Personal Enmity in Roman Politics, 218-43 B.C

PERSONAL ENMITY IN ROMAN POLIT/es, 218-43 B.C.

The Roman Republic was governed by a group of men who agreed far more than they disagreed on the fundamental questions facing the state. The detail of their public bchavioul' can only be unders tood through consideraLion of the personal motives so deeply embedded in Roman society. One of the most importanl such motives is that of personal enmity or hatred (inimicitia). Such enmity coulcl arise in various ways, and was often ccntral (as was its opposite, amicitia, though in difTerenl ways) in the formation of politieal faetions. In partieular faclions opposing such powerful figures as Pompey in the 60s and Caesar in the 50s might be uni ted by nothing more than comrnon hatred of the individual and his power. An important feature loo was the criminal trial, because 01' the highly personal nature of I he Roman adversary system: trials eould both forward and crcate inimicitia, and the author argues that personal faetors were more important than political ones in the famous trials of 111(' late Republic. llavid F. Epstein is Assistant to the President and Lecturer in Departments of History and Classics, the U niversity of ( :hicago. IllC

Personal Enmity in

Roman Politics

218 -43BC

DAVID F. EPSTEIN /

Dr. VEIT GEORG WAENTIG

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,:J100 The conduct 01' Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos was also a pleasant sur­ prise für Cicero. I have already referred to Nepos' hostility to Cicero and to Ciccro's alarm whcn Nepos acquired the consulate of 57 and the power to work against his recall. Cicero was all the more surprised that N epos did not use his office in that way because 01' Nepos' relationship to Clodius: 'Quintus Metellus, who was my enemy in his own right and a cousin 01' another 01' my enemies, abandoned his private feelings. >101 Cicero' s advice to

Q. Minucius Thermus, the propraetor of Asia in 51-50, further vividly i1lustrates his assumption that relatives would become involved in the inimicitiae of their kin. He urged Minucius, who was returning to Rome, to leave his province under the command of his quaestor L. Antonius. Failure to do so would disgrace Antonius and oblige Minucius to contend with the hostility not only of his quaestor but of 'three brothers, of the highest birth, who are quick to react and quite eloquent' .102 Sulla's hatred spread among Marius' relatives, and turned the civil war into a personal vendetta. M. Marius Gratidianus, Marius' nephew, was executed with Sulla's approval under Catiline' s gruesome and notorious direction .103 Sulla also extended his hatred to Marius' son, C. Marius, who had died during the siege of Praeneste. His head was brought to Sulla, who could not resist a joke at the comparative youth of the consul.!04 Sulla's wrath embraced even ]ulius Caesar, the nephew 01' Marius' wife. In addition to his birth, Caesar had added to his anti-Sullan credentials by marrying the daughter of Cinna. Sulla tried unsuccessfully to persuade Caesar to divorce his wife and then took steps to ensure that Caesar did not gain the priesthood he was sceking. He may have contemplated executing Caesar because he saw many l\1ariuses in the young man. Caesar pru­ dently withdrew into voluntary exile. I05 The most extensive evidence 01' how readily relatives associated themselves in inimicitiae comes from the exile of Cicero. Cicero was forever mentioning his well-founded concern that his brother Quintus would become involved in his own ruin. Quintus was indeed almost killed in the rioting fomented by Clodius to block a motion to recall Cicero. I06 Furthermore, the Clodians worried the Ciceros by threatening to prosecute Quintus for his administration of Asia after his return in 58. 107 Fran~'ois Hinaro has drawn attention to the virulence 01' inimicitiae inherited by Romans as a crucial element in the (by modern standards) harsh lex Cornelia de proscriptione, which barred descendants 01' Sulla's victims in the proscriptions from holding public office. lOS The burning resentments these men harboured would have made them unfit to be trusted with the responsibilities and temptations of public office. Cicero, who during his consul­ ship opposed restoring thc right to seek office to the Sullan victims, justified his actions in terms only an audience familiar with the consuming rage inspired by familial hatred would understand: 'I excluded from candidature young men who were worthy and

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brave, but who had suffered experiences which, had they attained public office, would have induced them to destroy the Republic.' 109 Inimicitiae also spread among Roman amici (friends). Again it is possible to find evidence that amici did not invariably share their enmities. 110 But this was exceptional. Nepos, a far more reliable source on social mores than historical details, evidently considered Atticus' friendship with Cicero and Brutus at a time when he was also intimate with Antony, a man they both detested, extremely unusual: Atticus, although he enjoyed intimacy with Cicero and was most friendly with Brutus, did not indulge them in their desire to injure Antony. On the contrary, he protected Antony's friends as much as possible when they fled the city, and provided whatever aid they needed. 111 Atticus was that rara avis, a Roman who preferred otium (leisure) to politics. His business interests forced hirn to be friendly with all and to offend nobody.112 He therefore needed to stand aloof from his friends' inimicitiae more than a man who depended on his amici to co-operate in the struggle for power. Among such men, sharing enmities became a kind of topos in references to friendship. Cicero, when stressing the ties of friendship that bound hirn to his correspondents, sometimes mentioned mutual enmities. 1I3 After retuming from exile Cicero commended the affection a few loyal friends had shown hirn by gladly taking up his inimicitiae. 1I4 Similarly, when Cicero explained his political embrace of the triumvirs in 54, he was especially moved because Pompey 'treated my enemy as his own unique enemy in the state' .115 Caesar's serious political dilemma after retuming from his pro­ consulate in Spain illustrates the impracticability of befriending two men who detested each other. His career ambitions required the support of influential amici like Pompey and Crassus, the two most powerful men in Rome at the time. Unfortunately, these two had been inimici for a decade, and Caesar recognised that friend­ ship with one inevitably meant enmity with the other. Caesar's ingenious solution was to reconcile the two, thereby conceiving the first triumvirate. 116 Cicero mirrored Caesar' s assumption that friends shared each other's inimicitiae. Crassus in the course of defending Gabinius had disparaged and alienated Cicero. Cicero later reported that a clique of reactionary optimates, hoping to re­ enlist hirn for the anti-triumviral cause, 'professed to rejoice that

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Crassus was my enemy, and claimed that those who supported Crassus' cause would never be my friends'. 117 The optimates evidently expected as a matter of course that Crassus' anger would spread to Pompey and Caesar. Numerous examples confirm the Roman expectation that amicitia involved sharing enmities. In the first recorded dash between Clodius and Milo in 57, Clodius attempted forcibly to block the eHorts of Milo and other magistrates to have Cicero recalled. Milo countered by enlisting his own band of gladiators, initiating the strect fighting that culminated five years later with Clodius' death. Cicero was duly appreciative of such solicitude: 'Milo not only took up enmities for my sake; he even sought them out.' 118 He subsequently professed to have da ne no less for Milo: 'I sought out the enmities of the powerful for your sake; I fre­ quently offered my body and my very life to your enemies' weapons.' 119 Caelius like Milo paid a price for his elose friendship with Cicero. He had a long-standing quarret with Ap. Claudius Pulcher and his entire family, which had been at least partially alleviated in 50, only to break out anew because Claudius had been insufficiently grateful for same help Caelius had given hirn at his prosecution earlier in the year. As a result, Claudius had deelared war, as Caelius put it. Caelius was espccially worried because Claudius as censor could bring the considerable powers of his office to bear against his enemies. He detcrmined to secure the aid of Claudius' colleague, L. Pisa, whose position could neu­ tralise any attempt Claudius made to exploit his office. But Piso was cool to Caelius' overturcs because of the latter's bond with Cicero, Piso's bitler inimicus since 58, the year Cicero was exifed during Pisa' s consulate .120 Friends were particularly essential when a Roman left the city for an extcnded period of time, opening a breach for his enemies while he could nol adequately defend hirnself. Such protection of an absent friend's position oftcn involved acquiring new inimici. Plancus, writing in April 43 from Gaul, thanked Cicero for the many services he was undertaking on his behalf in Rome. These included 'perpetual quarrcls with detractors on my account' .121 Cicero did no less the same year for D. Brutus, the proconsul of Cisalpinc Gaul. He assured Brutus that he was handling his detractors in Rome with ease. 122 Cicero had received similar services from Caelius during his proconsulate in Cilicia. A letter of appreciation suggests that Caclius must have acquired a rash of new inimici on Cicero's behalf: 'I truly adore you, my Rufus,

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The Causes 0] Inimicitiae whom fortune has provided to increase my dignity, and to take revenge not only on my enemies, but even on those who envy me.' 12]

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Envy as a sour ce of inimicitiae The most fertile source 01' inimicitiae within the nobility, however, was the desperate desire to advance up the rungs 01' the CUTSUS honorum. Among lesser men it was greed. 124 The Roman Republic richly rewarded successful competitors for the tiny number 01' curule offices. These happy few ennobled themselves and their families, thus achieving the goal to which the ruling class collec­ tivcly aspired. Roman society contrasted sharply with modern by offering few attractive alternatives to the rewards 01' public life. It is true that Atticus preferred otium and voluntarily renounced the CUTSILS honorum. As a new man he had little chance 01' attaining the ultimate prize, the consulate, and this may have made the decision easier for hirn. In spite 01' the vast power he wielded behind the seenes, his inf1uenee and prestige cannot be compared to those 01' a prominent Roman political figure. A nobilis with more secure politieal prospects was unlikely to make the same choice. 125 Sallust delicately alluded to the unfortunate circnmstances that forct'd his retirement from public life and left hirn a great deal 01' free time. He chose to write history, explaining that it was cer­ tainly more respectable than farming or hUllting, to say nothing 01' socordia (sloth) and desidia (idleness).126 But Sallust was not about to exaggerate the importance 01' his new pastime: 'Equal glory eertainly does not de"olve on the writer and doer 01' deeds.' 127 Sallust' s extraordinary assessment 01' the difficulties confronted by historians ernphasises his lingering contempt für the occupation: a writer had first to contend with the insuperable task 01' finding words equal to the deeds he was describing. Furthermore, his audienee-, convinced that aU historians yearned for action and were resentful 01' their inability to eompete in the political arena, auto­ matically attributed any eritical analysis to invidia. 128 In general the system oflered small eonsolation prizes to unsuc­ cessful Roman politicians unable to find solace in otium or litera­ ture. This resulted in a bitter competition 1'01' the few hOllOurS the Republic offen'd amI a vast residue 01' envy among the numerous frustrated losers. Cicero had good reason to know in his own right that invidia was the ine-vitable by-produet 01' a political career. 129

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Sallust mentioned the same phenomenon in describing his early political career: 'Although I did not füllow the evil practices 01' others, I was subjected to attack by the same slander and envy as everybody else because 01' my ambition to advance.' 130 Despite this inevitable production 01' invidia, Roman contests for honour did not always culminate in inimicitiae. Invidia for others' achievement was a complex emotion with disparate effects on dif­ ferent personalities. Sornetimes it provided no impediment to normal social relations with the successful cornpetitor. At the opposite extreme, however, it was powerful enough to polarise Catiline and some 01' the nobles who joined his desperate con­ spiracy.131 Cicero was perhaps adumbrating these extremes when he distinguished inimici and competitores: 'We compete with a fellow citizen in one way if he is an enemy, in another if he is a com­ petitor - with the first it is a contest for life, with the second für reputation.' 132 It is always difficult to establish invidia's responsibility for driving men into hostility. An individual himself can rarely assess the precise roll' envy plays in his conduct; the historian is quite helpless in comparison. The ancient sources compound the prob­ lem by their readiness to diagnose invidia, especially when they are trying to belittle their subject, a disparagement nourished by the Roman ideal that competitores should accept defeat gracefully. Intellectuallaziness also encouraged the sources to exaggerate the roll' 01' invidia because it provided an easy and virtually irrefutable explanation 01' hostile conduct. Cicero consoled hirnself with the thought, tiresomely repeated, that his exile resulted from the hostility 01' those who envied his consulate. Many must have resented the incomparable orator, the first new man in living memory to attain the consulate at the earliest legal age, 133 the man who had won not inconsiderable glory by crushing the detested Catilinarians. But invidia was only one 01' numerous motives people had for forcing Cicero out 01' Rome, and nobody can ever gauge its precise relative importance. As an orator, Cicero was also quick to accuse his clients' enemies 01' invidia. In Olle example, he claimed that envy prornpted P. Cornelius Sulla' s ejection from the consulate. 134 EIsewhere, he illustrated the grimness 01' his times by claiming that the name 01' consul conferred more envy than prestige. 135 Cicero was no more generous when he attacked the motives 01' his nemesis, P. Vatinius. He assigned Vatinius' attempt to destroy L. Lucullus to envy 01' Lucullus' military achievernents. l36

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Another farnaus example of inimicitiae shows how far ahostile source could distart historical reality by exaggerating the role of invidia. Plutarch ascribed the hatred between Marius and Sulla to a series of incidents that nourished Marius' envy of the younger nobleman, who had begun his career as his subardinate. Sulla, after accepting Jugurtha's surrender as Marius' representative, supposedly flaunted his role by wearing a seal ring commemorat­ ing this single most decisive act of the war. 137 Marius struggled with his envy, decided that Sulla was beneath it, and continued to allow hirn to serve. 138 Sulla then proceeded to win even more military glory at Marius' expense. He captured Copillus, the chief of the Tectosages, and then persuaded the Marsi to become the friends and allies of the Romans. 139 The last straw came during the German campaign when Sulla, now serving Marius' colleague Catulus, won same notable victaries against the barbarians in the Alps and was so successful in supplying his troops that same provisions were left over for Marius' army.140 Badian convincingly argues that Plutarch's im probable account reflected Sulla's Memoires. 14l Sulla was quite prepared to suppress the truth ~nd exaggerate to achieve his primary objective, dis­ crediting Marius. And yet one further incident must have been especially provoking to Marius. In 91, Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, dedicated on the Capitol same trophy-bearing images tagether with gilded figures representing the surrender ofJugurtha to Sulla. 142 Bocchus could not have made the dedication without the active co-operation of the anti-Marians. 143 The dedication is histarical, and must have piqued Marius' envy and focused his wrath on his former protege, who appeared to be minimising Marius' own gloria. Plutarch claims that only the outbreak of the Social War, adesperate danger that united all Romans, prevented the resentment between Marius and Sulla from boiling over at the time. l44 In spite of much distortion, there can be little quest ion that the distinctive feature of Roman politics - intense competition for a severely limited number of rewards - spawned irritation and envy, and contributed many inimicitiae to the Roman political system, although perhaps not as many as the sources claim. Invidia particularly affected those most successful in securing the highest prizes in republican Rome: military glary, high curule office, and the priesthoods. I have mentioned how envy over military glary played same role in the inimicitiae between Sulla and Marius. It seems to have been

decisive in the enmity between C. Aurelius Cotta, the consul of 200, and L. Furius Purpureo, praetor in the same year. Furius' suppression of same rebelIious Celts before Aurelius could reach camp deprived the latter of the military glory he had anticipated. 145 Furius subsequently persuaded the Senate to award hirn a triumph for his achievements, further compounding Aurelius' disappoint­ ment and bitterness .146 The inimicitiae between C. Claudius Pulcher, the consul of 177, and the two consuls of 178, M. Junius Brutus and A. Manlius Vulso, further i1lustrate how competition for military glory adversely affected Roman relationships. Junius and Manlius, campaigning as proconsuls in 177, had scored a resounding victory over the Histrians. Claudius resented their victory, fearing that it would deprive hirn of a province and of an army. Determined to waste no time, he rushed off to his province without attending to certain formalities required of commanders departing far their provinces. As soon as Claudius reached the proconsuls' camp, he ordered both Junius and Manlius out of the province. They refused to obey, citing Claudius' irregular depar­ ture from Rome. Claudius then unsuccessfully tried to persuade the army to throw the proconsuls into chains. Junius' and Manlius' obstreperousness ultimately forced Claudius to return to Rome, where he bitterly denounced the proconsuls, before attend­ ing to the prescribed rites and setting out afresh for his province with a new army.147 Same ancient authors could take inimicitiae between military rivals far granted, unconsciously revealing how widespread this source of hostility was in Roman society. Nothing shows this so c1early as the sensation which young Scipio's conduct toward L. Marcius Septimius aroused. 148 Marcius, chosen commander by those troops who survived the debäcle in Spain that had destroyed the eider Scipios during the Hannibalic War, succeeded in extri­ cating his men from the disastrous campaign. Even discounting the analysts' exaggeration of the magnitude of Marcius' success, the achievement would be hard to foIlow. 149 Marcius' successor turned out to be none other than P. Scipio, the future Africanus, san and nephew of the fallen commanders, who was desperately anxious to avenge his family and win gloria in Spain as a faunda­ tion far the brilliant career he anticipated. A lesser man than Scipio might yield to the temptation of seeing Marcius' successes as a humiliating amplification of his family's misfortunes and a potential drain on the military credit he hoped to monopolise for hirnself in the aftermath of the tragedy. But Scipio, accarding to

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Cassius Dio, showed surpnsmg goodwill when he accepted the command from Marcius: he paraded his extreme self-confidence by treating Marcius respectably instead of acting toward hirn as an enemy as most men would have done. 150 Next to military glory, a Roman's aspirations focused most heavily on high curule office. The paucity of Roman administra­ tive positions created an enormous weil of resentment among aristocrats unable to fulfil their ambitions. Such envy apparently prompted the inimieitiae between Brutus and Cassius prior to the murder of Caesar and continuing even after the assassination. 151 Caesar resolved an intense rivalry between the two for the city praetorship of 44 in Brutus' favour, claiming that Cassius had a juster case but that he could not ignore Brutus' desires. Small wonder that rumour suspected Caesar of deliberately fostering the feud to spur competition between the two. 152 The immensely prestigious priesthoods were another fertile source of competition, inuidia, and hence inimicitiae. Envy goaded Q. Lutatius Catulus, one of Rome' s most eminent senators during the late 60s, when Caesar - not yet a consular - secured appoint­ ment as the new pontifex maximus in 63. Catulus, hoping to crown his extraordinary career, was so thirsty for the honour that he attempted to bribe the impecunious Caesar not to run. 153 After the election, inimicitiae continued between the two men until Catulus died. It was on display du ring the Catilinarian conspiracy when Catulus joined C. Calpurnius Piso, another inimicus of Caesar, in trying to induce Cicero to bring a false charge against Caesar. 154 When Cicero refused, they spread ugly rumours about Caesar's alleged participation in the conspiracy, leading some overzealous knights to threaten to assassinate Caesar when he left the Senate one day. 155 The inimicitiae between Catulus and Caesar continued the next year when Caesar sought to discredit Catulus' restoration 01' the temple of Capitoline Jove by accusing hirn of embezzlement and demanding a full account of the costs incurred for the monu­ ment. Caesar hoped that his slander would persuade the people to remove Catulus' disgraced name from lhe temple. He appears to have compounded the insult by forbidding Catulus to speak from the rostrum on his own behalf. Caesar ultimately gave up when the entire aristocracy rallied behind Catulus and insisted that his name remain on the temple. 156 Catulus' envy was certainly not the only cause of his bitterness toward Caesar. The sources are unusually informative about their inimicitiae and revcal a wide tissue of interacting causes. The

relationship between Catulus and Caesar is paradigmatic of a truism that must never be lost sight of: inimieitiae, like any complex human emotion, rarely have a single or simple cause. Catulus and Caesar represented opposite political parties. Catulus was a bulwark of the optimate establishment; Caesar exploited the popularis strategy to rise as rapidly as possible within the Roman power structure. Caesar's tactics were on display during his aedile­ ship in 65 when he appealed for mass support by placing statues of Marius on the Capitoline. 1:J7 Catulus responded with a furious attack in the Senate, accusing Caesar of waging all-out war against the government. 158 Caesar also campaigned for the pontificate of 63 as a popularis. First, he supported T. Labienus' transfer to the people of the elections for the college of priests, which undid one of Sulla's reforms. This was only aprelude to what Dio considered a contemptible campaign: Caesar stressed his support for the prosecution of Rabirius and collected votes by serving or flattering anyone. 159 Disgust for such tactics doubtless helped guide Catulus' inuidia at losing the eleetion into inimicitiae against his successful rival. Factional politics also polarised the two. Pompey the Great, the central figure in Rome during the 60s, consistently received Caesar's support and Catulus' opposition. Caesar's loyalty to Pompey was evident when he accused Catulus of embezzling funds for the temple ofCapitolineJove - he hoped that Pompey's name would replace Catulus' on the monument. 160 Finally, some hereditary inimieitiae may have been at work between Catulus and Caesar. Caesar's uncle Marius was responsible for Catulus' father' s suicide during the proscriptions.1 61 !nuidia and inimieitiae alsofrequently arose because ofthe intense pressure Roman public officials feIt to surpass the achievements of their predecessors and successors in office. It was only natural, according to Cicero, to wish disaster on a successor in office so that one's own regime would shine forth more brightly. This state of aff"airs was 'not only not abhorrent to common practice, but ordinary and extremely widespread', and certainly no Roman need feel any disgrace (dedeeus) as a result. 162 This attitude illuStrates once more how generous public opinion could be toward individuals whose ambition exceeded their concern for the public interest. According to Cicero, Ap. Claudius' censorship of 136 followed Scipio Aemilianus', leading to enmity between the two. Similarly, M. Aemilius Scaurus succeeded Ap. Claudius, grand­ son of the censor of 136, as governor of Sardinia and these two naturally became inimiei. Cicero's own consulate before Ap.

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Claudius' resulted in ill will between the two until their farnaus reconciliation .163 The inevi tability of such inimicitiae ha(mted Cicero again just a few years later. When he took over the governorship of Cilicia from Ap. Claudius in 51, tension between the two almost undid their reconciliation. 164 lnimicitiae for his pre­ decessor came so naturally to a provincial governor that certain friends of Claudius could accuse Cicero of providing Cilicia with good government to foil Claudius' regime and damage his reputation. 165 The recurring suspensions of orderly government during the Roman Revolution increased the invidia feit by the Romans toward their successful peers. Loyalty to an ambitious and victorious general replaced the qualifications Romans had traditionally relied on to promote their leaders and to invest the competition for office with respect. The cursus honorum lost the legitimacy which had mitigated invidia by offering generally accepted norms of success. When Pompey taok up the Senate's cause against Caesar, he found hirnself burdened with the ambitions of his fellow senators and no acceptable procedure for arbitrating among them. One of the most notorious aspects of Pompey's unhappy camp at Pharsalus was the incessant bickering between P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio over who would inherit the coveted priesthood they expected Caesar soon to vacate. 166 Many also resented the extraordinary exemption Pompey had granted to his protege, C. Lucilius Hirrus: the right to stand in absentia for the praetorship.167 Such tension continued to plague the republican forces after Pompey's death. Cato despaired when, with Caesar advancing steadily in Africa, M. Octavius demanded a elarification of the command structure: 'Can we be surprised that our cause is lost when we see love ofpower remaining with us even while we are standing on the edge of doom?' 168 The absence of orderly constitutional procedures had likewise infected Q. Sertorius' 'Senate' of rebellious Marians in Spain with increasing invidia. The Sertorians co-operated in a forced unity as long as they confronted a tenuous and potentially disastrous military situation. Eut the atl1losphere changed dramatically in their camp when the military outlook brightened after the alliance with Mithridates and same impressive successes against the Roman forces. Sertorius' su,?ordinates became jealous of their general's pre-eminent position and M. Perpenna exploited their resentment to incite a conspiracy that placed him at the head of the Marian forces in Spain .169

lnimicitiae toward new men The conspiracy of Perpenna reveals another cause of inimicitiae ultimately emanating from invidia arising out of the political dass' s intense competition for power. Perpenna's resentment of Sertorius' position as a commander was aggravated by Sertorius' low birth: he was a Sabine of equestrian status. Perpenna by con­ trast was the son and grandsan of consuls. 170 The Roman nobility feit entitled to the state's most prestigious offices by birth and 'seethed with envy and regarded the consulate as virtually polluted if any new man, no matter how eminent, attained it' .171 New men therefore expected the inimicitiae of the nobiles throughout their political careers. 172 Such invidia was critical in the careers of the two most prominent natives of Arpinum, Marius and Cicero. Metellus' unwillingness to accept Marius as an equal, as reflected in the farnaus snub, contributed to the feud between the two. 173 The nobility as a whole remained openly hostile to Marius until his triumphant return from Germany. At that point, relenting in public at least, it acknowledged that Marius had preserved the state. l74 The hostility aroused by Cicero's origins dogged hirn through­ out his career, even after his consulate. The eminent consular M. Aemilius Scaurus' advice to the young Cicero, urging hirn to advance by constantia (steadfastness) and labor (industry), was quite astonishing. Ordinarily, a new man got no encouragement from the nobility in his quest for a public career. For Asconius, Scaurus' empathy with Cicero's hunger for advancement resulted from the long dormancy of Scaurus' own family.175 The scions of more successful families were unlikely to show the same understanding. Cicero summarised the more typical reaction of the patricians toward new men in the Verrines. He listed some prominent new men, M. Porcius Cato, Q. Pompeius Rufus, C. Flavius Fimbria, C. Marius and C. Coelius Caldus, who endured the inimicitiae of the powerful while seeking the same offices the nobility attained 'through indolence and neglect'. New men were only too aware 'with what envy and hatred certain nobles regarded their dedica­ tion and energy'. The very inevitability of the nobiles' hostility had the advantage of predictability.176 lnvidia from other non-noble groups raised another hurdle on a new man's obstaele course. New men themselves, instead of elosing ranks against the nobility and rejoicing in one another's successes, resented peers who surpassed them. l77 The common people were also averse to new men and

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The Causes of lnimicitiae

shared the nobility' s respect and enthusiasm for a long line of noble ancestors. 178 This extremely unrevolu tionary attitude helps explain the persistent success of the nobiles at the poils. 179

Caesar's designation 01' C. Caninius Rebilus as consul to fill out the few hours of the suddenly deceased Q. Fabius Maximus' term debased one 01' Rome's most respected offices. 1M Cicero's reaction - laughter and tears - poignandy reveals his despair. 18 :' The same tyrannical attitude was evident on the famous occasion when Caesar failed to rise to accept unprecedented honours awarded to hirn by the Senate. Seeing his enor too late, he tried to make amends by claiming that he had not seen the dele­ gation and even that one of his seizures prevented his rising. Others blamed the incident on L. Cornelius Balbus, daiming that he had restrained Caesar in an overzealous attempt to increase his master' s superiority .186 Balbus also seems to have been responsible far elrafting elecrees issued by Caesar in the name of the Senate without its approval. Cicero was even more furious to learn that he hael been recoreleel as witnessing 01' even voting in favour of senatorial elecrees of which he hael no prior knowleelge. 187 Even Cacsar's clemency, which implieel domination, provokeel the nobles who consielereel themselves his peers. Caesar had arrogated a right for himself that no Rom all lOuld properly exercise over his fellow citizens. J88 Caesar's stern actions against the anli-monarchical tribunes, C. Epidius M arullus anel L. Caesetius Flavus, also proeluced immense unpopularity. These tribunes had offendeel hirn when they orelereel the removal 01' a crown that hael mysteriously appeared on his statue. The two had then compounded their offcnce hy arresting a man who had addresseel Caesar as king. Caesar reacted by deposing them from office and removing them from the Senate. 189 Caesar further invited hostility when he failed to persuade a suspicious and hostile aristocracy that Antony had spontancously attemptcd the l~'lmous crowning at the Lupercalia. Cicero later emphasiscd this incielent's importance in reinforcing thc conspirators' determination. 190 Caesar apparendy toyed with the idea 01' ac('cpting the tide 01' king, but is unlikcly to have made a firm dccision at thc timc 01' his death: a mysterious oracle that Parthia cOllIeI ollI)' Iw conquered by a king was rnaking the rounds, <md L. COlla planned to proposc to the Senate on 15 March 44 that Cacsar bear the title 'king' in the provinces l91 Furthermore, his dictatorship for life was a unique cc)lltribution to the Roman cOllstitution, with powcrs many Romans found indistinguishable from the monalThy.192 Thc rcport in some sources that Cacsar's iTlimici zcalously supportcd thc honours ,ho\'Vt'l'ed on iIiIrl ernpha­ sises thc inevitability that Cacsar's cxtraordinary position would

Inimicitiae against the most powerful Romans Nothing at Rome attracted invidia, and therefore potentially inimicitiae, as readily as the perception that one member of the oligarchy was collecting too much power and rising above his peers. The Roman leadership could not tolerate even the sem­ blance of one-man rule, which negated all their most cherished values. Regnum (monarchy) was the most hated word in the Roman political lexicon. Every prominent Roman du ring the nearly two centuries under review here, from Fabius Maximus to Caesar, experienced the resentment of his peers for his dispro­ portionate share of glory and prestige. Frequently these invidiae lecl to the hostile actions associated with inimicitiae: denial of triumphs, attempts to hamstring a general's war efforts, prosecutions, etc. I shall have more to say about these manifestations in my next two chapters. Here I shall describe how Caesar provoked this type of invidia, which certainly helped motivate many nobles to join the conspiracy that took his life .180 Caesar could have mitigated the provocation of his achieve­ ments, as Sulla and Augustus successfully did. Instead of sneering at Sulla for resigning the dictatorship, 181 Caesar might have profi ted from Sulla's much bettel' understanding of the sensibilities of his dass. Augustus, in an effort to avoid his adopted father' s mistake, restored the forms of constitutional government, a charade that nevertheless reduced some of the nobility' s resent­ ment. Caesar, in sharp contrast, flaunted his pre-eminent position although weil aware of the hatred his power inspired. On one occasion he kept Cicero waiting in his ante-room, as if the dis­ tinguished consular were a petty dient. Caesar acknowledged the consequences of his behaviour by quipping: 'Can I doubt that I am bitterly resented when Cicero has to wait and cannot see me at his convenience?' 182 Such resentrnent did not prevent Caesar from arrogating to hirnself powers and honours guarded most zealously by oligarchie sentiment. His decision to designate which praetorship a successful candidate would hold infuriated M. Caelius Rufus and C. Cassius Longinus (the future assassin) when they were passed over for the most prestigious urban praetorships in 48 and 44 respectively.183 56

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The Causes 01 Inimicitiae

ereate inimicitiae. 193 Caesar showed that he suspected his inimici 01' as much when he accused Epidius and Caesetius 01' crowning his statue just so they could win credit für undoing the deed. 194 Caesar would have done weil to follow the example 01' Pompey, who became famous for his re!uctance to accept honours. Cassius Dio interprets his rest raint as a conscious effort to minimise the illvidia accornpanying high hünours. Initially, Pürnpey feigned to want no honours 1'01' (wo reasons, according to Dio: in this way he would !essen the resentrnent that would inevitably have followed open expression 01' ambition, but at the same time he atternpted to ca rn glory from the perception that honour followed hirn even against his will hecause he was inelispensable. 195 Pompey lorbade any honours to be awarded to him after his return from the east. Dio explains this as part 01' Pompey' s strategy to nip invidia in the budo Pompey considcred it insufficicnt to reject honours after they had been voted because this would not eliminate the resentment 01' high position that inspired them in the first place. Furthermore, the lIIan who rejected the recognition 01' his peers exposed hirnself to the charge 01' arrogance .196 Pornpey's intention to forbid all honours eventually lapsed, but his continuing caution anel obfuscation frustrated his associates WIIO attempted to understand his true desires. He was mysterious about wh at powers he wanted to accompany his grain comrnand in 57. His public statements indicated that the less powerful cornrnand would be sufficient, but privately he intimated a prefcr­ emT f(lr Mcssius' much more extensive proposal.1 97 Sirnilar vacillation about the clictatorship in 54 prevented Cicero from clivining his intentions. 198 Ultimately, Pompey abandonecl what­ ever ambit ions he had för the office in that year because 01' the general lack of enthusiasm. 199 He e1eclined the same office in 52, accepting the sole consulship instead. After a time he adlccted as fdlow consul his lather-in-Iaw Q. Caeeilius Metellus Scipio, a dccision Dio attribules to Pompey's eagerness to check the invidia certain to follow if he continued to occupy this unprccedented o ffi ce . ~()O

lf invidia against those successful in securing the honours of the Republic could be such a potent source of illim icitiae, it should cause no surprise to lind that tllOse held directly responsible for

thwarting one' s career became targets 01' bitter hostility. Cicero' s correspondence illustrates the kind 01' pressure this placed on pro­ Inagistrates with ambitious quaestors on their staffs. He warneel Q: Minucius Thermus, propraetor in Asia, 01' the inevitable enrnity that would follow if he disgraced his quaestor, L. Antonius, by passing hirn over for the cornrnand of the province before rcturning to Rome. 201 Cicero was careful to follow his own advice sevcral rnonths later when he turned his province 01' Cilicia over to his quaestor C. Coelius Caldus. His fear of alienating the well­ nmnected Coelius outweighed his considerable misgivings about Coelius' youth and foolishness. One alternative would have been to !eave the comrnand to his own brother Quintus, which Cicero was refuctant to do for a nunlber 01' reasons, including the fear that Coelius' revenge might indude spying on his successful rival with thc hope 01' subsequently indicting hinI.2o~ Cicero's candid assess­ me nt 01' his dilemma is espC'cially chilling considering his well­ e1escrved reputation 1'01' honest and conscientious provincial administration. In another example al ready mentioned in Chapter '2, Fulvius Nobilior's feud with Aemilius Lepidus dming the second century began because Aemilius held Fulvius responsible I(Jr setting his career back by causing hirn to attain the consulship two years late. A similar grievance fuelled Lucullus' inimicitiae with his brother-in-Iaw Clodius. Clodius expected to be held in high honour when he joined Lucullus' campaign in the east. When Lucullus failed to pay enough attention to his young relative, Clodius responded by corrupting the tmops and fomenting' a llIutiny .~():l LUCldlus later retaliated at his clivorce proceedings with Clodia when he produced female slavcs who testified that she had cornmittecl incest with her iJrother 204 Any intl'l'ference with a Roman's access to high religious office also createcleneluring ITSt'ntment. The hatn'd cu]minating in Cn. DOlllitius' prosecution 01' M. Aemilius ScaunIs I(n diminishing the sacrec! objects of the ROlllan peopk began when Scaurus refused to appoint DOlllitius to lhe priesthooel his father had held.~o5 In a bizarre inslance 01' sons 1()llowing in their htthers' footsteps, Domitius' son, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, after failing to becorne augur in 50, hlameel CaeJius for his (kl('at ancl becarne his bitter enerny. He mayaiso have heen angry at Caelius f()r blocking his ekct ion to thc pontificate. ~06 Cicero eloquently expresseel tlw passionate c!esire 01' every RonJan to cckbrate a triulllph.~117 Ikcause the desire was so strong, opposition (0 one's triumph was likdy to engender lasting

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hostility. C. l'vlemmius workeel vigorously if unsuccessfully to prevent L. Licinius Lucullus, just returneel from the east in 66, from triumphing. Although Plutarch claims that Memmius' oppo­ sition was inspireel hy loyalty to Pompey amI not by personal animosily,2lJH it is c!ear that therc was enmity between the two. In 60 Lucullus' brother Marcus divorceel his wife because 01' her adultery with Memmius. At the samt' time Memmius hael enough conletllpt for Lucius, as Cicero put it, to seeluce his wife as wel1. 209 The censors, with their enorl1lous power to elestroy political careers by eletlloting senators or clepriving them 01' their slate horses, easily attractcd inimiei/ial'. tv1. Caecilius Metellus' demotion by the censors 01' 214 tilr cowardliness after the battle 01' Cannae is an example 01' the hostility such censorial action could inspire. Metellus as tribune in 213 retaliated by indicting both men. 2lil In another example, Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, lhe censor 01' 131, passcd over in his review 01' the Senate one 01' the tribunes, C. Atinius Labeo. Atinius beuune so angry that he tried, unsuccessfulIy as it turned out, lo impose the death penalty by orclering Mat:edonicus hurled from the Tarpeian rock. 211 Q. Caecilius Metellus Numiclicus brought encluring im'miei/iae on himself when he deprived P. Furius 01' his state horse, and attcl1Iptcel to expcl Saturninus and C. Servilius Glaucia from the Senate. 212 Scipio Ac~milianus' cffort in 142 to demo te Ti. Claudius Aselllls, which had failed because 01' the opposition 01' his col­ leaglle, L. 1'vlutlltllillS, rurther illustrates how even an unsuccessful at te!1l pt by a ccnsor to darnage a senator' s dlj;ni/as could produce hostilily. Claudius' smoulclering rury burst out in 140 when he pmseclltecl Scipio on unknown charges anel taunted him for his inallspicious censorship. Scipio's elefence speech became famous fi)r ilS hiting wit at Asellus' C'xpensc. 2I:J

The Causes 0] Inimiei/iae

Clicrllaw' was the essential ingreclient 01' Roman politics. Political power ckpendc'c1 on thc ability to acquire large numbers 01' clicnts who assisted tlw patron in any wal" required and generally createcl an aura ofpowcr amund polilicians. In retllrnlhe patron provicled the help and prolection that Roman society vvas unable to extend to !1Iost 01' its citizt'lls. 211 A Roman 's image alTlong his clicnts was an incalculablc asset, to \)(' protecled at all costs. Anybody who interkred with the sacrecl relationship !letweell patron amI dient

gravely damaged the patron's status alld ultimately his political career. The Turpilius affair, which occurred after Metellus' snub 01' Marius, remains to be discussed arnong the numerous causes 01' the inimid/ial' betwl'en Marius and Metellus. Metellus had shown great confidence in T. Tllrpilills Silanus, his inherited guest­ friend, by appointing hirn cOl11/T1andcr 01' Vaga. When the people 01' Vaga secrl'tly admittcd J ugurtha within their walls, Turpilius was takclI prisoner along with the entire Roman garrison. He was subsequcntly rell'ased, in spitl' 01' thc' massacrc 01' all 01' his men. Marius, as a member 01' the commission investigating this unhappy event, called vociferously tiJr Turpilius' execution. The events at Vaga rel1ected so poorly on Turpilius 215 that Metellus had little choice but to inl1ict severe punishment, althollgh hc doubtless wished to spare his client execution by scourging. Even if Pilltarch is mistakc'n in claiming that Marills later boastecl pro­ vocatively 01' gellerating an avenging deity against Metelllls, whcn Turpilius was posthumollsly round innocent, Marills' repeatecl demands that Metellus take the harshest measllres against his client may l'xplaill the open enmity between the two that Pilltarch dates fro!1l this incidenl.·21 (; If 1'vlarius' dcmands only seemed to tip l\1etellus toward mC'ting out such a harsh sentcnce, his loss 01' face with his other clients, inevitable rcgardless 01' Turpilius' guilt, could bC' placed at Marius' doo!". P. Rlltilius, lhc trihulle 01' 169, also waged relentless war lO protect his replltat ion flJr pat ronage, which he believed the two cellsors l(lr the same year, Ti. Sempronius Gran'hus and C. Clauclills, had 11l1dcrrllilled. These censors forced one 01' Rutilius' frccdrneTl to tear dowll a hCHlse wall that they clairncd encroachec! on public land, and Ihell fined the ofl(>nclcr in spitc' of Rutilius' opposition. 217 The I riblllle' s prol CTt ion must have seel11ed worthless. A ROlnan's patronage orten ex!ended to dients in the provinces, sOlllelimes l'\Tn 10 eIltire provillccs. Any intcrference with such pro\'incial obligations (,()lIld irrcparably damage a reputatioll ami a political careU', anel was IherefiJre a natural ground fi)r In im iei/lal'. nllrin~~ his qUd Roman prosecutors as vultures who c1isgraccd the farnily n'Ul1('.:' The principal reason why a dc/(:nclant could not accept his prose­ cutor as anylhing but an irlllllicus was the ('xtraor'dinary darnage conviction would c1o. lts inhnent c1isgrac(' ami accOlnpanying

punishment - fine, exile or loss of curule honours - destroyed everything the Roman aristocrat spent his life pursuing. Some­ times, as in our society, even an unsuccessful prosecution could ruin a reputation and block access to the cursus honorum. For example, acharge of peculation supported by Cato's testimony appears to have destroyed the candidacy of M' Acilius Glabrio for the censorship in 189 although no verdict against Glabrio was ever reached. 4 Cicero hints at the strategie possibilities of prosecution for its own sake when he intimates that in this fashion Ap. Claudius Pulcher hoped to damage M. Aemilius Scaurus' candi­ dacy lor the consulship - Scaurus was competing with Claudius' brother for the' honour. 5 Roman prosecutors did not like to confine themselves strictly to the matters at issue. No rules of evidence protel'ted a defendant from the most ferocious personal attacks on all aspects of his public and private life. 6 Under modern American law, all evidence must meet standards of relevance in order tu be admissibleJ Moreover, evidenl'e concerning a defendant's charal'ter or his past crimes or unsavoury al'ts is ordinarily inadmissible to prove his propensity to commit the crime for which he is on trial, because even if the evidenl'e is relevant, it is thought to create too much undue preju­ dil'e toward the accused to be useful. 8 The trial judge retains the disl'retionary power to exclude any relevant evidenl'e whose pro­ bative value is similarly outweighed by the risk of prejudice, confusion or time-l'onsumption. 9 The Roman practil'e not only did not curtail use of such evidence categorically, it did not set standards 01' reliability that the evidence must meet in order to be introduced. The Roman defendant was therefore exposed to two risks: muckraking and fabrication. This lack of restraint helps to explain why prosecutor and defendant could so rarely avoid inimicitiae: it was a very rare Roman whose auctoritas l'ould survive unscathed the publil' ainng and slandering l'haracteristic of the law courts. The exceptions, defendants who did not conceive personal hostility for their prosecutors, were greatly admired, perhaps because they were so uncommon. Plutarch praised L. Licinius Murena for maintaining cordial relations with Cato even after Cato had prosecuted hirn, albeit unsuccessfully, for bribery.l0 Plutarch used the story tu illustrate Cato's unusual determination to maintain amicable relations with men who may have feit offended by his commitment to uphold justice, suggesting that M urena might not have been able to muster the same friendliness lor a different prosecutor. 11 Furthermore, had the prosecution

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PART 1: Litigation as a source of inimicitiae

Inimicitiae and the Courts

I nimicitiae and the Courts

resulted in a conviction, Murena might have found Cato's pro­ fessionalism less bearable. In general, however, a prosecutor would have to reckon with the inimicitiae of his victim as a matter of course, as many examples in the sources attest. Q. Fufius Calenus relied on this commonplace to counter the charge that he was Antony's friend. Any suggestion of intimacy between the two was disproved by Fufius' assertion that, despite his own benificia, Antony had taken legal action against him.J2 Cicero showed that animosity followed prosecution in a sUf'Cinct characterisation of Murena's prosecutors: 'habet eos accusatores, non qui odio inimicitiarum ad accusandum, secl qui studio accusandi ad inimicitias dcscenderint' (His accusers have not been driven to prosecute by their inimicitiae, but have been driven to inimicitiae by their passion for prosecuting).13 Cicero hirnself assurned that his prosecution of Ver res would cost hirn inimicitiae,14 ancl that his threat at the end of the Verrines to battle judicial corruption through prosecution would cast hirn many more: 'Do you intend to accept such an enormous task, to take up such great enmities with so many men?' he asked himselfrhetoric­ ally.15 Prosecution so inevitably produced inimicitiae that it coulet serve as a synonym for taking up enmity. Thus, when referring to P. Cornelius Dolabella's prosecution of Ap. Claudius, Cicero casually characterises it 'tuis inimicitiis suscipiendis' (when he took up inimicitiae with yoU).16 The deep embarrassment Cicero feit as a result of Dolabella's action shows how the Roman expectation of family cohesiveness necessarily involved a prosecutor' s relatives in inimicitiae with his victim. Dolabella had uncxpectedly becorne Cicero's son-in-law du ring the proceedings, and Cicero worried that the prosecution mighl disturb the dclicate re('(mciliation he was trying to maintain with Ap. Clalldius. 17 Even when a defendant's wrath was rendered toothless by conviction, the same family cohesiveness guaranteed that the su('(:t'SSfllI prosccutor could not cscape inimicitz'ae engen­ derecl by his suit, for thc convicted man's sons and friends were cluty-houncl to take revenge. Ciccro expected Verres' son to show his enmily eventually, although he professed nonchalance at the prospect. IB A sitnilar expectation is implicit in Cicero's clramatic request that young L. Sestius, son 01' his dient, read out the resolutiullS 01' the clecurions 01' Capua 'so that your boyish voice rnight al ready give SOlTle idea to your enernies what it will in all likclihoocl accolTlplish when it matures'. J9 Cicero leaves the iclentity 01' these illimiti ambiguous, but there can be little cloubt

that the prosecution was meant to take note. Apparently, the Romans found it unsurprising that the son of a convicted man would harbour inimicitiae not only for his father's prosecutor, but also 1'01' the prosecutor' s sons. Otherwise, C. Appuleius Decianus could scarcely have explained his inimicitiae with L. Valerius Flaccus as Cicero daimed he did: 'You attribute your inimicitiae to the prosecution your father brought as tribune against his father L. Flaccus, the curule aedile. '20 Cicero' s expectation that sons would retaliate judicially for their fathers' convictions is confirmed by Roman tradition. Such revenge was one 01' the very few honourable justifications for con­ ducting a prosecution. Numerous examples of sons indicting their fathers' prosecutors suggest how willingly the Romans accepted the obligation 2L The intensity of this duty's pressure on sons is illustrated by a story preserved in Asconius: Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos, the consul of 98, who had been prosecuted by C. Scribonius Curio, demanded on his deathbed that his identically named son, the future consul of 57, swear to accuse Curio. 22 The demands of such filial pietas were so widely appreciated that Valerius Maximus could rely on them to illustrate one 01' his moralistic exempla: L. Crassus, who had inaugurated his public career with a celebrated prosecution of C. Papirius Carbo, was so confident that his administration of Gaul would be faultless that he allowed the son of the accused Carbo to accompany hirn to his province, knowing full well that the young man hoped to build a case against hirn. 23 Cicero, although professing to admire sons who avenged their fathers in this way, was always ready when it suited his purpose to turn such tJietas against the accusers. He readily incited the jury to suspect that an accuser' s motivations were rooted in pietas rather than in a public-minded zeal for bringing criminals to justice. Hence the implieation that Albius Oppianicus' loyalty to his father induced hirn to bring suit against A. Cluentius Habitus: he was a man 'driven to prosecute by pietas' 24 Cicero resorted to the same strategy in the Pro Caelio when he implied quite cogently that L. Sernpronius Atratinus had ulterior motives for prosecuting Caclius, who had brought one unsuccessful suit against Atratinus' father and was preparing anotheL 25 Sons 01' convicted men resent­ ful 01' the family stigma occasionally sought a stronger outlet for their outrage than a retaliatory prosecution. Q. Lutatius Catulus exploited the Sullan proscriptions to engincer the exeeution 01' M. Marius Gratidianus. One souree suggests that Catulus was

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motivaled by his desire to avenge his father, who had been driven to suicide by Gratidianus' prosecution. 26 A prosccutor could also expect the enmity of his vietims' friends. An example ofthis lransference is Cicero's refusal to undertake the prosecution of A. Gabinius, a friend of Pompey. He feared that such a prosecution would irritate Pompey, with whom he could not afford a feud in 54: 'I'm restraining myself from prosecuting hirn [Gabiniusl, with difficulty, by Hercules; still I'm exercising restraint . . . because I don't want a fight wilh Pompey.'27 Cicero hirnself raged uncontrollably against T. M unatius Plancus for prosecuting Cicero's friend Sabinus. His fury was compounded because he had defended Munatius on an earlier occasion, and eonsidercd hirn ungrateful. 28 The eertainty that a proseeution would generate intense and widespread inimieiliae resulted in two distinetive phenomena at Rome. There was a great admiration of young men who under­ took justifiable proseeutions regardless of the risk of incurring enmity.29 Furthermore, the most powerful Romans, who had the most extensive resourees for damaging their inimiei, generally were not prosecuted. Any fruits gained from a prosecution were not worth the priel' 01' an undying feud with a man capable 01' exaeting the most harmful revenge. Brunt noted the relative infrequency 01' prosecutions against the prineipes 01' Cicero's era, and advanced it as an argument against Taylor's claim that Roman politics con­ sisted of 'unending prosecutions brought from political motives by [a man' s] political enemies'. 30 The exemption noted by Brunt is bettel' interpreted as the exception that proves Taylor' s general rule. I cannot, however, agree with the implications 01' Professor Taylor's sta.tement that politieal motives underlay most Roman prosecutions. A defendant's fury was usually not restrictcd to the prosecutor. Any hostile appearance in court might result in inimieiliae. Hostile testimony, 01' the appearance of giving hostile testimony, accounled for sorne of the most famous inimieiliae 01' the Republic. I have al ready diseussed in Chapter 2 the inimieiliae between M. Livius Salinator amI C. Claudius Nero during the Hannibalie War, which apparently originated in testimony given by Claudius Ieading to Livills' eonviction and exile in 218. Three decades la tel', as mentioned above, Cato's hostile testimony fatally compromised M' Aeilius Glabrio's chanees 1'01' beeoming eensor. Glabrio designed a eounterattack to make Cato unpopular and to destroy Cato's own hopes 01' attaining the same office. 3l Similarly, the )

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most dramatic feud of the late Republic, between Cicero and Clodius, began when Cicero destroyed Clodius' alibi at the Bona Dea trial and thereby very nearly secured his convietion. 32 lnimieiliae generated by hostile court appearances could even spread to a defendant's backers. Antony listed hostile testimony against one of his friends as a partial cause of his enmity with Cicero. 33 Like adverse witnesses, jury members became the targets 01' inimieiliae, for they were not considered merely the impersonal agents of Roman justice. Cicero notes this phenomenon in the Pro Cluenlio when he says that 'jurors ... consider the man they have condemned to be their inimicus'. 34 A letter to Atticus after the Bona Dea trial suggests with some rhetorical embellishment the danger jurors might face after reaching a guilty verdict: 'Twenty-five jurors were so courageous that in the face 01' extreme danger they preferred to risk their lives rather than destroy everything.' 35 The wave of inimieiliae generated by prosecutions often swept past prosecutors, defendants, and their families to touch defence lawyers. The pl'Ofessional ethos 01' Roman lawyers was not suffi­ eiently reserved to insulate the legal debate 1'1'0111 the effects 01' personal feelings. Cicero decried this tendency in the course of defending his representation of L. Licinius Murena against the attacks 01' Murena' s prosecutor SeI'. Sulpicius Rufus. Because Sulpicius was a friend of Cicero, he accused Cicero 01' violating the obligations of amieilia by defending Murena.:l6 Cicero had a more idealised vision of the proper relationship between legal opponents, insisting that it was entirely proper for a lawyer to defend even complete strangers whom his friends were prosecuting. 37 Brunt, who believes that amicable relations between opposing lawyers were the norm, places unwarranted emphasis on the friendly references Cicero occasionally rnakes to his opposition.:1 8 It was Brunt hi111self who demonstrated in the same artide that the Romans often used the term' amicus' to describe non-intimates, conveying the very same blandness that the term' friend' does in English. 39 Even if Cieero's tone was actually warm, it may havc been his way 01' winning his audience by fulfilling its expectations. The audience's receptivity to a corclial relationship betwecn lawyers wOllld have made such a taetie worthwhile. 40 Occasionally, thc meaninglessness 01' Cicero's prof(~ssions of friendship 1'01' his colleagues becomes transparent. He could hardly have had much frienclly feeling left for L. Manlius Torquatus, his 'familiaris et necessarius' (dose and intimate friend), whoJn he accusecl 01'

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violating their friendship du ring the course 01' Sulla' s trial. 41 Torquatus' reference to hirn as one 01' the three foreign tyrants 01' Rome must have additionally stung his ever-sensitive insecurity as a new manY Cicero labels L. Herrenius Balbus a 'friend' in Pro Caelio 25, but subsequently dismisses him as a liar.'13 It is doubtful whether Balbus and Cicero were ever intimate. Thc evidence reinforces Plutarch's claim H that bitter attacks on one'sjudicial opponents were the norm, and that, despite his occa­ sional cordiality, Cicero was often especially harsh and eamed a great deal 01' odium. Brunt admits that Cicero subjected Hortensius to a withering barrage in the Vl:Trines, resulting in lifelong uneasy relations between the two men, which might have degenerated evcn further without the good offices of Atticus, a close friend 01' them both. 45 Cicero' s own defence speeches indicate that opposing proseelllors orten trained their fire on hirn: 'Because the prosecu­ tors have attacked the zcal 01' my defence. ., and even the fact that I look thc case, ... I must begin by speaking a few words on my OWIl behalf. '46 Such stalemenls cannot be explained entirely by Cicero's hypersensitivity and sense 01' self-importance. Asconius reports lhat !\1ilo' s prosenltors did their best to provokc hatred against Cicero to help counter his tenacious and effective advocacy for his client. 47 Other sources confirm that Cicero's advocacy was a fertile source 01' enmity. The au thaI' 01' the Commentariolum Petitionis assumed that enemies acquired in the Jaw courts would oppose Ciccro's candidaey for the consulatc. 4A Dia, recagnising that public speaking might secure some friendship 1'01' the advocatc, neverthcless thuught that on the whole the speaker would gain more cnmities than fi'iendships because men were inhcrl'nlly disposed tu feel more resentment Ihan gratitude. Dio regarderl CiccrcJs experiencc as paradig1l1atic. 49 Neither Dia nor thc author of thc Comml'll/ariolurn Petitionis specifies who these cnemies were, but because Cicero preferred defending to prosccuting, il is sak tu assurne that they included prosecutors whom hc opposuJ as weil as the few defendants he prosccuted.

Inimidtiae and the Courts

Prosecutions werc pcrhaps the most significant single generator 01' private hostility in Rome. Inimieitz'ae had a profound influencc on thc Roman jurlicial system, however, not so much because they wen: a common product 01' prosc,cutions but because they so

frequently directly causedjudicial proceedings. The Roman courts provided the most convenient outlet 1'01' conducting private war­ fare. Roman judicial tradition gene rally encouraged this practice by considering inimieitiae a socially acceptable basis 1'01' prasecu­ tion. Indeed, as indicated above, sons who used the courts to retaliate against their fathers' prosecutors were tolerated and even admired. It was not only reverence 1'01' filial piety, however, that engen­ dcred this acceptance 01' inimiei as prosecutors. The Romans thought they could exploit enmity as an engine to secure zealous prosecution. Justice was most Iikely to prevail, according to this notion, when a prosecutor pursued his quarry with the single­ mindedness imparted by inimieitiae. Inimieitiae's role as the hound of truth is most clearly visible in Cicero's speech at the inquiry where he competed with Q. Caecilius Niger 1'01' the right to prosecute Verres. Caecilius professed to be an inimiws 01' Verres and openly argued that the feud qualified hirn to undertake the prosecution. 50 Cicero admitted that this was a legitimate recom­ mendation. 51 He was therefore at some pains during the speech to prove that the inimieitiae between Verres and Caecilius were a fabrication. 52 Cicero reversed hirnself 011 the existence 01' the quarrel when he wished to emphasise the honour 01' defeating Caecilius in competition for thc right to prosecute. Caecilius' request to prosecute was dcnied 'even though he had been injured by Verres, and was pursuing legitimate inimieitiae'. 53 This reversal reaffirms the Roman identification 01' interestedness with effective­ ness while highlighting the cluplieitous side 01' Cicero' s character. Although inimieitiae were thought to enhance a prosecutor' s effectiveness, they were not intended as a licence to fabricate evidence. A jury was somewhat na'ively expected to distinguish thoroughness from distortion. Inimiei/iae guaranteed the searing inquiry necessary to determine the truth; the jury was the institu­ tional safeguard against obvious bias, guaranteeing as weil as it could that the prosecutor's zeal stayed on a truth-finding course. The eager prosecutor on whom the system prided itself therefore curiously bore the seeds 01' his own destruction, 1'01' the very interestedness that made hirn effective could be used to undermine his credibility. Skilful defence lawyers could soften the impact 01' adverse evidencc by convincing the jury that its existence 01' intro­ ductiol1 was thc produet 01' the prosecutor' s inimieitiae. Hence Hortcnsius, making his best effort to defend Verres, tried to provoke the jury's distrust by implying that Cicero was motivated

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Litigation as a manifestation of inimicitiae

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Inimieitiae and the Courts

by a private grievance. 54 The fact that the existence of inimieitiae could cut two ways is particularly striking in light of Cicero's assertion that the same individuals occasionally served both at the inquiry to select the prosecutor (divinatio) and as jurors at the sub­ sequent trial. 55 In that case inimidtiae could be used both to recom­ mend and to deprecate the same man to the same audience. The ambiguous Roman view of the role of inimieitiae in the judicial system forced orators to pitch their appeal at whichever attitude their case required. This ambivalent Roman attitude explains why prosecutors who advertised their inirnieitiae as enhancing their ability to prosecute were ncvertheless obliged to swcar that they were undertaking the prosecution in good faith. 56 Furthermore, both prosecutor and defence counsel tried to appeal' objective lest they inadvertently damage their cases by allowing passion to distort the truth, or appeal' to. In his denunciation of Clodius, however, Cicero turned this need for caution on its head to gain a tacticaJ advantage. Because every Roman must have been acquainted with the feud between Cicero and Clodius du ring the 50s, Cicero feared that anything he might say about his opponent would be vitiated by the suspicion that it was coloured by bitterness. 57 He assuaged this suspicion and even reversed its force by rnaintaining, throughout his fierce attack on Clodia in thc Pro Caelio, that he was really exercising restraint for fear 01" straining the patience 01" the jury, who expected him to cmbellish the truth as a result of his notorious I"eud. This taetic left unspoken the inference that Clodia deserved far worse, and would have got it 'nisi inccderent mihi [Ciceroni] inirnicitiae cum istius mulieris viro - fraU-ern volui dicere' (if I were not restraint'd by my inimieitiae with that wornan's husband - I meant brother).58 Witnesses in Rorne also were open to attack on the basis 01' their inimieitiar. Thc juries keenly sensed the temptations the witness stand presented to inimiei, and ideally were on constant guard against its misuse 59 The deduction that inaccuracy followed hosti­ lity was so strong that it could be overcome only by an appeal to an even stronger sentiment, such as national pride. The Romans prided themselves on their integrity as a people, especially in com­ parison to the treacherous Greeb. It was this sensibility that enabled Cicero to undermine the testimony 01' Greek witnesses by intirnating that Greeks were inherently opportunistic, contrasting thern to three hostile Roman witnesses, all with private grievances against Flaccus, who restrained their hostility anel gave

unirnpeachable testimony. 60 When not seen in the strong light 01" distrust of the Greeks, however, even Roman witnesses with grudges were unconvincing. Cicero cites several juries that rejected the testimony of the most eminent witnesses in the belief that it was tainted by inimieitiae:

Valerius Maximus repeats Cicero's examples and adds a few ofhis own. 62 An interesting detail in his account of Q. Pornpeius' trial contradicts Cicero' s version: the jury believed the compelling evidence of the Servilii and the Metelli against Pornpeius but voted acquittal nevertheless for fear of creating the impression that the mighty could destroy their inimiei in the courts. 63 Suspicion of hostile witnesses was so strang at Rome that Valerius Maximus could believe that a jury's fear of appearing receptive to hostile evidence exceeded its desire to discover the truth. A corollary to the Roman jury's sensitivity to testirnony from hostile witnesses reinforces the proof that inimieitiae entered the jurors' consciousness. Special weight was given to favourable statements by men who were known inimiei 01' were even thought to have grounds for inimieitiae. Asconius considered the friendly testimony of P. Servilius Globulus an important contribution to the acquittal of C. Cornelius on acharge of treason in 65. 64 As tribune in 67, Cornelius had ignored his fellow tribune Globulus' veto,65 setting the stage for inimieitiae. By failing to fulfil the expectation of hostility, Globulus lent his testimony special credence. 66 An anecdote about the Scipio trials further suggests how much help a defendant might derive from the favourable testimony of an inimieus. Livy claims that laudatory statements made by Ti. Grau"hus about his inimicus Scipio Africanus helped to establish Scipio's 'magnitudo animi' (greatness of soul).67 The value of such evidence did not go unnoticed by M. Cato, who played a prominent role behind the scenes in bringing the Scipios to trial. 68 He reportedly tried to turn his own enmity with Ti. Gracchus to similar advantage by insisting that Gracchus prcside at one 01" his trials, hoping to impress the jury both by his

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The wisest of juries did not believe the testirnony 01' Cn. and Caepio and ofL. and Q. Metellus against Q. Pompeius, a new man. A suspicion of passion and of inimieitiae destroyed their reliability as witnesses, and shook the juries' confidence in the irnpartiality promised by their honour, lineage and accomplishrrients. 61

Q.

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Inimieitiae and the Courts

confidence in putting himself into the hands 01' an inimieus and by his discernment in choosing a man 01' such integrity.69 The Romans also tried to ensure that individual jurors would not allow their own inimieitiae to influence their verdicts. As in an American court, Roman judicial procedure allowed a defendant to challenge potential jurors, and the right naturally was used to eliminate inimiei. 70 The Verrines provide an example 01' how Verres took advantage 01' this right in his effort to sec ure acquittal. While governor 01' Sicily, he had directed his tithe collectors to remove the entire harvest 01' a farm inherited by the wife 01' the consul C. Cassius Longinus. Cassius was understandably offended, and Verres saw to it that he would have no opportunity to express his hostility as a juror. Cicero, who believed that he had as much to gain as Verres had to lose from Cassius' inimieitiae, assured Verres that Cassius had not been neutralised: if Cassius could not servc as a juror, Verres would still see and hear hirn in the witness box'?! Cicero apparently could not resist this bon mot even though he must have realised that he was compromising the value ofCassius' testi­ mony by revealing Verres' mistreatment and thereby suggesting that Cassius might have cause to embroider the truth. Defendants certainly were right to fear jurors prejudiced by the passions 01' inimieitiae. Dio, who had no motive to distort, reports that P. Cornelius Spinther voted to condemn Clodius for adultery at the Bona Dea trial 'because 01' private hatred' . 72

The ambivalent Roman attitude toward inimiei who resorted to prosecutions, combined with the devastating effect a prosecution might have on one's victim, suggests that prosecutions originating in inimieitiae ought to have been quite common in Rome. 73 Scholars routinely acknowledge the importance 01' inimieitiae in some prosecutions, but in general have preferred to seck a political explanation for trials even when this necessitates considerable con­ jecture. This tendency is most evident in the work 01' Erich Gruen, the most knowledgeable contemporary scholar on republican trials. Gruen states at the outset 01' his work on the criminal courts that inimieitiae were a potent source 01' trials. 74 He is generally more inclined, however, to interpret a trial as the work 01' a faction attempting to dominate Roman politics by neutralising opposing politicians. This technique is implicit in the title 01' his first book,

Roman Polities and the Criminal Courts. Gruen freely admits that the lineaments 01' his political groupings and the judicial activity allegedly carried out on their behalf are highly speculative, and reviewers have agreed. 75 The chapters on the courts during the Ciceronian era in The Last Generation oJ the Roman Republie show a similar emphasis on factional politics as the engine 01' Roman pro­ secution, although that work's perspective is broader and fre­ quently advances other motives. 76 As a result, the composite picture 01' Roman trials that emerges from Gruen's works seems to me distorted, even though Gruen almost always sets out the evidence meticulously. He generally prefers a factional explana­ tion to a personal one wheneyer, as in the vast majority 01' cases, the sources are yague about the prosecutor's motives. When the sources suggest that a trial had predominantly personal causes, Gruen frequently fills in a speculative political background. Thc reader is left with the impression that factional strife playcd a far larger role in the history 01' the Roman courts than the sources warrant. It is time to redress this imbalance by focusing on the role 01' inimieitioe in the Roman judicial system. This survey is meant to supplement, not to supplant, Gruen's work. He has amply demon­ strated that factional politics olten did play a kcy role in the Romanjudicial system. Avarice and ambition among Roman pro­ secutors accounted for other trials as mentioned in the first part 01' this chapter. And 01' course trials occasionally originated in a variety 01' motives leaving evidence that is too vague to assess the importance 01' any single cause. 77 Certainly, inimieitiae often played a contributory rather than the principal role in a prosecution. Many Romans who were unwilling or unable to act as prosecutors, or to induce others to undertake prosecutions, would have joyfully helped in any way they could to convict an inim/:eus. My investiga­ tion will focus on trials where inimidtiae see m to have been the primary moving force, but other motives for prosecution should not be lost sight 01'. The ancient sourees, whose evidence about the attitudes 01' their contemporaries or near-contemporaries is our most reliable sign­ post, often attributed particular prosecutions to raw inimieitiae without the slightest hint that any broader political considerations were involved. This should act as a check on modern readiness to embroider a factional context from the prosopographical records. The historian' s microscope ('an not help but complicate our under­ standing 01' any historical eyent: indeed, part 01' the historian's

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PART 2: The limits of current scholarship

Inimieiliae and Ihe Courls

Inimieiliae and Ihe Courls

mISSion is to add a unifying focus to aseries of apparently unrelated facts or to demonstrate the broader significance of seem­ ingly trivial events. His zeal to find complexity is fuelled by a widespread prejudice that any simple historical explanation is either simplistic or indicative of the insignificance of the issue. Complexity is not always a virtue, however; if untrue, it can obfuscate as readily and completely as oversimplification. Ancient history , dependent as it is on extrapolation from a limited but well­ combed body of facts, is especially prone to overinterpretation.

Catulus and C. Calpurnius Piso placed enormaus pressure on Cicero to bring a false charge against Caesar during the Catilinarian conspiracy: 'Both were in the midst ofbitter inimieiliae wi th Caesar.' 82 The reasons for their hatred are clear: Piso was angry because Caesar had prosecuted hirn for killing a Transpa­ dane Gaul; Catulus was still smarting from the humiliation of losing the recent election for ponlifex maximus to Caesar. 83 M. Caelius Rufus, reporting to Cicero about his feud with Ap. Claudius Pulcher in 50, also shows an appreciation of the power of inimieiliae to bring about prosecutions, and furnishes same interest­ ing details concerning the occasional difficulty of finding a suitable charge on wh ich to impale inimiei - further demonstrating that the identity of the defendant was sometimes more critical than the criminal charge. Inimieiliae between Caelius and Claudius intensi­ fied dramatically when Caelius appealed for protection to L. Calpurnius Pisa, Claudius' colleague in the censorship. Clalldius responded by joining Caelius' enemy L. Domitius Ahenobarbus in prosecuting their common foe. Claudius and Domitius had some difficulty finding acharge, and finally settled on an alleged violation of the lex Seanlinia, wh ich prohibited pederasty. Caelius answered with some charge-fabrication of his own. He accused Claudius of violating the same law, creating a major embarrass­ rnent for the censor. 84

The sufficiency of inimicitiae as a motive in prosecutions In several examples already mentioned, Romans themselves blamed trials on inimieiliae. In each, a defence attorney attempted to save his dient by c1aiming that the prosecutor was acting out of inimieiliae. Such a protest could have succeeded only if Roman juries found it plausible that inimidliae were sufficient to mobilise the machinery of the Roman judicial system. Other passages sug­ gest the Romans believed that inimiei were constantly scouting for charges to file against their personal enemies. In one, Cicero urged the genuineness of acharge that Verres had joined a tithe­ farming partnership by insisting it was' not concocted by inimici at Rome, but exported to Rome from the provinces'. 78 The unspoken assumption in this argument is that inimiei might con­ coct charges. Cicero's conviction that inimieiliae were an entirely sufficient cause of prosecutions is implicit in other public and private utterances as weIl. It animates his praise of Cato, who accused L. Licinius Murena, even though 'induced by no inimiti­ liae and wounded by no injury' .79 The power of inimieiliae is equally acknowledged in a letter to Atticus in which Cicero explained how Hortcnsius had blundered in his management of the Bana Dea trial. In his intense zeal to convict Clodius, Hortensius 'had hastened [0 take the case to judgement because he was carried away by his haU'ed' BO In another work Cicero praised Milo far prosecuting Clodius out of devotion to the public good with no ulterior motive, such as private animosity.81 Although the remark is absurd, it underscores how common private motivations for pmsecutions were. OthlT sources confirm that the Romans believed that prose­ cutors or those responsible for prosccutions needed no incentive other than inimieilial'. Sallust IIad no doubt why Q. Lutatius

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Aside from the contemporary evidence, there is also the test i­ mony oflater sources that inimieiliae could be the major impetus of a trial during the Republic. Livy implies that a personal grudge indllced M. Caecilius Metellus, tribune in 213, to prosecute the censors P. Furius and M. Atilius. These two censors earned Caecilius' hatred by depriving him ofhis state horse, removing him from his tribe, and disenfranchising him, because he had conspired to abandon Italy after the catastrophe at Cannae. 85 Diodorus showed his appreciation of the power of inimieiliae within the Roman judicial system in his account of the Pleminius episode. He assigns the decision of the military tribunes to take up the cause of the Locrians and threaten to indict Pleminius, to fury at Pleminius' unwillingness tu share the Locrian spoil, not to shock at his conduct or self1ess concern for the Locrians. 86 The two tribunes were unable to carry out the prosecution because they were execllted first. 87 Similar causes of trials are related in the narratives of other historians. Valerius Maximus asserts that L. Cornelius Balbus prosecuted his illimieus L. Valerius for personal reasons. 88 Aulus Gellius strongly implies that revenge underlay the prosecutiol1 ur

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Inimicitiae and the Courts

Scipio Aemilianus by Ti. Claudius Asellus, tribune in 140; Scipio had deprived Asellus 01' his state horse. 89 Gruen admits that per­ sonal considerations were paramount in the case, but also attri­ butes apart 01' his motivation, on the basis 01' extremely speculative evidence, to a Claudian faction's struggle to achieve supremacy by eliminating potential competitors. 90 Asconius' explanation ofCn. Domitius' prosecution 01' M. Aemilius Scaurus after Scaurus had not co-opted him into a priesthood reveals the same assumption about the power 01' inimicitiae to spark litigationYl Once again, Gruen admits that Domitius' prosecution 01' Scaurus grew out 01' a 'personal grievance'. He qualifies this admission, however, by surmising that 'personal vendetta and popular enthusiasm ... need not be the only elements, involved in the affair' .92 Gruen fleshes out this conjecture by noting that Scaurus was princeps senatus and a promineut leader ofthe Metellan faction and that, on the basis 01' extremely tenuous indieations, Domitius may have had connections with some anti-Metellan groups, and concludes that the trial 01' Scaurus may have represented a test 01' strength between the Metelli and their opponents. 93 No source directly supports Gruen' s view, and a sufficient cause 01' the prosecution is on recOl'd. Onee again Gruen seems guilty 01' allowing his histori­ cal imagination to distort rather than to explain. Unsupported hypothesis must never overwhelm reasonable explanations 1'01' which there is contemporary support.

The sources state unequivocally that prosecutor and defendant, 01' their backers, were inimici in only a small number 01' the trials on record. One such case concerns the Scipio trials. Many sources testify to the enmity between the Scipios and Cato the Censor, although specifics 01' the feud are meagre. But even allowing 1'01' some exaggeration in the evidence, there is evcry reason to believe that antithetical pcrsonalities and the ciimate 01' jealousy arising out 01' the Scipios' unique prestige within the Roman government would have embittered their relations with Cat0 94 In addition, Cato as a new man who enjoyed a brilliant career doubtless pro­ voked rescntment in a family as noble as the Scipios. Cato's inimicitiae apparently found an outlet in thc judicial proceedings known as the Scipio trials. Several sources imply that he instigated the Petillii in their attaek against the Scipios,'J5 Livy's account,

derived from Valerius Antias, adds that Cato aided the Petillii more overtly by speaking in favour 01' a special criminal inquiry to investigate Lucius Scipio's conduct, and by dissuading two trihunes from vetoing the measure. 96 Antias' account 01' Lucius' trial is almost certainly false, but Livy claims that Cato's speech, 'de pecunia regis Antiochi', was still extant in his day. It was probably transferred from some other context by Livy, and consti­ tutes further evidence 1'01' Cato's support 01' the judicial measures taken against his inimici the Scipios. 97 The private motives 01' P. Rutilius, the prosecutor 01' the two censors 01' 169, C. Claudius PlIlcher and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, are also weil attested. His animosity induced hirn tojoin the equestrian struggle against the censorship that year. Claudius was narrowly acqllittcd, and Rutilius did not pursue his case against Gracchus. 98 In another case discussed above, foul' distin­ guished consulars, animated according to Cicero and Valerius Maximus by private animosity, collaborated in the prosecution 01' Q. Pompeius in the early 130s. 99 One ofthe prosecution witnesses, Q. Metellus Macedonicus, was believed to have been so hostile to Pompeills that he sabotaged the Roman war effort in Spain when he learned that Pompeius had been appointed to succeed hirn .100 In an effort to explain the hostility 01' the consulars at Pompeius' trial, modern scholars have speculated about Pompeius' factional ties, especially his connection with Scipio Aemilianus. 101 It is true that, as a new man and a protege 01' Scipio, Pompeius owed Scipio a great deal. And yet it is very unlikely ti'dt any bond remained between the two after 142, when Pompeius duplicitously can­ vassed 1'01' the consulship after promising his support to Scipio's alter ego, Laelius. 102 It is therefore unlikely that the Metelli and the Caepiones chose to prosecllte Pompeius as an indirect means 01' attacking Scipio Aemilianus; rather, Scipio must have rejoiced in the prosecution 01' a man he could only have considered an ingrate. Similarly, there is no warrant 1'01' believing that the Servilii Caepiones were co-operating in the prosecution 01' Pompeius because 01' loyalty to the Metellans, as implied by Grllen. 103 The language 01' the sources suggests instead that they had their own reasons for disliking him. 104 The trial 01' Pompeius is therefore best seen as the response 01' a group 01' nobles to a new man who thrcatened their monopoly on the highest curule honours. Cicero spoke with personal knowledge 01' the inimicitiae every new man faccd when in summarising Pompeius' career he said: 'Didn't Q. Pompeius, a man 01' obscure and humble birth, secure the highest

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Specific trials

InimiLiliae and Ihe Courls

Inimieiliae and the Courts

honours after making many enemies amI enduring great dangers and hardships?' lOS The sources also suggest that inimiei faced each other as prose­ cutor and defendant in the trial 01' Q. Minucius Scaevola in 119. The prosecutor, T. Albucius, had spent his youth in Athens and later pompously cultivated his Hellenophilism. 106 Scaevola arouseel his ire when, passing through Athens on his way to Asia to serve as praetor, he anel his entire retinue scorned Albucius' pretensions by sarcastically aeldressing him in Greek. Lucilius Scaevola attributed his inimiLiliae with Albucius to this very incident. 107 Any factional interpretation 01' the prosecution 01' Scaevola is entirely speculative. The pOOl' fragments 01' the senmd book 01' Lucilius' satires and two other passing references are the only surviving record 01' the trial. 108 Gruen admits that it is impos­ sible to place Scaevola in any faction in 119. 109 Even if his affilia­ tion at the time 01' his trial could be ascertained with certainty, it would remain to be proved that an opposing faction plotted the trial and enlisted Albucius as prosecutor. What we 00 know about the hostile rdatiollship between Albucius and Scaevola lllakes inirnieilial' a more attractive explanation 01' the trial's causation. Indeed. wh at little cvidence we have 01' the trial itself supports this vicw. The fragments 01' Lucilius, almost all intended to represent speeches delivered by Albueius and Scaevola, 1\() have an unusually nasty tone, even allowing 1'01' the customary ferocity exhibited in speeches at Roman trials. Albucius freely added accusations 01' assault, possibly murder, sexual misconeluet, and even gluttony to the basic charge 01' extortion .111 Such sensationalism betrays the emotional pitch iniml:citiae frequently createel. M. Junius Brutus' prosecution 01' M. Aemilius Scaurus, pro­ bably in 114,112 is another example 01' a trial in which we know inimici faced each other. Gruen, although he acknowledges the inimiLitiae between Brutus and Scaurus, surmises that the trial may have had political overtones because one 01' Brutus' relatives, D. Junius Callaicus, had been allied with a coalition 01' extreme anti­ Gracchans, as shown by his support 01' L. Opimius in 121. The trial might be interpretcd, Gruen concludes, as a reflcction 01' further hostility bctween the anti-Gracchan extremists 01' 121 and the Metellan faction as enlboclied by M. Aemilius Scaurus. 113 The search für a factional background 1'01' the trial must not over­ shadow the personal gruclge Brutus harboureel against Scaurus. Cicero reports that the two wcre inimiei, a fact reinforccd hy thc notoriety of the trial 1'01' the ferocity 01' its false charges. 114 It may

be unwise to read tao much into Brutus' motivations, because his hahit 01' indiscriminate prosecution, wh ich brought much discredit on his family, 115 makes it likely that he requireel little incentive to undertake any prosecution. However, if one is to emphasise any theory for the prosecution 01' Scaurus at all, it is bettel' to emphasise the one for which there is direct support. M. Aemilius Scaurus himself used the criminal courts on several occasions to pursue his private feuds. I have already no ted pas­ sages in Cicero and Valcrius Maximus indicating that his test i­ mony at the trials 01' C. Memmius and C. Flavius Fimbria was ignored by juries because it was considered tainted by inimieitiae. 116 Little evidencc exists for either trial. Even their dates are quite uncertain, although the very end 01' the second century is most Iikely.1I7 Gnce again, Gruen acknowledges the role 01' inimieitiae, and then grafts a factional interpretation onto the niggardly evidence: no source supports his conjecture that Scaurus appeared in court as the avenger 01' the Metellan faction on both occasions. 118 Same additional information, however, emphasises the motive attributed to Scaurus by Cicero and Valerius Maximus, by suggesting what might have sparked Scaurus' enmity against Memmius. During his tribunate in 111, C. Memmius brought Jugurtha to Rome under safe conduct, in tending to use the king' s evidence to accuse Scaurus 01' bribery.119 Two years later Memmius and Scaurus took opposite sieles when L. Calpurnius Bestia appeared before the Mamilian commission which investigated irregularities in Roman relations withJugurtha, and in fact Cicero preserves ajibe Scaurus made at Memmius' expense during that inquiry .120 As in the examples dis­ cussed above, a factional interpretation, resting on tenuous and circumstantial evidence, must not crowd out inimieitiae, the motive underlined by the sources 1'01' Scaurus' behaviour, especially when independent testimony reinforces the existence 01' ill1:mieitiae. Cicero and Valerius Maximus both indicate that inimieitiae played a very significant role at the trial 01' M. Claudius Marcellus in the 90s.1 21 Here Gruen accepts that L. Licinius Crassus' testi­ mony was prompted by private animosity, and even attacks the highly speculative factional interpretation advanced by Ernst Badian. 122 Cicero also explicitly attributes the prosecution by M. Aemilius Scaurus (son ofthe consul 01' 115) ofCn. Cornelius Dola­ bella in the early 70s to inimieitial'.123 Dolabella, the last enemy Scaurus had inherited from his father, had assisted Q. Servilius Caepio in proseclIting the eider Scaurus. Gruen, acknowlcclging

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the feud between Scaurus and Dolabella, weaves a political context for the trial based on speculation that Dolabella may have been linked to the Marians. 124 This interpretation cannot be ruled out. But the testimony we have for the trial emphasises Scaurus' pielas in avenging his father and not any political motives he may have had. At about the same time, C. Rabirius was prosecuted alld acquitted for religious violations. Cicero characterises his accuser, C. Licinius Macer, as an inimicus. 125 Although the evielence in the examples discusseel thus far is meagre, inimieiliar have been recoreleel in the sources and must be consielereel the most likely generator 01' each trial. Fuller evielence allows more complex analysis in other cases. Occasionally the sources suggest that a criminal trial serveel as a magnet for a man's inimici. J ust as temporary factions 01' inimici were createclto battle a Roman' s political pretensions, so inimiei, motivateel by nothing more than mutual hat red 01' their victim, co-operated in bringing suit against their cOlllmon enemy. The Bona Dca trial of Clodius is an excellent example. For all 01' its notoriety, Cloelius' offenee need not have been blown up into the juelicial rause diebre that it became. It might easily have been quietly hanelled by the religious authori­ ties, ami quickly forgotten. 126 But Cloelius' inimiei coulel not resist a splendid opportunity to cmbarrass ancl humiliate hirn. Several sources note that the Corndii Lentuli were elriven to attack Cloelius hy personal gruelges. L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus was the rnain aecusalor, backed up by two 01' his relatives, Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Cornelius Lentulus Niger. 127 Valerius Maximus teils us that a Lentulus, presumably the principal aeeu.mlor, 'hostili voce peroraverat' (argueel in a hostile (one), suggesting astronger motive than outrage at Cloelius' religious offencc. 12B Moreover, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, a juror at the trial, voteel, aecording to Dio, to eondemn Clodius because 01' a private gruelge .129 The combineel evidence about the Lentuli suggests that their rcasons for using the courts against Clodius were personal, cven if we cannot know why they feIt so bitter. The sources suggest that other distinguished Romans also may have been motivatcc! by inimidlicU' to participate in the prosecution 01' Cloelius. L. Licinius Lucullus, an important character witness against Cloelius, had becn married to Cloelius' sister, anel was theref()rc in a position to proelUCT slaves who tcstifieel that she ancl Cloelius had committed incl'st. l :jO His reason for co-operating can oe traccd to his inlmielliae with Clodius who, in a fit of pique at 108

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what he consielered ill-treatment at the hands 01' his brother-in-Iaw, undermined Lucullus' army in the east, as discussed in Chapter 3. Hortensius also appears to have collaborated with the prosecution because of sOllle personal grudge against Clodius. t:ll Personal animosity mayaIso have played a role in drawing Cicero into the Buna Dca trial. It was not, however, animosity between Cicero and Clodius thal incluced Cicero to give his hostile testimony, inaugu­ rating the bitter feud between thc two men that continued until Cloclius' sudden death. Cicero's wife Terentia had hated Clodius sinci? 73 when Clodius accused Catiline of seducing her half-sister, the Vestal Virgin Fabia. She used her considerable influence with Cicero to persuade hirn to destroy Clodius' alibi at the Bona Dca trial, and avenge the insult her entire family had suffered because 01' Clodius' earlier accusation. 1:l 2 lnimiei 01' Caesar mayaIso have played their role at the Bona Dea trial. Clodius' sacrilege must have been a terrible embarrassment for hirn as the new and highly controversial ponlifex maximus. His inimiei woulel have questioned his fitness to serve in the office, and must have enjoyed the shadow the nolorious events cast on his wife. Their interest was to inflate the scandal with the hope 01' inereasing Caesar's loss 01' face. Inimieiliae with Caesar may there­ lore explain why C. Calpurnius Piso and Q. Lutatius Catulus co­ operated in prosecuting Clodil1s. 1:l:J Both men had already c1emon­ slrateel their inimieiliae in 63 when they tried to persuade Cicero to bring false charges against Caesar in connection with the Catilina­ rian conspiracy 134 The BOl1a Dca trial shows not only how inimiei could unite in undertaking a prosecution, but also how a trial might serve the purpose 01' very disparate inimieiliae. N umerous inimiei whose motives varied widely might exploit the same trial to pursue their own feuds. The trial of L. Valerius Flaccus in 59 provides another example 01' inimici co-operating to convict a common foe. Scholars have generally interpreted the li"ial as part 01' the struggle between the triumvirs and their opponents, and it would be lla'ive to deny all political implications to a trial in 59, in which Pompey, the most prominent triumvir, took such a conspicuous interest. J:J5 But this shoulcl not minimise the erucial roll' played by inimieiliar. Cicero says that the principal prosecutor, D. Laelius, undertook the trial at the request of his elose assoc'iatc Pompey, who hatecl Flaccus. 1:J6 Unforlunately, we cannot know why Pompey anel Flaccus were such biller enemies; it is nol at all elear that PompC'y' s role as a triumvir was rcsponsible frl!" this falling out. Nor do thc sourccs 109

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providc any evidence that the other two triumvirs shared the hatred Pompey feIt 1'01' Flaccus. There is therefore no reason to believe that the trial belonged to the triumviral agenda. In fact, D. Laelius, thc man who actually undertook the prosecution, may have been only too happy to oblige Pornpey because the trial satis­ fied his own indinations. Cicero re/crs to him as abittel' enemy 01' the defendant;137 again we cannot know what lay behind his enmity. Scholars who view the trial as the work 01' the triumvirs' political circlc cmphasisc thc roll' 01' L. Cornelius Balbus, the Spanish financier who collaborated with Pompey and Caesar. 13B It is true that he co-sponsared (as a subseriptor) the prosecution of Flaccus,IJ9 butthere is no evidencc that he did so as an agent ofthe triumvirs. Indeed, a passage in Valerius Maximus suggests that Balbus was an inimieus of Flaccus in his own right, and even before the trial in 59 had attempted to use the courts to destroy his cnemy.1,H)

Creticus, gave testimony favourable to Flaccus. 14B As discussed in Chapter 4, Metellus certainly had a violent personal feud with Pompey, who had been so reluctant to share any of the gloria he had garne red du ring his campaign against the pirates. We do not know, however, whether Metellus' bitterness extended to the entire triumvirate. Hence, his appearance for Flaccus may have resulted simply from adesire to exploit every opportunity to oppose Pompey. It is also worth noting that Flaccus had served under both Servilius and Metellus. 149 The enduring bond that united a Roman and his subordinates may explain why both men were willing to testify favourably, A comparable motive may account far the support of Cn. Domitius Calvinus, the bitter anti­ triumviral tribune of 59. He had served as legate under Flaccus in Asia. 150

Both Gruen and Münzer buttress their factional interpretation of Flaccus' trial by stressing that two staunch opponents 01' the triumvirs, P. Servilius Isauricus and Q. Caecilius Metellus

Because the sources provide no firm evidence of any political motivation for the trial of Flaccus, and an abundance of testimony that Flaccus' inimiei were a powerful force at the trial, it seems most probable that the trial originated in inimieitiae, rather than in the desire of the triumviral forces to punish their political opposi­ tion. Although the opponents ofthe triumvirate and the supporters of Flaccus coincided to some extent, it is misleading to stress the role 01' political animosity toward the triumvirs in bringing Flaccus to trial, at the expense of the inimieitiae that figure so prominently in the sources. A further detail of Flaccus' career, however, pro­ vides the most telling evidence that his prosecution was not politi­ cally inspired. In 57, Flaccus served as legate to L, Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, the proconsul in Macedonia. 151 Yet Calpurnius was a strong aclherent 01' the triumvirs. He had close ties with Caesar, who marriecl his daughter while consul and helped hirn secure the consulate with Gabinius in 58. 152 Calpurnius conducted his consulate in the interests 01' the triumvirs, notably by support­ ing Clodius' efforts to exile Cicero. 153 If Flaccus' trial in 59 really had been caused by triumviral politic:king, it would be odd to find either that Flaccus would assoc'iate with Calpurnius or that Calpurnius would eleet to be accompanied to his province by a legate with such good c:ause to be opposed to the triurnvirs. 154 The trial 01' T. Munatius Bursa in 52 01' 51 15 :, is another example 01' a prosecution which the sources attribute to inimieitiae, For Gruen, who acknowledges the roll' of private animosity in motivating the prosecutiol1, the trial belongs to an offensive against Pompey by those men bent Oll his destructiol1. 1',(j It is true that Munatius favoured Pompey's interests during iJi, tribunate in

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We know the names 01' several other hostile witnesses whose politics are unknown, but whosc reasons 1'01' co-operating in the prosecution of Flaccus are deal' enough. In each case, it was not because they were cornmitted to the triumvirs, but because they dctested Flaccus. M. Lucro frecly admitted that he was furious with Flaccus for his involvement in the conviction of one 01' his freed­ men,141 P. Septimius also had a personal grudge because Flaccus had exposed his ClVerseer as a rnurdercr. 142 M. Caelius' inimieitiae with Flaccus originated when he was removed from the lists of assessors, 143 C. Appuleius Decianus professed to have a family feud with Flaccus: because his father had brought Flaccus' father to trial, Decianus bclieved that Flaccus nursed a grudge against him .144 vVhether 01' not Flaccus felt such a grudge, it is deal' that as governor he had opposed Decianus' interests. 145 Decianus' appearance against Flaccus is therefore best interpreted as revenge for those actions. Not a shrecl 01' cvidcnce suggests that he was assoeiated with the triumvirs 01' acted on their behalf at the trial. The motives of two other supporters 01' the prosecution are less clear, but thcre is no warrant for believing they were motivated by loyalty to the triumvirs, Falcidius claimed that he had been forced to bribe Flaccus for the right to collect revenue from Tralles. 146 His appearance at Flaccus' trial may have been tied to his resentment over that expense. The motives 01' Caetra are entirely unknown. 147

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52, and that Pompey made adesperate effort to protect Munatius from condemnation during the trial, although the very intensity of his support backfired when the jurors voted to condemn so as not to appeal' to be Pompey' s slaves. 157 It is also true that Pompey' s opponents, especially Cato, supported the prosecution of Munatius and worked hard to secure his conviction. 158 But the evidence is undear on what we would most need to know to be sure that the prosecution was politically inspired: did Pompey's opponents mark out Munatius for prosecution because they con­ sidered this the most promising means of striking hard at Pompey, and then approach a prosecutor to carry out the mission for thern? The evidence suggests that other forces generated the trial. I have already described how Munatius, although indebted to Cicero for some unknown service, prosecuted Cicero's friend Sabinus, thereby surpassing even Clodius as Cicero's bitterest enemy. The intensity of Cicero' s feelings combined with his ecstatic reaction to Munatius' conviction suggest that his chief source 01' delight in the trial was his personal hatred of the man, not Munatius' elose affiliatior,s with Pompey. His personal motivations did not prevent Cicero from rejoicing, as always, that his actions met with the approval of the optimates. 159 Although litigation subsided during Caesar's dictatorship, 160 it remained a tempting outlet for inimici. A dispute about the African command at the beginning of the civil war in 49 led to a quarrel between Q. Ligarius and L. Aelius Tubero. Ligarius, along with P. Attius Varus, rdused to turn the province over to Tubero, who had been appointed by the Senate. Political loyalties did not provoke the argument between Ligarius and Tubero, because both were Pompeians at the time. Ligarius incurred the lasting enmity of Tubero and his son Quintus by refusing them permis­ sion to land, 01' even to draw water in Africa despite the illness of the YOllnger Tubero. 161 Quintus Tllbero subsequently brought Ligarius to trial in 46 on acharge of treason. Cicero, perhaps by cmphasising the personal motivations of the prosccution, success­ fully defcnded Ligarius in a court presided over by Caesar, whose dictatorship empowerecl him to hear the case. 162

trials are known through one 01' two terse references in the sourees, usually lacking any indication of why they occurred. Even when these fragmentary notices do not specify that inimicitiae existed betwcen a prosecutor and his victim, however, they often preserve the traces of inimicitiae. When such traces are present and evidence to support a factional interpretation is extremely tentative, the inference that inimicitiae were the basis of the trial is attractive. 1 have shown in Chapter 3 how easily a perceived attack on a man's honour might lead to inimicitiae. The courts provided an excellent opportunity to avenge wounded honour, as the case of Ti. Claudius Asellus shows. As censor in 142, Scipio Aemilianus disenfranchised Asellus. Even though Asellus recovered his rights, he apparently did not forget the insult he suffered at Scipio's hands. As soon as he became tribune in 140, Asellus brought charges against Scipio. 163 It is impossible to rule out Gruen' s hypothesis that Asellus was pursuing some broader political objec­ tive on behalf of the Claudian group.164 But Aulus Gellius strongly implies that wounded honour precipitated the prosecution of Scipio, and no source offers any evidence that a more complex motive was involved. 165 Similarly, the prosecution ofM. Antonius s(Jrnetime after his censorship in 97 is best attributed to inimicitioe originating in woundcd pride. M. Duronius, tribune perhaps in 97, had intemperately urged the repeal of a piece of sumptuary legislation, and earned expulsion from the Senate at the hands of the ccnsors of 97, L. Valerius Flaccus and M. Antonius. 166 Wc also know that Duronius later prosecuted Antonius for bribery.167 Again a factional background is conceivable within the bare frame­ work provided by the sources. In light of what the bare facts them­ selves imply about thc personalrelationship between Duronius and Antonius, however, it is safest to accept inimicitiae as Duronius' motive, especially because his political affiliations, if any, are cornpletely unknown 168

Anyone who has wrestled with the survlvmg evidence for Roman trials must be struck by the extremely patchy evidence for most known prosecutions. Luck or extl'aordinary notoriety has preserved reasonably full details abaul a small number of trials, and only these are open to safe interpretation. Thc vast rnajority of

Caesar's inimicitiae with Catulus, intensified by the campaign for ponti/ex maximus in 63, blossomed into his prosecution of Q. Lutatius Catulus in 62 for embezzling funds intended for the reconstruction of thc temple of J upiter Capitolinus. Gruen inter­ prets this prosccution as part 01" the maintenance 01' steady judicial pressure on the inimici of Pompey', sidestepping the inimicitiae bctween the principals themselves, the explanation that deserves the primary emphasis. He supports this view by focusing on Caesar's intention, as a final insult, to remove Catulus' name from the building in favour of Pompey's.16'1 This stress is

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misplaced, however, because 01' Dio's claim that Caesar made the proposal not to glorify Pompey, but to increase his own popu­ larity.170 Caesar's action is rcminiscent 01' his speech in favour 01' the lex Gabinia in 67 which was also motivated by his desire to ingratiate hirnself with the people, although Pompey was the apparent beneficiary.17I A detail from Suetonius about the out­ co me of Caesar' s suit confirms that personal motives rather than Pompeian partisanship fuelled the confrontation with Catulus in 62. He reports that Caesar withdrew his measure at the first wave of optimate opposition .172 Had Caesar been a truly dedicated Pompeian, he would not have buckled so readily under the easily anticipated opposition of the optimates. Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos demonstrated that same year how tenacious Pompey's true adhercnts could be. 17 :J The sum of the evidence therefore suggests that Caesar's primary aims were to humiliate Catulus and increase his own popularity. Inimicitiae generated by frustrated ambition for a high religious office, the augurate, also led to a trial in 50. M. Antony's defeat of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus created bitter animosity between Domitius and Cadius (one of Antony's supporters) as already mentioned. 174 Domitius' rage at his setback passed to his son Gnaells who prosecuted a certain en. Saturninus because of his supporl I4, was more diffuse. Plancius, a JH'W man, had

defeated Laterensis despite his illustrious lineage at the aedile elec­ tions in 55. Laterensis' resentment at this humiliating defeat suggests the inimicitiae of a noble toward new men .179 At the same time, ambition for the prestige of the aedileship doubtless needled hirn into action. IBO

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Because some prosecutions resulted from family feuds, cases known to involve such feuds and lacking other justifications often are most satisfactorily analysed in terms of family loyalty. A notorious feud raged between the Servilii and the Luculli during the late Republic. IBl We do not know when it began, but one episode, if it was not the ultimate cause, must have intensified the bitter feelings of the Servilii: L. Licinius Lucullus reacted to the news that the Senate had appointed C. Servilius to replace hirn as commander of the Roman forces in Sicily in 103 by disbanding his forccs and sabotaging the military initiatives his army had taken. IB2 Servilius the Augur, a member of the family different from the one who succeeded Lucullus, brought Lucullus to trial and secured his conviction. IB3 The sources do not say why Servilius the Augur embarked upon the prosecution, but it is a fair guess that he shared the resentment his relative feit when Lucullus' treason dashed his hopes of winning military glory, or that he shared some other aspect of his family's hostility toward the Luculli. The sons of the convicted Lucullus inherited hatred of Servilius the Augur from their father and were greatly admired when they brought hirn to trial, albeit unsuccessfully.IB4 In other trials, the divergence of the prosecutor's individual interests from those of his political associates is a good indication that family feeling rather than politics was responsible. A coali­ tion's priorities often left no room lor the pursuit of private grudges, wh ich could only distract members from the most impor­ tant concerns of a political group - the acquisition of power and the implementation of policy. This kind 01' tension between private and public impulses marks the career of C. Gracchus, whose backers came to power in 123 with an overwhelming agenda for social reform. Gaius undoubtedly shared his associates' goals, but he could not lorget the brutal murder of his brother Ti. Gracchus a decade earlier. Revenge against those responsible for Tiberius' murder became a leitmotiv of his career. Plutarch reports that he never missed an opportunity to refer to his dead brother in public orations. 11I5 Gaius gave notice early in his tribunate that he intendecl to seek revenge. He introduced two pieces 01' Iegislation 115

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tailored to secure the convlcllons 01' two 01' his brother' s most vigorous opponents, M. Octavius and P. Popillius 1.aenas. 186 These atternpts to use the Roman judicial system for what had become a private feud appeal' to have been very unpopular with the faction that brought Gracchus to power, perhaps because it could not afford to ciivcrt its limited resources from its central goals. Gracchus withdrew his legislation against Octavius, daim­ ing that he was obliging his mother Cornelia. 187 The people, who overwhelmingly supported the election 01' Gracchus, were never­ theless pleased that Octavius was not brought to trial 188 They may have shared the more practical sentiments Cornelia conveyed to her son when she urged hirn not to allow his feelings to injure the Republic's interests. 189 Popillius, the intencied victim 01' C. Gracchus' other proposed legislation, escaped prosecution by going into voluntary exile. 190 The Icgislation may weil have had broader ramifications, but Gracchus' pursuit 01' Popillius, presumably through a dause that made the measure retroactive, seems to have sprung from per­ sonal hatred rather than Irom the Gracchan political agenda. 191 Gracchus' politicaJ supporter~ would not have wanted to alienate the public, with whom Popillius was quite popular. Diodorus reports that Popillius was escorted out 01' Rome by weeping crowds who regretted that they had permitted themselves to be bribed against hirn. )l)2 It is true that this account 01' Popillius' departure from Rome is not consistcnt with Cicero's, but the claim that Popillius enjoyed somc measure 01' popular support should not be dismissed out 01 hand, for he had supported many 01' the measures urged by the Gracchans. 193 The reform-minded followers 01' C. Gracchus may have assessed his continuing value to their cause differently than Gracchus himsel!", obsessed by Popillius' clash with Tiberius. Yet another recurring pattern of criminal trials involves retalia­ tory prosecutions, in which a defcndant presses charges against his prosecutor. As in cases f"alling into other patterns, the sources orten do not state explicitly that irtimicitiaf engendcred or strengthened by thc original prosecution inspin~c1 the relaliatioll. However, thc inevitability with which irtimicitiae followed prosccution makes this an obvious infcrence, cspecially when the sou rces do not readily suggest any other explanation. Counter-prosccution was a particu­ larly gooel path 01' revenge because it was sure to cause the inimiwI considerable disCOlnf()rt, ('ven if he were acquittcd. This kind 01' 116

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exchange 01' prosecutions occurred between M. Aemilius Scaurus and P. Rutilius Rufus. Their rivalry far the consulship 01' 115 may weil have led to inimicitiae as political rivalry so often did in Rome. 194 Whether or not their inimicitiae sprang from that com­ petition, Rutilius, defeated at the poils, prosecuted Aemilius far bribery. Aemilius, although acquitted, was unwilling to let the matter rest. He immediately struck back with a counter-prosecu­ tion on identical charges, which also failed. 195 Gruen interprets these trials as part 01' the conflict between the Metelli and their opponents. l96 But the sources do not mention that either man was prosecuted because 01' his factional associations. Moreover, the reconstruction ·01' those associations is itself highly speculative. Gruen admits that we cannot recover the date at which Scaurus became a dose collaborator with thc Metelli. 197 The evidence far the political ties 01' P. Rutilius is even more tenuous. Whatever connections he may have had with the anti-Metellan Scipionic Circle belong to the 130s, almost twenty years earlier. 198 In fact, by 109 Rutilius must have switched camps, for in that year he served as Q. Caecilius Metellus' legate in Africa during the war against J ugurtha. 199 Gruen believes that Rutilius remained staunchly anti-Metellan untill15, but had a change 01' heart some­ time between 115 and 110, switched to the Metellan camp, and was ultimately weil rewarded first with the military assignment under Metellus, and finally with the consulship in 105. 200 How­ ever, there is no evidence that Rutilius' anti-Metellan associa­ tions, assuming he had any, continued into the 11 Os. 201 There is good reason to doubt that Rutilius ever opposed the Metelli. The absence 01' any real evidence 01' his allegiances makes any factional interpretation 01' the counter-prosecutions uncertain and unneces­ sary in the light 01' the burning desire to retaliate that Aemilius must have fell. lnimicitiae also help to account for C. Sempronius Rufus' pro­ secution of M. Tuccius. In 51, Tuccius filed an unknown charge against Sempronius. Before the case came to trial, Sempronius countered with his own complaint against Tuccius. Sempronius' motive was not purely revenge. Any prosecution would have served his immediate purpose, which was to delay his own trial by introducing another case that would take precedence and push his court date further back on the docket. 202 But so long as any judicial victim would serve Sempronius' purposes, he could think 01' no more desirable target than his own prospective prosecutor - M. Tuccius. 203 Sempronius' tactic was in the end too blatant; he was 117

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hirnself convicted on acharge of false accusation. Though Roman defendants were often unable to conduct their own retaliatory prosecutions, especially when they had been con­ victed and exiled, they might still engage in retaliation through the agency of their sons, other relatives or friends. Pietas provided all the incentive a son needed to avenge his father. In the absence of other evidence, it should be accepted as the primary motive when a prosecutor indicted his father's former accusers. The prosecution of M. Caelius Rufus in 56 is an excellent example. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the charges were brought by L. Sempronius Atratinus to avenge Caelius' judicial activity against Atratinus' father, L. Calpurnius Bestia. Gruen accepts the conelu­ sion of many scholars that the proseClltion originated in filial loyalty, but suggests that the trial quickly became an arena for the Clodians to combat Pompey. 20+ There can be no doubt that the Clodians, led by Clodia, were co-operating with the prosecu­ tion 20S But both the Clodians in general and Clodia in particular were hostile toward Caelius for reasons apart from his affiliation with Pompey. The hostility ofthe Claudian family is reaffirmed by two subsequent efforts it made to destroy Caelius in the courts. In 54 Servius Pola, acting on its behalf, prepared to prosecute Caelius 206 Ap. Claudius Pulcher used the same retainer to pro­ secute Caelius in 50 under the Scantinian law, provoking Caelius' retaliatory prosecution as mentioned above. The intervention of Cloclia in Atratinus' prosecution of Caelius is best attributed to her detestation of Caelius after he broke off their affair, rather than to any political opposition to Pompey. 207 Gruen deduces a political motivation for Clodia' s participation because of her reference to L. Lucceius in connection with her testimony regarding Caelius' allegcd attempt on the life of Dio, the Academic philosopher sent by Alexandria to Rome to prevent the Roman recognition of Ptolemy Auletes. 2oB Lucceius was a elose associate ofPompey, and slancler of the one wO'Jlcl have blackened the other. It is not at all elear, however, that Clodia's charges reflectecl so poorly on Lucceius' moral character. She did not accuse Caelius of turning over gold to Lucceius to arrange the assassination of Dio, as Gruen c1aims. 209 She did accuse Caelius of trying to bribe Lucceius' sen'ants to commit the murcler. 2lo It is true that a stain of guilt would have attached to Lucceius if the murcler had been com­ mitted in his house,211 but Pompey would scarcely have been held responsible for the greed of Lucceius' slaves. There is simply no evidcnce that Pompey had strong feelings one way or the other

about the trial of Caelius. Caelius' other aecusator, L. Herennius Balbus, admitted that his motives were highly personal, declaring quite openly that he would not have made the accusation ifCaelius had not brought charges a second time against his friend Bestia. 212 Herennius is a good example of how a defendant might count on his friends as weil as his family to share his inimieitiae and use the courts to avenge his prosecution. The legal battle between the Claudians and the Servilii illus­ trates how an entire clan might participate in a counter-prosecu­ tion on behalf of one member. In 51, C. Claudius Pulcher, the brother of Ap. Claudius Pulcher and the notorious Clodius, was accused of extortion committed du ring 55 - 53, while he was pro­ consul in Asia. The ensuing legal and illegal manoeuvres, which need not be discussed in detail, involved an attempt by Claudius to have M. Servilius use some of the ill-gotten funds to bribe the prosecution into mismanaging the cxtortion suit. Claudius' con­ viction suggests that Servilius botched the job. This apparent mis­ handling of the bribe inspired such fury in C. Claudius' son that, when Servilius himself was prosecuted for extortion by Q. Pilius, he testified against hirn in a way that seriously compromised his father as weil as himself. 213 He claimed that Servilius had received money from the senior Claudius to purehase the co-operation of the prosecutors at the earlier extortion trial. 2lf Although Servilius was acquitted, young Claudius soon paid for his actions in his own coin. The Servilii clan co-operated in an effort to convict him on a charge of extortion. 215

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In the cases discussed so far, the sources either explicitly say inimieitiae were the cause of the prosecution, or supply strong evidence from wh ich that infcrence can be drawn, by showing why the parties might weil be inimiei and why inimiei might turn to the courts. In other cases the evidence is more tenuous because the traces of inimieitiae that might have inspired the prosecutor are fainter. In these cases the course of inimieitl:ae cannot be recon­ structed, but their presence in some form is detectable through circumstantial evidence. The evidence strongly suggests that L. Opimius and P. Decius were inimiei, a fact that may account für Decius' prosecution of Opimius in 120. 216 Opimius was charged with having placed Roman citizens in prison without trial, and with rnurdering the Gracchans in 121. 217 The nature of the charge might tempt one to conclude that Decius was acting as an avenging spirit of the decimated Gracchans. Such a conclusion would be 119

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rash, however, because no source links Decius with the Gracchans. We da know, on the other hand, that Opimius' father sometime after his consulship in 154 had a sharp exchange with a Decius, who may weil have been identical with the tribune of 120 218 In this incident, Opimius' laughter at Decius' effeminate attire earned the consular a disrespectful retort. 219 Whatever the original motives for the proseeution of Opimius were, the anti-Gracchans became heavily involved in the trial. They had to intervene to save their hero, no matter what the prosecutor's original motives may have been. The political flavour thc trial lOok on is indicated by the fact that the Gracchan renegade C. Papirius Carbo undertook Opimius' defence. Factional politics transformed this trial, even though there is no evidence that they played any role in Decius' decision to launch the prosecution. 220 Sometimes the evidence of inimicitiae between prosecutor and defendant is fragmentary in a different way. In such cases the pro­ secutor's hostility is clearly indicated but the defcndant's responses are unknown. The sources may preserve, for example, aseries 01' hostile actions involving prosecutions for which the accounts are one-sided, omitting the counterattacks that perpetuate the cycle. The most we can concludc with confidence, however, is that some form of continuing inimiciliae was involved. The prosecution of L. Sergius Catilina by Clodius in 65 is this kind of case. 221 Prosecutor and defendant had been on bad terms at least as early as 73, when Clodius accused Catiline of seducing the Vestal Virgin Fabia. 222 In 65 Clodius again was the aggressor, presumably motivated by inimicitiae, although we lack evidence, as in the first trial, of any­ thing Catiline had done to provoke Clodius. A bitter personal feud between Clodius and Catiline would help explain not only these two trials, but also why Clodius' role during the Catilinarian conspiracy and its aftermath was so ambivalent. Asconius makes the puzzJing statement that Clodius wanted to join the Catilinarian conspiracy, but changed his mind at the last minute. 223 Plutarch claims that Clodius acted as Cicero's staunch supporter and pro­ tector during the course of the conspiracy. 224 Cicero' s portrayal of Clodius during the 50s as an heir to Catiline's legacy of revolution and violence 22 " despite Clodius' actual opposition to the con­ spiracy suggests that Clodius and Catiline were spiritual kin unable for personal rcasons to co-operate in the political arena. Cicero rclied on their spiritual atlinity to claim that they had co­ operated, and conveniently forgot thc bitter feud. Clodius' support 01' Catilinarianisrn was !lot cntire1y consistent with his

hatred 01' its leader. He wanted to thwart Catiline's threat to Cicero' s life even while toying with the idea of joining the cause Cicero so resolutely opposed. Clodius could not ultimately recon­ cile the sympathy with Catiline's cause that he expressed with his desire to destroy Catiline. Another trial that may have been motivated by inimicitiae, although the sources provide HO indication of any injury the pro­ secutor suffered at the hands of the defendant, is L. Manlius Torquatus' prosecution of P. Cornelius Sulla in 62. Gruen sees the trial as 'an ideal occasion für Pompey' s political foes to score an indirect hit' on the general. 226 As evidence of Sulla's political con­ nection with the Pompeians, he cites Sulla's marriage to Pompey's sister. 227 Whether this rnarriage tie shows such a political connec­ tion in 62 is uncertain, however. C. Memmius, Pompeia's first husband, died fighting Sertarius in 75. 228 A letter from Cicero in 45 mentions a Pompeia, perhaps the same woman, as the wife of P. Vatinius. 229 Because we do not know when Pompeia married Sulla or how long the marriage lasted, Gruen's reconstruction must remain speculative. Moreover, no evidence survives to suggest that Pompey' s enemies played any role at the trial. On the other hand, as Gruen hirnself suggests, 230 there is abundant reason to believe that L. Manlius Torquatus was responding to his own private feelings when he undertook the prosecution. An acri­ monious feud had been raging between the Manlii and Sulla for at least three years. Sulla and P. Autronius Paetus had been elected to the consulship far 65. Before they were to have taken office, both men suffered the disqualifying disgrace of conviction for bribery, and the two men who brought the charges, L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus, were elected in their place. 231 The identically named son 01' Manlius Torquatus, who became Sulla' s prosecutor in 62, had participated in the earlier bribery trial. 232 It is a likely assumption that Sulla harboured bitter feelings toward the whole Manlii family, wh ich had attained the highest honours by wrecking his career. The trial of Sulla in 62 should be considered part of the continuing hostilities between Sulla and the Manlii that began with Sulla's disgrace in 66 and endured long after Sulla' s acquittal in 62. 233 In the course of the defence, Cicero assumed that the prosecution was a continuation of the earlier judicial activity against Sulla. 234 It is true that he had a stake in persuading the jury that Manlius was bringing the accusation out of inimicitiae, and not because the case had any intrinsic merit. Still we would not expect hirn to make repcated

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references to the bitter enmity unless the argument had credibility. The trial of C. Antonius in 59 is another example of a prosecu­ tion that appears to have been motivated by inimicitiae despite the lack of all but the barest outline of the hostility. It seems deal' that Caesar was the driving force behind the prosecution. Cicero accused hirn of as much. 2:J5 Furtherrnare, P. Vatinius, one of Caesar's dosest associates in 59, openly admitted emending his 'lex de alternis consiliis reiciendis', which permitted challenging alternate jurymen in forming a panel, with a view toward depriving the accused Antonius of its benefits. 236 Gruen is right to suggest that Caesar may have induced the tribune to take this action. 2:J7 Thehostility between Antonius and Caesar appears to have been longstanding. In the 70s the young Caesar unsuccess­ fully prosecuted Antonius, and it is fair to assurne that they were chronically at odds until Caesar eventually pardoned Antonius sametime during his dictatorship. 238 The strength of their inimicitiae is suggested by M. Antony's failure to im'lude Antonius, who was his unde, in the general recall of exiles. Antony very iikely did not undertake this exdusion, which Cicero branded a sin, without same prodding from Caesar. External pressure, doubtless Caesar's, is also implied by Q. Fufius Calenus, who tried to defend Antony by arguing that he was not in a position to recall anyone he chose. 239 Gruen regards Caesar's role in the pro­ secution of Antonius in 59 as evidence of friction between the newly-formed first triumvirate and its opponents, calling the trial 'the first instance of triumviral collaboration in the judicia' .240 There is no apparent reason, however, why the triumvirate should have focused its wrath on Antonius, for he was not among the vociferous opponents of the new coalition. 241 1t is more likely, given what we know about the hostility between Caesar and Antonius, that Caesar's personal feelings account for the trial. Circumstantial evidence also suggests that inimicitiae motivated the prosecution of P. Vatinius in 54, in which his enemy C. Licinius Calvus appears to have been the principal prosecutor. 242 As in Antonius' trial discussed above, Gruen, although recog­ nising the animosity between Vatinius and Calvus, implies that Calvus' prosecution was motivated by political opposition to the triumvirate and dcsirc to strike indirectly at one of its weak points . .?43 1t is deal' that Vatinius was aligned with the triumvirate, whose decision at Luca to advance his career led to their support of his successful campaign against Cato for the praetorship of 55. 244 The unsavoury tactics used by Vatinius during this campaign 245

were to provide potential prosecutors all the ammumtlon they needed to attack hirn through the courts after his office expired. Calvus' links to the opposition forces are, on the other hand, quite tenuous. He is routinely considered an anti-triumviral poet though his lampoons against Caesar and Pompey are more remi­ niscent of modern political cartoons than of serious criticism of the new regime in Rome. 246 Gruen buttresses his identification of Calvus as an opponent of the triumvirate by pointing to his speech against M. Livius Drusus Claudianus, who was prosecuted just before Vatinius in 54. 247 However, the evidence does not support Gruen 's hypothesis that Drusus, like Vatinius, was tried by anti­ triumviral forces because of his association with the political alliance that had so recently reasserted itself at Luca. 248 The only firm connection between Drusus and the triumvirs dates from 59, when Cicero mentions hirn as a likely candidate for patronage from Caesar. 249 But many allianccs shifted in the volatile 50s, and there is no evidence whatever that Drusus was prosecuted in 54 because he was a Caesarian. Evcn if the Lucretius who prosecuted Drusus was the same as the Q. Lucretius who served on Pompey's side during thc civil war, we could not condude that he opposed Cacsar in 54. 250 Service on either side during the civil war is hardly indicative of a man's political affiliations at an earlier time when Pompey and Caesar were still associated, Nor does the fact that Cicero defended both Vatinius and Drusus show that the political motivations for their prosecutions were alike, for the cir­ cumstances of his representation differed. Thc triumvirs pressured Cicero into defending Vatinius. 251 There is no evidence that they had already forced his hand in the case of Drusus. Cicero's com­ plaints about the heavy workload he faced in 54, cited by Gruen as evidence that his heart was not in the defence of Drusus, seem to reflect the general harassment of overwork, not the resentment of forced service to the triumvirs. 252 Two other trials in 54 in which Calvus defended supporters of the triumvirate further undermine the theory that political friction accounts for the trial ofVatinius. The first case was that ofCalvus' dient C. Porcius Cato, whose career, like Cicero's, was pro­ foundly altered by the conference of Luca. 25 :1 Cato demonstrated his loyalty to the triumvirs by using his tribunate in 56 to advance the objectives of Pompey and Crassus. 254 This tribunician activity, which was legally questionable, led to his indictment in 54. 255 Despite Cato's strang political association, the trial did not necessarily originate in anti-triumviral politics. The twenty-two­

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year-old prineipal accusator, C. Asinius Pollio, may have wanted nothing more than to launeh his political career by conducting a prosecution, as so many Romans did. 256 Seneca's suggestion that Calvus retained his friendship with Pollio despite his defence of Cato shows that ideological fevers were not running very high at this trial. 257 Nevertheless, the triumvirs very likely stood by Cato, just as they supported Vatinius later in the summer. Calvus' con­ tribution to Cato's defence could not have escaped their notice, nor ean we imagine that Calvus was blind to the triumvirate's interest in the case. And yet we have no evidence that Calvus' actions were involuntary, or that his real feelings were anti­ triumviral. 258 Several weeks after Cato was acquitted, Calvus spoke in defence of C. Messius, another supporter of the triumvirate. Messius was a e10se associate of Pompey who demonstrated his devotion in 57 by urging that Pompey be given an even more sweeping grain­ command than the consuls had proposed. Pompey was pleased despite his public denial of desire for the more extensive power. 259 Messius, summoned from Caesar's staff in Gaul, was prosecuted by P. Servilius Isauricus, an intimate ofCato. 260 It would be over­ hasty to conclude that this prosectltion represented an attack on the triumvirate by ilS opposition in Rome, for we have no evidence that it was politically inspired. Whatever its motivation, however, Caesar cannot have been pleased by the recall of his legate to stand trial in Rome. Yet again Calvus took a position favourable to Caesar by appearing for the defence. 261 In short Calvus' judicial activity in 54 appears to have been politieally inconsistent, making any hypothesis about his political affiliations suspect. Inimieitiae are a mueh more promising explana­ tion of his prosecution of Vatinius. The prosecution of 54 was not the only time lhey c1ashed in court. Unfortunately, the sources do not reveal how frequently or on what occasions Calvus prosecuted Vatinius, or how their differenees began. 262 Eut the other judicial aetivity very likely preeeded the trial in 54, beeause Calvus seems 26 :J We [0 have died prematurely, either in 54 or shortly thereafter do know that Calvus had expressed an eagerness to prosecute Vatinius in 56, even if we cannot be sure that a trial took place in that year. 264 Calvus' hat red of Vatinius does not prove that lhe enernies of the triumvirate failed to eneourage the proseeution. But the evidence for polilical support is so weak that it cannot be presumcd the dominant motive for the trial. Two years later, in 52, inimieitiae probably played a key role in 124

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C. Memmius' indictment of Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica. Memmius himse!f had been charged with an offence re!ated to the electoral illegalities of 54, when he made a bid for the consulate, but repeated delays prevented the case from reaching court until 52.265 Almost nothing is known about this trial other than that Memmius was convicted, but Gruen is certainly right in

suggesting that Pompey, who had supported Memmius' consular

266 campaign in 54, would not have eome to his aid two years later. Bitter inimieitiae had blossomed between the two. The year had

begun auspiciously for Pompey as he forged another glittering

marital alliance, this time with Cornelia, the daughter of

Metellus,267 the man subsequently indicted by Memmius. The

name of Pompey's new father-in-I aw evoked some of the Repub­ lic's greatest heroes. Pompey had further achieved the unprece­ dented honour of a sole eonsulship, and therefore occupied that office for a third time 268 These triumphs soon soured. His marriage must have been still young when Memmius, perhaps encouraged by the age discrepancy between the bride and Lhe groom,269 sent Cornelia abillet doux. The messenger who delivered the letter was Curtius Nicias, a man who enjoyed excellent 270 relations with both Pompey and Mcmmius. When Cornelia, not interested in the proposal, informed her husband, Pompey sum­ marily forbade Nicias his house, as discussed in my lntroduction. Pompey's wrath undoubtedly included Memmius, the actual culprit, despite their earlier political association, and Memmius, who had already shown his eontempt for Pompey, must have reciprocated the inimieitiae. Prior to his conviction on charges of e!ectoral illegalities dating back to 54, Memmius hit on a brilliant if ultimately unsuccessful sche me to extricate hirnself from his judicial predicament and at the same time to deal a hard blow to Pompey and his newly acquired in-Iaws. The law under which Memmius was charged provided immunity to any defendant who 27l convicted another individual of the same offenee. To save him­ self, Memmius pressed eharges against Pompey's new father-in­ law, Metellus,272 Pompey responded by taking the extraordinary step of elevating Metellus to share his consulship, thereby eonfer­ 273 ring on him immunity from prosecution. In pressing charges Memmius clearly had more al stake than his personal feelings: he was trying to avoid convietion. But the inimieitiae that arose so recently between Memmius and Pompey' s entire family seems to havc played some role in Memmius' choice of virLims.

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Conclusion The criminal prosecution was one 01' the most destructive legiti­ mate weapons available to Romans. Its dual nature - clestructive­ ness within a legitimate framework - provided templations and opportunities to those whose interests extended beyond the public­ spirited objectives the judicial system was meant to facilitate, but instead encompassed purely private goals. Political interpretations 01' many trials, especially in the work 01' Professor Gruen, obscure the in im idtiac that often animated private prosecutions. The influence 01' inirnicilia(' on the Roman courts highlights the irnportam"e 01' inirniciliac in Roman e!aily life. At the same time it exposes a judiciaJ system powerless to shield its objeetivity from one 01' the most distinclive forces in Roman social life.

6

Conclusion

Scholars have long recognised the importance 01' personal con­ siderations in Roman republican politics. The Republic was governed by a group 01' men who agreed far more often than they disagreed about fundamental public questions facing the state. Ideology rarely played a critical roll' in shaping their coalitions. Roman political behaviour thus can be understood only by examining the social background in which leaders rcsponded to deeply embedded private motives. Earlier studies have focused on friendship, nobility and familial relationships as Roman substi­ tutes for the ideological imperatives that govern modern western politics. The emphasis in this study has been on in im icitiae. Personal hatred as a powerful force in politics affects a11 societies in same degree. But the pervasiveness and intensity 01' inimicitiae at Rome made them a unique phenomenon. This distinctiveness arose from two sources. First, Roman society was unusual in a110wing inimiciliae to compete along with other more conventional values such as patriotism and humanity in guiding a public figure's conduct. A reputation for successfu11y pursuing inirnicitiae was a vital asset to a Roman politician seeking to establish and maintain an influential voice within Roman governing cirdes because there was so much admiration and respect for men who battled and destroyed their foes. At the same time, the Romans were committed to main­ taining the supremacy 01' the state's interests and perceived that unregulated inimicitiae coule! dash with the community's best inlerests. Roman society was never very successful, however, in defining acceptable behaviour or in regulating the conduct 01' its most powerful citizens. The revolutionary ronditions 01' the last 126

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Conclusion

century 01' the Republic eroded the inlluence 01' those values and institut ions that had traditionally worked to restrain inimiei who threatelled the national interest. Powerful generals working essen­ tially for their own interests seized power from an increasingly feebk Senate. Inimieiliae therefore assumed particular force in shaping public conduct. Thc distinctive Roman constitution and the value set by Roman society on political success were the second major reason for the predominant inlluence 01' inimieiliae. A Roman politician built power alld inlluence through a network 01' friends, relatives and clients unitecl by the bonds of trust. Any violation or interference with these bonds had the potential for destroying careers and therefore sparked inimieiliae. The Roman constitution reinforced inimieiliae among thc Roman politician's priorities: the Roman ruJing dass was not accountable to the governed in the modern democratic sense, and this insulation gave the leaders even more freedorn to devote their energics to the destruction of their cnemies. Rather than being guided by any public accountability, the llobiles, who respeeted no ambition outside ofthe eursus honorum, competed viciously for the tiny number of curule offices. Losers received no consolation prizes. They faced social extinction uncomf(Jrted and unbuoyed by ideological conviction and resolve. Envy against t he successful and fortunate was the inevitable byproduct. Special hostility devolved on those few - Scipio Africanus, Scipio Aemilianus, Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar - who succeeded in monopolising a grossly disproportionate share 01' the prestige 01' governing, because such careers damaged the ambitions 01' their fellow oligarchs. New men who attempted to attain offices, already 100 scarce to satisfy the ambitions 01' the cstablished nobiles, encountered especial hostility. The inimieilzae 01' thc governing dass strongly inl1uenced the course 01' Roman history , ancl 01' its institutions. Some prominent Romans - Pompey and Caesar stand out during the last years 01' the Republic -- rivalled epie heroes in subordinating the state's intercsts to the personal priority 01' deslroying their foes. Thc most sacred Roman institutions, allel the most prestigious curule offices, were subverted by thc passions 01' inimieiliae. Even more irnportant för the understanding 01' Roman history is the extent to which inimieiliae inl1ueneed the inf()rmal hlctional structure 01' Roman society. Some 01' the most powerful Roman factions, such as those that opposed POlTlpey in the 60s and Caesar in the 50s, coalesced in a rdativcly short time, anel compriscd members whose comlIlon

sense of purpose arose from inimieiliae individually eontraeted with the two most dominant and suecessful figures 01' the late Republic. On eaeh occasion, inimieiliae, by contributing to the extraordinary solutions 01' the first triumvirate and Caesar' s dictatorship, played a significant role in destroying the Republic. The criminal trial was a partieularly important manifestation 01' inimieiliae. Prosecution invariably led to inimieiliae because of the highly personal nature of the Roman adversary system. Roman prosecutors more often took cases for personal reasons than as impersonal agents asserting the judicial interests 01' the state. At the same time prosecution, with its almost unlimited power to destroy enemies, became one of the most common outlets for inimieiliae. J udicial practice aided personally motivated lawsuits by accepting inimieiliae as an excellent qualification in the competitive process for selecting prosecutors. This approbation was tempered (in practice only imperfectly) by the fear that a prosecutor's inimieiliae might exceed constructive zealousness and distort the objective search for justice. Close investigation of the trials 01' the second and first centuries B.C. reveals that many were motivated by private animosity with­ out any hint 01' broader factional significance. Occasionally, inimieiliae went beyond prosecutor and defendant. Groups of Romans collaborated in a prosecution motivated by common feelings 01' inimieiliae against the defendant. The criminal trials are much less valuable evidence for charting the political history of the Republic than is commonly believed.

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No/es

Notes

1. Peter A. Brunt, 'Amicitia' in the Late Roman Republic', PCPS, vol. 11 (1965), p. 11. 2. On these sacred obligations, see ibid., p. 7 and n. 1. 3. J. Hellegouarc'h, LI' vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la republique (Paris, 1963), p. 186, suggests that inimidtiae were not the opposite of amiCi/ia because they conferred no obligations. Franc;ois Hinard, 'Paternus inimicus. Sur une expression de Ciceron' , in Milanges de liUerature et d'epigraphie latines, d'histoire aneienne et d'anheologie; Hommage a la memoire de Pierre Wuilleumier (Paris, 1980), pp. 199 - 200, mentions the obligation (devoir) of inimici to defend themselves against the hostility of their enemies, but concedes that this cannot be equated with the obliga­ tions conferred by amicitia. 4. Sec pp. 115-16 irifra. For the murder of a relative as a cause of inimieitiae, see pp. 43 - 4 irifra; for the obligation to avenge a sJain relative, see pp. 23 - 4 infra. 5. For a discussion of nther Latin terms eonnoting 'dislike' or 'hatred' , see Hellegouarc'h, LI' vocabulaire latin, pp. 188 fL 6. Ibid., pp. 186 - 7. CL Hinard, 'Paternus inimicus', p. 200, and J. Marouzeau, Quelques aspects de la formation du latin liUeraire (Paris, 1949), p. 189. 7. Cie. QFr. 1.2.10. 8. Brutus et Cassius apo Cie. Farn. 11.3.4. 9. Farn. 3.10.6. 10. Verr.2.5.182. 11. Cie. Phi!. 5.19: 'At ille homo vehemens et violcntus [Antonius] . inimicitias mihi [Ciceroni] denuntiavit', and Cie. Flacc. 2: 'Etenim cum a clarissimis viris iustissimas inimicitias saepe cum bene meritis eivibus depositas esse vidissem, non sum arbitratus quemquam amicum rei publicae, postea quam L. Flacci amor in patriam perspectus esset, novas huic inimicitias nulla accepta iniuria denuntiaturum.' CL p. 3 and n. 8 supra. For a discussion of the military terminology used to deseribe inimieiliae. see Hellegouarc'h, LI' vocabulaire latin, pp. 186-7. Similarly the Romans sometimes publicly dissolved an amieitia with a foreign state. See Polyb.33.12.5. 12. On amldtiam ,muntiare sec Roben Samuel Rogers, 'The Emperor's Displcasure', TA PA, vol. 90 (1959), pp. 224 fL 13. Tat'. Arm. 6.29.3. 14. The actual exdusion from an cnemy's house is attested in only two 01' the examples 01' amieitiam renuntiare cited from the Republic by Rogers, 'The Emperor's Displeasure', pp. 226-7. Pompey banned Curtius Nicias from his hOllse (Suet. Gramm. 14) ami Antony was no Jonger we1come at the house of the eider Curio after corrupting his son (Plut. Auf. 2.5).

15. Caelius apo Cic. Farn. 8.12.2. C. Scribonius Curio, hoping to make his shift of allegiance from Pompey to Caesar more credible in 50, provides another example of the artificial search for an acceptable pretext (App. BCiv. 2.27). CL also Caesar's fear that the expulsion of the two tribunes C. Epidius and L. Caesetius had given his enemies the pretext against hirn they needed (ibid., 2.109). 16. Cat. 10.5. 17. Cass. Dio 37.39.3. CL his very similar remarks at 48.29.3 in refer­ ence to the reconciliation between Antony and Octavian at Brundisium in 40. 18. Farn. 5.8.5. 19. For a famous example, see p. 13 and n. 7 irifra. 20. Cic. Farn. 1.9.20. CL Plut. Cic. 26.1. On such reconciliatory dinners, cL Cicero's crack when he heard that Vatinius also wanted a reeonciliation: 'Surely, it' s not possible that Vatinius also wishes to dine with me' (Plut. Cie. 26.2), and cL Cass. Dio 44.34.7, for the banquet held by the tyrannicides and the Caesarians after Caesar's murder. 21. Cicero emphasised how important a third party was when he attempted to explain his reconciliation with Caesar after the conference of Luca in Provo Cons. 25: 'Cur igitur exspectem hominem aliquem qui me cum illo in gratiam reducat? Reduxit ordo amplissimus, et ordo is qui est et publici consili et meorum omnium consiliorum aue tor et princeps.' 22. Cic. Au. 1.11.1: 'tarnen habet [Lucceius] quiddam profecto quod magis in animo eius insederit, quod neque epistulae tuae neque nostra adlegatio tarn potest facile delere quam tu praesens non modo oratione sed tun vultu illo familiari tolles.' It would, however, be amistake to emphasise the formality of the third party getting the two principals together. See Cie. Sest. 130: 'meeum [Cicerone] absens beneficio suo rediit [Metellus Nepos] in gratiam.' 23. Cie. Au. 15.4.1. It is difficult to agree with Brunt's conte nt ion (' "Amicitia" " p. 9) that Cicero accepted Fufius' reconciliation proposal. The weight Brunt places on Cicero's assertions of friendship for Fufius in the Philippics is misplaced considering Brunt's own statement (ibid., p. 8) that the term' amicus' was often used mere1y to express politeness. Dio, judging by the savage speech against Cicero he attributed to Fufius (46.1 - 28) was unaware of any reconciliation between the two men. CL also Dio's remark (46.29.1) about Cicero's resentment ofFllflUS' speech. 24. Rab. Post. 33. 25. Cic. Farn. 3.9.7. 26. Cass. Dio 45.8.3 - 4. 27. Val. Max. 2.9.6; Livy 29.37.10. 28. Mil. 21. For Pompey's reconciliation with Clodius, see Robin Seager, Pompey, A Political Biography (Berkeley, 1979), p. 126 and n. 1. 29. Farn. 1.9.4, 1.9.19; QFr. 2.12.2 - 3. For Pompey's role, see the frag­ ment of a lost letter quoted by Quint. Inst. 9.3.41: 'ego cum in gratiam redierim cum Ap. Claudio, et redierim per Cn. Pompeium.' D. R. Shaekleton Bailey, Cicero '5' Leuer.f to AUieus, 6 vols (Cambridge, 1965 - 8), vol. 1, p. 314, rejeets Erich Gruen's attempt, 'Pompey, the Roman Aristoeracy, and the Conference of Luea', Hist., vol. 18 (1969), p. 103, n. 145, to date the Quintilian fragment to 50.

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The abbreviations are as in the second edition of the Oxford Classical Dictionary .

Chapter 1

Notes

Notes

30. Cic. Fam 3.7.2,3.8.2,3.8.7; Alt. 6.1.2. 31. Cic. Fam. 3.10.1, 3.10.5, 3.12.2, 3.12.4, 3.15.2; Alt. 6.6.1. Cf. Erich Gruen, The Last Generation oj the Roman Republic (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 353-4. 32. Cic. Fam. 3.10.9. Cf. ibid., 3.12.4. In a similar vein Cae1ius (ap. Cic. Fam. 8.6.1) urged Cicero to support Claudius during his trial 'ne parum simpliciter et candide posuisse inimicitias videaris'. 33. Fam. 3.12.4. Cf. ibid., 3.10.8. 34. Ibid., 5.8.5. For Pompey's role in the reconciliation, see ibid., 1.9.20. 35. See Gruen's discussion of the trial in Last Generation, pp. 332-3. 36. Scaur. 33. 37. See p. 15 znfra. 38. Plut. Sull. 9.7- 8. 19. Pseudo-Sallust Inuectiua in Ciceronem 5: 'Irnmo vero homo levissimus [Cicero], supplex inimicis.' Cf. Cass. Dio 39.63.5, who mentions that Ci,:ero acquired the sobriquet, 'the deserter'. Crassus' reputation apparently suffered from a similar failing (Plut. Crass. 7.7). 40. QFr.3.1.15. 41. Rab. Post. 32, 19. 42. QFr. 3.9.1. 43. Amze. 17. 44. Fam. 1.9.11 ff. See especially ibid., 1.9.11: 'non putavi famam inconstantiae mihi pertimescendam, si quibusdam in sententiis paulum me immutassem meamque voluntatem ad summi viri de meque optime meriti dignitatem aggregassem.' 45. Ibid., 1.9.20. 46. The exile: ibid., 1.9.14. The soli attitude of the boni toward Clodius: ibid., 1.9.10, 1.9.15. The failure to prevent Cicero's expulsion from his house: ibid., 1.9.5. Cicero's peeuniary losses: ibid., 1.9.5. The boni rejoicing in Cicero's renewed enmity with Crassus: ibid., 1.9.20. 47. Ibid., 1.9.21. 48. Ibid. Cf. Cic. Plane. 94; Balb. 61; and Thomas N. MitchelI, 'Cicero before Luca', TAPA, vol. 100 (1969), p. 320. 49. Cass. Dio 38.29.4. 50. The sources on the reconciliation are Suet. Iul. 19.2; Plut. Crass. 14.1-4; Caes. 13.3-4; Pomp. 47.1; App. BCiu. 2.9; and Cass. Dio 37.54.3 - 57.1. For speculation about the motives of Pompey and Crassus, see Cass. Dio 37.56.3-5. I cannot accept the view ofG. R. Stanton and B. A. MarshalI, 'The Coalition between Pompeius and Crassus 60 - 59 Be', Hist., vol. 24 (1975), pp. 212 ff., that no reconciliation took place. See Seager, Pompey, p. 83. 51. Cicero, Comment. Pet. 40. 52. The term 'faction' is used throughout this study in its most general English sense of a group or coalition. Latin jactio has a more specific meaning as Robin Seager has shown in 'Faetio: Some Observations' ,jRS, vol. 62 (1972), pp. 53-8. 53. On consensus politics see Badian's remarks in his review of Gelzer's Kleine Schriften, jRS, vol. 57 (1967), p. 219. 54. Au. 2.3.4.

55. The sources on the warm relationship between Cicero and P. Crassus are collected by Münzer, PW, s. v. 'Licinills (63)', col. 291. 56. Plut. Crass. 13.4 - 5. 57. Cass. Dio 38.17.3. 58. Plut. Cic. 33.8. I see no reason for rejecting Plutarch's account of this reconciliation as Brunt does in ' "Amicitia" " p. 9. 59. Q. Metellus Celer: Fam. 5.2. Ap. Claudius Pulcher: ibid., 3.7, 3.8, 3.10. 60. Ibid., 5.2.5.

132

Chapter 2 1. Polyb. 18:35.8. Cf. Matthias Gelzer, Kleine Schriften, 3 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1962-4), vol. 2, p. 74: 'Die inimicitiae gehören von jeher zum Wesen der Nobilität', and ibid., vol. 1, p. 81, n. 127. 2. QFr. 1.1.43. 3. Livy 27.37.10; Val. Max. 4.2.2. See H. H. Scullard, Roman Politics 220-1508(;, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1973), pp. 67-8. 4. Livy 27.35.5-9; Val. Max. 7.2.6. 5. See the discussion in U rsula Hall, 'Vating Procedure in Roman Assemblies', Hist., vol. 13 (1964), pp. 300-1 and Christian Meier, Res Publica Amissa (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 178 - 80. 6. App. BCiu. 1.107. 7. Livy 38.57.3-8; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 4.4; Val. Max. 4.2.3. 8. On the accuracy of the story see Münzer, PW, s.v. 'Sempronius (53)', col. 1404, and David Stockton, The Gracchi(Oxford, 1979), p. 24. 9. Livy 38.43.1. 10. Ibid., 40.45.6-7. The scenario advanced by Münzer, Röm. Adelsparteien, pp. 200 ff., and accepted by Scullard, Roman Politics, 2nd edn, pp. 180 - 1, that the reconciliation was staged as a result of an agree­ ment between the Fulvii and the Aemilii by which a Fulvius acquired a priesthood in return for Aemilius' censorship, reaches beyond the evidence. It rests in large part on the currently much-criticised hypothesis that Roman ruling families acted as rigid, cohesive political units. See Meier, Res Publica Amissa, pp. 19 - 20, 170 ff., and Hampl's review of Scullard, Anze(/ter jür die Altertumswissenschaft, vol. 6 (1953), pp. 90 ff. Cf. Filippo Cassala, 1 gruppi politici romani 7Iel III secolo A. C. (Trieste, 1962), p. 19. 11. Plut. Crass. 6.5, 7.1. 12. Ibid., 11.10-11; Plut. Pomp. 21.3. Frank E. Adcock, Marcus Crassus, Millionaire (Cambridge, 1966). p. 26 and Bruce A. MarshalI, 'Crassus' Ovation in 71 H.C', Hzst .. val. 21 (1972), pp. 669 - 73 anel MarshalI, Crassus: A Political Biograph;' (Amsterdam, 1976), p. 33 deny that this incident would have caused enmity between the two. But see Allan Masan \Vard, MarcuJ Crassus and the Late Roman Republic (Columbia, 1977), pp. 97, n. 46 and 99, n. 1, and Robin Seager, PomplJ, a Political Bio./traphy (Berkeley, 1979), p. 22. 13. Plut. Pomp. 23.1-2; Cran. 12.4-5. On the different names assigned to Aurelius by Plutarch in these two accounts, sec Ward, Marcu.l'

133

No/es

No/es

Crassus, p. 109, n. 37. App. RCiv. 1.121 also mentions the reconciliation but confuses the date. See Gelzer, Kleine Schriften, vol. 2, p. 165.

suggests, the story was invented to explain Pompeius' military failures, it says something about the Roman attitude that Pompeius would have thought this the most effective means 01' distraeting the people from the facts. 29. Livy Per. 67. 30. For the series 01' trials after Arausio, I have closely followed Gruen's aecount in Roman Polili