Philosophy, Theology, and Politics: A Reading of Benedict Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-politicus (Supplements to the Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy)

Philosophy, Theology, and Politics

Supplements to The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy edited by

Leora Batnitzky, Christian Wiese, Elliot Wolfson

VOLUME 6

Philosophy, Theology, and Politics A Reading of Benedict Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus

by

Paul J. Bagley

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bagley, Paul J. Philosophy, theology, and politics : a reading of Benedict Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus / By Paul Bagley. p. cm. — (Supplements to The Journal of Jewish thought and philosophy ; v. 6) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-16485-7 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Spinoza, Benedictus de, 1632–1677. Tractatus theologico-politicus. 2. Judaism and philosophy. 3. Philosophy and religion. 4. Religion and politics. I. Title. II. Title: Reading of Benedict Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus. III. Series. B3985.Z7B34 2008 199’.492—dc22 2008005724

ISSN 1873-9008 ISBN 978 90 04 16485 7 Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

For my parents James Edward III and Lorraine Marie

CONTENTS Foreword ..................................................................................... Acknowledgements .....................................................................

ix xi

Introduction ................................................................................

1

Part One

Philosophy ................................................................

27

Part Two

Theology ..................................................................

81

Politics ...................................................................

143

Part Four Philosophy, Theology, and Politics ..........................

187

Epilogue

Spinoza: The New Moses ........................................

227

Selected Bibliography .................................................................

245

Index of Names ..........................................................................

251

Part Three

FOREWORD The reading of Benedict Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus presented in this book is based upon the standard edition of the Latin work contained in Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Universitætsbuchhandlung, 1925). The Tractatus theologico-politicus is located in the third volume of the Gebhardt edition, pages 3–267. The Tractatus theologico-politicus also will be referred to as “the treatise” in this book. Quotations from the treatise in this book, or references to passages from the treatise or other writings contained in the Gebhardt edition of the Opera, will be cited in the footnotes by reference to the volume number and the page number(s) where the passage(s) may be found. In the footnotes, Tractatus theologico-politicus will be abbreviated TTP and therefore a reference to the first page of the Preface to the treatise would appear in the footnote as TTP 3: 5. Translations from the Latin text into English have been made by the author.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book would not have been possible without the generous assistance and support of numerous people and institutions. I am grateful to Loyola College in Maryland for awarding me a senior faculty sabbatical leave that facilitated my research and writing. I also especially am indebted to the Program Officer, the President, and the Trustees of the Earhart Foundation for the award of a fellowship research grant that permitted me to focus exclusively on the completion of the manuscript for this book over an extended period of time. I wish to recognize the teachers, colleagues, and friends who have encouraged me in my work: Richard Kennington; Gary B. Herbert; David Berman; Rev. Aidan Manning, S.T.; Martin D. Yaffe; William Desmond; L.S. & P.; Douglas Den Uyl; Vigen Guroian; Robert Miola; Gregory Cowart; Rev. Joseph Rossi, S.J.; Rev. John Conley, S.J. I gratefully acknowledge and thank my children, Katherine Sarah and Michael Hugh, for their patience with me and Susan for her friendship and joy.

Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent, vel si fortuna ipsis prospera semper foret, nulla supersitione tenerentur. Præfatio, Tractatus theologico-politicus

INTRODUCTION

Benedict Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus1 is a complex book: it is a whole that consists of parts. The Tractatus theologico-politicus also is a complicated book: it is a whole the parts of which are interwoven in an intricate way. In other words, Spinoza’s old book can be a difficult read. Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus contains a lengthy study of the elemental features of Judeo-Christian revealed religion. Spinoza examines the nature of prophecy; the nature of the prophet; the nature of the Hebrew vocation; the nature of natural law, divine law, human law, and ceremonial law; the nature of miracles; the nature of Scriptural interpretation; the nature of the Scriptural canon; the nature of piety and the simplicity of Scripture; the nature of the apostolic mission; the nature of faith; and the nature of the relationship between theology and philosophy. But Spinoza also examines the foundational principles and aims of republics or democratic political regimes; and in the course of that examination his remarks frequently reflect what had been argued or concluded about revealed theology or religion in the first fifteen chapters of his book. In the final five chapters of the treatise, Spinoza

The title page of the TTP bears the publication date of 1670 and it lists the publisher as Henricus Künrath of Hamburg; the treatise was published anonymously. After the initial printing of the TTP, three other impressions of the book were distributed and each bore the 1670 publication date. During 1673 and 1674, four other printings of the book appeared from Amsterdam or Leiden but only one of them was published under the original title, Tractatus theologico-politicus: see Jacob Freudenthal, “On the History of Spinozism,” Jewish Quarterly Review 8 (1895–96): 30–31. According to Pierre Bayle in his Dictionary article on Spinoza, from 1681 until the close of the 17th century the TTP was translated two or three times into French under the titles, Traité des ceremonies superstitieuses des Juifs, La clef du sanctuaire, and Réflexions curieuses d’un esprit désintéressé: see An Historical and Critical Dictionary, 4 vols. (London, 1710) 4: 2789; and compare Ira O. Wade, The Structure and Form of the French Enlightenment, 2 vols. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977) 1: 183. In Epistle 44 to Jarig Jelles, dated 17 February 1671, Spinoza requested that his correspondent intercede to prevent the publication of a Dutch translation of the TTP. The entreaty of Jelles to those intending to publish a Dutch translation of the TTP was honored and the publication of the treatise in Dutch did not appear until 1693 after both Spinoza and Jelles had died. 1

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explains the nature and constitution of a republic; the nature of a democratic polity; the nature of the relationship between republics and citizens; the nature of the Hebrew republic and the political lessons to be derived from it; the nature of the relationship between religion and the republic; and the nature of the liberties that are to be found in a liberal republic. The reader of the treatise is notified that the various examinations, discussions, and conclusions presented in the book serve the purpose of demonstrating that the “liberty of philosophizing” may be granted to all individuals in a republic without detriment to piety or public peace; and, in fact, Spinoza proclaims that piety and public peace actually are jeopardized wherever the liberty to philosophize is curtailed.2 Spinoza’s treatise obviously is a book about theology and politics. However, it is a book about theology and politics that is written by a philosopher. More precisely, it is a theologico-political treatise written by someone whose allegiance is to philosophy rather than either to theology or to politics. Thus the treatise is a work of philosophy that takes account of the functions of theology and politics in public life from the philosophic point of view. In that respect, Spinoza’s book is not unique. The complete title of the important seventeenth century work by Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, indicates a similar interest to clarify the relationship between theology or religion and politics in public life from a philosophic perspective.3 But whereas Hobbes appears to maintain that there are patent divisions between the ecclesiastical and civil realms or powers,4 Spinoza advances a different kind of relationship between theology or religion and politics;5 and the theologico-political

2 TTP title page: Tractatus theologico-politicus continens Dissertationes aliquot, quibus ostenditur Libertatem Philosophandi non tantum salve Pietate, & Republicae Pace posse concedi: sed eandem nisi cum Pace Reipublicae, ipsaque Pietate tolli non posse; and compare 3: 7; 11; 179; 240–43; 246–47. 3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (London: Thomas Crooke, 1651). 4 Compare chapters 19–20 of the TTP with chapter 42 of Hobbes’ Leviathan. 5 The different kind of relationship is reflected in Spinoza’s conclusions about the subordination of theology or religion to civil governance: e.g.: “After that, I show that those who hold supreme authority are the interpreters and appropriators not only of civil but also sacred right” (TTP 3: 11); and “we conclude that nothing is more prudent for a republic than that piety and Religion are comprehended only in the exercise of Charity and Justice, and the right of the supreme powers, in respect of the sacred as with the profane, is referred only to actions” rather than to thoughts or words (3: 247).

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character of Spinoza’s treatise is one of the reasons why the treatise is a book that is both complex and complicated. The composition of a theologico-political treatise by a philosopher might suggest that the author is attempting to offer a philosophic analysis or a philosophic resolution of some kind of theologico-political question or problem. But the composition of a theologico-political treatise by a philosopher also can signify that the author is attempting to offer a theologico-political solution to some other sort of question or problem.6 Spinoza plainly addresses the nature of theology as well as the nature of politics in the treatise; and though he protests against the occasions of collusion between theological and political powers7 it does not seem to be the case that Spinoza analyzes or resolves any definitively theologico-political question or problem as such in his book. Therefore it is appropriate to study the alternative possibility and wonder whether Spinoza’s theologico-political treatise involves the theologico-political handling of some other sort of question or problem.8 The title of Spinoza’s book suggests that there can be some basis for a relationship between theology and politics.9 The title suggests that theology and politics can be combined perhaps insofar as they share some common foundation; they can be integrated perhaps for the sake of achieving some common goal; or they can intersect perhaps in some common interest. In the most obvious sense, theology or politics each has the express ambition of benefitting its charges. How theology achieves that aim and how politics achieves that aim may prove to be very different things. But if theology and politics do share a similar

The Latin word tractatus itself signifies a “handling,” “treatment,” “working,” or “management” of something; and the word derives from the Latin verb tractare which means to “to haul,” “to tug,” “to drag,” “to take in hand,” “to handle,” or “to manage.” A tractatus theologico-politicus thus may be understood to be a “theologico-political handling or management” of something. 7 TTP 3: 7. 8 The most apparent question or problem addressed in the TTP would seem to be the issue of the “liberty of philosophizing.” That question or problem surely has theological and political aspects to it inasmuch as theological doctrines or political policies can determine what is permitted to be said publicly; and the full title to the TTP indicates Spinoza’s awareness of the fact that philosophy is perceived suspiciously by religious and political authorities. But the question or problem of philosophic liberty as such may not be reducible to a theological, a political, or even a theologico-political matter. Instead the difficulty may be more basic, as it pertains to human nature itself; and therefore it must be understood as a natural or philosophic question or problem. 9 Chapters 18–20 of the TTP examine the particulars of the relationship between theology and politics “in Libera Republica” (TTP 3: 239). 6

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goal then some form of integration of the two, or an accommodation between the two, might yield a superior means to achieving the aim of benefitting their combined charges than if each were to operate independently of the other. An integration of theology and politics which would yield theologico-political solutions to particular human questions or problems can be witnessed in the example of a theocratic regime.10 For in the theocratic regime the principal interests and aims of an established religion and an established civil government basically would be indistinguishable. ‘Love of God’ and ‘Love of Country’ would be identical. In a theocratic regime, the solutions to human questions or problems would emanate uniformly from teachings that were by definition theologico-political. The theocratic regime would not differentiate between ‘coreligionist’ and ‘fellow citizen’. Indeed in the theocratic regime the terms of human theological salvation and the terms of human political welfare would be interchangeable. The theocratic regime’s theologico-political solutions to human questions or problems, such as the conduct of life and the governance of affairs, presume that the tenets advanced by theology or religion coincide with the principles advanced by civil government. Hence ‘theological dogma’ and ‘political policy’ would be as one in the theocratic regime. Moreover, the integration of theology and politics would seem to signal the prospect of an end to a variety of contentious disputes; it would seem to prevent any number of causes of crime or sedition; and it would seem to assure a regime that successfully could provide for the security and benefit of its people, both in material terms and in spiritual terms. Yet, Spinoza criticizes the Turkish regime for investing politics and public life with so much theology or religion that prejudices and superstitions, rather than sound reason, had become the criteria for evaluating the tolerability of all discourse and judgment.11 In another context, Spinoza defines the Hebrew kingdom as a theocratic regime and he expressly disclaims any intention of resuscitating it.12 10 TTP 3: 48–49; compare 3: 210–11 where Spinoza notes that piety and patriotism were considered to be identical in the Hebrew theocracy. 11 TTP 3: 6–7. The mention of the Turks by Spinoza probably was not arbitrary. The Ottoman Empire held territory in the Balkans during the seventeenth century. They attempted to besiege Vienna in 1663 and were driven from the gates of Vienna a final time in 1683. In other words, the principles and conditions of the Turkish theocratic regime were not an abstraction to Spinoza’s readers. 12 TTP 3: 206; 211. Although Spinoza states that it is not possible to restore the Hebrew regime, nor would it be advisable to do so, he nevertheless acknowledges that it “had many things worthy of being noted at least and perhaps advisable to imitate.”

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A predicament then seems to present itself. If theologico-political solutions to human questions or human problems are illustrated best in the cases of theocratic regimes yet Spinoza rebuffs the theocracies of the Muslims and the Hebrews, what sort of theologico-political teaching is it that will be propounded by Spinoza in his book? What question or problem is it that he is “handling” in a theologico-political fashion? Moreover, what, if any, theocratic dimension might be involved in the theologico-political solution to the question or problem that is before Spinoza in his theologico-political treatise? It is plain that there is a theological teaching of the treatise; and it equally is plain that there is a political teaching of the treatise. But it is not at all plain that there is a philosophic teaching of the treatise.13 Whereas Spinoza’s book contains a chapter on prophets, a chapter on the interpretation of Scripture, a chapter on the mission of the apostles, a chapter on the foundations of a republic, and a chapter on the liberty of thought and speech in a liberal republic, there is no chapter on philosophers, no chapter on the reading of philosophic books, no chapter on the task of philosophizing, and no chapter on the foundations of philosophy. The only chapter of the treatise in which the word “Philosophy” appears in the title is chapter fourteen; and Spinoza’s declared purpose in that chapter is to elucidate the foundations of theology for the sake of demonstrating that they are entirely separate from what is germane to philosophy. Though chapter fourteen describes what theology is at some length, based upon Spinoza’s account of it, the part of the chapter concerning philosophy concludes abruptly with only the succinct assertions that philosophy simply is different from theology; each has its own basis; and each has its own goal.14 However useful and important the conclusion about the separation of philosophy from theology may be to the overarching purpose of the book, and the reader is reminded at the beginning of chapter fourteen that “to separate faith from Philosophy has been the chief intention of 13 The title of the TTP explicitly states that securing the “liberty of philosophizing” is a principal ambition of the book. However it does not state that philosophy is the subject of the book. It is important to discern whether the TTP simply is a book about theology and politics written from the philosophic point of view or whether the book contains a philosophic teaching in addition to its theological teaching and its political teaching. 14 TTP 3: 179. The words “philosophy,” “philosophize,” and “philosophical” appear only seven times in chapter 14, the only chapter of the TTP which explicitly mentions the word “Philosophy” in its title. It also is noteworthy that the word “philosopher” does not appear in chapter 14 of the TTP at all.

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the whole work,”15 it would not be misleading to say that no formal or systematic account of philosophy is presented in the treatise.16 The fact that philosophy seems to be present in the treatise only obliquely contributes to the complicated complexity of Spinoza’s book. Still, if theology and politics can be brought into some kind of relation with each other then one might ask what connection does either, or both together, bear to philosophy? It is necessary to raise the question about the terms of the compatibility or the incompatibility among philosophy, theology, and politics. There is no evidence in the treatise that would permit one to conclude that Spinoza pits philosophy and politics in opposition to each other in his book. The treatise does not speak of politics in a deprecatory manner, an antagonistic manner, or an antithetical manner. To the contrary, Spinoza asserts that the foundations and principles of the democratic regime that he describes in his book are wholly consonant with nature and with the natural right that is accorded to every individual.17 Since philosophy seeks to provide an account of the natures of things and it is concluded by Spinoza that the democratic polity agrees with human nature then politics, in principle or in practice, need not be antagonistic to philosophy.18 Rather it may be inferred that there is something about

TTP 3: 173–74. Within the treatise, the opinions, sentiments, and dictates founded on religious prejudices or superstitions regularly are cast against the claims or perspectives that might be advanced by appealing to reason alone. Nevertheless the contrasting of the views attained by reason and the views that derive from superstition do not seem to be sufficient to afford the reader of the TTP a grasp of what Spinoza maintains that philosophy is. Indeed the less than conspicuous development of a position in the TTP on what constitutes philosophy is probably a main reason why many scholars, including Fokke Akkerman, Edwin M. Curley, Herman De Dijn, Errol E. Harris, H.G. Hubbeling, Alexandre Matheron, Lee C. Rice, Steven B. Smith, André Tosel, Yirmiyahu Yovel, et al., regard the treatise as being at best only a kind of a nonphilosophic version of the complete philosophic teaching of Spinoza that is presented only in the Ethica ordine geometrico demonsrata (1677). The verdict of those scholars might receive some support from Spinoza’s own claim in the Preface to the TTP that “the chief things” raised in his book “have been recognized more than enough by Philosophers”; though Spinoza still addresses the TTP directly to the “the one who reads Philosophically” (3: 12) and therefore the teaching of the treatise is intended for the reader who possesses some philosophic acumen. 17 TTP 3: 193–95; 245; and compare Tractatus politicus, chapter 2 § 4 and §§ 15–17; chapter 5 § 2 and §§ 4–6; chapter 11 § 1. 18 TTP 3: 179: “The object of Philosophy is nothing other than truth . . . The bases of Philosophy are common notions and one is bound to endeavor to obtain them only from nature itself ”; and 3: 195: “And thus I believe I have shown clearly enough the basis of a democratic regime (imperium); I chose to advance it before all others because it 15 16

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political life that agrees with human nature, especially the democratic kind of political life that is propounded by Spinoza in the treatise. Hence philosophy and politics appear to be compatible. According to Spinoza, “everything that we properly desire may be referred to three chief things”: (1) comprehending things through their primary causes; (2) acquiring the habit of virtue and subduing the passions; and (3) living securely with a healthy body. Of the three proper objects of desire, Spinoza asserts that the first and second objects may be attained by the powers that are “contained within human nature itself.” That is, knowledge and the acquisition of virtue depend solely on “the laws of human nature and [they] may be acquired solely through our power.” But the achievement of the third proper object of desire, “living securely and preserving the body,” occurs principally because of “things external” to us. Hence a cardinal source of our security and preservation owes more to fortune than it does to human planning or guidance. As a result, Spinoza concedes that the “ignorant and foolish” may be just as “happy or unhappy” as the “prudent and vigilant.” Nevertheless, in order to maximize the probability of realizing the third proper object of desire, Spinoza advocates the “formation of societies with certain laws” and he maintains that the task can be aided greatly by human direction and human vigilance.19 Rather than societies being arranged by fortune or chance it is better that they be established and arranged by sensible and attentive human beings. In other words, it is possible, desirable, and perhaps even necessary that philosophy and politics act in concert with each other at least for the sake of satisfying the third proper object of desire. A similar consequence, however, may not be realized with respect to the relationship between philosophy and theology. In point of fact, the professed intention of Spinoza’s treatise is to demonstrate that philosophy and theology have “nothing in common”; each rests solely appears the most natural and agrees the most with the liberty that is conceded to each by nature.” In his excellent translation of the Tractatus theologico-politicus, Martin Yaffe notes the difficulty of translating the Latin word imperium uniformly into English and so he chooses to retain the Latin word throughout his translation of the TTP, see Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise (Newburyport, Massachusetts: The Focus Philosophical Library, 2004) p. 256. The Latin word imperium may connote such diverse things as “authority,” “direction,” “command,” “right or power of command,” “sovereignty,” “empire,” “dominion,” “government,” “jurisdiction,” etc. I translate the Latin word imperium with the English word “regime” for the reason that regime encompasses the variety of meanings that are available in the Latin word imperium. 19 TTP 3: 46–47.

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on “its own proper basis”; the “foundation of each disagrees with the other”; and neither is “handmaid” to the other.20 The disagreement between philosophy and theology is introduced early to the reader of the treatise through Spinoza’s critique of theology or religion and the ways in superstition and prejudiced opinions had infected theological or religious dogma and doctrine with the result that theology and religion simply had become hostile to philosophy. Moreover, according to Spinoza, the bias that philosophy must be ancillary to theology or religion is the chief impediment that prevents human beings from philosophizing.21 Five years prior to the publication of the treatise, Spinoza sent a letter to his friend and regular correspondent, Henry Oldenburg, who recently had been appointed joint secretary of the Royal Society in London. The epistle began with a response to Oldenburg’s missive which contained information about various scientific researches that were being conducted or debated in England, as well as on the continent. Spinoza’s letter to Oldenburg also communicated a general view he held about human nature and the defect of human ability, or the simple human unwillingness, to understand the whole of nature in a more coherent way. Spinoza then informed Oldenburg that he had been composing a treatise on his interpretation of Scripture. He said that three causes had induced him to write such a book. First, human beings had been prevented from applying their minds to philosophy because of the “prejudices of the theologians” and so Spinoza planned to expose those prejudices in order to remove them from “the minds of the more sensible” sort of person. Second, he wished to avert “the opinion that the vulgar had of [him] as being an atheist”; that accusation, he said, must “be averted as far as is possible.” Third, Spinoza proposed to secure “the liberty of philosophizing and saying what we think” because those liberties typically were suppressed by “the excessive authority and petulance of the haranguers of the people.”22

TTP 3: 10; 174; 179–80. TTP 3: 12: “others would philosophize more liberally if this one thing did not thwart them, they suppose that reason must be ancillary to Theology.” 22 Spinoza, Opera quotquot reperta sunt, 2 vols., eds. J. van Vloten and J.P.N. Land (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1882–83): 2:305. The letter does not appear in the 1677 publication of the Opera Posthuma. Instead, the letter from Spinoza to Oldenburg is known from the correspondence between Oldenburg and Boyle in which Oldenburg copied what was written to him by Spinoza. The letter now is listed as Epistle 30 in the correspondence of Spinoza and its date of composition usually is agreed to be 20 21

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By contrast to what may be inferred from the treatise about the likelihood of a complementary relationship between philosophy and politics, the epistle to Oldenburg in 1665 categorically establishes that Spinoza’s views about theology, theologians and preachers, and theological prejudices were not only the stated causes that motivated him to write the treatise but they also were the causes that would prevent a complementary relationship between philosophy and theology. Perhaps to be more accurate, it should be said that the complaint was directed against what Spinoza regarded as the prevailing condition of theology or religion. According to Spinoza, theology had become corrupted by the vanity of the theologians and the preachers who sought less to serve as teachers or guides than to establish themselves as objects of veneration. To that end, the theologians and the preachers had discovered or introduced sacred mysteries in theology or religion that required extraordinary means of interpretation or understanding which they claimed that they alone possessed; they contaminated theological or religious doctrines by accommodating them to the speculative theories of Platonists or Aristotelians; and they were responsible for “faith [having] become nothing other than credulity and prejudice.” With respect to philosophy, the most detrimental feature of the prevailing theological or religious tradition was its express contempt for reason as being corrupt in itself; and Spinoza believed that theological or religious bigotry was responsible for “reducing rational human beings to brutes.”23 Unlike the prospect of some collaboration between philosophy and politics, one would be hard pressed to conceive of a situation in which philosophy and theology could cooperate successfully given the intensity of Spinoza’s complaints, both in Epistle 30 and in the Preface to the treatise itself, about the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and the negative impact of theology or religion on philosophy. If theology or religion is a chief cause of human beings coming to despise reason and if theology or religion is a chief cause of prohibiting human beings from thinking liberally for themselves then it is difficult to imagine the situation in which Spinoza could or would appeal to theology or religion to make any positive contribution to the teaching that he would formulate in the treatise. Spinoza’s candid and critical assessments in

autumn 1665. In the context of the letter to Oldenburg, Spinoza is referring to the theologians and the preachers as “the haranguers of the people.” 23 TTP 3: 8–9; 167–68.

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the treatise about the prevailing tradition of theology or religion should invite the reader of the treatise to take pause and wonder why and how Spinoza came to give his book the title that it has. From what Spinoza says in the treatise, it would seem that there is some sort of compatibility between philosophy and politics on a theoretical or a practical level. From what Spinoza says in the treatise about theology, however, it would not seem possible at all that there could be any sort of compatibility between philosophy and theology on any level. The following conclusion then seems apt: philosophy and politics are compatible; philosophy and theology are not compatible. But the question yet remains open how or whether theology and politics are compatible; and the title of Spinoza’s book certainly insinuates that they are. Despite compatibility between philosophy and politics, Spinoza’s book does not bear the name Tractatus philosophico-politicus; and because of the hostility of theology or religion toward philosophy the book cannot bear the name Tractatus philosophico-theologicus. Instead the book is called Tractatus theologico-politicus and there must a reason for choosing that title rather than any other one. In the treatise, Spinoza openly confronts the prevailing tradition of theology or religion. He reproaches theology for having surrendered itself to absurd secret mysteries, for having commingled idle philosophic speculations with religious dogmas, and for having abdicated the use of reason in favor of espousing blind prejudices. He declares that the theologians and the preachers have sought eminence and advantage for themselves in lieu of living and professing the message of the faith that they pretend to serve. He asserts that they have corrupted religion by promoting superstition and they have demanded that the faithful adopt their pronouncements without question. The impudence of the theologians and the preachers, he says, has led them and their followers to denounce philosophy, liberty of thought, and any exercise of reason that could lead to independence of thought or independence of judgment. However, the very condemnation of the prevailing condition of theology or religion that is tendered by Spinoza also seems to leave open the possibility that there may be some alternative to the prevailing tradition of theology or religion. That is, if the prevailing condition is corrupt then what alterative tradition was forfeited through the corruption? Spinoza himself alludes to it. In the midst of his pointed criticism of the prevailing state of theological or religious affairs, Spinoza remarks that “it therefore is not astonishing that nothing remains of the ancient

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Religion beyond its outward devotion [externum cultum] (by which the vulgar are seen to flatter God more than to adore him).”24 Without defining the alternative tradition, Spinoza suggests that there can be a condition of theology or a heritage of religion that does not suffer from the corruptions inherent in the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and perhaps it even may be possible to recover that more basic, original, and uncorrupted condition of theology or religion. Prior to the advent of theological arrogance, theological prejudice, or theological corruption, Spinoza suggests that there was a “Religio antiqua” though only the vestiges of it remain in the prevailing condition of theology or religion. If the current state of theology or religion may be characterized as inherently hostile to philosophy and reason, is it possible that once there was an expression of theology or religion that was not hostile to philosophy? In perhaps one of its most interesting respects, the argument of the treatise involves the attempt to reclaim a supposedly uncorrupted tradition of theology or religion and reestablish it as the valid and vital one. Moreover, that reclaimed tradition will confirm that the basic, original, and uncorrupted theology or religion is not at all hostile to philosophy or reason. On the contrary, the proper interpretation and understanding of the matter will demonstrate that the actual posture of theology or religion toward philosophy is one of indifference.25 Spinoza argues in the treatise that the basic teaching of theology is simple, uncomplicated, and easily comprehensible to anyone who wishes to seek it.26 The source of that teaching is the Bible which contains the Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian Scriptures.27 Thus Spinoza’s account of theology or religion, that is, his attempt to arrive at an understanding of the original message and meaning of the Scriptures focuses on the Judeo-Christian tradition; and his reading, understanding, and interpretation of that tradition was received with nearly universal denunciation upon the publication and circulation of the treatise.28 Because it was believed that so many of the claims of the treatise would be recognized to be patently heterodox by readers TTP 3: 8. TTP 3: 10; 174; 179–82; 188; 245–47. 26 TTP 3: 162–73. 27 TTP 3: 167. 28 Some of the edicts passed by the United Synods of The Netherlands against the publication and distribution of the TTP have been reprinted in Jacob Freudenthal’s Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas: In Quellenschriften, Urkunden und nichtnamlichen Nachrichten (Leipzig, 24 25

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who were committed to orthodox theological or religious views, some early students of the treatise argued that the book was so transparently outrageous that its falsities and errors would be obvious and easily detected by any reader.29 In 1673, Jean-Baptiste Stouppe, a Swiss Lutheran minister and military officer, issued a work in which he named Spinoza as the author of the anonymously published Tractatus theologicopoliticus. Colonel Stouppe assailed Spinoza as “a very wicked Jew and no better Christian”; furthermore he scolded the “Dutch divines” for having failed to refute the vicious claims that were advanced in the treatise.30 In response to Stouppe’s allegation, Jean Brun, a Dutch minister, penned a denunciation of Spinoza’s book. He acknowledged that there were many very pernicious doctrines contained in the treatise but he dismissed Stouppe’s charge of a lack of zeal on the part of the “Dutch divines” to produce refutations of the treatise by arguing that the book had been published in Hamburg and so the matter was not under the primary jurisdiction of the theologians or the preachers of The United Provinces of the Netherlands.31 There is little doubt that Spinoza’s book was unorthodox, provocative, and notorious. Even Thomas Hobbes, no stranger to controversy and public admonishment

1899). The reception of the TTP also was detailed by Freudenthal in “On the History of Spinozism,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 8 (1895–96). 29 For example, in Deism Examin’d and Confuted in Answer to a Book intitled Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (London: Charles Brown, 1697), Mathias Earbury maintained that it was not necessary to read past chapter 7 of the TTP to realize its errors and, in fact, it probably was not necessary to read past its first two chapters. A number of denunciations of the TTP appeared in 1674 and each of them condemned the book as “blasphemous” and “atheistic.” But perhaps more intriguing than the refutations of the book that can be found was the variety of opponents Spinoza had incited. They included Jacob Veteler, a Remonstrant preacher; Regner van Mansvelt, a Professor of Theology at Utrecht; Spitzelius, a Lutheran minister; Musaeus, a Professor of Theology at Jena; Willem van Blyenbergh, a merchant and correspondent of Spinoza during 1665; and Lambert van Velthuysen, an Utrecht physician. 30 Jean-Baptitste Stouppe, La Religion des Hollandois représentée en plusieurs lettres écrites par un Officier de l’armée du Roy à un Pasteur & Professeur en Théologie de Berne (Cologne: Chez Pierre Martineau, 1673) pp. 65–67. 31 Jean Brun, La veritable Religion des Hollandois, avec une apologie pour la Religion des EtatsGenereaux contre le Libelle diffamatoire de Stouppe (Jena, 1675). Despite Brun’s loyal defense of the Dutch ministers against Stouppe’s allegation, it is of course more than a little ironic that his defense partially relied upon the assumption that the TTP actually had been printed in Hamburg as the title page of the book indicated. But a year prior to the writing and publication of Brun’s book a work already had appeared from Jena confirming that Spinoza was a resident of The Netherlands and that the TTP actually had been printed in Amsterdam and not Hamburg: see, Musaeus, Tractatus theologicopoliticus ad veritatis lumen examinatus ( Jena, 1674).

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because of his own views, is reported to have expressed astonishment upon reading the treatise.32 On his way to recovering the basic meaning and teaching of the Scriptures, Spinoza proposes a variety of unconventional views. He asserts that the “natural knowledge” that is attainable by all human beings through the exercise of their own natural faculties is really equivalent to prophecy, namely, that unique communication of “sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings”; furthermore, the difference between the two kinds of knowledge really has more to do with style than with substance.33 Spinoza also maintains that although the Hebrew people claim a special providence and election by God it actually is the case that they are no more blessed than any other people; whatever advantages or prosperity the Hebrew people may have enjoyed concerned only temporal or material issues which had no bearing on “salvation” which is available to everyone equally.34 In a similar vein, Spinoza concludes that the “natural light” by itself is competent to apprehend the “divine law” and, in fact, the Scriptures fully endorse it doing so.35 He states that the customarily accepted doctrine about the creation of the world only derives from a mistaken assumption about the relationship between the power of nature and the power of God; and he declares that belief in miracles actually “leads to Atheism.”36 Spinoza further claims to demonstrate that an accurate reading and interpretation of Scripture legitimately can be conducted only after one methodically has assembled a “history of Scripture”; the reading of Scripture and the conclusions reached about Scripture must rely solely on the “the natural light that is common to all”; and in the effort to interpret the meaning of Scripture one must eschew

32 “When Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus first came out, Mr. Edmund Waller sent it to my lord of Devonshire and desired him to send him word what Mr. Hobbes said of it. Mr. H. told his lordship: Ne judicate ne judicemini. He told me he had outthrown him a bar’s length, for he durst not write so boldly” in Andrew Clark, ed., Brief Lives, chiefly of contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey, between the years 1669 and 1696, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898) 1:357. 33 TTP 3: 15–16. With respect to human knowledge of things divine, Spinoza states that “there is nothing that impedes God from communicating in some other form [viz., revelation] what we know by the natural light.” 34 TTP 3: 9; 45–47; 57. 35 TTP 3: 10; 68–69. 36 TTP 3: 81; 87.

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recourse to any interpretative authority that professes to implement a “light above nature.”37 However provocative the treatise’s version of the meaning of the Judeo-Christian tradition may be to orthodox readers, Spinoza’s critique of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion underscores his sense of the pragmatic advantage of adopting a minimalist attitude toward the selection, adoption, and sanctioning of theological dogmas, doctrines, or practices. That is, in satisfying the requirements of the method for compiling a history of Scripture, one necessarily encounters various inconsistencies and difficulties within or between the Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian Scriptures and consequently questions about the authorship, the intention, and the modes of communication employed in the Scriptures are driven to the foreground of the treatise where they come to receive a more critical and more focused attention. But the means to resolving those questions can occasion even more problems. For in the effort to adhere to the method of Scriptural interpretation devised by Spinoza, one must learn or know all of the languages in which the Scriptures originally were composed; one must catalogue the contents of the whole of Scripture according to the subject matter of its contents and one must make note of any passages that are obscure or contradictory; one must supply a comprehensive biographical account of each Scriptural author that includes the author’s life, mores, education, intended audience, etc.; and finally one must give an account of “the fortune of each book,” including evidence about who received the book, how it was received, how it came to be accepted into the canon of Scriptural books, etc.38 Beyond the daunting task of adhering to the rules of the interpretive method, the textual difficulties encountered by the readers of Scripture then often are so intricate and the prospect of resolving them is so dim that Spinoza himself almost despairs of settling many questions of Scriptural interpretation and thus he almost fatally concludes that we ultimately are resigned to affirming that “we undoubtedly are ignorant of the true sense of the Scriptures in many places or we divine it without certitude.”39 TTP 3: 98–102; 117. TTP 3: 99–101. 39 TTP 3: 111. The Latin verb hariolari means “to foretell,” “to prophesy,” or “to divine.” But the word also pejoratively connotes “to speak foolishly,” “to talk silly stuff,” or “to talk nonsense.” From an orthodox theological or religious perspective, “divining” the significance of a Scriptural passage or statement need not be controversial. But from Spinoza’s perspective, the use of a “method for the interpretation of Scripture” 37 38

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If one recognizes that there are numerous difficulties that cannot be resolved even by appealing to the methodical interpretation of Scripture that is propounded by Spinoza in the treatise and if one acknowledges the modest feasibility of resolving many of the problems that will be encountered in the process of interpreting the Scriptures then it becomes increasingly clear that it is preferable and more sensible to adopt a minimalist approach to understanding or interpreting the doctrines and meanings of Scripture rather than to become embroiled in endless wrangling about the significances of difficult, obscure, or corrupted passages of Scripture, a procedure which Spinoza believed to be characteristic of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion. If readers of the treatise were to embrace Spinoza’s position on Scriptural interpretation, as well as his account of the meaning of Scripture, and if they were to acknowledge his warning about the insolubility of numerous questions regarding the interpretation of Scripture then readers of Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise would be inclined to accept his simple or minimalist theology as being both reasonable and having the advantage of avoiding or at least discouraging futile speculative controversies and contentious disputes about irresolvable theological or religious matters. Spinoza’s version of the basic and authentic teaching of theology or religion is simple and minimalist. His opponents however would reject his theological teaching in the treatise for being simplistic and minimizing. Spinoza reduces to seven the number of dogmas essential to theology or religion; and he permits the faithful to apprehend the dogmas in whatever manner prompts their piety most. Theology or religion thus resides primarily in each individual’s own heart or spirit rather than in the edicts, the heritages, or the protocols stipulated by the theologians, the preachers, “the Pharisees or the Roman Pontiffs.”40 The teaching of Scripture is found only “in the Word of God and not in some number of books.”41 Consequently, any requirement that the faithful surrender interpretive authority to the theologians or the preachers in questions of religious observance or conviction is eliminated. Instead has the purpose of affording reliable explications of the meanings of Scripture and hence the method would eliminate the need for any guesswork, “divining,” or “talking nonsense” about the significance of any Scriptural statement. Where there is no final determination of the significance of a Scriptural passage, each individual is left to judge the meaning of it for himself (TTP 3: 11; 114–15; 178–80). 40 TTP 3: 116–17. 41 TTP 3: 10–11; 158–59; 172.

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the resolution of matters affecting the interpretation of the meaning of piety or faith is left to the adjudications of the individual consciences of ordinary human beings; and, in consequence of that principle, the verdict of the vulgus on such matters possesses the same theological or religious legitimacy as the decrees of theological counsels or the pronouncements of religious assemblies. Spinoza’s account of the nature and foundation of theology or religion in the treatise purportedly represents that “Religio antiqua” which had become unrecognizable after suffering so many perversions over time. Conceived on the basis of Spinoza’s version of it, the teaching and meaning of theology or religion essentially is easily comprehensible by everyone; it is simple; it is uncontroversial; and it consists of but a few dogmas and a few demands. Moreover, the account of theology or religion offered by Spinoza in the treatise seems to go some long way toward correcting those excesses of theology or religion that initially had prompted him to compose the treatise. In the first instance, the recovered version of theology or religion proposed by Spinoza in the treatise demonstrates that the introduction of various prejudices and superstitions into theology or religion is a result of the ambitions of the theologians and the preachers who seek to achieve and maintain a certain authority and power over the multitudes they influence. The debasement of theology or religion then is a consequence of their vanity and arrogance. When the supposed mysteries, secrets, or impenetrable lessons of the Scriptures have been shown to be only manipulated opinions foisted on ordinary human beings for the sake of the aggrandizement of the theologians and the preachers then the faithful are afforded the preparation necessary to reclaim the unadulterated teaching of Scripture. Moreover, at the same time, Spinoza’s exposure of the corruptions of the basic teaching of theology or religion means that “the more sensible” sort of person may be encouraged to turn his mind to philosophizing since the “ancient Religion,” or the basic teaching of theology, never would have dictated hostility toward liberal and independent thinking. Quite the contrary, the preeminent tenet of theology or religion unambiguously advocates charity and justice toward every human being;42 and in accordance with that tenet persecution and intolerance would be proscribed.

42

TTP 3: 10–11; 175–80; 184–85.

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In the second place, though Spinoza’s version of theology or religion conflicts with the prevailing tradition, his theological teaching in the treatise is a ‘theology’ nonetheless. Although the treatise may have been rejected by orthodox readers and believers as a pernicious and heretical book, strictly speaking, it is one thing to be a dissenter, an unorthodox thinker, or even a polemical writer on theology or religion but it very much is another thing simply to be an atheist. During the seventeenth century, it frequently was the case that such a distinction may have been observed in principle but only rarely was it applied in practice. If someone’s theology or religion was perceived to oppose someone else’s theology or religion then either party could be accused by the opposing party of having no theology or no religion at all. It is very clear that Spinoza’s theology is not the theology of the received tradition. Nor is Spinoza’s God in the treatise identical with the God of the received tradition. But nowhere in the treatise does Spinoza expressly deny the existence of God nor does he openly subvert the worth of theology or its teaching.43 On the contrary, Spinoza concludes the explicitly theological part of the treatise with the declaration that “except that we had the testimony of Scripture we would doubt the salvation (salus) of almost everyone.”44 One could submit then that Spinoza’s teaching of theology, or his version of the recovered “ancient Religion,” that is presented in the treatise serves to fulfill his professed aim of “averting the accusation of atheism as far as is possible.”45

43 Spinoza never expressly contests or denies the existence of God in the TTP nor does he do so in his other writings. However, the report of an Inquisition spy who was traveling in The Netherlands in the late 1650s offers another perspective on the matter. Fr. Tomás Solano y Robles attended a meeting of the Collegiants, a group of Dutch “freethinkers,” on 10 August 1659. Solan y Robles reported that Spinoza was present at the meeting and the priest described Spinoza’s confession of his atheism in this way: “[E]staban contentos en tener el herror de el ateismo, porque sentian que non havia Dios sino es filosofalmente (Como he declarado).” The report is reprinted and discussed in I.S. Révah’s Spinoza et le Dr. Juan de Prado (Paris: Mouton, 1959) pp. 31–32; 64. 44 TTP 3: 188. The theological part of the TTP is contained in chapters 1–15. 45 The initial and early receptions of the TTP confirm that Spinoza’s teaching in that book was considered heretical and atheistic by the majority of its readers. But over time Spinoza has enjoyed a kind of rehabilitation which perhaps owes to the fact that his successors have adopted his of method of Biblical criticism. In his assessment of Spinoza’s teaching on theology or religion, one scholar has concluded that “as a whole his doctrine is a representation of that liberal moral type of Christianity”: see H.G. Hubbeling, Spinoza’s Methodology (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum Company, 1967) pp. 58–59; and Hubbeling, Spinoza (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1978) pp. 96–110.

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In the third place, according to Spinoza, the genuine teaching and meaning of theology or religion indicates that human beings are free to think, to judge, and to speak for themselves. Each may read and interpret Scripture, for example, as his conscience and sentiment direct him. The conclusions an individual reaches about the lessons of the prophetic books, the significance of the histories of the Hebrew people, the meaning of the life and teaching of Jesus Christ, or the apostolic instructions in the epistles may vary from one member of the faithful to another so long as the interpretations and the understandings of such things enhance one’s piety. If one’s understanding or interpretation of Scripture leads to the performance of just and charitable acts then the theology or faith or religion embraced by that individual is sound. If one’s acts are pious then the exact content of his interpretation and understanding of “the word of God” is irrelevant. Whatever one believes and whatever serves as the motive for one’s faith are acceptable so long as they confirm one’s piety and therefore lead one to live justly and charitably in obedience to God; for faith is to be gauged only by acts and never by words.46 Thus liberty of thought, liberty of speech, and the liberty to philosophize appear to be sanctioned by the teaching of theology or religion itself. The account of theology or religion propounded by Spinoza in the treatise reflects the motives that prompted the composition of the book which were listed by Spinoza in Epistle 30 to Henry Oldenburg. First, Spinoza’s version of a more original and basic theology or religion strips away the prejudicial or superstitious accretions to theology or religion that had been introduced or compounded by the theologians and the preachers over time in their attempts to extend their authority, influence, and power over the people in their charge. Second, however provocative the doctrines of the treatise were, Spinoza’s book does express and defend a theological teaching; thus he affords himself some line of defense against accusations that he is an atheist. In addition, third, the version of theology or religion presented by Spinoza in the treatise places a remarkable premium on liberty of thought, liberty of judgment, and liberty of speech; only external behavior and action matter in the determination of one’s piety or faithfulness. Theology itself, therefore, may be understood to encourage ‘philosophizing’ in a broad sense of the word (for example, when an individual strives to

46

TTP 3: 11; 175–78; 182; 243–47.

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interpret Scripture for himself ) and theology’s emphasis on charity and justice implies that tolerance of intellectual liberty, including the liberty of philosophizing, is actually an element of piety or faithfulness. Still, the version of theology or religion propounded by Spinoza in the treatise continues to stand on a completely different foundation from philosophy; its goal remains entirely separate from philosophy; and accordingly it should not serve as a “handmaid” or complement to philosophy nor should philosophy serve as a “handmaid” or complement to theology. Hence the teaching of theology or religion presented by Spinoza in the treatise will not permit the title Tractatus philosophico-theologicus; although a recovery of the basic sense of theology or religion, as it is explained in the treatise, does permit something else. Spinoza’s account of theology or religion is no longer simply identical with the prevailing tradition of theology or religion which regards and treats philosophy with hostility. Instead, Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise proposes a theology or religion which acknowledges the legitimacy of liberty of thought and equal participation by all of the faithful in understanding, interpreting, and implementing “the Word of God.” Accordingly, Spinoza’s revised theology or religion essentially is democratic and that novel characteristic makes it possible for Spinoza’s theology to be compatible with Spinoza’s politics. Spinoza says in the treatise that the democratic political regime is the one most consonant with nature and natural right. The democratic political regime therefore is compatible with philosophy since philosophy involves knowledge of nature and nature teaches liberty and right.47 The prevailing theological tradition is impudent, authoritarian, illiberal, superstition-ridden, and corrupt. It opposes independent inquiry and philosophical investigation though theology sometimes will appeal to philosophic doctrines only if philosophy can be made to serve the interests of the prevailing theological or religious tradition as its “handmaid.” However, the version theology or religion presented in the treatise contains a set of modifications to the received tradition of theology or religion that make the recovered sense of the “Religio antiqua” more responsive to Spinoza’s intentions in his book. Philosophy and politics are consonant in respect of the democratic regime. Both philosophy and politics converge in their relation to nature. Philosophy and theology, however, are dissonant. The prevailing

47

TTP 3: 8; 179–80; 241.

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theological tradition rebuffs nature and espouses the supranatural; and even the version of theology or religion taught in the treatise remains discordant with philosophy in certain important respects. For theology of any kind and philosophy remain separate from each other in terms of their foundations and in terms of their goals. Still, theology, be it the version offered in the treatise or an uncorrected version of it, and politics have opportunities to intersect insofar as they may be said to share a common concern: each purports to offer what is indispensable to the wellbeing of those under their respective charges. Each claims to supply the indispensable instruction that is necessary for the proper conduct of human life and the governance of human affairs. The prevailing tradition of theology or religion which is impudent, authoritarian, prejudiced, and superstition-ridden may not easily be brought to cooperate with a liberal democratic political regime. Where there is intersection between the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and politics the result often is confrontation rather than cooperation. But the recovered sense of the “ancient Religion” and the corrected theology that is taught by the treatise now conspicuously incorporate a democratic trait. The newly retrieved sense of the basic teaching of theology or religion authorizes subjective judgment; it encourages personal assent; it advocates private interpretation; and it defends liberty of thought. Thus the reclaimed “ancient Religion” that is presented in the treatise carries with it the prospect of fashioning a teaching that can combine theology and politics through their common aim and their common element which is the provision of an instruction for ordinary human beings about how to conduct their lives and govern their affairs peaceably. Spinoza’s old book is not a tractatus philosophicus nor is it a tractatus theologicus nor is it a tractatus politicus although philosophy, theology, and politics each professes to furnish the teaching that is indispensable for the achievement of human happiness, human salvation, or human welfare. Instead Spinoza writes a tractatus theologico-politicus that professes to furnish a teaching that will establish the conditions which are requisite for human salvation and human welfare. In other words, Spinoza offers a ministerial theologico-political teaching under the supervision of philosophy. The first two proper objects of desire are knowledge and virtue. The acquisition of both depends solely upon the laws and powers of human nature. According to Spinoza, however, there are only “a very few, if compared to all of humankind, who acquire the habit of virtue led

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by reason alone.”48 Virtue implies knowledge; and knowledge is gained through the exercise of reason which involves knowledge of nature and knowledge of the causes of things. Though all human beings possess the faculty of reason and all human beings desire happiness or salvation or welfare, the vast majority of human beings are incapable of attaining knowledge and virtue through the exercise of reason because they instead are “drawn by their carnal instincts and desires rather than by the dictates of reason.”49 As a result, the satisfaction of the desire that is sought by every individual is likely to elude the vast majority of human beings. For the multitude succumbs to the influences of the passions and the imaginative-affective life. They shun reason and turn to fortune or superstition for the satisfaction of their desires.50 Hence the majority of human beings, who inherently are passionate and who are driven by the impulses of their emotions, look to “external things” for their salvation or for their welfare rather than to the things that are contained within human nature itself. They trust in chance more than they trust in reason. In consideration of what human nature is, philosophy cannot succeed in offering human beings the teaching or providing them the conditions that will promote their attainment of happiness. Passionate human beings, who are urged to action by the immediate satisfaction of their interests and who regularly are oblivious to the consequences of their conduct, abandon the dictates of reason, avoid the demonstrations of reason, and ignore the exhortations of reason. So we glimpse the very problem that is raised by Spinoza’s old book. The problem concerns the fact of human nature: Human beings are driven more by passion than they are guided by reason.51 Because of what human beings are, they will be moved to undertake only that which conforms to their established opinions, experiences, or expectations.52 They will be persuaded by what appeals most to their senses, their passions, their sentiments, or their emotions and they will contest, resent, dispute, or feel threatened by whatever is inconsistent with their experiences or what they customarily anticipate concerning such things. The problem raised by the treatise then is the natural or

48 49 50 51 52

TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3: 3:

188. 73–75; 189–92. 5. 189–90. 76–77.

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philosophic problem of human nature. That problem must be resolved if human beings are to live together. More precisely, the natural or philosophic problem must be resolved if rational human beings, or those who are reasonable, are to live peaceably and securely among the vast majority of human beings who behave only in accordance with their passions. Inasmuch as it is based on reason and not on passion, passionate human beings will not be receptive to the teaching of philosophy about knowledge, virtue, and human happiness. But if the teaching of philosophy concerning human happiness will be dismissed by passionate human beings then how will they manage to achieve the third proper object of desire? What will persuade passionate human beings to live in “security and health” with rational or reasonable human beings, as well as with those other human beings who typically also yield to their passions? Theology and politics impart teachings that influence the courses of human life and the conduct of human affairs. Moreover, the teachings of theology and politics are designed to appeal to the experiences, sentiments, opinions, and expectations of ordinary human beings. Thus theology and politics already exercise control over some of the principal avenues of access through which persuasive discourse can be undertaken with nonphilosophers. If philosophy is to solve the natural or philosophic problem effectively its solution must incorporate means that are recognizable and credible to the majority of human beings. Conjoining theology and politics under the supervision of philosophy offers the greatest likelihood of propounding a teaching that will enable human beings to satisfy the third proper object of desire; and the theological and political teachings of the treatise are devised precisely to facilitate the accomplishment of that task. For the political teaching of the treatise is receptive to philosophy’s instruction on human happiness to the extent that the democratic regime advocated in the treatise, which is designed to fosters human welfare, is consonant with Spinoza’s account of human nature. Thus philosophy can inform the teaching of politics in the treatise so that human security and health can be realized; and, in addition, the version of the teaching of theology that is presented in the treatise also is receptive to philosophy to the extent that theology or religion no longer needs to approach philosophy with hostility. That is, the teaching of theology or religion in the treatise encourages the use of reason; the teaching of theology in the treatise itself has been democratized; and so the teaching of theology in the

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treatise is tolerant of both politics and philosophy since each of them also is concerned with human wellbeing. The recovery of the basic teaching of theology or religion by philosophy in the treatise means that philosophy may appeal to the teaching of theology, as it appeals to the teaching of politics, in the service of satisfying the third proper object of desire. Although philosophy, theology, and politics are directed to human wellbeing, in accordance with the understanding of human nature that each professes, it is only philosophy that possesses the requisite knowledge and virtue to enable human beings to realize their proper desires in an appropriate manner. Spinoza does not write a tractatus philosophicus because it would be futile to do so; such a work would not be welcomed by the majority of human beings nor would it be understood by those among them whose lives are driven by passion. But because the theological teaching of the treatise and the political teaching of the treatise can be joined in their service of a shared objective, “security and health,” Spinoza aptly can name his old book Tractatus theologico-politicus. In the treatise, philosophy makes use of the familiar, appealing, and credible rhetoric of theology and politics for the sake of moving the nonphilosophers to adopt a kind of life that will bring them security, health, wellbeing, peace, and prosperity but only if they are moved to act in ways that initially appear to them to be contrary to their own selfish, immediate, asocial interests.53

53 One might propose that Spinoza imitates Plato. That is, just as Socrates tames Thrasymachus in the Republic (350d–354b) so too Spinoza tames the theologians and preachers in the TTP. Both Socrates and Spinoza wish to purge the content from the doctrines of their opponents while simultaneously leaving the mode of communication for their opponents’ doctrines intact. Just as Socrates empties Thrasymachus’ teaching of its content but saves its form, namely, the rhetorical art, Spinoza purges theology or religion of its harmful prejudices and superstitions so that he may continue to appeal to theology’s rhetorical prowess to move ordinary human beings toward sociability (TTP 3: 180; 188; compare Republic 398a–400 and Leo Strauss, The City and Man [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1964] pp. 80–85); for human beings by nature are inclined toward theology or religion (TTP 3: 5–7; and compare Republic 386a–392a). Plato’s justification for appealing to the rhetorical art of Thrasymachus, if not the teaching of Thrasymachus, might be said to owe to the fact that human beings are moved first, and perhaps most, more by ‘music’ than they are moved by ‘mathematics’. Spinoza is more straightforward about the matter in the TTP. According to Spinoza, if one wishes to persuade or dissuade anyone about anything that is not self-evident [per se notum non est] he must deduce the matter from what is accepted by his audience; he will speak in accordance with their capacity for being moved; he will grant their presumptions; he will rely on what they have experienced; and he will not resort to lengthy proofs that involve long chains of reasoning or demonstration (TTP 3: 76–77).

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Taken together, the democratic political regime proposed by Spinoza in the treatise and the democratic theology proposed by Spinoza in the treatise are devised to make feasible the achievement of the third proper object of desire. Theological salvation of the individual is the aim of religious institutions; and the political welfare of the individual is the aim of civic governments. Throughout the treatise, Spinoza uses the same Latin word, salus, to connote both the theological condition of salvation and the political condition of welfare.54 The problem or the question raised by the treatise is the problem or the question of how to solve the tension between human selfishness and human sociability. Spinoza’s treatment or “handling” of that problem and his solution to that problem is a theologico-political one. Notwithstanding his criticism of the Turkish and the Hebrew regimes, Spinoza’s answer to the natural or philosophic problem involves the invention of a novel sort of theocratic regime.

54

TTP 3: 64–66; 151–58; 163–65; 167–78; 188; 192–98.

PART ONE

PHILOSOPHY

The Tractatus theologico-politicus does not contain a single chapter that addresses philosophy exclusively. Whereas the title of chapter fourteen of the treatise indicates that the chapter will define “the foundations of faith” ( fidei fundamenta)1 and the title of chapter sixteen of the treatise indicates that the chapter will define “the foundations of a Republic” (de Reipublicae fundamentis),2 there is no title of any chapter in the treatise which suggests that the principal purpose of it is to define “the foundations of philosophy.” Instead the philosophic teaching of the treatise is scattered throughout the many chapters of the book. In other words, the philosophic teaching of Spinoza’s old book is presented only obliquely and it is appropriate to consider why he chose to proceed in that manner. The expressly stated aim of the treatise is to convince people that “the liberty of philosophizing can be conceded” in a republic without detriment to piety and without detriment to the public peace. But the need for Spinoza to plea for a “liberty of philosophizing” in the treatise also implies that a liberty to philosophize has not been achieved already. The fact that Spinoza’s plea is necessary at all denotes the extent to which there was an established environment in which philosophy was neither free nor encouraged. From remarks made early in the Preface to the treatise it easily can be concluded that Spinoza believed that the prevailing tradition of theology or religion was largely responsible for influencing and fostering an atmosphere of antagonism toward philosophy.3 Yet, even without any theological or religious nurturing of such an antagonism, a more basic fact of human nature explains why there was not, or perhaps there never will be, a universal approval for the liberty of philosophizing.

1 TTP 3: 173. Spinoza uses the words “faith” and “theology” interchangeably in the TTP (3: 179). 2 TTP 3: 189. 3 TTP 3: 8–9.

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One claim asserted repeatedly in the treatise, which presumably is reached in accordance with Spinoza’s philosophic teaching, is that human beings typically conduct their lives by the urgings of their passions rather than by the direction of reason4 and consequently they are not disposed to philosophy.5 Instead most human beings favor and adopt whatever seems to conform to their immediate sentiments and they embrace whatever appears to promise them the greatest likelihood of satisfying their desires.6 Lacking knowledge about the order and operations of nature, which would assist them in acquiring what they need or want, most human beings look for rarities, oddities, or exceptions in their experiences of the world and they apprehend such experiences as forebodings of whether their needs or desires will be satisfied or frustrated. In other words, human beings are induced to look to nonhuman or suprahuman things to provide them with the means to their wellbeing. They look especially to “external things” in order to satisfy the third proper object of desire, namely, “security and health.”7 Perhaps somewhat ironically, then, human nature is prone by nature to look away from nature and to look to something above or beyond nature in order to satisfy the most natural human needs or desires. The prevailing tradition of theology or religion, according to Spinoza, only foments that perspective on human life and on the world. For theology or religion teaches that nonhuman or suprahuman agents, that is, certain “external things,” are more useful, helpful, and successful than human agents, and the capacities inherent to human nature, for obtaining the objects of human need or human desire.8 Ignorant of the order and operations of nature but natively prone to superstition, that is, prone by nature to “religious overawe,” most human beings readily accept the perspective advanced by theology or religion because they do not know any alternative to it. Philosophy might offer that alternative. But theology or religion already professes to hold the knowledge that is requisite to the proper conduct of life and the governance of 4 TTP 3: 5–7; 29–30; 43–44; 53; 59–62; 73–78; 81–82; 98; 180–81; 188–92; 203–205; 217–19; 226–28; 239–40. 5 Spinoza’s identification of reason, or the use of reason, with philosophy (TTP 3: 180; 183; 188) implies that those who are led by the passions rather than by reason are led away from philosophy rather than being led toward it. 6 TTP 3: 5–7; 188–93. 7 TTP 3: 47. 8 TTP 3: 5–6; 8–9; 15–16; 46; 81–85; 186.

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human affairs, the knowledge that explains the order and operations of the world, and the knowledge that will lead all human beings to their ultimate wellbeing or salvation. Indeed, theology or religion claims to possess such knowledge exclusively. Any endorsement of philosophizing, therefore, would be taken to insinuate that theology or religion in fact might not possess or supply what it is that human beings need to know and to do in order to achieve their complete salus.9 Were philosophy to be considered a legitimate alternative to theology or religion then theology or religion would cede its authority and cease to enjoy its privileged position among the people. To safeguard itself and its station, theology or religion adopts an antagonistic posture toward philosophy; theology or religion prevents human beings from turning their minds to philosophy; and theology or religion induces ordinary human beings, the nonphilosophers, to regard philosophy with suspicion, contempt, or trepidation.10 The treatise seeks to demonstrate that philosophy can coexist peacefully with theology or religion and politics; and there is a significant point made in Spinoza’s statement of the express aim of his book. He maintains that allowing people the liberty to philosophize will not prove to be an inconvenience either to “piety or the public peace.” The title of the treatise, the summary of the chief aim of the treatise contained in the Preface to the book, and the concluding sentiment found on the last page of the treatise each repeat the promise that philosophy will not be either a private or a public nuisance.11 However, the avowed purpose of the treatise must be read against another declaration also made by Spinoza early in his book. In the Preface to the treatise, Spinoza states that the Dutch have the “rare happiness” of living in a Republic where “each is conceded complete liberty of judging and revering God from his own native bent [ex suo ingenio] and where nothing is held more estimable or agreeable

The ambiguity of the Latin word salus must be borne in mind throughout the reading of the TTP. For in one context, the word simply may convey a sense of personal “wellbeing” which can be neutral to any theological or political considerations. But in most contexts, Spinoza intends the word to bear the theological connotation of “religious salvation” or the political connotation of “civic welfare.” The latter two connotations bear a number of implications that can involve precepts or practices that are either mutually inclusive of each other or mutually exclusive of each other. 10 TTP 3: 6–8. 11 TTP 3: 1; 7; 243; 247. 9

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than liberty.”12 If the “complete liberty of judging” or the high estimation and approval of liberty were facts of the age, and the Dutch circumstance in particular, then the stated ambition of Spinoza’s treatise would be not only superfluous but also absurd. Why should Spinoza seek to win a liberty that already existed and which already was said to be enjoyed by every citizen? Spinoza’s assessment of the contemporary situation in The Netherlands continues, however, and he notes that “religious and political prejudices” as well as “superstitions” remain the chief obstacles that prohibit the specific kind of liberty that he is advocating. Indeed, the passage from the Preface about the Dutch situation makes it quite plain that the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and the prevailing tradition of politics are susceptible to the very sort of collusion that could reduce human beings, especially the most vulnerable ones, namely, the passionate ones who constitute the majority of humankind, to a condition of “servitude” of thought. The not so subtle warning against the undesirable consequences of collusion between theology and politics should remind the reader of Spinoza’s complaint against the Turkish regime wherein collusion between theology and politics had prevented liberal and open public discourse as well as independent judgment. It also is worthwhile to note that Spinoza’s complaint against the Turkish regime in fact appears at the top of the same page of the Preface to the treatise where Spinoza comments on the putatively salutary contemporary circumstances of The Netherlands.13 One implication that may be drawn from the proximity of the two statements would be that the conditions in The Netherlands ran the risk of becoming more similar rather than less similar to the conditions associated with the Turkish regime. The reader should be struck by an inconsistency. On the one hand, in the treatise Spinoza explicitly pleads for a “liberty of philosophizing.” Yet, on the other hand, Spinoza categorically asserts that liberty of judgment, liberty of worship, and a seemingly widespread ‘love of liberty’ already universally are approved in The Netherlands. Because of the inconsistency between Spinoza’s statements, it would seem fair for a reader of the treatise to infer that the liberty imputed to The Netherlands by Spinoza is something that may have been honored in speech but not really welcomed in deed.14 One ambition of the treatise is to correct that problem. 12 13 14

TTP 3: 7; 246. TTP 3: 7. TTP 3: 244–46.

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As much as securing the “liberty of philosophizing” may be critical to the overall design of Spinoza’s book, the elimination of the prejudices and superstitions that foster “servitude” of thought appears to be the necessary prerequisite to the announced aim of the treatise. There will not be liberty until the threat of servitude is removed. The “liberty of philosophizing” will depend upon a preliminary liberation of human beings from the forces that hinder an individual from having the freedom “to think as he wishes, and to say as he thinks.”15 So long as fear, ignorance, prejudice, and superstition dominate the human condition it is improbable that even “human beings endowed with reason” will be competent to protect themselves from being “turned into brutes”;16 and their brutishness only will contribute further to their subjugation in theological, political, moral, and even intellectual terms. Therefore, while the obvious ambition of the treatise concerns securing the “liberty of philosophizing,” the argument of the treatise in support of that ambition involves the elimination of theological and political prejudices together with an exposure of the superstitions that preclude freedom of thought, independence of mind, and the liberty of philosophizing. Still, the task of the supporting argument of the treatise never may be realized fully; for “human beings by nature are prone to superstition.”17 Furthermore, there always will be a natural antipathy toward philosophy by most human beings who are not philosophers since the majority is driven by the urgings of passion rather than by the dictates or conclusions of reason. It therefore is incumbent upon philosophy to engage theology or politics in ways that advance liberty and the possibility of philosophizing while simultaneously remaining mindful of the authority, function, and influence that theology and politics exercise over the majority of human beings in their daily affairs. Both the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and the prevailing tradition of politics invoke the opinions, sentiments, prejudices, and even the superstitions that are endorsed by the majority of human beings. They invoke the received views of things that are adopted by human beings in order to affect the courses of their behaviors in an effort to make it feasible for them to satisfy the third proper object of desire. But in their attempts to make “security and health” attainable, theology or religion and politics frequently embrace inadequate or mistaken 15 16 17

TTP 3: 239. TTP 3: 5–6; 8; 14; 81–82; 90–92; 167; 173; 180–82. TTP 3: 6.

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apprehensions of the world in order to facilitate the satisfaction of one of the objects of desire that is most basic and natural to all human beings. Holding out to human beings the prospect of the attainment of the wellbeing that they seek, theology or religion and politics devise and promulgate views about things that are contrary to what actually transpires in the world. Still, theology or religion and politics affirm that an individual can achieve what he most needs or desires so long as he adheres to their approved doctrines. Because ordinary human beings (vulgus) are impelled by their passions, possess little or no knowledge of the order and operations of the world, and they naturally are prone to superstition, theology and politics also inculcate vulgar conceptions of the world; and based upon those conceptions they strive to persuade or dissuade human beings about what is desirable, worthwhile, or acceptable in respect of achieving the third proper object of desire. But neither theology nor politics is philosophy. That is, the doctrines of theology or politics continue to be derived from basic human assumptions or opinions about the world and they remain assumptions or opinions which are nonphilosophical. When philosophy attempts to instruct ordinary human beings, the vulgar, the nonphilosophers, it proceeds in a different fashion. The philosophically devised teaching of theology in the treatise and the philosophically framed political teaching in the treatise are formulated in ways which suggest an agreement between nature and both theology and politics. Everyone seeks “security and health.” The achievement of “security and health” will be made feasible for the nonphilosophers by the introduction of a philosophical teaching about theology and a philosophical teaching about politics. Philosophy will not supplant theology or politics. Instead it will conserve some useful semblances of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and the prevailing tradition of politics which are familiar to the vast majority of human beings and which generally are accepted by them. Still, the basic opinions and notions on which theology or politics rest will be retained only in the form that is deemed by philosophy to be most effective for a philosophically devised version of theology and politics. The theological and political teachings found in the treatise will be unorthodox and controversial to the extent that they contest some established orthodox tenets. But notwithstanding their heterodoxy, the theological and political teachings propounded in the treatise also will remain attractive to ordinary human beings for the reason that they retain accepted elements of theology and politics while the teachings

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of the treatise also will recommend modifications to theology or politics that will be advantageous to ordinary human beings. Spinoza’s ‘democratic theology’ and his ‘democratic politics’ derive from premises that are consistent with nature; for, according to Spinoza, the ‘democratic’ and the ‘natural’ are in accord with one another.18 But in order to advance the ‘democratic theology’ and the ‘democratic politics’ of the treatise certain basic principles of the prevailing traditions of theology and politics will have to be contested and shown to be erroneous or mistaken to the readers of the treatise. A philosophic analysis of the principles of the prevailing traditions of theology and politics will enable attentive readers of the treatise to realize that the prevailing traditions of theology and politics represent perversions of nature inasmuch as the prevailing teachings on theology and politics derive from a nondemocratic foundation. That is, the foundations and principles of the prevailing tradition of theology and the prevailing tradition of politics are monarchic in character. What initially appears unorthodox, provocative, and controversial about Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise yet may be seen by ordinary human beings to be attractive and advantageous because Spinoza’s democratic theological and political teachings in the treatise offer a means to satisfying what human beings desire most; and his teachings also affirm what human beings hold most dear. Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise offers hope rather than fear; it offers liberty rather than servitude; and it offers the promise of the satisfaction of individual desires in an ordered society. If the teaching of philosophy were communicated directly in the treatise, rather than obliquely, it would come into stark contrast with the prevailing traditions of theology and politics. Or, contrary to the stated interests of the treatise,19 philosophy just might show itself to be quite inconvenient both to piety and to the public peace. Philosophy, and its teaching, will be resented by the readers of the treatise until Spinoza can persuade them that philosophy actually performs some sort of useful service for them. If philosophy can be employed to supply the assistance that is needed to correct or eliminate the prejudices and superstitions that had come to obscure the more original and basic meaning of theology or religion then philosophy could be perceived as beneficial to theology or religion and politics, as well as to the

18 19

TTP 3: 193–95; 245. TTP 3: 7; 12; 247.

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nonphilosophers. It is quite intentionally ironic, then, that much of the work accomplished by way of the oblique introduction of philosophy in the treatise actually can give the appearance of philosophy being a kind of “handmaid” (ancilla)20 to theology or religion. To make the “liberty of philosophizing” palatable to the nonphilosophers, Spinoza must try to introduce philosophy as being a help rather than a hindrance to human interests. Moreover, he credibly must submit that all human beings are able to philosophize; and that they incidentally are doing so when they think for themselves and say what they think.21 Teaching philosophy indirectly in the treatise allows Spinoza to manage his task of promoting the “liberty of philosophizing” by correcting the errors and mistakes of theology and politics without simultaneously directly exposing philosophy itself to jeopardy. Part of the indirectness of Spinoza’s philosophic teaching in the treatise can be illustrated by his attempt to imitate the formation of a theocratic regime along Biblical lines. That is, Spinoza’s ambition in the treatise is to institute a novel theocratic regime that procedurally mimics the theocratic regime instituted by Moses in the Hebrew Scriptures. Like Moses, Spinoza holds that the way to human security, health, and prosperity rests upon a particular understanding of revealed religion that promotes justice, charity, and human wellbeing,22 but which also happens to be “salutary and necessary” for the peace and harmony of a republic.23 In terms of the Moses model of a theocracy, the instruction for the attainment of security and health was written on tablets of stone; in the terms of the Spinoza model of a theocracy the way to human wellbeing is written in the hearts of faithful human beings.24 In effect, Spinoza intends to replace the theocratic model of the regime of the Hebrew people that is based upon the teachings of

20 TTP 3: 180. The Latin title of chapter 15 is “Nec Theologiam Rationi, nec Rationem Theologiae ancillari, ostenditur, & ratio, qua nobis S. Scripturae authoritatem persuademus.” The ironic sense of “handmaid” can be exhibited in the fact that notwithstanding Spinoza’s assertions about the separation of theology from philosophy there is every indication that theology increasingly is subordinated to reason or philosophy in the treatise. For example, Spinoza lists three criteria by which a prophecy or revelation may be certified as valid but in the final analysis the validity of a prophecy or revelation will rest on the reasonability of the doctrine or message that it imparts (compare TTP 3: 31 and 185–87). 21 TTP 3: 11–12; 239. 22 TTP 3: 11; 164–65; 172; 177–79. 23 TTP 3: 179. 24 TTP 3: 158–59; 175–76 and compare 69–70; 161.

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Moses, the prophets, and the Pentateuch with a theocratic model of a regime that is based upon the teachings of Christ, the apostles, and the Gospels.25 Whereas the Moses model of a theocracy bore all the hallmarks of monarchy, tribal heritage, and hierarchical authority; the Spinoza model of a theocracy bears all the hallmarks of democracy, individualism, and liberal egalitarianism. Moreover, Spinoza’s version of theology and his purported recovery of a more original and basic meaning of theology or religion prepares a justification for his model for a theocratic regime in the following way. According to Spinoza, prior to the monarchic theocracy of Moses, there was an initial moment when the entire Hebrew people made a compact with God and each of them individually “retained the right of the regime absolutely since the Hebrews transferred their right to no one else but all surrendered their right equally as in a Democracy.”26 However almost immediately after that initial democratic moment at the founding of the Hebrew regime, as Spinoza interprets the passages from Exodus and Deuteronomy concerning the event, the Hebrew people were overwhelmed by their fear of God and their fear of their own situation with respect to the presence and power of God.27 The Hebrew people then immediately demanded that Moses become the unique intermediary between them and God. Or, the fear of the Hebrew people led them to opine that their “security and health” best would be served if Moses alone were to communicate with God on their behalf. By that contract with Moses, says Spinoza, the Hebrew people resigned their rights to consult with God individually and to interpret the decrees of God privately. Thus the Mosaic theocracy was instituted.28 The theological teaching of the treatise purports to convey a recovered and uncorrupted theology or religion. That more basic form of theology or religion, which is reflected in the earliest stage of the

25 On the crucial differences between Christ and Moses, see TTP 3: 20–21 and 64–65. 26 TTP 3: 206. 27 Exodus 19:8; 18–21 and Deuteronomy 5:22–32; 18: 15–16. Spinoza’s account of the passages emphasizes the fear that was experienced by the Hebrews. But another passage at Deut. 19:16–25 also makes plain that God had forbidden the people to approach the mountain and God set a “boundary” which if crossed would result in the death of anyone who violated the boundary. The prohibition applied to human beings as well as to animals. Fear of death is what prevented the Hebrew people from approaching God. Moses did not suffer from the same fear that possessed the Hebrews and he was exempted from observing the boundary that had been established by God. 28 TTP 3: 205–207.

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relationship between God and the Hebrew people, as found in the books of Exodus and Deuteronomy, happens to be a condition that incorporates the same entitlements for the faithful that are advocated by Spinoza under the terms of the teaching of theology presented by him in the treatise. By contrast to the prevailing tradition of theology or religion, which is monarchic and hierarchical in structure, Spinoza’s version of the teaching of theology or religion is democratic in structure. The prevailing tradition of theology or religion emphasizes clerical authority, submissiveness, and conformity with approved traditions of doctrine.29 But in Spinoza’s theological teaching each member of the faithful once again is accorded the right to be a “consulter” and “interpreter” of the word of God, the Divine Law, or the meaning of faith and piety, just as the Hebrew people initially exercised those rights, albeit if only for an instant.30 From the philosophic perspective, the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and the prevailing tradition of politics solve the human problem of selfishness and sociability by recourse to ignorant opinions about the world, base superstitions, inane prejudices, and autocratic schemes of life and worship. But the philosophically inspired teaching of theology in the treatise together with the political instruction of the treatise offer a solution to the problem human nature and the problem of human sociability by recourse to an account of nature which is novel. The account of nature offered by Spinoza in the treatise emphasizes the democratic features of nature and it recasts theology or religion and politics under the influence of that account. Spinoza’s version of theology and his political instruction in the treatise thus make it feasible for philosophers and nonphilosophers to enjoy “security and health” together peaceably. Although most human beings are not inclined to philosophy, it is not a foregone conclusion of human nature that they therefore must be opposed to it. Ordinary human beings could be drawn to become unconcerned about philosophy or they could be induced to become impartial to it if philosophy were perceived to pose no threat either to the nonphilosophers or to their accustomed opinions, sentiments, or beliefs. Spinoza’s democratized theology and his democratic politics go

TTP 3: 8; 10; 97; 116–19; 137–38; 149–50; 159. TTP 3: 205–207 and compare 178–79; 187–88; also see chapters 7 and 13. Spinoza asserts that the liberty to think, even about religion, is always in one’s possession. He likens the liberty to a private and unassailable right (TTP 3: 117) or what might be characterized as a ‘natural right’. 29 30

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some way toward representing philosophy in that light. Still, the view that philosophy inherently threatens “piety or the public peace” is an opinion formidably endorsed by the prevailing traditions of theology and politics. As a result, animosity toward philosophy from either theology or politics typically occurs and Spinoza’s version of the teaching of theology in the treatise is designed to counteract that outcome. The account of theology or religion given in the treatise represents the prevailing received theological view about philosophy as a prejudice; and Spinoza’s version of the teaching of theology in the treatise reflects a doctrine of benign indifference on the part of theology or religion toward philosophy. The recovered original and basic meaning of theology or religion can tolerate the existence and practice of philosophy for the reasons that theology and philosophy have “no commerce nor affinity” with each other; each has its own province and its own foundation; neither serves as the handmaid to the other; and faith itself is shown to concede the “highest liberty to philosophizing.”31 Nevertheless, Spinoza must persuade his readers that philosophy can be tolerated and he must argue his case before an audience which naturally may be unsympathetic to his claim but which demonstrably has been made unsympathetic to his claim historically. Given the aims of his book, Spinoza was required to introduce his readers to philosophy; or, at least, he was required to present his readers with a number of propositions that were of a philosophical character or which were deducible from philosophy. But taking the prevailing state of theology and politics into account, it was necessary for Spinoza to communicate the teaching of philosophy in the treatise only in an indirect way. To make it possible for there to be a “liberty of philosophizing” philosophy has to confront the obstacles to philosophizing. Philosophy has to expose and then rebut those elements of the prevailing traditions of theology or religion and politics that prove most prohibitive of the liberty to philosophize. But philosophy also has to undertake its task without alienating itself further from its adversaries. Philosophy thus has to disclose enough of itself to combat its theological and political opponents while simultaneously indicating that philosophy in itself is not a lethal danger to those who oppose it nor does philosophy corrupt those who are the followers of those who are opposed to philosophy. In other words, if it is necessary to introduce

31

TTP 3: 179–80.

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the readers of the treatise to philosophy, in order to achieve the stated purposes of the book, yet human beings by nature are not attracted to philosophy then it would be prudent to insinuate philosophy into the treatise in such a way that the “liberty of philosophizing” can be promoted while also shielding philosophy from an unreceptive and unsympathetic audience.32 The unreceptive readers in that audience include all those whom Spinoza criticizes in his book. His unreceptive audience thus comprises a sizeable portion of humankind, namely, the theologians, the preachers, their followers, passionate human beings, the civic authorities, upstanding citizens, and almost all of those who can be classified as nonphilosophers. Accordingly, Spinoza has to convey the teaching of philosophy in the treatise warily and somewhat piecemeal so as to safeguard himself and anyone else who might be sympathetic to philosophy from being harassed by those who despised reason, those who were convinced that philosophy was a source of impiety, those who believed that philosophy must be subservient to theology, those who perceived philosophy as a hazard to religion or to civic life, or those who were anxious to classify philosophers as atheists, dissenters, or turncoats. In other words, Spinoza had to introduce philosophy to his readers indirectly because there are many in his audience who already were quite convinced that philosophers or those who are attracted to philosophy are the kind of persons who undoubtedly are menaces to theology or religion, that is, they are persons who threaten “piety,” and they are the kind of persons who are a danger to the political regime, that is, they threaten “the public peace.” While advocating the “liberty of philosophizing,” Spinoza tries to protect philosophy and the potential philosophers from those who have concluded that philosophy ought to be viewed with suspicion, disdain, or horror. Such a course of action would be sensible. But serious consideration, however, also must be given to the possibility that Spinoza decided to communicate the teaching

32 The almost immediate condemnations and refutations of the TTP by theologians, preachers, and other philosophers, as well as the banning of the publication, distribution, and sale of the book, all would appear to confirm the view that if Spinoza were trying to protect philosophy from its adversaries then it must be conceded that he failed quite miserably. But two points may be offered to counter that conclusion. First, almost every plea for reform or every demand for change initially is met with recriminations, denunciations, or counterclaims. The reaction does not invalidate the worth of the plea. Second, Spinoza’s teaching in the TTP generally was esteemed scandalous but that fact does not mean that his teaching was understood in its entirety or that it was understood correctly or even especially well.

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of philosophy in his book only indirectly for the sake of the “security and health” of his audience. Bearing in mind that the third proper object of desire is basic and universal, the philosopher recognizes that human beings cling, and often they cling tenaciously, to whatever they believe will provide them the greatest likelihood of satisfying their desire for security, health, prosperity, and preservation. Most human beings presume that the prevailing traditions of theology or religion and politics have proved to be, and they will continue to prove to be, the most apt means to providing them with security, health, preservation, and some degree of prosperity in their lives. Therefore human beings will not abandon their theology or their politics dispassionately; and theology or politics will attempt to intimidate them with the loss of “security and health” if they forsake theology or politics.33 Philosophy therefore concludes that it is unwise to vitiate the opinions, convictions, sentiments, or hopes of ordinary human beings without providing a satisfactory alterative to them. Even while philosophy performs a useful service by exposing the aspects of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion that had come to corrupt and obscure the more benign elements of the “ancient Religion,” it still would have been imperative for Spinoza to avoid being seen to subvert certain pieties or civic principles too openly, though philosophy itself actually might contest the merit, validity, or rectitude of many of those pieties or principles.34 The philosopher thus expresses himself guardedly in the presence of the nonphilosophers, especially those theologians, preachers, orthodox believers, and ordinary human beings or civic authorities, who are disinclined to suffer what philosophy professes. Some of the disaffection toward philosophy exercised by the nonphilosophers results from the ignorance, bias, intolerance, or antipathy that is endemic to human nature in cases where someone encounters something novel, unconventional, or different from what he generally expects to experience. But the superstitions and prejudices defended by the prevailing tradition of theology or religion, together with any political use or manipulation of those superstitions or prejudices, serve only to compound whatever natural disaffection for philosophy any individual already may possess.35 TTP 3: 8–9; 242–43. TTP 3: 74; 183; 243–45. 35 One might recall the second motive for writing the TTP that Spinoza communicated to Oldenburg in 1665. According to Spinoza, it is necessary to avert “the accusation of atheism” as far as it is possible to do so. 33 34

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Though the prevailing traditions of theology or religion and politics may be wrong in numerous ways, the philosopher acknowledges a responsibility not to eviscerate those traditions callously. He is mindful of the authority, function, and influence exerted by the received traditions of theology or religion and politics on public life. Notwithstanding their errors, therefore, the received teachings of theology or religion and politics ought not to be dismissed heedlessly. However intellectually suspect theology or religion may be from the perspective of philosophy or however much theology or religion may rely on absurd premises and tenets, Spinoza himself concedes that there is a fundamental worth and utility of theology or religion. The simple fact is that theology or religion is especially useful for inspiring, encouraging, or compelling human beings to a certain kind of salutary conduct of their lives that very well can promote the general security and health of all human beings.36 Indeed Spinoza maintains that without the teaching and the testimony of Scripture, which is the foundation of theology or religion, “we would doubt the salvation of almost everyone.”37 Still, theology or religion is not philosophy. Theology or religion is a teaching that involves or invokes suprarational knowledge and supranatural events.38 Theology or religion makes its appeals to the base or ignorant dispositions of passionate human beings; and its emphasis upon elements of the imaginative-affective life provokes animosity in the nonphilosophers toward philosophy or whatever else seems to be contrary to the customarily embraced notions about theology or religion.39 Given the predicament of his setting, namely, the basic human disinclination toward philosophy combined with the animosity of the received tradition of theology or religion toward philosophy and the likely civic complicity in theological or religious pronouncements against philosophy, one could wonder why Spinoza would introduce philosophy indirectly or directly in the treatise at all. Would it not have been better to leave philosophy for the philosophers? Should he not have left the teaching of philosophy for another book on another occasion for a different audience? To answer that question in the affirmative would demand that one neglect an important discrimination enunciated by Spinoza at the close of his Preface to the treatise. One would do a disservice 36 37 38 39

TTP 3: 179; 188. TTP 3: 188. The Latin word translated into English as “salvation” is salus. TTP 3: 5–6; 15–16; 81–86; 91; 153; 155–56; 165; 168; 174–78; 184–85. Spinoza asserts that “theological hatred” is the “worst kind of hatred” (TTP 3: 212).

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to the treatise, a disservice to its author, and a disservice to himself if he were to fail to remember the intended addressee of Spinoza’s old book. It must be recalled that the teaching of the treatise is specifically intended for the “one who reads Philosophically” and Spinoza then adds that “the vulgar, therefore, and all who are vexed by like affects with the vulgar I do not invite to read this [ book].”40 Spinoza’s treatise is a book written for readers who might be or could be disposed to philosophy. But it also is a book written for philosophical readers that can be read and will be read by many people who are not disposed to philosophy, who may reject philosophy out of hand, or who already may be convinced that philosophy indeed is detrimental to piety and public peace. While Spinoza communicates with the “one who reads philosophically” in the treatise, he nonetheless also is aware that the nonphilosophers are reading his book as well.41 He knows that TTP 3: 12. “One who reads Philosophically” is a literal way to render the Latin words Philosophe lector. In the passage cited, Spinoza invites a certain kind of reader to examine the treatise; he says that the main points of the TTP “I believe are evident enough to Philosophers”; and he asks “the vulgar” and those who suffer from vulgar passions not to read his book. Spinoza himself therefore acknowledges that the treatise is speaking simultaneously to a variety of audiences with different suppositions, convictions, and intellectual interests or disinterests and abilities. It would be unsound to think that the TTP can be read, and read well, without regard to the distinctions announced by Spinoza himself. 41 A different formulation of the proposition was stated by Leo Strauss in “How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise,” Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952): “In the Treatise Spinoza addresses potential philosophers of a certain kind while the vulgar are listening” (p. 184). The essay first appeared in Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 17 (1948): 69–131. In another essay, “Persecution and the Art of Writing,” Strauss enunciates a broader principle for the kind of writing and reading that is required for certain kinds of old books: “how can a man perform the miracle of speaking in a publication to a minority, while being silent to the majority of his readers? The fact that makes this literature possible can be expressed in the axiom that thoughtless men are careless readers and only thoughtful men are careful readers” (Persecution and the Art of Writing, p. 25). In Epistle 30 to Henry Oldenburg, Spinoza asserted that in the TTP he was attempting to assist “the more prudent sort” of person. Perhaps that “more prudent sort” of person would be the thoughtful and careful reader, the “one who reads philosophically,” or a potential philosopher who could apprehend what Spinoza was conveying in the TTP while the vulgar were induced to focus on other matters in the treatise that were of much less interest to philosophers, e.g., they could lose themselves in speculative disputes about theological issues (TTP 3: 180–88). Even Strauss acknowledged that at one time he himself had failed to attend sufficiently to the difference between the statements in the TTP that were intended for the philosophic readers and the statements that were intended for the nonphilosophers. In the Preface that he added to the English language publication of Die Religionskritik Spinozas als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft Untersuchung zu Spinozas Theologisch-Politischem Traktat (Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1930) [Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, trans. E.M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken Books, 1965)], Strauss 40

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they are disinclined to accept what philosophy teaches yet he knows that the nonphilosophical things which they have been taught and which they believe are not entirely useless. The nonphilosophical doctrines can impact the lives of the nonphilosophers in broadly positive ways. Perhaps then Spinoza decided to present the philosophic teaching of the treatise at one remove from the more conspicuous theological and political teachings of his book as much for the sake of protecting the nonphilosophers from certain of the doctrines that philosophy does teach as it may have been for the sake of shielding philosophy from the hostility of theology or politics.42 Spinoza’s old book raises a philosophic problem. The philosophic problem concerns human nature and the prospects for human sociability. The treatise provides a theologico-political solution to that philosophic problem while philosophy itself largely is understated and operates from the recesses of the book. If the declared intentions of Spinoza’s book are “to separate philosophy from theology” and to secure “the liberty of philosophizing”43 then it would seem that philosophy and the teaching of philosophy should have been displayed more prominently in the treatise and they should have been allotted more attention. But the teaching of philosophy is not perspicuous in the treatise; and that fact has occasioned different interpretations and explanations of Spinoza’s old book among various scholars. There are many scholars who argue that the purpose of the treatise is to address a contemporary set of questions or problems that affected The Netherlands at the close of the 1660s. Defenders of the republican movement were pitted against the monarchists and their supporters. The Calvinists also were contending with a variety of dissenting religious sects. Spinoza’s book takes sides in both of those conflicts. Thus a significant portion of Spinoza scholars maintain that the treatise is mainly a timely critique and treatment of the difficulties of its age.

made the following confession: “I became ever more attentive to the manner in which the heterodox thinkers of earlier ages wrote their books. As a consequence of this, I now read the Theologico-political Treatise differently than I read it when I was young. I understood Spinoza too literally because I did not read him literally enough” (p. 31). 42 Though the motive of protecting nonphilosophers from philosophy and the motive of shielding philosophy from the nonphilosophers both could have influenced Spinoza’s decision to write the TTP the way he did, the former is the more controversial and the more neglected of the two motives. I have discussed my view on the matter in “On the Practice of Esotericism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 53 (1992): 231–47. 43 TTP 3: 7; 10; 179–80; 188; 247.

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Therefore propounding the teaching of philosophy in such a book would be neither Spinoza’s chief interest nor his principal concern. It even could have proven to be counterproductive or a distraction for him to have done so. On that view, then, the treatise is a problemsolving exercise. It was an attempt to offer a philosophic analysis of the contemporary Dutch situation while simultaneously furnishing a set of recommendations for resolving the crises that had occasioned the immediate difficulties in The Netherlands. The recommendations included a recovery of a putatively more original, basic, and benign sense of the significance of theology, which would occasion a reorientation of attitudes about matters pertaining to worship, dogma, Scriptural interpretation, as well as judgment and speech about theological or religious issues, etc., together with the endorsement of a polity that espoused principles of democratic liberalism. Consequently, whatever philosophical position may have determined Spinoza’s recommendations in the treatise, Spinoza scholars have come to conclude that the definitive statement of Spinoza’s philosophy is fully developed and presented only in his magnum opus, the Ethica ordine Geometrico demonstrata.44 One even might go farther. One could extend the thesis adopted by such scholars and contend that there really was no ‘teaching of philosophy’ to be presented in the treatise because the doctrine propounded in the Ethica had not been completed yet. If some basic facets of the later systematic philosophic teaching can be discerned in the treatise, their appearance in the earlier book can be explained by the fact that composition of some parts of the Ethica already had begun in the early 1660s. Therefore whatever ‘philosophy’ is detectable in the Tractatus theologico-politicus is either an early and rudimentary form of Spinoza’s final completed philosophic teaching; or it is only a partial and much less thorough version of Spinoza’s complete philosophic teaching.45

44 In B.d.S. Opera Posthuma (Amstelodami, 1677). Part 4 of the Ethica contains propositions that would align best with the view claiming that the TTP at most only foreshadows the eventual systematic formulation of Spinoza’s teaching in the Ethica; see, e.g., Propositions 36–37 which concern political life. 45 Among those who have expressed the kind of perspective sketched here, one would include Abbé Antoine Sabatier de Castres, Apologie de Spinoza (Paris, 1766); A.E. Renthe, Probatio quod B. de Spinoza graviter errans non fuerit atheus (Coethen, 1766); A.W. Rehberg, Treatise on the Nature of Forces [trans. Anonymous] (Berlin, 1779); James Martineau, A Study of Spinoza (London: Macmillan and Company, 1882); Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: Duckworth and Co., 1899); Henry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1934); Alexandre Matheron, Le Christ et le salut des ignorants chez Spinoza (Paris: Aubier,

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In other words, at best and at most, the treatise may contain some hints of the fully articulated philosophy of Spinoza that yet was to come; and, at a glance, there may be much in the treatise and in the history of Spinoza scholarship to support the plausibility of that sort of conclusion which has been reached by many, if not to say most, Spinoza scholars. However, their conclusion can be maintained only at the expense of dismissing Spinoza’s explicit declaration in the Preface to the treatise that his book is addressed to philosophic readers and the nonphilosophers are asked to leave the book alone lest they become “annoying by interpreting it perversely.”46 On the other hand, it can be concluded from the statements made in the treatise itself that the teaching of philosophy occupies a covert position in Spinoza’s book, or the philosophic teaching of the book is communicated only indirectly, because philosophy not only is separate from theology or religion but philosophy also fundamentally is at odds with theology or religion.47 Insofar as theology or religion emphasizes that its source or foundation rests on matters that “surpass human grasp” (captum humanum superat) and insofar as it regularly affirms the occurrence of supranatural events, the teaching of theology and the teaching of philosophy must be at odds with each other. The tension between them owes to their very divergent regards for the status of reason and its ability to provide an account of nature. The source of theology or religion is revelation;48 and, according to the teaching of theology or religion, revelation provides a valid knowledge of the world and a valid teaching about the conduct of human life and the governance of human affairs that is superior to the knowledge of the world and the

1971); E.E. Harris, “Is There an Esoteric Doctrine in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus?” Mededelingen vanwege het Spinozahuis 38 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978); André Tosel, Spinoza, ou le crepuscule de la servitude: essai sur le Traité Théologico-politique (Paris: Aubier, 1984); Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Edwin M. Curley, “Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece, II: The Theologico-Political Treatise as a Prolegomenon to the Ethics,” Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. A.J. Cover and M. Floistad (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990); Herman de Dijn, “Knowledge, Anthropocentrism, and Salvation,” Studia Spinozana 9 (1993); Jacques Moutaux, “Exotérisme et philosophie: Leo Strauss et l’interprétation du Traité théologico-politique,” Spinoza au XX e Siècle, ed. Olivier Bloch (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993); Lee C. Rice, “Faith, Obedience, and Salvation in Spinoza,” Lyceum 6 (1994); and Nancy K. Levene, Spinoza’s Revelation: Religion, Democracy, and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 46 TTP 3: 12. 47 TTP 3: 167–68; 173–74; 180–81. 48 TTP 3: 5–6; 15; 180.

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knowledge of human life that is reached by reason.49 For Spinoza, the words theology and revelation are identical.50 So, if theology or revelation teaches “what surpasses human grasp,” “what exceeds the limits of the human intellect,” or “what happens in contradiction of the laws and operations of nature” then theology and philosophy must conflict with one another; for philosophy and philosophizing are indistinguishable from the exercise of reason51 and, according to Spinoza, “what is contrary to nature is contrary to reason, and what is contrary to reason is absurd.”52 Thus, at the most fundamental level, the orientation of theology or revelation toward the world and toward human life and the orientation of philosophy or reason toward the world and toward human life essentially are different from each other. If that constitutive difference between them cannot be surmounted, but philosophy still acknowledges the utility of theology to human conduct, then philosophy is obligated to convey its teaching in a circumspect manner, or at least it is obliged to communicate its teaching in a manner that pays heed to the authority, function, and influence wielded by theology or religion in everyday life. In an important respect, the problem encountered by Spinoza in the treatise is similar to the one encountered by Socrates in The Apology. How does one defend philosophy before a hostile audience or jury but simultaneously encourage others to philosophize?53 Or, from an even more troubling perspective, how does one defend the defendant, namely, philosophy, without simultaneously exposing it to further prosecution? Scholars who recognize the problem being addressed by Spinoza in the treatise also recognize that there may be a 49 TTP 3: 15–16; 20–21; 28; 88; 95; 98–99; 114; 155–56; 162–63; 168; 170; 184–85; 188; 198–200. 50 TTP 3: 184. 51 One source for the identification of “philosophy” with “reason” in the treatise is located in the opening sentence of chapter 15 of the TTP. The title of the chapter sets the words “Theology” and “Reason” as alternatives. The first sentence of the chapter then substitutes the word “Philosophy” for “Reason” (TTP 3: 180) which confirms that Spinoza recognizes the words as interchangeable. With respect to the suprarational character of revelation, theology, or faith, see TTP 3: 15–16; 20–21; 28; 88; 95; 98–99; 114; 155–56; 162–63; 168; 170; 184–85; 188; 198–200. In the Preface to the TTP, Spinoza says that he found “nothing in the things that Scripture expressly teaches which did not agree with the intellect or which conflicted with it” (TTP 3: 10; and compare 3: 68) but the seriousness of that statement must be reevaluated based upon Spinoza’s own account of what philosophy and reason are and what they teach. 52 TTP 3: 91. 53 Socrates expressly warns his audience, the jury, about their need to discriminate between “speeches that are calculated to persuade” but which are false and speeches that are calculated to persuade which are true (Apology 17a–d).

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serious and longstanding opposition between theology or religion and philosophy that cannot easily be overcome. Indeed, the longstanding opposition requires the use of certain literary devices that will enable the philosopher to defend philosophy from its prosecutors and persecutors while also allowing the philosopher to convey his thinking to the “one who reads philosophically.”54 54 During the twentieth century, Leo Strauss became the chief proponent of this view in his essay, “How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise,” Persecution and the Art of Writing, pp. 142–201. Strauss proposed that in the TTP Spinoza communicated the teaching of philosophy ‘between the lines’ (pp. 177–80). Strauss’ conclusion, and his argument for it, continues to cause debate among Spinoza scholars and others who contest Strauss’ reading of certain old books. However, Strauss was not the first to conclude that Spinoza had introduced philosophy and its unconventional teachings surreptitiously into the TTP. One also may consult Elmer E. Powell’s Spinoza and Religion (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, 1906). But Powell’s account, like Strauss’ account, reflected a tradition of Spinoza interpretation that dates from the time of the publication of the TTP. One early attack on the TTP sought to demonstrate that Spinoza cleverly had attempted to conceal the genuine purpose of his book. According to Musaeus, a Professor of Theology at Jena, the author of the TTP “had left no mental faculty, no cunning, no art untried in order to conceal his [atheistic intention] beneath a brilliant veil,” see Tractatus theologico-politicus ad veritatis lumen examinatus ( Jena, 1674) pp. 1–2. Johannes Bredenburg sought to expose the positions that Spinoza attempted “to conceal” in the TTP in Joannis Bredenburgii enervatio tractatus theologico politici, una cum demonstratione, geometrico ordine disposita Naturam non esse Deum, cujus effati contrario praedictus tractatus unice innitur (Kiel, 1675). Christian Kortholt decried Spinoza’s use “shifts and equivocations” in the TTP and he noted their harmful consequences for theology in De tribus impostoribus magnis liber (Kiloni literis & sumptibus Joachimi Reumanni, 1680) pp. 72–75, 96–99, 144–48. In Deism Examin’d and Confuted in Answer to a Book intitled Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (London: Charles Brown, 1697), Mathias Earbury maintained that most readers easily could recognize the heterodox character of the doctrine conveyed in the TTP. But Earbury also went further. He argued that the author of the TTP was guilty of “deliberate ambiguity of expression” (p. 14) and “affected obscurity” (p. 119) in his writing. Still, by focusing on the implications of the discrepant statements that he discovered in the TTP (pp. 99–102, 119, 138, 178, et al.); Earbury concluded that Spinoza concealed his own atheism by “pretending to be a Deist” (p. 180). In “Arguments to Prove the Being of God with Objections against it Answered,” A Defense of Natural and Revealed Religion: Being a Collection of Sermons Preached at the Lecture founded by Sir Robert Boyle, Esq. 1691–1732, 3 vols. (London, 1739), John Hancock impugned Spinoza for using “insinuation” to “undermine the Foundation not only of Revealed, but natural Religion, and the Belief in the Being of God” (2: 253). J. Roberts maintained that Spinoza had “dissembled his Principles . . . He plainly suspected his own constancy and therefore we injure not his Memory if we suspect it too” in The Christian Free-Thinker: Or an Epistolary Discourse on Freedom of Thought (London, 1740) pp. 58–60. Similar recent cases about Spinoza and his manner of literary communication have been made by A.J. Watt, “Spinoza and the Use of Religious Language,” The New Scholasticism 66 (Summer 1972) pp. 286, 293–94, 307; and Efraim Shmueli, “The Geometrical Method, Personal Caution, and the Ideal of Tolerance,” Spinoza: New Perspectives, eds. R.W. Shahan and J.I. Biro (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978) p. 210. I have written on the subject in “Harris, Strauss, and Esotericism in Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus,” Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (1996): 387–413; “Spinoza, the Status

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Because of the opposition between theology and philosophy, a philosopher can endeavor to manage the situation in one or another of a variety of ways. Philosophy can ignore its opponent; it merely can decide that theology or religion is an unavoidable nuisance and obstacle that probably will continue to persist. But ignoring the opponent will be insufficient for the purpose of lessening the opposition between theology or religion and philosophy since the philosopher’s decision would have no effect on theology or religion. That is, if philosophy ignores theology or religion there is no guarantee that theology or religion will ignore philosophy in return. Another option is for philosophy simply to destroy theology or religion and eliminate the opponent. Philosophy thereby might secure itself to some degree; philosophy will have removed a principal cause of the aversion to philosophy that is felt by many human beings and which feeling was prompted by theology or religion. But the attempt to eliminate theology or religion would only bring philosophy into more disrepute than it already suffers. Furthermore, the elimination of the prevailing prejudiced and superstition-ridden theology or religion would do nothing to preclude the emergence of another equally prejudiced and superstition-ridden theology or religion to succeed the one that just has been eliminated. Even a more liberal or putatively ‘enlightened’ theology or religion might yet come to be permeated by vulgar and obtuse views for the reason that “all human beings by nature are prone to superstition.”55 In other words, theology or religion just may be a fact of life and human nature that can be neither ignored nor eliminated by philosophy. Still, another option may be feasible for philosophy. The philosopher can attempt to tame his opponent. The taming of theology or religion involves neutralizing the opponent’s capacity to harm philosophy or to hinder the liberty of philosophizing.56 The taming of theology or religion

of Prophecy, and Exoteric Teaching in the Tractatus theologico-politicus,” Da Natureza ao Sagrado: Homenage a Francisco Vieira Jordao, ed. Mário de Carvalho (Porto: Fundaçao Eng. Antonio de Almeida, 1999); and “Spinoza, Philosophic Communication, and the Practice of Esotericism,” Piety, Peace, and the Freedom to Philosophize, ed., Paul J. Bagley (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999). 55 TTP 3: 6. 56 One example of the kind of taming of theology or religion that occurs in the TTP is illustrated by Spinoza’s claim at the close of chapter 4 of the treatise that “Scripture commends the natural divine light” (TTP 3: 68). The argument proposes that revelation itself actually approves of reason’s competence to apprehend the divine law on its own. On the face of it, Spinoza’s claim suggests a kind of intersection or integration of revelation and reason. But (a) if revelation relates suprarational

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involves a modification of certain basic elements of the prevailing tradition together with a renovated assessment of which elements of that tradition actually constitute the indispensable principles or tenets of theology, religion, or faith.57 Furthermore, if philosophy succeeds in its task and it manages to tame theology or religion, the natural human inclination toward things theological or religious also continues to be appeased. The disposition of nonphilosophic human beings to look above or to look beyond nature for the satisfaction of their needs and desires still is accommodated; and the positive effects of theology or religion on human behavior still can be maintained. Consequently, the taming of theology or religion is more possible, more desirable, and more prudential than either of the alternatives of ignoring it or eliminating it. However, the philosophic work of taming theology or religion requires considerable subtlety. Philosophy has to put forward a teaching of theology or religion that remains credible and which allows theology or religion to continue to exert influence over the lives of the faithful. However, the teaching of theology or religion that is presented by philosophy also must prevent theology or religion from exercising any authority over philosophy. To achieve the task of taming theology or religion, philosophy must navigate a complicated path. It has to establish the legitimacy of separating philosophy from theology or religion. But philosophy must achieve the objective of neutralizing theology or religion without subverting it entirely. Thus Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise involves a literary practice whereby he theologizes overtly while he simultaneously philosophizes covertly. Deciding neither to ignore nor to eliminate its opponent, philosophy seeks to correct the prevailing tradition of theology or religion through knowledge then surely it does not intersect with what is attainable through the use of ordinary or natural knowledge alone, namely, what can be attained by reason; on the contrary, revelation communicates “sure knowledge of some matter” that supersedes reason. Moreover (b) it is hard to take seriously the claim that revelation approves what reason concludes about the divine law. If that were the case then revelation would be superfluous; reason would be sufficient. Spinoza tames theology or religion by making an appeal to a particular reading of Scripture. On the basis of that reading, he can curtail the authority of theology or religion to contest the competence of philosophy or reason in grasping or interpreting the meaning of the divine law. Theology or religion is preserved and a certain respect for it is conceded. But the power and authority associated with theology or revelation also has been mitigated. 57 Both Plato and Spinoza demand that the ‘poetry’ about god(s) be submitted to a certain hygienic supervision so as to assure that the right tales about god(s) are told. The tales remain basically familiar but they omit whatever may tend to provoke controversy or discord; compare TTP 3: 177–80 and Republic 377b–394b.

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an exposure of its missteps, its errors, and its corruptions. The ostensible purpose of exposing the tradition’s mistakes is to occasion a return to a more original and basic understanding of the sense of theology or religion that retrieves and accentuates what are said to be the most indispensable principles or tenets of faith. But if the teaching of theology or religion and the teaching of philosophy in fact collide with each other then Spinoza cannot propose with seriousness that philosophic readers of the treatise approve his version of the teaching of theology or his version of the recovered “ancient Religion.” Philosophy must propound a version of theology or religion for the nonphilosophers that will incorporate the utility of the tamed theology or religion and still permit it to fulfill its unique function in respect of the “salvation of almost everyone.” As Spinoza himself states it, except that we have Scripture or theology or revelation or religion or faith we would doubt the salvation or wellbeing of nearly all human beings.58 The tamed theology of the treatise is stripped of the most harmful elements of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion, namely, useless superstitions and ignorant prejudices. But the remaining elements of the tradition that the teaching of theology in the treatise retains continue to be attractive to the passionate, nonphilosophic inclinations and aspirations of ordinary human beings. Theology or religion remains based on the Scriptures and from the outset they have been devised to lay hold of the imaginations of those who read or hear them so as to appeal to their passions, sentiments, prejudices, opinions, and experiences.59 But the “one who reads philosophically,” that is, the one to whom the treatise is addressed, will be drawn in a different direction. The “one who reads philosophically” will be pointed toward the covert philosophizing or the indirect teaching of philosophy that is contained within the treatise. Lambert van Velthuysen was a contemporary of Benedict Spinoza. He was educated at the University of Utrecht where he studied philosophy, theology, and medicine. Upon the completion his studies, he remained in Utrecht and established himself as a physician. He also continued to involve himself in scholarly pursuits and he embroiled himself in debates about a few public controversies. During his time at the university, van Velthuysen had become a disciple of the philosophic

58 59

TTP 3: 179 and 189. TTP 3: 28–35; 43–44; 90–91; 153–54; 157–61; 167; 173–74; 180–83.

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teaching of René Descartes and a supporter of the Collegiants. His views therefore were regarded as liberal and unconventional. In 1655, van Velthuysen published a tract in defense of the Copernican system in which he maintained that the thesis concerning the motion of the earth and the immobility of the sun did not entail a contradiction of the Scriptures.60 The small book provoked a large dispute over the relationship between science and Scripture that was seen to have implications for theology, politics, and philosophy, broadly conceived.61 Van Velthuysen remained at odds with the Calvinist theologians and preachers, as well as the Dutch authorities, until his death in 1685. Van Velthuysen was a liberal, reform-minded, controversial, free thinker. But he was not sympathetic to the doctrines contained in the Tractatus theologico-politicus nor was he an ally of its author. Van Velthuysen was opposed to the teaching of the treatise and he took pains to rebut its claims. Though he was a fervent opponent of Spinoza’s teaching, it also seems that he was a careful reader of Spinoza’s book. In a letter to Jacob Oostens, dated 24 January 1671, van Velthuysen composed a lengthy refutation of the treatise.62 He began his epistle to Oostens by remarking that he did not “know the nation or the occupation” of the anonymous author of the treatise but he acknowledged the intelligence of the author of the book. Nevertheless, van Velthuysen argued that the treatise sought to undermine revealed religion and he concluded that the book endorsed atheism. He cited the treatise’s claims about the necessity of God’s nature, the denial of miracles, the intellectual inferiority of the prophets, and the role of the civil authority in respect of public worship, among other propositions, as providing evidence that the treatise actually “undermines and excludes all worship and 60 Rienk Vermij, The Calvinist Astronomers: The Reception of the New Astronomy in the Dutch Republic 1575–1750 (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2002) p. 272; and Benedict Spinoza, The Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1995) pp. 35 note 78 and 225 note 213. 61 The Calvinist Astronomers, pp. 277–88. 62 The letter from van Velthuysen to Oostens was published as Epistle 48 in the Opera posthuma ([Amstelodami] 1677) p. 553ff; in modern editions of the correspondence, the letter appears as Epistle 42. In 1673, when he was at Utrecht to visit the Prince de Condé, Spinoza met with van Velthuysen on a number of occasions, see The Letters, p. 324 note 344. In the Autumn of 1675, Spinoza wrote to van Velthuysen and asked him to provide “the arguments that you believe that you can bring against my treatise.” Spinoza then praised van Velthuysen for his “devotion to the truth” and his “exceptional sincerity of mind” (Epistle 69, The Letters, pp. 323–24); the missive from Spinoza to van Velthuysen in 1675 was not included in the publication of the Opera posthuma.

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religion.” Still, more striking was how van Velthuysen concluded that Spinoza had accomplished the task of subverting theology or religion in the treatise. For van Velthuysen ended his letter to Oostens with the accusation that Spinoza had endeavored to teach atheism in the treatise “by hidden and disguised arguments” [tectis et fucatis argumentis]. The correspondence between van Velthuysen and Oostens was available to readers of Spinoza’s writings as early as 1677; the letter was published among the contents of the Opera posthuma. The fact that van Velthuysen’s missive appeared in the posthumously published collection of Spinoza’s writings is a matter of more than passing interest. One curious aspect of the letter’s inclusion in the volume is the fact that van Velthuysen’s epistle was not written to Spinoza. Van Velthuysen did not know who the author of the treatise was. Instead his critique of the treatise was presented in a letter that he wrote to Jacob Oostens who then passed the epistle to Spinoza, presumably because Oostens thought that van Velthuysen’s refutation of some of the chief points of the treatise was worthy of Spinoza’s attention. The presence of the van Velthuysen epistle in the Opera posthuma at first seems justified only inasmuch as it contains the criticisms of the treatise to which Spinoza was responding in a letter that he wrote to Oostens.63 In fact, Spinoza’s letter to Oostens begins with the acknowledgement that he undertakes the correspondence out of obligation. That is, Spinoza says to Oostens that there is “no reason to answer [van Velthuysen’s] letter other than to keep my promise [to you].” Still, the editors of the Opera posthuma, who were intimate friends of Spinoza, chose to include the van Velthuysen letter in the publication of that volume; and the letters that were printed in the Opera posthuma were deemed by the editors to be worthy of inclusion in the posthumous volume for the reason that they “contributed not a little to the elucidation of his other works.” Contained within the Opera posthuma were the works entitled Ethica ordine Geometrico demonstrata, Politica, De emendatione intellectus, Epistolæ & ad eas Responsiones, and Compendium grammatices linguæ Hebrææ. In the most obvious sense, the letters and responses contained within the Opera posthuma well might serve to elucidate the other works found in the posthumously published volume. But since multiple references

63 The letter appears as Epistle 49 in the Opera posthuma and as Epistle 43 in modern editions of Spinoza’s correspondence.

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are made to the Tractatus theologico-politicus in the Preface to the Opera posthuma, and van Velthuysen’s letter does refer to the treatise by name,64 one also justifiably may conclude that the treatise should be counted among those “other works” which can be elucidated by the “letters and the responses to them.” What van Velthuysen’s letter may be said to “contribute by way of elucidation” to Spinoza’s “other work” would be his contention that the author of the treatise communicated what he seriously held to be true in that book by way of “disguised and hidden arguments.” No other epistle in the extant correspondence of Spinoza makes any similar allegation about the philosopher’s manner of writing; and although van Velthuysen renounced both the disguised and the undisguised teachings of the treatise, he also seems to have recognized that Spinoza’s theologizing in the treatise was overt whereas his philosophizing in the treatise was covert. The most transparent function of philosophy in the treatise would appear to be the service it performs in respect of correcting defects in the prevailing tradition of theology or religion. Philosophy typically appears in the treatise in the role of questioner and critic of theology or religion, the foundations of theology or religion, the doctrines of theology or religion, or the oppressive character of theology or religion. In the main, therefore, philosophy appears to fulfill only a negative function in the treatise. It criticizes; it contests; it censures; it counters. Its positive function seems to be limited to the fact that it is able to expose the defects of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and then it suggests ways to repair them. Thus philosophy in the treatise typically is seen as the source that corrects the errors or the inventions that have corrupted theology or religion. So, in its most conspicuous form, philosophy is experienced in the treatise as a method65 that may be applied to emend the mistakes of theology or religion. Philosophy is not represented as being hostile or antagonistic to theology or religion per se. Philosophy is not represented as ignoring or eliminating theology or religion. Instead, philosophy or reason in the treatise ostensibly is presented as a useful tool. At its best, philosophy

64 The title of the treatise is cited incorrectly in van Velthuysen’s letter as Discursus theologico-politicus. But Spinoza does not dissociate himself from the book being discussed by van Velthuysen, nor does he disclaim his authorship of it, in the letter he writes to Jacob Oostens. Of course, by 1673, Spinoza generally had been acknowledged to be the author of the TTP. 65 The Latin word methodus means “way of teaching” or a “way of proceeding.”

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is a method that allows one to appreciate theology, Scripture, faith, or religion more accurately.66 At its worst, philosophy is a tool for pruning the contaminations of theology or religion that have accrued over time, and sometimes the tool cuts too deeply and too sharply for many people’s comfort.67 However, beneath the surface representation of the function of philosophy, there is a categorical teaching of philosophy that is provided by Spinoza in the treatise. At the close of his account of the “foundations of faith” in chapter fourteen of the treatise, Spinoza enunciates his definition of philosophy: “The foundations of Philosophy are common notions and they must be obtained from nature itself alone.”68 Philosophy, for Spinoza, is identical with knowledge of nature; and it would not be misleading to say that Spinoza’s philosophic teaching in the Tractatus theologico-politicus is identical with what he characterizes as the teaching about ‘that which is in accordance with nature’ or what may be termed the teaching of nature. Access to the teaching of nature comes through natural or ordinary knowledge that has shared foundations which are common to all human beings;69 and though Spinoza does not formulate an epistemology in the pages of the treatise, discrete statements in his book guide the reader to understand that philosophy, nature, and the exercise of reason are integrally related. Philosophy and reason fundamentally are connected through their common objective, truth. That is, “the goal of Philosophy is nothing other than truth”70 and “reason is the dominion of truth and wisdom.”71 Moreover, the truth that is attained by philosophy or reason is reached exclusively “on the basis of a universal history of Nature which alone is the foundation of Philosophy”;72 for “what is contrary to nature is contrary to reason, and what is contrary to reason is absurd.”73 In the treatise, philosophy is the exercise of reason that endeavors to provide an account of nature which includes both human nature and

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3: 3: 3: 3: 3:

9–10; 29–30; 36; 43; 88; 97–102; 114; 118; 167; 180; 183; 246–47. 180. 179. 15. 179 and 187. 184. 185. 91.

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nonhuman nature.74 However, Spinoza’s view of philosophy is intrinsically problematical to theology since theology also claims to supply an account of human nature and nonhuman nature that derives from a very different and superior source. That is, Spinoza identifies theology with revelation75 and he asserts that the foundations of theology are “the stories and the language that are obtained from Scripture and revelation alone.”76 Yet theology or revelation communicates what “surpasses human grasp” or what “exceeds the limits of human understanding.”77 Theology or revelation, therefore, imparts what is beyond, above, or divergent from reason. Hence what theology or revelation communicates also may be contrary to reason. But what is contrary to reason, on Spinoza’s view, is absurd and therefore also is refutable.78 Spinoza is clear in his assertion that philosophy and theology are separate from each other. The separation of the two means that neither should interfere with the other.79 An accommodation between philosophy and theology could be reached if each were to constrain itself within its respective province and neither were to attempt to constrain the other. But Spinoza’s statement about what is within the sphere of reason and what “surpasses human grasp” makes any serious or genuine accommodation between philosophy and theology extremely unlikely. For if philosophy concedes that theology does teach what “surpasses human grasp” or what “exceeds the limits of human understanding” then philosophy also must concede without complaint that theology legitimately can teach what is “contrary to reason and hence absurd.” Because the domain of philosophy and reason is truth, it would seem incumbent upon philosophy and reason to expose not only the errors or mistakes that philosophy or reason has discerned in theology or religion

74 In the unfinished De intellectus emendatione, Spinoza defines the “highest good” of human beings as the attainment of “a nature” that entails “the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature . . . To do so it first is necessary to understand as much of Nature as suffices to acquire such a nature” (Opera, ed. Gebhardt, 2: 9); compare Republic 534 and Sophist 234e. 75 TTP 3: 184. 76 TTP 3: 179. In a set of passages in chapter 15 of the TTP, Spinoza establishes that there is equivalence among the terms “theology,” “faith,” “revelation,” “Scripture,” and “piety” by using the words interchangeably in relation to the unique doctrine that “human beings can be saved by obedience alone” (3: 179–85). 77 TTP 3: 15–16; 20–21; 28; 95; 98–99; 114; 155–56; 162–63; 168; 170; 184–85; 188; 198–200. 78 TTP 3: 91. 79 TTP 3: 10–11; 169; 187–88.

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but more especially philosophy or reason should expose any absurdity that was advanced by theology or religion. Such a practice however is not always undertaken in the treatise. That is, with respect to certain matters in the treatise, Spinoza does not openly contest questionable theological principles or tenets. It immediately may not be clear why philosophy or reason would let a theological absurdity stand without contradicting or correcting it directly. Allowing a theological absurdity to persist would seem permissible only if the absurdity somehow were deemed to be expedient or salutary.80 Spinoza himself professes in the treatise that the cardinal teaching of theology is “useful and necessary” both to individual human wellbeing as well as to the wellbeing of a republic.81 But he also acknowledges that faith (and hence theology or revelation) only requires that its doctrines be pious; faith does not require that its doctrines be true.82 The real tension between philosophy and theology in the treatise is reflected in the tension between the teaching of nature or reason in the treatise, on the one hand, and the teaching of what is above or beyond nature or reason in the treatise, on the other hand. Indeed, a recognition of the elements involved in that tension affords the reader, especially “the one who reads philosophically,” an avenue of access to understanding what transpires when Spinoza theologizes overtly but philosophizes covertly. Cognizance of the actual tension between philosophy and theology in the treatise prepares thoughtful readers to detect when Spinoza is introducing his serious philosophic thinking by way of “hidden and disguised arguments.” For the moment, one example will suffice. One form of the principal tension between the teaching of philosophy and the teaching of theology, that is, the tension between the rational and the suprarational teachings in the treatise, is exhibited in Spinoza’s claim about the central teaching of theology, revelation, or faith. Spinoza’s statements about that doctrine and the consequences 80 Spinoza asserts that the “fundamental dogma of Theology cannot be investigated by the natural light” or at least no one has been able to demonstrate the veracity of it rationally or mathematically. Nevertheless, says Spinoza, the teaching of theology can be embraced “with moral certainty” because of the authority of the prophets (TTP 3: 185). In other words, theology’s essential doctrine cannot be proved to be true by the exercise of reason but the doctrine can be adopted because of the moral reputation of those who articulated it. Consequently, even an absurd doctrine can be advocated and embraced if it happens to be “morally” salutary or if it promotes a certain sense of human wellbeing. 81 TTP 3: 179 and 188. 82 TTP 3: 179.

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of his statements about it help to elucidate the deeper meaning of his book. According to Spinoza, the “goal of Faith, as we have shown abundantly, is nothing but obedience and piety.”83 However, Spinoza also says that “we cannot perceive by the natural light that simple obedience is the way to salvation but only revelation teaches that it comes from the singular grace of God, which we cannot attain by reason.”84 Theology or faith, founded on revelation, teaches that obedience is the necessary and sufficient condition for human salvation (salus). Reason or philosophy cannot ascertain the veracity of theology’s essential doctrine. But reason or philosophy knows that whereas all human beings are able to obey there are but very few human beings who acquire the habit of virtue led by reason alone.85 Nevertheless because theology’s teaching of obedience is suprarational it then is a claim that is above or beyond reason; and Spinoza explicitly rejects the legitimacy of all such claims.86 That is, in the treatise Spinoza concludes that those who hold that there is some faculty that is above or beyond reason actually possess only “a fantasy that is far below reason.”87 The pretense to possessing suprarational faculties or suprarational knowledge in fact is irrational.88 In other words, it is not simply the case that readers of the treatise should come to acknowledge that philosophy and theology are not subservient to each other, that each stands on its own foundation, or that there is no commerce nor affinity between them. Some readers of the treatise also ought to recognize that philosophy and theology fundamentally are opposed to each other. Theology posits what philosophy regards as fantastic. Hence it is not only the case that philosophy is separate from theology. Theology and philosophy teach different and opposite things. For while philosophy is defined by its study of the teaching of nature, theology is defined by its pronouncement of claims about what is above, beyond, or contrary to nature and Spinoza regards such pronouncements as fantastic or absurd. On the decisive point concerning the ultimate doctrine of philosophy and the ultimate doctrine of theology, Spinoza insists that “true human happiness and blessedness consist

83 84 85 86 87 88

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180. 188. 185; 188. 135–36. 80. 97–98; 112–13; 182.

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in wisdom and true knowledge.”89 Since only philosophy or reason, rather than theology, is dedicated to knowledge of the truth90 then it must follow that philosophy rather than theology is most competent to afford an account of human nature and an account of human happiness that will be sufficient to realize the three proper objects of desire that constitute human wellbeing, namely: knowledge of things through their primary causes; subduing the passions and acquiring the habit of virtue; and living securely with a healthy body.91 Not only is theology separate and different from philosophy but it also must be recognized as inferior to philosophy; for only actions “in accordance with the dictates of reason” are consonant with the wellbeing and true advantage of human beings.92 Moreover, the knowledge that comes from philosophy or reason is self-certifying by virtue of its own evidence but the knowledge attained and professed by theology, as it derives from revelation, always requires extraneous certification.93 Whereas philosophy or reason can stand on its own, theology or revelation cannot. Very few human beings are capable of acquiring the habit of virtue through the exercise of reason alone. Therefore very few human beings, left to their own devices, ever will achieve the second proper object of desire. Those who achieve virtue will have done so because of their knowledge of things, their knowledge of causes, and the accounts they formulate about both human nature and nonhuman nature. The important consequence of their satisfaction of the first and second proper objects of desire is that they will be able to provide for themselves a secure and healthy life.94 On the other hand, however, the vast majority of human beings proceed differently. They possess a

89 TTP 3: 44. Following that declaration, Spinoza immediately adds that true happiness will not involve any sense of vainglory. One’s happiness will not be identical with one’s conviction that he is wiser than others or that others are less knowledgeable than he is. By contrast, one could note that the prevailing tradition of theology or religion fosters vainglory among its members by demanding that they endorse one interpretation of the meaning of Scripture as being superior to another interpretation of the meaning of Scripture; or certain traditions of theology or religion cast one religious sect as being more valid than another religious sect. Such practices in the tradition of theology or religion only encourage the impudence of the theologians and the preachers; and hence they encourage disdain for reason and philosophy among ordinary human beings. 90 TTP 3: 172; 178–80. 91 TTP 3: 46. 92 TTP 3: 69; 73–74. 93 TTP 3: 30. 94 TTP 3: 73.

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hope of attaining knowledge of things, acquiring virtue, or living in security and health through their adherence to a set of suprarational tenets. More precisely, their hope of satisfying the three proper objects of desire is directly connected to their submission to theological or religious dictates that promise them security and health if they profess a particular creed and if they submit to a certain code of conduct in their lives. Although reason or philosophy can provide human beings with knowledge of causes, the acquisition of virtue, and a healthy, secure life, most human beings are not inclined to philosophy nor are they inclined to the exercise of reason that culminates in philosophy or even in philosophizing. Instead most human beings look to what is beyond or above reason and so they look to theology or religion and revelation. For them the turn to suprarational dictates and the anticipation of supranatural events supersedes the turn to philosophy and the exercise of reason that would bring them knowledge of nature, knowledge of virtue, and the knowledge that is necessary for security and health.95 For the vast majority of human beings, then, obedience to a set of salutary doctrines may have to suffice if there is to be any hope for human sociability; and perhaps obedience to salutary doctrines is all that can be expected of them. Accordingly, the majority of human beings will be encouraged to espouse teachings, opinions, or views that conduce to sociability and general human wellbeing.96 To that end, some form of theology or religion may be indispensable;97 and the version of theology advocated by Spinoza in the treatise expressly recommends obedience to a revealed law that demands the performance of acts of justice and charity.98 In order to achieve a sustainable kind of security, peace, and health, it is neither requisite nor possible to demand that all human beings pursue knowledge of nature and knowledge of virtue. Philosophy and philosophizing are not anticipated of all human beings. Theology and obedience, on the other hand, can prove sufficient for the task of making nonphilosophical human beings sociable since the teaching of theology or faith or revelation is said to vouchsafe the salus of nearly all humankind.99

95 TTP 3: 5–6; 15–16; 29; 43–45; 58–59; 68–70; 81–85; 95–98; 118; 173–75; 179–85. 96 TTP 3: 58–59. 97 TTP 3: 73–75. 98 TTP 3: 165; 176–78; 188. 99 TTP 3: 188.

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The crucial subject of the treatise is human wellbeing and human sociability. The crucial subject of the treatise then is the conduct of life and the governance of human affairs. Philosophy recognizes that reason is competent to afford the various sorts of knowledge that will enable human beings to live well. That is, if the domain of philosophy and reason is truth and if complete human happiness is achieved through the attainment of true knowledge and wisdom then philosophy and reason are the legitimate starting points for establishing the conditions through which human beings can live well and thereby become happy. The liberty to philosophize, the stated goal of the treatise, would seem to be a prerequisite for the success of philosophy or reason in making knowledge of nature, knowledge of virtue, and knowledge of secure and healthy living possible. But philosophy or reason encounters a fundamental problem related to human nature. Human beings by nature are not inclined toward philosophy. Instead they are inclined toward superstition;100 and superstition, that is to say, “religious overawe” or “excessive fear of god(s),” falls within the province of theology or religion. Thus human beings by nature are drawn more to theology or religion than they are drawn to philosophy. Theology or religion can exacerbate superstition or mitigate it but whichever course is taken the fact remains that the prevailing tradition of theology or religion is antagonistic to philosophy or reason and Spinoza contends that the natural fact of superstition contributes to that antagonism.101 Indeed, insofar as human nature is driven more by passion, instinct, or carnal TTP 3: 6. TTP 3: 5–7. Spinoza plainly suggests that the prevailing tradition and condition of theology or religion is the matter under scrutiny in the treatise. In other words, the theological or religious situation in The Netherlands or Europe in the seventeenth century appears to be the focus of Spinoza’s attention. But his first example in the treatise of a situation in which religion had gone awry is not a case from the contemporary Judeo-Christian heritage of seventeenth century Europe instead it is the case of Alexander the Great, a pagan. Alexander succumbed to superstition when he could not discern his fate in battle at the Gates of Susa and so he turned to augurs. Spinoza’s choice of his first example to illustrate the tendency toward superstition in human nature evinces that superstition and the problems it engenders are not unique to Judeo-Christianity, the Hebrew Scriptures, the Christian Scriptures, or any particular religion. On the contrary, superstition or the inclination toward superstition is a human problem. The root of superstition is fear; and the passion fear is common to all human beings (compare Leviathan [London, 1651] p. 2). If an inclination toward superstition, or “religious overawe,” is natural to human beings then it also is the case that an inclination to theology or religion also is natural and common to human beings. Mastering the passion of fear is a prerequisite for turning to reason rather than to revelation; and subduing the passions is part of achieving the second proper object of desire. 100 101

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urges, than it is governed by reason and insofar as human beings by nature are drawn to superstition there is something about human nature itself that disposes it to be resistant to the teaching and guidance of philosophy or reason.102 Knowledge of what is ‘by nature’, and the truth about what is ‘by nature’, are the proper objects of philosophy and philosophizing.103 Moreover, philosophy and philosophizing are identical with the exercise of reason, or the exercise of the “natural light,” and the conclusions that are established in accordance with philosophy or reason.104 Therefore the philosophic teaching of the treatise is contained in Spinoza’s account of what reason concludes in respect of human nature and nonhuman nature. The account of human nature in the treatise is most fully articulated in chapter sixteen of the book. According to that teaching, human nature and nonhuman nature share a common foundation. That is, it is the “highest law of nature that each thing endeavors, to whatever extent is in it, to persevere in its own state having regard for none other but itself, and it follows to this that each individual has the highest right, that is (as has been said), to existing and operating just as it is naturally determined.”105 An illustration of an individual thing “existing and operating just as it is naturally determined” is given in the case of greater and lesser fish in the water: “fish by nature are determined for swimming, the greater eating the lesser, thus fish have the chief power of the water and the greater eat the lesser. For it is certain that nature absolutely considered has the highest right to all of which it is capable, that is, the right of nature itself extends as far as its power itself extends.”106 Spinoza is quite blunt about the relationship

TTP 3: 5–6; 15–16; 73; 189–91. TTP 3: 95; 179–80; 185. 104 TTP 3: 10; 95; 180; 183; 185; 187. 105 TTP 3: 189. 106 TTP 3: 189. Spinoza continues the proposition by explaining that the identification of right with power is justified on the view that “the power of nature is the power of God.” That is, insofar as God has the “highest right over all things” and the power/right of nature is the power/right of God then nature also must possess “summum ius” over all things. Accordingly, natural power and divine power are the same and knowledge of nature and its power would appear to be coincident with knowledge of God and God’s power (TTP 3: 15–16; 46; 60; 95–96). Other consequences, however, also accompany Spinoza’s claim. In his account of the identification of natural power with natural right, Spinoza asserts that “the universal power of the whole of nature is nothing other than the same power of all individuals together hence it follows that each individual has the highest right to all that it can do, or the right of the individual extends as far as its determinate power extends” (TTP 3: 189). Two curious implications 102 103

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between power and right. Natural right and natural power are identical. That which a thing can do it has a right to do; or natural right is coextensive with determinate natural power.107 Spinoza, however, also goes farther. The philosophic teaching of the treatise posits that nature, considered in itself, involves a kind of moral neutrality. What human beings consider to be “ridiculous, absurd, or evil,” in respect of what they experience, derives only from human ignorance of the “order and coherence of the whole of nature.” Human beings typically perceive or conceive things only as discreet parts and consequently they fail to appreciate the ultimate integrity of things as a whole. Human beings gauge events and circumstances according to their own interests and designs. Hence when natural power or natural right causes events and consequences that do not conform to what a particular human being or a group of human beings anticipates or desires then human beings decry such events. What human beings call evil or good is not

follow from Spinoza’s proposition. First, if the “power of nature” is the “power of God” but the “power of nature” also is “nothing other than the same power of all individuals” then the latter power also must be acknowledged to be identical with the “power of God.” Or, individual power, natural power, and divine power are interchangeable terms. Second, if the “power of God” is the “power of nature” and the “power of nature” is the “power of all individuals” then God or nature must be understood to be capable of acting against itself just as one individual can and does act against another individual. That is, inasmuch as the “highest law of nature” is self-preservation and each individual preserves itself without regard for any other thing but itself (TTP 3: 189) then self-preservation can involve the injury or the destruction of other individuals. While such a consequence might be reconcilable with a broader philosophical view of nature’s order and operation, that is, for example, things can come into being and things can pass away, it is much more difficult to reconcile the consequence of mutual injury or mutual destruction, as may be implied in Spinoza’s claims about power and right, with any conventional sense of theology or religion. On the thesis that the “power of nature” is the “power of God” is the “power of all individuals” one would be compelled to acknowledge the logical implication that as individuals come into being or individuals pass away so also the same thing must apply to divine coming into being or passing away; such a tenet however is unacceptable to conventional theology or religion. If Spinoza’s claims are interpreted to represent some attempt at a natural theology one at least must recognize that such claims also are wholly subversive of revealed theology; and the realization of the genuine tension between philosophy and theology in the TTP cannot be obscured or neglected indefinitely. 107 Spinoza’s claim is reminiscent of the position advanced by Thomas Hobbes in the first three paragraphs of chapter 14 of Leviathan (London, 1651) where he provides definitions of “The Right of Nature,” “Liberty,” and “A Law of Nature.” Hobbes asserts that “The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his Nature, that is to say, of his own Life, and consequently of doing anything which, in his own Judgment and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto” (p. 64).

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determined “in respect of the laws of all of nature taken together but only in respect of the laws of our nature.”108 Philosophically considered, nature comprehended simply in itself adheres to the principle that each individual thing always is “existing and operating just as it is naturally determined” to do, regardless of what that “existing and operating” might include or entail in respect of this or that or the other individual thing, be it human or nonhuman. Moral blameworthiness and moral praiseworthiness then must be acknowledged to be discriminations made on the basis of dictates pronounced in accordance with human nature.109 Nature in itself is neither ‘good’ nor is it ‘evil’. Nature “exists and operates” as it is determined to do consistent with the principles and laws of nature. Therefore nature “absolutely considered” must be recognized to be morally neutral.110 Still, the individual exercise of natural right or natural power can be fraught with advantageous or disadvantageous consequences and repercussions. The lex summa naturae is that each individual endeavors to persevere in its own state so far as it is able to do so. Each thing, by nature, strives to continue to exist; and based on the “highest law of nature” it is consistent with the teaching of philosophy regarding ‘what is by nature’ that the third proper object of desire is “to live securely with a healthy body.”111 Though each individual is impelled by the highest law of nature to preserve itself, the achievement of security and health can be quite difficult. Unlike knowledge of nature and knowledge of the causes of things or knowledge of virtue, each of which may be attained through one’s own nature and power, the means to achieving security and healthy living principally are situated in external things.112 Having resources readily available to satisfy one’s basic needs or desires would be an important component for fulfilling the highest law of nature and to achieving a secure and healthy life. The absence of such resources, however, would prevent individuals from fulfilling the highest law of nature. Extrapolating from Spinoza’s example in the treatise about aquatic life, it may be concluded that where there are no “lesser fish,” it will be difficult for a “greater fish” to persevere in its own state; and TTP 3: 191. TTP 3: 191. 110 TTP 3: 57–58; 189–90. The moral neutrality of nature as a whole is echoed by Friedrich Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, Section 13. 111 TTP 3: 46; and compare 47; 73–74; 191–92. 112 TTP 3: 47. 108 109

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where the water is impure neither “greater fish” nor “lesser fish” are able to survive. Thus nature and the conditions of nature can facilitate or impede what an individual achieves in respect of self-preservation or in respect of achieving a secure and healthy life. The preservation of both “greater fish” and “lesser fish” depends upon “external things” and the same principle applies to human beings in terms of their preservation. Human nature will be a source that facilitates or impedes an individual’s fulfillment of the highest law of nature and the individual’s realization of the third proper object of desire. By the “right and plan of nature” Spinoza says that he means nothing other than “the rules of the nature of each individual according to which we conceive each as naturally determined to existing and operating in a certain manner.” The ius et institutum naturae applies to water, to lesser fish, to greater fish, and to every individual in nature. Thus the ius et institutum naturae applies to human beings in the same way that it applies to all of the other individuals of nature. The philosophic teaching of the treatise does not establish nor does it acknowledge any difference between human beings and the other individuals of nature with respect to the fundamental principle or the basic practices implied in the “right and plan of nature,” the “highest law of nature,” or the identification of natural right with natural power. In terms of the law that determines individuals to persevere in their own conditions and the observance of that law by human beings, philosophy or the teaching of nature admits no distinction between human beings who exercise reason and human beings who are ignorant of true reason. Neither does the philosophic teaching about human nature in the treatise discriminate between rational or reasonable human beings, on the one hand, and fools or madmen, on the other hand. Whatever any individual does, on the basis of its own nature, it does with summum ius inasmuch as it is “existing and operating as it naturally is determined to do and it cannot do otherwise.” Therefore, as long as human beings are considered as living solely under the regime (imperium) of nature, anyone who does not yet employ reason or anyone who does not yet possess the habit of virtue lives solely under the influence of appetite with the same “highest right of nature” as does the individual who conducts his life under the guidance of reason. That is to say, just as the sensible human being (sapiens) has the highest right to do all that reason dictates, namely, to live in accordance with the laws of reason, so, too, an individual who is ignorant of reason and who is wanton has the highest right to do

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all that is urged upon him by appetite, namely, to live in accordance with the laws of appetite.113 The philosophic teaching of the treatise affirms that the life conducted in accordance with reason and the life conducted in accordance with appetite or passion are equally legitimate by nature. The summum ius of “existing and operating” that is extended to the human being who conducts his life under the guidance of reason is the same summum ius that equally is extended to the human being who conducts his life foolishly, madly, or obsessively as he driven to do by his appetites or passions. Since each natural individual endeavors to persevere in its own state, as the lex summa naturae obliges it to do, inevitably there will be occasions when exercises of the “highest right” to exist and to operate naturally by the rational or sensible human being will conflict with exercises of the “highest right” to exist and to operate naturally by the irrational or foolish human being. By nature, then, it eventually will be the case that rational human beings and irrational human beings will have trouble endeavoring to persevere in their own respective states; and, as a result, the prospect of their living securely with healthy bodies will be imperiled, perhaps severely. For, in the attempt to preserve oneself and 113 TTP 3: 189–90. Whereas most English translations of the TTP render the Latin word sapiens as “wise man,” I have chosen to translate the Latin word sapiens by the English words “sensible human being.” Sapiens derives from the Latin verb sapere which means “to taste” or “to have flavor.” The word then also connotes something “having a taste or flavor.” Subsequently, sapere came to mean “to have a taste for” a thing, that is, “to have taste” or “to have sense or discernment” and so “to be sensible.” I am not confident that in the TTP Spinoza intends any philosophically definitive connotation for “wisdom” in the passage at issue. Rather, I think he aims at a more general and commonsensical meaning for sapientia and/or sapiens. Spinoza’s remarks in the TTP about the uniqueness of Solomon influence my decision. God is said to have told Solomon that “no one after him would be his equal in sapientia.” Spinoza says that such an expression only means that Solomon’s sapientia is of an extreme kind; God’s remark does not mean that no one after Solomon would be “wise.” But Solomon’s “wisdom” also consists chiefly in his “prudence” rather than his knowledge of nature, for example, which is the province of philosophy. Solomon is “prudens Rex” (3: 45). Thus Solomon’s distinction among human beings owes more to his possession of practical wisdom ( prudentia) than to his possession of theoretical wisdom. In other words, Solomon’s acclaimed “wisdom” is exhibited most in his political excellence as a “prudens Rex” and a sensible individual rather than in his standing as a philosopher. Indeed, although Spinoza explicitly praises Solomon for the fact that he “surpassed all others of his age” in relying on “the natural light,” and his teaching “plainly agrees with everything that natural knowledge teaches about Ethics and true virtue,” nevertheless Spinoza also explicitly says that Solomon ultimately cannot be considered to be a philosopher (3: 41 and 68). Solomon’s sapientia and his condition as being sapiens consist in the reasonability and sensibility that are evident in his teachings on theology and politics.

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to live securely with a healthy body, each individual, whether rational or irrational, has the highest right to pursue and to obtain whatever may be considered by the individual to be useful toward satisfying the goals of self-preservation, security, or health. In other words, human beings by nature are permitted to seek and to take whatever any one of them deems to be useful and conducive to his wellbeing in terms of self-preservation, security, or health; and every one of them may seek and take whatever he deems useful to his wellbeing by any means that are available to him. “The Right and Plan of nature, under which all are born and for the greater part live, prohibits nothing except what no one desires or no one can do; it does not exclude struggles, hatred, anger, ruses, nor absolutely any other thing that the appetite urges”; most notably, perhaps, the “highest right of nature” includes the use of “force” if an individual estimates that it will be effective as a means to any of the goals that he pursues.114 Life in accordance with “the right and plan of nature” entails that each individual thing seeks to preserve itself and each individual thing seeks to persevere in its own state through whatever means appear to it to be the most useful or the most conducive to the goal of self-preservation. The means to self-preservation can be perceived very differently by various individuals and those means can include treachery or force or bodily injury to others and none of those means is proscribed by nature. Therefore the lex summa naturae that impels all human beings to endeavor to persevere in their own states is also the same lex summa naturae that entitles them to exercise that ius naturae which in fact may jeopardize the endeavor of any other individual human being to persevere in his own state. That is, each individual seeks its own preservation “having regard for none other but itself ” and “the natural right of a human being is determined not by sound reason but by desire and power.”115 The influence of desire and power over human beings induces them to yield to the urgings of their passions and to submit to their “carnal instincts.” Passionate human beings, therefore, take little regard for the future and they concern themselves only with their own demands for the immediate satisfaction of their most urgent concerns or needs.116 Moreover, their desires and needs tend to be idiosyncratic

114 115 116

TTP 3: 190. TTP 3: 190. TTP 3: 73; 190–92.

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and inconstant. Impelled by the lex summa naturae to preserve himself, an individual human being pursues what he perceives to be useful to himself in terms of his own preservation. His pursuit of things contributing to his preservation, however, is determined chiefly by his own sense of what supplies him with ‘goods’ or what will allow him to avoid ‘evils’. Yet the mode of discriminating among such goods and evils is entirely subjective; for it is a “universal law of human nature” and it is to be accounted among the “eternal truths which no one can ignore” that every human being “elects of two goods the one which he judges to be the greater and of two evils the one which appears to be the less.” The accuracy of one’s judgments about such matters, however, is not assured. On the contrary, each individual will choose what he seeks and he will determine what he does on the basis of the apparent usefulness of the objects before him, though there is no guarantee at all “that the matter necessarily is as he judges it.” Notwithstanding the susceptibility of human beings to err in respect of their judgments, choices, or actions regarding the usefulness or uselessness of particular things, it is a consequence of human nature that every individual will regard as an enemy117 anyone who is considered to be an impediment to the satisfaction of his interests, his needs, or his desires.118 The philosophic teaching of nature in the treatise exposes a serious problem. The life conducted in accordance with passion is equally as

117 Spinoza’s reflection on the reason why human beings naturally may tend to consider others as enemies is more subtle than the doctrine rendered by Thomas Hobbes. In his account of the natural condition of human beings in chapter 13 of Leviathan (“Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as Concerning their Felicity, and Misery”), Hobbes characterizes pre-political life as a “condition which is called war.” In the eighth paragraph of chapter 13, he states that the condition is “such a war as is of every man against every man”; moreover, mere threats, suggestions, or suspicions of violence are sufficient to constitute the condition of war (Leviathan [London, 1651] p. 62). Thus Hobbes argues that war is a necessary consequence of the pre-political condition of human beings. Spinoza does not seem to go so far. He makes clear that there are imminent difficulties for human beings under “the right and plan of nature” and the various but excessive exercises of “natural right and natural power.” But, unlike Hobbes, Spinoza does not say flatly that “nature is war.” 118 TTP 3: 190–92. Human beings pursue what they pursue on the basis of the perceived usefulness or uselessness of the objects before them. The objects that appear to conduce to someone’s wellbeing will be the objects that are sought by him; and the objects that appear to be hindrances to his wellbeing will be avoided by him. What human beings call useful, then, they also call good; and what they call useless, they also call evil. The intimate relation between the concepts of utility and goodness, and the subjective manner by which such things are determined, is demonstrated by Spinoza’s account in the treatise of the making and keeping of “pacts” (3: 192; 196).

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legitimate ‘by nature’ as the life conducted in accordance with reason. Considered only under the regime of nature, or considered as existing and operating only under the rubric of the “highest law of nature,” the reasonable or sensible individual has no more right or power in principle than does the unreasonable or insensible individual. Each one is “naturally determined to existing and operating in a certain manner.” But the passionate or unreasonable individual, who judges and chooses the objects of his desires and the means to his preservation on the basis of the urgings of his appetites, typically opts for things that actually may not promote his wellbeing at all. Moved by carnal instincts or base impulses, and seeking immediate gratification of his longings, the individual who responds only to the stimulations of his passions and desires will neglect what is genuinely useful and advantageous to his preservation, his security, his health, and his general wellbeing. The passionate individual is determined to suffer such a fate because he ignores or abandons reason and “no one can doubt how much more useful it is to live according to laws and the dependable dictates of our reason which, as we have said, are directed only to what is of true human usefulness.”119 If every human being is impelled by the “highest law of nature” to preserve himself but human beings are governed more by their passions 119 TTP 3: 191. The Latin sentence contains the phrase “certa nostrae rationis dictamine.” The Latin adjective, certus, has an obvious English cognate in the word “certain” and other English translations of the sentence render the Latin phrase in that manner. For example, R.H.M. Elwes translates the phrase as “assured dictates of reason” (A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise [New York: Dover Publications, 1951; originally published in London by G. Bell & Son, 1883] p. 202); Samuel Shirley uses the words “sure dictates of our reason” (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [Leiden, New York, København, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1989] p. 239); and Martin D. Yaffe translates the words as “the certain dictates of our reason” (Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise [Newburyport, Massachusetts: The Focus Philosophical Library, 2004] p. 181). In his Glossary entry for the word “certain,” Yaffe also notes the ambiguity of the word certus which would have been recognized by Spinoza. That is, he raises a question about the epistemic standing of the word certus in the treatise. Yaffe wonders whether the word univocally signifies something like “sure-fire,” something that involves irrevocable certitude, or whether the word also may allow the meaning of something being “well-established” (p. 254). The Latin word certus also does mean “resolved,” “determined,” “fixed,” “settled,” or “purposed.” With respect to moral matters, the word signifies “sure,” “unerring,” “faithful,” and “to be depended upon.” I propose that what Spinoza intends by the word certus is closest to the last alternative. I think that in the TTP Spinoza’s teaching intends to emphasize the pragmatic “dependability” of rational dictates rather than demand that readers of the TTP acknowledge a “dictate of reason” as something that exhibits epistemic certitude. Hence I translate the Latin word certus with the English word “dependable.”

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than they are governed by reason then it is difficult to conceive how the choices, decisions, and actions of the vast majority of human beings can be brought under the guidance of the “dependable dictates of reason” that alone equips human beings with what is truly useful or advantageous to them. The philosophic account of the “ius et institutum naturae” formulated by Spinoza in the treatise discloses the obstacle that human beings confront when they endeavor to persevere in their respective states or when they seek to achieve security and health. Human beings, by nature, simply are drawn to whatever may be attractive to any one of them. They are self-interested. Whatever anyone esteems as useful to him he also esteems as a worthy object of desire since he perceives it to contribute to his preservation and wellbeing. Accordingly, he longs for it and he pursues it. Anyone who has the natural power to acquire any object that he desires also has a natural right to acquire it. One may deceive another, cheat another, steal from another, threaten another, connive with another, and injure or kill another in order to satisfy the desires or needs that one selfishly regards as indispensable to his own preservation, security, health, or wellbeing. The natural condition of human beings then is fundamentally egocentric and isolated.120 But there is no guarantee that what each human being esteems and pursues actually will satisfy his desires or allow him to achieve the end he seeks because each individual typically judges, decides, chooses, or acts in terms of what appears to each individual to be the most useful or the most successful mode of attaining a greater good or of suffering a lesser evil at any given instant. Mistaken perceptions, confused judgments, or erroneous opinions and the deeds that follow from them can have dire consequences. It is quite possible that in the attempt to satisfy the desire for preservation it will happen that ‘evil’ rather than ‘good’ may befall individuals in the natural condition with the result that their security, health, and wellbeing actually may be forfeited. In other words, beyond the commonplace problems raised by human subjectivity and human selfishness, the attempt by human beings to fulfill the lex summa naturae through the exercise of the ius naturae that is intrinsic to the ius et institutum naturae entails that life itself can be fraught with perils and

120 One may be reminded of Hobbes’ characterization of the “life of man” in the “state of nature” as being “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Leviathan, chapter 13, paragraph 9 [London, 1651, p. 62]).

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achieving the third proper object of desire will be require more than a little effort and skill. Each natural individual exists and operates as it naturally is determined. Human nature is determined more by cupidity and power than it is determined by sound reason. The prevalence of desire and power over reason in life owes to the fact that human beings are born ignorant of reason, its uses, and its advantages. Nevertheless it remains possible to implement the faculty of reason. What is needed, perhaps, is the establishment of a basic situation through which “true reason” can be cultivated. For example, one could speculate that if the “liberty of philosophizing” were granted to everyone then a greater number of human beings would be introduced to the advantages of reason and the advantages of living life in accordance with the advantageous dictates that issue from reason. With the liberty to philosophize, more human beings might come to appreciate the usefulness of the faculty of reason and so they might consent to the use of it in respect of their own interests or they even might elect to employ it themselves with more frequency than they customarily do. But just establishing the liberty of philosophizing probably is not enough; for even the general education of human beings itself appears to present an obstacle to philosophizing. That is, according to Spinoza, even in their rudimentary education and training, most human beings develop habits and temperaments that hinder them from developing reason fully and employing it “to acquire a true course of living and the habit of virtue.”121 In the context of the claims of the treatise, Spinoza’s remarks about education, training, and the prospects for the complete development of reason among all human beings are significant. It is clear that the theologians, for example, together with the educators in general, as well as the people who are instructed by them, are ‘educated’ human beings. They have knowledge of various languages, arts, sciences, literatures, histories, and so forth. But if Spinoza is correct that education and training do not provide for “a true course of living and the habit of virtue” then one must conclude that traditional education is unable to convey what is needed in order to satisfy the second proper object of desire. In other words, traditional education and training are inferior to reason and philosophy which themselves enable human beings to “master the passions and acquire the habit of virtue.” The defect of

121

TTP 3: 190.

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the traditional education and training cited by Spinoza may owe to the fact that traditional education and training toward “acquiring a true course of living and the habit of virtue” already are corrupted by the “handmaiden thesis” about the relationship between philosophy and theology which is the chief impediment to any sort of philosophizing in earnest by human beings.122 Under the influence of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion, human beings are told that philosophy or reason or the natural light is inadequate to define or guide the proper conduct of life or the governance of human affairs; and hence human beings come to believe that philosophy is unable to teach “a true course of living and the habit of virtue.” Traditional education and training teach that philosophy or reason or the natural light cannot lead human beings to security, health, or wellbeing. Instead it is maintained that the correct path to human wellbeing is found in teachings that relate something that is above or beyond reason and philosophy. Thus human beings educated or trained in the traditional manner do not possess or cultivate an unfettered reason. The faculty of reason that they develop and employ is tainted by the biases of a theological or religious tradition which itself may be rooted in a variety of contrarational and contranatural superstitions and prejudices that are opposed to philosophy and which also are opposed by philosophy. The issue that is raised and addressed by the philosophic teaching of the Tractatus theologico-politicus is the conduct of human life and the governance of human affairs. The opening sentence of Spinoza’s old book sets the problem that is to be solved by treatise: “If human beings were able to govern all their affairs with dependable counsel, or if fortune always bore prosperity for them, in no way would they be mastered by superstition.”123 Human beings may conduct their lives and govern their affairs in a variety of ways. But three particular kinds of life are delineated by Spinoza. The question posed by the treatise reduces to this: If human beings can conduct their lives and govern their affairs with dependable counsel, and presumably they can prosper and preserve themselves by doing so, why do they rely on fortune or turn to superstition in the conduct of their lives and the governance of their affairs? The answer to that question is not especially complicated.

TTP 3: 14. TTP 3: 5: Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent, vel si fortuna ipsis prospera semper foret, nulla superstitione tenerentur. 122 123

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The turn to other recourses, to recourses other than reason, is connected with the basic facts of human nature. If human beings relied on reason alone then they would enjoy “a true course of living” and they would acquire “the habit of virtue.” But by nature human beings are determined more by desire, passion, carnal instincts, and power than they are determined by reason; and they also naturally are prone to superstition.124 Yielding to passion and self-interest, human beings initially rely on fortune to influence their circumstances and they anticipate that fortune will bestow on them whatever satisfies their needs, desires, or concerns. But fortune does not always meet human expectations. So human beings look to some other recourse that promises to meet their expectations and alleviate their anxieties about their wellbeing or their prosperity. Eventually human beings turn to superstition and the tenets surrounding it in order to adopt a course of living that will offer them the promise of the preservation, security, health, wellbeing, or prosperity for which each individual human being longs. Human beings judge, decide, choose, and act in selfish ways. They opt for things on the basis of the apparent usefulness of those things and in terms of which of the things appears to afford them “greater goods” or which of the things will allow them to suffer “lesser evils,” presuming that some evil must be endured. Human beings may try to conduct their lives and govern their affairs on the basis of fortune alone. In the past, perhaps, or even in the present, things that were desired and sought were attained without the exercise of reason, without making any appeal to reason, and without expending any effort. Fortune simply favors some human beings. But reliance on fortune as a means to assuring one’s own preservation and wellbeing can be risky; for fortune involves external, unpredictable, and unexpected events that follow from sets of causations or relations among things about which the one who relies on fortune is entirely ignorant.125 Fortune may afford an individual what he wants; it may not afford him what he wants; or it even may afford more than he wants on any one occasion. If fortune seems to afford what someone desires here and now it is likely that the same person will expect fortune to give him what he desires or seeks on a continual basis. But even if fortune proves to be stingy on some occasion it is not necessarily the case that someone will seek an

124 125

TTP 3: 6; 81; 190. TTP 3: 46.

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alternative to it. Provided one does not suffer too greatly under the losses that fortune may prompt, that is to say, so long as fortune does not become oppressive, it is likely that one will continue to rely on fortune in the conduct of his life and the governance of his affairs. The difficulty of conducting one’s life based on fortune is that fortune is inconstant. “If fortune always bore prosperity for men” then life would be comfortable, pleasant, and for the most part satisfying. But human beings typically do not enjoy such a life. Instead fortune brings both ‘good fortune’ and ‘bad fortune’. Fortune does not favor everyone equally and even those whom it appears to favor sometimes suffer debilitating reversals of fortune. Fortune does not always bear prosperity for human beings; on the contrary, it is fickle. When fortune favors human beings they consider themselves “to abound in good sense” indeed they are “overconfident, boastful, and haughty.” But when fortune fails to favor them they despair, they panic, and they “beseech counsel from anyone, nor is there anything to be heard that is so inept, absurd, or vain, that they would not follow it.”126 Human beings who rely on fortune fall prey to the vicissitudes of it and then they are subjected to the throes of vacillating between the hopes that accompany their anticipations of ‘good fortune’ and the fears that accompany their anticipations of ‘bad fortune’. Every human being hopes for what is useful to his preservation, his security, his health, his wellbeing, or his prosperity. But every human being also fears that his hopes will be frustrated or that his longings will go unrealized. To assuage the fear that one’s hopes will not be realized or to assuage the fear that one’s wellbeing could be compromised, passionate human beings abandon their reliance on inconstant fortune and they take refuge in superstition and its tenets which promise the fulfillment of one’s needs and desires; or, failing that, they embrace superstition and the tenets surrounding it because at least they supply some explanation for why a particular need or desire has gone unfulfilled. When fortune fails to deliver the things which human beings hope to possess they turn to superstition and fear is the motive for that turn.127 Common to both fortune and superstition is the acknowledgement that the source for satisfying one’s needs and desires resides in a power that relies upon external, unpredictable, and unexpected causes or events to effect human well being. The difference

126 127

TTP 3: 5. TTP 3: 5–6.

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between fortune and superstition might be captured in the following way. Reliance on fortune in the conduct of one’s life and the governance of one’s affairs is reliance “chiefly on external things” without any doctrine explaining them; reliance on fortune or luck includes recourse to ‘dumb luck’. But reliance on superstition in the conduct of one’s life and the governance of one’s affairs is reliance “chiefly on external things” that includes a doctrine or a set of tenets which purports to give explanations about why things happen the way they do as well as reasons for why things happen to some human beings but not to other human beings. Whereas the life of fortune involves submission to indiscriminate fate, the life of superstition involves submission to the will of some divine agent(s) whose function and power orders the world and delivers human beings what is required for their preservation, wellbeing, and prosperity.128 The first sentence of the Preface to the treatise indicates that human beings are led to superstition because fortune does not bring them the prosperity which they seek. They turn from fortune to superstition because they fear that they will not preserve themselves or prosper without the intervention of some nonhuman agent or force. Furthermore, inasmuch as human beings are driven by passion more than they are guided by reason, those who turn to superstition do so also because they do not recognize dependable counsel as a worthwhile resource for the proper conduct of their lives or the governance of their affairs.129 But the life directed by dependable counsel ultimately ought to be preferred by human beings since it is the very kind of life that actually can assure human beings of the achievement of the third proper object of desire; and “no one can doubt how much more useful it is to live according to laws and the dependable dictates of our reason which, as we have said, are directed only to what is of true human usefulness.”130 The fact that human beings still turn to superstition owes to human nature itself. But human nature is capable of improvement and the natural human proclivity to superstition can be mitigated or modified. That is, the main difference between the lives of rational or sensible human beings and TTP 3: 5–7; 15–16; 21; 28–29; 81–82. With respect to the human interest in fortune, according to Spinoza, part of the good sense or sapientia of Solomon is displayed in his teaching that “all the goods of fortune are empty for mortals and human beings have nothing more excellent than the intellect” (TTP 3: 41). 130 TTP 3: 191. On my translation of the Latin phrase certo consilio by the English words “with dependable counsel,” see note 119 of this chapter where I explain my choice of the word “dependable” in preference to the word “certain.” 128 129

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the lives of irrational or insensible human beings is witnessed in the difference between the lives of human beings which are governed by the power of reason and the lives of human beings that are governed by the power of passion. Though the rational individual and the passionate individual legitimately live life as each naturally is determined to do, that is, each lives his life in accordance with the power or right that he possesses and exercises, namely, either the power of reason or the power of passion, experience attests that “there is no one who does not long to be able to live securely without fear; however this can be achieved least of all as long as each is allowed to do as he pleases and reason is granted no more right than hatred and anger.”131 The passion that inclines human beings to superstition, namely, fear, can be countered by the passion that could incline human beings “to live securely without fear,” or at least with a less pervasive fear. That passion is hope; and making an appeal to a most basic natural passion of every human being may be advantageous and useful for the purpose of attaining the third proper object of desire if that appeal is executed correctly. Philosophy or reason teaches that human beings are driven more by passion than they are directed by reason. Philosophy or reason teaches that the two most basic passions that motivate human choices, decisions, or actions are fear and hope; and that fact regularly is taken into account by those who attempt to influence human choices, decisions, or actions.132 Philosophy or reason also teaches that human beings naturally are inclined toward superstition and the cause of superstition is fear. However, from Spinoza’s perspective, the basic form of superstition has been compounded by the curators of superstition who use superstition and the tenets surrounding it to perpetuate more fear.133 Nonetheless, an alternative to that scheme of things is possible. Although superstition is engendered by fear, superstition also can be exploited to advocate and promote hope; for human beings prefer to act on the basis of hope for some good rather than fear of some evil. In terms of the ius et institutum naturae, which is to say, in terms of the philosophic teaching of the treatise, neither the life of reason nor the life of passion is accorded any superior rank by nature. Each individual endeavors to persevere in its condition and each individual

131 132 133

TTP 3: 191; and compare 58–59. TTP 3: 5–6; 58–59; 74; 191–93; 201–202. TTP 3: 6–8.

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uses the wherewithal at its disposal to attain that goal. Few individuals rely on reason only. Most yield to passion only. Perhaps some individuals, to whom both the power of reason and the power of passion are available, sometimes rely on reason and sometimes fall prey to passion depending upon which alternative strikes them as being more useful and successful in gaining the things or ‘goods’ that promote security and health or avoiding the things or ‘evils’ that impede security and health. Whether one follows reason or passion in the conduct of his life and the governance of his affairs, the philosophic teaching of the treatise makes plain that everyone “longs to live securely without fear”134 but security is undermined wherever hatred, anger, lust, or deceit reign in lieu of the “laws and dependable dictates of reason” which alone are directed to what truly is useful for human beings. Reason or philosophy may not succeed in convincing passionate human beings about the advantages of attaining knowledge of the causes of things and acquiring the habit of virtue. Thus the teaching of reason or philosophy may not succeed in helping human beings to achieve the first and second proper objects of desire. Still, reason or philosophy yet may aid and serve the advantage of passionate human beings by informing those “laws and dependable dictates of reason” that do forestall hatred, anger, lust, or deceit and which thereby mitigate and moderate the fears that erode human efforts to achieve security. Whereas knowledge of nature, or knowledge of the causes of things, and knowledge of virtue are attainable by human beings through their own nature and power, the attainment of a secure and healthy life, and hence the prospect for self-preservation, rests “chiefly in external things.” Therefore fortune, in one form or another, always continues to play a role in the ability of human beings to observe and fulfill the lex summa naturae. The effects of fortune improve the human situation or the effects of fortune worsen it. But when human beings encounter fortune and then augment their experiences of it with convictions about the reliability of portents, sacrifices, or invocations of extraordinary powers or agents then those human beings live superstitious lives. When human beings encounter fortune and augment their experiences of it with a study of nature and knowledge of the causes of things then those human beings start to conduct their lives sensibly and they govern their affairs with dependable counsel. For all human beings, life initiates with

134

TTP 3: 191.

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a fundamental reliance on fortune, or a reliance on “external things,” and we all long to receive the favors of “fortune.”135 We commence our lives as passionate, ignorant, and self-absorbed individuals. So, we rely on whatever the “external things” make available to us for the satisfaction of our needs, desires, and interests. Whether it is from the motive of hope or the motive of fear, human beings eventually try to bid the “external things” to supply them with what they demand when they seek it; and so human beings attempt to control the “external things” and press them into the service of their longings. One way to exert some form of control or influence over their condition is for human beings to implore the powers or agents that are believed to be responsible for the workings of the “external things” to act on behalf of the supplicants. But another way to exert some form of control over the “external things” is to study them, come to knowledge of their causes or relations, and to be mindful that the ultimate knowledge of the order and operations of the whole is not possessed yet even by the most diligent students of it.136 When it comes to achieving the most universal and indispensable of the three proper objects of desire, namely, living securely with a health body,137 success in the attainment of that “object

TTP 3: 5; 47; 73; 191. Spinoza warns readers of the TTP that an ultimate account of the whole, of which human beings are but a part, has not been achieved yet (3: 47; 81–82; 191). The knowledge of nature that would afford human beings some ‘control’ may be likened to the knowledge of nature that can demonstrate the causes of things, account for the particular actions of things, explain the various relations among things, and indicate what things are possible and what things are impossible. I do not think that Spinoza embraces the modern doctrine of “power and dominion over the whole universe” that is announced by Francis Bacon in the Novum organum (Book 1, aphorism 129) or the teaching of “mastery of nature” that is formulated by René Descartes in Discours de la méthode, Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 vols., rev. ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Vrin, C.N.R.S., 1964–76) 6: 62. However, there may be some affinity between Spinoza’s thinking and the “mastery of fortune” introduced by Machiavelli in Il principe (chapter 25). In the latter case, “fortune” is inescapable but prudent human agency can permit human virtú to arrange circumstances so as to influence or occasion the results that one desires. 137 The attainment of the third proper object of desire may be characterized as ‘indispensable’ because it is possible to live, and perhaps even to live with some prosperity, without “knowledge of the first causes of things” and without “acquiring the habit of virtue” which are achieved by the exercise of reason alone. If the attainment of all three proper objects of desire were ‘indispensable’ to human life then perhaps only the philosophers would be able to preserve themselves. Since that obviously is not the case then not all three proper of objects of desire can be characterized as indispensable for human life. The attainment of security and health, however, are ‘indispensable’; for no one can live, or at least no one can live long, without them. 135 136

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of desire” remains connected with the “gifts of fortune.” But even in acknowledging the fact that the achievement of security and health owes much to fortune it also still is emphasized by Spinoza that “human direction and watchfulness can assist very much” in the achievement of that goal.138 Philosophy or reason can be advantageous both to the philosophers and to the nonphilosophers by striving to assure that more ‘good fortune’ (that is, what truly is useful and advantageous to human beings) than ‘bad fortune’ (that is, what is useless and disadvantageous to them) attends the general condition of humankind. Still, passionate human beings are not disposed to the teaching of philosophy or reason nor are they disposed to the dictates of reason that constitute the dependable counsel that would improve their lives. Instead passionate human beings remain inclined toward superstitions of one kind or another, whether the superstitions are dreadful or hopeful or whether they are crude or sophisticated. A dilemma presents itself. Every human being longs for security and health. But how can that goal become realized if most human beings live as their passions urge them to live and if few live as reason dictates? To move passionate human beings toward security and health, that is, to help them achieve the third proper object of desire, passionate individuals must be drawn to conduct their lives and govern their affairs in a reasonable or sensible manner. Teaching passionate human beings in an exclusively philosophic manner will not succeed; the passionate are incapable of apprehending the arguments and demonstrations that philosophy or reason adduces for its doctrine. Instead passionate human beings must be addressed, persuaded, moved, and drawn to a form of reasonability or sensibility that is based upon what they already have experienced, what they already accept, or what they already believe. That is, “if anyone wishes to persuade, or wishes to dissuade, human beings of something that is not know in itself ” he will base his claims on their experiences; he will rely on appeals to what his audience already accepts or believes; he will accommodate his statements to their capacity to understand him; and he will be aware that he is addressing the multitude, or the common people, rather than the ones who are the few among humankind, namely, those who are capable of comprehending rational or philosophic demonstrations.139 If philosophy or reason is to

138 139

TTP 3: 47. TTP 3: 76–77.

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persuade passionate human beings to forsake their carnal instincts and base impulses then the teaching of philosophy or reason must appeal to what is common, experienced, accepted, or believed by the vast majority of human beings. According to the philosophic teaching of the treatise, all human beings by nature are inclined toward superstition or “religious overawe.” Thus theology or religion can be used as a conduit for persuading human beings to adopt some types of conduct and conviction that are advantageous to attaining security and health while theology or religion also can be used for dissuading them from adopting other types of conduct or conviction that are disadvantageous for attaining security and health. Under the supervision of reason, the philosopher will decide which parts of theology or religion are best suited to that purpose.

PART TWO

THEOLOGY

Spinoza declares in chapter fifteen of the Tractatus theologico-politicus, which is to say, he declares in the chapter of the book that concludes the theological teaching of the treatise proper, that “by Theology, in short I understand revelation, to the extent that it indicates the goal to which we have said Scripture aims (namely, the account and manner of obeying or the true dogmas of piety and faith), that is, what properly is called the Word of God which does not consist in a certain number of books.”1 Bringing to a close the argument that theology and philosophy are separate from each other and neither is subservient to the other, the reader of the treatise is informed that theology is revelation; revelation is communicated through the Scriptures; revelation imparts, or it necessarily involves, a doctrine which advocates obedience; and the doctrine which advocates obedience is the essential foundation of piety or faith. Thus theology, revelation, Scripture, piety, and faith are united and made identical through their unique common component: a teaching about a particular manner of obedience. A similar statement involving the identification of the same set of terms also appears at the close of chapter fourteen of the treatise where the “foundations of faith” are articulated.2 In the argument of chapter fourteen and in the argument of chapter fifteen, one paramount claim is expressed: Human salvation or wellbeing (salus) is achieved through obedience to God who demands only that human beings act and live justly and charitably in obedience to God.3 Faith itself is defined in the treatise as being “nothing

1 TTP 3: 184. Spinoza also refers the reader to chapter 12 and what was established there (3: 162–64) in respect of the view that the “Word of God does not consist of a certain number of books”; the subject matter of chapter 12 of the treatise is the sacredness or the divinity of Scripture. 2 TTP 3: 179–80. “The goal of Philosophy is nothing other than truth: Faith however, as we abundantly show, is nothing but obedience and piety. The foundations of Philosophy are common notions and they must be obtained from nature itself alone: Faith on the other hand owes to the stories and the language that are obtained from Scripture and revelation alone” (3: 179). 3 TTP 3: 176–80; and compare 165; 187–88.

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other than to feel about God such things that when they are ignored obedience toward God is annulled and when this obedience is posited such things necessarily are posited.”4 Human obedience consists in the observance of the “Divine Law” which teaches simply, unambiguously, and without adulteration that the basis of Scripture or revelation or faith or piety is nothing other than the instruction “to love God above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.”5 Indeed, if one is obedient to the law that commands love of God and love of a neighbor then one’s faith or piety is established and his salvation is assured; for “all who yield obedience to God by this plan of living alone are saved, however the rest who live under a regime of pleasure are lost.”6 The fundamental teaching of theology presented in the treatise promises salvation to the obedient and it warns of perdition for those who pursue a “plan of living” that is devoted to pleasure and self-indulgence. The doctrine characterized by Spinoza as representing the “universal faith or the fundamental premise of the whole of Scripture”7 also is “a doctrine that cannot be investigated by the natural light, or at all events there has been no one who has demonstrated it, and therefore revelation was very necessary.”8 Spinoza is confident that his version of the account about the foundation and meaning of theology or religion is accurate, authentic, and indispensable for a proper understanding by the faithful of what faith really entails. Moreover, he maintains that his version of the account about the foundation and meaning of theology or religion is not presented with a view to “introducing novelties” but with a view to “correcting depravities” that have infected both faith (or piety) and the interpretation of Scripture (or revelation). Spinoza’s account of theology or religion in the treatise purports to be a representative form of that more original and more basic “Religio antiqua” which had existed prior to the corruption of theology or religion by those prejudices, superstitions, and fantasies that various theologians, preachers, or churches had introduced into dogma and worship over time.9 The theological teaching of the treatise, therefore, recommends itself as a correction of the flaws and distortions that have come to

4 5 6 7 8 9

TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3: 3: 3:

175. 165; 168; 174; 176–77. 175; and compare 178. 177. 185. 8.

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contaminate the way in which the foundation and meaning of faith, theology, Scripture, piety, revelation, and the divine law appropriately should be conceived.10 Spinoza’s account of the “universal faith” involves an interpretation, as well as an evaluation, of the principal elements of revealed religion. Spinoza defines what prophecy is; he describes the characteristics and capacities of the prophet; he considers in what sense a people, for example, the Hebrews, can regard itself as elected by God; he explains the difference between the divine law and the ceremonial law; he discusses the phenomenon of miracles; and he formulates a method of Scriptural interpretation that involves the construction of a “historia naturae” by which the books of the Bible may be read, interpreted, and understood.11 In the treatise Spinoza also proposes an account of the apostolic mission and he explains the difference between the Hebrew prophets and the Christian apostles. It cannot be said that the theological teaching of the treatise is simply and entirely orthodox. Nevertheless it can be said that Spinoza’s version of the teaching and meaning of theology or religion retains many aspects of the theological or religious tradition that could be recognized and approved by most readers of the treatise who considered themselves faithful, even though Spinoza’s version of the teaching of theology or religion restates those aspects in a rather more liberal and unconventional form. For at the root of both the orthodox theology or religion as well as Spinoza’s theological teaching in the treatise is the tenet that there is an indispensable revealed instruction which offers hope to human beings with regard to their ultimate wellbeing. The instruction is believed to convey the requisite terms of a plan of living that will guarantee the salus of every human being who adheres to the principles contained in the instruction. The mode of communicating the indispensable instruction is particular revelation. According to Spinoza, theology is revelation; and revelation(s) together with histories constitute the largest part of the Scriptures.12 Revelation is the constitutive term of both theology and Scripture; but, according to Spinoza, revelation and its contents also happen to be “accommodated to the opinions of the Prophets and indeed they just surpass human

10 TTP 3: 8–11; 15–16; 27–29; 35; 42; 47–48; 61; 64–65; 78–86; 96; 97–99; 109–113; 116–118; 122; 128; 131; 141; 158–60; 163; 166–70; 174–74; 180–88. 11 TTP 3: 98. 12 TTP 3: 184; and compare 98.

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grasp.”13 If theology and Scripture are founded on revelation and what is imparted by revelation communicates the indispensable instruction for human salus then it is useful to understand what revelation is. The first chapter of the treatise, “De Prophetia,” begins with this definition: “Prophecy or Revelation is sure14 knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings. A prophet, in addition, is he who interprets the matters revealed by God to those who are unable to have sure knowledge of the matters revealed by God yet who are able to embrace the matters revealed simply by faith.”15 If philosophy draws a distinction between passionate human beings or irrational human beings, on the one hand, and sensible human beings or rational human beings, on the other hand, it also must be realized that theology discriminates between those who are able to deliver “sure knowledge” of what is revealed by God, namely, the prophets, and those who only are able to receive “sure knowledge” of such matters and so they must rely on faith alone in order to apprehend what is revealed. Whereas the distinction observed by philosophy between human kinds owes to the difference between those who choose to exercise reason and those who do not choose to exercise reason, the discrimination between human kinds observed by theology in the case of revelation owes simply to God’s selection of some human beings to be prophets while the remainder of human beings are not accorded such a gift.16 Moreover, whereas TTP 3: 99. Here I have translated the Latin words certa cognitio by the English words “sure knowledge.” In the preceding part of this book, I translated the Latin adjective certus differently. I also explained there my reason for translating the Latin adjective “certus” with the English word “dependable” rather than the word “certain” or the word “sure” in respect to the phrases “dependable dictates of reason” and “with dependable counsel” (see notes 119 and 130 to Part One of this book). However, I am confident that in the opening sentence of chapter 1 of the treatise Spinoza’s design is to confirm for his readers that “Prophecy or Revelation” conveys an unique sort of knowledge, a “sure knowledge”; or, in the case of the opening sentence of chapter 1 of the TTP, Spinoza does wish to assign an epistemic status to prophecy or revelation that he does not mean to assign to the phrases “dependable dictates of reason” or “dependable counsel.” Still, if for the sake of uniform consistency, I were to translate the sentence as “Prophecy or Revelation is dependable knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings,” I submit that “dependable knowledge” communicated by God to human beings normally would be taken to imply that prophecy or revelation necessarily must be granted unique epistemic standing as an utterance that is irrefragably “certain” or “sure,” that is, it is an utterance that is taken to be indisputably true since it issues from God, a being to whom the attributes of omniscience and veracity typically are assigned. 15 TTP 3: 15. 16 TTP 3: 171–72. 13 14

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the difference between philosophers and nonphilosophers is established on the basis of each individual’s willingness or unwillingness to make use of the faculty of reason, the gift of prophecy does not depend in any way upon the native ability of the prophet who prophesies. That is, prophecy or revelation is connected not with “the work of a more perfect mind but of a more vivid imagination.”17 On page one of chapter one of the treatise, Spinoza explains the significance of a prophet through reference to the Hebrew word, navi, which he says means a “speaker or interpreter.” More precisely, for the purposes of the argument of the treatise, prophet or navi means “interpreter of God.”18 The first prophet named in the treatise by Spinoza is Moses, whom he also calls the highest or greatest prophet (summum Prophetum Mosem).19 In addition, of course, Moses was the chief legislative prophet of the Hebrew people20 and the prophet who had the unique distinction of having had God speak to him directly with a “true voice” and having had God communicate with him “face to face.”21 The initial propositions in chapter one of the treatise seem to be in accord with orthodox positions that would be acceptable to the readers of the treatise who would be accounted faithful. But Spinoza then introduces an unconventional and controversial notion. He asserts that the definition of prophecy that he has given also allows “natural knowledge to be called Prophecy.” That is, although the possessor of natural knowledge is not accorded the title, “Prophet,” still natural knowledge and prophecy inherently are linked by the fact that both derive from the same source and each expresses some knowledge of God; for whatever “we know by the natural light depends upon a knowledge of God and his eternal decrees.”22 Thus natural knowledge and prophetic knowledge are assigned a kind of equivalence since each may be said to involve some knowledge of God. But the equivalence between the two sorts of knowledge ends at their common source of derivation. For according to Spinoza, in respect of the certitude it involves, “natural knowledge does not cede to prophetic knowledge in any way.” Rather, in some critical respects, natural knowledge should be considered superior to prophetic knowledge. For whereas prophetic 17 18 19 20 21 22

TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3: 3: 3:

21; 29–30; 32–35; 42; 97–99; 152–53; 167; 173; 180–81. 15. 153. 17–19; 44–45; 48; 163. 17–19. 15.

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knowledge imparts what “surpasses human grasp” or “what exceeds the limits of natural knowledge” and therefore it always requires some external certification for what it conveys, natural knowledge requires no such external certification. Instead, natural knowledge contains its own certification within itself.23 What natural knowledge apprehends about God is the same thing that can be apprehended about God by any human being who employs the “natural light,” which is to say that it is the same thing that can be apprehended by any individual who exercises reason. Yet what is attained by those natural faculties tends to be dismissed by most human beings “because natural knowledge rests on foundations that are common to all human beings but for that reason it is not so highly esteemed by the vulgar who always are gasping for what is rare and alien to their nature and despising natural gifts.” To the extent that natural knowledge and prophetic knowledge intersect in expressing some knowledge of God, “it follows that natural knowledge can be called Prophecy”; but because the vulgar strain after rarities or exceptions and they look to what they deem to be extraordinary, the majority of human beings typically demand that natural knowledge, which is common to all humans beings, be excluded when prophecy is mentioned.24 As a speaker for God or as an interpreter of God, each prophet has a power to convey what God dictates, demands, or desires; and the prophets share a common trait in that the vivacity of their imaginations is more obvious than is the power of their intellects. Moreover, Spinoza argues that the content of a prophet’s utterances regularly were determined by the temperament and disposition of the prophet himself. That is, prophets of a cheerful disposition conveyed cheerful messages from God, such as victory in battle, the advent of peace, or “whatever moves human beings to joy”; prophets who suffered from sadness, however, revealed “wars, torments, and every evil”; thus the prophecy or revelation communicated by the prophet was connected directly to the personality of the prophet, the bodily disposition of the prophet, and the opinions about various things that had been adopted by each prophet.25 Because of the imaginative-affective foundation of prophecy, the varying attitudes of the prophets, and the fact that

23 24 25

TTP 3: 16–17; 30. TTP 3: 15. TTP 3: 32.

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revelations were framed in accommodation to the capacities and the opinions of the prophets,26 Spinoza concludes in the treatise that “this Prophetic certitude was not mathematical but only moral.”27 The prophets were “ignorant of speculative matters” and “they should be looked to only in matters of charity and the practice of life.”28 In other words, prophecy or revelation amounts to nothing other than that teaching of faith or piety that dictates obedience to God through acts of justice and charity which reflect a love of God and a love of neighbor by those who are faithful; hence “we conclude therefore that we are not bound to believe the Prophets in any thing other than the aim and the substance of revelation; in what remains each is at liberty to believe as he wishes.”29 The phenomenon of prophecy or revelation involves the imaginative faculty of human beings. Furthermore, “if we look over the Sacred books, we will see that all that was revealed by God to the Prophets was revealed to them through words and figures, or through both modes, namely, words and figures” which were either real, in the sense that the words or figures were “true and outside the imagination of the Prophet who heard or saw them, or they were imaginary no doubt because the imaginations of the Prophet, even while awake, were disposed such that he clearly seemed to himself to hear words or to see something.”30 The qualification that prophecies or revelations either actually happened or they were such that someone was quite convinced that they actually happened might cause some readers of the treatise to suspect the worth of the nature and the content of what was prophesied or revealed in the Scriptures by a prophet who characteristically exhibited lively imaginative tendencies. Still, to forestall any suspicion about the merit of prophetic claims, Spinoza asserts that each instance of prophecy or revelation also was accompanied by three certifying criteria. “Prophetic certitude,” which was only moral and involved neither mathematical certitude nor speculative certitude, “was founded on three things. 1. The matter which was revealed was imagined very vividly as we are accustomed to being affected by objects when awake. 2. A sign. 3. Finally, and principally, [the prophets] have a spirit that was inclined

26 27 28 29 30

TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3: 3:

32–36. 31. 42–43; and compare 35; 87–88. 42. 17.

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solely toward the fair and the good.”31 Satisfaction of the three criteria would assure the faithful of the legitimacy of the prophecy or revelation and Scripture itself warns the faithful to guard against succumbing to the deceptions of “false prophets.”32 Nevertheless, a difficulty arises. In respect of the three criteria to which one can appeal for the certification of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation, readers of the prophecies or revelations contained in Scripture simply are not competent to pass judgment on the first criterion. Readers of the Scriptures cannot ascertain whether or not a prophecy or revelation in fact was “imagined very vividly.” Perhaps those whom the prophets first addressed may have enjoyed the possibility of assuring themselves of the “vividness” of a prophet’s revelation because of his evident enthusiasm in proclaiming the revelation, for example. But subsequent readers of the Scriptures have no basis on which to assess the “vividness” of a prophet’s revelation and therefore the first criterion cannot be applied reliably as an element in the certification of the authenticity of any prophecy or revelation. Taking that fact into account, Spinoza’s theological teaching in the treatise then proposes that the certification for the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation must rest with the other two criteria: the sign and the teaching. Yet Spinoza also notes that it is possible for someone to work a “true sign” but also predict or teach falsely and Scripture itself recommends that someone who commits such acts deserves to be put to death. In the absence of a confirmation of the actual vividness of the prophecy or revelation and because of the fact that true signs can accompany false sayings or predictions, Spinoza concludes that “it follows that a true Prophet is distinguished from a false one by the doctrine and the miracle together.”33 Since one cannot vouchsafe the vivacity of the prophetic imaginings, the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation will have to be certified on the basis of the teaching that is revealed and the sign or miracle that is worked to confirm it.34 However, readers of the treatise will know that chapter six of Spinoza’s book is dedicated to establishing the proposition that miracles cannot occur. On the contrary, in keeping with the TTP 3: 31. TTP 3: 186. 33 TTP 3: 186. 34 The identification of “signs” with “miracles” in the teaching of the TTP is established by Spinoza’s use of the example of the “sun standing still” for Joshua to illustrate an instance of “a sign” (3: 36) and his use of the same example later in the TTP, in chapter 6, “De Miraculis,” to illustrate an instance of “a miracle” (3: 92). 31 32

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hypothesis that the power of nature is the power of God,35 the theological teaching of the treatise contends that miracles are absurd;36 nothing can be learned or known about God from so-called miraculous events, least of all do they establish the existence of God;37 and miracles themselves are nothing other than the anthropocentric misinterpretations of the order and operations of nature that are rendered by human beings who hold vulgar and ignorant opinions about the natures of things.38 Still, the theological teaching of the treatise acknowledges that the narratives of Scripture contain numerous references to miraculous events and the prophets themselves “embraced them.” Spinoza resolves the matter by concluding that although Scripture does teach that miracles occur it is not the case that the Scriptures teach their occurrence “as lessons necessary to salvation”; rather “each is free to consider them as he feels is better for himself for sustaining worship of God and religion with a renewed spirit.”39 In other words, attention to the miracles related in Scripture serves the aim and object of piety and faith, or theology and Scripture, only to the extent that interest in miracles can encourage or enable human beings to accept and follow the divine law more wholeheartedly. If the belief that an event is miraculous serves as a motive for human beings to accept a particular prophecy or revelation as authentic and those human beings are moved to obey God by loving God above all things and loving their neighbors as themselves then the belief in miracles by human beings is to be tolerated and such a belief even may be considered salutary, despite the fact that the belief in miracles is predicated upon an absurd conception of the order and operations of nature.40 Readers of the Scriptures cannot adjudicate the vivacity of the imaginative words or figures experienced by any prophet and so the force of prophetic imagining cannot be used as a criterion for certifying whether a prophecy or revelation was authentic. Furthermore, belief in miracles only results from mistaken views about the order and operations of nature. The very “name miracle,” says Spinoza, “cannot be understood except in respect of human opinions and it TTP TTP 37 TTP (3: 87). 38 TTP 39 TTP 40 TTP 35 36

3: 17; 27–28; 46–47; 57–58; 81ff; 189. 3: 91. 3: 83–86; Spinoza even asserts that belief in miracles “leads to Atheism” 3: 81–82; 84; 88–89; 93–94. 3: 96. 3: 176–80.

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signifies nothing else than a work the natural cause of which we are not able to explain by the example of some other accustomed thing.”41 So-called miracles then are events which occur neither in ways that are “contrary to nature” nor are they events that occur in ways that are “above nature”; Spinoza considers each of those expressions to imply the same thing, namely, a violation of the fixed and unchangeable order of nature, and he regards any such event as an absurdity.42 Readers and interpreters of the Scriptures therefore should not appeal to miracles as corroboratory evidence of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation. At best and perhaps at most, references to miracles in the Scriptures, in connection with a prophecy or a revelation, seem to serve the purpose of inducing human beings to embrace a particular lesson or doctrine more steadfastly. For example, at most and at best, references in the Scriptures to the occurrence of miraculous events in connection with prophetic warnings or revelatory promises might lead an individual to obey the divine law with greater devotion in the hope that his salus would be secured by doing so. But at worst, miracles can be wrought by “false prophets” and so one might be led astray from the authentic foundation and meaning of faith and piety. It therefore would seem to be the case that the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation will rest almost entirely on the doctrine that is imparted together with the presumption that the prophet had “a spirit that was inclined solely toward the fair and the good.” It is the content of the prophecy or revelation, then, that supplies the certification for its authenticity. “Prophecy or Revelation is sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings. A prophet, in addition, is he who interprets the matters revealed by God to those who are unable to have sure knowledge of the matters revealed by God yet who are able to embrace the matters revealed simply by faith.” One may conjecture that each prophet is convinced of the authenticity of his own prophecy or revelation. But others must “embrace the matters revealed simply by faith.” Their faith in the prophecy or revelation is said to be certified by the power of the prophetic imagining, the sign or miracle that confirms it, and the presumption of the prophet’s devotion to fairness and goodness. Since one cannot make legitimate appeals to the first two criteria in order to certify the authenticity of the prophecy or revelation, only the third

41 42

TTP 3: 83–84. TTP 3: 86; 91.

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criterion can serve to warrant one’s “embrace [of ] the matters revealed simply by faith.” The fairness and goodness of the prophet and the extent to which the prophecy or revelation instructs human beings to embrace fairness and goodness then are of paramount importance for certifying the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation. But prophecy or revelation still occurs through words or figures or a combination of the two; and the production of those words or figures is either “true” or it is “imaginary.” Consequently, the fairness and goodness of the prophet or the prophetic utterance also could be either “true” or “imaginary.” In the former instance, the words or figures actually were experienced or they actually occurred just as the prophet heard or saw them whereas, in the latter instance, words or figures were imagined so vividly that the prophet was convinced that the words or figures appeared just as he believed he had imagined them.43 However, if one cannot determine the power of the imaginative faculty of a prophet to whom “imaginary revelations” were made then one cannot determine whether a prophecy or revelation that owes to the imaginative faculty was sufficiently “vivid” to demand one’s assent to it as being the “sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings”; so one’s assent is given only on the basis that the prophet and the content of the prophecy or revelation genuinely were fair and good. The process for certification of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation involves a serious problem. The process for the authentication of a prophecy or revelation becomes self-vitiating. The reader of the Scriptures has to embrace revelation by faith alone; the validity of a revelation involves the power of the imaginative faculty of the prophet, a corroborating sign, and the prophet’s devotion to fairness and goodness. One cannot appeal to the power of the imaginative faculty of the prophet to certify the authenticity of the prophecy or revelation since that power cannot be gauged adequately or accurately by the reader of the Scriptures. Nor can one validly make an appeal to some claim of a corroborating sign or miracle to certify the authenticity of the prophecy or revelation since such occurrences in fact simply are not possible. Hence, in order to certify the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation, one can rely only on the character of the prophet and the character of the doctrine that is professed by the prophet when one accepts a prophecy or revelation as “the sure knowledge of some

43

TTP 3: 17.

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matter revealed by God to human beings.” But again prophecies or revelations communicated to the prophets were either imaginary or they were true and “nothing from Scripture is more clearly manifested than that God gave one Prophet more grace for prophesying than another.”44 The reader of the Scriptures, however, will find it difficult to discover to which prophet “more grace” was given if one cannot invoke two of the three criteria that are supposed to be employed to certify the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation. One cannot say that this prophet was more graced than that prophet on the basis of one having had a more vivid imagination and worked greater miracles than the other. Such statements cannot be made because such things simply cannot be known. One can turn only to the character of the prophet and the character of the prophet’s teaching. Prophecies or revelations which suggest fairness and goodness should command the attention of the faithful. Yet however much a prophecy or revelation might involve a teaching that plainly indicates the fairness and goodness of the content of the prophecy or revelation, why should the lessons of any prophet whose prophecies or revelations are called “imaginary”45 or whose lessons are ostensibly corroborated by events that are called impossible or absurd be adopted by any human being “simply by faith”? Of all those persons in the Scriptures who are connected with prophecy or revelation only two figures may be said to escape the dilemma that attaches to the prophecies or revelations that are categorized as being “imaginary” in kind. The two figures also are the principal disclosers of the law that is the foundation of theology, piety, faith, and the Scriptures. The two superior figures of the Scriptures are Moses and Christ. Unlike all of the other figures mentioned in the treatise to whom revelations were made, Moses and Christ are unique. Whereas the prophecies or revelations of all the other prophets are categorized as imaginary, the revelations of Moses and Christ are not and therefore they may be understood to escape from the problems associated with the process for the certification of a prophecy or revelation as being authentic that applies to all of the other prophets in the Scriptures. Spinoza says God spoke only to Moses with a “true voice” and God communicated with Moses “face to face”; indeed the enunciation of the Decalogue to Moses was the only occasion of the “true voice” of

44 45

TTP 3: 35. TTP 3: 17–20; 30–34; 42–43.

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God in all of the Scriptures.46 Moses is set apart from all of the other prophets, whose prophecies or revelations are categorized by Spinoza as “imaginary,” by the fact that his revelation alone incorporated the use of a “true voice.” Thus the revelations or prophecies of Moses are accorded an authority that exceeds the testimony of other prophets. Still, notwithstanding the superiority accorded to Moses, the uniqueness of his prophetic experience, and his enunciation of the “sure knowledge” contained in the divinely revealed law that he imparted to the Hebrew people, an even greater distinction is imputed to Christ. By contrast with all of the others who may have received revelations from God, Christ is exceptional for the reason that the communications between Christ and God were undertaken “mind to mind.” The revelations to Christ neither involved nor required any mediation through words or figures, as was the case with all other prophets, including Moses; what was revealed to Christ was “not contained in the first foundations of our acquisition of knowledge nor can it be deduced from them, his mind necessarily must be more eminent and more excellent than the human one”; no one else achieved such perfection other than Christ; and so “in this sense we also are able to say that the Wisdom of God, that is, a Wisdom that surpasses human nature, assumed human nature in Christ, and Christ was the way of salvation (Christum viam salutis fuisse).”47 Although Moses and Christ are said to be distinct among the persons in the Scriptures to whom revelations were made, it also is the case that Christ’s distinction supersedes the distinction imputed to Moses. Though God employed a “true voice” and spoke with Moses “face to face,” a mode of communication not used with any other prophet, the revelations to Moses still included sensory mediation: real words or real figures which were external to Moses were employed in God’s communication with him. No such mediation, however, was required by Christ who communed with God “mind to mind,” who possessed a mind “more

46 TTP 3: 17; 21. Spinoza argues that God used a “true voice” when enunciating the Decalogue based on the fact that Exodus 24 asserts that the Jews heard God speaking to Moses (3: 19). Thus the ‘truth’ of the words or figures of the revelation at Mount Sinai, rather than the imagination of them, was assured because of the claim that the words or figures were external and presumably the words or figures also could be heard or seen at least obliquely by other sentient human beings who accompanied Moses when the Law was revealed. 47 TTP 3: 21.

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excellent than the human one”; who assumed the “Wisdom of God” in his own nature; and who therefore “was the way of salvation.”48 Moses and Christ are separated from all of the others to whom prophecies or revelations were made. Yet there also are a number of important disparities between Moses and Christ. A principal disparity concerns the claim that God spoke to Moses “face to face” whereas God communed with Christ “mind to mind”; and the implication of that disparity extends further because of Spinoza’s claim about the character of the law that each one of them revealed. The law revealed by Moses was designated for the Hebrew people but the law revealed by Christ was designated for the “whole human race.” In addition, Moses and Christ are different in respect of the fact that Christ perceived what was revealed “truly and adequately” as “eternal truths” whereas Moses perceived what was revealed to him as “precepts and ordinances and as laws prescribed by God”; accordingly “Christ was not so much a Prophet as the mouth of God (os Dei ).”49 While due stature is given to Moses and his teaching, it is clear that Spinoza intends to emphasize the dissimilarity between the mode of revelation implemented in the case of Moses and the mode of revelation implemented in the case of Christ. The dissimilarity between the two modes, together with the dissimilarity between their respective perceptions of what was revealed to each of them, particular laws, on the one hand, and eternal truths, on the other hand, as well as the respective audiences addressed by each of them, the Hebrew people and the entire human race, sets the teaching of Moses and the teaching of Christ apart from each other but perhaps also they are at odds with each other. Moses and Christ are unique among all of the others to whom prophecies or revelations were given by God. Yet there can be no doubt that the teaching of Christ must be acknowledged as the consummate teaching of the Scriptures for the reasons that Christ alone “perceived 48 In the sentence that immediately follows Spinoza’s acclamation of Christ as “the way of salvation,” he warns his readers that he is “not speaking of what some Churches assert about Christ nor do I negate it; for I freely acknowledge that I do not grasp it.” The preeminence granted to Christ by Spinoza is in conformity with the Christian belief that Christ is the Son of God. Indeed, Spinoza’s estimate that Christ had a “more than human mind,” the “Wisdom of God assumed human nature in Christ,” and “Christ was the way of salvation,” all tend toward the orthodox Christian position that Christ is God incarnate. But Spinoza’s disclaimer concerning “what some Churches assert about Christ” at least also suggests that one need not conclude that Spinoza subscribes to the Christian view even though his other remarks might appear to affirm it. 49 TTP 3: 64.

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truly and adequately” what was revealed as an “eternal truth”; Christ alone possessed a “mind more eminent and more excellent than the human one”; “the Wisdom of God, that is, a Wisdom that surpasses human nature, assumed human nature in Christ, and Christ was the way of salvation”; furthermore, Christ alone “was the mouth of God.” The superiority accorded to Moses and Christ, compared to all of the other prophets in Scripture, informs Spinoza’s teaching of theology in the treatise. But, in addition, the differences between Moses and Christ in respect of their modes of teaching, the content of their teachings, and the audience each of them addressed also informs Spinoza’s teaching of theology in the treatise. For the critical difference between the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ influences the theological teaching of the treatise with respect to prophecy, prophets, the election of a nation, the divine law, the ceremonial law, miracles, the interpretation of Scripture, the apostolic mission, the simplicity of Scripture, the foundations of faith, and the separation of philosophy from theology. In each of those aspects of the theological teaching of the treatise, one can discern a tension between the ‘Moses model’ of comprehending theology or religion and the ‘Christ model’ of comprehending theology or religion; and it is deference to the doctrine revealed by Christ and Spinoza’s interpretation of its meaning and orientation that decides the teaching of theology which is advocated by Spinoza in the treatise. One could describe the Moses model for comprehending theology, revelation, faith, piety, and the Scriptures in the following way. With respect to prophecy and prophets,50 Moses occupies a place of significance and uniqueness inasmuch as he was the instrument for the revelation of the divine law to the Hebrew people. God spoke to Moses “face to face” but to the other prophets God was revealed by means of their imaginations alone. Furthermore, God was revealed to each of the prophets in accordance with each one’s established dispositions, each one’s adopted opinions, or each one’s typical manner of apprehending things; and, in that important respect, Moses

50 Though “prophecy” and “prophets” are the subjects of two different chapters in the TTP, Spinoza makes clear the intimate connection between the two by virtue of the fact that prophecy, and what is revealed through it, is defined as being inextricably linked with the temperaments, dispositions, and opinions that are held by each of the prophets; none of the prophets, says Spinoza, was made more learned by prophecy nor were his basic opinions altered by it (TTP 3: 29–31).

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was not different from the other prophets. That is, Moses conceived of God as a “legislator or king” and consequently God was revealed to him, and Moses revealed God to the Hebrew people, as such a being. In fact, on the basis of his own impression of what the nature of God would involve, Moses revealed the very existence of God to the Hebrew people as a law to be obeyed rather than as an eternal truth to be acknowledged.51 Moreover, the introduction of the divine law involved an extraordinary component. It was accompanied by a terrifying event, the appearance of a “burning fire” that provoked fear and “violent trembling” among the Hebrew people.52 In the broader context of prophecy or revelation, then, one can understand why the faithful particularly would look to uncommon modes or instances of communication when they thought of the form of prophecy or revelation. God had spoken to Moses “face to face” with a “true voice” in the midst of a “burning fire” that engendered awe among the Hebrew people. Accordingly, the faithful would argue that it was appropriate to dismiss the possibility of any merely “natural knowledge” being competent to disclose or relate anything worthwhile about God. Natural knowledge somehow might fall under the broad rubric of prophecy, as Spinoza explains the proposition in chapter one of the treatise, but it could not be a real source of “sure knowledge” about God that would be most prized and most sought by those who were true followers of God. On the contrary, the faithful would be much more disposed to receiving and responding to authoritarian prescriptive edicts, precepts, or commands that emanated from a divine legislator-king who conveyed his designs for the Hebrew people through prophets, or “interpreters of God,” in ways that would seize the attention and imagination of the chosen people. The communications from the prophets and the interpretations of the prophecies or revelations that they made known also would conform to an authoritarian, legalistic tradition that was predicated upon dutifulness to the law.53 Indeed, the primacy of the law was so central to Mosaic theology or faith that the need for a certifying sign to authenticate a prophecy or revelation was excused in all cases where a prophecy or revelation offered “nothing novel or nothing that exceeded or excluded the Law of Moses.”54 Spinoza himself expresses 51 52 53 54

TTP 3: 63–64; 207–208; and see Exodus 20:1–6 and Deuteronomy 5:1–11. Exodus 19: 16–22 and Deuteronomy 5:1–5. TTP 3: 97–98; 151–53. TTP 3: 32.

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astonishment at the fact that even apocryphal books appear to have been introduced into the canon of sacred literature only for the reason that they were found to contain something in them that could be taken to commend the Law of Moses.55 The law was the bond that united the Hebrew people and it was the source of their identity.56 Through adherence to the law enunciated by Moses, both the divine law and subsequently the ceremonial laws, the Hebrew people believed that they would achieve and enjoy continued salus. The Hebrews’ sense of their election owed to their conviction that God had set them apart from other human beings. God liberated them from their Egyptian captivity; God had revealed the law to them alone in writing; and God promised prosperity to them for their observance of the law.57 The faithfulness of the Hebrews was acknowledged by God through the performance of “miracles,” namely, the occurrence of unusual, special, or unanticipated events, and when such occurrences tended to the advantage of the Hebrew people the events were taken to be demonstrations of God’s unique and providential care for the people he had elected above all others. Because the ‘miraculous events’ proved advantageous to them, the Hebrew people perceived such things to be confirmations of their conviction that belief in the prophetic testimonies and adherence to the divine law, as well as the ceremonial laws, would assure the exercise of God’s power on their behalf and to their advantage.58 Consequently, any reading, study, or interpretation of the Scriptures would be undertaken solely for the purpose of rehearsing and reinforcing the order of the Moses model of theology or revelation: Human beings long for security and prosperity; the phenomenon of prophecy or revelation establishes that a suprahuman agent is willing to offer security and prosperity to them;59 the suprahuman source makes itself and its design known to human beings through prophets; the prophets reveal the plan of living that must be adopted and obeyed by human beings if they are to live securely and prosperously; the working of miracles by the suprahuman agent provides the security and prosperity for which human beings TTP 3: 141–42. TTP 3: 206. 57 TTP 3: 205–207; and compare Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 5. 58 TTP 3: 81–82. 59 Spinoza indicates a connection between superstition and the natural human inclination to have recourse to a suprahuman source for alleviating the difficulties of the human condition. For example, human beings are inclined to seek the aid of any numen in times of hope or fear (TTP 3: 6). 55 56

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long; and the security and prosperity that are attained by human beings further confirm the belief of the faithful in the inextricable connection and indubitable relation among prophecy or revelation, prophets, the law, providence, and the authority of the Scriptures.60 The Christ model for comprehending theology, revelation, faith, piety, and the Scriptures also affirms the inextricable connection and indubitable relation among prophecy or revelation, prophets, the law, providence, and the authority of the Scriptures. But it does so in a very different fashion from the Moses model. Christ is exceptional among all of those to whom prophecies or revelations were made for the reason that Christ was of ‘one mind’ with God.61 Thus prophecy or revelation in the case of Christ must be considered superior to every other instance of prophecy or revelation that may be found in the Scriptures. Christ did not require any use of the imaginative faculty nor was any corporeal mediation needed in order for him to communicate with God. Every other prophet, including Moses, required such mediation. Christ alone is distinct from everyone else in the Scriptures because he was the “mouth of God” and “the Wisdom of God took on human nature in Christ.” For those reasons, Spinoza asserts that only Christ “perceived truly and adequately” what was revealed by God. The revealed teaching communicated by Christ involved the expression of an “eternal truth” rather than a legislative precept that was to be followed in order either to continue enjoying the advantages bestowed by God or to avoid the terrors to be suffered as a consequence of transgressing the law.62 Unlike the law revealed by Moses, a law dedicated to the promise of material or bodily rewards and “temporal happiness,” the law revealed by Christ offers the promise of a “spiritual reward” instead.63 Part of that reward involves the acknowledgement and acceptance of the eternal truth that “the highest human good and blessedness consist in knowledge and love of God”; but furthermore knowledge of nature offers the possibility of yielding an ever increasingly more perfect knowledge of God.64 In the broader context of prophecy or revelation, then, “natural knowledge” or the “natural light” may be considered prophetic or revelatory insofar 60 TTP 3: 97–98; 5–6; 9–10; 15; 31; 44; 58–60; 69; 81–82; 97. Compare Strauss, “How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise,” Persecution and the Art of Writing, pp. 165–66. 61 TTP 3: 21. 62 TTP 3: 41; 70. 63 TTP 3: 71. 64 TTP 3: 60; 15–16.

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as natural knowledge offers knowledge of God to the extent that the source of all knowledge is said to be God.65 But more to the point, with respect to the divine law, or with respect to the plan of living that will lead human beings to “blessedness,” Spinoza concludes that the Scriptures commend the ability of the “natural light” to grasp what one ought to pursue and what one ought to avoid in order to achieve salus;66 still, the possessors of such “natural knowledge” are not entitled to the name “prophet” for prophesying or revealing seems to entail the promulgation of an instruction that human beings are expected to obey.67 So whereas natural knowledge does not result in the issuance of commands about nature, prophecy or revelation does result in the issuance of commands about how to conduct one’s life and govern one’s affairs in obedience to God. Despite the superiority of the revealed teaching of Christ to the revealed teaching of Moses, even Spinoza admits that Christ, “who was not so much Prophet as mouth of God” and who perceived everything “truly and adequately,” also articulated “eternal truths” as “laws” on some occasions. Christ did so, Spinoza says, because of the nature, dispositions, and habits of the people whom he addressed.68 If Christ sometimes enunciated his revealed teaching as a law, rather than as an eternal truth, one may be led to wonder whether there ultimately is a real tension or a real difference between the Moses model of the revealed teaching of theology and the Christ model of the revealed teaching of theology since the achievement of salus in both cases is dependent upon an adherence to a certain plan of living. Spinoza explains the difference between Moses and Christ, and their respective revealed teachings in this way. Moses conceived of God as a legislator and king, and so he issued edicts for the Hebrew people to obey. Christ, however, did not conceive of God as a legislator or a king. Instead, if Christ “seems to have written laws in God’s name” it was done only because of “the ignorance and the stubbornness of the people.”69 Christ did not believe that God was a king. Yet Christ did TTP 3: 15–17; 81–87. TTP 3: 10; 68. 67 TTP 3: 151–52. 68 TTP 3: 64–65. In chapter 7 of the TTP, “De Interpretatione Scripturae,” Spinoza notes the importance of paying close attention to considerations of “who has said things, to whom, and at what time” when reading, interpreting, or assessing the meanings of the Scriptures (3: 103) and perhaps even other old books as well. 69 TTP 3: 64. 65 66

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recognize that the majority of people he addressed conceived of God in such a manner, owing to the tradition and authority of the Moses model of the revealed teaching of theology.70 Therefore, in order to communicate to people his revealed teaching about the terms for their salvation, in other words, for the purpose of giving expression to the revealed teaching about the indispensable “plan of living” that would yield security, prosperity, and salus for all human beings, Christ accommodated his discourse to the dispositions and opinions of his audience and he communicated the lesson that he revealed to them as though it were a law to be obeyed. But while the “Law of Moses” was directed exclusively to the Hebrew people, the law of Christ was announced for the entire human race and it was framed in such a way that all human beings who heard the law were able to acknowledge it and embrace it.71 Hence, while the law and the God of Moses were the law and the God of the Hebrew people only, the law and the God of Christ were the law and the God of “all nations,” or all of humankind. The universality of Christ’s teaching also reflects the universalizability of it; for since natural knowledge or the natural light makes knowledge of God possible it follows that it is feasible for reason or the natural light to apprehend the divine law, embrace it, and observe it.72 Still, most human beings do not exercise reason nor do they rely on it as much they might and so even Christ appears to have resorted to revealing “eternal truths” in the form of “laws” on some occasions. If the natural light, reason, or natural knowledge can offer knowledge of God then it also can have access to the divine law and so it can comprehend the “eternal truth” of the divine law, namely, that “the highest good and blessedness of a human being consist in knowledge and love of God”73 and love of God transforms one to practice love toward one’s neighbor.74 The real tension or the real difference between the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ does not concern the essential message of theology or revelation. The revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ concerning theology or revelation or the Scriptures or faith or piety both advocate nothing

70 Of course, one could go farther and contend that most religions conceive their supreme being as a legislator-king. 71 TTP 3: 65. 72 TTP 3: 68–69. 73 TTP 3: 60–61. 74 TTP 3: 102; 165; 167; 169–70; 174–77.

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other than obedience to God which consists in love of God above all things, love of neighbor, and the performance of acts of justice and charity that spring from one’s love of God.75 The real tension or difference between Moses and Christ then is that the former “establishes laws as a lawgiver” whereas the latter proceeds as a “teacher giving instructions”; for Christ “did not wish to correct external actions as much as to correct the spirit.”76 The Christ model of the revealed teaching of theology involves a correction to the Moses model of the revealed teaching of theology in the following ways. Human beings long for security and prosperity; the phenomenon of prophecy or revelation establishes that a suprahuman agent is willing to offer security and prosperity to them; the suprahuman source makes itself and its design known to human beings through the revealed teaching professed by Christ, who reveals the plan of living that must be adopted and obeyed by human beings if they are to live securely, prosperously, and attain salvation. Furthermore, in Spinoza’s account of the Christ model for comprehending the revealed teaching of theology, interest in the working of miracles becomes insignificant because the “Wisdom of God” has taken on human nature in Christ and the divine teaching is said to be knowable by the “natural light.” Therefore it is not an article of faith or piety that the faithful believe that Christ actually worked miracles.77 The true plan of living that guarantees the security, prosperity, and salvation for which each human being longs is first revealed through Moses who teaches that God is to be loved and obeyed. But Christ, who is “the way of salvation,” reminds human beings of the fact that the fundamental premise of the law, namely, obeying God by loving God and loving one’s neighbor, is indeed the sum of the divine law itself. Ceremonies, rituals, and institutions may serve to foster faith and piety in human beings. But ceremonies, rituals, and institutions are not requisite for human blessedness;78 TTP 3: 177. TTP 3: 103. 77 TTP 3: 68 and 90; and compare 43–44; 96; 156–58; 163; 168. 78 Spinoza asserts that the ultimate significance of the Scriptures is identical with their ability to move human beings to adopt a particular manner of living. He says that if one reads the Scriptures but is unaffected by them, that is, if one does not change his life, then it is as if he had read “the Koran or the Fictitious fables of the Poets” (TTP 3: 79). Readers of the Bible would find ‘reading the Koran’ a poor substitute for learning the true plan of living. So too a reader of the Koran would find ‘reading the Bible’ a poor substitute for learning the true plan of living. But common to reading the Bible, reading the Koran, or even reading the “fables of the Poets,” perhaps 75 76

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in fact, they can have the potential to debase and corrode the essential message of theology or revelation and therefore they are not mandatory for faith or piety.79 According to Spinoza, the plan of living that makes salus available to human beings and which enables human beings to live securely and prosperously can be received with equal effectiveness as an eternal truth or as a law which must be obeyed. The prophets have given an instruction that simply is moral in character and their prophecies or revelations are meant only to amplify the divine law as it eventually was articulated by Christ. Because that law applies to all of humankind there is no one nation or group that enjoys a privileged place among others in respect of their receipt of the law, their comprehension of the law, or the advantages that accompany obedience to that law. Furthermore, since the law is universal and eternal, there are no incidents of miracles or cases of special providence, that is, there are no contranatural events caused by a suprahuman agent, which would afford security and prosperity for only one people to the exclusion of the remainder of the human race.80 Instead the security and prosperity for which every human being longs is achieved through belief in the divine law and faithful adherence to it. The Scriptures express the divine law simply and unambiguously.81 Therefore wearisome contentious disputes about the interpretation of the Scriptures are pointless.82 The fundamental message of the Scriptures is easily intelligible and it is directed to the whole human race. Moreover, the intention of prophecy or revelation is only moral and thus one should not impute any authority to Scripture, faith, theology, revelation, or piety in matters pertaining to philosophic speculation, mathematical demonstration, or the knowledge of nature.83 Each may judge for himself about the basic meaning of theology, revelation, Scripture, faith, or piety because the instruction is simple as well as universal; and, in addition, each may judge for himself what messages, teachings, or instructions from the narratives of the Scriptures best serve the purpose of enhancing his

the works of Homer or Virgil for instance, is the issue of the power that each of the writings has to affect how human beings conceive of themselves and how they then conduct their lives and govern their affairs. 79 TTP 3: 10; 69–72; 76; 79–80; 200. 80 TTP 3: 47–48; 50; 56–57. 81 TTP 3: 102; 165. 82 TTP 3: 104; 116–17; 178–80; 184–85; 188. 83 TTP 3: 170.

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piety, that is, his obedience to God.84 The difference between the Moses model for comprehending the revealed teaching of theology and the Christ model for comprehending the revealed teaching of theology is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the claim that all of the prophets “command” whereas the apostles “teach.”85 The prophets issue edicts, warnings, and threats; the apostles argue and persuade. Hence the prophets are promulgators and enforcers of the divine law but the apostles strive to inspire human beings to understand the divine law and adopt it. On the basis of the dissimilarities between the Moses model of understanding theology or revelation and the Christ model of understanding theology or revelation, one may say that the delivery, implementation, and observance of the fundamental teaching and meaning of the Scriptures may be distinguished in terms of what follows in accordance with the prophetic mission, on the one hand, and what follows in accordance with the apostolic mission, on the other hand. The prophetic mission appears to be driven by an impulse to reign over those who adopt the faith by compelling them to remain faithful while the apostolic mission seems to be driven by an intention to persuade and invite human beings to be faithful.86 The prophetic mission is ordained for the Hebrew people only; the apostolic mission is ordained for all of humankind. The prophetic mission is autocratic and authoritarian; orthodox tenets are established and issued; the observance of them is strictly determined; and one’s faith is gauged by one’s unwavering adherence to the law. The interpretation of theology or revelation or the Scriptures is a matter reserved for those who are sufficiently trained or for those who are sufficiently gifted to undertake the task. However, it also often is claimed that the Scriptures and the interpretation of them are fraught with “mysteries” that are beyond human comprehension or explication; but the mysteries must be conceded nonetheless.87 The prophetic mission also entails the working of miracles to certify the authenticity of a prophecy or a revelation. But the credibility of miracles itself emanates only from a vulgar and ignorant conception of the order and operations of nature which absurdly posits the feasibility of contranatural events. What is restrictive, exclusive, and conservative about the prophetic mission and 84 85 86 87

TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3:

168; 179. 151–54. 156. 97–98; 104–105; 109; 111–13.

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its sense of theology or revelation becomes expansive, inclusive, and liberal in the apostolic mission and its sense of theology or revelation, at least as the apostolic mission is characterized by Spinoza. Based on the descriptions of them in the treatise, a critical difference between the two models of understanding the revealed teaching of theology is that the Moses model or prophetic mission is portrayed as being explicitly autocratic whereas the Christ model or apostolic mission is portrayed as being implicitly democratic. The Christ model of theology or revelation, together with its manifestation in the apostolic mission, proposes that there is one indispensable teaching communicated throughout the entirety of the Scriptures. The revealed teaching involves a plan of living which assures those who adhere to the plan that they will be saved. To love God above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself is the plan of living that guarantees one’s ultimate security, health, prosperity and wellbeing. It is the plan of living that will optimize the successful satisfaction of the third proper object of desire that is pursued by every individual. Furthermore, though doctrine and dogma are important to faith, theology, revelation, the Scriptures, and piety, in the final analysis it is only the performance of acts of justice and charity practiced in obedience to the divine law that evinces and affirms whether one is faithful. More importantly, one’s faith only can be evaluated properly on the basis of one’s piety, that is, one’s obedience to God;88 and one’s obedience to God does not depend upon one’s understanding of the doctrines of faith to which one subscribes but instead one’s obedience depends only on whether the doctrines of faith to which one subscribes lead an individual to be more obedient or they lead an individual to be disobedient and stubborn.89 Spinoza’s theological teaching in the treatise is representative of what may be characterized as a broadly Christian kind of faith. It emphasizes the superiority of the revealed teaching of Christ over the revealed teaching of Moses; though Spinoza maintains that the essential instruction in each of the revealed teachings is the same.90 His theological teaching in the treatise advocates the legitimacy of common sense or reasonableness in respect of the interpretation of

88 89 90

TTP 3: 167–68; 175. TTP 3: 174–77; 180. TTP 3: 163; 165–66.

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Scripture, the framing and understanding of doctrines or dogmas, and the performance and practice of faithful acts of justice and charity.91 The teaching of theology in the treatise conveys a doctrine with which most Christians could find some basic general agreement, though certain Christian sects obviously might object to particular aspects of Spinoza’s account and description of theology. Still, Spinoza attempts to blunt the significance and impact of possible disagreements with his teaching of theology in the treatise to the extent that he defends the view that each individual possesses a fundamental liberty of personal interpretation and judgment about matters of theology, revelation, Scripture, faith, or piety insofar as the inspiration for one’s own faith or piety ultimately is a private matter.92 The theological teaching of the treatise establishes that theology or revelation or Scripture or faith or piety propounds one uniform lesson that is accessible, comprehensible, and practicable by all human beings. Moreover, the indispensable lesson has been revealed. In other words, the revealed lesson involves the communication of the “sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings.”93 The matter was communicated both to Moses, the lawgiver of the Hebrew people, and to Christ, who was sent to instruct the entire human race. The doctrine or lesson which is the foundation of theology, revelation, Scripture, faith, or piety is uniform and it is commended throughout the Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian Scriptures. The doctrine is the “Divine Law” and it encourages all who encounter it “to love God above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.” However vexing the interpretation of the Scriptures may be, whether the vexation owes to the absence of a thorough Hebrew grammar or the textual corruptions that may have occurred to the sacred books over time,94 Spinoza

TTP 3: 116–17; 173–74; 178–79. TTP 3: 116–17; 173–74; 178–81. 93 TTP 3: 15. 94 TTP 3: 105–107. In chapter 7 of the TTP, Spinoza’s complaints about the difficulties of interpreting Scriptural passages are directed principally against passages from the Hebrew Scriptures. At one point, Spinoza almost despairs of being able to resolve many of the textual problems at all (3: 111–12). But one should not conclude that Spinoza’s criticisms are reserved for the Hebrew Scriptures alone. On the contrary, at the close of chapter 10 of the TTP, Spinoza demurs from addressing any questions about the Christian Scriptures on the grounds that he does not possess an adequate knowledge of Greek, the original Hebrew texts have been lost, and others who are more competent than he already have undertaken the task (3: 150–51). But in chapter 7, Spinoza already contended that what is said apropos the “Old Testament” 91 92

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assures the reader of the treatise that the “the foundation of the whole of religion,” namely, obedience to the instruction to love God and to love one’s neighbor, “cannot have been adulterated or written by an errant scribe” because if the Scriptures had taught any other doctrine then “it necessarily would have had to teach the remainder in another manner and the whole fabric falls to ruin.”95 The teaching of theology or revelation or Scripture or faith or piety is one. Furthermore, it is “a doctrine that cannot be investigated by the natural light, or at all events there has been no one who has demonstrated it, and therefore revelation was very necessary.”96 In other words, according to Spinoza, the revealed teaching about “love of God,” “love of one’s neighbor,” and obedience to God’s command to love one’s neighbor by living justly and charitably, is a lesson that cannot be demonstrated by reason or the “natural light” but it nevertheless remains a doctrine to which “our judgment” may assent because “we at least may embrace what already has been revealed with moral certainty” and what was revealed by the prophets is to be accorded “moral certainty, as already was shown in Chapter 2 of this Treatise.”97 The theological teaching of the treatise proposes that there is a divine law that has been revealed through the Scriptures. The principal advocates and promulgators of the divine law are said to have been Moses and Christ; though Christ’s instruction should be regarded as superior to the instruction of Moses since “the Wisdom of God took on human nature in Christ,” “Christ was the way of salvation,” and “Christ was sent to teach the entire human race.”98 The theological teaching of the treatise posits that the reading, understanding, and interpretation of theology, revelation, or the Scriptures basically are private and personal matters. The public matter of how one reads, understands, and interprets theology, revelation, or the Scriptures is exhibited in one’s living a life that is conspicuously just and charitable and doing so in obedience to God’s command to love one’s neighbor. One’s faith or piety therefore is demonstrated by one’s actions rather than by one’s convictions and, according to Spinoza, “it follows that also implicitly applies to the “New” inasmuch as the authors of both testaments were Hebrews and so their mode of expression even in the New Testament basically “also was Hebraic” (3: 100). 95 TTP 3: 165. 96 TTP 3: 185. 97 TTP 3: 185. 98 TTP 3: 21; 64–65.

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nothing can pertain to the catholic or universal faith which is able to give controversy among decent human beings.”99 Spinoza’s individual, liberal, and minimalist theology prepares a reduction in sectarian quarreling about a variety of issues to the extent that theology or revelation or the Scriptures or faith or piety is concluded to impart only moral certitude. No legitimate claim can be made by theologians, preachers, or the faithful that theology or revelation portends any mathematical or speculative certitude. Consequently, theological disputes that bear on theoretical matters simply become irrelevant; and any attempt by theology or religion to pretend to possess an authority or influence over such matters or indeed anything other than a consideration of moral issues must be taken as impertinence. The theological teaching of the treatise thus seeks to forestall the “prejudices of the theologians” and their “excessive authority and petulance” by establishing that the liberty of individual judgment is a fundamental concession demanded not only by Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise but by Scripture itself as well.100 After contesting long held prejudices and reclaiming uncontaminated beliefs, Spinoza’s teaching of theology in the treatise purports to reflect a doctrine that is more consistent with and approximate to that uncorrupted, untarnished, unprejudiced “Religio antiqua,” the demise of which had been lamented in the Preface to his book.101 The theological teaching advanced in the treatise obviously is Christian in character. It also obviously is liberal in attitude. But the theological teaching of the treatise is not indeterminate. According to Spinoza, theology or faith concerns nothing other than piety and obedience;102 and faith is defined as thinking or feeling those things about God such that when one thinks them or feels them one’s obedience to God is necessitated but when one ignores those things one’s obedience

TTP 3: 177. TTP 3: 116–17; 178–79. 101 Spinoza ostensibly recovers a more basic sense of theology or religion that accords with his sense of what had been sacrificed or corrupted in theology or religion by the various churches over time. Spinoza thus affords the reader a recovered sense of the “ancient Religion.” But one should not miss the irony. That is, the recovery of the more pristine “ancient Religion” is achieved only at the expense of the scathing critique of the “prejudices of an ancient people,” namely, the Hebrews, that is executed by Spinoza (3: 8; 81; 180; 222). In other words, on the one hand, the term “ancient” connotes “venerable” but, on the other hand, the term “ancient” in the treatise also is used to signify “rude and obsolete”; see Leo Strauss, “How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise,” Persecution and the Art of Writing, p. 194. 102 TTP 3: 179. 99

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to God is neglected.103 In other words, theology or faith is the sum of a set of revealed tenets that induces human beings to obey God and to live piously. Moreover, the sum of the revealed set of tenets is identical with what are defined as the essential and indispensable seven dogmas of the “universal faith” which are articulated in chapter fourteen of the treatise. The dogmas are essential to the universal faith inasmuch as “there are no others more than these”; and they are indispensable because if one were not to believe or to think or to feel such things about God then one’s obedience to God, and hence the prospect of one’s salvation, would be removed.104 The seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith are expressed by Spinoza in the following way. “(1) God, a supreme being, who is supremely just and merciful and who is the exemplar of the true life, exists. One who is ignorant or does not believe that God exists cannot obey God or know God as a judge. (2) God is one; no one can doubt that the supreme devotion, admiration, and love of God requires it; for devotion, admiration, and love only arise from one being excellent above all the rest. (3) God is present everywhere, or all lies open to God. If it were believed that a thing could be concealed from God then it could be doubted that God directs all things with fairness and justice, or one could ignore God’s fairness and justice. (4) God holds supreme right and dominion over all things. Everything God does is done at God’s good pleasure and singular grace; all absolutely must obey him, he obeys no one. (5) The Worship of God and obedience to him consist solely in Justice and Charity or love toward one’s neighbor. (6) Only all who obey God by this plan of living are saved; the rest who live under the regime of pleasure are lost. If human beings did not believe this firmly there would be no cause why they would choose to obey God rather than pleasure. (7) Finally, God remits the sins of the penitent: There is no one who does not sin; if therefore this were not established all would despair of salvation and there would not be any reason to believe God is merciful. Whoever firmly believes this, namely, God directs all things from his mercy and grace, remits the sins of human beings, and for this reason is incited to love God more

103 104

TTP 3: 175. TTP 3: 175; 177–78.

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greatly, he really renews Christ in himself according to the Spirit, and Christ is in him.”105 The seven fundamental dogmas of the “universal faith” generally are consonant with a recognizably Christian sense of the meaning of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety. But Spinoza’s interpretation of the basic character of that Christian teaching still also reflects his own liberal design. For example, the third dogma of the universal faith affirms the omnipresence of God. If one were to doubt God’s omnipresence, Spinoza says, or if one were to suppose that something could be concealed from God then one could doubt or ignore God’s equity and justice. In other words, if one doubted or ignored the omnipresence of God then one could suppose that some violation of the divine law could occur which would escape God’s notice; and, as a result, God’s justice and/or God’s mercy would be diminished or people could come to question God’s justice and/or mercy.106 The dogma that God is omnipresent and God is just and merciful must be believed. If the dogma is not believed then one cannot be obedient to God; and if one is not obedient to God then one is not faithful; one cannot live or act piously; and consequently one’s very salvation is at risk. Still, the liberal bent of Spinoza’s theology is confirmed by his claim that belief in the omnipresence of God does not require that one affirm the actual omnipresence of God or that one affirm the potential omnipresence of God. Rather, what each individual affirms about God’s omnipresence will be determined in accordance with each one’s own opinion about the matter. Moreover, whichever opinion one adopts about God’s omnipresence is irrelevant with respect to affecting that individual’s faithfulness. For although belief in God’s omnipresence is required for obedience to God and hence it is required for one’s salvation, belief in God as being “potentially omnipresent” or being “actually omnipresent” is a matter of personal opinion. The only issue of note is whether one or the other particular opinion better serves the enhancement of one’s piety, that is to say, one’s obedience to God.107 It equally is a matter of private opinion and private judgment whether one believes that God, as “the

TTP 3: 177–78. A different interpretation of Spinoza’s point would be that if one doubted God’s justice and/or mercy then one could opt for a “life of pleasure” rather than a life of “obedience to God”; and, furthermore, one could do so without compunction because divine reward and punishment would not be assured. 107 TTP 3: 178. 105 106

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exemplar of the true life,” is perceived to be “fire, Spirit, light, thought, etc.”; and it also is a matter of private opinion or private judgment whether one holds that God “prescribes laws as a prince” or whether God simply “teaches eternal truths.” The decisive issue concerns only the question of whether what one believes encourages an individual to be obedient or whether what one believes encourages an individual to be, or to become, disobedient.108 One must believe in God’s unity, God’s mercy, God’s grace, and the remission of sins by God. One also must believe that God exercises dominion over all things and that God obeys nothing whereas everything obeys God. One must believe that obedience to God consists solely in love of neighbor, which is demonstrated by acts of justice and charity; and one must believe that only those who live in such obedience to God are saved while all others are lost. Finally, one must believe that even the disobedient yet may have their sins remitted by God and consequently everyone may live in the hope that his disobedience will be forgiven and his salvation retrieved if he comes to obey God fully. Whatever anyone personally holds with respect to the specific nature of God’s attributes, namely, God’s unity, God’s mercy, God’s grace, God’s dominion over all things, God’s omnipresence, or God’s forgiveness of sins, is a matter of personal conviction that has bearing on the worth or the sincerity of an individual’s faith only to the extent that one’s convictions encourage or discourage his obedience to God. Scholastic debates and disagreements between individuals, churches, or institutions about the “actual omnipresence of God” versus the “potential omnipresence of God,” for example, at best are irrelevant to the practice of piety or faith. But at worst, such debates or controversies can have the harmful consequence of confusing the faithful to the extent that the controversies can sow doubt in the minds of the faithful about what is necessary to be believed for the purpose of being obedient to God and attaining salvation as distinct from what concerns are left to the preference and judgment of each pious or faithful person. The worth of one’s faith or theology or piety, that is, one’s belief in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith, is not something to be ascertained by the reasons one adduces to substantiate his conviction; rather the issue of one’s faith or theology or piety is to be determined only on the basis of the individual’s performance of acts of justice and charity, namely, his acts of love toward

108

TTP 3: 178.

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his neighbor as they are undertaken in obedience to God.109 Whatever view one may adopt about the particular characteristics of any one of the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith, faithfulness itself only requires that one acknowledge and embrace the basic seven fundamental dogmas; for if any one of the dogmas is removed then obedience also is removed110 and should obedience to God be removed then one’s salvation will be put in jeopardy. According to the theological teaching of the treatise, belief in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith is the necessary precondition for the performance of just and charitable actions in obedience to God. By the performance of such acts in obedience to God, individual salvation will be achieved. In contradistinction to their actions, individuals are permitted considerable latitude in the ways they understand the particular features of any one of the fundamental dogmas so long as their interpretations of them do not instigate behaviors that prompt disobedience to God. The theological teaching of the treatise thus curiously represents a kind of ‘liberal orthodoxy’. But the liberal orthodoxy of the theological teaching of the treatise also includes a rather extreme principle, namely, the fact of someone’s faith or piety is established only on the basis of that person’s performance of just and charitable acts. Regardless of what an individual’s particular beliefs may be, if his actions exhibit justice and charity then that person is accounted faithful or pious; whereas if another person’s beliefs conform to traditional and approved theological tenets but his actions vitiate justice and charity then he is faithless and impious.111 The performance of just and charitable actions in obedience to God serves the definitive function of confirming the validity of the foundation and meaning of revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety. That is, if human beings live justly and charitably then the teaching of revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety is substantiated. Thus it also is clear that the dogmas of the universal faith are dedicated to the aims of influencing human action, directing human behavior, and framing the terms for cooperative human living. To put the matter in terms of the “proper objects of desire,” the teaching of theology offers a plan of living that promises its followers “secure and healthy life.” It is a plan

109 110 111

TTP 3: 178–79. TTP 3: 178; and compare 175. TTP 3: 175–77.

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of living that leads toward human salus; and Spinoza assures the reader of the treatise that the lesson of prophecy or revelation, and hence the lesson of theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety, expresses moral certitude even though it may not be competent to impart mathematical or speculative certitude. How an individual conducts his life and how an individual governs his affairs are the sole means for assessing that person’s faithfulness or piety; and an individual’s faithfulness or piety, that is, his obedience to God, is made practicable only because one believes each of the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith. Disputations concerning the complicated significances of Scriptural passages, or scholastic controversies about the merits of one tradition of theological doctrine over another, or conflicts about ceremonies and religious practices have no bearing on the authenticity of an individual’s faith or piety. On the contrary, despite the fact that there may be differences of opinion among believers about specific aspects of the dogmas of faith, only one criterion ever may be invoked to determine whether an individual is faithful or pious: namely, “if the works are good he still is faithful [since] faith without works is dead.”112 Indeed, Spinoza’s theological teaching in the treatise goes so far as to assert a curious and extreme principle: “faith does not require true so much as pious dogmas, that is, such as move the spirit to obedience though there are many among them that do not have a shadow of truth.”113 The theological teaching of the treatise affirms that human salvation depends upon obedience to God; and obedience to God depends upon one’s belief in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith. The dogmas themselves need not be true; they only need to be pious or they only need to be such as to promote piety in human beings. That is, the dogmas only need to advocate and encourage obedience to God. Whatever one may think of Spinoza’s liberal orthodoxy, there is something odd in his remark about the relation between piety and truth. If we assume the premise of the treatise that theology and philosophy in fact are separate from each other, and neither is handmaid to the other, then perhaps it may be said with some legitimacy that the piety of a dogma is far more important than the truth of it since the dogmas of faith are revealed dogmas and what is revealed customarily “surpasses human grasp” and hence is it beyond rational demonstration.

112 113

TTP 3: 175. TTP 3: 176.

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Or, because the revealed dogmas are held to convey only moral certitudes then they should not be expected to convey mathematical certitudes. In that sense, the piety of the dogma is more significant than the truth of it because the “piety” of the dogma involves a kind of empirical verification that the “truth” of the dogma does not. For example, we are able to see the faithful acting piously by their performance of works of justice and charity; in other words, we are able to see the faithful acting lovingly toward their neighbors. On the other hand, however, we are not able to see the faithful embracing the “actual omnipresence” of God rather than the “potential omnipresence” of God; nor are we able to see the faithful believing the unity of God, the mercy and grace of God, the ability of God to remit sins, etc. The reader of the treatise, perhaps especially the “one who reads philosophically” to whom the book is addressed,114 might be perplexed by Spinoza’s assertion that the fundamental dogmas of the universal faith only need to be pious rather than true.115 But Spinoza seems to make some attempt to alleviate concern about the unconventional character of his declaration by the fact that he strongly recommends the teaching of revelation, theology, the Scriptures, piety, or faith for the reason that the essential lesson of Scripture has been transmitted uniformly, without error or corruption;116 and he states that one may accept the testimony of the prophets and the apostles who reliably bear witness to the authenticity of theology’s lesson.117 The distinctive teaching of theology is the teaching of obedience to God. The seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith are the TTP 3: 12. TTP 3: 179. Spinoza’s ‘liberal orthodox Christianity’ possesses other features that also might strike “one who reads philosophically” as being rather curious in character. For example, with respect to the performance of ceremonies, Spinoza argues that the Hebrew regime employed various ceremonies for the sake of establishing greater social coherence and identity but the ceremonies in fact did not have any bearing on the “blessedness” of the Hebrew people. Christian ceremonies also are said to have no bearing on blessedness; even “Baptism and the Lord’s Supper” are said to have no “blessedness or any Sanctity in them” (3: 76). During the 17th century, the controversy with the Anabaptists was significant and so was the controversy over the Eucharist and the issue of transubstantiation. If Spinoza’s teaching of theology in the treatise is accepted then his position on “ceremonies” effectively neutralizes disputes about those matters. Also, with a view to the ability of the “natural light” to apprehend the “divine law,” Spinoza affirms that our natural faculties have that competence and so it is not necessary to accept the “divine law” on the basis of one’s conviction in the “passion and resurrection of the carnal Christ” (3: 68). 116 TTP 3: 165–66. 117 TTP 3: 163; 174; 186–88. 114 115

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propositions that are necessary to be believed in order for one to obey God and thus to live faithfully or piously. Only the faithful or pious or obedient are saved and they are saved precisely because of the plan of living that they have adopted.118 The plan of living emphasizes the performance of acts of justice and charity by the faithful and as a result ‘theological deeds’ now become more decisive to faith or piety than are ‘theological thoughts’ or ‘theological words’. Furthermore, knowledge of the nature of God is not a requirement for faith or piety or obedience; only conviction in the fundamental dogmas of faith is required. Accordingly, Spinoza discriminates between knowledge of God, on the one hand, and obedience to God, on the other hand. The discrimination is consistent with Spinoza’s claim that “an intellectual or accurate knowledge of God is not a gift common to all of the faithful as is obedience”;119 that is, “no one is able to be commanded to be sensible any more than to live or to be. Men, women, children, and everyone equally are able to obey by command, but not to be sensible.”120 Nonetheless, the tension between knowledge of God and obedience to God illustrates a deeper tension that runs throughout the teaching of the treatise. Spinoza asserts that “true human blessedness and happiness” consist solely in the knowledge and love of God.121 But he also observes that the “happiness and tranquility” achieved by any individual owe more to one’s own nature and “internal virtue” than they owe to “fortune, that is, the external aid of God.”122 A question should come to mind for the “one who reads philosophically.” If true blessedness and happiness derive from “knowledge and love of God” then why is it the case that the very basis and teaching of theology only involves a doctrine of “obedience to God” rather than a teaching that also places some premium on knowledge of God? Or, what do knowledge of God and obedience to God have to do with each other?123 The question partially is resolved by Spinoza’s assertion that no one can be commanded to be sensible, or knowledgeable, any

TTP 3: 177–78. TTP 3: 168. 120 TTP 3: 170. I continue to translate the Latin verb, sapere, as “to have sense or discernment” or “to be sensible.” My reason for choosing to translate the word in that way may be found in note 113 in Part One of this book. 121 TTP 3: 44–45; 60–61. 122 TTP 3: 68. 123 Compare Strauss, “How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise,” Persecution and the Art of Writing, p. 170. 118 119

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more than he can be commanded to live and to be. If one is to live well and achieve happiness then he must develop the faculties and characteristics that enable him to accomplish those aims. Knowledge of the primary causes of things and the acquisition of the habit of virtue are indispensable to living well; and the treatise teaches that knowledge of the causes of things and the acquisition of the habit of virtue are contained entirely “within human nature itself ” and therefore the realization of them depends upon “human power alone, or on the laws of human nature alone.”124 Hence it is possible for human beings to live well, satisfy the third proper object of desire, and attain happiness by increasing their natural knowledge and conducting their lives and governing their affairs in accordance with the dictates of reason.125 However, for those who fail to employ their own rational power in the purpose of living well and attaining happiness there is an alternative. All can be commanded to obey and by adopting a plan of living that has been laid down for them they can live in a manner that conduces to the security and health that each of them desires. Still, not all will achieve sensibility and not all will gain knowledge; nor can they be commanded to do so. Every human being will seek to discover and adopt a plan of living that enhances the prospect of his own security and health. But due to lack of knowledge of the causes of things, lack of an interest to acquire the habit of virtue by oneself, and lack of effort to exert reason as a power of human nature, the vast majority of human beings will not look inward but instead they will look outward for a means to achieving the third proper object of desire. Most human beings then regularly will look to “fortune, that is, the external aid of God.” More precisely, they will turn to a phenomenon like prophecy or revelation to instruct and guide them with respect to the conduct of their lives and the governance of their affairs in their attempts to achieve security and health.126 In other words, security and health for most human beings is more a matter of obedience to an established plan of living than a matter of knowing the best plan of living. TTP 3: 46. TTP 3: 15–16; 60–61; 189–92. 126 Spinoza’s mention of the fact that Alexander the Great turned to superstition confirms the natural human proclivity toward recourse to augurs, prophets, and ‘miraculous events’, in times of distress, confusion, or anxiety. Even Alexander, who would have studied prudence and reasonability under the tutelage of Aristotle, was not exempt from the urgings of his passions that led him to seek security and health in the dictates of soothsayers (TTP 3: 6) or in the aftermath of extraordinary acts (3: 96). 124 125

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Insofar as piety and faith derive from revealed teachings but knowledge of the causes of things and virtue derive from human nature, one could distinguish between the kind of life that involves “obedience to God,” which is engendered by revelation, and the kind of life that involves “knowledge and love of God,” which arises from “human power alone and the laws of human nature.” Furthermore, inasmuch as nonphilosophers are more prone to follow their passions and to look chiefly to fortune in order to conduct their lives, govern their affairs, and satisfy their desires, whereas the philosophers follow reason and look to knowledge of nature and knowledge of the causes of things in order to conduct their lives, govern their affairs, and satisfy their desires, one may question whether the philosopher is able to live piously at all.127 Moreover, if “natural knowledge” and “prophecy or revelation” are equivalent,128 it is unclear why the former will lead to knowledge of God but the latter only can lead to obedience to God. Indeed, according to the teaching of the treatise, the teaching of revelation or theology or the Scriptures or faith or piety does not even require that the doctrines which promote obedience to God even be true. The only doctrines that are required by the “universal faith” are ones that sufficiently lead human beings to obey God by living justly and charitably; and human beings adopt that plan of living only because it has been revealed to them. They do not adopt the revealed plan of living because it emanates from natural knowledge or reason; for “no one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God, nor indeed does he attain it by reason, but someone is able to adopt it only on account of revelation confirmed by signs.”129 Consequently, the appeal of theology or revelation, and with it the prospect of inducing human beings to obey God, is tied to the appeal of “revelation confirmed by signs.” Yet in terms of the

127 The question of the relationship between piety and philosophy, of course, is the theme of Plato’s Euthyphro, as well as being a critical element of The Apology of Socrates. In the case of Socrates, the tension between the philosopher and the city is reflected in the tension between reason and piety. A similar tension seems to be present in the TTP. One illustration of the tension and Spinoza’s attempt to repair it appears in his intent to demonstrate in the TTP that philosophy, and the liberty of philosophizing, need not be detrimental to “piety and the public peace.” 128 TTP 3: 15–16. 129 TTP 3: 198. Philosophy and reason have truth as their common object and philosophy is founded upon “common notions that are sought on the basis of nature alone” (3: 179–80; compare 183 and 188). Accordingly, if one cannot know “by nature” that he owes any obedience to God then it also follows that one cannot know the doctrine of obedience to God on the basis of philosophy or reason.

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teaching of the treatise, the phrase “revelation confirmed by signs” is very problematical in two significant respects. The first and more obvious problem attaches to the notion of “signs.” Spinoza asserts in chapter two of the treatise that the process for the certification of the authenticity of “prophetic certitude” always was based on three criteria: (1) the revealed matters were imagined very vividly; (2) there was a sign; and (3) the prophet’s spirit was inclined toward fairness and goodness.130 Indeed, the theological teaching of the treatise also affirms that the apostles “confirmed their sayings by signs [for] signs absolutely were required for converting the peoples to religion and confirming them in it.”131 But in the course of the teaching of the treatise, Spinoza identifies “signs” with “miracles,” that is, the sun standing still for Joshua is called a “sign” in chapter two of the treatise132 and the same event illustrates a miracle in chapter six of the book.133 But, according to Spinoza, miracles are absurd.134 If revealed teachings require or involve signs or miracles to validate the teachings then there would appear to be serious grounds for questioning the authority or the credibility of any doctrine that must be accompanied by an absurdity, that is to say, a miracle or a sign, in order to certify the revealed teaching. Still, the obvious problem of “confirmation by signs” is eased somewhat by Spinoza’s version of the corrected criteria for establishing “prophetic certitude.” In chapter fifteen of the treatise, after a lengthy analysis of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion, Spinoza insists that “the authority of the Bible depends upon the authority of the Prophets [and] the authority and certitude of the Prophets consist of (1) a distinct and vivid imagination, (2) a Sign, and (3) finally, and chiefly, a spirit inclined to the fair and the good.”135 Spinoza repeats the criteria for the certification of the authenticity of prophetic certitude that were named in chapter two of the treatise. But Spinoza’s appraisal of the possibility of certifying the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation based upon those criteria alters considerably in chapter fifteen. That is, after his investigation of theology and his critique of the prevailing tradition

130 131 132 133 134 135

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31. 153. 35–36. 84. 86. 185–86.

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of theology or religion, Spinoza is prompted to reassess how readers of the Scriptures should employ those three criteria. With respect to the vividness of a prophet’s imagination, Spinoza concludes that only a prophet could validate the vivacity of such a faculty and therefore the certitude of the prophecy or revelation must be based upon the other two criteria. Spinoza then says that appeals to signs also are problematical because even Moses warns the people about being duped by false prophets who yet can give “true signs.”136 Therefore the only remaining criterion by which to determine prophetic certitude is the disposition of the prophet toward fairness and goodness together with the teaching that the prophet offers, namely, a teaching that advocates, encourages, commands, or conduces to a plan of living that requires acts of justice and charity in obedience to God.137 So the authority, certitude, and perhaps most importantly the credibility of prophecy or revelation is confirmed simply on the basis of the character of the prophet and the character of the prophet’s teaching, both of which must evince a fundamental disposition in favor of fairness and goodness.138 Based on that standard, however, it could be argued that any reasonable or sensible teaching that promoted fairness and goodness, as all reasonable or sensible teachings should do, also could be regarded as a prophetic or revealed teaching and thus it could be said to possess “prophetic certitude.”139 In fact, Spinoza proposes that human laws or human plans of living only have a different focus than the divine law “unless they have been confirmed by revelation.”140 In other words, then, reasonable or sensible human laws can pass for divine laws to the degree that they indisputably satisfy the determinative criterion for prophetic certitude: They are laws made by fair and good human beings that aim at promoting fairness and goodness among human beings. After all, natural knowledge and prophecy or revelation have been made equivalent by Spinoza; and the preference for revealed teachings over the teachings of natural knowledge appears to derive simply from the extraordinary character of the former versus the ordinary character of the latter. A case in point is Spinoza’s claim about the testimony of the apostles. For he observes that although the religion preached by

136 137 138 139 140

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186. 186–87. 79. 59–61. 61.

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the apostles might not be accounted reasonable, since their preaching revolved around the “history of Christ” and the peculiar claims made about it,141 nevertheless the sum of their teaching could be approved by reason because it consisted entirely of “moral lessons.”142 Still, the present issue is the matter of revealed teachings being confirmed by signs. Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise holds that the presence of a sign or the occurrence of some astonishing event together with the enunciation of a teaching or a law only would enhance the likelihood that vulgar and intellectually deficient human beings would embrace the teaching or law that was enunciated. For example, Spinoza suggests that Moses recognized the necessity of performing signs or miracles in order to convince the Hebrew people to remain steadfast in their covenant with God. That is, “after Moses noted the obstinate mind and spirit of his nation, he clearly saw that he could not complete the matter he had begun without great miracles and God’s singular external aid.”143 The second less obvious but more dramatic problem with the phrase “revelation confirmed by signs” concerns the question of the veracity of revelation itself. Spinoza asserts that “prophecy or revelation is sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings.”144 He then says that because the source of natural knowledge and the source of prophecy or revelation is the same, namely, God, it follows that natural knowledge actually is a kind of prophecy, though natural knowledge is not accorded that designation. The two most important persons in the Scriptures to transmit “sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings” are Moses and Christ. However Spinoza assigns superiority to the teaching of Christ on the basis of the differences between the characteristic features of the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ. For example, Moses is distinct from all of the other prophets because God spoke with Moses “face to face.” But Christ surpasses Moses for the reason that Christ

141 One should recall Spinoza’s confession that he does not understand certain things put forth about Christ by certain churches (TTP 3: 21) as well as his claim that one may accept the revealed teaching of Christ without being required to accept the “passion and resurrection of the carnal Christ” (3: 68). 142 TTP 3: 156. 143 TTP 3: 53. Because Spinoza identifies the “external aid of God” with “fortune” (3: 46), the claim that is made about Moses by Spinoza insinuates that Moses understood just how much fortune, or apparently some kind of extraordinary good luck, would be needed so as to keep the Hebrew people orderly and united. 144 TTP 3: 15.

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communed with God “mind to mind.” The revealed teaching of Moses was delivered only to the Hebrew people. But the revealed teaching of Christ was intended for the entire human race. Moses pronounced laws on God’s behalf whereas Christ enunciated eternal truths. Those basic differences between the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ permit Spinoza to cast the teaching of Christ as more universal, more accurate, and more adequate than the teaching of Moses. In one sense, the espousal of the teaching of Christ over the teaching of Moses would seem to be an obvious consequence of Spinoza’s liberal orthodoxy. That is, prior to the institutionalization of it, the revealed teaching of Christ is not as stylized, ritualized, or formalized as the revealed teaching of Moses and the religion of the Hebrew people. Nor does the revealed teaching of Christ inherently demand the hierarchical systems of interpretation, adjudication, or social relations that are endemic to the revealed teaching of Moses. Furthermore, “Christ does not abrogate the law of Moses”;145 Christ’s purpose is to extend it. Christ was sent to teach all human beings to adopt a universal love of neighbor rather than remain bound by the more constrictive love of one’s own neighbor, namely, one’s fellow Hebrews, which had been taught by Moses.146 Still, the endorsement of the revealed teaching of Christ in lieu of the revealed teaching of Moses also introduces an inconspicuous but serious implication about the very nature of prophecy or revelation itself. According to Spinoza, Moses taught that God was a legislator, a king who sits in judgment, a ruler who dispenses justice, mercy, etc.; but Christ, who was the “mouth of God,” perceived revealed matters “truly and adequately” and imparted them as eternal truths rather than as laws.147 On the surface of his argument, Spinoza distinguishes between the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ in terms of their universalizability, their accuracy, their adequacy, as well as their mode of communication. But he also goes farther. What Moses taught about God and the divine nature proceeded “from revelation or from a foundation of what was revealed to him.”148 Therefore what Moses taught “from revelation or from a foundation of what was revealed to him” must be presumed to have expressed a 145 146 147 148

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71. 233; and compare 64. 64–65. 64.

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“sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings” since that is what is implied by “prophecy or revelation.” Yet Spinoza also concludes that the revealed teaching of Moses expresses a false conception of the divine nature. That is, the writing of laws in God’s name, even when undertaken by prophets, is an exercise that counters and corrupts an adequate perception of the truth about the matter, namely, that God’s decrees are not laws but instead they are eternal truths. The reason for framing revealed teachings as laws rather than expressing revealed teachings as eternal truths, says Spinoza, is that the vulgar are able or willing to comprehend God only in such a fashion. Accordingly, Spinoza says that “we conclude therefore that God is described as a legislator or a prince, and called just, merciful, etc., from nothing other than the grasp of the vulgar and from a defect of their understanding; and God really acts solely from the necessity of his own nature and perfection, and all of his decrees are eternal truths and involve necessity.”149 In addition, Spinoza contends that describing God as “ruler, legislator, or king” and imputing to God “justice or compassion” simply are anthropomorphisms that are completely “alien to the divine nature.”150 The theological teaching that is advanced in the treatise in accordance with Spinoza’s liberal orthodoxy occasions a conflict that should be noted by “one who reads philosophically.” Moses teaches “from revelation or from a foundation of what was revealed to him” that God is a legislator and king, a ruler who dispenses justice and mercy. Christ, however, does not portray God in such a manner. He does not present God as legislator-king but speaks of God in terms that are familiar to his audience and their experiences. Christ typically “spoke more clearly than the Prophets” but it is conceded by Spinoza that he still taught revealed things obscurely because he conveyed the revealed matters through parables.151 Spinoza explains the difference between the mode in which Moses portrays God and the mode in which Christ portrays God by noting that the Mosaic portrayal of God is rooted in a conception of the deity that was embraced by those he addressed but their conception also derived from “a defect of their understanding.” The principle at issue, however, is rather more controversial than

149 150 151

TTP 3: 65. TTP 3: 64; 171–72. TTP 3: 65.

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any simple suggestion that Moses or Christ employed concessions or accommodations of vulgar views in their revealed teachings. Moses says that God is a king who legislates; Spinoza says that such a conclusion about God is vulgar, intellectually defective, and fundamentally false. Hence the theological position of Moses is contradicted explicitly by the philosophical position of Spinoza; and perhaps it also is contradicted implicitly by the theological position of Christ, at least as that teaching is interpreted and represented by Spinoza in the treatise. An astute reader of the treatise might detect the following predicament. At first glance, Spinoza’s advocacy of the revealed teaching of Christ over the revealed teaching of Moses appears orthodox to the majority of the readers of the treatise who subscribe to one Christian affiliation or another. But the superiority of the revealed teaching of Christ over the revealed teaching of Moses can be maintained only at the expense of exposing the vulgar and intellectually flawed character of the revealed teaching of Moses. In other words, the merit of the revealed teaching of Christ is affirmed because of its contrast with the shortcomings of the revealed teaching of Moses; and Spinoza states that the same vulgar conception of the deity and the same “defect of understanding” that is attributable to the revealed teaching of Moses also applies to “Adam, the Israelites, and all of the Prophets who wrote laws in God’s name.”152 In effect, therefore, the revealed teaching of Moses and the entire prophetic mission that is based upon that teaching are erroneous. But if the revealed teachings of Moses and the prophets are erroneous then it cannot be said with seriousness or confidence that “prophecy or revelation is sure knowledge of some matter revealed by God to human beings.” If the revealed teaching of Moses expresses a vulgar and intellectually defective depiction of God and the divine nature then there is at least one cardinal instance in the Scriptures which demonstrates that prophecy or revelation does not impart “sure knowledge.” But if prophecy or revelation fails to impart sure knowledge on any one occasion, but especially on an occasion as significant as the revelation of the Law of Moses, then the claim that prophecy or revelation exclusively conveys “sure knowledge” simply is undermined. If what is conveyed through revelation can be vulgar and erroneous, as it is in the case of the revealed teaching of Moses, then what exempts any other instance

152

TTP 3: 63.

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of prophecy or revelation, including the revealed teaching of Christ, from imparting similar vulgar, intellectually defective, erroneous, or false doctrines? According to Spinoza, even Christ on occasion appears to have expressed his teaching as a law instead of communicating it as an eternal truth. Christ did so, Spinoza claims, because of the “ignorance and stubbornness of the people”; but Spinoza also remarks that in legislating on such occasions Christ “acted the part of God.”153 The latter remark suggests that whatever may have been the actual perception of revealed matters by Christ, it is clear that Christ was aware of the generally received view of God as a legislator-king and so he also was aware of the efficacy of introducing a plan of living that would bring salus to human beings in the form of a divinely issued law or command. While the vulgar are able to obey God, they are not able to understand or know God; though the vulgar often confuse their obedience to God for a display of their knowledge of God. The vulgar think or feel that God is a king who legislates, judges, punishes or rewards, shows mercy, and dispenses justice. Those views about the nature of the deity themselves obligate human beings to obey the sort of divine being who possesses such characteristics. Still, the vulgar’s ‘knowledge of God’ involves a circular argument; for the knowledge of the divine nature that compels obedience issues from a command in the revealed teaching of Moses rather than from some exercise of the intellect. The fact of the matter is that “all are able to obey” but not all are able or willing to know or to understand. The majority of human beings, the nonphilosophers, need a plan of living. But the plan of living that will promote their security and health must be proposed for them since they are unable or unwilling to utilize their own power and the laws of their own nature in order to acquire the habit of virtue. Thus Moses, almost always, but also Christ, on certain crucial occasions, gives expression to a revealed teaching as a law and consequently each imparts a revealed theology of salus that is predicated upon obedience to God. Both Moses and Christ teach obedience to God; and both Moses and Christ teach that obedience to God is evinced through acts of love toward one’s neighbor. An important difference between their teachings, however, is that Moses sought to effect compliance with the law through external compulsion which focused on bodily advantages or disadvantages154

153 154

TTP 3: 65. TTP 3: 70; 73–74.

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whereas Christ sought to effect compliance with the law through an internal correction or reform of the spirit of each individual.155 The “authority and certitude” of the Scriptures, and hence revelation, theology, faith, and piety, are identical with the authority and certitude of prophecy or revelation. The authority and certitude of prophecy or revelation, however, rest upon the satisfaction of three criteria; and two of the three criteria must be abandoned. One cannot know the “vividness of the imagination” of the prophet nor can one appeal to a “confirming sign” in order to establish the certitude of a prophecy or revelation. All that remains by way of establishing the certitude of the revealed teaching is a determination of whether the doctrine revealed and the one who revealed it are inclined toward “the fair and the good.” But representing the “fair” and representing the “good” does not entail that the revealed teaching be true; it only is required that the revealed teaching be pious. That is, the teaching must induce human beings to obey God.156 According to Spinoza, obedience to God depends upon one’s conviction in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith. But one also is at liberty to decide the exact manner in which he apprehends those dogmas. Again, one must believe that God is omnipresent. But “it is nothing to faith” whether one believes that God is omnipresent essentially or potentially; nor is it anything to faith if one obeys God based on one’s free will or whether one obeys God based on the necessity of the divine decree; nor is it anything to faith if one believes that “the reward of the good and the punishment of the evil is natural or supranatural.”157 In other words, one is not required to have a precise knowledge about the attributes of God in order to live in obedience to God and thus be saved. All such claims conform to Spinoza’s teaching of a ‘liberal orthodox theology’. But Spinoza also tells the reader of the treatise that “whoever says that it is not a necessity to understand the attributes of God but only simply to believe them without demonstration certainly is jesting.”158 On the one hand, Spinoza emphatically declares that one must believe the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith and one enjoys considerable personal discretion in precisely how one understands those dogmas. But on the other hand, Spinoza equally emphatically declares 155 156 157 158

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103; and compare 65. 168; 175–76; 180. 178. 170.

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that whoever says that one must believe that there are particular attributes of God without affording a demonstration of them is someone who “certainly is jesting.” What is the reader of the treatise to conclude? More to the point, what should the “one who reads philosophically” conclude about Spinoza’s odd or discrepant statements?159 At the very least, a philosophical reader of the treatise can be assured of this consequence. If theology is revelation160 and the teaching of revelation is the teaching of obedience to God161 and obedience to God is achieved only through conviction in the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith162 then one must acknowledge that on the basis of Spinoza’s arguments in the treatise, that is to say, his philosophical argument or philosophical teaching in the treatise, it is necessary to conclude that however much the fundamental dogmas of faith may assure piety they also continue to teach vulgar, intellectually defective, and erroneous characterizations of the deity and Spinoza already explicitly has renounced those vulgar depictions of the deity previously in his book.163 The seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith require the faithful or pious to regard God as “highly just and merciful”; to regard God as a “judge”; to regard God as “directing all things through his fairness and justice”; to regard God as “having supreme right and dominion” over everything; and to think of God as “forgiving” and as “directing all things by his mercy and his grace.”164 However, Spinoza himself 159 At this juncture it could be tempting to rehearse the history of the debate over the question about the sincerity of Spinoza’s theological teaching in the TTP. That is, one could address the question of whether the TTP contains both an exoteric teaching that is designed for nonphilosophers and an esoteric teaching that is designed for the potential philosopher or for “one who reads philosophically.” It is not my intention to resolve that issue here in its entirety. I have defended the proposition that “exoteric/ esoteric” literature is possible in “On the Practice of Esotericism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 53 (1992); and I have demonstrated Spinoza’s use of such literature in “Harris, Strauss, and Esotericism in Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus,” Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (1996) and in “Spinoza, Philosophic Communication, and the Practice of Esotericism” in Piety, Peace, and the Freedom to Philosophize, ed. Paul J. Bagley (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999). 160 TTP 3: 184. 161 TTP 3: 185. 162 TTP 3: 175 and 178. 163 TTP 3: 62–65. This is but one instance where Spinoza demands that his reader pay close and careful attention to statements made in the book that are inconsistent with each other directly or that are inconsistent with each other indirectly or by implication. In the seven fundamental dogmas of the universal faith, Spinoza is encouraging inattentive readers to accept what Spinoza himself philosophically rejects as vulgar, defective, and erroneous. 164 TTP 3: 177–78.

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rejects each of those characterizations of the deity for the reasons that they are erroneous and anthropomorphic. Hence to be faithful or pious in the manner demanded by the theological teaching of the treatise is to forsake any accurate understanding of the deity and to embrace a vulgar, intellectually defective, and anthropomorphic apprehension of the nature of God. The theological teaching of the treatise therefore endorses and advocates as the foundational doctrine and lesson of revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, and piety a teaching that Spinoza himself contests and dismisses as vulgar and mistaken. Still, Spinoza’s theological teaching may prove to be palatable to most of his readers inasmuch as it is more liberal and it is not as superstitionridden as he says the traditional teaching of theology or religion had become.165 Nevertheless, the “one who reads philosophically” will have noted the fact that the theological teaching of the treatise demands that the faithful or pious, or all those who long to count themselves as faithful or pious for the sake of achieving salus, adopt a set of tenets which the author of the treatise deems to be patently untrue. But if that is the case then what purpose does the theological teaching of the treatise serve? The answer to that question is complex. The theological teaching of the treatise conforms to Spinoza’s definition of theology in this sense. Theology is revelation and Spinoza holds that revelation teaches obedience to God. Furthermore, theology or revelation teaches obedience to God through love of God and love of one’s neighbor and those kinds of love are displayed in acts of justice and charity. Spinoza says that the teaching of revelation or theology or the Scriptures or faith or piety always has been uniform. Obedience to God, love of God, love of neighbor, and the performance of acts of justice and charity are the essential components of the revealed teachings of the sacred books as well as the foundational elements of the revealed teachings of Moses and Christ.166 With respect to the 165 TTP 3: 8–9. In place of the traditional teachings of theology or religion which emphasize senses of prophecy, prophets, law, miracles, and the interpretation of sacred books that reflect an extreme kind of superstitious orientation, Spinoza’s versions of those elements of revealed theology, as they are presented in the TTP, may be said to promulgate a sort of ‘enlightened superstition’ rather than a merely crude one. I have treated the issue in “Spinoza, Biblical Criticism, and the Enlightenment,” Modern Enlightenment and the Rule of Reason, ed., John McCarthy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998). 166 TTP 3: 165–66. Spinoza’s claim that the Hebrews’ “hatred of other Nations preserves them considerably” (3: 56) and his conclusion that hatred of other nations was identical with piety for the Hebrew people (3: 215) intimate that there may be a

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basic elements of faith, the theological teaching of the treatise then is conventional albeit with a liberal bent. But what is said about the differences between the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ points the careful reader of the treatise to a significant and different consideration. Notwithstanding his endorsement of the revealed teaching of Christ over the revealed teaching of Moses, Spinoza states that it also happens to be the case that human beings can arrive at the revealed teaching of Christ in a way that they cannot arrive at the revealed teaching of Moses. The revealed teaching of Moses was communicated by God directly to Moses alone and so he became the sole prophet or “interpreter of God”; all of the others who embraced the Hebrew religion subsequently submitted to the revelations, prophecies, dictates, and guidance of Moses.167 By contrast, however, when Christ communicated his revealed teaching as an eternal truth rather than as a law it was possible for human beings to apprehend the teaching “by the natural light” inasmuch as “the sum of it contained moral lessons.”168 Spinoza therefore maintains that “natural knowledge” or the “natural light” is more than competent to apprehend the “natural divine law”;169 and human nature is sufficiently equipped to devise a plan of living consonant with the nature of things such that it can provide security and health for an individual as well as for other human beings.170 But if that conclusion is correct then the revealed teaching of Christ would seem to be superfluous. If “natural knowledge” or the “natural light” can know the “natural divine law” as an eternal truth, for example, then there is no need to rely on the revealed teaching of Christ in order for human beings to achieve salus. The revealed teaching of Christ would be redundant, and even dispensable, on Spinoza’s view about what natural knowledge

legitimate and serious question about the uniformity of the Scriptures’ teaching about “love of a neighbor.” Spinoza himself acknowledges the discrepancy between the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ in chapter 19 of the TTP where he draws the reader’s attention to the passage from Matthew 5:43: “it has been said to you ‘love your neighbor and hate your enemy’ ” (TTP 3: 233). 167 TTP 3: 44–45; 205–209. 168 TTP 3: 156; 65. 169 Chapter 4 of the treatise bears the title, “De Lege Divina.” However, a few pages into the chapter Spinoza refers to the “divine law” as the “natural divine law” (TTP 3: 61–68). In effect, Spinoza blurs any profound distinction between the revealed divine law and the “universal laws of nature” (3: 57). The shift made by Spinoza is most unorthodox. 170 TTP 3: 59–61.

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or the natural light can attain. Hence one simply could set aside the teaching of Christ, to say nothing of the revealed teaching of Moses. One could set aside those revealed teachings except for one persistent fact: “Still it is impossible for carnal human beings to understand this [namely, that the highest good can be attained by reason] since it seems vain to him who has an extremely barren knowledge of God and also he finds nothing in this highest good that he can caress, eat, or finally have affect his flesh, which delights him the most, because [the highest good] consists solely in speculation and it is purely in the mind.”171 In other words, the revealed teaching of Christ, the apostles, Moses, and the prophets might be expendable if it were not for the fact that human nature is disinclined to exercise the natural light and seek a knowledge of nature, human nature is not inclined to acquire the habit of virtue through the use of reason, and human nature is not inclined to achieve salus through native powers of the intellect. Instead, human beings are inclined to function in accordance with their “fleshy instincts” and “what the appetite urges.”172 Therefore the revealed teaching of Christ, like the revealed teaching of Moses, is indispensable so long as human beings remain driven more by passion than by reason, or for so long as there are more nonphilosophers than philosophers. The revealed teaching of Christ is situated between two orientations. On the one hand, Christ reveals eternal truths but, on the other hand, Christ pronounces laws. When Christ reveals eternal truths, the truths equally can be apprehended by the natural light and so revelation becomes redundant. But when Christ pronounces laws it seems that he is “the mouth of God” and he “acts the part of God” which suggests that unique revelations or pronouncements from Christ are necessary for inculcating the appropriate plan of living that will make human salus possible. The revealed teaching of Christ is bifurcated. In one respect, it is a teaching that can be attained by reason left to its own devices. In the other respect, the revealed teaching of Christ imitates the revealed teaching of Moses in terms of enunciating the indispensable instruction that leads to human salus as a law that is to be followed. Christ’s imitation of Moses and his indebtedness to the mode of the revealed teaching of Moses is illustrated in the gospels. On the decisive occasion in the New Testament when Christ is asked

171 172

TTP 3: 61. TTP 3: 73; 189–90.

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by the Pharisees about the “greatest commandment in the Law,” Christ affirms the revealed teaching of Moses, that is, he confirms the “Law of Moses” and he emphasizes obedience to the divinely dictated command to love God above all and to love one’s neighbor as oneself 173 as constituting the essence of the divine law. Christ does not present that teaching, the cardinal instruction of the New Testament, as an “eternal truth.” On the contrary, he explains his own teaching as a commandment that places him in continuity within the context and on the foundation of the revealed teaching of Moses. Spinoza’s account of the revealed teaching of Moses and the revealed teaching of Christ has this consequence. What Christ may be said to teach in contradistinction to the teaching of Moses is something that also can be learned or known by virtue of natural knowledge or the natural light. But what Christ teaches in concert with the teaching of Moses is something that cannot be obtained through the exercise of natural knowledge, reason, or the natural light. What Christ and Moses both teach is the doctrine of obedience to God; and that doctrine is conveyed and known only through revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety.174 What Christ offers beyond the revealed teaching of Moses is an appreciation of the “natural divine law” as an eternal truth. But that aspect of the matter equally is accessible to reason or the natural light and therefore those who live in accordance with reason or the natural light are under no obligation to appeal to revelation, theology, the Scriptures, faith, or piety in order to apprehend the “natural divine law” nor do they have any interest to do so. But what Christ offers by way of imitation of the revealed teaching of Moses, namely, when Christ enunciates laws, is the continuity of a theological tradition which inculcates a plan of living that depends upon obedience to divine commands and a vulgar perception of the nature of the deity. At first glance, one might infer that Spinoza proposes in the treatise that the teaching of revelation and the teaching of the natural light converge and meet each other. That is, both revelation and natural knowledge are said to emanate from the same source, namely, God, and therefore the teaching of revelation and the teaching of the natural light eventually and ultimately intersect. But what revelation imparts and what the natural light concludes actually are mutually exclusive of

173 174

Matthew 22:34–40; Mark 12:28–34; and Luke 10:25–28. TTP 3: 170; 175; 179–80; 185.

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each other in the most important respect. Both revelation and reason or the natural light can teach “love of God.” Only revelation teaches “obedience to God” whereas only reason or the natural light teaches “knowledge of God.” Knowledge of God and obedience to God are not the same thing. Indeed the revealed teaching of obedience to God is predicated upon a set of dogmas that Spinoza himself describes as vulgar, intellectually defective, and anthropomorphic. The dogmas are pious, or at least they are deemed to be the sort of tenets that will induce human beings to obey God but the pious dogmas do not have to be true. So long as one is ignorant of the falsity of a dogma and remains obedient to God, his piety is assured; though Spinoza also suggests that one who becomes aware that a dogma is false “necessarily will become rebellious.”175 Thus ignorance of the falsity of a dogma conduces to piety but awareness of the falsity of a dogma will lead to impiety, that is, it will lead to an inability to embrace the fundamental dogmas of the universal faith. Disbelief in any one of those dogmas, or awareness of the falsity of any one of those dogmas, means that one cannot be pious in the sense defined by Spinoza in the theological teaching of the treatise. That is, disbelief in any of the dogmas or awareness of the falsity of any one of the dogmas of the universal faith is sufficient to preclude an individual from living piously, which is to say, disbelief in any of the dogmas of the universal faith precludes an individual’s obedience to God. Nonetheless, Spinoza also maintains that “we nevertheless can embrace by our judgment what already has been revealed with at least a moral certitude” since the certitude of the prophetic testimonies concerns only moral matters.176 The combined worth of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety and the pious fundamental dogmas of the universal faith is contained in the fact that all are able to embrace them and thus all are able to adopt a plan of living based upon obedience which is salutary. But knowledge of the “first causes of things,”177 acquisition of the habit of virtue, and knowledge of a true plan of living, which owe to “our power alone or

TTP 3: 176. TTP 3: 185. 177 TTP 3: 46. The first of the three proper objects of desire is “to know things through their first causes” [res per primas suas causas intelligere]. If God is the cause of all things as Spinoza affirms, that is, if God is the ‘first cause’ (3: 60; 84–85), then it is curious that Spinoza defines the first proper object of desire as involving the knowledge of the “first causes” of things which suggests more than one first cause. 175 176

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to the laws of human nature alone,” are not objectives that are achieved equally by all human beings. Theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety offers a rhetorically powerful, imaginatively appealing, and passionately compelling teaching that can be embraced by the vast majority of human beings. The doctrine of theology or revelation posits that human salus can be obtained by obeying God through loving God and performing just and charitable deeds toward one’s neighbor. An individual does not require a speculative or mathematical knowledge of God or the doctrines and dogmas of theology or faith in order to be faithful or pious; an individual only needs to believe certain things about God that will make mandatory obedience to God by that individual inevitable. Moreover, the theological teaching of the treatise proposes that even if one fails to live a life dedicated to obeying God, through the performance of acts of justice and charity toward one’s neighbor, it still is possible for him to enjoy the remission of his sins, that is, the remission of his disobedience, if he repents and is delivered by God’s mercy and grace. Still, no particular fundamental dogma of theology, revelation, Scripture, piety, or faith needs to be true; it only needs to be pious.178 178 A significant example will help illustrate the matter. In chapter 7 of the treatise, Spinoza examines the difficulty of determining the meaning, rather than the truth, of any Scriptural statement. He then illustrates the difficulty by raising the question of how one is to understand the assertion of Moses that “God is fire” and the assertion of Moses that “God is jealous.” Spinoza maintains that each assertion individually is perfectly clear in its meaning. But in respect of their relation to one another he says that the two statements are very obscure (TTP 3: 100). In chapter 2 of the treatise, Spinoza remarked that God was revealed in accordance with each prophet’s opinions and preconceptions about the divine nature. Consequently, it was revealed to Moses and “he taught nothing other than that [God] was merciful, benign, and extremely jealous, as is evident from many places in the Pentateuch. Finally, he believed and he taught that this being differed so much from all other beings that the image of nothing visible could express it nor could it be seen” (3: 38). The claim that “God is fire” and the claim that “God is jealous” are assimilated by Spinoza through reference to a declaration by Moses found at Deuteronomy 4:24. The passage there helps Spinoza to explain that “the name fire also pertains to anger and jealousy (See Job 31:12), so the statements of Moses are easily reconciled, and thus we legitimately conclude that the two statements God is fire and God is jealous to be one and the same in meaning” (3: 101). In chapter 7 of the treatise, Spinoza’s interest in the two propositions is limited to their meaning only. But later in the treatise a very different verdict is reached with regard to the utterances of Moses. In chapter 15 of the TTP, Spinoza argues that there are numerous places in Scripture which speak in accordance with the received opinions of the prophets or the received opinions of the vulgar, teach falsely, and involve contradictions (3: 180–86). Among the examples cited are the statements of Moses that “God is fire” and “God is jealous.” Rebutting the proposition of Alpakhar that “one passage contradicts another only by implication but not directly,” Spinoza declares that

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The most basic dogma of the “universal faith” only needs to establish with some credibility that God demands obedience from human beings; God demands that human beings treat their fellows with justice and charity; and God promises the forgiveness of sins, together with the prospect of redemption, if one repents and becomes obedient to God. That set of claims can offer a compelling inducement for human

the statements of Moses involve a direct contradiction. That is, “Moses directly affirms that God is fire (see Deut. 4:24) and he directly denies that God holds any likeness with visible things (Deut. 4:12)” [3: 183]. The direct contradiction attributed to Moses in chapter 15 of the treatise involves the same statements Spinoza previously treated and reconciled in chapter 7 of the book. In the earlier treatment of the statements, Spinoza assigned a reason for the Mosaic claim that “God is jealous.” According to Spinoza, the claim itself is contrary to reason and hence it is absurd. But however repugnant the doctrine of a jealous God may be to reason, Spinoza says that one plainly must conclude that “Moses believed it himself or at least he wished to teach it” (3: 101). Because Spinoza says that the statements “God is fire” and “God is jealous” are “the same in meaning,” one may resolve the direct contradiction between the statements of Moses about God’s appearance as fire and God’s inability to be seen in a similar fashion to the way the statements were reconciled in chapter 7. That is, it may be postulated that Moses himself believed that God was fire or “at least he wished to teach it.” From his explanation of the statements made by Moses, one may infer that Spinoza imputes to Moses the practice of teaching exoterically. That is, since the revelation of the Decalogue at Exodus 19:17–18 attests that God descended on Sinai as fire when the tablets were conferred to Moses, the continued affirmation of the claim at Deuteronomy 4:11 that “God is fire” focuses the attention of the Hebrew audience on the uniqueness of that event. Indeed, Deuteronomy 4 concerns the fidelity of the Hebrew people to God. It is a reminiscence of the past glories of the Hebrew people, their historic mission, and the promise of their future greatness. By rehearsing the doctrine of God’s jealousy and the doctrine of God’s appearance as fire, as the passages from Deuteronomy recount, Moses is reminding the Hebrew people of the unique status of their election, their receipt of the Law, and God’s demand for obedience and loyalty from them. Moses is proposing that continued adherence to the plan of living which he established will assure the Hebrew people of future acts of divine providence. What Moses teaches, in respect of God’s jealousy or God’s appearance as fire, may not be true—and Spinoza asserts that the statements plainly are “contrary to reason” (3: 183)—but the teaching of Moses certainly was pious in the sense that it prompted the Hebrew people to recommit their obedience to God. In addition to the surface argument about God’s jealousy and God’s bearing a “likeness with visible things,” Spinoza exposes the self-contradiction of Moses which indicates another facet of the “vulgar and intellectually defective” character of Scriptural statements and the theology or faith that is based upon them. The exposure of the self-contradiction indicates that the Scriptures profess irrational things. For “one who reads philosophically,” the exposure of the irrationality of certain Scriptural claims, e.g., “God is fire” or “God is jealous,” should raise a crucial question: Which passages or doctrines of the Scriptures, if any, were ones that the speaker or writer of it really believed and which were the ones that the speaker of writer simply “wished to teach”? Spinoza’s use of “hidden and disguised arguments,” as Lambert van Velthuysen called them, to expose the irrationality of theological claims is intended to serve as a prompt for the philosophical reader of the TTP.

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beings to embrace the teaching of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety. The ambition of the foundational teaching of theology is not to withstand demands for rational verification of its dogma or doctrines. Instead, the purpose of the teaching of theology is to move human beings to behaviors that increasingly will promote their security and health, that is, their salus. Spinoza’s turn to theology or revelation to present the ‘teaching of obedience’ is dictated by the fact that the teaching of obedience cannot be established by reason. That is, “no one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God, nor indeed does he attain it by reason, but someone is able to adopt it only on account of revelation confirmed by signs.”179 Although the teaching of obedience to God is not a product of reason, it nevertheless is a teaching that is quite effective for influencing human action and behavior; it evidently is salutary; and it is persuasive to most human beings. Indeed, for that very reason, the “utility and necessity of Sacred Scripture or revelation has been very great.”180 Spinoza says in the treatise that if anyone wishes to persuade or dissuade anyone of anything that is not self-evident then he must argue his case by making concessions to the views of his audience and he must try to convince them of his position by deducing his claims from what is familiar to them; accordingly, he must demonstrate his claims by appealing to their experiences or he must appeal to their use of reason.181 But the goal of persuading or dissuading people about a specific matter regularly confronts a basic problem of human nature. That is, the sort of reasoning that may be required in order to demonstrate a point through the use of reason typically is too demanding for most human beings who eschew reason in favor of their passions and their immediate concerns.182 The kind of intellectual aptitude required for comprehending a thing by means of a rational demonstration of it is rare among human beings. Accordingly, Spinoza concludes that “human beings prefer to be taught by experience” rather than by rational proofs or demonstrations which presume abilities not possessed by the 179 TTP 3: 198. Spinoza only asserts that no one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God. But “one who reads philosophically” also might infer that if nature or reason does not teach obedience to a being who “has dominion over everything” (3: 177) it is unlikely that nature or reason can teach that one human being should or must obey another human being who is his equal unless he can be made to do so. 180 TTP 3: 188. 181 TTP 3: 76–77. 182 TTP 3: 73; 189–93.

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majority of them.183 Obedience to God is not known by nature and so it cannot be discovered, known, demonstrated, or proved to be true by the exercise of reason.184 Accordingly, since philosophy is reason and philosophy aims at knowledge of the truth about the causes or natures of things based upon common notions derived from nature alone185 the teaching of obedience to God, and perhaps the teaching of obedience simply, must be introduced by some other means. Those means are found in the revealed teaching of theology communicated through the Scriptures. But, more to the point, the Scriptures communicate the teaching of obedience in a manner that is especially alluring to the majority of human beings whose lives are conducted in accordance with their appetites and urgings. Persuading such individuals to adopt a plan of living that will lead to their security and health cannot be undertaken successfully by appeals to the reasonability or the sensibility of the plan or through the provision of rational proofs about it. Persuading passionate human beings to adopt a sensible plan of living will have to involve making concessions to their presumptions about things, accommodating one’s teaching to their received opinions, and appealing to their experiences. Passionate human beings will not be moved by rational demonstrations but they will be moved by accounts that conform to their inclinations and their way of perceiving themselves, others, and the world. To that end, Scripture proves to be most helpful; for “histories and revelations compose the greatest part of it and the histories principally contain miracles.”186 The narratives of the Scriptures relate the accomplishments of those who have adopted the plan of living that is articulated in the teaching of theology and the narratives also relate the failures of those who have rejected that plan of living or who have deviated from it. Moreover, the narratives in the Scriptures which contain the working of miracles forcefully illustrate God’s willingness to provide for those who obey the revealed teaching that is communicated through the Scriptures. The narratives of the Scriptures recount the blessings to be enjoyed by those who adhere to the plan of living that is formulated by the revealed teaching of theology and, since every individual seeks what he perceives to be to his own advantage or what he perceives to be of use to himself, the narratives 183 184 185 186

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77. 185. 179. 98.

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of the Scriptures are especially appealing because they affirm that acts of divine providence are performed in order to bestow “good fortune” or the “greater of two goods” upon faithful human beings.187 Hence, whereas reason may not be effective at persuading human beings to adopt a plan of living that will help them to achieve the basic objects of their desires, namely, security and health, it may be the case that the impressive narratives of Scripture and their accounts of marvelous wonders will fare better in persuading human beings to embrace a plan of living that will offer them what they need most.188 Even those who live in accordance with reason, those who pursue knowledge of nature, and those who follow the natural light are aware of the influence exerted by some stories on human dispositions as well as human actions; and philosophers will know that nonphilosophical tales are more likely to move or persuade nonphilosophers than rational arguments and proofs.189

TTP 3: 5–6; 44; 53–56; 81–82; 191–92. At issue is the question of rhetoric or the ‘telling of tales’. Spinoza notes that people may not sit still for long chains of deductions (3: 77); they are more moved and better moved by compelling stories. The educational process undertaken in Plato’s Republic also initiates with a “musical education of the soul”; for human beings are first moved more by music than by mathematical propositions. For the sake of the nonphilosophers, Spinoza will rely on his interpretation of the histories or powerful stories of the Scriptures in order to move the readers of the TTP to embrace his version of the teaching of theology just as Plato relies on his revision of the authorized poetry of the Athenians to move his interlocutors in the Republic (386aff ) to consider the teaching he advances for them. 189 In the course of the teaching of the treatise, Spinoza offers a commentary on the “intent of an author” as well as a commentary on ‘telling tales’, each of which gives an indication of Spinoza’s regard for certain sorts of writing, including the contents of the Scriptures. With respect to the “intent of an author,” Spinoza states in chapter 7 of the TTP that it is possible to read “similar histories in different books” (3: 110) but the judgment that a reader will make about each history or story will depend upon the opinion that the reader has about the author. In the context of chapter 7, Spinoza’s point is that it is necessary to know something about the life, upbringing, and disposition of the Scriptural authors in order to ascertain the meanings of their writings (3: 109). To illustrate the matter, Spinoza cites the case of a literary figure that “flies through the air” and “butchers” people. The example, Spinoza says, can be found in an account of Orlando Furioso, an account of Perseus by Ovid, and accounts of Samson and Elijah in the Books of Judges and Kings (3: 110). Acquaintance with the life and disposition of the author of each story informs the reader about how to interpret it. That is, familiarity with the author of the Orlando Furioso story informs the reader that the tale is intended to entertain; familiarity with Ovid informs the reader of the Perseus story that the tale has a political intention; and familiarity with the author(s) of the books of Judges and Kings informs the reader that the tales about Samson and Elijah have sacred intentions. We are able to draw those conclusions about the respective stories, Spinoza says, “because of the opinions we have of their writers” 187 188

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According to Spinoza, “faith in the histories” found in the Scriptures cannot yield knowledge of God.190 Nevertheless, the reading of the histories and an acquaintance with the basic features of them is “highly necessary for the vulgar” who are not intellectually competent to grasp things “clearly and distinctly.”191 What the narratives of Scripture affirm and repeat is that God exists; God sustains and directs all things; and God cares for human beings.192 Without belief in the existence of God, the direction of God, or the care of God for human beings, it would be difficult for human beings to obey God and embrace the revealed plan of living that assures them of their salvation. Indeed, if one were to reject the existence of God there would no reason for one to obey God rather than pleasure193 and for that reason Spinoza asserts that disbelief or lack of confidence in the narratives of Scripture is “impious.”194 That is to say, disbelief in the narratives of Scripture will prevent human beings from obeying God and following a plan of living that will assure their salus. (3: 110). In other words, although the substance of various stories basically can be the same, the purpose the story serves will be different depending upon the intent of the author who wrote it. The same story can serve the purpose of amusement, political instruction, or the inculcation of some theological view; and, with respect to ‘telling tales’, Spinoza also emphasizes in chapter 5 of the TTP that there are important consequences that accompany the telling of a tale. That is, Spinoza asserts that the reading of the Scriptures is of worth only insofar as it affects how one lives: “If one were to have faith in everything he were to read in the Sacred Scriptures but not attend to the doctrine that it intends to teach [viz., obedience to God] nor correct his life, for him it would be just as if he read the Koran, the Fictitious fables of the Poets, or the common Chronicles with the attention the vulgar usually do” (3: 79). In the end, the intent of the author and the tale that is told merge in the realization of a particular consequence for the behavior of the reader. If one reads and believes the Scriptures but does not alter and improve his life by having read them then it is as if he had read some profane or common book. But there also seems to be another equally plausible implication. If the consequence of reading the tale is decisive, i.e., if reading it makes one live better, then could it not be said that reading the Koran, poetical fables, or common chronicles could be just as effective as reading Sacred Scripture in exhorting human beings to live in some desired way? The Koran presents a revealed teaching that provides an instruction concerning the conduct of one’s life. The superiority of the Scriptures over the Koran, the fable, or the chronicle seems to be decided by the fact that “the opinion the reader” has of the author and the tale is determinative of how the story is received and understood; and for Spinoza’s audience the moral authority and force of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures enjoy preeminence over other books. 190 TTP 3: 61. 191 TTP 3: 78. 192 TTP 3: 77. 193 TTP 3: 178. 194 TTP 3: 78.

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Throughout the theological part of the Tractatus theologico-politicus, namely, chapters one through fifteen of that book, the reader has been advised of the difficulties and the dangers associated with the prevailing theological tradition. The tradition has urged human beings to accept the authority of certain schemes of Scriptural interpretation over others and it has denigrated the use of reason or the natural light.195 The theological tradition has attempted to subsume philosophy within theology or it has sought to reduce philosophy or reason to the status of a tool in the service of theology or religion.196 The theological tradition has demanded that the faithful and the unfaithful alike accept a view of nature that permits the possibility of miracles or events that occur in contradiction of the laws of nature.197 The tradition of theology or religion emphasizes the performance of ceremonies as manifestations of an individual’s faith or piety and it has insisted upon an individual’s belief in a number of stipulated tenets as proof of his faith rather than focusing upon his actions and behavior.198 The theological tradition has made pronouncements on speculative matters instead of confining itself to making recommendations about moral matters. Each of those troublesome elements of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion has been exposed and contested by Spinoza; and in lieu of what the theological tradition proclaims Spinoza offers an alternative version of that theological teaching. Spinoza’s teaching of theology in the treatise remains in line with the cardinal features of the theological tradition. Spinoza’s theological teaching emphasizes that God exists; God is meant to be worshipped; the worship of God consists of obedience to God; obedience to God only involves acts of justice and charity toward one’s neighbor; all who adopt the revealed plan of living are saved and all who oppose it or ignore it are lost. But by contrast to the tradition of the theology, in Spinoza’s teaching of theology one only needs to believe that God exists; one does need to know any of the particulars concerning God’s existence nor does one even need to believe various features about what may be imputed to the existence of God. One should read and familiarize oneself with the narratives of the Scriptures. But one should absorb only those aspects of the Scriptures that prompt firmer belief in God such 195 196 197 198

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that they occasion a more fervent obedience to God. One should look to the testimonies of the prophets, the chroniclers, the apostles, and the authors of the gospels for the moral lessons that may be gleaned from their writings; but one should not invoke the words of the Scriptures to solve speculative or philosophical questions. One should be moved by the Scriptural accounts of formidable historical events, and even the mention of the unusual occurrences that accompanied them, only insofar as those accounts may enhance one’s faith but one should not take the accounts literally; on the contrary, one must regard miraculous events simply as instances of causally unexplained ‘good fortune’ which have befallen people.199 Finally, whatever theology or revelation or the Scriptures or faith or piety seem to impart, each individual is permitted to take from it what is most consonant with his own sense of matters and what will contribute most to his obedience to God for the sake of his own salvation. It is not important that the doctrines or the dogmas of theology be true; it only is important that the doctrines or dogmas encourage one to live piously. Insofar as the piety of the foundation, meaning, teaching, and dogmas of theology is more crucial than the truth of those things, Spinoza can conclude the theological teaching of the treatise with a seemingly unqualified endorsement of theology; or at least an unqualified endorsement of the theological teaching that is propounded by him in the treatise. But perhaps the reason given by Spinoza for his endorsement of theology is more interesting than the endorsement itself. For Spinoza reminds the reader at the close of chapter fifteen of the treatise that “the utility and necessity of Sacred 199 A connection exists, I think, between “miracles,” as events for which the natural causes are unknown (TTP 3: 83–84) and “fortune,” as the occurrence of unexpected events which advantageously favor someone (3: 46). The same event can be called a “miracle” or an episode of “fortune” depending upon one’s suppositions about nature. That is, the one event that occurs unexpectedly and for which no causal account can be given will be called a “miracle” by the person who believes that God contravenes the order and operations of nature in order to display his power and providence for one group of human beings rather than another group of human beings (3: 81–82; 84). But that same event that occurs unexpectedly and for which no causal account can be given will be called “fortune” by two other kinds of person. The first kind of person is the one who sees the order and operations of nature as determined and inviolable; for him nature simply is acting in a way that he did not anticipate but still it is acting in accordance with the laws of nature. For the second kind of person, nature is an unknown and so he regards all events as matters of chance; the difference between good fortune and bad fortune is the same as the difference between what satisfies the person and what does not satisfy him. “Fortune,” for Spinoza, is defined as an occurrence that as yet is the causally unexplained “external aid of God” but the same description also equally applies to a “miracle” (compare 3: 46 and 96).

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Scripture or revelation is very great.” But the utility and necessity of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety is “very great” because “we cannot perceive by the natural light that simple obedience is the way of salus” hence the teaching of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety “has been a very great consolation to mortals.”200 In the context of Spinoza’s statement about the “utility and necessity” of the teaching of revelation, and the fact that it brings “consolation to mortals,” it seems plain that the Latin word, salus, should be translated by the English word “salvation.” Nonetheless it is well to remember the ambiguous character of the Latin word which can mean either religious “salvation” or it simply can mean general “wellbeing.” In respect of the theological teaching of the treatise, “obedience to God” is the way to theological or religious salvation. But perhaps obedience also is required for the sake of one’s own wellbeing together with the wellbeing of others in a social or political setting. What is significant in Spinoza’s statement about the “utility and necessity” of Scripture is the declaration that “we cannot perceive by the natural light that simple obedience is the way of salus,” be it theological salus or perhaps even social or political salus. Only revelation or theology makes such a doctrine available; though among the theological dogmas and doctrines “there may be very many that do not contain so much as a shadow of truth”201 and there are many things said in Scripture or revelation “which only Philosophy and reason and not Scripture teach to be false.”202 In the final analysis, it may be the case that philosophy, reason, or the natural light is unable to teach in truth that “simple obedience is the way of salus” in theological, social, or political terms. But philosophy, reason, or the natural light will espouse theology’s teaching of obedience for the reason that the doctrine is salutary for vulgar and passionate human beings who constitute the vast majority of humankind. Indeed, Spinoza discloses the social or political implications of the theological teaching of obedience at the close of chapter fourteen of the treatise when he states that “I leave everyone to judge how salutary and necessary this Doctrine is in a republic so that human beings live peacefully and in harmony.”203 In other words, because the “life of 200 201 202 203

TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3:

188. 176. 183. 179.

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passion” is equally as legitimate as the “life of reason,” in accordance with the teaching of nature, philosophy or reason or the natural light may endorse the theological teaching of obedience as a way to salus on the basis of it being a necessary and useful ‘pious tale’ even though it may not be a true tale. Theology teaches the doctrine that philosophy does not teach and perhaps philosophy cannot teach on its own. The realization of that fact, however, is attained only when the “one who reads philosophically” recognizes that Spinoza has theologized overtly but he also has philosophized covertly.

PART THREE

POLITICS

Chapter fourteen of the Tractatus theologico-politicus is dedicated to an examination of the “foundations of faith.” No chapter of the treatise by name is dedicated to an examination of the foundations of philosophy; and no chapter of the treatise by name is dedicated to an examination of the foundations of politics. The adjective politicus (political) conspicuously appears in the title of Spinoza’s book. But there is no formal or definitive treatment of “politics” or “the political” in the treatise.1 The Latin word politia, which means “the administration of the state,” appears once in Spinoza’s book;2 and later in the treatise, in the context of his examination of the “foundations of a Republic,” Spinoza refers the reader to the significance of what previously had been said about politia in chapter five of the treatise.3 In that chapter of the treatise which concerns the institution of “ceremonies,” Spinoza discusses the utility and necessity of society together with the reasons for its formation.4 He says that “we see that those who live rudely without politia make a miserable and almost brutish life.”5 Then, when discussing again the need for human association in the context of his account of the “foundations of a Republic” in chapter sixteen of the treatise, Spinoza reiterates his verdict that human beings live miserably, they fail to afford one another mutual assistance, and they neglect the cultivation of reason in those circumstances which

1 The Latin word Politica appears once in the TTP. Citing the teaching of Solomon, Spinoza says that “knowledge of God contains true Ethics and Politics” (TTP 3: 67). 2 TTP 3: 73. 3 TTP 3: 191. 4 TTP 3: 73–75. One should recall Spinoza’s remark at the close of chapter 14 of the TTP about the “salutary” effects of theology’s teaching of obedience and the performance of works of justice and charity with respect to peace and harmony in a Republic (3: 179). Spinoza also distinguishes the teaching of Sacred Scripture, theology, or faith for its “utility and necessity” in leading human beings to salus (3: 188). It is at least interesting that the double criteria of “utility and necessity” are applied almost exclusively to politics and theology in the TTP. 5 TTP 3: 73.

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are devoid of any sort of society.6 Though Spinoza offers no formal, separate treatment of “politics” or “the political” per se in the treatise, his account of the political things is contained in his teaching on the foundation, formation, definition, and purpose of a society or a republic. Therefore the political teaching of the treatise is transmitted through Spinoza’s accounts of a society, a republic, or the “regime” (imperium).7 The first extended remarks about society appear in chapter five of the treatise. The focus of that chapter is the ceremonial observances or laws of the Hebrew people that are described in the Scriptures and the stories that are related to them. But Spinoza also declares his intention in that chapter to demonstrate the “universal foundations” of society together with his account of how the ceremonial observances or laws of the Hebrew people were instituted for the purpose of fostering “only [their] temporal bodily happiness and the tranquility of [their] regime.”8 Spinoza’s description of the “universal foundations” of societies provides the basis for his formulation of an account about the natural inclination of individuals toward a life in society with other individuals. The “utility and necessity” of society, says Spinoza, is connected with the natural human drive toward self-preservation. That is, society is useful and necessary because it promotes mutual security from enemies and it “easily abbreviates many things,” such as labor; indeed, if there were not cooperation among human beings they would “lack the time and the skill to sustain and conserve themselves, for not all equally are apt for all things and no one alone would be able to provide for himself what he requires most.”9 The formation of a society principally is intended to assure the sustenance and conservation of the members of that society. A society seeks to achieve the sustenance and conservation of its members by overcoming the deficiencies that

TTP 3: 191. TTP 3: 193–200. In footnote 18 to the Introduction of this book, I explained my reason for translating imperium as “regime.” 8 TTP 3: 69. The overarching point of Spinoza’s argument is that the “divine law” is universal in character and the Hebrew ceremonial laws simply were customs or traditions observed by the Hebrew people as a particular nation. The ceremonial laws were not required for “salvation” (TTP 3: 78–80; and compare 48). 9 TTP 3: 73. The natural inclination toward society, as described by Spinoza, has an ancient pedigree. That is, both Plato (Republic 369a–d) and Aristotle (Politics 1252a24–1253a18) acknowledge that an awareness of the basic human insufficiency to live well on one’s own, that is, the fact of human need, is what initially compels human beings to enter into social or political arrangements with one another. 6 7

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are experienced by single, and perhaps isolated, individuals trying to provide for themselves on their own. What society introduces to the human situation are conveniences that make life possible as well as comfortable. A society offers its members mutual defense, facilitation of the use of various crafts or skills, the establishment of a division of labor, and, quite importantly, the promotion and the development of the arts and the sciences which Spinoza maintains are indispensable for the “perfection of human nature and its blessedness.”10 The formation of society is useful, necessary, and advantageous. What human beings can attain and accomplish in association with other human beings exceeds what any one human being might attain by himself alone. An individual’s awareness of his own insufficiency to satisfy his chief needs on his own is what disposes him toward a life in association with others. Still, despite the impetus of individual human beings to participate in society for the sake of their own conservation,11 the basic features of human nature can interfere with a society’s success in achieving the essential goals of social or political life, namely, the sustenance and conservation of the members of the society. For inasmuch as human beings live “miserably and brutishly without politia,” it must be inferred that their initial existences are conditioned by an asocial or unsocial manner of living prior to their entrance into society. Indeed, if human beings are considered only under the regime of nature then one must acknowledge that “the natural right” of each individual, that is, the fundamental condition of each individual, “is determined not by sound reason but by desire and power.”12 Furthermore, by nature, each human being exclusively pursues what he esteems to be to his own advantage, interest, or pleasure13 and so the practicability of human 10 TTP 3: 73. The “one who reads philosophically” might note that in the chapter preceding the discussion of the “ceremonial law” and the formation of society Spinoza plainly had said “knowledge and love of God” were the conditions requisite for achieving “blessedness” (3: 44; 50; 60; 62). In the passage from chapter 5, however, human blessedness seems to be attainable through the satisfaction of certain quite mundane and wholly nontheological needs, desires, or goals. 11 One will recall that the lex summa naturae is that each individual endeavors to persevere in its state so far as it is able to do so (TTP 3: 189). Therefore, if society serves the goal of the lex summa naturae then societies, republics, or regimes dedicated to the goal of self-preservation are wholly consonant with Spinoza’s teaching of nature. But it also must be concluded that just as the “natural state” is prior to religion both “in nature and in time” (3: 198) so too the “natural state” is prior to politics. 12 TTP 3: 190. 13 TTP 3: 190–93. Spinoza’s account of ‘that which is by nature’, or the philosophic teaching of the TTP, obviously is crucial to Spinoza’s account of political life

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social or political arrangements contains an inherent impediment. Each individual seeks only his own interest or advantage and he seeks it to the neglect, or even the possible injury, of others.14 But if society is to succeed in achieving the sustenance and conservation of each of its members then the members cannot be allowed to follow the urgings of their passions in the pursuits of their pleasures.15 Properly functioning societies require a means to counter the impetuses of those passions that lead human beings to neglect others or do injury to them. According to Spinoza, if “human beings were to be constituted by nature so that they sought nothing except what true reason indicates” then society would have no need for laws; to the contrary, it would be “absolutely sufficient to teach true moral lessons” and human beings would respond to them freely and they would do what is “truly useful.”16 But because human beings by nature are driven more by passion than by reason it is not enough to inculcate true moral doctrines and to wish that human beings will embrace what “true reason” teaches. Human nature is constituted very differently. Each seeks what is useful to him but he does so not on the basis of the sound dictates of reason; rather each seeks what is useful to him on the basis of what he determines to be most satisfying to his appetites and his lusts at any given moment.17 According to Spinoza, therefore, “no society can subsist without a regime, force, and consequently laws that moderate and restrain human lust and unbridled impetuses.”18 The problem of human nature is that human beings can conduct their lives and govern their affairs in accordance with the dictates of reason or they can conduct their lives and govern their affairs in

inasmuch as political life emerges from a natural inclination and political life serves as a correction to natural insufficiencies, as well as natural deficiencies. In explaining the political teaching of the treatise it will be necessary to recall certain features of the philosophic teaching of the treatise. 14 TTP 3: 189. 15 The absolute primacy of the human desire to pursue pleasure is presupposed even in the sixth dogma of “the fundamental dogmas of the universal faith.” That is, the sixth dogma states that only those who obey God by performing acts of justice and charity are saved; all others, who “live under the regime of pleasure are lost.” The dogma continues by asserting that if human beings did not believe in “salvation through works” then there would be no reason why they would obey God rather than follow their pleasures (TTP 3: 177). Spinoza posits a basic tension between a life of obedience to law and a life dedicated to the pursuit of pleasure alone. 16 TTP 3: 73. 17 TTP 3: 73; 191–92. 18 TTP 3: 73–74.

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accordance with the urgings of their passions and their appetites. By nature, either manner of living is completely legitimate; for each individual simply is conducting himself as he naturally is determined to do.19 Nevertheless, whereas reasonable or sensible individuals are competent to conduct themselves in a manner whereby they achieve what is truly useful to them, those who conduct themselves according to their impulses, lusts, and the urgings of their passions often do not achieve what is truly useful to them and furthermore they even can obstruct other human beings from obtaining what is “truly useful” to them. Passionate individuals typically lack reasonable or sensible selfcontrol. They pursue the objects of their longing with force, ruses, and any means at their disposal which they perceive to be suitable to the satisfaction of their desires or their interests. The facts of human nature therefore constitute ‘the problem of human nature’ itself.20 What is the prospect of “peaceful and harmonious” living, or what is the prospect of satisfying the third proper object of desire, namely, achieving security and health, if anyone, especially passionate human beings, may do or pursue anything that any one of them perceives to be pleasurable in any manner that he chooses to obtain it? According to Spinoza, the remedy for the problem of human nature involves a solution to it that requires taking human nature itself into account. That is, because it is a “universal law of human nature” that each individual pursues the greater of two goods and avoids the greater of two evils, it may be possible to persuade or entice passionate human beings to enter into a social or political arrangement with others which will allow all members of the society to enjoy the advantages of a life that will afford mutual security and defense, the division of labor, the development of the arts and the sciences, and the advancement of reasonability or sensibility, in the context of convenient and comfortable living.21 If reasonable or sensible human beings by nature already acknowledge the advantage and worth of conducting themselves reasonably or sensibly, it only is required that passionate individuals be drawn to adopt a reasonable or sensible plan of living. Still, passionate human beings must be made

TTP 3: 189–90. Compare Hilail Gildin, “Spinoza and the Political Problem,” Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (Notre Dame, Indiana: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1973). 21 TTP 3: 73 and compare 46–48; 190–91; also see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London, 1651) p. 62. 19 20

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to see why such a plan of living satisfies their own selfish, appetitive interests. In principle, that task appears to be achievable if one can move passionate individuals to perceive and embrace social or political life as a “greater good” and to regard continuing in their natural conditions as a “lesser good,” or perhaps even a “greater evil.” If passionate individuals can be moved to that way of perceiving social or political life then only one other task remains. The viability of any society or a republic, says Spinoza, depends upon the elimination of the natural right to act deceitfully.22 Each individual per ius et institutum naturae may do as he pleases in order to achieve what he believes to be conducive to his own interests, desires, or hopes. Each individual, therefore, may deceive others in order to obtain the things for which he longs. One can profess oaths, one can negotiate terms of agreement for an exchange of goods, or one can promise to perform a service or function for another individual but then violate the oath, forsake the agreement, or renounce the promise, if the individual comes to conclude that honoring his word to someone else amounts to a “lesser good” or a “greater evil.”23 For the force and validity of any oath, any agreement, any promise, or any kind of pact whatsoever depends entirely upon the perceived utility of it. If the pact is perceived as useful by the individuals who enter into it then the pact will be honored as binding but if the pact comes to be regarded as useless by any individual who has entered into it then the pact does not need to be honored at all.24 One way to forestall the breaking of promises and prevent the natural tendency to violate a pact when it comes to be regarded as having no use or advantage to one of the parties to the pact is to construct a social or political arrangement in which each participant transfers his private right to the collective right of the society or the regime. Under such a condition, what initially might be construed by individuals entering such a regime as a “greater evil,” namely, the sacrifice of one’s unlimited natural right to acts as one pleases, could be presented persuasively as being the realization of a “greater good” inasmuch as all of the other members of the political society also will ‘lose right or power’

22 23 24

TTP 3: 192. TTP 3: 191–92. TTP 3: 192.

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individually but each also will ‘gain right or power’ collectively.25 The mode by which passionate human beings are converted from being asocial or unsocial individuals to becoming social individuals can be rather simple and basic. Taking into account the fundamental dispositions of human nature toward what is regarded as “good,” passionate human beings must be promised “the hope of a greater good” for their participation in society and their cooperation with other individuals or they must be threatened with “the fear of a greater evil” if they do not participate in society and cooperate with other individuals. The name of the society to which human beings, even passionate ones, can be drawn in a collaborative endeavor to preserve and sustain themselves is a “democracy”; it is established on the basis of a pact which binds every member of the polity to abide by the terms of the pact and to keep the promises that he makes to others; and more than just providing for the wellbeing of its citizens, the political regime called a democracy serves the express ambition of following the dictates of reason and more particularly the democratic regime aims to avoid the “absurd things” of the appetite.26 The democratic regime, therefore, is the political arrangement that is most consonant with human nature and it is optimal for maximizing the satisfaction of the third proper object of desire, namely, security and health.27 For those who may be interested in the advantages of political life, or for those who already are inclined toward it, the avoidance or elimination of “absurd things” in favor of reasonable or sensible things would seem to be an attractive feature of a society, a republic, or a regime. Indeed, Spinoza affirms that it is a fact of human nature that “there is

25 Spinoza’s manner of discriminating between “goods” and “evils” is based upon the criterion of utility (TTP 3: 190–91; 196). As a result, however, what is “useful” and hence “good” to one person may be considered “useless” and hence “evil” to another person. A possible exception to the egoistical and subjective measure of useful and useless things is the fact that every individual has the essential endeavor to persevere in its state. Hence, a common motive for individual human beings to enter into social or political association is the promise of “sustenance and conservation” which such associations make feasible. As each citizen surrenders his right to do as he personally pleases, it also is the case that every other member of the polity has surrendered his right to do as he pleases and while each one’s ‘individual right’ to act impulsively is lost it also is the case that each individual’s ‘collective right’ to be protected from the impulsive, the deceitful, and the injurious acts of foreigners or fellow citizens has been gained. 26 TTP 3: 194. 27 TTP 3: 193–95; 245.

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no one who does not wish to live securely without fear” but that condition is exceedingly difficult to achieve where each individual is permitted to do as each one pleases and “reason has no more right than hatred or anger.”28 It would be natural then for citizens or potential citizens to presume that a polity would endeavor to curb the “absurd things,” namely, the longings, urges, impulses, actions, or behaviors, of passionate human nature. But in the course of the treatise Spinoza has not spoken of “absurd” longings, urges, or impulses; nor has he spoken of “absurd” actions or behaviors. Spinoza is prevented from making such declarations on philosophical grounds. For by the “right and plan of nature” whatever an individual does in accordance with its own nature, whether what he does follows from the dictates of reason or whether what he does follows from the urgings of the passions, it is perfectly legitimate for the individual to do as he does because “by nature” there are no “absurd” longings or “absurd” actions. Rather what individual human beings consider “ridiculous, absurd, or evil” owes only to the fact that human beings, for the most part, remain ignorant of the “order and coherence” of nature.29 From the perspective of philosophy, the “absurd” is what is contrary to nature; and what is contrary to nature also is contrary to reason.30 No longing, urging, passion, action, or behavior is “contrary to nature”; if it were “contrary to nature” then it also would be impossible.31 In the teaching of the treatise, the only matter that explicitly is designated “absurd” is the miracle;32 and by virtue of that designation it may be inferred that there can be circumstances in which the teaching of theology and the teaching of politics may not be consonant with one another. For example, the dependence of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion on “miracles” or “signs” as certifications of the authenticity of a prophecy or revelation will cause traditional orthodox theology or religion to come into conflict with the political teaching of the treatise which advocates a democratic regime that avoids “absurd things.” But the version of theology that is defended

TTP 3: 191. TTP 3: 191. 30 TTP 3: 91. 31 TTP 3: 86–87. 32 TTP 3: 86. One will recall that earlier in the treatise Spinoza had denounced superstition, which often is a basis for theology or religion, as having turned “rational beings into beasts” (3: 8). In the end, superstition, theology, and religion are connected through a basic tendency of each toward unreasonable or insensible predilections that ought to be resisted by a regime that is dedicated to fostering the development, the exercise, and the advancement of reason. 28 29

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in the theological teaching of the treatise, which denies the possibility of miracles because of their “absurdity,” is entirely consonant with the political teaching of the treatise. For, according to the political teaching of the treatise, society, the republic, or especially the democratic regime has an interest, an obligation, or a responsibility “not to command very absurd things” and its “goal and foundation” is “to avoid absurd things and to constrain human beings within the limits of reason.”33 As a result, from the perspective of philosophy, a society, a republic, or a democratic regime cannot embrace a theology or a religion which patently avows “absurd things.” How does politics or the political, that is, a society, a republic, or a regime, dedicated to the security, health, and wellbeing (salus) of its citizens relate to theology or religion, when “the goal of the Republic is not to make human beings from rational beings into beasts or machines” but instead its goal is to enable the minds and bodies of human beings to function safely while encouraging them to “use reason freely without confronting hatred, anger, or deceit”?34 In the Preface to the treatise, Spinoza explicitly states that various religious prejudices are responsible for turning “human beings from rational beings into beasts.”35 But if “the goal of the Republic” is to prevent “rational human beings” from being made into beasts and religious prejudices cause human beings to be made into “beasts,” or to be made less than human, then there may be a basic and ineluctable tension between politics and theology just as there is a basic and ineluctable tension between philosophy and theology. However, perhaps philosophy can mediate the tension between politics and theology on the basis of an appeal to the teaching of theology that is advocated by Spinoza in the treatise. That is, philosophy can mediate the tension between politics and theology in the same way that philosophy mediated the tension between the prevailing tradition of theology or religion and philosophy itself. Philosophy accomplished that task by contending that the authentic meaning of theology actually takes a position of indifference with respect to philosophy and implicitly the revealed teaching of Christ is indifferent to politics since both philosophy and politics can be separated completely from theology. The goal and purpose of a republic is to institute and promulgate a “plan of living” that will make it possible for human beings to satisfy the

33 34 35

TTP 3: 194. TTP 3: 240–41. TTP 3: 8.

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third proper object of desire.36 The plan of living will involve the enactment of laws which “serve the defense of life as well as the republic”37 and the laws will be framed so as to encourage citizens to do their duty not “from fear but from a hope for some good which they desire.”38 But given the proclivities of human nature, it will be a delicate chore to inspire human beings to forsake unlimited exercises of natural right and to conform to laws that serve the interests of the individual as well as the welfare of the political society as a whole. For human beings by nature are driven more by passion than by reason. They also naturally are inclined toward superstition and hence they are inclined to believe “absurd things,” follow rash impulses, suffer from credulity, and adopt unreasonable opinions and behaviors rather than live in accordance with reasonable or sensible designs. In one very significant sense, the teaching of the treatise has as a goal the correction of the prevailing conditions surrounding human nature by offering an alternative to the life that is conducted in accordance with the passions or superstitious urgings and opinions; though the alternative to the life of passion is not the life of the philosopher. Instead it is the life of the reasonable or sensible human being who lives in accordance with the dictates of reason whether they issue from his own nature or whether they have been issued to him by those reliable human beings who are reasonable or sensible and who also have the authority to devise a plan of living for all of those who inhabit a democratic political regime. Politics can avoid the “absurd things” and it can safeguard the wellbeing of citizens and the republic because of its ability to offer a plan a living that is reasonable or sensible. Indeed, the very necessity of providing such a plan is reflected in the opening sentence of the treatise. Bearing in mind the natural proclivity of human beings toward that which is passionate, superstitious, or nonrational, the overarching goal of the treatise is to propose a teaching that will persuade both reasonable and passionate individuals of the advantages of democratic political life. The Preface to the treatise commences with an unqualified and universal declaration: “If human beings were able to govern all their affairs with dependable counsel, or if fortune always bore prosperity for

36 37 38

TTP 3: 46–47; 73–74; 190–92; 240–41. TTP 3: 59. TTP 3: 73; 192–95.

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them, in no way would they be mastered by superstition.”39 The opening sentence of the Preface delineates three distinct manners whereby an individual may conduct his life and govern his affairs. An individual may proceed in his thinking, choosing, or acting on the basis of some kind of sure or reliable deliberation, that is, a dependable counsel.40 An individual may rely on fortune’s favor. Or an individual may live under the sway of superstition. It is evident from the Preface to the treatise, and even from the first sentence of it, that Spinoza regards the conduct of one’s life or the governance of one’s affairs by a reliance upon superstition as a plan of living that is to be avoided. Superstition is an extreme recourse for the individual who cannot achieve the satisfaction of his interests or his desires by any other means than wishing for extraordinary interventions by suprahuman agents on his behalf. Indeed, superstition is embraced only as a result of the combined facts that someone lacks a dependable counsel for the conduct of his life and

39 “Si homines res omnes suas certo consilio regere possent, vel si fortuna ipsis prospera semper foret, nulla superstitione tenerentur” (TTP 3: 5). The opening sentence of the Preface to the TTP may be translated in a variety of ways. For example, the noun res principally means “thing” but it also signifies a “matter” or “affair” or “circumstance.” Regere may be translated “to guide,” “to conduct,” “to direct,” “to keep straight,” “to rule,” “to manage,” “to control,” “to govern,” or “to have sway or supremacy over” someone or something. But the verb also means “to keep from going wrong.” Given the purpose of the argument of the Preface to the TTP, the latter sense of the verb is most apt. That is, in the first sentence there is an appeal to some kind of “certum consilium” as an alternative to forestall what can “go wrong” when individuals naturally are driven to embrace fortune or superstition as a guiding principle in the conduct of their lives or the governance of their affairs. Alternative English translations of the opening sentence of the Preface may be found in A Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. R.H.M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, 1951 [originally published London: G. Bell & Son, 1883]): “Men would never be superstitious, if they could govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favored by fortune” (p. 3); Tractatus theologico-politicus, trans. Samuel Shirley (Leiden, New York, København, Köln: E.J. Brill Publishers, 1989): “If men were able to exercise complete control over all of their circumstances, or if continuous good fortune were always their lot, they would never be prey to superstition” (p. 49); A Spinoza Reader, trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994): “If men could manage all their affairs by a certain plan, or if fortune were always favorable to them, they would never be in the grip of superstition” (p. 6); and Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. Martin Yaffe (Newburyport, Massachusetts: Focus Publishing, 2004): “If human beings could regulate all their affairs with certain counsel, or if fortune were always favorable to them, they would not be bound by any superstition” (p. xv). 40 The Latin word certus means “resolved,” “determined,” “fixed,” “settled,” or “purposed.” With respect to moral matters, the word signifies “sure,” “unerring,” “faithful,” and “to be depended upon.” I submit that what Spinoza intends by the word certus is closest to the last alternative and therefore I translate the Latin phrase “certo consilio” by the English words “by dependable counsel” or “with dependable counsel.”

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the governance of his affairs and fortune does not always bring that individual the prosperity for which he longs. Accordingly, there are three distinct ways in which one can conduct his life and govern his affairs; or, Spinoza proposes that there are three basic plans of living. One can employ dependable counsel; one can rely on fortune; or one can turn to superstition. It may be possible that some combination of those alternatives, or a combination of degrees of each of the alternatives, might be attempted for the conduct of one’s life and the governance of one’s affairs. But the opening sentence of the Preface insinuates that the three plans of living are reciprocally exclusive of one another and, indeed, the remainder of the Preface to the treatise demonstrates how and why human beings ruinously succumb to superstition as a mode for conducting their lives and governing their affairs. Little is said in the treatise about fortune. But, perhaps even more curiously, Spinoza is virtually silent about what “dependable counsel” is or what it involves. Yet if dependable counsel is the reliable plan of living that is advocated by Spinoza in the treatise then it is necessary to determine precisely what certum consilium means. The first sentence of the Preface to the treatise is the answer to a question that has not been asked expressly. The question is: Why do human beings become superstitious? The question is raised because of the prominence of the phenomenon of superstition and the philosophic proposition of the treatise that human beings by nature are inclined toward it.41 However, the question also is raised because superstition constitutes a plan of living that is adopted by a great many human beings who live and act under the influence of various traditions of theology or religion. The actual turn toward superstition appears to be prompted by a combination of three factors. Human beings often are driven into difficulties where their own counsel or deliberation fails them; nevertheless they still “long inordinately for the uncertain goods of fortune”; consequently, fluctuating miserably between hope and fear, they become “most prone to believing any thing whatever; the cause which encourages, conserves, and gives rise to superstition therefore is fear.”42 Spinoza’s argument reduces to this: Human beings are desirous beings who seek the satisfaction of their own desires.43 But human TTP 3: 6. TTP 3: 5–6. 43 TTP 3: 189–90. The principal desire and endeavor of any individual thing is to conserve itself; and although the human impetus to conservation of oneself may 41 42

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beings also are aware that on some occasions they will fail to realize the satisfaction of their desires. Thus an individual’s wish or hope that the fulfillment of his desire will be realized also often is cast against the same individual’s fear that his wish or hope will not be realized. When the conduct of his life or the governance of his affairs by means of dependable counsel yields success, one conceives himself “to abound in good sense” and he shuns any “who wish to give him counsel”; but when adversity befalls them, such individuals “beseech counsel from anyone, nor is there anything to be heard that is so inept, absurd, or vain, that they would not follow it.”44 An individual may attempt to employ his own counsel or even follow the counsel of another for the purpose of satisfying his desires. Regardless of whether that individual succeeds or fails in his attempts to satisfy his desires, Spinoza notes that such an individual will continue to seek the “goods of fortune.” Thus it may be inferred that individuals tend to presume that they will satisfy their desires for various goods either through fortune itself or through their own agency and planning. Yet a difficulty persists inasmuch as the goods sought from fortune are not assured; and human agency itself also may prove to be ineffective at obtaining what an individual wants or needs. Superstition, therefore, can appear to be as worthy an option as any other one when individuals are confronted with having to choose the plan of living that they will adopt based on their perception of which plan will be the most successful in satisfying their desires and which plan will permit them to conduct their lives and govern their affairs with some advantage. In the conduct of one’s life and the governance of one’s affairs, the turn to superstition shares a common element with the turn to fortune. Human beings hope, indeed they expect, that their desires will be satisfied. When the objects of their desires are easily obtained, without much

be universal, the means to it and the demands of it are quite idiosyncratic. A similar characterization of the matter is found in chapters 13 and 14 of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. Hobbes defines conatus, or the endeavor of a thing to persevere in its state, as a principle of “physical motion” in De Corpore, chapter 15, article 2; but he also defines conatus as a principle of “psychic motion” in Elements of Law, chapter 7, paragraph 2. The term conatus does not appear in the TTP. But in Part 3 of the Ethica ordine Geometrico demonstrata, Spinoza defines the “endeavor” [conatus] of a thing to persevere in its own being as the “actual essence of a thing” (Propositions 6–7). 44 TTP 3: 5. I have translated the Latin word sapientia as “good sense” rather than “wisdom” which is the word used in the translations of the TTP by Elwes (p. 3), Shirley (p. 49), Curley (p. 6), and Yaffe (p. xv). My reason for translating the Latin word sapientia as “sensibility” or “good sense” was explained in note 113 to Part One of this book.

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of their own agency or much of their own planning, then they conclude that “fortune” favors them. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that fortune would not or should not favor them again. Reliance on fortune is effortless. One simply anticipates that desirable things will happen to him. In chapter three of the treatise, Spinoza provides a definition of fortune in the context of his account of the Election of the Hebrews: “by fortune I understand nothing other than the direction of God to the extent that he directs human affairs through external and unexpected causes”; and Spinoza’s definition of fortune occurs within his account of the ways through which an individual human being achieves “conservation in [his] being.”45 Relying on fortune is one way whereby the “direction of human affairs” may be accomplished by an individual. But in addition to fortune, which involves unexpected and hence unpredictable causes and events, Spinoza maintains that an individual may direct his affairs through his own efforts or through some kind of external assistance.46 Yet experience confirms, sometimes painfully, that our hopes and desires often are either frustrated or forsaken when we rely on fortune or even on our own “dependable counsel.” In the sense that is most crucial to the teaching of the treatise, the decisive question of Spinoza’s book concerns which plan of living human beings adopt for the conduct of their lives and the governance of their affairs. What options are available to human beings? And in which directions are they usually drawn? The answer to the decisive question of what plan of living human beings adopt influences the sort of society or regime that human beings establish and it also determines how the third proper object of desire will be achieved. Reliance upon fortune is the easiest of the options for a plan of living inasmuch as it requires the least effort, or no effort at all, on the part of human beings.

45 TTP 3: 46. The precise form of Spinoza’s claim is threefold. (1) Where “perseverance in being” is achieved through one’s own nature and power then, strictly speaking, it is achieved through the “internal aid of God” since the “power of Nature is the power of God” and the power of human nature is an expression of the more comprehensive power of nature itself. (2) Where things useful to “perseverance in being” owe to causes external to human beings then such things express the “external aid of God.” (3) Where “perseverance in being” owes to unanticipated external causes then fortune is said to be at work. However, to those ignorant of the order and operations of nature, “the external aid of God” is likely to be confused with “fortune”; and that confusion only tends to confirm for most passionate or vulgar human beings the authority and validity of certain teachings propounded by the prevailing tradition of theology or religion about things like “miracles.” 46 TTP 3: 46.

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Still, fortune is fickle. When fortune fails to deliver the goods that one anticipates, he turns to superstition. Fearful that he will not acquire what he seeks, desires, or needs, or fearful that he will suffer what he opposes, an individual’s fear drives him to find a solution to his predicament through an appeal to god(s) or some divine agent(s). Consistent with his belief in supranatural causes and agencies, an individual then regards unusual and unexpected events as portents of things that will bring him prosperity or distress.47 But recourse to superstition as a plan of living also is related to one’s understanding and experience of the world. Ignorant of the order and operations of nature, superstitious individuals impute the satisfaction of their desires to forces, causes, or beings that are willful in their provision of the goods that individuals seek, desire, or need. What fortune does not yield and what planning does not provide will impel human beings to plead or sacrifice and promise service, worship, or obedience to whichever numen they deem to be responsible for providing the things for which they long. As a consequence, human beings are willing to yield to any delirium, fantasy, or extravagance, in the hope that they may obtain what they seek. “Such fear,” says Spinoza, “makes human beings insane”; furthermore, those individuals will castigate “human good sense as vain and they will call reason blind.”48 The choice of a plan of living that is based upon superstition presumes an ignorance of nature and an abdication of reason, as well as the implicit consequence that one must embrace any number of “absurd things.” The superstitious life, as Spinoza defines it, and the political life, as Spinoza defines it, do not intersect.49 TTP 3: 5. TTP 3: 5. The obvious English translation of the Latin verb insanire is “to be insane.” But the Latin verb also means “to be of unsound, unhealthy mind,” “to be without reason,” “to be senseless,” or “to be mad.” The turn to superstition thus must be recognized as an abandonment of reason, albeit sometimes only a temporary one. Spinoza suggests that one can vacillate between reliance upon superstition and reliance upon some sort of dependable counsel as is demonstrated by the example of Alexander the Great. When suffering from the “terror” of the unknown outcome of battle at the Gates of Susa, Curtius reports that Alexander turned to soothsayers for predictions about the result of the conflict. After Darius was defeated, Alexander abandoned such interests. However, “[Alexander] was led back to superstition” again, says Curtius, when his situation was unsettled (3: 6). 49 If superstition and the plan of living that derives from superstition involve belief in “absurd things,” e.g., miracles, but the goal of politics is to avoid “absurd things” and promote reasonability then the superstitious life and the political life cannot converge. Obviously the Turkish theocracy and the Hebrew theocracy exemplify instances where “superstition,” as understood by Spinoza, and politics were integrated. But Spinoza eschews both of those regimes. In lieu of those kinds of theocracy, Spinoza will introduce 47

48

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From the opening line and the first page of Spinoza’s Preface to the treatise it may be inferred that human beings embrace superstition largely because “fortune” and “dependable counsel” fail them when they try to acquire what they believe will serve their conservation and their interests. Here it should not be inferred that an individual’s dashed hope over the loss of one desired object, for example, or his unfulfilled desire to attain what he seeks, would of necessity drive an individual to espouse superstition as the only basis for the conduct of his life and the governance of his affairs. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore a simple fact. The fear of the failure to satisfy desires is what impels an individual to turn to superstition as a source of hope; and the fear that causes him to turn to superstition owes to his uncertainty about there being any reliable alterative means for satisfying his desires or conducting his life and governing his affairs prosperously. In other words, in the attempt to obtain what he seeks, desires, or needs, an individual human being will embrace whatever plan of living he perceives to be most conducive to the attainment of his ends. The attainment of the end, therefore, effectively justifies the means.50 Or, the perceived likelihood that some means will enable an individual to achieve his ends or to secure the objects of his desires is what justifies an individual’s choice of his plan of living. Fortune and superstition are quite similar in one significant respect. The turn to fortune and the turn to superstition involve an ultimate dependence upon “external and unexpected causes.” Neither fortune nor superstition involves an individual’s reliance upon his own power to conserve himself; and neither implies an individual’s employment of the power of external causes for the sake of his own conservation.51 According to Spinoza, the satisfaction of the third proper object of desire, namely, the achievement of security and health, will require and depend upon “external things,” that is, security and health will require a theocratic regime that involves a ‘mitigated superstition’ or an ‘enlightened superstition’ which restrains the excesses of the prevailing traditions of theology or religion. 50 TTP 3: 190. 51 TTP 3: 46. The passage from the TTP identifies an individual’s own power within himself as “the internal aid of God” and it designates an individual human being’s use of the power of external causes as the “external aid of God.” The “external aid of God” may be said to be different from fortune or superstition for the reason that the latter two are said to involve “unexpected” or unpredictable causes whereas the “external aid of God” simply involves the regular order and operations of nature which can be comprehended by human beings and used by them to facilitate their own conservation.

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and depend upon “fortune”; but Spinoza also insists that “human direction and vigilance” are of great assistance.52 Consequently, if an individual chooses to trust either fortune or superstition as appropriate means for the conduct of his life or the governance of his affairs, the choice of either fortune or superstition implies that the individual has forsaken his own agency and surrendered his conservation to external, unpredictable influences or forces. Still, if fortune always were to afford prosperity to human beings then they never would fall prey to superstition. But human beings never would fall prey to superstition nor would they ever rely on the vacillations of fortune if they could govern all their affairs with dependable counsel,53 that is, if they had a plan of living that generally assured them of maintaining their security and health and which offered them the greatest hope of living prosperously. Whereas Spinoza defines fortune in the treatise and gives an account of the causes of superstition in his book, he is almost silent about what certum consilium is. The word consilium appears nineteen times in the treatise and it is used preponderantly in connection with passages quoted from the Scriptures, both the Old Testament and the New Testament. For example, Spinoza refers to the breath or spirit of God as expressing “Spiritus sapientiae, counsel or fortitude.”54 In another passage in the treatise, he notes the difficulties associated with interpreting the histories conveyed in the Scriptures and he argues that an individual’s understanding of those histories cannot be made to depend, for instance, on the reader actually having heard “the quarrels of Isaac or the counsels of Achitophel given to Absalom”;55 and Saul went to the Prophet Samuel “on his servant’s counsel” in order to learn where to find his lost animals.56 It further is reported that the Apostle Paul maintained that he “gives counsel by God’s grace”; and Spinoza observes that the apostles’ “choices of their places to preach were taken on their own counsel.”57 If “dependable counsel” is the worthy alternative to fortune or superstition as a plan of living it yet remains unclear what that kind of counsel involves or requires. Still, based upon the passages from the Scriptures

52 53 54 55 56 57

TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3: 3: 3:

47. 5. 22. 78. 89; 131. 151.

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quoted by Spinoza, or Spinoza’s own use of the word, it is plain that consilium in the treatise is used to signify “advice” or “consideration,” some manner of “consultation,” or even one’s “determination” as it affects his plans or purposes of action. Accordingly, then, “governing all one’s affairs certo consilio” would mean that one would conduct himself with determination, due consideration, requisite consultation, or a deliberated plan and purpose of action. Hence life in accordance with “dependable counsel” would seem to be a worthy choice as a “plan of living.” Indeed, if human beings were able to govern all of their affairs in such a fashion then surely there would be no need for anyone to rely on fortune or to succumb to superstition in order to satisfy his interests, desires, or needs. But “counsel” and “dependable counsel” are not defined for the reader of the treatise. Rather the reader seems obliged to infer what “dependable counsel” means on the basis of what Spinoza says about “counsel” in general; and Spinoza’s citation of one instance from the New Testament of the use of “counsel” demonstrates that consilium in and of itself can be problematical. That is, Spinoza says that a rift between the apostles Paul and Barnabas resulted from Paul acting on his “own counsel.” In the treatise, the apostles are distinguished from the prophets because of their capacity to teach whereas the prophets are said to have possessed the ability to prophesy and command. According to Spinoza, the capacity to teach granted each apostle the authority to choose the method of teaching or preaching that he would employ. Furthermore, unlike the prophets who were ordained to prophesy to particular people in specific places, the apostles were permitted to teach or preach wherever each thought it best to do so. On one occasion the Apostle Paul “on his own counsel” chose where he would take his ministry; however, Spinoza observes that Paul’s decision about where to preach led to a disagreement with Barnabas who was accompanying him.58 Having gone to Antioch together, Paul recommended that he, Barnabas, and the others with them return to places where they had been preaching to see how the converted were faring. But Barnabas opted to continue his mission by going to other places. A disagreement ensued over whether the two apostles should proceed to new locations or return to old ones. They went in different directions. The subsequent

58 TTP 3: 151–55. The account of the matter is related at Acts of the Apostles 15:36–40.

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passage from Scripture testifies that both Paul and Barnabas proceeded in their respective missions with success. Still, Paul’s reliance on his “own counsel” and the action he undertook pursuant to it must be deemed the cause of some disturbance, aggravation, or conflict with his colleague, Barnabas. In other words, Paul’s consilium was not such that it guaranteed the satisfaction of his interests, aims, or desires. Paul’s “own counsel” moved him to travel in one direction but it did not move or persuade Barnabas to accompany Paul. As advice, due consideration, determined purpose, or deliberated plan of action, Paul’s specific “plan of living” and his consequent action illustrate that “counsel” or one’s “own counsel” may not always yield what one intends. Paul wanted Barnabas to return with him to the places where they had taught or preached together. Barnabas, however, presumably on ‘his own counsel’, chose not to do so and went his own way to Cyprus with John Mark while Paul and Silas traveled to Syria and Cilicia. There is no indication in the passages from Scripture, or from Spinoza’s assessment of them, that the failure of Paul’s “own counsel” to secure the object of his interest led him to embrace fortune or surrender to superstition as plans of living. Nevertheless, the failure of consilium in Paul’s “governance of his affairs” with Barnabas could invite one to opine that Paul actually did no better by his own counsel than he might have done had he turned to fortune or superstition to attain his aim. With respect to achieving success in the “governance of one’s affairs,” fortune and superstition are problematical. Neither supplies constant relief. But neither is it clear that one’s “own counsel” or “dependable counsel” provides a consistently worthy alternative to fortune or superstition as a “plan of living.” Very little is said in the treatise about certum consilium. However, in addition to the opening sentence of the Preface, there is only one other occurrence of the phrase “certo consilio” in the treatise. The words appear in chapter nine of the treatise. Chapters eight through ten of the treatise contain Spinoza’s examination of how the various books of the Bible have come to be arranged and received. In chapter nine of the treatise, Spinoza devotes special attention to the first five books of the Scriptures and the matter of Ezra’s responsibility for the final version of the Pentateuch, as well as the marginalia that accompany those writings. A question arises about whether some textual defects in the Pentateuch were accidental or contrived. According to Spinoza, one learned tradition holds that “the readings did not happen by chance.” On the contrary, obvious mistakes in the text were left uncorrected so that later students of the books

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could conclude that such flaws “were made with dependable counsel by the first Writers, in order that they signify something by them.”59 Spinoza’s reference to that learned tradition is in connection with the spelling of the Hebrew word for “girl” in the Pentateuch. Spinoza asserts that the word is incorrectly spelled on all occasions in the texts of the five books except one; but adjacent to the misspelled word is the correct spelling of the word in the marginalia. At issue is the question why the erroneous spelling in the texts was allowed to persist when the correct spelling was present in the marginalia. Spinoza explains that competing readings of the texts were allowed to stand in order to avoid the replacement of the correct sense of the text by an incorrect one. The general conclusion proposed by Spinoza is that the Scriptures have suffered a variety of impositions over time and therefore their history, sources, authors, and compositions present myriad difficulties for interpreters.60 Indeed, in many cases, it simply is impossible to recover the original meanings of the texts at all.61 Still, the present purpose is to learn what the phrase “certo consilio” means and one useful inference may be drawn from what Spinoza says about “dependable counsel” with regard to “the first Writers” of the Scriptures. What is said to have been done “by dependable counsel” (certo consilio) is set against what might have happened in the Scriptures “by chance” (casu). Spinoza therefore uses the terms “dependable counsel” and “chance” as antonymous to each other. Since he also maintains in the treatise that “words have a fixed meaning through their use alone”62 the reader of the treatise may conclude that what happens in accordance with “dependable counsel”

TTP 3: 137: Igitur cum hae lectiones casu non contigerint, nec tam clara vitia correxerint, hinc concludunt, haec certo consilio a primis Scriptoribus facta fuisse, ut iis aliquid significarent. 60 Spinoza does not believe the claim advanced by the one interpretive tradition about the “first Writers” of the Scriptures; he does not believe that there are profound mysteries hidden in them (TTP 3: 135–36; 167). Nor does Spinoza recite what factors or reasons might have prompted the “first Writers” to take the course of action that is imputed to them by some interpreters of the sacred books. Still, rather than explain the episode as being something that just happened “by chance,” Spinoza says that “dependable counsel” was the cause. However antithetical it may have been to a “chance” event, the practice imputed to the “first Writers” failed to accomplish what the interpreters claimed it was designed to achieve. Instead of “signifying something” specific by the intentional flaws, the “first Writers” appear only to have occasioned more confusion about the sacred books. Acting with “dependable counsel” moved them to leave textual errors uncorrected and subsequently the errors were compounded further over time by the misinterpretations of others (3: 137–41). 61 TTP 3: 136–37; and compare 109–111. 62 TTP 3: 160. 59

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is contrary to what happens by “chance”; and by implication it further may be inferred that “dependable counsel” is the opposite of those things that are related to “chance,” namely, fortune and superstition which rely on external, unexpected, or unpredictable causes.63 A philosophic proposition of the treatise is that an appropriate and effective plan of living is indispensable to the achievement of the third proper object of desire. All human beings seek security and health. But not all human beings pursue security and health in the same manner. Still, if human beings were able to govern all their affairs with dependable counsel, or if fortune always favored them, then they would never succumb to superstition. In other words, if human beings had dependable counsel at their disposal they could formulate a plan of living that enabled them to establish the conditions through which they would satisfy their needs, realize their desires, and live advantageously. That is, they could establish a society, institute a regime, and inculcate a plan of living that could be adopted by all human beings who choose to enter into the kind of political arrangement that offers them the hope of a “greater good.” The plan of living afforded by the dependable counsel of the democratic political regime is preferable to the alternative plans of living because they rely almost entirely upon “chance” elements and the alternative plans of living operate without the intercession of “human direction and vigilance.”64 In other words, because fortune owes to chance it is unreliable as a plan of living for the reason that it is occasioned by unexpected, that is to say, unpredictable, causes or events. Thus reliance upon fortune is a precarious way to conduct one’s life and govern one’s affairs. In addition, recourse to superstition as a plan of living also ought to be shunned because superstition owes to a kind of panicked longing for “goods” that leaves an individual subjugated and ignorant. Furthermore, succumbing to superstition demands a credulity that can be extended to almost any extreme and succumbing to superstition implies the abdication of reason on the part of the superstitious individual.65 Hence superstition cannot be a sane way to conduct one’s life or to govern one’s affairs. Still, it even appears that dependable counsel does not assure one on every occasion that he will accomplish the result that he desires.

63 64 65

TTP 3: 46–47. TTP 3: 47. TTP 3: 5; 29–30.

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So, a perplexity remains. On what basis can Spinoza maintain that human beings never would fall prey to superstition if they could “govern all their affairs with dependable counsel”? What advantage or incentive is there to the governance of one’s affairs, or the conduct of one’s life, certo consilio? If human beings are driven more by passion than by reason, why would they embrace “dependable counsel” rather than the ostentatious promises of superstitious observances or the facile reception of “goods” from fortune? The initial attractiveness of “dependable counsel” may be said to derive less from what it is, for there is no definition of it in the treatise, than from what it is not. Human beings, by nature, succeed or fail and rise or fall in the throes of hope and fear.66 “Dependable counsel” would seem to avoid the foolish hope prompted by turning to fortune while it also evades the desperate fear that is inherent in the turn to superstition. Perhaps it just is common sense that suggests the worth that may be assigned to “dependable counsel.” That is, Spinoza commences the argument of the treatise with an appeal to something that he nowhere defines in the book; and that fact is at odds with his more detailed comments about what fortune and superstition mean, involve, or entail. Spinoza would appear to believe that there is some general notion of what certum consilium means such that he can assume that his readers will be aware of its worth or at least they will be familiar with its significance. Yet if “dependable counsel” is not defined in any formal way in the treatise, to what in general is Spinoza appealing when he declares that human beings never would be mastered by superstition if they could “govern all their affairs with dependable counsel”? The answer may be inferred from Spinoza’s account of human nature. “By the right and plan of nature,” each individual thing “endeavors to persevere in its state” without consideration of any other thing but itself as it is naturally determined to exist and to operate.67 Human beings by nature are disposed to a ‘life of passion’ or to a ‘life of reason’ but they are determined to the former more than they are determined to the latter. Because the life of passion is more determinative of human nature than is the life of reason, it becomes clearer why fortune and superstition become the typical recourses embraced by human beings as plans of living for the conduct of their lives and the governance of

66 67

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their affairs. Passionate or insensible individuals seek any advantage in order that they may be conserved and they implore relief from any disadvantage in order that they may be conserved. Neglecting reason, passionate or insensible human beings credulously seize whatever may suggest itself as a source that promises them the satisfaction of their desires or they credulously seize whatever suggests itself as a remedy for their predicaments. Yet even sensible human beings are liable to commit blunders in judgment or make errant choices in their endeavors to persevere in their states. Regardless of whether one executes his endeavors according to the dictates of reason or he executes his endeavors according to the urgings of the passions, it is a “universal law of human nature” that no one neglects what he judges to be good except in the hope of a greater good or from the fear of a greater evil.68 In the endeavor to persevere in his state, an individual always will be drawn toward what he regards as the lesser of two evils or the greater of two goods; and Spinoza acknowledges that one’s judgment on such matters is entirely idiosyncratic. That is, an individual’s choice will be made on the basis of what “appears to him to be greater or less” rather than on the basis of what actually is the case. The turn to superstition or the turn to fortune or the turn to dependable counsel in the conservation of oneself, the conduct of one’s life, or the governance of one’s affairs involves an inherently subjective choice. The reasonable or sensible individual will gauge his options for action in respect of what “appears to him to be greater or less,” in respect of goods or evils, apropos his immediate circumstance and in the context of his present or his future hopes and fears; and the individual who surrenders to fortune or superstition evaluates the “greater of two goods and lesser of two evils” in respect of his immediate circumstances and in the context of his present or future hopes and fears. In terms of the governance of one’s affairs, then, the choice of “dependable counsel” is an appeal to reasonability or sensibility over and against a temptation to succumb to the unreasonable or insensible options for the conduct of an individual’s life or the governance of one’s affairs that characteristically accompany the life conducted in accordance with fortune or superstition. Furthermore, the opening sentence of the treatise suggests Spinoza’s belief that just as the turn to fortune and the turn to superstition are natural options for human beings so too

68

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recourse to “dependable counsel” also is available as a natural option to every human being. Each individual possesses a native disposition to rely on his own counsel. Each individual by nature selects what he perceives to be conducive to his owns interests, desires, needs, and the conservation of his state. Each individual also assesses the relative merits of things only with respect to himself and his own situation. In other words, whether “counsel” is informed by the dictates of sound reason or it is informed by the urgings of the appetites, an individual takes his own “counsel” just as he naturally is determined to do. If that counsel were “dependable” then no one ever would fall prey to the vicissitudes and consequences of fortune or superstition. Nevertheless, taking one’s own counsel, be it “dependable” or not, fundamentally reflects Spinoza’s awareness of the universality of natural egoism. For Spinoza acknowledges that in adhering to the lex summa naturae each individual attempts to conduct his life and govern his affairs on the basis of his own experience, his own judgment, his own perspective, his own habits, or his own learning. In fact, Spinoza’s position is reminiscent of the one enunciated by a philosopher about whom Spinoza wrote.69 The opening proposition of René Descartes’ Discours de la Méthode (1637) acknowledges the universality of natural egoism:70 “Good sense [bon sens] is the best shared thing in the world, because each thinks it to be so well provided, that the very same ones who are the most difficult to satisfy in any other thing have no habit at all of desiring more of it than they have.”71 In 69 Benedictus de Spinoza, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae, Pars I. et II. (Amstelodami, 1663). 70 Richard Kennington, “Descartes’ Discourse on Method,” and “Descartes and the Mastery of Nature” in On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Pamela Kraus and Frank Hunt (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004). 71 Oeuvres de Descartes, 11 vols., rev. ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Vrin, C.N.R.S., 1964–76) 6: 1–2. Acknowledgement of the universality of natural egoism also is found in the works of other prominent early modern philosophers, for example Thomas Hobbes: “For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one’s own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar, that is, than all men but themselves and a few others whom, by fame or for concurring with themselves, they approve” (Leviathan [London, 1651], pp. 60–61 and a similar claim also appears in chapter 5, pp. 18–19); and John Locke: “[The natural condition of man is a] State also of Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another” (The Second Treatise of Government, section 4). Locke’s account of natural equality follows his declaration in the same passage about the principal feature of

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other words, human beings generally regard themselves as possessors of sufficient competence to manage themselves, their interests, and their lives. It may not be amiss to suggest that Spinoza’s “dependable counsel” is comparable to Descartes’ “good sense.” That is, both philosophers concede the basically subjective character of each individual’s habit of judgment. Moreover, both philosophers recognize that painful or disadvantageous consequences can ensue from one’s reliance upon subjective judgment and consequently there will be need for some correction of it. In the Discours, Descartes asserts that there is “much more truth in the reasoning that each makes touching the matters that are important to him, and the consequences of which he must suffer soon after if he has judged badly, than in the reasoning of a man made in his study touching on speculations that produce no effect.”72 In other words, an individual’s “good sense” principally involves one’s assessment of the conduct of his life or the governance of his affairs in terms of their immediate or remote consequences for him. Experience bears witness to whether one’s judgment was useful and successful or not; and, according to Descartes, that personal experience of the matter is superior to the idle speculations of those who avoid experience. In a similar fashion, Spinoza affirms in the treatise that it is a “universal law of human nature” that each individual evaluates his condition, chooses his course, and acts with a view to what appears to be most desirable or useful to him as he perceives the matter at that time. Furthermore, if an individual believes that he has judged or chosen badly, Spinoza confirms that a person may change his mind, alter his course of action, or even renege on his commitments whenever he reconsiders his own counsel and believes that the result of his initial choice or action would be useless or disadvantageous to himself.73 When “good sense” or “dependable counsel” yields what we desire, we are satisfied with ourselves, proud, and confident.74 But neither

“what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of Perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions and Persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any Man.” The “equal power and jurisdiction” of which Locke speaks also is ‘the equal power of each man to say what is right for him’. The primacy of subjective bias in one’s conceptions and judgments also is recognized by Francis Bacon in Novum Organum, Book 1, Aphorism, 49. 72 Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 9–10. 73 TTP 3: 192. 74 TTP 3: 5–6; Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 1–2.

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bon sens nor certum consilium is infallible. Spinoza admits that sometimes human beings are driven into difficulties such that their own counsel fails them;75 and Descartes concedes that an individual’s good sense can cause him to suffer from the consequences of his judgments and therefore bon sens is not flawless. However, Descartes does propose a remedy. After conceding at the close of the first paragraph of part one of the Discours that an individual will be satisfied with himself when he successfully exercises “good sense,” Descartes reminds the reader of his book that “it is not enough to have a good mind [esprit] the chief thing is to apply it well.”76 Human beings can seek the satisfaction of their interests, desires, and needs through the “simple reasoning of a man of good sense” or they may employ something “more perfect,” namely, “a pure and solid reason as though it were had from birth”;77 and to possess the latter, superior, optimized sort of “good sense,” an individual only needs to apply the rules of “the method for rightly conducting reason and seeking truth in the sciences” which are articulated in part two of the Discours de la Méthode.78 In other words, Descartes supplies the reader of his book with a standard against which the exercise of one’s own reason or the application of one’s own “good sense” may be measured. In a broadly similar vein, Spinoza acknowledges that the proper exercise of “dependable counsel” might well involve the conduct of one’s life and the governance of one’s affairs not just on the basis of what one’s own simple, selfish counsel might exhort (something akin to Descartes’ “simple reasoning”) but he also might judge, choose, and act in accordance with what “reason dictates” (something more akin, though not identical, to Descartes’ methodical “pure and solid reason”). “No one can doubt,” says Spinoza, “how much more useful it is for human beings to live in accordance with laws and the dependable dictates of reason.”79 But to what rational dictates would the individual who follows dependable counsel adhere or defer? If one’s own judgments are subjective and often erroneous, what corrective standard can be invoked to improve them? Descartes gives a solution to that problem by advocating the use of a method “for the right conduct of reason,” which involves avoiding rash and precipitate judgment as well as reasoning

75 76 77 78 79

TTP 3: 5; and compare the example of the Apostle Paul. Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 2. Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 12–13. Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 17–19. TTP 3: 191.

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clearly and distinctly.80 If one employs and applies the method for the “right conduct of reason” then it is proposed that each individual will achieve the satisfaction of his interests, his desires, or his needs. Moreover, the satisfaction of them will be certain.81 Spinoza offers no such method in the treatise. Although Spinoza does seem to imply that even on the basis of egoistical experience there is some merit in relying upon ‘common sense’. Thus, Spinoza’s alternative to the “method” of Descartes in the Discours is the dutiful citizen’s reasonable or sensible cognizance of the advantages to be enjoyed by him when conducting his life and governing all his affairs in accordance with the dictates of reason that are established by the regime in which he lives. That is, political life advantageously can affect an individual’s security, health, and prosperity in ways that are evident even to the most egoistical human beings. It is evident that any individual’s own counsel may not always be sound. On the contrary, the counsel of each human being is subjective; it typically derives from passion rather than from reason; and therefore an individual’s native endeavor to persevere in his being ironically may become the very cause for frustrating that ambition; or it even can contribute to his own demise. Therefore “dependable counsel” would be superior, more desirable, and more efficacious in securing each individual’s ultimate goal, namely, self-preservation, security, and health, when the “dependable counsel” issues from the collective counsel of the political authority, or the “highest power,” reflected in the democratic political regime that serves the interests of its citizens, requires the ceding of some rights or powers by each of the citizens, and guarantees adherence to the laws of the regime through force, if necessary.82 Ceding individual, unlimited right or power to some external authority would appear to be counterintuitive to human beings whose lives are governed more by passion than by reason. But Spinoza assures the reader of the treatise that yielding individual right or power, even when it is done by passionate individuals, is a task that may be undertaken “easily” inasmuch as the sacrifice of such rights or powers in fact represents a “lesser evil” than the basic human condition in which

Oeuvres de Descartes, 6: 18. Part of the promise of the method enunciated in the Discours is that it will afford the practitioners of it a mathematical certitude. In the TTP, Spinoza only appears interested in advocating or arriving at moral certitude. 82 TTP 3: 192–94. 80 81

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every individual retains unlimited right or power to act as each pleases; furthermore, adherence to the reasonable or sensible dictates of the regime carries with it the promise of that for which every individual longs most, namely, preservation, security, health, and peace.83 In order to obtain the indispensable and highly desirable goods that are promised by the democratic political regime, a citizen must submit to the dictates of the regime even where they may affect the most personal matters; and to illustrate his point, Spinoza offers the example of a regime’s authority over public religious worship. For the sake of the “peace and preservation” of the republic, Spinoza declares that citizens must adhere to what the “supreme power” dictates about public religious worship since “it is certain that dutifulness in respect to one’s country is the chief thing that one can fulfill.”84 The sort of “certum consilium” that Spinoza recommends and defends in the treatise then is not the private, selfish counsel of the individual human being that can be influenced by various lusts or passions. Instead, Spinoza advocates the “dependable counsel” which issues from the supreme authority or power of a democratic political regime that is dedicated not only to the welfare of its citizens but which also serves the express ambition of following the sound dictates of reason and avoiding “absurd things.” Indeed, the identification of “dependable counsel” with the reasonable or sensible dictates issued by a democratic political regime is substantiated by Spinoza’s consideration of how the “counsel” of an individual must be relegated to the “counsel” of the regime. In chapter seventeen of the treatise, Spinoza reflects upon the practical implications of a difficulty that had been noted in the previous chapter of his book. In his account of human nature in chapter sixteen of the treatise, it was asserted that every individual per ius et institutum naturae endeavors to persevere in his own state by whatever means it may consider useful to itself. According to Spinoza, such means do not exclude “struggles, hatred, anger, or ruses.”85 Thus, in the pursuit of his own preservation and interests, an individual human being’s own counsel may lead him into situations that occasion faction and cause harm both for himself as well as for the society in which he resides. Accordingly, Spinoza asserts that the individual must conform to the

83 84 85

TTP 3: 194 –195; 202–203. TTP 3: 232. TTP 3: 190.

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dictates of the democratic political regime since the regime’s purpose is to foster the conditions for securing the preservation and health of all of its citizens. Furthermore, Spinoza categorically states that a citizen’s conformity to the dictates of the regime does not imply an “enslavement of the individual.” On the contrary, inasmuch as the dictates of the democratic political regime inherently encourage the better ambitions of its citizens, and the citizens choose to be members of that regime, then those ambitions are most likely to be realized when citizens embrace “the rational dictates of the supreme power.” That is, it is in the nature of a democratic government “to avoid absurd desires and to constrain men under the limits of reason, as much as it can be done, so that they may live concordantly and peacefully; if that foundation were removed the whole fabric easily goes to ruin.”86 In other words, obedience is the foundation of any political regime. To demonstrate the conclusion that conformity to the dictates of the democratic political regime is consonant with an individual’s own interests and counsel, Spinoza asserts in chapter seventeen of the treatise that even if a man does something “by his own counsel” ( proprio consilio) it cannot be concluded that he does it exclusive of the dictates of the regime. Given the terms and conditions of Spinoza’s democratic political regime, the action of an individual that is performed in conformity with the dictates of the regime implies that “he acts from the right of the regime and not by his own right” whether the motive for his act be fear, hope, love, or reverence.87 The action of the citizen and the dictates of the regime become as one. Perhaps more importantly, however, Spinoza also holds that even an individual’s own “good counsel” must submit to the counsel and dictates of the democratic political regime even though there may be occasions when the counsel of an individual is more useful or advantageous than the counsel of the regime. In chapter sixteen of the treatise, Spinoza defines “the crime of treason” as being the endeavor of a subject or a citizen to seize the right of supreme power himself or to transfer it to someone else. Spinoza then offers an example of a treasonous act. He proposes the scenario of an individual who quits his station in battle and attacks an enemy without his commander’s knowledge or approval of the assault. The consequence of the individual’s action is a victory in the military

86 87

TTP 3: 192; 241–42. TTP 3: 202.

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engagement with the result that the position of the city involved in the conflict also happens to be strengthened and improved. But despite the advantage gained by the regime from the individual’s action, Spinoza maintains that the fellow who “violated his oath to the commander” deserves condemnation as a traitor for the reason that he usurped the commander’s authority and power. Whatever may have been the citizen’s reason for doing so, and Spinoza affirms that the individual acted “with good counsel” (bono consilio) and he acknowledges that there was a successful, useful, and advantageous outcome for the city from the assault, any individual who acts on is own counsel and undermines the “right of the supreme power,” or the power(s) assigned to its representatives, is a traitor to the regime.88 According to the political teaching of the treatise, even the “good counsel” of a citizen may be considered detrimental to the regime because “the preservation of the Republic is the highest good” and only the regime can provide the conditions through which security, health, prosperity, and peace, are made available for all of its citizens.89 The example of treason in the political teaching of the treatise establishes that an individual’s endeavor to persevere in his own state requires that he submit to the dictates or the “dependable counsel” of the regime in which he lives regardless of any advantage or utility that might be obtained from his reliance on his own bonum or certum consilium. For the sake of sociability, peace, and as much health and security as may be extended to individuals by a polity, it is both necessary and useful that citizens adhere to the reasonable or sensible dictates of the democratic political regime. Citizens should adhere to the “dependable counsel” of the supreme authority or power if they hope to conserve themselves and sustain a social and political condition that makes their self-preservation practicable. Where an individual’s own “good counsel” or his own “dependable counsel” does not come into conflict with the dispositions and dictates of the regime then the individual is free to feel or to think or to speak or to act as he wishes; for “the goal of the Republic really is liberty.”90 Still, “the goal of the Republic” is unachievable if every individual simply does as he pleases and “the goal of the Republic” is unachievable where reason has no greater standing

88 89 90

TTP 3: 197. TTP 3: 192. TTP 3: 241.

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than passions such as hatred or anger with respect to the conduct of life and the governance of human affairs. Accordingly, the philosophic reader of the treatise is confronted with two stark alternatives.91 On the one hand, if all human beings were constituted so as to do nothing but what “true reason indicates” then there would be no need of laws; rather, it would be sufficient to “teach true moral lessons” to human beings and the conduct of their lives and the governance of their affairs would conform to standards of reasonability or sensibility. But, on the other hand, human beings are not so constituted by nature. Instead they abandon reason and follow their lusts and impulses. Therefore, in order for a society or a republic to exist and to operate successfully on behalf of its citizens it is necessary for the regime to enact laws that will constrain the lusts and impetuous behaviors of human beings; moreover, the regime must be willing and able to employ force to bring citizens into conformity with the law.92 Because human beings are driven more by passion than by reason it is necessary that passionate human beings be moved to abide by the reasonable or sensible dictates of the regime; for passionate human beings typically are not disposed to adhere to the dictates of others. Instead they regard the reasonable or sensible dictates of others to be opposite to their own interests, desires, or needs. Therefore human beings must be made to become law-abiding. Yet there may be no incentive for them to do so. For any pact between or among human beings has force only on the basis of its utility;93 and if an individual human being does not regard the social pact which obliges him to be law-abiding as useful to himself then he will not observe the terms or the conditions of the pact into which he has entered. Furthermore, if the utility of every pact is determined subjectively by each individual

91 Based on the teaching provided by Spinoza in the TTP, it may be said that any reader of the book will recognize that there is some need for law. However, given the idiosyncratic character of human assessments about matters of personal interest and personal utility, it is likely that any reader of the TTP will recognize that laws are necessary mostly for other human beings rather than for themselves. But the philosophic reader of the TTP will acknowledge something else. The philosophic reader of the treatise will know that by nature passion is as legitimate as reason in the conduct of life and the governance of human affairs and therefore unreasonable human beings will require greater inducements to adopt reasonable or sensible behaviors. In other words, it may be necessary to have recourse to unreasonable inducements to move vulgar or passionate human beings to become law-abiding citizens. 92 TTP 3: 73–74; 191– 94. 93 TTP 3: 192.

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then there is no guarantee that all of the members of a democratic political regime will remain mutually faithful to the pact simultaneously. Unless one can convince passionate human beings of the need for law, the need for becoming law-abiding, and the advantageous utility of obeying the law, there can be little confidence that the polity will succeed in accomplishing its cardinal aims. The polity or regime will not be able to cultivate preservation, security, health, or prosperity nor will the polity or regime be able to help its citizens realize the advantages of liberty. The task for the founder of a regime is to determine the best conduit for moving human beings toward political life and causing them to perceive life in association with others as useful and advantageous to them. In other words, the task is to persuade human beings, especially passionate human beings, about the utility of the law, the advantages of being law-abiding, and the necessity or desirability of participating in political life. Chapter four of the treatise is entitled, “De Lege Divina.” However, that chapter commences with a definition of the meaning and nature of law. According to Spinoza, “the name law taken absolutely signifies that according to which each individual, whether all or some of one same species, acts by a fixed and determinate plan.”94 But law also may be distinguished in respect of what occurs by the “necessity of nature” and what “depends on that which is agreeable by human beings.” With respect to the former kind of law, Spinoza cites as an example of a law from “the necessity of nature” a “universal law of bodies” according to which bodies impinging on smaller bodies lose as much of their motion as they communicate to other bodies; and with respect to the latter kind of law, Spinoza cites as an example of a law that “depends upon that which is agreeable to human beings” a law that involves the yielding of “some right they have by nature,” either voluntarily or by compulsion, whereby human beings confine themselves to “a certain plan of living.”95 The plan of living to which they adhere aims to provide the conditions through which human beings can adopt a manner of “living more safely and conveniently.”96 With respect to law “taken absolutely,” Spinoza concedes that “everything is determined from universal laws of nature to existing and

94 95 96

TTP 3: 57. TTP 3: 58. TTP 3: 57.

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operating by a fixed and determinate plan”; nevertheless it correctly may be said that some laws “depend upon that which is agreeable to human beings” for two reasons. First, inasmuch as human nature “constitutes part of the power of nature,” what proceeds from human agreement is part of what emanates from nature through the power of human nature as it is expressed by human beings. Second, though human agreements owe to the power of human nature, it also must be realized that human beings largely are ignorant of the order and operations of nature, and so they are ignorant of “the concatenation of causes” among the various things in nature. Therefore, according to Spinoza, “for the advantage of life, it is better, I rather should say, it is necessary, to consider things as possible.”97 The account of law given in the treatise leads the reader to the conclusion that law, properly conceived, is the fixed and determinate plan that is inherent to nature itself and which applies to all of the things that are included within nature. All that is within nature functions in accordance with “the universal laws of nature.” Still, one may draw a distinction between laws that are natural and necessary and laws that are human. Laws about bodies are natural and necessary. Laws about bodies apply to human bodies just as they apply to nonhuman bodies. Accordingly, there are functions of human bodies that may be characterized as adhering to the necessary laws of nature. For example, Spinoza cites the faculty of memory as a human function that proceeds in accordance with necessary laws of nature. An association of images or impressions with other like images or impressions is a natural and necessary element of the faculty of memory: “So when a human being recollects one thing he recollects at the same time another similar thing or something he perceived at the same time with it.”98 But it also is the case that laws which issue from “human agreement” can involve principles that conform to necessary laws of nature. For example, the lex summa naturae that dictates the self-preservation of the individual could be represented in the framing of a reasonable or sensible plan of living that would propose to assure the achievement of the third proper object of desire. In that instance, human power representing the power of nature can be conceived as devising laws for the conduct of life and the governance of affairs that are the most reasonable or sensible for

97 98

TTP 3: 58. TTP 3: 58.

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the purpose of achieving preservation, security, health, and peace. But the laws or codes of conduct that are devised by human beings through the use of reason possess a peculiar feature that differentiates them from necessary laws of nature. Human laws are predicated upon the assumption that things in nature are possible or contingent rather than necessary. The human laws concern the “possible” as “that which may exist” or “that which may be done.”99 Consequently, though human laws derive from human nature and hence they ultimately derive from the power of nature itself, human laws typically do not give adequate expression to the actual nature of things; for the actual nature of things is such that natural individuals are bound only by “the rules of the nature of each individual” which imply both the natural impetus of a thing “to existing and operating in a fixed and determinate manner” as well as the identification of “the right of nature” with “the right of power.”100 Insofar as human deliberation, human choice, and human agency emanate from the power of nature, the framing of human laws through the faculty of reason is natural. But one also cannot ignore the fact that human laws and even divine laws at best are an approximation of what is most adequately understood and expressed through a philosophic account of the necessary laws of nature. In a sense, the difference among the kinds of laws delineated by Spinoza, that is, necessary laws of nature, on the one hand, and human laws or divine laws, on the other hand, may be said to be reflected in the difference between the revealed teaching of Christ and the revealed teaching of Moses. For whereas Christ perceived things “truly and adequately” and taught them as “eternal truths,” Moses perceived things inadequately and translated his perceptions of those things into laws which would bring advantages to those who adhered to them and disadvantages to those who failed to adhere to the laws.101 Thus “the name law,” says Spinoza, “seems applied to natural things by transference and commonly nothing else is understood by law than a mandate that human beings either are able to execute or neglect”; and for that reason, “it seems Law is defined more particularly: namely, it is a plan of living which a human being prescribes for himself or for others toward some

99 The Latin word, possibilis, involves the sense of contingency expressed in those two phrases. 100 TTP 3: 189; and compare 57–58 and 81–84. 101 TTP 3: 63–65; and compare 21; 28–29; 41–44.

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aim.”102 Moreover, because the majority of human beings are inept at apprehending “the true goal of the laws” and because “they live on the basis of anything but reason,” Spinoza contends that “in order to constrain everyone equally, legislators have constituted another aim, quite different from that which necessarily follows from the nature of law, namely, promising the maintainers of the laws what the vulgar love most and threatening those who violate the laws with what they fear most; and so [legislators] have endeavored to curb the vulgar as a horse by the rein, as much as it can be done.”103 Spinoza’s account of law indicates that in the most basic and correct sense of the word, law is defined as that in accordance with which an individual acts by one and the same fixed and determinate plan. Laws governing the motions of bodies illustrate what it is to be a necessary law of nature. Natural necessary law is that without which an individual thing would not function in the fixed and determinate manner that empowers it to exist and operate in a natural and determinate way. In the primary sense, then, law concerns that which cannot be otherwise than it is. But since the necessary laws of nature involve the expressions of the power of nature itself, the laws or powers of human nature also are such that particular laws can be enacted by human beings to regulate the conduct of human life or the governance of human affairs; though it must be acknowledged that the human laws do not give an adequate expression to the actual nature of things.104 Instead, human laws typically include, or they even may require, an accommodation of vulgar sentiments and opinions about the nature things. More precisely, human laws appear to be especially effective for the majority of human beings when the laws powerfully affect the passions of human beings in terms of what they love, what they fear, or that for which they hope. Human law therefore attempts to exhort unreasonable or insensible human beings to become law-abiding through an appeal to their elemental hopes and fears; and if the human laws are ratified by revelation then their authority and their ability to influence the majority of human beings only is enhanced.105

102 103 104 105

TTP 3: 58. TTP 3: 58–59. TTP 3: 57. Compare TTP 3: 61 and 205–207.

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Most human beings do not grasp the “true aim of laws.”106 For them to do so would require that passionate human beings, unreasonable human beings, insensible human beings, or the vulgar exercise the faculty of reason in ways that they habitually eschew. Therefore legislators establish another aim for law. They use law to entice human beings to adopt a plan of living that promises them what they desire most. The true aim of law, however, is to curb the vulgar appetites and impulses of passionate, unreasonable, or insensible human beings. An accurate apprehension of the “true aim of laws” presupposes that a human being possesses the reasonableness and the capacity to seek nothing other than what “true reason” indicates as being useful or advantageous to him. Reasonable or sensible human beings recognize that simple moral lessons are sufficient to instruct reasonable or sensible human beings about how to conduct their lives and how to govern their affairs prosperously. But the majority of human beings are neither reasonable nor sensible. Consequently, “virtue,” which is contained within human nature and principally depends upon human power alone,107 “is quite rare in any age” among all human beings.108 The majority of human beings therefore must be persuaded or coerced to apply standards of reasonableness or sensibility to the conduct of their lives and the governance of their affairs by being “curbed.” The guiding or true aim of human law, as defined by Spinoza, is the attempt to curb the passionate, impulsive, and lustful behaviors of human beings. The law succeeds in that aim when the multitude are induced to become law-abiding citizens of a democratic political regime, or human beings who adhere to the dictates of the dependable counsel of the democratic political regime, because it promises them what they admire and love most or because it threatens them with what they detest and hate most. Human law will not succeed if it announces its “true aim.” Human law will not succeed if it announces that its purpose is to curb the vulgar impulses and appetites that are shared by the majority of human beings. Still, human laws must not oppress; they should persuade. Quoting Seneca, Spinoza reminds the reader of the treatise, and perhaps especially the “one who reads philosophically,” of the need for “moderate regimes”109

106 107 108 109

TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3:

58–59. 46. 102. 74.

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such as the democratic political regime that is advocated by Spinoza in the treatise.110 After considering law in terms of necessary laws of nature and human laws, Spinoza treats the subject matter proper of chapter four of the treatise, “De Lege Divina.” The difference between a human law and a divine law is explained by reference to the object of each kind of law. That is to say, both human law and divine law express a plan of living. But the object of the plan of living reflected in human law “serves in protecting life and the republic” whereas the object of the plan of living reflected in divine law “looks solely to the highest good, that is, knowledge and love of God.”111 Human law and divine law are said to be distinguishable from each other for the reason that each has a different object. Human law seeks to protect life and to protect the political institution that is designed to preserve life, namely, the democratic republic. Divine law, on the other hand, concerns knowledge and love of God. The claim about the divine law, the object of the divine law, and knowledge of God involves a perspective that emphasizes the difference between the life of reason and the life of passion. That is, since the perfection of the understanding is the highest thing that human beings can attain, the highest good of human beings consists in the perfection of the intellect. Furthermore, because “nothing can be or be conceived without God,” the more we know about nature the more we know about God; and the more we know about God the greater is the perfection of the intellect.112 Hence the divine law aims at the highest good of human beings insofar as the highest good of human beings consists in the perfection of the intellect and the perfection of the intellect ostensibly includes knowledge and love of God.113 Yet the highest good of human beings predictably is neglected by the vast majority of human beings inasmuch as “it is impossible for carnal human beings to understand” such things; they regard claims about the “highest good” as vain because they possess only a meager knowledge of God and they can find nothing tangible and satisfying in pursuing a knowledge and love of God that requires TTP 3: 193–94. TTP 3: 59. 112 TTP 3: 59–60. 113 TTP 3: 60–61. Notwithstanding Spinoza’s assertion, it also must be recalled that Spinoza maintains that knowledge of nature or knowledge of the primary causes of things is achievable on the basis of human power alone or it is achievable from “the laws of human nature alone” (TTP 3: 46; and compare 10; 15–16; 59–60). 110 111

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the use of the intellect alone.114 Hence the “highest good” of human beings remains largely unattained by most human beings for the reason that they fail to employ the faculties of human nature that make such knowledge possible. Still, because many things may be referred to God, especially things in the superlative degree,115 it also is the case that a plan of living may attain the status of a divine law where the human law aims at what is “highest,” or superlative, and if it “has been ratified by revelation [for] in this sense, the Law of Moses can be called the Law of God, or the divine Law.”116 In other words, the plan of living contained in the Law of Moses is regarded as divine law to the extent that it inculcates and fosters one half of the highest good of human beings, namely, love of God. Knowledge of the necessary laws of nature, knowledge of things through their primary causes, and acquisition of the habit of virtue are aims that may be achieved through the exercise of the human intellect alone. The achievement of those goals depends principally on human power or the laws of human nature.117 Accordingly, the highest good attainable by human beings is something that can be realized through human agency and effort.118 Moreover, the highest good attainable by human beings is such that it is “its own reward” and failure to attain the highest good is evinced in the life of those who suffer “slavery of the flesh, or an unsteady and vacillating spirit.”119 The vulgar do not pursue the highest good because it demands the exercise of the intellect and because it requires “speculation and a clear mind” whereas the passionate multitudes pursue only what they are able to touch, eat, or have affect their bodies.120 Nonetheless, the majority of human beings who are driven by their passions, who neglect reason, and who behave insensibly must be prompted to develop the habit of virtue if they are to preserve themselves and prosper; or, more to the point, they must

TTP 3: 61. TTP 3: 38–41. 116 TTP 3: 61. 117 TTP 3: 46. 118 TTP 3:229. At the close of chapter 5 of the TTP, Spinoza recounts the views expressed by “Rabbi Joseph, son of Shem Tov.” According to Rabbi Joseph, the ethical teaching of Aristotle “omitted nothing concerning true Ethics.” But the teaching of the Greek philosopher was incapable of contributing to one’s salus for the reason that Aristotle’s teaching was derived from reason alone and it therefore could not be embraced as a lesson “revealed prophetically” (TTP 3: 80 and compare 3: 79). 119 TTP 3: 62. 120 TTP 3: 61. 114 115

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be pushed toward living virtuously if others are to preserve themselves and prosper. The inducement to virtue and living well, however, will not come from the teaching of “moral lessons” that convince the intellect. Instead, the inducement to virtue and living well will come from those means which are more attractive or compelling to passionate, unreasonable, or insensible human beings. The majority of human beings can be moved by law. They can be moved by the law to constrain their excessive and harmful behaviors; and they can be moved by the law to develop behaviors which discourage them from acting neglectfully of others. The majority of human beings will be moved to embrace law because it will promise them what they love most or it will threaten them with what they fear most or desire least. The laws will have as their purposes “the protection of life and the republic”; and both purposes contribute to the fulfillment of the third proper object of desire inasmuch as laws constitute a plan of living that is dedicated to security and health. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the human laws need to be incompatible with the “Law of God or the divine Law.”121 As is evident from the example of the “Law of Moses,” it is plausible that human laws which are consistent with revelation or human laws sanctioned by revelation may supply human beings with an element of the “highest good” which includes a teaching about the love of God. That is, although divine law and human law involve histories and narratives that are not capable of affording human beings adequate knowledge of God,122 divine laws and human laws nonetheless can inspire a love of God which fosters obedience to God and the hope of salus.123

121 The possible compatibility of human law with divine law is illustrated in Spinoza’s claims about the reasonableness that ultimately should be reflected in each kind of law. That is, Spinoza goes so far as to assert that the Hebrew people during their enslavement were obligated to follow even the Egyptian laws if those laws “did not conflict with the natural divine law” (TTP 3: 72). 122 TTP 3: 61–62; 76–77; and compare 168–70. 123 TTP 3: 165; 168; 175–80. Spinoza’s account of the various kinds of law in chapter 4 of the TTP is reminiscent of Plato’s account of law in Minos which commences with the question: “What is law?” (313a). The focus of the dialogue is political law but in order to establish the significance of political law Socrates contrasts it with two other definitions of law. At one extreme, “law” is defined as “things customarily accepted” (313b) or what also may be characterized as “the official opinion [doxa] of the city” (313c). At the other extreme, law is an art which implies “knowledge of what is” (314b; 317d). Between those extremes, political law is defined as “the wish to be the discovery of what is” (315a). According to Socrates, “the official opinion of the city” can incorporate “divine” elements (318c). The scheme of law in Minos involves

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On the basis of their nature and inclinations, the vast majority of human beings can be persuaded to adhere to human laws or the dependable counsels of the democratic political regime because they promise them “what they love most” or because they threaten them with “what they fear most.” Reasonable or sensible legislators will realize what moves the vast majority of human beings most efficiently. They will be aware that passionate, unreasonable, or insensible human beings are not moved by the articulation of a long series of arguments, nor are they moved by sets of rational demonstrations, nor are they moved by the presentation of deductive proofs. Rather passionate human beings are moved by the telling of the appropriate sorts of compelling and persuasive tales or stories. Passionate human beings are moved to be virtuous, sociable, dutiful, and law-abiding as a consequence of the persuasive power of compelling narratives. The tales or stories are ones that appeal to the imaginations and the experiences of passionate human beings; they are tales or stories that reflect commonly received opinions, sentiments, or habits already received by the majority of human beings; and the tales or stories will have the authority to influence the desires, hopes, and fears of the multitude.124 The kind of tale or story or narrative that can be invoked for the purpose of moving the vulgar to political life is named in the teaching of the treatise. According to Spinoza, the Scriptures contain the sorts of tales, stories, or narratives that are “revealed first for the use of an entire nation and in the end revealed to the whole human race”; accordingly, the teaching of the Scriptures has been “accommodated greatly to the grasp of the plebs

three distinctions which I propose correspond approximately to Spinoza’s division of laws in the TTP. “Knowledge of what is” corresponds to “necessary laws of nature”; “the official opinion of the city” or “things customarily accepted,” insofar as they may include “divine” elements, correspond to “divine law”; and “the wish to be the discovery of what is” corresponds to “human law.” “Human law” occupies a middle position between two extremes. Or, while philosophy is concerned with “knowledge of what is” and “necessary laws of nature” and theology is concerned with “the official opinion of the city” and “things customarily accepted,” which can include “divine” elements, politics seeks to be “the discovery of what is” for the reason that it is less than philosophy but more than theology. That is, it is less than “knowledge of what is” but it seeks to be more than merely an “official opinion of the city” which can include more than one superstitious belief or absurd premise. Though politics can be informed by philosophy or theology, at its best politics aims to be the “discovery of what is” for an audience that remains comprised principally of nonphilosophers. 124 TTP 3: 76–77.

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and it is confirmed by experience alone.”125 In other words, the teaching of the Scriptures is capable of moving and persuading the majority of human beings to adopt a plan of living that is sensible and which contributes to their security and health. Moreover, the teaching of the Scriptures which is the teaching of revelation, theology, faith, or piety is one that demands obedience to law; it cultivates virtue and sociability by encouraging love of a neighbor; and it offers the promise of salus to all human beings in both theological and political terms.126

125 126

TTP 3: 118. TTP 3: 69–71.

PART FOUR

PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND POLITICS

The philosophical teaching of the treatise is the teaching of nature. The theological teaching of the treatise is the teaching of piety and obedience. The political teaching of the treatise is the teaching of the protection of life and the protection of the republic. But it is not immediately obvious how the three teachings of the Tractatus theologicopoliticus are related to each other nor is the connection among them entirely clear. Hence it is not immediately evident why the teaching of the treatise is distinctively “theologico-political.”1 Chapters one through fifteen of the treatise are devoted to subject matters that are preponderantly theological in kind and only chapters sixteen through twenty of the book treat subject matters that are political in kind; although two of those last five chapters of the treatise examine “the Republic of the Hebrews,” that is, those two chapters contain a discussion of various aspects of the relationship between theology and politics in the Hebrew theocracy.2 Nevertheless, the political intention of Spinoza’s book is exhibited in the subtitle to the treatise as well as in Spinoza’s declaration in the Preface to his book that “the principle to be demonstrated is that liberty,” especially liberty of thought, liberty of speech, and the liberty of philosophizing “can be granted without detriment to piety or the public peace”; and, indeed, such freedoms

1 A sense of the separation of the theological teaching of the treatise from the political teaching of the TTP is reflected in the title of the anonymously published first complete English translation of Spinoza’s book, A treatise partly theological and partly political, containing some few discourses, etc. (London, 1689). Prior to the 1689 publication of the treatise in English, Charles Blount had incorporated an English translation of chapter 6 of the TTP (“De Miraculis”) into his own anonymously published book, Miracles, No Violations of the Laws of Nature (London, 1683). Familiarity in England with Spinoza’s teachings in the TTP is confirmed by the fact that the interpolation by Blount of chapter 6 of the TTP into his own book was denounced quickly by Thomas Browne in his work, Miracles, Works Above and Contrary to Nature (London: Samuel Smith, 1683). Some of the ideas expressed in Part Four of this book initially were introduced in my essay, “On the Unity of Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus,” Jewish Political Studies Review 7 (5755/1995): 107–143. 2 TTP 3: 201 and 221.

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“cannot be withheld without great danger to peace and grave harm to the Republic.”3 The connection between the theological and political parts of the treatise is introduced by Spinoza’s remark in the Preface to the treatise that the conclusions he reaches concerning the liberty of thought and the liberty of speech in a democratic political regime derive from his examination of the Scriptures.4 In addition, at the beginning of the political part of the book, Spinoza states that he will consider the practical consequences “in optima Republica” of his conclusion that philosophy must be separated from theology, the position which he asserted at the close of the theological part of his book.5 On the surface appearance of matters, then, it would seem that chapters sixteen through twenty of the treatise represent an adjunct discussion of the manner whereby the civil liberties of a democratic political regime can be seen to parallel the kind of theological and philosophic liberties that were advanced in chapters one through fifteen of the book. Based on that perspective, one would infer that the aim of the treatise is to separate philosophy from theology so that liberty of thought and liberty of speech, as well as the liberty of philosophizing, could be instituted under a political regime whose chief purpose is to secure and advance the liberty of its citizens;6 and the achievement of that aim is central to the teaching of the treatise. However, the reader’s awareness of the significance of that aim also must be supplemented by the reader’s realization that Spinoza’s old book also serves a more basic intention. The teaching of philosophy, the teaching of theology, and the teaching of politics in the treatise are united more deeply through their relation to a problem that is endemic to human nature; and the teaching of the treatise concerns the respective abilities or inabilities of philosophy, theology, and politics to solve that problem. That is, since the vast majority of human beings do not acquire the habit of virtue by the exercise of their own faculties of intellect, it is necessary to motivate the vulgar to become sociable and virtuous by some means other than an appeal to their reasonability 3 The subtitle to the TTP describes the book as “containing a number of dissertations, wherein it is shown that liberty to philosophize not only can be granted without injury to Piety and the Peace of the Republic, but that the Peace of the Republic and Piety are endangered by the suppression of this liberty” (compare TTP 3: 7 and 11). 4 TTP 3: 11. 5 TTP 3: 189. 6 TTP 3: 241.

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or sensibility. If passionate human beings are to become sociable and virtuous, it is necessary to convince them of the advantages and the utility of political life through means that are more familiar and persuasive to them. Consequently, the teaching of the treatise requires philosophy to press theology into the service of politics. Or, to state the issue causally, Spinoza conceives the theological teaching that he presents in the treatise for the purpose of contributing to the solution of a natural or philosophic problem by a political means; and for that reason Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise necessarily is theologico-political: Spinoza presents a ‘theologico-political handling’ of the natural or philosophic problem. A principal aim of the treatise is to defend the liberty of philosophizing.7 Such liberty can be achieved only by permitting everyone in a democratic political regime to “think as he pleases and to say what he thinks.”8 As the opening passages from the Preface to the treatise make clear, a chief impediment to liberty of thought and liberty of speech is theological or religious prejudice which grows out of the natural human inclination toward superstitious beliefs which also leads human beings to despise the use of reason in itself or to condemn it as a source of impiety.9 Thus theology or religion inherently is indisposed to accept any claim by philosophy that philosophy or reason is capable of providing a plan of living for human beings that would prove to be sufficient for their attainment of salus. Theology or religion presumes that the plan of living that it prescribes is the sole plan of living that is suitable for the conduct of human life or the governance of human affairs. Moreover, because human beings are led more by passion than by reason it will happen that the majority of human beings will be drawn to the kind of instruction that theology or religion offers to them, namely, an instruction communicated though dramatic narratives which appeal to the opinions, sentiments, biases, and experiences of the world that are common to human beings who are not inclined toward philosophy. Furthermore, according to Spinoza, human beings naturally are prone to credulity and they live superstitiously especially at those times when they cannot govern all their affairs with some kind of dependable counsel or when they feel that fortune has failed 7 8 9

TTP 3: title page; 7; 11; 246–47. TTP 3: 10; 11; 117; 241; 243; 246–47. TTP 3: 5–7; 9–10.

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to favor them in accordance with their wishes or hopes.10 In such circumstances, human beings take refuge in the teachings of theology or religion. The doctrines and dogmas of theology or religion promise individuals the satisfaction of their hopes and desires, as well as the alleviation of their miseries, if the individuals adhere to a prescribed plan of living that has been approved by theology or religion. More particularly, because they are ignorant of the order and operations of nature, the vast majority of human beings come to adopt the theological or religious prejudice about the existence of a supranatural agent that is concerned with human wellbeing and the agent’s existence is said to be most manifest when the familiar courses of nature seem to be interrupted or contravened with an accompanying event that proves to be satisfying for those human beings who gain some advantage from the putative display of “divine providence.”11 Anyone who would seek to explain the unaccustomed event or the good fortune that follows from it by an account that involves natural causation rather than miraculous agencies is perceived by the vulgar to be an opponent of the existence and the power of God; and hence such individuals are charged with discrediting belief in the existence of the supranatural agent that most human beings regard as the source of human fortunes and misfortunes.12 The alternative to the plan of living that is determined by a reliance on superstition and chance events is the one that is despised by prejudiced and vulgar human beings. The alternative to the plan of living that is based upon superstition or fortune is the life of reason or the philosophic life13 which relies neither upon absurdities nor luck. Notwithstanding the liberating of the teaching of theology or religion from its corruptions and the liberalizing of its doctrines in the TTP 3: 5. TTP 3: 81–84. 12 TTP 3: 81–82; and compare 30. 13 The degradation of reason by those who succumb to religious prejudice and superstition is a pronounced theme of the Preface to the TTP: “[W]e see that it is especially those who greedily long for uncertain things who are the readiest victims of superstition of every kind, and it is especially when they are helpless and in danger that they implore God’s help with prayers and womanish tears. They call reason blind . . . and they call human sensibility vain, while the delusions of the imagination, dreams, and other childish absurdities they take to be the oracles of God. Indeed, they think that God, spurning the sensible (imo Deum sapientes aversari) has written his decrees not in man’s mind but in the entrails of beasts, or that by divine inspiration and instigation these decrees are foretold by fools, madmen, or birds. Fear makes human beings be insane” (3: 5). 10 11

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version of theology or religion that is presented in the treatise, which is achieved through critiques of prophecy, prophets, the Hebrew election, the status of ceremonial laws, belief in miracles, and the traditions of Scriptural interpretation, Spinoza’s teaching in the Tractatus theologico-politicus serves another more important philosophic purpose. The ultimate ambition of the teaching of the treatise is to provide a solution to the natural or philosophic problem.14 The ultimate ambition of the treatise is to solve the problem of human nature. The issue raised by Spinoza’s book is the problem concerning the conduct of human life and the governance of human affairs. Or, to state the issue differently, Spinoza’s purpose in the treatise is to solve the question of how human beings can live together in peace and security given the facts of human nature and the predominant tendencies and inclinations of passionate human beings. In other words, the treatise proposes to solve the question of how human beings can come to achieve the third proper object of desire by propounding a plan of living that will make preservation, security, health, and prosperity, or what generally may be termed human salus, possible. There are three proper objects of desire: the desire to know things through their primary causes; the desire to live well or to live virtuously; and the desire to live in security and health.15 Yet before the attainment of knowledge and the acquisition of virtue are feasible, it is necessary for human beings to live in security, health, and peace. The pursuit of knowledge, the cultivation of virtue, and the establishment of the liberty to think, to speak, and to act will not be practicable if human beings live in a bestial, rude, asocial way.16 Liberty and the opportunity to live well are unattainable without society or political life; and “no one can doubt that it is much more useful” for human beings to embrace life in political association with other human beings.17 However, a consequence of human nature is that human thoughts, speeches, and actions can occasion conflict among human beings. The peace and security advocated by Spinoza in the treatise therefore require that constraints be instituted which will prevent the harmful human inclinations toward license without simultaneously eliminating human liberty or human

14 15 16 17

TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3:

179. 46. 73; 190–91. 191.

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right. For the immediate purposes of the surface argument of the treatise, Spinoza focuses on the threats to the liberty of thought, speech, and action that are posed by the prevailing tradition of theology or religion in the Dutch situation of the late 1660s. He seeks to expand liberty while remaining mindful of the dangers of license. But in fact Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise reflects his awareness of the perennial tension that persists between those whose lives are led according to their passions and those who lives are led in accordance with reason.18 The first mention of the tension between the life of passion and the life of reason occurs early in the theological part of the treatise. In the discussion of the ceremonial law and the Hebrew regime, Spinoza seeks to demonstrate that the particular rituals observed by the Hebrew people were ordained for them only in respect to “the temporal happiness of the body and the tranquility of the regime, and therefore they could have been of use only while their regime was standing.”19 Spinoza’s conclusion about the Hebrew imperium enables him to confirm his narrow view of the condition of the Hebrew election, the condition of the Hebrew regime, and implicitly the condition of the Hebrew religion. But it also permits him the opportunity to introduce his teaching about the constitution of human societies by making an argument “from universal foundations.”20 Spinoza says that the formation of a society is necessary and useful to human beings because it provides for

18 That the treatise concerns the deeper question about the claim that is laid upon human life by passion and superstition as distinct from the claim that is laid upon human life by reason is indicated by a remark made by Spinoza in the Preface to the TTP. Even though Spinoza says “we have the rare good fortune to live in a Republic where liberty of judgment is fully granted to the individual citizen and he may worship God as he pleases, and where nothing is esteemed dearer and more precious than liberty,” nevertheless he also claims that he is “undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task in demonstrating that not only can [the liberty to philosophize] be granted without endangering piety and the peace of the Republic, but also that the peace of the Republic and piety depend upon this liberty” (3: 7). If nothing truly were “esteemed dearer and more precious than liberty” then Spinoza would have no need to defend the liberty of philosophizing in the TTP. Instead, however, he recognizes that the natural liberty to philosophize was in jeopardy because of the restrictions upon the civil liberties of thought and speech that were being advanced by the more zealous anti-republican alliances between sectarian religious forces and monarchists in The Netherlands during the 1660s. Still, the immediate historical situation only mirrors the more natural and basic problem inherent in the tension between the life of passion and the life of reason, as well as the dire consequences of that tension for the prospect of achieving the third proper object of desire. 19 TTP 3: 69. 20 TTP 3: 73.

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mutual security and the division of labor. Indeed, human beings would lack both the skill and the time to support and conserve themselves to the greatest extent possible if they did not afford each other mutual assistance. Moreover, life in society brings with it developments in “the arts and sciences which also are indispensable for the perfection of human nature and its blessedness”; for one sees that those who live in a barbarous way with no civilizing influences lead a wretched and almost brutish existence.21 While human societies are founded for the purposes of overcoming human insufficiencies, promoting human convenience, and establishing the terms for mutual aid and security among their members, the satisfaction of needs, desires, and interests in social life is contingent upon the observance of certain codes of behavior by the citizens who inhabit any particular society or political regime. For instance, as the Hebrew imperium enacted ritual ceremonies to enhance loyalty and conformity to the Hebrew political regime or the Hebrew plan of living, every political society, according to Spinoza, requires laws to regulate the behavior of its citizens in respect of the conduct of their lives and the governance of their affairs. The justification of the need for laws is conveyed through Spinoza’s account of human nature that is propounded in his discussion of ceremonial laws. Spinoza’s contention is that ceremonial laws, rituals, observances, etc., are not required by “the natural divine law”;22 nor do ceremonial laws have any bearing on the blessedness or the virtue of human beings.23 Rather the ceremonial laws, rituals, and observances that were formulated by the Hebrew regime for its people served the purpose of maintaining order and discipline among the people as well as order and discipline within the regime itself. Laws which constrain certain behaviors are needed because human beings naturally seek their own advantage to the neglect of others.24 Furthermore, human beings typically pursue their own advantages on the basis of their passions, lusts, or immoderate

21 TTP 3: 73. One might compare the similarity between Spinoza’s account of the origins of political association based upon mutual security and the division of labor with Plato’s account of the origins of the “city of natural necessity” at Republic 369b3ff. On the disadvantages of life outside political society, compare Spinoza’s remarks with the view offered by Thomas Hobbes in chapter 13 of Leviathan, where life in the “state of nature” is described as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (London: 1651), p. 62. 22 TTP 3: 62. 23 TTP 3: 69–71; 76. 24 TTP 3: 189.

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impulses instead of on the basis of the dictates of sound reason or on the basis of a reliance on some sort of dependable counsel:25 “Hence no society can subsist for long without government and coercion, and consequently without laws to control and restrain the lusts of human beings and their unbridled urges.”26 In the broader context of the discussion of human life in society and the need for laws to prevent human beings from pursuing base interests, Spinoza’s explanation of the Hebrew imperium and the intentions of its ceremonial laws indicates the crucial natural difference between those who live “solely from willfulness and who are carried away by the affects of the spirit,” namely, the passionate human beings, and those whose lives are conducted “from the sound dictates of reason,” namely, the reasonable or sensible human beings.27 If all human beings lived according to the sound dictates of reason then there would be no need for laws that compelled or curtailed certain behaviors since each individual would be acting in his own interest and to his own “true advantage.” However, the fact that the majority of human beings are passionate rather than reasonable or rational leads Spinoza to conclude that in order to maintain itself every society requires government, coercion, and the enforcement of laws that place restrictions upon the behaviors of human beings.28 Without laws, the threat of coercion and punishment for those who violate or ignore the laws, and the enforcement of the laws, there would be nothing to curb the impulses of the majority of human beings, who generally follow their fleshy instincts rather than rise to the use of reason. If unchecked impulses were to prevail, society and the advantages it can provide would be vitiated. The third proper object of desire is security and health; and the aim of society, as is evident from Spinoza’s claims about the Hebrew regime, is to afford the members of the society “temporal” and “bodily” advantages. Thus, inasmuch as they provide for the division of labor, establish mutual defense, and foster the development of the arts and sciences, societies naturally tend to promote the satisfaction of the third proper object of desire and hence the best kind of societies29 can serve as the means to TTP 3: 190. TTP 3: 73–74; 191–92. 27 TTP 3: 73; and compare 44, 68, and 80. 28 TTP 3: 73–74; 191–92. 29 Spinoza’s examination of “the foundations of a Republic” commences with a consideration of how far liberties may extend “in optima Republica” (TTP 3: 189). The “best Republic” also is called a “Democracy” (3: 193). 25 26

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achieving one of the most basic human desires. Yet the success of any society or regime in achieving its aims turns on the dispositions of its members and their willingness to embrace political life and the terms or the conditions that accompany it. According to the philosophic teaching of the treatise, “the right and plan of nature” is nothing other than the rules that determine the nature of any individual thing to act and to exist in a certain way: Fish swim; and big fish eat little fish because it is their nature to do so. Whatever any individual thing does by its own nature and through its own power it has the “highest right” to do because “the right of the individual is coextensive with its determinate power.”30 The identification of natural right with natural power extends to every individual in nature and therefore the identification of natural right with natural power extends to all aspects of human nature as well. In other words, a human being “who is not yet acquainted with reason or has not yet acquired a virtuous disposition lives under the control of appetite alone with as much right as he who conducts his life under the rule of reason.” Or, just as the reasonable or sensible human being has the highest right to do all that reason dictates, that is, he may live in accordance with the laws of reason, so too a human being who is ignorant and wanton has the highest right to do all that is urged on him by his appetites, that is, he may live according to the laws of appetite.31 Furthermore, “since it is the highest law of nature that each thing endeavors to persist in its state, as far as it is able to do so, taking no account of any other thing but itself, it follows that each individual has the highest right to exist and to operate as it is naturally determined.” In the exercise of rights or powers by any individual there is no distinction made between human beings who have discovered the advantages of the use of reason and human beings “to whom true reason is unknown or between fools, madmen, and the sane.”32 Whatever any individual thing does by the laws of its own nature, it does with the highest right inasmuch as it acts as it is determined to do by nature. The philosophic teaching of the treatise which is the teaching of nature and which contains an account of the ius et institutum naturae exposes the root of the natural or philosophic problem. That is, “the

30 31 32

TTP 3: 189. TTP 3: 189–90. TTP 3: 190.

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natural right of every human being is determined not by sound reason, but by his desire and his power.” The natural or philosophic problem addressed by the teaching of the treatise is the problem of human nature itself. Because human beings by nature are bound to preserve themselves, they will choose whatever they perceive to be the most convenient means to the satisfaction of their desire for self-preservation. But functioning without the use of sound reason, it is typical that passionate human beings will be guided by their appetites alone. Thus “whatever any human being believes to be to his advantage, whether he is under the guidance of sound reason or under the sway of passion, he may seek and get it for himself by the highest natural right through any means he can, be it force or deceit or entreaty and consequently he may regard as an enemy anyone who tries to hinder him from obtaining what he wants.”33 In and of itself, “the right and plan of nature” prohibits nothing except only those things that no one desires and no one can do; it does not condemn struggles or hatred or anger or ruses or anything at all that is urged by appetite, passion, impulse, or lust. Most striking in Spinoza’s account of the teaching of nature is his deduction that the life of passion is equally as legitimate as the life of reason per ius et institutum naturae. Hence the imaginative-affective life or the impulsive or impetuous or even the violent life is no less justified by nature than is the tranquil and self-possessed life. Every individual will pursue whatever he perceives to be to his own advantage or his own interest and each individual will pursue what he perceives to be to his advantage or his interest regardless of the consequences that his actions may have for others. The natural or philosophic problem, which is to say, the problem of human nature, turns on the issue of rational, reasonable, or sensible human beings living peacefully and securely among a majority of human beings who live passionately and who “regard as enemies” anyone who is perceived to impede them from satisfying their desires, impulses, or lusts however excessive or self-indulgent those urgings may be. Indeed, “by the highest right of nature,” passionate human beings may employ any means at their disposal to achieve the things they seek and only that which no one desires or no one can do is excluded from anyone’s right or anyone’s power.

33

TTP 3: 190.

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Inasmuch as most human beings are governed by “carnal instincts and emotions” rather than by “dictates of sound reason,” the fundamental native endeavor of any individual human being toward self-preservation implicitly is jeopardized by any other individual’s adherence to the lex summa naturae or any other individual’s exercise of natural right since natural right is limited only by an individual’s power. No one is prevented by nature from wresting from others by force whatever he perceives to be to his advantage; and even those who ignore reason for the sake of the passions are as much at risk from others who live according to the passions as are those who conduct themselves temperately according to the dictates of reason.34 In order to avoid the dangers inherent to the natural human condition and facilitate the satisfaction of the third proper object of desire, some remedy must be contrived that allows human beings to exercise their natural rights and natural powers within the bounds of some restrictions that can be set upon their excessive actions and behaviors. Laws must be instituted for human beings that prescribe limits to how they may act in the pursuit of their interests; and human beings must be brought to comply with those laws. One efficient way to achieve that goal is the construction of a political society that will frame laws to serve the advantage of the populace. But, in addition, the regime then must threaten punishment for those who violate the laws and promise rewards for those who abide by them.35 If human beings can be persuaded to enter into political life with other human beings then their adherence to laws can occasion specific advantages for them. For in addition to curtailing the harmful exercises of natural right and natural power by human beings which can be destructive of others, participation in

34 In accordance with the philosophic teaching of the treatise, that is, the teaching of nature, the life of passion and the life of reason are equally natural and equally legitimate. Still, the conclusion that the life of reason is superior to the life of passion is supported by Spinoza’s identification of living in accordance with “the dictates of sound reason” and living in accordance with one’s “true advantage” (TTP 3: 73–74). Moreover, if “a human being’s true happiness” demands “knowledge of the truth” (3: 44) and only philosophy or reason is devoted to truth (3: 179) then the life of reason must be superior to the life of passion and the various ways that the passionate life can express itself, including the acceptance of various forms of religious prejudice and superstition. Common to both the passionate life and the superstitious life are the emotions of “anger, hatred, and deceit” (3: 6; and compare 190); and Spinoza plainly affirms that superstition itself originates from the “most powerful kinds of affect” and not from reason (3: 6). 35 TTP 3: 74; and compare 58–59.

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political life safeguards mutual security, it increases the conveniences of life through a division of labor, and it provides the conditions through which the improvement of human life can be advanced insofar as the beneficence of the arts and sciences can become more developed and refined within the framework of a political society. Thus an obvious practical solution to the natural or philosophic problem of human nature would seem to be a political one. Human life, as determined by “the right and plan of nature,” has the ironic effect of making human life itself precarious. Since the natural right of every individual typically is determined more by desire and power than by reason there is no positive guarantee that the “highest law of nature,” which obliges each individual to preserve itself, actually conduces to the preservation or the protection of any individual at all. On the contrary, the fact that any human being has summum ius to live according to his appetites already implies that all human beings could act injuriously toward each other if they believed it to be advantageous to do so. Still, Spinoza insists that “no one can doubt” that it is far more salutary to live in accordance with laws and the sound dictates of reason that genuinely are intended for the true advantage of human beings.36 Each individual seeks to conduct his life and govern his affairs free from “anxiety, struggles, hatred, anger, and ruses” but that condition cannot be realized as long as “every individual is permitted to do as he pleases and reason can claim no more right than hatred or anger.” To forestall anxiety, struggles, hatred, anger, and ruses, together with the disadvantageous consequences of them, human beings must be moved “to unite into one body, agree that the unrestricted right naturally possessed by each individual be put into common ownership, and make the most stringent pledges to be guided in all matters only by the dictates of reason. [ They must] keep appetite in check in so far as it tends to another’s hurt, [they must] do to no one what they would not want done to themselves, and [they must] uphold another’s right as they would their own.”37 In a somewhat ironic fashion, the philosophic teaching of the treatise itself introduces the mode whereby human beings can foreswear the unrestricted exercise of their natural right or natural power and live in compliance with laws in a political regime. The natural mode which

36 37

TTP 3: 191; 73–75. TTP 3: 191.

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permits individuals the use of any extreme to secure their interests or satisfy their desires is the same mode that permits human beings to embrace political life and an adherence to established laws that constrain those very behaviors. That is, the “universal law of human nature” which compels self-preservation also entails that “no one rejects what he judges to be good except through the hope of a greater good or the fear of a greater evil, and no one endures any evil except to avoid a greater evil or to gain a greater good.”38 Because self-preservation of the individual is the lex summa naturae and political societies are designed to protect human beings from injury as well as improve their lives, it is obvious that human beings could be moved, persuaded, or lured to enter political life in the hope of achieving a “greater good” or avoiding a “greater evil” by doing so. Relinquishing one’s entitlement to the exercise of certain rights or powers would be perceived as a “lesser evil” that a human being could endure for the sake of attaining a “greater good” in the form of gaining protection from injury by other human beings; and that kind of protection is the stated ambition of human law for human law is a “plan of living” that is designed to protect life and to protect the republic.39 Still, the manner of discriminating between or among various goods and evils is an entirely idiosyncratic matter. According to Spinoza, it is a principle of human nature that “everyone will choose of two goods that which he judges to be the greater and of two evils that which seems to him to be the lesser. I say expressly that which in his belief is the greater or lesser. I do not say that the facts necessarily correspond with his judgment. This law is so firmly inscribed in human nature that it should be placed among the eternal truths which no one is able to ignore.”40 Human nature is such that one’s perception of what does or what does not conduce to his advantage or his interest is neither constant nor consistent. Even the advantages promised to an individual for participation in political life may not be sufficient to induce a human being to remain compliant with the law, to conform to the political culture, or to constrain all of the injurious behaviors to which he may be inclined. Indeed, because of the primacy of natural egoism, Spinoza concludes that “an agreement has no force except by reason of its utility, without TTP 3: 191–92. TTP 3: 59. 40 TTP 3: 192. The Latin word “firmiter” is italicized in the original 1670 publication of the TTP. 38 39

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which the agreement is annulled and held void.”41 Consequently, the maintenance and stability of any political regime ultimately depend upon the estimation of the utility of the regime to its citizens. If any citizen ceases to regard the regime as being of use to him then, in accordance with the philosophic teaching of the treatise, that individual is no longer bound by the terms of his allegiance to the regime. In that crucial respect, however, the right of nature that can draw human beings to participate in political society (namely, when human beings choose political life as a “greater good” based on its utility to them) is the same right which can undermine a political regime (namely, when human beings regard continuing in political life as a “greater evil” because of its lack of utility to them). Thus the political solution to the natural or philosophic problem of how to assure a secure and peaceful life for both rational human beings and passionate human beings contains an inherent deficiency. Within his account of the “universal law of human nature” that inclines human beings to choose in favor of the greater of two goods or the lesser of two evils, Spinoza introduces a claim which reveals the chief limitation to an exclusively political solution to the natural or philosophic problem. From the universal law of human nature “it necessarily follows that no one is going to promise in all good faith to give up his unrestricted right, and in general no one is going to keep any promises whatsoever, except through fear of a greater evil or hope of a greater good.”42 Since an individual’s natural right is determined by the individual’s power alone, the philosophic teaching of the treatise acknowledges that one can act deceitfully in dealing with an assailant, for example, and promise that individual whatever he demands though the victim has no genuine intention to honor his promise if he can avoid fulfilling it. In adhering to the highest law of nature which obliges every human being to preserve himself, it is a perfectly licit exercise of natural right and natural power to act deceitfully whenever an individual believes that necessity or utility calls for it. Hence it is a consequence of human nature that agreements are made, and they are made valid, only because of the perceived utility of an agreement or pact among the parties who assent to it; and that fact, Spinoza says, deserves special attention when establishing a political regime.

41 42

TTP 3: 192. TTP 3: 192; and compare 58–59.

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That is, if all human beings easily could be induced to follow reason alone and to recognize “the supreme utility and the necessity of the Republic’s existence” then they would foreswear deceit entirely. Because of their desire to secure “this highest good, namely, the preservation of the Republic,” all human beings would abide by their agreements or pacts with others in complete good faith and they would regard their most important civic function to be keeping their word since honesty is “the strongest shield of the Republic.” However, the majority of human beings are not readily induced to be guided by reason; “for each of them is drawn by his own pleasure, and the mind frequently is so occupied by avarice, glory, envy, hatred, etc., that no place remains for reason. Therefore although human beings may make promises by certain signs of simple spirit, and pledge themselves to keep faith, no one can be assured of another’s faith unless something else attends the promise; for everyone by the right of nature is able to act deceitfully and no one is bound to stand by a promise except in the hope of a greater good or the fear of a greater evil.”43 Human beings can be enticed to enter into political associations because of the assistances or conveniences that a regime is able to offer to them. Human beings can be enticed to live in political societies because they promise a “greater good” to them. But human beings will abide by the promises they make in political life principally because of “the threat of the supreme penalty universally feared by all.”44 It is the fear of some punishment or it is hope for some reward to which Spinoza alludes when he asserts that one cannot depend on another’s pledge of faith “unless something else attends the promise.” For many human beings, the threat of punishment—be it severe or mild—may be enough to prompt them to adhere to established laws, fulfill the terms of their agreements or pacts with others, and to participate fully and advantageously in political life. But daily experience plainly confirms that even threats of the severest punishments do not curb all injurious behaviors or excessive acts by human beings. Those human beings who are guided only by their “carnal instincts” regularly ignore laws, violate their agreements or pacts with others, and frequently they escape any reprisal for their injurious or excessive behaviors. If human

TTP 3: 192–93. TTP 3: 193. The “supreme penalty universally feared by all” obviously would be death since death is the antithesis of self-preservation. 43 44

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beings can act viciously toward others with impunity, even within the precincts of political life, then the hope of human beings for secure, healthy, and prosperous lives becomes compromised. Where “greater goods” or “lesser evils” are decided principally on the basis of their utility to individuals who are driven by their own selfish desires and power then there is only a scant possibility that “carnal human beings” will comply with established laws or that they will fulfill all of the terms of their obligations to other human beings in political life. Accordingly, an exclusively political solution to the natural or philosophic problem is undercut by the implications of what Spinoza himself calls a “law so firmly inscribed in human nature that it should be placed among the eternal truths which no one is able to ignore,” namely, no one ever completely forswears the right to act deceitfully.45 With respect to the formation of a political society or regime, the philosophic account in the treatise of the right of nature and natural power exposes the friction that occurs between a human being’s interest to satisfy his own desires and the regime’s interest to have individual human beings restrain themselves for the sake of the welfare of the political community as a whole. But that friction is compounded by another element of Spinoza’s account of human nature; for the philosophic teaching of the treatise establishes that the phenomenon of obedience cannot be known from nature and therefore the legitimacy of it cannot be established by philosophy or reason.46 In other words, the very thing that is required in order for human beings to enter political life and to comply with the laws established there, namely obedience, is something that the philosophic teaching of the treatise, which is to say, the teaching of nature, does not provide. Consequently, some alternative nonphilosophic means must be employed to introduce the doctrine of obedience that is necessary to support any political solution to the natural or philosophic problem; and to that end, Spinoza resorts to the teaching of theology. After describing the founding of a democratic political regime, Spinoza defines various matters which pertain to political life including justice, injustice, civil right and wrong, who is an ally and who is an enemy, etc.47 According to Spinoza, the perpetrator of the crime of

45 46 47

TTP 3: 192–93. TTP 3: 86; and compare 98–99. TTP 3: 195–99.

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treason, for example, is “the one who for whatever reason endeavors to seize the right of the highest power” even if the regime were assured of gaining some advantage from that individual’s action.48 The matter of treason, which in the example cited results from an action based upon an individual’s appeal to his “own good counsel,” recalls Spinoza’s account of the right of nature and natural power in terms of the interests of the individual and the interests of the regime. At issue in the crime of treason is the question of the relationship between the right and sovereignty of the regime over and against the right and sovereignty of the individual.49 However, the return to a consideration of right and power in the context of the political discussion of the act of treason incorporates a reflection on the obligations of individuals to the terms of divine right and the teaching of theology that are presented in the treatise. That is, Spinoza wonders whether an individual human being who lives entirely by appetite alone, even though he has the highest natural right to do so, is not in clear contradiction of the “revealed divine right” which demands that everyone equally is required by God’s command to love his neighbor and avoid doing injury to others since the command applies to everyone whether he uses reason or not.50 In the example, Spinoza asserts that the regime gains from the endeavor of the individual who is said to have acted treasonously; and there is no evident sense that the action involved some failure of the individual to love his neighbor or that any injury to his neighbors, that is, his fellow citizens, was involved. On the contrary, his actions secure the advantage of the regime and therefore his action served the advantage and welfare of his fellow citizens. Nevertheless, using the example of a crime of treason as a conduit, Spinoza asks the more penetrating question about whether the right or power of nature is superior to the right or power of the revealed divine law. The answer to the question is that the claim about a contradiction between the right of nature and divine right can be resolved easily; for “if we attend only to the natural state, we easily are able to respond that it is prior to religion in nature and in time. No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God.” Indeed, this knowledge cannot be attained by any process of reasoning. One adopts the teaching of obedience “only on account of revelation confirmed

48 49 50

TTP 3: 197–98. Compare the discussion of “treason” on pp. 173–75 of this book. TTP 3: 197.

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by signs.” Therefore prior to the revelation of the divine law and the teaching of obedience to God “no one can be bound by a divine right which he is not able to know.”51 According to the philosophic teaching of the treatise, the life of passion is as legitimate as the life of reason. In the context of the “natural state,” each individual human being may do as he pleases, that is, each individual may do as his right or power permit, whether he is led by his appetites, impulses, and lusts or whether he is led by the sound dictates of reason that derive from his own deliberations. In the ‘political state’, however, promulgated laws established by the dependable counsel of the supreme power of the regime establish limits to one’s behaviors in respect of the conduct of one’s life and the governance of one’s affairs; and in the ‘theological state’ the revelation of the divine law is the promulgation of the terms of divine right and the limits it sets upon human behavior with respect to the conduct of human life and the governance of human affairs. Nature, however, prescribes no restraints upon human behavior. Whatever limits to action or behavior one experiences in nature follow from an individual human being’s own exercise reason and his sensible perception of what accrues to his “true advantage.” With respect to the crime of treason, Spinoza’s account is rather conventional. Where political societies have been formed, the sovereignty and right of the regime is to be acknowledged above the sovereignty and right of the individual and his interests. Private right must yield to public right and those individuals who prefer to pursue the former rather than submit to the latter can be punished to the maximum degree. But Spinoza also raises another question that introduces a very different set of considerations. In the absence of political regimes with established and promulgated laws, that is to say, in the natural state, is it not the case that human beings still are bound to restrain their injurious tendencies and behaviors in accordance with the divine law and the divine right which obliges everyone to love his neighbor? Spinoza’s reply to the question is that human beings are not bound by any such obligation if they are conceived in accordance with their natural condition alone; for the state of nature is prior to religion both in nature and in time. Consequently, for Spinoza, the origin of religion is identical with the origin of a civil state. That is, the establishment of political life and the establishment of theological or religious life each

51

TTP 3: 198; and compare 165.

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involve the surrender or transference of certain natural rights or powers from individual human beings to the supreme legislative power, whether the legislative power is the polity or God.52 Through his treatment of the political phenomenon of treason, Spinoza establishes the political requirement of personal submission to public authority. Private right must yield to public right for the sake of the stability and the prosperity of the regime and its citizens. But, through his treatment of treason, Spinoza also establishes that human obedience is introduced and initiated only through a revealed teaching. The philosophic teaching of the treatise therefore establishes that political right is related to—if not to say dependent upon—theological or divine right. The natural right or power of human beings is determined solely by the laws of nature. By nature, no one is obligated to comply with laws or decrees of either human or divine origin. Rather each individual human being can conduct his life and govern his affairs as each one’s right or power determines him to live, namely, according to the right or power of the passions or according to the right or power of reason. In the natural condition, then, each individual human being is completely at liberty to follow passion or reason and each one is completely at liberty to live as his right or power allows him to live. Still, the exercise of individual liberty can be perilous to the other human beings with whom the individual lives and the exercise of individual liberty also can be perilous to the individual himself. Political law and right or theological law and right establish limits to human action or behavior by placing restrictions upon the exercises of natural right or power by individual human beings. Thus political law and right or theological law and right possess the authority and the influence to minimize injurious human behaviors and to foster human wellbeing because of their ability to promise rewards and dispense punishments on the basis of human observance of the law. Furthermore, politics and theology share the same basis of origin. Both political law and right and theological law and right are inaugurated and become binding only after the adoption of a pact among human beings through which individuals expressly resign their unlimited exercise of natural rights and powers and transfer certain of those rights and powers to a commonly acknowledged authority. Indeed, it is only through an express act of resignation of those rights and powers, together with the adoption of an agreement to enter into

52

TTP 3: 198.

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a pact to live in a certain way with other individual human beings, that the phenomenon of obedience comes into existence at all. For just as “no one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to God” prior to an express covenant with God, surely no one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to his fellow human beings, that is, to others who are his equals, prior to his pledging his “faith” to adhere to the laws, rights, responsibilities, obligations, and adjudications of the “supreme power” or the acknowledged authorities.53 Thus obedience, either to God or to other human beings, derives from an artificial contractual construct rather than a natural fact and that realization returns us to the core of the natural or philosophic problem. In accordance with the ius et institutum naturae, human beings legitimately can seek to preserve themselves and pursue their interests either through a life of passion or through a life of reason. The reasonable or sensible human being acts for his “true advantage” whereas the passionate human being acts as he is “drawn by his own pleasure.”54 The pursuits of pleasure that are connected with base interests, like the “carnal instincts and emotions,” produce “greed, ambition, envy, anger,” and other causes of strife. Human beings can protect themselves against the perilous consequences of the carnal, emotive, or passionate life by agreeing to live with other human beings in a peaceable and secure manner. Entrance into a pact with other individual human beings and forming a political society would seem to be an attractive alternative to conducting one’s life and governing one’s affairs in an environment where uncurbed passions, desires, impulses, urgings, or lusts carry every bit as much sway and legitimacy as reason does. But one significant and problematic feature of human nature persists. By natural right and natural power human beings may enter into pacts with other human beings and then break those pacts arbitrarily. In order for a political society to offer the hope of a providing a “greater good” to its citizens, individual human beings must be made to be obedient since they are not obedient by nature. However, it also is a fact that the natural tendencies of the vast majority of human beings are insufficient, if not to say simply opposed, to adopting the habit of obedience. The rational or the reasonable or the sensible human being who understands what conduces to his “true advantage” conducts his life

53 54

TTP 3: 199. TTP 3: 190–93; 73–74.

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and governs his affairs by the dictates of sound reason or by his reliance upon some dependable counsel (certum consilium) in both the natural condition and in the political condition. Furthermore, human actions that are rationally self-determined do not involve “acting at the bidding of another” and therefore such actions do not involve any kind of obedience.55 The fact that the rational and self-determined life does not entail obedience helps to explain Spinoza’s conclusion that “no one knows by nature” that he owes any obedience to God; moreover, knowledge of obedience cannot be attained by any process of reasoning. Instead, the phenomenon of obedience must be inaugurated through the suprarational and supranatural means of “revelation confirmed by signs.”56 Passionate human beings reject the dictates of sound reason, as well as the pronouncements issued by the dependable counsel of the political regime, because such dictates or pronouncements are contrary to what the appetites of passionate human beings esteem. The individual who conducts his life or governs his affairs on the basis of his passions desires, impulses, or lusts, will comply with rational, reasonable, or sensible decrees only if he is made to do so. Whereas the reasonable human being can live peaceably without obedience to law, the security of all human beings is put in doubt if the passionate human being is not made to be obedient. Yet if nature and reason do not and cannot teach obedience, what hope is there for moderating the behaviors of passionate human beings? Even those who conduct their lives and govern their affairs in accordance with passion rather than with reason also seek to 55 TTP 3: 74: “Denique quoniam obedientia in eo consistit, quod aliquis mandata ex sola imperantis authoritate exequatur.” Rational self-determination excludes the phenomenon of obedience inasmuch as no one can be said to “obey himself.” 56 TTP 3: 198. The need for a compelling medium to justify human obedience to law is obvious given Spinoza’s account of human nature. But the questionability of that medium from a philosophic perspective also is warranted because of the basis for the foundation of the doctrine. That is, the doctrine of obedience is apprehended only on the basis of “revelation confirmed by signs.” For Spinoza, however, that statement means that the doctrine of obedience is known only through a phenomenon that presumes the possibility of miracles and Spinoza rejects the possibility of miracles as absurd. Thus Spinoza disingenuously affirms the possibility of miracles for the sake of establishing the doctrine of obedience on grounds that appeal to prejudiced or superstitious human beings for whom only what is extraordinary and seemingly contranatural is sufficient to command their attention. In effect, then, for the purpose of compelling passionate human beings to become peaceful and moderate in their behaviors, Spinoza appeals to the very prejudices and superstitions that they embrace, even if the prejudices and superstitions have been mitigated by the liberated and liberating principles of the theological teaching of the treatise.

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preserve themselves in accordance with the lex summa naturae. They do not conduct their lives or govern their affairs with dependable counsel nor do they adopt the dictates of reason. Instead they turn to fortune to favor them. Naturally prone to superstition, human beings who are driven by passion refuse to solve the problems of life by resorting to the exercise of reason; they consider “reason to be blind and they take human sensibility as vain” with respect to obtaining what they desire. Nevertheless, the superstitious inclinations of passionate human beings that disincline them from adopting the rational or the reasonable or the sensible solutions to human predicaments still can be exploited so as to induce passionate human beings to live moderately; for passionate individuals will yield to suprarational and supranatural lessons or instructions that promise them a “greatest good” if they adhere to the precepts of the suprarational instruction. The natural or philosophic problem of human nature, that is, the problem of passionate human beings and rational or reasonable human beings living together in peace and security with one another cannot be solved naturally, which is to say, philosophically, because by nature the life of passion is as legitimate as the life of reason. Furthermore, philosophy or reason cannot demonstrate that a life of obedience is a true life because the genuinely rational life is self-determining. Nor can the natural or philosophic problem be solved by exclusively political means. For the political solution to the natural or philosophic problem still requires obedience to laws and obedience to laws is predicated upon the commitment of individual human beings to abide by the promises they make or the faith they pledge to live, to act, and to behave within certain prescribed constraints. But each individual human being evaluates his interests, choices, and actions only by the light of his own idiosyncratic gauge of what constitutes a “greater” or a “lesser” good or evil in respect of his own unique situation; and no individual ever completely surrenders the natural right to act deceitfully if he believes that violating his pledge of faith will accrue to his interest or to his advantage. Thus a wholly political solution to the natural or philosophic problem cannot eliminate a basic and legitimate exercise of natural right or natural power which itself is corrosive of political life. The democratic regime advocated by Spinoza permits human beings to make use of their natural rights, natural powers, and natural liberties as far as is reasonably practicable within the tolerable limits prescribed by the laws of the political regime. The political solution to the natural or philosophic problem still demands obedience to laws but political

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obedience frequently is secured through modes of coercion or fear57 rather than from a sense of devotion and dutifulness to the regime.58 One cannot rely on the natural appetites or emotions of human beings to guarantee their obedience to the laws of the regime; and one certainly cannot appeal to the use of reason in order to demonstrate from a philosophic perspective that a life of obedience is a superior kind of life. What recourse is there then that will prepare human beings to be obedient to salutary laws and to constrain their passionate impulses and behaviors? What recourse is there to prevent passionate human beings from believing that promises or pledges of faith are ‘made to be broken’ and retribution for their violations of the terms of their pacts with others or for their injurious behaviors against others can be avoided? The answer to the predicament posed by the problem of human nature is located in the theological teaching of the treatise. According to Spinoza, the sole, the specific, and the authentic teaching of theology is obedience to God through adherence to the command “to love God above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.”59 An individual obeys the divine law, and exhibits his piety, through the performance of acts of justice and charity toward those with whom he lives. The “love of neighbor” doctrine that is the basis of the teaching of theology in the treatise implies reciprocal treatment between or among human beings. The “love of neighbor” doctrine implies that individual human beings will avoid injuring other individuals on the basis of the empirically valid premise, that is to say, on the basis of the commonsensical opinion, that no individual human being wishes or hopes that he himself will be injured by any other individual human being. Moreover, the divinely revealed doctrine of “love of neighbor” encompasses the same terms that are expressly conveyed in Spinoza’s description of the fundamental principles that are essential to the establishment of a democratic political regime. That is, each member of the democratic political regime is bound “to keep [his] appetite in check insofar as it would tend to another’s hurt”; each member of the democratic political regime is to “do to no one what he would not want done to himself ”; and each member of the democratic political regime

57 58 59

TTP 3: 58–59; 73–74; 192–93; 202–203. TTP 3: 74. TTP 3: 165.

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is to “uphold another’s right as he would his own.”60 In other words, conducting one’s life and governing one’s affairs in accordance with the terms of political life in a democratic political regime, that is, a life in optima Republica, are tantamount to satisfying the essential conditions for a life of piety in accordance with the teaching of theology in the treatise which requires obedience to God through observance of the divine law. Whereas the demand for compliance with the sound dictates of reason found in the dependable counsel of a democratic political regime may not be sufficient to move passionate human beings to obey the laws that constrain their harmful desires, impulses, and lusts, the divinely revealed doctrine of obedience to God and its condition that the “saved” are those who perform acts of justice and charity because of love of a neighbor is more likely to inspire obedience to law in human beings because by nature they are prone to embrace superstitious things and the divinely revealed doctrine of obedience is professed to be a suprarational teaching that is “confirmed by signs.”61 The nexus between political obedience and theological obedience is evident in their common element. Political obedience and theological obedience each hinge upon the “pledging of faith” or the keeping of promises by individuals. Therefore eliminating deceit or fraud and “bearing public right before private convenience is the task and the labor.”62 If one adheres to the divine law it follows that one should and one will avoid deceit or fraud in his engagements with other human beings. But if one adheres to the human laws of the democratic political regime it is not at all apparent that all individual human beings will eschew ruses or fraud since no ever completely forswears the right to act deceitfully. Nevertheless, Spinoza resolves the troubling defect in the political solution to the problem of human nature by appealing to the teaching of theology. That is, the philosophic teaching of the treatise explicitly asserts that members of the democratic political regime are obliged to vouchsafe their promise of obedience to the polity, even where the determinations of the political regime concern religion, because “God bids that the faith,” or the promise of obedience, that is given to

60 TTP 3: 191; compare 3: 70–71; 84–85; and 177–80 which express the specific practical implications of the divine law for human behavior and action in everyday situations. 61 TTP 3: 198. 62 TTP 3: 203; and compare 74; 204; 211–12.

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the political regime “be altogether kept.”63 In other words, the political requirement of obedience is prepared, introduced, and given credibility by the divinely revealed theological teaching of obedience. In the political solution to the natural or philosophic problem, human beings are persuaded to keep “faith” or abide by their promises when making agreements with other human beings because their pledges of faith will be monitored by the regime and one’s adherence to the terms of any agreement or promise will be “attended by something else.” In the political context, that “something else” is an individual human being’s fear of punishment or his hope of reward. However, the dispensing of punishments and rewards by political regimes is neither wholly equitable nor is it entirely reliable; for the punishments or rewards of the regime may be inconstant. On the other hand, however, the prospect of divine punishment or reward is more perfect. What the theological teaching of the treatise brings to the solution of the natural or philosophic problem is the divinely revealed doctrine of obedience to law, a teaching which cannot be established by reason, together with the “something else” that “attends” the demand for obedience and compels one’s adherence to it, namely, the threat of divine punishment (perdition) and the promise of divine reward (salvation). Philosophy is able and willing to appeal to the teaching of theology for the purpose of contributing to the solution of the natural or philosophic problem for two reasons. First, it is not required that the fundamental teaching of theology be true; it only is necessary that the fundamental teaching of theology be such that it inspires piety, which is to say, it inspires obedience to God.64 Obedience to God then permits obedience to other legitimate authorities, such as the political authority or the “supreme power,” of the democratic political regime. In addition, philosophy can resort to the teaching of theology to contribute to the political solution to the natural or philosophic problem without being disingenuous for the reason that the teaching of theology does not involve any philosophic claim to truth, that is, the teaching of theology is moral and not mathematical.65 Second, the moral instruction of the teaching of theology contributes to the political solution to natural or philosophic problem because of its rhetorical influence, authority, and power. Philosophy can

63 64 65

TTP 3: 199–200. TTP 3: 167–72. TTP 3: 30; 32; 179; 185–86.

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resort to the teaching of theology to introduce the concept of human obedience to law or external authority for the reason that the mode of the teaching of theology is especially persuasive to the vast majority of human beings who are superstitious, ruled by their passions, prone to credulity, and led more by their imaginative-affective instincts than they are led by reason. Indeed, Spinoza himself professes that “faith in the histories” from the Scriptures, whatever their deficiencies may be, can be read with utility “for the reason of civil life”66 because the study of such histories indicates the mores and conditions of human beings which enables the reader “to live among them more cautiously” and to adapt his actions and life to their native dispositions as much as reason permits him to do so.67 The introduction of obedience to laws through the teaching of theology, together with the upholding of promises that it implies, exceeds any merely political resolution of the natural or philosophic problem in two decisive ways. First, among the seven fundamental dogmas of the “universal faith” that are enunciated in the treatise by Spinoza as representing the authentic teaching and meaning of theology, the third dogma of faith asserts that human beings must acknowledge the omnipresence of God: “God is present everywhere or all is open to him. If it were believed that a thing could be concealed from God then it could be doubted that God directs all things with justice and goodness, or the fairness of his Justice whereby he directs all things could be doubted or else it could be ignored.”68 Whereas the authorities of a political regime may fail to monitor and punish the breaking of laws or the breaking of civic or commercial agreements between or among human beings, belief in God’s omnipresence implies that no deceit or fraud or injury between or among human beings can go undetected by God and therefore no harmful act ultimately can elude the tribunal of divine justice. Human justice, to the contrary, typically is far less effective or thorough. Second, because obedience to God consists solely in justice and charity, or love toward a neighbor, and “only those who obey God are saved,”69 as the fifth and sixth dogmas of the “universal faith” assert, it follows that obedience to the established laws of the democratic

66 67 68 69

TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3:

61. 62. 177. 177–78.

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political regime and the keeping of “faith” in the pledges or promises one makes to other human beings not only are politically salutary but they also satisfy the conditions that are established in order for human beings to attain theological or religious salvation. In principle, therefore, the terms of human justice and divine justice become virtually identical; and, in practice, the meting out of divine justice is said by Spinoza to be witnessed in the rule of just individuals on earth.70 The limitation of an exclusively political solution to the natural or philosophic problem owes to its inability to preclude the natural right or the natural power of human beings to act deceitfully. Hence the success of any exclusively political solution to the natural or philosophic problem is identical with the political regime’s ability or inability to make passionate human beings submit to the law because of their fear of punishment for any failure to live in compliance with it. The exclusively political solution to the natural or philosophic problem, then, largely depends upon the threat of coercion or repression by the political regime. But, according to Spinoza, regimes that operate on the basis of coercion, repression, or trepidation are repugnant to human nature; for “human nature will not submit to simple compulsion, and, as Seneca had it, no one continues in a violent regime for long, moderate ones endure.”71 Without recourse to some other motive than coercion for constraining the licentious tendencies of human beings and inducing them to obey the salutary laws of political life, there only would be politically repressive regimes. But political regimes of that kind exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the natural or philosophic problem by causing more occasions for conflict and fear among human beings rather than fostering the conditions that reduce conflict and fear among them. The use of theology or religion in the service of a political solution to the natural or philosophic problem can help to avoid such difficulties when the suprarational revealed teaching of “love of a neighbor” and respect for others is the foundation of an individual human being’s convictions and actions. The authority of theology or religion to influence human behavior and action on the basis of a doctrine of love for one’s fellow human beings or fellow citizens, rather than on the basis of a fear

70 TTP 3: 228–29 and 231. According to Spinoza, it is a responsibility of a “good republic” to set conditions so that it cannot be “expedient for evil human beings to be evil” (3: 104). 71 TTP 3: 74.

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of them, is a teaching that philosophy can press into the service of a politically framed solution to the natural or philosophic problem. Furthermore, the theological teaching presented by Spinoza in the treatise is intended to be universal as well as nonsectarian. The theological teaching of the treatise, which is predicated upon the revealed teaching of Christ, is a teaching that is designed to be expressed to the whole human race. It is not a teaching that is dedicated to one nation nor is it a teaching that is designed for one people. As a result, the revealed teaching of Christ hypothetically can circumvent the kind of political or theological wrangling and strife in which passionate human beings frequently engage because of their theological or religious sentiments, opinions, or passions. Still, it is plain that Spinoza’s theological teaching in the treatise is designed especially to have its impact on passionate and superstitious human beings.72 What prompts Spinoza to employ a theologico-political solution to the natural or philosophic problem is foreshadowed perhaps in an acknowledgment expressed by him in the Preface to his book. Spinoza deferentially quotes the observation of the ancient Roman historian, Curtius, that “nothing rules the multitude more effectively than superstition.”73 The natural or philosophic problem is the problem of human nature. Human beings are driven more by desire and power than they are led by reason. In pursuing their desires or interests and exercising their power, human beings act to the neglect of other human beings. Moreover, in acting for their own interests exclusively, human beings determine their choices of what to pursue and what to avoid solely on the basis of the perceived utility of the object that is before each individual; and human beings discriminate between what they regard as good and what they regard as evil in a like manner, that is, a human being generally judges, chooses, and acts on the basis of his own private

72 At first glance, my claim may seem strange. The TTP is written and published in Latin which would seem to prevent the reading of the book by singularly “passionate and superstitious human beings,” that is, the language in which the book was written and published would seem to prevent a reading of it by “vulgar” human beings. Yet one must remember that at the close of the Preface to the TTP Spinoza explicitly says that he asks “the vulgar and those who suffer like affects as the vulgar” not to read his book (3: 12). Thus Spinoza recognized that there would be Latin readers, that is to say educated people, who nevertheless embraced vulgar passions and superstitions. I have described such readers as “the learned vulgar” in “Spinoza, Biblical Criticism, and the Enlightenment,” Modern Enlightenment and the Rule of Reason, ed. John McCarthy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998). 73 TTP 3: 6.

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and idiosyncratic standard without reference or regard to the desires, interests, or needs of others.74 The natural or philosophic problem, which is to say the human problem, is the problem of love of self.75 TTP 3: 189–90. The basis for any polity is the individual. But individuals are not born into isolation they are born into families and thus they are parts of a whole (cf. Aristotle, Politics 1253a20–40). The family is bound together by the bonds of blood and need. Families become bound to other families where the recognition of human need increases or human insufficiency becomes more apparent to the individuals involved. Individuals join with individuals from other families, marry, and blood ties are extended. Thus the first polity, even if it is based only on necessity and the recognition of the natural insufficiency of the self or a single family, is a tribe connected by blood ties and the basic inclination, need, or desire to procreate and to preserve life. The first polity then is the consequence of a shift from the most basic and native love of self to a familial or tribal love of one’s own. For the Hebrew people, for example, their regime or theocracy was constituted by Hebrew blood and the Hebrew claim of election by God. However, Spinoza’s critique of the Hebrew theocracy in the TTP undermines both the Hebrew claim to a unique election as well as the Hebrew claim about the need, advantage, or superiority of establishing the polity on the basis of blood ties alone. The deficiency of the Hebrew theocratic solution to the natural or philosophic problem of self-love is evident in the fact that its scope is unhelpfully narrow. Christianity, on the other hand, is more universal and better equipped to be universalized. Or, a liberal Christian liberal democracy is a more suitable alternative than the restoration of the Hebrew theocracy for the purpose of solving the natural or philosophic problem that is addressed in the TTP. But Spinoza’s theologico-political teaching in the treatise then also would seem to entail this consequence. The political teaching of the treatise emphasizes the “division of labor and mutual security” as the critical features of political life that serve to overcome natural human insufficiency. Thus the polity principally is directed toward fulfilling the needs of the body only. Yet the three legitimate objects of desire mentioned in the TTP include: knowledge of things through their primary causes; acquisition of the habit of virtue; and secure and healthy life. The first two objects of desire may be satisfied by an individual human being on the basis of his own effort whereas the third object of desire cannot be satisfied by oneself. Virtue, therefore, on Spinoza’s account of it, is a private matter that is attainable by human beings who possess knowledge of the causes of things. Virtue is not a public or political responsibility. “Protection of life” and “protection of the Republic” are the principal public or political responsibilities. By contrast, Aristotle says in the Politics that “if man does not have virtue he is the most savage and unholy of animals and the most full of gluttony and lust. But justice is the bond of human beings in cities, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society” (1253a35–40). Spinoza’s justice, it would seem, involves only what is required to set the conditions for a secure and healthy life. Thus Spinoza’s polity focuses on bodily preservation rather than the development of philosophic virtue or philosophic justice. Although philosophy and philosophizing will be safeguarded in the democratic political regime advocated by the teaching of the TTP, and so the possibility of the philosophic pursuit of virtue will be implied, Spinoza’s political teaching in the treatise and his theological teaching in the treatise are dedicated more to the restraint of lusts and urges—which also were noted by Aristotle—than either teaching is dedicated to a concentrated promotion of the “habit of virtue.” The theological teaching of the treatise and the political teaching of the treatise consist of more or less salutary opinions which foster religious pieties as well as civic pieties. Accordingly, Spinoza, like Plato, makes theological or political law 74 75

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If a human being is to achieve the third proper object of desire, he must be made to constrain his impulses and urges which tend only toward his own self-preservation as well as his own self-satisfaction and he must be moved to perceive the advantage and utility of satisfying his own designs and interests in collaboration with other human beings who also are satisfying their own designs and interests; for what every individual ultimately seeks is preservation, security, health, prosperity, and some sense of tranquility. Somewhat ironically, then, native selfishness is the shared component that every individual possesses in common with every other individual and because of that fact love of self can be modified and transformed into love of one’s own or love of one’s polity. Individual human beings must be persuaded that native love of self can be maximized and enhanced best only through participation in a political life which is dedicated to defending and increasing the security and health of every one of its citizens. According to Spinoza, the democratic political regime is the polity that is most consonant with human nature and the protection of natural right;76 it is the regime most dedicated to human liberty;77 and it is the regime that can institute the best plan of living that will safeguard the preservation, security, health, prosperity, and tranquility of every one of its members for the reason that it is the regime that emphasizes defending “another’s right as one’s own.”78 The democratic political regime, as defined by Spinoza, and the universal religion, as defined by Spinoza, share an important common focus. By the terms of Spinoza’s definitions of each of them, both politics and theology serve the purpose of encouraging human beings to live tranquilly, securely, and in health

“the wish to be the discovery of what is” (Minos 315a); even though the law or wish often must incorporate and accommodate persuasive “official opinions of the city” which yet may not be “worthy” opinions (Minos 313a–314e). For Spinoza, knowledge and virtue are achieved on the basis of the realization of a philosophic account of ‘what is’: Nature observes an order that functions in accordance with its own determinate plan. What philosophy teaches the polity to be and to do is to seek to represent a “wish” to discover “what is” while acknowledging that “what is” may oppose what passionate human beings desire, expect, or hope. In lieu of simply indiscriminately communicating a knowledge of “what is” to all human beings, philosophy influences the polity to teach its citizens what the knower of “what is” recommends as powerful, convincing, but also tolerable tales that serve to induce human beings to embrace political life as a “greater good” rather than being simply a “lesser evil” by the fact of their obedience to the “dependable counsel” of the democratic political regime. 76 TTP 3: 193 and 245. 77 TTP 3: 240–41. 78 TTP 3: 191.

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by overcoming their natural inclinations to act neglectfully of others; they both encourage human beings to abide by their pledges of faith to each other; and they both encourage human beings to be obedient as a matter of duty or devotion rather than as a matter of fear. Philosophy cannot teach that ‘love of self ’ is a false plan of living. On the other hand, however, theology and politics can communicate the doctrines of ‘love of a neighbor’ or ‘love of a fellow citizen’ because neither theology nor politics is bound by the same standards of reason and truth which bind philosophy. Theology professes doctrines and matters that are said “to exceed human grasp”79 and reason or philosophy is not able to certify the validity of the fundamental dogma of theology;80 and politics, by implication of its function in issuing human laws, offers a set of opinions about things based upon a sense of their being contingent rather than based upon a sense of affirming the actual knowledge of those things which would enable human beings to conceive of them as being contained within the natural, necessary, and eternal order81 of the Whole. In other words, neither theology nor politics is philosophy; and neither theology nor politics is sufficient on its own to discover the true plan of living82 that will permit every individual human being the possibility of achieving the security and health for which each human being longs. But because it is knowledgeable about ‘what it by nature’, philosophy can press theology and politics into the service of a solution 79 TTP 3: 15–16; 20–21; 28; 30; 83–84; 95; 98–99; 114; 155–56; 162–63; 168; 170; 184–85; 188; 198–200. 80 TTP 3: 185. 81 TTP 3: 57–59; 81–83. 82 TTP 3: 41; 58; 59–60; 69; 80; 190; 240–41. According to Spinoza, the means for acquiring the habit of virtue are “contained within human nature itself ” and they owe to “human power alone” or they depend upon “the laws of human nature alone” (3: 46). However, Spinoza also says that the “divinity of the Scriptures” has to be established on the basis of whether it teaches “true virtue” (3: 99). Scripture derives from revelation and revelation communicates “what surpasses human grasp” or what is insinuated to represent some kind of suprarational knowledge which is beyond “human power” and what exceeds “the laws of human nature.” If both reason and revelation each can teach “true virtue” one might be led to wonder whether one of them simply is redundant or whether one of them does not teach it as well or as completely as the other. Spinoza does say that “nothing impedes God from communicating the same things to human beings in a manner other than what we know by the natural light” (3: 16). On that view, the paths of reason and revelation might seem to intersect ultimately and propose an identical teaching. But, in point of fact, reason and revelation conflict on the decisive issue of obedience. For “no one knows by nature,” and hence no one can know from reason, that he owes obedience to God; obedience to God is established only on the basis of “revelation confirmed by signs.” Hence the paths of reason and revelation diverge rather than converge.

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to the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness. Philosophy can devise a persuasive and compelling tale to move passionate human beings to recognize that in order to satisfy their desires and interests it is necessary for them to be obedient to laws which constrain their selfish and injurious impulses and behaviors. The success of philosophy’s teaching in the Tractatus theologico-politicus, which is to say, the success of the tale told by philosophy, rests upon its ability to combine those elements of the teaching of theology and those elements of the teaching of politics that prove most attractive and most persuasive to the vast majority of human beings. Philosophy is competent to devise such a tale because philosophy concerns itself with knowledge of nature, both human nature and nonhuman nature, and that knowledge is indispensable for telling the right kind of tale since the tale must be accommodated to the natural predilections of human beings while it also attempts to neutralize human inclinations toward extreme forms of selfishness, prejudice, and superstition. Spinoza’s theologico-political teaching in the treatise offers a solution to the natural or philosophic problem of human nature by proposing the identification of political welfare (salus) with theological or religious salvation (salus) through a unique interpretation of the meaning of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, or piety.83 What the teaching of theology in the treatise contributes to the solution of the natural or philosophic problem is a dramatic and awe-inspiring warrant for obedience to laws that neither philosophy nor politics can supply. “All human beings absolutely are able to obey” but there is only a minority of human beings who acquire the habit of virtue led by reason alone; hence “without the testimony of the Scriptures we would doubt the salvation of nearly all human beings.”84 The teaching of theology in the treatise supplies a justification for human obedience to law which is extraordinary in character; and even though the “natural light” cannot affirm that “simple obedience is the way of salvation,” Spinoza still concedes that theology’s teaching of obedience “has brought a very great solace to mortals.”85 Not only has the teaching of theology given human beings solace with respect to the possibility of their attainment of some kind of ultimate wellbeing but Spinoza further encourages

83 84 85

TTP 3: 179 and 188. TTP 3: 188. TTP 3: 188.

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his reader to think “how salutary and necessary this Teaching is in a republic in order for human beings to live peacefully and harmoniously”; the inescapable merit of the doctrine, Spinoza says, “is something that everyone can judge for himself.”86 The importance of the teaching of theology—and its unique emphasis on obedience and the need to live justly and charitably by not neglecting one’s neighbor—is acknowledged by Spinoza in his conclusion that even in the natural condition an individual is bound by the “revealed right from the same motive that he is bound to live by the dictates of sound reason, namely, that it is useful and necessary to his salus, one is permitted to neglect it only at his own peril.”87 Philosophy or reason has for its object the teaching of nature. On the basis of that teaching, reason concludes that philosophy and politics, taken separately or taken together, are insufficient to solve the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness. To curb selfishness law is required.88 But the curbing of selfishness through adherence to laws presumes the fact of obedience. According to Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise, only theology teaches that obedience to laws which constrain injurious human behaviors and which compel human beings to observe their duties to others is the necessary and sufficient condition for achieving human salvation. But, in addition, the teaching of theology in the treatise also prepares the achievement of human political welfare. That is, inasmuch as the theological teaching of the treatise emphasizes almost exclusively the doctrine of obedience to God or obedience to established authority as the means to human salus, together with the demand that human beings treat one another with care and respect by performing acts of justice and charity, it becomes increasingly clear that the theological teaching of the treatise is devised for the sake of the political instruction of that book. For neither philosophy nor reason teaches that obedience is natural; and politics can offer only a fragile inducement to obedience, namely, the persistent threat of civic punishment or the regular promise of civic reward. If violators of the law are not regularly punished or if adherents to the law are not regularly rewarded then the advantage and utility of political life is

TTP 3: 179. TTP 3: 198–99. 88 The word “law” conveys a sense of binding or constraining human behavior. But it also is the case that laws are what serve as the bond, or the principle of binding together, that distinguishes one political regime from another. 86 87

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subverted. Theology’s teaching, on the other hand, contains a suprahuman command to obedience and it offers enticements for obedience that neither philosophy nor politics can deliver. That is, the form and content of the teaching of theology are persuasive or moving to the imaginative-affective faculties of the vast majority of human beings in three important respects: theology’s teaching of obedience is suprarational and supranatural in character; adherence to theology’s teaching promises a presumably eternal reward and blessing for compliance with the divine law but it also threatens a presumably eternal perdition for resistance to it; and theology’s teaching holds out the hope for what passionate and superstitious human beings desire most, namely, wellbeing now and in an afterlife at the behest of a provident deity. It is no mere coincidence that the theological teaching propounded by Spinoza in the treatise happens to supply precisely what philosophy and politics cannot supply individually or together for the sake of solving the natural or philosophic problem, namely, a compelling justification for human obedience to law. But that does not mean that what the teaching of theology in the treatise advances is true.89 On the contrary, philosophy and reason know that the teaching of obedience to another cannot be known or learned from nature. But philosophy and reason also know that human beings naturally are inclined toward superstition and only a powerful, persuasive, suprarational and supranatural doctrine of obedience will suffice to transform human behaviors and actions so as to correct the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness, even if that doctrine must involve certain superstitious and absurd

89 One example will suffice. The third dogma of the “universal faith” asserts that God “directs all things by the fairness of his Justice” (TTP 3: 177). The third dogma establishes the omnipresence of God which entails that nothing can escape God’s notice or nothing can be hidden from God and therefore divine justice is absolute. In other words, conviction in the theological doctrine of God’s omnipresence is necessary if human beings are to be moved to obedience either because of their hope for a divine reward or because of their fear of a divine punishment. But Spinoza also maintains in the treatise that God “acts and directs everything from the necessity of his own nature and perfection” and hence the imputation of justice to God owes only to a vulgar conception of the divine nature based upon a “defect of the intellect” (3: 65). A number of contradictions or inconsistencies can be discovered in the pages of the TTP. But Spinoza’s own ultimate verdict regarding how to resolve the discrepancies appears to be given in his conclusion that the Scriptures expressly affirm many things that “are said in accordance with the opinions of the Prophets and the vulgar and which only reason and Philosophy, but not Scripture, teach to be false” (3: 183; and compare 100–13).

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elements.90 Without recourse to the theological teaching of obedience in the treatise, the prospect for achieving political obedience and realizing the third proper object of desire would be reduced. The reconciliation of the lives of passionate human beings and rational human beings in security, health, liberty, and tranquility can be achieved only through a philosophic teaching which presses the teaching of theology into the service of politics. For that reason, the teaching of Spinoza’s treatise necessarily must be theologico-political; and that conclusion is confirmed by Spinoza’s use of a phrase that appears only twice in the pages of the treatise. The words of the phrase appear once in the context of the theological teaching of the treatise and once in the context of the political teaching of the treatise. In the theological teaching of the treatise, Spinoza asserts that the “foundation of the Scriptures itself ” is unambiguous and uniform. The “sum of it is to love God above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.” That doctrine is said to be so essential to the message and meaning of the Scriptures that if any other doctrine than “love of God and neighbor” were taught by Scripture then the whole teaching of Scripture would have had to have been revised and consequently the teaching of the Scriptures would be completely different from what has come to be received and there would have to be some other account of the essential teaching and meaning of theology, revelation, the Scriptures, faith, and piety. Furthermore, if the foundational doctrine of the Scriptures were removed or revised then “tota fabrica ruit”:91 the whole fabric or edifice would go to ruin. In other words, the philosophic version of the teaching of theology that is presented in the treatise by Spinoza asserts that if the Scriptures ever proposed any other teaching than the divine law which commands obedience to God through love of neighbor then the whole fabrica would come to ruin in one fall.92 In the political teaching of the treatise, Spinoza asserts that in a democratic political regime it is necessary for individuals to transfer their natural rights and natural powers to the supreme authority of the regime and once having done so they must submit to the dictates of the established authorities. Such a course of action may be taken without fear by individuals because the democratic regime has as one 90 91 92

ruit.”

TTP 3: 6–7. TTP 3: 165. TTP 3: 165: “hoc totius religionis fundamentum est, quo sublato tota fabrica uno lapsu

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of its chief purposes the “avoiding of absurd things.” Accordingly, every citizen of the regime may comply with the commands of the supreme authority, that is, each citizen can obey the dependable counsel of the regime and follow its sound dictates of reason, because if the regime were dedicated to anything other than harmony and peace among its citizens then the whole fabrica of the democratic political regime easily would come to ruin.93 The teaching of theology in the treatise and the teaching of politics in the treatise are united by the fact that each is a “fabrica.” Each is a “skillful production” or a “building”; each, in other words, is the product of an art. The art or craft or skill, namely, the sophia, which weaves the fabric of the theological teaching of the treatise together with the political teaching of the treatise is the art or craft or skill that relies on the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of causes of things, as well as the knowledge of virtue. It is philosophy that weaves a theologico-political fabric in the teaching of the treatise because philosophy itself cannot defend the life of obedience yet philosophy or reason also acknowledges that only the life of obedience can make passionate human beings curtail a complete love of self and constrain their behaviors within tolerable limits. The natural or philosophic truth of the treatise is that ‘no one knows by nature that obedience is owed to anyone nor can he attain such knowledge by reason’94 whether that obedience be to God or to other human beings or to political authorities and institutions. However, the promulgation of that philosophic truth could undermine the possibility of human beings living together in security, health, tranquility, and liberty. In other words, the telling of that philosophic truth could undermine the possibility of human beings achieving the third proper object of desire. Therefore, instead of advocating the philosophic teaching or the teaching of nature in the treatise, Spinoza resorts to the salutary opinion that is conveyed by the teaching of theology in the treatise. Obedience is made known only “through revelation confirmed by signs”; the teaching of theology has been of very great utility and necessity to political regimes; and the teaching of theology, because of its introduction of obedience and

93 TTP 3: 194: “quod fundamentum si tollatur, facile tota fabrica ruet”; and compare 3: 228. The Latin word fabrica signifies the “workshop of an artisan,” the “skill” or “profession” of an artisan, as well as “any skillful production,” “fabric,” or “building.” But the word also can mean a “crafty device” or “stratagem.” 94 TTP 3: 198.

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its emphasis upon obedience through works of justice and charity, has brought great solace to mortals.95 To solve the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness, Spinoza devises a theological teaching that advances obedience to laws of either divine or human origin;96 he makes the terms of theological salus identical to the terms of political salus;97 and he makes the terms of divine justice coincident with human justice.98 To assure the prospect of preservation, security, health, prosperity, liberty, and tranquility, within the democratic political regime, as well as the prevention of sectarian strife, Spinoza goes so far in the treatise as to dictate that there must be a subordination of religion to civil governance and he justifies that conclusion on the basis of the philosophic, theological, and political teachings in the treatise. That is, because the theological teaching of the treatise asserts that “God is the God of all nations,”99 and therefore God has no special kingdom or care over any particular nation, it then follows in the political teaching of the treatise that “public worship and the exercise of piety must be accommodated to the peace and utility of the Republic.”100 Spinoza further asserts that it is established both from experience and from reason that “divine right depends solely on the dictate of the highest powers”; and since the “welfare of the people is to be the highest law [salutem populi summam esse legem]” it is “the function of the highest powers [of the regime] to determine by which plan each must practice piety to a neighbor, that is, by which plan each is bound to obey God.”101 Accordingly, it is appropriate to conclude that the teaching of theology in the treatise is indispensable for introducing the notions of “piety” and “obedience” but it remains for the teaching of politics in the treatise to determine the precise manner by which piety and obedience will be practiced or exhibited in the democratic political regime. The theologico-political teaching of Spinoza’s old book is a “fabrica” devised by a philosopher for the sake of solving the perennial natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness or human unsociability. What the treatise proposes then is the framework for a modern liberal 95 96 97 98 99 100 101

TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP TTP

3: 3: 3: 3: 3: 3: 3:

179 and 188. 59; and compare 232. 174–75; 177–78; 191. 198–200. 54. 228–29; and compare 236. 232; and compare 197–98; 226; 233.

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democratic theocracy. The exemplar for Spinoza’s practice of the art of constructing a theologico-political teaching for the sake of solving the natural or philosophic problem through the institution of a plan of living conducted within a theologico-political regime is none other than Moses, the founder of the Hebrew theocratic regime.

EPILOGUE

SPINOZA: THE NEW MOSES

In the Preface to the Tractatus theologico-politicus, Spinoza criticizes oppressive and illiberal political regimes for inculcating theological or religious prejudices and superstitions among their populaces and conjoining theological and political convictions. Spinoza complains about the theocratic regime of the Turks which eschews sound reason and leaves no room for individuals to doubt anything dictated by the regime.1 It further may be concluded from the teaching of the treatise that Spinoza opposes the theocratic regime of the Hebrew people, or at least he is opposed to various fundamental elements of it. Still, in his reflections upon the nature and origin of the Hebrew theocratic regime and its history, Spinoza asserts that while “no can imitate it now,” nor would it be advisable to do so, nevertheless there are many things about that regime which are “worthy of being noted” and which even are “advisable to imitate.”2 The issue for the reader of the treatise, and perhaps especially for the “one who reads philosophically,” would seem to be this: Among the features of the Hebrew theocratic regime that are “worthy of being noted,” which features of that regime also are advisable to imitate and which features of that regime may be notable but not advisable to imitate? Or, what instruction does the model of the ancient Hebrew theocratic regime provide for the author of a book that advances the integration of a modern liberal democratic political regime with a modern liberal teaching of theology? The kind of theocratic regime mentioned by Spinoza in the Preface to the treatise is objectionable specifically for the reason that it refuses to permit liberty of thought and liberty of speech. The kind of theocratic regime mentioned in the Preface to the treatise opposes the liberty of philosophizing. However, there is a suggestion in the treatise that there may have been a more generous disposition toward theological or religious debate and dissent in the Hebrew theocratic regime than in the

1 2

TTP 3: 6–7. TTP 3: 221.

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theologico-political regime of the Turks. For example, the more generous disposition within the Hebrew circumstance is intimated by the fact that Spinoza himself acknowledges that there were various traditions of Scriptural or religious interpretation among faithful Hebrews; and although Spinoza contests most of the conclusions reached by both the orthodox and the dissenting traditions it yet must be recognized that differing interpretive traditions existed and there was some tolerance of them among the faithful adherents to the Jewish religion.3 Still, authority over the determination of the meaning of the Scriptures or the meaning of theology or religion and the implications of it to daily life ultimately resided with the appropriate councils that were appointed or approved to decide such matters, even from the time of Moses.4 The theocratic situation of the Hebrews thus may be seen to have been superior to the theocratic situation of the Turks in at least that one significant respect: theological or religious debate, perhaps even a rationally informed debate, was allowed. But despite that advantage of permitting scholarly disputes about Scriptural interpretation, the basic features of the Hebrew theocratic regime also consisted of objectionable elements such as the required performance of ritual or ceremonial observances which, according to Spinoza, added nothing to human blessedness5 and which, in the end, may have made the people effeminate;6 as well as the exceptional belief of the Hebrew people that their theocratic regime was founded by God for the sake of the Hebrew people alone to the exclusion of all the other nations.7 The attractiveness of the Hebrew theocratic regime as a model for Spinoza’s teaching in the treatise, and the extent to which it is imitable in some respects, rests on the fact that it was the kind of theocratic regime that expressly “was able to moderate spirits and contain those who were ruling as well as those who were ruled so that they were not rebellious on the one hand nor were they Tyrants on the other hand.”8 Spinoza turns to the Hebrew theocratic regime as an instructive model

TTP 3: 97–100; 180–86. An example of such a debate in the Hebrew tradition is cited by Spinoza in chapter 15 of the TTP. He notes the disagreement between Maimonides and Jehuda Alpakhar over the role and place of reason in Scriptural interpretation (3: 181). 4 TTP 3: 211–12; 217–18; 221–22. 5 TTP 3: 69–71. 6 TTP 3: 57; 216–17. 7 TTP 3: 44–45; 79–80; 207; 214–15. 8 TTP 3: 212. 3

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because it is an example of one particular kind of theologico-political solution to the natural or philosophic problem which enjoyed success for an extended period of time. Under the leadership of Moses,9 the Hebrew people were established as a nation and their nation prospered because in their regime piety and patriotism were taken to be identical10 since the Hebrews “were not bound by any right unless it were revealed to them by God” and therefore in the Hebrew theocratic regime “civil right and Religion which, as we have shown, consisted solely in obedience to God, were one and the same.”11 Furthermore, despite the unique role of Moses as the prophet-legislator-ruler of the Hebrew people,12 the Hebrew theocratic regime eventually also incorporated a distribution of functions and authority that prevented the concentration of all of the right or all of the power in one individual or in one group of individuals.13 There were separate functions and responsibilities assigned to the administrators, the judges, and the military commanders. But all of the princes of the Hebrew theocratic regime together with all of the citizens of the theocracy “were associated by the bond of religion alone” and every member of the regime acted not for his own interest, desire, or glory but every individual acted for God and the preservation of the regime.14 Indeed, the Hebrew theocracy is esteemed singular by Spinoza for the reasons that its “most solid” feature was the loyalty of the citizens to the regime which was based “no doubt on account of its utility which is the force and life of all human actions”; and in particular, the utility of the Hebrew theocratic regime was evident in its protection of the right to private property and its aversion to poverty.15 With respect to property and poverty, Spinoza notes that the very

9 It is worth observing that Spinoza’s treatment of Moses is ambiguous. For example, in the teaching of the treatise, the definition of prophecy and the very function of the prophet are illustrated through the example of Moses (TTP 3: 15). The appeal to Moses as the model for prophecy and the function of the prophet in the treatise also seems to rest on the premise that Moses actually did everything that is imputed to him in the first five books of the Scriptures; and the authority and stature of Moses seem linked to the presumption of the Mosaic authorship of the first five books of the Scriptures. But Spinoza’s final word is that it is “clearer than light at midday that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses” (3: 122). Thus Spinoza elevates Moses but he also subverts him in the treatise. 10 TTP 3: 208; 214–15. 11 TTP 3: 206. 12 TTP 3: 207; 208–11. 13 TTP 3: 222. 14 TTP 3: 212–16. 15 TTP 3: 215–16; and compare 69, 195.

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constitution of the Hebrew theocratic regime was such that poverty would be intolerable since “charity toward a neighbor, that is, toward a fellow citizen, had to be cultivated as the highest piety in order for God their King to be propitious” to them.16 Thus two foundational principles of the Hebrew theocratic regime, namely, the right to private property and the commitment to charity toward a neighbor and charity among the regime’s citizens, aimed to assure the “health” of the people; and the dedication of the military forces to victory for God and the theocratic regime meant that the “security” of the people also would be safeguarded.17 The Hebrew theocratic regime then represents a theologico-political solution to the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness or unsociability by making the third proper object of desire attainable by human beings through their obedience to God’s command to love a neighbor as oneself which was the foundation of both piety and patriotism in the Hebrew theocracy. Indeed the fact that all right or power in the theocracy was understood to proceed from God meant that obedience to the rule of the regime was tantamount to obedience to the rule of God. What is “advisable to imitate” in the Hebrew theocratic regime is its emphasis upon an inextricable connection between obedience to God and obedience to the regime. The love of God which commands obedience to God through love of a neighbor in acts of justice and charity is extended to the political regime in terms of respect for the rights of private property; respect for the rights of others in terms of defending another’s right as one’s own; respect for the rights of others in terms of keeping one’s pledges of faith; and respect for others in terms of constraining the appetites or impulses that lead one to do harm to another.18 The Hebrew theocratic regime, during the period of its success, ably afforded preservation, security, health, and prosperity to its citizens because the theological salus of the individual and the political salus of the individual were understood to be indistinguishable. Moses was able to inculcate the identification of theological salus and political salus because he “greatly had won over the judgment of his people, not by fraud but by divine virtue, so that he was believed to be divine and to speak by divine inspiration”;19 Moses also further 16 17 18 19

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216. 48–49. 165–66. 239.

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“submitted that there were beings who (without doubt by the order and command of God) carried the weight of the role of God, that is, beings to whom God gave authority, right, and power to direct nations and to provide and to care for them.”20 In other words, Moses himself taught the Hebrew people that God could anoint “beings” to “carry the weight of the role of God,” though Spinoza also says that Moses never defined the nature or the creation of such “beings,” and therefore “it can be doubted” whether Moses himself actually believed that beings who “carried the weight of the role of God” were uniquely created by God.21 On Spinoza’s view, Moses endorsed the proposition, at least rhetorically, that God can institute a plan of living for a nation by acting or speaking through an intermediary. Moses, of course, also was the intermediary to whom the Hebrew people turned to interpret and to promulgate the utterances of God when the Decalogue and the terms of the covenant between God and the Hebrew people were revealed.22 Hence although it may be said that God was the author of the Hebrew theocratic regime, it also must be said that Moses was the first to proclaim the laws or the plan of living of that the Hebrew people would adopt for their security, health, or salus and so Moses rather than God launched the Hebrew theocratic regime. Spinoza claims that Moses “excelled others in divine virtue”; Moses was able to persuade the people that he possessed it by demonstrating it to the people; and therefore he easily could retain his rule over the regime.23 The ease with which Moses was able to establish himself as TTP 3: 38. TTP 3: 39. Spinoza’s assertion is curious. On the one hand, the assertion suggests that God creates vice-regents to rule on earth. The assertion suggests that Moses endorsed a ‘divine right’ of kingship which would be consistent with the function of Moses within the Hebrew theocracy. But on the other hand, Spinoza says that it can be doubted whether Moses himself actually believed such a thing. A reader of the TTP, perhaps especially “one who reads philosophically,” would recall Spinoza’s account of the declarations by Moses that “God is fire” and “God is jealous.” According to Spinoza, both claims are absurd; and Spinoza concludes that either Moses “believed such things or at least he wished to teach them” (see note 178 in Part Two of this book). Since Spinoza says “it can be doubted whether Moses actually believed that God creates beings to carry the weight of the role of God” perhaps Moses simply wished to teach such a doctrine even though he himself did not believe it. The phrase “carried the weight of the role of God” in Latin is “quae vicem Dei gerebant.” A similar phrase also appears in the treatise in reference to the teaching of Christ where Spinoza holds that when Christ ordained laws, in that respect, he “played the role of God [in re vicem Dei gessit]” (3: 65). 22 TTP 3: 206–207. 23 TTP 3: 75. 20 21

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the principal prophet-legislator-ruler of the Hebrew people may have owed to the fact that upon their exodus from Egypt the Hebrews were untutored, ignorant, contumacious, and they were no longer bound by any law, any principle of social organization, or any plan of living to guide them.24 The excellence of Moses gave him a stature that distinguished him from his fellow Hebrews “and thus by the divine virtue in which he was strong, he established jurisdictions and commanded the people” and “because of this, therefore, Moses by virtue and by divine order introduced religion into the Republic so that the people would do their duty from devotion rather than from fear.”25 Spinoza’s statements about Moses and his function in respect of the constitution of the Hebrew theocratic regime appear conventional. But upon a closer inspection of the statements one finds the insinuation of something unconventional. It is said that Moses possessed “divine virtue”; and therefore it is to be inferred that his possession of that “divine virtue” enabled him to institute the Hebrew theocratic regime. However, Spinoza also notes that Moses was “strong,” or able, or indeed skilled, in divine virtue and that is a curious claim. If someone were to possess “divine virtue” it would seem that such a possession would be a gift from God rather than something at which a human being himself could excel or be “strong” or able; that is, it would not seem to be the case that “divine virtue” would be something at which a human being could become skilled or proficient. Moreover, the philosophic teaching of the treatise maintains that the acquisition of virtue, which is coincident with knowledge of things and their causes, is a consequence of “the laws of human nature” and so the acquisition of virtue “depends chiefly on human power alone.”26 According to Spinoza, it is only natural knowledge “which teaches Ethics and true virtue after we have acquired knowledge of things and tasted the excellence of knowledge.”27 It is not entirely clear then what “divine

TTP 3: 205–206; and compare 40–41; 48; 64; 75–76; 203. TTP 3: 75. 26 TTP 3: 46. 27 TTP 3: 68. The Latin word scientia means “knowledge.” That is, scientia means a “knowing” or a “being skilled” in anything. But that sense of scientia is broader than most modern significations of the word. I think that Spinoza is contrasting “knowledge of nature” or “knowledge of the causes of things” with superstition, prejudice, ignorance, or opinions about things. Whereas the former term includes the first proper object of desire which depends only on the power of human nature and is contained 24 25

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virtue” signifies. But even if it derives from God as a gift it also seems that “divine virtue” is something at which a human being, like Moses, can become proficient; or it is something at which a human being can excel, based on the exercise of one’s own native human powers. Spinoza’s claim that Moses “by virtue and by divine order introduced religion into the Republic” involves a subtle but interesting contradiction that reflects the problem of the difference between “divine virtue” and the kind of virtue that is attainable by human beings in accordance with their own intrinsic powers. According to Spinoza, virtue is acquired by the power of human nature itself; no other power is required for the acquisition of virtue. The power of human nature or the law of human nature that makes the acquisition of virtue possible is contained in the exercise of reason or the application of the laws and dictates of reason by human beings.28 For the human being who conducts his life, governs his affairs, adheres to a plan of living, or simply practices the life that is directed by reason, the need to follow “orders” is superfluous since the life of reason already pursues what truly is advantageous to human beings.29 Therefore if Moses instituted the Hebrew theocratic regime “by virtue” then his founding of the regime together with his introduction of religion into it would be more a consequence of his being a reasonable or sensible man than it would be a consequence of his having submitted to an “order” issued from another source. In other words, there may be a question about whether the introduction of religion into the Hebrew theocratic regime by Moses followed from his possession of a “divine virtue” or whether it followed from the fact of his possession of a different kind of virtue which may have been excellent but also quite human. Spinoza speaks in the treatise about the status and function of Moses in respect of the establishment and the framing of the Hebrew theocratic regime. After the Hebrew people initially had transferred their right to God at Mount Sinai, Spinoza says that they were in a condition similar to a democracy; that is, everyone who had engaged in the pact with God was equal. But when the Hebrew people went to meet with God to learn what would be commanded of them, they

within the laws of human nature, the latter terms are symptoms of the prevailing tradition of theology or religion. 28 TTP 3: 80. 29 TTP 3: 74.

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became terrified by God’s voice and they beseeched Moses to serve as their intermediary with God. Thus a new pact was entered with Moses by the Hebrew people which replaced the pact initially undertaken between God and the whole of the Hebrew people.30 The choice of turning to Moses as their leader and as their interpreter of God was a plain one for the Hebrew people if only for the reason that Moses had led them from their captivity in Egypt into a new realm where they might be reconstituted as a free and unified nation. Moreover, it was Moses who had interceded on behalf of the Hebrew people with the king of Egypt to seek their liberation and it was at the intercession of Moses that the Red Sea was parted by God’s power, an extraordinary event which permitted both the exodus of the Hebrew people from Egypt as well as the destruction of a considerable part of the Egyptian army that was in pursuit of them during their flight. Moses was the savior of the Hebrew people; he had advocated their cause before the king of Egypt; he had worked a great miracle on their behalf; he communicated directly with God; and accordingly he was the evident choice to serve as the prophet-legislator-ruler of the Hebrew people. Thus Moses assumed the role of a monarch but more importantly, as Spinoza expressly states it, Moses “had the role of God” in respect to the Hebrew people.31 Among the imitable features of the Hebrew theocratic regime were its particular emphasis upon loyalty to the regime in terms of love of one’s own country and love of one’s own fellow citizens rather than love of self; its particular emphasis upon the preservation of the security and the health of the regime’s citizens through the regime’s attention to the rights to private property together with the regime’s intolerance of poverty; and its particular emphasis upon the extent to which piety and patriotism were made to be identical so that in obeying God one was understood to be obeying the regime and in obeying the regime one was understood to be obeying God. What further is notable and perhaps even imitable about the Hebrew theocratic regime is the virtue or power of the one who launched the regime, Moses, who recognized certain basic features of human nature, namely, selfishness and

TTP 3: 206–207; and see Exodus 19–20. TTP 3: 207: “qui solus apud Hebraeos vicem Dei, hoc est, majestatem habuit.” One will recall that Moses himself had advocated and defended the view that there could be something or someone divinely anointed for “carrying the weight of the role of God to direct nations and to provide and to care for them” (3: 38). 30 31

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stubbornness, which would have to be overcome or corrected if preservation, security, health, prosperity, and the stability of the regime were to be achieved. His acknowledgement of those basic features of human nature influenced how Moses determined the modes by which he would devise a plan of living for the conduct of the lives and the governance of the affairs of the Hebrew people. The virtue or excellence of Moses impressed the Hebrew people. But perhaps Moses was most impressive to them because of their belief in his ability to work miracles on their behalf and thereby his ability to assure the providence of God for the elected Hebrew people. Such demonstrations of providence only would confirm the preeminence of Moses over the Hebrew people; and Spinoza asserts that the received perception of the ability of Moses to work miracles enhanced his claim to possess divine right, it suggested his possession of a peculiarly “divine virtue,” and it enhanced his rule over the Hebrew people and their regime.32 In particular, Spinoza cites the significance for the Hebrew people of the liberating miracle of the parting of the Red Sea. That feat was taken by the Hebrew people as a demonstration of the power of Moses to call upon God to perform acts of beneficence for them and the power of Moses to invoke the power of God led the Hebrew people to perceive the virtue of Moses as being a uniquely “divine virtue.”33 Indeed, Spinoza says quite plainly that because Moses knew something about human nature, and because he experienced that nature in the Hebrew people, Moses resolved that he would not be able to complete what he had begun with the Hebrew people through the institution of their regime “without very great miracles” and he further realized that without the invocation of “the special external aid of God” it would be difficult to convince the Hebrew people that “God wanted them to be conserved.”34 Recognizing the native selfishness and the native stubbornness within human nature itself, and not just the particular selfishness and stubbornness in the disposition of the Hebrew people,35 Moses determined that extraordinary means would be required to convince the Hebrew people of the utility and advantages of adopting a plan of living that would provide for their security, their health, and their salus. In effect, of course, the successful functioning of the regime instituted by Moses also would 32 33 34 35

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205–208. 75. 53. 217.

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facilitate the attainment of the third proper object of desire. But Spinoza also acknowledges that there was suspicion among the Hebrews about the divinity of the virtue possessed by Moses;36 and Spinoza indicates to “the one who reads philosophically” that what appeared to most of the Hebrew people as “divine virtue” may have been more akin to an adroit form of political virtue. At the close of chapter six of the treatise, “De Miraculis,” Spinoza quotes a passage from Antiquitates Judaicae by Flavius Josephus which relates the parting of the Pamphylian Sea by the deity for the sake of Alexander the Great so as to aid the Greeks and destroy the Persians.37 Josephus suggests that the event occurred because of the “will of God” and therefore he concludes: “Let no one, in truth, disbelieve in the word of the miracle.” Spinoza, however, relies on the passage from Josephus to serve another purpose. Spinoza’s interest is to corroborate his own conclusion that although the Scriptures may teach that there are miraculous events, and perhaps many prophets professed that unusual events were miracles, it ought to be understood that belief in those events as being miracles is irrelevant to faith or piety inasmuch as belief in such events as being miraculous is not really necessary for salvation. Belief in miracles or disbelief in miracles, says Spinoza, has no bearing on faith, piety, or salvation.38 That is, even if the parting of the Pamphylian Sea were perceived by human beings to be a miracle the event itself could have had nothing to do with the “salvation” of the Greeks since the Greeks were heathens. Belief in the parting the Pamphylian Sea as a miracle wrought by the power of God to spare the Greeks from the Persians or belief in the parting of the Red Sea as a miracle to spare the Hebrews from the Egyptians has nothing to do with the “salvation” of any human being since neither faith nor piety is predicated upon a belief in miraculous events. Still, for “the one who reads philosophically,” the similarity between the situation of the Hebrew exodus and the Egyptian pursuit in the context of the parting of the Red Sea and the situation of the Greek retreat and the Persian pursuit in the context of the parting of the Pamphylian Sea is quite striking;39 and in chapter seventeen of the treatise Spinoza

36 TTP 3: 239. Spinoza states that “jealousy” was the motive for the suspicions raised against Moses. 37 TTP 3: 96; and compare Antiquitates Judaicae 2. 347–48. 38 TTP 3: 88–89. 39 Spinoza cites the story of the Greeks and the Persians from the Antiquitates Judaicae of Josephus to indicate that many people are susceptible to belief in miracles. One

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weaves an argument which obliquely draws more attention to other similarities between Alexander and Moses.40 In one place, Spinoza affirms that “Alexander wished to be saluted as the son of Jove and it appears to have been done on the basis of counsel and not out of pride.”41 Moses, of course, achieved that stature himself insofar as he “had the role of God” with the Hebrew people; and, according to Spinoza, if one person is to “hold a regime he is to have something above common human nature or at least he must endeavor with the greatest strength to persuade the vulgar of it.”42 For a former member of the royal house of Egypt and the heir apparent to that throne,43 it may not have been a staggering feat for Moses to convince a simple, enslaved, and unlearned Hebrew people that his own virtue or power bore all of the hallmarks of a kind of “divine virtue.”44 By having attained “the role of God” with the Hebrew people, it is easy to imagine how effectively Moses could rule over the Hebrew theocratic regime. Deriving his right to rule from God, the authority facet of citing the Josephus account could be that it demonstrates that if there indeed are miracles then miracles are not reserved for one nation and so they cannot be used as evidence of one nation being favored more by God than any other nation. But it also happens to be the case that Spinoza confesses his own disbelief in the miraculous nature of the parting of the Red Sea and he attributes the parting of the Red Sea to natural causes (3: 90–91). 40 TTP 3: 204–213. It is worth noting that in his account of the characterization of the nature of God by Moses, Spinoza says that Moses believed God “has his home in the heavens, which opinion was very usual among the Heathens” (3: 39) and so Spinoza suggests that the revealed teaching of Moses possesses features common to other religious traditions. 41 TTP 3: 204. By contrasting “counsel” with “pride” in Alexander’s ambition, Spinoza suggests that the motive for Alexander’s ambition was a kind of political prudence. 42 TTP 3: 74; and compare 46. 43 Exodus 2:9–15. The Book of Exodus provides only a scant account of the life of Moses prior to his own departure from Egypt, his life in Midian, and his subsequent return to Egypt. But in Antiquitates Judaicae, Josephus is more elaborate. He explains that Moses was acknowledged to possess superior abilities to his peers as well as to those who were senior to him in the Egyptian court; he was of great physical size; and he was educated with care (2. 228–38). In fact, Moses defended and saved the Egyptians by defeating the Ethiopians. But there was envy toward Moses and fear of him among the Egyptians who thought that Moses would use his station to liberate and elevate the Hebrews; so there were plots concocted to assassinate Moses both before and after the Ethiopian campaign (2. 238–58). Spinoza quotes from the Antiquitates of Josephus five times in the TTP; it therefore is very likely that Spinoza was familiar with Josephus’ account of the early political and military training of Moses at the court of the king of Egypt. It is worth recalling that during their exodus from Egypt some portion of the Hebrew population was “armed for battle” and hence the exodus was both a religious and a military undertaking (Exodus 13:18). 44 TTP 3: 40–41; 74–75.

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of Moses was enhanced; although Spinoza also notes that there were cases in which the envy of the Hebrew people toward Moses threatened his authority.45 Nonetheless, according to Spinoza, “divine revelation long ago taught Moses” what was required to maintain the regime: the keeping of faith is what is most necessary, whether it be keeping faith with others in agreements, keeping faith in executing commands, or keeping faith with the dictates and directions of the regime.46 Part of that great task was achieved because of fact that the Hebrew theocratic regime demanded that keeping faith with God be identical to keeping faith with one’s fellow citizens as well as keeping faith with the regime. On the basis of the identification of piety with patriotism in the Hebrew theocratic regime, Moses was able to effect a theologico-political solution to the natural or philosophic problem of human selfishness or unsociability; for obedience to the divine law that regulated human action or behavior and obedience to human law, or the laws of the regime, that regulated human action or behavior were understood to be identical to each other. Spinoza himself makes this clear in the terms of his account of the laws of God and the laws of the regime in the Hebrew theocracy.47 According to Spinoza, the sum of the divine law is to “love God above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.” That divinely revealed cardinal teaching of the Scriptures is the foundation of theology and piety; the teaching has been transmitted without error; the teaching is unambiguous and unadulterated; and if that teaching ever were altered or removed in any way then the very notion of what theology or religion or faith or piety is would have to be revised completely.48 Spinoza also asserts that the Scriptures affirm that God exists; God is provident; God is omnipotent; God blesses the pious but punishes the impious; and God grants salvation by his grace alone.49 Furthermore, from the foundation of theology, that is to say, on the basis of the divinely revealed teaching of the Scriptures, the divine law also must include the following precepts “namely to defend justice, to be of help

TTP 3: 218–19. TTP 3: 203–204. 47 TTP 3: 215–16. 48 TTP 3: 165; and compare 168; 174–75; 177–80; 187. 49 TTP 3: 165. In a number of other passages, however, Spinoza says that philosophy teaches something very different from those claims or those claims are the product of vulgar prejudices and a “defect of the intellect”; compare TTP 3: 63–65; 175; 183. 45 46

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to the helpless, to murder no one, to covet nothing of another, etc.”50 Such are some of the particular practical implications of the divine law to “love God above all things and to love a neighbor as oneself.” In other words, those precepts are necessary consequences of the sum of the teaching of theology, revelation, faith, the Scriptures, or piety. But, in addition, those precepts also are the laws which are stipulated quite clearly in the Decalogue divinely revealed to the Hebrew people by Moses at Mount Sinai.51 Yet in the chapter concerning the election of the Hebrew people by God as a chosen nation, Spinoza contends that the laws of the Hebrew regime were instituted solely for the purpose of fostering the material and temporal welfare of the citizens of the Hebrew theocracy and therefore they had nothing to do with the achievement of blessedness by those who observed those laws. That is, according to Spinoza, “Moses does not teach the Jews not to kill or to steal as a teacher or a Prophet but he commands them as a legislator or prince; for he does not establish the lesson by reason but he adds a penalty to the order which can and must vary in accordance with the disposition of each nation, as experience sufficiently teaches. Thus also the order not to commit adultery has regard only to the utility of the republic and the regime.”52 In effect, Spinoza contends that at least the fifth through the tenth commandments, which constitute the practical implications of the sum of the divine law, are decidedly political in nature rather than being theological or religious in nature. In other words, then, the divinely revealed Law of Moses which affirmed the existence of God, issued the demand for obedience to God, and held out the prospect of reward and salvation for compliance with the law or the prospect of punishment and perdition for opposing the law, is a set of commands and warnings that are devised for the sake of establishing a plan of living that will provide for the preservation, security, health, and prosperity of the Hebrew people who otherwise were lawless, ignorant, and stubborn. The eminence of Moses enabled him to have himself regarded as being someone who was above “common human nature” and therefore he was considered to be someone who could serve as an intermediary between God and the Hebrew people. But, in fact, on Spinoza’s view, Moses was a man of some estimable virtue or power

50 51 52

TTP 3: 165. Exodus 20:1–18 and Deuteronomy 5:1–23. TTP 3: 70.

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who recognized something about the basic features of human nature and used that knowledge to accommodate his political instruction to the basic dispositions, superstitions, and prejudices of those whom he governed. Thus Moses assumed “the role of God” and became the unique prophet-legislator-ruler of the Hebrew theocratic regime.53 In suggesting that Moses devised a theologico-political solution to the natural or philosophic problem, Spinoza is not proposing that Moses was a philosopher. On the contrary, Spinoza explicitly states that Moses taught an abject Hebrew people a plan of living only as a “Legislator” and not as a “Philosopher.”54 Still, the virtue or excellence of Moses is affirmed by the successes of the Hebrew theocratic regime that he instituted, the basis on which he built it, and his recognition of the utility of combining theology and politics to correct the human problem of selfishness or unsociability. Those features of the Hebrew theocratic regime are the ones that Spinoza regards as “worthy of being noted” and which he promotes as being “advisable to imitate.” The Hebrew theocratic regime cannot be resurrected because in order to do so a new pact would have to be made between God and a people. Spinoza doubts whether such a situation as the one experienced by the Hebrew people upon their exodus from Egypt ever could be repeated. But there also is another critical difference from the circumstance that occasioned the institution of the Hebrew theocratic regime. That is, according to Spinoza, an express compact with God by a people, or even by the whole human race, is no longer necessary because “God has revealed through the Apostles that God’s pact is no longer written with ink and on stone tablets but on the contrary with the spirit of God on the heart.”55 Hence there is no need for introducing a new 53 In his Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, Machiavelli observes that “there has never been any sagacious lawgiver who did not resort to divine authority” and he states that such a practice was undertaken by Lycurgus and Solon (Discorsi I, 11). Previously in the Discorsi, Machiavelli had linked Moses, Lycurgus, and Solon as founders of monarchies and republics who had instituted laws for the general good by keeping authority exclusively for themselves (I, 6). In Il principe, Machiavelli connects Moses with the founders of other great regimes, namely, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus. In that context, Machiavelli remarks the success that is enjoyed by those leaders of regimes who have had recourse to force or threats of force; Machiavelli also explicitly speaks of “armed prophets” (chapter 6): compare Exodus 13:18. Spinoza may have known of Machiavelli’s views since he possessed a copy of the Testina edition of the Tutte le opere di Niccolò Machiavelli (Geneva, 1550); see, Jacob Freudenthal, Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas: In Quellenschriften, Urkunden und nichtnamlichen Nachrichten (Leipzig, 1899) p. 161. 54 TTP 3: 40–41. 55 TTP 3: 221.

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theology or a new religion. Instead, Spinoza turns to the existing teaching of theology or religion, which is to say that Spinoza invokes his own version of an interpretation of the revealed teaching of Christ, to serve the purpose of grounding the belief in the existence of God, the belief in the need for obedience to established laws and to established authorities, the belief in the remission of sins, the belief in salvation for loving a neighbor as well as the belief in perdition for neglecting a neighbor, and belief that faith and piety have little to do with theological disputes and everything to do with the performance of the acts of justice and charity which are encouraged, approved, and monitored by the appropriate authorities in a democratic political regime. By making theological salus and political salus identical in the teaching of treatise, Spinoza imitates the model of the Mosaic Hebrew theocratic regime. By making piety and patriotism indistinguishable in a liberal democratic regime which espouses a liberal Christian theology, Spinoza introduces a theologico-political solution to the natural or human problem of human selfishness or unsociability that imitates the basic features of the formula employed by Moses in establishing the Hebrew theocracy. Perhaps it may be said that Spinoza was a ‘New Moses’56 who has instituted a new theocracy predicated upon the natural or philosophic knowledge of the importance of satisfying the third proper object of 56 It is clear from the teaching of the treatise that the “virtue” of Moses, whether it was divine or simply political, distinguished him from other human beings. Spinoza remarks in the treatise that anyone who would “hold a regime” has to have something “above common human nature,” or at least he must endeavor to convince the vulgar that he possesses such a nature. The “virtue” of Moses accomplished that aim and it permitted him to “hold the regime.” Spinoza’s imitation of Moses does not extend to his own attempt to “hold a regime.” Spinoza advocates a liberal democratic regime. But it still can be said that Spinoza possesses something “above common human nature” by the fact that he dramatically and convincingly alters the received conceptions of theology and politics in the 17th century and beyond that time. As Moses liberated the Hebrew people from their captivity in Egypt, Spinoza aims to liberate his contemporaries and his successors from the kind of theological or political captivity that follows from ignorance, prejudice, or superstition. The theologico-political plan of living instituted by Moses involves an autocratic regime because of the obstinacy of human nature; the theologico-political plan of living instituted by Spinoza involves a democratic regime also because of the obstinacy of human nature. In both plans, however, there is the presumption that the wellbeing of the individual is best secured and maintained where the wellbeing of the regime is assured. Moses assumed that human selfishness was too great an obstacle to political stability and so his laws, according to Spinoza, made the people “effeminate” (TTP 3: 57). Spinoza, on the hand, assumes that human selfishness can be harnessed to advance the interests of both the regime and its citizens so as to secure the wellbeing of both (3: 193–95). Rather than curtailing selfishness, Spinoza seeks to establish the conditions for a more orderly and productive exercise of it.

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desire. Because of his knowledge of human nature and the causes of things, his appreciation of the usefulness of theology or religion for public life, and his formulation of a means for inducing human beings to obedience, Spinoza propounds a theologico-political teaching in the treatise that promises preservation, security, health, prosperity, and salus to human beings who adhere to the “dependable counsel” or the sensible and reasonable dictates of a liberal, democratic, and loosely Christian theocratic regime.

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