workplace for a person. Thus, a collective approach somewhat balances the relationship since all employees together are not easily replaceable and by walking off the job together in retaliation for poor treatment they can cause significant and expensive harm to the employer. Before or after reaching such a severe impasse necessitating this damaging action, backroom deals between the union and employer are often attempted. They are discussions kept behind-the-scenes to protect information and the images of the two sides. The following news excerpt about a labor union bargaining with Boeing exemplifies this type of delicate situation: The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers posted news of the restart to talks on its Web site Sunday. It said talks had resumed with the assistance of a federal mediator, and that a news blackout would be observed until the new round of negotiations had concluded. (Maynard, 2008)

In this case, workers had walked off the job and the situation was reportedly costing Boeing, an aviation company, $100 million per day in revenue (Maynard, 2008). Notice that the talks are kept private as bargaining continues (Maynard, 2008). Governmental bodies also are entrusted with protecting workers and the following excerpt from US Newswire (2008) exhibits the distrust between firefighters in South Carolina who expect health and safety protection regulation to be enforced by a governmental agency called OSHA (Occupational Health and Safety Administration). It seems that none of the city (the firefighters’ employer), OSHA and a particular commercial establishment are concerned with firefighters’ safety: This is just another slap in the face to the deceased firefighters and their families. The South Carolina OSHA has mishandled this incident from the beginning, and their backroom bargaining with the city and the Sofa Super Store is shameful. The South Carolina OSHA says this settlement is for the good of workers. In fact, the message is that employers won’t be held accountable. The agency’s modest fines will do little to encourage businesses to boost safety and prevent the future loss of life. This settlement shows once again that the S.C. OSHA is run by the good old boy network, and the agency doesn’t care about workers, even when they are killed in preventable circumstances.

The caption above suggests safety for firefighters has been sacrificed and that perhaps lowering costs of doing business by not monitoring or enforcing



122

123

safety requirements, such as acquiring the best available equipment, may have been part of the backroom deal. Furthermore, the negative connotation of the ad in regards to backroom-bargaining suggests a dirty deal in which the federal agency is controlled by business (the old boy network) and is not properly protecting workers. Notice that an external network, the business network, is interfering in the bargaining between the city, the federal agency, and the workers. Where the federal agency should be working on behalf of the workers, they are split because the business network has captured the government agency. Both S.C. OSHA and workers are weak parties, thus the business network is able to bribe one away from the other; presumably, some requirement for reciprocity among S.C. OSHA employees and the business (old boy) network is at work. The federal agency has been influenced by the external business network to fall into compliance with it; this mirrors influenced voting by a country in the UN because of its requirement to reciprocate with an external network partner(s) compared to which it is less powerful or to which it is indebted. The power politics in this article reflect a realist argument of issue-structuralism, rather than complex interdependence, because power resources are effective in maintaining the structure of power. The powerful business network is successfully linking its power resources to its interests in lowering costs related federal health and safety regulations (issue linkage).

Boards of Directors and Their Social Networks Boards of directors are connected through their directors’ other memberships on multiple boards and their close social ties (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). These ties influence them broadly in their substantive business decisions and social decisions to protect each other. Nelson D. Schwartz and Katrin Bennhold of The New York Times (2008) write about catastrophes resulting from the over-embeddedness in French director relationships below: The same is true of the French business establishment. A close-knit brotherhood—it’s nearly all male—that shares school ties, board memberships and rituals like hunting and wine-tasting, the French business elite is a surprisingly small coterie in a nation of more than 60 million people. But in the wake of a $7 billion loss attributed to a rogue trader at one of the nation’s leading banks, Société Générale, France’s modern-day aristocracy finds itself in the one place it never wants to be: the spotlight. While the trader, Jérôme Kerviel, now jailed, wasn’t a graduate of a top school or a member of an elite group like the Club des Cent, Société Générale’s embattled chief executive, Daniel Bouton, is both. And the fact that Mr. Bouton and other top managers of the bank have kept their posts since the scandal erupted nearly a month ago has unleashed criticism here that the



Ex amples of Diplomatic Behavior

124

Power and Influence

“Is there a tendency in France for the elites to be made in the same mold and close ranks?” asks Bernard-Henri Lévy, the French philosopher and social observer. “Yes, it’s an old French disease.” Members of the elite make no secret of the rules of the game. “When you are part of a small group, it is difficult to have an attitude of antagonism toward someone else in the group,” says Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the former president of France. “In a bigger group, there is less interference of personal considerations.”

This is a strong example of how external networks influence decisions in a formal business forum, a board of directors. This study is in an international context instead, but evidence suggests it generalizes to the business context. The specific example above is French, but business scholars who study boards of directors find similar behavior in their research: The findings are consistent with a sociocognitive perspective on board involvement in which director ties to other boards provide direct strategic experience and indirect access to strategic information through social contact with other directors, which in turn can critically inform the knowledge structures used to monitor decisions or give advice on a focal board. (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001)

The French business elite are all powerful players who are highly interdependent. This interdependence leads to a very stable set of peaceful relationships; conflict is suppressed, contrary to the realist expectation. As the article mentions, the elite do not criticize each other and this is part of playing the game correctly. In corroboration with the liberal view, more interaction leads to cooperation. The business elite are powerful because of their centrality in the business network; while they would survive if they were to act independently (because each has so much wealth), they have chosen to give up autonomy in favor of the greater net benefits of interdependence. In this situation, they do not have power to denounce other powerful network members, and this leads to corruption in business. The CEO of a large bank, Société Générale, Daniel Bouton, and others are not being held accountable for a $7 billion loss. Consequently, this old regime needs to change, but as described in the international realm, complex interdependence is very self-supporting and stable. The reporting by a major newspaper and criticism will only reveal the problems, but the networks are so stable that only a realist scenario of revolution, not likely to happen in the business sphere, will break up this over-embeddedness. Government regulation may be the realist answer since



French elite is an ancien régime—playing by old rules (largely its own) and quick to shift blame to protect itself.

125

government can be more powerful than business, and regime change could thus occur. However, it is also highly likely that the powers in business are connected to the same friendship networks in government. Therefore, there is no higher power in France to create a realist scenario. This illustrates the benefits of balance between issue-structuralism (realist view) and complex interdependence. Whereas, complex interdependence is more often positively associated with peace, the peace can be counterproductive, as in this business setting, and needs a jolt of “violence” to change it. Diplomatic Visits and Issue-Linkage in the Oil Industry Another example of bargaining in the business world follows, but this one transitions into an international relations setting and turns into an example of the international organization model in action (Keohane and Nye, 2001). It is a story about government control over Venezuela’s oil industry and the international ambitions related to it, by Brian Ellsworth of The New York Times (2004). Right at the interface between business and government, this story reports Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez’s appointments of Alí Rodríguez, former president of the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., to be head of the foreign ministry, and Rafael Ramírez, the energy minister, to be head of the company. Chávez has decided that, by co-opting leadership in the national oil industry, he can gain some significant leverage; Venezuela is the fifth largest oil exporter in the world (Ellsworth, 2004). His goal is to diplomatically use his oil influence in an effort to expand a leftist movement internationally, and after making the appointments he starts by visiting Libya, Qatar, Iran, and Russia (Ellsworth, 2004). “President Chávez believes that energy policy and foreign policy go hand in hand,” said Roger Tissot, director of markets and countries for the PFC Energy Group, an energy-consulting group in Washington, “so he needs someone like Alí Rodríguez who has the technical background to build diplomatic bridges out of commercial relationships based on oil.” (Ellsworth, 2004) Chávez has improved his position, which allows him to use oil to help him bargain in international diplomatic relations because he has power to make energy promises; the promises are backed up with control over a knowledgeable person who has the necessary industry networks to implement those promises. This is an obvious case of issue-linkage because Chávez very craftily links foreign relations with economic power in energy (oil). However, this issuelinkage is not based on military or any other kind of coercive power. Even if he has oil resources to offer, he does not have control over enough of them




Power and Influence

to make threats; even if he could do so, it would be neither a good business approach or a strategic diplomatic approach because current customers would be motivated to search for alternatives rather than adopt leftist policies and philosophy. Therefore, I would suggest that he is participating in an interdependent world that needs oil. Moreover, he is using his access to elite networks; he is able to hire the head of the state oil company. In a realist world, a small country like Venezuela, even having oil, would be no match for the powerful few. Yet, Chávez seems to think he has a chance to bargain. His follow-up actions further reinforce this example of the international organization model of complex interdependence. We hear about a leader of a small developing country in South America determined to become an information-shaper or influencer by making diplomatic visits to Libya, Qatar, Iran, and Russia. He has a leftist agenda to push, but other specifics are not provided (Ellsworth, 2004). The first three countries visited are fellow OPEC members; therefore, he starts with his friends and also visits Russia, another oil power. He knows that they do not need oil and therefore, I would suggest he has a plan for collective action on foreign policy. Perhaps, the four countries that he has selectively chosen have similar leftist interests. Together, these five countries have some meaningful power over the world’s oil supply. It would be difficult for them to convincingly threaten to cut off supply; they want to sell their oil, and in potentially igniting a war, they would risk oil fields being blown up. None of this furthers their economic or diplomatic interests. However, they have leverage over world oil prices, and rising prices are objectionable to powerful industrialized nations from whom Chávez will likely seek concessions in various international policy negotiations. While this latter scenario implies issue-structuralism, the success of Chávez’s endeavors hinges on partnerships and on future multiple outcomes from complex bargaining—outcomes that are difficult to determine in advance and that will not likely be made public; thus, this is anticipated backroom-bargaining that connects external networks in oil with any policy forum in which the Venezuelan leader is involved. The European Union The EU is a large and diverse group of European countries that have come together to form a relatively successful community. They have an EU government with representatives for the entire region who even guide foreign relations. These are powerful positions as suggested in the Financial Times (2003) article below: A breakthrough in the Middle East: the European Union may today have a new envoy to the region—and apparently Silvio Berlusconi is prepared to concede defeat graciously.



126


127

Even Rome would agree Otte is well suited. The career diplomat has served in Los Angeles and Washington, as well as Israel, and so understands the Americans (even if Washington doesn’t understand Belgians). Otte also headed the EU’s European security and defence policy task force, so he is close to Javier Solana, EU foreign policy chief, and well known by diplomats. Now the hard part begins.

Even in the (relatively speaking) transparent European Union, backroom-bargaining is part of the regime. The connotation in this article is not as negative as the last, suggesting that dealing out of the public eye is part of the process. At the same time, it implies that Berlusconi, having not gotten the Italian representative he initially wanted, probably received something in return for his acceptance of the Belgian representative. He used his powerful vote to obtain some benefits in return when he could have complied quietly in the beginning and not gained anything through his initial disagreement. Berlusconi does not come across as underhanded; instead, he is a strategic statesman who deals well on behalf of his country—this may get him some votes at home, too, as implied that “Rome would agree.” This situation is not realist where power resources in an issue-structuralism approach win concessions. Italy is not so powerful within the EU that it can throw its weight around or act like a hegemon. Had Berlusconi not been compliant, the process of choosing a representative would have dragged out longer, but there is no guarantee that the outcome would have been any different. Complex interdependence allowed Berlusconi to bargain for some benefits for his country because his vote or agreement is part of the cooperation-oriented EU regime. If his objections were ignored, social norms would have been violated. Furthermore, causing a leader loss of face on such an issue is not strategic for future smooth workings of the EU. Underlying the official offices and institutional structure are networks of government elites such that interpersonal relationships matter for operation of the community. By no means would such a situation lead to use of force had it not been dealt with successfully. Berlusconi may have complied on this issue in the end, but then he might have raised louder objections on other issues until he made such a nuisance of himself that the EU would regret not having bent on this particular issue in the first place. Like the UN, social norms and networks operate in the EU; unlike the UN, the EU has legal authority and, even so, complex interdependence rather than authoritative hierarchy or realist processes are operative.



Berlusconi had wanted an Italian but, Observer hears, after much backroom bargaining, Italy will recommend Belgian Marc Otte as Miguel Moratinos’ successor.

128

Power and Influence

Africa is a poor continent, rich in resources, but institutions and governments are not strong and do not work well such that the existing wealth is not fairly or widely distributed. Consequently, others have intervened to both take advantage, as happened widely during the period of colonialism, and to help. Intergovernmental Organizations play a role in diplomacy that attempts to solve complex problems in Africa and an excerpt from a speech by Herman J. Cohen, assistant secretary for African Affairs, explains the United States’ approach in 1993 for resolving problems that include IGOs: We approach conflict resolution and peace-making generally in four ways. First, through preventive diplomacy. This is a core part of our policy and programs in Africa. We strive whenever possible to avert the costs of human suffering [that] conflict invariably causes. Second, through multilateral diplomacy. We work closely with the United Nations and Africa regional institutions, including the Organization of African Unity [OAU] and the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], which have the credibility to support security and stability in Africa. Third, through participation in a mediation effort, as in Angola, Mozambique, and Rwanda. There are often advantages to working in partnership with other countries to broker and/or implement agreements to end conflicts. But our role as the world’s remaining superpower often makes the US imprimatur an essential contribution to a lasting settlement. Finally, through informal cooperation with such organizations as the Global Coalition for Africa, the Africa Leadership Forum, the African-American Institute, the Carter Center, Africare, and the many other non-governmental organizations which are striving to develop creative new approaches to conflict resolution in Africa at all levels.

The American approach implicitly balances realist, or issue-structuralism, and complex interdependence in bargaining. Also, it is a negotiation system that recognizes the requirement for a multiple-leadership approach, even in situations where a superpower intervenes. First, Cohen’s remarks have a realist tone when he mentions that United States involvement is necessary for a lasting settlement; this implies that some threat of force or power needs to back an agreement, as glue holds puzzle pieces together. Agreements among African nations that do not have strong regimes are tenuous and can fall apart easily. Complex interdependence operates in stable environments in which social norms and rules can be respected, partly for their own sake because of consequences to reputations. In volatile relationships, the maintenance of a good reputation is not an effective behavioral constraint because



Conflict Resolution in Africa—Realism, Complex Interdependence, and IGOs

129

a lack of respect and trust reigns among participants; they do not value the opinions of the others. However, if violent conflict is to be averted, then complex interdependence is part of the solution as suggested by the multilateral approach. If power could solve the problems, then they all would be solved by America’s military threat from above. Cohen mentions mediation processes and IGOs as lending credibility. IGOs mentioned include the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Economic Community of West African States. Therefore, successful bargaining is affected by social processes; trusted networks will influence the mediation processes. Moreover, membership in related credible IGOs builds opportunity for reconciliation. His speech suggests these IGOs have an active membership and are not merely symbolic associations. Complex interdependence is explicitly tied to conflict-reduction in this article since the countries and organizations must increase their constructive interactions in order to solve complex problems that intertwine them; by no means is there a suggestion that isolation or separation of the concerned parties is a solution. Also, although trade is not specifically mentioned, one of the IGOs is economic, and this suggests that economic solutions can decrease conflict. Overall, this conflict-resolution approach supports the liberal argument that interdependence leads to peace while at the same time this approach has some realist overtones, recognizing that the peace is fragile. Finally, although the United States is involved, clearly it is calling on regional leaders to participate. Cohen talks about working with country partners to broker and implement solutions in an effort at establishing multiple leadership; African states have to be involved in solving their problems, not only because they are the most knowledgeable about them, but also because they make the solutions happen; the solutions must be theirs. African countries that are viewed as leaders also legitimize the solutions in the eyes of other countries, so that they may be trusted and accepted. A Western solution may be rejected in practice. This is an instructive example that IGO memberships are indicators of cooperation and that they can be part of a complex web of negotiations.

Argentine Diplomacy in the 1990s Over the period of this study, Argentina is the most active South American country in the international diplomatic networks, so it is interesting to investigate some of the issues with which the Argentines are dealing. The Falklands war with the UK haunts them, but they are working on healing old wounds. Oil, illicit drugs, fishing-conservation, and visitation to burial grounds on the Falkland Islands are common issues as identified by Peter




Power and Influence

Ford of The Independent (1990). At the time of this story, diplomatic relations have been restored for eight months and although one agreement on investment-protection is to be signed when the Argentine foreign minister, Domingo Cavallo, visits London, not much progress has been made between the two nations (Ford, 1990). The British have been sending mixed messages. Ford (1990) explains that the British want to sign a cultural cooperation agreement and also desire a narcotics accord to discourage a predicted increase in illegal drug shipments to Europe through Argentina. However, the British tell the Argentines not to expect much investment, even though a consortium that includes British Gas has recently spent more than $100 million on four privatized oilfields. One can imagine that the situation is confusing for Argentines and frustrating when two difficulties caused by the British are added. For one, the British are making it difficult for Argentines to visit burial grounds on the Falklands (Ford, 1990). Also, there is an issue over control of overfishing in the South Atlantic that is contentious to Argentines (Ford, 1990). They see Falkland-licensed boats overfishing in the 150-mile conservation zone (Ford, 1990). This has led to a real sustainability problem such that stocks of some migratory species, such as squid, are perilously low, yet the British use a sovereignty pretext to avoid the issue (Ford, 1990). In the UNGA, Foreign Minister Cavallo indicated he would like to work with the British on this overfishing issue. This story is about bargaining and the British are playing games. As the British are drilling for oil on Argentine soil, they are, at the same time, telling the Argentines not to expect increased investment. Furthermore, the British create more bargaining chips for themselves over the issues of visits to burial grounds and overfishing. Meanwhile, they face the concern of drug shipments coming through Argentina. The problem of illicit drugs flowing around the world creates an additional reason to prefer international cooperation. Moreover, these two countries are at a crossroads in their relationship, and an opportunity to make a choice is evident; they may decide to become interdependent or they can choose greater independence from each other. The British do not have to invest in Argentina and Argentina can continue to turn a blind eye to drug trafficking. Also, the Argentines can wait until overfishing makes the UK extremely unpopular in international circles. In the meantime, Argentina’s government may have to tell their bereaved that they will not be able to visit the Falkland Islands or they may make an international case that the British are cold-hearted and thereby, simply embarrass them into compliance. The parties can choose to build friendly cooperative ties to solve mutual problems and gain benefits or they can butt heads. Issue-linkage in an international organization model is evident here rather than in a realist power model since the UK has much to gain by



130

131

working cooperatively with Argentina and vice versa, but neither is threatening the other such that one is dependent on the other or that issue-linkage is a done deal; this is a bargaining situation that could continue, resulting in a variety of outcomes. As they bargain, the relationship will grow closer and likely less contentious. The article implies that this situation—having so many issues to deal with—has been rebuilding the relationship, which had been completely cold due to the past war. Clearly, Argentina has some benefits to offer the UK if the UK wants to invest and solve drug problems, a negative aspect of globalization; consequently, Argentina seems to have a bargaining position with respect to the Falkland’s overfishing in the South Atlantic. In fact, this conservation issue should be a concern to the UK and the world; appropriately, the UN is involved, but the UK is also likely delaying action as a negotiation tactic, not only for economic reasons from the point of view of the fisherman on the Islands. It needs its own bargaining chips to extract benefits from Argentina. The international organization model works on formal and informal bases here because while the UN is involved, negotiations are on multiple levels and in many domains without any obvious outcomes. The situation becomes very petty as it is described that the Red Cross needs to be involved for making decisions about visitation of Argentine relatives to burial grounds on the Falkland Islands (Ford, 1990). The Brits are inappropriately using the mourners as pawns in their diplomatic negotiations to extract benefits from the Argentines. Also, Red Cross resources could instead be utilized for truly pressing issues of life and death. The UK has sunk to low levels to obtain what it wants. Although it remains a wealthy and powerful nation, its bargaining tactics suggest weakness. Its present power has limited effectiveness in a world of complex interdependence compared to past times when the realist model of military power dominated. Today, it can only attempt to be influential, not powerful in the coercive sense. Although Britons and Argentines may not even want to deal with each other due to past historical struggles, their mutual embeddedness created by common concerns and interests demands cooperation or they both will lose out. Also, notice again that IGOs such as the UNGA and the Red Cross play key roles in active bargaining between nations alongside bilateral diplomatic meetings. American Interdependence with Asia Over the 1990s, U.S. interdependence with Asia increased, and a 2001 article written by David Sanger of The New York Times describes the world facing newly elected President George W. Bush. Sanger explains that, because of the complicated consequences related to a complex web of interrelations, the




Power and Influence

president must weigh carefully any step he takes into Asian relationships. For example, taking a tough approach with China could hurt America’s relationship with Japan. Japan does not want to be viewed as being part of any bullying of China, a country it once occupied (Sanger, 2001). Moreover, cooperation behind-the-scenes with China with respect to North Korea’s poverty could be jeopardized. However, North Korea, not having a large constituency, is not that consequential (Sanger, 2001). Instead, Sanger implies the economic relationship with China is critical and says, “China and the United States define interdependence.” Relationships are additionally complicated by China’s friendliness with Russia in opposition to U.S. global power. However, the article implies that, today, pressuring the Olympic committee to select China as host of the 2008 games is more important to President Jiang Zemin than worries about American hegemony in the Pacific (Sanger, 2001). This kind of remark indicates a key change in international relations, suggesting a diminution of the realist power model. The article describes a situation where countries are diplomatically attempting to avoid the realist model of coercive power as leverage. For example, Japan is concerned about China’s feelings over past occupation and because the United States is working with China to deal with North Korea, the Americans do not want to disturb their relationship with China; at the same time, the most powerful country is concerned that China and Russia are scheming against it. This is not a realist scenario, however, because the United States, far more powerful militarily than all these countries combined, would otherwise be able to solve problems rather easily by using that power. All these countries should be succumbing to the United States. This complex interdependence is mind-bogglingly complicated and the article correctly identifies the United States-China relationship as defining interdependence, in the academic sense. It is “Chimerica.” They have made choices to give up autonomy in return for net benefits and it has become costly to break their ties. Moreover, the article attributes the economic (trade and investment) links between them as stifling conflict, thus supporting the liberal, not the realist, argument that interdependence leads to peaceful relations. Additionally, the mention of behind-the-scenes bargaining between the United States and China is admitting to backroom-bargaining. As explained earlier, everyone knows it is happening, but a wide chasm exists between the voluminous anecdotal evidence and the ability to test hypotheses with empirical models. U.S. Unilateralism versus the United Nations After the cold war, there is only one superpower and it has the choice to work with the rest of the world or not, possibly building a smaller coalition.



132

133

The choice of unilateralism or multilateralism in support of American interests is controversial because most of the world, represented by the UN, a moral authority that has no legal power, prefers the latter approach. It is also costly for the United States to act alone, although it can do so, and world opinion matters in an interdependent world. However, its power to act independently suggests a realist power model still operates. The following excerpts from a 1998 article by Ramesh Thakur of the International Herald Tribune provide a positive spin on the power-balance just described. The United States and the United Nations must come to terms with a world in which there is only one superpower and only one general international organization. The peace of the world today depends upon the political wisdom and military power of America. There is merit in imposing the international discipline and moderating influence of the UN on the exercise of U.S. power. Progress toward a world based on justice and law requires that U.S. power be harnessed to UN authority. Also, there is danger in permitting American power plays to be cloaked in the UN flag. This would not be progress toward a world in which force is ruled by law, but a reversion to a world in which law is put to the service of the mighty. Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz claims that the deal with Mr. Annan is a victory for UN diplomacy, not U.S. saber-rattling. This is not credible. Mr. Annan himself noted that we can achieve a lot more with diplomacy when it is backed by force. Force without diplomacy reduces us to the world of brutes; diplomacy without force leads us into appeasement. Mr. Annan has said that diplomacy must be backed by fairness. Much of the difficulty that Washington encountered in mobilizing international support stems from perceptions of unfairness. In the Arab and Islamic world, there is universal condemnation of U.S. double standards in seeking to punish Iraqi violations of UN resolutions with military force while allowing Israel to flout UN resolutions with impunity. Others, including friends and allies, resent U.S. triumphalism and unilateralism. They resisted U.S. attempts to extend its laws to stop foreign firms from trading with Cuba. They are not convinced of the morality and merits of maintaining total economic sanctions on Iraq seven years on.

The 1990s are memorable times in the Middle East and the UNGA; the United States takes leadership on many issues in nations so far away, yet interdependent for military, economic and cultural reasons. The cold war has ended and violence erupts in another region. The article suggests that even the head of the UN, Kofi Annan, in making the point that, “diplomacy without force leads us into appeasement,” approves of a helpful superpower’s use of force. The comment suggests the




Power and Influence

problem of over-embeddedness so vividly illustrated in the earlier article about the French business elite. No force or higher power existed in that context and the eagerness among the elite to appease each other led to an indestructible system of corruption. The story here also implies that interdependence leads to cooperation (not conflict) that needs to be balanced with realist power, as an overseer. However, the article mentions Cuba’s plight to illustrate a balanced view that the United States superpower needs to be constrained by the UN because unilateral power can be mistaken in judgment. Many believe the ban on business in Cuba is unfair; the UN can speak for what is fair and lawful. Notice that the United States is an independent country militarily and strong in other realms, such as the economic and political. Therefore, it chooses whether to be interdependent; however, it chooses as it pleases, not becoming so involved that it cannot revert to an independent stance. As discussed earlier, interdependence often comes with the longer-term cost of giving up autonomy, but the United States has largely avoided this problem, partly by keeping the UN slightly weakened; it is the UN’s largest contributor, but historically has held back the payments to which it is obligated (The Toronto Star, 1997). Therefore, the danger the article warns of—that the law could be to the advantage of the powerful—is a real concern when the UN operates at the behest of the superpower. It is not obvious how well the interdependence is balanced or which has more leverage over the other, the UN or the United States. United Nations Diplomacy This study examines external influences on UN decision making and outlines decision-making processes in the UNGA. The following excerpts from an article in the March–May 2002 issue of the UN Chronicle tell us more about what happens when formal processes in the UN do not lead to final decisions and informal processes are utilized. Another active diplomat of the G-77 developing nations said on condition of anonymity that “powerful” nations apply “subtle pressures and friendly pushes” to remind other nations to change their position.However, a diplomat of the group of developed nations said: “It is correct in the sense (sic) that powerful nations have an extensive network of diplomats, and are aware of positions of other developing and developed nations. So it’s natural that in a bilateral dialogue they put their concerns across clearly. Friendly pushes and subtle pressures usually work with those who want to be pushed. But a developing country, he said, would never give in to friendly pushes if that is against its best interests.” “You are pushed gently in the direction you are likely to



134


135

When negotiations are deadlocked, powerful nations attempt a realist stance and use issue-linkage (the pressures and pushes applied, as mentioned in the article) in an issue-structuralism approach. However, the developed nations’ representatives suggest that it is not easy, and less-powerful nations ultimately head in their desired directions, regardless. They sometimes also play the reverse games and win. It sounds like both issue-structuralism and the international organizations model of complex interdependence are operating where the latter dominates. This is something of a theme in the illustrations given in this chapter such that both processes coexist or are needed where the traditional model tends to act as backup when negotiation processes of a usually stable international organization model break down. The anonymity of the interviewees and the tone of the article suggest that the coercive-power model is discouraged and is not a formally acceptable approach. Additionally, the developed nations’ interviewee explains that their advantage over the developing nations in negotiations lies in their access to information, so that they have fuller understandings of positions. Although they use coercion, it is not force; rather, it is based on better knowledge. Correspondingly, the diplomatic networks of this study are examined from this point of view of knowledge-power that is influential, rather than being powerful in a forceful sense.



take . . . and developing nations apply subtle pressures too. Sometimes, when it works,” he added, “it’s beyond their wildest expectations!”




The United Nations Context



Part III




The United Nations and Its General Assembly (UNGA) T U N   G A will be described in this chapter. Furthermore, the UNGA’s appropriateness for empirically testing embeddedness theory will be explained by showing how theoretical concepts from previous chapters apply to this context. Additionally, a note is added to explain the rationale for why this is an interorganizational study. Not only is the UNGA a decision-making forum offering generalizability because it is international, but it is also a network context because it is not a hierarchical authority. Insights about the UN and Its General Assembly The United Nations is the world’s most important international governmental organization because of its large membership and an agenda that covers almost every issue facing humankind, such as trade, drugs, the environment, economic and social development, peacekeeping, international law, and so on. The UN is like a government of countries, but it does not have legal governing authority. Its main bodies are the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, and Secretariat. The General Assembly alone has many committees, subsidiary bodies, programs and funds, research and training institutes, and other UN entities, such as the United Nations University. Many IGOs that we think are independent are also partners of the UN, including the International Labour Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group, and the World Health Organization (WHO). The World Trade Organization is a related organization and so is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).



Chapter 8

Power and Influence

The focus of this study is the 192-member General Assembly (UNGA). The embeddedness of the international networks previously described is posited to affect the decisions in this arena of national government representatives. Therefore, it is useful to understand this organization and how it works. The UNGA is a large version of a boardroom in which a group of directors, who have been influenced by their external networks, come to discuss and make decisions for a firm. However, the delegates in the UN are different from directors in that they represent various countries, whereas the directors on a board of a company are all supposed to be working in the interests of that same firm; directors are categorized as inside and outside directors, based on their main association—that is either with the firm as management or with another firm, sometimes a bank, for example, so allegiances can be blurry. In fact, the delegates to the UN do have a competing loyalty analogous to that of directors and that is to do what is best for the world as well as for their own country. Moreover, country representatives have limited discretion because very strong constraints are placed upon them by their governments; they are not individual-level actors as are directors on boards. Another analogous forum is the House of Representatives in the United States Congress. These politicians are elected to represent the interests of their states, not their own personal interests, although their constraints are probably less than on country representatives in the UNGA. The UNGA, post–cold war 1990–2000, offers a unique setting for investigating social-structural factors that affect cooperative decision making at the interorganizational level. As alluded to earlier, country deliberations are at the interorganizational level because UN delegates represent their countries’ governments, not themselves. Also, they do not act atomistically and bargain bilaterally or multilaterally, thus the “inter” in “interorganizational.” This study’s empirical effort manages to work with dyads so bilateral influences are considered; more informally, multilateral influences already have been discussed. Although most decisions in the UNGA are a result of what appears to be a transparent and formal discussion and voting process, decisions have been made with knowledge and opinions developed outside the main forum. In fact, this informal process has even been formalized and discussed in the article, “The process of informals in the Fifth Committee” (2002), as mentioned in an earlier chapter. How decisions are actually arrived at is not in the public view. An ultimate lack of transparency in explanations for UNGA decisions elicits questions about what factors, including external social-structural ones, may affect voting outcomes. Studying the international networked relationships may reveal some of the underlying reasoning for the UNGA vote outcomes in a post–cold war world that has no clear divisions or hierarchy to instruct it. Before explaining this and the



140

141

boundaries imposed by this setting, I will provide some information about the UNGA. The UN General Assembly that began in 1945 with 51 country members had 159 to 189 members over the period of this study, and as of 2006 it had 192 members, since Montenegro joined. Switzerland did not join until 2002. So, while we think of the UN as representing the whole world, it has actually approached that actuality only in recent times. Its membership is geographically distributed as follows: Western Europe, 13 percent; Eastern Europe, 12 percent; Americas, 18 percent; Africa, 27 percent; Asia, 23 percent; Australia and Pacific, 7 percent (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). The UNGA is a “parliament of nations” that is in session from September to December of each year. When necessary, it may resume its session or hold a special or emergency session on subjects of particular concern. It meets to consider the world’s most serious problems and has an agenda of more than 150 items, including: conflicts in the Middle East, economic development, protection of the global environment, and support of human rights (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). Some confusion may exist about the UNGA’s function versus that of the Security Council; the UNGA’s discussions include topics that may also be examined by the Security Council, but it does not discuss anything currently being discussed by the Security Council; thus, they do not simultaneously duplicate each other’s efforts. The UNGA considers any topic to be of importance to its members whereas the Security Council only addresses security-related issues. Below is a list of the topics addressed over the 1990–2000 period, roughly categorized for simplicity (table 8.1). For each topic, the number of times the issue was voted on over these 11 years is listed under “vote frequency.” For example, votes on issues related to the Middle East were most frequent—237 occasions. The UNGA’s resolutions, or decisions, are approved by majority vote, consensus, acclamation, or adoption without a vote (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). Each member state has one vote and while most votes are decided by a simple majority, decisions on issues regarding international peace and security, admitting new members, and the UN budget require a two-thirds majority. Countries may vote “yes,” “no,” or “abstain.” A majority is calculated based only on votes cast as either “yes” or “no” votes. States are not legally required to act on resolutions, but the recommendations of the UNGA are an important indication of world opinion and represent an international moral authority (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). A problem with the UNGA is its perceived lack of power. The UNGA has no legal authority so it is not officially a world government, differentiating it from an institution like the European Union, which is a government; in contrast, the EU is seen as being very powerful. The EU has legal authority over its members, whereas the UN does not. Also, the rules for admittance



Un i t e d N at i o n s & It s G e n e r a l A s s e mb ly

142

Power and Influence Table 8.1

UNGA Vote Topics 1990–2000

1990–2000 UNGA Topics

Middle East Disarmament UN Principles Human Rights Peace Keeping Africa Outer Space Caribbean Economic UN Internal Issues Science & Technology Eastern Europe Antarctica Europe Asia Terrorism Environment

Vote Frequency 237 166 137 95 29 21 19 15 15 15 14 9 6 5 3 2 1

are very strict in the EU; countries strive for membership and change internal structures drastically to satisfy the requirements. In contrast, the UN has principles that members are expected to agree to and abide by, but little or no enforcement exists. The changes the EU demands prior to membership make countries similar to each other with regard to aspects such as government and business approaches; they must be democratic and have open, free markets. By devoting resources to transformation, new members demonstrate their commitment to being part of the European Community and value the benefits of membership. The UN also offers many benefits in its collective approach but they come too freely, except for the annual dues; as a result, members act like customers of the UN rather than committed members, as they do in the EU. EU membership is an earned privilege and it is more like a club in its exclusivity. An example of the UN’s weakness as a result of its members’ lack of commitment to its principles was when Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed in 2006 a global counter-terrorism strategy to the General Assembly. He faced difficulties in finding consensus—not only did the proposal seek to deter terrorism, but a major portion of it was related to defending the human rights of all, including those suspected of terrorism; many states regard human rights to be United States priorities and they resist supporting these principles partially because they do not practice them (Voeten,



UNGA Issue Areas

143

2004; UN Web site). However, human rights are UN principles. Why are these countries allowed to continue as members when they block proposals that support the organization’s goals? My answer to this is that if many of these countries that do not support certain principles, such as human rights, were left outside the institution, then there would be no chance for them to undergo internal change because they would not even be part of the discussion and would be isolated. In fact, the UN’s lack of legal clout may insulate us from related dangers of irresponsible governments—governments that are not accountable to their own people. If those countries that disagree with basic human rights principles were allowed to be involved in determining world “legislation,” this could be a dangerous situation. If the UN does not have legal power, it can have many controversial, but otherwise harmless, debates that possibly bring the world closer together while making “mistakes” initiated by irresponsible members—mistakes cannot be seriously detrimental because they do not have full weight. While there is no exclusivity of participation in the UNGA, there is exclusivity in the Security Council. The five members that are permanent and have veto power are all nuclear powers—Britain, France, the United States, China, and Russia—and this is a remnant from a realist world. However, their higher status could be influencing countries today, such as Iran, North Korea, and Israel, who seem to value the distinction of possessing nuclear capabilities, as implied by their attempts to build nuclear weapons. These countries nurture this belief no matter how irrelevant and conflict-provoking is such a posture. The structure of the Security Council is controversial and there is much talk about changing it by adding other important countries, such as Japan. However, the power struggles and problems involved in choosing a favored additional few make this almost impossible in the near term. Whereas the exclusivity of the EU makes it more productive, the kind of exclusivity extant in the Security Council decreases its legitimacy in the eyes of the world; it does not help that certain countries with permanent Security Council positions are there for outdated reasons that confer the status to control nuclear weapons internationally. As pointed out in earlier chapters, while complex interdependence prevails today, whenever it breaks down, the realist world of power presides and the predominance of this council reflects that truth. In many respects, the UN—in its structure and problems—reflects the dynamics of the wider world. Additional issues and points about UNGA procedures provide further background. First, is the debate about whether there should be weighted voting so as to be more democratic—that is, according to population or other criteria, because a small country’s vote is equal to a large country’s vote




Power and Influence

(Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). Also, as already briefly mentioned, diplomacy takes place outside of the discussions in the assembly, that is, debating in the assembly is called “conference diplomacy” or “parliamentary diplomacy,” to the extent that decisions are often made outside the council chambers, away from public scrutiny, sometimes in group meetings of various compositions, that is, regional (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). Some governments try to build support for their views in these forums in order to gain a majority vote in the Assembly (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). Although the process is not transparent to the public, it is necessary for governments to be able to negotiate and find compromise (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). The Appropriateness of the UNGA Context Post–Cold War From a formal institutional perspective, the UNGA is a place where countries vote and find consensus on important issues, but from an informal organizational perspective, it is a networking forum that animates the dynamics of complex interdependence and embeddedness. If the realist, power-oriented view of issue-structuralism were dominant here, there would be little need for behind-the-scenes negotiations because powerful countries would always use issue-linkage to impose their preferences. Also, the time after the cold war is a period where allegiances are not preset, as they were before in a more bipolar political environment. This state of affairs allows for new freedom to bargain with any country such that variations in external networks are relevant influences, whereas before they would not have existed. Moreover, this is the most international institution in the world, thereby allowing for the control of political and cultural differences on a massive scale that no firm or other organizational context could hope to match. Therefore, the UNGA is the perfect setting in which to test the effects of embeddedness. Given that backroom-bargaining is a well-known phenomenon among UNGA members, I may refer to vote-buying or reciprocity that is in a wider sense the reciprocal embeddedness of these nations. While in many settings vote-buying is generally accepted, it has not been extensively tested empirically because the bargaining is unobservable (Wiseman, 2004). Whether the behavior is either an overt trading of favors (vote-buying) or the more subtle return of a favor based on an implicit obligation, compliance, both are types of cooperative behavior, or reciprocity, difficult to observe and sort out. This study seeks to find evidence of difficult-to-observe cooperative behavior, but it cannot sort out the various types. Reciprocity enmeshes countries in a complicated interweaving of embedded relationships of mutual dependence and interdependence.



144

145

When a state votes, it makes trade-offs regarding these relationships— pleasing one state over another could have trade, military, and many other consequences, potentially strengthening and weakening ties at the same time or even changing a state’s position and, ultimately, its power and influence in various types of networks. While decisions are expected to be self-interested and moderated by various types of embeddedness, they are made with the limited information that state officials have and can process—the international context is complicated and there is no such thing as complete information. Information is uneven in networks of nations, depending on the nation’s positions in those networks and the strength of its relationships. Even so, UNGA countries face the problem that they must make decisions that have consequences for themselves and for other states embroiled in the issues. Although the UNGA makes decisions that have consequences, there are no binding laws or formal, hierarchical governance structures for transnational institutions and their member states. States can choose to join the UN and may not abide by its rules; for example, members may not pay their dues (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005; Halifax Summit, 1995; The Toronto Star, 1997). Therefore, international institutions only exist within a network form of governance. Consequently, the behavior of any individual state is regulated by social mechanisms such as restricted access, macroculture, collective sanctions, and reputation (Jones et al., 1997) as well as economic sanctions. Moreover, the world seems more chaotic, post–cold war. Although there was a strong nonaligned movement during the cold war, many countries were aligned on some level with one of the great powers. Alignment was so polarized that voting reflected this and other activities were strongly affected by these loyalties (Voeten, 2000). For example, American allies traded with each other and joined similar institutions so both economic and institutional embeddedness were determined by cold war allegiances (Russett & Oneal, 2001). After the cold war, alignments are not as clear and while there are a number of theories regarding how powers are aligning (see Voeten, 2000), these ties based on Western wealth and cultural affinity may not be so strong as to override the effects of interest in this study. Voting will be affected by other factors as well. The boundaries for this present investigation of the UNGA relate to group size and frequency of convening. In the UNGA, members have some social proximity and recognize their mutual memberships in some of the same networks which build external linkages among them. For example, countries are members of IGOs or may be trading partners; they may interact simply because they are geographical neighbors impacting each other through local actions or by sharing common concerns. They also expect to participate in future voting on a relatively regular and frequent basis—that




Power and Influence

is, more than once per year. Thus, social structure exists among UNGA members. An analogous situation, frequently studied, is roll-call voting in the United States Congress (Platt, Poole & Rosenthal, 1992; Poole, 1988). In this setting, influential social structure exists among congressmen who represent their states. It has been found that congressmen influence each others’ voting by taking part in private discussions (Weisberg, 1978). This setting is contrasted with a relatively disconnected electorate or crowds of people who could also be considered groups; however, these groups do not deliberately meet on a regular basis to vote or affect decisions. These types of groups are composed of actors too disconnected to recognize social-network consequences; they act much more autonomously than do actors in settings such as the UNGA or the United States Congress. Furthermore, there is a membership aspect, however weak (as discussed earlier), that creates social structure by promoting certain norms of behavior (Axelrod, 1997). The UNGA has formal requirements for membership such that a state must be peace-loving, must accept the obligations contained in the Charter and in the judgment of the organization, and must have the ability and willingness to carry out its obligations; also, applicants to join the GA must be recommended by the Security Council (Baehr & Gordenker, 2005). Another important differentiation is one between groups and networks, especially because they are both important social-constructs used here. The UNGA is a large group of member states each playing roles in many types of networks that may, for example, be based on trade or common IGO memberships. A social network is the set of actors and the ties among them, in which the ties may be any relationship between actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Networks can have subgroups and groups, while a subgroup is any subset of actors, including all the ties among them, and a group is “the collection of all actors on which ties are to be measured” (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; 19). Furthermore, the actors of a group should comprise a bounded set (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), which is the case for the 192 countries of the UNGA. Some relevant network concepts of groups include cliques and structures of affiliations (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In networks, the basic unit is the dyad for direct exchange and a triad for indirect exchange (Molm, 1994). It is anticipated that characteristics of the UNGA member states’ networks may partially explain the voting outcomes of this group. Note: The Theoretical Level of Analysis The field of strategic management is underpinned by varied academic roots that stem from sociology, political science, economics, and psychology. While this multitude of perspectives offers opportunities for interesting



146

147

academic integration, it presents challenges when definitions of various constructs differ. Even within these areas there are continuing debates and, as a consequence, some controversy inevitably is found in the level of analysis. In this study, two major inquiries arise related to the level of analysis. First, what type of organization is the UNGA and how does it compare to firms, that are usually the subjects of strategy studies? Second, what are these government actors within the UNGA—are governments to be considered organizations? Given this examination, what is the level of analysis in this study? From a sociological standpoint, Scott (2003) says, “the level of analysis is determined by the nature of the dependent variable—that is, by whether the phenomenon to be explained is the behavior of individuals, of organizations, or of systems of organizations” (Scott, 2003; 16). Moreover, he concedes that distinguishing among levels of analysis is to some extent subjective (Scott, 2003; 17). In this study, the dependent variable is the percentage of similar voting between each dyad of member countries in the UNGA in a year. What is the nature of this dependent variable? I propose that the UNGA is an organization and the actors within it are not acting as individuals. They are representatives of organizations or systems of organizations. I expect that the latter choice is slightly controversial, according to the literature as will be explained. Definitions of an organization and a system of organizations begin this exploration. Parsons (1956) provided his early perspective: An organization is defined as a social system oriented to the attainment of a relatively specific type of goal, which contributes to a major function of a more comprehensive system, usually the society. (Parsons, 1956; 64)

Parsons provides examples of organizations such as a government department or bureau, a university, a hospital, or a business firm (Parsons, 1956; 64). Since the UNGA is a principle organ of the UN, a body that is like a world government, then the UNGA qualifies as an “organization.” However, how would Parsons classify the actors within the UNGA? The country representatives are not acting at the individual level because within the UNGA they represent national governments. Depending on the context, self-interest and the interests of governments will, to various degrees, be represented by individuals. UNGA member representatives have little leeway other than to perform within the limits of their institutional roles because their governments leave them little or no individual discretion. Votes cast by UNGA members do not affect the individual representative’s status; they do affect the individual state’s status (Voeten, 2000). In fact, when votes are cast, the UNGA member countries are the recognized voters, not the individuals who represent them—it is China that voted “Yes,” or Russia




Power and Influence

that abstained. Therefore, this study takes the view that since governments of states influence each other, it is the embeddedness of states in various types of relationships that is most influential on voting outcomes. However, Parsons says that a nation is not an organization (Parsons a, 1956; 64); he does not specifically address what a government is but, implies that it is a system of organizations since any part of a government is an organization. Scott (2003) provides more modern definitions of organizations from several scholars representing rational- and natural-systems views. Parsons’ definition emphasizes specific goals, but Scott (2003) suggests Parsons’ overall view is a natural-systems perspective, to be further explicated, incorporating informal aspects of organizations (Scott, 2003; 72–75). Since governments pursue many disparate goals, the rational-systems definition works against their classification as organizations. Scott summarizes this view: Organizations are collectivities oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting relatively highly formalized social structures. (Scott, 2003; 27)

From a natural-systems perspective, Organizations are collectivities whose participants are pursuing multiple interests, both disparate and common, but who recognize the value of perpetuating the organization as an important resource. The informal structure of relations that develops among participants is more influential in guiding the behavior of participants than is the formal structure. (Scott, 2003; 28)

This view allows for the pursuit of multiple goals and does not emphasize formal structure. Thus, it is more open to the possibility that an entire government could be an organization. Traditionally, we think of a corporation like General Motors as an organization (Scott, 2003; 93). Is GM an organization or a system of organizations, given that is sells a variety of automotive vehicles and at the same time runs a huge financial services business? Global corporations, studied as organizations, are so vast and multifaceted that it is difficult to differentiate them from governments on the basis of existing organizational definitions, even within the realm of sociology and organizational studies. In fact, Giddens, an organizations and management scholar quoted by Whittington, actually proposes the state as a generic form of organization; a collectivity in which knowledge about the conditions of systems reproduction is reflexively used to influence, shape or modify that system reproduction. (Whittington, 1992; 695)



148

149

Moreover, in the Academy of Management Review, an organizational studies and management journal, Kelley (1976) quotes Perrucci, Robert, and Pilisuk (1970): “People will readily admit that governments are organizations. The converse—that organizations are governments—is equally true, but rarely considered” (Kelley, 1976; 66). Finally, outside the realms of sociology and management and organizational studies, political scientists generally accept that governments are organizations (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002). Moreover, some consider the UN, as a whole, an organization, even though it acts like a world government (Ingram et al., 2005). Clearly, the boundaries of what constitutes an organization are somewhat ambiguous, and part of the confusion may relate to the times. When Talcott Parsons defined organizations, firms were smaller entities, not as global in reach. Today, the size and multi-functionality of organizations make old definitions obsolete. The area needs a revised definition. However, until that happens, it remains acceptable, at least to a large set of mainstream scholars, to consider governments as organizations. The point here is to examine embeddedness at a level beyond the individual. Whether this study is considered interorganizational, or between systems of organizations, may remain in debate. However, I have sufficient support to take an interorganizational view until a new, widely accepted definition contradicts my position.







History of Decision Making in the UNGA T    into the last chapter by providing more specific history on decision making in the UNGA, with a few examples from the 1990–2000 period of this study. One illustration from recent times came up in the previous chapter: Kofi Annan’s attempt to develop a counter-terrorism strategy. It demonstrated the continuing difficulty of dealing in a forum composed of such diverse views. Annan’s ideas, in line with the UN’s mandate, fell on some deaf ears because of countries that do not hold the importance of human rights in high regard or have a different conception of it. Individuals accused of terrorism, without attendant proof, may not be given fair trials, and demonstrated terrorists may face inhumane treatment or a death penalty upon capture or in detainment,1 all as a consequence of the lack of consensus in the UNGA. In a forum operating on the principles of complex interdependence, the powerful can less often impose their values; post–cold war, the United States is the only military superpower and it, together with its allies, holds human rights dear; a qualification is important here, however, because the United States also violates its own human rights principles when states like Texas impose the death penalty. In any case, the understood military power of the United States is not enough to enforce human rights in the UNGA. Also, this example raises questions about organizational design and negotiation tactics. How could UNGA processes be improved so that its principles take precedence more often over rogue member nations’ uncooperative behavior? The discussion of the EU in the previous chapter provides possible suggestions, but with limits due to the differences in nature and purposes of the two institutions. Furthermore, how could Kofi Annan have been more successful with his proposed policy? Does it make a difference that he is a leader and, therefore, do differences in negotiation approaches apply at different levels within the UNGA? If the institution does not have hierarchical power, how then could its leader wield power? These questions are asked so 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


Chapter 9

152

Power and Influence

UN Principles Motivate Complex Interdependence Rather Than Power Buildups Whereas the Western world, along with the UN, has common interests in human rights, a report about coordination between Russia and China indicates their interests and how they are intertwined post–cold war. On November 15, 2000, Bandar Seri Begawan of The Xinhua news agency of Beijing reported the following: Chinese President Jiang Zemin said here Wednesday 15th November that China is willing to enhance its cooperation and coordination with Russia on the anti-missile issue. Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sideline of the informal leaders’ meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Jiang said the shared stance of China and Russia on this issue has won more and more support from the international world since the United Nations General Assembly approved the decision on safeguarding and abiding the AntiMissile Agreement earlier this year. Putin said that his country will not change its attitude toward the anti-missile issue. In their talks, Jiang highly appraised the development of the bilateral ties between the two large countries in the Pacific area. China and Russia will have a great prospect in developing their economic and trade cooperation in the next century, especially with Russian economic recovery. The Russian president said with the intensive contacts between the two leaders, the two sides have enjoyed very good cooperation both in the economic field and in the fields of safeguarding the world peace and other international issues. This is the fourth meeting between the two heads of state within this year.

Russia and China are coordinating on many levels—on the anti-missile issue, economics, and trade—and this study suggests that these intertwined relationships will affect their decisions. The news article makes the point that they have been meeting relatively frequently, already four times in the year, and this suggests an alignment in the world; however, unlike the past, this alignment is not based on military power so much as on an attempt to join forces on other issues: peace-building and economic development. Given earlier analyses that showed the Asian region to be relatively fragmented, and recognizing that Russia has lost power in its former realm



they may be pondered as the reader learns more about this institution, and they are suggested investigations for future research. The additional illustrations that follow will similarly demonstrate the applicability of the UNGA context to this study and reveal how decision making works in it. They may also spur more questions for future research.

153

because many of its former states prefer to become part of a democratic Europe, each of these two countries is alone in its region. Although very different communist-influenced countries, they are somewhat like outsiders looking in on a wealthier Western world and, as such, they reach out to each other to find an equal friend. The UNGA is a forum in which they can express their unity, and this gives them consequence; they are also both permanent Security Council members, the ones often viewed as less cooperative. According to the article, they are, however, surprisingly peaceful. A central aspect of the article is the importance it gives to the UNGA decision. Reportedly, after the UNGA backed a decision on safeguarding and adhering to the anti-missile agreement, the rest of the world is giving it more support. Russia and China seem to be taking some credit for this, and the UNGA is an influential instrument for conferring legitimacy to their views. This demonstrates how the UNGA plays a vital role post–cold war from all sides’ perspectives, West or East. Although this body is often derided as ineffective, this is, in fact, not the case. The UNGA forum promotes reputationbuilding based on constructive behavior according to its principles. In this case, Russia and China are not taking pride in military power, instead they are proud of their productiveness, through the UNGA, in promoting peace. This is a tremendous turnaround in world affairs, since military power used to be most admired, and it is an influential UNGA that is behind this transformation. A Democratic UNGA Has No Clear Divisions The UNGA also offers an arena for outspokenness in opposition to the only superpower, post–cold war. The one vote–one country approach means that the UNGA addresses issues of interest that at times will be in line with United States policy and at other times will not, as the BBC reported through Tele Rebelde of Havana on November 10, 2000: Once again, representatives from countries around the world in the United Nations General Assembly rejected the US blockade against Cuba. Representatives from Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Costa Rica, China, Russia, South Africa, Vietnam, France, Australia, Norway and others spoke before the assembly, expressing their support for Cuba’s resolution calling for an end to the blockade. A UN resolution condemning the US blockade against Cuba was passed once again for the ninth consecutive year. The final vote was 167 for, three against, and four abstentions. Cuban Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque addressed the representatives in favour of the vote.

Also, the following article demonstrates that the world is not aligned based on old cold war allegiances. Almost all countries are against the American blockade of Cuba, and the article particularly mentions Australia, a country that the United States coordinates militarily with in the Pacific region;




Power and Influence

Australia is an ally. Mexico is also mentioned, and it is a NAFTA partner. Furthermore, it suggests the United States is not using coercive power over its allies because if they were fearful, the freedom to vote this way would not exist; moreover, a tiny, almost irrelevant, country such as Cuba has a very strong voice in this organization. Therefore, a realist type of issuestructuralism is not operating in the UN. Instead, it appears to be quite democratic. This is evidence that this context bodes well for this study, which is searching for network influences on decision making such that cold war divisions or even North-South divisions are not overpowering. UN Decisions Are Driven by the Network, Not Hierarchy Whereas world-wide consensus about the Cuban blockade was consistent over nine years, other issues are historically difficult on a regular basis, and there is a process to ensure that debate is open on all of them. An article by Arno Mayer in the Deutsche-Press Agentur of September 9, 1994, illustrates the priorities of open debate and consensus in the UN, while at the same time demonstrates the effectiveness of strategic backroom-bargaining. He explains that by the halfway point of the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, the Vatican had been successful at using tactical behind-the-scenes maneuvers to slow down compromise on the right to abortion. The conference wanted to move past this debate to address family planning and sex education. Moreover, it is expected that the 180 nations participating in the conference would pass the proposed 20-year wide-ranging action-program on population control (Mayer, 1994). However, as at earlier conferences in Bucharest (1974) and Mexico City (1984), the Vatican was expected to refuse to sign the final agreement (Mayer, 1994). Still, the Vatican was given the opportunity to present its point of view once again. At every UN conference, this due process is maintained even though much time is wasted; the UN attempts full consensus, but if one member disagrees it may append a footnote that expresses its opposition. The extra time is given with the hope that these kinds of divisive outcomes can be avoided (Mayer, 1994). Although this illustration is of a UN conference, it includes the countries of the UNGA and is essentially this same forum that is taken to Cairo. The norms expressed regarding proper procedures for conference decision making are illustrative of UNGA culture. Here, even the Vatican engages in backroom-bargaining and, clearly, this is an international norm for influencing decision making. The Vatican is determined to do whatever it can to prevent a consensus approving of abortion, and the UN conference will give it all possible opportunity to express itself even at the expense of slowing down progress that could be made on family planning and sex education; in fact, such delay furthers the Vatican’s 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


154

155

cause because it is also less supportive of the majority views on these latter issues. Moreover, the fact that the Vatican is expending so much effort on this indicates the importance of these collective UN decisions. No hierarchy instructs the entire world, not even the Catholic Church; instead, the international network’s moral consensus has a great deal of weight. Although the Catholic Church is still a relatively strong religious force, worldwide, and has a huge following, it is still concerned about UN agreements. Thus, the UN is extremely relevant post–cold war. At the same time, minority views are important, as demonstrated by the enforced UN process. All participants, even those taking outlier positions, are considered important. How they are treated could have long-term repercussions on the smooth running and continuance of the institution. UN strategists sacrifice some time now in order that all members are kept satisfied in the sense that they perceive it is a fair process. Votes in the UNGA Are Valuable Whereas the UN prefers consensus, votes are taken, and this is what this study analyses. If, in the UNGA, reciprocity occurs due to external network influences, the votes must have some value; if they do not, then there is no possibility of drawing conclusions about any relationship in this study. Votes only have value if what the UNGA decides has some weight, regardless of its lack of legal authority, and this already has been demonstrated. However, the following December 23, 1996, article from the IRNA news agency, Tehran, reports on the importance of a UNGA vote. The foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a message to Tansu Ciller, the foreign minister of Turkey, has expressed gratitude for the decision of the Turkish government on greater cooperation between the two countries in international bodies. In the message which was submitted by the Iranian embassy in Ankara to the Turkish Foreign Ministry today, Ali Akbar Velayati expressed gratitude for the recent Turkish cooperation in the case of the resolution [passed] at the 51st UN General Assembly on the state of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The message states that such cooperation, particularly in fields of joint interest, would bring the two nations and governments of Iran and Turkey closer together. At the 51st UN General Assembly, Turkey voted against the resolution which claimed that human rights were being violated in Iran.

The decision in the UNGA as to whether Iran was violating human rights was important enough that Iran made public its appreciation for support from Turkey. Turkey’s vote bought political good will and “gratitude” from Iran such that Iran would like to cooperate with Turkey on other issues. Not 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange



156

Power and Influence

only was Turkey’s strategic vote valuable to Iran, but publicizing that vote admits that this cooperation spills over into other realms. Thus, votes in the UNGA are precious and are worthy for consideration as reciprocal behavior in respect of relationships outside the UNGA.

This set of decision-making examples provides a great deal of anecdotal evidence that the UNGA, as described, is a context appropriate for testing the organizational theory, embeddedness. It is a forum that is not hierarchical because it has no legal authority and in this time period does not allow itself to be dominated by the only extant superpower; even so, it commands a great deal of importance and operates on the basis of democratic principles that conform to social norms demanded by the international network that fosters its continued existence. As inferred by the behavior at the UN conference in Cairo, the network could reject the institution if it did not maintain a fair process that considers minority views. Since it does command importance, votes in the UNGA are valuable for purposes of reciprocity. Moreover, cooperative strategic behavior that involves reciprocity is a norm such that backroom-bargaining is even written about on occasion. Bargaining is effective in this world that has no clear divisions, as reflected in these stories of UNGA voting; there is room for persuasion because alignments are not so steadfast. If there were strong alignments as during the cold war, then bargaining between countries would not occur since everyone would know in advance how any country would vote. Evidence that the UNGA motivates peaceful behavior rather than power buildups by secondary (and possibly dissatisfied) powers like Russia and China demonstrates its significance. Its principles of promoting peace are diffused because of its ability to confer legitimacy on nations, and this could only occur if it possessed its own legitimacy; Russia and China decide to publicize their accordance with the UN because this is good for international perceptions of themselves. Also, the UN is a forum in which nations communicate and demonstrate their cooperative clout in constructive rather than power-oriented ways. Thus, complex interdependence is supported by this organization. However, it is known from a previous chapter that in backroom-bargaining a realist, issuestructuralism approach sometimes becomes useful, and even Kofi Annan recognized the need for a friendly, but stern, counterbalance to the superpower. Although this forum particularly shows these attributes anecdotally, backroom-bargaining is difficult to study because it is not regularly observable. Empirical studies need relatively large amounts of data to be satisfactory and, through the use of a network-analysis approach, this empirical step is one this study intends to take.



Conclusion

The Research Study



Part IV




Research Hypotheses T     explain the research hypotheses that are the cornerstones of the empirical part of this study. First, I will recapitulate some of the main ideas of this study. So far the theoretical discussion has linked mechanisms of power and influence to the various forms of embeddedness examined—economic, institutional, political, and cultural—to predict effects on decision making, where votes are the observable results of strategic decisions. The form of economic embeddedness employed is trade ties, and three forms of institutional embeddedness are used: formalized military alliances, direct country-to-country diplomatic visits, and common intergovernmental organization (IGO) memberships. When examining nested embeddedness, political and cultural embeddedness are moderators for the institutional embeddedness that is IGO membership. Each form utilizes different mechanisms or a different combination of mechanisms. Predictions relate the mechanisms to their expected impact on similar dyadic voting. Power- and influence-mechanisms are operationalized in the hypotheses using network concepts such as degree-centrality and connectedness. The following sections explain the hypotheses. Economic Embeddedness—Positional Power in the Trade Network Economic embeddedness is expected to have a strong influence on voting in the UNGA; here, economic embeddedness will be synonymous with international trade. This assertion supports a liberal view that interdependence leads to cooperation rather than to conflict. At the same time, there is powerful issue-linkage that is realist, yet it does not suggest a hierarchy of issues in such a way that military power is of top importance, effectively determining the outcomes on other types of issues.



Chapter 10

Power and Influence

Since economic ties are monetary exchanges rather than exchanges of information—although information may accompany the transactions— differential power, rather than homophylic influence, is expected to matter more in influencing UNGA voting. In-degree centrality in the trade network will reflect economic prowess and prominence because this measure is in direct proportion to a country’s number of trade partners (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). This is a network-positional measure and not a marketpower measure. Market power is controlled for in the analysis with a dyadic trade-intensity measure since it may be alternatively posited that countries vote cooperatively because they do a lot of business with each other and have strong ties that may be increasing in strength (Granovetter, 1973, 1983). Aligned voting is, however, first and foremost a social-political behavior, and will therefore be more highly influenced by prominence—a dominant social position in an economic network—rather than by market power, a measure of economic influence. Prominence is more salient than is the quantifying of relative total trade. While representatives know, by volumes and monetary amounts, who their larger trade partners are, they pay attention to the prominent powers. For this theory, other network-centrality measures—such as eigenvectorcentrality, closeness-centrality, betweeness-centrality, or the Bonacich power index—are not preferred over in-degree centrality. The following discussion explaining the differences among these measures so as to justify the use of in-degree centrality will also be relevant for later hypotheses. Eigenvector and closeness-centrality are measures that consider “the distance of an actor to all others in the network by focusing on the geodesic distance from each actor to all others” (Hanneman, 2001; 65). In other words, the contention is that an actor is more central the closer it is to more of the other actors in the network. Eigenvector-centrality is a more sophisticated measure of this condition than is closeness-centrality since eigenvector-centrality recognizes the difference between an actor having a few close ties and another having many slightly more distant ties, the latter actor being more central (Hanneman, 2001; 68). Although these measures are more global in nature than is indegree centrality, they do not relate well to the reality of trade which is that no trade relationships exist except for those relations with direct trading partners (direct ties). A reputation of prominence exists among the entire global trading community, but this reputation is built on a state’s relationships with its direct ties only—that is, a state’s distance, along network paths, to other states has no meaning in the world of trade because trade is governed by contracts. Betweeness-centrality, too, offers no advantage over in-degree centrality for measuring power or prominence. Sometimes, because of domestic trade laws, goods travel through certain countries prior to reaching others.



160

161

Consequently, a country may be between others as a “pass through” country or as a broker between countries. However, if such a country is powerful, then it will be brokering between many countries and, consequently, will have many trade partners; this condition will be captured by in-degree centrality. Finally, the Bonacich centrality measure suggests that if a country has more weak trading partners, it is in a more powerful position. The dependence of weak trading partners makes them more vulnerable and, therefore, more compliant and reciprocating. Weak trading partners are defined as those having few direct contacts. This measure most convincingly challenges the use of in-degree centrality. However, if power and prominence in trade circles is affected by one’s reputation with one’s direct trading partners, then being a powerful overlord rather than a dutiful trading partner who exchanges with many other strong countries would not have a positive effect on reputation, power, or prominence in the network in a global sense. Trading countries are attracted to prominent countries that have a reputation for fair trading practices. Moreover, the concept of in-degree centrality does not exclude dependent relationships—the type of relationship on which the Bonacich measure capitalizes. Traditional measures of trade are not relevant for this study because they do not consider overall or relative position in the trade network. Operationalizations of dyadic trade interdependence either (1) consider whether a given trade relationship is valuable relative to others; for example, by measuring the concentration of trade-share one country has with another compared to its concentration with other trading partners (Barbieri, 1995, 1996, 1998b; Gartzke and Li, 2003); or (2) they consider to what extent a given trade relationship is valuable relative to a state’s overall economic performance (Oneal & Russett, 1997, 1999 a, b; Gartzke & Li, 2003). Rather, states in central positions, attracting many trade partners, are prominent, powerful, and influential. In-degree centrality is the reflective network concept that increases with the number of inwardly directed trade ties (Krackhardt, 1990). Centrality, the extent to which a given individual is connected to others in a network, is the structural component most often associated with instrumental outcomes, including power (Brass, 1984), influence in decision making (Friedkin, 1993), and innovation (Ibarra, 1993, Sparrowe, Liden, & Kraimer, 2001; 316). Prominent trading countries have greater relative network power, which translates into power on the world stage. Less prominent trading countries desire the benefits of association with more powerful countries through trade links and will repay, or entice, the prominent states through other means, including compliant voting. In addition to earlier anecdotal evidence of



Research Hypotheses

Power and Influence

reciprocity, research has found that in UN General Assembly voting, Latin American countries will bandwagon on issues of interest to the United States because they receive American foreign aid (Voeten, 2000). Furthermore, a historically good reputation as a reciprocating trading partner is important in international relationships—reciprocation is a norm (Axelrod, 1997). If states have successful ongoing trading relationships, then their reputations as good trading partners are beneficial to them because other states are encouraged to trade with them; this is an effect of structural embeddedness (Uzzi, 1996). These third parties, who become new trading partners or who increase their trade volume, gain confidence through vicariously learning that they can trust their trade partners to reciprocate as anticipated. Conversely, it is damaging to a state’s reputation if trade relationships break down. The more basic rationale for trade leading to similar voting is related to the kind of relationship it entails. This relationship is one of mutual dependence transformed to interdependence through binding, negotiated agreements that are continuously activated through frequent trade activity. As earlier discussed, there are two forms of relations: those based on (1) mutual dependence and (2) interdependence; these correspond to two types of social structure, respectively: (1) exchange and networks and (2) groups (Molm, 1994). In the case of exchange and networks (which includes trade), the mutual dependence is riskier than the interdependence found in groups. Although trading relationships do not create “groups,” the negotiated binding agreements made through a joint decision process prior to any actual exchange taking place mitigates the risks of mutual dependence; binding agreements directly change the structure of the interactions, introducing interdependence. Also, trade tends to be ongoing and the simultaneity of the transactions reduces the risk of defection by one of the parties. However, while trade agreements set up this cooperation as far as the actual trade of goods and services goes, outside the agreement the trading parties are in different power positions. Consequently, although the agreement sets up a false equality between unequal powers, the weaker power is obliged to reciprocate for this benefit outside the trade relationship. Otherwise, the more powerful trading partner can change its trading terms, reduce trade, or not trade at all. Also, the less prominent partner’s reputation may be tarnished, as explained earlier. In the case of trade-dependence, dependent countries may reciprocate with their powerful benefactor country by voting in accordance with it in the UNGA. Reciprocity will occur when the relationship is consequential to the lesser trading partner. As a result, the level of reciprocity, reflected in similar voting, will vary depending on the two countries’ relative in-degree centrality; in a pair, there may be two who are powerful, two who are both weak,



162

163

two who hold some medium-level difference in prominence, and two who are vastly different in prominence. In the first two cases, where partners are both powerful or both weak, the relative in-degree centrality will be small, with increasing values in the third and fourth cases. First, two countries with high in-degree centrality both wish to trade with each other, but because they are relatively equal players, they are quite independent and do not need to reciprocate outside the trade relationship, whether it is to attract or keep the other partner. The earlier example of China and Russia cooperating with each other through the UNGA on the anti-missile initiative is an example of very prominent nations cooperating with each other; either country could walk away from, or selectively choose, what topics to work on with the other. Second, two countries with low in-degree centrality have little to gain from each other. Third, countries with comparable in-degree centralities, but with some differential, will be conspicuous to each other. The less-central country will vote in alignment with the more prominent one; in an earlier UNGA illustration, Turkey voted with Iran, for example; in terms of perceived prominence based on their general salience, they are similar and likely have advantages to offer each other in different realms. Even if one country is more central, they are relatively important to each other and could even become interdependent. The final case occurs when the difference in countries’ trade in-degree centrality is very large. The less-central country’s vote is still valuable to the other country, and the less-powerful country would like to gain the benefits associated with being tied to the more prominent country. The relationship between Israel and the United States illustrates this, where Israel is quite dependent on the United States. In summary, a country will vote with those who may offer needed benefits—reciprocal behavior occurs. Consequently, as the relative trade in-degree centrality of a dyad of countries in the UNGA trade network increases, the more likely they are to vote similarly. H1a: As country-dyad relative trade in-degree centrality increases, so does similar voting. Total trade in-degree centrality is another approach to testing the concept above with a small difference that acts as a check. When the two countries’ centrality values added together are small, then they are inconsequential to each other and will not vote together. When the two countries’ values added together are at the high end of the scale then they are independent of each other, both being powerful. However, in the middle of this range, countries will differ in their in-degree centrality and may be more interdependent or dependent such that they will vote similarly. An inverted U-shape relationship is expected. This measure does not clearly delineate the case where the countries are vastly different in in-degree centrality, but the relative in-degree centrality



Research Hypotheses

Power and Influence

measure does. However, total trade in-degree centrality is used as an additional measure because if a different effect, homophily rather than power, is operative, then a U-shape curve rather than an inverted U-shape curve will occur; two less-powerful or two powerful countries will vote together because they are similar. Consequently, if power rather than homophily is operative, it is expected that as the total trade in-degree centrality of a dyad of countries in the UNGA trade network increases, the more likely they are to vote similarly. However, this happens at a decreasing rate such that at higher levels of total in-degree centrality there will be a reversal and the two countries will be less likely to vote similarly. H1b: The relationship between country-dyad total trade in-degree centrality and similar voting will form an inverted U-shaped curve. Notice that these hypotheses are testing relative positional values, or potential relative power in the trade network, as discussed in the earlier chapter about international relations research; moreover, no intention to utilize power is assumed, also suggested by previous research as discussed. The countries do not have to be trade partners; they may be potential trade partners. Institutional Embeddedness The following is an introduction to institutional embeddedness and the three sections that introduce the related hypotheses. Institutional embeddedness occurs when states are tied through international institutions. With so many possible types of institutional ties, only a limited set of these is examined here with regard to their influence on voting: formal military alliances, diplomatic visits, and common IGO memberships. Homophylic influence and information-sharing tend to dominate over power-interdependence relationships as cooperative mechanisms in institutional settings, as will be explained in each case. Also, taking a slightly realist point of view that power is believed more effective than other mechanisms, it is posited that institutional embeddedness has a weaker effect on similar voting than does economic embeddedness. Anecdotally speaking, even Kofi Annan of the UN believes that some power must backup relationships of complex interdependence, and when the latter breaks down, the world reverts to a realist situation in which power is primary. Moreover, binding agreements and simultaneity are not present in institutional contexts to build interdependence or dependence. In the case of IGOs that are possibly interdependent groups, membership does not involve a dyadic exchange and states are not tightly bound by their membership agreements, as noted in the UN. The memberships are too loose and concern for constructive outcomes is not strong. For example, a trade partner



164

165

will notice, and may punish, the partner who defects. In contrast, it may go completely unnoticed that an IGO member has not abided by all the rules or norms of the IGO. Even if this is noticed, any consequences are unlikely (Axelrod, 1997; 7). Similarly, when countries visit each other no obligations may arise and while information may be shared there is no guarantee of agreement on the related issues. Finally, while alliances seem to carry some stronger obligations, attendant actions and behaviors are often disconnected from the initial agreements, so power-differentials have a lesser effect on voting patterns. Alliance Position in the Network—Power Differentials. Military alliances attempt to build cooperation through contracts, as does trade, except there is a disconnect between the formation of agreements and the related action: “[A] treaty is just a scrap of paper” (Russett & Oneal, 2001; 104); the action(s) may never occur because mutual dependence is not successfully transformed into interdependence (Molm, 1994). For this reason, in the case of this type of institutional embeddedness, the mechanism through which trade influences voting may not operate to the same extent. Similarly to trade, alliances in this study are formal, upfront binding agreements reached through joint decision-making processes. However, there is a simultaneity problem in that there is a second, rather distant, stage to this kind of cooperation (Molm, 1994; Heckathorn, 1985). Parties to these types of agreements can and will sometimes defect when it comes time to supporting an alliance partner. This sequential dependence is risky because the likelihood of reciprocity within the alliance is lower. Consequently, it is common to build trade and other contingent agreements into alliances to increase the likelihood of cooperation (Larson, 1998; Long & Leeds, 2006); this is complex interdependence. Building these sequentially dependent transactions into relationships of mutual dependence is another approach, along with binding agreements, for motivating cooperation. By building in the sequential contingencies, allowing for retaliation on one level when partners defect, the structure of the relationship is changed. However, due to the difference in timing and to power differences between nations involved in these kinds of agreements, this linkage-approach is limited. In general, institutional embeddedness often offers the chance to influence through information-pooling prior to group discussions. Influence prediscussion occurs among countries in similarly powerful positions in the alliance network because they are homophylic. Shared information disseminated prior to discussions is believed to be more influential than unshared private information (even though it could be valuable) brought out in meeting situations because actors will focus on the earlier and, therefore, morefamiliar information (Winquist & Larson, 1998). Given actors’ limited abilities to process incomplete information in complex situations (Axelrod,



Research Hypotheses

Power and Influence

1997), the most salient information will sway their decisions and, therefore, their votes (Ocasio, 1997; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Cyert & March, 1992). Security information, discussed among alliance partners, is highly relevant to the issues the UNGA discusses, making this type of influence pre-discussion potentially impactful on voting. However, it is the more powerful countries who will be more involved in this discussion since they have the capability to defend themselves and protect others (Russett & Oneal, 2001; 89); these actors are attractive alliance partners and will, therefore, have high degree-centrality in the alliance network. Also, powerful countries seek to maintain their power, and weak countries seek protection. The powerful tend to maintain their status by taking similar positions on various mutual issues that might affect them. Weak countries have little to offer powerful countries. For these reasons, high degree-centrality actors will tend to vote similarly. As similarly explained in the section about economic embeddedness, other network measures—eigenvector centrality, closeness-centrality, betweenesscentrality, or the Bonacich power index—are not preferred to degree-centrality for the alliance network measure. Eigenvector and closeness-centrality are measures that consider “the distance of an actor to all others in the network by focusing on the geodesic distance from each actor to all others” (Hanneman, 2001; 65). In other words, the contention is that an actor is more central if it is closer to more of the other actors in the network. Eigenvector-centrality is a more sophisticated measure of this than is closeness-centrality since it recognizes the difference between an actor having a few close ties and another having many slightly more distant ties, the latter actor being more central (Hanneman, 2001; 68). Although these measures are more global in nature than is degree-centrality, they do not relate well to the alliance network because alliances are direct-tie agreements, shakier than those of trade. Like trade, a reputation for prominence exists in the world community and this reputation is built on a state’s relationships with its direct ties only; however, within alliances the time that elapses between promises and unknown future actions creates weaker ties; consequently, a state’s distance along network paths to other states has no meaning in the world of alliances because the direct paths are already relatively weak. Betweeness-centrality does not offer any advantage over degreecentrality for measuring power or prominence in the alliance network either; although it could mean that a country is in a beneficial position in terms of having access to many countries’ security secrets and knowledge, a multiple-connections condition is already captured by degreecentrality. Finally, the Bonacich centrality measure suggests that if a country has more weak alliance partners, it is in a more powerful position. The dependence of the weak trading partners makes them more vulnerable and, therefore, more 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


166

167

compliant and reciprocating. Weak alliance partners are defined as those having few direct contacts. This measure most convincingly challenges the use of degree-centrality. However, if power and prominence in the alliance network is affected by reputation with one’s direct partners, then similarly to the trade situation, countries that offer protection without taking advantage of their position will have a better reputation than those that act reprehensibly. Also, even the most powerful countries gain more by allying with other powerful countries, rather than with weaklings, because of the military capabilities each can potentially contribute. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the concept of degree-centrality does not exclude dependent relationships—the type of relationships the Bonacich measure takes advantage of. H2a: As total alliance degree-centrality increases between two countries in a dyad, they will be more likely to vote similarly. In contrast, weak countries are peripheral because they lack military capabilities and tend to be dependent on the powerful (Russett & Oneal, 2001; 89); they will have lower degree-centrality in the alliance network. When two countries in a voting dyad are both low in alliance degree-centrality, their relative degree-centrality will be low, and they will not take notice of each other; they have no motivation to vote together. However, two powerful countries will also have low relative degree-centrality, but should vote together, as stated in hypothesis H2a. Consequently, at low levels of relative degree-centrality, the measure is not a good predictor of similar voting because of the commingling of pairs of small and large countries in the dyads. As the countries differ more in degree-centrality, it is more likely that a weak country will vote in alignment with a strong country, seeking its potential military support. For example, the United States protects others through NATO and expects cooperation on other issues in return (Larson, 1998; 121). So, the measure of relative degree-centrality at higher levels may be useful for teasing out this dependence relationship. H2b: At higher levels of relative alliance degree-centrality countries in a dyad will tend to vote similarly. Diplomatic Visits—Information-Exchange and Prominence. State visits are considered a type of institutional embeddedness—institutions are meeting with each other. When countries visit each other they send their representatives; the representatives are not making personal-level visits. States strengthen their ties with each other through these relationship-building interactions. These meetings are more directed for this purpose than are IGO forums because states are choosing to make direct efforts at building particular relationships with each other. Two distinct concepts result from these activities because visits are unidirectional, one actor visits the other. The first concept develops from the observation that one makes the 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


Research Hypotheses

Power and Influence

effort to visit another and it may choose to visit many others; informationsharing under these circumstances is quite specific and, therefore, influential because each is interested in the purpose of the visit. Secondly, prominence in the visits-network suggests that an actor receives several visitors and is influential because of its reputation as possessing desirable knowledge. Outdegree centrality is reflective of the former concept, and in-degree centrality is reflective of the latter concept. When two countries both have high out-degree centrality in the visitsnetwork, they are both reaching out to many others, converting their private information into public information prior to decision making. The shared information will influence voting in their favor. Also, they are more likely influencing each other directly or through the third parties they mutually encounter, who diffuse the information, reciprocally influencing each other toward shared world views. Moreover, those whom they visit may subsequently visit others, diffusing the information to third parties, further increasing the influence prediscussion. In contrast, a dyad pair, neither of whom visits many others, while homophylic in the social-structural sense, will not tend to vote similarly since there is little chance they can influence any other actors, including each other. Thus, information-sharing is more so the operative mechanism than is homophily. However, when both actors are actively making efforts to influence, they share a similarity that will lead to a cooperative outcome. H3a: As the total out-degree centrality of a country-dyad in the countrycountry visits-network increases, the more likely the dyadic countries are to vote similarly. Prominence is also related to information-sharing in the visits-network. A prominent actor receives more visitors because it is known to hold more information that is of importance. Such an actor also has more opportunities to disperse its views to its many visitors and those views may hold more weight because they are sought out. Another measure of centrality, in-degree centrality, measures this prominence and actors will vote with those others whom they notice as having this type of prominence because they are recognized as well-informed. At the high end of total in-degree centrality, both countries in a dyad are prominent and while they may not even visit each other, they are salient to each other and, therefore, will more heavily weight each other’s well-known opinions. H3b: As the total in-degree centrality of a country-dyad in the countrycountry visits-network increases, the more likely are the dyadic countries to vote similarly. As in the previous cases, network measures such as eigenvector centrality, closeness-centrality, betweeness-centrality, or the Bonacich power index are not preferred to in-degree or out-degree centrality for this theory. First,



168

169

none of these alternative centrality measures allow for the directionality that in/out-degree centrality offer. Eigenvector and closeness-centrality are measures that do not fit the main diplomatic visits situation that this study intends to capture—one of direct relationship-building through direct interaction, as mentioned earlier. However, either could be used to capture secondary effects of the information-spreading as a result of direct interactions. Therefore, one of them could replace out-degree centrality, except for the problem that neither is directional; H3a would not be distinguishable from H3b, which uses in-degree centrality. It might be interesting to use eigenvector-centrality in future research after the effects of in/out-degree centrality are explored and understood. For similar reasons, as explained earlier for trade and alliance networks, betweeness and Bonacich centralities do not offer advantages over the in/ out-degree centrality measures—all types of ties are captured by the in- and out-degree measures and they are all of consequence here. IGO Memberships—Influence. IGO memberships foster shared views and, thus, cooperation through a homophylic mechanism; states have similar interests, although they may disagree on issues within these forums. Furthermore, if two states are in many of the same IGOs, they are highly connected by common interests. Also, states that participate widely in IGOs can repeatedly share their views and thereby strategically turn private information into influential public information. Finally, group membership can potentially build a sense of solidarity, affinity, or cohesion that is transferable to other forums (Burt, 1987; Friedkin, 1993; Gartzke, 2000; Ingram et al., 2005: 830–831). Shared views are fostered among countries having common memberships for the following four reasons. First, IGOs offer forums for exchanging information. If there is substantial participation, then these forums are places where discussion reinforces these shared views that will ultimately be reflected in similar voting on related issues; group membership influences attitudes and behaviors (Rice, Grant, Schmitz, &Torobin, 1990). Common IGO membership is an indication of value-homophily (McPherson et al., 2001). Second, where participants are not very active, common memberships still signal to states that they share similar interests since they are at least symbolically supporting the same causes. Third, the fact that an IGO exists makes the issues it represents salient. The salience of the issues and views of the IGO contribute to the shared information that is so influential in decision making. Fourth, countries that take part in more IGOs have more opportunities to disseminate their views. Consequently, they are more influential because they have repeatedly disseminated information that furthers their interests. They have many times turned their private information into shared information



Research Hypotheses

Power and Influence

prior to the voting or even prior to some of the specific backroom-bargaining that pertains to current UNGA issues. This shared information will be influential in these informal discussions because the negotiators have it in the back of the minds, consciously or subconsciously, and will be discussed more, consequently having more influence on the voting (Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbott, 1998; Winquist & Larson, 1998). Another aspect of IGOs that builds cooperation among members is that they can possibly act like interdependent groups. This may happen if there are tight relationships among members and if they deeply care about, or have vested interests in, successful group outcomes. Without the participation of all members, it is difficult for the IGO to further its cause. Although some members will freeride while others will be very active, the IGO is more like a group than a setting for mutual exchange, under the aforementioned special circumstances (Molm, 1994). Members of groups may transfer their cooperative behavior to other forums, such as the UNGA, out of familiarity with those with whom they have cooperated on other causes; past cooperation may reinforce the building of a sense of solidarity (Gartzke, 2000; Ingram et al., 2005: 830–831). This is the only type of embeddedness in this study that potentially involves a group mechanism underlying cooperation. This group mechanism will be stronger or weaker depending on the cohesiveness of the IGO group: a tighter group will be more cooperative. One study draws a causal connection between membership in structured IGOs (those with stronger organizational capabilities) and higher trade levels which indicates greater cooperation (Ingram et al., 2005). These are all reasons why it is expected that more common IGO memberships, or higher connectedness, will have a positive influence on similar voting. The level of connectedness is like a tie-strength measure because the expectation is that more connections via memberships will build stronger relationships through increased interactions based on common interests (Ingram et al., 2005). Even though memberships in IGOs are not direct ties, conceptually, they are forums that join countries together. Ingram et al. (2005) found that higher IGO connectedness leads to trade, but this is a social/institutional phenomenon influencing an economic decision. What is posited here is one social/institutional phenomenon influencing another social behavior—cooperation in voting. This is important for developing the embeddedness theory, as will be explained later; essentially, the theory needs to stand on its own outside economic theory because it has been defined with respect to economic theory and, therefore, relied upon it too much for its development. Also, the IGOs are considered together and split into types using the same coding as Ingram et al. (2005) to test whether some types of issues unite the UNGA membership more than do others. This includes



170

Research Hypotheses

171

economic, social-cultural, and political-military categories, with the remainder falling into a general IGO category. H4: As the IGO connectedness between two countries in a dyad increases, they will more often tend to vote similarly.

Strengthening institutional embeddedness are other types of embeddedness that are collectively internalized in the minds of people within states: cultural and political embeddedness are nested in institutional embeddedness. Similarity on cultural and political dimensions, otherwise known more generally as value-homophily, strengthens the existing links between states; the states are therefore culturally and politically embedded. Although occasionally the two concepts of culture and political ideology are conflated, there is solid support for keeping the two concepts quite separate (Williams, 1996). Huntington (1996) has generalized culture at the state level, having made cultural assignments to the post–cold war states and suggested that this cultural embeddedness exists. Moreover, scholars such as Hofstede (1983) have recognized that culture resides at the country level and have developed cultural dimensions for states. Additionally, to identify political ideology at an international level, political scientists use a common scoring method and refer to the “regime type” of state. This state ranges from being strongly autocratic to strongly democratic. The poles of this post–cold war multi-polar world, not based on military power, are rooted in cliques of states having similar cultures (Huntington, 1996) and this is what is meant by the cultural embeddedness of states. States band together because of this type of value-homophily, similar national culture. National culture is a shared-meaning system wherein members of the same culture interpret and evaluate events in a similar way (Erez & Earley, 1993: 20). An alternative complementary definition is that national culture is “a system of values and norms that are shared among a group of people and that when taken together constitute a design for living” (Doney et al., 1998). Over the time period of this study, the polarization is no longer between the East and West, that is, communism versus democracy and free markets. Instead, the polarity is based on indigenization (Huntington, 1996). Some argue that the world is not multi-polar; but uni-multipolar (Voeten, 2000); however, this could be a transitional stage such that the world will become multipolar (Huntington, 1999). Huntington’s civilizations include: Western, Latin America, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. An important clarification is that this study is not concerned with the direct connection between culture and voting as a means to identify one of



Nested Embeddedness

Power and Influence

the dimensions on which the world might be divided, as is Voeten’s study (Voeten, 2000). Instead, I look at how culture moderates an institutional embeddedness mechanism that is expected to lead to cooperation. It is not a “Clash of Nations” this study is testing (Huntington, 1996; Russett & Oneal, 2001;Voeten, 2000, 2004). Instead, it is considering culture as a basis for homophily that strengthens common understanding and shared views that lead nations to vote similarly when they are already embedded institutionally. As mentioned earlier, states may share and express common interests by being members of IGOs, but within these organizations there may be widely varying opinions on the issues. More bases for similarity may be required to actually bring states to consensus within these forums. Like common culture, similar political ideology is a basis for valuehomophily. Kritzer (1978) defines a political ideology as “a system of beliefs centered upon a small number of central principles.” Within the West’s system of politics, ideology tends to be left-center-right. However, at an international level, this is too simplified, so political scientists use a scoring method devised by the Polity IV Project to identify a nation’s regime type, what I will refer to as the political ideology of the state. According to the Polity IV Project, a “polity” is a “political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; state; body politic.” Each polity or nation is assigned a democracy score and an autocracy score and the subtraction of these gives a rating from +10 to –.10 such that a high positive value is assigned to a democracy and a large negative score goes to an autocracy. In contrast to the multipolar view, which is more culturally based, the uni-multipolar view is one where the United States and its allies are challenged by rising powers such as China and India; these countries object to Western views (Voeten, 2000). This is more a result of a combination of economic development and political ideology than of culture, according to the study (Voeten, 2000). It is found that even when Western countries are excluded from the analysis, states that are wealthy and democratic tend to vote in the General Assembly in accordance with the United States (Voeten, 2000). Consequently, in this study, political embeddedness is also considered a moderator that will strengthen the effects on voting of institutional embeddedness. Shared views are reinforced and thus improved communication ultimately builds stronger ties (Axelrod, 1997; McPherson et al., 2001). Nested embeddedness is the descriptive concept for this phenomenon— cultural or political embeddedness will strengthen existing institutional embeddedness. Greater similarity among nations in cultural and political orientations builds these types of embeddedness which, as a consequence will lead to more interactions, strengthening institutional embeddedness.



172

173

The mutually reinforcing relationships will lead to strong ties—through strengthened, multiple IGO membership relationships, since political and cultural embeddedness are not tie based—that have a stronger influence on voting (Granovetter, 1973). Value-homophily is the mechanism underlying the effects of nested embeddedness (McPherson et al., 2001); one kind of nested embeddedness, either with the assistance of cultural or political embeddedness, will predominate depending on the balance of power that dictates how people identify with each other, as explained in earlier discussions regarding multipolarity, associated with culture, and uni-multipolarity, associated with politics and wealth. The balance of power makes some issues more salient than others. For example, during the cold war, the prevailing identification was with political ideology because the opposing philosophies were democracy versus communism. After the cold war, indigenization led people to focus on cultural homophily (Huntington, 1996). However, others may disagree that political homophily has become less prominent than cultural homophily, as discussed (Russett & Oneal, 2001; Voeten, 2000). Therefore, both types of embeddedness will be operative after the cold war, since political ideology is still salient. Similar world views encapsulated in political ideology or cultural similarity result in states’ engaging with each other more within the networks to which they mutually belong. This will be most evident within institutionally embedded groups. States that are members of the same IGOs have common interests, often beyond economic considerations; the cultural and political similarities will strengthen the bonds and, thus, the states will communicate more and will more often vote similarly. For example, an IGO may have many members and within these forums there will be cliques—these cliques may be formed because of commonly shared views on the issues with which the IGO is concerned, and culture and/or political ideology may guide the various positions on these issues. To demonstrate this influence, I will test the effects of interactions between different types of IGO connectedness, as mentioned earlier, and cultural and political embeddedness on voting. H5a) As the IGO connectedness between two countries in a dyad increases, they will tend to vote similarly; this relationship is strengthened by cultural embeddedness. H5b) As the IGO connectedness between two countries in a dyad increases, they will tend to vote similarly; this relationship is strengthened by political embeddedness.



Research Hypotheses




Data and Methods T   of this chapter describe the data, variables, and methods of this study. It uses a very large data set, both cross-sectionally, because of the number of countries in the UNGA, and longitudinally, over 11 years. Also, the data is drawn from many public sources, all used by scholars in previous academic studies. The dyadic variables, some of which are unique because of the network approach, are many. Variables are constructed for the hypotheses and many controls are used. The dependent variable and the variables of interest are continuous. This approach provides more information and avoids some problems encountered in other studies, previously discussed, that turn continuous variables in to dichotomous ones. The methods are sophisticated because of complications that arise in the data, as will be explained, and the Appendix, therefore, holds an important explanation of the additional methods utilized to add assurance to this work. Extensive work was done in this regard. Thus, the effort in this chapter and the Appendix, aside from being novel because a network-approach is used to discover effects normally unobservable, is also instructive to those encountering difficult situations with panel data. Data Sources The following is a list with explanations of the publicly available data sources that were drawn upon to construct the data set. It contains voting information from the UNGA from 1990–2000 as well as all the data needed to examine trade, alliance, diplomatic, and IGO networks along with cultural and political comparative information for each voting dyad of countries. United Nations General Assembly voting data. The United Nations General Assembly country roll call voting data comes from Erik Voeten’s Web site. He has extended the data set of 1946–2002; it builds on several



C h a p t e r 11

Power and Influence

other scholars’ data sets, as his site acknowledges. For each resolution each year, the votes for each country are recorded as 1 = yes, 2 = abstain, 3 = no, 8 = absent, and 9 = not a member. I reduced the list so as to use a post–cold war time period, 1990–2000. Furthermore, I removed countries that were not members in a given year and for each year kept only the countries that voted at least once in the year. Also, following a similar approach used by Voeten (2000), I eliminated votes with less than 2.5 percent of the voters on the “No” side because, essentially, everyone has agreed and there is little to be learned from this in terms of power and influence; this happens frequently because the UNGA attempts to build consensus. This disagreement rate is calculated as: (Number of “No” votes/[Number of total votes, including abstentions]). The purpose is to ensure enough variance in the data and the results find 18 percent of the votes abstentions, 67 percent “yes” votes and the remaining 15 percent “no” votes. Using this data is advantageous for testing theory because decisionmaking data in firms is hard, if not impossible, to collect in large amounts. Even in the case of recorded decisions by a board of directors, firms are unlikely to offer this information for public research. Consequently, the UN data offers a reliable and long-term source of decision-making data. Also, rather than studying performance outcomes, decisions are nearer consequences to the effects that the embeddedness view describes. Trade and GDP data. The Expanded Trade and GDP Data are created by Gleditsch (2001). Gleditsch (2001) has used International Monetary Fund (1997) trade data as a base and imputed missing data through various means, using additional sources to make it more complete. The trade data is in millions of current year United States dollars. Dyadic total trade and directional trade are available. “Directional” means that it is reported as imports, trade to a country from another country, rather than netted out as total trade between two countries. Imports are used for the network variables. GDP is “the most common indicator of a state’s resources or economic wealth” (Gleditsch, 2001). GDP per capita data also comes from the Expanded Trade and GDP Data by Gleditsch (2001). The expanded GDP data is based on the Penn World Tables (Summers & Heston, 1991). It is provided in both constant U.S. dollars (base 1985) and nominal figures in United States dollars at current international prices. Constant U.S. dollar data are used. Alliance data. Military alliance data comes from version 3.0 of the Correlates of War (COW) Formal Interstate Alliance Data Set, 1816–2000 created by Gibler and Sarkees (2004). The data set used records a single record per dyad year. Therefore, if two countries have many documented alliances, the alliance with the highest level of commitment is selected



176

177

(defense = 1; neutrality or non-aggression = 2; and entente = 3). I recoded the alliances such that they exist (1) or do not exist (0); the level of commitment is not used. Also, the dataset is adjusted so as to create a non-directed dyad data set. All alliances in the data set are supported by written ratified agreements. IGO data. The list of International Governmental Organizations that each COW system member belongs to from 1990–2000 comes from the COW web page. Version 2.1 created by Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke is used. An IGO is considered one when its membership includes at least three members from the COW-defined state system, it holds regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years, and has a permanent secretariat and headquarters. Thus, an IGO could be quite symbolic and not very active, as it is defined. The coding of the IGOs, generously provided by the authors of Ingram et al. (2005), is such that they are divided according to whether they are economic (EIGOs), social-cultural (SCIGOs), political-military (PMIGOs) or general IGOs (GIGOs). Some finer-grained coding was also done but, not used in this paper. Country-visits data. The country-visits data comes from Gary King’s web site at http://gking.harvard.edu/. His data set entitled, “10 Million International Dyadic Events” includes the event “Travel to Meet” and this data is extracted at the country level from 1990 to 2000 to identify all the diplomatic visits between countries in the UNGA each year. A meeting between diplomats is coded with some very brief information to indicate what it was about, but the information is too vague to be truly useful. Also, it comes from press reports that could not report accurately the true nature of the meetings since they are private. Political ideology data. The Polity IV data was downloaded from the site http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002). Polity-coding of national regime characteristics identify the authority patterns of the effective polity. A polity is defined as a “political or governmental organization; a society or institution with an organized government; state; body politic.” (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002). The dataset provides a score for all member countries of the international system, as defined by the Correlates of War project from 1800–2002, ranging from –10 to 110 where –10 is strongly autocratic and a 110 is strongly democratic. The scores do not apply to groups within states operating outside the main political arena within the state. Culture data. Culture is coded according to Huntington’s (1996) Map 1.3, “The World of Civilizations: Post-1990.” The world is divided according to nine cultures: Western, Latin America, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. This coding has been used in other studies (Voeten, 2000; Russett & Oneal, 2001).1



Data and Method s

178

Power and Influence

Dependent Variable The same dependent variable is used in all hypothesis-testing. It is a countrydyad measure of vote similarity on each UNGA resolution, 1 if they voted the same way and 0 if not, and a sum of these is taken over each year, which is then divided by the total number of times that they both voted in the year. It is summed to provide a measure of the tendency of two countries to vote cooperatively. Consequently, it is a continuous variable, the percentage of vote-similarity between country dyads over a year, named “Similar votes.” Similar votes 5 (Number of same votes by two countries over the year) 31 (Number of times both countries voted on the same resolutions in the year) Independent Variables The following is a list, with descriptions, of independent variables of interest. All were constructed using data earlier described and are network variables. They are the focus of hypotheses-testing in this study. Relative trade in-degree centrality. This variable is a relative powerposition measure in the international trade network and is explained here in detail. First, in-degree centrality is a power measure related to prominence or prestige (Hanneman, 2001), receptivity, or popularity (Wasserman & Faust, 2005). When many other actors send direct ties to another actor, it indicates their importance. The in-degree of a node is the number of nodes adjacent to it or the number of arcs terminating at it (Wasserman & Faust, 2005). Trade imports are directional and each country that imports into another is tie-directed toward that other country. Countries with higher trade in-degree centrality are perceived to offer easier access to large, attractive markets. It is not considered a measure of market-power, per se. Many reasons could explain a particular country’s prominence. For example, it may be more prominent, but not because it has a larger market. Rather, contributing to its popularity may be that it makes its market more open and accessible than others that have larger markets. Also, countries may be



Contiguity data. The Correlates of War project offers version 3.0 of direct contiguity among nations with coding depending on whether the boundaries are by land or water (Stinnett, D. M., Tir, J., Schafer, P., Diehl, P. F. & Gochman , C.). This data helps construct an important control since geographic proximity affects trade and the tendency to ally or be involved in military disputes (Ingram et al., 2005; Russett & Oneal, 2001).

179

in a familiar habit of trading with a prominent country so this phenomenon could be related to the focal country’s ability to maintain good trading relationships. In any case, what is of main interest is the general concept of potential positional power in the network because this is salient and understood by the network; a combination of many and different factors could go into explaining any country’s prominence. Relative in-degree centrality is a dyadic comparative measure. It is the absolute value of the difference between two countries’ normed in-degree centralities. The difference between the centralities becomes larger as the countries differ more in their prominence. A less prominent country may defer to a more prominent country by, for example, cooperatively voting so as to potentially gain access to the prominent country’s markets, if it isn’t already trading with it. Total trade in-degree centrality. This measure is similar in many ways to the previous measure because it uses the in-degree centrality of two countries in the trade network. However, it is the sum, rather than the difference, of the normed trade in-degree centralities of the two nations in the dyad. At low values of this measure, two countries are similar in that they both have low prominence, whereas at high values, two countries are similar because they are both prominent. Therefore, this measure can tease out whether it is relative power, homophily, or just similarity in low/high prominence that leads to similar voting. A U-shaped curve would suggest homophily operates because similarly prominent countries vote together whereas, an inverted U-shaped curve would suggest relative power, and so on, as explained in the chapter presenting the hypotheses. Total-alliance degree-centrality. This measure is based on degreecentrality, not in-degree centrality, the only difference being that it is not directional. Alliances are considered non-directional or reciprocal and an alliance tie between two countries is counted as one tie for both of them in their respective centrality calculations. Therefore, a country having more alliances has higher degree-centrality. The measure is the sum of the normed alliance degree-centralities of the two nations in the dyad. This measure tests concepts in the alliance network analogous to those of the total trade power measure, but with important differences, as discussed in the hypotheses, due to the different nature of alliance relationships compared to those of trade. Relative alliance degree-centrality. This measure is similar to the latter one except it is a subtraction of degree-centralities rather than a sum. Again, degree-centrality is a non-directional measure. The variable is the absolute value of the difference of the normed alliance degree-centralities of the countries in a dyad. This measure tests concepts in the alliance network analogous to those of the relative trade-power measure, but with important



Data and Method s

Power and Influence

differences, as discussed in the hypotheses, due to the different nature of alliance relationships compared to those of trade. Visits total out-degree centrality. Similar to earlier variables, this one is based on degree-centrality, but it is an out-degree measure meaning that the ties counted are those that are directional in an outward fashion from the focal country node to others. Out-degree centrality increases with the number of visits the country makes to other nations in the year. The variable is the total of the normed out-degree centralities of the countries in the dyad. Some countries may be successful at being influential by sharing their information widely through country visits, as discussed with the related hypothesis. Visits total in-degree centrality. This is a similar measure to the last one except that it is based on in-degree rather than out-degree centrality. In-degree centrality increases with the number of visits a focal country receives from other nations in the year; it is an inwardly directional measure. Some countries may be influential because of their prominence in terms of receiving many visitors. These visitors may arrive for a variety of reasons. For example, the visited country may be known to hold more valuable information and act as a respected opinion leader. In the face of uncertainty and ambiguity, other countries may choose to imitate by voting similarly. The variable is the total of the normed in-degree centralities of the countries in the dyad. IGO connectedness. This is a count measure duplicated from Ingram et al. (2005). Essentially, it is a count of the number of same IGO memberships that each country dyad pair shares, categorized by type of IGO. Symmetric country-country matrices report the number of common EIGO (Economic), SCIGO (Social-Cultural), PMIGO (Political-Military) and GIGO (General) memberships that country dyads have. A routine in UCInet converts the country-IGO membership affiliation matrices by taking the cross product with its transpose (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002). The COW IGO data originally coded differing levels of membership, including observer status. The codes were converted to be binomial and observer status was included as membership in this case since it indicates some level of participation, common interest, or receipt of information. Countries that share many of the same memberships may have more opportunities to communicate with each other and develop common views, leading to similar decisions. Control Variables A strength of this study is that it uses many controls based on previous research and theory. Two of the variables in this set, related to culture and political orientation, become variables of interest when they are interacted



180

181

with other variables for the purpose of testing nested embeddedness. On their own, they are required controls that also produce some interesting effects, as is later discussed. Control variables used in the models are listed and described. Trade intensity. Trade intensity measures the trade tie-strength between the country dyad, and there could be none. It is measured as the sum of total trade in millions of current year U.S. dollars between each pair of countries for the year. This variable is meant to control for the case that countries vote cooperatively because they are trade partners and/or are increasing their volume of trade with each other, rather than because of their positions in the trade network. Allies. Countries may have direct ties as allies; they have signed at least one alliance agreement and this creates a tie. It is an indicator variable that is 1 if the country dyad has an alliance agreement and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the case that countries in a dyad vote together because they are allies rather than because of their positions in the alliance network. Notice that this is not a tie-strength measure, for example, based on the type of alliance, because it would not be accurate. Whatever is in the alliance agreement, even if it is interpreted as more peaceful than another type, it is risky mutual interdependence, and there is no way of telling whether partners will come through for each other until the moment of truth comes. Similar polity score. The similarity of political ideology of two countries is measured with this score. Each country has a polity score from 110 to–10. The values for each of the two countries are subtracted and the absolute value is taken such that a smaller value means they are similar. However, so that the variable increases as the countries become more similar, the absolute value is subtracted from 1, that is, 1 – abs (score 1 – score 2). This creates a continuous variable that increases as the two countries are more similar in regime type or political ideology. Similar regime type is believed to be a predictor for similar voting (Voeten, 2000). This variable is also a main effect, utilized in interactions, in some models. Similar wealth. Countries having similar wealth may vote together based on homophily. More specifically, the North–South divisions of world systems theory may be captured by this such that wealthy industrialized nations may vote together, and poor developing nations may vote together. Previous analysis in an earlier chapter demonstrated that this group phenomenon may operate. Also, when both countries are wealthy, this corresponds with similar voting (Voeten, 2000). For each dyad, the countries’ per capita GDP (in constant 1985 U.S. dollars) are subtracted, the absolute value taken, and then subtracted from 1 so as to produce an increasing value as countries become more similar in wealth, that is, 1 – abs(GDP/capita1 – GDP/capita2). This value is larger for two countries in a dyad that are both wealthy or both poor.



Data and Method s

Power and Influence

Combined wealth. When two countries are both wealthy they may vote together as has been found (Voeten, 2000). Also, when one country is poor, it may vote with a wealthy country to gain its attention or reciprocate for having been helped. Countries of similar medium wealth may also be able to help each other, whereas, two poor countries may not even be able to help themselves. To create this variable for each dyad, the countries’ per capita GDPs are added. Therefore, if both countries are poor it will be low; it will be medium if both countries each have medium values of wealth or if one is rich and the other poor, and it will be high if both countries are wealthy. Contiguity. Proximity may be a motivation to vote similarly since countries close geographically may experience some similar conditions, face the same issues, or affect each other directly and, therefore, have similar or related concerns that produce some interdependence (Ingram et al., 2005). For some examples, water resources that flow across borders must be managed and shared, pollution crosses borders in water and the air, trade may be more convenient, land disputes may emerge, and the issue of migration can be contentious. The COW data codes countries based on various geographic characteristics that make them near to each other. For this study, these codes were converted to an indicator variable that is 1 if the COW data assigned a contiguity code of 1 or greater and 0 otherwise. Same culture—Huntington. Countries having similar cultures may hold common views on issues and, therefore, vote similarly. Each country’s culture was coded according to Huntington’s map Fig. 1.3 (Huntington, 1996). He assigns each country a culture: Western, Islamic, Sinic, Latin American, Orthodox, African, Japanese, and Buddhist. When it was not clear from the map which culture Huntington had assigned, the CIA World Fact Book provided the required statistics to assign the country a culture code. A comparison of the countries in each dyad resulted in the creation of an indicator variable, 1 if the countries have the same culture and 0 otherwise. This variable is also a main effect, utilized in interactions, in some models. This type of value homophily could be a moderator when countries also share high connectedness through many common memberships in IGOs, a test of nested embeddedness. Model Specification To explain the model choice, I will first outline the characteristics of the data because this helps to determine the model. The 11 years of data is an unbalanced panel data set because of the unevenness of the numbers of country dyads each year. The data consists of T 5 11 years of data with N 5 162 968 country dyads in total, where N is much larger than T, and there is a different N T number of country dyads for each year (N1990 5 11 781, N1991 5 13 366, N1992 5 14 861, N1993 5 15 357, N1994 5 14 530,



182

183

N1995 515 557, N1996 5 16 037, N1997 5 15 219, N1998 5 15 500, N1999 5 14 518, N2000 5 16 242) (see table 11.1). Also, this data has several issues to deal with, including heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-sectional correlation of the errors. Variance decomposition (not shown, for brevity) shows both longitudinal and crosssectional variation. To consider the time element in the data, a longitudinal model is chosen rather than pooling the data (an approach that would incorrectly assume all the events contained in the data happen at the same time); this is a necessary trade-off due to technical limitations. Other possible problems are addressed for completeness. Moreover, extensive additional analysis (see the Appendix) is conducted to investigate influential observations and the potential for an omitted third variable. The heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-sectional correlation result in a variance-covariance matrix of the errors that does not have constant variance along the diagonal and zero off-diagonal covariances, resulting in biased standard errors. Plots of the residuals and a BreuschPagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity confirm that this is a problem. Additionally, a Durbin Watson statistic test shows that there is serial correlation. Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are reduced by calculating robust (White) standard errors and using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) to transform the variance-covariance matrix. In particular, the Prais-Winston method is the FGLS approach used to address first-order autocorrelation. It iteratively calculates a new sample correlation coefficient estimate and transforms the variance-covariance matrix. First, it finds an FGLS estimator using an estimate of the correlation coefficient, computes a set of residuals, and obtains a revised value of the estimate for the correlation coefficient used to transform the matrix, and estimate with OLS (Wooldridge, 2006: 426). Although a differencing approach rather than fixed effects is often suggested in the case of serial correlation (Wooldridge, 2006: 491), it is not used in the main model because it would alter the research question to whether a change in the independent variables (IVs) of interest leads to a change in the dependent variable (DV) and this is not the question of this study. Another problem with differencing is that some variables with low variation are dropped. A Hausman test and a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects were done, both of which confirmed that a fixedeffects model would be preferred over a random-effects model, the problem being that the independent variables are not orthogonal to the unobserved variables in the error term. Although it would be nice to control for some unobservable effects, including those related to country-dyad and country effects that are not modeled, they cannot be modeled using dummies (as



Data and Method s

Basic Statistics

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1

2

3

4

1 Similar votes

162968

0.53

0.34

0.00

1.00

2 Relative trade in-degree centrality

160780

27.95

26.82

0.00

96.53

–0.42

3 Total trade in-degree centrality

160780

43.79

39.49

0.00

192.31

–0.32

4 Relative ally degree centrality

65865

4.40

3.52

0.00

19.50

–0.02 0.08 –0.06

5 Total ally degree 65865 centrality

12.73

5.65

0.00

39.62

0.04

0.07

0.28

0.10

6 Visits total outdegree centrality

162968

1.48

3.40

0.00

46.30

–0.14

0.21

0.21

0.15

7 Visits total in-degree centrality

162968

1.48

2.32

0.00

29.63

–0.04 0.09

0.05

0.10

8 IGO 162968 connectedness

26.17

14.57

0.00

132.00

0.11

0.07

0.32

–0.19

9 Economic IGO 162968 connectedness

8.73

5.34

0.00

42.00

0.08

0.09

0.32

–0.17

10 General IGO 162968 connectedness

5.52

4.06

0.00

45.00

0.03

0.10

0.32

–0.12

11 Political162968 military IGO connectedness

0.52

0.93

0.00

5.00

0.33

–0.19 –0.05 –0.16

12 Social-cultural 162968 IGO connectedness

11.40

6.12

0.00

47.00

0.12

0.04

0.28 –0.20

13 Trade intensity

109437

180.53

2560.65

0.00

0.01

0.15

0.04

14 Allies

162968

0.05

0.23

0.00

1.00

0.17

–0.08 0.12

–0.32

15 Contiguity

162968

0.03

0.16

0.00

1.00

0.10

–0.08 0.03

–0.18

16 Combined wealth

160780 14968.90 10620.65 705.54 77282.43 –0.31

0.37

0.48

–0.01

17 Similar wealth

160780 7809.28

7224.71

0.01

43708.18 –0.37 0.34

0.27

0.07

18 Similar polity score

113878

7.76

6.00

0.00

20.00

–0.19

0.17 –0.09 0.06

19 Same culture— 162619 Huntington

0.18

0.38

0.00

1.00

0.26

–0.15

229191.00 0.01

0.61


0.02 –0.33


Table 11.1

5

6

Continued 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18


Table 11.1

0.07

0.03

0.47

–0.05

0.16

0.15

–0.12

0.16

0.15

0.94

0.01

0.15

0.15

0.82

0.65

–0.08 –0.07 –0.10 0.38

0.38

0.16

0.00

0.88

0.69

0.15

0.15

0.96

0.32

0.05

0.19

0.15

0.11

0.12

0.09

0.04

0.09

0.33

0.05

0.03

0.29

0.25

0.20

0.28

0.29

0.10

0.03

0.02

0.04

0.20

0.19

0.13

0.20

0.19

0.11

0.26

0.15

0.28

0.18

0.17

0.16

0.25 –0.13

0.11

0.15

0.05

0.01

0.02

0.07 –0.16 –0.02 0.01 –0.06 –0.08 0.66

0.00

0.01

0.22

0.12

0.02

0.02

0.05 –0.19 –0.19 –0.12 –0.17 –0.17 –0.05 –0.18 –0.08 0.03 0.14

0.13

0.01

0.01

0.19

0.18

0.12

0.37

0.17

0.07

0.35

0.22 0.05 –0.10 –0.21


Power and Influence

fixed effects) because the number of variables becomes too large given the number of observations for each dyad in the data set.2 A particular type of serial correlation is related to the potential for a dyad of countries to vote similarly year after year. If this is the case, then the replication downward biases standard errors. This is specifically dealt with in the model by clustering on country dyads, relaxing the assumption of independence of the errors of the same country dyad over time when calculating the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. Moreover, two potential difficulties resulting in cross-sectional correlation arise because of the dyadic nature of the dependent variable. One concern is transitivity in the dependent variable; however, being an aggregated percentage alleviates this concern to some extent, as will be explained. If country A and B both vote “yes” and country A and C also vote the same way, then C and B must also have voted “yes.” This transitive nature of voting results in a kind of replication of observations and, therefore, crosssectional correlation in the error terms, leading to low standard errors and overly optimistic results in terms of significance levels. However, this dyadic DV is a percentage aggregated over the year for the same dyads on multiple votes. If this percentage is 90–100 percent very often, then the concern is still valid. However, the mean of similar voting is about 53 percent, thus, on average (see table 11.1), A and B vote the same way 53 percent of the time and A and C vote, on average, the same way at the same rate, but potentially on different votes, therefore, it is hard to predict whether B and C are voting the same way on those same votes. If one is still concerned, the model has a few aspects that may help to alleviate the problem including the use of robust standard errors and generalized least squares (GLS). The second cross-sectional issue is that the same country, appearing many times in all dyads, may have a consistent voting bias, voting in a particular way regularly. Thus once again, standard errors are downward biased because of the replication. This problem would occur over time as well. Differencing was used in a sensitivity analysis (not shown) to test for the extent of the problem serially and it was not found to be a substantial issue. This can be logically rationalized since, although the same country is voting, it will take different stands on different issues. While I believe it is unlikely that a country will often, or easily, change a stand on a particular issue once taken, the nature of the UNGA is to alter wording in draft documents and negotiate to find consensus so when a topic comes up again it may be framed in a changed manner enough so as to illicit a changed response. This also tested the earlier-mentioned cross-sectional problem since the consistent bias of country A values is removed in variables for both dyads ABt and ACt by subtracting ABt-1 values from ABt values and ACt-1 values from ACt values. Multi-collinearity presents a potential although not serious problem (see table 11.1). The IGO connectedness variables are correlated with each other. 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


186

187

Also, the relative trade and total trade in-degree centrality measures are correlated, and the two wealth measures (combined and similar wealth) are correlated with each other. Wealth measures and trade-centrality measures are somewhat correlated. The large sample size mitigates this potential problem (Wooldridge, 2006: 104). Misspecification is avoided by using appropriate controls from theory from Russett and Oneal (2001), Voeten (2000), and Ingram et al. (2005). In all cases, F tests provide evidence that the models presented are significant, and coefficients of determination are in the 80 percent range. Another potential issue is the bounded dependent variable. Percentage similar voting ranges from 0–100 percent; however, when such a “variable takes on many different values, a special econometric model is rarely necessary” (Wooldridge, 2006: 582). This dependent variable has a mean of 53 percent +/–34 percent and takes on a full range of values so special methods are probably not required in this case. In general, endogeneity is not an expected problem for network theoretic and practical reasons. The direction of causality is both theoretically and practically determined. It makes little sense that similar dyadic voting causes a player to have a position in a network. First, too many relationships are involved in a network centrality position such that voting would not change enough of them to alter a position. Moreover, the relative and total values that the variables calculate are even less likely to change or change significantly. Second, endogeneity is also not an issue because on a one-on-one level, it would not make sense for countries to constantly change their trade, alliance, and diplomatic relationships based on every vote that takes place; it would be extremely annoying to all those involved and would violate international norms such that a country’s government would hurt its own reputation and not be viewed as a reliable partner. As shown in analysis in the Appendix, not even major shocks often change long-term international relationships so, definitely, votes are not going to be substantially effective. Third, a vote is a simpler thing than a relational tie. A cooperative vote is more of a fleeting gesture, albeit it can have greater value than symbolism, so it can be given away relatively easily as in reciprocity. However, breaking off or building a relationship, whether in trade, alliances, or diplomacy is not so simple or fleeting. The two things, a vote and a relationship, are not equivalent such that one replaces another; so, while a country may vote similarly in gratefulness to its partner or for the benefit of future partnerships, it won’t build a relationship or shut one down over the direction of a vote. The press example of Turkey voting with Iran did suggest Iran’s gratefulness to Turkey for voting in favor of the view that Iran is not a human rights violator. It even suggested that Turkey’s helpfulness would lead to more interactions and relationship-building. However, in this unusual case, Iran is the subject of the vote, and it is a very consequential vote for it; moreover, 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


Data and Method s

Power and Influence

Turkey and Iran have had more of a relationship than one based on a particular vote and they historically have most often been friendly. Turkey’s vote is a symbol of friendliness and will motivate Iran to want to deal with it, but it will not be the sole reason for tie-building. Moreover, if Turkey’s vote was so weighty that it would change its network position, it would risk destroying other more important relationships with many Western partners by backing Iran on human rights; Turkey aspires to join the EU, and it was an associate member of the EU as early as 1963. Thus, this is more likely additional evidence that a vote does not change international network relationships such as those studied in this research. However, the story demonstrates how very valuable a UNGA vote can be, and that is the intention of presenting the illustration, so rarely reported as such. Finally, other previous research supports this view that voting does not affect network position. If it were true that votes changed network positions then this kind of decision, to alter a voting pattern in accordance with one other country so as to a change network relationship with it, would simultaneously change relationships with many others, potentially creating unknown havoc (Ingram et al., 2005). Moreover, memberships in IGOs don’t change because of voting; the countries are under control of their own membership statuses. No country member can choose to throw out another member because the latter member does not vote in another forum as the first country would like it to. This concludes the discussion of the issues with the data and model such that the model is presented. The general form of the model is as follows where i51, . . . , N are the country-dyads and t51, . . . , T are the years 1990–2000: yit = bo +a it yi ,t −1 + b1 xit + uit β 0 is a vector of constants yit is a vector of continuous dependent variables yi,t–1 is a vector of lagged dependent variables αit are parameters of the lagged dependent variable xit are 1 3 k1 vectors of covariates β1 is a k1 3 1 vector of parameters to be estimated uit is a vector of error terms In summary, the model is estimated using FGLS (Prais-Winston), which corrects for auto-correlation. It uses robust (White) standard errors and clusters on country-dyad. Moreover, it has a lagged dependent variable.



188

Results T     of the model-testing described in Chapter 11. The regression results are provided in tables 12.1 and 12.2. Table 11.1 contains basic statistics for the data. This was information required to help discern what modeling approach to use and FGLS was chosen. Tables 12.1 and 12.2 contain the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable that is the percentage of similar voting of dyads of countries in the UNGA, a measure of cooperation. The model also contained this variable as an independent variable, lagged because the previous year’s voting may affect voting similarly in the current year. The results will be discussed in the context of effects supporting economic and institutional embeddedness and further remarks are added following this. Economic Embeddedness Economic embeddedness is reflected in the results for the trade variables. Referring to table 12.1, Models 1a, 1b, and 1c progressively add variables: Model 1a is a trade model, Model 1b includes alliance variables, and Model 1c adds the diplomatic-visits variables. The coefficients in all Models 1a, 1b, and 1c on Relative Trade In-degree Centrality and Relative Trade In-degree Centrality Squared are positive and of similar magnitude, suggesting only a very slightly upward sloping curve, essentially a straight line, since the coefficient on the squared term is very small. This result is support for H1a and, consequently, an important concept is supported. As countries increasingly differ in their network-centrality positions in the trade network, representing their increasing potential power differential, they are more likely to vote together. Less powerful countries reciprocate with more powerful countries. In the case of Total Trade In-degree Centrality, consistent results arise, both in sign and magnitude in the three Models 1a, 1b, and 1c. However,



Chapter 12

Table 12.1

Main Model Table of Results

Lagged Similar votes Relative Trade In-degree Centrality/1000 Relative Trade In-degree Centrality Squared/1000 Total Trade In-degree Centrality/1000 Total Trade In-degree Centrality Squared /1000 Relative Alliance Degree Centrality/1000 Relative Alliance Degree Centrality Squared/1000 Total Alliance Degree Centrality/1000

Model 1a

Model 1b

Model 1c

0.825* (0.004) 4.717* (0.596) 0.030* (0.006) –11.866* (0.550) –0.074* (0.004)

0.826* (0.004) 6.193* (0.614) 0.041* (0.007) –13.560* (0.565) –0.086* (0.004) –31.932* (5.440) –2.856* (0.403) –147.568* (8.213) –4.976* (0.256)

0.002* (0.001) –0.026* (0.004) 0.009* (0.004) 0.001* (0.000) 0.003* (0.000) 0.966* (0.000) 0.045* (0.003) 0.119* (0.004) 22101 4415 0.8278

–0.002* (0.001) –0.016* (0.003) 0.012* (0.004) –0.001* (0.000) 0.003* (0.000) 1.273* (0.156) 0.043* (0.003) 0.117* (0.004) 22101 4415 0.8309

0.827* (0.004) 6.166* (0.604) 0.037* (0.006) –13.530* (0.561) –0.085* (0.004) –37.000* (5.210) –3.380* (0.400) –149.113* (7.968) –5.120* (0.258) –1.869* (0.374) 6.963* (0.591) –0.002* (0.001) –0.013* (0.003) 0.012* (0.004) –0.001* (0.000) 0.003* (0.000) 1.240* (0.156) 0.042* (0.003) 0.117* (0.004) 22101 4415 0.8317

Total Alliance Degree Centrality Squared/1000 Visits Total Out-degree/1000 Visits Total In-degree/1000 Trade Intensity/1000 Allies Contiguity Combined Wealth/1000 Similar Wealth/1000 Similar Polity Score/1000 Same Culture—Huntington Constant Observations No. of dyads R-Squared * p < 0.05, two-tailed test ** p < 0.05, one-tailed test Notes: standard errors in parentheses



Prais-Winston (FGLS) Estimation—with Robust Standard Errors—of Percentage Similar Votes By Country Dyads, 1990–2000

191

a downward-sloping curve is the result, suggesting that only the downward side of the inverted U shape that was predicted in H1b results. As pairs of countries become more central in the trade network, they are less likely to vote together. This is supportive of the idea that they do not need to reciprocate with each other—they are already powerful and have chosen to be independent. Whereas, less-powerful countries and countries that differ in power, or are of medium prominence in the trade network, do tend to reciprocate with each other. More interdependence is suggested among the lesser powers. Notice that, as expected, dyadic trade intensity as a measure of the strength of ties plays a much lesser role, although it is significant. It has a tiny effect (that wavers between being positive and negative in the models) compared to the positional measures; this is evidence that a social-political behavior such as voting is effected by prominence, a social popularity measure, rather than the strength of ties, a more economically oriented measure in this study because it is based on the volume of trade in monetary terms. Institutional Embeddedness Institutional embeddedness is captured by the alliance, diplomatic visits, and IGO variables. Table 12.1, Model 1b, introduces Relative and Total Alliance Degree Centrality with their respective squared terms. Model 1c introduces the Visits variables. All the alliance degree-centrality parameters are significant, negative, and of similar magnitudes from model to model. Therefore, both relative and total alliance degree-centrality are downwardsloping curves, falsifying H2a and H2b’s predictions of positive slopes. However, position in the alliance network does matter, since the alliance variables affect voting, just not in the predicted manner. The “relative” measure suggests that similarity in centrality results in cooperative voting and the “total” measure narrows this down to: similarity in low centrality in the network results in cooperative voting, that is, countries with fewer allies vote together. This latter result is only somewhat surprising since it is understood that military alliances are not reliable and, therefore, may not be a reason to reciprocate. Perhaps, countries not engaged in military alliances are also not expecting to need them and are more peaceful and, therefore, better at cooperating with each other. This result could be evidence that military power is not perceived to be as relevant post–cold war as it was previously. The realist view that military power is most important and dominant is not supported. The fact that less powerful countries in this network are banding together in voting may signify complex interdependence in the sense that issue-hierarchy is not clear and strength in power does not determine



Results

Power and Influence

outcomes. A deeper investigation is required to explain this result, and this is an opportunity for future research. The visits-centrality measures, added to Model 1c, are both significant and, together, suggest that prominence in the visits network encourages cooperative voting—the Visits Total In-degree variable has a positive coefficient, whereas the Out-degree variable has a significant negative coefficient. Two countries that are receiving many visits tend to vote similarly, whereas those countries working hard to influence by making visits are less likely to vote together. Perhaps, the prominent countries are influential because they are in receipt of more information and are known for this—they are known to be wise. In contrast, those making many visits are not as successful at being influential. See table 12.2 for analysis of the effects of IGO connectedness, including different types of IGO connectedness and nested embeddedness. Model 2a and 2b both show that IGO connectedness positively affects cooperative voting, so H4 is supported. However, when cultural or political embeddedness effects are interacted with IGO connectedness either no effect, as in the former case, or a negative effect occurs, as in the latter case. Similar political orientation seems to create discord among those who are highly connected through many IGOs and this needs further investigation that could be future research. Note that in all models the control variable Similar Polity Score has a positive direct effect on Percentage of Similar Voting and this supports the concept that political embeddedness leads to cooperation. The fact that the two together, political and institutional embeddedness, do not reinforce each other to create improved cooperation is strange. The negative effect may indicate decay in the relationships because they are too close. Model 3a breaks down the various types of IGOs such that connectedness in economic IGOs, political-military IGOs, general IGOs, and socialcultural IGOs positively affects the percentage of similar voting. Notice that political-military IGO connectedness has the largest effect. This corresponds with the type of topics with which the UNGA is most often concerned. It does not seem consistent with the earlier result that power in the militaryalliance network was not effective. However, it may be explained that the group dynamic in political-military IGOs works because there is more likely interdependence rather than riskier mutual dependence. Also, relative power is not operative because the threats of the old realist world are not modern realities; rather, the cooperation and networks of complex interdependence in a team effort are effective. When nesting of embeddedness is tested through the interaction variables in Model 3b, it is found that cultural nesting weakly and negatively affects similar voting when paired with social-cultural IGO connectedness. Also, political nesting negatively affects voting when paired with



192

Table 12.2

Main Model Table of Results

Prais-Winston (FGLS) Estimation—with Robust Standard Errors—of Similar Votes By Country Dyads, 1990–2000

IGO Connectedness/1000 Econ IGO Connectedness/1000 Gen IGO Connectedness/1000 Political-military IGO Connectedness/1000 Social-cultural IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Culture X IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Culture X Econ IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Culture X Gen IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Culture X Politicalmilitary IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Culture X Socialcultural IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Polity Score X IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Polity Score X Econ IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Polity Score X Gen IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Polity Score X Political-military IGO Connectedness/1000 Same Polity Score X Socialcultural IGO Connectedness/1000 Trade Intensity/1000 Allies Contiguity

Model 2b

0.836* (.004) 0.815* (0.289)

0.836* (.004) 1.058* (0.346)

Model 3a Model 3b 0.835* (.004)

0.832* (.004)

8.883* (2.165) 0.864* (0.333) 56.395* (14.631) 9.570* (2.015)

19.166* (2.915) .895** (0.468) 61.790* (19.960) 7.850* (2.539)

–0.487 (0.449) –1.604 (3.815) –0.666 (0.523) –16.300 (20.271) –6.011** (3.465) –0.052** (0.028) –1.550* (0.215) –0.064 (0.052) –1.114* (0.542) –0.000 (0.161) –0.003* (0.001) –0.031* (0.004) 0.006 (0.004)

–0.003* (0.001) –0.031* (0.004) 0.006 (0.004)

–0.003* (0.001) –0.031* (0.004) 0.005 (0.004)

0.003* (0.001) –0.031* (0.004) 0.006 (0.004) Continued



Lagged Similar Votes

Model 2a

194

Power and Influence Table 12.2

Continued

Prais-Winston (FGLS) Estimation—with Robust Standard Errors—of Similar Votes By Country Dyads, 1990–2000

Similar Wealth/1000 Similar Polity Score Same Culture—Huntington Constant Observations No. of dyads R-Squared

Model 2b

–0.001* (0.000) 0.003* (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 0.043* (0.003) 0.103* (0.004) 22101 4415 0.83

–0.001* (0.000) 0.003* (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 0.044* (0.003) 0.103* (0.004) 22101 4415 0.83

Model 3a Model 3b –0.000* (0.000) 0.003* (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 0.047* (0.003) 0.099* (0.004) 22101 4415 0.83

–0.001* (0.000) 0.003* (0.000) 0.001* (0.000) 0.052* (0.003) 0.100* (0.004) 22101 4415 0.83

* p < 0.05, two-tailed test ** p < 0.05, one-tailed test

economic and political-military IGO connectedness. Thus, H5a and H5b are not supported. If nested embeddedness has negative effects on cooperation then this offers a future research opportunity, since current theory does not explain it. A final comparison, discussed earlier, is to consider whether economic or institutional embeddedness effects have more impact on decision making. The estimates on measures utilizing centralities are comparable since normed centralities are used. From an absolute value perspective, the alliance estimates have larger magnitudes than trade and visits estimates. In Model 1c, Relative Trade In-degree Centrality has only a slightly larger effect than Visits Total In-degree. The effect size seems to depend on the form of embeddedness, rather than whether it is categorized as economic or institutional embeddedness—therefore, it is preferable not to draw conclusions for this evaluation, by generalizing to the classifications, economic versus institutional types of embeddedness. Finally, a note about the control variable trade intensity; it is significant but, with a tiny effect compared to the institutional-embeddedness variables. This provides further evidence that the economic dyadic strength-of-ties trade measure is not an important effect compared to more social-political oriented variables on voting, itself a highly socialpolitical behavior.



Combined Wealth/1000

Model 2a

Results

195

The results of this study find that two particular social-structural mechanisms are successfully tested for: (1) power imbalances and interdependence in organizational relationships and (2) influence through informationsharing between organizations that may be encouraged by homophily. The first mechanism corresponds to situations of organizations’ economic embeddedness and the second mechanism corresponds to institutional embeddedness. As expected, economic-embeddedness effects of trade networks are related to the power imbalances and institutional-embeddedness effects of diplomatic visits and IGO networks are related to information-sharing and homophily. The institutional-embeddedness effects, relating to military alliances, were not as well predicted, but they make sense in a world that is not functioning primarily on realist principles wherein military power dominates. This may be additional support for the international organization model (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Also, the position power is not as effective in alliances because of the uncertainty of the value of the relationships due to their unreliability. Homophily in these alliance networks, rather than power, may be the driving force. Moreover, when institutional embeddedness is examined using country visits, centrality is not, on its own, a sufficient predictor as is hypothesized; it makes a large difference whether an actor has high in-degree or outdegree centrality; prominence (in-degree centrality) in this type of network is important, whereas making an effort to visit does not influence voting positively (out-degree centrality). This type of prominence is related to being knowledgeable and, therefore, being perceived to have valuable information to share. Finally, IGO connectedness is influential; members of many of the same “clubs” will tend to vote cooperatively. However, having other characteristics in common in addition to the memberships does not tend to positively influence voting. Instead, this nested embeddedness can have a negative effect and only potentially in some situations does the nested embeddedness increase the likelihood of similar voting. This was found in the additional analysis after outliers, influential observations, were removed. Therefore, this needs more investigation and is possible future research. The power positions that states have in their external networks, especially those that are economic, make them influential through relationships of dependence and interdependence. As the gap in in-degree centrality in the trade network widens, states tend to vote together. The state with less trade-network prominence is likely reciprocating with the state that is more prominent; the lesser state desires the trading relationship. Additionally,



Discussion of Results

Power and Influence

states that are both prominent in the trading network do not reciprocate by voting similarly—likely, they are each quite independent, having many trading partners and markets sufficiently attractive that they do not have to offer additional incentives. Instead, states that are less central in the trade network are cooperative voters. Unexpectedly, it is the less-central actors in alliance networks who vote together. Their cooperative behavior may be a result of their similar vulnerability and need to make “friends.” In contrast, countries highly central in this type of network are not motivated to reciprocate by voting similarly since they are relatively secure—multiple alliances provide them with a security network such that if one partner does not come through when required, other alternative allies may be called upon. Also, their centrality may reflect military strength—others seek them out as allies because they can provide protection. Consequently, they have no need to defer to others through cooperative voting. Moreover, alliances are posited as relationships of mutual dependence, and this has some risk in it in that performance on the agreement is not assured. International relations literature agrees, as discussed in the hypotheses section. Therefore, reciprocity based on an agreement may not make sense, and could later occur if there is performance. In general, the management literature on interorganizational alliances says that alliances tend to fail for a multitude of reasons, including rivalry, complexity, and lack of trust (Gulati, 1995b; Gulati, 1998; Park & Ungson, 2001). These past findings may explain the negative effects of the alliance variables on the cooperative-dependent variable in this study. Additional support for this view is provided by the dyadic control “allies” that is negative and significant in all models. The outcome of the tests for centrality in the visits network suggests prominence influences voting. The motivation to vote similarly with prominent others could be based both on power and informational influence, but the latter is more likely. A country receiving many visitors may be able to bestow benefits on those visiting; thus they are powerful in some manner aside from the information they possess. However, controls for wealth were incorporated along with the other relative power measures in trade and alliance networks. More likely, they are influential because of the information they are known to possess—receiving more information from many others, and potentially being the state that others go to for advice. These governments are viewed as wise, so in the face of uncertainty and a highly complex environment, others are encouraged to imitate their decisions. Moreover, multiple IGO connections lead to cooperation. Homophily in terms of interests is a mechanism for cohesion and information-sharing. Furthermore, it may be conceptualized that many connections between countries through IGOs additively build stronger ties; countries interact



196

197

more in more forums. Thus, it is support for the theory that strong ties are useful for influencing strategic decision making. All the different types of IGO-connectedness have this positive effect: economic, political-military, social-cultural, and general IGO connectedness promote cooperative voting. An additional interesting outcome of this study is related to a control variable—dyadic trade intensity, a monetary measure of trade-tie strength. Its effect provides a contrast to the effects of the social-network measures for two reasons. First, it is a strong tie-effect comparison with positional measures of prominence in the trade network. Through this comparison, it is found that position, a wider network concept, dominates over a dyadic relationship as an effect on voting in this economic network. Second, the trade intensity covariate is purely economic, being a monetary measure, whereas other variables are not. For example, the trade variables of interest are positional, based on relative network centrality; also, IGO connectedness, while also like a strength of ties measure, is not based on monetary transactions. Consequently, one may surmise that social-political influences, whether positional or dyadic, have greater effects on other social behaviors, such as voting, than do purely economic influences. When nested embeddedness is examined, it is only on removal of influential observations (based on analysis in the Appendix) that it becomes a positive factor affecting cooperation; otherwise, it either has no effect or has a negative effect. Consequently, more investigation is suggested since the results of this study are equivocal. Nesting may be disruptive to relationships within IGOs, regardless of whether it is political or cultural embeddedness that is nested within the institutional embeddedness of IGO connectedness. Perhaps this is evidence of a dark side of embeddedness called “over embeddedness” (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Uzzi, 1997)? Over embeddedness has not been characterized as uncooperative behavior in previous literature. Rather, it identifies problems when actors are limited to cooperation with only one other or a few, they do not promote diversity through new members, and are even too cooperative such that they do not invite healthy debate and conflict. After additional research is conducted to understand nested embeddedness, other new terminology may be more appropriately applied to situations when conflict arises. If conflict arises, then this could support a realist view that interactions can lead to conflict. Understanding these negative dynamics needs more in-depth theoretical and empirical exploration. However, the results of all models suggest that cultural and political types of embeddedness have direct positive influences on cooperative voting— nesting is not necessary for this type of homophily to be influential.



Results




Implications



Part V




Contributions to Political Science and International Relations For Political Scientists and Policy Makers From a multidisciplinary approach, this research examines and tests the liberal view that strategic cooperation is the outcome of greater interdependence and international interactions. Cooperation spills over from international networks into international decision-making forums, such as the United Nations. The study demonstrates this by applying a novel network approach. Moreover, analysis and anecdotal evidence suggests that the world enjoys some benefits from the current structure of international relations, in which there is one superpower, multipolarity, and a chief world organization to help coordinate and balance power. Additionally, this work examines bargaining and power relations to see whether issue structuralism, a realistlinkage strategy, or the international organization model of Keohane and Nye (2001) predominates. The international organization model is related to the concept of network governance, rather than hierarchical governance based on coercive military power. Also, many of the contributions made here to political science are in refining some core concepts such as dependence, interdependence, mutual dependence, sensitivity versus vulnerability, conflict, power, and influence. The empirical conception of power, here, is very different from any others in international relations and, yet, better reflects it in a generalized way. For policy makers, this work sheds light on how the world is evolving post–cold war and therefore suggests how policy may be shaped for a modern globalizing world that has moved away from a strictly power-oriented



Chapter 13

Power and Influence

realist model. Moreover, the application of concepts from management and related theory-building are not of exclusive interest to that area because international relations and strategic management have developed along many parallel lines, but sometimes, in different ways such that they can contribute to each others’ bodies of knowledge. Interests in alliances, decision making, bargaining, and negotiations are common to both fields. Interdependence and Strategic Cooperation. This study tests whether or not dependence and interdependence lead to a cooperative outcome; it separates cooperation from conflict and finds that relationships of power and influence—in a context of complex interdependence, as defined by Keohane and Nye (2001)—do lead to cooperative decision making in the UN. It sheds light on how networks influence governments’ or, more generally, organizations’ decisions. While economics is a suspected influence, this study provides evidence of it—literally, the tradeoffs are part of the game; relationships of dependence and interdependence set up reciprocated action. Moreover, states’ use of diplomacy is not ineffectual; even controlling for wealth and political ideology, country visits and memberships in IGOs are influential—information-sharing is impactful. This empirical work is supported by much anecdotal and procedural evidence of cooperative outcomes, not conflictual ones. Academics agree that these constructs, conflict and cooperation, are not on the same continuum such that they could occur at the same time. However, the argument brought forth is that there still remains a problem in the concept of conflict, even when separated from cooperation. Conflict has been poorly defined in previous studies since there is a vast difference between destructive and constructive types to the point that one is to be avoided and the other is an expected desirable outcome. In other studies they are purposely commingled without this awareness. Not only is this illogically mixing different ideas, but also it does not allow us to identify how to address the main concern of violent, destructive conflict that most of us would like to avoid. Furthermore, without non-violent expression of disagreement, which is what many studies have included as conflict, problems would not be solved and, in fact, we would wonder if something was wrong such that disagreement is being suppressed. Concepts from embeddedness help here because “over embeddedness” describes a negative outcome when there is too much cooperation, resulting in disagreement and civilized conflict being censored; the network ossifies and, as illustrated in the world of French business, it becomes corrupt. That illustrative situation is not likely confined to the French business and political environment, since the recent international financial crisis that had its epicenter in the United States was probably associated with problems of crony-capitalism both in the United States and worldwide.



202

203

The cooperation that this research uncovers is in international strategic decision making by governments that engage in secretive and opaque processes; power and influence in networks change world events even though most of the developed world and the UN advocate transparent democracy. This work empirically demonstrates, as has not before been done, the likelihood of the operation of backroom mechanisms and international norms that are also illustrated in this text and are frequently recognized in the press. Also, it infers the necessity of behind-the-scenes dealings as part of informal interorganizational behavior that enables good relationships. In the context of business firms, alliances involve negotiations that could be construed as backroom deals, short of bribery; it is in the public sphere that we expect transparency. These interactions maintain an environment of complex interdependence balanced with realist power. It is beneficial that informal communications and bargaining are permitted so as to build understanding and informal friendly networks that help avoid a reversion to a power-oriented realist world of misunderstanding that can lead to violent conflict. The Structure of International Relations. The networked world of complex interdependence reinforced by this study lends support to the international organization model of Keohane and Nye (2001). Whereas a kind of issue-structuralism works such that there is issue-linkage—for example, trade networks motivate reciprocity—it is not in the realist context, where there is a hierarchy of issues in which military power dominates, and solutions follow from that power. International affairs are not as clearly delineated post–cold war, and the structure of international relations is not rigid; rather, it is fluid inasmuch as the powerful and weak are not so easily predefined, since the dynamics of bargaining and international norms can lead to surprising outcomes. Social structure, macroculture, reputation, and trust in networks relate directly to complex interdependence and, ultimately, to the uncertainty and ambiguity associated with globalization. This study supports the contention that, on military and economic bases, there is one superpower: the United States. However, the world is multipolar based on cultural and regional differences such that the United Nations is an appropriate forum as a collectivist balancing power to the individualist and sometimes unilaterally acting superpower. In many regions, there is burgeoning or established cooperation among states, along with at least one prominent country from the region that stands out on the world stage. Overall, the patterns of voting and cooperation over this time period do not suggest that the world is uni-multipolar since no group of nations seems to particularly regularly support American initiatives regarding similar political ideology and wealth. However, this study does find that both cultural (more often) and political embeddedness are influential on cooperative decision making in the UN.



Political Scientists & Policy Makers

Power and Influence

This understanding of the structure of relations and how the world is evolving is of supreme importance to policy makers. High-level understanding guides policy in such a way that military issues no longer hold the highest priority; this is so because many other factors in other realms affect security. For example, solving international sustainability problems with the aim of helping billions of people to have healthy lives, including sufficient clean air and water, coupled with hope for an improved standard of living, is understood to underpin security more so than any buildup of military might that only increases fear and instability through the threat suggested by its very existence. Migration, financial crises, natural disasters, and climate change—as some examples—have global consequences that threaten all of us in various complex ways. These and other issues become policy priorities over defense and military build-up. Policy makers and diplomats also must adjust to the greater complexity that this multipolar and interdependent world produces. It changes how they negotiate; they must be very sophisticated—knowledge is influential and enhances effectiveness in negotiations, as suggested empirically and in one of the excerpts about UN negotiations. Empirically, opinion leaders are found to be influential. Also, the excerpt describing dealings between wealthy and developing nations alluded to an advantage that wealthy nations have because they have greater resources invested in understanding diplomatic positions; thus, more than does the use of coercive power, wealth supports the ability to gather information in order to be influential. Moreover, the wealth invested in knowledge does not guarantee successful bargaining outcomes. Increased uncertainty exists under these circumstances in which power does not ensure a victory. Suggestions for negotiation strategy are applicable in this setting and in the business world, so they are included in the next chapter. Refining Core Concepts. In reviewing previous literature in international relations for this study, I came across important concepts that could be applied and refined. I have addressed problems, such as the empirical definition of conflict, already mentioned. Some additional concepts have been distilled, including dependence, interdependence, mutual dependence, and independence; also, I have continued the discussion of sensitivity versus vulnerability and started a new one about power compared to influence. Moreover, a novel measurement of power has been introduced that satisfies many of international relations scholars’ requirements. In discussing the various concepts related to dependence, I made several conceptual suggestions. Although I agree that vulnerability is preferred over sensitivity in defining dependence, in these modern days the former is more easily converted to the latter. Therefore, a modern definition may consider Keohane & Nye’s (2001) discussion such that these variations on dependence



204

205

lie on a continuum and are not such discrete choices. Also, I clarified dependence and independence versus interdependence and provided a new definition of interdependence. Dependence describes a situation where one actor requires the assistance of another and the latter is, therefore, in a position of power over the other; this is not a situation of choice for the dependent actor. In contrast, independence is a situation of full choice and both dependence and independence sit at opposite ends of a continuum. Interdependence is not on this continuum; rather, it stems from a mutual choice made by at least two parties that at first are both relatively independent; they may give up some autonomy in becoming interdependent. An actor does not have the option to be interdependent if that actor is already dependent. Furthermore, some discussions do not differentiate interdependence from mutual dependence as I do in this work. Concepts from management in the area of business alliances were intertwined in this exploration because this stream of research sheds light on these complex relationships of interdependence. Of vital importance is the differentiation between the concepts of power and influence, which is not always clarified in international relations literature; the two words are used interchangeably and, sometimes, it is difficult not to do so. Whereas the ability to influence may be developed into a kind of power, it is not the same as the power of leverage over another in such a way that the pressure can force the other to do something it may not otherwise choose to do. Influence is primarily the ability to persuade and this is a skill often needed because an actor does not have real power. Moreover, influence does not suggest that the influenced actor does something it would not otherwise choose to do; instead, the actor has been persuaded, without being threatened, of a choice that is in its best interests. In the context of this work, relative power positions in economic networks, measured by relative in-degree centrality, suggest leverage; weaker members are obliged to reciprocate. This applies to economic embeddedness—in the trade network, specifically. However, in other networks, where linkages are not as tight and/or are social-political links, reciprocity does not make sense, as is the case in military alliance networks; or reciprocity is not operable, as in the diplomatic and IGO networks. In the latter networks, information-sharing is influential; thus, in cases of institutional embeddedness, influence through information is effective, but is not power. Consequently, in reflection of the importance of studying and recognizing the different mechanisms of economic and institutional embeddedness (also somewhat parallel to realist issue structuralism or issue-linkage versus the international organization model of Keohane and Nye [2001]), this book is titled Power and Influence.



Political Scientists & Policy Makers




Contributions to Strategic Management and Organizational Theory For Strategic Management Scholars and Managers In general, this study contributes to strategic management and organizational theory by finding support for the embeddedness view in a generalized way. It can stand alone as a very useful explanatory theory. The results of the analysis find empirically that social structure, embedded in external networks, has effects on cooperative, strategic decision making, a tighter causal linkage compared to other studies that, instead, seek effects on performance outcomes. The findings are in both economic and institutional contexts, so the theory is not confined to definition with respect to economics. Also, it uses a novel network method in its investigation. Moreover, it demonstrates the value of a multidisciplinary approach across fields; management research has closely analogous concepts to those in international relations and the two academic areas have been working on many of the same problems in different contexts; conceptually, the contexts do not make a difference to the theories except that the international realm is more generalizable. Whatever the type of organization, a domestic firm or multinational, the principles of embeddedness—and the more specific principles here regarding bargaining—apply. In fact, many business people agree that the abilities to negotiate and understand power relations in networks and organizations comprise one of the most important set of skills a manager can have.



Chap ter 14

Power and Influence

The more international is the context, the greater is the likelihood that the stakes are higher, and the more complicated it is to grasp the power relations because the scale is so vast and the landscape is so varied. Therefore, lessons learned from an international context are most valuable and can be applied to simpler situations; the reverse is not possible in that simplistic and specific situations are not instructive for the more complicated ones. Embeddedness is a Theory. In this research, many of the embeddedness view’s concepts are supported in a tighter causal link, empirically lending credence to this fledgling theory. It explores embeddedness at a level above the individual, arguably at the interorganizational level, and shows that it does operate at this level. Also, it studies the nesting of embeddedness and shows that possibly it works in both positive and negative ways; this type of investigation is so rare that there is not much literature available against which to compare the research found here. Homophily is influential, but the evidence suggests that too much similarity and, as a possible consequence too much cohesiveness, may cause ruptures in relationships and blocks to cooperation. These findings can motivate interesting future research: Why would having so much in common sometimes lead to uncooperative behavior? This management-theory investigation could help answer the realist question of whether too much interaction leads to conflict, rather than to cooperation, as proposed by liberals and generally supported in this work. This research also resolves a conundrum described by Krippner and Alvarez (2007); addressing this conceptual problem strengthens the theory. In Krippner and Alvarez’s (2007) review, they address a tension between various scholars’ views of embeddedness, such as those of Granovetter (1985) and Polanyi (1944 [2001]). However, I believe that I have reconciled this tension since I demonstrated, through his own words, that Granovetter’s (1985) view is not “external” and, rather, that he intertwines sociological behavior with economic systems. Also, I suggested that the division between economics and sociology is socially constructed such that sociology does not have to continue the debate about how to define itself vis-à-vis economics; I will add to this now by explaining how this research demonstrates that embeddedness has a positive research program. If one were desirous of demonstrating embeddedness-effects in a realm not including economic systems, to show that embeddedness has a positive research program without defining itself solely in opposition to various economic assumptions (Granovetter, 1985; Krippner & Alvarez, 2007), the section about institutional embeddedness provides supportive research. The results show that both relative position in the diplomatic-visits networks and connectedness in IGO networks influence decision making in the UNGA. These are sociological networks, not based on economic ties that affect other non-economic behavior—voting in the UNGA. So, embeddedness has effects without consideration of economic systems. 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


208

209

Moreover, by reviewing the results of the economic embeddedness section— how trade networks affect voting—one finds that it is position in the trade network (relative centrality), not the value of the transactions (since this is controlled for) that influences similar decision making. Consequently, this is support for both the Granovetterian and Polanyian views that I reconciled in earlier discourse. Granovetter (1985) wants to make the point that social structure is important in economic systems and this is exactly what is shown in this study. Moreover, in regard to Krippner and Alvarez’s (2007) concern about Polanyi’s concept of “disembeddedness,” the results of my study show that through the reciprocal behavior, the economic realm of trade networks is tied to the sociopolitical realm of UNGA voting. Thus, economic systems are not disembedded or disentangled from the rest of the world (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007; Callon, 1998). Instead, as seen from Polanyi’s interior perspective, economic systems are part of the sociological world (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007). Novel Network Methodology. Additionally, this study makes contributions through its application of novel network approaches that uncover interesting bargaining relationships, usually not observable. I find evidence of relative, potential, network positional power and influence in a variety of types of networked relationships that lead to reciprocity, possibly interpreted as backroom-bargaining and vote-buying and may also represent compliance based on behavioral norms. This study has used network concepts of increasing interest, such as centrality, but in a dyadic and relative sense. Just as in relational ties, actors in positions in networks, although not necessarily tied to each other, may affect each other. Their power or influence is relative to others and should not be discussed as an absolute; international relations theory makes this point—that power should be potential and relative; thus, it contributes in this way to management theory. Moreover, international relations recognizes that we live in an inter-connected world so both the embeddedness view together with the network methodology can uncover relationships in ways that other theory and methods cannot. Empirical Challenges and Generalizability. Moreover, some complicated empirical challenges arise, and this study is an example of how to approach them. First, the context is an opportune setting for discovering embeddedness-effects among organizations because of the public availability of unbiased information on large networks that are not confined to a single culture or to a geographical area. Embeddedness studies in international settings may be more generalizable for this reason. Most studies attempt to use the context of the firm to test embeddedness, but this has enormous limitations due to problems of data and information availability. Moreover, researchers that use data on firms often do not share it publicly, for various reasons, so results are not replicable by other researchers as they are when public data are used. The use of public data lends credibility to the results presented here and, thus, to the support found for the embeddedness view. Additionally, the 10.1057/9780230115545 - Power and Influence, Deborah E. de Lange


Str ategic Management S chol ar s

Power and Influence

cultural and political characteristics of states allows for a rare study of nested embeddedness and value-homophily at the interorganizational level.1 The methodological contribution occurs on many fronts; while the data set represents an excellent context for testing the research questions, it also presents many technical challenges. These challenges require modeling trade-offs and a subsequent, extensive in-depth additional analysis to ensure that the patterns found using the main model are not spurious. Consequently, this study presents an instructive example of how to approach empirically very complicated circumstances rarely attempted by researchers. I will not reiterate how all the challenges are addressed; rather, I will highlight some examples as illustrations. In this study, an example of a modeling trade-off is that a longitudinal model is chosen to recognize the timing of events, even though crosssectional variation seems to dominate longitudinal variation. The decision to use a lagged dependent variable imposed the necessity of a longitudinal model—it is a valid choice, since results show that previous voting choices affect future voting choices. Repetitive behavior by organizations, resulting in routines, has ample previous empirical support (Amburgey, Kelley, & Barnett, 1993; Amburgey & Minor, 1992; Gulati, 1995b). Additional analysis extensively examines cross-sections to compensate for this choice. Another challenge is the possibility of omitted variables. Omitted third variables in the residual that are correlated with independent variables are a concern because this could result in biased estimates (Wooldridge, 95–99; 2006). The use of theory to choose variables and an in-depth search for patterns in cross-sections address this possibility. Moreover, removing influential observations from the large sample did not uncover different results that would suggest omitted variables and misspecification. Overall, the model results are sound and while there is some sensitivity in the IGO-connectedness and nested embedded results, it does not nullify the reported results, both for and against the hypotheses; in some ways, the additional analysis is more supportive of those hypotheses that did not find support in the main model. In sum, the methodological approaches used in this work represent a good example of how to deal with a combination of difficult challenges by using a very large unbalanced panel data set. A Multidisciplinary Approach. The multidisciplinary approach of this research has proven to be extremely beneficial for theory development and testing. From an academic perspective, this study conjoins two theoretical areas, the embeddedness view, stemming from strategy and organizations theory, and international relations. By applying network approaches to an area that is just newly discovering the opportunities for its application, international relations, it provides very generalizable empirical support for the embeddedness view. The study of a developing view from organizational



210

211

theory—embeddedness—in an international relations context is novel, but the approach is gaining the attention of scholars who are interested in working in an interdisciplinary fashion (Hafner-Burton and& Montgomery, 2006; Ingram et al., 2005). Moreover, the international realm allows for a tighter causal relationship to be tested; theory testing is improved. It has been demonstrated that embeddedness does have an impact on decision making, the first step toward actions and outcomes. It is very rare that such a close link can be studied because decisions are not usually publicly reported; in business, only performance measures, such as profit, are made available for firm studies. Once again, the international relations context is beneficial for theory testing because the international arena offers large public data sets over long periods of time. Finally, this study addresses many concepts in the management literature that are closely analogous to those in international relations; this exchange is fruitful for both fields’ theoretical development. For example, inter-firm alliances explore relationships that, in the international relations literature, have issues similar to relations of interdependence and dependence. Also, embeddedness and complex interdependence, together with the international organization model that Keohane and Nye (2001) talk about, contain many similar concepts, including networks and relationships not based on hierarchical power. In some ways, realist views are related to those that come from transaction cost economics; for example, TCE makes a general assumption of opportunism, meaning that one actor will take advantage of another in smallnumbers bargaining, as in the case of a sole supplier. A realist may assume, likewise, that power dominates, as in issue-linkage, such that powerful actors get their way. The embeddedness view does not make these assumptions and neither does a liberal view nor a view of complex interdependence. The international evidence in this study suggests that we should prefer the latter set of ideas because they explain an existing, wider range of phenomena; this leads to a corresponding theory choice. Moreover, another management theory, resource dependence, for the sake of brevity not talked about extensively here, has power as a core tenet; thus, it may be able to borrow from, and add to, international relations theory. Both in theory and in practice, power relationships are important in business and international relations. Power Relations and Globalization in Business. Finally, practical implications are outcomes of theoretical development and testing. This present work illustrates useful concepts for management and demonstrates how an understanding of the international arena is relevant for successful multinational, or even domestic, enterprise. Globalization affects firms even if they choose to stay at home; the world comes to them in multiple ways. First, many concepts are useful. Power is central in management and organizational theory; it is not just a construct of political science, that is,




Power and Influence

resource-dependence theory, inter-firm alliances, and network power. Also, the ability to influence is core in firms, since many positions do not hold positional power such as that of a CEO or vice president. Other employees have roles in which they must motivate others through influence, not power. Here, the analysis of different types of relationships of power and influence suggest how to build better crucial business relationships and how to bargain in complex environments. For example, if it is not possible to set up a power-interdependence relationship that creates a reciprocally beneficial obligation, then alternatively an actor may be prominent as an opinion leader or be active in many related external organizations that offer forums for sharing information and views. Contexts such as alliance constellations, industry associations, and standards-setting bodies may be networkgovernance situations like that of the UNGA, as discussed earlier, in which the aforementioned mechanisms are operative. Many illustrations were provided in business settings, including cases of unions and worker protection agencies (firefighters), boards of directors (the French business elite), and how governments can be involved in, and directly affect, industry to such an extent that they internationally connect both government and domestic industry (the oil industry of Venezuela). This is a small set of situations used to illustrate why and how the lessons of this research are useful, and why managers need to be on top of international issues. International organizations directly impact business through their decisions and policy-making. They set standards, regulate and create markets, and offer guidance using principles for sustainable business practices. Some firms even become directly involved through programs such as ISO 14000 and the UN Global Compact. In a networked world of complex interdependence in which reputation is a critical asset, a firm’s good standing and ability to do business can depend on an understanding of, together with participation in, international organizations; when participation is not possible, another approach is the lobbying of governments that are members. They may even be able to have influence if they understand the dynamics of international bargaining, the lessons of this text. Limitations and Future Research. The limitations of this study relate to the connection between the evidence of the behaviors and the mechanisms believed to explain them. Is it really power, homophily, or informationsharing that explains the independent variables’ relationships to cooperative voting behavior? This is a relatively disconnected empirical examination that uses theory and electronic data from a very high-level view. While the explanations are plausible, future research could seek to further investigate this subject by using additional, complementary research methods. The challenge is to determine what these methods might be. The rough analyses of the international networks and the effects of shocks facilitate this research,



212

213

but they are not sufficient to address the inadequacy first mentioned. More in-depth shock analysis could be possible future research, but it may not be that useful since initial analysis indicates that short-term shocks do not significantly affect long-term international relationships. In fact, this is further analogous support for the empirical work, already explained theoretically, such that voting would not likely disturb these relationships, either. Instead, the relationships affect voting—this is the causal direction. Also, a wide cross-section of interviews could tighten the linkages; however, this type of approach is likely to be insurmountably difficult; even after ignoring the high costs of interviewing diplomats and other country representatives, gaining access and obtaining large amounts of unbiased information is next to impossible; the ramifications (likely leading to job-loss) to country representatives who talk about secret discussions deter them from disclosing such information. As repeated throughout this study, the bargaining is sensitive and purposely kept secret. However, several excerpts from news reports (as have been presented) could possibly be considered limited substitutes for such interviews; they were also supportive of the empirical work. The illustrations and generalized knowledge provided in this work bear out much of the theory and the empirical evidence; although, it is clearly acknowledged that this information has been selected for its corroborative content, no news reports found in the search for relevant ones contradicted the findings in this research. Overall, this study’s approach, although seemingly disconnected, may be one possibility of a very few choices. In general, the field of international relations has utilized this data-analysis approach (Ingram et al., 2005; Russett & Oneal, 2001) to make similar types of connections. Is this study confined to strategic decision making at the interorganizational level in international relations settings or even only at the UNGA? The answer to this question of generalizability is naturally quite subjective; however, the author’s opinion is that it is not likely confined to international institutions and voting situations. As implied earlier, organizations and other actors who seek to influence other organizations’ decisions can learn from this study. It is generalizable to strategic decision making at the organizational level, whatever the type of organization and this study makes a contribution to the embeddedness view at the interorganizational level. Future research could ask more specific questions and address some of the questions that have arisen out of the results mentioned earlier. More fine-grained analysis could study certain countries’ power relationships and specific issues. For example, do social-structural positions in certain types of networks affect decisions on certain types of issues more than on others? An illustrative example in this study is that the type of IGO-connectedness made a difference to the level of influence on cooperative voting—the Political-Military IGO members were more likely dealing with issues similar




Power and Influence

to those of the UNGA, and this type of connectedness had a greater positive influence in motivating similar voting. Also, why does nested embeddedness in IGOs often result in non-cooperation? This potentially conflict-ridden side of closeness needs further investigation; it would make an interesting contribution to the realist view that negative outcomes can occur in cases of too much interdependence. Moreover, this setting could offer an excellent opportunity to explore international networks from a broader viewpoint; one could ask how the various networks—alliances, trade, and country visits—change over time and what influences the shape of these changes (Borgatti & Foster, 2003:1000). The shock analysis suggests that a larger dataset over many decades is required since the international relationships in this study (over one decade) were found to be quite long-term and stable. Moreover, the examinations of the networks in the chapters are a beginning. Evolutionary network analysis may uncover historical processes, unthinkably difficult to discover using any other methods. The interconnectedness can now be investigated with advanced network-analysis methods. New methods and theory applied to unconventional contexts can provide exciting new insights and open up opportunities for future investigation not previously considered. Many more opportunities open up with the exploitation of the field of network methodology; for example, this study examines relative dyadic centrality, but group centrality and clustering the data (or examining cliques) are additional approaches to studying the massive international data sets, that is, studying the G8 and other regional groups of nations (Borgatti & Everett, 1992; Borgatti & Foster, 2003: 1001). A problem with this type of research is the identification and acceptability of various network definitions of groups and cliques. However, initial analysis of international networks has suggested a strong tendency toward regional cooperation and this is the multipolarity of international relations post–cold war. Perhaps, a choice of the international context could help to overcome the empirical definitional problem that arises due to established continental regions, cultural identification, and other political groupings such as the G8 and G20. Group studies are out-of-scope here since the research question focuses on interorganizational actor power and influence on a bilateral basis (A dyadicdependent variable is used that corresponds to real negotiation situations, backroom-bargaining, and vote-buying or reciprocal behavior, including voting compliance.) not group-level power and influence. Also, delving deeper into the specific network relationships and core and periphery structures reveals more opportunities (Carrington, Scott & Wasserman, 2005). Network methodology is an ever-expanding area offering creative approaches to research in many fields.



214

F      the data is presented to address various issues and lend assurance to the results. Cross-sectional correlation and influential observations are some possible issues. First, as discussed in the methods section, endogeneity is not theoretically possible. Endogeneity, when applicable, has traditionally been dealt with in international relations studies using lagged independent variables of interest (Russett & Oneal, 2001). More recently, tested theory by Ingram et al. (2005) using instruments predicts causality is correctly represented in their network model that tests whether IGO-connectedness affects trade . However, voting is not like trade except that they are both indicative of cooperation and, moreover, the variables of interest are not measuring direct ties, as was more specifically explained earlier, so endogeneity is not an applicable problem. However, cross-sectional correlation, stemming from the use of a dyadic dependent variable, is a more difficult problem—if the approach used is not considered satisfactory then QAP (quadratic assignment procedure) may be applied and the QAP results compared with these results; however, QAP’s requirement for a more structured data set interferes with the ability to compare the results.1 Although QAP is not used, a sensitivity analysis using differencing was done, as mentioned earlier, and the problem is not found to be consequential. Also, to investigate whether the main model is reasonably representing the main trends, an in-depth, cross-sectional analysis is included that considers influential observations. Finally, a rough look at how sudden historical events affect some of the international relationships, represented by the variables used in this study, is done in a section called “Repercussions of Shocks.” Overall, the model is found to be sound; also, the shock analysis suggests that international relationships are not easily disturbed, thus lending further support to the earlier contention that reverse causality— that voting could affect positions in these networks—is not theoretically or practically reasonable.



Appendix: Additional Analyses

216

Appendix

In case the cross-sectional correlation remains a concern, an approach for handling non-independent observations is QAP, which allows for improved hypothesis-testing because it permutes the data set so that it corresponds with a null hypothesis that takes into account the cross-sectional correlation among observations (Simpson, 2001). Thus, the coefficients’ significance is based on a comparison against the null hypothesis. To perform this QAP testing, the data set has to be cut down so that each year is the same square matrix—each year must contain the same dyads as all other years such that several countries would no longer be included in my data. This systematic sampling approach could alter the results so that they are not comparable with the results presented here, that is, after the cold war, several Eastern bloc countries became independent and were admitted to the UN. No longer part of the Soviet Union, their votes may be quite different.

Influential Observations According to Belsley et al., influential observations, or subsets of observations, may occur as a result of incorrectly recorded or observed data.2 Alternatively, the outliers and leverage3 points that are influential may be legitimately occurring extreme observations, and this is considered a potentially beneficial situation, improving estimation efficiency (Belsley et al, 1980: 6). However, the advice is to isolate these influential observations, whether beneficial or not, and determine the extent to which the estimates depend on them. Each crosssection may be affected by influential observations that are particular to a year and not representative of the general trends that this paper seeks to uncover. Also, reviewing the data in this manner may suggest a better specification for the model or strengthen the case that this model is well specified. The main concern to be investigated is that the model estimates are representative of the majority and not a subset of the data. Belsley et al. (1980: 39) advocates that single-row analysis is not sufficient for this investigation. While multiple-row analysis is acceptable additional analysis, a substitute for it can be a combination of partial-regression leverage plots and stepwise multiple-row methods (Belsley et al., 1980: 39). This latter approach is preferred for large data sets because of the problem of masking (Belsley et al., 1980: 39). Plots were included in this analysis but, for brevity, not shown here; however, stepwise multiple-row methods were not technologically feasible at the time of this study.4 After potentially influential observations are identified, I delete them in both the small and then the large samples, presenting the results only as a sensitivity analysis.



Cross-Sectional Correlation

217

For this analysis, I took a small sample because of the enormity of the data set. To determine the small sample, I examined leverage-versusresidual-squared plots and partial-regression leverage plots (for each variable of interest) of all the observations for each year. Since many observations were densely clustered, I could identify those country dyads that stood out. After creating extensive lists of these dyads, I chose six countries that were frequently noticed as outlying and, out of these, chose at least a couple of countries that were large in terms of per capita GDP and a couple of small countries on the same basis. The small sample data set includes all dyads for all years 1990–2000 that include one of the six countries: Japan (740), United Arab Emirates (696), Turkey (640), the Czech Republic (316), Djibouti (522), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (346). While Japan and Turkey are large, the others, especially Djibouti, are small. As an initial step, these data were examined and the entire sample was modeled for comparison purposes. The basic statistics and models are shown in tables A.1, A.2, and A.3. Comparing the small sample results in table A.2 with the large sample results in table 12.1, prior to making any deletions, the main conclusion is that this smaller sample is indeed made up of outliers that, with some exceptions, would have the effect of amplifying the original results. Starting with the trade variables, the Relative Trade In-degree Centrality coefficient and its squared term have the opposite sign—they are negative in the small sample, whereas they are positive in the large sample—suggesting a downward, rather than an upward, slope—this is the main exception to the magnification problem mentioned. Consequently, these outliers could be reducing the upward trend found in the main large sample model. The other trade, alliance, and visits variables’ coefficients have the same signs but, are larger—they magnify the results of the large sample model. Looking at the control variables, it is noted that the Same Polity Score coefficient is not quite double in magnitude, and the Same Culture variable is very similar in magnitude. Also, all the variables of interest are significant as in the main model except Visits Total Out-degree. One other strange result in the small sample is the small magnitude in Model 1c of the coefficient for Relative Alliance Degree-Centrality. The coefficient’s magnitude is extremely small compared to the large sample coefficient and compared to the Model 1b small sample coefficient. Comparing table 12.2—the large sample results for IGO-connectedness and nested embeddedness tests—with table A.3, the small sample equivalent prior to deletions, what is evident are changes in the variables that are significant and, once again, magnification. IGO-Connectedness has a larger effect on its own in the small sample Model 2a. In Model 2b, the nested effect of political ideology with IGO-connectedness now has a



Appendix

Basic Statistics for Small Sample Analysis

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

1 Similar votes

10026

0.46

0.35

0.00

1.00

2 Relative trade in-degree centrality

1709

0.18

4.57

–22.23

21.89

0.04

3 Total trade in-degree centrality

1709

0.66

6.51

–33.98

32.91

–0.11

4 Relative ally degreecentrality

1709

0.00

0.43

–3.15

4.49

–0.02 –0.06 –0.01

5 Total ally degreecentrality

1709

0.01

0.44

–1.95

4.81

0.02

0.05 0.13 –0.31

6 Visits total outdegree centrality

1709

–0.11

2.95

–14.20

15.99

0.01

0.02 0.17 0.02

7 Visits total in-degree centrality

1709

–0.15

2.77

–9.81

11.31

0.12

0.00 –0.23 0.02

8 IGOconnectedness

2870

0.58

2.16

–13.23

16.85

0.07

0.04 0.05 0.02

9 Economic IGOconnectedness

2870

0.11

0.73

–3.92

5.12

0.04

0.10 –0.11 0.03

10 General IGOconnectedness

2870

0.13

1.58

–6.46

14.82

0.03

0.03 –0.01 0.01

11 Political-Military IGOconnectedness

2870

0.00

0.08

–0.42

1.02

0.04 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02

12 Social-Cultural IGOconnectedness

2870

0.17

0.65

–2.16

4.02

0.03 –0.11

13 Trade intensity

1709

18.20

698.40

1709

0.01

0.19

–1.00

10026

0.03

0.17

0.00

14 Allies 15 Contiguity

16 Combined wealth 9960 19986.30 12118.95

Min

Max

–9606.90 14974.97

2238.16

1

2

3

4

0.14

0.25 0.00

0.01

0.00 –0.01 –0.01

1.02

0.00

0.02 0.04 0.08

1.00

0.05

0.01

0.00 0.01

68833.40 –0.05 –0.06 –0.04 0.02

17 Similar wealth

9960 –10375.72 8167.00 –41885.00

0.99

0.03

0.00 0.00 0.00

18 Similar polity score

8355

–7.09

6.32

–19.00

1.00

0.28

0.00 –0.01 0.06

10014

0.18

0.38

0.00

1.00

0.26 –0.01 –0.01 0.00

19 Same culture— Huntington



Table A.1

Table A.1 Continued

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18


5

0.19 –0.03

0.05

–0.06

0.03 –0.09

–0.11

0.00

–0.01

0.01 –0.08

0.11

0.31 0.65 –0.11

0.03 –0.01 –0.01 -0.03 –0.11

0.05

0.03

0.03 -0.17

0.22 –0.45

-0.10 –0.14

0.01

0.05

0.02 –0.04

0.04 0.00

0.04

–0.18 –0.04 –0.16 0.07

0.00 –0.01

–0.07 –0.06 0.01

0.09

0.04

0.05 –0.01

0.06 –0.08 –0.17

0.02

0.11 –0.10 0.00

0.00

0.02 0.09

0.00 0.01

0.06

0.04 –0.03 –0.05 0.11 0.03

0.00

0.05 –0.04

0.07

0.05

0.01 0.06

0.05

0.02 –0.01 0.07 –0.52

–0.01 –0.04 –0.02

0.15

0.00

0.13 0.00

0.10

0.08 0.05

0.02

0.07 –0.09

0.02 –0.01 –0.17 –0.09 –0.05 0.03 –0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.17 –0.07


0.16 0.07 0.14

Table A.2

Main Model using Small Sample

Lagged Similar votes Relative Trade In-degree Centrality/1000 Relative Trade In-degree Centrality Squared/1000 Total Trade In-degree Centrality/1000 Total Trade In-degree Centrality Squared/1000 Relative Alliance DegreeCentrality/1000 Relative Alliance Degree-Centrality Squared/1000 Total Alliance DegreeCentrality/1000 Total Alliance Degree-Centrality Squared/1000 Visits Total Out-degree/1000

Model 1a

Model 1b

Model 1c

0.828* (0.014) –4.672* (1.985) –0.058* (0.020) –13.378* (2.142) –0.070* (0.016)

.821* (0.014) –2.958 (2.039) –0.048* (0.021) –16.706* (2.281) –0.094* (0.017) –86.670* (20.109) –5.898* (1.125) –154.868* (31.671) –4.365* (0.777)

–0.002 (0.002) –0.035* (0.011) 0.028 (0.032) 0.000 (0.000) –0.001 (0.001) 1.509* (0.581) .035* (0.012) 0.085* (0.011) 1709

–0.002 (0.002) –0.042* (0.013) 0.052** (0.028) 0.000 (0.000) –0.001 (0.000) 1.917* (0.589) 0.036* (0.013) 0.082* (0.011) 1709

0.811* (0.015) –5.154* (2.070) –0.075* (0.021) –16.044* (2.346) –0.098* (0.018) –0.090* (18.186) –6.399* (1.076) –181.963* (28.129) –5.349* (0.735) –2.436 (1.535) 16.349* (2.211) –0.004** (0.002) –0.006 (0.012) 0.053** (0.029) 0.000 (0.000) –0.001 (0.001) 2.034* (0.620) 0.042* (0.013) 0.088* (0.011) 1709

Visits Total In-degree/1000 Trade Intensity/1000 Allies Contiguity Combined Wealth/1000 Similar Wealth/1000 Similar Polity Score/1000 Same Culture—Huntington Constant Observations

Continued



Small Sample Prais-Winston (FGLS) Estimation—with Robust Standard Errors—of Percentage Similar Votes By Country Dyads, 1990–2000

Table A.2

Continued

Small Sample Prais-Winston (FGLS) Estimation—with Robust Standard Errors—of Percentage Similar Votes By Country Dyads, 1990–2000 Model 1b

Model 1c

No. of dyads

414

414

414

R-Squared

0.77

0.77

0.76

p < 0.05, two-tailed test ** p < 0.05, one-tailed test Notes: standard errors in parentheses

Table A.3

Main Model using Small Sample

Small Sample Prais-Winston (FGLS) Estimation—with Robust Standard Errors - of Similar Votes By Country Dyads, 1990–2000

Lagged Similar Votes IGOconnectedness/1000 Econ IGOconnectedness/1000 Gen IGOconnectedness/1000 Political-Military IGOconnectedness/1000 Social-Cultural IGOconnectedness/1000 Same Culture X IGOconnectedness/1000 Same Culture X Econ IGOconnectedness/1000 Same Culture X Gen IGOconnectedness/1000 Same Culture X Political-Military IGOconnectedness/1000 Same Culture X SocialCultural IGOconnectedness/1000

Model 2a

Model 2b

Model 3a

Model 3b

0.841* (0.013) 4.692* (1.364)

0.841* (0.013) 0.791 (2.173)

0.856* (0.011)

0.866* (0.011)

6.783 (6.848) 6.487* (1.477) 29.560 (52.000) 66.594* (9.925)

–4.025 (14.360) –0.943 (2.850) 8.582 (75.581) 70.969* (14.169)

–3.104 (4.432) –5.495 (39.761) –0.221 (5.712) –79.105 (89.718) –54.434 (35.686) Continued



Model 1a

222

Appendix

Table A.3 Continued Small Sample Prais-Winston (FGLS) Estimation—with Robust Standard Errors - of Similar Votes By Country Dyads, 1990–2000 Model 2a

Allies Contiguity Combined Wealth/1000 Similar Wealth/1000 Similar Polity Score Same Culture— Huntington Constant Observations No. of dyads

Model 3a

Model 3b

0.405* (0.172) 1.761 (1.072) 1.325* (0.221) –0.827 (1.940) –2.371* (0.789) –0.003 (0.002) –0.042* (0.012) 0.024 (0.028) 0.000 (0.000) –0.001 (0.000) 0.001* (0.001) 0.038* (0.012) 0.064* (0.009) 1709 414

–0.003 (0.002) –0.050* (0.021) 0.026 (0.028) 0.000 (0.000) –0.007 (0.000) 0.001* (0.001) 0.040* (0.013) 0.066* (0.009) 1709 414

–0.004* (0.002) –0.057* (0.014) 0.011 (0.027) 0.000 (0.000) –0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.047* (0.011) 0.041* (0.009) 1709 414

–0.004* (0.002) –0.081* (0.025) 0.019 (0.026) 0.000 (0.000) –0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.061* (0.016) 0.033* (0.009) 1709 414

0.79

0.79

0.82

0.84

R-Squared * p < 0.05, two-tailed test ** p < 0.05, one-tailed test Notes: standard errors in parentheses

positive and larger effect. In Models 3a and 3b, which breakdown the type of IGO-connectedness into Economic, General, Political-Military, and Social-Cultural classifications and then add nested tests, many variables lose significance. Economic and Political-Military IGO-connectedness lose significance and the effects of Social-Cultural IGO-connectedness are much larger.



Same Polity Score X IGOconnectedness/1000 Same Polity Score X Econ IGO-connectedness/1000 Same Polity Score X Gen IGO-connectedness/1000 Same Polity Score X Political-Military IGOconnectedness/1000 Same Polity Score X SocialCultural IGOconnectedness/1000 Trade Intensity/1000

Model 2b

223

All the nested effects of culture are not significant in the large sample model; however, in the small sample model, the interaction of Culture and Social-Cultural IGO-connectedness is significant. Moreover, the nested effects of political ideology all change in significance—with Economic IGOs it is now not significant, with General IGOs it is significant and larger, with Political-Military IGOs it loses significance, and with Social-Cultural IGOs it becomes significant and larger (negative). Changes occur with the control variables in significance and size. Most notable is that among all these changes, the Same Culture—Huntington coefficient stays very similar to that of the large sample. Culture has an effect on similar voting even using an otherwise strangely behaving smaller sample. A conclusion from this analytical comparison is that the potential magnification effects and other oddities of this sample suggest that it is worthwhile to perform a diagnostic analysis according to Belsley et al. (1980). After the diagnosis is completed, Belsley et al. (1980: 9) suggests that if some observations, or a set of them, are found to be erroneous and highly influential, then deletion, down-weighting, or model-reformulation are possible options. However, very often, no action is taken because the observations are beneficial, serving as valid evidence (Belsley et al., 1980: 9, 16). Single Row Analysis. Single-row analysis includes row deletion in the set of observations to discover the effects on the residuals, estimated coefficients, predicted (fitted) values, and the covariance structure of the coefficients. Also, the diagonal values of the hat-matrix, if large, are indicative of leverage points (Belsley et al., 1980).

Residuals A listing of the magnitudes of the studentized residuals helps to identify outliers (Belsley et al., 1980: 19). Tables including these lists were produced but, for brevity, are not included here. Studentized residuals use the root mean square error of a regression that omits the ith observation—the deleted row. RSTUDENT = ei* =

ei s(i ) 1 − hi

Since RSTUDENT is less dependent on sample size, an absolute cutoff for extreme values is a value in excess of two. The largest of these residuals for each year were listed in a summary table also not included for brevity. While there are several residuals that surpass a value of two, some that are high include C20C740 (Canada and Japan), C437C522 (Ivory Coast and Djibouti), C346C640 (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey), C20C346 (Canada and Bosnia-Herzegovina), C346C900 (Bosnia-Herzegovina and



Appendix

224

Appendix

Australia). Although these are outliers, they may not be influential, so further investigation as follows is required.

Leverage Points

H = X ( X T X )−1 X T that determines the predicted values (Belsley et al., 1980): yˆ = Xb = Hy

(0

Power and Influence: The Embeddedness of Nations

The Power of Indirect Influence

Power and Influence in the Boardroom

The Power of Legitimacy among Nations

The social embeddedness of industrial ecology

The game of nations; the amorality of power politics

The Science of Influence

The Science of Influence

The Anxiety of Influence

Maximum Influence: The 12 Universal Laws of Power

Maximum Influence: The 12 Universal Laws of Power Persuasion

Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations. United Nations

Maximum Influence: The 12 Universal Laws of Power Persuasion

Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, United Nations

Israel and the Nations

The Wealth of Nations

The Size of Nations

Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace

Influence

Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of Influence

Investigating the Influence of Standards

Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion

The Lord of the Nations

Investigating the Influence of Standards

Influence and Power: Variations on a Messy Theme

Drug Prohibition and the Conscience of Nations

Big Business and the Wealth of Nations

Influence Science and Practice

Power and Influence: The Embeddedness of Nations

The Power of Indirect Influence

Power and Influence in the Boardroom

The Power of Legitimacy among Nations

The social embeddedness of industrial ecology

The game of nations; the amorality of power politics

The Science of Influence

The Science of Influence

The Anxiety of Influence

Maximum Influence: The 12 Universal Laws of Power

Maximum Influence: The 12 Universal Laws of Power Persuasion

Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations. United Nations

Maximum Influence: The 12 Universal Laws of Power Persuasion

Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, United Nations

Israel and the Nations

The Wealth of Nations

The Size of Nations

Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace

Influence

Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of Influence

Investigating the Influence of Standards

Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion

The Lord of the Nations

Investigating the Influence of Standards

Influence and Power: Variations on a Messy Theme

Drug Prohibition and the Conscience of Nations

Big Business and the Wealth of Nations

Influence Science and Practice

Recommend Documents