Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy

Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy

Studies in Philo of Alexandria Edited by

Francesca Calabi and Robert Berchman Editorial Board

Kevin Corrigan (Emory University) Louis H. Feldman (Yeshiva University, New York) Mireille Hadas-Lebel (La Sorbonne, Paris) Carlos Lévy (La Sorbonne, Paris) Maren Niehoff (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Tessa Rajak (University of Reading) Roberto Radice (Università Cattolica, Milano) Esther Starobinski-Safran (Université de Genève) Lucio Troiani (Università di Pavia)

VOLUME 5

Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy Edited by

Francesca Alesse

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Philo of Alexandria and post-Aristotelian philosophy / edited by Francesca Alesse. p. cm. -- (Studies in philo of Alexandria ; 5) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-16748-3 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Philo, of Alexandria. I. Alesse, Francesca. II. Title. III. Series. B689.Z7P45 2008 181’.06–dc22 2008014096

ISSN 1543-995x ISBN 978 90 04 16748 3 Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Francesca Alesse

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Philo and Hellenistic Doxography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 David T. Runia Philo and post-Aristotelian Peripatetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Robert W. Sharples Moses Against the Egyptian: the anti-Epicurean Polemic in Philo. . 75 Graziano Ranocchia La conversion du scepticisme chez Philon d’Alexandrie. . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Carlos Lévy Philo on Stoic Physics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Anthony A. Long Philo and Stoic Ethics. Reflections on the Idea of Freedom . . . . . . . . . 141 Roberto Radice Philo of Alexandria on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology: The Socratic Higher Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Gretchen Reydams-Schils Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic ΠΡΟΠΑΘΕΙΑΙ . . . 197 Margaret Graver Philo and Hellenistic Platonism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 John Dillon Towards Transcendence: Philo and the Renewal of Platonism in the Early Imperial Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Mauro Bonazzi Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 Index Locorum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 Index of Ancient Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 Index of Modern Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The publication of this volume has benefited from a contribution from the Goren-Goldstein Foundation, Switzerland, and the University of Milan. For this I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Enrico I. Rambaldi Feldman. My thanks also go to Prof. Ronald Polansky, Editor of Ancient Philosophy, who authorised the reprint of the article by Prof. Gretchen Reydams-Schils; to Prof. Verity Harte, Editor of Phronesis, who authorised the reprint of the article by Prof. Margaret Graver. My heart-felt gratitude goes naturally to all those who have supported and encouraged this project with their advice and suggestions, such as Prof. Francesca Calabi, Prof. Michael Erler, Prof. Tullio Gregory, Prof. Carlos Lévy. Finally, I am grateful to the friends and colleagues at the “Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo”, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, for their help in preparing this volume, and for the spirit of collaboration which they have all demonstrated: Michele Alessandrelli, M. Cristina Dalfino, Delfina Giovannozzi, Annarita Liburdi, Diana Quarantotto, Luca Simeoni.

INTRODUCTION

Francesca Alesse

Preliminary remarks This volume is the result of a project concerning the place held by the philosophy of the Hellenistic age, or post-Aristotelian philosophy— from Theophrastus to Eudorus of Alexandria—in Philo’s philosophical and exegetical works. This appears as part of a much broader and extremely complex issue, that of the relationship between Philo’s corpus and Greek philosophical traditions. It inevitably touches another important area of Philonic studies, that of the role played by this outstanding representative of the Jewish intellectual community in Alexandria in favouring the encounter between Greek philosophy and Scripture and exploiting the Greek philosophical traditions as instruments of Biblical interpretation.1 Interest in the relation of Philo to Hellenistic or post-Aristotelian philosophical schools and traditions is by no means recent, as is demonstrated by the seminal works of, for instance, Hans von Arnim, Paul Wendland, Emile Bréhier and Max Pohlenz;2 indeed, the presence of 1 Just to mention the most recent and comprehensive studies on Philo’s acquaintance with Greek cultural and philosophical traditions and his use of them as exegetical instruments: V. Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de l’Écriture chez Philon d’Alexandrie: son caractère et sa portée. Observations philologiques (Leiden 1977); R. Goulet, La philosophie de Moïse: essai de reconstruction d’un commentaire philosophique préphilonien du Pentateuque (Paris 1987); R. Radice, Platonismo e creazionismo in Filone di Alessandria (Milan 1989); D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden 1986); C. Lévy (ed.), Philon d’Alexandrie et le langage de la philosophie. Actes du colloque international organisé par le Centre d’études sur la philosophie hellénistique et romaine de l’Université de Paris XII–Val de Marne (Créteil, Fontenay, Paris 26–28 octobre 1995), (Turnhout 1998). See also The Ancestral Philosophy. Hellenistic Philosophy in the Second Temple Judaism, essays of David Winston, ed. by G.E. Sterling (Providence 2001), chapter 4, and G.E. Sterling, “The Jewish Philosophy: the Presence of Hellenistic Philosophy in Jewish Exegesis in the Second Temple Period”, in C. Backos (ed.), Ancient Judaism in its Hellenistic Context (Leiden–Boston 2005), 131–153. 2 H. von Arnim, Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandreia, II: Philo und Aenesidem, Berlin 1888; P. Wendland, Philos Schrift über die Vorsehung (Berlin 1892); Philo und die kynisch-

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topics and technical terms from the Sceptical tradition as well as the numerous, apparently certain traces of Stoic philosophy, have been objects of research and debate for a long time. One of the main critical problems has been the identification of Philo’s sources, direct or indirect. The well-known thesis advanced by Hans von Arnim that Philo’s list of Sceptical tropes, in De ebrietate, depends more or less directly on Aenesidemus, to whom should also be ascribed the ‘Heraclitism’ characterizing Philo’s exposition of the tropes, was questioned and rejected by J.-P. Dumont3 and U. Burkhard;4 a Stoic and particularly Posidonian background has often been supposed, given the numerous hints of Stoic metaphysics, psychology and ethics that can be found in Philo’s exegetical treatises, and considering the great number of Philonic extracts in von Arnim’s collection Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta.5 On the other hand, much interest has been raised by the position taken by the Academy of late Hellenism and one of its most important representatives, Antiochus of Ascalon: Willy Theiler6 sustained, as a general approach to the problem of Philo’s sources, that much of

stoische Diatribe (Berlin 1895); “Eine doxographische Quelle Philos”, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (1897), 1074–1079; E. Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie (Paris 1908, 19252, 19503); P. Barth–A. Goedeckemeyer, Die Stoa (Stuttgart 19415); M. Pohlenz, “Philo von Alexandreia”, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen 5 (1942), 409–487, repr. in Kleine Schriften, ed. by H. Dörrie (Hildesheim 1966), vol. 1, 306–383; P. Boyancé, “Études philoniennes”, Revue des Etudes Grecques 76 (1963), 64–110; see also W. Theiler, “Philon von Alexandria und der Beginn des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus”, in K. Flasch (ed.), Parousia. Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für J. Hirschberger (Frankfurt 1965), 199–218. More recent surveys in A. Terian, “A Critical Introduction to Philo’s Dialogues”, in ANRW II 21.1 (Berlin–New York 1984), 272–294, and D. Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory”, ibidem, 372–416. 3 J.-P. Dumont, Le Scepticisme et le phénomène. Essai sur la signification et les origines du Pyrrhonisme (Paris 1972). 4 U. Burkhard, Die angebliche Heraklit-Nachfolge des Skeptikers Aenesidem (Bonn 1973). 5 See E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Leipzig 19235), vol. 3.2, 385 ff.; H. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (Leipzig 1905), vol. 1, XIX; A. Schmekel, Forschungen zur Philosophie des Hellenismus (Berlin 1938), 527 f.; P. Barth–A. Goedeckmeyer, Die Stoa, cit., 232–242; I. Heinemann, Poseidonios metaphysische Schriften (Breslau 1921–1928); M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung (Göttingen 19643), vol. 1, 369 ff.; 2, 180 ff.; H. Leisegang, s.v. “Philo”, RE, XX 1 (1941), 1–50; contra, K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie. Neue Untersuchungen über Poseidonios (München 1926). 6 In L. Cohn–L. Heinemann–M. Adler–W. Theiler, Philon von Alexandria. Die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. 6. (Breslau–Berlin 1938), ad locc., and “Philon von Alexandria und der Beginn des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus”, cit.

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the philosophical vocabulary in his works might actually be derived from Antiochus, partly through Eudorus of Alexandria. Followed by G. Luck,7 he suggested Antiochus as the main source in Mut. 2 (for the Aristotelian idea of μεστης), 4 (συνεργν), 98 (Stoic εφυα), 211 (προϋπρχειν), 223 (πσπασμα), 260 (ατογενς); Somn. 1.30 (νδηλεχς); Opif. 146 (πσπασμα). P. Boyancé8 proposed to interpret Mut. 179 (for the theme of the ‘flight of mind’), Opif. 71 (the ν"ουσιασμς of the intellect contemplating the intelligible forms), Her. 301 (God as a “charioteer and pilot” of the universe), Abr. 272 (human soul as κυβερντης) and others, as telling examples of the exegetical tradition of Plato’s Phaedrus inaugurated by the post-Platonic Academy and particularly encouraged by Antiochus; the French scholar also traced the arithmological theories of De opificio back to the influence exerted on Philo by Eudorus.9 In the last few decades there has been a great advance in inquiries into Classic and Hellenistic philosophy in the context of philosophical and doxographical literature, especially that dating from the late Republican and early Imperial age. Thanks to this methodical approach it has been possible to point out different procedures and strategies in the reception and diffusion of philosophical doctrines in the late Hellenistic age, so that fresh attention to the phenomenon of coexistence and combination of ‘traditions’ has been increasing and gradually replacing the interest in ‘individual sources’.10 At the same time, some recent studies on Philo have considered the progress achieved in

7 Der Akademiker Antiochos (Bern–Stuttgart 1953), 26 ff., 29 n. 1, 64 f. In H.J. Mette, “Zwei Akademiker Heute: Krantor von Soloi und Arkesilaos von Pitane”, Lustrum 26 (1984), and “Philon von Larissa und Antiochos von Askalon”, Lustrum 28 (1986), there is no mention of Philo among the sources, nor in the commentary. 8 “Sur l’exégèse hellénistique du Phèdre (Phèdre p. 246c)”, in Miscellanea di studi alessandrini in memoria di A. Rostagni (Turin 1963), 45–53. 9 “Études Philoniennes”, cit., 99–105. 10 As is well outlined by David Runia, in the opening chapter of this volume, it is essentially to Jaap Mansfeld’s credit that our schemes of reading ancient philosophical texts have been modified, starting with The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract ΠΕΡΙ %ΕΒΔΟΜΑΔΩΝ, ch. 1–11 and Greek Philosophy (Assen 1971), in which, incidentally, much attention is already devoted to Philo; fundamental contributions for the understanding of Philo’s work in this critical perspective are: “Philosophy in the Service of Scripture: Philo’s Exegetical Strategies”, in J. Dillon–A.A. Long (eds.), The Question of ‘Eclecticism’. Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (Berkeley 1988), 70–102; “Doxography and Dialectic: the Sitz im Leben of the Placita”, ANRW II 36.4 (Berlin–New York 1990), 3056–3229; Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy (Leiden–New York–Köln 1992), partic. 312 ff.; for a general evaluation, see D.T. Runia, in this volume, 16–21.

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the conceptual interpretation of Hellenistic philosophy and the analysis of ancient doxographical literature.11 There seem to be good reasons to attempt a more comprehensive overview of the presence of Hellenistic philosophy in Philo’s treatises, providing essays on both passages containing explicit quotations of philosophers and schools, and passages revealing topics and technical terms which may be related to one or more philosophical traditions of the Hellenistic period. Focusing the passages in which Philo reports theories explicitly attributed to schools or philosophers of the Hellenistic age should supply more detailed knowledge of Philonic evidence, highlighting its possible novelty value and originality in comparison with other evidence on the same subject. The most remarkable cases of explicit quotations of Hellenistic philosophers and doctrines may be considered: the long report of proofs in favour of the eternity of the world, in De aeternitate mundi, and representing Theophrastus’, Critolaus’, Diogenes of Babylon’s, Panaetius’ and Boethus of Sydon’s standpoints, and sometimes their extensive arguments; the reference, in the same treatise, to Chrysippus’ use of the so-called ‘growing argument’ (Aet. 48–51 = SVF 2.397); the mention of Epicurean doctrines in Prov. 1.50, Post. 2, Aet. 8, and ‘Pythagorean’ theories in Opif. 100, Aet. 12, QG 3.49e. The label ‘Stoics’ and the names of some Stoics appear extensively in De aeternitate, while properly Stoic technical terms, such as +γεμονικν, προκοπ, or προκπτων, are used in various manners, although not always in conformity with an ‘orthodox’ Stoic viewpoint; the term σκεπτικς can be found, e.g., in Congr. 52, Fug. 209, QG 3.33, apparently referring to a faction or group of intellectuals.12 But even in the absence of explicit quotations, scholars have often realized that some of Philo’s arguments and his lexicon are peculiar to philosophical traditions, including the post-Aristotelian ones, par11 See D.T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and the Greek Hairesis-Model”, Vigiliae Christianae, 53 (1999), 117–147; “The Beginnings of the End: Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology”, in D. Frede–A. Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (Leiden 2002), 281–316; J. Dillon, “Cosmic Gods and Primordial Chaos in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy: the Context of Philo’s Interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus and the Book of Genesis”, in G.H. van Kooten (ed.), The Creation of Heaven and Earth. Re-Interpretation of Genesis I in the Context of Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, Christianity and Modern Physics (Leiden–Boston 2005), 97 ff. 12 On the presence of the label σκεπτικς, which Carlos Lévy discusses in this volume, see also: K. Janáˇcek, “Das Wort σκεπτικς in Philons Schriften”, Listy Filologické 102 (1979), 65–68; H. Tarrant, Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy (Cambridge 1985), 23 f.; R. Bett, Pyrrho, His Antecedents and His Legacy (Oxford 2000), 148.

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ticularly in his exegetical treatises. Such references are very problematic as in these cases Philo’s use of philosophical theories and technical terms is normally aimed at revealing the allegorical or symbolic meaning of passages from the Bible and may have nothing to do with the original doctrine from which either the theory or the term is derived: just to confine our examples to Hellenistic philosophy, we should consider Philo’s celebrated description of Sceptical tropes—but without the word ‘trope’—in Ebr. 169–205, while explaining the symbolic senses of wine; and his introduction of the Stoic notion of ti in the interpretation of manna, in Leg. 3.175 = SVF 2.334. Sometimes Philo gives the technical term a modified meaning; at other times he conflates, in the same context, doctrines and terminologies which had different philosophical origins (as in the case of arguments taken from the Hellenistic Academy and Pyrrhonian tradition),13 while the allusions to the Stoic theory of the principles (ρχα.) are increasingly recognized as the effect of an act of ‘appropriation’ by the Hellenistic Academy, involving Philo as well as other authors of the same period.14 An inquiry drawing on the presence of post-Aristotelian philosophical lexicon in Philo should also advance our knowledge of the diffusion of Hellenistic philosophy and doxography from the late Republican age to the early Christian period, as suggested by Philo’use of such characteristically Epicurean locutions as καταστεματικ/ +δον, in Leg. 3.160, π0ντρωσις in Leg. 3.140–141, γαργαλισμς in Sacr. 26, Deter. 110, Spec. 3.10–11, 4.100; Leg. 3.160;15 or by such expressions relating the Stoic-

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C. Lévy has particularly highlighted this aspect of Philo’s modus operandi: see “Le ‘scepticisme’ de Philon d’Alexandrie: une influence de la Nouvelle Académie?”, in A. Caquot, M. Hadas-Lebel, J. Riaud (eds.), Hellenica et Judaica. Hommage à Valentin Nikiprowetzky (Leuven–Paris 1986), 29–41 and “Deux problèmes doxographiques chez Philon d’Alexandrie: Posidonius et Enésidème”, in A. Brancacci (ed.), Philosophy and Doxography in the Imperial Age (Florence 2005), 79–102. 14 See H.J. Krämer, Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie (Berlin–New York 1971), 108–122, F.H. Sandbach, The Stoics (London 1975), 74 and Aristotle and the Stoics (Cambridge 1985), 31–37; D.N. Sedley, Chrysippus on Psychophysical Causality, in J. Brunschwig– M.C. Nussbaum (eds.), Passions and Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge 1993), 325; Stoic Physics and Metaphysics, in K. Algra–J. Barnes–J. Mansfeld– M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge 1999), 385, and The Origins of Stoic God, in D. Frede–A. Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath, cit., 41–83; A.A. Long, Theophrastus and the Stoa, in J.M. van Ophuijsen–M. van Raalte (eds.), Theophrastus. Reappraising the Sources (New Brunswick–London 1998), 377. 15 See C. Lévy, “Philon et l’épicurisme”, in M. Erler (ed.), Epikureismus in der späten Republik und der Kaiserzeit (Stuttgart 2000), 122–136.

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Academic epistemological debate, as κατληπτος, in Leg. 1.20; 2.65 (καταλπτως … κα1 συνκατα"0τως); Cher. 97; Deter. 89, Heres, 132, 209, QG 2.54 (2δηλον … κατληπτον); μυδρς in Opif. 65, 141, 145, Leg. 3.111, Post. 118, Somn. 1.116, κρδαντος in Post. 25, 122 (β0βαιον … κρδαντον), Conf. 87, Mut. 135, Abr. 269 (σφαλ3 κα1 κρδαντον).16 Nor are the traces of Pythagorean tradition confined to the explicit references to ‘Philolaus’ (Opif. 100 = T2 Thesleff), ‘Ocellus Lucanus’ (Aet. 12 = T1 Thesleff) and ‘Pythagoreioi’ (QG 3.49e), as has been remarked since E. Bréhier and E. Goodenough.17 Both H. Thesleff and B. Centrone pointed out a good number of ethical and religious conceptions and metaphors which might well be taken from the pseudoPythagorean literature flourishing in the Hellenistic age.18

The present volume The essays collected offer an examination of the topics outlined above, with particular attention to new historiographical perspectives on Hellenistic philosophy and lexical problems. The book is arranged following the chronological sequence of the schools, but providing a range of basic subjects in the case of Stoicism and of chronological phases in the case of the Academy and the history of Platonism. In the opening chapter by David T. Runia, “Philo and Hellenistic Doxography”, the author promises an inquiry aimed at investigating what Philo knew of Hellenistic doxography and evaluating his capacity to exploit the doxographical material for his own main purpose, the allegorical explanation of Scripture. But Runia’s essay does much more 16 The various and particular occurrences of μυδρς in Plato (see Resp. 533d, Theaet. 195a, Soph. 250a, Tim. 49a) may have originated a ‘sceptical’ reception of this term, as emerges from Sext. M. 7.171–172, 258, Eus. PE XI 11. 4. On the relation between κρδαντος and the Sceptical tradition, see H.W. Ausland, “On the Moral Origin of the Pyrrhonian Philosophy”, Elenchos, 10 (1989) 392–397 and notes. 17 E. Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie, cit.; E. Goodenough, “A neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus”, Yale Classical Studies, 3 (1932), 115–164. See also H.R. Moehring, Arithmology as an Exegetical Tool in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria, in “Seminar Papers of the Society of Biblical Literature” (Missoula 1978), vol. 1, repr. in J.P. Kenny (ed.), The ‘School of Moses’. Studies in Philo and Hellenistic Religion (Atlanta 1995), 141 ff. 18 H. Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period (Åbo 1961), 31 ff.; B. Centrone, Pseudopythagorica ethica. I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo (Naples 1990), 32 f., 33 note 73.

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than this, recalling the origin of the modern category of ‘doxography’ and the enormous impact of Hermann Diels’ Doxographi Graeci, and providing an outline of the ancient doxographical literature from its beginnings in the V century BC until the early Imperial age in the light of the most recent research. In the main part of his contribution, Runia examines a series of ‘doxographical’ texts, showing that Philo very often resorts to the method of expounding the opposed views of philosophers on the same subject, that is, the scheme of diaphonia. This is particularly evident in such texts as, e.g., Abr. 162–163, Somn. 1. 52–55, 145, 184, Mut. 10, 67, the long section of De ebrietate reporting a version of the Sceptical tropes: in all these contexts Philo seemingly employs doxographical material very similar to that found in Aetius’ Placita and other authors’ collections of doxai circulating from the I century BC on. The important role of the Aristotelian school in forming the doxographical literature and the hypothesis that Philo used a manual collecting the opinions of philosophers are confirmed by Robert W. Sharples’ chapter “Philo and post-Aristotelian Peripatetics”. Sharples’ main, though not unique, concern is Philo’s acquaintance with Peripatetic cosmology and biology, both in De aeternitate mundi and in exegetical treatises. The doxography of De aeternitate, containing arguments in favour of the eternity of the world, is divided in four sections and is expounded by the author beginning with Theophrastus and continuing with Critolaus, Aristotle’s arguments probably depending on De philosophia, and dissident Stoics. As regards the question of Philo’s source(s) in compiling this treatise, Sharples is inclined to think that he consulted a sort of anthology or a school treatise which had already collected the various cosmological opinions from different schools and philosophers. The hypothesis of a common source underlying at least three of the four sections was advanced by Hans von Arnim, who thought of a Peripatetic source of the I century BC. Arnim’s conjecture has been recently supported by M. Baltes, but Sharples recalls some alternatives, such as Colson’s and Dillon’s suggestions of Ocellus and Eudorus respectively. The analysis includes other texts than De aeternitate, particularly Decal. 30–31, Prov. 2.60, QG 4.8, Her. 283, QE 2.73— the three latter on the important theory of the ‘fifth substance’—, and Ebr. 172 and 174 which reveal a significant resemblance between some examples of Sceptical tropes and biological texts from Theophrastus. The difficult task of delineating the relationship between Philo and Epicurean philosophy is faced in Graziano Ranocchia’s contribution

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“Moses Against the Egyptian: the anti-Epicuren Polemic in Philo”. Besides the three already-mentioned explicit references, Ranocchia draws out a series of implicit references and allusions to what may be considered the major object of Philo’s philosophical aversion. Among the most interesting passages in which an Epicurean doctrine is at least adumbrated are Somn. 1. 184 (on the theory of intermundia), Conf. 114–115 (on the dominance of chance and denial of divine providence), Opif. 171 (on infinity of worlds), Fug. 148 and QG 4.42 (on the assumption of both atoms as principles of being and pleasure as the final goal of life); Leg. 3.140–143 (Philo’s use of technical terms of Epicurean ethics as exegetical tools), Somn. 2.48–49 (a curious renversement of a sentence from the Epistle to Menoeceus). Two significant results emerge from Ranocchia’s essay: the first is that Philo was well acquainted with Epicurean philosophy, if not directly from the writings of Epicurus and Epicureans, then certainly from reliable doxographical material; the second result is that Philo’s appropriation of the lexicon and conceptual apparatus of a school to which he was radically hostile, should be seen as an example of the tendency to ‘standardisation’ of philosophical thought, starting from late Hellenism; in such a context Epicurean philosophy appeared as the main reference point and ‘depository’ for all that might be argued about pleasure. Carlos Lévy’s chapter “La conversion du scepticisme chez Philon d’Alexandrie” is a new contribution to the definition of the place held by the composite Sceptical tradition in Philo’s work; it is thus to be added to the above-mentioned papers by the French scholar (see n. 13). Lévy rejects the modern interpretation which has ‘ontologized’ ancient Scepticism and made of it a uniform reality, the existence of which is often assumed independently from any serious philological and textual research; instead, the author proposes a fresh study of the terms σκ0ψις and σκεπτικς and the verb σκ0πτομαι. What emerges from this semantic analysis is a rather frequent contrast between the negative evaluation of the σκεπτικς and the approval of the intellectual and practical attitude indicated by σκ0πτομαι and σκ0ψις. Sometimes, σκεπτικς stands for πορετικς (e.g. in Fug. 129, QG 3.33), or σοφιστς (Congr. 52). The verb is constantly used to mean a difficulty in explaining a Scriptural passage, while σκ0ψις can also indicate the ‘Socratic’ spirit of research (e.g. Somn. 1.58). The second part of the essay is devoted to Philo’s use of the verb π0χω as a way of expressing the limits of human knowledge. Some texts (Post. 18, Fug. 136 and others) present an interesting case of philosophical appropriation, consisting in Philo’s transforma-

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tion of epoche, which was originally a voluntary act of suspension of judgement, into the sign of an objective limit imposed by the inaccessible nature of God. Finally, a comparison of Somn. 1 and Cicero’s Lucullus demonstrates the diffusion, in the cultural milieu of the I century BC, of a relationship between ‘scepticism’ (as suspension of judgement) and transcendence. The preliminary concern in Anthony Long’s chapter, “Philo on Stoic Physics”, is a methodological one: starting from a critical consideration of Hans von Arnim’s approach in collecting texts from Philo, based on his trust in Philo’s dependence on Posidonius and Antiochus of Ascalon, Long goes on to propose a more updated perspective which takes into account the dialectical contexts to which Philo’s reputed Stoic references belong. The principal part of the chapter is focused on De aeternitate mundi: much attention is paid to the argument according to which two “peculiarly qualified individuals” cannot inhere in the same substance (the famous case of Dion and Theon), and, therefore, the central dogma of conflagration. In this regard, as Long observes, Philo’s evidence is of primary importance for its uniqueness, though not its accuracy. The second part deals with some aspects of Stoic physiology, while the final section concentrates on De opificio. The impression drawn from this treatise is that Stoicism is a useful but not necessary instrument in Philo’s exegetical work: he would probably have arranged his exegetical scheme of creation even if he had never heard of Stoicism. Nonetheless, if his adoption of Stoicism was “something like a lingua franca” (p. 139), similar to what Ranocchia points out for Philo’s adoption of Epicurean concepts and terms, this remains of great interest. Roberto Radice’s chapter, “Philo and Stoic Ethics. Reflections on the Idea of Freedom”, aims at demonstrating the presence of Stoic ethical tenets in exegetical rather than philosophical contexts. After a clarification of the limits of Stoic influence on Philo’s moral thought, Radice focuses on Legum allegoriae, constantly compared to De opificio. The same biblical passages about the divine act of creation are commented by Philo from two distinct standpoints, De opificio being the work in which he describes the constitution of the physical kosmos, Legum allegoriae that in which he explains the ethical kosmos, that is, the code of moral values given by God to mankind. Some Stoic (or ‘Stoicizing’) conceptions can be found behind Philo’s allegorical vision of Genesis, such as the role assigned to intellect in the process of human knowledge (although in Philo it is always God who provides man directly with intellectual

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capacity). A central place in Radice’s analysis is occupied by the Scriptural subject of Eden and its allegorical sense of ‘divine plantation’ of virtues. This allegory offers some elements of Stoic ethical doctrine which are adopted as exegetical instruments. Particularly, the symbology of the Garden fits well with the Stoic conception of virtue, which is at the same time unique and various, so recalling the Stoic idea of virtue conceived as a unique ‘science’ of good and evil and, at the same time, divided into various moral qualities. Dealing with the psychological models used by Philo, Gretchen Reydams-Schils’ contribution “Philo of Alexandria on Stoic and Platonist Psycho-Physiology: The Socratic Higher Ground”, addresses a difficult issue of Philonic research: the relationship between Platonism and Stoicism in describing the nature of the soul, its functions and parts, the hierarchy of its rational and non-rational components. The leitmotiv of Reydams-Schils’ paper is that Platonic and Stoic systems are well balanced in Philo’s works, because they are subsumed under a “larger purpose”, precisely, re-establishing the Socratic view of the soul as we learn it from early Platonic dialogues. The essay is a meticulous review of all the contexts in which Philo resorts to Platonic and Stoic conceptions and provides a very large spectrum of similes, metaphors and allegories signifying the connections of soul and body, mind and senses, or passions, according to both Platonic and Stoic patterns. The penultimate section presenting ‘mixed cases’ paves the way to the author’s critical conclusions. The idea of a ‘balance’ between Platonism and Stoicism is sufficient justification for re-printing this well-known article, confirming that Philo represents a fascinating example of that strategy of philosophical appropriation which is greatly reflected in MiddlePlatonic and Stoic philosophers of I and II centuries AD. The specific value of Philo not only as testimony for a Stoic doctrine but also as a medium for transmitting it, is the topic of Margaret Graver’s paper, “Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic ΠΡΟΠΑΘΕΙΑΙ” (this too already published in 1999). The subject being an important doctrine of Stoic moral psychology, that of προπ"ειαι and their relation to the canonical theory of the four passions, Graver’s critical approach is essentially philological and historical. She studies four passages from Quaestiones in Genesim (1.79, 4.73, 1.55, 3.56), only one of which is included in SVF. In the course of the examination, which is accompanied by a parallel one in other Stoic evidence, especially Seneca and Epictetus, extremely crucial and vexed questions in Stoic research are raised: of these we need to remember at least the relation

introduction

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of ‘impression’ and ‘assent’ and the problem of progress towards moral perfection, both of them connected to the topic of the ‘wise’ man according to the celebrated Stoic ideal that Philo shows he appreciates on many occasions. Given the importance of these doctrines in early and late Stoicism and the place they have had in modern criticism, Graver’s essay on Philo’s treatment offers an invaluable contribution to both the history of the diffusion of Stoic philosophy during the early Imperial age, and the history of the appropriation of Stoic ethics and psychology in the exegetical literature. John Dillon, with his “Philo and Hellenistic Platonism”, offers a survey of the relation of Philo to late Hellenistic Platonism, that is, the renewal of the Old Academy by Antiochus of Ascalon. This appears a very difficult task if seen as an attempt to isolate single and specific instances of Antiochus’ impact, independently of other possible influences, such as those produced by neo-Pythagoreanism and Eudorus of Alexandria. The most important and useful author to whom Philo is to be compared is obviously Cicero; Dillon examines those passages from Academica (e.g. Ac. pr. 2.14–42, Ac. po. 1.24–32) and De finibus (e.g. 5.9–74) which have long been regarded as Stoic reports, considering them rather as cases of combination between Platonism and Stoicism attributable to Antiochus. Of those traces of Antiochus’ presence on which Dillon dwells, I would like to recall at least two, because of their enormous importance in the Imperial age: the first is the presentation of the moral end of life, echoing both the Stoic “consistency with nature” and the Platonic “likeness to God” (as in Praem. 11 ff.); the second is the celebrated theory of Forms as “thoughts of God”. The conclusion of the essay confirms what Dillon says at the beginning about the philosophical tendencies of the Hellenistic age being so tangled in Philo’s work as to make it extremely difficult to distinguish them. Nonetheless, the role of Antiochus as an intermediate source for the acquaintance of ancient Platonism, though partially transformed by Stoicism, is something of which we can be plausibly confident. As a natural continuation of John Dillon’s study and a conclusion to a volume devoted to Philo and Hellenistic philosophy from Theophrastus to Eudorus, Mauro Bonazzi’s chapter, “Towards Transcendence: Philo and the Renewal of Platonism in the Early Imperial Age” addresses the relation of Philo to the neo-Pythagorean Platonism circulating in Alexandria after the end of the I century BC and represented by Eudorus. Bonazzi assumes, as a critical starting-point, a question raised by the most recent scholarship, that of the evaluation of Philo as

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either a ‘witness’ of the philosophically composite culture of his age, or ‘participant’; this means trying to establish to what extent he was able, besides conforming to pre-existing patterns of doxographical composition, to produce new solutions in combining different philosophical tendencies. Bonazzi’s inquiry demonstrates, on the one hand, an interesting influence exerted by the neo-Pythagoreanism to which it seems reasonable to trace back Philo’s preference for the notions of transcendence, God’s separateness and the superiority of the divine principle, all of them very widespread in neo-Pythagorean treatises; on the other hand, a good deal of autonomy, emerging, for example, from Philo’s rejection of the radical ‘mathematicalization’ of reality, which is peculiar to neo-Pythagorean metaphysics, or the adoption on occasion of the Stoic formula of the moral end. Bonazzi’s conclusion is that Philo’s tendency to combine Stoic and Platonic tenets is aimed not at reconciling opposed systems of thought, but at including different conceptual aspects in a unique orientation. This fact makes of Philo a legitimate ‘participant’ in the culture of his age.

PHILO AND HELLENISTIC DOXOGRAPHY

David T. Runia 1. Introduction* If we were in a position to ask our protagonist, Philo the learned Jew from Alexandria, what his views were on the subject of the present chapter, he might at first be somewhat puzzled. He would want to know more about what this term hellenistike doxographia might represent. We would have to explain that both parts of the term are based on neologisms coined in the 19th century of our era by German scholars— ‘Hellenistic’ from J.G. Droysen’s ‘Hellenismus’,1 ‘doxography’ from H. Diels’ Doxographi. But it would surely not take him long to understand what we were talking about, and there would be much that we could learn from him. Sadly we have no choice but to base our investigation on his writings, but at least these are copious and full of interesting information. The aim of this article will be firstly to investigate what Philo can teach us about Hellenistic doxography, and secondly to determine how he was able to use this form of ancient philosophical literature for his own purposes. It will fall into four parts. First we will have to look more closely at the work and legacy of Hermann Diels in order to determine more exactly what doxography is. Next we shall attempt to outline a brief history of doxographical literature from its first beginnings in the fifth century BCE until the early imperial period in which Philo himself lived. In the longest part of the article we shall examine the chief texts in which Philo bears witness to and makes use of doxographical material. In the final part we shall draw some conclusions on

* I would like to thank Francesca Alesse most warmly for inviting me to write this contribution to her volume, and my collaborator in the area of doxography, Jaap Mansfeld (Utrecht), for commenting on a draft version. 1 On Droysen’s “particularly lucky” find see R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship from 1300 to 1850 (Oxford 1976), 189.

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what Philo can tell us about doxography and why it was important for him in fulfilling the aims he set himself as a thinker and writer. 2. Hermann Diels and the concept of doxography It was the massive collection of ancient texts entitled Doxographi Graeci published in 1879 by the young German scholar Hermann Diels (1848– 1922) that put the concept of doxography on the scholarly map, where it has remained ever since.2 Inspired by his teacher H. Usener and a large number of scholarly predecessors going back to the Renaissance, Diels investigated the tradition of a number of ancient writers recording in various forms the opinions (doxai) of Greek philosophers.3 In the manner of the 19th century philologist he presented a body of texts, ranging from Theophrastus in the 4th century BCE to late compilations in Epiphanius and ps. Galen Historia philosopha. The central work was the collection of doxai or placita (lit. “what it pleases one (to think)”) attributed to the obscure author Aëtius (c. 50–100 CE) and partially preserved in three later authors, ps. Plutarch, Johannes Stobaeus and Theodoret of Cyrrhus. Diels was convinced that this work preserved older material. In fact his prime interest was not in the doxographical authors themselves, but rather in what they could tell us about earlier sources from which they derived their material. The motto of his work was a quote from Cicero: tardi ingeni est rivulos consectari, fontes rerum non videre.4 In the vast and labyrinthine ‘Prolegomena’ to his collection of texts, Diels first analyses the works and then attempts to trace their sources. He concludes that the core of the doxographical tradition goes back to Theophrastus and the early Peripatetic school, and in particular to his work Physikon doxai (The Opinions of the Natural Philosophers). This analysis was a cornerstone of his monumental collection of the fragments of the Presocratic philosophers, first published in 1903, which remains an important textual basis for research on early Greek philosophy today.

H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin 1879, repr. 1976; abbreviated as DG). On Diels and the earlier scholarly tradition that he built on see J. Mansfeld– D.T. Runia, Aëtiana. The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer, vol. 1: the Sources (Leiden 1997). 4 “It is evidence of a slow mind when one pursues the little streams, and fails to see the sources of things”, De orat. 2.117. 2 3

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Remarkably Diels begins his ‘Prolegomena’ by discussing a Philonic text. His opening words are:5 The first to have been in contact with the Epitome On the Placita that goes under the name of Plutarch appears to have been Philo the Jew, if indeed we believe that the following text in the first book On Providence has been written by him.

Diels then places the two texts (Prov. 1.22, ps. Plut. Epit. 1.3) side by side and concludes that the parallels cannot be coincidental. But Philo is about 120 years earlier than the next witness and the chronological consequences for Diels’ reconstruction are unacceptable. As hinted at in the above quote, he concludes that these words could not have been written by Philo. Later in his ‘Prolegomena’ he devotes a number of pages to the well-known Theophrastean passage on the eternity of the cosmos in Aet. 117–149. But perhaps the most important Philonic passage for his purposes was overlooked, as he later realized. We shall return to these texts later on in our article.6 Diels invented the term ‘doxography’ and it soon passed into general scholarly currency. But the term has never been adequately defined and continues to be used in a number of different ways. The following four meanings, going from narrow to broad, are indicative of the diversity of current usage:7 (1) The tradition of Placita-literature and related writings as collected by Diels; (2) The broader tradition of discussion and summary of ancient philosophical doctrines; (3) All reportage of ancient philosophical doctrine not recorded in the philosophers’ original works; (4) The practice of doing the history of philosophy by discussing philosophers’ doctrines (and not the problems they are tackling).

5 H. Diels, DG, 1: “Plutarchi quae fertur de Placitis epitomen primus attigisse videtur Philo Iudaeus, si modo hunc locum libri primi de providentia ab eo scriptum esse credimus.” 6 See below Section 4(f), (e), & (b) respectively. 7 See the more detailed discussion on terminology in D.T. Runia, “What is Doxography?”, in P.J. van der Eijk (ed.), Ancient Histories of Medicine. Essays in Medical Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity (Leiden–Boston 1999), 33–55. The difference between the first and second meaning corresponds to the distinction between broad and narrow doxography made by J. Mansfeld in the Encyclopedia article cited in the next note, § 6.

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In the present article it is the second meaning that covers our subject best. As we just saw, Diels does discuss Philo in the context of the Placita, but much of this literature (though not its sources) post-dates him. On the other hand if we took the third and fourth of the meanings above, then the contents of the entire volume on Philo and Hellenistic philosophy could be subsumed under our subject. The scope of ancient doxography in the context of Philo’s writings will become clearer as we give a brief outline of its development from the earliest beginnings up to the time of Philo. This history will not amount to a summary of Diels’ work. For the first hundred years after the publication of Doxographi Graeci, most scholars were happy to accept his reconstruction. However, recent research, primarily carried out by the Dutch scholar Jaap Mansfeld, with some contributions from myself and others as well, has yielded greater insight into the nature of purpose of the doxographical tradition.8 It will form the basis of the following section. 3. A brief outline of the origin and development of doxography When philosophers first started to write down their thoughts, it did not take long before they made reference to the views of their predecessors and contemporaries. But it took some time before this was done in any systematic kind of way. In Plato’s dialogues there are already some traces of this process, for example when in the Theaetetus he contrasts the views of Heraclitus and Parmenides, or when in the Sophist he speaks of a “battle of giants” in which materialist thinkers are opposed to “friends of the forms”, or when in the Phaedo he identifies various physical topics relating to the cosmos and the soul, on which thinkers such as Anaxagoras and Socrates are supposed to have views.9 It is

8 The best recent overview of the results of this research is given in the article “Doxography of ancient philosophy” by J. Mansfeld in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doxography-ancient. See also the survey of J. Mejer, Überlieferung der Philosophie im Altertum. Eine Einführung (Copenhagen 2000), esp. 22–33. Mansfeld and I are undertaking a large scale examination of the tradition of the Placita. The study cited above in n. 3 is the first of a number of projected volumes. See further the review article on the project by M. Frede, “Aëtiana”, Phronesis 44 (1999), 135–149. Frede praises the basic approach, but encourages its authors to look more closely at the evidence that Theodoret supplies. 9 Cf. Theaet. 152e, 180e, Soph. 246a–c, Phaed. 96b–c, 97d–e, 98a etc. On the latter texts see J. Mansfeld, “Physical Doxai in the Phaedo”, in M. Kardaun–J. Spruyt (eds.),

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likely that in such passages he is drawing on earlier work done by Sophists such as Hippias and Gorgias. A decisive contribution was made by Aristotle.10 It is a regular feature of his method of philosophizing (often called his dialectical method) that when he treats a philosophical topic, he first examines the “reputable opinions” (endoxa) held by previous thinkers, both organizing and evaluating them prior to the establishment of his own views. A fine example is found at the beginning of De anima (Α 2.403b20–25): For our study of soul it is necessary, when formulating the problems of which in our further advance we are to find the solutions, to summon forth the opinions (doxai) of our predecessors, so that we may profit by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors. The starting-point of our inquiry is to put forward those features which have been thought to belong to it in its very nature.

The question on the nature or essence of the soul (ousia) which is announced here later finds its way into doxographical collections, e.g. at Aët. 4.2 (in Diels’ reconstruction). In his Topics Aristotle gives instructions on how problems should be treated through the elucidation of tenets or opinions (doxai). Such problems are divided into three domains, ethics, logic and physics. An example is given for each domain, e.g. for physics the question whether the cosmos is everlasting or not.11 The mass of material needs to be organized and a variety of instruments are available for the purpose, e.g. the method of division (diaeresis) or opposition, the use of enumeration, the making of lists, and so on. Another contribution that Aristotle made lay in the study and summarization of earlier philosophical writings. From surviving lists of his writings we know that he wrote a number of treatises on earlier thinkers such as Archytas, Democritus and other Presocratics, as well as an Epitome of Plato’s Timaeus.12

The Winged Chariot. Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk (Leiden 2000), 1–17. 10 On the Aristotelian background, which Diels largely overlooked, see the seminal article of J. Mansfeld, “Physikai Doxai and Problêmata Physica from Aristotle to Aëtius (and Beyond)”, in W.W. Fortenbaugh–D. Gutas (eds.), Theophrastus: his Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings (New Brunswick–London 1992), 63–111, esp. 70–82. 11 Top. Α 14.105b19–25. This topic is treated in Aët. 2.4. The example for ethics is whether one should obey one’s parents or the laws, for logic whether there is the same knowledge of contraries or not. 12 The three main lists are printed in O. Gigon, Aristotelis Opera, vol. III: Librorum deperditorum fragmenta (Berlin–New York 1987), 1–44.

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Aristotle’s work was continued by his pupils. It appears that Theophrastus distilled much of the work on early philosophical doctrines in the area of natural philosophy into the 18 books of his compendious Physical Doctrines.13 His surviving brief treatise De sensibus may well have originally formed part of this work. It certainly appears to illustrate the method used very well.14 Views on the role and working of the senses are divided into a small number of oppositions, e.g. between those who think knowledge is obtained through similarity and those who think it comes from difference. Notable philosophers such as Empedocles, Plato and Democritus are associated with these views and their doctrines are evaluated and criticized in accordance with Peripatetic doctrine. Diels was most likely correct in arguing that much of the collection of doxai that we find in later doxographical writings was first done in the Peripatos, but the arguments for the leading role he assigned to Theophrastus are not as strong as he assumed. The contribution of Eudemus may also have been significant.15 He also underestimated the amount of adaptation and development that took place in the Hellenistic period. Unfortunately the loss of almost all philosophical writings in the Hellenistic period makes it very difficult to follow the further development and use of the doxographical methods initiated by Aristotle and Theophrastus. The evidence of Epicurus’ Letters and other fragmentary texts suggest that he made extensive use of the organization and some of the arguments of Theophrastus’ treatises in the presentation of his views on physics, especially when suggesting multiple possible causes of celestial and meteorological phenomena.16 Half a century later Chrysippus exploits doxographical material in discussing the seat 13 Diels thought the title of the work was Physikon doxai; cf. DG, 102–118, 473–495. J. Mansfeld has demonstrated, however, that it was most likely Physikai doxai; see his article cited in n. 10, 64. The crucial difference is that the latter title places the emphasis on the systematic nature of the collection rather than on the philosophers whose views are being discussed. 14 See J. Mansfeld, “Aristote et la structure du De sensibus de Théophraste”, Phronesis 41 (1996), 158–188; H. Baltussen, Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato. Peripatetic Dialectic in the De sensibus (Leiden 2000). 15 See the suggestive remarks of J. Mansfeld, “Cosmic Distances: Aëtius 2.31 Diels and Some Related Texts”, Phronesis 45 (2000), 200–201. 16 See further J. Mansfeld, “Epicurus Peripateticus”, in A. Alberti (ed.), Realtà e ragione: studi di filosofia antica (Florence 1994), 29–50; D.T. Runia, “Lucretius and Doxography”, in K.A. Algra–M.H. Koenen–P.H. Schrijvers (eds.), Lucretius and his Intellectual Background (Amsterdam–Oxford–New York–Tokio 1997), 98–99. See also the article of D. Sedley cited below in n. 81.

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of the ruling part (hegemonikon) of the soul in his treatise On the Soul. The striking parallels with later texts have been studied by J. Mansfeld.17 He points out that Chrysippus emphasizes the disagreement (antilogia) prevalent in views on the subject. This suggests that by this time the earlier Peripatetic collections of material have been reworked by the Sceptical Academy instituted by Arcesilaus in the 3rd cent. BCE in order to support their view that one should suspend judgment on all philosophical questions whether theoretical or practical. Difference of opinion, as recorded by Aristotle and Theophrastus, is converted into disagreement or dissension (diaphonia). The difference is well brought out by Cicero when he writes:18 Aristotle the founder [of the Peripatos] instituted the practice of speaking both for and against on every topic, not in order to speak against every position as Arcesilaus did, but to set out the possible arguments on either side on every subject.

The sceptical and controversialist method was continued by the 2nd century Academic philosophers Carneades and Clitomachus. The final body of significant evidence before Philo is found in the writings of Cicero. In his youthful manual of rhetoric, De inventione, Cicero informs us about the method of the thesis or quaestio infinita, which discusses general topics such as ‘are the senses true’, ‘what is the shape of the cosmos’, ‘what is the size of the sun’. It is no coincidence that all three questions recur in the doxographical manual of Aëtius.19 Much of Cicero’s philosophical writing is structured around the discussion of such topics, e.g. De natura deorum on whether gods exist and, if they do, what is their nature, De finibus on what is the goal of the good life, and so on. In these discussions he likes to give opposed views (pro et contra dicere, as attributed to Aristotle in the quote above), with his own preferred view often a third compromise position. In addition these writings contain many overviews of the opinions of leading philosophers on the subjects in question. The best known example is the long doxography on theological views in De nat. deor. 1.25–41, which is paralleled by the papyrus PHerc. 1428 (most likely the work of Philodemus), 17 J. Mansfeld, “Chrysippus and the Placita”, Phronesis 34 (1989), 311–342; “Doxography and Dialectic: the Sitz im Leben of the Placita”, ANRW II 36.4 (Berlin–New York 1990), 3056–3229, esp. 3167–3179. 18 De fin. 5.10; text cited by J. Mansfeld, “Doxography and Dialectic”, cit., 3173. 19 De inv. 8; cf. J. Mansfeld, “Physikai doxai”, cit., 79. The chapters in Aëtius are 4.9, 2.2, 2.21.

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and bears a significant resemblance to the chapter in Aëtius on the nature of divinity, 1.7.20 Perhaps the most interesting text of all is found in Cicero’s Academica priora, 2.112–146, in which he presents the sceptical view that all the dogmatic philosophers are in fatal discord with each other.21 Many of the examples, especially in the area of physics, are closely related to texts in the Placita literature and led Diels to postulate that there was an older collection of views (the so-called Vetusta placita) which served as a source for both Cicero and Aëtius.22 Situated chronologically between these two authors, of course, we find Philo of Alexandria. But before we move to Philo’s evidence, two further comments need to be made. The first pertains to the kind of philosophical topics that are dealt with in doxographical literature. As we saw above, Aristotle indicates that his dialectical method can handle subjects in the areas of physics, ethics and logic, and he gives an example for each. However, it appears that only in the area of physics (including first principles, psychology and related epistemology) do we have a body of doxai that are organized on a large scale, i.e. the tradition of the Placita investigated by Diels. M. Giusta made a valiant attempt to show that there was a parallel body of ethical doxai, but it has been generally agreed that no such work ever existed.23 This does not mean that there was not a significant number of ethical doxographies, as seen for example in Cicero’s De finibus,24 but there was no systematically organized corpus. The same applies for topics in the area of logic. The second comment pertains to the way in which doxographical material was presented. This happened in many different forms.25 In the Placita the various doxai are mostly presented in an extremely com20 Already included by H. Diels in DG, 531–550. The new edition of the papyrus by D. Obbink is eagerly awaited. 21 On this passage and its antecedent sources see J. Mansfeld, “Gibt es Spuren von Theophrasts Phys. Op. bei Cicero?”, in W.W. Fortenbaugh–P. Steinmetz (eds.), Cicero’s Knowledge of the Peripatos (New Brunswick–London 1989), 133–158, repr. in Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy (Assen 1990), 238–263. 22 Cf. esp. Ac. pr. 2.122–123, on which see Mansfeld, “Physikai doxai”, cit., 98–108, who emphasizes the further link back to Arist. De cael. Β 13. 23 M. Giusta, I dossografi di etica, 2 vols., (Turin 1964–1967). Copious use is made of the evidence furnished by Philo; see the index of passages at 2.584–585. 24 See also the overview of ethical disagreement in Ac. pr. 2.129–141. A fine example in a later author is on the telos (end of life) in Clem. Al. Strom. 2.127–132. 25 A brief overview is given in D.T. Runia, “What is Doxography”, cit., 40–45; see also the two studies of J. Mejer, Diogenes Laërtius and his Hellenistic Background (Wiesbaden 1978), and Überlieferung der Philosophie, cited above (n. 8).

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pact form, often merely stating the view without any accompanying argument. In other texts views can be set out at greater length with argumentation and illustratory material, as for example in the Ciceronian texts cited above or in Seneca’s Naturales quaestiones. Sometimes the doxai belonging to a single philosopher are collected together in a doctrinal compendium, as found for example in many biographies in Diogenes Laertius. A different form of Hellenistic doxography is found in the ‘On the sects’ literature, which dealt with the doctrines of haireseis or “schools of thought”. The best known extant example is by Arius Didymus on Peripatetic and Stoic physics and ethics.26 It was long thought that Arius was the Alexandrian Stoic who was an older contemporary of Philo, but this is now considered unlikely.27 Another genre was the ‘Successions’ literature, which emphasized how philosophical ideas were handed down from teacher to pupil in various successions (Diadochai) from Thales to the Hellenistic schools.28 Together these various works constitute well-known philosophy manuals of Philo’s time. We may surmise that the learned Jew was very familiar with them. But it is now time to turn to his evidence and see the extent of his acquaintance. 4. Some important Philonic texts There are a very considerable number of texts scattered throughout Philo’s extensive corpus that can be called upon to illustrate his knowledge and use of the Greek doxographical tradition. The following series of texts have been selected because of their importance or because they illustrate particular kinds of usage or adaptation. They should not, however, be regarded as exhaustive. It will not be practical to quote 26 The physical fragments were collected in Diels, DG, 445–472; see further D.T. Runia, “Additional Fragments of Arius Didymus on Physics”, in K.A. Algra–P.W. van der Horst–D.T. Runia (eds.), Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Philosophy presented to Jaap Mansfeld (Leiden 1996), 363–381. Two long passages on Stoic and Peripatetic ethics are preserved in Stobaeus; see W.W. Fortenbaugh (ed.), On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Didymus (New Brunswick–London 1983); A.J. Pomeroy, Arius Didymus. Epitome of Stoic Ethics (Atlanta 1999). 27 As argued by T. Göransson, Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus (Göteborg 1995). 28 See the surviving examples on the Academy and Stoa attributed to Philodemus’ Σ6νταξις τ8ν φιλοσφων and edited by T. Dorandi: Storia dei filosofi [.] Platone e l’Academia (PHerc. 1012 e 164) (Naples 1991); Filodemo. Storia dei filosofi: la Stoà da Zenone a Panezio (PHerc. 1018) (Leiden 1994).

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all the texts in their entirety. The reader is asked to consult editions and translations of Philo’s works in order to gain acquaintance with full details.29 a. The gift of sight and the origin of philosophy In a number of texts scattered throughout his works Philo gives encomia of the human faculty of sight. The theme is a topos that has been developed from the famous passage in Plato, Tim. 47a–d, where it is argued that sight is the ultimate origin of philosophy.30 As part of his expansion of Plato’s themes Philo adds examples of philosophical problems that the mind, responding to the data of sight, investigates. At Opif. 54, prompted by exegesis of the creation of the heavenly bodies on the fourth day of creation, he explains what contemplation of the heavens allows the soul to do:31 It started to busy itself with further enquiries: (1) what is the substance (ousia) of these objects of sight? (2) are they by nature uncreated or did they obtain a beginning of genesis? (3) what is the manner of their movement, and (4) what are the causes by means of which each thing is administered? From enquiry into these matters the pursuit of philosophy arose.

The examples that Philo gives are taken from the realm of physics. He moves from three questions on the nature of visible phenomena to a final question on their causes. A similar but more expansive text is found at Abr. 162–163, where he gives a rather far-fetched symbolic explanation why one of the five cities was exempted from destruction in Gen 19:15–29: The understanding … taking from sight the starting-points of its ability to observe the things of the mind, proceeded to investigate whether (1) these phenomena are ungenerated or have obtained a beginning of genesis, (2) whether they are infinite or limited, (3) whether there is a single cosmos or a plurality, and (4) whether the four elements form the substance of all things, or whether the heaven and its contents have been allotted a special nature and share in a substance that is more divine and differing from the others. Moreover, if indeed the cosmos has come 29

In what follows Philonic texts are quoted in my own translation. On these texts and their background see D.T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden 1986), 270–276. 31 See also the parallel text at Spec. 3.190, which asks a further question of the causes, namely whether they are material or immaterial. 30

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into being (cf. question 1), (5) by whom did this occur, and (6) who is the creator (demiourgos) in terms of substance or quality, and (7) what did he have in mind in creating it, and (8) what is he doing now and what is his occupation and manner of life, and all the other questions that a keen intellect with wisdom as its companion is inclined to examine. These and similar questions are what philosophizing is concerned with.

Here we first have four questions on the nature of visible phenomena. In each case Philo presents alternative answers, and in all but the last these form a diaeresis consisting of contradictories (e.g. the phenomena are either generated or ungenerated, there is no third possibility). Then, instead of asking about their causes in a general way, as in the previous text, Philo takes one of the alternatives, that the cosmos is generated, and asks four further questions about its cause in the form of a creator. The examples in these two texts show how it is envisaged that the subject-matter of philosophy is organized in terms of questions. Moreover, the way that these questions are presented is relevant in a number of respects to doxographical texts. Firstly it clearly privileges questions in the area of cosmology and first principles, which is precisely the subject matter of Books I and II of Aëtius’ Placita. Indeed the specific questions asked correspond in a rather inexact way with various chapters in that work, e.g. 2.1 on whether the cosmos is single or infinite, 2.2a on the cosmos’ motion,32 2.4 on whether the cosmos is generated or ungenerated,33 2.11 on the substance of heaven, 1.3 on first principles, 1.7 who is God, 1.11 on causes, 1.12 on bodies etc. Doxography is thus used as a tool to give structure to the domain of philosophy. In addition, the way Philo gives alternative answers is reminiscent of the method of the thesis or quaestio infinita initiated by Aristotle and commonly found in Cicero.34 We note, finally, that Philo is not neutral in the way he formulates the questions. The second example plainly tends in the direction of the cosmology of the Timaeus, which he sees as corresponding in large part to the Mosaic creation account in the book of Genesis. The 32 As I will show in my forthcoming reconstruction of Placita Book II, analysis of the evidence shows that originally there must have been a chapter entitled Περ1 κινσεως κσμου which was deleted by the epitomiser ps. Plutarch. 33 To judge by ps. Plutarch’s epitome, the title of this chapter in Aëtius appears to have been ε9 2φ"αρτος : κσμος, but its contents clearly also cover the wider question of whether the cosmos came into being or is ungenerated. The question goes back to Plat. Tim. 27c5. 34 See the discussions above in the previous section.

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Placita in Aëtius also show signs of Platonist influence, for example in the lemma on Plato’s theology in 1.7.35 b. Inscrutability of the heavens and the mind In De somniis 1, towards the end of Philo’s great Allegorical Commentary on Genesis, an elaborate exegesis is given of Jacob’s famous dream in Genesis 28. It is noted (§ 4) that the dream occurs as he makes a journey from the well of the Oath (v. 10 LXX; Beersheba in the Hebrew original). In allegorical terms the well should be seen as a symbol of knowledge (§ 6). But why is this well the fourth of those dug by Abraham and Isaac? Philo’s solution is to suggest that both in the cosmos and in us human beings there are four constituents, of which three are knowable and one beyond our knowledge. The idea is elaborated in two parallel arguments as follows: § 14 biblical problem § 15 suggested solution § 16 four constituents of the cosmos §§ 17–20 three of these, earth-water-air, are knowable §§ 21–24 fourth, heaven, is essentially unknowable § 25 four constituents of human beings §§ 27–29 three of these, body-perception-speech, are knowable §§ 30–33 fourth, intellect, is essentially unknowable.

The procedure is typically Philonic. Greek philosophical doctrines are used to convey a deeper understanding of Scripture. It is often while explaining the doctrines adduced that the exegete can supply us with valuable information about Greek philosophy, even though that is not his primary goal. We have a striking case here. In order to demonstrate the unknowability of both heaven and the human intellect Philo’s strategy is to set out the diversity of opinion that exists on these two topics. For his material he draws on a doxographical manual which is no longer extant but bears a close resemblance to the Placita of Aëtius. Diels missed out on this vital text when he wrote his ‘Prolegomena’, but it was discovered by Paul Wendland, the co-editor of the great critical edition of Philo’s works. He was encouraged by 35 Fullest text at Stob. Ecl. 1.1.29b, cf. Diels, DG, 306–307. I have examined the parallelism between Philo and the Placita in my article, “The Beginnings of the End: Philo of Alexandria and Hellenistic Theology”, in D. Frede–A. Laks (eds.), Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (Leiden 2002), 281–316.

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Diels to present his find to the Berlin Academy.36 I draw on his analysis in what follows, as well as on the important discussion by Jaap Mansfeld in his magisterial article on the Placita concerned with the soul and the intellect.37 After positing that the heaven has an incomprehensible nature (physis akataleptos), Philo proceeds by asking a series of questions involving doxai that correspond to the contents of various chapters in Aëtius. A summary of these correspondences can be given as follows (for the full text see the Appendix):38 § 21 heaven: what is its nature? cf. Aët. 2.11 On heaven, what is its substance (ousia) § 21 heaven: is it three- or two-dimensional?, cf. Aët. 2.15 On the order of the stars § 22 stars: what is their nature? cf. Aët. 2.13 What is the substance of the stars? § 22 the stars: are they living or lifeless? (no chapter in Aëtius, but cf. 2.3 Whether the cosmos is ensouled and administered by providence) § 23 the moon: is its light its own or from the sun? cf. Aët. 2.28 On the illuminations of the moon.

The same procedure is followed to illustrate the incomprehensible nature of the dominant mind (ho hegemon nous): § 30 what is it as regards its substance? cf. Aët. 4.2 On the soul, 4.3 Whether the soul is body and what is its substance? § 31 does it have an external origin or does it arise organically with the substance of the soul? no direct equivalent in Aëtius, but cf. two doxai at Stob. Ecl. 1.48.739 § 31 is it destructible or indestructible? cf. Aët. 4.7 On the indestructibility of the soul § 32 where is it located? cf. Aët. 4.5 What is the dominant element of the soul and in which part is it located?

For this material there are not only parallels in Aëtius, but also in Cicero, Tusc. 1.18–24, Ac. pr. 2.124, Lucretius, Book 3, and in later texts such as Tertullian and Macrobius.40 In addition, as Wendland noted, 36 P. Wendland, “Eine doxographische Quelle Philos”, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (1897), 1074–1079. 37 J. Mansfeld, “Doxography and Dialectic”, cit., 3117–3122. 38 I give the titles of the chapters as preserved in the epitome of ps. Plutarch. 39 These are derived from a missing chapter in Aëtius, as the parallel in Theodoret. 5.28 shows; see J. Mansfeld, “Doxography and Dialectic”, cit., 3092 n. 138. 40 Analysed in depth by Mansfeld, “Doxography and Dialectic”, cit. On the important Ciceronian texts see 3122–3137. Through these parallels Mansfeld can show that

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Philo appears to use the same source material a little further on in his treatise, when he illustrates the activity of the Chaldean astronomers, which Abraham leaves behind when he emigrates to Haran (Somn. 1.52–55, translation in the Appendix). Here the presentation is much more compact, with just one or two doxai used as illustrations of only the topic indicated. The topics are similar to those used in the earlier passage, but interestingly Philo adds the subject of the size of the sun, whether just a foot in diameter (the doxa associated with Heraclitus) or much larger than the earth. This topic was a favourite illustration of a thesis or quaestio infinita in rhetorical literature,41 but was also compactly treated in a chapter in Aët. 2.21 ‘On the size of the sun’. It is also worth noting that when Philo indicates what the human being should investigate, namely his own nature, he outlines a number of topics related primarily to sense-perception which correspond closely to chapters in Book IV of Aëtius’ compendium.42 Wendland was right to conclude that the parallels between these texts are such that they cannot be fully independent of each other. But they can also not be reduced to each other. At least two topics are included in Philo’s summary that are not covered in the remains of Aëtius as we have them and various individual doxai are not exactly paralleled (see further the Appendix). Naturally we have to allow for the considerable freedom that Philo permits himself in using philosophical material. A good example of such latitude is Philo’s suggestion that according to some the substance of the stars consists of hollows and glens and fiery clumps (of metal). The doxa is paralleled in Aëtius, but there it is said of the moon which in the view of Anaxagoras and Democritus is a fiery solid which has in it plains and mountains and ravines. Two of Aëtius’ three nouns are also found in the doxographical report of Hippolytus on Anaxagoras.43 So it is likely that Philo has Philo has applied the doxography on the soul in general to the dominant part, i.e. the intellect, alone. 41 Cf. Hermagoras at Cic. De inv. 1.6.8, De orat. 2.66, Quint. Inst. or. 3.6.42, 7.2.6, 7.4.1. 42 E.g. § 55 τ. ;ρασις … τ. τ< :ρ=ν κα1 π8ς :ρ>=ς, cf. Aëtius 4.13, Περ1 :ρσεως, π8ς :ρ8μεν. 43 Compare Somn. 1.22: ο? στ0ρες πτερον γ3ς ε9σιν @γκοι πυρ=στα δ6ναται, τ. τ/ν DΕπικο6ρειον σ0βειαν W τ/ν τ8ν Α9γυπτ.ων "ετητα W τAς μυ"ικAς Iπο"0σεις, Xν μεστα τε.νας), resserrant les muselières, leur rappellera à coups de fouet et d’aiguillon que sa puissance est absolue et qu’ils l’avaient oubliée à cause de la bonté et de la douceur, comme le font les mauvais serviteurs.

Il reste à déterminer comment s’effectue l’articulation entre, d’une part, cette rétention de caractère théologique, dont la traduction philosophique pourrait être le Yς κατA τ< δυνατν platonicien,28 imposant à l’être humain dans son imitation de Dieu des limites pour ainsi dire statutaires, et, d’autre part, l’ποχ des sceptiques néo-pyrrhoniens et néo-académiciens qui se présente comme étant libre de tout présupposé métaphysique. On notera que le mot ποχ ne connaît qu’une occurrence chez Philon, ce qui est en soi remarquable quand on sait que le verbe, lui, est employé près de cent fois.29 Il est probable qu’il a cherché à éviter un terme qui était, encore plus que le verbe, emblématique du scepticisme. Son unicité même donne à ce passage une signification particulière, qu’il convient d’étudier avec soin. Il s’agit donc du commentaire allégorique du sacrifice d’Isaac.30 Au moment où l’enfant s’inquiète de savoir où est l’agneau pour l’holocauste, Abraham lui répond: “Dieu se pourvoira” et ils découvrent un bélier qui s’était pris les cornes dans un buisson. Philon explique que cet animal représente l’ποχ, parce que “la meilleure victime c’est l’immobilité et la suspension du jugement sur les points où les preuves font totalement défaut”, et il ajoute: on peut déclarer seulement ceci: “Dieu verra”. L’univers lui est connu, il l’éclaire d’une lumière très éclatante, à savoir lui-même. Le monde créé Theaet. 176b. Très précisément 97 fois, avec des sens très différents qui diluent en quelque sorte l’acception purement sceptique du terme. 30 Fug. 136. 28 29

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carlos lévy ne peut déclarer rien d’autre: sur lui sont répandues d’épaisses ténèbres, et dans les ténèbres il est prudent de rester tranquille.

On notera que le texte est dans la continuité de Post. 28, en ceci que l’ποχ n’a pas une signification humaine, mais divine. Abraham la découvre littéralement comme don de Dieu, alors que lui-même arrive au sacrifice sans elle. Plus exactement, le patriarche fait preuve d’ποχ en disant “Dieu se pourvoira”, mais c’est Dieu lui-même qui donne leur sens à ces paroles en les acceptant comme substitut du sacrifice d’Isaac et qui en donne une représentation visuelle, dans l’interprétation allégorique de Philon, par l’image du bélier empêtré dans un buisson. Pourquoi cette image précisément? Le terme de κρις qui désigne cet animal est souvent employé dans le corpus philonien, avec des identifications allégoriques complexes. En Somn. 1.199 les boucs et les béliers représentent les concepts parfaits, “pleins d’ardeur pour opérer la diminution des péchés et l’accroissement des bonnes actions” qui saillissent les brebis et les chèvres, autrement dit les âmes jeunes et tendres. Dans Her. 125, le bélier représente la fonction de réfutation du langage, qui permet de venir à bout des sophismes et qui donne à celui qui s’en sert de la stabilité et de l’équilibre. En revanche, dans Leg. 3.129–131, la nature du bélier est présentée comme impulsive et incontrôlée (:ρμητικ=; Sacr. 46–47: τAς μHν οRν λγους ατοL φορς (of mind itself; φορς Timaeus terminology); Det. 5: τAς ψυχ3ς λγους φορς; Agr. 88: περ1 τ3ς κατA ψυχ/ν λγου κα1 μ0τρου κα1 πει"οLς φορ=ς; Sobr. 7: ε9ς ψυχ3ς δυνμεις κινουμ0νης εR τε κα1 χεSρον (Posidonius; divine revolutions of mind); Her. 88; 184–185 (divine revolutions of mind, Timaeus language, see Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, cit., 276–278). C6. Soul and τνος, as in: Leg. 1.29–30; Fug. 39; Somn. 1.111: [λγος] φ.λος γAρ κα1 γνNριμος κα1 συν"ης κα1 FταSρος +μSν στιν, νδεδεμ0νος, μ=λλον δH +ρμοσμ0νος κα1 +νωμ0νος κλλJη τιν1 φ6σεως λ6τGω κα1 ορτGω; Ios. 61 (with also the notion of νεLρα); Decal. 122; Spec. 1.99; Praem. 21, 48; QG 1.10, 24.

C7. The Stoic distinction between ruling faculty and the instrumental ones, and the language of parts, as in: Opif. 117: Stoic model, τ< δ.χα τοL +γεμονικοL μ0ρος Fπταχ3 σχ.ζεται; Leg. 1.11: ψυχ3ς τ< 2λογον Fπταμερ0ς, 39; Det. 100–103, 168: τ< 2λογον τ3ς ψυχ3ς ε9ς FπτA διαν0μεται μο.ρας; Agr. 30 (with the notion of one root and two shoots); Her. 232–233; Mut. 111; Spec. 1.211; 4.79; QG 1.75; 2.11–12 (with Socratic theme); 3.51; 4.110. Contrast with, for example, QG 3.5, where speech goes with mind into the rational part, and the senses are reduced to four. Seven parts, connected to Timaeus’ circles of the planets, as in: Her. 232–233; QG 4.110 (cf. also Cher. 22–23). C8. A specific list of +δον, λ6πη, φβος, and πι"υμ.α; the Stoic list, as in: Opif. 79 (with γαστριμαργ.α); Migr. 60, 219; Ios. 79; Mos. 2.139; Decal. 142 ff.; Spec. 2.30; Prob. 18, 159 (+ \ργ); Prov. 2.8 (longer list + Eρως); QG 2.55–57; 4.15 (cf. 38), 230 (+ senses and passions in general). See the section below, E. mixed cases, for passion as a “four-legged creature”, and Deus, 71: anger, fear, pain and pleasure, compared to the Timaeus lists (43a6–7; 69d1–4).

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D. Platonic model of the soul D1. Leg. 1.70: tripartite soul, spatial locations, discussion of cardinal virtues; 3.123: reason controlling irrationality of spirit; Agr. 72–73: tripartite psychology, image of one who holds reins and two horses, but see also 78; Conf. 21: tripartite soul, three parts cooperating in sin; Migr. 66: desire and its brother passion spirit make up the irrational part of the soul; 67: spatial locations (breast and belly), charioteer image; reason making use of proper impressions (compare also with 18); Spec. 1.145– 148: full-fledged tripartite model, with spatial locations; 4.92: Timaeus account, with different spatial locations, and positive role of spirit (but see also 4.79: Stoic model); Virt. 113: reason bridling desire; Praem. 13: mortal/immortal ‘nature’ only, not fully developed model (also Det. 91—rational/irrational part; Conf. 21, 112; Migr. 18—but both plural; 185); 59: spirit and desire, irrational part warring against reason; QG 1.13: tripartite soul; 4.42: “entire place of desire and anger”, 216; QE 1.12: tripartite soul: heart (location, not function)/desire/reason; 2.100: tripartite soul, spatial locations; 115: anger connected to heart, needing reason’s control, see Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, cit., 301–305. See also Leg. 3.115: tripartite soul, but Philo mentions that “some philosophers have distinguished these parts from each other in regard to function, some in regard also to the places which they occupy”. D2. Posidonian position, as described by Galen (see below), of irrational functions rather than parts, as in: Leg. 3.115, cf. supra; Sacr. 45 (metaphor of flock and herdsman); Det. 3 (with metaphor of flock and herdsman), 95; Conf. 112: functions and parts; Somn. 2.151–153 (metaphor of flock and herdsman); Virt. 13 (reason reining in faculties like horses); QG 3.115. D3. Stronger/weaker or better/worse soul parts, as in: Migr. 185; Fug. 24 ( μ0ρος); Somn. 1.152 (μοSρα); Spec. 3.99 (μ0ρος and εBδος); Virt. 40 (τ/ν \λιγφρονα μοSραν); Praem. 48 (but with Stoic language, see below section E. mixed cases). E. Mixed cases Leg. 3.128: reason versus spirit, located in breast, but spirit reckoned among “random impulses” (κρ.τοις :ρμαSς); unruly horse; Migr. 67–

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68: tripartite soul, reason making use of proper impressions (charioteer imagery); Her. 233 (88; 184–185); Fug. 69, 71–72: distinction mortal/immortal, rational/irrational soul parts, but admixture of soul is of sense/perception; Mos. 1.25–29: Phaedrus imagery, but charioteer in control of impulses; soul/body distinction dominant; Spec. 4.79: bridling impulses, reining them in like horses; QG 4.186: list of reason, spirit, appetite, nutritive soul part, sensory soul-part, body, external things. See also passion as “four-footed beast”, as in: Leg. 2.99; Agr. 73; Her. 269; Congr. 172; Abr. 236; Mos. 1.26; Spec. 4.79.25

II. Conceptual Analysis One can scarcely read a page of Philo’s writings without encountering the soul/body distinction (A). This distinction is his preferred shorthand rendering of the human condition, and of the challenges humans face: “justice and every virtue love the soul, while injustice and every vice love the body; that what is friendly to the one is utterly hostile to the other” (Her. 243). Philo tells us that body, sense-perception, speech, and mind are the four most important factors in us (Somn. 1.25, see B10; esp. Det. 159; Post. 55; Migr. 2; 195). This list could be accommodated by a variety of psychological models. At Spec. 1.211, he uses the language of “parts” (Bii.2). And at Migr. 137–138, the list is body, soul, sense-perception, and logos, with the strong injunction to “Know thyself ”. In Leg. 2.50, we read that when inferior senseperception leads the superior mind, the mind “resolves itself into the order of the flesh which is inferior, into sense-perception, the moving cause of the passions” (ναλ6εται ε9ς τ< χεSρον τ< σαρκ