Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America

Political Survival Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America

Barry Ames

Political Survival Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America

California 5f;ries on Social Choi« and I'oli\;ul Economy Ediud by Brian Barry, Ro/nrt H. Baus, and Sam uel L. I'opkin 1. Markell and Statts in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of .4g';. cultural Policies RonUT Ii. BATES

2. Political 1-:Conomits

JAMES E. AI.T AN D K. AUC C HRYITAL

3. Abortion and the Politics 01 Motherhood

KRISTIN LUKER

4. Haul Choices: How Women Decide about Work, ClrerT_ and Motherhood KATHLEEN GERSON

5. Regulatory I'o/icy and the Social Sciences

ROGER N OLL.

t typically just one year before Ih~ ronlesl. th~

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The l1uory of SurVIlld/

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Co.JI' lio~s

In addi tio n 10 the cyclical effects o f eleCiions, pressu re from wo rking-class conSlilUcnci~ was ex pcCled to boost 0\-er311 spending. In adminisuations supported by pa n ics wi th worki ng-class backing, IOlal spending inc~a sed mo re tha n 8 percent . In essence, even modest class polarization o f the party system raised the COSt of rCl:lining o ffice. Natura lly such polarization a ffects some government p rograms mo re th an OIhers. In the nex t cha pler WI.' Sh311 examine the consequences o f class polarizalion on trade-offs between progra ms; here it is imporlant to note merel y th aI demands fo r cerlain prog rams a re not matched by compensato ry cuts in others. Wo rk ing-class demands are ac ro mmodaled al the cost o f overa ll budgeta ry expansio n. Is there a mili tary coup cycle? Thc results arc not extremely solid statisticall y, hUi they d e,Hl y move in the right directio ns. Coups occur d uring economic recessions, at times when overall spending is shrinki ng. U Ikeause military regimes initiall y bring or· der, bt: nc r tax collection,

~IIlJ

higher public seeto r salaries (espe-

cia lly fo r the armed forces), and because military regimes seek 10 buy po pularity, ex penditures rise more than 6 percent fro m th.· year in which a coup occurs to the first subsequent year. Then declines set in, lasting until the fo unh year o f milita ry gO\'t~rnm ent. Military gove rnmems, in other ..... o rds, behave for o ne yea r like civilians. Then their sense o f secur ity increases, and they begin 10 em phasize austerity and o rthodoxy. What about the bureaucratic-autho ritarian cases and the few left-leaning milita ry regimes? If these regimes truly follo wed d is· tinctive co urses. courses not captured by o ur theory, the model sho uld systematica lly err in its predictio n o f their ex penditures. The spending of ex pansio nist ad ministrations should be underpredicted. and the spending o f o rthodox regimes sho uld be o ver· pre. (Ecua dor)

20. B.nur (Bolivi a )

:Uro O.vianc. from Prediction

2'-

3'-

Ba rrientos (Boli via) I'rodo (Peru ) 23. Owri o (EI Salvador ) H. Rivera Carballo (EI Salvador) Robl ... (Panama ) 26. VJlencia (Colombia)

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F. Gesrido (Uruguay) lB . Mendez MOnfenegro (Guar(m~ l a) 19. Echandi (Cosr~ Rica) 30. Dial Ordaz (Mexico)

IkI.rI
in the legislature and bureaucracy, and heavy majorities pass legislation. Such an agreement could work only if the two panies were rdatively close on substantive issues. In tenns of our model. however, President Guillermo Leon Valencia underspent by more than 12 percent, while his successor, Carlos L1eras Restn-po, overspent by nearly 9 percent. The key 10 Lleras's reversal of Valencia's policies lies precisely in the requirement of party alternation. Lleras sought to undo the destabilizing effecls of Valencia's conservative economic policies. Realizing that his party could not succeed itself, L1efa.'> spent heavily in order (0 wmmit the next presidem 10 his programs (Latin America 1967: 111152). Since the spending of Misael Pastrana, Lleras's su(:(:cssor, matched almost exactly the model's prediction (neither under- nor overspending), Lleras must surely have felt vindicated. This cursory look at the model's under- and overpredictio ns provides confirmation that the model works. It is also an exercise in speculafion- an exercise that leaves plenty of puzzles and clues for furth er explo ration.

10

Conclusion This chapter has sought a plausible, general explanation of lO\al central government expenditures in Latin America. The model developed here sees the government neither as a mere referee for the conflicts of social groups nor simply as a representative of some domina nt economic interest. Instead, the model emphasizes the survival motivations of political leaders. Public expenditures, as an inSTrument for the realization of leaders' goals, become political expenditures. Most Latin American leaders would like 10 satisfy every dema nd fo r public money, bUi they cannot: In poor and volatile economies, resource constraints are ever present. Fluctuations in the gross domestic product and in exports exert a powerful influence on spending. But the pressure 10 spend must he intense, because leaders ignore wheneve r possible such economic warnings as falling international reserves and IMF agreements. Spending cannot, in this difficult economic environment, rise constantly, so ext'cutives husband their resources for use against the strongest threats. Some leaders must accommodate the demands of working-class conSlituencies for job creation and social

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Tht Politics of Public Sptlfdi1lg

JJ

programs. Othtrs face tht cyclical threat of d ections. Bc:fort elections, spending rises as incumbents try to ensure electoral success, and after d ections spending rises again if a new leader has a«ained the presidency. The importance of d ections in constituting national authority was not a factor in the size of spending increases. Why do elections of varying significa nce dicit similar expenditure responses? O ne answer is that the more important the election, the more likely it is to be close and the tougher will be opposition to the executive's attempts to buy victory. Another answer is that achieving the widU t possible margin of victory may be important even when an election obviously will not be close. Mexico's PRI cannot lose, but the campaign is ta ken seriously by a host of lower-level politicians on thei r way up. Finally, what about Latin America's many authoritarian gO\'ernments? In light of the repressiveness of a Stroessner in Paraguay or a Pinochet in Chile, is the political function of public spending irrelevant? It is not. Classifying governments as authoritarian and nonauthoritarian ovtrsimplifits: In rtalilY few govtrnmenls are 50 securt that the budgt t is not a tool fo r incrtasi nl;! support. Military governments may opt for austerity once: they fed safe, but in thti r first ytar in power thty Covtr thtir political bascs. Aggregale spending remains, however, a blunt political instrumenl. Guidi ng expenditures to serve political needs requires precist strategic caiculuions on tht part of txttuti vcs. Tht ntxt chapter tlaboratts this model of u tin Amt rican political survival by disaggregating lotal spending into the specific programs that bind togetht r the executive's survival coalition.

2.

Survival Strategies and Expenditure Trade-offs

This cbapler analyzes the strategies chosen by Latin American executives to guide the allocation of public expenditures into individual programs. The central question is whether executives ado pt allocation policies increasing their chances for sun'ival in office. Since the choice of an appropriate policy depends on each country's political and soci31 environment, the firSI seerion of the chap. [t' r ('xplores the conditions t'xecutives consider when they frame their strategic approa(bcs. The second section evaluates five strategies available to Lliin AmeriGln political leaders. Each str.:llcgy stresses specific programs of public expenditures, and each strategy is directed at a specific political target-the military, bureaucrats, local interests, receivers of direct transfer paymentS, or specific social classes. The third section treats the economic context of allocations, focusing on the relatio nship between expenditure stralegies and changes in rhl' rates of economic growth and inflation.

What CO lllHS in the Calcu lus of Survival? The executive's problem is one of coalition formation. ' In building survival coalitions, the key cboices of Latin American leaders revolve around two Sl·ts of facturs: the sites, currencies, and sizes of winning coa litions and the conditions governing the prices paid to secure allies. 1. Of th~ vaSt lit.ratur~ in coal ition the"ry, [ have found particularly IIS.,(,,\ the "'~Y' by ui .. r",n. Kenw"rthy, and De Swan n in Grocnnins, and "thers (1970).

Survival Strategies and Expenditure Trade-offs Site, Currency, and She: The Dimensions of Winning Coalitions

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Since most research on the formation of political coalitions has concentrated on the United States and Western Europe, we know most about coalition processes in legislatures and cabinets. In these sites votes are the major currency, and the influence wielded by political actors depends on the number of votes they command. In Latin America, by conlrast, multiple sites and currencies are the rule, and political forces losing in one arena may not accept the decision. Legislatures, if they exist, are only one of many arenas of decision making. Other sites include international finandal agencies, transnational corporations, military headquarters, bureaucracies, and even the streets. Currencies of influence include violence (or the potential for violence), the ability to unseat a government by force, Ihe market power of inveslors, and the potenlial 10 block or advance the implementation of programs. Scholars have often noted the failure of Latin American nations 10 agree on the dominant currency of authority. In an attempt to apply coalition analysis to Latin America, Eldon Kenwonhy (1970) offers a "dual currency" model in which coercion and popularity are the dominant power r"sources. COt'rcion, mostly in the hands of the military, is a resource of the upper and upper middle classes. Popularity, defined 3S the ability to elicit support from large numbers of people across occupational strata, is a currency more available to middle-class and working-class groups. Kenwonhy's dual currency model is a good beginning, but its restriction to coercion and popularity is too narrow. The cenlrality of entrepreneurs, for example, comes from their roles as investors and employers.l The mere threat of organized disruptive behavior by entrepreneurial elites is often sufficient to derail government effons at reform, and even where economic compelition is too fierce for entrepreneurs to collude, government policies that frighten investors lead 10 economic decline. In the same way, Ihe bargaining power of organized labor extends beyond getting out the vote. Labor's ability to disrupt economic activity can bring down governments by encouraging military intervention. J In es2. Stt Lindblom (1977), l liberal rest3t(mem of this long-argued Mane;st positio n. J. This ugument i. ma de by Payne (1965).

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,6

Tht Th([Jry of Su,"illal Coalitio"$

senee, coalition fonnalion in Latin America is more than a IWOarena game. l atin American coalitions involve muldple sites and currencies, and banles fought in onc site remain indecisive as long

as a major political fo rce finds better odds elsewhere. Wh:n determines coalition size? Suppose we distinguish, alol1S with Kenworthy, between " reigning~ and Mruling." If leaders

merely want to preserve the status quo-that is, 10 reign-they require smaller coalitions that need not include every currency. But when leaders want to effect change-to rule-they must develop larger coalitions including more of the major currencies. The mo rt: a program demands active support-rather than mere acquiescence-the larger the coalition necessary to ensure its success. Whether leaders choose to rule or reign is surely no accident. Reformist leaders representing middle-class o r working-class groups need the power to rule. Leaders representing higher-statuS groups are usually content to hold the line, to reign. Beginning in the middle 19605, however, military regimes representing industrial and agro-cxport clites ca nlC to dominate Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. Not content merely to reign, these regimes attempted to transform the political and economic structures of their societies. The nature of each regime's program determined the minimum size of its suppOrt c031ition. In Chile, Pinochet adopted a program of shrinking the st3le, a program thai commanded so linle domestic support the regime had to rely on heavy doses of coercion. In Brazil, on the other hand, the Geisel administration tried hard after the 1973 o il , risis to auran the suppOrt of the domestic bourgeoisie, because without its support the regime's ambitious plans for promoting capital goods production could not succeed.

The Costs of Coalition Building Putting wgether a walition requires determining which political actors a re potential participants . A society's cleavages define its political actors. Totally latent cleavages create no political demands. Cleavages become manifest through organization. Organized interests, represented by political acwrs, constitute the bases of conflict, the building blocks of the executive's political world. Once having identified the society's cleavages and relevant political aCtors, Ihe executive divides them into allies and adversaries. Allies 3re those who contributed support 3t the executive's acces-

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Survival Strategies and Expenditure Trade.offs

17

sion to power (or at some other critical test); adversaries are those who were opposed. The executive can convert old adversaries into new allies, but conversions may come at the COSt of losing some previous allies. Old supporters defect because resources-in the form of control over programs-are transferred to the new recruits: The executive therefore seeks to minimize expected losses and maximize expected gains. The crucial elements in this tactical equation include the bargaining resources and unity of potential coalition members, the nature of intermediate organizations like political parties, and the motivating issues themselves. The resources with which political actors bargain have no fixed or absolute weight. Instead, the perceptions of other actors determine the weight of each actor's resources. The military, for example, can always threaten to overthrow the government, but such a threat will be taken much more seriously in Argentina than in Mexico, simply because coups occur much more frequently in Argentina and because olher political forces might support a takeover. Similarly, the pre-1973 Chilean legislature paid more attention to working-class groups than did the Colombian legislature, because in Chile the parties divided along class lines and represented every major social group, while in Colombia the elite-dominated National Front largely excluded labor. The fundamental point is simple: Rules and structures translate interests into bargaining resources at particular sites. In industrial countries, legislatures and bureaucracies are the main sites. In Latin America, legislatures are sometimes important and bureaucracies always so, but claims are also pressed through personal and family connections, demonstrations, elections, strikes, and insurrections. When executives are aware of these bargaining sites, they can estimate the value of any potential coalition participant 10 their chances of surviving and implementing a program. Executives often find it useful to divide or disaggregate political forces. If the executive can splil a once-united group, and if one of Ihe new subgroups dominates the other, cheaper coalitions hecome feasible. Thus an executive seeking to cut wages may try to deal separalely with labor's leaders. If the leaders will accept 4. Ncr distributable po!itical-«onomic spoil. may illerca.., a. a (Oll"'quon"" of a new coalition tht inerea..,. producti~ity. gross outpUt, or foreign aid, but sucr. incru..,s arc un""win. To induc. a political aeror ro accept furu~ for present ~waro.

requires a premium.

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Tht Theory of SurufllO/ Coalitions

bribes to counsel workers against striking, it will be much easier to ignore the interests of the workers themselves.

The Importance of Intermediate OrganiUltion.

The notion of or-

ganized interests implies intermediate authority between the execurive and the population itself. The slrength of such intermediate organizations varies rremendously, from structures thoroughly dominating followers 10 those safely ignored by executives. In the former case, organizational leaders may have a direct "charismatic" authority over followers, an 3U1hority based on personal dependence. At the other extreme, an organization such as a political party may exist only at elections and there may be little agreement between party leaders and followers even on basic issues. The effects of intermediate organizations on coalition formation depend on two factors: the nature of group loyalties and the ease of entry of new competitors. The more intense the links between allies and the executive, Ihc easier it is to woo the opposition without losing the allies' support. Com'ersely, the more intense a group's loyalties to an adversary, the more difficult it is for the executive to pursue them. Desertion of old allies usually pays only if the executive can keep a significant part of their support. [n a case like Mexico, for example, since competition with the ruling Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) is very difficult in the first place, defection of allies from the ruling coalition is nearly impossible. As a result, Mexican presidents can adopt policies that are contrary 10 Ihe interests of important members of the coalition. 5 Ideological Distance. Coalition theorists recognize the concept of ideological distance. Coalition partners must not be ideological opposites, and coalitions form more easily among political actors with shared interests. Still, such simple rules obscure the richness of political life. Ideological distances change with the passage of time. When import substitution in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil had reached a point where an emphasis on economic stabilization be· 5. The ,«en! eleaora1 gains by The opposition PAN in Mexico only reinfor", This argument. Though by 1985 the f'RI had 10st a .;gni~cant percen t3ge of its electoral .hare, it w •• not d.,... 10 losing control of the mech.n;sms of policy making •• nd it did not suffer the dffecrion of important members of its coalition.

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Survival Strategies and Expenditure Trade-offs

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came imperative, populist coalitions of industrialists and urban laborers were no longer possible, because each side came to see its interests as quite opposed to those of the other (O'Donnell 1973). Moreover, if issues are perceived as zero sum-if IMF help is contingent upon a slowing of land {efonn or if the army hinges its support on repression of workers-then certain alliances are ruled out. Divisibility and Symbolism. Executives seek to avoid zero-sum situations, so they resort to divisibility and symbolism. Perhaps they can divide a peasant movement by conceding bureaucratic jobs to its leaders o r providing a few symbolic gifts of land for the masses. Perhaps the executive can announce grandiose plans for education and health care or the arrival of Peace Corps volunteers. Symbolic policies afe promises. Even though real benefits are postponed, executives expect prompt rewards from the grateful recipients of symbols. Promises made to one group imply costs for another. Even though costs, like real benefits, are postponed, why do those on the cost-paying side of promises not see their long-term implications and penalize the executive accordingly? Perhaps they realize promises are subject to future renegotiation that will lower their cost or even void the deal entirely. Beneficiaries of promises should come to the same conclusion and hold back their rewards as well, but they often do not, particularly if they are poor. Such groups may be victims of an "ideological hegemony" preventing them from comprehending the consequences of political action.6 Symbolic outputs satisfy those with the d out to compel a better Outcome but insufficient understanding to demand more than promises. Suppose, however, that political actors refuse to accept symbols in place of material allocations. If a demand must he met with an immediate material response, then its benefits ought to he as spe6. In an interesting p~per on public opiniOl1 in authoritarian Bruil, Geddes and Zaller (1985 ) found that people of lower education tended to increase thei r .uppon of [he regime'. policies u their information in"",ased. Be "n~~ r.g ... " .....

Bureaucratic recruitment is d irected row.:Ird political :u:ti visls. It works best when 13yers of intcrmediilte le3ders control the m3SS b3se supporting the cxecutlvc. JIISI as Lyndo n Johnson's War on Poverty benefited well-placed activists morc than the poor, so a bureaucr3tic recruitment strategy rewards labo r leaders mor(" than fa ctory workers, It'achers mOTC tha n pupils. By comrast, bUrt'aucratic recruitmem is less useful when intermediate organizations arc weak or absem- th:1I is, when the relationship belWet"n It"aders and followers is dirc-cl 3nd pt"rsonal. A bureaucratic strategy ma y be implemented either by enlarging the size of the bureaucracy or by increasing public sector salaries. The executive's problem is to determine when such tactics would be effective. Su rely one import3nt d3tum is the size of the bureaucracy relative 10 the politically relevant population. If the numbe r of government employees is large, perhaps compared to the actual or pOlenljal e1ecror3le, then bureauef3tic r«ruil mem makes scnsc." The feasibility of emphasizing the bureaucracy de16. An inte~rin, .tn iR,e from Cou~ R,,:a i~ pro"idni by Osat Anas Sinck, (1976). The pcrcnuagc Qf fe Ntilhtr Work s Works Works Wurks lobn(nu. olt~ p"'t:r.'m, .Juring C1'.1n ~nd noneri,"- no .Jllk .... n~s ap~u In ,he: comlXl""'C s'rrn~,h of publIC ,,·o. ks pto. gr~m ., Thi, ~n ding ~U PPOrlS 'M hypotlles., thu uch mlntSHY', w~gc b.1I shou ld m~ i main in rd ~,i"e position. BUI on« ~8~in I.... I<stll" ~rc Cn, .. ,~m III d i.ccritln '~lh,. ,han imprC:SI' v, In sia, 20. In 1950, I"" begin ning of ' he ~rsl ""np'(WI!,on~1 g.,..trnmml ail, . J..... Flgu eres 's uprisi ng. no prm«IIon d (e" IS nr«,~d. 21 . l."c~1 , " aleg;" ar e "'" II ,"e,su ll)' ~PP"'JI "~ IC (0. ~II polllicalllluhlnC'>. iu" for Ihose rompcllllve ~I 'h e loc31..,. ' '1:ion.II.,·.1. ,\ l3ch, n... II .. , ..e domIna", n31ionally, such os M.,,;co ', I'ltl , m. y ...... u" . vcry dl ffncnt appro1

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0.007 0.010 0.006 0.001

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Wdfore Poli"" Agr;';'ulture

0.106 0.128 0.10l. 0.206 0.1 76

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Military

Education Hcahh For~ign

Rdarions

L>h", Pensions

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101

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' H< "",Ifiri"".. . nd u lI"ific.",,< 1...1, 01 the local,n""",' dummy "'I>m .11 ".her "ri.bln ... md..dUSCN not by his own milic~ry hut by a ppular rebdhon led by Jose FiguorC'S . Poron was overthrown aftor (but not k· couse) hi, regime h.d .hiftN 10 , mulrida...tr.t~gy. ArbenL d;ffers from OTher J~~dcrs who loll OWN working..:la .. woregif!", including hi. pred«csK'~rion •• politt .nd milir~ry n with Thr entf)' in p.>M'lt~ i. tho .W>ci.t
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Adminimation in P"'&""nI', Sha.e of TOfal Expcndirurcs

p...... Miliury Eduction Agriculrun: Public Works Hulcl! To tal Budg"

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0.122 0.092 0.171 0.170 0.051

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....... >0.05 > 0.26 > 0.«< > 0.0) >0.3 4 > 0.10

'The prol>.bililJ ..tim.tN i. . .. ociatN WIth the pncentose of rima. difference 0C>tn of that m"IJU'ud. could """,. by ,h._. II p,obo.bility of 0.05, 10. ~.mpk , muM th •• 5 tim .. OUt of 100 • dilfffcnct in militory .pending I>nwkn ,un'i ...... and .;mml II 1>,.. .. 'M difttr=« reported he.e could oceu. by
Though constitutions may p rohibit immediate reelection, many leaders harbor dreams of assuming the presidency again after a term on the sidelines. Even without such hopes, loyalty might stimulate leaders 10 help their panics' candidates. Viaory by the incumbent pany in the election of a successor puts the stamp of approval o n an administration. If, on the other hand, the election is lost, the president may be a bme duck for many months as his lenn nears its end. If executives do care about the election of their successors, particular panerns of spending might increase their chances of victory. Success, unfonun,uely, occurs pretty rarely, because incumbents nearly always lose. In the entire World War 11 period, incumbent panies in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Venezuela won only six times in thiny ekctions. If elections are generally lost, prior expenditure shifts may be irrelevant or even counterproductive. Perhaps the armed forces still need pacification, but group, class, and loca l strategies become measures of intent and hope rather than predictors of success. In an imponant study of Latin American elections, Roben Dix (1984) anributes high uccul ive turnover 10 both political and ecoBanur (Bolivia), KubitJd>ck alld Castello 8n.nro (lkuil). l'illochfl (Chi It). Odria (PmI). Molina and Romero (El Salvador), and Pba Jimenn (Vrnaufla).

With Time to Breathe

79

nomic factors. Constitutional prohibitions on immediate reelection weaken presidential control. Presidents cannot tfansfer their authoriry to the candidates of their parties, and these candidates may even choose to :lttack the president in order to mobilize their own followers. Even without this inevitable weakening of incumbents. executives have a hard time coping with steadily rising levels of social mobilization. As Latin American populations have become more urban, they have become more restive and better organized politically. The result, in Dix's view, is an ever-increasing gap between popular demands and the limited resources of executives. How can the linkages between expenditures and electoral out· comes be discovered ? In some cases the executive's party has no chance at or interest in reelection. When a party exists only to support a certain leader, the victory of an opposing party in the next presidential test is not an instance of electoral turnover. Ecuador's Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, a charismatic figure par excelience, was constitutionally prohibited from running in 1956. Velasco supported Camilo Ponce, the candidate of another party. Ponce's victory did not make Velasco a winner, but surely he should not be classified as a loser. In the election of 1952, outgoing Ecuadorean President Galo Plaza chose to back no candidate (Marn 1972). Like Velasco, Plaza neither won nor lost. Personalist parties represent only one of the difficulties in classifying outgoing executives as winners or losers. Democratic Ac· tion (AD), the dominant parry of Venezuela. split over il5 attempt to elect a successor to Raul Leoni in 1968. Together AD's two candidates took a majority of the popular vote, but singly neither could overcome the candidate of the opposition. Since dissatisfaction with Leoni did not cause the split in AD, it is hard to call the electoral result a negative judgment on his adminisrration. Eliminating such ambiguous cases leaves twenty incumbents clearly interested in the election of their successors. Eight were victorious; that is, the incumbent president or his party captured the presidency for another term.' 6. Tht twtlvc Iostn, Frti and A1QUndri (Q.ik), And." Pf rn and Oddcra {Vcnuueia), Edu.ndi, Ulart, Odilbc., Tujos, and Cuaw (CosQ Ilia ), Ibl~gucr {Dominican Republic), Kubiachck (Bealil). and M~ MonraltgrO {G",rtmala). The tight winners, Pcr6n {ArJentina. ' 9S II, Apra {Costa Rica, 197-4 ), Guzm.in {Dominican Rcpubtifates accepted thi s arrangement, b«:.uoe li miting the influence of !h( urb an work·

,

The COffgTeSS Connection

"7

yur terms th rough a system of proporlional represcn!ation. Whole states constituted districts, and electors (literate adults) selected one candidate from a party list. After Ihe balloting, votes for all candidates on each party's list were added together, and the frac· tion of the total vote represented by each party's share determined the number of seats allocated to that party. The number of votes each candidale had received determined Ihe actual holders of the sealS. Gellllio Vargas's influence over Brazilian politics did not disappear with his ouster in 1945. At the closc of the Estado Novo, Vargas and his followers organized two political parties. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) rooted itself in the state political machines Vargas had fostered. Though influential everywhere, the PSD was particularly Slrong in rural areas and poorer Slates. The Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), by contrast, was organized by Varguistas in the Labor Ministry and Ihe unions. The PTB's strength was concentrated in big cities (though not in Sao Paulo) and in Vargas's home statc of Rio Grande do SuI. As time passed. the PTB also became home to a diverse collection of dissidenls from OIher panies. The major opposition to Ihe Varguisras came from Ihe Nalional Democratic Union (UDN). The UDN combined losers in the intra· oligarchic power snuggles of Ihe Estado Novo, constitutionalists who opposed the dictatorship on principle, and upper-middle-class city dwellers repelled as much by the populism of the PTB as the conservalism of the PSD (Benevides 198J ). Though laissez-faire constiluted the mosl important currenl of UON economic Ihink· ing, its raison d'ctre was opposition to Vargas. The UDN's hopes thai the diclator's fall would lead to its own ascension to power were dashed at the end of 1945, when the join! candidate of Ihe PSD and PTB, General Eurico Dutra, was elected presidenl. The PSO received 42 perctnt of tht I;ongressional vote and took 52. per«nl of the scats in the Chamber of Deputies. Tht UON came in sccond. with 2.9 perunt of the seats, and Ihe ITB fini shed a distant Ihird with less than 8 ptrl;ent. The Duna administration was cautious in its economk policy. By 1947 Brazil's hard OIrrency reserves from World War II had in, cluJ w;u "'OIt j"'pOIunr rhan rhe ;n rUtSB of rheir own sutn. (!itt ScNu ]976, Soares ]\173, and Kinm 19110.1

'0'

Two Applications of tfft Tht!ory

disappeared. and huge deficits appeared on the cu rrent accoum . Rather than devalue the cu rrency. the government adopted rigid import controls. Import substitution in consumer durables began, but the government's share of nalional income stagnated and blockages in infrastructure became evident. The eltttion of 1950 returned Cerulio Varg~lS 10 office. The

PSD had refused

10

go along with the PTB's nomination of Varg3s,

but many PSD supporlers backtd the former dictator anyway, and Vargas won an absolute m3jority of the popul3r vOle. In the Chamber of Deputies the PSD lost its majority, never ag3in surpassing 37 percelll. The PTB doubled its scat share (10 abou t 17 percent), and sma ll parties became a major force. Vargas's administriuion was both activist and limited. Public investment in energy and transpo n .uion increased, the National uonom ic Development Bank (BN DE) became a major source of investment capital, and the government controlle-d exchange r:lles to help rat ion imp""i. The government was Imahle. however, to increase taxes, and it met infb.tionary pressures in 195 4 and 1955 with another try at contraction. BUI comraClion and austerit), were difficult to accept in the middle 1950s, because the vigorous in· dustrial sector was quite import-dependent and Brazilian nationalism (encouraged by the goverllment and fueled by Vargas's suicide in 1954) had grown enormously." In 1955 the PSD and PTB rebuilt its fo rmer alliancc, electing Juscelino Kubitschek to the presidency. Kubitschek's ~ TargetI'ro­ gram" was Brazil's first thoroughly developmenralist strategy (Lessa 1975). Emph:lsizing tl'1lnsport, energy, basic industry, :lnd the construction of the city of Brasili:l, Kubitschek paid less attention to price stability, the b:d.mce of p:lymentS, :lgricultuu, and income distribution. Though the resources fo r the program had to come from the government and foreign capital, domestic industrialists wert supportive. because the government was cre:lting new areas of growth and leavi ng imaCI the prerogati ves of domestic capital. Initially Kubitschek's strategy wo rked. 8etwctn 1957 and \96 1 domestic production climbed 7.0 percent ann ua1Jy, and key sectors 4. At his dc~th, V~rps kit a ktttr anad,onIJ. ror~i", nlt~'l'riH$ for m~kon, exorbitant profits ~nd fM blockUl, me plYemm~nt 's dforrs '0 ~,d workers and takr a biWr rolt in the ecooomy. The len~' unlushnl a way~ nf pub!i, symp.rhy

for Va r&-,s and

~trrngthr~

narioR3lisl fttling. Stt Skidmorr

(I~67].

Tht ColIgrtSJ

COlIlIUriOIl

"9

like transporl3tion advanced even faster. Brazil began the sixties with a more mature economy, but the financing of the developmem program inevitably encouraged a hyperinflation. Agricultural production per person had barely increased, regional disparities had worsened, ;;and employment had grown less than the increase in the work force. A political crisis paralleled the developing economic crisis. Rapid industrialization and urbanization had broken the dominance of the conservative parties, especially the PSD, but malapportionment and electoral instability prevented the emergence of a stable legislative realignment. Increasingly, deputies were elected by multiparty coalitions whose composition va ried from state to state. These coalitions, moreover, were rarely based on enduring ideological differences, so they changed from election to election. The electoral rules also encouraged small parties to ally with larger ones as a way of guaranteeing themsdves at least one legislative seat. Along with the overrep r~enta tion of traditional regions like the Northeast, this combination of electoral instability and the diminished weight of the thrtt major parties made the Congress consistemly more conservative than the president and produced a legislative deadlock.' While President J030 Goulart (first elK ted vice president in 1960) was drihing lehward in the face of pressure from populist groups and challenges from conservative economic and military interests, Congress was in a state of disorder and paralysis. The legislative process came to a halt as both the number of bills introduced and the number passed shrank. The rcsult was political and ad ministrative chaos-a chaos that contributed, in no small measure, to the overthrow of the competitive regime at the end of March 1964. elmlral Government E.xfnnditures

The Brazilian Congress had constitutional authority over thr national budget, but legal control over a budget docs not translate automatically into effective control. Depurirs might not sec budgets as part of their survival stratcgits, and informal pattems of influence outside the Congress could negate their efforts. But public expenditures were strategically important for Brazilian congressmen, and though some important political actors bypassed

s. 5« ~ru (19'-4, 1971, 191)), Sdlwamnu.n (1970), and Souu (1976).

of rhe Theory

Two ApplicationJ

.. 0

0 .35

0 .30

f•

0.25

i,

0 .20

J ~

D. I S

~

,;

~

0 .10

,,

.

\/\

'/

I 'I I"

, \.

f

,.

'-_'

_ ._ '

,

"

, \\ ,, ,

"

-

\ r

"",

/

'

-""" \ . / ,.,."\

~

0 .05

,,

, ',',,

,I',

,

\ .\ .I

... ................. .. ~...~...••.

..~..

v

i

,_ .1.

..........................~ ... ~

M i litary

Public Works

EducaHon and Hoallh AlI'icullure

Figure 7. Program Shares: 1945- 1965

the legislative branch to deal directly with the executive, most budget-related political activity did involve the Congress. We begin our examination of congressional behavior with some simple expenditure patterns. Figure 7 shows the shares of final expenditures devoted 10 key programs between 1945 and 1965. The military was the chief loser, fallin g from JS percent of expenditures in 1947 to just 14 percent in 1964." Public works pro6. Th~ military .hur i .....fincd a. tho .urn of all t"'" military rnin lS{n(S and other mililary progurns divickd by I"'" IOI~' 01 all «nlnl govrmmcnl Jpmding.

The Cnngfl'5S Connl'ction

'" _t.4

"\

""

"

"

0.50

0.75 ~aui

Ma ranhao

Alagoaa

-

/, 1.10

"

1. 6

"

"-0.90

1.25 Rio Grande

SerQipe

"

Ceara

do Nor1e

NOle: Numerical entries represent the ratios of the percentage of all spending received by the sta te 10 its percenlage of Brazil's POputation.

Figure 8. Central Government Spending on Nonheastern Stales: 1948_1966

grams stagnated during Dutra's administration but prospered during the terms of Vargas and Kubitschek. Education and health programs, which aided increasingly powerful middle-class and working-class voters, grew steadily until the military takeover. The programs enjoying the sirongesl growlh are those often

1~",1

Ie

a

Tu.v AppUallions of lbe Theory

called "pork barrel"-that is, programs targetable to specific regions or localities. Since the severe malapportionment of the Chamber of Deputies fav ored less-populated regions, small Northeastern states should have received more than their share of such programs_ Overall, the small Stales of the Northeast did indeed improve their position. But if we examine these Slates separately, as in Figure 8, their budgeta ry reco rd seems quite mixed. Four states clearly gained, twO showed no trend, 3nd one aClu3l1y declined. Figure 8 presents a pU7.1.le. What explains the diverse movements of expenditures into states and progra m s~ We know, of course, that pork barrel politics is legislative politics par excelience? Did the legislative process produce the patterns in Figure 8? And if so, how? Congressional Influence in the Expenditure Process Why Legislators Wallt Pork

Legislators care about reelection . In the hope that voters will reward them, deputies suppon projects aiding their electoral bases. To ensure that their pet projeers will pass the legislalUTC, deputies seek aUies who wi!J join coali(ions backing their pro jectS. This search for aIlies leads to the time-honored practice of logrolling, each member supponing the projects of others in relUrn for their suppon on his. The division of the total budget shifts to fa\'or programs with more pork potential. Funds for hospitals, schools, :md roads expand. Programs that cannot easily be subdivided or th;1t barely affect individ ual districts (such as foreign relations or military wages) suffer.' Unless legislators can claim credit for new government projects placed in their districts, they have no incentive to seck such projects. As a result, legislative survival strategies are affected by 1_ St1: Lowi (1964). The seognpki... lly s.eparabl~ compon ~nt of miliruy 'IKn.!. inS docs not .s«m to be as import.>nt for tke miliury ;n lati n Ameri ... as ;1 i. in Ikc United State$, probably ~ u.., tken: i. much leu local procurement in utin Ameri .... 8. The belr theorerial statement of this position is found in She~le and W~jn­ Sur (198\).

n, c1tttoral laws. If ~ach legislative distria electS one representative, crroil is unambiguous, but representation in Brazil was proportional, with whole sr:nes serving as multimember electoral distrieu. Did incenrives for the pursuit of pork exist nonetheless? They did. for two reasons. Voters cast ballolS for individual candidates, not for party lislS. so voters could reward individual legislators. Moreover, rn3ny states developed a system of informal districlS akin to the "bailiwicks" of Ireland.' Candidates coneentrau:d their campaign efforts in these: districts and dn!w most of their VOltS from them. So ( ven though Brazil used a system of proportional representation, legislalOrs seeking reelection should have attempted to influence the programmatic a nd geographic distribution of public expenditures. Deputies seeking more cennal government spending in their states had a variety of options. to They could ame nd budget proposals with projects benefiting their bailiwicks, they could seek membership on committees dealing with budgets, and they could try to join the leadership of the Chambers or the party directorates. If all deputies' survival motivations were equally intense, no matter which Slates they represented, the malapponionment of the Brazilian Congress would benefit the poor, rural states of the Northeast. This was not the case. NO[ all Northeastern states were winners, and some SlateS gained much more than others. What else counted, then: What conditions m3de some members of Congress more eager and mo re successful in the pursuit of targetable budgetary goods? Inlecurity. If deputies cxp«e to seek future terms in office, the insecurity of their current $COltS stimulates their sc3rch (or district· specific benefits. In Brazil's system of proponion31 representation. deputies' c1eaor31 fortunes were determined by their p3rty list ra nking after the balloting. Deputies with low ranks or bare mar9. On Imand _ Sack. (1976). for evidentt of ba,liwick$ in Srnd _ Fkischn (1976. 19m. 10. Aftu proposed budgeTs were .ubmi"~ by [he praidrnt ,n 1M ~d quarrn- of uch yel
The Conguu Connu tion

'"

to the president's budget. During tht! populist.devd opmenralisr administration of Dutra's sucCt!Ssor Gt!tulio Vargas, tht! Finance Commintt 100000n«l its purst! strings. With hudgcury opponunitit!S tOO good to pass up, the dt!ctorally powerful exercised their prerogativt!S and took scats on key commintts. Vargas's suicide in 1954 was succeed«l by twO years of austerity budgets submin ed by provisional prt!Sidents. 17 Opportu nitit!S for pork were paltry, and the Budget Committee's new members came as often from the bottom half of tht!ir pany lists as the tOp half. Tht! Kubitschek and Goulart presidencies brought a renewed budgetary expansion, and after the congressional dection of 1958 new members once again came from the upper half of pany lists. Why did deputit!S want these Budget Comminee scats? For top \·ote-geners electoral anxiety was hardly a strong incentive. In· stead, they treated the Budget Committee as a source of long-term political capital. Passing out budgetary largesse to colleagues was an important way of amassing influence, both in their own states and nationally. Lesser vote-getters, by contrast, nl.'eded [0 assure their own reelection. They sought Budget scats because a position on the committee would increase their political resources and im· prove their immediate chances for survival. Deputies sought or avoided scats on the Budget Committee for three reasons: party ethos, vote concentration, and competitive pressure. As we saw in the first section, the National Democratic Union (UDN) had a streak of antipopulism and fiscal conservatism. This orientation inclined Udenistas away from the budget committttS. When deputies were asked (in the mail survey) which of their committees was most important to them, Udenistas were half as likdy as members of other parties to name the Budget Committee, and they were much more likd y to seck scalS on [he Constitution and Junice Committee. When ask«l to rate the importance of " helping local areas" in committee selcttion, UDN members were slightly more likely to dOWPIgrade local benefits. Nonetheless, Udenistas did serve on the Budget Committtt, because party shares of committee scats correspond«l closely with pany shares of total Chamber scats. Why, with their aversion 10 pork, did UDN members accept Budget Committee spots? When 17. Loal ludm in Rio (Orand.: do Notu: tc$rified m31 Proicknt Cafi Fitho particularly dipppoinltd his follow~. who up«mlloa of money.

Two AppliCillions of the Theory

t1.o

Table 23. Campllign Conuntrlltion lind Key Committee Art'a of C2 mpaign

K..y Commin""

Rudget finance Oth~r

No Regionll/

Conctnl"lIion in Contiguous

Conctm,"/ion in G,oup of Sulle,ed

Conunrr3tjon

Alunjc;p~/jrje.

Munjdp;>/jljts

11.1 % 1 L! % 77.8% 1000/. (27)

20.6% 15.6% 63.8% 100% (34)

20.0% 26. 7% 53.3% 100% (30)

Not" Thi, ubi. i, • , .. ult of fWD qu .. rion" "When you ran lor , ...1 in lhe o..mbcr, wnne did 1"" ~., .. p.>"

cone."".,. your

"''''p.i",?" and

"~

..... wh .... you co""'"""..! .h.

of your ",mp.ip ..,.r•. .. ." TIre "umbe,.. in p.,.mh ........ ,he ""mbe, o'

=pondcnts.

asked which committee members were particularly associated with the role of "Oefend .. rs of Order" (a Brazilian euphemism for fiscal conservatism), a long"time Budget Comminee staffer responded with six names: Adauto Cardoso, Pedro Aleixo, Aliomar Baleeiro, Herbert Levy, Gustavo Clpanema, and Wagner Esrdita. All were distinguished deputies, but four of the six represented the VON. Thus a party that averaged less than one"quarter of all Chamber seats from 1947 until 1964 generated two-thirds of the leading budgetary conservatives. VON members got on the Budget Com" mittee in order to resist pressures to spend, not to get a piece of the action. Ideology-in this case the ethos of the party-pre" vented adoption of a strategy that might have broadened the po" litical appeal of some VDN deputies. Deputies representing discrete electoral zones could claim they were responsible for attracting governmt!nt programs to thost! zones. Survey respondents were asked whether they concenlrated their campaigns or spread their eHom all around their states. As Table 23 shows, concentration led members 10 rely on the Budget and Finance Committees. Asked what percentages of their votes came from their areas of greatest suppon, deputies who believed that a single key area delivered more than 60 percent of their votes were twice as likely to regard the Budget Committee as most im" portant as those whose key areas delivered less than 40 percent. Respondents were then asked why certain committees were most important to them. Their responses were coded into fifteen

,

The Congress Connection

Table 24. CompDign ConU1ltrDtion and Committu Efforu Helpin! kse or R~on

Campaigned in Whole SllIe

Most Important 2nd Mosl lmponant 3rd MO$I Imponanl

CamJnigned in Some Areas More Than Orhers

7.0%

30.1% 23.8"-

18.S% ~

6.)"-

27% Nort: Column. do

no
uf ln~ Budg~t Commi nee. bocau"" tnei r could be anended without .mendment5. IO. If approp ri.", dau were available. o ne migh, ask whether th ese depuri~ reduced their aCTi~ity tr..c.usc they knew they int~nd.-d to ....·ithdraw Ut whether their inactivity led to ddeat or withdrdw.1. II. ,\-byhew (1974) argues thal,n the Un ited Staf~ cI.iming cred it for future performance (tha t i~. prom;... ) may be more imponam th~n u.king cr.dil {or proj «:fS already completed. In Brazil, howcv~r. political communication is tOO ""eok lur th. cI«:tor. te !(r an(1 boli.'·e .uch plomises. n~d.

Ile.,

The CongreJ1 Connection

The Issue of l'ennea/Jility. How did the existence of electoral Strongholds affect budgetary behavior? The survey data discussed earlier tied deputies' perceptions of electoral zones to their committee choices. Rather than relying on perceptions, can we calculate individual bailiwicks' actual permeability (or penetrability) to the campaigns of other deputies? Such a calcubtion requires county-level denion returns, but these returns randy exist. Suppose, instead, we could identify localities benefiting from the individual amendments each deputy made. Assuming that no deputy would waste political capital seeking benefits from places that contribute no votes, localities getting aid constitute deputies' bail iwicks.u If no other deputy from the same state made amendments for any of the places aided by a particular deputy's amendments, then the latter had a completely impermeable bailiwick. If all the other deputies in a state made amendments for every site aided by the deputy, the bailiwick was completely penetrated-that is, it was no bailiwick at all. The key, then, is the bailiwick's permeability, defined as the ratio of actual to potential entrants in one's lone:

a.cc-p. " ,--",

(n - l)s,

where

p. a. n

'.

permeability of depllly x, ranging from 0 to number of sites mentioned in amendments by deputy x that are also mentioned by each other deputy in the state total number of deputies in the state number of pbces for which deputy x makes amendments

Permeability can also be defined in a second, more limited way, in terms of bailiwick incursions made only by members of other panies. This alternative version, in other words, ignores entries by members of the deputy's own party because they are less threatemng. Focusing on members of three important committees, I used the 1953 grants-in-aid budget of the Ministry of Education and Health 22. In a few srares all rhe: deputies ioined rogerher ro sponsor a single amend· ment. Joint sponsorship indicates cooperation, bur if does nor mean rhal all rhe ckpuries """"ived vOles cycrywheu in the Slate.

""

1~",1

Ie

"'a

Two A.PP/;Clltion$ of the Theory

'"
CN, 0.:.... 4, " H, pp. S- I07.

to caleulalc Ihcsc two cxpcrimcnlal vcuiolls of bailiwick permeability. On both meas ures Minas Gerais matched its reputation in Brazilian political folklore 35 the stale wilh Ihe mOSI impermeable districts. Experts o n Sao Paulo and Bahia confirmed that these locality-defined bailiwicks corresponded to Ihe elector:!! dislricts they knew. Finally. county-level electoral data for the state of Rio de Janeiro were available for the year 1962, and although ,he overlap between the experimental bailiwicks and the declio n results was imperfect (due to IUrnover among the deputies), it was quite high. Did the exinence of electo ral bailiwicks affect survi val strategies? Table 26 demonst rates that, with both measures, representatives of more permeable (that is, Icss secure) distriru were mo re likely to hold seats on the Budget Commintt. Suppose the actual monetary size of amendments is affected by bailiwick permeability. Do deputies from more permeable districts make larger amendments? Table 27 answe rs that question in the affirmative. In o ther words: Deputies whose d~Cloral bases were easily invaded sought committees that could reward their districts and made larger amendments to budget proposals.l.I

Determinants of Sliccess at the State Level We now turn to the budgetary success of whole statcs. More precisely, what determined ave rage per capita spending on each

me

23. One olh~r Ioel of amendment.!, 1M.. "l
us

The Congreu Connection

Table 27.

Permeability and Amendment She Correlation Between lliputy'$ Nonparty Enuy Ratio and Site of Avcr~gI' "mrodmmt

St~t'"

Ome4>tion

"'

Minu Gtr:ai. Sio Paulo Bahia

0 •.39

5.48

0.52 0.44

32 23 IS

~ari

0.63

10

5.5 1

"

7.99 3.12

$00e 0.05 le>d .uepe of Sahl., whidr 'oI.

,Iu,

state over [he entire 1947-1964 pe r iod?l~ Pursuant 10 the model developed in the second section, the effeas of five factors wefe estim:'IIed with multiple regression techniques.2J The five v:lnables and their indicators arc as follows : Budget Committee Representation: the total of Ihe :mnual over' or unde rrepr~ntation on the Budget Commi[t~ of each sta(t as compared to its percentage of all Chamber scats Party Leadership: the average annual ra tio of a s(;ue's per(en(.age of positions in the pany leaderships to its percentage of tolal Chamber sc.ats Chamber Leadership: the average annual ralio of a Slate's per· 2.4. For each year, the per~ntage of total nntralplvemmc:n1 Jpendin, Coin, into each SCatC ....·a5 divided by the STate', percentage- of Br:azil', population. A SI.Te receivi ng a share of central governmenT spmding equ.1 In ils populu;o., .ha", would receiY~ a ..:ore 011, statel proportiona tely bett~r off would receive a SCOU g.UtU than I, and so on. H. The ambiguity of the Ktutnove," hypothesi, was noted ~bovt. High del egale turnover seemed likely to inCfl'aJe mntivation to s«k po,k. but mJua tM prn;.ibility of IUCcns. In preliminary "tim~rion. of tht multi pit reycssion, ,he uro-orde. correl ation of this nriable wilh spending was low .nd irs partial ' tIVrs · sion .ocflkient was in,igni~unt. Sinct it wu both theoretically and naTistically wuk. il WaS d,opped from Ihe analy,i,. In .ddition. a control ,uch as "economic development" might be expected. Initially, the per.:entage of the work foro: participating in industry was included n such a (UnlTol. It il not reported he,e beau ... iii partial waS elOC11tially zero, with a 0.99 signi~Clln~ loel. Note .1", ,ha t the Federal Dimicr was 'emoved f'om the ana lysis since 10 much federal ,pendin8 t«hnio.lly uricinat" tM",.

1:.6 Table 28.

Two Applicatio11$ of the Theory Avtrage Spending by untral GOllernment on States in Relation to Population: 1947-1964

Vatiablt

Esrim~le"

0.0003

0.041 -0. 126 0.250

3.6] -1.0] 3.32

0.0027 0.320 0.005

O.ot8

2.27

0.039

- 0.008

- 1.48

0.162

1.04

RepTcsent~rion

No,,, Il' • 0.62: F • 4.51: P"ob :> F •

'Th... rorffici

Of


T

o.on.

umun.urdi ..d. Th
C C

'''''' 20%

C P

pCP

C

/: Pc

c .. CoIIgresslonai elect.io!'l eHeet Ilq)e(:led P _ PrHidential election IIMeet Ixpec1ed NOTE : The dilia lor income, lotal population. and urban population come from the decennial IigUf8S 01 !he Anu6rio EsIa1istioo do Brasil. They were interpolated to yield I _I estimales. In lhe years COIIsred by Ihesa dala. presidential e!ecli0n5 were held on October 3, 1950: October 3. 1955;

and OcIobef 3. 1960. ElecOons Iof the Chamber of Oepulies were IwlId on 0d0tIeI 3, 1950; Oc\obef 3, 19~ : Odober 3, 1958: and October 7, 1962. Because II careUlkef g0vernment was ., o tfiee in 1955, no preelection elleel is expecled. The year 1962 t\as also bHrI id&nlifild with • 'p- because il was the /irS! year 01 !he admInlSI•• ,iDn of JoAo Goulart, who took oI1iCe atter !he resignation of JaniO Ouadlos.

Figure 9. Expbined Vari:lncl.' of the B:lStlinl.' R~rl.'5Sion of TOlal Central Government Spt"nding on Sillies

n.

The Congress Connection

ralist years. The higher the percentage of total fluctuation ex· plained, the less important are "political" factors. The dramatic decline after 1950 in the explanatory value of the baseline equation reflects the increasing politicization of expen· diture politics that resulted from the end of PSD dominance. Within that decline, elections played a significant short-term role. In 1950, the first election year, the baseline regression actually improved its performance (Rl rising from 52 to 76 percent). The increased weight of income, total population, and urban population in explaining state shares resulted from the apolitical quality of the outgoing Dutra administration and the conservative role taken by the Finance Committee. In 1951, however, President Var· gas and the new Congress had their own ideas about state shares. Political coalition building became much more important, and the percentage of the interstate distribution explained by the equation declined from 72 to 17 percent. The congressional election of 1954 did not affect the distribution, but in the aftermath of the 1955 election-held by a caretaker government after Vargas's deaththe baseline regression fell back to 21 percent. The congressional election of 1958, like its predecessor, left distribution unchanged, but another low in the baseline model was reached in the presidential election of 1960. Two years later, when a new president took power and congressional elections were held, the predictive power of the equation declined again. Deviations from the baseline regression represent an increase in the use of the budget as a survival weapon. Electoral deviations attributable to the executive were much stronger than those at· tributable to the legislature. Indeed, me midterm congressional elections of 1954 and 1958, which did not coincide with presidential elections, affected the distrihution of spending very little. Why did the distribution of expenditures change so little around midterm congressional elections? In Chapter 3 we saw that total spending rose during midterms, because the executive's survival chances were improved by spending more. For individual deputies this one-time largesse would be beneficial, but it would not caust' them to rearrange their own distribution pattern. Each deputy could bring in a litrle more spending without incurring the political cost of pursuing a major budgetary redistribution. In other words, the willingness of the executive to spend more enabled incumbent legislators to engage in their own form of shock-cushioning. The

1~",1

Ie

a

'JO

Two Af'pliwlio"s of tht: Theory

fact that the interstate distribution-of expenditures changed during presidential elections may be a sign of the president's weakness relative to the legislature- for only at presidential elections could the president modify an interstate division basically determined by the Congress.

Some Indiuidual Cases The slUdy of individual cases is a way of enriching our understanding of the underlying processes generating statistical estimates. Six states were selected for intensive analysis on the basis of the cross-sectional regression's residuals (t hat is, the differences between the model's predictions and the :lellla1 federal spending the states received).

Rio Grande do SuI, Parand, and Sama Catarina. These relatively wealthy states ;lre all in Brazil's prosperous SOUlh. In budgetary terms thSP, picked up vOles primarily in rura l areas, and it was as conservative as the PSO. The PTB and UON wefe also conservative, but they wefe so weak tha t often they failed e\'en 10 compete in fede ral cI«'t;ons. 3~. In Ih~ I'SD, t~ JK>wers W (rC Gwrgi!>Q Avdhoo, who li,'( d in Rio; Thco· dorico Ikuna, w,th intercsts in COltOn and hotd.; JOlO Cam .... conon; ~nd JCSIoC Pinto Freire, I,nkQlirician from Goi:h who alone rimr huded the Budgn CO n1miu«, 11Ji> took l "national" posirion. Paraib~, tOO, sums full Qf politicians caring linle ~bout loc~1 intu.n•. Ern~ni Sa tim, for m~ny ye~", a member Qf the Budget Commi n« and .rill in the Chan1ber, boasted 10 me that M h~d never gonen anylhin8 for hi •• kelllnl wne .~"'pT o ne wetch Qf road, and even that h~d never been Rnished. adminim~tiQn

.,6

Two Application$ of the Theory

cians saw the: ad va ntages of expendit ures. Parana's i nten ~ interpany conflias reduced the political influence of the state as a whole. Each deputy might actively pursue: his own pork-oriented survival Slrategy. but inlerpany hostility kept Parana's deputies from cooperating and high turnover kept the delegation from attaining much seniority. In Ihis case the structu re of political competition damaged the interests of the whole sta te.

Pork Barrel Politics Under Military Rule When the military came to power in 1964, the role of the Congress in the distribu tion of federa l expendirures changed drarn:nically_ The hostility of th e: generals and their civilian ad visers toward the Congress was not merely rhetorical. Within a few days of the coup the junta issued a decrtt granting the p r~i dent the exclusive right [0 initi:lote all fi nancial bills and preventing the Congress fro m voting any additions 10 expendi tures. The junta soon wro te a new consti tutio n strengthening these rest rictions. The Constitution of 1967, in the words of Ronning and Keith (1976:231 ), ~curbs the ab ility of any congressman to build up his own clientde- via 'pork barrel' kgislatio n. "J' As an institution independently able 10 modify expc-nditurc:s, Congress ceased 10 exist, but the junla went even furthe r, mounting a n intense attack, particularly during the Costa e Silva and Medici administra tions, against nalio nal and state-Ievd ~ profC'S­ sional politicians." These attacks no twithstanding, clientc1istie pol . ilics survived. The regime had made the conventional lr:lppings of parlia menta ry democracy, including panies and cI« tions. pan of its own surv ival stra tegy. As a result, it had to rely o n mu nicipal authorities 10 deliver the vote in its highly controlled elections. As Paul Cammack (1982) points ou t, once central au tho rities concentrated resources in their own hands, and o nce civilian politicians could make no credible claim to effective ro les in representation or policy formation, municipal autho rities were in a strong position to manipu late resources to benefit the government party. Fo r Congress as a body a nd for mosl individual politieiam, however, budgetary politics disa ppea red. Some of the deputies responding to o ur mail surve-y continued 38. Fo.

~ {oml'r~h~osiv(

OOthly. At k .1$1 until 1977. when Geisel m,n'ged to remOVe .he huds of The Msecurit)'~ opeution.., periodl of intense reprusion (inc luding 10rlllre ~nd ,mpr'loOnmml) were ~ommon. S« Ku~i",ki (1982). 4. Reis VelloloO, lpeed> publisl>ed in Ulri"", Ho,... Mardi 29, 197J.

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The Abertur3 Broadens Liberalization was [0 begin with the election of 1974. If the eleerion could take place in a n atmosphere frcc from coercion, and i( the gove rnment received a resounding vOle of confidence, the president would ha ve the support his gradualist stra tegy required. Until a few weeks before the eltccion, the government expected an easy vicrory.J Instead, the opposition sWTcd a smashing success, taking 16 of 22 ~natc seats and 160 of 364 Cha mbe r seats.' Why did th e regime fare so poorly when four yea rs earlier it had achieved a great electoral success? Admittedly, the election of 1970 had been held in an a unosphere of intimidatio n, but even w the opposition was dea rl y in disar ray. Moreover, McDonough 's public opinion survey, implemented in 1972- 1973 at the height of the "miracle,R fou nd high levels of support for the regime in all social classes, with only a small falloff among wo rkers (Cohen 1982). Why, then. was the regime so badly defeated in 1974? Why did the same pallfista indust rial workers who had supported the regime in 1972 vote 8- 1 for the opposition ('andidate in the 1974 Sao Paulo Senate race (Cardoso and l..amounier 1975)1 &unom;c collapse did nOI cause Ihe reversal of opinion. True, GNP growth between 1973 and 1974 dedi ned from 14 10 9.H percent, and inflation grew from 12.8 10 27.6 percent. Still. employment was high and real wages were improving. Oider wo rkers knew thei r real incomes had declined since 1964, but thei r memories of the chaos of the Q uadros and Goulart years made them distrustful of open politiCli. Younger workers saw the mselves as beneficiaries of an orde rl y economic growth directed by a mo ralistic military. Mass opinion during the heyda y of growth was supportive. but that support was fragile: . The gove:rn ment bombarded the population with news of its achievements. and opposing views faced an impenetrable: wall of censorship. The 1974 d ectOfal campaign was the first time the opposition was able 10 make il s case abou t the gap between rich and poor, the deterioration of urb:lIl health ('onditions, the rights of workers, and other issues. The military's 5. Sc.:, for tumpk. the )I~temc111~ of one of the ci~,hn k.dc:~ of the- .Jm,,,Pfflonio Por!ell~, in \'t'I'" Oc-lobc. JO, IlI7o, a supportive Stale, was spht into fWO, fhus increasing pwgovemment strength. Th= p.acri~s became w wen kno"o'Il in B.azil [hal C4Uui.mo (KcasuiSlry" ) Me>me an .v.ryday word. 17. Pritt sening provides a powerful moon_ of buying support. In 1980. Dclfim NelO, lhe minisler of planning and al thaI time Ihe le~ding civilian candidale for the p ... idency, incrcued me price the government paid lor sugar. Coincidmully, Dc:16m Neto used the ceuion to ask the growers to join Ih. government party. s.c., Jo"",1 do Rrll$il. June J. 1980, p. 1'1.

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military regime, so it could never be written off. Economically important Minas Gerais gave the government thirty-seven of sixtyone seats, but Minas was surely no government bailiwick. Minas boasted an extremely active political elite, one that would respond quickly to signs of neglect (Fleischer 1973). A third group of states offered better long-term prospects. Northeastern states had smaller concentrations of blue· collar workers and lower levels of classbased opposition. Moreover, clientelistic relationships between landowners and their dependent tenants guaranteed a heavily proregime vote in rural areas. These factors point to the Northeast as the key to a regional strategy. BUI one caveat remained: Why invest resources where the lead is already secure? If ARENA elects thirty·seven out of fifty deputies in Bahia, thirty of forty in Ceara, and nineteen of twenty-four in Piaui, these states are safe. Why not put resources in politically important but elcclOrally marginal areas? A strategy that favors marginal cases, ignoring both unyielding opposition and unwavering support, runs into one major obstacle. For local elites, survival depends on securing government largesse for their regions. The greatest pressure on the regime came from states with the largest progovernment delegations. Because Bahia strongly supported the regime, its leaders expected rewards com· mensurate with that support. The regime, on the other hand, should treat Bahia as a "safe" region and devote its efforts elsewhere. Thus the regime's political interests were directly opposed 10 the claims upon it. II Recapitulation

Four distinct strategies of long-range survival Were available to Geisel and Figueiredo. It would be surprising, however, if they had implemented only one strategy, because few administrations can act as single-mindedly as the preceding hypotheses demand. If pressure from loyalist states was too strong to ignore, the n::gime might have opted for a region-wide approach, putting money everywhere in the Northe~st. It might have adopted multiple strat18, In an interesting pi«c on Mex ican presidems, Coleman and Wanat (1973 ) diocoveroo that one pre>idem appeared to be putting resource, wh.r. th. PRJ was weakest. whil. his sucr"nor rewarded those Slaies thai were strongly pro-PRI. Such uctical choiCfi would have Mf.n somewhat tasiu in Mexico, with its more insti _ tutionalized 3ulhorituianiim.

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cgies or evc:n inherently contradictory combinations. Combining a Northeast regiona l approach with social spending, fo r example.

would h;n'C been coumc:rproductivc:. Silla' most of the beneficiaries of social programs wert located in indusuial arcas. highe r social spending would have: inc:vitably reduced the: share of the budget going to the Northeast. Strategies are truly conlradiclOry o nl y in the long run. In th e shoft run, the irreconci lable can be rceon eilC'd through cxp:msion-that is, by do ing everything simullanoously and lening successors pay the cost. Sy 1983, as we shall $tt, the ttOnomic decline: was so Sleep thai th e con~ucnas of such c:xpansion were: ftll almost immediately, and the military regime had so degenerated that it could no lo nger make choiet·s. II could only Mpush with its stomach (empum,r com Q barrigaj-that is, postpom: wit hout deciding. M

Five Policies The five policies discussed here are not a random sample of the univerK of policy areas, (lOr do they include every important iss ue. They were chosen because IOgeth er they affect th e vital inte rests of all potential regime targets. Put another way, each regional or class targel cared inte nsely about at least one of these policies.

Agricultllre The No rtheast supported th e military regime, but its support was not the response of a conservatism based on wealth, for the Norlheast, especially its interior, is aClllal1y Brazil's pooreSt region. Concentration of landownership is extreme, agricultural productivity is very low, and per capita inco mes are less than one-fifth those of Ihe prosperous SOUlh and SOlltheast. As a resul t, migration is very high from the interior to cities in the Northeast and to o th er regions. The close relationship between the military regim e and NortheaSlern elites was like the relationship between right-wing regimes and backward regions in many parts of the world, but in Brazil a dominant ecological factor, the periodic drought sufferid by the arid serrao region, conditioned the linkage as well. Occurring about every seven years, these droughts led to a long history of dam conSlruction and river-valley development. In the late 19505,

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under the leadership of Northeastern economist Celso Furt:Jdo, region:ll pbnning took on :I more comprehensive tone with the creation of [he Superintendency fo r the Develupment of the Northeast (SUDENE). SUDENE's gO:lls included greater agricultural productivity, crop diversifica tion, and even colonization, but its main objective was industria lization. By the middle sixties, it was obvious that SUD ENE had failed. I[s resources were insufficient, its management was tOO influenced by the region's conservative oligarchy, it was unable to enforce compliance with its pbns, and its industrialization strategy was technically deficient. The industrial park of the Northeast had grown, but industry created small numbtn of fobs, developed few links to agriculture, and magnified intraregional disparities by locating new plants in the large cities. While successive Brazilian governments tried various schemes to integrate the Northeast into the nation, the structure of the national cRO-

TERRA crwi! in ]972 and SA percenl in 1973 but only 0.35 percent of all PRO· TERRA credit in \974. ]n lal(( yurs no loans were mde for land uquililions at all. The lending of the Bank of Brazil also illustrate> the powerful (o"«nltation of PROTERRA capital ~hind 3gm·industry. l\erv;""n I ':17 1 and 1':178, morc than 97 percent of the bank's loans wem fot land acqui~ilion, but morc than 62 percell! of the loaned funds wenl to agro-industry.

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exempted farms of less than a thousand hectares from expropriation. Larger landowners who submined "lenus of adherence" (0 the program became responsible for its implementation. The landowners themselves would dete rmi ne which portions of their land would be bought by INCRA and which tena nts would receive land. Moreover, adhering landowners received extremely favorable compensation for the expenses of relocation and resettlement. In August 1974, when it was dear that nOl hing was happening, INCRA assumed sole control of the project, giving the landowners thirty days to accept INCRA's proposals or face immediate expropriation. INC RA's proposals, however, were simply grants of credit to the recipients of individual parcels, and INCRA compensated landowners generously for quite marginal pieces of land. Very little redistribution ever took place. By 1975 I'ROTERRA credit had been used (0 purchase only about 1.5 percent of the (Otal farm area in the "priority zone" of Pernambuco. No expropriations had occurred. Only 840 families had settled on acquired land, and after 1975 the number of new owners declined steadily (Carvalho 1982). Why was PROTERRA so unsuccessful? PROTERRA's land acquisition policy was barely an improvement over mere credit. Land recipients had (0 pay for their land at market prices, fo rmer landowners were well compensated, and the parcels of land were tOO large. 1 ' PROTERRA was also administratively weak. At the inception of the program INCRA relied on the landowners themselves. When that failed, it lacked the personnel to do the work itself. Most importa nt, however, was the absence of political will. President Medici may have believed in PROTERRA, but economic CLafS Ddfim Ne(O, Reis Vdloso, and Simonsen did not. According t o informants, Ddfim New had told the World Bank, which supported agrarian rdorm in the Northeast, that he had nothing against land reform. Since the World Bank had the money, Ihe World Bank could pay fo r redistribution. But acqui6Cence was not support. PROTERRA needed active backing, because the land24. INCRA w~nttd to ~void tht CTunon of a mm'fundiJtll dau, 50 ir man · duro minimum , ius fot I~nd par",b. That p~r,(ls hid to nfnge ISO h«t~r<s in CUr3 and 60 hecrar« in Ptrn~mbuco. Pcoplt living 01\ su,h potuls wllo Were not I~nd recipients n~ fU rally lWf

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lowered by extending the mortgage term from twemy to twemyfive years and by reducing the imerest rate three percentage points. COHABs were also given the right 10 construct and finance housing for a wealthier section of the lower middle class, those earning three 10 five minimums. U With these changes the vacancy rateIS. Ikcau.e .peculation had driven up housing prices, such buyers kc,a"", mud! rna,", ;nt~=tcd in low-income dwelling •. In a comparison of projects com-

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Two Applicati()lu of the Theory

6.7 percent al the end of 1973-dropped to 0.3 percent in September 1978, and the percentage of residenls at least three months behind in payments-36.3 percent in 1973-droppcd to 12.6 percent. Did these changes in housing programs reAcet a class strategy or a regional str;ltegy? If the regime was appealing directly to actual or potential housing recipients, the interstate distribution of government housing per urban dweller should have hecome more

equal. n If the regime's str:ltcgisTs were assuming that each state had equal importance as a target, then the distribution between states, regardless of the states' urban populations, should have become more equal. In Brazil such a regional strategy would ino rdinately favor the Northeast, because its states are mostly smaller and more rural. Figure 12 plots the distribution of COHAB units per srale, both in absolute terms and in relation to the percentage of Brazil's urban population TC'siding in the stat.... ~o Both distributions be ...

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trend.J~ Figueiredo's election year deviations were much greater than those of Geisel; indeed, the average difference between predicted and actual shares in 1982 is more than three times the same difference in 1978.j~ Different programs also deviated in each administration. Geisel boosted agriculture and welfare in the election year and made extra cuts in the already declining military ministries. , J7 These shifts fit a strategy, centered on agricultural aid to Northeastern farmers and welfare for the urban middle and working classes. By contrast, Figueiredo's election year deviations seem confused. His adminisnation had emphasized social programs, but in 1982 he switched toward infrastructure (transport and communications) and away from education, housing, health, and welfare. Well before the election, however, the economy had begun to deteriorate, and economic conditions were the paramount issue of the election. Public works spending creates private sector jobs that can be targeted and controlled by local elites. Social programs disproportionately benefit urban groups unlikely to vote for the government party in any event. Figueiredo's clection year expenditures reflect more than just a short-term survival strategy. The Army Ministry, profiting from the insecurity of an administration faced with restive officers and strident opposition politicians, managed to reverse the fall of its budget share. The army's gain, along with the increased volatility in ministerial spending in 1982 (as compared to 1978), is our first indication of Figueiredo's loss of control of his administration. The programmatic shifts of the Geisel and Figueiredo years represent a broadening of the regime's social base, but regional shifts are less dear. Table 31 shows that central government expendi-

35. Rates of change were calculated for each program - lim iM:twan 19711973 and 1975_ 1977 and then iM:twan 1975_1977 and 1979_1981. The first rate of change wa. e>lt.apolatro to 1978 and the second rale of change was e>Itrapola~d to 1982. The differcnces between the~ predj~ions and the actual share'S for earn progr:am durinS the dn:rion yurs were then ",lculaled. The dection of 1974 was nol included becau~ Gei~l had little cOll1rol oycr spending during his finl y~r in office. 36. The muns of the absolu~ values of Ihe diffnences equal 0.41 for Geisel and 1.34 for Figueiredo. 37. Gei~l's conlidence in his military suppan mUSI have incrusN afrer 19n, when he remoyed wenl Frat:o, a dissidml memiM:r of Ihe high command. See GOes (1978). Why the txpendiNtes of the Interior Ministry suffered is uncertain. Housing progr:arm arc one componenl of ln~rior, bUI ,ina: the National Housing Bank itself Stew in 1978, it may be thai the nonhousing componenlS of Ihe InICI;OI Minislry bott most of the shon-Ienn reduction.

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lures going to the Northeast declined during the adrninisU3tio ns of both Geisel and Figueiredo. These reduct io ns, however, might simply have been by-products of the increases in social programs, because social programs weigh morc hea vil y in expenditures into the industrialized Southca st. j~ If a regional STrategy was pursued. it might sho w up in the movements of direct transfers 10 st ate go vC'rnrn ents. Altho ugh some transfer payments arc subject to long-Ierm arrangementS and thus cannot easily be manipu13tcd from year 10 year, transfers also have a "controllable" component that includes grams in such areas as management of health care facilities, support of univc rsitits. and provision of agricultural scrviccs .J~ Overall, l a rg~' in· creases in transfers benefited the Northeast during the Figueiredo government, and in 1982 (;an cleo;tio n year) the steady upwMd trend rulminated in the delivery to the Northeast of ;almost half of alluans(ers 10 slates (Rclende 1982a). In sum, then, in the industri;al Southeast Figuciredo chose to suess direct programs like education a nd he!l.lth, but in the North· cast the real objects of political recruitment were state and local elites. In that clientelistic realm, state a nd local clites were patrons 10 program beneficia ries but clients of the central adminiSlr;ation. 40

Proposed vs. Acwal Budgets. After 1981 the "dceomposition of the Figueiredo adminisu a tion became a common theme in the M

38. Wh(lher lhe rqoonal shim W C(( 1("~lIr an anifaCl of progl~ m (h~"gu cannor be okfiniri"dy anSWnN unrilthe completion of the 1 ~80 region~liurion projeCI. Uling the ~. li ... rioM .v. iI~bk for 1~70 and 1975, there wa' ..... n · idm~ of a bi • • (ither row,,,d prov~m, or rc-gion•. Thi, was okw on;oW by lim calculating. for u ch J>fOYaln in (ach SUtc, tho: ohn c of tOla l CCIIIf. 1 govcrnmm r l(m, public hi"'.r eduution is the ,(Sponsibiliry of th. ~ntul gm"ernment. ~nd about 50 ""r~nt of all fed~ral ,pending on education goes to the universiti(S. Ptimary and ~condary education nt b.:uicaUy Slate and locaL Th. f.deral sha re in alll~vd, has grown rapidly in r"""m years as th. c~mral gov.rnn'~nt has inctea,ingly pteentpted the tax po"·.r~ of stat.. and municipalities. 47. It is wonh noting th~t in 1984 univ.... iti(S aU m".r th~ country went on a I'rolonsed strike to prot(St inadNJuate funding. lbe strike was partly a =uh of th .. ~ ,hilts in budS.t ~har...

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figurt Lt. Percentage Division of Actual Expenditures in Ministry of Educa tion and Culturt

moved in opposite directions. To a certain extent, then, Figueiredo's political weakness ncg:ncd his social strategy.

Recapitulatioll. Geisel's :md Figucirrdo's expenditure policies reveal similarities and differences. They both cut the shares of the military and transport:n ioll rniniSlrics, and they both increased spending on agriculture, education, and welfare. Figueiredo also

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aided housing, a program nicely attuned to the presidential ambitions of Interior Minister Mario Andreazza_ The elections of 1978 and 1982 illustrate the difference between the two presidents_ Expenditure shifts in Geisel's last year (1978) reflected a continuation of the strategies that had motivated his administration earlier. Figueiredo, on the other hand, had the bad luck to preside over a deteriorating economic and political situation. His expenditures in 1982 represent a midcourse correction just before a crucial election: more spending to pacify the military and more spending on public works to cut unemployment and reward state and local clites. The regional distribution of expenditures initially seemed confused. The Northeast lost from changes in the distribution of min· isterial expenditures but gained from changes in the payment of transfers. Regional political differences, however, explain the apparent contradiction. In the clientelistic Northeast, transfers increased the political clout of powerful elites. In the industrialized Southeast, direct programs were appeals to the middle and working classes. The priorities of the NoO administrations arc also reflected in the changing distribution of education spending. Geisel reached out to all segments of civil sociery, but his prime target was the upper middle class, a group for whom access to higher education was paramount. Figueiredo sought to widen the regime's base by increasing spending on primary education at the expense of universities. The effort met with only partial success: Figueiredo conlrol1ed the Ministry of Education and Culture, but less than half of al1 educational expenditures were under its control, and the bureaucracy outside the ministry resistt:d his efforts and reduced the overall shift away from higher education.

The Politics of Industrial Deconcentration Industry locates near markets, cheap transponation, and raw materials. The primary "growth pole'" in Brazil is the Rio de Janeiro-Belo Horiwnle-Sao Paulo triangle. especially the ciry and state of Sao Paulo. In 1980 Sao Paulo state contained 21 percent of Brazil's population, produced 54 percent of its industrial product, and consumed 39 percent of all energy. With its surrounding area, the eiry of Sao Paulo represents one of the largest industrial

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concentrations in the world. Because the pace of industrialization has been so rapid and the influx of newcomers so large, the delivery of urban services has never caught up with demand. Transportation is woefully in3dequate; infant monality extrcmelr high; environmental damage already substantial. Sao Paulo, il may be said, is Oiler-industrialized. Official recognition of the problem came in the basic planning document of the Geisel administration, the Second National Dcvelopment Plan (PNDII). PNDII called for a reduction in the interregional inequalities crc:ued by industrialization: To avoid contin uin g the tendency for indusl rial activity to concentra te in a single metropolitan arca, stimulus will Ix: given {Q a better balance in the Sao Paulo-Rio-Belo Horizonte triangle. The objective will be

a decemralization compadble with the preservation of economics of scale (Brazil, PNDIi:40).

Industrial deconcentration was by no means the sole concern of PNDII. It primarily emphasized the dilemma of expensive oil, a dilemma it sought to resolve through a quantum leap in Brazil's level of development. Central to this leap would be the development of basic indUStry. including capital goods, electronics. and such industrial inputs as metals, petrochemicals, fertilizers, paper and cellulose, raw materials for pharmaceuticals, and construction materials. PNDJI stressed exports of manufactured goods and effons to reduce the cost of technology and increase the production of foodstuffs . Whether central to PNDII or not, industrial deconcentration was now on the regime's policy agenda. What were its strategic implications? Deconcentration would strengthen the regime in states benefiting from new industry. Though it would diminish the political weight of Sao P:lUlo, in the long run it would help the paulista working class, because social services could catch up with demand. But if the regime wanted the paulista industrialists to move to the himerlands. it would have to till toward domestic industry and away from transnational corporations seeki ng investment opportunities. PNDII m3de promises to domestic entrepreneurs, but its promises were vague: creation of strong entrepreneurial structures, use of the development banks to aid domestic firms, formation of national conglomerates, and help for small and medium-sized companies.

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One of the most important tools for implementing decancennation was the fiscal incentive program,OI Fiscal incentives were exemptions from taxes on income and on imported equipmem, They were gramed by the lndumial Development Council (COl), an organ of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, An industrialist desiring a tax exemption would present a project to the COl. If the project met the council's criteria, it would gram a tax exemption. The annual distribution of projectS approved for fiscal incentives, by value and absolute number, is shown in Tablts 32 and 33. The Northeast, expected to be the major beneficiary of industrial deconcemration, did increase its percentage of incentives, and the Southeast and Siio Paulo received smaller shares. But the changes were rather small, and until 1981-1982 (when a few enormous projects absorbed a huge share of incentives), Siio Paulo still attracted a substantial portion. However we judge the interregional shifts in incentives, their magnitude pales before the huge dedine in the total value of the incentives granted. After peaking at 53 percent of all direct federal receipts in 1976, incentives declined to 10 percent of taxes in 1978 and only 2 percent in 1980. The Northeast, in other words, may have gained in the battle for incentive shares, but the virtual disappearance of the incentive program itself makes the victory rather hollow. Deconcentration was also implemented through the lending of the two major official devdopment banks, the Bank of Brazil and the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE). As Tables 34 and 35 demonstrate, their lending pattern differed from the fiscal incentives of the CDL The distribution of loans from the Bank of Brazil (basically a commercia l bank) shifted toward the Northeast after 1974, although the region had actually been gaining since 1969. Sao Paulo's share, along with the shares of the Federal District, Rio Grande do Su i, and Parana, declined after 1974 . The geographic distribution of BNDE loans is harder to characterize, because its emphasis on a smal( number of very large projects produced a volatile loan distribmion. The Northeast's share of BNDE loans did not grow until the beginning of the Figueiredo 48. Two other p"'gram~ ,,/ d"':"",enltuion are ignorw here: tht regional di· ,·i.ion of 1"""Uy collected tax •• ~nd the Fund lot th. Developmem of Inlegr~led Progr~m •.

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years, and except for Bahia the region fared worse under Gcisd than under th e Medici government.

Taken together, the incentive and loan programs reveal little evidence of a substantial shi ft away from the traditional industrial centers. Why was there so linle ch:mgc? Consider th t Industrial Development Council, the body ch:uged with formubling and implementing deconccntration_ The C DI was headed by SCVtrO Gomes, the minister of industry and commerce. Go mes began as an enthusiast, arguing that: Tht indi:;criminalc localion of industrial p lants is a major cauS(C of the disorder ly and quasi-chaotic growt h of some Brazilian urban c.. m ... rs. For a resource-poor country with the cXICnsil'c territory of Brazil, the .

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.••' •e illcpn as a '($uh of tM ,«n,ion ), .vo,age " 'age< inerr .... d Ins man ochor C1)!;1 indica,,,, •. Morwyu. ahhnugh tile demand for ronSUlTK, goods 'os( wilh Ih. 110 pc:.,ont ,nCrusn fo, wag. U'rKrs in I.... """ '0 Ihrtt minimum "'ngt. I.... prien of agricu ltural p.oducu-l.uy,ly Ct)n~u mc:d by , .... poo, - rose k •• Iha" pt iCQ of ;"du.,,;.1 goods. 73. In tile ,hret II, ... v.n minimum range. lhe... ,udjusrmc:nu mum a 1.8 peru", lou. For SOffinJnC' earning ~.n 10 'm minimum.,

ensure survival, APRA risked losing popular support by seeking allies in the military and the upper class. In the end, its ideological migration failed, because the military trusted a right-wing APRA no more [han its left.wing predecessor. For Cardoso and Faletto, APRA's defeat signifies that "the middle sectors lost strength" (p. 122). But since the middle sectors were growing in numbers and in economic imponance, they could not have lost economic strength. Cardoso and Faleno can only mean the middle sectors lost political strength, and that loss could only result from the faulty Strategy of APRA leaders. Cardoso and Faleno's treatment of Brazilian industrialization provides a final example of the centrality of strategies and coalition building. The cla!>Ses potentially interested in industrial development in Brazil were 100 weak 10 force favorable policies on a reluctant government. Ultimately, the govermm:nt's adoption of an industrialization policy "was not just thrust on it by the force of economic circumstances-it was a political decision" (p. 140). The stimulation of cerlain industries "can be explained politically by the existence of masses that were mobilized without effective employment having been created to absorb them" (p. 140). If economic considerations had motivated political elites, they would have adopted a different policy (p. 139). Instead, political elites chose to consolidate their own power against the threat of urban unrest. Between the theoretical and empirical levels, then, Cardoso and Faletto afe of twO minds. Theoretically, the language is mainly that of class analysis. Though they frequently note the importance of political considerations, the authors treat the government either as something economic groups capture or as something that weighs the different currencies of group influence. Political actors have no motivations beyond those of their economic backers. Empirically, however, at the concrete level of historical episodes, many of Cardoso and Faletto's interpretations rely on themes consonant with the perspective of survival-oriented coalition building. Real politicians tum out to have real, purely political, interests.

The Evolution of Economic Policy in BA Regimes Since the beginning of the 19705, the most signifi!;ant theoretical advance in the study of Latin American politics has been the development of the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" (SA) model. Al-

,,6

Conclusion

though debate O\'cr the concept has no w proceeded to the point wheTe it may no longer descri be a single coherent set of phenomena, bureaucr:nic authoritarianism still remains the dominant characterization of the powerful military regimes that came 10 power in 30mc of thc m03t advanced Latin ,\mer;c;]"

nation~;

Bra-

zil betwt:en 1964 and 1984, Argentina between 1966 and 1970 and again between 1976 and 1984, Chile after \973, and Uruguay between 1973 and 1984. The main characteristics of the BA state include; exclusion of civil society (except for those at the top of large o rganizations such as thc armed forces and major oligopolistie enterprises) from access to policymakcrs, domination by specialists in coercion and econo mic " normalizatio n," depoliticization of social issues in fa vor of decision making according to supposedly objective criteria of technical rationality, suppression of democratic institutions, and increases in economic in equiti es.~ One of the key puzzles remaining in the BA debate is the model 's inability to explain the evolution of economic policy in Chile. Uruguay, :lnd post- 1976 Argentina, three caSl"S dominalCd by neoliberal policymakers. In this brief comment, limited 10 Argentina :lnd C hile, I shall show th:n allemion 10 thl' survi val-maxi mizing behavior of key figures in the BA coalition can help solve the puzzle. ! G Although BA states sh:l re important char:lcteristics, O' Donnell did not ex pect them all to adopt the same policies. Economic pol icies would differ, in part, because the working class had posed varying degrees of threat to the interests of the bourgeoisie during the pre-BA period. Countries in which the working-class threat had been acute wo uld stick much longer with orthodox po liciesthat is, policies emphasizing constriction of the mOlley supply, CUlS in public expenditures, and reductions in wages. While O'Donnell conceded that policy varied a mong high-threat Chi le, Uruguay, ? 1Mi•• ummuy bils 10 do )uM ice eilher 10 oonlribulOrs Olh.r th.n Ihe originator of th~ concq,t, Guillermo O'Don ncll. Or 10 the evolutio n of his own Ihought. O'Donnell'. ti rsl expr= ion of Ihe5C conup", which cam~ beforo aUlhoritari an transformations lKCurrffi in Chi le, Uruguay, and prn;t·I?76 Argentina, was pub· lishW in /tfcxkmiztUion CS of ex treme corruption arc randomly distributed by co untri es, ministries, and yea rs. [f th is assumpti on is correct, then COf ruption contributes no systematic bias to the estimates. In the end, the only M' rious defe" :;': ag3;n~t ~ charlie that ML~tin Ameri can sta[;~lics ~re all meaningless" lin in th e results these data generate. Wha t story based on corruption is consistent with the estimatC$ prese nted here? Operatio1ll~/hi"g

the V/lr;ablt£

A series of ~dummyM va riables, one for each yea r of the C}'ck, opcrationaliud the various electoral cycle hypothesC$. If, for eX;lmple,;I country had twO elections, in 1950 and 1960, then those two year1 were coded I on the ~elcClionM variab le and 0 on the ·postel«tion" va ri able. The M y(;J.{'$ 1951 and 196 1 were coded 0 on ·eI«tion and I on " postelection." The thi rd va riable, " all Other yea rs," is left OU I of the equations for tech·

4'

nical rea sons. Provisional goyernmmts not partKipating in the electoral COntest (:lind th~rrfo re la cking spending incen tives) " 'cre :lssigncd O. R.:deaed incumbents and newly d ecttd nonincumben ts h:lYe sim il:!r incen· tivcs to spend, SO they wcre grouped together. Incm ti vcs to spend were ~ttributed to presidents if their p~nies part icipa ted in the cleaion, even if the incumbents could not o r did not ~r k rcelC'Clion. An administra ti on a$Suming powcr e:lrl y in th e yea r un ~hift budget priorities in that year, but an admini stration taking office la te in the )·1.'3 r can only affect spending in the next year. If an election occu rred before Ma y 30, the prrYiou~ year was therdore coded as the dution yea r and the )'car in wh ich it actually occurred was (oded as the first postdection year. The military coup cycle was also opt'ranonalized with a se ries of dummies: CouP. (th e year in which the coup oc(urs) POSt(o up. (the first yca. after th e mup) POStcoup + I, (the second year after the ( oup) ]'ostmup + 2, (the third yca r aftcr the co up ) 1'051«)UP + .\ (the fourth year after the coup) If a coup occurred befo re June I, the previous YC;lr was co nsidered to be the year of the cou p. and the yea r in which it actually occurred "'as defined as the first postcoup year. If the coup occurred after June I. th at year was coded as the year of the co up, The non linear hypothesis predicting the clo~eness of (he electoral mar' gin was o(,nationalized with a quadratic of the form y .. x + x' , where y is p" hl;c spending and x i~ the difference bNween the two I~ading con· tenders. A nonlinear story is :IS follows: When eleelions are cxtremd y close, the discn'lion of executivcs over expenditures might be- so !imited that spendi ng changes arc 7,erO or even n"gadve, When (he electoral ma r· gin widen s a bit, constraints lessen even though insecurity remain s, Then, as margins become very large, !ow incenti ves again depress spending. Other nonmonetary ,'a riable s were operarionalized with dummy Vaf] ' abies in the sam.' nm nner as those ci red a1)(." 'e. All variables were measured in ca lendar years, Occasional expenditure repons with fiscal yea rs staning midyear were con"crted 10 calenda r years, It should be noted thaI the conve rsion to constant l'u rrt"ncy is somewhat problematic, due 10 diffi culties in the construction and interpretation of cos t of living indices,

ur,-Om Variabln wails 10 Latin Amt"rican nat iOIlS ftom the United States were iucluded in preliminary es timatio ns. These !oan s Ylddcd a coefficient ncar zero,

Tuhnical Data for Chapter 1 This result is not su rprising, since loans that must be repaid should be at least partially discounted in th e plans of budget makers. Ideally we would like to know the efica. of loa ns and grants on other kinds of spending. External funds might substitute for domestic resources, or they might increa se: th e use of do mestic resources, because: programs begun with outside mo ney must be maintained. Unfonunately, Latin Ameri can expend iTu re reports are ra rel y prc.:isc as to the inclusion or exclusion of all aid. Cunsequently, caurion is adviscd in attributing causal significance to the grant-spending relationshi p. This variable simply accounts for a portion of the variance in total spe nding. One important aspect of the international economic environment has been excludw from this analysis. Foreign private investment is important to Latin American economies, but it does not dirca.ly enter the revenue calculations of budget makers until it becomes pan of the domestic resou rce basco To count foreign in vestment as a rC50urce would be to double-cou nt, because private investment is n01 a separa te taxable resource distinct from the revenue base.

RegreS5ion and the Interpretation of Remits Due to crnain statistical problems, the ordinary.lrast-squares (O LS) approach could nOT be used. Instead, it was necessary to estima te the model WiTh an instrumental-va riables, generalized-least-squares (GLS) regression. If a model including a lagged dependent variab le on the righT side of th e equation is estimated with OLS in the presence of aUlOcorr"bted error, The usual result is an inflation of the coefficient of the lagged variable and a deflation of other coefficients. Inte rested readers should consul t Hibbs (1974b). Hi bbs ( 1974a ) also provides a good example of the fixed ' parameters, dummy-variables approach 10 pooling. Estimation in Chapter I relied on the Scientific Analysis SyStem (SAS ) to creaTe an estim aTe of th e dependent \'ariab le in Th e previous year. Then the Pa rks routine in SAS TSCSREG produced the GLS es timates. One caVeat about the interpretation of individual resulls: Due TO the conjunction of TWO .:onlinuou, va ri ab le. (p reviuus .pending "Old rc· sources) wilh the dichoTOmou ~ dummy variables, Ihe relative weighl of specific va riabl es in the overall explanaTion of TOtal spending cannot be infer red from the differences in the sizes of their coefficients or t scores. The coefficienrs do measure th e differential importance of eco nomic versus bureaucratic constrain ts, but they cannot, for example, measure rhe substantive importance of The electoral cycle versus the econo mic con· strainrs, because electi ons occur reJati"el y infrequently. In other WQrds , the coefficients of the political va riables measu re the effects o n spend"1!: wh en a cerlain condilion exi~ts, but since no single political variable occurred in mo re than o ne-third of all cases, Ihey conrribote rdalively lillIe

rho

l~

h

,,8

Appendix A

to the overall explanation of total sEX'nding. Note also thai if the data panitioned infO prc+1965 and po§t-1964 cohorts, the model works about as wc1! in each set of years, given that variances generally increase WiTh decreasing data points. Finally, r scores arc s.omcwhal unsuitabk for hypothesis testing in this model due to cenain statistical anomalies. They arc presented simply as rough guides 10 the strength of coefficients. A t of 1.65 would indicate significance at the 0.05 level. The discussion in the text LlseS both residuals and comparisons of predicted and actual values. Regression modds allow a comparison of the actua l bch:lVior of any case with its predicted behavior. Predicted values C3 n bc calculated for each reM by add ing th e intercept Term 10 the cod· ficients for each variable in the model multiplied by the actual va lue of the variable for that yea r for a particular country. This predicted value can then be compared to the actual value. If the prediction is less than the actual "alue, the model underpredicts; if the prediction is greater than the actual value, the model overpredicts. The difference betv;cen the ac· tual and predicted values is the residual. aTC

Data Sources Argentina. Ministerio de Hacienda. Ml'moria. Bolivia. Banco Central dl' Bolivia. Memoria Anual. Brazil. Contadoria Ge ra l da Republica. Balan~o Gual da Uniiio. ___ !BGE. Anudrio E5tdli5tico. Chile. Mini§terio d~ Hacienda. Cuenlas Fiscal1'5 .11' Chile. ___ . Contraloria Genera l. Memoria. Colombia. Contraloria Genera l de la Republica. Informl' financiero de Contraloria. ___ . Contra loria General de la Republica. Cifras Fi5Cales del Gobierno Naciol/al y las Entidadfs Dl'scelltralizadas Nadol/ales. Costa Rica. Banco Central. Memoria Anual. ___ . Contraloria General. Memoria. ___ . Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda. Memoria ;'nual. ___ Direccion General de F.stadistica y Censos. Anuario ESladislico de Costa Rica. Ecuador. Comraloria General d" ]a Nacion. Info rme. ___ Banco Central del Ecuador. ,\jemoria. ___ Mi nisterio del Tesoro. Organo de Informacion Trimcstral. Bo· Il'li... EI Salvador. Ministerio de Economia. Anuario Estadislico. ___ . Ministerio de Hacienda. Liquitiacionl':S del Presupuestos Fiscales del Deparlamento de Auditoria de fa COT/e de Cuenlas de Ia Rep';·

b/ica.

•

Technical Data for Chapter 1

Gualemala. Banco de Gualemala. Memoria. ___ . Minislerio de Economia. Direcci6n General de Estadfstica. Gua· temala en Cifras. ___ Banco de Gualemala. Memoria Anual. Honduras. Secreta ria de Economia y Hacienda. Conladuria General de la Republica. Informe. Mexico. 5eC the dfee{ o f a gi ven coefficien t on the d iflerenee in the ratts 01 change of a pair of progr;lms depends on the relative size of the original programs. It is still possible 10 oonven the estimated clX"fficienl$ into subs tantively mea ning· ful differences in rates o f change. In general, the true difference be' ..... em growth rates (in percm tage points) is about lw ice the coefficient ( )( 100). Thus an oti mated clX"ffici cm o f 0. 10 implies ;I differmee in ratl'S of growth o f about twm ty pereentage poin ts.

Coding tbe Strategies The text identified the ad ministrations for which the social dass strat· egio were optimal. The lists that follow del3ilthe coding of the remai ning approaches. The clt3tion s 3ppended 10 the first list also identify schobrly works found particularly usdul in coding that country on a ll adminis· trations and strategies. For the sa ke o f brevity I have omiued changes occurring in strategic approaches during th e tenu re of administrations.

"

Apptndix B

'"

Not~ thai only adminisuations for which expendi ture data were available arc listed.

Military P"dficDljon Argtn/;"a: Peron ( 1~46-1955 ). Fronditi, lIIia. 5« D rdoso and Fa]· eno (1979), Kcnwonhy (1970), O'Donndl (1973). Ranis (1968 ), Wynia (1978), and Zuvckas (1968 ). Bolillid: Siles Z U:lZO, paz E.:ilcnswro (19601964), Barrientos- Banter. 5« Kenwon hy (1970), Malloy (1970), Mitchell (19??), Van Niekerk (1976), Brazil: Vargas (1951 - 1954), KubitsChek, Quadl"05, Goulart, Castd lo Branco, Gdscl. 5« AmC'$ ( 1973 ). Cardmo a nd Falc'I1o (1979), o,aloull (1978), Dinit (1978). Erickwn (1977), Gu ham (1968), Jenks ( 1978), Kenworth y (1970), Nunberg ( 1986). Skidmorl." ( 1967 ). Chile: Allende. Pinochct. 5« SoWCI"$ (1958 ), Cln vC'$ ( 1969), Ffn:nch· Dav is (1973), Hughes and Mi i«ki (1973), Kenworth y (1970). Lc:vy (1979), Moran (1974). Sullings ( 1978 ), Valcmuela and Wilde ( 1979) O'Brien and Ca mm3ck ( 19H5). Colombia: Ospina I'ira-Rojas Pinilla, Sec Hanlyn (1981), Aga r (197 1), Alc"ander ( 1973). Campos and McCaman! (1972 ). Oi" (1967 ), Hoskin , leal, and Kline (1976). Payne (1968), Rothenberg (I973), Vidal (1966 ). ECI/ador: Vcla§co (all ), Carlos Julio Arosemena, Rodriguez Lara. Sec Fitch ( 1977). Mart1 (1972), Pyne (1973), Hurtado (1980). r~rII: Bummen!e, Odr;a (1949- 1952 ), Be· launde (ble in adminimal ion). Sec Alexander (1973 ), Ander!iOn (1967 ), Co tler (1970), Gilbert (1977), Hilliker (1971 ), JaquctTc (1971), Payne (1965), Pike ( 1967). Uruguay: none for 1955-1966. See Taylor (1960), Weimilein (1975). Vene:{ul'la: Junta (1949- 1952), Iktancourt (19591963). See Agor ( 1971), Ander!iOn (1967), Burggraaff (1972), u:vine ( 1973), Myers ( 1973), Powell (1971 ), Ray (1969), T ugwell (1975). Cos ta Rica: none. Sec Ameringer (197 8), Ande rson (1962), Arias S~nchel (197 1, 1976), Bell (197 1), Denton (197 1), Ebel (1972), Hughcs and Miieski (1973 ), Rothenberg ( 1973). Guatemala: all admini strations. Sec Anderson (1962), Ebel (1972), Jonas and To bis (1974 ), Mell'ille and Mdville ( 197 1), Wtaver (1971 ), Wiardllnd Kline (1979 ). Hondura5: all admin· iSlta lklns. Sec Andcr!iOn (1962), Ebel (1972 ), Wiarda a nd Kline ( 1979). Mexico: none. Sec Am6 (1970), Camacho (1974), Hansen (197 1). Koth· ler (1968 ), Purcell and Purcell (1980). N icaragua: Roman y Reyes and SomoZ3 (1947- 1956). Sec Anderson ( 1962 ), Millett ( 1977). l'anmlla: all adminiSU;1tions. Sc.: Pippin (1964 ). Soler ( 1972), Soun and o thns (1970). Wiarda and Kline (1979). £/ S<J/v<Jdor: O!iOrio, Lc:mu$. Se~ Andcr!iOn (1962), Ebel (1 972). Wiarda and Kline (I 979). BJlreaucratic Recruitment Bolivia: P3~ (1953- 1956 ), Sil6 Zuno, Pa~ (196 1- 1964 ). 8"Jlj/: Var· gas (1951- 1954). Kubi lsclKok, Quad rO$. Goulart. Colombia: adminj~ l n·

Tuhlliwl Data for Chapter 2 lions of the National Fron!. Ecuador: Velasco Iba rra (1969-1971 ). Peru: Bus!amen!e, Prado, Bda6nde. Velluuela: Be!ancourt, Leuni, Caldera. Costa Rica: Figuercs, Echandi, Orlich, Trejos, Figueres. Honduras: Villeda Morales. Pallama: Arosemena, Rem6n, Ari~s Espinosa, de la Guardia, Robles. EI Salvador: Sanchez Hernandez, Molina. Regiollal Interests

Bolivia: Barrientos. BT/nil: Kubitschek. Colombia: Rojas Pinilla, all National Front administrations. Ecuador: Galo Plaza (due to earthquake), Velasco, Ca rlos Julio Arosemena, Junta (1963-1966). Peru: Bdaunde, Velasco Alvarado. Vene~uela: Caldera. Costa Rica: Figueres, Orlich, Figueres. Guatemala: Arbenz, Castillo Annas, Mendez Montenegro. Honduras: Galvez, Lozano Dias, Villeda Morales, L6pez Arellano. Nicar(Jgu(J: Luis Somoza. Panam(J: Chiari, Torrijos. EI Salvador: Osorio, Lemus, Rivera Ca rball o. Transfers IIrgent;n(J: Peron (post-195Oj. Bra~il: Quadros. Chile: Carlos Ibariez. Ecuador: Velasco Ibarra (1969-1971 ). Peru: Odria. P(Jn(Jma: de la Guardia, Arnulfo Arias.

rho

l~

h

Appendix C: Technical Data for Chapter 4

The theoretical model presented in the scrond scaian of Ch~p!cr 4 did not limit its predictions to factors fo r which evidence was known tU be available. The information required for empirical verification can be summarized in five categories:

Individual Incentivts: permeability of dt"Ctoral zone, rank .in pany list, party ideology, number of terms 2. Delegation CharacfI'risrics: tllrnover, leadership positions, committee and occupational distributions 3. Attitudes: deputies ' p~rccptions of their own behavior 4. BthalJior: deputies' activiti es dirt"Cted toward maximizing expenI.

ditures in their ~oncs 5. Budgets and Expenditures: annua l proposed budgets and final expcndittJres for tach stale and program Such readily availa ble information as ranks in party lists, party membership, and number of terms ~rvw were all u~d. EleclOral result s by eounty (nec;esS3ry to establish the boundaries of bailiwicks) were almost never available, 50 the surrogate permeability variable discu5~d in Ihe lext was u~d as a preliminary attempt to address the question. [n order to lap legisla tors· self-perceptions, I mailed a quest ionnaire to all deputies ~rving ill the Chamber of Deputies between 1947 and 1967. This survey, undertaken with the coll3 bora tion of Prof. David FJeiseher of the Unh·ersidade de Brasilia, was implemented betweeo May and August 1983. The questionnaire dealt with such topics as campaign practi~s, vote concentration, committees, strategies, imerparty state-level cooperation. leadership roles, and amending frequency. The number of deputies reply ing was 103. I then conducted extensive personal interviews with 28 deputies from fourteen states, and I supplemented these interviews with conversations with loca l academics in Ceara, Maranhao, Pataiba, Rio Grande do Norte, Bahia, and Santa Catarina. Doeumentary information about budgetaty behavior eame from Ihe

Technical Data fOT Chapter 4

Record of the National Congress (DeN ). The DeN contains speeches and amendments, including budget amendmen ts by author, program, and outcome. It is, however, woefullr incomplete, lacking eit her an index or a cialts to cI Brasi l, 1945- 1962." Revi5ta /.ali"o-americlJna de Cie"cia Polftiea 2:5-23. _ _ _ 1973. Soci..dode e Poliliea no Brasil. Sao Paulo: Difusao Europeia do liVTO. ___ 1978. ~Afrcr the Miradt." Luso-Brazi/ian Review 15:278- 301. Soler, Ri policy options for mass support, !l!i problems in implementing an appeal to elites, 150- 51 ; as regional strateg)', lib ~ lqIonal Str.lleg)' Yi. local press1m', llJ..; as respo~ to Geisel's oK
and Golbery, lli; rod ...1

o;omponenes afur 197, 2ll8. ~ Castello Stanco, Humb. victim. of: and competitive dcaions, !L imcrprognm prio riries, 76_77; n,""d for military p. ci fication, 77_78; .dormill

administrations, lli spending p.1I0ms, ll",18

Couto c Silva, Golbery, I..i1 Crisis, political: definition, ib eI«toral, ~ miliury ooup, i2.

Oabnd, Rob..t, 11 DASI'. Se~ Adminimarivc Department of th. Public s"rvicc, Brnil Dt- Abf r~rna. &.bIZ Expmdinua., public. Su Public apmoditura., Brazil; Public apawliturlOS, uOn America Expmditun o-adN>ffs. Sa T rade-ofh, upmdi tur~

Fakno, Enw, 233-35 Felix, David, 22l Ficun~, Joio: Achit-Yemmts, !!!; backgovnd in stUn police, !.i!i backs labor minisl" in .... a~ dispure, ZOOi oonscnincd by Geiocl's aWoad., gQ; tbcrted by allies. ~ and tcOnOmic rnllapx, ~ edllCltion expmdituru., !Z!i dectiOll·yur shifts in sp-is·a·vis Nonheastem so .. nnon and Andrcuu, Z!I..i Figue.cs, J'*. 'lfu o¥~npmder in rmal opcndins m !ji; social da .. appeals, ~ support for ARENA, !it; I2lkinK social policy in 1975, !£;. uninterested in working cla"- ~ wonem Fi gu~iredo's economic options, 2Il2 Geisel, Orlando, ~ GOa, Waldu ill Medeiros, Onivio, 2.ll!:! n...8.l Medici, Garr.utazu: as ~apoliliC;OI~ candidatl, ~ atrack on politicians, !.Mi criticism of wage policy, !li; housing policy, !§!; bnd reform., ~ military pacification, ~ ar>d Orlando Geisel, ill.; repression and growth, !..1J.; repressivl administration, ~ and total spending model, 18 Mtndu Monrcnegro, julio Ctsar, II Merlo:, Gilben, llZ n..U Mexico: and MBuilder~ adminiRrariolUi, 96-97: coalition and dlpmdency approaches compared, ll!; deflnsiv .... liberal administration, ~ effen of noncompetitive .ll"Ctions, lli and IMF ,~rgel>, ~ mi li, .. ry rhr~a' and coalitions, ll; political·business cyde, llfu presidentia l ."a'.sie. in, 15311: .eformist admillistntions, i2

Midterm de"ions, ~ Military roups, 1.6. Su allo Military r~mes

Militory pacification: ,n Bruil, 1!i budgetary demands and, 'M.; conditions bvoring, 43-44: d,oorder, ~ in EI Salvador, lli ""aluaring, lli in Hondu ras, !!.; ideological conRia, ~ imporraoce of profession, ~ 100ing proS"'''''. lli political crisis and, lli social origins, ~ and spending, 87- 88 ; summary of results, ill; triggns of crisis, ~ winning programs, !S Military regimes: autonomy from social forces, !§ effea of military coup cycl~, ~ doctoral challen&", !§ fur of coun~rcoup, lZ.; fiscal consc ..... atism, li; military coup spending cycle, 16 Miliury regimes, and .pending: romplr~d to civilian regimn, 85l!!.; effect of austerity, 88 - 89; effect of mililary pacificatioo, 87- 88; ~xistin8 resea rch, 82 - 83; iIle&itimate participation, 84-86; int.rprogram prioritiu, ll; mtthodological problems, ~ ~ prior budget WIS, 86- 87; r~gim~ classifications, 83-84 Minas Glrais: housing programs, !1Q;. inmmgional shim in industrial location, ~ in regional stutegy, !1!; nrikes in, !.E; subsidies to industry, 1.22.. Su .. Iso Brazil: industrial decollcenttation Models, elements of expendirnre. 1 Mor>dal~, Waher, i l l Moran, Theodore, .5.!! MO$ley, Paul, 2..ll} n.3 Moulian, Tom1s, i l l o...U Multiclus administraTions, and miliTary prlssure, 2.1.4 Multiclass STrategy: Argentina, @; Bolivia, @.. ~ Btozil, @;. euluating, ~ Goula" adminiSltation, §!; Peron admini.tra.ion, .r!§ Siles ZuatO administration, §!; Vlnnuela, 60

.8.

fndcx

Multiple '(gr.soion: ~lt.rn~liv. app .oachcs. l 47j inl.rp~larion of fOf NOflM ....CCrn .,a,n.. ill; pIotlcd 19~5-I% 5, UO Public upmditurn, Larin America: awegalc spending dclincd, ll; alloarions and elections, alloarionJ and military coups, llli bias toward expaosion, lJ1; bureall"" ric·aurhorilarian rcpmcs and, l,!; coding str.Itfgin, lS I-52; cuna:pt 01 priorities, Z!. Z!.; rome<jUCncCl for bureaucracy, u U> conKqumccs for inA.rion, !l;

m

",

,8,

J"de:.;

ronsequen«s for wage maintenance. !1i data quality, ~ dua sources by country, 248-ri na : interparty budgetary cooperation, I...U.J interviews conducted, .lJi; mild" ... of imernal politio, i..U.; suc"",s in budgetary politio., ill Sin Paulo: banling Parana oVer plants. !2.!i budgetary ,co:ip15 under military rule, J.JL inrrartgional .hifts in industrial l'Xation, !!2.; opposition 10 mili,"ry regime, ill; and rural ,redit ShaTC5, UZ; strikes

lndu in, liZ, Sa "Iso B.uil: induuri.1 dcconcmfrlnion Suu"le, P~ulo, ill Sa"'q-, 1""', ill IL.l6 Sitiro, E.nani, ill n..l1 5lilical survival is a constant preoccupation lor the region's leaders. Barry Ames examines this struggle and analyzes how pubic rx;>icy, especially the public budgel , is used by potilicatleaders seeking 10 construct coalitions insuring their survival in oHice. "Ttlis is a compact , lucidly wrin en, nd H n-observatJons sludy 01 survival politics in lalin America . Us thorough statishcal testing 01 a wide range of hypolheses and pragmalic approach are most welcome. , . , Po~tica l scientists as well as hislorians, economisls, and olher Lalin Americanisls will greatly benefiJ from this l irsl-rat e monograph." - Mar!