Philosophy, Philology, and Politics in Eighteenth-Century China: Li Fu and the Lu-Wang School under the Ch'ing (Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions)

This book explains the general intellectual climate of the early Ch'ing period, and the political and cultural characteristics of the Ch'ing regime at the time. Professor Huang brings to life the book's central characters, Li Fu and the three great emperors - K'ang-hsi, Yung-cheng, and Chien-lung - whom he served. Li Fu rose from poverty to become top graduate in the examinations, a distinguished scholar-official, and author of several important philosophical works; he was also involved in such practical affairs as the troubled relations between the state and nonHan minority peoples in Kwangsi. Li Fu's turbulent relationship with three of China's most active emperors led to repeated banishments, loss of office, and in one case to a death sentence and a last-minute reprieve. Although the author's main concern is to explain the contributions of Li Fu to the Lu-Wang school of Confucianism, he also gives a clearly written account of the Lu-Wang and Ch'eng-Chu schools from the twelfth century to the eighteenth. In a clear, succinct style, Huang explains the historical differences between the Ch'eng-Chu and LuWang schools without sacrificing the subtleties of either. The book culminates in a discussion of the hero-emperor K'ang-hsi's appropriation of the "tradition of the Way" from his intellectual officials, which denied them their traditional role as moral censors and critics of the emperor's exercise of authority. This depiction of the Ch'ing period's activist management of the world of ideas will broaden our understanding of the historical relationship between intellectuals and the state in China.

PHILOSOPHY, PHILOLOGY, AND POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHINA

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Philosophy, philology, and politics in eighteenth-century China Li Fu and the Lu-Wang school under the Ch'ing Chin-shing Huang Academia Sinica

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13,28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © Cambridge University Press 1995 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1995 First paperback edition 2002 A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Huang, Chin-shing. Philosophy, philology, and politics in eighteenth-century China: Li Fu and Lu-Wang school under the Ch'ing / Chin-shing Huang, p. cm. - (Cambridge studies in Chinese history, literature, and institutions) Originally presented as the author's thesis. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0 52148225 9 1. Li, Fu, 1673-1750. 2. Philosophy, Chinese- 1644-1912. 3. Neo-Confucianism. 4. Political science - China - Philosophy. I. Title. II. Series. B5234.L485H83 1996 181M12-dc20 95-13358 CIP ISBN 0 52148225 9 hardback ISBN 0 521 52946 8 paperback

For my parents

Contents

Foreword by Professor Ying-shih Yii Acknowledgments Abbreviations

1

2

3

4 5

page ix xvi xviii

Introduction

1

The original argument (1): "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" (Chu-Lu i-t'ung): A philosophical interpretation

4

The original argument (2): Wang Yang-ming and the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan"

25

The critical dimension in the Confucian mode of thinking: The conception of the Way as the basis for criticism of the political establishment

47

Li Fu: an exemplary Lu-Wang scholar in the Ch'ing dynasty (1): His life

63

Li Fu: an exemplary Lu-Wang scholar in the Ch'ing dynasty (2): His thought His conception of destiny (ming)

77 77

The character of the Way (tao) The relationship between mind (hsiri), nature (hsing), and principle (It) His theory of ko-wu 6 Ii Fu and the philological turn The Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life: An evidential vii

84 90 101 107

Contents

approach to the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan"

107

The intellectual transmission of Lu Hsiang-shan's

doctrine: the establishment of an intellectual lineage Li Fu and the study of classics

117 130

The price of having a sage-emperor: the assimilation of the tradition of the Way by the political establishment in the light of the K'ang-hsi emperor's governance Li Fu's perception of the Ch'ing regime A sage-emperor emerges: K'ang-hsi's appropriation of the tradition of the Way The implications of the unity of the tradition of the Way and that of governance

157

Conclusion Chinese glossary Bibliography Index

169 173 185 195

vni

143 144 148

Foreword by Ying-shih Yii

Li Fu (1675-1750) is practically unknown in the West. Neither is he adequately studied by scholars of his own land in the twentieth century. To the best of my knowledge, it was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929) who, in a series of lectures on Ch'ing intellectual history delivered at Tsing Hua University in 1923, first referred to Li Fu as "the last Neo-Confucian of the Lu-Wang persuasion." Perhaps inspired by Liang's lecture, my late mentor Ch'ien Mu (1895-1990) devoted a whole chapter to the life and thought of Li Fu in his History of Chinese Scholarship during the Last Three

Hundred Years (1937), which remains to this day the most detailed and penetrating account in Chinese. Li Fu's oblivion in twentieth-century Chinese historiography says a great deal more about the mentality of the historian than the historical reality in which Li Fu found himself. Riding on the tide of nationalism and positivism Chinese historians in modern times are generally biased against Confucian scholars closely associated with the Manchu court and Neo-Confucianism as a philosophical system. As a result, modern research on Ch'ing intellectual history has been heavily focused on the philological turn of the Han Learning at the expense of Neo-Confucianism of both the Ch'eng-Chu and the Lu-Wang varieties. The double identities of Li Fu as a high-ranking official and spokesman for Lu-Wang Confucianism have thus made him low on the historian's list of priorities. However, once we manage to step outside this modern frame of reference and directly and closely examine the historical record, we would immediately see that neither Li Fu nor Lu-Wang Confucianism can be ignored in the study of Ch'ing intellectual history, particularly if we aim to understand it in its own terms. To begin with, it may be emphatically pointed out, Li Fu's intellectual influence was considerable. First, his elaborate attempt, ably assisted by the well-known historian Ch'uan Tsu-wang (1705-55), to reconstruct ancient texts from the IX

Foreword

Ming encyclopedia Yung-lo ta-tien in the early 1730s set the example for the imperial project known as Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu (The Comprehensive Collections of the Four Categories) initiated some forty years later. It was this project that brought the Han Learning to its peak. Second, Li Fu was the first Confucian scholar in the Ch'ing period to openly attack the historical prejudice against Wang An-shih (1021-86) and his reform movement. His writings on Wang directly inspired Ts'ai Shang-hsiang (1717-1810), who devoted two decades of his life to a detailed biographical study of Wang An-shih. For the first time most, if not all, of the false charges against this great Sung reformer were cleared. Based on Ts'ai's research, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was able to write a modern biography of Wang in 1908, which greatly facilitated the spread of reformist ideas. Thus, indirectly, Li Fu also contributed to the political development in late Ch'ing China. Third, from his death in 1750 to the end of the dynasty, Li Fu's name was never forgotten. Many nineteenth-century writers wrote of him either in connection with his political career or scholarly achievement or both. As a matter of fact his reputation as a scholar of encyclopedic knowledge and photographic memory continued to grow, at times even to legendary proportions. The republication of his complete works in 1831 also testifies to his enduring influence in the world of learning. Li Fu may well have been, as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao says, the last scholar of the Ch'ing period who openly identified himself as a Lu-Wang follower. But this must not be taken to mean that the Lu-Wang tradition as a whole came to an abrupt end with his death in 1750. On the contrary, it continued its existence without a spokesman and without a publicly recognizable identity. Put in a different way, we may say that the spectre of Lu-Wang Neo-Confucianism never ceased to haunt the intellectual world even in the heyday of the Han Learning. From time to time some scholars, notably Chang Hsueh-ch'eng (1738-1801), would advocate the methodological holism of the Lu-Wang school while others like Chiao Hsun (1763-1820) would seek to redefine Wang Yang-ming's theory of liang-chih ("innate knowledge of the good") for their own age. By the 1820s the spectre of Lu-Wang Neo-Confucianism must have appeared very threatening to a Ch'eng-Chu disciple like Fang Tung-shu (1772-1851) who alerted his contemporaries, in a tone of utmost urgency, to the imminent second coming of the Lu-Wang school in the wake of the moral bankruptcy of the Han Learning. His warning proved to be prophetic, though not immediately. Some six decades later when K'ang Yu-wei founded his private academy in Canton to promote educational reform, the Learning of the Mind of the Lu-Wang variety figured centrally in his revised Confucian curriculum.

Foreword

There can be no question that a book-length study on Li Fu and the Lu-Wang school under the Ch'ing is long overdue. Now, with the publication of Dr. Chin-shing Huang's study presented below, this lacuna in Chinese intellectual history isfilledat long last. As I have closely followed the progress of Dr. Huang's project over the years since its conception, I would like to share with the reader my appreciation of this book by pointing out a few of its most distinctive contributions. To begin with, I think the author deserves commendation for his ingenuity in contextualization. The book is so broadly conceived that Li Fu is located in the largest possible context of historical significance. Within the realm of intellectual history the contextualization operates in two different ways, one may be called genealogical and the other contemporaneous. Having first placed Lu Fu in the context of what the author calls the problematik of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan," he then traces the genealogy of the problematik upwardly all the way to its beginning and downwardly to Chang Hsueh-ch'eng at the end of the eighteenth century. As a result, the book goes far beyond the scope of intellectual biography in the ordinary sense, and therefore can be better appreciated as a highly condensed history of Neo-Confucianism skillfully narrated from a particular vantage point. By the way, the first two chapters on "The Original Argument" present what seems to me a most clear exposition of the profound philosophical differences between Ch'engChu on the one hand and Lu-Wang on the other. The author analyses their arguments entirely in their own terms and resists every temptation to apply Western philosophical categories to Neo-Confucianism as has been so fashionable nowadays. Contemporaneously, the author places Li Fu and the problematik of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" in the context of mid-Ch'ing intellectual mainstream. Chapter 6, "Li Fu and the Philological Turn," strikes me as the best case study of how Neo-Confucian philosophical debates, in this case from the Lu-Wang point of view, interacted and interwined with the rising evidential scholarship known as k'ao-cheng. Ch'ing evidential scholarship was built largely on the basis of philological explication of texts. Writing in the West today we often render the term k'ao-cheng as "philology" in the interest of simplicity. Therefore the reader may well be reminded that when the author discusses the relationship between "philosophy" and "philology" in this book, he is primarily talking about Neo-Confucianism as a philosophical tradition and evidential scholarship as evolved since the late sixteenth century. I shall follow the same usages. The "philological turn" as a learned movement arose and developed from very complex historical situations. A comprehensive account of the xi

Foreword

movement, needless to say, would require a thorough examination, on the part of the historian, of every aspect of Chinese history during the Ming-Ch'ing transition. Intellectual history alone is far from adequate to the task. Interestingly, however, within the Neo-Confucian philosophical tradition the evolution of the problematik of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiangshan" itself can be shown to be responsible for initially setting the "philological turn" in motion. Early in the sixteenth century, Wang Yangming, in one of his important philosophical battles against Chu Hsi, made a great effort to restore the so-called "old text of the Great Learning." In so doing, perhaps unwittingly, Wang got himself involved in textual and philological studies. Thus he set the example for many philosophically minded scholars in the seventeenth century to devote themselves to philological exercises on this Confucian text. On the other hand, Lo Ch'in-shun (1465-1547), Wang Yang-ming's most celebrated rival in the Chu versus Lu problematik, also advocated "return to the sources" as an important way to settle philosophical disputes. Defending Chu Hsi's "the nature is principle" against Lu Hsiang-shan's "the mind is principle," he quoted several passages from the classics to make his point. In concluding he argued that "If one carries on his studies without seeking evidence in the classics and is utterly arbitrary and opinionated, it is inevitable that he will go astray." Here we see the beginning of how philosophy pushed itself into philology. Through his detailed and careful analysis of Li Fu's writings, Dr. Huang has given us a concrete illustration of the "philological turn" of Lu-Wang Confucianism on the eve of the full flowering of Ch'ing evidential scholarship. In the case of Li Fu, the problematik of "Chu versus Lu" had now to be coped with by way of philology rather than philosophy. To a considerable extent, Dr. Huang's admirable success in this regard results from the important fact that he is the first intellectual historian in modern times to make a full and fruitful use of Li Fu's Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi s Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life. This text

has long been a rare book, generally inaccessible to researchers, my late mentor Ch'ien Mu included. As Dr. Huang has convincingly shown, Li Fu's thesis is built on a rather flimsy basis. But this is beside the point. What really matters is, in the author's words, "Li's transformation of the problematik of Chu versus Lu from a philosophical to a textual one." In this connection I wish to support Dr. Huang's firmly established case from the other, that is, Chu Hsi's, side. Wang Mao-hung (1668-1741), a leading Chu Hsi scholar of the period, dedicated his life to the compilation of a detailed Chronological Biography of Chu Hsi from a point of view diametrically opposite to Li's. He came to the conclusion that throughout his intellectual life, early and late, Chu Hsi never showed a slightest xii

Foreword

inclination to reconcile his philosophical differences with Lu Hsiangshan. Later critics are in general agreement that, though somewhat flawed due to Wang's deep-seated prejudice, the biography must nevertheless be regarded as a tour deforce of evidential research. Thus we see that in the Ch'eng-Chu camp the problematik also underwent exactly the same transformation in exactly the same time. Finally, in Chapter 7, Dr. Huang places Li Fu and Neo-Confucian philosophy in the context of early Ch'ing political history. His account of Emperor K'ang-hsi's appropriation of the Tao-Vung ("Tradition of the Way") is truly fascinating. Apparently of their own accord Neo-Confucian philosophers of both the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools in the imperial court, represented respectively by Li Kuang-ti (1642-1718) and Li Fu, ceded the Tao-VungXo the emperor. In order to do this they made the clever ideological move by suggesting that, after the separation of Tao-Vungand chih-Vung ("tradition of governance") over three millennia, now for the first time the two traditions are reunited in the person of a sage-emperor. Now the interesting question is how are we to account for this sudden change of heart on the part of these Neo-Confucian scholars? Dr. Huang has offered many keen observations based on research in a variety of historical and literary texts. In what follows I would like to highlight some of his most significant findings by supplementing a few pertinent facts which happen to be at my disposal. First, Dr. Huang is quite right to suggest that Li Fu was genuinely convinced that his emperor was indeed in possession of certain "sagely" qualities. Li Fu's unbounded admiration for K'ang-hsi can be justified by the latter's impressive public record as well as his many-sided accomplishments in Confucian cultivation. It is very significant that even Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-95), leading Lu-Wang philosopher and Ming loyalist, appears to have also shared Li Fu's enthusiasm to a certain degree. Dr. Huang quotes his praise of K'ang-hsi from his letter to a friend, datable to early 1686.1 wish to add that in the same letter he also referred to K'ang-hsi as "sage-emperor." Second, according to the author's learned judgment, K'ang-hsi was "particularly conscious of the significance of Confucian ritual practice." He cites as evidence K'ang-hsi's visit to the Confucian temple in the sage's home-town in 1684. There, the emperor did an unprecedented honor to the sage by performing the rite of "three kneelings and nine bows." From the point of view of cultural history, this is an event of singular importance which merits a little amplification. K'ang-hsi's visit to the Confucian temple in Ch'u-fu took place near the end of 1684 when he was on his way back from the first Southern Tour. Earlier he stayed in Soochow and Nanking, each for a few days.

Foreword

While in Nanking he made a sacrifice in person at the tomb of the founding emperor of the Ming dynasty. Moreover, a vivid eye-witness account of K'ang-hsi's activities in Soochow in early December 1684 has recently seen the light of day. In the diary of a local Shanghai literatus {Li-nien chi, "Record of Past Years"), the diarist gives a detailed description of the emperor's meeting with the local people in front of a Buddhist temple. K'ang-hsi himself joined the monks playing a musical instrument to entertain the crowd. Much excited, the crowd shouted "Long Live the Emperor!" In response the emperor turned toward the crowd saying loudly "Greetings to the people!" The three ritual performances of K'ang-hsi in 1684, mentioned above, seem to have been remarkably well orchestrated to deliver an important political message, namely, the arrival of universal peace in the Chinese world under the benevolent rule of a sage-emperor. With kneeling in the Confucian temple and sacrificing at the tomb of Ming T'ai-tsu he appeared to be saying to the Chinese elite that he was now the legitimate heir of both the Tao-Vung and chih-t'ung, whereas with music-playing he was probably showing the masses that he exemplified the ideal Confucian ruler who, as defined by Mencius, "shared his enjoyments with the people." Rites and music have always been central to Confucian symbolism. It is truly amazing that a young Manchu emperor at age thirty was able to reach such an extraordinarily high degree of sophistication in his manipulation of Confucian symbols. I use the word "manipulation" advisedly because, despite his well-publicized but initially self-promoted image as an assiduous Confucian scholar, K'ang-hsi never really abandoned his Manchu identity. That he did all of this out of the need of political manipulation rather than true belief becomes immediately clear once the significance of the year - 1684 - of hisfirstSouthern Tour is grasped. The previous year Taiwan was annexed and three years earlier the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories was pacified. There were no power groups left in China to challenge the legitimacy and authority of the new dynasty. K'ang-hsi knew his Chinese history only too well: The time had finally arrived for Confucian symbolism to be evoked to advance the cause of universal peace. In the cases of Huang Tsung-hsi and the local diarist, as shown above, K'ang-hsi's manipulation must be considered a success. After his first Southern Tour, both men's antiManchu feelings noticeably subsided. Dr. Huang's study of the relationship between Confucianism and imperial power under the Ch'ing ends, quite understandably, on a melancholy note. It is indeed depressing to find that the price of having a sage-emperor was paid with the critical dimension of Confucianism. This was very true as far as Confucians in the center of imperial power xiv

Foreword

were concerned. As Chang Ping-lin (1867-1936) points out, the "speaking officials" known as chi-shih-chung ("Supervising Censors"), whose function had been by definition critical under the Ming, were completely silenced since 1723, one year after K'ang-hsi's death. Institutionally speaking, therefore, Dr. Huang's point is irrefutable. However, in the case of Confucian scholars who were only peripherally or remotely connected with imperial power, it proved to be quite difficult to strip them of their critical functions completely. The reason is not far to seek. The Confucian critic has always been what Michael Walzer calls in Interpretation and Social Critism, the "connected" critic whose critical distance is measured in inches. "Connected" critics, Walzer assures us, can establish critical distance by way of interpretation. "So long as they do intellectual work, they open the way for the adversary proceeding of social criticism" (p. 40). In Ch'ing China, Tai Chen (1724-1777) maybe taken as a classic example of the "connected" Confucian critic. Through a new interpretation of the Confucian concept of li ("moral principle"), he was bold enough to question the validity of the state-sponsored Ch'eng-Chu philosophy to its core. "Sympathy," said he, "is sometimes expressed for a person who is executed in the name of law. But who will sympathize with a person who is condemned to death in the name of moral principle?" Viewed in this way, the unity of Tao-t'ungand chih-t'ung, no matter how solidly forged, can never be complete. Princeton, New Jersey July 1995

xv

Acknowledgments

When Professor Ying-shih Yu first suggested that I select Li Fu as a dissertation topic, I did not even know who Li Fu was. With some curiosity, I took his advice. My interests in Li Fu and related problems grew rapidly in the course of my research and writing. In the end, it proved a very rewarding intellectual exercise. Along the way Professor Yu has given me his valuable guidance. It is not difficult to find Professor Benjamin Schwartz's influence in the treatment of this subject. My discussions with him often produced many insights into my analysis, and his critical comments on the manuscript were very beneficial. In addition, both Professor Schwartz and Professor Yu have taught, by example, what a good scholar ought to be. They have been very kind and patient in helping me overcome the difficulties of my study at Harvard. It is a great pleasure to thank Professor Schwartz and Professor Yu, to whom I am indebted in many ways. This book is essentially based upon the dissertation that I wrote under their guidance. In retrospect, my years at Harvard were most exciting intellectually, a period in which I was exposed to various trends in Western thought, a critical assessment of which, in turn, aided my understanding of Chinese culture. I believe that my experience at Harvard can be seen as a kind of spiritual resource upon which I can draw again and again. I am grateful to my teachers, Professor Yu-sheng Lin of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Professor Cho-yun Hsu of the University of Pittsburgh, Professors Chia-lin Pao andjing-sheng Tao of the University of Arizona, and Professor Wei-yun Tu of National Cheng-chih University in Taiwan. Their continuing support and encouragement gave me the strength I needed to complete my work. My thanks also extend to Professor Wei-ming Tu, who read the manuscript of my thesis and provided many good suggestions. Professor Wing-tsit Chan and Professor Frederick Mote read the manuscript and offered their generous xvi

A cknowledgments

encouragement. In the process of revising my thesis into a book, Professors Prasenjit Duara, Hoyt Tillman, and Benjamin Elman kindly offered their constructive ideas. Professor Duara and Professor Tillman, in addition, have improved my English. Chien Ho, Deborah White, and Sidney Tai have been very helpful in my use of the Harvard-Yenching library, and they have always provided delightful company. In 1985, when I made a visit to Japan, my friends Professor Hiroshi Watanabe and Mi-cha Wu helped me explore the library of the Institute of Oriental Cultures of Tokyo University and Tokyo Bunko. The Institute of East Asian Philosophies in Singapore was very generous in providing both the grant and the place for completing my book in 1986. Needless to say, thanks are due to my home institution, the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, in which a tradition of pure research and discussion has blossomed. I have benefited deeply from this intellectual spirit. This book is dedicated to my parents, who have made many sacrifices so that I could continue my quest for an intellectually meaningful life.

xvn

Abbreviations

CCTC CHL CTNP CTWC CTYL ECCS HPTP KHCY LCA LHCC LTHP MJHA MTCK MTPK SCTT SKCS SPPY SSCC SYHA TSCC WMSK WSC WYCC YCWC

Chi-ch'i t'ing-chi Ch'uan-hsi lu Chu-tzu nien-fl'u Chu-tzt wen-chi Chu-tzu yu'-lei Erh-Ch 'eng ch yuan-shu Hsueh-pu t'ungpien Kang-hsi cheng-yao Lo Cheng-an hsien-sheng ts yun-kao Lu Hsiang-shan hsien-sheng ch 'uan-chi Lu-tzu hsueh-p'u Ming-ju hsueh-an Mu-t 'ang ch 'u-kao Mu-t 'ang pieh-kao Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu tsung-mu Vi-yao Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu Ssu-pu pei-yao Ssu-shu chi-chu Sung-Yuan hsueh-an Tsung-shu chi-ch'eng Wen-miao ssu-tien k 'ao Wen^yuan-ke ssu-k 'u ch 'ixan-shu Wang Yang-ming ch 'uan-chi Yu-chih Kang-hsi wen-chi

XVlll

Introduction

This study will explain the general intellectual climate of the early Ch'ing period and explore the political and cultural characteristics of the Ch'ing regime at the time. To achieve these ends I have focused on the Lu-Wang school, but will pay special attention to Li Fu (1675— 1750), the most outstanding representative of this school in the early Ch'ing. By the early Ch'ing, the Lu-Wang doctrines had undergone several transformations. Li Fu's thought can be seen as the final LuWang response to the Ch'eng-Chu school. Early Ch'ing rulers and scholars generally blamed the left wing of the Wang Yang-ming school for the fall of the Ming dynasty. Yet Li Fu demonstrated successfully that a LuWang scholar could still lead a viable intellectual life even after the Ming. In other words, the Lu-Wang school did not end with the fall of the Ming. Stressing the transformative power that the mind has upon moral cultivation, the Lu-Wang scholar takes a critical stance toward book learning (tu-shu), even if he does not necessarily exclude it from the process of moral perfection. One among many distinctions between the Lu-Wang school and its rival, the Ch'eng-Chu school, resides in their differing attitudes toward the role book learning plays in their moral programs. For the Ch'eng-Chu school, book learning has an inherent positive value in the course of moral cultivation. Notwithstanding these differences, by the Ch'ing period neither LuWang scholars nor those of the Ch'eng-chu school hesitated to employ an evidential approach (k'ao-cheng) as an efficient way to argue for their own doctrines. Prior to this, the battles between them were conducted primarily in the sphere of philosophical speculation. What compelled the Lu-Wang scholars to assume this new weapon - (that is) the evidential approach - may have resided in the shift in intellectual climate from "honoring the moral nature" (tsun te-hsing) to "the pursuits of inquiry

Introduction

and study" (tao wen-hsueh). Briefly, the philological turn did occur during the late Ming and early Ch'ing periods. In reconstructing the philosophical argument between Lu Hsiangshan (1139-92) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200), it becomes apparent that the vital issue separating them is the different approach each takes to the ontological presupposition of "mind" (hsiri). From this perspective, the other differences, such as whether book learning benefits moral cultivation, merely stem from their ontological presupposition of mind. Various political and intellectual factors contributed to the rise of the Chu Hsi school and the decline of the Lu Hsiang-shan school. The pressures that the Chu Hsi school exercised upon the Lu Hsiang-shan school were manifold. First of all, intellectually, during his lifetime the doctrines set forth by Chu Hsi and the commentaries on the classics made by him attracted an enormous following; the degree to which these beliefs found acceptance and support is reflected by the ease with which they survived the political purges aimed at their obliteration. In contrast, the philosophy of Lu Hsiang-shan lost influence shortly after his death. The intellectual reasons for the rise and fall of these two schools are discernible if we penetrate their doctrines. Furthermore, since the end of the Southern Sung period, Chu Hsi's scholarship had gained government patronage and become the official learning. In the Yuan dynasty, Chu Hsi's annotations to the classics were further employed to test the civil service candidates. The line between a student sincere in his devotion to Chu Hsi's philosophy and examination candidates keen on government position blurred, because knowledge of Chu Hsi's doctrine became a conditio sine qua non for passing the civil service examinations. Because of this, K'ung Shang-jen (1648-1718) lamented that most of the students favored Chu Hsi and attacked Lu Hsiang-shan simply because the former wrote commentaries that could be used for the civil service examinations.1 This trend certainly could not satisfy scholars committed to learning for the sake of intellectual and moral enlightenment. Wang Yang-ming (1472—1529) is perhaps the best example of such philosophers. He reacted against the current of Chu Hsi's learning in two ways. First, through a process of intellectual struggle with Chu Hsi's doctrines, he eventually arrived at a theory of moral action that drew directly upon the inner mind as the source of morality, in opposition to Chu Hsi's philosophy. Second, in order to reduce his own psychological anxieties caused both by his felt intellectual indebtedness to Chu Hsi's doctrine and by the hostility of the Chu Hsi scholars toward his newly proposed theory, 1. K'ung Shang-jen, Hu-hai chi, Shanghai, 1957, 9/203-204. 2

Introduction

Wang Yang-ming restored The Great Learning of the Ancient Text as a

justification of his theory of ko-wu (rectification of the mind). Furthermore, he compiled Chu Hsi s Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life to try

to show that no basic difference existed between his own doctrines and those articulated by Chu Hsi. Both of Yang-ming's works triggered a series of debates that continued well into the Ch'ing period. The content of these debates no doubt had bearing upon the philosophical stands of both the Ch'eng-Chu and the Lu-Wang schools; the form of these debates witnessed the rise of the evidential approach itself.2 Li Fu, as a Lu-Wang scholar in the Ch'ing period, not only argued with the Chu Hsi scholars on philosophical issues, but also assumed the new weapon of evidential research to fight against the Chu Hsi school. Although we can detect an underlying intellectual continuity between the thought of the Sung Confucians and the early Ch'ing Confucians, their political ideology underwent a subtle but fundamental change. Before the reign of the K'ang-hsi emperor, in spite of their intellectual differences, both the Ch'eng-Chu school and the Lu-Wang school shared the assumption that the Way {tao) or the tradition of the Way (tao-tfung) could be employed to criticize the political authorities, the rulers. This critical dimension of the Way, however, eventually was eliminated in the thought of Ch'ing scholars (except among the Ming loyalists). Li Fu, who was the major champion of the Lu-Wang school during the early Ch'ing, is a good example of a scholar who reflected the intellectual and political changes that occurred in that period. An in-depth analysis of his life and thought will help to illuminate how the political establishment successfully usurped the formerly independent tradition of the Way. Moreover, Li Fu illustrates how a man who claimed to be an adherent of the Lu-Wang school could still serve as a scholar-official under an alien dynasty. Finally, his thought illustrates the process whereby the debates between the Ch'eng-Chu school and the Lu-Wang school resulted in the evidential research movement. I also will discuss the Ch'eng-Chu school, the rival of the Lu-Wang school, at some length when clarity warrants a broader perspective for the Lu-Wang school.

2. This thesis was first proposed by Professor Ying-shih Yu; see his Li-shih yii ssu-hsiang (History and thought), Taipei, 1977, pp. 87-156.

1 The original argument (1): "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" (Chu-Lu i-t'ung): A philosophical interpretation

In 1175, Chu Hsi (1130—1200) and the Lu brothers, Chiu-ling (1132— 80) and Chiu-yuan (Hsiang-shan, 1139—92) were invited by Lii Tsuch'ien (1137—81) to the Goose Lake temple to seek a reconciliation of their long-held divergent views. The theme of this debate constituted one of the major discourses in the history of Neo-Confucianism. The debate itself was significant not only for those philosophers who participated in it, but also for those who developed Neo-Confucianism in later days. Hence, it deserves our detailed scrutiny in order to appreciate its far-reaching implications. Before their departure for Goose Lake, the Lu brothers had an intellectual exchange so as to reach a common ground between themselves. In the end the elder brother, Chiu-ling, agreed with Hsiang-shan and wrote a poem to express his own view: Children know love, but in growing up learn respect. The ancient sages pass on this mind. Only after the foundation has been laid can a house be built. No hill will rise without a base. Fondness for commentaries brings thorns and thistles. If you are attached to details, you may lose yourself in them. Value friendship and counsel each other. Realize that great joy lies in this moment.1 1. Lu Hsiang-shan, Lu Hsiang-shan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi (Complete works of Lu Hsiang4

The original argument (i)

However, Hsiang-shan felt somewhat dissatisfied with the second line of his brother's poem, "The ancient sages pass on this mind." On the way to Goose Lake he wrote a poem in response: Graveyards evoke sorrow, ancestral shrines, respect. This man's unpolished Mind through all ages. Tiny drops make up a mighty ocean, Small rocks pile up as mounts T'ai and Hua. Easy [i] and simple [chien] effort [kung-fu] brings lasting greatness. Fragmented work stays drifting and aimless. To know how to mount, from the lower to the higher, Find out truth and falsehood this very day.2 In their meeting with Chu Hsi the Lu brothers in turn preceded the debate with presentation of each's poem. It was said that on hearing these poems, Chu Hsi turned pale. Still, Chu Hsi discussed his own view with the Lu brothers. Today, there are few materials left that record in detail the arguments adduced in that debate. From the fact that Chu Hsi and the Lu brothers (especially Hsiang-shan) continued to criticize each other long after the debate, one might assume that the debate itself was a failure of intellectual communication for both sides. Chu Hsi quite often attacked Lu Hsiang-shan's philosophy as Zen Buddhism or Confucianized Zen. 3 Lu Hsiang-shan in response called Chu's philosophy heterodoxy (i-tuari) that was unconsciously influenced by Taoism. 4 The primary task for a proper Confucian of the Sung dynasty was to distinguish true Confucianism from Buddhism as well as from Taoism. All the criticisms employed by Chu and Lu were intended as insults to each other's self-image as champions of true Confucianism. Chu Heng-tao, a witness to this debate, recalled the situation as folshan), hereafter abbreviated as LHCC, 1823. Punctuated by Li Fu. 34749a. Professor Wing-tsit Chan's and Julia Ching's English translations provided a great help to my rendering of this poem. Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, "Neo-Confucian Philosophical Poems," Rendition, no. 4 (Spring 1975), 14; and Julia Ching, "The Goose Lake Monastery Debate," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 1 (1974), 165. 2. Ibid., 34/49b. Ching, "Goose Lake," 165. The second line of this poem reads: "Ssu-jen-

ch'ien-ku^ru-mo-hsin"; the other version of it reads "Ssu-jen-ch'ien-tsai-tsui-ling-hsin," which

is literally rendered as 'This man possesses the most subtle and sensitive mind through thousands of years." See Sheng Ju-tzu, Shu-chai-lao-hsueh-ts'ung-t'an, Shanghai, 1941, p. 26. 3. Chu-tzu yu'-lei (Classified conversations of Chu Hsi), hereafter abbreviated as CTYL, Taipei, 1962. 114/4460-4461; and Chu-tzu wen-chi (Collection of literary works by Chu Hsi), hereafter abbreviated as CTWC, in Ssu-ftu pei^yao, entitled Chu-tzu ta-ch 'u'an, 35/22a. 4. LHCC, i5/3b-5a.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

lows: "During the meeting at the Goose Lake, in a discussion of educating people, Chu Hsi held that one should be widely read, and then seek the essential (yileh). But according to the Lu brothers, one should discover the fundamental mind (pen-hsin)first,then read widely. For Chu, the Lu brothers' teaching method is oversimplified; for the Lu brothers, Chu's method is fragmented."5 This account has long been accepted as a standard paradigm for comprehending the discrepancy between Chu's and Lu's philosophy. Despite the oversimplified character of this account of their differences, during the past eight hundred years many scholars have adopted this model in grasping Chu's scholarship as dealing primarily with "intellectual pursuits" (tao wen-hsueh) and Lu's as solely concerned with "honoring the moral nature" (tsun te-hsing). For example, although the present-day scholar Hsu Fu-kuan shows a more sophisticated comprehension of Chu and Lu than previous scholars, he merely presents a modern version of that traditional paradigm. He employs the dichotomy between knowledge and morality and criticizes Chu Hsi's confusion of a moral problem with an intellectual problem.6 But even Lu Hsiang-shan himself had already perceived that this way of arguing could not convince Chu Hsi,7 not to mention those who cautiously keep in mind the distinction between an "ought" category and an "is" category, a distinction actually made in post-Kantian philosophy. After reconstructing the original arguments of Chu and Lu, I will come back to these criticisms. Here, I will show that the fundamental difference between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan lies in their respective ontological presupposition of "mind"; all other differences are derived from their different perspectives on this issue. In fact, Chu Hsi's understanding of human mind is intimately shaped by, or interconnected with, his cosmology, especially with the concept of ch% which can be rendered as "vital force," "physical-psychic energy," or "substance."8 It is fruitful for us first to investigate Chu's cosmology in order to form a comprehensive picture of his "mind-based" philosophical anthropology. 5. LHCC, 36/18a. 6. Hsu Fu-kuan, Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang-shih lun-chi (Essays on Chinese intellectual history), Taipei, 1975, p. 37. In his later days, Professor Hsu reflected upon his early view of Chu Hsi and confessed it was too superficial. This is one example to show that Professor Hsu is a highly reflective scholar. See Hsu Fu-kuan tsui-hou jih-chi (The last diary of Professor Hsu Fu-kuan), Taipei, 1987, p. 184. 7. LHCQ 3 4 /37a. 8. Ch'i is usually rendered as material force, vital force, ether, or substance. In fact, none of these is equal to its meaning in Chinese philosophy. A stone is made of ch \ and the spirits are a form of ch'i too. Hence, ch'i has both spiritual and physical nature in one.

The original argument (i)

In discussing the origin of the earth, Chu Hsi said: In the beginning of the universe there was only vital force [ch'i] consisting of yin and yang. This force moved and circulated, turning this way and that. As this movement gained speed, a mass of sediment was pushed together and, since there was no outlet for this, it consolidated to form the earth in the center of universe. The clear part of vital force formed the sky, the sun and moon, and the stars and zodiacal spaces. It is only on the outside that the encircling movement perpetually goes on. The earth exists motionless in the center of the system, not at the bottom.9 He also said: Within the universe there are principle [li] and vital force [ch'i]. Principle constitutes the Way [tao] that is "above form"; it is the source from which things are produced. Vital force constitutes the "instruments" [ch'ib] that are "within form"; it is the [material] means whereby things are produced. Hence, men or things, at the moment of their production, must receive this principle [li] in order that they have a nature [hsing] of their own; they must receive this vital force in order that they may have form.10

Four points can be made from these quotations: first, that the vital force is the basic material for making everything in the universe; second, that although the earth as well as other celestial bodies are made of the vital force, the composition of the earth is not so pure as those of heaven, the sun, the moon, and the stars. If we admit that purity is a normative criterion in Neo-Confucianism, then we must agree that heaven and other celestial bodies should be evaluated as being higher than the earth. Third, people and things on the earth are also made from the vital force. Finally, principle regulates the way in which vital force operates. But principle is not a separate entity. It exists inside vital force. Without vital force, principle would have nothing to adhere to. So Chu Hsi stated, "In the universe there has never been any vital force without principle or principle without vital force."11 To correspond to the vital force as a whole, Chu Hsi gives a general name to the principle of Heaven and Earth and the myriad things, that is, the Great Ultimate (t'ai-chi). "With" the Great Ultimate there is the shapeless Great Void (wu-chi), which preserves the infinite possibility of transformation and creation. It is this very concept, the Great Void, that aroused fierce criticism from Lu Hsiang-shan. Lu not only casts doubt on 9. CTYL, 1/72. The English quotation is slightly modified from Wing-tsit Chan's A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton, N.J., 1973, pp. 641-642. 10. CTWC, 5874b. The English translation is based on Fung Yu-lan's A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans, by Derk Bodde, Princeton, N.J., 1953, vol. 11, p. 542. 11. CTYL, 4 / i o a .

Philosophy, philology, and politics

the necessity of this concept, but argues that yin and yang are "above form" (hsing-erh-shang), just as the Great Ultimate is. In his view, the Great Void, with a strong flavor of Taoism, cannot be legitimately accepted in a proper Confucian cosmology.12 Despite Lu's objection, Chu Hsi insists that the Great Void is cosmologically a theoretical necessity, and that yin and yang are "within form" (hsing-erh-hsia), not above form as the Great Ultimate is. These assertions receive their support from a textual interpretation of the writings of Chou Tun-i (1017—73), from whose books Chu Hsi draws these ideas. 13 Moreover, Chu Hsi is deeply influenced by Hua-yen Buddhism with respect to the nature of principle (&'). He thinks that everything in the universe possesses a Great Ultimate (principle in general term) and that the Great Ultimate in everything is identical, as the Buddhist metaphor "the moon reflected in ten thousand rivers" implies. 14 Here in "principle" more than in "vital force" one can more clearly recognize the homogeneity of Heaven and Earth, creatures, and all things. It is the endowment of the vital force in each case that creates differences between one thing and another. In other words, while in terms of "principle," everything has no difference at all, in terms of "vital force," owing to the endowment of each one, all things differ from one another. However, among the myriad things, human beings stand out as the best because their better endowment of the "vital force" enables them to manifest the principle more completely than other creatures. For instance, in the case of birds and other animals, since they are endowed with the "vital force" to a lesser degree of purity than mankind, they suffer from the incompleteness of principle manifested in their physical structure and behavior. The crow can know no more than filial piety, the otter no more than to offer sacrifices; the dog can only keep guard, the ox, plow. Chu Hsi explains this very well: From the point of view of principle, all things have one source, and of course man and things cannot be distinguished as higher and lower creatures. From the point of view of vital force, that which receives it in its perfection and is unimpeded becomes man, while those that receive it partially and are obstructed become things. Because of this, they cannot be equal, but some are higher and others are lower.15 12. LHCC, 2 / i o b - i 4 a . 13. CTWC, 3 6 / 7 b - i o b . 14. CTYL, 18/700. Fung Yu-lan, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh shih (A history of Chinese philosophy), n.d., Taipei, pp. 902—903; Bodde, History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 11. pp. 541— 542; Hou Wai-lu et al., Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang Vung-shih (A general history of Chinese thought), vol. 4b, p. 601. 15 CTYL, 4/152—153. Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 622.

The original argument (i)

This implies that although all things share the same principle, only man can understand the principle on a conscious level because he is better endowed with the vital force.16 Viewed in this light, man is no doubt the most intelligent creature in the universe. But as far as individual endowment is concerned, men are also different among themselves according to opaqueness or clarity of their vital force. Sages embody the purest "vital force," idiots the most sullied. The majority of men are between these two extreme categories. In order to penetrate into the real source that distinguishes man from other creatures, we need to take account of Chu Hsi's understanding of mind (hsiri).

Human mind, which distinguishes man from other things, is the master of the whole body. It is a crystallization of the most delicate vital force.17 The substance of mind is emptiness and sensitivity (hsu-ling).18 These qualities allow it to contain all principle (s) and respond to things. The mind so conceived is the convergence of principle and vital force. The very fact that the mind is an embodiment of vital force makes it vulnerable to obstruction from the coarser part of its endowment. Sages are the perfect embodiment of the "pure" vital force; consequently, the mind of a sage because of his gifted endowment is completely identical to "principle."19 But this is not the case for average people. Although both sages and common men possess "principle" in their minds, they are different because men usually are unaware of the existence of "principle" in their own minds. Effort (kung-fu) and cultivation (han-yang) are needed to arouse the immanent principle onto consciousness of one's mind. To precisely grasp this point would involve the most complicated intellectual growth in Chu's life, which has to do with his restructuring of the relationship among three concepts - nature (hsing), feeling (ch'ing), and mind (hsin). Chu Hsi experienced a great change in his apprehension of these three conceptual units. At the age of twenty-four, he went to see Li T'ung (1088-1163), who continued the teaching of Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I. Before that he was under the spell of Zen Buddhism. Chu Hsi was quite discouraged by his first visit to Li because Li did not appreciate his understanding of Zen. On the contrary, Li persuaded him to read the Confucian classics, a plain and common suggestion that caused Chu Hsi to be skeptical of the depth of Li's appreciation of "profound truth."20 16. Li T'ung, Li Yen-f'ing chi (The writings of Li T'ung), Shanghai, n.d., Ts'ung-shu chick 'eng ch 'u-pien, 2 /30. 17. CTYL, 5/198. 18. Ibid., 27/200. 19. Ibid., 27/1158. 20. Li T'ung, Li Yenning chi, 3/49.

Philosophy, philology, and politics Later, his study of the classics gradually came to inspire him, and he was able to come to terms with Li's teaching. But Chu Hsi never felt at ease with Li's method of cultivation, "sitting in silence and clarifying one's mind" (mo-tso ch'eng-hsiri), which, in a sense, showed some similarity to the approach of Zen Buddhism.21 As a result Chu Hsi did not formally receive Li's teaching until the age of thirty-one. When Chu Hsi was thirty-four, Li passed away. According to Ch'ien Mu, as Chu Hsi's intellectual mentor, Li influenced Chu in three respects: First, he directed Chu's attention to practical human affairs; second, Li pointed out the importance of classical learning for Chu Hsi; and last, Li presented the idea that "principle is one but its manifestations are many" (li-i fen-shu),22 Chu Hsi confessed that before he met Li Tung, he was inclined to engage in grand and superficial talk. Later, having been influenced by Li, he gradually realized that it was much more difficult to recognize principle manifested in various forms than to grasp principle in one. This realization, in Chu's view, is crucial in distinguishing Confucian teaching from heterodoxy.23 It might also account for Chu Hsi's intellectual reorientation as expressed in his interest in studying the details of any subject. As Chu Hsi recalled, Master Li usually taught the people how to experience the fundamental and that which is not yet manifested (ta-pen wei-fa) in a state of quietude. When this state is clearly achieved, one can deal with human affairs spontaneously and adequately. This pedagogic art has been transmitted through a line of Yang Shih's (Kuei-shan, 1053—1135) disciples. At the time when I was studying with him, I was distracted from the practice of this by my fondness for intellectual discussions and textual analysis - Each time I think of this, I feel ashamed.24 In fact, Chu Hsi had long been obsessed with identifying a definite relation between the substance of mind and the operation of mind; or in Thomas Metzger's terminology, the "linkage" between the metaphysical world and the experiential world.25 At the time of Li T'ung's death, Chu Hsi had still not figured out a conceptual scheme incorporating these two states of mind on a firm and secure basis. With the realization of such a scheme as his goal, at the age of thirtyeight, Chu paid a visit to Chang Shih (Chang Nan-hsiian, 1133—80), who 21. Li T'ung, Li Yen-p'ing chi, 3/39. 22. Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tzu hsin-hsueh-an (A new record of Chu Hsi's learning), Taipei, 1971, vol. 3, pp. 34—35; and Wang Mao-hung, Chu-tzu nien-p'u (Chronological biography of Chu Hsi), hereafter abbreviated as CTNP, Taipei, 1971, pp. 7-22. 23. CTYL, 117/4556-4557. 24. CTWQ 4o/8a. 25. Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament, New York, 1977, pp. 70-79. 1O

The original argument (i) was at that time the leader of the Hsiang school. 26 Through their intellectual exchanges, Chang convinced Chu that the "not yet actualized" (weifa) is nature (hsing) and the "actualized" (i-fa) is mind. Chu Hsi further developed this idea in a series of philosophical letters called "The Old Theory of Equilibrium and Harmony." In this theory, he implies that with regard to the method of cultivation, one ought to examine one's mind (the actualized) before preserving and nourishing it. A decisive change took place when Chu Hsi was forty years old, one year after he had finished the compilation of the Ch'eng brothers' works (Ch'eng Hao, 1032—85; C h ' e n g I, 1033—1107). According to Chu's own account, his rereading of the Ch'eng brothers' writings brought about this dramatic change. In a letter to his friend in H u n a n , he wrote: Right along, in my discussions and thinking, I have simply considered the mind to be the state after feelings are aroused, and in my daily efforts I have also merely considered examining and recognizing the clues [of activities of feelings] as the starting points. Consequently I have neglected the effort of daily selfcultivation, so that the mind is disturbed in many ways and lacks the quality of depth or purity. Also, when it is expressed in speech or action it is always characterized by a sense of urgency and an absence of reserve, and there is no longer any disposition of ease or profoundness - When Master Ch'eng said that "whenever we talk about the mind, we refer to the state after the feelings are aroused," he referred [only] to the mind of an infant [whose feelings have already been aroused]. When he said, "Whenever we talk about the mind," he was mistaken in the way he expressed it and therefore admitted the incorrectness and corrected himself.27 Chu Hsi subsequently adopted the view of Chang Tsai (1020—77). According to this view, nature is the state of mind before it is aroused, whereas feelings are the state of mind after it is aroused, as expressed in Chang Tsai's idea: that the mind commands nature and feelings (hsin t'ung hsing-ch'ing) ,28 From there he can consistently claim that "nature is the principle." Nature is what man is given from the heavenly principle (Vien-li), and resides in h u m a n mind. 29 Feelings are the concrete manifestations of the mind. It appears to be unstable and precarious because of impurity on the part of each person's endowment. The mind cannot be equal to the principle, as Lu Hsiang-shan thinks. Only nature, which belongs to the "not yet actualized" (in Chu's new theory), is identical to the principle and totally good. Chu Hsi had arrived at this new 26. The Hsiang school was founded by Hu Wu-feng (1100—1155), who was Chang Nanhsuan's teacher. 27. CTWC, 64/2O,a-2O,b. Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, pp. 601-602. 28. CTYL, 60/2318.

29. Ibid., 60/2318, 2324. 11

Philosophy, philology, and politics

perspective when he met Lu Hsiang-shan at the Goose Lake temple at the age of forty-six. Thus, from Chu Hsi's standpoint, Lu Hsiang-shan's claim that "the mind is the principle" implies that Lu is blind to the fact that man is constituted by the vital force, which displays the physical nature (ch'i-chih chih hsing) in him.30 According to Chu Hsi, the idea of the physical nature, first proposed by Chang Tsai and the Ch'eng brothers, makes a tremendous contribution in compensating for the defect in Mencius's and Hsiin tzu's theory of human nature. The physical nature formed by vital force is supposed to differ from the heaven-conferred nature (t'ienming chih hsing or i-li chih hsing), that is, principle. When Mencius (ca. 371-289 B.C.) says that human nature is originally good, he merely has the "heaven-conferred nature" in mind; when Hsun tzu (fl. 298-238 B.C.) says that human nature is originally evil, he is concerned only with the physical nature. So only if one takes both nature and vital force into account, can one come up with a comprehensive understanding of human nature.31 Implicitly Chu Hsi criticized Lu Hsiang-shan on this point. The substance of nature is without doubt the supreme good. But if one fails to see the vital force at work, one is unable to realize why various things (especially the bad) occur; vice versa, if one is solely absorbed by these diversified phenomena without knowing the existence of nature, one cannot understand that in another respect these diversified phenomena participate in the common source of goodness, nature. Therefore, we know that Chu Hsi's phrase "nature is the principle" actually refers to heaven-conferred nature but not physical nature. Here more than anywhere else, Chu Hsi reveals the dualistic elements of his thought. To put it another way, Chu Hsi reveals this dualism more clearly in his philosophical anthropology than in his cosmology. Chu Hsi believes that "man, being at the center of Heaven and Earth, is the most intelligent creature among the ten thousand things. The reason for this is his mind."32 It is reasonable to say that Chu's philosophical anthropology centers around his theory of human mind. "Nature is principle. The mind is its embracement and reservoir, and issues it forth into operation," Chu Hsi says.33 In theory, this saying is correct. But in fact, only the sages, because of their special endowment, are born with the knowledge of principle; hence their minds are entirely compatible with the principle. Average men are obstructed by the impure vital force in their psychophysical endowment so that they are unable to immediately realize the principle in their minds. Nevertheless, 30. CTYL, 124/4826.

31. Ibid., 59/2262-2263.

32. CTWC, 77/6b.

33. CTYL, 5/203; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 631. 12

The original argument (i)

the mind (of an average person), as the purest part of the psychophysical endowment, has a capacity to be perceptive and conscious of the principle(s) from within and without. In other words, the principle, which one's mind has not been aware of, needs to be aroused by the investigation of external affairs (affairs in a general sense, including book learning). This does not mean that the principle so obtained is external to one's mind. On the contrary, all principles are inherent in one's mind and are the same as those in external things and events.34 In fact Chu Hsi never doubts that all principle (s) appearing in the universe are the same, since he believes that "the principle of the mind is the Great Ultimate,"35 and that "each and every person has in him the Great Ultimate and each and every thing has in it the Great Ultimate."36 For Chu Hsi, the best way to acquire the principle is by studying the classics, which are based upon the sages' writings and sayings over the ages. The sage's mind contains the principle in the universe. The reason for us to study and learn is simply that our minds are not the same as those of sages.37 During the debate at the Goose Lake temple, Lu Hsiang-shan bluntly put the question to Chu, "What did the ancients read before the writing system was invented?"38 Years after that occasion, Chu Hsi replied, "Before the written language had been created, students certainly had nothing to read; people above average were expected to achieve human perfection by themselves without sudying texts. But after cultural creations (including the written language) by the sages and wise men, the Way [tao] has been preserved in detail in the classics; even a man as sagacious as Confucius could not avoid learning these classics."39 A strong historical and cultural overtone can be perceived in Chu's views here. He considers Confucius to have made the cultural legacy of the earlier sages significant to the world through his enormous efforts. Since Confucius, learning, especially the study of the classics, constituted the primary path for quest of the Way. But Chu Hsi is not an antiquarian in any sense. In a reply to his student about whether one should study texts to become enlightened, he answered, "Surely one should study texts. If the principle is in the books, one apprehends it by book learning; if not, one should look for it in contemporary affairs. If the principle does not exist in the ancient period, seek it in modern times."40 He is also known for his skeptical spirit in his treatment of ancient texts. But he feared that if he took his skeptical approach to an extreme, the validity of all the important classics would be shaken.41 34. CTYL, 17/673. 35. Ibid., 5/197. 36. Ibid., 94/3823. 37. CTWC, 42/21*. 38. LHCC, 34/49b. 39. CTWC, 43/7^ 40. CTYL, 14/384. 41. Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tzu hsin-hsiieh-an, vol. 1, pp. 181-182. 13

Philosophy, philology, and politics

Lu Hsiang-shan's approach to principle is considerably different from that of Chu Hsi. Although the study of classics is not superficial in his strategy of grasping the principle, personal experience and practice seem even more important. Lu once made a very daring dictum: "If in our study we know the fundamentals, then all the six classics are my footnotes." 42 This symbolized a protest against the heavy weight of classical learning. Overemphasis by scholars upon the fragmented and detailed study of the classics made them prisoners of the classics. Lu often proudly said, "I reduce the b u r d e n for students, but other scholars tend to increase it for students." 4 3 It is interesting to note that both Lu Hsiang-shan and Chu Hsi were determined to become sages in their youth. A precocious curiosity was also characteristic of both scholars. They were preoccupied with cosmological questions from an early age. Chu Hsi said that from the age of five or six, he had been continuously preoccupied with the cosmological question of what is above heaven. 44 This same pattern repeats itself in Lu's early life. When Lu Hsiang-shan was merely three or four years old he was so absent-minded in his speculation on the scope of Heaven and Earth that he even stopped eating; this resulted in a scolding by his father. 45 Their outlook on cosmology and philosophical anthropology, however, diverged sharply in their later intellectual and personal development. As already indicated, influenced by Chou Tun-i, Shao Yung ( 1 0 1 1 77) and Chang Tsai, Chu Hsi synthesized their theories and constructed a grand cosmology with an "intellectual-analytic" style that characterizes Chu Hsi's scholarship methodologically. It can be best seen in his concern with cognitive clarity, especially of verbal expression. 46 T h e last four lines of the poem he wrote in response to Lu Chiu-ling displays this concern very well: We exchanged views about the study with which we were occupied, and went to the depths to discover how new knowledge could be improved. I am just afraid that we might talk about what is beyond words; I doubt that there is a difference of opinion between ancient and modern days.47 Chu Hsi believed that from the course of discussion would inevitably emerge the various opinions from which a valid conclusion could be derived. 42. LHCC, 34/ib. 43. Ibid., 35/143. 44. CTNP, p. 2. 45. LHCC, 3675b. 46. Cf. Metzger, Escape, pp. 63-68. 47. CTWC, 4/1 oa. Unlike the former two poems, this English translation is based upon Carsun Chang's Development ofNeo-Confucian Thought, New York, 1957, vol. 1, pp. 298— 299l

4

The original argument (i)

Lu Hsiang-shan, however, followed another path to resolve his concerns. In contrast to that of Chu Hsi, Lu's approach appeared to be an "experiential-holistic" style. One day when he was reading an old text, he happened to encounter two characters, yii-chou, in it. He was so inspired by the annotation defining yii (spacial continuum) as "the four directions plus upward and downward," and chou (temporal continuum) as "what has gone by in the past and what is to come in the future" that he wrote, "The affairs in the universe {yii-chou) are my own affairs. My own affairs are affairs of the universe." He suddenly grasped the point that people, Heaven and Earth, and the ten thousand things are all in the infinitude.48 Unlike Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan does not employ a lot of concepts such as vital force, Great Ultimate, principle, and so forth to cope with the origins of the universe. He becomes one with the universe not by intellectual understanding of the homogeneity of men and the ten thousand things, but by an intuitive awareness and experience of the total truth. In reply to a student's question about the differences among mind, capacity (ts'ai), nature, and feeling, he said: What you say is also a matter of details. However, this is not your fault, my friend; it is the defect of the entire world. When scholars read today, they try to understand only words and do not go further to find out what is vital. As to feeling, the nature, mind, and capacity, they are all one thing in general and simply happen to be expressed differently - You do not have to talk about them. If you do, you will be wrong; and in the future you will depend on only words, and study not for your own sake but to impress others. If you pay attention to what is concrete to yourself, you will eventually understand.49 Here, Lu's experiential-holistic approach is at work. Basically, Lu does not trust language very much. Rather, he puts an exclusive emphasis on the experiential dimension of knowledge. A disciple was scolded by him when the former asked him to "teach" moral knowledge.50 Discussing moral problems meant futile talk to Lu. He had a deep suspicion of those who engaged in grandiose discourse. In that fashion, language may be perverted to the extent that its corresponding reality and practice are entirely missing. "Empty talk" (hsii-shuo) and "opinions expressed in examination essays" (shih-wen chih chien) are two terms constantly employed by him to criticize these persons.51 For him, those who pursue material interests find it easier to understand his teaching than those who immerse themselves in grand ideas.52 His very emphasis on the experiential dimension of language and knowledge leads him to 48. LHCC, 36/5b-6a. 49. Ibid., 35/2oa-2ob. 51. Ibid., 35/6a, 8a-iob; CTYL, 124/4817-4818.

50. Ibid., 34/22b. 52. LHCC, 34/6a.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

say that although he has uttered tens of thousands of words, they are all expressions of what is within him, and nothing more has been added. Spontaneity is characteristic of his learning, which is rarely found in that of others.53 No wonder Chu Hsi's great interest in intellectual discussion, book editing, and annotative tasks convinces Lu Hsiang-shan that Chu starts his learning from an improper point. By immersing himself in the details, he fails to apprehend the fundamental mind first. Lu is so concerned with the starting point {tuan-hsu) for pursuing the Way that, in his view, if one begins with the wrong starting point, one will end up far away from the right path of the scared learning and get lost in the jungle of heterodoxies. From this point of view, Chu Hsi's doctrine qualifies as a heterodoxy.54 On one occasion, when Lu walked by moonlight with his disciple, he sighed, saying, "Chu Yuan-hui's (Chu Hsi's) scholarship is like the great mountain T'ai, yet he does not arrive at the Way by his learning. This is equal to wasting his energy without making any progress in himself."55 In contrast, Lu has a great confidence in his own understanding of the Way. "The universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe," claims Lu.56 In this sense, the mind (or his mind) becomes the focus of the unity of people and the universe. It is worth our while to examine Lu's conception of mind to understand the difference between Lu and Chu in their understanding of it. As Lu's student once pointed out, Lu Hsiang-shan did not like to talk about the concept of nature (hsing). But on at least one occasion when he was requested to discuss it, Lu simply equated "the nature in heaven" with "the mind in man."57 This demonstrates Lu's profound commitment to the doctrine that mind is the principle that warrants the conceptual possibility of the equation between "nature in heaven" and "mind in man." The reason Lu puts mind and the principle directly together is because the human mind is the most intelligent and the principle is clearly latent in the mind itself. Naturally, every man has this mind and contains the principle in full.58 If he does not, it is simply because his mind is distracted by human desires. With regard to this point Chu Hsi did an injustice to Lu Hsiang-shan in accusing him of ignoring the operation of the vital force in human beings. In fact, Lu is not unaware of the bad effect of impure vital force. However, for him it constitutes no great obstacle to moral cultivation.59 As Lu puts it, "Moral principles inherent in the human mind are endowed by Heaven and cannot be wiped out. Those who are beclouded by material desires so as to pervert 53. LHCC, 34/ga. 54. Ibid., 34/11a. 57. CTYL, 124/4820; LHCC, 35/206.

55. Ibid., 34/28^ 58. LHCC, 22/ioa. 16

56. Ibid., 22/9a-o.b. 59. Ibid., i3/ia-2b.

The original argument (i)

principles and violate righteousness, do so because they do not think, that is all."60 But Lu Hsiang-shan never gives a clear account of the origin of human desires. For him, in order to recover the original state of the mind {pen-hsin), one needs simply to think and examine oneself. For Chu Hsi, this would be just the first step to moral perfection. The investigation of things serves as the necessary second step. At this point, Chu Hsi attacks Lu Hsiang-shan for being overly subjective in his method of grasping principle. In addition, Lu also underestimates the bad effect of the impure vital force in each person's endowment. The impure vital force, like built-in sin in oneself, takes a lifelong struggle to get rid of, or to purify. To set one's mind right needs both tremendous determination (li-chih) and strenuous effort. The way to achieve sagehood is a precarious one. Chu Hsi remembered that based on his reading of Mencius he had believed that to become a sage was easy. But later he felt it was very difficult to achieve sagehood.61 He believed that an enormous intellectual understanding was necessary in order to arouse the principle im-

plicit in one's mind (yiing-chih fang fa-ti ch'u-lai).62 Here we see the

concept of vital force go through Chu's cosmology and philosophy of mind, playing a crucial role in the whole system. By contrast, vital force does not receive the same weight in Lu's thought. For Lu, the mind, as the unique source of moral development, is in accord with principle; hence, it is self-sufficient for moral cultivation. He ascribes to the mind an unimpeded transformative power that Chu Hsi would not allow. For Lu, it is incorrect to believe that the mind is only a place for locating the principle, as Chu Hsi holds. It is also the principle itself. If one becomes corrupted and evil, it is merely because one loses the original knowledge of the innate good in the mind. The only task for that person is to make up his mind to "recover" (hui-fu) his initial moral consciousness. (In Chu's case, we can expect he would use the word discover (fa-chiieh) here instead of hui-fu.) Based on this, one can also achieve sagehood. For Lu Hsiang-shan, mind is universal and identical in all cases. He asserts, "There is only one mind. My mind, my friend's mind, the minds of the sages thousand of years ago, and the minds of sages thousands of years to come are all the same."63 This reveals why he felt uneasy about the second line of his brother's poem - "Ancient sages pass on this mind." In this line, sages become the mediating agents of the mind. Chu Hsi, as might be expected, took issue with Lu on this point. In Chu's view, Lu transmits his own mind rather than the mind of the sages; 60. Ibid., 32/7a; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 580. 61. CTNP, p. 2. 62. CTYL, 17/673. 63. LHCC, 3 5 / i g b - 2 o a .

Philosophy, philology, and politics

he transmits his private ideas rather than the sages' ideas.64 In order to grasp the principle, people ought to trace the works of the sages to the latter's intentions, and from those intentions to the principle in the universe. Viewed in this light, the classics, being the records of sages' doings and sayings, form the most important source for Chu's "investigation of things." While book learning is not totally excluded from Lu's search for principle,65 personal experience with the real world occupies a more important position. One day, when he was asked why he was unwilling to put his doctrine into written form, he replied that The Six Classics annotated his experience and his experience annotated The Six Classics.66 In his view, the study of classics merely served as a witness to one's own experience. In this respect, Lu appears to have been a more independent thinker than Chu. He boldly challenged the Tzu-kung and Tzu-hsia wing of the Confucian literary tradition, the branch that distracted scholars from appreciating the essence of Confucius's teaching: "One thread goes through all."67 Moreover, he questioned the classics, the words of the sages, whenever he felt they were contradictory to his own experience. Lu said, "Establish yourself in life and respect yourself. Don't follow other people's footsteps nor repeat their words."68 The possibility of achieving moral perfection depends on one's determination to become a sage and one's authentic confrontation with the practical world. A man without even the slightest knowledge of literature can still claim to be a dignified and imposing person.69 But the concern with "objectivity" or "validity" of the principle haunts Chu Hsi's thought constantly. As Chu Hsi conceded, he would not feel secure if the principle reached by his mind were not compatible with the sages' classics.70 The task of looking for a systematic procedure that both guides the discovery of the principle in one's mind and at the same time guarantees the validity of the principle is pressing in Chu Hsi's intellectual endeavor. The validity of the principle must be tested either by the study of the classics, by the investigation of the external world, or by both. Of course, Lu Hsiang-shan also talks about these matters. In answer to a question about the investigation of things, Lu quotes Mencius: "All things are already complete in oneself."71 His understanding of 64. CTWC, 70/22a—22b. Here Chu Hsi criticizes Wang Hsin-po's sayings. This criticism can be applied to Lu Hsiang-shan as well. Cf. Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tzu hsin-hsiieh-an, vol. 3, pp. 300-301. 65. LHCC, 34/7b. 66. Ibid., 34/7b. 67. Ibid., 34/ioa-iob, 20b. 68. Ibid., 35/43a; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 586. 69. LHCC, 35/243. 70. CTWC, 42/2ob-2oa. 71. LHCC, 35/14^ 18

The original argument (i)

"things" here deserves a closer look. Lacking an unambiguous context, one cannot be certain whether he means that the ontological basis of things is rooted in our mind, or whether, espistemologically, that our mind is acute enough to know "the principle of things" in itself. The ambiguity of that utterance will become apparent when compared with Chu Hsi's vision of "things." In Chu's case, the mind has the same principle in itself as is in external things; the external things have their own ontological reality simply because of their embodiment of the vital force. But one is tempted to say that in order to support more forcefully the self-sufficiency of mind, Lu Hsiang-shan finds it possible to move from an espistemological ground to an ontological one. This, however, is inconsistent with his other concerns. Despite the fact that he disagrees with Chu Hsi on the problems of the ontological status of yin and yang, their philosophical anthropology shares the same cosmic base. Both Chu and Lu presuppose a continuity of beings from heaven to human beings that are all made of the vital force of yin and yang. They take for granted Mencius's saying, "He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature. He who knows his nature knows Heaven."72 Heaven means to them a supreme entity outside one's mind that one seeks to understand and thus to model oneself after. Therefore, the mind in question is not just an individual mind. For Lu Hsiang-shan, whatever ontological reality a thing possesses vis-a-vis universal mind, still vis-a-vis the individual mind it has a certain external reality. Then, Lu's realization of the objective existence of external things is beyond question. Actually, Lu believes simply that the principle resides in our mind. We initiate learning from the very place of our inner mind because from the mind we can extend the principle to all things. As he describes it, "What permeates the mind, emanates from it, and what extends to fill the universe is nothing but principle."73 A conversation between him and his disciple, Li Po-mien, also corroborates this observation, although indirectly. Li asked, "There are so many things in the world. How can one study all of them?" The teacher said, "'All things are already complete in oneself.' It is necessary to understand only principle."74 This reveals either that one can find "principle" of the ten thousand things in one's mind, or that one has the cognitive power to grasp the principle often thousand things. If we take into account Lu's inner-directed approach, the first interpretation seems more plausible. To him Chu Hsi's mistake simply lies in his searching for the principle in things, not in mind. 72. Mencius, SSCC, p. 187.

73. LHCQ 34/43^

74. Ibid., 35/14^

Philosophy, philology, and politics

Thus, we can see that Chu Hsi and Lu's disagreements on cosmological problems extend to philosophical anthropology as well. Lu insists that yin and yang are "above form," as is the Great Ultimate. This, in a way, brings an ontological strength to his claim that "mind is principle." Since mind is made of yin and yang and principle is the Great Ultimate, mind and principle are above form and identical to each other. It is superfluous to use the concept hsing (nature) as Chu Hsi does to bridge the gap between mind (in Chu's case, "within form") and principle (in Chu's case, "above form"). Hence, it is understandable that Lu's former student, Fu Shun-kung, said that Lu did not like to talk about nature (hsing).75 In contrast to Lu, Chu Hsi has to insist that yin and yang belong to "within form" in support of his tenet, "Nature is principle." Mind and principle, according to Chu, belong respectively to two different categories, "above form" and "within form"; therefore they cannot be identical to each other, as Lu asserts. In sum, while I stress that Chu Hsi's philosophical anthropology is much influenced by his cosmology, particularly the concept of the vital force, I do not mean to say that Lu Hsiang-shan has no interest in cosmology at all. What I am trying to argue is that the differences in their cosmologies may be regarded as expressive of their distinct philosophical styles. One emphasizes an intellectual-analytical style; the other, an experiential-holistic style. Besides, Lu Hsiang-shan would endow the mind with more power and content than Chu Hsi would allow. Therefore, their conceptions of mind differ in an ontological sense. In this respect, Fung Yu-lan is wrong in saying that the mind in both Chu and Lu is the same.76 Lu's understanding of the mind is atemporal and universal both in endowment and potentiality. He openly proclaims, "Sages appeared tens of thousands of generations ago. They shared this mind; they shared this principle. Sages will appear tens of thousands of generations to come. They will share this mind, they will share this principle. Over the four seas sages appear. They share this mind; they share this principle."77 The mind so apprehended by him lacks a historical and cultural dimension that is immanent in Chu Hsi's understanding of mind. Chu Hsi has long been known as a great synthesizer of the doctrines of the five masters of the Northern Sung dynasty; this makes his intellectual burden much 75. CTYL, 124/4820. Also see Huang Tsung-hsi, Sung-Yuan hsueh-an, Taipei, 1975, 76. Fung Yu-lan, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh shih, p. 940; Bodde, History of Chinese Philosophy,

p. 588. 77. LHCC, 36/5b-6a.

2O

The original argument (i)

heavier than Lu's.78 Chu Hsi had to go over all the fields touched by his intellectual predecessors, to cover all the subjects in a consistent and interconnected manner. By and large, he succeeded in accomplishing this. We have seen how the concept of vital force goes through his cosmology and philosophical anthropology without any contradiction. On the contrary, Lu Hsiang-shan relied on his own learning. He confidently asserted that after Mencius, only his learning shed light on the Way.79 His knowledge had been obtained through his own reading of Mencius. Chu Hsi also once remarked that he did not know who Lu's teachers were.80 Before concluding this chapter, I would like to make some brief comments on those scholars who deal with the "Chu-Lu problematic" somewhat differently than I do. It is misleading to accuse Chu Hsi of confusing a moral discourse with an intellectual one, a charge made by Hsu Fu-kuan. The natural world, Heaven and Earth, or the cosmos is constituted by the better part of the vital force. Normatively, it provides a model for human beings to imitate or emulate. The principle is one, its manifestations are many. Even a thing as small as a blade of grass is expected to contain the principle. Basically, one is entitled to study anything in the universe in order to approach the principle. Chu Hsi believes that as a human being, one ought to understand the principles in Heaven and Earth, including the names of plants and animals.81 His conception of principle is normative in nature, but not descriptive in a modern empirical sense. In other words, principle, if true, penetrates both the natural and the human world. There is no distinction between "is" and "ought" in these two zones. Besides, after the first step is taken - that is, after a decision is made to achieve moral perfection - the relationship between the consciousness of the moral nature and the investigation of things becomes dialectical. Each effort reinforces the other and raises the relationship to a new level. Hence, the investigation of things is always morally oriented ana! enhances moral understanding, not only quantitatively but qualitatively' This idea is well expressed in Chu Hsi's postscript to the fifth chapter or The Great Learning: 78. Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism" in Francois Aubin, ed., Sung Studies, 2d series, 1 (1973), 59-90. I have some reservations about Chan's assertion that Chu Hsi set the direction of Neo-Confucian movement to philosophy of principle. 79. LHCC, io/7a. 80. CTYL, 124/4812. 81. CTYL, 119/4641. Although Heaven and Earth contain the principle in themselves, it is the sages who read the riddle of them and speak for them. CTYL, 65/2621. 21

Philosophy, philology, and politics

[ The Great Learning, at the outset of its lessons, instructs the learner, in regard to all things in the world, to proceed from what knowledge he has of their principle, and pursue his investigation of them, till he reaches the extreme point. After exerting himself in this way for a long time, he will suddenly find himself possessed of a wide and far-reaching penetration. There, the qualities of all things, whether external or internal, the subtle or the coarse, will all be apprehended, and the mind in its entire substance and its relations to things will be perfectly intelligent.82

Chu Hsi once admonished the emperor, saying that the way of learning consists in the investigation of things, and that the essence of the investigation of things lies in studying the classics.83 In theory, everything in the universe contains the principle in itself, but the essence of the principle has been embodied perfectly in the classics of the sages. The step from the investigation of things to the study of the classics is significant if one can sympathize with Chu Hsi's view that the study of the classics, owing to its particular constitution, paves the quickest way in the quest for sagehood. Chu Hsi is quite clear that "the commentaries of the classics enable us to understand the classics; after grasping the classics, the commentaries become useless. In the same way, though one understands the principle by means of the classics, after obtaining the principle, the classics become useless."84 Viewed in this light, the classics serve as the necessary means to the end of acquiring the principle in Chu Hsi's whole project. Hence, study of the classics is not off the point or peripheral to moral cultivation. The dichotomy between "is" and "ought," or between "transcendental" and "natural" often employed by modern scholars in analyzing the distinction between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan is actually drawn, consciously or unconsciously, from Western post-Kantian philosophy.85 82. Ta-hsiieh, SSCC, p. 6. James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Hong Kong, 1960, vol. 1, pp. 365-366. 83. CTWQ 14/11a. 84. CTYL, 11/365. 85. For example, Carsun Chang employs concepts such as "transcendental" and "natural" to apprehend the difference between Chu and Lu. See Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, pp. 270-275. Apart from that, I can only partially agree at his observation that Lu Hsiang-shan was merely influenced by Zen Buddhism in methodological respect. As he says: "In my opinion, Lu may be called a believer in Ch'an thought only in the methodological sense. He lived at a time while the Ch'an school flourished, and this school did regard book reading, intellectual pursuits and erudition, as being unessential, concerning on inner realization and sudden awakening for the attainment of truth. Lu could not help but be attracted and influenced by these ideas. He forsook the negative attitude towards life of the Ch'an school but kept their method, seeking the original mind. Methodologically he applied their technique by calling the mind directly to attention in the interest of moral perfection, and also for the sake of the cause of Confucianism. In this sense I am inclined to agree with Chu Hsi's verdict that Lu Chiu-yuan was a Ch'an follower. But I must enter the proviso that the applica22

The original argument (i)

We should keep this in mind when we enthusiastically seek to apply Western philosophical categories where they do not necessarily belong. Mou Tsung-san, a self-proclaimed proponent of the Lu-Wang school in contemporary China who is inspired by Kant's moral philosophy, applies Kant's conceptual scheme in an idiosyncratic fashion in order to make a distinction between Chu's and Lu's philosophy. The result is quite disappointing. His appreciation of Kant's moral philosophy is not only arbitrary, but also immature. It is arbitrary in the sense that he extracts Kant's concepts out of context and imposes them inappropriately on Chu's and Lu's concerns; it is immature in the sense that Mou does not carry his analysis to a logically consistent point. Can we really say that Chu Hsi's conception of morality is a posteriori, and Lu's a priori? Are we really justified in concluding that for Chu Hsi the relation of principle (li) to mind (hsiri) is horizontally oriented (heng-she) and static, but that for Lu Hsiang-shan is vertically oriented (tsung-kuan) and dynamic? Does Lu Hsiang-shan's moral philosophy have the character of moral autonomy, whereas Chu's does not?86 In short, Mou neither apprehends the Chu-versus-Lu problematic from an appropriate perspective nor directs our attention to the proper place in which to seek the real basis of their conflict. tion of this method of mental hygiene has nothing to do with Buddhism in general, nor with Ch'an thought as such" (p. 303). But inasmuch as the mind constitutes the major discourse for both Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan, it cannot be relegated to a technical status or minor point. Arguing with Buddhists and Taoists on the nature of mind, they based their philosophical anthropology on a redefined ground, mind. As in his reading of Yiieh-ai-lou k'e-hua, Shen Tseng-chih (1851—1922) indicates, unlike Buddhists and Taoists, who employ more than one conceptual unit in analyzing mind, Confucianists cover the same subject with a single concept, mind. See Shen Tseng-chih, Hai-jih-Um cha-ts'ung, Shanghai, 1962, p. 151. 86. Mou Tsung-san, Hsin-t'i yu hsing-t'i (Mind and human nature), Taipei, 1968, vol. 1, introduction, and idem, Ts'ungLu Hsiang-shan tao Liu Chi-shan (From Lu Hsiang-shan to Liu Chi-shan), Taipei, 1979, chs. 1 and 2. A passage of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason suffices to show how misleading Mou's understanding of Kant is: ".. . the reasons which occasion all the confusion of philosophers concerning the supreme principle of morals. For they sought an object of the will in order to make it into material and the foundation of a law;... instead, they should have looked for a law which directly determined the will a priori and only then sought the object suitable to it. Whether they placed this object of pleasure, which was to deliver the supreme concept of the good, in happiness, or in perfection, in moral feeling, or in the will of God . . . their fundamental principle was always heteronomy, and they came inevitably to empirical conditions for a moral law." Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans, by Lewis White Beck, New York, 1956, pp. 66-67. For a general critique of the use of the concept of moral autonomy in the interpretation of Chinese thought see my article, "Rethinking the Concept of Moral Autonomy in the Study of Chinese Thought" (So-wei tao-te tzu-chu-hsing), Shih-huo, 14, nos. 7-8 (November 1984), 7788. Also see my "Mencius' Theory of Four Germs and Theory of Moral Sense," Continent (Ta-lu tsa-chih), 88, no. 5 (May 1994), 1—3.

23

Philosophy, philology, and politics

T'ang Chun-i, a well-known Neo-Confucianist in modern times, approaches the Chu-versus-Lu problematic {Chu-Lu i-t'ung) from another perspective and tends to minimize the differences between the two men. In his understanding, Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan share the same ideas on fundamental questions such as moral concerns, but diverge on the method of moral cultivation {te-hsing kung-fu).87 But the distinction between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan has been commonly perceived as real and sharp by many Confucian scholars. Chang Hsueh-ch'eng's statement bears witness to this: [In terms of intellectual style and temperament] Sung Confucians such as Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan were in opposition to each other. Over the ages the difference between them could never be reconciled, nor could their differences be eradicated [because they are two fundamental, but distinct, doctrines about the Way].88 In this, I am totally in agreement with Chang. 87. T'ang Chun-i, Chung-kuo che-hsueh yiian-lun (A fundamental exposition of Chinese philosophy), Hong Kong, 1968, p. 531. 88. Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, Wenshih t'ung-i, Taipei, 1980, p. 54.

2 The original argument (2): Wang Yang-ming and the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan"

Despite their real intellectual differences, Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan, and their followers shared something in common. Their uncompromising attitude toward each other's philosophical views reflected their lack of a pluralistic conception of truth. Lu Hsiang-shan was typical of this attitude, as he proclaimed that "there can exist only one most adequate truth; never can two profound meanings hold at the same time" (chihtangkuei-i ching-i wu-erh).1 Chu Hsi welcomed various intellectual discussions (chiang-lun) as methods to achieve final truth.2 Nevertheless, Chu's pluralistic view is confined to a technical sense and does not extend to the nature of truth. For Chu believed that if Lu went through a process of fruitful discussions, Lu would eventually recognize his mistaken ideas.3 Hence, there is no significant difference between Chu and Lu in their comprehension of the nature of truth. After Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan passed away, the difference between their views was reinforced because their disciples formed cliques in support of their own master's doctrines. These groups not only continued to develop the criticisms inherited from their masters, but they also intensified the debate in a factious and divisive spirit. Huang Kan (1152-1221), the major disciple of Chu Hsi, succeeded in restraining Chu's students from conflict with Lu's students. But, after his death, conflict seemed inevitable. The label "Zen" was typically applied 1. LHCC, 35/16b.

2. C7WC, 34/343-34^

25

3. Ibid., 34/17a-17b.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

by Chu's students to attack Lu's teaching; in turn, the term chih-li (fragmented), was adopted by Lu's students to criticize Chu's scholarship. After Huang's death, and partly because of his absence, various versions of Chu's recorded conversations surfaced, all of which reinforced the discrepancies between Chu and Lu.4 On the other hand, Lu's students also established their clique seeking a distinct and outstanding reputation. Even when they read the classics, they intentionally avoided reading Chu Hsi's later annotations, thereby focusing on the earlier works and selecting among them for their own purposes. Out of partisan interest, they concentrated on the complete works of the Ch'eng brothers, and on Chou Tuni's Penetrating the Book of Changes {T'ung-shu), but avoided Reflections on Things at Hand (Ching-ssu-lu) and Chou's An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate {T'ai-chi-t'u shuo).5

Although all of these works had been edited primarily by Chu Hsi,6 the latter two were the sources with which Chu Hsi's philosophy was closely related. After the controversy had continued for some time, the Chu Hsi school became the dominant one. One of the major intellectual reasons for its ascendancy over the Lu school was that Lu Hsiang-shan himself was averse to putting his ideas into print. Moreover, because his thought was oriented toward moral teaching through personal demonstration, his school declined rapidly after the first generation of his disciples passed away. For this reason, Chu's school could take advantage of Chu Hsi's great achievement of commenting on and editing the classics in order to gain the attention of the literati and political leaders. In 1212, the Directorate of Education adopted Chu Hsi's commentaries on both the Analects and Mencius as the official doctrine. Court politics and the international crises of the day also played a role in the rise of the Chu school. In his lifetime, Chu Hsi enjoyed a reputation as a great scholar and political critic. He and his followers underwent several political purges on account of their political and intellectual stance. The term "false learning" {wei-hsueh) was intentionally employed to designate Chu's scholarship. Despite that, the Sung councillor Shih Mi-yuan (1164-1233), in order to clear his own sullied image (acquired through his struggle in court politics), turned to the school of Chu Hsi for intellectual justification of his position. He thereby confirmed the 4. Huang Tsung-hsi and Ch'uan Tsu-wang, Sung Yuan hsueh-an (Philosophical records of the Sung and Yuan Confucians), hereafter abbreviated as SYHA, Taipei, 1975, 63/21. 5. SYHA, 74/68-69. The Lu scholars read the original text of T'ung-shu, but not the version annotated by Chu Hsi. 6. Ching-ssu-lu is coedited by Chu Hsi and Lu Tsu-ch'ien.

The original argument (2)

school's leading intellectual position and restored political and social prestige to both the school and himself.7 At that time, the Mongols sought to compete with the Sung regime militarily and culturally as the Confucian empire. Because it needed an ideology for national consolidation in the face of the Mongolian invasion into Inner Mongolia, the Sung regime adopted Chu Hsi's commentaries on The Four Books in their entirety in 1227 as the official version. Before that, in 1223, the Mongols had taken the advice of Yeh-lu Ch'uts'ai (1190-1244) to honor Confucius and erect a temple for this purpose. Having conquered the Jurchen empire in 1234, the Mongols directly threatened the Southern Sung regime, which tried desperately to boost its political prestige through cultural propaganda. Chu Hsi, together with thefivemasters of the Northern Sung, was to be worshiped in the Confucian temple in 1241.8 This meant that the Southern Sung could meet the Mongol challenge on an ideological level only through their claim to represent the sole legitimate line of transmission of the true Way of Confucianism. The Sung's attempt to survive proved futile, as the regime was destroyed in 1297.9 It is worth noting that it was not the Sung emperor, but the Mongol emperor Jen-tsung of the new Yuan dynasty, who, in an edict issued in 1313, formally decreed that Chu Hsi's commentaries on The Four Books and other classics be incorporated into the syllabus of the civil service examination. The content of this syllabus was largely followed by the two successive dynasties, the Ming and Ch'ing, until 1904.10 As the "officially" approved doctrine, the Chu Hsi school enjoyed an unprecedented prestige compared with any previous school, both intellectually and politically. In some sense, this may have been a Pyrrhic victory for Chu Hsi. Most students or examination candidates read Chu's commentaries, yet this was done usually out of practical interest rather than with an aim to moral cultivation. For them, the classics and their commentaries served merely as a stepping-stone to fame and a career, which were expected from success in the examinations. Wu Yuan-ying 7. Concerning the rise of Chu Hsi's school and the political purges connected with it see James T. C. Liu, "How Did a Neo-Confucian School Become the State Orthodoxy?" Philosophy East and West, 23, no. 4 (October 1973), 485-505; Conrad Schirokauer, "Neo-Confucians under Attack: The Condemnation of Wei-hsiieh," in John Winthrop Haeger, ed., Crisis and Prosperity in Sung China, Tucson, 1975, pp. 163—198; and Hoyt Tillman, Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy, Honolulu, 1992, ch. 10. 8. T'uo T'uo, Sung-shih, Peking, 1977, 105/2554. 9. J. Liu, "Neo-Confucian School," 501—503. 10. Teng Ssu-yu, Chung-kuo k'ao-shih chih-tu shih (History of the Chinese examination system), Taipei, 1967, pp. 214-215, 245.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

(1297—1340), a Chu scholar of the Yuan period who had criticized Lu, criticized this trend as follows: In recent years, the civil service examinations have been carried out. It causes the flourishing of Chu's learning and the decay of Lu's learning. Scholars today tend to routinize their study without aspiring to moral benefit, and to analyze the texts without grasping the essential point for reflection. This further exposes the flaws in their study. I hope that they may rediscover the forgotten books of Chinhsi [Lu Hsiang-shan], thereby cleansing their spirit of the process of study to prepare for the process of moral learning.11 As a matter of fact, no matter how sharply the schools of Chu and Lu differed, during this period they still shared one thing; namely, their advocates were so disposed to abstract discourse that they neglected the practice of their learning. As expected, early Ming Neo-Confucianism, which was represented by the Chu school, reacted against this spirit by reemphasizing the critical need for the integration of practice and study. This is also the background of the emergence of Wang Yang-ming's theory of knowledge and action later in the Ming. The political climate from the end of the Sung period generally favored the development of the Chu Hsi school. This was particularly true in the Ming period. The founder of the Ming empire, T'ai-tsu, promoted the Chu Hsi school both because of his admiration for Chu's teaching (probably through the influence of one of his subjects, Sung Lien [1310—81]) and because the royal house shared the same family name with Chu Hsi. He decreed Chu Hsi's commentaries to be the criterion for the official tests. His son, the emperor Ch'eng-tsu, further ordered Hu Kuang (1370—1418) to compile A General Collection of Commentaries of the Five Classics (Wu-ching-ta-ch yuan), A General Collection of Commentaries of the Four Books (Ssu-shu-ta-ch'uari), and A General Collection of Hsing-li Learning (Hsing-li-ta-ch'uari) based on the works of the Sung and Yuan Neo-Confucians.12 Wang Wei (1322-73), a follower of the Chu school in the very beginning of the Ming period, expressed the current attitude very well: "On the whole, the achievement of Confucians is no more than the study of classics that embody the Way. To contribute to the study of classics is equal to the performance of the Way."13 11. SYHA, 65/87. 12. Chang Ting-yu, Ming Shih, 70/725. The former two collections were for the purpose of the civil office examination. Hsieh Chih-shih points out that Ming T'ai-tsu's enthusiasm to promote Chu Hsi's learning is due to their sharing the same family name. See Ch'en Teng-yuan, Kuo-shih chiu-wen, Peking, 1980, vol. 3, pp. 174—175. 13. Quoted from Jung Chao-tsu's Ming-tai ssu-hsiang shih (The history of Ming thought), Taipei, 1962, p. 9.

28

The original argument (2)

The great historical thinker Chang Hsueh-ch'eng (1738-1801) wrote these astute observations on the intellectual climate of this day: The doctrine of nature and fate [hsing-ming chih shuo] easily passes over to the idea of emptiness. Chu-tzu [Chu Hsi] seeks "one thread" [i-kuan] in erudition, and draws the essential rites from the variety of cultural expressions. The task is complex but sophisticated; its achievement is solid but difficult. It is hard even for Chu-tzu to accomplish this, not to mention others - through the fourth intellectual generation to Ch'ien-hsi [Sung Lien] and I-wu [Wang Wei], the fifth generation to Ning-jen [Ku Yen-wu] and Pai-ssu [Yen Jo-ch'u], all revere the ancients and are good at studying the classics. Their learning aims at substantial scholarship. They are definitely distinguished from those who engage in empty talk about nature and fate and behave in a dogmatic and obstinate manner.14 Ironically, regardless of the fact that the rulers enthusiastically advocated the Chu school, there was no great and intellectually innovative Chu scholar in the Ming period. We can find only certain Chu scholars known for their practice of Chu's learning. Among them, Hsiieh Hsiian (1389—1464) was probably most noted for living in accordance with Master Chu's teaching. He confidently proclaimed that "since Master Chu the Way has been manifested in brightness and there is no need for further writing. What one ought to do is simply to act on it, that is all." 15 Another Chu scholar, Wu Yii-pi (1392—1469), who committed himself to sacred learning so earnestly that he constantly dreamed of Confucius, King Wen, and Chu Hsi, paid most of his attention to the concrete details of daily activities, such as dressing, behaving, learning, and so on, with little interest in exploring their theoretical implication. 16 Professor Wing-Tsit Chan notes that the Ch'eng-Chu school in the early Ming period had already anticipated the general tendency toward the cultivation of the mind through its sole emphasis on the preservation of "seriousness" (ching), which refers to a state of mind guided by moral effort. This emphasis resulted from the inner logic of the Ch'eng-Chu school as well as other historical factors and was not influenced by the Lu Hsiang-shan school. Furthermore, there was no necessary connection between this first stage of the Ch'eng-Chu school and the later moral philosophy of Ch'en Hsien-chang (1428-1500) and Wang Yang-ming (1472—1529). 17 However, it was not the Ch'eng-Chu but rather the LuWang strain that redirected the development of Neo-Confucianism at this time. Ch'en Hsien-chang in his youth studied with the Ch'eng-Chu 14. Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, Wen-shih-t'ung-i (General meaning of historiography), Taipei, 1980, p. 56.

15. Chang Ting-yii, Ming Shih, 282/3100. 16. Jung Chao-tsu, pp. 18—23. 17. Wing-tsit Chan, "The Ch'eng-Chu School of Early Ming," in William Theodore de Bary, ed., Self and Society in Ming Thought, New York, 1970, p. 46.

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scholar Wu Yii-pi. Ch'en was unsympathetic since Wu's teaching did not appear to show Ch'en the path to the true Way. Through a long-term spiritual struggle and solitary study, Ch'en came to realize that one's own inner resource, the mind, is rich enough to experience heaven's principle (t'ien-li) and that spontaneousness is characteristic of the dynamic transformation of the universe of which human activities constitute one part.18 Ch'en's thought reveals a need for the reorientation of Neo-Confucianism. In him, we see the fundamental position of mind as the ground of being once again confirmed as the source of moral enlightenment. Later on, his favorite disciple, Chan Jo-shui (1466—1560), adopted this view to advocate "experiencing heaven's principle everywhere" (suicWu t'i-jen t'ien-li). Although Ch'en Hsien-chang himself had no immediate influence on Wang Yang-ming, his student, Chan Jo-shui, had a great deal of intellectual exchange with Wang. Wang, of course, represented the turning point of the development of Neo-Confucianism in general and the great achievement of the Neo-Confucianism of the Ming period in particular. As Huang Tsung-hsi put it: The learning of the Ming dynasty started with Ch'en Hsien-chang but did not achieve great glory until Wang Yang-ming. The reason was that scholars before them learned well the established doctrines of earlier Neo-Confucians but never returned to themselves to realize their meaning or extend them to discover their profound subtlety. As we say, this scholar merely transmitted Chu Hsi's ideas, and that scholar also merely transmitted Chu Hsi's ideas.19 In short, since the end of the Sung dynasty, the "problematic of Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" gradually developed from being purely intellectual to being complexly intertwined with social and political factors. This was the problematic that Wang Yang-ming faced. Therefore, if we set aside for the moment the existential meaning of his deeply felt quest for the true Way, Wang Yang-ming's philosophical activities might be looked upon as a response to the various aspects of the Chu Hsi school as it had developed until then. Yet in saying this we do not reduce the creativity of Wang Yang-ming's philosophical endeavor. His lifelong struggle with Chu Hsi's learning and its consequences vividly prove this point. 18. To my knowledge, the best English writing on Ch'en Hsien-chang is Jen Yu-wen's "Ch'en Hsien-chang's Philosophy of Mind," in de Bary, ed., Self and Society in Ming Thought, pp. 53-92. 19. Huang Tsung-hsi, ed., Ming-ju hsueh-an (Critical anthology of Ming Confucians), 10/ 53. The English translation is taken from Wing-tsit Chan's article in de Bary: Self and Society in Ming Thought, p. 30.

The original argument (2)

Wang Yang-ming's experience with Chu Hsi's learning is supposed to have started in his childhood, as part of his elementary education. According to his chronology (nien-p'u), it was only at the age of eighteen that Chu Hsi's teaching became a significant question for Wang. It tells us that one day on his way home, Wang Yang-ming met Lou Liang, a disciple of Wu Yii-pi, in Kuang-hsin. Lou discussed the Sung Confucians' theory of investigation of things with Wang and assured the latter that sagehood could be achieved by study.20 Although Wang's chronology does not specify whose theory of investigation of things was discussed by the two, in view of subsequent events we can be almost sure that this theory was directly related to Chu Hsi's doctrine, or that Chu's theory was one among many being posed in Lou's discussion. Three years later, Wang Yang-ming accompanied his father to the capital. While he was there he sought to read all of Chu Hsi's writings. He was impressed and inspired by Chu Hsi's idea that everything, even a blade of grass or piece of wood, contains principle. It so happened that his home was surrounded by bamboo groves, and he made up his mind to engage himself in an investigation of principle within the bamboo. After seven days, all principle seemed to evade him and he fell ill.21 His frustration led him to believe that sagehood could not be realized by cultivating merely human qualities, but was predetermined by heaven.22 Two years after that, he recognized his mistake, through his reading of Chu Hsi's memorial to the Sung emperor, Kuang-tsung. In it a statement read, "The basis of study consists in keeping a serious state of mind and in firmly persisting in the determination of the will; the method of study lies in successive steps to achieve refinement." This pointed him to the defect in his former study. Nevertheless, he could not feel that his mind and principle converged anywhere, and he once again fell ill.23 Wang Yang-ming led an eventful life in his quest for the true Way. A great misfortune befell him at the age of thirty-five. A censor, Tai Hsien, was imprisoned after leading a group in a joint memorial to the young emperor, Wu-tsung, attacking the corruption of the powerful eunuch, Liu Chin. Wang Yang-ming at once submitted a memorial attempting to defend and rescue Tai. As a result, he was sent to prison as well. Having stayed in prison for two months and suffered forty strokes of the cane in the palace, he was banished to the border area, Lung-ch'ang, in 20. Nien-p'u, in Wang Yang-ming cWuan-chi (The Complete works of Wang Yang-ming, hereafter abbreviated as WYCC), Taipei, 1978, 32/610. 21. Wang Yang-ming, Ch'uan-hsi lu (Instructions for practical living, hereafter abbreviated as CHL), annotated by Yeh Shao-chun, Taipei, 1967, p. 263. 22. Nien-p'uin WYCC, 32/611. 23. Ibid., 32/612.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

Kweichow, to become the head of a postal station. This misfortune in the end turned out to provide a spark for a series of intellectual transformations Wang underwent throughout the rest of his life. Lung-ch'ang was full of all kinds of hardship. The natives of Kweichow were hostile to outsiders and spoke a language incomprehensible to the Han people. The living conditions were felt to be very harsh by outsiders. The jungle, disease, and wild animals all presented formidable obstacles to living in comfort. Wang's servants were sick and he had to serve them and cheer them up by singing and joking. Moreover, Wang Yang-ming's personal obsession with his own long-term failure in finding access to the true Way inevitably exacerbated his anxieties. He made a stone coffin in which he slept at night, awaiting his fate and thereby transcending worries about life and death. He constantly imagined what a sage would do in his situation. One night he was struck by a mystical experience that can be described as an enlightenment because it transformed him entirely. He suddenly realized that the Way of the sage lay in one's mind, and that it was emphatically wrong to search for principle in things external to one's mind, as Chu Hsi recommended. He confirmed his recent enlightenment by his memorization of the words in The Five Classics and wrote Speculation on "The Five Classics" (Wu-ching i-shuo). The next year, he

began his examination of the unity of knowledge and action (chih-hsing ho-i).24

In his later conversation with his disciple, Hsu Ai, we can see the impact of this enlightenment. In their conversations, Wang Yang-ming called into question The Great Learning, edited by Chu Hsi. Wang thought that Chu Hsi was wrong in changing the term ch'in-min (loving the people) of the old text into hsin-min (renovating the people) in the new text.25 More important, he offered a new interpretation of the term kowu, which, as we shall see, marked the turning point in Wang Yangming's intellectual development; indeed, the interpretation itself becomes an alternative to Chu Hsi's view of the phrase. For Chu Hsi, komeant "to reach" (chihb); wumeant "everything" (shih b). Combined, ko-wu meant to reach things to obtain principle (s) from them.26 The concept of ko-wu holds a crucial position in the architecture of Chu Hsi's thought. This can be seen in his commentary on the relationship of the extension of knowledge (chih-chih) to the investiga24. Nieni>'uin WYCC, 32/614-615. 25. CHL, pp. 3-4. Following Ch'eng I, Chu Hsi changed ch 'ing-ming into hsin-ming, SSCC, Ta-hsiieh, p. 1, annotation of Chu Hsi. 26. Ssu-shu-chi-chu (hereafter, SSCC), annotated by Chu Hsi, Shanghai, 1947, Ta-hsiieh, p. 2.

32

The original argument (2) tion of things (ko-wu) in The Great Learning. T h e extension of knowledge d e p e n d s o n the investigation of things. C h u Hsi said: If we wish to carry out knowledge to the utmost, we must investigate the principles of all things we come into contact with, for the intelligent mind of man is certainly formed to know, and there is not a single thing in which its principles do not inhere. But so long as all principles are not investigated, man's knowledge is incomplete. On this account, The Great Learning, at the outset of its lessons, instructs the learner, in regard to all things in the world, to proceed from what knowledge he has of their principles, and pursue his investigation of them, till he reaches the extreme point. After exerting himself in this way for a long time, he will suddenly find himself possessed of a wide and far-reaching penetration. Then, the qualities of all things, whether external or internal, the subtle or the coarse, will all be apprehended, and the mind, in its entire substance and its relations to things, will be perfectly intelligent. 27 T o b e sure, in C h u Hsi's view, principle is i m m a n e n t in m i n d , b u t it requires intellectual effort for its manifestation. Before that, m i n d a n d principle are separate "in o u r feeling"; after that m i n d a n d principle are u n i t e d into one. 2 8 T h e ontological status of external things is recognized in C h u Hsi's t h o u g h t because of his c o m m i t m e n t to the c o n c e p t of ch'i. T o achieve the unity of m i n d a n d principle is a long a n d precarious process that c a n n o t b e c o m p l e t e d all at o n c e , in a flash of moral enlighte n m e n t , as W a n g Yang-ming asserted. In fact, the a b r u p t transformation of o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of principle in its entirety is also anticipated by C h u Hsi. This qualitative c h a n g e is b r o u g h t only by m e a n s of, a n d subsequent to, the quantitative accumulation of knowledge. But C h u Hsi does n o t clearly specify how or w h e n this stage can b e attained. In response to these questions W a n g Yang-ming p r o p o s e d a new a p p r o a c h , having b e e n disappointed with C h u Hsi's project. For W a n g Yang-ming after his e n l i g h t e n m e n t , ko m e a n t to "rectify" in accordance with Mencius's use of ko, w h e r e the great m a n rectified (ko) the ruler's mind; 2 9 wu m e a n t "affairs in o n e ' s mind"; ko-wu m e a n t "to rectify affairs in o n e ' s own m i n d " accordingly. T h e p r o c e d u r e of ko-wu, in Wang's a p p r o a c h , is to eliminate what is incorrect in the m i n d so as to preserve the correctness of its original substance. 3 0 T h e investigation of things of this kind, according to Wang, b e c o m e s inner-directed a n d appears to b e m o r e explicitly moralistic in n a t u r e . In this, h e is in a g r e e m e n t with Lu Hsiang-shan in thinking that "mind is principle." 3 1 In addition, h e h e l d that n e i t h e r principle n o r affairs are outside o n e ' s m i n d . As h e described it, "The master of the body is the 27. Ibid., p. 6. James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Hong Kong, i960, vol. 1, pp. 365-366. 28. CTWQ 10/12a-b. 29. CHL, p. 15; SSCC, Mentius, p. 107. 30. CHL, p. 15. 31. Ibid., p. 6.

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mind. What emanates from the mind is the will [i]. The original substance of the will is knowledge [chih], and wherever the will is directed is a thing."32 Through such a redefinition of what counts as a "thing," the intentionality of the human mind becomes the leading factor in deciding the meaningfulness of a thing for human practice. For instance, when the will is directed toward serving one's parents, then serving one's parents constitutes a thing, and when the will is directed toward seeing, hearing, speaking, and acting, then each of these constitutes a thing. Fundamentally, Wang Yang-ming relates this conception of a thing to his program of moral cultivation, not intending to negate the existence of external things. The following saying of his confirms this: The eye has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the colors of all things. The ear has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the sounds of all things. The nose has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the smell of all things. The mouth has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the tastes of all things. The mind has no substance of its own. Its substance consists of the right or wrong of the influence and responses of Heaven, Earth, and all things.33 Wang is least concerned with whether we can know the existence of things objectively; rather, he is interested in locating the relatedness of the mind to things in a philosophy of value, and thereby, in the possibility of enhancing moral action. Wang Yang-ming no doubt shares the common consciousness of NeoConfucians in accepting the idea of "forming one body with all things."34 Men are supposed to recognize this given "fact" through the function of the mind as pure intelligence. For Wang Yang-ming, the epistemological possibility of knowing "the unity of all things" is warranted by their ontological homogeneity - all things come from the same source, ch'L55 But the concrete and distinct shape of each thing forms an "epistemological break" among things. Therefore, it needs the clear intelligence of the human mind to recover the union of all things in their original participation of the same ch 'i. The following statement firmly supports this analysis: 32. CHL, p. 15. English translation is taken from Wing-tsit Chan's Instructions for Practical Living and other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming (New York, 1964), p. 14. 33. CHL, pp. 235—236; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 223. 34. The common theme in Neo-Confucianism is to "form one body with all things." See Ch'ein Mu, Yang-ming-hsueh shu-yao (The essential analysis of Yang-ming learning), Taipei, 1955. As for Wang Yang-ming himself, see CHL, pp. 272—273, and WYCC, 2 6 / 469-474. 35. CHL, p. 273.

34

The original argument (2)

All that fills Heaven and Earth is but this clear intelligence (ling-ming). It is only because of their physical forms and bodies that men are separated. My clear intelligence is the master of Heaven and Earth and spiritual things. - Separated from my clear intelligence, there will be no Heaven, Earth, spiritual beings or myriad things, and separated from these, there will not be my clear intelligence.36

The major point Wang wants to make here is that the "unity of all things" is manifested in its most refined and excellent form in the clear intelligence of the human mind, though the human mind and the external world are meaningless in themselves. In other words, only in relation to the mind do things obtain their meaning in the network of human practice. Wang Yang-ming extends this doctrine into a more explicit moral zone. He claims that the innate knowledge of the good (liang-chih) is the same as that of plants, trees, stones, Heaven, and Earth. Without this innate knowledge inherent in man, nothing can exist.37 This reveals that Wang's epistemology is intimately related to moral concerns. Or more abstractly speaking, Wang's espitemological approach is morally relevant to an ontology that is also moral in character. The next step in his response to Chu Hsi is the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action. The relationship between knowledge (chih) and action (hsing) had been a perennial subject of inquiry since the time of Confucius. In support of this, a couple of examples may suffice. A gentleman, Confucius said, is ashamed that his words exceed his deeds;38 in another place he said that the man of perfect virtue is cautious and slow in his words lest he should be unable to keep them.39 Both utterances reveal the Master's deep concern with the correspondence of words and action as a norm for a gentleman. If we take "words" (yen) here as meaning a kind of moral knowledge in an explicit oral expression, then the relation of knowledge to action is pressing in Confucius's moral project. Moreover, as shown in his discussion of "six words and six becloudings,"40 Confucius also discerned that learning (hsiieh) as a form of acquiring knowledge is an indispensable element for adequate moral 36. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 257. 37. CHL, p. 234. 38. SSCC, Lun-yii, p. 101. 39. Ibid., p. 24. 40. Ibid., p. 121. Confucius said, "There is the love of being benevolent without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to a foolish simplicity. There is the love of knowing without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to dissipation of mind. There is the love of being sincere without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to an injurious disregard of consequences. There is the love of straightforwardness without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to rudeness. There is the love of boldness without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to insubordination. There is the love of firmness without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to extravagant conduct." Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 322.

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action in a concrete situation. In such a way, the importance of learning or knowledge is well recognized in the process of moral action. Chu Hsi further put knowledge prior to action. He believed that knowledge and action are complementary. In terms of chronological priority, knowledge comes first; but action is more important.41 Even his intellectual adversary, Lu Hsiang-shan, shared this point with Chu Hsi, admitting that knowledge serves as an intellectual guide for and is prior to action; otherwise, action will become blind action that goes nowhere.42 Both Chu and Lu placed a heavy emphasis on the necessity of acting following knowing. They deeply believed that the true knowledge should be a kind of knowledge rilled with personal practice in one's lived experience. Wang Yang-ming, through his new conceptualization of knowledge and action, caused a revolutionary change in perception of their interrelationship. Wang held that "knowledge is the direction for action and action the effort of knowledge," and that "knowledge is the beginning of action and action the completion of knowledge."43 Knowledge and action so conceived form an inseparable continuum and are identical to each other. Although he made such a strong assertion about the unity of knowledge and action, Wang left room for the legitimacy of theoretical practice. Wang Yang-ming was dissatisfied with earlier scholars who regarded study and reflection as merely belonging to the realm of knowledge, while earnest action was assigned to the realm of action. Contrary to this view, Wang held that if one devotes oneself to substantial study and speculation, these sorts of activities count as action as well. "In its intelligent, conscious, and discerning aspects, action is knowledge. In its genuine, concrete, and practical aspect, knowledge is action," Wang said.44 To be clearly aware of what is, and to do concretely what is, share equal weight in his doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action. These two items are not two sequential steps, but take place simultaneously in the practice of moral cultivation. Wang's conception of the unity of knowledge and action was by no means self-evident to his disciples. To take one example: having heard Wang's theory, Hsu Ai was puzzled that someone could indeed understand the concept of filial piety but not observe it. Wang Yang-ming responded by pointing out that the discrepancy of knowledge and action 41. CTYL, 9/1 a. 42. Lu Hsiang-shan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi (Complete works of Lu Hsiang-shan), 1823, punctuated by Li Fu. i2/6a-6b, 34/1 ob, 39b. 43. CHL, p. 11. Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 11. 44. WYCC, 6/38. Julia Ching, trans., The Philosophical Letters of Wang Yang-ming Columbia,

1973, p. 106.

36

The original argument (2)

in such a case was mediated by selfish desires; they were no longer knowledge and action in their original sense. In order to show the true nature of his conception of knowledge and action, Wang Yang-ming gave the example of sensory behavior, such as loving beautiful colors and hating bad odors, in which knowledge and action are performed simultaneously.45 But the distinction between sensory and moral knowledge was well perceived long ago even by Confucius, who once sighed that he had not seen one who loved virtue as much as he loved beauty.46 Still, the Master urged that a gentleman ought to bring (moral) knowledge and action into strict correspondence. "Ought," however, is not equal to a fact. Some element has to be introduced between them to bridge the gap. To put in another way, if Wang Yang-ming's unity of knowledge and action can hold, there must exist some interlocking chain to connect them tightly. Wang's solution to this is the introduction of the concept i, which if read in a motivational sense meant the will or intention, and if read in reference to an individual act meant simply an intent toward an event or an object. This missing link was generally overlooked by Wang's later disciples, especially the left-wing Wang school, in comprehending the unity of knowledge and action, but was taken up and emphasized by Liu Tsung-chou in his own philosophy of action.47 It is no accident that Wang Yang-ming insisted that the procedure of the Great Learning begins with "making the will sincere" (ch'eng-i) rather than with "investigating things" {ko-wu)y as Chu Hsi had done. For Wang, the essence of the Great Learning consists in the sincerity of the will alone (chih-shih-ch'eng-i).48 Even political and social matters fundamentally rely upon personal cultivation (hsiu-sheri), whose realization in turn depends on the sincerity of the will.49 The distinction between a real gentleman and a mean person is that the former can make his will sincere, whereas the latter cannot.50 The parallel between "the will" and "knowledge" and "sincerity of the will" and "action" can be seen in Wang Yang-ming's observation, When the will desires to care for the comfort of parents in both winter and summer, and to serve and support them, the will exists but not yet the sincerity of the will. Before the will can be said to be sincere, there must be the actual 45. CHL, pp. 9-10. 46. SSCC, Lun-Yii, p. 59. 47. As for Liu Tsung-chou, see Tang Chiin-i's "Liu Tsung-chou's Doctrine of Moral Mind and Practice and His Critique of Wang Yang-ming," in William Theodore de Bary, ed., The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism, New York, 1975, pp. 305—332. 48. WYCC, 7/58. 49. Wang Yang-ming, Ta-hsiieh ku-pen p'ang-shih (The annotations of the Old Text of The Great Learning), in Pai-ling-hsueh-shan anthology, Shanghai, n.d., pp. lb, 2b. See Wang's annotations. 50. Ibid., p. 2. See Wang's annotation.

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practice of caring for their comfort and of serving and supporting them until one is satisfied and has not self-deception.51 It is reasonable to argue that only with such an emphasis on the sincerity of the will can Wang Yang-ming legitimately claim that "knowledge in its genuine and earnest aspect is action, and action in its intelligent and discriminating aspect is knowledge."52 In a letter written in his later days (1525?) in reply to Ku Tung-ch'iao (1476-1545), Wang Yang-ming confirmed his belief in the doctrine of the sincerity of the will as the first principle of Confucianism in teaching people to exert moral effort, which was inadequately understood and relegated to secondary importance by later scholars. His goal of advocating the importance of the sincerity of the will was to cure the defects of his time, in which scholars searched for the external and neglected the internal, thus emphasizing breadth over essentials.53 But Wang Yang-ming was well aware that the will or an intent is not necessarily good. He said, "What arises from the will may be good or evil, and unless there is a way to make clear the distinction between good and evil, there will be a confusion of truth and untruth. In that case, even if one clearly wants to make his will sincere he cannot do so."54 Therefore, the way of making the will sincere consists in extending knowledge. But knowledge is not necessarily good, either. As Wang noted: The original substance of the mind is correct. How is it that any effort is required to rectify the mind? The reason is that, while the original substance is originally correct, incorrectness enters when one's thoughts and will are in operation. Therefore he who wishes to rectify his mind must rectify it in connection with the operation of his thoughts and will.55 For example, whenever one has a good idea, one really loves it as he loves beautiful colors, and whenever one has an evil idea, one hates it as he hates bad odors. But what causes one to love the good and hate the evil? Is it not the differentiating feeling of the mind to tell the correct from the incorrect? This brings to light why Wang Yang-ming was particularly drawn to the differentiating function of the mind, and put an unusual emphasis on it. His final doctrine couched in the famous Four Statements confirms this very well. It reads: In the substance of the mind there is no distinction of good and evil. When the will becomes active, however, such distinction exists. The faculty of innate knowl51. 52. 54. 55.

CHL, pp. 118—119; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 106. CHL, p. 108; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 93. 53. CHL, p. 105. WYCC, 26/472; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 278. WYCC, 26/472; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 277.

The original argument (2)

edge is to know good and evil. The investigation of things is to do good and remove evil.56 The differentiating feeling, together with the other three feelings, constitutes the four moral germs inherent in the mind. This doctrine was initially elaborated by Mencius.57 But in Wang Yang-ming's moral philosophy, this feeling stands out as a unique intellectual and moral power to begin moral cultivation so as to meet the need that derives from his whole moral program as already discussed. Hence, we can understand why he said that innate knowledge of the good is the feeling of differentiating the correct from the incorrect (shih-fei chih-hsin) .58 This, in a sense, provides an ontological basis for his former theory of ko-wu, which means "to rectify the affairs in the mind." This knowledge is given to man by Heaven. Man knows it without thinking and without learning. Although the innate knowledge does not come from hearing and seeing, it constitutes the substance of the mind in a state of sensitivity and perceptiveness. To extend knowledge, according to Wang Yang-ming, does not mean to enrich knowledge of the principle of individual things, as Chu Hsi held, but to extend the innate knowledge of the good.59 By this approach alone, the innate knowledge can be extended to reach and endow everything with principle. The mind and principle so conceived are from their very beginning identical. This can cancel Chu Hsi's approach of investigating things, an approach that divides mind and principle. Wang Yang-ming's belief that "innate knowledge does not come from hearing and seeing"60 is in the same vein as Ch'eng I's comprehension of moral knowledge. Cheng I also held that the knowledge obtained from moral nature does not depend on seeing and hearing.61 This idea can be traced back to Mencius.62 The priority of moral knowledge is recognized by all of them, but Wang Yang-ming has a clear conception of the relationship between innate knowledge and perceptive knowledge. In his view, perceptive knowledge is a function of innate knowledge and is subsumed by innate knowledge when in operation. The extension of innate knowledge must be seen in one's interactions with other things and people. Innate knowledge is neither impeded by perceptive 56. 57. 59. 61.

CHL, p. 243; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 258. SSCC, Mencius, pp. 46-47, 161. 58. CHL, pp. 124, 241-242. WYCC, 226/472. 60. CHL, p. 158. Erh-Ch'eng ch'uan-shu (Complete works of the two Ch'engs), hereafter abbreviated as ECCS), 1908. 25/26; translation from Wing-tsit Chan's Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton, NJ., 1973, p. 570; and CTWC, 64/29a. 62. SSCC, Mencius, p. 192.

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knowledge nor separated from it. The key point is whether one's basic idea is to engage in the extension of innate knowledge. If so, then however much one may hear or see, it all belongs to the task of the extension of innate knowledge.63 Even participation in the civil service examination is included if one really feels it relevant to the task of the extension of the innate knowledge.64 "For in one's daily life," Wang said, "although there is an infinite variety of experience and dealings with others, there is nothing that is not functioning and operation of innate knowledge."65 In other words, without actual interactions with others in reality, there will be no innate knowledge to be extended at all. His famous practical instruction for moral effort, that "one must be trained and polished in the actual affairs of life" (shih-shang-mo-lien), can be adequately grasped in this context.66 Therefore, the innate knowledge of the good, when in operation, must have its "object" to act on, otherwise it will become void and aimless. This is why the extension of the innate knowledge of the good must consist of the rectification of things. A thing is an event to which the will is directed. An event is what the will issues from the mind. What Chu Hsi calls "to investigate" is to rectify. To rectify what is incorrect in the mind is to return to the original substance of the mind. So through his creative interpretation, Wang reverses Chu Hsi's statement, "The extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things (ko-wu)" into "The rectification of things (ko-wu) lies in the extension of knowledge." Looked at from this perspective, the extension of innate knowledge of the good appearing in the thought of the later Wang Yang-ming is just a logical conclusion to his previous theories concerning ko-wu and the unity of knowledge and action. All of these three theories draw upon the great potential of the mind as their source. In the logical structure of these three theories, innate knowledge as moral instinct serves as the ontological basis and starting point for Wang's proposed moral cultivation. When it is sincere, this innate knowledge gets rid of human desires and follows Heaven's principle. This is equal to the will to be good and the courage to see good practiced. Hence, the initial condition of the unity of "knowledge" and "action" is a decision to be sincere to our moral knowledge, especially by its dictates in the primordial state of moral instinct. In sum, the will (to be good) as a link enables Wang Yangming to unite knowledge and action. But only after Wang Yang-ming came out with the idea of the extension of the innate knowledge did this 63. CHL, pp. 158-159. 64. Ibid., p. 215. 65. Ibid., p. 159; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 151. 40

66. CHL, pp. 31, 196.

The original argument (2) unity obtain its c o m p l e t e a n d powerful justification. In e x t e n d i n g the innate knowledge o n e realizes the unity of knowledge a n d action. By a n d large, o n e can safely j u d g e that the t h o u g h t of W a n g Yangm i n g in its m a t u r e form is in a g r e e m e n t with that of Lu Hsiang-shan. But the closeness of their t h o u g h t does n o t imply a causal relation. Rather, this similarity is unexpectedly achieved by each o n e ' s lived experience. W a n g Yang-ming asserted that his learning sprang from "a h u n d r e d deaths a n d a t h o u s a n d sufferings" (ch'ien-ssu pai-nan). This echoes Lu Hsiang-shan's claim that his words were all s p o n t a n e o u s a n d his learning based o n his own r e a d i n g of Mencius.67 T h e message h e r e is clear: true knowledge is p e n e t r a t e d by personal subjectivity. But W a n g Yang-ming was well aware of his differences with Lu Hsiangshan. After having praised Lu's views as second to n o n e after C h o u Tun-i a n d C h ' e n g H a o in answer to a student's question a b o u t Lu's scholarship, W a n g c o n c l u d e d that Lu's doctrine was somewhat rough. 6 8 T h e defects of Lu's learning were later (in 1521) m o r e concretely expressed by W a n g in a letter to Hsi Yuan-shan, an a d m i r e r of Lu: The teaching of [Lu] Hsiang-shan is simple and direct. In this he ranks only after Mencius. While his theories about study, inquiry, reflection and discernment, about the extension of knowledge and the investigation of things, are not free from [conformity to] convention, his basic insights are definitely far beyond what the other philosophers can hope to have.69 Elsewhere W a n g also criticized Lu for h o l d i n g mistaken views r e g a r d i n g the relation between knowledge a n d action. 7 0 H e was clearly conscious of the g a p between knowledge a n d action a m o n g c o n t e m p o r a r y scholars. H e criticized t h e m by saying that "the Way is n o t manifested because we only speak it with o u r m o u t h s b u t d o n o t m a k e it seen in o u r behavior. People enjoy the rhetoric of morality b u t are u n a b l e to act. T h e only r e m e d y is the resolve to b e sincere (li-ch'eng) ."71 T h e separation of knowle d g e from action a m o n g c o n t e m p o r a r y scholars was Wang's central p r e o c c u p a t i o n . In sharp contrast to others, W a n g Yang-ming h a d determ i n e d to achieve sagehood at a very early age. H e acted o n what h e knew a n d what h e believed. Several examples should suffice to prove this. His early c o m m i t m e n t to the quest for sagehood was revealed at the age of eleven, w h e n h e asked his teacher what the most i m p o r t a n t thing in the world was. "Only to study a n d pass t h e civil service examination," answered the teacher. W a n g was skeptical a n d replied, "I a m afraid that to pass the civil service examinations is n o t the most i m p o r t a n t thing, b u t 67. LHCC, 34/ga, 35/57^ 68. CHL, p. 196. 69. WYCC, 5/21; Ching, trans., Philosophical Letters of Wang Yang-ming, p. 56. 70. WYCC, 6/38. 71. Ibid., 5/21.

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Philosophy, philology, and politics

rather to study and become a sage."72 Later influenced by Chu Hsi's writings, he investigated the bamboo until he became ill; he made a bold protest against a powerful eunuch; his intellectual preoccupations were so consuming that he even forgot his wedding date. He was well qualified to proclaim that his learning sprang from "a hundred deaths and a thousand sufferings."73 Indeed, his life displays an existential dimension by which we can apprehend the unity of knowledge and action.74 Hence, although Wang Yang-ming shares the first premise, "Mind is principle," with Lu Hsiang-shan, their doctrine concerning the extension of innate knowledge is very different. For Lu Hsiang-shan, the extension of innate knowledge is precisely the process that initiates moral cultivation. He criticized Chu Hsi for heresy because in his opinion Chu Hsi deviated from this right path to moral perfection. Beyond this, Wang Yang-ming was extremely concerned with the imperative need of immediate moral action. He did not agree with Lu Hsiang-shan that moral perfection was achieved by incessant accumulation of moral effort. Instead, he believed that each moral action was qualitatively and therefore ontologically equal to moral perfection.75 However, his real conflicts were with Chu Hsi. After all, Lu and Wang shared the first principle, "Mind is principle." Chu Hsi's and Wang Yang-ming's different ultimate commitment can be briefly shown in their comments on the term chih-shan (the highest excellence) - the final goal of the Great Learning. For Chu Hsi, chih-shan meant "the ultimacy of principle of affairs" (shih-li tang-jen chih chih) ;76 for Wang Yang-ming, it meant "the substance of the mind" (hsin chih pent'i).77 In other words, the final concern for Chu is the attainment of principle in its fullness; for Wang, it is the fulfillment of the substance of the mind. Both express their philosophical views through interpreting The Great Learning. What concerns us here is their own doctrine rather than whether their interpretations are faithful to the original meaning of The Great Learning.

In annotating The Great Learning Wang Yang-ming accomplishes two things at once. First, he shows that "making the will sincere" is the touchstone of the Great Learning and constitutes the core of moral effort. Second, he attacks Chu Hsi's doctrine through his commentaries. As Wang held, the essence of the Great Learning is simply "the sincerity of the will," and the effect of the sincerity of the will is nothing more than 72. Nien-p'u in WYCC, 32/610. 73. Ibid., 33/648. 74. Cf. Tu Wei-ming, Neo-Confudan Thought in Action: Wang Yang-ming's Youth (14721509), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976, pp. 172-176. 75. MJHA, 12/4. 76. SSCC, Ta-hsiieh, p. 1. 77. Wang Yang-ming, Ta-hsiieh ku-fen p'ang-shih, pp. 1, 78. WYCC, 7/58.

42

The original argument (2) "the rectification of mind" (ko-mu).78 Chu Hsi, following Ch'eng I, held that the two maxims, "Self-cultivation requires seriousness," and ' T h e pursuit of learning depends on the extension of knowledge," combine the inner and external approaches of moral effort. 79 Now, through Wang Yang-ming's particular interpretation of ko-wu as "rectification of affairs in the mind," the first maxim is assimilated into the second. The concept of seriousness (ching) entertained by Chu Hsi as the inward process of moral cultivation turns out to be superfluous. 80 T h e strain of a holistic-experiential approach is characteristic of Wang Yang-ming's thought. His conception of the innate knowledge of the good illustrates this perfectly. "The equilibrium of the not-yetactualized" Wang said, "is innate knowledge. It is neither before nor after any state of the mind and is neither internal nor external, but is one substance without differentiation." 81 Wang continued to describe its nature as follows: Activity and tranquillity may refer to the mind's engaging in something or nothing, but innate knowledge makes no distinction between doing something and doing nothing. Activity or tranquillity may also refer to the state of being absolutely quiet and that of being acted upon and penetrating things, but innate knowledge does not make any distinction between such states.82 Here, Wang Yang-ming actually applied his description of heaven's principle to that of innate knowledge. In doing so, his thinking employed syllogistic reasoning. First, he believed that innate knowledge is the substance of the mind, 83 second, that the substance of the mind is Heaven's principle. 84 Following there two premises, it can be concluded that the innate knowledge in our mind is the so-called Heaven's principle, which is single and indivisible and cannot be brought about by thinking or deliberation. 85 In this way, Wang Yang-ming blurred Chu Hsi's proposed demarcation between the two states of the mind: the actualized and the not yet actualized (i-fa and wei-fa). In Wang's view, the state of not yet actualized is in the state of the actualized. But in this state (of the actualized) there is n o other state as the not yet actualized. Likewise, the state of the actualized is in the state of the not yet actualized. But in this state (of the not yet actualized), there is not a separate state as the actualized. Both are not without activity or tranquillity and cannot be separately characterized as active or tranquil. They are identical. 86 79. ECCS, 18/76. 80. WYCC, 7/58. 81. CHL, p. 146. 82. Ibid., p. 146; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 136. 83. CHL, p. 142. 84. Ibid., p. 137. 85. Ibid., p. 113. 86. Ibid., p. 147.

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Philosophy, philology, and politics

Moreover, Wang Yang-ming's attitude toward the classics differs from Chu Hsi's, and resembles that of Lu Hsiang-shan. The Six Classics, Wang said, are the records of our mind. The substance of The Six Classics resides in our mind. But the vulgar scholars do not search for the substance of The Six Classics in our inner mind; instead, they seek it superficially in their literal meaning. The defect is like the members of a once-rich family who hear the figures of their former property, yet have lost it.87 Wang's independent spirit was explicitly expressed in the letter to Lo Ch'in-shun (1465-1547) in which he said, "The important thing in learning is to acquire learning through the exercise of the mind. If words are examined in the mind and found to be wrong, although they have come from the mouth of Confucius, I dare not accept them as correct. How much less those from people inferior to Confucius." 88 Wang Yang-ming attempted in this letter to justify his restoring the old text of The Great Learning, which had been rearranged by Chu Hsi and for a long time had become a standard text. The other point made by Wang in the letter already mentioned was to meet Lo Ch'in-shun's criticisms of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life (Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun). Wang's motive for compiling this anthology was to soften the psychological tension between his commitment to his own doctrine and his early intellectual indebtedness to Chu Hsi. Wang wrote, All my life Chu Hsi's doctrine has been to me a revelation as from the gods. In my heart I cannot bear suddenly to oppose him. Therefore it was because I could not help it that I did it. Those who know me say that my heart is grieved but those who do not know me say that I am after something. The fact is that in my own heart I cannot bear to contradict Master Chu, but I cannot help contradicting him because the Way is what it is and the Way will not be fully evident if I do not correct him.89 Here Wang Yang-ming reveals two conflicting commitments: One is the Way and the other is to Chu Hsi's doctrine as his early intellectual inspiration. For Wang, the Way is public and belongs to the whole world. No one is allowed to monopolize it privately, even Chu Hsi and Confucius. To learn is to acquire the Way. We learn and respect the sages because they transmit the true Way. If they did not fulfill this mission, we should seek direct access to the Way rather than blindly observe their doctrines. It is the Way that demands our devotion, not the sages or authorities. Two lines in his poem, On Immortality (ch 'ang-sheri), convey 87. WYCC, 7/66. 88. CHL, p. 167; Chan, Instructions far Practical Living, p. 159. 89. CHL, p. 171; Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, p. 164.

44

The original argument (2)

this spirit perfectly. They read, "The thousand sages pass as shadows/the innate knowledge alone is my master."90 Wang Yang-ming thought that although he deviated from Chu Hsi's teaching, Chu Hsi as an authentic scholar would rejoice in his finding of the true Way because only the Way was worth dedicating one's life to.91 But as a matter of fact, the image of Chu Hsi looms large in Wang's mind. The psychological pressures on Wang are real and enduring and spring from two sources. The first and major one is personal - a tension between his doctrine and his former intellectual relation with Chu Hsi's teaching. The second is social and political. Wang was living in a world overwhelmed by the influence of Chu Hsi's scholarship among the ruling circles. Therefore, Wang's underlying intention can be seen in his effort to show that his doctrine in the last analysis is compatible with the thought of the aging Chu Hsi. But the anachronism Wang committed in dating Chu Hsi's letters invited immediate criticism from Lo Chin-shun, the greatest Ch'eng-Chu scholar in the Ming period. Wang Yang-ming himself was not interested in carrying forward the debate between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan (at least not in a factional spirit). Rather, he had much more interest in developing his own doctrine. When he was asked by Hsi Yuan-shan in 1509 about the debate concerning the similarities and differences between Chu and Lu, he replied by stating his newly obtained doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action.92 Indeed, Wang Yang-ming wrote a preface for the republication of Lu Hsiang-shan's work;93 he also ordered the local official in Lu's native place to take special care of Lu's descendants by exempting them from labor service and awarding them scholarships.94 But he was no less critical of Lu Hsiang-shan than he was of Chu Hsi on the problem of the investigation of things and the relation of knowledge and action. In Wang's view, both held mistaken ideas on these questions. In addition, Wang, unlike the previous scholars, disagreed in the use of tao-wen-hsueh (intellectual pursuit) and tsun-te-hsing (honoring the moral nature) to divide Chu Hsi's and Lu Hsiang-shan's learning. To make this division signified an inadequate understanding of their scholarship and concerns.95 Compared to other scholars, Wang's understanding and evaluation of Chu and Lu did more justice to both of them. Hence in order to have a comprehensive picture of the complicated reaction of Wang Yang-ming to Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan, we need to take account of Wang's sympathy with Lu's learning, which had fallen into oblivion in Wang's day. Apart from a relatively intellectual closeness 90. WYCQ 20/387. 91. CHL, p. 171. 92. Nien-p'uin WYCC, 33/615. 93. WYCQ 7/59. 94. Ibid., 17/274. 95. Ibid., 21/394-395.

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Philosophy, philology, and politics

between him and Lu, Wang Yang-ming's justification for Lu's teaching represented a mixture of moral and psychological factors. As Wang said: I dare to risk the attacks of the whole world to highlight Hsiang-shan's teaching. For this, I would have no regret even if I offend others. Chu Hsi's teaching has brought me a great deal of benefit. Is it possible for us to rebel against him without regard to his favors? The fact is that the doctrine of Chu Hsi has been manifested to the world like the sun and the stars, while the doctrine of Lu Hsiang-shan still receives the fabricated slanders which it has for four hundred years, and no one ever says a word for him. Chu Hsi would not be comfortable in the Confucian temple for a single day if he knew this.96 Conveyed here is a sense of righteous defense of Lu in a climate of hostility toward him brought about by the domination of the Chu school as a result of long years of scholarly and official support. From a historical point of view, Wang Yang-ming's compilation of Chu Hsi's correspondence unintentionally triggered a long debate and thereby enriched the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan." This debate found its culmination in the thought of Li Fu, to whom we shall turn following an analysis of the critical tradition of Confucianism that was shared by both the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools. 96. WYCC, 21/395.

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3 The critical dimension in the Confucian mode of thinking The conception of the Way as the basis for criticism of the political establishment

In his publications, Professor Ying-shih Yii explores the significance of the "philosophical breakthrough" of Chinese intellectual development since the time of Confucius. One crucial point elucidated by Professor Yu is that a tension between the tradition of the Way and the political establishment had emerged because of the breakdown of feudalism during the Eastern Chou. In the Western Chou, ritual and music in themselves were thought to embody the Way. But as feudalism declined, the practice of ritual and music began to decline along with the political system that fostered them. Knowledge needed to implement ritual and musical practices, which was previously in the hands of central political authorities (then, supposedly the Chou family) shifted to newly rising private scholars. It was Confucius (551—479 B.C.) who associated the newly emerging intellectual group with the great mission to inherit and defend the Way (tao). Devoted and committed to preserving and reviving the cultural tradition, Confucius redefined the term "intellectual" {shih). Confucius divested shih of its former social and political designation within a feudalistic structure as the lowest class of noblemen. At the same time, he gave the term shih in its relation to the Way a new meaning: the bearer of the Way.1 1. Yu Ying-shih, "Ku-tai chih-shih chieh-tseng ti hsing-ch'i yu fa-chan" (The rise and development of the class of the intellectuals in ancient China) in his Chung-kuo chih-shih chieh-tseng shih-lun, ku-tai p 'ien (A historical survey of the Chinese intellectual class, the ancient period), Taipei, 1980, pp. 1-108. Also see his "Tao-t'ung yii cheng-t'ung chih chien" (Between tao-t'ung and cheng-t'ung), in his Shih-hsueh yu ch'uan-t'ung (History and tradition), Taipei, 1982, pp. 30-70.

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Philosophy, philology, and politics

From then on, the ideal intellectual (shih) or gentleman (chiin-tzu) was expected to embody the Way - to speak for it and act on it. Thus, for the intellectuals, there appeared a new criterion of political and moral conduct. According to Confucius, "A gentleman, in his plans, thinks of the Way; he does not think how he is going to make a living. Even farming sometimes entails a time of shortage; and even learning may incidentally lead to high pay. But a gentleman's anxieties concern the progress of the Way; he has no anxiety concerning poverty." 2 Clearly, Confucius thought the primary duty of an intellectual to be the quest for the Way. This meant that if one was solely concerned with material reward, he would not be able to justify his role in any true sense as an intellectual. Confucius despised those who set their mind on truth but were ashamed of bad clothes and bad food. Exemplifying this mode of being, Confucius expected himself to be "a man hearing the Way in the morning, dying in the evening without regret." 3 His authentic commitment to the Way provided a paradigm for the intellectuals who followed him. His disciple, Tseng-tzu, took this idea to its logical conclusion: An intellectual [shih] may not be without breadth of mind and vigorous endurance. His burden is heavy and his course is long. Perfect virtue is the burden which he considers it is his to sustain; is it not heavy? Only with death does his course stop; is it not long?4 Similarly, Mencius envisioned an intellectual to be one who even in dire economic straits could maintain a fixed heart; nonetheless, Mencius was well aware that for the people, moral cultivation was possible only if they were provided with the means of subsistence. 5 The concept of individual as intellectual became idealized to such an extent that he was expected to be a perfectly moral and versatile man. Confucius created this standard for an intellectual: "Let the will be set on the Way. Let every attainment in what is good be firmly grasped. Let perfect virtue be accorded with. Let relaxation and enjoyment be found in the arts."6 If the feudalistic states were no longer believed to combine political power and the Way, then the relationship between the political establish2. SSCC, Lun-yii, Shanghai, 1947. p. 111. Arthur Waley, trans., Analects of Confucius,

London, 1949, p. 199. 3. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 22. 4. Ibid., p. 51. The English translation is based on Legge's Chinese Classics, vol. 1, pp. 210— 211.

5. Ibid., Mencius, p. 14. 6. Ibid., Lun-yu, p. 42. The English translation is based on Legge's Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 196.

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The critical dimension in the Confucian mode

ment and the Way-bearers demanded redefinition. Confucius prescribed the new relationship: With sincere faith he [the intellectual] unites the love of learning; hold firm to death, he is perfecting the excellence of the Way. Such a one will not enter a tottering state, nor dwell in a disorganized one. When the Way prevails in the kingdom, he will show himself; when it is suppressed, he will keep concealed. When the Way prevails in your land, count it a disgrace to be needy and obscure; when the Way does not prevail in your land, then count it a disgrace to be rich and honored.7 Reflecting upon this, two ideas immediately come to the fore. The Way is an ontological entity that can be realized in the human world by the effort of a person acting as a medium between the Way and its manifestation. This inspires Confucius to conclude that it is man who makes the Way great. 8 Accordingly, the duty of an intellectual is to develop and preserve the Way. Confucius's conception of the relationship of the Way and the intellectual is shared by Mencius. This is witnessed by the latter's belief that "when the Way [tao] prevails in the empire, it goes where one's person goes; when the Way is eclipsed, one's person goes where the Way has gone. I have never heard of making the Way go where other people are going."9 Viewed in this light, the Way has an independent and transcendental character in spite of the fact that its realization in the human world hinges upon human mediation. It means the Way exists neither for sage-king Yao nor for tyrant Chieh. Moreover, an intellectual is supposed to be involved with political authorities only if they are willing to receive the guidance of the Way. An intellectual should concern himself with the fulfillment of the Way for the country he serves. It is shameful for him to serve a government merely for the sake of fame and fortune. Mencius set the political norm for the intellectual in an uncompromising manner: [Therefore], an intellectual, though poor, does not let go of his righteousness; though prosperous, he does not leave the Way; it is thus that the expectations of the people from him are not disappointed. When the men of antiquity realized their wishes, benefits were conferred by them on the people. If they did not realize their wishes, they cultivated their personal character, and became illustrious in the world. If poor, they attended to their own virtue in solitude; if advanced to dignity, they made the whole kingdom virtuous as well.10 7. Ibid., Lun-yu, pp. 52-53. The English translation is based on James Legge and Arthur Waley.

8. Ibid., p. 110. 9. Ibid., Mencius, pp. 202-203; D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius, New York, 1976, p. 192. 10. Ibid., p. 190. The English translation is based on Legge's Chinese Classics, vol. 2, p. 453.

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Mencius also proclaimed that reciprocity is the guideline for the interaction between a ruler and his subject (engaged intellectuals). He put it as follows: If a prince treats his subjects as his hands and feet, they will treat him as their belly and heart. If he treats them as his horses and hounds, they will treat him as a mere fellow countryman. If he treats them as mud and weeds, they will treat him as an enemy.11 Obviously, the emphasis is placed on the ruler's duty to pay due respect to his subjects so that their service can be obtained. In addition, Mencius argued for the right of "revolution". He defended it in terms of rectification of names when he was asked by King Hsuan of Ch'i whether regicide is permissible. Mencius replied, "He who mutilates benevolence [jeri] is a mutilator; he who cripples Tightness [i] is a crippler; and a man who is both a mutilator and a crippler is an 'outcast.' I have indeed heard of the punishment of the 'outcast' Chou, but I have not heard of any regicide."12 With regard to political affairs, the word tao (Way) is frequently used to correlate with terms indicating individual virtue, such asjen (humanity) or i (righteousness), and tends to describe a universal politicalcultural norm that is characteristically moral. The ethical considerations implicit in the concept of the Way are evidenced by the following two conversations. The first is about Confucius and his disciples. One day the Master said, "Shen [Tseng-tzu]! My Way has one thread that runs right through it." The other disciples were puzzled by the saying. After the Master went out, Tseng-tzu expounded upon it, saying, "Our Master's Way is simply this: faithfulness [chung], and consideration [shu].ls The other conversation concerns Mencius's reply to Prince Tien's question about the business of being an intellectual. According to Mencius, the duty of an intellectual is to set his mind on high principles; namely, to cultivating humaneness (jeri) and righteousness (i).u Thus, Lu Hsiang-shan illuminates this point by citing Mencius's "setting one's mind on high principles [shang-chih]" as meaning "setting one's mind on the Way" [chihyu tao].15

Hence, aside from the moral autonomy expressed by the individual's process of moral decision making,16 the bearer of the Way brings to his 11. 12. 14. 15. 16.

SSCC, Lun-yii, pp. 111-112; D. C. Lau, Mencius, p. 128. Ibid., p. 26. D. C. Lau, Mencius, p. 68. 13. Ibid., Lun-yii, p. 23. Ibid., Mencius, pp. 97—98. Lu Hsiang-shan, Lu Hsiang-shan ch'iian-chi (hereafter abbreviated as LHCC), 21/10 a. The Confucian concept of moral autonomy has been discussed in detail by Professor Lin Yu-sheng in his "Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning oijen and the Confucian Concept of Moral Autonomy," Monumenta Serica, 31 (1974-75), 172-204. A typical 50

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encounter with politics a critical approach that is made possible only after the separation of the Way from its former embodiment, the political establishment of the golden age. This critical standard as conceived by Confucius and Mencius is identical to the Way, but was realized fully by three ancient dynasties, the Hsia, Shang, and Chou. 17 This conviction was accepted by later Confucians as the most cherished value for them in their response to politics. By actively allowing the Way to become a presence in their lives, subsequent generations of Confucians were able to expand their vision of the world and to give insight into the use of the Way as a critical transcendental standard for political activities. Intellectuals held that the highest moral conduct of an individual consisted of the preservation and the actualization of the Way in the world. This provides us with the perspective to understand why Confucius firmly defended Kuan Chung. Upon the death of his master, Kuan Chung had not only refused to sacrifice himself but later chose, instead, to act as prime minister for the enemy. In response to his students' criticisms, however, Confucius defended Kuan Chung's behavior: Kuan Chung acted as prime minister to the duke Huan, made him leader of all the princes, and united and rectified the whole kingdom. Down to the present day, the people enjoy the gifts that he conferred. But for Kuan Chung, we should now be wearing our hair unbound, and the lappets of our coats buttoning on the left side. Will you require from him the small fidelity of common men and statement among others can be drawn from Analects to represent this idea: "The determined scholar and the man of virtue will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their virtue. They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue complete." SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 107; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 297. Mencius elaborates by saying that "I like life, and I also like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two together, I will let life go and choose righteousness. I like life indeed, but there is that which I like more than life, and therefore, I will not seek to possess it by improper ways. I dislike death indeed, but there is that which I dislike more than death, and therefore there are occasions when I will not avoid danger. If among the things man likes there were nothing he liked more than life, why should he not use every means by which he could preserve it? If among the things man dislikes there were nothing he disliked more than death, why should he not do anything by which he could avoid danger? There are cases when men by a certain course might preserve life, and they do not employ it. When by certain things they might avoid danger, and they will not do them. Therefore, men have that which they like more than life, and which they dislike more than death. They are not men of distinguished talents and virtue only who have this mental nature. All men have it; what belongs to such men is simply that they do not lose it." SSCC, Mencius, pp. 166-167; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 2, pp. 411-412. The last two sentences of this quotation indicate Mencius's intention to universalize the concept of moral autonomy, which is organically connected with his theory of human nature: "Human nature is originally good." 17. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 110.

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common women, who would commit suicide in a stream or ditch, no one knowing anything about them?18 Literally, Confucius may appear to be employing a utilitarian argument to defend Kuan Chung's act. Yet, Confucius's eager concern with the fulfillment of the Way in the world is of importance to our understanding of this issue. In a broad sense, the Way not only encompasses political order, but also includes the preservation of cultural institutions to which Confucius himself was deeply committed. What Kuan Chung had done, in Confucius's eyes, was precisely to preserve all of these values, an act with priority over anything, even the giving and receiving of one's life. Within this concept, moral choice begins with preservation of the Way.19 By proceeding in this fashion, the Way becomes established as a universal societal norm of moral behavior to be sought after and acted upon continuously. If the Way demands a high degree of commitment, each individual is nonetheless allowed moral autonomy in the pursuits of the Way. But both ideal and individual action become consistently interrelated in a manner that provides an all-encompassing but ideal environment within which political, cultural, and moral issues are expected to develop in tandem. Because Confucianism is a "this-worldly" ethic, its consideration tends to cover the political order even though the combination of the Way and political power was believed to be in a perfect state only in the "golden age" of the Three Dynasties at early antiquity. Therefore, the belief that the Way and political power became separate and distinct after the golden age increasingly began to be subscribed to by later Confucians in spite of the fact that the concept of the Way then became the critical standard for judging the legitimacy and success of any political endeavor. When the question arose as to whether the Way took primacy over political power, the answer for most Confucians was obvious. They cited Confucius's statement, "When the Way prevails in the world, the common people will not criticize."20 18. SSCC, Lun-yii, pp. 97-98; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 282. 19. But one will observe that Mencius later said, "The followers of Confucius are shameful in talking about the history of Duke Huan of Ch'i and Duke Wen of Chin." Ibid., Mencius, p. 8. In contrast to Confucius, Mencius seems not to commit to the cultural institutions of the Chou dynasty. This makes his conception of moral autonomy more inner-determined and more self-based. Cf. Hoyt Tillman, "The Development of Tension between Virtue and Achievement in Early Confucianism: Attitudes toward Kuan Chung and Hegemon (pa) as Conceptual Symbols," Philosophy East and West 31, no. 1 (January 1981), 17—28. In view of different assessments of Kuan Chung by Confucius, Mencius, and Hsun-tzu, Professor Tillman has keenly observed the implicit tension between personal virtue and social result in early Confucianism. 20. SSCC, Lun-yii, p. 115.

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It is a cliche that Confucius advocated moral leadership of the political elite. But what concerns us is on what condition a political elite is allowed to assume moral leadership of the people. Is it not because a member of the political elite happens to be a person of moral excellence in the Confucian definition? A story about Duke Mu and Tzu-ssu relates this very clearly. Duke Mu frequently went to see Tzu-ssu. "How did kings of states with a thousand chariots in antiquity make friends with an intellectual?" he asked. Tzu-ssu was displeased. "What the ancients talked about," said Tzu-ssu, "was serving them, not making friends with them."21 Mencius explained Tzu-ssu's displeasure: In terms of position, Duke Mu was a prince and Tzu-ssu was a subject. How dare Tzu-ssu be friends with Duke Mu? In terms of virtue, it was Duke Mu who ought to serve Tzu-ssu. How can he presume to be friends with Tzu-ssu?22 Thus an intellectual should associate with political authorities only if they are willing to accept his moral guidance. Keeping well within this Confucian conviction, Tseng Tzu elevated the value of virtue to "a supreme degree": "The wealth of Chin and Ch'u cannot be rivaled. They may have their wealth, but I have my benevolence; they may have their exalted rank, but I have my integrity. In what way do I suffer in the comparison?"23 Even though he lived on the eve of unification of the Chinese empire, Hsiin Tzu echoed Tseng Tsu's idea. He quoted Tzu Hsia saying, "I do not serve those arrogant lords who treat me improperly; I do not see twice these arrogant officials who treat me not with respect."24 Hsiin Tsu also affirmed the dignity of an intellectual. He put words in Duke Chou's mouth as follows: "One may disdain those who rely upon official pay, but one must not disdain those who pursue moral cultivation. Men of integrity sacrifice the eminent for the humble, sacrifice wealth for poverty, and sacrifice comfort for toil. Even if their complexion becomes dark, they remain steadfast to their principle."25 In sum, the notion that the Way holds primacy over whatever political establishment happens to be in power, and that the Way is expected to put political leaders on the "correct" moral track, is rooted in ancient Confucianism. A Confucian state is one in which the Way is carried out. Conceived of in these terms, the Way provides the affirmative sanction needed to legitimize a political regime, and the very success of Confucian scholars has often been judged by their ability to get ruler and ruled to believe in this conviction. Certainly, history reveals that some rulers employed intellectuals or the concept of the Way to serve their own opportunistic ends, and that 21. Ibid., Mencius, p. 152. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., p. 52; Lau, Mencius, p. 87. 24. Annotated by Liang Ch'i-hsiung, Hsun-Tzu chien-shih, Peking, 1983, p. 382. 25. Ibid., pp. 408-409.

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they relied heavily upon some intellectuals' knowledge of political and cultural affairs. As the king of Ch'i once said, "I wish to give Mencius a house in the most central part of my capital and a pension of ten thousand measures of rice for the support of his disciples, so that my officials and my people will have an example to look up to."26 The interaction between the tradition of the Way and the tradition of political establishment has a long, complicated history that is not our major concern here. There is, however, one event that deserves attention. In 136 B.C., the emperor Wu of the Han dynasty adopted Tung Chung-shu's (ca. 179-ca. 104 B.C.) proposal to establish Confucianism as the state doctrine. From that time, save for a few occasions, Confucianism predominated as the official state ideology. No matter what form of political regime ruled thereafter, whether native or foreign, all leaders tried to approximate the image of a Confucian dynasty, whether from practical calculation or sincere choice. The relationship between the concept of the Way and political power became more and more intricate as history unfolded. Nevertheless, Wang Fu-chih's (1619—92) insightful definitions of these terms can facilitate our grasp of these problems. According to Wang, "the tradition of the Way" (tao~t'ung) concerned the transmission of the teachings of sages in contrast to "the tradition of governance" (chih-t'ung) which dealt with legitimate emperorship or rulership from the ancient period onward.27 But the concept of the Way was intrinsically involved with the legitimacy problem of rulership. Thus, politically, the Way was built into a tradition that remained critical of political authorities. Intellectually, it ushered in the problem of transmission of the "true" Way. In the T'ang dynasty, Buddhism and Taoism flourished. Han Yii (768-824) and Li Ao (fl. 798) had each established a line of transmission of the Confucian Way, a move against the Buddhists' and Taoists' conceptualization of the transmission of the Way. During the Sung dynasty, when Confucianism was being revived, the idea of "the tradition of the Way" (tao-t'ung) became enriched with a historical perspective. This approach was not novel and can be traced far back to Mencius, who proclaimed that the doctrine of the sage was transmitted from Yao and Shun through the sage-kings Yu, T'ang, and Wen to Confucius.28 In an environment where different schools competed for the right Way, Mencius had to construct a tradition of the Way in order to justify the teachings he received. The appeal to ancient sages was a common 26. Annotated by Liang Ch'i-hsiung, Mencius, pp. 59-60; Lau, Mencius, p. 92. 27. Wang Ch'uan-shan, Tu T'ung-ch'ien lun (Comments on T'ung-ch'ien), Peking, 1975, 13/408. 28. SSCC, Mencius, pp. 218-219.

54

The critical dimension in the Confucian mode p h e n o m e n o n a m o n g the c o m p e t i n g schools of the Warring States p e r i o d at the e n d of the Chou. 2 9 Neo-Confucians in the Sung dynasty invented a line of the transmission of the Way to claim their legitimacy within the Confucian circle. This suggests that at that time B u d d h i s m a n d Taoism probably did n o t p r e s e n t the same sort of threat to Confucianism as previously. 30 This new a p p r o a c h to t h e transmission of the Way is evident in the eulogy C h u Hsi wrote at the d e a t h of his friend (t'ung-chih), C h a n g Shih: After Confucius and Mencius, the sacred learning discontinued. It was Chou Tun-i and the Ch'eng brothers who sustained the Way from falling. Their subtle words have not been heard for not more than one hundred years, but the intellectuals diverged tremendously in their interpretation of the sacred doctrine. Among all, only you and I shared the same heart and mind. 31 Before this, in the N o r t h e r n Sung period, C h ' e n g I h a d praised his b r o t h e r , C h ' e n g H a o , for rediscovering t h e Way for the world after its i n t e r r u p t i o n for fourteen h u n d r e d years: "After the d e a t h of Duke C h o u , the Way of sages was n o t carried out; after the d e a t h of Mencius t h e learning of sages was n o t transmitted. Since t h e Way was n o t manifested, t h e r e has b e e n n o g o o d governance for centuries; since the Way was n o t transmitted, t h e r e has b e e n n o real scholar for thousands of years." 32 In C h ' e n g Fs view, having n o real scholar was worse t h a n having n o real governance, for scholars could at least b r i n g the Way of governance to the world, a l t h o u g h g o o d g o v e r n m e n t does n o t necessarily p r o d u c e a new c r o p of scholars. T h u s , in r e t u r n i n g to the surviving classics, C h ' e n g H a o revived the belief in the true Way by r e i n t e r p r e t i n g its message a n d r e n d e r i n g it explicable to the world. Evidencing the same spirit, C h u Hsi traced the line of transmission of the Way back to the legendary E m p e r o r Fu Hsi a n d the Yellow E m p e r o r . A m o n g all the sages, however, C h u Hsi cited Confucius as the greatest because h e readily acknowledged this inheritance of wisdom a n d steadfastly sought to r e g e n e r a t e these contributions, despite that h e h a d n o political position (wei) with which to see t h e m i m p l e m e n t e d . But after Mencius, the transmission of the Way was discontinued. It was n o t until C h o u Tun-i a n d the C h ' e n g b r o t h e r s that the Confucian Way was 29. Yang K'uan, "Chung-kuo shang-ku-shih tao-lurf (An introduction to ancient Chinese history), in Lu Ssu-mien and T'ung Shu-yeh, eds., Ku-shihpien (The investigations of ancient history), Taipei, 1970, vol. 7, pp. 65-401. 30. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," in Francois Aubin, ed., Sung Studies, 2d series, 1 (1973), p. 80. 31. CTWC, 87/9D. 32. Ch'eng I, I-ch 'uan wen-chi, in Erh-Ch 'eng ch 'uan-shu (Complete works of the two Ch'engs; hereafter abbreviated as ECCS), Tan-ya-chu, 1908, 7/iob-i la.

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rediscovered. There is no doubt that Chu Hsi attempted to establish an intellectual connection between the doctrine of the Northern Sung Confucians and his own, and thereby regarded himself as the real successor of this orthodox tradition. He was the first Neo-Confucian to make explicit use of the term tao-t'ung (the tradition of the Way or the line of the transmission of the Way) in a philosophical sense that found its mature expression in the preface he wrote in 1189 to The Commentaries on the Doctrine of the Mean.33 In his arrangement of the line of transmission, Chu Hsi entirely excluded the Confucians of the Han and T'ang periods because of their partial and impure comprehension of the Way. Lu Hsiang-shan took a far more radical position. Unconcerned with the intellectual origins of his doctrine, he professed that through his reading of Mencius he grasped the Way,34 and that it was his scholarship that shed the necessary light on the long-concealed Way.35 Although Lu did not use the term tao-fung, he did not abandon the concept of transmission of the Way. Instead, he preferred to use the term tao-mai, which means the lineage of the Way. It was the Han Confucians whom Lu blamed for confusing the transmission of the true Way with heresy, a mistake that he thought worse than that made by Emperor Ch'in-shihhuang. The emperor tried to cut off the real transmission with a blunt measure, but did not succeed.36 Lu Hsiang-shan was, however, willing to credit the Northern Sung Confucians with rediscovering the long-lost Way; nonetheless, Lu believed that it was his historical mission to create an environment in which the dim light of their discovery would shine forth.37 By exploring the various lineages proffered by Chu, Lu, and others as transmitting the Way, it becomes apparent that these philosophers were more interested in constructing a philosophical base for their thought than in providing a history of Confucian thought. By restructuring and stressing certain elements in previous scholars' thoughts, they were able to lend credence to their doctrines.38 We will recall that Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan had been determined to become sages since childhood. Their authentic desire to achieve sagehood made them irrevocably committed to the Way. It was said that as a child, when Chu Hsi was given The Classic of Filial Piety, he read it through in one sitting and immediately grasping the point, wrote, "If not so [I] am not a human being."39 Equally committed, Lu believed that 33. CTWC, 76/2oa-23a. 34. LHCQ 3 4 / 9 ^ 35/57^ 35. Ibid., 35/7*). 36. Ibid., 34/14^ 37. Ibid., 35/7b. 38. For Chu Hsi's case, see Chan, "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," pp. 5 9 90. 39. CTNP, p. 2.

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"the Way in the universe cannot be augmented or diminished. Neither can it be taken or be given away. Man must find this out for himself."40 Thus, years after the Goose Lake debate, when Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiangshan were again engaged in heated arguments, Lu's student, Pao Mintao, advised Lu not to argue with Chu Hsi because it seemed to Pao that Chu Hsi could not come to terms with his master's doctrine at all. Hearing that, Lu became angry and said that the Way did not exist for him or for Chu Hsi alone.41 Rather, Lu envisioned the Way as bright as the sun at noon.42 Chu Hsi shared this view, saying, "The Way [or here, "principle"] is quite responsive. Its substance as a whole is both splendid and magnificent. It is clear and evident through the thousands of years. The sages in the past transmitted it without doubt."43 Thus, the Way came to be regarded as a universal and transcendental factor with which to measure the legitimacy of both intellectual viewpoints and political authorities.44 Because of their personal commitment to the Way, Confucians believed that they were entitled to champion its cause. The social implication of this attitude comes to the fore in the strong consciousness evidenced by both Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan of Waybearers as fellowship. Thus the deaths of Chang shih (in 1180) and Lii Tsu-ch'ien (in 1181) were considered by Chu Hsi to be symbolic of a decline of the Way that resulted in a great loss to the world.45 Chu Hsi even extended the idea that the Way-bearers were a community based upon a common intellectual religious faith and a commitment to political activities. Unlike conventional scholars, who were sensitive to the problems of party struggle (tang-cheng) in Chinese politics, Chu Hsi encouraged the chancellor not to be afraid of forming a party (tang) among upright officials.46 Although the position taken by Chu could be thought of as contradicting Confucius's view that "a gentleman grave in self-maintenance, but not quarrelsome, allies himself with individuals, but not with parties,"47 Chu Hsi also advised the emperor to give free rein to good officials, allowing them to form a group and endowing them with more powers to carry out state policy efficiently.48 Though Lu Hsiang-shan had an independent mind in relation to the classics, he was very concerned with the relationships established 40. Lu Hsiang-shan, LHCC, $5/$b; Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 584. 41. LHCQ 34/28D, 7a. 42. Ibid., 34/8b. 43. CTYL, ii7/2a. 44. As for the transcendental character of Confucianism in ancient China, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, "Transcendence in Ancient China," Daedalus, 104, no. 2 (Spring 1975), 57-68. 45. CTWC, 34/258,87/12a. 46. Ibid., 28/1 gb-2ob. 47. SSCC, Lun-yii, 109.

48. CTWC, 11/23b.

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between individuals and the group as a whole. According to him, after one makes up his mind to engage in moral cultivation, one needs to select his mentor and friends carefully; otherwise he will become corrupt and wild.49 The value of "sharing the same Way" (t'ung-tao) and "sharing the same goal" (t'ung-chih) is essential to the identity of the Confucian community. Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan were both well aware that, after the ancient period (the Three Dynasties), a chasm developed between the Way and political power (shih b). Lu claimed that in ancient times, the political establishments and the Way were combined in one; after that, they were split. What does "the identity of the political power and the Way" (shihyii tao ho) mean? In terms of virtue, those who are entitled to be lords are lords; to be high officials, high officials; to be intellectuals, intellectuals. This is called "the identity of the political power and the Way." Their identity is a time of good order; the split between them is a time of turmoil.50 The split between the Way and political power had been taken for granted by all Confucians. Accordingly, as the bearers of the Way, they had an accepted responsibility to lead the rulers onto the correct path. Theoretically, the emperor, as the "son of Heaven" occupying the key post as the model for all subjects, is expected to assume moral leadership. Did not Confucius say, "He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turned toward it"?51 To Confucians, the character of politics is held to be normative in nature, and the populace is supposed to look to the rulers for moral inspiration. The relation between superiors and inferiors is thought of as "that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend when the wind blows across it."52 Society expects the political elite to be able to maintain political order and moral well-being. The moral cultivation that inspires this system lies in the initiative of the political elite. Once Chi K'ang asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, "To govern means to rectify. If you lead the people with correctness, who will dare not to be correct?"53 49. LHCC, i/i8a-iga, 15/53, 34/11a. Lu Hsiang-shan insists that after making up one's mind to achieve moral perfection, one must choose one's mentors and friends carefully because they are supposed to show the right path. This assertion seems inconsistent with his self-portrait: "Self-assured, self-made, and self-directed; independent of teachers, friends, and books." Ibid., 35/3ib. 50. LHCC, 34/25I). 51. SSCC, Lunyii, p. 6; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 145. 52. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 6; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 259. 53. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 83; Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 258.

The critical dimension in the Confucian mode But after the split of the Way and the political establishment a division of labor appeared. The author of The Doctrine of the Mean was perceptive enough to see: "One may occupy the throne, but if he have not the proper virtue, he should not presume to make ceremonies or music. One may have the virtue, but if he have not the throne, he in the same way should not presume to make ceremonies or music." 54 In principle, only the "son of Heaven" can establish cultural institutions, but after the breakdown of the identity of the Way with the political institution he loses this specific knowledge and moral excellence. The sage-king is a nostalgic projection of the Confucians' ideal in which everything, moral and social, political and cultural, is drawn to this monolithic pivotal agent. But the sage-king is gone. The Confucianists now have to take the responsibility to inculcate the rulers with the Way. The numerous memorials of Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan bear witness to this point. In his famous Wu-shen memorial (1188), Chu Hsi said: The mind of Your Majesty is the great foundation of the world since everything on earth, though varied and changing unlimitedly, actually relies upon the mind of Your Majesty. That is a natural principle. Therefore, if the mind of an emperor is on the right path, everything on earth follows the right path; if the mind of an emperor is not on the right path, everything on earth will go astray.55 Subsequently, Chu Hsi severely criticized the affairs of court and the personal selection of civil and military officers. Focusing on the education of the heir apparent, Chu Hsi leveled his criticisms against the mediocre opportunists who surrounded and demoralized the prince. Chu Hsi held that all of these Disarrangements actually pointed to the moral failure of the emperor himself. Nonetheless, the emperor was assured by Chu Hsi that if he studied the message in the memorial, he would discern that this saying was not a private opinion, but rather an idea strongly supported by the sages of ancient times. And if the emperor pursued the idea further, he would find that the idea was not simply an opinion of the sages, but rather the sincere belief that verbally captured the natural principle of Heaven and Earth, which not even sages and wise men dared violate. 56 In reading the memorials written by Chu Hsi, one is constantly impressed by his self-assured role as the proponent of the Way. Given Chu Hsi's deep commitment to the Way, it becomes understandable why he 54. SSCC, Chung-yung, p. 25. English translation by James Legge, Li Chi, New York, 1967, vol. 2, p. 324. 55. CTWQ n/i8b-io.a, 24a-24b. 56. CTWC, 11/36b.

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so often chose to resign from office. His actions lose their ambiguity as we realize the extent to which he believed in the ideal relationship to be achieved between the Way-bearer and the political leader.57 Similarly, the memorial Lu Hsiang-shan presented to the emperor also created quite a stir in scholarly circles because of Lu's frank criticisms of the emperor. Nonetheless, it drew criticism from Chu Hsi because, according to Chu Hsi, Lu did not focus attention on the need to rectify the mind of the emperor.58 Four years later, however, in a letter to Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan did state that the duty of the emperor is to govern the people by accomplishing the Way of Heaven and Earth, and that the duty of an intellectual is to use his knowledge to rectify the mind of the emperor and to lead him to the right path. Only then can the Way be manifested.59 In the Ming dynasty, Wang Yang-ming echoed the view expressed by Chu and Lu. Wang stated that the good order of the world rested in part on the ability of the emperor's ministers to assist him in trying to cultivate morality. For Wang, this was an urgent task to be performed by Confucian officials.60 He was well aware of the rift that had arisen between the Way and political power since the golden age and viewed those in authority as "having political status but not virtue" (yu-wei wu-te). Precisely because they lacked the knowledge necessary to make musical and ritual creations, rulers had no option but to depend upon Confucians at cultural events.61 Besides, a ruler needed to rely upon the virtue of Confucian officials for rectification of his mind after he had cultivated it with an initiative to be morally good and a capability of discriminating between good and evil subjects.62 On the surface, Wang's notion of how a ruler should achieve moral cultivation and this theory's reliance upon Confucians' guidance appears to be inconsistent with another of his doctrines in which he asserts 57. Chu Hsi's major disciple, Huang Kan, described this point very well: "The master led a sincere life. He was always concerned about the state. When he heard the errors of the current affairs, one could learn from his concerned complexion he was depressed. Whenever referring to the weak power of the state in contrast to that of the northern enemy, he was moved and his eyes filled with tears. He scrupulously observed the propriety of taking and resigning office. He definitely would not accept an office to which he was not entitled. He would resign office without hesitation if his words were not respected by the emperor. As a subject to the emperor, he never depreciated the value of the Way in order to sell it to the emperor -fiftyyears from the day he took the first office to the day of his death - he served at imperial court for only forty days. How difficult to put the Way into practice like this," CTNP, p. 230. A different description of Chu Hsi's political behavior is given by Conrad M. Schirokauer. See his "Chu Hsi's Political Career: A Study in Ambivalence," in Arthur F. Wright, ed., Confucian Personalities (Stanford, Calif.: 1962), pp. 162-188. 58. LHCC, 36/26a. 59. Ibid., 2/i6a-b. 60. WYCC, 21/406. 61. Ibid., 31/600. 62. Ibid., 31/598-599. 60

The critical dimension in the Confucian mode

the self-sufficiency of man's innate knowledge for achieving moral perfection.63 But if we take into account Wang's preoccupation with the "norm" governing how a ruler and a Way-bearer should interact, this apparent contradiction dissolves. Wang Yang-ming held that an official who could serve his ruler by helping him obtain the Way never brought shame on himself. It was particularly the duty of a great minister (tach 'en) to rectify the mind of the ruler and to lead him to the correct path of the Way.64 Thus, the role of Confucians was affirmed by Wang Yangming in relation to the function of the rectification of the mind for the ruler. This, again confirmed that the idea of the Way-bearer was very alive among truthful Confucians. In short, the split that took place between the concept of the Way and various political regimes presented the possibility of allowing Confucian intellectuals to consider themselves as champions of the Way. From then on, they spoke not only for themselves as a community, but also for the Way. Confucius once said, "It is man that can make the Way manifest by actualizing it, and not the Way that can manifest itself."65 Inspired by this dictum, Confucian intellectuals were prepared to make the Way great. Once, after quoting this dictum, Lu stated that the Way is not added to or diminished by human effort. Rather, the Way is the fundamental principle of the universe and has governed it for ten thousand generations. No one stands outside this principle, not even a ruler. If the general populace needs to learn the Way from the teachings of their leaders, the intellectuals can learn it by "their own study."66 Because of their initiative and their ability to monopolize access to the Way, it began to be believed that only intellectuals could bear and teach the Way. Viewed from the vantage of the intellectuals, the Way represented a solid ground upon which their role and function in the state and society was defined. For the rulers, however, the Way became a sacred doctrine and ideology legitimizing their position. In the last analysis, the Way offered a critical standard to judge rulers and regimes. Its essence was moral in nature and was, furthermore, compatible with the concept of moral autonomy based upon individual ethical self-decision. In addition, it brought a universal and impersonal dimension to the concept of moral autonomy that was employed by the intellectuals in the political arena. In other words, an intellectual as bearer of the Way had the backing of this grand tradition of the Way when he confronted the political rulers. This entitled Wang Fu-chih (1619-92) in the early Ch'ing to claim: "Two things in this World are 63. See Chapter 2. 64. WYCQ 31/598-590. 65. SSCC, Lun-yu, p. 110. 66. LHCQ 2i/9b-ioa. 61

Philosophy, philology, and politics

supreme and cannot be usurped, that is, the position of ruler in the tradition of governance and the teaching of the sages in the tradition of the Way."67 In ideology, Confucian intellectuals were able to preserve this spirit until the reign of the Ch'ing emperor K'ang-hsi.68 67. Wang Fu-chih, Tu T'ung-chien-lun, p. 408. 68. Based on this analysis of the concept of the Way, I would like to make a brief remark on Mou Tsung-san's discussion of the difference between Chu Hsi's and Lu Hsiangshan's ethical views. I cannot bring myself to accept his assertion that Lu's idea has the character of moral autonomy, but not Chu's. If the concept of moral autonomy is denned as morality (Way) for the sake of morality (Way), Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan have no difference in their ethical thinking on either the individual or the collective level. But if the concept is taken strictly as what Kant really means in the Critique of Practical Reason, neither Chu Hsi nor Lu Hsiang-shan can be qualified as having the idea of moral autonomy because the ethics of Chu and Lu, like that of most Confucians, is not based upon an a priori rational universalizable principle. See my article, "Rethinking the Concept of 'Moral Autonomy' in the Study of Chinese Thought" (Sowei tao-te tzu-chu-hsing), Shih-huo, 14, nos. 7-8 (November 1984), 77-88.

4 Li Fu: an exemplary Lu-Wang scholar in the Ch'ing dynasty (1): His life

Li Fu had one courtesy name, Chu-lai, and two pen names, Mu-t'ang and Hsiao-shan. He was known to his contemporaries as Master Mu-t'ang and has been commonly regarded as the major proponent of the Lu-Wang school in the Ch'ing dynasty.1 He was born on April 5, 1675, m Linch'uan, Kiangsi. His father was a native of She-hsien of Anhwei. His grandfather died when his father was still young. This probably caused his father to wander about central and southern China in search of a living. His father finally settled in Lin-ch'uan after marrying into a family named Wu.2 He married the only child of the Wu family, and so the parents asked him to stay in their family. From Li Fu's later description, it seems that the marriage did not cause his father to stay home very long; Li Fu's 1. Hsu Shih-ch'ang, ed., Ch'ing-ju hsueh-an (Philosophical records of the Ch'ing scholars), n.p., 1938, 55/1 a; and Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsueh-shu-shih (Chinese intellectual history of the last three hundred years), Taipei, 1968, p. 284. For a brief English biography of Li Fu, see Fang Chao-ying's "Li Fu" in Arthur W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, Taipei, 1964, pp. 455-457. 2. Li Fu, Mu-t'ang ch'u-kao (The initial collection of Li Fu's writings, hereafter abbreviated as MTCK), Fu-ch'i-t'ang, 1831, 25/1 a. In addition to the 1831 edition, MTCK was initially printed in 1740 (hereafter abbreviated as MTCK [1740]). Another collection of Mu-t'ang's writings, Mu-t'ang pieh-kao (abbreviated as MTPK), was published about 1747. Li Fu's writings were banned in 1768 because in them there were two poems dedicated to a gathering at which Tai Ming-shih was present. In 1831, both collections were revised and printed. I rely primarily on the 1831 edition for my analysis. As for the problems of the texts see Fang Chao-ying's article on Li Fu in Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, p. 456. Also see "The Case of Li Fu's Poems" in Ch'ing-tai wentzu-yu tang.

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father was by nature fond of traveling and left home often. Li Fu and his four brothers were brought up and educated mainly by their mother, who embodied the traditional virtues of Chinese women - frugality, diligence, and perseverance.3 All of these virtues were especially cherished in a poor family like Li Fu's. Since his childhood, Li Fu was known for his gift in writing poetry. He began composing poems at the age of ten, writing prose at the age of twelve, and practicing "current essays" (the "eight-legged essays") to prepare for the civil service examinations at fourteen. He showed particular interest and talent in the writing of poetry and prose.4 He was noted for being able to compose "one hundred poems and dozens of essays" within a day. Li Fu proudly called this practice "a battle of art."5 His talent in literature was immediately recognized by a group of his literary friends, among whom Li Fu was the youngest. He was only twelve years old when he was admitted to this group; the other members were already middle-aged.6 Later, when Li Kuang-ti (1642-1718) who was a major advocate of the Ch'eng-Chu school and an important Ch'ing official, read Li Fu's writings, he praised the latter's literary style as comparable to that of the established writers of the Sung dynasty, such as Ou-yang Hsiu (1007-72) and Tseng Kung (1019-83). 7 In the preface to his book of poetry Surviving Fires {Huo-yii ts'ao), Li Fu tells us that he was advised to concentrate on the examinations rather than unimportant matters such as writing poetry, so he burned his poems on several occasions. Nevertheless, he did not entirely abandon his continuing interest in composing poetry.8 When Li Fu went to take the civil service examination, he was accused of pretending to be a native of Lin-ch'uan by some people who were jealous of his talent; he was then disqualified from taking the test.9 These unhappy events ironically sharpened his strong identity with Lin-ch'uan. Li Fu was deeply convinced of his father's idea that the trend of the age (shih-yun) from the Eastern Chin dynasty onward had shifted from the North to the South and would prosper on the southern side of the Yangtze River. This was why his father chose Lin-ch'uan as the place to call home.10 Li Fu was extremely proud of being a man of Lin-ch'uan, where a great cultural heritage had taken shape over the centuries, and which had produced many distinctive scholars. Li Fu's unceasing justifications of Wang An-shih (1021-86), his attempts to prove that the great calligrapher Wang Hsi-chih (321—76 or 303—61) was a native of Lin3. MTCK, 36/4^-41*). 4. Ibid., Preface, p. la. 5. Ibid., i7b/i6b. 6. Ibid., preface, pp. ib~3b, 2/7a~7b. 7. Ibid., preface, p. 6a. 8. Ibid., 3/1 a. 9. Ibid., 2/3a, 5a, 9a. 10. Ibid., 25/1 b-2a.

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ch'uan, and his emulation of the literary style of Ou-yang Hsiu and Tseng Kung were only a few examples of the various manifestations of an unusual local patriotism.11 This patriotism constituted an important ingredient in Li Fu's thought and life because it displayed an emotional strain in his orientation and provided him with the strength to struggle against the current orthodoxy, the Ch'eng-Chu school. His local patriotism also extended to his defense of Lu Hsiang-shan, to whom he paid his greatest respect and from whose learning he drew his main intellectual inspiration. Apart from the fact that he received some elementary education from his mother and learned the rules of poetic composition from Wu Yu-chai,12 Li Fu was intellectually a self-taught man. He had a remarkable memory, which aided him in acquiring vast knowledge from books. It is said that he could recite whatever he had casually read only once. Normally he could read twenty chiian (Chinese volumes) per day; on a busy day he would still read a chiian or two. In a letter to Ch'en Yen-yii in which he discussed the difficulties of studying, Li Fu expressed remorse, saying, "Within seven months I have read 'only' the histories of the Three Kingdoms, Chin, and the Southern and Northern dynasties; the poetry of Li Po, Tu Fu, Li Shang-yin, Wen T'ing-yun, Su Tung-p'o, and Lu Yu twice; and the various commentaries on the Erh-ya, The Book ofFilial Piety (Hsiao-ching), I-li, Analects, Mendus once; Ssu-ma Ch'ien's Historian's

Record, the histories of former Han, later Han, Sui, T'ang, and Five Dynasties once; and part of the histories of Sung, Ch'i, Liang, Ch'eng, later Wei, Northern Ch'i, later Chou, and Sung-Liao-Chin-Yuan periods." It was clear that in Li Fu's view the advancement of one's learning was proportional to how broadly and how profoundly one had read.13 In his youth, Li Fu had been very poor. In 1692, the financial situation of his family became worse than ever before. Because they had to sell their property, Li's family was forced to move to Hsia-lu, seven li (Chinese miles) north of Lin-ch'uan, where Li Fu married a girl from a family named Hsii.14 In 1695, Li Fu received the status of a student in the prefectural school, but it was not until 1697 that he received a stipend from the school. However, the stipend did not significantly improve his family's financial situation. Li Fu often felt sorry that he was unable to provide a good living for his family, especially for his aged parents.15 For a time he had to walk hundreds of miles to cities like Hui-chou or Soochow in search of work. In the winter of 1697, Li Fu braved a major 11. Ibid., preface, p. 8a, g/i2a-i3b, 19/393-4lb. 12. Ibid., 2/73, 36/4ia-4ib. 13. Ibid., 41/1 a-lb. 14. Ibid., 2/5b-6a, 17a, 27/1 a. 15. Ibid., 4b/nb-i2a.

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snowstorm, traveling three thousand li by foot while carrying 300 wen (a Chinese unit of currency) to look for his elder brother, who had used up his travel funds and was trapped in a remote place.16 Sometimes his family was so poverty-stricken that they did not have enough food. In Li Fu's later writings on the death of his wife, he recollects that his wife was kind and capable, and that she exerted her utmost in trying to cope with their financial difficulties even after he assumed an official post.17 Poverty did not break Li Fu; on the contrary, the more distressing his financial situation became, the more determined he was to carry on his study. Later he was fortunate enough to be appreciated by Liang T'ingchi (1663—1715), the governor of Kiangsi, through whose financial assistance Li Fu was able to pass the provincial examination in 1708 with the first rank after having previously failed it four times. The following year, he passed the metropolitan examination and became a chin-shih, and subsequently he was selected as a bachelor of the Hanlin Academy.18 After receiving the rotation training there, he was appointed a compiler (pien-hsiu).

Meanwhile, his scholarship was recognized by two important scholarofficials, Li Kuang-ti and Wang Shih-chen (1643—1711). Both regarded Li Fu as "a leading scholar of national importance" (kuo-shih). His outstanding talent impressed Li Kuang-ti so much that through the latter's recommendation to the K'ang-hsi emperor he was promoted in an unprecedented manner, four grades to shu-tzu, in 1715.19 The next summer, he was transferred to the post of study-attendant (shih-tu-hsuehshih), and in autumn he served as the vice-supervisor of the military examination. In 1717 he rose to the post of attendant whose job was to record the emperor's daily life. In this assignment, he had the opportunity to directly wait on the K'ang-hsi emperor. This experience reinforced his admiration for the emperor, intellectually and personally.20 He was sent to take charge of the provincial examination in the same year. Three years later he held the same post in Chekiang. Early in 1719, he went to Canton on behalf of the emperor to offer sacrifices to the gods of the South Sea. He was promoted to the vice-presidency of the censorate in 1721. It was in that year that bad luck struck him. Li Fu was assigned to the post of vice-examiner for the metropolitan examination of 1721. When the day came to release the list of successful 16. MTCK, 3/gb. 17. Ibid., 27/ia-ib. 18. Ibid., 25/2a; Ch'uan Tsu-wang, Chi-ch'i t'ing chi (hereafter abbreviated as CCTC), Taipei, 1977, 17/210. 19. Win-cheng hung nien^p'u in Li Kuang-ti, Jung-ts'un ch'iian-shu, B/596; MTCK, 11/1 a; CCTC, 17/207. 20. MTCK 46/32a-35b.

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graduates, a yellow fog and dark wind occurred in the capital and were conventionally interpreted as evil omens. Awed by this strange phenomenon, the K'ang-hsi emperor said that this must be caused by evil forces, which implied that the list either contained usurpers or failed to include good scholars. He ordered a review of examination papers and consequently made some changes.21 This readjustment caused the failed candidates to gather in front of Li Fu's house in protest. They eventually stoned the house. Li Fu did not report this unhappy event to the government. The censor Shu Ku impeached him for concealing the facts and for being unfair in his examination of these candidates. Li Fu was deprived of his ranks and offices, but was allowed to atone for his mistakes by assisting in conservancy work at the Yung-ting River at his own expense. The emperor pardoned him after realizing that Li Fu had been forced to sell everything for the sake of the conservancy project, including his collection of books.22 Even before ascending the throne, the future Yung-cheng emperor had a deep appreciation of Li's personality and capacity. Soon after his ascension the emperor asked him to come back to the capital. The emperor restored all his ranks and frequently held private discussions with him, an indication of his favor. In July 1723 he was sent to tackle the shipment of grain from the South to the capital. This had posed a serious problem since the end of the K'ang-hsi period because of the lack of water and defects in the administration. The grain revenue was supposed to be transported annually from the South to Tungchow (east of Peking), where the grain was stored. But owing to inefficiencies during shipment, as well as to water shortages, the grain boats often were blocked en route and arrived late at their destination. This created further delays for the next shipment because during the winter months the canal was frozen and the grain boats could not go back to the South; this, in turn, was compounded by the fact that the fleet would block the river on its way home, when it met the next fleet of grain boats heading north. Li Fu's ingenuity and industry were able to overcome all of these difficulties. He arranged for the grain to be stored in Tientsin instead of Tungchow, and thus shortened the necessary distance for transport. He also adopted a method of using straw to preserve the grain through the cold winter, and reorganized the shipping administration to make it more efficient. In the beginning, many officials considered his plan impractical, but to their surprise he succeeded in carrying it out. His very 21. Ch'ing-shih (The history of the Ch'ing), Taipei, n.d., 294/4068. 22. MTCK, i5b/8a, 4o/5a-5b.

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success in this mission won much appreciation from the Yung-cheng emperor, who wrote that he had been "honorably entrusted by the state to make an exhaustive effort" (feng-kuo ch'ing-hsiri) in praise of Li's merit.23 The boatmen also felt the benefits of Li Fu's accomplishment, since he abolished many corrupt practices such as the taking of illegal fees from them. In spite of the enthusiasm of the boatmen, he resolutely declined their offer to erect a shrine in his honor as an expression of their gratitude.24 In April of 1724, Li Fu was appointed governor of Kwangsi, where conflicts often arose between the aboriginal and Han people. He put down a local uprising there and pacified a border quarrel between Vietnam and China. On the cultural side, he restored the academy of Hsiian-cheng in order to sinicize the aboriginal people and educate students. This academy, which used to offer sacrifices to the two NeoConfucians, Lu Tsu-ch'ien and Chang Shih, had sunk into oblivion for years.25 In addition, Li Fu initiated the compilation of the General History of Kwangsi {Kwangsi t'ung-chih), which was completed by Kan Ju-lai, the successor to his post, in 1726. In 1725, Li Fu was promoted to the post of governor-general of Chihli due to his outstanding performance. On his way back to the capital, he had a bitter confrontation with T'ien Wen-ching (1662-1732), a favorite of the emperor, who was currently the governor of Honan. At that time, T'ien, claiming to set the bureaucracy in order, was behaving harshly toward his subordinates. It is said that his dislike of the degree holders caused him to impeach in a memorial a dozen local officials, most of whom held their posts by formally passing the civil service examinations. When he met T'ien, Li Fu became angry and said bitterly, "Being as you are, a high official entrusted by the court to govern this vast area, why do you deliberately trample the scholars underfoot?" T'ien could not stand Li Fu's criticism, so he secretly sent a memorial to the emperor accusing Li Fu of protecting local officials.26 On his return to the capital, Li verbally attacked T'ien during an audience with the emperor that lasted until midnight. At first, the emperor trusted the words of Li Fu and was about to denounce T'ien. Coincidentally, a memorial from the censor Hsieh Chi-shih (1689— 1756) had also made the allegations that T'ien Wen-ching was cruel and 23. MTCK, 19/19b. 24. For a detailed description of Li Fu's shipment of the grain see MTCK, 17—20, 20/ na-i2b. 25. MTCK, 39a/3a-4a. 26. Yuan Mei, Sui-yiian ch'uan-chi (The Complete works of Yuan Mei), Shanghai, 1981, 27/ia.

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unjust to local officials. The similarity in the content of these criticisms aroused the emperor's suspicions. He felt that Li Fu and Hsieh Chi-shih were conspiring to attack T'ien, so he changed his mind and denounced Li and Hsieh instead. The Yung-cheng emperor had come to the throne only after surviving fierce factional struggles among his brothers, and had a special hatred for such conflict. In 1724, he issued an edict that on no account would leniency be shown toward high officials involved in factions.27 In spite of the emperor's support of T'ien, Hsieh Chi-shih pressed his accusation until he himself was sent to trial. When interrogated by the judge as to who instigated him to fabricate charges against T'ien, Hsieh replied, "Confucius and Mencius." When the judge asked him why he made such a reply, Hsieh answered: "The learning of Confucius and Mencius teaches us that a subject should admonish the emperor when he thinks it necessary to do so. If a subject knows of a corrupt official's wrongdoings and does not report them to the emperor, he cannot count as a loyal subject."28 Hsieh was exiled to Mongolia, where he devoted himself to writing and teaching. His troubles continued; in 1729 he was impeached by the commander of the military settlement, Hsi-pao, for his arrogance in attacking the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy. The commander sent Hsieh's Annotations on the Great Learning of the Old Text (Ta-hsueh ku-pen-chu) to

Peking for investigation. The emperor found an implicit criticism of himself in Hsieh's annotations. On this basis, Hsieh was sentenced to capital punishment. However, he was later pardoned by the emperor.29 Li Fu underwent a similar experience. He was hot tempered by nature, and any type of injustice aroused his indignation. He was well aware of his own temper and in fact would give the name "nonanger studio" (wunu-hsuari) to any place he resided as a constant reminder to control his temper.30 In spite of this he often had difficulty getting along with his colleagues due to his temper. Some of them took advantage of Li Fu's offense against T'ien Wen-ching to slander him for concealing the crime of another official, Ts'ai T'ien, through whose recommendation the Yiing-ch'eng emperor before his ascension had originally come to know Li Fu.31 Even worse, Li Fu was said to have been involved in a political conspiracy. When he was the governor-general of Chihli, he had been ordered to keep the emperor's brother and enemy, Yin-t'ang, in custody at his headquarters, P'ao-ting. Li Fu had Yin-t'ang placed in special confinement in a building surrounded by high walls, where he died 27. MTCK, 4o/i5a-i6b. 30. MTCK, 30/ioa-iob.

28. Ch'ing-shih, 294/4071. 29. Ibid., 294/4071. 31. Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, Taipei, n.d.,

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within three months. A rumor circulated widely that Li Fu had murdered Ying-t'ang at the emperor's behest. The emperor, who was understandably sensitive to this charge, blamed Li Fu for mishandling the case.32 Li was demoted to vice-president of the Board of Works in early 1727. Subsequently, various reports from his successors in Kwangsi and Chihli accused Li Fu of mishandling local affairs and of recommending incompetent personnel during his terms. Li Fu was ordered to go back to Kwangsi to personally arrest an aborigine who had escaped from prison. His friends were concerned for his safety since he had to complete this job without any aid from the government. When Li Fu arrived in Kwangsi, the aborigine returned to jail voluntarily, saying that he could not show ingratitude to Li. In spite of this, Li Fu was arrested upon returning from Kwangsi. According to the sentence of the Ministry of Justice, Li Fu had committed crimes among which seventeen deserved strangulation and six deserved beheading.33 The administration confiscated his property and incidentally discovered that Li Fu was so poor that in spite of his high official status, his wife's hairpins and earrings were made of bronze. In jail, he read daily, ate with a hearty appetite, and slept soundly as if nothing had happened to him. The former governor of Kansu, Hu Ch'iheng, who was also in prison, saw this and sighed that Li was really a man of firm principle.34 Li Fu was twice brought to the market to face execution. The first time, an official put to him questions concerning the classics and histories, which Li Fu answered fluently. When the knife was put on his neck, the official sent by the emperor asked him, "Now, do you understand the merits of T'ien Wen-ching?" Li said "Even though I am to die, I do not know the good of T'ien Wen-ching."35 In fact, the Yung-cheng emperor had no intention of killing Li Fu at all. He simply wanted to frustrate Li Fu's stubbornness. At the last moment the emperor commuted Li Fu's death sentence on account of his outstanding learning and sent him back to jail.36 32. For Li Fu's involvement with this case see Wen-hsien t'sung-pien, Peiping: Palace Museum, I3a-i8b. Chang T'ai-yen, a nationalistic scholar, says that the Yung-cheng emperor attempted to kill Li Fu on the pretext of T'ien Wen-ching's case to cover his murdering his own brother, Yin-t'ang. This seems quite implausible to me. See Chang T'ai-yen, "Comments on Two Historical Events," Hua-kuoyiieh Wan, 1, no. 10, (15314), Taipei, reprint. 33. CCTC, 17/208. In Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, there were only twenty-one crimes committed by Li Fu. See Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, 15/6a-6b. According to Ch'uan Tsu-wang, the total crimes amount to twenty-four. Yuan Mei also followed Ch'Cian's account without correcting the items from twenty-four to twenty-three; see Sui-yuan ch'iian-chi 27/ia-ib. 34. CCTC, 17/208. 35. Yuan Mei, Sui-yiian ch'iian-chi, 27/2a, 1a. 36. Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, i5/6b.

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One year later the emperor put Li on trial. During the course of the trial, the emperor's expression was grave and his voice broke with anger. All the attending officials were trembling, but Li Fu's response was as calm as usual. Not only did he not beg for mercy; he also said, "I committed a crime for which I deserve to be executed so as to warn those who are disloyal to your Majesty."37 Hearing this, the emperor's anger abated somewhat. Li Fu was finally pardoned and ordered to serve in the Editorial Bureau, where he was to work on the General History of the Eight-Banner System. Released from jail, Li Fu rode directly to the bureau in a broken cart drawn by a skinny horse. He stayed away from all social activities and concentrated on studying for eight years. In 1728, it is said that his wife died of grief over the course of Li Fu's life.38 During this troubled period, Li Fu was intellectually very productive. Apart from the job with the General History of the Eight Banners, he devoted

himself to editing his previous writings and to the compilation of three philosophical works. The Ch'eng-Chu school had since the end of the Sung period been elevated to the status of official learning; later owing to the K'ang-hsi emperor's patronage, the status of this school reached a peak. Most of the scholars read the Ch'eng-Chu annotations in order to be successful in the civil service examinations and thereby become famous.39 The Lu-Wang school thus became comparatively obscure in contrast to the Ch'eng-Chu school of the day. Li Fu had been born near Lu Hsiang-shan's birthplace, and his commitment to Lu's teaching could be traced back to his youth. His local patriotism naturally drew his attention to Lu's teaching, which provided him a way of living and a philosophy of action. He once wrote a poem in which he lamented that the people were ignorant that Lu's teaching was the access to the true Way.40 Li Fu was determined to defend the Lu-Wang school against the popular Ch'eng-Chu school. He pursued this goal via two methods: One was to elaborate the Lu-Wang doctrines; the other was to construct the intellectual genealogy of the Lu-Wang school to show its intellectual continuity, as opposed to that of the Ch'eng-Chu school. He expanded Lu Hsiang-shan's chronological biography (Lu-tzu nien-p'u) from two to three chu'an and compiled the intellectual lineages of Lu Hsiang-shan (Lu-tzu hsueh-j)'u) and Wang Yang-ming (Yang-ming hsueh-lu). He also revised Yang-ming's work called Chu HsVs Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life (Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-luri), adding materials and developing it

into a more sophisticated and comprehensive form. In doing so, he 37. CCTC, 17/208.

38. MTCK 27/1 b-2a.

39. Ch'ing-ju hsiieh-an, 55/1 a.

40. MTCK, 2

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reinforced Yang-ming's argument that in his later days Chu Hsi came to the same conclusion reached earlier by Lu.41 Meanwhile, Li Fu had many exchanges with two distinguished LuWang scholars, Wan Ju-lu and Ch'iian Tsu-wang (1705—55), both of whom were invited to live in his house. They often gathered in his garden, called Wisteria Studio, where they enjoyed fruitful discussions.42 Wan and Ch'iian were important in assisting Li Fu in accomplishing the tasks already mentioned. Working together in the Editorial Bureau, both Li Fu and Ch'iian Tsu-wang sensed the importance of the Yiing-lo Encyclopedia (Yiing-lo ta-tien) as a rich reservoir for rare and lost books. They initiated an ambitious plan to recover all the valued books from the quotations in this encyclopedia. They set a rule for themselves to edit twenty chiian each day, and hired four copiers to write them down. But due to the lack of money and helpers, they were unable to complete the project, which aimed to recover all the lost annotations of the SungYiian scholars on the Three Rites (San-li). Nevertheless, they set an example for later scholars, who compiled The Comprehensive Collections of the Four Categories {Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu). This undertaking incorporated their

original project - the reconstruction of lost books from the Yiing-lo Encyclopedia.^ Ch'iian Tsu-wang stayed with Li Fu from 1733 to 1736. In Ch'iian's estimation, Li Fu was a very assertive man, always confident of his own views. On the other hand, Li Fu did not impose his ideas on others and was open to hearing different opinions. Li Fu often encouraged Ch'iian to express his views even though the two men sometimes disagreed. Although Wan, Ch'iian, and Li shared an interest in Lu's learning, there were shades of difference in their views. Owing to his personal association with Lu's learning, Li Fu tended to attack Chu Hsi vehemently. The other two could not entirely approve of his criticisms of Chu Hsi and were somewhat successful in lessening his dislike of Chu Hsi's thought.44 Li Fu held that one's acts should match one's beliefs. A common utterance of his accurately reflects this spirit. He said, "After selfexamination, if I feel right in my inner mind, the worries of life or death cannot move my mind; if fortune or misfortune cannot move my mind, neither does success or failure. I find it is easy to live in this way."45 Upon meeting Li Fu, a high official who claimed to be a champion of the Chu Hsi school said: "Lu's teaching is not unworthy. However, I cannot feel

41. MTCK, 32/7a~7b, 32/ia-2a, 32/3a-4b. 42. CCTC, wai-pien, 20/931-932. 43. MTCK, 43/2oa-2ib. CCTC, wai-pien, 17/889-891. On the relation between the revis-

ing of the Yung-Lo Encyclopedia and the Comprehensive Collections of the Four Categories, see Kuo Po-kung, Ssu-k'u-ch'uan-shu tsuan-hsiu-k'ao, 1937, p. 8. 44. CCTC, 17/209. 45. Ibid., 17/210.

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Li Fu: his life

at ease in my mind with it. This means that Lu's teaching does not follow the correct way of the sages." Li Fu responded: "When you took charge of the official granaries, you attempted to submit the surplus (hsien-yu) to curry favor. Did you feel right for having done that? Among those who favor Lu's teaching, even a child would spit [be contemptuous] at this behavior." The official became pale and never saw Li Fu again.46 Indeed, the hypocrisy and superficiality of the contemporary Ch'engChu scholars played a great role in reinforcing his commitment to Lu-Wang doctrines. A description provided by K'ung Shang-jen (1648— 1718) pointedly described the general mentality of students of the day. Asked why they honored Chu Hsi while attacking Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming, students often replied that it was because Chu Hsi had made commentaries, whereas Lu and Wang had not.47 This answer exposed the real motive of the students in associating themselves with the learning of Chu Hsi - their practical interest in the use of Chu Hsi's commentaries for the civil service examination. For Li Fu, the Ch'eng-Chu scholars simply used their learning as a stepping-stone to fame and profit without regard to its role in real life. This also showed a defect inherent in Chu Hsi's teaching: its exclusive emphasis on the study of the classics.48 By contrast, Li Fu believed that the Lu-Wang doctrine could provide a theory of moral cultivation to bridge the gap between words and actions.49 Li Fu was known for enthusiastically helping scholars in difficulty and recommended them to the court when possible. He had two lines of Lu Yu's (1125-1210, the famous poet in the Sung period) poem written on pillars. They read: "Although remote from those who have special talent, my mind goes with them/In spite of my old age, my eyes become refreshed whenever an excellent book comes across my way."50 It is a precise description of Li Fu himself. When the Ch'ien-lung emperor succeeded to the throne, he reinstated Li Fu and told him that the Yiingcheng emperor originally intended to employ him. The new emperor ordered Li Fu to work for the Board of Revenue and then promoted him to senior vice-president of the board. In 1736, the court held the "erudite scholars" examination (po-hsiieh hung-ts'u k'e). The high-ranking officials were expected to recommend eligible students. After having used up his own quota, Li Fu asked his student Sun Fu-hsien to recommend the poet Wang Tsao, who had not yet been recommended by others. Sun appeared somewhat reluctant. Seeing this, Li Fu burst into anger and cursed Sun to the extent that Sun 46. Ibid., 17/209. 47. K'ung Shang-jen, Hu-hai chi, Shanghai, 1957, 9/203-204. 48. MTCK, i 8 / i i a - n b , 4 5 / 4 b . 49. Ibid., 2 6/ 4 a. 50. CCTQ 17/210.

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had to kneel down to apologize to appease Li's anger. The emperor learned about this event the next day. Chastising Li for transgressing the propriety of a high official, the emperor demoted him by two ranks.51 He was ordered to work in the Bureau of the Three Rites, where he joined his old friend Fang Pao (1668—1749), who had been purged by a literary inquisition for his involvement with the Tai Ming-shih case.52 Li Fu later suffered from the Tai case as well. In 1768, eighteen years after his death, Li Fu's writings were banned on the charge that Li wrote two poems for a gathering at which Tai was present.53 When Li Fu served in the Bureau of the Three Rites, his mother passed away and he returned to his hometown to observe the mourning period. When he returned from the observance, he first served as vice-president of the Bureau of the Ming History in 1741. Li Fu had a deep interest in history. He had written broadly on various historical subjects, including comments on historical figures (shih-lun) and a book devoted to the exposition of the Annual of Spring and Autumn (Ch'un-ch'iu i-shih). Once he initiated a project to rewrite Sung history, but failed to carry it through.54 During his term in the Bureau of the Ming History, he was known for his erudition because he often contested his colleagues' evaluations of historical figures. His apology for the notorious Yen Sung (1480—1565) stands out the most distinctly. It is said that in that debate none of his colleagues could win him over to their view.55 After his service in the Bureau of the Ming History, he assumed the vice-chancellorship of the secretariat in charge of the Chiangnan examination. During the examination period he suddenly fell ill, becoming absent-minded and murmuring all day long. Having returned to Peking, he was asked by the emperor to remain in the capital to recover. Many years earlier, when Wang Shih-chen first read Li Fu's exmaination essays, he could not help but praise Li Fu as "having the talent often thousand men."56 Indeed, Li Fu had combined the distinct qualities of scholar, literatus, official, and general. But after he had led 51. Yuan Mei, Suiyiian ch'iian-chi, 27/1 a. 52. Fang Pao, Fang Wang-hsi hsien-sheng wen-chi, in Kuo-hsiieh chi-pen ts'ung-shu, Shanghai, 4/83. 53. Ibid., 4/83-84. 54. Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ming Ch'ingpi-chi t'an-ts'ung, Shanghai, 1981, p. 323. 55. Juan Kuei-sheng, Ch'a-yii k'e-hua, Shanghai, 1959, chuan 3. Viewed from the perspective provided by Lee Cheuk Yin in his article on Yen Sung. Li Fu cannot be totally wrong. See Lee Cheuk Yin, 'The Ming-feng chi and the Problem of the Appraisal of Yen Sung," Journal of Ming Studies, no. 6 (1983), 37—76. 56. CCTC, 17/209; MTCK (1740), 6/15b-i6b.

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Li Fu: his life

an eventful life, his health gradually began to decline. He never completely recovered from his illness, and in 1743 he resigned his office because of failing health.57 Asked by the emperor if he had anything to say before taking his leave, Li Fu merely replied, "To act with the same care in the end as in the beginning" (shen chung ju shih),58 an epigram that also commented ironically on the decline of the Ch'ing regime, which began shortly after the Ch'ien-lung emperor reached the peak of a glorious reign in his middle age. This concise maxim made by Li Fu for the Ch'ien-lung emperor did not escape the historians' attention and was recorded in the History of the Ch'ing Dynasty.59

To glorify Li Fu's return to his home, the Ch'ien-lung emperor composed a poem in praise of Li's contributions to the state over three reigns and his personal integrity as a Lu scholar. During his life, Li Fu promoted the ideas that the learning of Chu Hsi consisted primarily of "following the path of inquiry and study" (tao wen-hsiieh) and that the superiority of Lu Hsiang-shan resided in "honoring the moral nature" (tsun te-hsing), a theme first struck by Wu Ch'eng in the early Yuan and inherited by Li Fu. The Ch'ien-lung emperor acknowledged Li's remarks.60 After his retirement, Li-Fu led a relatively tranquil life until his death in Lin-ch'uan in 1750. In sum, Li Fu's life furnishes us with the existential dimension to enable us to appreciate why he was attracted to the thought of Lu Hsiang-shan in his early days and subsequently took up the championing of the Lu-Wang doctrines as his lifelong commitment. Apart from the common stress on the need for practice in concrete situations, both Lu's belief in "the fundamental mind" and Wang's in "the innate knowledge of the good" provided Li Fu with the dynamism to respond to the everchanging situation he encountered. Although Li Fu was a Lu-Wang scholar, he was well versed in evidential study (k'ao-cheng) as well. He had no difficulty in grasping the merits of the evidential approach and established good relations with the Hui family that had been famous for doing evidential research over three generations.61 57. Mu-t'angpieh-kao (The additional collection of Mu-t'ang's writings, hereafter abbreviated as MTPK), Fu-ch'i-t'ang, 1831, 33/2ib-23b. 58. Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan, i5/8a. 59. Ibid., i5/8b. Besides the Ch'ien-lung emperor's mishandling of personnel affairs in his later years, other social and economic factors also contributed to the decline of the Ch'ing regime. 60. Wang Ping-hsieh, Kuo-ch'ao ming-ch'eng yen-hsing-lu (The deeds and words of the famous officials of the Ch'ing), 1885 edition, i2/25a. 61. Chiang Fan, Kuo-ch'ao Han-hsiieh shih-ch'eng-chih, Peking, 1983, p. 23.

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Li Fu was also noted as an outstanding writer in his day. He was very critical of Fang Pao's writings, although the latter had already enjoyed great literary fame and was considered the leader of the T'ung-ch'eng school.62 In writing an epigraph in memory of Fang Pao, Ch'uan Tsuwang singled out Li Fu and praised him and Fang as the two most learned scholars south of the Yangtze River.63 The first collection of Li Fu's writings was printed in 1740, entitled Mu-Vang ch'u-kao. His selfconfidence in his talent for literary composition can be seen in a letter to a student seeking the latter's help to publish his book. In the letter he asserts that his writings could compete with those of the established writers of the Sung and the Yuan periods.64 Fang Pao also contributed a preface to this collection in praise of Li Fu's literary merits.65 The second collection of his writings, called Mu-t'angpieh-kao, appeared about 1747. Both were banned in 1768 due to his involvement with the Tai Mingshih case.66 In 1831, a combined and revised edition of his writings was reprinted with alteration and the omission of some passages that might have invited censorship. The popularity of Li Fu's writings is evidenced by the fact that certain illegal book merchants even put Li Fu's younger brother's book in Li Fu's name in order to reap greater profits.67 Li Fu's writings on current social and economic measures also attracted Ho Ch'ang-ling's attention. Ho included some of them in his famous anthology, Writings from Our Dynasty on Statecraft (Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien) ,68 62. Ch'en K'ang-ch'i, Lang-ch'ien chi-wen san-pi, Peking, 1984, pp. 842-843. 63. CCTC, 17/204. 64. MTCK, $5/5a. 65. Fang Pao, Fang Wang-hsi, 4/83-84. 66. 'The Case of Li Fu's Literary Compositions," in Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yu tang, 2nd series, Taipei, 1969, pp. ia-2b. 67. A certain merchant changed Nan-yuan shih-wen-ch'ao, a collection of essays actually composed by Li Fu's brother, Li Hung, to the title, Mu-fang shih-wen ch'ao to cheat those who liked to read Li Fu's writings. The so-called Mu-t'angshih-wen-ch'ao, available in the Harvard Yenching Library, is in fact Nan-yuan shih-wen-ch 'ao. 68. Ho Ch'ang-ling, Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien, 1896.

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Li Fu: an exemplary Lu-Wang scholar in the Ch'ing dynasty (2) His thought

His conception of destiny (ming)

In discussing Li Fu's thought, it may be useful to start with what he believes can and cannot be accomplished during a person's lifetime. His notion of destiny reveals his perception of the limits of human effort in general and of moral practice in particular. In his view, people who lack a correct understanding of the meaning of destiny cannot become sages or wise men. Some of these people neither believe nor trust in the operation of destiny. They think that a person can pursue the good and avoid disasters at one's will. On the other hand, others assign too great a role to destiny. Believing that everything is predetermined, they simply submit themselves to the hands of destiny. Both ideas are incorrect, according to Li Fu.1 A clear discussion of the nature of destiny seems superfluous to those who already reside in the zone of virtue; but it is absolutely necessary for those who are immersed in material desires, but willing to learn. The strategy used to enlighten the latter is to teach them an appropriate belief in destiny. This is not to suggest that one should simply become obsessed with fortune and misfortune. Instead, one should engage oneself in the sages' Way. A second task is to show that the good are remunerated with blessing and the evil with calamity. Only after realizing these truths can one be virtuous.2 At first glance these two tasks appear to be contradictory, but they are not. 1. MTCK, i8/6a.

2. Ibid., i8/6a-6b.

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Li Fu's idea of destiny had two components. One concerns the determinate destiny (yu-ting chih ming), which man is made to follow. The other is the indeterminate destiny (wu-ting chih ming) which awaits its realization by the will of man. Therefore, for the gentleman there are two modes of learning that correspond to these two destinies. For the determinate destiny, there is the learning of waiting for fate (ssu-ming chih hsu'eh); for the indeterminate destiny, there is the learning of establishing one's own destiny (li-ming chih hsu'eh). Both are important to a gentleman in leading a moral life.3 According to Li Fu, in the universe there are vital forces (ch 'i) such as yin and yang, through which the ten thousand things are created. Among all creatures, man is the most intelligent. So it is plausible to see these two destinies in him.4 Man has a life cycle just as ch 'i has its pattern of rise and fall. When ch 'i is ascending, no one can force it down; when ch'i is down, no one can make it go up. Thus man's life cycle cannot be reversed or changed. However, Li Fu does not care to illustrate this point with examples from physical life, but instead applies the pattern of ch 'i to human destiny as a whole. The ups and downs of destiny are decided by Heaven and therefore called the determinate destiny. The determinate destiny is further categorized under four items. From the microscopic to the macroscopic, they are the determinate destiny of an individual, of a family, of a state, and of the world.5 When the world leaned to prosperity, the sagely emperors Yu, T'ang, Wen, and Wu could bring about a grand age through their rule. When it declined, even sages such as Confucius and Mencius could not put it in order. When a state was on the rise, dukes such as Huan of Ch'i and Wen of Chin could assume hegemonies. When a state like Lu was on the decline, a great minister such as Kung-i-tzu and wise men such as Tzu-liu and Tzu-ssu could do nothing to stop its downfall. The same is true of the fate of an individual and a family. If a family moves toward prosperity, the father will initiate a great undertaking and his son will inherit it. But if a family declines, things will go the other way. For an individual, when he is in a prosperous trend, the Way will be manifested in him; when not, the Way will perish. These are the four determinate destinies against which a gentleman can voice no complaints and has to accept.6 In other words, even men of sagely endowment may appear in history, but whether they can bring their wisdom and virtue to bear upon society is to a large extent dependent on the times. However, there are also four indeterminate destinies relating to the world, state, family, and individual. One can see the indeterminate 3. MTCK, i8/6b.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 18/73.

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6. Ibid., i8/7a~7b.

Li Fu: his thought

destiny manifested in the general trend. For example, although the Ch'in merged six other states and unified the world as parts of a general trend, the Ch'in empire lasted for only two generations because its rulers disregarded benevolent politics. The Eastern Chou regime, although weak, lasted very long, for it benefited from the accumulated achievement of its previous virtuous rulers. The examples of the manifestations of the indeterminate destiny on the level of state can be seen in the various lands of the Warring States period. Solely dependent on their might, the states of Wu and Yueh acquired hegemony quickly, but lost it after a very short while. Lu and Wei, despite their weaknesses, endured for a long period because they had accommodated many gentlemen and rites. Family and individual are no exceptions to this rule. They rise when they behave morally; they decline when they do not.7 This description of the indeterminate destiny seems to contradict the concept of the determinate destiny mentioned by Li Fu previously. To resolve this apparent contradiction, Li Fu introduces the concept of chi (accumulation). People are constantly puzzled by the phenomenon that good deeds do not always pay rich dividends to the doer. Or sometimes they are mistaken in holding that only emperors or ministers with great powers can establish their destiny, as opposed to those scholars and commoners who are incapable of doing so because their power is too feeble to dominate ch'i (vital force). All of these mistaken views result from their ignorance of the concept of chi (accumulation).8 Ten thousand things are formed by ch'i and are always located in a trend. The trend so defined is the embodiment of overwhelming ch'i or the disposition of ch'i moving in a dynamic process. The ch'i as a trend is not influenced by the small, individual acts of good or evil made by separate acts of human behavior. In order to transform ch'i substantially, one needs to accumulate enough acts, whether good or evil, over a period of time. Only then can ch'i (the determinate destiny, here) be changed or a trend be reoriented.9 Indeed, Li Fu leaves room for moral practice to play a role in human destiny. But how much influence can it exert on human affairs? It seems that its effects are quite limited. Li Fu well recognized that ch 'i as a trend, an environmental force, sets a priori the track that human effort must follow and thereby constrains it. Determinate destiny as a given ch'i (or trend, here) means to him much more than historical or social factors understood in today's scientific context. The notion of a determined fate came from the pattern of ch % a mysterious, impersonal, and encompassing cosmic force and material. Pervading the universe, the pattern of ch'i 7. Ibid., i8/7a.

8. Ibid., i8/7b.

9. Ibid., i8/8a.

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regulates human affairs as well. It is too powerful for any human being to modify. Moral practice, defined by Li Fu as the indeterminate destiny, seems to be a restraining force to check - rather than to change entirely - the pattern of ch'i. Historical examples provided by Li Fu bear witness to this. Even a man as sage as Confucius could not restore the ideal feudalistic order to the Chou regime. The longevity of certain types of benevolent politics can be attributed to the character of the trend at the time when power was assumed, as in the cases of kings Wen and Wu. When Li Fu adopts the idea of the accumulation of moral behavior in opposition to the determining power of the pattern of ch % he considers moral practice in a quantitative sense and counts the consequence of moral behavior rather than its existential meaning. He believes that in the long run, through the accumulation of individual moral acts, the pattern of ch'i can be altered to a certain extent. This throws light on why, in spite of his severe criticisms of Buddhism, Li Fu thinks that it is worth retaining the ledgers of merit and demerit (kung-kuo-ko) as a form of recording daily concrete moral behavior without adopting such Buddhist doctrines as the rebirth of the soul or the theory of emptiness.10 The ledgers of merit and demerit, which had come into being in the Sung but became widely popular in the late Ming, were initially developed by the Buddhists, Taoists, or even Confucians to evaluate daily deeds with a credit system in which a balance is achieved by adding a point for each merit and deducting a point for each demerit. The greater the balance of the credit, the better a person is in moral terms, and the more he or she will be rewarded by gods. A believer is expected to carry on this method each day, and at the end of each month and each year must also calculate how he or she stands. Mechanical though the system is, it implies that one can evaluate oneself by doing virtue and eschewing vice, and thereby take charge of one's own fate.11 It was interesting to note that in contrast to Li Fu, such Ch'eng-Chu scholars as Lu Liu-liang and Chang Lii-hsiang attacked the ledgers of merit and demerit and their advocate, Yuan Huang, vehemently, because the ledgers contradicted the Confucian "learning of establishing destiny."12 But such Lu-Wang scholars as Li Fu and Chang Hsueh-ch'eng 10. MTCK, 11. As for the ledgers of merit and demerit see Tadao Sakai, "Confucianism and Popular Education Works," in William Theodore de Bary, ed., Self and Society in Ming Thought (New York, 1970), pp. 341-345. Also see Cynthia Brokaw's study on the same subject,

The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit (Princeton, N.J., 1991). 12. MTCK, 43/10a. See Lu Liu-liang, Ssu-shu chiang-i, prefaced in 1686, i7/3a~3b; Chang Lii-hsiang, Chang Yang-yuan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi, 1871, 28723a.

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favored the adoption of the ledgers as a tool of moral cultivation.13 The difference in their attitudes toward ledgers, I speculate, might lie in the fact that the Wang Yang-ming school during the late Ming period was associated with the movement of the unity of three teachings (san-chiao ho-i), and the ledgers were a synthetic phenomenon. Therefore, the LuWang scholars were not so hostile to ledgers as the Ch'eng-Chu school often was. At the age of twenty-four, Li Fu once used the ledgers to examine his daily life.14 His approval of the ledgers of merit and demerit shows that although he does not expect that good or bad deeds will induce rewards or punishments on either an immediate or a short-term basis, he does believe that human destiny can be altered through incessant moral effort over a long period. More revealing, moral behavior denned by Li Fu as countable, discrete units lacks the character of intrinsic connection, as the pattern of ch 'i always does. According to such an understanding, Li Fu unwittingly relegates moral practice to secondary importance in contrast to the enormous collective force of the pattern of ch'i (the determinate destiny) in its domination over the human world. His belief in geomancy is a good indication of this. Once he complained to his brother that because the latter did not manage their father's tomb properly, they let out the good ch 'i and caused quite a few misfortunes to befall the family, including the death of Li Fu's two children, the illness of their eldest brother, and his own trouble in official service.15 Besides being a duty of a local official, Li Fu's performance of sacrificial rites to a god of the city wall (Ch 'eng-huang) or to the god of the river, as well as his praying for rain and good harvest, can also be understood in this context.16 In this regard, Li Fu stood in contrast to his "master," Lu Hsiang-shan. When Lu served as a magistrate, he substituted moral teachings for religious ceremonies.17 If, quantitatively speaking, moral practice can never be as efficacious as ch'i as a whole, an interpretation of moral behavior in a qualitative sense might. In the essay "On Destiny," Li Fu not only offers the quantitative argument already described, but also reveals another conviction he held concerning moral effort. The second argument is often entangled with the first, for Li Fu is eager to persuade the layman to convert to the sagely Way through the accumulation of moral acts. The second argument recovers its original form only through a roundabout 13. 14. 16. 17.

Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, Chang-shih i-shu, Taipei, n.d. 2g/i2b-i4a. MTCK 43/ioa. 15. MTPK 35/gb-ioa. Ibid., 48/3a~3b, 4a~4b, 5a~5b, 6a-6b. Lu Hsiang-shan, Lu Chiu-yuan chi, Peking, 1980, 36/510.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

analysis further attested to by Li Fu's personal demonstration of moral courage. When Li Fu tries to define the indeterminate destiny, he says: Heaven endows man with ch yi. There must be principle in correspondence to this ch'i Ch'i has increase and decrease; but not principle. Ch'i has up and down but not principle. The state of prosperity cannot abruptly fall, but a gentleman is to worry about its prosperity. The state of decline cannot abruptly be recovered, but a gentleman is to help raise it from its state of decline. Thus [Mencius] says, "This is the fate, but therein lies human nature. That is why the gentleman does not regard it as fate."18 This is the so-called indeterminate destiny.19 That Li Fu quotes Mencius in this statement reminds us that his conception of the indeterminate destiny is in effect a variation on the theme of human nature first proposed by Mencius. As Mencius had said: The way the mouth is disposed toward tastes, the eye toward colors, the ear toward sounds, the nose toward smells, and the four limbs toward ease is human nature, yet therein also lies fate. That is why the gentleman does not describe it as nature. The way benevolence pertains to the relation between prince and subject, the rites to the relation between guest and host, wisdom to the good and wise man, and the sage to the Way of Heaven, is fate, but therein also lies human nature. That is why the gentleman does not describe it as fate.20

Li Fu's definition of indeterminate destiny corresponds well to Mencius's stress on the moral character of human nature. In addition, he enriches the discussion of it with the concepts of principle and ch'i. Unlike ch'i, principle is not subject to change. Li Fu believed that a gentleman should stand on principle rather than submit totally to ch 'I21 In other words, a gentleman does not shift his ground to accord with the vicissitudes of destiny. Moral behavior concerns itself with principle, not the external operation of ch'i Li Fu's conviction that moral practice is a kind of existential decision based on intrinsic human values displays his conception of principle as being located in moral discourse. But when Li Fu turns to the concept of the accumulation of indeterminate destiny in contrast to the pattern of ch % he is shifting from a deontological argument to a utilitarian one in which the meaning of moral commitment is blurred by an objective calculation of efficiency. However, at least three points are clear to us. First, Li Fu holds that it is necessary to take the result of long-term moral practices into account in order to influence the determinate destiny. 18. SSCC, Mencius, p. 210. 19. MTCK, i8/6b~7a. 20. English translation is taken from D.C. Lau with a slight modification. D.C. Lau, trans., Mencius, Harmondsworth, 1970, pp. 198-199. 21. MTCK, i8/7b.

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Second, a sense of moral autonomy also finds expression in his thought, but more vividly in his action. In an essay written for one of his students, he states a maxim rooted in his mind from reading Mencius and The Doctrine of the Mean in his youth. He writes: "In situating oneself, one should reside in changes and await his destiny; in charge of business, one should act only according to the norm and await his destiny."22 So a full understanding of Li Fu's ethical view needs to cover two dimensions. As for external things or conditions like fame and wealth, one should not attempt to pursue them because they are beyond oneself, and thus their gain or loss are decided by uncontrollable fate. As for moral perfection, man can totally rely upon his own inner decision and effort. Since moral perfection belongs to the realm of the autonomous to oneself, one can achieve it by oneself.23 Finally, seeing that Li Fu regards principle as the source of moral discourse, he has to admit the discrepancy between principle and ch'i as well as that between moral practice (indeterminate destiny) and trend (determinate destiny).24 This distinction between principle and ch'i is not an insignificant aspect of a Lu-Wang scholar's construction of a theory of morality. To him ch'i is the cosmic force or substance that goes through Heaven and Earth as well as the ten thousand things. But unlike Chu Hsi, in discussing the concept of destiny Li Fu emphasizes the aspect of ch'i as a huge, hardly resistible trend rather than as an individual's endowment such as wisdom, folly, or longevity. The disposition in a major Lu-Wang scholar to understand ch'i as a general trend with deterministic overtones deserves our attention. In fact, Li Fu's appreciation of the concept of destiny should not be taken as a sheer intellectual exercise, but as a personal reflection on his existential predicament. The separability of principle from ch 'i reveals the tensions deeply rooted in his life as a Lu-Wang scholar-official under an alien regime, and as a minority Lu-Wang thinker overwhelmed by the majority Ch'eng-Chu school. Politically, Li Fu's acceptance of the Ch'ing regime is understandable because the rise or fall of a political power was associated in his thought with the pattern of encompassing ch% and thus 22. MTPK, g/i2a-i2b. 23. MTCK, 43/22a-23b. Mencius anticipated the same idea long before Li Fu. Mencius said: "Seek and you will get it; let go and you will lose it. If this is the case then seeking is of use to getting and what is sought is within yourself. But if there is a proper way to seek it and whether you get it or not depends on destiny, then seeking is of no use to getting and what is sought lies outside yourself." SSCC, Mencius, p. 188. The English translation is taken from Lau, Mencius, p. 182. 24. For a general discussion of the development of the concept of fate (ming) over Chinese history see Tang Chun-i, Chung-kuo che-hsueh yuan-lun (On Chinese philosophy), Hong Kong, 1966, chs. 16—18.

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the Ch'ing regime represented the rise of ch'l However, Li Fu cannot come to terms with the dominant Ch'eng-Chu school because intellectual commitment means an individual moral decision and thus a matter of "principle." In this regard, his life can be regarded as a confirmation of his theoretical articulation of the concept of destiny: Although an individual is too finite to resist predetermined destiny or the movement of ch'i, he is entitled to stand on principle to magnify the meaning of his commitment to the Way and thereby to assert his existence. The character of the Way (too)

What is the Way? And where is the Way manifested? According to Li Fu, the Way is found in the relationship between lord and subject, father and son, husband and wife, brothers, and friends. These five fundamental human relationships (wu-luri) are regarded as eternal and ethical in character. If the Way is so defined, then education (chiaOy education in a broad sense) should begin with teaching these human relationships (jen-lun), which are indispensable for human self-preservation.25 Li Fu was in essence an anthropogenic constructivist who believed that human culture and civilization were intentionally created by the sagekings and the sages.26 In ancient China, during the time of the sage-kings Yao, Shun, Yu, T'ang, Wen, and Wu,27 political authority and cultural authority were combined in one - instructors and education policy came from above. After kings Wen and Wu of the Chou dynasty, although power shifted to the duke of Chou, the Way was still retained in court. By the time of Confucius, the Way moved down to the intellectuals (shih) as education became common among them.28 Li Fu illustrates this assertion by pointing out that the earliest educational program was initiated by the sage-kings Yao and Shun to instruct the minister Ch'i how to teach people the five ethical principles, that is, the affection between father and son, the righteousness between sovereign and minister, the distinction between husband and wife, the proper order between old and young, and fidelity between friends. The ancient 25. MTCK, 18/1 a. 26. The term "anthropogenic constructivist" is borrowed from Professor Yu-sheng Lin in referring to "a belief that social, political, and moral orders of the world are intentional constructions by sage-kings and sages of antiquity." See his Crisis of Chinese Consciousness, Madison, Wise, 1978, p. 51. I employ this term in a broader sense to include the renovations of the physical civilization by the sages. 27. The sage-kings of ancient China usually referred to two emperors, Yao and Shun, and four kings, Yu, T'ang, Wen, and Wu. 28. MTCK, i8/2a-2b.

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text version of the Chou-li asserts that the minister of instruction teaches three things to people: the "six virtues" (liu-te), the "six conducts" (liuhsing), and the "six arts" (liu-i).29 All of these are intrinsically associated with the five human relationships, and through them a distinctively ethical community can be formed. In that period, the sage-kings promoted education from above. Those who received their teachings were regarded as their subjects.30 Later, the sages inherited this tradition in instructing people to farm, fish, build houses, and make weapons for self-protection. Through their ingenious cultural innovations and ritual practices, the sage-kings created solidarity among the people and invented the written language for the purpose of communication. Further, they arranged the social hierarchy on the basis of political and economic differentiation. For instance, in terms of political distinctions, there were the sovereign, the ministers, the low-ranking officials, and the commoners; in terms of professions, there were the scholars, the peasants, the workers, and the merchants. All of these various groups originated from the five fundamental categories of human relations.31 Therefore, no true Way existed outside of these five human relationships. Li Fu concludes, "If the Way exists only in human relationships, no teaching can go beyond human relationships. "32 Historically speaking, Li Fu believes that the later the age, the more sophisticated the culture, and consequently, the more comprehensive the contents of education. To Li Fu, this was the universal pattern followed since the golden age of the sage-kings. But after the breakdown of the Chou feudal order, cultural power became separated from political power and fell into the hands of the intellectuals. Thereupon, people who did not understand the Way's evolution during the ancient golden age wrongly considered the teachings of the sages to be exclusively the doctrine of the Confucians.33 Taking advantage of the divorce of the cultural tradition from political authority, the first generation of heterodox teachers emerged with Yang Chu and Mo-tzu to compete with Confucian transmission of orthodox teachings established by the sage-kings. According to Li Fu, it was Mencius who first reserved the word "ju" for those who fought for the authentic Way and against heterodoxies. Before Mencius, the word ju 29. The six virtues are wisdom, humanity, sageliness, righteousness, loyalty, and harmony; the six conducts are filial piety, friendliness, fraternity, kindness, love of kin, trustworthiness, and charity; the six arts are rite, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and mathematics. 30. MTCK, 18/ia-ib. 31. Ibid., i8/ia-2b. 32. Ibid., i8/2a. 33. Ibid., i8/2a-2b.

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was used to refer to scholars in general. After him,ju became specifically used to denote the members of the Confucian school.34 Yang Chu promoted the doctrine of egoistic love (wei-wo), and Mo-tzu that of universal love (chien-ai). Although Yang Chu and Mo-tzu were heretics, they did not entirely abandon the idea of five basic human relationships. It was only the extreme forms of their doctrines that were detrimental to human relations. Mo-tzu's "universal love," if pushed to the extreme, would blur the intimate relations between father and son. Yang Chu's "egoistic love," if pushed to its extreme, would eradicate the obligations between sovereign and minister. Mo-tzu set forth a social ideal directly counter to the natural expression of biological intimacy between parents and children. In Yang Chu's case, to the extent that egoistic love becomes a concern only for oneself, the individual would disregard the social obligations indispensable for the functioning of society, even though the individual survives best in a social network. Mencius had to dispute with Yang and Mo because he was well aware of their implicit mistakes.35 Because human relations were necessary for self-preservation, Mencius was justified in saying, "Those who flee from the errors of Mo naturally turn to Yang, and those who flee from the errors of Yang naturally turn to the Confucians."36 More serious challenges to Confucianism later came from Taoists and Buddhists who claimed that their "Way" transcended human relationships. Li Fu leveled criticisms at both doctrines by showing that only human relationships enable man's self-preservation.37 In the human body, Li Fu maintains, there exists principle (li), spirit (sheri), vital force {ch'i), and form (hsingh). Humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and truthfulness are what he meant by principle. The operation of consciousness is spirit. Inhalation and exhalation are vital force. Ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and the four limbs are the form of the body. When one allows principle to direct the spirit, one's spirit to control vital force, and the vital force to circulate in the body, human relationships arise when all of these prevail in oneself and the world.38 Viewed in this light, Li Fu regards human relationships as the external and dynamic manifestations of human endowment. Even if the "Way" of Buddhists can shed light on the past and predict the future, they do not concern themselves with human relations because of their obsession with the quietness of the spirit to the exclusion of things and principles. The spirit they attain is vulnerable to disturbance when it moves in response to things. The same is true for the "Way" of the Taoists. At best, it can cure illnesses and 34. MTCK i8/2b. 37. MTCK 18/33.

35. Ibid., 18/33. 36. SSCC, Mencius, p. 211; MTCK, i8/2b. 38. Ibid., i8/3a~3b.

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prolong human life, but their "Way" brings nothing to human relations because of their preoccupation with the purity of vital force to the exclusion of all things and principles. The vital force they cultivate is vulnerable to failure in action.39 Hence, only the Confucian Way is valid under all circumstances because it is immanent in human relations. Worried about the spread of these heterodoxies. Han Yu (768—824), the forerunner of Neo-Confucians, urged the government to suppress them, and Ou-yang Hsiu (1007—72) proposed cultivation of the fundamental to oppose them. To Li Fu, it is superfluous to do either because the true Confucian Way will eventually be realized in this world. The reason is obvious: The teachings of the sages consist in the five human relationships. To dispense with these human relationships would be to eradicate human society. For example, without the distinction between the sovereign and the minister, the strong would mistreat the weak, the majority would oppress the minority, and disorder would prevail; without the distinction between husband and wife, the reproductive system would cease.40 To Li Fu, it was also incorrect for Neo-Confucians since the Southern Sung to argue against Taoism and Buddhism by employing such abstract concepts as "nature" or "mind." These concepts were so elusive that they were exploited by various sides to support different positions. Often the more one used these terms, the more confused one became. To avoid the confusion brought about by such metaphysical discussions, one should directly appeal to the substance of the five human relationships. The constant performance of these human relationships in daily life was the best demonstration of the real nature of the Way.41 Human society cannot exist even for a moment without the five human relationships, and therefore the Way of the sages will not cease for a moment. One who fears the influence of Taoism and Buddhism is mistaken: He does not realize that as long as men live in this world they cannot transcend the categories of human relationships. Through his identification of the Confucian Way with secular human relations, Li Fu broadens the community of Confucians to include all classes of people. Anyone who fulfills the substance of the human relationships is by definition counted as a Confucian. Hence, peasants, workers and merchants, together with the Confucian intellectuals, are all regarded as Confucians. Confucians thus defined far outnumbered the heretics. The influence of Confucianism was thus much greater than that of Taoism and Buddhism.42 In accordance with the true Way, the program of Confucian education lies in the teaching of the five human relation39. Ibid., 24/ib.

40. Ibid., i8/3b~4a.

41. Ibid., 24/ib.

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ships, which are the practical expression of moral principle.43 In Li Fu's mind, there apparently is a slight difference between the Way and principle. The Way is principle in the process of operation. In other words, until principle is acted upon, it cannot be called the Way. It is not only true of the Way of man, but also true of Heaven's Way. The principle of Heaven is called the Great Ultimate. When principle is accompanied by cWi and transforms itself in the world, it is called yin and yang. The Way is yin and yang in operation. The Way and yin and yang are invisible. They belong to the category of "above form" (hsing-erh-shang), as Lu Hsiang-shan had asserted in opposition to Chu Hsi.44 If the Way is manifest only in the dimension of action, the appropriate way of learning should focus on the realization of principle in human behavior. Li Fu's sympathy with the reforms of Wang An-shih can be explained in terms of his notion of the Way as well.45 The true Way cannot be remote from or ineffectual in human affairs. Nonetheless, the reforms of Wang An-shih did not exemplify a perfect demonstration of the exercise of the Way because of their failure in the end. By this standard of the Way, the incomparable achievements in the civil and military service belonged to Wang Yang-ming and were the result of the practice of his own doctrine.46 Lo Ch'in-shun, a famous contemporary of Yang-ming, could not compare with Yang-ming as a statesman. This provides Li Fu with another reason to assert that Yang-ming's doctrine is far superior to that of Lo Ch'in-shun.47 Li Fu believes that man is self-sufficient in moral resources, for he is endowed at birth with innate knowledge of the good. Innate knowledge that is a priori needs no borrowing from the external world. If so, what does learning consist of? Learning as an empirical experience is, first of all, the "imitation" (hsiao) of heaven's principle of our mind. In other words, the effect of learning is expressed through the extension of the innate knowledge to practical action.48 Learning thus conceived is primarily an ongoing process extending from within our minds toward what is outside. Subsidiary to this major form of learning, book reading and other literary activities can be considered secondary learning. They help to nourish our mind and broaden our view "only when we are isolated from other persons."49 This qualification indicates that the problem of human 43. MTCK, 18/ioa. 44. Ibid., 21/17a. 45. For example, his sympathy with the reform of Wang An-shih is expressed in his justification for Wang. Like Lu Hsiang-shan, Li Fu has a more positive opinion of Wang An-shih's reform than Chu Hsi does. See MTCK, 45/6a~7a, and his comments in LHCC, 19/iob. For Lu's appraisal of Wang An-shih, see CTWC, 7o/6b-i3a. 46. MTCK, 45/1 lb-i2a. 47. Ibid., i8/i7a-i7b. 48. Ibid., 18/ioa. 49. MTCK{ 1740), 21/18b, MTCK 18/12b.

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relatedness is of prime concern to Li Fu. The Way emerges only in human interactions. One is not obliged to grasp everything in books. Li Fu states: [Reading and discussing the classics] are useful to cultivate our mind and body. But even if we exert ourselves fully to master the classics, it in fact adds nothing to our learning, for the principles contained in these texts are already to be found in our nature. It does not diminish the value of our learning if we do not understand every point in these texts, for one's degree of comprehension of any text often depends on his own temperament.50 Therefore, for Li Fu, it is misleading for Chu Hsi and his followers to treat textual studies and intellectual discussion as the major forms of learning. Learning in a real sense is never a matter of discussion and speculation.51 The first task of learning is to direct our attention to the innate knowledge of our mind. Through the actualization of the innate knowledge in concrete situations, the end of learning is finally achieved. Man thus learns "something" from the process of his association of the inner moral principle with external conditions. In this sense, we can understand why Li Fu relegates the study of the classics to a role of secondary importance. Similarly, ko-wu (the measurement of things, according to Li) never means book learning and intellectual discussion, and ch'iung-li (the search for principle) is not simply a matter of intellectual understanding alone.52 Lu Hsiang-shan had urged people to cultivate themselves through social interactions; still, he put knowledge prior to action. 53 Wang Yangming called for vigorous and active effort in polishing and training oneself in the actual affairs of life, but he placed knowledge and action on the same footing temporarily.54 While this respect for the importance of practical action finds its expression in Li Fu's thought, too, he goes beyond his precursors in maintaining that action is the very source from which knowledge comes.55 This unique concern with action results in his development of a particular interpretational theory in which the original wording of the classics concerning knowledge or learning is turned into a description of action. A few examples will suffice for our analysis. In the Analects, Confucius said: "[A gentleman] should study all learning extensively" (po-hsiieh yu wen) .56 Rather than referring to the classic texts such as the Book of Poetry, learning (wen) here is taken by Li Fu to mean the items of seeing (shih), hearing (t'ing), speaking (yen), and behaving (tung).57 By holding that Confucius's self-description about being fond 50. MTCK(1740), 2i/i8b. 51. MTCK, 18/1 lb. 52. MTCK(1740), 21/24^ 53. LHCC, i2/6a-6b, 34/1 ob, 39b, 36/9^ 54. CHL, p. 31. 55. MTCK i8/ioa-i5a. 56. SSCQ Analects, p. 39. 57. MTCK (1740), 21/19b.

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of antiquity and earnestly seeking it, Li Fu asserts something specifically about Confucius's textual compilations rather than about a general method of study. Certainly po-hsueh (broad learning) in the Doctrine of the Mean cannot, in the eyes of Li Fu, be taken to mean "study, inquiry, and reflection."58 In short, an "emphasis on praxis" permeates Li Fu's voice. In this regard he was probably influenced by the Yen-Li school, a group of thinkers active a generation earlier who advocated that action and only action was the touchstone of all truth.59 However, Li Fu does not go as far as Yen Yuan does in proclaiming that "the more one reads the more foolish one becomes," or even that "reading a book is just the same as swallowing arsenic."60 Li's concern for the need for action blends with another stream of thought initiated by Ku Yen-wu and Huang Tsung-hsi. For examples, Huang wrote, "Without wide reading one cannot confirm the variations of the principle."61 This stream of thought gradually reached its peak in Li Fu's day. Li Fu represents not only an authentic Lu-Wang thinker but also a man of erudition. In order to survive in an age dominated by an interests in textual research, a Lu-Wang scholar had to cut his clothes in a way that was not at all compatible originally with Lu-Wang tradition. The relationship between mind (hsin), nature (hsing), and principle (li) Even if a discussion of the general view of the Way cannot clearly distinguish a Lu-Wang from a Ch'eng-Chu scholar, an exposition of their conceptualization of the relationship among mind, nature, and principle should suffice. In other words, philosophically, the essential distinction between a Lu-Wang and a Ch'eng-Chu scholar can be easily seen in their different understanding of the relationship between these three concepts. Li Fu distinguishes himself successfully as a Lu-Wang thinker in the early Ch'ing by inheriting and synthesizing the Lu-Wang heritage, on the one hand, and by responding to Ch'eng-Chu scholars' challenges, on the other. Thus one of the best ways to understand Li Fu's conception of the relationships among mind, nature, and principle is to view his defense of Wang Yang-ming's ontology of mind and the extension of the innate knowledge of the good (chih liang-chih). 58. MTCK, 2i/igb-2oa. 59. Li Fu has a high regard for Li Kung's personal attainment of his own learning and viewpoint. MTCK, 33/2D. 60. Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsueh-shu-shih, vol. 1, pp. 163—164. 61. CCTC, 11/136. 9O

Li Fu: his thought

In the conversation at T'ien-ch'uan Bridge with disciples Wang Chi and Ch'ien Te-hung, Wang Yang-ming reportedly approved of the provocative statement, "The substance of mind is without the distinction between good or bad" {wu-shan wu-o shih hsin-chih-t'i).62 Wang's statement sounded very Buddhist and therefore had evoked a series of debates among scholars. For instance, Chang Lieh (1622-85) fiercely attacked the statement in his Doubts on the Doctrine of Wang Yang-ming (Wang-hsiieh chih-i), a book that drew Li Fu's attention.63 Yen Jo-ch'u (1636-1704) also attacked Wang Yang-ming, in his famous Inquiry into the Book ofHistory of the Old Text (Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng), for deviating

from the Confucian Way by holding that the substance of the mind is neither good nor bad. Yen even went so far as to propose the removal of Wang's tablet from the Confucian temple.64 It was such severe criticism by Chu Hsi scholars that provoked Li Fu's defense of Wang.65 Li Fu was skeptical as to whether or not Wang Yang-ming had actually made the provocative statement. Liu Tsung-chou (1578-1645) and Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-95) na cl earlier raised questions about the authenticity of the statement and had thus already given Lu-Wang scholars an easy way out.66 Nonetheless, Li Fu found nothing wrong with the statement; thus it was not necessary to insist that Yang-ming never uttered it.67 In Li Fu's view, the word t'i (substance), which demands explication if we are to understand Yang-ming's statement, means original and unchangeable essence. In the state of tranquillity, the substance of mind is calm and unmoved, so the distinction between good and bad does not arise. Only when the mind becomes active with the will (i) does such a distinction emerge.68

62. CHL, pp. 257-258. Also see Wang Yang-ming nien-p 'u in WYCC. For a description of the same event with a slightly different emphasis see Wang Chi, Lung-hsi Wang-hsien-sheng ch'iian-chi, Kyoto, n.d., i/ia~3a. 63. Chang Lieh, Wang-hsiieh chih-i, n.p., n.d., appendix, pp. 1 ia-i4b; MTCK, 45/i6a-i7b. 64. Yen Jo-ch'u, Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng (An inquiry into the Book ofDocuments ofthe Old Text), n.p., 1867, 8/67a-7ob. 65. Although Yen Jo-ch'u's book was published in 1745, its manuscript had circulated for a long while. (See postscripts to Yen's book made by his son and grandson, la-ib). Li Fu might be one of those who read, or at least knew of, it. Li once wrote an article criticizing Mao Hsi-ho's Apology for the Book of History of the Old Text (Ku-wen shang-shu yiian-ts'u), which was intended to argue against Yen's writings. This showed Li's knowledge of the debate between Yen and Mao. In fact, on the controversial authenticity of The Book of History of the Old Text was a hot issue in Li's time. Probably inspired by his friend, Wangju-lu, Li Fu wrote several articles demonstrating that the Old Text was, a forgery. See MTCK, ig/ia-3b, 4a-6a, and 4 5 / 3 9 ^ - 4 1 ^ 66. MJHA, Shih-shou, p. 7 and 16/55. According to Tsou Shou-i, the statement should read "Ultimate good without evil is mind" (Chih-shan wu-o che hsin). Liu Tsung-chou believed that "four-sentence teaching" (ssu-chu-chiao) was initially proposed by Wang Chi rather than Wang Yang-ming himself. 67. MTCK i8/27a. 68. Ibid., i8/27a.

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Li Fu employs two strategies to defend his position. In one he appeals to argument by analogy. Debating with Lu Hsiang-shan over the validity of xvu-chi (Non-Ultimate or Great Void) in Chou Tun-i's cosmology, Chu Hsi had justified the need for wu-chi on the grounds that it was used to describe the shapelessness of t'ai-chi (Great Ultimate) and served as the source of all potential transformation.69 Li Fu contended that if Chu Hsi was justified in arguing in this way, one could describe the substance of mind as neither good nor bad (wu-shan-o) since both employ the concept wu.70 As a matter of fact, Chu Hsi used "the Non-Ultimate and also the Great Ultimate" (wu-chi erh t'ai-chi) to describe "the reality that is formless but possesses principle." The Great Ultimate implied nothing other than a general name of the principle of Heaven and Earth and the myriad things. Therefore, it is the highest good and not ethically neutral.71 The Non-Ultimate and the Great Ultimate, which were for Chu identical temporally and spatially, are not the same as Li Fu's description of mind in both its active and tranquil states. Most important, for Chu Hsi the Non-Ultimate and the Great Ultimate cannot be seen as the mind. Furthermore, even if Li Fu's analogy holds, what concerns us most is whether the substance is indeed neither good nor had. If Li Fu's analogical reasoning seems unpersuasive, his rebuttal of an alternative thesis, which claimed that the mind is only good but not bad, is more revealing. One admits, according to Li Fu, that if mind includes nature and feelings (hsin fung hsingch'ing),72 then it is correct to assume that nature is good, but wrong to assume that mind as a whole is completely good since the feelings of mind are susceptible to evil. Further, if one penetrates the concept of nature in any depth, nature, also, is not good in its entirety. The concept of nature has two references. One refers to moral nature (i-li chih hsing) which is totally good, the other to physical nature {ch'i-chih chih hsing) which is subject to corruption and thus can be either good or bad. Therefore, nature as a whole cannot be entirely good.73 Unlike his discussion of the concept of the indeterminate destiny, in which the possibility of independence of principle in relation to chyi is allowed, Li Fu now maintains that principle always goes with ch'i and nature with mind. Mind and nature are "one in two and two in one."74 This idea enables him to identify the moral nature immediately with the mind of the Way, and the physical nature with the human mind. Conse69. CTWQ 36/7b-iob. 70. MTCK, 18/273. 71. CTWC, 36/14^ 72. MTCK, 18/273. In Chu Hsi's context it is better read: "Mind commands the nature and feelings." 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid., i8/27b.

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quently, the thesis that mind is good cannot stand - unless the mind is particularly specified as the mind of the Way.75 The discrepancy between the mind of the Way and the human mind is perceived by Li Fu as a subtle one. In disclosing this discrepancy, he indirectly exposes the gap between man's moral and physical natures, along with that between principle and ch'i in Chu Hsi's construction of a philosophical anthropology. In other words, the means that Li Fu adopts to offer a possibly valid interpretation for the thesis, 'The mind is good," confirms that Chu Hsi's maxim, "Nature is principle," should be understood as "Moral nature is principle," a conclusion we reached in Chapter 2. In Chu Hsi's own system, mind and nature are clearly not the same. Chu Hsi's conception of mind is more like a conscious agent than a static substance in itself. For him, the mind of the Way (tao-hsin) refers to the mind when consciously responding to the Way; the human mind (jenhsin) refers to the mind when issuing from biological needs and desires.76 But there is one mind alone taking charge of those two functions. To be good is to have the mind of the Way presiding over the human mind, which is ethically indeterminate but is susceptible to physical desires.77 It is Li Fu's identification of principle with ch'i, and mind with nature, that allows him to make use of Chu Hsi's moral nature, physical nature, the mind of the Way, and the human mind in line with the LuWang tradition. Moreover, the way Li Fu uses Chu Hsi's vocabulary partially reveals his commitment to Chu's concept of ch'i. In Li Fu, we see how the concept of ch 'i acquires a theoretical significance by tackling the problem of moral cultivation - despite that this concept was originally peripheral to the Lu-Wang tradition.78 This emphasis on the influence of ch'i required Li Fu both to recognize its role in his own strivings for moral perfection and to integrate it well enough be compatible with the Lu-Wang heritage. Li Fu's effort at assimilating the concept of ch'i in the Lu-Wang tradition is best seen in his elaboration of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine of the extension of the innate knowledge of the good. In explaining the need of the extension of the innate knowledge of the good, Li Fu cannot help but agree with Chu Hsi that the endowment of ch'i in human bodies constitutes a vital factor in moral cultivation.79 For from the point of view of (human) nature, people are the same, but from the point of view of 75. Ibid. 76. CTYL, 62/2421. 77. Ibid., 62/2421-2424. 78. As far as Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming are concerned, Yang-ming was more obsessed with the concept of ch 'i than Hsiang-shan was. When I say that the concept of ch'i is peripheral to the Lu-Wang doctrines, I simply mean that it does not constitute a vital element in their construction of a philosophy of man. 79. MTCK 43/16a.

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the ch'i endowment, they are distinctive. Sages are exceptional because they are endowed with the purest ch'i and thus can follow principle spontaneously. Others need moral effort to compensate for the defect or partiality in their endowments of ch'i.80 People are born with the innate knowledge of the good. The innate knowledge of the good is the mind of the Way, which is very subtle for people to perceive. Moreover, it is easily beclouded by desires, although its substance can never be changed. Therefore, one cannot totally rely on the spontaneous issuance of the innate knowledge. Instead, a deliberate effort is needed for moral cultivation. This is why, according to Li Fu, Wang Yang-ming adds moral effort or "extension" (chih c) to the inborn, innate knowledge of the good.81 The special weight that Li Fu puts on deliberate moral practice reveals that the negative influence of human endowment looms large in his reckoning of moral perfection. Li Fu holds that only through a strenuous effort can original human nature be recovered and the substance of innate knowledge be fully manifested.82 Here, Li Fu must have the left wing of the Wang Yang-ming school in mind. As Wang Chi said, the extension of the innate knowledge of the good is made merely for those who are not yet enlightened. If a man has full confidence in his own innate knowledge, he would not transgress any principle just like a bead rolling around within a bowl.83 Wang Ken also claims that the extension of the innate knowledge of the good is Yang-ming's early doctrine. In his later days, Yang-ming reportedly preached only the innate knowledge of the good.84 By their interpretation of this doctrine, Wang Chi and Wang Ken transformed Yang-ming's theory of the extension of the innate knowledge of the good into their own doctrine of the innate knowledge of the good; thus they risked mistaking physical desires for Heaven's principle.85 Awareness of Wang Chi and Wang Ken's favoring the spontaneous expression of the innate knowledge of the good, and their relegating conscious moral effort to an insignificant role, is necessary to our understanding of Li Fu's interpretation of Wang Yang-ming's doctrine. Since Yang-ming's program of extension for innate knowledge took the substance of that knowledge as its point of departure in moral cultivation, his theory of moral action was intimately related to his ontology of innate knowledge. It is precisely Li Fu's acceptance of the ontological status of the innate knowledge of the good that distinguishes him from Huang Tsung-hsi, a major representative of the right wing of the Wang Yang-ming school. Huang believed that the innate knowledge 80. MTCK, i8/2ia-2ib, 27b. 81. Ibid., i8/2ia. 82. Ibid. 83. MJHA, 12/2. 84. Ibid., 32/86. 85. Cf. Wu Chen, "Wang Ken yu Wang Chi ho-lung," Chekianghsiieh k'an, no. 4, 109-115.

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of the good possessed an undisciplined quality because the mind in itself had no substance; its substance was seen only in moral effort.86 In accepting Yang-ming's doctrine, Li Fu is also forced to justify the substance of the innate knowledge, which was directly questioned by Wang Yang-ming's contemporary, Lo Ch'in-shun. For Wang, the innate knowledge of the good in our mind was the socalled principle of Heaven.87 He conceded that "nature is principle" was valid if and only if the substance of mind were taken to be the same as nature.88 In this way, he returned to Lu Hsiang-shan's "mind is principle." In fact, he also made no distinction between ch'i and nature. Metaphysically, perhaps nature conceptually meant goodness. But the good human nature's beginnings - the feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and compliance, right and wrong - could be seen only in the operation of ch'i.89 In this connection, Yang-ming could equate nature with ch'i. Unlike Lu Hsiang-shan, who disliked discussing the concept of nature,90 Yang-ming tried hard to assimilate it into his thought. However, Lo Ch'in-shun, under Chu Hsi's influence, took issue with Yang-ming on the identification of the innate knowledge with the principle of Heaven. In his opinion, the innate knowledge was consciousness at work; thus it was a cognitive function that could not be equal to heaven's principle.91 In an attempt to counter Lo's criticism, Ou-yang Ch'ung-i, a disciple of Yang-ming, employed the distinction between the mind of the Way and the human mind to characterize the difference between the innate knowledge of the good and consciousness. In doing so, Ou-yang Ch'ung-i regarded the innate knowledge of the good as knowing the "four moral germs" (ssu-tuari), and consciousness (chihch'ueh) as knowing in response to the senses.92 He thereby bifurcates knowledge into two categories. Disagreeing with Ou-yang Ch'ung-i, Lo Ch'in-shun insisted that the mind of the Way and the human mind had to be one, not two. The innate knowledge of the good could be construed as "knowing without reflection" (pu-lii-erh-chih) in the Mencian sense. It did not follow that there was another sort of knowing other than knowing in response to the senses. Besides, all the manifestations of knowing the "four moral germs" had to be expressed through sense organs; for instance, the sense of right or wrong was spoken by the mouth; the feeling of respectability was 86. MJHA, preface, p. 1. 87. CHL, p. 113. 88. Ibid., p. 64. 89. Ibid., pp. 141-142. 90. CTYL, 124/4820. 91. Lo Ch'in-shun, Lo Cheng-an hsien-shen ts'un-kao (The surviving writings of Lo Ch'inshun, hereafter abbreviated as LCA), Shanghai, 1936, 1/12. 92. LCA, 1/12; MTCK 18/230-23^

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shown in one's attitude toward others; and so forth. The conceptual distinction between "knowing morality" and "knowing perceptions of the senses," Lo charged, originally came from Buddhist influence, which should be resisted by any authentic Confucian.93 The heavenly nature (t'ien-hsing), with which Heaven endowed man at birth should be, according to Lo, conceived as substance in relation to its function, the activity of consciousness. Hence, although substance must have some function, function cannot be regarded as the substance itself.94 Therefore, principle as the Heaven's nature cannot be identical to the innate knowledge as consciousness. This claim had already been anticipated by Chu Hsi: 'That which we are conscious of in our mind is principle; that which brings consciousness into operation is the intelligent quality of ch'i [i.e., the mind]." 95 Indeed, Lo Chin-shun can be credited as a faithful Chu Hsi scholar with a profound comprehension of Master Chu's teachings. Chu Hsi's concern with an objective or cosmic guarantee of the validity of principle reappeared in Lo's critique of Wang Yang-ming's (also Ou-yang Ch'ung-i's) neglect of the external world.96 Principle, which for Lo could not be sought within the mind alone, must be confirmed by Heaven and Earth, and by the ten thousand things. Not until this was complete was principle universally to be found in everything in the universe.97 And through principle, man was to become one with the ten thousand things.98 93. LCA, 1/12-13. 94. Ibid., 1/13. 95. CTYL, 5/198. 96. LCA, 1/5, 9, 14-15. 97. Ibid., 1/14, 16-17. 98. Ibid., 1/5. Lo Chin-shun's belief that "through principle man becomes one with ten thousand things" throws a new light on Chu Hsi's disagreement with Ch'eng Hao's assertion that man becomes one with Heaven, Earth, and ten thousand things through personal recognition and feelings. Ch'eng Hao once said: "A book on medicine describes paralysis of the four limbs as absent of jen. This is an excellent description. The man of jen regards Heaven and Earth and all things as one body. To him there is nothing that is not himself. Since he has recognized all things as himself, can there be any limit to his humanity? If things are not parts of the self, naturally they have nothing to do with it. As in the case of paralysis of the four limbs, the vital force no longer penetrates them, and therefore they are no longer parts of the self." (Ho-nan Ch'engshih i-shu, Shanghai, 1935, 2a/i5; see also Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, P. 53O) He also said: "[One's duty] is to understand this principle and preserve jen with sincerity and seriousness, that is all. There is no need for caution and control. Nor is there any need for exhaustive search. Caution is necessary when one is mentally negligent, but if one is not negligent, what is the necessity for caution? Exhaustive search is necessary when one has not understood principle. But if one preserves jen long enough, it will automatically dawn on him. Why should he have to depend on exhaustive search?" (Ho-nan Ch'eng-shih i-shu, 2a/ib, see also Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 523.) Chu Hsi's preoccupation with an intellectual and analytical understanding forced him to revolt against Ch'eng Hao at this point. In "On Humaneness" (jen-shuo), he

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Well informed of these intellectual debates, Li Fu is ready to take up the criticisms made by Lo Ch'in-shun of Yang-ming's doctrine." He easily dismisses Lo's claim that the chih (knowledge) of liang-chih (the innate knowledge of the good) cannot be read as a noun, implying not a substance but a verb, a process of cognitive function. Li Fu picks out several examples from ancient texts: for instance, the chih of hsien-chih (those who are first informed) or hou-chih (those who are later informed) of Mencius, or the chih of chih-chih (the extension of knowledge) of The Great Learning. In all of these cases chih is used as a noun, meaning a substance.100 In addition, Li Fu points out that all the texts written before the spring and autumn period use the already mentioned chih (as a verb meaning "know", and as a noun meaning "knowledge") to substistated: "To talk about jen in general terms of the unity of things and the self will lead people to be vague, confused, neglectful, and make no effort to be alert. The bad effect - and there has been — may be to consider other things as oneself. To talk about jen in specific terms of consciousness will lead people to be nervous, irascible, and devoid of any quality of depth. The bad effect - and there has been - may be to consider desires as principle. In one case [the mind] forgets [its objective]. In the other [there is artificial effort to] help [it grow]. Both are wrong." (CTWQ 67/20a21b; the English translation is taken from Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 596, with a slight modification.) There are here two criticisms voiced by Chu Hsi. One is aimed at Ch'eng Hao's claim. Nevertheless, the theme of becoming one with all things is upheld by all NeoConfucians. Chu Hsi says, "When ch'ien is regarded as the father, k'un as the mother, and this applies to all classes of living beings without exception; this means principle is one." (Chang-tzu ch'uan-shu, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935, 1/8.) A good elaboration of Chu Hsi's position is made in Lo Chin-shun's formula, "In view of the self, things are for themselves; in view of principle, the self becomes identical with things without any differentiation" (LCA, 1/5). For Chu Hsi it was through principle that all things become one. To understand principle required primarily the intellectual effort of the investigation of things. The second criticism made by Chu Hsi countered the claim that jen is consciousness, and this issue is directly related to our discussion in the text. Ch'eng I once remarked, "The medical expert names those who have no consciousness of sensation as non-jen [pu-jen], which is also commonly used by people to call those having no consciousness of sensation and having no recognition of moral principles. This analogy is very appropriate." (Ch'eng-tzu hsiangpen, n.p., 1675, i/55b.) Chu Hsi commented on Ch'eng I's remark as follows: "Ich'uan [Ch'eng I] is excellent to say that those who have no recognition of moral principles are non-jen. If one is merely obsessed with the substance of mind as consciousness, what will consciousness do with an empty mind, which has no access to moral principles?" (Ch'eng-tzu hsiangpen, i/55b.) In short, the difference between the Ch'eng Hao strains (including Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming) and the Chu Hsi strains (Lo Chin-shun) can partially be seen in their distinctive styles or intellectual approaches. One is experiential-holistic, the other is intellectual-analytic. Professor Wing-tsit Chan looks at this problem with the ideas of "substance" and "function" and comes up with another interpretation. See his "On the Theory of Jen in Chu Hsi's Philosophy" in Universitas, 8, no. 6 (June 1981), 29. 99. Li Fu has his own account of this debate. MTCK, 18/230-24^. 100. LCA, 1/13; MTCK, 18/243-240.

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tute whenever necessary for a n o t h e r character chih (now p r o n o u n c e d in the fourth tone, meaning "wisdom"). 101 A textual analysis that might successfully settle the philological disputes is of little help in clarifying the ontological controversy involved. Li Fu, however, is p r e p a r e d to undertake a clarification of the ontological issues through an intellectual theoretical discourse. To Lo Ch'in-shun, the identity of Heaven's principle with the innate knowledge of the good was not compatible with the fact that regardless of their lack of the innate knowledge of the good - for Lo, the functioning of consciousness - things such as mountains, rivers, earth, grass, wood, metals, and stones each had its own principle. 102 Li Fu disagrees with Lo Chin-shun on this point: The Heaven's principle possessed by men is what is called "illustrious virtue" in The Great Learning. Because of its intelligence and brightness it can contain principles of all sorts, and it responds to any affair. Animals with consciousness cannot possess principle as completely as human beings, not to mention the inanimate things such as grass, wood, metals and stones.103 In other words, Li Fu's formulation conveys a flavor of panpsychism: All things contain a degree of consciousness. Man is exceptional in that he has the most comprehensive principle in his mind. Therefore, he can stand along with Heaven and Earth as the three ultimate standards (san-chi) for the myriad things of the universe. Rivers, mountains, grass, and stones may only have some share of principle, but they also have some share of consciousness. If this were not true, we could not explain why we worship the gods of mountains and rivers, or why in the great eras, such good omens as the purity of the Yellow River appeared. In his descriptions of auspicious omens during the K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng periods, Li Fu demonstrates his personal experience with these symbols. 104 At this point, Li Fu deviates somewhat from Wang Yang-ming's teaching, for Wang had proclaimed: The innate knowledge of man is the same as that of plants and trees, tiles and stones. Without the innate knowledge inherent in man, there cannot be plants and trees, tiles and stones. This is not true of them only. Even Heaven and Earth cannot exist without the innate knowledge that is inherent in man. For at bottom, Heaven, Earth, the myriad things, and man form one body. The point 101. MTCK i8/24b. 102. LCA, 1/17. 103. MTCK, 18/24^-25. In this 1831 edition there is a misprint in line 9. Cf. MTCK, 1740 edition, 18/21 a. 104. MTCK, 18/24b-25a. For instance, the good omens about which Li Fu wrote were the "magnificent clouds" of the sixtieth year of the K'ang-hsi reign, the "purification of Yellow River in the fourth year of Yung-cheng reign," etc. MTCK, i/i8a-2ob, 29a31b.

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at which this unity is manifested in its most refined and excellent form is the clear intelligence of the human mind.105

To Yang-ming, mind stands out as the agent that confers meaning on all things. For Li Fu, external things have their partial principle and thus partial consciousness. In expressing this notion, Li Fu may, in my opinion, be influenced by Chu Hsi's ideas on "principle in partiality" {li-j)'ieri) and "principle in entirety" (li-ch'uari), which in their turn are determined by the degree of the endowment of ch 'i in the myriad things.106 To be certain, Chu Hsi uses these two concepts in explaining the differences among things in terms of the ch 'i endowment. Li Fu, in his preoccupation with the identity of the innate knowledge and principle, discovers that things have partial consciousness because they are endowed with partial principle. In fact, Li Fu is not interested just in the "theoretical" aspect. He is eager to put the innate knowledge of the good into practice. He is greatly concerned with the extension of the innate knowledge as the way of moral cultivation. In his view, Yang-ming's extension of the innate knowledge comprises all the merits of the previous Neo-Confucians' doctrines, even though different approaches had arisen from their individualized realizations of the Way. For example, when understood as the state of equilibrium of the not yet actualized (wei-fa), the innate knowledge of the good is equal to Heaven's nature in its original form, in the state of tranquillity endowed in us at birth. Hence, Chou Tun-i's (1017— 73) doctrine of "regarding tranquillity as fundamental" (chu-ching) also implied the extension of the innate knowledge. The innate knowledge of the good can be understood as the manifestation of the inner nature, in which the innate knowledge, after becoming calm, becomes the inner nature. In this state the mind appears to be broad and impartial as it responds to all things spontaneously as they come. Thus the extension of the innate knowledge possesses the merit of Ch'eng Hao's (1032—85) doctrine of "calming human nature" (tien-hsing), as well as Ch'eng I's (1033-1107) and Chang Tsai's (1020-77) doctrines. Ch'eng I advocated seriousness (ching) as the way to cultivate the mind in a state of singleness and intelligence. Chang promoted propriety (li b) as the means to regulate the external life to cultivate the internal life. Thus for Li Fu, the extension of the innate knowledge to examine the subtlety of the ideas within the mind can make up for the defects of Chu Hsi's externally oriented project of "the investigation of things." And Li's view of the extension of the innate knowledge is closely related to Lu Hsiangshan's "seeking the lost mind" (ch'iu fang-hsin) because this doctrine was 105. CHL, p. 124. Instructions far Practical Living, pp. 221-222.

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106. CTWQ 46/1 lb.

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the source from which the extension of the innate knowledge developed. As Hu Po-chuan rightly points out, liang-chih (the innate knowledge of the good) is interchangeable with liang-hsin (conscience), so the teaching of "seeking the lost mind" can also be viewed as the extension of the innate knowledge. The concept tuan-ni (clue or sign) is the innate knowledge as the inner nature in its actualized state. Therefore, Ch'en Hsien-chang's (1428—1500) "cultivating [moral] clues in the state of tranquillity"(ching-chung yang-ch'u tuan-ni) was also similar to the extension of the innate knowledge. Finally, because the innate knowledge can be seen as the manifestation of Heaven's principle, Chan Jo-shui's (1466—1560) "experiencing Heaven's principle everywhere" (sui-ch'u t'ijen Vien-li) could be derived from the same extension of the innate knowledge.107 All in all, Li Fu's doctrine of extending of the innate knowledge of the good inherits the entire rich tradition of the Neo-Confucians and embraces the merits of all doctrines prior to Yang-ming. In interpreting the doctrine of the extension of the innate knowledge, Li Fu places a special emphasis on the importance of effort or extension chih in a dynamic and practical sense, for the truth must be personally realized in daily life. He disdains such speculative discussions of moral metaphysics as "the learning of mind and nature." What one ought to do is to realize moral maxims in practice.108 Because people do not discriminate authentic teachings from heterodoxy, Li Fu is regretfully compelled to devote energy to this empty talk.109 He ascribes two causes for the state of oblivion to which Wang Yangming's doctrine has fallen. One is the conventional scholars' immersion in trivial textual studies to the neglect of the great meaning of the Way. The other is the result of the doctrine of Yang-ming's "left wing" adherents such as Wang Chi and Wang Ken, who misunderstand Yang-ming's teaching. They had mistakenly claimed that there was no need for deliberate effort to achieve moral perfection because the innate knowledge is always present and spontaneous in our minds. This belief inevitably made them mistake physical desires for the Heaven's principle, and thereby indulge in pleasures.110 Li Fu's emphasis on the need for effort in moral cultivation can be seen from the perspective of a new conception of learning shared by such thinkers as Ku Yen-wu, Huang Tsung-hsi, Yen Yuan, and Li Kung. They all reacted against the abstract speculations and empty talk that dominated the intellectual milieu of their era. In their view, empty 107. MTCK i8/2 2a-23a. 108. Ibid., i8/28b. 109. Ibid., i8/23b. 110. Ibid., i8/25a-26b. 1OO

Li Fu: his thought

speculation was one of the major reasons for the Ming dynasty's fall. Li Fu's particular emphasis on moral effort shows that he was still under the sway of the widespread reaction to the late Ming trends. "Empty talk" assumed a new form in Li Fu's own day - the focus of philological studies (k'ao-cheng), which commanded most of the attention and became a dominant intellectual movement. Li Fu's stress on the extension of innate knowledge indicates only one aspect of his reaction to this movement. His involvement with this intellectual trend toward evidential scholarship is by no means simple, but rather a complex one, full of tension, conflict, and compromise. We will return to this issue later in Chapter 6. His theory of ko-zuu

Despite that Li Fu associated himself closely with Yang-ming's doctrine of the extension of the innate knowledge of the good, he was not satisfied with Yang-ming's interpretation of ko-xvu as "to rectify what is wrong in the mind."111 Although Li Fu does not give any explicit account of why he disagrees with Yang-ming's theory of ko-wu, his justification of the thesis that the mind is neither good nor bad might serve as a clue to understanding his divergence from Yang-ming on this particular point. If, as Yang-ming holds, the substance of the mind is neither good nor bad, what is there in the mind to rectify?112 In addition, Li could not but agree with Lo Chin-shun that "things" could not be understood entirely as nothing more than the objects of human intentionality.113 This may have caused Li Fu to come up with his own theory of the "investigation of things" in an attempt to oppose Chu Hsi from another angle. Like Wang Yang-ming, Li believes with certainty that the restoration of the old text version of The Great Learning is necessary to bring students back on the right track of the true Way. Chu Hsi's mistake was that he considered the old text as an incomplete version abounding with errors, and therefore reedited and supplemented it with his own interpolations. In doing so, he deviated from the authentic Way. In point of fact, the old text version of The Great Learning, which contains the essential meaning of the Way, is an original text transmitted from the ancient Confucian school.114 On the basis of the old text, Li Fu developed his theory of ko-wu. 111. CHU p- 15; MTCK(1740), 2i/22a. 112. MTCK i8/27a. 113. Ibid., i8/23b. LCA, 1/9. There are three points made by Lo Ch'in-shun in this letter criticizing Yang-ming's interpretation of a "thing" (wu); Li Fu, however, cannot agree with the third point, which charges that the innate knowledge is not Heaven's principle. 114. MTCK(1740), 2 i / 2 i a ; MTCK, 19/343-38^ 1O1

Philosophy, philology, and politics

There have been eighteen different interpretations of the word ko in the classics. Only the exegesis of the Chapter of Ts'ang-chieh (75'ang-chieh p'ieri), which is the oldest interpretation, meets, for Li Fu, the exact meaning of ko in the context of ko-wu, that is, "to measure," "to evaluate" (liang-tu) .115 Li Fu provides the following definition of ko-xvu: Making the will sincere is to extend knowledge which consists in knowing what is first and what is last, to measure the roots and the branches, and to know the beginnings and the endings of all things. Only after knowing the roots can knowledge be perfected. Therefore, the old text version of The Great Learning states: "This is called knowing the root, this is perfecting knowledge," after stating, "It never has been the case [that what was of great importance has been slightly cared for, and, at the same time] that what was of slight importance has been greatly cared for." Ko-wu simply means this, that is all.116 Li Fu, like Yang-ming, takes "making the will sincere" as his point of departure for moral cultivation. The effort at making the will sincere, for Li Fu, is seen in the extension of knowledge, the assessment of the importance of things, and the measurement of all things. In other words, things have their roots and their branches; affairs have their beginnings and their endings. The function of ko-wu lies in adequately evaluating their priorities. Li Fu apprehends the "eight steps" of The Great Learning sequentially.117 From the exercise of ko-xvu, we learn that in order to pacify the world and set the state in order, one needs to trace them back to the sincerity of the will - the foundation and beginning of our moral effort. Conversely, we extend our effort from ko-wu to the self, to the family, to the state, and to the world - the final stages or results of our moral endeavor. Among the eight steps, personal cultivation (hsiu-shen) is fundamental because it draws the eight steps into a meaningful interrelationship. 118 This is why The Great Learning asserts that "from the Son of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard the personal cultivation as the root."119 Li Fu's understanding of ko-wu as the capacity of the mind to measure or evaluate stands in contrast to the thinking function of the mind as a whole. It is different from the role the mind played in Yang-ming's ko-wu program, in which the mind was to differentiate right from wrong in a direct moral sense.120 115. MTCK(1740), 21/17b. 116. Ibid. 117. The "eight steps" are the investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, the sincerity of the will, the rectification of the mind, the cultivation of the self, the regulation of the family, and the attainment of national order and world peace. 118. MTCK, 19/35^ 119. Ibid., 19/35^ SSCQ Ta-hsueh, p. 2. 120. CHL, pp. 241, 257. 1O2

Li Fu: his thought

Long before Li Fu, Wang Ken (1483—1541) had interpreted ko-wu as "measuring things" (hsieh-chu or hsieh-tu). But it is very unlikely that Wang Ken's interpretation was the source of Li Fu's intellectual inspiration.121 Ko-wu in the context of Wang Ken's moral program appeared individualistic. Wang Ken's obsession with self-cultivation (hsiu-shen) and self-preservation (an-shen) did not match Li Fu's fundamental concerns.122 Furthermore, Wang Ken's division of the eight steps of moral and sociopolitical development of self-cultivation into two sorts of effort {kung-fu) ran counter to Li Fu's claim that the eight steps were one continuum.123 Mao Hsi-ho (1623-1716), in his historical survey of the various interpretations of ko-wu, also anticipated Li Fu's interpretations of it.124 Nevertheless, the causal relation between the interpretations of either Wang Ken or Mao Hsi-ho and that of Li Fu remains open. Leaving aside this historical problem, we can detect the spirit of Lu Hsiang-shan exercising an influence on Li Fu's theory - although Lu Hsiang-shan, like Chu Hsi, understood the word ko as meaning "to reach." To Sung thinkers, ko-wu meant "to reach things, to search for [what can be] known,"125 an interpretation unacceptable to Li Fu. Lu Hsiang-shan was most concerned with the starting point (tuan-hsu) in the approach to the true Way. To him, even a slight departure from the correct starting point of study will inevitably end up far from the authentic Way, and one will become a heretic. Thus it becomes decisive to know the right starting point at the very beginning of learning. "Learning," Hsiang-shan said, "surely has no limits, but it is better to distinguish the right starting point from the wrong one; then whether one can attain the Way can be immediately known."126 Hsiang-shan reinforced the point: Things have their roots and branches; affairs have their beginnings and endings. To know what isfirstand what is last will lead one near the Way. If one does not extend the starting point [of learning] to its perfection, but instead devotes his effort entirely to the branches, the results will resemble ditchesfilledwith water, but whose dryness can be anticipated. In the end, both root and branch are lost.127 121. Wang Ken, Hsin-chai Wang-hsien-sheng ch'iian-ch'i, reprinted in 1616, 3/4013-4lb. Wang Ken's interpretation of ko-wu was known as the "Huai-nan ko-zuu." MJHA, 32/ 69-70. 122. Ibid., 3/39.D, 41a. 123. Ibid., 3/ib-2a, 440-45^ MTCK, ig/35a-35b. 124. Mao Hsi-ho, "Ta-hsueh cheng-wen" in Hsi-ho ho-chi, Liu-ch'ao-t'ang printed, l/iob. Mao even traced the interpretation oiko-xvu, meaning "measuring things," back to Li Li-wu of the Sung period. Ibid., i/8a. 125. LHCC, 2o/i5a-i5b. 126. Ibid., i/2a. 127. Ibid., i/3a. 103

Philosophy, philology, and politics

In short, the goal of Lu Hsiang-shan's procedure of learning can be summed up in one of his favored statements from Mencius: "Build up the nobler part of one's nature."128 In order to know the nobler part of one's nature, one needs to evaluate which part is important and which is secondary in one's constitution. Viewed in this light, the evaluating function of the mind becomes the initial step for moral cultivation, an idea from which Li Fu develops his theory of ko-xvu. For Li Fu, moral cultivation begins with making the will sincere, and this depends on first extending the mind's ability to measure the importance of all things. His theory of ko-xvu especially emphasizes knowing the importance of some things over others, and is intimately related to the procedure of moral perfection. Nonetheless, the results of his evaluation are none other than those reached by Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yangming through their respective doctrines. For all of them, the goal of koxvu is to explore, and at the same time to recover, the original mind on which Heaven bestows moral principles. Other pursuits must follow and center around this moral concern to obtain their ultimate goal.129 Li Fu vehemently attacks Chu Hsi's theory of ko-xvu (investigation of things) as heterodoxy because Chu Hsi misleads students toward a search for principle outside the self. In his theory, Chu Hsi recommended reaching for external things and investigating their principles. Moreover, Chu Hsi claimed that making the will sincere could only follow after achieving the extension of knowledge. Without the complete consciousness of principle in the mind, the will could not be said to be really sincere.130 Chu Hsi wrote: But so long as all principles are not investigated, man's knowledge is incomplete. On this account, The Great Learning, at the outset of its lessons, instructs the learner, in regard to all things in the world, to proceed from what knowledge he has of their principles, and pursue his investigation of them, till he reaches the extreme point.131 In short, the relationship between the investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, and making the will sincere is sequential. 128. SSCC, Mencius, p. 170. As Mencius says, "The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These - the senses and the mind - are what Heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man." Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 2, p. 418. 129. CHL, pp. 120-125; MTCK{ 1740), 21/24a. 130. Chu Hsi, SSCC, Ta-hsiieh, p. 7. 131. Ibid., p. 6. Legge, Chinese Classics, vol. 1, p. 365. 104

Li Fu: his thought

For Li Fu, Chu's view is absurd because even though a sage does not know the principles of all things, it does not follow that the sage's will is not sincere from the very beginning. In Li's system, the purpose of ko-wu is to inform us what is important and what is secondary. By this measurement of importance, we know where to make our first effort. The moral principle within our mind is the very thing demanding our devotion. The theory of ko-wu so conceived is reduced from both an epistemology and moral philosophy as originally envisioned by Chu Hsi to merely a philosophy of values. Li Fu argues that Chu Hsi's theory of ko-wu led students to look to external things for principles or values. If Chu Hsi were correct, principle would not be immanent in the mind. Ethically, Chu's doctrine implied that human virtues come from a process of socialization imposed by external surroundings. Theoretically, it denied the possibility of moral self-transformation because it lacked an ontological basis of moral nature in human beings. Thus Li Fu regards Chu Hsi's theory of ko-wu as morally equivalent to the heterodox doctrine of "seeking virtue from without" (i-wai shuo) ,132 Therefore, Chu's theory did not square with Mencius's teachings that "all things are already complete in us,"133 and that "everyone can become a sage like Yao or Shun."134 Li Fu points to the mind as the very source of moral cultivation. But he does not, as a result, focus moral effort on the cultivation of the mind. Rather, he maintains that effort should be concentrated in concrete and practical acts that in turn will arouse and enrich the moral sensitivity of the mind. His theory of ko-wu has a "pragmatic" flavor with a unique stress on the importance of the act. He declares that authentic truth must be something that can be realized in daily life. The Way that concerns scholars merely in their metaphysical discourse cannot count as the true Way at all. Action and action alone is the ultimate criterion and test for the presence of the authentic Way.135 Once Li Fu said regretfully that he had read as many as fifty thousand volumes and had engaged in Chu Hsi's theory of the investigation of things for decades until his hair turned white, but that nothing came from such endeavor. After this unfruitful odyssey, he came to realize that the Way consists simply in one's ethical actions.136 But students in his day regarded book learning and metaphysical discussion as the means for attaining the Way. This confusion had resulted from Chu Hsi's advocacy of textual studies and intellectual discussion, and had led students away from realizing the Way in their personal lives.137 Because of this incorrect understanding, they deemphasized and even entirely overlooked the 132. MTCK, i8/i2a-i3b, 19b; 34/22a. 133. SSCC, Mendus, p. 189. 134. Ibid., p. 174. 135. MTCK (1740), 2i/i9b-2ob. 136. Ibid., 2i/2ib-22a. 137. Ibid., 2i/2ib-22a. 105

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experiential dimension of the Way. This trend was simply contrary to the teachings of sages. Li Fu does not actually negate the importance of erudition; however, for him, erudition lacks any intrinsic value unless it is connected to moral perfection. Whenever situations arise, all sorts of subsidiary knowledge can be employed to implement the moral dictates of the mind. In this hierarchical conception of knowledge, moral knowledge is the most urgent and needs constant cultivation. Other knowledge is not difficult to learn when the will to study is sincere and can be used in relation to the immediate moral context.138 So the "exhaustive search for principles" (ch'iung-li) cannot mean to seek every principle from all things, but rather to make the mind sincere. As The Great Learning proclaimed, "If the mind is sincere, then even if it does not hit upon the goal precisely, it cannot be far away from it."139 Thus, in Li Fu's view, the "exhaustive search for principle" is internally directed, rather than a matter of the intellectual understanding of an outside world.140 In summary, Li Fu distinguished himself brilliantly as a Lu-Wang thinker in two ways. First, he preserved the essence of Lu-Wang doctrines - the idea that mind is the unique source of morality. Second, because he was forced to respond to the later Ch'eng-Chu scholars' criticisms of LuWang doctrines, he was able to reinterpret these doctrines - especially those concerning the relationship between mind, nature, and principle - in a more sophisticated manner. Although he abandoned Lu Hsiangshan's interpretation of ko-wu, he did use Lu's teachings to develop his own theory of ko-wu in opposition to Chu Hsi's theory. Because he defined the Way in terms of human relations, his theory of ko-wu focused on moral evaluation as the first and last concern. Li Fu's doctrine can be expressed in a single statement: He combined an emphasis on the need for moral effort with a belief in the importance of praxis. The emphasis on moral effort was like that of the right wing of the Wang Yang-ming school, and was formed in reaction against its left wing. The second point, the belief in the importance of praxis, is based upon Lu Hsiang-shan's own teachings. Li's reflections upon the concepts of destiny and the Way may have something to do with the political-cultural realities and ideologies of the early Ch'ing, a subject discussed in Chapter 7. 138. MTCK (1740), 2i/i8b-iga. 140. MTCK (1740), 21 /24a.

139. SSCQ Ta-hsueh, p. 9.

106

6 Li Fu and the philological turn

Li Fu's Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life (Chu-tzu wan-nien ch yuan-luri), his Intellectual Lineage of the Learning of Master Lu (Lu-tzu hsiieh-p'u), and his study of the classics

reflect the general intellectual climate of the high Ch'ing in which Li

lived.1 The Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived

at Late in Life is typical of the evidential approach employed by philologists of that era. Li Fu himself was an active participant of the evidential approach movement. The philosophically minded among both the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools generally opted instead for establishing intellectual lineages. It is not unusual to find one or the other approach in a scholar of this time, but it is indeed peculiar to find both in one scholar. Li Fu is a good example of this unusual combination, and I will try to explain this apparent peculiarity. The Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life: an evidential approach to the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" li

Chu-Lu i-Vung" (Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan), which literally means "the similarity and dissimilarity between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan," has become an enduring issue in the history of Confucianism since the end of the Sung period. During their lifetimes both thinkers exchanged ideas on questions ranging from textual analysis to politics and metaphysics in order to make their stance clear to each other.2 The 1. Li Fu, Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, prefaced by Li Fu in 1732, eight chuan. The version accessible to me is the microfilm made by the University of Chicago, Lu-tzu hsiieh-p'u, prefaced by Li Fu in 1732, twenty chuan. 2. See Chapter 2. 107

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conventional understanding of the distinction between Chu and Lu was exemplified by Chu Heng-tao, a contemporary of both men, whose recollection of the Goose Lake debate provided a brief description of it. He presented the primary difference between Chu and Lu as a whether emphasis should be put on learning or on personal cultivation in the process of moral perfection.3 Chu Hsi once declared that in his teaching he put somewhat more stress on "following the path of inquiry and study" (tao wen-hsueh), and that Lu focused solely on "honoring the moral nature" (tsun te-hsing). Initially, Chu professed his readiness to combine these two approaches in order to overcome the defects in each emphasis.4 Hearing this from another, Lu Hsiang-shan remarked: "I do not believe this to be possible. If one does not know how to honor his moral nature, how can he talk about following the path of study and inquiry?"5 Lu's uncompromising attitude was here explicitly expressed in his response to Chu's declaration. This spirit was later fostered by both sides, and was inherited by their disciples, who pushed their mentors' doctrines to the extreme so that the views of Chu and Lu finally became diametrically opposed to each other. In the end the learning of Chu was criticized for being atomistic and that of Lu for being an oversimplification.6 However, the controversies among their disciples became intense only after the demise of Chu Hsi's major disciple, Huang Kan, who was said to be sufficiently influential to restrain Chu's students from engaging in factional disputes with Lu's disciples.7 Despite the growing antagonism, attempts were made from time to time by those sympathetic to both Chu and Lu to reconcile their differences. The first attempt was made in the middle of the thirteenth century by the T'ang brothers, possibly initiated by T'ang Ch'ien or his younger brother, T'ang Chin.8 This is commonly regarded as the earliest reconciliation tried by thinkers other than Chu and Lu after the failure of the Goose Lake debate. But there is no writing extant that is detailed enough to tell us how the T'ang brothers carried this out. Yet this effort at least reveals that the conflicts between Chu's and Lu's teachings were felt to be a real tension that needed to be resolved. A few decades later 3. LHCQ 36/18a. 4. CTWC, 5 4 / 5 b-6a. 5. LHCC, 34/8a-8b, translation in Chan, Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 582. 6. LHCC, 36/18a. 7. Yuan, Ch'ing-jung chu-shih chi, in TSCC, 21/378.

8. According to Yuan Chueh and Ch'uan Tsu-wang, it was T'ang Chung who wanted to reconcile the difference between Chu and Lu. See Ch'ing-jung chii-shih chi, 21/378; CCTC, 34/430-431. But by Wang Tsu-ts'ai's further investigation, it is more likely the eldest brother, T'ang Ch'ien, who initiated the project of reconciling the difference between Chu and Lu; SYHA, 84/113-114. Also see Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Hsi-shan wen-chi, Ssu-pu ts'ung-kan edition, 42/26b~3ib. 108

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an elderly Wu Ch'eng (1249-1333) took on the reconciliation of Chu and Lu as his final task. He suggested that Chu's approach needed to be complemented by Lu Hsiang-shan's teachings on "honoring the moral nature".9 The numerous criticisms ofWu's endeavor show that tensions between Chu and Lu were not entirely resolved.10 A new approach gradually took shape in the middle of the fourteenth century. Chao Fang (1319-69), in answering a question of his teacher, Yu Chi (1272-1348, who was Wu Ch'eng's student), came up with a new interpretation - that although Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan had differed earlier, they reached the same view in their latter days. The evidence that Chao Fang used to support this view was one of Chu Hsi's letters to Hsiang P'ing-fu and an epigraph written by Lu Hsiang-shan in memory of Lu Tzu-ch'ien.11 In that epigraph, Lu expressed his regret for previously having been thoughtless and rash in his disagreement with Lu.12 This implied that Lu Hsiang-shan had at last come to a view similar to that of Chu Hsi, since Lii and Chu supposedly stood on the same ground in the Goose Lake debate. In Chu Hsi's letter, Chu admitted that since the time of Tzu-ssu, "honoring the moral nature" and "following the path of inquiry and study" constituted two essential methods of education. Lu Hsiang-shan had been wholly concerned with the former, but Chu Hsi put more stress on the latter. What should be done now, Chu Hsi proposed, was eliminate the defects in these two methods and combine the merits of each, so as not to suffer from a one-sided view.13 It was Chao Fang who first interpreted this letter as crucial evidence indicating the "turn" of Chu Hsi in his old age toward Lu's doctrine.14 The attempt to reconcile the difference between the doctrines of Chu and Lu had thus gained considerable currency after the time of Wu Ch'eng. But Chao Fang's suggestion that Chu and Lu agreed in their later days was an interesting one, and this approach was later refined by Ch'eng Min-cheng (1445-99), Wang Yang-ming, and LiFu. Chao Fang and those who followed his suggestion were no doubt under great pressure from their rivals, for the Ch'eng-Chu school had grown steadily since the end of the Sung. The idea that Chu Hsi had, after all, arrived at the same conclusion as Lu Hsiang-shan was an ingenious strategy to cope with or reduce the hostility from Ch'eng-Chu scholars. According to Li Fu, it was Ch'eng Min-cheng who first put 9. SYHA, 92/5-6. 10. MTCK, 43/12b. 11. Chao Fang, Tung-shan ts'un-kao, in Ssu-k'u-chiian-shu chen^pen, second series, 2/18a18b. 12. LHCC, 26/ia-3a. 13. CTWC, 54/5b-6a. 14. Chao Fang, Tung-shan ts'un-k'ao, 2/18a-18b. 109

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Chao Fang's idea into a book; Wang Yang-ming later adopted the same approach.15 Although initially only by accident, Wang took advantage of this exposition to support his own doctrine indirectly. While in the capital, Wang was attacked from all sides for proclaiming his doctrine. In order to deflect these criticisms, he edited some of Chu Hsi's writings, which he claimed showed Chu's deep remorse about his own early scholarship.16 Wang Yang-ming thereby implied that there was no significant difference between Chu's final doctrine and Wang's own teaching. The persuasive effect of the compilation was unexpectedly great. With this "proof," scholars came to accept what Wang Yang-ming advocated: that Chu changed his intellectual orientation in his mature years.17 A dimension not mentioned in Wang's letter was his awareness of intellectual debt to Chu Hsi, In reply to Lo Ch'in-shun's question concerning his motive behind the compilation,18 Wang expressed his feelings with anguish: I wrote Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life because I could not avoid

it.... All my life Chu Hsi's doctrine has been to me a revelation as if from the gods. In my heart I could not bear suddenly to oppose him. Therefore, it was only because I could not avoid doing so that I did so.19

Therefore, to understand why Wang undertook the compilation one has to take into consideration the objective social pressures as well as Wang's personal feelings. In his compilation of the writings of Chu Hsi, Wang Yang-ming chose passages from thirty-four letters that he judged to be from Chu's later years. He deliberately excluded selections from the Classified Conversations of Chu Hsif for he believed Chu's disciples compiled them in a factious spirit. Outside of his preface, Wang let Chu's letters speak for themselves. Although Ch'eng Min-cheng's Compilation of Essays on the Oneness of the Way (Tao-ipien) had intended to serve the same purpose, it actually invited more disputes because Ch'eng had not allowed Chu's letters to speak for themselves, but had rather juxtaposed the writings of Chu and Lu.20 Ch'eng had concluded: "In the beginning, the relationship between the learning of Chu and Lu was like ice and fire; in the 15. Li Fus Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'iian-lun, pp. 8a-8b. Also see Ch'en Chien, Hsiieh-pu t'ungpien, hereafter abbreviated as HPTP(f), i.e., the Japanese edition, Chung-wen ch'upan-she, preface, 5a~5b and i/8a-gb. Li Fu's observation is confirmed by the writings of Ch'eng Min-cheng and Wang Yang-ming. See Ch'eng Min-cheng, Tao-i pien, prefaced in 1489, microfilm, chuan 6; and WYCC, 4/17-18. 16. WYCC, 4/17-18. 17. Ibid. 18. Lo, Lo Cheng-an hsien-sheng ts'un-kao, 1/6-8. 19. CHL, p. 171. 20. WYCC, 4/17-18; Ch'eng, Tao-ipien, microfilm. HO

Li Fu and the philological turn

middle year, they were 'half convinced and half suspicious' of each other; but in the end, their doctrines became as complementary as the wheels to one cart."21 Ch'eng's rendering had unintentionally refreshed memories of Chu's early conflicts with Lu and further provoked factional disputes. Even at the risk of relegating Lu Hsiang-shan to the background, the reason Wang Yang-ming published Chu's writings alone was his desire not to offend Chu Hsi scholars. Ch'eng's and Wang's compilations, and especially the latter's, won wide acceptance among scholars - even by some within the Chu Hsi school.22 Disputes over "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" were not an isolated intellectual exercise, for the disputes affected the political interests of scholars and civil service examination candidates. Although the examinations were officially based on the Ch'eng-Chu commentaries on the classics, the Wang Yang-ming school influenced the minds of administering officials and competing candidates. Ku Yen-wu claimed that this was particularly true after the Lung-ch'ing reign (1567-72). Indeed, the problematic of "Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan" often appeared in civil service examination questions from local to metropolitan levels. An acceptable standard answer to this question would definitely influence the candidates and thereby ultimately the political status of the Chu or the Lu school. Such scholars as Ch'en Chien (1497-1567), Ku Yen-wu (1613-82), Wang Fu-chih (1619-92), and LuLiu-liang (1629-83) were not insensitive to the political consequence of these long-standing academic disputes.23 Their concern was well justified in the light of the political vicissitudes of the two schools after the Sung. Ch'en Chien complained: "Recently, whenever there has been a question concerning Chu and Lu in the provincial examinations, all candidates answered on the basis of Ch'eng Min-cheng's Compilation ofEssays on the Oneness of the

Way."24 While still a local official in southern Fukien, Ch'en Chien learned of the proposal at court to admit Lu Hsiang-shan's tablet into the Confucian temple. Worried that this would cause "a shift of the transmission of the Way and confusion of the [correct] intellectual

lineage," he compiled A General Critique of Obscure Learning {Hsu'eh^pu t'ung-pien) to criticize Wang Yang-ming's Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion 21. Ch'eng, Tao-ipien, preface, 2b~3a; idem, Huang-tun Ch'enghsien-sheng wen-ts'ui, 1506, 13/ia-ib.

22. Ch'en Chien, Hsueh-pu t'ung-pien (hereafter abbreviated as HPTP), in TSCC, preface, p. 1; and Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682), Jih-chih lu (Knowledge acquired day by day), Taipei, 1979,21/535. 23. HPTP, 3/25; Ku, Jih-chih Lu, 20/530-532, 539; Lu Liu-liang, Lu Yung-hui wen-chi, in Kuo-ts'ui ts'ung-shu, 1908, 5/176; Wang Fu-chih, Chiang-chai shih-hua chien-chu, Peking,

1981, appendix, pp. 214-215. 24. HPTP, 3/25.

Ill

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Arrived at Late in Life.25 After seven years, Ch'en Chien accomplished his project in 1548. Earlier Lo Ch'in-shun, in his correspondence with Wang Yang-ming, had already pointed out the anachronism in Wang's dating of the letters of Chu Hsi.26 To take one example, Wang incorrectly dated Chu's letters to Ho Shu-ching after Chu's Commentaries on the Analects and the Mencius.

We know that the letters to Ho included indefinite ideas in Chu's middle years, and that the commentaries were his final conclusions.27 Thus the truth turned out to be the reverse of what Wang Yang-ming had presented. The factual mistakes Wang committed were so obvious that they could hardly escape notice. Therefore, besides Lo Ch'in-shun, other of Wang's contemporaries such as Ku Tung-ch'iao (1476-1545) and Wei Chuang-ch'u (1483-1543) also challenged Wang's thesis.28 It was Ch'en Chien however, who first made sweeping, yet detailed, criticisms of Wang's thesis. Ch'en Chien proclaimed that his intention was to attack comprehensively Ch'eng Min-cheng's and Wang Yangming's work.29 By closely investigating each letter they included and interpreted, he found many errors in chronology. For example, Ch'eng had placed the correspondence of Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan on the issue of the Non-Ultimate before the Goose Lake debate.30 Contrary to Ch'eng Min-cheng, Ch'en Chien argued that in the beginning as well as in Chu's youth, Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan had similar learning, for both were immersed in Zen Buddhism. After Chu Hsi turned to orthodox learning in his middle years, he became "half convinced and half suspicious of Lu's learning; in the end, the learning of Chu and Lu was like "the relation between ice and fire." Ch'en Chien concluded that this conflict was particularly intense in the years immediately after Lu passed away.31 He further pointed out that Wang Yang-ming and Ch'eng Mincheng drew their conclusion from unreliable sources. In the last analysis, he charged that Wang and Ch'eng, as well as Lu Hsiang-shan, had simply preached Buddhism in a Confucian guise. This vital point, he further claimed, had not been grasped well by Lo Ch'in-shun and Huo T'ao {chin-shih, 1514) - even though both were Wang's contemporaries and had rightly criticized Wang's ideas.32 Although finished in 1548, Ch'en Chien's work became known and acclaimed only after the famous Tung-

25. Huang Ch'ang-ch'u, Lo Min yuan-liu-lu, g/28b-2ga. 26. Lo, Lo Cheng-an hsien-sheng ts'un-kao, 1/6-7. 27. Ibid., 1/6. 28. CHL in WYCC, p. 35; Wei Chuang-ch'u, Chuang-ch'u i-shu, in Wen-Yiian-ke Ssu-k'uch'uan-shu (hereafter abbreviated as WSQ, Taipei, n.d., 3 / 3 ^ - 3 4 3 . 29. HPTP, 3/25. 30. HPTP(J), 3/7a-8a; cf. Ch'eng, Tao-ipien, l/ia and 3/8a-8b. 31. HPTP(J), preface, 2a-2b. 32. Ibid., i2/i3a-i3b. Huo T'ao compiled Hsiang-shan hsiieh-pien (A critique of Lu Hsiang-shan's doctrine), frequently quoted by Ch'en Chien in HPTP. 112

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lin leader Ku Hsien-ch'eng (1550-1612) wrote its preface in 1605.33 As expected, Ch'en's work was highly acclaimed by the Chu Hsi scholars.34 It was to be the major target of Li Fu's bitter criticisms. Two decades after Ch'en had written his book, Feng K'e (1524-1601) composed a work in 1573 on Wang Yang-ming's Instructions for Practical Living (Ch'uan-hsi lu) and frequently singled out Wang's thesis about Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan for criticism.35 Ever since Ch'eng Mincheng and especially Wang Yang-ming had presented their thesis, a number of writings emerged arguing for and against it.36 It was precisely in this context that Li Fu took up his ceaseless debates with Ch'en Chien and other Chu Hsi scholars who followed the work of Ch'en. Among a number of writings following Ch'en Chien's, two received Li Fu's particular attention: A Rectification of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life (K'ao-cheng Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun) by Sun Ch'eng-tse (1593-1675), and Doubts on the Doctrines of Wang Yang-ming

(Wang-hsiieh chih-i) by Chang Lieh (1622-85).37 Sun, a renowned Chu Hsi scholar, charged Wang with using Chu Hsi's own learning against Chu Hsi.38 Chang claimed his conversion to Chu's teaching only after fifteen or sixteen years fruitlessly immersed in Wang Yang-ming's doctrines.39 Both scholars were very unsatisfied with Wang's compilation. Chang Lieh was also uncompromising in his contention that any attempted reconciliation merely favored the dissemination of Wang's doctrine and could never lead one to Confucius's teaching.40 Chang Lieh pointed out that the year Wang Yang-ming passed the metropolitan 33. HPTP(J), preface by Ku Hsien-ch'eng, 1-11. 34. For example, Chang Lu-hsiang (1611—1674), Yang-yuan hsien-shen ch'iian-ch'i, Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hsien ch'u-pan-she, n.d., 40/14b; Lu Lung-chi (1630-1693), San-yiit'ang wen-chi, WSC, 5/29^ and Ku Yen-wu, Jih-chih-lu, p. 538. 35. Feng K'e, Ch'iu-shih pien, Japanese edition, Kyoto, n.d., 4/38a~42b (pp. 259-271), 6ob/68b (pp. 306-323). 36. According to Ssu-k'u ch'u'an shu tsung-mu t'i-yao (abbreviated as SCTT), the books listed are related to the problem at issue. On the Chu Hsi side, for example, there were: Hsien-p'i lu by Ch'eng T'ung (SCTT, p. 193) and Tao-hsueh hui-lan by Wang Yin (SCTT, p. 1997), in the Ming period; and in the early Ch'ing period, K'ao-cheng Chu-tzu wannien ting-lun by Sun Ch'eng-tse (SCTT, p. 1999), Wang-hsiieh chih-i by Chang Lieh (SCTT, pp. 2013-2014), Chou Ch'eng Chang Chu cheng-mai by Wei I-chieh (SCTT, pp. 2005-2006), Tzuyang ta-chih by Chin Yun-shuang (SCTT, p. 2010), Chu-tzu sheng-hsueh k'ao-lieh by Chu tse-yun (SCTT, p. 2006), and Chu-tzu wei-hsueh-k'ao by T'ung Neng-lin (SCTT, p. 2028). On the Lu-Wang side, there were: Hsin-hsueh lu by Wang Ming (SCTT, p. 1974), Shuo-li huei-pien by Chi Pen (SCTT, p. 1975), Hsien-shih-pien by T'ang He-cheng (SCTT, p. 1985), an&Jihyen by K'ung Ch'eng-t'i (SCTT, pp. 1983-1984) in the Ming period; and San-tzu ting-lun by Wang Fu-li (SCTT, p. 2016) and Tung-wan hsueh-an by Wu Ting (SCTT, p. 2030) in the early Ch'ing. 37. MTCK, 45/133-15^ i6a-i7b. 38. Ku, Jih-chih lu, p. 538. 39. Chang, Wang-hsiieh chih-i, prefaced in 1681 by Chang himself, Cheng-i-t'ang, 2a. 40. Ibid., ia-2b.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

examination coincided with fires at the Confucian temple and the Chien-yang Academy (which had been built in Chu's memory). These omens sent by Heaven showed that the rise of Wang Yang-ming would be disastrous to the teachings of Confucius and Chu Hsi. Unfortunately people did not realize the exact meaning of these omens.41 Chang even went so far as to propose that Wang Yang-ming's tablet should be removed from the Confucian temple. Chang fully agreed with Ku Yen-wu, whose writings were typical of the early Ch'ing view that blamed Wang's learning for the fall of the Ming regime.42 Confucian scholars commonly assumed that ideas played the decisive role in the sociopolitical arena. When Ku Yen-wu and other scholars condemned the doctrine of Wang as vicious heterodoxy, they were inevitably led to the conclusion that "before the reigns of Hungchih (1488-1505) and Cheng-te (1506-1516)," social, political, and intellectual affairs were in good order because of the firm acceptance of Chu Hsi's teaching; because of the spread of Wang's doctrine after these periods, things deteriorated and ended in calamity and the breakdown of the Ming society.43 Facing these charges against the teaching of Wang Yang-ming, Li Fu was compelled to argue repeatedly that Wang's political and military achievements were far superior to those of any of his intellectual rivals. If Confucian assumptions were right about correct ideas leading to positive effects, Wang's objective accomplishment and therefore the validity of his doctrine were beyond doubt.44 Li Fu also used a documentary approach to attack the problematic of Chu Hsi versus Lu Hsiang-shan. Regarding whether or not Chu Hsi in his mature years held the same view as Lu Hsiang-shan, Li's answer was affirmative. In the light of what Li called "reality," the learnings of Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan in their early forms were "half-similar and halfdifferent" from each other; in middle age, "less different and more similar"; and in the end, they were "in complete agreement."45 But in the realm of "personal opinion," Chu and Lu at the beginning were "halfdoubting and half-believing" each other; in the middle "less doubting and more believing"; and in the end their relation was like "that of ice to fire."46 The huge gap between Chu's and Lu's philosophies - as perceived by themselves and others - had to be explained away if Li Fu was to prove that at least at the very end Chu did not essentially differ from Lu. Li 41. 42. 43. 45.

Chang, Wang-hsueh chih-i, 4/12b. Ku,Jih-chih lu, p. 539. Chang, Wang-hsueh chih-i, 4/14b, 12a-12b. Chang, Wang-hsueh chih-i, 4/12a-i 2b. 44. MTCK, 4 5 / 1 7 ^ Ibid., 3 2 / 3 ^ 46. Ibid. 114

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ascribed the misunderstanding between Chu and Lu to two things: first, the distorted communications through their disciples about the sayings of the other party;47 and second, the "superfluous debate" (pu-chi chih pieri) on the problem of the Non-Ultimate (wu-chi).48 Regarding this problem, Li Fu claimed that Chu and Lu differed only in terms, but not in substance. Both regarded the Great Ultimate (t'ai-chi) as a formless principle. The debate simply derived from "the different readings of the classics" and thus was not really relevant to the problematic of Chu versus Lu.49 Although in principle none of the writings on this debate should have been included in his compilation, Li could not ignore the significance of the debate in assessing the relation between Chu and Lu in their final stage. Thus he included both Chu's and Lu's letters from the debate on the grounds that the debate unintentionally triggered the controversy over "the problematic of Chu versus Lu."50 This second reason is more significant in intellectual history because it reveals the antimetaphysical mentality dominating philosophical discussion and ushering in the philological emphasis of his era. Avoiding the errors in chronology that Ch'eng Min-cheng and Wang Yang-ming made, Li Fu scrupulously drew his compilation from the entire corpus of Chu Hsi's writing.51 The compilation was ten times the size of Wang's work. Li selected writings by Chu Hsi from the age of fiftytwo to seventy-one.52 This was based on Li's periodization of Chu Hsi's intellectual life, which Li later articulated more clearly in The Period in which Chu Hsi was Free from Perplexities (Chu-tzu pu-huo lu). This later book

covered Chu's writings from the age of thirty-one to forty, a period in which Chu's ideas were, according to Li, consistent with Li T'ung's teachings and Confucian doctrine.53 This compilation aimed to rebut Ch'en Chien's claim that Chu's writings - such as his letters to Ho Shuching - from this period were immature and could not be used to support Wang Yang-ming's thesis.54 Li divided the life of Chu Hsi into four distinct stages of intellectual development.55 Before the age of thirty Chu was exposed to the doctrines of Buddhism and Taoism. Between thirty-one and forty, while under the influence of Li T'ung, Chu Hsi was converted to "pure Confucianism." From forty tofiftyChu discarded the teaching of Li T'ung and concentrated on philological studies of the classics in an attempt "to imitate the undertaking of Confucius' literary 47. 50. 53. 54. 55.

Ibid., 32/3!). 48. Ibid. 49. Li, Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, l/yJb. Ibid., i/44b. 51. Ibid., 8a-8b. 52. Ibid., 7a. MTCK, 32/5%; also see his Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, 8/274b. MTCK, 32/6a-6b. Li Fu, in the preface of Chu-tzu pu-huo-lu, in MTCK, 3 2/5a. Ch'ien Mu makes a criticism of Li Fu's periodization of Chu Hsi's intellectual life in Chu-tzu hsin hsueh-an, vol. 2, p. 173.

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project." At fifty-two Chu returned to true Confucian teaching because he was inspired by the lecture Lu Hsiang-shan gave in Nan-k'ang at Chu's own invitation.56 Whether Li Fu's periodization does justice to the intellectual growth of Chu Hsi is not crucial here. More important to our discussion is that it reveals that Li's approach to Chu's doctrine was from the teaching of Lu Hsiang-shan. Chu's alleged final conversion to Lu's doctrine was really based on little more than Li's own prejudice. It was precisely this bias that often led Li to interpret Chu Hsi's writings out of context. For example, Li Fu considered the "one"(i) in Chu Hsi's "principle is 'one' but its manifestations are many" (li-i fen-shu) equivalent to the "one" in Lu Hsiang-shan's doctrine that "'one' thread runs through all" (i-kuari).57 Furthermore, Li Fu singles out the character hsin (mind) in Chu's letters to demonstrate that Chu put as much emphasis on the learning of mind as Lu had.58 Whenever Chu Hsi mentions "seeking the lost mind" (ch'iu fang-hsin), Li reads it as identical to Lu's doctrine of mind. 59 In so doing, Li disregards the specific context in which Chu Hsi employs the character hsin and thus fails to comprehend the different connotations in Chu's and Lu's usages.60 Li Fu's friend Wan Ch'eng-chang once wrote a long essay proving that li (principle) was also the ultimate concern of Lu's teaching, and thus that in the final analysis the discrepancy between Chu and Lu did not exist.61 It is worth noting that at that time Wan served as Li's chief assistant in compiling the Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life and the Intellectual Lineage of the Doctrine of Master Lu; moreover, Li placed Wan's essay in the appendix of this second work. One might say that Li's focus on mind and Wan's focus on principle were each designed to complement the other's thesis about similarities in Chu's and Lu's doctrines. The intention underlying their endeavor could be seen when Li admitted: People have long been obsessed with the difference between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan. It is hard to persuade them to study the teaching of Master Lu; on the other hand, it is proper to urge them to study Chu Hsi's mature teaching. In this manner, studying Chu is equal to studying Lu, even though Master Lu is not accorded the credit he deserves.62 This passage, among many others, is a good example of Li's transformation of the problematic of Chu versus Lu from a philosophical to a textual one. This merits special examination in our exploration of the 56. 58. 59. 60. 61.

MTCK, 32/5a-6a. 57. Li, Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, 7/22o,a-22o,b. To take a few examples, ibid., i/6ia, 2/82a, and 7/244^. Ibid., 2/75a, 80a, 4/130b, 57165b; these are a few examples among many. Cf. Hsia, Shu-Chu chih-i, 10/2b; and Chi Yun, Ssu-k'u ch'uan shu ts'ung-mu t'i-yao. LTHP, 2o/3ga-5ia. 62. MTCK, 116

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intellectual climate of Li Fu's time. Here, a peculiar trait in the style of Li's approach attracts our attention. Li is inclined to analyze and solve intellectual problems through a documentary approach. The intellectual transmission of Lu Hsiang-shan's doctrine: the establishment of an intellectual lineage

When Mencius (ca. 371-289 B.C.) constructed his line of the transmission of the Way, he attempted to clarify and strengthen his intellectual position in opposition to heterodoxies such as those of Mo-tzu and Yang Chu.63 When Han Yu (768-824) assumed the idea of the authentic Way, he was aiming at resisting the overwhelming influence of Buddhism and Taoism in his day.64 When Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi restructured the legitimate line of the transmission of the Way, they made a distinction between their own doctrines and Buddhism and Taoism, on the one hand, and between themselves and other Confucians, on the other.65 From this historical perspective, Li Fu's construction of the Lu-Wang school's intellectual lineage was as an attempt to oppose the Ch'eng-Chu school's unique claim to the authentic Confucian Way. Before taking a close look at Li Fu's establishment of an intellectual lineage for the Lu-Wang school, we should first briefly discuss the historical background of the Ch'eng-Chu school, which had been rising steadily since the end of the Sung. This discussion will provide a better basis for understanding the pressures faced by Li Fu and other Lu-Wang scholars in contending with Ch'eng-Chu scholars for a true understanding of the Way. Claims to preserving and inheriting the "transmission of the Way" became common among Chu Hsi's followers, although their interpretation of this concept differed considerably from Chu's. They favorably appraised Chu's achievements as embodying two aspects of the Waybearer who both recovers the Way from the lost transmission and passes it on to later generations properly. Chu's editing confused texts, and his annotation of the classics aimed at promoting and preserving - rather than rediscovering - the Way.66 Huang Kan, Chu's favorite disciple, wrote in his account of Chu's life: The Way never disappears from the world, but the transmission of the Way depends on the proper men to carry it on. It was not until one thousand years 63. 64. 65. 66.

SSCC, Mencius, pp. 90-91. Han Yu, Han Ch'ang-li wen-chi, Hong Kong, 1972, 1/8. ECCS, 7/iob-iia; CTWC, 86/12a. Professor de Bary discussed these two types of transmissions at length in his Neo-

Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind and Heart, New York, 1981, pp. 9-13. 117

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after Mencius that Chou [Tun-i], Ch'eng [Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I] and Chang [Tsai] discussed the lost Way. But soon after them, the Way was gradually distorted. It was Master Chu who not only synthesized the orthodoxy of their Lien-Lo learning but also revitalized the teachings of Confucius and Mencius from a state of decline. What a magnificent contribution Master Chu has made to the Way of all previous sages and wise men.67 The conviction that the legitimate line of the transmission of the Way awaits the authentic Confucian was clearly expressed here. Chu Hsi in his Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean had already publicized his idea of "the legitimate line of transmission of the Way" (tao-t'ung) in 1189.68 Even as early as 1170, the Chu Hsi scholar, Li Yiian-kang, had drawn a diagram showing the transmission of the Way beginning with the sagekings Yao and Shun and ending with the two Ch'eng brothers. 69 Besides a chart showing the Way's transmission (Ch'uan-tao t'u), Chao Fu in the early Yuan dynasty made a Shih-yii t'u showing those who had transmitted the Way by following Chu's scholarship. 70 The second chart is more important in view of subsequent developments in the construction of the intellectual lineages, for it conveyed not only a sense of community but also the historical continuity of Chu's learning. The adoption of Chu Hsi's commentaries on the classics as the standard texts for the civil service examinations by the Yuan, Ming, and Ch'ing regimes further reinforced the dominance of the Ch'eng-Chu school on the intellectual scene. Historically, the political and cultural interactions between Chu scholars and these rulers were complicated. One fact, however, that can be stated with certainty is the increasing growth of the Ch'eng-Chu school from the end of the Sung dynasty, regardless of whether the Sung and Mongol rulers approached the scholars out of an authentic belief in Chu Hsi's doctrine or out of political expediency. 71 Subsequently, Chu Hsi's teaching received its sponsorship from the Ming regime through the active effort of such Ming scholars as Sung Lien (1310-81) and Wang Wei (1321-73). They further enhanced the Chu school's political power.72 Moreover, in part because the Ming rulers had the same family name as Master Chu, the Ch'eng-Chu school enjoyed imperial backing in spreading its doctrine and scholarship. The political advantage derived by the Ch'eng-Chu school from its wide dissemination is beyond doubt. Li Fu could not but admit: 67. CTNP, p. 240. 68. CTWC, 76/2ia-23a. 69. Li Yuan-kang, Sheng-meng shihyeh-t'u, in Pai-ch'uan hsiieh-hai, Taipei, n.d., pp. 9 9 9 1001.

70. Sung Lien, Yuan shih, Peking, 1976, 189/4314. 71. Liu, "Neo-Confucian School.' 72. Jung Chao-tsu, Ming-tai ssu-hsiang shih (The history of Ming thought), pp. 7-13. 118

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Because of the government's promotion of Chu Hsi's teaching, vulgar scholars tend to slander Lu Hsiang-shan to curry favor. They are blind to the fact that both Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan have been awarded the great honor of receiving sacrifices in the Confucian temple. The government, in effect, is not partial to either one, but the civil service examination stipulates testing official candidates on the basis of the commentaries written by Chu Hsi. By contrast, Lu Hsiang-shan did not write any annotations of the classics, for he held the view that the "Six Classics are footnotes to me." Had he written commentaries, these would have been widely circulated throughout the world [and the Lu school could compete with the Chu school on an equal footing] .73

Li Fu's observation illuminates the advantage enjoyed by Ch'eng-Chu scholars because of Chu's commentaries on the classics. Li Fu deemphasized the fact that in 1241 the Sung had already bestowed on Chu Hsi the honor of receiving sacrifices in the Confucian temple;74 however, this honor came to Lu Hsiang-shan only much later through the petition of Wang Yang-ming's disciple Hsueh K'an in 1530.75 Having one's tablet placed posthumously in the Confucian shrine was considered the greatest honor a Confucian scholar could expect. Symbolically, it also implied that one's contribution through learning to the transmission of the authentic Way wasfinallyand conclusively recognized by later generations. These far-reaching implications can be illustrated by the 1584 debate about whether Wang Yang-ming should receive sacrifices in the Confucian temple. T'ao Ta-lin, trying to calm down Lu Shu-shen, said, "It is not difficult for the court to bestow the rank of count upon Wang Yang-ming, not to mention the honor of receiving sacrifices in the Confucian temple."76 Lu replied, "The rank of count is merely an honor of one generation, but the receiving of sacrifices in the Confucian temple is an honor for ten thousand generations."77 Everyone then recognized the appropriateness of Lu's comment.78 In light of this, that Lu Hsiang-shan entered the Confucian temple almost three hundred years after Chu Hsi is a significant indicator of the flourishing of Chu's teaching and the relative oblivion of Lu's. 73. MTCK (1740), 41/13a-i3b. 74. T'uo T'uo, Sungshih, Peking, 1977, 429/12769. For a general English introduction to the institution of the Confucian temple, see John K. Shryock, Origin and Development of the State Cult of Confucius, New York, 1966. For a detailed and analytical study consult my "Ch'iian-li yu hsin-yang" (Power and belief), Continent, 86, no. 5 (May 1993), 8-34. 75. Chang Ting-Yu, Ming shih, Peking, 1974, 50/1300. 76. Sun Ch'eng-tse, Ch'un-ming meng-yu-lu, Hong Kong, 1965, 21/36b; and idem, T'ien-fu kuang-chi, Peking, 1962, 9/89. 77. Sun, Ch'un-ming meng-yu-lu, 21/36b; idem, T'ien-fu kuang-chi, 9/89. 78. Sun, T'ien-fu kuang-chi, 9/89.

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In 1712, during K'ang-hsi's reign, Chu Hsi's status in the Confucian temple was raised even higher to the rank of shih-che, considered equal to the "ten brilliant disciples of Confucius" or "ten Confucian philosophers."79 This promotion in Chu Hsi's status linked his teaching directly to that of Confucius, and his relationship to the transmission of the Confucian Way was thus acknowledged publicly by the constituted political authority. Although the tablets of Lu Hsiang-shan (since 1530) and Wang Yang-ming (since 1584) were also in the Confucian temple, Lu's was put in the east corridor and Wang's in the west corridor. Both were placed under the rubric of "Confucian scholar" (hsien-ju), a rank below "Confucian wise man" (hsien-hsien), and two ranks below Chu's status as "Confucian philosopher."80 Thus, the hierarchy within the Confucian temple is both intellectually and politically meaningful. Furthermore, such scholars as Yen Jo-ch'u (1636-1704) had been proposing the removal of Lu Hsiang-shan's and Wang Yang-ming's tablets because Lu and Wang allegedly deviated from the Confucian Way.81 Politically and intellectually the continuity of transmission of Ch'engChu's teaching since the end of the Sung was beyond question. Even in the middle of the Ming period, when Wang Yang-ming and his adherents rose to challenge its authority, the Ch'eng-Chu school had by no means disappeared. The Yang-ming school indeed exerted a great sway over the intellectual orientation of its era, but it did not dominate intellectual life completely. The Ch'eng-Chu school represented by Lo Ch'in-shun (1465-1547) and the Tung-lin movement cannot be overlooked as vital responses to the Lu-Wang school. In Li Fu's day, the Ch'eng-Chu school rose again to a peak through the sponsorship of the K'ang-hsi emperor and the promotion of Li Kuang-ti (1642-1718), who ironically had served as Li Fu's examiner in the metropolitan examination and was thereby his "teacher."82 As a Lu-Wang follower, Li Fu certainly felt stifled by the overwhelming dominance of the Ch'eng-Chu school, and displayed his feelings unreservedly in many of his writings.83 In order to oppose the Ch'eng-Chu school, Li Fu was determined to undertake a compilation of an intellectual lineage of the Lu-Wang school. The underlying reason for this commitment was that if the authentic Way had indeed been discovered by Master Lu, it should be appreciated, shared, and continued by his followers in later ages. Though the continuity of the Ch'eng-Chu school was an accepted fact, it had occurred by various mixed motives - not only by the sincere commitment to the Way of the Ch'eng-Chu school but 79. Ch'ingshih, 85/1067. 80. Ibid., 85/1068. 81. Yen, Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng, 8/673-71 a. 82. MTCK, 33/ib. 83. Ibid., 41/4^ 38/i2b-i3a. 12O

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also by the search for fame and wealth. Therefore, if Li Fu could reconstruct an uninterrupted line of Lu-Wang scholars who were deeply committed to it as the true Way and were untainted by impure motives, then presumably the superiority of the Lu-Wang doctrines over those of the Ch'eng-Chu school would become self-evident. Certainly, Li's reasoning took into consideration both human susceptibility to external temptations and the ability to overcome these temptations and eventually to make moral and rational choices. Li Fu's direct inspiration to compile the intellectual transmission of the Lu-Wang school ironically arose in reaction to Chu Hsi's pioneering works to demonstrate his own intellectual origins. Chu Hsi cooperated with Lu Tsu-ch'ien in compiling Reflections on Things at Hand (Chin-ssu lu) to present the thought and words of Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, and Chang Tsai. Chu Hsi also described their actions in The Development of I-Lou Learning (I-Lou yuan-yuan lu). In doing so, Chu Hsi had, according to Li Fu, puts words (yen) and acts (hsing) into separate categories - a serious mistake that he wished to avoid in his own works.84 For this purpose, Li Fu compiled two books: The Development of Yangming's Learning (Yang-ming hsueh-lu); and the Intellectual Lineage of the Learning of Master Lu (Lu-tzu hsueh-f'u, prefaced in 1732).85 Because the book on Wang's learning is unavailable to me and probably not extant, our analysis will focus on Li's work on Lu's learning. In this book, Li Fu first gives a comprehensive exposition of the doctrines of Master Lu with particular emphasis on their relation to the "family learning" shared by Lu's clan.86 The stress on the milieu of Lu's family as an important context in which Master Lu developed his unique thought also enabled Li Fu to broaden the former chronology of Master Lu in a comprehensive manner.87 Since Master Lu proclaimed that the bulk of his own learning was formed by his understanding of Mencius,88 it was not necessary to trace Lu Hsiang-shan's learning to earlier scholars. Lu's teachings were basically a kind of moral learning through personal demonstration. The flourishing of the Lu school during his own lifetime bore witness to his moral charisma. But the power of his personal charisma could not be felt beyond the first generation of his disciples. Even worse, owing to apparent similarities between Lu's doctrines and Zen Buddhism, some of Lu's disciples were attracted to Zen doctrines. Such major disciples as Yang Chien, Fu Tzu-yiian, and 84. Ibid., 32/ia. 85. The work was unavailable to me. Most likely it is no longer extant. 86. Li Fu, Lu-tzu-hsueh-f'u (hereafter abbreviated as LTHP), Wu-nu hsuan prefaced in 1732, chuan 5. 87. MTCK, 32/7a-7b. 88. LHCQ 35/37^ 121

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Yen Tzu-sheng were only a few among many to drift in that direction.89 The unspeakable shame associated with this trend, along with the rapid decline of the Lu school after the first generation of Lu's disciples, truly hampered Li Fu in his attempt to draw an uninterrupted line within the Lu school that could begin to rival the Chu school. Despite this intrinsic defect in the history of the Lu school, Li Fu was ingenious enough to employ the idea of "self-declared disciple" to refer to those who did not directly receive the instruction of Master Lu but in earnest admiration cultivated themselves on his model. Li Fu derived this idea from the example of Mencius, who called himself the "selfdeclared disciple" (ssu-shu) of Confucius, although he was born more than a hundred years after the latter's demise.90 Using this concept, Li Fu had little difficulty filling in the gap between Lu and his admirers in later times.91 The first figure Li Fu chose as an illustration of the "self-declared disciples" of Master Lu was Wu Ch'eng, whose life spanned the late Sung and early Yuan dynasties.92 The advantage in choosing Wu Ch'eng was threefold. First, Wu Ch'eng began his intellectual pursuits as a Ch'engChu scholar but later, due to an exposure to Lu's teaching, converted to the doctrines of Lu Hsiang-shan; hence, the primacy of Lu's teaching over Chu's was recognized even by a former Chu scholar. Second, Wu Ch'eng was also a native of Lin-ch'uan, a fact of which Li Fu was very proud. Li Fu also used Wu Ch'eng's case to justify accepting government office under an alien regime. Wu Ch'eng was born in 1249 and passed the provincial examination at the age of twenty, five years prior to the Mongol conquest of the Southern Sung. Wu was reluctant to assume certain officially assigned academic offices and agreed to them only after he had declined several times.93 Wu Ch'eng believed that intellectual pursuits had to be associated with concern for moral perfection; otherwise, they would degenerate into trivial textual studies. Wu attempted to reconcile the doctrines of Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan as complementary.94 He regarded Chu as good at intellectual learning and Lu as good at moral cultivation. This paradigm for comprehending the contrast between Chu and Lu was taken up by Li Fu as well.95 As Li would later attempt to do, Wu Ch'eng tried to broaden the cultural heritage of his era in opposition to more narrow-minded Chu scholars such as Hsu 89. MTCK, i8/2oa-2ob. 90. SSCQ Mencius, pp. 117, 202. 91. LTHP, 18/ia-ib. 92. Ibid., i8/ia-4b. For a description in English of Wu's life see David Gedalecia, "Wu Ch'eng and the Perpetuation of the Classical Heritage in the Yuan," in John D. Langlois,Jr., ed., China under Mongol Rule (Princeton, N.J., 1981), pp. 186-211. 93. MTCK 24/ga-na. 94. SYHA, 23/5. 95. CWing-shih lieh-chuan, 15/8,1. 122

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Heng (1209-81). Hsu taught at Imperial College for years, basing his work primarily on Elementary Learning (Hsiao-hsileh), a book reportedly

composed by Master Chu to discuss the fundamental ritual practices for the commencement of learning.96 In 1435, Wu Ch'eng was granted the posthumous honor of sacrifices in the Confucian temple.97 But in 1530 this sacrifice was terminated because he was charged with unrighteous behavior by serving the alien Mongol regime without regard to the fact he had been born and had passed the provincial examination in the Sung dynasty.98 When proposing to deprive Wu of the honor,99 Hsieh Tu said: Wu "had lived in [Han] China under Han control but later served the barbarians. He forgot the loyal duty of a subject and cooperated with the barbarians, supposedly his enemies as well, an improper act that did not conform to the propriety of a sage or wise man in taking or declining an office."100 Li Fu strove to defend Wu and urged the restoration of his honor in the Confucian temple. For Li Fu, Wu Ch'eng was a scholar indifferent to fame and wealth. Even during the Sung, Wu was only "forced" by his grandfather to take the civil service examination; how much less plausible, then, that he should crave office under the Mongol regime. His service on the Mongol court was imposed by the peculiar political demands of his time. Moreover, although Wu Ch'eng passed the provincial examination during the Sung, he did not assume any government post under that dynasty. Thus the doctrine of the proper relationship between ruler and minister could not be applied in the case of Wu's relation to the Sung dynasty.101 More revealing, it seemed to Li Fu that political legitimacy based on the distinction between the Han Chinese and barbarians was incompatible with principle(li). In an attempt to support his rationalization of alien rule in China, Li cites from the Kungyang commentary to the Ch'un-ch'iu, the phrase "to treat as a family [or unite] China's multitudinous states and to keep at a distance the neighboring countries around China" (nei-chu-hsia erh wai-ssu-i),102 He regards this as suggesting a convenient expediency for ruling all the people in China and downplays the implication of racial discrimination. "Historically" speaking, he noted, the sage Shun was an eastern barbarian, and King Wen was a western barbarian. After becoming China's rulers they brought about the most prosperous and peaceful ages in 96. LTCP, i8/2a. 97. Ming-shih, 50/1297. 98. Ibid., 163/443; MTCK, 24/9. 99. Ming-shih, 50/1299-1300. 100. MTCK, 24/9^ 101. Ibid., 24/1 ob. 102. Ibid., 24/1 lb. The original wording of the Kung-Yang commentaries is nei-chu-hsia erh wai-i-ti, meaning "to familize the multitudinous states of China and to distance i-ti [barbarians]." Kung-Yang Chuan, SPPY. i8/5b. The replacement of i-ti by ssu-i (the neighboring countries) on the part of Li Fu reveals the high pressures of the literary inquisition by the Ch'ing regime. 123

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antiquity. He further noted that in his own time, people never criticized Shun and King Wen for their origins because their achievements have been universally appreciated. 103 Li sought to make the examples of these sage-kings relevant to the case of Wu Ch'eng. The Yuan regime had peacefully ruled China for a considerable period; therefore, driving the Mongols out would conflict with the goal of maintaining a secure order for the people's livelihood - even if the government did not entirely satisfy Confucian political standards. In short, Li Fu's justification of Wu Ch'eng's action is reminiscent of his own situation. His experience as a Lu-Wang scholar-official under an alien regime would make him more likely than others to sympathize with Wu Ch'eng. In 1737, Wu Ch'eng's tablet was eventually restored to its place in the Confucian temple. 104 This would have pleased Li Fu greatly, for it was in part the result of his years of pleading. 105 The implausible nature of Li Fu's intellectual lineage of Lu's teaching did not escape Ch'uan Tsu-wang's notice. Despite that he was an intimate friend of Li and a Lu-Wang scholar himself, Ch'uan points out that quite a few figures Li mentioned, such as Ts'ai Yu-hsueh, Lu Tsu-ch'ien, Hsiang An-shih, and Tai Hsi, could in no way be counted as Lu scholars or Lu's disciples.106 Li Fu's motivation for including these figures in the Lu camp may reflect his desire to compete in terms of the numbers of mambers of the Chu school. His obsession with the number of adherents of the Lu school can be illustrated by the preface Li wrote for his biographies of Lu's disciples: Confucius had three thousand students, of whom only seventy-two had mastery of the six arts, and among whom five are included in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's Records of the Grand Historian. [By contrast], Lu Hsiang-shan promoted his doctrines in the Southern Sung, and his disciples numbered in the thousands. It so happens that among Lu's students, the names of more than seventy can be found in historical records and gazetteers; furthermore, more than one hundred others can be found in Lu's writings without specific reference to their official titles.. .. Here, I simply choose Lu's most brilliant students [for my description] in these ten chiian.107

But in Ch'uan Tsu-wang's opinion, Li Fu's concern with membership alone would inevitably confuse the genuine transmission of Lu's teaching just as his intellectual rival, the author of The Origins of Chu Hsi Learning (K'ao-t'ingyuan-yuan lu), debased the lineage of Chu scholars because of his inability to differentiate a real Chu scholar. 108 Li Fu's and Ch'uan Tsu-wang's criteria of classifying a Lu scholar was sometimes 103. MTCK, 24/1 lb. 104. Ch'ing-shih, 85/1067. 105. MTPK, 25/11 a-i2b. 106. CCTC, wai-p'ien, 44/1322-1323. 107. LTHP, 6/ia. 108. Ibid., 44/1323. 124

Li Fu and the philological turn contradictory. For instance, in his Philosophical Records of the Neo-Confu-

cians of the Sung and the Yuan, Ch'iian remarked that Wu Ch'eng's work as a whole sided with Chu Hsi.109 The divergent views held by these two Lu-Wang scholars about the continuity of the Lu school itself seemed to be so acute as to leave outsiders in doubt about the authenticity of the line. As a matter of fact, the history of Lu's teaching is characterized more by discontinuity than by continuity. A generation later, Chang Hsuehch'eng faced similar difficulties when he attempted to link the Che-tung (Chekiang) school's study of historiography with the spirit of Lu-Wang in order to distinguish them from Tai Chen's Che-hsi (Kiangsi) school's study of the classics from the Ch'eng-Chu perspective.110 However, Li Fu's preoccupation with constructing an intellectual lineage by means of historical exposition reflected the intellectual fashion of his time. His historical approach was certainly predicated on his philosophical position as a Lu-Wang scholar; however, the exposition itself involved more than making a chart of the orthodox transmission of the Way, as Chao Fu had done during the early Yuan. Li's work assumed the form of historical exposition. His approach also differed from that of the Sung Confucians, who emphasized discontinuity rather than continuity, claiming to be rediscovering the Way after a thousand years' break. Since the Way had been rediscovered by the Sung Confucians, Li Fu and other Lu-Wang scholars, as might be expected, stressed its preservation and transmission through every generation. Consequently their approach possessed a unique historical style. The rise of the Wang Yang-ming school precipitated the conflict between the doctrine of Ch'eng-Chu and that of Lu Hsiang-shan because of people's association of Wang Yang-ming's doctrines with those of Lu - whose ideas at the time had fallen into oblivion. The battles between these two schools took place at various levels. Spurred by political, social, and intellectual confrontations, both Ch'eng-Chu and Luwang scholars became more concerned than ever with their own ideological purity, and the question of intellectual origins became a crucial concern for both schools. Aside from engaging in philosophical disputes, they were eager to justify their learning in terms of the true transmission of the Way, an approach indirectly learned from Zen Buddhists' focus on the transmission of their doctrines.111 Confucians 109. SYHA, 23/5. 110. This subject is well explored by Professor Yii Ying-shih in On Tai Chen and Chang Hsueh-ch'eng (Lun Tai Chen yii ChangHsiieh-ch'eng), Hong Kong, 1976, p. 59. 111. Historically speaking, James T.C. Liu was right in saying that "[the tradition of the Way] was a double borrowing: on the one hand, from Confucian historiography on

Philosophy, philology, and politics

not only took account of their own intellectual heritage, but also commented on the origins of their rivals. For example, a Chu scholar, Huang Ch'ang-chu, stated in 1682: We, the Ch'eng-Chu school, unified the learning of the early Ming, but for about a century, the heterodoxies rose to compete with us. Without the least regard for Tseng-tzu and Mencius, they claimed to inherit the teachings of Confucius directly and also sought to dismiss the Sung Confucians. They actually knew that they were not standing on solid ground. .. . Not having a well-founded argument, they differentiated Ch'eng's doctrine from Chu's doctrine by charging that the latter was not faithful to the former. Moreover, they differentiated between the two Ch'eng brothers, saying that Ch'eng I-ch'uan's teaching went against that of Ch'eng Ming-tao. They even went to the extreme of concluding that the teaching of the Min region [that of Chu Hsi] was not the genuine transmission of Lo teaching [that of the Ch'eng brothers] in their attempt to further sever the teaching of Lo from that of Confucius.112 Huang's criticism inadvertently informs us that Lu-Wang scholars' inquiry into the formation of the Ch'eng-Chu school actually arose from their philosophical disputes. Hence, the effort by the Lu-Wang side to separate the components of Ch'eng-Chu teaching was a logical result of the long-term confrontation between the schools over the true transmission of the Confucian Way. Long before Li Fu's construction of a Lu-Wang lineage, adherents of the Ch'eng-Chu school and the Lu-Wang school had made many similar attempts to set up their own lineage of intellectual transmission. The Ch'eng-Chu school works included A Sequel to Master Chu's Origins ofl-Lo Learning (I-Lo yuan-yuan hsu-lu) by Hsieh To (1435-1510), 113 and The Intellectual Lineage ofHsin-an Area (Hsin-an hsueh-hsi lu) by Ch'eng T'ung (chin-shih, 1508), in 1508.114 Both were Wang Yang-ming's contemporaries. A few decades later, The Origins of Chu Hsi's Learning (K'ao-t'ing yuan-yuan lu) was finished by Hsueh Ying-ch'i, with a preface written by the legitimacy of dynastic successions known as cheng-t'ung; and on the other hand, from the Buddhist practice of transmitting this teaching from one patriarch to the next, especially in Zen Buddhism." See his "Neo-Confucian School," 490-491. However, Wing-tsit Chan does not agree with the second point Liu makes. Chan contends that Chu Hsi's making up the tradition of the Way is out of necessity of Chu's intellectual concern and development. See his "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism." 112. Huang Ch'ang-ch'u in his preface to Lo-Min yuan-liu lu, 1682, pp. 2a—2b. 113. Hsieh To, I-Lo yuan-yuan hsu-lu, n.d., microfilm by the National Central Library, Taipei. 114. Ch'eng T'ung, Hsin-an hsueh-hsi lu, prefaced 1508, in Anhwei ts'ung-shu, first series, 1932, p. 3a. 126

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Hsu Chieh in 1569.115 In Li Fu's writings this book was mentioned and criticized.116 Around Li's time, other works included The Development of the Learning of Lo and Min Areas {Lo Min yuan-liu lu) by Chang Hsia in 1682,117 The Transmission of Orthodox Learning (Hsueh-t'ung)by Hsiung Ssu-lu (1635-1709) in 1685,118 Records of the Transmission of the Way {Taotung lu) by Chang P'o-hsing (1652-1725) in 1708,119 and The Origins of the Learning Transmitted to the South (Tao-nan yuan-wei) by Chu Heng in 1709 or earlier.120 Among these four works, Chang Hsia's writing received Li Fu's special attention, and he composed an essay devoted to criticizing it.121 In 1749, a year before Li's death, An Investigation of the Learning of the Neo-Confucians of the Middle Min Area {Min-chung li-hsiieh k'ao) was written by Li Ch'ing-fu.122 Prior to Li Fu, the Lu-Wang line, or scholars who were interested in Lu-Wang learning, produced several works, among them Philosophical Records of Various Confucians {Chu-ju hsiieh-an) by Liu Yuan-ch'ing. This work reminds us of the "philosophical records" later made by Huang Tsung-hsi.123 In addition, The Origins of the Learning of T'ai-chou {T'ai-hsueh yiian-liu), a piece written by Chin Penheng (Chin-shih, 1514),124 The Orthodox Transmission of the Sage Learning {Sheng-hsiieh tsung-ch'uan) by Chou Ju-teng in 1605,125 and The Orthodox Transmission of Neo-Confudanism {Li-hsiieh tsung-ch'uan) by Sun Ch'i-feng 115. Sung Tuan-i, K'ao-t'ing yuan-yuan lu, microfilm by the National Central Library, Taipei, only six chu'an available. Sung Tuan-i (1447-1501) initiated the compilation of this book but merely composed a draft of it. It was Hsueh Ying-ch'i who finalized the manuscripts. See also K'ao-t'ing yiian-yiian-lu, prefaces written separately by Hsu Chieh and Hsueh Ying-ch'i, Japan's edition. Twenty chu'an were republished by Chung-wen ch'u-pan-she. 116. LTHP, i/22a-22b, 59b. 117. Chang Hsia, Lo-min yuan-liu lu, prefaced in 1682, p. 5. 118. Hsiung Ssu-lu, Hsiieh-t'ung, 1685, included in TSCC. 119. Chang P'o-hsin, Tao-tunglu, 1708, included in TSCC. 120. Chu Heng, Tao-nan-yiian-wei, completed by Chang Po-hsing, prefaced in 1709. 121. MTCK (1740), 45/16a-i7b. 122. Li Ch'ing-fu, Min-chung li-hsiieh yuan-yuan k'ao, SKCS (Ssu-Ru ch'iian-shu) edition, prefaced in 1749, but composition started in 1728. See p. 1. 123. SCTT, p. 1984. The title, Chu-ju hsiieh-an, appears as one "philosophical record" in Huang's work. See my "Hsiieh-an t'i-ts'ai pu-lun" (On the term hsiieh-an), Shih-huo, 16, nos. 9—10. But before that, Liu's teacher, Keng Ting-hsiang (1524-1596) had already employed the term hsiieh-an for the biographies of Lu Hsiang-shan and his disciple, Yang Chien (1140-1225). See Ch'ih Sheng-ch'ang, "Keng Ting-hsiang yu T'ai-chou hsueh-p'ai," (Keng Ting-hsiang and the T'ai-chou school), master's thesis, National Taiwan Normal University, 1990, p. 30. 124. Chi Yun, Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao, Taipei, n.d., p. 1346. 125. Chou Ju-teng, Sheng-hsiieh tsung-ch'uan, prefaced in 1605. Chou's book is detailed in the description of the Confucians of the ancient period, but relatively sketchy in that of recent centuries; hence, Liu Lin-ch'ang composed another book and patterned it after the style of Chou's to make up this defect. Liu's book was titled Che-hsueh tsungch'uan. See SCTT, p. 1371.

127

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in 1666, are all in the Lu-Wang strain.126 These are the only works available to me. There may well be others beyond my knowledge or that have been lost in circulation. 127 The meaning of Li Fu's works can easily be located within the spectrum of such compilations, and he was certainly not the one who first initiated the construction of partisan intellectual lineages. The motive behind all such endeavors was to compete with the opposing school in establishing an orthodox transmission of the Way. The ideological drives by both sides to construct intellectual lineages provides a background for understanding Huang Tsung-hsi's work, The Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucians (Ming-ju hsueh-an) .128 Dissatis-

fied with the writings of Chou Ju-teng, Huang charged that Chou's commitment to Zen resulted in subjective interpretations of the different schools. Huang was also critical of Sun Ch'i-feng's undiscriminating use of source materials. Aware of such limitations in both schools, Huang Tsung-hsi attempted to be impartial and prudent in selecting subjects.129 Even so, Huang could not escape criticism, in one case even by an admirer, Ch'iian Tsu-wang, who said, "Nevertheless, Huang suffers profoundly from his factional view."130 In commenting on The Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucians, the authors of the Imperial Catalog {Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu tsung-mu Vi-yao) shared Ch'uan's judgment: [Huang] Tsung-hsi was born in Yao-chiang [the birthplace of Wang Yang-ming]. He would not feel happy to deprecate Wang [Yang-ming] and honor Hsueh [Hsuan], but in view of the circumstances of his situation, he was not allowed to deprecate Hsueh and honor Wang, either. It turned out that he apparently sided with the school of Hsueh, but actually took a roundabout way to criticize it. His defense of the school of Wang was disguised by his superficial attacks on it.131 Thus, the influence of Huang's philosophical viewpoint on his own work has been widely recognized. Despite that their works had a somewhat similar format, a distinction must be made between Huang Tsung-hsi and Li Fu in terms of their goals and motivations. Li's aim was to justify his intellectual stand 126. Sun Ch'i-feng, Li-hsueh tsung-ch'uan, Taipei, prefaced 1666. 127. The books mentioned in Li Ch'ing-fu's preface to his work bear witness to my

assertion. Min-chung li-hsueh yuan-yuan k'ao, pp. ia-5a. 128. Huang did not finish the Philosophical Records of the Confucians of the Sung and the Yuan.

Later, through the effort primarily of Ch'iian Tsu-wang and secondarily Wang Tsuts'ai, this work was completed. For a more detailed investigation of the relationship between "intellectual genealogy" and "philosophical records," see my article, 'The Emergence of a Historical Genre: The Background to the 'Philosophical Records'" (Hsueh-an t'i-ts'ai ch'an-sheng ti ssu-hsiang pei-ching), Chinese Studies, 2, no. 1 (June 1984), 201-221. 129. MJHA, p. 1. 130. CCTC, wai-fien, 44/1332. 131. SCTT, p. 1286. 128

Li Fu and the philological turn

through a seemingly "historical" reconstruction of a philosophical school. By contrast, Huang at least claimed to be more interested in presenting the historical evolution of various schools impartially and comprehensively.132 Furthermore, Huang consciously separated his own comments from his descriptions of different schools in order to avoid confusing his own evaluations and the historical subjects he presented.133 To evaluate how well he realized his goals is important, but not critical to our present inquiry. What concerns us now is rather that Huang created a new genre of historical writing from within the old-fashioned anthologies of "intellectual lineages." Yet it cannot be judged by its format alone, for the substance and the results of the composition are crucially relevant, too. However, Huang's genre did not entirely displace the "intellectual lineage" genre, for each had its faithful followers. Li Fu's type of intellectual lineages were still being constructed in the 1920s.134 Nonetheless, in the light of the subsequent development of Chinese historiography, Huang's approach has received wider acceptance than Li's,135 especially because of Ch'uan Tsu-wang - ironically, a historian and a Lu-Wang scholar - who continued Huang's unfinished Philosophical Records of the Sung and the Yuan Confucians, which has been viewed as

a modern "intellectual history" in spirit and in substance.136 But our study of Li Fu's dedication to the establishment of the intellectual lineages serves to remind us of the long-forgotten ideological origins of a genre invented, modified, and adopted by Li and his predecessors, and

132. MJHA,p. 1. 133. Cf. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsiieh-shu shih, Taipei, n.d., pp. 7778.

134. Shao Ch'i-hsien, ed., Wang-hsueh yuan-yuan lu, printed in 1920. Or Huang Ssu-tung, Tao-hsueh yuan-yuan lu, Feng-shan hsueh-she, 1908; 100 volumes. To take one example from those made in the nineteenth century, see Tso Chung-ch'uan, Tao-nanyuanyuan lu, prefaced in 1848. 135. A brief description of the development of the form of "philosophical record" (hsu'ehan) can be found in Chin Yu-fu's Chung-kuo shih-hsueh-shih (History of Chinese historiography), Hong Kong, n.d., pp. 202-204. Also see Juan Chih-sheng's "A Preliminary Investigation of the form of 'Philosophical Record'" in Tu Wei-yun and Huang Chin-shing, eds., Chung-kuo shih-hsueh-shih lun-wen hsuan-chi (Readings in the history of Chinese Historiography), Taipei, 1976, vol. 1, pp. 574-596; and Ch'ien Mu, The Masterpieces of Chinese Historiography {Chung-kuo shih-hsueh ming-chu), Taipei,

1973, pp. 285-317. These sources do not explore the intellectual or ideological origins of "philosophical record," however. 136. In fact, Huang Tsung-hsi made only the outline of this book. Of 100 chu'an, he finished merely 17. Ch'uan Tsu-wang continued the project for ten years without putting it in a publishable form. Another scholar, Wang Tsu-ts'ai, primarily following the work of Ch'uan, finally brought it to an end. As for the comparison between Huang's Philosophical Records of the Confucians of the Ming and this book, one can consult Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's comments on both. In his judgment, the latter made progress on the former. Liang, Chung-kuo chin-san-pai-nien hsueh-shu-shih, pp. 147H9129

Philosophy, philology, and politics

upon which Huang Tsung-hsi drew in making his own philosophical records. The cultural trend that inspired Li Fu to construct Lu-Wang's intellectual lineage in opposition to the Ch'eng-Chu school may also shed light on Chang Hsueh-ch'eng's similar efforts. Chang set up an eastern Che school as "a way of expression "to oppose the western Che school represented by his contemporary, Tai Chen. Professor Ying-shih Yii has pointed out this implicit psychological tension between Chang and Tai.137 Constructing an intellectual lineage was not the exclusive monopoly of the philosophers of the Ch'eng-Chu or the Lu-Wang schools. The evidential research school also saw the advantages of intellectual lineages in undermining the legitimacy of Sung and Ming Confucian philosophers who claimed that after more than a thousand-year break in the transmission of the Way,138 their doctrines directly linked them to the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. To contest this claim of legitimacy, such scholars as Ch'en Yu-fu and Chiang Fan established their own intellectual lineage for the school of evidential research by associating themselves with the Han and T'ang Confucians who had anticipated their own philological interests.139 In this view, it was the scholars of the Han and the T'ang who had inherited the Way through preserving the classics, a contribution that subsequent Confucians could not match.140 To support their emphasis on the value of philology within their own intellectual lineage, members of the evidential research school greatly depreciated the significance of the doctrines of Sung and Ming Confucians; thus, the status of philologists was securely confirmed. Hence, the use of intellectual lineages was available not only to Ch'eng-Chu and LuWang scholars, on the one hand, but also to their common enemies, on the other. Li Fu and the study of classics

Li Fu's study of classics is a clear indication that the rise of the evidential approach to scholarship was intimately linked to the disputes between the Ch'eng-Chu and the Lu-Wang schools. Li Fu and the other scholars in the early Ch'ing were not doing Wao-cheng (evidential research) for its own sake. Their evidential studies were a part of their larger philosophi137. Yu Ying-shih, Lun Tai Chen yii Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, Hong Kong, 1976, pp. 53-75. 138. For example, this idea is seen in the epigraph of Ch'eng Hao written by Ch'eng I, ECCS, 7/1 oa-11 a; and in the epigraph of Chu Hsi written by Huang Kan, CTNP, p. 240. 139. Ch'eng Mai-fu, Cheng-hsueh-hsu (Continuity of the orthodox learning), in TSCC, 1/ 1-4. 140. Ibid., p. 7. Chiang Fan, 1/1-2. 130

Li Fu and the philological turn

cal concerns. Li Fu's own interests were wide-ranging and included history, ritual, geography, poetry, the classics, and essay writing. We will use case studies of The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The

Book of Documents to demonstrate first, that Li Fu was a competent philologist; second, that the relationship between philosophy and philology was an affirmative one, at least during the early Ch'ing; and finally, that the evidential approach was a neutral weapon available to various schools. The Great Learning (Ta-hsueh)

Among Neo-Confucian interpretations of the classics, those dealing with The Great Learning tend to be most revealing of their basic philosophical position. Li Fu's study of The Great Learning demonstrates this point perfectly. The Great Learning was originally merely a chapter of The Book ofRites (Li-chi). Ssu-ma Kuang (1019—86), in the Northern Sung period, was said to be the first one to publish it as a separate work.141 But it probably appeared as an independent text earlier because in 1030 the Sung emperor Jen-tsung bestowed it on scholars who had recently passed the metropolitan examination.142 Dissatisfied with the structure of the text of The Great Learning, Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I separately reorganized the structure of the text and thus produced different versions of it.143 Chu Hsi further rearranged the work by dividing it into the main text (ching, literally "canon") and its commentaries (chuan, literally "paraphrase"). In an attempt allegedly to complete the meaning of the fifth chapter, he also composed and inserted a passage on ko-wu (investigation of things) and chih-chih (extension of knowledge).144 In doing so, Chu Hsi expounded his own theory of ko-wu. Chu Hsi's undertaking marked a milestone in the history of Confucianism. First, as a result of his advocacy, The Great Learning, together with The Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects, and Mendus, replaced The Five Classics as the most important texts of Confucian learning.145 Second, The Great Learningthereafter came to be regarded as the gateway to the Confucian study of classics and moral perfection.146 Third, Chu Hsi's version of The Great Learning, together with his commentaries to the other Four Books, were prescribed as the standard texts for the imperial examinations from 1313 onward. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145.

Chul-chun, Ching-i k'ao, SPPY, 156/ia. MTCK, ig/34a; also see Mao Hsi-ho, Ta-hsueh cheng-wen, in WSC, i/6a. Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I, Erh-Ch'eng chi, Peking, 1984, pp. 1126-1132. SSCC, Ta-hsueh, pp. 5-6. Ch'ien, Mu, Chu-tzu hsin-hsueh-an, vol. 1, p. 189. 146. SSCC, Ta-hsueh, p. 1.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

Although Chu's new text received unanimous approval from the political establishment, the response of intellectuals was far more complicated. Traditionally a classic was considered sacred and was to be preserved unaltered. Given the scale of transformations that he wrought on the text, Chu Hsi was indeed a radical. Although some scholars had their reservations about Chu's alteration of the classic, many of his followers went as far as he did. Following Chu Hsi, several versions of the text were suggested by Wang Po, (1197-1274) Tung Huai (d. 1262), and other scholars.147 But Chu Hsi's version retained its ascendancy because of a combination of political and intellectual influences. Chu Hsi's supremacy went unchallenged until Wang Yang-ming reintroduced the old text of The Great Learning to support his own doctrines; thereafter, a serious philosophical dispute, grounded in the textual problems, raised doubts about the validity of Chu Hsi's version. 148 A quest for the authentic edition of The Great Learning became something of a fashion, as is evident in the emergence of a number of newly arranged texts in the wake of Wang Yang-ming's challenge. 149 An ancient stone-inscription version of The Great Learning (Shih-ching Ta-hsiieh) even appeared that was first accepted by quite a few famous scholars, including Ku Hsien-ch'eng (1550—1612) and Liu Tsung-chou (1578—1645). It later proved to be a forgery. 150 Liu Tsung-chou, who was well versed in contemporary scholarship on The Great Learning, lamented: In sum, The Great Learning has been an unsettled case for a long time. The old text and the stone-inscription text [of it] are all uncertain. The texts of the Ch'eng brothers, Chu Hsi and Kao P'an-lung [1562—1626] are also uncertain. Whether or not the passage ko-wu and chih-chih is complete is uncertain; therefore, the interpretations of it are uncertain. Alas! When can these problems be solved? Although I have studied until this old age, I can never clear my doubts about The Great Learning}51

As the study of The Great Learning after Wang Yang-ming's challenge became linked to one's philosophical position; those who argued for 147. Chu I-tsun, Ching-i-k'ao, i57/3a-3b. Wang Po's suggested version is seen in Mao Hsiho's Ta-hsiieh cheng-wen, 4/19—20b; Tung Huai's version is in Huang-shih jih-ch'ao, in WSC, 28/42a-5oa. 148. Chang, Wang-hsiieh chih-i, appendix, pp. I2a-i2b. 149. Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, 159—161. 150. Mao, Ta-hsiieh cheng-wen, 1/2D-4D, 2/2a-i2b; and Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, i6o/6b~7a, 151. Liu Tsung-chou, Liu-tzu ch'iian-shu chi i-jrien, Kyoto: Chung-wen ch'u-pan-she, 36/2b. 132

Li Fu and the philological turn Wang Yang-ming inevitably challenged Chu Hsi's version, and vice versa.152 Ch'en Ch'ueh (1604—77), a disciple of Liu Tsung-chou, carried this debate to an extreme by arguing that The Great Learningwas not a sacred book at all. Ch'en's daring assertion sought to undermine Chu Hsi's theory of ko-mu: Yang-ming did not directly attack The Great Learning when [based upon his proposed old text] he argued against Chu Hsi's interpretation of ko-mu and chihchih.... In the end, Chu Hsi's school used The Great Learning to triumph over Yang-ming's doctrines. This is why the dispute between them has been unable to come to an end. Alas! the fault lies in Master Yang-ming [for he did not attack The Great Learning directly] .153 C h ' e n ' s r e m a r k d e m o n s t r a t e s that t h e study of The Great Learning was closely related to t h e philosophical a r g u m e n t s between C h u a n d Wang. C h ' e n ' s iconoclasm toward The Great LearningW?LS also a straightforward b u t illogical answer to Liu Tsung-chou's confusion a b o u t t h e a u t h e n ticity of its various texts. T h e quest for t h e a u t h e n t i c Great Learning h a d i n d e e d b e c o m e pressing by t h e early C h ' i n g . Li Fu d i d n o t follow C h ' e n C h ' u e h ' s conclusion, b u t r a t h e r basically a g r e e d with W a n g Yang-ming. Li a g r e e d that t h e restoration of t h e old text of The Great Learning was necessary to show C h u Hsi's mishandling of t h e original text, a n d thus his m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ko-xvu.154 Li Fu raises m a n y d o u b t s a b o u t C h u Hsi's study of The Great Learning. In his preface to t h e text, C h u Hsi h a d asserted that Tseng-tzu was its a u t h o r , b u t Li Fu was skeptical. 155 T h e r e h a d b e e n n o evidence of its a u t h o r s h i p before C h u Hsi c a m e u p with t h e n a m e of Tseng-tzu. 156 Li Fu also p o i n t e d o u t that t h e C h ' e n g b r o t h e r s h a d n o t b e e n t h e first ones to p r o m o t e The Great Learning as a n i n d e p e n d e n t text, as C h u Hsi h a d claimed. A l t h o u g h t h e Sung e m p e r o r h a d given The Great Learning to new d e g r e e holders in 1030, C h u Hsi h a d concealed this to glorify t h e C h ' e n g brothers. 1 5 7 As we m i g h t expect, Li Fu r e g a r d e d C h u Hsi's gravest e r r o r to b e his dividing t h e text itself into two parts a n d a d d i n g his own writing to it. For m o r e t h a n a t h o u s a n d years, n o scholar h a d ever c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t lapses o r omissions in t h e text, so h o w could t h e C h ' e n g b r o t h e r s a n d 152. Hu Wei, Ta-hsiieh i-chen, in WSC, vol. 3. Not all Ch'eng-Chu scholars approve of Chu Hsi's version, however. For example, Li Kuang-ti accepts the Old Text version rather than Chu Hsi's. Li Kuang-ti, Ta-hsiieh ku-^pen-shuo, in WSC, la—17a. 153. Ch'en Ch'ueh, Ch'en Ch'ueh chi, Peking, 1979, p. 565. 154. Cf. Hu Wei, Ta-hsiieh i-chen, 3/8D-9D. 155. MTCK, 19/343. 156. Mao, Ta-hsiieh cheng-wen, 3/2%—4a.

157. MTCK, 19/343.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

Chu Hsi suddenly discover such alleged omissions? Moreover, each of them had, within a mere few decades, brought out his own edition. What criterion should one use to select one of them rather than the older one?158 Furthermore, if the text of The Great Learning were merely one chapter of The Book of Rites, it might not deserve our respect. However, if it were indeed linked closely to Confucius himself, its original form should be preserved, and not even the slightest modification was permissible, not to mention the extreme case of Chu Hsi's additions and amendations.159 Li Fu's charge against Chu Hsi's violation of textual rules was actually intended as a refutation of his philosophy. It was, after all, based on the inserted passage on ko-wu that Chu Hsi preached a theory that dissociated not only mind from experience but also knowledge from action. Thus Li claimed that Chu's altered text led people into unorthodox learning. In other words, what Chu Hsi had done was to "transform tradition" (pien-ku) rather than "restore tradition" (fu-ku), an act that ruined the ancient method of education.160 As Li Fu rightly pointed out, the controversies over Chu Hsi's version of The Great Learning had never really ceased. Even scholars within the Chu Hsi school such as Tung Huai (d. 1262) and Wang Po questioned the necessity of Chu Hsi's inserted passage. Yang-ming's restoration of the old text further aroused criticisms of Chu Hsi.161 Having for centuries used Chu Hsi's version of The Great Learning in the civil service examinations, scholar-officials were shocked when they heard that an "old and original" text existed.162 Li Fu also appealed to the early T'ang commentaries of K'ung Ying-ta, which proclaimed that great learning should start with the sincerity of the will; thus, the T'ang commentaries supported Wang Yang-ming's reading of the text.163 In spite of his general agreement with the tenets of Wang Yang-ming's doctrines, Li Fu believed that his own theory of ko-wu matched the meaning of the old text more precisely and thus proved that there was no need for Chu's alteration of it.164 Li Fu's final conclusion thus derived from the conjunction of his textual research and his philosophical views. The Doctrine of the Mean (Chung-yung)

In comparison with Chu Hsi's fundamental errors regarding The Great Learning, his version of The Doctrine of the Mean had only minor mistakes. Nonetheless, Li Fu complained that it was improper for Chu Hsi to 158. MTCK, ig/34b-35a. 159. Ibid., 19/34^ 160. Ibid. 161. Ibid., i9/36b-37a. 162. Ibid., ig/37a-37b. 163. Ibid., ig/36a-36b. 164. Ibid., ig/37b-38a; MTPK, 2i/22a.

Li Fu and the philological turn

divide the text into six sections and thirty-three paragraphs under the claim of clarifying Tzu-ssu's supposed meaning.165 The Doctrine of the Mean was also initially only a chapter of The Book of Rites. Tzu-ssu, the grandson of Confucius, had reportedly once written a book with forty-nine chapters that was also titled the Chung-yiing. But the bibliography of The History of the Han Dynasty (Han-shu) records the entry for Chung-yiing-shuo (On Chungyiing) as having only two chapters.166 Although there has been much speculation on the relationship between The Doctrine of the Mean, the Chung-yiing, and the Chung-yung-shuo, there are still no conclusive answers. The Doctrine of the Mean must have appeared as an independent book much earlier than The Great Learning because it is so listed in the bibliography of The History of the Sui Dynasty (Sui-shu) ,167 Philosophically, it was Li Ao (772-ca. 838) who first took The Doctrine of the Mean as a point of departure for the Confucian revival.168 In the Northern Sung dynasty, there were many studies of The Doctrine of the Mean, and the works of the Ch'eng brothers and their disciples stand out as the most important. It was largely on the basis of their writings that Chu Hsi composed three commentaries on The Doctrine of the Mean.169 Of these, Chung-yiing chang-chii (Commentaries on Chung-yiing), was the one that Li Fu reviewed. There had certainly been scholars long before Li Fu who had challenged Chu Hsi's authority on The Doctrine of the Mean. For instance, Li Li-wu in the Southern Sung proposed a fifteen-chapter version;170 moreover, in the Ming, Liao Chi suggested a twenty-five-chapter version, and Kuan Chih-tao, a thirty-five-chapter version.171 In the early Ch'ing, Li Kuang-ti proposed a twelve-chapter version, and there is no need to mention Mao Hsi-ho, who never gave up an opportunity to attack Chu Hsi.172 Li Fu argued that unlike The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean was not a single piece of writing.173 It consisted of many different writings under the title Chung-yiing. The Doctrine of the Mean was probably like some other chapters in The Book of Rites that lumped together various items under the heading taken from the primary term of the first chapter. Li noted that after the fifteenth chapter, Chu Hsi's edition of the text referred to the concept of chung-yiing only once - in the twenty-sixth chapter, where it appeared in contrast to the term kao-ming (brilliance) and had nothing to do with the key concept of the text. Li Fu thus 165. 167. 169. 171. 172.

MTCK, ig/32a. 166. Pan Ku, Han-shu, 30/709. Wei Cheng, Sui-shu, 32/923. 168. Huang Chen, Huang-shih jih-ch'ao, 25/1 a. CTWC, 76/22b-23a. 170. Li Li-wu, Chung-yiingfen-chang, in WSC, 721-736. SCTT, 37/761-762; Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, SCTT, 37/777. 173. MTCK, 19/29^

Philosophy, philology, and politics

implied that the concept of chung-yungcould not be the central theme of the text, and that it was wrong for Chu Hsi to treat the entire text as a single essay.174 Li Fu cites another piece of evidence to attack Chu Hsi. According to K'ung-ts'ung-tzu, a work written by certain K'ung families in the Han period, The Doctrine of the Mean that Tzu-ssu composed had forty-nine chapters (p'ieri). Therefore, Li reasoned, it could not be divided into thirty-three chapters (chang), as Chu Hsi did.175 On the basis of Li's reading of the original text, he recommended a new version of The Doctrine of the Mean.176

Li Fu further sought to contest Chu Hsi's philosophical interpretation of The Doctrine of the Mean by deemphasizing its metaphysical flavor. According to Chu Hsi, The Great Learning provided students with a methodology for Confucian learning; The Analects and Mencius gave the content of Confucian teaching; and The Doctrine of the Mean supplied moral metaphysics. Viewed in this light, The Doctrine of the Mean is the most difficult and the last to be read of The Four Books.111 To Chu Hsi, the first chapter of The Doctrine of the Mean provided an essential description of the Confucian Way. As we saw in Chapter 1, Chu Hsi elaborated the theory of "equilibrium and harmony" (chung-ho shuo) on the basis of it. But for Li Fu, the first chapter was characterized by a lack of attention to the substance of the Confucian Way. It was much too vague and unable to provide a sharp contrast between the Confucian Way and the ways of Buddhism and Taoism.178 If Tzu-ssu had merely discussed the concepts of nature (hsing) and the Way (tao), there would be no difference between him and the Buddhists and Taoists, for they also employed these metaphysical ideas to support their doctrines. Since the Southern Sung period, according to Li, Confucians had argued with the Buddhists and Taoists by using metaphysics, but the more these Confucians argued, the more confused they became.179 The only cure was to reintroduce the five ta-tao (literally, the path taken by all to attain the Way), namely, the traditional five constant relationships between ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger siblings, and among friends. Li Fu contends that these social and ethical relationships unambiguously distinguished the concerns of Confucians from those of heterodoxies.180 In Li Fu's conception, the twentieth chapter (in Chu Hsi's edition) of The Doctrine of the 174. MTCK, i9/3ob. 175. Ibid., 19/32b. That the K'ung-ts'ung-tzu is really made by the K'ung family is questionable. See SCTT, pp. 187-188. 176. MTCK, 19/3 2a. 177. CTYL, 14/1 a. 178. MTCK, 24/1 a. 179. Ibid., 24/ia-ib. 180. Ibid., 24/ib-2b.

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Mean, which involves the discussion of these five constant relationships, actually became the core of the whole text. The shift of emphasis from the first chapter to the twentieth chapter thus nicely corresponded to Li Fu's conception of the Way.181 The Book of Documents (Shang-shu)

Two studies of the classics pioneered the evidential approach in the early Ch'ing period. One was the Evidential Analysis of the Old Text Documents (Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng) by Yenjo-ch'u (1636—1704); the other was An Investigation of the Diagrams in the Book of Changes (I-t'u ming-pien) by Hu Wei (1633—1714). Yen proved that the Old Text Documents (Ku-wen Shang-shu), unlike the New Text Documents (Chin-wen Shang-shu), was a

forgery. And Hu debunked the myths about the diagrams in the Book of Changes. Both studies were taken as paradigms of the evidential approach.182 It appears, however, that Li Fu had not read either of these books in spite of the fact that he was very much involved with the discussion of them, especially of The Book of Documents. Ironically, when invited to write a preface for a friend's work on the diagrams of the Book of Changes, Li Fu argued, in accordance with Huang Tsung-yen (1616—86), that these diagrams came from dubious Taoist sources.183 On the issue of the diagrams, the Huang brothers, Huang Tsung-hsi and Huang Tsung-yen, were in accord with Li Fu. But in their work on the Book of Changes, the Huang brothers vehemently attacked Chu Hsi. Huang Tsung-yen argued, "Chu Hsi further added Buddhist doctrines to them [the diagrams of Vai-chi that came from Taoism]."184 The factional spirit is unreservedly conveyed in Huang's charge against Chu Hsi.185 Huang thus continued the debate between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan over the diagrams of the Great Ultimate (Vai-chi). Li Fu was skeptical of the sources of these diagrams as well. He made three points about the issue of the diagrams of the Book of Changes. First, according to Ch'en T'uan (d. 989), who had transmitted them, the diagrams had been made by Fu Hsi and did not appear on the mythical dragon-horse as was widely believed; second, the hsien-Vien diagram did not fit the text of Hsi-ts'u; third, even if Ch'en T'uan were correct, why had no one - for the two or three thousand years before him - ever talked about it?186 181. Ibid., 24/1 a-ib. 182. Chiang Fan, Kuo-ch'ao Han-hsueh shih-ch'eng-chi, pp. 6—11, 13—15. As for English writing on the evidential approach, one can rely upon Benjamin Elman's From Philosophy to Philology, Cambridge, Mass., 1984. 183. MTPK (1740), 24/ia-ib. 184. Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, 7i/i8a. 185. SCTT, p. 88. 186. MTPK (1J40), 21/ia-ib.

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Doubts about the Old Text Documents had first been raised in the Southern Sung period by Wu Yu (chin-shih, 1117).187 In comparison with the literary style of the New Text Documents, which is difficult to read, the style of the Old Text Documents seemed to Chu Hsi too easy and fluent, and hence unau then tic.188 After Wu Yu and Chu Hsi, scholars questioned the Old Text Documents. Among these were Wang Po in the Southern Sung; Chao Meng-fu (1254—1322) and Wu Ch'eng in the Yuan; and Kuei Yu-kuang (1506—71), Hao Ching (1558—1639), and Mei Cho (who passed the local examination in 1513) in the Ming.189 Mei Cho was the first one to apply the evidential approach to the study of the Old Text Documents. Yen Jo-ch'u, although not informed of Mei Cho's research, further developed this approach in his work on the same book.190 Regarding Yen Jo-chii's work as an attack on Lu-Wang doctrines, Mao Hsi-ho composed his Apologia for the Old Text Documents (Ku-wen Shang-

shu yuan-ts'u) in an attempt to defend them. In his book, Mao Hsi-ho

appealed to The History of the Chin Dynasty (Chin-shu) to justify the argu-

ment that the transmission of the Old Text Documents had never been interrupted. Li Fu was critical of Mao's work. He argued that although in the T'ang period there were seven versions of The History of the Chin Dynasty, the one quoted by K'ung Ying-ta, the commentator of The Book of Documents, could be the only official version of The History of the Chin Dynasty.191 Li's point was that there were no grounds for either K'ung Ying-ta or Mao Hsi-ho to make such a reference. Li Fu further argued that it was very likely that Huang-fu Mi had made up the Old Text Documents, a thesis that agreed with Mei Cho's findings.192 He also rebuts his friend Fang Pao's claim that the writing style of the Old Text Documents could not be initiated by anyone other than its traditionally ascribed author. Li Fu also offered some counterexamples.193 In the end, Li Fu showed that Mao Hsi-ho's underlying motive was to attack Chu Hsi rather than to defend the Old Text Documents.™ In another essay, "Textual Examination of the Old Text Documents' {Ku-wen Shang-shu k'ao), Li Fu confirmed Mei Cho's earlier observation that the "sixteen characters" in the "Counsels of Yu the Great" (Ta Yu mo) of the Old Text Documents were forged by someone in the Han or Wei 187. Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, 8o/6b. 188. CTYL, 78/3142-3143. 189. Chu, Ching-i-k 'ao, 84/2b~4b, 85/1 a~3b, 91/1 b-2a. 190. Yen knows only Mei's Shang-shu-p'u, but not Shang-shu k'ao-i, which is much more sophisticated than the former. Cf. Tai Chun-jen, Yen Mao ku-wen Shang-shu kung-an, Taipei, 1963, chapter 2; and Lin Ch'ing-chang, Ming-tai k'ao-chu-hsiieh, Taipei, 1983, chapter 3. 191. MTCK, 45/39b-4oa. 192. Ibid., 45/40^ 193. Ibid., 45/4ob-4ia. 194. Ibid., 45/41^

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periods.195 Mei Cho had proven that the "sixteen characters" were taken from The Analects and the Hsiin-tzu.196 Li Fu further pointed out that The Classic of the Way (Tao-ching) cited by Hsiin-tzu could not be The Book of Documents. In the first place, whenever Hsiin-tzu quoted The Book of Documents, he referred to it as Shu (the Documents), and not as Tao-ching. This implied that before the book burnings during the Ch'in, the forged section had not appeared in the text of The Book ofDocuments.197 Second, before the Han period, only Taoist writings (e.g., Lao-tzu's Tao-te ching and Chuang-tzu's Nan-hua ching) - not Confucian classics such as / {Book of Changes), Shih (Book of Poetry), CWun-ch'iu (Book of History), or Shu (Book

ofDocuments) - were canonized as ching.198 Finally, Li Fu showed that the two surviving pieces of the original Old Text Documents in the Records of the Grand Historians (Shih-chi) do not match the style of the present Old Text Documents at all.199 In his view, the doubts about the present Old Text Documents were textually well confirmed. In sum, Li Fu's contribution to the study of The Book of Documents lies primarily in his strengthening Mei Cho's arguments.200 Ts'ui Shu (1740— 1816), the famous philologist of the middle Ch'ing period, was a great admirer of Li Fu, whom he believed to have been the most erudite scholar of the preceding hundred years.201 Apparently ignorant of the works of Yen Jo-ch'ii and Mei Cho, Ts'ui Shu (1740-1816) was determined to take up where Li Fu left off, and thus delivered a final blow to the Old Text Documents.202

Unlike some radical scholars who wanted to remove the Old Text Documents entirely from the syllabus of Confucian learning, Li Fu held that the Documents were still worth reading, for they contained fragments of the authentic Book of Documents. Nevertheless, certain statements like "chia-mo ju-kao" (which had something to do with political manipulation) harmed the correct way of government and should be deleted.204 "The 'sixteen characters' in the Old Text Documents laid the foundation for the later development of Sung and Ming neo-Confucianism and served as the method of mind transmission for rulers," Li Fu pointed out. "This is 195. Ibid., 19/1 a. The sixteen characters read as follows: "The human mind is precarious [liable to make mistakes]; the mind of the Way is subtle [follows moral law]. Have absolute refinement and single-mindedness and hold fast the Mean." The English translation is based upon CHL, translated by Wing-tsit Chan, p. 119. On the shift from philosophy to philology on the discussions of the human mind and the mind of the Way, see Benjamin Elman, "Philosophy (I-li) versus Philosophy (K'ao-cheng): The JenHsin Tao-Hsin Debate," T'oungPao, 69, nos. 4-5 (1983), 175-222. 196. Chu, Ching-i-k'ao, 88/6b~7b. 197. MTCK, 19/ia-ib. 198. Ibid., i9/ib-2a. 199. Ibid., 19/23-30. 200. Wang Yun-wu, ed., Hsii-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'iian-shu t'iyao, Taipei, 1971, p. 186. 201. Ts'ui Shu, Ts'ui Tung-pi i-shu, Shanghai, 1983, p. 597. 202. Ibid., pp. 581-602. 203. MTCK, 45/41^ 204. Ibid., 45/41^

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the reason Chu Hsi once raised questions about the Old Text Documents but ended up doing nothing about it."205 It appears that by singling out the "sixteen characters" for criticism, Li Fu managed to undermine the foundation of the metaphysical trend within Sung-Ming Confucianism. In his time, Li had been famous for his photographic memory. It was said that he could recall any record he had read.206 Relying on this gift, he liked to argue with others about historical events.207 Li's habit of dealing with an intellectual problem by reading and recalling enormous amounts of material, rather than by engaging in theoretical speculation, was representative of the general intellectual trend of his day. In a letter, he said that within six or seven years he had carefully read the works of Chou Tun-i, the Ch'eng brothers, Chu Hsi, Lu Hsiang-shan, and Wang Yang-ming ten or more times.208 Thus, Li felt he could reject Chu Hsi's charge that Lu's teaching was one of "sudden enlightenment" (tun-wu), because he had gone through Lu's complete works a dozen times without being able to find the term tun-xvu therein.209 He also rebutted Ch'en Chien's argument - based on a Buddhist poem Lu quoted - that Lu was influenced by Buddhism. After his wide reading, Li had been unable to find the poem in any Buddhist writings.210 Li also dismissed the claim that Wang Yang-ming's teachings were some kind of Zen doctrine because he was able to show that Wang's term, chao-hsin (shining mind), was not to be found in the writings of the Buddhists.211 In order to refute Sun Ch'eng-tse's and Chang Lieh's criticisms of Lu and Wang, it seemed to Li reasonable and adequate to claim that it was only their incomplete and sporadic reading of Lu's and Wang's works, or even of Chu Hsi's, that had given rise to their mistaken views.212 The predisposition to reduce philosophical issues to an argument over documentary or philological evidence was by no means characteristic of Li Fu alone.213 Li's approach, although empowered by his excellent memory, should not be regarded as an isolated phenomenon. His intellectual style should be seen in the perspective of what Professor Yii has called "the rise of Ch'ing Confucian intellectualism."214 In other words, Li Fu was entering the era of "following the pursuit of inquiry and study," while still in the mold of the learning of Lu and Wang. At first glance, 205. 207. 210. 213.

MTCK, 19/1 a. 206. Juan Kuei-sheng, Ch'a-yii k'o-hua, Shanghai, 1959, p. 226. Ibid., p. 225. 208. MTCK, 43/iob. 209. Ibid., 18/iga. LTHP, n / i g b . 211. MTCK, 43/17^ 212. Ibid., 45/13^ 16b. Cf. Chiang Fan, Kuo-ch'ao Han-hsiieh shih-ch'eng-chi, which discussed the rise of the philological approach from the early Ch'ing. 214. Yu, "Preliminary Observations." In this paper, Professor Yu uses the term "intellectualism" somewhat differently from the philosophical doctrine that claims human intellect is the source of truth; Yu's sense is that "knowledge is good and desirable." 140

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this statement may seem self-contradictory, for both Lu and Wang had a certain independence of spirit toward book learning, which they regarded as subordinate to "honoring the moral nature." Theoretically, according to Lu and Wang, book learning and intellectual discussion were not necessary to achieve moral perfection. However, neither philosopher excluded them totally from the methods of moral cultivation in practice. In spirit, Li Fu followed Lu and Wang, for he often declared that although the sages did not exclude book learning from moral cultivation, real learning never solely consisted in it. The learning of the sages, Li argued, was seen rather in the realization of the norms of the "five human relationships." Only after these relationships had been cultivated could one really study the classics.215 In addition, Li also challenged the prevailing philological approach, which appealed to the ancient annotations (ku-hsuri), especially those made in the Han period, as the highest authority in deciding questions about truth.216 Li even went so far as to quote Chu Hsi, who had once claimed that "textual study is trivial learning" (k'ao-cheng shih mo-liu), in order to depreciate the value of philology as a whole.217 Li's distrust of the authority of ancient commentaries was consistent with Lu and Wang's doctrine that the ultimate authority should be one's mind or the innate knowledge of the good therein. On the other hand, Li Fu did not ignore the ready-made weapon provided by the philologists for attacking metaphysical discussions which Li agreed led nowhere. He also concurred with philologists such as Mei Cho or Yen Jo-ch'u that the Old Text of The Book of Documents was a forgery.218 Li thus undermined the sacredness of the "sixteen-character mind-transmitted maxim" contained in this text, which had been used to imitate metaphysical discussions of mind and nature. Thus Li Fu employed the methods of philology to tackle a philosophical problem. Li, the Lu-Wang philosopher, however, did not contradict Li, the scholar of philology. Although philology prescribed textual learning as the sole access to truth, Li Fu rejected it as a valid theoretical guide for acquiring the true Way. However, he accepted philology as an efficient weapon for fighting his intellectual enemies, both Ch'eng-Chu scholars and other metaphysical "empty talkers." The appeal to sources as authority in the Lu-Wang school can be traced back to Wang Yang-ming, who at the same time ironically stood as 215. MTCK 9/5b. 216. Ibid., 217. Li, Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'uan-lun, 6/i87a-i88a. 218. Yen Jo-ch'u, Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng, proves that Old Text of The Book of Documents was a forgery.

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the exemplar of the "honoring morality" approach. Wang Yang-ming confirmed what he had achieved his first enlightenment in Lung-ch'ang by memorizing the texts of the Five Classics.219 Wang also went back to The Great Learning in the Old Text version to justify his interpretation of ko-wu.220 Moreover, he edited Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in

Life, where he implied basic similarity between his thought and Chu Hsi's mature positions in order to deflect pressure from his critics.221 Li Fu's Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at

Late in Life can be also seen in a context similar to Wang's. One of the differences is that in Li's time the authority of Chu Hsi loomed larger than ever. Moreover, Li had to come to terms with an age in which the study of philology was becoming a dominant intellectual trend. The philological method of evidential research definitely influenced Li's approach in compiling the Comprehensive Compilation, the Intellectual Lineage of the Learning of Master Lu, and his other studies. 219. WYCC, 22/417, 32/614-615. 221. Ibid., 3/83-84, 4/17-18.

220. Ibid., 7/58.

142

7 The price of having a sage-emperor The assimilation of the tradition of the Way by the political establishment in the light of the K'ang-hsi emperor's governance

Since the time of Confucius, thinking about the relationship between political rulers and cultural elites had evolved into a particular conceptualization. The Way and political power had separated and their final unity was ideologically prescribed as the ultimate political-cultural goal. The author of The Doctrine of the Mean was aware of this commitment when he wrote: One may occupy the throne, but if he does not have the proper virtue, he should not presume to make ceremonies or music. One may have the virtue, but if he does not occupy the throne, he likewise should not presume to make ceremonies or music. As a matter of mutual interest, both political and cultural elites had to accept a basic division of labor: rulers were in charge of government, while Confucian scholars supervised the preservation and transmission of the Way. The Records of the Rites in The New T'ang History illustrated this point quite well: Before the Three Dynasties, the ruling authority came from one source, and ceremonies and music spread to the world; after the Three Dynasties, the ruling authority came from two sources, and ceremonies and music became empty names. Since they saw themselves as representatives of the Way, Confucians were theoretically justified in opposing political authorities whenever the

Philosophy, philology, and politics

situation required. Authentic Confucians since Confucius and Mencius had upheld this idea, and Sung and Ming Confucians with their sense of "continuity" or "tradition" further reinforced it. By and large, the role of the Confucian Way in checking government was very much alive in the minds of Confucians until the early Ch'ing period. Nevertheless this concept was eliminated when the K'ang-hsi emperor successfully appropriated the long-aspired Confucian political ideal - the unity of power and truth. This coup proved to be an ideological trump card in the emperor's hand. Here was the transformation of a political ideal by a dynamic autocracy. Li Fu's perception of the Ch'ing regime is just one example among many that could be used to reflect this subtle but fundamental change on the part of Ch'ing Confucians in conceptualizing political reality as manipulated by the rulers of their day. This transformation of political ideology was to have far-reaching implications. Li Fu's perception of the Ch'ing regime In his preface to a series of essays celebrating K'ang-hsi's sixtieth birthday, Li Fu noted that His Majesty had repeatedly declined to participate in the traditional ceremony in which the emperor would assume an honorific title and receive certain ceremonial tablets. The emperor had also refused to permit buildings to be erected in commemoration of his unprecedented achievements. Li Fu viewed this as modesty unparalleled in history.1 He continued: His Majesty possesses such a great virtue: Besides having already accomplished what the former sagely emperors Yao and Shun had done for the world, he has also mastered the profundity of Heaven's nature and the subtlety of the sagely Way through the learning of the "sixteen-character maxim" as the way of transmitting the mind. His realization of the Way frees him from superficial formality and conventional constraints. [Because he stresses substance rather than name,] he is not concerned about an honorific title, to which the emperors of the T'ang and Sung much aspired, and neither does he care for the ritual of worshiping Heaven and Earth [on the mountains of T'ai and Liang-fu] to inform Heaven of his achievement. How fortunate we are to live in such a grand age [sheng-shih] !2 At first glance, one hesitates to judge whether Li Fu's appraisal of the K'ang-hsi emperor is an expression of genuine feelings or a mere rhetorical paean. Suspending our judgment for a moment will facilitate probing Li Fu's wording. The phrase saying that the emperor had "already accomplished 1. MTPK, 40/43.

2. Ibid., 40^-4!).

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what the previous sagely emperors Yao and Shun had done for the world" attracts our attention. To be sure, urging or admonishing a ruler to become a sage was quite common among responsible scholars, who regarded this as their duty. But to say that an emperor was already equal to a sage-king is qualitatively different from a mere exhortation. Li Fu's statement asserts that the K'ang-hsi emperor had fulfilled the highest Confucian ideal: sageliness within and kingliness without, an ideal that had awaited actualization since the remote golden age of Yao and Shun. Even in the mostfloweryof essays, this kind of praise was rarely bestowed on any other emperor in Chinese history.3 Indeed, Li Fu was very much impressed by the emperor's accomplishments in both military and civil affairs.4 Very few Chinese rulers could rival the K'ang-hsi emperor in both these spheres. The emperor's outstanding achievements have been commonly recognized by past and present historians. Even Marxist historians have had to concede that there were some "progressive" aspects of his reign.5 Thus, Li Fu's high esteem for the emperor was solidly based. Precisely because of the K'anghsi emperor's unique achievements, Li Fu felt that the emperor was as sagacious as Yao and Shun. Li Fu held the emperor to be the embodiment of the two traditions of governance {chih-t'ung) and the Way (tao-t'ung).6 He based this opinion on the fact that the emperor had achieved unity of ideology with actual achievement. The emperor's ideas were handed down to his successors and thus established a political ideology for the Ch'ing regime. In Li Fu's view, the emperor's successors not only inherited the tradition of governance but also that of the Way.7 His perception of the K'ang-hsi emperor was widely shared by other scholars at that time. Li Kuang-ti, the leading representative of the Ch'eng-Chu school, expressed the same view. He anticipated 3. In the Shih-chi, we find the paean for Ch'in Shih-huang, which reads, "(His) merits were beyond that of the Five Emperors." See Shih-chi, Shanghai, 1972, 6/236, 6/245. 4. M7P/C4o/ia-i6b, 4 i / i a - i 2 b . 5. For a typical Marxist historical view of the K'ang-hsi emperor, see a standard text designed for the youth of Communist China: Chung-kuo ku-tai-shih ch'ang-shih, MingCh'ing pu-fen (The common knowledge of China's ancient history, the Ming and Ch'ing periods), Peking, 1979, pp. 215-225. For the traditional assessments of the K'ang-hsi emperor, see Ch'ing-shih kao (The manuscript of the Ch'ing history), which was compiled by Chao Erh-hsun and others from 1914 to 1927; and K'ang-hsi Cheng-yao (The politics of the K'ang-hsi emperor), which was edited in 191 o by Chang Ch'ing, hereafter abbreviated as KHCY. Both can be put in the category of Confucian historiography. Even a nationalistic historian such as Hsiao I-shan had high regard for the emperor; see Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing tai t'ung-shih (A general history of die Ch'ing period), Shanghai, 1927, vol. 1, chapter 6. 6. Li Fu, Mu-t'ang ch'u-kao, hereafter abbreviated as MTCK, 46/333. 7. MTPK 25/1 lb.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

Li Fu's feeling in his memorial to the K'ang-hsi emperor of 1680: I observed that in the ancient period the Way [tao] and governance [chih] came from one source. But afterward, they came from separate sources - Confucius was born after the Chou dynasty had moved to the East; Master Chu was born after the Sung regime had moved to the South. Although Heaven endowed them with the Way, they lived in a time unfavorable to the realization of the Way. This was the reason the Way and governance separated. Your Majesty was born five hundred years after Master Chu. It is the right timing for the rise of a true king (wang) like you who can practice the learning of sages. Is it not the will of Heaven to bring back the time of Yao and Shun so that the tradition of the Way and the tradition of governance will converge once again?8

The interaction between the K'ang-hsi emperor and the Confucian scholars of his time is complex. In retrospect, the emperor certainly took Li Kuang-ti's advice and assumed the responsibility of combining the tradition of governance and that of the Way. Confucians gained a generous patron in the emperor, one who fulfilled their cultural ideal. But this was achieved at the expense of the autonomy of the tradition of the Way. The ideological difference between the tradition of the Way and that of governance was blurred, because they now functioned in a single person. Furthermore, the emperor's cultural preferences now overwhelmed the scholars. When the once-renowned Lu-Wang scholar Mao Hsi-ho learned of the K'ang-hsi emperor's decision to elevate Chu Hsi's status in the Confucian pantheon, he was so frightened that he immediately destroyed the printers' plates for his Corrections of Chu Hsi's Commentaries on the Four Books (Ssu-shu kai-tsyuo). In his original draft for this book, Mao had severely criticized Chu Hsi's annotations.9 Hsieh Chih-shih was sentenced to death on account of his Lu-Wang deviation from orthodox interpretations of the classics.10 Li Fu's relationship with his rulers was a good example of this loss of the Way as a standard for criticizing the political establishment, for he never criticized or admonished the emperors from the standpoint of a representative of the tradition of the Way. This shows that the K'ang-hsi emperor's ideology had indeed assimilated the Way into government, 8. Li Kuang-ti, Jung-tsun ch'iian-shu, io/3a~3b. Prefaced by Li Fu. Also see MTCK, 33/lb. 9. CCTC, wai-pien, 12/828. 10. CSK, 293/10328-10329. Although Hsien Chih-shih was sentenced to death, he was pardoned by the emperor, Yung-cheng. Hsieh's case was actually linked with a political conspiracy, but what concerns us is that he was accused of deviating from orthodox interpretations. Later he was impeached again by a local official for attacking Chu Hsi in his writings. The Ch'ien-lung emperor ordered an investigation of his works. The punishment was limited to the confiscation and destruction of Hsieh's writings, thanks to the "mercy" of the emperor. See Ch'ing-tai wen-tzu-yu tang,firstseries, pp. ia-2b.

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and that the ruler had become the supreme authority both in the realm of politics and of culture. Thus Li and other Confucians lost their grounds for confronting the ruler as a follower of the Way should.11 As a Lu-Wang scholar, Li Fu was courageous enough to oppose the officially backed Ch'eng-Chu school. Intellectually, he stuck to his belief in Lu-Wang doctrines, but he did not step beyond that limit to criticize the Ch'ing regime in either political or cultural terms. The Ch'ing rulers' support for the Ch'eng-Chu doctrines did not in any way diminish his acceptance of their alien regime. On the contrary, the extent to which he had embraced the Ch'ing regime was apparent in his poem rationalizing the Manchu Ch'ing invasion of China.12 This poem, which he had composed in his youth, before taking office, blamed the fall of the Ming dynasty on the corruption of Ming politics and the violence of bandits.13 It was to the merit of the Manchus that they came to the rescue of the Han Chinese amid intolerable suffering.14 The ethnic origins of the alien Manchu rulers did not, in Li Fu's opinion, lessen the legitimacy of their regime; he asked, "Did not the sagely emperors Yao and Shun come from barbarian places?"15 Li Fu also queried the accepted version of history when he argued that the expedition of King Wu had not so much deliberately replaced the Shang dynasty given that it had been invited by the Shang rulers themselves, who had thus brought upon themselves their own final destruction.16 He thus implied that the relationship between the Ming dynasty and the Manchus was similar. In another essay, "The Massacre of Fang Hsiao-ju's ten Clan," Li Fu pointed out that the Ming ruler Yiing-lo's cruelty toward officials and scholars stood in sharp contrast to the tolerance and generosity of the K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng emperors. He remarked, "In contrast to the ten-clan massacre of the scholar Fang Hsiao-ju during the Ming, we can now really appreciate our good fortune in living in a grand age, the most splendid of all time."17 Four factors may facilitate understanding of Li Fu's acceptance of the Ch'ing regime. First, as is evident in our earlier discussion of his conception of the Way, Li Fu had been deeply immersed in Confucian political ideology. Second, he was born twenty-nine years after the fall of the Ming dynasty. Third, his birthplace suffered very little during the transition from Ming to Ch'ing. This distance he felt from the actual historical experience of fighting against the Manchus made it easier for him to believe that the Ch'ing regime was a legitimate one. 11. Contrast this with Chapter 3. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 24/1 lb. 17. Ibid., 24/12b.

12. MTCK, 2/3*3-4^ 16. MTCK (1740),

13. Ibid.,

Philosophy, philology, and politics

Fourth and most important, the K'ang-hsi emperor's endeavor to combine the tradition of the Way and that of governance also suggested to contemporary scholars a return to the golden age of Chinese history. This image of a return to an ideal past was based not only on the emperor's real accomplishments but also on his political ideology. The famous but frustrated essayist Fang Pao (1668—1749) once claimed that no ruler in history could be compared with K'ang-hsi both as a ruler and as a teacher because the emperor performed these two roles so well.18 This was precisely what caused Li Fu and others to believe they were living in a golden age (sheng-shih). Was not the Confucian's highest ideal a ruler who could embody both the tradition of the Way and that of governance? This perception of a grand age cannot be explained by Ch'ing hard-line policy, such as the literary inquisitions, alone. It was brought about by the ruler's realization of a long-aspired-to Confucian political ideal. After all, the poet Yuan Mei (1716-98), after showing his sympathy for Li Fu's eventful life, remarked: "Nevertheless, he [Li Fu] was fortunate to live in a grand age; otherwise, his life would have been much worse."19 A sage-emperor emerges: K'ang-hsi's appropriation of the tradition of the Way

Having an introspective bent, the K'ang-hsi emperor demanded of himself that he should be a good ruler in every sense. During his reign, he not only consolidated Manchu rule over China proper and Manchuria but also extended Manchu control over a vast area beyond his territory, extending it to Mongolia, Sin Kiang, and Tibet. Being sensitive to Confucian doctrine, the K'ang-hsi emperor was no doubt aware of Confucian historians' sharp criticism of such militarily ambitious rulers as Ch'in Shih-huang and Han Wu-ti. In the opinion of Confucian historians, their expansionist policies had damaged the people's livelihood back home. Such judgments obliged him to pay attention to domestic affairs.20 18. Fang Pao, Fang Pao chi, Shanghai, 1983, vol. 2, p. 440. 19. Yuan, Sui-yiian ch'iian-chi, 27/2D. Since one lives in a grand age, nothing, politically or collectively, can be blamed for one's misfortune, except for one's own fate and talent. This peculiar feeling was shared by quite a few scholars of the time. Yuan Mei's judgment on Li's life is only one among many. Chao I (1727-1814), the poet and historian, expressed similar reflections on his own life; Chao I, Ou-pei shih-ch'ao (Poetry of Chao I), in Kuo-hsiieh chi-pen ts'ung-shu, Shanghai, n.d., pp. 368, 424-425. 20. Yii-chih K'ang-hsi wen-chi, hereafter abbreviated as YCWQ fourth series, 21 /9a-13b. For an interesting English biography of the K'ang-hsi emperor see Jonathan D. Spence, Emperor of China: Self-Portrait of K'ang-hsi (New York, 1975). Historians criticize Ch'in Shih-huang and Han Wu-ti; see Shih-chi, 6/276-277, and Han-shu, 6/212. For the K'ang-hsi emperor's awareness of these, see YCWC, fourth series, 2i/9a~9b.

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K'ang-hsi's contributions in the social and economic spheres were no less great than his military exploits. His sincere concern with the people's livelihood was remarkable. He journeyed to the South six times to acquire firsthand knowledge of commoners' daily lives, and also to work out a way to channel the troublesome Yellow and Huai rivers directly to the sea and away from the vast area they often flooded.21 The emperor also worried about the tax burden on the peasants. His decision to grant exemption from land tax was unprecedented in Chinese history. By his decree of 1711, he permanently froze the amount of the national headtax {ting) payment. Privately, he led a frugal and restrained life despite his position as the ruler of a wealthy nation.22 The emperor was prudent in appointing local officials and rewarded them generously if they performed well. Under his capable leadership, the bureaucracy functioned almost perfectly.23 The resulting stable social and political order brought economic affluence, reflected in the rapid growth of the population during his reign.24 The K'ang-hsi emperor did create a "literary inquisition" to crack down on those dissidents who still refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Ch'ing regime. But this inquisition was limited in scope and its punishments lenient - if compared to those of the subsequent Yiingcheng and Ch'ien-lung reigns. He vetoed the proposed punishment in Tai Ming-shih's case five times, and pardoned three hundred or so implicated persons. The only one sentenced to death was Tai himself.25 In 1678 the emperor ordered a special examination to be held for "erudite scholars" (po-hsiieh hung-ts'u), to recruit them into government.26 The following year, he comissioned a history of the Ming dynasty, as a successor dynasty should.27 In doing so, the emperor secured the legitimacy of his regime and simultaneously appeased Ming loyalists. Combining the traditions of governance and of the Way was K'anghsi's most significant cultural-political policy. Because this aspect of his reign has been relatively overlooked, it is necessary to explore further K'ang-hsi's contribution to the tradition of the Way. The emperor's profound interest in cultural and intellectual matters can be traced back to his childhood. As the emperor himself said, he had been fond of book learning (tu-shu) form the age offive.After ascending 21. MTPK, 4o/2a-2b, 8a; Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-ship, pp. 643-645. 22. MTPK, 4i/ia-2b; Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, pp. 661-665. 23. Ibid., 4o/2b~3a. 24. Ho Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China, 13 68-1955, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, pp. 266-270. 25. MTPK, 4i/6a-9b, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, vol. 1, p. 751. 26. CSK, 109/3175-3177, 6/199-200. 27. Ibid., 6/199.

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the throne at the age of eight, he often asked his entourage about

the commentaries on The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean.28

He would not feel satisfied with himself if he did not completely understand the text. The young emperor was so fond of reading that at times it made him seriously ill. Even so, he did not stop.29 The scope of his interests was unusually broad. He burned with curiosity to know almost everything culturally meaningful, including astronomy, physics, mathematics, mechanics, and of course the classics. Li Fu was not the only one among his ministers to be surprised at the breadth of the emperor's knowledge.30 The emperor gave special attention to the institution of ching-yen, the lectures given by selected scholars to the ruler. The topics of these "classics mat" lectures were selected from the Confucian classics. They were held according to a definite schedule in the inner court and before the emperor alone. The emperor manifested his enthusiasm for the classics-mat lectures by scheduling them daily, a departure from previous practice of holding the lectures only every other day.31 Further, in order to make full use of his study time, he scheduled his daily discussion with his attendant scholars before dawn and thus prior to his court audience. After receiving a court audience, he came back to resume the discussion.32 K'ang-hsi disapproved of earlier rulers who had treated the classics-mat lectures as a mere formality. Playing a much more active role, he interpreted the text and only then invited comments from scholars, or he would recapitulate what the lecturer had said to make sure that he had fully comprehended.33 He was almost never absent from the lectures; he made no exception even for his birthday or an expedition.34 Why did the emperor take the lectures so seriously? An obvious explanation is that they constituted a major source of knowledge for him. In his view, learning was the foundation of all things. Through study of the sages' works, one could cultivate oneself and acquire knowledge to help deal with the external world.35 He repeatedly told his sons to study hard so that their conduct in later life would be correct.36 He pointed out that the Sung emperor Li-tsung's lack of learning had prevented him from making good political judgments. Letting his mind drift, the Sung emperor allowed his power to slip into the hands of opportunistic ministers, so the deterioration of state affairs was inevitable.37 28. KHCY, 7/6a; YCWC, fourth series, l/ia. 29. KHCY, 7/11 a. 30. Ibid., 7/8a; MTPK, 4o/2a. 31. KHCY, 7/1 b. The emperor's stress on the ching-yen lecture also received Li Fu's attention. MTCK, 40/1 b. 32. KHCY, 7/5b. 33. Ibid., 7/8a-8b, 4a. 34. Ibid., 7/6b. 35. YCWC, second series, 4o/2a-2b. 36. Ibid., ^o/^.-^. 37. KHCY, 7/ga. 150

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The K'ang-hsi emperor's predilection for the classics and histories derived from his view that the former contained the Way of governance and the latter the concrete examples of it. Both were indispensable for statecraft.38 As a ruler, he was inclined to evaluate philosophy and history in terms of their practical application. His key role in the imperial system required him to use his own wisdom to deliberate on various political issues. Wisdom for him meant not only understanding how to manage state affairs but also knowing how to secure his own political power. When it came to the management of state affairs, learning was the best way to absorb principles for tackling anything and everything. So he urged all officials, whether military or civil, to read many books in order to improve their ability to deal with state business. K'ang-hsi's concern for consolidating the ruler's power is evident in his criticism of Sung Li-tsung. Aside from this practical concern for daily administration, K'ang-hsi's emphasis on book learning was also connected with his political ideology. He believed that "where there is a tradition of the Way, there is the tradition of governance." 39 A ruler, if he is to be called a sagely ruler, should manifest this principle in his worldly actions. K'ang-hsi said, "The reason Heaven sets up a ruler for the people is not to bestow wealth and power on the ruler alone, but to endow him with the responsibility of educating and sustaining his people." 40 Ultimately, the ruler should make "all men in the world become what they are [morally] supposed to be."41 This is the kingly Way (wang-tao) that a virtuous rule should achieve. It is at this point that education receives a special emphasis. And because the sagely Way is laid down in the classics, the study of the classics becomes central to the education of the ruler as well as of his people. 42 In the preface to the Lecture Notes to the Interpretations of the Four Books (Ju-chiang Ssu-shu chieh-i hsu), K'ang-hsi stated: I think that the reason Heaven gives birth to sages is to make them the rulers and teachers of people. The tradition of governance is at all times linked to the transmission of the tradition of the Way. Confucius, Tseng-tzu, Tzu-ssu, and Mencius were born after the sagely emperors Yao, Shun, Yii, and T'ang, and after the sagely kings Wen and Wu. Likewise, after the Five Classics, there came the Four Books, and through the teachings of these four philosophers, the Way of the sagely emperors has been transmitted. It is also because of the Four Books that the Way of the Five Classics is completed.43 The emperor believed that historically no ruler's governance was better than that of Yao and Shun, because "their success in governance was 38. YCWQ first series, ig/3b. 39. Ibid., ig/7a. 40. Ibid., ig/8a. 41. Ibid., i8/ioa-i2a. 42. Ibid., io/5b-6a; KHCY, i6/2ob. 43. FCWC,firstseries, ig/5b-6a.

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nothing but the result of their learning."44 Thus, understanding the teachings of the sagely rulers was crucial to good governance. According to K'ang-hsi, the learning of the sagely rulers essentially consisted of "the learning of mind" or "the method of mind-cultivation" {hsin-fa). In the narrowest sense, this term refers to learning the method of the "sixteencharacter maxim" on transmitting the mind.45 More broadly interpreted, it refers to the learning of mind and nature as a whole.46 In the emperor's view, the rule of the ancient sagely rulers was based on the Way something perceived in the mind. Hence, their success lay not so much in the sophistication of their governance, but rather in their understanding of "the learning of mind" and "the learning of the Way" (tao-fa).47 Learning was thus the foundation of governance, and a ruler's learning should begin with the learning of the mind.48 The emperor even believed that the rise and fall of a government and the shift of Heaven's mandate were also associated with the flourishing of "the learning of mind."49 In K'ang-hsi's understanding of the learning of mind, the concept of seriousness (ching) stands out as the central idea. He extended Chu Hsi's doctrine of "observing seriousness" (chu-ching) in one's state of mind from the realm of personal self-cultivation to that of politics.50 He did not hesitate to criticize would-be Confucians at his court for their inability to match learning with deeds.51 Their moral defects resulted simply from their neglect of the principle of seriousness as the most important guide in life. He held that embodying seriousness was the highest principle of political action.52 The influence of the Sung Confucians, especially that of Chu Hsi, is nowhere more clearly shown than in the emperor's belief that the "learning of mind" was related to both self-cultivation and politics. In the emperor's view, it was the Sung Confucians who really shed light on the concept of the learning of mind. His understanding of the Sung Confucians opened up the Confucian Way for him, for they had rediscovered the long-lost Way and made it known to the world once again.53 Among them, Chu Hsi towered supreme. For several decades, the emperor was inspired by the life and thought of Chu Hsi and set himself the task of living what he had learned from Chu Hsi's writings.54 When The Complete Works of Chu Hsi (Chu-tzu ch 'uan-shu) was published, the em-

peror said that he had it compiled because of his high regard for this great thinker, and not out of any desire to gain fame for himself.55 His 44. 47. 50. 53.

YCWQ 28/2a-2b. 45. Ibid., 19/ia-ib. 46. Ibid., ig/2a-2b. Ibid., 19/ia. 48. Ibid., i9/8b-ga, 19/ia-ib. 49. Ibid., lg/gb. KHCY, i / n b - i 2 b . 51. Ibid., i6/23b-24a, 24b-25b. 52. Ibid., i/nb-i2a. YCWQ fourth series, 21/ib. 54. Ibid., 2i/i2a. 55. Ibid., 2i/i2b-i3b.

The price of having a sage-emperor

admiration for Chu Hsi's achievements in the study of the classics eventually led him in 1712 to enhance Chu's status to the rank of the "ten philosophers" (shih-che) in the Confucian temple.56 He made this decision on the advice of Li Kuang-ti. At first, the emperor had decided to raise Chu Hsi to a rank equal to "the four most outstanding Confucian disciples" (ssu-p'ei), whose honor and status are considered just next to those of the Master. Although also an admirer of Chu Hsi, Li memorialized the emperor: "Indeed, the learning of Chu Hsi is not inferior to that of the four disciples. But the fact that Chu Hsi was born more than a thousand years after the ten philosophers would make Chu Hsi feel uneasy if his tablet were placed above theirs."57 In the end the emperor adopted Li's proposal and thus clearly signaled his own approval of the Ch'eng-Chu school. The influence of such Ch'eng-Chu scholars as Hsiung Tz'u-lu (1635—1709), Lu Lung-ch'i (1630—93), and Li Kuang-ti on the emperor's intellectual orientation cannot be underestimated. Nonetheless, the emperor's fondness for book learning since his childhood had made him inherently receptive to the learning of Chu Hsi, who had stressed the role of book learning in the process of moral cultivation. As an alien ruler particularly conscious of the significance of Confucian ritual practice, the K'ang-hsi emperor in 1684 paid a visit to the Confucian temple in Ch'u-fu and initiated a new, expanded version of the ritual ceremony there. Alighting from his sedan chair, the emperor entered the main hall of the Confucian temple on foot. He knelt down to read an epigraph on Confucius and performed the rite of "three kneelings and nine bows" instead of "two kneelings and six bows," a degree of reverence that a ruler had never given to Confucius.58 The emperor also composed a poem to express his reverence for Confucius: Coming to eastern Lu, I ascended to the hall of the Master. Libations stand between two columns; Crossing the high wall I discover the Master's profound learning, perpetuating the tradition of the Way of Yao and Shun, and extending like the rivers of Chu and Ssu. Then entering the grove, I touch light pine and fir trees, I bow with solemnity.59 56. Ibid., l/ia-ib; MTPK, 41/43, 42/12b-13a. 57. See Wen-chen-kung nien-p'u in Li Kuang-ti's Jung-ts'un ch'uan-shu, B/5oa-b. 58. K'ung Shang-jen, Ch'u-shan i-shu chi (Memoir concerning the K'ang-hsi emperor's visit to the Confucian temple), in Chao-tai ts'ung-shu, second series, i8/4b. 59. This poem is seen in K'ung Shang-jen's Ch'u-shan i-shu chi, 18/15b.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

This is one of very few poems that rulers dedicated to Confucius on their visits to the Confucian temple in Ch'u-fu.60 Deliberately departing from the practice of former rulers who had given gold or silver utensils as gifts to the temple, the K'ang-hsi emperor, as a unique favor, left his own royal yellow umbrella in the temple, and wrote 'The Teacher of Ten Thousand Generations" {wan-shih shih-j)iao) in praise of Confucius. K'ang-hsi explained that his intention was to enhance unprecedentedly the rite of revering Confucius.61 To K'ang-hsi, there were two kinds of sages. The first kind gained political power and could fulfill the Way within their own lifetimes. The second did not have political position (wei) and thus could not actualize the Way. Sagely emperors Yao and Shun, who combined the duties of ruler and teacher, were the sages that fulfilled the Way. As the transmitter of the Way to later generations, Confucius was the sage that manifested the Way. The sages that fulfilled the Way were glorious in their own day, but the sage that manifested the Way endured forever. Without Confucius, the Way-manifesting sage, the Way would not have been transmitted beyond the golden age.62 For only through the teaching of Confucius did rulers have access to the learning of mind of the former sagely emperors.63 Here, the K'ang-hsi emperor echoed Chu Hsi's idea that although Confucius never achieved the position of political leadership he deserved, he was greater than Yao and Shun in terms of realizing his cultural inheritance from the past and transmitting its legacy to future generations.64 In 1686, the K'ang-hsi emperor established the Mind-Transmitting Hall (Ch 'uan-hsin Tien) as a place to listen to lectures and worship such 60. Another poem composed by the T'ang emperor Hsuan-tsung, entitled "When Passing Through Lu, Sacrificing to Confucius and Mourning Him," reads: How is it with you, Master K'ung, Who strove for your belief a whole age long? This place is still the Tsou family's ground, Your home became a palace for the duke of Lu. You signed for a phoenix and lamented your ill luck. You grieved for the unicorn and mourned the failure of your teaching, As I watched the libation poured between two columns. I thought of your dream - all was just the same! See 300 T'ang Poems, trans, by Innes Herdan, Taipei, 1973, p. 218. The T'ang emperor's poem, although it conveys a sympathetic feeling for Confucius, lacks the sort of reverence for him that is found in the K'ang-hsi emperor's poem. The difference in mood between these two poems tells us much about the image of Confucius adopted by the rulers of different periods. 61. K'ung Shang-jen, Ch'u-shan i-shu chi, 18/1 lb. 62. YCWC, first series, 25/ia-ib. 63. Ibid., 25/ib-2b.

64. Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu wen-chi, in Ssu-pu pei-yao edition, entitled Chu-tzu ta-ch'uan, Taipei:

Chung-hua shu-chu, 76/2 2b.

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mentors as Confucius, the duke of Chou, and the nine sage-kings of antiquity.65 This practice implied that the tradition of governance was transmitted through the teaching of Confucius, the first transmitter of the Way. That the tradition of governance could gain its legitimacy only through the tradition of the Way was thus recognized not only in theory but also in practice. This linkage of the tradition of governance with that of the Way in the K'ang-hsi emperor's conception of politics was his justification for claiming to embody both traditions. The emperor already had the exclusive access to the tradition of governance because none besides a ruler could assume supreme political power. In addition, thanks to his enthusiastic patronage of Confucianism, he was also seen as the patron saint of the tradition of the Way. The emperor's obsession with the concept of the ideal ruler as the embodiment of both traditions made him initiate a number of cultural projects. Unlike previous rulers, he not only took the initiative in asking officials to compile many books,66 but personally participated in the process of compilation and editing.67 His deep involvement with these cultural activities influenced his son, the Yung-cheng emperor (1678— 1734) and his grandson, the Ch'ien-lung emperor (1711—99) to perpetuate this tradition. Both his successors also practiced his expanded version of Confucian rites. In the first year of his reign (1723), the Yung-cheng emperor generously bestowed the title of king (wang) on all five generations of Confucius's ancestors in the Confucian temple.68 This measure sharply contrasted the Ming emperor Shih-tsung's decision in 1530 to remove all noble titles from the Confucians who qualified for the ritual of sacrifice in the temple.69 Ming Shih-tsung's edict was generally regarded as a downgrading of the status of Confucius.70 By contrast, the Yungcheng emperor ordained that people should refrain from mentioning Confucius by name or writing any of the characters of his name (pihui). Thereby, he extended to Confucius the same privilege as the 65. P'ang Chung-lu, Wen-miao ssu-tien-k'ao (A study of the Confucian temple), Taipei, 1977, hereafter abbreviated as WMSK, 1/4D; CSK, 84/2532; MTPK, i2/7a. The other one to accompany the nine sagely emperors is the duke of Chou. The nine sagely emperors are Fu Hsi, Sheng Nung, Hsuan Yuan, Yao, Shun, Yu, T'ang, Wen, and Wu. CSK, 84/2532. 66. For a brief list of the K'ang-hsi emperor's cultural engagements, see Hsiao, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, vol. 1, pp. 781-784. 67. Examples of these are his participation in the compilations of Hsing-li ching-i and Tzuchih t'ung-chien kang-mu; YCWC, third series, 2i/ia~3a; fourth series, 2i/7a-8a. 68. WMSK, i/8a; CSK, 84/2534. 69. Ming-shih, 50/1298-1299. 70. Shen Teh-fu, Wang-li yeh-huo^p'ien, Peking, 1980, pp. 361-362; and Chiao Hung, Yut'ang ts'ung-yu, Peking, 1981, pp. 92-93.

Philosophy, philology, and politics

emperor.71 He also demanded that the whole nation abstain from eating meat on Confucius's birthday as a token of the highest respect for him.72 Thanks to the emperor, twenty-six Confucians received the sacrifice in the Confucian temple,73 a number second only to those benefiting from the decrees of the T'ang emperors Tai-tsung and Hsiian-tsung in 647 and in 739 respectively.74 Among those celebrated Confucians with the Yung-cheng emperor's approval, thirteen were Ch'eng-Chu scholars, but none was a Lu-Wang scholar. Intellectually, the Yung-cheng emperor acted as a final arbitrator for the different sects of Buddhism; moreover, he debated the legitimacy of the Ch'ing regime with Tseng Ching (1679—1736), a onetime admirer of the Ch'eng-Chu scholar, Lu Liuliang (1629—83).75 All these gestures once again demonstrated that the emperor regarded himself not only as a political leader but also as an intellectual authority. Continuing this tradition, the Ch'ien-lung emperor paid nine visits to the Confucian temple at Ch'u-fu76 and ordered the adoption of the color yellow, an imperial perquisite, for the roof and gate of the Confucian temple.77 The emperor visited the Confucian temple more times than any ruler in Chinese history. On his first visit, the emperor made arrangements for the marriage of his beloved daughter to a K'ung, a seventy-second-generation descendant of Confucius.78 Before his abdication, the Ch'ien-lung emperor managed to hold the ritual sacrifice ceremony in honor of Confucius by himself. By then, he was eighty-five years old and his age already prevented him from attending other middle-level ceremonies.79 Emperor Ch'ien-lung's generous patronage of many large-scale cultural projects was admirable. Most conspicuous of these was the compilation of the Complete Works of the Four Libraries (Ssu-k 'u-ch yiian-shu) .80

Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung's deliberate intensification of cultural activity could be read as being in tune with the K'ang-hsi emperor's ideology, which had proclaimed that the tradition of governance was 71. WMSK, i / i o b - n a . 72. Ibid., i / n a - i 2 a . 73. Ibid., l / g b - i o a . 74. Ibid., 2/1 lb, 13b. 75. For example, in Chien-mou pien-i lu (Criticisms of Buddhist heresies), 1733 edition, introduction; and in Ta-i Chueh-mi lu, Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, i / 2 a - i 3 a , he argues against the Fa Tsang sect of Zen Buddhism. For the Buddhist debates in the early Ch'ing, consult Ch'en Yuan's Ch'ing-ch'u seng-ching-chi, Li-yun shu-wu, 1944. 76. WMSK i/i7b-24a. 77. Ibid., i / i 4 b . In fact, the Yung-cheng emperor had already ordered that yellow tiles be used for the roof of the Confucian temple. Also see Ch'ing-shih kao, 82/2538. 78. K'ung Te-mao, K'ung-fu nei-chai i-shih, Tien-chin, 1982, p. 24. 79. WMSK, i/24b-25b. 80. As for The Complete Works of the Four Libraries, see Kuo Po-kung's Ssu-ku ch'iian-shu tsuanhsiu k'ao.

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linked to that of the Way. More precisely interpreted, it represented more of an extension of political power into the cultural sphere than vice versa, since it was the political authority that had taken the initiative to intrude into the cultural arena. Now, the two once-separated traditions had merged in the position of emperor, and the emperor had become the ultimate authority for both. This phenomenon reflected the continuing growth of autocracy since the Sung period.81 Before the K'ang-hsi emperor, the development of autocracy had primarily taken the form of restructuring political institutions in order to monopolize political power. Autocracy became complete only when it usurped the cultural authority formerly embodied in Confucian scholars alone. This, then, was one of the K'ang-hsi emperor's primary ideological achievements. The implications of the unity of the tradition of the Way and that of governance

The goal of combining these once-separated traditions was inherited by all of K'ang-hsi's successors, but the success of this endeavor is best measured through the achievements of K'ang-hsi himself and those of his two successors, Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung. Their real success lay in the way they absorbed the tradition of the Way into the political establishment. As Ch'ing rulers became the unique representatives of both traditions, no independent ground was left for Confucians to oppose political power. The critical function of the Way, which was once exercised by the Sung and the Ming Confucians, was thus eliminated. Another school of thought represented by Fei Mi (1625—1701), who attacked the Sung and the Ming Confucians from a pragmatic standpoint, may also have incidentally helped to undermine a more independent tradition of the Way. Fei Mi criticized Sung and Ming metaphysicians for their empty talk in the name of the tradition of the Way, offering no practical contribution to daily life at all.82 Only those who wielded substantial political power were entitled to speak for the 81. For the growth of autocracy after the Sung, see Ch'ien Mu's Kuo-shih ta-kang (Outline of Chinese history), Taipei, 1956, vol. 2 chs. 36 and 37; his Chung-kuo li-tai cheng-chih te-shih (Historical evaluation of Chinese politics), Taipei, 1974, pp. 65—67; and his "Lun Sung-tai hsiang-ch'uan" (On the rights of the Sung prime minister), in Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-ch'iu hui-k'an, 1942, 145-150. 82. Fei Mi, Hung-tao shu (Book devoted to glorifying the Way), in Hsiao-i chia-shu ts 'ung-shu, la-ib. For a brief introduction to the life and thought of Fei Mi and his son, see Hu Shih, Hu Shih wen-ts'un, second series, Taipei, 1953, pp. 48-90.

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tradition of the Way.83 In other words, only the ruling political authority was able to embody the Way in the world. In spite of their different motives, Fei Mi, the K'ang-hsi emperor, and Li Kuang-ti all came very close to each other in their final conclusions. All of them implied that, once separated from the political establishment, the tradition of the Way was not only useless but groundless. Therefore, it was best for the tradition of the Way to hinge on that of governance in order to continue and fulfill itself. As they saw it, the e m p e r o r was much more qualified than anyone else to act or speak for the tradition of the Way. T h e initiative to integrate both traditions within the state thus came from the interaction between the ruler and his Confucian ministers; however, this initiative did not necessarily mean that the Ch'ing rulers were committed to Confucian political doctrine. T h e K'ang-hsi emperor did indeed appear to have a real and deep commitment to Confucianism. But by contrast, the Yung-cheng emperor manipulated this new political ideology to serve his own interests. T h e Ch'ien-lung e m p e r o r fell somewhere between these two extremes. 84 Regardless of motive, the resulting meaning was quite clear: In the context of Chinese political history the merging of the tradition of the Way and that of governance was the last step in the growth of autocracy. Full autocracy implies a ruler with absolute political power, a power that is unrestrained. Historically, the tradition of the Way symbolized Confucian cultural power and was political in that it was used as the criterion for judging the legitimacy and competence of a government. The indep e n d e n c e of the Way from the political establishment served as a check on political power and so blocked possible autocracy. No one understood this better than Lii K'un (1536-1618) when he reflected on the relationship between power and truth: While ministers dispute with one another at court, no one dares to defy or speak after the issuance of the edict from the emperor. Although scholars argue with one another in school, everyone agrees and keeps silent when someone invokes the words of Confucius. Therefore, in the world only principle (li) and political power (shih) are most respectable {tsun), but principle is supreme. The emperor cannot suppress principle with his power at court. Even if he did so, prinicple would nevertheless exist in the world forever. In fact, political power lies within the realm of emperors, whereas principle lies within the realm of sages. If the reign of an emperor is not legitimized by the principle of sages, it will decline. 83. Fei Mi, Hung-tao shu (Book devoted to glorifying the Way), in Hsiao-i chia-shu ts'ung-shu, lb. Later, Chang Hsueh-ch'eng developed this idea more radically in promoting the "unity of state and education." 84. Cf. Huang Pei, Autocracy at Work, Bloomington, 1974, pp. 44-48. 158

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This is the reason political power needs principle for the justification of its existence and exercise.85 To be sure, just because a political ruler claims absolute power does not necessarily mean that he has identified with the tradition of the Way; nor does it mean that political and cultural authority are united in the ruler. The ruler might attempt to challenge or even destroy the tradition of the Way and the power of the Confucian authorities as a means of expanding his power over that tradition. Such were the measures adopted by the founder of the Ming dynasty, T'ai-tsu. In 1369, the second year of his reign, T'ai-tsu issued an edict ordering that the spring and autumn sacrifices offered in the Confucian temples could be held only in the temple at Ch'u-fu, and nowhere else in the nation. 86 In this way, T'ai-tsu attempted to localize the Confucian sacrificial ritual and restrict its symbolic meaning to a specific place, while his own political power remained universal. Confucian scholar-officials memorialized, but the ruler persisted in doing things his way. In 1372, the fifth year of his reign, Ming T'ai-tsu abolished the sacrifices usually made to Mencius because he disliked Mencius's precept of mutual responsibility between ruler and minister. What irritated the emperor - so much that he threatened to execute anyone who dared to dissuade him from removing Mencius's sacrifice from the Confucian temple - was Mencius's statement, "If a ruler treats his subject as mud and weeds, they will treat him as an enemy." 87 The emperor even ordered his guards to shoot at the image of Mencius with arrows. 88 Ch'ien T'ang memorialized against the emperor's measure, however, saying "It would be a great honor for me to die for Mencius." 89 This was exactly the sort of price the ruler could not afford, and so shortly thereafter, the sacrifice to Mencius was restored. 90 In 1382, the sacrifices at the Confucian temple were once again permitted nationwide. 91 In fact, Ming T'ai-tsu was aware that it was essential for his newly established regime to be recognized by Confucius's descendants if it was to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Once he wrote to K'ung K'e-chien, a descendant of Confucius, after K'ung had excused himself from an audience with the emperor: I am told that you have been sick for a long time, but I wonder whether that is true. Your K'ung family is a distinguished house known for your ancestor's teachings, which have been followed by generation after generation of rulers. Your family has served different dynasties over history and should surely make no 85. Lu K'un, Shen-yin yii, Taipei, 1975, 1/4-12a. 86. Chang, Ming-shih, 139/3981. 87. Ibid. 88. WMSA, 4/35. 89. Chang, Ming-shih, 139/3982; WMSK, 4/3!). 90. Chang, Ming-shih, 139/3982. 91. WMSK,

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exception to this rule when it comes to my regime. I have received the mandate of Heaven to lead the Chinese people and drive away the barbarians in order to bring peace to China. This despite the fact that I came from among the common people, but so did the founder of the Han dynasty, Kao-tsung [sic, the correct title is Kao-tsu] in the ancient period. Hence, it is not permissible for you to neglect my state on the pretext of illness!92 Undermining an independent tradition of the Way was a perfectly logical step in the process of strengthening autocracy. The methods varied, however, as is clear from the differences between those used by Ming T'ai-tsu and by the Ch'ing emperor K'ang-hsi. In retrospect, the Ch'ing emperor, even though an alien ruler, was much more successful. Unlike the Ming founder, the Ch'ing emperor did not directly confront the tradition of the Way, the symbol of cultural authority. The K'ang-hsi emperor was more sensitive to, and more conscious of, the subtle influence of Confucian symbolism on Chinese politics and society.93 His promotion of Confucian temple rituals was only one of many demonstrations of this sensitivity. The Ch'ing emperor used the Confucian cultural heritage as a means of reinforcing his political legitimacy. Through his restructuring of the relationship between the tradition of the Way and that of governance, the K'ang-hsi emperor assumed the leadership of both. The integration of the tradition of the Way and the tradition of governance in the Ch'ing regime was what most worried Wang Fu-chih (1619—92), one who could never bring himself to accept Manchu power on account of his radical racist nationalism.94 In a discussion on past conquest dynasties, Wang fiercely attacked the "corrupt Confucians" (jou-ju) who had sold the tradition of the Way to the "barbarians" (i-ti) and so helped invaders to gain access to the sages' teachings.95 With the help of "corrupt Confucians" an alien conqueror could temporarily pretend to be a Confucian ruler. Among such Confucians, Wang particularly blamed Lien Hsi-hsien, Hsu Heng, and Yao Shu of the Yuan dy92. Kung-fu tung-an hsien-pien, Peking, 1982, vol. 1, p. 17. 93. As Ch'ien Mu observed on his visit to the Confucian temple in Ch'u-fu, most of the tablets of epigraphs dedicated to Confucius were set up by alien rulers. See Ch'ien Mu, "Shih-yu tsa-i" (Recollections of teachers and friends) in China Monthly, 2, no. 4 (May 1980), 59. According to The Records of Ch'ueh-li, there are thirteen pavilions built on stone tablets (pei-t'ing) dedicated to the Confucian temple; nine of them were put up by these three Ch'ing rulers. K'ung Chi-fen, Ch'ueh-li wen-hsien k'ao, 1762, 12/1 b. As for the buildings of the Confucian temple, the author also confirmed that "nothing can be further added since our dynasty has increased it to such an utmost extent." Ch'ueh'-li wen-hsien K'ao, 11 /1 a. 94. Wang Fu-chih, Tu T'ung-chien-lun (Reading the T'ung-chien), 13/408-490. Wang defines an orthodox dynasty by race rather than by culture. 95. Ibid., 13/409. 160

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nasty, who had used their understanding of the learning of principle (lihsiieh) to help the Mongol rulers establish a new cultural order.96 Despite such help, said Wang, alien dynasties could only imitate cultural forms, never grasping their essence. A conquest dynasty could never win the mandate of Heaven and was destined to fall shortly after "its superficial adoption of Confucian culture."97 Wang's anger at the "corrupt Confucians" reflected his fear that through the exploitation of Confucian symbols, alien rulers could legitimize their domination over China. Because Wang Fu-chih died in the thirty-first year of K'ang-hsi's reign, his apprehension about the adoption of Confucian culture by alien rulers was quite accurate in the context of K'ang-hsi's success in appropriating Confucian symbolism to support his power.98 The Ch'ing rulers' embodiment of both cultural and political traditions shaped the nature of their regimes. A few examples will suffice to reveal the far-reaching impact of this political ideology on the concept of political authority and the relationship between ruler and subjects. First, the contrast between the visits made by a Han emperor and a Ch'ing emperor to the Confucian temple of Ch'ueh-li in Ch'u-fu is revealing: Han Chang-ti in the year 85 paid a visit to the Confucian temple. After participating in the rites there, he remarked to K'ung Hsi, "My present visit glorifies your clan, doesn't it?" Thereupon the descendant of Confucius replied: "I have learned that none of the sagacious rulers fail to respect the Master and his teachings. The visit Your Majesty pays to our place is exactly a manifestation of reverence for the Master and one by which Your Majesty will increase your virtue. As for glorifying our clan, we dare not receive the honour." Laughing and acknowledging this witty response, Han Chang-ti said, "Only a descendant of the sage could come up with such a good answer."99 Even down to the end of the Ming period, the K'ung family still preserved this enduring Confucian ethos. The famous essayist Chang Tai put it in a nutshell. When he visited the Confucian temple shortly before the fall of the Ming regime, he met the K'ung family and was told: There are only three notable families in the world: the [Taoist] Chang family of Chianghsi, the [royal] Chu family of Feng-yang, and our K'ung family. Among them, the K'ung family stands out as the most distinguished, for the Chang family appears to be vulgar in its religious character [tao-shih-ch'i\, and the parvenu Chu family behaves like people of low birth.100 96. 98. 99. 100.

Ibid., 14/467. 97. Ibid., 13/409. Wang Fu-chih completed Tu T'ung-chien-lun one year before his death in 1692. Fan Yeh, Hou-Han shu, 79/2562. Chang Tai, T'ao-an meng-i, Shanghai, 1982, p. 10. 161

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This statement made by certain members of the K'ung family highlights the pride of the K'ung family in assessing itself side by side with a powerful royal house. In contrast, humbler feelings overwhelmed the K'ung family during the Ch'ing emperor K'ang-hsi's visit in 1684. In answer to K'ang-hsi's question about the sights of the temple, K'ung Shang-jen (1648-1718) replied, Most of the relics of the sage have been ruined. It is not worth Your Majesty's while to look at them. Nevertheless, after your viewing them, all the things in this temple will automatically become precious and magnificent. Your Majesty's act will go down in history and make the whole world know the respect Your Majesty has paid to the sage and his teaching. The honor will not be confined to our family alone.101 The difference between the two dialogues is clear. In the first dialogue, K'ung Hsi maintained that the imperial visit to the Confucian temple bestowed moral benefit and political prestige to the Han emperor. In the second dialogue, the Ch'ing emperor conferred glory on Confucius by the very fact of his visit. In K'ung Shang-jen's reply, the Ch'ing emperor is seen as the embodiment of both the tradition of the Way and that of governance. The Confucian temple has come to rely on endorsement by the political authority of its status as a major cultural institution. This trend, however, did not contradict the Ch'ing ruler's intensified use of the Confucian symbols. The emperor knew the meaning of Confucian symbolism only too well; thus he was able to choose the right symbols to convey unequivocally any desired message to the Confucian community. The Ch'ien-lung emperor revealed this strategy clearly. Noting the way the emperors K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng had intensified Confucian ritual practice, he remarked that "only a sage [Emperor Yung-cheng] is able to understand another sage [Emperor K'ang-hsi]."102 The Ch'ing rulers' efforts to combine political and cultural traditions can be regarded as the ideological component of an ever-growing autocracy. The authoritarian character of the Ch'ing regime was ever more explicitly expressed through the character of its rulers, a phenomenon that may well have been the result of this political and cultural combination. At the trial of Tseng Ching, the Yung-cheng emperor fiercely refuted Tseng Ching's "vicious idea" that the emperorship would be best 101. K'ung Shang-jen, Ch'u-shan i-shu chi (Memoir concerning the K'ang-hsi emperor's 1684 tour to the Confucius temple), in Chao-tai ts'ung-shu, 15a-!5b. K'ung is famous

for his play, Peach Blossom Fan (T'ao-hua shan). 102. Ch'ing Kao-tsung, Yii-chih-wen ch 'u-chi (Writings of Ch'ing Kao-tsung, first series), 17/ 3b. 162

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given to virtuous Confucians. For instance, Tseng said that in the Spring and Autumn period, Confucius should have been the ruler; in the Warring States period, Mencius; after the Ch'in dynasty, the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi; and at the end of the Ming, Lu Liu-liang. 103 The emperor rebuked Tseng: The reason why Confucius and Mencius are great is because they set norms for human relations. They rectified the people's minds for ten thousand generations and expounded the great meaning in history. But there never has existed a principle that they should become the ruler. If they had obtained the political position to carry the Way out, they would have merely fulfilled the duty of a minister. There is absolutely no reason for plain scholars to become rulers. I do not know what Tseng Ching has in mind. What he has done seems to me to slander the sages because he imposes the vicious crime of usurpation on Confucius and Mencius.104 For the Yung-cheng emperor, Confucius and Mencius and their teachings occupied a fixed position in the equally fixed hierarchy of the ruler - subject relationship. He regarded this fixed relationship as the basis for the other four human relationships. In his mind, the sages had no right to oppose their rulers at all, and certainly no right to become rulers. For the Ch'ien-lung emperor, even the significance of the prime minister was relegated to the background. Through the position of prime minister, a Confucian scholar was supposed to be able to help his ruler to embody the Confucian Way for the world. But the Ch'ien-lung emperor reduced the prime minister's role to that of a bureaucrat, deemphasising his critical functions. He quite frankly expressed his dissatisfaction with Ch'eng I's conception of a prime minister: It is the emperor who employs a prime minister. If the emperor is only concerned with self-cultivation in solitude and hands over the governing power to the prime minister, he will either be fortunate to have good prime ministers such as Han Ch'i and Fan Chung-yen, who will, nevertheless, argue with him at court, or be unfortunate enough to have bad ministers, such as Wang An-shih and Lii Hui-ch'ing, who will make a mess of the world.105 The emperor eventually made a final remark on what he really thought: "It is particularly wrong for a prime minister to take state affairs as his sole duty and to neglect the existence of his emperor." 106 In point of fact, there was no office in the Ch'ing bureaucracy equivalent to the 103. Ch'ing Shih-tsung, Ta-i ch'ueh-mi-lu (Record of great tenor for the deluded) in Chintai Chung-kuo shih-liao t'sung-k'an, no. 3, Taipei, 1966, 2/5a~5b. 104. Ibid., 2/5b-6b. 105. Ch'ing Kao-tsung, Yu-chih-wen erh-chi (Writings of Ch'ing Kao-tsung, second series), ig/8b. 106. Ibid., ig/8b.

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post of prime minister. What the Ch'ien-lung emperor said merely reflected the effects of autocracy on his acceptance of the idea of having a prime minister. He wished to deprive Confucian bureaucrats not only of their power but also of their political ideals. 107 Ch'uan Tsu-wang, a close friend of Li Fu, was also a Lu-Wang scholar who had ambivalent feelings about the Ch'ing regime because he had grown up in a place historically antagonistic to the Manchus. Despite this bias, we can still detect the influence of autocracy on his understanding of the ruler's legitimate power. In the Philosophical Records of the Sung and the Yuan Confucians, Ch'uan Tsu-wang borrows a passage from the Complete Works of Lu Hsiang-shan to exemplify Lu Chiu-shao's political views: Sung-nien once asked Suo-shan [Lu Chiu-shao, the elder brother of Lu Hsiangshan] , "Mencius persuaded feudal princes with the kingly Way. Did he mean to advise them in practicing the kingly Way to honor the Chou house, or to advise them in practising the kingly Way to obtain Heaven's mandate?" "To obtain Heaven's mandate," answered Suo-shan. "Doesn't Mencius then instigate usurpation?" Sung-nien said. 'The people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler," replied Suo-shan. After listening to Sung-nien's report on this conversation with his brother, Lu Hsiang-shan sighed {Van), saying, "My brother used not to hold this view. Neither has this view been uttered since remote antiquity." Said Sung-nien, "Po-i does not know this principle, but King Wu does." [Italics added]108 Surprisingly, Ch'uan has distorted the meaning of the original. The passage in the Complete Works ofLu Hsiang-shan reads as follows: Sung [Sung-nien] at a time asked Suo-shan, "Someone asked me, 'Mencius persuades feudal princes with the kingly Way. Does he mean to advise them in practicing the kingly Way to honor the Chou house, or to advise them in practising the kingly Way to obtain Heaven's mandate?' How should I answer him?" 'To obtain Heaven's mandate," answered Suo-shan. "If so, how can one remove the common doubt that Mencius is inciting feudal princes to usurp?" Sung-nien said. 'The people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler," replied Suo-shan. After listening to Sung-nien's report on his conversation with his brother, Master Lu Hsiang-shan praised again and again {tsai-san ch'eng-t'ari), saying, "My 107. For the rise of the ruler's power and the decline of prime minister's in Chinese history, one can consult Professor Yu Ying-shih's Li-shih Yu ssu-hsiang, pp. 47-76. 108. SYHA, 57/130. 164

The price of having a sage-emperor brother used not to hold this view." After a long while, Master Lu Hsiang-shan said, "Neither has this view been uttered since remote antiquity." "Po-i does not know this principle," said Sung. Master Lu agreed. Sung said again, "King Wu knows this principle."

"Since Fu-hsi everyone has known this principle" Master Lu concluded. [Itaics added]109 Here Lu Hsiang-shan approves of his brother's political ideas; but according to Ch'uan, he disapproved. Although the literary inquisition haunted the scholars of the time, it played no role in Ch'uan's distortion of the Lu brothers' political views. Ch'uan would not have been held responsible for Lu Hsiang-shan's idea, as Lu was born almost six hundred years before and was one of those honored with sacrifices in the Confucian temple. The explanation of Ch'uan's distortion lies, rather, in the growing influence of autocratic thinking on contemporary scholars, who now began to prescribe such a position as an acceptable political stand.110 Commenting on Lu K'un's reflections on the relationship between principle and political power, the renowned philologist Chiao Hsiin (1763—1820) bore further witness to the strength of this influence: In the Ming period, Lit K'un wrote a book in which he discussed the relationship between principle and political power. According to him, in the world principle and political power are most respectable, but principle is supreme. The emperor cannot suppress principle with his power at court. Even if he did so, principle nevertheless would exist in the world forever. This is exactly a kind of heresy, since Confucius taught that a subject should treat his ruler with propriety (li b), but never threaten his ruler with principle (li). What Lu K'un said indicates the character of a usurping minister and an evil thief [Italics added] 111

What is involved here is a change in the criterion of political conduct. If principle is the essence of the tradition of the Way, then political power is the foundation of the tradition of governance. Lu K'un, at the end of the Ming, recognized that principle, and thus the tradition of the Way, performed the function of criticizing political authority. In the eyes of Chiao Hsun, however, this critical dimension of principle had been eliminated, for Chiao lived in an age that was autocratic both in theory and in practice. 109. LHCQ 34/44b. 110. It is Mao Huai-hsin's note that draws my attention to the discrepancy between the original version and Ch'uan's quotation. But I cannot agree with his interpretation that Ch'uan's misrendering was caused by his fear of the literary inquisition. Cf. Mao Huai-hsin, "Tu-shu cha-chi san-tse" (Three notes) in Chung-kuo che-hsueh, vol, 2, pp. 152-154. 111. Chiao Hsiin, Tiao-hu chi, in Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng ch'u-pien, 10/151.

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The last but not the least example that shows the political climate of the time comes from the Annotated Catalog of the Complete Work of the Four Libraries (Ssu-ku ch'uan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao). When Chi Yun, the chief editor, commented on the Essential Reading from Liu Tsung-chou {Liu-tzu chieh-yao) by Yun Ju-ch'u, he was generous in his praise for the selections made, but felt sorry for Yun Ju-ch'u because his editing had not censored some improper political views in Liu Tsung-chou's writings. Chi Yun wrote: With respect to the selection and classification of the content, this anthology is very strict. But the editor included some disputative statements that should have been deleted. For example, Liu wrote in his book that "the bond between ruler and subject holds when Heaven's mandate has not been broken off; when it has, the ruler becomes a mere fellow (tu-fu). Therefore, it is opportune for King Wu to rise in arms on the chia-tzu day. If he did so one day earlier (k'uei-hai), he would become a usurper; and if he did it one day later (i-ch'ou), he would be out of tune with the will of Heaven and lose the opportunity." The above statements should not be uttered by a subject [like Liu Tsung-chou]. Statements like these should be expunged.112 Chi Yiin's remark on Liu Tsung-chou's writings shows that he denied any transcendental ground on which a Confucian can assess the legitimacy of a political regime. In other words, he reduced the role of a Confucian from that of standard-bearer for the Way to that of a submissive subject obsessed with the concept of absolute loyalty. Chi's view was also seen in the criticism he made of some Ming Confucians' conception of the tradition of the Way, in which they regarded the ancient sage-kings such as Yao and Shun as Confucian (ju) as well, and thereby enhanced their own status, an act Chi condemned as usurpation. 113 The disappearance of the critical strain in the Confucian thought of the day was reflected in formal intellectual articulation as well. For example, Chang Hsiieh-ch'eng (1738-1801) maintained that the real Way was the Way both in name and in substance. For Chang, the Sung Confucians' metaphysical discussions were indicative of their obsession with the name of the Way, a grave mistake that caused them to lose the correct perspective for understanding its substance. 114 According to Chang, the substance of the Way was immanent in the historical process. After the formation of society, it could be seen through the intermediation of political mechanisms. There was no point in talking about the 112. Chi Yun, Ssu-k'u ch'u'an-shu tsung-mu t'iyao, Taipei, p. 1991. 113. Chi Yun's criticism is seen in his preface to Wan Ssu-t'ung's/w-/m tsungj)'ai, Taipei, n.d., 2a. 114. Chang Hsiieh-ch'eng, Wen-shih t'ung-i, p. 44.

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Way apart from its concrete manifestations (hsing) in history.115 A lack of transcendentalism in Chang's conception of the Way is apparent here, for if the Way is always manifested in the concrete forms of history, its capacity to stand above the historical process and criticise an existing power are logically denied. This theory laid the needed foundation for Chang Hsiieh-chang to favor the unity of state and education (chih-chiao ho-i).116

Chang's statement also sheds light on why, unlike most of the Confucians, Chang Hsueh-ch'eng assessed the achievement of the duke of Chou to be greater than that of Confucius.117 To Chang, the duke of Chou "combined virtue [te] and political power [wei]" and fulfilled the reality of the so-called great synthesizer (chi-ta-ch 'eng) better than Confucius did. In Chang's view, it was the opportune moment (shih-hui) rather than the difference in their inborn talents that made the duke of Chou superior to Confucius.118 Nevertheless, Chang's judgment reveals the Zeitgeist of his time: the unity of truth and power.119 In the twenty-fifth year (1686) of K'ang-hsi's reign, the renowned antiManchu scholar Huang Tsung-hsi (1610—95) in a letter to his friend praised the current situation as "the time Confucian scholars have been best treated, and so one unexpectedly witnesses the coming of a grand age."120 Huang's comment demands our attention, for it reveals that although he never betrayed his status as a Ming loyalist, he was not mindlessly bound by his loyalty to the Ming dynasty. Huang's apparent contradiction can be resolved if we understand his praise for the Ch'ing ruler (Emperor K'ang-hsi) as a reflection of his anticipation of the coming of a sage-emperor, a dream that had occupied the minds of 115. Ibid., pp. 39-41. 116. Ibid., p. 42. 117. Ibid., p. 37. 118. Ibid. On the one hand, when comparing their achievements, Wang Yang-ming gave sage emperors Yao and Shun more credit than Confucius. He gave them a metaphorical "ten thousand Hang (a Chinese unit of weight) in gold for their accomplishments, but Confucius only "nine thousand Hang" On the other hand, Wang Yang-ming did not subsequently regard Yao and Shun as superior to Confucius. Ch'uan-hsi lu, pp. 72-73. Nevertheless, Wang's seemingly "quantitative" assessment of Confucius invited severe criticism from scholars like Feng K'e (1524-1601) and Lu Lung-chi. See Feng K'e, Ch'iu-shih-p'ien, Kyoto, n.d., 3/8b-iob; and Lu Lung-ch'i, San-yu-t'ang wenchi, in Wen-yiian-ke Ssu k'u-ch'iian shu, 5727b. Furthermore, Ch'en Chien agreed with Hu Ching-chai that Confucius was greater than Yao and Shun even in terms of practical affairs (shih-kung). See Ch'en, Hsueh-pu t'ungpien, Japanese edition, Kyoto, n.d., 12/ioa-iob. 119. Hu Shih does not grasp Chang's point in an adequate context, therefore Chang's assessment of the duke of Chou appeared "ridiculous" or "mistaken" to Hu Shih. See Hu Shih, Chang Shih-tsai hsien-sheng nien-p'u in Chang Shih-tsai hsien-sheng nien-p'u huipien, Hong Kong, 1975, p. 115. 120. Huang Tsung-hsi, Huang Tsung-hsi Nan-lei tsa-chu-kao chen chi, Chekiang, 1987, p. 278.

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Confucians for more than two thousand years. But the coming of this particular sage-emperor had been at the expense of the autonomy of the tradition of the Way, which previously had entitled Confucians to criticize those with political authority. Such is the paradox inevitably derived from deep within Confucian political ideology.

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Conclusion This study has used the Lu-Wang school to explore two major themes: the change in intellectual climate from the Sung to the early Ch'ing, and the Ch'ing regime's assimilation - largely through the efforts of the K'ang-hsi emperor - of the tradition of the Way. The Lu-Wang school has been chosen as the focus of this study. In contrast to its rival, the Ch'eng-Chu school, the Lu-Wang school had, an independent spirit toward book learning and was never supported by the political powers as the holder of official doctrines. In the final analysis it appears that the Lu-Wang school was better suited than the Ch'eng-Chu school to reflect the depth and breadth of these themes. Though initially detached from book learning, the school was influenced by the fashion of evidential study in the early and middle Ch'ing. Despite that the LuWang school never received formal political patronage, it adapted quite easily to the rule of the alien Ch'ing regime. That Li Fu would be both a Lu-Wang scholar and a high-ranking official is a clear example of this. As a Lu-Wang scholar, Li Fu depreciated the importance of book learning. However, in order to convince his contemporaries of the truth of Lu-Wang doctrines, he was compelled to use arguments based on an evidential research. The discrepancy between means and ends in Li Fu's expression can be grasped only through an understanding of his intellectual context. Scholars of the time were generally hostile to metaphysical speculation. As Li Fu himself admitted, he did not like the learning of nature and principle by intuition.1 The reaction against the metaphysical ideas of the late Ming had led scholars either to stress the practical aspect of their teachings, to solve problems by means of an empirical approach, or to do both. Therefore, it is not surprising that Li Fu emphasized the practicality of Lu-Wang doctrines and also appealed to evidential scholarship to prove his arguments. Besides changes in the intellectual approaches, what began as a purely 1. MTCK, i8/28a-28b.

169

Conclusion

intellectual argument between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan became more and more complicated because of extra intellectual considerations in later generations. For instance, Ch'eng-Chu doctrine was prescribed by the ruling class as the required curriculum of the civil service examinations. Since success in the civil service examinations brought such worldly gains as status, fame, and profit, one's interest in Ch'eng-Chu learning became entangled with more immediate material and social concerns. Thus, a Lu-Wang scholar had to fight on two fronts, one intellectual and the other social and political. This was the inevitable situation a scholar faced if he committed himself to the Lu-Wang doctrines. In relation to the question of political power prior to the K'anghsi period, these two schools shared a view of Confucian scholars as a group of Way-bearers. On the one hand, their disagreement in philosophy did not influence their critical stand toward their rulers. On the other, their philosophical quarrels did not reduce their rulers' respect for them as Way-bearers. Rulers had little interest in tackling the bothersome intellectual debates arising from different systems of thought. What they did was recognize ad hoc the victory of one school over the other and take advantage of the doctrines held by the proponents of the mainstream - usually the Ch'eng-Chu school. Rulers' passive role in intellectual life, and their willingness to listen to Confucians, may have been a major reason that the tradition of the Way and its bearers could retain a critical attitude toward the political establishment. By actively participating in cultural life, the K'ang-hsi emperor, wittingly or unwittingly, took away this critical dimension from the tradition of the Way. Having realized the significance of Confucian symbolism only too well, his sensitivity to and his activism in Confucian culture went hand in hand with his remarkable accomplishments in civil governance. As a result, Confucian intellectuals perceived him as a sage-emperor, and thus he satisfied their long-standing nostalgia for the return of a golden age. Since the time of Confucius a new conceptualization of the relationship between political rulers and cultural elites had evolved. This was based on the perception that the Way and political power had become separated; their eventual reunification was ideologically prescribed as the ultimate political-cultural goal. As the author of The Doctrine of the Mean enthusiastically suggested: One may occupy the throne, but if he does not have the proper virtue, he may not dare to make ceremonies or music. One may have the virtue, but if he does 170

Conclusion

not occupy the throne, he likewise may not presume to make ceremonies or music.2

Here the message is conveyed unambiguously that cooperation between rulers and scholars is indispensable for successful governance. Both political and cultural elites agreed on a division of labor for their mutual interests: Rulers were in charge of governance, and Confucian scholars increasingly focused on the preservation and transmission of the Way. Nonetheless, Confucians never hesitated to take advantage of the highly suggestive symbol - the "golden age" in which the Way and power were combined - as a justification for their active participation in political affairs. Furthermore, in defending their importance in society, Confucians devised the idea of the tradition of the Way to argue against other intellectual competitors (heterodoxies) and thus to legitimize their leading role in cultural and intellectual arenas on which political practice was, in turn, founded. Before the K'ang-hsi emperor, the unity of power and truth was to a certain extent fulfilled under this cooperative arrangement. With this perception among Confucians, the emergence of a sageemperor such as the K'ang-hsi emperor would inevitably be at the cost of the independence of the tradition of the Way from political power. In achieving the unity of the tradition of governance and the tradition of the Way, the emperor became both the political and cultural ruler. Confucians could no longer tap their intellectual tradition for the strength to oppose current political authorities. In other words, there were no grounds left for Confucian scholars to "rectify their ruler's mind." Objectively, the elimination of the critical function of the tradition of the Way coincided with the growth of autocracy in Chinese political history. Is it not an irony that a golden age could return and a sage-emperor reappear only in the fulfillment of autocracy - both in practice and in theory? 2. SSCC, ChungyiXng, p. 25. English translation by James Legge, Li Chi, New York, 1967, vol. 2, p. 324.

171

Chinese Glossary

an-shen Carsun Chang 3ft®Hf Chan Jo-shui IS ?r 7JC chang M Chang Hsia 3i I t Chang Hsiieh-ch'eng Chang Lieh 3RS1 Chang Lu-hsiang 31111 # Chang Nan-hsiian (Chang Shin) Chang Po-hsing f fi Chang Tai 3ft I ch' ang-sheng Chao Meng-fu Chao Fang S Chao Fu chao-hsin Che-hsi Che-tung Ch'en Chien Ch'en Ch'ueh Ch'en Hsien-chang Ch en T uan Ch'en Yuan-yu Ch'eng-Chu S * Ch'engHao UM Ch'engl I B Ch'eng-huang W ch'eng-i M ^ Ch'eng Min-cheng Ch'eng T'ung S B l chi (accumulation) K ch'i (vital energy) M

3ftlSfF ' 3ft tt

173

Chinese Glossary

ch'i (b) (instrument, form) Ch'i (great minister) i? chi-ta-ch'eng H^C® ch'i-chih chih hsing Ch'i Huan WU chia-mo ju-kao ^ chiang-lun Hlfw Chiao Hsiin HfM chiao Wi chien ffi chien-ai 5$: ft Ch'ien-lung f£K Ch'ien Mu &ft ch'ien-ssu pai-nan Ch len T ang W& m Ch'ien Te-hung chih $P chih (b) (to reach) chih (c) (extension) chih (d) (wisdom) chih-chiao ho-i chih-chih Sfc^ chih-chiieh chih-hsing ho-i chih liang-chih chih-shan M # chih shih ch'eng-i R chih-tang kuei-i U chih-t'ung chih yii tao ch'in-min Chin Pen-heng Chin-shu S # Chin-wen (Duke Wen of the Chin) chin-wen 4*3t Ch'in % ching (seriousness) ^[ ching (b) (classics) M ching chung yang-ch'u tuan-ni ching-i wu-erh ^ W ^ ^ Chin-ssu-lu S& ching-yen MM ch'ing I'W ch'iu fang-hsin ch'iung-li I I J ! 174

Chinese Glossary

Chouju-teng J i f t S chou lif Chou-li ffl® Chou Tun-i JURIS chu-ching ChuHeng Chu Hsi Chii-lai E?fc Chu-Lu i-t'ung ^F Chu-tzu ch'iian-shu Chu-tzu pu-huo-lu Chu-tzu wan-nien ch'iian-lun Chu-tzu wan-nien ting-lun Ch'ii-fu ffl# chuan H Ch'un-ch'iu i-shih #^C~^S chun-tzu © ~f Ch'iian Tsu-wang (Ch'iian Hsieh-shan) Ch'uan-hsin Tien H j tJS Ch'uan-tao t'u Ch'ueh-li HM chung >f> i chung-ho shuo Chung-yiing + fit Chung-yiing chang-chii Chung-yiing shuo t Erh-ya fa-chiieh Fan Chung-yen Fang Hsiaoju Fang Pao ^ Fei Mi » Feng K'e 8|W feng-kuo ch'ing-hsin fu iff fu-ku « * Fu Shun-kung Fu Tzu-yiian Fung Yu-lan Han Ch'i Han-shu 31 id han-yang S # HanYii Hao Ching heng-she W. JS 175

^ I & H ' ^IB"ill

Chinese Glossary

hou-chih Hsi-ts'u Hsi Yuan-shan f% 7U ill Hsiang An-shih hsien-t'ien hsiao Sfc Hsiao-hsiieh /h Hsiao-shan /h jJLj Hsiao-ching # Hsieh Chi-shih hsieh-chii Hsieh To hsieh-tu hsien-chih hsien-hsien hsien-ju hsien-yii hsin >lLN hsin chih pen-t'i hsin-fa 'llNft hsin-min ^ff S hsin t'ung hsing ch'ing hsing (nature) tt hsing (b) (form) j& hsing (c) (action) fi1 hsing-erh-hsia JU M ~F hsing-erh-shang IB- M _t Hsing-li ta-ch'iian tt hsiu-shen j ^ # HsiiAi Hsu Chieh Hsiieh K'an Hsiieh Ying-ch'i Hsiieh-pu t'ung-pien Hsiung Tz'u-lii Hsu Fu-kuan hsii-ling hsu-shuo Hsiian-ch'eng hsueh $ Hsiieh Hsiian Hsiin Tzu Hu Ch'i-heng HuKuang S Hu Po-ch'uan

176

Chinese Glossary

HuWei HuWu-feng Huai-nan ko-wu Huang Ch'ang-ch'u Jfciifff Huang Chen He IS Huang Kan (Huang Mien-chai) Huang Tsung-hsi 11^11 Huang Tsung-yen Huang-fu Mi S I " I S hui-fu 'KH Huo-yii ts'ao ^ i (will) jft i (b) (one) i (c) (righteous)

##

I a

i-ch'ou Hi i-fa i-kuan ~ H Mi

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i-li chih hsing i-ti ^ i t I-t'u ming-pien

# M W I?

i - t u a n MrVfiQ

i-wai shuo jen t jen-hsin jen-lun ju M Kanju-lai kao-ming Kao P'an-lung K'ang-hsi M k'ao-cheng k'ao-cheng shih mo-liu ko-wu $t$J Ku Hsien-ch'eng ku-hsun Infill Ku Tung-ch'iao ku-wen "Sf^C Ku Yen-wu (Ku Ning-jen) Kuan Chih-tao Wfe Kuan Chung Kuang-hsi t'ung-chih kuang-hsin ftf 177

Chinese Glossary

Kuei Yu-kuang kung-fu ft 3 k'uei-hai ^ kung-kuo-ko Kung-i-tzu K'ung Hsi K'ung K'e-chien K'ung Shang-jen ?L ini tt K' ung-ts' ung-tzu L HI P K'ung Ymg-ta Kweichow Lang T'ing-chi li (principle) li (ritual) (b) Li-chi li-chih Li Ch'ing-fu li-ch'eng Li Ao ^ H Li Fu (Li Mu-t'ang) Li Hung ^Ife li-ifen-shu Li Kuang-ti Li Li-wu li-ming chih-hsueh LiP'o $ 6 Li Po-min Li Shang-yin Li Yiian-kang liang-chih liang-hsin liang-tu Liao Chi Lien Hsi-hsien ling-ming II ^ Lin-ch'uan IJ Liu Chin liu-hsing liu-i A ^ liu-te A ^ Liu Tsung-chou Liu Yiian-ch'ing S!l7n!W Lo Ch'in-shun S l i H lou-ju Lou Liang

Chinese Glossary

Lu Chiu-ling Lu Chiu-shao Lu Hsiang-shan (Lu Chiu-yuan) Lu Lung-ch'i H H ^ Lu Shu-sheng Lu-tzu hsiieh-p'u Lii Tsu-ch'ien Lu-Wang B 3:

mm

Lii Hui-ch'ing LiiK'un S t t Lu Liu-liang S H Lung-ch'ang H # Mao Hsi-ho Mei Cho 1618 ming 1w Ming-ju hsiieh-an Mo-tzu i§ "f* Mou Tsung-san Nan-hua ching S ¥ M Nei-chu-hsia erh wai-ssu-i ft IS ITO^h O ^ nien-p'u ^ I H Ou-yang Ch'ung-i fc# Ou-yang Hsiu fe pen-hsin ^ pi-hui pien-ku p'ien ^ p'ien-hsiu 18 ft po-hsueh hung-tz'u pu-chi chih pien po-hsiieh yii wen pu-lii erh chih san-chi H ffi san-chiao ho-i san-fan H3I san-li H|fi shang-chih ^ ShangK'o-hsi Shang-shu i^ ^

shen

tt

shen-chung ju-shih Shen Tseng-chih tfc g1 sheng-shih ^1tt shih (intellectual) ±

Chinese Glossary

shih (b) (event) 9shih (c) (trend) J5* shih (d) (look) U shih-che +1? Shih-ching Ta-hsueh shih-fei chih hsin s shih-hui $f^t shih-li tang-jan chih chih Shih Mi-yuan ^MH shih-shang mo-lien shih-tu-hsueh-shih shih-wen chih chien Shih-yu t'u shih yii tao ho shih-yiin 1fl:S shu f& Shu # shu-tzu ffi •? Sui-shu n # Shun If ssu-jen ch'ien-ku pu mo-hsin ssu-jen ch'ien-tsai tsui ling-hsin Ssu-k'u-ch'iian-shu *^# Ssu-ma Ch'ien ^] S ssu-ming chih hsiieh ssu-p'ei 09 BB ssu-shu f£ $J Ssu-shu kai-ts'o Ssu-shu ta-ch'iian ssu-tuan E9 ^S Su Tung-p'o sui-ch'u t'i-jen t'ien-li Sun Ch'eng-tse MM Sun Ch'i-feng Sung Lien | Sung-nien Sung Tuan-i ta-ch'en Ta-hsueh ku-pen-shu ta-pen wei-fa A ^ ta-tao ^ H Ta-yii mo t'ai-chi T'ai-chi-t'u shuo TaiHsi 180

Chinese Glossary

Tai Chen Tai Hsien

fan ft tang M

T'ang Ch'ien T'ang Chin T'ang Chun-i tao IE Tao-ching II tao-fa l i f e tao-hsin Ui'fr Tao-i p'ien U tao-mai Hi US tao-shih ch'i tao-t'ung tao-wen hsiieh T'ao Ta-lin te-hsing kung-fu t'i II t'ien-hsing t'ien-li t'ien-ming chih hsing T'ien Wen-ching ting T ting-hsing vStt t'ing % tsai-san ch'eng-t'an ts'ai ^t* Ts'ai T'ing Ts'ai Yu-hsueh Ts'ang-chieh-pien Tseng Ching t Tseng Rung Tseng-tzu Ts'ui Shu Tu Fu tt* tu-fu ® * Tsun te-hsing tsung-kuan tu-shu t l tuan-hsii tun-wu tung W) Tung Chung-shu Tung Huai t $ 181

Chinese Glossary

t'ung-tao W | JH t'ung-chih 1^3 ;fe T'ung-shu tltlf Tzu Hsia ~?jC Tzu Rung f l Tzu Liu Tzu Ssu Wanju-lu wan-shih shih-piao Wan Ssu-t'ung H wang 3: Wang An-shih Wang Chi WangFu-chih Wang Hsi-chih Wang Ken Wang Po Wang Shih-chen i ± M wang-tao j£ H Wang Tsao Wang Tzu-ts'ai Wang Wei Wang Yang-ming (Wang Shou-jen) Wei Chuang-ch'ii wei-fa ^ # wei-hsiieh wei-wo wen A Wen T'ing-yun Wing-tsit Chan Wu ^ WuCh'eng wu-chi ^ wu-chi erh t'ai-chi Wu-ching i-shuo 5 Wu-ching ta-ch'uan wu-lun S f^ wu-erh wu-shan ^ Wu-nu-hsiian wu-shen iX wu-ting chih ming WuYii ^ M Wu Yii-pi Wu Yii-chai 182

Chinese Glossary

WuYiian-ying Yang Chien Yang Chu H Yang Kuei-shan (Yang Shih) Yang-ming hsueh-lu Yao H Yao Shu tttil Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai Yenjo-ch'u B yen g Yen-Li Yen Sung Yen Tzu-sheng j|il~jP yii-ting chih ming ^ yii ¥ YuChi yu-chou Yu Ying-shih Yuan Huang Yuan Mei yueh ,^J Yiieh ffi Yiin-t'ang Yiing-cheng yiing chih fang fa-te-chu-lai

1§ft ill

183

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Wang Ch'uan-shan j£#nll|. Tu T'ung-chien lun 8! ft Ultra (Comments on T'ungchien). Peking, 1975. Chiang-chai shih-hua chien-chu M ^FfttSSItL Peking, i98i. Wang Ken j£S.. Hsin-chai Wang-hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi 'llN^f3i5te^fe^:H (The complete works of Wang Ken). N.P., 1616. Wang Mao-hung I f t S . Chu-tzu nien-p'u ;5fc~f ^Hf (Chronological biography of ChuHsi). Taipei, 1971. Wang Ping-hsieh j£ffi^ . Kuo-ch 'ao ming-ch 'en yen-hsing-lu H W & E Wff^ (The deeds and words of the famous officials of the Ch'ing). N.P., 1885. Wang Yang-ming l | i B l . Ta-hsueh-ku-penp'ang-shih ^ ^ ] * f ^ ^ f ? (The annotations of the O/# Tbtf of The Great Learning). In Pai-ling hsueh-shan Wl^^ill. Shanghai, n.d. Ch'uan-hsi / i ( f t S ^ (Instructions for practical living). Annotated by Yeh Shao-chun Hifg^J. Taipei, 1967. Wang Yang-ming ch'uan-chi zEHI^^^t (The complete works of Wang Yang-ming). Taipei, 1978. Wang Yun-Wu zEUfjS, ed. Hsu-hsiu Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu t'i-yao lc. Taipei, 1971. Wen-hsien ts'ung-pien I&lSRiil$i. Peiping, n.d. Wei Chuang-ch'u fISEIi. Chuang-ch'ii i-shu ffi!Rft#. In WSC. Wu Chen j*iJt. "Wang Ken yii Wang Chi ho-lung" Chekiang hsueh-k'an SJfff^fJ, no. 4, 109-115. Yang K'uan HI It. "Chung-kuo shang-ku-shih tao-lun" ^ H - t ^ T ^ ^ I r a (An introduction to ancient Chinese history). In Lii Ssu-mien and T'ung Shu-yeh S S M f P i ^ H , eds., Ku-shih pien ^*5tl? (The investigation of ancient history), vol. 7. Taipei, 1970. Yenjo-ch'ii HI SET St. Shang-shu ku-wen shu-cheng f^^"£"ZStiSlliE (An investigation of The Book of Documents of the Old Text). N.P., 1867. Yii Ying-shih. "Some Preliminary Observations on the Rise of Ch'ing Confucian Intellectualism," in the Tsing-Hua Journal of Chinese Studies fff¥^$K new series, nos. 1-2, 105-144. ^ ^ N F . Lun Tai Chen yii Chang Hsueh-ch'eng W^WLM.^^-^WL (On Tai Chen and Chang Hsiieh-ch'eng). Hong Kong, 1976. Li-shih yii ssu-hsiangM^t^&tM, (Histoy and thought). Taipei, 1977. Chung-kuo chih-shih chieh-ts'eng shih-lun, ku-tai pien ^B^f&II^Sifilij ' (A historical survey of the Chinese intellectual class, the ancient period). Taipei, i98o. • Shih-hsueh yii ch'uan-t'ung j&^HflFlfii (History and tradition). Taipei, i98 2 . Yuan Chiieh Mffi. Ch'ing-jung chu-shih chi 8 f $ g ± H . In TSCC Yuan Mei Mftt. Sui-yuan ch'uan-chi MM^M (The complete works of Yuan Mei). Shanghai, i98i.

Index

"actualized" (i-fa), 11, 43 Analects, 26, 65, 89, 131, 139

Chang Hsia, 127 Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, 24, 29, 80-1, 130, 166-7 Chang Lieh, 91, 113 Chang Lii-hsiang, 80 Chang Shih (Chang Nan-hsuan), 10—

Annotated Catalog of the Complete Work of the Four Libraries, 166 Annotations on the Great Learning of the

Old Text (Hsieh Chi-shih), 69 Annual of Spring and Autumn (Li Fu), 74 Apologia for the Old Text Documents

(MaoHsi-ho), 138 Book of Changes, 137 The Book of Documents (K'ung Ying-ta

commentator), 137-42 The Book of Filial Piety, 65

book learning (tu-shu): Ch'eng-Chu scholars' use of, 1, 73; Chu Hsi's view of, 108, 141; corresponding to destinies, 78; human interactions vs., 89; Li Fu's view of, 65, 89-90, 141, 169; Lu's procedure of, 1, 104, 108; source of, 41; supported by K'ang-hsi emperor, 149-52; vs. abstract speculations, 100-1; see also education; knowledge Book of Poetry, 89 The Book of Rites, 131, 134, 135

Buddhism: during T'ang dynasty, 54; influence of Huang, 137; ledgers of merit/demerit within, 80-1; view of the "Way" by, 86; Zen, 910,

121-2,

125

ll

> 55>57

Chang Tai, 161 Chang Tsai, 11-12, 14, 99 Chan Jo-shui, 30 Chan, Wing-Tsit, 29 Chao Fang, 109-10 Chao Meng-fu, 138 Ch'en Chien, 111-13 Ch'en Ch'ueh, 133 Ch'eng-Chu school: on book learning (tu-shu), 1; Chang Hsueh-ch'eng study of, 125; evolution of, 2930; intellectual transmission of, 126-8; Li Fu's rejection of, 73, 84; official learning status of, 71; political support for, 118-19, 169-70; rise of, 2, 120-1; see also Chu Hsi school Ch'eng Hao: Chu's compilation of work by, 11; doctrine of "calming human nature," 99; The Great Learning promoted by, 133-4; a s influence on Li T'ung, 9; the Way revived by, 55; the Way transmission ending with, 118

Ch'eng I: Chu's compilation of work 195

Index Ch'eng I (cont.) by, 11; conception of prime minister by, 163; doctrine of "calming human nature," 99; The Great Learning promoted by, 133-4; as influence on Li T'ung, 9; on moral knowledge, 39; praises Ch'eng Hao, 55; the Way transmission ending with, 118 Ch'eng Min-cheng, 109-11 Ch'en Hsien-chang, 29-30, 100 Ch'en T'uan, 137 Ch'en Yu-fu, 130 ch % see vital force (ch 'i) chi (accumulation), 79-80 Chiang Fan, 130 Chiao Hsiin, 165 Ch'ien-lung emperor, 75, 155-6, 158, 163-4 Ch'ien Mu, 10 Ch'ien T'ang, 159 Ch'ien Te-hung, 91 Chien-yang Academy, 114 chih-li (fragmented), 26 Chi K'ang, 58 Ch'ing regime: Li Fu's praise of, 147-8; political/cultural legacy of, 155-7; political ideology of, 145; use of the Way by, 157-8, 160-3; see a^° K'ang-hsi emperor Chiu-ling, 4 Chiu-yuan, see Lu Hsiang-shan ChiYiin, 166 Chouju-teng, 128 Chou Tun-i, 8, 14, 41, 99 Ch'uan Tsu-wang, 72, 76, 124-5, 129, 164 Chu Heng-tao, 5-6, 108 Chu Hsi: attends Goose Lake debate, 4-6; Ch'eng brothers' influence on, 11; dating of letters of, 112; debate with Lu Hsiang-shan, 2, 57; editing of classics by, 26, 118, 131-4; Huang brothers' attack on, 137; K'ang-hsi's admiration of, 152-3; on ko-uru,

104-5; legitimate transmission of, 55-6; letters on Lu by, 109; Li T'ung's influence on, 9-10; on nature of truth, 25; on political power, 59-60; on principle, 12-13, 33, 96; shih-che rank given to, 120; on study of the classics, 22; Wang Yang-ming criticism of, 42, 45-6; see also Ch'eng-Chu school Chu Hsi school: ascendancy over Lu school by, 26-8; criticism of Wang Yang-ming by, 91; interaction between rulers and, 26-8, 118-19; Li Fu on Lu-Wang school vs., 107-17; Lu-Wang school vs, 25-6, 90-101; Wang Yang-ming's struggle with, 2 9 32, 45-6; see also Ch'eng-Chu school Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life (Chu Hsi), 44, 142 Chu Hsi's Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life (Wang Yang-ming), 3, 71, 111-12 Chii-lai, see Li Fu Chung-yung chang-chii, 135 Chungyiing-shuo, 135 Chung-yung (Tzu-ssu), 135 civil service examination: Chu Hsi's doctrine in, 2, 27-8, 118, 134; Li Fu disqualified from, 64 The Classic of Filial Piety, 56 the classics: Chu Hsi's editing of, 26, 118; civil service examination use of, 27-8; "classics mat" lectures from, 150; learning through, 22; Li Fu's study of, 130-42; protest against emphasis on, 14; Wang Yang-ming's attitude toward, 44; the Way preserved in, 13, 28, 105-6 "classics mat" (chingyen) lectures, 150

The Classic of the Way, 139 Classified Conversations of Chu Hsi, 110

196

Index defense of Kuan Chung by, 5 1 2; duke of Chou compared to, 167; honored by Ch'ing regime, The Commentaries on the Doctrine of the 153-6; honored by Mongols, 27; Mean (Chu Hsi), 56, 118 honored as sage, 55; on learning community: relationships within, 5 7 for moral action, 35-6, 89-90; 8; Way-bearers as, 57 on politics and the Way, 48-9, Compilation of Essays on the Oneness of 58, 61; redefines "intellectual" the Way (Ch'eng Min-cheng), by, 47-8 110-11 The Complete Works of Chu Hsi, 152 correct from incorrect (shih-fei chihComplete Works of the Four Libraries, hsin), 39 156 Corrections of Chu Hsi's Commentaries on Complete Works ofLu Hsiang-shan, the Four Books (Mao Hsi-ho), 146 164-5 cosmology: description of Chu Hsi's, The Comprehensive Collections of the Four 6-9; development of Chu Hsi,' Categories, 72 14 Comprehensive Compilation of Chu Hsi's "Counsels of Yii the Great," 138 Final Conclusion Arrived at Late in cultivation (han-yang), 9 Life (Li Fu), 107-17, 142 Confucianism: adopted as state destiny (ming): chi (accumulation) of doctrine, 54; Challenge to Tzugood deeds and, 79; kung/Tzu-hsia, 18; Chu Hsi's determinate/indeterminate, 78conversion to, 115-16; Chu Hsi's 9, 82; tasks of, 77; vital force philosophy of, 6-13; community and, 78-80 of, 57-8; criticism of alien access determinate destiny (yu-ting chih to, 160-1; distinguished from ming), 78 Buddhism, 136; distinguished The Development ofl-Lou Learning from heterodoxy, 10; Goose (Chu Hsi), 121 Lake debate over, 4-6; The Development of the Learning ofLo intellectual lineage of, 117-30; and Min Areas (Chang Hsia), 127 'ju" used within, 85-6; K'ang-hsi The Development of Yang-ming's emperor and, 146-58, 160; Learning (Li F u ) , 1 2 1 Ming, 157-8, 166; on political The Doctrine of the Mean (Chu Hsi power, 61, 170-1; political version), 59, 83, 90, 131, 134-7, response by, 51, 143-4; sincerity 170-1 of the will principle of, 38; Sung, The Doctrine of the Mean (Tzu-ssu 27, 125, 152, 157-8, 166; see also version), 136, 143 the Way {tad) Doubts on the Doctrine of Wang YangConfucian ritual practice, 153, ming (Chinag Lieh), 91, 113 159-60 duke of Chou, 53, 55, 167 Confucian temple: Chu Hsi/Lu status Duke Mu, 53 within, 119-20, 153; erected by Mongols, 27; Han/Ch'ing education: human interactions as, 89; emperors' visit to, 161-2; Wu purpose of earliest, 84-5; unity Ch'eng's status within, 123-4 of state and, 167; see also book learning (tu-shu) Confucius: contributions of, 13; Commentaries on the Analects and the Mencius

( C h uHsi) , 1 1 2

197

Index The Great Learning of the Ancient Text (Chu Hsi version), 32, 44, 131-4 The Great Learning of the Ancient Text (Wang Yang-ming version), 3,

"eight steps" (The Great Learning), 102-3

Elementary Learning (Chu Hsi), 123 "empty talk," 100-1 Erh-ya, 65 "erudite scholars" examination, 73 Essential Reading from Liu Tsung-chou

21-2, 42-3, 44, 101-2, 106, 132-3

Great Ultimate (tfai-chi), 8, 13, 92, H5» !37 the Great Void (xvu-chi), 7-8, 92,

(Yiinju-ch'u), 166 Evidential Analysis of the Old Text Documents (Yen Jo-ch'u), 137 evidential approach (k'ao-cheng): development of, 3, 137-42; Li Fu's use of, 75, 107, 130-1, 141-2; Lu-Wang use of, 1-2 extension of knowledge (chih-chih), 32-3

112,

115

Han Chang-ti (Han emperor), 161 Han Yii, 87 Hao Ching, 138 heaven-conferred nature (t'ien-ming chih-hsing or i-li chih hsing), 12 heavenly nature (t'ien-hsing), 96 Heaven's principle, 43, 95, 100 "false learning" (wei-hsiieh), 26 heterodoxy: Chu Hsi's doctrine as, Fang Pao, 74, 76, 138, 148 16; Confucianism distinguished feeling (ch'ing), 9 from, 10 Fei Mi, 157-8 Historian's Record (Ssu-ma Ch'ien), Feng K'e, 113 The Five Classics, 32 65 five ethical principles, 84-8 The History of the Chin Dynasty (seven The Four Books, 27 versions), 138 "four moral germs," 95-6 The History of the Sui Dynasty, 135 Four Statements (Wang Yang-ming), Ho Ch'ang-ling, 76 "honoring the moral nature" (tsun te38-9 hsing), 1-2, 6, 45 fundamental mind (pen-hsin), 6 Ho Shu-ching, 115 Fung Yu-lan, 20 Hsiang An-shih, 124 Fu Tzu-yuan, 121 Hsiang-shan, see Lu Hsiang-shan A General Collection of Commentaries of Hsiao-shan, see Li Fu the Five Classics, 28 Hsieh Chi-shih, 68-9, 146 A General Collection of Commentaries of Hsieh Tu, 123 the Four Books, 28 Hsi-pao, 69 A General Collection of Hsing-li Hsiung Tz'u-lu, 153 Learning, 28 Hsu Ai, 32, 36 A General Critique of Obscure Learning Hsueh Hsuan, 29 (Ch'en Chien), 111 Hsiieh K'an, 119 General History of the Eight-Banner Hsu Fu-kuan, 6, 21 System, 71 Hsu Heng, 160 General History of Kwangsi, 68 Hsiin tzu, 12, 53, 139 gentleman (chun-tzu), 48 Hsun-tzu, 139 Goose Lake debate, 4-6, 13, 108 Huang Ch'ang-chu, 126 the Great Learning, 42 Huang-fu Mi, 138

198

Index Huang Kan, 25, 108, 117-18 Huang Tsung-hsi: on Book of Changes diagrams, 137; on book learning, 90; defense of Wang by, 91; on innate knowledge, 94-5; philosophical records of, 12730; praises Ch'ing ruler, 167-8 Huang Tsung-yen, 137 Hua-yen Buddhism, 8 Hu Ch'i-heng, 70 Hu Kuang, 28 human interactions, 84-9, 136-7; see also the Way (tao) Huo T'ao, 112 Hu Po-chuan, 100

Jentsung (Sung emperor), 27, 131 'ju," 85-6

K'ang-hsi emperor: Li Fu on, 144-8; use of the Way by, 62, 146-58, 160; visit to Confucian temple by, 162; see also Ch'ing regime; political establishment Kanju-lai, 68 Kant's moral philosophy, 23 King Wu, 147 knowledge: of the good, 90-2, 94, 97-8; Li Fu's discourse on, 97101; nature of innate, 43, 94-5; parallel between will and, 37-8; sources of, 39-40, 98-9; unity of action and, 28, 32, 35-7, 41-2; I-li, 65 see also book learning (tu-shu); Imperial Catalog, 128 moral knowledge indeterminate destiny (xvu-ting chih ming), 78-9, 82 knowledge of good {liang-chih), 35 innate knowledge, 43, 94-5; see also ko (rectified), 33 knowledge ko-uru (reaching to obtain principle): innate knowledge of the good (chih attack against Chu Hsi's, 133; Chu Hsi' theory of, 32-3, 37, liang-chih), 90-2, 94, 97-101 104-5, 1315 Li Fu's theory of, Inquiry into the Book of History of the 101-6; see also principle (It) Old Text, 91 Instructions for Practical Living (Wang ko-wu (rectification of the mind) theory, 3, 39-40, 43 Yang-ming) ,113 "instruments" (ch'ib), 7 Kuan Chih-tao, 135 Kuan Chung, 51-2 intellectual discussions (chiang-lun), Kuei Yu-kuang, 138 25 The Intellectual Lineage ofHsin-an AreaKu Hsien-ch'eng, 113, 132 (Ch'engT'ung), 126 K'ung Hsi, 161-2 Intellectual Lineage of the Learning of K'ung K'e-chien, 159-60 MasterLu (Li Fu), 107, 121, 142 K'ung Shang-jen, 2, 73, 162 "intellectual pursuits" (tao wen-hsueh), K'ung-ts'ung-tzu (K'ung families), 136, 161-2 6,45 K'ung Ying-ta, 134 "intellectual" (shih), 47-9, 61-2 An Investigation of the Diagrams in the Ku Tung-ch'iao, 38 Book of Changes (Hu Wei), 137 Ku Yen-wu, 90, 111, 114 An Investigation of the Learning of the Neo-Confucians of the Middle Min language: experiential dimension of, 15-16; value of written, 13 Area (Li Ch'ing-fu), 127 learning, see book learning (tu-shu) i (righteousness), 50 "the learning of mind" (hsin-fa), jen (humanity), 50 152

Index Lecture Notes to the Interpretations of the Four Books, 151 ledgers of merit/demerit (kung-kuoko), 80-1 Liang T'ing-chi, 66 Li Ao, 135 Liao Chi, 135 Lien Hsi-hsien, 160 Li Fu: on The Book of Documents, 13742; as champion of Lu-Wang school, 3; character of, 65, 72, 140; on character of the Way, 84-90; on Ch'ing regime, 144-8; on Chu Hsi vs. Lu Hsiang-shan, 107-17; conception of destiny (ming), 77-84; on The Doctrine of the Mean, 134-7; early life of, 63-6; government service of, 6 6 8, 74-5; on The Great Learning texts, 131-4; on knowledge, 9 7 101; legacy of, 75-6; politically disfavored, 69-71; study of classics by, 130-1; support of LuWang doctrine by, 71-3, 75, 106; theory of ko-ivu by, 101-6; on transmission of Lu's doctrine, 117-30 Li Kuang-ti, 64, 66, 135, 145-6, 153 Li Li-wu, 135 lineage of the Way (tao-mai), 56 Li Po-mien, 19 Li T'ung, 9-10, 115 Liu Chin, 31 Liu Tsung-chou, 91, 132 Li Yiian-kang, 118 Lo Ch'in-shun, 44, 95-7, 101, 110, 112

Lou Liang, 31 Lu brothers, see Chiu-ling; Lu Hsiangshan Lu Chiu-shao, 164 Lu Hsiang-shan: approach to principle/mind by, 12-19; awarded Confucian scholar rank, 120; criticism of the Great Void by, 7-8; debate with Chu Hsi, 2,

57; invited to Goose Lake debate, 4-6; Li Fu's defense of, 65; on nature of truth, 25; on political power, 60, 164-5; o n source of learning, 41; on the "starting point," 103; Wang Yang-ming criticism of, 41-2, 45" 6 Lu K'un, 158, 165 Lu Liu-liang, 80, 156 Lu Lung-ch'i, 153 Lii Tsu-ch'ien, 4, 57, 124 Lu-Wang school: on book learning {tu-shu), 1; conflict with Chu Hsi school, 25-6, 90-101; decline of, 2; intellectual transmission of, 117-30; Li Fu on Chu Hsi vs., 107-17; Li Fu as proponent of, 3, 63, 71-2; Li Fu on transmission of, 117-30; Mou Tsung-san on, 23 Lu Yu, 73 Mao Hsi-ho, 103, 135, 146 "The Massacre of Fang Hsiao-ju's Ten Clan" (Li Fu), 147 Mei Cho, 138, 139 Mencius, 17, 21, 41, 65, 104, 131 Mencius: constructs tradition of the Way, 54-5, 117; on differentiating, 39; on human nature, 12; on indeterminate destiny, 82; on investigation of things, 18-19; o n right °f "revolution," 50; on role of intellectuals, 48-50; as "selfdeclared disciple," 122; T'ai-tsu attack against, 159; use of 'ju" by, 85-6; on virtue, 105 Metzger, Thomas, 10 "mind" (hsin): actualized/not yet actualized, 11, 43; Chu Hsi's view of, 2, 6-12; Li Fu's view of nature, principle and, 90-101; Lu Hsiang-shan's view of, 2, 9, 12-19; as principle, 42;

2OO

Index rectification of, 40, 42; as source of moral enlightenment, 30, 104-6; substance and operation of, 10-11; Wang Yang-ming on, 33-4 Mind-Transmitting Hall, 154-5 Ming Confucianism, 157-8, 166 Ming dynasty: adoption of Chu Hsi school by, 28; attack against the Way in, 159-60; fall of, 101, 114; intellectual climate of, 29; Li Fu's praise of, 147 Mongols: as Sung regime rival, 27; Wu Ch'eng service under, 123-4 moral behavior: human destiny and, 79-80; learning vs., 141-2; Li Fu's definition of, 81-2, 94; perfection of, 83 moral knowledge: Ch'eng I on, 39; decision making through, 50-1; mind as source of, 30, 104-6; perceptions of the senses vs., 96; principle and, 83; unity of action and, 28, 32, 35-6; used by political leaders, 61-2 Mo-tzu, 85-6, 117 Mou Tsung-san, 23 Mu-t'ang, see Li Fu Mu-t'ang ch'u-kao (Li Fu collection), 76

Mu-t'angpieh-kao (Li Fu collection),

during Ming period, 29-30; reemphasizes practice/study, 28; on unity of all things, 34-5; see also Confucianism The New T'ang History, 143 New Text Documents, 137-8 Non-Ultimate (or Great Void), 7-8, 92,

112,

115

"not yet actualized" (wei-fa), 11, 43 Old Text Documents, 137-8 "The Old theory of Equilibrium and Harmony" (Chu Hsi), 11 "On Destiny" (Li Fu), 81 On Immortality (Wang Yang-ming), 44-5 The Origins of Chu Hsi Learning (Hsu Chieh/Hsueh Ying-ch'i), 124, 126-7 The Origins of the Learning of T'ai-chou (Chin Penheng), 127 The Origins of the Learning Transmitted to the South (Chu Heng), 127 The Orthodox Transmission of NeoConfucianism (Sun Ch'i-feng), 127 The Orthodox Transmission of the Sage Learning (Chou Ju-teng) ,127 Ou-yang Ch'ung-i, 95 Ou-yang Hsiu, 64-5, 87 Pao Min-tao, 57

76

nature (hsing): feeling, mind and, 9; honoring the moral, 108-9; Li Fu's view of principle, mind and, 90-101; linked to ch'i, 95; Lu Hsiang-shan on, 16; physical vs. heaven-conferred, 12; principle and, 7; within the mind, 11-12 "nature is the principle," 12-13, 93, 95 Neo-Confucianism: claim of legitimacy by, 55; Goose Lake debate over, 4-6; Li Fu's criticism of, 87; redirection 201

The Period in which Chu Hsi was Free from Perplexities (Li Fu) , 1 1 5

philology, 141-2 philosophical anthropology, 20-1 The Philosophical Records of the Ming Confucians (Huang Tsung-hsi), 128

Philosophical Records of the NeoConfucians of the Sung and the Yuan (Ch'iian Tsu-wang), 125, 129 Philosophical Records of the Sung and the Yuan Confucians (Ch'uan Tsuwang), 164

Index Philosophical Records of Various

Conclusion Arrived at Late in Life

Confucians (Liu Yuan-ch'ing), (Ch'en Chien), 113 127 rectification of the mind, 3, 39-40, physical nature (ch'i-chih chih hsing), 42 12 Reflections on Things at Hand (Lii Tsupolitical establishment: bringing ch'ien), 121 order to, 52-5; criticism of, 3, 54; determinate/indeterminate sage-emperors: K'ang-hsi as, 148-57; destinies of, 78-9; impact of price of having, 168, 171; two academic disputes on, 111-12; kinds of, 154; use of the Way by, implications of using the Way 157-68 for, 157-68; issue of alien, 123sagehood: achieving, 17-18; ch'i 4; principle (li) and, 161, 165; within, 94; Chu Hsi/Lu's desire ruler/subject relations in, 50; for, 56-7; Chu Hsi school on, split between the Way and, 5731; Wang Yang-ming's 62; unity of education and, 167; enlightenment on, 32-3; see also use of the Way in, 48-51, 84-5, the Way (tao) 143-57; vital force and rise of, sage-kings, 84, 124 83-4; see also K'ang-hsi "seeking the lost mind" (ch'iu fangemperor's rule hsin), 99-100 principle of Heaven, 43, 95, 100 "self-declared disciple," 122 A Sequel to Master Chu's Origins ofl-Lo "principle is one but its Learning (Hsieh To), 126 manifestations are many" (li-ifenshu), 10 "seriousness" (ching), 29 principle (li): Chu Hsi on, 7-9, 12Shao Yung, 14 13, 33; ko-wu concept on, 32-3; Shih Mi-yuan, 26-7 Li Fu's view of mind, nature and, Shih-tsung (Ming emperor), 155 90-101; Li Fu on the Way and, sincerity of the will, 37-8, 42-3 88; Lu Hsiang-shan's approach "sitting in silence and clarifying one's to, 14; mind as, 42 (add to this); mind" (mo-tso cheng-hsin), 10 political power and, 161, 165; as The Six Classics, 18 source of moral discourse, 83; "sixteen characters," 138-41, 152 vital force and, 7-9, 82; Wang "six virtues" (liu-te), 85 Yang-ming on, 33-4; see also ko- Speculation on "TheFive Classics,'*32 wu (reaching to obtain starting point (tuan-hsu), 103 principle) Sun Ch'i-feng, 128 "the principle of things," 19 Sun fu-hsien, 73-4 Sung Confucianism: criticism of, prosperity, 78 157-8, 166; influence on K'ang"the pursuits of inquiry and study" hsi of, 152; transmission claim (tao wen-hsueh), 1-2 of, 27, 125 Records of the Grand Historians, 139 Sung dynasty, 26-7, 54 Sung Lien, 28, 118 Records of the Rites, 143 Sung Li-tsung (Sung emperor), Records of the Transmission of the Way 150-1 (Chang P'o-hsing), 127 A Rectification of Chu Hsi's Final Surviving Fires (Li Fu), 64 2O2

Index Tai Chen, 130 and, 78-80, 83; Li Fu on principle and, 93-4; Lu HsiangTai Hsi, 124 shan on, 16-17; nature linked Tai Hsien, 31 to, 95; political power as, 83-4; Tai Ming-shih case, 74, 76, 149 principle and, 7-9, 82 T'ai-tsu (Ming emperor), 28, 159-60 T'ang Ch'ien, 108 Wan Ch'eng-chang, 116 T'ang Chin, 108 Wang Chi, 91, 94, 100 T'ang dynasty, 54 Taoism, 54, 86-7 Wang Fu-chih, 54, 61-2, 160-1 Wang Hsi-chih, 64 T'ao Ta-lin, 119 Wang Ken, 94, 100, 103 "The Teacher of Ten Thousand Generations" (K'ang-hsi), 154 Wang Po, 132, 134, 138 "Textual Examination of the Old Text Wang Shih-chen, 66, 74 Documents' (Li Fu), 138 Wang Wei, 28, 118 Wang Yang-ming: awarded Confucian Three Rites, 72, 74 scholar rank, 120; contributions three ultimate standards (san-chi), 98 of, 2-3, 88; criticism of Lu by, T'ien Wen-ching, 68-70 41-2, 45-6; epistemology of, 34t'i (substance), 91 5; Four Statements of, 38-9; Li tradition of the Way (tao-t'ung), 3, 54, Fu's criticism of, 100; on Lu/ 56; see also the Way (tao) Chu Hsi's agreement, 109-10; The Transmission of Orthodox Learning moral philosophy of, 29; (Hsiung Ssu-lu), 127 ontology of mind and truth: nature of, 25; political power knowledge, 90-2; on political and, 158-9, 167, 171; realized in power, 60-1; on source of daily life, 100 knowledge, 39-40, 98-9; on Ts'ai T'ien, 69 source of learning, 41; struggle Ts'ai Yu-hsueh, 124 with Chu Hsi's learning by, 29Tseng Ching trial, 162-3 32, 45-6; teachings blamed for Tseng Kung, 64-5 Ming fall, 114; theory of Tseng Tsu, 53 knowledge/action by, 28, 32, Tseng-tzu, 48, 133 Ts'ui Shu, 139 35"7> 4i-2, 94-5 T'ung-ch'eng school, 76 Wang Yang-ming school, 81, 125-6 Tung Chung-shu, 54 Wanju-lu, 72 Tung Huai, 132, 134 the Way (tao): Confucianism Tzu Hsia, 53 reintroduction of, 136-7; Tzu-ssu, 53, 135-6 described, 7; intellectual quest for, 47-8; K'ang-hsi emperor's "unity of all things," 34-5 use of, 148-57; legitimate unity of knowledge and action (chihtransmission of, 55-7, 117-30; hsing ho-i), 28, 32, 35-7, 40-2 Li Fu on, 84-90; Lu's grasp of, unity of three teachings (san-chiao 56; political establishment and, ho-i), 81 48-51, 143-68; political order through, 52-5; split between vital force (ch'i): Chu Hsi on, 17; political power and, 58-62; described, 6-7; Li Fu on destiny starting point (tuan-hsu) of, 103; 203

Index the Way (tao) (cont.)

used in political criticism, 3; Wang Yang-ming's quest for, 3 1 2, 44-5; within the classics, 13, 28, 105-6; see also Confucianism; sagehood Western post-Kantian philosophy, 22-3

the will: knowledge and, 37-8; sincerity of, 42-3 will (i), 34 will is knowledge {chih), 34 Writings from Our Dynasty on Statecraft

(Ho Ch'ang-ling), 76 Wu Ch'eng, 109, 122-4, 1 3 ^ Wu (Han emperor), 54 Wu Pu-pi, 29 Wu-shen memorial, 59 Wu-tsung (Ming emperor), 31 WuYu, 138 Wu Yuan-ying, 27-8 Wu Yii-pi, 30

Yang Chu, 85-6, 117 Yao Shu, 160 Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai, 27 Yen Jo-ch'u, 91, 120, 138, 139 Yen-Li school, 90 Yen Sung, 74 Yen Tzu-sheng, 122 Yin-t'ang, 69-70 yin and yang, 78, 88 Yuan Huang, 80 Yuan Mei, 148 Yu Chi, 109 Yung-cheng emperor, 68-71, 155-6, 158, 162-3 Yiing-lo, 147 Yung-lo Encyclopedia, 72 Yunju-ch'u, 166 Yu, Ying-shih, 47, 130, 140 Zen Buddhism: influence on Chu Hsi by, 9-10; Lu's doctrines and, 121-2; transmission of, 125; see also Buddhism

Yang Chien, 121

204