Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore (Politics in Asia)

The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

Singapore has pursued a development track that some have seen as a paradigm for latecomers to the international capitalist market. It is a state that has firmly rejected welfarism but whose political leaders have maintained that collective values, rather than those of individuals, are essential to its survival. Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee examine basic concepts of citizenship, nationality and the state in the context of Singapore’s arrival at independence. The theme of nation building is explored with emphasis on how the creation of a national identity, through building new institutions, has been a central feature of political and social life in Singapore. Education has been of great importance, specifically a system of multilingual education that is part of a broader government strategy of multiculturalism and multiracialism, which has served the purpose of building a new national identity. Other areas covered by the authors include family planning, housing policy, the creation of parapolitical structures and the importance of shared ‘Asian values’ amongst Singapore’s citizens. The book offers a sociological account of nation building which is distinct from prevailing Western models as well as from routes taken by other post-colonial states. Michael Hill is Professor of Sociology at Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand. Lian Kwen Fee is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the National University of Singapore.

Politics in Asia Series Edited by Michael Leifer London School of Economics

ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia Michael Leifer China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes The Case of the South China Sea Islands Chi-kin Lo India and Southeast Asia Indian Perceptions and Policies Mohammed Ayoob Gorbachev and Southeast Asia Leszek Buszynski Indonesia under Suharto Order, Development and Pressure for Change Michael R.J.Vatikiotis The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia David Brown

The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee

London and New York

First published 1995 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. © 1995 Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-42443-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-73267-7 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-10052-6 (hbk) ISBN 0-415-12025-x (pbk)

Contents

Preface Acknowledgements

vii ix

Introduction

1

1 The state, citizenship and nationality in Singapore

12

2 The ethnic origins of Singapore

39

3 Education and bilingualism

67

4 Multiracialism and the structuring of ethnic relations

91

5 Housing policy in the nation building process

113

6 Between the family and the state

140

7 Parapolitical and intermediary structures

159

8 From the ideology of pragmatism to shared values

188

9 Civil society: the current project

220

10 Conclusion

242

Bibliography Index

251 272

v

Preface

Singapore had statehood rudely thrust upon it. A new national identity had to be constructed speedily within a culture which had assimilated Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s conventional wisdom that ‘island-nations are political jokes’. In the wake of a traumatic separation from Malaysia, forging a new national identity began to be addressed through defining the role of citizenship so that it served the imperative needs of the vulnerable city-state. In this pioneering study, Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee have explored the promotion and significance in Singapore of an alternative conception of citizenship to the liberal individualist model common in Western societies. In Singapore, the status of citizenship has been more directly associated with duties and obligations than with rights. It is this signal feature of the Republic’s nation building process which is addressed across the range of social policy issues in a skilful and timely manner. This study is particularly timely because of the way in which spokespersons for Singapore have played such a prominent part in the international debate over the respective merits of ‘Asian values’ as the basis for the good society by contradistinction to those of the so-called Western world. This volume will provide an informed and scholarly perspective on that continuing debate as well as illuminating the nature of social order in an exemplar of what the World Bank has described as ‘the East Asian Miracle’. Michael Leifer

vii

Acknowledgements

Many people contribute to the writing of a book, some of them quite unwittingly, others more persistently aware of the work in progress. We cannot thank them all, and we certainly cannot hold any one of them responsible for the content of this book, but we wish to acknowledge the contribution of several individuals and institutions whose generosity played an important part in its completion. More formal acknowledgement of intellectual debt is, of course, one of the functions of the Bibliography. Michael Hill acknowledges the support of the Victoria University of Wellington for granting extended research leave in 1991–2, which allowed concentrated periods of work both as Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore—where the hospitality of Ananda Rajah and the kindness of librarian Peggy Chin are fondly remembered—and at the London School of Economics; and a briefer period of overseas leave in Singapore during 1993–4, spent in the congenial company of sociologists at the National University of Singapore. In London, Michael Leifer gave support and encouragement, Peter Lyon was ready with helpful suggestions, and former LSE colleagues Eileen Barker, David Martin and Nicos Mouzelis were—well, warmly collegial. Among Wellington colleagues who shared their ideas were David Boardman and David Pearson; and the expertise of Raj Vasil was invaluable. The help of research assistants Phillip Anderson and Alex Melrose at Victoria University is particularly appreciated. Lian Kwen Fee acknowledges the interest taken by David Pearson of Victoria University in the work. Friends Jayanath Appadurai and Tilak Doshi, from both sides of the causeway, lived through the periods referred to in the book with me. We shared many hours of discussion of some of these events which have directly or indirectly ix

x

Acknowledgements

affected our lives, and which have shaped our intellectual development. My Singapore colleagues, Ananda Rajah and James Jesudason, have always been willing to engage in argument. In the innumerable tasks involved in the writing process the secretaries in the Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, have been most supportive to both authors. In a 1994 speech Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong referred to the family as ‘the centre of the universe’, and continued: ‘Without my family, I would lose my direction in life and life would become empty and void.’ This book is dedicated to our families.

Introduction

The sociological debate over the nature of citizenship was initiated in Europe during a period of expanding welfare provision in the years following the Second World War. Its revival in the past decade has been associated with the crisis of the welfare state in Western societies, which have since the 1970s experienced prolonged recession and an accompanying erosion of customary welfare provisions. The crisis in Western welfare systems has been heightened by the prevailing liberal individualist conception of citizenship as conferring rights and thus as expansionary, emancipatory and centred on the autonomous individual. Within this tradition, citizenship is a status which, once achieved, has to be maintained. In recent explorations of the citizenship concept, notably by Oldfield (1990), the potential of an alternative, civic republican model has been developed. In this model, citizenship is conceived as conferring duties and is rendered meaningful by the practice of those duties within a community of similarly responsible and participating citizens. In this second tradition of citizenship the goals of the collectivity, rather than those of the individual, take precedence, and the ‘active citizens’ are those persons who recognize, and acknowledge as their own, such communal goals. In the chapters which follow it will be shown that this second tradition provides a more viable account of the process of nation building, and with it the articulation of a concept of citizenship, in a state which has firmly rejected welfarism, and whose political leaders have constantly maintained that the values of the collectivity over those of autonomous individuals are essential to its very survival. That Singapore has simultaneously managed to sustain an impressive rate of economic growth indicates a potentially instructive comparative analysis of the civic republican tradition of citizenship against the more commonly assumed liberal individualist version. 1

2

Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

The book begins by examining basic concepts of citizenship, nationality and the state in the context of Singapore’s arrival at independence. This was a traumatic process involving intense and often violent political contestation throughout the Malay peninsula and within Singapore. After a brief and unsettled period of federation with Malaysia, Singapore found itself abruptly and precariously independent, and its leadership very rapidly had to establish a viable state and confront such exigencies as the British military withdrawal. These events have been encapsulated in the mythology of the nation building process and the political leadership has had constant recourse to them, and to their implications for the survival of the state, over the succeeding years. The nation, it is argued, should be seen as a social construction rather than as representing some primordial actuality, and results from a protracted negotiation between its political leaders and a population which is increasingly educated into conceptions of legitimacy and citizenship. A similar process could be traced in the emergent nation-states of eighteenth— and nineteenth-century Europe and North America. Nor should the interaction between the political elite and the citizenry be seen as one way, since the possibility of missed cues and unintended consequences on the part of the latter may well result in reverses and delays in the process of nation building. The book labels this a ‘Return to Sender’ process. One of the concerns of nation building in Europe was the principle of viability. An unscrambling of interspersed ethnic groups, for instance, was not always possible, and this led to some peoples becoming nation-states while others were subsumed within larger entities—sometimes retaining simmering aspirations to nationhood. An important feature of Singapore was that its leaders at the time of decolonization were firmly convinced that it could not survive outside Malaysia as an independent nation. When independence became a fact, they were faced with the infrastructure of a state without an accompanying nation—a not uncommon sequel to colonization. The process of nation building thus involved the construction of an identity which could accommodate ethnic and linguistic pluralism while simultaneously inculcating an overarching sense of nationhood. In the initial period of Singapore’s emergence as an independent nation-state, economic goals were pre-eminent, with employment and infrastructure (especially housing) as key priorities. Later, the cultural and symbolic dimensions of identity became prominent, with education policy and a search for national ideology receiving particular attention. Most recently, concerns with a more

Introduction

3

participatory style of politics have been articulated, with debate over the nature of civil—or civic—society. All these can be seen, following Giddens, as developments in the different sectors of citizenship which are intimately bound up with the consolidation of a modern nationstate. Contrary to a view proposed by some accounts of nation building in Singapore, the birth of nationhood began, not in 1959 when the colony was given self-government, nor in 1965 when it separated from Malaysia and became independent, but in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Malayan Union proposal of 1946. This had the goal of establishing a unitary state over the peninsula but it excluded Singapore. As a result of this proposal and together with political developments in China following the communist seizure of power, political consciousness on the island was aroused. Opinion about the future of Singapore was divided between the middle-class English-educated population and the Chinese-educated working class, known as the Nanyang Chinese. The former identified with Malaya and espoused the ideal of multiracialism, and consequently were more willing to accommodate Malay aspirations across the causeway; while the latter, the product of a China-oriented educational philosophy, championed Chinese language and culture and viewed Malay political dominance, with the collapse of the Union proposal, as a threat. The rise of the People’s Action Party (PAP) and its subsequent split in 1961 between the moderate and leftwing factions embodied these developments. As a legacy of the founding of Singapore as a centre for free trade and movement of people, and of the predominantly migrant background of its population, citizenship laws and provisions there were more liberal when contrasted with the restrictionist policy on the peninsula. The merger with Malaysia in 1963 created two formal types of citizenship status, namely, Malaysian citizens who were also Singapore citizens and those who were not Singapore citizens. The distinction simply reflected a lack of consensus over what constituted a ‘Malayan nationality’ and nation. It eventually led to the separation of Singapore and for the next fifteen years, the PAP leadership struggled to wean itself from its emotional ties with the peninsula. Nation building began in earnest—it involved historical amnesia, looked towards the future and was integrated in institution building. It also reinforced the pragmatism of the PAP. Political elites in states formed as a consequence of decolonization are left with the infrastructure, however rudimentary, of power and its coercive instruments but they are immediately faced with the task

4

Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

of forging their legitimacy. This requires tackling simultaneously the cultural-symbolic and civic-instrumental tasks of nation building, as these are outlined by Breton (1988). Education is a potent instrument of nation building partly because it straddles the symbolic and instrumental dimensions and partly because education has the potential to transform one generation into sharing a common destiny. In multi-ethnic societies like Singapore language policy is a critical issue. Education under the colonial administration was expediently compartmentalized, with English available only to a privileged minority while the vernacular schools (Chinese, Malay and Tamil) served the majority. Of the vernacular schools, Chinese education was the most effectively organized and better funded, but it was oriented towards the nationalism of the motherland as interpreted by the Nanyang Chinese. Much of the political career of the PAP between 1954 and 1965 was occupied with countering the strength of a Chinese ethnie which had little sympathy for multiracialism and threatened any possible unification with the peninsula. Following the disturbances of the Chinese middle schools in 1954, the All-Party Committee Report on Education affirmed the principle of according equal treatment to the four language streams and laid the foundation for a multilingual education system in Singapore, better known as bilingualism. The ideal of multiracialism was put into practice. On coming into power in 1959 the PAP introduced integrated schools with English as the lingua franca, while continuing to support the policy of a second language. In this way both the civicinstrumental and cultural-symbolic construction of nationhood was maintained. However, the former succeeded only too well and the economic advantage of English-medium education was significant in the decline of vernacular enrolments. The Goh Report on the Ministry of Education in 1978 was a response to the failure of the implementation of bilingual education and the fear of deculturalization. The revitalization of bilingualism, and in particular the aggressive promotion of Mandarin, has been viewed with apprehension by the non-Chinese ethnic communities. Multiracialism is one of the founding myths of Singapore. Its origins may be traced to the development of political consciousness among English-educated Malayans as a reaction to the emergence of a Malay ethnie and a Chinese ethnie, which were precipitated by Sino-Malay antagonism in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Multiracialism constitutes a strong political tradition on the island, as exemplified by party politics of the period. The concept of multiracialism or multiculturalism is in fact cultural pluralism and

Introduction

5

may be distinguished at three levels, namely, as ideology, as government policy and practice, and as a structural feature of society. While Singapore was part of Malaysia the PAP practised the politics of multiracialism to blunt Malay extremism, which adopted an assimilationist stance towards other ethnic groups. On becoming independent in 1965 multiracialism was articulated in vague and general terms by the party, and subsumed within a political discourse which underscored economic development, competition and the meritocratic principle. Rex’s (1986) delineation of a multicultural society as practising equality of opportunity in the public domain and multiculturalism in the private domain is a most appropriate description of multiracialism as conceived in Singapore in the first decade of independence. Nevertheless, the government continued the colonial practice of ascriptive ethnicity: every Singaporean is also classified as Chinese, Malay, Indian; or Other. The practice of a hyphenated identity (national-ethnic) was adopted, reflecting the ideology of multiracialism and the construction of a national identity. Since the early 1980s the state has embarked on a revitalization of ethnicity as part of a broader strategy in countering what it perceived as the deculturalization of its population. The policy of public discussion of ethnic issues and the explicit encouragement of ethnicbased associations is a testament to its confidence as a sovereign state. Ultimately, the practice of multiracialism in Singapore serves to appease and contain ethnic demands, and in so doing contributes to the nation building process. One of the most remarkable early achievements of the PAP government in Singapore was its public housing policy. This was closely meshed with its economic development policy and, because of the urgency of housing needs among the large majority of the population, the rapid provision of affordable housing gave legitimacy to the government’s political programme as well as affording it a most effective mechanism of social engineering. Historically, there had been a mounting problem of over-occupation and slum-dwelling which had not been effectively tackled under colonial administration. Furthermore, colonial policy had encouraged the growth of ethnically segregated urban localities or ‘islands of settlement’ which had the potential for intercommunal conflict. As part of an integrated policy of infrastructural development—especially the lowering of costs to both domestic and overseas capital—industrial estates and housing developments were established in tandem. Simultaneously, the government stimulated the development at residential level of a variety of organizations which would link the industrial working

6

Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

class with government policy and initiatives. In the 1960s these developments were vigorously pursued, partly by implementing a stringent policy of compulsory purchase. Within a few years of the policy’s inauguration, home ownership was being encouraged through affordable provisions as a means of giving citizens a stake in their country and reducing the sense of transiency characteristic of a substantially migrant population. The linkage between citizenship and home ownership in Singapore can be compared with discussions of its significance in some Western societies. During the 1970s, housing policy became a more refined adjunct of social engineering, with the encouragement of family support for the aged through various purchase schemes, the encouragement of new forms of community organization and the prevention of ethnic concentration through a quota policy within housing estates. Housing also provided an important mechanism for the maintenance of social control with the introduction of a neighbourhood policing system in the early 1980s. Coupled with enhanced means of surveillance in housing estates, a sense of residential security has been developed. One of the dilemmas of such an all-embracing system of housing provision has been that it has tended to politicize housing, with the result that unpopular changes in policy may have negative electoral consequences. The PAP government has attempted to limit the impact of this by distancing itself from its housing bureaucracy, though with only partial success. Another dilemma which results from the effective large-scale provision of housing is its tendency to inflate other demands for government provision and performance. This the government has tried to prevent by insisting that housing provision is not an automatic right and that it carries certain responsibilities on the part of residents—though again, if problems such as homelessness (which might necessitate some form of welfare intervention) are to be avoided, the logic of this policy cannot be pushed too inflexibly. From an initial concern with the need for adequate housing, through a more extensive concern with social and ethnic cohesion, the most recent initiatives in housing policy have been with environmental and quality of life issues—in other words, with the kind of symbolic issues which have become predominant in other areas of policy. Two issues are central to a consideration of the relationship between the family and the state: the family as a mediating structure and as a source of moral values. As the most private of institutions, and arguably as one enjoying greater autonomy than other institutions in Singapore, policies which affect the family are treated

Introduction

7

with caution—a lesson the state has learned after negative reactions to such policies as its eugenics campaign. Unlike the state in most liberal societies, where a reactive and supportive role in the sphere of the family is adopted, the PAP government—even before Singapore’s full independence in 1965—adopted a proactive stance. In 1961 it passed the Women’s Charter, outlawing polygamous marriages within non-Muslim communities. The fear of an overpopulated society, which would overtax economic resources and threaten living standards, compelled the government to institute a comprehensive family planning programme. This programme contained disincentives to fertility in an attempt to reduce family size to no more than two children. In succeeding years population growth declined so rapidly that by the late 1970s the government expressed concern that population increase was below replacement level. In 1983 the government diagnosed the procreation pattern as lopsided, in the sense that better-educated women were producing less children than those with low educational qualifications. The New Population Policy was introduced in 1987 to encourage families, particularly those containing mothers with education qualifications of O-level and above, to have more children. From the 1970s onwards, state intervention in the family was largely concerned with restricting family size, as dictated by economic considerations, and in encouraging the formation of generational groupings which would secure the care of the elderly without the necessity of government welfare provision. In the 1980s, government policy paid more attention to the cultural-symbolic construction of the nation, and this entailed introducing a revamped bilingual education system stressing Asian values, followed for a brief period by an abortive Religious Knowledge programme in secondary schools and ending in a lukewarm response to its espousal of ‘shared values’. Its most recent initiative, in 1994, has been a statement of family values for public discussion. The family is now seen to play a Durkheimian moral role in society rather than existing as a mediating link between the individual and the state. In its attempt to reconstitute community in line with the overarching goal of multiracialism, the Singapore government has deployed innovative parapolitical structures through which its policies can be disseminated and grassroots opinion tapped. The earliest of these structures, the Peoples’ Association and the Community Centres, arose mainly out of political exigency, when the radical faction in the PAP broke from the moderates and took much of the local party organization with it. From these beginnings,

8

Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

however, an extensive system of community representation through a variety of residentially based structures has evolved. To a certain extent, these can be seen as a state-sponsored and more formal equivalent of the ethnic community associations which emerged during the colonial period both to represent and to control ethnic localities. The ethnic associations have survived, even if their functions have been partly displaced by the parapolitical organizations and, since the late 1980s, they have experienced something of a renaissance. The parapolitical structures, for their part, have to some extent seen their social space occupied by more spontaneous associational growths as part of the civic society debate. Parapolitical oganizations, however, still maintain a high social profile and have at times been outspoken in representing the views of their grassroots members to the political elite. In addition, the availability of such channels for facilitating the two-way flow of political information, and for providing environments within which political skills might be learned and rehearsed, has meant that the PAP does not require the potentially turbulent adjunct (as Malaysian experience has demonstrated) of a highly developed party bureaucracy. Certainly, the practice of civic virtue as contained in the civic republican tradition—which, it is argued, has relevance for the concept of citizenship in Singapore—would seem to require a form of responsible participation in the various levels of community activity which parapolitical organizations encourage. In common with other aspects of nation building in Singapore, the search for a common symbolic core in the form of shared values dates from the mid-1970s, after the initial period of economic consolidation had been successfully completed. The prevailing value orientation of the post-independence period was pragmatic—it has even been termed an ideology of pragmatism—and this has persisted in political discourse. But from the mid-1970s there was an expanding concern with what were labelled ‘Asian values’, and the need was stressed to reinforce such values in the face of the allegedly decadent materialism and individualism of Western values which, it was claimed, were imported along with the English language and Western technology. The concern with ‘Asian values’ was partly stimulated by the interest of Western social scientists in the successful economic transformation of East Asian societies—Japan and the ‘four little dragons’ of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore—all of which were attributed with their own version of Confucianism. In the 1980s the concern with ‘Asian values’ was largely transmuted into a consideration of the positive elements in

Introduction

9

Confucianism, which were seen to be an encouragement of collective orientation and social discipline. After two major government reports into education, it was proposed to introduce Religious Knowledge into the secondary school curriculum, and it became a compulsory subject in 1984, with options offered for each of the different ethnic groups, together with Bible Knowledge and Confucian Ethics. Religion thus became an adjunct of training in citizenship in an otherwise secular state. Very soon afterwards, however, the divisive potential of religion became evident, with questions being raised about the loyalty of Malay Muslims to the Singapore state. This was followed in rapid succession by the uncovering by the Internal Security Department of a ‘Marxist conspiracy’ involving Catholic social activists, by the commissioning of government reports into levels of conversion-especially, it was thought, by Christian fundamentalists of English-speaking middle-class Chinese—and in 1989 by the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act and the ending of the Religious Knowledge programme in schools. Thereafter the government sought to introduce a non-sectarian set of shared values which would secure social cohesion and a collective orientation. These have subsequently received little promotion though their influence can be observed in the promotion of a set of family values in 1994 and in the acceptance by the political leadership of new, consensus-oriented forms of social movement of the type envisaged by the Shared Values White Paper. In the wake of the Shared Values White Paper, and very much associated with the more participatory political style espoused by the new, second-generation leadership, there has been an extensive debate on the nature of, and constituent elements within, civil society. Beginning in the late 1980s, but with increasing variety in the 1990s, a series of spontaneously generated associations have developed to represent ethnic, cultural and interest group goals. Such associations have adopted a low-key, non-confrontational approach and have achieved recognition by government to the extent of being consulted on policy or co-opted into the formal political process. They have been seen by key figures in the PAP leadership as evidence of increasing ‘space’ between the state and the private sphere within which independent initiatives might develop. While political activity remains the preserve of formally constituted political parties—and is as such constrained by the PAP’s hegemony over the political process—new associations have had some success in influencing government. This has occurred even when they have competed with

10

Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

officially sponsored parapolitical organizations, for instance in pressing ethnic agendas. While the survival motif of the early years of independence still features in political legitimization—for instance, in emphasizing the pivotal role of the political elite and the need for highly skilled and rewarded new recruits to it—Singapore’s material base has now been substantially secured. The most recent phase of development has seen an emphasis in government policy, and in popular participation, on artistic and creative pursuits. The concept of Singapore as a centre of artistic excellence in Southeast Asia has been advanced, not only as a source of economic benefit, but also as a domain of aspiration for a new generation of citizens. This may well provide a crucial pointer to Singapore’s future, because as expectations of material success begin to approach the ceiling of realistic outcome, the availability of alternative fields of participation and fulfilment will become a more pressing agenda. To adopt the analogy of a prominent government minister, will Singapore be able to render itself to its citizens as less of a ‘hotel’ and more of a ‘home’? In addressing this question, the PAP government has advanced policies which can be seen as compatible with the civic republican tradition of citizenship. The culture of political management in Singapore is authoritarian and interventionist, and while the government maintains a large and robust public sector (Low, 1993), it has steadfastly rejected the growth of a welfare state. Hence the discussion of citizenship in a Singapore context has a different point of departure from that of recent Western debates, where claims of an ‘overloaded’ welfare state have been the common concern of a range of political perspectives (Marquand, 1991:331). In contrast with the liberal-individualist tradition, where it is commonly assumed that the interest of the citizen may conflict with the interest of the community (Marquand, 1991:338), the ‘civic society’ envisaged in Singapore is one in which individual interest and community interest are equated. The necessary conditions for the practice of civic republican citizenship include not only the degree of material security required for adequate public participation—thus the potential problem of a disadvantaged working class developing in Singapore society has been canvassed in recent years (see ST 12.9.91; 8.2.92)—but also a strong component of training and motivation to enable citizens to make their active contribution to the community. As the book will show, the danger of ‘free riders’ pursuing hedonistic goals in an environment of expanding economic opportunity has been a constant preoccupation of the Singapore

Introduction

11

government. The ‘crisis’ and ‘survival’ motifs of the early and traumatic years of independence have not been entirely abandoned— the former being identified in 1987 with a ‘Marxist conspiracy’ and the latter being more recently expressed in terms of a ‘Darwinian process of mutation, competition and selection’ (Yeo, 1990:102)— but their resonance has weakened within a generation of citizens which has not experienced the bitter struggles of the 1950s and 1960s. Faced with the possibility of motivational entropy, the PAP leadership, especially from the late 1970s, has repeatedly and by means of a variety of projects sought to inject the requisite values into its citizens. The stated intention of the government to inoculate its population against the claimed decadence of Western values has been implemented in a succession of public campaigns, educational initiatives and values projects, the most recent one being the Family Values project. An important aspect of this policy has always been pragmatic, especially its avoidance of welfarism by stimulating citizen-based initiatives, but its concern to instil a style of motivation characterized by disciplined obligation to the community has been an equally important feature. In the following chapters, nation building in Singapore is seen as the construction of an appropriate institutional and motivational setting for the practice of citizenship conceived less in terms of rights—as enshrined in the liberalindividualist tradition of Western societies—than in terms of community-defined duties. In Chapter 1 these concepts are examined in greater depth.

1 The state, citizenship and nationality in Singapore

We ask ourselves, what is a Singaporean? In the first place, we did not want to be Singaporeans. We wanted to be Malayans. Then the idea was extended and we decided to become Malaysians. But twenty-three months of Malaysia—a traumatic experience for all parties in Malaysia—ended rather abruptly with our being Singaporeans. (Lee Kuan Yew, cited in Chan, 1971b:29) In 1990, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia on 9 August 1965, footage was shown on Singapore television of the Prime Minister breaking down in tears in response to this traumatic event. It was shown to Singaporeans to remind the younger generation on the country’s National Day that the birth of Singapore had been a painful one. And despite, if not because of, the economic success achieved over the previous twentyfive years, a new generation of Singaporeans was being reminded that they should not forget the origin of their nation. Twenty-three months after the inauguration of Malaysia, Singapore had found itself on its own. August 9 was a fateful day in this history and, in the sense in which Anthony Smith (1988) uses the term, symbolically encapsulates the ‘myth’ of the modern nation. This book explores the concepts of citizenship, nationality and the state, and how these have been articulated within a city-state such as Singapore which came into existence despite its leaders’ deep-seated conviction that it did not constitute a viable entity. It is argued that state-society relations are problematic and that concepts like nationality and citizenship cannot be taken for granted in examining such relations. Attention is drawn to the need to theorize the relationship between the state, sovereignty and nationality in order to 12

The state, citizenship and nationality

13

understand how citizenship is perceived and practised. In taking this approach, it will be demonstrated that the relationship between the modern state and its citizens is at best negotiable and uncertain. Even when the state has achieved a high degree of surveillance and ‘reflexive monitoring’ (Giddens, 1985:206)—as is demonstrably the case in Singapore—it needs constantly to address the unpredictable responses and demands of its citizens. THE NATION AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION A number of writers have emphasized that nationalism and nation building, rather than exposing deeply embedded primordial loyalties, are fundamentally synthetic processes. The point has been made very succinctly by Alter, who notes that, with few exceptions, the nation is a goal rather than an actuality. Put simply, nations are not creatures of ‘God’s hand’, as post-Herder prophets of nationalism often claimed: instead they are synthetic—they have to be created in a complicated educational process. (Alter, 1989:21) He draws on Barthes’ view of nations as a political myth. The process of nation building is seen as being engineered by intellectual minorities, though aimed at the whole social group. As such, nation building is a protracted process of political integration that always remains unfinished, even when the nation has gained its own independent state. The political consciousness required effectively to contain internal conflict does not result from a unilinear process of evolution but rather is a disjointed series of reverses and delays. One such element in the forging of political consciousness—which will be demonstrated on several occasions in this book—is a mechanism we have labelled the ‘Return to Sender’ process. Stated succinctly, this is a process in which the definition of citizen vis-à-vis the state has to be repeatedly renegotiated. The concept was devised as an extension of Gellner’s evocative Wrong Address theory of nationalism (the Marxist contention that ‘the awakening message [of history] was intended for classes, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to the wrong nations’ (Gellner, 1983:129)). The origin of the idea that the policies and doctrines enunciated by the leaders are modified as they become part of grassroots reality has its basis in classical sociology, and especially in Weber’s study of the gradual reformulation of Calvin’s doctrine of predestination, as Calvinist

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Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

leaders were forced constantly to readdress the concerns of lay members confronted by its psychological consequences (Weber, 1976:98–128; Hill, 1973:104–22). In the process—which Weber termed elective affinity—some of the unintended consequences of the original doctrine contributed to a major episode of economic and social change; and, Gellner maintains, it was the ‘trick’ of Calvinist salvation anxiety that produces the ‘civic spirit’ of contractual obligation underlying modern rational capitalism (Gellner, 1991:501). The Return to Sender dynamic emphasizes an interactive relationship between the political elite and citizens, between policies and their public resonance, in contrast with the ‘top-down’ approach of the corporatist model. As a result attention is focused on the way in which political leaders, in consolidating their control and legitimacy, require of their citizens a consciousness of themselves as citizens: this is important in confirming the regime’s claim to internal legitimacy. Citizens can in turn convert this consciousness into a basis for negotiation. The political leadership ‘educates’ its population into identities appropriate to its political agenda; but these identities take on an autonomy which cannot always be anticipated—and may well be unintended—so that the elite then has to readdress them. In the case of Singapore, political discourse has been articulated and encoded in such a visible fashion that the logic of the Return to Sender process is strikingly revealed. In the establishment of political consciousness in the way we have just outlined, the leaders who initiate a process of nation building rely on a series of myths. Commonly, as Gellner shows, these myths invert reality: the elite claims to be defending folk culture while propagating high culture; to be preserving significant elements of the old folk society while simultaneously assisting in the construction of an anonymous mass society. In the particular case of Singapore, multiracialism can be seen as one of the Republic’s founding myths and as a central element in what Benjamin calls Singapore’s ‘national culture’ (Benjamin, 1976:116). But as he goes on to demonstrate, this myth involves a recreation of culture in an attempt by the elite to prevent the erosion of what they perceive as desirable collective and socially cohesive components of an allegedly discipline-oriented Eastern culture by the individualistic emphasis of Western values. The latter are seen as an inevitable accompaniment of the importation of Western technological and economic innovations. One of the tasks of the book will be to scrutinize the construction of such cultural artifacts as part of the process which Breuilly (1982) terms the politics of cultural

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engineering. By this he means the attempt to create a sense of national identity in cultural terms, and he finds the process located principally in the areas of education and communication. It is important at this stage in our argument to emphasize that the process of synthetic nation building has not been confined to those post-colonial states which are now engaged in political consolidation. There is much evidence to link these contemporary agendas for nation building with those of various European states in the late nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries. Bowles and Gintis show that the development of citizenship as a key force in stabilizing and legitimating the nineteenth-century nation-state required the securing of a sense of national identity and this was achieved through ‘providing universal education, inventing public ceremonies, and mass-producing public monuments’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1987:38). Hobsbawm sees the key period in the invention and mass production of tradition as the thirty or forty years before the First World War, and links the process with the unprecedented problems faced by states attempting to maintain, or even to establish, the loyalty and cooperation of their subjects (Hobsbawm, 1983:263, 265). Even more important was the development of an alternative ‘civic religion’ to replace more traditional forms of ritualized collectivity. Thus there can be observed consciously planned attempts to generate the sense of national identity among populations of territorial states. On the other hand, there is much to suggest that this was only ever a partially successful process. Waldron believes that the whole trend of research into nationhood in Europe has been to weaken the notion that nationalism is an essential accompaniment of industrialization and modernization, a view which is associated with the work of Gellner. What the research shows is the great diversity that existed in historical nations quite recently: for instance, there was little national feeling in France in the nineteenth century, and ‘the national identity’ had to be imposed gradually from the centre. In 1864, schoolchildren in the relatively remote Lozere could not answer the question whether they were Russian or English. A number of historians have traced the processes—ranging from the distribution of tricolors, the introduction of new textbooks, and the popularization of a new image of the past, to the development of mass armies—that contributed to the gradual knitting together of France as a nation. (Waldron, 1985:428)

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Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

In Poland, in censuses taken in 1919 and 1931, most inhabitants of the Pripet Marshes responded to questions about nationality with such statements as ‘local’ or ‘from here’. A similar localism seems to have been apparent in Italy: in 1860—a time when national feelings were supposed to be rife—only 2.5 per cent of inhabitants spoke what eventually became the standard language (non-standardized languages being labelled ‘dialects’, a common feature of the way in which states appropriate domains of life in the process of nation building (Benjamin, 1988:40)). ‘Italian’ reluctance to participate in the process of nation building has been shown to persist to the present day, for it has been noted of Italian migrants to Australia that ‘Italian Catholics do not normally have a strong, national sense of being Italian. Instead, their strongest tie is to their paese; that is, their village of origin and surrounding area’ (McKay and Lewins, 1991:173). The above illustrations are meant to temper the assumption, which so often accompanies discussions of nationalism, that there is something categorically distinct about the processes of nation building in the primary nation-states (those which had been emerging in Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) in comparison with secondary nation-states (many of which have arisen from decolonization in the aftermath of the Second World War). One of the implications of this approach is to refocus attention on the essentially political characteristics of nation building in general, an implication which Waldron is quick to seize: Instead of emergent historical nations beginning to stir, and to cast up nationalist leaders who call them into being, it seems that it is the politicians who strive to create the nations. And to what end? One is tempted to say: in order to rule them. (Waldron, 1985:428) However, a major concern of those involved in the nation building process in Europe was the principle of viability. Where nationalities were so interspersed on the same territory, a purely spatial unscrambling of them was seen to be unrealistic (Hobsbawm, 1990:33–4). An independent or real nation also had to be a viable nation in terms of resources—the ‘threshold principle’ as Hobsbawm calls it. The conventional understanding of nationality (based, for example, on a common language, religion or ethnicity) had to be weighed against the viability of ‘nations’ to stand on their own feet. Consequently, some peoples were destined to become nation-states while others were swallowed by more viable nations.

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Most of the political leaders of Singapore in the period leading to the formation of Malaysia in 1963 did not believe that Singapore could survive as an independent nation. The People’s Action Party, the ruling party of Singapore since 1959, for example, had always been pan-Malayan in its orientation, partly for pragmatic reasons and partly because many of its leaders were born in Malaya and had strong emotional ties there. The Alliance government in Malaya deliberated over the inclusion of Singapore into the proposed Malaysian Federation. One consideration was the prospect that Singapore’s predominantly Chinese population would offset the ethnic balance in which Malays would remain the numerical majority. In the end, geopolitical considerations were a decisive factor. The activity of left-wing militants in Singapore impressed upon Alliance leaders the conclusion that unless Singapore was accepted into an anti-communist Malaysia, it could become a base for communists to subvert the mainland (Yeo and Lau, 1991:140). To offset the Chinese population, Sarawak and Sabah—which had significant indigenous as well as Malay inhabitants—were included in the Malaysian Federation. STATE AND NATION In referring to the relationship between the nation and the state, Gellner (1983:6) demonstrates that states have emerged without the help of a nation, and nations have emerged without the blessing of their state. It is a separation well worth keeping in mind as a counterbalance to those theories which tend to overemphasize the significance of ethnicity in the development of the nation-state. An example of the latter would be Smith’s formulation of the ‘ethnic origins of nations’ (Smith, 1989:352). He argues that while the state was necessary for the formation of national loyalties, its operations owed much to the presence of core ethnic communities around which these states were built up. However, states which were a direct consequence of colonization were imposed on peoples whose leaders, at the time of independence, were left solely the infrastructure of a state. Rarely was this accompanied by a common identity which could be utilized in the process of nation building, as Singapore amply demonstrates. Counter to Anthony Smith’s argument that the state is built around an ethnic community, rather the development of nationhood had to contend with the presence of ethnic communities. It is therefore useful to draw attention to the two variants of the ‘nation’ discussed by Hobsbawm (1990:22). For nationalists, the

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Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

creation of a political entity was seen to be derived from the prior existence of a community, for example of an ethnic type, distinguishing itself from foreigners. However, the revolutionarydemocratic notion of the state, as in post-revolutionary France, could only be understood as the response of a populace attempting to liberate itself from the control of absolute monarchies. When the revolutionary democrat appealed to a sense of patriotism or national loyalty, it was state-based rather than nationalist (Hobsbawm, 1990:87). Such an appeal related to the idea of a sovereign people in the name of whom the state exercised power. Ethnicity or other elements were irrelevant to ‘the nation’ in this sense, and a common language was significant only on the pragmatic grounds of coordination and communication. The emergence of nationalism in the last third of the nineteenth century posed a potential threat to states (Hobsbawm, 1990:89–90). The state was forced to confront nationalism as a political force separate from it. If nationalism could be tamed and become a central emotional component of loyalty to the state, then it could become a powerful asset of government. States in Southeast Asia, which have been formed as a consequence of decolonization, are not the products of popular uprisings in the sense that revolutionary-democratic states could be seen to be. They were independent states created out of territories under colonial administration. Their boundaries were drawn, as Hobsbawm (1990:171) portrays it, without any reference to, and sometimes without the knowledge of, their inhabitants. The formation of such states had no significance for their populations, except, perhaps, for their colonial-educated and Westernized native elites. Having inherited the state, such elites were subsequently faced with the problem of creating nationality. Singapore’s emergence as an independent state vividly illustrates this process. Singapore was given limited self-government by the British in 1959, incorporated into the Malaysian Federation in 1963 and gained independence reluctantly on expulsion from Malaysia in 1965. Its leaders found themselves in possession of a state but without a nation. Although one option in the process of independence and decolonization after 1945 was the assertion of a primordial identity, the general movement was towards identification with socialist/ communist anti-imperialism, as Hobsbawm shows (1990:149). As such, many decolonized and newly independent states declared themselves to be in some sense ‘socialist’. The PAP leadership in Singapore was no exception to this broader tendency, but was inhibited from embarking on a radical socialist programme for a

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number of compelling reasons. From the beginning, the Englisheducated moderates within the party adopted a strong and militant anti-colonial stance demanding immediate national independence through peaceful constitutional means (Yeo and Lau, 1991:130). However, despite their constitutionality the moderates could not be seen as overtly anti-communist since they needed the help of the Chinese-educated communists, an influential group within the PAP, to maintain communication with the Chinese-educated (and Chineseoriented) population. The major ethnic communities in Singapore had strong affectual ties with their ‘motherland’; the Indians with India and the Malays with Malaya. The Chinese in the 1950s identified strongly with China, which had become a communist state in 1949. Consequently, the communist faction within the PAP had considerable support from working-class Chinese. When the leftwing leaders finally split from the party in 1961 to form the Barisan Sosialis party, the PAP moderates were left to chart their own course for Singapore. While initially committed to socialist ideals and a panMalayan nation, the shock of expulsion from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, followed in July 1967 by the announced withdrawal of British military forces from Singapore and Malaysia, required the PAP not only to formulate a new economic strategy of self-reliance, but also to articulate for its citizens the difficult circumstances in which it found itself as part of a nation building exercise. This has been variously characterized as the ‘ideology of survival’ (Chan, 1971a), an ‘ideology of pragmatism’ (Chan and Evers, 1973) and a ‘garrison mentality’ (Brown, 1994). By the PAP leaders themselves it was seen as building a ‘rugged society’. Westernized political elites in newly independent countries have faced the task of shedding their colonial or neo-colonial identities and replacing them with available alternatives. In Southeast Asia, there were two such alternatives (Chan and Evers, 1973:303–4). One was to resort to a ‘regressive’ identity by reviving a long and proud cultural tradition through an appeal to the ‘golden past’. The other was a ‘progressive’ identity, embodying an ameliorative programme of building a society by discarding its feudal or colonial shackles: one such option lay in establishing a socialist state. However, neither of these alternatives was viable in the context of Singapore. A progressive identity was too strongly identified at that time with support for Chinese socialism. Events in the early 1960s which caused Tunku to fear a communist take-over of the Singapore government and the creation of Southeast Asia’s ‘Cuba’ (Busch, 1974:26) was still fresh in the minds of the Singapore leaders, who

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Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

were most concerned to attract foreign investment consequent upon its separation from the mainland. A return to the ‘golden past’, which would have nurtured an ethnic revival, had potentially divisive consequences given the ethnic composition of Singapore. In 1970, over 76 per cent of the total population were Chinese, 15 per cent Malays and 7 per cent Indians (these proportions have remained virtually constant up to the present). A socialist identity, sanctioned by the PAP elite in the initial struggle for independence, was no longer acceptable in the 1960s as Singapore found itself having to squeeze every advantage it could get from the international economy for its mere survival. It had been first and foremost a trading centre. After the 1965 expulsion from the Federation and the 1967 announcement of impending British military withdrawal, the Singapore state embarked on an ambitious industrialization policy, which in turn meant attracting foreign investment. Socialist ideals were articulated for domestic consumption while foreign policy was geared towards encouraging overseas capital. The intimate connection between nation building and industrialization which can be traced in Singapore is fully consistent with Gellner’s argument that the nation emerges in the process of industrialization (1983:55). Because a modern economy requires a mobile labour force and communication between individuals, a common public education system is necessary. Therefore, the homogenizing tendency of a modern industrial society would, out of sheer necessity, overcome the divides and particularistic identities which separate individuals and groups. As a consequence, intended or unintended, a nation is created. And it is a central argument of this book that the analysis of nationality and citizenship in Singapore must acknowledge the key role of the state. In conceptualizing the state, three essential features have been identified: centrality, territoriality and control (Mann, 1984:188–9). What these characteristics have in common is that they all concern the exercise and deployment of power. In the case of the modern state, what is relevant is the exercise of infrastructural power by institutions of the state. Mann refers to infrastructural power as the capacity of the modern state to penetrate and implement political decisions throughout civil society. Such powers, he argues, are immense. They include taxing income, storing and retrieving a massive amount of information about its citizens, influencing the economy and directly or indirectly providing subsistence for most of its inhabitants. The modern state, in the view of Mann and Giddens,

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penetrates everyday life to a much greater extent than did any historical state. There is in their accounts little hiding place for the individual from the infrastructural reach of the modern state: this, it might be noted, is in contrast to the Durkheimian paradox—which is examined in the account of intermediary structures—that to some degree the individual ‘eludes’ the state (Durkheim, 1957:63). However, the ability of the state to exercise control and ensure an orderly functioning of society cannot depend on coercion alone; the state requires the practical consent of its tax-paying citizens. In the past, and to a large extent in the contemporary world, the military role of the state has been critical in exercising control over territory. Taxation was necessary to fund military service and warfare, both of which functions of the state have contributed to the development of citizenship (see Smith, 1981b; Turner, 1986). The more the state penetrated society and reached a greater number of people, the more it had to legitimize its power. As a result of regular contact, government and subject or citizen (with an historical progression from the former to the latter) were linked by daily bonds as never before (Hobsbawm, 1990:81). Unlike the traditional state in which the relationship between subject and sovereign was subordinate and passive, government and citizenship demanded active co-operation from all in the modern state. As Hobsbawm depicts the process: It became equally obvious, at least from the 1880s, that wherever the common man was given even the most nominal participation in politics as a citizen—with the rarest exception the common woman remained excluded—he could no longer be relied on to give automatic loyalty and support to his betters or to the state…. Obviously, the demoralization of politics, i.e. on the one hand the growing extension of the (male) franchise, on the other the creation of the modern, administrative, citizen-mobilizing and citizen-influencing state, both placed the question of the ‘nation’, and the citizen’s feelings towards whatever he regarded as his ‘nation’, nationality or other centre of loyalty, at the top of the political agenda. (Hobsbawm, 1990:83) The state had no guarantee of security—nor could passivity be expected from its citizens—as emergent political parties sought to mobilize constituencies within the overall population on the basis of national, non-national or alternative national appeals (Hobsbawm, 1990:44). The rhetoric of nationhood became an essential political

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Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

strategy of the modern state as it sought to neutralize competing appeals from ethnic and non-ethnic groups. It is appropriate here to identify two dimensions in the construction of the nation, the cultural-symbolic and the civicinstrumental (Breton, 1984; 1988). The rhetoric of nationhood involves the generation of cultural-symbolic capital in society, and the restructuring of collective identity and its symbolic contents. The development of such an identity is important for individual members of society because ‘individuals expect to recognize themselves in public institutions. They expect some consistency between their private identities and the symbolic contents upheld by public authorities, embedded in the societal institutions, and celebrated in public events’ (Breton, 1984:124–5). However, any attempt to articulate a collective identity, or to change it, results in an allocation or reallocation of social status or recognition among various segments of the society (Breton, 1984:126). The cultural-symbolic construction of the nation in Singapore is clearly illustrated in subsequent developments in the PAP’s policy on bilingualism, multiracialism and national values—all of which have been differentially received by the ethnic groups in the Republic. The civicinstrumental dimension, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the material and the utilitarian, and the problems of administration and resource control (Breton, 1988:87). The government of a newly independent state is almost immediately confronted with maintaining its infrastructure while at the same time devoting sufficient effort to the construction of its symbolic order. The construction of the nation also requires the use of power, and this is distinguished in three forms (Bobbio quoted from Poggi, 1990:4). Economic power is exercised by the state through incentives and rewards, occasionally penalties, to influence the conduct of the population. Ideological power is based on the use of ideas and values to mobilize the inhabitants. Political power is the use of coercion. All three types have been used throughout the period the PAP has been in government as the following chapters will show; only the emphasis has changed. Thus, while economic power has been most consistently applied, ideological power can be seen as a marked feature of the period 1975–91, and coercive political power was especially evident in the early years of independence. The marked difference is that the first-generation leadership led by Lee Kuan Yew has been particularly effective in persuading Singaporeans of the wisdom of its policies. This was greatly aided by the dominance of a single political party which exercised an overwhelming hegemony after independence

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through such agencies as education, the media and grassroots organizations—Community Centres, Citizens’ Consultative Committees, and Residents’ Committees. The PAP government, on taking office in 1959, consolidated its position in the administrative structure by exposing senior bureaucrats to party ideology (Chan, 1991:162). The politicization of bureaucrats together with the establishment of a network of partyrelated organizations at the grassroots level ensured its monopoly of the political ground. The PAP was thus left largely free to set its own agenda for nation building and identity-construction, occasional challenges from representatives of ethnic extremism notwithstanding. Despite its dominance of the discourse on national identity, the PAP has had constantly to regenerate and renegotiate the process as it was confronted by unanticipated contradictions and by the logic of the Return to Sender process. Nevertheless, the Singapore state, in penetrating deep into the lives of its citizens, offered them a stronger sense of security, affiliation and even personal identity—certainly more so than any other alternative source (Deutsch cited in Alter, 1989:123). The greater the perceived need for such affiliation and identity in the face of past political and social upheavals, the greater the potential power of the state in demanding citizenship responsibilities. Paradoxically, the security and identity of citizens have to be reinforced by the creation of recurrent ‘crises’ which draw attention to the state’s key arbitrating role, a process which will be analysed in subsequent chapters, for instance, in relation to the visit of the Israeli President in 1986 and the reaction this provoked in Malaysia (Leifer, 1988). In this way, the state demonstrates the necessity of its citizens’ recognition of and compliance with its own definitions of identity and political reality. However, the political skills of the first-generation leaders of Singapore in using the powers of persuasion may be found wanting in the second-generation leaders. This has been succinctly described by Vasil: The first generation leaders, having recruited technocrats devoid of political skills as their successors, had tended to consider the important political tasks of dealing with the common masses and mobilising their support for the government as their domain, their special responsibilty; they had made no special efforts to train and tutor the second generation in the art of political management and given them opportunities to experience the rough and tumble of competitive politics. They had been left mostly to preoccupy

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Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore themselves, as functionaries of the regime, with the administration and management of social and economic change. Their background, attitudes and functions and activities were not vastly different from those of senior civil servants. (Vasil, 1992:203–4)

Thus, to the three types of power may be added a fourth, the power of competent authority in which the claim to influence is based on the expertise and technical competence of the political elite. This is the hallmark of the second-generation leadership led by Goh Chok Tong. SOVEREIGNTY This discussion of the government-citizenship relationship has touched on the ‘internal’ legitimacy of the state. Whether a government is able to reflect the wishes of its citizens and mobilize their support is in part a question of political representation, but also in part it rests on the state’s ability to deliver an acceptable standard of living. A significant example of this process in Singapore is dealt with in the chapter on housing policy. One of the tasks of this book will be to show that this has important implications for the theory of citizenship. In addition to its internal legitimacy, the state has to be legitimated externally. This requires that its sovereignty be recognized by other states. Interstate tensions may be heightened by two often contradictory criteria by which such claims to sovereignty might be made (Poggi, 1978:90). One is the principle of ‘nationality’. The other criterion is the declaration of ‘natural borders’ or physical boundaries which render states militarily defensible and economically viable. The governing elite in Singapore did not view its present borders as ‘natural’ until forced to do so by separation from Malaysia in 1965; and there are still anxieties expressed about the ‘narrowness’ of Singapore’s geography (see Lee Kuan Yew, ST, 5.10.91). Using these criteria, it was possible to advance a claim on the basis of nationality while rejecting a competing state’s appeal to ‘natural borders’. Conversely, a claim could be made on ‘recognized borders’ as a means of rejecting arguments of nationality. One of the legacies of colonial rule in Southeast Asia was the tacit recognition of spheres of influence and the respect for borders as a means of avoiding confrontation between the French, British and Dutch in both mainland and island territories. Claims over islands, frequently viewed as a no man’s land, are more complicated: for instance, there is ongoing debate between Malaysia, Vietnam, China,

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the Philippines and Brunei over the designation of the Spratly Islands, just as there is between Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca (Pulau Batu Putih). Where states are preoccupied with claims over sovereignty in terms of physical boundaries, nationality may become exclusivist, emphasizing a distinct if not superior identity (Giddens 1985:217–18). Governments then become more defensive about the categories of persons they recognize as citizens rather than with their political capacity to respond to the interests and needs of their citizens. Consequently, in situations of disputed sovereignty, citizenship rights—especially civil and political rights—are likely to be poorly developed. Internally, the legitimacy of the state revolves around the construction of nationality; externally, it requires the skilful management of interstate relations. Both aspects of nation building are analogous to the maintenance of the ethnic boundary; for it is the boundary which defines the ethnic group, not the cultural content that it encloses (Bauman, 1992:678). Nationality and physical borders constitute the imaginary and real boundaries of the nation respectively, and they may be viewed as ‘discourses in which identities and counter-identities are conceived and through which they are sustained’ (Bauman, 1992:678) in the construction of the nation. The greater the need for such boundaries to be maintained the more exclusivist citizenship and membership of a nation-state will be. CITIZENSHIP AND NATION BUILDING A valuable distinction has been made between radical and formal citizenship (Turner, 1986:67). Radical citizenship is the outcome of class struggles, war, migration and egalitarian ideologies. The revolutionary-democratic states of nineteenth-century Europe which emerged from popular uprising generated a form of citizenship that was ‘real and expansive rather than formal and defensive’ (Turner, 1986:67). This has been seen by various theorists as a bottom-up process, resulting in a dispersion of political decision-making among a wide group of citizens, a form of what Giddens calls polyarchy. Polyarchy, as Giddens depicts it (1985:199), is rule by the many, and involves the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens considered as political equals. A polyarchic society, in theory, should generate a citizenry which is participatory and responsible in terms of civic obligations. By contrast, citizenship as a formal status—that is, primarily focused on the question of who qualifies to be a citizen—is used by governments defensively, as a

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Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

means of exclusion and control. It is not surprising, given the chronicle of failures in the implementation of polyarchy in most nonWestern societies, that Southeast Asian governments are more circumspect about the practice of democracy and the fostering of civil society. As the final chapter reveals, the discussion of the concept of civil society—in the sense of a set of institutions independent of the state yet capable of collective mobilization—is of very recent origin in Singapore. The ramification for the development of citizenship is that it is viewed by such governments as a formal status, that is, as an exclusionary strategy. This has been particularly evident in the political formation of the Federation of Malaya and subsequently Malaysia, where the state faced the task of defining in the clearest possible way the criteria of inclusion and exclusion—a consequence of Sino-Malay polarization precipitated by the British proposal to establish a unitary state. The development of citizenship is naturally related to political developments in the peninsula; and one consequence, it will be seen later, is the evolution of liberal citizenship laws on the island. The original concept of Singapore citizenship introduced in 1957 had only nominal significance (Goh, 1970:1). Aliens could own property and do business without any restrictions. With the introduction of an elected Legislative Assembly in 1959, only those who were citizens could vote. Prior to 1965 and Singapore’s full independence, aliens could work for anyone who was prepared to employ them. Singapore’s population was made up of large numbers of immigrants who were non-citizens. With the introduction of work permits and travel restrictions at the Johore causeway which links Singapore with the Malay peninsula—a development which was consequent on the expulsion from Malaysia—Singapore citizenship was of greater consequence to all who lived there. Non-citizens no longer had the automatic right to work and were required to apply for a work permit. Those having no documentary proof of their birth in Singapore were thereafter treated as non-citizens. The onus was on individuals to establish their status as Singapore citizens. The foregoing discussion illustrates how governments in new nations commonly regard citizenship as a matter of status and as a means of exclusion from membership of a political community. Analytically, this implies that citizenship and nationality bear no simple relation to each other. Just as states can exist without nations and vice versa, so inhabitants can be formally recognized as citizens without maintaining any symbolic identification with the collectivity. For the political leadership of new nations, citizenship is an

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administrative problem, consequent upon inheriting a state. In its origins, citizenship carried no connotations of sovereignty and the development of nationality. Within the geopolitical circumstances in which Singapore found itself, nation building was—and in the view of politicians remains—a long-term prospect. In summary, the nation-state is the product of two parallel processes and its legitimacy is viewed at two levels, external and internal, associated with these processes. Between states, sovereignty hinges on the question of nationality, which can be defined in terms of whether individuals and groups are perceived as identifying with the state; and sovereignty also depends on establishing the principle of mutual recognition of borders. Whether states can sustain their sovereignty depends on the viability principle to which Hobsbawm alludes, and which may be seen both in political and economic terms. Within states, nationality cannot be taken for granted. It is dependent on the question of whether individuals and groups identify with the state. This in turn is conditioned by the extent to which governments are willing and prepared to accommodate the interests of constituent groups (which may be ethnic or non-ethnic; for example, they may be age-based) within their populations, while simultaneously balancing such interests against the capacity to deliver a certain minimum standard of living, economic welfare and security. In return there is the question of whether individuals are willing to fulfil the obligations that government may, from time to time, require of them. The legitimacy of the nation-state is determined by the extent to which the two parallel processes converge. Both processes, we propose, are articulated within the development of citizenship. Only within this framework of ideas can we appreciate how the state, nationality and citizenship impact on each other. CITIZENSHIP AS CONTESTATION We can now discuss citizenship proper. Any discussion of citizenship within a sociological context must acknowledge Marshall’s seminal essay on ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (1950), which was first delivered as a lecture in 1949. In this presentation, citizenship is seen as being constituted by three elements (Marshall, 1965:78). The civil element refers to the rights of the individual—freedom of speech and faith, the right to own property and to justice. The political element is portrayed as the right to participate directly or indirectly in the exercise of political power. The implementation of this right pertains to political representation. The social element contains the right to

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economic welfare and security and to share in the social heritage and an acceptable standard of living. Marshall (1965:90) then proceeds to trace the development of citizenship in England. Civil rights were first secured at the end of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth centuries, followed by political rights, expanding throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, and culminating in social rights, the establishment of which spans the period between the development of public elementary education in the mid-nineteenth century and the introduction of social benefit entitlements in the post-Second World War period. The evolutionary development of citizenship which Marshall portrays has been a focus of critical appraisal. Giddens, for example (1985:205), cites the case of nineteenth-century Germany, in which Bismarck conceded welfare rights to the working class in order to prevent the extension and realization of political rights. Another example of the open-ended development of citizenship rights can be provided by the case of Malaysia. While those of Malay origin were accorded unconditional citizenship and therefore political rights after independence in 1957, the Chinese had access to citizenship under certain restrictions such as a specified period of residence and language competence in Malay or English. Yet it may be argued that the Chinese, by virtue of their dominance in largely urban and commercial occupations, were able to secure economic and educational advantages, and therefore social rights, far earlier than were the Malays. This illustrates the point made by Barbalet (1988:21) that while citizenship rights can be exercised by all who possess them, they serve members of different classes—and, we may add, ethnic groups—differently. While it is tempting to regard citizenship as a means of social and political integration, citizenship rights can equally be viewed as a site of social conflict (Barbalet, 1988:81). As such, the question must then be raised as to the type of citizenship rights which have been most favourable for the maintenance of social cohesion. Barbalet (1988:91) suggests that while much overt contestation may occur around the question of civil and political rights, the significance of social rights in citizenship lies precisely in their tendency to remove illegitimate inequalities from society. Thus he would see the fulfilment of social and economic citizenship as performing a key integrative function. Recent discussions of the nature of citizenship suggest that it is perhaps most useful to view the concept as identifying three arenas of contestation—legal, political and social/economic—rather than as signifying an evolutionary schema (Giddens, 1985:205). It is also

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important to view citizenship as a concept implying reciprocity. As individuals and groups compete for citizenship rights and put pressure on the state to deliver these rights, they are in turn monitored by the state and its bureaucracy. Individuals and groups are to be viewed not only as right-bearing units but also as dutybearing units, the latter being an aspect of citizenship explored by Oldfield (1990) which is discussed below. This is what the present chapter—as a means of encapsulating the surveillance and communication functions of the modern state—has termed the ‘Return to Sender’ dynamic of citizenship. This can be explained by returning to the discussion of Giddens: he points to the generic association between the nation-state and polyarchy—or government by the many, a term preferred to democracy—and depicts this as a continuing responsiveness on the part of government to its citizens’ preferences (1985:199). Since the modern state extends its administration in the form of surveillance over its constituent population, this both marginalizes its control over the deployment of violence as a mechanism of rule and simultaneously increases the reciprocal relationship between governors and governed. In consequence of this, the rights associated with citizenship have been enhanced in the three sectors (though not necessarily stages) of civil, political and social/economic rights. Each of these sectors should be seen, argues Giddens, as an arena of conflict linked to distinct forms of surveillance, and he offers the following typology: Citizenship sector civil political

economic

Surveillance mode policing ‘reflexive monitoring’ of state administration ‘management’ of production

Institutional locale law courts parliament/council

work-place

Each form of citizenship rights is double-edged in the sense that it can be employed to expand the control of the dominant group over the subordinates, while simultaneously being used by the latter as a lever of struggle against such control. The Return to Sender dynamic occurs because in order to extend its administrative surveillance into the day-to-day activities of its population the modern state requires a ‘public’ which is aware of its membership in a common polity and can respond to the state’s initiatives. Such responses constitute an ongoing source of feedback by means of which the state is able to

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formulate further initiatives, which will in turn induce further responses. One implication of recent non-evolutionary accounts of the different forms of citizenship is that rights in one sector may be relatively unsynchronized with those in another. This is because the different elements of citizenship have different institutional bases and different histories. They also bear different relations with distinct social groups and with each other (Barbalet, 1988:6–7). For example, Turner (1986; 1988; 1990; 1991) refers to the differential impact of citizenship rights on status, both in terms of ethnic group membership and of life-cycle fluctuations in the availability of certain rights. Ethnic minorities, the aged or unmarried mothers may not enjoy the full benefits of citizenship. Refinements of this kind are reminders that the distinction should always be made between de jure and de facto conditions in the allocation of and access to citizenship rights and obligations. CITIZENSHIP AS MEMBERSHIP OF A COMMUNITY Barbalet (1988:87–8) draws attention to an important aspect of citizenship discussed by Marshall. Citizenship is not merely about formal rights; it is about participation in social life and therefore contributes to the integration of society. In its most developed form, it is real membership of a real community, based on loyalty to a civilization (the content of which he goes on to elaborate) commonly shared. Hence citizenship has a normative component which includes the acceptance of national and societal values. This is described as realizing the cultural content of full citizenship (Turner, 1991:216). Such a notion of citizenship, referring as it does to membership of a community, is closely related to the problematic process of creating nationality. As Barbalet explains: the looser the notion of the common civilization shared by citizens the more likely it is that citizenship will be a successful source or support of social integration; the vaguer the idea of a common civilization the greater the range and diversity of interests and values to be accommodated by it. (Barbalet, 1988:88) In multi-ethnic societies like Singapore, membership of a community is articulated in supra-ethnic terms. As debate over the 1991 White Paper on Shared Values demonstrates, the articulation of a set of

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national values has been possible only when those values have successfully transcended ethnic identifications and loyalties. The articulation of a common set of values of a general and succinct kind—a project similar to Rousseau’s delineation of civil religion (Rousseau, 1973:276)—is examined in Chapter 8. It is apparent that ‘nation building’ in Singapore since 1965 has revolved around the concepts of multiracialism (or effectively multiculturalism), meritocracy and multilingualism. Multiracialism is defined by Singapore leaders as the practice of cultural tolerance towards the various communities; acceptance of differences in religious practices, customs and traditions of the different communities; and according each community equality before the law and equal opportunity for advancement (Chan and Evers, 1973:308– 9). Meritocracy is appropriate to multiracialism since it facilitates social mobility by dint of hard work and gives no special advantage to any single ethnic community. The practice of multilingualism, while formally recognizing Malay, Chinese and Tamil as official languages, nevertheless accords English the status of lingua franca. The practice of bilingual education requires that all students learn English as well as their ‘mother tongue’ which, for practical purposes, is their second language. Multiracialism can be seen as one of the founding myths of the Republic of Singapore (Benjamin, 1976:116). The other founding myth is meritocracy. Because of the relatively short history of Singapore and the presence of several ethnic communities, Singapore’s leaders cannot rely on a ‘golden past’—or Chan and Evers’s ‘regressive identity’—in searching for the myths of nationhood. Instead they have to look towards the future and the importance of economic achievements to articulate their conception of the nation. For example, it has recently been stated as official policy (ST, 14.10.91) that the government plans to make Singaporeans as rich as Americans by the year 2030, and one can find many instances of similar appeals to economic success as a measure of the state’s performance. Such universalistic appeals are intended to override the development of ethnically based nationalism, since nationalism in multi-ethnic societies is a divisive force if it is identified, as it often is, with a particular ethnic identity (see for example, M.G.Smith, 1986). If citizenship, as membership of a community and a common civilization, can be developed in the loose and vague sense that Barbalet suggests, it may provide an alternative to more particularistic forms of nationalism. In a speech in 1968, Foreign Minister S.Rajaratnam stated that the

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nationalism of the past, referring to the regressive identity of the ‘golden past’, was appropriate in the fight for freedom, but was unsuitable for dealing with the problems of independence (Chan and Haq, 1987:140). He called for a renovation of its content so that Asian nationalism could move towards regionalism and internationalism. As will be shown, the appeal to pragmatism, especially in the economic sphere, has been presented as one of the characteristic features of Singaporean citizenship. Hence, nation building in Singapore does not consist, as one might expect, of the cultivation of ‘nationalist’ feelings but rather the practice of citizenship in the civic-republican tradition, as outlined by Oldfield (1990). He points to the tradition of liberal individualism which defines citizenship in terms of rights and status and counterposes the tradition of civic republicanism in which the individual becomes a citizen through performing the duties of the practice of citizenship: Within civic republicanism, citizenship is an activity or a practice, and not simply a status, so that not to engage in the practice is, in important senses, not to be a citizen. Second, civic republicanism recognizes that, unsupported, individuals cannot be expected to engage in the practice. (Oldfield, 1990:5) Hence individuals have to be given opportunities to perform the duties associated with the practice of citizenship and also be given sufficient motivation to practise them. The appropriateness of this concept of citizenship within a Singapore context is further addressed in subsequent chapters. The ideology of multiracialism as nurtured and practised in Singapore should also be viewed in the context of interstate relations and sensitivities. Both her neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia, have predominantly Muslim populations. Furthermore, Singapore’s closest neighbour, Malaysia, with whom there are strong historical ties, has a substantial Chinese community. Multiracialism is an effective counter to the possibility of ethnic polarization within Singapore which, if it were to occur, would have negative consequences for interstate relations. Multiracialism, as enunciated and practised in Singapore, is sufficiently vague and encompassing—emphasizing as it does a depoliticized and culturally defined notion of ‘race’-to be an effective strategy in defining a Singaporean nationality and facilitating social integration. The policy of ‘multiracialism’ in Singapore has been deployed in

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order to depoliticize ethnic issues. In common with multicultural policies in an ethnically plural society such as Australia, the ‘culture’ in multiculturalism refers to the ‘interesting’, ‘colourful’ and personal ‘lifestyles’ which belong to the private domain of family and religious belief (Castles et al., 1988:121). It may also refer to folk art, dance, craft and music but they are all kept distinct from public or national issues which are the responsibility of the state. As part of its articulation as a founding myth, multiracialism has a depoliticizing function and prevents potential ethnic divisions from developing in the realm of public politics. Citizenship in Singapore is viewed, implicitly, as membership of a ‘multiracial’ community and the responsibilities that go with it. As long as multiracialism is defined and perceived loosely (in the sense in which Barbalet uses this term) and the practice of ‘ethnicity’ is confined to the private domain, it is an effective instrument of social integration. When, however, the state has embarked upon a more explicit articulation of ‘culture’ or ‘identity’ as it did during the 1980s in attempting to introduce Confucian ethics in schools and in propagating its Speak Mandarin campaign publicly, many sections of the population, including English-educated Chinese, expressed misapprehensions. Multiracialism, meritocracy and bilingualism as the conceptual apparatus for creating a national community offer significant insights into the development of citizenship in the modern state as portrayed by Giddens (1985:210). Citizenship was absent in traditional states, he contends, because the sovereign-subject relationship was a passive one. If it existed at all, most people were unaware of it, since the consciousness necessary to conceptualize such a relationship was undeveloped. However, the more the administrative state penetrated the everyday activities of its subjects, the less this was true. The expansion of state sovereignty means that those subject to it are in some sense—initially vague, but growing more and more definite and precise—aware of their membership in a political community and of the rights and obligations such membership confers. (Giddens, 1985:210) The simple act of voting attests to this. ‘A state can only be sovereign,’ Giddens states, ‘if large segments of the population of that state have mastered an array of concepts connected with sovereignty’ (Giddens, 1985:210). Multiracialism, meritocracy and bilingualism, in our view, are just such concepts and are internalized by

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Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore

Singaporeans through a variety of mechanisms of socialization including education, public ceremonies and the media. They have contributed to the development of sovereignty and the sense of nationality in Singapore. In order to communicate effectively with the rest of the population, leaders in Singapore, as in other states engaged in a process of post-colonial consolidation, must generate a common cultural mode (Benjamin, 1988:19): this is the common view of several recent accounts of citizenship (Barbalet, 1988; Giddens, 1985; Turner, 1986). Given that no common culture was already in existence, the political leaders were obliged to synthesize one out of whatever elements were available, a process which has been outlined above as incorporating such elements as multiracialism and meritocracy. From time to time, the mass media are mobilized to engender personal identity crises in the citizenry so that the leaders can then present themselves as possessing the means to solve people’s crises and provide them with a certain ‘identity’ (Benjamin, 1988:22). In this way the ‘boundary’ of the nation may be maintained (Bauman, 1992:678). This strategy is used quite openly and with the conscious goal of enhancing the sense of dependence on the state. For example, a minister in the Singapore government in 1970 expressed it in the following way: And one of the things we can do to get a little further down the road a little faster is to raise the spectre of total disaster as the alternative….Within this context, sooner or later they [the citizens] will change. (Betts, 1975:141) In the absence of war or any other crisis by which the citizenry is tested and nations are built, it is arguably the only effective strategy available to leaders in peacetime and in a buoyant economy. The dynamics of crisis construction and crisis management in Singapore have been well analysed by Regnier, who emphasizes their constant rehearsal by the political elite: ‘After the crisis of 1963–5, the PAP continued to keep up an atmosphere of psychosis, in direct relation to the perpetual challenges of shaky external events’ (Regnier, 1991:230). Throughout this book the ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP) is treated as being largely synonymous with the state, and this requires some explication. The relationship between the party and the state in Singapore has been variously described in the literature as a

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dominant party system (Bellows, 1970), as the administrative state (Chan, 1989) and as the corporatist state (Brown, 1994). While these labels capture significant aspects of the operation of the state and serve heuristic purposes, their limitations are worth noting. Bellows (1970:8), writing in the late 1960s, a time when the PAP began to establish its dominance after a prolonged period of often competitive, if not debilitating, party politics, understandably described Singapore as having moved from a multiparty system to a dominant party system. The relationship between party and state is not addressed in this formulation. It certainly is not a one-party state in the sense that it is party-driven, or that there are formal constitutional checks on the emergence of opposition parties. Brown (1994:69), in developing the corporatist state model, draws attention to corporatism as a strategy employed by Third World states to curtail the divisive nature of mass politics, and thus to enable the state elite to concentrate on the management of economic development. His model is restricted to the management of ethnic relations in Singapore, a fuller discussion of which is given in Chapter 4. However, in constructing the model of the corporatist state Brown inflates the monolithic nature of the state. Chan’s model of the administrative state (1989:78–82) presents its goal-orientation, efficiency and effectiveness as being vital to economic growth. For this reason the political arena is clearly defined, open politics is discouraged, and the ambit of decisionmaking in the bureaucracy is expanded. While the political leadership—an elite group comprised of personnel with a proven track record—is responsive to popular needs, it is essentially paternalistic. It decides what is desirable for society and is not accountable to the public except in a formal sense (Girling, 1981:51). Drawing on the various elements referred to in this discussion the polity in Singapore may be summarized. At the apex is the state elite, the members of which are mostly recruited, in the case of the secondgeneration PAP leadership, from the military, bureaucracy, business and tertiary institutions. The PAP and Parliament, which is dominated by PAP members, clearly constitute the demarcated sphere of political activity. At the lowest level are parapolitical institutions and grassroots organizations, which provide feedback to the elite after the information gathered has undergone a filtering process. SUMMARY This is a point at which some of the conceptual material in this chapter and its relevance to the nation building process in

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Singapore can briefly be summarized. It has been argued that in order to accomplish successfully the process of nation building, the state must make itself ‘meaningful’ to its citizens in ways which have been detailed above. The process is one of establishing legitimacy and is necessitated by the state’s need not only to secure internal stability but also to demonstrate to other states, especially those in close proximity, that it possesses sovereignty over a given territory. This is particularly important when linguistic and religious groups which are dominant in a neighbouring state exist as minority ethnic groups in the state claiming such sovereignty. In such cases, the need to demonstrate a shared ‘national’ identity becomes acute, and the response of a number of newly emergent states has been to construct such identities around a core of shared values. These, like the notion of a common civilization (Barbalet, 1988:88), need to be phrased at a high level of generality in order to fulfil their task of generating social integration, particularly since they are required frequently to overarch the cultural values of a diversity of groups. Reference was made earlier to the argument of Chan and Evers that there have been two major alternatives for elites trying to shed a colonial or neo-colonial identification: one is to adopt a regressive identity, focusing on a ‘golden age’ in the past as a source of identity; the other is to adopt a future-oriented progressive identity, rejecting the past in favour of a new model of society, which has often been seen in socialist or communist terms (Chan and Evers, 1973). These alternatives may be regarded less as discreet options than as points on a continuum between which a ‘mix’ of traditional and progressive elements may be assembled. Hence, states in the process of nation building tend to be Janus-faced, selecting from the past and reconstituting those elements which are identified as possible sources of cultural ballast and therefore of stability while simultaneously orienting citizens towards the achievement of future goals in terms of which certain key value-components of identity can be highlighted. The concept of ‘cultural ballast’ is one which frequently appears in analyses of Singapore’s multiculturalism and bilingualism, and it refers to the state’s policy of stabilizing the identities of citizens by means of an input of ‘Asian values’ in response to the seemingly irresistible tide of Western materialism and decadence (see, for example, Benjamin, 1976:124; Quah, 1990:57). As will be shown later, nautical metaphors have played a significant role in political discourse—perhaps appropriately so given Singapore’s location and origins. In terms of our Janus-faced depiction, it can certainly be

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maintained that the mix of traditional and progressive elements has become more apparent during the 1980s. In this respect the situation of Singapore can be seen as openended, as the prefacing statement of Lee Kuan Yew indicates. The initial identification with Malaya, then Malaysia, is still evident in such practices as the singing of the national song in Malay: the latter is not without controversy, since the claim that some people do not understand it—and therefore, in the words of one critic, lack ‘strong emotions’ when they sing it (ST, 26.7.91)—is periodically made. With the forced separation of Singapore from the Federation in 1965 the political leadership faced the dilemma of what identity to select in order to facilitate nation building in a multiracial state. A regressive identity was not a viable option, since with a population containing a significant proportion of recent migrants, 76 per cent of whom were Chinese, the only major tradition available for appeal was Chinese; but the proximity of a ‘third China’ would be wholly unacceptable to Indonesia and Malaysia. The option of a progressive identity incorporating a socialist or communist model was vitiated both by the presence of Western forces in significant numbers (remnants of the British and Commonwealth military presence are still a prominent aspect of Singapore’s urban geography) and by the necessity of attracting foreign capital and trade to ensure economic survival. It would also have had to confront the ‘third China’ objection. The solution to the dilemma was to create an identity based on an ‘ideology of pragmatism’, an ideology so successful, suggests Chua, that it has penetrated the political consciousness of the population and provided the parameters for their common-sense knowledge (1983; 1985). More than this, the ideology has been so fully articulated that it is seen even by social scientists as the only rational choice and therefore as ‘non-ideological’ ideology (Chan and Evers, 1978:122; Chua, 1985). And the end goal for which pragmatism supplies the means can be encapsulated in the word ‘survival’; indeed, the survival motif has taken on the status of an evolutionary fiat. As cabinet minister George Yeo, addressing a preuniversity students’ seminar in 1989 argued: ‘Our Darwinian duty is to survive and prosper, as an independent nation, to the year 2050, at least, when most of you will still be around’ (1989b:84). In terms of our ‘Janus-faced’ depiction, we would characterize the ideology of pragmatism as the progressive component in the ‘mix’ of identity, utilized most fully in the public and especially political sphere of life. Acting as a counterbalance, and regarded by the state as an essential stabilizing element, is the regressive component of

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multiracialism. It is regressive in the sense that it highlights identities that are essentially traditional and primordial, though the state has been careful to encode them in ways that are non-conflictual. Thus racial identity is seen by the state as appropriate to the private and especially familial sphere of life, and is meticulously defined in apolitical, cultural terms (when expressions of multiracialism overstep these parameters they become ‘communalism’, which is proscribed as socially and politically disruptive). Bilingualism represents the communicative dimension of these two components English as lingua franca, associated with the progressive adoption of Western technology; ethnic ‘mother tongue’ as a regressive Asian ‘brake’ on overidentification with Western ideas and as a stabilizer in a rapidly changing social environment. Additionally, and with increasing assiduousness since 1988, the state has engaged in a search for a core set of distinctively Singaporean values which would have the function of fusing the two components and of realigning identity in the face of distortions perceived to have resulted from the ideology of pragmatism.

2 The ethnic origins of Singapore

The previous chapter examined the relationship between nation building and citizenship. It argued, in referring to Barbalet, that citizenship is more than a formal status—it is also about membership of a community and as such involves the acceptance of common societal values. Thus the development of citizenship is closely involved in the process of nation-building. Forging common values in newly independent states where there are two or more significant ethnic groups poses a formidable challenge to the political elite. It has been argued that a real and participatory form of citizenship was generated in the revolutionary-democratic states of nineteenthcentury Europe because they were the products of popular sentiments, and for this reason citizenship was inclusivist and indistinguishable from nationality. In contrast, newly independent states such as Singapore and Malaysia, created by colonization, struggled to come to terms with a definition of citizenship acceptable to all because they did not share a common ‘nationality’ in the first place. Consequently, citizenship status was viewed in formal terms, as a means of inclusion or exclusion. This chapter traces the circumstances which led to the independence of Malaya, the formation of Malaysia, the merger of Singapore and its separation events which decisively influenced the definition of citizenship and the articulation of nationhood in the island Republic. The expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 has often been taken as the reference point for academic discourse on the nationstate in Singapore, with a succession of studies examining the issue of national identity. Four years after independence, a national probability sample survey of Singapore citizens, known as Singapore National Identity Survey (SNIS), was conducted to determine levels of national identification in the various ethnic groups. This survey set 39

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in motion subsequent studies on national identity, notably by Chiew (1972), the findings of which were published in Chan and Evers (1978), Chen (1983) and Quah et al. (1985). Data collected in the SNIS were used in an analysis of ethnicity and nationality by Chew (1987). In 1989 the Institute of Policy Studies was requested by the Singapore government to conduct a study to identify those national values which would help to unite all Singaporeans. Contributions were published in a book titled, In Search of Singapore’s National Values (Quah, 1990) which included findings from a major survey on national identity and citizens’ perception of national issues conducted by Chiew and Tan (1990). All these surveys had one thing in common, they attempted to track the extent to which the three major ethnic communities—the Chinese, Malays and Indians-identified themselves as Singaporean and with Singapore since independence. Such surveys were symptomatic of the preoccupation of the political elite with looking to the present and future for their vision of a national destiny. Careful and selective use was made of the traumatic past in constructing a sense of national identity. Albert Lau, quoting from Rajaratnam (a former minister and firstgeneration PAP leader), wrote: Indeed, in the official mind, ‘Creating an awareness of the past poses peculiar and unique problems for Singapore’. Given Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-cultural mix, the search for her past, it was feared, could easily drift into a search to strengthen ethnic and cultural identities and ‘turn Singapore into a bloody battle-ground for endless racial and communal conflicts’. The government was therefore compelled to be ‘careful about the kind of awareness of the past it should inculcate in a multi-cultural society’. (Lau, 1992:50) ‘Knowing where you are going to is more important than knowing where you came from’ (Rajaratnam quoted in Lau, 1992:50). For the next twenty years the ‘national psyche’ was made sense of in these terms. Until the mid-1980s, the past was neglected and the teaching of Singapore’s history was relegated to a minor component in the primary school curriculum. There is now a growing selfconsciousness among historians in Singapore that they should be writing about a state which acquired independence more than a quarter of a century ago and which has been, and still is, preoccupied with establishing its nationhood. A History of Singapore (Chew and

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Lee, 1991) was recently published and reflected this increasing selfawareness. The bulk of this work is devoted to tracing changes in the political, economic and social landscape of Singapore since independence in 1965. Lau (1992:62–3) noted that this book focused on selected themes instead of consecutive chronology, and echoed the comment by Turnbull that the time is not right for the ‘standard’ history of Singapore to be written. Turnbull’s view raises the interesting issue of whether she meant that Singapore had not matured as a nation or simply that its history was too short for historians to work on. THE MALAYAN UNION, 1946: IN SEARCH OF NATIONALITY It is our contention that the origins of the nation-state in Singapore extend further back than 1965. In order to understand the nature of citizenship in the nation-state that was propelled into existence so abruptly in 1965, it is necessary to establish an historical baseline in the events of, principally, the 1940s but with reference to more distant points in history. It began with the Japanese occupation of Malaya in 1942–5 during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, when the British announced plans to establish a unitary state over the Federated and Unfederated Malay States (FMS and UMS) and the Straits Settlements under the Malayan Union Scheme in 1946. The Union represented a major departure from colonial policy in pre-war Malaya. The sovereignty of the Malay Sultans in the FMS and UMS was to be transferred to the British Crown (Andaya and Andaya, 1982:255). Citizenship in the Malayan Union would be extended to all regardless of race or creed, and all citizens had equal rights. The citizenship provisions were very liberal. They were based on the principle of jus soli (citizen by birth) and conferred citizenship automatically on anyone born in the Straits Settlements or the Malay states. As such, the citizenship concept broke with previous practice—that of preserving only Malay political rights (Lau, 1991:4). Several reasons have been identified for this change in policy (Allen, 1967:8–10; Stockwell, 1979:21; Andaya and Andaya, 1982:254; Turnbull, 1977:229–30). First, the British hoped that the perennial problems of an incoherent administration for the whole of Malaya, which had dogged colonial officials since the turn of the century, would be solved by the Union. Second, the British recognized that an increasing number of immigrants were settling permanently

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in Malaya. They had come to play an indispensable role in the economy and the Chinese, in particular, were respected for their commitment in fighting the Japanese alongside Allied forces. ‘The emergence of a plural society, and the presence of an economically preponderant and majority non-Malay community by the early 1930s,’ Lau states (1991:15), ‘ensured that, while Malay rights could not be neglected, those of the Chinese and Indians equally could not be ignored.’ Furthermore, by the end of the Japanese occupation of Malaya the impression had been created in the Colonial Office that Malay support for the Malayan campaign was less than forthcoming, and that the Sultans had collaborated with the Japanese (Lau, 1991:72). Third, Britain was committed to a policy of decolonization as an integral part of the Allied strategy to convince the world of the justice of its cause. Singapore was excluded from the proposed Union partly because the liberal citizenship policy, which would have made large numbers of Chinese Malayan citizens and upset the racial balance in Malaya, was perceived as a political threat to the Malays. Britain hoped that Singapore’s exclusion would facilitate Malay acceptance of the scheme. In the short term at least, the overriding consideration was a constitutional union of the peninsular states—regarded by the Colonial Office as a necessary first step before a wider union of other British territories could be contemplated (Lau, 1992:282). Moreover, the British government considered Singapore a strategic naval base as its defence strategy shifted to Southeast Asia (Turnbull, 1989:228). However, despite the British plan not to include the island, the original proposals for Malayan Union citizenship included anyone born or having resided in Singapore for a minimum period (Ratnam, 1967:73). The apparent anomaly can be explained if we regard the British conception of citizenship in the Malayan Union as excluding nationality, for there was no nation. The sovereignty of the new state remained with the Crown. A committee was subsequently set up in 1946 to examine the proposals for Union citizenship (Lau, 1991:173– 82). It considered the arguments for accepting Singapore residents as Union citizens; a compromise suggestion was that these residents be granted ‘latent’ Malayan Union citizenship which could be ‘activated’ after a period of residence in the peninsula (Lau, 1991:179). It was rejected on the ground that it offered no advantage to either territory. The Committee eventually excluded Singapore residents as Union citizens for several reasons (Lau, 1991:181). One was that a possible conflict of interests could arise between the Union and Singapore, and that it was unjustifiable to allow Singapore residents to influence

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the direction of the Union if the island was not accorded full membership. The other was that exclusion of these residents from citizenship would not prejudice the possible fusion of the two territories in the future. The proposed Union and a common citizenship, from the British point of view, would help to regularize the status of the Chinese in Malaya, who were deemed subjects of China under the Chinese nationality law of 1929 (Lau, 1991:16–17). The scheme was also regarded by the British as a first step towards laying the foundation of a Malayan nationality and a Malayan community. The British government did not regard the exclusion of Singapore as a permanent arrangement. The draft of the Federation Agreement, an Anglo-Malay compromise worked out to accommodate Malay objections to the Union, reiterated British policy of not prejudicing the fusion of Singapore and the mainland should it be considered desirable (Yeo, 1973b:43). In 1953 when the Rendel Commission was appointed to review the constitution of the colony in preparation for responsible government, it took care that its recommendations would not impede closer association with the Federation as a basis for gaining full independence (Turnbull, 1977:242). Malay protest against the proposed Union was spontaneous and widespread, precipitating a Malay nationalist movement under the auspices of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). The Malayan Union scheme was revoked and replaced by the Federation of Malaya Agreement in 1948. Under the new Federation the sovereignty of the Sultans and the special position of the Malays were preserved (Stockwell, 1979:92). Citizenship was offered to nonMalays but the qualifications for eligibility were restrictive. ‘While reaffirming the pre-war “pro-Malay” policy in the Federation,’ Lau (1991:284) remarked, ‘the British, at the same time, implicitly recognized that Singapore should hitherto develop as a Chinese enclave. In restropect, the formula succeeded only too well.’ For the most part the Chinese were either hesistant of or indifferent to the Union when it was introduced in 1946. Unable to make the distinction between nationality and citizenship, the immigrant Chinese (mostly China-born) assumed that accepting Malayan citizenship automatically meant rejecting Chinese nationality (Lau, 1989:228–9). Many believed they would be returning to China in the future. Although by 1947 60 per cent of the Chinese population in Singapore were Malaya-born (Smith, 1964:177) a significant proportion maintained strong mainland links before the Chinese communist revolution, through kinship ties and a

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Chinese education that was essentially based on a China-oriented curriculum: the significance of this is underlined in the chapter on education and bilingualism. Together with the other 40 per cent of the China-born population this constituted an overwhelming number of Chinese who did not have strong ties with Malaya. It should also be noted that the majority of the Chinese population at this time were adults. Those who were born in the Straits Settlements, particularly those who could claim more than one generation of local-born, were the ones most inclined to view Malaya as their home. These were mainly middle-class Straits Chinese who, however, did not fully realize the implications of Union until it was abandoned by the British. By then it was too late and the Malays, through UMNO, had seized the initiative and were positioned to stamp their dominance on the direction of Malayan society. ‘The separation of Singapore and the Malayan Union,’ Yeo (1973a: 13) comments, ‘not only conditioned political development in the island but brought to the fore the question of merger of the two territories.’ When the proposed union was announced in 1946 the Chinese response was cautious (Cheah, 1978:110). The political situation was tense as a result of Sino-Malay clashes earlier in the year. Chinese leaders were preoccupied with rebuilding their businesses which were damaged during the Japanese occupation. Only the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), a left-wing anticolonial party, accepted the scheme, on condition that Singapore be included in the mainland (Yeo, 1973b:34). In the face of strong Malay opposition to the Union the British entered into secret talks with Malay leaders to work out a compromise. The British were mindful that Malay opinion should not be polarized to the extent that it became anti-British in the same way it had amongst Indonesians, who were engaged in open and armed resistance against the Dutch (Lau, 1991:279). As news that Malay objections would prevail and that the non-Malays would be discriminated against in the new Anglo-Malay proposals—which were later formalized in the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 (Yeo, 1973a:22–9)—a united front was hastily organized in opposition. The front had the support of several groups. These were the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), the first political party formed in Singapore by English-educated middle-class intellectuals fighting for a united and independent Malaya (Yeo, 1973a:88–9); and the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) which had its origins in the anti-Japanese struggle. The others were the Malay Nationalist

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Party (MNP)—formed by a group of radical Malay intellectuals in 1945 in the peninsula, who espoused left-wing ideas and the concept of a greater Indonesia (Yeo, 1973a:20–1) and a few prominent Chinese business interests. The united front, referred to as the PanMalayan Council for Joint Action (PMCJA), later renamed to distinguish between the Malay and non-Malay factions of the front, responded to the draft Federation Agreement with its own People’s Constitution in 1947. The People’s Constitution was a significant document in the context of political development in Singapore. It was largely a product of the Singapore-based MDU which contributed important ideas in articulating a Malayan political consciousness and a Malayan nationality. The MDU was led by middle-class Englisheducated non-Malays, trained in British universities and exposed to left-wing influence. They were anti-colonial, committed to fighting for a united and independent Malaya which included Singapore (Yeo, 1973a: 89). While not a mass-based party, it viewed independence as embracing peasants, smallholders, workers and the middle class. It therefore sought the active co-operation of the CPM, partly because it needed all the support it could get to oust the British and partly because it believed the strength of the CPM was in its mass organization—foreshadowing the strategy of the moderates in cultivating the support of the communists in the PAP. The MDU leaders were convinced that only the English-speaking and middle class had the expertise and knowledge to lead a democratic government in Malaya. It even anticipated that it may have to defend such a government against attacks from the CPM. The political career and fortunes of the PAP were uncannily foretold by the assessment of the MDU leaders. The proposals contained in the People’s Constitution represented the first ever attempt to create a Malayan nationality which transcended the Malay/non-Malay divide. The Constitution asserted that Malaya was a multiracial country, stressed a common citizenship which was a nationality in that everyone who qualified should be considered Malayans enjoying equal rights, and demanded immediate self-government (Yeo, 1973b:46–7). In contrast, the Anglo-Malay Federation Agreement assumed that Malaya was a Malay state, regarded citizenship as not conferring equal rights in the sense that political rights be in Malay hands until economic parity with non-Malays was achieved, and accepted the British concept of tutelage in a gradual devolvement of self-government. The concept of citizenship in the Federation did not encourage the development of a

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common nationality because it was used as a device to exclude those non-Malays whom the Malays perceived as having suspect or divided loyalty to the country. Interestingly, the People’s Constitution recognized a joint AngloMalay sovereignty over Malaya, accepted Malay as the official language and a common citizenship based on a Melayu nationality (Yeo, 1973a:37). The new nationality was to be termed Melayu acknowledging its historical past and cultural origins. Such an identity was to be conceived as ethnic and transcended ‘racial’ origins. Hence Melayu nationality was premised on free will and would be bestowed on all who decided to renounce their ties outside of the Malay peninsula. In other words, ‘Malays’ might choose to reject such an identification or the Chinese could adopt such a nationality if they so wished. A Melayu nationality was quite different from bangsa Melayu. The latter was defined in primordial terms, in that cultural traits were inalienably bound to a particular people sharing a single and common origin (Nagata, 1981:98), whereas the former stressed a common destiny rather than origin and was situational. Hence a Chinese or non-Malay could never be bangsa Melayu. Originally, bangsa Melayu was used to distinguish Malay Muslims from non-Malay Muslims, for example of Indian or Arab origins (Tan, 1988:6–7). The political rhetoric of bangsa Melayu took on renewed significance in the political conflict generated by the Malayan Union crisis in 1946 and in the lead-up to independence for the Federation of Malaya in 1957, as the Malays perceived the increasing numbers of Chinese and their economic dominance as a threat to their existence. The term bangsa Melayu, because it was defined in primordialist terms and categorically excluded the Chinese, was most appropriate in articulating the political struggle of the Malays during this period. The years between 1948 and 1957 also saw a protracted process of bargaining by the Chinese to wrest greater concessions from the Malays. With the entry of Singapore into Malaysia in 1963, which added a million Chinese to the new state, the PAP government under Lee Kuan Yew sought to redefine political discourse with the rhetoric of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’. This immediately struck a chord with the non-Malays in the mainland and fear in the heart of the Malay community. Later in this chapter the events leading to Singapore’s membership of and separation from Malaysia and how they affected the first generation of the PAP leadership and party policy will be discussed more fully. The joint coalition against the Federation proposals collapsed

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because it was unable to win the support of Chinese business and commercial concerns, who feared that continued agitation against the British would eventually jeopardize their interests (Yeo and Lau, 1991:122). More importantly, the British refused to negotiate with an organization which was stridently anti-colonial and supported by the Communist Party. In 1948 the CPM gave up its constitutional struggle through political and labour unrest to gain independence for a united Malaya and resorted to armed insurrection (Yeo and Lau, 1991:123–4). The British administration declared the Emergency. The CPM was overwhelmingly Chinese in membership. The communist victory in China in 1949 strengthened its position and contributed to a broader Chinese activism and chauvinism in the peninsula and Singapore. For the next five years after the declaration of the Emergency the government was preoccupied with containing the insurrection, delaying constitutional change in both territories and leaving little room for a radical anti-colonial movement to develop (Yeo, 1973a:56). Consequently, the MDU was voluntarily dissolved leaving the political ground to conservative and pro-British parties. THE MALAYAN FORUM, 1949 AND THE RISE OF THE PAP It was against this backdrop that a discussion group called the Malayan Forum was formed in London in 1949 by a group of politically conscious Malayan students, including Abdul Razak who later succeeded Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister of Malaysia. Among its active members were three from Singapore who were to become the most influential first-generation PAP leaders who came to chart the course of Singapore—Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and Toh Chin Chye. They believed that the time had come to organize and foster a broad-based Malayan nationalist movement, transcending narrow communal loyalties, and to fight constitutionally for an independent and socialist Malaya which included Singapore (Yeo and Lau, 1991:128). It is useful to reiterate the important events which had a major impact on the political ideas of this influential group. First, the brutality of the Japanese occupation of Singapore in the Second World War drove home to the young Lee that neither the Japanese nor the British, in his words, ‘had the right to push and kick us around’ (Yeo and Lau, 1991:117; Bloodworth, 1986:43). Second, the Malayan Union crisis impressed upon this group how ‘Malayans’, in

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the process of decolonization, should view themselves in the midst of the communal polarization occurring between the Malays and the Chinese. It also awakened in them their conception of a ‘Malayan Nation’. Third, the Emergency, despite the callousness of communist violence, impressed on Lee the strength and hold the communists had over the masses (Clutterbuck, 1984:77). The idea of belonging to a ‘nation’ came to this group of young university students on what Anderson (quoted from Preston, 1987:195–6) describes as a ‘pilgrimage’—encouraged to go to the metropolitan capital to continue their university education and training, with a possible view to joining the colonial administration on their return, graduates realized that they would be disadvantaged if not discriminated against. For Lee, Goh and Toh their pilgrimage may well have begun when they were students at Raffles College, the only local tertiary institution at that time opened to students who had performed well in their secondary education. The role of the intelligentsia in nation building has also been discussed by Smith (1981a:108–33). Because of their cultural position and marginality, the local intelligentsia felt a strong urge to rejoin their communities, but only in order to forge blueprints for reshaping the structures and goals of such communities—in order to transform them into a nation. Their alliances with other strata must be understood not merely in terms of tactical political needs, but also of the blueprints of “nationhood” and “nation building” that they entertain at successive moments in their rise to power’ (Smith, 1981a:133). This will be illustrated in the case of the first generation of Singapore’s leaders in what follows. Between 1948 and 1955 the political climate in Singapore favoured pro-British conservative parties dominated by Englisheducated and middle-class leaders. One of these, the Progressive Party (PP), was formed by leaders of the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) and the Singapore Association which represented British interests in Singapore. Membership of the PP was restricted to British and British-protected subjects, and these were mainly from the middle and upper-middle income groups (Yeo, 1973a:103). The party saw no need to widen its membership or develop a mass organization because the political system then did not require it. In the first decade of the post-war era the British administration planned to introduce self-government gradually, in line with its policy of political tutelage (Yeo, 1973a:55). As a first step, it introduced a reconstituted Legislative Council to include members who were democratically elected. The electorates in 1948 and 1951 were taken from a voluntary registration of voters and merely reflected the

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English-speaking population (Ong, 1975:62–3). Universal suffrage was only extended to adults who had the status of British subjects. Therefore the Legislative Council was concerned with issues that were remote or irrelevant to the overwhelming majority of the population and it did not stimulate mass interest in politics. Meanwhile, significant changes were occurring within the fabric of Singapore society. By 1947 the population was more balanced and less transitory (Turnbull, 1977:233–4). In the same year the proportion of Singapore Chinese who were Straits-born was 60 per cent; by the mid-1950s this had risen to 70 per cent. The Indians had stronger ties with their homeland. Between 1947 and 1957 the Indian population, two thirds of whom were migrants from Malaya in search of better opportunities, increased rapidly. Living conditions in the first half of the 1950s deteriorated. Singapore had one of the highest rates of population growth in the world in the mid-1950s, and half its population was aged below twenty-one (Turnbull, 1977:275). Unemployment was higher in 1954 than in 1947, and most working-class families lived in appalling conditions (Turnbull, 1977:250). The Chinese population blamed the colonial regime for their circumstances and resented the privileges of the English-educated. They viewed the language, education and citizenship policies as being pro-British. The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce led a campaign to secure equal recognition for Chinese education and the acceptance of a multilingual policy, as well as a Singapore citizenship which would enfranchise the Chinese population (Yeo and Lau, 1991:128). The effect of the campaign, clearly evident by 1954, was to generate political consciousness amongst the Chinese. Between 1948 and 1953 the CPM pursued a policy of armed insurrection, precipitating the declaration of the Emergency. This was a blow not only to Chinese patriots and communists but also to legitimate left-wing politics and trade union activities in Singapore (Turnbull, 1977:248). As the Federation government prevailed over the communist insurgents political repression was lifted, and by 1953 the CPM, taking advantage of the grievances of students and workers, began infiltrating Chinese schools and labour unions. In 1954 it emerged to continue its constitutional struggle by fomenting labour and student unrest through a number of communist front organizations. Recommended by the Rendel Constitutional Commission, a general election was called in 1955 as a first step towards selfgovernment in Singapore. Automatic registration of voters was introduced in 1955 and the fourfold increase in the electorate, from

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75,000 to over 300,000 (Ong, 1975:63)—most of whom came from the Chinese-educated and lower income groups—had an immediate impact on the political development of Singapore. One year earlier in 1954 the People’s Action Party (PAP) had been inaugurated, with Lee as Secretary-General and a committee drawn from trade unionists and Chinese-and English-educated radicals (Turnbull, 1977:253). In the election the Progressive Party suffered a shock defeat from which it never recovered. The two left-wing parties, the Singapore Labour Front (SLF) and the PAP made the greatest gains. The SLF formed a minority coalition government while the PAP became the opposition, reflecting that mass support would only be forthcoming for those parties who were stridently left-wing, anti-colonial and socialist (Yeo and Lau, 1991:132). It was in these circumstances that the moderate PAP leaders under Lee Kuan Yew found themselves pursuing a political strategy that would lay down the foundation for the formation of the party. First, Lee believed that the only way a political organization would succeed in Singapore was to gain the mass support of the Chinese-educated majority. The CPM had this support through its grassroots organization. He was convinced, even in 1950 at the Malayan Forum, that this was the only political organization capable of evicting the British and taking over Malaya (Bloodworth, 1986:44). To this end, he resolved to tap the resources of the Communists and their front organizations, including working with influential Chineseeducated and Mandarin-speaking labour and student organizers. Second, on his return from Britain he actively sought the support of labour unions by volunteering to serve as their legal adviser. He defended both union and student activists who agitated against colonial rule. In particular, he worked closely with the government unions to accelerate the Malayanization of the public service in order to gain the support of the English-educated and middle-class civil servants. This was a strategy the PAP continued when it came into power and set up a Political Study Centre to wean the bureaucracy off its sympathy for its colonial masters and to bring it to identify with PAP objectives. At the inauguration of the PAP in 1954, a significant number of the convenors were trade unionists giving the signal that it was reliant on labour in its nationalist struggle (Yeo, 1973a:124). Third, Lee adopted an anti-colonial stance by attacking Western culture and the privileged position of the pro-British Englisheducated middle class. Finally, the PAP viewed its struggle for independence within the context of a democratic, non-communist socialist Malaya. Merger was a historical necessity, if only for

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economic survival. For this reason, the PAP cultivated a Malayan outlook and accepted Malay as the national language of Singapore. The presence of two prominent Malayan leaders, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tan Cheng Lock, at its inauguration served notice of its pan-Malayan identity (Yeo, 1973a: 125). The political rhetoric of ‘democratic’ and ‘socialist’ was a manifestation of the delicate position the moderates found themselves in, which reflected the symbiotic relationship between the PAP and the CPM so aptly described by Bloodworth (1986) in the title of his book The Tiger and the Trojan Horse. The ‘tiger’ was the CPM which the PAP had to ride in order to cultivate the support of the Chineseeducated, and the ‘Trojan horse’ was the PAP, a legitimate political party through which the CPM intended to seize power. The moderates had to publicly counter the accusation that they were subversives without alienating the vital support of the extremists in the party and their sympathizers (Ong, 1975:71). The description ‘democratic socialist’ admirably suited this purpose. Ten years after the group of young Malayans gathered in London to discuss their vision of a united Malaya—carefully working out its strategy for over a decade—the PAP took its first step towards realizing its vision by scoring a landslide victory in the 1959 general election, winning forty-three of the fifty-one seats in the Legislative Assembly. The 1959 election was the first time compulsory voting was implemented in Singapore. The number who voted leapt from 53 per cent in 1955 to nearly 90 per cent in 1959 (Ong, 1975:63); the PAP reaped the benefit of the full force of the Chinese-educated and lower-income groups in this election. At this juncture it is pertinent to discuss two issues which dominated Singapore politics in the 1950s, and came to have considerable impact on the ideology and policy of the PAP government in the lead-up to merger, separation and independence. These are citizenship and language, and their consequences for nation building. CITIZENSHIP IN THE YEARS OF COLONIAL DECLINE Earlier in this chapter we recounted the Singapore-based joint coalition’s opposition to the pro-Malay proposals for Federation, after the abortive attempt to set up the Malayan Union excluding Singapore. The reason for the failure of the coalition was partly attributed to the lack of support from the Chinese community, especially businessmen who were perceived as the natural leaders of Chinese migrants in the Straits Settlements. The MDU which

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spearheaded the anti-Federation coalition was dominated by leftwing English-speaking intellectuals who could hardly claim to have any influence over Chinese organizations. After the establishment of the communist Republic in China in 1949, it dawned upon the Nanyang Chinese that they may never return to their homeland. They became more conscious of their political identity in Singapore in the context of far-reaching political developments occurring in Malaya, in particular the Federation Agreement which favoured the Malays. The cultural orientation of the Nanyang Chinese is well captured by Wang Gungwu and we can do no better than to quote him at length: The dozen years after the Republic was established did change the Nanyang Chinese, but more in their faith in themselves as members of a Chinese nation than in their faith in the government of China. They seem to have recognized that the vast majority of them were illiterate and that, among those who were literate, few were literate enough in Chinese to lead them to a more meaningful Chinese identity. The most urgent task, therefore, was to expand Chinese education on the lines of the modern national schools being built in China. Money spent on political causes in China now that there was a government ruled by Chinese seemed less fruitful than money spent on teaching their children about China. Their own understanding of nationalism had been learnt the hard way from exiles and rebels. Their children should be taught properly and be prepared not only to appreciate better a modern China but also to represent better the Chinese people abroad. They should be thoroughly freed from the shame of being a people despised by both Westerners and Japanese. A sound modern Chinese education would enhance the status abroad of generations to come. It would make them proud of China’s glorious past and potential greatness, and it would stop their children from becoming babas and peranakans and put an end to the process of cultural and physical assimilation which the nationalist leaders had so fiercely denounced. And finally, in due course, it would make all Chinese abroad think less of themselves as Cantonese, Hokkiens, Hakkas, Teochius, and Hailams and more as Chinese compatriots. (Wang, 1981:154) The campaign organized by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the early 1950s—for a Singapore citizenship conferring

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equal political rights to all communities and for a policy of equal recognition of Chinese language and culture (Yeo, 1973a: 136)—is to be appreciated in the light of the above quote. The campaign is significant for its close co-ordination of the two issues of citizenship and language. It should also be appreciated in the context of the educational policy of the colonial administration. Although the policy supported Malay schools and subsidies to Tamil and Chinese schools, in practice the bulk of funds were diverted into English education where the demand was increasing because of better employment prospects (Turnbull, 1977:240). As referred to earlier, Singapore politics in the first half of the 1950s were dominated by the English-educated middle class, only British and British-protected subjects were eligible to stand for election to the Legislative Council. This effectively disenfranchised more than half the total adult population of Singapore who were born in China. Together with what was perceived as the unfair and restrictive conditions placed on Malayan citizenship for non-Malays under the Federation Agreement of 1948 and the communist takeover of China in 1949, the Nanyang Chinese in Singapore were pressured into rethinking their status in this region. Hence the campaign on citizenship and language. Yeo (1973a:137) argues that the issues were related. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce, in arguing for citizenship to be extended to the Nanyang Chinese, was concerned about fighting for the eligibility of the China-born for political participation as Singapore moved gradually towards self-government. Citizenship—to transpose the Singapore situation into the terms of T.H.Marshall’s analysis of the concept—was viewed by the Chinese as enshrining political rights in the first instance since this was the most effective means of ensuring their status in a foreign state. However their status was not simply viewed in terms of political participation. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce also campaigned for a multilingual policy in the legislature, not only to enable non-English speakers to be politically represented, but also to gain recognition for the Chinese language and education. This would guarantee the preservation of Chinese culture and the ethnic identity of the Nanyang Chinese. Barbalet’s comment that citizenship is not simply a matter of formal rights and status is therefore significant. It involves real membership of a community and the acceptance of societal values. It refers to the cultural content of full citizenship. If the cultural content of citizenship is only articulated in ethnic or narrowly communal terms, as we have seen in the Malayan Union controversy, then it

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presents formidable problems for creating nationality. The PAP government, fully cognizant of these dangers throughout its political development, quickly moved to neutralize communal appeals to nationality by defining political discourse, in terms such as multiracialism, meritocracy and pragmatism. This will be expanded on later. Although the China-born qualified for citizenship under the existing Act they had to fulfill two requirements—adequate knowledge of English and British naturalization, they were reluctant to become British nationals as this amounted to renouncing Chinese nationality (Yeo, 1973a:146). Consequently, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce proposed terms for a local citizenship that included a residential qualification, a declaration of loyalty to the Colony and literacy in either Chinese or English (Yeo, 1973a:144). Such a citizenship meant that applicants would not have to renounce Chinese nationality, as recognized by the Chinese Nationality Act of 1929 and which accepted citizenship on the basis of jus sanguinis (blood ties). The Nanyang Chinese were caught in a predicament. They found themselves living in a territory which the British were reluctant to give up in the short term even though the process of decolonization had already begun. In the event of departure, the British view was that independence for Singapore was only viable in a merger with Malaya. The British rejected the CCC citizenship proposal for fear of jeopardizing continuing negotiations on the mainland for a liberal citizenship for non-Malays and an eventual Singapore-Federation merger (Yeo, 1973a:145). In the face of political transformation in Southeast Asia and China after the War, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce concept of citizenship was an attempt by the Nanyang Chinese to articulate their ethnic identity in an island where they constituted a significant proportion of the population. At the same time they cast a wary eye across the causeway where events signalled increasing Malay domination of the destiny of the new Federation. ‘Whatever citizenship that was evolved,’ Yeo (1973a:147) points out, ‘could not be a nationality, until Singapore merged with the Federation.’ Singaporeans would then become Malayans; however, the Nanyang Chinese sentimental attachment to their homeland acted as a barrier to renouncing their Chinese nationality. In 1955, as part of a strategy to win Chinese support, the coalition government led by the Labour Front under David Marshall announced its intention to introduce a Singapore citizenship which would operate in parallel with British naturalization (Yeo, 1973a:

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149–50). The Malays strongly opposed the proposal, partly at the instigation of UMNO from the mainland, and partly out of fear that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce would dominate Singapore with the support of the Nanyang Chinese. A compromise was reached with the British authorities and the Singapore Citizenship Ordinance was introduced in 1957. The citizenship provisions were extremely liberal. They were inclusivist in contrast to the exclusivist provisions of citizenship in the Federation. The principle of jus soli was accepted as the basis of citizenship (Yeo, 1973a:152–3). Naturalization was offered to those who had resided in Singapore for ten years. Singapore citizens would be recognized as British subjects. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce conceded that a single citizenship was more appropriate to a state on its way to self-government. Virtually all the 220,000 China-born qualified for citizenship and the right to vote in the next general election in 1959, which saw the PAP come into power. From 1959 to merger and the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the moderates in the PAP government devoted their entire energy to dealing with three problems. First, they had to contain the left-wing extremists, who constituted much of the second echelon leadership in the PAP and who controlled most of the party branches and grassroots organization, from seizing power in the party now that it was the government. Second, they had to convince the Federation government and Tunku that the Chinese in Singapore posed no threat to Malay political dominance in merger with Malaysia. Third, the PAP had to address the economic and social difficulties of an impoverished migrant society which successive colonial governments had neglected, in order to ensure its re-election in 1963. MERGER AND THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA, 1963 The first serious split within the party was precipitated by Tunku’s speech in 1961 suggesting that it was inevitable Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories be brought closer together in political and economic co-operation (Bloodworth, 1986:225). While this delighted the Singapore government, the PAP’s left-wing feared the prospect of merger which would bring the island under the control of an anticommunist central government (Turnbull, 1977:278). In the event of merger the left wing believed the possibility of it taking control of the Singapore government would be lost. As the left wing made moves to undermine Lee and the moderates within and outside the legislative assembly an open confrontation was inevitable. The split came soon

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after Tunku’s statement. The left wing broke away to form the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front), taking with it most of its active party workers and many supporters (Turnbull, 1977:279). These were desperate times for the PAP moderates. The PAP’s parliamentary majority was precarious, and its party organization was almost crippled. They faced a referendum the following year on whether Singapore should join Malaysia, and their very survival depended on its outcome. Bellows’ description of the PAP campaign in the referendum is a graphic illustration of the tenacity of its leaders and the effectiveness of its strategy in mobilizing the population: For the next 345 days, the government pursued an unprecedented information campaign in Singapore to convince the citizenry that the PAP-supported merger was necessary. Radio, nightly meetings of Ministers and Assemblymen with constituents, and the concerted efforts of the Ministry of Culture all worked towards convincing the people of the wisdom of merger and PAP policy. Describing this campaign and conditions since, one Minister puts it very succinctly: ‘In many ways, the PAP and the government machinery have become one and the same’. (Bellows 1970:48) This ‘abiding belief in the efficacy of information, argumentation, and reason to establish and confirm popular support for the government’ (Bellows, 1970:47) has been and still is the hallmark of the PAP government, as will be borne out time and again in the chapters which follow. The referendum offered three forms of merger but not the choice of opting out of the Union. Not surprisingly it confirmed popular support for unification. The domestic crisis created by the split turned the tide for the PAP. If there was any doubt in Tunku’s mind about the wisdom of admitting Singapore into Malaysia it was dispelled by the left-wing breakaway and the fear that if the pro-communists came into power in an independent Singapore, alignment with the communist bloc was a real possibility (Fletcher, 1969:8). Singapore might then become the base to provide the impetus to the activities of Malayan communists, and a ‘second Cuba’ (Turnbull, 1977:277–8). The need to assuage Malay fears of Chinese dominance—already exacerbated by the strong economic role of the latter in the Malayan economy—and accelerate merger led the PAP to carefully execute policies and actions to de-emphasize the Chinese character of the island and to demonstrate that it was part of the Southeast Asian

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region with a definite affinity with the Malay archipelago (Chan, 1973a:7). Malay education, long neglected under colonial administration, was only available up to primary level in 1960. The government established Malay secondary schools, and enrolment jumped from 136 in 1960 to 7,000 in 1967 (Chan, 1971a:17). Greater emphasis was given to the Malay language, a Malay was appointed Head of State in 1959, and Malay representation was included in the PAP cabinet. The split of the left-wing in 1961 resulted in an increase of Malay membership of the PAP (Turnbull, 1977:287). The improvement of the position of the Malays was so obvious that in the 1963 elections the PAP decisively defeated UMNO candidates in predominantly Malay constituencies. The performance of the PAP after it formed the government was impressive relative to the slow progress of the years under colonial administration. Abandoning doctrinaire socialism, it embarked on a pragmatic policy of economic expansion and social reform and launched its four-year economic development plan in 1961 (Turnbull, 1977:283–4). Industrial growth and the setting up of labour-intensive industries to tackle the unemployment problem was its top priority. Attractive incentives were offered to foreign and local investors to set up industries. The labour unions were reorganized. The Housing and Development Board was set up in 1960 and built more accommodation in three years than had been constructed in the previous thirty. Public utilities and sanitation were improved. The rights of women were protected by the Women’s Charter of 1962. Law and order was vigorously pursued in a migrant community where secret societies had been rampant. Impressive gains were made in the development of education. By the end of 1963 the development plan was ahead of schedule. Several days after the proclamation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 a snap general election was held in Singapore. The PAP won thirty-seven of the fifty-one seats. The victory was critical to the PAP as it was the first election held after the Barisan Sosialis broke away from the party and thus represented a swing away from the left (Turnbull, 1977:285). The PAP could now claim that it had won the confidence of a wide spectrum of the population. In the Malaysia Agreement Singapore was treated as a special state with greater autonomy than the other territories in the new Federation (Turnbull, 1977:280). It retained control over finance, education and labour in exchange for a limited political role in the Federation. In the Federal Parliament it was allocated half the number of seats it was entitled to for the size of its population. The

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Agreement also stipulated that special privileges enjoyed by Malays in Malaya should not be extended to Malays in Singapore (Chan, 1971a:18–19), even though the Singapore constitution acknowledged that the Malays needed special assistance to catch up with the other communities. The question of citizenship in the Federation was significant for its implications for nation building in the new state. There were reservations about Singapore citizens acquiring Malaysian citizenship for fear that this could create a political disadvantage for the ruling Alliance Party on the mainland. To get around the problem, the Malaysian constitution introduced a distinction between Malaysian ‘citizens who are Singapore citizens’ and ‘citizens who are not Singapore citizens’ (Jayakumar and Trindade, 1964:2–3). This distinction was not a minor disability, as Leifer commented (1965:54). A Singapore citizen could only vote in the island in an election for the Federal Parliament. Likewise a Malaysian citizen could not vote in a Singapore constituency. A Singapore citizen was only eligible to stand for its own Legislative Assembly while a Malaysian citizen was disbarred from doing so. As referred to earlier in this chapter the concept of citizenship proposed in the Malayan Union was problematic because it did not imply a common nationality. Despite Singapore’s merger with Malaysia the question of nationality was not resolved as there were two types of citizenship in one ‘nation-state’—the purpose of which was to manage the extent of political influence residents in Singapore and Malaysia could exert in each other’s territory. As it will be seen later, the formal delineation of citizenship and its qualifications for political participation did not prevent the PAP or the Alliance, the ruling parties of the respective territories, from becoming involved in each other’s politics. This was to contribute to the eventual separation of Singapore. As noted earlier, the concept of citizenship in Singapore was a liberal one and was inclusivist, in the spirit of the proposed Malayan Union which viewed citizenship as a means of encouraging and building a new loyalty and identity, and as a reflection of an emerging nation-state. Under the Malaysian constitution the acquisition of ‘Singapore citizenship’ was defined in terms that more closely resembled the provisions for the acquisition of Malaysian citizenship (Jayakumar and Trindade, 1964:7). It will be recalled that Malaysian citizenship was derived from the British concessions to the Malays in the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948—which placed certain restrictions on the eligibility of non-Malays for Malayan citizenship—and was exclusionary in intent. It was an issue which

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dominated much of the politics of Malaya in the 1950s and spilled into debates over what language was to be given priority in a national education policy (Ongkili, 1986:105–14). It polarized the Malay and Chinese communities and posed a major obstacle to nation building efforts. The fall-out from an exclusionary conception of citizenship and its ramifications for language and education spread to Singapore. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce, as discussed earlier, campaigned for more liberal qualifications for the Chinese and greater recognition of the Chinese language in its use in the legislature and in schools. The negotiations leading to the Malaysia Agreement was a difficult and hard-fought affair between the two sides. Given the special provisions and exceptions which applied to Singapore, the Agreement appeared to be a compromise between two competing states rather than an attempt at unification. The distinction between a Malaysian citizen who is also a Singapore citizen and one who is not showed that there was no agreement on what a common nationality meant, and reflected a deep division between the Malays and the non-Malays—in particular the Chinese. It reflected a wide gulf in opinion between the two protagonists, separated by the causeway, on what constituted a Malaysian nationality. In 1964, serious communal clashes between Malays and Chinese in Singapore erupted, sparked off during a religious procession on the anniversary of the prophet Mohammed. The activities leading to the violence were interpreted as a deliberate attempt to undermine the Chinesedominated PAP government, which was regarded by many in UMNO as a threat to continued Malay dominance in Malaysia (Leifer, 1964:1115). Another serious race riot in Singapore was in 1950 when a Dutch girl, Maria Hertogh, who had been brought up by an Indonesian family and converted to Islam, was subsequently returned to her Dutch parents by a court decision (see Hughes, 1982; Maideen, 1989). The decision enraged Muslims in Singapore who went on a rampage killing some Europeans. Such riots, including the 1969 SinoMalay clashes centred on Kuala Lumpur, have been used by the PAP leaders as reminders of the traumatic origins of Singapore; hence the significance of one of the founding myths of Singapore-multiracialism (see Chapter 4). Events over the period leading to the Malaysia Agreement were reminiscent of the controversy surrounding the Malayan Union. The inclusion of Singapore in the Malaysian Federation was against the odds of history and, with hindsight, unworkable.

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SEPARATION FROM MALAYSIA AND INDEPENDENCE It was discussed earlier that the description, bangsa Melayu, was used by the so-called indigenous community to articulate their ethnic and political identity, specifically to distinguish themselves from nonMalays and as a justification for the special position of the ‘Malay race’. In other words, the term bangsa Melayu was defined in stark opposition to ‘non-Malayness’. As the PAP and the Alliance (with UMNO as the dominant partner) fought over which direction the ‘new Malaysian society’ should take and which political party should lead in each other’s territory, the term bangsa Melayu took on renewed emotional significance for the Malays. Lee and the PAP argued that Malay privileges provided for in the Constitution were economic and social but not political; hence Malays had no special right to rule (Fletcher, 1969:59–60). Lee commented that no ‘racial group’ was any more native than the others (Fletcher, 1969:62). In mid-1965 a Malaysian Solidarity Convention was organized by the PAP, to launch a united opposition against the Alliance government. The techniques of mass mobilization, so effectively used against the communists in the battle for merger, were employed to win the hearts and minds of Malayans (Yeo and Lau, 1991:149). The term ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ was coined by Lee to counter the political rhetoric of bangsa Melayu. The definition of the term is from Bellows: A Malaysian Malaysia means that the nation and the state is not identified with the supremacy, wellbeing, and the interests of any one particular community or race…. A Malaysian Malaysia means in theory as well as in practice, educating and encouraging the various races in Malaysia to seek political affiliation not on the basis of race and religion but on the basis of common political ideologies. (Bellows, 1970:59) The term simply meant ‘multiracialism’. When expounded by the Prime Minister of Singapore most Malays regarded it as an insidious plan by which they gradually would lose their privileges and power to the more industrious Chinese (Leifer, 1965:70). When separation did come in 1965 it was a bitter moment for Lee and a personal anguish for his Malayan-born colleagues, Toh Chin Chye, Goh Keng Swee and Rajaratnam. Goh was born in Malacca, Rajaratnam spent his early years in Seremban and Kuala Lumpur,

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and Toh had lived in the northern state of Perak (Minchin, 1990: 51– 2)—all had emotional ties with the peninsula. All his life, Lee stated in a televised press conference on the day of separation, he had fought for a united Malaya, and he broke down in tears. It was a disappointment that remained with him for the rest of his political career, and which he recently expressed when he stepped down as Prime Minister in 1990. The dream of a group of Malayans which first began in London in 1949, as a political awakening to the inevitability of an independent Malayan nation and people—they believed with such conviction that they were in a position to chart— was shattered. Even more daunting was their realization that the basis of Singapore’s viability as a state, as part of Malaya, had now collapsed. The PAP leaders struggled to come to terms with the emotional trauma of separation even as they resolved to steer Singapore on an independent course. The Singapore government referred to Malaya, in the immediate aftermath of separation, as ‘one people now divided into two arenas’, and ‘one people in two countries’ (Turnbull, 1977:297). Leaders on both sides expressed the view that historical, economic and social circumstances would compel reunification some day (Lau, 1969:155). Lee even suggested that such a task may have to be left to the next generation. The reality of separation soon sunk in as the acrimony over the past continued with Singapore aggressively forging an independent economic direction. The marriage had come to an end; it was no less than a divorce. In the years following separation the two states have treated each other as more alien than their close ties in the past would suggest. Singapore’s separation from Malaysia did not in any way weaken the PAP government. On the contrary, merger had consolidated the position of the moderates with the arrest of key left-wing leaders by the Kuala Lumpur government, who did not need much encouragement from the Singapore authorities. Its interlude in the Federation had not resulted in any major disruption in the political organization or government of the island. As Turnbull (1977:299) remarked, ‘the need for cohesion in the 1950s and early 1960s forged a remarkable solidarity of PAP leadership in later years.’ Throughout the 1960s the PAP leadership laid the groundwork of a party organization which would not only prevent any form of infiltration, but also kept in touch with the ground level through several levels of what has been described as ‘parapolitical institutions’. This process had begun with the defection of the Barisan Sosialis, taking with them much of the grassroots party and trade union organization and

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necessitating the rebuilding of grassroots structures, but it was to be greatly elaborated by the government-sponsored growth of a range of parastatal organizations. The experience of communist infiltration and their use of front organizations in the 1950s and early 1960s impressed upon the PAP, now free of left-wing influence, the need for more rigorous procedures in recruitment. Accordingly, candidates for ordinary membership of the party were scrutinized by the Special Branch before they were considered by the Central Executive Council (Bellows, 1970:29–30). From this a small number were selected to be cadres. Cadre membership was secret for several reasons—to ensure security against left-wing subversion, to help the party keep touch with the grassroots and to prevent cadres from using their membership for personal gain. In keeping with their role as the eyes and ears of the party, most cadres were paid party workers, lower rank civil servants or held trade union positions. The People’s Association and community centres were set up as a second line of defence in the event that the leadership lost the support of party branches (Chan, 1991:164–5) as it did in 1961. The Citizens’ Consultative Committees (CCCs) were started in 1963 as a means of identifying and enabling local leaders to participate in the governing process. Fifteen years later, the work of the CCCs was to be complemented by the formation of Residents’ Committees (RCs) in all the HDB estates. The work of these institutions will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. Separation from Malaysia also forced the PAP leaders to radically revise their economic and industrialization plans for the island. What is significant about this revision is that it was conditioned by the social and political structures which had emerged by the mid-1960s, namely a paternalistic state exercising authoritarian influence as a safeguard against the debilitating consequences of the factional struggles of the past (Rodan, 1989:83). It was a paternalism, Rodan states, that was to grow and become more sophisticated in the future. THE FOUNDATION OF PAP IDEOLOGY This discussion of the major political events and changes which occurred in Singapore between 1948 and 1965 would be incomplete without tracing them to the central tenets of PAP philosophymultiracialism, pragmatism and meritocracy—a formula which has informed and guided the government ever since it became independent in 1965. One important feature of political development

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in Singapore was that no major political party had been a communal party (Turnbull, 1977:236) in the sense of promoting ethnic chauvinism and disregarding the sensitivities of other groups. The MDU, PP, Labour Front and the PAP have never appealed to ethnic sentiments in order to win votes. This was partly because of the influence of socialist ideas on their policies, and partly because all these parties were led by essentially middle-class, English-educated individuals, many of whom had received a university education. Indeed, multiracialism was actively promoted, a policy encouraged by the colonial administration as it prepared to withdraw from power. All the political parties referred to accepted the future of Singapore within a united Malaya or within some expanded Federation— though for different reasons; for example, the BS and CPM were only prepared to accept it as a springboard to longer-term goals. This meant acknowledging the significant Malay presence on the mainland. Moreover, the early political awakening of Singaporeans began with Malay opposition to the proposed Malayan Union, which precipitated the development of Malay nationalism. The MDU campaigned against what they perceived to be a Malay-dominated Federation, and wanted recognition of the presence of other ethnic communities in Malaya. The PAP pursued a similar line in the political rhetoric of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’. Multiracialism, the strongest proponents of which came from left-wing parties, particularly from Singapore, came to be a potent means of countering the rise of Malay nationalism in Malaya. While it is true to argue that the post-war preoccupation with achieving unification precluded building a Singaporean identity (Turnbull, 1977:301) the significance of multiracialism for nation building today is only appreciated in the political history of merger which came to dominate Singapore’s development for two decades after the War. Despite the parting of ways, the fall-out from separation has not diminished so long as both states have an ethnic minority which is the majority across the causeway. With the formation of Malaysia in 1963 Malay expectations in Singapore rose. Fuelled by communal politics, racial riots broke out in 1964. The lessons of 1964 has never been lost on the Singapore government for several reasons (Chan, 1971a:16). The awesome consequences of communal riots are all too obvious, not least of which is the implications for foreign investment. Furthermore, Singapore’s sensitivity to Malay feelings is heighthened by the fact that the island is, in Lee’s words, surrounded by a ‘sea of Malay

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peoples’. Therefore Singapore’s policies towards the Malay minority has regional implications. The present policy of looking towards China for its economic expansion has created some disquiet among its Southeast Asian neighbours. The domestic policies of both Malaysia and Singapore, especially when they have ethnic implications, continually reverberate on both sides. Soon after separation at the end of 1965 (Chan, 1991:171), the Chinese Chamber of Commerce sought a constitutional guarantee for the Chinese language to be recognized as one of the official languages in the state. As Malay was scheduled to be adopted as the national and sole official language in Malaysia in 1967, Lee was aware that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce request could quickly turn into a communal issue if publicly debated and have a destabilizing effect across the causeway. He summoned all the chambers of commerce, including the Malay and Indian ones, and warned them of the dangers of making an issue of language. In early 1966 a constitutional commission was appointed to consider how the rights of racial, linguistic and religious minorities could be safeguarded in a written constitution (Turnbull, 1969:193). Following its recommendations a Presidential Council was created. The Council is a non-elected advisory body of eminent citizens who can debate policies affecting a minority and act as a check on new legislation. The origins of the ‘ideology of pragmatism’ in the PAP may be attributed to the time when it formed the government in 1959 and was faced with the task of tackling the formidable problems of housing, educating and finding employment for a young and growing population. Even in the early years of its foundation the PAP’s espousal of socialist ideals was less a matter of firmly entrenched principles than one of technique—the ideals would be realized if the social conditions of the masses could be sufficiently ameliorated. When it launched the four-year economic development plan in 1961 the PAP turned its back on doctrinaire socialism and embarked on a pragmatic programme of economic expansion, incentives for foreign investments and social reform (Turnbull, 1977:283). The task was given greater urgency after 1965. Many writers discuss the ‘pragmatic ideology’ of the PAP in the context of the ‘politics of survival’ in the 1960s (Chan and Evers, 1973; Shee, 1971; Chua, 1985). We contend that the origins of such pragmatism began with the Malayan Forum in 1949 when Lee argued that only the CPM had the organization to force the British out of Malaya and resolved to draw on the resources of left-wing leaders. The PAP espousal of socialism in its early years has been described

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as enigmatic and perplexing (Bellows, 1970:15). Its verbal commitment to socialism was motivated by several considerations (Bellows, 1970:17). Many of the non-communist faction of the party believed in some form of socialism. In the post-war era socialism as a doctrine for independent states was acceptable to Afro-Asian leaders. It articulated ideas of equality and justice which aroused popular support for independence from colonial rule and exploitation. For this reason Lee made numerous visits to African countries immediately preceding the formation of Malaysia. Most important of all, the PAP identification with socialism was intended to win procommunist and communist support which had gone underground in Singapore. ‘It eliminated that space on the political continuum between the Malayan Communist Party and the PAP, intending to prevent any other non-communist movement from obtaining the sustained working allegiance of the pro-communists’ (Bellows, 1970:17). As Lee describes (Bellows, 1970:18), Those who want to out-left us are either genuine communists or bogus democrats.’ Capturing and laying down the rules of the political game was a style repeated many times by the PAP as subsequent chapters will reveal. When the PAP adopted a less strident socialist reputation in the early 1960s it was simply a reflection of ‘problem-solving’. Lee himself remarked: I am interested in ideas insofar as they can galvanize both our society, which means you and I, in a way which will enable us eventually to move our neighbours or those of our neighbours who matter to us, in the right direction. (Shee, 1971:188) The roots of pragmatism did not emerge in the conditions of the 1960s, rather it should be viewed as a clear and consistent philosophy which informed the thinking of PAP leaders long before the PAP was founded. The stormy history of Singapore between 1948 and 1965, the period which saw the PAP rise from a group of politically conscious Malayans committed to unification to become the government of an independent Singapore, is illustrative of the emotional bonds between the first generation of PAP leaders and the mainland. It also reflected the struggle of Malayan-born Chinese and Indians in forging a political identity within a nation-state in which they were regarded as immigrants. In doing so they had to contend with the significant presence of the Nanyang Chinese who were reluctant to cut their ties

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with the motherland, and who were themselves awakening to a Chinese nationalism which began with the revolution in 1911 led by Sun Yat-Sen and was continued by the Communists and Kuomintang as they battled to control China. It is difficult to understand the course which Singapore has taken as it came to terms with its newfound freedom after 1965 without an appreciation of the political and emotional turbulence its people and leaders experienced in the preceding years. This chapter has attempted to recount these years as a prelude to the building of a nation in Singapore.

3 Education and bilingualism

In the earlier analysis of Singapore’s ethnic origins attention was drawn to the predicament in which the Nanyang Chinese in Singapore found themselves in the early 1950s. This situation was the outcome of two elements. One was the success of the Communists in seizing power in China in 1949 and the other was the uncertain status of the island in a period of rapid decolonization which saw the British committed to preparing Malaya for self-government and nationhood. The two events impressed upon the China-born a sense of urgency in coming to terms with their ethnic identity and the regularization of their political status. Some chose to return to China, but most remained in Malaya and Singapore. For the latter the question of citizenship within an evolving nation was a pressing one. Its settlement not only meant access to political rights, but to social rights—economic welfare and security, social and cultural heritage. Critical to the social rights of citizenship was the language issue and the related educational policy of colonial and independent Singapore. In Malaya and Singapore it is hardly possible to speak of education without meaning language, because, as Gopinathan (1980a: 175) remarked, ‘whenever major decisions on education had to be taken these were expressed in terms of language rather than objectives or content.’ Furthermore, the development of education in new states is inevitably tied in with the task of creating nationhood and building citizenship. If language is synonymous with education such a task is acutely problematic in an ethnically plural society, where several languages compete for official status. A modern industrial economy necessitates a common public education system which puts pressure on governments to adopt a common language. The consequence, Gellner contends (1983), is to contribute to the evolvement of nationhood. 67

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This chapter traces the educational and language policy of Singapore since 1946. Colonial policy favoured an English education, accessible to a few, which opened the doors to political and economic opportunities. As a result, the pro-British Straits-born Chinese and Eurasian community benefited greatly from such a policy. The Straits-born Chinese could claim two or more generations of localborn, mainly English—and Malay-speaking and came from a middleclass background. On the other hand, the Chinese-speaking were predominantly working class, recent migrants or could claim no more than one generation of Malayan-born; in addition they had generally been exposed to a Chinese education that was oriented towards the motherland. The problem of a uniform education and language policy for Singapore came to a head in the mid-1950s, when widespread student unrest in Chinese schools forced the first locally elected government to form an All-Party Committee in 1956 to look into the problem of Chinese education. It was the first attempt at formulating a national education policy. The Committee accepted bilingualism as a central tenet of education policy—the choice of a second language to be left to the parents—and stressed that such a policy should encourage not only a Singapore-oriented but also a Malayan-centred loyalty. In the lead-up to Singapore’s merger with Malaysia the PAP government adopted Malay as the national language and provided support and encouragement for the use of the language in schools. Separation in 1965 relieved the stress on Malay as a priority second language. For the next fourteen years the government, preoccupied with laying the economic foundations of Singapore, was content to allow the English language to take precedence, although it continued to encourage and support the use of second language in the educational system. This was to change with the release of the Goh Report on education in 1979. Although the Education Study Team led by Goh Keng Swee did not have explicit terms of reference, the report dealt with two related problems, the high attrition rate in primary and secondary schools and the ineffectiveness of a bilingual education, already in existence for about twenty years. The Goh Report addressed both problems and charted the present education policy of Singapore. In what follows is an attempt to identify chronologically the major developments in the evolution of education policy, to provide a broad historical background against which the role of education and language policy in nation building may be appreciated.

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CHINESE EDUCATION BEFORE INDEPENDENCE The period between the turn of the century and the outbreak of the Second World War has been described by Gopinathan (1974:3) as ‘the growth and extension of compartmentalization of education’ in Singapore and Malaya. English education was available to a select few in Christian mission schools, Chinese education in communitybased and private schools, Tamil education in estate-run schools and Malay education in government-supported schools. Financial assistance, curricula, quality of teaching and control were as varied as the types of schools existing. Pre-war British educational policies created two educational systems, vernacular and English, which produced two distinct groups—culturally, intellectually and economically divorced from each other (Chai quoted from Gopinathan, 1974:3). Consequently, by the beginning of the twentieth century there had already occurred within the Chinese population in Singapore a polarization, based on language and education, between a minority of Anglophile Chinese and the majority of Chinese-educated (Murray, 1971:60–1). The division was reproduced in Chinese leadership in the colony. For example, leading Chinese businessmen were founders or patrons of Chinese schools while the Straits-born went to mission schools, pursued a career in the professions and were encouraged by the colonial authorities to play an active part in local politics. Many of the Chinese businessmen were active in clan and dialect-based associations, which contributed to the welfare of their members (Tan, 1986) but which later also became the basis of useful trading and business networks. There have been some attempts recently to revitalize these associations in view of the government initiative in establishing ethnic-based self-help organizations, including the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC). Vernacular education in the island was dominated by Chinese schools and the significance of Chinese education in influencing educational policy and nation building is only appreciated by examining how it came to be established. The years from 1894 to 1941 saw the birth and growth of modern Chinese education in Malaya (Lee, 1987:49). Its philosophy was derived from the humiliating defeats inflicted on China, first by the British in 1830 and later by the Japanese. In 1894 the Manchu government went to war with Japan and suffered the shock of defeat because China had never held the Japanese in much respect (Lee, 1987:52–3). Following the end of the war a reform movement led by a scholar, K’ang Yu Wei,

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advocated changes in China along the lines of the Meiji Restoration. Another Chinese intellectual, Dr Sun Yat-sen, believed that the rejuvenation of China could only be achieved by overthrowing the Manchu dynasty. After several unsuccessful revolts he finally dislodged the Manchu government in 1911. Both K’ang and Sun spread their political ideas to Malaya and were instrumental in inspiring many local Chinese leaders to build and develop modern schools for Chinese children (Lee, 1987:53–4). Dr Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles—Nationalism, Democracy and People’s Livelihood—were the guiding spirits of the 1911 revolutionary movement. Of the three nationalism was the only one preached in Singapore and Malaya (Yen, 1982:423–4). Unlike the reformists who were loyal to the emperor and the reigning dynasty but wanted it reformed to gain popular support, ‘revolutionary nationalism’ cultivated loyalty only to the nation-state. The revolutionary movement had a great impact on the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya because of its egalitarian appeal and its ability to organize mass support. Newspapers, books and magazines were important means of spreading political ideas (Yen, 1982:424). However, the revolutionaries also effectively utilized night schools, public rallies and drama troupes in reaching out to the illiterate overseas Chinese. Considering that the only education available to the majority of the Chinese population in Malaya and Singapore was a curriculum based on Chinese nationalism inspired by the 1911 revolution, a whole generation of Chinese children were brought up to identify themselves with the political destiny of the nation-state in China. Even as recently as the early 1950s many of the textbooks used were still based on the political ideas of revolutionary nationalism and were strongly antiManchu in orientation (Franke, 1965:187). Between 1900 and 1920 modern schools teaching mathematics, science, history, geography, ethics and even quasi-military drill were opened (Murray, 1971:61). Most were sponsored by surname, district or speech-group associations, some by business guilds and private individuals. Dialects were used as the medium of instruction thus reinforcing intra-ethnic identities within the Chinese population. The supply of teachers and textbooks from the ‘motherland’ increased after the 1911 revolution (Murray, 1971:61). The colonial administration made no attempt to control the rapid expansion of Chinese schools until 1920 when students and teachers organized anti-Japanese activities in reaction to SinoJapanese hostilities in China. The Education Ordinance was

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introduced in that year in the Straits Settlements, which empowered the government to register schools and teachers, regulate administration, and close down schools when necessary (Gopinathan, 1974:4). The move was widely opposed by the Chinese community. Attempts by the government to persuade the schools, through grants-in-aid, to accept the general guidelines of the Ordinance were rejected mainly because such schools were already self-supporting. After 1920 the medium of instruction shifted to Mandarin, a consequence of the sweeping tide of Chinese nationalism and the increasing supply of teachers from China (Murray, 1971:62). By 1930 nearly all the Chinese schools in the colony used Mandarin. Its role as lingua franca in unifying the various speech groups is probably overstated by Murray; nevertheless its potential as a political and cultural symbol for the overseas Chinese should not be underestimated. In summary, Chinese education in Singapore and Malaya was largely private and completely oriented to China. The political turmoil in China following the Second World War and the communist take-over subsequently, drove many Chinese intellectuals (including secondary school teachers) to seek a living overseas (Franke, 1965:182). Many found their way to Singapore and Malaya. By the mid-1950s Chinese primary and secondary school education was more widespread and developed than English, Malay or Tamil education (Franke, 1965:182–3). Because the Chinese schools were financially self-supporting and independent from government control, political ideologies originating from the conflict between the nationalists and the communists in the ‘motherland’ found a breeding ground in the minds of Chinese students. Furthermore, the issue of Chinese education was symptomatic of the political alienation of the Chinese, first under colonial rule and later after independence, in Malaya and Singapore. Chinese education was viewed negatively by the colonial authorities (Franke, 1965:184–5) and in an independent Malaya. As referred to earlier, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore campaigned unsuccessfully in the early 1950s for multilingualism to be accepted in the legislature, so that due recognition would be given to the Chinese language. Graduates from Chinese high schools found themselves in an inferior position—few opportunities were opened to them either for employment or higher education—in contrast to their counterparts from English-medium schools. Growing resentment and frustration eventually led to their political radicalization. This was

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the situation the administration in Singapore, in the political transition from colonial to self-rule, inherited. DECOLONIZATION AND EDUCATION The British proposal in 1946 for a Malayan Union which sought to establish a unitary state by incorporating the Federated Malay States, Unfederated Malay States, and the Straits Settlements was referred to in the last chapter. The Union may be viewed as Britain’s commitment to post-war decolonization and as a first step (albeit administrative) towards the building of a Malayan nation and a Malayan consciousness. Although Singapore was not included in the plan, the British accepted that responsible government was to be introduced in the colony through a policy of tutelage, and eventual unification with the mainland remained very much in the official mind. A critical instrument in creating a Malayan consciousness in the post-war era was the formulation of an educational and language policy appropriate to an ethnically plural society. The colonial authorities in Singapore believed that English education was a prerequisite to nurturing loyal Malayan citizens as it was envisaged that English-medium schools would be multiracial and would minimize communal isolation (Murray, 1971:90). However, by 1946, largely because past colonial practice was to restrict English education only to a select few, three-quarters of Chinese students were already enrolled in private Chinese-medium schools. Even if the will now existed to provide English education for all students, the British administration did not have the resources to fund sufficient places or teachers. For this reason the Ten-Year Programme outlined in 1947, Murray (1971:90) argues, was a compromise solution—to support schooling in all three vernaculars (Chinese, Malay, Tamil) while expanding the English-medium schools as quickly as possible. The Programme was significant for its attempt at defining the objectives of education in Singapore for the first time (Gopinathan, 1974:7). It noted that education should foster the capacity for selfgovernment, civic loyalty and responsibility. It also recommended that English be introduced in the third year of schooling—at the age of around ten in Chinese, Malay and Indian primary schools. The colonial administration supported vernacular schools for expedient reasons. Vernacular education was not regarded in official circles as relevant to the community, and was viewed negatively. Chinese schools, because they were highly politicized, were treated with suspicion. In contrast English medium education and the learning of

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English, Gopinathan (1974:8–9) states, were seen as synonymous with loyalty to Singapore largely because the British perceived their interests would be best served by an English-educated elite. For this purpose an English-educated Chinese leadership was deliberately nurtured by the colonial authorities. The colony, however, was not insulated from political and educational developments in Malaya. In 1950 as part of British policy to prepare Malaya for independence and nationhood, the Barnes Report was released, underlining the pro-Malay view that political and cultural unity in Malaya could only be attained through Malay language and culture (Yeo, 1973a:139). It outlined a nation building education system in which there would only be Malay or English primary schools and English post-primary schools. As a result widespread fear was aroused among the Chinese community in Malaya and Singapore about the survival of Chinese language and culture. This prompted the government to set up a mission led by two prominent Chinese, Fenn and Wu, to look into the problem of education of the Chinese in Malaya. The Fenn-Wu Report of 1951, in response to the Barnes’s position, stated that: No element of the population can be ‘Malayanized’for the simple reason that there is no ‘Malayan’ pattern to which to mould it and because such moulding is not produced by fiat. A new culture can come only from the natural mingling of diverse cultural elements for generations. In the process, elements which do not command appreciation disappear, while those which do need no political or external support. (Ongkili, 1986:108) The Fenn-Wu Report pointed out that the education system as it existed preceded the political concept of a Malayan nation (Gopinathan, 1974:16). It maintained that neither English nor vernacular education matched the expression of ‘Malayan needs’. In the absence of an indigenous system (and what constituted a Malayan nation, we may add) the adoption of such foreign institutions was inevitable. It therefore supported the non-Malay call for equal treatment of the existing English and vernacular schools. The implication, it may be surmised, was that a national education system would evolve over time. Gopinathan (1974:16) describes such a policy as advocating cultural pluralism (an issue which will be considered later in the chapter). Fenn and Wu also suggested that the China-oriented curriculum of Chinese schools be replaced by one

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more sensitive to ‘Malayan needs’. The Barnes Report was accepted as the basis of the education policy in Malaya in 1952 but with the provision that vernacular languages be taught where there was sufficient demand. Three major influences which shaped educational developments in Singapore have been identified. First, the proliferation of Chinese schools since the turn of the century in Malaya and Singapore was given impetus by the rise of a nationalist movement in China. The products of Chinese education in both territories were imbued with political ideas associated with such a movement. Second, the colonial administration, believing that Singapore would be unified with the mainland in the long term, encouraged the emergence of an Englisheducated leadership which would be sympathetic to British interests. An English-medium education would not only help to achieve this but also eventually break down communal loyalties, and in this way was seen as necessary for the creation of a common citizenship and nationhood. Third, political developments in Malaya, spurred by a vociferous Malay nationalist movement which made its presence felt in educational policy, caused considerable consternation in Singapore. All these developments clearly point to one thing, that the question of education and language policy could only be settled politically. The debates and acrimony surrounding education and language in Malaya and Singapore until they parted in 1965—just as was the case with the citizenship policy—reflected the painful experience of the birth of two nations. ALL-PARTY COMMITTEE, 1955 AND MULTILINGUAL EDUCATION In Singapore student unrest in Chinese schools in the first half of the 1950s culminated in the All-Party Committee on Chinese Education, which produced a report in 1956 laying the basis of the present education system. During the Japanese Occupation, the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was a strong ally of the British in organizing armed resistance against the Japanese. For this reason it gained considerable prestige and influence in the Chinese population (Yeo, 1973a:184). After the Japanese defeat it pursued a strategy of organizing a ‘united front’ by infiltrating labour unions and student organizations. With the establishment of a communist China in 1949 communist activities—appealing to the idealism of a younger generation—in Chinese schools increased (Yeo, 1973a:185). The declaration of the Emergency in 1948 drove the

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CPM underground; it subsequently relied on front organizations to mobilize support. One of these, the Singapore Students’ Anti-British League (SSABL) was used to subvert Chinese schools and organize anti-colonial activities (see Clutterbuck, 1984; Bloodworth, 1986 for detailed discussion). In 1950 the Registration of Schools Ordinance, containing similar provisions to the 1920 Ordinance, was introduced to contain communist subversion in Chinese schools (Yeo, 1973a:188). The Ordinance came at a time of increasing dissatisfaction with colonial education policy and was seen as a political move directed only against Chinese schools (Gopinathan, 1974:11). Relations between the British administration and the Chinese community deteriorated, presenting opportunities for the communists to exploit. In 1954 a government proposal to call up youths for military training was met by student opposition, demonstration and a subsequent riot (Yeo, 1973a:190–2). Student arrests followed precipitating the occupation of the Chinese High School by about a thousand students. No attempt was made by the government to close down the school for fear of provoking the Chinese community who sympathized with the students. In this, Yeo (1973a:194) comments, the communists were successful in linking student politics to Chinese education, an issue which struck at the heart of the Nanyang Chinese. These events brought home the fears Lee had publicly expressed about the dangers of communalism in Malaya in 1950 at the Malayan Forum in London (Josey,1974:91). He commented, as if he was totally unprepared for it, ‘Then one day in 1954 we came into contact with the Chinese-educated world’ (Lee, 1961:16). He was to use the word ‘chauvinism’ frequently in his political attacks against those extremists who unscrupulously championed the causes of ethnic communities, both Chinese and Malay. It was also around this time that he began to learn Mandarin in order to communicate with the Chinese-educated population (Josey, 1974:29). Student agitation continued throughout 1954 with their involvement in industrial disputes. In 1955 they supported the striking busworkers from the Hock Lee Bus Company by raising funds and food for the strikers. Backed by pro-communist labour unions student boycotts spread. The newly elected Labour Front government led by Marshall was anxious to avoid using force against the students, for fear of being branded ‘anti-Chinese education’ (Yeo, 1973a:201). Instead, it set up the All-Party Committee, which included Lee Kuan Yew, to look into the problem of Chinese education. When Marshall accepted the Committee’s recommendation that the question of

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disciplinary action against students and closure of the Chinese schools involved in fomenting unrest be set aside, the students claimed a major victory. Recognizing that Singapore was a multiracial society the Committee made several far-reaching recommendations (Gwee, 1969:212). These included the principle of equal treatment for the four streams of education—Malay, Chinese, English and Tamil; a common and nationally oriented curriculum; introduction of bilingual education in primary and trilingual education in secondary schools; the teaching of civics; encouraging social interaction of pupils from the different language streams; and building a common culture by fusing the best elements from all. By implication it rejected the Barnes concept of a national school which retained English and Malay but eliminated Chinese and Tamil (Gopinathan, 1974:22). It accepted the ‘cultural pluralism’ which underlay the Fenn-Wu Report. The All-Party Committee accepted that Chinese education and culture was bound to the formation of an independent nation but recognized the contribution of other races. The concept of multiculturalism, so integral to the political culture of the island and accepted by all the major Singapore-based political parties (especially the Malayan Democratic Union or MDU) in the 1950s, was given expression in the All-Party Report on education in Singapore. Its rationale for a bilingual and eventually trilingual policy, the latter somewhat ambitious, was a convincing one. The Committee noted that Chinese as a majority language should be given due recognition (Gopinathan, 1974:22). English was vital to a society dependent on an international economy; Malay could not be ignored because of its close ties with the mainland and its regional importance with respect to Indonesia and the Borneo territories. The Report is also significant for its numerous references to the need consciously to create a Singapore Malayan-centred loyalty (Gopinathan, 1974:20). The White Paper on Education Policy, subsequently released in the same year, stated that the main aim of such a policy was to build a ‘Malayan nation’ (Gopinathan, 1974:23–4). Echoing the tone of the All-Party view, the way to create such a nation was to accord equal respect to the four principal cultures for no ‘deculturized’ group would have anything to contribute. However, the PAP led by Lee sharply criticised the Labour Front government’s policy on language policy (Gopinathan, 1974:24–5). It attacked the government for not giving priority to the Malay language and took the view that instead of a free choice, Malay should be the predominant second language in the country.

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The PAP was able to put its view into practice when it came to power in 1959. It upgraded the status of Malay by declaring it the national language and expanded Malay education in primary and secondary schools to demonstrate that it was seriously committed to merger. The PAP officially stated in 1960 that the fears which led the Malay majority in the mainland to be wary of the Chinese majority in Singapore must be resolved (Ahmat, 1973:173). It argued that ‘a lingua franca is necessary, and moral, political and practical considerations make Malay, rather than English, the obvious choice.’ Between 1960 and 1965 Chinese students could freely choose English as their first language and Malay as the second language (Newman, 1986:56). However, the political boost given to Malay education and Malay language was to create a lost generation of Malay-medium students after separation, a point we will take up later. As proposed by the MDU a decade earlier and implied by the AllParty Report, the PAP introduced integrated schools in the 1960s (Murray, 1971:104–5). The purpose of such schools was to ensure the availability of both vernacular and English classes in areas of demand and to encourage social contact and second language use across ethnic lines. In other words, schools could either be EnglishChinese or English-Malay schools. Such integrated schools were considered essential in building a national identity while preserving the cultural traditions of each ethnic community (Gopinathan, 1974:46). The progress of the integrated schools policy over the next twelve years is revealing. By 1972 nearly a quarter of the total number of schools were integrated, more in secondary schools than in primary ones (Gopinathan, 1974:46–7). This was the result of a greater number of secondary schools, the main target of integration efforts, being built over the period. In primary schools the Malays were the most heavily integrated; only 14 per cent of Chinesemedium pupils were integrated. At the secondary level the Malays were fully integrated while only half of the Chinese-medium pupils were. Merger with Malaysia did not have any significant impact on the education policy of Singapore largely because the latter retained autonomy over education under the Malaysia Agreement. The PAP government continued its expansion of facilities for Malay education within the integrated schools policy. While committed to vernacular education and the Chinese language it played a low profile in promoting Chinese education because of mainland sensitivities about left-wing influence in Chinese schools. However, the educational policies of Singapore and the Federation reflected a potentially

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serious schism in the development of nationhood. In 1961, just before merger, the Rahman Talib Report was issued by the Federation government which sought to establish Malay as the sole and official language in all schools including vernacular ones (Gopinathan, 1974:37). By then the principle of multilingualism had been entrenched in Singapore society. While the PAP government sought unity through multilingualism and a national language (Malay) the mainland had in principle accepted Malay as the sole official and national language, believing that it was instrumental in creating unity. How this deep division would have resolved itself if separation had not occurred is now a matter of conjecture. LANGUAGE AND NATION BUILDING Nevertheless, this discussion of the historical and political underpinning of the role of education in the development of nationhood in Singapore and Malaya leads us to draw some useful sociological lessons. For these we refer to the work of Anthony Smith and Raymond Breton. Smith identifies two overlapping concepts of the modern nation—civic or territorial and ethnic or genealogical: The civic conception treats nations as units of population which inhabit a demarcated territory, possess a common economy with mobility in a single territory-wide occupational and production system, common laws with identical rights and duties for everyone, and a public, mass education system, with a single civic ideology. Territory, economy, law and education constitute the four spheres in and through which nations, in this view, are formed. It is very much a Western conception, and fits well with the myth of the ‘modern nation’, since these kinds of unityterritorial, economic, legal and educational—require a modern industrial base. He continues: But there is another conception of the nation which harmonises less well with Western modernity. It sees nations as named human populations claiming a common ancestry, a demotic solidarity, common customs and vernaculars, and a common native history. Genealogy, demography, traditional culture and history, furnish the main resources for an ethnic view of the formation of nations.

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It is a conception of the nation that has found favour mainly outside the West, and often opposes civic conceptions. (Smith 1988:9–10) Any definition of the nation, he concludes, must do justice to both ethnic and territorial conceptions. In this way, ethnicity is closely linked to the nation and nationalism. When both conceptions coincide as in the case of Japan or Thailand, the ‘nation’ is unproblematic. However, in multi-ethnic societies such as Singapore and Malaya there is a certain tension between the two concepts. Smith’s work on the nation is echoed in Breton’s distinction (1988:85–7) between the cultural-symbolic and civic-instrumental dimensions of nationhood mentioned in Chapter 1. He argues that the construction of a nation involves both although the emphasis can vary considerably. Where the cultural-symbolic is emphasized the basis of inclusion and exclusion is ethnic such as language, religion or ancestry. The identification of individuals with the collective is primarily symbolic and emotional rather than pragmatic or utilitarian. The society and institutions are constructed on the basis of cultural unity. Language is a critical component in the cultural-symbolic construction of the nation and constitutes a basis for defining collective identities and lifestyles (Breton, 1984:126). The language used in public affairs and institutions,’ Breton continues, ‘signifies to individuals and groups that the society is indeed their society, and the institutions, their institutions.’ Hence multilingualism (or bilingualism) and multiculturalism create tension in such forms of nationhood. The PAP government experienced this situation while Singapore was in Malaysia. Committed to ‘multiracialism’, articulated in the political rhetoric of a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ in 1965, it found itself on a collision course with the Federal government led by UMNO. When the PAP contested the parliamentary election on the mainland in 1964 its appeal to non-Malay support provoked Malay nationalists—the Malayan Union controversy still fresh in their memories—into action. Consequently the UMNO-led government was more strident in pursuing a mono-ethnic policy and championing a Malay ethnic identity. Where nationhood is instrumentally oriented, Breton maintains, membership is civic, that is by birth or through legally established criteria and procedures. It was seen in the last chapter that citizenship in Singapore is based on birth and is inclusivist in spirit; in contrast, qualification for citizenship in Malaya was exclusionary. The

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difference was maintained even after merger. A society preoccupied with the civic-instrumental problems of nation building is geared towards establishing control over resources and solving problems. The concern is with administering a territory. The attachment of individuals to such a society is primarily utilitarian. While a public education system is central to Smith’s civic conception of the modern nation and to Breton’s civic-instrumental management of nationhood, language—so critical to education policy in a multi-ethnic society—falls squarely within the ethnic conception of the nation and constitutes the cultural-symbolic construction of nationhood. It may now be realized why education and language policy straddle the civic-instrumental and culturalsymbolic dimensions of nation building. Much of the tension in nation building in an ethnically plural society is condensed in the question of what language policy to adopt. Singapore moved from a monolingual policy under its colonial administration, where English was the favoured language, to an essentially bilingual education under self-government, as recommended by the All-Party Report of 1956. Bilingualism may be considered as compatible to multiculturalism or multiracialism— which is the founding myth of Singapore—because it accorded the principle of equal treatment to all four languages including the vernaculars. The implicit definition of bilingualism was English plus a second language. Such a concept of bilingualism was acceptable because it was generally understood to mean English, a neutral but instrumental language, and a second language of the parents’ choice. It may also be viewed as an attempt, albeit unconscious, to combine the symbolic and instrumental facets of nation building. The insistence by the government on mother tongue as the second language came later in a post-independence Singapore. As mentioned earlier, the All-Party Report argued that English was vital to the economy, but also recognized Chinese as the majority language and Malay because Singapore was historically part of the mainland. However, in the decade preceding separation, the PAP was forced to concentrate on the cultural-symbolic construction of the political identity of the island. Here it was treading a fine line between a Chinese majority strongly identified with Chinese education and a significant Malay minority which looked towards Malaysia for direction. The impending merger in 1963 made the situation more acute. The PAP government found a compromise in bilingualism.

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EDUCATION AFTER INDEPENDENCE After separation the PAP government had a freer hand in dealing with Chinese education. Economic survival became a consuming priority in independent Singapore. Education was to be directed towards promoting a cohesive community for its own collective interests and indeed its very survival (Gopinathan, 1976:73). The civicinstrumental construction of nationhood began in earnest. In 1966 the government signalled its intention to review the education content and syllabus so that secondary schools could produce the type of students needed (Chew, 1976:151). Lee himself stated, ‘We do not grudge this money (spent increasingly every year on schools and teachers), but we must get for it a worthwhile return—a good citizen, robust, well-educated, skilled, and well-adjusted.’ From now on education was for responsible citizenship, which included one’s contribution to economic development and the interests of the community, however defined. Education has never been seen to waver from this single-minded objective since. A brief comment must be made about the enrolment trends of the four language streams because they have direct political and policy implications. Prior to the 1950s the ratio of Chinese-stream to English-stream students was almost two to one (Murray, 1971:97–8). By 1954 total enrolments in English and Chinese schools were about equal. In 1962 the number of Chinese children entering Englishmedium schools at Primary 1 finally exceeded those admitted into Chinese medium schools. By 1978 English-stream students outnumbered their Chinese counterparts by nine to one (Noss, 1984:23). Vernacular education among Malays and Indians declined sharply (Murray, 1971:101). Enrolment in English-medium schools was more extreme in these two communities than in the Chinese. By 1976 no pupils were enrolled in Primary 1 Malay-medium classes and by 1982 the same applied for Tamil-medium classes (Pakir, 1992:242). In a message to the Singapore Malay Teachers’ Union in 1972 Lee drew attention to the declining enrolments in vernacular education by providing an economic explanation (Gopinathan, 1974:58–9). The policy of industrialization geared to an export market, he commented, had resulted in an emphasis on vocational and technical training and the widespread use of English. Parents had placed the careers of their children before any cultural or linguistic patriotism. The decline in school enrolments in vernacular education in Singapore is illustrative of the view that in most societies language

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shift is a function of economic forces (Edwards, 1985:163–4). Such a shift usually reflects an adaptation sought for instrumental reasons. Once language decline occurs it is difficult to stem. This is true of Tamil and Malay, and to a lesser extent Chinese. The aggressive promotion of economic development after 1965, the existence of a substantial core of competent English language speakers and teachers—the legacy of a colonial administration and the cosmopolitan nature of a highly urbanized population—all within a city-state whose existence depended on its ability to tune itself to international developments and influences, account for the speed with which the educational system shifted to a monolingual one in less than twenty years. A cautionary note must be added to what appears to be a dramatic shift towards monolingual education. The figures cited relate to school enrolments but they do not indicate what languages are spoken by the population and whether the pattern has changed. In a significant study done on changes in the relative status of major languages in Singapore between 1957 and 1972, Kuo (1976:138–41) states that Mandarin seemed to have gained the most in competent usage within the Chinese population, compared to English, Malay or Tamil. The status of English had also shown impressive gains, evenly distributed among the major ethnic groups. The Indians gained the most, followed by the Malays and then the Chinese. In a more recent review of the data Anderson (1985:97) supports these conclusions. He also identified sharp falls in the use of Chinese dialects, to a lesser extent in the use of Tamil, while the use of Malay has been maintained. If these trends are accepted we may conclude that Singapore is moving towards a ‘bilingual society’, however defined, in which primacy is accorded to English and Mandarin, and to a lesser extent English and Malay. Bilingualism will then be a relatively stable phenomenon for ethnic Chinese and Malays; for the latter contacts with Malaysia and Indonesia will continue to be important (Pendley, 1983:54), but Indians may well choose, for instrumental reasons, to learn Chinese or Malay. A revitalized and vigorous bilingual policy since 1979, with the emphasis on Mandarin, may well have arrested the slide towards monolingualism in the 1970s. We will return to a discussion of the Speak Mandarin policy later in the chapter. As early as 1965 Lee expressed his fear that the consequence of English education was the decentralization of the population (Murray, 1971:107–8). For this reason and for the purpose of encouraging interethnic communication, a second language was made compulsory in secondary schools. Lee later argued that the learning of a second

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language, the mother tongue, was synonymous with learning a whole value system that would help maintain the fabric of society against the negative excesses of Westernization (Gopinathan, 1974:63). Similar reasoning lay behind the introduction in 1974 of a new subject, Education for Living, which combined civics, history and geography, and was taught in the mother tongue (Gopinathan, 1974:45). The objective was to inculcate in pupils some traditional Asian values, an understanding of right and wrong, and the rights and obligations of citizenship. Four years earlier, in 1970, the Ministry of Education introduced primary history textbooks in the four languages (Gopinathan, 1976:74). These books celebrated the success of the various immigrant ‘races’ which settled in the island—partly to provide a different perspective of history, and partly to extol the virtues of hard work, perseverance and the rewards which come with them. The Malay minority in Singapore, in the face of changing political fortunes, found themselves in a predicament with regard to education. Under colonial administration Malay education was only available at the primary level (Ahmat, 1973:169). Partly because of government inertia and partly because of Malay resistance to any changes for fear that the purity of Malay education would be diluted, no progress was made. In 1951 the British proposed an increased use of English in the fourth year of schooling to prepare Malays for English-medium secondary schools and to enhance their employment opportunities. Malay opposition and indecision on the part of the government resulted in the abandonment of the plan in 1956 (Ahmat, 1973:171–2). Malay students in the 1950s, Ahmat comments, suffered because of the government’s indecision and Malay conservatism. Malay education, as we have noted, was later given a tremendous boost under the PAP government. For a brief period of seven years political considerations worked to the advantage of Malay education (Ahmat, 1973:177). Following separation the objectives of education were revised, priority was given to economic transformation, and the special attention given to Malay education was discontinued (Ahmat, 1973:178–9). So successful was the PAP in implementing an education policy geared towards technical and vocational training, which required English proficiency, and so drastic was the decline in enrolments in Malay schools that the Singapore Malay Teachers Union urged the government to drop its four-medium policy (Ahmat, 1973:182). It proposed a national system, similar to the one in the Barnes Report, in which English will be the main medium and Malay a compulsory second language. The fate of the Malays in Singapore was a product

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of the political vicissitudes of colonialism, unification and independence and their dilemma was poignantly expressed in 1966 by a Malay minister in the PAP government: The Malays today, consequent upon Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, were placed in a dilemma of being in a minority relatively poor and backward, and yet living in a region where people of their own race, religion, culture and language, predominate and decisively hold sway in their political lives. Under the circumstances, we must try to understand deeply and with the utmost sympathy this enigmatic frame of mind the Malays are in for no fault of their own. It is important that we find a long-term solution to this problem of theirs, that is of being isolated, so to speak, in their own home country… (Ahmat, 1973:184) Before turning to the major policy initiatives which were taken in the area of education in the late 1970s, it will be useful to summarize the main features of earlier policies. Education in post-independence Singapore was geared towards economic priorities. This did not preclude an awareness, on the part of the PAP government, that successful economic development was likely to be accompanied by the problem of ‘deculturalization’, as they perceived it. The government was convinced that a bilingual education, English and a mother tongue as the second language, would provide the ‘cultural ballast’ to contain the problem, as well as facilitating the interethnic communication so essential to nation building. The bilingual policy was pursued vigorously. In 1966 Chinese students who chose English as their first language were expected to take Chinese rather than Malay as their second language (Newman, 1986:56). Increased exposure time was given to the two languages studied. In 1973 the second language paper was given equal weight in examinations as the first language. An integrated schools policy was instrumental in advancing the cause of bilingual education. By the mid-1970s it became clear that it was only a matter of time before the vernacular streams would lose all their students, with the exception of a minority of Chinese students, to the English medium schools. On the one hand, however, it could be claimed that the policy had been successful in breaking down the ethnic barriers of vernacular education. On the other hand it was questionable whether a bilingual policy was effective in fortifying the resilience of Asian communities against ‘undesirable changes’ precipitated by rapid economic development.

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THE GOH REPORT ON EDUCATION, 1979 This brings us to the most important educational development that has taken place in Singapore. The Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Keng Swee, was asked in 1978 to lead a team to study problems in the Ministry of Education; no terms of reference were given. As Noss (1984:24) pointed out, the Goh Report, which was subsequently produced, was an admission that the bilingual education policy was a failure. In fact the system, he continued, had rapidly become monolingual and differences between the Mandarin and English streams were being obliterated. At the outset the Report stated that the school system in its existing form was unnatural to Singaporeans. Most students were taught in two languages, English and Mandarin; 85 per cent of these students did not speak either language at home. It also highlighted the high attrition rates of bilingual schooling. Of those who sat for the primary school leaving examination (PSLE), the first major public examination, 60 per cent failed in one or both languages. Only 71 per cent of primary school pupils continued with their secondary education; a mere 14 per cent eventually reached ‘A’ level. The Report then stated, ‘it is clear that a single system of education imposed on children of varying abilities to absorb learning in languages which they do not speak at home, is the main reason for the weaknesses of the system and for high attrition rates.’ Attention is drawn to two major recommendations of the Report. One recommendation is the screening of students at Primary 3 (now Primary 4) to determine what kind of bilingual education will most benefit them. There are now three options available depending on ability—English and mother tongue as first languages, which on paper should produce a student who is effectively bilingual; English and mother tongue as second language, which was the original practice; English and mother tongue only as an oral language. In defending this policy of streaming at an early age against the opposition of educationists the Goh Report argued that it was less cruel to students who would be repeated failures under the old system and suffer loss of self-confidence and self-esteem. It stated, ‘Much of the prejudice against streaming of school children derives from an egalitarian philosophy fashionable in the Western world after World War II.’ The argument was persuasive, if not admirable. The Report recognized that different children have different capacities to acquire knowledge. It stated that the language of instruction in Singapore is not usually the language spoken at home, unlike other homogenous societies. Any educational system devised must therefore

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accommodate such special circumstances. The unintended consequences of streaming are yet to be documented. One such consequence is that it has made education extremely competitive at an early age. The labelling of failures’—for example, those pupils who are required to learn their mother tongue as an oral language are perceived by the public as failures—and ‘successes’, while not ostensibly intended in the spirit of the Report, have been institutionalized. This is partly because of parental expectations and pressures, and partly because it accords with the PAP conception of a meritocratic society—hence the competitive principle is embodied in the education system. The other recommendation relates to the identification of the top 8 per cent of Chinese-medium students from primary schools, who are then invited to attend special Chinese-medium secondary schools under the Special Assistance Plan (SAP). This will allow them to continue their secondary education in Chinese and at the same time enable them to achieve proficiency in English. This was a measure to deal with the imminent decline of Chinese education in Singapore. The policy had mixed success because many parents continued to send their children to English-medium schools. The top 10 per cent of PSLE students are now offered places in SAP schools, to take English and their mother tongue as first languages in secondary school. In his letter to Goh in 1979 which accompanies the published Report, Lee made some telling remarks about the educational system. He commented, ‘A quarter century of political battling has roughed up the education system.’ He expressed regret over what he estimated to be the one-third of students who could have become competent in at least one language, had they been allowed to go at their own pace. The cost of a bilingual policy had been high. However, there was no question of abandoning the policy. The merits of bilingualism were overwhelming—it enhances national integration through interethnic communication, it is vital to multiculturalism, it gives the individual and ethnic group a sense of identity and community and it improves employment and economic opportunities for Singaporeans (Gopinathan, 1980a: 181). It was a matter of modifying the bilingual policy to accommodate the range of abilities of students, and then rigorously applying it to make it work. In 1976 an educationist wrote, ‘there has been no precise formulation as to the objectives that bilingualism should serve, beyond stating that it would help interethnic communication and provide cultural ballast’ (Gopinathan, 1976:77). By 1978 it had become clear to the government that if a bilingual policy was to be

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effective, it had to be specific about the objectives. Lee made an attempt to identify these in several public discussions on bilingualism in that year. First, he argued that, by implication, the failure rate in primary schools would not be so high if dialects were used less and were replaced with Mandarin. Second, the presence of some fifteen dialects in Singapore required the active encouragement of a lingua franca amongst the Chinese. Mandarin, being congruent with a written script and more widely used outside of Singapore, was the logical choice. Third, he reiterated the original rationale for bilingualism as essential to maintaining cutural identity and countering the individualization of society. He referred to the resentment of English-stream students (when the Chinese-medium Nanyang University was amalgamated in a joint campus with the English-medium University of Singapore in 1978) who felt that the Chinese-educated students, because of their poor English, were slowing their progress at lectures and tutorials. Lee remarked that Chinese-stream students, because of their strong mutual help habits, would have gone out of their way to help English-stream students if the situation were reversed. It was also about the same time, in the late 1970s, that the government launched the Speak Mandarin campaign, maintained every year since then, to persuade the Chinese population to use Mandarin in place of dialects. The 1980s may be described as a revitalization of the bilingualism and a more vigorous implementation of the policy, with a difference. While Malay and Tamil were still offered to those parents who wished their children to learn their mother tongue, the emphasis in bilingualism was now English and Mandarin. Despite assurances from the government that other second languages would be maintained, the Speak Mandarin campaigns have caused some uneasiness amongst the non-Chinese population and the Anglophile Chinese. From 1979 secondary students had to pass the second language in order to be admitted to pre-university classes. In 1982, to demonstrate the government’s commitment to make the bilingual policy work, English-stream students were required to meet a second language requirement for entry into the university (Newman, 1988:445). Noss (1984:25) identifies three official arguments for the priority given to Mandarin and they coincide with Lee’s views—the educational, in which dialects are seen as a hindrance to bilingualism, the ‘cultural’ rationale that Mandarin is an effective symbol of Chinese identity and the practical, which sees Mandarin as an effective lingua franca for an otherwise fragmented Chinese

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community and as an increasingly important international language. It is conspicuous that with increasing trade with and investments in China the commercial argument, which would probably have an immediate impact on Singapore Chinese, has not figured prominently in ministerial speeches or newspaper editorials (Newman, 1988:438). It is possible that the government is acutely sensitive to regional feelings if the domestic promotion of Mandarin is explicitly linked to economic interests in China. RATIONALE FOR BILINGUAL EDUCATION The ‘cultural’ reason for a bilingual education policy has been the most consistent and the most strongly espoused by the government ever since Lee stated in 1965 that the learning of a language is tantamout to accepting a whole value system. This was a message repeated many times over the next two decades. While such a claim may be disputed, and has been by anthropologists (see Benjamin, 1976; Clammer, 1981a), we need to examine the concept of bilingual education and the ‘objective’—usually attributed by politicians and language planners—it serves. There are two varieties of bilingual education (Edwards, 1984:185). In its transitional form, Edwards states, ‘bilingual education is seen as a temporary, bridging mechanism intended to help children who enter school with limited or no knowledge of the national language.’ In its maintenance form the two languages are to be kept throughout school. Which form is adopted is ultimately a political question. If the goal is to assist in the retention of language and culture, Edwards continues, some form of maintenance bilingual education is required. This is the case in Singapore. However, as Mandarin acquires greater instrumental significance, as it appears to be doing in East Asia, then this may well be more effective in influencing some shift towards the language as in the case of the English language. Without delving into some very complex issues in bilingual education we want to raise three further points discussed by Edwards. First, in referring to North American society, Edwards (1984:187) is of the opinion that the lifestyles of ‘ethnics’ are such that a transitional form of bilingual education is more appropriate. The members of ethnic communities are more mainstream and assimilationist than is generally believed. In our view this is true of migrant societies such as Singapore. The transitional variety facilitates nation building and is the most attractive option to governments who wish to homogenize society rather than fragment

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it; yet the PAP government has not pursued this course. The culturalsymbolic value of bilingualism within a so-called multicultural society like Singapore has had the effect of unifying its people. However, if bilingualism is viewed primarily as English and Mandarin it may not have the same appeal as in the past. If this is the case, it may well be asked whether the bilingualism, now conceived, is compatible with the founding charter of Singapore, multiculturalism. Second, Edwards (1985:166) states that maintenance bilingual education is unlikely significantly to affect group identity and may in fact damage it. It is difficult to evaluate this view in the absence of research evidence in Singapore. Third, does language loss necessarily lead to cultural erosion and a diminution of ethnic identity, as implied in Lee’s view? Language loss does reflect some culture loss and denude cultural markers (Edwards, 1985:129). But the important point Edwards makes is that ‘language and other elements of ethnicity are simultaneously acted upon by social forces; some succumb, some do not.’ In short, the loss of cultural or ethnic identity cannot be simply a function of language. In 1984 Lee, indicating a change from his original position, expressed a similar view when he doubted that ‘we shall lose our culture and roots because Chinese is not taught as the first language. Language is related to, but not synonymous with, culture’ (Lee quoted from Pakir, 1992:248). This poses the interesting question, how does the government now provide the ‘cultural ballast’ and nurture the moral values of society if the learning of mother tongue is neither sufficient nor effective? In his letter to Goh after reading the Report in 1979 Lee commented that while he was in agreement with its conclusions, he felt that the Report did not deal with the moral and characterforming aspects of education. He wrote: The first subject concerns good citizenship and nationhood. What kind of man or woman does a child grow up to be after 10–12 years of schooling? Is he a worthy citizen, guided by decent moral precepts? Have his teachers and principals set him good examples? Imparting knowledge to pass examinations, and later to do a job, these are important. However, the litmus test of a good education is whether it nurtures good citizens who can live, work, contend and cooperate in a civilised way. Is he loyal and patriotic? Is he, when the need arises, a good soldier, ready to defend his country, and so protect his wife and children, and his fellow citizens? Is he filial, respectful to elders, law-abiding, humane, and responsible?

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In this remarkable excerpt from his letter, Lee captures the essence of the civic-republican conception of citizenship, outlined by Oldfield (1990) and referred to earlier in the book. In contrast to the liberalindividualist model which regards citizenship as a status—the individual is conferred rights which should be protected from the interference of others or from the community—citizenship in the civic-republican tradition is a practice. It requires citizens to honour, defend and share in the government of the city (Marquand, 1991:338). Citizens work for the interests of the community, not the individual. ‘Citizens are called to stern and important tasks which have to do with the sustaining of their identity’ (Marquand, 1991:338). The danger of regressing or backsliding is ever present. Hence, in Protestant fashion, self-discipline, duty and activity are constantly stressed to counter the temptation to laxity. The sequel to the Goh Report and Lee’s comment on its neglect of the moral aspect of education was the Report on Moral Education (the Ong Report) which was produced later in 1979. Its critique of the existing programmes, Education for Living, and Civics, and its call for the replacement of these programmes with one that would inculcate Eastern and Asian moral concepts, values and attitudes, is discussed in Chapter 8. There, the links between bilingualism and the espousal of moral values claimed to produce responsible citizenship of the civic-republican model are traversed in detail. Furthermore, it will be shown how the rapid development of a moral education syllabus and curriculum (Gopinathan, 1988:138), and the radical change marked by the acceptance of religious instruction as central to moral education, led in the latter half of the 1980s to an awareness of the unintended consequences of this policy. In a clear instance of the ‘Return to Sender’ dynamic, religion—which had been allocated a prominent role in the moral values programme, came to be seen as a volatile and problematic area.

4 Multiracialism and the structuring of ethnic relations

The significance of multiracialism as a central component in the ideological basis of nationhood in Singapore has already been evaluated. This abiding belief in according equal status to the founding races of Singapore (Chinese, Malays, Indians and Eurasians) is deeply rooted in the political history and origins of the island state. Although the official classification of ‘races’ does not include Eurasians, who are described under ‘Others’, the PAP government recognizes the important contribution they have made to Singapore. The Japanese Occupation precipitated anti-colonial movements in India, China and Indonesia and helped to articulate the national identities of these societies. These events served to reinforce, as Benjamin states (1976:119), ‘the separate ethnic identities that had developed in Singapore under British rule’. The ethnic identities of the Chinese, Malays and Indians were therefore derived from and fed by their association with increasing political awareness in their homelands. The Malayan Union plan in 1946 which proposed the formation of an independent and unitary Malaya (which excluded Singapore) would have granted equal citizenship rights to all ethnic communities had it not been for widespread Malay objections. The proposed Union was critical to the development of Malay nationalism in Malaya and its antagonism towards the growing dominance of a migrant Chinese community. It was against these events that the Malayan Forum was formed in 1949 by a group of university students studying in London. The group, led by Lee, was concerned about obstacles to a united and independent Malaya, and this included Sino-Malay polarization. It was also against this background that fledgling political parties in Singapore such as the MDU, PP and the Labour Front were formed in the pre-PAP years. As 91

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indicated in Chapter 2, party politics in the island during these years were notable for their non-communal persuasion, mainly because they were dominated by the English-educated who shared socialist ideals. While the ideology of multiracialism was not enunciated then its origins may be traced to political events in the mid-1940s. The first occasion on which multiracialism was recognized as a guiding principle in government policy was in the 1956 Report of the All-Party Committee on Education. The Committee included the PAP, founded two years earlier, which had steadily built up its political influence in the colony. The Report, in accepting that Singapore was a multiracial society, recommended the principle of equal treatment for the four streams of education existing then—Malay, Chinese, English and Tamil, but within a national curriculum. The White Paper on Education which followed soon after expressed the fear of ‘deculturalization’ if this principle was not adhered to. This fear was to be repeated many times over the years and informed the PAP’s ethnic policy. For example, in 1978, Lee stated, ‘I say a person who gets deculturalised—and I nearly was, so I know this danger—he loses his self-confidence’ (quoted in Hong and Yap, 1993:37). The idea of cultural pluralism was thus already explicitly acknowledged in the mid-1950s and, as discussed in Chapter 3, institutionalized in a bilingual educational system in 1957 (Turnbull, 1977:267). In the early 1960s multiracialism, as a political ideology, was played down by the PAP to enhance its chances of merger with Malaysia. Soon after the formation of Malaysia in 1963 and the entry of the PAP into Malaysian politics, the political rhetoric of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ was used by Lee to blunt Malay demands for an assimilationist policy based on the primacy of Malay culture and language for all Malaysians, and to foreshadow his vision of the new Federation. The rhetoric may be viewed as ‘multiracialism’ in disguise, but expressed in terms which would appeal to a broad section of non-Malays and a few Malays in the mainland. The short-term strategy was to replace the MCA as the Chinese partner in the Alliance government then and to influence the direction of the Malaysian Federation. UMNO, however, viewed the PAP intrusion into Malaysian politics as the thin end of the wedge. In sum the origins of multiracialism in Singapore are found in the political philosophy of English-educated middle-class intellectuals who dominated local politics, with the tacit approval of a colonial administration in the lead-up to independence. Such a philosophy was not only a reflection of the personal commitments of its exponents, but also of the political sensitivities in which the PAP

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found itself embroiled—namely, the need to simultaneously contain and appease the Chinese-educated whose growing influence on the island was felt through the ballot box. Appeasement was necessary as the PAP found itself in competition with the communists, who worked through trade unions and student organizations in mobilizing Chinese support. Containment was equally necessary in order to prevent Chinese chauvinism from spilling over the point at which merger might be rejected. The formula was found in multiracialism though its full significance was only realised over the years. These issues will be taken up in detail later. The ejection of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 was essentially over the PAP’s intransigent stand on multiracialism. For this reason multiracialism is what Benjamin (1976:116) describes as one of the founding myths (charter for social action) of the Republic. It is not simply rhetoric. It reflects the Singaporean’s sense of reality for those who lived through the 1950s and the painful experience of separation in 1965. Multiracialism is one of the key reasons why Singapore is an independent state today. Having set the historical origins of a political ideal, this chapter will focus on three issues, not necessarily in order. First, it will unpeel the conceptual layers surrounding multiracialism and discuss its significance for the process of nationstate formation in Singapore. Second, it tracks the career of multiracialism, demonstrating its multifaceted character as a reflection of the pace of political and economic developments on the island. Third, it examines how ethnic relations in the island have been structured by the leitmotif of multiracialism. MULTIRACIALISM: CONCEPT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLICY The concept of multiracialism and its sociological implications for Singapore was raised by several writers during the mid-1970s, including Benjamin (1976), Chan and Evers (1978), and Clammer (1982). The significance of the ideology of multiracialism for Singaporeans is three-fold (Benjamin, 1976:115–16). First, it is a powerful force against ethnic discrimination, and this is reflected in the ease and unself-conscious manner in which members of different ethnic communities interact at the public level. Second, it is woven almost invisibly into the everyday life of Singaporeans. Third, the multiracial idea-complex is the clearest expression and cognition of Singaporean culture. As one of the founding myths of Singapore it is a ‘charter’ for social action.

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Much of the conceptual work done on the issue of multiculturalism is centred in societies like Australia and Canada, whose political experiences are derived from British origins. Both countries pursued a liberal immigration policy in the 1970s which have resulted in a population more ethnically diverse than in the past—a situation out of which policies of multiculturalism have been evolved by their respective governments. It is therefore instructive to draw on comparative material, particularly from Canada, as a point of reference in the analysis of multiculturalism in Singapore. Since the federal government in Canada made its policy statement on multiculturalism and its commitment to the ideal in 1971, much has been written by Canadian scholars on the political implications of multiculturalism. It should be pointed out that both political and academic discourse in Canada refers to multiculturalism rather than multiracialism as is the case in Singapore. As Benjamin (1976:115) notes, a multiracial ideology also serves to define the Singapore population as divided into ‘races’. The significance of this is that the PAP government regards the relationship between society, culture, race, ethnicity, and the individual as unequivocally interchangeable (Benjamin, 1976:118). To this may be added language and ethnic community. In other words, every individual has a race, language and culture to which he or she belongs; and this is one of three, Chinese, Malay or Indian—those not fitting into any of these categories are loosely defined as ‘Others’, and this carries implications which will be examined. The terms multiracialism and multiculturalism will be used interchangeably, as they are in the discourse of the PAP. As an analytical tool it is also useful to identify several dimensions of multiculturalism. Isajiw, referring to Canada, suggests that one has to distinguish between multiculturalism as an ideology, a social policy, and as a feature of the structure of our society. The three meanings are, of course, interdependent. An analysis of the structure of society may indicate a certain ideology as the most appropriate to follow. On the other hand, an ideology applied into policy systematically pursued over a longer period of time may contribute to the development of one or another feature of the social structure. (quoted from Anderson and Frideres, 1981:99) Benjamin’s use of the concept multiracialism is restricted to the level of a structural feature of society; for him it is both a cultural and

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social institution (1976:115). The analysis of multiracialism in Singapore should take heed of the three levels suggested by Isajiw. What began as a political ideal for a group of English-educated intellectuals with strong ‘Malayan’ sentiments was later worked into a consistent political ideology which touched the heartstrings of a generation of Malayan-born, and was finally institutionalized through official policy. As government policy multiculturalism may be interpreted in two ways (Fleras and Elliot, 1992:70). First, it can consist of specific government initiatives and programmes designed to promote the needs of ethnic minorities. In Singapore the multiracial policy has been used in this way but is not only aimed at minorities, as will be shown later. Second, as a policy it also refers to the establishment of a broad political agenda which legitimizes specific programmes and actions. In other words, it is both ideology and policy; it is because the PAP government has been able to espouse multiracialism as an ideal and simultaneously operationalize it consistently that it has indeed become a structural feature of society. A distinction is made by Chua (1985) between operant elements and overarching Utopian elements in the governing philosophy of the PAP; for example, pragmatism may be regarded as operant while the idea of a future democratic society can be seen as Utopian. To the extent that multiracialism combines both pragmatic and ideological elements, it can be seen as both an operant and a Utopian concept. Because of this, the PAP government is able to move with relative ease between the levels of cognition and practice. Why should nations practise multiculturalism in the first place ? Its practice is predicated upon a particular model of ethnic integration. Four models of integration are identified for the North American situation (Kallen, 1982:158–9), of which the last three are relevant. The model of the melting pot (amalgamation) is premised on the goal of one nation, one people and one culture. Social mobility is based on achieved criteria, and its national identity is de-ethnicized. The US is often held as an example of this model. The mosaic (cultural pluralism) is committed to one nation, many peoples and many cultures. Mobility is achievement-driven. Its national identity is a hyphenated identity (ethnic-national). The model of dominant conformity (absorption) is based on one nation, one people and one dominant culture. Mobility may be achieved or ascribed; and a dominant ethnic identity is the basis of national identity. Societies which are the products of migration and whose populations are dominated by peoples who have a migrant history

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espouse meritocratic values. The US, Canada, Australia and Singapore are some examples. Integral to the founding charter of Singapore is the meritocratic principle which has been rigorously applied in a spectrum of social contexts, notably in education. It is also appropriate that many of these migrant-based societies (whose populations are dominated by Anglo-Saxons) such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand have adopted some form of multiculturalism if not biculturalism as part of their nation building effort. As Moodley (1983:329) comments on Canada, ‘In a country with a vague identity, in a society rich in geography and short of history, multiculturalism is propagated as the lowest common denominator on which all segments may agree.’ The practice of multiculturalism in migrant-based societies, Singapore included, is conducive to the adoption of liberal citizenship policies. Such policies are inclusivist in the sense that migrants with occupational skills are welcome, and after a short period of residence are granted citizenship. In the long run a greater sense of national identity may be created. While the endogenous significance of multiculturalism for nation building in migrant-based societies has been identified, its external ramifications should not be overlooked. Drawing on Earth’s notion that it is ‘the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses’, it has been argued (Bauman, 1992:678) that nation building is about the maintenance of boundaries, and one may add imaginary boundaries. Accordingly, discourses in nationalism centre around identities and counter-identities which are always contested and fragile. In Canada political discourse in multiculturalism is sometimes couched as counter-identity—‘Canadians will lose their identity to Americanization unless ethnic groups preserve their cultural heritage’ (Anderson and Frideres, 1981:100). Similarly the practice of multiracialism in Singapore has to be appreciated as asserting a counter-identity in relation to Malaysia. The difference between this and the Canadian situation is that Singapore had been part of Malaya and later Malaysia. As recounted in an earlier chapter, the formation of the Federation of Malaya and a subsequent expanded Malaysia occurred against the rise of Malay nationalism and the precipitation of a Malay ethnie. While the Alliance government (a coalition of major Malay, Chinese and Indian political parties) was able to contain extremist demands from the Malays and Chinese, widespread Sino-Malay riots in 1969 were a political watershed for the country. For the next twenty years the UMNO-dominated government leaned towards the model of

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dominant conformity, pursuing a national policy of giving precedence to Malay identity, language and culture. Seen in this context the PAP espousal of multiracialism in post-1969 Singapore takes on a renewed significance. Although it may not, in our view, be regarded as an overt manifestation of counter-identity in response to the mainland, nevertheless its covert relevance should not be lost. In the process multiracialism lends external legitimacy to the state (Moodley, 1983:330). In contrast, the visit of Israel’s President to Singapore in 1986 precipitated a political furore which brought relations between the two neighbours to their lowest point since Singapore’s separation in 1965 (Leifer, 1988). The circumstances which led to the furore are outlined in Chapter 8, but the ramifications for the policy of multiracialism are relevant here. When Muslim organizations on the island followed the lead taken by their Malaysian counterparts in protesting the visit, the loyalty of the Malays in Singapore was publicly questioned by the Prime Minister (Leifer, 1988:349). The significance of the episode was no less a test of national sovereignty (Leifer, 1988:351). In examining ethnic relations in Singapore since self-government, Brown (1994) identifies three periods on the basis of the role played by the state. The three periods can first be summarized and their detailed features then examined. The years between 1959 and 1965 were characterized by what he describes as ethnic mosaic politics. From 1966 to 1980 ethnic relations were dominated by the politics of a neutral meritocracy. Since the 1980s ethnic issues have increasingly been subsumed within a corporatist state (Brown, 1994:78–89). This is a useful attempt at periodization within which ethnic relations will be discussed, but his arguments may be disputed. POLITICS OF MULTIRACIALISM In the first period between self-government and separation, Brown (1994:78–9) argues that geopolitical, that is, exogenous circumstances, were the dominant considerations behind the PAP rationale for adopting a policy of multiracialism. Because the political consciousness of the Chinese majority in Singapore has historically been dominated by their self-consciousness as a minority within a Malay-dominated region, the PAP has assiduously cultivated a multiracial identity so that the Republic is not seen as a ‘third China’. Brown fails to pay credence to the domestic origins of multiracialism, an interpretation which this book is concerned to emphasize. First, he overlooks the political background of the first

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generation PAP leaders who were committed to multiracialism and were instrumental in forging a multiracial policy. Second, he fails to appreciate the attraction of multiracialism or multiculturalism to societies with strong migrant origins. Third, he ignores the intimate links that Singapore had previously experienced with the peninsula through its political history, as part of the Straits Settlements then through the crisis of Union to eventual merger and its subsequent fallout. These have conditioned the PAP perception of ethnic relations after 1965 and its view of nation building. Reference has been made to the way in which the PAP deliberately, and for pragmatic reasons, downplayed its multiracial roots so as not to give the slightest impression to the mainland politicians that it had any intention of nurturing the depth of feeling of the Chineseeducated—who were already closely associated with the campaign waged by the CPM—for the Chinese language and identity. Lee desperately needed to convince the Tunku that the PAP was fully committed to the concept of Malaysia, to the point where the party actively promoted Malay language (which was declared the national language) and education on the island. The PAP, however, did not relinquish its multiracial philosophy. When it made its ill-judged decision to participate in the federal elections in 1964, it campaigned in the name of a multiracial Malaysia. Despite the depth of communal feelings generated on both sides of the causeway—which were the occasion for a serious race riot in Singapore in the same year—both sides declared that they were determined to establish political influence in each other’s territory (Turnbull, 1977:291). The pragmatism with which the PAP had credited itself for guiding its success failed them on one of few occasions, when Tunku made the decision in the following year to evict Singapore from Malaysia. The political rhetoric of multiracialism pursued in this period paradoxically polarized Sino-Malay relations in Singapore to an extent not experienced before or after. The PAP policy of multiracialism was intended to establish the basis of good ethnic relations in both territories. It had the opposite effect. The more the PAP tried to counter Malay chauvinism on the mainland, as it did Chinese communalism in the island, the more strident such chauvinism became. However, the politics of multiracialism practised by the PAP must be appreciated as a policy of containment and appeasement. Multiracialism sent a clear signal to both Malays and Chinese that ethnic chauvinism would not be tolerated. On the other hand, it could be viewed as a reassurance for the Chinese and the other ethnic communities, who feared Malay domination after

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merger, that their interests would be safeguarded. The moderate wing of the PAP, the strongest supporters of multiracialism, were acutely concerned that it did nothing to alienate the Chinese-educated and in fact drove them into the camp of left-wing and communist sympathizers. MULTIRACIALISM AND ECONOMIC SURVIVAL Independence in 1965, the start of the second period, meant that the PAP government had a freer hand in managing ethnic relations, but this did not in itself produce a major shift in policy. Instead it reaffirmed the PAP’s objective of creating a multiracial, multilingual and multicultural society (Betts, 1975:130). The first President of Singapore, Yusof Ishak, a Malay, in a New Year’s message in 1966 stated, The basic ideas we propounded while we were still in Malaysia are still sound and offer the best solutions to the problems of a multiracial society.’ While affirming their faith in multiracialism the PAP leaders were determined that the bitterness and follies of ethnic conflict, still fresh in their minds, would never be forgotten in Singapore (Betts, 1975:135). Rajaratnam (1974) articulated those sentiments in the following terms, ‘The more we were inspired by our past, the greater our awareness of our differences and separateness and the greater the chances of a multiracial society collapsing through racial fears and violence.’ Multiracialism as a political philosophy would continue to express the ideal of according equal status to the charter communities of Singapore, but as an instrument of policy it would be directed towards the depoliticization of ethnicity—for example, multiracialism could be invoked to head off any attempt by an ethnic group to promote a particular language to the detriment of others. Some comment on this point, drawing again on the Canadian literature, is appropriate here. Moodley (1983:320), in criticizing the Canadian government’s policy of multiculturalism, argues that it neutralizes the special claims of French and Native Canadians. ‘Both of these historical groups with charter rights are now equalized among numerous others.’ Similarly Peter (1981:57) comments that Canadian multiculturalism ‘relegates the role of ethnic groups to that of contributors of quaint cultural practices and upholders of individual identities’ while denying them any economic or political influence. In Singapore the ‘cultural show’, which may be a musical or dance performance, almost invariably contains individual contributions from the Chinese, Indian and Malay communities (Benjamin,

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1976:121) as an expression of the cultural mosaic promoted by the government. In its liberal garb multiculturalism is a policy of ethnic group containment, and that is the objective of the Canadian government’s policy. It is simplistic to interpret the PAP’s policy of multiracialism as motivated solely by its desire to contain ethnic demands and depoliticize ethnic issues, though it has served this end from time to time, for example in rationalizing the policies of preventing ethnic polarization or segregation in education and housing—as analysed elsewhere in the book. The Singapore experience in ethnic relations is quite different from the Canadian one. One significant difference in the latter’s conception of multiculturalism is that it is informed by a strong liberal view. The federal government in Canada subscribes to the position that the preservation of ethnic identity is a voluntary matter, both for the individual and for the group (Kallen, 1982:165). It recognizes the right of individual choice and supports participation in Canadian society, independent of ethnic classification. That right is absent in Singapore where the government continues to retain the greater part of the authoritarianism it inherited from colonial rule. Moreover, every Singaporean is classified under one of the four founding groups irrespective of individual choice, a classification which often fudges the complex reality of a cosmopolitan society. The classification has very real consequences for it is entered on every Singaporean’s identity card, and is used to determine one’s compulsory second language and the allocation of public housing. The rhetoric of multiracialism was overlaid by the ‘politics of survival’, as described by Chan (1971a) in her book of this title, for the decade following independence. The doubts the PAP leaders had consistently expressed about the viability of Singapore on its own prior to separation had now to be faced directly and the population mobilized for that overriding purpose, namely economic and therefore physical survival. Britain’s decision in early 1968 to accelerate withdrawal from her Singapore bases (Turnbull, 1977:305) only created a greater sense of urgency for the PAP leaders to make hardheaded decisions on the economic future of the island. Rajaratnam, rarely at a loss for words, said in 1969, ‘we have never been very strident about creating a so-called Singaporean…about Singapore nationalism…. Nationalism should become a philosophy of national development’ (Betts, 1975:184). The various epithets used by writers about this period revolve around the metaphor of survival—they include such phrases as ‘encirclement complex’ (Betts, 1975), ‘seige legitimacy’ (Brown,

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1985), and ‘garrison mentality’ (Brown, 1994)—and they reflect the current political language of the PAP. MULTIRACIALISM AND MERITOCRACY The guiding principle as Singapore moved into the 1970s was meritocracy, a concept that was fully articulated only in early 1969 (Betts, 1975:140) and most appropriate to the ethos of the period. More to the point, the meritocratic principle was most compatible with multiracialism as it was understood then. In the aftermath of the bitter conflict over the position of migrant communities vis-à-vis the indigenous community while Singapore was in Malaysia, multiracialism was espoused as a doctrine of equal rights for all ethnic groups. The essence of multiracialism was the ability of all to advance, in whatever field, on the basis not of ascriptive criteria such as race, family, or sex, but rather solely on the basis of achievement, merit, and hard work’ (Betts, 1975:139). It is opportune at this point to explore some of the conceptual content of multiracialism and multiculturalism. The critical problem which confronts all ethnically plural societies is how to reconcile the recognition of the status of ethnic communities with a universalistic doctrine of equal opportunities and equal rights. Rex (1986:120–1) maintains that one solution is to insist on a distinction between public and private domains. Accordingly the ideal of a multicultural society, he continues, is to designate equality of opportunity in the public domain and the practice of multiculturalism in the private domain. Under this option, every individual would have equal rights before the law, in politics and in the market place as well as equality of social rights where these are provided by a welfare state, while at the same time having the right to conduct ‘private’ matters (i.e. religion, family arrangements, language and the cultural arts) according to the custom of a separate ethnic (sometimes racial) community. (Rex, 1986:121) The doctrine of equal rights accords primacy to the individual and may be traced to its liberal-democratic origins. Consequently, in Rex’s interpretation of multiculturalism, ethnic groups do not have political or economic significance; they only enjoy ‘cultural’ rights. This may be interpreted to mean that ethnic groups have no contribution to make to the development of civil society, yet ethnicity

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constitutes a salient basis for associations in such multi-ethnic societies as Singapore. Multiculturalism, for Rex, is defined in terms of its consequences for the individual rather than for the group. The PAP’s acceptance of multiculturalism in the postindependence years comes close to Rex’s formulation. The principle of meritocracy sat comfortably with the doctrine of equal rights, and the advocacy of a meritocratic society had the added purpose of depoliticizing ethnicity (Lim, 1990; Brown, 1994). As the meritocratic principle gathered pace in the period from the late 1960s, the Malays, who had come to expect special assistance from the government to improve their economic position while in Malaysia, lowered their expectations (Lim, 1990:31). Referred to in an earlier chapter, the Singapore Malay Teachers’ Union in 1970, realizing the Malays were left behind in their educational performance, supported the use of English as the main medium in a national system of education (Zoohri, 1987:188). The PAP’s commitment to meritocracy was non-negotiable. As an illustration of this, in 1972 a substantial number of Malays voted against the ruling party but no concessions were made to the Malay community (Lim, 1990:34). The PAP held the view that ‘special privileges’ were in the long term harmful to the Malays and to economic progress (Betts, 1975:156). Such privileges instilled a ‘crutch mentality’ which would be difficult to get rid of later. This is highly consonant with the PAP’s avowed commitment to avoid welfarism, a view it has untiringly reiterated since the 1960s. Official policy towards the Malays in the post-independence period was guided by the ultimate objective of their integration into mainstream society, within the framework laid down by the ideology of multiracialism and meritocracy (Betts, 1975:162). Nevertheless a meritocratic society totally geared towards economic achievement, if it proved successful, had the potential to produce a generation of self-interested individuals and extreme individualism, and even an anomic society. The fear of ‘deculturalization’, first expressed in the 1956 Report on Education, remained very much in the minds of the first-generation PAP leaders. As recently as 1987, in his National Day speech, Lee commented that rapid development and resettlement had produced a disorientated and rootless population, and that religion had helped many Singaporeans keep their bearings (Lee, 1987). The report commissioned by the Ministry of Community Development in 1987 on Religion and Religious Revivalism (Kuo, Quah and Tong, 1988) also considered whether anomie was a factor in religious revivalism.

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Even as early as the 1970s the preservation of ethnic identity was encouraged and expressed by way of ‘cultural ballast’ (Mirror, 20.11.72:4) by Lee, and subsequently in the Goh Report on education in 1978. The identity of Singaporeans, Goh argued, must be anchored in their ethnic and cultural origins; and this can be achieved by requiring children to learn a second language which is their ‘mother tongue’. In the political discourse of nation building in Singapore, race, culture and ethnicity, as Benjamin (1976:117–18) points out, were not regarded as independent of each other. They were equated with community, identity and the individual. They were to be the building blocks of the nation, and as such they have sociocultural and even economic significance—but no ‘political’ relevance. In so defining the terms of debate the political content of ethnic issues was disavowed. Henceforth any attempt to politicize the interests of an ethnic community was met with public admonishment, and occasionally with the threat of incarceration. The spectre of total disaster as a consequence of communal violence was invariably raised to justify the depoliticization of ethnicity. OFFICIAL CLASSIFICATION: A POLICY OF ASCRIPTION The adoption of racial/ethnic group as the official classification of the Singapore population in the post-independence years was therefore consistent with the government’s definition of Singapore as a ‘multiracial society’. As noted previously, the four-group model recognizes the status of the three charter communities, the Chinese, Malays, and Indians; everyone else is referred to as ‘Others’. The official category of others, introduced for administrative expediency, has had the effect of relegating the non-charter groups to a marginal status. What is referred to under this category is the Eurasian community, which though numerically small, has in the past made a disproportionately significant contribution to Singapore society. In a recent television series on Pioneers of Singapore (November/ December, 1993) produced by Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, the Eurasians were featured as contributors to the development of Singapore (the series also included the other charter communities). Increasingly aware that they have been marginalized in the city-state, the Eurasian Association which had been dormant for a long time, has been reactivated and has enjoyed a large increase in membership. A recent publication, appropriately titled, Singapore Eurasians: Memories and Hopes, celebrated the contributions of the community

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to Singapore (Braga-Blake and Ebert-Oehlers, 1992). They are presently engaged in a debate on what is the definition of a Eurasian, and recently the Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, was appointed as unofficial Cabinet representative for the Eurasians, in the absence of a Eurasian minister. If nation building is based on the model of cultural pluralism, which was discussed earlier in this chapter, and if it is committed to the objective of one nation, many peoples and many cultures, the adoption of an hyphenated identity (ethnic-national) is most suitable. Hence terms of identification such as Singaporean-Chinese or Singaporean-Malay, tacitly approved by the state, are often used by Singaporeans in the course of interactions with foreigners. As Brown (1993:84) comments, Singapore citizens are enjoined not only to learn two languages—one of which is the mother tongue and the source of cultural ballast—but also to inhabit two cultural worlds, the non-political ethnic and the non-ethnic political. There is a certain paradox in the logic of the multiracial model (Clammer, 1981b:275). On the one hand it may lead to a synthetic culture and identity which is uniquely Singaporean. On the other it exhorts individuals to identify more closely with their own ethnic group and culture. The danger of either extreme if taken to its logical conclusion, Clammer argues, is that one is either rootless or chauvinist—neither of which is acceptable to the PAP government. The compromise, it can be argued, lies in a delicate balance between the two; hence the model of an hyphenated identity is efficacious. The consistency and perseverance with which the PAP government has articulated the ideology of multiracialism and implemented its multiracial policy has over the years facilitated the emergence and stabilization of a dual ethnic and national identification in the population (Chew, 1987:140). The policy of multiculturalism which, in principle, accords equal status to the charter communities of Singapore, and is given official recognition in the CMIO classification, has differential consequences for the different ethnic groups. We have referred to its impact on Eurasians. IntraChinese distinctions are based on dialect groups, the major ones being Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese and Hakka. While such dialect groups have been significant bases of ethnic identification and, together with clan associations, have constituted major economic and trading networks in the past, such ties have been diluted within the younger generation. The potential division between the Chinese-educated and English-educated within the Chinese community, which has remained below the surface since the

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1960s, ironically may have been given a fillip by the more aggressive promotion of bilingualism since the late 1970s. A bilingual education, quite consistent with the multiracial policy, has produced a generation of Singaporean Chinese who are competent and comfortable with one of the languages—English or Mandarin—but not both. Only a small number are really bilingual. This has partly contributed to a polarization within the Chinese community; distinctions between Chinese-educated and English-educated are now more real in the Chinese community (Pakir, 1993:81). In the last general election of 1991 the popular vote for the government fell below its expectations (Vasil, 1993:310–11). Following this, much public discussion centred around the grievances of the Chineseeducated, the implication being that they were the single largest group who had voted against the government. Citing several studies, Pakir (1993:81) comments that for the Chinese-educated the Chinese language is seen as the most important indicator of ethnic identity; for the English-educated other markers such as descent and surname are more salient. It is possible that such distinctions may have been reinforced by income disparities, the English-educated enjoying higher average earnings than the Chinese-educated. However, with the economic development of China gathering pace and Singapore’s decision to take on a regional outlook in its economic policy, the Chinese-educated may find themselves in an enhanced role. Many large and a greater number of medium-sized firms are run by the Chinese-speaking community, who have in the past feared that the internationalization of the Singapore economy had given the Englisheducated the upper hand (Vasil, 1993:311). The potential polarization between these two groups notwithstanding the Chinese have a strong and primordialist consciousness of ethnic identity (Clammer, 1985b:143). ‘One is a Chinese,’ Clammer asserts, ‘by origin, i.e. birth, parentage, geographical origin, and no one not so born can become a Chinese, and no Chinese, even one who abandons cultural markers such as language, can cease to be Chinese.’ He attributes this to a strong family ethos and structure, and a concern with maintaining the ‘purity’ of the descent line (Clammer, 1985b:145). Hence, Chinese ethnicity is not only guarded but actively promoted (Clammer, 1981b:281). Ethnicity is a resource partly for the economic mobilization of goods and services and partly as a means of conferring identity on the Nanyang Chinese. It may also be added that the high awareness of being Chinese is due to the perception that they are a minority community in Southeast Asia.

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Consequently, the Chinese, with the exception of the Straits-born, will be less resistant to official classification and a bilingual policy which stipulates Mandarin as their mother tongue and a compulsory second language. The Malays, the largest minority group, was part of the majority when Singapore was in Malaysia. Politically they constituted bangsa Melayu and shared the expectations of the Malay ethnie on the mainland until separation (see Chapter 2). While ties with the mainland were strong even until the late 1970s and the lingua franca of the group, Malay, has been maintained, there are signs that an emerging generation of younger and upwardly mobile ‘Malays’ identify themselves as part of Singapore, as reflected in the formation of the Association of Muslim Professionals in 1990, referred to in the discussion on civil society (Chapter 9). It is significant that the association called itself Muslim rather than Malay. The Malays in Singapore, like the Indians and Chinese, are migrants and may trace their origins to Malaysia and Indonesia such as the Javanese, Bawanese and Bugis. The official classification of Malay raises no objections as they constitute a comparatively homogenous community, identifying with a common religion, Islam, and a common mother tongue. In the future it may well be that the younger generation choose to locate their ethnic identity in their geographical origins rather than with Malaysia or Indonesia. However, the Islamic religion, because of its firm social profile, will continue to be a homogenizing influence on subsequent generations of Malays. The official classification is relatively unproblematic for the Chinese and the Malays. Clammer (1982:129–30) comments that there is a remarkable congruence between the official model of ethnicity and the popular conception of ethnicity in Singapore. The same cannot be said, however, of the Indian category for they are the most heterogenous community—they are Tamils, Malayalees, Sikhs, Gujeratis, Pakistanis and Sri Lankans; and Muslims and Hindus. The second language offered the Indians is Tamil, and Tamils also constitute the largest group, nearly 64 per cent of the Indian population in 1980. This leaves the other groups the option of Malay, and a few choose Mandarin. The official policy of multiracialism recognizes the right of ethnic groups to practise their ‘distinctive’ cultures and religions. These are, as Rex points out with reference to societies dominated by an Anglo-Saxon population (such as Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand), confined to the private realm. However ‘cultural practices’ are not private in Singapore. For example, language is a public concern. While it had only symbolic

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significance (enhancing cultural unity) in nation building in the past it has now evolved into the civic-instrumental management of nationhood, that is, a preoccupation with problem solving and resource mobilization. The shift may be attributed to two reasons. First, language is critical to one’s ethnic identity; it is a form of cultural ballast without which the individual is unable to function and practise the citizenship of the civic-republican tradition, which has been described in Chapter 1 and is the prescribed definition of citizenship in Singapore. It is also critical to the conception of a Singaporean identity as an hyphenated identity because this is simultaneously ethnic and national. Second, the learning of Chinese and Malay is now even more important as Singapore prepares to embark on more regionally oriented policies and grow a ‘second wing’ in its economic development policy. Whatever excursions have been made into the non-material aspects of nation building—for instance, in the introduction of religious knowledge in the educational curriculum or the Shared Values project—they were ultimately grounded in the pragmatism of the PAP government. As much as the government recognizes that language is the ethnic marker of the population (Clammer, 1982:131), the practice of multiracialism is really the practice of multilingualism. STATE REVITALIZATION OF ETHNICITY The third period that Brown identifies in examining ethnic relations in the Republic, from the early 1980s to the present, is described as the corporatist politics of ethnicity. His argument about the emergence of the corporatist state and politics in Singapore is premised on three assumptions (Brown, 1994:91–6). First, the state demands and expects of its citizens that they show absolute loyalty to the nation-state. In return the government acts as moral guardian and competent manager of the community. Second, the cultural identity of the nation is based on the model of the ethnic mosaic and in a recognition of cultural pluralism. Third, for the purposes of national unity and development all groups, including ethnic associations, are mobilized through state-sponsored channels to advance their interests. Ethnic politics, in its corporatist form, is only comprehensible within the coherent complex of political loyalty— national identity—interest associations. Hence the formation of state-sponsored self-help and ethnic-based organizations, the philosophy of which is anathema to any suggestion of welfarism. These include the Council on Education of Muslim Children, later the

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Council for the Development of Muslims in Singapore (MENDAKI), the Association of Malay Professionals (AMP), the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) and the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA), and they are seen as illustrative of corporatist ethnic politics. The objection to Brown’s use of the corporatist model in understanding ethnic relations in Singapore can be simply stated. It assumes that state-society relations are unproblematic and that national loyalty is a given. As has been argued throughout this book and encapsulated in the Return to Sender thesis, the PAP government works hard at mobilizing its citizens, and furthermore the public response has not always been one of equanimity. The limitations of the corporatist model lies in its statist bias and its tendency to be reductionist. What marked ethnic relations in the 1980s from the previous periods was the willingness of the ruling party to discuss the position of the ethnic minorities openly. It began when Malay MPs in the PAP, alarmed when the 1980 Census revealed that the socio-economic position of the Malays was significantly lower than that of the other ethnic groups, called for a meeting with Malay community leaders (Zoohri, 1987:189–90). As a result MENDAKI (The Council on Education of Muslim Children) was formed to improve the educational status of Muslim children. Prior to this the only significant institutionalized participation of the Malay community was MUIS (Islamic Religious Council), which was sponsored by the state (Lee, K.J., 1992:30). The purpose of the organization was to contain Malay religious extremism in the Republic in the late 1960s and 1970s, at a time when the PAP government was acutely conscious of the destabilizing influence of ethnic politics in the region. From about the mid-1980s Malay loyalty to the nation and the government had been publicly questioned. This was precipitated by Malay protest against the Israeli President’s visit to the Republic in late 1986 (Leifer, 1988; Brown, 1993). In a letter to the Far Eastern Economic Review (March 19, 1987) the Prime Minister’s press secretary defended the action to discuss publicly sensitive issues of race, language and religion from time to time, ‘to make people face up to them and desensitize them’ (a fuller discussion of this is in Chapter 8). This was followed by the Prime Minister’s National Day speech in 1987 where he stated that Malays were not yet in the mainstream of Singapore society; and in the same year Minister Lee Hsien Loong publicly justified restrictions on Malay recruitment into the armed forces. In 1988 Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong

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alleged that Malays had failed to support the PAP in the election held the same year. In mid-1989 the Malay self-help organization MENDAKI was restructured to accommodate an expanded agenda and to give it wider responsibility and a higher public profile. It now became known as The Council for the Development of Muslims in Singapore. MENDAKI was to become the forerunner of similar self-help initiatives for other ethnic communities—the Chinese, Indians, Sikhs and Eurasians—which are discussed in Chapter 9. In 1991 Lee, as Senior Minister, acknowledged that there was now a distinct ‘working class’ constituted by the bottom 20 to 30 per cent—a group he described as not having done well in the education system, lacking technical training and finding life tough to manage because of their low-paying jobs (ST, 23.9.91). Lee stated, ‘This is a problem which I think will consume a lot of our energy such that a lot of effort will have to go into upgrading the lower end.’ For government policy to be effective the ‘underclass’ had to be identified by their ethnic origins so that they could be best assisted by their own ethnic communities. Since then the educational performance of students by ethnic origins has been periodically released for the first time, to draw public attention to and support for government intiatives to help the underachievers. Malay economic and educational underperformance have, as in the past, been singled out by government, academics and community leaders. In explaining the poor performance of the Malays relative to the other ethnic communities all groups have consistently fallen back on what Li (1989:167) describes as reified cultural explanations for Malay backwardness. Such explanations have their origins in the colonial ascription of economic roles to the various ‘races’ in Malayan society (Abraham, 1983), which had as its underlying premise social Darwinist assumptions about the development of the human population. Quoting from a prominent colonial administrator in the late nineteenth century, the Chinese were described as the bone and sinew of the Malay States. They are the labourers, the miners, the principal shopkeepers, the contractors, the capitalists, the holders of revenue farms, the contributors of almost the whole of the revenue; we cannot do without them. (Abraham, 1983:26–8) Malay economic backwardness, on the other hand, was attributed to a moral inferiority associated with indolence, thriftlessness and

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conservatism. In essence the argument attributes the relative deprivation of the Malays to their adherence to so-called cultural values associated with a rural and agricultural society, that act as impediments to economic progress. The explanation has been variously incorporated in political and academic discourse, and is well-documented by Li (1989:166–83). MENDAKI’s efforts to concentrate on the education of Malay students, for example, involves the creation of a cultural climate within the family and the community, that would lift the performance of these students. If government intiatives in setting up ethnically based self-help organizations are viewed in this light, it lends support to the thesis put forward by Benjamin (and cited earlier) that the PAP’s ideology of multiracialism regards the relationship between race, language, ethnic identity and culture as completely solidary. Ideology is translated into practice, in the form of government policies which directly affect the citizenry—in education, in helping the disadvantaged and, as will be demonstrated, in political representation and housing. The overall consequence is that citizens come to ‘behave’ as members of ethnic groups. If economic disparities should become apparent in the future they could be explained away in the short term by resorting to cultural explanations and placing the responsibility on individual ethnic communities. In this way the possibility that any political opposition might indulge in the politics of class divisions would be pre-empted. By the mid-1980s the PAP government’s handling of ethnic relations increasingly reflected a self-confidence, even an assertiveness for a Chinese state in Southeast Asia, the absence of which had marked its approach to dealing with the Malay minority in the past. It was now more forthright in identifying what it deemed to be the legitimate concerns of all ethnic communities, not just the minority ones, and putting in place a set of policies to address these concerns openly. In addition to restructuring bilingual education and mobilizing the ethnic communities to ameliorate economic underachievement it also turned its attention to the political representation of ethnic minorities and the question of ethnic quotas in the allocation of public housing for the population. In 1988 the Group Representative Constituency (GRC) system was introduced. Under this system three constituencies are regrouped into a larger constituency within which three candidates (now four) are fielded as a team. The party winning the highest number of votes will take all the seats in the constituency. Two reasons were cited for this innovation (Chan, 1989:86). It was argued that such a system

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would encourage the election of responsible representatives who were now expected to take on the added responsibility of running town councils. The other argument, with which this discussion is more directly concerned, was that such a system would ensure minority representation. In the proceedings of the Select Committee on the GRC it was stated that the system would force political parties to take a moderate, multiracial approach when campaigning in the GRCs (Cheng, 1989:41). In fielding teams to contest the GRCs Chinese members would have to strike compromises with their minority partners to establish a common middle ground, countering any tendencies towards extremism or communalism. Lee asserted that the system would encourage the minority communities to act as a moderating broker force. Indeed, Lee argued (Cheng, 1989:44), the GRC scheme was reflective of a change in the policy of the PAP government to encourage Singaporeans to discuss ethnic issues openly and to face the realities of living in a multiracial society. It should be noted, however, that the GRCs made it more difficult for opposition parties to field a slate of candidates—as well demonstrated in the 1992 by-election in Prime Minister Goh’s constituency of Marine Parade. The imposition of ethnic quotas in the allocation of new housing stock by the HDB, informally practised before it was made public knowledge in 1987 by the Prime Minister, is discussed in Chapter 5 on housing. It is yet another instance of the PAP government’s posture in the 1980s of openly discussing policies which directly affected ethnic groups. What is significant about the HDB allocation is that it was implemented under the auspices of multiracialism, which rejected assimilation (Chua, 1991b:349–50) and was based on the model of cultural pluralism. Indeed, as Chua elaborates, the construction of housing estates acknowledged the need to establish institutional underpinnings for the major ethnic communities. In summary, the 1980s saw an assertiveness and openness in the government’s handling of ethnic relations. It reflected a Singapore that was economically and politically more secure than it had ever been in the past. As an expression of this self-confidence the government was willing to accommodate and support the AMP, independently initiated by a group of Muslim professionals, within its programme of ethnic self-help. The model of cultural pluralism, so fundamental to its understanding of multiracialism, was formulated in the 1950s under historical circumstances which moulded the firstgeneration PAP leadership. It was not until the last decade that the model was publicly acknowledged and practised. The policies which

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have been reviewed in this chapter—the bilingual foundation of education, ethnic-based initiatives to advance the interests of the economically disadvantaged, political representation of ethnic minorities, public housing—are based on the perception that ethnic communities are the building blocks of the nation and are articulated under the umbrella of the founding charter of the Republic, multiracialism. The fear often expressed that such policies increase the possibility of ethnic polarization and communalism is misplaced if the policies are viewed as effective instruments of ethnic containment. Bilingualism meets the demands of the ethnic communities in the past that their respective languages be protected; but these are contained within the significance of a neutral English language, advanced as indispensable to commercial and technological communication. The self-help associations have the potential to neutralize the appearance of class politics and counter accusations that the PAP government has neglected disadvantaged ethnic minorities. The system of GRCs, the argument that it would make it difficult for the opposition to win seats in parliament because of their limited resources notwithstanding, meets criticisms that the interests of ethnic minorities are not represented. The ethnic allocation of public housing prevents Malay concentrations of population from developing and makes it easier to control ethnic confrontations should they arise in future.

5 Housing policy in the nation building process

The way in which housing and ownership redefine the perceptions of people has been a vital political factor, and one of which the government has taken advantage most effectively. (Ong, 1989:937) A central feature of the PAP government’s social and economic strategy since it first came to power has been its policy on housing. The fashioning of a novel form of community based on an integrated plan represents a remarkably successful achievement in the area of social engineering. In this chapter the role of housing policy in the overall process of nation building will be analysed. It can be demonstrated that housing policy went through an evolutionary process similar to that of policy on the family and to the search for a set of core values. To summarize this process, policy in the first decade after independence was characterized by decision-making which was necessarily based on exigency and a high degree of pragmatism. It was from the 1970s onwards that the relevance of housing policy to a sophisticated programme of social engineering was fully actualized. In order to trace these developments and to highlight the major transformation that was accomplished so rapidly, a brief review of the history of housing policy in Singapore is needed. PHASES OF HOUSING POLICY This can be divided into three distinct periods (Teh, 1975:1–5); the first (1819–1926) being one in which there was no official attempt to address the problems of overcrowding and the poor quality of much of the housing stock. Singapore’s commercialization and the growth of slums occurred simultaneously during the late nineteenth century 113

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(Yeh and Lee, 1968:12). At this time Singapore was becoming the main commercial centre of Southeast Asia and in consequence it attracted large numbers of migrants, principally from China. Initially migrants were poor, transient males who congregated in cheap substandard housing in the central city, especially in the central area which in the late nineteenth century became ‘one of the most crowded slums in the world’ (Teh, 1975:2–3). As a result of a Housing Commission which was set up in 1918 to report on central area housing conditions, the Singapore Improvement Trust began operating in 1927. This marks the start of the second period of policy (1927–59) as the Singapore Improvement Trust embarked on the task of implementing housing schemes, building artisans’ quarters, flats, tenements and shops in the 1930s. With the arrival of large numbers of Chinese women in the same period ‘more and more temporary migrants turned into permanent settlers and all the characteristics of slum living became more and more pronounced’ (Yeh and Lee, 1968:12). There was a growth of squatter settlements around the fringe of the central city area and in the post-war period rapid population growth exacerbated the problem of overcrowding in inadequate living conditions. Little remedial action was taken by the colonial administration, which occasionally reacted with largely ineffective crisis measures; for instance, the introduction of rent and eviction controls in 1947 had the unintended consequence of further subdivision of rooms and deterioration of housing stock as landlords sought to retain incomes. While the Singapore Improvement Trust has generally been dismissed as an ineffective official initiative, it did provide the basis of a public housing bureaucracy with a valuable accumulation of experience, which could later be utilized by the Housing and Development Board. An illustration of this transition is the development of the first satellite town, Queenstown, which was originally planned by the Trust but was left to its successor to accomplish (Hassan, 1977:13). The final period of housing policy dates from the establishment of the HDB in 1960. Especially important in the light of later PAP housing policy is the effect of early migration on settlement patterns. From the earliest days of settlement official policy combined with the migrants’ own perceptions to reinforce patterns of racial segregation. Thus in 1822, when Raffles issued his first urban planning edict, having directed that the first preference in allocating land should be given to merchants, the second to artisans and the third to farmers, he stated the prescription that ‘separate nationalities and provincial groups should inhabit distinct areas of the town’ (Castells et al., 1990: 211).

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Thereafter, Singapore was divided into specific, racially segregated areas, as described by Chua: The immediate west bank of the river was used for government and other civic buildings. The best drained area adjacent to it was reserved for the white community. Beyond the white area was the Malay settlement of indigenous Malays and other Muslims. The area west of the commercial district was allocated to the Chinese. On the northern edge of the Chinese area was the Indian town. (Chua, 1991b:345) Subsequent adjustments were made to the locations of ethnically segregated areas, though overall the pattern of residential segregation persisted until the large-scale development of public housing schemes in the 1960s. The racial distribution of the Singapore population was thoroughly charted in a land-use survey on behalf of the Singapore Improvement Trust in the early 1950s (Hodder, 1953). The survey reveals a high degree of racial segregation and also shows the extent to which the Chinese followed residential patterns based on dialect groupings. As a result, Singapore’s racial groups established, to a large degree, a traditional pattern of living in isolation from each other. While there was geographical proximity, each group inhabited its own social territory and maintained a distinct, exclusive cultural identity. Indeed, so real was the segregation of these ‘islands of settlement’ in Chinatown, Serangoon, and Geylang that the British authorities were able to use ethnic communal organizations as the foundation for community security (Ong, 1989:948). Interaction between members of the different groups occurred mainly in the workaday world of economic exchanges (Busch, 1974:20–1). This is essentially Furnivall’s characterization of ‘plural society’, where different sections of the community live side by side but separately, and where a racial division of labour chracterizes the economic sphere (Furnivall, 1956:304). Among immigrant Chinese and Indians in Singapore, ethnic isolation was enhanced by their perception of Singapore as a temporary location and by the development of resilient institutions of protection and self-help. In the rootless environment of constant migration and movement, the secret society and clan association provided a measure of security but also an important means of insulating different groups of Chinese from outside interference (Freedman, 1960); indeed, the role of such institutions was to provide a familiar environment in an alien world (Busch 1974:21).

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Intercommunal conflict in Singapore has been associated with spatial segregation: Spatial and social segregation of a multiracial society into exclusive racial enclaves potentially contribute to racial conflicts, especially when racial and economic divisions coincide. (Chua, 1991b:346) This partially explains the later element of ethnic dispersal in the PAP’s housing policy. Indeed, two examples of ‘traumatic’ events to which the PAP leadership would frequently refer involve one from the colonial period and another from the immediate post-independence years. First, the Hertogh riots of 1950—though directed against Europeans and containing a distinct religious dimension—drew much popular vigour from the concentration of activity in a predominantly Malay district where the mosque was a focus of militancy (Maideen, 1989). The second example is the rioting which occurred in the years 1963–5, when Singapore was within the Malaysian Confederation and ethnic politics were heightened. Malay resentment of housing resettlement policy and claims to special rights contained in the Malaysian constitution lay behind intercommunal violence between Malays and Chinese during the celebration of a Muslim religious festival (Chua, 1991b:346–7). Significantly these incidents, together with the Maria Hertogh riots of 1950 and the intercommunal violence in Malaysia in 1969, have become a symbolic focus of the underlying fragility of race relations and they are reiterated when issues of racial sensitivity emerge as part of public debate. For example, during controversy over the claimed conflicting loyalties of Malay Singaporeans to religion or to the nation (see page 206), the Straits Times revisited these three earlier incidents under the headline Three Tragic Reminders’ (ST, 4.6.87). THE HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD Issues of ethnic segregation and communalism will figure prominently in a later section of this chapter, but first we turn to the situation in the 1950s and the establishment of the Housing and Development Board. Housing conditions in Singapore in the preindependence period have been well documented. In 1954 a study of one typical street in Chinatown described as having living conditions ‘which must be among the most primitive in the urban areas of the world’ (Kaye, 1960:5) produced an in-depth account of the

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dimensions of the housing problem. A few years later, in the period immediately before independence, a survey of housing and poverty in Singapore by Goh Keng Swee (then Director of Social Welfare— Research) provided a detailed insight into the problem. Using the methods of the Booth and Rowntree surveys in Britain, Goh calculated the ‘poverty-line’ strictly and discovered that on this definition some 25 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line and some 73 per cent of surveyed households were found to live in badly overcrowded conditions (Pugh, 1989:849). On coming to power in 1959 the PAP government embarked on a series of major, long-term strategies designed to provide affordable public housing on a massive scale, and to address the other major existing problem which was the high rate of unemployment. It should be noted that in this task the new government made use of structures which had already been put in place under colonial rule but which had been ineffectively implemented: this lack of implementation could be attributed to the fact that, with independence approaching, the colonial administration was reluctant to invest substantial funds in infrastructural development. The concept of large-scale urban development, for example, had already been established in a master plan for urban redevelopment, which had been conceived as early as 1951 and approved by the colonial government in 1958. But it did not make rapid progress and needed subsequent revision (Castells et al., 1990:215). The role of the Singapore Improvement Trust, which prepared this master plan, has already been noted. And a further component of later innovation in housing policy was the Central Provident Fund, which had been brought into operation by the CPF Ordinance in 1955. This was to be the scheme which was eventually adopted when the PAP came into power—rather than opting for ‘ambitious plans for immediate improvement of social services’ (Lim, et al., 1986:4)—and its sophisticated deployment has served to provide a regulatory link between housing provision, savings, investment and economic growth. Another structural factor which should not be overlooked— because it marks a distinct contrast between Singapore and other countries in the process of development—is the fact that until 1970 expenditure on defence was negligible due to the British military presence (Hassan, 1976:246–7). Housing provision by government was from the outset regarded as one aspect of a more comprehensive development strategy which placed extensive emphasis on infrastructural components. This should be seen as integral to the PAP’s political strategy (especially in

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relation to the Chinese-educated, who were concentrated among the poorest segments of the population): Politics have also been important in the Singapore housing story. It was in the late-1950s that the PAP became committed to priorities in housing, employment and development. Those were the years of anti-colonial agitation, ferment in the mass population, and a political leadership which was close to the people. It was in this context that housing policy was formulated. (Pugh, 1989:855) The major architects of the strategy were Goh Keng Swee and Albert Winsemius; the latter’s 1961 Report produced under the auspices of the United Nations Industrial Survey Mission highlighted the key role required on the part of the state in sustaining private capital (Rodan, 1989:64), much of which would have to be attracted from overseas. Similar conclusions were drawn by the State Development Plan, 1961– 4, which highlighted the importance of state intervention in making Singapore an attractive investment site. Both the Winsemius Report and the Development Plan viewed the impending union with Malaya as no guarantee of Singapore’s industrialization, and hence infrastructural developments were seen as essential for lowering establishment and operational costs to capital, both domestic and overseas. The government consequently committed major capital investment to economic development (through an Economic Development Board) on the one hand, especially to the establishment of industrial estates, while on the other hand it made major commitments to social development, principally in the areas of housing (through the Housing and Development Board) and education. Housing and education were a vital part of the industrialization strategy—the first by providing low-cost accommodation for the work-force and the second by providing it with the requisite technical skills—but Rodan sees a broader political strategy in the policy: These outlays, however, cannot simply be explained in terms of their utility to the industrial programme. Lee and his group were always looking to extend the social base of their faction’s support beyond the middle class and could only do this by carrying out real reforms of benefit to the working class. (Rodan, 1989:66) From the outset, therefore, political legitimacy was in a direct way tied to the success of the housing development programme and, as

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will be seen later in the chapter, electoral vicissitudes have sometimes been directly attributable to policy decisions and administrative competence in the housing field. The HDB’s initial task was to address the housing crisis, which it did by rapidly constructing economical ‘emergency’ one-and tworoom flats and ‘standard’ two-and three-room flats: these were let at subsidized rents to meet basic housing needs. Proximity to the central business district was an initial requirement to obviate the need for provision of employment opportunities, and those housed consisted mostly of fire victims (a sizeable group), squatters, and farmers displaced by the HDB’s compulsory acquisition of land (Castells et al., 1990:228–9). Pragmatic exigencies dominated the early programme and, as one observer has noted, ‘fires of convenience’ accelerated it (Pugh, 1989:848–9). The design of housing construction was based on the imported models of new-town, high-rise development—or what has been labelled the ‘garden city Modernist’ solution: To the concern for healthy living in a green and clean environment of the mid 19th century British garden city movement was added the 1920s Modern architects’ socialist sentiments and their search for a new architecture appropriate to an industrial age technology. (Chua, 1991c: 207) The Garden City concept was initiated by Lee Kuan Yew in 1963 and has since developed into a comprehensive programme of ‘the greening of Singapore’ (Yeh, 1989:831). Organized around five-year building programmes, it is noteworthy that by the end of the HDB’s first decade more than one-third of the population was in public housing as shown by the table below. Having initially targeted low-income groups for priority housing provision, from the mid-1960s the HDB extended its range of dwelling sizes to four-and five-room units. The process was assisted Table 1: HDB units completed and percentage of population housed

Source: Teh, 1975:9.

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by the acquisition of land at reasonable, non-inflated prices under the Land Acquisition Act of 1966, designed to prevent windfall gains accruing to private owners and speculators (Pugh, 1989:848). Only a few years after the housing programme was initiated—in 1964—the Home Ownership Scheme was introduced, augmented in 1968 by the Home Ownership Through CPF (Central Provident Fund) Scheme, when CPF members were allowed to utilise up to the entire amount in their accounts to purchase HDB flats (Wong and Yeh, 1985:231; Lim et al., 1986:5). This has been seen by several commentators, including Wong and Yeh, as the core of government policy: The fundamental aim of the present government from the inception of its public housing programme has been the creation of a nation whose people have homes they are proud to call their own. The underlying philosophy is that if one owns an asset in the country, one would stand to defend it. (Wong and Yeh, 1985:231) In particular, ownership of well-constructed property has been seen as a way of reducing the sense of transiency which had persisted into the 1960s (Ong, 1989:937). More recently, in a continuation of the original policy of ‘owning an asset’, there have been developments such as the upgrading of older estates—with residents being asked to vote on proposed upgrading—and financial support for home improvements. The cumulative effect of such policies, which have underlined the politicized nature of housing, is succinctly encapsulated in the following: Growth processes carry some important emotional relationships bound up with nation building, senses of accomplishment, pride, and the intensities which are called forth in dealing with colonialist rulers, slums, unemployment, and the political vulnerabilities of those who fail to meet the challenges. Housing is strongly politicized in the process. (Pugh, 1989:837) HOME OWNERSHIP AND NATION BUILDING The next section of the chapter examines the particular role which home ownership in Singapore has played in the nation building process, with particular reference to the political and comparative dimensions of the debate. The quotation from Wong and Yeh states in

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a rudimentary way what in the context of Western capitalist societies has come to be argued as the thesis of ‘practical incorporation’, namely ‘the expansion of commitment to the prevalent social order by the development of personal stakes in its survival’ (Agnew, 1981:457). A considerable range in the proportions of owner occupation exists in Western societies and, apart from Britain and the United States, there has been no general tendency for the proportion to increase over time. In the United States and Britain, home ownership has been seen to confer two principal benefits: first, it confers status and ‘social personhood’ by creating a social tie in the form of longterm debt; and second, a house becomes an investment that can be bought and sold, thus a source of potential profit (Agnew, 1981:466– 72). Threats to these symbolic and material benefits are a source of ‘community consciousness’, and might for instance consist of intrusions into personal space or a possible lowering of the property’s value. In a Singapore context, the community consciousness engendered by home ownership synthesizes with the network of grassroots organizations such as Community Centres, Citizens’ Consultative Committees, Residents’ Committees, and Town Councils, which provide formal channels for—among other matters—the articulation of interests related to residential space. The collective use of facilities also provides a source of symbolic benefits, so that the aggregation of interests around the core of housing provision endows the latter with an enhanced significance which is arguably more pervasive than in Western societies. Even in the United States, for example, where the applicability of the incorporation thesis has been most clearly established, variations are evident between social strata and in different contexts. Within Singapore, it can be argued that the incorporationist thesis has strong support, since the policy of home ownership coupled with a gradual relaxation of resale restrictions (to avoid profiteering) meant that real gains were made by the early owners, many of whom were from lower income groups (Chua, 1991a:33–4). In a comparison of a cohort of families between 1974/ 6 and 1981, Salaff was able to demonstrate the extent to which the housing policy had facilitated home ownership and upgrading (Salaff, 1988:239–44). Simultaneously, the resettlement policy made possible the disciplining and proletarianization of a population that had previously been accustomed to low and sporadically paid rents. The cost of home ownership of an HDB property and the required regular monthly payments effectively habituated the population into a

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disciplined industrial workforce. Again, Salaff s research confirms this process: The housing transformation has deep implications for the political economy. Since poor couples and those of modest means find it hard to save, CPF enables them to buy a home without having to stint on daily necessities. The low proportion of their take-home pay spent for housing frees them to spend more on consumer goods. This painless road to property ownership ties a family into debt and credit relations that require them to work steadily for years to come. (Salaff, 1988:243) Throughout the 1970s housing policy became an increasingly refined adjunct of social engineering, as the initial problems of urgent provision receded and the housing sector became largely selffinancing. In this later stage of the public housing programme there were explicit government-sponsored reforms, introduced through the HDB, ‘to encourage desirable social values, internalise social control, support general economic policies, and maintain the PAP’s political dominance’ (Castells et al., 1990:245). Among the most important of these was the attempt to preserve what were seen as traditional family structures in the shape of a claimed Asian ‘extended family’ system. In fact, the HDB flats had always been designed according to an AngloAmerican model based on the conjugal-family household, and the latter has increasingly been the dominant household type in Singapore (Hassan, 1976:247). The extent of this trend is evident in the 1990 Census figures: of the 603,979 resident private households with at least one family nucleus, ‘8 per cent consisted of family members with one generation, 77 per cent with two generations and the remaining 15 per cent with three or more generations’ (Singapore Census of Population 1990, Households and Housing: 5). Nevertheless, in its policy of allocating flats the HDB attempted to institutionalize what was declared the traditional family model, partly in pursuit of the overriding government policy of avoiding welfarism. The care of old people was designated a responsibility of the family—consonant with the frequently rehearsed value of ‘filial piety’—rather than of state-financed welfare homes, and as signs were detected in the 1970s that young people were choosing to live apart from their parents the government moved through the HDB to resist this trend. Various schemes were introduced: the Joint Balloting Scheme, begun in 1978, enabled parents and married children to be

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allocated flats in close proximity. By 1982 on the basis of interviews conducted by the HDB there were indications of some success with this arrangement in aspects such as mutual support, financial help and childcare arrangements: such benefits were found to be available without forfeiting familial privacy (Wong and Yeh, 1985:252–4). Other schemes, including one permitting exchanges of flats to facilitate parent/children proximity and a Multi-Tier Family Housing Scheme encouraging parents and married children to live in the same dwelling unit, have proved less successful or have generated a less than anticipated response. Other means of reinforcing government definitions of the ‘normal family’ include the provision that public housing is only available to households. Young single individuals and divorcees are excluded and even in the case of older single people who are presumably never going to marry (males aged 50 or more and females 40+), eligibility to rent depends on agreement to share with another person (Chua, 1991a: 37). It is especially in this context that observers have noted the combined effects of dependency on the HDB’s position as monopolistic provider of affordable housing—since the private market in housing is small and very expensive—together with the government’s concern to implement its policies of social engineering through the agency of the HDB. In the case of those who by choice or other circumstance live alone, the private market is the only recourse for such a basic requirement as housing. This illustrates, notes Chua, ‘how unpopular social policies may be able to “piggy-back” on successful housing policy which renders to the government a very high degree of political legitimacy’ (1991b:345). That the housing policy has indeed been successful is one of the most remarkable material and symbolic achievements of the PAP government, providing a visible sign of the regime’s ability to honour its undertaking to improve the living conditions of its population. Hence the high degree of political legitimacy it can command (Chua, 1991a:29; 36). HOUSING AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION Given the key role of housing policy in the process of nation building, its integrative goals are particularly significant. These goals are substantially intermeshed with other policies, such as those on parapolitical organizations and multiracialism, so that an analysis of them as discreet elements in overall strategy requires a degree of selectivity. However, the goals or strategies can be

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examined as: social integration, ethnic integration, and social control and surveillance. In the initial years of the public housing programme the eligibility rules and income ceilings imposed meant that housing was targeted at lower-income, working-class families. By gradually increasing the family income ceiling and with the addition in 1971 of a larger fiveroom flat, HDB housing was made accessible to wider income segments in the population. Even so, by 1973 the problem of middleincome groups’ ineligibility for HDB housing was becoming evident, and the suggestion was made that CPF credits should be available for purchases of private housing (Goh, C.M., 1973:41). This vocal minority—resembling a similar group in what has been termed Hong Kong’s ‘sandwich society’ (Castells et al., 1990:243)—found themselves priced out of the private market, which was then experiencing price inflation, but had income levels which debarred them from HDB housing. The government’s response was the establishment of the Housing and Urban Development Co. (Pte) Ltd (HUDC) in 1974. The flats provided by the HUDC were built in more exclusive areas and were comparable in quality and design with those in the private sector, though they sometimes cost half as much (Wong and Yeh, 1985:237). After several years, however, the government felt that HUDC estates were growing into exclusive enclaves, quite distinct from the HDB estates. There was evidence in other countries to suggest that the segregation of the better-educated and economically better-off citizens could possibly create social tension and retard the development of a harmonious community. A better social mix in public housing estates was desired. (Wong and Yeh, 1985:237) It was always government policy to provide a differentiated range of housing grades—as will be shown later, this was essential to its policy of encouraging housing mobility—and the existence of a small private sector catering to the wealthiest market segment made available housing as a status goal, but these elements of policy were balanced against the fundamental goal of social integration. Thus, with the goal of social integration pre-eminent, from 1980 HUDC housing was first integrated with HDB housing and then in 1982 the functions of the HUDC were absorbed into the HDB. It was at this time that the social consequences of HDB building and allocation policies for social segregation were clearly articulated. Income groups

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were segregated into different blocks, rental flats were in different blocks from purchase flats, and HUDC flats were located on prime sites away from other HDB developments. Although these design and planning standards were clearly intended by the HDB planners to attract the middle-income and upper-middle-income groups into the HDB housing market, they were not part of any deliberate national policy. As lamented by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, ‘We’ve made serious mistakes, not intentionally, but nevertheless mistakes that we will avoid in future’ (Straits Times 9 February 1981). The HDB quickly responded that future building programs would pay more attention to social integration. (Castells et al. 1990:266) There has been a constant series of political initiatives in support of the social integration emphasis of housing policy. As is demonstrated more fully in Chapter 7, the government has made extensive use of parapolitical community-based grassroots organizations to service local residential areas, beginning with the Community Centres and continuing in the 1980s with Town Councils and Group Representative Constituencies. The Residents’ Committees, which were originally proposed in 1978, were specifically intended to promote neighbourliness, ethnic harmony and community cohesiveness, and were allocated local domains of activity throughout the HDB blocks. Their political function was to channel government policies to local residents and to provide feedback to government. In characterizing changes in the overall political rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s, Pugh contends that there is a contrast between the radicalism of the earlier period and the latter, when the PAP leadership was moving towards ‘a more aloof, meritocratic politics with technocracy and self-discipline by the populace as its main themes’ (Pugh, 1989:855). In line with this change in the area of housing there occurred a reduction in expenditure committed to the HDB, arguably with negative electoral consequences. Given the pivotal role of multiracialism in the political agenda and the historical segregation of racial groups noted at the start of this chapter, the pursuit of racial integration by means of housing policy is of particular importance. This is underscored by the fact that the most serious episode of intercommunal violence in the postindependence period was associated with housing policy rulings. Since the government’s crisis orientation—the paradoxical element in

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its claim to legitimacy—results in the enshrining of such incidents in myth, its significance is further enhanced: as shown in chapter 1 (p. 34), traumatic past events are identified as rhetorical reference points in legitimizing current government policies. The incident has already been alluded to at the start of this chapter, but additional detail, including the role played by the HDB, will highlight the centrality of housing policy in the affair. In 1964, when Singapore was still part of the Malaysian Confederation and Malays maintained high status and aspirations, an HDB decision to resettle a Malay housing area prompted demands on the part of residents for an exclusive land reservation and housing concessions. When these were rejected by the government on the grounds of equal treatment of all races the decision was denounced as failure to recognize Malay rights which had been stated in the Constitution. Coinciding with a large procession to celebrate Mohammed’s birthday, fighting broke out between Chinese and Malay youths, resulting in the death of 36 people and injury to an additional 563 (ST, 4.6.87). A subsequent political agreement to make special housing allocations to Malays lasted until separation from Malaysia in 1965, after which the prevention of ethnic segregation in the population became the first priority of government and HDB policy, and residential racial mixing was institutionalized. This has been achieved through a number of mechanisms. First, since its inception the public housing and resettlement policy has been based on a first-come-first-served rule which, while not eliminating racial enclaves, has done much to disperse them (Chua, 1991b: 347). Second, through the process of upgrading through resale, Malays— because of lower incomes on average—have been ready purchasers of cheaper accommodation vacated by Chinese and Indians, thus dispersing their population out of traditional settlement areas (Chua, 1991b: 348). But finally, in any construction of new housing stock the HDB—implementing its policy of social integration discussed above—not only distributed different apartment types spatially but maintained an unpublicized 20 per cent quota on the proportion of Malays: this was made public by the Prime Minister in 1987 (Chua, 1991b: 348). The policy was formalized in 1989 to include all housing blocks because the level of resales had resulted in what the HDB regarded as excessive concentrations of Malays in certain estates. The regulation of quotas is in the hands of the estate management authority, and owners who wish to sell flats are required to consult them: should the quota for any ethnic group be full, the owner will not then be allowed to sell to a member of that group.

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The government’s justification for this policy follows the rationale of its income-mixing policy: it is intended to integrate citizens into a national community. The national community takes precedence over personal or communal preference, and the government’s monopoly over affordable housing provision effectively secures compliance. Nevertheless, the ‘piggy back’ principle of an unpopular policy being enacted through the agency of a generally popular one is the operative one, and some evidence suggests that the result has been greater interracial tolerance if not absolute understanding or social integration (Chua, 1991b: 349). Government policies have not, however, resulted in the comprehensive unscrambling of traditional ethnic enclaves, and there is continuing evidence of their resilience (Castells, et al., 1990:312– 18). Finally, though dealt with elsewhere, the relevance of GRCs or Team MPs’ to the policy of racial integration at a community level should not be overlooked: these, it will be recalled, have had the dual function of ensuring the representation of different racial groups while additionally restricting the political space of opposition parties. Housing policy has direct implications in the area of social control and surveillance through its definitions of eligibility, income levels, rules of tenancy, and sanctions against rule-breakers. As an agent of social control, the HDB is empowered to introduce, from time to time, rules and regulations to instil desired social habits and consciousness among residents. (Castells et al, 1990:290) An example of the latter which became especially contentious, even within the PAP itself, was the so-called ‘killer litter’ campaign which was debated on the occasion of the Housing and Development (Amendment) Bill of 1986. Throughout its existence the HDB had accumulated monopoly bureaucratic powers and sought to extend these to permit the imposition of further controls and sanctions. The ‘killer litter’ problem had emerged in 1984 as a result of people being injured (and in one case killed) by objects thrown from high-rise flats: reported cases numbered thirty-six in 1984, fourteen in 1985, and three in 1986. What caused particularly keen debate among government MPs was the proposal that the families of anyone over fourteen years old convicted of such an offence should be evicted: as will be shown later, the problem of disbarment from what has become de facto a universal concomitant of citizenship presents potentially insoluble problems. As one opposition member remarked, eviction of residents would defeat the government’s aim to achieve

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100 per cent home ownership (ST 1.8.86). The Bill was in the event passed despite the unprecedented abstention of Dr Toh Chin Chye, a founding member of the PAP. A further direct form of social control which is directly linked with public housing provision is the system of community policing which was initiated in 1983 (Quah and Quah, 1987). Along with the growth of non-crime related complaints to police which was becoming evident by the early 1980s, one of the reasons for the introduction of communityoriented policing through the Neighbourhood Police Post system was the inappropriateness of the vertical, patrol method in a high-rise environment. The success of the Japanese koban (police post) system, particularly through public co-operation, was also cited as a justification for its introduction in Singapore (Quah and Quah, 1987:7). An NPP is a small police post in the middle of a neighbourhood and serves a population of about 30,000 HDB residents. Of note is the community welfare aspect of the actual policing: Apart from providing the conventional services available at any police station, the NPP also functions as an information centre for residents, and as a crime prevention centre, where exhibitions and talks on crime prevention measures are held or where such services as the engraving of names on personal property are provided free for the residents. In addition to these duties, the NPP officers are also required to patrol the constituency and conduct house visits to residents living within the constituency. Each team of two NPP officers is assigned 250 households and they are expected to visit these residents twice a year. (Quah and Quah, 1987:7) The NPP system is effectively integrated with local grassroots organizations, from which suggestions are addressed relating to desired changes in policing. For instance, the more general availability of women police constables to handle cases involving women has been proposed in this way; WPCs were also thought to be more effective in managing visits to selected households (Quah and Quah, 1987:104). In summary, the NPP system offers a community-oriented, multifunctional mechanism which is integrated with other aspects of estate management and social control in public housing areas. An example of the latter is a more recent development in surveillance—started as a pilot scheme in a small number of HDB blocks—by means of the installation of closedcircuit cameras in the lifts. In some cases residents can monitor these on

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their televisions as a way of taking responsibility for their own security; though the large-scale installation of this means of surveillance has yet to be decided (ST, 17.11.93). POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HOUSING POLICY The government’s goal of providing high-quality public housing for the overwhelming majority of Singapore citizens has important implications which will be examined from three perspectives. First, it is necessary to differentiate this goal from that of welfare provision, which the government has unwaveringly avoided. Second, the goal of universal provision raises the issue of the extent to which housing provision in Singapore has been ‘depoliticized’. Third, the government’s policy can be evaluated in the comparative context of housing provision in both capitalist and socialist societies. In relation to the first of these issues, it is important to stress that housing in Singapore is not provided as of right and cannot be regarded as a legal entitlement of citizenship. The acquisition of a public housing flat is a business transaction between client and vendor, since the HDB operates as a corporation which is financially and administratively independent of government. In reality, of course, the HDB maintains intimate links with government policy and is seen to do so, though the formal separation allows the government to distance itself from HDB decisions which attract public criticism. Thus, while the government maintains its commitment to the universal provision of public housing, the latter is defined in terms of private property rights and has never been a matter of welfare provision. A paradoxical problem that arises as a result is that it is extremely difficult for the HDB to evict an occupier who either falls into arrears with rent or who infringes in some serious way the tenancy rules (as was suggested in debate over the ‘killer litter’ problem). To evict a family would be to render its members indigent and hence in need of welfare intervention: this would be entirely contradictory to one of the most central principles of government policy. The outcome of this insoluble dilemma is that an unpublicized arrears problem exists though it is seldom mentioned. Even the problem of mortgage arrears, which could in principle be met by forced sale followed by downgrading of accommodation, becomes more intractable as such downgraded accommodation becomes scarcer. The second issue, that of depoliticization, has its origins in sociological analyses of housing classes, especially in a British context. They are relevant to an examination of Singapore’s housing policy because they show that while the housing classes which have

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developed in Western societies are significantly absent, the public provision of housing nevertheless remains politicized since housing has become such a fundamental measure of Singaporean citizenship. The major British studies were generated by the finding of weakening association between class defined in occupational terms and political alignment, and by the work of Rex and Moore which used a Weberian model to assert that class struggles could arise around the control of domestic property (Rex and Moore, 1967). In subsequent modification of their work Saunders (1978) has argued that domestic property ownership provides access to real accumulation and therefore provides the basis for a distinct class formation. Among other reasons, this is because housing consumption is unlike other forms of consumption in which the very act of consumption depletes the value of a commodity. Following this, Dunleavy (1979) has introduced the concept of ‘consumption sectors’: The concept of sector is a means of characterizing and grouping together non-class or ‘immediate’ social interests distributed in systematic ways by economic, political and ideological structures. (Dunleavy, 1979:419) The state does not so much create sectoral cleavages in consumption but adds an important new dimension to the sectoral differentiation already present, and in particular the state’s intervention to provide collectively consumed services heightens consumption cleavages and changes the level of politicization. Where there is near-universal public provision—as had been the case in education and health care—sectoral issues were effectively depoliticized, but in other areas such as housing consumption has polarized into an individualizedcommodity-private and a collective-service-public mode. Only where there is this fragmentation between the two modes, argues Dunleavy, do important social and political cleavages develop. Chua (1991a) provides a critical appraisal of the depoliticization thesis on the basis of Singapore’s public housing programme. Given the policy of near-universal public provision there would appear to be strong grounds for accepting the thesis, but this should be questioned on three grounds. First, political cleavages cannot simply be equated with electoral behaviour since politics penetrates many other areas of social life. Second, the state works to keep its public provision depoliticized in order to deflect negative reaction to its policies onto administrative functionaries and thus distance itself, though this is constantly negated by the fact that the state (effectively the PAP) and

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administrative functionaries are the same entity in the public perception. Third—a corollary of the last point—the ruling government will seek political legitimacy on the strength of those parts of its provision which achieve success. Thus state intervention to provide universally available housing does not in itself depoliticize this sphere. To the extent that it can be depoliticized the state has to work to produce an ideological consensus, and as has been shown in other chapters this has substantially comprised an ideology of pragmatism: that a particular policy of government works is its own justification. In other words, the popular subscription to this ideological consensus—in the domain of housing as in that of economic policy—means that the government accrues legitimacy because it ‘delivers the goods’ (Chua, 1991a:28). In this as in other areas there may be detected elements of the ‘Return to Sender’ dynamic, as a comparative treatment by Jones (1990) of ‘oikonomic welfare states’ reveals. In applying this term to Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, she refers to the form of management exercised in the interest of the ruled or in pursuit of some advantage shared by ruler and ruled. Pointing to common elements in these four societies, such as rootlessness on the negative side and cheap labour on the positive, she identifies the strong family tradition of Confucianism at the level of popular culture and the absence of abstract conceptions of politics: ‘Successful government, in this context, is government with least appearance of polities’ (Jones, 1990:451). Consequently there is neither much place nor much respect for ‘professional politicians’ since those capable of making a significant contribution to society will largely have been ‘recruited, co-opted or assiduously cultivated’ (Jones, 1990:452) by members of the ruling elite. In the area of social policy, in which Jones highlights education as the most popular component (clearly housing would have to be advanced in the case of Singapore), governments constantly ‘instructed’ ordinary people in their wider social obligations. This is very much the process we have associated with Giddens’s ‘penetration of everyday life’ (page 133); and the popular response to this undertaking by government to ‘deliver the goods’—as it has been labelled in a Singapore context— captures the bargaining process to which we have earlier referred: Ordinary people thus exposed to ‘active government’ could develop notions of their own importance hitherto unforeseen by either side: at the same time as government ‘in the service of the economy’ could increasingly be coming to mean government as a

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provider of services useful to the economy. Once exposed to such services ‘courtesy of government’—and to the extent that they themselves perceived them to be useful—ordinary people were liable to demand more of the same: if not as a right then certainly as a perk to go for in the perennial struggle to get ahead. Just so has a popular learning exercise been taking place, beyond the bounds of any formal public education programme. So practical community building could be as much about striking bargains as imposing grand designs. (Jones, 1990:454) The problem for the Singapore government is that in the process of being a good provider of services it may create a state of dependency, or spirit of welfarism, which the PAP has assiduously tried to avoid. Another problem of growing proportions is the way in which the constant expansion of expectations and the need to appease demands for status rewards places ever more complex demands on the political process. If, in the later stages of the economic growth process, ‘delivering the goods’ of the kind typified in the public housing programme is no longer adequate for the maintenance of ideological consensus, there is a possibility that political legitimacy might become more overtly contested. Lee Kuan Yew’s perception of the problem as still manageable was evidenced in a speech to parliament in January, 1994: Last month, Dr Albert Winsemius returned to Singapore after a lapse of 10 years. He’s been associated with us since 1960. At the end of his stay, I asked him what was the most profound change in Singapore. He paused, and said, They want more… I responded: But they are prepared to work for the more that they want. And he replied: Yes, that is no longer true in Europe. (ST, 15.1.94) Some of the electoral vicissitudes of the PAP have been directly linked to HDB policies (Pugh, 1987; 1989). With almost 87 per cent of the population now living in HDB housing (Singapore 1993:210) and with such a direct impact being exerted by the HDB bureaucracy on the everyday lives of the population, the relationship between housing provision and political legitimacy—however skilful the government’s ideological work—is inescapable. This has had both positive and negative outcomes for the government’s political legitimacy. In the early period of PAP government the impressive

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scale of its achievement in constructing public housing was influential in generating enormous electoral support at the 1963 election (Rodan, 1989:73). By contrast, electoral support was lost in 1981 and an opposition MP was elected to the Anson constituency as a direct result of government and HDB policies. There had been a reduction in government expenditure grants to the HDB (Pugh, 1987:326); there was a large waiting list for HDB flats in the area (Milne and Mauzy, 1990:37); eviction notices had been issued to Port of Singapore Authority employees who were resident in the area (Rodan, 1993a:84–5); and on top of a 38 per cent increase in the prices of flats that year there was something of a panic reaction after a PAP Minister suggested there might be a fourfold increase in prices in the subsequent four years (Castells et al, 1990:250–1). In the 1984 election a combination of factors can be cited in explanation of the further attrition in support for the PAP. Middleclass disapproval of the patronizing tone of the Prime Minister’s eugenics views was one element (Rodan, 1989:183–6), but resentment at the way decisions and policies were enacted, especially on the part of the HDB (this was shortly after the debate on the ‘killer litter’ problem) was another important source of dissatisfaction. Another issue, the proposal by a government-appointed committee that the minimum age for withdrawal of benefits from the CPF should be raised from fifty-five to sixty or even sixty-five (Milne and Mauzy, 1990:33), highlights an important unintended consequence of policy implementation. Because of the complex integration of so many areas of policy—which is one reason for the high degree of success of the government’s programmes—changes in one area tend to resonate with implications for another, and when these are perceived as having negative consequences the reaction is amplified. In this case the synthesis between CPF and HDB policies was one factor behind the decline in the PAP’s electoral support. The distancing of government from administrative delivery as part of an attempt to enhance legitimacy was nullified by the HDB’s bureaucracy becoming almost synonymous with government itself (Castells, et al., 1990:299). It was as a result of this electoral downturn that a number of political reforms were introduced (Milne and Mauzy, 1990:68–75); for example, the more consultative structure of Town Councils was introduced with the express purpose of giving them as much autonomy from the HDB bureaucracy as possible. Most importantly in terms of its contribution to the nation building process, it is within a comparative framework that some of the most

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significant features of the Singapore model of housing development can be highlighted. The problems facing housing systems in both advanced capitalist and advanced socialist countries have been identified in a range of research (Chua, 1988a; Morton, 1984; Pugh, 1980). The main characteristics of the two extremes of the continuum—capitalist and socialist systems—will be summarized at this point, and the divergent features of Singapore’s housing system made manifest. First, drawing on housing provision in the United States as exemplifying the capitalist extreme, government plays a minimal role and the market mechanism is the primary mechanism for allocation. Only where specific groups—those on the very lowest incomes—are inadequately serviced by the market is there intervention by government, on a low subsidy basis. In such circumstances the housing conditions of the poor tend to be substandard and declining due to poor maintenance and the low rate of new provision. This minimalist approach to public housing means that households with stable incomes are forced by income ceiling levels out of public housing, leaving behind concentrations of the very poor and accentuating the accumulation of social problems in these stigmatized locations (Chua, 1988a: 15). At the other extreme in market terms were the post-revolutionary socialist societies of Eastern Europe, where housing was defined as a natural right and the state as sole provider. In this model rents are uniform and low, with the result that financial returns to the state are small in comparison to capital investment and since tenants receive a substantial subsidy they are able to retain a substantial part of their disposable income. There is thus no inducement to move out of public housing, necessitating constant provision of new housing stock in the face of unremitting demand for this natural right, with a resulting drain on the nation’s economy. The solution to these dilemmas, Chua has argued, is to avoid the extremes of commodification versus decommodification of housing and to seek a model which reconciles elements of both (Chua, 1988a: 7). The principles he advocates—some of which are based on suggested reforms in the socialist housing programme—are those which have evolved in the housing policies of Singapore. They include a political commitment to universal provision of housing together with a significant decommodification of housing to reduce market instabilities while retaining some degree of market functioning to provide a return on state investment (which in turn facilitates the cycle of new construction). To ensure that the most needy receive the greatest subsidy, both rents and housing quality must be differentiated: in this way an adequte return to the state is

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achieved and housing mobility encouraged, the latter being further encouraged by the continual upgrading of properties. Two essential conditions are seen to underlie the policy: decommodification of land—which, as has been shown, was made possible by the Land Acquisition Act of 1966–and universal provision. Both of these conditions are absent in the United States, but are in principle attainable in socialist states: it is therefore of significance that the HDB has been acting as consultant in urban planning in the People’s Republic of China. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT OF HOUSING In the final section of this chapter discussion will be focused on the extent to which, and the ways in which, Singapore’s housing policy has been able to deliver an adequate living environment for its citizens. A living environment goes beyond housing provision per se to include other infrastructural features such as transport, schools, leisure and cultural facilities, but as a central element housing—for which read HDB performance—demands special attention. In fact, there are two markedly different assessments of the impact of high-rise development in Singapore. On the one hand there is a critical perspective which accentuates such features as the financial anxiety engendered by HDB relocation (Hassan, 1977) and the atomization and disruption of kin ties that such mobility causes (Salaff, 1988:8). Perhaps the most articulate critique has been advanced by Pugh, who regards the high-rise ideology as a voguish import (in the urgent circumstances of the 1960s) from overseas social and public housing schemes on which the HDB became ‘hooked’ before preferable alternatives were disseminated in the mid1970s (Pugh, 1987:327–8). High-rise has become entrenched because of the monopoly bureaucratic power of the HDB not only as housing provider but as an influence over architectural education. Despite the argument, which Pugh supports, that low-rise housing is more economical, both in financial cost and use of space, the opposite is believed, in part because such housing is associated with the small, luxury private market (Pugh, 1987:328). Supporting evidence is provided from Hassan’s and Fonseca’s research in the early 1970s (Hassan, 1977:9– 10), the former being specifically confined to poor residents, many of whom expressed anxiety about the newly incurred costs of HDBprovided housing. A significant area of neglect in housing policy, Pugh maintains, is the changing role and status of women in society. On Western experience this influences household composition, family size,

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locational preference and the allocation of domestic responsibilities (Pugh, 1989:840). The link between these changes and the broader implementation of government policies produces conflicts which relate directly to housing provision. For instance, from 1983 official concern has been expressed about lower-than-average marriage and reproduction rates and the need to reverse these trends. Housing plays a role in this question: For example, child rearing is easier (but still hard, satisfying work) in houses with good spatial standards, with gardens, and with the burden of domestic work shared among men and women. It is also easier if the schooling of children in the family is not spread on rosters over all the sunlit hours from dawn to sunset. In fact, a very competitive education system, with some pressures towards private tutoring, also imposes more work and strain on women than on men. We really should not be surprised that young, educated, Singaporean women might prefer to work in offices rather than in the domestic area. (Pugh, 1989:840) Pugh suggests that a ‘feminization of housing’—by which he means the greater prominence of women in housing administration—might achieve some of the desired changes. On the other hand there is substantial evidence of satisfaction with housing provision, and that this can be documented from a relatively early period in its development. Some of the evidence is in the form of officially sponsored studies (Yeh, 1975) and shows increasing satisfaction with the living environment in the period 1968–73, particularly in relation to the provision of additional infrastructure and services (Yeh, 1975:233–4). The most extensive exploration of the thesis that new forms of community and cultural expression have emerged in the living environment of high-rise flats has been made by Chua, beginning with his detailed longitudinal study of village resettlement in the early 1980s (in Wong and Yeh, 1975: Chapter 10, ‘Resettling Soon Hock Village’). Chua has been a strong adversary of anti-high-rise discourse, which he in part interprets as a reaction to the deterioration of public blocks of flats through vandalism in Western societies, consistent with the process depicted earlier in the chapter (Chua, 1988a: 22). In Singapore the principle of ‘maintenance’ is not only rigorously applied to the infrastructure but extends from there to the political and social structure (Leifer, 1990b). Arguments against high-rise housing development also tend

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to contain a logic of architectural determinism, which contending that the physical structure determines social behaviour; against this, it can be maintained that architecture only creates the spaces for potential social activities but cannot realize them (Chua, 1988a: 31). Moreover, even when the issue is framed in exclusively architectural terms, there are sound arguments to be made in favour of high-rise accommodation in a tropical climate, principally on the grounds of coolness (Chua, 1991c: 206). But it is in the sphere of social interaction that evidence is available of the humanizing of the high-rise environment, in contrast to its portrayal as the stereotyped concomitant of bureaucratic social engineering. Especially significant is the process through which the temporal and spatial aspects of everyday social life are integrated in the concept of ‘corridors of activities’, as people interact on the basis of regular routines and as a result produce a ‘high level of visual as well as social familiarity’ (Wong and Yeh, 1985:370) Pedestrian activities are maximized because no block in a neighbourhood is further than 400 metres from the neighbourhood centre with its shops and other facilities. This further facilitates the development of the ‘corridors’ associated with interaction between residents. Over time, ‘acquaintances are made and a sense of identification with the residential location does emerge among the high-rise residents’ (Chua, 1991c: 216), and these tend to be related to fixed routines or to membership in one of the groups designed to foster acquaintance, such as a Residents’ Committee. The network of organizations based on locality enhance the salience of residence, which becomes the hub of broader social and political activity, and there are important consequences for the redefinition of community which occurred as a result of housing policy: If a sense of permanence and some form of stability are the primary consequence of housing ownership, the secondary consequence must surely be the immediate fact of shared territoriality. The integrated neighbourhoods created in the housing estates, both by fate and by fiat, required the individual to come to terms with new social-psychological realities, a phenomenon which the earlier segregated patterns of settlement did not force many residents to face. (Ong, 1989:938) It is noted elsewhere (page 207) that among Singapore’s political leadership concern has been expressed about the impact of resettlement in new surroundings; indeed, this concern was aired

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publicly by Lee Kuan Yew, and an investigation of the potential anomie that might have resulted was an explicit part of the remit given to the research team on religious conversion (Kuo, Quah and Tong, 1988:18–19). The standardization of high-rise flats disregards one of the principal cultural elements that was present in traditional house layouts, namely the symbolic representation of the religious beliefs of the occupants’ ethnic group: The geomantic belief system and the hierarchical organization of the family of the Chinese combine to produce a strong emphasis on formal symmetry in the building’s facade and layout. The Malays, as a result of Islamic injunction against gender mixing, emphasize gender segregation between non family members in the layout of their house. Finally, the Hindu Indians’ cosmological concern with ‘purity’ is expressed in a spatial arrangement of the house that maintains both functional and gender segregation. (Chua, 1988b: 3) In response to this, the otherwise neutral layout of the HDB flat is modified by religiously observant members of each ethnic group in accordance with the injunctions of their belief system. For the Chinese this involves adjustments to allow the appropriate location of the altar in the living room; for Malays, avoidance of certain proscribed forms of gender contact is maintained by spatial arrangement and body gesture; and for Indians, both the ascribed ritual status of women and the separation of toilet facilities from areas used for food preparation are constituents of the symbolic universe which require spatial adjustments. The constraints of standardized building technology together with the policy of racial intermixing and that of encouraging upgrading combine to nullify the option of a diversity of cultural designs: allocation difficulties alone would preclude this. Therefore, ingenuity on the part of occupants in constructing a living space which is compatible with basic belief systems is the practical outcome. Inevitably, in the process some elements of belief and practice will be retained while others will lapse. In a very literal sense, the process can be incorporated within an analysis of the broader rationalization of religion in Singapore (Tong, 1992). While education and language policy have been indicated as the major agents of change in religious belief, it should be recognized that the physical environment has a significant impact on religious practice. Thus, in relation to the nation building project and to the

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developing content of citizenship in post-independence Singapore, some of the main observations of this chapter may be summarized. First, in the immediate period after independence, the principal goal of the PAP government was the urgent provision of housing both in the face of a housing crisis and with the goal of rapidly generating infrastructural growth. The emphasis was on the material provision of housing, with the sole symbolic element being an emphatic demonstration of the government’s competence, with corresponding enhancement of its legitimacy. Increasingly during the 1970s housing policy was incorporated into a sophisticated programme of social engineering as part of the nation building enterprise. The policy was used to facilitate social integration (especially in the areas of class and income); it played a significant part in assisting the process of ethnic integration; and the control and surveillance of the population was also included within its scope. With the home ownership policy an effort was made to incorporate the population both socially and ideologically, and there can be seen in housing policy an increasingly symbolic emphasis, with an inculcation of desirable social values. In the late 1980s a renewed material emphasis emerged with the physical upgrading of the environment, while citizens were given greater responsibility for the running of HDB estates, and what might be termed the overall ‘embourgeoisement’ of housing became a predominant theme. There are parallels here with developments in the PAP government’s search for a set of core values, as cultural and symbolic themes were increasingly stressed from the 1970s onwards. On the one hand the public provision of housing can be seen as an expanding dimension of citizenship; on the other, the delivery of quality housing creates a greater capacity on the part of government to underline the obligation which citizens owe to the nation. One version of the latter, which is more fully explored in the context of recent debates about the nature of civil society in Singapore, is the government’s goal which was expressed by George Yeo (1991:79) in a pointedly residential analogy: The problem is how to make Singapore more than just a nice hotel to stay in, how to make it a home worth living and caring for.’

6 Between the family and the state

The family has been called upon to preserve the traditional cultural values and bear the primary responsibility for socializing the children in the virtues of the ‘rugged’ society. Thus, seen in this light, the family has taken on a renewed importance as an intermediary between the individual and the state, and has become an important instrument for achieving national economic goals. The theoretical implication is clear: in developing countries where social planning is extensive, such as in Singapore, the family is not just a passive recipient of the impact of economic and social development but may become an active agent of socioeconomic change. (Kuo and Wong, 1979:11) The issue raised by Kuo and Wong in their introduction to the sociology of the family in Singapore on the relationship between the family and the state is the subject of this chapter. The question at issue, which their account leaves open, is whether the family in Singapore society should be viewed as a mediating structure between the individual and the state, or as an essential constituent in advancing the economic and nation building strategy of the PAP government. The family is regarded unequivocally by Berger and Neuhaus (1977:2–3) to be one of four mediating structures; the others are neighbourhood, church, and voluntary association. Defining mediating structures as those institutions standing between individuals in their private lives and large institutions of public life, they argue that such structures should be protected and fostered by public policy; but they should not be co-opted by the government since such control would destroy their mediating function (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977:6–7). Indeed, as a consequence of modernization 140

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and the advent of mass society, the mediating function of the family had become even more important. It was the major private and autonomous institution where individuals continue to exercise some measure of control over their lives in the face of infringements by megastructures (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977:19). In contrast to this presentation of the family, Durkheim, while recognizing the significance of ‘secondary groups’ in performing a mediating role between the individual and the state, argued that the family was becoming an increasingly temporary institution—restricted to childrearing and the relationship between the married couple (Lukes, 1973:184–5). For this reason he saw the need for an alternative to the family, which was able to accomplish the economic and moral functions previously undertaken by this institution. Such an alternative, he suggested, might be found in occupational or professional groupings. However, although the family is relegated to a less important role in modern industrial society it is still ‘an important centre of morality, a basis for moral education, a centre of moral security and a source of attachment and regulation for the individual’ (Lukes, 1973:1895). It is clear from this discussion that Durkheim, unlike Berger and Neuhaus, did not foresee the family as a mediating link between the state and the individual but he recognized nevertheless that it would continue to play an important moral role in society. In this discussion of the relationship between the family and the state two issues are addressed—the family as mediating structure and the family as a source of moral values in society. Both, as will be made clear later, are particularly relevant to any discussion of the family in Singapore. The relationship between the family and the state may be approached from two different perspectives, the liberalindividualist and the civic-republican traditions of citizenship, which have been delineated by Oldfield (1990) and introduced in Chapter 1. And although Oldfield applies them to the concept and practice of citizenship, the discussion is equally relevant to state-family relations. Liberal individualism, a manifestation of the political and cultural traditions of American and British society, begins with the premise that the individual not only has ontological and epistemological priority but moral priority as well (Oldfield, 1990:1–2). Hence the sovereignty of the individual must be protected as much from the state as from other individuals, the assumption being that people who have power should not be trusted. The function of the political realm is to render service to individual interests and purposes, to protect citizens in the exercise of their

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rights, and to leave them unhindered in the pursuit of whatever individual and collective interests and purposes they might have. (Oldfield, 1990:2) It follows from this, in liberal democratic belief, that the family is a private institution in which domestic concerns such as residence, marriage, love, sex, abortion and procreation are fulfilled. The state, in these areas, is restricted to a reactive and supportive role; for instance, in cases of family breakdown it may intervene to mediate and protect the weak and the innocent. However, the autonomy of the individual and the family is ultimately preserved. In the alternative civic-republican account of the relationship between individuals and society, and particularly the role of the state, it is assumed that the interests of the political community are the interests of citizens (Oldfield, 1990:4–5). While citizenship is a right in the liberal-individualist account, it is a duty within civic republicanism, where citizens are called to stern and important tasks through which their identity is sustained. Indeed, the very identity of citizens is derived from the community. There are, Oldfield continues, two important aspects of citizenship in civic republicanism. First, citizenship is regarded as practice, not merely a status as in the liberal description. Citizens are required actively to contribute to the demands of the political community. Second, citizens cannot be expected to engage in practice unless they are encouraged and supported. The ramifications for state-family relations may now be discerned. The family is susceptible to the encroachments of the government in the interests of the community. The state, in seeking to be proactive, may formulate social policy which directly or indirectly affects the private interests of individuals and their family. If, as Berger and Neuhaus suggest, the family has become even more important in the face of modernization and the development of mass society, then it may be argued that individuals who live in such societies value whatever remaining autonomy they possess. They may consequently resent the interference in the most private of institutions, the family. The critical question is how far social policy in the area of the family should extend before it provokes a negative response from the populace. This chapter, in dealing with these major issues of public policy towards the family, will establish that state-society relations in Singapore, as exemplified in the area of the family, have been punctuated by unanticipated consequences and reversals of policy. Once again, the ‘Return to Sender’ logic of developing conceptions of

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citizenship has been clearly apparent in this important institutional area. THE MIGRANT FAMILY AND THE WOMEN’S CHARTER, 1961 Freedman (1957) identified some characteristics of Chinese migration to Singapore which provide a useful background to the organization of the Chinese family prior to self-government in 1959. First, the Chinese population in the colony was constituted by fragmented localized lineages, as contrasted with the situation in China; no immigrants could claim to belong to an integrated lineage organization in the same way that they could on the mainland. Second, the migrants consisted almost exclusively of single and ablebodied men. This highly individualistic pattern of migration coupled with the shallowness of generational depth (no more than one or two generations) produced a situation in which there were few close patrilineal kin and the average number of kindred was small. Third, most immigrants came from ‘lower class’ origins or peasant background. These patterns were characteristic of Chinese migration until well into the present century. It was not until the 1930s that there were clear indications of a settled population in Singapore (Kuo and Wong, 1979:6), and not until the late 1940s that a more balanced male to female ratio appeared (Smith, 1964:177). The Chinese households in the colony mainly consisted of what Freedman (1957:227) has described as an elementary family which may or may not have contained the parent(s) of the husband. In confirmation of these patterns, the Census in 1957 recorded that nearly 64 per cent of the total households were ‘one-family nucleus’ (Quah, 1993:59). Although the official definition of one-family nucleus included one parent of a married couple as a member of the household (Census of Population 1980, No. 6—Households and Houses: 17), the majority of such households were without the parent. As such, one-family nucleus households may be regarded as nuclear families broadly defined. One noteworthy feature of the family was that residential polygamy was rare: however, polygamous liaisons, especially with children, were scattered over several households (Freedman, 1957:37). The extent of polygamy in Singapore was not known but it must have been sufficiently significant to result in the Women’s Charter, which specifically prohibited such marriages, being passed in 1961. In a discussion of how colonial law affected the Chinese, Freedman (1952:115–17) concluded that the system as it existed was

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by its very nature anomalous. It was neither Chinese nor English but an unfortunate hybrid which worked to the detriment of Chinese interest. The failure to develop a suitable legal system was partly attributed to the lack of consensus within the Chinese community. The heterogenous character of the community was clearly reflected in the presence of numerous dialect groups in the colony, observing a diversity of customs governing marriage and family practice. Moreover, the Chinese, who were loathe to settling their domestic disputes in alien courts, resorted to a diverse range of indigenous associations—from those based on kinship, quasi-kinship, territorial origin and professional interest (Freedman, 1952:121–2)—which simply compounded the difficulty of establishing legal procedures acceptable to the Chinese community as a whole. In its political campaign during Singapore’s first general election of 1959, which the PAP contested successfully, the Party articulated its policy in a number of areas in a document titled The Tasks Ahead: PAP’s Five Year Plan 1959–1964. This included its policy on women which had direct consequences for the family. Suffused with the socialist anti-colonial and anti-feudal rhetoric of the early years, the document called for the emancipation of working-class women from domestic drudgery and household slavery by increasing education and employment opportunities for women (The Tasks Ahead, 1959:11). It committed itself to the principle of equality of women with men in all spheres. The party also promised to introduce a monogamous marriage law for all—with the exception of Muslim marriages which sanctioned polygamy—as a necessary condition for a stable home and family; and it undertook to check the inflow of immoral and ‘yellow’ cultures which were primarily targeted at women (The Tasks Ahead, 1959:18–19). Two years after coming into power the PAP government passed the Women’s Charter in 1961 which outlawed non-Muslim polygamous marriages. At the time the Charter was introduced in the Legislative Assembly there were an estimated seven non-Muslim marriage systems in operation, the result of which was a great amount of confusion, conflict and general unhappiness (Leong, 1990:9). The significance of the Charter is threefold. First, it was an attempt to rationalize the administration and regulation of marriages and the family in Singapore, as a reflection of the PAP’s pragmatism which was centred on instituting an efficient form of government on entering office. As Quah (1981:38) has argued, the Women’s Charter was a bold and revolutionary decision taken by the government in the early 1960s for two principal reasons. One was that the Charter

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would remove the legal barriers and enable women to be recruited into the labour force, at a time when the economic survival of the island was a priority. This argument is questionable because there were insufficient economic opportunities available even for men in those years, and economic survival became a compelling issue only when the island separated from Malaysia in 1965. The other reason concerns nation building, since the Charter would facilitate the process of unification of individuals from different migrant backgrounds. This argument should be tempered by the fact that the PAP government in the early years of power did not entertain the viability of the island as an independent nation; indeed it identified with the common destiny of a Malayan nation (The Tasks Ahead, 1959:12–18). The second element of significance in the Charter relates to the better-educated members of the community who regarded polygamy as repulsive and demeaning of the status of women (Leong, 1990:10). The effect of the Charter, Leong comments, was the replacement of Chinese customary marriages with Anglo-Christian norms already practised in English family law, namely monogamy as the basis of all non-Muslim marriages and family organization. In so far as this constituted the first attempt of a popularly elected and independent government to intervene in family affairs, it revealed the values of a political elite who came from a middle-class and English-educated background, and among whom some may have been exposed to a Christian mission education. Third, despite the aspirations for establishing equality for women as outlined by the party in The Tasks Ahead, the Charter was less concerned with women’s rights than with resolving a chaotic situation with regard to marriage, divorce and the rights of spouses and their children of a migrant society. An elected female member of the Legislative Assembly stated, ‘this Charter falls very short of what one might expect from a Women’s Charter’ (Leong, 1990:14). Neither was it a charter about family policy in the sense defined by Quah (1981:34)—there are clearly formulated goals about what kind of family and social values that a national community wants to encourage and maintain. This was to come later. ‘TWO IS ENOUGH’ Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 called into question the viability of the island as an independent state (Turnbull, 1977:297). The PAP leaders, who had invested so much faith in a merger with the

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peninsula for both economic and political reasons, were now forced to re-evaluate their economic priorities. The report of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1955 had already warned that economic expansion on the island would not keep pace with its growing population and had pointed to the need for measures to be initiated that would curb population growth and discipline the labour force (Turnbull, 1977:275). The reordering of the PAP’s economic strategy was not as radical as it might otherwise have appeared, since the government accepted the assumption of the Winsemius Report in 1961 that unification with Malaya did not guarantee its economic future; instead, it had independently to attract foreign capital to finance an ambitious industrialization plan (Rodan, 1989:64). The population growth rate from 1947 to 1955 was high, averaging 4.2 per cent for the period (Quah, 1981:39) and reaching a peak of 4.4 per cent in 1957 (Turnbull, 1977:310). Although the birth rate declined slowly between 1957 and 1966 its level was unacceptable to the government since it posed a threat to the goals of maintaining and raising the standard of living of the population, and this was an integral component of its economic strategy. In 1966 the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board was established to implement a national family planning programme. Its immediate objectives were to slow population growth as quickly as possible through a concerted effort in education and information dissemination, and to establish an island-wide network of maternal and child health services which would make family planning services freely available. Its long-term goal was to achieve zero population growth by maintaining a replacement level which would have resulted in each family having no more than two children (Quah, 1981:39), a policy more popularly known as ‘Two is enough’. From 1969 the birth rate showed a slight upward trend until 1972, when there was a minor peak. This was attributable to a growing number of women entering their reproductive years (Cheng, 1979:80), which was in turn a product of the post-war baby-boom generation. As a consequence, the government introduced a range of specific policies to limit family size to two children. These policies were designed as economic disincentives or penalties imposed on parents who exceeded the two-child limitation. They included increasing accouchement fees, restricted choice of schools for the third or fourth child, no income tax deductions for the fourth or any subsequent child and a reversal of the policy of giving priority to large families in the allocation of public housing flats (Salaff and Wong, 1978:50–1; Fawcett and Khoo, 1980:559–60; Quah, 1981: 42). In 1970 both the

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Abortion Act and Voluntary Sterilization Act were passed, making these services available to Singaporeans at low cost. In this way, the policies and measures introduced by the government to check population growth can be seen to illustrate what Quah (1990:248) has described as a process of increasing government intervention, namely, distributing objective information, suggesting appropriate behaviour, introducing incentives or disincentives, and finally instituting sanctions. The population policy of the mid-1960s to the late 1970s was clearly determined by overriding economic considerations. These were to create employment opportunities for a growing population and not simply to sustain but to improve the present standard of living. Together with the public housing programme, which made it easier for young married couples to live separately from their parents, the policy of economic disincentives for those exceeding two children and the law of monogamy for non-Muslim marriages introduced in 1961 have had some impact on the type of family which evolved in Singapore. The one-family nucleus or the ‘nuclear family’—broadly defined and referred to earlier—constituted about 64 per cent of total households in 1957. Hence the ‘nuclear family’ was already the norm before Singapore became industrialized (Kuo and Wong, 1979:8). The population and housing policy merely accelerated the development of such a family. In 1970 the one-family nucleus increased to nearly 72 per cent of total households, 78 per cent in 1980, and 85 per cent in 1990 (Quah, 1993:60). If only public housing flats are taken into account, the proportion is even higher; for example, in the 1970 Census 83 per cent of households in public flats were nuclear families compared to 72 per cent of all households in Singapore (Fawcett and Khoo, 1980:567). While the data suggest that an overwhelming majority of households are ‘nuclear families’ it does not necessarily follow that family lifestyle is in consequence wholly centred around a relatively isolated unit with the emphasis on the conjugal relationship (as has been generally understood in sociological accounts of the nuclear family). The predominant one-family nucleus household reveals more the physical structure than the social structure of the Singapore family. Such a structure does not fully represent the actual practice of maintaining wider kinship relations in Singapore as suggested in studies such as Kuo and Wong (1979) and Wong and Yeh (1985:409– 54). Studies such as these support the view that, although the majority of the population live in so-called nuclear-family households, many continue to engage in extended kinship

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interactions even if these are sporadic. One final comment may be made about the period of population changes and family organization reviewed. Given the imperative of economic priorities which underlay the policy of the PAP government, its attitude towards the family was equally pragmatic. In 1965 the Minister of Finance, Goh Keng Swee, in writing on the subject of development planning, argued that: the most important single economic variable determining the scope and effectiveness of a development plan is the amount of domestic savings that can be made available from the economy…. In many poor countries, kinship ties impose certain economic obligations that are absent in Western countries where welfare and social security schemes assist those whose sources of incomes have been disrupted through old age, illness or unemployment. The extended or joint family system, by placing these functions on the income earners of the extended family, diminishes their capacity to save and may even reduce incentives to earn more income. (Goh, 1972:63) The extended family was regarded as a possible obstacle to economic development in Singapore in its early years of independence. As indicated earlier, the birth rate declined slowly after 1957. By the time Singapore became independent in 1965, its population growth was primarily the result of natural increase (Thomson, 1979:23). In 1970 the growth rate was 2.8 per cent, but in 1980 it plunged to 1.5 per cent (Lee, Alvarez and Palen, 1991:65). Between 1957 and 1977 the crude birth rate had been reduced by more than half, from 42.7 to 16.6 (Fawcett and Khoo, 1980:554–5). What was even more dramatic was the decline in the total fertility rate, from six children per woman to less than five in 1965, and to less than two for the first time in 1977. It is estimated that for the population in Singapore to replace itself in the long run required each woman to produce 2.1 children over her lifetime (Yap, 1992:137). At less than two per woman it was heading for less than zero population growth. What had brought about such a dramatic decline in population in less than a generation? THE PROLETARIANIZATION OF THE FAMILY By the early 1960s the Singapore government, following the recommendations of the Winsemius Report, set out to attract industrial capital from overseas by heavily investing in infrastructural

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development and by establishing industrial estates (Rodan, 1989:64– 5). The development plan in this decade concentrated on creating jobs for the many unemployed, and this required a skilled but labourintensive and low-wage industrial sector to produce for foreign corporations (Salaff, 1988:23). Singapore’s economic growth from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s had been among the world’s highest. Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP was not less than 15 per cent between 1965 and 1969, and not less than 20 per cent between 1970 and 1974 (Rodan, 1989:98–118). By 1970 the Republic had achieved a state of near full employment (Turnbull, 1977:309); its industrial work-force had multiplied six times during the period 1965–77, and in the 1970s real per capita income had doubled (Fawcett and Khoo, 1980:553). So successful was the industrialization policy which had been launched in the early 1960s that by the late 1970s Singapore experienced severe labour shortages in some sectors (Rodan, 1989:136–41) and was forced to rethink its economic strategy. Convinced that high economic growth rates could no longer be sustained through labour expansion it embarked on the ‘Second Industrial Revolution’ by it shifting towards more capital-intensive, higher value-added production (Rodan, 1989:142–3). The economic restructuring of the island following separation in 1965 and the announcement of British military withdrawal in 1967 transformed Singapore from a service-based to a manufacturing economy, and had a profound impact on the position of women and the organization of the family. Progress for women in the educational sphere was impressive. The literacy rate for females doubled from 34 per cent in 1957 to 65 per cent in 1965, increasing to 80 per cent in 1980 (Fawcett and Khoo, 1980:562–3). The greatest change in the educational level of females was observed in tertiary education, where the proportion almost doubled between 1962 and 1975—in part due to the introduction of national military service in 1967 for all male Singaporean citizens on reaching eighteen years of age. The progress in female education was accompanied by increasing participation of women in the work-force and by an improvement in their economic status. In 1957 nearly 22 per cent of the total female population aged 15 years and above was economically active, rising to 29.5 per cent in 1970 and about 44 per cent in 1980 (Low et al, 1993:87). As a percentage share of the total labour force women comprised over 19 per cent in manufacturing industry in 1957, 31 per cent in 1970, and 40 per cent in 1980 (Low et al., 1993:89). The major reasons for the rapid increase in female labour force participation were higher educational attainment of women, the

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growth of employment opportunities for women, particularly in manufacturing, and changing attitudes towards women in paid work (Fawcett and Khoo, 1980:563). The sum effect of these economic changes was that families in Singapore society in the 1970s had become proletarianized (Salaff, 1988:262–9) as women and their families had been drawn progressively into a money economy. A successful public housing programme has produced a high rate of home ownership, the consequence of which is that families become involved in long-term work goals, mortgage payments and indebtedness to their retirement plans. A competitive educational system which is closely integrated in a performance economy has channelled young people into achievement for certification. Parents, whether they are poor or well off, invest heavily both economically and emotionally in their children’s education (Salaff, 1988:246–54). As the cost of raising children and maintaining the family increases many women are pressured to seek full-time or part-time employment. Family-size goals have been reshaped even though there is a class difference in such goals, as we will see later. Referring to local research, Fawcett and Khoo (1980:564) report that working women are less likely to have children for traditional reasons such as continuing the family line, they practise contraception earlier than non-working women, prefer smaller family size, postpone childbearing and space their births over a wider period. They cite the findings of another study which revealed that Singaporean parents do not expect to rely on their children to look after them in their old age and consequently have less need for more children (Fawcett and Khoo, 1980:569). In summary, Fawcett and Khoo (1980:575) point to increasing educational levels, widespread female employment, rising affluence, improvement in housing conditions and government efforts to legitimize the small family norm as critical to the rapid decline in population increase in Singapore. The disincentives introduced by the government to regulate family planning have been effective, but this is not simply because they have directly discouraged large family size. In covering a wide range of concerns which affect people’s everyday lives—education, housing, medical services and taxation— government policies have served to inform and educate the public of the benefits of small family size. Thus, public policy on family planning has merely accelerated a process of population decline which had already begun prior to independence in 1965. Reference has been made already to the government’s reversal of its policy of according priority to large families in the allocation of HDB

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flats. This occurred in 1972 as part of a package of disincentives designed to reduce family size, while the policy of allowing young married couples to buy such units, which had been introduced in 1968, continued. One of the negative consequences which has been pointed out (Quah, 1981:42) was that such a policy would encourage married couples to break away from the traditional extended family which might include their aged parents. In response, the housing policy was modified in 1980 to allow for the joint balloting of flats from parents and their adult children who were single (Quah, 1981:42–3). This policy change, Quah has suggested, marked a return to the emphasis on the extended family. In fact, the move had already begun two years earlier in 1978 when the joint balloting scheme was implemented to enable parents and married children to be allocated adjacent flats within the same block or in neighbouring blocks (Wong and Yeh, 1985:253). The significance of this should be appreciated in the light of several developments in government policy at about the same time. These developments signal the beginning of a revitalization of so-called ‘Asian values’, which were seen to have receded in the previous decade when economic priorities had preoccupied the minds of the PAP leaders. The Goh Keng Swee Report on Education in 1979, discussed in Chapters 3 and 8, was one of the earliest signs of ideological shift in its call for the introduction of ‘mother tongue’ in a reinvigorated bilingual education. This was followed by the Ong Report on moral education in the same year, which will be examined in Chapter 8. The Ong Report led to the incorporation of religious values in a moral education syllabus introduced to upper secondary schools in 1982. The courses offered, as will be seen, were Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic studies, and Bible knowledge; and at an early stage, Confucian Ethics was added. HAVE THREE OR MORE In 1983 at a National Day rally, Lee made one of his most controversial speeches, indicating a change in population policy towards pronatalism. Citing the 1980 Census, he pointed out that a woman below the age of 40 with no educational qualifications produced about three children on average; with primary education she produced about two; and with secondary or tertiary education she had one and a quarter children (Lee, 1983:5–8). He stated bluntly that if ‘we reproduce ourselves in this lop-sided way’—referring to educated women, and particularly to graduates—then society would decline and the loss of talent would have to be replaced from overseas

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(Lee, 1983:10). The rationale behind this argument, he suggested, was that a person’s performance was determined more by nature than nurture (Lee, 1983:4). In subsequent public and academic discussions on the subject the description ‘lop-sided procreation pattern’ referred to two changes in demographic behaviour. The first was a lower reproduction rate among the Chinese, particularly among those with higher education, and the second was the increasing number of unmarried women with tertiary education (Quah, 1990:256). Reminiscent of the process of increasing government intervention in limiting family size in the early 1970s, the Prime Minister’s speech was followed by the dissemination of information and by public discussions. In early 1984 the Graduate Mothers’ Priority Scheme was introduced to encourage university-educated women to have more children by giving them priority in choice of schools (Lee, Alvarez and Palen, 1991:67). The scheme was later extended to include women who were high school graduates. At about the same time a Social Development Unit (SOU) within the Ministry of Community Development was established to facilitate marriage for university-educated women. While encouraging educated women to produce more children the government offered cash incentives for poor and less-educated women to accept sterilization. Lee’s speech in 1983 and the programmes in early 1984 provoked considerable public discussion and criticism. The loss of two seats in Parliament to the opposition in the general election of 1984 for the first time since 1963, and a drop of nearly 13 per cent of the votes cast from the election in 1980, have in part been attributed to the policy of favouring a selected group in the population (Quah, 1990:281). It may well be argued that elitist policies of this kind were not well received by a population containing a majority who had migrant backgrounds, who were committed to an ethic of hard work, and who expected upward mobility through it. It called into question a central element in the founding charter of Singapore, namely meritocracy. In 1985 the priority scheme for graduate mothers was terminated by the Minister of Education on the ground that it did not produce the desired results (Lee, Alvarez and Palen, 1991:67). Since then the government has trodden cautiously on any area which involves direct intervention in family behaviour. In the same year that the priority scheme was scrapped, the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board, which had played a major role in government programmes to reduce population increase, was finally closed. Two years later, in 1987, Goh Chok

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Tong—then the First Deputy Prime Minister—announced the ‘New Population Policy’. Expressing concern about an ageing population which would have to be supported in the future by a decreasing number of young persons, he declared that the new family size norm for the vast majority of Singaporeans should be three children (Goh, 1987:2–3). The restrictions in school enrolment imposed on the third child were to be removed, child-care centres would be expanded, Medisave (a scheme which allocates a percentage of CPF contributions to medical expenses) could be used to pay for the delivery of the third baby and priority would be given to families in three-room flats who wished to upgrade their housing after the birth of their third child. Later Goh released the fertility rates of the major ethnic groups, and commented that while the Malay and Indian figures were at replacement or near replacement level, the Chinese were not replacing themselves. The frank admission is another illustration of the self-confidence of the PAP government in managing sensitive ethnic issues in the mid-1980s. Since the announcement of the New Population Policy, generous financial incentives and tax rebates have been progressively introduced to encourage women, particularly those with at least ‘O’ level education, to have more children (Yap, 1992:132). Unlike the disincentives of the 1970s and the elitist but abortive scheme of 1984, the emphasis is on a comprehensive range of economic incentives to effect change in family size and behaviour. In one of the most recent developments in family policy, Goh, now Prime Minister, expressed concern about drop-outs from the educational system even though they were only 1.7 per cent of the total cohort (ST, 16.8.93). He described these dropouts as coming from large families, living in a one-or two-room HDB flat and as having parents who had not attended secondary school. Noting that the cash grant scheme for women who agreed to undergo sterilization had been unpopular, he announced the introduction of the Small Families Improvement Scheme. Under the plan mothers would get an annual housing grant of $800 for the next twenty years and their children will receive education bursaries from primary to polytechnic level. What is perhaps most significant about the scheme are the conditions of eligibilty. These specify that the mother’s age must not be more than 35 years, and that parents’ education must be below ‘N’ or ‘O’ levels (‘N’ refers to normal stream students in secondary schools, who pursue a non-academic education such as vocational or technical courses). In addition, each parent was required to earn not more than $750 a month, the family must be intact, and the parents

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must also agree to have no more than two children. It was estimated that more than 8,000 families would qualify under the scheme (ST, 27.12.93). Goh emphasized that the grants would not be paid out if a family broke up, warning that the scheme should not become a welfare handout for single mothers in the way it has developed in New Zealand. As indicated in the previous chapter, changes in housing policy favouring those families who wanted to maintain ties with their ageing parents had begun in 1978 with the joint balloting scheme. Together with the pronatalist policies of 1984 and the shift to a threechild family in 1987, the Small Families Improvement Scheme could be regarded as evidence of a government that has been highly supportive of the institution of the family in the past one and a half decades. But as Chua has remarked: In a country where the government explicitly eschews any social welfare support and relegates this to voluntary associations, these pro-family rules reduce the government’s share of social welfare responsibilities. However, they are being justified ideologically as supporting the family as the basic social institution of the society and, in even more explicit ideological language, as maintaining the Asian traditions. (Chua, 1991a:37) FAMILY VALUES The latest development in family policy in the Republic was the release for public discussion of a draft document on family values in early 1994. Initiated by the Ministry of Community Development the previous year, the National Advisory Council on Family and the Aged was asked to prepare the document and to gather views from the public. Following the government’s White Paper on Shared Values in 1991, in which the second of the five values enunciated the family as the basic unit of society, the draft document identified five family values commonly shared by Singaporeans. These were: love, care and concern; mutual respect; filial piety; commitment; and responsibility (Singapore’s Family Values, 1994:4). Reminiscent of the concern expressed by the government over the alleged problem of anomie in a rapidly changing environment—which was evident when it commissioned the series of reports on religion in Singapore in 1988 which are outlined in Chapter 8—the Committee pointed out that families throughout the world were exposed to values which

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overemphasized individualism. Hence, there was a need to recognize and encourage values which uphold the importance of family ties and contribute to the collective good (Singapore’s Family Values, 1994:2). The family values identified in the document appear to be a composite of ‘Asian’ traditional and ‘Western’ middle-class elements. They resonate with the core values of the family within the Confucian social system (Kuo, 1987b: 1), these being filial piety, ancestral worship, family continuity and extended kinship network. For example, in explaining the values as manifest within family relationships, the document asserted that children should continue the family line (Singapore’s Family Values, 1994:6–8). Children should also reciprocate the care and concern shown by their parents and elders by showing respect and deference towards the latter, and strong ties between relatives were claimed to contribute to the strength of the family. However, leaning towards a more liberal Western view, the document also prescribed that the relationship between husband and wife should be egalitarian and that siblings should regard each other as companions. It may be inferred that while the Committee drew from Confucianist precepts in identifying family values, it attempted to minimize their ethnic content to make it acceptable to a multi-ethnic population. After a series of public discussions on the document the official statement of the five core family values listed the following: love, care and concern; mutual respect; commitment; filial responsibility; and communication (ST, 24.5.94). The last two replaced filial piety and responsibility, which were in the original proposal. The Committee (in the Community Development Ministry) felt that filial piety carried the connotation of religious practice. These values are not incompatible with those associated with the bourgeois family. Berger and Berger (1983:3– 21) have described such a family as it originated amongst the middle class in nineteenth-century Europe: it was child-centred, it had strict morals, emphasized economic success and was highly religious. The secular identity of the PAP government precludes it from openly espousing religious values which may upset the sensitivities of a multi-ethnic population. For this reason, as we will see in the White Paper on Shared Values and as we have seen in the draft document on Family Values, the government attempts to seek a moral consensus which is appropriate to a capitalist society. In evaluating the role of the family in nation building in Singapore it is clear that the PAP government has taken a proactive role in family policy since independence in 1965. It has worked from the assumption that the family, like most areas in social life, is

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subordinate to the interests of the national community. The overriding consideration of the family remains pragmatic and is driven by economic priorities, whatever the political rhetoric. The family size norm advocated by the government—from Two is enough’ in the early 1970s to ‘Have three, and more if you can afford it’ in 1987—was determined by fears of overpopulation and underpopulation respectively. Lee himself is convinced that Confucian values have contributed to the economic growth of the four dragons, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (ST, 28.2.94). These values, he maintains, are a great source of strength to the family—in particular, the desire to bring honour to the family through scholarship, hard work and working together. One of the reasons for the decline of the West is the absence of such values in the Western family. Two other related issues have also been raised in this chapter. These are the family as a mediating structure and as a source of moral values, both of which should be considered in tandem. Like the institution of education, the family is an indispensable mediator of the civil virtues of society, however these may be defined. Unlike education, on the other hand, the family enjoys a degree of autonomy as the most private of institutions. It is possible for the family to withdraw into its own ‘selfishness and privatism’ and obstruct the development of common and desirable virtues (Berger and Berger, 1983:171). For this reason the family has been described as a subversive organization which, it is argued, has the potential to undermine the state (Mount, 1982:1). The opposition to the Graduate Mothers’ Priority Scheme in 1984 may be regarded as a form of subversion since few families, including those who would have benefited from it, would countenance the intervention of the state in what they considered to be in a most inequitable manner. If the family is to maintain its mediating function, as Berger and Neuhaus (1977) suggest, then it is necessary for the family to preserve and nurture its autonomy, and consequently to maintain some distance from the state. In 1984 the PAP government attempted to impart moral values by adopting Religious Knowledge in its secondary school curriculum, though it subsequently abandoned this policy in 1989. In 1991 it introduced Shared Values as a statement of what it perceived as being important to Singaporeans as a national community but since then there has been little discussion of this project, or intiatives from the government in relation to it. The draft document identifying and articulating Singapore’s family values

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may be seen as a significant move by the state to use the family as a mediator of moral values in the light of its unsuccessful initiatives in the past. However, in the absence of a religious world view to lend legitimacy to moral actions, it may be questionable whether secular efforts to do so such as through the family will be effective (Berger and Berger, 1983:177). Furthermore if it is argued that the autonomy of the family should be respected, any attempt by the state to mediate moral values through this institution should empathize with the values that ‘families’ hold dear to themselves. In a heterogenous society this may be problematic not only because of ethnic differences but also as a result of differences arising from social class. This is expressed by Morgan: In some cases, among the poorer sections of society, the family may well have had its ‘autonomy’ challenged; middle-class families, on the other hand, may well have had their autonomy strengthened by the growth of the state since they are the groups that tend to use, rather than allow themselves to be used by, the agencies of the state. (Morgan, 1985:60–1) In Singapore, for example, middle-class families are in a better position to make use of the incentives afforded them by government policy, particularly if they decide to have larger families. Workingclass families who qualify for assistance under the Small Families Improvement Scheme may not even be aware of it, a concern which has been voiced by social workers (ST, 27.12.93). As a mediator of values it may also be argued that the middle-class or bourgeois family rather than the working-class family will play a more effective role (Berger and Berger, 1983:183), and consequently that the state will focus on this type of family for such a purpose. However, the evolution of the bourgeois family is associated with the rise of individualism (Berger and Berger, 1983:172), which implies that children in such families develop as autonomous and independent individuals. This, by contrast, is a matter of concern expressed in the draft document on family values (Singapore’s Family Values, 1994:2). The proletarianization of the family in Singapore in the 1970s will probably lead to its embourgeoisment in the 1990s if Singapore maintains its present impressive rate of economic growth. The rise of the bourgeois family may then pose a challenge to the state. In sum, between the family and the state in Singapore there

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exists a relationship that is ambivalent and occasionally uneasy. How the state effects a working relationship with the family in the future will be a matter of considerable interest in the light of such recent developments as a more participatory political style, and of the debate over civil society in Singapore.

7 Parapolitical and intermediary structures

The consolidation of the state in Singapore has involved a complex set of processes: these have been dominated by overwhelmingly pragmatic policies and have sometimes resulted from unexpected exigencies, such as the separation from the Malaysian Federation and the British military withdrawal. Furthermore, the government has not hesitated to employ resolute measures against perceived opposition— for example, in 1963 against left-wing trade unionists and political activists, and in 1987 against Catholic social activists. Examined in this chapter is the way in which the state, as represented by the PAP, has both extended its surveillance over citizens and simultaneously engaged in a process of reconstituting areas of society which are formally separate from the state. This has been effected through the provision of roles and identity models deemed appropriate to the goal of nation building with which the state is involved. The process has already been noted in the discussion of Breton’s concept of culturalsymbolic identity as a means of maintaining consistency between private and public worlds (see Chapter 3:79). In the particular context of Singapore, the government’s co-opting, construction and adaptation of mediating structures has been a central mechanism for restructuring collective identity and its symbolic components. MEDIATING STRUCTURES The concept of mediating or intermediary structures has a long history in sociology and is closely linked with the concept of civil society: because the latter has been the subject of intense recent debate in Singapore it is the subject of a separate chapter. Among classical theorists it forms a core element in Durkheim’s analysis of the relation of the individual to the state, and of individualism in complex society. 159

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Although the concept of ‘secondary groups’ in Durkheim had attracted the attention of subsequent commentators on his work, some important implications of his writing on the individual remained relatively unexplored until around 1970, when the work of Lukes and Giddens began to point to a more complex and dialectical treatment in Durkheim of the relationship of the individual to society and the state (Giddens, 1971; Lukes, 1969; 1973). Subsequently, in the wake of the dominant ideology thesis, other aspects of the relationship were developed, especially the variety of ways in which different theorists— including Durkheim—had conceptualized the relationship between the individual and society in the emergence of modern Western capitalism (Abercrombie et al, 1980; 1986). The implications of competing conceptions of the individual in social and political thought for the notion of citizenship has received considerable attention by social theorists, and there has been an extensive debate among certain politicians and journalists in Singapore, principally relating to the concept of civil society. A contrast has been drawn between the Enlightenment tradition associated with Rousseau, which emphasized the breaking down of particularistic ties and the emergence of the individual citizen, and the tradition of social pluralism associated with Burke, de Tocqeville and Durkheim, in which ‘subordinate partiality’—characterized by devolution, localism, and the rights of associations as well as individuals (Nisbet, 1986:139; see also Van Dyke, 1977)—is seen as a corrective to the otherwise potentially despotic outcome of a situation in which the naked individual confronts the state (Talmon, 1952). An apposite development of the latter can be found in Nisbet’s argument that the Western conception of the individual as citizen can be sustained, ‘but only if the necessary mediating contexts, the social and moral wall of [the individual and the citizen], are maintained or, where necessary, created’ (Nisbet, 1986:140, emphasis added). He takes his notion of created mediating contexts even further in advocating social invention: I would like to see the concept of social invention become a popular and also a significantly rewarded one. By invention I mean quite literally the assembling of existing elements in novel patterns, as is the case with mechanical or cultural inventions. Social inventions are of course those with primary referent being the relation of the individual to major areas of functional need. Inventions, if I may so call them, from the past of a social kind are labour unions, co-operatives, mutual aid and assurance societies.’ (Nisbet, 1986:147)

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Kornhauser (1960) had incorporated Durkheim’s ideas, particularly as set out in Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, in his study of mass society. He identified three levels of social relations in all but the most simple societies: the first consisted of primary relations, notably the family; the second comprised all intermediate relations, mainly the local community, voluntary association, and occupational groups. This second level provided links between the first and the third levels, the third being relations with the state. It was Kornhauser’s contention that in mass society the second level, or intermediate relations, was lacking, and people participated in the larger society through state and ‘other inclusive (nation-wide) structures’ (Kornhauser, 1960:75). He credits Durkheim with having perceived more clearly than other theorists that it was the combination of the state and ‘secondary groups’ which engendered individual liberty rather than either one in isolation. For Durkheim, the state fulfilled both an emancipatory function—freeing the individual from particularistic constraints in much the way that the Enlightenment theorists had viewed it—but he also saw that the unrestricted dominion of the state over what has elsewhere been labelled the naked individual had implications of tyranny: if that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual, it has itself need of some counterbalance; it must be restrained by other collective forces, that is, by…secondary groups… And it is out of this conflict of social forces that individual liberties are born. (Durkheim, 1958:63; quoted in Kornhauser, 1960:79) And Durkheim adds, ‘our moral individuality, far from being antagonistic to the State, has on the contrary been a product of it’ (Durkheim, 1957:68). In fact, the idea of the moral individual as the product of the state is highly congruent with the PAP government’s strategy, as it seeks to nurture the ‘morality’, as defined by it, of the individual and citizen. The concept of mediating structures, a reworking of the ‘secondary groups’ concept in Durkheim’s analysis of the individual’s location in a highly differentiated society, has been discussed in relation to public policy by Berger and Neuhaus (1977): their assessment can be shown to have particular relevance to some features of state-society relations in Singapore. They define mediating structures as institutions standing between the individual in private life and the large institutions of public life. In a modern society, they

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argue, individuals migrate between the public and private spheres; and while on the one hand they experience the megastructures of the public sphere as alienating (because they fail to provide meaning and identity for individual existence), the attempt to realize such meaning and identity in the private sphere involves disempowerment, since the administrative agencies are able to encroach on the private sphere without resistance. The dilemma arises, as Durkheim so perceptively expressed it, because the individual ‘eludes’ the state to some extent, and hence individual diversity may not come to light. By ‘eludes’, Durkheim means that the state, which is necessarily set at some distance from the individuals who ultimately come within its purview, cannot take into account every nuance of individual diversity and the special or local conditions in which people lead their day-to-day lives (Durkheim, 1957:63). But the main thrust of Berger and Neuhaus’s argument is the contention that, in order to empower people, mediating structures are required which can operate as buffers between the individuals operating in the private sphere and the major bureaucratic agencies of the state. Moreover, such mediating structures need to be protected and fostered by public policy rather than being regarded as irrelevant or as a symptom of cultural lag. The reason for such necessary protection is stated thus: Without institutionally reliable processes of mediation, the political order becomes detached from the values and realities of individual life. Deprived of its moral foundation, the political order is ‘delegitimated.’ When that happens the political order must be secured by coercion rather than by consent. And when that happens, democracy disappears. (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977:3) The focus of the Berger and Neuhaus paper is on the four mediating structures of the neighbourhood, the family, the church and the voluntary association. Two observations are appropriate at this point: first, their paper’s emphasis is on mediating structures as a ‘natural’, spontaneous phenomenon—they speak, for instance, of ‘the actual institutions of the community’ (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977:40)—and they are suspicious of such structures as a product of government policy. In this they diverge from Nisbet’s ‘creationist’ option, and it is in precisely this form of divergence that we will identify a debate about the variously labelled parapolitical or grassroots organizations fostered by the state in Singapore. The second important observation is that their

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concept of mediating structures cannot be equated simply with the concept of civil society. Although they base their argument in the classical civil society tradition, and although some of the mediating structures they analyse—voluntary associations and religious groups, for example—would come within most definitions of civil society— there is one significant inclusion which would not: the family. As an institution, the family has been allocated to the private sphere—and indeed Berger and Neuhaus take the same approach here—and as such has not been included in the range of institutions comprising ‘civil society’. Durkheim explicitly denies it a ‘political’ role and sees it as of declining importance and in need of some functional alternative (Fenton, 1984:90; Lukes 1973:184–5). Similarly, Kornhauser’s definition of civil society locates the family in the private or primary sphere. It is clear that Berger does, however, wish to insist on including the family within the remit of mediating structures, because elsewhere he has argued that ‘one thing is very clear: The family is the most important of these [mediating] institutions—in Emile Durkheim’s phrase, “the key link of the social chain of being”’ (Berger and Berger, 1983:183). And the rider is added that in democratic societies only a certain kind of family qualifies for such a status, namely the bourgeois family (or a reasonable facsimile). In the discussion of the role of the family in the nation building process in Singapore it is shown that it was only in the late 1970s—along with the debate over an appropriate set of national values—that the family came to be seen as a key mediating structure in the implementation of public policy. Before then, the government was more immediately concerned with promoting the growth of parapolitical institutions based on locality. The focus in this chapter is on neighbourhood structures and associational groups which have a primarily ethnic and religious base. A central feature of the state’s consolidation in Singapore has been the proliferation of state-sponsored associations and organizations: to what extent can these parapolitical organizations be equated with the concept of mediating structures? They have served a variety of functions but among them two are primary: first, to strengthen the support for and legitimacy of the PAP at a local level; and second, to facilitate feedback from the grassroots to the highest levels of government. While such structures have typically been created or adapted as a result of conscious government policy, the process has sometimes involved the incorporation of existing groups and personnel. Such incorporation has not only provided a source of continuity with earlier social and cultural associations in a society otherwise characterized by rapid and potentially dislocating social

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change, but, simultaneously, by recruiting from among the leaders of traditional associations in the formation of novel structures, the possible destabilizing presence of a group of displaced and disaffected former leaders has been mitigated. Some of the implications of this process can be seen in the changing role of traditional Chinese associations. CHINESE VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS Chinese voluntary associations in the form of secret societies were evident in Singapore from the earliest period of settlement, and by the 1840s had gained a reputation for lawlessness (Freedman, 1960:30). Nevertheless, these societies played an important role in community security through the British, seeking coordination and control of the distinct ethnic communities, ‘recognizing’ their leaders and co-opting them into enforcing social control, thereby establishing an important symbiotic relationship (Ong, 1989:940). On the one hand, the colonial authority secured a measure of social control, while for their part the organizations and their leadership gained prestige, power and legitimacy (Wing, 1992:492). A vivid illustration of this is the technique adopted by the Governor in the 1860s to quell rioting: The only way in which Cavenagh and his colleagues could hold the societies in check when trouble broke out was to swear in their leaders as special constables and parade them up and down in order, as Cavenagh says with nice irony, ‘to entice them to take a warm personal interest in the preservation of the peace’. (Freedman, 1960:31) But Freedman sees the societies as much more than criminal gangs (Trocki, 1990:235), suggesting that they were multifunctional within their ethnic community. They allocated political power among the Chinese, provided substitute kin and territorial networks for new immigrants, and operated an internal system of law. In short, he maintains, such societies appeared when the Chinese faced a challenge to control over their own affairs: ‘Let us say that secret societies were a response to external government’ (Freedman, 1960:46). Indeed, the development of such organizations to secure some measure of autonomy had much to do with rural migrants’ experience of a modern (colonial) state penetrating their everyday lives, for instance through legislation, in novel and unwelcome ways (Wong, 1980:181–2).

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More recently, Tan (1986) has argued that studies of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia—as well as in other parts of the world—show that these communities always contain three kinds of voluntary association, namely, clan associations, ‘speech’ or territorial associations, and secret societies. In Singapore the evolution of Chinese voluntary associations is seen by Tan to fall into three distinct periods. The first, from 1819 until 1900, was one in which the associations were primarily concerned with social welfare and community work among the immigrant Chinese. From about 1900 until 1949 the associations identified closely with the Chinese mainland and played an essentially political role. Then, after the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949 the associations came to play an increasingly cultural role. In the latter period the traditional Chinese leaders, who mostly belonged to the rich mercantile class and led the clans and guilds, gradually experienced a decline in influence among the Singapore Chinese. This coincided with a displacement by government of traditional associations in favour of the new parapolitical organizations. There was also a generational shift of influence in the 1950s, as a younger group of locally born Chinese, who were better educated and whose bases of support were the Chinese middle-schools and trade unions rather than the traditional associations, emerged. After the moderate leadership of the PAP gained ascendancy the more radical of the students’ and workers’ organizations were suppressed. The 1960s saw the construction of government-sponsored organizations, which are discussed in a later section of this chapter. They include Community Centres (CCs) formed in 1960, Management Committees (MCs) in 1963, Citizens’ Consultative Committees (CCCs) in 1965 and Residents’ Committees (RCs) in 1978. The process is summarized thus: At the more structural level, the vigorous promotion of government-sponsored grassroots organizations could be seen as the attempt by the government to organize, communicate and control its citizens, especially the substantially large proportion living in the newly created Housing and Development Board estates. (Tan, 1986:78) Cultural activities then became an important preoccupation of the traditional Chinese voluntary associations, in the process forging a link with Chinese heritage and culture. And when the PAP government began emphasizing a multiracial society and encouraging

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each ethnic group to maintain its traditions and its moral strength— while simultaneously promoting modernization and industrialization in the economic and technological spheres—the traditional organizations began to organize cultural and social activities such as Chinese self-defence arts, lion and dragon dances, and Chinese opera and music. This ran very much in parallel with the government’s emphasis on bilingualism in the 1960s, a policy which emphasized one’s ethnic language as the ‘mother tongue’, thus stimulating the recreation of ethnically delimited cultural traditions (Benjamin, 1976:120). Initially the Chinese associations had helped migrants recreate traditional institutions and secure a degree of political autonomy within their new environment: now their role was one of cultural preservation. By contrast, as will be seen, the Malay community’s activities were centred on religion, with few other organizations developing; and the Indian community’s organizations were mostly focused around the different temples. Historically the traditional leaders of Chinese voluntary associations had been important both in regulating their own communities and in forging links with the colonial authority. In the period of growth of parapolitical institutions, their role has been seen as one of continuing influence. Their transitional role has been noted by Chan Heng Chee. She points out that if a modernizing political elite is seeking radical change and wishes simultaneously to retain the loyalty of traditional and influential interest groups (Chan, 1976), the role of traditional leaders may be enhanced. To remove them too clumsily might act as a destabilizing factor, producing ‘displaced notables’: hence a preferred strategy may well be to utilize their contribution and in the process to forestall opposition. MALAY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION The role of intermediary structures in relations between the state and the Malays has been significant in several aspects of nation building in Singapore. First, the Malays are the largest minority in Singapore and have posed a significant challenge to the development of nationality. As much as social class is relevant to the theory of citizenship expressed by Marshall in Britain, the ethnic group has important implications for the conceptualization of citizenship in non-Western societies. Second, reference has been made to the contrasting views of the role of intermediary structures. While Nisbet favours the ‘invention’ of such structures to ameliorate the relationship of the individual to the state, Berger and Neuhaus (1977)

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argue that they should be spontaneous and a reflection of the ‘natural’ relations of the community; this too will be examined in the context of Malay organization. Third, comparison is made between the development of Malay voluntary associations and that of their Chinese counterparts in relation to the state’s response to them. The 1960s was a period of ethnic tension precipitated by political debate about the formation of the Malaysian Federation and Singapore’s position within the new polity. Singapore’s inclusion in Malaysia was strongly opposed by some Malay politicians in the dominant Malay political party on the mainland (see Turnbull, 1989a; Fletcher, 1969): the opposition was on the grounds that Chinese Singaporeans would dilute Malay political preeminence (Mutalib, 1990:45). In this context, the significance of ethnic politics at the time of merger needs to be underlined. On admission into the new federation, as has already been noted, the PAP government championed the idea of a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’. Because this implied that all ethnic groups were to be accorded equal political rights— including the significant Chinese population in Singapore—it was interpreted by the Malays as a threat to their political dominance. Much of the political activity of the period highlighted the position of the Malay minority in Singapore which, in identifying with the Malays on the mainland, had become a majority within the larger Federation. In this context, UMNO in Singapore and its link with the parent party in Malaysia took on a political significance it had not previously enjoyed. Two years after separation from Malaysia, Singapore UMNO was forced to break its ties with its parent organization and was renamed PEKEMAS (Singapore National Malays Organization). It ceased to be a political threat to the PAP, and ever since the state has taken the lead in initiating, if not circumscribing, the development of Malay community organization. One of the earliest initiatives was an umbrella organization of nonpolitical Malay organizations, the Central Council of Malay Cultural Organizations Singapore, or Majlis Pusat, formed in 1969 on the suggestion of a Malay MP from the PAP (Kassim, 1974:93–4). Majlis Pusat was constituted as a non-political body committed to organizing Malay resources and advancing the economic and educational progress of the Malays by co-operating with the government. This was the earliest attempt on the government’s part after separation from Malaysia to redefine the role of the Malays within the national framework of an independent Singapore, and it stood in contrast to the communal appeals of the now defunct UMNO. Another important initiative was to encourage the development of

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a small and informal group of English-educated, modern Malay intellectuals including high-ranking PAP members and civil servants who, because of their proximity to the locus of power and authority in Singapore, would come to play a critical role in articulating and facilitating the adjustments the Malay community must make in the face of rapid economic changes (Betts, 1975:266–7). Such a group of middle-class mediators, grounded in both traditional and modern cultures and institutions, was necessary to communicate the messages associated with economic progress to a community perceived as being handicapped by traditional values and obligations (Betts, 1975:312– 13). The identification of such mediators proved difficult in the 1970s, since there were few suitable or willing to play the role. Those that emerged were either Arab or Indian Muslims who could hardly claim to represent the Malay community (Betts, 1975:315). The few who could be found to be mediators experienced hostility and suspicion from the Malay community. As a consequence of government-initiated efforts in 1969 and 1970 to reorientate the values and identity of the Malay community, Malay awareness of the need for change was heightened (Betts, 1975:306–7). However, the government initiatives also created confusion and uncertainty as to what was demanded of the Malay community and how they should go about accommodating these demands. In particular, considerable frustration was felt over the absence of appropriate structures to effect the required changes. The other notable organization created by the government in 1968 was MUIS (Muslim Religious Council of Singapore). Partly to satisfy the demands of Muslim organizations and partly to bring around fifteen religious organizations under an umbrella structure, MUIS was created as the supreme body to regulate Muslim religious affairs (Kassim, 1974:48). There was considerable controversy over the question of its autonomy. When the Parliamentary Bill was passed in 1966 to set up the organization, it was provided that the President, Mufti (religious head of the Muslim community in Singapore) and Secretary were to be appointed by the government (Kassim, 1974:92). The significance of MUIS lies in its intermediary function between the state and the Muslim community. More importantly, the government through MUIS has an effective means of containing Malay extremism and religious fanaticism (Kassim, 1974:97). As noted earlier in the book, Benjamin argues that the state must generate a common cultural mode within which overarching concepts such as survival, meritocracy and multiracialism may be articulated in order to communicate effectively with the rest of the population.

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The government sought to assert the compatibility of Malay identity within a common national framework. One way in which this was done was through the government’s acceptance and promotion of the orthodox explanation of Malay economic backwardness in terms of their cultural values: the government has promoted the acceptance amongst the Malays of the ‘Malay cultural-weakness orthodoxy’, whereby the Malays are persuaded to see their own internal attributes as responsible for their socio-economic problems, instead of blaming the Chinese or the government. It is the lack of achievement motivation, or the rural orientation of Malays, which is, in this view, the cause of their ‘predicament’. (Brown, 1994:93) The history of the development of the ‘ideology’ of Malay backwardness has been well documented by Li (1989:166–77). The belief was perpetuated in part by the colonial administration in Malaya in the nineteenth century, which pursued a policy of discouraging rural Malays from participating in a modern capitalist economy so that they could continue in their traditional role of food producers (rice cultivation) for the expanding population in colonial society. In part, it was promoted by reform-minded Muslims and subsequently taken up by the Malay literary elite and voluntary associations in explaining the plight of the poor Malay. It has even been accepted by social scientists such as Bedlington (1974) and Betts (1975). The government’s rationale in its policy towards the Malays in Singapore is based on this assumption—the present economic predicament of the Malays is explained by their cultural orientation. To address the ‘problem’, runs the government’s diagnosis, the value-orientation of the Malay community must undergo a radical change. The most effective way to do this is not only mobilizing Malay middle-class mediators to spearhead the change and organizing conferences to create awareness in the community, but also to set up organizations specifically directed at improving the educational qualifications of the Malays. One such organization, and the most significant, is MENDAKI (The Council on Education of Muslim Children), formed in 1981 on the initiative of PAP Malay MPs who were alarmed by the poor performance of Malays in education and employment as revealed by the 1980 Population Census. In 1989, it was renamed Yayasan MENDAKI (The Council for the Development of Muslims in Singapore). While its objective, to

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improve the educational and economic performance of Muslims, has not changed, its new identity is a reflection of the greater organizational and financial resources it now has. At the end of 1990, a national convention of Malay Muslim professionals was held. It criticized the present system of leadership within the Malay-Muslim community on three grounds (Malays/ Muslims in 21st Century Singapore, 1990:59). First, leadership is imposed upon the community. Second, the system places too much power in MPs affiliated to one party; and third, the selection of Malay leaders has created a problem of lack of accountability to the community. The convention affirmed support for MENDAKI but wanted it depoliticized by minimizing the influence of government appointees and Malay PAP MPs in the organization (Malays/Muslims in 21st Century Singapore: 194–6). In the long run this would revitalize the organization by making it more representative of the community. The government’s use of the mass media (which it effectively controls) to instil a crisis of identity in the citizenry in order to mobilize awareness and muster support for its policies has been widely noted (for a recent account, see Birch, 1993). In recent years, there has been much public discussion on the question of Malay loyalty to the nation (Brown, 1994:102). The government accused the Malays of disloyalty for protesting against the visit of the Israeli President in 1986. The Prime Minister’s speech on National Day in 1987 asserted that Malays were not fully participating in Singapore society. A speech by Minister (BG) Lee in the same year openly discussed and justified restrictions on Malay recruitment into the Armed Forces, an assertion which provoked considerable controversy. In 1988, the Deputy Prime Minister alleged that Malays had failed to support the PAP in the 1988 election. In all these instances, it may be surmised, the government’s intention was to provoke the Malays to re-examine their position in Singapore society (a fuller discussion is found in Leifer, 1988). In contrast to the government strategy in dealing with voluntary associations in the Chinese community, the articulation of ethnic issues in the Malay community has been institutionalized (Brown, 1994:100). Two reasons have been suggested for this (Betts, 1975:322–4). First, the government is especially sensitive to Malay communalism and its critical importance to the fulfilment of multiracialism on Singapore’s route to nationhood. Second, the idea of a Malay community was a new phenomena for Singapore Malays. Unlike the Chinese clan and other voluntary associations, the Malays

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had no tradition of community organization; indeed, there were few precedents for dealing with such an organization. However, the state, by institutionalizing Malay participation at the intermediate level, may facilitate the development of ethnic consciousness within the Malay community. In the case of the Chinese community, the state has made no attempt to institutionalize the participation of voluntary associations despite its fear that such organizations have been and are potential sources of Chinese chauvinism. In the 1950s, the influential Hokkien Huay Kuan, a dialect-based association which represented a significant proportion of Hokkien-speaking Chinese on the island, was at the forefront in championing the cause of Chinese language and education (Borthwick, 1988:45–6). It strongly supported the establishment of a Chinese-medium Nanyang University, which became the only tertiary institution serving Chinese-educated students who had completed secondary education in Singapore and the peninsula. Prior to the setting up of this university the only other avenue for these students seeking tertiary education was in universities in China. Nanyang University consequently became the centre of Chinese education in Malaya and later Singapore. The government avoided direct confrontation with these associations partly because of their influence within the Chinese community, which represented a majority of the Singaporean population. Instead they chose to gradually minimize their influence. Many of these associations have suffered declining membership and are run by elderly Chinese: the younger generation has not been attracted to them. The setting up of the Community Centres, Citizens’ Consultative Committees and Residents’ Committees in housing estates has not only had the effect of siphoning off young and able Chinese into their management but also has resulted in the co-optation of leaders in the traditional Chinese associations to serve as office-bearers. More recently, the government has shown some interest in revitalizing the clan associations. The Second Deputy Prime Minister spoke on the relevance of clans in modern Singapore (Ong, 1990:44– 5). They could be used to preserve and promote traditional values among the young Chinese Singaporeans as part of the policy of putting up bulwarks—or ‘cultural ballast’—against excessive Westernization and individualism, which the leaders have perceived as an unhealthy development. He also drew attention to the importance of contacts with clan association in other parts of the world for the purpose of economic co-operation.

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ETHNIC COMMUNITIES AND CITIZENSHIP This discussion of the role of ethnically based voluntary associations as intermediary structures, and of the state’s response to them, has important implications for the theory of citizenship. The principle of individual conscience and freedom is a necessary feature of citizenship in liberal political theory, because citizenship deals with the rights of individuals in relation to the state. As part of this theory, individuals, as citizens, are right-bearing and duty-bearing units. However, Van Dyke (1977:343) has maintained that it is not sufficient to regard citizenship only at the level of the individual. Ethnic communities and other groups may be viewed as right-and duty-bearing units whose relationship with the state requires exploration. Van Dyke argues the case for regarding such groups as citizens: Ethnic communities are sometimes treated as political units within countries, both through territorial delimitations and through the use of separate electoral rolls. Thus, communities as units are accorded representation in the various branches of government. Different communities sometimes live under different sets of laws—for instance, in the field of family law. It is not at all uncommon for ethnic communities to operate their own school systems, with tax support. Ethnic communities in many countries are differentially treated with respect to rights of property and residence; it is not only a question of territorial reservations for the indigenous but also a question of special measures designed to make it possible for the communities to preserve their distinctive identity. And in the case of less advanced groups or of groups that have suffered discrimination, it is now not uncommon to give them a right to expect special measures (affirmative action) designed to promote their equality eg. in the economic and educational realms. (Van Dyke, 1977:351) Singapore society is replete with examples of this. Malay family practices such as marriage and divorce are regulated by Muslim law as distinct from laws governing non-Malays. It is government policy to allocate accommodation in HDB estates on the principle that it reflects the ethnic composition of the population as a whole, and concern has been expressed by government ministers about developing concentrations of particular ethnic groups, labelling them as ‘new disturbing trends’ (Dhanabalan, 1989:5). Malay students,

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until recently, enjoyed free education up to tertiary level. Statesponsored educational foundations have been established for both the Malay and Indian Communities to improve the performance of their pupils in schools. In 1988, the Group Representative Constituency (GRC) system—briefly described above—was introduced. Several constituencies were regrouped into a larger constituency within which three candidates were fielded as a team. One reason for the new system was to ensure minority representation: hence the team must have representatives from each of the three major ethnic communities (Cheng, 1989). The case for supporting Van Dyke’s contention that citizenship should recognize the rights not only of individuals but also of ethnic communities is arguably a convincing one. It has already been clearly articulated in one of the more influential recent discussions of citizenship: Any further development of the theory of citizenship will have to deal more fundamentally with societies in which the struggle over citizenship necessarily involves problems of national identity and state-formation in a context of multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism. (Turner, 1990:212) Recognizing ethnic communities as de facto ‘citizens’ is already practised in some societies such as Singapore but it is not without problems. One of them is that since citizenship institutionalizes social expectations which cannot be met by the state, claims on full citizenship entitlements may create political dissent (Turner, 1991:217)—this is appropriately incorporated within our Return to Sender logic. Ethnic minorities which find themselves disadvantaged in society may appeal to citizenship rights to draw attention to their plight and consequently to seek redress. The Malay community is unable at present to do this because it has often been reminded by government leaders of its less than satisfactory participation in Singapore society. A comparative situation might be cited which illustrates the point made by Turner about the importance of wartime conflict in expanding citizenship rights (Turner, 1986:69): the Maori minority in New Zealand has been able to wrest some concessions from the state after the Second World War because the participation and bravery of soldiers drawn from that ethnic group in the war effort was impressive and respected by European New Zealanders (Lian, 1990:88–9). The institutionalization of the rights of cultural

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communities in some form of collective citizenship creates serious problems for liberal theory, which argues from the primacy of individual and individual rights. For this reason liberal theory is concerned to avoid entrenching majorities or creating permanent minorities, and prefers to view cultural communities as private associations where individuals are free to leave or join (Kukathas, 1992:114–17). When groups perceive themselves as being unable to gain a stake in society, the possibility of citizenship becoming an exclusive rather than an inclusive status is increased (Dahrendorf, 1987:13). In other words, some are full citizens while others are not. Such a society, Dahrendorf warns, may become defensive and closed. In a society with a buoyant economy like that of Singapore, the discourse on citizenship has been of an inclusive nature. It revolves around a debate concerning the improvements and refinements which can potentially be made by the state with regard to the environment, educational, recreational and cultural facilities and their accessibility to Singaporeans of various income levels. More recently, a debate has begun (aspects of which we have already noted) over whether or not Singapore should have a dual citizenship system (ST, 8.7.91). The ethnic voluntary associations discussed above can be typified as spontaneous mediating structures. They arose out of a common experience of colonial administration, sometimes combined with migration, and were not called into existence by the state, even though it might on occasion co-opt them to provide social control functions. By contrast, the organizations discussed in the next section of the chapter are of Nisbet’s ‘creationist’ type. They were designed—or modified from existing structures—by the PAP government for the explicit purposes of facilitating political communication and maintaining social control; and if their effectiveness diminished they were superceded by other, more streamlined structures. As part of the process of nation building in Singapore, parapolitical institutions have played a key role in the construction of new forms of community. PARAPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS Turning now to the development of parapolitical institutions, their important role in political consolidation may be identified. Such consolidation has been achieved principally through the government’s successful economic management, but accompanying this has been a policy of ‘controlled mobilization and participation’ (Seah, 1985:173). In the initial years of independence the political

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elite faced the task of generating a common identity and political community within a heterogeneous population. Controlled mobilization was seen to be an important part of the solution: Basically this involved the creation of various intermediary institutions which sought to absorb the participatory talents of the people, directing them to different aspects of the government’s socio-political and development programmes. (Seah, 1985:174) Linkage between citizens and the government is channelled through the parapolitical institutions, but they also serve to provide associational networks for individuals at a local level: this has formed an especially important component of the government’s housing policy. Part of the rationale behind the creation of parapolitical institutions was to facilitate two-way communication between citizens and the government. The fact that parapolitical institutions were established to perform this function rather than utilizing party institutions or available bureaucratic agencies arose from a combination of expediency and acceptability. The use of party organization would have alienated a substantial number of people with little interest in organized political activity—to which should be added the fact that political intimidation had been very much a feature of radical activity in the 1950s (Lee Kuan Yew, 1980:7). Nor was the deployment of government bureaucracy a promising option, because even if the popular dislike of red tape could have been surmounted, the organizations were themselves in a state of major restructuring and thus ill-prepared to expand their activities. ‘Institutions which were not part of the formal bureaucracy and which were sufficiently flexible were thus ideal’ (Seah, 1985:176). This was especially the case when traditional leaders could be coopted into the organizations: it was a feature of the grassroots organizations which were set up that leadership was to be achieved through politically organized selection rather than by popular vote. The three most important parapolitical institutions, or as they are more popularly known, grassroots organizations, are the Community Centres (CCs), which are coordinated by the People’s Association (PA), the Citizens’ Consultative Committees (CCCs) and the Residents’ Committees (RCs). These bodies come under the practical control of the Prime Minister’s Office, which is involved in the process of selection and appointment of members. The creation and constant revision of government-sponsored grassroots organizations

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is a singular feature of the political system in Singapore, and has been seen as one of the conditions of the PAP government’s long political dominance. In terms of the ‘reflexive monitoring’ which Giddens (1985:206) understands as characterizing the modern state, the parapolitical organizations provide a ‘sensory system in the body politic’ (Chan, 1989:81) which encourages and structures grievances through effective channels of influence (Bellows, 1970:101). It is an important political consequence of the institutionalization of this system that representatives of opposition political parties are at a clear disadvantage in advancing their policies, since they do not have access to the same set of intermediary institutions. Chronologically the Community Centres came first, being formally structured in 1960. As will be seen, they filled a most important political vacuum in the early 1960s when, after a split in the PAP, it was impossible to rebuild party organization quickly enough to play an effective political role. Instead, the moderate PAP leadership deployed Community Centres as a mode of disseminating information and consolidating their influence at a grassroots level: this experience undoubtedly contributed to the subsequent extension of parapolitical institutions. COMMUNITY CENTRES Until 1959 the Community Centres, which had begun under colonial administration, played a somewhat marginal role in Singapore society, and were little more than recreational centres (Seah, 1973). Some were independent and managed by local committees while others were supervised by the Social Welfare Department. As in the case of other public policy, such as that on housing and pensions, the Community Centres developed out of an initiative begun under colonial administration. Their roots went back to the emergency food centres set up by the Military Adminstration in the months after the Japanese surrender. It was not until the PAP won the 1959 election that the political potential of Community Centres was realized: the government saw that under its control they could be employed as agents of socialization, imparting values that would assist in nation building and lead to the emergence of an integrated political community. They could also be seen as a way of consolidating PAP power by extending the party’s influence to the poorer sections of the population; and indeed, the CCs played a key role in maintaining political stability and PAP survival, especially during the period 1961–3 when the PAP was split and the moderate leadership faced the challenge of the Barisan Sosialis, which

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was dominant among Peoples’ Association and Community Centre organizers. So the PAP government has used these institutions to disseminate the values it considers important in the nation building process and, in effectively excluding rival political parties from influence over these institutions, has monopolized the potential political space. The People’s Association Ordinance was enacted in 1960. The stated purpose of the Association was the organization and promotion of group participation in social, cultural, educational and athletic activities to foster a sense of national identification and multiracial solidarity, as well as to provide leadership training. The implementation of these goals was entrusted to the CCs: It would be the task of the community centres, under the People’s Association umbrella, to ensure the survival of a non-communist state by providing the necessary ‘bridge’ between government and masses. The hangers, trusses and decks of this bridge would be made up of civil servants and party cadres. (Lee Kuan Yew, 1980:33) The political organization of the PAP was particularly weak in rural areas and in order to counter left-wing activity the CCs were to project government perspectives. This should be seen against the background of the loss to the PAP of a majority of constituency committees to the Barisan Sosialis faction which defected, with resulting high percentages of blank votes in the merger referendum of 1962, and the targeting of CCs to those constituencies which were most disaffected (Clutterbuck, 1984:322–3). The PA growth spurt began after internal party divisions were resolved in 1963. The PAP branch kindergartens and CC kindergartens diverted lower income groups from left-wing propaganda by providing services and facilities which were needed by, and therefore popular with, the population. Formal control is exerted by the political leadership appointing its own nominees to these organizations, and by liaison at the local level between the constituency MP and the CC since the MP acts as adviser and is involved in the periodic screening of committee members. In addition a sizeable proportion of paid CC staff have links with the PAP. The principal roles of the CCs have been to disseminate information to the people about government policies and to provide feedback on local feelings by means of which the government could assess local support. Political communication was thus one of their vital functions, and with the goal of expanding the CCs role in this Community Centre Management Committees (CCMCs) were

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established in 1964. Committee members were nominated by politicians and their political suitability was assessed before they were appointed: Generally, the bulk of these members were Chinese-educated businessmen or petty merchants. Many of them too were involved simultaneously in many other clan and civic organizations. (Seah, 1985:179) CITIZENS’ CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES The Citizens’ Consultative Committees (CCCs) were set up in 1965, and were part of a similar initiative to develop structures within which informal leaders could be identified and cultivated. More specifically, they were seen as a mechanism for speeding up the handling of minor grievances, and were consciously modelled on a precedent established during the Japanese wartime occupation, when village councils had been formed to maintain order and to keep the Japanese administration informed of grassroots activities. The urgency of setting up mechanisms for dealing with complaints at the community level was underscored by intercommunal riots in 1964, after which the government sought the help of local informal leaders in the effort to establish communal harmony. The rules of these committees highlight their two-way communication function—transmitting information and recommendations about peoples’ needs to the government while keeping people informed about government responses—together with the promotion of ‘good citizenship among the people of Singapore’ (Seah, 1985:183). A further practical task of the CCCs is to set up working committees to organize activities for such events as National Day. Every constituency has a CCC and membership is through nomination by the constituency MP, through proximity with whom committee members have some involvement in the wider political process: The Government leaders publicized and presented this new creation as a desire on their part to enlarge citizenship participation in the governance of the country, and a step towards the institutionalization of democratic government. (Chan, 1976:136) Government Minister Rajaratnam encapsulated the perceived role of these committees in the phrase ‘local parliaments’ (Chan, 1976:137).

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RESIDENTS’ COMMITTEES Yet another example of the Singapore government’s institutionalization of parapolitical structures is provided by the introduction of Residents’ Committees (RCs) in 1978. To some extent RCs were introduced because of the perceived failure of the CCs to generate sufficient local activism, and are part of the pragmatic response of government to the maintenance of communication flows through grassroots organizations. Moreover, as a result of the mobility which housing policy had introduced, many CCC members did not live in the areas they were serving and this was seen to limit the effectiveness of these bodies: a new, local form of grassroots organization was required (Seah, 1985:187–8). Each block of public housing was divided into zones and each zone was given a committee responsible for 500–2,000 housing units (Chan, 1989:81): MPs were to liaise with these and they were also to select suitable people to sit on them. It was proposed that senior bureaucrats should also have to participate in the operation of these committees in order to generate greater responsiveness in their dealings with the public (Seah, 1985:187). At their inception, the RCs were seen by the political elite as an important experiment in grass roots participatory democracy. In the words of a senior Minister: It will help shape a more cohesive society of mass participation for mutual benefit and the healthy growth of our state…. Our nation cannot survive if the 2.3 million live in separate worlds of their own. (quoted in Seah, 1985:187) RCs have been widely regarded as a successful form of parapolitical organization. They deal with issues which directly impinge on the everyday lives of residents in the Housing and Development Board blocks, and as is shown in the chapter on housing, such environments can serve important functions in generating new form of communal networks—even for those who might otherwise be politically apathetic. The overall integration of community organizations into the security and policing of housing areas is noted elsewhere (page 128), but an important function of the introduction of RCs has been to facilitate social control at the local level without exclusive recourse to such state agencies as the police. Thus although formal policing is highly ‘Visible’ in the sense that Neighbourhood Police Units are located on the ground floors of high-rise housing blocks, giving the

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police direct involvement in the residents’ daily lives, many of the interpersonal disputes in which they might become involved either never reach them—because they have been the subject of RC intervention—or are referred to RCs for solution (Austin, 1989:921). This is a further illustration of the way in which individual and community security have merged. The argument has been made that citizenship in Singapore is conceived as a citizenship of practice, and here the role of the RCs in encouraging the growth of participatory democracy has been noted. Involvement in political activity requires the acquisition of a certain level of competence, and this in turn requires a degree of practice. Here the role of the RCs has been highlighted, because: it is the RCs which provide the best training ground for people to acquire the skills necessary for a participatory democracy as they were established in 1978 with the main object of providing ‘a better channel for communication between residents and the various authorities to obtain feedback information and find solutions to the problems of the residents living in the housing estates’. (Quah and Quah, 1989:121) TOWN COUNCILS One further example of the government’s ongoing concern to maintain communication flow and influence at a local level is the Town Councils (TC) scheme which was proposed in 1985 and first piloted in 1986. When first proposed, the TCs were officially perceived as: the institutions established to ensure that both public housing residents and their MPs are now held to account for the way in which HDB estates are run. The councils have promised the residents participation in the management of their estates. Thus Town Councils are going to be judged not only on their performance in estate management but also on their ability to involve the public housing residents in the running of their estates. (Ooi, 1990:5) Hence the scheme was presented as means of starting a dialogue with the people and encouraging participation in decision making, especially over the shape of their local environment. As in other parapolitical structures, Town Councillors are selected from grassroots leaders by

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MPs, which results in the involvement of a small proportion of HDB residents. In effect, suggests Ooi, the TCs are scaled-down versions of the HDB estate management offices, but with an important element of politicized devolution: ‘Retribution for the wrong choice of MP is to come in the form of mismanagement of the estates by Town Councils and funds allocated to those councils’ (Ooi, 1990:7). Because TCs rely on grassroots leadership and because their introduction was motivated by political concerns, the management of public housing estates has been overtly politicized, with the result that managers need to be responsive to the concerns of residents (Ooi, 1990:34). Choice of MP was made more intricate in 1988 with the introduction of Group Representative Constituencies—the Team MPs’ system. These are mergers usually of three constituencies into one large constituency associated with a TC in which at election time three or four candidates run as a team. One of the arguments put forward by the government in support of this system was that it would ensure the future representation of ethnic minorities who might otherwise find it difficult to have candidates elected in predominantly Chinese constituencies. The ethnic component of the system—which is a further extension of the government’s overriding policy of multiracialism—can be interpreted as ‘the politics of anticipation’. Any future ethnic revival—perhaps following an economic downturn—would be contained by this institutionalized channel of ethnic representation (Cheng, 1989:39). The other supporting argument was that Team MPs were expected to be in charge of the administration of TCs, so that the system would encourage the election of responsible representatives (Chan, 1989:86). The political advantage to the PAP is that it is difficult for opposition parties to field a slate of capable candidates representing different ethnic groups: given the management role of MPs in the TCs this is an immediate consideration for voters. This was demonstrated in the parliamentary by-election of December 1992 when J.B.Jeyaratnam’s Workers’ Party failed to nominate a slate of candidates on nomination day, supposedly because one of their candidates had failed to show up (Vasil 1993:302). The claim to a monopoly of expertise has been a consistent political strategy of the PAP; and in the 1988 general election, for example, a major theme of PAP candidates—and especially of government ministers—was the need for expertise in running the TCs and the availability of back-up and resources from the elected MPs’ political party. The argument was underlined further when it was pointed out that funds and HDB assistance to TCs would depend on these bodies showing financial competence. Arguably, this insistence on technical expertise—coupled with the frequent emphasis on meritocracy—has

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transmuted MPs into bureaucrats, as post-electoral media analysis in 1991 tended to suggest. For instance, one senior journalist called for ‘political talent of the more traditional kind’, adding: Those who seek political office need a will to win. Or the tedium of tending the ground—whether it is managing the side-effects of sound economic and social policies or setting aside time for idle chatter with a constituent—might prove unpalatable. Especially for the talented with other pastures to graze in opportunity-filled Singapore.’ (ST, 4.9.91) In support of the TC concept another commentator cited John Naisbitt’s book Megatrends (1982), in which it is suggested that two trends are likely to change patterns of social life in the future. One was the evolution of participatory democracy out of representative democracy; and the other was the switch from institutionalized help to self-help. Such a scenario has much in common with the argument of Berger and Neuhaus in relation to the role of mediating structures. In both of these trends TCs were seen to be a significant development, facilitating the growth of ‘bottom-up’ decision making (ST, 25.3.85). ROLE OF PARAPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS What is strikingly evident in the above account is the close relationship between these parapolitical organizations and the PAP; indeed, some of the earlier structures like CCs and CCCs were designed in part as a mechanism for recruiting talented individuals to the PAP. This carries definite advantages for the Party in the political process because with the involvement of local informal leaders in government sponsored institutions, it is difficult for opposition parties to extend their base of support or to develop links with groups which are potentially sympathetic. Thus parapolitical institutions have performed a vital ancillary role in political communication and brokerage between the masses and the government (and administration)…With these institutions the PAP is thus spared from having to bear the brunt of the consolidation exercise at the constituency level. (Seah, 1985:192) Partly as a result of this, the PAP does not have a highly developed party bureaucracy. It does not need such organization; and indeed it

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avoids it because elsewhere—Malaysia being a notable example— party organizations have shown a tendency to develop a relative degree of autonomy and to slip out of the control of the political leadership. Instead, the PAP is able to rely on the impressive variety of grassroots ancillary organizations with which it has close links. Indeed, the party’s only direct link to the populace is through the MPs, who are carefully selected and firmly disciplined. Above all, the political system is maintained by a constant flow of information and communication, much of it in the form of feedback from grassroots organizations. In this respect the Singapore state closely resembles Durkheim’s account: Because there is a constant flow of communication between themselves and the State, the State is for individuals no longer like an exterior force that imparts a wholly mechanical impetus to them. Owing to constant exchanges between them and the State, its life becomes linked with theirs, just as their life does with that of the State. (Durkheim, 1957:91) The grassroots structures institutionalized by the PAP government play a central role in ensuring the two-way flow of quality information. For this reason there is constant reference by government ministers to the qualities of grassroots leadership and significant media coverage of consultations with grassroots representatives. Two illustrations in the immediate aftermath of the September 1991 general election will suffice to confirm this statement. On October 4, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew addressed the CCC National Tribute Dinner and used the occasion to make a major speech on grassroots organizations, especially in the early and turbulent history of Singapore’s emergence as an independent state: The strength of grass roots organizations has always been a critical factor in Singapore’s success. They helped establish rapport between political leaders and the people, and helped to forge the consensus that endured from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. These grassroots links were first forged in the heat of political battles from 1961 to 1965, when we were evicted from Malaysia. In 1961, the communists broke with the PAP and formed Barisan Sosialis. There was open conflict with the CPM United Front organizations, Barisan Sosialis, Satu (the trade unions), the

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Chinese school old boys’ associations, the Rural Dwellers’ Association and cultural associations. It was a life and death struggle, which those not old enough will never fully appreciate. To counter the communists, I went on tour to every part of the island. In the process, I was able to identify grassroots leaders who gradually but bravely came out in this crisis to make their stand. (ST, 5.10.91) The challenge of the 1990s, he went on, was to encourage new grassroots leaders to come forward and to strengthen bonds with the people, though probably no more than 30 per cent of the younger educated people would have the interpersonal and managerial skills needed. A second illustration of the role played by grassroots leaders can be found later in the same month. In response to widespread controversy about a new charging system for telephone calls, a meeting was convened by the Feedback Unit of the Ministry of Community Development between these leaders and the Communications Minister at which concerns about the resulting social and familial problems were raised: difficulty in maintaining contact with family and friends and disputes over excessive use were mentioned. A prominent theme raised at the meeting was the need for the PAP leaders to listen to the people if they did not want to lose more parliamentary seats to the opposition in future elections—this was a reference to the election of four opposition MPs in 1991, which was unprecedented since PAP hegemony was secured in 1968 (ST, 20.10.91). Shortly afterwards the Prime Minister, then attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Zimbabwe, issued a statement suggesting a possible modification of the charging system if within six months it was not working, and this was given prominent coverage in the local media (ST, 25.10.91). Furthermore, on his return to Singapore, a meeting of grassroots leaders which the PM attended called on the government to give them more information in order that they could be in a position to explain its policies more fully. This incident underscores the observation that organizations of a parapolitical nature are empowered to take initiatives in response to government policy, and that such initiatives may result in rapid response and policy modification. Even in a state governed by a hegemonic political party, the Return to Sender logic results in continual negotiation between government and citizens. Such a process is a corrective to the image of the state as a monolithic bloc (Rosa, 1990:499). On the basis of such evidence, it is clear that the range of parapolitical organizations, of which only three have been examined in detail in this chapter, do provide a mechanism whereby the demands of citizens can

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be channelled to government and the intentions of government disseminated to those who are active at a local community level. To this extent they operate as mediating structures of the type envisaged by Nisbet (1986:147): they are ‘social inventions’ created by government for communication and consensus building. But partly because they are closely identified with the PAP their effectiveness has been limited. Thus Tan, for instance, would not see them as the prime means of mediating between the individual and the state. Specifically opposing the argument of Nisbet that freedom lay in multiplying the range of voluntary associations, he argues: my interpretation of a new genre of voluntary associations, which is locality-based and externally induced is radically different. In the Singapore context, voluntary associations can become part of the spiral network that supports the government. In other words, voluntary associations need not be seen only as freely organized and spontaneously generated intermediatory associations, but as ‘artificially’ created and externally controlled associations. (Tan, 1986:82) The type of mediating structure which Berger and Neuhaus seek to have recognized in and protected by public policy is the spontaneously generated voluntary association of de Tocqueville, and their argument is based on a perception that the bureaucratic structures of central government have invaded and pre-empted such voluntaristic organization. The context in which their critique of liberalism is set is the contemporary United States, where the liberal-individualist model defines citizenship in terms of a status conferring rights (Marquand, 1991:337). Citizens are rights-bearing units, and the purpose of legal and bureaucratic intervention in the activities of mediating structures is to secure the rights of those claiming the state’s recognition and protection. This is observed in the area of alleged discrimination against minority groups: The careless expansion of antidiscrimination rulings in order to appease every aggrieved minority or individual will have two certain consequences: first, it will further erode local communal authority and, second, it will trivialize the historic grievances and claims to justice of America’s racial minorities. (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977:12) Though Nisbet’s critique derives from the same classical roots, his ‘creationist’ option is more concerned to emphasize the nature of

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mediating structures as social inventions. In both critiques the perceived dilemma is the expansionary logic of the liberalindividualist model of citizenship. By contrast, the civic-republican conception of citizenship, which has been proposed as a more appropriate frame for an interpretation of Singapore’s process of nation building, has a more austere style: In it, citizenship is a practice, not a status; active, not passive; public not private…the practice of citizenship takes place, and can only take place, in the public realm: virtue is civic virtue. (Marquand, 1991:338) In this chapter it has been shown that parapolitical institutions—the invented and reinvented mediating structures which the PAP government has inserted into the social structure—are based precisely on this notion of the practice of civic virtue. Through responsible participation in various levels of community activity, the members of such organizations learn to take part in the active performance of civic duties. Citizenship in the civic-republican tradition is not natural and has to be absorbed through practice: moreover, the motivation to engage in civic duties may diminish—Marquand (1991:339) here points to ‘the possessive hedonism which lies at the heart of the free-market model of man and society’—and must be constantly reinvigorated. The resonance of this model with the PAP’s conception of citizenship is unmistakable. The constant exhortations to work as a team and the government’s commitment to ‘the politics of maintenance’ (Leifer, 1990) exemplify the inherent pessimism (or realism) of the civic-republican assessment of citizens’ regressive tendencies. Parapolitical institutions have been the PAP’s method of providing a structured location for the training of civic skills. The government recognizes the association in the public perception between parapolitical organizations and the hegemonic party system. It recognizes too that with the growth of a highly educated and sophisticated population, communication channels other than those based primarily on locality—the media, literature and drama, for example—are increasingly important. In response, the government has opened a debate on the nature of civil (or, as it seeks to encode it, civic) society, and has signalled an intention to allow more spontaneous social inventions. As was demonstrated in this chapter, historically the most important spontaneously generated mediating structures were ethnically based associations, and it will be evident in Chapter 9 that this is an area of renewed activity in the

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1990s. In tacit acknowledgement that parapolitical institutions can fill effectively only part of the social space between individual citizens and the state, the government has responded positively to the growth of new voluntary associations, some of them ethnically based, while ensuring that they operate within the general parameters laid down by the state. The overall agenda has been variously described by government ministers as ‘providing more space’ or developing a ‘more rounded personality’ (Yeo, 1991:84; Vasil, 1993:297–8). In Chapter 9 this recent process of opening up more spontaneous and participatory styles of social organization is examined in depth.

8 From the ideology of pragmatism to shared values

One of the central tenets of PAP policy, as has already been shown, is bilingualism. As this policy developed the lingua franca adopted was English—‘rationalized entirely on the basis of its utility for science, technology and commerce’ (Chua, 1985:35)—together with a ‘mother tongue’ of either Mandarin, Malay, or Tamil, depending on the ethnic category to which an individual was assigned. The mother tongue was expected to act as an agent for the transmission of ‘Asian values’—cultural values which, it was argued, would counterbalance undesirable Western ones. The materialism and individualism which were allegedly imported through the use of English and the adoption of Western technology were to be checked by the learning of a language appropriate to one’s ethnic group: in this strong sense it is possible to speak of language ‘not as a vehicle but as the embodiment of culture’ (Gopinathan, 1988:137). In the words of one proponent: Bilingualism will serve to inoculate our young people against the epidemic of unwholesome fads and fetishes and make them understand that they are they, and we are ourselves. (quoted in Clammer, 1981a: 233) It is important to note at this point that the policy of bilingualism and the later search for Asian values began with the goal of ‘inoculation’ and subsequently developed into a search for an ideology to legitimate social discipline and an exploration of substitutes for the Protestant ethic. The unwholesome Western elements—which had been identified from the 1960s onwards—had from the mid-1970s acquired a symbolic focus in the image of the long-haired hippie, embodying the philosophy of ‘patched-up jeans and patched-up souls’ (Gopinathan, 188

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1988:134). The desired cultural values increasingly came to be labelled ‘Asian values’ and were claimed to include such traits as thrift, industry, and filial piety. Whether there existed in a readily identifiable form a set of values that could be seen as distinctly ‘Asian’ was a matter of debate even among senior government Ministers (Chua, 1985:35) and the polarized conception of a set of desirable Asian values confronting the decadent lure of those imported from the West has attracted critical comment (Clammer, 1993; Ho, 1989:687–88). Nevertheless, attempts to articulate such values continued throughout the latter part of the 1970s and became a major project during the 1980s. It will be the task of this chapter to trace the progress of this construction of values into a principal component of the nation building exercise, and to show how some of the consequences of this emphasis exemplify the ‘Return to Sender’ logic which has been proposed as a key feature of contemporary state-society relationships. During the 1960s, a decade dominated by the trauma of separation from Malaysia and the exigencies of the early period of independence, the stance of the political elite was overwhelmingly pragmatic. When reference was made to values, it was to values of an economic kind, as Lee Kuan Yew is quoted as emphasizing: And by ‘right values’ I mean the values that will ensure you a reasonably secure, a relatively high standard of living which demands a disciplined community prepared to give of its best and ready to pay for what it wants. (quoted in Tamney, 1988:111) So marked did the pragmatic orientation become that by the early 1970s analysts could speak of an ‘ideology of pragmatism’ and could identify this as an alternative—albeit the only viable one—to the regressive identity espoused by more traditional political regimes in the region or to the progressive identity which was sought by socialist and communist regimes as part of the nation building process (Chan and Evers, 1973). If the ideology required legitimization this was readily available in the ‘survival’ motif, which was given strong reinforcement by the British decision in 1967 to withdraw its military forces: The PAP government thereafter adopted policies designed to organize the population into a tautly controlled, efficient, and achievement-oriented society. The new ‘politics of survival’ (the government’s own phrase) envisaged the mobilization of a ‘rugged

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society,’ innovative and technological in outlook: ‘What is required,’ wrote the PAP leader, ‘is a rugged, resolute, highlytrained, highly-disciplined community.’ (Bedlington, 1978:211) By 1970 Goh Keng Swee, one of the principal agents of Singapore’s economic and social transformation, augmented the survival motif with that of success and pointed to a ‘decade of achievement’ (Goh, 1970). In doing so, he introduced a theme which provided further legitimization for the effective application of purposive rational policies, to which the next section of the chapter devotes attention. However, one of the issues which was to become central to the subsequent values debate was also noted in the early 1970s: The decisive question is, of course, whether a nonideological national identity is viable over a long period of time and what political forms will be attached to it in the long run. (Chan and Evers, 1973:304–5) THE IDEOLOGY OF PRAGMATISM AND INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY The logic of the PAP’s pragmatism in the area of social engineering, which has been evident from the beginning of the PAP’s control over the Singapore political system in the 1960s, embodies the classic features of Weber’s category of Zweckrational—instrumentally rational—action that is, determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; the expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends. (Weber, 1978:24) The expectation of actor rationality is evident in all spheres of economic, social and political activity, and especially prominent in government decision-making in the economic sphere, where policies are articulated on the principle that persons affected by them will respond in a calculating and predictable manner. Two examples of this instrumental rationality will serve as illustrations. First, after outlining changes to trade union legislation in the late 1960s which made dismissal from employment a strictly

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employer and management function excluding employees and unions, the Minister for Labour justified this provision on the grounds that under conditions of full employment—one of the stated objectives of the legislation—employers would be deterred from dismissing valuable employees. As Vasil observes, ‘Obviously the Minister considered employers to be totally rational beings’ (Vasil, 1989:159). A second example would be the government’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach which explicitly ties electoral choice to housing improvements: thus opposition constituencies are warned that they can expect less favourable maintenance services, a policy justified by the housing minister in the following statement: This is a very practical political decision…. It’s fair from our party point of view that we should give priority to the constituencies with PAP MPs and give lower priority to opposition MPs.… But they will not be denied the service. (ST, 22.3.85, quoted in Castells et al., 1990:324) Of course, political considerations of this kind are common in other democratic states; the point is that in Singapore they are openly articulated as variables in a rational decision-making process. The clearest depiction of the rational basis of political action is that of Chan and Evers in their 1973 account, briefly introduced above. It is both comprehensive and succinct, and is worth quoting at length: The pragmatism to which the national identity refers is one of purposive rational action, one of means-end calculation, one of technology and science. Citizens are admonished to identify with the economic success of the state which demonstrates that the correct policies have been applied. As these policies are not based on an explicitly stated ideology nor even on purely political considerations, but on rational and scientific principles, any criticism of these policies can be branded as irrational. The prestige of science and technology is thus used to buttress not only the day to day policies but also the social and political system resulting from such policies, because leaders will ask if such a system is not derived from the very principles of scientific and rational action. The supremacy of this pragmatic identity or technocratic consciousness can thus be used to legitimize tight political control and eventually an authoritarian political system. (Chan and Evers, 1973:317) Nor is the operation of instrumental rationality restricted to the ‘public’ sphere, since it extends into areas of life which are claimed in a number

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of other societies to represent the private (Chua, 1985:36–7). Again, there are comparisons with developments in Western societies, where the boundaries between public and private worlds have been perceived as strongly contested. The claim that the agencies of the state have intruded their instrumental control into areas of private concern has been made by such critics as Habermas (1987) and Offe (1984). The contribution of their analysis to the recent debate over civil society will be given further attention in the next chapter. However, social policy in Singapore is especially characterized by the extent to which the state intervenes in areas elsewhere deemed private. The introduction of a policy of rewards and disincentives to encourage differential fertility behaviour is an example, in this case one which aroused considerable opposition (Pang et al, 1989:137; Yap, 1989:463–4). Another example is the state’s encouragement of marriage as the basis of a stable society which has seen the growth of a number of official agencies to facilitate matchmaking, including the Social Development Unit which encourages marriage between graduates, the Social Development Section catering for less-educated people, and the Family Services Unit of the SAP (South China Morning Post, 29.9.92). A principal component of the instrumental rationality underlying the ideology of pragmatism is a well-articulated notion of ‘spheres of competence’ and of rule by experts. For example, these principles have been clearly stated in Lee Kuan Yew’s strictures on academic freedom which, he argues, is founded upon three principles: First, that the teacher was a technical expert in his field. Second, that his search for truth and knowledge was disinterested. Third, that teachers in a university did not just transmit knowledge to successive generations: they were expected to advance the frontiers of human knowledge and widen the dominion of man’s mind…. Within his province, his freedom was supreme. But his special status did not extend to fields where he was not the competent disinterested explorer. And one of those fields was the heat and dust of the political arena. (Josey, 1974:72) The notion of distinct spheres of competence is fully consistent with the definition of politics as an area of specialized expertise, since the selection of PAP candidates for election entails a scientific screening, to which since 1980 have been added an IQ test and other psychological tests with the goal of eliminating candidates who are self-interested (Clutterbuck, 1984:352). Vogel has characterized the

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political system in Singapore as a ‘macho-meritocracy’ (Vogel, 1989:1053). As further evidence of the bureaucratization of many aspects of society, the principle of specialization of function is applied in exactly the same way to religious institutions, which are seen as having no legitimate role in political debate and activity. The values conveyed by religious institutions are seen as appropriate to the private sphere only, and thus the operation of such institutions as mediating structures is substantially curtailed. As Lee Kuan Yew has expressed it: A religion looks after the spiritual, moral and social well-being of its followers. But religious organisations should leave the economic-political needs of people to non-religious groups, like political parties. This is because if any religious group tries to define the socio-economic agenda of Singapore and mobilises the grass-roots by ‘social action programmes’, other religious groups will do likewise. Once people are mobilised on socio-economic issues on the basis of religious loyalties, the consequences will be bad for all. (Lee, 1988:13) Some of the implications of this definition are examined later in the chapter, when the background to the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act is traced; but it illustrates the increasing ‘rationalization of religion’ that has been identified in Singapore (Tong, 1992). By this is meant that religious beliefs are redefined in a more coherent and rationally oriented manner, while the social space within which religion operates is more formally demarcated. The process of rationalization, which Weber saw in broad historical terms has, in relation to religion in Singapore, taken a precise and readily identifiable form as a response to specific government policies. ‘ASIAN VALUES’ AND MODERNIZATION By the 1960s there was considerable interest among social and political scientists working within a comparative framework in modernization scenarios based on Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis and on the comparative studies of Oriental religion which were intended to test his initial hypothesis (Hill, 1973:132–4). A variety of studies had been undertaken, ranging from in-depth analyses of social change in Asia, of which Bellah’s work on the role of religion in Tokugawa Japan is a prominent example (Bellah, 1957), to the genre

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of research which attempted to operationalize elements of the Protestant Ethic thesis in the concept of ‘achievement motivation’ (McClelland, 1967). From the late 1960s scholarly interest in the role of religion and ideology in the modernization process in Southeast Asia became increasingly manifest, discussion usually being framed within the context of national consciousness or identity (Alatas, 1969; Tamney, 1973). The 1973 volume edited by Evers contains a significant paper by Alatas which critically assesses the relevance of the Weberian thesis to an analysis of the differential economic development of Malays and Chinese (Alatas, 1973). Thus, with the model of Japan as a template for the investigation of links between ideology and social change, there was a shift towards encapsulating such links within a dichotomy that has persisted in both academic and political discourse until the present. The dichotomy which began to emerge in academic and political discourse in a Singapore context from the mid-1970s was increasingly to posit a radical opposition between Western values and those identified as ‘Asian values’. Ironically, the dichotomy replicated the concept of orientalism on which such ‘type’ constructions as that of Weber were based (Said, 1979:259–60). The polarities contained in Weber’s depiction of occidental progress versus oriental stagnation were, however, strongly questioned if not simply reversed. The validity of the stereotyped conceptualization of ‘Asian values’ (based mostly on Indian examples) had already been challenged by Myrdal (1970:93–112), but it was to become a major focus, especially of political discourse, after 1976. The theme was taken up in a seminar that year which subsequently appeared as the volume Asian Values and Modernization (Seah, 1977). One of the contributors to the volume cited—and has subsequently revisited—Myrdal’s sceptical note (Ho, 1977; 1989), while the senior politician who attended the seminar was more firmly dismissive: I have very serious doubts as to whether such a thing as ‘Asian values’ really exists—or for that matter ‘Asian’ anything—Asian unity, Asian socialism, Asian way of life and so on. It may exist as an image but it has no reality. (Rajaratnam, 1977:95) This statement—coupled with the same speaker’s characterization of prevailing Singaporean values as ‘moneytheism’ (Milne and Mauzy, 1990:24)—is noteworthy. It stands in marked contrast to the important role which was later assigned to ‘Asian values’—and

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especially to Confucian values—as a source of ‘cultural ballast’ (Goh, 1979:1–6) in the process of nation building. Indeed, the initial reception of the ‘Asian values’ scenario was considerably more agnostic than its later incorporation as orthodoxy. In fact, in the early 1970s a quite different parallel had been drawn by Goh Keng Swee in the identification of core values: If we are honest with ourselves, I think we can detect in contemporary Singapore a strange but striking similarity of intellectual climate and social values with Victorian England, together with much of the hypocrisies and cruelties of that age. (Goh, 1972:176) In view of his later association with the Confucian Ethics programme, it is interesting to examine Goh Keng Swee’s stated position on the cultural and value elements in economic growth. On the one hand Goh had complained that economists refused to consider non-economic factors in economic growth (Goh, 1972:2), but on the other he would claim that Singapore’s industrialization was attributable to the application of policies common to most developing countries, albeit in a more thorough and principled way (Goh, 1972:101). Concern over core values became increasingly acute in the late 1970s when the more pressing economic and political emergencies had been addressed: By the late 1970s, when most of the basic needs of the population had been fulfilled, there came the time for soul-searching and reflection, and there emerged a new and increased concern over the non-material (social and cultural) dimensions of nation building. Alarmed by increasing (or at least socially more visible) numbers of crime, delinquency, drug-abuse, abortion and divorce (and despite the fact that the rates of such social indicators were comparatively low in Singapore compared to other equally urbanized societies), there emerged a collective sense of moral crisis, calling for collective action. (Kuo, 1992:4) The crisis was identified as one of ‘Westernization’, and it was to exert a more direct impact on Singapore than on other Asian societies because of the use of English as a common language. In the light of the subsequent discussion of allegedly ‘Asian’—and specifically Confucian—values it is important to establish that before 1979

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‘Confucianism was not even a topic for public discussion in Singapore’ (Wong and Wong, 1989:517). The issue of the importance of a set of core values in the process of nation building attained great prominence in 1979, partly as a result of the two government reports which have already been discussed in the context of bilingualism and multiculturalism. Simultaneously the government began an extensive programme of political ‘maintenance’ (Leifer, 1990b), initiating national compaigns such as the National Courtesy Campaign, Senior Citizens’ Week Campaign, and the Speak Mandarin Campaign (Kuo, 1992:5). VALUES IN EDUCATION In the discussion that follows, what was earlier referred to as the ‘cultural’ dimension of the education debate will be re-examined in relation to the intersecting preoccupation with values. The main findings of the Goh Report relating to bilingualism have already been summarized, but another focus of the Report is of interest in relation to the values debate. The Report’s Overview devoted a section to the topic of moral education, which was prefaced with the comment, ‘One of the dangers of secular education in a foreign tongue is the risk of losing the traditional values of one’s own people and the acquisition of the more spurious fashions of the west’ (Goh, 1979:1–5). Noting the ineffectiveness of much of the existing moral education and civics material, the Report asserted a principle which was to underpin government initiatives in the area of values for the following decade: A society unguided by moral value can hardly be expected to remain cohesive under stress. It is a commitment to a common set of values that will determine the degree to which the people of recent migrant origin will be willing and able to defend their collective interest. They will not be able to do this unless individuals belonging to the group are able to discern that an enlightened view of their long-term selfinterest often conflicts with their desire for immediate gain. (Goh, 1979:1–5) The solution, the Report went on, was not to teach moral values in the context of abstract ideas but in terms of great men in Asian history, and furthermore to do this in the language of the students’ ‘mother-tongue’: One way of overcoming the dangers of deculturisation is to teach children the historical origins of their culture. Chinese pupils could be taught in the Chinese language in secondary schools early

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Chinese history up to the setting up of the Confucian state in the Han dynasty; Indians, the ancient history of India; and Malays, the early history of their peoples and the Archipelago. (Goh, 1979:1–5) Noting that a Parliamentary Committee was already addressing the subject, the Report did not elaborate further. As has already been shown, the Prime Minister’s response to the Report did, however, offer some observations on moral education, specifically in relation to the building of good citizenship and nationhood. The passage in which Lee Kuan Yew itemized some of the characteristics of the good citizen—including patriotism, filial respect, responsibility, tolerance and punctuality—has already been cited (pages 89–90), but it is important to note that this depiction was then elaborated to argue for an amalgam of the best characteristics of Eastern and Western values. It is valuable to quote the relevant passage because it reveals with some precision the basis on which the dichotomy was conceptualized: The best of the East and of the West must be blended to advantage in the Singaporean. Confucianist ethics, Malay traditions, and the Hindu ethos must be combined with sceptical Western methods of scientific inquiry, the open discursive methods in the search for truth. We have to discard obscurantist and superstitious beliefs of the East, as we have to reject the passing fads of the West. Particularly important are intra-family relationships. We must reinforce these traditional family ties found in all Asian societies. But we must excise the nepotism which usually grows out of this extended family net of mutual help. (Goh, 1979: v) Although his views on this were subsequently somewhat modified, the chief value of learning a second language was seen by Lee as its conveying of moral values and cultural traditions. The example of Chinese was given by way of illustration, since The greatest value in the teaching and learning of Chinese is in the transmission of the norms of social or moral behaviour. This means principally Confucianist beliefs and ideas, of man, society, and the state. (Goh, 1979: v) Similar values are conveyed in the case of Malay and Indian proverbs and folklore; and Lee Kuan Yew’s remarks on moral education contain a strikingly explicit metaphor:

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No child should leave school after 9 years without having the ‘soft-ware’ of his culture programmed into his subconscious. (Goh, 1979: v) The Goh Report was presented in February 1979 and was followed in June of that year by the Report on Moral Education 1979 (the Ong Report). The Report pointed out that the existing programmes, Education for Living, and Civics, were too broad and had little direct relevance to moral education. Among other significant points of detail it pointed out that, in contrast to those in government schools, many of the teachers in mission schools had a strong religious background, which lent support to their teaching of Education for Living and Civics. It called for the scrapping of these programmes and their replacement by a ‘Moral Education’ programme the object of which should be to produce ‘good, useful and loyal citizens through inculcation of the desired moral values and social attitudes’ (Ong, 1979:8). As its model of the ideal Singaporean the Report quoted the passage from Lee’s response to the Goh Report which, as earlier suggested, supports a civicrepublican conception of citizenship. Having examined the moral education programmes in Taiwan, Japan and Russia, the Report made the following recommendation: Emphasis should be placed on the inculcation of the desired Eastern and Asian moral concepts, values and attitudes so as to help in the preservation and strengthening of our cultural heritage. (Ong, 1979:10) Use of the mother tongue was seen as the most ‘efficient’ way of transmitting Asian moral values, though at the higher levels of the secondary education system—where debate rather than passive reception of ideas was to be encouraged—the moral education programme should be taught in the students’ most proficient language, i.e. in their first language, which was not necessarily their mother tongue. One of the final recommendations is particularly noteworthy: Religious studies help to reinforce the teaching of moral values. The Education Ministry should review its policy to allow mission schools greater flexibility in implementing their religious instruction programmes. (Ong, 1979:12) Goh, as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, made some characteristically robust comments in repose to the Ong

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Report. First, he dismissed the narrow professional approach to moral education as taking ‘the approach of a cook preparing a dish. A list of ingredients is made out with quantities of each. The cooking time is then prescribed. To me, moral beliefs form an integrated system of thought and does [sic] not consist of a conglomeration of bits and pieces’ (Ong, 1979: iii). Observing that there was nobody in his Ministry who had a grasp of such matters—perhaps not surprisingly, it might be interjected, in view of the purposive-rational ethos inculcated throughout the bureaucratic administration—Goh suggested a prominent Jesuit rector as someone who might render the ‘outside help’ required. Thus the Ong Report and Goh’s initial reponse to it mark the point at which religion began to be coopted as an instrument of public policy. It was also during 1979 that the government accepted Bible Knowledge and Islamic Religious Knowledge as examination subjects, further acknowledging the value of religious instruction (Quah, J.S.T., 1990:53). Even so, one prominent educationalist at the time was still concerned to emphasize the fundamentally secular nature of values education: There would be a broad agreement in Singapore with the Durkheimian view that the schools are the guardians of national character, to be used for the inculcation of common moral sentiments on the basis of a secular rather than a religious inspired morality. (Gopinathan, 1980b: 174) The proposals in the Ong Report led to the rapid development, under the guidance of the Singapore Jesuit, of a moral education syllabus and curriculum (Gopinathan, 1988:138). In 1981 pilot testing of a Being and Becoming moral education programme began. It followed closely principles established by the Ong Report, namely those of personal behaviour, social responsibility, and loyalty to country. At the same time a Chinese-language programme, Good Citizen, was introduced, drawing heavily on Chinese myths and legends. It had been an original aim of the moral education programme to provide an ethical rather than an overtly religious programme, but the difficulty of teaching Malay students in isolation from Islamic precepts and the combination of moral with religious elements in the mission schools led to the linking of moral and religious education as a package, the former to be taught at primary and lower secondary levels and the latter at upper secondary levels (Wong and Wong, 1989:521–2). The acceptance of religious instruction as central to moral education was a radical change of direction: ‘A

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government that had previously restricted religious instruction to noncurriculum time in the aided mission-run schools has now acknowledged the value of such instruction’ (Gopinathan, 1988:138–9). As announced in January 1982, only five religious subjects were to be offered—Bible knowledge, Buddhist studies, Hindu studies, Islamic religious knowledge and World religions: Confucianism, as a secular ethical system, could have no place as a part of the religious teachings. It was at the suggestion of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, and after spending ‘many of his wakeful hours and several sleepless nights’, that two weeks later in early February 1982, Goh announced that Confucian Ethics was to be included as an additional subject for those Chinese who might not be religiously inclined, ‘to give young Singaporeans a cultural ballast against the less desirable aspects of Western culture’. (Kuo, 1992:6) Thereafter support for the Confucian curriculum attracted a disproportionate share of the resources devoted to the moral education programme. Kuo (1992) has depicted this as part of a ‘revitalization movement’ with diffuse cultural goals which went beyond the introduction of a new school curriculum. The establishment of the Institute of East Asian Philosophies, with Goh Keng Swee as its first director, was especially important in providing the movement with legitimacy. In the development of curriculum material for the six different options it is possible to discern one aspect of a broader phenomenon to which Tong has given the label the ‘rationalization of religion’ in Singapore (Tong, 1992). By this is signified the gradual filtering out of folk beliefs and practices and the domestication or ‘tidying up’ of less manageable elements in the religious tradition, sometimes as a conscious result of government policy. In the case of the religion curriculum a clear distinction was made between the cognitive component of religion—religious knowledge—on which the curriculum would be based, and what was called ‘religious instruction’, including such practices as prayer, meditation, and worship, which were proscribed. Religion was to be a classroom subject, ‘like studying Shakespeare’ (Gopinathan, 1988:139). It was decided at government level that teachers would be volunteers and need not be practitioners of the religions they taught, and in response to public disquiet over possible classroom conversions it was announced that members of fundamentalist sects with a conversionist emphasis would not be assigned to these courses (Tamney, 1988:115).

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The rationale behind the incorporation of religion into the moral values programme, as explained by government leaders in 1982, was twofold. On the one hand there was much concern about the problems plaguing Singapore: Specific problems mentioned in print included lapses in business ethics (e.g., dishonest bankers), drug and theft problems among the military, snobbery among secondary students attending an elite school, aged parents being sent to welfare homes, and a decline in the work ethic. (Tamney, 1988:116) The government wanted to curb the urge to self-gratification without concern for other people—encapsulated in the ethos of hippyism— while supporting the desire to make money. One of the ministers (who was not himself a Christian), speaking of his admiration for the moral probity of his former classmates at a religiously affiliated school, noted that they had had successful business careers, and that, being trustworthy, bankers trusted them (Tamney, 1988:117). In this statement, the speaker was echoing the entrepreneurial values portrayed by Weber in The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism’ (Weber, 1970). A second aspect of the government’s rationale lay in their observation that other economically successful Asian countries—Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan—had a Confucian tradition of ethics. Confucian ethics, it was thought, were playing a role similar to that played by the Protestant ethic in the West: what was important about the Confucian ethic was not just its emphasis on hard work but its stress on social obligations. As the Prime Minister noted in his 1981 May Day message, ‘The Singaporean is an individual achiever. The Singaporean must now learn to be a team achiever’ (Kwok, 1983:75). This statement was made in the context of complaints by students at the National University of Singapore they were being held back by Chinese-speaking students from the recently merged Nanyang University. Lee maintained that Chinese speakers would never have made such a complaint. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: CONFUCIANISM AND BUDDHISM Religious Knowledge became a compulsory subject for Secondary 3 and 4 students in 1984. A brief examination of two of the options offered, Confucian Ethics, and Buddhist Studies, will demonstrate the

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selective emphasis given to those moral values considered most constructive in shaping the ideal citizen. The direction taken in the debate veered gradually from the evaluation of Confucianism as a source of inoculation or insulation against Western values to a perception that Confucianism might offer a positive form of work ethic appropriate to the Asian trajectory of industrialization. In a series of comparative works, the role of Confucianism was brought into increasing prominence, and was seen as a positive agent of economic transformation in its East Asian environment. One of the earliest popularizers of the link between Japanese economic success and neo-Confucianism was Herman Kahn (1979). The role of Confucianism in Japan was later examined by Morishima (1982) in the book Why Has Japan Succeeded? In Singapore, George Lodge and Ezra Vogel’s Ideology and National Competitiveness, published in 1987, had a decisive impact on the attempt to devise a set of core values in Singapore (culminating in the Shared Values project, which is discussed later in this chapter). With growing state interest in Confucian ideology, especially as a means of securing order and harmony, a widespread engagement with issues of Confucian values was stimulated from the late 1970s onwards. Among intellectuals, especially at Nanyang University, links were established between Confucian ideas and those of such Western political philosophers as Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli; and more practical attempts were made to test the relevance of traditional values in the context of modern Singapore (Chang, 1979). After the government announced that Confucian Ethics would be included in the Moral Education syllabus in secondary schools, Confucian scholars from the United States and Taiwan were invited to Singapore in 1982 for consultation (Gopinathan, 1988:139–40; Ling, 1989:701–2). As Gopinathan notes: This paradox of calling upon expatriate expertise in a curriculum area both heavily cultural and sensitive is seldom noted. Perhaps the explanation for their use lies in the desire to have some non-Singapore reference point as a way of managing internal differences. (Gopinathan, 1988:139) In view of later developments in the search for core national values, one of the prominent justifications for including Confucian Ethics in the curriculum was its collective orientation: the Confucian emphasis on community is diametrically opposed to individualism as we often understand the term. Confucianism

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conceives of the self neither as an isolated atom nor as a single, separate individuality, but as a being in relationship…. Each relationship contributes to the development and overall constitution of the self. (quoted in Ling, 1989:702) The importance of the emphasis on collectivity over the individual can be related directly to the ideology of pragmatism, in that the latter requires a ‘generalized social discipline’ (Chua, 1985:36; see also Levy, 1992) for the effective mobilization of the population and the implementation of instrumentally rational goals. It will be recalled that Weber’s analysis of the concept of rationality maintained that a high level of discipline was required as more rationalized social structures developed (Weber, 1978:1156). However, an unintended consequence of the successful achievement of such goals is the creation of centrifugal strains, as people seek more individualized forms of gratification which the rationalized environment of everyday life fails to offer. For instance, a search for personal autonomy and hedonism in a mass-consumption economy has been seen as erosive of America’s civil religion (Anthony and Robbins, 1983:244). And the more successfully economic goals are achieved through instrumental rationality, the more accessible, and keenly sought, become these individualistic goals. Hence the emphasis on community as a counterbalance to the inherent strains is a response to perceived contradictions in pragmatism as an ideology: The compelling element in its rationality is that of necessity. Contrary to necessity, which may serve as the basis for collective action, affluence opens up the avenues of choice and individual preferences. (Chua, 1985:42) As an example of the way in which a moral precept such as the principle of reciprocity was given practical expression in the new textbooks, the following extract is informative: It is common for people to grumble a lot in their place of work. Managers or supervisors grumble among themselves about how unhelpful or ungrateful their workers are. Workers, on the other hand, grumble about how unfair and bullying their managers or supervisors are. Such attitudes lead to much misunderstanding and friction. Confucius’ advice to both groups of people would be to show compassion by not doing to each other what each group would not themselves like. (quoted in Kuah, 1990:376)

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A similar principle was advanced in the area of social welfare. This had particular relevance to the Singapore situation, where the government had firmly resisted the emergence of a welfare state. Confucian society was thus portrayed as ‘humane and caring’ and the welfare implications were then drawn out: In such a society, the old and young, orphans and widows, the lonely and disabled are all looked after and cared for. The old have a proper resting place. The young are brought up to be healthy, fulfilled adults. Every person, man and woman, has a home and work. The people cultivate friendship and trust among themselves. (quoted in Kuah, 1990:377) The Buddhist Studies syllabus is noteworthy because, in contrast with other religious traditions, there had been little previous experience of providing formal instruction on the part of local Buddhist monks. Hence, when the Singapore Buddhist Foundation commissioned a prominent Sinhalese scholar-monk to write a textbook, the resulting work was judged unsuitable, and was criticized for lacking practical orientation and failing to reflect the ‘desirable national values’ (Kuah, 1991:32). The Ministry of Education instead entrusted the task to the Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore, which formed its own team to write the material, calling in foreign experts chosen by the Ministry, and only consulting the Singapore Buddhist Federation in the event of queries over scriptural interpretation. In the resulting text: The Buddhist teaching is given a practical redefinition to suit the secular context. Indeed, in the textbook the religious references are only used minimally and then only to reinforce the secular values of the programme. …the Buddhist teachings are translated into values such as selfreliance, tolerance, loving-kindness, and compassion. The textbook treats ritualism, so vital a part of Buddhist culture, in a negative manner. (Kuah, 1991:34) The case of Buddhism represents a clear instance of the ‘rationalization of religion’, consciously pursued with the aim of shaping an ideology consonant with the nation building project. Less consciously directed, but contributing to the rationalization process, has been the growth of Protestant Buddhism—a modernized form of belief and practice which has been influenced by developments in Japanese Buddhism. Among

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Protestant Buddhists there was some appreciation of the Buddhist Studies syllabus since it was seen as a means of deflecting Chinese conversion to Christianity (Kuah, 1991:26). Tamney has suggested three broad consequences of the state’s deployment of religion as a sustainer of shared social values. First, the state defines what is acceptable religion; this is an aspect of the rationalization of religion on which we have already commented, and shortly it will be shown how the definition took a legal form in the period 1988–90. Second, all religions are pressured to adjust to the state ideology; in the case of Singapore this involved, among other things, accepting the capitalist basis of the economy, adopting a tolerant stance towards other religions and subscribing to democratic values. Third, it homogenizes religion, permitting interreligious differences to emerge only if they complement each other (Tamney, 1988:127). The principal unintended consequence of the policy was to enhance the social profile of religion in a way that heightened ethnic cleavages as well as revealing religion’s potential for political mobilization. Such a consequence could hardly be attributed to the introduction of religion into the educational process, but it had the effect of raising serious doubts about religion’s utility as a guarantor of consensual values. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF RELIGION In the period 1986–8 these doubts were generated by two episodes which will be briefly summarized here. The first—in late 1986 and early 1987—concerned the recurring issue of Malay ethnicity and religion. The occasion which signalled intense concern in 1986 was the invitation by the Singapore President to the President of Israel to visit the Republic. Singapore had both military and symbolic links with Israel, but the visit was widely interpreted by her Muslim neighbours as evidence of hubris on the Republic’s part. In Malaysia especially, there was vehement popular reaction (Leifer, 1988). Among Singaporean Malays, there was widespread disapproval of the visit (Lee, L.T., 1987). Within Singapore Islam has been comprehensively incorporated into the state under the Administration of Muslim Law Act, and there is a high degree of consultation between the government and Muslim authorities. Such consultation was embarked upon in the aftermath of the Israeli President’s visit, with a forum of Muslim and Malay organizations in January 1987 calling for greater government sensitivity towards Malay Singaporeans coupled with more open and mature discussion. Almost immediately, however, the issue of Malay identity was

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reopened by Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who replied during a constituency tour to the question of why there were no Malay pilots in the Singapore Armed Forces in the following way: If there is a conflict, if the SAF is called upon to defend the homeland, we don’t want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position where his emotions for the nation may come in conflict with his emotions for his religion, because these are two very strong fundamentals, and if they are not compatible, then they will be two very strong destructive forces in opposite directions. (ST, 23.2.87) The statement attracted considerable adverse comment in Malaysia, with one political representative in Malaysia accusing the PAP leadership of chauvinism (ST, 1.3.87). The ethnic dimension of the religious problem was further dramatized in June 1987 with the announcement that on 24 April four Malays had been arrested under the Internal Security Act (under which detention orders without trial for up to two years can be issued) for spreading rumours of impending racial clashes on or around 13 May—the anniversary of the 1969 racial riots in Malaysia and Singapore. In televised confessions two of the four spoke of their involvement in both Malay martial arts groups and Islamic education. The second episode which highlighted the problematic nature of religious commitment was the ‘Marxist conspiracy’ of May 1987. The details of these events have been well summarized elsewhere (Asiawatch, 1990; Lee, L.T., 1987; Rodan, 1989:202;1992:9–14), but some salient points can be elicited. On 21 May 1987, sixteen people were arrested under Singapore’s Internal Security Act on the grounds of their alleged connection with a clandestine communist network (organizations with which the individuals were connected included the Student Christian Movement of Singapore, the Young Christian Workers’ Movement, the National University of Singapore Catholic Students’ Society, Singapore Polytechnic Catholic Students’ Society, the Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church and a Catholic Welfare Centre whose main activity was to run a refuge for Filipino maids). Of special significance was the fact that those arrested were English-educated, middle-class graduates who were engaged in Christian social action programmes. As the official version of the arrests expressed it: Singapore now has to contend with new hybrid pro-communist types who draw their ideological inspiration not only from

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Maoism and Marxist-Leninism, but also from the ideas of contemporary militant leftists in the West. They augment traditional CPM (Communist Party of Malaya) tactics with new techniques and methods, using the Catholic church and religious organizations. This marks a new phase in the unceasing communist efforts to subvert the existing system of government and to seize power in Singapore. (ST, 27.5.87) It was noted that with the introduction of the Religious Knowledge programme there was explicit recognition of the potential problem of conversion in the classroom, and this became a major preoccupation of government in the late 1980s. Faced with what appeared to be a dramatic shift among young, English-educated Chinese towards the rapidly growing Christian charismatic churches, with the possibly destabilizing effect of interethnic conversions, and with evidence of the growth in the Christian population of another ‘little dragon’— South Korea—the government took a decisive initiative. It commissioned a series of reports by sociologists at the National University of Singapore into the current religious situation and especially into patterns of conversion (see Kuo et al., 1988; Tong Chee Kiong, 1989). One of the concerns behind the commissioning of the reports was a feeling among political leaders that the pace of social change in Singapore had outstripped the capacity of many people to make sense of their new surroundings; and the perceived problem was conceptualized around Durkheim’s analysis of anomie, which the researchers set out to investigate. The reports’ findings confirmed that there had been a degree of revivalism, especially among Christian charismatic churches in Singapore, that conversion was disproportionately concentrated among those who were young (14–19 being the key age group), of higher status and Englisheducated. Anomie was not found to be an important factor in conversion to Christianity (Tong Chee Kiong, 1989:19). The government’s response over the following two years was twofold: on the one hand it established clear parameters to the allowable activities of religious groups and personnel—which led to the passing of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 1990—while on the other it set out to construct a secularized ‘civil religion’ to provide a state-sponsored source of shared national values. This culminated in the Shared Values White Paper of 1991. The other major influence in these developments was the role of ‘Asian values’, and especially of Confucianism. After the somewhat

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tentative introduction of this notion in the 1970s, when the inoculating or insulating function of such values was most strongly canvassed, there was a more confident assertion of the dynamic role such values might play throughout the next decade. As has been shown, this was especially associated with the importing of what one observer calls ‘attacks on liberal individualism from a business management provenance’ (Jones, 1993:30): the contributions of Kahn, Lodge and Vogel have already been noted. The dissemination of Confucian values had always been a prime goal of the Religious Knowledge programme, with Lee Kuan Yew confidently asserting at its inception that ‘Dr Goh Keng Swee agreed with me that for most Chinese students, Confucianism not Buddhism will be what parents would prefer their children to study’ (ST, 8.2.82). In the event, student preferences in 1989 were, for Buddhism, 44 per cent; Confucianism, 18 per cent and Bible Knowledge, 21 per cent (Kuo, 1992:16–18; Wong and Wong, 1989:523). It was partly in response to the finding that the Confucian Ethics option had attracted a comparatively modest percentage of enrolments that in 1989 the Religious Knowledge curriculum was abandoned in favour of a new Civics programme (Tamney, 1992). Scrutiny of this major policy change shows how the amalgam of unanticipated factors brought it about. One of the unintended consequences of the emphasis on religion as a source of values which were associated with distinct ethnic groups and with the medium of a ‘mother tongue’ was to amplify ethnic differences in divisive ways instead of forging the solidarity originally intended. Quah summarizes the official rationale behind the decision in a way that emphasizes the ‘Return to Sender’ logic: The Religious Knowledge programme in schools was recently scrapped in order to ensure that the government was neutral in its treatment of the various religions in Singapore. Instead of exposing students to a course on comparative world religions, they were exposed to six options, each stressing the uniqueness of its own religion. The programme exposed students to particular religions of their choice and had the unintended effect of increasing their religious fervour. The bilingual policy and especially the ‘Speak Mandarin’ campaign had the unintended effects of creating insecurity among the non-Chinese Singaporeans and focussing on the uniqueness of the Chinese Singaporeans vis-à-vis the other races. The mass media’s role in nation building can certainly be enhanced through the renewed emphasis on the common bonds or similarities among

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the various races in Singapore instead of focussing on their differences. …the policy-makers themselves should always be conscious of the possibility of unintentionally raising the racial consciousness of the population through the implementation of public policies. In a multi-racial society like Singapore, it is quite easy for policies which are directed towards the majority group to be perceived differently by the minorities. (Quah, J.S.T., 1990:61) Hence Confucian values, while clearly embodying elements which the state saw as important in promoting social discipline and a work ethic, were too particular to a single ethnic group and their propagation could be interpreted by members of other ethnic groups as elevating the cultural position of the Chinese. Furthermore, in a secular state with a range of different religions it was necessary to frame core values at a very general level. As Barbalet notes, the vaguer the idea of a common civilization is, the more accommodating it can be (Barbalet, 1988:88). The response of the Singapore government was, first, to set clear parameters around religious activity, specifying its private and non-political nature; and second, to attempt the construction of a set of ‘shared values’ on which to base a sense of Singaporean identity. This undertaking was contemporaneous with the reversal of policy over religion as a framer of values, and was strongly influenced by the conviction among the political elite that there had been a drift from ‘Asian’ to ‘Western’ values which needed to be redressed. A particular focus of interest was the edited volume by George Lodge (the Lee Kuan Yew Distinguished Visitor in 1991) and Ezra Vogel, Ideology and National Competitiveness (1987), which dichotomizes national ideologies into two ideal-types, those of communitarianism and individualism. The appeal of this book in a Singapore context is readily apparent, for it rehearses the familiar ‘Asian values’ scenario by contrasting Western atomistic individualism with Eastern organic collectivism, making negative inferences about the former: Individualism in the West has produced an adversarial society characterized by interest-group pluralism in the political system, and contractual, often adversarial, bargaining of labor and management in the economic system, in each case the name of the game being a larger share of the pie, not necessarily a larger pie. The east’s competitive superiority is causing many to question the

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desirability of such behavior. Can the West learn from the Asians as for so long they learned from us? (Lodge and Vogel, 1987:24) The three East Asian societies covered in the book are Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. All are seen to be high on a rating of ideological coherence which, the book predicts, is likely to be an increasingly important factor in ranking economies in the future. And if East Asian countries continue to be more competitive than other industrial nations, it is argued, the world trading system as a whole will become more integrated and communitarian. There is a certain symbolism in the fact that just as the transition to a new cohort of political leaders was occurring, the configuration of core national values was being modified from an overtly Confucian design to a refurbished global systems model. In his account of the new leadership’s embarking on ‘the ambitious project of establishing an official national ideology’, Rodan highlights the importance of Lodge and Vogel’s book, which led Goh Chok Tong to lament that ‘over the last decade there had been a clear shift in the dominant values in Singapore, away from group interests or “communitarianism” in favour of self interests or “individualism”’ (Rodan, 1993a:90). In the final part of the chapter the most recent attempt to articulate a national ideology, or as the project came to be known, ‘shared values’, will be examined. RELIGIOUS HARMONY AND THE ‘SHARED VALUES’ PROJECT This most recent strategy in the domain of building a value consensus began in late 1988. It followed several years in which the role of religion in shaping values had first been deployed by the government in the educational sphere but then came under increasing scrutiny as its potential for ethnic disharmony and political activism became apparent. Religion became a major preoccupation of both government and state-controlled media as the investigation by the Internal Security Department and the findings of the commissioned reports on religious conversion were disseminated. The sequence of reports and subsequent legislation is tightly integrated, as the following synopsis shows. The reports on religion and religious conversion were commissioned in August 1987, in the immediate aftermath of the discovery of the ‘Marxist conspiracy’. In October 1988 the fifth of the substantive reports of the research team on religion and revivalism was presented to the Ministry of

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Community Development. On 28 October 1988 the First Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, spoke of the challenge facing the government and the PAP in formulating a national ideology, and on 5 November a government committee was set up to draft a set of values, reporting on 28 December that it had identified four core values. The theme was reiterated at the opening of Parliament on 9 January 1989 by the Singapore President, Wee Kim Wee, and early in the same year the Institute of Policy Studies was requested to conduct a study to identify national values that would unite the populace. In February, March and April 1989 reports from the previously established research team on religion and conversion were released and were covered extensively in the media. The Straits Times noted that religious trends ‘need careful handling’ and cited the evidence of growing Christian evangelism and a revival of Buddhism (ST, 19.3.89). On 30 April the idea of legislation to preserve religious harmony was mooted by Cabinet Minister Lee Hsien Loong and a report in the Straits Times ten days later noted that the idea was acceptable to the leaders of the various faiths. The proposed legislation was contained in a government White Paper on 28 December 1989 and was introduced as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill on 15 January 1990: at the same time race, religion, and politics were discussed at seminars organized for PAP activists. The Bill was debated in late February, the same month that the first draft of the study of national values by the second university research team was prepared—it was finally completed in June. In late September Select Committee hearings on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill were held, coinciding with the release to the media of results from the national values study and its publication in book form. The Bill was passed on 10 November 1990. On 6 January 1991 a White Paper on Shared Values—now numbering five—was extensively reported in the media and it was debated in Parliament on 14 January. Thus the government’s initial response to the potentially destabilizing effects of religious revivalism and activism was to promote legislation which would restrict the autonomy of religious organizations and personnel. This process was completed in November 1990. Following close behind came a government initiative to promote certain core values around which to develop a Singaporean identity. Noteworthy features of both initiatives were the commissioning of social scientific research by academics, its release to and extensive reporting in the media and the framing of legislation around an objectively presented ‘social problem’ requiring political intervention.

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Having traced the chronology of events and initiatives it now remains to examine the objectives of the ‘Shared Values’ project. In his initial statement of the goals behind the development of shared values, the future Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong spoke of the need to determine what kind of society Singapore would be in twenty-five years’ time and drew attention to the clear shift in values towards individualism: If individualism results in creativity, that is good, but if it translates into a ‘me first’ attitude, that is bad for social cohesion and for the country. (Goh, 1988:13–14) What was needed to enhance national competitiveness, argued Goh, was a dominant element of communitarianism over individualism. Communitarianism was seen to derive from a Confucian cultural base and was part of the core values of other economically successful countries in the region: The question is how to preserve them [the core values] when daily we are exposed to alien influences. My suggestion is: Formalise our values in a national ideology and then teach them in schools, work-places, homes, as our way of life. Then we will have a set of principles to bind our people together and guide them forward. (Goh, 1988:15) The precedents of Indonesia (which Goh and other Cabinet Ministers later visited in order to study Pancasila (ST, 9.1.91)) and Malaysia were then introduced, and the need to become a uniquely multiracial and Asian nation rather than a ‘pseudo-Western’ society was stressed. Shared values, then, were to provide ‘cultural ballast’ to counteract the pressures of Western materialism and individualism, in much the same way that bilingualism had earlier been conceived as inoculating the population from the spread of Western culture. The issue of how to reconcile shared values with those of the different ethnic communities was to be addressed later. The government committee which deliberated on the national values issue in November and December 1988 initially identified four core values. These were presented formally in President Wee Kim Wee’s address at the opening of Parliament in January 1989 and have also been articulated by the then Minister for Trade and Industry, Lee Hsien Loong. The four core values at this stage were: 1) community over self; 2) upholding the family as the basic building block of society; 3) resolving major issues through consensus instead of

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contention; and 4) stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony (Quah, J.S.T., 1990:91). In Lee’s presentation, the rationale for a National Ideology was set very firmly against a background of ‘The problem: Westernization’, indicators of which were loss of faith in traditional religions and the openness of Singaporean society. As a society, we are absorbing ideas from the outside faster than we can digest them, and in danger of losing our sense of direction. (Lee, H.L., 1989:27) A National Ideology would establish a distinctive identity and would incorporate certain common abstract values which drew on the different cultural heritages. The values should be non-political and non-religious and the list should be kept to a minimum. Referring to the four values, Lee thought these were an adequate starting point for a National Ideology since they were compatible with Chinese, Malay, and Indian cultures, and with the values taught by the major religions: There will be many other values, such as hard-work, honesty, loyalty and justice, which Singaporeans ought to uphold, but these four are the key ones. (Lee, H.L., 1989:31) The National Ideology would identify the personal set of values needed to bring about the ideals represented by the five stars on the national flag—namely, democracy, equality, peace, progress and justice—and enshrined in the National Pledge. Thus we can interpret the initial proposal for a National Ideology as having a quite different basis from the precedents of Indonesia and Malaysia, thus helping to underline the different trajectories of nation building in the three states. The main differentiating features can be summarized briefly. First, the framing of national ideologies in both Indonesia and Malaysia was precipitated by sociopolitical divisions that were disruptive and highly threatening. Second, these ideologies link a theistic (though not theocratic) conception of the state with generalized and succinct norms defining good citizenship. Third, a strategy behind both Indonesia’s Pancasila and Malaysia’s Rukunegara—especially in the case of Indonesia—was that of heading off fundamentalist Islamic claims on the state. By contrast, Singapore’s national values were to be framed as a personal set of values—related to matters of social discipline and community responsibility—and the underlying basis of such values was still pragmatic. Thus Singapore’s national ideology was conceived as ‘not a constitutionally mandated political ideology’ (Bellows,

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1989:201): indeed, a proposal by the Study Group to include a political value—Honest Government—as a component in the core values was rejected when the Report was debated. Since the Ideology was to be about means to attain ends which were elsewhere specified it bears a remarkable similarity to MacIntyre’s concept of ‘secondary virtues’. These, MacIntyre argued, were values based on such norms as pragmatism, co-operation and tolerance, and were mobilized to facilitate consensus in situations of social pluralism—for MacIntyre, the existence of class and the growth of class co-operation, though the mechanism would operate equally in situations of ethnic pluralism. In reference to the values claimed, from the late nineteenth century, to be characteristic of British life, MacIntyre argues The public virtues of British life…just because they are secondary virtues, are virtues which rule out any kind of metaphysical exclusivism. They are virtues which express an attitude to the world in which the making of cosmic and universal claims for one’s own group, as against other groups, is no longer possible. (MacIntyre, 1967:25) Pragmatism thus becomes the principal element in ‘national’ values when the absolutizing of particularistic claims carries the threat of social cleavage. Finally, the articulation of the Ideology was a response not to major upheavals and fractures in the social structure, as had been the case in both Indonesia and Malaysia, but to what was diagnosed as a process of diffuse and long-term erosion of cultural values. Thus the implications were future-oriented, and an appropriate metaphor in Lee Hsien Loong’s presentation was that of charting a course: As we develop economically, will we also naturally evolve into a successful copy of a Western society? If so, we have nothing to worry about. We can just let everything happen by itself, and all will be well. Or is our fate inevitable and tragic in that as we develop, we become superficially Westernised, cast off our traditional moorings, drift into banks and shoals, and come to grief? Or will we, through deliberate effort, retain and strengthen our identity, one which is distinct from other societies, and continue to prosper, achieving political stability, freedom from want, human dignity and fulfilment for ourselves? (Lee, H.L., 1989:37–8)

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The nautical metaphor reappeared in another speech by a government minister, George Yeo, on national identity. He stated, There is a tide in the lives of nations, which ebbs and flows’ (Yeo, 1989b: 73), and developed the analogy of Singapore as a small, manoeuvrable speedboat able to react more quickly than supertankers of the major nations but needing to be aware constantly of the latters’ movements. In the same speech he identified three contradictions in Singapore society that needed to be reconciled, the first being that between nationalism and cosmopolitanism: We must balance this contradiction between being cosmopolitan and being nationalistic. We cannot be a trading nation, if we are not cosmopolitan. We cannot be a nation, if we are not nationalistic. We must be both at the same time. (Yeo, 1989b: 81) The second contradiction was between democracy and centralization. While democracy would grow deeper roots in Singapore and was needed to achieve political consensus, it must always be practised within a framework of centralized decision-making. Hence traditional Asian values were needed to balance the individualizing effects of the free market. The third contradiction was between being efficient and being humane, and the way in which this contradiction is resolved amply demonstrates the emphasis on functional spheres of competence discussed earlier. The argument is worth quoting: Our national finances are healthy, because our government policies are based on sound, economic principles. The Government’s approach to problems is practical and utilitarian. The test of policy is: Does it work? Does it produce the desired effect? Few deny that we have a Government that is effective and efficient. Efficiency often means competition in a free market. By harnessing the desire of every person to better himself, Adam Smith’s market economy creates the most wealth for society, as a whole. But in any competition, there are winners and losers. The losers are also our citizens. For the system to survive, as a whole, the losers must be looked after, and their dignity preserved. Efficiency and competition must, therefore, be tempered by compassion and humanity. … The solution does not lie in comprehensive state welfare. That way leads to calamity, as we see all too well in other countries…. Let the Government concentrate on being efficient

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but let us, as members of the community, be compassionate in the way we treat our fellow human beings. (Yeo, 1989b:82–3) Throughout 1989 the Study Group worked on the four core values— preferring the term ‘values’ to ‘ideology’ because of the pejorative connotations of the latter (Quah, J.S.T., 1990:2)—modifying some of the emphases and proposing additions. The principle of ‘community over self became ‘harmony or balance between individual and community interests’ as a more feasible short-term goal: It would indeed be unrealistic at the present moment to expect pragmatic Singaporeans to change their individualistic behaviour overnight, especially when the reward system is still based on individualism rather than communitarianism. (Quah, J.S.T., 1990:93) The value enshrining support for the family was unchanged, though the Study Group cautioned that the government should be careful not to be seen as advocating a Confucian conception of the family, which would be unacceptable to non-Chinese Singaporeans. Consensus rather than contention was likewise supported, with specific advice to government that it should be seen as practising this value by maintaining consultation and feedback: one finding of the survey commissioned by the Study Group indicated ‘that the majority of the respondents want to be consulted by the government before policies are made but their perception is that the government has not done so’ (Quah, J.S.T., 1990:96). Racial and religious harmony were seen as important in the Singapore context, even as the most distinctive aspect of the four core values in comparison with other Asian countries, but understanding in addition to tolerance was thought to be important. This, it should be emphasized, is highly consonant with the multicultural ideology which stresses not simply tolerance but respect for members of other ethnic groups. Reference was made by the Study Group to the White Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmony, which had been published in January 1990. The Study Group then went on to propose two additional values (hence attracting the formula ‘four plus two’ for their report). The two additions were a) honest government—thought to be worth highlighting because it was partly responsible for Singapore’s economic success— and b) compassion for the less fortunate—seen both as a way of encouraging more fortunate Singaporeans to be considerate and as a

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means of preventing the disabled and destitute from feeling alienated, though explicitly not as a recommendation for a welfare state. The Study Group’s findings and recommendations, including the details of the survey on attitudes to government, were extensively reported in the media later in September and in early November (see, for example, Sunday Times, 30.9.90; 7.10.90). The search for a value system formed the theme of a speech by the new Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in December 1990, again in terms of the long-term survival of Singapore as a nation. Noting that Chinese values alone could not be promoted for the nation as a whole, he suggested that what was needed was a set of core values for all races, supplemented by values appropriate to each community, so long as the latter did not conflict with the core values. Exhorting his Chinese audience to promote those values which had characterized Chinese civilization for over 5,000 years, he added, ‘But please do so within the context of a multi-racial society’ (Goh, C.T., 1990:28). In fact, the articulation of core values was a sensitive issue for the Malay community in Singapore since its tone resonated with Confucian referents. In January 1991 the government’s White Paper on Shared Values was issued, containing five components: 1) Nation before community and society above self; 2) Family as the basic unit of society; 3) Regard and community support for the individual; 4) Consensus instead of contention; and 5) Racial and religious harmony (Shared Values, 1991). Commentators have detected various agendas in the White Paper, a political one being most plausible: the PAP’s concern was primarily with the possibility that a new set of cultural values and an associated political culture was evolving, contributing to the increasing support for opposition political parties. The ‘shared core values’ statement was intended to assert Singapore’s distinctiveness and thereby discourage any emulation of other ‘Western’—notably pluralist—political systems. The political significance of the document was that it opened the possibility for the PAP to portray challenges to itself as challenges to the national consensus or the collectively shared values of Singaporeans. (Rodan, 1993a: 91) In his extensive analysis of the White Paper, which reiterates earlier critiques of the polarized notion of ‘Asian’ and ‘Western’ values, Clammer detects two hidden agendas: the first is political and ‘represents an attempt (doomed, but nevertheless a real attempt) on the part of the PAP to pre-empt social change or to direct it in

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“suitable” directions’ (Clammer, 1993:36). The second he characterizes in a term borrowed from The Homeless Mind: ‘counter-modernisation’ (Berger et al., 1974: esp. Chapter 8). This argument brings the chapter full circle because it bears directly on the concept of an ‘ideology of pragmatism’ which provided a point of departure. It will be recalled that in their 1973 paper on nation building and national identity Chan and Evers saw two major alternatives available to post-colonial elites (1973:303): one is the regressive identity associated with the revival of tradition and the reinstatement of a ‘golden’ past; the other is the progressive identity associated with more radical social reconstructions. These are precisely the options identified as ‘counter-modernization’ processes by the authors of The Homeless Mind (1974:168–9). If, as Chan and Evers argue, such options were not viable in the nation building process and were rejected in favour of an ‘ideology of pragmatism’, the question then becomes one of whether they have subsequently become viable—presumably favouring an emphasis on regressive, ‘Asian’ identity. It is argued here that this has not happened and that, as maintained earlier, forays into the non-material—in this case, ideological—aspects of nation building, have ultimately been grounded in the pragmatism of the PAP government. Indeed, a recent discussion of East Asian political thought finds a high degree of compatibility between neo-Confucian thought and the ‘proactive’ pragmatism of paternalistic managerial elites (Jones, 1993:31). In the construction of nationalistic ideologies, as Breton has shown and as has been emphasized elsewhere in this study, the emphasis placed on the instrumental or on the cultural-symbolic can vary considerably (Breton, 1988:86). Given Singapore’s ethnic pluralism, a cultural-symbolic variant of nationalism (broadly similar to a ‘regressive’ identity in Breton’s account) would not be viable. But his depiction of instrumental nationalism would seem to be highly consonant with the Singapore situation: The attachment of individuals to the social order is primarily utilitarian. The community is based on interest, not on symbolic identification. Comparison with other societies is in terms of the ‘national product’ and other indicators of economic development and of the standard of living. Culture is relatively easily sacrificed if a particular course of action is perceived as economically beneficial and if national sovereignty is preserved (so as to be able to make

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other advantageous moves in the future). This type of nationalism has been called political, civic, territorial, or secondary. (Breton, 1988:87) Viewed in this light, the outcome of the ‘Shared Values’ project has been only marginally different from that of its predecessor, the Religious Knowledge programme. Having been promulgated at a time both of ideological contention and of leadership transition, in a period less conspicuous for such overt problems as religious commitment and political legitimacy—the period 1992–3 has been interpreted as one of consolidation for the PAP’s leadership (Rodan (ed.), 1993b:xix–xxii)—the utility of a formally articulated national ideology has diminished. Perhaps also on the principle, acquired through experience of the Religious Knowledge project, that the attempted mobilization of ideological support for social discipline may have unintended consequences, the White Paper on Shared Values has been left quietly to lie on the table. But certainly the White Paper should be seen against the background of previous attempts to articulate core values which have been detailed in this chapter, rather than as some novel and discontinuous foray into symbolic territory (Clammer, 1993).

9 Civil society: the current project

In line with the relative decline in importance of material growth will come an increasing urge for participation in the arts and other creative and intellectual pursuits. This will be reinforced by the growing desire to participate in the moulding of Singapore society and in the discussions leading to policy decision-making. Since critical comment is an integral part of this process in the marketplace of ideas, an increase in criticism of things as they are and of the way in which things are done and run is to be expected. (Rieger, 1989:1042) Civil and political rights represent the formal side of citizenship. Social rights, which include not only the economic but the cultural contents of citizenship, constitute its informal side. This is a critical element in the argument of this book for it is closely linked to the development of nationality and membership of a community. The conceptual apparatus to make nationality and sovereignty meaningful to the population is only articulated as a relationship between the state and individuals. In between lies a gamut of groups and associations which provide the link between the individual and the state. It was demonstrated in the chapter on parapolitical institutions that the PAP government in Singapore has made extensive use of grassroots organizations, both as agencies of political socialization and as mechanisms for reconstituting community. The most recent period has seen the spontaneous, albeit somewhat tentative, emergence of novel forms of mediating structure, accompanied by a surge of activity in the cultural and artistic spheres. Indeed, the quotation which heads this chapter provides a remarkably prescient synopsis of the kinds of developments which have recently emerged. 220

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CIVIL OR CIVIC SOCIETY: A NEW AGENDA In the wake of the Shared Values White Paper the concept of ‘civil society’ became a dominant issue for debate, first among journalists and leading politicians, but increasingly involving academic input. It should be noted that the ‘civil society’ debate is one of the most recent of a series of debates in Singapore in which academic analysis and political discourse have cross-fertilized. Earlier examples are the exploration of Confucian values and the incorporation of concern over anomie into the research on religious conversion. It is of particular interest in the context of the present discussion because any discussion of civil society must necessarily address the question of appropriate demarcation between society and the state. How this is interpreted by Singapore’s political leadership has a range of implications for future developments: In particular, state-society relations are seen to be at the centre of pressures for a reassessment of Singapore’s political and economic direction. This theme surfaces, for instance, in relation to the emerging middle class and the implications for civil society and interest group activity, the role of the domestic bourgeoisie in Singapore’s economic redirection, the expansion of private as opposed to government sources of information, the rationalisation of the state’s social functions and the workforce requirements of a more sophisticated economy. (Rodan, 1993b: xiii) Discussion of the civil society concept crystallized in 1990– encoded by one journalist as ‘the year of civil society’ (ST, 30.12.90:18)—as a result of the close juxtaposition of two international events. The first was the collapse in 1989 of socialist hegemony in Eastern Europe; and the second was the continued resilience of socialism in China, symbolized by the 1989 confrontation in Tiananmen Square. One explanation offered for the divergence was the survival of a more developed civil society in the Soviet bloc (ST, 30.12.90:18). The resilience it demonstrated in the transformation of Eastern European societies could be contrasted with the absence or relative weakness of civil society in China. Two contrasting analyses by journalists of the civil society concept highlight the poles of the debate. The first, by Russell Heng, deploys the work of Western liberal representatives such as Dahrendorf, whose definition of civil society is adopted as the point of departure. Civil society consists of autonomous institutions not run by the state which act as agents of

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the will of the people (ST, 30.12.90:18). Reference is made to an open society in which such institutions as political parties, trade unions, independent industrial enterprises, social movements (an example being ecology groups), free churches, liberal professions and autonomous universities all operate on the assumption that no one group possesses an infallible social blueprint. Out of the ‘creative chaos’ of competition between them arises the free environment of an open society. On this basis, it is maintained that signs—albeit very tentative ones—of the emergence of civil society are evident in Singapore, and the single prominent example of this is the founding of the Association of Muslim Professionals in 1990, which occurred spontaneously rather than in response to a government initiative. The article concludes by alluding to an earlier venture in the direction of civil society, the Singapore Planning and Urban Research Group of the 1960s and early 1970s. This was a group of professionals who acted as a watchdog on government policy and who advanced independent policy initiatives (one of which was the suggestion that the international airport should be diverted to Changi to avoid noise pollution). The group had even been applauded by Lee Kuan Yew: Then what happened to that promising start for civil society? A short announcement by the Registrar of Societies in 1975 said it voluntarily dissolved itself. (ST, 30.12.90:18) The explanation seems to have been that some members of this group crossed ‘that perennially hazy line that separates permissible social concern from ill-advised political activity’. The article concludes by maintaining that elements of civil society once existed in Singapore and speculates on the possibility that with strength and better consolidation its contemporary exemplars might prove more tenacious. An accompanying article, by Asad Latif, is more critical in its examination of the concept (ST, 30.12.90:18). Presenting it as a tenet of liberal capitalism that the least government is the best government, the notion that a strong civil society is most able to achieve this is seen to contain two weaknesses: Firstly, the much-vaunted ‘autonomy’ of civil society from the state can be a mirage because, after all, it is the state that determines how citizens organize their economic lives and a great deal of their social lives.

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Secondly, the theory misrepresents the nature of the state. The state is not just an administrative edifice but an ideological structure as well which reflects the distribution of power among dominant social interests. The state and civil society are complementary. (ST, 30.12.90:18) The image of civil society opposing the state thus reflects the ideology of the middle class and is consonant with Western political culture. Chinese, Malay and Indian political traditions, on the other hand, are not based on an adversarial relationship between the state and civil society. The argument reflects the dominant political view of the salience of ethnicity which, it has been suggested elsewhere, has the goal of depoliticizing society. Furthermore, as for the government: it has drawn up the limits of civil society by stating that interest groups are just that—groups representing special interests—and that they have to become political parties if they wish to extend their brief beyond those interests and push for change that affects society as a whole. (ST, 30.12.90:18) An example of this, continues the article, was the government’s handling of the Law Society in 1986 in response to the latter’s perceived interference in a legislative matter. The examples of what happened in South Korea and Taiwan, where greater political participation led not to the constructive growth of civil institutions but to violent social activism, were instructive: Ordinary people began to yearn for a more peaceful, though regulated past. They wanted the state to act to stop the slide into chaos. (ST, 30.12.90:18) The two articles offer an insight into the competing formulations of the state/civil society demarcation in a Singapore context. On the one hand, the first article provides an assertion of the classic Western liberal position in which the scope of the state is contained by an expansive terrain of autonomous institutions. Interestingly, the catalogue of those cited in Dahrendorf s definition brings together a range of institutions—such as political parties, trade unions, free churches and liberal professions—each of which has in some form

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been co-opted, curtailed or legally circumscribed by the Singapore government. The second article approaches the concept by affirming the dominant political ideology in Singapore. This is apparent in its assertion that ‘after all’ it is the state which ‘determines’ its citizens’ economic lives and much of their social lives also. The ideological transformation of dominant ideas into ‘natural’ ways of social practice has been noted by Chua: The ‘universalization’ and ‘naturalization’ of ruling group ideas into general ideas of the society appropriate to these ideas their sense of public authority and objectivity for the members of the society, as ‘the only rational, universal valid ones’. In sum, these ideas provide for a significant segment of members’ sense of the ‘natural reality of everyday life’. (Chua, 1983:34) By locating civil society in middle-class ideology the journalist’s critique presents as problematic the degree of middle-class commitment to political activism. This, incidentally, has affinities with some recent analyses which see the middle class as a reluctant player in the process of political change (Rodan, 1993b: 67), but it does not coincide with the stance of George Yeo, whose important contribution is detailed below (Rodan, 1993a: 96). The article reiterates the dichotomy between ‘Western’ and ‘Asian’ cultures. While the former tends towards political chaos, the latter is characterized by a population which craves a state guaranteeing a peaceful though regulated existence—something which existed in the traditional past but which has been disturbed by Western ideas. The articles also encapsulate a more general observation, that between proponents of the liberal civil society thesis (which will be considered shortly) and their conservative opponents it is stated or implied that civil society once existed in Singapore. However, their versions of it differ markedly. As is evident in other myths of origin, for the proponents it represents a condition of noble savagery that was relentlessly suppressed, while for opponents it is the classic state of nature in need of firm discipline. The ideas of the ruling elite incorporate two further important elements which are drawn on by Latif. First, it is seen as possible—and indeed necessary—for the state to demarcate the limits of civil society. This it does by specifying ‘spheres of competence’ so that civil society may only contain apolitical ‘interest groups’. Second, the ideology prescribes that only the state (which means effectively the PAP government) possesses political expertise: this reflects the unvarying equation of politics with

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rational administration, so aptly described by Chan Heng Chee in 1975 in Politics in an Administrative State, and exemplifies the claim to the power of competent authority raised in Chapter 1. The government’s perception of the nature of civil society, containing a firm demarcation of its scope, became apparent some months later in a speech to the National University of Singapore Society by the Acting Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo. In a significant receding of the concept his speech had the title ‘Civic Society—Between the Family and the State’ (Yeo, 1991; see also ST, 21.6.91:32–3). ‘Civic’— as will later be argued—signifies a non-political variant of the civil society concept which is containable within the dominant political culture. The speech takes as its starting-point the globalization of the economy and the possibility that the mobility of skilled labour might lead to demands on the part of Singaporeans abroad for dual citizenship. Against this is the argument that the process of nation building might be diluted by such a measure, and that what is needed is emotional attachment to the country—otherwise, the citizen will treat the country ‘merely as a hotel’ and not as a home: So what we must have is a soul—and that money cannot buy. Yet, without it, Singapore is only a hotel, however well-run the country may be. And we cannot make the hotel a home by preventing the guests from leaving. (Yeo, 1991:79) In examining the ‘Singapore soul’, Yeo discovers elements which have a long history and are hence likely to survive—these are ethnic and religious elements which are not in themselves of Singaporean origin. Of the two indigenous components of the Singapore soul the first, at the national level, is well established. This incorporates the major state institutions and public policy: These are institutions unique to Singapore, institutions created in reponse to the huge problems of the 1960s and the 1970s. At the national level, the act of creation has been largely accomplished and this is now largely internalised in the Singapore soul. But below the level of the state, at the level of civic life, the Singapore soul is still evolving. Yes, the state is strong. The family is also strong. But civic society, which is the stratum of social life between the state and the family, is still weak. Without a strong civic society, the Singapore soul will be incomplete. (Yeo, 1991:80)

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Just as the initial task of nation building was the creation of a strong state, so the next major task was the creation of a strong civic society. On the analogy of the state as hotel, what were needed were individuals and families to take responsibility for running the hotel, thus turning it into a home. This could be effected if there was a ‘whole array of civic organizations which anchor Singaporeans, as individuals and as families, to the country’ (Yeo, 1991:81). These institutions were listed as religion—so long as it was not too extreme—education—and particularly the social life surrounding educational institutions such as PTAs and alumnus organizations— local government—by which was meant an extension of grassroots participation—Total Defence (again, civic republicanism is emphasized) as an extension of civil defence, and cultural and artistic organizations. For these civic institutions to grow, argued Yeo, the state—whose institutions were too pervasive and intruded into every sphere of community life—needed to pull back a little and allow for the development of local initiatives. This was possible now that the remarkable transformation of Singapore through necessary centralized initiatives had been achieved. He employed Edmund Burke’s anecdote affirming ‘loving the little platoon’ as the germ of public affections, and made reference to de Tocqueville’s account of the township in America. These sources were associated with the aphorism of Mencius, that governing a state is like frying small fish: it must be lightly done. There had to be a proper balance between centralization and decentralization since Singapore would always need a strong centre to enable it to respond quickly to change: The problem now is that under a banyan tree, very little else can grow. When state institutions are too pervasive, civic institutions cannot thrive. Therefore, it is necessary to prune the banyan tree so that other plants can also grow. (Yeo, 1991:84) The change which is proposed in the agenda of civic society can from one perspective be interpreted as a cautious move in the direction of empowering mediating structures in the sense in which Kornhauser (1961), Berger and Neuhaus (1977) and Nisbet (1986) have envisaged the process. In recoding civil society as civic society, Yeo was careful to avoid two implications which normally accompany the analysis of the former, as a Straits Times editorial was quick to point out. Civil society carries the implication of autonomy for the individual in the political space and the accountability of government

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to a critical populace, both of which, in the editorial’s view, were too politically adversarial: given that the basic economic and political parameters of Singapore’s external environment are unchanged, necessitating a strong and effective government at home, it is important that emerging civic institutions do not overstep their mandate and adopt a politically adversarial role… Conflict for the sake of a civil society will not do; the results, in fact, will be most uncivil. By contrast, a questioning, but understanding, population working together with a responsive Government can create the kind of civic culture that will politically complement Singapore’s economic success.’ (ST, 25.6.91) It is clear too that Yeo’s scenario was removed from that of Lee Kuan Yew. Lee’s image of culture has been expressed in various idioms, from one framed in a predominantly Confucian mode with its accompanying hazard of deculturalization (ST, 18.8.78), to that of ‘software’ programmed into the subconscious (Goh, 1979:v), and more recently he has adopted an almost mystical conception of culture. This emerged when he was asked in an interview in The Economist when the small groups that make up a civic society might develop, and he gave the following response: I have no idea whether it will come, because the culture is the other way. It may never come. You cannot break out of your culture altogether… Culture is very deep-rooted; it’s not tangible, but it’s very real. The values and perceptions, attitudes, reference points, a map up here, in the mind. (quoted in ST, 4.7.91) From another perspective, Yeo’s proposal can be interpreted as a strategic intervention on the part of the PAP leadership in order to preserve its ideological hegemony. The civil society agenda had emerged spontaneously and had been stimulated by political events elsewhere in the world. Its implications for the demarcation of local political space were, however, potentially contentious. The civic society agenda was thus a means of recapturing the ideological ground by steering the debate and establishing the acceptable parameters of discourse. In addition to recapturing the ideological ground there was an underlying pragmatic concern which is stated as the occasion for Yeo’s speech. It is presented as the issue of ‘multiple loyalties’:

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As our economy develops, more Singaporeans will travel overseas for work, study and leisure. Many Singaporeans will live overseas for months, if not years. It is natural that some of these Singaporeans should feel attached to more than one community. (ST, 21.6.91:32) In other words, the ‘soul’ which the civic society project is designed to promote has as its principal pragmatic objective the discouragement of long-term emigration by skilled citizens. Emigration had become a pressing concern, and in 1988 alone 4,707 families emigrated (Rodan, 1993a: 95). It was felt that an appropriate social and cultural environment needed to be created in order to counter this propensity. It is instructive to compare the rhetoric of the Civic Society project with that of the Shared Values White Paper which preceded it by a few months. What becomes apparent is that the relationship between ‘society’ and ‘self referred to in the White Paper takes on a problematic status for precisely the reason that in Singapore the state has absorbed or co-opted many of the elements of ‘society’. While the latter is frequently—as in the Dahrendorf formulation-identified with mediating structures and interest groups, we have shown that these exist in Singapore largely in the form of state-sponsored organizations and that groups espousing values or interests which the government defines as ‘political’ are effectively curtailed. On the other hand, there is a strong correspondence between claims of the state’s invasion of the private sphere on the part of sociologists working in a Western context and of critics of the civic society proposal in Singapore. Appropriately—since Yeo’s proposal had been addressed to the National University of Singapore Society—a major appraisal of the conceptual base of civil versus civic society appeared in the Society’s journal, Commentary (1993). Noting the tenuous nature of the concept, ‘civil society’, the editors nevertheless find it a valuable device: For “civil society” allows us to comprehend the initiatives of the individual, whether as a consumer, professional, entrepreneur, worker, artist, teacher, or citizen. It also brings into focus the question of agency, of what people can do in their capacities as members of families, institutions, associations, interest groups, trade unions, ethnic communities, and so on. Civil society is in short that mutually overlapping realm of the social which is defined by voluntary engagement and negotiation. (Commentary, 1993:4)

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Civil society is located mainly in the zone of ‘voluntary organizations, undertaken by local initiatives, which are engaged in social activities beyond the individual and private household, without the involvement of any state authorities’ (Chua, 1993b: 9). On this definition—again basing the argument on a civil society which once existed—Singapore has seen three phases in its development. First, there had been a vibrant period of community and ethnic associations in the 1950s in response to colonial neglect of community services. Second, a decline of voluntary organizations—led by trade unions and student organizations—had occurred as the state on the one hand consolidated its power and, on the other, delivered an effective range of social services. And finally, in the post-1984 period, there had been a gradual emergence of interest groups and voluntary associations of a reformist character: the latter are discussed below. In a situation in which the ruling party is seeking new mechanisms for consensus formation—a process which began after the major shift in electoral fortunes in 1984—the role of voluntary associations may be enhanced. An attempt is made to assess the correspondence between analyses of state intervention in the private sphere in Western liberal-pluralist societies and in the Singapore context in Nair’s contribution to the Commentary symposium. Though the official critique of Western political traditions and experience—and with them the notion of civil society—is particular to Singapore, the underlying design of the civic society project is, she claims, identical with that of Western neoconservative regimes: Claus Offe (1985) has argued that the neo-conservative project (to which the civic society concept belongs) seeks the depoliticization of a civil society which has been over-regulated and manipulated by the state. Its reach and control of civil society’s ‘private’ spheres of action (the family, culture, tradition, science, etc.) ultimately erodes its authority. Ironically, having made the private both public and politically contestable, the state to survive must retreat or insulate itself… We must ask if the Singapore leadership is being prescient in invoking the civic society concept at a time when it seems that the state is everywhere from the bedroom to the boardroom. (Nair, 1993:16; 17) It is the state which publicizes and makes political a whole range of ‘private’ matters, and this leads to calls for even greater government involvement, which the state eventually resists. The situation is one

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echoed in Jones’s claim—cited in Chapter 5—that ‘Ordinary people thus exposed to “active government” could develop notions of their own importance hitherto unforeseen by either side’ (Jones, 1990:454). The response to this penetration of everyday life has been seen by Habermas and Offe in the form of new social movements which have acquired major importance in late-capitalist societies; and Beckford has applied their insights to the growth of new religious movements, which he sees as one species of cultural movement generated by this tension (Beckford, 1989:143–57). In this latter context, the emphasis on localized, decentralized social forms is interpreted not as a privatized ‘turning inwards’ but as a creative, critical challenge to perceived control and exploitation. Nair finds such expressions of everyday resistance and difference in Singapore in the form of ‘nascent social movements’, which she sees as evidence of the re-emergence of civil society independent of state-sponsored grassroots organizations. Their substantive content is not delineated, but three general characteristics are identified: First, they tend to be critical of an array of official initiatives such as those relating to culture, work, environment, marriage, religion or education. Led by a new breed of urban intellectuals educated at local universities, these movements are seldom overtly confrontational and seek to work within established limits… Second, their indeterminate ideological stance is also related to a brand of non-institutional politics outside of the conventions of party or pressure group activity… Finally, and related to the other features is the role of the mediatory structures or organizations created by NSMs which aim to withstand the incursions of the state into civil society, or as Habermas puts it: the system’s colonisation of the lifeworld. (Nair, 1993:18–19) Thus, while the civic society project has as its goal the depoliticization of citizens, the direction taken by the NSMs is the creation of more autonomous public space which is not subject to bureaucratic control and in which the expression of political difference is possible. There are two problems with Nair’s analysis. The first is its attempt to import the critique of welfare state institutions in liberal-democratic societies into a context where citizenship, as has been shown, is differently grounded. The legitimation problem of the state for Habermas and Offe arises because it is unable to cater to the rising expectations it

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has stimulated in a period of economic recession. Offe would see uninterrupted economic growth of the type experienced in Singapore under PAP leadership as mitigating the legitimation crisis which in the West has provoked the formation of such new social movements (Offe, 1984:29). The second problem with Nair’s analysis is its reluctance to cite examples of the nascent social movements she sees as fulfilling the functions envisaged by Offe—almost, one suspects, because of their perceived fragility. A few voices of dissent can hardly be said to constitute even a nascent social movement, and in this respect the argument is not persuasive. THE EMERGENCE OF AUTONOMOUS INTEREST, GENDER AND ETHNIC ORGANIZATIONS In Chapter 7 it was shown that parapolitical, or government-sponsored agencies have expanded into many areas of people’s lives, especially at the local residential level. As has been suggested, in their steering of the civic society debate it has been argued by government spokespersons such as George Yeo that the state and governmment need to stand back and allow public space in which the spontaneous growth of new social initiatives may occur. On the one hand this represents a recognition that economic rights have now substantially been conferred and that civic and political rights form the next part of the agenda. On the other hand, it must be noted that autonomous activity is still strictly demarcated, for all the activities of these new voluntary associations are circumscribed by the Societies Act which specifically denies any association from speaking on issues out of its declared constituency. To do so may be construed as engaging in ‘political’ activity, which is specifically proscribed by the Act and thus subject to state sanction, including deregistration. (Commentary: Civil Society, 1993:12) One suggested site for the development of civil society lies in the area of NGOs. In themselves NGOs do not guarantee participatory involvement and in a number of developing countries NGOs have had a somewhat mixed existence, being accused of elitism and a ‘top down’ approach (Sasono, 1989:16). In the Singapore context, where parapolitical organizations occupy much of the space between the state and the individual, NGOs of independent origin have begun to emerge and create space of their own. There they have represented the interests of several

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constituencies and have also achieved a degree of rapport with government, acting in a consultancy or advisory role. The three most notable are the Malayan Nature Society (known as the Nature Society of Singapore—NSS—since 1992), the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) and the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP). Both the Nature Society and AWARE take a low-key approach in their attempt to influence government policy, avoiding public debate and working mainly through written submissions rather than public campaigns. By means of their non-confrontational approach they have successfully influenced government and for its part the government has reciprocated. For instance, government approved many of the recommendations of a 1990 MNS report, and the Nature Society has also taken part in public debate over the relative merits of conserving a mature secondary forest or—as proposed by the Public Works Department—building another golf course (Commentary: Civil Society, 1993:12). For its part, AWARE has declared its approach as one of taking a low profile but has engaged in activities which might be defined as thoroughly political (Commentary: Civil Society, 1993:12; Rodan, 1993a:93–4; 1993b:65–7). It has, for instance, pressed the demand that female civil servants be accorded fringe benefits on a par with those of male civil servants. This is a demand on the state and to that extent a ‘political’ activity—moreover, it directly challenges PAP policy on the role of women and the nature of the family—but its reformist tone has prevented overt political conflict. Indeed, in one respect the government’s response to AWARE has been to attempt to co-opt or replicate its programme in a more politically controlled setting. The Vice-President of AWARE, Kanwaljit Soin, has been recruited into the formal political process as a Nominated Member of Parliament. In another reponse to the perceived effectiveness of AWARE, the PAP in 1988 revived its Women’s Wing, which had lapsed during the 1960s into inactivity, though in its revived form it has had little impact (Rodan, 1993b: 66). Here there is another instance of the argument that a once-existing political condition was being reactivated, since it has been claimed that women MPs, who had been prominent in the PAP in the late 1950s and early 1960s, had been displaced by the increasingly ‘credible’ technocrat politicians (Commentary: Democracy, 1993:19). The concept of spontaneously generated mediating structures in pursuit of ethnic interests was introduced in Chapter 7, and this can be seen as a characteristic feature of the more recent ethnic voluntary associations. Among these the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) is especially noteworthy because it was initially formed as a

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direct challenge to the dominance of PAP-aligned leaders within the Muslim community (Chua, 1993a: 104). Its challenge to MENDAKI, the existing PAP-sponsored community organization for Muslims, has been direct and resulted from a sense of alienation from an organization that was too closely identified with official ethnic policy. The AMP was formed in 1990 by young professional Malays, and while initially suspicious of its intentions, the government rapidly sought accommodation with the organization and offered financial support on a dollar-for-dollar basis (Brown, 1993:30; Rodan, 1993a: 94). More than this, there was acknowledgement on the part of the government that some of the AMP’s criticisms were justified, with the Malay Deputy Speaker partly agreeing that there was truth in the charge that: By implication and imputation, a new and different leadership and changes in government’s attitudes are required if the Malays are to make headway in their march into the next century. Implicit in all this is the assumption that Malay MPs do not fully understand or care enough for Malay aspirations and do not empathise with their community, or if they do, they are impotent in shaping policies and conditions which could further Malay interests and alleviate Malay concerns. (quoted in Chua, 1991d:262) The aim of the AMP was to serve as a think-tank and to provide models for young Malays, and while it expressed its desire to be nonpartisan and to co-operate with MENDAKI, it engaged in a frontal attack on MENDAKI’s politicization (Chua, 1991d: 262). Far from resulting in a PAP counter-attack, the initiative was welcomed by then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew as the kind of response that was needed from the Malay community, and a dialogue was begun with the new organization. Lee’s support, arguing for the opportunity to be given to test the professionals’ agenda, was unequivocal: If this group of professionals believe that dissociation or no association with Malay PAP MPs or ministers will inspire them and galvanize the community better, then I say: let’s get on with it. (ST, 13.10.90) The outcome has been that the Malay community now has two centres of Malay/Muslim development, and the AMP has replicated one of the earlier tasks of MENDAKI by introducing scholarship schemes and assistance for needy Malay students, gaining a higher

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public profile in the process (Kumar, 1992:291). This latter activity is one which has the particular encouragement of government because, as has been indicated elsewhere, the government’s studious avoidance of direct state welfare provision and encouragement of communitybased support envisages just such initiatives on the part of nongovernmental organizations (Rodan, 1993a: 94). A combination of ethnic concerns and a similar perceived need for self-help welfare intervention lay behind the establishment in late 1990 of the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA). An awareness on the part of Indians of their minority ethnic status had been heightened by policies promoting Mandarin among the Chinese and by the impending immigration of substantial numbers of Chinese from Hong Kong. The latter was experienced acutely because it was coupled with a high rate of emigration by well-educated and professional Indians (Kumar, 1992:291). This had left the Indian community with a preponderance of the less well-educated. In response, SINDA set out to create economic opportunities and to reshape values with the goal of integrating the Indian community more fully into the mainstream of Singapore society. With both Malay and Indian communities addressing the issues of those of their members in lower socioeconomic groups, the Chinese also took initiatives of their own. Especially after the 1991 election, when an unprecedented (since 1969) four opposition candidates succeeded in being elected, concern was expressed about discontent among less fortunate, mainly dialect-speaking Chinese. They too, it was felt, required community assistance, and the response was the formation in 1992 of the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC). This was set up through co-operation between Chineseeducated professionals, clan associations and the government to promote Chinese education and to channel assistance to poorer Chinese (Brown, 1993:27–8; Kumar, 1992:291). This provided an opportunity for the government to acknowledge that Chinese culture had been neglected in favour of the English-speaking Chinese and to promote more openly aspects of Chinese culture. In late 1992, a research panel set up by CDAC estimated that there were 350,000 Chinese under-achievers from 85,000 households, forming 16 per cent of all Chinese families in Singapore. Finally, the fourth—‘Other’—category of the official model came to prominence, with an assertion by Eurasians (who do not comprise an homogenous community) of their own customs and practices (Kumar, 1992:291). A Eurasian Heritage Day was instituted and in late 1991 the Singapore media began to celebrate the existence of this hitherto somewhat residual community. The Straits Times featured an extensive

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article on ‘The Eurasian Story’, including an item under the headline ‘Who Am I?’ (ST, 2.11.91). In this article similar claims to ethnic community status were made on behalf of this group as the more established claims of Chinese, Malay and Indian communities: Despite the fact that the Eurasians are descended from various Europeans [sic] and Asiatic forebears, they are one community, speak one common language, that is, English, have similar modes of living and religious beliefs, the majority being Catholics. (ST, 2.11.91) Given the degree of intermingling and intermarriage among Eurasians, this group was accorded—by government minister George Yeo—the special contribution of encouraging other Singaporeans to be tolerant (ST, 4.11.91). And although the community was small (only an estimated 13,000, or less than 0.5 per cent of Singapore’s population), its members’ contribution to the development of Singapore was seen to be a large one. In announcing a dollar-for-dollar government grant to the Eurasian Association Endowment Fund, Deputy Prime Minister Ong urged Eurasians not to be ruffled by the term ‘Others’ (ST, 26.10.92). The Eurasian community acquired further prominence early in 1994 with the distribution of the autobiographical Seasons of Darkness: A Story of Singapore by Wilfred Hamilton-Shimmen, himself a Eurasian. Throughout this resurgence of ethnic community groups, the government has continued to emphasize the need for self-help initiatives in place of state-provided welfare, and the appropriateness of expressing communal interests, but always within the context of its overall policy of multiracialism. Thus Prime Minister Goh has called on self-help groups to reaffirm their commitment to multiracialism, so that they do not work against each other at the expense of the overall national interest. And they should always remember that their main concern was with the less advantaged in their own community rather than with the attempt to boost their own community above others (ST, 22.11.91). This has been a recurring theme, with observers questioning the propriety of adopting ethnic-based self-help programmes while maintaining a multiracial ideal: If society is organized and mobilised on the basis of race, it can be easily divided on the basis of race, rendering it easier for the various ethnic communities to be manipulated against one another on the basis of ethnicity. Multi-racialism thus becomes reduced to rhetorical sloganising. (Ishak, 1992:1)

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This apprehension was stimulated by the concern that the greater resources of CDAC might give an unfair advantage to Chinese underachievers, but the Prime Minister’s response was a suggestion that once the CDAC’s programmes were established it should extend its assistance to MENDAKI and SINDA (ST, 6.10.92). The idea of setting up a national self-help body catering to the needs of all groups was seen as unfeasible since it would not be sufficiently sensitive to the special needs of smaller communities (ST, 26.10.92). Thus government policy remains one of channelling assistance to members of lower socioeconomic groups through the agency of ethnically based self-help organizations, while maintaining a fundamental commitment to the overriding goal of multiracialism. THE ARTS AND THE EXPANDING PARTICIPATION DEBATE One of the most remarkable developments in government policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s has been its commitment to a greatly enhanced sector of artistic and cultural activity in Singapore society. This featured as a major theme of the second-generation political leaders’ manifesto, The Next Lap, and has been presented by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong as the next stage in social maturation after the substantial economic achievements of the initial phase of nation building. The development of the cultural dimension, albeit through a process of slow and cautious change represented, in Goh’s words, an attempt to provide Singapore with ‘a more rounded personality’: In the past…we emphasised primarily the basics, relating to economics. That’s unquestionably a very important aspect. But that’s a one-dimensional aspect of a society’s development. Now, having succeeded in fulfilling the basic needs, we have got to address the question: how do you make life more fulfilling for Singaporeans, what is it that they want? (quoted in Vasil, 1993:298) The cultural project has been closely associated with the civic society debate in the person of George Yeo, Minister for Information and the Arts and now also Second Minister for Foreign Affairs. The accelerating growth of the cultural environment can be traced from the late 1980s. In 1988 the Advisory Council on Culture and the Arts mapped out a programme ‘to develop Singapore into a gracious, cultured and well-informed society, appreciative of its multi-cultural

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heritage’ (Committee on Visual Arts, 1988: Preface 1). As the Committee on Visual Arts noted, Singapore had for more than two decades been preoccupied with national development and as a result government resources had been directed towards economic and infrastructural goals, according culture and the arts low priority. Private interest groups and individuals had been left to promote cultural activities. With the high economic growth and improved living standards of the 1980s, however, Singaporeans had more leisure time and were turning to ‘the finer things in life. In the pursuit of culture and the arts, the people increasingly look to the Government and its agencies to take the lead’ (Committee on Visual Arts, 1988: n.p.). The visual arts in particular were seen to develop an ability to explore cultural traditions and contemporary experiences and to contribute to a sensitive response to society and the environment. More than this, the arts encouraged appreciation and respect for the cultural and social values of the different races and ‘can provide the gel for social integration of our nation and form the basis to build the spirit of a nation’ (Committee on Visual Arts, 1988: n.p.). Nor was the value of the arts limited to nation building in a multicultural society because in direct economic terms there was considerable potential in the international marketing of Singapore art work. The pragmatic overlay of this perceived cultural renaissance was to be a persistent theme. Singapore’s 25th anniversary as a nation in 1990 provided the occasion for a substantial expansion of artistic and cultural activity, with ‘cultural months’ dedicated to each of the three main ethnic communities and an international festival of the arts at mid-year. Since its origin in 1977 this biennial festival had seen ticket sales increase from 6,000 to 100,000 in 1990 (Iau, 1991:58). Plans were announced to develop a cultural zone—principally for the performing arts— encompassing some of Singapore’s historic sites, and towards the end of the year a new government ministry was formed, the Ministry of Information and the Arts. The latter expressed the government’s intention ‘to focus resources into the development of culture as one of the strong bondings for a maturing Singapore society’ (Iau, 1991:58). Another most important development in the cultural scene, also in 1991, was the establishment of the National Arts Council with the intention of developing Singapore into a global city for the arts. Features of the increased interest in the arts—which were noted by Iau in the course of a national policy review symposium under the auspices of the Institute of Policy Studies—were the popularity of Western cultural productions and the decline in many of the traditional ethnic performing arts. Nevertheless, the attention given to culture

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and the arts together with the emphasis on traditional values—since the Shared Values project of 1990–1 was seen to have intimate links with the rapidly growing interest in the arts—were jointly seen to have great significance for the final stage of the nation building exercise: There is no argument that these are attributes which represent the final building blocks in the emergence of a mature Singapore society. Together, they form the ingredients vital to the enrichment of life and a caring and sharing society. (Iau, 1991:62–3) Another contributor to the national policy review symposium pointed to the lack of a cultural layer in Singapore society, arguing that this reflected the weakness of the cultural ballast but noting a paradoxical advantage in this situation. In his diagnosis there are clear echoes of Goh Keng Swee’s earlier scepticism and pragmatism: A divisive population without a cohesive, wholesome outlook, but having the capacity for hardwork and desperately seeking material gains, makes a very effective labour force. Hence, colonial administration and education reinforced this weakness of ours. … Ironically, deculturalisation became an advantage in economicgrowth-led development. This characteristic of our existence, whether imposed or evolved, played a very important part in our rapid accumulation of material wealth. (Kuo, 1991:70) However, this was at the price of the lack of a cultural layer and a consequent impatience with issues which were not expressed in technological, economic or political terms; indeed, there was a tendency indiscriminately to reduce cultural issues to such a level. In counterposing non-material culture with the technological ethos of Singapore society, Kuo also insisted that art should be measured as a creative, ‘down-up’ process rather than as a product of government sponsorship. The latter, nonetheless, was an irreplaceable input given the fragmented and subcultural nature of the surrounding milieu. A third contributor to the symposium, Koh, perceptively drew together a series of observations which highlighted discrepancies and lacunae in official definitions of and policies towards culture. The ‘cultural months’ of the 25th anniversary, for example, could be seen as show-case activities with no organic link to contemporary life.

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Much the same critique of the ‘cultural show’ presentation of multiculturalism has been made by Benjamin (1976). And while three cultural months were allocated to Chinese, Malays, and Indians, the ‘Others’ (notably Eurasians) in official categorization received no cultural recognition. Furthermore, when the opportunity was available to choose between performances, seven out of the eight topselling productions at the anniversary Festival of the Arts were Western in their cultural orientation. Against this background, resistance to Western culture and an emphasis on ‘Asian values’ could be portrayed as a ‘museumization’ of culture (Koh, 1991:82). A further discrepancy noted by Koh is that, while the focus of official policy has been consistently on culture as a source of multicultural integration, its definition may be becoming increasingly classoriented. By this is meant that culture is viewed increasingly as the concern of middle-class English-educated constituencies and that cultural developments do not reflect the interests of majority ‘grassroots’ communities. Theatre, for example, has come to be a fringe minority, but privileged, activity, symbolized by the 100–200 seat size of two of the most influential theatre establishments. Thus Koh indicates on the one hand an official encouragement of cultural heterogeneity while simultaneously the search is made for common cultural identity. The removal of Religious Knowledge from the secondary school curriculum followed by the articulation of Shared Values are illustrative of this dilemma, as is the subsequent engagement of political leaders in the ‘civic society’ debate. This, argues Koh, has important implications for both society and the types of cultural activities that will be supported. For instance, the deemphasis on the arts in the formative school years and the concurrent call for individual creativity through art education provide contradictory cues over the relationship between the individual and society which is central to the civic society debate. In sum, the evidence suggests that support for cultural activity and the arts, and with it an evaluation of their broader social significance, diverges between two competing definitions: The first…is a feeling that culture and the arts are a secular substitute, a repository of values in a world where organized religion and communal worship have in their retreat left a spiritual vacuum. This is implicit in the…dream of Singapore as a ‘City of Excellence’, ‘a cultured society’ and a ‘cultural centre of good international standing.’ The other is the view of culture and the arts as an industry first spelled out locally in the 1986 Report of

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the Economic Committee…which focused on the re-positioning of the Singapore economy by the 1990s. (Koh, 1991:86) It is clear that both definitions—competing though not in principle incompatible—have informed government policy, and that both expressive and utilitarian conceptions of culture and the arts have been incorporated into policy. As an example of the former, the National University of Singapore’s Centre for the Arts (CFA) has been very substantially funded by government with the goal of creating a ‘culturally vibrant campus environment’ (Centre for the Arts, publicity brochure). The CFA was established to complement the activities of the National Arts Council with the ideal of ‘developing cultural openings in higher education. It aims to “turn the university into a major arts centre in Singapore, creating wellrounded students and generating students’ interests in the arts’” (Soin, 1993:67). Its emphasis on the creative arts is represented in its performance, recording and publishing facilities and it supports a wide range of resident groups. A more utilitarian conception of the arts is evidenced in support by the Economic Development Board and the National Arts Council for companies staging major international productions—Cats and Les Miserables within a period of three months in 1993–4, for instance (Yeo, 1993:64). The competing definitions, with financial considerations to the fore in a speech to a fine art and antique fair, can be seen clearly in the reason given by the Minister for Information and the Arts for promoting the arts: We want to make Singapore a centre for the arts partly for its own sake and partly because we need the arts to help make us a centre for brain services. We want talent from all over the world to meet here, to work here and to live here. They must enjoy being here— the people, the food, the music, the cosmopolitan air. We cannot work the magic without the arts. This is why we will be spending quite a lot of money—about a billion dollars—over the next five to 10 years building new cultural facilities and expanding existing ones. (Yeo, 1993:65) Thus the debate over civil or civic society highlights the tension and dilemma of the PAP government as it strives to formulate responses to demands by an increasingly highly educated citizenry for legitimate areas of social participation. As shown in this chapter, the

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autonomous organizations which have developed from the late 1980s until the present have avoided confrontation and have chosen instead to work largely behind the scenes in furthering their agendas. In the process they have succeeded in demonstrating that there is indeed space in the interstices between the ‘political’, as defined by the state, and the ‘legitimate’—albeit unobtrusively political—concerns of the interest groups which have arisen in this way. By espousing consensus politics, rather than the politics of overt confrontation, these autonomous organizations have in effect pursued one of the precepts of the Shared Values agenda, ‘Consensus instead of contention’.

10 Conclusion

The principal focus of this book has been on the intimately related issues of nation building and citizenship in a post-colonial society which experienced abrupt and precarious independence and which had to contend with potentially disruptive ethnic strains. The process of nation building was hence embarked on as an urgent and challenging task. It is noteworthy that in the past decade, academic theorizing on the nation-state in Western societies has devoted considerably more attention to the concept of citizenship than to that of nationhood. Part of the reason for this emphasis has been the momentum generated by the push for some form of political union which would embrace the ideal of a European community. As a key element in this process, the concept of citizenship has become transnational. Nevertheless, the concept of nationhood continues to be a significant concern in post-colonial societies; indeed, this persists even when such societies come to terms with the need to forge regional associations—such as ASEAN—in the wake of competition from economic blocs in other parts of the world. Throughout the book it has been maintained that, although analytically separate, nationhood and citizenship are closely linked. The modern conception of citizenship in the Western world has to be seen in terms of the significance of the French Revolution (Turner, 1986:19). This is for three principal reasons. First, the idea of citizenship is linked with the affirmation of human equality and individual rights within some notion of community. Second, the development of modern citizenship occurred with the rise of the nation-state in France during the eighteenth century, and it is for this reason that today millions of people resident in France are not entitled to citizenship status because they are not French nationals.

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Third, citizenship is associated with a major concern of the Revolution, namely, political liberation. The view that the practice of citizenship required the acceptance of collective responsibility entailed by membership of a community gradually became eroded with the emergence of the liberal welfare state in the middle of the present century. As conceived in T.H. Marshall’s exposition in 1949, citizenship was essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone gained entitlement to full and equal rights as members of society, including economic and social security. The fullest expression of this would, in Marshall’s view, be found in a liberal-democratic welfare state. The consequence of this was that citizenship, in response to the growing influences of liberal individualism in the post-war period, became an issue of entitlement in which the rights of individuals were sacrosanct—to be guaranteed and protected by political institutions. The emphasis shifted to passive entitlements and the absence of any obligation to participate in public life. Thus, it could be argued, the liberal-democratic view of citizenship facilitated the emergence of the private citizen. With the rise of the liberal welfare state, the preoccupation with nationality was expurgated from the practice of citizenship, as the focus of attention centred on the rights both of the individual and of disadvantaged minorities. While citizenship has evolved out of the rise of the nation in the primary nation-states of Western Europe, new states which were the products of post-war decolonization inherited the instruments of administration from the departing colonial powers. One of these administrative tools, the status of citizenship, could be used as an exclusionary device by those in power who were unable to transcend ethnic loyalties. When this occurred, the outcome was that citizenship came to be envisaged as a source of division rather than of unification, as nationality was disembodied from it. In newly independent states citizenship was distinct from nationality, hence the tension between the two. In such states citizenship implied that all members, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, were entitled to full and equal rights within the community; but until this was seen to be practised a common nationality accepted by all remained problematic. Thus one of the tasks of this book has been to explore in depth an observation made by Turner (1986:62), which is that while citizenship can be regarded as a reasonable criterion of modernization there is no necessary relationship between the two: there are different historical routes and experiences. It is a familiar comparative pattern that political regimes in newly

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independent states, when they suddenly find themselves in government, have a tenuous hold on power. For this reason they find it necessary to engage in the cultural-symbolic construction of nationhood to the detriment of administration, resource control and distribution—the civic-instrumental dimension of nationhood—as portrayed by Breton (1984). The practice of citizenship falls squarely within the latter since it is invariably concerned with economic and social well-being. Here can be seen one of the distinct features of the nation building process in Singapore. From time to time the PAP government has indeed involved itself in manipulating the symbolic content of national identity, but it has never lost sight of the material and utilitarian objectives in nation building. Furthermore, for reasons which embrace its geopolitical situation and the political orientation of its leadership, the Singapore government from the outset rejected the two alternatives available to post-colonial elites in forging a national identity which would be perceived as a decisive break with the colonial past—the first, a regressive identity in search of an imagined golden past; the second, a progressive identity embodied in a radically restructured society based on socialist ideals (Chan and Evers, 1973:303). A regressive identity was out of the question since the Chinese majority on the island was a minority within the surrounding region. A progressive identity oriented towards a socialist Utopia was unacceptable both to Singapore’s neighbours and to the pragmatic vision of the founders of the PAP. At a very early stage in nation building they viewed negatively the practice of Asian nationalism which harked back to a golden past. Instead they called for a forward-looking, collective orientation committed to economic achievement and problem-solving, and a national identity grounded in rational and pragmatic values (Chan and Evers, 1973:317). So successful was its development programme in the 1960s and 1970s that the PAP feared Singapore was in danger of becoming an atomized society in the face of perceived rampant Westernization. The enunciation of citizenship as a communitarian ideal, in reaction to liberal individualism, gathered pace in the 1980s. To this end citizens are, in Oldfield’s portrayal of the civicrepublican tradition of citizenship (1990:5), ‘called to stern and important tasks which have to do with the very sustaining of their identity’. Civic republicanism, in Oldfield’s account (1990:145), is communitarian; it stresses what individuals share with other individuals and it emphasizes the elements that integrate citizens into the community. Consequently, it involves a commitment to a common enterprise for the collective good. The practice of citizenship

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in Singapore requires that citizens fulfil their obligations and duties to the community. However, the overtly paternalistic and interventionist policies of the PAP government, even though they have successfully addressed the material problems of nation building, have over the years reduced the social and political space within which Singaporeans are allowed to operate. The government’s response has been to create its own version of ‘civil society’, significantly receding it as ‘civic society’, as a means of capturing some of the political ground it fears it has been losing in recent elections. At this point it should be noted that the practice of the civic republican form of citizenship predates its articulation as an explicit goal of PAP government policy. In the early years after independence, when the precariousness of the country’s situation was underscored by a succession of unforeseen events, appeals to civic duty were largely expressed in the ‘crisis’ and ‘survival’ modes; and these motifs have never been entirely transcended. For instance, in the aftermath of the 1991 general election, when the election of four opposition MPs was widely interpreted as a rebuff to the PAP’s dominance, Prime Minister Goh sketched three possible future scenarios for Singapore—none of them particularly appealing, he noted. The first two represented the extremes which have always been the targets of PAP rhetoric: ‘Individualism run wild’ and ‘Welfare for all scenario’. The third was the stoic proposition of a ‘Unity in crisis scenario’ in which the people rally round their government and accept austerity in a time of uncertainty (ST, 30.11.91). While the ‘crisis’ and ‘survival’ motifs dominated the 1960s and early 1970s, by the mid-1970s, in a climate of economic and social achievement which had been widely experienced by Singapore’s citizens, the concept of social discipline articulated by PAP leaders was constructed more explicitly in terms of a reaction to alleged Western decadence—symbolized in the figure of the long-haired hippie—and the assertion of ‘Asian’ values in the face of what was argued to be potential deculturation. The 1980s was the decade of ‘civil religion’, as the moral education programme sought to elicit models of good citizenship from the teachings of the major world religions and ethical systems. This entailed a selective highlighting of those components in each religious tradition which were most conducive to the formation of the ‘ideal Singaporean’, but when the socially and ethnically disruptive potential of religion were realized in the latter half of the 1980s the articulation of this ideal was sought elsewhere. Thus, finally, from the late 1980s and against the background of a perceived growth of individualism among an increasingly affluent body of citizens, has come the attempt to

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engender shared values—which have now taken the more distinctive form of family values—and the civic society project. The latter, it has been maintained, contains strong elements of the civic-republican tradition of citizenship while simultaneously offering the prospect of autonomous social space. As has been seen at various points in this book, a number of the initiatives taken by the PAP government can be interpreted as instances of a ‘Return to Sender’ dynamic. The interventionist state undeniably penetrates many aspects of the everyday lives of its citizens—from bedroom to boardroom, as Nair (1993:17) labels it— and citizens respond, not infrequently in an unanticipated or unintended manner. That the PAP government has consistently monitored grassroots opinion through an array of parapolitical and community-based agencies, and has devoted considerable resources to their maintenance and effectiveness, is evidence of its concern with ‘reflexive surveillance’ as a means of maintaining its political hegemony. But no amount of maintenance can fully guarantee a successful outcome, and the proof of this is manifest in the PAP’s electoral vicissitudes. Before outlining some key examples of the ‘Return to Sender’ process, an important qualification must be made. While the PAP government has never hesitated to modify policies in the light of the unintended response of groups of citizens—to the extent on occasion of totally abandoning a policy which had been introduced only after considerable discussion and design—its overall course has also demonstrated a high degree of consistency. In three fundamental aspects of policy this consistency is especially evident. These are the aspects of pragmatism, multiracialism and meritocracy. Pragmatism has been an attribute of the PAP leadership from the party’s earliest years. In part the result of external events necessitating flexible responses, but more profoundly deriving from the technocratic character of the political elite, this principle has remained at the centre of policy formation. More than this, it has been seen as a source of ideological consensus within the population at large, defining ‘how things really are’ (Chua, 1985:33). Multiracialism too has been one of the key principles in PAP policy since the mid-1950s. Though muted for a period in the early 1960s, as the government sought merger with Malaysia, it has subsequently been fully developed as one of the founding myths of Singapore. It finds its most immediate everyday expression in the hyphenated identity carried by every Singapore citizen. The principle of meritocracy is the third fundamental element of PAP philosophy. It is

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highly compatible with the ideology of pragmatism, and in a multiracial society its maintenance is an essential factor in preventing the growth of ethnic privilege. Meritocracy finds its most concrete expression in the competitive education system, with the government constantly monitoring comparative success rates and modifying educational structures to ensure that the weaker students are not disadvantaged. Equally, a system of rewards is supported which offers high remuneration to the most talented: in the words of one government minister, ‘Talented people are the yeast in helping to raise the overall performance of society’ (ST, 19.1.92). The three central tenets of PAP philosophy thus underlie any detailed policy revisions, and it is clear that the PAP government considers that policy reverses may be tolerated, and unanticipated demands responded to, so long as these policy basics remain intact. The notion of ‘firm limits beyond which there will be no give’ has in fact been spelled out by Lee Kuan Yew in challenging the activities of pressure groups (ST, 16.8.92). Having stated this proviso, some of the ‘Return to Sender’ responses may briefly be reviewed. In its policies towards the family, for instance, the PAP has encountered strong resistance to its intrusion into an area of private concern. As has been shown, the eugenics-based attempt to encourage selective reproduction in the 1983–4 period was an immediate factor in the large electoral downturn of 1984. In response, the government rapidly adjusted its policy as it perceived negative reaction of a significant group in the electorate. A similar penetration of everyday life in a closely related area, that of housing, has also produced reactions that were unanticipated. In addition to the broader creation of unwanted expectations which Jones (1979) regards as endemic to the operation of ‘oikonomic welfare states’, there have been more direct repercussions of the government’s close association with the administration of the HDB. The increase in the price of HDB flats in the period 1979–84, which was motivated by an attempt to match wage increases designed to encourage highproductivity industry, produced considerable discontent among lower-and middle-income members of the population. This has been cited as a factor in the Anson by-election of 1981, which resulted in the election of an opposition candidate, the first since 1968 (Castells, et al, 1990:250–1). A striking example of the ‘Return to Sender’ dynamic is provided by the intense debate over the role of religion in education which spanned the decade 1979–89, and to which detailed attention has already been given in Chapter 8. Beginning with an attempt to

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institutionalize religious education as a vehicle for the dissemination of moral values which would underpin the practice of good citizenship, the unforeseen potential of religion to foment social division soon became apparent. Having introduced the programme into schools in 1984, by 1986–7 the issue of Malay Muslim loyalty to the state had become a contentious public issue. In the middle of 1987 the capacity of religion to stimulate radical social action was highlighted by the highly-publicized ‘Marxist conspiracy’, in which the Internal Security Department played a key role in ‘crisis’ amplification and management. To these events was added the discovery of apparently large numbers of conversions to fundamentalist Christianity of highly educated, English-speaking Chinese, and the failure of the Confucian Ethics programme to recruit a significant proportion of students. In 1989 the religious education programme was terminated, and in 1990 the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act was introduced. Also in 1990, the civil society debate was initiated in Singapore. This had a variety of sources—events in China and Eastern Europe, the unexpected and spontaneous emergence of the Association of Muslim professionals together with the leadership transition, all played a part in stimulating the debate—but it represented an autonomous response on the part of local intellectuals. Partly in response to the perceived contraction of social and political space which had occurred in the late 1980s, as represented for instance by government policy towards religion, the concept of autonomous space between the state and the family was advanced by intellectual commentators who adopted the Western liberal model of civil society. In response, the government proposed its own model of civic society based on a growth of non-political but autonomous institutions and presented it as the next stage of nation building. Under the able supervision of George Yeo, this exercise in Southeast Asian glasnost has so far seen the development of several independent associations, as well as a growth of cultural and artistic activity. In the political sphere, however, the hegemony of the PAP remains largely intact. While the civic-republican practice of citizenship calls on individuals to fulfil their responsibilities as citizens by attending to that part of their will and interest which is general, Oldfield draws attention to the difference between ‘motivating individuals to take the duties of citizenship seriously’ and ‘using them to foist a unitary consensus over substantive issues on an otherwise unwilling citizenry’ (Oldfield, 1990:163). The latter may lead to a blind and unreflective

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patriotism, which is inappropriate in a modern society. It may also result in individuals participating in the practice of citizenship for instrumental reasons. As a way of countering such a tendency, Oldfield (1990:163) argues that some bonding between the individual and the community must exist beforehand. In a speech to PAP activists (ST 15.6.92) Prime Minister Goh stated that one of the main thrusts in the party’s political programme in the coming years was to strengthen the bond between the government and the people. However, whether the PAP government succeeds in motivating Singaporeans to take up the duties of citizenship—in the civicrepublican sense—and at the same time avoid the negative consequences identified by Oldfield, may depend upon the amount of political space it is prepared to concede. The civic society project is a first if tentative step in this direction. In concluding this account of nation building and citizenship in Singapore, reference once more to the historical origins of the citystate is unavoidable because, as was shown in the earlier chapters of the book, the direction which nation building has taken is very much a product of its political history. Singapore became an independent state in a most inauspicious way, through separation from its origins in Malaya which the state was forced to accept, despite its leaders’ firm conviction that it could not survive as an independent entity. In the absence of wars of popular liberation, class struggles and the realistic threat of interstate hostility, the development of nationhood has almost inevitably turned inward. It has become transformed into a preoccupation with the development and practice of citizenship in a population with a singular migrant background, and initially without strong communal solidarity or a tradition of social discipline. The success of this process has depended substantially on the accomplished economic and social pragmatism of the political leadership, which has secured for the governing party a high degree of political legitimation. Paradoxically, sustained success is not only required to prevent the development of potential fissures in the society, especially those based on ethnicity, but is simultaneously likely to generate many of the problems of individualistic hedonism which the ‘free rider’ dilemma of Western liberal-individualist versions of citizenship has presented. The cultural-symbolic project of motivation in the practice of citizenship through the dissemination of collective values—several versions of which have been introduced, as has been shown—is unlikely by itself to succeed in generating the desired model of responsible citizenship. But with the immense

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prospect of an East Asian renaissance in succeeding decades, it may well be that Singapore’s citizens, ideally located economically to play a leading role in its progress, may concurrently discover a degree of cultural compatibility that will reinforce the habits of group solidarity which their leadership has been attempting to instil.

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Index

Note: Sub-entries are in alphabetical ‘Asian’ values 8, 36; and civil society 239, 245; core see under values; order, except where chronological and family 148, 151, 155; and order is more useful Abercrombie, N. 160 Abortion Act (1970) 147 Abraham, C.E.R. 109, 110 Administration of Muslim Law Act 205 Advisory Council on Culture and Arts 236–7 Africa 65, 184 ageing population 122–3, 153 Agnew, J.A. 121 Ahmat, S. 77, 83, 84 Alatas, S.H. 194 Allen, J. 41 Alliance Party 17, 58, 60 All-Party Committee on Chinese Education (1956) 4, 68, 74–8, 80, 92, 102 Alter, P. 13, 23 Alvarez, G. 148, 152 AMP see Association of Muslim Professionals Andaya, B.W. and L.Y. 41 Anderson, A.B. 94, 96 Anderson, E.A. 48, 82 Anthony, D. 203 Arabs 46, 108 Aristotle 202 arts and cultural activities 165, 236–41 ascription, policy of 103–7 ASEAN 242

ideology 188–9, 193–8, 207, 209, 215, 217; and modernization 193–6 Association of Muslim Professionals 106, 108, 222, 232–3, 248 Association of Women for Action and Research 232 Austin, W.T. 180 Australia 16, 33 autonomous organizations 231–6 AWARE (Association of Women for Action and Research) 232 bangsa Melayu 46, 60 Barbalet, J.M. 28, 30, 33–4, 36, 39, 53, 209 Barisan Sosialis 19; and nation state and ethnic origins 56, 57, 61, 63; and parapolitical institutions 176–7, 183 Barnes Report (1950) 73, 74, 76, 83 Barth 25 Barthes, R. 13 Bauman, Z. 25, 34, 96 Beckford, J.A. 230 Bedlington S.S., 169, 190 Bellah, R.N. 193 Bellows, T.J. 35, 56, 60, 62, 64–5, 176, 214 Benjamin, G. 88, 239; and intermediary structures 166, 168; and multiracialism 91, 93, 94, 99,

272

Index 103, 110; and nation state and citizenship 14, 16, 31, 34, 36 Berger, B. 155, 156, 157, 163 Berger, P.L. 218, 226; and family 140–2, 155–7; and intermediary structures 161–3, 166–7; and parapolitical institutions 182, 185 Betts, R. 34, 99–102, 168, 169, 170 bilingualism see education and language Birch, D. 170 Bismarck, O.von 28 Bloodworth, D. 47, 50, 51, 55, 75 borders and boundaries 24–5 Borneo 55, 76 Borthwick, S. 171 Bowles, S. 15 Braga-Blake, M. 103 Breton, R. 4, 22, 78–80, 159, 218–19, 244 Breuilly, J. 14–15 Britain and British: Commonwealth 37, 184; and family 141, 144, 145, 149; federation attempts see Federation of Malaya; Malayan Forum; Malayan Union; Malaysia; housing in 117, 119, 121, 122, 129–30; and housing in Singapore 115; and ideology 189, 195, 214; and intermediary structures 164; and multiracialism 100, 107; see also colonialism; English Brown, D.: and civil society 233, 234; and intermediary structures 169, 170; and multiracialism 97, 101, 102, 104, 107, 108; and nation state and citizenship 19, 35 Brunei 25 BS see Barisan Sosialis Buddhism 151, 200, 204–5, 208 bureaucratization 23, 193 Burke, E. 226 Busch, P.A. 19, 115 Calvinism 13–14 Canada: multiracialism 94, 96, 99–100, 107 Castells, M. 191, 247; and housing 119, 122, 124–5, 127, 133

273

Castles, S. 33, 114–15, 117 CCs see Community Centres CCCs see Citizens’ Consultative Committees CDAC see Chinese Development Assistance Council Censuses 122, 143, 147, 151, 169 Central Executive Council 62 Central Provident Fund 117, 120, 122, 124, 133, 153 Centre for Arts (NUS) 240 Chai Hon Chan 69 Chamber of Commerce see Chinese Chamber of Commerce Chan Heng Chee 166, 225, 244; and ideology 189–91, 218; and multiracialism 93, 100, 111; and nation state and citizenship 12, 19, 23, 31–2, 35–7; and nation state and ethnic origins 56–8, 62–4; and parapolitical institutions 176, 178–9, 181 Cheah Boon Kheng 44 Chen, P.S.J. 40 Cheng Cheang Wing 111, 173, 181 Cheng Siok-Hwa 146 Cheng Soo May 192 Chew, E. 40 Chew, S. 81 Chew Sock Foon 40, 104 Chiew Seen Kong 39, 40 children: numbers of 7, 145–8, 151–4, 247; see also education China 3, 25, 248; and civil society 221, 248; and education 67, 69–71, 73–4; and family 143; and housing 135; and Japan 69, 70; and multiracialism 91, 105; and nation state and ethnic origins 43, 47, 52, 53, 54, 65–6; Tiananmen Square 221; see also Chinese Chinatown 115–16 Chinese Chamber of Commerce 49, 52, 53, 54–5, 59, 64, 71 Chinese Development Assistance Council 69, 108, 234, 236 Chinese language and education 3, 4, 67, 75–6, 80, 106; before independence 69–72; after independence 82–9; and civil

274

Index

society 228, 234; and ideology 205, 207; and multiracialism 92, 106; and nation state and citizenship 19, 31, 33; and nation state and ethnic origins 49, 50, 52–5, 64, 65; and parapolitical institutions 178, 183; Speak Mandarin Campaign 82, 87, 196, 208–9; see also Chinese people Chinese Nationality Act (1929) 54 Chinese people in Singapore 5, 244, 248; and civil society 223, 228, 234–5, 239; and education 67– 76, 77, 81–9; and family 143–5, 153; and housing 114, 115, 116, 126, 138; and ideology 188, 194, 196–7, 199, 205, 207, 209, 213, 217; and intermediary structures 164–6, 169, 170–1, 174, 185; and multiracialism 92, 106; and nation state and citizenship 17, 20, 26, 29, 31–3, 37; and nation state and ethnic origins 40, 41–4, 46–56, 59–60, 64–5; and parapolitical institutions 178, 181, 183; see also Chinese language Christianity 9, 69, 159, 235; and family 145, 151; and ideology 188, 193–1, 199–201, 204, 206–8 Chua Beng Huat 37, 64, 154, 246; and civil society 224, 229, 233; and housing 115–16, 119, 121, 123, 126–7, 130–1, 134, 136–8; and ideology 188, 189, 191, 203; and multiracialism 95, 111 Citizens’ Consultative Committees 23, 62, 121, 165, 171, 175, 178, 182, 183 citizenship 1, 2, 3, 242–3, 244–5, 248–9; and colonial decline 51–5; by birth 41, 55; as contestation 27–30; as duty 142; and education 81; and ethnic communities 172–4; as membership of community 30–5; and nation building 25–7; see also ethnic origins; nation building; rights civic society 221–31, 245

civic-republican construction of nation 22, 78, 79, 90, 142, 244–5, 249; see also citizenship; civic society; civil society civil religion see moral education civil society 9–10, 163, 220–41, 245, 248; arts and expanding participation debate 236–41; autonomous organizations 231–6; new agenda of civil or civic society 221–31 Clammer, J. 88, 93, 104–7, 188–9, 217–19 class: and family 148–51, 157; see also middle class; working class Clutterbuck, R. 48, 75, 177, 192 colonialism 5, 72, 98, 164; decline and citizenship 51–5; and education see English language; and nation state and citizenship 24, 28, 37; and nation state and ethnic origins 41–2, 44, 49, 50–5; see also decolonization Commonwealth, British 37, 184 communism 3, 9, 11, 165, 206, 248; and education 67, 71, 74–5; and ideology 206–7, 209, 210; and nation state and citizenship 13, 17, 18–19; and nation state and ethnic origins 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50–1, 52, 62, 64–5; and parapolitical institutions 182, 183–4; see also China; Communist Party; Eastern Europe; socialism Communist Party of Malaya 44–5, 47, 49–51, 64–5, 74, 182, 207 Communitarianism 212 community 7, 249; citizenship as membership of 30–5; Community Development, Ministry of 152, 154–5, 183, 211; and ideology 202–3, 209, 213, 216; organizations, Malay 166–71; policing 128, 179–80 Community Centres 7, 23, 62, 165, 171, 175, 176–8, 179, 182; and housing 121, 125 Confederation see Malaysia Confucianism 8–9, 131, 248; and civil

Index society 221, 227; and education 201–4; and family 151, 155–6; and ideology 155–6, 194–7, 200, 201– 4, 207–10, 212, 216, 218 conjugal family 122, 143, 147 consensus 213, 216 Constitution 43, 45–6, 49 contestation, citizenship as 27–30 contraception 146, 147, 152–3 Cope, B. 33, 114–15, 117 Council for Development of Muslims/on Education of Muslim Children see MENDAKI ‘counter-modernization’ 218 CPF see Central Provident Fund CPM see Communist Party of Malaya crime 127–9, 164; see also police ‘crises’ created 23, 34, 170, 245 ‘Cuba’ 19 cultural activities see arts cultural pluralism see multiracialism cultural-symbolic dimension 22, 79, 244; see also education; multiracialism; values current project see civil society Curriculum Development Institute 204 Dahrendorf, R. 174, 221, 223, 228 decadence see Western influence decolonization 16, 18–19, 42; and citizenship 51–5; and education 72–4; see also colonialism; Federation of Malaya; independence; Malaya; Malaysia depoliticization 129–31, 229 Dhanabalan, S. 172 Dunleavy, P. 130 Durkheim, E. 7, 21, 141, 183, 207; and intermediary structures 159–53 Eastern Europe and Soviet bloc 134, 221, 248 Ebert-Oehlers, A. 103 Economic Development Board 118, 240 economic growth and industrialization 1, 8, 195, 237; and family 146, 149; and nation

275

state and citizenship 20, 31–2; and nation state and ethnic origins 57, 64; survival and multiracialism 99–101 education and language 3, 4, 50–1, 67–90; Chinese education before independence 69–72; decolonization and education 72– 4; multilingual plans see All-Party Committee; nation building and language 78–80; after independence 81–9; rationale for bilingualism 88–90; and civil society 228, 234; and family and women 145, 149, 150, 151–4, 156–7; Goh Report see under Goh Keng Swee; and ideology 188, 196–205, 206–8, 219, 239; and intermediary structures 166, 167– 8, 172–3; and multiracialism 92, 98, 102, 104–9, 112; and nation state and citizenship 15, 20, 22, 28, 31, 33–4, 37, 38, 78–80; and nation state and ethnic origins 40, 44–5, 48–55, 57, 63–5; and parapolitical institutions 178, 183; and religion see moral education; tertiary 48, 87, 149, 171, 201–2, 206; values in 196–201; see also All-Party Committee; Chinese language; English; Malay language; meritocracy; Tamil Edwards, J. 81, 89 elections and voting 33, 49–50, 51, 57, 133, 245 Elliott, J.L. 95 Emergency (1948–60) 48, 49, 74 emigration 228 English language and education 3, 4, 239; and decolonization 72–4; and education policy 68, 69, 71, 76, 77, 81–5, 87; and family 145; and ideology 188, 206–7; and intermediary structures 167–8; and multiracialism 92, 102, 105, 112; and nation state and citizenship 19, 28, 31, 33, 38, 80; and nation state and ethnic origins 44–5, 48, 53, 54, 63 environment and housing 135–9

276

Index

ethnic origins 17, 39–66, 172–4; early ideas of union see Malayan Forum; Malayan Union; colonial decline and citizenship 51–5; merger with Malaysia see Malaysia; separation from Malaysia see independence; PAP’s ideology created 62–6; structuring ethnic relations see multiracialism; and civil society 24, 222, 232–5; see also Britain and British; Chinese; Eurasians; Europe and Europeans; Indians; Malays; multiracialism eugenics attempts 7, 145–8, 151–4, 247 Eurasians 68, 91, 103–4, 234–5, 239 Europe and Europeans 215; Eastern 134, 221, 248; and family 143; and nation states 15–16, 18, 24, 25, 28, 39, 242–3; see also Britain; colonialism; Second World War Evers, H.D. 37, 93, 244; and ethnic origins 40, 64; and ideology 189– 91, 194, 218 evictions from housing 127, 129, 133 expectations, expansion of 132 expulsion from Malaysia see independence extended family 122, 147–8, 151 Family Planning and Population Board 146, 152–3 Family Services Unit 192 family and state 6–7, 140–58, 247; and housing 122–3, 135–6, 147, 150, 151, 153, 154; and ideology 213, 216; and intermediary structures 161, 163; migrant 143– 5; number of children 7, 145–8, 151–4, 247; proletarianization 148–51, 157; values 11, 140, 141, 148, 151, 154–8, 246; Women’s Charter 57, 143–5 Fawcett, J.T. 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 Federated Malay States (FMS) 41, 79 Federation of Malaya: Agreement and creation (1948) 26, 37, 58,

116, 126; Emergency (1948–60) 48, 49, 74; independence (1957) 39; after 1963 see Malaysia; and education 77–8; and intermediary structures 159, 167; and multiracialism 92, 96; and nation state and ethnic origins 43–5, 49, 52–5, 57–61, 63 Fenn-Wu Report (1951) 73, 76 Fenton, S. 163 Finance, Ministry of 148 Fleras, A 95 Fletcher, N.M. 56, 60, 167 FMS (Federated Malay States) 41, 79 France 24, 28, 215, 242 Franke, W. 70, 71 Freedman, M. 115, 143–4, 164 Frideres, J.S. 94, 96 Furnival, J.S. 115 future orientation 19, 36, 37, 244 Garden City concept 119 Gellner, E. 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 67 Germany 28; see also Second World War Geylang 115 Giddens, A. 3, 131, 160, 176; and nation state and citizenship 13, 21, 25, 28, 29, 33, 34 Gintis, H. 15 Girling, J.L.S. 35 Goh Chok long 24, 48, 153, 245, 249; and civil society 235–6; and ideology 210–12, 217; and multiracialism 109, 111 Goh Keng Swee 103; and civil society 227, 238; and family 148, 151, 153–4; and housing 117–18; and intermediary structures 190, 194–200, 208; and nation state and ethnic origins 47, 60; Report on Education (1979) 4, 68, 85– 90, 103, 151, 196–8 Goh, L. 191, 247; and housing 119, 122, 124–5, 127, 133 Gopinathan, S.: and education 67, 69, 71–3, 76–8, 80, 83, 86, 90; and ideology 188, 199, 200, 202 Graduate Mothers’ Priority Scheme 152, 156

Index grassroots organizations see parapolitical institutions Group Representative Constituency (GRC) 110–12, 125, 127, 173, 181 groups, autonomous 231–6; see also intermediary structures; parapolitical institutions Gwee Yee Hean 76 Habermas, J. 192, 230 Hamilton-Shimmen, W. 235 Haq, Obaid ul 32 Hassan, R. 114, 117, 135 HDB see Housing and Development Board Heng, Russell 221 Hertogh, Maria:riots (1950) 59, 116 higher education see tertiary education Hill, M. 14, 193 Hill, S. 160 Hinduism 106, 151, 197, 200; see also Indians history: before World War II see colonialism; during World War II see occupation under Japan; early confederation plans see Malayan Forum; Malayan Union; 1948–63 see Federation of Malaya; in early 1960s see Malaysia; since 1965 see independence; neglected in schools 40; see also past Hobsbawm, E. 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 27 Hodder, B.W. 115 Ho Wing Meng 194 home ownership 120–3, 127, 150; see also housing Hong, L. 92 Hong Kong 8, 124, 131, 156, 201, 234 housing 5–6, 113–39, 191, 247; and environment 135–9; and ethnic origins 57, 62; and family 122–3, 135–6, 147, 150, 151, 153, 154; home ownership and nation building 120–3, 127, 150; and intermediary structures 165, 172; and multiracialism 111; and

277

parapolitical institutions 121, 125, 133, 137, 179, 180, 181; phases 113–16; and politics 129– 35; social integration and 123–9; see also Housing and Development Board Housing Commission 114 Housing and Development (Amendment) Bill (1986) 127–8 Housing and Development Board 111, 120, 247; and ethnic origin 57, 62; and family 151, 153; and housing policy 114, 116–20, 121–7, 129, 132–3, 135, 138–9; and intermediary structures 165, 172; and parapolitical institutions 179, 180, 181 Housing and Urban Development Co. 124–5 Huay Kuan 171 HUDC see Housing and Urban Development Hughes, T.E. 59 Iau, R. 237–8 identity, national 5, 19, 22–3, 36–8, 39–40; see also citizenship; crises; nation building; nationalism ideology 19, 62–6, 188–219; see also communism; meritocracy; multiracialism; policy; pragmatism; religion; socialism; values incentives, family size 152, 153, 156, 157 independence after expulsion from Malaysia (1965) 93, 126, 145, 183, 189; and education 81–9; and nation state and citizenship 12, 19, 20, 24, 26; and nation state and ethnic origins 39, 60–2 India 91, 197 Indian Development Association, Singapore 108, 234, 236 Indians in Singapore 4, 5; and civil society 223, 234–5; and education see Tamil; and family 153; and housing 115, 138; and ideology 188, 197, 213; and intermediary structures 166, 168;

278

Index

and multiracialism 91–2, 94, 99, 103, 106, 108; and nation state and citizenship 19, 20, 31; and nation state and ethnic origins 40, 42, 46, 49, 53, 64; see also Tamil individualism and liberalism 1, 42, 243, 245–6, 249; and family 141– 2, 155; and ideology 208, 209–10, 215; and intermediary structures 160–2, 173; and nation state and citizenship 14, 27 Indonesia 32; and education 76, 82; and ideology 212, 213, 214; and multiracialism 91, 106; and nation state and ethnic origins 37, 45 industry see economic growth Information and Arts, Ministry of 225, 237, 240 Institute of Policy Studies 40, 211, 237 instrumental rationality 190–3, 203 integration, social 123–9 interest groups 229, 231–6 intermediary structures 7–8, 159–74, 229; Chinese voluntary associations 164–6; concept 159– 64; ethnic communities and citizenship 172–4; Malay community organizations 166– 71; see also parapolitical institutions Internal Security Act 206 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 146 Isajiw 94, 95 Ishak, L.Z.R. 235 Islam see Muslims Israel, visit by President of 97, 108, 170, 205 Italy 16 Japan 8, 79; and China 69, 70; and ideology 193–4, 198, 202, 210; occupation of Malaya and Singapore (1942–45) 41, 42, 44, 47, 52, 74, 91, 178 Java 106 Jayakumar, S. 58

Johore causeway 26 Joint Balloting Scheme 122, 151 Jones, C. 131–2 Jones, D.M. 208, 218, 247 Josey, A. 75, 192 jus soli (citizenship by birth) 41, 55 Kahn, H. 202, 208, 230 Kalantzis, M. 33, 114–15, 117 Kallen, E. 95, 100 K’ang Yu Wei 69–70 Kassim, I. 167, 168 Kaye, B. 116 Khoo, S. 146, 147, 148, 149, 150 ‘killer litter’ problem 127 Koh Tai Ann 238, 239–40 Kornhauser, W. 161, 163, 226 Kuah Khun Eng 203, 204, 205 Kuala Lumpur 59, 60–1 Kukathas, C. 174 Kumar, S. 233, 234 Kuo, E.C.Y. 82, 102, 138; and family 140, 143, 147, 155; and ideology 195–6, 200, 207–8 Kuo Pao Kun 238 Kwok Kian Woon 201 Kwok, R.Y-W. 191, 247; and housing 119, 122, 124–5, 127, 133 labour see economic growth; trade unions; unemployment Labour Front 91; and education 75, 76; and nation state and ethnic origins 50, 54, 63 Labour, Ministry of 190–1 Land Acquisition Act (1966) 120, 135 language: bilingualism see education and language; major see Chinese language; English; Malay; Tamil; and nation state 16 ‘latent’ citizenship 42 Latif, Asad 222–3, 224 Lau, A. 17, 19, 40–4, 47, 49, 50, 60, 61 law and legislation: citizenship 3, 54; civil society 231; education 70–1; family 143–5, 147; housing 120, 127–8, 135; ideology 193, 205,

Index 207, 211; Law Society 223; Muslim 172; parapolitical institutions 176–7; religion 9, 193, 207, 210–11; trade unions 190–1; see also Legislative Assembly Lee, E. 40 Lee Hsien Loong 37, 109, 206, 211–14 Lee Kuan Yew 247; and civil society 222, 225–8, 233; and education 69–70, 75–6, 81–2, 86–90; and family 151–2, 156; and housing 125, 132, 137; and ideology 189, 192–3, 197–8, 200–1, 208–9; and intermediary structures 170; and multiracialism 91–2, 102–3, 108– 9, 111, 119; and nation state and citizenship 12, 22, 24, 37; and nation state and ethnic origins 46, 50, 55, 60–1, 63–5; and parapolitical institutions 175, 177, 183; see also People’s Action Party Lee Lai To 205, 206 Lee, S.M. 148, 152 Lee Yoke San 114, 136 legislation see law Legislative Assembly 144–5; introduced (1959) 26; and nation state and ethnic origins 48–9, 51, 53, 58 Leifer, M. 23, 136, 170, 186; and ideology 196, 205; and multiracialism 97, 108; and nation state and ethnic origins 59, 60 Leong Wai Kum 144, 145 Lewins, F. 16 Li, T. 109, 110, 169 Lian Kwen Fee 173 liberalism see individualism; rights Lim Chai Yean 102 Lim Chong Yah 117, 120 Ling, T. 202–3 living conditions see standard of living Lodge, G.C. 208, 209–10 London see Malayan Forum Low, L. 10, 149

279

Lukes, S. 141, 160, 163 McClelland, D.C. 194 Machiavelli, N. 202 MacIntyre, A. 214 McKay, J. 16 Maideen, H. 59, 116 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (1990) 9, 193, 207, 211 Majlis Pusat (Malay Cultural Organizations) 167 Malay language and education 4; after independence 82–3, 87; and education policy 68, 69, 72–3, 76–80, 82–3, 87; and ideology 188; and multiracialism 92, 98, 106, 107; and nation state and citizenship 31, 37, 78–80; and nation state and ethnic origins 51, 64; see also Malays in Singapore Malay Nationalist Party 44 Malaya, Federation of see Federation of Malaya Malayan Democratic Union 76–7, 91; and nation state and ethnic origins 44, 45, 47, 51–2, 63 Malayan Forum 47–51, 61, 64, 75, 91 Malayan Nature Society 232 Malayan Union scheme (1946) 3, 41–7, 51, 53, 56, 58, 63, 72, 91 Malays in Singapore 5, 248; and civil society 223, 233–5, 239; and education 68–9, 72–5, 77–9, 82– 4; and family 153; and housing 115, 116, 126, 138; and ideology 188, 194, 197, 199, 205, 213, 217; and intermediary structures 166–73; and multiracialism 91–2, 94, 96–8, 102–4, 106–10, 112; and nation state and citizenship 19, 20, 26, 28, 31, 37, 78–80; and nation state and ethnic origins 40, 42–7, 51, 54–7, 59– 60, 63–5; see also Malay language Malaysia: created and Singapore’s membership of (1963) 3, 4, 17– 18, 26, 37, 39, 55–9, 63, 167; and ideology 205–6, 212, 213, 214; and multiracialism 92, 96, 98–9, 101–2; and nation state

280

Index

and citizenship 23, 25, 26, 32, 37, 38; and nation state and ethnic origins 39, 55–9, 60–2, 63, 68; Singapore expelled (1965) see independence ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ 60, 63, 79, 167 Malaysian Solidarity Convention (1965) 60 Management Committees 165 Mandarin see Chinese language; Speak Mandarin Campaign Mann, M. 20 Maoism 206 Marquand, D. 10, 90, 185, 186 marriage see family; polygamy Marshall, T.H. 27–8, 30, 53, 75, 166, 243 Marx, K./Marxism 9, 11, 13, 206–7, 209, 210, 248; see also communism; socialism Mauzy, D.K. 133, 194 MCs see Management Committees MDU see Malayan Democratic Union mediating structures:family as 140– 1, 156; see also intermediary structures; parapolitical institutions Medisave 153 Melayu nationality 46 Mencius 226 MENDAKI and Yayasan Mendaki (Muslim Development Councils) 108–9, 110, 169–70, 232, 236 meritocracy 31, 33, 101–3, 152, 192–3, 246–7; see also education middle class: education see English language and education; ideology see civil society migrant family 143–5 Milne, R.S. 133, 194 Ministries: Community Development 152, 154–5, 183, 211; Education 204(see also Report under Goh Keng Swee); Finance 148; Information and Arts 225, 237, 240; Labour 190–1 MNP see Malay Nationalist Party MNS (Malayan Nature Society) 232

modernization and ‘Asian’ values 193–6 Moodley, K. 96, 97, 99 Moore, R. 130 moral education programme 7, 9, 90, 239, 245, 247–8; and family 151, 156; and ideology 188, 196– 205, 207–8, 217, 219; Ong Report on 90, 151, 198–9 moral values see religion; values Morgan, D.H.J. 157 Morishima, M. 202 Morrissey, M. 33, 114–15, 117 Morton, Henry 134 Mount, F. 156 MUIS see Muslim Religious Council Multi-Tier Family Housing Scheme 123 multilingualism 31, 49, 64; Committee on 74–8, 80, 92, 102; see also education and language; multiracialism multiracialism 3, 5, 7, 91–112, 246; as concept, ideology and policy 93–7; and economic survival 99– 101; and education 80; and housing 125; and meritocracy 101–3; and nation state and citizenship 22, 31, 32–3, 36; official classification as policy of ascription 103–7; politics of 97– 9; state revitalization of ethnicity 107–12; see also ethnic origins Murray, D.P. 69, 70, 71, 72, 77, 81, 82 Muslim Religious Council of Singapore 32, 108, 168 Muslims 248; and civil society 222, 233; and family 144, 151; and housing 115, 116, 126, 138; and ideology 199, 200, 205, 206, 213; and intermediary structures 168–70, 172; and multiracialism 97, 106, 108–9, 111; and nation state and ethnic origins 32, 46, 59 Mutalib, H. 167 Myrdal, G. 194 myths, political 13, 14, 31; see also meritocracy; multiracialism Nagata, J. 46

Index Nair, S. 229, 230, 246 Naisbitt, J. 182 Nanyang Chinese (educated in Chinese) see Chinese language Nanyang University 87, 171, 201–2 nation building and nation state 2–3, 242–3, 244; and education 76–7; and home ownership 120–3; and language 78–80; nation as social construction 13–17; nation and state 17–24; sovereignty 24–5; see also citizenship; ethnic origins; housing; identity; nationalism; state National Advisory Council on Family and Aged 154 National Arts Council 237, 240 National Courtesy Campaign 196 National Ideology 213–14 National Pledge 213 National University of Singapore 201, 206; Society 225, 228, 240 nationalism, creation of 15–16, 17– 18, 218–19; see also nation building Neighbourhood Police Post 128, 179–80 Netherlands 24 Neuhaus, R.J. 218, 226; and family 140–2, 156; and intermediary structures 161–3, 166–7; and parapolitical institutions 182, 185 ‘New Population Policy’ 153 New Zealand 18, 107, 154, 173 Newman, J. 77, 84, 87, 88 NGOs see non-governmental organizations Nisbet, R. 160, 162, 166, 174, 185 non-governmental organizations 231–2; see also Association of Muslim Professionals North America: and family 141; and housing 121, 122, 134–5; and multiracialism 94–6, 99–100 Noss, R.B. 81, 85, 87 NPP (Neighbourhood Police Post) 128 NSS (Nature Society of Singapore, formerly Malayan Nature Society) 232

281

nuclear family 122, 143, 147 NUSS see Society under National University Offe, C. 192, 229, 230, 231 old people 122–3, 153 Oldfield, A. 1, 90, 244–5, 248–9; and family 141–2; and nation state and citizenship 29, 32 Ong, C.C. 235; and housing 113, 115, 120, 137; and ideology 164, 171; and nation state and ethnic origins 48, 49, 51 Ong Teng Cheong: Report on Moral Education (1979) 90, 151, 198–9 Ongkili, J.P. 59, 73 Ooi Giok Ling 180–1 ‘Others’ see Eurasians; Europe and Europeans PA see People’s Association Pakir, A. 81, 89, 105 Palen, J. 148, 152 Pan-Malayan Council for Joint Action 45 Pang Eng Fong 192 PAP see People’s Action Party parapolitical institutions 7–8, 23, 62, 165, 171, 174–87; and civil society 229, 231–6; and housing 121, 125, 133, 137, 179, 180, 181; role of 182–7; see also Citizens’ Consultative Committees; Community Centres; Residents’ Committees; Town Councils participation 30–5; debate, expanding 236–41 past, ‘golden’, rejected 19–20, 32, 36, 37–8, 40, 244; see also history Pedra Branca 25 PEKEMAS see Singapore National Malays Organization Pendley, C. 82 People’s Action Party 3–11, 244–9; and nation state and ethnic origins and rise of 3, 12, 45–6, 50–1, 53–65; and nation state and citizenship 18–19, 22–4, 34–

282

Index

5, 37; and civil society 220, 222, 224–8, 231, 233, 240–1; and education 4, 68–70, 75–84, 86– 90; and family 144–8, 151–2, 156; and housing 112, 116–19, 122, 125, 127–8, 131–3, 137, 139; and intermediary structures 159, 161–3, 165, 167–8, 170, 174; key principles see meritocracy; multiracialism; pragmatism; leaders see Goh Keng Swee; Lee Kuan Yew; Toh Chin Chye; and multiracialism 5, 91–5, 97, 100, 102–4, 107–12; and parapolitical institutions 175–7, 181–8; synonymous with state 34–5(see also state); see also ideology; policy; Singapore People’s Association 7, 62, 175, 176–7 People’s Constitution (1947) 45–6 Perak 60 Peter, K. 99 Philippines 25 Planning and Research Group, Singapore 222 Plato 202 pluralism 115, 160; see also multiracialism PMCJA (Pan-Malayan Council for Joint Action) 45 Poggi, G. 22, 24 Poland 16 police 128, 179–80 policy see family; housing; ideology; meritocracy; multiracialism; People’s Action Party; pragmatism; religion Political Study Centre 50 politics: consciousness created see ‘Return to Sender’; and housing 129–35; of multiracialism 97–9; see also civil society; intermediary structures; meritocracy; multiracialism; parapolitical institutions; People’s Action Party polyarchy 25–6, 29 polygamy 7, 143, 144, 145 population growth 49; see also family

power, state 20–4 PP see Progressive Party pragmatism 189, 203, 214, 246; and instrumental rationality 190–3; and nation state and citizenship 19, 32, 37; and nation state and ethnic origins 62, 64–5 Presidential Council 64 Preston, P.W. 48 progressive identity see future Progressive Party 48, 50, 63, 91 proletarianization of family 148–51, 157 public housing 5–6, 117, 147, 150; see also Housing and Development Board Pugh, C. 117–20, 125, 132–6 Pulau Batu Putih 25 Quah, J.S.T. 102, 180; and housing 128, 138; and ideology 199, 207, 208–9, 213, 216 Quah, S.R. 36, 40, 128, 180; and family 143–7, 151, 152 Queenstown 114 race: riots 59, 63, 116; segregation in housing 5, 115–16; see also ethnic origins; multiracialism radical citizenship 25–6 Rahman Talib Report (1961) 78 Rahman, Tunku Abdul 19, 47, 51, 55, 56, 98 Rajaratnam, S. 32, 40, 60, 99, 100, 194 rationality 190–3, 203 Ratnam, K.J. 42 Razak, Abdul 47 RCs see Residents’ Committees reciprocity 203–4 Registrar of Societies 222 Regnier, Philippe 34 regressive identity see past religion: and education see moral education; and family 154–5, 156–7; harmony and ‘Shared Values’ project 210–19; law 9, 193, 207, 210–11; in private sphere 193; problematic nature of 205–10; see also Buddhism;

Index Christianity; Hinduism; Muslims; values Rendel Constitutional Commission (1953) 43, 49 Residents’ Committees 23, 62, 165, 171, 179–80; and housing 121, 125, 137 ‘Return to Sender’ process 2, 108, 131, 142, 173, 184, 246–8; and ideology 189, 208; and nation state and citizenship 13–14, 23, 29; see also policy Rex, J. 101, 102, 106, 130 Rieger, H.C. 220 rights 1, 27–30, 32, 101, 142, 173, 243 riots 75, 96, 125–6, 164, 221; race 59, 63, 116 Robbins, T. 203 Rodan, G. 62; and civil society 221, 224, 228, 232, 233, 234; and family 146, 149; and housing 118, 133; and ideology 206, 210, 217, 219 Rosa, L. 184 Rousseau, J.-J. 31, 160 Rural Dwellers’ Association 183–4 Russia 198 Sabah 17 Said, E.W. 194 Salaff, J. 121–2, 135, 146, 149, 150 SAP see Special Assistance Plan Sarawak 17 Sasono, A. 231 Satu 183 Saunders, P. 130 SCBA see Straits Chinese British Association SDU (Social Development Unit) 152 Seah Chee Meow 174–5, 178, 179, 182, 194 Second World War 1, 3, 71; aftermath 28, 173, 176 (see also decolonization) ; see also occupation under Japan secondary groups see intermediary structures; parapolitical institutions secret societies, Chinese 164–6 security and housing 128–9

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segregation in housing 5, 115–16 Senior Citizens’ Week Campaign 196 separation from Malaysia see independence Serangoon 115 Seremban 60 ‘Shared Values’ project 9, 30–1, 107, 246; and civil society 221, 228, 238, 239, 241; and family 154–5, 156; and ideology 207, 211–12, 217, 219; and religion 210–19 Shee, P.K. 64, 65 SINDA see Singapore Indian Development Association Singapore see citizenship; civil society; education; ethnic origins; family; history; housing; ideology; intermediary structures; multiracialism; nation building; parapolitical institutions; People’s Action Party Singapore Association 48 Singapore Broadcasting Corporation 103 Singapore Buddhist Foundation 204 Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce 49, 52, 53, 54–5, 59, 64, 71 Singapore Citizenship Ordinance (1957) 55 Singapore Improvement Trust 114, 115, 117 Singapore Indian Development Association 108, 234, 236 Singapore Labour Front see Labour Front Singapore Malay Teachers’ Union 81, 83, 102 Singapore National Identity Survey 39 Singapore National Malays Organization 167 Singapore Planning and Research Group 222 Singapore Students’ Anti-British League 75 single people 123 SLF see Labour Front slums 5, 113–14 Small Families Improvement Scheme 153–4, 157

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Smith, A.D. 12, 17, 21, 48, 78–9, 80 Smith, Adam 215 Smith, M.G. 31 Smith, T.E. 43, 143 SNIS (Singapore National Identity Survey) 39 Social Development Unit 152, 192 social integration and housing 123–9 Social Welfare Department 176; see also welfare socialism 18–20, 65, 134, 221, 244; authoritarian see People’s Action Party; communist and Marxist see communism; Marx; Socialist Front see Barisan Sosialis Societies Act 231 Soin, K. 232, 240 South Korea 8, 131, 156, 223; and ideology 201, 202, 210 sovereignty 24–5, 33–4 Soviet bloc see Eastern Europe Speak Mandarin Campaign 82, 87, 196, 208–9 Special Assistance Plan 86 spheres of competence 192–3 Spratly Islands 25 SSABL (Singapore Students’ AntiBritish League) 75 standard of living 24, 49, 189, 237; see also housing state: autonomy from see civil society; and nation 17–24; revitalization of ethnicity 107–12; sponsored associations see intermediary structures; parapolitical institutions; see also nation building; People’s Action Party; policy State Development Plan 118 sterilization 147, 152 Stockwell, A.J. 41, 43 Straits Chinese British Association 48 Straits Settlement colony (1867– 1942) 41, 44, 72, 98 Sun Yat Sen 66, 70 synthetic process, nation building as 13, 15 Taiwan 8, 131, 156, 223; and ideology 198, 201, 202, 210

Talmon, J.L. 160 Tamil language education 4, 31, 53, 69, 70, 72, 188; after independence 81–3, 87; and multiracialism 92, 106 Tamney, J.B. 189, 194, 200–1, 205, 208 Tan Chwee Huat 192 Tan Ern Ser 40 Tan, T.T.W. 165, 185 taxation 20–1 ‘Team MPs’ see Group Representative Constituency Teh Cheang Wan 113, 114, 119 telephone call costs 184 Ten-Year programme 72 tertiary education 48, 87, 149, 171, 201–2, 206 Thailand 79 Thomson, G.G. 148 ‘threshold principle’ 16 Tiananmen Square massacre 221 Tocqueville, A.de 160, 185, 226 Toh Chin Chye 47, 60, 128 tolerance 213–14, 216 Tong Chee Kiong 138, 193, 200, 207 Tong, C.K. 102, 138, 207 Town Councils 121, 125, 133, 180– 2 trade unions 75, 159, 183, 229; and ethnic origins 49, 50, 57; and ideology 190–1 Trindade, F.A. 58 Trocki, C.A. 164 Tunku see Rahman Turnbull, C.M. 167; and family 145–6, 149; and multiracialism 92, 98, 100; and nation state and ethnic origins 41–3, 49, 50, 55–7, 61, 63 Turner, B.S. 243; and intermediary structures 160, 173; and nation state and citizenship 21, 25, 30 UMNO see United Malays National Organization UMS (Unfederated Malay States) 41, 72 unemployment 49, 117

Index unions see trade unions United Malays National Organization 79, 167; leader see Rahman; and multiracialism 92, 96; and nation state and ethnic origins 43–4, 54, 57, 69–50 United Nations Industrial Survey Mission 118 United States 141, 185; housing in 121, 122, 134–5; and ideology 202, 203 universities see tertiary education values 8–9, 22, 40; core see community; consensus; family; tolerance; in education 196–201; family 11, 140, 141, 148, 151, 154–8, 246; see also ‘Asian’ values; ideology; religion; ‘Shared Values’ Van Dyke, V. 160, 172, 173 Vasil, R. 23–4, 105, 236; and parapolitical institutions 181, 187, 191 viability of nation 2, 16 Vietnam 25 Vogel, E. 192–3, 202, 208, 209–10 voluntary associations 164–6, 174, 185, 229 Voluntary Sterilization Act (1970) 147 voting see elections and voting Waldron, A.N. 15, 16 Wang Gungwu 52 Weber, M. 13–14; and ideology 190, 193, 194, 201, 203 Wee Kim Wee 211, 212 welfare provision avoided 129, 204

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Western influence 8, 10–11, 134, 244, 245; ideology and religion 188–9, 194–5, 197, 202, 209–10, 213 (see also Christianity); see also Britain; civil society; colonialism; English language; individualism; North America White Papers 76, 216; see also ‘Shared Values’ Wing Chung Ng 164 Winsemius, Albert: Report (1961) 118, 132, 146, 148–9 women:and civil society 232; and family 57, 143–5, 149; and housing 135–6; working 149–50 Women’s Charter (1961–2) 57, 143– 5 Wong, A. and J. 196, 199, 208 Wong, A.K.:and family 140, 143, 146–7, 149, 151; and housing 120, 123–4, 136–7 Wong Lin Ken 164 working class education see Chinese language and education World Bank (IBRD) 146 Yap, J. 92 Yap Mui Teng 148, 153, 192 Yeh, S.H.K.:and family 147, 151; and housing 114, 119, 120, 123, 124, 136, 137 Yen Chin Hwang 70 Yeo, G.Y.B. 11, 37, 139, 187, 248; and civil society 224–8, 231, 235–6, 240; and ideology 215–16 Yeo, K.W. 17, 19, 43–7, 49, 52–5, 73–5 Zoohri, W.H. 102, 108