Physics and Ontology Gustav Bergmann Philosophy of Science, Vol. 28, No. 1. (Jan., 1961), pp. 1-14. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28196101%2928%3A1%3C1%3APAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B Philosophy of Science is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.
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osophy of Science January, 1961
NO. I
PHYSICS AND ONTOLOGY* GUSTAV BERGMANN State University of Iowa T h e recent philosophy of physics is confronted with the new ontology, as it emerges after philosophy proper has fully articulated thc linguistic turn. T h e classical ontologists asserted or denied, controversially, that certain entities "existed." Rather than adding to these controversies, the new ontology uncovers their dialectics. The ontologically problematic entitics of physics are of two kinds, represented by forces and particles, respectively. T h e dialectics has been dominated by eight patterns. Two of these, independence and r,enlisin, belong to philosophy proper. T h e latter is here considered in order to relieve the philosophy of physics of a burden only philosophy proper can bear. That leaves six patterns: concreteizess (including the orbit feature), acquaintance, simplicity, significance, process, and model. T h e paper sketches how- each of these (nay be used and probably has been used, either explicitly or implicitly, in the recent controversies.
There is philosophy propev, also called first philosophy or metaphysics, and there are the several philosophies of something or other. A "philosophy of," if it is to remain just that, must not cut itself off from philosophy proper. Deliberate confrontations from time to time should help to avoid such fatal severancc. The heart of philosophy proper is ontology. For a while this insight was lost. Now it is being recovered. Thus it may help to confront some recent ontological thought with the recent philosophy of physics. This is what I propose t o do. But I cannot of course on this occasion offer more than the barest sketch or outline, just as 1 shall have to leave unsupported much of even the little I can say.l As to method, philosophy during the first half of the century has taken the
* Received September, 1960. Rcad, with some omissions, as part of a symposium at the 1960 International Congress for Logic, hlethodology and Philosophy of Science held at Stanford University. For supporting arguments, see Philosophy of Science (The Univcrsity of Wisconsin Press, 1957) and two volumes of cssays, Tlze Metaphysics of Logical Positivism (Longmans, Gr.:en and Company, 1954) and Nlcaning aizd Existence (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959). Specially relevant, among older essays not included in the two collections, are the two pieces on the philosophy of physics in FI. Fcigl and M. Brodbeck (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science (.4ppleton-Century-Crofts, 1953). Among recent essays, see "Ineffability, Ontology, and AIethod," Tlze Philosophical Review, 69, 1960, pp. 18-40 and "Dell'htto," Rivista d i Filosoj5n, 51, 1960, pp. 3-51. ("Acts," the original of the Italian piece, is now being published in The Iridi(m Journal of Philosophy, August and December, 1960.)
linguistic turn. Words are used either philosophically or commonsensically. Philosophical uses are literally unintelligible. T h e task is to explicate them by talking commonsensically about them. This is the fundamental idea of the turn. By now it has fully emerged. How, then, does it affect the emerging concern with ontology as the main content? Ontology ask what exists. This use of 'exist' is philosophical. An ontologist who has executed the linguistic turn will therefore not propose still another division of all entities imo existents and nonexistents. Rather, he will attempt to discern and state commonsensically the several and often conflicting intellectual motives which control the philosophical use of 'exist'. I just spoke of motix-es; I could instead have spoken of criteria. Both ~vords,though, motive and criterion, may seem to impute critical awareness where its absence often has been crucial. So I shall avoid both, speaking of patte~nsinstead. Of such patterns there are quite a few. Some I shall ignore or merely mention; to some others I shall attend. First, though, for the connection with physics. (When used commonsensically, 'exist' can always be replaced by 'there is (are)'. In this essay Y shall therefore noL use it at all except in order to mention the philosophical use. Other philosophicai uses I must mention I shall mark by double quotes when they first appear and whenever it seems necessary to avoid confusion. 'Ei~tity' has also been used philosophically. I use it here merely as an abbreviation, to avoid such commonsensical but tedious phrases as 'what an expression expresses or refers to'.) Are forces and particles "real" or are they merely (methodological) "fictions" ? At the time of Mach the par.ticles were atoms. Nowadays they are the many entities of subatomic physics; and one may wish to include the psis. Within the philosophy of physics this change from, say, Mach to the present gave rise to a nekt group of special problems. One cannot tackle them successfuliy unless he understands what has not changed at all. 'Real' and '5ction' in this question are used philosophically and exactly as a moment ago I used 'existcnt' and 'nonexistent'. That shows the conncction between ontology and the philosophy of physics. The question I borrowed from the tradition thus opens the ontological P ~ o b l e m a ~ of i k ~physics. Forces and particles have also been called "theoretical" entities. This adjective, too, is compromised by a philosophical past. So I shall avoid it, speaking instead of the problematic entities of physics. T h e problematic entities are very many. T h e patterns controlling the phi!osophical use of 'exist' are quite a few. Thus it may well be that the latter lead to a classification of the former, depending on which pattern or group of patterns is needed to clarify the status of the entity. Very roughly, there are t ~ v osuch classes. That is why I gave two illustrations, forces and particles. I shall first attend to the class represented by forces; then, after a digression about phenomenalism and realism, to that represented by particles. What exists exists "independently." This is the independence pattern. T h e 2 D;e PvoBI~mntzk,In problema~ica,lo p~obl&nzatiqzte are handy nouns French. I often wssh we had their equivalent xn English.
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German, Itaissn, and
PHYSICS AND ONTOLOGY
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use of 'independent' is philosophical. According to one explication, only facts can be indegendent; according to another, only things may be. T h e alternative marks the deepest dividing line in the ontological tradition. That is why 3: mention it. But it has not affected the recent philosophy of physics. With but few exceptions, such as Whitehead's eventism, its practitioners are all implicit thing ontologists. That is why I shall say no more about this pattern. What exists is what is "in" space and time. This is the formula of the cnnmeteness pattern. As the crucial word is used, physical objects are in physical space and time; sensa, in phenomenal space and time. T h e pattern does therefore not commit one to either materialism or phenomenalism. On the other hand, properties and relations exemplified by either physical okijects or sensa are not literally in space and time; either physical, in the case of the former; or phenomenal, in the case of the latter. That spots the place of the complex we can ~ concreteness pattern in the nominalism ~ o m p l e x .This again ignore. One subpattern or component of the pattern, though, has been very important recently. Physical objects move in orbits. As some put it, that is indeed part of the notion of a physical object. Call this the orbit subpattern. Literally, the modern particles have no orbits. Everyone is familiar with the disturbance this feature has created. We cannot know anything to exist unless we are "acquainted" either with it or with a part of it or, ~vhollpor in part, with a thing of its sort. This is the formula of the acqzlaintance pattern. Its flavor is epistemological. I n one sense, ontology and epistemology can indeed not be disentangled; in another, dialectically, they can. This I here take for granted.4 The phrase to be explicated is, of course, 'being acquainted'. We are acquainted with what we perceive, or, synonymously, with perceptual things, i.e., with perceptual objects, such as stones and chairs, and with some of the characters they exemplify, such as colors, shapes, and distance, That is one explication. Upon another explication, we are acquainted only with what we are directly aware of; direct awareness being of phenomenal entities, i.e., such things as sensa and the characters they exemplify on the one hand and, on the other, mental acts such as perceiving, remembering, thinking, and, of course, direct awareness itself. The dialectics of this alternative, perception versus direct awareness, has dominated much of the tradition. Made fully explicit, it can be confined to philosophy proper. Implicitly, from Mach to Einstein, it has profoundly affected the Probtenzatik of the particle. Retain, then, for future reference, that in this context I called stones and chairs perceptual rather than physical objects. Some entities are "simples"; all others "consist" of simples; the former exist; the latter don't. This is the simplicity patter%. What is a simple ? What does it mean for a thing to consist of others ? T h e formula, we see, contains Concerning the place of the independence pattern in the nominalism complex, see Edwin 13. Allaire, "Existence, Independence, and Universals," The P/zilosophical Review, 69, 1960, pp. 485496. T o r argumcnt, see my special review of Strawson's "Individuals," The Jozirnal of Plzilosof~hy, 57, 1960, pp. 601-622.
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GUSTAV BERGlVIANN
two philo~cphicaluses. Each has produced a huge body of dialectics. I call them two bodies rather than one because up to a point one can examine each separately. T o understand that, consider that one may disagree as to whether the "simples" are phenomenal, or perceptual, or even more fundamentally, whether they are facts or things, and yet agree on what it means for one entity to "consist" of others. I n our subject the dialectics of consisting looms large, that of simplicity doesn't. So I shall ignore the latter, except for a digression that will permit me to complete the ontological schema as well as to relieve the dryness of the catalogue by at least a fragment of argument. (One may accept the fundamental idea o i the linguistic turn concerning the proper method without accepting another, concerning the proper technique. I accept both. '6he proper technique, expedient for all purposes, indispensable for some, is to talk comn~onsensicallyabout a schema called the ideal language (IL). T h e HI, I propose is built around a syntactical dichotomy called logicaldescriptive. I n the I L there are logical features, signs, and truths. 'l'he shapes expressing the type distinctions are among the logical features; the connectives and the quantifiers, among the logical signs. T h e explication of "analytic" rests on the logical truths.) T h e philosophical uses of 'simple' are all misguided; attempts at explicatirg them show that none has a retrievable and important common-sense core. This is what the holists believe. If they are right, then H should not have listed the simplicity pattern. Since holism is now again fashionable, I shall in four steps sketch a partial defense of that pattern, exhibiting the role it plays in a crucial dichotomy which even some modern holists wish to preserve. 1. Philosophers have long tried to distinguish the world's "form" from its
