Personality and Individual Differences: Theory, Assessment, and Application

PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH PROGRESS Additional books in this series can be found on Nova‘s website under the Series tab.

Additional E-books in this series can be found on Nova‘s website under the E-books tab.

PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH PROGRESS

PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND APPLICATION

SIMON BOAG AND

NIKO TILIOPOULOS EDITORS

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Personality and Individual Differences Ed: Simon Boag and Niko Tiliopoulos

ISBN 978-1-61122-070-4 © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Copyright © 2011 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Personality and individual differences : theory, assessment, and application / editors, Niko Tiliopoulos, Simon Boag. p. cm. Includes index. 1. Personality. 2. Individuality. I. Tiliopoulos, Niko. II. Boag, Simon. BF698.P3584 2010 155.2--dc22 2010036439

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

CONTENTS Chapter 1

Introduction Niko Tiliopoulos and Simon Boag

1

Part A: Processes and Performance Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Integrating the Study of within- and between-Person Variability in Personality at Work Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian and Robert E. Wood

11

Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive Functions Damian P. Birney

21

The Effects of Comparison Status and Individual Differences in Social Comparison Tendencies on the Experience of Schadenfreude Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk Processing Style and Social Comparison Outcomes: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Automatic Behaviour and Self-evaluation Lauren O’Driscoll and Eugene Chekaluk

51

The Excitation Transfer Paradigm and Emotional Intelligence: Predicting Interpersonal Attraction Madeleine Fraser and Simon Boag

67

Chapter 7

Take a Break: A Look at the Incubation Effect on Creativity Gerry Pallier and Niko Tiliopoulos

Chapter 8

The Role of Personality in Learning Processes and Learning Outcomes in Applied Settings Paul Ginns, Gregory Arief D. Liem and Andrew J. Martin

Chapter 9

37

Something about Metacognition: Self-confidence Factor(s) in School-aged Children Sabina Kleitman, Karina Mak, Sarah Young, Phoebe Lau and David Livesey

83

93

103

vi

Contents

Part B: Culture, Religion, and Spirituality Chapter 10

Spiritual-Hypnosis Assisted Therapy: A New Culturally Sensitive Approach to the Treatment and Prevention of Mental Disorders Luh Ketut Suryani

Chapter 11

Militant Extremist Mindset Lazar Stankov, Gerard Saucier and Goran Knežević

Chapter 12

Emotional Intelligence among Church Leaders: Applying the Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale within Newfrontiers Leslie J. Francis, Andrew Ryland and Mandy Robbins

119 131

141

Chapter 13

Ominous Signs: Schizotypy and Religious Attachment Lisa Hancock

151

Chapter 14

Sham Reasoning, Humpty Dumpty and the Burden of Proof Fiona J. Hibberd

163

Chapter 15

Will Right-brainers Rule the Future? John Reid

171

Chapter 16

Cultural Perspectives on Personality and Personhood Hoyt L. Edge and Cokorda Bagus Jaya Lesmana

181

Part C: Contributions to Clinical Psychology and Assessment Chapter 17

Genetic Variation in DRD4, Criminality, and Conduct Disorder Tara M. Thompson, Marya Getchell, Britt af Klinteberg, Roman A. Koposov, Lars Oreland, Andrew J. Pakstis, Vladislav V. Ruchkin, Carolyn M. Yrigollen and Elena L. Grigorenko

Chapter 18

The Assessment of Depression, Anxiety and Tension/stress in Youth Marianna Szabó

209

Unconscious Schemas, Bulimic Tendencies and the Influence of Subliminal Abandonment and Unification Cues on Eating Kathleen Mairet and Simon Boag

223

Motivational Interviewing Changes the Treatment Trajectory of Group Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for Anxiety Weiwen Yang and Esben Strodl

237

Chapter 19

Chapter 20

Chapter 21

What do Self-report Measures of Disinhibition Really Measure? Elliroma Gardiner and Chris J. Jackson

Chapter 22

Can Employers Screen Job Applicants for Potential White Collar Fraud Offenders? Jennifer Keen and Julie Fitness

193

249

265

Contents Chapter 23

Chapter 24

Reflections on the Factor Structure of the Occupational Stress Inventory-Revised Richard E. Hicks Introducing the YWEDO Online Cognitive Laboratory Chris J. Jackson

vii

275 283

Part D: Developments in Theory and Structure Chapter 25

Six Solutions to the Circular Nature of Trait Psychology Jonathan P. Gerber

Chapter 26

A Proposition for a Parsimonious Taxonomic Convergence of Personality Traits Niko Tiliopoulos

Chapter 27 Index

The Role of Conceptual Analysis in Personality Research Simon Boag

297

307 321 331

We should fill our life with possibilities, not regrets. Impossibility is a result of an absence of belief in oneself. Learning from experience is the best way to reach success. Our happiness in this life depends on our ability to choose the best possibility to walk on. No need for regrets; everything has an effect on the development of ourselves. There is always a chance, if we are willing to try. Everybody can change; they just have to want to. Before trying to change others, change yourself first.

Luh Ketut Suryani Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, Udayana University and The Suryani Institute for Mental Health, Bali, Indonesia

In: Personality and Individual Differences Ed: Simon Boag and Niko Tiliopoulos

ISBN 978-1-61122-070-4 © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION Niko Tiliopoulos School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia

Simon Boag Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia

ABSTRACT Since Allport and Vernon‘s assessment of the field over eighty years ago (Allport & Vernon, 1930), the field of personality and individual differences research has expanded enormously. This is particularly so in terms of theoretical development and practical relevance, where the research generated by researchers in this field is distinguished for its contributions to both assessment and application. In fact, personality and individual differences research is relevant to practically every facet of human existence. For instance, since theories of persons either explicitly or implicitly guide clinical work, the field contributes to discussions of understanding abnormal psychology and provides a guide for conceptualising best treatment. Additionally, the field is relevant to understanding human development across the lifespan, and our understanding of personality and individual differences impacts upon our views of socialisation and interpersonal relations. Furthermore, business and organisations continues to utilise personality and individual differences research since it provides the possibility of predicting performance. Subsequently, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the research covered in this field. Concurrently, however, the field of personality and individual differences research is developing in ways that reflect a new appreciation of encompassing a global-context and of possible new approaches to understanding persons. This collection of papers from personality and individual difference researchers highlights social and cultural dimensions of personality and individual differences.



Ph: 61-2-9036 9223; Fax: 61-2-9036 5223; email: [email protected]; The editors would like to acknowledge that the book and chapter represent equal contributions from both authors.

2

Niko Tiliopoulos and Simon Boag

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY Historically, theories of personality and individual differences research have generally emerged primarily out of western thinking and traditions. In fact, Dan Jones (2010) has recently pointed out that since psychology students tend to be the most accessible and ‗willing‘ participants for psychology research, such findings are mostly representative of WEIRDos—Western, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic cultures. It has been further pointed out that such theories and findings have tended to emphasise the individual at the expense of understanding the person in relation (Edge, this volume; Hall, 2003). Consider, for instance, the significance of ‗self‘ in many approaches to personality, and the value placed on ‗self-development‘ and ‗self-actualisation‘, and so forth. While there may be value in such constructs, others have noted that this focus on the self reflects the values of western, industrialised cultures (e.g., North America) and may actually ignore the vast majority of the world‘s cultures that place value on the social collective over and above the individual (Hall, 2004; Markus, 2004). Consequently, some have been critical of personality and individual research, claiming that it reflects (and imposes) a western bias and thus not reflecting the global state of affairs (e.g., Markus, 2004). Some have even claimed that we are each trapped in our own cultural cocoons and are thus prevented from even ever understanding other cultures (e.g., Gergen, 2001). However, the latter claim is itself too extreme since if it is true, then it is itself trapped in its cultural setting and so can make no claim to making any truth statement extending beyond itself. Furthermore, it ignores humanity‘s great capacity to learn and communicate, and while we may struggle to get into another‘s world we can still make the effort, just as someone brought up ‗bi- (or even tri- etc.) culturally‘ has the benefit of appreciating multiple cultural nuances (cf. Hall, 2001). Consequently, while much research has emerged out of western thinking, this is, in itself, not necessarily problematic. Instead, acknowledging the potential for cultural bias raises very interesting questions—empirical questions—about whether findings generated in particular parts of the world generalise to other parts, and whether our theories are as universal as we may wish to believe. Subsequently, there is growing interest in cultural factors and increasing questioning of the universality of theories and findings generated in the predominantly English-speaking, western, industrialised countries. This makes for exciting times, and what is helping to break down cultural barriers is increasing accessibility to the internet. Since the internet‘s inception approximately two decades ago, global communication has become steadily more accessible and this global accessibility and communication has led to the internet being increasingly used in research (see Jackson, this volume; Kraut et al., 2004). More and more, then, we have the technology to help us become global researchers.

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES While the greater global focus is both important and necessary for developing comprehensive theories and approaches, it brings with it certain challenges. In particular, coming to terms with different approaches to understanding persons—especially with respect to religious and spiritual dimensions—is an element that many researchers may feel

Introduction

3

uncomfortable with. Since the dawn of modern psychology, it seems psychologists have been sceptical about the value or utility of the psychological study of religion and spirituality. This battering scepticism apparently resulted in a rather uneasy relationship between psychology and religion (for example Esau, 1998; van Till, 1935/1972; Vande Kemp, 1986). Had it not been for people like William James (1902/2002) and Gordon Allport (1950), who through their pioneering ideas helped lift to a great extent that doubt, the field of the psychology of religion may have been far more marginal than it is today. Echoing their words, we argue that religion and spirituality are fundamental, multidimensional, and multilevel aspects of humanity. Since they carry a set of experiences, communal as well as personal belief systems, motives, and codes of values that seem to have a direct, at times powerful, and distinct impact on a person‘s functional and dysfunctional mental processes and behaviour, their investigation considerably overlaps with the domain of psychology, and more specifically with that of personality. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the main psychological body of both theory and empirical evidence on religion and spirituality comes from within the broader area of personology and individual differences. Contextualising the psychological interest, it should be made clear that it is the feeling, thought, or personal interpretation of transcendence, as well as the associated attitudes, behaviours, and personality correlates that are of direct if not exclusive interest to psychology, while the existence of religious objects and the transcendent actual are best addressed through philosophy or theology. It would be sagacious to stress Spilka‘s et al. (2003) disclaimer that states that the object of the psychological study of religion is neither God nor the worldview of religious institutions, nor faith versus reason, nor religion versus science, but people. And religion appears to be important to our understanding of people, not only because it addresses an element of life that seems to be central to most individuals and societies, but also because it seems to affect a plethora of areas, such as individual differences, identity, attachment, well-being, and mental health, that are of principal interest to psychologists. Despite Sigmund Freud‘s (for example 1927/1961) attempts to present it as an anachronistic and disappearing concept, it looks like psychologists, and definitely personologists, are presently yet still gradually acknowledging that the psychology of religion is here to stay.

CLINICAL DIMENSIONS The relevance of the above discussion is all the more pertinent given the application of personality and individual differences research to clinical work. In fact, more than ever is it time to consider such issues given that changes in clinical conceptualisations are beginning and that such changes directly involve personality factors. The American Psychiatric Association (2010a) boldly states on its webpage ―DSM-V: The Future Manual‖, while the official DSM-V site heralds the expected publication date of the manual (May 2013) as ―one the most anticipated events in the mental health field‖ (American Psychiatric Association, 2010b). Bells and whistles aside, what is immediately evident from reading through the published draft of the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) is the triumphal influence of personology and individual differences on the shape of things to come in the clinical assessment, diagnosis, and classification of mental

4

Niko Tiliopoulos and Simon Boag

health. This influence is most obvious in the proposed changes to Axis II, and particularly to personality disorders, where terms like personality trait domains, trait facets, personality hierarchy, and dimensional assessment of personality functioning—all rather familiar to psychologists—prominently feature in abundance. According to the currently used clinical and categorical (binary) model of psychopathology (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), mental disorders are conceptualised as distinct health-related (latent) taxa, with specific and differentiated properties (symptoms and aetiologies) that an individual either possesses or not at any given point in their life. This position sits comfortably with at least the ―traditional‖ medical model of illness, and initially it may appear to make intuitive sense. After all, and as a layperson may state, one is either healthy or ill. It has gradually, however, become apparent that the categorical model is problematic. The arguably poorly defined and non-evidence based taxa and subclasses of disorders appear to generate rather unreliable and subjective diagnoses, possess problematic construct validities, result in unrealistically large numbers of co-diagnoses (the problem of comorbidity), and seriously limit scientific enquiry into mental illness (for more see Millon et al., 2004; Stark, 2006). Eventually, even the medical establishment acknowledged that the distinction between normality and abnormality is far fuzzier than it was originally conceived and that the current model is practically incapable of allowing a useful and meaningful differentiation between the two (for example, Helzer et al., 2008). As early as the 1970s (although arguably the seed had been planted decades before), with Hans and Sybil Eysenck‘s bold introduction of psychoticism as a fundamental dimension of ―normal‖ personality (e.g., Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976), personologists and clinical psychologists—also acknowledging the sincere efforts from the fields of behavioural genetics and evolutionary psychology—have been, at times, forcefully and explicitly questioning the value of the medical model of mental health, with a particular focus on personality disorders. The accumulating evidence points to the existence of the same personality traits in both nonclinical and clinical populations, the similar heritability levels of disordered and functional traits, common (if not identical) biological and genetic markers in the formation of both, and a cross-cultural correspondence between them (see also Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman, 2009; O‘ Donohue, Fowler, & Lilienfeld, 2007; Zuckerman, 2005). Thus far, the evidence appears to overwhelmingly suggest that personality traits may function as vulnerability to the aetiology and development of mental illness and that, within certain parameters, personality disorders may be both quantitative and qualitative exaggerated, dysfunctional, and nonadaptive expressions of normal personality variations. The inevitable conclusion is that the adoption of a dimensional approach to mental illness is the viable evidence-based solution to the problematic current state of affairs (see also Widiger, Livesley, & Clark, 2009). Consequently within such framework, the diagnostic and assessment discourse centres around levels of mental health functioning and impairment, and contextual or cultural degrees of adaptation. In the DSM-V the initial brave steps toward this approach are evident, with the complete redefinition of personality (and other) disorders and the introduction of a dimensional traits assessment of personality functioning. As a result, personology and individual differences (officially) gain a new status and acquire a far more central role in mental health, with corresponding levels of responsibility and increased demands for further research in the field. It remains to be seen whether the infusion of such knowledge results in this ―future manual‖

Introduction

5

living up to expectations and allowing for diagnoses to be ―more accurate, valid, and clinically useful‖ (American Psychiatric Association, 2010b).

ORGANISATION AND SCOPE With the above considerations in mind, the purpose of this book is twofold. The first general aim is to draw attention to the rich scientific literature that continues to emerge with respect to personality and individual differences psychology. Here the book addresses the underlying processes associated with known and novel personality factors, as well as current critical developments in theory. The second more specific aim is to draw attention to lesser known cross-cultural considerations that impact upon personality and individual differences research. This latter aim provides the book with a global context which is important for reflecting the growing direction in personality and individual differences research. Here the book addresses cross-cultural considerations and devotes special attention to religious factors, noting a wide-range of views on the matter. At the very least, history demonstrates that humans are attracted to the numinous, and so any account of personality should be able to accommodate this aspect of the human psyche. The book is divided into 4 major sections that address the major directions in personality and individual differences research: Part A: Processes & performance Part B: Culture, religion & spirituality Part C: Contributions to clinical psychology & assessment Part D: Developments in theory & structure Part A (Processes & performance) examines both individual and social processes that impact upon behaviour. Nadin Beckmann and colleagues open this section with a chapter that addresses the important issue of the relationship involving between- and within-person variables and their consideration in research in the workplace. Damian Birney follows this up with a discussion of the possibility of training fluid intelligence, a construct commonly noted for its immutability. Lauren O‘Driscoll and Jessica Franklin then (each with Eugene Chekaluk) focus upon the impact of the social environment on self-concept and selfevaluation. Following this, Madeleine Fraser and Simon Boag‘s chapter examines the interaction of person-variables (emotional intelligence) and situational variables, before Gerry Pallier and Niko Tiliopoulos discuss findings related to ‗nonconscious‘ processing, the incubation effect, and its impact upon creativity (as well as theorising why ‗sleeping on a problem‘ may be effective). Paul Ginns and colleagues discuss the role of traits in learning and performance with respect to academic achievement, workplace performance and physical exercise, and then finally, Sabina Kleitman and colleagues examine the important issue of predicting self-confidence in childhood and its relation to metacognition. Part B (Culture, religion & spirituality) discusses applications and findings relevant to understanding and acknowledging the importance of cultural considerations. This section begins with Luh Ketut Suryani discussing the significance of culture and spirituality, and its application to therapy. At the other end of the scale, Lazar Stankov and colleagues then

6

Niko Tiliopoulos and Simon Boag

examine militant extremist mindsets, a mindset often associated with extreme religious views. Following this, Leslie Francis and colleagues look at emotional intelligence in church leaders, finding relatively low scores on emotional intelligence compared to other populations. In a similar vein, Lisa Hancock examines the relationship between religious attachment (an extension from attachment theory) and schizotypal traits, finding a relationship between religious attachment and schizotypy in Christian samples. Fiona Hibberd then addresses the issue of secularism in psychology and whether there is a bias against discussion of religious issues, while John Reid looks at right- and left-brain thinkers and considers possible future issues in organisational psychology in a global economy. Finally for this section, Hoyt Edge and colleagues discuss differences between individualist and collectivist cultures through comparing North American and Balinese cultures. Part C (Contributions to clinical psychology and assessment) discusses clinical findings and evaluates current personality and individual differences assessment tools (including cutting-edge discussion of internet assessment). Tara Thompson and colleagues begin this section with a counterpoint to the influence of culture by examining the genetic variation associated with conduct disorder. Next, Marianna Szabó investigates the commonly used Depression Anxiety Stress Scales and its suitability across different phases of the life-span. Kathleen Mairet and Simon Boag‘s chapter then looks at the potential role of unconscious negative schemas underlying bulimia using subliminal presentation and again finding that cultural consideration appear to be important. Weiwen Yang and Esben Strodl next look at the importance of personality variables and motivational interviewing as an adjunct to successful cognitive behavioural therapy. With respect to assessment, Elliroma Gardiner and Chris Jackson address the noteworthy issue of conceptualising and assessing ‗disinhibition‘, a construct linked to impulse control failure, and then Jennifer Keen and Julie Fitness look at issues related to assessing and detecting white-collar fraud, which is all the more salient in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Richard Hicks then discusses measures of stress and both disadvantages and advantages associated with different approaches to the issue. Finally, Chris Jackson‘s contribution concerns the use of current technologies in personality and individual research, and will be of interest also to anyone wishing to assess and find new online testing facilities. Part E (Developments in theory & structure) discusses the theoretical and conceptual issues surrounding personality and individual differences research. Jonathan Gerber first discusses the issues of circularity and traits psychology before offering a constructive response to rescuing traits from conceptual problems. Niko Tiliopoulos next discusses an alternative ‗circular‘ conception of traits that arises in contrast to the problematic factor analytic derivation of constructs. Finally, Simon Boag‘s chapter argues for the importance of conceptual research as a supplement for empirical research.

FINAL COMMENTS This book arose from ideas generated at the Australasian Conference on Personality and Individual Differences (ACPID) held at the University of Sydney in November, 2009. ACPID has become a focal point for both personality and individual differences researchers in Australia and increasingly throughout the world. In conjunction with this, ACPID provides a

Introduction

7

constructive forum for the exposition and discussion of personality and individual differences research for both established researchers and also up-and-coming researchers. This spirit is found within this volume. The Editors would especially like to thank Mike Jones (deputy Head of Department at Macquarie University) and Chandera Rajah who made this book possible with financial backing. The Editors would also like to extend their gratitude to Sabina Kleitman, Carolyn McCann and Gerry Pallier for help with chapter reviews and finally, we would also like to extend our gratitude to all of the authors who contributed to this book.

REFERENCES Allport, G. W. (1950). The individual and his religion. New York: MacMillan. Allport, G. W., & Vernon, P. E. (1930). The field of personality. Psychological Bulletin, 27, 677-730. American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed., text revision). Washington, DC: Author. American Psychiatric Association (2010a). DSM-V: The future manual. Retrieved from http://www.psych.org/dsmv.aspx American Psychiatric Association (2010b). DSM-V: The future of psychiatric diagnosis. Retrieved from http://www.dsm5.org/Pages/Default.aspx Esau, T. G. (1998). The evangelical Christian in psychotherapy. American Journal in Psychotherapy, 52, 28-36. Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1976). Psychoticism as a dimension of personality. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Freud, S. (1961). The future of an illusion. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 21, pp. 5-56). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1927). Gergen, K. J. (2001). Psychological science in a postmodern context. American Psychologist, 56, 803-813. Hall, G. C. (2003). The self in context: Implications for psychopathology and psychotherapy. Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 13, 66-82. Helzer, J. E., Kraemer, H. C., Krueger, R. F., Wittchen, H. U., Sirovatka, P. J., & Regier, D. A. (Eds.) (2008). Dimensional approaches in diagnostic classification. Refining the research agenda for DSM-V. Arlington: APA. James, W. (2002). Varieties of religious experience. London: Routledge. (Original work published 1902). Jones, D. (2010). A WEIRD view of human nature skews psychologists‘ studies. Science, 328, 1627. Kraut, R., Olson, J., Banaji, M., Bruckman, A., Cohen, J., & Couper, M. (2004). Psychological research online; report of Board of scientific Affairs‘ Advisory group on the conduct of research on the internet. American Psychologist, 59, 105-117. Markus, H. R. (2004). Culture and personality: Brief for an arranged marriage. Journal of Research in Personality, 38, 75-83.

8

Niko Tiliopoulos and Simon Boag

Matthews, G., Deary, I. J., & Whiteman, M. C. (2009). Personality traits (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Millon, T., Grossman, S., Meagher, S., Millon, C., & Ramnath, R. (2004). Personality disorders in modern life (2nd ed.). Int.: Wiley. O‘ Donohue, W., Fowler, K. A., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (Eds.) (2007). Personality disorders: Toward the DSM-V. London: Sage. Spilka, B., Hood, R. W. Jr., Hunsberger, B., & Gorsuch, R. L. (2003). The psychology of religion: An empirical approach (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford. Strack, S. (Ed.) (2006). Differentiating normal and abnormal personality (2nd ed.). New York: Springer. van Til, C. (1972). The psychology of religion. Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Pubs. (Original work published 1935). Vande Kemp, H.(1986). Dangers of psychologism: The place of God in psychology. Journal of Psychology & Theology, 14, 97-109. Widiger, T. A., Livesley, J. W., & Clark, A. L. (2009). An integrative dimensional classification of personality disorders. Psychological Assessment, 21, 243-255. Zuckerman, M. (2005). Psychobiology of personality (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PART A: PROCESSES AND PERFORMANCE

In: Personality and Individual Differences Ed: Simon Boag and Niko Tiliopoulos

ISBN 978-1-61122-070-4 © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 2

INTEGRATING THE STUDY OF WITHIN- AND BETWEEN-PERSON VARIABILITY IN PERSONALITY AT WORK Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian Accelerated Learning Laboratory, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2050, Australia

and Robert E. Wood Melbourne Business School, Carlton, VIC 3053, Australia

ABSTRACT Research on personality in the workplace has primarily focussed on differences between individuals in their typical thoughts, feelings and behaviours as represented in the five-factor model of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999). We argue that a withinperson conceptualisation of personality offers additional meaningful insights into the role of personality in general and at work in particular. In this chapter we present a multi-level framework that integrates between- and within-person approaches to the study of personality in the workplace. We outline questions of interest that arise within this approach, provide examples from the literature that illustrate each question and highlight future research directions.

Keywords: Five-factor model, Experience sampling, Organisational psychology, Personality, Within-person variability



Ph: 61-2-9931 9187; Fax: 61-2-9931 9199; [email protected]

12

Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian and Robert E. Wood

INTRODUCTION An important but largely unresearched topic in personality research within organisational contexts relates to the variability in personality responses that occurs within a person across time and situations. Although much research has focussed on personality in the workplace, this work has primarily focussed on differences between individuals in their typical thoughts, feelings and behaviours as represented in the five-factor model of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1999), and the relation of these to work outcomes of interest (e.g., Barrick, Mount & Judge, 2001). In trait models, such as the five-factor model, which study between-person effects, variability that occurs within a person is treated as error variance. In this chapter we will present a multi-level framework that integrates between- and within-person approaches to the study of personality in the workplace. We will outline some questions of interest that arise within this approach, provide examples from the literature that illustrate each question and highlight future research directions.

BACKGROUND TO AN INTEGRATED APPROACH Over the past twenty years, the study of personality in organisational psychology has been dominated by traits; that is, relatively stable personality characteristics that influence thoughts, feelings, and overt behaviour (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1999). The most widelyvalidated trait model—the five-factor model (FFM; Costa & McCrae, 1992)—describes personality in terms of five broad dimensions labelled neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. The trait approach as represented by the FFM has provided a useful framework for organisational psychologists to describe individual differences on fundamental personality characteristics. In particular, it has allowed us to identify which of these between-person differences in personality are relevant for work. For example, meta-analytic studies have shown that individuals who tend to be more conscientious and/or less neurotic tend to perform better across a wide range of occupations (Barrick et al., 2001). Furthermore, by providing a taxonomy of the major personality factors the FFM has enabled the integration of seemingly heterogeneous findings regarding the role of personality in work settings (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 2005; Borkenau, Egloff, Eid, Henning, Kersting, Neubauer & Spinath, 2005). Although the trait approach has yielded major contributions to the development of personality research in organisational psychology, its emphasis has primarily been on descriptions of people relative to each other on relatively stable characteristics. Less emphasis has been placed on within-person variation, which itself is an important topic within the field of personality (Cervone, 2004). Within-person variability was most prominently studied by Mischel (1973) in the 1970‘s who argued that a considerable amount of variation in cognition, affect, and behaviour occurs within an individual and that this variation can be explained by the impact of the situation. In response, over the past two decades personality research has adopted a model that includes both trait-concepts and situations as sources of variability (see Matthews & Deary, 1998). This has been referred to as an interactionist approach. Within this approach within-person variability is captured by the concept of ‗states‘. In contrast to traits, states are conceptualised as aspects of personality that are

Integrating the Study of within- and between-Person Variability…

13

variable across situations and time. Specifically, traits interact with the situation to influence an individual‘s state at a given point in time. However, within organisational contexts, the emphasis has been on between-person differences, even when an interactionist approach has been adopted. For example, when predicting job performance using conscientiousness as a predictor, Barrick and Mount (1993) took into account the influence of the situation by including job autonomy as the situational moderator. That is, they examined how individuals who are working under different levels of autonomy compare on their job performance; not how an individual‘s job performance varies across situations with different levels of autonomy. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the two types of variability (i.e., betweenversus within-person) discussed above. The figure plots the mean levels and variation in effort expended by two employees (rated on a scale of 0 to 10) conditional on one situational characteristic, namely who is present. Within-person variability in effort across different situations is represented by the profiles (solid lines), whereas between-person variability is represented by the differences between the mean effort levels (dashed lines). Integrating within-person variability into the study of personality at work is important because of at least three reasons: (1) Previous research within the general personality literature has shown that within-person variability comprises a large part of the total variability in behaviour (Fleeson, 2001). Consequently, in order to get a complete picture of personality at work the two sources of variance (within-person and between-person) need to be simultaneously taken into account; (2) Within-person effects often differ between people and these differences capture meaningful components of personality. For example, it has been argued that situation contingent within-person effects may provide insights into individual differences in adaptability (Fleeson & Jolley, 2006). Assessing these differences and their correlates will provide insights into aspects of personality that are not well captured by a purely between-person trait approach; (3) Between-person relations are often used as proxies for inferences that relate to within-person effects. Specifically, researchers often articulate theories about the psychological processes that occur within an individual, but then collect data to test these theories at the between-person level. However, the two levels are conceptually and statistically distinct, and, therefore, conclusions that are made at one level do not necessarily generalise to the other level (Nezlek, 2001). In recent years the study of within-person variability has been advanced by developments in methodological and data-analytic techniques. These techniques facilitate the collection and analysis of data that involves frequent reassessments of individuals and has a multilevel structure. Specifically, experience sampling methodology (ESM), while known for several decades, has now become a practical option for collecting large-scale within-person data due to advances in computer technology such as the advent of handheld computers (see FeldmanBarrett & Barrett, 2001); additionally, developments in hierarchical linear modelling and associated software provide a means by which researchers can appropriately address the nested structure of such data (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We discuss experience sampling and hierarchical linear modelling in greater detail below.

14

Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian and Robert E. Wood 10 9 8

Effort

7 P1 Profile P2 Profile P1 Mean P2 Mean

6 5 4 3 2 1 0 supervisor

peer

subordinate

no one

Pe rs on Pre s ent

Figure 1. Response patterns for effort levels of two individuals (P1 & P2) as a function of people present in the situation for: (a) the average level of effort across situations (dashed lines), & (b) the variation in effort across situations where different people are present (solid lines).

Experience Sampling Method (ESM) To study the within-person aspects of personality we require a design that allows measurement of the individual‘s momentary thoughts, feeling and behaviours, and the variation in these states over time and situations. Experience sampling is a methodology that allows frequent sampling in a natural context without being too intrusive. This method has begun to be used in organisational research (e.g., Miner, Glomb, & Miner, 2005) as it allows for short, frequent measures of feelings, thoughts and behaviours that occur across the workday. By assessing these states as they occur, ESM designs have been argued to be more ecologically valid and less prone to the biases in recall that affect retrospective reports of behaviour (e.g., Fisher, 2002). ESM is typically implemented by sending individuals signals (e.g., via handheld computers or email) at different times during the day over several weeks that request them to report on properties of the situation and their thoughts, feelings and behaviours at that point in time. The sampling design for the timing of the signals and the measures will depend on the specific hypotheses researchers are testing.

Hierarchical Linear Modelling Integrating within-person and between-person variability raises several data-analytic complications that are not present in studies that focus solely on between-person differences (see Hofmann, 1997). In particular, the nested structure of the data (observations are clustered within individuals) creates dependency among the observations that violates the independence of observations assumption associated with the traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis. Consequently, use of OLS to analyse multilevel data results in inaccurate (downwardly biased) estimates of standard error. In contrast, hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) explicitly and simultaneously models each level of analysis—including the residuals

Integrating the Study of within- and between-Person Variability…

15

at each level—in terms of its own submodel. In this way, HLM accounts for the interdependence between observations that are clustered within individuals. Furthermore, it allows one to disentangle between-person and within-person effects on the outcome of interest, and to examine cross-level interactions. Use of hierarchical linear modelling has been limited in the past due to the practical difficulties associated with estimating the model parameters, however the emergence of several statistical programs for accomplishing this purpose has resulted in an increased use of such models over the past decade (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Within-person relationships (e.g., between situations and states) can be modelled by parameters at level 1 and between-person relationships (e.g., between traits and mean states) can be modelled by parameters at level 2. Furthermore, cross-level interactions (e.g., the effects of traits on within-person situation-state relationships) can also be represented and tested by parameters at the second level.

QUESTIONS WITHIN AN INTEGRATED APPROACH An integrated approach to studying personality at work lends itself to several types of questions that include but also go beyond the between-person questions that have typically been addressed in studies of personality at work (see Nezlek, 2007). In this section we outline and elaborate on these questions and provide illustrative examples from the literature. 



Between-person relationships: Individuals differ systematically in their typical levels of cognitive, affective and behavioural states as a function of traits Between-person relationships are the typical types of relationships that have been examined in studies on personality at work. They include findings from metaanalyses in which the association between personality variables and cross-sectionally assessed outcomes of interest, such as job performance and job satisfaction, are estimated (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002). This category also includes studies in which between-person differences in personality dispositions are related to between-person differences in aggregated levels of momentary states, such as positive and negative affect (e.g., Fisher, 2002). Within-person relationships: An individual’s states vary systematically as a function of the nominal and psychological properties of different situations as well as a function of other states In recent years, within-person relationships have received increasing attention in the organisational literature, although this body of research has primarily focused on state constructs that are distinct from personality, such as task performance (Fisher & Noble, 2004), job satisfaction (Ilies & Judge, 2002) and organisational citizenship behaviour (Ilies, Scott, & Judge, 2006). These studies indicate that within-person variability typically accounts for a substantial amount of the total variability in the construct of interest. Moreover, this variability is explicable as a function of momentary situational characteristics such as task difficulty (Fisher & Noble, 2004), as well as affective states (Ilies & Judge, 2002). In a recent study, we examined whether these findings extend to momentary variations in the conscientiousness

16

Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian and Robert E. Wood





levels of managers during three working weeks (Minbashian, Wood, & Beckmann, 2009, in press). As argued by Fleeson (2001), this represents a strong test of the viability of studying within-person aspects of personality given the assumptions of cross-situational consistency traditionally associated with the FFM. Nevertheless, we found that within-person variability in conscientiousness was approximately two times greater than between-person difference in conscientiousness, and that psychological properties of the tasks individuals were engaged in (importance, difficulty, urgency) accounted for the majority of this variance. Cross-level interactions: The within-person relationship between situations and states or between states and states, respectively, vary as a function of differences between people in traits In studies of within-person relationships the magnitude and/or direction of within-person effects frequently differ between people. These individual differences are often outcomes of interest in their own right and can be modelled as a function of personality traits and other individual difference variables, thus defining a third type of question that arises within an integrated approach. For example, Ilies et al. (2006) found significant differences between people in the extent to which momentary positive affect was associated with organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB). This effect was moderated by agreeableness such that individuals low on agreeableness tended to display a strong association between positive affect and OCB, whereas highly agreeable individuals tended to display high levels of OCB regardless of their affect levels. In contrast, Ilies and Judge (2002) found that individual differences in the within-person association between affect and momentary reports of job satisfaction were not significantly accounted for by either extraversion or neuroticism, although the latter was related to within-person variability in negative affect and job satisfaction. Such findings help to shed light on the way in which the effects of traits are reflected in everyday work situations. Comparisons of relationships at different levels: The between-person relationship between two constructs is not necessarily equivalent to the within-person relationship between the constructs Findings from studies implementing between-person designs do not necessarily generalise to within-person phenomena. For instance, the between-person finding of a five-factor model of personality does not imply the existence of a five-factor structure that operates within most individuals. This is because, statistically, models of between-person variability are not related to models of within-person variability (Nezlek, 2001; Schmitz, 2006). While the distinctness of the two models has been discussed in the literature (e.g., Cervone, 2005, see also lead paper by Cervone, et al., 2006 and associated commentaries), there has been little systematic empirical investigation of this issue (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003). Few studies have directly compared findings with regard to the structure of personality at the between-person level with findings at the within-person level. In one study Borkenau and Ostendorf (1998) collected data from 22 students once a day over 90 consecutive days employing a German adjective-based FFM measure. Individual within-person factor structures of FFM relevant states were rather weakly related to the overall between-person reference factor structure of FFM traits as assessed in a different sample. A stronger match, however, was found when the average within-

Integrating the Study of within- and between-Person Variability…

17

person factor structure was considered. In our own research we have looked at the relationship between two FFM dimensions, neuroticism and conscientiousness, from a between-person and a within-person perspective (Beckmann, Minbashian, & Wood, 2009, in press). We found that while neuroticism and conscientiousness were negatively related at the between-person level (a finding that is well documented in the literature, see Mount, Barrick, Scullen and Rounds, 2005), at the level of the individual this relationship was reversed. Further empirical evidence for the distinctness of within- and the between-person effects can be found in other areas of psychology, for instance, in the field of self-regulation (Vancouver, 2001, 2006).

CONCLUSION Personality has increasingly become an important topic in organisational psychology. Much of this research has relied on between-person comparisons. In this chapter we argued that the field would benefit from an approach that incorporates within-person aspects of personality. We have presented a framework that illustrates the types of research questions that can follow from this integrated approach. Furthermore we outlined some initial studies that fall within each type of research question. In the following paragraphs we list three areas of future research: 





Broader focus. More research is required to evaluate within- versus between-person effects on a broader range of personality related constructs. To date, most of the research has focused on a limited number of broad personality dimensions, such as conscientiousness and neuroticism (Minbashian, et al., 2009; Beckmann et al., 2009). Yet, the personality domain comprises a multitude of constructs, both broad and narrow that are likely to be relevant for a work context, such as openness to experience (Barrick, et al., 2001), or goal orientation (Payne et al., 2007). Conceptual clarity. Research is required to provide theoretical clarity about the types of effects studied at the within- and between-person levels. Questions of interests include: a) whether within-person effects (e.g., situation-state contingencies, such as an individual‘s responsiveness to situational cues) are stable across macro-contexts; b) whether these within-person effects are assessing constructs that are distinct from traditional trait constructs (rather than representing different methods of assessing the same constructs), and if so; c) how they fit in the nomological net of the traditional trait constructs. Malleability. Traditionally, trait approaches to personality have focused on the stable aspects of personality and, consequently, there have been few applications designed to develop personality in a way that facilitates performance in work contexts. It is likely that within-person aspects of personality are more modifiable. Unlike trait measures that have been traditionally routed in biology, within-person effects are thought to reflect cognitive factors that arguable are more amenable to intervention (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). However, this is an empirical question that has received little attention to date in the organisational literature.

18

Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian and Robert E. Wood 

Implications for work outcomes. Finally, studies are required to evaluate the implications of within-person effects for predicting and explaining work outcomes. In particular, from a practical perspective an important question relates to whether within-person measures provide incremental validity over what is already accounted for by traditional trait measures. Furthermore, a study that addresses this issue can also provide insight into the day-to-day processes by which personality traits influence important work outcomes; that is, one can explore the extent to which within-person constructs mediate the trait-job performance relationships that have traditionally been observed. This knowledge is relevant for organisational psychologists who are interested in identifying the underlying psychological processes that can be targeted as part of employee learning and development programs in order to implement behavioural change.

Integrating within- and between-person variability into the study of personality at work represents an exciting direction for future research. Pursuing this approach will lead to a more comprehensive picture of the individual in their work environment than captured by a purely between-person trait perspective.

REFERENCES Barrick, M. R. & Mount, M. K. (1991). The Big Five personality dimensions and job performance: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44, 1-26. Barrick, M. R. & Mount, M. K. (1993). Autonomy as a moderator of the relationships between the Big Five personality dimensions and job performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 111-118. Barrick, M. R. & Mount, M. K. (2005). Yes, personality matters: Moving on to more important matters. Human Performance, 18, 359-372. Barrick, M. R., Mount, M. K., & Judge, T. A. (2001). Personality and performance at the beginning of the new millennium: What do we know and where do we go next? International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 9, 9-30. Beckmann, N., Wood, R.E., & Minbashian, A. (2009, 25-28 November). It depends how you look at it—on the relationship between conscientiousness and neuroticism. Paper presented at the 8th Australian Conference on Personality and Individual Differences, Sydney, Australia. Beckmann, N., Wood, R.E., & Minbashian, A. (in press). It depends how you look at it: On the relationship between conscientiousness and neuroticism at the within- and betweenperson levels of analysis. Journal of Research in Personality. Borkenau, P. & Ostendorf, F. (1998). The Big Five states: How useful is the Five-Factor Model to describe intraindividual variation over time? Journal of Research in Personality, 32, 202-221. Borkenau, P., Egloff, B., Eid, M., Henning, J., Kersting, M., Neubauer, A. C., & Spinath, F. M. (2005). Persönlichkeitspsychologie: Stand und Perspektiven [Personality psychology: Current state and future prospects]. Psychologische Rundschau, 56, 271-290.

Integrating the Study of within- and between-Person Variability…

19

Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., & van Heerden, J. (2003). The theoretical status of latent variables. Psychological Review,110, 203-219. Cervone, D. (2005). Personality Architecture: Within-person structures and processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 423-452. Cervone, D. (2004). The architecture of personality. Psychological Review, 111, 183-204. Cervone, D., Shadel, W. G., Smith, R.E., & Fiori, M. (2006). Self-regulation: Suggestions and reminders from personality science. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 55, 333-385. Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) and NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Feldman Barrett, L. & Barrett, D. J. (2001). An introduction to computerized experience sampling in psychology. Social Science Computer Review, 19, 175-185. Fisher, C. & Noble, Ch. S. (2004). A within-person examination of correlates of performance and emotions while working. Human Performance, 17, 145-168. Fisher, C. D. (2002). Antecedents and consequences of real-time affective reactions at work. Motivation and Emotion, 26, 3-30. Fleeson, W. & Jolley, S. (2006). The challenge and the opportunity of intraindividual variability: A theory of human flexibility. In D. Mroczek & T. D. Little (Eds.). Handbook of personality development (pp.41-60). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Fleeson, W. (2001). Towards a structure- and process-integrated view of personality: Traits as density distributions of states. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 10111027. Hofmann, D. A. (1997). An overview of the logic and rationale of hierarchical linear models. Journal of Management, 23, 723-744. Ilies R. & Judge, T. A. (2002). Understanding the dynamic relationships among personality, mood, and job satisfaction: A field experience sampling study, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89, 1119-1139. Ilies, R., Scott, B. A., & Judge, T. A. (2006). The interactive effects of personal traits and experienced states on intraindividual patterns of citizenship behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 561-575. Judge, T. A., Heller, D., & Mount, M. K. (2002). Five-Factor Model of personality and job satisfaction: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 530-541. Matthews, G. & Deary, I. J. (1998). Personality traits. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. McCrae R. R. & Costa P. T., Jr. (1999). A Five-Factor Theory of personality. In L. A. Pervin and O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of personality psychology (pp.139-155). New York: Guilford. Minbashian, A., Wood, R. E., & Beckmann, N. (in press). Task-contingent conscientiousness as a unit of personality at work. Journal of Applied Psychology Minbashian, A., Wood, R. E., & Beckmann, N. (2009). Contingent beliefs as predictors of within-person variation in conscientiousness at work. In George T. Solomon (Ed.), Proceedings of the Sixty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (CD), ISSN 1543-8643.

20

Nadin Beckmann, Amirali Minbashian and Robert E. Wood

Miner, A. G., Glomb, T. M., & Hulin, C. (2005). Experience sampling mood and its correlates at work. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 78, 171193. Mischel, W. & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive–affective system theory of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. Psychological Review, 102, 246-268. Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social reconceptualization of personality. Psychological Review, 80, 252-283. Mount, M. K., Barrick, M. R., Scullen, S. M., & Rounds, J. (2005). Higher-order dimension of the Big Five personality traits and the Big Six vocational interest types. Personnel Psychology, 58, 447-478. Nezlek, J.B. (2001). Multilevel random coefficient analyses of event- and interval-contingent data in social and personality psychology research. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 771-785. Nezlek, J. B. (2007). A multilevel framework for understanding relationships among traits, states, situations and behaviours. European Journal of Personality, 21, 789-810. Payne, S. C., Youngcourt, S. S., & Beaubien, J. M. (2007). A meta-analytic examination of the goal orientation nomological net. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 128-150. Raudenbush, S.W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). Hierarchical linear models (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. Schmitz, B. (2006). Advantages of studying processes in educational research. Learning and Instruction, 16, 433-449. Vancouver, J. B., Thompson, Ch. M., & Williams, A. A. (2001). The changing signs in the relationships among self-efficacy, personal goals, and performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 605-620. Vancouver, J. B. & Kendall, L. N. (2006). When self-efficacy negatively relates to motivation and performance in a learning context. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 1146-1153.

In: Personality and Individual Differences Ed: Simon Boag and Niko Tiliopoulos

ISBN 978-1-61122-070-4 © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

DELIBERATE PRACTICE AND THE TRAINABILITY OF FLUID COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS Damian P. Birney Accelerated Learning Laboratory, University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia

ABSTRACT Over 100 years of research has failed to produce training programs that lead to demonstrable and sustained increases in fluid intelligence (Gf). We report on the work of Jaeggi, et al. (2008) who showed Gf-gains obtained by training working memory using a deliberate-practice-like approach. While promising, the work is not conclusive and we argue that future research needs to be very clear about what attributes are being modified, through what processes, and via what training-methods. We believe an investigative framework of deliberate practice will be fruitful for such work. Closer investigations of how training in different fluid cognitive functions leads to Gf gains which have a practical impact on everyday functioning are required. Implications for theory and test development, education and training programs, as well as ultimately for socio-political stereotypes are significant. To achieve this, headway will need to be made in overcoming a century of inertia surrounding traditional psychometric assessment and theorising.

Keywords: Deliberate Practice, Fluid Intelligence, Working Memory, Training

INTRODUCTION In this chapter we dissect and investigate the claim made by Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, et al. (2008) that they have achieved what over 100 years of education and psychology research has failed to do—to increase fluid intelligence (Gf). The increases in fluid 

Ph: 61-2-9931 9484; Fax: 61-2-9931 9199; [email protected]

22

Damian P. Birney

intelligence were achieved through training working memory (WM) using a variant of the nback task. As will be discussed below, central to their success is a presentation routine that prevented (or at least minimised) the automatisation of solution strategies by participants. It will be argued that this is, in essence, a deliberate practice routine as prescribed by Ericsson and his colleagues (Ericsson, 2003; Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Römer, 1993). We outline core issues that future research needs to address and discuss the socio-political importance and implications of this research.

JAEGGI, ET AL.’S RESEARCH In the typical n-back task, participants are shown a series of stimuli (e.g., letters, sounds, spatial locations), and for each stimulus are required to indicate whether it matches the identity of the stimulus that preceded it by n-places in the series (see Figure 1 where n = 2). The n-back task is considered a continuous WM task because participants must maintain and update (and presumably rehearse) a set of items while responding to each current item. The cognitive demands are thus theoretically consistent with the simultaneous storage and processing requirement central to many theories of working-memory (Conway, Jarrold, Kane, Miyake & Towse, 2007). Jaeggi, et al.‘s (2008) training sessions entailed an adaptive presentation of the n-back task that the authors believe minimised automaticity. We will outline their research here in some detail because of the remarkable simplicity of the training design and the significance of its impact on individual Gf gains. Participants were 69 healthy University of Bern students (mean age = 25.6; SD = 3.3). The WM training entailed presentation of varyingly difficult versions of the n-back task contingent on the individual‘s performance on previous trial sets. Difficulty was manipulated in terms of changes in n (1, 2, 3-back). Automaticity was further minimised by mixing the modality of presentation under dual-task conditions. That is, participants had to simultaneously maintain and update different item sets for two different nback tasks—one in an auditory mode and the other in a visuospatial mode. The auditory nback task consisted of one of eight consonants presented in a female voice. The visuospatial n-back task consisted of the presentation of visual stimuli located at one of eight possible screen locations. The rate of presentation of each component was synchronised to coincide and only match responses were required. The difficulty of the task was tailored to the individual. As individual performance changed, n incremented accordingly—up by 1 item for improved performance, and down by 1 item when performance worsened. The amount of nback practice was manipulated across four different groups—8 days (16 participants), 12 days (22 participants), 17 days (16 participants), and 19 days (15 participants). Daily practice consisted of 20 blocks of 20+n trials which equated to a daily training time of approximately 25mins. Change in Gf was evaluated using ‗parallel‘ versions of Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices and a short version of the Bochumer Matrizen-Test matrix reasoning task at pre- and post-test (before and after training). The results indicated that relative to a control group, not only did WM training result in greater gains in Gf, but the magnitude of the gains were a function of training ‗dosage‘—the more training, the greater the gains in Gf.

Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive Functions

23

2-Back Task No Match

G

1 No Match

D Match

2

G

3

R

N+1 Lure Trial

4

D

5

Figure 1. The 2-back task. Participants are presented each item (G, D, G… etc) one at a time and are required to indicate whether the current stimuli is the same as the one presented 2-back. Item 2 (‗D‘) is a N+1 lure for Item 5 (‗D‘). In responding to Item 5, participants must inhibit the tendency to incorrectly decide match which is triggered by the temporal location of Item 2’s ‗D‘ to the target location of Item 3 (‗G‘ = no match) & the fact that it primes a match response with the Item 5 ‗D‘.

EVALUATION OF JAEGGI, ET AL.’S FINDINGS Jaeggi, et al.‘s (2008) results are remarkable for a number of reasons. First, their sample consisted of healthy adults in their mid-20‘s. The general consensus regarding the developmental trajectory of Gf is that it rises from birth to plateau in the late teenage years from which time on there is a general, gradual decline (McArdle, Ferrer-Caja, Hamagami & Woodcock, 2002). These trajectory findings are consistent with the common interpretations of neuronal plasticity data (Berlucchi & Buchtel, 2009; Garlick, 2002). Significant neural change, which is presumably happening during Jaeggi, et al.‘s WM training, is more likely to occur in children rather than adults, because neuronal plasticity is reduced in adults. Second, research in educational psychology often report negative correlations between the amount of post-intervention gain and pre-intervention starting point (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002). In ability domains, this negative-gain effect is sometimes interpreted as the result of high-ability students simply having less room to improve than students who begin with less ability. In comparison to a general population, university students are very capable and (typically) already have quite high Gf levels. The student population used by Jaeggi, et al. (2008) would be expected to gain less simply because they are starting from an already high level. In short, that Jaeggi, et al. report measurable Gf gains over a relatively short period of time in a high-ability adult sample is impressive.

WHY HAS THIS INTERVENTION WORKED? Jaeggi, et al.‘s (2008) is not the first attempt to develop Gf. There have been numerous programs over the years developed to train WM and attentional resources associated with cognitive control. Most recently, the clear majority of these have been situated in the

24

Damian P. Birney

cognitive neurosciences (Braver, Paxton, Locke & Barch, 2009; Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen & O'Reilly, 2005) and have focused on identifying prefrontal cortex regions associated with various executive process manipulations. Transfer performance has typically been evaluated using untrained tasks that are similar in structure to the trained tasks. There is little research looking at modifiability of higher-order functions like Gf, or at implications for everyday function. A notable exception is the work of Holmes, Gathercole, and Dunning (2009). They instigated an adaptive WM training program (primarily with complex-span like tasks) with a small sample of 10yr old children (n=22) who had been previously assessed to have poor WM (the program was adaptive in the sense that training was targeted at children‘s current span level). These children performed significantly better on other untrained WM tasks compared to children in the non-adaptive condition who trained only on tasks that had a list length of 2 (so as not to tax WM). The trained WM and the untrained (transfer) WM tasks were comparatively similar in structure. It is important to note, the training and criterion tasks used by Jaeggi, et al. (2008) were not structurally similar. Holmes, et al. (2009) found that their adaptive WM training was associated with greater numerical reasoning performance when assessed 6 months later, compared to the control group. However, unlike Jaeggi, et al. there were no measurable increases in Performance IQ of the Wechsler test (the Gf proxy used in the study). In summary, Holmes, et al. (2009) showed improvements on some tasks following WM training, but not on all tasks, and unfortunately, not on Gf tasks. Jaeggi, et al. (2008) argue that their intervention worked because their form of n-back training engaged activities required for the management of executive processes for responding to two n-back tasks simultaneously. Further, and most importantly from our perspective is that the task format ―…discouraged the development of task-specific strategies and the engagement of automatic processes.‖ (p. 6830). The authors speculate that this is because of the tailored, adaptive variation in n-back difficulty and because the two n-back tasks drew on different modalities. We believe this is consistent with the concept of deliberate practice which will be elaborated in the following section (Ericsson, 2003; Ericsson, et al., 1993).

CAN DELIBERATE PRACTICE LEAD TO GF GAINS? Ericsson et al. (1993) used the term deliberate practice as a means to explain how experts in a given domain arrive at a level of performance qualitatively different from people who have been involved in the same domain for just as long, but who have not achieved such high levels. Deliberate practice is differentiated from practice alone in that it is: a) highly structured; b) effortful, and; c) designed to continually stress the individual to improve performance beyond a level most people would consider more than sufficient. As their primary case in point, Ericsson and his colleagues (extending on earlier research, Simon & Chase, 1973) have analysed the practice routines of chess players who differed in levels of expertise (i.e., novice, expert, and grand-masters). They concluded that the maximal levels of performance obtained by grand-masters are not automatically achieved by simply extending the amount of time playing chess. The aspect of experience that most strongly shapes the development of expertise is deliberate practice (Ericsson, 2002, 2005). Within the domain of higher-order problem-solving and knowledge acquisition, deliberate practice seeks to refine

Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive Functions

25

knowledge representations while avoiding automatisation. Automatisation here can be thought to refer to the development of eventually over-learnt strategies that might be triggered unthinkingly when certain stimuli in the environment occur. While automatisation of strategies frees resources for other activities, it tends to inhibit further learning improvements (Wood, Beckmann & Birney, 2009). Jaeggi, et al. (2008) make direct reference to the goal of preventing automatisation in their WM training. The question here is whether deliberate practice, as conceptualised by Ericsson (2002, 2005), can be used as a framework for explaining Gf gains reported by Jaeggi, et al. While Ericsson (2003) suggests that performance and its mediating biological mechanisms are modifiable as a result of extended deliberate practice, he presents no clear evidence that this is possible for basic cognitive processes (like Gf). Most of the examples cited are drawn from domains where gains could be obtained by a) better use of putatively unmodifiable, possibly innate, cognitive resources, or b) from physical domains such as sports, where aerobic training might lead to physiological changes that can be integrated with better use of cognitive resources (anecdotally leading to, for instance, superior ―eye-hand‖ coordination). As an example of the former, Chase and Ericsson (1982) conducted a shortterm memory training study where they tested individuals on a simple digit-span task every second day for many weeks and months. After 50h of practice, all subjects improved performance by 200% (~20 digits). After 200-400h of practice, two participants performance had increased by 1000% (~80 digits). Ericsson‘s (2003) interpretation was that through deliberate practice—adaptively extending the to-be-recalled list as individuals improved—the participants had acquired skill for storing and accessing long-term memory. That is, they had expanded their functional WM. The implicit assumption here is that while skills and strategies for using WM became more effective (increasing its function), there is no evidence that the underlying components of WM per se had changed. As an example of expertise development in the physical domain, Ericsson (2003) quotes the typical finding that physically fit adults (e.g., university students) can make around 20 push-ups in a row (with a range of 8-32). In 1966, a record was set by an individual who was able to complete 6000 push-ups. At the time of writing, Ericsson (2003) reported that the then current record, limited by how many push-ups can be achieved in a 24hr period, was 26000. These gains were attributed to deliberate practice. Our conclusion is that the procedure used by Jaeggi, et al. (2008) seems to fit well with Ericsson‘s (2003) deliberate practice framework. However, while deliberate practice research in cognitive and physical domains has shown that it is possible to vastly increase performance on trained tasks, it is not clear (at least in our evaluation of cognitive performance) that what is modified is truly transferable. That is, using the computer analogy of Newell and Simon (1972), it is not clear a priori whether that WM training results in deep structural changes to hardware, or whether it is simply tweaking software. Closer theoretical and empirical consideration of the nature of the attributes Jaeggi, et al. refer to is needed before the deliberate practice framework can be accepted as a plausible general account of the observed Gf gains.

26

Damian P. Birney

WHAT IS BEING MODIFIED? IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS Jaeggi, et al.‘s (2008) research spanned between 8 and 19 days with no ongoing followup evaluations of the sustainability of the gains observed. It is important for sustainability to be evaluated further because interventions designed to improve intelligence in the past have typically been conducted only with children and any putative Gf-like gains, if they have occurred, have not persisted (Holmes, et al., 2009; Neisser, et al., 1996). For the remainder of this chapter, rather than go into the details of any one study, we reflect on the broader issues that we believe all research in this area needs to be cognizant of—construct definitions issues and socio-political ramifications. Fluid intelligence, working memory, executive functions, and to some extent learning, have all been conceptualised as fluid cognitive functions (FCFs), a higher-order catch-all for a range of cognitive processes that are not contingent on the specific content of the information being processed (Blair, 2006). However, FCF turns out to be a rather nebulous conceptualisation once one begins to drill down to component functions. This is because while it might seem appropriate to include Gf, WM, and executive function under the same overarching umbrella, the constituents of each and the relationships between them are not always apparent theoretically (Birney, Bowman & Pallier, 2006) nor empirically. To understand the nature and broader implications of Jaeggi, et al.‘s results, we need to know what is being modified and whether these can be related to the effects of deliberate practice. In the next section, we provide a brief analysis of the issues that need to be considered in dissecting the claim made by Jaeggi, et al. (2008). Particular emphasis is given to issues associated with the definitions and operationalisations of Gf (including the learning and plasticity debate) and WM (including the executive function debate). We also reflect on some of the potential non-cognitive variables that might moderate WM-training effects through deliberate practice.

FLUID INTELLIGENCE (GF) Definitions of Gf Fluid intelligence could be considered the prototypical FCF. It is frequently considered to be at a conceptually higher level than WM and executive processes. Gf has developed meaning from within the differential psychology domain (Horn & Cattell, 1966) where theoretical constructs are defined by a nomological network of tests. Using correlational techniques (such as structural equation modelling), Gf is empirically defined as the latent trait extracted from a variety of reasoning-dominated psychometric tests. If Raven’s Progressive Matrices (the Gf measure used by Jaeggi, et al.) is included in such a battery, it typically dominates the extracted factor. Gf is considered perhaps the most important, some would say quintessential, aspect of intelligence primarily because it has been linked to many everyday success outcomes, such as schooling and job performance (Jensen, 1998).

Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive Functions

27

Gf and Learning A gap remains between how Gf is defined conceptually and how it is often empirically operationalised. For instance, despite a common definition of Gf as the capacity to learn, few measures of it are explicitly structured to provide the opportunity of learning throughout the test (Carlstedt, Gustafsson & Ullstadius, 2000). Instead, research has tended to focus more on the problem-solving aspect of Gf than on the learning ability aspect (Feldman Barrett, Tugade & Engle, 2004). This is an interesting outcome because Gf is also considered empirically distinct but theoretically related to Crystallised Intelligence (Gc). The latter reflects acquired (i.e., learnt) acculturated knowledge. Gc, like Gf, is defined as a latent trait and is typically estimated from tests of verbal based acculturated knowledge. The theoretical link between Gf and Gc is that Gc is thought to develop through the application of Gf (Ackerman, 1996; Ackerman & Beier, 2005; Cattell, 1987). Gf is critical to learning and knowledge acquisition. A possible reason why operationalisation of Gf has focused on reasoning (rather than learning) may be due to the restrictive and theoretically arbitrary assumption of many theories of intelligence—that cognitive abilities are stable and mostly immutable (Birney & Sternberg, 2006). Historically, the immutability of Gf was also supported by early informationprocessing theorists such as Newell and Simon (1972) who suggested that acquired knowledge and skills were like a computer‘s changeable software, and the cognitive processes were like the fixed hardware. Under these types of assumptions, explicitly assessing learning has been thought to have been unnecessary. Rather, the aptitude or ability to learn could simply be inferred from static tasks that assess the capacity to reason. Hence, paradoxically, learning has tended to have been under-represented in the basic theory building research on Gf. In attempting to manipulate task complexity, Carlstedt et al. (2000) intermixed items from a number of different reasoning tasks in the same (i.e., heterogeneous) presentation. Their expectation was that increasing task complexity should result in an increased correlation between task performance and Gf (see Birney & Bowman, 2009, for discussion of psychometric indicators of complexity). However, contrary to their expectations, performance on the homogeneously presented items (items blocked by task type) was actually the better predictor of Gf. The researchers argued that the basis of this finding was that homogeneous presentation allowed strategies to develop and that high Gf individuals benefited more from the opportunity to learn the structure of the items than low Gf individuals. This is a reasonable interpretation. However, if the deliberate practice work of Ericsson (2003) and the WM training approach of Jaeggi, et al. (2008) are considered, a heterogeneous presentation would be expected to be more beneficial to learning in the long term. It may be the case that the best way to assess Gf (i.e., homogeneous presentation, Carlstedt, et al.) is at odds with the way we might develop Gf (i.e., heterogeneous presentation, Jaeggi, et al.).

Gf and Neuronal Plasticity A relationship between learning and Gf has also been implicated at the biological level. Neural plasticity was proposed as a biological account of learning over 100 years ago (Berlucchi & Buchtel, 2009). However the consensus within the psychometric tradition of cognitive abilities is that while it may be possible to better exploit the use of one‘s level of Gf

28

Damian P. Birney

through cognitive training and through the acquisition of reasoning strategies or mnemonics (as supported by Ericsson‘s studies), the underlying basis of Gf is largely immutable (Ackerman & Beier, 2005; Garlick, 2002). Cognitive neuroscience studies tend to support this assertion. That is, while a) brain changes during cognitive training have been observed (McNab, et al., 2009), b) that impressive transfer and long-term maintenance has been reported in untrained tasks of similar structure (Dahlin, Nyberg, Backman & Neely, 2008), and c) that both these are examples of plasticity, before Jaeggi, et al. (2008), evidence for functional behavioural changes that go beyond simple improvements on structurally similar untrained tests has been lacking.

WORKING MEMORY (WM) WM is important to consider because Gf gains were (purportedly) obtained by Jaeggi, et al. (2008) by training on tasks that demand WM processes.

Definitions of WM A clear consensus regarding the nature of WM remains somewhat elusive (Conway, et al., 2007). Part of the confusion results from the varied approaches to the study of cognition. Experimental psychology, neurosciences, and cognitive-individual differences psychology all conceptualise WM processes somewhat differently. As a relevant case in point, the n-back task (as used by Jaeggi, et al., 2008) has received considerable attention, particularly in the cognitive neurosciences literature (Jonides, et al., 1997), however its status as a WM measure has recently been questioned on the grounds that it does not demonstrate construct validity with other (apparently more accepted) measures of WM, such as complex-span tasks (Kane, Conway, Miura & Colflesh, 2007). That is, despite the n-back task having many of the elementary cognitive operations that are hallmarks of WM, such as encoding, storage and rehearsal, and inhibition and continued maintenance of irrelevant items (Gray, 2001; Jonides, et al., 1997), correlations between n-back and complex-span tasks are often low. Jaeggi, et al. focused on WM training because they believed it targeted the executive processes central to WM, and that WM in turn was central to Gf. It is possible that inconsistency in correlations between different WM tasks (e.g., n-back vs complex-span) may be a result of the tasks targeting different executive processes. That is, training on different WM tasks may produce different Gf gains. We explore some of these issues next.

WM as a System of Executive Processes One of the main definitional problems with the executive processes underlying WM is that different theorist often use the same terms for different purposes (Gray, 2001). Oberauer et al. (2007) have argued that the term executive function is used in a ―… rather loose and very encompassing way‖ (p. 59). They prefer to distinguish between primary cognitive operations and executive processes, and argue for a further demarcation of two kinds of

Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive Functions

29

executive processes. The first relates to cognitive control processes, the second relates to inhibition processes. A prototypical executive function of the cognitive control type is task-set switching (Oberauer, et al., 2007). In task-set switching studies, the set of task parameters on which decisions are made is changed and a performance cost is generated in the transition to the new set of task parameters. While the exact interpretation of this cost is still open to debate (e.g., time costs or inhibition of proactive interference), Oberauer, et al. report that switching costs have unexpectedly been shown to have low or non-existent correlations with other FCFs such as WM capacity and Gf. This result was unexpected, they argue, because the capacity to maintain different task set parameters and to control when these parameters are activated is something a central executive-like component of WM would do. Finding zero or low correlations with measures of WM brings into question the exact nature of the constructs being assessed. The complexity of the WM/executive process issue can be further appreciated if one considers the work of Gray, Chabris, and Braver (2003). In this work, brain activation was shown to be more correlated with Gf on lure-trials than non-lure trials in the n-back task. Lure trials require inhibition of an inappropriate match-response. Thus, when executive processes are defined by inhibition processes, high correlations are found. It seems that the conceptualisation of the causal link between n-back performance and WM is in part a function of what is emphasised, and thus even within a task, close attention is required regarding just how WM components should be operationalised and trained.

NON-COGNITIVE MODERATORS OF GF GAINS There are a number of non-cognitive factors that are known to impact on reasoning performance and may thus moderate any observed Gf gains. The factors that are of most interest here are: a) implicit theories regarding the malleability of cognitive abilities; b) goal orientations toward learning versus performing, and; c) personality dispositions that favour effortful cognitive activities.

Implicit Theories regarding Malleability of Intelligence Dweck, et al. (1995) argue that the assumptions people make about the malleability of highly valued personal attributes follow either an entity or incremental implicit theory. Entity theorists tend to believe that intelligence is a fixed, non-malleable trait-like entity and that although people can learn new things, their underlying intellectual abilities remain the same. Individuals holding an entity perspective tend to view difficult situations as aversive, are less likely to see intrinsic learning value in attempting difficult tasks, and are more likely to attribute failure to external factors. The threat of potentially exposing one‘s ability limitations is thought to lead to maladaptive behavioural responses. Alternatively, incremental theorists tend to believe that intelligence is a malleable quality that can be changed and developed through effort. Individuals who hold an incremental perspective tend to be more motivated to attempt and persist at difficult problems. Failure is not simply attributed to lack of ability,

30

Damian P. Birney

rather they see challenging tasks as opportunities for learning and as evidence that more effort should be invested (Grant & Dweck, 2003). Investigating the impact of implicit theories on cognitive performance, Birney and Jeltova (2005) presented 92 university students a set of easy to moderately difficult Latin square reasoning problems (Birney, Halford & Andrews, 2006). At the completion of this first set of items, participants were told that the next set would take the same form but would be much more difficult. Individuals holding an entity perspective performed significantly worse on the second set of items than individuals holding an incremental theory, in spite of the fact that the two groups did not differ in Gf. It seems that the perspectives we have regarding the malleability of intelligence in part determines the way we approach cognitively demanding tasks and thus influences subsequent performance. Implicit theories need to be investigated as a potential moderator of WM training effects.

Personality and Goal Orientation Trait-based personality is typically conceptualised by five distinct and independent personality factors: Extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Openness to experience has been linked to need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), a tendency to seek out complex cognitive activities, and thus both are related to implicit theories in that they have the potential to moderate effects on training outcomes. Conscientiousness is also of relevance to training outcomes. Furthermore, the goal orientation one adopts has also been shown to be important for training outcomes (Payne, Youngcourt & Beaubien, 2007). Individuals with learning goal orientations are similar to incremental theorists, in that task engagement is intrinsically motivated. On the other hand, individuals with performance goal orientations are said to be driven by seeking approval from others and they tend to engage in ineffective learning strategies. All these non-cognitive factors are linked in that they influence the motivation to engage in the types of behaviours demanded by deliberate practice.

IMPLICATIONS FOR REAL-WORLD ACHIEVEMENTS We argue that one of the main reasons for why Jaeggi, et al.‘s (2008) findings are important and why they need to be investigated further, has to do with the putative relationship between the fore-mentioned FCFs and everyday life achievements. Although there have been many successful educational programs and psychological interventions developed to improve expertise in almost every area of human endeavour, the general consensus has been that knowledge acquisition is contingent on, and therefore limited by, basic cognitive functions which are largely immutable (Neisser, et al., 1996). As already mentioned, knowledge acquisition in virtually all domains, including vocational ones, is thought to be achieved to a significant extent through the investment of one‘s Gf in appropriate learning activities (Ackerman & Beier, 2005; Cattell, 1987). If Gf is not a malleable human attribute, then a limit on knowledge acquisition concomitant with one‘s Gf

Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive Functions

31

would logically follow. Furthermore, if researchers and educators make the presumption that certain cognitive abilities cannot be changed, then the approach to intelligence test development will naturally progress in a way that supports this assumption. If these assumptions are incorrect (even partially), then as argued by Birney and Sternberg (2006), the psychometric tools and the intelligence theories which emerge through their use are necessarily incomplete. Additional research is required to investigate the implications of Jaeggi, et al.‘s findings for Gf testing and how measurement and conceptualisation of the construct changes after training. In this last section, we reflect on the socio-political implications of Jaeggi, et al.‘s (2008) findings to present a case for the importance of continued research in this area. It is not surprising, given the previous discussion, that the standard interpretation of an individual‘s performance on a traditional intelligence test (that is, the meaning assigned to a score) has progressed in a way consistent with the assumption that basic cognitive abilities are largely immutable. It is also not surprising that historically this has had wide, ongoing, social ramifications that have not been missed in the scientific and popular literature. Furthermore, given the close link between intelligence and achievements in everyday activities (e.g., Jensen, 1998), and that the latter are often the responsibility of social institutions (i.e., policy makers at schools, universities, governments, and in commercial industries), it is not surprising there are complex implications. Much has been written and said throughout what has been a long and sometimes sordid history about the educability and intellectual worth of individuals and groups of individuals (the latter almost invariably linked to social, gender or ethnic clustering). A view of the intellectual worth of one such group of individuals 130 years ago was reported by Le Bon in 1879: ―In the most intelligent races, as among Parisians, there are a large number of women whose brains are closer in size to those of gorillas than to the most developed male brain... All psychologists who have studied the intelligence of women… recognize today that they represent the most inferior forms of human evolution... They excel in fickleness, inconstancy, absence of thought and logic, and incapacity to reason. Without doubt, there exist some distinguished women, very superior to the average male, but they are as exceptional as the birth of any monstrosity, as, for example, of a gorilla with two heads; consequently, we may neglect them entirely‖ (cited in, Gould, 1996, p 136).

And further: ―A desire to give them the same education, and, as a consequence, to propose the same goals for them, is a dangerous chimera…. The day when, misunderstanding the inferior occupations which nature has given her, women leave the home and take part in our battles; on this day a social revolution will begin, and everything that maintains the sacred ties of the family will disappear.‖

The contemporary view in comparison is of course considerably more moderate than this extreme example (though of course, the example was not so extreme in 1879). However, similar writings can be found since this time ‗justifying‘ slavery, early immigration policies, and selection decisions regarding who will fight a war at the frontline and who will not. In fact, group intelligence testing arguably emerged in the USA to specifically address just these types of questions (see Gould, 1996, for an excellent review). Controversy persists regarding

32

Damian P. Birney

how to deal with the assumption of cognitive fixedness as a potential success-limiting factor in providing access to educational and/or other opportunities. The debate has at times become polarised with arguments presented for and against slashing social programs because beneficiaries are seen as not being able to benefit because of inborn and fixed cognitive limits (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). These limits are almost invariably expressed as low IQ scores collected from psychometric measures that were developed under the assumption that cognitive abilities are generally fixed. Proponents of dynamic assessment (Lidz & Elliott, 2000), which philosophically has tailored adaptive assessment at its heart, strongly advocate for a greater acceptance that for at least some individuals, scores on standardised psychometric aptitude tests are not appropriate for making decisions regarding whether they should be permitted access to quality education.

CONCLUSION Specific evaluations of Jaeggi, et al.‘s (2008) work is still somewhat lacking. Sternberg (2008), one of the leading contemporary researchers of intelligence, is optimistic about the findings. He concludes that although several limitations of the study mean that there is a clear need for follow-up research, ―… none of them call into question the obtained results.‖ (p. 6791). We have argued that a fruitful route for further investigation is to use an overarching deliberate practice framework. To do this, one must be very clear about what attributes are being modified, through what processes, and via what training-methods. There are significant scientific and socio-political implications associated with this work. Simply demonstrating that Gf can be measurably improved and that this has a follow-on effect in everyday functioning has substantial implications for theory and test development, education and training programs, as well as ultimately for social stereotypes. To achieve this, significant headway will need to be made in overcoming a century of inertia surrounding traditional psychometric assessment and theorising.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Timothy Scriven and Fiona Ang for their assistance in researching the material for this Chapter. This research was supported under Australian Research Council's Linkage Projects funding scheme (project LP0669552). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian Research Council.

REFERENCES Ackerman, P. (1996). A theory of adult intellectual development: Process, personality, interests, and knowledge. Intelligence, 22, 227-257. Ackerman, P., & Beier, M. E. (2005). Knowledge and intelligence. In O. Wilhelm & R. W. Engle (Eds.), Handbook of understanding and measuring intelligence (pp. 125-139). CA: Sage.

Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive Functions

33

Berlucchi, G., & Buchtel, A. (2009). Neuronal plasticity: Historical roots and evolution of meaning. Experimental Brain Research, 192, 307-319. Birney, D. P., & Bowman, D. B. (2009). An experimental-differential investigation of cognitive complexity. Psychology Science Quarterly, 51, 449-469. Birney, D. P., Bowman, D. B., & Pallier, G. (2006). Prior to paradigm integration, the task is to resolve construct definitions of gF and WM. Behavioral and Brain Science, 29, 127. Birney, D. P., Halford, G. S., & Andrews, G. (2006). Measuring the Influence of Relational Complexity on Reasoning: The Development of the Latin Square Task. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 66, 146-171. Birney, D. P., & Jeltova, I. (2005). Perceptions of the malleability of intelligence: Culture and influences on reasoning, self-confidence, and tolerance to ambiguity. Paper presented at the 10th International Association for Cognitive Education and Psychology, University of Durham, Durham, UK. Birney, D. P., & Sternberg, R. J. (2006). Intelligence and cognitive abilities as competencies in development. In E. Bialystok & G. Craik (Eds.), Lifespan cognition: Mechanisms of change (pp. 315-330). New York: Oxford University Press. Blair, C. (2006). How similar are fluid cognition and general intelligence? A developmental neuroscience perspective on fluid cognition as an aspect of human cognitive ability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29, 109-160. Braver, T. S., Paxton, J. L., Locke, H. S., & Barch, D. M. (2009). Flexible neural mechanisms of cognitive control within human prefrontal cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106, 7351-7356. Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116-131. Carlstedt, B., Gustafsson, J. E., & Ullstadius, E. (2000). Item sequencing effects on the measurement of fluid intelligence. Intelligence, 28, 145-160. Cattell, R. B. (1987). Intelligence: Its structure, growth and action. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers. Chase, W. G., & Ericsson, K. A. (1982). Skill and working memory. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 16, pp. 1-58). New York: Academic Press. Conway, A. R. A., Jarrold, C., Kane, M. J., Miyake, A., & Towse, J. N. (Eds.). (2007). Variation in working memory. New York: Oxford University Press. Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Four ways five factors are basic. Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 653-665. Dahlin, E., Nyberg, L., Backman, L., & Neely, A. S. (2008). Plasticity of executive functioning in young and older adults: Immediate training gains, transfer, and long-term maintenance. Psychology and Aging, 23, 720-730. Dweck, C. S., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1995). Implicit theories and their role in judgments and reactions: A world from two perspectives. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 267-285. Ericsson, K. A. (2002). Attaining excellence through deliberate practice: Insights from the study of expert performance. In M. Ferrari (Ed.), The pursuit of excellence through education (pp. 21-55). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Ericsson, K. A. (2003). The search for general abilities and basic capacities: Theoretical implications from the modifiability and complexity of mechanisms mediating expert

34

Damian P. Birney

performance. In R. J. Sternberg & E. L. Grigorenko (Eds.), The psychology of abilities, competencies, and expertise (pp. 93-125). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Ericsson, K. A. (2005). Recent advances in expertise research: A commentary on the contributions to the special issue. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19, 223-241. Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., & Tesch-Römer, C. (1993). The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance. Psychological Review, 100, 363-406. Feldman Barrett, L., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. W. (2004). Individual differences in working memory capacity and dual-process theories of the mind. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 553-573. Garlick, D. (2002). Understanding the Nature of the General Factor of Intelligence: The Role of Individual Differences in Neural Plasticity as an Explanatory Mechanism. Psychological Review, 109, 116-136. Gould, S. J. (1996). The mismeasure of man (Revised and expanded ed.). NY: Penguin Books. Grant, H., & Dweck, C. S. (2003). Clarifying achievement goals and their impact. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 541-553. Gray, J. R. (2001). Emotional modulation of cognitive control: Approach-withdrawal states double-dissociate spatial from verbal two-back task performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130, 436-452. Gray, J. R., Chabris, C. F., & Braver, T. S. (2003). Neural mechanisms of general fluid intelligence. Nature Neuroscience, 6, 316-322. Herrnstein, R. J., & Murray, C. (1994). The bell curve. New York: Free Press. Holmes, J., Gathercole, S. E., & Dunning, D. J. (2009). Adaptive training leads to sustained enhancement of poor working memory in children. Developmental Science, 12, F9-F15. Horn, J., & Cattell, R. B. (1966). Refinement and test of the theory of fluid and crystallized general intelligences. Journal of Educational Psychology, 57, 253-270. Jaeggi, S. M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Perrig, W. J. (2008). Improving fluid intelligence with training on working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 6829-6833. Jensen, A. (1998). The g factor: The science of mental ability. Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood. Jonides, J., Schumacher, E. H., Smith, E. E., Lauber, E. J., Minoshima, S., & Koeppe, R. A. (1997). Verbal working memory load affects regional brain activation as measured by PET. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 462-475. Kane, M. J., Conway, A. R., Miura, T. K., & Colflesh, G. J. H. (2007). Working Memory, attention control, and the N-back task: A question of construct validity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33, 615-622. Lidz, C. S., & Elliott, J. G. (Eds.). (2000). Dynamic assessment: Prevailing models and applications. New York, NY: Elsevier Science. McArdle, J. J., Ferrer-Caja, E., Hamagami, F., & Woodcock, R. W. (2002). Comparative longitudinal structural analyses of the growth and decline of multiple intellectual abilities over the life span. Developmental Psychology, 38, 115-142. McNab, F., Varrone, A., Farde, L., Jucaite, A., Bystritsky, P., Forssberg, H., et al. (2009). Changes in cortical dopamine D1 receptor binding associated with cognitive training. Science, 323, 800-802.

Deliberate Practice and the Trainability of Fluid Cognitive Functions

35

Neisser, U., Boodo, G., Bouchard Jr., T. J., Boykin, A. W., Brody, N., Ceci, S. J., et al. (1996). Intelligence: Knowns and unknowns. American Psychologist, 51, 77-101. Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. NJ: Prentice-Hall. Oberauer, K., Suss, H., Wilhelm, O., & Sander, N. (2007). Individual differences in working memory capacity and reasoning ability. In A. Conway, C. Jarrold, M. J. Kane, A. Miyake & J. N. Towse (Eds.), Variation in working memory (pp. 49-75). NY: Oxford University Press. Payne, S. C., Youngcourt, S. S., & Beaubien, J. M. (2007). A meta-analytic examination of the goal orientation nomological net. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 128-150. Rougier, N. P., Noelle, D. C., Braver, T. S., Cohen, J. D., & O'Reilly, R. C. (2005). Prefrontal cortex and flexible cognitive control: Rules without symbols. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102, 7338–7343. Simon, H. A., & Chase, W. G. (1973). Skill in chess. American Scientist, 61, 394-403. Sternberg, R. J. (2008). Increasing fluid intelligence is possible after all. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 6791-6792. Sternberg, R. J., & Grigorenko, E. L. (2002). Dynamic testing. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wood, R. E., Beckmann, J., & Birney, D. P. (2009). Simulations, learning and real world capabilities. Education & Training, 51, 491-510.

In: Personality and Individual Differences Ed: Simon Boag and Niko Tiliopoulos

ISBN 978-1-61122-070-4 © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 4

THE EFFECTS OF COMPARISON STATUS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL COMPARISON TENDENCIES ON THE EXPERIENCE OF SCHADENFREUDE Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk Department of Psychology, Macquarie University Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia

ABSTRACT Little is known of the attributes of an individual that are involved in the emotion of Schadenfreude (pleasure at another‘s misfortune). This study used social comparison theory as a basis for exploring individual differences in experiences of Schadenfreude. Ninety nine first-year psychology students participated in a repeated measures experimental study where they responded to vignettes where a comparison target (upward vs. downward) experienced a misfortune. The participants completed a Schadenfreude Scale that measured their response to the misfortune of each target. They also completed the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure, which measured their social comparison orientation (SCO), the Upward Comparison Subscale (UCS), and the Downward Comparison Subscale, which measured their directional social comparison tendencies. The results showed that participants reported greater Schadenfreude towards the upward comparison target than the downward comparison target. Participants‘ SCO and UCS scores positively predicted Schadenfreude towards the upward comparison target, but not towards the downward comparison target, whilst participants‘ DCS scores were not predictive of Schadenfreude towards either target. These findings suggest that Schadenfreude is facilitated by upward social comparison processes, and that individual differences in experiences of Schadenfreude can be partially explained by individual differences in one‘s dispositional social comparison tendencies. 

Ph: 61-2-9850 8009; Fax: 61-2-9850 8062; [email protected]

38

Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk

Keywords: Emotion, Negative affect, Schadenfreude, Social comparison theory

INTRODUCTION When another person experiences misfortune, the emotional response directed towards the unfortunate other is typically one of sympathy (Brigham, Kelso, Jackson, & Smith, 1997). However, a somewhat less appropriate, joyous, emotional response may also occur. This emotion is Schadenfreude, or, as it is commonly defined, ‗pleasure at another‘s misfortune‘ (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000; Hareli & Weiner, 2002). This unusual type of pleasure is characterised by the observer‘s passive role in both causing and sustaining the other‘s misfortune (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000; Feather, 2008; Leach, Spears, Branscombe & Doosje, 2003). Thus, for one to experience Schadenfreude, a third party or external event must be responsible for the other‘s suffering (Leach et al., 2003). Although the existence of Schadenfreude has been documented by philosophers for centuries (Nietzsche, 1887/1967; Portmann, 2000), empirical studies examining this emotion only began to emerge in the 1990s. Much of the empirical research that has been conducted has emphasised the social nature of Schadenfreude. Schadenfreude is undoubtedly a social emotion: the other person‘s negative experience generates emotion within us, and is subsequently directed towards them (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000; Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). Schadenfreude is also dependent upon a discordant social appraisal, where the observer positively evaluates a situation or event that the object of the Schadenfreude negatively evaluates (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000; Hareli & Parkinson, 2008). The discordant social appraisal signifies the presence of a comparative concern between the observer‘s fortune and the other‘s misfortune (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000). It is due to this comparative concern, which is central to the experience of Schadenfreude (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000), that Schadenfreude has been theoretically and empirically linked to social comparison theory (e.g., Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000; Feather, 2008; Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany, Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Smith et al., 1996; van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006). Previous empirical studies that have investigated this link have typically emphasised other-focused social comparison explanations for individual differences in Schadenfreude (Leach & Spears, 2008), and consequently, insight into the dispositional personal attributes of an individual that may contribute to differences in this emotional experience has been lacking. Thus, this study proposes to examine both other- and self-focused social comparison explanations for individual differences in experiences of Schadenfreude to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between Schadenfreude and social comparison processes, and to provide insight into the personal characteristics of an individual that contribute to the experience of this complex and under-studied emotion.

LINKING SCHADENFREUDE AND SOCIAL COMPARISON THEORY Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) proposes that people seek to gain information and evaluate their own abilities, opinions, and relative standing by comparing themselves with similar others in their social environment. Similarly, Schadenfreude is typically directed

The Effects of Comparison Status and Individual Differences…

39

towards others in our social-emotional environment (Hareli & Weiner, 2002). Furthermore, just as people are more likely to compare themselves with others on attributes that are of personal importance (Festinger, 1954), Schadenfreude is most likely to occur in self-relevant domains (Leach et al., 2003; Nietzsche, 1887/1967), and in situations where there is direct competition between the fortunes of the observer and those of the unfortunate other (BenZe‘ev, 2000). In recent years, social comparison theory has undergone numerous changes (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007), with increasing focus on the affective outcomes of making comparisons with others (Buunk, Zurriaga, Peíró, Nauta, & Gosalvez, 2005). Specifically, there has been an emphasis on the affective consequences of making comparisons with those who are in a superior position to oneself, that is, the process of upward comparison, and, with those who are in an inferior position to oneself, known as downward comparison (Buunk, Zurriaga, et al., 2005; Wills, 1981). Comparing one‘s fortunes with those of a superior or inferior other will lead to differing affective outcomes (Buunk, Kuyper, & van der Zee, 2005; Wills, 1981). Contrast effects are believed to occur when one views another‘s status as unchangeable and substantially different from their own, and thus, an upward comparison will elicit negative feelings such as resentment, envy, inferiority and frustration, and a downward comparison will elicit positive feelings such as relief and pleasure (Buunk, Kuyper, et al., 2005; Buunk, Zurriaga, et al., 2005; Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004).

SCHADENFREUDE AND TARGET COMPARISON STATUS The status of another with whom we compare our fortunes has considerable implications for the elicitation of Schadenfreude. Interestingly, research has found that Schadenfreude is commonly preceded by an upward comparison with another (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000; Brigham et al., 1997), and is facilitated by the contrastive negative emotions such as envy (Brigham et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1996) and resentment (Feather & Nairn, 2005; Feather & Sherman, 2002) that are elicited by this upward comparison. Pleasure and joy are experienced when the superior other subsequently experiences a misfortune, as the misfortune provides relief from the negative emotions associated with the upward comparison, whilst furthermore emphasising the observer‘s new, comparatively superior position (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000; Smith et al., 1996). Accordingly, it is believed that Schadenfreude is rarely preceded by a downward comparison, as the downward other poses no threat to the observer‘s comparative fortune (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000).

SCHADENFREUDE AND SOCIAL COMPARISON ORIENTATION There are considerable individual differences in the extent to which people engage in social comparison (Buunk & Mussweiler, 2001; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Gibbons and Buunk (1999) developed the concept of social comparison orientation (SCO), to refer to an individual‘s dispositional tendency to engage in social comparison, and they developed a scale assessing such individual differences. Generally, those who are high in SCO are more prone to engage in social comparison (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Researchers have suggested

40

Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk

that this variability in SCO may be a function of differing personality characteristics, and indeed, research has indicated that those individuals who are high in SCO are also more likely to have an unstable self concept, lower self-esteem, and be higher in negative affectivity and depression (Buunk & Gibbons, 2006, 2007). Furthermore, those high in SCO are typically more affected by social comparison situations (Buunk & Gibbons, 2006). These results have important theoretical implications for Schadenfreude. Firstly, as an upward social comparison appears to be a necessary antecedent for the elicitation of Schadenfreude (Brigham et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1996), it would be likely that the greater an individual‘s SCO, and thus the more sensitive they are to social comparison situations, the more Schadenfreude they would feel when presented with the misfortune of a superior other in a socially comparative situation. Secondly, as those who are high in SCO are more likely to suffer from low self-esteem and depression (Buunk & Gibbons, 2006, 2007; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), it is likely that individuals with these characteristics would be particularly sensitive to negative emotions (Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, Vaknin, Marom, & Hermesh, 2008) emerging from an upward social comparison, and thus experience more pleasure when these negative emotions are alleviated by witnessing misfortune befall a superior other.

SCHADENFREUDE AND DIRECTIONAL SOCIAL COMPARISON TENDENCIES It is also believed that the direction in which people have a dispositional tendency to compare with others varies considerably from one person to the next (Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg, 2001; Wills, 1981). This finding has important implications for the elicitation of Schadenfreude. As the experience of Schadenfreude is commonly preceded by an upward comparison (Brigham et al., 1997; Smith et al., 1996), and witnessing a misfortune befall another places the observer in a comparatively superior position to the unfortunate other, effectively producing a downward comparison (Ben-Ze‘ev, 2000), comparison direction appears to play a fundamental role in the experience of Schadenfreude. It is likely then, that the direction in which an observer has a dispositional tendency to compare with others would be associated with their experience of Schadenfreude towards both upward and downward comparison targets.

THE PRESENT STUDY This study aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between Schadenfreude and social comparison processes by examining Schadenfreude within the explicit framework of social comparison theory. Thus, we ask whether social comparison theory can provide an explanation as to why individual variance occurs in experiences of Schadenfreude. Specifically, this study aims to clarify previous findings by investigating whether a social comparison other‘s superior or inferior status may affect one‘s experience of Schadenfreude. Furthermore, we aim to provide a new dimension to the Schadenfreude and social comparison literature by investigating whether individual differences in experiences of

The Effects of Comparison Status and Individual Differences…

41

Schadenfreude towards upward and downward comparison others can be explained by differences in individuals‘ SCO, and their directional social comparison tendencies. Based on the literature reviewed above, we propose: 1. Overall, participant experience of Schadenfreude will be greater towards the upward comparison target than the downward comparison target. 2. SCO will be a positive predictor of participants‘ Schadenfreude towards the upward comparison target. This relationship will not be found for the downward comparison target. 3. To explore whether participants‘ dispositional directional comparison tendencies are able to predict participants‘ experience of Schadenfreude towards the upward and downward comparison targets.

METHOD Participants and Design One hundred first-year psychology students from Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, participated in a repeated measures experimental study. The participants were recruited via Macquarie University‘s subject-pool website and were required to be proficient in English. One participant was excluded from the analysis as they failed to meet the eligibility requirements. The remaining sample of 99 participants consisted of 18 males and 81 females whose ages ranged from 17 to 43 years (M = 20.08 years). For their participation, all participants received a time-credit of 30 minutes towards their assessment requirement for an introductory psychology course.

Materials Vignettes Two written vignettes were constructed to induce Schadenfreude in the participants. The participants were asked to imagine themselves as they were described in the vignettes, interacting with a peer student. The peer student was described as having either exceptional social and academic skills (upward comparison target condition ―G.A.‖), or poor social and academic skills (downward comparison target condition ―S.B.‖), whilst in both vignettes the participant was described as having average social and academic skills. The vignettes were written to increase comparison behaviour between the participant and the target by increasing perceived similarity (Festinger, 1954), and were based around characteristics that students typically compare themselves with others on such as grades, performance, and behaviour (Buunk, Kuyper, et al., 2005). The vignettes then described a situation where the target experienced a misfortune. The target was ―caught cheating from notes they had snuck into the final exam‖ and ―consequently failed the unit, jeopardising their chance of getting into a competitive fourth-year program.‖ Aside from the manipulation of the target‘s comparison level, the two vignettes were identical.

42

Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk

Schadenfreude Scale Two Schadenfreude Scales were constructed to measure the extent to which the participants experienced Schadenfreude in response to the comparison targets‘ misfortune described in the two vignettes. The Schadenfreude Scales comprised of eight items in total. Schadenfreude was measured by five items that described feelings of satisfaction, pleasure, contentment, joy, and happiness at the target‘s misfortune (e.g., ―I feel satisfied by what happened to G.A.‖). Three filler items that reflected general emotional responses to the target‘s misfortune that are not consistent with the experience of Schadenfreude (e.g., ―I feel upset by what happened to S.B‖) were also included. Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with each of the statements on a 6-point Likert-type scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) from the perspective of the participant they were asked to identify with in each of the vignettes. Overall, a higher mean score on the five items indicated greater Schadenfreude. Aside from being adjusted for the corresponding target in each vignette, the two Schadenfreude Scales were identical.

Social Comparison Tendencies SCO was measured using the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). The INCOM comprises 11 items (e.g., ―I often compare how I am doing socially (e.g., social skills, popularity) with other people‖), and requires participants to rate their level of agreement with each item on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (I disagree strongly) to 5 (I agree strongly). After reverse coding items 5 and 11, a higher mean score on the 11 items indicates greater SCO. The INCOM‘S two directional subscales, the Upward Comparison Subscale (UCS) and the Downward Comparison Subscale (DCS; F.X. Gibbons, personal communication, March, 2009) were also utilised. The UCS comprises six items measuring dispositional tendency to engage in upward social comparisons (e.g., ―I sometimes compare myself with others who have accomplished more in life than I have‖), and the DCS comprises six items measuring dispositional tendency to engage in downward social comparisons (e.g., ―I sometimes compare myself with others who have accomplished less in life than I have‖). All items on both subscales are rated on the aforementioned 5-point scale, and a higher mean score on each subscale indicates a greater dispositional tendency to engage in upward (UCS) and downward (DCS) social comparisons.

Procedure Participants were randomly allocated a questionnaire booklet containing each of the measures, where the vignettes and related Schadenfreude Scales were counterbalanced across the sample. Instructions on how to complete each questionnaire were presented at the beginning of each measure. The participants then read the first vignette and completed the pertaining Schadenfreude Scale. This was followed by the INCOM, the UCS and the DCS. Next, the participants read the remaining vignette and completed the subsequent Schadenfreude Scale. The study concluded with completion of the demographics questionnaire and a participant debriefing.

The Effects of Comparison Status and Individual Differences…

43

RESULTS Preliminary Analyses Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and reliability coefficients for each of the study‘s measures. As can be seen by the Cronbach‘s alpha coefficients, each of the scales demonstrated sufficiently high internal consistency. Table 1. Descriptive statistics & reliability coefficients for the study variables (N=99) Measure Schadenfreude UCTC DCTC Social Comparison INCOM UCS DCS

M

SD

Min.

Max.

Possible Range

Cronbach‘s α

2.76 1.85

0.95 0.66

1.00 1.00

5.60 4.00

1-6 1-6

.84 .80

3.78 3.22 2.89

0.55 0.80 0.82

2.45 1.17 1.00

5.00 5.00 4.67

1-5 1-5 1-5

.82 .82 .85

UCTC = upward comparison target condition; DCTC = downward comparison target condition; INCOM = Iowa-Netherlands Social Comparison Orientation Measure; UCS = Upward Comparison Subscale; DCS = Downward Comparison Subscale.

Data inspection revealed that the Schadenfreude Scale pertaining to the downward comparison target condition was positively skewed, and so in accordance with the method recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), a log10 data transformation was performed. The resulting transformed data set was normally distributed. All statistical analyses were then conducted twice, once using the untransformed data set and once using the transformed data set. It was found that the actual pattern of significance of the results obtained in the two sets of analyses did not differ. Therefore, for ease of interpretation, the untransformed data set was used to report the results of all analyses. The primary assumptions for all other variables were tested and satisfied and the conventional alpha level of .05 was used in all analyses.

Primary Analyses Hypothesis 1 A paired-samples t-test was conducted to investigate the effect of target comparison status on the participants‘ experience of Schadenfreude. As predicted, participant reported Schadenfreude was greater towards the upward comparison target (M = 2.76, SD = 0.95), than the downward comparison target (M = 1.85, SD = 0.66), as participant scores on the Schadenfreude Scale pertaining to the upward comparison target condition were significantly higher, t (98) = 10.15, p < .0005, η² = .51, 95% CI [0.74, 1.09].

44

Jessica E. Franklin and Eugene Chekaluk

Table 2. Results of regression analyses of variables predicting Schadenfreude towards the upward comparison target & Schadenfreude towards the downward comparison target (N=99) Predictor Variable

B

Upward comparison target SCO .45 Upward comparisonª .39 Downward .08 comparisonb Downward comparison target SCO .04 Upward comparisonª .04 Downward -.07 comparisonb

SE B

β

p

% variance explained

.17 .12 .12

.26 .33 .06

.010 .001 .518

7% 10% 5% in at least one out of the two groups were revealed (see Table 2). Significant differences in frequencies of DRD4 haplotypes across the C_1611535 (rs58688157), rs9366, exon 3 VNTR, and rs11246226 polymorphisms were registered (X2(14)=40.2, p